the interest of america in sea power, present and future. by captain a.t. mahan, d.c.l., ll.d. united states navy. author of "the influence of sea power upon history, - ," "the influence of sea power upon the french revolution and empire," of a "life of farragut," and of "the life of nelson, the embodiment of the sea power of great britain." london: sampson low, marston & company, _limited._ . _copyright, ,_ by alfred t. mahan. _copyright, , ,_ by houghton, mifflin and company. _copyright, ,_ by the forum publishing company. _copyright, ,_ by lloyd bryce. _copyright, , ,_ by harper and brothers. _all rights reserved._ university press: john wilson and son, cambridge, u.s.a. preface. whatever interest may be possessed by a collection of detached papers, issued at considerable intervals during a term of several years, and written without special reference one to the other, or, at the first, with any view to subsequent publication, depends as much upon the date at which they were composed, and the condition of affairs then existent, as it does upon essential unity of treatment. if such unity perchance be found in these, it will not be due to antecedent purpose, but to the fact that they embody the thought of an individual mind, consecutive in the line of its main conceptions, but adjusting itself continually to changing conditions, which the progress of events entails. the author, therefore, has not sought to bring these papers down to the present date; to reconcile seeming contradictions, if such there be; to suppress repetitions; or to weld into a consistent whole the several parts which in their origin were independent. such changes as have been made extend only to phraseology, with the occasional modification of an expression that seemed to err by excess or defect. the dates at the head of each article show the time of its writing, not of its publication. the thanks of the author are expressed to the proprietors of the "atlantic monthly," of the "forum," of the "north american review," and of "harper's new monthly magazine," who have kindly permitted the republication of the articles originally contributed to their pages. a.t. mahan. _november, ._ contents. i. the united states looking outward from the atlantic monthly, december, . ii. hawaii and our future sea power from the forum, march, . iii. the isthmus and sea power from the atlantic monthly, september, . iv. possibilities of an anglo-american reunion from the north american review, november, . v. the future in relation to american naval power harper's new monthly magazine, october, . vi. preparedness for naval war harper's new monthly magazine, march, . vii. a twentieth-century outlook harper's new monthly magazine, september, . viii. strategic features of the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico harper's new monthly magazine, october, . maps. the pacific the gulf and caribbean the united states looking outward. _august, ._ indications are not wanting of an approaching change in the thoughts and policy of americans as to their relations with the world outside their own borders. for the past quarter of a century, the predominant idea, which has asserted itself successfully at the polls and shaped the course of the government, has been to preserve the home market for the home industries. the employer and the workman alike have been taught to look at the various economical measures proposed from this point of view, to regard with hostility any step favoring the intrusion of the foreign producer upon their own domain, and rather to demand increasingly rigorous measures of exclusion than to acquiesce in any loosening of the chain that binds the consumer to them. the inevitable consequence has followed, as in all cases when the mind or the eye is exclusively fixed in one direction, that the danger of loss or the prospect of advantage in another quarter has been overlooked; and although the abounding resources of the country have maintained the exports at a high figure, this flattering result has been due more to the superabundant bounty of nature than to the demand of other nations for our protected manufactures. for nearly the lifetime of a generation, therefore, american industries have been thus protected, until the practice has assumed the force of a tradition, and is clothed in the mail of conservatism. in their mutual relations, these industries resemble the activities of a modern ironclad that has heavy armor, but inferior engines and guns; mighty for defence, weak for offence. within, the home market is secured; but outside, beyond the broad seas, there are the markets of the world, that can be entered and controlled only by a vigorous contest, to which the habit of trusting to protection by statute does not conduce. at bottom, however, the temperament of the american people is essentially alien to such a sluggish attitude. independently of all bias for or against protection, it is safe to predict that, when the opportunities for gain abroad are understood, the course of american enterprise will cleave a channel by which to reach them. viewed broadly, it is a most welcome as well as significant fact that a prominent and influential advocate of protection, a leader of the party committed to its support, a keen reader of the signs of the times and of the drift of opinion, has identified himself with a line of policy which looks to nothing less than such modifications of the tariff as may expand the commerce of the united states to all quarters of the globe. men of all parties can unite on the words of mr. blaine, as reported in a recent speech: "it is not an ambitious destiny for so great a country as ours to manufacture only what we can consume, or produce only what we can eat." in face of this utterance of so shrewd and able a public man, even the extreme character of the recent tariff legislation seems but a sign of the coming change, and brings to mind that famous continental system, of which our own is the analogue, to support which napoleon added legion to legion and enterprise to enterprise, till the fabric of the empire itself crashed beneath the weight. the interesting and significant feature of this changing attitude is the turning of the eyes outward, instead of inward only, to seek the welfare of the country. to affirm the importance of distant markets, and the relation to them of our own immense powers of production, implies logically the recognition of the link that joins the products and the markets,--that is, the carrying trade; the three together constituting that chain of maritime power to which great britain owes her wealth and greatness. further, is it too much to say that, as two of these links, the shipping and the markets, are exterior to our own borders, the acknowledgment of them carries with it a view of the relations of the united states to the world radically distinct from the simple idea of self-sufficingness? we shall not follow far this line of thought before there will dawn the realization of america's unique position, facing the older worlds of the east and west, her shores washed by the oceans which touch the one or the other, but which are common to her alone. coincident with these signs of change in our own policy there is a restlessness in the world at large which is deeply significant, if not ominous. it is beside our purpose to dwell upon the internal state of europe, whence, if disturbances arise, the effect upon us may be but partial and indirect. but the great seaboard powers there do not stand on guard against their continental rivals only; they cherish also aspirations for commercial extension, for colonies, and for influence in distant regions, which may bring, and, even under our present contracted policy, already have brought them into collision with ourselves. the incident of the samoa islands, trivial apparently, was nevertheless eminently suggestive of european ambitions. america then roused from sleep as to interests closely concerning her future. at this moment internal troubles are imminent in the sandwich islands, where it should be our fixed determination to allow no foreign influence to equal our own. all over the world german commercial and colonial push is coming into collision with other nations: witness the affair of the caroline islands with spain; the partition of new guinea with england; the yet more recent negotiation between these two powers concerning their share in africa, viewed with deep distrust and jealousy by france; the samoa affair; the conflict between german control and american interests in the islands of the western pacific; and the alleged progress of german influence in central and south america. it is noteworthy that, while these various contentions are sustained with the aggressive military spirit characteristic of the german empire, they are credibly said to arise from the national temper more than from the deliberate policy of the government, which in this matter does not lead, but follows, the feeling of the people,--a condition much more formidable. there is no sound reason for believing that the world has passed into a period of assured peace outside the limits of europe. unsettled political conditions, such as exist in haiti, central america, and many of the pacific islands, especially the hawaiian group, when combined with great military or commercial importance as is the case with most of these positions, involve, now as always, dangerous germs of quarrel, against which it is prudent at least to be prepared. undoubtedly, the general temper of nations is more averse from war than it was of old. if no less selfish and grasping than our predecessors, we feel more dislike to the discomforts and sufferings attendant upon a breach of peace; but to retain that highly valued repose and the undisturbed enjoyment of the returns of commerce, it is necessary to argue upon somewhat equal terms of strength with an adversary. it is the preparedness of the enemy, and not acquiescence in the existing state of things, that now holds back the armies of europe. on the other hand, neither the sanctions of international law nor the justice of a cause can be depended upon for a fair settlement of differences, when they come into conflict with a strong political necessity on the one side opposed to comparative weakness on the other. in our still-pending dispute over the seal-fishing of bering sea, whatever may be thought of the strength of our argument, in view of generally admitted principles of international law, it is beyond doubt that our contention is reasonable, just, and in the interest of the world at large. but in the attempt to enforce it we have come into collision not only with national susceptibilities as to the honor of the flag, which we ourselves very strongly share, but also with a state governed by a powerful necessity, and exceedingly strong where we are particularly weak and exposed. not only has great britain a mighty navy and we a long defenceless seacoast, but it is a great commercial and political advantage to her that her larger colonies, and above all canada, should feel that the power of the mother country is something which they need, and upon which they can count. the dispute is between the united states and canada, not the united states and great britain; but it has been ably used by the latter to promote the solidarity of sympathy between herself and her colony. with the mother country alone an equitable arrangement, conducive to well-understood mutual interests, could be reached readily; but the purely local and peculiarly selfish wishes of canadian fishermen dictate the policy of great britain, because canada is the most important link uniting her to her colonies and maritime interests in the pacific. in case of a european war, it is possible that the british navy will not be able to hold open the route through the mediterranean to the east; but having a strong naval station at halifax, and another at esquimalt, on the pacific, the two connected by the canadian pacific railroad, england possesses an alternate line of communication far less exposed to maritime aggression than the former, or than the third route by the cape of good hope, as well as two bases essential to the service of her commerce, or other naval operations, in the north atlantic and the pacific. whatever arrangement of this question is finally reached, the fruit of lord salisbury's attitude scarcely can fail to be a strengthening of the sentiments of attachment to, and reliance upon, the mother country, not only in canada, but in the other great colonies. these feelings of attachment and mutual dependence supply the living spirit, without which the nascent schemes for imperial federation are but dead mechanical contrivances; nor are they without influence upon such generally unsentimental considerations as those of buying and selling, and the course of trade. this dispute, seemingly paltry yet really serious, sudden in its appearance and dependent for its issue upon other considerations than its own merits, may serve to convince us of many latent and yet unforeseen dangers to the peace of the western hemisphere, attendant upon the opening of a canal through the central american isthmus. in a general way, it is evident enough that this canal, by modifying the direction of trade routes, will induce a great increase of commercial activity and carrying trade throughout the caribbean sea; and that this now comparatively deserted nook of the ocean will become, like the red sea, a great thoroughfare of shipping, and will attract, as never before in our day, the interest and ambition of maritime nations. every position in that sea will have enhanced commercial and military value, and the canal itself will become a strategic centre of the most vital importance. like the canadian pacific railroad, it will be a link between the two oceans; but, unlike it, the use, unless most carefully guarded by treaties, will belong wholly to the belligerent which controls the sea by its naval power. in case of war, the united states will unquestionably command the canadian railroad, despite the deterrent force of operations by the hostile navy upon our seaboard; but no less unquestionably will she be impotent, as against any of the great maritime powers, to control the central american canal. militarily speaking, and having reference to european complications only, the piercing of the isthmus is nothing but a disaster to the united states, in the present state of her military and naval preparation. it is especially dangerous to the pacific coast; but the increased exposure of one part of our seaboard reacts unfavorably upon the whole military situation. despite a certain great original superiority conferred by our geographical nearness and immense resources,--due, in other words, to our natural advantages, and not to our intelligent preparations,--the united states is wofully unready, not only in fact but in purpose, to assert in the caribbean and central america a weight of influence proportioned to the extent of her interests. we have not the navy, and, what is worse, we are not willing to have the navy, that will weigh seriously in any disputes with those nations whose interests will conflict there with our own. we have not, and we are not anxious to provide, the defence of the seaboard which will leave the navy free for its work at sea. we have not, but many other powers have, positions, either within or on the borders of the caribbean, which not only possess great natural advantages for the control of that sea, but have received and are receiving that artificial strength of fortification and armament which will make them practically inexpugnable. on the contrary, we have not on the gulf of mexico even the beginning of a navy yard which could serve as the base of our operations. let me not be misunderstood. i am not regretting that we have not the means to meet on terms of equality the great navies of the old world. i recognize, what few at least say, that, despite its great surplus revenue, this country is poor in proportion to its length of seaboard and its exposed points. that which i deplore, and which is a sober, just, and reasonable cause of deep national concern, is that the nation neither has nor cares to have its sea frontier so defended, and its navy of such power, as shall suffice, with the advantages of our position, to weigh seriously when inevitable discussions arise,--such as we have recently had about samoa and bering sea, and which may at any moment come up about the caribbean sea or the canal. is the united states, for instance, prepared to allow germany to acquire the dutch stronghold of curaçao, fronting the atlantic outlet of both the proposed canals of panama and nicaragua? is she prepared to acquiesce in any foreign power purchasing from haiti a naval station on the windward passage, through which pass our steamer routes to the isthmus? would she acquiesce in a foreign protectorate over the sandwich islands, that great central station of the pacific, equidistant from san francisco, samoa, and the marquesas, and an important post on our lines of communication with both australia and china? or will it be maintained that any one of these questions, supposing it to arise, is so exclusively one-sided, the arguments of policy and right so exclusively with us, that the other party will at once yield his eager wish, and gracefully withdraw? was it so at samoa? is it so as regards bering sea? the motto seen on so many ancient cannon, _ultima ratio regum_, is not without its message to republics. it is perfectly reasonable and legitimate, in estimating our needs of military preparation, to take into account the remoteness of the chief naval and military nations from our shores, and the consequent difficulty of maintaining operations at such a distance. it is equally proper, in framing our policy, to consider the jealousies of the european family of states, and their consequent unwillingness to incur the enmity of a people so strong as ourselves; their dread of our revenge in the future, as well as their inability to detach more than a certain part of their forces to our shores without losing much of their own weight in the councils of europe. in truth, a careful determination of the force that great britain or france could probably spare for operations against our coasts, if the latter were suitably defended, without weakening their european position or unduly exposing their colonies and commerce, is the starting-point from which to calculate the strength of our own navy. if the latter be superior to the force that thus can be sent against it, and the coast be so defended as to leave the navy free to strike where it will, we can maintain our rights; not merely the rights which international law concedes, and which the moral sense of nations now supports, but also those equally real rights which, though not conferred by law, depend upon a clear preponderance of interest, upon obviously necessary policy, upon self-preservation, either total or partial. were we so situated now in respect of military strength, we could secure our perfectly just claim as to the seal fisheries; not by seizing foreign ships on the open sea, but by the evident fact that, our cities being protected from maritime attack, our position and superior population lay open the canadian pacific, as well as the frontier of the dominion, to do with as we please. diplomats do not flourish such disagreeable truths in each other's faces; they look for a _modus vivendi_, and find it. while, therefore, the advantages of our own position in the western hemisphere, and the disadvantages under which the operations of a european state would labor, are undeniable and just elements in the calculations of the statesman, it is folly to look upon them as sufficient alone for our security. much more needs to be cast into the scale that it may incline in favor of our strength. they are mere defensive factors, and partial at that. though distant, our shores can be reached; being defenceless, they can detain but a short time a force sent against them. with a probability of three months' peace in europe, no maritime power would fear to support its demands by a number of ships with which it would be loath indeed to part for a year. yet, were our sea frontier as strong as it now is weak, passive self-defence, whether in trade or war, would be but a poor policy, so long as this world continues to be one of struggle and vicissitude. all around us now is strife; "the struggle of life," "the race of life," are phrases so familiar that we do not feel their significance till we stop to think about them. everywhere nation is arrayed against nation; our own no less than others. what is our protective system but an organized warfare? in carrying it on, it is true, we have only to use certain procedures which all states now concede to be a legal exercise of the national power, even though injurious to themselves. it is lawful, they say, to do what we will with our own. are our people, however, so unaggressive that they are likely not to want their own way in matters where their interests turn on points of disputed right, or so little sensitive as to submit quietly to encroachment by others, in quarters where they long have considered their own influence should prevail? our self-imposed isolation in the matter of markets, and the decline of our shipping interest in the last thirty years, have coincided singularly with an actual remoteness of this continent from the life of the rest of the world. the writer has before him a map of the north and south atlantic oceans, showing the direction of the principal trade routes and the proportion of tonnage passing over each; and it is curious to note what deserted regions, comparatively, are the gulf of mexico, the caribbean sea, and the adjoining countries and islands. a broad band stretches from our northern atlantic coast to the english channel; another as broad from the british islands to the east, through the mediterranean and red sea, overflowing the borders of the latter in order to express the volume of trade. around either cape--good hope and horn--pass strips of about one-fourth this width, joining near the equator, midway between africa and south america. from the west indies issues a thread, indicating the present commerce of great britain with a region which once, in the napoleonic wars, embraced one-fourth of the whole trade of the empire. the significance is unmistakable: europe has now little mercantile interest in the caribbean sea. when the isthmus is pierced, this isolation will pass away, and with it the indifference of foreign nations. from wheresoever they come and whithersoever they afterward go, all ships that use the canal will pass through the caribbean. whatever the effect produced upon the prosperity of the adjacent continent and islands by the thousand wants attendant upon maritime activity, around such a focus of trade will centre large commercial and political interests. to protect and develop its own, each nation will seek points of support and means of influence in a quarter where the united states always has been jealously sensitive to the intrusion of european powers. the precise value of the monroe doctrine is understood very loosely by most americans, but the effect of the familiar phrase has been to develop a national sensitiveness, which is a more frequent cause of war than material interests; and over disputes caused by such feelings there will preside none of the calming influence due to the moral authority of international law, with its recognized principles, for the points in dispute will be of policy, of interest, not of conceded right. already france and great britain are giving to ports held by them a degree of artificial strength uncalled for by their present importance. they look to the near future. among the islands and on the mainland there are many positions of great importance, held now by weak or unstable states. is the united states willing to see them sold to a powerful rival? but what right will she invoke against the transfer? she can allege but one,--that of her reasonable policy supported by her might. whether they will or no, americans must now begin to look outward. the growing production of the country demands it. an increasing volume of public sentiment demands it. the position of the united states, between the two old worlds and the two great oceans, makes the same claim, which will soon be strengthened by the creation of the new link joining the atlantic and pacific. the tendency will be maintained and increased by the growth of the european colonies in the pacific, by the advancing civilization of japan, and by the rapid peopling of our pacific states with men who have all the aggressive spirit of the advanced line of national progress. nowhere does a vigorous foreign policy find more favor than among the people west of the rocky mountains. it has been said that, in our present state of unpreparedness, a trans-isthmian canal will be a military disaster to the united states, and especially to the pacific coast. when the canal is finished, the atlantic seaboard will be neither more nor less exposed than it now is; it will merely share with the country at large the increased danger of foreign complications with inadequate means to meet them. the danger of the pacific coast will be greater by so much as the way between it and europe is shortened through a passage which the stronger maritime power can control. the danger will lie not merely in the greater facility for despatching a hostile squadron from europe, but also in the fact that a more powerful fleet than formerly can be maintained on that coast by a european power, because it can be called home so much more promptly in case of need. the greatest weakness of the pacific ports, however, if wisely met by our government, will go far to insure our naval superiority there. the two chief centres, san francisco and puget sound, owing to the width and the great depth of the entrances, cannot be effectively protected by torpedoes; and consequently, as fleets can always pass batteries through an unobstructed channel, they cannot obtain perfect security by means of fortifications only. valuable as such works will be to them, they must be further garrisoned by coast-defence ships, whose part in repelling an enemy will be co-ordinated with that of the batteries. the sphere of action of such ships should not be permitted to extend far beyond the port to which they are allotted, and of whose defence they form an essential part; but within that sweep they will always be a powerful reinforcement to the sea-going navy, when the strategic conditions of a war cause hostilities to centre around their port. by sacrificing power to go long distances, the coast-defence ship gains proportionate weight of armor and guns; that is, of defensive and offensive strength. it therefore adds an element of unique value to the fleet with which it for a time acts. no foreign states, except great britain, have ports so near our pacific coast as to bring it within the radius of action of their coast-defence ships; and it is very doubtful whether even great britain will put such ships at vancouver island, the chief value of which will be lost to her when the canadian pacific is severed,--a blow always in the power of this country. it is upon our atlantic seaboard that the mistress of halifax, of bermuda, and of jamaica will now defend vancouver and the canadian pacific. in the present state of our seaboard defence she can do so absolutely. what is all canada compared with our exposed great cities? even were the coast fortified, she still could do so, if our navy be no stronger than is designed as yet. what harm can we do canada proportionate to the injury we should suffer by the interruption of our coasting trade, and by a blockade of boston, new york, the delaware, and the chesapeake? such a blockade great britain certainly could make technically efficient, under the somewhat loose definitions of international law. neutrals would accept it as such. the military needs of the pacific states, as well as their supreme importance to the whole country, are yet a matter of the future, but of a future so near that provision should begin immediately. to weigh their importance, consider what influence in the pacific would be attributed to a nation comprising only the states of washington, oregon, and california, when filled with such men as now people them and still are pouring in, and which controlled such maritime centres as san francisco, puget sound, and the columbia river. can it be counted less because they are bound by the ties of blood and close political union to the great communities of the east? but such influence, to work without jar and friction, requires underlying military readiness, like the proverbial iron hand under the velvet glove. to provide this, three things are needful: first, protection of the chief harbors, by fortifications and coast-defence ships, which gives defensive strength, provides security to the community within, and supplies the bases necessary to all military operations. secondly, naval force, the arm of offensive power, which alone enables a country to extend its influence outward. thirdly, it should be an inviolable resolution of our national policy, that no foreign state should henceforth acquire a coaling position within three thousand miles of san francisco,--a distance which includes the hawaiian and galapagos islands and the coast of central america. for fuel is the life of modern naval war; it is the food of the ship; without it the modern monsters of the deep die of inanition. around it, therefore, cluster some of the most important considerations of naval strategy. in the caribbean and in the atlantic we are confronted with many a foreign coal depot, bidding us stand to our arms, even as carthage bade rome; but let us not acquiesce in an addition to our dangers, a further diversion of our strength, by being forestalled in the north pacific. in conclusion, while great britain is undoubtedly the most formidable of our possible enemies, both by her great navy and by the strong positions she holds near our coasts, it must be added that a cordial understanding with that country is one of the first of our external interests. both nations doubtless, and properly, seek their own advantage; but both, also, are controlled by a sense of law and justice, drawn from the same sources, and deep-rooted in their instincts. whatever temporary aberration may occur, a return to mutual standards of right will certainly follow. formal alliance between the two is out of the question, but a cordial recognition of the similarity of character and ideas will give birth to sympathy, which in turn will facilitate a co-operation beneficial to both; for if sentimentality is weak, sentiment is strong. [illustration: the pacific ocean] hawaii and our future sea power. [the origin of the ensuing article was as follows: at the time of the revolution in hawaii, at the beginning of , the author addressed to the "new york times" a letter, which appeared in the issue of january . this, falling under the eye of the editor of the "forum," suggested to him to ask an article upon the general military--or naval--value of the hawaiian group. the letter alluded to ran thus:-- _to the editor of the "new york times"_:-- there is one aspect of the recent revolution in hawaii which seems to have been kept out of sight, and that is the relation of the islands, not merely to our own and to european countries, but to china. how vitally important that may become in the future is evident from the great number of chinese, relatively to the whole population, now settled in the islands. it is a question for the whole civilized world and not for the united states only, whether the sandwich islands, with their geographical and military importance, unrivalled by that of any other position in the north pacific, shall in the future be an outpost of european civilization, or of the comparative barbarism of china. it is sufficiently known, but not, perhaps, generally noted in our country, that many military men abroad, familiar with eastern conditions and character, look with apprehension toward the day when the vast mass of china--now inert--may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion. the great armies of europe, whose existence is so frequently deplored, may be providentially intended as a barrier to that great movement, if it come. certainly, while china remains as she is, nothing more disastrous for the future of the world can be imagined than that general disarmament of europe which is the utopian dream of some philanthropists. china, however, may burst her barriers eastward as well as westward, toward the pacific as well as toward the european continent. in such a movement it would be impossible to exaggerate the momentous issues dependent upon a firm hold of the sandwich islands by a great, civilized, maritime power. by its nearness to the scene, and by the determined animosity to the chinese movement which close contact seems to inspire, our own country, with its pacific coast, is naturally indicated as the proper guardian for this most important position. to hold it, however, whether in the supposed case or in war with a european state, implies a great extension of our naval power. are we ready to undertake this? a.t. mahan, _captain, united states navy_. new york, jan. , .] the suddenness--so far, at least, as the general public is concerned--with which the long-existing troubles in hawaii have come to a head, and the character of the advances reported to be addressed to the united states by the revolutionary government, formally recognized as _de facto_ by our representative on the spot, add another to the many significant instances furnished by history, that, as men in the midst of life are in death, so nations in the midst of peace find themselves confronted with unexpected causes of dissension, conflicts of interests, whose results may be, on the one hand, war, or, on the other, abandonment of clear and imperative national advantage in order to avoid an issue for which preparation has not been made. by no premeditated contrivance of our own, by the cooperation of a series of events which, however dependent step by step upon human action, were not intended to prepare the present crisis, the united states finds herself compelled to answer a question--to make a decision--not unlike and not less momentous than that required of the roman senate, when the mamertine garrison invited it to occupy messina, and so to abandon the hitherto traditional policy which had confined the expansion of rome to the italian peninsula. for let it not be overlooked that, whether we wish or no, we _must_ answer the question, we _must_ make the decision. the issue cannot be dodged. absolute inaction in such a case is a decision as truly as the most vehement action. we can now advance, but, the conditions of the world being what they are, if we do not advance we recede; for there is involved not so much a particular action as a question of principle, pregnant of great consequences in one direction or in the other. occasion of serious difficulty, indeed, should not arise here. unlike the historical instance just cited, the two nations whose interests have come now into contact--great britain and the united states--are so alike in inherited traditions, habits of thought, and views of right, that injury to the one need not be anticipated from the predominance of the other in a quarter where its interests also predominate. despite the heterogeneous character of the immigration which the past few years have been pouring into our country, our political traditions and racial characteristics still continue english--mr. douglas campbell would say dutch, but even so the stock is the same. though thus somewhat gorged with food not wholly to its taste, our political digestion has contrived so far to master the incongruous mass of materials it has been unable to reject; and if assimilation has been at times imperfect, our political constitution and spirit remain english in essential features. imbued with like ideals of liberty, of law, of right, certainly not less progressive than our kin beyond sea, we are, in the safeguards deliberately placed around our fundamental law, even more conservative than they. that which we received of the true spirit of freedom we have kept--liberty and law--not the one or the other, but both. in that spirit we not only have occupied our original inheritance, but also, step by step, as rome incorporated the other nations of the peninsula, we have added to it, spreading and perpetuating everywhere the same foundation principles of free and good government which, to her honor be it said, great britain also has maintained throughout her course. and now, arrested on the south by the rights of a race wholly alien to us, and on the north by a body of states of like traditions to our own, whose freedom to choose their own affiliations we respect, we have come to the sea. in our infancy we bordered upon the atlantic only; our youth carried our boundary to the gulf of mexico; to-day maturity sees us upon the pacific. have we no right or no call to progress farther in any direction? are there for us beyond the sea horizon none of those essential interests, of those evident dangers, which impose a policy and confer rights? this is the question that long has been looming upon the brow of a future now rapidly passing into the present. of it the hawaiian incident is a part--intrinsically, perhaps, a small part--but in its relations to the whole so vital that, as has been said before, a wrong decision does not stand by itself, but involves, not only in principle but in fact, recession along the whole line. in our natural, necessary, irrepressible expansion, we are come here into contact with the progress of another great people, the law of whose being has impressed upon it a principle of growth which has wrought mightily in the past, and in the present is visible by recurring manifestations. of this working, gibraltar, malta, cyprus, egypt, aden, india, in geographical succession though not in strict order of time, show a completed chain; forged link by link, by open force or politic bargain, but always resulting from the steady pressure of a national instinct, so powerful and so accurate that statesmen of every school, willing or unwilling, have found themselves carried along by a tendency which no individuality can resist or greatly modify. both unsubstantial rumor and incautious personal utterance have suggested an impatient desire in mr. gladstone to be rid of the occupation of egypt; but scarcely has his long exclusion from office ended when the irony of events signalizes his return thereto by an increase in the force of occupation. further, it may be noted profitably of the chain just cited, that the two extremities were first possessed--first india, then gibraltar, far later malta, aden, cyprus, egypt--and that, with scarce an exception, each step has been taken despite the jealous vexation of a rival. spain has never ceased angrily to bewail gibraltar. "i had rather see the english on the heights of montmartre," said the first napoleon, "than in malta." the feelings of france about egypt are matter of common knowledge, not even dissembled; and, for our warning be it added, her annoyance is increased by the bitter sense of opportunity rejected. it is needless here to do more than refer to that other chain of maritime possessions--halifax, bermuda, santa lucia, jamaica--which strengthen the british hold upon the atlantic, the caribbean, and the isthmus of panama. in the pacific the position is for them much less satisfactory--nowhere, perhaps, is it less so, and from obvious natural causes. the commercial development of the eastern pacific has been far later, and still is less complete, than that of its western shores. the latter when first opened to european adventure were already the seat of ancient economies in china and japan, furnishing abundance of curious and luxurious products to tempt the trader by good hopes of profit. the western coast of america, for the most part peopled by savages, offered little save the gold and silver of mexico and peru, and these were monopolized jealously by the spaniards--not a commercial nation--during their long ascendency. being so very far from england and affording so little material for trade, pacific america did not draw the enterprise of a country the chief and honorable inducement of whose seamen was the hope of gain, in pursuit of which they settled and annexed point after point in the regions where they penetrated, and upon the routes leading thither. the western coasts of north america, being reached only by the long and perilous voyage around cape horn, or by a more toilsome and dangerous passage across the continent, remained among the last of the temperate productive seaboards of the earth to be possessed by white men. the united states were already a nation, in fact as well as in form, when vancouver was exploring puget sound and passed first through the channel separating the mainland of british america from the island which now bears his name. thus it has happened that, from the late development of british columbia in the northeastern pacific, and of australia and new zealand in the southwestern, great britain is found again holding the two extremities of a line, between which she must inevitably desire the intermediate links; nor is there any good reason why she should not have them, except the superior, more urgent, more vital necessities of another people--our own. of these links the hawaiian group possesses unique importance--not from its intrinsic commercial value, but from its favorable position for maritime and military control. the military or strategic value of a naval position depends upon its situation, upon its strength, and upon its resources. of the three, the first is of most consequence, because it results from the nature of things; whereas the two latter, when deficient, can be supplied artificially, in whole or in part. fortifications remedy the weaknesses of a position, foresight accumulates beforehand the resources which nature does not yield on the spot; but it is not within the power of man to change the geographical situation of a point which lies outside the limit of strategic effect. it is instructive, and yet apparent to the most superficial reading, to notice how the first napoleon, in commenting upon a region likely to be the scene of war, begins by considering the most conspicuous natural features, and then enumerates the commanding positions, their distances from each other, the relative directions, or, as the sea phrase is, their "bearings," and the particular facilities each offers for operations of war. this furnishes the ground plan, the skeleton, detached from confusing secondary considerations, and from which a clear estimate of the decisive points can be made. the number of such points varies greatly, according to the character of the region. in a mountainous, broken country they may be very many; whereas in a plain devoid of natural obstacles there may be few, or none save those created by man. if few, the value of each is necessarily greater than if many; and if there be but one, its importance is not only unique, but extreme,--measured only by the size of the field over which its unshared influence extends. the sea, until it approaches the land, realizes the ideal of a vast plain unbroken by obstacles. on the sea, says an eminent french tactician, there is no field of battle, meaning that there is none of the natural conditions which determine, and often fetter, the movements of the general. but upon a plain, however flat and monotonous, causes, possibly slight, determine the concentration of population into towns and villages, and the necessary communications between the centres create roads. where the latter converge, or cross, tenure confers command, depending for importance upon the number of routes thus meeting, and upon their individual value. it is just so at sea. while in itself the ocean opposes no obstacle to a vessel taking any one of the numerous routes that can be traced upon the surface of the globe between two points, conditions of distance or convenience, of traffic or of wind, do prescribe certain usual courses. where these pass near an ocean position, still more where they use it, it has an influence over them, and where several routes cross near by that influence becomes very great,--is commanding. let us now apply these considerations to the hawaiian group. to any one viewing a map that shows the full extent of the pacific ocean, with its shores on either side, two striking circumstances will be apparent immediately. he will see at a glance that the sandwich islands stand by themselves, in a state of comparative isolation, amid a vast expanse of sea; and, again, that they form the centre of a large circle whose radius is approximately--and very closely--the distance from honolulu to san francisco. the circumference of this circle, if the trouble is taken to describe it with compass upon the map, will be seen, on the west and south, to pass through the outer fringe of the system of archipelagoes which, from australia and new zealand, extend to the northeast toward the american continent. within the circle a few scattered islets, bare and unimportant, seem only to emphasize the failure of nature to bridge the interval separating hawaii from her peers of the southern pacific. of these, however, it may be noted that some, like fanning and christmas islands, have within a few years been taken into british possession. the distance from san francisco to honolulu, twenty-one hundred miles--easy steaming distance--is substantially the same as that from honolulu to the gilbert, marshall, samoan, society, and marquesas groups, all under european control, except samoa, in which we have a part influence. to have a central position such as this, and to be alone, having no rival and admitting no alternative throughout an extensive tract, are conditions that at once fix the attention of the strategist,--it may be added, of the statesmen of commerce likewise. but to this striking combination are to be added the remarkable relations, borne by these singularly placed islands, to the greater commercial routes traversing this vast expanse known to us as the pacific,--not only, however, to those now actually in use, important as they are, but also to those that must be called into being necessarily by that future to which the hawaiian incident compels our too unwilling attention. circumstances, as already remarked, create centres, between which communication necessarily follows; and in the vista of the future all discern, however dimly, a new and great centre that must largely modify existing sea routes, as well as bring new ones into existence. whether the canal of the central american isthmus be eventually at panama or at nicaragua matters little to the question now in hand, although, in common with most americans who have thought upon the subject, i believe it surely will be at the latter point. whichever it be, the convergence there of so many ships from the atlantic and the pacific will constitute a centre of commerce, interoceanic, and inferior to few, if to any, in the world; one whose approaches will be watched jealously, and whose relations to the other centres of the pacific by the lines joining it to them must be examined carefully. such study of the commercial routes and of their relations to the hawaiian islands, taken together with the other strategic considerations previously set forth, completes the synopsis of facts which determine the value of the group for conferring either commercial or naval control. referring again to the map, it will be seen that while the shortest routes from the isthmus to australia and new zealand, as well as those to south america, go well clear of any probable connection with or interference from hawaii, those directed toward china and japan pass either through the group or in close proximity to it. vessels from central america bound to the ports of north america come, of course, within the influence of our own coast. these circumstances, and the existing recognized distribution of political power in the pacific, point naturally to an international acquiescence in certain defined spheres of influence, for our own country and for others, such as has been reached already between great britain, germany, and holland in the southwestern pacific, to avoid conflict there between their respective claims. though artificial in form, such a recognition, in the case here suggested, would depend upon perfectly natural as well as indisputable conditions. the united states is by far the greatest, in numbers, interests, and power, of the communities bordering upon the eastern shores of the north pacific; and the relations of the hawaiian islands to her naturally would be, and actually are, more numerous and more important than they can be to any other state. this is true, although, unfortunately for the equally natural wishes of great britain and her colonies, the direct routes from british columbia to eastern australia and new zealand, which depend upon no building of a future canal, pass as near the islands as those already mentioned. such a fact, that this additional great highway runs close to the group, both augments and emphasizes their strategic importance; but it does not affect the statement just made, that the interest of the united states in them surpasses that of great britain, and dependent upon a natural cause, nearness, which has been admitted always as a reasonable ground for national self-assertion. it is unfortunate, doubtless, for the wishes of british columbia, and for the communications, commercial and military, depending upon the canadian pacific railway, that the united states lies between them and the south pacific, and is the state nearest to hawaii; but, the fact being so, the interests of our sixty-five million people, in a position so vital to our part in the pacific, must be allowed to outweigh those of the six millions of canada. from the foregoing considerations may be inferred the importance of the hawaiian islands as a position powerfully influencing the commercial and military control of the pacific, and especially of the northern pacific, in which the united states, geographically, has the strongest right to assert herself. these are the main advantages, which can be termed positive: those, namely, which directly advance commercial security and naval control. to the negative advantages of possession, by removing conditions which, if the islands were in the hands of any other power, would constitute to us disadvantages and threats, allusion only will be made. the serious menace to our pacific coast and our pacific trade, if so important a position were held by a possible enemy, has been mentioned frequently in the press, and dwelt upon in the diplomatic papers which from time to time are given to the public. it may be assumed that it is generally acknowledged. upon one particular, however, too much stress cannot be laid, one to which naval officers cannot but be more sensitive than the general public, and that is the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a coaling-station well within twenty-five hundred miles, as this is, of every point of our coast-line from puget sound to mexico. were there many others available, we might find it difficult to exclude from all. there is, however, but the one. shut out from the sandwich islands as a coal base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies of fuel to distances of thirty-five hundred or four thousand miles,--or between seven thousand and eight thousand, going and coming,--an impediment to sustained maritime operations well-nigh prohibitive. the coal-mines of british columbia constitute, of course, a qualification to this statement; but upon them, if need arose, we might hope at least to impose some trammels by action from the land side. it is rarely that so important a factor in the attack or defence of a coast-line--of a sea frontier--is concentrated in a single position; and the circumstance renders doubly imperative upon us to secure it, if we righteously can. it is to be hoped, also, that the opportunity thus thrust upon us may not be viewed narrowly, as though it concerned but one section of our country or one portion of its external trade or influence. this is no mere question of a particular act, for which, possibly, just occasion may not have offered yet; but of a principle, a policy, fruitful of many future acts, to enter upon which, in the fulness of our national progress, the time now has arrived. the principle being accepted, to be conditioned only by a just and candid regard for the rights and reasonable susceptibilities of other nations,--none of which is contravened by the step here immediately under discussion,--the annexation, even, of hawaii would be no mere sporadic effort, irrational because disconnected from an adequate motive, but a first-fruit and a token that the nation in its evolution has aroused itself to the necessity of carrying its life--that has been the happiness of those under its influence--beyond the borders which heretofore have sufficed for its activities. that the vaunted blessings of our economy are not to be forced upon the unwilling may be conceded; but the concession does not deny the right nor the wisdom of gathering in those who wish to come. comparative religion teaches that creeds which reject missionary enterprise are foredoomed to decay. may it not be so with nations? certainly the glorious record of england is consequent mainly upon the spirit, and traceable to the time, when she launched out into the deep--without formulated policy, it is true, or foreseeing the future to which her star was leading, but obeying the instinct which in the infancy of nations anticipates the more reasoned impulses of experience. let us, too, learn from her experience. not all at once did england become the great sea power which she is, but step by step, as opportunity offered, she has moved on to the world-wide pre-eminence now held by english speech, and by institutions sprung from english germs. how much poorer would the world have been, had englishmen heeded the cautious hesitancy that now bids us reject every advance beyond our shore-lines! and can any one doubt that a cordial, if unformulated, understanding between the two chief states of english tradition, to spread freely, without mutual jealousy and in mutual support, would increase greatly the world's sum of happiness? but if a plea of the world's welfare seem suspiciously like a cloak for national self-interest, let the latter be accepted frankly as the adequate motive which it assuredly is. let us not shrink from pitting a broad self-interest against the narrow self-interest to which some would restrict us. the demands of our three great seaboards, the atlantic, the gulf, and the pacific,--each for itself, and all for the strength that comes from drawing closer the ties between them,--are calling for the extension, through the isthmian canal, of that broad sea common along which, and along which alone, in all the ages prosperity has moved. land carriage, always restricted and therefore always slow, toils enviously but hopelessly behind, vainly seeking to replace and supplant the royal highway of nature's own making. corporate interests, vigorous in that power of concentration which is the strength of armies and of minorities, may here withstand for a while the ill-organized strivings of the multitude, only dimly conscious of its wants; yet the latter, however temporarily opposed and baffled, is sure at last, like the blind forces of nature, to overwhelm all that stand in the way of its necessary progress. so the isthmian canal is an inevitable part in the future of the united states; yet one that cannot be separated from other necessary incidents of a policy dependent upon it, whose details cannot be foreseen exactly. but because the precise steps that hereafter may be opportune or necessary cannot yet be foretold certainly, is not a reason the less, but a reason the more, for establishing a principle of action which may serve to guide as opportunities arise. let us start from the fundamental truth, warranted by history, that the control of the seas, and especially along the great lines drawn by national interest or national commerce, is the chief among the merely material elements in the power and prosperity of nations. it is so because the sea is the world's great medium of circulation. from this necessarily follows the principle that, as subsidiary to such control, it is imperative to take possession, when it can be done righteously, of such maritime positions as contribute to secure command. if this principle be adopted, there will be no hesitation about taking the positions--and they are many--upon the approaches to the isthmus, whose interests incline them to seek us. it has its application also to the present case of hawaii. there is, however, one caution to be given from the military point of view, beyond the need of which the world has not yet passed. military positions, fortified posts, by land or by sea, however strong or admirably situated, do not confer control by themselves alone. people often say that such an island or harbor will give control of such a body of water. it is an utter, deplorable, ruinous mistake. the phrase indeed may be used by some only loosely, without forgetting other implied conditions of adequate protection and adequate navies; but the confidence of our own nation in its native strength, and its indifference to the defence of its ports and the sufficiency of its fleet, give reason to fear that the full consequences of a forward step may not be weighed soberly. napoleon, who knew better, once talked this way. "the islands of san pietro, corfu, and malta," he wrote, "will make us masters of the whole mediterranean." vain boast! within one year corfu, in two years malta, were rent away from the state that could not support them by its ships. nay, more: had bonaparte not taken the latter stronghold out of the hands of its degenerate but innocuous government, that citadel of the mediterranean would perhaps--would probably--never have passed into those of his chief enemy. there is here also a lesson for us. it is by no means logical to leap, from this recognition of the necessity of adequate naval force to secure outlying dependencies, to the conclusion that the united states would need for that object a navy equal to the largest now existing. a nation as far removed as is our own from the bases of foreign naval strength may reasonably reckon upon the qualification that distance--not to speak of the complex european interests close at hand--impresses upon the exertion of naval strength by european powers. the mistake is when our remoteness, unsupported by carefully calculated force, is regarded as an armor of proof, under cover of which any amount of swagger may be indulged safely. an estimate of what is an adequate naval force for our country may properly take into account the happy interval which separates both our present territory and our future aspirations from the centres of interest really vital to european states. if to these safeguards be added, on our part, a sober recognition of what our reasonable sphere of influence is, and a candid justice in dealing with foreign interests within that sphere, there will be little disposition to question our preponderance therein. among all foreign states, it is especially to be hoped that each passing year may render more cordial the relations between ourselves and the great nation from whose loins we sprang. the radical identity of spirit which underlies our superficial differences of polity surely will draw us closer together, if we do not set our faces wilfully against a tendency which would give our race the predominance over the seas of the world. to force such a consummation is impossible, and if possible would not be wise; but surely it would be a lofty aim, fraught with immeasurable benefits, to desire it, and to raise no needless impediments by advocating perfectly proper acts, demanded by our evident interests, in offensive or arrogant terms. the isthmus and sea power.[ ] _june, ._ for more than four hundred years the mind of man has been possessed with a great idea, which, although by its wide diffusion and prophetic nature resembling one of those fundamental instincts, whose very existence points to a necessary fulfilment, first quickened into life in the thought of christopher columbus. to him the vision, dimly seen through the scanty and inaccurate knowledge of his age, imaged a close and facile communication, by means of the sea, that great bond of nations, between two ancient and diverse civilizations, which centred, the one around the mediterranean, the birthplace of european commerce, refinement, and culture, the other upon the shores of that distant eastern ocean which lapped the dominions of the great khan, and held upon its breast the rich island of zipangu. hitherto an envious waste of land, entailing years of toilsome and hazardous journey, had barred them asunder. a rare traveller now and again might penetrate from one to the other, but it was impossible to maintain by land the constant exchange of influence and benefit which, though on a contracted scale, had constituted the advantage and promoted the development of the mediterranean peoples. the microcosm of the land-girt sea typified then that future greater family of nations, which one by one have been bound since into a common tie of interest by the broad enfolding ocean, that severs only to knit them more closely together. so with a seer's eye, albeit as in a glass darkly; saw columbus, and was persuaded, and embraced the assurance. as the bold adventurer, walking by faith and not by sight, launched his tiny squadron upon its voyage, making the first step in the great progress which was to be, and still is not completed, he little dreamed that the mere incident of stumbling upon an unknown region that lay across his route should be with posterity his chief title to fame, obscuring the true glory of his grand conception, as well as delaying its fulfilment to a far distant future. [ ] the map of the gulf and caribbean, p. , will serve for geographical references of this article. the story of his actual achievement is sufficiently known to all readers, and need not be repeated here. amid the many disappointments and humiliations which succeeded the brief triumphant blaze of his first return, and clouded the latter years of his life, columbus was spared the pang of realizing that the problem was insoluble for the time. like many a prophet before him, he knew not what, nor what manner of time, the spirit that was in him foretold, and died the happier for his ignorance. the certainty that a wilderness, peopled by savages and semi-barbarians, had been added to the known world, would have been a poor awakening from the golden dreams of beneficent glory as well as of profit which so long had beckoned him on. that the western land he had discovered interposed a barrier to the further progress of ships towards his longed-for goal, as inexorable as the mountain ranges and vast steppes of asia, was mercifully concealed from his eyes; and the elusive "secret of the strait" through which he to the last hoped to pass, though tantalizing in its constant evasion, kept in tension the springs of hope and moral energy which might have succumbed under the knowledge of the truth. it fell to the great discoverer, in his last voyage, to approach the continent, and to examine its shores along the region where the true secret of the strait lay hidden,--where, if ever, it shall pass from a dream to a reality, by the hand of man. in the autumn of , after many trials and misadventures, columbus, having skirted the south side of cuba, reached the north coast of honduras. there was little reason, except in his own unaccountable conviction, for continuing thence in one direction rather than in the other; but by some process of thought he had convinced himself that the sought-for strait lay to the south rather than to the north. he therefore turned to the eastward, though the wind was contrary, and, after a hard buffet against it, doubled cape gracias á dios, which still retains its expressive name, significant of his relief at finding that the trend of the beach at last permitted him to follow his desired course with a fair wind. during the next two months he searched the entire coast-line as far as porto bello, discovering and examining several openings in the land which since have been of historical importance, among others the mouth of the san juan river and the chiriqui lagoon, one of whose principal divisions still recalls his visit in its name, almirante bay, the bay of the admiral. a little beyond, to the eastward of porto bello, he came to a point already known to the spaniards, having been reached from trinidad. the explorer thus acquired the certainty that, from the latter island to yucatan, there was no break in the obdurate shore which barred his access to asia. every possible site for an interoceanic canal lies within the strip of land thus visited by columbus shortly before his death in . how narrow the insurmountable obstacle, and how tantalizing, in the apparent facilities for piercing it extended by the formation of the land, were not known until ten years later, when balboa, led on by the reports of the natives, reached the eminence whence he, first among europeans, saw the south sea,--a name long and vaguely applied to the pacific, because of the direction in which it lay from its discoverer. during these early years the history of the region we now know as central america was one of constant strife among the various spanish leaders, encouraged rather than stifled by the jealous home government; but it was also one of unbroken and venturesome exploration, a healthier manifestation of the same restless and daring energy that provoked their internal collisions. in january, , one gil gonzalez started from panama northward on the pacific side, with a few frail barks, and in march discovered lake nicaragua, which has its name from the cacique, nicaragua, or nicarao, whose town stood upon its shores. five years later, another adventurer took his vessel to pieces on the coast, transported it thus to the lake, and made the circuit of the latter; discovering its outlet, the san juan, just a quarter of a century after columbus had visited the mouth of the river. the conquest of peru, and the gradual extension of spanish domination and settlements in central america and along the shores of the pacific, soon bestowed upon the isthmus an importance, vividly suggestive of its rise into political prominence consequent upon the acquisition of california by the united states, and upon the spread of the latter along the pacific coast. the length and severity of the voyage round cape horn, then as now, impelled men to desire some shorter and less arduous route; and, inconvenient as the land transport with its repeated lading and unlading was, it presented before the days of steam the better alternative, as to some extent it still does. so the isthmus and its adjoining regions became a great centre of commerce, a point where many highways converged and whence they parted; where the east and the west met in intercourse, sometimes friendly, more often hostile. thus was realized partially, though most incompletely, the vision of columbus; and thus, after many fluctuations, and despite the immense expansion of these latter days, partial and incomplete his great conception yet remains. the secret of the strait is still the problem and the reproach of mankind. by whatever causes produced, where such a centre of commerce exists, there always will be found a point of general interest to mankind,--to all, at least, of those peoples who, whether directly commercial or not, share in the wide-spreading benefits and inconveniences arising from the fluctuations of trade. but enterprising commercial countries are not content to be mere passive recipients of these diverse influences. by the very characteristics which make them what they are, they are led perforce to desire, and to aim at, control of these decisive regions; for their tenure, like the key of a military position, exerts a vital effect upon the course of trade, and so upon the struggle, not only for bare existence, but for that increase of wealth, of prosperity, and of general consideration, which affect both the happiness and the dignity of nations. consequently, in every age, according to its particular temperament and circumstances, there will be found manifested this desire for control; sometimes latent in an attitude of simple watchfulness; sometimes starting into vivid action under the impulse of national jealousies, and issuing in diplomatic rivalries or hostile encounter. such, accordingly, has been the history of the central american isthmus since the time when it became recognized as the natural centre, towards which, if not thwarted by adverse influences, the current of intercourse between east and west inevitably must tend. here the direction of least resistance was indicated clearly by nature; and a concurrence of circumstances, partly inherent in the general character of the region, partly adventitious or accidental, contributed at an early date, and until very recently, to emphasize and enlarge the importance consequent upon the geographical situation and physical conformation of this narrow barrier between two great seas. for centuries the west india islands, circling the caribbean, and guarding the exterior approaches to the isthmus, continued to be the greatest single source of tropical products which had become increasingly necessary to the civilized nations of europe. in them, and in that portion of the continent which extended on either side of the isthmus, known under the vague appellation of the spanish main, great britain, during her desperate strife with the first napoleon,--a strife for very existence,--found the chief support of the commercial strength and credit that alone carried her to the triumphant end. the isthmus and the caribbean were vital elements in determining the issue of that stern conflict. for centuries, also, the treasures of mexico and peru, upon which depended the vigorous action of the great though decadent military kingdom of spain, flowed towards and accumulated around the isthmus, where they were reinforced by the tribute of the philippine islands, and whence they took their way in the lumbering galleons for the ports of the peninsula. where factors of such decisive influence in european politics were at stake, it was inevitable that the rival nations, in peace as well as in open war, should carry their ambitions to the scene; and the unceasing struggle for the mastery would fluctuate with the control of the waters, which, as in all maritime regions, must depend mainly upon naval preponderance, but also in part upon possession of those determining positions, of whose tenure napoleon said that "war is a business of positions." among these the isthmus was chief. the wild enterprises and bloody cruelties of the early buccaneers were therefore not merely a brutal exhibition of unpitying greed, indicative of the scum of nations as yet barely emerging from barbarism. they were this, doubtless, but they were something more. in the march of events, these early marauders played the same part, in relation to what was to succeed them, as the rude, unscrupulous, lawless adventurers who now precede the ruthless march of civilized man, who swarm over the border, occupy the outposts, and by their excesses stain the fair fame of the race whose pioneers they are. but, while thus libels upon and reproaches to the main body, they nevertheless belong to it, share its essential character, and foretell its inevitable course. like driftwood swept forward on the crest of a torrent, they betoken the approaching flood. so with the celebrated freebooters of the spanish main. of the same general type,--though varying greatly in individual characteristics, in breadth of view, and even in elevation of purpose,--their piratical careers not only evidenced the local wealth of the scene of their exploits, but attested the commercial and strategic importance of the position upon which in fact that wealth depended. the carcass was there, and the eagles as well as the vultures, the far-sighted as well as the mere carrion birds of prey, were gathering round it. "the spoil of granada," said one of these mercenary chieftains, two centuries ago, "i count as naught beside the knowledge of the great lake nicaragua, and of the route between the northern and southern seas which depends upon it." as time passed, the struggle for the mastery inevitably resulted, by a kind of natural selection, in the growing predominance of the people of the british islands, in whom commercial enterprise and political instinct were blended so happily. the very lawlessness of the period favored the extension of their power and influence; for it removed from the free play of a nation's innate faculties the fetters which are imposed by our present elaborate framework of precedents, constitutions, and international law. admirably adapted as these are to the conservation and regular working of a political system, they are, nevertheless, however wise, essentially artificial, and hence are ill adapted to a transition state,--to a period in which order is evolving out of chaos, where the result is durable exactly in proportion to the freedom with which the natural forces are allowed to act, and to reach their own equilibrium without extraneous interference. nor are such periods confined to the early days of mere lawlessness. they recur whenever a crisis is reached in the career of a nation; when old traditions, accepted maxims, or written constitutions have been outgrown, in whole or in part; when the time has come for a people to recognize that the limits imposed upon its expansion, by the political wisdom of its forefathers, have ceased to be applicable to its own changed conditions and those of the world. the question then raised is not whether the constitution, as written, shall be respected. it is how to reach modifications in the constitution--and that betimes--so that the genius and awakened intelligence of the people may be free to act, without violating that respect for its fundamental law upon which national stability ultimately depends. it is a curious feature of our current journalism that it is clear-sighted and prompt to see the unfortunate trammels in which certain of our religious bodies are held, by the cast-iron tenets imposed upon them by a past generation, while at the same time political tenets, similarly ancient, and imposed with a like ignorance of a future which is our present, are invoked freely to forbid this nation from extending its power and necessary enterprise into and beyond the seas, to which on every side it now has attained. during the critical centuries when great britain was passing through that protracted phase of her history in which, from one of the least among states, she became, through the power of the sea, the very keystone and foundation upon which rested the commercial--for a time even the political--fabric of europe, the free action of her statesmen and people was clogged by no uneasy sense that the national genius was in conflict with artificial, self-imposed restrictions. she plunged into the brawl of nations that followed the discovery of a new world, of an unoccupied if not unclaimed inheritance, with a vigor and an initiative which gained ever-accelerated momentum and power as the years rolled by. far and wide, in every sea, through every clime, her seamen and her colonists spread; but while their political genius and traditions enabled them, in regions adapted to the physical well-being of the race, to found self-governing colonies which have developed into one of the greatest, of free states, they did not find, and never have found, that the possession of and rule over barbarous, or semi-civilized, or inert tropical communities, were inconsistent with the maintenance of political liberty in the mother country. the sturdy vigor of the broad principle of freedom in the national life is attested sufficiently by centuries of steady growth, that surest evidence of robust vitality. but, while conforming in the long run to the dictates of natural justice, no feeble scrupulosity impeded the nation's advance to power, by which alone its mission and the law of its being could be fulfilled. no artificial fetters were forged to cramp the action of the state, nor was it drugged with political narcotics to dwarf its growth. in the region here immediately under consideration, great britain entered the contest under conditions of serious disadvantage. the glorious burst of maritime and colonial enterprise which marked the reign of elizabeth, as the new era dawned when the country recognized the sphere of its true greatness, was confronted by the full power of spain, as yet outwardly unshaken, in actual tenure of the most important positions in the caribbean and the spanish main, and claiming the right to exclude all others from that quarter of the world. how brilliantly this claim was resisted is well known; yet, had they been then in fashion, there might have been urged, to turn england from the path which has made her what she is, the same arguments that now are freely used to deter our own country from even accepting such advantages as are ready to drop into her lap. if it be true that great britain's maritime policy now is imposed to some extent by the present necessities of the little group of islands which form the nucleus of her strength, it is not true that any such necessities first impelled her to claim her share of influence in the world, her part in the great drama of nations. not for such reasons did she launch out upon the career which is perhaps the noblest yet run by any people. it then could have been said to her, as it now is said to us, "why go beyond your own borders? within them you have what suffices for your needs and those of your population. there are manifold abuses within to be corrected, manifold miseries to be relieved. let the outside world take care of itself. defend yourself, if attacked; being, however, always careful to postpone preparation to the extreme limit of imprudence. 'sphere of influence,' 'part in the world,' 'national prestige,'--there are no such things; or if there be, they are not worth fighting for." what england would have been, had she so reasoned, is matter for speculation; that the world would have been poorer may be confidently affirmed. as the strength of spain waned apace during the first half of the seventeenth century, the external efforts of great britain also slackened through the rise of internal troubles, which culminated in the great rebellion, and absorbed for the time all the energies of the people. the momentum acquired under drake, raleigh, and their associates was lost, and an occasion, opportune through the exhaustion of the great enemy, spain, passed unimproved. but, though thus temporarily checked, the national tendency remained, and quickly resumed its sway when cromwell's mighty hand had composed the disorders of the commonwealth. his clear-sighted statesmanship, as well as the immediate necessities of his internal policy, dictated the strenuous assertion by sea of great britain's claims, not only to external respect, which he rigorously exacted, but also to her due share in influencing the world outside her borders. the nation quickly responded to his proud appeal, and received anew the impulse upon the road to sea power which never since has been relaxed. to him were due the measures--not, perhaps, economically the wisest, judged by modern lights, but more than justified by the conditions of his times--which drew into english hands the carrying trade of the world. the glories of the british navy as an organized force date also from his short rule; and it was he who, in , laid a firm basis for the development of the country's sea power in the caribbean, by the conquest of jamaica, from a military standpoint the most decisive of all single positions in that sea for the control of the isthmus. it is true that the successful attempt upon this island resulted from the failure of the leaders to accomplish cromwell's more immediate purpose of reducing santo domingo,--that in so far the particular fortunate issue was of the nature of an accident; but this fact serves only to illustrate more emphatically that, when a general line of policy, whether military or political, is correctly chosen upon sound principles, incidental misfortunes or disappointments do not frustrate the conception. the sagacious, far-seeing motive, which prompted cromwell's movement against the west indian possessions of spain, was to contest the latter's claim to the monopoly of that wealthy region; and he looked upon british extension in the islands as simply a stepping-stone to control upon the adjacent continent. it is a singular commentary upon the blindness of historians to the true secret of great britain's rise among the nations, and of the eminent position she so long has held, that writers so far removed from each other in time and characteristics as hume and the late j.r. green should detect in this far-reaching effort of the protector, only the dulled vision of "a conservative and unspeculative temper misled by the strength of religious enthusiasm." "a statesman of wise political genius," according to them, would have fastened his eyes rather upon the growing power of france, "and discerned the beginning of that great struggle for supremacy" which was fought out under louis xiv. but to do so would have been only to repeat, by anticipation, the fatal error of that great monarch, which forever forfeited for france the control of the seas, in which the surest prosperity of nations is to be found; a mistake, also, far more ruinous to the island kingdom than it was to her continental rival, bitter though the fruits thereof have been to the latter. hallam, with clearer insight, says: "when cromwell declared against spain, and attacked her west indian possessions, there was little pretence, certainly, of justice, but not by any means, as i conceive, the impolicy sometimes charged against him. so auspicious was his star, that the very failure of that expedition obtained a more advantageous possession for england than all the triumphs of her former kings." most true; but because his star was despatched in the right direction to look for fortune,--by sea, not by land. the great aim of the protector was checked by his untimely death, which perhaps also definitely frustrated a fulfilment, in the actual possession of the isthmus, that in his strong hands might have been feasible. his idea, however, remained prominent among the purposes of the english people, as distinguished from their rulers; and in it, as has been said before, is to be recognized the significance of the exploits of the buccaneers, during the period of external debility which characterized the reigns of the second charles and james. with william of orange the government again placed itself at the head of the national aspirations, as their natural leader; and the irregular operations of the freebooters were merged in a settled national policy. this, although for a moment diverted from its course by temporary exigencies, was clearly formulated in the avowed objects with which, in , the wise dutchman entered upon the war of the spanish succession, the last great act of his political life. from the peace of utrecht, which closed this war in , the same design was pursued with ever-increasing intensity, but with steady success, and with it was gradually associated the idea of controlling also the communication between the two oceans by way of the isthmus. the best known instance of this, because of its connection with the great name of nelson, was the effort made by him, in conjunction with a land force, in , when still a simple captain, to take possession of the course of the san juan river, and so of the interoceanic route through lake nicaragua. the attempt ended disastrously, owing partly to the climate, and partly to the strong series of works, numbering no less than twelve, which the spaniards, duly sensible of the importance of the position, had constructed between the lake and the sea. difficulties such as were encountered by nelson withstood great britain's advance throughout this region. while neither blind nor indifferent to the advantages conferred by actual possession, through which she had profited elsewhere abundantly, the prior and long-established occupation by spain prevented her obtaining by such means the control she ardently coveted, and in great measure really exercised. the ascendency which made her, and still makes her, the dominant factor in the political system of the west indies and the isthmus resulted from her sea power, understood in its broadest sense. she was the great trader, source of supplies, and medium of intercourse between the various colonies themselves, and from them to the outer world; while the capital and shipping employed in this traffic were protected by a powerful navy, which, except on very rare occasions, was fully competent to its work. thus, while unable to utilize and direct the resources of the countries, as she could have done had they been her own property, she secured the fruitful use and reaped the profit of such commercial transactions as were possible under the inert and narrow rule of the spaniards. the fact is instructive, for the conditions to-day are substantially the same as those of a century ago. possession still vests in states and races which have not attained yet the faculty of developing by themselves the advantages conferred by nature; and control will abide still with those whose ships, whose capital, whose traders support the industrial system of the region, provided these are backed by a naval force adequate to the demands of the military situation, rightly understood. to any foreign state, control at the central american isthmus means naval control, naval predominance, to which tenure of the land is at best but a convenient incident. such, in brief, was the general tendency of events until the time when the spanish colonial empire began to break up, in - , and the industrial system of the west india islands to succumb under the approaching abolition of slavery. the concurrence of these two decisive incidents, and the confusion which ensued in the political and economical conditions, rapidly reduced the isthmus and its approaches to an insignificance from which the islands have not yet recovered. the isthmus is partially restored. its importance, however, depends upon causes more permanent, in the natural order of things, than does that of the islands, which, under existing circumstances, and under any circumstances that can be foreseen as yet, derive their consequence chiefly from the effect which may be exerted from them upon the tenure of the isthmus. hence the latter, after a period of comparative obscurity, again emerged into notice as a vital political factor, when the spread of the united states to the pacific raised the question of rapid and secure communication between our two great seaboards. the mexican war, the acquisition of california, the discovery of gold, and the mad rush to the diggings which followed, hastened, but by no means originated, the necessity for a settlement of the intricate problems involved, in which the united states, from its positions on the two seas, has the predominant interest. but, though predominant, ours is not the sole interest; though less vital, those of other foreign states are great and consequential; and, accordingly, no settlement can be considered to constitute an equilibrium, much less a finality, which does not effect our preponderating influence, and at the same time insure the natural rights of other peoples. so far as the logical distinction between commercial and political will hold, it may be said that our interest is both commercial and political, that of other states almost wholly commercial. the same national characteristics that of old made great britain the chief contestant in all questions of maritime importance--with the dutch in the mediterranean, with france in the east indies, and with spain in the west--have made her also the exponent of foreign opposition to our own asserted interest in the isthmus. the policy initiated by cromwell, of systematic aggression in the caribbean, and of naval expansion and organization, has resulted in a combination of naval force with naval positions unequalled, though not wholly unrivalled, in that sea. and since, as the great sea carrier, great britain has a preponderating natural interest in every new route open to commerce, it is inevitable that she should scrutinize jealously every proposition for the modification of existing arrangements, conscious as she is of power to assert her claims, in case the question should be submitted to the last appeal. nevertheless, although from the nature of the occupations which constitute the welfare of her people, as well as from the characteristics of her power, great britain seemingly has the larger immediate stake in a prospective interoceanic canal, it has been recognized tacitly on her part, as on our side openly asserted, that the bearing of all questions of isthmian transit upon our national progress, safety, and honor, is more direct and more urgent than upon hers. that she has felt so is plain from the manner in which she has yielded before our tenacious remonstrances, in cases where the control of the isthmus was evidently the object of her action,--as in the matters of the tenure of the bay islands and of the protectorate of the mosquito coast. our superior interest appears also from the nature of the conditions which will follow from the construction of a canal. so far as these changes are purely commercial, they will operate to some extent to the disadvantage of great britain; because the result will be to bring our atlantic seaboard, the frontier of a rival manufacturing and commercial state, much nearer to the pacific than it now is, and nearer to many points of that ocean than is england. to make a rough general statement, easily grasped by a reader without the map before him, liverpool and new york are at present about equidistant, by water, from all points on the west coast of america, from valparaiso to british columbia. this is due to the fact that, to go through the straits of magellan, vessels from both ports must pass near cape st. roque, on the east coast of brazil, which is nearly the same distance from each. if the nicaragua canal existed, the line on the pacific equidistant from the two cities named would pass, roughly, by yokohama, shanghai, hong kong, and melbourne, or along the coasts of japan, china, and eastern australia,--liverpool, in this case, using the suez canal, and new york that of nicaragua. in short, the line of equidistance would be shifted from the eastern shore of the pacific to its western coast, and all points of that ocean east of japan, china, and australia--for example, the hawaiian islands--would be nearer to new york than to liverpool. a recent british writer has calculated that about one-eighth of the existing trade of the british islands would be affected unfavorably by the competition thus introduced. but this result, though a matter of national concern, is political only in so far as commercial prosperity or adversity modifies a nation's current history; that is, indirectly. the principal questions affecting the integrity or security of the british empire are not involved seriously, for almost all of its component parts lie within the regions whose mutual bond of union and shortest line of approach are the suez canal. nowhere has great britain so little territory at stake, nowhere has she such scanty possessions, as in the eastern pacific, upon whose relations to the world at large, and to ourselves in particular, the isthmian canal will exert the greatest influence. the chief political result of the isthmian canal will be to bring our pacific coast nearer, not only to our atlantic seaboard, but also to the great navies of europe. therefore, while the commercial gain, through an uninterrupted water carriage, will be large, and is clearly indicated by the acrimony with which a leading journal, apparently in the interest of the great transcontinental roads, has lately maintained the singular assertion that water transit is obsolete as compared with land carriage, it is still true that the canal will present an element of much weakness from the military point of view. except to those optimists whose robust faith in the regeneration of human nature rejects war as an impossible contingency, this consideration must occasion serious thought concerning the policy to be adopted by the united states. the subject, so far, has given rise only to diplomatic arrangement and discussion, within which it is permissible to hope it always may be confined; but the misunderstandings and protracted disputes that followed the clayton-bulwer treaty, and the dissatisfaction with the existing status that still obtains among many of our people, give warning that our steps, as a nation, should be governed by some settled notions, too universally held to be set aside by a mere change of administration or caprice of popular will. reasonable discussion, which tends, either by its truth or by its evident errors, to clarify and crystallize public opinion on so important a matter, never can be amiss. this question, from an abstract, speculative phase of the monroe doctrine, took on the concrete and somewhat urgent form of security for our trans-isthmian routes against foreign interference towards the middle of this century, when the attempt to settle it was made by the oft-mentioned clayton-bulwer treaty, signed april , . great britain was found then to be in possession, actual or constructive, of certain continental positions, and of some outlying islands, which would contribute not only to military control, but to that kind of political interference which experience has shown to be the natural consequence of the proximity of a strong power to a weak one. these positions depended upon, indeed their tenure originated in, the possession of jamaica, thus justifying cromwell's forecast. of them, the belize, a strip of coast two hundred miles long, on the bay of honduras, immediately south of yucatan, was so far from the isthmus proper, and so little likely to affect the canal question, that the american negotiator was satisfied to allow its tenure to pass unquestioned, neither admitting nor denying anything as to the rights of great britain thereto. its first occupation had been by british freebooters, who "squatted" there a very few years after jamaica fell. they went to cut logwood, succeeded in holding their ground against the efforts of spain to dislodge them, and their right to occupancy and to fell timber was allowed afterwards by treaty. since the signature of the clayton-bulwer treaty, this "settlement," as it was styled in that instrument, has become a british "possession," by a convention with guatemala contracted in . later, in , the quondam "settlement" and recent "possession" was erected, by royal commission, into a full colony, subordinate to the government of jamaica. guatemala being a central american state, this constituted a distinct advance of british dominion in central america, contrary to the terms of our treaty. a more important claim of great britain was to the protectorate of the mosquito coast,--a strip understood by her to extend from cape gracias á dios south to the san juan river. in its origin, this asserted right differed little from similar transactions between civilized man and savages, in all times and all places. in , thirty years after the island was acquired, a chief of the aborigines there settled was carried to jamaica, received some paltry presents, and accepted british protection. while spanish control lasted, a certain amount of squabbling and fighting went on between the two nations; but when the questions arose between england and the united states, the latter refused to acquiesce in the so-called protectorate, which rested, in her opinion, upon no sufficient legal ground as against the prior right of spain, that was held to have passed to nicaragua when the latter achieved its independence. the mosquito coast was too close to the expected canal for its tenure to be considered a matter of indifference. similar ground was taken with regard to the bay islands, ruatan and others, stretching along the south side of the bay of honduras, near the coast of the republic of that name, and so uniting, under the control of the great naval power, the belize to the mosquito coast. the united states maintained that these islands, then occupied by great britain, belonged in full right to honduras. under these _de facto_ conditions of british occupation, the united states negotiator, in his eagerness to obtain the recession of the disputed points to the spanish-american republics, seems to have paid too little regard to future bearings of the subject. men's minds also were dominated then, as they are now notwithstanding the intervening experience of nearly half a century, by the maxims delivered as a tradition by the founders of the republic who deprecated annexations of territory abroad. the upshot was that, in consideration of great britain's withdrawal from mosquitia and the bay islands, to which, by our contention, she had no right, and therefore really yielded nothing but a dispute, we bound ourselves, as did she, without term, to acquire no territory in central america, and to guarantee the neutrality not only of the contemplated canal, but of any other that might be constructed. a special article, the eighth, was incorporated in the treaty to this effect, stating expressly that the wish of the two governments was "not only to accomplish a particular object, but to establish a general principle." considerable delay ensued in the restoration of the islands and of the mosquito coast to honduras and nicaragua,--a delay attended with prolonged discussion and serious misunderstanding between the united states and great britain. the latter claimed that, by the wording of the treaty, she had debarred herself only from future acquisitions of territory in central america; whereas our government asserted, and persistently instructed its agents, that its understanding had been that an entire abandonment of all possession, present and future, was secured by the agreement. it is difficult, in reading the first article, not to feel that, although the practice may have been perhaps somewhat sharp, the wording can sustain the british position quite as well as the more ingenuous confidence of the united states negotiator; an observation interesting chiefly as showing the eagerness on the one side, whose contention was the weaker in all save right, and the wariness on the other, upon whom present possession and naval power conferred a marked advantage in making a bargain. by , however, the restorations had been made, and the clayton-bulwer treaty since then has remained the international agreement, defining our relations to great britain on the isthmus. of the subsequent wrangling over this unfortunate treaty, if so invidious a term may be applied to the dignified utterances of diplomacy, it is unnecessary to give a detailed account. our own country cannot but regret and resent any formal stipulations which fetter its primacy of influence and control on the american continent and in american seas; and the concessions of principle over-eagerly made in , in order to gain compensating advantages which our weakness could not extort otherwise, must needs cause us to chafe now, when we are potentially, though, it must be confessed sorrowfully, not actually, stronger by double than we were then. the interest of great britain still lies, as it then lay, in the maintenance of the treaty. so long as the united states jealously resents all foreign interference in the isthmus, and at the same time takes no steps to formulate a policy or develop a strength that can give shape and force to her own pretensions, just so long will the absolute control over any probable contingency of the future rest with great britain, by virtue of her naval positions, her naval power, and her omnipresent capital. a recent unofficial british estimate of the british policy at the isthmus, as summarized in the clayton-bulwer treaty, may here have interest: "in the united states was recognized a coming formidable rival to british trade. in the face of the estimated disadvantage to european trade in general, and that of great britain in particular, to be looked for from a central american canal, british statesmen, finding their last attempt to control the most feasible route (by nicaragua) abortive, accomplished the next best object in the interest of british trade. they cast the onus of building the canal on the people who would reap the greatest advantage from it, and who were bound to keep every one else out, but were at the same time very unlikely to undertake such a gigantic enterprise outside their own undeveloped territories for many a long year; while at the same time they skilfully handicapped that country in favor of british sea power by entering into a joint guarantee to respect its neutrality when built. this secured postponement of construction indefinitely, and yet forfeited no substantial advantage necessary to establish effective naval control in the interests of british carrying trade." whether this passage truly represents the deliberate purpose of successive british governments may be doubtful, but it is an accurate enough estimate of the substantial result, as long as our policy continues to be to talk loud and to do nothing,--to keep others out, while refusing ourselves to go in. we neutralize effectually enough, doubtless; for we neutralize ourselves while leaving other powers to act efficiently whenever it becomes worth while. in a state like our own, national policy means public conviction, else it is but as sounding brass and a tinkling cymbal. but public conviction is a very different thing from popular impression, differing by all that separates a rational process, resulting in manly resolve, from a weakly sentiment that finds occasional hysterical utterance. the monroe doctrine, as popularly apprehended and indorsed, is a rather nebulous generality, which has condensed about the isthmus into a faint point of more defined luminosity. to those who will regard, it is the harbinger of the day, incompletely seen in the vision of the great discoverer, when the east and the west shall be brought into closer communion by the realization of the strait that baffled his eager search. but, with the strait, time has introduced a factor of which he could not dream,--a great nation midway between the west he knew and the east he sought, spanning the continent he unwittingly found, itself both east and west in one. to such a state, which in itself sums up the two conditions of columbus's problem; to which the control of the strait is a necessity, if not of existence, at least of its full development and of its national security, who can deny the right to predominate in influence over a region so vital to it? none can deny save its own people; and they do it,--not in words, perhaps, but in act. for let it not be forgotten that failure to act at an opportune moment is action as real as, though less creditable than, the most strenuous positive effort. action, however, to be consistent and well proportioned, must depend upon well-settled conviction; and conviction, if it is to be reasonable, and to find expression in a sound and continuous national policy, must result from a careful consideration of present conditions in the light of past experiences. here, unquestionably, strong differences of opinion will be manifested at first, both as to the true significance of the lessons of the past, and the manner of applying them to the present. such differences need not cause regret. their appearance is a sign of attention aroused; and when discussion has become general and animated, we may hope to see the gradual emergence of a sound and operative public sentiment. what is to be deprecated and feared is indolent drifting, in wilful blindness to the approaching moment when action must be taken; careless delay to remove fetters, if such there be in the constitution or in traditional prejudice, which may prevent our seizing opportunity when it occurs. whatever be the particular merits of the pending hawaiian question, it scarcely can be denied that its discussion has revealed the existence, real or fancied, of such clogs upon our action, and of a painful disposition to consider each such occurrence as merely an isolated event, instead of being, as it is, a warning that the time has come when we must make up our minds upon a broad issue of national policy. that there should be two opinions is not bad, but it is very bad to halt long between them. there is one opinion--which it is needless to say the writer does not share--that, because many years have gone by without armed collision with a great power, the teaching of the past is that none such can occur; and that, in fact, the weaker we are in organized military strength, the more easy it is for our opponents to yield our points. closely associated with this view is the obstinate rejection of any political action which involves implicitly the projection of our physical power, if needed, beyond the waters that gird our shores. because our reasonable, natural--it might almost be called moral--claim to preponderant influence at the isthmus heretofore has compelled respect, though reluctantly conceded, it is assumed that no circumstances can give rise to a persistent denial of it. it appears to the writer--and to many others with whom he agrees, though without claim to represent them--that the true state of the case is more nearly as follows: since our nation came into being, a century ago, with the exception of a brief agitation about the year ,--due to special causes, which, though suggestive, were not adequate, and summarized as to results in the paralyzing clayton-bulwer treaty,--the importance of the central american isthmus has been merely potential and dormant. but, while thus temporarily obscured, its intrinsic conditions of position and conformation bestow upon it a consequence in relation to the rest of the world which is inalienable, and therefore, to become operative, only awaits those changes in external conditions that must come in the fulness of time. the indications of such changes are already sufficiently visible to challenge attention. the rapid peopling of our territory entails at least two. the growth of the pacific states enhances the commercial and political importance of the pacific ocean to the world at large, and to ourselves in particular; while the productive energies of the country, and its advent to the three seas, impel it necessarily to seek outlet by them and access to the regions beyond. under such conditions, perhaps not yet come, but plainly coming, the consequence of an artificial waterway that shall enable the atlantic coast to compete with europe, on equal terms as to distance, for the markets of eastern asia, and shall shorten by two-thirds the sea route from new york to san francisco, and by one-half that to valparaiso, is too evident for insistence. in these conditions, not in european necessities, is to be found the assurance that the canal will be made. not to ourselves only, however, though to ourselves chiefly, will it be a matter of interest when completed. many causes will combine to retain in the line of the suez canal the commerce of europe with the east; but to the american shores of the pacific the isthmian canal will afford a much shorter and easier access for a trade already of noteworthy proportions. a weighty consideration also is involved in the effect upon british navigation of a war which should endanger its use of the suez canal. the power of great britain to control the long route from gibraltar to the red sea is seriously doubted by a large and thoughtful body of her statesmen and seamen, who favor dependence, in war, upon that by the cape of good hope. by nicaragua, however, would be shorter than by the cape to many parts of the east; and the caribbean can be safeguarded against distant european states much more easily than the line through the mediterranean, which passes close by their ports. under this increased importance of the isthmus, we cannot safely anticipate for the future the cheap acquiescence which, under very different circumstances, has been yielded in the past to our demands. already it is notorious that european powers are betraying symptoms of increased sensitiveness as to the value of caribbean positions, and are strengthening their grip upon those they now hold. moral considerations undoubtedly count for more than they did, and nations are more reluctant to enter into war; but still, the policy of states is determined by the balance of advantages, and it behooves us to know what our policy is to be, and what advantages are needed to turn in our favor the scale of negotiations and the general current of events. if the decision of the nation, following one school of thought, is that the weaker we are the more likely we are to have our way, there is little to be said. drifting is perhaps as good a mode as another to reach that desirable goal. if, on the other hand, we determine that our interest and dignity require that our rights should depend upon the will of no other state, but upon our own power to enforce them, we must gird ourselves to admit that freedom of interoceanic transit depends upon predominance in a maritime region--the caribbean sea--through which pass all the approaches to the isthmus. control of a maritime region is insured primarily by a navy; secondarily, by positions, suitably chosen and spaced one from the other, upon which as bases the navy rests, and from which it can exert its strength. at present the positions of the caribbean are occupied by foreign powers, nor may we, however disposed to acquisition, obtain them by means other than righteous; but a distinct advance will have been made when public opinion is convinced that we need them, and should not exert our utmost ingenuity to dodge them when flung at our head. if the constitution really imposes difficulties, it provides also a way by which the people, if convinced, can remove its obstructions. a protest, however, may be entered against a construction of the constitution which is liberal, by embracing all it can be constrained to imply, and then immediately becomes strict in imposing these ingeniously contrived fetters. meanwhile no moral obligation forbids developing our navy upon lines and proportions adequate to the work it may be called upon to do. here, again, the crippling force is a public impression, which limits our potential strength to the necessities of an imperfectly realized situation. a navy "for defence only" is a popular catchword. when, if ever, people recognize that we have three seaboards, that the communication by water of one of them with the other two will depend in a not remote future upon a strategic position hundreds of miles distant from our nearest port,--the mouth of the mississippi,--they will see also that the word "defence," already too narrowly understood, has its application at points far away from our own coast. that the organization of military strength involves provocation to war is a fallacy, which the experience of each succeeding year now refutes. the immense armaments of europe are onerous; but nevertheless, by the mutual respect and caution they enforce, they present a cheap alternative, certainly in misery, probably in money, to the frequent devastating wars which preceded the era of general military preparation. our own impunity has resulted, not from our weakness, but from the unimportance to our rivals of the points in dispute, compared with their more immediate interests at home. with the changes consequent upon the canal, this indifference will diminish. we also shall be entangled in the affairs of the great family of nations, and shall have to accept the attendant burdens. fortunately, as regards other states, we are an island power, and can find our best precedents in the history of the people to whom the sea has been a nursing mother. possibilities of an anglo-american reunion. _july, ._ [the following article was requested by the editor of the "north american review," as one of a number, by several persons, dealing with the question of a formal political connection, proposed by mr. andrew carnegie, between the united states and the british empire, for the advancement of the general interests of the english-speaking peoples. the projects advocated by previous writers embraced: , a federate union; , a merely naval union or alliance; or, , a defensive alliance of a kind frequent in political history.] the words "kinship" and "alliance" express two radically distinct ideas, and rest, for both the privileges and the obligations involved in them, upon foundations essentially different. the former represents a natural relation, the latter one purely conventional,--even though it may result from the feelings, the mutual interests, and the sense of incumbent duty attendant upon the other. in its very etymology, accordingly, is found implied that sense of constraint, of an artificial bond, that may prove a source, not only of strength, but of irksomeness as well. its analogue in our social conditions is the marriage tie,--the strongest, doubtless, of all bonds when it realizes in the particular case the supreme affection of which our human nature is capable; but likewise, as daily experience shows, the most fretting when, through original mistake or unworthy motive, love fails, and obligation alone remains. personally, i am happy to believe that the gradual but, as i think, unmistakable growth of mutual kindly feelings between great britain and the united states during these latter years--and of which the recent articles of sir george clarke and mr. arthur silva white in the "north american review" are pleasant indications--is a sure evidence that a common tongue and common descent are making themselves felt, and are breaking down the barriers of estrangement which have separated too long men of the same blood. there is seen here the working of kinship,--a wholly normal result of a common origin, the natural affection of children of the same descent, who have quarrelled and have been alienated with the proverbial bitterness of civil strife, but who all along have realized--or at the least have been dimly conscious--that such a state of things is wrong and harmful. as a matter of sentiment only, this reviving affection well might fix the serious attention of those who watch the growth of world questions, recognizing how far imagination and sympathy rule the world; but when, besides the powerful sentimental impulse, it is remembered that beneath considerable differences of political form there lie a common inherited political tradition and habit of thought, that the moral forces which govern and shape political development are the same in either people, the possibility of a gradual approach to concerted action becomes increasingly striking. of all the elements of the civilization that has spread over europe and america, none is so potential for good as that singular combination of two essential but opposing factors--of individual freedom with subjection to law--which finds its most vigorous working in great britain and the united states, its only exponents in which an approach to a due balance has been effected. like other peoples, we also sway between the two, inclining now to one side, now to the other; but the departure from the normal in either direction is never very great. there is yet another noteworthy condition common to the two states, which must tend to incline them towards a similar course of action in the future. partners, each, in the great commonwealth of nations which share the blessings of european civilization, they alone, though in varying degrees, are so severed geographically from all existing rivals as to be exempt from the burden of great land armies; while at the same time they must depend upon the sea, in chief measure, for that intercourse with other members of the body upon which national well-being depends. how great an influence upon the history of great britain has been exerted by this geographical isolation is sufficiently understood. in her case the natural tendency has been increased abnormally by the limited territorial extent of the british islands, which has forced the energies of their inhabitants to seek fields for action outside their own borders; but the figures quoted by sir george clarke sufficiently show that the same tendency, arising from the same cause, does exist and is operative in the united states, despite the diversion arising from the immense internal domain not yet fully occupied, and the great body of home consumers which has been secured by the protective system. the geographical condition, in short, is the same in kind, though differing in degree, and must impel in the same direction. to other states the land, with its privileges and its glories, is the chief source of national prosperity and distinction. to great britain and the united states, if they rightly estimate the part they may play in the great drama of human progress, is intrusted a maritime interest, in the broadest sense of the word, which demands, as one of the conditions of its exercise and its safety, the organized force adequate to control the general course of events at sea; to maintain, if necessity arise, not arbitrarily, but as those in whom interest and power alike justify the claim to do so, the laws that shall regulate maritime warfare. this is no mere speculation, resting upon a course of specious reasoning, but is based on the teaching of the past. by the exertion of such force, and by the maintenance of such laws, and by these means only, great britain, in the beginning of this century, when she was the solitary power of the seas, saved herself from destruction, and powerfully modified for the better the course of history. with such strong determining conditions combining to converge the two nations into the same highway, and with the visible dawn of the day when this impulse begins to find expression in act, the question naturally arises, what should be the immediate course to be favored by those who hail the growing light, and would hasten gladly the perfect day? that there are not a few who seek a reply to this question is evidenced by the articles of mr. carnegie, of sir george clarke, and of mr. white, all appearing within a short time in the pages of the "north american review." and it is here, i own, that, though desirous as any one can be to see the fact accomplished, i shrink from contemplating it, under present conditions, in the form of an alliance, naval or other. rather i should say: let each nation be educated to realize the length and breadth of its own interest in the sea; when that is done, the identity of these interests will become apparent. this identity cannot be established firmly in men's minds antecedent to the great teacher, experience; and experience cannot be had before that further development of the facts which will follow the not far distant day, when the united states people must again betake themselves to the sea and to external action, as did their forefathers alike in their old home and in the new. there are, besides, questions in which at present doubt, if not even friction, might arise as to the proper sphere of each nation, agreement concerning which is essential to cordial co-operation; and this the more, because great britain could not be expected reasonably to depend upon our fulfilment of the terms of an alliance, or to yield in points essential to her own maritime power, so long as the united states is unwilling herself to assure the security of the positions involved by the creation of an adequate force. it is just because in that process of adjusting the parts to be played by each nation, upon which alone a satisfactory cooperation can be established, a certain amount of friction is probable, that i would avoid all premature striving for alliance, an artificial and possibly even an irritating method of reaching the desired end. instead, i would dwell continually upon those undeniable points of resemblance in natural characteristics, and in surrounding conditions, which testify to common origin and predict a common destiny. cast the seed of this thought into the ground, and it will spring and grow up, you know not how,--first the blade, then the ear, then the full corn in the ear. then you may put in your sickle and reap the harvest of political result, which as yet is obviously immature. how quietly and unmarked, like the slow processes of nature, such feelings may be wrought into the very being of nations, was evidenced by the sudden and rapid rising of the north at the outbreak of our civil war, when the flag was fired upon at fort sumter. then was shown how deeply had sunk into the popular heart the devotion to the union and the flag, fostered by long dwelling upon the ideas, by innumerable fourth of july orations, often doubtless vainglorious, sometimes perhaps grotesque, but whose living force and overwhelming results were vividly apparent, as the fire leaped from hearthstone to hearthstone throughout the northern states. equally in the south was apparent how tenacious and compelling was the grip which the constant insistence upon the predominant claim of the state upon individual loyalty had struck into the hearts of her sons. what paper bonds, treaties, or alliances could have availed then to hold together people whose ideals had drifted so far apart, whose interests, as each at that time saw them, had become so opposed? although i am convinced firmly that it would be to the interest of great britain and the united states, and for the benefit of the world, that the two nations should act together cordially on the seas, i am equally sure that the result not only must be hoped but also quietly waited for, while the conditions upon which such cordiality depends are being realized by men. all are familiar with the idea conveyed by the words "forcing process." there are things that cannot be forced, processes which cannot be hurried, growths which are strong and noble in proportion as they imbibe slowly the beneficent influence of the sun and air in which they are bathed. how far the forcing process can be attempted by an extravagant imagination, and what the inevitable recoil of the mind you seek to take by storm, is amusingly shown by mr. carnegie's "look ahead," and by the demur thereto of so ardent a champion of anglo-american alliance--on terms which appear to me to be rational though premature--as sir george clarke. a country with a past as glorious and laborious as that of great britain, unprepared as yet, as a whole, to take a single step forward toward reunion, is confronted suddenly--as though the temptation must be irresistible--with a picture of ultimate results which i will not undertake to call impossible (who can say what is impossible?), but which certainly deprives the nation of much, if not all, the hard-wrought achievement of centuries. disunion, loss of national identity, changes of constitution more than radical, the exchange of a world-wide empire for a subordinate part in a great federation,--such _may_ be the destiny of great britain in the distant future. i know not; but sure i am, were i a citizen of great britain, the prospect would not allure me now to move an inch in such a direction. surely in vain the net is spread in the sight of any bird. the suggestions of sir george clarke and of mr. white are not open to the reproach of repelling those whom they seek to convince. they are clear, plain, business-like propositions, based upon indisputable reasons of mutual advantage, and in the case of the former quickened, as i have the pleasure of knowing through personal acquaintance, by a more than cordial good-will and breadth of view in all that relates to the united states. avoiding criticism of details--of which i have little to offer--my objection to them is simply that i do not think the time is yet ripe. the ground is not prepared yet in the hearts and understandings of americans, and i doubt whether in those of british citizens. both proposals contemplate a naval alliance, though on differing terms. the difficulty is that the united states, as a nation, does not realize or admit as yet that it has any strong interest in the sea; and that the great majority of our people rest firmly in a belief, deep rooted in the political history of our past, that our ambitions should be limited by the three seas that wash our eastern, western, and southern coasts. for myself, i believe that this, once a truth, can be considered so no longer with reference even to the present--much less to a future so near that it scarcely needs a prophet's eye to read; but even if it be but a prejudice, it must be removed before a further step can be taken. in our country national policy, if it is to be steadfast and consistent, must be identical with public conviction. the latter, when formed, may remain long quiescent; but given the appointed time, it will spring to mighty action--aye, to arms--as did the north and the south under their several impulses in . it is impossible that one who sees in the sea--in the function which it discharges towards the world at large--the most potent factor in national prosperity and in the course of history, should not desire a change in the mental attitude of our countrymen towards maritime affairs. the subject presents itself not merely as one of national importance, but as one concerning the world's history and the welfare of mankind, which are bound up, so far as we can see, in the security and strength of that civilization which is identified with europe and its offshoots in america. for what, after all, is our not unjustly vaunted european and american civilization? an oasis set in the midst of a desert of barbarism, rent with many intestine troubles, and ultimately dependent, not upon its mere elaboration of organization, but upon the power of that organization to express itself in a menacing and efficient attitude of physical force, sufficient to resist the numerically overwhelming, but inadequately organized hosts of outsiders. under present conditions these are diked off by the magnificent military organizations of europe, which also as yet cope successfully with the barbarians within. of what the latter are capable--at least in will--we have from time to time, and not least of late, terrific warnings, to which men scarcely can shut their eyes and ears; but sufficient attention hardly is paid to the possible dangers from those outside, who are wholly alien to the spirit of our civilization; nor do men realize how essential to the conservation of that civilization is the attitude of armed watchfulness between nations, which is maintained now by the great states of europe. even if we leave out of consideration the invaluable benefit to society, in this age of insubordination and anarchy, that so large a number of youth, at the most impressionable age, receive the lessons of obedience, order, respect for authority and law, by which military training conveys a potent antidote to lawlessness, it still would remain a mistake, plausible but utter, to see in the hoped-for subsidence of the military spirit in the nations of europe a pledge of surer progress of the world towards universal peace, general material prosperity, and ease. that alluring, albeit somewhat ignoble, ideal is not to be attained by the representatives of civilization dropping their arms, relaxing the tension of their moral muscle, and from fighting animals becoming fattened cattle fit only for slaughter. when carthage fell, and rome moved onward, without an equal enemy against whom to guard, to the dominion of the world of mediterranean civilization, she approached and gradually realized the reign of universal peace, broken only by those intestine social and political dissensions which are finding their dark analogues in our modern times of infrequent war. as the strife between nations of that civilization died away, material prosperity, general cultivation and luxury, flourished, while the weapons dropped nervelessly from their palsied arms. the genius of cæsar, in his gallic and germanic campaigns, built up an outside barrier, which, like a dike, for centuries postponed the inevitable end, but which also, like every artificial barrier, gave way when the strong masculine impulse which first created it had degenerated into that worship of comfort, wealth, and general softness, which is the ideal of the peace prophets of to-day. the wave of the invaders broke in,--the rain descended, the floods came, the winds blew, and beat upon the house, and it fell, because not founded upon the rock of virile reliance upon strong hands and brave hearts to defend what was dear to them. ease unbroken, trade uninterrupted, hardship done away, all roughness removed from life,--these are our modern gods; but can they deliver us, should we succeed in setting them up for worship? fortunately, as yet we cannot do so. we may, if we will, shut our eyes to the vast outside masses of aliens to our civilization, now powerless because we still, with a higher material development, retain the masculine combative virtues which are their chief possession; but, even if we disregard them, the ground already shakes beneath our feet with physical menace of destruction from within, against which the only security is in constant readiness to contend. in the rivalries of nations, in the accentuation of differences, in the conflict of ambitions, lies the preservation of the martial spirit, which alone is capable of coping finally with the destructive forces that from outside and from within threaten to submerge all the centuries have gained. it is not then merely, nor even chiefly, a pledge of universal peace that may be seen in the united states becoming a naval power of serious import, with clearly defined external ambitions dictated by the necessities of her interoceanic position; nor yet in the cordial co-operation, as of kindred peoples, that the future may have in store for her and great britain. not in universal harmony, nor in fond dreams of unbroken peace, rest now the best hopes of the world, as involved in the fate of european civilization. rather in the competition of interests, in that reviving sense of nationality, which is the true antidote to what is bad in socialism, in the jealous determination of each people to provide first for its own, of which the tide of protection rising throughout the world, whether economically an error or not, is so marked a symptom--in these jarring sounds which betoken that there is no immediate danger of the leading peoples turning their swords into ploughshares--are to be heard the assurance that decay has not touched yet the majestic fabric erected by so many centuries of courageous battling. in this same pregnant strife the united states doubtless will be led, by undeniable interests and aroused national sympathies, to play a part, to cast aside the policy of isolation which befitted her infancy, and to recognize that, whereas once to avoid european entanglement was essential to the development of her individuality, now to take her share of the travail of europe is but to assume an inevitable task, an appointed lot, in the work of upholding the common interests of civilization. our pacific slope, and the pacific colonies of great britain, with an instinctive shudder have felt the threat, which able europeans have seen in the teeming multitudes of central and northern asia; while their overflow into the pacific islands shows that not only westward by land, but also eastward by sea, the flood may sweep. i am not careful, however, to search into the details of a great movement, which indeed may never come, but whose possibility, in existing conditions, looms large upon the horizon of the future, and against which the only barrier will be the warlike spirit of the representatives of civilization. whate'er betide, sea power will play in those days the leading part which it has in all history, and the united states by her geographical position must be one of the frontiers from which, as from a base of operations, the sea power of the civilized world will energize. for this seemingly remote contingency preparation will be made, if men then shall be found prepared, by a practical recognition now of existing conditions--such as those mentioned in the opening of this paper--and acting upon that knowledge. control of the sea, by maritime commerce and naval supremacy, means predominant influence in the world; because, however great the wealth product of the land, nothing facilitates the necessary exchanges as does the sea. the fundamental truth concerning the sea--perhaps we should rather say the water--is that it is nature's great medium of communication. it is improbable that control ever again will be exercised, as once it was, by a single nation. like the pettier interests of the land, it must be competed for, perhaps fought for. the greatest of the prizes for which nations contend, it too will serve, like other conflicting interests, to keep alive that temper of stern purpose and strenuous emulation which is the salt of the society of civilized states, whose unity is to be found, not in a flat identity of conditions--the ideal of socialism--but in a common standard of moral and intellectual ideas. also, amid much that is shared by all the nations of european civilization, there are, as is universally recognized, certain radical differences of temperament and character, which tend to divide them into groups having the marked affinities of a common origin. when, as frequently happens on land, the members of these groups are geographically near each other, the mere proximity seems, like similar electricities, to develop repulsions which render political variance the rule and political combination the exception. but when, as is the case with great britain and the united states, the frontiers are remote, and contact--save in canada--too slight to cause political friction, the preservation, advancement, and predominance of the race may well become a political ideal, to be furthered by political combination, which in turn should rest, primarily, not upon cleverly constructed treaties, but upon natural affection and a clear recognition of mutual benefit arising from working together. if the spirit be there, the necessary machinery for its working will not pass the wit of the race to provide; and in the control of the sea, the beneficent instrument that separates us that we may be better friends, will be found the object that neither the one nor the other can master, but which may not be beyond the conjoined energies of the race. when, if ever, an anglo-american alliance, naval or other, does come, may it be rather as a yielding to irresistible popular impulse than as a scheme, however ingeniously wrought, imposed by the adroitness of statesmen. we may, however, i think, dismiss from our minds the belief, frequently advanced, and which is advocated so ably by sir george clarke, that such mutual support would tend in the future to exempt maritime commerce in general from the harassment which it hitherto has undergone in war. i shall have to try for special clearness here in stating my own views, partly because to some they may appear retrogressive, and also because they may be thought by others to contradict what i have said elsewhere, in more extensive and systematic treatment of this subject. the alliance which, under one form or another,--either as a naval league, according to sir george, or as a formal treaty, according to mr. white,--is advocated by both writers, looks ultimately and chiefly to the contingency of war. true, a leading feature of either proposal is to promote good-will and avert causes of dissension between the two contracting parties; but even this object is sought largely in order that they may stand by each other firmly in case of difficulty with other states. thus even war may be averted more surely; but, should it come, it would find the two united upon the ocean, consequently all-powerful there, and so possessors of that mastership of the general situation which the sea always has conferred upon its unquestioned rulers. granting the union of hearts and hands, the supremacy, from my standpoint, logically follows. but why, then, if supreme, concede to an enemy immunity for his commerce? "neither great britain nor america," says sir george clarke, though he elsewhere qualifies the statement, "can see in the commerce of other peoples an incentive to attack." why not? for what purposes, primarily, do navies exist? surely not merely to fight one another,--to gain what jomini calls "the sterile glory" of fighting battles in order to win them. if navies, as all agree, exist for the protection of commerce, it inevitably follows that in war they must aim at depriving their enemy of that great resource; nor is it easy to conceive what broad military use they can subserve that at all compares with the protection and destruction of trade. this sir george indeed sees, for he says elsewhere, "only on the principle of doing the utmost injury to an enemy, with a view to hasten the issue of war, can commerce-destroying be justified;" but he fails, i think, to appreciate the full importance of this qualifying concession, and neither he nor mr. white seems to admit the immense importance of commerce-destroying, as such. the mistake of both, i think, lies in not keeping clearly in view--what both certainly perfectly understand--the difference between the _guerre-de-course_, which is inconclusive, and commerce-destroying (or commerce prevention) through strategic control of the sea by powerful navies. some nations more than others, but all maritime nations more or less, depend for their prosperity upon maritime commerce, and probably upon it more than upon any other single factor. either under their own flag or that of a neutral, either by foreign trade or coasting trade, the sea is the greatest of boons to such a state; and under every form its sea-borne trade is at the mercy of a foe decisively superior. is it, then, to be expected that such foe will forego such advantage,--will insist upon spending blood and money in fighting, or money in the vain effort of maintaining a fleet which, having nothing to fight, also keeps its hands off such an obvious means of crippling the opponent and forcing him out of his ports? great britain's navy, in the french wars, not only protected her own commerce, but also annihilated that of the enemy; and both conditions--not one alone--were essential to her triumph. it is because great britain's sea power, though still superior, has declined relatively to that of other states, and is no longer supreme, that she has been induced to concede to neutrals the principle that the flag covers the goods. it is a concession wrung from relative weakness--or possibly from a mistaken humanitarianism; but, to whatever due, it is all to the profit of the neutral and to the loss of the stronger belligerent. the only justification, in policy, for its yielding by the latter, is that she can no longer, as formerly, bear the additional burden of hostility, if the neutral should ally himself to the enemy. i have on another occasion said that the principle that the flag covers the goods is forever secured--meaning thereby that, so far as present indications go, no one power would be strong enough at sea to maintain the contrary by arms. in the same way it may be asserted quite confidently that the concession of immunity to what is unthinkingly called the "private property" of an enemy on the sea, will never be conceded by a nation or alliance confident in its own sea power. it has been the dream of the weaker sea belligerents in all ages; and their arguments for it, at the first glance plausible, are very proper to urge from their point of view. that arch-robber, the first napoleon, who so remorselessly and exhaustively carried the principle of war sustaining war to its utmost logical sequence, and even in peace scrupled not to quarter his armies on subject countries, maintaining them on what, after all, was simply private property of foreigners,--even he waxes quite eloquent, and superficially most convincing, as he compares the seizure of goods at sea, so fatal to his empire, to the seizure of a wagon travelling an inland country road. in all these contentions there lies, beneath the surface plausibility, not so much a confusion of thought as a failure to recognize an essential difference of conditions. even on shore the protection of private property rests upon the simple principle that injury is not to be wanton,--that it is not to be inflicted when the end to be attained is trivial, or largely disproportionate to the suffering caused. for this reason personal property, not embarked in commercial venture, is respected in civilized maritime war. conversely, as we all know, the rule on land is by no means invariable, and private property receives scant consideration when its appropriation or destruction serves the purposes of an enemy. the man who trudges the highway, cudgel in hand, may claim for his cudgel all the sacredness with which civilization invests property; but if he use it to break his neighbor's head, the respect for his property, as such, quickly disappears. now, private property borne upon the seas is engaged in promoting, in the most vital manner, the strength and resources of the nation by which it is handled. when that nation becomes belligerent, the private property, so called, borne upon the seas, is sustaining the well-being and endurance of the nation at war, and consequently is injuring the opponent, to an extent exceeding all other sources of national power. in these days of war correspondents, most of us are familiar with the idea of the dependence of an army upon its communications, and we know, vaguely perhaps, but still we know, that to threaten or harm the communications of an army is one of the most common and effective devices of strategy. why? because severed from its base an army languishes and dies, and when threatened with such an evil it must fight at whatever disadvantage. well, is it not clear that maritime commerce occupies, to the power of a maritime state, the precise nourishing function that the communications of an army supply to the army? blows at commerce are blows at the communications of the state; they intercept its nourishment, they starve its life, they cut the roots of its power, the sinews of its war. while war remains a factor, a sad but inevitable factor, of our history, it is a fond hope that commerce can be exempt from its operations, because in very truth blows against commerce are the most deadly that can be struck; nor is there any other among the proposed uses of a navy, as for instance the bombardment of seaport towns, which is not at once more cruel and less scientific. blockade such as that enforced by the united states navy during the civil war, is evidently only a special phase of commerce-destroying; yet how immense--nay, decisive--its results! it is only when effort is frittered away in the feeble dissemination of the _guerre-de-course_, instead of being concentrated in a great combination to control the sea, that commerce-destroying justly incurs the reproach of misdirected effort. it is a fair deduction from analogy, that two contending armies might as well agree to respect each other's communications, as two belligerent states to guarantee immunity to hostile commerce. the future in relation to american naval power. _june, ._ that the united states navy within the last dozen years should have been recast almost wholly, upon more modern lines, is not, in itself alone, a fact that should cause comment, or give rise to questions about its future career or sphere of action. if this country needs, or ever shall need, a navy at all, indisputably in the hour had come when the time-worn hulks of that day, mostly the honored but superannuated survivors of the civil war, should drop out of the ranks, submit to well-earned retirement or inevitable dissolution, and allow their places to be taken by other vessels, capable of performing the duties to which they themselves were no longer adequate. it is therefore unlikely that there underlay this re-creation of the navy--for such in truth it was--any more recondite cause than the urgent necessity of possessing tools wholly fit for the work which war-ships are called upon to do. the thing had to be done, if the national fleet was to be other than an impotent parody of naval force, a costly effigy of straw. but, concurrently with the process of rebuilding, there has been concentrated upon the development of the new service a degree of attention, greater than can be attributed even to the voracious curiosity of this age of newsmongering and of interviewers. this attention in some quarters is undisguisedly reluctant and hostile, in others not only friendly but expectant, in both cases betraying a latent impression that there is, between the appearance of the new-comer and the era upon which we now are entering, something in common. if such coincidence there be, however, it is indicative not of a deliberate purpose, but of a commencing change of conditions, economical and political, throughout the world, with which sea power, in the broad sense of the phrase, will be associated closely; not, indeed, as the cause, nor even chiefly as a result, but rather as the leading characteristic of activities which shall cease to be mainly internal, and shall occupy themselves with the wider interests that concern the relations of states to the world at large. and it is just at this point that the opposing lines of feeling divide. those who hold that our political interests are confined to matters within our own borders, and are unwilling to admit that circumstances may compel us in the future to political action without them, look with dislike and suspicion upon the growth of a body whose very existence indicates that nations have international duties as well as international rights, and that international complications will arise from which we can no more escape than the states which have preceded us in history, or those contemporary with us. others, on the contrary, regarding the conditions and signs of these times, and the extra-territorial activities in which foreign states have embarked so restlessly and widely, feel that the nation, however greatly against its wish, may become involved in controversies not unlike those which in the middle of the century caused very serious friction, but which the generation that saw the century open would have thought too remote for its concern, and certainly wholly beyond its power to influence. religious creeds, dealing with eternal verities, may be susceptible of a certain permanency of statement; yet even here we in this day have witnessed the embarrassments of some religious bodies, arising from a traditional adherence to merely human formulas, which reflect views of the truth as it appeared to the men who framed them in the distant past. but political creeds, dealing as they do chiefly with the transient and shifting conditions of a world which is passing away continually, can claim no fixity of allegiance, except where they express, not the policy of a day, but the unchanging dictates of righteousness. and inasmuch as the path of ideal righteousness is not always plain nor always practicable; as expediency, policy, the choice of the lesser evil, must control at times; as nations, like men, will occasionally differ, honestly but irreconcilably, on questions of right,--there do arise disputes where agreement cannot be reached, and where the appeal must be made to force, that final factor which underlies the security of civil society even more than it affects the relations of states. the well-balanced faculties of washington saw this in his day with absolute clearness. jefferson either would not or could not. that there should be no navy was a cardinal prepossession of his political thought, born of an exaggerated fear of organized military force as a political, factor. though possessed with a passion for annexation which dominated much of his political action, he prescribed as the limit of the country's geographical expansion the line beyond which it would entail the maintenance of a navy. yet fate, ironical here as elsewhere in his administration, compelled the recognition that, unless a policy of total seclusion is adopted,--if even then,--it is not necessary to acquire territory beyond sea in order to undergo serious international complications, which could have been avoided much more easily had there been an imposing armed shipping to throw into the scale of the nation's argument, and to compel the adversary to recognize the impolicy of his course as well as what the united states then claimed to be its wrongfulness. the difference of conditions between the united states of to-day and of the beginning of this century illustrates aptly how necessary it is to avoid implicit acceptance of precedents, crystallized into maxims, and to seek for the quickening principle which justified, wholly or in part, the policy of one generation, but whose application may insure a very different course of action in a succeeding age. when the century opened, the united states was not only a continental power, as she now is, but she was one of several, of nearly equal strength as far as north america was concerned, with all of whom she had differences arising out of conflicting interests, and with whom, moreover, she was in direct geographical contact,--a condition which has been recognized usually as entailing peculiar proneness to political friction; for, while the interests of two nations may clash in quarters of the world remote from either, there is both greater frequency and greater bitterness when matters of dispute exist near at home, and especially along an artificial boundary, where the inhabitants of each are directly in contact with the causes of the irritation. it was therefore the natural and proper aim of the government of that day to abolish the sources of difficulty, by bringing all the territory in question under our own control, if it could be done by fair means. we consequently entered upon a course of action precisely such as a european continental state would have followed under like circumstances. in order to get possession of the territory in which our interests were involved, we bargained and manoeuvred and threatened; and although jefferson's methods were peaceful enough, few will be inclined to claim that they were marked by excess of scrupulousness, or even of adherence to his own political convictions. from the highly moral standpoint, the acquisition of louisiana under the actual conditions--being the purchase from a government which had no right to sell, in defiance of the remonstrance addressed to us by the power who had ceded the territory upon the express condition that it should not so be sold, but which was too weak to enforce its just reclamation against both napoleon and ourselves--reduces itself pretty much to a choice between overreaching and violence, as the less repulsive means of compassing an end in itself both desirable and proper; nor does the attempt, by strained construction, to wrest west florida into the bargain give a higher tone to the transaction. as a matter of policy, however, there is no doubt that our government was most wise; and the transfer, as well as the incorporation, of the territory was facilitated by the meagreness of the population that went with the soil. with all our love of freedom, it is not likely that many qualms were felt as to the political inclinations of the people concerning their transfer of allegiance. in questions of great import to nations or to the world, the wishes, or interests, or technical rights, of minorities must yield, and there is not necessarily any more injustice in this than in their yielding to a majority at the polls. while the need of continental expansion pressed thus heavily upon the statesmen of jefferson's era, questions relating to more distant interests were very properly postponed. at the time that matters of such immediate importance were pending, to enter willingly upon the consideration of subjects our concern in which was more remote, either in time or place, would have entailed a dissemination of attention and of power that is as greatly to be deprecated in statesmanship as it is in the operations of war. still, while the government of the day would gladly have avoided such complications, it found, as have the statesmen of all times, that if external interests exist, whatsoever their character, they cannot be ignored, nor can the measures which prudence dictates for their protection be neglected with safety. without political ambitions outside the continent, the commercial enterprise of the people brought our interests into violent antagonism with clear, unmistakable, and vital interests of foreign belligerent states; for we shall sorely misread the lessons of , and of the events which led to it, if we fail to see that the questions in dispute involved issues more immediately vital to great britain, in her then desperate struggle, than they were to ourselves, and that the great majority of her statesmen and people, of both parties, so regarded them. the attempt of our government to temporize with the difficulty, to overcome violence by means of peaceable coercion, instead of meeting it by the creation of a naval force so strong as to be a factor of consideration in the international situation, led us into an avoidable war. the conditions which now constitute the political situation of the united states, relatively to the world at large, are fundamentally different from those that obtained at the beginning of the century. it is not a mere question of greater growth, of bigger size. it is not only that we are larger, stronger, have, as it were, reached our majority, and are able to go out into the world. that alone would be a difference of degree, not of kind. the great difference between the past and the present is that we then, as regards close contact with the power of the chief nations of the world, were really in a state of political isolation which no longer exists. this arose from our geographical position--reinforced by the slowness and uncertainty of the existing means of intercommunication--and yet more from the grave preoccupation of foreign statesmen with questions of unprecedented and ominous importance upon the continent of europe. a policy of isolation was for us then practicable,--though even then only partially. it was expedient, also, because we were weak, and in order to allow the individuality of the nation time to accentuate itself. save the questions connected with the navigation of the mississippi, collision with other peoples was only likely to arise, and actually did arise, from going beyond our own borders in search of trade. the reasons now evoked by some against our political action outside our own borders might have been used then with equal appositeness against our commercial enterprises. let us stay at home, or we shall get into trouble. jefferson, in truth, averse in principle to commerce as to war, was happily logical in his embargo system. it not only punished the foreigner and diminished the danger of international complications, but it kept our own ships out of harm's way; and if it did destroy trade, and cause the grass to grow in the streets of new york, the incident, if inconvenient, had its compensations, by repressing hazardous external activities. few now, of course, would look with composure upon a policy, whatever its ground, which contemplated the peaceable seclusion of this nation from its principal lines of commerce. in , however, a great party accepted the alternative rather than fight, or even than create a force which might entail war, although more probably it would have prevented it. but would it be more prudent now to ignore the fact that we are no longer--however much we may regret it--in a position of insignificance or isolation, political or geographical, in any way resembling the times of jefferson, and that from the changed conditions may result to us a dilemma similar to that which confronted him and his supporters? not only have we grown,--that is a detail,--but the face of the world is changed, economically and politically. the sea, now as always the great means of communication between nations, is traversed with a rapidity and a certainty that have minimized distances. events which under former conditions would have been distant and of small concern, now happen at our doors and closely affect us. proximity, as has been noted, is a fruitful source of political friction, but proximity is the characteristic of the age. the world has grown smaller. positions formerly distant have become to us of vital importance from their nearness. but, while distances have shortened, they remain for us water distances, and, however short, for political influence they must be traversed in the last resort by a navy, the indispensable instrument by which, when emergencies arise, the nation can project its power beyond its own shore-line. whatever seeming justification, therefore, there may have been in the transient conditions of his own day for jefferson's dictum concerning a navy, rested upon a state of things that no longer obtains, and even then soon passed away. the war of demonstrated the usefulness of a navy,--not, indeed, by the admirable but utterly unavailing single-ship victories that illustrated its course, but by the prostration into which our seaboard and external communications fell, through the lack of a navy at all proportionate to the country's needs and exposure. the navy doubtless reaped honor in that brilliant sea struggle, but the honor was its own alone; only discredit accrued to the statesmen who, with such men to serve them, none the less left the country open to the humiliation of its harried coasts and blasted commerce. never was there a more lustrous example of what jomini calls "the sterile glory of fighting battles merely to win them." except for the prestige which at last awoke the country to the high efficiency of the petty force we called our navy, and showed what the sea might be to us, never was blood spilled more uselessly than in the frigate and sloop actions of that day. they presented no analogy to the outpost and reconnoissance fighting, to the detached services, that are not only inevitable but invaluable, in maintaining the _morale_ of a military organization in campaign. they were simply scattered efforts, without relation either to one another or to any main body whatsoever, capable of affecting seriously the issues of war, or, indeed, to any plan of operations worthy of the name. not very long after the war of , within the space of two administrations, there came another incident, epoch-making in the history of our external policy, and of vital bearing on the navy, in the enunciation of the monroe doctrine. that pronouncement has been curiously warped at times from its original scope and purpose. in its name have been put forth theories so much at odds with the relations of states, as hitherto understood, that, if they be maintained seriously, it is desirable in the interests of exact definition that their supporters advance some other name for them. it is not necessary to attribute finality to the monroe doctrine, any more than to any other political dogma, in order to deprecate the application of the phrase to propositions that override or transcend it. we should beware of being misled by names, and especially where such error may induce a popular belief that a foreign state is outraging wilfully a principle to the defence of which the country is committed. we have been committed to the monroe doctrine itself, not perhaps by any such formal assumption of obligations as cannot be evaded, but by certain precedents, and by a general attitude, upon the whole consistently maintained, from which we cannot recede silently without risk of national mortification. if seriously challenged, as in mexico by the third napoleon, we should hardly decline to emulate the sentiments so nobly expressed by the british government, when, in response to the emperors of russia and france, it declined to abandon the struggling spanish patriots to the government set over them by napoleon: "to spain his majesty is not bound by any formal instrument; but his majesty has, in the face of the world, contracted with that nation engagements not less sacred, and not less binding upon his majesty's mind, than the most solemn treaties." we may have to accept also certain corollaries which may appear naturally to result from the monroe doctrine, but we are by no means committed to some propositions which lately have been tallied with its name. those propositions possibly embody a sound policy, more applicable to present conditions than the monroe doctrine itself, and therefore destined to succeed it; but they are not the same thing. there is, however, something in common between it and them. reduced to its barest statement, and stripped of all deductions, natural or forced, the monroe doctrine, if it were not a mere political abstraction, formulated an idea to which in the last resort effect could be given only through the instrumentality of a navy; for the gist of it, the kernel of the truth, was that the country had at that time distant interests on the land, political interests of a high order in the destiny of foreign territory, of which a distinguishing characteristic was that they could be assured only by sea. like most stages in a nation's progress, the monroe doctrine, though elicited by a particular political incident, was not an isolated step unrelated to the past, but a development. it had its antecedents in feelings which arose before our war of independence, and which in , though we were then in deadly need of the french alliance, found expression in the stipulation that france should not attempt to regain canada. even then, and also in , the same jealousy did not extend to the floridas, which at the latter date were ceded by great britain to spain; and we expressly acquiesced in the conquest of the british west india islands by our allies. from that time to no remonstrance was made against the transfer of territories in the west indies and caribbean sea from one belligerent to another--an indifference which scarcely would be shown at the present time, even though the position immediately involved were intrinsically of trivial importance; for the question at stake would be one of principle, of consequences, far reaching as hampden's tribute of ship-money. it is beyond the professional province of a naval officer to inquire how far the monroe doctrine itself would logically carry us, or how far it may be developed, now or hereafter, by the recognition and statement of further national interests, thereby formulating another and wider view of the necessary range of our political influence. it is sufficient to quote its enunciation as a fact, and to note that it was the expression of a great national interest, not merely of a popular sympathy with south american revolutionists; for, had it been the latter, it would doubtless have proved as inoperative and evanescent as declarations arising from such emotions commonly are. from generation to generation we have been much stirred by the sufferings of greeks, or bulgarians, or armenians, at the hands of turkey; but, not being ourselves injuriously affected, our feelings have not passed into acts, and for that very reason have been ephemeral. no more than other nations are we exempt from the profound truth enunciated by washington--seared into his own consciousness by the bitter futilities of the french alliance in and the following years, and by the extravagant demands based upon it by the directory during his presidential term--that it is absurd to expect governments to act upon disinterested motives. it is not as an utterance of passing concern, benevolent or selfish, but because it voiced an enduring principle of necessary self-interest, that the monroe doctrine has retained its vitality, and has been made so easily to do duty as the expression of intuitive national sensitiveness to occurrences of various kinds in regions beyond the sea. at its christening the principle was directed against an apprehended intervention in american affairs, which depended not upon actual european concern in the territory involved, but upon a purely political arrangement between certain great powers, itself the result of ideas at the time moribund. in its first application, therefore, it was a confession that danger of european complications did exist, under conditions far less provocative of real european interest than those which now obtain and are continually growing. its subsequent applications have been many and various, and the incidents giving rise to them have been increasingly important, culminating up to the present in the growth of the united states to be a great pacific power, and in her probable dependence in the near future upon an isthmian canal for the freest and most copious intercourse between her two ocean seaboards. in the elasticity and flexibleness with which the dogma thus has accommodated itself to varying conditions, rather than in the strict wording of the original statement, is to be seen the essential characteristic of a living principle--the recognition, namely, that not merely the interests of individual citizens, but the interests of the united states as a nation, are bound up with regions beyond the sea, not part of our own political domain, in which therefore, under some imaginable circumstances, we may be forced to take action. it is important to recognize this, for it will help clear away the error from a somewhat misleading statement frequently made,--that the united states needs a navy for defence only, adding often, explanatorily, for the defence of our own coasts. now in a certain sense we all want a navy for defence only. it is to be hoped that the united states will never seek war except for the defence of her rights, her obligations, or her necessary interests. in that sense our policy may always be defensive only, although it may compel us at times to steps justified rather by expediency--the choice of the lesser evil--than by incontrovertible right. but if we have interests beyond sea which a navy may have to protect, it plainly follows that the navy has more to do, even in war, than to defend the coast; and it must be added as a received military axiom that war, however defensive in moral character, must be waged aggressively if it is to hope for success. for national security, the correlative of a national principle firmly held and distinctly avowed is, not only the will, but the power to enforce it. the clear expression of national purpose, accompanied by evident and adequate means to carry it into effect, is the surest safeguard against war, provided always that the national contention is maintained with a candid and courteous consideration of the rights and susceptibilities of other states. on the other hand, no condition is more hazardous than that of a dormant popular feeling, liable to be roused into action by a moment of passion, such as that which swept over the north when the flag was fired upon at sumter, but behind which lies no organized power for action. it is on the score of due preparation for such an ultimate contingency that nations, and especially free nations, are most often deficient. yet, if wanting in definiteness of foresight and persistency of action, owing to the inevitable frequency of change in the governments that represent them, democracies seem in compensation to be gifted with an instinct, the result perhaps of the free and rapid interchange of thought by which they are characterized, that intuitively and unconsciously assimilates political truths, and prepares in part for political action before the time for action has come. that the mass of united states citizens do not realize understandingly that the nation has vital political interests beyond the sea is probably true; still more likely is it that they are not tracing any connection between them and the reconstruction of the navy. yet the interests exist, and the navy is growing; and in the latter fact is the best surety that no breach of peace will ensue from the maintenance of the former. it is, not, then the indication of a formal political purpose, far less of anything like a threat, that is, from my point of view, to be recognized in the recent development of the navy. nations, as a rule, do not move with the foresight and the fixed plan which distinguish a very few individuals of the human race. they do not practise on the pistol-range before sending a challenge; if they did, wars would be fewer, as is proved by the present long-continued armed peace in europe. gradually and imperceptibly the popular feeling, which underlies most lasting national movements, is aroused and swayed by incidents, often trivial, but of the same general type, whose recurrence gradually moulds public opinion and evokes national action, until at last there issues that settled public conviction which alone, in a free state, deserves the name of national policy. what the origin of those particular events whose interaction establishes a strong political current in a particular direction, it is perhaps unprofitable to inquire. some will see in the chain of cause and effect only a chapter of accidents, presenting an interesting philosophical study, and nothing more; others, equally persuaded that nations do not effectively shape their mission in the world, will find in them the ordering of a divine ruler, who does not permit the individual or the nation to escape its due share of the world's burdens. but, however explained, it is a common experience of history that in the gradual ripening of events there comes often suddenly and unexpectedly the emergency, the call for action, to maintain the nation's contention. that there is an increased disposition on the part of civilized countries to deal with such cases by ordinary diplomatic discussion and mutual concession can be gratefully acknowledged; but that such dispositions are not always sufficient to reach a peaceable solution is equally an indisputable teaching of the recent past. popular emotion, once fairly roused, sweeps away the barriers of calm deliberation, and is deaf to the voice of reason. that the consideration of relative power enters for much in the diplomatic settlement of international difficulties is also certain, just as that it goes for much in the ordering of individual careers. "can," as well as "will," plays a large share in the decisions of life. like each man and woman, no state lives to itself alone, in a political seclusion resembling the physical isolation which so long was the ideal of china and japan. all, whether they will or no, are members of a community, larger or, smaller; and more and more those of the european family to which we racially belong are touching each other throughout the world, with consequent friction of varying degree. that the greater rapidity of communication afforded by steam has wrought, in the influence of sea power over the face of the globe, an extension that is multiplying the points of contact and emphasizing the importance of navies, is a fact, the intelligent appreciation of which is daily more and more manifest in the periodical literature of europe, and is further shown by the growing stress laid upon that arm of military strength by foreign governments; while the mutual preparation of the armies on the european continent, and the fairly settled territorial conditions, make each state yearly more wary of initiating a contest, and thus entail a political quiescence there, except in the internal affairs of each country. the field of external action for the great european states is now the world, and it is hardly doubtful that their struggles, unaccompanied as yet by actual clash of arms, are even under that condition drawing nearer to ourselves. coincidently with our own extension to the pacific ocean, which for so long had a good international claim to its name, that sea has become more and more the scene of political development, of commercial activities and rivalries, in which all the great powers, ourselves included, have a share. through these causes central and caribbean america, now intrinsically unimportant, are brought in turn into great prominence, as constituting the gateway between the atlantic and pacific when the isthmian canal shall have been made, and as guarding the approaches to it. the appearance of japan as a strong ambitious state, resting on solid political and military foundations, but which scarcely has reached yet a condition of equilibrium in international standing, has fairly startled the world; and it is a striking illustration of the somewhat sudden nearness and unforeseen relations into which modern states are brought, that the hawaiian islands, so interesting from the international point of view to the countries of european civilization, are occupied largely by japanese and chinese. in all these questions we have a stake, reluctantly it may be, but necessarily, for our evident interests are involved, in some instances directly, in others by very probable implication. under existing conditions, the opinion that we can keep clear indefinitely of embarrassing problems is hardly tenable; while war between two foreign states, which in the uncertainties of the international situation throughout the world may break out at any time, will increase greatly the occasions of possible collision with the belligerent countries, and the consequent perplexities of our statesmen seeking to avoid entanglement and to maintain neutrality. although peace is not only the avowed but for the most part the actual desire of european governments, they profess no such aversion to distant political enterprises and colonial acquisitions as we by tradition have learned to do. on the contrary, their committal to such divergent enlargements of the national activities and influence is one of the most pregnant facts of our time, the more so that their course is marked in the case of each state by a persistence of the same national traits that characterized the great era of colonization, which followed the termination of the religious wars in europe, and led to the world-wide contests of the eighteenth century. in one nation the action is mainly political,--that of a government pushed, by long-standing tradition and by its passion for administration, to extend the sphere of its operations so as to acquire a greater field in which to organize and dominate, somewhat regardless of economical advantage. in another the impulse comes from the restless, ubiquitous energy of the individual citizens, singly or in companies, moved primarily by the desire of gain, but carrying ever with them, subordinate only to the commercial aim, the irresistible tendency of the race to rule as well as to trade, and dragging the home government to recognize and to assume the consequences of their enterprise. yet again there is the movement whose motive is throughout mainly private and mercantile, in which the individual seeks wealth only, with little or no political ambition, and where the government intervenes chiefly that it may retain control of its subjects in regions where but for such intervention they would become estranged from it. but, however diverse the modes of operation, all have a common characteristic, in that they bear the stamp of the national genius,--a proof that the various impulses are not artificial, but natural, and that they therefore will continue until an adjustment is reached. what the process will be, and what the conclusion, it is impossible to foresee; but that friction at times has been very great, and matters dangerously near passing from the communications of cabinets to the tempers of the peoples, is sufficiently known. if, on the one hand, some look upon this as a lesson to us to keep clear of similar adventures, on the other hand it gives a warning that not only do causes of offence exist which may result at an unforeseen moment in a rupture extending to many parts of the world, but also that there is a spirit abroad which yet may challenge our claim to exclude its action and interference in any quarter, unless it finds us prepared there in adequate strength to forbid it, or to exercise our own. more and more civilized man is needing and seeking ground to occupy, room over which to expand and in which to live. like all natural forces, the impulse takes the direction of least resistance, but when in its course it comes upon some region rich in possibilities, but unfruitful through the incapacity or negligence of those who dwell therein, the incompetent race or system will go down, as the inferior race ever has fallen back and disappeared before the persistent impact of the superior. the recent and familiar instance of egypt is entirely in point. the continuance of the existing system--if it can be called such--had become impossible, not because of the native egyptians, who had endured the like for ages, but because there were involved therein the interests of several european states, of which two principally were concerned by present material interest and traditional rivalry. of these one, and that the one most directly affected, refused to take part in the proposed interference, with the result that this was not abandoned, but carried out solely by the other, which remains in political and administrative control of the country. whether the original enterprise or the continued presence of great britain in egypt is entirely clear of technical wrongs, open to the criticism of the pure moralist, is as little to the point as the morality of an earthquake; the general action was justified by broad considerations of moral expediency, being to the benefit of the world at large, and of the people of egypt in particular--however they might have voted in the matter. but what is chiefly instructive in this occurrence is the inevitableness, which it shares in common with the great majority of cases where civilized and highly organized peoples have trespassed upon the technical rights of possession of the previous occupants of the land--of which our own dealings with the american indian afford another example. the inalienable rights of the individual are entitled to a respect which they unfortunately do not always get; but there is no inalienable right in any community to control the use of a region when it does so to the detriment of the world at large, of its neighbors in particular, or even at times of its own subjects. witness, for example, the present angry resistance of the arabs at jiddah to the remedying of a condition of things which threatens to propagate a deadly disease far and wide, beyond the locality by which it is engendered; or consider the horrible conditions under which the armenian subjects of turkey have lived and are living. when such conditions obtain, they can be prolonged only by the general indifference or mutual jealousies of the other peoples concerned--as in the instance of turkey--or because there is sufficient force to perpetuate the misrule, in which case the right is inalienable only until its misuse brings ruin, or until a stronger force appears to dispossess it. it is because so much of the world still remains in the possession of the savage, or of states whose imperfect development, political or economical, does not enable them to realize for the general use nearly the result of which the territory is capable, while at the same time the redundant energies of civilized states, both government and peoples, are finding lack of openings and scantiness of livelihood at home, that there now obtains a condition of aggressive restlessness with which all have to reckon. that the united states does not now share this tendency is entirely evident. neither her government nor her people are affected by it to any great extent. but the force of circumstances has imposed upon her the necessity, recognized with practical unanimity by her people, of insuring to the weaker states of america, although of racial and political antecedents different from her own, freedom to develop politically along their own lines and according to their own capacities, without interference in that respect from governments foreign to these continents. the duty is self-assumed; and resting, as it does, not upon political philanthropy, but simply upon our own proximate interests as affected by such foreign interference, has towards others rather the nature of a right than a duty. but, from either point of view, the facility with which the claim has been allowed heretofore by the great powers has been due partly to the lack of pressing importance in the questions that have arisen, and partly to the great latent strength of our nation, which was an argument more than adequate to support contentions involving matters of no greater immediate moment, for example, than that of the honduras bay islands or of the mosquito coast. great britain there yielded, it is true, though reluctantly and slowly; and it is also true that, so far as organized force is concerned, she could have destroyed our navy then existing and otherwise have injured us greatly; but the substantial importance of the question, though real, was remote in the future, and, as it was, she made a political bargain which was more to her advantage than ours. but while our claim thus far has received a tacit acquiescence, it remains to be seen whether it will continue to command the same if the states whose political freedom of action we assert make no more decided advance towards political stability than several of them have done yet, and if our own organized naval force remains as slender, comparatively, as it once was, and even yet is. it is probably safe to say that an undertaking like that of great britain in egypt, if attempted in this hemisphere by a non-american state, would not be tolerated by us if able to prevent it; but it is conceivable that the moral force of our contention might be weakened, in the view of an opponent, by attendant circumstances, in which case our physical power to support it should be open to no doubt. that we shall seek to secure the peaceable solution of each difficulty as it arises is attested by our whole history, and by the disposition of our people; but to do so, whatever the steps taken in any particular case, will bring us into new political relations and may entail serious disputes with other states. in maintaining the justest policy, the most reasonable influence, one of the political elements, long dominant, and still one of the most essential, is military strength--in the broad sense of the word "military," which includes naval as well--not merely potential, which our own is, but organized and developed, which our own as yet is not. we wisely quote washington's warning against entangling alliances, but too readily forget his teaching about preparation for war. the progress of the world from age to age, in its ever-changing manifestations, is a great political drama, possessing a unity, doubtless, in its general development, but in which, as act follows act, one situation alone can engage, at one time, the attention of the actors. of this drama war is simply a violent and tumultuous political incident. a navy, therefore, whose primary sphere of action is war, is, in the last analysis and from the least misleading point of view, a political factor of the utmost importance in international affairs, one more often deterrent than irritant. it is in that light, according to the conditions of the age and of the nation, that it asks and deserves the appreciation of the state, and that it should be developed in proportion to the reasonable possibilities of the political future. preparedness for naval war. _december, ._ the problem of preparation for war in modern times is both extensive and complicated. as in the construction of the individual ship, where the attempt to reconcile conflicting requirements has resulted, according to a common expression, in a compromise, the most dubious of all military solutions,--giving something to all, and all to none,--so preparation for war involves many conditions, often contradictory one to another, at times almost irreconcilable. to satisfy all of these passes the ingenuity of the national treasury, powerless to give the whole of what is demanded by the representatives of the different elements, which, in duly ordered proportion, constitute a complete scheme of national military policy, whether for offence or defence. unable to satisfy all, and too often equally unable to say, frankly, "this one is chief; to it you others must yield, except so far as you contribute to its greatest efficiency," either the pendulum of the government's will swings from one extreme to the other, or, in the attempt to be fair all round, all alike receive less than they ask, and for their theoretical completeness require. in other words, the contents of the national purse are distributed, instead of being concentrated upon a leading conception, adopted after due deliberation, and maintained with conviction. the creation of material for war, under modern conditions, requires a length of time which does not permit the postponement of it to the hour of impending hostilities. to put into the water a first-class battle-ship, fully armored, within a year after the laying of her keel, as has been done latterly in england, is justly considered an extraordinary exhibition of the nation's resources for naval shipbuilding; and there yet remained to be done the placing of her battery, and many other matters of principal detail essential to her readiness for sea. this time certainly would not be less for ourselves, doing our utmost. war is simply a political movement, though violent and exceptional in its character. however sudden the occasion from which it arises, it results from antecedent conditions, the general tendency of which should be manifest long before to the statesmen of a nation, and to at least the reflective portion of the people. in such anticipation, such forethought, as in the affairs of common life, lies the best hope of the best solution,--peace by ordinary diplomatic action; peace by timely agreement, while men's heads are cool, and the crisis of fever has not been reached by the inflammatory utterances of an unscrupulous press, to which agitated public apprehension means increase of circulation. but while the maintenance of peace by sagacious prevision is the laurel of the statesman, which, in failing to achieve except by force, he takes from his own brow and gives to the warrior, it is none the less a necessary part of his official competence to recognize that in public disputes, as in private, there is not uncommonly on both sides an element of right, real or really believed, which prevents either party from yielding, and that it is better for men to fight than, for the sake of peace, to refuse to support their convictions of justice. how deplorable the war between the north and south! but more deplorable by far had it been that either had flinched from the maintenance of what it believed to be fundamental right. on questions of merely material interest men may yield; on matters of principle they may be honestly in the wrong; but a conviction of right, even though mistaken, if yielded without contention, entails a deterioration of character, except in the presence of force demonstrably irresistible--and sometimes even then. death before dishonor is a phrase which at times has been abused infamously, but it none the less contains a vital truth. to provide a force adequate to maintain the nation's cause, and to insure its readiness for immediate action in case of necessity, are the responsibility of the government of a state, in its legislative and executive functions. such a force is a necessary outcome of the political conditions which affect, or, as can be foreseen, probably may affect, the international relations of the country. its existence at all and its size are, or should be, the reflection of the national consciousness that in this, that, or the other direction lie clear national interests--for which each generation is responsible to futurity--or national duties, equally clear from the mere fact that the matter lies at the door, like lazarus at the rich man's gate. the question of when or how action shall be taken which may result in hostilities, is indeed a momentous one, having regard to the dire evils of war; but it is the question of a moment, of the last moment to which can be postponed a final determination of such tremendous consequence. to this determination preparation for war has only this relation: that it should be adequate to the utmost demand that then can be made upon it, and, if possible, so imposing that it will prevent war ensuing, upon the firm presentation of demands which the nation believes to be just. such a conception, so stated, implies no more than defence,--defence of the nation's rights or of the nation's duties, although such defence may take the shape of aggressive action, the only safe course in war. logically, therefore, a nation which proposes to provide itself with a naval or military organization adequate to its needs, must begin by considering, not what is the largest army or navy in the world, with the view of rivalling it, but what there is in the political status of the world, including not only the material interests but the temper of nations, which involves a reasonable, even though remote, prospect of difficulties which may prove insoluble except by war. the matter, primarily, is political in character. it is not until this political determination has been reached that the data for even stating the military problem are in hand; for here, as always, the military arm waits upon and is subservient to the political interests and civil power of the state. it is not the most probable of dangers, but the most formidable, that must be selected as measuring the degree of military precaution to be embodied in the military preparations thenceforth to be maintained. the lesser is contained in the greater; if equal to the most that can be apprehended reasonably, the country can view with quiet eye the existence of more imminent, but less dangerous complications. nor should it be denied that in estimating danger there should be a certain sobriety of imagination, equally removed from undue confidence and from exaggerated fears. napoleon's caution to his marshals not to make a picture to themselves--not to give too loose rein to fancy as to what the enemy might do, regardless of the limitations to which military movements are subject--applies to antecedent calculations, like those which we are considering now, as really as to the operations of the campaign. when british writers, realizing the absolute dependence of their own country upon the sea, insist that the british navy must exceed the two most formidable of its possible opponents, they advance an argument which is worthy at least of serious debate; but when the two is raised to three, they assume conditions which are barely possible, but lie too far without the limits of probability to affect practical action. in like manner, the united states, in estimating her need of military preparation of whatever kind, is justified in considering, not merely the utmost force which might be brought against her by a possible enemy, under the political circumstances most favorable to the latter, but the limitations imposed upon an opponent's action by well-known conditions of a permanent nature. our only rivals in potential military strength are the great powers of europe. these, however, while they have interests in the western hemisphere,--to which a certain solidarity is imparted by their instinctive and avowed opposition to a policy to which the united states, by an inward compulsion apparently irresistible, becomes more and more committed,--have elsewhere yet wider and more onerous demands upon their attention. since great britain, france, and germany have each acquired colonial possessions, varying in extent from one million to two and a half million square miles,--chiefly in africa. this means, as is generally understood, not merely the acquisition of so much new territory, but the perpetuation of national rivalries and suspicions, maintaining in full vigor, in this age, the traditions of past animosities. it means uncertainties about boundaries--that most fruitful source of disputes when running through unexplored wildernesses--jealousy of influence over native occupants of the soil, fear of encroachment, unperceived till too late, and so a constant, if silent, strife to insure national preponderance in these newly opened regions. the colonial expansion of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is being resumed under our eyes, bringing with it the same train of ambitions and feelings that were exhibited then, though these are qualified by the more orderly methods of modern days and by a well-defined mutual apprehension,--the result of a universal preparedness for war, the distinctive feature of our own time which most guarantees peace. all this reacts evidently upon europe, the common mother-country of these various foreign enterprises, in whose seas and lands must be fought out any struggle springing from these remote causes, and upon whose inhabitants chiefly must fall both the expense and the bloodshed thence arising. to these distant burdens of disquietude--in the assuming of which, though to an extent self-imposed, the present writer recognizes the prevision of civilization, instinctive rather than conscious, against the perils of the future--is to be added the proximate and unavoidable anxiety dependent upon the conditions of turkey and its provinces, the logical outcome of centuries of turkish misrule. deplorable as have been, and to some extent still are, political conditions on the american continents, the new world, in the matter of political distribution of territory and fixity of tenure, is permanence itself, as compared with the stormy prospect confronting the old in its questions which will not down. in these controversies, which range themselves under the broad heads of colonial expansion and the eastern question, all the larger powers of europe, the powers that maintain considerable armies or navies, or both, are directly and deeply interested--except spain. the latter manifests no solicitude concerning the settlement of affairs in the east of europe, nor is she engaged in increasing her still considerable colonial dominion. this preoccupation of the great powers, being not factitious, but necessary,--a thing that cannot be dismissed by an effort of the national will, because its existence depends upon the nature of things,--is a legitimate element in the military calculations of the united states. it cannot enter into her diplomatic considerations, for it is her pride not to seek, from the embarrassments of other states, advantages or concessions which she cannot base upon the substantial justice of her demands. but, while this is true, the united states has had in the past abundant experience of disputes, in which, though she believed herself right, even to the point of having a just _casus belli_, the other party has not seemed to share the same conviction. these difficulties, chiefly, though not solely, territorial in character, have been the natural bequest of the colonial condition through which this hemisphere passed on its way to its present political status. her own view of right, even when conceded in the end, has not approved itself at first to the other party to the dispute. fortunately these differences have been mainly with great britain, the great and beneficent colonizer, a state between which and ourselves a sympathy, deeper than both parties have been ready always to admit, has continued to exist, because founded upon common fundamental ideas of law and justice. of this the happy termination of the venezuelan question is the most recent but not the only instance. it is sometimes said that great britain is the most unpopular state in europe. if this be so,--and many of her own people seem to accept the fact of her political isolation, though with more or less of regret,--is there nothing significant to us in that our attitude towards her in the venezuelan matter has not commanded the sympathy of europe, but rather the reverse? our claim to enter, as of right, into a dispute not originally our own, and concerning us only as one of the american group of nations, has been rejected in no doubtful tones by organs of public opinion which have no fondness for great britain. whether any foreign government has taken the same attitude is not known,--probably there has been no official protest against the apparent admission of a principle which binds nobody but the parties to it. do we ourselves realize that, happy as the issue of our intervention has been, it may entail upon us greater responsibilities, more serious action, than we have assumed before? that it amounts in fact--if one may use a military metaphor--to occupying an advanced position, the logical result very likely of other steps in the past, but which nevertheless implies necessarily such organization of strength as will enable us to hold it? without making a picture to ourselves, without conjuring up extravagant contingencies, it is not difficult to detect the existence of conditions, in which are latent elements of future disputes, identical in principle with those through which we have passed heretofore. can we expect that, if unprovided with adequate military preparation, we shall receive from other states, not imbued with our traditional habits of political thought, and therefore less patient of our point of view, the recognition of its essential reasonableness which has been conceded by the government of great britain? the latter has found capacity for sympathy with our attitude,--not only by long and close contact and interlacing of interests between the two peoples, nor yet only in a fundamental similarity of character and institutions. besides these, useful as they are to mutual understanding, that government has an extensive and varied experience, extending over centuries, of the vital importance of distant regions to its own interests, to the interests of its people and its commerce, or to its political prestige. it can understand and allow for a determination not to acquiesce in the beginning or continuance of a state of things, the tendency of which is to induce future embarrassments,--to complicate or to endanger essential welfare. a nation situated as great britain is in india and egypt scarcely can fail to appreciate our own sensitiveness regarding the central american isthmus, and the pacific, on which we have such extensive territory; nor is it a long step from concern about the mediterranean, and anxious watchfulness over the progressive occupation of its southern shores, to an understanding of our reluctance to see the ambitions and conflicts of another hemisphere approach, even remotely and indirectly, the comparatively peaceful neighborhoods surrounding the caribbean sea, bearing a threat of disturbance to the political distribution of power or of territorial occupation now existing. whatever our interests may demand in the future may be a matter of doubt, but it is hard to see how there can be any doubt in the mind of a british statesman that it is our clear interest now, when all is quiet, to see removed possibilities of trouble which might break out at a less propitious season. such facility for reaching an understanding, due to experience of difficulties, is supported strongly by a hearty desire for peace, traditional with a commercial people who have not to reproach themselves with any lack of resolution or tenacity in assuming and bearing the burden of war when forced upon them. "militarism" is not a preponderant spirit in either great britain or the united states; their commercial tendencies and their isolation concur to exempt them from its predominance. pugnacious, and even warlike, when aroused, the idea of war in the abstract is abhorrent to them, because it interferes with their leading occupations, and its demands are alien to their habits of thought. to say that either lacks sensitiveness to the point of honor would be to wrong them; but the point must be made clear to them, and it will not be found in the refusal of reasonable demands, because they involve the abandonment of positions hastily or ignorantly assumed, nor in the mere attitude of adhering to a position lest there may be an appearance of receding under compulsion. napoleon i. phrased the extreme position of militarism in the words, "if the british ministry should intimate that there was anything the first consul had not done, _because he was prevented from doing it_, that instant he would do it." now the united states, speaking by various organs, has said, in language scarcely to be misunderstood, that she is resolved to resort to force, if necessary, to prevent the territorial or political extension of european power beyond its present geographical limits in the american continents. in the question of a disputed boundary she has held that this resolve--dependent upon what she conceives her reasonable policy--required her to insist that the matter should be submitted to arbitration. if great britain should see in this political stand the expression of a reasonable national policy, she is able, by the training and habit of her leaders, to accept it as such, without greatly troubling over the effect upon men's opinions that may be produced by the additional announcement that the policy is worth fighting for, and will be fought for if necessary. it would be a matter of course for her to fight for her just interests, if need be, and why should not another state say the same? the point--of honor, if you like--is not whether a nation will fight, but whether its claim is just. such an attitude, however, is not the spirit of "militarism," nor accordant with it; and in nations saturated with the military spirit, the intimation that a policy will be supported by force raises that sort of point of honor behind which the reasonableness of the policy is lost to sight. it can no longer be viewed dispassionately; it is prejudged by the threat, however mildly that be expressed. and this is but a logical development of their institutions. the soldier, or the state much of whose policy depends upon organized force, cannot but resent the implication that he or it is unable or unwilling to meet force with force. the life of soldiers and of armies is their spirit, and that spirit receives a serious wound when it seems--even superficially--to recoil before a threat; while with the weakening of the military body falls an element of political strength which has no analogue in great britain or the united states, the chief military power of which must lie ever in navies, never an aggressive factor such as armies have been. now, the united states has made an announcement that she will support by force a policy which may bring her into collision with states of military antecedents, indisposed by their interests to acquiesce in our position, and still less willing to accept it under appearance of threat. what preparation is necessary in case such a one is as determined to fight against our demands as we to fight for them? preparation for war, rightly understood, falls under two heads,--preparation and preparedness. the one is a question mainly of material, and is constant in its action. the second involves an idea of completeness. when, at a particular moment, preparations are completed, one is prepared--not otherwise. there may have been made a great deal of very necessary preparation for war without being prepared. every constituent of preparation may be behindhand, or some elements may be perfectly ready, while others are not. in neither case can a state be said to be prepared. in the matter of preparation for war, one clear idea should be absorbed first by every one who, recognizing that war is still a possibility, desires to see his country ready. this idea is that, however defensive in origin or in political character a war may be, the assumption of a simple defensive in war is ruin. war, once declared, must be waged offensively, aggressively. the enemy must not be fended off, but smitten down. you may then spare him every exaction, relinquish every gain; but till down he must be struck incessantly and remorselessly. preparation, like most other things, is a question both of kind and of degree, of quality and of quantity. as regards degree, the general lines upon which it is determined have been indicated broadly in the preceding part of this article. the measure of degree is the estimated force which the strongest _probable_ enemy can bring against you, allowance being made for clear drawbacks upon his total force, imposed by his own embarrassments and responsibilities in other parts of the world. the calculation is partly military, partly political, the latter, however, being the dominant factor in the premises. in kind, preparation is twofold,--defensive and offensive. the former exists chiefly for the sake of the latter, in order that offence, the determining factor in war, may put forth its full power, unhampered by concern for the protection of the national interests or for its own resources. in naval war, coast defence is the defensive factor, the navy the offensive. coast defence, when adequate, assures the naval commander-in-chief that his base of operations--the dock-yards and coal depots--is secure. it also relieves him and his government, by the protection afforded to the chief commercial centres, from the necessity of considering them, and so leaves the offensive arm perfectly free. coast defence implies coast attack. to what attacks are coasts liable? two, principally,--blockade and bombardment. the latter, being the more difficult, includes the former, as the greater does the lesser. a fleet that can bombard can still more easily blockade. against bombardment the necessary precaution is gun-fire, of such power and range that a fleet cannot lie within bombarding distance. this condition is obtained, where surroundings permit, by advancing the line of guns so far from the city involved that bombarding distance can be reached only by coming under their fire. but it has been demonstrated, and is accepted, that, owing to their rapidity of movement,--like a flock of birds on the wing,--a fleet of ships can, without disabling loss, pass by guns before which they could not lie. hence arises the necessity of arresting or delaying their progress by blocking channels, which in modern practice is done by lines of torpedoes. the mere moral effect of the latter is a deterrent to a dash past,--by which, if successful, a fleet reaches the rear of the defences, and appears immediately before the city, which then lies at its mercy. coast defence, then, implies gun-power and torpedo lines placed as described. be it said in passing that only places of decisive importance, commercially or militarily, need such defences. modern fleets cannot afford to waste ammunition in bombarding unimportant towns,--at least when so far from their own base as they would be on our coast. it is not so much a question of money as of frittering their fighting strength. it would not pay. even coast defence, however, although essentially passive, should have an element of offensive force, local in character, distinct from the offensive navy, of which nevertheless it forms a part. to take the offensive against a floating force it must itself be afloat--naval. this offensive element of coast defence is to be found in the torpedo-boat, in its various developments. it must be kept distinct in idea from the sea-going fleet, although it is, of course, possible that the two may act in concert. the war very well may take such a turn that the sea-going navy will find its best preparation for initiating an offensive movement to be by concentrating in a principal seaport. failing such a contingency, however, and in and for coast defence in its narrower sense, there should be a local flotilla of small torpedo-vessels, which by their activity should make life a burden to an outside enemy. a distinguished british admiral, now dead, has said that he believed half the captains of a blockading fleet would break down--"go crazy" were the words repeated to me--under the strain of modern conditions. the expression, of course, was intended simply to convey a sense of the immensity of suspense to be endured. in such a flotilla, owing to the smallness of its components, and to the simplicity of their organization and functions, is to be found the best sphere for naval volunteers; the duties could be learned with comparative ease, and the whole system is susceptible of rapid development. be it remembered, however, that it is essentially defensive, only incidentally offensive, in character. such are the main elements of coast defence--guns, lines of torpedoes, torpedo-boats. of these none can be extemporized, with the possible exception of the last, and that would be only a makeshift. to go into details would exceed the limits of an article,--require a brief treatise. suffice it to say, without the first two, coast cities are open to bombardment; without the last, they can be blockaded freely, unless relieved by the sea-going navy. bombardment and blockade are recognized modes of warfare, subject only to reasonable notification,--a concession rather to humanity and equity than to strict law. bombardment and blockade directed against great national centres, in the close and complicated network of national and commercial interests as they exist in modern times, strike not only the point affected, but every corner of the land. the offensive in naval war, as has been said, is the function of the sea-going navy--of the battle-ships, and of the cruisers of various sizes and purposes, including sea-going torpedo-vessels capable of accompanying a fleet, without impeding its movements by their loss of speed or unseaworthiness. seaworthiness, and reasonable speed under all weather conditions, are qualities necessary to every constituent of a fleet; but, over and above these, the backbone and real power of any navy are the vessels which, by due proportion of defensive and offensive powers, are capable of taking and giving hard knocks. all others are but subservient to these, and exist only for them. what is that strength to be? ships answering to this description are the _kind_ which make naval strength; what is to be its _degree_? what their number? the answer--a broad formula--is that it must be great enough to take the sea, and to fight, with reasonable chances of success, the largest force likely to be brought against it, as shown by calculations which have been indicated previously. being, as we claim, and as our past history justifies us in claiming, a nation indisposed to aggression, unwilling to extend our possessions or our interests by war, the measure of strength we set ourselves depends, necessarily, not upon our projects of aggrandizement, but upon the disposition of others to thwart what we consider our reasonable policy, which they may not so consider. when they resist, what force can they bring against us? that force must be naval; we have no exposed point upon which land operations, decisive in character, can be directed. this is the kind of the hostile force to be apprehended. what may its size be? there is the measure of our needed strength. the calculation may be intricate, the conclusion only approximate and probable, but it is the nearest reply we can reach. so many ships of such and such sizes, so many guns, so much ammunition--in short, so much naval material. in the material provisions that have been summarized under the two chief heads of defence and offence--in coast defence under its three principal requirements, guns, lines of stationary torpedoes, and torpedo-boats, and in a navy able to keep the sea in the presence of a probable enemy--consist what may be called most accurately preparations for war. in so far as the united states is short in them, she is at the mercy of an enemy whose naval strength is greater than that of her own available navy. if her navy cannot keep the enemy off the coast, blockade at least is possible. if, in addition, there are no harbor torpedo-boats, blockade is easy. if, further, guns and torpedo lines are deficient, bombardment comes within the range of possibility, and may reach even the point of entire feasibility. there will be no time for preparation after war begins. it is not in the preparation of material that states generally fall most short of being ready for war at brief notice; for such preparation is chiefly a question of money and of manufacture,--not so much of preservation after creation. if money enough is forthcoming, a moderate degree of foresight can insure that the amount of material deemed necessary shall be on hand at a given future moment; and a similar condition can be maintained steadily. losses by deterioration or expenditure, or demand for further increase if such appear desirable, can all be forecast with reasonable calculations, and requirements thence arising can be made good. this is comparatively easy, because mere material, once wrought into shape for war, does not deteriorate from its utility to the nation because not used immediately. it can be stored and cared for at a relatively small expense, and with proper oversight will remain just as good and just as ready for use as at its first production. there are certain deductions, a certain percentage of impairment to be allowed for, but the general statement holds. a very different question is confronted in the problem how to be ready at equally short notice to use this material,--to provide in sufficient numbers, upon a sudden call, the living agents, without whom the material is worthless. such men in our day must be especially trained; and not only so, but while training once acquired will not be forgot wholly--stays by a man for a certain time--it nevertheless tends constantly to drop off from him. like all habits, it requires continued practice. moreover, it takes quite a long time to form, in a new recruit, not merely familiarity with the use of a particular weapon, but also the habit and working of the military organization of which he is an individual member. it is not enough that he learn just that one part of the whole machinery which falls to him to handle; he must be acquainted with the mutual relations of the other parts to his own and to the whole, at least in great measure. such knowledge is essential even to the full and intelligent discharge of his own duty, not to speak of the fact that in battle every man should be ready to supply the place of another of his own class and grade who has been disabled. unless this be so, the ship will be very far short of her best efficiency. now, to possess such proficiency in the handling of naval material for war, and in playing an intelligent part in the general functioning of a ship in action, much time is required. time is required to obtain it, further time is needed in order to retain it; and such time, be it more or less, is time lost for other purposes,--lost both to the individual and to the community. when you have your thoroughly efficient man-of-war's man, you cannot store him as you do your guns and ammunition, or lay him up as you may your ships, without his deteriorating at a rate to which material presents no parallel. on the other hand, if he be retained, voluntarily or otherwise, in the naval service, there ensues the economical loss--the loss of productive power--which constitutes the great argument against large standing armies and enforced military service, advanced by those to whom the productive energies of a country outweigh all other considerations. it is this difficulty which is felt most by those responsible for the military readiness of european states, and which therefore has engaged their most anxious attention. the providing of material of war is an onerous money question; but it is simple, and has some compensation for the expense in the resulting employment of labor for its production. it is quite another matter to have ready the number of men needed,--to train them, and to keep them so trained as to be available immediately. the solution is sought in a tax upon time--upon the time of the nation, economically lost to production, and upon the time of the individual, lost out of his life. like other taxes, the tendency on all sides is to reduce this as far as possible,--to compromise between ideal proficiency for probable contingencies, and the actual demands of the existing and usual conditions of peace. although inevitable, the compromise is unsatisfactory, and yields but partial results in either direction. the economist still deplores and resists the loss of producers,--the military authorities insist that the country is short of its necessary force. to obviate the difficulty as far as possible, to meet both of the opposing demands, resort is had to the system of reserves, into which men pass after serving in the active force for a period, which is reduced to, and often below, the shortest compatible with instruction in their duties, and with the maintenance of the active forces at a fixed minimum. this instruction acquired, the recipient passes into the reserve, leaves the life of the soldier or seaman for that of the citizen, devoting a comparatively brief time in every year to brushing up the knowledge formerly acquired. such a system, under some form, is found in services both voluntary and compulsory. it is scarcely necessary to say that such a method would never be considered satisfactory in any of the occupations of ordinary life. a man who learns his profession or trade, but never practises it, will not long be considered fit for employment. no kind of practical preparation, in the way of systematic instruction, equals the practical knowledge imbibed in the common course of life. this is just as true of the military professions--the naval especially--as it is of civil callings; perhaps even more so, because the former are a more unnatural, and therefore, when attained, a more highly specialized, form of human activity. for the very reason that war is in the main an evil, an unnatural state, but yet at times unavoidable, the demands upon warriors, when average men, are exceptionally exacting. preparedness for naval war therefore consists not so much in the building of ships and guns as it does in the possession of trained men in adequate numbers, fit to go on board at once and use the material, the provision of which is merely one of the essential preparations for war. the word "fit" includes fairly all that detail of organization commonly called mobilization, by which the movements of the individual men are combined and directed. but mobilization, although the subjects of it are men, is itself a piece of mental machinery. once devised, it may be susceptible of improvement, but it will not become inefficient because filed away in a pigeon-hole, any more than guns and projectiles become worthless by being stored in their parks or magazines. take care of the pence and the pounds will take care of themselves. provide your fit men,--fit by their familiarity not only with special instruments, but with a manner of life,--and your mobilization is reduced to a slip of paper telling each one where he is to go. he will get there. that a navy, especially a large navy, can be kept fully manned in peace--manned up to the requirements of war--must be dismissed as impracticable. if greatly superior to a probable enemy, it will be unnecessary; if more nearly equal, then the aim can only be to be superior in the number of men immediately available, and fit according to the standard of fitness here generalized. the place of a reserve in any system of preparation for war must be admitted, because inevitable. the question, of the proportion and character of the reserve, relatively to the active force of peace, is the crux of the matter. this is essentially the question between long-service and short-service systems. with long service the reserves will be fewer, and for the first few years of retirement much more efficient, for they have acquired, not knowledge only, but a habit of life. with short service, more men are shoved through the mill of the training-school. consequently they pass more rapidly into the reserve, are less efficient when they get there, and lose more rapidly, because they have acquired less thoroughly; on the other hand, they will be decidedly more numerous, on paper at least, than the entire trained force of a long-service system. the pessimists on either side will expound the dangers--the one, of short numbers; the others, of inadequate training. long service must be logically the desire, and the result, of voluntary systems of recruiting the strength of a military force. where enrolment is a matter of individual choice, there is a better chance of entrance resulting in the adoption of the life as a calling to be followed; and this disposition can be encouraged by the offering of suitable inducements. where service is compulsory, that fact alone tends to make it abhorrent, and voluntary persistence, after time has been served, rare. but, on the other hand, as the necessity for numbers in war is as real as the necessity of fitness, a body where long service and small reserves obtain should in peace be more numerous than one where the reserves are larger. to long service and small reserves a large standing force is the natural corollary. it may be added that it is more consonant to the necessities of warfare, and more consistent with the idea of the word "reserve," as elsewhere used in war. the reserve in battle is that portion of the force which is withheld from engagement, awaiting the unforeseen developments of the fight; but no general would think of carrying on a pitched battle with the smaller part of his force, keeping the larger part in reserve. rapid concentration of effort, anticipating that of the enemy, is the ideal of tactics and of strategy,--of the battle-field and of the campaign. it is that, likewise, of the science of mobilization, in its modern development. the reserve is but the margin of safety, to compensate for defects in conception or execution, to which all enterprises are liable; and it may be added that it is as applicable to the material force--the ships, guns, etc.--as it is to the men. the united states, like great britain, depends wholly upon voluntary enlistments; and both nations, with unconscious logic, have laid great stress upon continuous service, and comparatively little upon reserves. when seamen have served the period which entitles them to the rewards of continuous service, without further enlistment, they are, though still in the prime of life, approaching the period when fitness, in the private seaman or soldier, depends upon ingrained habit--perfect practical familiarity with the life which has been their one calling--rather than upon that elastic vigor which is the privilege of youth. should they elect to continue in the service, there still remain some years in which they are an invaluable leaven, by character and tradition. if they depart, they are for a few years a reserve for war--if they choose to come forward; but it is manifest that such a reserve can be but small, when compared with a system which in three or five years passes men through the active force into the reserve. the latter, however, is far less valuable, man for man. of course, a reserve which has not even three years' service is less valuable still. the united states is to all intents an insular power, like great britain. we have but two land frontiers, canada and mexico. the latter is hopelessly inferior to us in all the elements of military strength. as regards canada, great britain maintains a standing army; but, like our own, its numbers indicate clearly that aggression will never be her policy, except in those distant regions whither the great armies of the world cannot act against her, unless they first wrench from her the control of the sea. no modern state has long maintained a supremacy by land and by sea,--one or the other has been held from time to time by this or that country, but not both. great britain wisely has chosen naval power; and, independent of her reluctance to break with the united states for other reasons, she certainly would regret to devote to the invasion of a nation of seventy millions the small disposable force which she maintains in excess of the constant requirements of her colonial interests. we are, it may be repeated, an insular power, dependent therefore upon a navy. durable naval power, besides, depends ultimately upon extensive commercial relations; consequently, and especially in an insular state, it is rarely aggressive, in the military sense. its instincts are naturally for peace, because it has so much at stake outside its shores. historically, this has been the case with the conspicuous example of sea power, great britain, since she became such; and it increasingly tends to be so. it is also our own case, and to a yet greater degree, because, with an immense compact territory, there has not been the disposition to external effort which has carried the british flag all over the globe, seeking to earn by foreign commerce and distant settlement that abundance of resource which to us has been the free gift of nature--or of providence. by her very success, however, great britain, in the vast increase and dispersion of her external interests, has given hostages to fortune, which for mere defence impose upon her a great navy. our career has been different, our conditions now are not identical, yet our geographical position and political convictions have created for us also external interests and external responsibilities, which are likewise our hostages to fortune. it is not necessary to roam afar in search of adventures; popular feeling and the deliberate judgment of statesmen alike have asserted that, from conditions we neither made nor control, interests beyond the sea exist, have sprung up of themselves, which demand protection. "beyond the sea"--that means a navy. of invasion, in any real sense of the word, we run no risk, and if we did, it must be by sea; and there, at sea, must be met primarily, and ought to be met decisively, any attempt at invasion of our interests, either in distant lands, or at home by blockade or by bombardment. yet the force of men in the navy is smaller, by more than half, than that in the army. the necessary complement of those admirable measures which have been employed now for over a decade in the creation of naval material is the preparation of an adequate force of trained men to use this material when completed. take an entirely fresh man: a battleship can be built and put in commission before he becomes a trained man-of-war's man, and a torpedo-boat can be built and ready for service before, to use the old sea phrase, "the hay seed is out of his hair." further, in a voluntary service, you cannot keep your trained men as you can your completed ship or gun. the inevitable inference is that the standing force must be large, because you can neither create it hastily nor maintain it by compulsion. having fixed the amount of material,--the numbers and character of the fleet,--from this follows easily the number of men necessary to man it. this aggregate force can then be distributed, upon some accepted idea, between the standing navy and the reserve. without fixing a proportion between the two, the present writer is convinced that the reserve should be but a small percentage of the whole, and that in a small navy, as ours, relatively, long will be, this is doubly imperative; for the smaller the navy, the greater the need for constant efficiency to act promptly, and the smaller the expense of maintenance. in fact, where quantity--number--is small, quality should be all the more high. the quality of the whole is a question of _personnel_ even more than of material; and the quality of the _personnel_ can be maintained only by high individual fitness in the force, undiluted by dependence upon a large, only partly efficient, reserve element. "one foot on sea and one on shore, to one thing constant never," will not man the fleet. it can be but an imperfect palliative, and can be absorbed effectually by the main body only in small proportions. it is in torpedo-boats for coast defence, and in commerce-destroying for deep-sea warfare, that the true sphere for naval reserves will be found; for the duties in both cases are comparatively simple, and the organization can be the same. every danger of a military character to which the united states is exposed can be met best outside her own territory--at sea. preparedness for naval war--preparedness against naval attack and for naval offence--is preparedness for anything that is likely to occur. a twentieth-century outlook. _may, ._ finality, the close of a life, of a relationship, of an era, even though this be a purely artificial creation of human arrangement, in all cases appeals powerfully to the imagination, and especially to that of a generation self-conscious as ours, a generation which has coined for itself the phrase _fin de siècle_ to express its belief, however superficial and mistaken, that it knows its own exponents and its own tendencies; that, amid the din of its own progress sounding in its ears, it knows not only whence it comes but whither it goes. the nineteenth century is about to die, only to rise again in the twentieth. whence did it come? how far has it gone? whither is it going? a full reply to such queries would presume an abridged universal history of the expiring century such as a magazine article, or series of articles, could not contemplate for a moment. the scope proposed to himself by the present writer, itself almost unmanageable within the necessary limits, looks not to the internal conditions of states, to those economical and social tendencies which occupy so large a part of contemporary attention, seeming to many the sole subjects that deserve attention, and that from the most purely material and fleshly point of view. important as these things are, it may be affirmed at least that they are not everything; and that, great as has been the material progress of the century, the changes in international relations and relative importance, not merely in states of the european family, but among the peoples of the world at large, have been no less striking. it is from this direction that the writer wishes to approach his subject, which, if applied to any particular country, might be said to be that of its external relations; but which, in the broader view that it will be sought to attain, regards rather the general future of the world as indicated by movements already begun and in progress, as well as by tendencies now dimly discernible, which, if not counteracted, are pregnant of further momentous shifting of the political balances, profoundly affecting the welfare of mankind. it appears a convenient, though doubtless very rough, way of prefacing this subject to say that the huge colonizing movements of the eighteenth century were brought to a pause by the american revolution, which deprived great britain of her richest colonies, succeeded, as that almost immediately was, by the french revolution and the devastating wars of the republic and of napoleon, which forced the attention of europe to withdraw from external allurements and to concentrate upon its own internal affairs. the purchase of louisiana by the united states at the opening of the current century emphasized this conclusion; for it practically eliminated the continent of north america from the catalogue of wild territories available for foreign settlement. within a decade this was succeeded by the revolt of the spanish colonies, followed later by the pronouncements of president monroe and of mr. canning, which assured their independence by preventing european interference. the firmness with which the position of the former statesman has been maintained ever since by the great body of the people of the united states, and the developments his doctrine afterwards received, have removed the spanish-american countries equally from all probable chance of further european colonization, in the political sense of the word. thus the century opened. men's energies still sought scope beyond the sea, doubtless; not, however, in the main, for the founding of new colonies, but for utilizing ground already in political occupation. even this, however, was subsidiary. the great work of the nineteenth century, from nearly its beginning to nearly its close, has been in the recognition and study of the forces of nature, and the application of them to the purposes of mechanical and economical advance. the means thus placed in men's hands, so startling when first invented, so familiar for the most part to us now, were devoted necessarily, first, to the development of the resources of each country. everywhere there was a fresh field; for hitherto it had been nowhere possible to man fully to utilize the gifts of nature. energies everywhere turned inward, for there, in every region, was more than enough to do. naturally, therefore, such a period has been in the main one of peace. there have been great wars, certainly; but, nevertheless, external peace has been the general characteristic of that period of development, during which men have been occupied in revolutionizing the face of their own countries by means of the new powers at their disposal. all such phases pass, however, as does every human thing. increase of production--the idol of the economist--sought fresh markets, as might have been predicted. the increase of home consumption, through increased ease of living, increased wealth, increased population, did not keep up with the increase of forth-putting and the facility of distribution afforded by steam. in the middle of the century china and japan were forced out of the seclusion of ages, and were compelled, for commercial purposes at least, to enter into relations with the european communities, to buy and to sell with them. serious attempts, on any extensive scale, to acquire new political possessions abroad largely ceased. commerce only sought new footholds, sure that, given the inch, she in the end would have the ell. moreover, the growth of the united states in population and resources, and the development of the british australian colonies, contributed to meet the demand, of which the opening of china and japan was only a single indication. that opening, therefore, was rather an incident of the general industrial development which followed upon the improvement of mechanical processes and the multiplication of communications. thus the century passed its meridian, and began to decline towards its close. there were wars and there were rumors of wars in the countries of european civilization. dynasties rose and fell, and nations shifted their places in the scale of political importance, as old-time boys in school went up and down; but, withal, the main characteristic abode, and has become more and more the dominant prepossession of the statesmen who reached their prime at or soon after the times when the century itself culminated. the maintenance of a _status quo_, for purely utilitarian reasons of an economical character, has gradually become an ideal--the _quieta non movere_ of sir robert walpole. the ideal is respectable, certainly; in view of the concert of the powers, in the interest of their own repose, to coerce greece and the cretans, we may perhaps refrain from calling it noble. the question remains, how long can it continue respectable in the sense of being practicable of realization,--a rational possibility, not an idle dream? many are now found to say--and among them some of the most bitter of the advocates of universal peace, who are among the bitterest of modern disputants--that when the czar nicholas proposed to move the quiet things, half a century ago, and to reconstruct the political map of southeastern europe in the interest of well-founded quiet, it was he that showed the idealism of rational statesmanship,--the only truly practical statesmanship,--while the defenders of the _status quo_ evinced the crude instincts of the mere time-serving politician. that the latter did not insure quiet, even the quiet of desolation, in those unhappy regions, we have yearly evidence. how far is it now a practicable object, among the nations of the european family, to continue indefinitely the present realization of peace and plenty,--in themselves good things, but which are advocated largely on the ground that man lives by bread alone,--in view of the changed conditions of the world which the departing nineteenth century leaves with us as its bequest? is the outlook such that our present civilization, with its benefits, is most likely to be insured by universal disarmament, the clamor for which rises ominously--the word is used advisedly--among our latter-day cries? none shares more heartily than the writer the aspiration for the day when nations shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning-hooks; but is european civilization, including america, so situated that it can afford to relax into an artificial peace, resting not upon the working of national consciences, as questions arise, but upon a permanent tribunal,--an external, if self-imposed authority,--the realization in modern policy of the ideal of the mediæval papacy? the outlook--the signs of the times, what are they? it is not given to human vision, peering into the future, to see more than as through a glass, darkly; men as trees walking, one cannot say certainly whither. yet signs may be noted even if they cannot be fully or precisely interpreted; and among them i should certainly say is to be observed the general outward impulse of all the civilized nations of the first order of greatness--except our own. bound and swathed in the traditions of our own eighteenth century, when we were as truly external to the european world as we are now a part of it, we, under the specious plea of peace and plenty--fulness of bread--hug an ideal of isolation, and refuse to recognize the solidarity of interest with which the world of european civilization must not only look forward to, but go out to meet, the future that, whether near or remote, seems to await it. i say _we_ do so; i should more surely express my thought by saying that the outward impulse already is in the majority of the nation, as shown when particular occasions arouse their attention, but that it is as yet retarded, and may be retarded perilously long, by those whose views of national policy are governed by maxims framed in the infancy of the republic. this outward impulse of the european nations, resumed on a large scale after nearly a century of intermission, is not a mere sudden appearance, sporadic, and unrelated to the past. the signs of its coming, though unnoted, were visible soon after the century reached its half-way stage, as was also its great correlative, equally unappreciated then, though obvious enough now, the stirring of the nations of oriental civilization. it is a curious reminiscence of my own that when in yokohama, japan, in , i was asked to translate a spanish letter from honolulu, relative to a ship-load of japanese coolies to be imported into hawaii. i knew the person engaged to go as physician to the ship, and, unless my memory greatly deceives me, he sailed in this employment while i was still in the port. similarly, when my service on the station was ended, i went from yokohama to hong-kong, prior to returning home by way of suez. among my fellow-passengers was an ex-confederate naval officer, whose business was to negotiate for an immigration of chinese into, i think, the southern states--in momentary despair, perhaps, of black labor--but certainly into the united states. we all know what has come in our own country of undertakings which then had attracted little attention. it is odd to watch the unconscious, resistless movements of nations, and at the same time read the crushing characterization by our teachers of the press of those who, by personal characteristics or by accident, happen to be thrust into the position of leaders, when at the most they only guide to the least harm forces which can no more be resisted permanently than can gravitation. such would have been the rôle of nicholas, guiding to a timely end the irresistible course of events in the balkans, which his opponents sought to withstand, but succeeded only in prolonging and aggravating. he is honored now by those who see folly in the imperial aspirations of mr. joseph chamberlain, and piracy in mr. cecil rhodes; yet, after all, in his day, what right had he, by the code of strict constructionists of national legal rights, to put turkey to death because she was sick? was not turkey in occupation? had she not, by strict law, a right to her possessions, and to live; yea, and to administer what she considered justice to those who were legally her subjects? but men are too apt to forget that law is the servant of equity, and that while the world is in its present stage of development equity which cannot be had by law must be had by force, upon which ultimately law rests, not for its sanction, but for its efficacy. we have been familiar latterly with the term "buffer states;" the pleasant function discharged by siam between great britain and france. though not strictly analogous, the term conveys an idea of the relations that have hitherto obtained between eastern and western civilizations. they have existed apart, each a world of itself; but they are approaching not only in geographical propinquity, a recognized source of danger, but, what is more important, in common ideas of material advantage, without a corresponding sympathy in spiritual ideas. it is not merely that the two are in different stages of development from a common source, as are russia and great britain. they are running as yet on wholly different lines, springing from conceptions radically different. to bring them into correspondence in that, the most important realm of ideas, there is needed on the one side--or on the other--not growth, but conversion. however far it has wandered, and however short of its pattern it has come, the civilization of modern europe grew up under the shadow of the cross, and what is best in it still breathes the spirit of the crucified. it is to be feared that eastern thinkers consider it rather an advantage than a detriment that they are appropriating the material progress of europe unfettered by christian traditions,--as agnostic countries. but, for the present at least, agnosticism with christian ages behind it is a very different thing from agnosticism which has never known christianity. what will be in the future the dominant spiritual ideas of those nations which hitherto have been known as christian, is scarcely a question of the twentieth century. whatever variations of faith, in direction or in degree, the close of that century may show, it is not probable that so short a period will reveal the full change of standards and of practice which necessarily must follow ultimately upon a radical change of belief. that the impress of christianity will remain throughout the coming century is reasonably as certain as that it took centuries of nominal faith to lift christian standards and practice even to the point they now have reached. decline, as well as rise, must be gradual; and gradual likewise, granting the utmost possible spread of christian beliefs among them, will be the approximation of the eastern nations, as nations, to the principles which powerfully modify, though they cannot control wholly even now, the merely natural impulses of western peoples. and if, as many now say, faith has departed from among ourselves, and still more will depart in the coming years; if we have no higher sanction to propose for self-restraint and righteousness than enlightened self-interest and the absurdity of war, war--violence--will be absurd just so long as the balance of interest is on that side, and no longer. those who want will take, if they can, not merely from motives of high policy and as legal opportunity offers, but for the simple reasons that they have not, that they desire, and that they are able. the european world has known that stage already; it has escaped from it only partially by the gradual hallowing of public opinion and its growing weight in the political scale. the eastern world knows not the same motives, but it is rapidly appreciating the material advantages and the political traditions which have united to confer power upon the west; and with the appreciation desire has arisen. coincident with the long pause which the french revolution imposed upon the process of external colonial expansion which was so marked a feature of the eighteenth century, there occurred another singular manifestation of national energies, in the creation of the great standing armies of modern days, themselves the outcome of the _levée en masse_, and of the general conscription, which the revolution bequeathed to us along with its expositions of the rights of man. beginning with the birth of the century, perfected during its continuance, its close finds them in full maturity and power, with a development in numbers, in reserve force, in organization, and in material for war, over which the economist perpetually wails, whose existence he denounces, and whose abolition he demands. as freedom has grown and strengthened, so have they grown and strengthened. is this singular product of a century whose gains for political liberty are undeniable, a mere gross perversion of human activities, as is so confidently claimed on many sides? or is there possibly in it also a sign of the times to come, to be studied in connection with other signs, some of which we have noted? what has been the effect of these great armies? manifold, doubtless. on the economical side there is the diminution of production, the tax upon men's time and lives, the disadvantages or evils so dinned daily into our ears that there is no need of repeating them here. but is there nothing to the credit side of the account, even perhaps a balance in their favor? is it nothing, in an age when authority is weakening and restraints are loosening, that the youth of a nation passes through a school in which order, obedience, and reverence are learned, where the body is systematically developed, where ideals of self-surrender, of courage, of manhood, are inculcated, necessarily, because fundamental conditions of military success? is it nothing that masses of youths out of the fields and the streets are brought together, mingled with others of higher intellectual antecedents, taught to work and to act together, mind in contact with mind, and carrying back into civil life that respect for constituted authority which is urgently needed in these days when lawlessness is erected into a religion? it is a suggestive lesson to watch the expression and movements of a number of rustic conscripts undergoing their first drills, and to contrast them with the finished result as seen in the faces and bearing of the soldiers that throng the streets. a military training is not the worst preparation for an active life, any more than the years spent at college are time lost, as another school of utilitarians insists. is it nothing that wars are less frequent, peace better secured, by the mutual respect of nations for each other's strength; and that, when a convulsion does come, it passes rapidly, leaving the ordinary course of events to resume sooner, and therefore more easily? war now not only occurs more rarely, but has rather the character of an occasional excess, from which recovery is easy. a century or more ago it was a chronic disease. and withal, the military spirit, the preparedness--not merely the willingness, which is a different thing--to fight in a good cause, which is a distinct good, is more widely diffused and more thoroughly possessed than ever it was when the soldier was merely the paid man. it is the nations now that are in arms, and not simply the servants of the king. in forecasting the future, then, it is upon these particular signs of the times that i dwell: the arrest of the forward impulse towards political colonization which coincided with the decade immediately preceding the french revolution; the absorption of the european nations, for the following quarter of a century, with the universal wars, involving questions chiefly political and european; the beginning of the great era of coal and iron, of mechanical and industrial development, which succeeded the peace, and during which it was not aggressive colonization, but the development of colonies already held and of new commercial centres, notably in china and japan, that was the most prominent feature; finally, we have, resumed at the end of the century, the forward movement of political colonization by the mother countries, powerfully incited thereto, doubtless, by the citizens of the old colonies in different parts of the world. the restlessness of australia and the cape colony has doubtless counted for much in british advances in those regions. contemporary with all these movements, from the first to the last, has been the development of great standing armies, or rather of armed nations, in europe; and, lastly, the stirring of the east, its entrance into the field of western interests, not merely as a passive something to be impinged upon, but with a vitality of its own, formless yet, but significant, inasmuch as where before there was torpor, if not death, now there is indisputable movement and life. never again, probably, can there of it be said, "it heard the legions thunder past, then plunged in thought again." of this the astonishing development of japan is the most obvious evidence; but in india, though there be no probability of the old mutinies reviving, there are signs enough of the awaking of political intelligence, restlessness under foreign subjection, however beneficent, desire for greater play for its own individualities; a movement which, because intellectual and appreciative of the advantages of western material and political civilization, is less immediately threatening than the former revolt, but much more ominous of great future changes. of china we know less; but many observers testify to the immense latent force of the chinese character. it has shown itself hitherto chiefly in the strength with which it has adhered to stereotyped tradition. but stereotyped traditions have been overthrown already more than once even in this unprogressive people, whose conservatism, due largely to ignorance of better conditions existing in other lands, is closely allied also to the unusual staying powers of the race, to the persistence of purpose, the endurance, and the vitality characteristic of its units. to ambition for individual material improvement they are not insensible. the collapse of the chinese organization in all its branches during the late war with japan, though greater than was expected, was not unforeseen. it has not altered the fact that the raw material so miserably utilized is, in point of strength, of the best; that it is abundant, racially homogeneous, and is multiplying rapidly. nor, with the recent resuscitation of the turkish army before men's eyes, can it be thought unlikely that the chinese may yet obtain the organization by which alone potential force receives adequate military development, the most easily conferred because the simplest in conception. the japanese have shown great capacity, but they met little resistance; and it is easier by far to move and to control an island kingdom of forty millions than a vast continental territory containing near tenfold that number of inhabitants. comparative slowness of evolution may be predicated, but that which for so long has kept china one, amid many diversities, may be counted upon in the future to insure a substantial unity of impulse which, combined with its mass, will give tremendous import to any movement common to the whole. to assert that a few selected characteristics, such as the above, summarize the entire tendency of a century of teeming human life, and stand alone among the signs that are chiefly to be considered in looking to the future, would be to take an untenable position. it may be said safely, however, that these factors, because the future to which they point is more remote, are less regarded than others which are less important; and further, that those among them which mark our own day are also the factors whose very existence is specially resented, criticised, and condemned by that school of political thought which assumes for itself the title of economical, which attained its maturity, and still lives, amid the ideas of that stage of industrial progress coincident with the middle of the century, and which sees all things from the point of view of production and of internal development. powerfully exerted throughout the world, nowhere is the influence of this school so unchecked and so injurious as in the united states, because, having no near neighbors to compete with us in point of power, military necessities have been to us not imminent, so that, like all distant dangers, they have received little regard; and also because, with our great resources only partially developed, the instinct to external activities has remained dormant. at the same period and from the same causes that the european world turned its eyes inward from the seaboard, instead of outward, the people of the united states were similarly diverted from the external activities in which at the beginning of the century they had their wealth. this tendency, emphasized on the political side by the civil war, was reinforced and has been prolonged by well-known natural conditions. a territory much larger, far less redeemed from its original wildness, and with perhaps even ampler proportionate resources than the continent of europe, contained a much smaller number of inhabitants. hence, despite an immense immigration, we have lagged far behind in the work of completing our internal development, and for that reason have not yet felt the outward impulse that now markedly characterizes the european peoples. that we stand far apart from the general movement of our race calls of itself for consideration. for the reasons mentioned it has been an easy but a short-sighted policy, wherever it has been found among statesmen or among journalists, to fasten attention purely on internal and economical questions, and to reject, if not to resent, propositions looking towards the organization and maintenance of military force, or contemplating the extension of our national influence beyond our own borders, on the plea that we have enough to do at home,--forgetful that no nation, as no man, can live to itself or die to itself. it is a policy in which we are behind our predecessors of two generations ago, men who had not felt the deadening influence of merely economical ideas, because they reached manhood before these attained the preponderance they achieved under politicians of the manchester school; a preponderance which they still retain because the youths of that time, who grew up under them, have not yet quite passed off the stage. it is the lot of each generation, salutary no doubt, to be ruled by men whose ideas are essentially those of a former day. breaches of continuity in national action are thus moderated or avoided; but, on the other hand, the tendency of such a condition is to blind men to the spirit of the existing generation, because its rulers have the tone of their own past, and direct affairs in accordance with it. on the very day of this writing there appears in an american journal a slashing contrast between the action of lord salisbury in the cretan business and the spirited letter of mr. gladstone upon the failure of the concert. as a matter of fact, however, both those british statesmen, while belonging to parties traditionally opposed, are imbued above all with the ideas of the middle of the century, and, governed by them, consider the disturbance of quiet the greatest of all evils. it is difficult to believe that if mr. gladstone were now in his prime, and in power, any object would possess in his eyes an importance at all comparable to that of keeping the peace. he would feel for the greeks, doubtless, as lord salisbury doubtless does; but he would maintain the concert as long as he believed that alone would avoid war. when men in sympathy with the ideas now arising among englishmen come on the stage, we shall see a change--not before. the same spirit has dominated in our own country ever since the civil war--a far more real "revolution" in its consequences than the struggle of the thirteen colonies against great britain, which in our national speech has received the name--forced our people, both north and south, to withdraw their eyes from external problems, and to concentrate heart and mind with passionate fervor upon an internal strife, in which one party was animated by the inspiring hope of independence, while before the other was exalted the noble ideal of union. that war, however, was directed, on the civil side, by men who belonged to a generation even then passing away. the influence of their own youth reverted with the return of peace, and was to be seen in the ejection--by threat of force--of the third napoleon from mexico, in the acquisition of alaska, and in the negotiations for the purchase of the danish islands and of samana bay. whatever may have been the wisdom of these latter attempts,--and the writer, while sympathizing with the spirit that suggested them, questions it from a military, or rather naval, stand-point,--they are particularly interesting as indicating the survival in elderly men of the traditions accepted in their youth, but foreign to the generation then rapidly coming into power, which rejected and frustrated them. the latter in turn is now disappearing, and its successors, coming and to come, are crowding into its places. is there any indication of the ideas these bring with them, in their own utterances, or in the spirit of the world at large, which they must needs reflect; or, more important perhaps still, is there any indication in the conditions of the outside world itself which they should heed, and the influence of which they should admit, in modifying and shaping their policies, before these have become hardened into fixed lines, directive for many years of the future welfare of their people? to all these questions the writer, as one of the departing generation, would answer yes; but it is to the last that his attention, possibly by constitutional bias, is more naturally directed. it appears to him that in the ebb and flow of human affairs, under those mysterious impulses the origin of which is sought by some in a personal providence, by some in laws not yet fully understood, we stand at the opening of a period when the question is to be settled decisively, though the issue may be long delayed, whether eastern or western civilization is to dominate throughout the earth and to control its future. the great task now before the world of civilized christianity, its great mission, which it must fulfil or perish, is to receive into its own bosom and raise to its own ideals those ancient and different civilizations by which it is surrounded and outnumbered,--the civilizations at the head of which stand china, india, and japan. this, to cite the most striking of the many forms in which it is presented to us, is surely the mission which great britain, sword ever at hand, has been discharging towards india; but that stands not alone. the history of the present century has been that of a constant increasing pressure of our own civilization upon these older ones, till now, as we cast our eyes in any direction, there is everywhere a stirring, a rousing from sleep, drowsy for the most part, but real, unorganized as yet, but conscious that that which rudely interrupts their dream of centuries possesses over them at least two advantages,--power and material prosperity,--the things which unspiritual humanity, the world over, most craves. what the ultimate result will be it would be vain to prophesy,--the data for a guess even are not at hand; but it is not equally impossible to note present conditions, and to suggest present considerations, which may shape proximate action, and tend to favor the preponderance of that form of civilization which we cannot but deem the most promising for the future, not of our race only, but of the world at large. we are not living in a perfect world, and we may not expect to deal with imperfect conditions by methods ideally perfect. time and staying power must be secured for ourselves by that rude and imperfect, but not ignoble, arbiter, force,--force potential and force organized,--which so far has won, and still secures, the greatest triumphs of good in the checkered history of mankind. our material advantages, once noted, will be recognized readily and appropriated with avidity; while the spiritual ideas which dominate our thoughts, and are weighty in their influence over action, even with those among us who do not accept historic christianity or the ordinary creeds of christendom, will be rejected for long. the eternal law, first that which is natural, afterwards that which is spiritual, will obtain here, as in the individual, and in the long history of our own civilization. between the two there is an interval, in which force must be ready to redress any threatened disturbance of an equal balance between those who stand on divergent planes of thought, without common standards. and yet more is this true if, as is commonly said, faith is failing among ourselves, if the progress of our own civilization is towards the loss of those spiritual convictions upon which it was founded, and which in early days were mighty indeed towards the overthrowing of strongholds of evil. what, in such a case, shall play the tremendous part which the church of the middle ages, with all its defects and with all the shortcomings of its ministers, played amid the ruin of the roman empire and the flood of the barbarians? if our own civilization is becoming material only, a thing limited in hope and love to this world, i know not what we have to offer to save ourselves or others; but in either event, whether to go down finally under a flood of outside invasion, or whether to succeed, by our own living faith, in converting to our ideal civilization those who shall thus press upon us,--in either event we need time, and time can be gained only by organized material force. nor is this view advanced in any spirit of unfriendliness to the other ancient civilizations, whose genius admittedly has been and is foreign to our own. one who believes that god has made of one blood all nations of men who dwell on the face of the whole earth cannot but check and repress, if he ever feels, any movement of aversion to mankind outside his own race. but it is not necessary to hate carthage in order to admit that it was well for mankind that rome triumphed; and we at this day, and men to all time, may be thankful that a few decades after the punic wars the genius of cæsar so expanded the bounds of the dominions of rome, so extended, settled, and solidified the outworks of her civilization and polity, that when the fated day came that her power in turn should reel under the shock of conquest, with which she had remodelled the world, and she should go down herself, the time of the final fall was protracted for centuries by these exterior defences. they who began the assault as barbarians entered upon the imperial heritage no longer aliens and foreigners, but impregnated already with the best of roman ideas, converts to roman law and to christian faith. "when the course of history," says mommsen, "turns from the miserable monotony of the political selfishness which fought its battles in the senate house and in the streets of rome, we may be allowed--on the threshold of an event the effects of which still at the present day influence the destinies of the world--to look round us for a moment, and to indicate the point of view under which the conquest of what is now france by the romans, and their first contact with the inhabitants of germany and of great britain, are to be regarded in connection with the general history of the world.... the fact that the great celtic people were ruined by the transalpine wars of cæsar was not the most important result of that grand enterprise,--far more momentous than the negative was the positive result. it hardly admits of a doubt that if the rule of the senate had prolonged its semblance of life for some generations longer, the migration of the peoples, as it is called, would have occurred four hundred years sooner than it did, and would have occurred at a time when the italian civilization had not become naturalized either in gaul or on the danube or in africa and spain. inasmuch as cæsar with sure glance perceived in the german tribes the rival antagonists of the romano-greek world, inasmuch as with firm hand he established the new system of aggressive defence down even to its details, and taught men to protect the frontiers of the empire by rivers or artificial ramparts, to colonize the nearest barbarian tribes along the frontier with the view of warding off the more remote, and to recruit the roman army by enlistment from the enemy's country, he gained for the hellenic-italian culture the interval necessary to civilize the west, just as it had already civilized the east.... centuries elapsed before men understood that alexander had not merely erected an ephemeral kingdom in the east, but had carried hellenism to asia; centuries again elapsed before men understood that cæsar had not merely conquered a new province for the romans, but had laid the foundation for the romanizing of the regions of the west. it was only a late posterity that perceived the meaning of those expeditions to england and germany, so inconsiderate in a military point of view, and so barren of immediate result.... that there is a bridge connecting the past glory of hellas and rome with the prouder fabric of modern history; that western europe is romanic, and germanic europe classic; that the names of themistocles and scipio have to us a very different sound from those of asoka and salmanassar; that homer and sophocles are not merely like the vedas and kalidasa, attractive to the literary botanist, but bloom for us in our own garden,--all this is the work of cæsar." history at times reveals her foresight concrete in the action of a great individuality like cæsar's. more often her profounder movements proceed from impulses whose origin and motives cannot be traced, although a succession of steps may be discerned and their results stated. a few names, for instance, emerge amid the obscure movements of the peoples which precipitated the outer peoples upon the roman empire, but, with rare exceptions, they are simply exponents, pushed forward and upward by the torrent; at the utmost guides, not controllers, of those whom they represent but do not govern. it is much the same now. the peoples of european civilization, after a period of comparative repose, are again advancing all along the line, to occupy not only the desert places of the earth, but the debatable grounds, the buffer territories, which hitherto have separated them from those ancient nations, with whom they now soon must stand face to face and border to border. but who will say that this vast general movement represents the thought, even the unconscious thought, of any one man, as cæsar, or of any few men? to whatever cause we may assign it, whether to the simple conception of a personal divine monarchy that shapes our ends, or to more complicated ultimate causes, the responsibility rests upon the shoulders of no individual men. necessity is laid upon the peoples, and they move, like the lemmings of scandinavia; but to man, being not without understanding like the beasts that perish, it is permitted to ask, "whither?" and "what shall be the end hereof?" does this tend to universal peace, general disarmament, and treaties of permanent arbitration? is it the harbinger of ready mutual understanding, of quick acceptance of, and delight in, opposing traditions and habits of life and thought? is such quick acceptance found now where easterns and westerns impinge? does contact forebode the speedy disappearance of great armies and navies, and dictate the wisdom of dispensing with that form of organized force which at present is embodied in them? what, then, will be the actual conditions when these civilizations, of diverse origin and radically distinct,--because the evolution of racial characteristics radically different,--confront each other without the interposition of any neutral belt, by the intervention of which the contrasts, being more remote, are less apparent, and within which distinctions shade one into the other? there will be seen, on the one hand, a vast preponderance of numbers, and those numbers, however incoherent now in mass, composed of units which in their individual capacity have in no small degree the great elements of strength whereby man prevails over man and the fittest survives. deficient, apparently, in aptitude for political and social organization, they have failed to evolve the aggregate power and intellectual scope of which as communities they are otherwise capable. this lesson too they may learn, as they already have learned from us much that they have failed themselves to originate; but to the lack of it is chiefly due the inferiority of material development under which, as compared to ourselves, they now labor. but men do not covet less the prosperity which they themselves cannot or do not create,--a trait wherein lies the strength of communism as an aggressive social force. communities which want and cannot have, except by force, will take by force, unless they are restrained by force; nor will it be unprecedented in the history of the world that the flood of numbers should pour over and sweep away the barriers which intelligent foresight, like cæsar's, may have erected against them. still more will this be so if the barriers have ceased to be manned--forsaken or neglected by men in whom the proud combative spirit of their ancestors has given way to the cry for the abandonment of military preparation and to the decay of warlike habits. nevertheless, even under such conditions,--which obtained increasingly during the decline of the roman empire,--positions suitably chosen, frontiers suitably advanced, will do much to retard and, by gaining time, to modify the disaster to the one party, and to convert the general issue to the benefit of the world. hence the immense importance of discerning betimes what the real value of positions is, and where occupation should betimes begin. here, in part at least, is the significance of the great outward movement of the european nations to-day. consciously or unconsciously, they are advancing the outposts of our civilization, and accumulating the line of defences which will permit it to survive, or at the least will insure that it shall not go down till it has leavened the character of the world for a future brighter even than its past, just as the roman civilization inspired and exalted its teutonic conquerors, and continues to bless them to this day. such is the tendency of movement in that which we in common parlance call the old world. as the nineteenth century closes, the tide has already turned and the current is flowing strongly. it is not too soon, for vast is the work before it. contrasted to the outside world in extent and population, the civilization of the european group of families, to which our interests and anxieties, our hopes and fears, are so largely confined, has been as an oasis in a desert. the seat and scene of the loftiest culture, of the highest intellectual activities, it is not in them so much that it has exceeded the rest of the world as in the political development and material prosperity which it has owed to the virile energies of its sons, alike in commerce and in war. to these energies the mechanical and scientific acquirements of the past half-century or more have extended means whereby prosperity has increased manifold, as have the inequalities in material well-being existing between those within its borders and those without, who have not had the opportunity or the wit to use the same advantages. and along with this preeminence in wealth arises the cry to disarm, as though the race, not of europe only, but of the world, were already run, and the goal of universal peace not only reached but secured. yet are conditions such, even within our favored borders, that we are ready to disband the particular organized manifestation of physical force which we call the police? despite internal jealousies and friction on the continent of europe, perhaps even because of them, the solidarity of the european family therein contained is shown in this great common movement, the ultimate beneficence of which is beyond all doubt, as evidenced by the british domination in india and egypt, and to which the habit of arms not only contributes, but is essential. india and egypt are at present the two most conspicuous, though they are not the sole, illustrations of benefits innumerable and lasting, which rest upon the power of the sword in the hands of enlightenment and justice. it is possible, of course, to confuse this conclusion, to obscure the real issue, by dwelling upon details of wrongs at times inflicted, of blunders often made. any episode in the struggling progress of humanity may be thus perplexed; but looking at the broad result, it is indisputable that the vast gains to humanity made in the regions named not only once originated, but still rest, upon the exertion and continued maintenance of organized physical force. the same general solidarity as against the outside world, which is unconsciously manifested in the general resumption of colonizing movements, receives particular conscious expression in the idea of imperial federation, which, amid the many buffets and reverses common to all successful movements, has gained such notable ground in the sentiment of the british people and of their colonists. that immense practical difficulties have to be overcome, in order to realize the ends towards which such sentiments point, is but a commonplace of human experience in all ages and countries. they give rise to the ready sneer of impossible, just as any project of extending the sphere of the united states, by annexation or otherwise, is met by the constitutional lion in the path, which the unwilling or the apprehensive is ever sure to find; yet, to use words of one who never lightly admitted impossibilities, "if a thing is necessary to be done, the more difficulties, the more necessary to try to remove them." as sentiment strengthens, it undermines obstacles, and they crumble before it. the same tendency is shown in the undeniable disposition of the british people and of british, statesmen to cultivate the good-will of the united states, and to draw closer the relations between the two countries. for the disposition underlying such a tendency mr. balfour has used an expression, "race patriotism,"--a phrase which finds its first approximation, doubtless, in the english-speaking family, but which may well extend its embrace, in a time yet distant, to all those who have drawn their present civilization from the same remote sources. the phrase is so pregnant of solution for the problems of the future, as conceived by the writer, that he hopes to see it obtain the currency due to the value of the idea which it formulates. that this disposition on the part of great britain, towards her colonies and towards the united states, shows sound policy as well as sentiment, may be granted readily; but why should sound policy, the seeking of one's own advantage, if by open and honest means, be imputed as a crime? in democracies, however, policy cannot long dispute the sceptre with sentiment. that there is lukewarm response in the united states is due to that narrow conception which grew up with the middle of the century, whose analogue in great britain is the little england party, and which in our own country would turn all eyes inward, and see no duty save to ourselves. how shall two walk together except they be agreed? how shall there be true sympathy between a nation whose political activities are world-wide, and one that eats out its heart in merely internal political strife? when we begin really to look abroad, and to busy ourselves with our duties to the world at large in our generation--and not before--we shall stretch out our hands to great britain, realizing that in unity of heart among the english-speaking races lies the best hope of humanity in the doubtful days ahead. in the determination of the duties of nations, nearness is the most conspicuous and the most general indication. considering the american states as members of the european family, as they are by traditions, institutions, and languages, it is in the pacific, where the westward course of empire again meets the east, that their relations to the future of the world become most apparent. the atlantic, bordered on either shore by the european family in the strongest and most advanced types of its political development, no longer severs, but binds together, by all the facilities and abundance of water communications, the once divided children of the same mother; the inheritors of greece and rome, and of the teutonic conquerors of the latter. a limited express or a flying freight may carry a few passengers or a small bulk overland from the atlantic to the pacific more rapidly than modern steamers can cross the former ocean, but for the vast amounts in numbers or in quantity which are required for the full fruition of communication, it is the land that divides, and not the sea. on the pacific coast, severed from their brethren by desert and mountain range, are found the outposts, the exposed pioneers of european civilization, whom it is one of the first duties of the european family to bind more closely to the main body, and to protect, by due foresight over the approaches to them on either side. it is in this political fact, and not in the weighing of merely commercial advantages, that is to be found the great significance of the future canal across the central american isthmus, as well as the importance of the caribbean sea; for the latter is inseparably intwined with all international consideration of the isthmus problem. wherever situated, whether at panama or at nicaragua, the fundamental meaning of the canal will be that it advances by thousands of miles the frontiers of european civilization in general, and of the united states in particular; that it knits together the whole system of american states enjoying that civilization as in no other way they can be bound. in the caribbean archipelago--the very domain of sea power, if ever region could be called so--are the natural home and centre of those influences by which such a maritime highway as a canal must be controlled, even as the control of the suez canal rests in the mediterranean. hawaii, too, is an outpost of the canal, as surely as aden or malta is of suez; or as malta was of india in the days long before the canal, when nelson proclaimed that in that point of view chiefly was it important to great britain. in the cluster of island fortresses of the caribbean is one of the greatest of the nerve centres of the whole body of european civilization; and it is to be regretted that so serious a portion of them now is in hands which not only never have given, but to all appearances never can give, the development which is required by the general interest. for what awaits us in the future, in common with the states of europe, is not a mere question of advantage or disadvantage--of more or less. issues of vital moment are involved. a present generation is trustee for its successors, and may be faithless to its charge quite as truly by inaction as by action, by omission as by commission. failure to improve opportunity, where just occasion arises, may entail upon posterity problems and difficulties which, if overcome at all--it may then be too late--will be so at the cost of blood and tears that timely foresight might have spared. such preventive measures, if taken, are in no true sense offensive but defensive. decadent conditions, such as we observe in turkey--and not in turkey alone--cannot be indefinitely prolonged by opportunist counsels or timid procrastination. a time comes in human affairs, as in physical ailments, when heroic measures must be used to save the life of a patient or the welfare of a community; and if that time is allowed to pass, as many now think that it was at the time of the crimean war, the last state is worse than the first,--an opinion which these passing days of the hesitancy of the concert and the anguish of greece, not to speak of the armenian outrages, surely indorse. europe, advancing in distant regions, still allows to exist in her own side, unexcised, a sore that may yet drain her life-blood; still leaves in recognized dominion, over fair regions of great future import, a system whose hopelessness of political and social improvement the lapse of time renders continually more certain,--an evil augury for the future, if a turning tide shall find it unchanged, an outpost of barbarism ready for alien occupation. it is essential to our own good, it is yet more essential as part of our duty to the commonwealth of peoples to which we racially belong, that we look with clear, dispassionate, but resolute eyes upon the fact that civilizations on different planes of material prosperity and progress, with different spiritual ideals, and with very different political capacities, are fast closing together. it is a condition not unprecedented in the history of the world. when it befell a great united empire, enervated by long years of unwarlike habits among its chief citizens, it entailed ruin, but ruin deferred through centuries, thanks to the provision made beforehand by a great general and statesman. the saracenic and turkish invasions, on the contrary, after generations of advance, were first checked, and then rolled back; for they fell upon peoples, disunited indeed by internal discords and strife, like the nations of europe to-day, but still nations of warriors, ready by training and habit to strike for their rights, and, if need were, to die for them. in the providence of god, along with the immense increase of prosperity, of physical and mental luxury, brought by this century, there has grown up also that counterpoise stigmatized as "militarism," which has converted europe into a great camp of soldiers prepared for war. the ill-timed cry for disarmament, heedless of the menacing possibilities of the future, breaks idly against a great fact, which finds its sufficient justification in present conditions, but which is, above all, an unconscious preparation for something as yet noted but by few. on the side of the land, these great armies, and the blind outward impulse of the european peoples, are the assurance that generations must elapse ere the barriers can be overcome behind which rests the citadel of christian civilization. on the side of the sea there is no state charged with weightier responsibilities than the united states. in the caribbean, the sensitive resentment by our people of any supposed fresh encroachment by another state of the european family has been manifested too plainly and too recently to admit of dispute. such an attitude of itself demands of us to be ready to support it by organized force, exactly as the mutual jealousy of states within the european continent imposes upon them the maintenance of their great armies--destined, we believe, in the future, to fulfil a nobler mission. where we thus exclude others, we accept for ourselves the responsibility for that which is due to the general family of our civilization; and the caribbean sea, with its isthmus, is the nexus where will meet the chords binding the east to the west, the atlantic to the pacific. the isthmus, with all that depends upon it,--its canal and its approaches on either hand,--will link the eastern side of the american continent to the western as no network of land communications ever can. in it the united states has asserted a special interest. in the present she can maintain her claim, and in the future perform her duty, only by the creation of that sea power upon which predominance in the caribbean must ever depend. in short, as the internal jealousies of europe, and the purely democratic institution of the _levée en masse_--the general enforcement of military training--have prepared the way for great national armies, whose mission seems yet obscure, so the gradual broadening and tightening hold upon the sentiment of american democracy of that conviction loosely characterized as the monroe doctrine finds its logical and inevitable outcome in a great sea power, the correlative, in connection with that of great britain, of those armies which continue to flourish under the most popular institutions, despite the wails of economists and the lamentations of those who wish peace without paying the one price which alone has ever insured peace,--readiness for war. thus it was, while readiness for war lasted, that the teuton was held back until he became civilized, humanized, after the standard of that age; till the root of the matter was in him, sure to bear fruit in due season. he was held back by organized armed force--by armies. will it be said that that was in a past barbaric age? barbarism, however, is not in more or less material prosperity, or even political development, but in the inner man, in the spiritual ideal; and the material, which comes first and has in itself no salt of life to save from corruption, must be controlled by other material forces, until the spiritual can find room and time to germinate. we need not fear but that that which appeals to the senses in our civilization will be appropriated, even though it be necessary to destroy us, if disarmed, in order to obtain it. our own civilization less its spiritual element is barbarism; and barbarism will be the civilization of those who assimilate its material progress without imbibing the indwelling spirit. let us worship peace, indeed, as the goal at which humanity must hope to arrive; but let us not fancy that peace is to be had as a boy wrenches an unripe fruit from a tree. nor will peace be reached by ignoring the conditions that confront us, or by exaggerating the charms of quiet, of prosperity, of ease, and by contrasting these exclusively with the alarms and horrors of war. merely utilitarian arguments have never convinced nor converted mankind, and they never will; for mankind knows that there is something better. its homage will never be commanded by peace, presented as the tutelary deity of the stock-market. nothing is more ominous for the future of our race than that tendency, vociferous at present, which refuses to recognize in the profession of arms, in war, that something which inspired wordsworth's "happy warrior," which soothed the dying hours of henry lawrence, who framed the ideals of his career on the poet's conception, and so nobly illustrated it in his self-sacrifice; that something which has made the soldier to all ages the type of heroism and of self-denial. when the religion of christ, of him who was led as a lamb to the slaughter, seeks to raise before its followers the image of self-control, and of resistance to evil, it is the soldier whom it presents. he himself, if by office king of peace, is, first of all, in the essence of his being, king of righteousness, without which true peace cannot be. conflict is the condition of all life, material and spiritual; and it is to the soldier's experience that the spiritual life goes for its most vivid metaphors and its loftiest inspirations. whatever else the twentieth century may bring us, it will not, from anything now current in the thought of the nineteenth, receive a nobler ideal. [illustration: the gulf of mexico and the caribbean sea] the strategic features of the gulf of mexico and the caribbean sea. _june, ._ the importance, absolute and relative, of portions of the earth's surface, and their consequent interest to mankind, vary from time to time. the mediterranean was for many ages the centre round which gathered all the influences and developments of those earlier civilizations from which our own, mediately or immediately, derives. during the chaotic period of struggle that intervened between their fall and the dawn of our modern conditions, the inland sea, through its hold upon the traditions and culture of antiquity, still retained a general ascendency, although at length its political predominance was challenged, and finally overcome, by the younger, more virile, and more warlike nationalities that had been forming gradually beyond the alps, and on the shores of the atlantic and northern oceans. it was, until the close of the middle ages, the one route by which the east and the west maintained commercial relations; for, although the trade eastward from the levant was by long and painful land journeys, over mountain range and desert plain, water communication, in part and up to that point, was afforded by the mediterranean, and by it alone. with the discovery of the passage by the cape of good hope this advantage departed, while at the same instant the discovery of a new world opened out to the old new elements of luxury and a new sphere of ambition. then the mediterranean, thrown upon its own productive resources alone, swayed in the east by the hopeless barbarism of the turk, in the west by the decadent despotism of spain, and, between the two, divided among a number of petty states, incapable of united and consequently of potent action, sank into a factor of relatively small consequence to the onward progress of the world. during the wars of the french revolution, when the life of great britain, and consequently the issue of the strife, depended upon the vigor of british commerce, british merchant shipping was nearly driven from that sea; and but two per cent of a trade that was increasing mightily all the time was thence derived. how the suez canal and the growth of the eastern question, in its modern form, have changed all that, it is needless to say. yet, through all the period of relative insignificance, the relations of the mediterranean to the east and to the west, in the broad sense of those expressions, preserved to it a political importance to the world at large which rendered it continuously a scene of great political ambitions and military enterprise. since great britain first actively intervened in those waters, two centuries ago, she at no time has surrendered willingly her pretensions to be a leading mediterranean power, although her possessions there are of purely military, or rather naval, value. the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico, taken together, form an inland sea and an archipelago. they too have known those mutabilities of fortune which receive illustration alike in the history of countries and in the lives of individuals. the first scene of discovery and of conquest in the new world, these twin sheets of water, with their islands and their mainlands, became for many generations, and nearly to our own time, a veritable el dorado,--a land where the least of labor, on the part of its new possessors, rendered the largest and richest returns. the bounty of nature, and the ease with which climatic conditions, aided by the unwarlike character of most of the natives, adapted themselves to the institution of slavery, insured the cheap and abundant production of articles which, when once enjoyed, men found indispensable, as they already had the silks and spices of the east. in mexico and in peru were realized also, in degree, the actual gold-mine sought by the avarice of the earlier spanish explorers; while a short though difficult tropical journey brought the treasures of the west coast across the isthmus to the shores of the broad ocean, nature's great highway, which washed at once the shores of old and of new spain. from the caribbean, great britain, although her rivals had anticipated her in the possession of the largest and richest districts, derived nearly twenty-five per cent of her commerce, during the strenuous period when the mediterranean contributed but two per cent. but over these fair regions too passed the blight, not of despotism merely, for despotism was characteristic of the times, but of a despotism which found no counteractive, no element of future deliverance, in the temperament or in the political capacities of the people over whom it ruled. elizabeth, as far as she dared, was a despot; philip ii. was a despot; but there was already manifest in her subjects, while there was not in his, a will and a power not merely to resist oppression, but to organize freedom. this will and this power, after gaining many partial victories by the way, culminated once for all in the american revolution. great britain has never forgotten the lesson then taught; for it was one she herself had been teaching for centuries, and her people and statesmen were therefore easy learners. a century and a quarter has passed since that warning was given, not to great britain only, but to the world; and we to-day see, in the contrasted colonial systems of the two states, the results, on the one hand of political aptitude, on the other of political obtuseness and backwardness, which cannot struggle from the past into the present until the present in turn has become the past--irreclaimable. causes superficially very diverse but essentially the same, in that they arose from and still depend upon a lack of local political capacity, have brought the mediterranean and the caribbean, in our own time, to similar conditions, regarded as quantities of interest in the sphere of international relations. whatever the intrinsic value of the two bodies of water, in themselves or in their surroundings, whatever their present contributions to the prosperity or to the culture of mankind, their conspicuous characteristics now are their political and military importance, in the broadest sense, as concerning not only the countries that border them, but the world at large. both are land-girt seas; both are links in a chain of communication between an east and a west; in both the chain is broken by an isthmus; both are of contracted extent when compared with great oceans, and, in consequence of these common features, both present in an intensified form the advantages and the limitations, political and military, which condition the influence of sea power. this conclusion is notably true of the mediterranean, as is shown by its history. it is even more forcibly true of the caribbean, partly because the contour of its shores does not, as in the mediterranean peninsulas, thrust the power of the land so far and so sustainedly into the sea; partly because, from historical antecedents already alluded to, in the character of the first colonists, and from the shortness of the time the ground has been in civilized occupation, there does not exist in the caribbean or in the gulf of mexico--apart from the united states--any land power at all comparable with those great continental states of europe whose strength lies in their armies far more than in their navies. so far as national inclinations, as distinct from the cautious actions of statesmen, can be discerned, in the mediterranean at present the sea powers, great britain, france, and italy, are opposed to the land powers, germany, austria, and russia; and the latter dominate action. it cannot be so, in any near future, in the caribbean. as affirmed in a previous paper, the caribbean is pre-eminently the domain of sea power. it is in this point of view--the military or naval--that it is now to be considered. its political importance will be assumed, as recognized by our forefathers, and enforced upon our own attention by the sudden apprehensions awakened within the last two years. it may be well, though possibly needless, to ask readers to keep clearly in mind that the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico, while knit together like the siamese twins, are distinct geographical entities. a leading british periodical once accused the writer of calling the gulf of mexico the caribbean sea, because of his unwillingness to admit the name of any other state in connection with a body of water over which his own country claimed predominance. the gulf of mexico is very clearly defined by the projection, from the north, of the peninsula of florida, and from the south, of that of yucatan. between the two the island of cuba interposes for a distance of two hundred miles, leaving on one side a passage of nearly a hundred miles wide--the strait of florida--into the atlantic, while on the other, the yucatan channel, somewhat broader, leads into the caribbean sea. it may be mentioned here, as an important military consideration, that from the mouth of the mississippi westward to cape catoche--the tip of the yucatan peninsula--there is no harbor that can be considered at all satisfactory for ships of war of the larger classes. the existence of many such harbors in other parts of the regions now under consideration practically eliminates this long stretch of coast, regarded as a factor of military importance in the problem before us. in each of these sheets of water, the gulf of mexico and the caribbean, there is one position of pre-eminent commercial importance. in the gulf the mouth of the mississippi is the point where meet all the exports and imports, by water, of the mississippi valley. however diverse the directions from which they come, or the destinations to which they proceed, all come together here as at a great crossroads, or as the highways of an empire converge on the metropolis. whatever value the mississippi and the myriad miles of its subsidiary water-courses represent to the united states, as a facile means of communication from the remote interior to the ocean highways of the world, all centres here at the mouth of the river. the existence of the smaller though important cities of the gulf coast--mobile, galveston, or the mexican ports--does not diminish, but rather emphasizes by contrast, the importance of the mississippi entrance. they all share its fortunes, in that all alike communicate with the outside world through the strait of florida or the yucatan channel. in the caribbean, likewise, the existence of numerous important ports, and a busy traffic in tropical produce grown within the region itself, do but make more striking the predominance in interest of that one position known comprehensively, but up to the present somewhat indeterminately, as the isthmus. here again the element of decisive value is the crossing of the roads, the meeting of the ways, which, whether imposed by nature itself, as in the cases before us, or induced, as sometimes happens, in a less degree, by simple human dispositions, are prime factors in mercantile or strategic consequence. for these reasons the isthmus, even under the disadvantages of land carriage and transshipment of goods, has ever been an important link in the communications from east to west, from the days of the first discoverers and throughout all subsequent centuries, though fluctuating in degree from age to age; but when it shall be pierced by a canal, it will present a maritime centre analogous to the mouth of the mississippi. they will differ in this, that in the latter case the converging water routes on one side are interior to a great state whose resources they bear, whereas the roads which on either side converge upon the isthmus lie wholly upon the ocean, the common possession of all nations. control of the latter, therefore, rests either upon local control of the isthmus itself, or, indirectly, upon control of its approaches, or upon a distinctly preponderant navy. in naval questions the latter is always the dominant factor, exactly as on land the mobile army--the army in the field--must dominate the question of fortresses, unless war is to be impotent. we have thus the two centres round which revolve all the military study of the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico. the two sheets of water, taken together, control or affect the approaches on one side to these two supreme centres of commercial, and therefore of political and military, interest. the approaches on the other side--the interior communications of the mississippi, that is, or the maritime routes in the pacific converging upon the isthmus--do not here concern us. these approaches, in terms of military art, are known as the "communications." communications are probably the most vital and determining element in strategy, military or naval. they are literally the most radical; for all military operations depend upon communications, as the fruit of a plant depends upon communication with its root. we draw therefore upon the map the chief lines by which communication exists between these two centres and the outside world. such lines represent the mutual dependence of the centres and the exterior, by which each ministers to the others, and by severance of which either becomes useless to the others. it is from their potential effect upon these lines of communication that all positions in the gulf or the caribbean derive their military value, or want of value. it is impossible to precede or to accompany a discussion of this sort with a technical exposition of naval strategy. such definitions of the art as may be needed must be given _in loco_, cursorily and dogmatically. therefore it will be said here briefly that the strategic value of any position, be it body of land large or small, or a seaport, or a strait, depends, , upon situation (with reference chiefly to communications), , upon its strength (inherent or acquired), and, , upon its resources (natural or stored). as strength and resources are matters which man can accumulate where suitable situation offers, whereas he cannot change the location of a place in itself otherwise advantageous, it is upon situation that attention must primarily be fixed. strength and resources may be artificially supplied or increased, but it passes the power of man to move a port which lies outside the limits of strategic effect. gibraltar in mid-ocean might have fourfold its present power, yet would be valueless in a military sense. the positions which are indicated on the map by the dark squares have been selected, therefore, upon these considerations, after a careful study of the inherent advantages of the various ports and coast-lines of the caribbean sea and the gulf. it is by no means meant that there are not others which possess merits of various kinds; or that those indicated, and to be named, exhaust the strategic possibilities of the region under examination. but there are qualifying circumstances of degree in particular cases; and a certain regard must be had to political conditions, which may be said to a great extent to neutralize some positions. some, too, are excluded because overshadowed by others so near and so strong as practically to embrace them, when under the same political tenure. moreover, it is a commonplace of strategy that passive positions, fortified places, however strong, although indispensable as supports to military operations, should not be held in great number. to do so wastes force. similarly, in the study of a field of maritime operations, the number of available positions, whose relative and combined influence upon the whole is to be considered, should be narrowed, by a process of gradual elimination, to those clearly essential and representative. to embrace more confuses the attention, wastes mental force, and is a hindrance to correct appreciation. the rejection of details, where permissible, and understandingly done, facilitates comprehension, which is baffled by a multiplication of minutiae, just as the impression of a work of art, or of a story, is lost amid a multiplicity of figures or of actors. the investigation precedent to formulation of ideas must be close and minute, but that done, the unbiassed selection of the most important, expressed graphically by a few lines and a few dots, leads most certainly to the comprehension of decisive relations in a military field of action. in the united states, pensacola and the mississippi river have been rivals for the possession of a navy-yard. the recent decision of a specially appointed board in favor of the latter, while it commands the full assent of the writer, by no means eliminates the usefulness of the former. taken together, they fulfil a fair requirement of strategy, sea and land, that operations based upon a national frontier, which a coast-line is, should not depend upon a single place only. they are closer together than ideal perfection would wish; too easily, therefore, to be watched by an enemy without great dispersal of his force, which norfolk and new york, for instance, are not; but still, conjointly, they are the best we can do on that line, having regard to the draught of water for heavy ships. key west, an island lying off the end of the florida peninsula, has long been recognized as the chief, and almost the only, good and defensible anchorage upon the strait of florida, reasonable control of which is indispensable to water communication between our atlantic and gulf seaboards in time of war. in case of war in the direction of the caribbean, key west is the extreme point now in our possession upon which, granting adequate fortification, our fleets could rely; and, so used, it would effectually divert an enemy's force from pensacola and the mississippi. it can never be the ultimate base of operations, as pensacola or new orleans can, because it is an island, a small island, and has no resources--not even water; but for the daily needs of a fleet--coal, ammunition, etc.--it can be made most effective. sixty miles west of it stands an antiquated fortress on the dry tortugas. these are capable of being made a useful adjunct to key west, but at present they scarcely can be so considered. key west is miles distant from the mouth of the mississippi, and from the isthmus. the islands of santa lucia and of martinique have been selected because they represent the chief positions of, respectively, great britain and france on the outer limits of the general field under consideration. for the reasons already stated, grenada, barbadoes, dominica, and the other near british islands are not taken into account, or rather are considered to be embraced in santa lucia, which adequately represents them. if a secondary position on that line were required, it would be at antigua, which would play to santa lucia the part which pensacola does to the mississippi. in like manner the french guadeloupe merges in martinique. the intrinsic importance of these positions consists in the fact that, being otherwise suitable and properly defended, they are the nearest to the mother-countries, between whom and themselves there lies no point of danger near which it is necessary to pass. they have the disadvantage of being very small islands, consequently without adequate natural resources, and easy to be blockaded on all sides. they are therefore essentially dependent for their usefulness in war upon control of the sea, which neither pensacola nor new orleans is, having the continent at their backs. it is in this respect that the pre-eminent intrinsic advantages of cuba, or rather of spain in cuba, are to be seen; and also, but in much less degree, those of great britain in jamaica. cuba, though narrow throughout, is over six hundred miles long, from cape san antonio to cape maysi. it is, in short, not so much an island as a continent, susceptible, under proper development, of great resources--of self-sufficingness. in area it is half as large again as ireland, but, owing to its peculiar form, is much more than twice as long. marine distances, therefore, are drawn out to an extreme degree. its many natural harbors concentrate themselves, to a military examination, into three principal groups, whose representatives are, in the west, havana; in the east, santiago; while near midway of the southern shore lies cienfuegos. the shortest water distance separating any two of these is miles, from santiago to cienfuegos. to get from cienfuegos to havana miles of water must be traversed and the western point of the island doubled; yet the two ports are distant by land only a little more than a hundred miles of fairly easy country. regarded, therefore, as a base of naval operations, as a source of supplies to a fleet, cuba presents a condition wholly unique among the islands of the caribbean and of the gulf of mexico; to both which it, and it alone of all the archipelago, belongs. it is unique in its size, which should render it largely self-supporting, either by its own products, or by the accumulation of foreign necessaries which naturally obtains in a large and prosperous maritime community; and it is unique in that such supplies can be conveyed from one point to the other, according to the needs of a fleet, by interior lines, not exposed to risks of maritime capture. the extent of the coast-line, the numerous harbors, and the many directions from which approach can be made, minimize the dangers of total blockade, to which all islands are subject. such conditions are in themselves advantageous, but they are especially so to a navy inferior to its adversary, for they convey the power--subject, of course, to conditions of skill--of shifting operations from side to side, and finding refuge and supplies in either direction. jamaica, being but one-tenth the size of cuba, and one-fifth of its length, does not present the intrinsic advantages of the latter island, regarded either as a source of supplies or as a centre from which to direct effort; but when in the hands of a power supreme at sea, as at the present great britain is, the questions of supplies, of blockade, and of facility in direction of effort diminish in importance. that which in the one case is a matter of life and death, becomes now only an embarrassing problem, necessitating watchfulness and precaution, but by no means insoluble. no advantages of position can counterbalance, in the long-run, decisive inferiority in organized mobile force,--inferiority in troops in the field, and yet much more in ships on the sea. if spain should become involved in war with great britain, as she so often before has been, the advantage she would have in cuba as against jamaica would be that her communications with the united states, especially with the gulf ports, would be well under cover. by this is not meant that vessels bound to cuba by such routes would be in unassailable security; no communications, maritime or terrestrial, can be so against raiding. what is meant is that they can be protected with much less effort than they can be attacked; that the raiders--the offence--must be much more numerous and active than the defence, because much farther from their base; and that the question of such raiding would depend consequently upon the force great britain could spare from other scenes of war, for it is not likely that spain would fight her single-handed. it is quite possible that under such conditions advantage of position would more than counterbalance a _small_ disadvantage in local force. "war," said napoleon, "is a business of positions;" by which that master of lightning-like rapidity of movement assuredly did not mean that it was a business of getting into a position and sticking there. it is in the utilization of position by mobile force that war is determined, just as the effect of a chessman depends upon both its individual value _and_ its relative position. while, therefore, in the combination of the two factors, force and position, force is intrinsically the more valuable, it is always possible that great advantage of position may outweigh small advantage of force, as + is greater than + . the positional value of cuba is extremely great. regarded solely as a naval position, without reference to the force thereon based, jamaica is greatly inferior to cuba in a question of general war, notwithstanding the fact that in kingston it possesses an excellent harbor and naval station. it is only with direct reference to the isthmus, and therefore to the local question of the caribbean as the main scene of hostilities, that it possesses a certain superiority which will be touched on later. it is advisable first to complete the list, and so far as necessary to account for the selection, of the other points indicated by the squares. of these, three are so nearly together at the isthmus that, according to the rule before adopted, they might be reduced very properly to a single representative position. being, however, so close to the great centre of interest in the caribbean, and having different specific reasons constituting their importance, it is essential to a full statement of strategic conditions in that sea to mention briefly each and all. they are, the harbor and town of colon, sometimes called aspinwall; the harbor and city of cartagena, miles to the eastward of colon; and the chiriqui lagoon, miles west of colon, a vast enclosed bay with many islands, giving excellent and diversified anchorage, the shores of which are nearly uninhabited. colon is the caribbean terminus of the panama railroad, and is also that of the canal projected, and partly dug, under the de lesseps scheme. the harbor being good, though open to some winds, it is naturally indicated as a point where isthmian transit may begin or end. as there is no intention of entering into the controversy about the relative merits of the panama and nicaragua canal schemes, it will be sufficient here to say that, if the former be carried through, colon is its inevitable issue on one side. the city of cartagena is the largest and most flourishing in the neighborhood of the isthmus, and has a good harbor. with these conditions obtaining, its advantage rests upon the axiomatic principle that, other things being nearly equal, a place where commerce centres is a better strategic position than one which it neglects. the latter is the condition of the chiriqui lagoon. this truly noble sheet of water, which was visited by columbus himself, and bears record of the fact in the name of one of its basins,--the bay of the admiral,--has every natural adaptation for a purely naval base, but has not drawn to itself the operations of commerce. everything would need there to be created, and to be maintained continuously. it lies midway between colon and the mouth of the river san juan, where is greytown, which has been selected as the issue of the projected nicaragua canal; and therefore, in a peculiar way, chiriqui symbolizes the present indeterminate phase of the isthmian problem. with all its latent possibilities, however, little can be said now of chiriqui, except that a rough appreciation of its existence and character is essential to an adequate understanding of isthmian conditions. the dutch island of curaçao has been marked, chiefly because, with its natural characteristics, it cannot be passed over; but it now is, and it may be hoped will remain indefinitely, among the positions of which it has been said that they are neutralized by political circumstances. curaçao possesses a fine harbor, which may be made impregnable, and it lies unavoidably near the route of any vessel bound to the isthmus and passing eastward of jamaica. such conditions constitute undeniable military importance; but holland is a small state, unlikely to join again in a general war. there is, indeed, a floating apprehension that the german empire, in its present desires of colonial extension, may be willing to absorb holland, for the sake of her still extensive colonial possessions. improbable as this may seem, it is scarcely more incomprehensible than the recent mysterious movements upon the european chess-board, attributed by common rumor to the dominating influence of the emperor of germany, which we puzzled americans for months past have sought in vain to understand. the same probable neutrality must be admitted for the remaining positions that have been distinguished: mujeres island, samana bay, and the island of st. thomas. the first of these, at the extremity of the yucatan peninsula, belongs to mexico, a country whose interest in the isthmian question is very real; for, like the united states, she has an extensive seaboard both upon the pacific and--in the gulf of mexico--upon the atlantic ocean. mujeres island, however, has nothing to offer but situation, being upon the yucatan passage, the one road from all the gulf ports to the caribbean and the isthmus. the anchorage is barely tolerable, the resources _nil_, and defensive strength could be imparted only by an expense quite disproportionate to the result obtained. the consideration of the island as a possible military situation does but emphasize the fact, salient to the most superficial glance, that, so far as position goes, cuba has no possible rival in her command of the yucatan passage, just as she has no competitor, in point of natural strength and resources, for the control of the florida strait, which connects the gulf of mexico with the atlantic. samana bay, at the northeast corner of santo domingo, is but one of several fine anchorages in that great island, whose territory is now divided between two negro republics--french and spanish in tongue. its selection to figure in our study, to the exclusion of the others, is determined by its situation, and by the fact that we are seeking to take a comprehensive glance of the caribbean as a whole, and not merely of particular districts. for instance, it might be urged forcibly, in view of the existence of two great naval ports like santiago de cuba and port royal in jamaica, close to the windward passage, through which lies the direct route from the atlantic seaboard to the isthmus, that st. nicholas mole, immediately on the passage, offers the natural position for checking the others in case of need. the reply is that we are not seeking to check anything or anybody, but simply examining in the large the natural strategic features, and incidentally thereto noting the political conditions, of a maritime region in which the united states is particularly interested; political conditions, as has been remarked, having an unavoidable effect upon military values. the inquiry being thus broad, samana bay and the island of st. thomas are entitled to the pre-eminence here given to them, because they represent, efficiently and better than any other positions, the control of two principal passages into the caribbean sea from the atlantic. the mona passage, on which samana lies, between santo domingo and puerto rico, is particularly suited to sailing-vessels from the northward, because free from dangers to navigation. this, of course, in these days of steam, is a small matter militarily; in the latter sense the mona passage is valuable because it is an alternative to the windward passage, or to those to the eastward, in case of hostile predominance in one quarter or the other. st. thomas is on the anegada passage, actually much used, and which better than any other represents the course from europe to the isthmus, just as the windward passage does that from the north american atlantic ports. neither of these places can boast of great natural strength nor of resources; st. thomas, because it is a small island with the inherent weaknesses attending all such, which have been mentioned; samana bay, because, although the island on which it is is large and productive, it has not now, and gives no hope of having, that political stability and commercial prosperity which bring resources and power in their train. both places would need also considerable development of defensive works to meet the requirements of a naval port. despite these defects, their situations on the passages named entitle them to paramount consideration in a general study of the caribbean sea and the gulf of mexico. potentially, though not actually, they lend control of the mona and anegada passages, exactly as kingston and santiago do of the windward. for, granting that the isthmus is in the caribbean the predominant interest, commercial, and therefore concerning the whole world, but also military, and so far possessing peculiar concern for those nations whose territories lie on both oceans, which it now severs and will one day unite--of which nations the united states is the most prominent--granting this, and it follows that entrance to the caribbean, and transit across the caribbean to the isthmus, are two prime essentials to the enjoyment of the advantages of the latter. therefore, in case of war, control of these two things becomes a military object not second to the isthmus itself, access to which depends upon them; and in their bearing upon these two things the various positions that are passed under consideration must be viewed--individually first, and afterwards collectively. the first process of individual consideration the writer has asked the reader to take on faith; neither time nor space permits its elaboration here; but the reasons for choosing those that have been named have been given as briefly as possible. let us now look at the map, and regard as a collective whole the picture there graphically presented. putting to one side, for the moment at least, the isthmian points, as indicating the end rather than the precedent means, we see at the present time that the positions at the extremes of the field under examination are held by powers of the first rank,--martinique and santa lucia by france and great britain, pensacola and the mississippi by the united states. further, there are held by these same states of the first order two advanced positions, widely separated from the first bases of their power; namely, key west, which is miles from pensacola, and jamaica, which is miles from santa lucia. from the isthmus, key west is distant miles; jamaica, miles. between and separating these two groups, of primary bases and advanced posts, extends the chain of positions from yucatan to st. thomas. as far as is possible to position, apart from mobile force, these represent control over the northern entrances--the most important entrances--into the caribbean sea. no one of this chain belongs to any of the powers commonly reckoned as being of the first order of strength. the entrances on the north of the sea, as far as, but not including, the anegada passage, are called the most important, because they are so few in number,--a circumstance which always increases value; because they are so much nearer to the isthmus; and, very especially to the united states, because they are the ones by which, and by which alone,--except at the cost of a wide circuit,--she communicates with the isthmus, and, generally, with all the region lying within the borders of the caribbean. in a very literal sense the caribbean is a mediterranean sea; but the adjective must be qualified when comparison is made with the mediterranean of the old world or with the gulf of mexico. the last-named bodies of water communicate with the outer oceans by passages so contracted as to be easily watched from near-by positions, and for both there exist such positions of exceptional strength,--gibraltar and some others in the former case, havana and no other in the latter. the caribbean, on the contrary, is enclosed on its eastern side by a chain of small islands, the passages between which, although practically not wider than the strait of gibraltar, are so numerous that entrance to the sea on that side may be said correctly to extend over a stretch of near miles. the islands, it is true, are so many positions, some better, some worse, from which military effort to control entrance can be exerted; but their number prevents that concentration and that certainty of effect which are possible to adequate force resting upon gibraltar or havana. on the northern side of the sea the case is quite different. from the western end of cuba to the eastern end of puerto rico extends a barrier of land for miles--as against on the east--broken only by two straits, each fifty miles wide, from side to side of which a steamer of but moderate power can pass in three or four hours. these natural conditions, governing the approach to the isthmus, reproduce as nearly as possible the strategic effect of ireland upon great britain. there a land barrier of miles, midway between the pentland firth and the english channel--centrally situated, that is, with reference to all the atlantic approaches to great britain--gives to an adequate navy a unique power to flank and harass either the one or the other, or both. existing political conditions and other circumstances unquestionably modify the importance of these two barriers, relatively to the countries affected by them. open communication with the atlantic is vital to great britain, which the isthmus, up to the present time, is not to the united states. there are, however, varying degrees of importance below that which is vital. taking into consideration that of the -mile barrier to the caribbean miles is solid in cuba, that after the -mile gap of the windward passage there succeeds miles more of haiti before the mona passage is reached, it is indisputable that a superior navy, resting on santiago de cuba or jamaica, could very seriously incommode all access of the united states to the caribbean mainland, and especially to the isthmus. in connection with this should be considered also the influence upon our mercantile and naval communication between the atlantic and the gulf coasts exercised by the peninsula of florida, and by the narrowness of the channels separating the latter from the bahama banks and from cuba. the effect of this long and not very broad strip of land upon our maritime interests can be realized best by imagining it wholly removed, or else turned into an island by a practicable channel crossing its neck. in the latter case the two entrances to the channel would have indeed to be assured; but our shipping would not be forced to pass through a long, narrow waterway, bordered throughout on one side by foreign and possibly hostile territories. in case of war with either great britain or spain, this channel would be likely to be infested by hostile cruisers, close to their own base, the very best condition for a commerce-destroying war; and its protection by us under present circumstances will exact a much greater effort than with the supposed channel, or than if the florida peninsula did not exist. the effect of the peninsula is to thrust our route from the atlantic to the gulf miles to the southward, and to make imperative a base for control of the strait; while the case is made worse by an almost total lack of useful harbors. on the atlantic, the most exposed side, there is none; and on the gulf none nearer to key west than miles,[ ] where we find tampa bay. there is, indeed, nothing that can be said about the interests of the united states in an isthmian canal that does not apply now with equal force to the strait of florida. the one links the atlantic to the gulf, as the other would the atlantic to the pacific. it may be added here that the phenomenon of the long, narrow peninsula of florida, with its strait, is reproduced successively in cuba, haiti, and puerto rico, with the passages dividing them. the whole together forms one long barrier, the strategic significance of which cannot be overlooked in its effect upon the caribbean; while the gulf of mexico is assigned to absolute seclusion by it, if the passages are in hostile control. [ ] there is charlotte harbor, at miles, but it can be used only by medium-sized vessels. the relations of the island of jamaica to the great barrier formed by cuba, haiti, and puerto rico are such as to constitute it the natural stepping-stone by which to pass from the consideration of entrance into the caribbean, which has been engaging our attention, to that of the transit across, from entrance to the isthmus, which we must next undertake. in the matters of entrance to the caribbean, and of general interior control of that sea, jamaica has a singularly central position. it is equidistant ( miles) from colon, from the yucatan channel, and from the mona passage; it is even closer ( miles) to the nearest mainland of south america at point gallinas, and of central america at cape gracias-á-dios; while it lies so immediately in rear of the windward passage that its command of the latter can scarcely be considered less than that of santiago. the analogy of its situation, as a station for a great fleet, to that for an army covering a frontier which is passable at but a few points, will scarcely escape a military reader. a comparatively short chain of swift lookout steamers, in each direction, can give timely notice of any approach by either of the three passages named; while, if entrance be gained at any other point, the arms stretched out towards gallinas and gracias-á-dios will give warning of transit before the purposes of such transit can be accomplished undisturbed. with such advantages of situation, and with a harbor susceptible of satisfactory development as a naval station for a great fleet, jamaica is certainly the most important single position in the caribbean sea. when one recalls that it passed into the hands of great britain, in the days of cromwell, by accidental conquest, the expedition having been intended primarily against santo domingo; that in the two centuries and a half which have since intervened it has played no part adequate to its advantages, such as now looms before it; that, by all the probabilities, it should have been reconquered and retained by spain in the war of the american revolution; and when, again, it is recalled that a like accident and a like subsequent uncertainty attended the conquest and retention of the decisive mediterranean positions of gibraltar and malta, one marvels whether incidents so widely separated in time and place, all tending towards one end--the maritime predominance of great britain--can be accidents, or are simply the exhibition of a personal will, acting through all time, with purpose deliberate and consecutive, to ends not yet discerned. nevertheless, when compared to cuba, jamaica cannot be considered the preponderant position of the caribbean. the military question of position is quantitative as well as qualitative; and situation, however excellent, can rarely, by itself alone, make full amends for defect in the power and resources which are the natural property of size--of mass. gibraltar, the synonym of intrinsic strength, is an illustration in point; its smallness, its isolation, and its barrenness of resource constitute limits to its offensive power, and even to its impregnability, which are well understood by military men. jamaica, by its situation, flanks the route from cuba to the isthmus, as indeed it does all routes from the atlantic and the gulf to that point; but, as a military entity, it is completely overshadowed by the larger island, which it so conspicuously confronts. if, as has just been said, it by situation intercepts the access of cuba to the isthmus, it is itself cut off by its huge neighbor from secure communication with the north american continent, now as always the chief natural source of supplies for the west indies, which do not produce the great staples of life. with the united states friendly or neutral, in a case of war, there can be no comparison between the advantages of cuba, conferred by its situation and its size, and those of jamaica, which, by these qualities of its rival, is effectually cut off from that source of supplies. nor is the disadvantage of jamaica less marked with reference to communication with other quarters than the united states--with halifax, with bermuda, with europe. its distance from these points, and from santa lucia, where the resources of europe may be said to focus for it, makes its situation one of extreme isolation; a condition emphasized by the fact that both bermuda and santa lucia are themselves dependent upon outside sources for anything they may send to jamaica. at all these points, coal, the great factor of modern naval war, must be stored and the supply maintained. they do not produce it. the mere size of cuba, the amount of population which it has, or ought to have, the number of its seaports, the extent of the industries possible to it, tend naturally to an accumulation of resources such as great mercantile communities always entail. these, combined with its nearness to the united states, and its other advantages of situation, make cuba a position that can have no military rival among the islands of the world, except ireland. with a friendly united states, isolation is impossible to cuba. the aim of any discussion such as this should be to narrow down, by a gradual elimination, the various factors to be considered, in order that the decisive ones, remaining, may become conspicuously visible. the trees being thus thinned out, the features of the strategic landscape can appear. the primary processes in the present case have been carried out before seeking the attention of the reader, to whom the first approximations have been presented under three heads. first, the two decisive centres, the mouth of the mississippi and the isthmus. second, the four principal routes, connecting these two points with others, have been specified; these routes being, , between the isthmus and the mississippi themselves; , from the isthmus to the north american coast, by the windward passage; , from the gulf of mexico to the north american coast, by the strait of florida; and, , from the isthmus to europe, by the anegada passage. third, the principal military positions throughout the region in question have been laid down, and their individual and relative importance indicated. from the subsequent discussion it seems evident that, as "communications" are so leading an element in strategy, the position or positions which decisively affect the greatest number or extent of the communications will be the most important, so far as situation goes. of the four principal lines named, three pass close to, and are essentially controlled by, the islands of cuba and jamaica, namely, from the mississippi to the isthmus by the yucatan channel, from the mississippi to the atlantic coast of america by the strait of florida, and from the isthmus to the atlantic coast by the windward passage. the fourth route, which represents those from the isthmus to europe, passes nearer to jamaica than to cuba; but those two islands exercise over it more control than does any other one of the archipelago, for the reason that any other can be avoided more easily, and by a wider interval, than either jamaica or cuba. regarded as positions, therefore, these two islands are the real rivals for control of the caribbean and of the gulf of mexico; and it may be added that the strategic centre of interest for both gulf and caribbean is to be found in the windward passage, because it furnishes the ultimate test of the relative power of the two islands to control the caribbean. for, as has been said before, and cannot be repeated too often, it is not position only, nor chiefly, but mobile force, that is decisive in war. in the combination of these two elements rests the full statement of any case. the question of position has been adjudged in favor of cuba, for reasons which have been given. in the case of a conflict between the powers holding the two islands, the question of controlling the windward passage would be the test of relative mobile strength; because that channel is the shortest and best line of communications for jamaica with the american coast, with halifax, and with bermuda, and as such it must be kept open. if the power of jamaica is not great enough to hold the passage open by force, she is thrown upon evasion--upon furtive measures--to maintain essential supplies; for, if she cannot assert her strength so far in that direction, she cannot, from her nearness, go beyond cuba's reach in any direction. abandonment of the best road in this case means isolation; and to that condition, if prolonged, there is but one issue. the final result, therefore, may be stated in this way: the advantages of situation, strength, and resources are greatly and decisively in favor of cuba. to bring jamaica to a condition of equality, or superiority, is needed a mobile force capable of keeping the windward passage continuously open, not only for a moment, nor for any measurable time, but throughout the war. under the present conditions of political tenure, in case of a war involving only the two states concerned, such a question could admit of no doubt; but in a war at all general, involving several naval powers, the issue would be less certain. in the war of the tenure, not of the windward passage merely, but of jamaica itself, was looked upon by a large party in great britain as nearly hopeless; and it is true that only a happy concurrence of blundering and bad luck on the part of its foes then saved the island. it is conceivable that odds which have happened once may happen again. the end. [transcriber's note: obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all other inconsistencies are as in the original. author's spelling has been maintained. every chapter heading had an illustration; the corresponding tag has been removed.] [illustration: spilling grog on the "constitution" before going into action.] the naval history of the united states by willis j. abbot with many illustrations _volume one_ new york: peter fenelon collier, publisher. copyright, , , , by dodd, mead and company _all rights reserved_ contents. the naval history of the united states. _part i._ blue jackets of ' . chapter i. early exploits upon the water. -- gallop's battle with the indians. -- buccaneers and pirates. -- morgan and blackbeard. -- capt. kidd turns pirate. -- downfall of the buccaneers' power. chapter ii. expeditions against neighboring colonies. -- romantic career of sir william phipps. -- quelling a mutiny. -- expeditions against quebec. chapter iii. opening of the american revolution. -- the affair of the schooner "st. john." -- the press-gang and its work. -- the sloop "liberty." -- destruction of the "gaspee." -- the boston tea-party. chapter iv. the beginning of the navy. -- lexington and concord. -- a blow struck in maine. -- capture of the "margaretta." -- gen. washington and the navy. -- work of capt. manly. chapter v. events of . -- the first cruise of the regular navy. -- the "lexington" and the "edward." -- mugford's brave fight. -- loss of the "yankee hero." -- capt. manly, and the "defence." -- american vessels in european waters. -- good work of the "lexington" and the "reprisal." -- the british defeated at charleston. chapter vi. the career of paul jones. -- in command of the "providence." -- capture of the "mellish." -- exploits with the "alfred." -- in command of the "ranger." -- sweeping the english channel. -- the descent upon whitehaven. chapter vii. career of paul jones continued. -- his descent upon the castle of lord selkirk. -- the affair of the plate. -- the descent upon whitehaven. -- the battle with the "drake." -- lieut. simpson's perfidy. chapter viii. career of paul jones continued. -- his search for a ship. -- given command of the "bon homme richard." -- landais and his character. -- the frustrated mutiny. -- landais quarrels with jones. -- edinburgh and leith threatened. -- the dominie's prayer. chapter ix. career of paul jones concluded. -- the battle between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis." -- treachery of landais. -- jones's great victory. -- landais steals the "alliance." -- jones in command of the "ariel." -- the "ariel" in the storm. -- arrival in america. chapter x. career of nicholas biddle. -- his exploit at lewiston jail. -- cruise in the "randolph." -- battle with the "yarmouth." -- the fatal explosion. -- samuel tucker. -- his boyhood. -- encounter with corsairs. -- cruising in the "franklin." -- in command of the "boston." -- anecdotes of capt. tucker. chapter xi. hostilities in . -- american reverses. -- the british in philadelphia. -- the attack upon fort mifflin. -- cruise of the "raleigh" and the "alfred." -- torpedo warfare. -- the battle of the kegs. chapter xii. naval events of . -- recruiting for the navy. -- the descent upon new providence. -- operations on the delaware. -- capt. barry's exploits. -- destruction of the american frigates. -- american reverses. -- the capture of the "pigot." -- french naval exploits. chapter xiii. last years of the war. -- disastrous expedition to the penobscot. -- wholesale captures on the newfoundland banks. -- french ships in american waters. -- taking of charleston. -- the "trumbull's" victory and defeat. -- capt. barry and the "alliance." -- close of the war. chapter xiv. work of the privateers. -- the "gen. hancock" and the "levant." -- exploits of the "pickering" -- the "revenge." -- the "holkar." -- the "congress" and the "savage." -- the "hyder ali" and the "gen. monk." -- the whale-boat hostilities. -- the "old jersey" prison-ship. chapter xv. the navy disbanded. -- aggressions of barbary corsairs. -- a disgraceful tribute. -- bainbridge and the dey. -- gen. eaton at tunis. -- a squadron sent to the mediterranean. -- decatur and the spaniards. -- the "enterprise" and the "tripoli." -- american slaves in algiers. chapter xvi. more vigorous policy. -- commodore morris sent to the mediterranean. -- porter's cutting-out expedition. -- commodore preble sent to the mediterranean. -- his encounter with a british man-of-war. -- the loss of the "philadelphia." -- decatur's daring adventure. chapter xvii. a stirring year. -- the bombardment of tripoli. -- decatur's hand-to-hand fight. -- lieut. trippe's bravery. -- lieut. spence's bold deed. -- somers's narrow escape. -- the floating mine. -- the fatal explosion. -- close of the war. -- the end. _part ii._ blue jackets of . chapter i. the gathering of the war-cloud. -- the revolution ended, but the war for independence yet unfought. -- outrages upon american sailors. -- the right of search. -- impressment. -- boyhood of commodore porter. -- early days of commodores perry and barney. -- burning a privateer. -- the embargo. -- war inevitable chapter ii. war with france. -- the building of a navy. -- first success for the americans. -- cutting out the "sandwich." -- the "constellation" and "l'insurgente." -- the "constellation" and "la vengeance" chapter iii. proposed reduction of the navy. -- renewal of british outrages. -- the affair of the "baltimore." -- attack on the "leander." -- encounter between the "chesapeake" and "leopard." -- the "president" and "little belt" chapter iv. the war on the ocean. -- commodore rodgers's cruise. -- the loss of the "nautilus." -- first success for the british. -- the escape of the "constitution." -- the "essex" takes the "alert." -- the "constitution" and the "guerriere" chapter v. an international debate. -- the "wasp" and the "frolic." -- the "united states" and the "macedonian." -- ovations to the victors chapter vi. bainbridge takes command of the "constitution." -- the defeat of the "java." -- close of the year's hostilities on the ocean. chapter vii. the war on the lakes. -- the attack on sackett's harbor. -- oliver hazard perry ordered to lake erie. -- the battle of put-in-bay. chapter viii. on the ocean. -- the "hornet" sinks the "peacock." -- the blockade. -- adventures of the "sally." -- hostilities on chesapeake bay. -- the cruise of the "president". chapter ix. decatur blockaded at new york. -- attempts to escape through long island sound. -- the flag-ship struck by lightning. -- torpedoes. -- fulton's steam-frigate. -- action between the "chesapeake" and "shannon". chapter x. cruise of the "essex." -- a rich prize. -- the mysterious letter. -- cape horn rounded. -- capture of a peruvian privateer. -- among the british whalers. -- porter in command of a squadron. -- a boy commander. -- the squadron lays up at nookaheevah. chapter xi. war with the savages. -- the campaign against the typees. -- departure from nookaheevah. -- the "essex" anchors at valparaiso. -- arrival of the "phoebe" and "cherub." -- they capture the "essex." -- porter's encounter with the "saturn." -- the mutiny at nookaheevah. chapter xii. capture of the "surveyor." -- work of the gunboat flotilla. -- operations on chesapeake bay. -- cockburn's depredations. -- cruise of the "argus." -- her capture by the "pelican." -- battle between the "enterprise" and "boxer." -- end of the year on the ocean. chapter xiii. on the lakes. -- close of hostilities on lakes erie and huron. -- desultory warfare on lake ontario in . -- hostilities on lake ontario in . -- the battle of lake champlain. -- end of the war upon the lakes. chapter xiv. on the ocean. -- the work of the sloops-of-war. -- loss of the "frolic." -- fruitless cruise of the "adams." -- the "peacock" takes the "epervier." -- the cruise of the "wasp." -- she captures the "reindeer." -- sinks the "avon." -- mysterious end of the "wasp". chapter xv. operations on the new england coast. -- the bombardment of stonington. -- destruction of the united states corvette "adams." -- operations on chesapeake bay. -- work of barney's barge flotilla. -- advance of the british upon washington. -- destruction of the capitol. -- operations against baltimore. -- bombardment of fort mchenry. chapter xvi. desultory hostilities on the ocean. -- attack upon fort bowyer. -- lafitte the pirate. -- british expedition against new orleans. -- battle of the rigolets. -- attack on new orleans, and defeat of the british. -- work of the blue-jackets. -- capture of the frigate "president." -- the "constitution" takes the "cyane" and "levant." -- the "hornet" takes the "penguin." -- end of the war. chapter xvii. privateers and prisons of the war. -- the "rossie." -- salem privateers. -- the "gen. armstrong" gives battle to a british squadron, and saves new orleans. -- narrative of a british officer. -- the "prince de neufchatel." -- experiences of american prisoners of war. -- the end. chapter xviii. the long peace broken by the war with mexico. -- activity of the navy. -- captain stockton's stratagem. -- the battle at san jose. -- the blockade. -- instances of personal bravery. -- the loss of the "truxton." -- yellow fever in the squadron. -- the navy at vera cruz. -- capture of alvarado. chapter xix. the navy in peace. -- surveying the dead sea. -- suppressing the slave trade. -- the franklin relief expedition. -- commodore perry in japan. -- signing of the treaty. -- trouble in chinese waters. -- the koszta case. -- the second franklin relief expedition. -- foote at canton. -- "blood is thicker than water". _part iii._ blue jackets of ' . chapter i. the opening of the conflict. -- the navies of the contestants. -- dix's famous despatch. -- the river-gunboats. chapter ii. fort sumter bombarded. -- attempt of the "star of the west" to re-enforce anderson. -- the naval expedition to fort sumter. -- the rescue of the frigate "constitution." -- burning the norfolk navy-yard. chapter iii. difficulties of the confederates in getting a navy. -- exploit of the "french lady." -- naval skirmishing on the potomac. -- the cruise of the "sumter" chapter iv. the potomac flotilla. -- capture of alexandria. -- actions at matthias point. -- bombardment of the hatteras forts. chapter v. the "trent" affair. -- operations in albemarle and pamlico sounds. -- destruction of the confederate fleet. chapter vi. reduction of newbern. -- exploits of lieut. cushing. -- destruction of the ram "albemarle". chapter vii. the blockade-runners. -- nassau and wilmington. -- work of the cruisers. chapter viii. du pont's expedition to hilton head and port royal. -- the fiery circle. chapter ix. the first ironclad vessels in history. -- the "merrimac" sinks the "cumberland," and destroys the "congress." -- duel between the "monitor" and "merrimac". chapter x. the navy in the inland waters. -- the mississippi squadron. -- sweeping the tennessee river. chapter xi. famous confederate privateers, -- the "alabama," the "shenandoah," the "nashville". chapter xii. work of the gulf squadron. -- the fight at the passes of the mississippi. -- destruction of the schooner "judah." -- the blockade of galveston, and capture of the "harriet lane". chapter xiii. the capture of new orleans. -- farragut's fleet passes fort st. philip and fort jackson. chapter xiv. along the mississippi. -- forts jackson and st. philip surrender. -- the battle at st. charles. -- the ram "arkansas." -- bombardment and capture of port hudson. chapter xv. on to vicksburg. -- bombardment of the confederate stronghold. -- porter's cruise in the forests. chapter xvi. vicksburg surrenders, and the mississippi is opened. -- naval events along the gulf coast. chapter xvii. operations about charleston. -- the bombardment, the siege, and the capture. chapter xviii. the battle of mobile bay. chapter xix. the fall of fort fisher. -- the navy ends its work. _part iv._ blue jackets in time of peace. chapter i. police service on the high seas. -- war service in asiatic ports. -- losses by the perils of the deep. -- a brush with the pirates. -- admiral rodgers at corea. -- services in arctic waters. -- the disaster at samoa. -- the attack on the "baltimore's" men at valparaiso. -- loss of the "kearsarge." -- the naval review. chapter ii. the naval militia. -- a volunteer service which in time of war will be effective. -- how boys are trained for the life of a sailor. -- conditions of enlistment in the volunteer branch of the service. -- the work of the seagoing militia in summer. chapter iii. how the navy has grown. -- the cost and character of our new white ships of war. -- our period of naval weakness and our advance to a place among the great naval powers. -- the new devices of naval warfare. -- the torpedo, the dynamite gun, and the modern rifle. -- armor and its possibilities. _part v._ the naval war with spain. chapter i. the state of cuba. -- pertinacity of the revolutionists. -- spain's sacrifices and failure. -- spanish barbarities. -- the policy of reconcentration. -- american sympathy aroused. -- the struggle in congress. -- the assassination of the "maine." -- report of the commission. -- the onward march to battle. chapter ii. the opening days of the war. -- the first blow struck in the pacific. -- dewey and his fleet. -- the battle at manila. -- an eye-witness' story. -- delay and doubt in the east. -- dull times for the blue-jackets. -- the discovery of cervera. -- hobson's exploit. -- the outlook. chapter iii. the spanish fleet makes a dash from the harbor. -- its total destruction. -- admiral cervera a prisoner. -- great spanish losses. -- american fleet loses but one man. list of illustrations. volume one spilling grog on the "constitution" before going into action. _frontispiece_. commodore esek hopkins. siege of charleston, s.c., may, . captain john paul jones quelling the mob at whitehaven, scotland, nov., . the action between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis," september , . commodore barry. shortening sail on the "lancaster"--the oldest cruiser in commission. commodore decatur. derelict. cutting away the flag. commodore perry. barney regains his ship. toasting the wooden walls of columbia. commodore macdonough. hull makes a reconnoissance. the british squadron. lieut. allen fires a shot. commodore rogers hails. explosion on the "president". "hull her, boys!" loading. ready to board. engagement of the frigates "united states" and "macedonian," christmas day, . assuming to be british men-of-war. marines picking off the enemy. in the cross-trees. perry's recruits. drilling the raw recruits. commodore perry at the battle of lake erie. perry's victory--the battle of lake erie, september , . making ready to leave the "lawrence". awaiting the boarders. "i am commodore rogers". beating to quarters. the last shot of the "chesapeake". on board the "chesapeake". the peruvian privateer. the duel at the galapagos islands. firing the howitzer. volume two destruction of the "maine," havana harbor, feb. , . _frontispiece_ the fight with the "boxer". the surrender of the "boxer". on the way to lake erie. hiram paulding fires the guns. the captain of the "reindeer". the end of the "reindeer". lieut. richmond pearson hobson, who sank the "merrimac" in santiago harbor, june , . the descent of wareham. sharp-shooters. the march on washington. planning the attack. response to the call for volunteers to accompany hobson on the "merrimac". the "president" tries to escape. battleship "massachusetts". prison chaplain and jailer. the last volley of the war. new u. s. torpedo-boat "talbot". the "hartford," farragut's flagship. departure of a naval expedition from port royal. fort moultrie. anderson's command occupying fort sumter. major robert anderson. the "morris"--torpedo-boat of the smallest type-- - / tons displacement, horse-power. blockading the mouth of the mississippi. flag of the confederacy. naval patrol on the potomac. attack on the hatteras forts. spanish merchant steamer "catalina" captured by the cruiser "detroit," april , . flag of south carolina. nassau: the haunt of blockade-runners. cotton ships at nassau. marines saluting on the "lancaster"--our oldest naval vessel in active service. fortress monroe. du pont's expedition off cape hatteras. the opening gun. engagement of the "monitor" and "merrimac," march , . a river gunboat. engagement of the "kearsarge" and "alabama," june , . rescue of capt. semmes. the "nashville" burning a prize. fort pensacola. levee at new orleans before the war. farragut's fleet engaging the enemy near new orleans, april , . breaking the chain. farragut engaging the port hudson (la.) batteries, march, . the "arkansas" under fire. farragut's fleet engaging forts jackson and st. philip and confederate fleet on the mississippi river, below new orleans, april , . the launching of the battleship "iowa". passing the vicksburg batteries. bailey's dam on the red river. engagement between the u. s. flagship "hartford" and the confederate ironclad "tennessee," mobile bay, august , . warships off charleston harbor. battle of mobile bay--union fleet engaging fort morgan and confederate vessels, august , . forward turret of monitor "terror". torpedo-boat "cushing". dynamite cruiser "vesuvius". ensign worth bagley, of the torpedo-boat "winslow," killed may , . partial view of the wreck of the "maine". dewey's victory--the naval fight in manila bay, may , . the defeat of cervera's fleet--the "colon" running ashore. the naval board of strategy, . rear-admiral william thomas sampson. bombardment of san juan, puerto rico, may , . rear-admiral george dewey. admiral sampson's fleet off puerto rico, in search of cervera's vessels, may , . admiral cervera's fleet approaching santiago, may, . commodore john crittenden watson. general miles's expedition to puerto rico, as seen from the deck of the "st. paul". hobson sinking the "merrimac" in the entrance to santiago harbor, june , . rear-admiral winfield scott schley. monitors at league island navy yard, philadelphia. training ship "alliance"--type of the last wooden sloops-of-war. training ships "portsmouth" and "lancaster" at brooklyn navy yard. "racing home"--the battleship "oregon" on her way from san francisco to key west. hammock-inspection on a battleship. armored cruiser "new york" on her way to puerto rico. new york's welcome to the battleship "texas". spanish merchant steamer "panama," captured april , by lighthouse tender "mangrove". forward -inch guns on battleship "indiana". forward deck of dynamite gun-vessel "vesuvius". hospital ship "relief". religious service on battleship "iowa," off havana. the battleship "maine" leaving new york for havana. bombardment of matanzas, cuba, by the "new york," "cincinnati," and "puritan," april , . ironclads in action. bombardment of forts at entrance of santiago harbor, cuba, may , . torpedo-boat "ericsson". deck-tube and projectile of a torpedo-boat. crew of the "indiana" watching the "new york" capture a prize. hurry-work at night on monitor "puritan" at league island navy yard, philadelphia. part i blue-jackets of ' . chapter i. early exploits upon the water. -- gallop's battle with the indians. -- buccaneers and pirates. -- morgan and blackbeard. -- capt. kidd turns pirate. -- downfall of the buccaneers' power. in may, , a stanch little sloop of some twenty tons was standing along long island sound on a trading expedition. at her helm stood john gallop, a sturdy colonist, and a skilful seaman, who earned his bread by trading with the indians that at that time thronged the shores of the sound, and eagerly seized any opportunity to traffic with the white men from the colonies of plymouth or new amsterdam. the colonists sent out beads, knives, bright clothes, and sometimes, unfortunately, rum and other strong drinks. the indians in exchange offered skins and peltries of all kinds; and, as their simple natures had not been schooled to nice calculations of values, the traffic was one of great profit to the more shrewd whites. but the trade was not without its perils. though the indians were simple, and little likely to drive hard bargains, yet they were savages, and little accustomed to nice distinctions between their own property and that of others. their desires once aroused for some gaudy bit of cloth or shining glass, they were ready enough to steal it, often making their booty secure by the murder of the luckless trader. it so happened, that, just before john gallop set out with his sloop on the spring trading cruise, the people of the colony were excitedly discussing the probable fate of one oldham, who some weeks before had set out on a like errand, in a pinnace, with a crew of two white boys and two indians, and had never returned. so when, on this may morning, gallop, being forced to hug the shore by stormy weather, saw a small vessel lying at anchor in a cove, he immediately ran down nearer, to investigate. the crew of the sloop numbered two men and two boys, beside the skipper, gallop. some heavy duck-guns on board were no mean ordnance; and the new englander determined to probe the mystery of oldham's disappearance, though it might require some fighting. as the sloop bore down upon the anchored pinnace, gallop found no lack of signs to arouse his suspicion. the rigging of the strange craft was loose, and seemed to have been cut. no lookout was visible, and she seemed to have been deserted; but a nearer view showed, lying on the deck of the pinnace, fourteen stalwart indians, one of whom, catching sight of the approaching sloop, cut the anchor cable, and called to his companions to awake. this action on the part of the indians left gallop no doubt as to their character. evidently they had captured the pinnace, and had either murdered oldham, or even then had him a prisoner in their midst. the daring sailor wasted no time in debate as to the proper course to pursue, but clapping all sail on his craft, soon brought her alongside the pinnace. as the sloop came up, the indians opened the fight with fire-arms and spears; but gallop's crew responded with their duck-guns with such vigor that the indians deserted the decks, and fled below for shelter. gallop was then in a quandary. the odds against him were too great for him to dare to board, and the pinnace was rapidly drifting ashore. after some deliberation he put up his helm, and beat to windward of the pinnace; then, coming about, came scudding down upon her before the wind. the two vessels met with a tremendous shock. the bow of the sloop struck the pinnace fairly amidships, forcing her over on her beam-ends, until the water poured into the open hatchway. the affrighted indians, unused to warfare on the water, rushed upon deck. six leaped into the sea, and were drowned; the rest retreated again into the cabin. gallop then prepared to repeat his ramming manoeuvre. this time, to make the blow more effective, he lashed his anchor to the bow, so that the sharp flukes protruded; thus extemporizing an iron-clad ram more than two hundred years before naval men thought of using one. thus provided, the second blow of the sloop was more terrible than the first. the sharp fluke of the anchor crashed through the side of the pinnace, and the two vessels hung tightly together. gallop then began to double-load his duck-guns, and fire through the sides of the pinnace; but, finding that the enemy was not to be dislodged in this way, he broke his vessel loose, and again made for the windward, preparatory to a third blow. as the sloop drew off, four or five more indians rushed from the cabin of the pinnace, and leaped overboard but shared the fate of their predecessors, being far from land. gallop then came about, and for the third time bore down upon his adversary. as he drew near, an indian appeared on the deck of the pinnace, and with humble gestures offered to submit. gallop ran alongside, and taking the man on board, bound him hand and foot, and placed him in the hold. a second redskin then begged for quarter; but gallop, fearing to allow the two wily savages to be together, cast the second into the sea, where he was drowned. gallop then boarded the pinnace. two indians were left, who retreated into a small compartment of the hold, and were left unmolested. in the cabin was found the mangled body of mr. oldham. a tomahawk had been sunk deep into his skull, and his body was covered with wounds. the floor of the cabin was littered with portions of the cargo, which the murderous savages had plundered. taking all that remained of value upon his own craft, gallop cut loose the pinnace; and she drifted away, to go to pieces on a reef in narragansett bay. this combat is the earliest action upon american waters of which we have any trustworthy records. the only naval event antedating this was the expedition from virginia, under capt. samuel argal, against the little french settlement of san sauveur. indeed, had it not been for the pirates and the neighboring french settlements, there would be little in the early history of the american colonies to attract the lover of naval history. but about the buccaneers began to commit depredations on the high seas, and it became necessary for the colonies to take steps for the protection of their commerce. in this year an eighteen-gun ship from cambridge, mass., fell in with a barbary pirate of twenty guns, and was hard put to it to escape. and, as the seventeenth century drew near its close, these pests of the sea so increased, that evil was sure to befall the peaceful merchantman that put to sea without due preparation for a fight or two with the sea robbers. it was in the low-lying islands of the gulf of mexico, that these predatory gentry--buccaneers, marooners, or pirates--made their headquarters, and lay in wait for the richly freighted merchantmen in the west india trade. men of all nationalities sailed under the "jolly roger,"--as the dread black flag with skull and cross-bones was called,--but chiefly were they french and spaniards. the continual wars that in that turbulent time racked europe gave to the marauders of the sea a specious excuse for their occupation. thus, many a spanish schooner, manned by a swarthy crew bent on plunder, commenced her career on the spanish main, with the intention of taking only ships belonging to france and england; but let a richly laden spanish galleon appear, after a long season of ill-fortune, and all scruples were thrown aside, the "jolly roger" sent merrily to the fore, and another pirate was added to the list of those that made the highways of the sea as dangerous to travel as the footpad infested common of hounslow heath. english ships went out to hunt down the treacherous spaniards, and stayed to rob and pillage indiscriminately; and not a few of the names now honored as those of eminent english discoverers, were once dreaded as being borne by merciless pirates. but the most powerful of the buccaneers on the spanish main were french, and between them and the spaniards an unceasing warfare was waged. there were desperate men on either side, and mighty stories are told of their deeds of valor. there were pierre françois, who, with six and twenty desperadoes, dashed into the heart of a spanish fleet, and captured the admiral's flag-ship; bartholomew portuguese, who, with thirty men, made repeated attacks upon a great indiaman with a crew of seventy, and though beaten back time and again, persisted until the crew surrendered to the twenty buccaneers left alive; françois l'olonoise, who sacked the cities of maracaibo and gibraltar, and who, on hearing that a man-o'-war had been sent to drive him away, went boldly to meet her, captured her, and slaughtered all of the crew save one, whom he sent to bear the bloody tidings to the governor of havana. such were the buccaneers,--desperate, merciless, and insatiate in their lust for plunder. so numerous did they finally become, that no merchant dared to send a ship to the west indies; and the pirates, finding that they had fairly exterminated their game, were fain to turn landwards for further booty. it was an englishman that showed the sea rovers this new plan of pillage; one louis scott, who descended upon the town of campeche, and, after stripping the place to the bare walls, demanded that a heavy tribute be paid him, in default of which he would burn the town. loaded with booty, he sailed back to the buccaneers' haunts in the tortugas. this expedition was the example that the buccaneers followed for the next few years. city after city fell a prey to the demoniac attacks of the lawless rovers. houses and churches were sacked, towns given to the flames, rich and poor plundered alike; murder was rampant; and men and women were subjected to the most horrid tortures, to extort information as to buried treasures. two great names stand out pre-eminent amid the host of outlaws that took part in this reign of rapine,--l'olonoise and sir henry morgan. the desperate exploits of these two worthies would, if recounted, fill volumes; and probably no more extraordinary narrative of cruelty, courage, suffering, and barbaric luxury could be fabricated. morgan was a welshman, an emigrant, who, having worked out as a slave the cost of his passage across the ocean, took immediate advantage of his freedom to take up the trade of piracy. for him was no pillaging of paltry merchant-ships. he demanded grander operations, and his bands of desperadoes assumed the proportions of armies. many were the towns that suffered from the bloody visitations of morgan and his men. puerto del principe yielded up to them three hundred thousand pieces of eight, five hundred head of cattle, and many prisoners. porto bello was bravely defended against the barbarians; and the stubbornness of the defence so enraged morgan, that he swore that no quarter should be given the defenders. and so when some hours later the chief fortress surrendered, the merciless buccaneer locked its garrison in the guard-room, set a torch to the magazine, and sent castle and garrison flying into the air. maracaibo and gibraltar next fell into the clutches of the pirate. at the latter town, finding himself caught in a river with three men-of-war anchored at its mouth, he hastily built a fire-ship, put some desperate men at the helm, and sent her, a sheet of flame, into the midst of the squadron. the admiral's ship was destroyed; and the pirates sailed away, exulting over their adversaries' discomfiture. rejoicing over their victories, the followers of morgan then planned a venture that should eclipse all that had gone before. this was no less than a descent upon panama, the most powerful of the west indian cities. for this undertaking, morgan gathered around him an army of over two thousand desperadoes of all nationalities. a little village on the island of hispaniola was chosen as the recruiting station; and thither flocked pirates, thieves, and adventurers from all parts of the world. it was a motley crew thus gathered together,--spaniards, swarthy skinned and black haired; wiry frenchmen, quick to anger, and ever ready with cutlass or pistol; malays and lascars, half clad in gaudy colors, treacherous and sullen, with a hand ever on their glittering creeses; englishmen, handy alike with fist, bludgeon, or cutlass, and mightily given to fearful oaths; negroes, moors, and a few west indians mixed with the lawless throng. having gathered his band, procured provisions (chiefly by plundering), and built a fleet of boats, morgan put his forces in motion. the first obstacle in his path was the castle of chagres, which guarded the mouth of the chagres river, up which the buccaneers must pass to reach the city of panama. to capture this fortress, morgan sent his vice-admiral bradley, with four hundred men. the spaniards were evidently warned of their approach; for hardly had the first ship flying the piratical ensign appeared at the mouth of the river, when the royal standard of spain was hoisted above the castle, and the dull report of a shotted gun told the pirates that there was a stubborn resistance in store for them. landing some miles below the castle, and cutting their way with hatchet and sabre through the densely interwoven vegetation of a tropical jungle, the pirates at last reached a spot from which a clear view of the castle could be obtained. as they emerged from the forest to the open, the sight greatly disheartened them. they saw a powerful fort, with bastions, moat, drawbridge, and precipitous natural defences. many of the pirates advised a retreat; but bradley, dreading the anger of morgan, ordered an assault. time after time did the desperate buccaneers, with horrid yells, rush upon the fort, only to be beaten back by the well-directed volleys of the garrison. they charged up to the very walls, threw over fireballs, and hacked the timbers with axes, but to no avail. from behind their impregnable ramparts, the spaniards fired murderous volleys, crying out.-- "come on, you english devils, you heretics, the enemies of god and of the king! let your comrades who are behind come also. we will serve them as we have served you. you shall not get to panama this time." as night fell, the pirates withdrew into the thickets to escape the fire of their enemies, and to discuss their discomfiture. as one group of buccaneers lay in the jungle, a chance arrow, shot by an indian in the fort, struck one of them in the arm. springing to his feet with a cry of rage and pain, the wounded man cried out as he tore the arrow from the bleeding wound,-- "look here, my comrades. i will make this accursed arrow the means of the destruction of all the spaniards." so saying, he wrapped a quantity of cotton about the head of the arrow, charged his gun with powder, and, thrusting the arrow into the muzzle, fired. his comrades eagerly watched the flight of the missile, which was easily traced by the flaming cotton. hurtling through the air, the fiery missile fell upon a thatched roof within the castle, and the dry straw and leaves were instantly in a blaze. with cries of savage joy, the buccaneers ran about picking up the arrows that lay scattered over the battle-field. soon the air was full of the fire-brands, and the woodwork within the castle enclosure was a mass of flame. one arrow fell within the magazine; and a burst of smoke and flame, and the dull roar of an explosion, followed. the spaniards worked valiantly to extinguish the flames, and to beat back their assailants; but the fire raged beyond their control, and the bright light made them easy targets for their foes. there could be but one issue to such a conflict. by morning the fort was in the hands of the buccaneers, and of the garrison of three hundred and fourteen only fourteen were unhurt. over the ruins of the fort the english flag was hoisted, the shattered walls were repaired, and the place made a rendezvous for morgan's forces. on the scene of the battle morgan drilled his forces, and prepared for the march and battles that were to come. after some days' preparation, the expedition set out. the road lay through tangled tropical forests, under a burning sun. little food was taken, as the invaders expected to live on the country; but the inhabitants fled before the advancing column, destroying every thing eatable. soon starvation stared the desperadoes in the face. they fed upon berries, roots, and leaves. as the days passed, and no food was to be found, they sliced up and devoured coarse leather bags. for a time, it seemed that they would never escape alive from the jungle; but at last, weak, weary, and emaciated, they came out upon a grassy plain before the city of panama. here, a few days later, a great battle was fought. the spaniards outnumbered the invaders, and were better provided with munitions of war; yet the pirates, fighting with the bravery of desperate men, were victorious, and the city fell into their hands. then followed days of murder, plunder, and debauchery. morgan saw his followers, maddened by liquor, scoff at the idea of discipline and obedience. fearing that while his men were helplessly drunk the spaniards would rally and cut them to pieces, he set fire to the city, that the stores of rum might be destroyed. after sacking the town, the vandals packed their plunder on the backs of mules, and retraced their steps to the seaboard. their booty amounted to over two millions of dollars. over the division of this enormous sum great dissensions arose, and morgan saw the mutinous spirit spreading rapidly among his men. with a few accomplices, therefore, he loaded a ship with the plunder, and secretly set sail; leaving over half of his band, without food or shelter, in a hostile country. many of the abandoned buccaneers starved, some were shot or hanged by the enraged spaniards; but the leader of the rapacious gang reached jamaica with a huge fortune, and was appointed governor of the island, and made a baronet by the reigning king of england, charles the second. such were some of the exploits of some of the more notorious of the buccaneers. it may be readily imagined, that, with hordes of desperadoes such as these infesting the waters of the west indies, there was little opportunity for the american colonies to build up any maritime interests in that direction. and as the merchantmen became scarce on the spanish main, such of the buccaneers as did not turn landward in search of booty put out to sea, and ravaged the ocean pathways between the colonies and england. it was against these pirates, that the earliest naval operations of the colonies were directed. several cruisers were fitted out to rid the seas of these pests, but we hear little of their success. but the name of one officer sent against the pirates has become notorious as that of the worst villain of them all. it was in january, , that william iii., king of england, issued "to our true and well-beloved capt. william kidd, commander of the ship 'adventure,'" a commission to proceed against "divers wicked persons who commit many and great piracies, robberies, and depredations on the seas." kidd was a merchant of new york, and had commanded a privateer during the last war with france. he was a man of great courage, and, being provided with a stanch ship and brave crew, set out with high hopes of winning great reputation and much prize money. but fortune was against him. for months the "adventure" ploughed the blue waves of the ocean, yet not a sail appeared on the horizon. once, indeed, three ships were seen in the distance. the men of the "adventure" were overjoyed at the prospect of a rich prize. the ship was prepared for action. the men, stripped to the waist, stood at their quarters, talking of the coming battle. kidd stood in the rigging with a spy-glass, eagerly examining the distant vessels. but only disappointment was in store; for, as the ships drew nearer, kidd shut his spy-glass with an oath, saying,-- "they are only three english men-o'-war." continued disappointment bred discontent and mutiny among the crew. they had been enlisted with lavish promises of prize money, but saw before them nothing but a profitless cruise. the spirit of discontent spread rapidly. three or four ships that were sighted proved to be neither pirates nor french, and were therefore beyond the powers of capture granted kidd by the king. kidd fought against the growing piratical sentiment for a long time; but temptation at last overcame him, and he yielded. near the straits of babelmandeb, at the entrance to the red sea, he landed a party, plundered the adjoining country for provisions, and, turning his ship's prow toward the straits, mustered his crew on deck, and thus addressed them:-- "we have been unsuccessful hitherto, my boys," he said, "but take courage. fortune is now about to smile upon us. the fleet of the 'great mogul,' freighted with the richest treasures, is soon to come out of the red sea. from the capture of those heavily laden ships, we will all grow rich." the crew, ready enough to become pirates, cheered lustily: and, turning his back upon all hopes of an honorable career, kidd set out in search of the treasure fleet. after cruising for four days, the "adventure" fell in with the squadron, which proved to be under convoy of an english and a dutch man-of-war. the squadron was a large one, and the ships greatly scattered. by skilful seamanship, kidd dashed down upon an outlying vessel, hoping to capture and plunder it before the convoying men-of-war could come to its rescue. but his first shot attracted the attention of the watchful guardians; and, though several miles away, they packed on all sail, and bore down to the rescue with such spirit that the disappointed pirate was forced to sheer off. kidd was now desperate. he had failed as a reputable privateer, and his first attempt at piracy had failed. thenceforward, he cast aside all scruples, and captured large ships and small, tortured their crews, and for a time seemed resolved to lead a piratical life. but there are evidences that at times this strange man relented, and strove to return to the path of duty and right. on one occasion, a dutch ship crossed the path of the "adventure," and the crew clamorously demanded her capture. kidd firmly refused. a tumult arose. the captain drew his sabre and pistols, and gathering about him those still faithful, addressed the mutineers, saying,-- "you may take the boats and go. but those who thus leave this ship will never ascend its sides again." the mutineers murmured loudly. one man, a gunner, named william moore, stepped forward, saying,-- "you are ruining us all. you are keeping us in beggary and starvation. but for your whims, we might all be prosperous and rich." at this outspoken mutiny, kidd flew into a passion. seizing a heavy bucket that stood near, he dealt moore a terrible blow on the head. the unhappy man fell to the deck with a fractured skull, and the other mutineers sullenly yielded to the captain's will. moore died the next day; and months after, when kidd, after roving the seas, and robbing ships of every nationality, was brought to trial at london, it was for the murder of william moore that he was condemned to die. for kidd's career subsequent to the incident of the dutch ship was that of a hardened pirate. he captured and robbed ships, and tortured their passengers. he went to madagascar, the rendezvous of the pirates, and joined in their revelry and debauchery. on the island were five or six hundred pirates, and ships flying the black flag were continually arriving or departing. the streets resounded with shouts of revelry, with curses, and with the cries of rage. strong drinks were freely used. drunkenness was everywhere. it was no uncommon thing for a hogshead of wine to be opened, and left standing in the streets, that any might drink who chose. the pirates, flush with their ill-gotten gains, spent money on gambling and kindred vices lavishly. the women who accompanied them to this lawless place were decked out with barbaric splendor in silks and jewels. on the arrival of a ship, the debauchery was unbounded. such noted pirates as blackbeard, steed bonnet, and avary made the place their rendezvous, and brought thither their rich prizes and wretched prisoners. blackbeard was one of the most desperate pirates of the age. he, with part of his crew, once terrorized the officials of charleston, s.c., exacting tribute of medicines and provisions. finally he was killed in action, and sixteen of his desperate gang expiated their crimes on the gallows. to madagascar, too, often came the two female pirates, mary read and anne bonny. these women, masquerading in men's clothing, were as desperate and bloody as the men by whose side they fought. by a strange coincidence, these two women enlisted on the same ship. each knowing her own sex, and being ignorant of that of the other, they fell in love; and the final discovery of their mutual deception increased their intimacy. after serving with the pirates, working at the guns, swinging a cutlass in the boarding parties, and fighting a duel in which she killed her opponent, mary read determined to escape. there is every evidence that she wearied of the evil life she was leading, and was determined to quit it; but, before she could carry her intentions into effect, the ship on which she served was captured, and taken to england, where the pirates expiated their crimes on the gallows, mary read dying in prison before the day set for her execution. after some months spent in licentious revelry at madagascar, kidd set out on a further cruise. during this voyage he learned that he had been proscribed as a pirate, and a price set on his head. strange as it may appear, this news was a surprise to him. he seems to have deceived himself into thinking that his acts of piracy were simply the legitimate work of a privateersman. for a time he knew not what to do; but as by this time the coarse pleasures of an outlaw's life were distasteful to him, he determined to proceed to new york, and endeavor to prove himself an honest man. this determination proved to be an unfortunate one for him; for hardly had he arrived, when he was taken into custody, and sent to england for trial. he made an able defence, but was found guilty, and sentenced to be hanged; a sentence which was executed some months later, in the presence of a vast multitude of people, who applauded in the death of kidd the end of the reign of outlaws upon the ocean. chapter ii. expeditions against neighboring colonies. -- romantic career of sir william phipps. -- quelling a mutiny. -- expeditions against quebec. while it was chiefly in expeditions against the buccaneers, or in the defence of merchantmen against these predatory gentry, that the american colonists gained their experience in naval warfare, there were, nevertheless, some few naval expeditions fitted out by the colonists against the forces of a hostile government. both to the north and south lay the territory of france and spain,--england's traditional enemies; and so soon as the colonies began to give evidence of their value to the mother country, so soon were they dragged into the quarrels in which the haughty mistress of the seas was ever plunged. of the southern colonies, south carolina was continually embroiled with spain, owing to the conviction of the spanish that the boundaries of florida--at that time a spanish colony--included the greater part of the carolinas. for the purpose of enforcing this idea, the spaniards, in , fitted out an expedition of four ships-of-war and a galley, which, under the command of a celebrated french admiral, was despatched to take charleston. the people of charleston were in no whit daunted, and on the receipt of the news of the expedition began preparations for resistance. they had no naval vessels; but several large merchantmen, being in port, were hastily provided with batteries, and a large galley was converted into a flag-ship. having no trained naval officers, the command of the improvised squadron was tendered to a certain lieut.-col. rhett, who possessed the confidence of the colonists. rhett accepted the command; and when the attacking party cast anchor some miles below the city, and landed their shore forces, he weighed anchor, and set out to attack them. but the spaniards avoided the conflict, and fled out to sea, leaving their land forces to bear the brunt of battle. in this action, more than half of the invaders were killed or taken prisoners. some days later, one of the spanish vessels, having been separated from her consorts, was discovered by rhett, who attacked her, and after a sharp fight captured her, bringing her with ninety prisoners to charleston. but it was chiefly in expeditions against the french colonies to the northward that the naval strength of the english colonies was exerted. particularly were the colonies of port royal, in acadia, and the french stronghold of quebec coveted by the british, and they proved fertile sources of contention in the opening years of the eighteenth century. although the movement for the capture of these colonies was incited by the ruling authorities of great britain, its execution was left largely to the colonists. one of the earliest of these expeditions was that which sailed from nantasket, near boston, in april, , bound for the conquest of port royal. this expedition was under the command of sir william phipps, a sturdy colonist, whose life was not devoid of romantic episodes. though his ambitions were of the lowliest,--his dearest wish being "to command a king's ship, and own a fair brick house in the green lane of north boston,"--he managed to win for himself no small amount of fame and respect in the colonies. his first achievement was characteristic of that time, when spanish galleons, freighted with golden ingots, still sailed the seas, when pirates buried their booty, and when the treasures carried down in sunken ships were not brought up the next day by divers clad in patented submarine armor. from a weather-beaten old seaman, with whom he became acquainted while pursuing his trade of ship-carpentering phipps learned of a sunken wreck lying on the sandy bottom many fathoms beneath the blue surface of the gulf of mexico. the vessel had gone down fifty years before, and had carried with her great store of gold and silver, which she was carrying from the rich mines of central and south america to the court of spain. phipps, laboriously toiling with adze and saw in his ship-yard, listened to the story of the sailor, his blood coursing quicker in his veins, and his ambition for wealth and position aroused to its fullest extent. here, then, thought he, was the opportunity of a lifetime. could he but recover the treasures carried down with the sunken ship, he would have wealth and position in the colony. with these two allies at his command, the task of securing a command in the king's navy would be an easy one. but to seek out the sunken treasure required a ship and seamen. clearly his own slender means could never meet the demands of so great an undertaking. therefore, gathering together all his small savings, william phipps set sail for england, in the hopes of interesting capitalists there in his scheme. by dint of indomitable persistence, the unknown american ship-carpenter managed to secure the influence of certain officials of high station in england, and finally managed to get the assistance of the british admiralty. a frigate, fully manned, was given him, and he set sail for the west indies. once arrived in the waters of the spanish main, he began his search. cruising about the spot indicated by his seafaring informant as the location of the sunken vessel, sounding and dredging occupied the time of the treasure-seekers for months. the crew, wearying of the fruitless search, began to murmur, and signs of mutiny were rife. phipps, filled with thoughts of the treasure for which he sought, saw not at all the lowering looks, nor heard the half-uttered threats, of the crew as he passed them. but finally the mutiny so developed that he could no longer ignore its existence. it was then the era of the buccaneers. doubtless some of the crew had visited the outlaws' rendezvous at new providence, and had told their comrades of the revelry and ease in which the sea robbers spent their days. and so it happened that one day, as phipps stood on the quarter-deck vainly trying to choke down the nameless fear that had begun to oppress him,--the fear that his life's venture had proved a failure,--his crew came crowding aft, armed to the teeth, and loudly demanded that the captain should abandon his foolish search, and lead them on a fearless buccaneering cruise along the spanish main. the mutiny was one which might well have dismayed the boldest sea captain. the men were desperate, and well armed. phipps was almost without support; for his officers, by their irresolute and timid demeanor, gave him little assurance of aid. standing on the quarter-deck, phipps listened impatiently to the complaints of the mutineers; but, when their spokesman called upon him to lead them upon a piratical cruise, he lost all control of himself, and, throwing all prudence to the winds, sprung into the midst of the malcontents, and laid about him right manfully with his bare fists. the mutineers were all well armed, but seemed loath to use their weapons; and the captain, a tall, powerful man, soon awed them all into submission. though he showed indomitable energy in overcoming obstacles, phipps was not destined to discover the object of his search at this time; and, after several months' cruising, he was forced, by the leaky condition of his vessel, to abandon the search. but, before leaving the waters of the spanish main, he obtained enough information to convince him that his plan was a practicable one, and no mere visionary scheme. on reaching england, he went at once to some wealthy noblemen, and, laying before them all the facts in his possession, so interested them in the project that they readily agreed to supply him with a fresh outfit. after a few weeks spent in organizing his expedition, the treasure-seeker was again on the ocean, making his way toward the mexican gulf. this time his search was successful, and a few days' work with divers and dredges about the sunken ship brought to light bullion and specie to the amount of more than a million and a half dollars. as his ill success in the first expedition had embroiled him with his crew, so his good fortune this time aroused the cupidity of the sailors. vague rumors of plotting against his life reached the ears of phipps. examining further into the matter, he learned that the crew was plotting to seize the vessel, divide the treasure, and set out upon a buccaneering cruise. alarmed at this intelligence, phipps strove to conciliate the seamen by offering them a share of the treasure. each man should receive a portion, he promised, even if he himself had to pay it. the men agreed to this proposition; and so well did phipps keep his word with them on returning to england, that, of the whole treasure, only about eighty thousand dollars remained to him as his share. this, however, was an ample fortune for those times; and with it phipps returned to boston, and began to devote himself to the task of securing a command in the royal navy. his first opportunity to distinguish himself came in the expedition of against port royal. throughout the wars between france and england, the french settlement of port royal had been a thorn in the flesh of massachusetts. from port royal, the trim-built speedy french privateers put to sea, and seldom returned without bringing in their wake some captured coaster or luckless fisherman hailing from the colony of the puritans. when the depredations of the privateers became unbearable, massachusetts bestirred herself, and the doughty phipps was sent with an expedition to reduce their unneighborly neighbor to subjection. seven vessels and two hundred and eighty-eight men were put under the command of the lucky treasure-hunter. the expedition was devoid of exciting or novel features. port royal was reached without disaster, and the governor surrendered with a promptitude which should have won immunity for the people of the village. but the massachusetts sailors had not undertaken the enterprise for glory alone, and they plundered the town before taking to their ships again. this expedition, however, was but an unimportant incident in the naval annals of the colonies. it was followed quickly by an expedition of much graver importance. when phipps returned after capturing and plundering port royal, he found boston vastly excited over the preparations for an expedition against quebec. the colony was in no condition to undertake the work of conquest. prolonged indian wars had greatly depleted its treasury. vainly it appealed to england for aid, but, receiving no encouragement, sturdily determined to undertake the expedition unaided. sailors were pressed from the merchant-shipping. trained bands, as the militia of that day was called, drilled in the streets, and on the common. subscription papers were being circulated; and vessel owners were blandly given the choice between voluntarily loaning their vessels to the colony, or having them peremptorily seized. in this way a fleet of thirty-two vessels had been collected; the largest of which was a ship called the "six friends," built for the west india trade, and carrying forty-four guns. this armada was manned by seamen picked up by a press so vigorous, that gloucester, the chief seafaring town of the colony, was robbed of two-thirds of its men. hardly had capt. phipps, flushed with victory, returned from his port royal expedition, when he was given command of the armada destined for the capture of quebec. early in august the flotilla set sail from boston harbor. the day was clear and warm, with a light breeze blowing. from his flag-ship phipps gave the signal for weighing anchor, and soon the decks of the vessels thickly strewn about the harbor resounded to the tread of men about the capstan. thirty-two vessels of the squadron floated lightly on the calm waters of the bay; and darting in and out among them were light craft carrying pleasure-seekers who had come down to witness the sailing of the fleet, friends and relatives of the sailors who were there to say farewell, and the civic dignitaries who came to wish the expedition success. one by one the vessels beat their way down the bay, and, rounding the dangerous reef at the mouth of the harbor, laid their course to the northward. it was a motley fleet of vessels. the "six brothers" led the way, followed by brigs, schooners, and many sloop-rigged fishing-smacks. with so ill-assorted a flotilla, it was impossible to keep any definite sailing order. the first night scattered the vessels far and wide, and thenceforward the squadron was not united until it again came to anchor just above the mouth of the st. lawrence. it seemed as though the very elements had combined against the voyagers. though looking for summer weather, they encountered the bitter gales of november. only after they had all safely entered the st. lawrence, and were beyond injury from the storms, did the gales cease. they had suffered all the injury that tempestuous weather could do them, and they then had to chafe under the enforced restraints of a calm. phipps had rallied his scattered fleet, and had proceeded up the great river of the north to within three days' sail of quebec, when the calm overtook him. on the way up the river he had captured two french luggers, and learned from his prisoners that quebec was poorly fortified, that the cannon on the redoubts were dismounted, and that hardly two hundred men could be rallied to its defence. highly elated at this, the massachusetts admiral pressed forward. he anticipated that quebec, like port royal, would surrender without striking a blow. visions of high honors, and perhaps even a commission in the royal navy, floated across his brain. and while thus hurrying forward his fleet, drilling his men, and building his air-castles, his further progress was stopped by a dead calm which lasted three weeks. how fatal to his hopes that calm was, phipps, perhaps, never knew. the information he had wrung from his french prisoners was absolutely correct. quebec at that time was helpless, and virtually at his mercy. but, while the massachusetts armada lay idly floating on the unruffled bosom of the river, a man was hastening towards quebec whose timely arrival meant the salvation of the french citadel. this man was frontenac, then governor of the french colony, and one of the most picturesque figures in american history. a soldier of france; a polished courtier at the royal court; a hero on the battle-field, and a favorite in the ball-room; a man poor in pocket, but rich in influential connections,--frontenac had come to the new world to seek that fortune and position which he had in vain sought in the old. when the vague rumors of the hostile expedition of the massachusetts colony reached his ears, frontenac was far from quebec, toiling in the western part of the colony. wasting no time, he turned his steps toward the threatened city. his road lay through an almost trackless wilderness; his progress was impeded by the pelting rains of the autumnal storms. but through forest and through rain he rode fiercely; and at last as he burst from the forest, and saw towering before him the rocks of cape diamond, a cry of joy burst from his lips. on the broad, still bosom of the st lawrence bay floated not a single hostile sail. the soldier had come in time. with the governor in the city, all took courage, and the work of preparation for the coming struggle went forward with a rush. far and wide throughout the parishes was spread the news of war, and daily volunteers came flocking in to the defence. the ramparts were strengthened, and cannon mounted. volunteers and regulars drilled side by side, until the four thousand men in the city were converted into a well-disciplined body of troops. and all the time the sentinels on the saut au matelot were eagerly watching the river for the first sign of the english invaders. it was before dawn, on the morning of oct. , that the people of the little city, and the soldiery in the tents, were awakened by the alarm raised by the sentries. all rushed to the brink of the heights, and peered eagerly out into the darkness. far down the river could be seen the twinkling lights of vessels. as the eager watchers strove to count them, other lights appeared upon the scene, moving to and fro, but with a steady advance upon quebec. the gray dawn, breaking in the east, showed the advancing fleet. frontenac and his lieutenants watched the ships of the enemy round the jutting headland of the point of orleans; and, by the time the sun had risen, thirty-four hostile craft were at anchor in the basin of quebec. the progress of the fleet up the river, from the point at which it had been so long delayed, had been slow, and greatly impeded by the determined hostility of the settlers along the banks. the sailors at their work were apt to be startled by the whiz of a bullet; and an inquiry as to the cause would have probably discovered some crouching sharp-shooter, his long rifle in his hand, hidden in a clump of bushes along the shore. bands of armed men followed the fleet up the stream, keeping pace with the vessels, and occasionally affording gentle reminders of their presence in the shape of volleys of rifle-balls that sung through the crowded decks of the transports, and gave the sailor lads a hearty disgust for this river fighting. phipps tried repeatedly to land shore parties to clear the banks of skirmishers, and to move on the city by land. as often, however, as he made the effort, his troops were beaten back by the ambushed sharp-shooters, and his boats returned to the ships, bringing several dead and wounded. while the soldiery on the highlands of quebec were eagerly examining the hostile fleet, the invaders were looking with wonder and admiration at the scene of surpassing beauty spread out before them. parkman, the historian and lover of the annals of the french in america, thus describes it:-- "when, after his protracted voyage, phipps sailed into the basin of quebec, one of the grandest scenes on the western continent opened upon his sight. the wide expanse of waters, the lofty promontory beyond, and the opposing heights of levi, the cataract of montmorenci, the distant range of the laurentian mountains, the warlike rock with its diadem of walls and towers, the roofs of the lower town clustering on the strand beneath, the chateau st. louis perched at the brink of the cliff, and over it the white banner, spangled with _fleurs de lis_, flaunting defiance in the clear autumnal air." little time was spent, however, in admiration of the scene. when the click of the last chain-cable had ceased, and, with their anchors reposing at the bottom of the stream, the ships swung around with their bows to the current, a boat put off from the flag-ship bearing an officer intrusted with a note from phipps to the commandant of the fort. the reception of this officer was highly theatrical. half way to the shore he was taken into a french canoe, blindfolded, and taken ashore. the populace crowded about him as he landed, hooting and jeering him as he was led through winding, narrow ways, up stairways, and over obstructions, until at last the bandage was torn from his eyes, and he found himself in the presence of frontenac. the french commander was clad in a brilliant uniform, and surrounded by his staff, gay in warlike finery. with courtly courtesy he asked the envoy for his letter, which, proving to be a curt summons to surrender, he answered forthwith in a stinging speech. the envoy, abashed, asked for a written answer. "no," thundered frontenac, "i will answer your master only by the mouths of my cannon, that he may learn that a man like me is not to be summoned after this fashion. let him do his best, and i will do mine." the envoy returned to his craft, and made his report. the next day hostilities opened. wheeling his ships into line before the fortifications, phipps opened a heavy fire upon the city. from the frowning ramparts on the heights, frontenac's cannon answered in kind. fiercely the contest raged until nightfall, and vast was the consumption of gunpowder; but damage done on either side was but little. all night the belligerents rested on their arms; but, at daybreak, the roar of the cannonade recommenced. the gunners of the opposing forces were now upon their mettle, and the gunnery was much better than the day before. a shot from the shore cut the flagstaff of the admiral's ship, and the cross of st. george fell into the river. straightway a canoe put out from the shore, and with swift, strong paddle-strokes was guided in chase of the floating trophy. the fire of the fleet was quickly concentrated upon the adventurous canoeists. cannon-balls and rifle-bullets cut the water about them; but their frail craft survived the leaden tempest, and they captured the trophy, and bore it off in triumph. phipps felt that the incident was an unfavorable omen, and would discourage his men. he cast about in his mind for a means of retaliation. far over the roofs of the city rose a tapering spire, that of the cathedral in the upper town. on this spire, the devout catholics of the french city had hung a picture of the holy family as an invocation of divine aid. through his spy-glass, phipps could see that some strange object hung from the steeple, and, suspecting its character, commanded the gunners to try to knock it down. for hours the puritans wasted their ammunition in this vain target-practice, but to no avail. the picture still hung on high; and the devout frenchmen ascribed its escape to a miracle, although its destruction would have been more miraculous still. it did not take long to convince phipps that in this contest his fleet was getting badly worsted, and he soon withdrew his vessels to a place of safety. the flag-ship had been fairly riddled with shot; and her rigging was so badly cut, that she could only get out of range of the enemy's guns by cutting her cables, and drifting away with the current. her example was soon followed by the remaining vessels. sorely crestfallen, phipps abandoned the fight, and prepared to return to boston. his voyage thither was stormy; and three or four of his vessels never were heard of, having been dashed to pieces by the waves, or cast away upon the iron-bound coast of nova scotia or maine. his expedition was the most costly in lives and in treasure ever undertaken by a single colony, and, despite its failure, forms the most notable incident in the naval annals of the colonies prior to the revolution. the french colonies continued to be a fruitful source of war and turmoil. many were the joint military and naval expeditions fitted out against them by the british colonies. quebec, louisbourg, and port royal were all threatened; and the two latter were captured by colonial expeditions. from a naval point of view, these expeditions were but trifling. they are of some importance, however, in that they gave the colonists an opportunity to try their prowess on the ocean; and in this irregular service were bred some sailors who fought right valiantly for the rebellious colonies against the king, and others who did no less valiant service under the royal banner. chapter iii. opening of the american revolution. -- the affair of the schooner "st. john." -- the press-gang and its work. -- the sloop "liberty." -- destruction of the "gaspee." -- the boston tea-party. it is unnecessary to enter into an account of the causes that led up to the revolt of the american colonies against the oppression of king george and his subservient parliament. the story of the stamp act, the indignation of the colonies, their futile attempts to convince parliament of the injustice of the measure, the stern measures adopted by the british to put down the rising insubordination, the boston massacre, and the battles at concord and lexington are familiar to every american boy. but not every young american knows that almost the first act of open resistance to the authority of the king took place on the water, and was to some extent a naval action. the revenue laws, enacted by the english parliament as a means of extorting money from the colonies, were very obnoxious to the people of america. particularly did the colonists of rhode island protest against them, and seldom lost an opportunity to evade the payment of the taxes. between providence and newport, illicit trade flourished; and the waters of narragansett bay were dotted with the sail of small craft carrying cargoes on which no duties had ever been paid. in order to stop this nefarious traffic, armed vessels were stationed in the bay, with orders to chase and search all craft suspected of smuggling. the presence of these vessels gave great offence to the colonists, and the inflexible manner in which the naval officers discharged their duty caused more than one open defiance of the authority of king george. the first serious trouble to grow out of the presence of the british cruisers in the bay was the affair of the schooner "st. john." this vessel was engaged in patrolling the waters of the bay in search of smugglers. while so engaged, her commander, lieut. hill, learned that a brig had discharged a suspicious cargo at night near howland's ferry. running down to that point to investigate, the king's officers found the cargo to consist of smuggled goods; and, leaving a few men in charge, the cruiser hastily put out to sea in pursuit of the smuggler. the swift sailing schooner soon overtook the brig, and the latter was taken in to newport as a prize. although this affair occurred early in , the sturdy colonists even then had little liking for the officers of the king. the sailors of the "st. john," careless of the evident dislike of the citizens of the town, swaggered about the streets, boasting of their capture, and making merry at the expense of the yankees. two or three fights between sailors and townspeople so stirred up the landsmen, that they determined to destroy the "st. john," and had actually fitted up an armed sloop for that purpose, when a second man-of-war appeared in the harbor and put a final stopper to the project. though thus balked of their revenge, the townspeople showed their hatred for the king's navy by seizing a battery, and firing several shots at the two armed vessels, but without effect. during the same year, the little town of newport again gave evidence of the growth of the revolutionary spirit. this time the good old british custom of procuring sailors for the king's ships by a system of kidnapping, commonly known as impressment, was the cause of the outbreak. for some months the british man-of-war "maidstone" lay in the harbor of newport, idly tugging at her anchors. it was a period of peace, and her officers had nothing to occupy their attention. therefore they devoted themselves to increasing the crew of the vessel by means of raids upon the taverns along the water-front of the city. the seafaring men of newport knew little peace while the "maidstone" was in port. the king's service was the dread of every sailor; and, with the press-gang nightly walking the streets, no sailor could feel secure. all knew the life led by the sailors on the king's ships. those were the days when the cat-o'-nine-tails flourished, and the command of a beardless bit of a midshipmen was enough to send a poor fellow to the gratings, to have his back cut to pieces by the merciless lash. the yankee sailors had little liking for this phase of sea-life, and they gave the men-of-war a wide berth. often it happened, however, that a party of jolly mariners sitting over their pipes and grog in the snug parlor of some seashore tavern, spinning yarns of the service they had seen on the gun-decks of his majesty's ships, or of shipwreck and adventure in the merchant service, would start up and listen in affright, as the measured tramp of a body of men came up the street. then came the heavy blow on the door. "open in the king's name," shouts a gruff voice outside; and the entrapped sailors, overturning the lights, spring for doors and windows, in vain attempts to escape the fate in store for them. the press-gang seldom returned to the ship empty handed, and the luckless tar who once fell into their clutches was wise to accept his capture good-naturedly; for the bos'n's cat was the remedy commonly prescribed for sulkiness. as long as the "maidstone" lay in the harbor of newport, raids such as this were of common occurrence. the people of the city grumbled a little; but it was the king's will, and none dared oppose it. the wives and sweethearts of the kidnapped sailors shed many a bitter tear over the disappearance of their husbands and lovers; but what were the tears of women to king george? and so the press-gang of the "maidstone" might have continued to enjoy unopposed the stirring sport of hunting men like beasts, had the leaders not committed one atrocious act of inhumanity that roused the long-suffering people to resistance. one breezy afternoon, a stanch brig, under full sail, came up the bay, and entered the harbor of newport. her sides were weather-beaten, and her dingy sails and patched cordage showed that she had just completed her long voyage. her crew, a fine set of bronzed and hardy sailors, were gathered on her forecastle, eagerly regarding the cluster of cottages that made up the little town of newport. in those cottages were many loved ones, wives, mothers, and sweethearts, whom the brave fellows had not seen for long and weary months; for the brig was just returning from a voyage to the western coast of africa. it is hard to describe the feelings aroused by the arrival of a ship in port after a long voyage. from the outmost end of the longest wharf the relatives and friends of the sailors eagerly watch the approaching vessel, striving to find in her appearance some token of the safety of the loved ones on board. if a flag hangs at half-mast in the rigging, bitter is the suspense, and fearful the dread, of each anxious waiter, lest her husband or lover or son be the unfortunate one whose death is mourned. and on the deck of the ship the excitement is no less great. even the hardened breast of the sailor swells with emotion when he first catches sight of his native town, after long months of absence. with eyes sharpened by constant searching for objects upon the broad bosom of the ocean, he scans the waiting crowd, striving to distinguish in the distance some well-beloved face. his spirits are light with the happy anticipation of a season in port with his loved ones, and he discharges his last duties before leaving the ship with a blithe heart. so it was with the crew of the home-coming brig. right merrily they sung out their choruses as they pulled at the ropes, and brought the vessel to anchor. the rumble of the hawser through the hawseholes was sweet music to their ears; and so intent were they upon the crowd on the dock, that they did not notice two long-boats which had put off from the man-of-war, and were pulling for the brig. the captain of the merchantman, however, noticed the approach of the boats, and wondered what it meant. "those fellows think i've smuggled goods aboard," said he. "however, they can spend their time searching if they want. i've nothing in the hold i'm afraid to have seen." the boats were soon alongside; and two or three officers, with a handful of jackies, clambered aboard the brig. "muster your men aft, captain," said the leader, scorning any response to the captain's salutation. "the king has need of a few fine fellows for his service." "surely, sir, you are not about to press any of these men," protested the captain. "they are just returning after a long voyage, and have not yet seen their families." "what's that to me, sir?" was the response. "muster your crew without more words." sullenly the men came aft, and ranged themselves in line before the boarding-officers. each feared lest he might be one of those chosen to fill the ship's roll of the "maidstone;" yet each cherished the hope that he might be spared to go ashore, and see the loved ones whose greeting he had so fondly anticipated. the boarding-officers looked the crew over, and, after consulting together, gruffly ordered the men to go below, and pack up their traps. "surely you don't propose to take my entire crew?" said the captain of the brig in wondering indignation. "i know my business, sir," was the gruff reply, "and i do not propose to suffer any more interference." the crew of the brig soon came on deck, carrying their bags of clothes, and were ordered into the man-o'-war's boats, which speedily conveyed them to their floating prison. their fond visions of home had been rudely dispelled. they were now enrolled in his majesty's service, and subject to the will of a blue-coated tyrant. this was all their welcome home. when the news of this cruel outrage reached the shore, the indignation of the people knew no bounds. the thought of their fellow-townsmen thus cruelly deprived of their liberty, at the conclusion of a long and perilous voyage, set the whole village in a turmoil. wild plots were concocted for the destruction of the man-of-war, that, sullen and unyielding, lay at her anchorage in the harbor. but the wrong done was beyond redress. the captured men were not to be liberated. there was no ordnance in the little town to compete with the guns of the "maidstone," and the enraged citizens could only vent their anger by impotent threats and curses. bands of angry men and boys paraded the streets, crying, "down with the press-gang," and invoking the vengeance of heaven upon the officers of the man-of-war. finally, they found a boat belonging to the "maidstone" lying at a wharf. dragging this ashore, the crowd procured ropes, and, after pulling the captured trophy up and down the streets, took it to the common in front of the court-house, where it was burned in the presence of a great crowd, which heaped execrations upon the heads of the officers of the "maidstone," and king george's press-gang. after this occurrence, there was a long truce between the people of newport and the officers of the british navy. but the little town was intolerant of oppression, and the revolutionary spirit broke out again in . historians have eulogized boston as the cradle of liberty, and by the british pamphleteers of that era the massachusetts city was often called a hot-bed of rebellion. it would appear, however, that, while the people of boston were resting contentedly under the king's rule, the citizens of newport were chafing under the yoke, and were quick to resist any attempts at tyranny. it is noticeable, that, in each outbreak of the people of newport against the authority of the king's vessels, the vigor of the resistance increased, and their acts of retaliation became bolder. thus in the affair of the "st. john" the king's vessel was fired on, while in the affair of the "maidstone" the royal property was actually destroyed. in the later affairs with the sloop "liberty" and the schooner "gaspee," the revolt of the colonists was still more open, and the consequences more serious. in the armed sloop "liberty," capt. reid, was stationed in narragansett bay for the purpose of enforcing the revenue laws. her errand made her obnoxious to the people on the coast, and the extraordinary zeal of her captain in discharging his duty made her doubly detested by seafaring people afloat or shore. on the th of july the "liberty," while cruising near the mouth of the bay, sighted a sloop and a brig under full sail, bound out. promptly giving chase, the armed vessel soon overtook the merchantmen sufficiently to send a shot skipping along the crests of the waves, as a polite invitation to stop. the two vessels hove to, and a boat was sent from the man-of-war to examine their papers, and see if all was right. though no flaw was found in the papers of either vessel, capt. reid determined to take them back to newport, which was done. in the harbor the two vessels were brought to anchor under the guns of the armed sloop, and without any reason or explanation were kept there several days. after submitting to this wanton detention for two days, capt. packwood of the brig went on board the "liberty" to make a protest to capt. reid, and at the same time to get some wearing apparel taken from his cabin at the time his vessel had been captured. on reaching the deck of the armed vessel, he found capt. reid absent, and his request for his property was received with ridicule. hot words soon led to violence; and as capt. packwood stepped in to his boat to return to his ship, he was fired at several times, none of the shots taking effect. [illustration: siege of charleston, s.c., may, . copyright, , by johnson, wilson & co.] the news of this assault spread like wildfire in the little town. the people congregated on the streets, demanding reparation. the authorities sent a message to capt. reid, demanding that the man who fired the shots be given up. soon a boat came from the "liberty," bringing a man who was handed over to the authorities as the culprit. a brief examination into the case showed that the man was not the guilty party, and that his surrender was a mere subterfuge. the people then determined to be trifled with no longer, and made preparations to take vengeance upon the insolent oppressors. the work of preparation went on quietly; and by nightfall a large number of men had agreed to assemble at a given signal, and march upon the enemy. neither the authorities of the town nor the officers on the threatened vessel were given any intimation of the impending outbreak. yet the knots of men who stood talking earnestly on the street corners, or looked significantly at the trim navy vessel lying in the harbor, might have well given cause for suspicion. that night, just as the dusk was deepening into dark, a crowd of men marched down the street to a spot where a number of boats lay hidden in the shadow of a wharf. embarking in these silently, they bent to the oars at the whispered word of command; and the boats were soon gliding swiftly over the smooth, dark surface of the harbor, toward the sloop-of-war. as they drew near, the cry of the lookout rang out,-- "boat ahoy!" no answer. the boats, crowded with armed men, still advanced. "boat ahoy! answer, or i'll fire." and, receiving no response, the lookout gave the alarm, and the watch came tumbling up, just in time to be driven below or disarmed by the crowd of armed men that swarmed over the gunwale of the vessel. there was no bloodshed. the crew of the "liberty" was fairly surprised, and made no resistance. the victorious citizens cut the sloop's cables, and allowed her to float on shore near long wharf. then, feeling sure that their prey could not escape them, they cut away her masts, liberated their captives, and taking the sloop's boats, dragged them through the streets to the common, where they were burned on a triumphal bonfire, amid the cheers of the populace. but the exploit was not to end here. with the high tide the next day, the hulk of the sloop floated away, and drifted ashore again on goat island. when night fell, some adventurous spirits stealthily went over, and, applying the torch to the stranded ship, burned it to the water's edge. thus did the people of newport resist tyranny. it may well be imagined that so bold a defiance of the royal authority caused a great sensation. prolonged and vigorous were the attempts of the servants of the king to find out the rebellious parties who had thus destroyed his majesty's property. but their efforts were in vain. the identity of the captors of the "liberty" was carefully concealed, and even to this day none of their names has become known. but, before the people of newport had done talking about this affair, another outbreak occurred, which cast the capture and destruction of the "liberty" into the shade. this was the affair of the "gaspee,"--considered by many historians the virtual opening of the revolutionary struggle of the colonies against great britain. the "gaspee," like the "st. john" and the "liberty," was an armed vessel stationed in narragansett bay to enforce the revenue. she was commanded by lieut. dudingston of the british navy, and carried eight guns. by pursuing the usual tactics of the british officers stationed on the american coast, duddingston had made himself hated; and his vessel was marked for destruction. not a boat could pass between providence and newport without being subjected to search by the crew of the "gaspee;" and the yankee sailors swore darkly, that, when the time was ripe, they would put an end to the britisher's officious meddling. the propitious time arrived one bright june morning in the year , when the "gaspee" gave chase to a newport packet which was scudding for providence, under the command of capt. thomas lindsey. the armed vessel was a clean-cut little craft, and, carrying no heavier load than a few light guns of the calibre then in vogue, could overhaul with ease almost any merchantman on the coast. so on this eventful day she was rapidly overhauling the chase, when, by a blunder of the pilot, she was run hard and fast upon a spit of sand running out from namquit point, and thus saw her projected prize sail away in triumph. but the escape of her prize was not the greatest disaster that was to befall the "gaspee" that day. lindsey, finding himself safe from the clutches of the enemy, continued his course to providence, and on arriving at that city reported the condition of the "gaspee" to a prominent citizen, who straightway determined to organize an expedition for the destruction of the pest of marine traffic. he therefore gave orders to a trusty ship-master to collect eight of the largest long-boats in the harbor, and, having muffled their oars and rowlocks, place them at fenner's wharf, near a noted tavern. that night, soon after sunset, as the tradesmen were shutting up their shops, and the laboring men were standing on the streets talking after their day's work, a man passed down the middle of each street, beating a drum, and crying aloud,-- "the schooner 'gaspee' is ashore on namquit point. who will help destroy her?" all who expressed a desire to join in the enterprise were directed to repair to the sabin house; and thither, later in the evening, flocked many of the townspeople carrying guns, powder-flasks, and bullet-pouches. within the house all was life and bustle. the great hall was crowded with determined men, discussing the plan of attack. guns stood in every corner, while down in the kitchen a half a dozen men stood about a glowing fire busily casting bullets. at last, all being prepared, the party crossed the street to the dock, and embarked,--a veteran sea-captain taking the tiller of each boat. on the way down the harbor the boats stopped, and took aboard a number of paving-stones and stout clubs, as weapons for those who had no muskets. after this stoppage the boats continued on their way, until, when within sixty yards of the "gaspee," the long-drawn hail. "who comes there?" rang out over the water. no answer was made, and the lookout quickly repeated his hail. capt. whipple, one of the leaders of the attack, then responded,-- "i want to come on board." dudingston, who was below at the time, rushed on deck, exclaiming, "stand off. you can't come aboard." as dudingston stood at the side of the "gaspee" warning off the assailants, he presented a good mark; and joseph bucklin, who pulled an oar in the leading boat, turned to a comrade and said, "ephe, lend me your gun, and i can kill that fellow." the gun was accordingly handed him, and he fired. dudingston fell to the deck. just as the shot was fired, the leader of the assailants cried out,-- "i am sheriff of the county of kent. i am come for the commander of this vessel; and have him i will, dead or alive. men, spring to your oars." in an instant the boats were under the lee of the schooner, and the attacking party was clambering over the side. the first man to attempt to board seized a rope, and was clambering up, when one of the british cut the rope, and let him fall into the water. he quickly recovered himself, and was soon on deck, where he found his comrades driving the crew of the "gaspee" below, and meeting with but little resistance. a surgeon who was with the party of americans led the boarders below, and began the task of tying the hands of the captured crew with strong tarred cord. while thus engaged, he was called on deck. "what is wanted, mr. brown?" asked he, calling the name of the person inquiring for him. "don't call names, but go immediately into the cabin," was the response. "there is one wounded, and will bleed to death." the surgeon went into the captain's cabin, and there found dudingston, severely wounded, and bleeding freely. seeing no cloth suitable for bandages, the surgeon opened his vest, and began to tear his own shirt into strips to bind up the wound. with the tenderest care the hurt of the injured officer was attended to; and he was gently lowered into a boat, and rowed up the river to providence. the americans remained in possession of the captured schooner, and quickly began the work of demolition. in the captain's cabin were a number of bottles of liquor, and for these the men made a rush; but the american surgeon dashed the bottles to pieces with the heels of his heavy boots, so that no scenes of drunkenness were enacted. after breaking up the furniture and trappings of the craft, her people were bundled over the side into the boats of their captors, and the torch was set to the schooner. the boats layoff a little distance until the roaring flames satisfied them that the "gaspee" would never again annoy american merchantmen. as the schooner's shotted guns went off one after the other, the americans turned their boats' prows homeward, and soon dispersed quietly to their homes. it is almost incredible that the identity of the parties to this expedition was kept a secret until long after the revolution. although the british authorities made the most strenuous efforts, and offered huge rewards for the detection of the culprits, not one was discovered until after the colonies had thrown off the royal yoke, when they came boldly forward, and boasted of their exploit. after the destruction of the "gaspee," the colonists in no way openly opposed the authority of the king, until the time of those stirring events immediately preceding the american revolution. little was done on the water to betoken the hatred of the colonists for king george. the turbulent little towns of providence and newport subsided, and the scene of revolt was transferred to massachusetts, and particularly to boston. in the streets of boston occurred the famous massacre, and at the wharves of boston lay the three ships whose cargo aroused the ire of the famous boston tea-party. to almost every young american the story of the boston tea-party is as familiar as his own name,--how the british parliament levied a tax upon tea, how the colonies refused to pay it; and determined to use none of the article; how british merchants strove to force the tea upon the unwilling colonists, and how the latter refused to permit the vessels to unload, and in some cases drove them back to england. at philadelphia, annapolis, charleston, newport, and providence, disturbances took place over the arrival of the tea-ships; but at boston the turbulence was the greatest. the story of that dramatic scene in the great drama of american revolution has been told too often to bear repetition. the arrival of three ships laden with tea aroused instant indignation in the new england city. mass meetings were held, the captains of the vessels warned not to attempt to unload their cargoes, and the consignees were terrified into refusing to have any thing to do with the tea. in the midst of an indignation meeting held at the old south church, a shrill war-whoop resounded from one of the galleries. the startled audience, looking in that direction, saw a person disguised as a mohawk indian, who wildly waved his arms and shouted,-- "boston harbor, a tea-pot to-night! hurrah for griffin's wharf." in wild excitement the meeting adjourned, and the people crowded out into the streets. other indians were seen running down the streets in the direction of griffin's wharf, where the tea-ships were moored, and thither the people turned their steps. on reaching the wharf, a scene of wild confusion was witnessed. the three tea-ships lay side by side at the wharf. their decks were crowded with men, many of them wearing the indian disguise. the hatches were off the hatchways; and the chests of tea were being rapidly passed up, broken open, and thrown overboard. there was little noise, as the workers seemed to be well disciplined, and went about their work in the bright moonlight with systematic activity. in about three hours the work was done. three hundred and forty-two chests of tea had been thrown overboard, and the rioters dispersed quietly to their homes. the incident of the destruction of the tea in boston harbor was the last of the petty incidents that led up to the american revolution. following quick upon it came lexington, concord, and bunker hill,--then the great conflict was fairly under way, and the colonies were fighting for liberty. what part the sailors of the colonies took in that struggle, it is the purpose of this book to recount. chapter iv. the beginning of the navy. -- lexington and concord. -- a blow struck in maine. -- capture of the "margaretta." -- gen. washington and the navy. -- work of capt. manly. in treating of the history of the navy during the war of the revolution, we must always bear in mind the fact, that, during the greater part of that war, there was no navy. indeed, the subject presents much the same aspect as the celebrated chapter on snakes in ireland, which consisted of exactly six words, "there are no snakes in ireland." so many of the episodes and incidents of the revolutionary war that we chronicle as part of the naval history of that struggle are naval only in that they took place on the water. the participants in them were often longshoremen, fishermen, or privateersmen, and but seldom sailors enrolled in the regular navy of the united colonies. nevertheless, these irregular forces accomplished some results that would be creditable to a navy in the highest state of efficiency and discipline. the expense of building vessels-of-war, and the difficulty, amounting even to impossibility, of procuring cannon for their armament, deterred the colonies from equipping a naval force. all the energies of the revolutionists were directed towards organizing and equipping the army. the cause of independence upon the ocean was left to shift for itself. but, as the war spread, the depredations of british vessels along the coast became so intolerable that some colonies fitted out armed vessels for self-protection. private enterprise sent out many privateers to prey upon british commerce, so that the opening months of the year saw many vessels on the ocean to support the cause of the colonies. to man these vessels, there were plenty of sailors; for even at that early day new england had begun to develop that race of hardy seamen for which she is still noted in this day of decadence in the american marine. there was, however, a sad lack of trained officers to command the vessels of the infant navy. many americans were enrolled on the lists of the ships flying the royal banner of england, but most of these remained in the british service. the men, therefore, who were to command the ships of the colonies, were trained in the rough school of the merchant service, and had smelt gunpowder only when resisting piratical attacks, or in serving themselves as privateers. for these reasons the encounters and exploits that we shall consider as being part of the naval operations of the revolutionary war were of a kind that would to-day be regarded as insignificant skirmishes; and the naval officer of to-day would look with supreme contempt upon most of his brethren of ' , as so many untrained sea-guerillas. nevertheless, the achievements of some of the seamen of the revolution are not insignificant, even when compared with exploits of the era of farragut; and it must be remembered that the efforts of the devoted men were directed against a nation that had in commission at the opening of the war three hundred and fifty-three vessels, and even then bore proudly the title conferred upon her by the consent of all nations,--"the mistress of the seas." it was on the th of april, , that the redoubtable major pitcairn and his corps of scarlet-coated british regulars shot down the colonists on the green at lexington, and then fled back to boston followed by the enraged minute-men, who harassed the retreating redcoats with a constant fire of musketry. the news of the battle spread far and wide; and wherever the story was told, the colonists began arming themselves, and preparing for resistance to the continually increasing despotism of the british authorities. on the th of may, a coasting schooner from boston put into the little seaport of machias on the coast of maine. the people of the little town gathered at the wharf, and from the sailors first heard the story of lexington and concord. the yoke of the british government had rested lightly on the shoulders of the people of machias. far from the chief cities of the new world, they had heard little of the continued dissensions between the colonies and the home government, and they heard the story of the rebellion with amazement. but however unprepared they might have been for the news of the outbreak, their sympathies went warmly out to their struggling brethren, and they determined to place themselves shoulder to shoulder with the massachusetts colonists in the fight against the oppression of the british. their opportunity for action came that very night. as the sturdy young colonists stood on the deck listening to the stories of the newly arrived sailors, they could see floating lightly at anchor near the wharf a trimly rigged schooner flying the ensign of the british navy. this craft was the "margaretta," an armed schooner acting as convoy to two sloops that were then loading with ship-timber to be used in the service of the king. the boston sailors had not yet finished their narrative of the two battles, when the thought occurred to some of the adventurous listeners that they might strike a retaliatory blow by capturing the "margaretta." therefore, bidding the sailors to say nothing to the british of lexington and concord, they left the wharf and dispersed through the town, seeking for recruits. that same evening, sixty stalwart men assembled in a secluded farm-house, and laid their plans for the destruction of the schooner. it was then saturday night, and the conspirators determined to attack the vessel the next morning while the officers were at church. all were to proceed by twos and threes to the wharf, in order that no suspicion might be aroused. once at the water-side, they would rush to their boats, and carry the schooner by boarding. sunday morning dawned clear, and all seemed propitious for the conspirators. the "margaretta" had then been in port for more than a week, and her officers had no reason to doubt the loyalty and friendship of the inhabitants: no whisper of the occurrences in massachusetts, nor any hint of the purposes of the people of machias, had reached their ears. therefore, on this peaceful may morning, capt. moore donned his full-dress uniform, and with his brother officers proceeded to the little church in the village. every thing then seemed favorable to the success of the adventure. the "margaretta," manned by a sleepy crew, and deserted by her officers, lay within easy distance of the shore. it seemed as though the conspirators had only to divide into two parties; and while the one surrounded the church, and captured the worshipping officers, the others might descend upon the schooner, and easily make themselves masters of all. but the plot failed. history fails to record just how or why the suspicions of capt. moore were aroused. whether it was that the wary captain noticed the absence of most of the young men of the congregation, or whether he saw the conspirators assembling on the dock, is not known. but certain it is that the good dominie in the pulpit, and the pious people in the pews, were mightily startled by the sudden uprisal of capt. moore, who sprang from his seat, and, calling upon his officers to follow him, leaped through the great window of the church, and ran like mad for the shore, followed by the rest of the naval party. there was no more church for the good people of machias that morning. even the preacher came down from his pulpit to stare through his horn-rimmed glasses at the retreating forms of his whilom listeners. and, as he stood in blank amazement at the church door, he saw a large party of the missing young men of his congregation come dashing down the street in hot pursuit of the retreating mariners. in their hands, the pursuers carried sabres, cutlasses, old flint-lock muskets, cumbrous horse-pistols, scythes, and reaping-hooks. the pursued wore no arms; and, as no boat awaited them at the shore, their case looked hopeless indeed. but the old salt left in charge of the schooner was equal to the occasion. the unsabbath-like tumult on the shore quickly attracted his attention, and with unfeigned astonishment he had observed his commander's unseemly egress from the church. but, when the armed band of colonists appeared upon the scene, he ceased to rub his eyes in wonder, and quickly loaded up a swivel gun, with which he let fly, over the heads of his officers, and in dangerous proximity to the advancing colonists. this fire checked the advance of the conspirators; and, while they wavered and hung back, a boat put off from the schooner, and soon took the officers aboard. then, after firing a few solid shot over the town, merely as an admonition of what might be expected if the hot-headed young men persisted in their violent outbreaks, the "margaretta" dropped down the bay to a more secluded anchorage. the defeated conspirators were vastly chagrined at the miscarriage of their plot; but, nothing daunted, they resolved to attempt to carry the schooner by assault, since strategy had failed. therefore, early the next morning, four young men seized upon a sloop, and, bringing her up to the wharf, cheered lustily. a crowd soon gathered, and the project was explained, and volunteers called for. thirty-five hardy sailors and woodmen hastily armed themselves with muskets, pitchforks, and axes; and, after taking aboard a small supply of provisions, the sloop dropped down the harbor toward the "margaretta." the captain of the threatened schooner had observed through his spy-glass the proceedings at the wharf, and suspected his danger. he was utterly ignorant of the reason for this sudden hostility on the part of the people of machias. he knew nothing of the quarrel that had thus provoked the rebellion of the colonies. therefore, he sought to avoid a conflict; and, upon the approach of the sloop, he hoisted his anchor, and fled down the bay. the sloop followed in hot haste. the yankees crowded forward, and shouted taunts and jeers at their more powerful enemy who thus strove to avoid the conflict. both vessels were under full sail; and the size of the schooner was beginning to tell, when, in jibing, she carried away her main boom. nevertheless, she was so far ahead of the sloop that she was able to put into holmes bay, and take a spar out of a vessel lying there, before the sloop overtook her. but the delay incident upon changing the spars brought the sloop within range; and capt. moore, still anxious to avoid an encounter, cut away his boats, and stood out to sea. with plenty of sea room, and with a spanking breeze on the quarter, the sloop proved to be the better sailer. moore then prepared for battle, and, as the sloop overhauled him, let fly one of his swivels, following it immediately with his whole broadside, killing one man. the sloop returned the fire with her one piece of ordnance, which was so well aimed as to kill the man at the helm of the "margaretta," and clear her quarter-deck. the two vessels then closed, and a hand-to-hand battle began, in which muskets, hand-grenades, pikes, pitchforks, and cutlasses were used with deadly effect. the colonists strove to board their enemy, but were repeatedly beaten back. if any had thought that capt. moore's continued efforts to avoid a conflict were signs of cowardice, they were quickly undeceived; for that officer fought like a tiger, standing on the quarter-deck rail, cheering on his men, and hurling hand-grenades down upon his assailants, until a shot brought him down. the fall of their captain disheartened the british; and the americans quickly swarmed over the sides of the "margaretta," and drove her crew below. this victory was no mean achievement for the colonists. the "margaretta" was vastly the superior, both in metal and in the strength of her crew. she was ably officered by trained and courageous seamen; while the yankees had no leaders save one jeremiah o'brien, whom they had elected, by acclamation, captain. that the americans had so quickly brought their more powerful foe to terms, spoke volumes for their pluck and determination. nor were they content to rest with the capture of the schooner. transferring her armament to the sloop, o'brien set out in search of prizes, and soon fell in with, and captured, two small british cruisers. these he took to watertown, where the massachusetts legislature was then in session. the news of his victory was received with vast enthusiasm; and the legislature conferred upon him the rank of captain, and ordered him to set out on another cruise, and particularly watch out for british vessels bringing over provisions or munitions of war to the king's troops in america. but by this time great britain was aroused. the king saw all america up in arms against his authority, and he determined to punish the rebellious colonists. a naval expedition was therefore sent against falmouth, and that unfortunate town was given to the flames. the legislature of massachusetts then passed a law granting commissions to privateers, and directing the seizure of british ships. thereafter the hostilities on the ocean, which had been previously unauthorized and somewhat piratical, had the stamp of legislative authority. petty hostilities along the coast were very active during the first few months of the war. the exploits of capt. o'brien stirred up seamen from maine to the carolinas, and luckless indeed was the british vessel that fell into their clutches. at providence two armed american vessels re-took a yankee brig and sloop that had been captured by the british. at dartmouth a party of soldiers captured a british armed brig. in addition to these exploits, the success of the american privateers, which had got to sea in great numbers, added greatly to the credit of the american cause. the first order looking toward the establishment of a national navy was given by gen. washington in the latter part of . the sagacious general, knowing that the british forces in boston were supplied with provisions and munitions of war by sea, conceived the idea of fitting out some swift-sailing cruisers to intercept the enemy's cruisers, and cut off their supplies. accordingly, on his own authority, he sent out capt. broughton with two armed schooners belonging to the colony of massachusetts. broughton was ordered to intercept two brigs bound for quebec with military stores. this he failed to do, but brought in ten other vessels. congress, however, directed the release of the captured ships, as it was then intended only to take such vessels as were actually employed in the king's service. by this time congress had become convinced that some naval force was absolutely essential to the success of the american cause. in october, , it therefore fitted out, and ordered to sea, a number of small vessels. of these the first to sail was the "lee," under command of capt. john manly, whose honorable name, won in the opening years of the revolution, fairly entitles him to the station of the father of the american navy. with his swift cruiser, manly patrolled the new england coast, and was marvellously successful in capturing british storeships. washington wrote to congress, "i am in very great want of powder, lead, mortars, and, indeed, most sorts of military stores." hardly had the letter been forwarded, when manly appeared in port with a prize heavy laden with just the goods for which the commander-in-chief had applied. a queer coincidence is on record regarding these captured stores. samuel tucker, an able yankee seaman, later an officer in the american navy, was on the docks at liverpool as a transport was loading for america. as he saw the great cases of guns and barrels of powder marked "boston" being lowered into the hold of the vessel, he said to a friend who stood with him, "i would walk barefoot one hundred miles, if by that means these arms could only take the direction of cambridge." three months later tucker was in washington's camp at cambridge, and there saw the very arms he had so coveted on the liverpool docks. they had been captured by capt. manly. manly's activity proved very harassing to the british, and the sloop-of-war "falcon" was sent out to capture the yankee. she fell in with the "lee" near gloucester, just as the latter was making for that port with a merchant schooner in convoy. manly, seeing that the englishman was too heavy for him, deserted his convoy and ran into the port, where he anchored, out of reach of the sloop's guns. capt. lindzee of the "falcon" stopped to capture the abandoned schooner, and then taking his vessel to the mouth of the port, anchored her in such a way as to prevent any escape for the "lee." he then prepared to capture the yankee by boarding. the "falcon" drew too much water to run alongside the "lee" at the anchorage manly had chosen; and the englishman therefore put his men in large barges, and with a force of about forty men set out to capture the schooner. manly saw the force that was to be brought against him, and sent his men to quarters, preparing for a desperate resistance. the schooner was lying near the shore; and the townspeople and militia gathered by the water-side, with guns in their hands, prepared to lend their aid to the brave defenders of the "lee." as the three barges drew near the schooner, manly mounted the rail, and hailed them, warning them to keep off lest he fire upon them. "fire, and be hanged to you," was the response of the lieutenant in command of the assailants. "we have no fear of traitors." so saying, the british pressed on through a fierce storm of musketry from the deck of the schooner and from the shore. they showed no lack of courage. the lieutenant himself brought his boat under the cabin windows, and was in the act of boarding, when a shot from the shore struck him in the thigh, and he was carried back to the man-of-war. capt. lindzee, who had watched the progress of the fight from the deck of the "falcon," was greatly enraged when his lieutenant was thus disabled; and he hastily despatched re-enforcements to the scene of action, and directed the gunners on the "falcon" to commence a cannonade of the town. "now," said he with an oath, "my boys, we will aim at the presbyterian church. well, my brave fellows, one shot more, and the house of god will fall before you." but the british were fairly outfought, and the outcome of the battle was disastrous to them. a newspaper of the period, speaking of the fight says, "under god, our little party at the water-side performed wonders; for they soon made themselves masters of both the schooners, the cutter, the two barges, the boat, and every man in them, and all that pertained to them. in the action, which lasted several hours, we have lost but one man; two others wounded,--one of whom is since dead, the other very slightly wounded. we took of the man-of-war's men thirty-five; several are wounded, and one since dead; twenty-four are sent to headquarters. the remainder, being impressed from this and neighboring towns, are permitted to return to their friends. this morning capt. lindzee warped off with but one-half of his men, with neither a prize-boat nor tender, except a small skiff the wounded lieutenant returned in." the work done by the small armed schooners of which the "lee" was a type encouraged congress to proceed with the work of organizing a regular navy; and by the end of that body had authorized the building of thirteen war-vessels carrying from twenty-four to thirty-two guns each. but as some naval force was obviously necessary during the construction of this fleet, five vessels were procured, and the new navy was organized with the following roster of officers:-- esek hopkins _commander-in-chief._ dudley saltonstall _captain of the "alfred."_ abraham whipple _captain of the "columbus."_ nicholas biddle _captain of the "andrea doria."_ john b. hopkins _captain of the "cabot."_ a long list of lieutenants was also provided, among whom stands out boldly the name of john paul jones. john manly, whose dashing work in the schooner "lee" we have already noticed, was left in command of his little craft until the thirty-two-gun ship "hancock" was completed, when he was put in charge of her. it may possibly have occurred to some of my readers to wonder what flag floated from the mastheads of these ships. there is much confusion upon this point, and not a little uncertainty. there were three classes of american armed vessels on the seas. first were the privateers, that sailed under any flag that might suit their purpose. next came the vessels fitted out and commissioned by the individual colonies; these usually floated the flag of the colony from which they hailed. last came the vessels commissioned by congress, which at the outset floated many banners of diverse kinds. it fell to the lot of lieut. paul jones, however, to hoist the first authorized american flag over a regularly commissioned vessel-of-war. this flag was of bunting, showing a pine-tree on a plain white ground, with the words "liberty tree" and "appeal to god" prominently displayed. this flag was chiefly used until the adoption of the stars and stripes. the "rattlesnake flag," with a reptile in the act of striking, and the legend "don't tread on me," was largely used by the privateers. the year closed with but little activity upon the ocean. the ships of the regular navy were late in getting into commission, and an early winter impeded their usefulness. some little work was done by privateers and the ships of the different colonies, and the ships of the british navy were kept fully occupied in guarding against the operations of these gentry. the man-of-war "nautilus" chased an american privateer into a little cove near beverly, and in the heat of the chase both vessels ran aground. the people on shore put off to the privateer, and quickly stripped her of her cordage and armament, and with the guns built a small battery by the water-side, from which they opened a telling fire upon the stranded "nautilus." the man-of-war returned in kind, and did some slight damage to the town; but when the tide had risen she slipped her cables and departed. such desultory encounters were of frequent occurrence, but no naval battles of any importance took place until the spring of . [illustration: commodore esek hopkins.] chapter v. events of . -- the first cruise of the regular navy. -- the "lexington" and the "edward." -- mugford's brave fight. -- loss of the "yankee hero." -- capt. manly, and the "defence." -- american vessels in european waters. -- good work of the "lexington" and the "reprisal." -- the british defeated at charleston. the year witnessed some good service done for the cause of liberty by the little colonial navy. the squadron, under the command of ezekiel hopkins, left the delaware in february, as soon as the ice had left the river, and made a descent upon the island of new providence, where the british had established a naval station. the force under hopkins consisted of seven vessels-of-war, and one despatch-boat. the attack was successful in every way, a landing party of three hundred marines and sailors which was sent ashore meeting with but little resistance from the british garrison. by this exploit, the americans captured over a hundred cannon, and a great quantity of naval stores. after this exploit, hopkins left new providence, carrying away with him the governor and one or two notable citizens, and continued his cruise. his course was shaped to the northward, and early in april he found himself off the shore of long island. he had picked up a couple of insignificant british vessels,--one a tender of six guns, and the other an eight-gun bomb-brig. but his cruise had been mainly barren of results; and his crew, who had looked forward to sharp service and plenty of prize-money, were beginning to grumble. but their inactivity was not of long duration; for before daylight on the morning of april , the lookout at the masthead of the "alfred" sighted a large ship, bearing down upon the american squadron. the night was clear and beautiful, the wind light, and the sea smooth; and so, although it lacked several hours to daylight, the commanders determined to give battle to the stranger. soon, therefore, the roll of the drums beating to quarters was heard over the water, and the angry glare of the battle lanterns on the gun-decks made the open ports of the war-ships stand out like fiery eyes against the black hulls. the englishman, who proved later to be the "glasgow," twenty guns, carrying one hundred and fifty men, might easily have escaped; but, apparently undaunted by the odds against him, he awaited the attack. the little "cabot" was the first american ship to open fire on the enemy. her attack, though sharp and plucky, was injudicious; for two of the englishman's heavy broadsides were enough to send her out of the battle for repairs. the "glasgow" and the "alfred" then took up the fight, and exchanged repeated broadsides; the american vessel suffering the more serious injuries of the two. after some hours of this fighting, the "glasgow" hauled away, and made good her escape, although she was almost surrounded by the vessels of the american squadron. it would seem that only the most careless seamanship on the part of the americans could have enabled a twenty-gun vessel to escape from four vessels, each one of which was singly almost a match for her. it is evident that the continental congress took the same view of the matter, for hopkins was soon after dismissed from the service. this action was little to the credit of the sailors of the colonial navy. fortunately, a second action during the same month set them in a better light before the people of the country. this was the encounter of the "lexington," capt. barry, with the british vessel "edward," off the capes of virginia. the two vessels were laid yard-arm to yard-arm; and a hot battle ensued, in which the americans came off the victors. the career of this little american brig was a rather remarkable one. the year following her capture of the "edward," she was again off the capes of the delaware, and again fell in with a british ship. this time, however, the englishman was a frigate, and the luckless "lexington" was forced to surrender. her captor left the americans aboard their own craft, and, putting a prize crew aboard, ordered them to follow in the wake of the frigate. that night the americans plotted the recapture of their vessel. by a concerted movement, they overpowered their captors; and the "lexington" was taken into baltimore, where she was soon recommissioned, and ordered to cruise in european waters. shortly after the battle between the "lexington" and the "edward," there was fought in massachusetts bay an action in which the americans showed the most determined bravery, and which for the courage shown, and losses suffered on either side, may well be regarded as the most important of the naval battles of that year. early in may, a merchant seaman named mugford had succeeded, after great importunity, in securing the command of the armed vessel "franklin," a small cruiser mounting only four guns. the naval authorities had been unwilling to give him the command, though he showed great zeal in pressing his suit. indeed, after the appointment had been made, certain damaging rumors concerning the newly appointed captain reached the ears of the marine committee, and caused them to send an express messenger to boston to cancel mugford's commission. but the order arrived too late. mugford had already fitted out his ship, and sailed. he had been but a few days at sea, when the british ship "hope," of four hundred tons and mounting six guns, hove in sight. more than this, the lookout reported that the fleet of the british commodore banks lay but a few miles away, and in plain sight. many a man would have been daunted by such odds. not so capt. mugford. mustering his men, he showed them the british ship, told them that she carried heavier metal than the "franklin," told them that the british fleet lay near at hand, and would doubtless try to take a hand in the engagement; then, having pointed out all the odds against them, he said, "now, my lads, it's a desperate case; but we can take her, and win lots of glory and prize-money. will you stand by me?" the jackies wasted no time in debate, but, cheering lustily for the captain, went to their posts, and made ready for a hot fight. the naval discipline of the present day was little known, and less observed, at that time in the american navy. the perfect order which makes the gun-deck of a ship going into action as quiet and solemn as during sunday prayers then gave place to excited talk and bustle. the men stood in crews at the four guns; but most of the jackies were mustered on the forecastle, ready to board. all expected a desperate resistance. great was their surprise, then, when they were permitted to take a raking position under the stern of the "hope," and to board her without a shot being fired. but as mugford, at the head of the boarders, clambered over the taffrail, he heard the captain of the "hope" order the men to cut the topsail halliards and ties, with the intention of so crippling the ship that the british squadron might overhaul and recapture her. "avast there!" bawled mugford, seeing through the plot in an instant, and clapping a pistol to the head of the captain; "if a knife is touched to those ropes, not a man of this crew shall live." this threat so terrified the captured sailors, that they relinquished their design; and mugford, crowding all sail on his prize, soon was bowling along before a stiff breeze, with the british squadron in hot pursuit. an examination of the ship's papers showed her to be the most valuable prize yet taken by the americans. in her hold were fifteen hundred barrels of powder, a thousand carbines, a great number of travelling carriages for cannon, and a most complete assortment of artillery instruments and pioneer tools. while running for boston harbor, through the channel known as point shirley gut, the vessel grounded, but was soon floated, and taken safely to her anchorage. her arrival was most timely, as the american army was in the most dire straits for gunpowder. it may well be imagined that there was no longer any talk about revoking capt. mugford's commission. mugford remained in port only long enough to take a supply of powder from his prize; then put to sea again. he well knew that the british fleet that had chased him into boston harbor was still blockading the harbor's mouth, but he hoped to evade it by going out through a circuitous channel. unluckily, in thus attempting to avoid the enemy, the "franklin" ran aground, and there remained hard and fast in full view of the enemy. he had as consort the privateer schooner "lady washington," whose captain, seeing mugford's dangerous predicament, volunteered to remain near at hand and assist in the defence. mugford knew that his case was desperate, and made preparations for a most determined resistance. swinging his craft around, he mounted all four of his guns on that side which commanded the channel in the direction from which the enemy was expected. boarding-nettings were triced up, and strengthened with cables and cordage, to make an effective barrier against the assaults of boarders. the men were served with double rations of grog, and set to work sharpening the cutlasses and spears, with which they were well provided. the work of preparation was completed none too soon; for about nine o'clock mugford heard the rattle of oars in rowlocks, and saw boats gliding towards the "franklin" through the darkness. "boat ahoy!" he challenged. "keep off, or i shall fire into you." "don't fire," was the response; "we are friends from boston coming to your aid." "we want none of your aid," cried mugford with an oath. then, turning to his crew, he shouted, "let them have it, boys." the roar of the cannon then mingled with the rattle of the musketry, the cries of the wounded, and the shouts and curses of the combatants, as the british strove to clamber up the sides of the "franklin." not less than two hundred men were engaged on the side of the british, who advanced to the fray in thirteen large barges, many of them carrying swivel guns. several boats dashed in close under the side of the "franklin," and their crews strove manfully to board, but were beaten back by the yankees, who rained cutlass blows upon them. the long pikes with which the americans were armed proved particularly effective. "one man with that weapon is positive of having killed nine of the enemy," says a newspaper of that day. unhappily, however, the heroic mugford, while urging on his men to a more vigorous resistance, was struck by a musket-ball, which inflicted a mortal wound. at the moment the wound was received, he was reaching out over the quarter to catch hold of the mast of one of the barges, in the hope of upsetting her. as he fell to the deck, he called his first lieutenant, and said, "i am a dead man. do not give up the vessel; you will be able to beat them off." nearly forty years after, the heroic lawrence, dying on the deck of the "chesapeake," repeated mugford's words, "don't give up the ship." for about half an hour the battle raged fiercely. the british, beaten back with great loss, returned again and again to the attack. the boats would come under the lee of the "franklin;" but, not being provided with grappling-irons, the british were forced to lay hold of the gunwales of the enemy with their hands, which the americans promptly lopped off with their cutlasses. shots from the swivel guns of the yankee soon stove in two of the boats of the enemy, which sunk, carrying down many of their crew. after nearly an hour of this desperate fighting, the british withdrew, having lost about seventy men. the only loss sustained by the americans was that of their brave commander mugford. about a month after this battle, there occurred off the coast of massachusetts a battle in which the americans, though they fought with the most undaunted bravery, were forced to strike their colors to their adversary. the american was the privateer "yankee hero" of newburyport. she sailed from that place for boston on the th of june with only forty men aboard, intending to ship her full complement of one hundred and twenty at boston. as the "hero" rounded cape ann, she sighted a sail on the horizon, but in her short-handed condition did not think it worth while to give chase. the stranger, however, had caught sight of the "hero;" and, a fresh southerly breeze springing up, she began to close with the american. as she came closer, capt. tracy of the "yankee hero" saw that she was a ship-of-war. despite the desperate efforts of the americans to escape, their pursuer rapidly overhauled them, and soon coming up within half a mile, opened fire with her bow chasers. the brig returned the fire with a swivel gun, which had little effect. seeing this, capt. tracy ordered the firing to cease until the ships should came to close quarters. the stranger rapidly overhauled the privateer, keeping up all the time a vigorous fire. tracy with difficulty restrained the ardor of his men, who were anxious to try to cripple their pursuer. when the enemy came within pistol-shot, tracy saw that the time for action on his part had come, and immediately opened fire with all the guns and small-arms that could be brought to bear. the only possible chance for escape lay in crippling the big craft with a lucky shot; but broadside after broadside was fired, and still the great ship came rushing along in the wake of the flying privateer. closer and closer drew the bulky man-of-war, until her bow crept past the stern of the "yankee hero," and the marines upon her forecastle poured down a destructive volley of musketry upon the brig's crowded deck. the plight of the privateer was now a desperate one. her heavy antagonist was close alongside, and towered high above her, so that the marines on the quarter-deck and forecastle of the englishman were on a level with the leading blocks of the yankee. from the depressed guns of the frigate, a murderous fire poured down upon the smaller craft. for an hour and twenty minutes the two vessels continued the fight, pouring hot broadsides into each other, and separated by less than a hundred feet of water. the brisk breeze blowing carried away the clouds of smoke, and left the men on the deck of the yankee no protection from sharp-shooters on the enemy's deck. accordingly, the execution was frightful. tracy, from his post on the quarter-deck, saw his men falling like sheep, while the continual volleys of the great ship had so cut the cordage of the weaker vessel that escape was impossible. at last a musket-ball struck capt. tracy in the thigh, and he fell bleeding to the deck. for a moment his men wavered at their guns; but he called manfully to them, from where he lay, to fight on boldly for the honor of the "yankee hero." two petty officers had rushed to his assistance; and he directed them to lay him upon a chest of arms upon the quarter-deck, whence he might direct the course of the battle. but, strong though was his spirit, his body was too weak to perform the task he had allotted it; and, growing faint from pain and loss of blood, he was carried below. he lay unconscious for a few minutes, but was recalled to his senses by the piteous cries of wounded men by whom he was surrounded. when he came to himself, he saw the cabin filled with grievously wounded people, bleeding and suffering for lack of surgical aid. the firing of the privateer had ceased, but the enemy was still pouring in pitiless broadsides. enraged at this spectacle, capt. tracy ordered his men to re-open the conflict, and directed that he be taken in a chair to the quarter-deck. but, on getting into the chair, he was suddenly seized with a fainting spell, and gave orders, by signs, that the colors be struck. when the inequality of the two enemies is considered, this action appears to be a most notable reason for pride in the powers of the americans. the "yankee hero" was a low single-decked vessel of fourteen guns, while her captor was the british frigate of thirty-two guns. yet the little american vessel had held her own for two hours, and by good gunnery and skilful manoeuvring had succeeded in doing almost as much damage as she had suffered. in reading of the naval engagements of the revolution, one is impressed with the small sacrifice of life that attended the most protracted conflicts. thus in the action just recorded only four men were killed upon the defeated ship, although for more than an hour the two vessels had exchanged broadsides a distance of less than a hundred feet apart. the execution done on the british frigate has never been recorded, but was probably even less. only the most fragmentary account can be given of any naval actions in the year , except those in which america's great naval hero paul jones took part. of the trivial encounters that go to complete the naval annals of the year, only the briefest recountal is necessary. the work of the little brig "andrea doria," capt. biddle, deserves a passing mention. this little fourteen-gun craft had the most wonderful luck in making prizes. besides capturing two transports loaded with british soldiers, she took so many merchantmen, that on one cruise she brought back to port only five of her original crew, the rest having all been put aboard prizes. on the th of june, the crew of the connecticut cruiser "defence," a fourteen-gun brig, heard the sound of distant cannonading coming faintly over the water. all sail was crowded upon the brig, and she made all possible speed to the scene of conflict. about nightfall, she fell in with four american schooners that had just been having a tussle with two heavy british transports. three of the american vessels were privateers, the fourth was the little cruiser "lee" in which capt. john manly had done such brilliant service. the four schooners had found the transports too powerful for them, and had therefore drawn off, but were eager to renew the fray with the help of the "defence." accordingly the "defence" led the way to nantasket roads, where the transports lay at anchor. capt. harding wasted little time in manoeuvring, but, laying his vessel alongside the larger of the two transports, summoned her commander to strike. "ay, ay--i'll strike," was the response from the threatened vessel; and instantly a heavy broadside was poured into the "defence." a sharp action followed, lasting for nearly an hour. the "defence" bore the brunt of the conflict, for the four schooners did not come to sufficiently close quarters to be of much assistance against the enemy. the gunnery of the americans proved too much for the enemy, however; and after losing eighteen men, together with a large number wounded, the british surrendered. the american vessel was a good deal cut up aloft, and lost nine of her men. the next morning a third transport was sighted by the "defence," and speedily overhauled and captured. more than five hundred british soldiers were thus captured; and the british thenceforward dared not treat the americans as rebels, lest the colonial army authorities should retaliate upon the british prisoners in their hands. it was in the year that the first naval vessel giving allegiance to the american colonies showed herself in european waters. this vessel was the "reprisal," capt. wickes, a small craft, mounting sixteen guns. early in the summer of ' , the "reprisal" made a cruise to martinique, taking several prizes. when near the island, she encountered the british sloop-of-war "shark," and a sharp battle ensued. in size and weight of metal, the two vessels were about evenly matched; but the "reprisal" had been sending out so many prize-crews, that she was short eighty men of her full crew. therefore, when, after a brisk interchange of broadsides, the british sloop sheered off, and left the "reprisal" to continue her course, capt. wickes rejoiced in his escape as being almost equal to a victory. after completing this cruise, the "reprisal" was ordered to france for the purpose of conveying thither from philadelphia benjamin franklin, the ambassador sent from the colonies to interest the french in the cause of american liberty. while on the way over, she took two or three prizes, which were sold in france. after landing her distinguished passenger, she cruised about in the proverbially tempestuous bay of biscay, where she forced several british vessels to strike to the american flag, then first seen in those waters. on returning to france to sell his newly captured prizes, capt. wickes found trouble in store for him. the british ambassador at paris had declared that the american cruiser was a detestable pirate; and that for france to permit the pirate to anchor in her harbors, or sell his prizes in her markets, was equal to a declaration of war against england. wickes was, therefore, admonished to take his ships and prisoners away. but even in that early day yankee wit was sharp, and able to extricate its possessor from troublesome scrapes. wickes knew that there were plenty of purchasers to be had for his prizes: so, gathering a few ship-owners together, he took them out to sea beyond the jurisdiction of france, and there sold them to the highest bidder. the money thus obtained wickes used in purchasing vessels suitable for armed cruisers. while these were fitting out, the "lexington" and the "dolphin" arrived in france, and soon joined the "reprisal" in a cruise around the british islands. the little squadron fairly swept the channel and the irish sea of merchantmen. the excitement in england ran high, and the admiralty despatched all the available men-of-war in search of the marauders. but the swift-sailing cruisers escaped all pursuers. once indeed the "reprisal" came near falling into the hands of the enemy, but escaped by throwing overboard every thing movable, sawing away her bulwarks, and even cutting away her heavy timbers. the result of this cruise so aroused england, that france no longer dared to harbor the audacious yankee cruisers. the "lexington" and "reprisal" were, therefore, ordered to leave european waters forthwith. the "lexington" complied first, and when one day out from the port of morlaix encountered the british man-of-war cutter "alert." the "alert" was the smaller of the two vessels, but her commander had in him all that pluck and those sterling seamanlike qualities that made the name of england great upon the ocean. a stiff breeze was blowing, and a heavy cross sea running, when the two vessels came together. the gunners sighted their pieces at random and fired, knowing little whether the shot would go plunging into the waves, or fly high into the air. as a result, they carried on a spirited cannonade for upwards of two hours, with the sole effect of carrying away the top hamper of the "alert," and exhausting most of the powder on the american craft. finding his ammunition rapidly giving out, the captain of the "lexington" clapped on all sail, and soon showed his crippled antagonist a clean pair of heels. but so great was the activity of the crew of the "alert" that they repaired the damage done aloft, and in four hours overtook the "american," and opened fire upon her the battle now became one-sided; for the "lexington," being short of powder, could make little resistance to the brisk attack of her persevering adversary. in less than an hour she was forced to strike her flag. the fate of the "reprisal" was even harder than that of her consort. while crossing the atlantic on her way back to the coast of america, she was overtaken by a furious gale. with furled sails and battened hatches, the little craft made a desperate fight for life. but the fierce wind carried away her masts and spars, and the tossing waves opened her seams, so that it became apparent to all on board that the fate of the gallant craft, that had so nobly defended the cause of american liberty, was sealed. as the water rose higher and higher in the hold, the officers saw that it was no longer a question of the possibility of saving the ship, but that their lives and those of the crew were in the greatest danger. boats were lowered; but the angry white-capped waves tossed them madly aloft, and, turning them over and over, sent the poor fellows that manned them to their long account. all hands then set to work at the construction of a huge raft; and just as the ship's stern settled, it was pushed off, and all that could reach it clambered on. a few poor fellows clung to the sinking ship; and their comrades on the raft saw them crowd on the forecastle, and heard their despairing cries as the good ship threw her prow high in the air, and sunk stern foremost to the placid depths of the stormy ocean. but those on the raft were not destined to escape the fate of their comrades. the haggard sufferers were doomed to see the frail structure on which their lives depended go slowly to pieces before the mighty power of the remorseless sea. bit by bit their foothold vanished from beneath them. one by one they were swept off into the seething cauldron of the storm. at last but one man remained, the cook of the ill-fated vessel, who floated about for three days on a piece of wreckage, until, half-starved and nearly crazed, he was picked up by a passing vessel, and told the tale of the wreck. so ended the career of the patriotic and gallant capt. wickes and his crew, and such is the fate that every stout fellow braves when he dons his blue jacket and goes to serve his country on the ocean. in addition to the exploits of the american cruisers upon the high seas, certain operations of the british navy along the american coast, during the year , demand attention. of these the most important was the attack by sir peter parker upon charleston, in september of that year,--an attack made memorable by the determined courage of the americans, the daring exploit of sergt. jasper, and the discovery of the remarkable qualities of palmetto logs as a material for fortifications. charleston was then a town of but a few thousand inhabitants; but, small as it was, it had become particularly obnoxious to the british on account of the strong revolutionary sentiment of its people, and their many open acts of defiance of king george's authority. when the offensive stamp act first was published, the people of charleston rose in revolt; and the stamps for the city being stored in an armed fortress in the bay, known as castle johnson, a party of a hundred and fifty armed men went down the bay, surprised the garrison, captured the castle, and, loading its guns, defied the authorities. not until the promise had been made that the stamps should be sent back to england, did the rebellious carolinians lay down their arms. nor was their peace of long duration. when the news of the battle of lexington reached the little southern seaport, the people straightway cast about for an opportunity to strike a blow against the tyranny of england. the opportunity soon offered itself. an english sloop laden with powder was lying at st. augustine, fla. learning this, the people of charleston fitted out a vessel, which captured the powder-ship, and, eluding a number of british cruisers, returned safely to charleston with fifteen thousand pounds of gunpowder for the colonial army. soon after the colonial troops took possession of the forts in the harbor, and charleston became a revolutionary stronghold. therefore, when the war authorities of great britain prepared to take active, offensive measures against the seaport cities of the rebellious colonies, charleston was one of the first points chosen for attack. it was on the th of june, , that the british fleet, under the command of the veteran admiral, sir peter parker, appeared off charleston bar. the colonists had learned of its approach some time before; and the town was crowded with troops, both regular and volunteer. two forts, johnson and sullivan, were erected at points commanding the entrance to the harbor. troops were thrown out to oppose the advance of landing parties. the wharves were covered with breastworks, and the streets leading up from the water-side were barricaded. there was a great scarceness of lead for bullets; and to supply that need the leaden sashes, in which window-panes were at that time set, were melted down. when the fleet of the enemy appeared in the offing, charleston was quite ready to give the invaders a warm reception. fort sullivan was the chief work in the harbor, and against this parker began a vigorous cannonade early on the morning of the th of june. the fort had been built of logs of palmetto wood, and was looked upon with some distrust by its defenders, who did not know how well that material could withstand cannon-shot; but the opening volley of the fleet re-assured them. the balls penetrated deep in the soft, spongy wood without detaching any of the splinters, which, in a battle, are more dangerous than the shot themselves. the fort soon replied to the fire of the fleet; and the thunder of three hundred cannon rang out over the bay, while dense clouds of sulphurous smoke hid the scene from the eager gaze of the crowds of people on the housetops of the city. when the stately ships of the british squadron swung into line before the little wooden fort, there was hardly a sailor who did not take his station without a feeling of contempt for the insignificant obstacle that they were about to sweep from their path. but as the day wore on, and the ceaseless cannonade seemed to have no effect on the bastions of the fort, the case began to look serious. "mind the commodore, and the fifty-gun ships," was the command moultrie gave to the gunners in the fort when the action commenced, and right well did they heed the injunction. the quarter-decks of the ships-of-the-line were swept clean of officers. the gunners in the fort soon found that the fire of the enemy was doing little or no execution, and they sighted their guns as coolly as though out for a day's target practice. the huge iron balls crashed through the hulls of the ships, or swept their decks, doing terrific execution. the cable of the "bristol" was shot away, and she swung round with her stern to the fort. in this position she was raked repeatedly; her captain was killed, and at one time not an officer remained on her quarter-deck except the admiral sir peter parker. when the conflict ceased, this ship alone contained forty killed and seventy-one wounded men. the other ships suffered nearly as severely. the twenty-eight-gun ship "actæon" grounded during the course of the engagement; and when, after ten hours' fruitless cannonading, the british abandoned the task of reducing the fort, and determined to withdraw, she was found to be immovable. accordingly admiral parker signalled to her officer to abandon the ship, and set her on fire. this was accordingly done; and the ship was left with her colors flying, and her guns loaded. this movement was observed by the americans, who, in spite of the danger of an explosion, boarded the ship, fired her guns at the "bristol," loaded three boats with stores, and pulled away, leaving the "actæon" to blow up, which she did half an hour later. while the battle was at its hottest, and the shot and shell were flying thick over the fort, the flagstaff was shot away; and the flag of south carolina, a blue ground, bearing a silver crescent, fell on the beach outside the parapet. sergt. william jasper, seeing this, leaped on the bastion, walked calmly through the storm of flying missiles, picked up the flag, and fastened it upon a sponge-staff. then standing upon the highest point of the parapet, in full view of the ships and the men in the fort, he calmly fixed the staff upright, and returned to his place, leaving the flag proudly waving. the next day the governor of the colony visited the fort, and seeking out the brave sergeant, handed him a handsome sword and a lieutenant's commission. but jasper proved to be as modest as he was brave; for he declined the proffered promotion, with the remark,-- "i am not fit to keep officers' company; i am but a sergeant." the complete failure of the attack upon charleston was a bitter pill for the english to swallow. they had brought against the raw, untrained forces of the colony some of the finest ships of the boasted navy of great britain. they had fought well and pluckily. the fact that sir peter parker was in command was in itself a guaranty that the attack would be a spirited one; and the tremendous loss of life in the fleet affords convincing proof that no poltroonery lurked among the british sailors. the loss of the british during the engagement, in killed and wounded, amounted to two hundred and twenty-five men. the americans had ten men killed and twenty-two wounded. moultrie, the commandant of the fort, says that after the battle was over they picked up more than twelve hundred solid shot of different sizes, and many thirteen-inch shells. most of the shells that fell within the fort fell into a large pool of water, which extinguished their fuses, thus robbing them of their power for evil. in his report of this battle, admiral parker fell into a queer error. he reports that a large party of men entering the fort met a man going out, whom they straightway hanged to a neighboring tree, in full view of the fleet. from this the admiral concluded that there was an incipient mutiny in the fort, and the ringleader was hanged as an example. col. moultrie, however, explained this by stating that the man hanging in the tree was simply the coat of a soldier, which had been carried away by a cannon-shot, and left hanging in the branches. chapter vi. the career of paul jones. -- in command of the "providence." -- capture of the "mellish." -- exploits with the "alfred." -- in command of the "ranger." -- sweeping the english channel. -- the descent upon whitehaven. we have already spoken of the farcical affair between the fleet under ezekiel hopkins and the english frigate "glasgow," in which the english vessel, by superior seamanship, and taking advantage of the blunders of the americans, escaped capture. the primary result of this battle was to cause the dismissal from the service of hopkins. but his dismissal led to the advancement of a young naval officer, whose name became one of the most glorious in american naval annals, and whose fame as a skilful seaman has not been tarnished by the hand of time. [illustration: captain john paul jones quelling the mob at white haven, scotland, nov., .] at the time of the escape of the "glasgow," there was serving upon the "alfred" a young lieutenant, by name john paul jones. jones was a scotchman. his rightful name was john paul; but for some reason, never fully understood, he had assumed the surname of jones, and his record under the name of paul jones forms one of the most glorious chapters of american naval history. when given a lieutenant's commission in the colonial navy, jones was twenty-nine years old. from the day when a lad of thirteen years he shipped for his first voyage, he had spent his life on the ocean. he had served on peaceful merchantmen, and in the less peaceful, but at that time equally respectable, slave-trade. a small inheritance had enabled him to assume the station of a virginia gentleman; and he had become warmly attached to american ideas and principles, and at the outbreak of the revolution put his services at the command of congress. he was first offered a captain's commission with the command of the "providence," mounting twelve guns and carrying one hundred men. but with extraordinary modesty the young sailor declined, saying that he hardly felt himself fitted to discharge the duties of a first lieutenant. the lieutenant's commission, however, he accepted; and it was in this station that with his own hands he hoisted the first american flag to the masthead of the "alfred." the wretched fiasco which attended the attack of the american fleet upon the "glasgow" was greatly deplored by jones. however, he refrained from any criticism upon his superiors, and sincerely regretted the finding of the court of inquiry, by which the captain of the "providence" was dismissed the service, and lieut. paul jones recommended to fill the vacancy. the duties which devolved upon capt. jones were manifold and arduous. the ocean was swarming with powerful british men-of-war, which in his little craft he must avoid, while keeping a sharp outlook for foemen with whom he was equally matched. more than once, from the masthead of the "providence," the lookout could discover white sails of one or more vessels, any one of which, with a single broadside, could have sent the audacious yankee to the bottom. but luckily the "providence" was a fast sailer, and wonderfully obedient to her helm. to her good sailing qualities, and to his own admirable seamanship, jones owed more than one fortunate escape. once, when almost overtaken by a powerful man-of-war, he edged away until he brought his pursuer on his weather quarter; then, putting his helm up suddenly, he stood dead before the wind, thus doubling on his course, and running past his adversary within pistol-shot of her guns, but in a course directly opposite to that upon which she was standing. the heavy war-ship went plunging ahead like a heavy hound eluded by the agile fox, and the yankee proceeded safely on her course. some days later the "providence" was lying to on the great banks near the isle of sables. it was a holiday for the crew; for no sails were in sight, and capt. jones had indulgently allowed them to get out their cod-lines and enjoy an afternoon's fishing. in the midst of their sport, as they were hauling in the finny monsters right merrily, the hail of the lookout warned them that a strange sail was in sight. the stranger drew rapidly nearer, and was soon made out to be a war vessel. jones, finding after a short trial that his light craft could easily outstrip the lumbering man-of-war, managed to keep just out of reach. now and then the pursuer would luff up and let fly a broadside; the shot skipping along over the waves, but sinking before they reached the "providence." jones, who had an element of humor in his character, responded to this cannonade with one musket, which, with great solemnity, was discharged in response to each broadside. after keeping up this burlesque battle for some hours, the "providence" spread her sails, and soon left her foe hull down beneath the horizon. after having thus eluded his pursuer, jones skirted the coast of cape breton, and put into the harbor of canso, where he found three british fishing schooners lying at anchor. the inhabitants of the little fishing village were electrified to see the "providence" cast anchor in the harbor, and, lowering her boats, send two crews of armed sailors to seize the british craft. no resistance was made, however; and the americans burned one schooner, scuttled a second, and after filling the third with fish, taken from the other two, took her out of the harbor with the "providence" leading the way. from the crew of the captured vessel, jones learned that at the island of madame, not far from canso, there was a considerable flotilla of british merchantmen. accordingly he proceeded thither with the intention of destroying them. on arriving, he found the harbor too shallow to admit the "providence;" and accordingly taking up a position from which he could, with his cannon, command the harbor, he despatched armed boats' crews to attack the shipping. on entering the harbor, the americans found nine british vessels lying at anchor. ships and brigs, as well as small fishing schooners, were in the fleet. it was a rich prize for the americans, and it was won without bloodshed; for the peaceful fishermen offered no resistance to the yankees, and looked upon the capture of their vessels with amazement. the condition of these poor men, thus left on a bleak coast with no means of escape, appealed strongly to jones's humanity. he therefore told them, that, if they would assist him in making ready for sea such of the prizes as he wished to take with him, he would leave them vessels enough to carry them back to england. the fishermen heartily agreed to the proposition, and worked faithfully for several days at the task of fitting out the captured vessels. the night before the day on which jones had intended leaving the harbor, the wind came on to blow, and a violent storm of wind and rain set in. even the usually calm surface of the little harbor was lashed to fury by the shrieking wind. the schooner "sea-flower"--one of the captured prizes--was torn from her moorings; and though her crew got out the sweeps, and struggled valiantly for headway against the driving storm, she drifted on shore, and lay there a total wreck. the schooner "ebenezer," which jones had brought from canso laden with fish, drifted on a sunken reef, and was there so battered by the roaring waves that she went to pieces. her crew, after vainly striving to launch the boats, built a raft, and saved themselves on that. the next day the storm abated; and capt. jones, taking with him three heavily laden prizes, left the harbor, and turned his ship's prow homeward. the voyage to newport, then the headquarters of the little navy, was made without other incident than the futile chase of three british ships, which ran into the harbor of louisbourg. on his arrival, jones reported that he had been cruising for forty-seven days, and in that time had captured sixteen prizes, beside the fishing-vessels he burned at cape breton. eight of his prizes he had manned, and sent into port; the remainder he had burned. it was the first effective blow the colonists had yet struck at their powerful foe upon the ocean. hardly had paul jones completed this first cruise, when his mind, ever active in the service of his country, suggested to him a new enterprise in which he might contribute to the cause of american liberty. at this early period of the revolution, the british were treating american prisoners with almost inconceivable barbarity. many were sent to the "old jersey" prison-ship, of whose horrors we shall read something later on. others, to the number of about a hundred, were taken to cape breton, and forced to labor like russian felons in the underground coal-mines. jones's plan was bold in its conception, but needed only energy and promptitude to make it perfectly feasible. he besought the authorities to give him command of a squadron, that he might move on cape breton, destroy the british coal and fishing vessels always congregated there, and liberate the hapless americans who were passing their lives in the dark misery of underground mining. his plan was received with favor, but the authorities lacked the means to give him the proper aid. however, two vessels, the "alfred" and the "providence," were assigned to him; and he went speedily to work to prepare for the adventure. at the outset, he was handicapped by lack of men. the privateers were then fitting out in every port; and seamen saw in privateering easier service, milder discipline, and greater profits than they could hope for in the regular navy. when, by hard work, the muster-roll of the "alfred" showed her full complement of men shipped, the stormy month of november had arrived, and the golden hour for success was past. nevertheless, jones, taking command of the "alfred," and putting the "providence" in the command of capt. hacker, left newport, and laid his course to the northward. when he arrived off the entrance to the harbor of louisbourg, he was so lucky as to encounter an english brig, the "mellish," which, after a short resistance, struck her flag. she proved to be laden with heavy warm clothing for the british troops in canada. this capture was a piece of great good fortune for the americans, and many a poor fellow in washington's army that winter had cause to bless paul jones for his activity and success. the day succeeding the capture of the "mellish" dawned gray and cheerless. light flurries of snow swept across the waves, and by noon a heavy snowstorm, driven by a violent north-east gale, darkened the air, and lashed the waves into fury. jones stood dauntless at his post on deck, encouraging the sailors by cheery words, and keeping the sturdy little vessel on her course. all day and night the storm roared; and when, the next morning, jones, wearied by his ceaseless vigilance, looked anxiously across the waters for his consort, she was not to be seen. the people on the "alfred" supposed, of course, that the "providence" was lost, with all on board, and mourned the sad fate of their comrades. but, in fact, capt. hacker, affrighted by the storm, had basely deserted his leader during the night, and made off for newport, leaving jones to prosecute his enterprise alone. jones recognized in this desertion the knell of the enterprise upon which he had embarked. nevertheless, he disdained to return to port: so sending the "mellish" and a second prize, which the british afterwards recaptured, back to massachusetts, he continued his cruise along the nova scotia coast. again he sought out the harbor of canso, and, entering it, found a large english transport laden with provisions aground just inside the bar. boats' crews from the "alfred" soon set the torch to the stranded ship, and then, landing, fired a huge warehouse filled with whale-oil and the products of the fisheries. leaving the blazing pile behind, the "alfred" put out again into the stormy sea, and made for the northward. as he approached louisbourg, jones fell in with a considerable fleet of british coal-vessels, in convoy of the frigate "flora." a heavy fog hung over the ocean; and the fleet yankee, flying here and there, was able to cut out and capture three of the vessels without alarming the frigate, that continued unsuspectingly on her course. two days later, jones snapped up a liverpool privateer, that fired scarcely a single gun in resistance. then crowded with prisoners, embarrassed by prizes, and short of food and water, the "alfred" turned her course homeward. five valuable prizes sailed in her wake. anxiety for the safety of these gave jones no rest by day or night. he was ceaselessly on the watch lest some hostile man-of-war should overhaul his fleet, and force him to abandon his hard-won fruits of victory. all went well until, when off st. george's bank, he encountered the frigate "milford,"--the same craft to whose cannon-balls jones, but a few months before, had tauntingly responded with musket-shots. it was late in the afternoon when the "milford" was sighted; and jones, seeing that she could by no possibility overtake his squadron before night, ordered his prizes to continue their course without regard to any lights or apparent signals from the "alfred." when darkness fell upon the sea, the yankees were scudding along on the starboard tack, with the englishman coming bravely up astern. from the tops of the "alfred" swung two burning lanterns, which the enemy doubtless pronounced a bit of beastly stupidity on the part of the yankee, affording, as it did, an excellent guide for the pursuer to steer by. but during the night the wily jones changed his course. the prizes, with the exception of the captured privateer, continued on the starboard tack. the "alfred" and the privateer made off on the port tack, with the "milford" in full cry in their wake. not until the morning dawned did the englishman discover how he had been tricked. having thus secured the safety of his prizes, it only remained for jones to escape with the privateer. unluckily, however, the officer put in charge of the privateer proved incapable, and his craft fell into hands of the british. jones, however, safely carried the "alfred" clear of the "milford's" guns, and, a heavy storm coming up, soon eluded his foe in the snow and darkness. thereupon he shaped his course for boston, where he arrived on the th of december, . had he been delayed two days longer, both his provisions and his water would have been exhausted. for the ensuing six months jones remained on shore, not by any means inactive, for his brain was teeming with great projects for his country's service. he had been deprived of the command of the "alfred," and another ship was not easily to be found: so he turned his attention to questions of naval organization, and the results of many of his suggestions are observable in the united states navy to-day. it was not until june , , that a command was found for him. this was the eighteen-gun ship "ranger," built to carry a frigate's battery of twenty-six guns. she had been built for the revolutionary government, at portsmouth, and was a stanch-built, solid craft, though miserably slow and somewhat crank. jones, though disappointed with the sailing qualities of the craft, was nevertheless vastly delighted to be again in command of a man-of-war, and wasted no time in getting her ready for sea. it so happened, that, on the very day paul jones received his commission as commander of the "ranger," the continental congress adopted the stars and stripes for the national flag. jones, anticipating this action, had prepared a flag in accordance with the proposed designs, and, upon hearing of the action of congress, had it run to the masthead, while the cannon of the "ranger" thundered out their deep-mouthed greetings to the starry banner destined to wave over the most glorious nation of the earth. thus it happened that the same hand that had given the pine-tree banner to the winds was the first to fling out to the breezes the bright folds of the stars and stripes. early in october the "ranger" left portsmouth, and made for the coast of france. astute agents of the americans in that country were having a fleet, powerful frigate built there for jones, which he was to take, leaving the sluggish "ranger" to be sold. but, on his arrival at nantes, jones was grievously disappointed to learn that the british government had so vigorously protested against the building of a vessel-of-war in france for the americans, that the french government had been obliged to notify the american agents that their plan must be abandoned. france was at this time at peace with great britain, and, though inclined to be friendly with the rebellious colonies, was not ready to entirely abandon her position as a neutral power. later, when she took up arms against england, she gave the americans every right in her ports they could desire. jones thus found himself in european waters with a vessel too weak to stand against the frigates england could send to take her, and too slow to elude them. but he determined to strike some effective blows for the cause of liberty. accordingly he planned an enterprise, which, for audacity of conception and dash in execution, has never been equalled by any naval expedition since. this was nothing less than a virtual invasion of england. the "ranger" lay at brest. jones planned to dash across the english channel, and cruise along the coast of england, burning shipping and towns, as a piece of retaliation upon the british for their wanton outrages along the american coast. it was a bold plan. the channel was thronged with the heavy frigates of great britain, any one of which could have annihilated the audacious yankee cruiser. nevertheless, jones determined to brave the danger. at the outset, it seemed as though his purpose was to be balked by heavy weather. for days after the "ranger" left brest, she battled against the chop-seas of the english channel. the sky was dark, and the light of the sun obscured by gray clouds. the wind whistled through the rigging, and tore at the tightly furled sails. great green walls of water, capped with snowy foam, beat thunderously against the sides of the "ranger." now and then a port would be driven in, and the men between decks drenched by the incoming deluge. the "ranger" had encountered an equinoctial gale in its worst form. when the gale died away, jones found himself off the scilly islands, in full view of the coast of england. here he encountered a merchantman, which he took and scuttled, sending the crew ashore to spread the news that an american man-of-war was ravaging the channel. having alarmed all england, he changed his hunting-ground to st. george's channel and the irish sea, where he captured several ships; sending one, a prize, back to brest. he was in waters with which he had been familiar from his youth, and he made good use of his knowledge; dashing here and there, lying in wait in the highway of commerce, and then secreting himself in some sequestered cove while the enemy's ship-of-war went by in fruitless search for the marauder. all england was aroused by the exploits of the yankee cruiser. never since the days of the invincible armada had war been so brought home to the people of the tight little island. long had the british boastfully claimed the title of monarch of the seas. long had they sung the vainglorious song,-- "britannia needs no bulwarks, no towers along the steep; her march is o'er the mountain waves, her home is on the deep." but paul jones showed great britain that her boasted power was a bubble. he ravaged the seas within cannon-shot of english headlands. he captured and burned merchantmen, drove the rates of insurance up to panic prices, paralyzed british shipping-trade, and even made small incursions into british territory. the reports that reached jones of british barbarity along the american coast, of the burning of falmouth, of tribute levied on innumerable seaport towns,--all aroused in him a determination to strike a retaliatory blow. whitehaven, a small seaport, was the spot chosen by him for attack; and he brought his ship to off the mouth of the harbor late one night, intending to send in a boat's crew to fire the shipping. but so strong a wind sprung up, as to threaten to drive the ship ashore; and jones was forced to make sail, and get an offing. a second attempt, made upon a small harbor called lochryan, on the western coast of scotland, was defeated by a like cause. but the expedition against lochryan, though in itself futile, was the means of giving jones an opportunity to show his merits as a fighter. soon after leaving lochryan, he entered the bay of carrichfergus, on which is situated the irish commercial city of belfast. the bay was constantly filled with merchantmen; and the "ranger," with her ports closed, and her warlike character carefully disguised, excited no suspicion aboard a trim, heavy-built craft that lay at anchor a little farther up the bay. this craft was the british man-of-war "drake," mounting twenty guns. soon after his arrival in the bay, jones learned the character of the "drake," and determined to attempt her capture during the night. accordingly he dropped anchor near by, and, while carefully concealing the character of his craft, made every preparation for a midnight fight. the men sat between decks, sharpening cutlasses, and cleaning and priming their pistols; the cannon were loaded with grape, and depressed for work at close quarters; battle lanterns were hung in place, ready to be lighted at the signal for action. at ten o'clock, the tramp of men about the capstan gave notice that the anchor was being brought to the catheads. soon the creaking of cordage, and the snapping of the sails, told that the fresh breeze was being caught by the spreading sails. then the waves rippled about the bow of the ship, and the "ranger" was fairly under way. it was a pitch-dark night, but the lights on board the "drake" showed where she was lying. on the "ranger" all lights were extinguished, and no noise told of her progress towards her enemy. it was the captain's plan to run his vessel across the "drake's" cable, drop his own anchor, let the "ranger" swing alongside the englishman, and then fight it out at close quarters. but this plan, though well laid, failed of execution. the anchor was not let fall in season; and the "ranger," instead of bringing up alongside her enemy, came to anchor half a cable-length astern. the swift-flowing tide and the fresh breeze made it impossible to warp the ship alongside: so jones ordered the cable cut, and the "ranger" scudded down the bay before the ever-freshening gale. it does not appear that the people on the "drake" were aware of the danger they so narrowly escaped. the wind that had aided the tide in defeating jones's enterprise blew stronger and stronger, and before morning the sea was tossing before a regular north-east gale. against it the "ranger" could make no headway: so jones gave his ship her head, and scudded before the wind until within the vicinity of whitehaven, when he determined to again attempt to destroy the shipping in that port. this time he was successful. bringing the "ranger" to anchor near the bar, capt. jones called for volunteers to accompany him on the expedition. he himself was to be their leader; for as a boy he had often sailed in and out of the little harbor, knew where the forts stood, and where the colliers anchored most thickly. the landing party was divided into two boat-loads; jones taking command of one, while lieut. wallingford held the tiller of the other boat. with muffled oars the americans made for the shore, the boats' keels grated upon the pebbly shore, and an instant later the adventurers had scaled the ramparts of the forts, and had made themselves masters of the garrisons. all was done quietly. the guns in the fortifications were spiked; and, leaving the few soldiers on guard gagged and bound, jones and his followers hastened down to the wharves to set fire to the shipping. in the harbor were not less than two hundred and twenty vessels, large and small. on the north side of the harbor, near the forts, were about one hundred and fifty vessels. these jones undertook to destroy. the others were left to lieut. wallingford, with his boat's crew of fifteen picked men. when jones and his followers reached the cluster of merchantmen, they found their torches so far burned out as to be useless. failure stared them in the face then, when success was almost within their grasp. jones, however, was not to be balked of his prey. running his boat ashore, he hastened to a neighboring house, where he demanded candles. with these he returned, led his men aboard a large ship from which the crew fled, and deliberately built a fire in her hold. lest the fire should go out, he found a barrel of tar, and threw it upon the flames. then with the great ship roaring and crackling, and surrounded by scores of other vessels in danger from the flames, jones withdrew, thinking his work complete. many writers have criticised paul jones for not having stayed longer to complete the destruction of the vessels in the harbor. but, with the gradually brightening day, his position, which was at the best very dangerous, was becoming desperate. there were one hundred and fifty vessels in that part of the harbor; the crews averaged ten men to a vessel: so that nearly fifteen hundred men were opposed to the plucky little band of americans. the roar of the fire aroused the people of the town, and they rushed in crowds to the wharf. in describing the affair jones writes, "the inhabitants began to appear in thousands, and individuals ran hastily toward us. i stood between them and the ship on fire, with my pistol in my hand, and ordered them to stand, which they did with some precipitation. the sun was a full hour's march above the horizon; and, as sleep no longer ruled the world, it was time to retire. we re-embarked without opposition, having released a number of prisoners, as our boats could not carry them. after all my people had embarked, i stood upon the pier for a considerable space, yet no person advanced. i saw all the eminences round the town covered with the amazed inhabitants." as his boat drew away from the blazing shipping, jones looked anxiously across the harbor to the spot to which lieut. wallingford had been despatched. but no flames were seen in that quarter; for, wallingford's torches having gone out, he had abandoned the enterprise. and so the americans, having regained their ship, took their departure, leaving only one of the enemy's vessels burning. a most lame and impotent conclusion it was indeed; but, as jones said, "what was done is sufficient to show that not all the boasted british navy is sufficient to protect their own coasts, and that the scenes of distress which they have occasioned in america may soon be brought home to their own doors." chapter vii. career of paul jones continued. -- his descent upon the castle of lord selkirk -- the affair of the plate. -- the descent upon whitehaven. -- the battle with the "drake."-lieut. simpson's perfidy. we now come to the glorious part of the career of paul jones upon the ocean. heretofore he has been chiefly occupied in the capture of defenceless merchantmen. his work has been that of the privateer, even if not of the pirate that the british have always claimed he was. but the time came when jones proved that he was ready to fight an adversary of his mettle; was willing to take heavy blows, and deal stunning ones in return. his daring was not confined to dashing expeditions in which the danger was chiefly overcome by spirit and rapid movements. while this class of operations was ever a favorite with the doughty seaman, he was not at all averse to the deadly naval duel. we shall for a time abandon our account of the general naval incidents of the revolution, to follow the career of paul jones to the end of the war. his career is not only the most interesting, but the most important, feature of the naval operations of that war. he stands out alone, a grand figure in naval history, as does decatur in the wars with the barbary pirates, or farragut in the war for the union. the war of affords no such example of single greatness in the navy. there we find perry, mcdonough, and porter, all equally great. but in ' there was no one to stand beside paul jones. when the "ranger" left the harbor of whitehaven, her captain was heavy hearted. he felt that he had had the opportunity to strike a heavy blow at the british shipping, but had nevertheless inflicted only a trifling hurt. angry with himself for not having better planned the adventure, and discontented with his lieutenant for not having by presence of mind prevented the fiasco, he felt that peace of mind could only be obtained by some deed of successful daring. he was cruising in seas familiar to him as a sailor. along the scottish shores his boyhood hours had been spent. this knowledge he sought to turn to account. from the deck of his ship, he could see the wooded shores of st. mary's island, on which were the landed estates of lord selkirk, a british noble, of ancient lineage and political prominence. on the estate of this nobleman paul jones was born, and there he passed the few years of his life that elapsed before he forsook the land for his favorite element. leaning against the rail on the quarter-deck of the "ranger," jones could see through his spy-glass the turrets and spires of lord selkirk's castle. as he gazed, there occurred to him the idea, that if he could send a landing party ashore, seize the castle, capture the peer, and bear him off into captivity, he would not only strike terror into the hearts of the british, but would give the americans a prisoner who would serve as a hostage to secure good treatment for the hapless americans who had fallen into the hands of the enemy. with jones, the conception of a plan was followed by its swift execution. disdaining to wait for nightfall, he chose two boats' crews of tried and trusty men, and landed. the party started up the broad and open highway leading to the castle. they had gone but a few rods, however, when they encountered two countrymen, who stared a moment at the force of armed men, and then turned in fear to escape. "halt!" rang out the clear voice of the leader of the blue-jackets; and the peasants fell upon their faces in abject terror. jones directed that they be brought to him; and he questioned them kindly, setting their minds at rest, and learning from them much of the castle and its inmates. lord selkirk was away from home. this to jones was bitter news. it seemed as though some evil genius was dogging his footsteps, bringing failure upon his most carefully planned enterprises. but he was not a man to repine over the inevitable, and he promptly ordered his men to the right about, and made for the landing-place again. but the sailors were not so unselfish in their motives as their captain. they had come ashore expecting to plunder the castle of the earl, and they now murmured loudly over the abandonment of the adventure. they saw the way clear before them. no guards protected the house. the massive ancestral plate, with which all english landed families are well provided, was unprotected by bolts or bars. they felt that, in retreating, they were throwing away a chance to despoil their enemy, and enrich themselves. jones felt the justice of the complaint of the sailors; but only after a fierce struggle with his personal scruples could he yield the point. the grounds of the earl of selkirk had been his early playground. a lodge on the vast estate had been his childhood's home. lady selkirk had shown his family many kindnesses. to now come to her house as a robber and pillager, seemed the blackest ingratitude; but, on the other hand, he had no right to permit his personal feelings to interfere with his duty to the crew. the sailors had followed him into danger many a time, and this was their first opportunity for financial reward. and, even if it was fair to deny them this chance to make a little prize-money, it would hardly be safe to sow the seeds of discontent among the crew while on a cruise in waters infested with the enemy's ships. with a sigh jones abandoned his intention of protecting the property of lady selkirk, and ordered his lieutenant to proceed to the castle, and capture the family plate. jones himself returned to the ship, resolved to purchase the spoils at open sale, and return them to their former owner. the blue-jackets continued their way up the highway, and, turning aside where a heavy gate opened into a stately grove, demanded of an old man who came, wondering, out of the lodge, that he give them instant admittance. then, swinging into a trot, they ran along the winding carriage-drive until they came out on the broad lawn that extended in front of the castle. here for the first time they were seen by the inmates of the castle; and faint screams of fear, and shouts of astonishment, came from the open windows of the stately pile. the men-servants came rushing out to discover who the lawless crowd that so violated the sanctity of an english earl's private park could be; but their curiosity soon abated when a few stout blue-jackets, cutlass and pistol in hand, surrounded them, and bade them keep quiet. the lieutenant, with two stout seamen at his back, then entered the castle, and sought out the mistress, who received him with calm courtesy, with a trace of scorn, but with no sign of fear. briefly the lieutenant told his errand. the countess gave an order to a butler, and soon a line of stout footmen entered, bearing the plate. heavy salvers engraved with the family arms of lord selkirk, quaint drinking-cups and flagons curiously carved, ewers, goblets, platters, covers, dishes, teapots, and all kinds of table utensils were there, all of exquisitely artistic workmanship, and bearing the stamp of antiquity. when all was ready, the lieutenant called in two of the sailors from the lawn; and soon the whole party, bearing the captured treasure, disappeared in the curves of the road. this incident, simple enough in reality, the novelist fenimore cooper has made the germ of one of his exquisite sea-tales, "the pilot." british historians have made of it an example by which to prove the lawlessness and base ingratitude of paul jones. as may readily be imagined, it stirred up at the time the most intense excitement in england. jones became the bugbear of timid people. his name was used to frighten little children. he was called pirate, traitor, free-booter, plunderer. it was indeed a most audacious act that he had committed. never before or since had the soil of england been trodden by a hostile foot. never had a british peer been forced to feel that his own castle was not safe from the invader. jones, with his handful of american tars, had accomplished a feat which had never before been accomplished, and which no later foeman of england has dared to repeat. it is little wonder that the british papers described him as a bloodthirsty desperado. a few weeks later, the captured plate was put up for sale by the prize agents. capt. jones, though not a rich man, bought it, and returned it to the countess. lord selkirk, in acknowledging its receipt, wrote,-- "and on all occasions, both now and formerly, i have done you the justice to tell that you made an offer of returning the plate very soon after your return to brest; and although you yourself were not at my house, but remained at the shore with your boat, that you had your officers and men in such extraordinary good discipline, that your having given them the strictest orders to behave well,--to do no injury of any kind, to make no search, but only to bring off what plate was given them,--that in reality they did exactly as was ordered; and that not one man offered to stir from his post on the outside of the house, nor entered the doors, nor said an uncivil word; that the two officers stayed not one-quarter of an hour in the parlor and in the butler's pantry while the butler got the plate together, behaved politely, and asked for nothing but the plate, and instantly marched their men off in regular order; and that both officers and men behaved in all respects so well, that it would have done credit to the best-disciplined troops whatever." but the british took little notice of the generous reparation made by capt. jones, and continued to hurl abuse and hard names at him. jones was vastly disappointed at his failure to capture the person of lord selkirk. the story of the sufferings of his countrymen in british prisons worked upon his heart, and he longed to take captive a personage whom he could hold as hostage. but, soon after leaving st. mary's isle, he fell in again with the british man-of-war "drake;" and as a result of this encounter he had prisoners enough to exchange for many hapless americans languishing in hulks and prisons. after the wind and tide had defeated the midnight attempt made by jones to capture the "drake," that craft had remained quietly at her anchorage, little suspecting that the bay of carrickfergus had held so dangerous a neighbor. but soon reports of the "ranger's" depredations began to reach the ears of the british captain. the news of the desperate raid upon whitehaven became known to him. he therefore determined to leave his snug anchorage, and go in search of the audacious yankee. just as the captain of the "drake" had reached this determination, and while he was making sail, the "ranger" appeared off the mouth of the harbor. the "drake" promptly sent out a boat to examine the strange craft, and report upon her character. jones saw her coming, and resolved to throw her off the scent. accordingly, by skilful seamanship, he kept the stern of the "ranger" continually presented to the prying eyes in the british boat. turn which way they might, be as swift in their manoeuvres as they might, the british scouts could see nothing of the "ranger" but her stern, pierced with two cabin windows, as might be the stern of any merchantman. her sides, dotted with frowning ports, were kept securely hidden from their eyes. though provided with spy-glasses, the people in the boat were totally deceived. unsuspectingly they came up under the stern of the "ranger," and demanded to come on board. as the officer in command clambered up a rope, and vaulted the taffrail to the quarter-deck, he saw paul jones and his lieutenants, in full uniform, standing before him. "why,--why, what ship's this?" stammered the astonished officer. "this is the american continental ship 'ranger,' and you are my prisoner," responded jones; and at the words a few sailors, with cutlasses and pistols, called to the men in the boat alongside, to come aboard and give themselves up. from his captives jones learned that the news of the whitehaven raid had reached the "drake" only the night before; and that she had been re-enforcing her crew with volunteers, preparatory to going out in search of the "ranger." as he stood talking to the captured british naval officer, jones noticed slender columns of smoke rising from the woods on neighboring highlands, where he knew there were no houses. "what does that mean?" he asked. "alarm fires, sir," answered the captive; "the news of your descent upon whitehaven is terrifying the whole country." soon, however, the attention of the americans was diverted from the signal-fires to the "drake." an appearance of life and bustle was observable about the boat. the shrill notes of the boatswain's whistle, and the tramp of men about the capstan, came faintly over the waters. the rigging was full of sailors, and the sails were being quickly spread to catch the fresh breeze. soon the ship began to move slowly from her anchorage; she heeled a little to one side, and, responsive to her helm, turned down the bay. she was coming out to look after her lost boat. jones determined to hold his ground, and give battle to the englishman. he at once began to prepare for battle in every way possible without alarming the enemy. the great guns were loaded and primed. cutlasses and pistols were brought up from the armorer's room, and placed in convenient locations on the main deck, so that the boarders might find them when needed. the powder-monkeys, stripped for action, and the handlers and cartridge-makers entered the powder-magazine, and prepared to hand out the deadly explosive. the cook and his assistant strewed sawdust and ashes about the decks, to catch the blood, and keep the men from slipping. every one was busy, from the captain down to the galley-boy. there was plenty of time to prepare; for the tide was out, and the "drake," beating down a narrow channel, made but slow headway. the delay was a severe strain upon the nerves of the men, who stood silent and grim at their quarters on the american ship, waiting for the fight to begin. at such a moment, even the most courageous must lose heart, as he thinks upon the terrible ordeal through which he must pass. visions of home and loved ones flit before his misty eyes; and jack chokes down a sob as he hides his emotion in nervously fingering the lock of his gun, or taking a squint through the port-holes at the approaching enemy. at length the "drake" emerged from the narrow channel of the harbor, and coming within hailing distance of the "ranger," ran up the flag of england, and hailed,-- "what ship is that?" paul jones, himself standing on the taffrail, made answer,-- "this is the american continental ship 'ranger.' we are waiting for you. the sun is but little more than an hour from setting. it is therefore time to begin." the "drake" lay with her bow towards the "ranger," and a little astern. as jones finished speaking, he turned to the man at the wheel, and said, "put your helm up. up, i say!" quickly responsive to her helm, the vessel swung round; and, as her broadside came to bear, she let fly a full broadside of solid shot into the crowded decks and hull of the "drake." through timbers and planks, flesh and bone, the iron hail rushed, leaving death, wounds, and destruction in its path. the volunteers that the "drake" had added to her crew so crowded the decks, that the execution was fearful. it seemed as though every shot found a human mark. but the british were not slow to return the fire, and the roar of their broadside was heard before the thunder of the american fire had ceased to reverberate among the hills along the shore. then followed a desperate naval duel. the tide of victory flowed now this way, and now that. jones kept his ship at close quarters with the enemy, and stood on the quarter-deck urging on his gunners, now pointing out some vulnerable spot, now applauding a good shot, at one time cheering, and at another swearing, watching every movement of his foe, and giving quick but wise orders to his helmsman, his whole mind concentrated upon the course of battle, and with never a thought for his own safety. for more than an hour the battle raged, but the superior gunnery of the americans soon began to tell. the "drake" fought under no colors, her ensign having been shot away early in the action. but the spirited manner in which her guns were worked gave assurance that she had not struck. the american fire had wrought great execution on the deck of the englishman. her captain was desperately wounded early in the fight; and the first lieutenant, who took his place, was struck down by a musket-ball from the "ranger's" tops. the cock-pit of the "drake" was like a butcher's shambles, so bespattered was it with blood. but on the "ranger" there was little execution. the brave wallingford, jones's first lieutenant and right-hand man, was killed early in the action, and one poor fellow accompanied him to his long account; but beyond this there were no deaths. six men only were wounded. the sun was just dipping the lower edge of its great red circle beneath the watery horizon, when the "drake" began to show signs of failing. first her fire slackened. a few guns would go off at a time, followed by a long silence. that portion of her masts which was visible above the clouds of gunpowder-smoke showed plainly the results of american gunnery. the sails were shot to ribbons. the cordage cut by the flying shot hung loosely down, or was blown out by the breeze. the spars were shattered, and hung out of place. the main-mast canted to leeward, and was in imminent danger of falling. the jib had been shot away entirely, and was trailing in the water alongside the ship. gradually the fire of the "drake" slackened, until at last it had ceased altogether. noticing this, capt. jones gave orders to cease firing; and soon silence reigned over the bay that had for an hour resounded with the thunder of cannon. as the smoke that enveloped the two ships cleared away, the people on the "ranger" could see an officer standing on the rail of the "drake" waving a white flag. at the sight a mighty huzza went up from the gallant lads on the yankee ship, which was, however, quickly checked by jones. "have you struck your flag?" he shouted through a speaking-trumpet. "we have, sir," was the response. "then lay by until i send a boat aboard," directed capt. jones; and soon after a cutter put off from the side of the "ranger," and made for the captured ship. the boarding-officer clambered over the bulwarks of the "drake," and, veteran naval officer as he was, started in amazement at the scene of bloodshed before him. he had left a ship on which were two dead and six wounded men. he had come to a ship on which were forty men either dead or seriously wounded. two dismounted cannon lay across the deck, one resting on the shattered and bleeding fragments of a man, torn to pieces by a heavy shot. the deck was slippery with blood. the cock-pit was not large enough to hold all the wounded; and many sufferers lay on the deck crying piteously for aid, and surrounded by the mangled bodies of their dead comrades. the body of the captain, who had died of his wound, lay on the deserted quarter-deck. hastily the american officer noted the condition of the prize, and returned to his own ship for aid. all the boats of the "ranger" were then lowered, and in the growing darkness the work of taking possession of the prize began. most of the prisoners were transferred to the "ranger." the dead were thrown overboard without burial service or ceremony of any kind, such is the grim earnestness of war. such of the wounded as could not be taken care of in the sick-bay of the "drake" were transferred to the "ranger." the decks were scrubbed, holystoned, and sprinkled with hot vinegar to take away the smell of the blood-soaked planks. cordage was spliced, sails mended, shot-holes plugged up; and, by the time morning came, the two ships were sufficiently repaired to be ready to leave the bay. but, before leaving, capt. jones set at liberty two fishermen, whom he had captured several days before, and held prisoners lest they should spread the news of his presence in those parts. while the fishermen had been taken on board the "ranger," and treated with the utmost kindness, their boat had been made fast alongside. unluckily, however, the stormy weather had torn the boat from its fastenings; and it foundered before the eyes of its luckless owners, who bitterly bewailed their hard fate as they saw their craft disappear. but, when they came to leave the "ranger," their sorrow was turned to joy; for jones gave them money enough to buy for them a new boat and outfit,--a bit of liberality very characteristic of the man. when the "drake" was in condition to sail, jones put her in command of lieut. simpson, and the two vessels left the bay. this choice of commander proved to be an unfortunate one. simpson was in many ways a most eccentric officer. he was a violent advocate of equal rights of all men, and even went so far as to disbelieve in the discipline without which no efficiency can be obtained on ship-board. he was an eighteenth-century sir joseph porter. he believed that all questions of importance on ship-board should be settled by a vote of the crew; that the captain was, in a certain sense, only perpetual chairman of a meeting, and should only execute the will of the sailors. naturally, this view of an officer's authority was little relished by lieut. simpson's brother officers, and he had for some time been greatly dissatisfied with his position. when it came about, therefore, that the "ranger," seeing a strange sail in the offing, left the "drake" to go in pursuit of the stranger, lieut. simpson saw his chance to make off with the "drake," and thus rid himself of the disagreeable necessity of submitting to the orders of a superior officer. this course he determined to adopt; and when jones, having overtaken the stranger and found her a neutral, turned to rejoin his prize, he was vastly astounded at the evolutions of the "drake." the vessel which he had left in charge of one of his trusted officers seemed to be trying to elude him. she was already hull down on the horizon, and was carrying every stitch of sail. the "ranger" signalled to her colleague to return, but in vain. several large ships were in sight; but jones, perplexed by the strange antics of his consort, abandoned all thoughts of making captures, and made after the rapidly vanishing "drake." as the "ranger" cut through the ugly cross seas of the channel, jones revolved in his mind the causes which might lead to the inexplicable flight of his consort. his chief fear was that the prisoners on the "drake" might have risen, overpowered their captors, and were then endeavoring to take the ship into a british port. convinced that this was the true explanation of the matter, jones made tremendous efforts to overhaul the prize before the night should give her an opportunity to elude pursuit. every thing from jib-boom to main-truck, that would draw, was set on the "ranger;" and the gallant little vessel ploughed along at a rate that almost belied her reputation as a slow craft. after an hour's run, it became evident that the "ranger" was gaining ground. nevertheless, darkness settled over the waters, and the "drake" was still far in the lead. it was not until the next day that the runaway was overhauled. upon boarding the "drake," jones found, to his intense indignation, that not to the revolt of the captives, but to the wilful and silly insubordination of lieut. simpson, the flight of the captured vessel was due. this officer, feeling himself aggrieved by something jones had said or done, had determined to seize upon the "drake," repair her in some french port, and thenceforward to cruise as a privateer. this plan was nipped in the bud by jones, who put the disobedient officer in irons, and carried the "drake" into brest as a prize. all europe now rang with the praises of paul jones. looked at in the calm light of history, his achievements do not appear so very remarkable. but it is none the less true that they have never been paralleled. before the day of paul jones, no hostile vessel had ever swept the english channel and irish sea clear of british merchantmen. and since the day of paul jones the exploit has never been repeated, save by the little american brig "argus" in the war of . but neither before nor since the day of paul jones has the spectacle of a british ship in an english port, blazing with fire applied by the torches of an enemy, been seen. and no other man than paul jones has, for several centuries, led an invading force down the level highways, and across the green fields, of england. chapter viii. the career of paul jones continued. -- his search for a ship. -- given command of the "bon homme richard." -- landais and his character. -- the frustrated mutiny. -- landais quarrels with jones. -- edinburgh and leith threatened. -- the dominie's prayer. when paul jones arrived at brest, bringing the captured drake, he found the situation of affairs materially altered. france had acknowledged the independence of the american colonies, and had openly espoused their cause as against that of great britain. it was no longer necessary to resort to cunning deceptions to buy a war-ship or sell a prize in a french port. french vessels, manned by french crews and commanded by french officers, were putting to sea to strike a blow against the british. french troops were being sent to america. the stars and stripes waved by the side of the _fleur de lys_; and benjamin franklin, the american envoy, was the lion of french society, and the idol of the parisian mob. paul jones saw in this friendship of france for the struggling colonies his opportunity. heretofore he had been condemned to command only slow-going, weak ships. he had been hampered by a lack of funds for the payment of his crew and the purchase of provisions. more than once the inability of the impoverished continental congress to provide the sinews of war had forced him to go down into his own purse for the necessary funds. all this period of penury he now felt was past. he could rely upon the king of france for a proper vessel, and the funds with which to prosecute his work on the seas. accordingly, when the "ranger" was again ready for sea, he turned her over to the insubordinate lieut. simpson, while he himself remained in france with the expectation of being provided with a better ship. but the sturdy seaman soon found how vexatious is the lot of him who depends upon the bounty of monarchs. ship after ship was put in commission, but no command was tendered to the distinguished american. the french naval officers had first to be attended to. jones made earnest appeals to the minister of the marine. he brought every possible influence to bear. his claims were urged by dr. franklin, but all to no avail. at last an appointment came. it was to command an english prize, lately captured and brought into brest. thither went jones to examine the craft. much to his disappointment, he found her very slow; and this determined him to decline the commission. "i wish to have no connection with any ship that does not sail fast," he wrote to a gentleman who had secured for him the appointment; "for i intend to go in harm's way. you know i believe that this is not every one's intention. therefore, buy a frigate that sails fast, and that is sufficiently large to carry twenty-six or twenty-eight guns, not less than twelve-pounders, on one deck. i would rather be shot ashore than sent to sea in such things as the armed prizes i have described." five months of waiting and ceaseless solicitation of the authorities still left the sailor, who had won so many victories, stranded in shameful inactivity. he had shrunk from a personal interview with the king, trusting rather to the efforts of his friends, many of whom were in high favor at versailles. but one day he happened to light upon an old copy of "poor richard's almanac," that unique publication in which benjamin franklin printed so many wise maxims and witty sayings. as jones listlessly turned its pages, his eye fell upon the maxim,-- "if you wish to have any business done faithfully and expeditiously, go and do it yourself. otherwise, send some one." shutting the book, and dashing it to the floor, jones sprang to his feet exclaiming, "i will go to versailles this very day." before night he set out, and soon reached the royal court. his reputation easily gained him an interview; and his frank, self-reliant way so impressed the monarch, that in five days the american was tendered the command of the ship "daras," mounting forty guns. great was the exultation of the american seaman at this happy termination of his labor. full of gratitude to the distinguished philosopher whose advice had proved so effective, he wrote to the minister of marine, begging permission to change the name of the vessel to the "poor richard," or, translated into french, the "bon homme richard." permission was readily granted; and thereafter the "bon homme richard," with paul jones on the quarter-deck, did valiant work for the cause of the young american republic. the "bon homme richard" was lying in the harbor of l'orient when jones visited her to examine his new ship. he found her a fairly well modelled craft, giving promise of being a good sailer. she had one of the high pitched poops that were so common in the early part of the last century, and that gave to the sterns of ships of that period the appearance of lofty towers. originally she was a single-decked ship, mounting her battery on one gun-deck, with the exception of a few cannon on the quarter-deck and forecastle. the gun-deck mounted twenty-eight guns, all twelve-pounders. on the quarter-deck and forecastle were eight long nines. to this armament jones at once added six eighteen-pounders, which were mounted in the gun-room below. to man this vessel, jones was obliged to recruit a most motley crew. few american seamen were then in france, and he considered himself fortunate to find enough to fill the stations of officers on the quarter-deck and forward. for his crew proper he was forced to accept an undisciplined crowd of portuguese, norwegians, germans, spaniards, swedes, italians, malays, scotch, irish, and even a few englishmen. about a hundred and thirty-five marines were put aboard to keep order among this rabble; and, even with this aid to discipline, it is wonderful that no disturbance ever broke out in a crew that was made up of so many discordant elements. while the "bon homme richard" was being made ready for sea, the vessels that were to sail with her as consorts were making for the rendezvous at l'orient. these vessels were the "pallas," "cerf," "vengeance," and "alliance." the three former were small vessels, built in france, and manned wholly by frenchmen. the "alliance" was a powerful, well-built american frigate, carrying an american crew, but commanded by a french officer,--capt. landais. this vessel was the last to arrive at the rendezvous, as she had a stormy and somewhat eventful trip across the ocean. the "alliance" was a thirty-two gun frigate, built under the supervision of the american marine committee, and which had come to european waters, bringing as a passenger the distinguished gen. lafayette. as has been stated, she was under the command of a french naval officer, to whom the command had been offered as a compliment to france. unfortunately the jack tars of america were not so anxious to compliment france, and looked with much disfavor upon the prospect of serving under a frenchman. capt. landais, therefore, found great difficulty in getting a crew to man his frigate; and when lafayette reached boston, ready to embark for france, the roster of the ship in which he was to sail was still painfully incomplete. great was the mortification of the american authorities; and the government of massachusetts, desiring to aid the distinguished frenchman in every way, offered to complete by impressment. it is vastly to the credit of lafayette that he refused for a moment to countenance a method of recruiting so entirely in opposition to those principles of liberty to which he was devoted. but, though impressment was not resorted to, a plan hardly less objectionable was adopted. the british man-of-war "somerset" had been wrecked on the new england coast some time before, and many of her crew were then in boston. these men volunteered to join the crew of the "alliance," though by so doing they knew that they were likely to be forced to fight against their own flag and countrymen. but the ties of nationality bear lightly upon sailors, and these men were as ready to fight under the stars and stripes as under the cross of st. george. with a crew made up of americans, englishmen, and frenchmen, the "alliance" put to sea in the early part of january, . it was the most stormy season of the year on the tempestuous atlantic. but the storms which racked the good ship from without were as nothing to the turbulence within. in the forecastle were three different elements of discord. british, french, and americans quarrelled bitterly among themselves, and the jackies went about their work with a sullen air that betokened trouble brewing. the officers suspected the impending trouble, but had little idea of its extent. they were living over a volcano which was liable to burst forth at any moment. the englishmen in the crew, who numbered some seventy or eighty, had determined to mutiny, and had perfected all their plans for the uprising. their intention was not only to seize the ship, and take her into an english port, but they proposed to wreak their hatred in the bloodiest form upon the officers. capt. landais, as the special object of their hate, was to be put into an open boat without food, water, oars, or sails. heavy irons were to bind his wrists and ankles, and he was to be set adrift to starve on the open ocean. the fate of the surgeon and marine officer was to be equally hard. they were to be hanged and quartered, and their bodies cast into the sea. the sailing-master was to be seized up to the mizzen-mast, stripped to the waist, and his back cut to pieces with the cat-of-nine-tails; after which he was to be slowly hacked to pieces with cutlasses, and thrown into the sea. the gunner, carpenter, and boatswain were to be mercifully treated. no torture was prepared for them, but they were to be promptly put to death. as to the lieutenants, they were to be given the choice between navigating the ship to the nearest british port, or walking the plank. this sanguinary programme the mutineers discussed day and night. the ringleaders were in the same watch, and in the silent hours of the night matured their plans, and picked out men whom they thought would join them. one by one they cautiously chose their associates. the sailor whom the mutineers thought was a safe man would be led quietly apart from his fellows to some secluded nook on the gun-deck; and there, with many pledges to secrecy, the plot would be revealed, and his assistance asked. or perhaps of two men out on the end of a tossing yard-arm, far above the raging waters, one would be a mutineer, and would take that opportunity to try to win his fellow sailor to the cause. so the mutiny spread apace; and the volcano was almost ready to burst forth, when all was discovered, and the plans of the mutineers were happily defeated. the conspirators had succeeded in gaining the support of all the englishmen in the crew, as well as many of the sailors of other nationalities. so numerous were their adherents, that they were well able to capture the ship; but before so doing they sought to gain one more recruit. this man was an american sailor, who had lived long in ireland, and spoke with a slight brogue, that led the conspirators to think him a subject of the king, and an enemy to the revolted colonies. this man was known to have some knowledge of navigation, and the mutineers felt that his assistance would be essential to the success of their plot. though they had planned to force the lieutenant, under penalty of death, to navigate the vessel into a british port, they had no means of telling whether the lieutenant should play them false. it would be an easy matter for an officer to take the ship into a french port, where the lives of the conspirators should pay the penalty of their misdeeds. accordingly, it was highly important for them to number among them some one versed in the science of navigation; and, with this end in view, they turned to the young irish-american. the young seaman proved to be possessed of the loyalty and shrewdness of the yankee, together with a touch of the blarney of the genuine irishman. he listened to the complaints of the mutineers, sympathized with their grievances, entered heartily into their plans, and by his apparent interest in the conspiracy soon became looked upon as one of the chief ringleaders. he learned that the plan of the conspirators was to assemble on deck about daylight on a certain day when one of the conspirators should be posted in the tops as lookout. this man was to raise the cry of "sail, ho!" when the officers and passengers would of course come to the quarter-deck unarmed. the mutineers would commence operations by seizing them in a body. then, separating into four parties, the conspirators would seize upon the ship. on the forecastle were mounted four nine-pound guns. these were usually kept charged with blank cartridge only; but a gunner's mate, who was one of the ringleaders, had quietly slipped a charge of canister into each gun. should the officers show signs of resistance, these cannon were to be trained aft, and the quarter-deck swept by their discharge. discipline on a man-of-war requires that the crew should be kept disarmed, except in time of battle; the cutlasses, pikes, and pistols being given over to the armorer. but a sergeant of marines had done the cause of the mutineers good service, by purloining some muskets, and handing them over to the ringleaders. having thus gained full knowledge of the plans of the mutineers, the loyal seaman sought the first opportunity to warn the officers of the ship. but not until three o'clock on the afternoon before the day set for the mutiny could he manage to slip into the captain's cabin unseen by the conspirators. landais and lafayette were seated there talking. "well, what's wanted now?" asked the captain in the peremptory tone officers assume in speaking to a sailor. the intruder stammered and looked confused, but finally managed to tell the story. landais was amazed. that so dangerous a conspiracy should have been nurtured in his crew, astonished him beyond expression. but he wasted no time in vain conjectures. quietly the word was passed to the officers and passengers to assemble in the captain's cabin. some trusty petty officers were given arms to distribute among the american and french seamen who had not been infected with the fever of mutiny. at a given signal the officers and passengers rushed to the quarter-deck. the american and french seamen joined them; and the conspirators suddenly found themselves confronted by an angry body of determined men, fully armed. the leading mutineers were pointed out by the informer, instantly seized, and hurried below in irons. then the work of arresting the other conspirators began, and was continued until about forty of the english were in irons. while the work was progressing, a square-rigged ship hove in sight, and was soon made out to be one of the enemy's twenty-gun ships. under ordinary circumstances, the "alliance" would have sought to give battle to the enemy; but in the present instance, with mutiny rife among his crew, capt. landais thought it his wisest course to avoid the stranger. a few days later, the "alliance" arrived at brest, where the mutineers were thrown into jail, and kept in close confinement, until exchanged for american prisoners in the hands of the british. but to return to paul jones, whom we left with the "bon homme richard" lying at anchor in the harbor of l'orient waiting for the arrival of his allies. on the th of june, , all were ready to sail, and left the harbor with a few coasters and transports under convoy. the "bon homme richard" was the largest vessel of the little fleet; next came the "alliance," under command of capt. landais; then the "pallas," an old merchantman hastily remodelled, and mounting thirty-two guns; then the "cerf" with eighteen guns, and the "vengeance" with twelve. though not a very formidable armada, this little fleet might have done great good to the american cause, had paul jones been given proper authority, and had his daring plans been countenanced by the french authorities. but, though nominally commander-in-chief, jones soon found that he had no means of enforcing his authority. he found that the three frenchmen in command of the other vessels of the squadron looked upon him as a partner in the enterprise, rather than as a leader with absolute authority. they paid no heed to the signals set at the fore of the flag-ship. they wilfully disobeyed orders. worse than all, they proved to be poor seamen; and the squadron had hardly got into blue water before the "alliance" was run foul of the "richard," losing her own mizzen-mast, and tearing away the head and bowsprit of the flag-ship. thus, after long months of preparation for sea, jones found himself forced to return to port to refit. it has been charged that this accident was not altogether accidental, so far as the "alliance" was concerned. landais, the commander of that vessel, hated jones, and was insanely jealous of the man who outranked him. the collision was only the first of a series of mishaps, all of which landais ascribed to accident, but which unprejudiced readers must confess seem to have been inspired by malice or the results of gross incompetence. a few days sufficed to repair all damage, and again the vessels sought the open sea. when two days out, a strange sail was sighted. jones crowded all sail on the "richard," and set out in hot pursuit, but found, to his bitter disappointment, that his ship was a wretchedly slow sailer. therefore, signalling to the swift-sailing "cerf" to follow the stranger, he abandoned the chase to the smaller craft. all night long the cutter followed in the wake of the stranger, and when day broke the two vessels were near enough to each other to readily make out each other's character. the stranger proved to be a small english cruiser of fourteen guns. her captain was no poltroon; for as soon as he discovered that the ship from which he had been trying to escape was but little larger than his own, he came about, and, running down upon the "cerf," opened fire. the action was a sharp one. the two vessels were fairly matched and well fought. the thunder of their broadsides resounded far and wide over the ocean. for an hour they grappled in deadly strife. the tide of battle turned now to one side, and now to the other. but at last the superior metal of the "cerf" won for her the victory. with her battered prize in tow, she sought to rejoin the squadron, but unluckily fell in with a british frigate that had been attracted by the sound of the cannonading. it was useless to think of saving the prize: so the "cerf" abandoned it, and after a hard chase escaped, and put into the harbor of l'orient. in the mean time, the squadron had become separated; and, after a fortnight's fruitless cruising, all the vessels returned to l'orient. here they lay until the middle of august. more than three months had passed since jones had been given command of the "richard." most of the time had been spent in port. the little cruising that had been done had been unproductive of results. dissension and jealousy made the squadron absolutely ineffective. as for the "bon homme richard," she had proved a failure; being unable to overhaul the enemy that she wished to engage, or escape from the man-of-war she might wish to avoid. jones saw his reputation fast slipping away from him. bitterly he bewailed the fate that had put him at the mercy of a lot of quarrelsome frenchmen. he determined that when once again he got to sea he would ignore his consorts, and fight the battles of his country with his own ship only. it was on the th of august that the squadron weighed anchor, and left the harbor of l'orient. the "richard" was greatly strengthened by the addition to her crew of about one hundred american seamen, who had been sent to france from england in exchange for a number of english prisoners. with her sailed the same vessels that had previously made up the squadron, together with two french privateers,--the "monsieur" and the "granville." four days after sailing, a large french ship in charge of a british prize-crew was sighted. the whole squadron gave chase; and the "monsieur," being the swiftest sailer of the fleet, recaptured the prize. then arose a quarrel. the privateersmen claimed that the prize was theirs alone. they had captured it, and the regular naval officers had no authority over them. to this capt. jones vigorously demurred, and, taking the prize from its captors, sent it to l'orient to be disposed of in accordance with the laws. in high dudgeon, the privateers vowed vengeance, and that night the "monsieur" left the squadron. she was a fine, fast vessel, mounting forty guns; and her departure greatly weakened the fleet. a few days later a second serious loss was encountered. the fleet was lying off cape clear, only a few miles from the shore. the day was perfectly calm. not a breath of wind ruffled the calm surface of the water. the sails flapped idly against the mast. the sailors lay about the decks, trying to keep cool, and lazily watching the distant shore. far off in the distance a white sail glimmered on the horizon. it showed no sign of motion, and was clearly becalmed. after some deliberation, capt. jones determined to attempt to capture the stranger by means of boats. the two largest boats, manned with crews of picked men, were sent out to hail the vessel, and, if she proved to be an enemy, to capture her. in this they were successful, and returned next day, bringing the captured craft. but, while the two boats were still out after the enemy's ship, the tide changed; and capt. jones soon saw that his ship was in danger from a powerful current, that seemed to be sweeping her on shore. a few hundred yards from the ship, two dangerous reefs, known as the skallocks and the blasketts, reared their black heads above the calm surface of the sea. toward these rocks the "bon homme richard" was drifting, when jones, seeing the danger, ordered out two boats to tow the ship to a less perilous position. as the best men of the crew had been sent away to capture the brig, the crews of the two boats were made up of the riff-raff of the crew. many of them were englishmen, mere mercenary sailors, who had shipped on the richard, secretly intending to desert at the first opportunity. therefore, when night fell, as they were still in the boats trying to pull the "richard's" head around, they cut the ropes and made off for the shore. the desertion was discovered immediately. the night was clear, and by the faint light of the stars the course of the receding boats could be traced. the sailing-master of the "richard," a mr. trent, being the first to discover the treachery, sprang into a boat with a few armed men, and set out in hot pursuit. the bow-gun of the "richard" was hastily trained on the deserters, and a few cannon-shot sent after them; but without effect. before the pursuing boat could overhaul the fugitives, a dense bank of gray fog settled over the water, and pursued and pursuers were hidden from each other and from the gaze of those on the man-of-war. all night long the fog, like a moist, impenetrable curtain, rested on the ocean. the next day the "cerf" set out to find the missing boats. as she neared the shore, to avoid raising an alarm, she hoisted british colors. hardly had she done so when she was seen by trent and his companions. the fog made the outlines of the cutter indistinct, and magnified her in the eyes of the americans, so that they mistook her for an english man-of-war. to avoid what they thought would lead to certain capture on the water, they ran their boat ashore, and speedily fell into the hands of the british coast guard. they were at once thrown into prison, where the unfortunate trent soon died. the rest of the party were exchanged later in the war. the loss of the boats, and capture of mr. trent and his followers, were not the only unfortunate results of this incident; for the "cerf" became lost in the fog, and before she could rejoin the fleet a violent gale sprang up, and she was carried back to the coast of france. she never again returned to join the fleet, and jones found his force again, depleted. but the effective force of the squadron under the command of paul jones was weakened far more by the eccentric and mutinous actions of capt. landais of the "alliance" than by any losses by desertion or capture. when the news of the loss of two boats by desertion reached the "alliance," landais straightway went to the "richard," and entering the cabin began to upbraid jones in unmeasured terms for having lost two boats through his folly in sending boats to capture a brig. "it is not true, capt. landais," answered jones, "that the boats which are lost are the two which were sent to capture the brig." "do you tell me i lie?" screamed the frenchman, white with anger. his officers strove to pacify him, but without avail; and he left the "richard" vowing that he would challenge capt. jones, and kill him. shortly thereafter the "richard" captured a very valuable prize,--a ship mounting twenty-two guns, and loaded with sails, rigging, anchors, cables, and other essential articles for the navy great britain was building on the lakes. by desertion and other causes, the crew of the "richard" was greatly depleted, and not enough men could be spared to man the prize. jones applied to landais for aid. in response the frenchman said,-- "if it is your wish that i should take charge of the prize, i shall not allow any boat or any individual from the 'bon homme richard' to go near her." to this absurd stipulation jones agreed. landais, having thus assumed complete charge of the prize, showed his incompetence by sending her, together with a prize taken by the "alliance," to bergen in norway. the danish government, being on friendly terms with england, immediately surrendered the vessels to the british ambassador; and the cause of the young republic was cheated of more than two hundred thousand dollars through the insane negligence of the french captain. ever thereafter, landais manifested the most insolent indifference to the orders of capt. jones, to whom, as his superior officer, he should render implicit obedience. he came and went as he saw fit. the "alliance" would disappear from the squadron, and return again after two or three days' absence, without apology or explanation. jones soon learned to look with indifference upon the antics of his consort, and considered his squadron as composed of the "richard," "vengeance," and "pallas" only. on the th of september, the three vessels lay off the port of leith, a thriving city, which was then, as now, the seaport for the greater city of edinburgh, which stands a little farther inland. jones had come to this point cherishing one of those daring plans of which his mind was so fertile. he had learned that the harbor was full of shipping, and defended only by a single armed vessel of twenty guns. shore batteries there were none. the people of the town were resting in fancied security, and had no idea that the dreaded paul jones was at their very harbor's mouth. it would have been an easy matter for the three cruisers to make a dash into the harbor, take some distinguished prisoners, demand a huge ransom, fire the shipping, and escape again to the open sea. had jones been in reality, as he was in name, the commander of the little fleet, the exploit would have been performed. but the lack of authority which had hampered him throughout his cruise paralyzed him here. by the time he had overcome the timid objections of the captains of the "vengeance" and the "pallas," all leith was aroused. still jones persevered. his arrangements were carefully perfected. troops were to be landed under command of lieut.-col. chamillard, who was to lay before the chief magistrate of the town the following letter, written by jones himself:-- "i do not wish to distress the poor inhabitants. my intention is only to demand your contribution toward the reimbursement which britain owes to the much injured citizens of america. savages would blush at the unmanly violation and rapacity that have marked the tracks of british tyranny in america, from which neither virgin innocence nor helpless age has been a plea of protection or pity. "leith and its port now lay at our mercy. and did not the plea of humanity stay the just hand of retaliation, i should without advertisement lay it in ashes. before i proceed to that stern duty as an officer, my duty as a man induces me to propose to you, by means of a reasonable ransom, to prevent such a scene of horror and distress. for this reason, i have authorized lieut.-col. de chamillard to agree with you on the terms of ransom, allowing you exactly half an hour's reflection before you finally accept or reject the terms which he shall propose." the landing parties having been chosen, the order of attack mapped out, and part to be taken by each boat's-crew accurately defined, the three vessels advanced to the attack. it was a bright sunday morning. a light breeze blowing on shore wafted the three vessels gently along the smooth surface of the bay. it is said that as the invaders passed the little town of kirkaldy, the people were at church, but, seeing the three men-of-war passing, deserted the sacred edifice for the beach, where the gray-haired pastor, surrounded by his flock, offered the following remarkable appeal to the deity:-- "now, dear lord, dinna ye think it a shame for ye to send this vile pirate to rob our folk o' kirkaldy? ye ken that they are puir enow already, and hae naething to spare. the way the wind blaws, he'll be here in a jiffy. and wha kens what he may do? he's nae too good for ony thing. mickles the mischief he has done already. he'll burn their hooses, take their very claes, and strip them to the very sark. and waes me, wha kens but that the bluidy villain might tak' their lives! the puir weemin are most frightened out of their wits, and the bairns screeching after them. i canna think of it! i canna think of it! "i hae long been a faithful servant to ye, o lord. but gin ye dinna turn the wind about, and blaw the scoundrel out of our gate, i'll nae stir a foot, but will just sit here till the tide comes. sae tak' your will o't." never was prayer more promptly answered. hardly had the pastor concluded his prayer, when the wind veered round, and soon a violent gale was blowing off shore. in the teeth of the wind, the ships could make no headway. the gale increased in violence until it rivalled in fierceness a tornado. the sea was lashed into fury, and great waves arose, on the crests of which the men-of-war were tossed about like fragile shells. the coal-ship which had been captured was so racked and torn by the heavy seas, that her seams opened, and she foundered so speedily, that only by the most active efforts was her crew saved. after several hours' ineffectual battling with the gale, the ships were forced to come about and run out to sea; and jones suffered the mortification of witnessing the failure of his enterprise, after having been within gunshot of the town that he had hoped to capture. as for the good people of kirkaldy, they were convinced that their escape from the daring seamen was wholly due to the personal influence of their pastor with the deity; and the worthy parson lived long afterward, ever held in the most mighty veneration by the people of his flock. chapter ix. career of paul jones concluded. -- the battle between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis." -- treachery of landais. -- jones's great victory. -- landais steals the "alliance." -- jones in command of the "ariel." -- the "ariel" in the storm. -- arrival in america. after this adventure, the three vessels continued their cruise along the eastern coast of scotland. continued good fortune, in the way of prizes, rather soothed the somewhat chafed feelings of capt. jones, and he soon recovered from the severe disappointment caused by the failure of his attack upon leith. he found good reason to believe that the report of his exploits had spread far and wide in england, and that british sea-captains were using every precaution to avoid encountering him. british vessels manifested an extreme disinclination to come within hailing distance of any of the cruisers, although all three were so disguised that it seemed impossible to make out their warlike character. one fleet of merchantmen that caught sight of the "bon homme richard" and the "pallas" ran into the river humber, to the mouth of which they were pursued by the two men-of-war. lying at anchor outside the bar, jones made signal for a pilot, keeping the british flag flying at his peak. two pilot-boats came out; and jones, assuming the character of a british naval officer, learned from them, that besides the merchantmen lying at anchor in the river, a british frigate lay there waiting to convoy a fleet of merchantmen to the north. jones tried to lure the frigate out with a signal that the pilots revealed to him; but, though she weighed anchor, she was driven back by strong head-winds that were blowing. disappointed in this plan, jones continued his cruise. soon after he fell in with the "alliance" and the "vengeance;" and, while off flamborough head, the little squadron encountered a fleet of forty-one merchant ships, that, at the sight of the dreaded yankee cruisers, crowded together like a flock of frightened pigeons, and made all sail for the shore; while two stately men-of-war--the "serapis, forty-four," and the "countess of scarborough, twenty-two"--moved forward to give battle to the americans. jones now stood upon the threshold of his greatest victory. his bold and chivalric mind had longed for battle, and recoiled from the less glorious pursuit of burning helpless merchantmen, and terrorizing small towns and villages. he now saw before him a chance to meet the enemy in a fair fight, muzzle to muzzle, and with no overpowering odds on either side. although the americans had six vessels to the englishmen's two, the odds were in no wise in their favor. two of the vessels were pilot-boats, which, of course, kept out of the battle. the "vengeance," though ordered to render the larger vessels any possible assistance, kept out of the fight altogether, and even neglected to make any attempt to overhaul the flying band of merchantmen. as for the "alliance," under the erratic landais, she only entered the conflict at the last moment; and then her broadsides, instead of being delivered into the enemy, crashed through the already shattered sides of the "bon homme richard." thus the actual combatants were the "richard" with forty guns, against the "serapis" with forty-four; and the "pallas" with twenty-two guns, against the "countess of scarborough" with twenty-two. it was about seven o'clock in the evening of a clear september day--the twenty-third--that the hostile vessels bore down upon each other, making rapid preparations for the impending battle. the sea was fast turning gray, as the deepening twilight robbed the sky of its azure hue. a brisk breeze was blowing, that filled out the bellying sails of the ships, and beat the waters into little waves capped with snowy foam. in the west the rosy tints of the autumnal sunset were still warm in the sky. nature was in one of her most smiling moods, as these men with set faces, and hearts throbbing with the mingled emotions of fear and excitement, stood silent at their guns, or worked busily at the ropes of the great war-ships. as soon as he became convinced of the character of the two english ships, jones beat his crew to quarters, and signalled his consorts to form in line of battle. the people on the "richard" went cheerfully to their guns; and though the ship was extremely short-handed, and crowded with prisoners, no voice was raised against giving immediate battle to the enemy. the actions of the other vessels of the american fleet, however, gave little promise of any aid from that quarter. when the enemy was first sighted, the swift-sailing "alliance" dashed forward to reconnoitre. as she passed the "pallas," landais cried out, that, if the stranger proved to be a forty-four, the only course for the americans was immediate flight. evidently the result of his investigations convinced him that in flight lay his only hope of safety; for he quickly hauled off, and stood away from the enemy. the "vengeance," too, ran off to windward, leaving the "richard" and the "pallas" to bear the brunt of battle. it was by this time quite dark, and the position of the ships was outlined by the rows of open port-holes gleaming with the lurid light of the battle-lanterns. on each ship rested a stillness like that of death itself. the men stood at their guns silent and thoughtful. sweet memories of home and loved ones mingled with fearful anticipations of death or of mangling wounds in the minds of each. the little lads whose duty in time of action it was to carry cartridges from the magazine to the gunners had ceased their boyish chatter, and stood nervously at their stations. officers walked up and down the decks, speaking words of encouragement to the men, glancing sharply at primers and breechings to see that all was ready, and ever and anon stooping to peer through the porthole at the line of slowly moving lights that told of the approach of the enemy. on the quarter-deck, paul jones, with his officers about him, stood carefully watching the movements of the enemy through a night glass, giving occasionally a quiet order to the man at the wheel, and now and then sending an agile midshipman below with orders to the armorer, or aloft with orders for the sharp-shooters posted in the tops. as the night came on, the wind died away to a gentle breeze, that hardly ruffled the surface of the water, and urged the ships toward each other but sluggishly. as they came within pistol-shot of each other, bow to bow, and going on opposite tacks, a hoarse cry came from the deck of the "serapis,"-- "what ship is that?" "what is that you say?" "what ship is that? answer immediately, or i shall fire into you." instantly with a flash and roar both vessels opened fire. the thunder of the broadsides reverberated over the waters; and the bright flash of the cannon, together with the pale light of the moon just rising, showed flamborough head crowded with multitudes who had come out to witness the grand yet awful spectacle of a naval duel. the very first broadside seemed enough to wreck the fortunes of the "richard." in her gun-room were mounted six long eighteens, the only guns she carried that were of sufficient weight to be matched against the heavy ordnance of the "serapis." at the very first discharge, two of these guns burst with frightful violence. huge masses of iron were hurled in every direction, cutting through beams and stanchions, crashing through floors and bulkheads, and tearing through the agonized bodies of the men who served the guns. hardly a man who was stationed in the gun-room escaped unhurt in the storm of iron and splinters. several huge blocks of iron crashed through the upper deck, injuring the people on the deck above, and causing the cry to be raised, that the magazine had blown up. this unhappy calamity not only rendered useless the whole battery of eighteen-pounders, thus forcing jones to fight an eighteen-pounder frigate with a twelve-pounder battery, but it spread a panic among the men, who saw the dangers of explosion added to the peril they were in by reason of the enemy's continued fire. jones himself left the quarter-deck, and rushed forward among the men, cheering them on, and arousing them to renewed activity by his exertions. now he would lend a hand at training some gun, now pull at a rope, or help a lagging powder-monkey on his way. his pluck and enthusiasm infused new life into the men; and they threw the heavy guns about like playthings, and cheered loudly as each shot told. the two ships were at no time separated by a greater distance than half a pistol-shot, and were continually manoeuvring to cross each others' bows, and get in a raking broadside. in this attempt, they crossed from one to the other side of each other; so that now the port and now the starboard battery would be engaged. from the shore these evolutions were concealed under a dense cloud of smoke, and the spectators could only see the tops of the two vessels moving slowly about before the light breeze; while the lurid flashes of the cannon, and constant thunder of the broadsides, told of the deadly work going on. at a little distance were the "countess of scarborough" and the "pallas," linked in deadly combat, and adding the roar of their cannon to the general turmoil. it seemed to the watchers on the heights that war was coming very close to england. the "serapis" first succeeded in getting a raking position; and, as she slowly crossed her antagonist's bow, her guns were fired, loaded again, and again discharged,--the heavy bolts crashing into the "richard's" bow, and ranging aft, tearing the flesh of the brave fellows on the decks, and cutting through timbers and cordage in their frightful course. at this moment, the americans almost despaired of the termination of the conflict. the "richard" proved to be old and rotten, and the enemy's shot seemed to tear her timbers to pieces; while the "serapis" was new, with timbers that withstood the shock of the balls like steel armor. jones saw that in a battle with great guns he was sure to be the loser. he therefore resolved to board. soon the "richard" made an attempt to cross the bows of the "serapis," but not having way enough failed; and the "serapis" ran foul of her, with her long bowsprit projecting over the stern of the american ship. springing from the quarter-deck, jones with his own hands swung grappling-irons into the rigging of the enemy, and made the ships fast. as he bent to his work, he was a prominent target for every sharp-shooter on the british vessel, and the bullets hummed thickly about his ears; but he never flinched. his work done, he clambered back to the quarter-deck, and set about gathering the boarders. the two vessels swung alongside each other. the cannonading was redoubled, and the heavy ordnance of the "serapis" told fearfully upon the "richard." the american gunners were driven from their guns by the flying cloud of shot and splinters. each party thought the other was about to board. the darkness and the smoke made all vision impossible; and the boarders on each vessel were crouched behind the bulwarks, ready to give a hot reception to their enemies. this suspense caused a temporary lull in the firing, and capt. pearson of the "serapis" shouted out through the sulphurous blackness,-- "have you struck your colors?" "i have not yet begun to fight," replied jones; and again the thunder of the cannon awakened the echoes on the distant shore. as the firing recommenced, the two ships broke away and drifted apart. again the "serapis" sought to get a raking position; but by this time jones had determined that his only hope lay in boarding. terrible had been the execution on his ship. the cock-pit was filled with the wounded. the mangled remains of the dead lay thick about the decks. the timbers of the ship were greatly shattered, and her cordage was so badly cut that skilful manoeuvring was impossible. many shot-holes were beneath the water-line, and the hold was rapidly filling. therefore, jones determined to run down his enemy, and get out his boarders, at any cost. soon the two vessels were foul again. capt. pearson, knowing that his advantage lay in long-distance fighting, strove to break away. jones bent all his energies to the task of keeping the ships together. meantime the battle raged fiercely. jones himself, in his official report of the battle, thus describes the course of the fight:-- "i directed the fire of one of the three cannon against the main-mast with double-headed shot, while the other two were exceedingly well served with grape and canister shot, to silence the enemy's musketry, and clear her decks, which was at last effected. the enemy were, as i have since understood, on the instant for calling for quarter, when the cowardice or treachery of three of my under officers induced them to call to the enemy. the english commodore asked me if i demanded quarter; and i having answered him in the negative, they renewed the battle with double fury. they were unable to stand the deck; but the fury of their cannon, especially the lower battery, which was entirely formed of eighteen-pounders, was incessant. both ships were set on fire in various places, and the scene was dreadful beyond the reach of language. to account for the timidity of my three under officers (i mean the gunner, the carpenter, and the master-at-arms), i must observe that the two first were slightly wounded; and as the ship had received various shots under water, and one of the pumps being shot away, the carpenter expressed his fear that she would sink, and the other two concluded that she was sinking, which occasioned the gunner to run aft on the poop, without my knowledge, to strike the colors. fortunately for me a cannon-ball had done that before by carrying away the ensign staff: he was, therefore, reduced to the necessity of sinking--as he supposed--or of calling for quarter; and he preferred the latter." indeed, the petty officers were little to be blamed for considering the condition of the "richard" hopeless. the great guns of the "serapis," with their muzzles not twenty feet away, were hurling solid shot and grape through the flimsy shell of the american ship. so close together did the two ships come at times, that the rammers were sometimes thrust into the port-holes of the opposite ship in loading. when the ships first swung together, the lower ports of the "serapis" were closed to prevent the americans boarding through them. but in the heat of the conflict the ports were quickly blown off, and the iron throats of the great guns again protruded, and dealt out their messages of death. how frightful was the scene! in the two great ships were more than seven hundred men, their eyes lighted with the fire of hatred, their faces blackened with powder or made ghastly by streaks of blood. cries of pain, yells of rage, prayers, and curses rose shrill above the thunderous monotone of the cannonade. both ships were on fire; and the black smoke of the conflagration, mingled with the gray gunpowder smoke, and lighted up by the red flashes of the cannonade, added to the terrible picturesqueness of the scene. the "richard" seemed like a spectre ship, so shattered was her framework. from the main-mast to the stern post, her timbers above the water-line were shot away, a few blackened posts alone preventing the upper deck from falling. through this ruined shell swept the shot of the "serapis," finding little to impede their flight save human flesh and bone. great streams of water were pouring into the hold. the pitiful cries of nearly two hundred prisoners aroused the compassion of an officer, who ran below and liberated them. driven from the hold by the inpouring water, these unhappy men ran to the deck, only to be swept down by the storm of cannon-shot and bullets. fire, too, encompassed them; and the flames were so fast sweeping down upon the magazine, that capt. jones ordered the powder-kegs to be brought up and thrown into the sea. at this work, and at the pumps, the prisoners were kept employed until the end of the action. but though the heavy guns of the "serapis" had it all their own way below, shattering the hull of the "richard," and driving the yankee gunners from their quarters, the conflict, viewed from the tops, was not so one-sided. the americans crowded on the forecastle and in the tops, where they continued the battle with musketry and hand-grenades, with such murderous effect that the british were driven entirely from the upper deck. once a party of about one hundred picked men, mustered below by capt. pearson, rushed to the upper deck of the "serapis," and thence made a descent upon the deck of the "richard," firing pistols, brandishing cutlasses, and yelling like demons. but the yankee tars were ready for them at that game, and gave the boarders so spirited a reception with pikes and cutlasses, that they were ready enough to swarm over the bulwarks, and seek again the comparative safety of their own ship. but all this time, though the americans were making a brave and desperate defence, the tide of battle was surely going against them though they held the deck of the "richard" secure against all comers, yet the englishmen were cutting the ship away from beneath them, with continued heavy broadsides. suddenly the course of battle was changed, and victory took her stand with the americans, all through the daring and coolness of one man,--no officer, but an humble jacky. the rapid and accurate fire of the sharp-shooters on the "richard" had driven all the riflemen of the "serapis" from their posts in the tops. seeing this, the americans swarmed into the rigging of their own ship, and from that elevated station poured down a destructive fire of hand-grenades upon the decks of the enemy. the sailors on the deck of the "richard" seconded this attack, by throwing the same missiles through the open ports of the enemy. at last one american topman, filling a bucket with grenades, and hanging it on his left arm, clambered out on the yard-arm of the "richard," that stretched far out over the deck of the british ship. cautiously the brave fellow crept out on the slender spar. his comrades below watched his progress, while the sharp-shooters kept a wary eye on the enemy, lest some watchful rifleman should pick off the adventurous blue-jacket. little by little the nimble sailor crept out on the yard, until he was over the crowded gun-deck of the "serapis." then, lying at full length on the spar, and somewhat protected by it, he began to shower his missiles upon the enemy's gun-deck. great was the execution done by each grenade; but at last, one better aimed than the rest fell through the main hatch to the main deck. there was a flash, then a succession of quick explosions; a great sheet of flame gushed up through the hatchway, and a chorus of cries told of some frightful tragedy enacted below. it seemed that the powder-boys of the "serapis" had been too active in bringing powder to the guns, and, instead of bringing cartridges as needed, had kept one charge in advance of the demand; so that behind every gun stood a cartridge, making a line of cartridges on the deck from bow to stern. several cartridges had been broken, so that much loose powder lay upon the deck. this was fired by the discharge of the hand-grenade, and communicated the fire to the cartridges, which exploded in rapid succession, horribly burning scores of men. more than twenty men were killed instantly; and so great was the flame and the force of the explosion, that many of them were left with nothing on but the collars and wristbands of their shirts and the waistbands of their trousers. it is impossible to conceive of the horror of the sight. capt. pearson in his official report of the battle, speaking of this occurrence, says, "a hand-grenade being thrown in at one of the lower ports, a cartridge of powder was set on fire, the flames of which, running from cartridge to cartridge all the way aft, blew up the whole of the people and officers that were quartered abaft the main-mast; from which unfortunate circumstance those guns were rendered useless for the remainder of the action, and i fear that the greater part of the people will lose their lives." this event changed the current of the battle. the english were hemmed between decks by the fire of the american topmen, and they found that not even then were they protected from the fiery hail of hand-grenades. the continual pounding of double-headed shot from a gun which jones had trained upon the main-mast of the enemy had finally cut away that spar; and it fell with a crash upon the deck, bringing down spars and rigging with it. flames were rising from the tarred cordage, and spreading to the framework of the ship. the americans saw victory within their grasp. but at this moment a new and most unsuspected enemy appeared upon the scene. the "alliance," which had stood aloof during the heat of the conflict, now appeared, and, after firing a few shots into the "serapis," ranged slowly down along the "richard," pouring a murderous fire of grape-shot into the already shattered ship. jones thus tells the story of this treacherous and wanton assault:-- "i now thought that the battle was at an end. but, to my utter astonishment, he discharged a broadside full into the stern of the 'bon homme richard.' we called to him for god's sake to forbear. yet he passed along the off-side of the ship, and continued firing. there was no possibility of his mistaking the enemy's ship for the 'bon homme richard,' there being the most essential difference in their appearance and construction. besides, it was then full moonlight; and the sides of the 'bon homme richard' were all black, and the sides of the enemy's ship were yellow. yet, for the greater security, i showed the signal for our reconnoissance, by putting out three lanterns,--one at the bow, one at the stern, and one at the middle, in a horizontal line. "every one cried that he was firing into the wrong ship, but nothing availed. he passed around, firing into the 'bon homme richard,' head, stern, and broadside, and by one of his volleys killed several of my best men, and mortally wounded a good officer of the forecastle. my situation was truly deplorable. the 'bon homme richard' received several shots under the water from the 'alliance.' the leak gained on the pumps, and the fire increased much on board both ships. some officers entreated me to strike, of whose courage and sense i entertain a high opinion. i would not, however, give up the point." fortunately landais did not persist in his cowardly attack upon his friends in the almost sinking ship, but sailed off, and allowed the "richard" to continue her life-and-death struggle with her enemy. the struggle was not now of long duration; for capt. pearson, seeing that his ship was a perfect wreck, and that the fire was gaining head way, hauled down his colors with his own hands, since none of his men could be persuaded to brave the fire from the tops of the "richard." as the proud emblem of great britain fluttered down, lieut. richard dale turned to capt. jones, and asked permission to board the prize. receiving an affirmative answer, he jumped on the gunwale, seized the mainbrace-pendant, and swung himself upon the quarter-deck of the captured ship. midshipman mayrant, with a large party of sailors, followed. so great was the confusion on the "serapis," that few of the englishmen knew that the ship had been surrendered. as mayrant came aboard, he was mistaken for the leader of a boarding-party, and run through the thigh with a pike. capt. pearson was found standing alone upon the quarter-deck, contemplating with a sad face the shattered condition of his once noble ship, and the dead bodies of his brave fellows lying about the decks. stepping up to him, lieut. dale said,-- "sir, i have orders to send you on board the ship alongside." at this moment, the first lieutenant of the "serapis" came up hastily, and inquired,-- "has the enemy struck her flag?" "no, sir," answered dale. "on the contrary, you have struck to us." turning quickly to his commander, the english lieutenant asked,-- "have you struck, sir?" "yes, i have," was the brief reply. "i have nothing more to say," remarked the officer, and turning about was in the act of going below, when lieut. dale stopped him, saying,-- "it is my duty to request you, sir, to accompany capt. pearson on board the ship alongside." "if you will first permit me to go below," responded the other, "i will silence the firing of the lower deck guns." "this cannot be permitted," was the response; and, silently bowing his head, the lieutenant followed his chief to the victorious ship, while two midshipmen went below to stop the firing. lieut. dale remained in command of the "serapis." seating himself on the binnacle, he ordered the lashings which had bound the two ships throughout the bloody conflict to be cut. then the head-sails were braced back, and the wheel put down. but, as the ship had been anchored at the beginning of the battle, she refused to answer either helm or canvas. vastly astounded at this, dale leaped from the binnacle; but his legs refused to support him, and he fell heavily to the deck. his followers sprang to his aid; and it was found that the lieutenant had been severely wounded in the leg by a splinter, but had fought out the battle without ever noticing his hurt. so ended this memorable battle. but the feelings of pride and exultation so natural to a victor died away in the breast of the american captain as he looked about the scene of wreck and carnage. on all sides lay the mutilated bodies of the gallant fellows who had so bravely stood to their guns amid the storm of death-dealing missiles. there they lay, piled one on top of the other,--some with their agonized writhings caught and fixed by death; others calm and peaceful, as though sleeping. powder-boys, young and tender, lay by the side of grizzled old seamen. words cannot picture the scene. in his journal capt. jones wrote:-- "a person must have been an eye-witness to form a just idea of the tremendous scene of carnage, wreck, and ruin that everywhere appeared. humanity cannot but recoil from the prospect of such finished horror, and lament that war should produce such fatal consequences." but worse than the appearance of the main deck was the scene in the cock-pit and along the gun-deck, which had been converted into a temporary hospital. here lay the wounded, ranged in rows along the deck. moans and shrieks of agony were heard on every side. the surgeons were busy with their glittering instruments. the tramp of men on the decks overhead, and the creaking of the timbers of the water-logged ship, added to the cries of the wounded, made a perfect bedlam of the place. [illustration: the action between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis," september , .] it did not take long to discover that the "bon homme richard" was a complete wreck, and in a sinking condition. the gallant old craft had kept afloat while the battle was being fought; but now, that the victory had remained with her, she had given up the struggle against the steadily encroaching waves. the carpenters who had explored the hold came on deck with long faces, and reported that nothing could be done to stop the great holes made by the shot of the "serapis." therefore jones determined to remove his crew and all the wounded to the "serapis," and abandon the noble "richard" to her fate. accordingly, all available hands were put at the pumps, and the work of transferring the wounded was begun. slings were rigged over the side; and the poor shattered bodies were gently lowered into the boats awaiting them, and, on reaching the "serapis," were placed tenderly in cots ranged along the main deck. all night the work went on; and by ten o'clock the next morning there were left on the "richard" only a few sailors, who alternately worked at the pumps, and fought the steadily encroaching flames. for jones did not intend to desert the good old ship without a struggle to save her, even though both fire and water were warring against her. not until the morning dawned did the americans fully appreciate how shattered was the hulk that stood between them and a watery grave. fenimore cooper, the pioneer historian of the united states navy, writes:-- "when the day dawned, an examination was made into the situation of the 'richard.' abaft on a line with those guns of the 'serapis' that had not been disabled by the explosion, the timbers were found to be nearly all beaten in, or beaten out,--for in this respect there was little difference between the two sides of the ship,--and it was said that her poop and upper decks would have fallen into the gun-room, but for a few buttocks that had been missed. indeed, so large was the vacuum, that most of the shot fired from this part of the 'serapis,' at the close of the action, must have gone through the 'richard' without touching any thing. the rudder was cut from the stern post, and the transoms were nearly driven out of her. all the after-part of the ship, in particular, that was below the quarter-deck was torn to pieces; and nothing had saved those stationed on the quarter-deck but the impossibility of sufficiently elevating guns that almost touched their object." despite the terribly shattered condition of the ship, her crew worked manfully to save her. but, after fighting the flames and working the pumps all day, they were reluctantly forced to abandon the good ship to her fate. it was nine o'clock at night, that the hopelessness of the task became evident. the "richard" rolled heavily from side to side. the sea was up to her lower port-holes. at each roll the water gushed through her port-holes, and swashed through the hatchways. at ten o'clock, with a last dying surge, the shattered hulk plunged to her final resting-place, carrying with her the bodies of her dead. they had died the noblest of all deaths,--the death of a patriot killed in doing battle for his country. they receive the grandest of all burials,--the burial of a sailor who follows his ship to her grave, on the hard, white sand, in the calm depths of the ocean. how many were there that went down with the ship? history does not accurately state. capt. jones himself was never able to tell how great was the number of dead upon his ship. the most careful estimate puts the number at forty-two. of the wounded on the american ship, there were about forty. all these were happily removed from the "richard" before she sunk. on the "serapis" the loss was much greater; but here, too, history is at fault, in that no official returns of the killed and wounded have been preserved. capt. jones's estimate, which is probably nearly correct, put the loss of the english ship at about a hundred killed, and an equal number wounded. the sinking of the "richard" left the "serapis" crowded with wounded of both nations, prisoners, and the remnant of the crew of the sunken ship. no time was lost in getting the ship in navigable shape, and in clearing away the traces of the battle. the bodies of the dead were thrown overboard. the decks were scrubbed and sprinkled with hot vinegar. the sound of the hammer and the saw was heard on every hand, as the carpenters stopped the leaks, patched the deck, and rigged new spars in place of those shattered by the "richard's" fire. all three of the masts had gone by the board. jury masts were rigged; and with small sails stretched on these the ship beat about the ocean, the plaything of the winds. her consorts had left her. landais, seeing no chance to rob jones of the honor of the victory, had taken the "alliance" to other waters. the "pallas" had been victorious in her contest with the "countess of scarborough;" and, as soon as the issue of the conflict between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis" had become evident, she made off with her prize, intent upon gaining a friendly port. the "richard," after ten days of drifting, finally ran into texel, in the north of holland. the next year was one of comparative inactivity for jones. he enjoyed for a time the praise of all friends of the revolting colonies. he was the lion of paris. then came the investigation into the action of landais at the time of the great battle. though his course at that time was one of open treachery, inspired by his wish to have jones strike to the "serapis," that he might have the honor of capturing both ships, landais escaped any punishment at the hands of his french compatriots. but he was relieved of the command of the "alliance," which was given to jones. highly incensed at this action, the erratic frenchman incited the crew of the "alliance" to open mutiny, and, taking command of the ship himself, left france and sailed for america, leaving commodore jones in the lurch. on his arrival at philadelphia, landais strove to justify his action by blackening the character of jones, but failed in this, and was dismissed the service. his actions should be regarded with some charity, for the man was doubtless of unsound mind. his insanity became even more evident after his dismissal from the navy; and from that time, until the time of his death, his eccentricities made him generally regarded as one mentally unsound. jones, having lost the "alliance" by the mutiny of landais, remained abroad, waiting for another ship. he travelled widely on the continent, and was lavishly entertained by the rich and noble of every nation. not until october, , did he again tread the deck of a vessel under his own command. the ship which the french government finally fitted out and put in command of paul jones was the "ariel," a small twenty-gun ship. this vessel the adventurous sailor packed full of powder and cannon-balls, taking only provisions enough for nine weeks, and evidently expecting to live off the prizes he calculated upon taking. he sailed from l'orient on a bright october afternoon, under clear skies, and with a fair wind, intending to proceed directly to the coast of america. but the first night out there arose a furious gale. the wind howled through the rigging, tore the sails from the ring-bolts, snapped the spars, and seriously wrecked the cordage of the vessel. the great waves, lashed into fury by the hurricane, smote against the sides of the little craft as though they would burst through her sheathing. the ship rolled heavily; and the yards, in their grand sweep from side to side, often plunged deep into the foaming waves. at last so great became the strain upon the vessel, that the crew were set to work with axes to cut away the foremast. balancing themselves upon the tossing, slippery deck, holding fast to a rope with one hand, while with the other they swung the axe, the gallant fellows finally cut so deep into the heart of the stout spar, that a heavy roll of the ship made it snap off short, and it fell alongside, where it hung by the cordage. the wreck was soon cleared away; and as this seemed to ease the ship somewhat, and as she was drifting about near the dreaded rock of penmarque, the anchors were got out. but in the mean time the violent rolling of the "ariel" had thrown the heel of the main-mast from the step; and the heavy mast was reeling about, threatening either to plough its way upward through the gun-deck, or to crash through the bottom of the ship. it was determined to cut away this mast; but, before this could be done, it fell, carrying with it the mizzen-mast, and crushing in the deck on which it fell. thus dismasted, the "ariel" rode out the gale. all night and all the next day she was tossed about on the angry waters. her crew thought that their last hour had surely come. over the shrieking of the gale, and the roaring of the waves, rose that steady, all-pervading sound, which brings horror to the mind of the sailor,--the dull, monotonous thunder of the breakers on the reef of penmarque. but the "ariel" was not fated to be ground to pieces on the jagged teeth of the cruel reef. though she drifted about, the plaything of the winds and the waves, she escaped the jaws of penmarque. finally the gale subsided; and, with hastily devised jury-masts, the shattered ship was taken back to l'orient to refit. two months were consumed in the work of getting the shattered vessel ready for sea. when she again set out, she met with no mishap, until, when near the american coast, she fell in with a british vessel to which she gave battle. a sharp action of a quarter of an hour forced the englishman to strike his colors; but, while the americans were preparing to board the prize, she sailed away, vastly to the chagrin and indignation of her would-be captors. the short cruise of the "ariel" was the last service rendered by paul jones to the american colonies. on his arrival at philadelphia, he was dined and fêted to his heart's desire; he received a vote of thanks from congress; he became the idol of the populace. but the necessities of the struggling colonies were such that they were unable to build for him a proper war-ship, and he remained inactive upon shore until the close of the revolution, when he went abroad, and took service with russia. he is the one great character in the naval history of the revolution. he is the first heroic figure in american naval annals. not until years after his death did men begin to know him at his true worth. he was too often looked upon as a man of no patriotism, but wholly mercenary; courageous, but only with the daring of a pirate. not until he had died a lonely death, estranged from the country he had so nobly served, did men come to know paul jones as a model naval officer, high-minded in his patriotism, pure in his life, elevated in his sentiments, and as courageous as a lion. chapter x. career of nicholas biddle. -- his exploit at lewiston jail. -- cruise in the "randolph." -- battle with the "yarmouth." -- the fatal explosion. -- samuel tucker. -- his boyhood. -- encounter with corsairs. -- cruising in the "franklin." -- in command of the "boston." -- anecdotes of capt. tucker. in the career of paul jones is to be found the record of the most stirring events of the revolution; but there were other commanders in the young american navy no less daring than he. as the chief naval representative of the colonies who cruised in european waters, jones achieved a notoriety somewhat out of proportion to his actual achievements. but other brave seamen did gallant service along the atlantic coast for the cause of the struggling nation, and, by their daring and nautical skill, did much to bring the war of the revolution to its happy conclusion. we abandoned our consideration of the general naval events of the war, to turn to a recountal of the exploits of paul jones at the close of the year . hostilities on the water during that year were confined to sharp, but short, actions between small men-of-war or privateers. the americans lacked the discipline and experience necessary to win for themselves any great reputation on the water. though they showed themselves full of dash and spirit, they were deficient in discipline and staying qualities. nevertheless, the record of the year was by no means discreditable to so young a naval organization. aside from the naval operations on the ocean, the year had seen the thick clouds of gunpowder-smoke floating across the placid surface of lake champlain, while the wooded hills that surrounded that lake and lake george more than once resounded with thunderous tones of cannon. the hostile meetings of the english and americans on the interior lakes are hardly to be classed as naval engagements. the vessels were chiefly gondolas and galleys, and many of their crews had never seen salt water. on the british side the forces were more considerable. in october, , the british had on lake champlain at least one full-rigged ship; and their schooners and galleys were all manned by trained sailors, drafted from men-of-war laid up in the st. lawrence. this force was under the command of capt. douglass of the frigate "isis." the americans, on the contrary, had manned their fleet with recruits from the army; and the forces were under the command of an army-officer, gen. benedict arnold, the story of whose later treachery is familiar to every american. it was late in october that the two hostile fleets met in deadly conflict, and a few short hours were enough to prove to the americans that they were greatly overmatched. such of their vessels as were not sunk were captured and burned by the enemy; while their crews escaped into the woods, and ultimately rejoined arnold's army, from which they had been drafted. we pass thus hastily over the so-called naval operations on lake champlain, because they were properly not naval operations at all, but merely incidents in the shore campaign. the fact that a few soldiers hastily build a small flotilla, and with it give battle to an enemy on the water, does not in any sense constitute a naval battle. the year witnessed many notable naval events. hostilities along the seaboard became more lively. new vessels were put into commission. england despatched a larger naval armament to crush her rebellious colonies. the records of the admiralty show, that at the beginning of that year parliament voted to the navy forty-five thousand men. the americans were able to array against this huge force only some four thousand, scattered upon thirteen small vessels-of-war. one of the first ships to get to sea in this year was the "randolph:" a new frigate commanded by nicholas biddle, who thus early in the war had won the confidence of the people and the naval authorities. in command of the little cruiser "andrea doria," biddle had cruised off the coast of newfoundland in . his success upon that cruise has already been noted. biddle was a man possessing to the fullest degree that primary qualification of a good naval officer,--an indomitable will. in illustration of his determination, a story is related concerning an incident that occurred just as the "andrea doria" had left the capes of the delaware. two of her crew had deserted, and, being apprehended by the authorities on shore, were lodged in lewiston jail. but the sheriff and his deputies found it easier to turn the key on the fugitive tars, than to keep them in control while they lay in durance vile. gathering all the benches, chairs, and tables that lay about the jail,--for the lockup of those days was not the trim affair of steel and iron seen to-day,--the unrepentant jackies built for themselves a barricade, and, snugly entrenched behind it, shouted out bold defiance to any and all who should come to take them. the jail authorities had committed the foolish error of neglecting to disarm the prisoners when they were captured; and, as each had a brace of ugly pistols in his belt, the position of the two behind their barricade was really one of considerable strength. the prison officials dared not attempt to dislodge the warlike tars. the militia company of the town was ordered to the scene, but even this body of soldiery dared not force the prison door. accordingly they determined to let time do the work, and starve the rogues out of their retreat. at this juncture capt. biddle came ashore. he had no intention of letting his trim ship lie idly in the offing while two mutinous blue-jackets were slowly starved into subjection. the "andrea doria" needed the men, and there must be no more delay. a captain in the american navy was not to be defied by two of his own people. therefore, seizing a loaded pistol in each hand, capt. biddle walked to the prison, accompanied only by a young midshipman. as the two pounded upon the heavy barred door, the crowd outside fell back, expecting the bullets to fly. "open this door, green," shouted biddle to one of the prisoners, whom he knew by name. "try to open it yourself," came the reply from within, with an accompanying oath. "the first man that shows his head inside this door gets a bullet." green was known as a bold, desperate man; but biddle did not hesitate a moment. ordering the bystanders to break down the door, he waited quietly, until a crash, and the sudden scattering of the crowd, gave notice that the way into the prison was clear. then gripping his pistols tightly, but with his arms hanging loosely at his sides, he advanced upon the deserters. behind the barricade stood green, his eyes blazing with rage, his pistol levelled. biddle faced him quietly. "now, green, if you don't take a good aim, you are a dead man," said he. with a muttered curse, the mutineer dropped his weapon. the cool determination of the captain awed him. in a few minutes he, with his companion, was on his way to the ship in irons. it was in february, , that the stanch new frigate "randolph," with biddle in command, set sail from philadelphia. hardly had she reached the high seas when a terrific gale set in, from which the "randolph" emerged, shorn of her tapering masts. as she lay a helpless wreck tossing on the waves, the hard work necessary to put her in decent shape again induced biddle to accede to the request of a number of british prisoners on board, who wished to be enrolled among the crew of the "randolph." this proved to be an unfortunate move; for the englishmen were no sooner enrolled on the ship's list than they began plotting mutiny, and the uprising reached such a stage that they assembled on the gun-deck, and gave three cheers. but the firm and determined stand of the captain and his officers overawed the mutineers, and they returned to their places after the ringleaders had been made to suffer at the gratings. but the spirit of disaffection rife amid his crew, and the crippled condition of his ship, determined biddle to proceed forthwith to charleston to refit. but a few days were spent in port. getting to sea again, the "randolph" fell in with the "true briton," a twenty-gun ship, flying the british colors. though the captain of the "true briton" had often boasted of what he would do should he encounter the "randolph," his courage then failed him, and he fled. the "randolph" gave chase, and, proving to be a speedy ship, soon overhauled the prize, which struck without waiting for a volley. three other vessels that had been cruising with the "true briton" were also captured, and with her rich prizes the "randolph" returned proudly to charleston. here her usefulness ceased for a time; for a superior force of british men-of-war appeared off the harbor, and by them the "randolph" was blockaded for the remainder of the season. early in biddle again took the sea with the "randolph," supported this time by four small vessels, fitted out by the south carolina authorities. they were the "gen. moultrie," eighteen guns; the "polly," sixteen; the "notre dame," sixteen; and the "fair american," sixteen. with this force capt. biddle set out in search of a british squadron known to be cruising thereabouts, and probably the same vessels that had kept him a prisoner during so much of the previous year. on the th of march, , the lookouts on the smaller vessels saw a signal thrown out from the masthead of the "randolph," which announced a sail in sight. chase was at once given; and by four o'clock she was near enough for the americans to see that she was a large ship, and apparently a man-of-war. about eight o'clock the stranger was near enough the squadron for them to make out that she was a heavy frigate. the englishman was not slow to suspect the character of the vessels with which he had fallen in, and firing a shot across the bows of the "moultrie," demanded her name. "the 'polly' of new york," was the response. leaving the "moultrie" unmolested, the stranger ranged up alongside the "randolph," and ordered her to show her colors. this biddle promptly did; and as the american flag went fluttering to the fore, the ports of the "randolph" were thrown open, and a broadside poured into the hull of the englishman. the stranger was not slow in replying, and the action became hot and deadly. capt. biddle was wounded in the thigh early in the battle. as he fell to the deck, his officers crowded about him, thinking that he was killed; but he encouraged them to return to their posts, and, ordering a chair to be placed on the quarter-deck, remained on deck, giving orders, and cheering on his men. it is said that capt. biddle was wounded by a shot from the "moultrie," which flew wide of its intended mark. for twenty minutes the battle raged, and there was no sign of weakening on the part of either contestant. suddenly the sound of the cannonade was deadened by a thunderous roar. the people on the other ships saw a huge column of fire and smoke rise where the "randolph" had floated. the english vessel was thrown violently on her beam-ends. the sky was darkened with flying timbers and splinters, which fell heavily into the sea. the "randolph" had blown up. a spark, a red-hot shot, some fiery object, had penetrated her magazine, and she was annihilated. the horrible accident which destroyed the "randolph" came near being the end of the "yarmouth," her antagonist. the two battling ships were close together; so close, in fact, that after the explosion capt. morgan of the "fair american" hailed the "yarmouth" to ask how capt. biddle was. the english ship was fairly covered with bits of the flying wreck. some heavy pieces of timber falling from the skies badly shattered her main-deck. an american ensign, closely rolled up, fell on her forecastle, not even singed by the fiery ordeal through which it had passed. the "yarmouth" wasted little time in wonder over the fate of her late antagonist. in all the mass of floating wreckage that covered the sea, there appeared to be no living thing. the four smaller american vessels, dismayed by the fate of their consort, were making good their escape. without more ado, the "yarmouth" set out in chase. four days later, the americans having escaped, the "yarmouth" was again cruising near the scene of the action. a raft was discovered on the ocean, which seemed to support some living creatures. running down upon it, four wretched, emaciated men were discovered clinging to a piece of wreckage, and wildly waving for assistance. they were taken aboard the british man-of-war, and given food and drink, of both of which they partook greedily; for their sole sustenance during the four days for which they clung to their frail raft was rain-water sucked from a piece of blanket. so died capt. nicholas biddle, blown to atoms by the explosion of his ship in the midst of battle. though but a young officer, not having completed his twenty-seventh year, he left an enduring name in the naval annals of his country. though his service was short, the fame he won was great. among the more notable commanders who did good service on the sea was capt. samuel tucker, who was put in command of the frigate "boston" in the latter part of the year . tucker was an old and tried seaman, and is furthermore one of the most picturesque figures in the naval history of the revolution. he first showed his love for the sea in the way that yankee boys from time immemorial have shown it,--by running away from home, and shipping as a cabin-boy. the ship which he chose was the british sloop-of-war "royal george," and the boy found himself face to face with the rigid naval discipline of the british service at that time. but he stuck manfully to the career he had chosen, and gradually mastered not only the details of a seaman's duty, but much of the art of navigation; so that when finally he got his discharge from the "royal george," he shipped as second mate on a salem merchantman. it was on his first voyage in this capacity that he first showed the mettle that was in him. two algerine corsairs, their decks crowded with men, their long low hulls cleaving the waves like dolphins, had given chase to the merchantman. the captain of the threatened ship grew faint-hearted: he sought courage in liquor, and soon became unable to manage his vessel. tucker took the helm. he saw that there was no chance of escape in flight, for the corsairs were too fleet. there was no hope of victory in a battle, for the pirates were too strong. but the trim new england schooner minded her helm better than her lanteen-rigged pursuers, and this fact tucker put to good account. putting his helm hard down, he headed the schooner directly for the piratical craft. by skilful manoeuvring, he secured such a position that either pirate, by firing upon him, was in danger of firing into his fellow corsair. this position he managed to maintain until nightfall, when he slipped away, and by daylight was snugly at anchor in the port of lisbon. for some time after this episode, the record of tucker's seafaring life is lost. certain it is that he served in the british navy as an officer for some time, and was master of a merchantman for several years. when the revolution broke out, samuel tucker was in london. being offered by a recruiting officer a commission in either the army or navy, if he would consent to serve "his gracious majesty," tucker very rashly responded, "hang his gracious majesty! do you think i would serve against my country?" soon a hue and cry was out for tucker. he was charged with treason, and fled into the country to the house of a tavern-keeper whom he knew, who sheltered him until he could make his escape from england. hardly had he arrived in america, when gen. washington commissioned him captain of the "franklin," and instructed him to proceed directly to sea. an express with the commission and instructions was hurried off to marblehead, then a straggling little city. he was instructed to find the "hon. samuel tucker," and to deliver to him the packets in his charge. when the messenger arrived, tucker was working in his yard. the messenger saw a rough-looking person, roughly clad, with a tarpaulin hat, and his neck bound with a flaming red bandanna handkerchief. never once thinking this person could be the man he sought, he leaned from his horse, and shouted out roughly,-- "i say, fellow, i wish you would tell me whether the hon. samuel tucker lives hereabouts." tucker looked up with a quizzical smile, and surveyed the speaker from under the wide rim of his tarpaulin, as he answered,-- "honorable, honorable! there's none of that name in marblehead. he must be one of the tuckers in salem. i'm the only samuel tucker here." "capt. glover told me he knew him," responded the messenger, "and described his house, gable-end on the seaside, none near it. faith, this looks like the very place!" with a laugh, tucker then confessed his identity, and asked the messenger his business. receiving the commission and instructions, he at once began his preparations for leaving home, and at daybreak the next morning was on his way to beverly, where lay anchored the first ship he was to command in the service of his country. in the "franklin" capt. tucker did some most efficient work. his name appears constantly in the letters of gen. washington, and in the state papers making up the american archives, as having sent in valuable prizes. at one time we read of the capture of "a brigantine from scotland, worth fifteen thousand pounds sterling;" again, of six gunboats, and of brigs laden with wine and fruit. during the year , he took not less than thirty--and probably a few more--ships, brigs, and smaller vessels. nor were all these vessels taken without some sharp fighting. of one battle tucker himself speaks in one of his letters. first telling how his wife made the colors for his ship, "the field of which was white, and the union was green, made of cloth of her own purchasing, and at her own expense," he goes on to write of one of his battles:-- "those colors i wore in honor of the country,--which has so nobly rewarded me for my past services,--and the love of their maker, until i fell in with col. archibald campbell in the ship "george," and brig "arabella," transports with about two hundred and eighty highland troops on board, of gen. frazer's corps. about ten p.m. a severe conflict ensued, which held about two hours and twenty minutes. i conquered them with great carnage on their side, it being in the night, and my small bark, about seventy tons burden, being very low in the water, i received no damage in loss of men, but lost a complete set of new by the passing of their balls; then the white field and pine-tree union were riddled to atoms. i was then immediately supplied with a new suit of sails, and a new suit of colors, made of canvas and bunting of my own prize-goods." another time, during the same year, tucker took two british ships near marblehead. so near was the scene of action to the house of capt. tucker, that his wife and her sister, hearing the sound of cannonading, ascended a high hill in the vicinity, and from that point viewed the action through a spy-glass. capt. tucker kept the sea in the "franklin" until late in the winter. when finally the cold weather and high winds forced him to put his ship out of commission, he went to his home at marblehead. he remained there but a short time; for in march, , he was put in command of the "boston," a frigate of twenty-four guns. in this vessel he cruised during the year with varying success. feb. , , capt. tucker was ordered to carry the hon. john adams to france, as envoy from the united states. the voyage was full of incidents. feeling impressed with the gravity of the charge laid upon him, capt. tucker chose a course which he hoped would enable him to steer clear of the horde of british men-of-war which then infested the american coast. but in so doing he fell in with a natural enemy, which came near proving fatal. a terrific thunderstorm, gradually growing into a tornado, crossed the path of the ship. the ocean was lashed into waves mountain high. the crash of the thunder rent the sky. a stroke of lightning struck the main-mast, and ripped up the deck, narrowly missing the magazine. the ship sprung a leak; and the grewsome sound of the pumps mingled with the roar of the waves, and the shrieking of the winds. for several days the stormy weather continued. then followed a period of calm, which the captain well employed in repairing the rigging, and exercising the men with the guns and small-arms. many ships had been sighted, and some, evidently men-of-war, had given chase; but the "boston" succeeded in showing them all a clean pair of heels. "what would you do," said mr. adams one day, as he stood with the captain watching three ships that were making desperate efforts to overhaul the "boston," "if you could not escape, and they should attack you?" "as the first is far in advance of the others, i should carry her by boarding, leading the boarders myself," was the response. "i should take her; for no doubt a majority of her crew, being pressed men, would turn to and join me. having taken her, i should be matched, and could fight the other two." such language as this coming from many men would be considered mere foolhardy boasting. but tucker was a man not given to brag. indeed, he was apt to be very laconic in speaking of his exploits. a short time after his escape from the three ships, he fell in with an english armed vessel of no small force, and captured her. his only comment on the action in his journal reads, "i fired a gun, and they returned three; and down went the colors." john adams, however, told a more graphic story of this capture. tucker, as soon as he saw an armed vessel in his path, hastily called his crew to order, and bore down upon her. when the roll of the drum, calling the people to quarters, resounded through the ship, mr. adams seized a musket, and took his stand with the marines. capt. tucker, seeing him there, requested him to go below, and upon his desire being disregarded, put his hand upon the envoy's shoulder, and in a tone of authority said,-- "mr. adams, i am commanded by the continental congress to deliver you safe in france, and you must go below." the envoy smilingly complied, and just at that moment the enemy let fly her broadside. the shot flew through the rigging, doing but little damage. though the guns of the "boston" were shotted, and the gunners stood at their posts with smoking match-stocks, capt. tucker gave no order to fire, but seemed intent upon the manoeuvres of the ships. the eager blue-jackets begun to murmur, and the chorus of questions and oaths was soon so great that the attention of tucker was attracted. he looked at the row of eager faces on the gun-deck, and shouted out,-- "hold on, my men! i wish to save that egg without breaking the shell." soon after, tucker brought his broadside to bear on the stern of the enemy, and she struck without more ado. she proved to be an armed ship, the "martha." after this encounter, nothing more of moment occurred on the voyage; and the "boston" reached bordeaux, and landed her distinguished passenger in safety. two months later she left bordeaux, in company with a fleet of twenty sail, one of which was the "ranger," formerly commanded by paul jones. with these vessels he cruised for a time in european waters, but returned to the american coast in the autumn. his services for the rest of that year, and the early part of , we must pass over hastily, though many were the prizes that fell into his clutches. many anecdotes are told of tucker. his shrewdness, originality, and daring made him a favorite theme for story-tellers. but, unhappily, the anecdotes have generally no proof of their truth. one or two, however, told by capt. tucker's biographer, mr. john h. sheppard, will not be out of place here. in one the story is told that tucker fell in with a british frigate which he knew to be sent in search of him. showing the english flag, he sailed boldly towards the enemy, and in answer to her hail said he was capt. gordon of the english navy, out in search of the "boston," commanded by the rebel tucker. "i'll carry him to new york, dead or alive," said tucker. "have you seen him?" was asked. "well, i've heard of him," was the response; "and they say he is a hard customer." all this time tucker had been manoeuvring to secure a raking position. behind the closed ports of the "boston," the men stood at their guns, ready for the word of command. just as the american had secured the position desired, a sailor in the tops of the british vessel cried out,-- "that is surely tucker; we shall have a devil of a smell directly." hearing this, tucker ordered the american flag hoisted, and the ports thrown open. hailing his astonished foe, he cried,-- "the time i proposed talking with you is ended. this is the 'boston,' frigate. i am samuel tucker, but no rebel. fire, or strike your flag." the englishman saw he had no alternative but to strike. this he did without firing a gun. the vessel, though not named in the anecdote, was probably the "pole," of the capture of which tucker frequently speaks in his letters. of the part tucker played in the siege of charleston, of his capture there by the british, and of his exchange, we shall speak later. at that disaster four american frigates were lost: so many of the best naval officers were thrown out of employment. among them was tucker; but ever anxious for active service, he obtained the sloop-of-war "thorn," which he himself had captured, and went out as a privateer. in this vessel he saw some sharp service. one engagement was thus described to mr. sheppard by a marine named everett who was on board:-- "we had been cruising about three weeks when we fell in with an english packet of twenty-two guns and one hundred men. not long after she was discovered, the commodore called up his crew, and said, 'she means to fight us; and if we go alongside like men, she is ours in thirty minutes, but if we can't go as men we have no business here.' he then told them he wanted no cowards on deck, and requested those who were willing to fight to go down the starboard, and those who were unwilling the larboard gangway. every man and boy took the first, signifying his willingness to meet the enemy. "as mr. everett was passing by, the commodore asked him,-- "'are you willing to go alongside of her?' "'yes, sir,' was the reply. "in mentioning this conversation, however, mr. everett candidly confessed, 'i did not tell him the truth, for i would rather have been in my father's cornfield.' "after the commanders of these two vessels, as they drew near, had hailed each other in the customary way when ships meet at sea, the captain of the english packet cried out roughly from the quarter-deck,-- "'haul down your colors, or i'll sink you!' "'ay, ay, sir; directly,' answered tucker calmly. and he then ordered the helmsman to steer the 'thorn' right under the stern of the packet, luff up under her lee quarters, and range alongside of her. the order was promptly executed. the two vessels were laid side by side, within pistol shot of each other. while the 'thorn' was getting into position, the enemy fired a full broadside at her which did but little damage. as soon as she was brought completely alongside her adversary, tucker thundered out to his men to fire, and a tremendous discharge followed; and, as good aim had been taken, a dreadful carnage was seen in that ill-fated vessel. it was rapidly succeeded by a fresh volley of artillery, and in twenty-seven minutes a piercing cry was heard from the english vessel: 'quarters, for god's sake! our ship is sinking. our men are dying of their wounds.' "to this heart-rending appeal capt. tucker exclaimed,-- "'how can you expect quarters while that british flag is flying?' "the sad answer came back, 'our halliards are shot away.' "'then cut away your ensign staff, or ye'll all be dead men.' "it was done immediately. down came the colors, the din of cannonading ceased, and only the groans of the wounded and dying were heard. "fifteen men, with carpenters, surgeon, and their leader, were quickly on the deck of the prize. thirty-four of her crew, with her captain, were either killed or wounded. her decks were besmeared with blood, and in some places it stood in clotted masses to the tops of the sailors' slippers. the gloomy but needful work of amputating limbs, and laying out the dead, was begun; and every effort was made to render the wounded prisoners as comfortable as possible." here we must take leave of commodore tucker and his exploits. as a privateersman, he continued to do daring work to the end of the war. he fought at least one more bloody action. he was captured once and escaped. but the recountal of his romantic career must now yield to our chronological survey of the lesser naval events of the revolution. chapter xi. hostilities in . -- american reverses. -- the british in philadelphia. -- the attack upon fort mifflin. -- cruise of the "raleigh" and the "alfred." -- torpedo warfare. -- the battle of the kegs. we have now heard of the exploits of some of the chief naval leaders of the war of the revolution. but there were many dashing engagements in which the great commanders took no part, and many important captures made by vessels sailing under the flags of the individual colonies, which deserve attention. the american cause on the water suffered some rather severe reverses in the early part of . in march, the brig "cabot" fell in with the british frigate "milford," and was so hard pressed that she was run ashore on the coast of nova scotia. the crew had hardly time to get ashore before the british took possession of the stranded craft. the americans were left helpless, in a wild and little settled country, but finally made their way through the woods to a harbor. here they found a coasting schooner lying at anchor, upon which they promptly seized, and in which they escaped to portsmouth. in the mean time, the british had got the "cabot" afloat again. two months later, or in the early part of may, two united states vessels, the "hancock" thirty-two, capt. manly, and the "boston" twenty-four, capt. hector mcneil, sailed in company from boston. when a few days out, a strange sail was sighted, and proved to be a british frigate. the "hancock" soon came near enough to her to exchange broadsides, as the two vessels were going on opposite tacks. the enemy, however, seemed anxious to avoid a conflict, and exerted every effort to escape. manly, having great confidence in the speed of his ship, gave chase. calling the people from the guns, he bade them make a leisurely breakfast, and get ready for the work before them. the "hancock" soon overhauled the chase, which began firing her guns as fast as they would bear. the americans, however, made no response until fairly alongside, when they let fly a broadside with ringing cheers. the action lasted for an hour and a half before the enemy struck. she proved to be the "fox," twenty-eight. she was badly cut up by the american fire, and had thirty-two dead and wounded men on board. the loss on the "hancock" amounted to only eight men. in this running fight the "boston" was hopelessly distanced, coming up just in time to fire a gun as the british ensign came fluttering from the peak. putting a prize crew on the "fox," the three vessels continued their cruise. a week passed, and no sail was seen. somewhat rashly capt. manly turned his ship's prow toward halifax, then, as now, the chief british naval station on the american coast. when the three ships appeared off the entrance to the harbor of halifax, the british men-of-war inside quickly spied them, raised anchor, and came crowding out in hot pursuit. there was the "rainbow" forty-four, the "flora" thirty-two, and the "victor" eighteen, besides two others whose names could not be ascertained. the americans saw that they had stirred up a nest of hornets, and sought safety in flight. the three british vessels whose names are given gave chase. the "boston," by her swift sailing, easily kept out of the reach of the enemy. the "fox," however, was quickly overhauled by the "flora," and struck her flag after exchanging a few broadsides. the "hancock" for a time seemed likely to escape, but at last the "rainbow" began gradually to overhaul her. capt. manly, finding escape impossible, began manoeuvring with the intention of boarding his powerful adversary; but the light winds made this impossible, and he suddenly found himself under the guns of the "rainbow," with the "victor" astern, in a raking position. seeing no hope for success in so unequal a conflict, manly struck his flag. in the mean time the "boston" had calmly proceeded upon her way, leaving her consorts to their fate. for having thus abandoned his superior officer, capt. mcneil was dismissed the service upon his return to boston. these losses were to some degree offset by the good fortune of the "trumbull," twenty-eight, in command of capt. saltonstall. she left new york in april of this year, and had been on the water but a few days when she fell in with two british armed vessels of no inconsiderable force. the englishmen, confident of their ability to beat off the cruiser, made no effort to avoid a conflict. capt. saltonstall, by good seamanship, managed to put his vessel between the two hostile ships, and then worked both batteries with such vigor, that, after half-an-hour's fighting, the enemy was glad to strike. in this action the americans lost seven men killed, and eight wounded. the loss of the enemy was not reported. this capture was of the greatest importance to the american cause, for the two prizes were loaded with military and naval stores. during the year , the occupation of philadelphia by the british army, under gen. howe, led to some activity on the part of the american navy. while philadelphia had been in the possession of the continentals, it had been a favorite naval rendezvous. into the broad channel of the delaware the american cruisers had been accustomed to retreat when the british naval force along the coast became threateningly active. at the broad wharves of philadelphia, the men-of-war laid up to have necessary repairs made. in the rope-walks of the town, the cordage for the gallant yankee ships was spun. in the busy shipyards along the delaware, many of the frigates, provided for by the act of , were built. in the summer of all this was changed. sir william howe, at the head of an irresistible army, marched upon philadelphia; and, defeating the american army at brandywine, entered the city in triumph. the privateers and men-of-war scattered hastily, to avoid capture. most of them fled down the delaware; but a few, chiefly vessels still uncompleted, ascended the river. to cut off these vessels, the british immediately commenced the erection of batteries to command the channel of the river, and prevent any communication between the american vessels above and below philadelphia. to check the erection of these batteries, the american vessels "delaware" twenty-four, and "andrea doria" fourteen, together with one or two vessels flying the pennsylvania flag, took up a position before the incomplete earthworks, and opened a heavy fire upon the soldiers employed in the trenches. so accurate was the aim of the american gunners, that work on the batteries was stopped. but, unluckily, the commander of the "delaware," capt. alexander, had failed to reckon on the swift outflowing of the tide; and just as the sailors on that ship were becoming jubilant over the prospect of a victory, a mighty quiver throughout the ship told that she had been left on a shoal by the ebb tide. the enemy was not long in discovering the helpless condition of the "delaware;" and field-pieces and siege-guns were brought down to the river-bank, until the luckless americans saw themselves commanded by a heavy battery. in this unhappy predicament there was no course remaining but to strike their flag. though the british had possession of philadelphia, and virtually controlled the navigation of the river at that point, the americans still held powerful positions at red bank and at fort mifflin, lower down the river. against the former post the british sent an unsuccessful land expedition of hessians, but against fort mifflin a naval expedition was despatched. fort mifflin was built on a low marshy island near the mouth of the schuylkill. its very situation, surrounded as it was by mud and water, made it impregnable to any land attack. while the fort itself was a fairly strong earthwork, laid out upon approved principles of engineering, its outer works of defence added greatly to its strength. in the main channels of the river were sunk heavy, sharp-pointed _chevaux de frise_, or submarine palisades, with sharp points extending just above the surface of the water. in addition to this obstacle, the enemy advancing by water upon the fort would have to meet the american flotilla, which, though composed of small craft only, was large enough to prove very annoying to an enemy. in this flotilla were thirteen galleys, one carrying a thirty-two pounder, and the rest with varying weight of ordnance; twenty-six half-galleys, each carrying a four-pounder; two xebecs, each with two twenty-four-pounders in the bow, two eighteen-pounders in the stern, and four nine-pounders in the waist; two floating batteries, fourteen fire-ships, one schooner-galley, one brig-galley, one provincial ship, and the brig "andrea doria." it was no small naval force that the british had to overcome before attacking the mud ramparts and bastions of fort mifflin. against this armament the british brought a number of vessels, with the "augusta," sixty-four, in the lead. the battle was begun late in the afternoon of the d of october, . the attack of the hessians upon the american fortifications at red bank, and the opening of the action between the british and american fleets, were simultaneous. the hessians were beaten back with heavy loss, some of the american vessels opening fire upon them from the river. the naval battle lasted but a short time that night, owing to the darkness. when the battle ended for the night, the "augusta," and the "merlin," sloop-of-war, were left hard and fast aground. the next morning the british advanced again to the attack. the skirmish of the night before had shown them that the yankee flotilla was no mean adversary; and they now brought up re-inforcements, in the shape of the "roebuck" forty-four, "isis" thirty-two, "pearl" thirty-two, and "liverpool" twenty-eight. no sooner had the british squadron come within range than a heavy fire was opened upon the fort. the american flotilla was prompt to answer the challenge, and soon the action became general. time and time again the americans sent huge fire-ships, their well-tarred spars and rigging blazing fiercely, down among the enemy. but the skill and activity of the british sailors warded off this danger. thereupon the americans, seeing that they could not rely upon their fire-ships, changed their plan of action. any one of the british vessels was more than a match for the largest american craft, so the yankees saw they must rely upon force of numbers. accordingly their larger vessels were each assigned to attack one of the enemy; while the swift-sailing galleys plied to and fro in the battle, lending aid where needed, and striking a blow wherever the opportunity offered itself. this course of action soon began to tell upon the british. all of their vessels began to show the effects of the american fire. the "augusta" was in flames, owing to some pressed hay that had been packed upon her quarter having been set on fire. despite the efforts of her crew, the flames spread rapidly. seeing no chance to save the vessel, the crew abandoned her, and sought to gain the protection of other vessels of the british fleet. but the other ships, seeing the flames on the "augusta" drawing closer and closer to the magazine, and knowing that her explosion in that narrow and crowded channel would work dreadful damage among them, determined to abandon the attack upon fort mifflin, and withdrew. the "merlin," which was hard and fast aground, was fired, and the british fled. as they turned their ships' prows down the delaware, the dull sullen roar of an explosion told that the "augusta" had met her end. soon after the "merlin" blew up, and the defeat of the british was complete. but, though worsted in this attack upon fort mifflin, the british did not wholly abandon their designs upon it. immediately upon their repulse, they began their preparations for a second attack. this time they did not propose to rely upon men-of-war alone. batteries were built upon every point of land within range of fort mifflin. floating batteries were built, and towed into position. by the th of november all was ready, and upon that day a tremendous cannonade was opened upon the american works. after two days of ceaseless bombardment, the garrison of the fort was forced to surrender. since the fall of fort mifflin gave the control of the delaware to the british, the americans immediately put the torch to the "andrea doria" fourteen, the "wasp" eight, and the "hornet" ten; while the galleys skulked away along the jersey coast, in search of places of retreat. while the yankee tars on river and harbor duty were thus getting their share of fighting, there was plenty of daring work being done on the high seas. one of the most important cruises of the year was that of the "raleigh" and the "alfred." the "raleigh" was one of the twelve-pounder frigates built under the naval act of . with her consort the "alfred," she left the american coast in the summer of , bound for france, in search of naval stores that were there awaiting transportation to the united states. both vessels were short-handed. on the d of september the two vessels overhauled and captured the snow "nancy," from england, bound for the west indies. her captain reported that he had sailed from the west indies with a fleet of sixty merchantmen, under the convoy of four small men-of-war, the "camel," the "druid," the "weasel," and the "grasshopper." the poor sailing qualities of the "nancy" had forced her to drop behind, and the fleet was then about a day in advance of her. crowding on all canvas, the two american ships set out in hot pursuit. from the captain of the "nancy" capt. thompson of the "raleigh" had obtained all the signals in use in the fleet of indiamen. the next morning the fleet was made out; and the "raleigh" and the "alfred" exchanged signals, as though they were part of the convoy. they hung about the outskirts of the fleet until dark, planning, when the night should fall, to make a dash into the enemy's midst, and cut out the chief armed vessel. but at nightfall the wind changed, so that the plan of the americans was defeated. at daylight, however, the wind veered round and freshened, so that the "raleigh," crowding on more sail, was soon in the very centre of the enemy's fleet. the "alfred," unfortunately, being unable to carry so great a spread of canvas, was left behind; and the "raleigh" remained to carry out alone her daring adventure. the "raleigh" boldly steered straight into the midst of the british merchantmen, exchanging signals with some, and hailing others. her ports were lowered, and her guns on deck housed, so that there appeared about her nothing to indicate her true character. having cruised about amid the merchantmen, she drew up alongside the nearest man-of-war, and when within pistol-shot, suddenly ran up her flag, threw open her ports, and commanded the enemy to strike. all was confusion on board the british vessel. her officers had never for a moment suspected the "raleigh" of being other than one of their own fleet. while they stood aghast, not even keeping the vessel on her course, the "raleigh" poured in a broadside. the british responded faintly with a few guns. deliberately the americans let fly another broadside, which did great execution. the enemy were driven from their guns, but doggedly refused to strike, holding out, doubtless, in the hope that the cannonade might draw to their assistance some of the other armed ships accompanying the fleet. while the unequal combat was raging, a heavy squall came rushing over the water. the driving sheets of rain shut in the combatants, and only by the thunders of the cannonade could the other vessels tell that a battle was being fought in their midst. when the squall had passed by, the affrighted merchantmen were seen scudding in every direction, like a school of flying-fish into whose midst some rapacious shark or dolphin has intruded himself. but the three men-of-war, with several armed west-indiamen in their wake, were fast bearing down upon the combatants, with the obvious intention of rescuing their comrade, and punishing the audacious yankee. the odds against thompson were too great; and after staying by his adversary until the last possible moment, and pouring broadside after broadside into her, he abandoned the fight and rejoined the "alfred." the two ships hung on the flanks of the fleet for some days, in the hopes of enticing two of the men-of-war out to join in battle. but all was to no avail, and the americans were forced to content themselves with the scant glory won in the incomplete action of the "raleigh." her adversary proved to be the "druid," twenty, which suffered severely from the "raleigh's" repeated broadsides, having six killed, and twenty-six wounded; of the wounded, five died immediately after the battle. it was during the year that occurred the first attempt to use gunpowder in the shape of a submarine torpedo. this device, which to-day threatens to overturn all established ideas of naval organization and architecture, originated with a clever connecticut mechanic named david bushnell. his invention covered not only submarine torpedoes, to be launched against a vessel, but a submarine boat in which an adventurous navigator might undertake to go beneath the hull of a man-of-war, and affix the torpedoes, so that failure should be impossible. this boat in shape was not unlike a turtle. a system of valves, air-pumps, and ballast enabled the operator to ascend or descend in the water at will. a screw-propeller afforded means of propulsion, and phosphorescent gauges and compasses enabled him to steer with some accuracy. preliminary tests made with this craft were uniformly successful. after a skilled operator had been obtained, the boat perfectly discharged the duties required of her. but, as is so often the case, when the time for action came she proved inadequate to the emergency. let her inventor tell the story in his own words:-- "after various attempts to find an operator to my wish, i sent one, who appeared to be more expert than the rest, from new york, to a fifty-gun ship, lying not far from governor's island. he went under the ship, and attempted to fix the wooden screw to her bottom, but struck, as he supposes, a bar of iron, which passes from the rudder hinge, and is spiked under the ship's quarter. had he moved a few inches, which he might have done without rowing, i have no doubt he would have found wood where he might have fixed the screw; or, if the ship were sheathed with copper, he might easily have pierced it. but not being well skilled in the management of the vessel, in attempting to move to another place, he lost the ship. after seeking her in vain for some time, he rowed some distance, and rose to the surface of the water, but found daylight had advanced so far that he durst not renew the attempt. he says that he could easily have fastened the magazine under the stern of the ship above water, as he rowed up to the stern and touched it before he descended. had he fastened it there, the explosion of a hundred and fifty pounds of powder (the quantity contained in the magazine) must have been fatal to the ship. in his return from the ship to new york, he passed near governor's island, and thought he was discovered by the enemy on the island. being in haste to avoid the danger he feared, he cast off the magazine, as he imagined it retarded him in the swell, which was very considerable. after the magazine had been cast off one hour the time the internal apparatus was set to run, it blew up with great violence. "afterwards there were two attempts made in hudson's river, above the city; but they effected nothing. one of them was by the aforementioned person. in going toward the ship, he lost sight of her, and went a great distance beyond her. when he at length found her, the tide ran so strong, that, as he descended under water, for the ship's bottom, it swept him away. soon after this, the enemy went up the river, and pursued the boat which had the submarine vessel on board, and sunk it with their shot." so it appears, that, so far as this submarine vessel was concerned, bushnell's great invention came to naught. and, indeed, it was but the first of a long line of experiments which have been terribly costly in human life, and which as yet have not been brought to a successful end. in every war there comes forward the inventor with the submarine boat, and he always finds a few brave men ready to risk their lives in the floating coffin. somewhere in charleston harbor to-day lies a submarine boat, enclosing the skeletons of eight men, who went out in it to break the blockade of the port during the civil war. and although there are to-day several types of submarine boat, each of which is claimed to make practicable the navigation of the ocean's depths, yet it is doubtful whether any of them are much safer than bushnell's primitive "turtle." but bushnell's experiments in torpedo warfare were not confined to attempts to destroy hostile vessels by means of his submarine vessel. he made several attacks upon the enemy by means of automatic torpedoes, none of which met with complete success. one of these attacks, made at philadelphia in december, , furnished the incident upon which is founded the well-known ballad of the "battle of the kegs." it was at a time when the delaware was filled with british shipping, that bushnell set adrift upon its swift-flowing tide a number of small kegs, filled with gunpowder, and provided with percussion apparatus, so that contact with any object would explode them. the kegs were started on their voyage at night. but bushnell had miscalculated the distance they had to travel; so that, instead of reaching the british fleet under cover of darkness, they arrived early in the morning. great was the wonder of the british sentries, on ship and shore, to see the broad bosom of the river dotted with floating kegs. as the author of the satirical ballad describes it,-- "twas early day, as poets say, just as the sun was rising; a soldier stood on a log of wood and saw the sun a-rising. as in amaze he stood to gaze (the truth can't be denied, sir), he spied a score of kegs, or more, come floating down the tide, sir. a sailor, too, in jerkin blue, the strange appearance viewing, first d----d his eyes in great surprise, then said, 'some mischief's brewing.' these kegs, i'm told, the rebels hold, packed up like pickled herring; and they've come down to attack the town in this new way of ferrying." the curiosity of the british at this inexplicable spectacle gave place to alarm, when one of the kegs, being picked up, blew up a boat, and seriously injured the man whose curiosity had led him to examine it too closely. half panic-stricken, the british got out their guns, great and small; and all day every small object on the delaware was the target for a lively fusillade. "the cannons roar from shore to shore, the small arms loud did rattle. since wars began, i'm sure no man e'er saw so strange a battle. the fish below swam to and fro, attacked from every quarter. 'why sure' (thought they), 'the devil's to pay, 'mong folk above the water.'" but in the end the kegs all floated by the city, and only the ammunition stores of the british suffered from the attack. another attempt was made by bushnell to destroy the british frigate "cerberus," lying at anchor off the connecticut coast. a torpedo, with the usual percussion apparatus, was drawn along the side of the frigate by a long line, but fouled with a schooner lying astern. the explosion occurred with frightful force, and the schooner was wholly demolished. three men who were on board of her were blown to pieces; and a fourth was thrown high into the air, and was picked out of the water in an almost dying condition. these experiments of the connecticut mechanic in the revolutionary war were the forerunner of a movement which took almost a hundred years to become generally accepted. we have been accustomed to say that ericsson's armor-clad monitor revolutionized naval warfare; but the perfection of the torpedo is forcing the armor-clad ships into disuse, as they in their day thrust aside the old wooden frigates. the wise nation to-day, seeing how irresistible is the power of the torpedo, is abandoning the construction of cumbrous iron-clads, and building light, swift cruisers, that by speed and easy steering can avoid the submarine enemy. and if the torpedo cannot be said to be the ideal weapon of chivalric warfare, it may at least in time be credited with doing away with the custom of cooping men up in wrought-iron boxes, to fight with machine guns. farragut, who hated iron-clads, liked torpedoes little better; but had he foreseen their effects upon naval tactics, he might have hailed them as the destroyers of the iron-clad ships. chapter xii. naval events of . -- recruiting for the navy. -- the descent upon new providence. -- operations on the delaware. -- capt. barry's exploits. -- destruction of the american frigates. -- american reverses. -- the capture of the "pigot." -- french naval exploits. the year opened with the brightest prospects for the american cause. the notable success of the american arms on land, and particularly the surrender of burgoyne, had favorably disposed france toward an alliance with the united states; and, in fact, this alliance was soon formed. furthermore, the evidence of the prowess of the americans on shore had stirred up the naval authorities to vigorous action, and it was determined to make the year a notable one upon the ocean. much difficulty was found, at the very outset, in getting men to ship for service on the regular cruisers. privateers were being fitted out in every port; and on them the life was easy, discipline slack, danger to life small, and the prospects for financial reward far greater than on the united states men-of-war. accordingly, the seafaring men as a rule preferred to ship on the privateers. at no time in the history of the united states has the barbaric british custom of getting sailors for the navy by means of the "press-gang" been followed. american blue-jackets have never been impressed by force. it is unfortunately true that unfair advantages have been taken of their simplicity, and sometimes they have even been shipped while under the influence of liquor; but such cases have been rare. it is safe to say that few men have ever trod the deck of a united states man-of-war, as members of the crew, without being there of their own free will and accord. but in it was sometimes hard to fill the ships' rosters. then the ingenuity of the recruiting officers was called into play. a sailor who served on the "protector" during the revolution thus tells the story of his enlistment:-- "all means were resorted to which ingenuity could devise to induce men to enlist. a recruiting officer, bearing a flag, and attended by a band of martial music, paraded the streets, to excite a thirst for glory and a spirit of military ambition. the recruiting officer possessed the qualifications necessary to make the service appear alluring, especially to the young. he was a jovial, good-natured fellow, of ready wit and much broad humor. when he espied any large boys among the idle crowd around him, he would attract their attention by singing in a comical manner the following doggerel,-- 'all you that have bad masters, and cannot get your due, come, come, my brave boys, and join our ship's crew.' [illustration: commodore barry.] "a shout and a huzza would follow, and some would join in the ranks. my excitable feelings were aroused. i repaired to the rendezvous, signed the ship's papers, mounted a cockade, and was, in my own estimation, already more than half a sailor. appeals continued to be made to the patriotism of every young man, to lend his aid, by his exertions on sea or land, to free his country from the common enemy. about the last of february the ship was ready to receive her crew, and was hauled off into the channel, that the sailors might have no opportunity to run away after they were got on board. upward of three hundred and thirty men were carried, dragged, and driven on board, of all kinds, ages, and descriptions, in all the various stages of intoxication, from that of sober tipsiness to beastly drunkenness, with an uproar and clamor that may be more easily imagined than described." but, whatever the methods adopted to secure recruits for the navy, the men thus obtained did admirable service; and in no year did they win more glory than in . as usual the year's operations were opened by an exploit of one of the smaller cruisers. this was the united states sloop-of-war "providence," a trig little vessel, mounting only twelve four-pounders, and carrying a crew of but fifty men. but she was in command of a daring seaman capt. rathburne, and she opened the year's hostilities with an exploit worthy of paul jones. off the south-eastern coast of florida, in that archipelago or collection of groups of islands known collectively as the west indies, lies the small island of new providence. here in was a small british colony. the well-protected harbor, and the convenient location of the island, made it a favorite place for the rendezvous of british naval vessels. indeed, it bid fair to become, what nassau is to-day, the chief british naval station on the american coast. in the little seaport had a population of about one thousand people. with his little vessel, and her puny battery of four-pounders, capt. rathburne determined to undertake the capture of new providence. only the highest daring, approaching even recklessness, could have conceived such a plan. the harbor was defended by a fort of no mean power. there was always one british armed vessel, and often more, lying at anchor under the guns of the fort. two hundred of the people of the town were able-bodied men, able to bear arms. how, then, were the yankees, with their puny force, to hope for success? this query rathburne answered, "by dash and daring." it was about eleven o'clock on the night of the th of january, , that the "providence" cast anchor in a sheltered cove near the entrance to the harbor of new providence. twenty-five of her crew were put ashore, and being re-enforced by a few american prisoners kept upon the island, made a descent upon fort nassau from its landward side. the sentries dozing at their posts were easily overpowered, and the garrison was aroused from its peaceful slumbers by the cheers of the yankee blue-jackets as they came tumbling in over the ramparts. a rocket sent up from the fort announced the victory to the "providence," and she came in and cast anchor near the fort. when morning broke, the americans saw a large sixteen-gun ship lying at anchor in the harbor, together with five sail that looked suspiciously like captured american merchantmen. the proceedings of the night had been quietly carried on, and the crew of the armed vessel had no reason to suspect that the condition of affairs on shore had been changed in any way during the night. but at daybreak a boat carrying four men put off from the shore, and made for the armed ship; and at the same time a flag was flung out from the flagstaff of the fort,--not the familiar scarlet flag of great britain, but the almost unknown stars and stripes of the united states. the sleepy sailors on the armed vessel rubbed their eyes; and while they were staring at the strange piece of bunting, there came a hail from a boat alongside, and an american officer clambered over the rail. he curtly told the captain of the privateer that the fort was in the hands of the americans, and called upon him to surrender his vessel forthwith. resistance was useless; for the heavy guns of fort nassau were trained upon the british ship, and could blow her out of the water. the visitor's arguments proved to be unanswerable; and the captain of the privateer surrendered his vessel, which was taken possession of by the americans; while her crew of forty-five men was ordered into confinement in the dungeons of the fort which had so lately held captive americans. other boarding parties were then sent to the other vessels in the harbor, which proved to be american craft, captured by the british sloop-of-war "grayton." at sunrise the sleeping town showed signs of reviving life, and a party of the audacious yankees marched down to the house of the governor. that functionary was found in bed, and in profound ignorance of the events of the night. the americans broke the news to him none too gently, and demanded the keys of a disused fortress on the opposite side of the harbor from fort nassau. for a time the governor was inclined to demur; but the determined attitude of the americans soon persuaded him that he was a prisoner, though in his own house, and he delivered the keys. thereupon the americans marched through the streets of the city, around the harbor's edge to the fort, spiked the guns, and carrying with them the powder and small-arms, marched back to fort nassau. but by this time it was ten o'clock, and the whole town was aroused. the streets were crowded with people eagerly discussing the invasion. the timid ones were busily packing up their goods to fly into the country; while the braver ones were hunting for weapons, and organizing for an attack upon the fort held by the americans. fearing an outbreak, capt. rathburne sent out a flag of truce, making proclamation to all the inhabitants of new providence, that the americans would do no damage to the persons or property of the people of the island unless compelled so to do in self-defence. this pacified the more temperate of the inhabitants; but the hotheads, to the number of about two hundred, assembled before fort nassau, and threatened to attack it. but, when they summoned rathburne to surrender, that officer leaped upon the parapet, and coolly told the assailants to come on. "we can beat you back easily," said he. "and, by the eternal, if you fire a gun at us, we'll turn the guns of the fort on your town, and lay it in ruins." this bold defiance disconcerted the enemy; and, after some consultation among themselves, they dispersed. about noon that day, the british sloop-of-war "grayton" made her appearance, and stood boldly into the harbor where lay the "providence." the united states colors were quickly hauled down from the fort flagstaff, and every means was taken to conceal the true state of affairs from the enemy. but the inhabitants along the water-side, by means of constant signalling and shouting, at last aroused the suspicion of her officers; and she hastily put about, and scudded for the open sea. the guns at fort nassau opened on her as she passed, and the aim of the yankee gunners was accurate enough to make the splinters fly. the exact damage done her has, however, never been ascertained. all that night the daring band of blue-jackets held the fort unmolested. but on the following morning the townspeople again plucked up courage, and to the number of five hundred marched to the fort, and placing several pieces of artillery in battery, summoned the garrison to surrender. the flag of truce that bore the summons carried also the threat, that, unless the americans laid down their arms without resistance, the fort would be stormed, and all therein put to the sword without mercy. for answer to the summons, the americans nailed their colors to the mast, and swore that while a man of them lived the fort should not be surrendered. by this bold defiance they so awed the enemy that the day passed without the expected assault; and at night the besiegers returned to their homes, without having fired a shot. all that night the americans worked busily, transferring to the "providence" all the ammunition and stores in the fort; and the next morning the prizes were manned, the guns of the fort spiked, and the adventurous yankees set sail in triumph. for three days they had held possession of the island, though outnumbered tenfold by the inhabitants; they had captured large quantities of ammunition and naval stores; they had freed their captured countrymen; they had retaken from the british five captured american vessels, and in the whole affair they had lost not a single man. it was an achievement of which a force of triple the number might have been proud. in february, , the delaware, along the water-front of philadelphia, was the scene of some dashing work by american sailors, under the command of capt. john barry. this officer was in command of the "effingham," one of the vessels which had been trapped in the delaware by the unexpected occupation of philadelphia by the british. the inactivity of the vessels, which had taken refuge at whitehall, was a sore disappointment to barry, who longed for the excitement and dangers of actual battle. with the british in force at philadelphia, it was madness to think of taking the frigates down the stream. but barry rightly thought that what could not be done with a heavy ship might be done with a few light boats. philadelphia was then crowded with british troops. the soldiers were well provided with money, and, finding themselves quartered in a city for the winter, led a life of continual gayety. the great accession to the population of the town made it necessary to draw upon the country far and near for provisions; and boats were continually plying upon the delaware, carrying provisions to the city. to intercept some of these boats, and to give the merry british officers a taste of starvation, was barry's plan. accordingly four boats were manned with well-armed crews, and with muffled oars set out on a dark night to patrol the river. philadelphia was reached, and the expedition was almost past the city, when the sentries on one of the british men-of-war gave the alarm. a few scattering shots were fired from the shore; but the jackies bent to their oars, and the boats were soon lost to sight in the darkness. when day broke, barry was far down the river. opposite the little post held by the american army, and called fort penn, barry spied a large schooner, mounting ten guns, and flying the british flag. with her were four transport ships, loaded with forage for the enemy's forces. though the sun had risen, and it was broad day, barry succeeded in running his boats alongside the schooner; and before the british suspected the presence of any enemy, the blue-jackets were clambering over the rail, cutlass and pistol in hand. there was no resistance. the astonished englishmen threw down their arms, and rushed below. the victorious americans battened down the hatches, ordered the four transports to surrender, on pain of being fired into, and triumphantly carried all five prizes to the piers of fort penn. there the hatches were removed; and, the yankee sailors being drawn up in line, barry ordered the prisoners to come on deck. when all appeared, it was found that the yankees had bagged one major, two captains, three lieutenants, ten soldiers, and about a hundred sailors and marines,--a very respectable haul for a party of not more than thirty american sailors. the next day a british frigate and sloop-of-war appeared down the bay. they were under full sail, and were apparently making for fort penn, with the probable intention of recapturing barry's prizes. fearing that he might be robbed of the fruits of his victory, barry put the four transports in charge of capt. middleton, with instructions to fire them should the enemy attempt to cut them out. in the mean time, he took the ten-gun schooner, and made for the christiana river, in the hopes of taking her into shallow waters, whither the heavier british vessels could not follow. but, unluckily for his plans, the wind favored the frigate; and she gained upon him so rapidly, that only by the greatest expedition could he run his craft ashore and escape. two of the guns were pointed down the main hatch, and a few rounds of round-shot were fired through the schooner's bottom. she sunk quickly; and the americans pushed off from her side, just as the british frigate swung into position, and let fly her broadside at her escaping foes. the schooner being thus disposed of, the british turned their attention to the four captured transports at fort penn. capt. middleton and capt. mclane, who commanded the american militia on shore, had taken advantage of the delay to build a battery of bales of hay near the piers. the british sloop-of-war opened the attack, but the sharp-shooters in the battery and on the transports gave her so warm a reception that she retired. she soon returned to the attack, but was checked by the american fire, and might have been beaten off, had not middleton received a mortal wound while standing on the battery and cheering on his men. dismayed by the fall of their leader, the americans set fire to the transport and fled to the woods, leaving the british masters of the field. barry's conduct in this enterprise won for him the admiration of friend and foe alike. sir william howe, then commander-in-chief of the british forces in america, offered the daring american twenty thousand guineas and the command of a british frigate, if he would desert the service of the united states. "not the value and command of the whole british fleet," wrote barry in reply, "can seduce me from the cause of my country." after this adventure, barry and his followers made their way through the woods back to whitehall, where his ship the "effingham" was lying at anchor. here he passed the winter in inactivity. at whitehall, and near that place, were nearly a dozen armed ships, frigates, sloops, and privateers. all had fled thither for safety when the british took possession of philadelphia, and now found themselves caught in a trap. to run the blockade of british batteries and men-of-war at philadelphia, was impossible; and there was nothing to do but wait until the enemy should evacuate the city. but the british were in no haste to leave philadelphia; and when they did get ready to leave, they determined to destroy the american flotilla before departing. accordingly on the th of may, , the water-front of the quaker city was alive with soldiers and citizens watching the embarkation of the troops ordered against the american forces at whitehall. on the placid bosom of the delaware floated the schooners "viper" and "pembroke," the galleys "hussar," "cornwallis," "ferret," and "philadelphia," four gunboats, and eighteen flat-boats. between this fleet and the shore, boats were busily plying, carrying off the soldiers of the light infantry, seven hundred of whom were detailed for the expedition. it was a holiday affair. the british expected little fighting; and with flags flying, and bands playing, the vessels started up stream, the cheers of the soldiers on board mingling with those on the shore. bristol, the landing-place chosen, was soon reached; and the troops disembarked without meeting with any opposition. forming in solid column, the soldiers took up the march for whitehall; but, when within five miles of that place, a ruddy glare in the sky told that the americans had been warned of their coming, and had set the torch to the shipping. when the head of the british column entered whitehall, the two new american frigates "washington" and "effingham" were wrapped in flames. both were new vessels, and neither had yet taken on board her battery. several other vessels were lying at the wharves; and to these the british set the torch, and continued their march, leaving the roaring flames behind them. a little farther up the delaware, at the point known as crosswise creek, the large privateer "sturdy beggar" was found, together with several smaller craft. the crews had all fled, and the deserted vessels met the fate of the other craft taken by the invaders. then the british turned their steps homeward, and reached philadelphia, after having burned almost a score of vessels, and fired not a single shot. on the high seas during occurred several notable naval engagements. of the more important of these we have spoken in our accounts of the exploits of tucker, biddle, and paul jones. the less important ones must be dismissed with a hasty word. it may be said, that, in general, the naval actions of went against the americans. in february of that year the "alfred" was captured by a british frigate, and the "raleigh" narrowly escaped. in march, the new frigate "virginia," while beating out of chesapeake bay on her very first cruise, ran aground, and was captured by the enemy. in september, the united states frigate "raleigh," when a few days out from boston, fell in with two british vessels,--one a frigate, and the other a ship-of-the-line. capt. barry, whose daring exploits on the delaware we have chronicled, was in command of the "raleigh," and gallantly gave battle to the frigate, which was in the lead. between these two vessels the conflict raged with great fury for upwards of two hours, when the fore-topmast and mizzen top-gallant-mast of the american having been shot away barry attempted to close the conflict by boarding. the enemy kept at a safe distance, however; and his consort soon coming up, the americans determined to seek safety in flight. the enemy pursued, keeping up a rapid fire; and the running conflict continued until midnight. finally barry set fire to his ship, and with the greater part of his crew escaped to the nearest land, an island near the mouth of the penobscot. the british immediately boarded the abandoned ship, extinguished the flames, and carried their prize away in triumph. to offset these reverses to the american arms, there were one or two victories for the americans, aside from those won by paul jones, and the exploits of privateers and colonial armed vessels, which we shall group together in a later chapter. the first of these victories was won by an army officer, who was later transferred to the navy, and won great honor in the naval service. in an inlet of narragansett bay, near newport, the british had anchored a powerful floating battery, made of the dismasted hulk of the schooner "pigot," on which were mounted twelve eight-pounders and ten swivel guns. it was about the time that the fleet sent by france to aid the united states was expected to arrive; and the british had built and placed in position this battery, to close the channel leading to newport. major silas talbot, an army officer who had won renown earlier in the war by a daring but unsuccessful attempt to destroy two british frigates in the hudson river, by means of fire-ships, obtained permission to lead an expedition for the capture of the "pigot." accordingly, with sixty picked men, he set sail from providence in the sloop "hawk," mounting three three-pounders. when within a few miles of the "pigot," he landed, and, borrowing a horse, rode down and reconnoitred the battery. when the night set in, he returned to the sloop, and at once weighed anchor and made for the enemy. as the "hawk" drew near the "pigot," the british sentinels challenged her, and receiving no reply, fired a volley of musketry, which injured no one. on came the "hawk," under a full spread of canvas. a kedge-anchor had been lashed to the end of her bowsprit; and, before the british could reload, this crashed through the boarding-nettings of the "pigot," and caught in the shrouds. the two vessels being fast, the americans, with ringing cheers, ran along the bowsprit, and dropped on the deck of the "pigot." the surprise was complete. the british captain rushed on deck, clad only in his shirt and drawers, and strove manfully to rally his crew. but as the americans, cutlass and pistol in hand, swarmed over the taffrail, the surprised british lost heart, and fled to the hold, until at last the captain found himself alone upon the deck. nothing was left for him but to surrender with the best grace possible; and soon talbot was on his way back to providence, with his prize and a shipful of prisoners. but perhaps the greatest naval event of in american waters was the arrival of the fleet sent by france to co-operate with the american forces. not that any thing of importance was ever accomplished by this naval force: the french officers seemed to find their greatest satisfaction in manoeuvring, reconnoitring, and performing in the most exact and admirable manner all the preliminaries to a battle. having done this, they would sail away, never firing a gun. the yankees were prone to disregard the nice points of naval tactics. their plan was to lay their ships alongside the enemy, and pound away until one side or the other had to yield or sink. but the french allies were strong on tactics, and somewhat weak in dash; and, as a result, there is not one actual combat in which they figured to be recorded. it was a noble fleet that france sent to the aid of the struggling americans,--twelve ships-of-the-line and three frigates. what dashing paul jones would have done, had he ever enjoyed the command of such a fleet, almost passes imagination. certain it is that he would have wasted little time in formal evolutions. but the fleet was commanded by count d'estaing, a french naval officer of honorable reputation. what he accomplished during his first year's cruise in american waters, can be told in a few words. his intention was to trap lord howe's fleet in the delaware, but he arrived too late. he then followed the british to new york, but was baffled there by the fact that his vessels were too heavy to cross the bar. thence he went to newport, where the appearance of his fleet frightened the british into burning four of their frigates, and sinking two sloops-of-war. lord howe, hearing of this, plucked up courage, and, gathering together all his ships, sailed from new york to newport, to give battle to the french. the two fleets were about equally matched. on the th of august the enemies met in the open sea, off newport. for two days they kept out of range of each other, manoeuvring for the weather-gage; that is, the french fleet, being to windward of the british, strove to keep that position, while the british endeavored to take it from them. the third day a gale arose; and when it subsided the ships were so crippled, that, after exchanging a few harmless broadsides at long range, they withdrew, and the naval battle was ended. such was the record of d'estaing's magnificent fleet during . certainly the americans had little to learn from the representatives of the power that had for years contended with england for the mastery of the seas. chapter xiii. last years of the war. -- disastrous expedition to the penobscot. -- wholesale captures on the newfoundland banks. -- french ships in american waters. -- taking of charleston. -- the "trumbull's" victory and defeat. -- capt. barry and the "alliance." -- close of the war. the year is chiefly known in american naval history as the year in which paul jones did his most brilliant service in the "bon homme richard." the glory won by the americans was chiefly gained in european waters. along the coast of the united states, there were some dashing actions; but the advantage generally remained with the british. perhaps the most notable naval event of this year, aside from the battle between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis," was the expedition sent by the state of massachusetts against the british post at castine, on the banks of the penobscot river. at this unimportant settlement in the wilds of maine, the british had established a military post, with a garrison of about a thousand men, together with four armed vessels. here they might have been permitted to remain in peace, so far as any danger from their presence was to be apprehended by the people of new england. but the sturdy citizens of massachusetts had boasted, that, since the evacuation of boston, no british soldier had dared to set foot on massachusetts soil; and the news of this invasion caused the people of boston to rise as one man, and demand that the invaders should be expelled. accordingly a joint naval and military expedition was fitted out under authority granted by the legislature of the state. congress detailed the united states frigate "warren," and the sloops-of-war "diligence" and "providence," to head the expedition. the massachusetts cruisers "hazard," "active," and "tyrannicide" represented the regular naval forces of the bay state; and twelve armed vessels belonging to private citizens were hired, to complete the armada. the excitement among seafaring men ran high. every man who had ever swung a cutlass or sighted a gun was anxious to accompany the expedition. ordinarily it was difficult to ship enough men for the navy; now it was impossible to take all the applicants. it is even recorded that the list of common sailors on the armed ship "vengeance" included thirty masters of merchantmen, who waived all considerations of rank, in order that they might join the expedition. to co-operate with the fleet, a military force was thought necessary; and accordingly orders were issued for fifteen hundred of the militia of the district of maine to assemble at townsend. brig.-gen. sullivan was appointed to the command of the land forces, while capt. saltonstall of the "warren" was made commodore of the fleet. punctually on the day appointed the white sails of the american ships were seen by the militiamen at the appointed rendezvous. but when the ships dropped anchor, and the commodore went ashore to consult with the officers of the land forces, he found that but nine hundred of the militiamen had responded to the call. nevertheless, it was determined, after a brief consultation, to proceed with the expedition, despite the sadly diminished strength of the militia battalions. on the d of july, the fleet set sail from the harbor of townsend. it was an extraordinary and impressive spectacle. the shores of the harbor were covered with unbroken forests, save at the lower end where a little hamlet of scarce five hundred people gave a touch of civilization to the wild scene. but the water looked as though the commerce of a dozen cities had centred there. on the placid bosom of the little bay floated forty-four vessels. the tread of men about the capstans, the hoarse shouts of command, the monotonous songs of the sailors, the creaking of cordage, and the flapping of sails gave an unwonted turbulence to the air which seldom bore a sound other than the voices of birds or the occasional blows of a woodman's axe. nineteen vessels-of-war and twenty-five transports imparted to the harbor of townsend an air of life and bustle to which it had been a stranger, and which it has never since experienced. the weather was clear, and the wind fair; so that two days after leaving townsend the fleet appeared before the works of the enemy. standing on the quarter-deck of the "warren," the commodore and the general eagerly scanned the enemy's defences, and after a careful examination were forced to admit that the works they had to carry were no mean specimens of the art of fortification. the river's banks rose almost perpendicularly from the water-side, and on their crest were perched the enemy's batteries, while on a high and precipitous hill was built a fort or citadel. in the river were anchored the four armed vessels. two days were spent by the americans in reconnoitring the enemy's works; and on the th of july the work of disembarking the troops began, under a heavy fire from the enemy's batteries. the "warren" and one of the sloops-of-war endeavored to cover the landing party by attacking the batteries; and a spirited cannonade followed, in which the american flag-ship suffered seriously. at last all the militia, together with three hundred marines, were put on shore, and at once assaulted the batteries. they were opposed by about an equal number of well-drilled scotch regulars, and the battle raged fiercely; the men-of-war in the river covering the advance of the troops by a spirited and well-directed fire. more than once the curving line of men rushed against the fiery front of the british ramparts, and recoiled, shattered by the deadly volleys of the scotch veterans. here and there, in the grass and weeds, the forms of dead men began to be seen. the pitiable spectacle of the wounded, painfully crawling to the rear, began to make the pulse of the bravest beat quicker. but the men of massachusetts, responsive to the voices of their officers, re-formed their shattered ranks, and charged again and again, until at last, with a mighty cheer, they swept over the ramparts, driving the british out. many of the enemy surrendered; more fled for shelter to the fort on the hill. the smoke and din of battle died away. there came a brief respite in the bloody strife. the americans had won the first trick in the bloody game of war. only a short pause followed; then the americans moved upon the fort. but here they found themselves overmatched. against the towering bastions of the fortress they might hurl themselves in vain. the enemy, safe behind its heavy parapets, could mow down their advancing ranks with a cool and deliberate fire. the assailants had already sacrificed more than a hundred men. was it wise now to order an assault that might lead to the loss of twice that number? the hotheads cried out for the immediate storming of the fort; but cooler counsels prevailed, and a siege was decided upon. trenches were dug, the guns in the outlying batteries were turned upon the fort, and the new englanders sat down to wait until the enemy should be starved out or until re-enforcements might be brought from boston. so for three weeks the combatants rested on their arms, glaring at each other over the tops of their breastworks, and now and then exchanging a shot or a casual volley, but doing little in the way of actual hostilities. provisions were failing the british, and they began to feel that they were in a trap from which they could only emerge through a surrender, when suddenly the situation was changed, and the fortunes of war went against the americans. one morning the "tyrannicide," which was stationed on the lookout down the bay, was seen beating up the river, under a full press of sail. signals flying at her fore indicated that she had important news to tell. her anchor had not touched the bottom before a boat pushed off from her side, and made straight for the commodore's flag-ship. reaching the "warren," a lieutenant clambered over the side, and saluted commodore saltonstall on the quarter-deck. "capt. cathcart's compliments, sir," said he, "and five british men-of-war are just entering the bay. the first one appears to be the 'rainbow,' forty-four." here was news indeed. though superior in numbers, the americans were far inferior in weight of metal. after a hasty consultation, it was determined to abandon the siege, and retreat with troops and vessels to the shallow waters of the penobscot, whither the heavy men-of-war of the enemy would be unable to follow them. accordingly the troops were hastily re-embarked, and a hurried flight began, which was greatly accelerated by the appearance of the enemy coming up the river. the chase did not continue long before it became evident the enemy would overhaul the retreating ships. soon he came within range, and opened fire with his bow-guns, in the hopes of crippling one of the american ships. the fire was returned; and for several hours the wooded shores of the penobscot echoed and re-echoed the thunders of the cannonade, as the warring fleets swept up the river. at last the conviction forced itself on the minds of the americans, that for them there was no escape. the british were steadily gaining upon them, and there was no sign of the shoal water in which they had hoped to find a refuge. it would seem that a bold dash might have carried the day for the americans, so greatly did they outnumber their enemies. but this plan does not appear to have suggested itself to capt. saltonstall, who had concentrated all his efforts upon the attempt to escape. when escape proved to be hopeless, his only thought was to destroy his vessels. accordingly his flag-ship, the "warren," was run ashore, and set on fire. the action of the commodore was imitated by the rest of the officers, and soon the banks of the river were lined with blazing vessels. the "hunter," the "hampden," and one transport fell into the hands of the british. the rest of the forty-nine vessels--men-of-war, privateers, and transports--that made up the fleet were destroyed by flames. it must indeed have been a stirring spectacle. the shores of the penobscot river were then a trackless wilderness; the placid bosom of the river itself had seldom been traversed by a heavier craft than the slender birch-bark canoe of the red man; yet here was this river crowded with shipping, the dark forests along its banks lighted up by the glare of twoscore angry fires. through the thickets and underbrush parties of excited men broke their way, seeking for a common point of meeting, out of range of the cannon of the enemy. the british, meantime, were striving to extinguish the flames, but with little success; and before the day ended, little remained of the great massachusetts flotilla, except the three captured ships and sundry heaps of smouldering timber. the hardships of the soldiers and marines who had escaped capture, only to find themselves lost in the desolate forest, were of the severest kind. separating into parties they plodded along, half-starved, with torn and rain-soaked clothing, until finally, footsore and almost perishing, they reached the border settlements, and were aided on their way to boston. the disaster was complete, and for months its depressing effect upon american naval enterprise was observable. in observing the course of naval events in , it is noticeable that the most effective work was done by the cruisers sent out by the individual states, or by privateers. the united states navy, proper, did little except what was done in european waters by paul jones. indeed, along the american coast, a few cruises in which no actions of moment occurred, although several prizes were taken, make up the record of naval activity for the year. the first of these cruises was that made in april by the ships "warren," "queen of france," and "ranger." they sailed from boston, and were out but a few days when they captured a british privateer of fourteen guns. from one of the sailors on this craft it was learned that a large fleet of transports and storeships had just sailed from new york, bound for georgia. crowding on all sail, the americans set out in pursuit, and off cape henry overhauled the chase. two fleets were sighted, one to windward numbering nine sail, and one to leeward made up of ten sail. the pursuers chose the fleet to windward for their prey, and by sharp work succeeded in capturing seven vessels in eight hours. two of the ships were armed cruisers of twenty-nine and sixteen guns respectively, and all the prizes were heavy laden with provisions, ammunition, and cavalry accoutrements. all were safely taken into port. in june, another fleet of united states vessels left boston in search of british game. the "queen of france" and the "ranger" were again employed; but the "warren" remained in port, fitting out for her ill-fated expedition to the penobscot. her place was taken by the "providence," thirty-two. for a time the cruisers fell in with nothing of importance. but one day about the middle of july, as the three vessels lay hove to off the banks of newfoundland, in the region of perpetual fog, the dull booming of a signal gun was heard. nothing was to be seen on any side. from the quarter-deck, and from the cross-trees alike, the eager eyes of the officers and seamen strove in vain to penetrate the dense curtain of gray fog that shut them in. but again the signal gun sounded, then another; and tone and direction alike told that the two reports had not come from the same cannon. then a bell was heard telling the hour,--another, still another; then a whole chorus of bells. clearly a large fleet was shut in the fog. [illustration: shortening sail on the "lancaster"--the oldest u. s. cruiser in commission.] about eleven o'clock in the morning the fog lifted, and to their intense surprise the crew of the "queen of france" found themselves close alongside of a large merchant-ship. as the fog cleared away more completely, ships appeared on every side; and the astonished yankees found themselves in the midst of a fleet of about one hundred and fifty sail under convoy of a british ship-of-the-line, and several frigates and sloops-of-war. luckily the united states vessels had no colors flying, and nothing about them to betray their nationality: so capt. rathburn of the "queen" determined to try a little masquerading. bearing down upon the nearest merchantman, he hailed her; and the following conversation ensued,-- "what fleet is this?" "british merchantmen from jamaica, bound for london. who are you?" "his majesty's ship 'arethusa,'" answered rathburn boldly, "from halifax on cruise. have you seen any yankee privateers?" "ay, ay, sir," was the response. "several have been driven out of the fleet." "come aboard the 'arethusa,' then. i wish to consult with you." soon a boat put off from the side of the merchantman, and a jolly british sea-captain confidently clambered to the deck of the "queen." great was his astonishment to be told that he was a prisoner, and to see his boat's crew brought aboard, and their places taken by american jackies. back went the boat to the british ship; and soon the americans were in control of the craft, without in the least alarming the other vessels, that lay almost within hail. the "queen" then made up to another ship, and captured her in the same manner. but at this juncture commodore whipple, in the "providence," hailed the "queen," and directed rathburn to edge out of the fleet before the british men-of-war should discover his true character. rathburn protested vigorously, pointing out the two vessels he had captured, and urging whipple to follow his example, and capture as many vessels as he could in the same manner. finally whipple overcame his fears, and adopted rathburn's methods, with such success that shortly after nightfall the americans left the fleet, taking with them eleven rich prizes. eight of these they succeeded in taking safe to boston, where they were sold for more than a million dollars. in may, , occurred two unimportant engagements,--one off sandy hook, in which the united states sloop "providence," ten guns, captured the british sloop "diligent," after a brief but spirited engagement; the second action occurred off st. kitts, where the united states brig "retaliation" successfully resisted a vigorous attack by a british cutter and a brig. the record of the regular navy for the year closed with the cruise of the united states frigates "deane" and "boston," that set sail from the delaware late in the summer. they kept the seas for nearly three months, but made only a few bloodless captures. the next year opened with a great disaster to the american cause. the count d'estaing, after aimlessly wandering up and down the coast of the united states with the fleet ostensibly sent to aid the americans, suddenly took himself and his fleet off to the west indies. sir henry clinton soon learned of the departure of the french, and gathered an expedition for the capture of charleston. on the th of february, clinton with five thousand troops, and a british fleet under admiral arbuthnot, appeared off edisto inlet, about thirty miles from charleston, and began leisurely preparations for an attack upon the city. had he pushed ahead and made his assault at once, he would have met but little resistance; but his delay of over a month gave the people of charleston time to prepare for a spirited resistance. the approach of the british fleet penned up in charleston harbor several united states men-of-war and armed vessels, among them the "providence," "queen of france," "boston," "ranger," "gen. moultrie," and "notre dame." these vessels took an active part in the defence of the harbor against arbuthnot's fleet, but were beaten back. the "queen," the "gen. moultrie," and the "notre dame" were then sunk in the channel to obstruct the progress of the enemy; their guns being taken ashore, and mounted in the batteries on the sea-wall. then followed days of terror for charleston. the land forces of the enemy turned siege guns on the unhappy city, and a constant bombardment was kept up from the hostile fleet. fort sumter, the batteries along the water front, and the ships remaining to the americans answered boldly. but the defence was hopeless. the city was hemmed in by an iron cordon. the hot-shot of the enemy's batteries were falling in the streets, and flames were breaking out in all parts of the town. while the defence lasted, the men-of-war took an active part in it; and, indeed, the sailors were the last to consent to a surrender. so noticeable was the activity of the frigate "boston" in particular, that, when it became evident that the americans could hold out but a little longer, admiral arbuthnot sent her commander a special order to surrender. "i do not think much of striking my flag to your present force," responded bluff samuel tucker, who commanded the "boston;" "for i have struck more of your flags than are now flying in this harbor." but, despite this bold defiance, the inevitable capitulation soon followed. charleston fell into the hands of the british; and with the city went the three men-of-war, "providence," "boston," and "ranger." it will be noticed that this disaster was the direct result of the disappearance of count d'estaing and the french fleet. to the student of history who calmly considers the record of our french naval allies in the revolution, there appears good reason to believe that their presence did us more harm than good. under de grasse, the french fleet did good service in co-operation with the allied armies in the yorktown campaign; but, with this single exception, no instance can be cited of any material aid rendered by it to the american cause. the united states navy, indeed, suffered on account of the french alliance; for despite the loss of many vessels in and , congress refused to increase the navy in any way, trusting to france to care for america's interests on the seas. the result of this policy was a notable falling-off in the number and spirit of naval actions. the ship "trumbull," twenty-eight, one of the exploits of which we have already chronicled, saw a good deal of active service during the last two years of the war; and though she finally fell into the hands of the enemy, it was only because the odds against her were not to be overcome by the most spirited resistance. it was on the d of june, , that the "trumbull," while cruising far out in the atlantic ocean in the path of british merchantmen bound for the west indies, sighted a strange sail hull down to windward. the "trumbull" was then in command of capt. james nicholson, an able and plucky officer. immediately on hearing the report of the lookout, nicholson ordered all the canvas furled, in order that the stranger might not catch sight of the "trumbull." it is, of course, obvious that a ship under bare poles is a far less conspicuous object upon the ocean, than is the same ship with her yards hung with vast clouds of snowy canvas. but apparently the stranger sighted the "trumbull," and had no desire to avoid her; for she bore down upon the american ship rapidly, and showed no desire to avoid a meeting. seeing this, nicholson made sail, and was soon close to the stranger. as the two ships drew closer together, the stranger showed her character by firing three guns, and hoisting the british colors. seeing an action impending, nicholson called his crew aft and harangued them, as was the custom before going into battle. it was not a promising outlook for the american ship. she was but recently out of port, and was manned largely by "green hands." the privateers had so thoroughly stripped the decks of able seamen, that the "trumbull" had to ship men who knew not one rope from another; and it is even said, that, when the drums beat to quarters the day of the battle, many of the sailors were suffering from the landsman's terror, seasickness. but what they lacked in experience, they made up in enthusiasm. with the british flag at the peak, the "trumbull" bore down upon the enemy. but the stranger was not to be deceived by so hackneyed a device. he set a private signal, and, as the americans did not answer it, let fly a broadside at one hundred yards distance. the "trumbull" responded with spirit, and the stars and stripes went fluttering to the peak in the place of the british ensign. then the thunder of battle continued undiminished for two hours and a half. the wind was light, and the vessels rode on an even keel nearly abreast of each other, and but fifty yards apart. at times their yard-arms interlocked; and still the heavy broadsides rang out, and the flying shot crashed through beam and stanchion, striking down the men at their guns, and covering the decks with blood. twice the flying wads of heavy paper from the enemy's guns set the "trumbull" a-fire, and once the british ship was endangered by the same cause. at last the fire of the enemy slackened, and the americans, seeing victory within their grasp, redoubled their efforts; but at this critical moment one of the gun-deck officers came running to nicholson, with the report that the main-mast had been repeatedly hit by the enemy's shot, and was now tottering. if the main-mast went by the board, the fate of the "trumbull" was sealed. crowding sail on the other masts, the "trumbull" shot ahead, and was soon out of the line of fire, the enemy being apparently too much occupied with his own injuries to molest her. hardly had she gone the distance of a musket-shot, when her main and mizzen top-masts went by the board; and before the nimble jackies could cut away the wreck the other spars followed, until nothing was left but the foremast. when the crashing and confusion was over, the "trumbull" lay a pitiable wreck, and an easy prey for her foe. but the briton showed a strange disinclination to take advantage of the opportunity. the yankee sailors worked like mad in cutting away the wreck; then rushed to their guns, ready to make a desperate, if hopeless, resistance in case of an attack. but the attack never came. without even a parting shot the enemy went off on her course; and before she was out of sight her main topmast was seen to fall, showing that she too had suffered in the action. not for months after did the crew of the "trumbull" learn the name of the vessel they had fought. at last it was learned that she was a heavy letter-of-marque, the "watt." her exact weight of metal has never been ascertained, though capt. nicholson estimated it at thirty-four or thirty-six guns. the "trumbull" mounted thirty-six guns. the captain of the "watt" reported his loss to have been ninety-two in killed and wounded; the loss of the "trumbull" amounted to thirty-nine, though two of her lieutenants were among the slain. this action, in severity, ranked next to the famous naval duel between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis." as the "trumbull" fought her last battle under the flag of the united states a year later, and as our consideration of the events of the revolution is drawing to a close, we may abandon chronological order, and follow nicholson and his good ship to the end of their career. in august, , the "trumbull" left the delaware, convoying twenty-eight merchantmen, and accompanied by one privateer. again her crew was weakened by the scarcity of good seamen, and this time nicholson had adopted the dangerous and indefensible expedient of shipping british prisoners-of-war. there were fifty of these renegades in the crew; and naturally, as they were ready to traitorously abandon their own country, they were equally ready for treachery to the flag under which they sailed. there were many instances during the revolution of united states ships being manned largely by british prisoners. usually the crews thus obtained were treacherous and insubordinate. even if it had been otherwise, the custom was a bad one, and repugnant to honorable men. so with a crew half-trained and half-disaffected, the "trumbull" set out to convoy a fleet of merchantmen through waters frequented by british men-of-war. hardly had she passed the capes when three british cruisers were made out astern. one, a frigate, gave chase. night fell, and in the darkness the "trumbull" might have escaped with her charges, but that a violent squall struck her, carrying away her fore-topmast and main-top-gallant-mast. her convoy scattered in all directions, and by ten o'clock the british frigate had caught up with the disabled american. the night was still squally, with bursts of rain and fitful flashes of lightning, which lighted up the decks of the american ship as she tossed on the waves. the storm had left her in a sadly disabled condition. the shattered top hamper had fallen forward, cumbering up the forecastle, and so tangling the bow tackle that the jibs were useless. the foresail was jammed and torn by the fore-topsail-yard. there was half a day's work necessary to clear away the wreck, and the steadily advancing lights of the british ship told that not half an hour could be had to prepare for the battle. there was no hope that resistance could be successful, but the brave hearts of nicholson and his officers recoiled from the thought of tamely striking the flag without firing a shot. so the drummers were ordered to beat the crew to quarters; and soon, by the light of the battle-lanterns, the captains of the guns were calling over the names of the sailors. the roll-call had proceeded but a short time when it became evident that most of the british renegades were absent from their stations. the officers and marines went below to find them. while they were absent, others of the renegades, together with about half of the crew whom they had tainted with their mutinous plottings, put out the battle-lanterns, and hid themselves deep in the hold. at this moment the enemy came up, and opened fire. determined to make some defence, nicholson sent the few faithful jackies to the guns, and the officers worked side by side with the sailors. the few guns that were manned were served splendidly, and the unequal contest was maintained for over an hour, when a second british man-of-war came up, and the "trumbull" was forced to strike. at no time had more than forty of her people been at the guns. to this fact is due the small loss of life; for, though the ship was terribly cut up, only five of her crew were killed, and eleven wounded. the frigate that had engaged the "trumbull" was the "iris," formerly the "hancock" captured from the americans by the "rainbow." she was one of the largest of the american frigates, while the "trumbull" was one of the smallest. the contest, therefore, would have been unequal, even had not so many elements of weakness contributed to the "trumbull's" discomfiture. taking up again the thread of our narrative of the events of , we find that for three months after the action between the "trumbull" and the "watt" there were no naval actions of moment. not until october did a united states vessel again knock the tompions from her guns, and give battle to an enemy. during that month the cruiser "saratoga" fell in with a hostile armed ship and two brigs. the action that followed was brief, and the triumph of the americans complete. one broadside was fired by the "saratoga;" then, closing with her foe, she threw fifty men aboard, who drove the enemy below. but the gallant americans were not destined to profit by the results of their victory; for, as they were making for the delaware, the british seventy-four "intrepid" intercepted them, and recaptured all the prizes. the "saratoga" escaped capture, only to meet a sadder fate; for, as she never returned to port, it is supposed that she foundered with all on board. the autumn and winter passed without any further exploits on the part of the navy. the number of the regular cruisers had been sadly diminished, and several were kept blockaded in home ports. along the american coast the british cruisers fairly swarmed; and the only chance for the few yankee ships afloat was to keep at sea as much as possible, and try to intercept the enemy's privateers, transports, and merchantmen, on their way across the ocean. one united states frigate, and that one a favorite ship in the navy, was ordered abroad in february, , and on her voyage did some brave work for her country. this vessel was the "alliance," once under the treacherous command of the eccentric landais, and since his dismissal commanded by capt. john barry, of whose plucky fight in the "raleigh" we have already spoken. the "alliance" sailed from boston, carrying an army officer on a mission to france. she made the voyage without sighting an enemy. having landed her passenger, she set out from l'orient, with the "lafayette," forty, in company. the two cruised together for three days, capturing two heavy privateers. they then parted, and the "alliance" continued her cruise alone. on the th of may the lookout reported two sail in sight; and soon the strangers altered their course, and bore down directly upon the american frigate. it was late in the afternoon, and darkness set in before the strangers were near enough for their character to be made out. at dawn all eyes on the "alliance" scanned the ocean in search of the two vessels, which were then easily seen to be a sloop-of-war and a brig. over each floated the british colors. a dead calm rested upon the waters. canvas was spread on all the ships, but flapped idly against the yards. not the slightest motion could be discerned, and none of the ships had steerage-way. the enemy had evidently determined to fight; for before the sun rose red and glowing from beneath the horizon, sweeps were seen protruding from the sides of the two ships, and they gradually began to lessen the distance between them and the american frigate. capt. barry had no desire to avoid the conflict; though in a calm, the lighter vessels, being manageable with sweeps, had greatly the advantage of the "alliance," which could only lie like a log upon the water. six hours of weary work with the sweeps passed before the enemy came near enough to hail. the usual questions and answers were followed by the roar of the cannon, and the action began. the prospects for the "alliance" were dreary indeed; for the enemy took positions on the quarters of the helpless ship, and were able to pour in broadsides, while she could respond only with a few of her aftermost guns. but, though the case looked hopeless, the americans fought on, hoping that a wind might spring up, that would give the good ship "alliance" at least a fighting chance. as barry strode the quarter-deck, watching the progress of the fight, encouraging his men, and looking out anxiously for indications of a wind, a grape-shot struck him in the shoulder, and felled him to the deck. he was on his feet again in an instant; and though weakened by the pain, and the rapid flow of blood from the wound, he remained on deck. at last, however, he became too weak to stand, and was carried below. at this moment a flying shot carried away the american colors; and, as the fire of the "alliance" was stopped a moment for the loading of the guns, the enemy thought the victory won, and cheered lustily. but their triumph was of short duration; for a new ensign soon took the place of the vanished one, and the fire of the "alliance" commenced again. the "alliance" was now getting into sore straits. the fire of the enemy had told heavily upon her, and her fire in return had done but little visible damage. as capt. barry lay on his berth, enfeebled by the pain of his wound, and waiting for the surgeon's attention, a lieutenant entered. "the ship remains unmanageable, sir," said he. "the rigging is badly cut up, and there is danger that the fore-topmast may go by the board. the enemy's fire is telling on the hull, and the carpenter reports two leaks. eight or ten of the people are killed, and several officers wounded. have we your consent to striking the colors?" "no, sir," roared out barry, sitting bolt upright. "and, if this ship can't be fought without me, i will be carried on deck." the lieutenant returned with his report; and, when the story became known to the crew, the jackies cheered for their dauntless commander. "we'll stand by the old man, lads," said one of the petty officers. "ay, ay, that we will! we'll stick to him right manfully," was the hearty response. but now affairs began to look more hopeful for the "alliance." far away a gentle rippling of the water rapidly approaching the ship gave promise of wind. the quick eye of an old boatswain caught sight of it. "a breeze, a breeze!" he cried; and the jackies took up the shout, and sprang to their stations at the ropes, ready to take advantage of the coming gust. soon the breeze arrived, the idly flapping sails filled out, the helmsman felt the responsive pressure of the water as he leaned upon the wheel, the gentle ripple of the water alongside gladdened the ears of the blue-jackets, the ship keeled over to leeward, then swung around responsive to her helm, and the first effective broadside went crashing into the side of the nearest british vessel. after that, the conflict was short. though the enemy had nearly beaten the "alliance" in the calm, they were no match for her when she was able to manoeuvre. their resistance was plucky; but when capt. barry came on deck, with his wound dressed, he was just in time to see the flags of both vessels come fluttering to the deck. the two prizes proved to be the "atlanta" sixteen, and the "trepassy" fourteen. both were badly cut up, and together had suffered a loss of forty-one men in killed and wounded. on the "alliance" were eleven dead, and twenty-one wounded. as the capture of the two vessels threw about two hundred prisoners into the hands of the americans, and as the "alliance" was already crowded with captives, capt. barry made a cartel of the "trepassy," and sent her into an english port with all the prisoners. the "atlanta" he manned with a prize crew, and sent to boston; but she unluckily fell in with a british cruiser in massachusetts bay, and was retaken. once more before the cessation of hostilities between great britain and the united states threw her out of commission, did the "alliance" exchange shots with a hostile man-of-war. it was in , when the noble frigate was engaged in bringing specie from the west indies. she had under convoy a vessel loaded with supplies, and the two had hardly left havana when some of the enemy's ships caught sight of them, and gave chase. while the chase was in progress, a fifty-gun ship hove in sight, and was soon made out to be a french frigate. feeling that he had an ally at hand, barry now wore ship, and attacked the leading vessel, and a spirited action followed, until the enemy, finding himself hard pressed, signalled for his consorts, and barry, seeing that the french ship made no sign of coming to his aid, drew off. irritated by the failure of the french frigate to come to his assistance, barry bore down upon her and hailed. the french captain declared that the manoeuvres of the "alliance" and her antagonist had made him suspect that the engagement was only a trick to draw him into the power of the british fleet. he had feared that the "alliance" had been captured, and was being used as a decoy; but now that the matter was made clear to him, he would join the "alliance" in pursuit of the enemy. this he did; but barry soon found that the fifty was so slow a sailer, that the "alliance" might catch up with the british fleet, and be knocked to pieces by their guns, before the frenchman could get within range. accordingly he abandoned the chase in disgust, and renewed his homeward course. some years later, an american gentleman travelling in europe met the british naval officer who commanded the frigate which barry had engaged. this officer, then a vice-admiral, declared that he had never before seen a ship so ably fought as was the "alliance," and acknowledged that the presence of his consorts alone saved him a drubbing. this engagement was the last fought by the "alliance" during the revolution, and with it we practically complete our narrative of the work of the regular navy during that war. one slight disaster to the american cause alone remains to be mentioned. the "confederacy," a thirty-two-gun frigate built in , was captured by the enemy in . she was an unlucky ship, having been totally dismasted on her first cruise, and captured by an overwhelming force on her second. though this chapter completes the story of the regular navy during the revolution, there remain many important naval events to be described in an ensuing chapter. the work of the ships fitted out by congress was aided greatly by the armed cruisers furnished by individual states, and privateers. some of the exploits of these crafts and some desultory maritime hostilities we shall describe in the next chapter. and if the story of the united states navy, as told in these few chapters, seems a record of events trivial as compared with the gigantic naval struggles of and , it must be remembered that not only were naval architecture and ordnance in their infancy in , but that the country was young, and its sailors unused to the ways of war. but that country, young as it was, produced paul jones; and it is to be questioned whether any naval war since has brought forth a braver or nobler naval officer, or one more skilled in the handling of a single ship-of-war. the result of the war of the revolution is known to all. a new nation was created by it. these pages will perhaps convince their readers that to the navy was due somewhat the creation of that nation. and if to-day, in its power and might, the united states seems inclined to throw off the navy and belittle its importance, let the memory of paul jones and his colleagues be conjured up, to awaken the old enthusiasm over the triumphs of the stars and stripes upon the waves. chapter xiv. work of the privateers. -- the "gen. hancock" and the "levant." -- exploits of the "pickering." -- the "revenge." -- the "holkar." -- the "congress" and the "savage." -- the "hyder ali" and the "gen. monk." -- the whale-boat hostilities. -- the old jersey prison-ship. to chronicle in full the myriad exploits and experiences of the privateers and armed cruisers in the service of individual states during the revolution, would require a volume thrice the size of this. moreover, it is difficult and well-nigh impossible to obtain authentic information regarding the movements of this class of armed craft. an immense number of anecdotes of their prowess is current, and some few such narratives will be repeated in this chapter; but, as a rule, they are based only upon tradition, or the imperfect and often incorrect reports in the newspapers of the day. the loss inflicted upon great britain by the activity of american privateers was colossal. for the first year of the war the continental congress was unwilling to take so belligerent a step as to encourage privateering; but, in the summer of , the issuing of letters of marque and reprisal was begun, and in a short time all new england had gone to privateering. the ocean fairly swarmed with trim yankee schooners and brigs, and in the two years that followed nearly eight hundred merchantmen were taken. discipline on the privateers was lax, and the profits of a successful cruise were enormous. often a new speedy craft paid her whole cost of construction on her first cruise. the sailors fairly revelled in money at the close of such a cruise; and, like true jack-tars, they made their money fly as soon as they got ashore. a few days would generally suffice to squander all the earnings of a two-months' cruise; and, penniless but happy, jack would ship for another bout with fortune. a volume could be written dealing with the exploits of the privateers, but for our purpose a few instances of their dash and spirit will be enough. though the purpose of the privateers was purely mercenary, their chief end and aim being to capture defenceless merchantmen, yet they were always ready to fight when fighting was necessary, and more than once made a good showing against stronger and better disciplined naval forces. in many cases audacity and dash more than made up for the lack of strength. in two american privateers hung about the british isles, making captures, and sending their prizes into french ports. the exploits of paul jones were equalled by these irregular cruisers. one of them, being in need of provisions, put into the little irish port of beerhaven, and lay at anchor for ten hours, while her crew scoured the town in search of the needed stores. a second privateer boldly entered a harbor on the island of guernsey. a castle at the entrance of the harbor opened fire upon her, whereupon she came about, and, keeping out of range of the castle guns, captured a large brig that was making for the port. when night fell, the privateer sent a boat's crew ashore, and took captive two officers of the local militia. in occurred an action between a private armed ship and a british frigate, in which the privateer was signally successful. on the th of september of that year, the "gen. hancock," a stout-built, well armed and manned privateer, fell in with the "levant," a british frigate of thirty-two guns. the "hancock" made no attempt to avoid a conflict, and opened with a broadside without answering the enemy's hail. the action was stubbornly contested upon both sides. after an hour of fighting, the captain of the yankee ship, peering through the smoke, saw that the colors no longer waved above his adversary. "have you struck?" he shouted. "no. fire away," came the response faintly through the roar of the cannon. two hours longer the combat raged, with the ships lying yard-arm to yard-arm. a ball struck capt. hardy of the "hancock" in the neck, and he was carried below, while the first lieutenant took command of the ship. a few minutes later there arose a deafening roar and blinding flash; a terrific shock threw the men on the american ship to the deck. stifling smoke darkened the atmosphere; and pieces of timber, cordage, and even horribly torn bits of human flesh began to fall upon the decks. when the smoke cleared away, the americans looked eagerly for their enemy. where she had floated a minute or two before, was now a shattered, blackened hulk fast sinking beneath the waves. the surface of the sea for yards around was strewn with wreckage, and here and there men could be seen struggling for life. as ready to save life as they had been to destroy it, the americans lowered their boats and pulled about, picking up the survivors of the explosion. the boatswain of the ill-fated ship and seventeen of the crew were thus saved, but more than fourscore brave fellows went down with her. the american vessel herself was damaged not a little by the violence of the explosion. this was not the only case during this year in which a british man-of-war met defeat at the guns of a yankee privateer. the "hinchinbrooke," sloop-of-war fourteen; the "york," tender twelve; and the "enterprise," ten guns,--all struck their colors to private armed vessels flying the stars and stripes. by the privateers under the british flag were afloat in no small number. america had no commerce on which they might prey, and they looked forward only to recapturing those british vessels that had been taken by yankee privateers and sent homeward. that so many british vessels should have found profitable employment in this pursuit, is in itself a speaking tribute to the activity of the american private armed navy. during the revolution, as during the second war with great britain in , salem, mass., and baltimore, md., were the principal points from which privateers hailed. in all the early wars of the united states, the term "salem privateer" carried with it a picture of a fleet schooner, manned with a picked crew of able seamen, commanded by a lanky yankee skipper who knew the byways of old ocean as well as the highways of trade, armed with eight, four, or six pounders, and a heavy "long tom" amidships. scores of such craft sailed from salem during the revolution; and hardly a week passed without two or three returning privateers entering the little port and discharging their crews, to keep the little village in a turmoil until their prize money was spent, or, to use the sailors' phrase, until "no shot was left in the locker." one of the most successful of the salem privateers was the "pickering," a craft carrying a battery of sixteen guns, and a crew of forty-seven men. on one cruise she fought an engagement of an hour and a half with a british cutter of twenty guns; and so roughly did she handle the enemy, that he was glad to sheer off. a day of two later, the "pickering" overhauled the "golden eagle," a large schooner of twenty-two guns and fifty-seven men. the action which followed was ended by the schooner striking her flag. a prize crew was then put aboard the "golden eagle," and she was ordered to follow in the wake of her captor. three days later the british sloop-of-war "achilles" hove in sight, and gave chase to the privateer and her prize. after a fifteen hours' chase the prize was overhauled; and the sloop-of-war, after taking possession of her, continued in pursuit of the privateer. but while the privateersmen had preferred flight to fighting while nothing was at stake, they did not propose to let their prize be taken from them without a resistance, however great the odds against them. accordingly they permitted the "achilles" to overhaul them, and a sharp action followed. the british tried to force the combat by boarding; but the americans, with pikes and cutlasses, drove them back to their own ship. then the two vessels separated, and during the rest of the conflict came no nearer each other than the length of a pistol-shot. at this distance they carried on a spirited cannonade for upwards of three hours; when the "achilles," concluding that she had had enough, sheered off. thereupon, the "pickering" coolly ran back to her late prize, took possession of her, captured the lieutenant and prize crew that the "achilles" had put in charge of her, and continued her cruise. a good example of the baltimore privateers was the "revenge," mounting eighteen guns, with a crew of fifty men. in this vessel was commanded by capt. alexander murray of the regular navy. she was engaged by a large number of baltimore merchants to convoy a fleet of merchantmen, but had hardly started to sea with her charges when she fell in with a fleet of british vessels, and was forced to retreat up the patuxent river. while there, the american fleet was strengthened by several privateers and armed merchant-vessels which joined it, so that it was felt safe to try again to get to sea. accordingly the attempt was made; but, though the captains of the fleet had signed a solemn compact to stand together in case of the danger, the sudden appearance of a fleet of hostile armed vessels sent all scurrying up the patuxent again, except one brig and a schooner. the british fleet consisted of a ship of eighteen guns, a brig of sixteen, and three privateer schooners. leaving the schooners to his two faithful consorts, murray threw himself between the two larger vessels and the flying merchantmen. seeing themselves thus balked of their prey, the enemy turned fiercely upon the "revenge," but were met with so spirited a resistance, that they hauled off after an hour's fighting. the other american vessels behaved equally well, and the discomfiture of the british was complete. philadelphia, though not looked upon as a centre of privateering activity, furnished one privateer that made a notable record. this was the "holkar," sixteen guns. in april, , she captured a british schooner of ten guns, and in may of the same year she fought a desperate action with a british privateer brig, the name of which has never been ascertained. twice the briton sheered off to escape the telling fire of the american; but the "holkar" pressed him closely, and only the appearance of a second british armed vessel at the scene of the action saved the englishman from capture. this battle was one of the most sanguinary ever fought by private armed vessels; for of the crew of the "holkar" six were killed and sixteen wounded, including the captain and first lieutenant, while of the enemy there were about the same number killed and twenty wounded. three months later this same privateer fell in with the british sixteen-gun cutter "hypocrite," and captured her after a sharp conflict. perhaps the most audacious privateering exploit was that of the privateers "hero," "hope," and "swallow," in july, . the captains of these craft, meeting after an unprofitable season upon the high seas, conceived the idea of making a descent upon the nova scotian town of lunenberg, some thirty-five miles from halifax. little time was wasted in discussion. privateers are not hampered by official red tape. so it happened that early in the month the three privateers appeared off the harbor of the threatened town, having landed a shore party of ninety men. before the invaders the inhabitants retreated rapidly, making some slight resistance. two block-houses, garrisoned by british regulars, guarded the town. one of these fortresses the americans burned, whereupon the british established themselves in the second, and prepared to stand a siege. luckily for the americans, the block-house was within range of the harbor; so that the three privateers took advantageous positions, and fired a few rounds of solid shot into the enemy's wooden citadel. the besieged then made haste to raise the white flag, and surrendered themselves prisoners-of-war. when the yankee ships left the harbor, they took with them a large quantity of merchandise and provisions, and a thousand pounds sterling by way of ransom. one more conflict, in which the irregular naval forces of the united states did credit to themselves, must be described before dismissing the subject of privateering. in september, , the british sloop-of-war "savage" was cruising off the southern coast of the united states. her officers and men were in a particularly good humor, and felt a lively sense of self-satisfaction; for they had just ascended the potomac, and plundered gen. washington's estate,--an exploit which would make them heroes in the eyes of their admiring countrymen. off charleston the "savage" encountered the american privateer "congress," of about the same strength as herself,--twenty guns and one hundred and fifty men. in one respect the "congress" was the weaker; for her crew was composed largely of landsmen, and her marines were a company of militia, most of whom were sadly afflicted with seasickness. nevertheless, the yankee craft rushed boldly into action, opening fire with her bow-chasers as soon as she came within range. like two savage bull-dogs, the two ships rushed at each other, disdaining all manoeuvring, and seemingly intent only upon locking in a deadly struggle, yard-arm to yard-arm. at first the "savage" won a slight advantage. swinging across the bow of the "congress," she raked her enemy twice. but soon the two ships lay side by side, and the thunder of the cannon was constant. the militia-marines on the "congress" did good service. stationed in the tops, on the forecastle, the quarter-deck, and every elevated place on the ship, they poured down upon the deck of the enemy a murderous fire. the jackies at the great guns poured in broadsides so well directed that soon the "savage" had not a rope left with which to manage the sails. her quarter-deck was cleared, and not a man was to be seen to serve as a mark for the american gunners. so near lay the two vessels to each other, that the fire from the guns scorched the gunners on the opposite ship. the antagonists were inextricably entangled; for the mizzen-mast of the "savage" had been shot away, and had fallen into the after-rigging of the "congress." there was no flight for the weaker vessel. when she could no longer fight, surrender was her only recourse. neither vessel showed any colors, for both ensigns had been shot away early in the action. accordingly, when the boatswain of the "savage" was seen upon the forecastle wildly waving his arms, it was taken as an evidence of surrender; and the fire slackened until his voice could be heard. "give us quarter," he cried hoarsely; "we are a wreck, and strike our flag." the firing then ceased; but, when the lieutenant of the "congress" ordered a boat lowered in which to board the prize, the old boatswain came back with the report,-- "boats all knocked to pieces, sir. couldn't find one that would float." accordingly the two vessels had to be slowly drawn together, and the boarding party reached the deck of the prize by clambering over a spar which served as a bridge. when they reached the prize, they found her decks covered with dead and wounded men. the slaughter had been terrible. twenty-three men were killed, and thirty-one wounded. on the "congress" were thirty, killed and wounded together. one of the wounded americans was found lying with his back braced against the foot of the bowsprit, cheering for the victory, and crying,-- "if they have broken my legs, my hands and heart are still whole." throughout this sanguinary action both parties showed the greatest courage and determination. two vessels of the two most perfectly organized regular navies in the world could not have been better handled, nor could they have more stubbornly contested for the victory. a class of armed vessels outside the limits of the regular navy, but very active and efficient in the service of the country, was the maritime forces of the individual states. before congress had seen the necessity for a naval force, several of the colonies had been alive to the situation, and fitted out cruisers of their own. even after the revolution had developed into a war of the first magnitude, and after the colonies had assumed the title of states, and delegated to congress the duty of providing for the common defence, they still continued to fit out their own men-of-war to protect their ports and act as convoys for their merchant fleets. though vessels in this service seldom cruised far from the coast of their home colony, yet occasionally they met the vessels of the enemy, and many sharp actions were fought by them. of all the actions fought by the state cruisers, the most hotly contested was that between the pennsylvania cruiser "hyder ali," and the british sloop-of-war "gen. monk." the "hyder ali" was a merchantman, bought by the state just as she was about departing on a voyage to the west indies. she was in no way calculated for a man-of-war; but the need was pressing, and she was pierced for eight ports on a side, and provided with a battery of six-pounders. the command of this vessel was given to joshua barney, a young officer with an extensive experience of yankee privateers and british prisons, and whose later exploits in the united states navy are familiar to readers of "blue-jackets of ." barney's instructions were, not to go to sea, but to patrol the delaware river and bay, and see that no privateer lay in wait for the merchant-vessels that cleared from the port of philadelphia. in april, , the "hyder ali" stood down delaware bay at the head of a large fleet of outward-bound merchantmen. when cape may was reached, strong head-winds sprang up, and the whole fleet anchored to await more favorable weather before putting out to sea. while they lay at anchor, the "hyder ali" sighted a trio of british vessels, two ships and a brig, rounding the cape. instantly barney signalled his convoy to trip anchor and retreat, a signal which was promptly obeyed by all save one too daring craft, that tried to slip round the cape, and get to sea, but fell into the hands of the enemy. soon the whole fleet, with the "hyder ali" bringing up the rear, fled up the bay. the british followed in hot pursuit. at a point half-way up the bay the pursuers parted; one of the ships, a frigate, cutting through a side channel in the hope of intercepting the fugitives. the other two pursuers, a privateer brig and a sloop-of-war, continued in the wake of the "hyder ali." the brig proved herself a clipper, and soon came up with the american vessel, which promptly offered battle. the challenge was declined by the privateer, which fired a harmless broadside, and continued on up the bay. barney let her pass, for he had determined to risk the dangers of an unequal combat with the sloop-of-war. this vessel came up rapidly; and as she drew near barney luffed up suddenly, and let fly a broadside. this somewhat staggered the enemy, who had expected only a tame surrender; but she quickly recovered, and came boldly on. at this juncture barney turned to his helmsman, and said,-- "now, when i give the word, pay no attention to my order, but put the helm hard-a-starboard. pay no heed to the actual command i may give you." the british vessel was then within half pistol-shot, and her forward guns were beginning to bear. from his station on the quarter-deck barney shouted to his steersman in stentorian tones,-- "port your helm. hard-a-port." the order was clearly heard on board the enemy, and he prepared to manoeuvre his ship accordingly. but the steersman of the "hyder ali" remembered his instructions; and before the enemy discovered the ruse, the american ship lay athwart the other's bow, and the bowsprit of the enemy was caught in the "hyder ali's" rigging, giving the latter a raking position. quickly the yankee gunners seized the opportunity. not five miles away was a british frigate ready to rush to the assistance of her consort, and whatever was to be done by the bold lads of pennsylvania had to be done with expedition. no cheer rose from their ranks; but with grim determination they worked at the great guns, pouring in rapid and effective broadsides. the explosions of the two batteries were like the deafening peals of thunder echoed and re-echoed in some mountain-gorge. smoke hid the vessels from sight, and the riflemen in the tops could only occasionally catch sight of the figures of the enemy. the enemy had twenty guns to barney's sixteen; but he was out-manoeuvred at the start, and this disadvantage he never overcame. half an hour from the time of the opening of the battle, his flag was struck, and the americans, with lusty cheers, took possession of their prize. there was no time for ceremony. the frigate had seen the conflict from afar, and was bearing down upon the two antagonists. so without even asking the name of the captured vessel, barney hastily threw a prize crew aboard, ordered her to proceed to philadelphia, and himself remained behind to cover the retreat. some hours later, having escaped the british frigate, the two vessels sailed up to a philadelphia wharf. the scars of battle had been in no way healed: the tattered sails, the shattered hulls and bulwarks, the cordage hanging loosely from the masts, told the story of battle. the crowd that rushed to the wharf, and peered curiously about the decks of the two vessels, saw a ghastly and horrible sight. for the battle had been as sanguinary as it was spirited, and the dead still lay where they fell. on the british vessel, the "gen. monk," lay the lifeless bodies of twenty men; while twenty-six wounded, whose blood stained the deck, lay groaning in the cock-pit below. on the "hyder ali" were four killed and eleven wounded. this action, for steadiness and brilliancy, was not surpassed by any naval duel of the war of the revolution. by it the name of joshua barney was put upon a plane with those of the most eminent commanders in the regular navy; and had not the war speedily terminated, he would have been granted a commission and a ship by the united states. while the chief naval events of the war for independence have now been recounted, there still remain certain incidents connected more or less closely with the war on the water, which deserve a passing mention. one of these is the curious desultory warfare carried on in and about new york harbor by fishermen and longshoremen in whale-boats, dories, sharpies, and similar small craft. from until the close of the war, new york city and the region bordering upon the harbor were occupied by the british. provisions were needed for their support, and were brought from connecticut and new jersey in small sailing craft, chiefly whale-boats. these boats the patriots often intercepted, and desperate encounters upon the water were frequent. nor did the yankee boatmen confine their attacks to the provision boats alone. in the summer of the british transport "blue mountain valley" was captured by a band of hardy jerseymen, who concealed themselves in the holds of four small sail-boats until fairly alongside the enemy's vessel, when they swarmed out and drove the british from the deck of their vessel. two new jersey fishermen, adam hyler and william marriner, were particularly active in this class of warfare. twice the british sent armed forces to capture them, and, failing in that, burned their boats. but the sturdy patriots were undaunted, and building new boats, waged a relentless war against the followers of king george. every tory that fished in the bay was forced to pay them tribute; and many of these gentry, so obnoxious to the yankees, were visited in their homes at dead of night, and solemnly warned to show more moderation in their disapproval of the american cause. when the occasion offered, the two jerseymen gathered armed bands, and more than one small british vessel fell a prey to their midnight activity. two british corvettes were captured by them in coney island bay, and burned to the water's edge. with one of the blazing vessels forty thousand dollars in specie was destroyed,--a fact that hyler bitterly lamented when he learned of it. no narrative of the events of the revolution would be complete, without some description of the floating prison-houses in which the british immured the hapless soldiers and sailors who fell into their hands. of these the chief one was a dismasted hulk known as the "old jersey" prison-ship, and moored in wallabout bay near new york city. no pen can adequately describe the horrors of this prison; but some extracts from the published recollections of men once imprisoned in her noisome hold will give some idea of the miserable fate of those condemned to be imprisoned on her. thomas andros, a sailor taken by the british with the privateer "fair american," writes of the "old jersey:" "this was an old sixty-four-gun ship, which, through age, had become unfit for further actual service. she was stripped of every spar and all her rigging. after a battle with a french fleet, her lion figure-head was taken away to repair another ship. no appearance of ornament was left, and nothing remained but an old unsightly rotten hulk; and doubtless no other ship in the british navy ever proved the means of the destruction of so many human beings. it is computed that no less than eleven thousand american seamen perished in her. when i first became an inmate of this abode of suffering, despair, and death, there were about four hundred prisoners on board; but in a short time they amounted to twelve hundred. in a short time we had two hundred or more sick and dying lodged in the forepart of the lower gun-deck, where all the prisoners were confined at night. utter derangement was a common symptom of yellow-fever; and to increase the horror of the darkness that surrounded us (for we were allowed no light between decks), the voice of warning would be heard, 'take heed to yourselves. there is a madman stalking through the ship with a knife in his hand,' i sometimes found the man a corpse in the morning, by whose side i laid myself down at night. in the morning the hatchways were thrown open; and we were allowed to ascend on the upper deck all at once, and remain on the upper deck all day. but the first object that met our view in the morning was an appalling spectacle,--a boat loaded with dead bodies, conveying them to the long island shore, where they were very slightly covered." ebenezer fox, another privateersman, has left his recollections of this dreadful prison. his description of the food upon which the unhappy prisoners were forced to subsist is interesting:-- "our bill of fare was as follows: on sunday, one pound of biscuit, one pound of pork, and half a pint of pease; monday, one pound of biscuit, one pint of oatmeal, and two ounces of butter; tuesday, one pound of biscuit, and two pounds of salt beef; wednesday, one and a half pounds of flour, and two ounces of suet; thursday was a repetition of sunday's fare; friday, of monday's; and saturday, of tuesday's. "if this food had been of good quality and properly cooked, as we had no labor to perform, it would have kept us comfortable, at least from suffering; but this was not the case. all our food appeared to be damaged. as for the pork, we were cheated out of it more than half the time; and when it was obtained, one would have judged from its motley hues, exhibiting the consistence and appearance of variegated fancy soap, that it was the flesh of the porpoise or sea-hog, and had been an inhabitant of the ocean rather than of the stye. the pease were generally damaged, and, from the imperfect manner in which they were cooked, were about as indigestible as grape-shot. the butter the reader will not suppose was the real 'goshen;' and had it not been for its adhesive properties to hold together the particles of the biscuit, that had been so riddled by the worms as to lose all their attraction of cohesion, we should have considered it no desirable addition to our viands." but it is unnecessary to prolong the painful description of the horrors of this floating charnel house. its name and record must ever rest as a dark stain upon the name of england. it is seldom possible in war-time to house and care for the immense hordes of prisoners-of-war with the same regard for their comfort which is shown ordinarily to convicted felons. war is brutal; it is unfeeling, and the weaker party must always suffer. but such sufferings as those of the "old jersey" captives can be excused upon no ground. there was no need to crowd hundreds of men into a space hardly large enough for a few score. to starve her prisoners, should not be part of a great nation's policy. the one plea which england can urge in extenuation of the "old jersey" is that it had its day at a time when those broad principles of humanity, now so generally accepted, had not yet been applied to the rules of war. with this chapter ends the narrative of the naval events of the war of the revolution. it was not a great naval war, for the belligerent nations were not sufficiently well matched in naval strength. but it brought forth paul jones and more than one other brave and able commander. it established a new flag upon the seas, a flag that has ever since held an honorable position among the insignia of the foremost nations of the earth. and in the war of the revolution, as in every war in which the united states has taken part since, there was manifested the wonderful ability of the american people to rush into a conflict half prepared, and gain daily in strength until the cause for which they fight is won. in that cause was liberty, and in its behalf none fought more bravely than the lads who wore the blue jackets of the american navy. chapter xv. the navy disbanded. -- aggressions of barbary corsairs. -- a disgraceful tribute. -- bainbridge and the dey. -- gen. eaton at tunis. a squadron sent to the mediterranean. -- decatur and the spaniards. -- the "enterprise" and the "tripoli." -- american slaves in algiers. peace having been signed with great britain in , the nucleus of a navy then in existence was disbanded. partly this was due to the disinclination of the sturdy republicans to keep a standing establishment, either naval or military, in time of peace. the same tendency of the american mind to disregard the adage, "in time of peace, prepare for war," is observable to-day. but the chief reason for the dissolution of the navy lay in the impossibility of collecting funds to pay for its maintenance. the states had formed themselves into a confederacy, but so jealously had each state guarded its individual rights, that no power was left to the general government. the navy being a creation of the general government, was therefore left without means of support; and in the last remaining frigate, the "alliance," was sold because there was not enough money in the treasury to pay for her needed repairs. for eight years thereafter the nation remained without a navy. but gradually there sprung up a very considerable maritime commerce under the flag of the united states. the stars and stripes began to be a familiar sight in sea-ports as far away as china and japan. but as far as it afforded any protection to the vessel above which it waved, that banner might have been a meaningless bit of striped bunting. in the dey of algiers, looking to piracy for his income, sent his piratical cruisers out into the atlantic to seize upon the merchantmen of the new nation that had no navy to enforce its authority. two vessels were captured, and their crews sold into disgraceful slavery in algiers. when the first congress of the united states under the present constitution assembled, president washington called the attention of the law-makers to the crying need for a navy. but war had set in between portugal and algiers; the algerian corsairs were blockaded in their ports, and american vessels were enjoying a temporary immunity from piratical attack. therefore congress hesitated. but in peace was suddenly arranged between portugal and algiers. immediately the corsairs swarmed out of the mediterranean sea, and swooped down upon the american merchantmen. in a few weeks four ships were in their hands, and the gangs of white slaves in tunis and tripoli were re-enforced by nearly two hundred luckless yankee sailors. then congress awoke, and ordered the immediate building of six frigates. the ships were laid down, the work was well under way, naval officers had been appointed, and every thing seemed to point to the revival of the american navy, when a treaty was negotiated with algiers, and all work was stopped. and what a treaty it was! by it the united states relinquished every claim to the rights of a sovereign nation. it agreed to pay an annual tribute to the piratical dey, in consideration of his granting to american vessels the right of travel on the high seas. and when some slight delay occurred in making the first payment of tribute, the obsequious government presented the barbary corsair with a frigate, to allay his wrath. we must pass hastily over the time during which this iniquitous treaty was in force. suffice it to say, that by it the united states paid the dey more than a million dollars. for the same sum his piratical establishment might have been scattered like the sands of the desert. in may, , it fell to the lot of capt. william bainbridge, commanding the frigate "george washington," to carry the annual tribute to algiers. on arriving there he was treated with contempt by the dey, who demanded that he put the "washington" at the service of algiers, to carry her ambassador to constantinople. "you pay me tribute, by which you become my slaves," said the dey; "i have therefore a right to order you as i may think proper." bainbridge protested, but to no avail. he had anchored his frigate under the guns of the dey's castle, and to disobey meant capture and slavery. accordingly he complied, but despatched a letter to the authorities at home, saying, "i hope i may never again be sent to algiers with tribute, unless i am authorized to deliver it from the mouth of our cannon." when bainbridge reached the united states, after faithfully discharging the errand of the dey, he found that it was unlikely that either he or any other officer would be forced to carry any further tribute to the barbary pirates. for, while the tribute paid to algiers had merely changed the attitude of that country from open hostility to contemptuous forbearance, it had brought the other barbary states clamoring to the united states for tribute. tunis and tripoli demanded blood-money; and each emphasized its demand by capturing a few yankee merchantmen, and selling their crews into slavery. the agents or ambassadors sent by the united states to these powers were treated with the utmost contempt; and while their lives were often in danger, their property was always considered the fair prey of the barbarian ruler to whose domain they were sent. to tunis was sent gen. william eaton, an american politician, who has left a record of his experiences in the land of the bey. some of the entries in his journal are very pithy. thus under the date of aug. , , he wrote,-- "some good friend had informed the bey that i had an elegant grecian mirror in my house. to-day he sent a request for it, pretending that he wanted it for the cabin of his pleasure-boat, now about to be launched. so it is. if the consuls have a good piece of furniture, or any other good thing which strikes the bey's fancy, he never hesitates to ask for it; and they have no alternative but to give it. they have suffered this to become usance also. " th. sent the bey the mirror." a letter from gen. eaton to the secretary of state, in , tells of the capacity of the bey. a fire in the regal palace destroyed fifty thousand stand of small-arms. the next day the monarch ordered eaton to procure from the united states ten thousand stand to help make up the loss. eaton demurred. "the bey did not send for you to ask your advice," said the prime minister, "but to order you to communicate his demands to your government." eaton still protested, pointed out the fact that the united states had already paid the bey heavy tribute, and asked when these extortionate demands were to end. "never," was the cool response; and the interview ended. but by this time the united states authorities had perceived the error they had committed in temporizing with the barbary powers. they had quieted algiers by the payment of a heavy tribute, and the gift of a frigate. but this had only excited the cupidity of the other petty states. tunis demanded like tribute. the bashaw of tripoli, discontented with his share of the spoils, cut down the flagstaff before the american consulate, and sent out his cruisers to prey upon american commerce. accordingly, on the th of may, , the secretary of the navy ordered a squadron prepared to proceed to the mediterranean, and bring the rapacious arabs to terms. the vessels chosen for this service were the "president," commodore richard dale; "philadelphia," capt. barron; "essex," capt. bainbridge; and the schooner "enterprise," lieut.-commandant sterrett. though the fleet in itself was powerful, the commodore was hampered by the timid and vacillating instructions of congress. war had not been actually declared, and he was therefore to commit no overt act of hostility. the vessels of the fleet were to be employed simply to convoy american merchantmen in and out of the mediterranean sea, and to be in readiness to ward off any hostile action on the part of any of the barbary powers. on july the fleet entered the roadstead at gibraltar, and anchored in the shadow of the famous rock. here the americans found two of the most rapacious of the tripolitan corsairs lying at anchor; one a ship of twenty-six guns under the command of the tripolitan admiral, and the other a brig of sixteen guns. to keep an eye on these piratical worthies, the "philadelphia" was ordered to remain at gibraltar, while the other vessels scattered. the "essex" was ordered to cruise along the northern shore of the mediterranean, gathering up all the american merchantmen, and convoying them to sea. the "president" and the "enterprise" made sail for algiers, to convince the ruler of that country that it would be impolitic for him to declare war against the united states at that time. the desired effect was produced; for the sight of an american frigate did more to tone down the harshness of the dey's utterances, than could the most extortionate tribute. the cruise of the "essex" was uneventful, save for a dispute between the officers of the american man-of-war and a spanish xebec in the roads of barcelona. the trouble arose in this wise:-- the "essex," though a small vessel, was perfectly appointed, of handsome model and appearance, and her crew was drilled to the highest possible state of discipline and efficiency. when she cast anchor at barcelona, she straightway became the talk of the town, and her officers became the lions of the hour, vastly to the disgust of the spaniards on the xebec lying in the same port. accordingly they took every opportunity to annoy the americans, challenging the boats of the "essex" as they passed the xebec, and not scrupling to use abusive language to capt. bainbridge himself. one night a boat, under command of lieut. stephen decatur, was brought under the guns of the xebec, and held there while the spaniards shouted insults from the deck above. decatur called for the officer in command, and remonstrated with him, but receiving no satisfaction, ordered his men to shove off, declaring he would call again in the morning. accordingly, in the forenoon of the following day, a boat from the "essex," with decatur in the stern-sheets, made for the spanish vessel. coming alongside, decatur went on board, and asked for the officer who had been in command the night previous. he was told that the man he sought had gone ashore. "well, then," thundered decatur, in tones that could be heard all over the vessel, "tell him that lieut. decatur of the frigate 'essex' pronounces him a cowardly scoundrel, and when they meet on shore he will cut his ears off." and having thrown this bombshell into the enemy's camp, decatur returned to his ship. the duel was never fought, for the civil authorities bestirred themselves to prevent it. but the matter was taken up by the united states minister to spain, who never permitted it to rest until the fullest apology was made by spain for the indignities to which the american naval officers had been subjected. after having collected a large number of merchantmen, and taken them safely out of the reach of tripolitan cruisers, the "essex" showed her colors in the chief barbary ports, and rejoined the flag-ship in time to return to the united states in december. while the "essex" had been thus pacificly employed, the little schooner "enterprise" had carried off the honors by fighting the first and only pitched battle of the year. this little craft, after accompanying the "president" to algiers, was ordered to malta. while on the way thither she fell in with a polacre-rigged ship flying the tripolitan colors. closer inspection showed her to be a notorious corsair, well known for the constant and merciless warfare she waged upon american merchantmen. the stars and stripes, floating at the peak of the american man-of-war, alarmed the moors, and they opened fire without waiting for a hail. the "enterprise" took up a position alongside, and at a distance of less than a pistol-shot. broadside succeeded broadside in rapid succession. the aim of the americans was better than that of the enemy, and the effect of their fire was observable whenever the breeze cleared away the dense smoke that hid the vessels from each other. but the ordnance of both was light, so that the combat was greatly prolonged. the vessels were almost equally matched; for the "enterprise" carried twelve guns and ninety men, while the tripolitan mounted fourteen guns, and had a crew of eighty-five men. for two hours the battle continued, and the roar of the cannon and the rattle of small-arms were incessant. the day was calm and clear, with the still, warm air prevalent in the mediterranean. hardly was the breeze strong enough to carry away the sulphurous cloud of smoke that formed the one blot on the fair surface of the fairest of all seas. at last the americans noticed that the fire of the enemy had ceased. eagerly they peered through the smoke, and when the outline of their adversary could be made out, three ringing cheers told that the tripolitan flag waved no longer in its place. leaving their guns, the americans were preparing to board the prize, when they were astonished to receive another broadside, and see the colors of their adversary again hoisted. with cries of rage the yankee seamen again went to quarters; and, if they had fought boldly before, they now fought viciously. they cared little to take the prize: their chief end was to send her, and the treacherous corsairs that manned her, to the bottom. the tripolitans in their turn exerted every energy to conquer. bringing their vessel alongside the "enterprise," they strove repeatedly to board, only to be beaten back again and again. finally, after receiving two raking broadsides from the "enterprise," she again struck her flag. this time capt. sterrett was in no haste to consider the combat ended. keeping his men at the guns, he ordered the tripolitan to come under the quarter of the "enterprise." but no sooner had the enemy done so than she renewed the conflict for the third time, by attempting to board. "no quarter for the treacherous dogs," was then the cry on the american vessel. "fight on, and send them to the bottom." the rest of the battle was wholly in favor of the "enterprise." several times she raked her antagonist, doing great execution. many shots took effect between wind and water; and the cry arose on the decks of the tripolitan, that she was sinking. the "enterprise" kept at a safe distance, and by skilful sailing chose her own position, so that she could pour in a deliberate and murderous fire. bitterly were the tripolitans punished for their treachery. their decks ran red with blood, half of their officers were shot down, the cries of their wounded rose shrill above the thunder of the cannon. her flag was struck, but to this the american gunners paid no heed. the repeated treachery of the corsairs had left in the minds of the yankee sailors but one thought,--to send the ship to the bottom, and rid the ocean of so pestiferous a craft. but, enraged though they were, the americans could not wholly cast aside their feelings of humanity. though they had been twice deceived, they could not keep up their attack upon a vessel so sorely stricken as to be unable to respond to their fire. and when at last the commander of the tripolitan, a venerable old man with a flowing beard, appeared in the waist of the ship, sorely wounded, and, bowing submissively, cast the colors of his vessel into the sea, then the fire of the "enterprise" ceased, although the usages of war would have justified the americans in exterminating their treacherous foe. having captured his enemy, capt. sterrett was in some uncertainty as to what to do with it. the instructions under which he sailed gave him no authority to take prizes. after some deliberation, he concluded to rob the captured vessel, which proved to be the "tripoli," of her power for evil. accordingly he sent lieut. david porter, the daring naval officer of whose exploits we have already spoken in the "blue-jackets of ," on board the prize, with instructions to dismantle her. porter carried out his instructions admirably. with immense satisfaction the jackies he took with him forced the tripolitans to cut away their masts, throw overboard all their cannon, cutlasses, pistols, and other arms; cut their sails to pieces; throw all ammunition into the sea, and, to use a nautical expression, "strip the ship to a girtline." one jury-mast and small sail alone was left. porter then pointed out to the crestfallen tripolitan captain, mahomet sons, that the "enterprise" had not lost a man in the action, while of the corsairs not less than fifty were either killed or wounded. "go," said he sternly to the cowering mussulman, "go tell the bashaw of tripoli, and the people of your country, that in future they may expect only a tribute of powder and ball from the sailors of the united states." amid the jeers and execrations of the yankee tars, the crippled tripolitan hulk, with her dead and dying, drifted slowly away. when she reached tripoli, the anger of the bashaw was unappeasable. he had expected his cruiser to return freighted deep with plunder, and crowded with american slaves. she had returned a dismantled hulk. in vain her commander showed his wounds to his wrathful master, and told of the size of his enemy, and the vigor of his resistance. the rage of the bashaw demanded a sacrifice, and the luckless mahomet sons was led through the streets of tripoli tied to a jackass. this in itself was the deepest degradation possible for a mussulman, but the bashaw supplemented it with five hundred bastinadoes well laid on. this severe punishment, together with the repeated assertions of the sailors of the defeated ship, that the dogs of christians had fired enchanted shot, so terrified the seafaring people of tripoli that it was almost impossible for the bashaw to muster a ship's crew for a year after. [illustration: commodore decatur.] the battle between the "enterprise" and the "tripoli" alone saved the first year of the war from being entirely puerile. certain it is that the distinguished naval officers who accompanied the fleet to the mediterranean were so hedged about with political red tape, that they were powerless to take a step in defence of the honor of their country. while they were empowered to rescue any american ship that might be discovered in the grasp of a corsair, they were powerless to attempt the rescue of the hundreds of americans held by bashaw, bey, and dey as slaves. commodore dale, indeed, through diplomacy, managed to free a few of the enslaved americans. having blockaded the harbor of tripoli with the frigate "president," he captured a greek vessel having a score or more of tripolitan soldiers aboard. he then sent word to the bashaw that he would exchange these prisoners for an equal number of americans; but the monarch apparently cared little for his subjects, for he replied that he would not give one american slave for the whole lot. after much argument, an exchange was made upon the basis of three tripolitans to one yankee. it is hard, even at this late day, to regard the policy of the united states towards the barbary powers with feelings other than of mortification. tunis, tripoli, algiers, and morocco constantly preyed on our commerce, and enslaved our sailors. in the streets of algiers worked american slaves, chained together, and wearing iron collars upon their necks. their lives were the property of their owners, and they suffered unheard of privations and tortures. yet at this very time the united states kept a consul in algiers, and maintained friendly relations with the dey. indeed, a historian writing in applauds the american government for the care it took of its citizens enslaved in algiers, by providing each with a suit of clothing yearly! but the continued aggressions and extortionate demands of the barbary powers became at last unbearable. the expedition to the mediterranean, under commodore dale, was but the premonitory muttering before the storm. dale returned to the united states in december, , and his report led to the organization of the naval expedition that was to finally crush the piratical powers of barbary. chapter xvi. more vigorous policy. -- commodore morris sent to the mediterranean. -- porter's cutting-out expedition. -- commodore preble sent to the mediterranean. -- his encounter with a british man-of-war. -- the loss of the "philadelphia." -- decatur's daring adventure. the return of commodore dale from the mediterranean, and the reports which he brought of the continued aggressions and insolence of the barbary powers, made a very marked change in the temper of the people of the united states. early in congress passed laws, which, though not in form a formal declaration of war, yet permitted the vigorous prosecution of hostilities against tripoli, algiers, or any other of the barbary powers. a squadron was immediately ordered into commission for the purpose of chastising the corsairs, and was put under the command of commodore morris. the vessels detailed for this service were the "chesapeake," thirty-eight; "constellation," thirty-eight; "new york," thirty-six; "john adams," twenty-eight; "adams," twenty-eight; and "enterprise," twelve. some months were occupied in getting the vessels into condition for sea; and while the "enterprise" started in february for the mediterranean, it was not until september that the last ship of the squadron followed her. it will be remembered that the "philadelphia" and "essex," of dale's squadron, had been left in the mediterranean; and as the "boston," twenty-eight, had been ordered to cruise in those waters after carrying united states minister livingstone to france, the power of the western republic was well supported before the coast-line of barbary. the "enterprise" and the "constellation" were the first of the squadron to reach the mediterranean, and they straightway proceeded to tripoli to begin the blockade of that port. one day, while the "constellation" was lying at anchor some miles from the town, the lookout reported that a number of small craft were stealing along, close in shore, and evidently trying to sneak into the harbor. immediately the anchor was raised, and the frigate set out in pursuit. the strangers proved to be a number of tripolitan gunboats, and for a time it seemed as though they would be cut off by the swift-sailing frigate. as they came within range, the "constellation" opened a rapid and well-directed fire, which soon drove the gunboats to protected coves and inlets in the shore. the americans then lowered their boats with the intention of engaging the enemy alongshore, but at this moment a large body of cavalry came galloping out from town to the rescue. the yankees, therefore, returned to their ship, and, after firing a few broadsides at the cavalry, sailed away. thereafter, for nearly a year, the record of the american squadron in the mediterranean was uneventful. commodore morris showed little disposition to push matters to an issue, but confined his operations to sailing from port to port, and instituting brief and imperfect blockades. in april, , the squadron narrowly escaped being seriously weakened by the loss of the "new york." it was when this vessel was off malta, on her way to tripoli in company with the "john adams" and the "enterprise." the drums had just beat to grog; and the sailors, tin cup in hand, were standing in a line on the main deck waiting their turns at the grog-tub. suddenly a loud explosion was heard, and the lower part of the ship was filled with smoke. "the magazine is on fire," was the appalling cry; and for a moment confusion reigned everywhere. all knew that the explosion must have been near the magazine. there was no one to command, for at the grog hour the sailors are left to their own occupations. so the confusion spread, and there seemed to be grave danger of a panic, when capt. chauncey came on deck. a drummer passed hurriedly by him. "drummer, beat to quarters!" was the quick, sharp command of the captain. the drummer stopped short, and in a moment the resonant roll of the drum rose above the shouts and the tramping of feet. as the well-known call rose on the air, the men regained their self-control, and went quietly to their stations at the guns, as though preparing to give battle to an enemy. when order had been restored, capt. chauncey commanded the boats to be lowered; but the effect of this was to arouse the panic again. the people rushed from the guns, and crowded out upon the bowsprit, the spritsail-yard, and the knightheads. some leaped into the sea, and swam for the nearest vessel. all strove to get as far from the magazine as possible. this poltroonery disgusted chauncey. "volunteers, follow me," he cried. "remember, lads, it's just as well to be blown through three decks as one." so saying he plunged down the smoky hatchway, followed by lieut. david porter and some other officers. blinded and almost stifled by the smoke, they groped their way to the seat of the danger. with wet blankets, and buckets of water, they began to fight the flames. as their efforts began to meet with success, one of the officers went on deck, and succeeded in rallying the men, and forming two lines of water-carriers. after two hours' hard work, the ship was saved. the explosion was a serious one, many of the bulkheads having been blown down, and nineteen officers and men seriously injured, of whom fourteen died. it came near leading to a still more serious blunder; for, when the flames broke out, the quartermaster was ordered to hoist the signal, "a fire on board." in his trepidation he mistook the signal, and announced, "a mutiny on board." seeing this, capt. rodgers of the "john adams" beat his crew to quarters, and with shotted guns and open ports took up a raking position astern of the "new york," ready to quell the supposed mutiny. luckily he discovered his error without causing loss of life. for a month after this incident, the ships were detained at malta making repairs; but, near the end of may, the "john adams," "adams," "new york," and "enterprise" took up the blockade of tripoli. one afternoon a number of merchant vessels succeeded in evading the blockaders, and though cut off from the chief harbor of the town, yet took refuge in the port of old tripoli. they were small lanteen-rigged feluccas of light draught; and they threaded the narrow channels, and skimmed over shoals whither the heavy men-of-war could not hope to follow them. scarcely had they reached the shore when preparations were made for their defence against any cutting-out party the americans might send for their capture. on the shore near the spot where the feluccas were beached, stood a heavy stone building, which was taken possession of by a party of troops hastily despatched from the city. the feluccas were laden with wheat, packed in sacks; and these sacks were taken ashore in great numbers, and piled up on either side of the great building so as to form breastworks. so well were the works planned, that they formed an almost impregnable fortress. behind its walls the tripolitans stood ready to defend their stranded vessels. that night lieut. porter took a light boat, and carefully reconnoitred the position of the enemy. he was discovered, and driven away by a heavy fire of musketry, but not before he had taken the bearings of the feluccas and their defences. the next morning he volunteered to go in and destroy the boats, and, having obtained permission, set out, accompanied by lieut. james lawrence and a strong party of sailors. there was no attempt at concealment or surprise. the americans pushed boldly forward, in the teeth of a heavy fire from the tripolitans. no attempt was made to return the fire, for the enemy was securely posted behind his ramparts. the yankees could only bend to their oars, and press forward with all possible speed. at last the beach was reached, and boats-prows grated upon the pebbly sand. quickly the jackies leaped from their places; and while some engaged the tripolitans, others, torch in hand, clambered upon the feluccas, and set fire to the woodwork and the tarred cordage. when the flames had gained some headway, the incendiaries returned to their boats, and made for the squadron again, feeling confident that the tripolitans could do nothing to arrest the conflagration. but they had underestimated the courage of the barbarians; for no sooner had the boats pushed off, than the tripolitans rushed down to the shore, and strained every muscle for the preservation of their ships. the men-of-war rained grape-shot upon them; but they persevered, and before porter and his followers regained their ships, the triumphant cries of the tripolitans gave notice the flames were extinguished. porter had been severely wounded in the thigh, and twelve or fifteen of his men had been killed or wounded; so that the failure of the expedition to fully accomplish its purpose was bitterly lamented. the loss of the enemy was never definitely ascertained, though several were seen to fall during the conflict. on both sides the most conspicuous gallantry was shown; the fighting was at times almost hand to hand, and once, embarrassed by the lack of ammunition, the tripolitans seized heavy stones, and hurled them down upon their assailants. for some weeks after this occurrence, no conflict took place between the belligerents. commodore morris, after vainly trying to negotiate a peace with tripoli, sailed away to malta, leaving the "john adams" and the "adams" to blockade the harbor. to them soon returned the "enterprise," and the three vessels soon after robbed the bey of his largest corsair. on the night of the st of june, an unusual commotion about the harbor led the americans to suspect that an attempt was being made to run the blockade. a strict watch was kept; and, before morning, the "enterprise" discovered a large cruiser sneaking along the coast toward the harbor's mouth. the tripolitan was heavy enough to have blown the yankee schooner out of the water; but, instead of engaging her, she retreated to a small cove, and took up a favorable position for action. signals from the "enterprise" soon brought the other united states vessels to the spot; while in response to rockets and signal guns from the corsair, a large body of tripolitan cavalry came galloping down the beach, and a detachment of nine gunboats came to the assistance of the beleaguered craft. no time was lost in manoeuvring. taking up a position within point-blank range, the "john adams" and the "enterprise" opened fire on the enemy, who returned it with no less spirit. for forty-five minutes the cannonade was unabated. the shot of the american gunners were seen to hull the enemy repeatedly, and at last the tripolitans began to desert their ship. over the rail and through the open ports the panic-stricken corsairs dropped into the water. the shot of the yankees had made the ship's deck too hot a spot for the tripolitans, and they fled with great alacrity. when the last had left the ship, the "john adams" prepared to send boats to take possession of the prize. but at this moment a boat-load of tripolitans returned to the corsair; and the americans, thinking they were rallying, began again their cannonade. five minutes later, while the boat's-crew was still on the tripolitan ship, she blew up. the watchers heard a sudden deafening roar; saw a volcanic burst of smoke; saw rising high above the smoke the main and mizzen masts of the shattered vessel, with the yards, rigging, and hamper attached. when the smoke cleared away, only a shapeless hulk occupied the place where the proud corsair had so recently floated. what caused the explosion, cannot be told. were it not for the fact that many of the tripolitans were blown up with the ship, it might be thought that she had been destroyed by her own people. after this encounter, the three united states vessels proceeded to malta. here commodore morris found orders for his recall, and he returned to the united states in the "adams." in his place commodore preble had been chosen to command the naval forces; and that officer, with the "constitution," forty-four, arrived in the mediterranean in september, . following him at brief intervals came the other vessels of his squadron,--the "vixen" twelve, "siren" sixteen, and "argus" sixteen; the "philadelphia" thirty-eight, and the "nautilus" twelve, having reached the mediterranean before the commodore. three of these vessels were commanded by young officers, destined to win enduring fame in the ensuing war,--stephen decatur, william bainbridge, and richard somers. before the last vessel of this fleet reached the mediterranean, a disaster had befallen one of the foremost vessels, which cost the united states a good man-of-war, and forced a ship's crew of yankee seamen to pass two years of their lives in the cells of a tripolitan fortress. this vessel was the "philadelphia," capt. bainbridge. she had reached the mediterranean in the latter part of august, and signalled her arrival by overhauling and capturing the cruiser "meshboha," belonging to the emperor of morocco. with the cruiser was a small brig, which proved to be an american merchantman; and in her hold were found the captain and seven men, tied hand and foot. morocco was then ostensibly on friendly terms with the united states, and bainbridge demanded of the captain of the cruiser by what right he had captured an american vessel. to this the moor returned, that he had done so, anticipating a war which had not yet been declared. "then, sir," said bainbridge sternly, "i must consider you as a pirate, and shall treat you as such. i am going on deck for fifteen minutes. if, when i return, you can show me no authority for your depredations upon american commerce, i shall hang you at the yard-arm." so saying, bainbridge left the cabin. in fifteen minutes he returned, and, throwing the cabin doors open, stepped in with a file of marines at his heels. in his hand he held his watch, and he cast upon the moor a look of stern inquiry. not a word was said, but the prisoner understood the dread import of that glance. nervously he began to unbutton the voluminous waistcoats which encircled his body, and from an inner pocket of the fifth drew forth a folded paper. it was a commission directing him to make prizes of all american craft that might come in his path. no more complete evidence of the treachery of morocco could be desired. bainbridge sent the paper to commodore preble, and, after stopping at gibraltar a day or two, proceeded to his assigned position off the harbor of tripoli. in the latter part of october, the lookout on the "philadelphia" spied a vessel running into the harbor, and the frigate straightway set out in chase. the fugitive showed a clean pair of heels; and as the shots from the bow-chasers failed to take effect, and the water was continually shoaling before the frigate's bow, the helm was put hard down, and the frigate began to come about. but just at that moment she ran upon a shelving rock, and in an instant was hard and fast aground. the americans were then in a most dangerous predicament. the sound of the firing had drawn a swarm of gunboats out of the harbor of tripoli, and they were fast bearing down upon the helpless frigate. every possible expedient was tried for the release of the ship, but to no avail. at last the gunboats, discovering her helpless condition, crowded so thick about her that there was no course open but to strike. and so, after flooding the magazine, throwing overboard all the small-arms, and knocking holes in the bottom of the ship, bainbridge reluctantly surrendered. hardly had the flag touched the deck, when the gunboats were alongside. if the americans expected civilized treatment, they were sadly mistaken, for an undisciplined rabble came swarming over the taffrail. lockers and chests were broken open, storerooms ransacked, officers and men stripped of all the articles of finery they were wearing. it was a scene of unbridled pillage, in which the tripolitan officers were as active as their men. an officer being held fast in the grasp of two of the tripolitans, a third would ransack his pockets, and strip him of any property they might covet. swords, watches, jewels, and money were promptly confiscated by the captors; and they even ripped the epaulets from the shoulders of the officers' uniforms. no resistance was made, until one of the pilferers tried to tear from bainbridge an ivory miniature of his young and beautiful wife. wresting himself free, the captain knocked down the vandal, and made so determined a resistance that his despoilers allowed him to keep the picture. when all the portable property was in the hands of the victors, the americans were loaded into boats, and taken ashore. it was then late at night; but the captives were marched through the streets to the palace of the bashaw, and exhibited to that functionary. after expressing great satisfaction at the capture, the bashaw ordered the sailors thrown into prison, while the officers remained that night as his guests. he entertained them with an excellent supper, but the next morning they were shown to the gloomy prison apartments that were destined to be their home until the end of the war. of their life there we shall have more to say hereafter. while this disaster had befallen the american cause before tripoli, commodore preble in the flag-ship "constitution," accompanied by the "nautilus," had reached gibraltar. there he found commodore rodgers, whom he was to relieve, with the "new york" and the "john adams." hardly had the commodore arrived, when the case of the captured morocco ship "meshboha" was brought to his attention; and he straightway went to tangier to request the emperor to define his position with regard to the united states. though the time of commodore rodgers on the mediterranean station had expired, he consented to accompany preble to tangier; and the combined squadrons of the two commodores had so great an effect upon the emperor, that he speedily concluded a treaty. commodore rodgers then sailed for the united states, and preble began his preparations for an active prosecution of the war with tripoli. it was on the st of october that the "philadelphia" fell into the hands of the tripolitans, but it was not until nov. that the news of the disaster reached commodore preble and the other officers of the squadron. shortly after the receipt of the news, the commodore proceeded with his flag-ship, accompanied by the "enterprise," to tripoli, to renew the blockade which had been broken by the loss of the "philadelphia." it was indeed high time that some life should be infused into the war with tripoli. commodore dale had been sent to the mediterranean with instructions that tied him hand and foot. morris, who followed him, was granted more discretion by congress, but had not been given the proper force. now that preble had arrived with a sufficient fleet, warlike instructions, and a reputation for dash unexcelled by that of any officer in the navy, the blue-jackets looked for some active service. foreign nations were beginning to speak scornfully of the harmless antics of the united states fleet in the mediterranean, and the younger american officers had fought more than one duel with foreigners to uphold the honor of the american service. they now looked to preble to give them a little active service. an incident which occurred shortly after the arrival of the "constitution" in the bay of gibraltar convinced the american officers that their commodore had plenty of fire and determination in his character. one night the lookouts reported a large vessel alongside, and the hail from the "constitution" brought only a counter-hail from the stranger. both vessels continued to hail without any answer being returned, when preble came on deck. taking the trumpet from the hand of the quartermaster, he shouted,-- "i now hail you for the last time. if you do not answer, i'll fire a shot into you." "if you fire, i'll return a broadside," was the reply. "i'd like to see you do it. i now hail you for an answer. what ship is that?" "this is h. b. m. ship 'donegal,' eighty-four; sir richard strachan, an english commodore. send a boat aboard." "this is the united states ship 'constitution,' forty-four," answered preble, in high dudgeon; "edward preble, an american commodore; and i'll be d--d if i send a boat on board of any ship. blow your matches, boys!" the englishman saw a conflict coming, and sent a boat aboard with profuse apologies. she was really the frigate "maidstone," but being in no condition for immediate battle had prolonged the hailing in order to make needed preparations. on the d of december, while the "constitution" and "enterprise" were blockading tripoli, the latter vessel overhauled and captured the ketch "mastico," freighted with female slaves that were being sent by the bashaw of tripoli to the porte, as a gift. the capture in itself was unimportant, save for the use made of the ketch later. the vessels of the blockading squadron, from their station outside the bar, could see the captured "philadelphia" riding lightly at her moorings under the guns of the tripolitan batteries. her captors had carefully repaired the injuries the americans had inflicted upon the vessel before surrendering. her foremast was again in place, the holes in her bottom were plugged, the scars of battle were effaced, and she rode at anchor as pretty a frigate as ever delighted the eye of a tar. from his captivity bainbridge had written letters to commodore preble, with postscripts written in lemon-juice, and illegible save when the sheet of paper was exposed to the heat. in these postscripts he urged the destruction of the "philadelphia." lieut. stephen decatur, in command of the "enterprise," eagerly seconded these proposals, and proposed to cut into the port with the "enterprise," and undertake the destruction of the captured ship. lieut.-commander stewart of the "nautilus" made the same proposition; but preble rejected both, not wishing to imperil a man-of-war on so hazardous an adventure. the commodore, however, had a project of his own which he communicated to decatur, and in which that adventurous sailor heartily joined. this plan was to convert the captured ketch into a man-of-war, man her with volunteers, and with her attempt the perilous adventure of the destruction of the "philadelphia." the project once broached was quickly carried into effect. the ketch was taken into the service, and named the "intrepid." news of the expedition spread throughout the squadron, and many officers eagerly volunteered their services. when the time was near at hand, decatur called the crew of the "enterprise" together, told them of the plan of the proposed expedition, pointed out its dangers, and called for volunteers. every man and boy on the vessel stepped forward, and begged to be taken. decatur chose sixty-two picked men, and was about to leave the deck, when his steps were arrested by a young boy who begged hard to be taken. "why do you want to go, jack?" asked the commodore. "well, sir," said jack, "you see, i'd kinder like to see the country." the oddity of the boy's reason struck decatur's fancy, and he told jack to report with the rest. on the night of feb. , , the "intrepid," accompanied by the "siren," parted company with the rest of the fleet, and made for tripoli. the voyage was stormy and fatiguing. more than seventy men were cooped up in the little ketch, which had quarters scarcely for a score. the provisions which had been put aboard were in bad condition, so that after the second day they had only bread and water upon which to live. when they had reached the entrance to the harbor of tripoli, they were driven back by the fury of the gale, and forced to take shelter in a neighboring cove. there they remained until the th, repairing damages, and completing their preparations for the attack. the weather having moderated, the two vessels left their place of concealment, and shaped their course for tripoli. on the way, decatur gave his forces careful instructions as to the method of attack. the americans were divided into several boarding parties, each with its own officer and work. one party was to keep possession of the upper deck, another was to carry the gun-deck, a third should drive the enemy from the steerage, and so on. all were to carry pistols in their belts; but the fighting, as far as possible, was to be done with cutlasses, so that no noise might alarm the enemy in the batteries, and the vessels in the port. one party was to hover near the "philadelphia" in a light boat, and kill all tripolitans who might try to escape to the shore by swimming. the watchword for the night was "philadelphia." about noon, the "intrepid" came in sight of the towers of tripoli. both the ketch and the "siren" had been so disguised that the enemy could not recognize them, and they therefore stood boldly for the harbor. as the wind was fresh, decatur saw that he was likely to make port before night; and he therefore dragged a cable and a number of buckets astern to lessen his speed, fearing to take in sail, lest the suspicions of the enemy should be aroused. when within about five miles of the town, the "philadelphia" became visible. she floated lightly at her anchorage under the guns of two heavy batteries. behind her lay moored two tripolitan cruisers, and near by was a fleet of gunboats. it was a powerful stronghold into which the yankee blue-jackets were about to carry the torch. about ten o'clock, the adventurers reached the harbor's mouth. the wind had fallen so that the ketch was wafted slowly along over an almost glassy sea. the "siren" took up a position in the offing, while the "intrepid," with her devoted crew, steered straight for the frigate. a new moon hung in the sky. from the city arose the soft low murmur of the night. in the fleet all was still. on the decks of the "intrepid" but twelve men were visible. the rest lay flat on the deck, in the shadow of the bulwarks or weather-boards. her course was laid straight for the bow of the frigate, which she was to foul. when within a short distance, a hail came from the "philadelphia." in response, the pilot of the ketch answered, that the ketch was a coaster from malta, that she had lost her anchors in the late gale, and had been nearly wrecked, and that she now asked permission to ride by the frigate during the night. the people on the frigate were wholly deceived, and sent out ropes to the ketch, allowing one of the boats of the "intrepid" to make a line fast to the frigate. the ends of the ropes on the ketch were passed to the hidden men, who pulled lustily upon them, thus bringing the little craft alongside the frigate. but, as she came into clearer view, the suspicions of the tripolitans were aroused; and when at last the anchors of the "intrepid" were seen hanging in their places at the catheads, the tripolitans cried out that they had been deceived, and warned the strangers to keep off. at the same moment the cry, "americanos! americanos!" rang through the ship, and the alarm was given. by this time the ketch was fast to the frigate. "follow me, lads," cried decatur, and sprang for the chain-plates of the "philadelphia." clinging there, he renewed his order to board; and the men sprang to their feet, and were soon clambering on board the frigate. lieut. morris first trod the deck of the "philadelphia," decatur followed close after, and then the stream of men over the rail and through the open ports was constant. complete as was the surprise, the entire absence of any resistance was astonishing. few of the turks had weapons in their hands, and those who had fled before the advancing americans. on all sides the splashing of water told that the affrighted turks were trying to make their escape that way. in ten minutes decatur and his men had complete possession of the ship. doubtless at that moment the successful adventurers bitterly regretted that they could not take out of the harbor the noble frigate they had so nobly recaptured. but the orders of the commodore, and the dangers of their own situation, left them no choice. nothing was to be done but to set fire to the frigate, and retreat with all possible expedition. the combustibles were brought from the ketch, and piled about the frigate, and lighted. so quickly was the work done, and so rapidly did the flames spread, that the people who lit the fires in the storerooms and cock-pit had scarce time to get on deck before their retreat was cut off by the flames. before the ketch could be cast off from the sides of the frigate, the flames came pouring out of the port-holes, and flaming sparks fell aboard the smaller vessel, so that the ammunition which lay piled amidships was in grave danger of being exploded. axes and cutlasses were swung with a will; and soon the bonds which held the two vessels together were cut, and the ketch was pushed off. then the blue-jackets bent to their sweeps, and soon the "intrepid" was under good headway. "now, lads," cried decatur, "give them three cheers." and the jackies responded with ringing cheers, that mingled with the roar of the flames that now had the frame of the "philadelphia" in their control. then they grasped their sweeps again, and the little vessel glided away through a hail of grape and round shot from the tripolitan batteries and men-of-war. though the whistle of the missiles was incessant, and the splash of round-shot striking the water could be heard on every side, no one in the boat was hurt; and the only shot that touched the ketch went harmlessly through her main-sail. as they pulled away, they saw the flames catch the rigging of the "philadelphia," and run high up the masts. then the hatchways were burst open, and great gusts of flame leaped out. the shotted guns of the frigate were discharged in quick succession; one battery sending its iron messengers into the streets of tripoli, while the guns on the other side bore upon fort english. the angry glare of the flames, and the flash of the cannon, lighted up the bay; while the thunders of the cannonade, and the cries of the tripolitans, told of the storm that was raging. the ruddy light of the burning ship bore good news to two anxious parties of decatur's friends. capt. bainbridge and the other american officers whom the tripolitans had captured with the "philadelphia" were imprisoned in a tower looking out upon the bay. the rapid thunder of the cannonade on this eventful night awakened them; and they rushed to their windows, to see the "philadelphia," the bashaw's boasted prize, in flames. right lustily they added their cheers to the general tumult, nor ceased their demonstrations of joy until a surly guard came and ordered them from the windows. far out to sea another band of watchers hailed the light of the conflagration with joy. the "siren" had gone into the offing when the "intrepid" entered the harbor, and there awaited with intense anxiety the outcome of the adventure. after an hour's suspense, a rocket was seen to mount into the sky, and burst over tripoli. it was the signal of success agreed upon. boats were quickly lowered, and sent to the harbor's mouth to meet and cover the retreat of the returning party. hardly had they left the side of the ship, when the red light in the sky told that the "philadelphia" was burning; and an hour later decatur himself sprang over the taffrail, and proudly announced his victory. not a man had been lost in the whole affair. as the expedition had been perfect in conception, so it was perfect in execution. the adventure became the talk of all europe. lord nelson, england's greatest admiral, said of it, "it was the most bold and daring act of the ages." and when the news reached the united states, decatur, despite his youth, was made a captain. chapter xvii. a stirring year. -- the bombardment of tripoli. -- decatur's hand-to-hand fight. -- lieut. trippe's bravery. -- lieut. spence's bold deed. -- somers's narrow escape. -- the floating mine. -- the fatal explosion. -- close of the war. -- the end. decatur's brilliant exploit set the key-note for the year ; and, for the remainder of that year, the americans carried on the war with no less spirit and dash. a high degree of daring had been infused into the men by so notable an example; and long before the year was out, the blue-jackets began to consider themselves invincible, and were ready to undertake any exploit for which their services might be required. the lesser events of the year, we must pass over hastily. the maintenance of the blockade of tripoli led to one or two slight actions, and an occasional capture of little consequence. thus, in march, the "siren" captured the "transfer," privateer, which was trying to run the blockade. a month or two later, a coasting felucca, loaded with supplies, was chased ashore near tripoli, and two boats' crews were sent to take possession of her. the tripolitans, as usual, sent out a body of cavalry to protect the felucca, and the americans were driven off. thereupon the american blockading squadron took up a position within range, and threw solid shot into the felucca until she was a complete wreck. nor did the tripolitan cavalry escape without a shot or two. but while the smaller vessels of the mediterranean squadron were enforcing the blockade before tripoli, commodore preble, with the flag-ship and the larger vessels, was at malta preparing for a vigorous attack upon the city of the bashaw itself. he had added to the fleet he had brought with him from the united states two bomb-vessels and six gunboats. he had also added somewhat to the armament of the "constitution," and now proposed to try the effect upon tripoli of a vigorous bombardment. by the st of july, the commodore was able to leave malta with his fleet, fully prepared for active hostilities. tripoli was then defended by heavy batteries mounting a hundred and fifteen guns. in the harbor were moored nineteen gunboats, two galleys, two schooners, and a brig. the available force under the command of the bashaw numbered not less than twenty-five thousand men. it was no pygmy undertaking upon which the americans had embarked. on the st of august, , the first attack was made; and though only a bombardment of the town had been contemplated, there followed one of the most desperate hand-to-hand naval battles recorded in history. it was a sultry midsummer day, and the white walls of the city of tripoli glared under the fierce rays of a tropical sun. a light breeze stirred the surface of the water, and made life on the ships bearable. before this breeze the american squadron ran down towards the town. all preparations had been made for a spirited bombardment; and as the americans drew near the shore, they saw that the tripolitans had suspected the attack, and had made ready for it. the attacking forces formed into two lines, with the regular naval vessels in the rear, and the gunboats and bomb-vessels in front. as the vessels in the van were to bear the brunt of the battle, they were manned by picked crews from the larger vessels, and had for their officers the most daring spirits of the mediterranean squadron. at half-past two the firing commenced, and soon from every vessel in the american line shells and shot were being thrown into the city of the bashaw. the tripolitan batteries returned the fire with vigor, and their gunboats pressed forward to drive the assailants back. at the approach of the tripolitan gunboats, the americans diverted their aim from the city, and, loading with grape and canister, turned upon their foes a murderous fire. upon the eastern division of the enemy's gunboats, nine in number, decatur led the four boats under his command. the advance of the enemy was checked; but still the americans pressed on, until fairly within the smoke of the tripolitans' guns. here the boats were held in position by the brawny sailors at the sweeps, while the gunners poured grape and canister into the enemy. fearfully were the americans outnumbered. they could hope for no help from their friends in the men-of-war in the rear. they were hemmed in on all sides by hostile gunboats, more strongly manned, and heavier in metal, than they. they were outnumbered three to one; for gunboat no. , which had belonged to decatur's division, had drawn out of the fight in obedience to a signal for recall, which had been displayed by mistake on the "constitution." then decatur displayed his desperate courage. signalling to his companions to close with their adversaries and board, he laid his vessel alongside the nearest gunboat; and in a trice every american of the crew was swarming over the enemy's bulwarks. taken by surprise, the turks retreated. the gunboat was divided down the centre by a long, narrow hatchway; and as the yankees came tumbling over the bulwarks, the turks retreated to the farther side. this gave decatur time to rally his men; and, dividing them into two parties, he sent one party around by the stern of the boat, while he led a party around the bow. the turks were dazed by the suddenness of the attack, and cowed by the fearful effect of the americans' last volley before boarding. their captain lay dead, with fourteen bullets in his body. many of the officers were wounded, and all the survivors were penned into a narrow space by the two parties of blue-jackets. the contest was short. hampered by lack of room in which to wield their weapons, the turks were shot down or bayoneted. many leaped over the gunwale into the sea; many were thrown into the open hatchway; and the remnant, throwing down their arms, pleaded piteously for quarter. decatur had no time to exult in his victory. hastily securing his prisoners below decks, and making his prize fast to his own vessel, he bore down upon the tripolitan next to leeward. while shaping his course for this vessel, decatur was arrested by a hail from the gunboat which had been commanded by his brother james. he was told that his brother had gallantly engaged and captured a tripolitan gunboat, but that, on going aboard of her after her flag had been struck, he had been shot down by the cowardly turk who was in command. the murderer then rallied his men, drove the americans away, and carried his craft out of the battle. decatur's grief for the death of his brother gave way, for the time, to his anger on account of the base treachery by which the victim met his death. casting prudence to the winds, he turned his boat's prow towards the gunboat of the murderer, and, urging on his rowers, soon laid the enemy aboard. cutlass in hand, decatur was first on the deck of the enemy. behind him followed close lieut. macdonough and nine blue-jackets. nearly forty turks were ready to receive the boarders. as the boarders came over the rail, they fired their pistols at the enemy, and then sprang down, cutlass in hand. the turks outnumbered them five to one; but the americans rallied in a bunch, and dealt lusty blows right and left. at last, decatur singled out a man whom he felt sure was the commander, and the murderer of his brother. he was a man of gigantic frame; his head covered with a scarlet cap, his face half hidden by a bristly black beard. he was armed with a heavy boarding-pike, with which he made a fierce lunge at decatur. the american parried the blow, and make a stroke at the pike, hoping to cut off its point. but the force of the blow injured the tripolitan's weapon not a whit, while decatur's cutlass broke short off at the hilt. with a yell of triumph the turk lunged again. decatur threw up his arm, and partially avoided the thrust; so that the pike pierced his breast, but inflicted only a slight wound. grappling the weapon, decatur tore it from the wound, wrested it from the turk, and made a lunge at him, which he avoided. the combatants then clinched and fell to the deck, fiercely struggling for life and death. about them fought their followers, who strove to aid their respective commanders. suddenly a tripolitan officer, who had fought his way to a place above the heads of the two officers, aimed a blow at the head of decatur. his victim was powerless to guard himself. one american sailor only was at hand. this was reuben james, a young man whose desperate fighting had already cost him wounds in both arms, so that he could not lift a hand to save his commander. but, though thus desperately wounded, james had yet one offering to lay before his captain,--his life. and he showed himself willing to make this last and greatest sacrifice, by thrusting his head into the path of the descending scimetar, and taking upon his own skull the blow intended for decatur. the hero fell bleeding to the deck; a pistol-shot from an american ended the career of the turk, and decatur was left to struggle with his adversary upon the deck. but by this time the great strength of the turkish captain was beginning to tell in the death-struggle. his right arm was clasped like an iron band around the american captain, while with his left hand he drew from his belt a short _yataghan_, which he was about to plunge into the throat of his foe. decatur lay on his side, with his eyes fixed upon the face of his foe. he saw the look of triumph flash in the eyes of the turk; he saw the gleaming steel of the _yataghan_ as it was drawn from its sheath. mustering all his strength, he writhed in the grasp of his burly foe. he wrested his left arm clear, and caught the turk's wrist just as the fatal blow was falling; then with his right hand he drew from his pocket a small pistol. pressing this tightly against the back of his enemy, he fired. the ball passed through the body of the turk, and lodged in decatur's clothing. a moment later the tripolitan's hold relaxed, and he fell back dead; while decatur, covered with his own blood and that of his foe, rose to his feet, and stood amidst the pile of dead and wounded men that had gathered during the struggle around the battling chiefs. the fall of their captain disheartened the tripolitans, and they speedily threw down their arms. the prize was then towed out of the line of battle; and, as by this time the american gunboats were drawing off, decatur took his prizes into the shelter of the flag-ship. while decatur had been thus engaged, the gunboats under his command had not been idle. lieut. trippe, in command of no. , had fought a hand-to-hand battle that equalled that of decatur. trippe's plan of attack had been the same as that of his leader. dashing at the enemy, he had let fly a round of grape and canister, then boarded in the smoke and confusion. but his boat struck that of the enemy with such force as to recoil; and trippe, who had sprung into the enemy's rigging, found himself left with but nine of his people, to confront nearly twoscore tripolitans. the americans formed in a solid phalanx, and held their ground bravely. again the two commanders singled each other out, and a fierce combat ensued. the turk was armed with a cutlass, while trippe fought with a short boarding-pike. they fought with caution, sparring and fencing, until each had received several slight wounds. at last the tripolitan struck trippe a crushing blow on the head. the american fell, half stunned, upon his knees; and at this moment a second tripolitan aimed a blow at him from behind, but was checked and killed by an american marine. rallying all his strength, trippe made a fierce thrust at his adversary. this time the sharp pike found its mark, and passed through the body of the tripolitan captain, who fell to the deck. his men, seeing him fall, abandoned the contest, and the americans were soon bearing away their prize in triumph. but in the excitement of victory no one thought to haul down the tripolitan flag, which-still flaunted defiant at the end of the long lateen mast. so, when the prize came near the "vixen," the american man-of-war, mistaking her for an enemy, let fly a broadside, that brought down flag, mast and all. luckily no one was hurt, and the broadside was not repeated. but by this time the wind had veered round into an unfavorable quarter, and the flag-ship showed a signal for the discontinuance of the action. the gunboats and their prizes were taken in tow by the schooners and brigs, and towed out of range of the enemy's shot. while this operation was going on, the "constitution" kept up a rapid fire upon the shore batteries, and not until the last of the smaller craft was out of range, did she turn to leave the fray. as she came about, a shot came in one of her stern-ports, struck a gun near which commodore preble was standing, broke to pieces, and scattered death and wounds about. when the squadron had made an offing, preble hoisted a signal for the commanders to come aboard the flag-ship, and make their reports. he was sorely disappointed in the outcome of the fray, and little inclined to recognize the conspicuous instances of individual gallantry shown by his officers. he had set his heart upon capturing the entire fleet of nine tripolitan gunboats, and the escape of six of them had roused his naturally irascible disposition to fury. as he stalked his quarter-deck, morose and silent, decatur came aboard. the young officer still wore the bloody, smoke-begrimed uniform in which he had grappled with the turk, his face was begrimed with powder, his hands and breast covered with blood. as he walked to the quarter-deck, he was the centre of observation of all on the flag-ship. stepping up to the commodore, he said quietly,-- "well, commodore, i have brought you out three of the gunboats." preble turned upon him fiercely, seized him with both hands by the collar, and shaking him like a schoolboy, snarled out,-- "ay, sir, why did you not bring me more?" the blood rushed to decatur's face. the insult was more than he could bear. his hand sought his dagger, but the commodore had left the quarter-deck. turning on his heel, the outraged officer walked to the side, and called his boat, determined to leave the ship at once. but the officers crowded about him, begging him to be calm, and reminding him of the notoriously quick temper of the commodore. while they talked, there came a cabin steward with a message. "the commodore wishes to see capt. decatur below." decatur hesitated a moment, then obeyed. some time passed, but he did not re-appear on deck. the officers became anxious, and at last, upon some pretext, one sought the commodore's cabin. there he found preble and decatur, sitting together, friendly, but both silent, and in tears. the apology had been made and accepted. there is one humble actor in the first attack upon tripoli, whom we cannot abandon without a word. this is reuben james. that heroic young sailor quickly recovered from the bad wound he received when he interposed his own head to save his commander's life. one day decatur called him aft, and publicly asked him what could be done to reward him for his unselfish heroism. the sailor was embarrassed and nonplussed. he rolled his quid of tobacco in his mouth, and scratched his head, without replying. his shipmates were eager with advice. "double pay, jack: the old man will refuse you nothing;" "a boatswain's berth;" "a pocket-full of money and shore leave," were among the suggestions. but james put them aside. he had decided. "if you please, sir," said he, "let somebody else hand out the hammocks to the men when they are piped down. that is a sort of business that i don't exactly like." the boon was granted; and ever afterwards, when the crew was piped to stow away hammocks, reuben james sauntered about the decks with his hands in his pockets, the very personification of elegant leisure. for modesty, the request of the preserver of decatur is only equalled by that of the sailor who decided the battle between the "bon homme richard" and the "serapis." he had stationed himself on the yard-arm, and was dropping hand-grenades upon the deck of the "serapis." at last a well-aimed grenade set fire to some powder on the enemy's ship, and virtually decided the day in favor of the americans. when asked by paul jones what he would have as a reward for this great service, he suggested double rations of grog for the next week as the proper recompense. this he got, and no more. but to return to the american fleet before tripoli. four days were spent in repairing damages, and on the th of august a second attack was made upon the town. the disposition of the american forces was much the same as on the occasion of the first attack, although the americans were re-enforced by the three captured gunboats. the fighting was confined to long-range cannonading; for the enemy had been taught a lesson, and was afraid to try conclusions hand to hand with the americans. about three o'clock in the afternoon, a tremendous explosion drew the gaze of every one to the spot where gunboat no. had been anchored. at first only a dense mass of smoke, with the water surrounding it littered with wreckage, was to be seen. when the smoke cleared away, the extent of the disaster was evident. the gunboat had blown up. her bow alone remained above water, and there a handful of plucky men were loading the great twenty-six-pound cannon that formed her armament. lieut. spence commanded the gunners, and urged them on. "now, lads, be lively," he cried. "let's get one shot at the turks before we sink." every ship in the squadron was cheering the devoted crew of no. . from every vessel anxious eyes watched the men who thus risked their lives for one shot. the water was rushing into the shattered hulk; and just as spence pulled the lanyard, and sent a cast-iron shot into tripoli, the wreck gave a lurch, and went down. her crew was left struggling in the water. spence, who could not swim, saved himself by clinging to an oar, while his men struck out for the nearer vessels, and were soon receiving the congratulations of their comrades. in this attack, richard somers, a most courageous and capable officer, who a few weeks later met a tragic end, narrowly escaped death. he was in command of gunboat no. , and while directing the attack stood leaning against her flagstaff. he saw a shot flying in his direction. involuntarily he ducked his head, and the next instant the flying shot cut away the flagstaff just above him. when the action was over, lieut. somers stood by the pole, and found that the shot had cut it at the exact height of his chin. after firing for about three hours, the american squadron drew off. little had been accomplished, for the stone walls and fortresses of tripoli were not to be damaged very greatly by marine artillery. the americans themselves had suffered seriously. their killed and wounded amounted to eighteen men. they had lost one gunboat by an explosion, and all the vessels had suffered somewhat from the tripolitan fire. that night the americans were gladdened by the arrival of the frigate "john adams," bringing letters and news from home. she brought also the information that re-enforcements were coming. accordingly preble determined to defer any further attack upon tripoli until the arrival of the expected vessels. in the mean time he had several interviews with the bashaw upon the subject of peace; but, as the turk would not relinquish his claim of five hundred dollars ransom for each captive in his hands, no settlement was reached. while waiting for the re-enforcements, preble continued his preparations for another attack. the ships were put into fighting trim, munition hauled over, and repeated and thorough reconnoissances of the enemy's works made. it was while on the latter duty, that the brig "argus" narrowly escaped destruction. with preble on board, she stood into the harbor, and was just coming about before one of the batteries, when a heavy shot raked her bottom, cutting several planks half through. had the shot been an inch higher, it would have sunk the brig. by the th of august, preble's patience was exhausted; and, without waiting longer for the expected squadron, he began an attack upon the town. on the night of the th, a few shells were thrown into tripoli, but did little damage. four days later, a more determined attack was made, in which every vessel in the squadron took part. two of the enemy's gunboats were sunk; but with this exception little material damage was done, though the americans chose the most advantageous positions, and fired fast and well. it was becoming evident that men-of-war were no match for stone walls. during this engagement, the american fleet came within range of the bashaw's palace, and the flying shot and shell drove that dignitary and his suite to a bomb-proof dungeon. one heavy shot flew in at the window of the cell in which capt. bainbridge was confined, and striking the wall, brought down stones and mortar upon him as he lay in bed, so that he was seriously bruised. but the american captain was in no way daunted, and the next day wrote in sympathetic ink to preble, telling him to keep up his fire, for the tripolitans were greatly harassed by it. on sept. , yet another attack upon the town and fortress was made. as in the foregoing instances, nothing was accomplished except the throwing of a vast quantity of shot and shell. capt. bainbridge, in a secret letter to preble, reported, that of the shells he had seen falling in the city very few exploded, and the damage done by them was therefore very light. preble investigated the matter, and found that the fuse-holes of many of the shells had been stopped with lead, so that no fire could enter. the shells had been bought in sicily, where they had been made to resist a threatened invasion by the french. it is supposed that they had been thus ruined by french secret agents. but, before this time, commodore preble, and the officers under his command, had about reached the conclusion that tripoli could not be reduced by bombardment. accordingly they cast about for some new method of attack. the plan that was finally adopted proved unfortunate in this instance, just as similar schemes for the reduction of fortresses have prove futile throughout all history. briefly stated, the plan was to send a fire-ship, or rather a floating mine, into the harbor, to explode before the walls of the fortress, and in the midst of the enemy's cruisers. the ketch "intrepid," which had carried decatur and his daring followers out of the harbor of tripoli, leaving the "philadelphia" burning behind them, was still with the fleet. this vessel was chosen, and with all possible speed was converted into an "infernal," or floating mine. "a small room, or magazine, had been planked up in the hold of the ketch, just forward of her principal mast," writes fenimore cooper. "communicating with this magazine was a trunk, or tube, that led aft to another room filled with combustibles. in the planked room, or magazine, were placed one hundred barrels of gunpowder in bulk; and on the deck, immediately above the powder, were laid fifty thirteen-and-a-half-inch shells, and one hundred nine-inch shells, with a large quantity of shot, pieces of kentledge, and fragments of iron of different sorts. a train was laid in the trunk, or tube, and fuses were attached in the proper manner. in addition to this arrangement, the other small room mentioned was filled with splinters and light wood, which, besides firing the train, were to keep the enemy from boarding, as the flames would be apt to induce them to apprehend an immediate explosion." such was the engine of death prepared. the plan of operations was simply to put a picked crew on this floating volcano, choose a dark night, take the "infernal" into the heart of the enemy's squadron, fire it, and let the crew escape in boats as best they might. the leadership of this desperate enterprise was intrusted to lieut. richard somers. indeed, it is probable that the idea itself originated with him, for a commanding officer would be little likely to assign a subordinate a duty so hazardous. moreover, there existed between decatur and somers a generous rivalry. each strove to surpass the other; and since decatur's exploit with the "philadelphia," somers had been seeking an opportunity to win equal distinction. it is generally believed, that, having conceived the idea of the "infernal," he suggested it to preble, and claimed for himself the right of leadership. but ten men and one officer were to accompany mr. somers on his perilous trip. yet volunteers were numerous, and only by the most inflexible decision could the importunate ones be kept back. the officer chosen was lieut. wadsworth of the "constitution," and the men were chosen from that ship and from the "nautilus." as the time for carrying out the desperate enterprise drew near, preble pointed out to the young commander the great danger of the affair, and the responsibility that rested upon him. particularly was he enjoined not to permit the powder in the ketch to fall into the hands of the tripolitans, who at that time were short of ammunition. one day, while talking with somers, preble burned a port-fire, or slow-match, and, noting its time, asked somers if he thought the boats could get out of reach of the shells in the few minutes it was burning. "i think we can, sir," was the quiet response. something in the speaker's tone aroused preble's interest, and he said,-- "would you like the port-fire shorter still?" "i ask no port-fire at all," was the quiet reply. at last the day of the adventure was at hand. it was sept. , the day following the last attack upon tripoli. the sky was overcast and lowering, and gave promise of a dark night. fully convinced that the time for action was at hand, somers called together the handful of brave fellows who were to follow him, and briefly addressed them. he told them he wished no man to go with him who did not prefer being blown up to being captured. for his part, he would much prefer such a fate, and he wished his followers to agree with him. for answer the brave fellows gave three cheers, and crowded round him, each asking to be selected to apply the match. somers then passed among the officers and crew of the "nautilus," shaking hands, and bidding each farewell. there were few dry eyes in the ship that afternoon; for all loved their young commander, and all knew how desperate was the enterprise in which he had embarked. it was after dusk when the devoted adventurers boarded the powder-laden ketch, as she lay tossing at her anchorage. shortly after they had taken possession, a boat came alongside with decatur and lieut. stewart in the stern-sheets. the officers greeted their comrades with some emotion. they were all about of an age, followed one loved profession, and each had given proofs of his daring. when the time came for them to part, the leave-taking was serious, but tranquil. somers took from his finger a ring, and breaking it into four pieces, gave one to each of his friends. then with hearty handshakings, and good wishes for success, decatur and stewart left their friends. on the ketch was one man who had not been accepted as a volunteer. this was lieut. israel of the "constitution," who had smuggled himself aboard. with this addition to his original force, somers ordered sail made, and the "intrepid" turned her prow in the direction of the tripolitan batteries. as far as the harbor's mouth, she was accompanied by the "argus," the "vixen," and the "nautilus." there they left her, and she pursued her way alone. it was a calm, foggy night. a few stars could be seen glimmering through the haze, and a light breeze ruffled the water, and wafted the sloop gently along her course. from the three vessels that waited outside the harbor's mouth, eager watchers with night-glasses kept their gaze riveted upon the spectral form of the ketch, as she slowly receded from their sight. fainter and fainter grew the outline of her sails, until at last they were lost to sight altogether. then fitful flashes from the enemy's batteries, and the harsh thunder of the cannon, told that she had been sighted by the foe. the anxious watchers paced their decks with bated breath. though no enemy was near to hear them, they spoke in whispers. the shadow of a great awe, the weight of some great calamity, seemed crushing them. "what was that?" all started at the abrupt exclamation. through the haze a glimmering light had been seen to move rapidly along the surface of the water, as though a lantern were being carried along a deck. suddenly it disappeared, as though dropped down a hatchway. a few seconds passed,--seconds that seemed like hours. then there shot up into the sky a dazzling jet of fire. a roar like that of a huge volcano shook earth and sea. the vessels trembled at their moorings. the concussion of the air threw men upon the decks. then the mast of the ketch, with its sail blazing, was seen to rise straight into the air, and fall back. bombs with burning fuses flew in every direction. the distant sound of heavy bodies falling into the water and on the rocks was heard. then all was still. even the tripolitan batteries were silent. for a moment a great sorrow fell upon the americans. then came the thought that somers and his brave men might have left the ketch before the explosion. all listened for approaching oars. minutes lengthened into hours, and still no sound was heard. men hung from the sides of the vessels, with their ears to the water, in the hopes of catching the sound of the coming boats. but all was in vain. day broke; the shattered wreck of the "intrepid" could be seen within the harbor, and near it two injured tripolitan gunboats. but of somers and his brave followers no trace could be seen, nor were they ever again beheld by their companions. to capt. bainbridge in his prison-cell came a tripolitan officer, several days later, asking him to go to a point of rocks, and view some bodies thrown there by the waves. thither bainbridge went, and was shown several bodies shockingly mutilated and burned. though they were doubtless the remains of some of the gallant adventurers, they could not be identified. the exact reason for this disaster can never be known. many have thought that somers saw capture inevitable, and with his own hand fired the fatal charge; others believed the explosion to be purely accidental; while the last and most plausible theory is, that a shot from the enemy's batteries penetrated the magazine, and ended the career of the "intrepid" and her gallant crew. but however vexed the controversy over the cause of the explosion, there has been no denial of the gallantry of its victims. the names of all are honored in naval annals, while that of somers became a battle-cry, and has been borne by some of the most dashing vessels of the united states navy. it may be said that this episode terminated the war with tripoli. thereafter it was but a series of blockades and diplomatic negotiations. commodore barron relieved preble, and maintained the blockade, without any offensive operations, until peace was signed in june, . the conditions of that peace cannot be too harshly criticised. by it the united states paid sixty thousand dollars for american prisoners in the hands of the bashaw, thus yielding to demands for ransom which no civilized nation should for a moment have considered. the concession was all the more unnecessary, because a native force of insurrectionists, re-enforced by a few americans, was marching upon tripoli from the rear, and would have soon brought the bashaw to terms. but it was not the part of the navy to negotiate the treaty. that rested with the civilians. the duty of the blue-jackets had been to fight for their country's honor; and that they had discharged this duty well, no reader of these pages can deny. part ii blue-jackets of . chapter i. the gathering of the war-cloud. -- the revolution ended, but the war for independence yet unfought. -- outrages upon american sailors. -- the right of search. -- impressment. -- boyhood of commodore porter. -- early days of commodores perry and barney. -- burning a privateer. -- the embargo. -- war inevitable. on a bright november afternoon in the year , the streets of new york city, bordering on the bay, were crowded with excited people, pushing and elbowing each other rudely, and all pressing down to the water-side, where was collected a huge crowd, looking anxiously across the broad waters of the noble bay, to a spot where lay anchored a large squadron of ships. the taut cordage, the trimly squared yards, and the rows of cannon protruding from the open ports made it evident to the veriest landsman that many of the ships were men-of-war; while the scarlet flags crossed by the emblem of st. george, flaunting from the peak of every vessel, declared the allegiance of the fleet to the monarch of great britain, against whose rule the hardy colonists had been for years waging a warfare, now to end in victory. between the ships and the landing-place of old fort george, that then stood where now extends the green sward of the battery park, a fleet of long-boats was actively plying; the long, swinging strokes of the blue-clad sailors stamping them as men-o'-war's men beyond doubt. the landing-place was thronged with troops, whose glistening muskets, scarlet coats, gold trimmings, and waving plumes contrasted beautifully with the bright blue jackets of the sailors, as file after file of the soldiers boarded the boats, and were rowed away to the waiting ships. the troops drawn up on the shore formed long lines of scarlet against the green background of the bastions of fort george. the men standing at rest talked loudly to each other of the coming voyage, and now and again shouted fiercely at some soberly clad citizen who strolled too near the warlike ranks; for had not all the sturdy citizens of new york come down to see the hated british evacuate the city, forced out by the troops of gen. washington (plain _mr._ washington, the british liked to call him)? the ragged gamins scurried here and there, yelling ribald jests at the departing soldiers; and the scarlet-coated troopers had hard work keeping down their rising anger, as suggestive cries of "boiled lobsters" rose on every side. even the staid citizens could hardly conceal their exultation, as they thought that with those soldiers departed forever the rule of great britain over the colonies. it was a quaint-looking crowd that had gathered that day, at the end of the little town. the sturdy mechanics and laborers, who were most numerous, were dressed in tight leather or yellow buckskin breeches, checked shirts, and flaming red flannel jackets. their heads were covered with rusty felt hats, cocked up at the sides into a triangular shape, and decorated with feathers or bright buckles. on their feet were heavy leathern shoes, fastened with huge brass buckles that covered the entire instep. here and there in the crowd stood a prosperous merchant or man of fashion, whose garb, if less rough than that of his humbler fellow-citizen, was no less odd and picturesque. at first sight, an observer might think that all the men of new york were white-haired; but a closer examination would show that the natural color of the hair was hid by dense layers of white powder. the hair was done up in a short cue tied by black ribbons, and on top of all rested a three-cornered cocked hat, heavily laced with gold or silver braid. the coat was light-colored, with a profusion of silver buttons, stamped with the wearer's monogram, decorating the front. over the shoulders hung a short cape. the knee-breeches, marvellously tight, ended at the tops of gaudy striped stockings, which in turn disappeared in the recesses of pointed shoes adorned with gleaming buckles. the broad cuffs of the coat-sleeves were heavily laden with lead, to keep them in proper position. [illustration: derelict.] such were the characteristics of the crowd that had assembled that day to witness the closing scene of british domination in america. even as they stood there, they heard, faintly rising on the autumnal air, the sound of the fife and drum, as the american troops came marching down into the city, from their camp at the upper end of the island. and, as the last boat-load of grenadiers pushes off from the shore, the crowd, no longer restrained by the glittering bayonets, rushes down to the water's edge, and hurls taunts and gibes after the retreating boats, until the grizzled old soldiers curse the "yankee rebels" fiercely, under their mustaches, and beg the officers to give them a volley. now the advance guard of the little american army, with fifes shrilling out the notes of "yankee doodle," comes marching down to the fort. no gay trappings, scarlet or gold lace about these soldiers, but ragged suits of homespun and homely flint-lock muskets, whose barrels are better burnished within than without. they march quickly to the water-front, and halt. the captain looks at the british squadron, now getting under way, and then, with true soldierly instinct, flashes a glance to the top of the flagstaff in the centre of the fort. his brow contracts, he stamps his foot, and the soldiers and citizens who have followed his glance break out into a cry of rage that rings far out over the placid waters of the bay, and makes the tough old british veterans chuckle grimly over the success of their little joke upon the yankees; for there, high above the heads of the wrathful crowd, flaunting its scarlet folds over the roofs of the liberated city, floats proudly the british flag. "tear it down!" the cry rises hoarsely from a thousand throats; and the colonial officer springs with glittering sword to cut the halliards, but finds them cut away already, and the flag nailed to the mast. then a trim sailor-boy works his way through the crowd, and, grasping the pole firmly, attempts to climb up, but soon slides down ingloriously over the greasy surface, freshly slushed by the british before their departure. the crowd yells in wrathful impotence; and a few hot-headed youths spring forward, axe in hand, to bring down pole and all to the earth. but the firm hand of the commanding officer restrains them. he whispers a few words into their ears; and they start briskly away, followed by a dozen or two of the steadily growing crowd. "gen. washington will be here soon," says the captain; "we must get that rag down at once." [illustration: cutting away the flag.] in a few minutes the messengers return. they have been to a neighboring hardware store, and startled the gray-haired old merchant so that he stared vaguely at them through his spectacles, as they fiercely demanded hammers, nails, and wooden cleats. loaded with these, they dash back to the scene of action; and again the sailor-boy becomes the hero of the moment. with his pockets filled with cleats, and his mouth stuffed with nails, he begins again his ascent of the slippery staff. he nails cleat after cleat upon the pole, and step by step mounts toward the top. at last he reaches the flag; and, with a few quick jerks, it is torn from the pole, and thrown contemptuously out into the air, to float down upon the crowd, and be torn to pieces by curiosity seekers. then the halliards are lowered, and soon the flag of the young and struggling nation floats in the cool breeze; while from the neighboring heights the cannon of the forts speak in deep-mouthed salvos of applause, that mingle with the rejoicings of the people, and do not cease until the ships of the enemy have passed through the narrows, and are out of sight and hearing. the british had evacuated new york, and america had won her independence. not many years, however, had passed after this memorable event, when the citizens not only of new york, but the people of all the united states, began to find out that america had not won her true independence, but merely a slight relief from the oppressions of great britain. already the nations of europe were beginning to encroach upon the rights and liberties of the infant nation. for this the states were themselves greatly to blame. nobly as they had fought in unison to throw off the yoke of great britain, they fell into strife among themselves as soon as the war was at an end, and by their quarrels and bickerings led all the european nations to believe that the contentious colonies, like the kilkenny cats, would end by destroying each other. such a nation could command little respect, and the stronger powers were not slow to show their contempt for the united states. american vessels, coming back to port, would report that a british ship-of-war had halted them in mid-ocean, and seized american sailors as suspected british deserters. other american ships, sailing full of hope from american ports, would never re-appear, and their fate would be a mystery, until, after many months, some sailor wandering home told of his ship's capture by a french privateer or tripolitan war vessel. for years a debasing tribute was paid to the bashaw of tripoli, upon condition of his granting to american ships the privileges of the sea, that are the undoubted rights of every nation; yet even this compact was more often ignored than observed. small wonder was it that the sage old statesman, benjamin franklin, on hearing a young man speak of the "glorious war for independence," responded gravely, "say rather the war of the revolution: the war for independence is yet to be fought." in the year , the states, after much debate and bickering, finally ratified the document known as the constitution of the united states. while the work of the american revolution was thus being completed, and a new nation was being formed, events were transpiring on the other side of the atlantic that were destined to affect gravely the growth of the new nation. the oppressed peasantry and laborers of france, smarting under the wrongs of centuries, rose in a mighty wave, and swept away the nobles, their masters. the royal head of king louis fell a prey to the remorseless spirit of the guillotine, and the reign of terror in paris began. soon the roll of the drum was heard in every european city, and the armies of every nation were on the march for france. england was foremost in the fray; and the people of the united states, seeing their old enemy at war with the country of lafayette, fired by generous enthusiasm, were ready to rush to the aid of their old ally. but the wise prudence of their rulers restrained them; and for the next twenty years the united states were neutrals, while all the nations of europe were plunged in war. the first effect of this condition of affairs was most beneficial. as neutrals, the ships of the united states could trade with all the battling peoples; while any vessel flying a european flag was sure to find an enemy somewhere on the broad seas, and suffer confiscation. while france was giving her farmers and mechanics to follow in the glorious footsteps of napoleon, the industrious citizens of the united states were reaping a rich reward in trade with the warring nation. the farmers received the highest prices for their grain, the ingenious mechanics of new england reaped fortunes from the sale of their wares, and the shipyards were filled to their greatest capacity with the graceful frames of fast clipper vessels destined for the trade with europe. in the shipping of the united states was confined to a few coasting-vessels, and the american flag was seldom seen beyond the atlantic. fifteen years later, the white sails of american ships dotted every sea, and but few european ports did not show some trim clipper floating in the harbor, bearing at her peak the stars and stripes. from maine to georgia the people were building ships, and manning them. the vast forests resounded with the strokes of the woodman's axe, getting out the timber; and the seaport towns were given over to ship-wrights, who worked day and night at their craft. in new england there sprung up a race of hardy seamen. boys of twelve or fourteen ran away to sea, made a coasting voyage or two, and, after a voyage to some european port, became captains of ocean-going ships,--often before they were twenty years of age. the people of the coastwise towns of new england can tell of hundreds of such cases. there was "nat" palmer of stonington, who shipped when a boy of fourteen, and, after four years' coasting, was made second mate of the brig "herselias," bound around cape horn, for seals. on his first voyage the young mate distinguished himself by discovering the south shetland islands, guided by the vague hints of a rival sealer, who knew of the islands, and wished them preserved for his own trade, as the seals swarm there by the hundred thousands. the discovery of these islands, and the cargo of ten thousand skins brought home by the "herselias," made young palmer famous; and, at the age of twenty, he was put in command of a sloop, and sent to the south seas again. one day he found his passage in the desired direction blocked by two long islands, with a narrow opening between them. to go around the islands would have been a long voyage; and the young captain headed his craft for the opening, but soon found himself on the rocks. luckily, the vessel backed off, and the crew set about repairing damages. while thus engaged, the great, blunt head of a whale was seen in the narrow channel; and, after blowing a column of water high in the air, the monster swam lazily through the strait. "if a whale can go through that channel, i can," quoth "cap'n nat." and he forthwith did so. quick of observation, and prompt of action, the sailors of the united states became the foremost seamen of the world, and guided their little vessels over every known sea. but the growing commerce of the united states was destined to meet a series of checks, that seemed for a time likely to destroy it forever. england, jealous of the encroachments of the americans upon the broad seas of which she had long called herself the mistress, began a series of outrages upon american ships, and, not content with acting in open hostility, incited the piratical rulers of tripoli and algiers to make war upon american shipping. in this volume it is not my purpose to tell of the means adopted by england to let the swarming ships of the barbary pirates out of the mediterranean sea, to prey upon the vessels of the united states; nor do i intend to tell how, after peaceful arguments had been exhausted, decatur and preble, with a fleet of american vessels and a handful of fighting jack-tars, crossed the ocean, and thrashed the pirates of the mediterranean into subjection. that may well be left for future consideration, and this chapter devoted to a history of the acts of insolence and oppression on the part of england, that finally forced the united states to declare war against a power so vastly superior to them in wealth, population, and military and naval strength. the first great and crying outrage, protested against by the statesmen, the newspapers, and the people of the united states, was the so-called right of search. by this was meant the right claimed by every british man-of-war to stop an american vessel on the high seas, muster her crew on the forecastle, and seize and carry away any sailor thought to be a native of great britain. this outrageous act was committed time and time again by the commanders of british frigates, who knew no easier way of filling up a short-handed crew than by stopping some passing vessel flying the stars and stripes, and taking from her the best-looking sailors of her crew. hardly a week passed without the arrival of a ship at new york, new london, or any of the shipping towns of new england, bringing some such tale. the merchant-vessel, skimming lightly over the ocean, at peace with all the world, and with nothing to fear save the terrors of the storms, against which the sturdy mariners knew so well how to guard, would be suddenly halted by a shot from a frigate of a nation with whom the united states had no quarrel. a hail from the frigate told the american to come up into the wind, while a boat was sent aboard. soon a long-boat filled with man-o'-war's men, and with a beardless young midshipman in the stern-sheets, came dancing over the water; and in a minute or two a lieutenant, the middy, and a few sailors clambered aboard the wondering merchantman. there was small ceremony about the proceedings then. "muster your men aft," quoth the middy peremptorily; "and you'd better be quick about it, too." perhaps the american captain protested,--they generally did,--and talked about the peace between the nations, and the protection of his flag; but his talk was usually of little avail. "get those man aft, and be quick about it," orders the british officer. "you've got deserters from his majesty's service in your crew; and i'll have them. do you want me to send the boat back for the marines?" the american crew came aft unwillingly, grumbling, and cursing his majesty's service under their breath, and formed a line before the boarding officer. that worthy whispered a minute or two with the boatswain and sailors who came aboard with him, and then, pointing out one man, boldly claimed him as a british subject. american captains declared that the man so chosen was generally the most ship-shape sailor aboard; and indeed it seemed but natural that the english, in filling out their crew, should choose the best. sometimes the american captain went on board the british ship, to protest against so summary a draft upon his crew. in such a case he was usually received with courtesy by the commander, but never did he regain his kidnapped sailors. the commander trusted in every thing to his first lieutenant, who boarded the merchantman; and that officer was thus made, in the words of an english journalist, "at once accuser, witness, judge, and captor." the men thus pressed were expected to serve with all the zeal and bravery of regularly enlisted sailors. the slightest sign of hesitation or unwillingness was met with blows. a pressed man who refused to serve was triced up, and lashed with the cat-o'-nine tails until his back was cut to ribbons, and the blood spurted at every blow. few cared to endure such punishment twice. yet the sailors taken from the american ships lost no opportunity for showing their desire to get out of the service into which they had been kidnapped. desertions from ships lying near the coast were of weekly occurrence, although recaptured deserters were hanged summarily at the yard-arm. sailors who found no chance to desert made piteous appeals to the american consuls in the ports at which they stopped, or wrote letters to their friends at home, begging that something should be done to release them from their enforced service. it was not the severity of man-o'-war discipline that so troubled the poor fellows; many of them were old man-o'-war's men, and all would have been glad of berths in the united states navy; but the sight of the red flag of great britain waving above their heads, and the thought that they were serving a nation with which their country had just fought a bloody war, were intolerable. one "pressed man," on a british ship lying in the west indies, managed to write the following letter to a newspaper editor in new york, and, after much planning, succeeded in mailing it. port royal, jamaica, june , . mr. snowden,--i hope you will be so good as to publish these few lines. i, edwin bouldin, was impressed out of the barque "columbus" of elizabeth city, and was carried on board his britannic majesty's brig "rhodian," in montego bay, commanded by capt. mowbary. he told me my protection was of no consequence, and he would have me whether or not. i was born in baltimore, and served my time with messrs. smith & buchanan. i hope my friends will do something for me to get my clearance; for i do not like to serve any other country but my own, which i am willing to serve. i am now captain of the forecastle, and stationed captain of a gun in the waist. i am treated very ill, because i will not enter. they request of me to go on board my country's ships to list men, which i refused to do, and was threatened to be punished for it. i remain a true citizen of the united states edwin bouldin. pathetic letters such as this appear often in the columns of the newspapers published in the early part of this century; and are usually accompanied by petitions from the relatives and friends of the pressed man, begging that congress take some action to secure american sailors from such outrages. but year after year the practice went on, and higher and higher grew the enmity between england and the united states. among the sailors who suffered impressment at the hands of the british were many who afterward in the naval battles of the ensuing war won ample revenge from the nation that had so abused their liberties. most prominent of all these men was david porter, who, from the humble station of a cabin boy on his father's ship in , rose in twenty years to be commodore in the united states navy. the name of porter is one famous in the naval annals of the united states; and probably there never existed a family in which the love for the life of a fighting jack-tar was so strong as among these representative american sailors. david porter, sen., and samuel porter served the american colonies dashingly upon the sea in the revolution. of david porter, jun., we shall have much to say in this volume. of his children the eldest, william d., rose to the post of commodore, united states navy, and died of wounds received in the civil war; henry o. porter was first lieutenant of the "hatteras" when she sunk before the fire of the confederate ship "alabama;" thomas porter served in the mexican navy; hambleton porter died of yellow-fever while a midshipman in the united states navy; lieut. theodoric porter, u.s.a., was the first officer killed in the mexican war; and admiral david d. porter, u.s.n., by virtue of his exploits on blue water and in the ditches and bayous back of vicksburg during the civil war, now stands at the head of living naval officers. but to return to david porter. he was sixteen years old, when, in , his father, having obtained command of a vessel in the west india trade, determined to take the lad to sea, that he might learn the profession of his ancestors. it was hardly a favorable time to inspire an independent boy with admiration for the life of an american merchant sailor. the united states had no navy to protect its merchant ships; and the british cruisers that scoured the ocean felt little hesitation about boarding the ships of the infant nation, and kidnapping such sailors as they might desire. of this young porter soon had evidence. while his ship, the "eliza," was lying in the port of jeremie in san domingo, a british frigate came into the harbor, and dropped anchor near by. one morning the lookout on the "eliza" saw a boat, manned by armed men, put off from the frigate, and steer for the american merchantman. the movement was quickly reported to capt. porter, who was too old a seaman not to know what it portended, and too plucky an american to submit willingly to any indignity. his preparations were quickly made; and by the time the frigate's boat came alongside, the crew of the "eliza" were armed and ready to rush to the deck at the first alarm. capt. porter with his officers and son stood on the quarter-deck, and awaited with great dignity the arrival of the boat. soon the british came alongside; and an officer in the stern-sheets announced that he was about to board the "eliza," and demanded to search the vessels for deserters from the british service. capt. porter replied that his was an american ship, and the british might board at their peril; for he was armed, and would resist the boarders to the last extremity. a great laugh went up from the boat alongside. a yankee merchantman to resist british sailors, indeed! and the officer, without more ado, ordered his men to board. hardly had the order passed his lips, than porter's clear voice rang out, "repel boarders!" and the crew of the "eliza," armed with pikes and muskets, rushed upon their assailants, and drove them into the sea. young porter was not behindhand in the fight, but lent his boyish aid to the vindication of american sailors' rights. one man was shot down by his side; and porter received his first baptism of blood in this encounter, which thus early rooted in his mind a detestation for the arrogance of the british, and a determination to devote his life to the cause of his seafaring countrymen. on his second voyage, a year later, young porter was destined to experience still further the hardships and ignominy which american sailors only too often encountered at the hands of the british. once again the boy, now a first officer, was walking the deck of his vessel in a san domingo port, when a boat's-crew from a british frigate came on board on the usual errand of impressment. this time the sturdy, independent spirit of the elder porter was absent; and the captain of the american vessel basely permitted a portion of his crew, among whom was porter, to be carried aboard the frigate, where they were to be kept until they agreed to enlist. loaded with irons, they were thrust into "the brig," or guard-room of the frigate; but, though the case seemed hopeless, porter gallantly refused to enter the king's service, and ceaselessly exhorted his comrades to stand firm against the commands of the british. days passed, and still the frigate's crew was in no wise increased from among the obstinate americans. the british captain lost patience, and commanded that all the prisoners be brought out on deck, triced up, and publicly flogged with the cat-of-nine tails, for "the bad example they set the crew of his majesty's ship." the order was duly put into execution. the prisoners, still ironed, were brought up under a heavy guard, and taken to the gratings; but when young porter reached the deck, and saw the ignominious punishment in store for him, he fought desperately with his guards, and, finally breaking away, ran below, and hid in some corner of the hold, from which the most careful search failed to dislodge him. the captain finally gave orders to leave him alone, saying, "he'll come out fast enough when he gets hungry." but the lad did not wait for hunger to drive him from his hiding-place. that very night he came from the hold, crawled stealthily across the deck, and dropped into the water, regardless of the sharks that abound in those tropic seas. a short swim took him to a danish vessel, by which he was carried across the atlantic. only after many months of voyaging as a common sailor did the lad succeed in working his way back to his home. even this experience could not deter the young seaman from again seeking employment upon the billowy main, and for the third time he shipped upon an american merchantman. again his course lay toward the west indies, and again he was intercepted by the inevitable man-of-war. this time he was not so fortunate as to escape until after a month or more of captivity, during which time he was treated with the greatest cruelty on account of his persistent refusal to serve under any flag save that of his own country. at last he made his escape, and reached home. by this time he was naturally somewhat disgusted with the life of a sailor on an american merchant-vessel; and he cast about for an appointment to the navy, which he soon received. it is impossible to doubt that his three adventures with the british press-gang had much to do with the ardor and bravery with which in later days the young sailor, then elevated to the highest ranks, did battle with the enemies of his country. when, at the close of the war of , the veteran naval officer looked back upon his record during that conflict, he could point to one captured british man-of-war and scores of captured british merchantmen as the measure of his retaliation for the wrongs done him as a defenceless american sailor-boy. oliver hazard perry, of whose famous victory over the british on lake erie we shall speak later, also was brought into conflict with the british in the days of the "right of search." his father, christopher raymond perry, in command of the united states ship "gen. greene," was escorting an american brig freighted with a valuable cargo. near gibraltar they were sighted by a british man-of-war, which bore down quickly upon the two ships. perry was an old and cautious naval officer; and, though peace reigned between his country and great britain, he no sooner saw an armed vessel approaching, than he put his vessel in trim for action, and sent the crew to the guns. nearer and nearer came the great english man-o'-war; and, as she came within range, a puff of smoke burst from her bow-port, and a ball skipped along the water before perry's unarmed convoy, conveying a forcible invitation to heave to. perry at once made signal to his convoy to pay no regard to the englishman; and, setting the american flag, the two ships continued on their way. but at this moment the breeze died away, and all three ships lay becalmed within easy range of each other. the british captain was not slow to take advantage of this; and a boat soon put off from his ship, and made for the american brig. this move perry promptly checked by a shot from the "gen. greene," which so narrowly missed the boat that the crew thought it well to run alongside the american man-o'-war, and arrange the matter peaceably. as the boat came alongside the "gen. greene," the gangway was manned, and the british officer escorted with the greatest formality to perry's presence. he at once stated his purpose in attempting to board the merchantman; claiming that, by virtue of the right of search, he was entitled to visit the brig, and examine into the nationality of her crew. "i deny the existence of any right, on the part of british vessels, to search any american vessel, except with the consent of the american commander," responded perry; "and my shot was intended to warn you that you had received no such permission." by this time the british vessel had come within hailing distance of the "gen. greene;" and the captain demanded why his boat had been fired upon, and was now detained. perry responded in the same words with which he had answered the boarding-officer. "it's a most surprising thing," shouted the englishman, losing his temper, "if a british seventy-four-gun ship cannot search a pitiful little yankee merchantman." "by heaven!" responded perry. "if you were a ship of the first rate, you should not do it, to the dishonor of my flag." and in an instant the ports of the "gen. greene" were triced up, and the british captain saw that his adversary was prepared for battle. after a moment's thought, he abandoned all attempts at violence, and sent a courteous letter to perry, begging leave to visit the brig in search of british deserters, which request perry as courteously granted. to this list of american seamen who suffered indignities at the hands of the british, and afterwards won reparation from their enemies in the war of , may be added the name of joshua barney. few americans have given to their country a longer service or more efficient aid than he. in the little colonial navy of the revolution, he held high rank, and won the plaudits of older sailors. at the close of the revolution, he served for a time in the merchant-marine; then entered the naval service of france, and, at the first news of war between england and america, returned to his country, to enlist under the stars and stripes. it was while he was in command of a merchantman that he was brought into collision with the british in a way that well might make the doughty old sea-dog doubt if the revolutionary days, when he suffered in the noisome confines of mill prison, had not come again. it was in the summer of , that the good ship "sampson," two days out from cape françois, west indies, was slowly making her way northward, over the tropic seas, and under the glaring rays of the summer sun of the torrid zone. capt. barney and his crew were ever on the watch for danger; for, in addition to the hurricanes and typhoons common to the equatorial latitudes, much was to be feared from the lawless british privateers that then swarmed in the west indies and bermudas. that the "sampson" was under the flag of a neutral power, was but little protection; for the commanders of the semi-piratical craft cared little for international law or for justice. war was raging between france and england; and a mere suspicion of traffic with french colonies was enough, in the eyes of these worthies, to condemn a vessel of any nationality. knowing his danger, capt. barney strove to avoid the localities frequented by the privateers, but to no avail. one bright morning, the lookout reported three sail in sight from the masthead, and in a few hours barney found himself hemmed in by privateers. three officers boarded him, and began a rigid examination of the cargo and papers. two finally expressed themselves as satisfied of the neutral character of the vessel; but the third exclaimed that he had discovered in the cabin an iron chest, full of money, which surely proved that the "sampson" had something to do with the french, for "no blasted yankee ever had iron chests or dollars on board his vessel!" such conclusive proof as this could not be overlooked by the sapient privateers; and, after a little consultation, they informed capt. barney that they would let the ship go, if the money were given to them. as it amounted to eighteen thousand dollars, capt. barney looked upon this demand as nothing short of robbery, and indignantly refused to consider it; whereupon his captors took from the "sampson" all her crew except the carpenter, boatswain, and cook, sent a prize-crew aboard, and ordered that she be taken to new providence, a british naval station. the privateers were soon hull down on the horizon; and barney found himself a prisoner on his own ship, exposed to ceaseless insolence from the british prize-master. [illustration: commodore perry.] several days passed, as the "sampson" lay becalmed in the tropics. barney, though too old a sailor to be cast down by misfortune, nevertheless chafed under his situation. from prize-master and prize-crew he received nothing but scurrilous epithets; and the oft-repeated murmurs of "rebel rascal!" "yankee traitor!" "blow out his brains!" and "throw him overboard!" made it hard for him to believe the revolution over, and the united states and england at peace. even while they thus abused the captain, the rogues were feasting upon his provisions and drinking his wines; and only his firm refusal to give up his keys prevented their rifling his iron chest, and filling their pockets with his dollars. at last he began to feel that his life was no longer safe in the hands of his captors; and, though he had by him but three men of his original crew, he determined to attempt to recapture the ship. one evening the captain managed to catch a few minutes' conversation with the carpenter and boatswain of his own crew, and broached to them the project for a recapture. no argument was needed to induce these bold men to embark in the perilous enterprise. indeed, from the very moment of the capture, they must have cherished some such purpose; for each had hidden away in his bunk a gun and bayonet. barney, on his part, had secreted a small brass blunderbuss and a broad-sword; and with this meagre armament the three determined to take the ship from its captors. the success of the project then depended upon a favorable opportunity, and the three conspirators watched eagerly for the decisive moment to arrive. at last there came a day so squally that all the prize-crew were kept busy with the sails all the morning. much exhausted, the sailors sat down to their dinner on the forecastle at noon, while the three british officers spread their mess amidships. barney saw that the moment had arrived; and, giving the signal to his men, the plotters went below for their weapons. barney was the first to re-appear,--the blunderbuss, loaded and cocked, in his hand, and the naked cutlass under his arm. hardly had he stepped on deck when one of the officers saw him, and, throwing down dishes and dinner, sprang at the american and grappled with him. barney struggled violently, and soon managing to get the blunderbuss against his enemy's shoulder, fired it, filling the wretch's arm and side with buckshot. freed from his adversary, the gallant captain cut down with a blow of his cutlass the second prize officer, who was advancing upon him; and the third, seeing his two companions lying, drenched with blood, upon the deck, ran below. in the mean time the crew, startled from their dinner by the report of the blunderbuss, had rushed below for their weapons; but the last man had hardly dived down the hatchway when the wily carpenter and boatswain rushed forward, clapped on the hatches, and in a trice had the british sailors nicely cooped up in the forecastle. the two wounded officers were quickly cared for, and the unhurt fugitive secured; and barney found himself again in control of the ship. the victors then held a consultation as to their future action. they controlled the ship, it was true; but what were three men to do with a full-rigged ship on the stormy atlantic? clearly they must get aid from their captives, or all might go to the bottom together. accordingly the three, with loaded weapons, went forward, and standing at the hatchway, proposed terms to the imprisoned sailors below. capt. barney acted as spokesman. "you shall be released from confinement," cried he to the captives, "and may now come on deck one at a time, each one bringing his weapons with him." the hatches were then thrown back, and the carpenter and boatswain stood with cutlasses and muskets ready to cut down the first who should make an offensive movement. the british saw the preparations for their reception, and came up one at a time as ordered. as each came up, his arms were seized and thrown overboard; and a gruff order given for him to go forward. before long the crew, deprived of all means of resistance, were gathered on the forecastle. barney then retired to the quarter-deck, and ordered that the crew be mustered before him. "you are now my prisoners," said he; "and i have not only the power, but the right, to hang every man jack of you. you seized this vessel without any just cause, and simply because you were the stronger; and you have further used that strength to abuse and ill-treat me and waste my property. i do not propose to execute you, but will give you the choice of two alternatives. you may either stay with me and work this ship to baltimore, there to be discharged with wages; or i will give you a small boat with provisions, and set you adrift to shift for yourselves. one condition i attach to the first alternative. if one of you is seen talking with his former officers, or if one man steps abaft the main-mast, he shall be instantly shot." [illustration: barney regains his ship.] the crew wasted no time in deliberation, but decided to stay with the ship, and at once went forward on duty. then began a fortnight of ceaseless watchfulness and grave anxiety for capt. barney. at night he never closed his eyes, but took his sleep by day in an armchair on deck, his blunderbuss and cutlass by his side, and a sentinel ready to awaken him at the slightest alarm. at last, however, he brought his ship safely to baltimore, and discharged his crew. but the memory of that month of violence remained with him; and we shall hear of him again as a brave sailor in the service of the united states, and an uncompromising foe to england. among the most adventurous of american merchant seamen in the days following the revolution was capt. thomas macdonough. like others of his class, his daring and ability as a navigator gained him a commission in the very small american navy of that time. on one occasion the united states ship "siren," of which he was first lieutenant, was lying at anchor in the harbor of gibraltar, surrounded by a number of merchantmen, from the peak of one of which floated the stars and stripes. while pacing the deck one bright afternoon, macdonough observed a boat manned with armed men put off from a british man-of-war that rode at anchor a mile away. at once his suspicions were aroused, and with a strong glass he watched the movements of the british. as he had expected, the boat steered straight for the american merchantman; and through his glass macdonough could see the boarders scramble over the bulwarks of the vessel, and soon thereafter return to their boat, taking with them a man dressed in the garb of a merchant seaman, and tightly bound. the captain of the "siren" was on shore; and macdonough, as the officer in command, determined that so audacious an impressment should not succeed under the guns of an american war-vessel, small though she might be. "clear away the long-boat," he shouted; and the boat quickly was lowered to the water, and a dozen jackies grasped the oars. macdonough sprung into the stern-sheets, and grasped the tiller. "let fall! give way! pull hard, men!" he gave the orders in quick succession, and laid his course straight for the british boat, which was soon overtaken. he laid his boat alongside the british cutter, and demanded that the captive be given up. the english officer began to protest, but macdonough cut his protests short. "you have no right to that man. he is an american sailor.--tumble in here, my man." the pressed man, delighted with the prospect of rescue, sprang into the american boat; and before the british officer had recovered from his amazement sufficiently to offer resistance, the blue-jackets were pulling away toward the "siren," with the long, swinging, man-o'-war stroke. when he reached his vessel, macdonough retired to his cabin to await further developments, which were not long in appearing. "boat from the british frigate heading for the ship, sir," reported the officer of the deck, in a few minutes. "very good, sir. have the gangway manned," returned the lieutenant. the boat was soon alongside; and the british captain, white with rage, leaped to the gangway, and was shown to lieut. macdonough's cabin. "how dare you take a man from a boat of his majesty's ship, sir?" was his salutation. "'dare' is not a word to be spoken to an officer of the united states navy," responded macdonough. "as for the man, he is a citizen of the united states; and i propose to protect him, at all hazards." "i'll bring my frigate alongside, and sink your beggarly little craft," shouted the visitor, with a volley of oaths. "that you may do," responded the american; "but while she swims, the man you shall not have." "you are a hair-brained young fellow, and will repent this rashness," cried the irate briton. "do you mean to say, that, if i had been in that boat, you would have dared to commit such an act?" "i should have made the attempt, sir, at all hazards." "what, sir!" shouted the captain, greatly enraged, "would you venture to interfere, if i should now impress men from that brig?" "you have but to try it, sir," was the pithy response. and the british captain returned to his frigate, vowing all sorts of vengeance, but nevertheless did not again annoy the american ship. while the popular clamor against the hateful right of search was still at its height in america, great britain unwisely added yet another outrage to the already long list of grievances complained of by the americans. notwithstanding the danger of barbary pirates and british impressment, the merchants of the united states were carrying on a thriving trade with france. england, then at war with the great napoleon, looked upon this commerce at first with disfavor, and finally with such intense hatred that she determined to put an end to it altogether. accordingly, she issued the celebrated "orders in council," forbidding all traffic with french ports. for such action the imperious nation had no authority by any principle of international law. her blockade of the french ports was very imperfect, and easily evaded. it is a perfectly well-established principle of the common law of nations that a blockade, to be legal, must be complete and effective; otherwise, it is known as a "paper blockade," and neutral vessels are justified in attempting to evade it. instead of posting blockading vessels at the entrances of french ports, to warn off all vessels, great britain contented herself with licensing hordes of privateers, that roamed the seas and snapped up vessels with little regard to law or justice. hundreds of american vessels were thus captured; for our trade with france and the french west indian colonies at that time was of vast proportions. the ocean soon became so infested with privateers that every american merchantman carried cannon, and an array of small-arms that would have done credit to a sloop-of-war. the new england sailors became able naval fighters, as well as experienced seamen; for a man shipping for a voyage knew well that, in addition to battling with the angry elements, he might be required to sight truly the great "long tom," or beat back piratical boarders at the muzzle of the muskets. but even these heroic remedies could not save many a good ship. occurrences such as these fanned into flaming fury the smouldering fires of the american hatred for great britain. the people saw their old oppressor and enemy engaged in war with their old ally france, and the popular cry went up for a union of france and the united states against england. happily, the statesmen of the time--washington, hamilton, and jay--were too firm of purpose, and too clear-sighted, to be led away by popular clamor; and they wisely kept the united states government in a position of neutrality between the two nations. deep and loud were the murmurs of the people at this action. could true-hearted americans desert their friends in such a manner? never! and so, whatever might be the policy of the rulers, the many-headed people welcomed french ambassadors, fêted the officers of visiting men-of-war, and hung the tricolor and the stars and stripes side by side on all public holidays. it was in , while the popular affection for france was at its height, that a merchant-vessel flying the british flag sailed into boston harbor, and made fast to the long wharf. under her stern appeared the legend, "the betsy of st. croix;" her decks were littered with poultry and domestic animals, her cordage flapped loosely in the breeze, and every thing about her bespoke the merchant-vessel. her captain, being hailed by the dock-loafers, and made the victim of the proverbial yankee inquisitiveness, stated that he had just come from the west indies with a load of lignum-vitæ, pineapples, and hides, which he hoped to sell in boston. the self-constituted investigating committee seemed satisfied, and the captain strolled on into the city. but the french consul at boston was far from satisfied, and he took care to let his suspicions become generally known. "that innocent-looking merchantman is a british privateer," quoth he; "and it's a shame to harbor her in the good port of boston, amid french-loving people." the consul's words spread like wildfire; and his suspicions soon passed for facts, without any supporting proof. no one knows who was the writer, or who the printer; but in a few hours the people upon the streets had thrust into their hands the following handbill:-- this night will be performed at the steps bottom of long wharf a comedy of stripping the bermudian privateer. citizens. remember there have been near three hundred of our american vessels taken by these bermudians, and have received the most barbarous treatment from those damn'd pirates!!! now, americans, if you feel the spirit of resentment or revenge kindling in your hearts, let us be united in the cause. this was enough to rouse the turbulent people of boston to action. they well remembered the winter's night, twenty-two years before, when their harbor was the scene of the first protest against the oppression of great britain. then they threw overboard the tea, and spared the ships; this time ship and cargo alike should be destroyed. when night fell, small bodies of men could be seen marching down to the wharfs, through the narrow, crooked streets of the old town. before eight o'clock long wharf was crowded with an angry mob. on the deck of the threatened vessel stood the captain, arguing and pleading with the crowd, and at times pointing to the scarlet flag above his head, and threatening his assailants with the wrath of mighty england. argument, entreaty, and threats proved unavailing; and the crowd, gaining courage with numbers, rushed upon the vessel, and ordered captain and crew ashore. leaving the scene, the captain rushed wildly into the city in search of the british consul; and, in his absence, the mob began to search his ship. an active and careful search soon brought to light in an out-of-the-way corner of the hold two swivel-guns, two three-pounders, forty charges of shot, fifteen pounds of powder, and eight muskets. all was piled upon the deck, and pointed out to the captain on his return, amid frantic yells from the enraged populace. he solemnly protested that the ordnance was only intended for purposes of defence against the pirates that infested the bermudas. but the case was already judged. the people laughed at the captain's declarations; and in a few minutes the "betsy," a mass of flame, was drifting across the harbor to the charlestown beach. there she blazed away, while the crowd watched the bonfire from the dock, until the last timbers of the ship fell with a hiss into the black waters, and all was dark again. popular sympathy is at best but an unstable sentiment, and so it proved with this unreasoning affection of the american people for france. firmly the american authorities held to their policy of neutrality, refusing to be influenced in the slightest degree by the popular clamor of the people for an alliance with france. then the french sympathizers made their fatal error. in the presidential chair of the united states sat washington, the hero of the revolution. rashly the french minister and his following began an onslaught upon this great and wise man, because of his firm determination to keep the united states neutral. they accused him of being an "aristocrat;" of wishing to found an hereditary monarchy, with himself at the head. no epithet was too vile for them to apply to him: "liar" and "traitor" were terms freely applied to him whom we regard as the veritable founder of our free republic. such intemperate and unreasoning malice as this had a very different effect from what was intended by the french sympathizers, or republicans as the party was then termed. the party supporting the president gained strength and influence, even while the actions of napoleon and the french chamber of deputies were giving american seamen the same grounds of complaint as those which great britain had so long forced upon them. it was during the last year of the administration of washington, that the french directory issued secret orders to the commanders of all french men-of-war, directing them to treat neutral vessels in the same manner as they had suffered the english to treat them. the cunning intent of this order is apparent by its wording: "treat american vessels as they suffer themselves to be treated by the british." what course does that leave open to the americans, save to resist the british, thereby become involved in a war, and so aid france? but there was one other alternative; and, much to the surprise and chagrin of the french, the americans adopted it. and the only effect of the diplomatic secret order was to embroil france in a naval war with the united states. the condition of american commerce, after the promulgation of the french decree, became deplorable indeed. a merchant-vessel flying the american flag was never safe unless under the guns of an american war-vessel; and the reduction of the navy had made these few indeed. should the brig "nancy" or "sarah jane" put out from the little port of salem or new london, she was certain to be overhauled by some british frigate, whose boarding officer would pick from the brig's crew a few able sailors, and leave her to make her way short-handed as best she might. next would come along some french frigate or privateer,--some "terreur," "incroyable," or "insurgente,"--whose astute officers would quickly notice the gaps in the american crew, and, finding out that the brig had been boarded by the english, would declare her a prize for having given aid to the enemies of _la belle france_. should the little brig be so fortunate as to escape the civilized belligerents, there were still the pirates of tripoli, the picaroons of the french west indies, and the unauthorized and irresponsible pirates, who, with forged commissions and flying the spanish or portuguese colors, ravaged the seas in all directions. the career of an american merchantman at that time is admirably told by our great novelist fenimore cooper in his sea-tale of "miles wallingford." the fate of the good brig "dawn" was the fate of too many an american vessel in those turbulent times; and the wondrous literary art with which the novelist has expanded the meagre records of the times into an historical novel of surpassing interest makes an acquaintance with the book essential to a proper knowledge of american naval history. the first act of retaliation on the part of the united states was the embargo ordered by congress, which prohibited any vessel from leaving american ports. this action had two effects. it quickly brought about great distress in european countries, which even then relied much on the united states for food. this was the chief object of the embargo. the second effect was inevitable. the sudden check upon all foreign commerce plunged business in all parts of the united states into stagnation. sailors out of work thronged the streets of the seaport towns. farmers trudged weary miles beside their ox-teams, only to find, when they had hauled their produce to town, that there was no market for it. along the docks the ships lay idly tugging at their cables, or stranded on the flats as the tide went out. merchants discharged their clerks, and great warehouses were locked up and deserted. for nearly a year the ports were closed, and commerce thus languished. then congress substituted for the embargo the non-intercourse act, which simply prohibited commerce with france and england; and again the american flag appeared upon the ocean. but the two warring nations had learned neither wisdom nor justice, and began again their depredations upon the unoffending americans. envoys were sent to france to protest against the outrageous action of that nation; but they were told that no audience could be granted them, unless they paid into the french treasury two hundred and forty thousand dollars. this last insult was too great. the envoys returned home, told of their treatment, and the war party in the united states rallied to the defence of their nation's honor, shouting pinckney's noble sentiment, "_millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute_." chapter ii. war with france. -- the building of a navy. -- first success for the americans. -- cutting out the "sandwich." -- the "constellation" and "l'insurgente." -- the "constellation" and "la vengeance." while france and england were waging a desperate and bloody war, the united states was like a shuttlecock, being struck repeatedly by the diplomatic battledores of each nation. between the british "orders in council" and the french "milan decree," american commerce was in a fair way of being obliterated. to declare war against both nations, would have been absurd in so young a people; and for months, and even years, the fierce contests of political parties in the united states made a declaration of war against either aggressor impracticable. now the franco-maniacs were in the ascendency, and the country rang with praises of france,--the nation which had cast off aristocrats, and, like america, was devoted to republican principles; the nation which had aided the colonies in their war for freedom. what though a french privateer did occasionally seize an american ship? the americans alone were to blame for that; for was not their attitude toward england, their natural foe, enough to inflame the french? and were not the british aggressions more oppressive than those of france? war there must be, but let it be declared against the hated british. such were the sentiments of the french sympathizers, or democrats as they were then termed in political parlance. but the english sympathizers, or federalists, held very different opinions. they made no attempt to excuse the offensive attitude assumed by england, but claimed that so soon as her war with france was over she would admit the injustice of her actions, and make due reparation for the injuries she had heaped upon american commerce. but they pointed out that for one vessel taken by england, ten were seized by french privateers, or piratical vessels of nondescript nationality, but bearing french papers. as for france loving republican principles, her republicanism was founded upon blood and the guillotine. she was no longer the nation that had aided the struggling colonies. she was the nation that had foully murdered the kind king who had lent that aid two decades before. besides these arguments, the federalists did not scruple to hint, that, in a second war with england, the united states might lose the independence so recently won, while the navy of france was not so greatly to be dreaded. indeed, the american people of that day might well be excused for lethargy in resenting the insults of any first-class naval power. it is not too strong a statement, to say that at this time, when the need was greatest, the united states had no navy. at the close of the revolution, the navy had been disbanded, the ships sold, and the officers dispersed among the vessels of the merchant marine. this fact alone is enough to account for the depredations of french, english, portuguese, tripolitans, and the hordes of pirates without a country. is there no lesson in this? from this lesson of history cannot we deduce the rule that a nation with , miles of seacoast, a republic hated by all monarchies, must maintain its sea-power if it would maintain its honor? the naval regeneration begun in ought not to be checked until the united states ranks next to great britain as a naval power. but the depredations of the enemies of american commerce at last reached such a point that congress could no longer overlook the necessity for an american navy. in march, , congress, after listening to a message from the president detailing the depredations of the algerines, passed an act authorizing the construction or purchase of six frigates, or an equivalent naval force. this was the beginning of the present united states navy; for some of the frigates built under that law are still afloat, although no longer exposed to the rude shocks of battle or the still more violent onslaughts of the mighty ocean. in accordance with the law, the frames of six frigates were quickly laid upon the stocks at six different shipyards; and even while the ribs were yet uncovered, commanders were selected for the unbuilt ships. the names of ships and officers alike are famous in american annals, and may well be mentioned here. the "constitution," "president," "united states," "chesapeake," "constellation," and "congress" were the vessels begun at this time; and the rolls of no navy of the world ever bore six more famous names. the captains chosen were john barry, samuel nicholson, silas talbot, joshua barney, richard dale, and thomas truxton. of these, all save truxton had served the colonies in the revolution. barney narrowly escaped being totally disowned by his country, because while holding a commission in the french navy he had once accidentally hoisted the american flag upside down. a cry went up from his enemies, that it was an intentional insult to the country; but his friends, with justice, pleaded that the flag had been wet, and a sailor, running it up to dry, had thus carelessly inverted it. in the mean time the building of the ships went merrily on, until, when they were nearly finished, a disgraceful treaty was made with algiers, and work on the new navy was neglected, and three of the unfinished ships sold. but in the french depredations became so unbearable that work was hastened; and cities and towns, not satisfied with the three frigates provided for, began collecting subscriptions for the purchase of ships, to be presented to the government. the first of the frigates building by the government to reach the water was the "united states." as the first vessel built by the united states under the constitution, her launch was an event to be celebrated. at noon on the bright may afternoon chosen, the streets of philadelphia leading to the ship-yard, where the hull of the great frigate lay upon the stocks, were thronged with holiday-making people. the sun had hardly risen, when anxious spectators began to seize upon the best points of observation about the ship-yard. the hour of the launch was set at one p.m.; and for hours before the crowd of watchers sung patriotic songs, cheered for congress and the new navy, and anxiously debated the chances of a successful launch. the river was covered with pleasure-craft, decked with flags, and bright with the gay dresses of ladies. the great frigate, too, was a mass of bunting from stem to stern. at one precisely, the blows of many hammers were heard knocking out the blocks; and, after a moment's trembling pause, the first united states frigate glided swiftly into the water, and, after a graceful dip, rode buoyantly on the placid surface of the delaware. [illustration: toasting the wooden walls of columbia.] while the ships were building, the war-feeling against france was steadily growing, and the enthusiasm of the people over the infant navy knew no bounds. toasts to the "wooden walls of columbia," and the "rising navy of america," were drunk with cheers at stately public banquets, and by bands of jolly roisterers at tap-houses. the patriotic song writer invaded the columns of the newspapers; and, as these could not afford space for all the poetic effusions, they were printed on broadsides, and hawked about the streets. at harvard college the students made the chapel walls ring with the ode written by joseph story:-- "shall gallia's clan our coast invade, with hellish outrage scourge the main, insult our nation's neutral trade, and we not dare our rights maintain? rise, united harvard's band, rise, the bulwark of our land." admirable as may be the patriotism of this ode, the poetry is not above criticism; but it is classic in comparison with many others. the following stanza and chorus will show the character of one of the most popular street-songs of the day:-- "americans, then fly to arms, and learn the way to use 'em. if each man fights to 'fend his rights, the french can't long abuse 'em. yankee doodle (mind the tune), yankee doodle dandy; for the french there's trouble brewin': we'll spank 'em, hand and handy." from maine to georgia the mania for writing such doggerel spread with a rapidity only equalled by the avidity with which the people seized upon the songs, and sung them. a complete collection of these remarkable efforts of poetic art would form an amusing volume, and from it alone a history of political movements in the united states might be written. that even such wretched doggerel had its effect upon popular sentiment, cannot be doubted; for has it not been said, "i care not who makes the laws of a nation, let me but write its songs"? but the manifestation of the growing ill-feeling towards france was not confined to poor but harmless poetizing. the first open rupture took place at savannah. in the port of that city were lying two long, rakish schooners flying the french tricolor. their decks were crowded with men, whose rough actions and brutal countenances showed them to be no respecters of law or order. it did not need the rows of cannon protruding from the ports, nor the carefully covered "long toms" amidships, to indicate to the good people of savannah that their harbor sheltered two french privateers. among the seafaring people of the city, the sight of these two vessels aroused the greatest anger. were they not representatives of the nation whose ships were seizing and burning american vessels in the west indies almost daily? perhaps these very vessels were then fresh from an action with some american ship. who could tell that the holds of the privateers did not at that very minute contain the best part of the cargo of some captured american vessel? probably the last shot fired from that "long tom" had crashed into the side of some little brig flying the stars and stripes, and perhaps ended the career of many an american sailor. from suspicions and conjectures, positive statements soon grew. it was whispered about that the two privateers had recently plundered and burned a yankee ship returning from the west indies with a goodly store of specie in exchange for her cargo. those cut-throat-looking frenchmen were even then stained with the blood of true americans. the money they threw on the bars of water-side dram-shops, in exchange for the vile rum which was the worst enemy of too many a good jack-tar, was looked upon with suspicion. "what yankee's pockets did johnny crapaud pick to get all that money?" growled the american sailors. the frenchmen were not slow in discovering the dislike manifested by the people of savannah; and like true soldiers of fortune, as they were, they did nothing to make friends of their enemies. they came ashore in troops instead of singly. cutlasses hung at their sides. their tight leather belts held many a knife or clumsy pistol. their walk on the street was a reckless swagger; and a listener who could understand french could catch in their loud conversation many a scornful sneer or braggart defiance of the americans. [illustration: commodore macdonough.] such a state of affairs could not long continue. each party was ready and waiting to fight, and it was not hard to find an excuse. how the fighting began, no one ever knew; but one night the streets of the little city resounded with cries of rage and groans of agony. soon crowds began to gather; and sailors rushed up and down the streets, crying that the french desperadoes had killed three americans. the rage of the populace, and particularly of the seafaring community, had no bounds. "arm! arm! and take bloody vengeance upon the murderers," was the cry in all quarters. the mob blocked all the roadways leading to the water-front. with cutlasses and guns they attacked the sailors on "l'agile," which lay at a wharf, and drove them overboard. once in possession of the ship, the enraged rioters vented their fury by cutting away the masts and rigging, tearing to pieces the woodwork of the cabin, and finally putting the torch to the battered bulk, and sending her drifting helplessly down the river. this summary vengeance did not satisfy their anger. they looked about them for the other vessel, "la vengeance," and discovered that she had been towed away from the shore, and was being warped up stream to a place of safety. boats were secured, and the irresistible mob set out in mad pursuit. a militia company, hastily sent to the scene of action by the authorities of the town, failed to check the riot; and, after a futile struggle on the part of her crew, "la vengeance" shared the fate of her consort. sympathy for france was well rooted out of savannah then, and the cry of the city was for war. before the news of the uprising at savannah was known in new england, the navy had struck the first blow against french oppression, and the victory had rested with the sailors of the united states. congress had at last been aroused to a sense of the situation, and had issued orders to captains of american war-vessels, directing them to capture french cruisers wherever found. a number of large merchant-vessels and indiamen had been armed hastily, and sent out; and at last the country had a navy on the seas. one of the first vessels to get away was the "delaware," a twenty-gun ship, commanded by stephen decatur the elder. decatur had been out but a few days when a merchantman, the "alexander hamilton," was sighted, from the halliards of which a flag of distress was flying. the "delaware" ran toward the vessel, and sent a boat aboard, which returned, bringing the captain of the distressed craft. to decatur the captain related the old story of french aggression, which had become so hateful. only the day before, he said, his ship had been boarded by boats'-crews from a french privateer of twenty guns. the assailants, once on board, had eaten his provisions, and plundered his cargo without scruple. he gave careful directions as to the course of the privateer after leaving the "alexander hamilton," and returned to his ship happy in the thought, that, though he could not regain his plundered property, the thieves at least would be punished. decatur crowded on all sail, and set off in pursuit of the oppressor. four hours later, the lookout forward reported four schooners in sight off the bow. for a moment the captain was puzzled, as he had no means of knowing which was the guilty privateer; but, after brief deliberation, he determined to adopt strategy. the rigging of his vessel was slackened, the yards slewed round, and every attempt made to transform the trim man-o'-war into a shiftless merchantman. then the helmsman was instructed to carefully avoid running near the suspected schooners. the ruse succeeded admirably. the lookouts in the tops of the schooners reported an american merchantman in sight, but making attempts to escape. the cupidity of the frenchmen was aroused. in the "delaware" they saw only a defenceless ship, from which, by virtue of their strength, they could take whatever plunder they desired. from the decks of the "delaware," the sailors could see the frenchmen shaking out sail after sail; and soon one schooner, a perfect cloud of canvas, took the lead, and left her consorts far in the rear. it was the privateer they were after. the jackies of the "delaware" clambered into the rigging, and set all sail, with the clumsiness of merchant-sailors; but, though the ship spread a large expanse of canvas, she was making but little progress, for two long cables dragged in the water astern, holding her back. the frenchman came up gallantly, but suddenly discovered the ports along the side of the "delaware," and concluded he had caught a tartar. it was too late to escape then; for the "delaware," coming about, had the schooner directly under her guns, and the frenchman had no course left but to surrender. the privateer proved to be "le croyable," of fourteen guns and seventy men. her captain was vastly astounded to hear that the united states had at last sent out cruisers against the french, who had come to look upon americans as their legitimate prey. keeping "le croyable" alongside, decatur ran for philadelphia, where he was received with unbounded enthusiasm. the captured ship was taken into the united states navy, under the name of the "retaliation," and sent, under command of lieut. bainbridge, to cruise in search of other privateers. but the career of the "retaliation" under the american flag was neither long nor glorious. ill luck seemed to attend the vessel in all her cruises, and bainbridge wandered up and down the high seas without getting within range of a french cruiser or privateer. in november, , the "retaliation" was cruising, with two other men-of-war, in the west indies, not far from guadaloupe. one day three sails were made out to the eastward, and two more to the westward. bainbridge thought that at last his opportunity had arrived; and the "retaliation" set off to reconnoitre the strangers on the eastward, while the two other american ships made after the three sails in the opposite direction. as bainbridge gained upon his chase, he concluded from their appearance that they were two english ships, and accordingly threw aside all caution, and sailed boldly alongside. unluckily, they proved to be hostile french cruisers; and, when the discovery was made, the "retaliation" was well within range. every sail was set, and the ship put before the wind, to escape from the enemy, but too late. the leading ship of the enemy was a fine frigate; and she rushed through the water after the fugitive, like a dolphin after a flying-fish. soon a heavy shot from one of the frigate's bow-chasers came whizzing by the "retaliation," unpleasantly reminding the americans that they were still within range, and their adversaries carried heavy metal. the second frigate soon opened fire, and the position of the "retaliation" became hopeless. her flag was unwillingly hauled down, and the vessel became again the property of its original owners. it is a strange coincidence, that this ship should have thus been the first prize of both americans and french in the war. the frenchmen were not content with their success in capturing the "retaliation:" so, while one frigate stopped to secure the prize, the other passed on in hot chase after "the retaliation's" two former consorts, the "montezuma" and "norfolk." bainbridge was taken aboard the french frigate "volontaire," which then continued her course in the wake of her consort, the "insurgente." for the captured american captain on the deck of the "volontaire," the chase was one of great excitement. he well knew that the two stately french frigates were much more than a match for the flying americans; and, should they overhaul the chase, the "montezuma" and the "norfolk" would join the "retaliation" in french captivity. racked with anxiety he paced the deck, trying in vain not to perceive that the pursuers were steadily gaining, and chafing under the position of helplessness in which he found himself. but an opportunity to help did unexpectedly present itself. the french captain, after a long look through his marine-glasses at the flying craft, turned to bainbridge, and inquired,-- "what may be the force of your consorts, captain?" without a moment's hesitation, bainbridge responded,-- "the ship carries twenty-eight twelve-pounders, and the brig twenty nines." the frenchman was astounded, as well he might be; for bainbridge's answer was a most preposterous falsehood, nearly doubling the actual armament of the two vessels. an eager consultation was immediately held by the officers on the quarter-deck. bainbridge looked on anxiously, and was delighted with the success of his ruse, when he heard orders for the hoisting of a signal which should call back the frigate leading in the chase. the signal was hoisted; and the "insurgente," obeying, abandoned the chase, and returned. her captain was indignant at his recall, and curious to know the cause of it. when told of bainbridge's statement, he was furious; for his ship had been close enough to the chase to see that the americans were small craft, utterly unable to cope with the two pursuing frigates. for his falsehood, bainbridge was roundly abused, and many a french oath was hurled at his head. his action was indeed inexcusable by the rules of honor; and the utmost that can be said of it by the most patriotic american is, that by his falsehood he saved two good ships for the infant navy of the united states. from a military point of view, however, his conduct was commendable; and in recognition thereof, on his release from captivity, he was made commander of the "norfolk," one of the vessels he had saved. france and the united states were now actually at war, although no definite declaration of war had been made by either party. this fact made many french privateers assume an injured air, on being captured by united states ships, and complain that they had never heard of any declaration of war. with a frenchman of this sort, stephen decatur the younger had an experience early in his naval career. this occurred in february, . the frigate "united states" was cruising near martinique in that year, and to her young decatur was attached as a sub-lieutenant. one morning a french privateer was sighted, and the frigate set out in hot pursuit. the privateer took the alarm quickly, and crowded on all sail, until her long, narrow hull slipped through the waves like a fish. the breeze was fresh, and the chase an exciting one; but gradually the immense spread of the frigate's canvas began to tell, and she rapidly overhauled the fugitive. the french captain was plucky, and even desperate, in his attempt to escape; for, seeing that he was about to be overhauled, he resorted to the expedient of a fox chased by hounds, and doubled, turning short to windward, and running right under the guns of the frigate. the move was a bold one, and might well have succeeded, had it not been for the good marksmanship of a gunner on the frigate, who promptly sent a twenty-four-pound shot (the only one fired in the affair) straight through the hull of the privateer, between wind and water. in an instant all was confusion on the french vessel. the water poured into her hold through the hole cut by the shot; and the hasty lowering of her sails, and the frantic howls for succor from the crew, told the people of the "united states" that their chase was at an end. the boats of the frigate were quickly lowered, and decatur went in one as officer in command. when he reached the sinking ship, he found a scene too ludicrous to be pathetic. along the rail of the vessel, from bow to stern, the frenchmen were perched like birds. many had stripped off all their clothes, in order to be prepared to swim; and from all arose a medley of plaintive cries for help, and curses on that unlucky shot. by skilful management of the boats, all were saved; and it happened that decatur pulled into his own boat the captain of the sinking vessel. brushing the salt water out of his eyes, this worthy expressed great surprise that he had been fired upon by a vessel bearing the united states flag. "ees eet that that ees a sheep of les �tats-unis?" he inquired, in the broken english that four years of cruising against americans had enabled him to pick up. "it is," responded decatur. "i am indeed sairprised. i had not thought that les �tats-unis had the war with la république française." "no, sir," responded decatur, thoroughly provoked; "but you knew that the french republic was at war with the united states, that you were taking our merchant-vessels every day, and crowding our countrymen into prison at basseterre to die like sheep." this was more than the frenchman could deny, and he was constrained to accept his capture with the best grace possible. an audacious, but clearly illegal, exploit of the blue-jackets in this war, was the cutting out and capture of the french letter-of-marque vessel "sandwich," as she lay in port platte, a small harbor on the spanish side of st. domingo. commodore talbot, who won a reputation for daring and recklessness in the revolution, was cruising about on the san domingo station, and had spent some weeks in monotonous voyaging, without an opportunity to capture a single prize. word was brought to the squadron, that in the little harbor of port platte a vessel was taking in a cargo of coffee. from the description of the vessel, commodore talbot recognized her as a former british packet, the "sandwich," now sailing under french letters of marque. her known speed and seaworthy qualities made her too valuable a prize to be left in the hands of the enemy; and talbot, without more ado, determined to capture her. the first difficulty that lay in the way was the fact that the vessel was under the protection of spain, a neutral power. talbot was no man to notice so purely formal an obstacle. he growled out a decided negative to all hints about respecting a neutral flag. spain neutral, indeed! she might claim to be neutral, but her picaroons were too often to be found among the french pirates to leave any respect for spain's neutrality in the mind of a man of sense; and the "sandwich" he was going to take, and on his own responsibility. this silenced all opposition. having arrived at the determination to take the "sandwich," the next problem to be solved was, how shall she be taken? obviously the first step was to make a careful reconnoissance of the ship and her defences. to lieut. hull of the "constitution," this duty was assigned. one dark and stormy night mr. hull took one of the frigate's cutters, and, pulling into the harbor, carefully examined the situation. on his return, he reported that the "sandwich" was stripped of her rigging, and lay directly under the guns of a small battery, built on shore for her protection. to sail in with the frigate, and capture the enemy by mere force of arms, would have been simple enough; but the object of the americans was to take the ship without injuring her, in order that she might at once join the united states squadron. strategy was therefore necessary. it was accordingly determined to secure an american merchant-vessel, that could enter the port, and run alongside the "sandwich," without arousing suspicion. luckily at that very moment a craft turned up that filled the need precisely. this was the american sloop "sally," a battered, weather-beaten little craft, that had for some time been trading in the west indies, and by her very insignificance had escaped capture by the french. she had often entered and cleared from port platte, and therefore her appearance there would create no suspicion. [illustration: hull makes a reconnoissance.] the "sally" was accordingly chosen to bear the sailors on their audacious expedition. a rendezvous having been appointed, the sloop met the "constitution" far out at sea; and a large body of blue-jackets and marines left the frigate, and took quarters on the clumsy little merchantman, which then laid her course for port platte. about midnight the lookouts on the "sally" saw a vessel's lights near at hand; but, beyond reporting to the officer of the deck, they paid no heed to their neighbor. suddenly, however, out of the darkness came a bright flash; and the hum of a heavy shot in the air above the "sally" was followed by the dull report of a cannon. at the same time a blue light burned on the deck of the vessel from which the shot proceeded, showed her to be a powerful frigate. then ensued a few moments of intense suspense for the little band on the "sally." should the stranger prove to be a french frigate, all was lost; but in that latitude english vessels were common, and possibly this might be one. soon the regular thumping of oars in the tholepins, and the splashing of the waves against an approaching boat, could be heard; and in a few minutes a hail came from the black water alongside, and the dark figure of a man standing in the stern-sheets of a boat was seen. a rope was thrown him, by the aid of which he nimbly clambered aboard. an involuntary murmur of relief arose from the party on the "sally," as by the dim light of the lanterns they saw that the officer wore a british uniform. the officer himself could not repress a start and exclamation of surprise as he saw a band of officers in naval uniform, and a large body of blue-jackets and marines, on the vessel which he expected to find manned by a half-dozen lanky yankees, commanded by a down-east "skipper." "why, what ship's this?" he exclaimed in surprise, as he looked upon the armed men about him. lieut. hull, who was in command, explained to him the situation, and told him of the adventure that was being attempted. the officer seemed much disappointed, and told mr. hull that the british frigate was standing about outside the harbor, to capture the "sandwich" as she came out; but the idea of so boldly setting at naught the principles of neutrality had not occurred to them. after a few minutes' conversation, the visitor returned to his ship, and the "sally" proceeded on her errand. she reached the entrance to the harbor of port platte in the morning, and sailed boldly in. most of the crew and the marines were hidden beneath the bulwarks, or sent below; so that the people on the "sandwich" gave but a glance to the approaching vessel, until she ran so close to their vessel's bows that they feared an accident. "look out there, or you'll run foul of us!" shouted a mate from the deck of the "sandwich"; and, as if his cry was a signal, the helm of the "sally" was put down, the vessel ranged up alongside, and in an instant a torrent of armed men poured over the sides of the surprised frenchman, and drove the crew below. there was no resistance. the ship was captured in five minutes. the marines of the expedition had been sent ashore to spike the guns of the battery, and their work was performed with equal promptitude. then all hands set to work rigging the captured vessel, and getting her ready for sea. on the shore the people were in the greatest excitement, beating drums, parading the few militia, and threatening dire revenge in the name of outraged spain. but the captors of the vessel paid but little attention to their enemies; and by sunset the "sandwich," with all sails set, left the harbor, and joined the united states squadron. the news of this achievement, lawless as it was, evoked great enthusiasm in the united states. a nation's conscience is elastic; and the people praised the heroes of the "sandwich" episode, much as sixty-five years later they commended the commander of the "wachuset" for running down and capturing the confederate ship "florida," which was relying upon the protection of a neutral port in brazil. yet in , when two british frigates attacked and captured the "essex" in the harbor of rio janeiro, the good people of the united states were loud in their denunciations of the treachery of a commander who would so abuse the protection of a neutral nation. such inconsistencies are only too common in the history of nations. in the end, however, the affair of the "sandwich" terminated disastrously for the bold adventurers; for the protests of spain were too forcible to be disregarded, and the prize-money of all concerned in the exploit was confiscated to pay the damages awarded the injured party. not all the successes of the united states navy in the war with france were, like those we have related, dependent upon the speed rather than the fighting qualities of our ships. not many months had passed, when two representative ships of the warring nations met, and tried conclusions at the mouths of their cannon. it was on the th of february that the "constellation," one of the new american frigates, was cruising on her station in the west indies, when her lookout reported a large ship some miles to leeward. the frigate at once ran down the stranger, which hoisted american colors. among ships of the same navy it is customary to have private signals of recognition; and commodore truxton, who commanded the "constellation," set his signal, and awaited the answer. but no answer came; and the stranger, evidently considering further disguise impossible, boldly set french colors, and fired a gun to windward by way of a challenge. on the "constellation" the challenge aroused universal enthusiasm. for the first time since the revolution, the gallant defenders of the stars and stripes were to have an opportunity to try their strength with a hostile man-of-war. the enemy seemed no less ready for the conflict, and waited gallantly for the "constellation" to come down to closer quarters. from both ships came the roll of the drums and the shrill pipings of the bo's'n's whistle, as the men were called to quarters. then all became still, and the two frigates bore down upon each other. neither antagonist was hasty about opening fire, and the report of the first gun came from the yankee when she had come into point-blank range. then began the thunderous broadsides, that soon enveloped the hulls of the two ships in dense gray smoke; so that, to an observer at a little distance, all that could be seen of the fight was the tapering masts and yard-arms, above the smoke, crowded with sailors repairing damages, and nimble young midshipmen shrilly ordering about the grizzled seamen, and now and again taking a crack at the enemy with pistol or musket, by way of recreation. in the foretop of the "constellation" was stationed young david porter, who in that trying moment showed the result of his hard schooling in the merchant-service, of which we have spoken. by the rapid fire of the enemy, the fore-topmast was badly cut, and there was great danger that it might go by the board. porter hailed the deck several times for instructions, but, finding that his voice could not be heard above the roar of battle, determined to act upon his own responsibility, and accordingly cut away the sails, lowered the yards, and, by relieving the injured spar of all strain, prevented its falling. in the mean time the battle raged fiercely below. the american frigate was more powerful in her armament, and better handled, than the frenchman. her guns were handled with deliberation, and the aim of the gunners was sure and deadly; while the shot from the enemy went hurtling through the rigging of the "constellation," doing but little damage. the decks of the frenchman were covered with dead and wounded, and at last two raking broadsides from the american frigate ended the conflict. when the vanquished ship was boarded, she proved to be the "insurgente," the same frigate that had captured the "retaliation" some months before. her loss in this engagement amounted to twenty-nine killed and forty-one wounded, while the cock-pit of the "constellation" was tenanted by but three wounded men; and but one american had lost his life, he having been killed by an officer, for cowardice. both ships were badly cut up in the engagement. the news of this victory was received with great rejoicing in the united states, and was celebrated with cannon-firing and the ringing of bells. at boston, the fourth sunday in march was set for a day of general rejoicing; and on that day huge crowds gathered in state street, and after salutes had been fired, and the city's bells pealed, the people, at a given signal, joined in three mighty cheers, that fairly shook the surrounding houses, for truxton, the "constellation," the blue-jackets, and the success of the wooden walls of america. even after the "insurgente" had struck her flag, the tars of the "constellation" found they had an elephant on their hands. the work of transferring the prisoners was begun, and actively prosecuted; but, when night fell, there were still nearly two hundred frenchmen on the prize. the wind was rising fast, and the long rollers of the atlantic were being lashed into foaming breakers by the rising gale. it was hazardous for the two vessels to continue near each other; and lieutenant rodgers, with midshipman porter and eleven men, was detailed to take charge of the prize, and bring her into port. when the officers boarded the prize, they found that they had indeed a desperate undertaking before them. it was difficult enough for thirteen men to handle the great ship, without having to keep in subjection one hundred and seventy-three captives. to add to the clanger, the gratings had been thrown overboard, and there was no way of confining the captives in the hold. a careful search for handcuffs resulted only in failure. but rodgers was a man of decision, and porter, though but a boy, was bold and determined; and between them they solved the problem. the prisoners were ordered below; and a sentinel was placed at each hatchway, with orders to shoot the first man who should attempt to come on deck. howitzers loaded with grape were trained upon the hatchway, for use in case of an organized movement of the prisoners. for three days the officers sustained this fearful strain, without a moment's sleep; but their labors were finally crowned by successfully bringing the ship and prisoners into st. kitts. in the second pitched battle of the war, the "constellation" was again the american combatant; but this time, though the fight was a glorious one, it did not terminate so fortunately for the american ship. it was on the st of february, , that the gallant frigate, under the same commander, was cruising about her old hunting-grounds, near guadaloupe. a sail was sighted, which, after a careful examination through his marine-glass, commodore truxton pronounced to be an english merchantman. as an invitation to the stranger to approach, english colors were hoisted on the "constellation," but had only the effect of causing the stranger to sheer off; for she was, indeed, a french war-vessel. perplexed by the actions of the mysterious ship, the "constellation" gave chase, and soon came near enough to see that she had caught a tartar; for the vessel was the french frigate "la vengeance," mounting fifty-two guns. although a more powerful vessel than the american, she continued her flight; while the gallant truxton, caring nothing for the odds against him, kept on in hot pursuit. all the remainder of that day, and until noon of the next, the chase continued, with but little change in the position of the ships. "a stern chase is a long chase," thought the jackies on the "constellation;" but they were not discouraged, and only crowded on the more sail. on the afternoon of the second day, the american began to gain rapidly; and by eight at night the two ships were within speaking distance of each other. truxton mounted the rail, and shouted through a speaking-trumpet, "what ship is that?" the only answer was a shot from the stern-port of the frenchman, and the fight was opened. it was then growing dark, though the faint glow of the long tropic twilight still lingered on the western horizon. above the towering masts of the two great frigates, the stars gleamed with a brilliancy seldom seen in more northern latitudes. as the ships rushed through the water, the waves broke against the bows, and fell back in masses of phosphorescent light; while the wakes of the vessels could be traced far back into the darkness,--two parallel paths of light, that glowed and sparkled like the milky way that spanned the starry sky above. side by side the two frigates ploughed through the water. the creaking of their cordage, and the rushing of the wind through the rigging, mingled with the thunder of the cannonade, which, though slow, and made up of single reports, when the "constellation" was confined to the use of her bow-chasers, soon rose to thunderous broadsides as the two ships came side to side. as the twilight died away, the two contestants were enveloped in almost total darkness, save for the fitful flashes of the cannon, and the red glare of the battle-lanterns that hung from the shrouds. the gunners had for a target nothing but a black, shapeless mass, that could be seen rushing through the waves some hundreds of yards away. but this did not prevent fearful execution being done on both sides. for five hours the two ships kept up the running fight. the ponderous eighteen and forty-two pound shot of the enemy crashed into the "constellation," or swept her decks, doing dreadful damage. the deck was strewn with dead and dying men, and the surgeons down in the cock-pit soon had their tables full of moaning sufferers. no one could tell what might be the condition of "la vengeance;" but her regular fire told that she was in no wise disabled. at one o'clock in the morning, the sound of her guns seemed to be more distant; and by the flash of the cannon it was seen that she was drawing out of the fight. the americans cheered lustily, and truxton ordered that his ship be braced up in chase. but the fire of the enemy had been rapid and well directed; and now, at this critical moment, its results were to rob the "constellation" of her victory. as the ships were brought about, to follow in the track of the flying "vengeance," an officer came rushing to the quarter-deck, and reported that all the shrouds and braces of the foremast had been shot away, and the mast was in momentary danger of falling. the rigging had been so literally cut in pieces by the fire of the enemy, that splicing was out of the question; but truxton, in the hope of saving his mast, called all hands from the guns, and the fire of the "constellation" stopped. up in the foretop was stationed midshipman jarvis, with a dozen or more of jackies, whose duty it was to mend the cordage of the topmast, and to keep up a musketry fire upon the enemy. long before the officer of the deck had reported the danger of the foremast, one of the topmen had told jarvis, who was but a lad, that the mast was likely to fall. "ay, ay, my lad," responded the plucky young officer; "but our place is here, and we must go with it." the sailors on the deck below worked manfully: but, notwithstanding all their efforts, the mast soon went by the board; and jarvis and his brave comrades were thrown far out into the black water, never to be seen again. the fall of the foremast ended the battle for the "constellation." helpless, and cumbered by the wreck, she tossed about on the water while her foe made good her escape. what might have been the outcome of the conflict, had it continued, it is impossible to tell. "la vengeance" carried heavier metal and a larger crew than the american frigate; and truxton, with all his dash, found no mean adversary in capt. pitot. yet the condition of the french ship when she came into port at curaçoa showed that the fire of the yankee gunners had been rapid and accurate. fifty of the enemy were killed, and one hundred and ten wounded; while, of the americans, only thirty-nine appeared on the lists of killed and wounded. it was said at the time, that capt. pitot reported having struck his flag three times; hoisting it again, on finding that in the darkness the "constellation" took no notice of the surrender. but this seems, on the face of it, improbable; and the action can hardly be awarded to either ship, although the gallantry shown on either side was enough to win a victory. it may well be imagined that this brilliant action, together with the capture of "l'insurgente," made the "constellation" the most popular ship of the navy; a place which she held until the stirring events of the war with england pushed the "constitution" so far to the front, that even now, when she lies dismantled and rotting at the brooklyn navy-yard, americans still think of "old ironsides" as the typical ship of our once glorious navy. the actions between the "constellation" and the "vengeance" and "insurgente" were the chief contests between regularly commissioned ships of the two nations in the war with france. but the west indies were filled with privateers and semi-piratical craft, with which the navy waged a ceaseless warfare, which well prepared the blue-jackets for the graver struggle which was yet to come with great britain. the half-savage population of the french islands was a fruitful source of trouble to the american seaman. these gentry, known as picaroons, seemed to have a natural inclination for piracy; and the unlucky merchant-captain who should come to anchor, or be becalmed, near one of the islands, was sure to see his vessel boarded, and his cargo plundered, by a lawless horde of frenchmen and mulattoes, whose dialect was an unmusical combination of french and african tongues. the custom of the picaroons was to do their cruising in huge barges propelled by sweeps. with these they would often cut out a merchant-vessel from beneath the guns of a protecting man-of-war, and tow her off to be plundered at leisure. occasionally, however, their well-laid plans failed in the execution. one of the most noted of these occasions was the repulse of ten picaroon barges that attacked the united states topsail schooner "experiment," and a fleet of merchantmen under her charge. the "experiment," with her convoy, was lying becalmed in the bight of leogane, in the island of san domingo. not a breath of air was stirring; and the vessels, drifting about at the mercy of the currents, soon became widely separated, and were an easy prey for the hordes of picaroons that swarmed in that region. in no way could the "experiment" secure a position which would enable her to protect all the merchantmen. in this dilemma it was determined to disguise the war-vessel, in the hopes that the pirates, taking her for a merchantman, would attack her first. this was done; and, as luck would have it, the picaroons fell into the trap. although not the captain of the ship, lieut. david porter was in command on this occasion; and, on hearing that ten picaroon barges with swivels in the bows, and crews of forty men each, were approaching, he sent his crew to quarters, and prepared for a desperate resistance. onward over the smooth waters came the huge barges, each with its twenty-six oars, looking like a mighty centipede. on the ship every thing was quiet, as the jackies stood to their guns, with the prospect of a deadly struggle before them. should the barges get to close quarters, and surround the schooner, no earthly power could prevent their boarding, when their numbers would surely bring them success. but the painful pause before the battle was not long. suddenly porter, ever on the alert, cried out to fire. from every gun that could be brought to bear, a storm of grape and canister was rained upon the advancing boats; and the yells that went up from the astounded picaroons told of the deadly work done in the crowded boats. for a moment, the fleet of barges fell into confusion; some retreating, some advancing, and others drifting about helpless. although the murderous fire was kept up, the pirates formed again, and attempted to get alongside, but were repeatedly beaten back. with musketry and swivels they attempted to answer the fire of the americans; but with little effect, for the crew of the "experiment" kept close under the bulwarks. men were precious then, and porter would not let one expose himself unnecessarily; but he himself, from his prominent post of observation, was an easy mark, and a picaroon's bullet soon lodged in his shoulder. notwithstanding the painful wound he never left his post. the unexpected opposition only maddened the picaroons, and they made desperate attempts to get alongside; but to no avail. now the stern and now the bow of the "experiment" was chosen as the point of attack; but still the rapid fire of the jackies beat the pirates back. on the low-lying shores of the islands, some hundreds more of the picaroons had gathered to watch the conflict; and, as the boats became short-handed from the carnage, they put back to the shore, and returned to the fight fully re-enforced. the bodies of the dead were thrown overboard without ceremony, and soon attracted great schools of the fierce sharks that abound in the waters of the tropics. then a new horror was added to the scene. at a moment when the barges wavered and floated for a moment without motion, porter ordered his gunners to load with solid shot. two or three broadsides rang out; and, when the smoke cleared away, two barges were seen to be sinking. the affrighted crews bent to their oars, and strained every muscle to reach the shore; but, while yet in deep water, the barges sunk, and the picaroons were left floundering in the sea. all struck out manfully for the shore; but suddenly one sprung half from the water, and with a horrid yell sunk from sight. one after another disappeared in the same way; for the sharks had tasted blood, and were not to be appeased. for seven hours the conflict raged fiercely; but at last the picaroons confessed themselves beaten, and sullenly relinquished their attacks upon the "experiment." but they were not to be wholly robbed of their plunder; and two merchant-vessels fell a prey to their piratical violence, before a breeze, springing up, enabled the squadron to escape. before the year was over, the picaroons had another serious defeat to mourn over; and on this second occasion they were well punished for their many piracies. the "boston," a twenty-eight-gun ship, was convoying a merchant-brig to port au prince, when the lookout discovered nine large barges skulking along the shore, ready to pounce upon the two vessels when a favorable moment should arrive. porter was again in command. his tactics were at once determined upon; and the ports of the "boston" were closed, and the ship thoroughly disguised. the picaroons were deceived sufficiently to make a dash upon the two ships, and approach boldly within easy gunshot; then, discovering their mistake, they turned and fled in panic. this time no calm hampered the ship-of-war; and, making all sail, she dashed into their midst. for two hours she kept within easy range of the barges; and her gunners, working deliberately, did fearful execution in the ranks of the enemy, and sunk three barges before the wretched fugitives could reach the shore. after dealing out this summary justice, the "boston" continued her voyage, and, after leaving her convoy in the port of her destination, began a cruise about the islands and the spanish main. in the course of this cruise she met the french corvette "le berceau," which struck after a plucky action of two hours. the frenchman was badly cut up in hull and rigging, and shortly after the surrender her fore and main masts went by the board. the "boston" was but little injured, and took her prize safely into port. after this the fighting was chiefly confined to short, sharp affrays between the smaller united states ships and the french privateers, which were generally good sailers and well manned, although deficient in metal. the great frigates like the "constellation" found no more adversaries worthy of their fighting qualities, and only the sloops and topsail-schooners gave their crews a chance to smell gunpowder. some of these smaller actions, however, were sharp and gallant, although their details have not been preserved like those of the famous naval duels. the "experiment," after her adventure with the picaroons, fought two gallant battles, and was successful in each, although the second for a time threatened to lead to international difficulties. while cruising on her station, the vessel made two sail, which, as they came nearer, proved to be a brig of eighteen guns and a three-masted schooner of twenty guns, both flying the french tricolor, and both intent on mischief. the american fled, but laid her course in such a way as to separate the two pursuers. when night had fallen, lieut.-commander stewart, who commanded the "experiment," saw that the enemy's forces were divided by about a league of green water, and at once determined to strike a blow. doubling on his course, he ran his vessel alongside the schooner, and poured in two or three broadsides with such rapidity and haste that the frenchman struck before his consort could come to his aid. hastily throwing lieut. porter and a prize-crew aboard the prize, stewart dashed off after the brig, which fled incontinently, and proved too good a sailer to be overtaken. pure audacity had carried the day for the "experiment," for the brig was powerful enough to have blown her pursuer to bits in a short engagement. the second exploit of the "experiment" was no less gallant than this, but in the end proved far less satisfactory. late in a summer's afternoon a suspicious sail was made; and the chase, begun at once, had continued until nightfall. when darkness settled over the ocean, stewart calculated the course laid by the stranger, and ordered his helmsman to keep the ship on that course until midnight, when, if the fugitive was not overhauled, the chase would be abandoned. just before midnight a sail was seen near by and to windward. the men were sent to quarters; and with guns shotted, and battle-lanterns burning, the "experiment" ran up under the stranger's lee, and hailed. no answer was returned. perplexed and irritated, stewart ordered a shot fired into the stranger, which was no sooner done than a broadside was returned, which made the schooner reel. both vessels were then plunged into conflict, though neither knew the name or nationality of the opponent. for a time the "experiment" was handicapped by the heavy wind, which laid her over so far that her guns were elevated skyward, and her shot whistled through the enemy's tops. to obviate this, planks were thrust under the breeches of the guns, until at last the proper range was secured, when an active cannonade soon forced the stranger to strike. lieut. porter was sent to take possession of the prize; but the report he brought back put all thought of prize-money out of the minds of the victors, for the stranger was a bermudian privateer, flying the british flag, and under the protection of a nation with which the united states was at peace. the fault lay with the privateers for not responding to the hail, but the americans did all in their power to repair the damage done. all the next day they lay by their vanquished adversary, and the sailors of two ships worked side by side in patching up the injuries done by the shot. by night the privateer was able to continue her cruise, resolving, doubtless, to avoid future conflicts with the ships of the american navy. but to enter into the details of each of the naval duels of the french war of , would require a volume devoted exclusively to its consideration. although there was never a declaration of war between the two countries, yet the warfare on the ocean was earnest, and even desperate. both nations went to work with a will, and the results were of incalculable benefit to the then pygmy navy of the united states. in their newspapers the americans read with wonder and pride of the successes of their new vessels and young sailors, against the trained seamen and best frigates of france. when the war closed, the country rang with the praises of the blue-jackets. indeed, a record of sixty-four french vessels captured, besides many american vessels which were recaptured from their captors, was enough to arouse feelings of pride throughout the nation; and the celerity with which france seized upon the proposal for peace showed well the reputation which our navy had gained beyond the ocean. for months after the peace was signed, the names of bainbridge, truxton, stewart, and talbot were household words throughout the nation; and the deeds of the gallant ships along the spanish main were the favorite stories of the boys of the land. three of the oaken veterans, however, never came home; but against their names must be put the saddest of all naval records: foundered at sea. the captured "insurgente," the "saratoga," and the "pickering" simply vanished from the ocean. over fourscore years have passed; and of them, and the gallant lads that manned them, nothing has ever been known. whether they perished by the fury of the tropical typhoon, whether a midnight collision sent them suddenly to the bottom, or whether the ships were destroyed and the crews murdered by the piratical desperadoes of the west indies, can never be known. somewhere on the coral-strewn bed of the blue seas of the tropics lie the mouldering hulks of those good ships, and the bones of their gallant crews. there will they lie, unknown and unsought, until earthly warfare is over for all men, and the sea gives up its dead. chapter iii. proposed reduction of the navy. -- renewal of british outrages. -- the affair of the "baltimore." -- attack on the "leander." -- encounter between the "chesapeake" and "leopard." not many months had elapsed after the close of the war between the united states and france, when the pride of the nation in the navy that had won such laurels in that conflict began to wane. in the place of poems and editorials singing the praises and pointing out the value of the navy, the newspapers began to be filled with demands for its reduction. it was an unwarrantable expense, exclaimed the critics of the press, for a nation so young, and so far from the warring peoples of europe, to maintain a navy at all. a few gunboats to guard the coast would be enough. all the consequences of the reduction of the navy at the close of the revolution were forgotten in an instant. a penny-wise and pound-foolish spirit came over all the political leaders; and the democratic party, then newly come into power, determined to endear itself to the hearts of the people by cutting down the expenses of the government, and to this end they attacked first the appropriations for the navy. a gallant fight was made against the total abolition of the navy; and finally it was decided to retain thirteen of the ships-of-war on the list, while the others should be sold. with these thirteen vessels, of which the most noted were the "constitution," the "constellation," and the "united states," the navy was placed upon a peace footing. even this moderate squadron, however, brought out much opposition from economically minded statesmen; but the aggressions of the barbary pirates, and the war with tripoli which opened in , gave the sailor lads active employment, and for the time the outcry of the economists against the navy ceased. of the various wars with tripoli and the other states of barbary, we have already given some account. the political bearing of the tripolitan war upon the war which afterwards followed with great britain was slight; but, as discipline for the sterner reality of naval warfare with the nation long reputed to be "mistress of the seas," the experience of the yankee tars with the turbaned infidels was invaluable. let us, then, return to the shameful recountal of the injuries committed by the british upon the american flag on the high seas. even while the united states was at war with france, and thus aiding the british, the outrages never ceased. american sailors were still impressed. american vessels were boarded, and often seized, on the slightest pretexts. even the ships of the government were not exempt, for the british respected no right save that of greater power. it was in november, , that the united states sloop-of-war "baltimore," of twenty guns, and under command of capt. phillips, was in charge of a convoy of merchantmen bound to havana. on the morning of the th of that month, the sloop, with her convoy, were in sight of their destination, and could even see the solid, towering walls of the moro, rising high above the low-lying shores about havana. the breeze was fresh and fair; and all hands expected to cast anchor before night in the beautiful bay, oh the shores of which stands the chief city of the island of fruits and spices. on the "baltimore" the jackies were busily at work holystoning the decks, until they glistened with the milky whiteness dear to the eye of the sailor of the days before the era of yellow pine or black, unsightly iron ships. the shrouds and standing rigging had been pulled taut with many a "yo, heave ho!" until the wind hummed plaintively through the taut cordage, as through the resounding strings of an �olian harp. the brasswork and polished breeches of the guns were polished by the vigorous rubbing by muscular sailors, until they shone again. all told of a coming season in a friendly port. while the work of preparation for port was thus going busily on, the lookout hailed the deck, and reported a squadron in sight. a moment's glance convinced capt. phillips that the strangers were british war-vessels; and, as they were still accustomed to annoy american merchantmen, he hastily signalled his convoy to carry sail hard, and make port before the british came up, while the "baltimore" bore up to speak to the british commodore. before the merchantmen could escape, however, the british cut off three of them, under some peculiar and mistaken ideas of the law of blockades. more than this, when capt. phillips paid his visit to the english commodore in the latter's cabin, he was calmly informed that it was intended to take from the "baltimore" into the british service every sailor who had not a regular american protection; this under the new english doctrine, that every sailor was an englishman unless proved to be otherwise. the avowal by the british captain of this intention filled phillips with indignation, and he warmly protested against any such action. [illustration: the british squadron.] it would, he insisted, be an outrage on the dignity of the nation which he served; and, as the overpowering force of the british rendered resistance impossible, he should insist upon surrendering his ship should they persist in their undertaking, which was no more nor less than open warfare. with this he arose from his seat, and leaving the cabin, to which he had been invited as the guest of a friendly nation, returned to his own ship. here he found a state of affairs that still further added to his indignation. at the foot of the gangway of the "baltimore" floated a boat from one of the british ships, and on the deck of the sloop was a lieutenant in british uniform in the act of mustering the american crew. capt. phillips at once seized the muster-roll, and ordered the officious briton to walk to leeward, while the crew of the "baltimore" were sent to their quarters. but, having done this, he became doubtful as to the course for him to pursue. successful resistance was out of the question; for he was surrounded by five british vessels, one of which carried ninety-eight guns, while the smallest mounted thirty-two, or twelve more than the "baltimore." even had the odds against him been less great, capt. phillips felt grave doubts as to his authority to resist any armed vessel. he had sailed under instructions that "the vessels of every other nation (france excepted) are on no account to be molested; and i wish particularly to impress upon your mind," wrote the secretary of the navy, "that should you ever see an american vessel captured by the armed ship of any nation at war, with whom we are at peace, you cannot lawfully interfere, for it is to be taken for granted that such nation will compensate for such capture, if it should prove to have been illegally made." after some deliberation over this clause in his instructions, capt. phillips concluded that for him to make even a formal resistance would be illegal; and accordingly the flag of the "baltimore" was lowered, and the british were told that the ship was at their disposal. they immediately seized upon fifty-five men from the american crew, who were taken away to the british fleet. but in this wholesale impressment they did not persist. fifty of the men were sent back; and the squadron set sail, carrying away the five pressed men, and leaving the men of the "baltimore," from the captain down to the smallest cabin-boy, smarting under the sense of an indignity and insult offered to the flag under which they served. capt. phillips hoisted his flag again, and continued his cruise. news travelled slowly in those days; and the tidings of this latest british insult did not reach the united states until the "baltimore," returning home, brought it herself. hardly had the ship reached port, when capt. phillips hastened to philadelphia, then the national capital, and laid his report of the affair before the government. in a week's time, without even the formality of a trial, he was dismissed from the navy. after the lapse of more than eighty years it is impossible to look back upon this affair without indignation, mortification, and regret. that the naval officers of great britain should have been able, by the mere force of arms, to inflict so cruel an insult upon our flag, can but arouse indignation in the breast of every true american. and the humiliation was great enough, without having added to it the obviously hasty and unjust action of the authorities, in dismissing, without a trial, an officer who had faithfully served his country. it is indeed possible that capt. phillips erred gravely in his course; but justice alone demanded for him a fair trial, and the nature of his instructions certainly afforded him some justification for his action. the years that opened the nineteenth century were full of events that exerted the greatest influence over the growth of the united states. the continuance of the napoleonic wars in europe, our own war with the barbary powers, the acquisition of louisiana,--all these had their effect on the growth of the young republic of the west. but, at the same time, england was continuing her policy of oppression. her cruisers and privateers swarmed upon the ocean; and impressment of seamen and seizure of vessels became so common, that in memorials and petitions from seamen and merchants of the seaport towns poured in upon congress, begging that body to take some action to save american commerce from total destruction. congress directed the american minister in london to protest; but to no avail. even while the correspondence on the subject was being carried on, the british gave renewed evidence of their hostility to their former colonies, and their scorn for the military or naval power of the united states. from the far-off shores of the mediterranean came the news that boats from the fleet of the british admiral collingwood had boarded the united states gunboat no. , and taken from her three sailors, under the pretence that they were englishmen. but an occurrence that shortly followed, nearer home, threw this affair into oblivion, and still further inflamed the national hatred of the english. a small coasting sloop, one of hundreds that made voyages along the american coast from portland to savannah, was running past sandy hook into new york bay, when she was hailed by the british ship "leander," and ordered to heave to. the captain of the coaster paid no attention to the order, and continued on his way, until a shot from the cruiser crashed into the sloop, and took off the head of the captain, john pearce of new york. this was murder, and the action of the british in firing upon the sloop was gross piracy. such an outrage, occurring so near the chief city of the united states, aroused a storm of indignation. the merchants of new york held meetings at the old tontine coffee-house, and denounced not only the action of the british cruiser, but even impeached the government of the united states; declaring that an administration which suffered foreign armed ships to "impress, wound, and murder citizens was not entitled to the confidence of a brave and free people." the fact that the captain of the offending cruiser, on being brought to trial in england, was honorably acquitted, did not tend to soothe the irritation of the americans. occurrences such as this kept alive the american dislike for the english, and a year later an event happened which even the most ardent peace-lover could not but condemn and resent with spirit. in the united states frigate "chesapeake," then lying at the navy-yard at washington, was put in commission, and ordered to the mediterranean, to relieve the "constitution." nearly a month was consumed in making necessary repairs to hull and cordage, taking in stores, shipping a crew, and attending to the thousand and one details of preparation for sea that a long time out of commission makes necessary to a man-of-war. while the preparations for service were actively proceeding, the british minister informed the naval authorities that three deserters from his british majesty's ship "melampus" had joined the crew of the "chesapeake;" and it was requested that they should be given up. the request was made with due courtesy; and, although there is no principle of international law which directs the surrender of deserters, yet the united states, as a friendly nation, was inclined to grant the request, and an inquiry was made into the case. the facts elicited put the surrender of the men out of the question; for though they frankly confessed to have deserted from the "melampus," yet they claimed to have been impressed into the british service, and proved conclusively that they were free americans. this was reported to the british minister; and, as he made no further protests, it was assumed that he was satisfied. some weeks later the vessel left the navy-yard, and dropped down the river to hampton roads. even with the long period occupied in preparation for sea, the armament of the ship was far from being in order; a fact first discovered as she passed mount vernon, as she was unable to fire the salute with which at that time all passing war-vessels did honor to the tomb of washington. after some days stay at hampton roads, during which time additional guns and stores were taken on, and the crew increased to three hundred and seventy-five men, the ship got under way, and started on her voyage. it was on a breezy morning of june that the "chesapeake" left the broad harbor of hampton roads, the scene of so many of our naval glories. from the masthead of the frigate floated the broad pennant of commodore barron, who went out in command of the ship. the decks were littered with ropes, lumber, and stores, which had arrived too late to be properly stowed away. some confusion is but natural on a ship starting on a cruise which may continue for years, but the condition of the "chesapeake" was beyond all excuse; a fact for which the fitting-out officers, not her commander, were responsible. as the american ship passed out into the open ocean, there was a great stir on the decks of four english cruisers that lay quietly at anchor in lynn haven bay; and almost immediately one of these vessels hoisted her anchor, set her sails, and started out in the track of the frigate. a stiff head-wind blowing, the american was forced to tack frequently, in order to get ahead; and her officers noticed that the british ship (the "leopard," of fifty guns) tacked at the same time, and was evidently following doggedly in the wake of the "chesapeake." no suspicion that the pursuer had other than peaceful motives in view entered the minds of the american officers; and the ship kept on her course, while the sailors set about putting the decks in order, and getting the vessel in trim for her long voyage. while all hands were thus busily engaged, the "leopard" bore down rapidly, and soon hailed, saying that she had a despatch for commodore barron. the "chesapeake" accordingly hove to, and waited for a boat to be sent aboard. the two ships now lay broadside to broadside, and only about a half pistol-shot apart. no idea that the englishman had any hostile designs seems to have occurred to commodore barren; but some of the younger officers noticed that the ports of the "leopard" were triced up, and the tompions taken out of the muzzles of the cannon. the latter fact was of the gravest import, and should have been reported at once to the commander; but it appears that this was not done. in a few moments a boat put off from the "leopard," and pulled to the american ship, where an officer stood waiting at the gangway, and conducted the visitor to barron's cabin. here the english lieutenant produced an order, signed by the british admiral berkeley, commanding all british ships to watch for the "chesapeake," and search her for deserters. commodore barron immediately responded, that the "chesapeake" harbored no deserters, and he could not permit his crew to be mustered by the officer of any foreign power. hardly had this response been made, when a signal from the "leopard" recalled the boarding officer to his ship. the officers of the "chesapeake" were now fully aroused to the dangers of the situation, and began the attempt to get the ship in readiness for action. commodore barron, coming out of his cabin for the first time, was forcibly struck by the air of preparation for action presented by the "leopard." capt. gordon, the second in command, was ordered to hasten the work on the gun-deck, and call the crew to quarters. the drummers began to beat the call to quarters, but hasty orders soon stopped them; and the men went to their places quietly, hoping that the threatening attitude of the "leopard" was mere bravado. the most painful suspense was felt by all on board the american ship. the attitude of the "leopard" left little doubt of her hostile intentions, while a glance about the decks of the "chesapeake" told how little fitted she was to enter into action. her crew was a new one, never exercised at the guns, and had been mustered to quarters only three times. on the gun-deck lay great piles of cumbrous cables, from the coiling of which the men had been summoned by the call to quarters. on the after-deck were piles of furniture, trunks, and some temporary pantries. what little semblance of order there was, was due to the efforts of one of the lieutenants, who, suspecting trouble when the "leopard" first came up, had made great exertions toward getting the ship clear. while the captain stood looking ruefully at the confusion, still more serious troubles were reported. the guns were loaded; but no rammers, powder-flasks, matches, wads, or gun-locks could be found. while search was being made for these necessary articles, a hail came from the "leopard." commodore barron shouted back that he did not understand. "commodore barron must be aware that the orders of the vice-admiral must be obeyed," came the hail again. barron again responded that he did not understand. after one or two repetitions, the british determined to waste no more time in talking; and a single shot fired from the bow of the "leopard" was quickly followed by a full broadside. the heavy shot crashed into the sides of the "chesapeake," wounding many of the men, and adding to the confusion on the gun-deck. no answer came from the american frigate; for, though the guns were loaded, there was no way of firing them. matches, locks, or loggerheads were nowhere to be found. mad with rage at the helpless condition in which they found themselves, the officers made every effort to fire at least one volley. pokers were heated red-hot in the galley-fire, and carried hastily to the guns, but cooled too rapidly in the rush across the deck. in the mean time, the "leopard," none too chivalric to take advantage of an unresisting foe, had chosen her position, and was pouring in a deliberate fire. for nearly eighteen minutes the fire was continued, when the flag of the "chesapeake" was hauled down. just as it came fluttering from the masthead, lieut. allen, crying, "i'll have one shot at those rascals, anyhow," ran to the galley, picked up a live coal in his fingers, and carried it, regardless of the pain, to the nearest gun, which was successfully discharged. this was the only shot that the "chesapeake" fired during the affair,--battle it cannot be called. a boat with two british lieutenants and several midshipmen on board speedily boarded the "chesapeake," and the demand for the deserters was renewed. four seamen were seized, and borne away in triumph; but the british commander refused to receive the ship as a prize, and even went so far as to express his regret at the loss of life, and proffer his aid in repairing the damages. both sympathy and assistance were indignantly rejected; and the disgraced ship went sullenly back to norfolk, bearing a sorely mortified body of officers and seamen. of the four kidnapped sailors, it may be stated here, that one was hanged, and the other three forced to enter the british service, in which one died. his comrades, five years later, were restored to the deck of the ship from which they had been taken. [illustration: lieut. allen fires a shot.] the news of this event spread like wildfire over the country, and caused rage and resentment wherever it was known. cities, towns, and villages called for revenge. the president issued a proclamation, complaining of the habitual insolence of british cruisers, and ordering all such vessels to leave american waters forthwith. as in the reduced state of the navy it was impossible to enforce this order, he forbade all citizens of the united states to give aid to, or have any intercourse with, any such vessels or their crews. war measures were taken both by the federal and state governments. as usual, the popular wrath was vented upon the least culpable of the people responsible for the condition of the "chesapeake." commodore barren was tried by court-martial, and sentenced to five years' suspension from the service, without pay. the cool judgment of later years perceives the unjustness of this sentence, but its execution cast a deep shadow over the remainder of the unhappy officer's life. for some years after this episode, little occurred to change the relations of the two nations. the war spirit grew slowly, and was kept alive by the occasional reports of impressments, or the seizure of american ships by british privateers. the navy held its place amid the national defences, although a plan devised by president jefferson came near putting an end to the old organization. this plan provided for the construction of great numbers of small gunboats, which should be stationed along the coast, to be called out only in case of attack by an armed enemy. a contemporary writer, describing the beauties of this system, wrote, "whenever danger shall menace any harbor, or any foreign ship shall insult us, somebody is to inform the governor, and the governor is to desire the marshal to call upon the captains of militia to call upon the drummers to beat to arms, and call the militia men together, from whom are to be _drafted_ (not impressed) a sufficient number to go on board the gunboats, and drive the hostile stranger away, unless during this long ceremonial he should have taken himself off." fortunately the gunboat system did not work the total extinction of the old navy. in the british aggressions began again, and the situation became more and more warlike. so bold had the privateers become, that they captured a richly laden vessel within thirty miles of new york. shortly after, the british frigate "guerriere" stopped an american brig eighteen miles from new york, and took from her a young sailor. the sea was running very rough, and a stiff breeze blowing, when the "spitfire" was halted by the frigate; but the american captain went with the captured lad to the war-vessel, and assured the commander that he had known the young man as a native of maine from his boyhood. the reply was, "all that may be so; but he has no protection, and that is enough for me." with these memories fresh, it is not surprising that americans rejoiced when the news of an encounter terminating in favor of the united states ship was received. on may , , the united states frigate "president" was lying quietly at anchor off fort severn, annapolis. every thing betokened a state of perfect peace. the muzzles of the great guns were stopped by tompions. the ports were down. in the rigging of the vessel hung garments drying in the sun. at the side floated half a dozen boats. many of the crew were ashore on leave. the sailing-master was at baltimore, and the chaplain and purser were at washington. from the masthead floated the broad pennant of commodore rodgers, but he was with his family at havre de grace; and the executive officer, capt. ludlow, was dining on the sloop-of-war "argus," lying near at hand. but the captain's dinner was destined to be interrupted that bright may afternoon; for in the midst of the repast a midshipman entered, and reported that the commodore's gig was coming up rapidly, with rodgers himself on board. the dinner party was hastily broken up, and the captain returned to his ship to receive his superior officer. on his arrival, commodore rodgers said that he had received orders to chase the frigate that had impressed the sailor from the "spitfire," and insist upon the man's being liberated, if he could prove his citizenship. this was good news for every man on the frigate. at last, then, the united states was going to protect its sailors. three days were spent in getting the crew together and preparing for sea; then the stately frigate, with all sails set and colors flying, weighed anchor, and stood down the chesapeake with the intention of cruising near new york. she had been out on the open ocean only a day, when the lookout, from his perch in the cross-trees, reported a strange sail on the horizon. the two vessels approached each other rapidly; and, as the stranger drew near, rodgers saw, by the squareness of her yards and the general trim, symmetrical cut of her sails, that she was a war-vessel. perhaps she may be the offender, thought he, and watched eagerly her approach. as the stranger came up, the "president" set her broad pennant and ensign; on seeing which the stranger hoisted several signal flags, the significance of which was not understood by the americans. finding her signals unanswered, the stranger wore ship, and bore away to the southward, hotly followed by the "president." during all these manoeuvres, rodgers's suspicion of the strange vessel had increased; and her apparent flight only convinced him the more of the hostile character of the stranger. it was a stern chase and a long one, for at the outset the stranger was hull down on the horizon. after an hour it became evident that the "president" was gaining, for the hull of the fugitive was plainly seen. the breeze then died away, so that night had fallen over the waters before the ships were within hailing distance. a little after eight in the evening the "president" was within a hundred yards of the chase, which could be seen, a dark mass with bright lights shining through the rows of open ports, rushing through the water directly ahead. rodgers sprang upon the taffrail, and putting a speaking-trumpet to his lips, shouted, "what ship is that?" a dead silence followed. those on the "president" listened intently for the answer; but no sound was heard save the sigh of the wind through the cordage, the creaking of the spars, and the rush of the water alongside. rodgers hailed again; and, before the sound of his words had died away, a quick flash of fire leaped from the stern-ports of the chase, and a shot whizzed through the rigging of the "president," doing some slight damage. rodgers sprang to the deck to order a shot in return; but, before he could do so, a too eager gunner pulled the lanyard of his piece in the second division of the "president's" battery. the enemy promptly answered with three guns, and then let fly a whole broadside, with discharges of musketry from the deck and the tops. this exhausted rodgers's patience. "equally determined," said he afterwards, "not to be the aggressor, or to suffer the flag of my country to be insulted with impunity, i gave a general order to fire." this time there was no defect in the ordnance or the gunnery of the american ship. the thunderous broadsides rang out at regular intervals, and the aim of the gunners was deliberate and deadly. it was too dark to see what effect the fire was having on the enemy, but in five minutes her responses began to come slowly and feebly. unwilling to continue his attack on a ship evidently much his inferior in size and armament, rodgers ordered the gunners to cease firing; but this had hardly been done when the stranger opened again. a second time the guns of the "president" were run out, and again they began their cannonade. the stranger was soon silenced again; and commodore rodgers hailed, that he might learn the name of his adversary. in answer came a voice from the other vessel,-- "we are his majesty's ship ----." a gust of wind carried away the name, and rodgers was still in doubt as to whom he had been fighting. hoisting a number of bright lights in her rigging, that the stranger might know her whereabouts, the "president" stood off and on during the night, ready to give aid to the disabled ship in case of need. [illustration: commodore rodgers hails.] at early dawn every officer was on deck, anxious to learn the fate of their foe of the night before. far in the distance they could see a ship, whose broken cordage and evident disorder showed her to have been the other party to the fight. a boat from the "president" visited the stranger, to learn her name and to proffer aid in repairing the damages received in the action. the ship proved to be the british sloop-of-war "little belt;" and her captain stated that she was much damaged in her masts, sails, rigging, and hull, and had been cut several times between wind and water. he declined the proffered aid, however, and sailed away to halifax, the nearest british naval station. commodore rodgers took the "president" to the nearest american port. when the "president" reached home, and the news of her exploit became known, the exultation of the people was great, and their commendations of rodgers loud. "at last," they cried, "we have taught england a lesson. the insult to the 'chesapeake' is now avenged." rodgers protested that he had been forced unwillingly into the combat, but his admirers insisted that he had left port with the intention of humbling the pride of some british ship. indeed, the letter of an officer on the "president," printed in "the new york herald" at the time, rather supported this theory. "by the officers who came from washington," wrote this gentleman, "we learn that we are sent in pursuit of a british frigate, who had impressed a passenger from a coaster. yesterday, while beating down the bay, we spoke a brig coming up, who informed us that she saw the british frigate the day before off the very place where we now are; but she is not now in sight. we have made the most complete preparations for battle. every one wishes it. she is exactly our force; but we have the "argus" with us, which none of us are pleased with, as we wish a fair trial of courage and skill. should we see her, i have not the least doubt of an engagement. the commodore will demand the person impressed; the demand will doubtless be refused, and the battle will instantly commence.... the commodore has called in the boatswain, gunner, and carpenter, informed them of all circumstances, and asked if they were ready for action. ready, was the reply of each." no consequences beyond an intensifying of the war spirit in america followed this rencounter. before dismissing the subject, however, it is but fair to state that the account as given here is in substance commodore rodgers's version of the matter. the british captain's report was quite different. he insisted that the "president" fired the first shot, that the action continued nearly an hour, that it was his hail to which no attention was paid, and finally he intimated that the "president" had rather the worse of the encounter. the last statement is easily disproved, for the "president" was almost unscathed, and the only injury to her people was the slight wounding of a boy, in the hand. on the "little belt," thirty-one were killed or wounded. the other points led to a simple question of veracity between the two officers. each government naturally accepted the report of its officer; and, so far as the governments were concerned, the matter soon passed into oblivion. not long after this episode, a somewhat similar occurrence took place, but was happily attended with no such serious consequences. the frigate "united states," cruising under the broad pennant of commodore decatur, fell in with two british ships near new york. while the commanders of the vessels were amicably hailing, a gun was suddenly fired from the battery of the "united states," owing to the carelessness of a gunner in handling the lanyard. it was a critical moment, for the british would have been justified in responding to the fire with broadsides. happily, they were cool and discreet, and decatur made such explanations as showed that no attack or insult was intended. this little incident is interesting, as showing the distrust of the british which led an american captain to keep his guns primed and cocked, while conversing with english men-of-war. another incident showed that the hatred of the british service that prevailed among seamen was a matter of deep-seated conviction. while the united states ship "essex" was lying in an english port, it became known that one of her crew was a deserter from the british navy, and his surrender was immediately demanded. although the man stoutly protested that he was an american, yet no proof could be shown; and, as the ship was in british waters, it was determined to surrender him. a british officer and squad of marines boarded the "essex" and waited on the deck while the sailor went below to get his kit. bitterly complaining of the hardness of his fate, the poor fellow went along the gun-decks until he passed the carpenter's bench. his eye fell upon an axe; and after a minute's hesitation he stepped to the bench, seized the axe in his right hand, and with one blow cut off the left. carrying the severed member in his hand, he again sought the deck and presented himself, maimed, bleeding, and forever useless as a sailor, to the british officer. astonished and horrified, that worthy left the ship, and the wounded man was sent to the sick-bay. the incident was a forcible commentary on the state of the british service at that time, and left a deep impression on the minds of all beholders. in the next contest over deserters, however, the americans rather secured the best of the argument. the "constitution" was lying at anchor in portsmouth roads, when one of the crew slily slipped overboard and swam down with the tide to the british ship "madagascar" that lay at anchor near by. when he had reached the englishman, he was too exhausted to speak; and the officers, supposing that he had fallen overboard accidentally, sent word to the "constitution" that her man had been saved, and awaited the orders of his commander. the next morning a boat was sent down to the "madagascar" to fetch the man back; but, to the astonishment of the visiting officer, he was told that the sailor claimed to be a british subject and wished to escape from the american service. "have you any evidence," asked the american officer of the british admiral, "beyond the man's own word, that he is an englishman?" "none whatever, sir," was the response, "but we are obliged to take his declaration to that effect." the american officer returned to his ship, vowing vengeance on the harborers of the deserter. his opportunity came that very night. in the dead watches of the night, when all was still on deck save the monotonous tramp of the sentries, there suddenly rang out on the still air the sharp crack of a musket. the officer of the deck rushed to see what was the matter, and was shown a dark object floating near the ship, at which a sentry had fired. a boat was lowered and soon came back, bringing in it a sailor who had deserted from the "madagascar," and reached the "constitution" by swimming. capt. hull asked the fellow his nationality. "sure, o'im a 'merricun, your honor," he answered in a rich brogue that would have branded him as a paddy in any part of the world. with a twinkle in his eye, hull sent the irishman below, and told the sailors to take good care of him. early in the morning, a boat came from the "madagascar;" and a trim young lieutenant, clambering aboard the american frigate, politely requested that the deserter be given up. with great dignity, capt. hull responded that the man was a citizen of the united states, and should have protection. the visiting officer fairly gasped for breath. "an american!" he exclaimed. "why, the man has never been out of ireland except on a british man-of-war." "indeed!" responded hull blandly. "but we have his statement that he is an american, and we are obliged to take his declaration to that effect." and the man was never given up. during the day, two british frigates cast anchor so near the "constitution" that capt. hull suspected them of hostile intentions, and moved his ship to a new anchorage. a frigate followed closely in her wake. at eight in the evening, capt. hull determined to meet the show of force with force. the drums beat, and the men were called to quarters. the battle-lanterns were lighted fore and aft. the tops were crowded with sailors, armed with short carbines, to pick off the men on the enemy's decks. along the gun-deck stood the men at the guns; and an officer, describing the scene, says they took hold of the ropes as if they were about to jerk the guns through the ship's sides. all were enthusiastic over the prospect of the coming action. "now, then, my lads," said an officer to a group of sailors, "if a fight comes of this, it will be in the cause of you sailors; and i expect you to fight like men." "ay, ay, sir," was the response. "let the quarter-deck look out for the colors, and we'll keep the guns going." all the preparations for battle were made openly, and the attitude taken by the "constitution" was an open challenge. no notice of it was taken by the british ship; and, after maintaining her hostile attitude for some time, the "constitution" hoisted her anchor, and left the harbor. the time of the formal declaration of war was now rapidly approaching. the long diplomatic correspondence between the two nations had failed to lead to any amicable solution of the difficulties that were fast urging them to war. great britain still adhered to her doctrine that a man once an englishman was always an english subject. no action of his own could absolve him from allegiance to the flag under which he was born. upon the trade of the united states with france, the english looked with much the sentiments with which, during our civil war, we regarded the thriving trade driven with the confederacy by the british blockade-runners. upon these two theories rested the hateful "right of search" and the custom of impressment. it is needless to say that the views of the united states on these questions were exactly contrary to those of the english. such vital differences could, then, only be settled by war; and war was accordingly declared in june, . it was a bold step for the young nation, but there was enough of plausibility in the english claims to make it evident that they could never be set aside by diplomacy; and so, with hardly a thought of the odds against her, the united states dashed in to win justice at the muzzles of her cannon. that the odds were tremendous, is not to be denied. of the military strength of the two nations, it is not the purpose of this book to treat. indeed, a recountal of the land battles of the war of would hardly be pleasant reading for americans. it was on the sea that our laurels were chiefly won. yet, at the time of the declaration of war, the navy of the united states consisted of twenty vessels, of which the largest carried forty-four guns, and the majority rated under thirty. for years this navy had been a butt of ridicule for all the european naval powers. the frigate "constitution" was scornfully termed by an english newspaper "a bunch of pine boards sailing under a bit of striped bunting." not long after the publication of this insolent jeer, the "constitution" sailed into an american port with a captured british frigate in tow. right merrily then did the americans boast of their "bunch of pine boards." this miniature navy of the united states was about to be pitted against the greatest naval power of the world. the rolls of the navy of great britain bore at this time the names of over one thousand ships. of these, no less than two hundred and fifty-four were ships-of-the-line, mounting over seventy-four guns each. behind this great navy were the memories of long years of conquests, of an almost undisputed supremacy upon the ocean. small wonder was it, then, that the british laughed at the idea of the americans giving battle to their hitherto unconquered ships. what, then, was the secret of the success which, as we shall see, attended the american arms on the sea? the answer is, that men, not ships, carried the day. yet great britain had the more sailors on her muster-rolls. true, but they were only too often unwilling slaves. instead of enlisting, like free men, they were hunted down like brutes and forced to enter the service. no sailor was safe from the press-gang, and even sober citizens were often kidnapped to serve the 'king' on the ocean. from the ships of other nations, from their homes and from taverns, the unlucky sailors were dragged away. even in the streets of populous cities, they were not safe; and it was no uncommon sight to see pitched battles being fought between the press-gangs and sailors whom they were trying to capture. generally, the inhabitants and landsmen sided with the victims; and a sailor running through the streets of the town would be given every assistance by people, who filled with obstacles the path of his pursuers. could he reach the water-side, the fugitive would find every boat at his service; while his pursuers, on coming up, found every water-man very busy and very gruff. but the wonder is, that, with this unjust and repulsive system of impressments, the british sailors were so loyal, and fought with the dogged courage that they invariably showed. in the american navy, on the contrary, the enlistments were voluntary. the service was popular, and the seamen entered it without the feeling of outraged liberty inspired by the british system. officers were readily obtained from the ranks of the adventurous american navigators. officers and men alike often brought into the service personal memories of british oppression; and this, with their free and independent spirit, enabled them to wage an unequal war with glorious results for the supporters of the stars and stripes. chapter iv. the war on the ocean. -- commodore rodgers's cruise. -- the loss of the "nautilus." -- first success for the british. -- the escape of the "constitution." -- the "essex" takes the "alert." -- the "constitution and the "guerriere." at the time when the declaration of war was made public, a small squadron of united states vessels was lying in the port of new york, under the command of commodore rodgers. the warlike tendency of the popular mind had long been evident, and the captain of every war-vessel had been for some time making active preparations for service. some apprehension was felt in naval circles, lest the small size of the navy should lead the authorities to lay up the vessels in port during the continuance of the war. this apprehension was well founded; for not only had such a course been debated in the cabinet, but orders had been prepared, directing commodore rodgers to hold his vessels in port. this decision was actively opposed by the officers of the navy, who felt that, though inconsiderable in numbers, the united states navy could make a brave fight for the honor of the nation; and with one accord all protested against the action contemplated. two officers, capt. bainbridge and capt. stewart, went to washington and sought an interview with the secretary of the navy, paul hamilton, who assured them that the plans of the government were well matured and would not be changed. the united states could not afford, said the secretary, that its few frigates and men-of-war should be snapped up by the enormous fleets of the british, as would surely be the case, if they ventured upon the ocean. but it was not intended to materially reduce the lists of naval officers. the frigates, with all their loose spars and top-hamper taken down, were to be anchored at the entrances of the principal harbors of the country, and operated as stationary batteries. this prospect was far from agreeable to the two officers. it was intolerable for them to imagine the graceful frigates, with towering masts and snowy canvas, reduced to mere shapeless hulks, and left to guard the entrance of a placid harbor. finding the secretary inexorable, they went to the president and put the case before him. they assured him, that, small though the list of american ships was, it bore the names of vessels able to cope with any thing of their class in the british navy. both officers and seamen were proud of the service, and burned to strike a blow for its honor. president madison seemed much impressed by their representations, and agreed to take the matter into consideration; and, if it seemed wise, to change the plan. but, before any definite action was taken by him, war was declared. within an hour after he had received news of the declaration of war, commodore rodgers had his squadron under way, and dropped down new york bay to the ocean. under his command were the flag-ship "president" of forty-four guns, the "essex" thirty-two, and the "hornet" eighteen. in the lower bay these vessels were joined by the "united states" forty-four, the "congress" thirty-eight, and the "argus" sixteen. on june , , three days after the declaration of war, the whole squadron passed sandy hook, and stood out into the ocean. it is probable that the remarkable celerity of commodore rodgers's departure was due, in part, to the fear that the authorities would revive the obnoxious order laying up the ships in port. his chief object, however, was to overhaul a large fleet of british merchantmen that had recently left the west indies, and, according to all calculations, should have been in the vicinity of new york at that time. all sail was accordingly crowded upon the ships, and the squadron set out in hot pursuit. for two days the monotony of the horizon was broken by no sail; but on the third a ship was espied in the distance, which was made out to be an enemy's frigate, after which chase was made by the whole squadron. a fresh breeze was blowing, and both chase and pursuers were running free before the wind. as sail after sail was crowded upon the ships, the smaller vessels, with their lesser expanse of canvas, began to fall behind; and in a few hours the frigate "president" had gradually drawn away from the fleet, and was rapidly gaining on the enemy. the sail had been spied at six o'clock in the morning, and at four p.m. the flag-ship had come within gunshot of the chase. the wind then fell; and the chase, being long out of port and light, began to gain on her heavier adversary. both vessels now began to prepare for a little gunnery. on the english vessel, which proved to be the "belvidera," thirty-six, the sailors were busily engaged in shifting long eighteens and carronades to the stern, making a battery of stern-chasers mounting four guns. the action was opened by a gun from the bow of the "president," sighted and fired by commodore rodgers himself; so that this officer may be said to have fired the first gun of the war. his shot was a good one, hulling the enemy. a second shot from one of the guns of the first division broke off the muzzle of one of the "belvidera's" stern-chasers; and a third shot, fired by commodore rodgers, crashed into the stern of the chase, killing two men, and wounding several others. certainly in their first action the yankees showed no lack of skill in gunnery. the chase was slow in responding to the fire; and although her commander, capt. byron, sighted the guns for the first few discharges himself, his aim was by no means so good as that of the americans. the british showed great energy, however, in defending their ship. not content with the stern guns already mounted, they shifted to the stern ports two long eighteen-pounders on the main deck, and two thirty-two-pound carronades on the quarter-deck. with these they kept up a brisk fire, which soon became effective, many shots cutting the rigging of the "president," while one plunged down upon the deck, killing a midshipman and two or three men. but the superiority of the american gunnery was beginning to tell, when, at a critical moment, a main-deck gun, on the "president," burst with a stunning report; and the flying fragments killed or wounded sixteen men. the force of the explosion shattered the forecastle deck. commodore rodgers was thrown high into the air, and, falling heavily on the deck, suffered a painful fracture of the leg. the crew was at once thrown into confusion and almost panic. every gun was looked upon with suspicion. encouraged by this confusion, the enemy worked his stern guns with renewed vigor, and at the same time lightened his ship by cutting away boats and anchors, and starting fourteen tons of water. thus lightened, she began to draw away from the "president;" perceiving which, the latter ship yawed several times, and let fly full broadsides at the escaping chase. the shot rattled among the spars of the "belvidera," but the nimble topmen quickly repaired all damages; and the british ship slowly but steadily forged ahead. seeing no hope of overtaking her, rodgers ordered the chase abandoned; and the american squadron again took up its search for the fleet of british merchantmen. but this, the first cruise of the united states navy in the war was destined to be a disappointment to all concerned. the key-note set by the affair just related--in which the "president" lost twenty-two men, and permitted her adversary to escape--was continued throughout the voyage. always finding traces of the enemy they were seeking, the americans never succeeded in overhauling him. one day great quantities of orange-peel, cocoanut-shells, and similar fragments of tropical fruits gave the jackies assurance of the proximity of the long-sought enemy, and urged them on to renewed energy and watchfulness. then the master of an english letter-of-marque, captured by the "hornet," reported that the day before he had passed a fleet of eighty-five sail, of which four were men-of-war. that night there was no room in the minds of the sailors for any thoughts other than those of big prize-money. but their golden dreams were never to be fulfilled; for, although the chase was continued until within a day's run of the english channel, no sight of the jamaica fleet was ever gained. abandoning this chase, the squadron returned to boston by a southern route; and, although constantly in the very highway of commerce, few sails were sighted. when port was reached, the results of a cruise that had occupied seventy days amounted only to the capture of one letter-of-marque, seven merchantmen, and the recapture of one american ship. but rodgers heard, that, while he had been scouring the ocean with such meagre results, events of more importance had occurred nearer home. [illustration: explosion on the "president."] the british ship "belvidera," after her lucky escape from the "president," had made her way to halifax, the chief naval station of great britain on the american coast. her report was the first news of the declaration of war, for at that day news travelled slowly. once alarmed, the british were prompt to act; and in a few days a squadron left halifax in search of commodore rodgers. the force thus hurriedly gathered was quite formidable. the "africa" of sixty-four guns, the "shannon," thirty-eight, the "guerriere," thirty-eight, the "belvidera," thirty-six, and the "�olus," thirty-two, made up the fleet despatched to chastise the headstrong americans for their attempt to dispute with great britain the mastery of the ocean. early in july, this force made its appearance off new york, and quickly made captures enough to convince the american merchantmen that a season in port was preferable to the dangers of the high seas in war-times. to this same fleet belongs the honor of the first capture of a war-vessel during the war; for the american brig "nautilus," fourteen guns, was suddenly overhauled by the entire fleet, and captured after a plucky but unavailing attempt at flight. fourteen-gun brigs, however, were rather small game for a squadron like that of the british; and it is probable that his britannic majesty's officers were heartily glad, when, some days, later the united states frigate "constitution" hove in sight, under circumstances which seemed certain to make her an easy prey to the five british ships. it was on the th of july, , that the "constitution," after receiving a new crew at annapolis, was standing northward under easy sail on her way to new york. about noon four sails were sighted on the horizon, and an hour later the appearance of a fifth sail was duly reported. a careful scrutiny of the strangers convinced capt. hull that they were men-of-war, although their nationality could not be determined. night fell before the ships could come within hailing distance; and, though hull set private signals, no answer was returned. when day broke, hull found himself fairly surrounded by british frigates. in addition to the squadron which has been described as leaving halifax, there was the captured "nautilus" with her guns turned against her own nation, and a captured american schooner which had been likewise pressed into the service. clearly the "constitution" was outnumbered, and nothing was left for her but flight. the events of that three days' chase are told with great minuteness in the log-book of the "constitution" to which many of those on board have, in later publications, added more interesting personal reminiscences. when the rising mists showed how completely the american frigate was hemmed in, hardly a breath of air was stirring. although every sail was set on the ship, yet she had not steerage way; and hull ordered out the boats, to pull the ship's head around and tow her out of range of her enemies. at the same time, gangs of sailors with axes cut away the woodwork about the cabin windows, and mounted two stern guns in the cabin and one on the upper deck. the enemy, in the mean time, were keeping up a vigorous fire, but without effect. their ships were rapidly gaining, as they were enabled to set the boats of the whole squadron to towing the two foremost vessels. hull saw that some new means of getting ahead must be devised. soundings were taken, and the ship found to be in twenty-six fathoms of water. all the available rope in the ship was then bent on to a kedge and carried far ahead, when the kedge was lowered to the bottom. the sailors then shipped their capstan-bars, and tramped about the capstan, until the ship was dragged up to the kedge, which was then hoisted and again carried ahead and let fall. this manoeuvre was repeated several times with marked success; for the "constitution" was rapidly drawing away from her pursuers, who could not discover her means of propulsion. out of sight of land as they were, the british did not for some time suspect the true cause of the sudden speed of the fugitive. when, after long scrutiny through their marine-glasses, they finally did discover the stratagem, the "constitution" was far ahead; and though the pursuers adopted the same device, yet their awkwardness was so great, that even the superior force they were enabled to employ did not bring them up to their chase. while the ships were thus being urged on by towing, kedging, and occasionally by sweeps, an intermittent fire was kept up by the british, and responded to by the "constitution" from her stern ports. the guns which had been mounted by the americans in the cabin, they were soon forced to abandon, as the explosions threatened to blow out the whole stern frame. with the stern-chasers on the gun-deck, however, a constant fire was maintained, in the hopes of crippling the enemy by a lucky shot. for more than forty-eight hours the chase maintained this aspect of monotony. a dead calm prevailed the greater part of the time. occasionally, light breezes filled the sails, and wafted the ships ahead for a few minutes; then, dying away, left the sea unruffled, and the sails flapping idly against the masts. british historians concur with those of our own country, in saying that the "constitution," in seizing the advantages of the breeze, showed far better seamanship than did her enemies. while the british vessels lay to, to pick up their boats, the "constitution" forged ahead, picking up her boats while under way. later in the chase, the british totally abandoned their boats, and, when the american frigate had fairly escaped them, went about for some days picking up such boats as were found drifting on the broad ocean. the morning of the second day of the chase dawned with a light breeze ruffling the water, and filling out the sails of the ships. before the breeze died away, which it did in a few hours, the "constitution" had gained on her pursuers so that she led them by more than four miles. then the calm again held the ships quiet; and again the americans saw their enemies closing in upon them by the aid of sweeps, and towing with their boats. there was little rest for the crew of the american frigate. on the gun-deck, about the carriages of the great cannon, lay such of the men as were not assigned to duty in the boats or at the capstan. wearied with the constant strain, they fell asleep as soon as relieved from active duty; though they knew that from that sleep they might be awakened to plunge into the fierce excitement of desperate battle. exhausted as the men were, their officers were forced to endure a still more fearful strain. no sleep came to the eyelids of capt. hull, throughout the chase. now encouraging the men, now planning a new ruse to deceive the enemy, ever watchful of the pursuing ships, and ready to take advantage of the slightest breath of air, capt. hull and his able first lieutenant morris showed such seamanship as extorted admiration even from the british, who were being baffled by their nautical skill. by skilful manoeuvring, the americans managed to keep to the windward of their enemies throughout the chase; and to this fact the success of capt. hull's most astute stratagem was due. ever alert for any sign of a coming breeze, he saw on the water far to windward that rippling appearance that betokens the coming of a puff. hull determined to utilize it for himself, and, if possible, trick the british so that they would lose all benefit of the breeze. the clouds that were coming up to windward seemed to threaten a squall, and driving sheets of rain were rapidly advancing toward the ship. with great ostentation, the "constitution" was made ready for a severe gale. the enemy could see the nimble sailors taking in sail, and furling all the lighter canvas. then the driving rain swept over the ship, and she was shut out of sight. immediately all was activity in the tops of the british frigates. reefs were rapidly taken in the larger sails, while many were closely furled. all forsook their course, and steered in different directions in preparation for the coming squall, which, indeed, was far less violent than the action of the "constitution" seemed to indicate. but the shrewd yankees on that craft, protected from spying british eyes by the heavy rain, were now shaking out the reefs they had just set; and under full sail the ship was soon flying away towards home. after an hour of driving thunder-shower, the clouds passed by; and the wall-like edge of the shower could be seen moving rapidly away before the wind. the tars on the "constitution" watched eagerly to see the british fleet appear. farther and farther receded the gray curtain, and yet no ships could be seen. "where are they?" was the thought of every eager watcher on the deck of the "constitution." at last they appeared, so far in the distance as to be practically out of the chase. two were even hull down; while one was barely visible, a mere speck on the horizon. though now hopelessly distanced, the british did not give up the pursuit, but held valiantly on after the american frigate. she had so long been within their very grasp that it was a bitter disappointment for them to be balked of their prey. but, as the wind now held, the american gained on them so rapidly that at last they unwillingly abandoned the chase; and, disbanding the fleet, each ship set off on an individual cruise, in the hopes that the enemy which had shown such ability in flight when overpowered would not deign to fly if encountered by a single hostile ship. this expectation was fully realized some weeks later, when the "constitution" fell in with the british frigate "guerriere." thus, after a chase of more than sixty-four hours, the "constitution" evaded her pursuers, and made her way to boston. although they reaped no glory by their labors, the british did not come out of the chase altogether empty-handed. as the course of the vessels was along the new england coast, they were in the direct path of american commerce; and more than one wretched coaster fell into their clutches. at one time, a fine, full-rigged ship, flying the stars and stripes, came within sight; and the british, to lure her to her destruction, hoisted the american flag over all their vessels. but hull was a match for them at strategy; and he promptly set the british colors at his masthead, and began so vigorous a cannonade that the stranger concluded that a merchantman had no business in that quarter, even though the americans did appear to be rather in the majority. by his able seamanship in this chase capt. hull gained for himself a national reputation. the newspapers of the day vied with each other in pointing out the manoeuvres in which he had excelled his enemies,--how he had picked up his boats while under way, though the enemy were forced to cut theirs adrift; how he had come out of the chase without injury, and after parting with only a few gallons of water, though a less cool-headed commander would have thrown overboard guns, ammunition, and every thing movable, in the face of so great a danger. a modest sailor, as well as a skilful one, capt. hull showed himself to be; for, while the popular adulation was at its height, he inserted a card in the books of the exchange coffee-house at boston, begging his friends to "make a transfer of a great part of their good wishes to lieut. morris and the other brave officers and crew under his command, for their very great exertions and prompt attention to orders while the enemy were in chase." leaving the "constitution" thus snugly in port at boston, we will turn aside to follow the fortunes of a ship, which, though belated in getting out to sea, yet won the honor of capturing the first british war-vessel taken during the war. when commodore rodgers set sail from new york with his squadron, in the fruitless pursuit of the fleet of jamaica men, he left in the harbor the small frigate "essex," under the command of capt. david porter. the ship was thoroughly dismantled,--stripped of her rigging, her hold broken out, and provided neither with armament, ammunition, nor crew. her captain, however, was a man of indomitable energy; and by dint of much hard work, and constant appeals to the authorities at washington, he managed to get his ship in order, and leave the harbor within a fortnight after the departure of the squadron under rodgers's command. the "essex" was a small frigate, lightly sparred, rating as a thirty-two-gun ship, but mounting twenty-six guns only, of which six were twelve-pounders, and the remainder carronades of thirty-two pounds. a carronade is a short cannon of large calibre, but of very short range. capt. porter protested vigorously against being furnished with a battery so useless except at close quarters: but his protests were unheeded; and the "essex" put to sea, trusting to her ability to get alongside the enemy, where her carronades would be of some use. among the midshipmen who bunked, messed, and skylarked together in the steerage of the "essex," was one lad whose name in later days was to be inscribed on the roll of the greatest naval heroes of history. david glasgow farragut was a child of seven years of age when he was adopted by capt. porter, and began his training for a naval career. in the boy secured his appointment of midshipman; and now, in , we find him enrolled among the "young gentlemen" who followed the fortunes of the "essex." in those days the midshipmen were often mere boys. farragut himself was then but eleven years old. but, boys as they were, they ordered the hardy old tars about, and strutted the streets when on shore-leave with all the dignity of veterans. that the discipline of the "essex" was of the strictest, and that the efficiency of her crew was above criticism, we have the testimony of farragut himself to prove. "every day," he writes, "the crew were exercised at the great guns, small arms, and single stick; and i may here mention the fact, that i have never been on a ship where the crew of the old "essex" was represented, but that i found them to be the best swordsmen on board. they had been so thoroughly trained as boarders, that every man was prepared for such an emergency, with his cutlass as sharp as a razor, a dirk made by the ship's armorer out of a file, and a pistol." hardly were the highlands of navesink lost to sight below the horizon, when porter began to receive evidences that his cruise was to be a lucky one. several brigs were captured, and sent into new york; but the tars of the "essex" were beginning to grow weary of small game, and hoped, each time a sail was sighted, that it might be a british man-of-war. at last a small squadron hove into sight, the appearance of which seemed to indicate that the jackies might smell gunpowder to their hearts content before the next day. it was late at night when the strange fleet was sighted; and the "essex" was soon running down upon them, before a fresh breeze. although the moon was out, its light was obscured by dense masses of cloud, that were driven rapidly across the sky; while over the water hung a light haze, that made difficult the discovery of objects at any distance. the "essex" soon came near enough to the squadron to ascertain that it was a fleet of british merchantmen and transports convoyed by a frigate and bomb-vessel. the frigate was at the head of the line; and the "essex," carefully concealing her hostile character, clapped on all sail and pressed forward, in the hopes of bringing on an action. after passing the hindermost transport, however, the american ship was hailed by a second transport, which soon suspected her hostile character and threatened to give the alarm. instantly the ports of the "essex" were knocked out, the guns trained on the enemy, and the transport was ordered to haul out of the line at once, and silently, under penalty of being fired into. the defenceless ship complied, and was at once taken possession of, and the soldiers on board were transferred to the "essex." this operation took so much time, that, by the time it was concluded, day dawned over the ocean; and the attack upon the british frigate was abandoned. again the "essex" continued her cruise in search of an enemy worthy of her metal. for two or three days she beat about the ocean in the usual track of ships, without sighting a single sail. the ship had been so disguised, that the keenest-eyed lookout would never have taken her for a ship-of-war. the top-gallant masts were housed, the ports of the gun-deck closed in, and her usually trim cordage and nicely squared yards were now set in a way that only the most shiftless of merchant skippers would tolerate. not many days passed before the enemy fell into the trap thus set for him. when on the th of august capt. porter learned that a sail to windward, apparently a british man-of-war, was bearing down upon the "essex," he carried his little bit of acting still further. instead of the great crowd of agile sailors that spring into the rigging of a man-of-war, at the order to make sail, only a handful, in obedience to porter's orders, awkwardly set on the "essex" all the sail she would carry. two long, heavy cables dragging in the water astern so retarded the ship, that the stranger, coming down gallantly, thought he had fallen in with a lumbering old american merchantman, which was making frantic, but futile, efforts to escape. had the british captain been able to look behind the closed ports of the "essex," he would have formed a very different idea of the character of his chase. he would have seen a roomy gun-deck, glistening with that whiteness seen only on the decks of well-kept men-of-war. down either side of the deck stretched a row of heavy carronades, each with its crew of gunners grouped about the breech, and each shotted and primed ready for the opening volley. from the magazine amidships, to the gun-deck, reached a line of stewards, waiters, and cooks, ready to pass up cartridges; for on a man-of-war, in action, no one is an idler. active boys were skurrying about the deck, barefooted, and stripped to the waist. these were the "powder monkeys," whose duty it would be, when the action opened, to take the cartridges from the line of powder-passers and carry it to the guns. on the spar-deck, only a few sailors and officers were visible to the enemy; but under the taffrail lay crouched scores of blue-uniformed jackies, with smooth-faced middies and veteran lieutenants, ready to spring into the rigging at the word of command, or to swarm over the side and board the enemy, should the gunwales of the vessels touch. all this preparation, however, was unknown to the "englishman," who came boldly on, doubting nothing that the "essex" would that day be added to his list of prizes. as he drew nearer, the american sailors could see that their foe was much their inferior in size and armament; and the old tars who had seen service before growled out their dissatisfaction, that the action should be nothing but a scrimmage after all. in a few minutes, the bold britons gave three ringing cheers, and let fly a broadside at the "essex." in an instant the ports of the sham merchantman were knocked out; and, with a warlike thunder, the heavy carronades hurled their ponderous missiles against the side of the assailant. the astonished englishmen replied feebly, but were quickly driven from their posts by the rapidity of the american fire; and, in eight minutes after the action was opened, the british hauled down their flag. the captured ship proved to be the sloop-of-war "alert," mounting twenty eighteen-pounder carronades. the boarding officer found her badly cut up, and seven feet of water in the hold. the officers were transferred to the "essex," and the "alert" taken in tow. circumstances, however, forced the americans to part in a very few days. the chief cause which led to the separation of the two vessels was an incipient mutiny, which was discovered by midshipman farragut, and was only averted by the perfect discipline of the american crew. an exercise to which the greatest attention was given was the "fire-drill." when the cry of fire was raised on the ship, every man seized his cutlass and blanket, and went to quarters as though the ship were about to go into action. capt. porter was accustomed, that his men might be well prepared for any emergency, to raise this cry of fire at all hours of the night; and often he caused a slight smoke to be created in the hold, further to try the nerves of his men. shortly after the "alert" was captured, and while the "essex" was crowded with prisoners, some of the captives conspired to seize the ship, and carry her to england. one night, as farragut was sleeping in his hammock, a strange feeling of fear came over him; and he opened his eyes to find the coxswain of the captain's gig of the "alert" standing over him with a pistol in his hand. the boy knew him to be a prisoner, and, seeing him armed, was convinced that something was wrong. expecting every moment to be killed, he lay still in his hammock, until the man turned on his heel and walked away. then farragut slipped out, and ran to the captain's cabin to report the incident. porter rushed upon the berth-deck in an instant. "fire! fire!" shouted he at the top of his voice; and in an instant the crew were at their quarters, in perfect order. the mutineers thought that a bad time for their project, and it was abandoned. the next day the prisoners were sent on board the "alert," and that vessel sent into st. johns as a cartel. the capture of the "alert" reflected no great glory upon the americans, for the immense superiority of the "essex" rendered her success certain. it is, however, of interest as being the first capture of a british war-vessel. the action made the honors easy between the two nations; for while the americans had the "alert," the british were captors of the brig "nautilus." this equality was not of long duration, however; for an action soon followed which set all america wild with exultation. after her escape from the british fleet, the "constitution" remained at boston only a few days, and then set out on a cruise to the eastward along the new england coast. bad luck seemed to follow her, and she had reached a point off cape sable before she made a prize. here two or three prizes of little value were taken; and an english sloop-of-war was forced to relinquish an american brig, which had been recently captured. shortly afterwards, a salem privateer was overhauled, the captain of which reported an english frigate cruising in the neighborhood; and capt. hull straightway set out to discover the enemy. the frigate which had been sighted by the salem privateer, and for which hull was so eagerly seeking, was the "guerriere," a thirty-eight-gun ship commanded by capt. dacres. with both ship and captain, capt. hull had previously had some little experience. the "guerriere" was one of the ships in the squadron from which the "constitution" had so narrowly escaped a few weeks before, while capt. dacres was an old acquaintance. a story current at the time relates, that, before the war, the "guerriere" and the "constitution" were lying in the delaware; and the two captains, happening to meet at some entertainment on shore, fell into a discussion over the merits of their respective navies. although even then the cloud of war was rising on the horizon, each was pleasant and good-natured; and the discussion assumed no more serious form than lively banter. "well," said hull at last, "you may just take good care of that ship of yours, if ever i catch her in the 'constitution.'" capt. dacres laughed good-humoredly, and offered to bet a sum of money, that in the event of a conflict his confident friend would find himself the loser. "no," said hull, "i'll bet no money on it; but i will stake you a hat, that the 'constitution' comes out victorious." "done," responded dacres; and the bet was made. war was soon declared; and, as it happened, the two friends were pitted against each other early in the hostilities. it was not long after the american frigate parted from the privateer when the long-drawn hail of "sail ho-o-o!" from the lookout aloft announced the discovery of another vessel. the course of the "constitution" was at once shaped toward the stranger. in half an hour she was made out to be a frigate, and from her actions was evidently anxious to come alongside the american ship. as more than an hour must elapse before the ships could come together, capt. hull made his preparations for action with the greatest deliberation. the top-gallant sails were furled, and the lighter spars lowered to the deck. through their glasses, the officers could see the enemy making similar preparations, and waiting deliberately for the "constitution" to come down. at five o'clock in the afternoon the two ships were rapidly nearing, and the drums on the american frigate beat to quarters. then followed the rush of barefooted men along the deck, as they ran hastily, but in perfect order, to their stations. as the roll of the drums died away, the shrill voices of the boyish midshipmen arose, calling off the quarter-bills, and answered by the gruff responses of the men at their posts. every man, from the cook to the captain, knew his place, and hurried to it. the surgeon, with his assistants, descended to the cock-pit. the carpenter and his mates made ready their felt-covered plugs, for stopping holes made by the enemy's shot. the topmen clambered to their posts in the rigging, led by the midshipmen who were to command them. the line of powder-passers was formed; and the powder-monkeys gave up skylarking, and began to look sober at the thought of the business in hand. the "guerriere" was not behindhand in her preparations for action. capt. dacres had suspected the character of the american vessel, from the first moment she had been sighted. on board the english frigate was capt. william b. orne, a marblehead sailor who had been captured by the "guerriere" some days before. "capt. dacres seemed anxious to ascertain her character," wrote capt. orne, shortly after the battle, "and after looking at her for that purpose, handed me his spy-glass, requesting me to give him my opinion of the stranger. i soon saw, from the peculiarity of her sails and her general appearance, that she was without doubt an american frigate, and communicated the same to capt. dacres. he immediately replied, that he thought she came down too boldly for an american; but soon after added, 'the better he behaves, the more credit we shall gain by taking him.' "the two ships were rapidly approaching each other, when the 'guerriere' backed her main topsail, and waited for her opponent to come down and commence the action. he then set an english flag at each masthead, beat to quarters, and made ready for the fight. "when the strange frigate came down to within two or three miles distant, he hauled upon the wind, took in all his light sails, reefed his topsails, and deliberately prepared for action. it was now about five in the afternoon, when he filled away and ran down for the 'guerriere.' at this moment capt. dacres said politely to me, 'capt. orne, as i suppose you do not wish to fight against your own countrymen, you are at liberty to retire below the water-line,' it was not long after this, before i retired from the quarter-deck to the cock-pit." it may be well here to supplement capt. orne's narrative by the statement that capt. dacres, with a chivalric sense of justice not common in the british navy of that day, allowed ten american sailors who had been impressed into his crew to leave their quarters and go below, that they might not fight against their country. though an enemy, he was both gallant and generous. the action was opened by the "guerriere" with her weather broadside; the shot of which all falling short, she wore around, and let fly her port broadside, sending most of the shot through her enemy's rigging, though two took effect in the hull. in response to this, the "constitution" yawed a little, and fired two or three of her bow-guns; after which the "guerriere" again opened with broadsides. in this way the battle continued for about an hour; the american ship saving her fire, and responding to the heavy broadsides with an occasional shot. during this ineffectual firing, the two ships were continually drawing nearer together, and the gunners on the "constitution" were becoming more and more restive under their inaction. capt. hull was pacing the quarter-deck with short, quick steps, trying to look cool, but inwardly on fire with excitement. as the shot of the enemy began to take effect, and the impatience of the gunners grew more intense, lieut. morris, the second in command, asked leave to respond with a broadside. "not yet," responded capt. hull with cool decision. some minutes later, the request was repeated, and met with the same response, while the captain never ceased his pacing of the deck. when within about half pistol-shot, another broadside came from the "guerriere." then the smothered excitement in hull's breast broke out. "now, boys, pour it into them!" he shouted at the top of his lungs, gesticulating with such violence that the tight breeches of his naval uniform split clear down the side. lieut. morris seconded the captain in cheering on the crew. "hull her, boys! hull her!" he shouted; and the crew, catching up the cry, made the decks ring with shouts of "hull her!" as they rapidly loaded and let fly again. [illustration: "hull her, boys!"] the effect of their first broadside was terrific. deep down in the cock-pit of the "guerriere," capt. orne, who had been listening to the muffled thunder of the cannonade at long range, suddenly "heard a tremendous explosion from the opposing frigate. the effect of her shot seemed to make the 'guerriere' reel and tremble, as though she had received the shock of an earthquake. immediately after this, i heard a tremendous shock on deck, and was told that the mizzen-mast was shot away. in a few moments afterward, the cock-pit was filled with wounded men." though in his retreat in the cock-pit the captive american could hear the roar of the cannon, and see the ghastly effects of the flying missiles, he could form but a small idea of the fury of the conflict which was raging over his head. stripped to the waist, and covered with the stains of powder and of blood, the gunners on the two ships pulled fiercely at the gun-tackle, and wielded the rammers with frantic energy; then let fly the death-dealing bolt into the hull of an enemy only a few yards distant. the ships were broadside to broadside, when the englishman's mizzen-mast was shot away, and fell, throwing the topmen far out into the sea. the force of the great spar falling upon the deck made a great breach in the quarter of the ship; and, while the sailors were clearing away the wreck, the "constitution" drew slowly ahead, pouring in several destructive broadsides, and then luffed slowly, until she lay right athwart the enemy's bow. while in this position, the long bowsprit of the "guerriere" stretched far across the quarter-deck of the american ship, and was soon fouled in the mizzen-rigging of the latter vessel. then the two ships swung helplessly around, so that the bow of the englishman lay snugly against the port-quarter of the yankee craft. instantly, from the deck of each ship rang out the short, sharp blare of the bugle, calling away the boarders, who sprang from their guns, seized their heavy boarding caps and cutlasses, and rushed to the side. but a heavy sea was rolling and tossing the two frigates, so that boarding seemed impossible; and, as dacres saw the crowd of men ready to receive his boarders, he called them back to the guns. although each party stuck to its own ship, the fighting was almost hand to hand. pistols were freely used; and from the tops rained down a ceaseless hail of leaden missiles, one of which wounded capt. dacres slightly. so near to each other were the combatants, that the commands and the cries of rage and pain could be heard above the deep-toned thunder of the great guns and the ceaseless rattle of the musketry. the protruding muzzles of the guns often touched the sides of the opposing ship; and when the cannon were drawn in for loading, the sailors on either side thrust muskets and pistols through the ports, and tried to pick off the enemy at his guns. while the fight was thus raging, a cry of "fire!" horrified every one on the "constitution." flames were seen coming from the windows of the cabin, which lay directly beneath the bow-guns of the "guerriere." the fire had been set by the flash from the enemy's cannon, so close were the two ships together. by the strenuous exertions of the men on duty in the cabin, the flames were extinguished, and this, the greatest of all dangers, averted. shortly after, the gun which had caused the trouble was disabled by a skilful shot from one of the yankee's guns. while the flames in the cabin were being extinguished, the americans were making a valiant attempt to board and lieut. morris with his own hands was attempting to lash the two ships together. abandoning this attempt, he leaped upon the taffrail, and called upon his men to follow him. lieut. bush of the marines, and mr. alwyn, were soon at the side of the intrepid officer, when, at a sudden volley of musketry from the british, all three fell back, poor bush dead, and the two others badly wounded. the ships then drifted asunder; and the "guerriere's" foremast was shot away, and dragged down the main-mast with it in its fall. the shattered ship now lay a shapeless hulk, tossing on the waves, but still keeping a british ensign defiantly flying from the stump of her fallen mizzen-mast. the "constitution" drew away, firing continually, and soon secured a raking position; seeing which, the british hauled down their colors. lieut. read was sent on board the prize, and, on the appearance of capt. dacres, said,-- "capt. hull presents his compliments, sir, and wishes to know if you have struck your flag." dacres looked significantly at the shattered masts of his ship, and responded dryly,-- "well, i don't know. our mizzen-mast is gone, our main-mast is gone; and i think, on the whole, you may say that we have struck our flag." after looking about the ship, the boarding officer stepped to the side, to return to his own vessel. before leaving, he said to capt. dacres,-- "would you like the assistance of a surgeon, or surgeon's mate, in caring for your wounded?" dacres looked surprised, and responded,-- "well, i should suppose you had on board your own ship business enough for all your medical officers." "oh, no!" answered read. "we have only seven wounded, and they have been dressed long ago." dacres was astounded, as well he might be; for on the decks of his ship lay twenty-three dead or mortally wounded men, while the surgeons were doing their best to alleviate the sufferings of fifty-six wounded, among whom were several officers. indeed, the ship looked like a charnel-house. when capt. orne, freed by the result of the battle, came on deck, he saw a sight that he thus describes: "at about half-past seven o'clock, i went on deck, and there beheld a scene which it would be difficult to describe. all the 'guerriere's' masts were shot away; and, as she had no sails to steady her, she was rolling like a log in the trough of the sea. many of the men were employed in throwing the dead overboard the decks were covered with blood, and had the appearance of a ship's slaughter-house. the gun-tackles were not made fast; and several of the guns got loose, and were surging from one side to the other. some of the petty officers and seamen got liquor, and were intoxicated; and what with the groans of the wounded, the noise and confusion of the enraged survivors on board of the ill-fated ship, rendered the whole scene a perfect hell." for some time after the "guerriere" had been formally taken possession of, it seemed as though the "constitution" would have to fight a second battle, to keep possession of her prize. a strange sail was seen upon the horizon, bearing down upon the "constitution" in a way that seemed to threaten hostilities. again the drums beat to quarters, and once again the tired crew went to their stations at the guns. but the strange ship sheered off, and the gallant crew were not forced to fight a second battle. all hands then set to work to remove the prisoners from the "guerriere," which was evidently in a sinking condition. in the first boat-load from the sinking ship came capt. dacres, who was politely shown into capt. hull's cabin. unclasping his sword from its place at his hip, the conquered seaman handed it silently to capt. hull. the victor put it gently back, saying,-- "no, no, captain: i'll not take a sword from one who knows so well how to use it. but i will trouble you for that hat." for a moment a shade of perplexity passed over the brow of the british captain; then he recollected the wager of a year or two before, and all was clear again. unfortunately, the veracious chronicler who has handed this anecdote down to modern times has failed to state whether the debt was duly paid. after some hours of hard work with the boats, the last of the prisoners, with their effects, were brought on board the "constitution." torches were then set to the abandoned frigate; and the sailors watched her blaze, until the fire reached her magazine, and she vanished in the midst of a tremendous explosion. then, leaving behind her the floating mass of ruin, the "constitution" headed for boston, where she arrived after a few days of sailing. great was the excitement and exultation aroused among the people by the arrival of the noble ship with her prisoners. she had, indeed, come at a time when the public mind required cheering; for from the interior came the reports of british successes by land, along the canadian frontier about detroit, and for weeks the papers had been unable to record any success for the american arms. but the report of the engagement with the "guerriere" changed wholly the tide of popular feeling. boston--the city which at the declaration of war had hung its flags at half-mast, in token of mourning and humiliation--boston welcomed the conquerors with an ovation like to a triumph in the days of imperial rome. when the ship came up the harbor, she was met and surrounded by a great flotilla of gayly decorated boats; while the flags on the surrounding vessels were dipped in salutation as the war-scarred veteran made her stately way to the wharf. here a volunteer artillery company was assembled; and, as the ship came up, they fired a national salute, which was returned from the guns so lately employed in defending the national honor. quarters had been prepared for capt. hull in the city; and, as he landed, he found the streets through which he must pass decked with bright bunting, and crowded with people. his progress was accompanied by a great wave of cheers; for, as the people saw him coming, they set up a shout, which was not ended until he had passed from sight. at night came a grand banquet to the officers of the ship, at which six hundred sat down to the feast. the freedom of the city was presented to the captain; and at a later date came the news of sword presentations from citizens of new york, plate from the people of philadelphia, and gold medals from congress. amid all the exultation, the rash arrogance of the british writers was not forgotten; and many a bumper was emptied to the success of the frigate described by british journalists as "a bunch of pine boards under a bit of striped bunting." chapter v. an international debate. -- the "wasp" and the "frolic." -- the "united states" and the "macedonian." -- ovations to the victors. the rejoicing over the success of the "constitution" had not died away in the united states when the english newspapers began to appear with elaborate articles, showing just why the battle had terminated as it did. "the 'constitution' is the crack frigate of the american navy," cried the apologists; but to this the americans retorted by quoting the british description of the ship as "a bunch of pine boards." the "guerriere" was an "old worn-out frigate," responded the english, returning to the charge. "she was on her way to halifax to refit, when attacked." again they were refuted by their own statements; for, but a month before, the "guerriere" was said to be "able to drive the insolent striped bunting from the seas." throughout the discussion, the shrewdness of the americans enabled them to meet the arguments of the british at every point; but not until the charge was made, that the "constitution" was chiefly manned by british sailors, did the people become thoroughly in earnest in the war of words. such a charge as this was adding insult to injury. was not the british navy full of americans who were forced against their will to serve against their own country, while the few englishmen on the "constitution" were enlisted with their own consent? for capt. dacres to say that his ship was weakened by allowing the ten americans to go below, and then beaten by the efforts of the englishmen on the "constitution," was merely tantamount to saying that the victory hinged on the fact that americans would not fight against their own country, while englishmen did so willingly. but for great britain to exclaim against the american navy because it harbored a few englishmen, was the rankest hypocrisy. so said the american journalists of the day; and, in support of their statement, they printed long letters from american seamen impressed into and held in the british naval service. one writes that he was impressed into his british majesty's ship "peacock," in , and after serving two years he heard of the declaration of war. after a consultation with two fellow-seamen, both americans, all decided to refuse to serve longer, claiming to be prisoners of war. but the captain under whom they were enrolled looked upon the matter in a different light. he heard their claim, pronounced it a bit of "confounded insolence," and straightway ordered that they be put in irons. after some hours for meditation in "the brig," the three sailors were taken to the gangway, stripped naked, and tied up, while a sturdy boatswain's mate laid on a dozen and a half blows of the cat. later, when the ship went into action with a united states vessel, the three sailors asked to be sent below, that they might not fight against their own countrymen; but the captain's sole response was to call up a midshipman, and order him to do his duty. this duty proved to consist in standing over the three malcontents with a loaded pistol, threatening to blow out the brains of the first who should flinch from his work. three sailors were impressed after the war had begun. learning that the ship on which they found themselves was to cruise upon the american station, they with one accord refused to serve. the response to this was "five dozen lashes well laid on." being still mutinous, they received four dozen lashes two days later, and after the lapse of two more days were flogged with two dozen more. but all the beating to which they were subjected could not compel them to serve against their country; and they were accordingly ironed and thrown into "the brig," where they lay for three months. when released from "the brig," they found the ship at london. here they heard of the glorious victory of the "constitution," and determined to celebrate it. by ripping up their clothing into strips, and sewing the strips together, a rude american flag was made; and with the most astonishing audacity the three sailors hung this emblem over a gun, and gave three cheers for the stars and stripes. this naturally brought them another flogging. flogging, however, could not always be resorted to in order to bring american sailors into subjection. it is estimated, that, when war was declared, there were five times as many american seamen in the british navy as were in the whole navy of the united states. to attempt to keep this immense body of disaffected seamen in order by the lash, would have been impracticable; and soon the custom arose of sending the more refractory tars into confinement at some english prison. dartmoor prison was for a time the principal place of detention for pressed men; but, as it soon became crowded, it was given over to prisoners of war, and the hapless seamen were sent to languish in dismantled ships, known as "hulks." these hulks were generally old naval vessels, dismasted and stripped of all their fittings. anchored midstream in tidal rivers, the rotting hulks tugged at their rusty chains, as the tide rose and fell, groaning in their bondage, and seeming as much imprisoned as the wretched sailors by whom they were tenanted. the captives lived in misery and squalor. crowded together in stifling quarters between decks, they were the prey of vermin of all kinds. their miserable diet, and lack of proper exercise, caused the scurvy in its most repulsive forms to break out among them. the only breath of fresh air they could obtain was when, in gangs, they were allowed to go on deck, and pace up and down under the watchful eyes of soldiery; then back to the crowded quarters below, to swelter in summer or freeze in winter. such was their punishment for the crime of being loyal to their country. [illustration: engagement of the frigates "united states" and "macedonian," christmas day, . copyright, , by c. klackner] careful estimates show that at this time there were at least twenty thousand american sailors in the british navy, each one of whom was liable at any moment to be ordered into this inhuman captivity. a british official document of reported that , american seamen had been imprisoned for refusing to serve against their country. hundreds of these were sent to the living death in the hulks. was it any wonder that, with such facts, before their eyes, americans grew indignant at hearing that the victory of the "constitution" had been won by the prowess of british seamen? but before many days had passed, a victory was recorded for the stars and stripes, which not even the acuteness of an english naval historian could ascribe to any cause other than the naval superiority of the victor. this was the capture, by the united states sloop-of-war "wasp," of the british sloop-of-war "frolic," after a battle ever memorable for the extraordinary dash and bravery shown by each combatant. in size, the "wasp" was one of the inferior vessels of the united states navy. in her architecture and appointments, however, she was the pride of the navy, and was often cited as a model ship of her class. her armament consisted of sixteen thirty-two-pounder carronades, and two "long twelves." when the war broke out, the "wasp" had just left the coast of europe, bearing despatches from the foreign diplomatic representatives of the united states to the government. it was accordingly near the middle of october before the sloop had been refitted, and, with a crew of one hundred and thirty-five men, left the delaware, on her first cruise against the english. her commander was capt. jacob jones, who had served in the war with tripoli, and had himself been a captive among the barbarians of northern africa. after a few days' cruising, with one or two unimportant captures, a bunch of sails was sighted at some distance. the most careful examination failed to reveal the character of the strangers, and jones determined to run down cautiously toward the squadron, to reconnoitre. the wind was blowing fiercely at the time, and a heavy sea was running, from the effects of a gale of the day before, in which the "wasp" lost her jib-boom, together with two sailors who were upon it. as the vessel bore down upon the strangers, jones could see through his marine glasses that they were a convoy of merchantmen, under the protection of a british sloop-of-war. the merchantmen were evidently armed, and some seemed to carry as many as twelve guns. deeming it unwise to attack at that moment, capt. jones kept on a course parallel with that of the enemy, during the remainder of that day and through the night. with the break of day, every officer of the "wasp" was on deck, and all eyes were turned towards the quarter in which the englishmen should be found. there, sure enough, they were. six merchant ships and a bluff little brig, the port-holes in the sides of which showed her to be a war-vessel rating as a sloop. signs of activity on board made it evident that the englishmen had caught sight of the vessel which had been dogging them for the last day, and were making ready to give her battle. the british, too, had suffered in the gale, and the sailors could be seen shipping a new main-yard, and setting new topsails. on the "wasp," the jackies were hard at work, getting in a spar to take the place of the jib-boom, which had been lost in the storm. both ships were under short canvas, for the wind was still high. instead of the english ensign, a spanish flag fluttered from the halliards of the englishman,--an unnecessary ruse to draw on an adversary already seeking a conflict. [illustration: loading.] it was half-past eleven in the morning when the action began. the day was an ideal october morning at sea,--cool, clear, and a breeze blowing fresh and constantly stiffening. the two vessels were running on the starboard tack, not sixty yards apart. as they ploughed through the waves, great clouds of spray dashed over the bows; and every now and then a wave would sweep over the forecastle, drenching the jackies as they stood at their quarters. as they sped along, the two ships exchanged broadsides, the "frolic" firing three to the "wasp's" two. after every broadside, the gunners cheered as they saw the damage done by their fire. when the state of the sea is considered, it seems marvellous that the broadsides should have done any execution whatever. the vessels were rolling terribly, now wallowing in the trough of the sea, and again tossed high on the crest of some enormous wave. at one instant the muzzles of the guns would be pointed toward the skies, then actually submerged under the waves, from which they rose dripping, to be loaded and fired before another dip should soak the charge. yet, with all this rolling to spoil their aim, the gunners of both ships pointed their pieces with most destructive effect. within five minutes from the time of opening fire, the main topmast of the "wasp" was shot away, and hung tangled in the rigging, despite the active efforts of the topmen, headed by the nimble midshipmen, to clear away the wreck. this greatly hampered the movements of the american vessel; and when, a few minutes later, the gaff and the main top-gallant mast fell, the chances of the american ship seemed poor indeed. the effects of the "wasp's" fire were chiefly to be seen in the hull of her antagonist; but the first twenty minutes of the fight seemed to give the englishman every chance of victory, since his fire had so cut away the rigging of the "wasp" that she became unmanageable. it is said that the difference between the execution done by the two batteries was due to the fact that the british fired as their ship was rising on the crest of the wave, while the americans fired from the trough of the sea, sending their shot into the hull of the enemy. while the fight was raging, the two ships were constantly drawing nearer together; and just as it seemed as though the destruction wrought in the "wasp's" rigging would inevitably lead to her defeat, the two vessels fouled. for an instant they lay yard-arm to yard-arm, and at that very moment the american gunners poured in a terrific broadside. so close were the two vessels to each other, that, in loading, the rammers were shoved up against the sides of the "frolic." before the gunners of the "frolic" could respond to this broadside, their ship swung round so that her bow lay against the "wasp's" quarter; and her bowsprit passed over the heads of capt. jones and his officers as they stood on the quarter-deck. that was the moment for a raking volley; and with deadly aim the americans poured it in, and the heavy iron bolts swept the decks of the "frolic" from stem to stern. this turn in the tide of battle fairly crazed with excitement the sailors of the "wasp." with ringing cheers they applauded the success of the last volley, and, springing into the hammock-nettings, called loudly for their officers to lead them on board the english ship. from the quarter-deck, capt. jones, with shouts and gestures, strove to hold back the excited men until another broadside could be given the enemy. but the enthusiasm of the sailors was beyond all control. all at once, they saw a sailor from new jersey, named jack lang, spring on a gun, cutlass in hand, ready to board. all were about to follow him, when capt. jones called him down. only for a minute did jack's sense of duty overcome his enthusiasm; and then, remembering that he had once been impressed on the "frolic," his rage blazed up, and in an instant he was clambering over the nettings, calling for followers. capt. jones saw that the ardor of his crew was beyond his control, and ordered the bugler to call away the boarders. headed by their officers, the bold tars swarmed over the nettings, and through the tangled rigging, to the deck of the enemy's ship. each man clutched his cutlass viciously, for he felt that a desperate conflict was imminent. but when they dropped upon the deck of the "frolic," a most unexpected spectacle met their eyes. the broad deck stretched out before them, untenanted save by a few wounded officers near the stern, and a grim old british seaman at the wheel. instead of the host of armed men with whom the boarders expected to dispute the possession of the ship, they saw before them only heaps of dead sailors lying about the guns which they had been serving. on the quarter-deck lay capt. whinyates and lieut. wintle, desperately wounded. all who were unhurt had fled below, to escape the pitiless fire of the american guns, and the unerring aim of the sailors stationed in the "wasp's" tops. only the old helmsman stood undaunted at his post, and held the ship on her course, even while the americans were swarming over the nettings and clambering down the bowsprit. the colors were still flying above the ship; but there was no one left, either to defend them or to haul them down, and they were finally lowered by the hands of lieut. biddle, who led the boarding party. no action of the war was so sanguinary as this short conflict between two sloops-of-war. the "frolic" went into action with a crew of one hundred and ten men, fully officered. when the colors were hauled down, only twenty men were uninjured. every officer was wounded, and of the crew thirty lost their lives. they had stood to their guns with the dogged courage of the english sailor at his best, and had been fairly mowed down by the destructive fire of the americans. on the "wasp," the loss of life was slight. the shot of the enemy took effect in the rigging chiefly. the three sailors who were killed were topmen at their posts, and the five wounded were almost all stationed in the rigging. [illustration: ready to board.] the americans were not destined to enjoy their triumph long. shattered though the "frolic" was, lieut. biddle, with a prize-crew, took charge of her, and was in hopes of taking her safely to port; but his plan was rudely shattered by the appearance of an english frigate, only a few hours after the action ceased. for the "frolic" to escape, was out of the question. both her masts had gone by the board shortly after her flag was struck; and, when the new enemy hove in sight, the prize-crew was working hard to clear from her decks the tangled mass of rigging, wreckage, and dead bodies, that made the tasks of navigation impossible. the ship was rolling like a log, in the trough of the sea, and was an easy prize for an enemy of even less strength than the man-of-war which was then bearing down upon her. the vessel which came rapidly down before the wind was the "poictiers," a british seventy-four-gun ship, which would have been more than a match for the little "wasp," even though the latter had been fresh and ready for battle, instead of shattered by desperate fight. seeing no chance for a successful resistance, capt. jones determined upon flight, and ordered all hands aloft, to make sail. but the sails when shaken out were found to have been cut to pieces by the "frolic's" shot; and the "poictiers" soon came alongside, and changed the triumph of the americans to defeat. though capt. jones and his gallant crew were thus deprived of their hard-won conquest, they received their full meed of praise from their countrymen. they were soon exchanged, voted twenty-five thousand dollars prize-money by congress, and lauded by every newspaper and legislative orator in the country. the song-writers of the day undertook to celebrate in verse the famous victory, and produced dozens of songs, of which the following stanza may be taken for a fair sample:-- "like the fierce bird of jove the 'wasp' darted forth, and he the tale told, with amazement and wonder. she hurled on the foe from her flame-spreading arms, the fire-brands of death and the red bolts of thunder. and, oh! it was glorious and strange to behold what torrents of fire from her red mouth she threw; and how from her broad wings and sulphurous sides, hot showers of grape-shot and rifle-balls flew!" let us now turn to commodore john rodgers, whose unlucky cruise at the opening of the war we have already noted. having refitted his squadron in the port of new york, he set sail on a second cruise, leaving behind him the "hornet." again he seemed to have fallen upon unprofitable times, for his ships beat up and down in the highway of commerce without sighting a single sail. after several days of inaction, it was determined to scatter the squadron; and to this end the frigate "united states," commodore decatur, and the sixteen-gun brig "argus," capt. sinclair, left the main body of ships and started off on a cruise in company. after the two ships left the main body, commodore rodgers met with better success, capturing a jamaica packet with two hundred thousand dollars in her hold, and chasing a british frigate for two hours, but without overhauling her. in the mean time, the "argus" had parted from her consort, and was cruising to the eastward on her own account, meeting with fair success. during her cruise she captured six merchantmen, and was herself chased by a british squadron. this chase was almost as memorable as that of the "constitution;" for the little brig was hotly pursued for three days and nights, and, to escape her pursuers, was obliged to cut away her boats and anchors, and part with every thing movable save her guns. she escaped at last, however, and was for many months thereafter a source of continual annoyance to the commerce of the enemy. after parting with the "argus," the "united states" had made her course toward the south-east, in the hopes of intercepting some of the british west-indiamen. but what the plucky sailors would consider better luck fell to the lot of the frigate. at dawn on a bright sunday morning, the lookout of the "united states" descried a sail about twelve miles away, on the weather-beam. sail was crowded on the american frigate, and, urged along by a rattling breeze, she made towards the stranger. as the distance between the ships lessened, and the rigging of the stranger showed her to be a frigate, the enthusiasm among the gallant tars of the "united states" grew apace. visions of battle, of glory, and, above all, of resultant prize-money, arose in their minds; and their shouts could be heard by the crew of the distant frigate before the two vessels came within range of each other. the vessel toward which the "united states" was advancing was the "macedonian," a british frigate rating thirty-eight guns, but said to have been carrying forty-nine at this time. she had for some time been reckoned a crack ship of her class in the british navy, and her crew was in admirable training. from her quarter-deck and forecastle groups of officers and seamen were watching the on-coming of the american frigate. one of the powder monkeys, named samuel leech, of the british ship, told graphically and simply the story of that day's doings on the "macedonian." "sunday (dec. , ) came, and it brought with it a stiff breeze," so runs the powder-monkey's tale. "we usually made a sort of holiday of this sacred day. after breakfast it was common to muster the entire crew on the spar-deck, dressed as the fancy of the captain might dictate,--sometimes in blue jackets and white trousers, or blue jackets and blue trousers; at other times in blue jackets, scarlet vests, and blue or white trousers; with our bright anchor-buttons glancing in the sun, and our black, glossy hats ornamented with black ribbons, and the name of our ship painted on them. after muster we frequently had church-service read by the captain; the rest of the day was devoted to idleness. but we were destined to spend the rest of the sabbath just introduced to the reader in a very different manner. "we had scarcely finished breakfast before the man at the masthead shouted 'sail, ho!' "the captain rushed upon deck, exclaiming, 'masthead, there!' "'sir?' "'where away is the sail?' "the precise answer to this question i do not recollect; but the captain proceeded to ask, 'what does she look like?' "'a square-rigged vessel, sir,' was the reply of the lookout. "after a few minutes, the captain shouted again, 'masthead, there!' "'sir?' "'what does she look like?' "'a large ship, sir, standing toward us.' "by this time, most of the crew were on deck, eagerly straining their eyes to obtain a glimpse of the approaching ship, and murmuring their opinions to each other on her probable character. "then came the voice of the captain, shouting, 'keep silence, fore and aft!' "silence being secured, he hailed the lookout, who to his question of 'what does she look like?' replied, "a large frigate bearing down upon us, sir.' "a whisper ran along the crew, that the stranger ship was a yankee frigate. the thought was confirmed by the command of 'all hands clear the ship for action, ahoy!' the drum and fife beat to quarters, bulkheads were knocked away, the guns were released from their confinement, the whole dread paraphernalia of battle was produced; and, after the lapse of a few minutes of hurry and confusion, every man and boy was at his post ready to do his best service for his country, except the band, who, claiming exemption from the affray, safely stowed themselves away in the cable tier. we had only one sick man on the list; and he, at the cry of battle, hurried from his cot, feeble as he was, to take his post of danger. a few of the junior midshipmen were stationed below on the berth-deck, with orders, given in our hearing, to shoot any man who attempted to move from his quarters. "as the approaching ship showed american colors, all doubt of her character was at an end. 'we must fight her,' was the conviction of every breast. every possible arrangement that could insure success was accordingly made. the guns were shotted, the matches lighted; for, although our guns were all furnished with first-class locks, they were also furnished with matches, attached by lanyards, in case the lock should miss fire. a lieutenant then passed through the ship, directing the marines and boarders--who were furnished with pikes, cutlasses, and pistols--how to proceed if it should be necessary to board the enemy. he was followed by the captain, who exhorted the men to fidelity and courage, urging upon their consideration the well-known motto of the brave nelson, _'england expects every man to do his duty.'_ in addition to all these preparations on deck, some men were stationed in the tops with small-arms, whose duty it was to attend to trimming the sails, and to use their muskets, provided we came to close action. there were others, also, below, called sail-trimmers, to assist in working the ship, should it be necessary to shift her position during the battle." thus, with her men at their quarters, her guns primed, and matches lighted, the "macedonian" bore down to open the action. on the "united states," very similar scenes were being enacted. in some respects, the american frigate was a more formidable ship than the adversary she was about to engage. her battery consisted of fifty-four guns, and some were of heavier calibre than those of the "macedonian." her crew, too, was rather larger than that of her adversary. but, in most respects, the ships were well matched. indeed, the commanders of the two ships had met before the opening of the war, and, in conversation, agreed that their vessels were well fitted to test the comparative valor of yankee and english sailors. capt. carden of the "macedonian" had asked decatur what would be the probable result, if the two ships were to meet in battle. "why, sir," responded the american captain, "if we meet with forces that might be fairly called equal, the conflict would be severe; but the flag of my country on the ship i command shall never leave the staff on which it waves, as long as there is a hull to support it." such sentiments as this were ever in the heart of the gallant decatur, whose service in the war of was but the continuation of his dashing career during the war with tripoli. a captain of such ardent bravery could not fail to inspire his crew with the same enthusiasm and confidence. in the crew of the "united states" were many young boys, of ages ranging from twelve to fourteen years. at that time many a lad received his warrant as midshipman while still in his tenth year; and youngsters who wished to join the navy as "ship's boys," were always received, although sometimes their extreme youth made it illegal for their names to be formally enrolled upon the roster of the crew. such was the station of little jack creamer, a ten-year-old boy, who had been serving on the ship for some weeks, although under the age at which he could be legally enlisted. when jack saw the english frigate looming up in the distance, a troubled look came over his face, and he seemed to be revolving some grave problem in his mind. his comrades noticed his look of care, and rallied him on what they supposed to be his fear of the coming conflict. jack stoutly denied this charge, but said he was anxious to speak to the captain before going into action. an old quartermaster marched him up to the quarter-deck, and stood waiting for capt. decatur's attention. in a moment the captain noticed the two, and said cheerily,-- "well, jack, what's wanting now?" touching his hat, the lad replied, "commodore, will you please to have my name put down on the muster-roll?" "why, what for, my lad?" "so that i can draw my share of the prize-money, when we take that britisher, sir." amused and pleased with the lad's confidence in the success of the "united states" in the coming battle, decatur gave the necessary order; and jack went back to his post with a prouder step, for he was now regularly enrolled. the two ships were now coming within range of each other, and a slow, long-distance cannonade was begun, with but little effect; for a long ground-swell was on, and the ships were rolling in a manner fatal to the aim of the gunners. after half an hour of this playing at long bowls, the englishman's mizzen topmast was shot away; and the cannon-balls from the "states" whizzed through the rigging, and splashed into the water about the "macedonian," in a way that proved the american gunners had the range, and were utilizing it. capt. carden soon saw that at long range the american gunners were more than a match for his men, and he resolved to throw prudence to the winds; and, disdaining all manoeuvring, bore straight down on the american ship that lay almost stationary on the water, pouring in rapid and well-aimed broadsides. though a gallant and dashing movement, this course led to the defeat of the english ship. the fire of the americans was deadly in its aim, and marvellous in rapidity. so continuous was the flashing of the discharges from the broadside ports, that the sailors on the "macedonian" thought their adversary was on fire, and cheered lustily. but the next instant their exultation was turned to sorrow; for a well-directed shot cut away the mizzen-mast, which fell alongside, suspended by the cordage. "huzza, jack!" cried the captain of a gun on the "united states." "we've made a brig of her." "ay, ay, my lad," said decatur, who stood near by; "now aim well at the main-mast, and she'll be a sloop soon." a few minutes later, the captain shouted to the nearest gunner, "aim at the yellow streak. her spars and rigging are going fast enough. she must have a little more hulling." this order was immediately passed along the gun-deck, until every gunner was striving his utmost to plant his shot in the hull of the enemy. the effect was terrible. the great missiles crashed through the wooden sides of the english frigate, and swept the decks clear of men. she was coming down on the american bravely, and with manifest intention of boarding; but so skilfully was the "united states" manoeuvred, and so accurate and rapid was her fire, that the "macedonian" was unable to close, and was fairly cut to pieces, while still more than a pistol-shot distant. the "united states," in the mean time, was almost unscathed. the aim of the english gunners was usually too high, and such shots as took effect were mainly in the rigging. after pounding away at the "macedonian" until the chocks of the forecastle guns on that ship were cut away, her boats cut to pieces, and her hull shattered with more than one hundred shot-holes, the american ship drew away slightly. the british thought she was in retreat, and cheered lustily, but were soon undeceived; for, after a little manoeuvring, the "united states" ranged up under her adversary's lee, securing a raking position. before a broadside could be fired, the british hauled down their flag; and the action was ended, after just an hour and a half of fighting. the slaughter on the british frigate had been appalling. from the official accounts, we glean the cold reports of the numbers of the killed and wounded; but for any picture of the scene on the decks of the defeated man-of-war, we must turn to such descriptions as have been left by eye-witnesses. sailors are not much given to the habit of jotting down the descriptions of the many stirring scenes in which they play parts in their adventurous careers; and much that is romantic, much that is picturesque, and much that is of historic value, has thus been lost to history. but of the details of the action between the "macedonian" and "united states," the sailor-lad already quoted has left an account, probably as trustworthy as should be expected of a witness in his situation. he was stationed at one of the guns on the main-deck; and it was his duty, as powder-boy, to run to the magazine for powder for his gun. before the entrance to the magazine was a heavy wooden screen, pierced with a hole through which the cartridges were passed out to the fleet-footed powder-monkeys, as they rushed up for more powder. each boy, on getting his cartridge, wrapped it in his jacket, that no stray spark might touch it, and dashed off at full speed for his gun, quickly returning for further supplies. with the men all standing pale and silent at the guns, the "macedonian" came on doggedly towards her foe. three guns fired from the larboard side of the gun-deck opened the action; but the fire was quickly stopped by the gruff order from the quarter-deck, "cease firing: you are throwing away your shot!" then came the roar of the opening volley from the american frigate. "a strange noise such as i had never heard before next arrested my attention," wrote the english sailor-lad. "it sounded like the tearing of sails just over our heads. this i soon ascertained to be the wind of the enemy's shot. the firing, after a few minutes' cessation, recommenced. the roaring of cannon could now be heard from all parts of our trembling ship; and, mingling as it did with that of our foes, it made a most hideous noise. by and by i heard the shot strike the sides of our ship. the whole scene grew indescribably confused and horrible. it was like some awfully tremendous thunderstorm, whose deafening roar is attended by incessant streaks of lightning, carrying death in every flash, and strewing the ground with the victims of its wrath; only in our case the scene was rendered more horrible than that by the presence of torrents of blood, which dyed our decks. though the recital may be painful, yet, as it will reveal the horrors of war, and show at what a fearful price the victory is won or lost, i will present the reader with things as they met my eye during the progress of this dreadful fight. i was busily supplying my gun with powder, when i saw blood suddenly fly from the arm of a man stationed at our gun. i saw nothing strike him: the effect alone was visible; and in an instant the third lieutenant tied his handkerchief round the wounded arm, and sent the poor fellow below to the surgeon. "the cries of the wounded now rang through all parts of the ship. these were carried to the cock-pit as fast as they fell, while those more fortunate men who were killed outright were immediately thrown overboard. as i was stationed but a short distance from the main hatchway, i could catch a glance at all who were carried below. a glance was all i could indulge in; for the boys belonging to the guns next to mine were wounded in the early part of the action, and i had to spring with all my might to keep three or four guns supplied with cartridges. i saw two of these lads fall nearly together. one of them was struck in the leg by a large shot; he had to suffer amputation above the wound. the other had a grape or canister sent through his ankle. a stout yorkshire man lifted him in his arms, and hurried with him to the cock-pit. he had his foot cut off, and was thus made lame for life. two of the boys stationed on the quarter-deck were killed. they were both portuguese. a man who saw one killed afterwards told me that his powder caught fire, and burnt the flesh almost off his face. in this pitiable situation the agonized boy lifted up both hands, as if imploring relief, when a passing shot instantly cut him in two." but the narrative of this young sailor, a boy in years, is almost too horrible for reproduction. he tells of men struck by three or four missiles at once, and hacked to pieces; of mangled sailors, mortally wounded, but still living, thrown overboard to end their sufferings; of the monotonous drip of the blood on the deck, as desperately wounded men were carried past. the brave seaman who left his bed of sickness for the post of duty had his head carried away by a cannon-ball. the schoolmaster who looked after the education of the midshipmen was killed. even a poor goat, kept by the officers for her milk, was cut down by a cannon-ball, and, after hobbling piteously about the deck, was mercifully thrown overboard. and this was sunday, christmas day! the spot amidships where our sailor-lad was stationed must have been the hottest station in the whole ship. many years later, as herman melville, the author of several exciting sea-tales, was walking the deck of a man-of-war with an old negro, "tawney," who had served on the "macedonian," the veteran stopped at a point abreast the main-mast. "this part of the ship," said he, "we called the slaughter-house, on board the 'macedonian.' here the men fell, five and six at a time. an enemy always directs its shot here, in order to hurl over the mast, if possible. the beams and carlines overhead in the 'macedonian' slaughter-house were spattered with blood and brains. about the hatchways it looked like a butcher's stall. a shot entering at one of the port-holes dashed dead two-thirds of a gun's crew. the captain of the next gun, dropping his lock-string, which he had just pulled, turned over the heap of bodies, to see who they were; when, perceiving an old messmate who had sailed with him in many cruises, he burst into tears, and taking the corpse up in his arms, and going to the side with it, held it over the water a moment, and eying it, cried, 'o god! tom'--'hang your prayers over that thing! overboard with it, and down to your gun!' the order was obeyed, and the heart-stricken sailor returned to his post." amid such scenes of terror, the british tars fought on doggedly, cheering loudly as they worked their guns, but not knowing why they cheered; for the officers, at least, could see how surely the battle was going against them. when the "united states" drew away to repair damages, the british officers held a consultation on the quarter-deck. they could not but see that their position was hopeless; and, knowing all further resistance to be folly, the flag was hauled down. to the pride of the officers, the surrender was doubtless a severe blow. but sam leech remarks pithily, that to him "it was a pleasing sight; for he had seen fighting enough for one sabbath,--more, indeed, than he wished to see again on a week-day." decatur at once hailed, to learn the name of his prize, and then sent off a boat with lieut. allen to take possession. he found the decks of the ship in a fearful state. many of the crew had found liquor, and were drinking heavily. others were throwing the dead into the sea, carrying the wounded below, and sprinkling the deck with hot vinegar, to remove the stains and odor of blood. the dead numbered forty-three, and sixty-one were wounded. an eye-witness of the terrible spectacle writes of it: "fragments of the dead were distributed in every direction, the decks covered with blood,--one continued, agonizing yell of the unhappy wounded. a scene so horrible of my fellow-creatures, i assure you, deprived me very much of the pleasure of victory." yet, with all this terrific destruction and loss of life on the "macedonian," the "united states" was but little injured; and her loss amounted to but seven killed, and five wounded. indeed, so slight was the damage done to the american ship, that an hour's active work by her sailors put her in trim for a second battle. while lieut. allen was examining the muster-rolls of the "macedonian," a sailor pushed his way toward the quarter-deck, and cried out that he was an impressed american, and that he had seven mates aboard, all pressed into the british service. they had all been forced to serve against their country, and in the battle three had been killed. just before the battle began, they had begged to be sent below, but were peremptorily ordered to stand by their guns, or expect to be treated as mutineers. now that the battle was over, the five who were left alive begged to be taken into the crew of the "united states," which was accordingly done. after the "macedonian" had been formally taken possession of by lieut. allen, the british officers were removed to the american ship. some of them were inclined to be very surly over their defeat, and by words and actions showed their contempt for the americans, whose prisoners they were. in the first boat which went from the prize to the victor was the first lieutenant of the "macedonian." as he clambered down the side of his vessel, he noticed that his baggage had not been put in the boat which was to bear him to the american frigate. turning to lieut. allen, he said surlily,-- "you do not intend to send me away without my baggage?" "i hope," responded allen courteously, "that you do not take us for privateersmen." "i am sure i don't know by whom i have been taken," was the rude reply, which so angered allen that he peremptorily ordered the fellow to take his place in the boat, and be silent. whatever may have been the demeanor of the british captives, they met with nothing but the most considerate treatment from the american officers. capt. carden, on his arrival upon the deck of the victorious frigate, was received with the consideration due his rank and the brave defence of his vessel. he was conducted at once to decatur's cabin, on entering which he took off his sword, and mutely held it out for decatur's acceptance. decatur courteously refused to accept it, saying, "sir, i cannot take the sword of a man who has defended his ship so bravely; but i will take your hand." as long as carden and his officers remained on the ship, they were treated with the greatest consideration, and were allowed to retain all their personal property. every attempt was made to take away from them the bitter remembrance of their defeat. the innate nobility of decatur's nature is well shown in a letter written to his wife a few days after the action. "one-half of the satisfaction," he says, "a-rising from this victory is destroyed in seeing the mortification of poor carden, who deserved success as much as we did who had the good fortune to obtain it." when carden left the ship, he thanked decatur for his consideration, and expressed a desire to do likewise by the americans, should he ever be able to turn the tables. amid the heat of battle and the excitement of success, decatur did not forget little jack creamer, the lately enrolled ship's boy. shortly after the close of the conflict, he sent for jack to come to his cabin. soon a much abashed small boy stood before the captain. "well, jack," said the great man, "we did take her, after all." "yes, your honor," responded jack. "i knew we would, before we gave her the first broadside." "and your share of the prize-money," continued decatur, "may amount to two hundred dollars, if we get her safe into port. now, what are you going to do with so much money?" jack's eyes had lighted up at the thought of such great wealth. "please, sir," he cried, "i'll send half of it to my mother; and the rest will get me a bit of schooling." "well said, jack," said decatur warmly; and the interview closed for the time. but the captain's interest in the boy was aroused, and for years he showed an almost fatherly regard for the lad. jack had his "bit of schooling," then received a midshipman's warrant, and for years served with decatur, giving promise of becoming an able officer. at last, however, his career was ended by the accidental upsetting of a boat when on a pleasure excursion in the mediterranean. after putting in for a short time at new london, the two ships, captor and captive, proceeded down the sound to new york. here they arrived on the st of january, ; and the news-writers of the day straightway hailed the "macedonian" as "a new year's gift, with the compliments of old neptune." however, the news of the victory had spread throughout the land before the ships came up to new york; for decatur had sent out a courier from new london to bear the tidings to washington. a curious coincidence made the delivery of the despatch as impressive as a studied dramatic scene. it so happened that the people of washington had chosen the night of dec. for a grand ball, to be tendered to the officers of the navy, and particularly to capt. stewart of the "constellation." a brilliant company was gathered, in honor of the occasion. the secretary of the navy, and other cabinet officers, lent their presence to the festivities. capt. hull of the victorious "constitution" was present; and, to make the affair even more of a triumph, the captured colors of the "alert" and the "guerriere" were draped on the wall of the hall. near midnight, the revelry was at its height. the brilliant toilets of the ladies; the men, gorgeous in the uniforms of the army, navy, or diplomatic corps; the light of a thousand wax-candles flashing from a myriad of sconces,--made the scene one of the utmost splendor. all at once, in the midst or the stately measures of the old-fashioned minuet, a murmur rose near the entrance to the hall, and spread until every one was whispering, that news had come of a great naval battle, a victory. word was brought to the secretary of the navy. he directed that the bearer of the despatches should be at once admitted; and, amid cheers and clapping of hands, lieut. hamilton entered the hall, and delivered his despatches to his father, the secretary of the navy. the tenor of the despatch was soon known to all; and lieut. hamilton turned from the greetings of his mother and sisters, who were present, to receive the congratulations of his brother-officers. he had brought the colors of the captured ship with him to the city; and capts. stewart and hull immediately went in search of them, and soon returned, bearing the flag between them. the two veteran sailors marched the length of the hall, amid the plaudits of the gay company, and laid the colors before mrs. madison,--the dolly madison who is still remembered as the most popular of the "ladies of the white house." then the company proceeded to the banquet-hall, where, to the list of toasts already prepared, was added, "the health of commodore decatur and the officers and crew of the 'united states.'" two weeks later, capt. decatur and his officers and the crew of the "united states" were sumptuously entertained by the citizens of new york. the officers were tendered a banquet in the great assembly-room of the city hotel, which was decked with laurel and ship's spars and sails. the chief table at the head of the room, at which sat mayor de witt clinton and capts. hull and decatur, was a marvel of decoration. its centre was taken up by a sheet of water with grassy banks, bearing on its placid surface a miniature frigate floating at her moorings. each of the smaller tables bore a small frigate on a pedestal in the centre of the board. on the wall at the end of the room hung a heavy sail, on which was printed the motto,-- "our children are the property of their country." after the dinner was ended and the toasts were begun, the health of the navy was proposed. at the word, the great sail began to ascend, and, being drawn to the ceiling, disclosed an illuminated transparent painting, showing vividly the scenes of the three great actions won by the "constitution," the "united states," and the "wasp." the whole company rose and cheered, until the walls of the hall fairly rung. three days later, the jackies from the forecastle of the "united states" were entertained. they were landed at the battery, and marched in procession to the hotel, headed by a brass band which had been captured with the "macedonian." four hundred of the fine fellows were in the line, clad in the dress uniform of the navy of that time. glazed canvas hats with stiff rims, decked with streamers of ribbon; blue jackets buttoned loosely over red waistcoats; and blue trousers with bell-buttons,--made up the toggery of the tar of . as they marched, two by two, through the narrow streets that led to the city hotel, the populace assembled on the sidewalks and in the windows along the route, greeting the jackies with cheers. the rear was brought up by the usual band of street-urchins, each of whom that day was firm in his determination to be a sailor. after the banquet at the hotel, the sailors were marched to the theatre, where the pit had been set aside for them. the orchestra opened with "yankee doodle;" but the first bar had hardly been played, when the cheers of the blue-jackets fairly drowned the music, and the musicians were fain to stop. the programme had been arranged with special regard to the seafaring audience. little children bounded upon the stage, bearing huge letters in their hands, and, after lightly whirling through the mazes of the dance, grouped themselves so that the letters formed the words,-- hull, jones, decatur. then came more cheers from the pit; and more than one glazed hat soared over the heads of the audience, and fell on the stage,--a purely nautical substitute for a bouquet. late at night, the sailors returned to their ship, elated with an ovation the like of which has never since been tendered to the humble heroes of the forecastle or the ranks. chapter vi. bainbridge takes command of the "constitution." -- the defeat of the "java." -- close of the year's hostilities on the ocean. as hull and decatur sat in the gayly decorated banquet-hall at new york, and, amid the plaudits of the brilliant assembly, drank bumpers to the success of the navy, they little thought that thousands of miles away the guns of an american frigate were thundering, and the stout-hearted blue-jackets laying down their lives for the honor and glory of the united states. but so it was. the opening year of the war was not destined to close without yet a fourth naval victory for the americans; and, at the very moment when they were so joyfully celebrating the glories already won, capt. bainbridge in the good ship "constitution" was valiantly giving battle to a british frigate far south of the equator. before considering the details of this last action of the year , let us recount briefly the movements of some american vessels in commission at this time. after sending the "guerriere" to the bottom of the sea, and bringing her officers and crew in triumph into boston, capt. hull had voluntarily relinquished the command of the "constitution," in order that some other officer might win laurels with the noble frigate. in his place was appointed capt. bainbridge, who had served in the wars with france and tripoli. after a short time spent in refitting, bainbridge sailed from boston, accompanied by the "hornet," eighteen guns. the "essex," thirty-two, capt. porter, was lying in the delaware at the time bainbridge left boston, and her captain was ordered to cruise in the track of british west-indiamen. after spending some time in this service, he was to turn southward and visit several south american ports, with a view to joining bainbridge. should he fail to find the "constitution," he was free to act at his own discretion. this permission gave porter an opportunity to make a cruise seldom equalled in naval annals, and which will form the subject of a subsequent chapter. the "constitution" and "hornet" left boston on the th of october, and shaped their course at once for the south. they put in at two or three ports which had been named to capt. porter as meeting-places, but, finding no trace of the "essex," continued their cruise. at port praya in the island of st. jago, and at fernando noronha, the two ships assumed the character of british men-of-war. officers from whose uniform every trace of the american eagle had been carefully removed went ashore, and, after paying formal visits to the governors of the two islands, requested permission to leave letters for sir james yeo of his majesty's service. though directed to this prominent british naval officer, the letters were intended for capt. porter, and contained directions for his cruise, written in sympathetic ink. after the letters were deposited, the two vessels left; and we may be sure that the british colors came down from the masthead as soon as the ships were out of sight. the next point at which the american ships stopped was san salvador, on the coast of brazil. here bainbridge lay-to outside the harbor, and sent in capt. lawrence with the "hornet" to communicate with the american consul. lawrence returned greatly excited. in the harbor he had found the british sloop-of-war "bonne citoyenne," of twenty guns, which was on the point of sailing for england. a more evenly matched adversary for the "hornet" could not have been found, and the yankee sailors longed for an engagement. a formal challenge was sent, through the american consul, to the captain of the british ship, requesting him to come out and try conclusions with the "hornet." every assurance was offered that the "constitution" would remain in the offing, and take no part in the battle, which was to test the strength of the two equally matched ships only. some days later, this challenge was reduced to writing, and sent to the english captain. but that officer declined the challenge, giving as his reason the fact that he had in his ship over half a million pounds in specie, which it was his duty to convey to england. for him to give battle to the "hornet," would therefore be unwise, as he would put in jeopardy this money which it was his duty to guard. this response was conclusive, and the englishman must be admitted to have acted wisely; but the knowledge of the valuable cargo of the "bonne citoyenne" only increased the desire of the americans to capture her. the "hornet" accordingly remained outside the harbor, as a blockader, while the "constitution" continued her cruise alone. [illustration: assuming to be british men-of-war.] she had not far to go in order to meet an enemy well worthy of her metal. three days after parting with the "hornet," two sail were made, well in shore. one of the vessels so sighted seemed to make for the land, as though anxious to avoid meeting the american ship; while the other came about, and made her course boldly toward the "constitution." it was about nine o'clock on a bright december morning that the "constitution" encountered the strange vessel, which bore down upon her. a light breeze, of sufficient force to enable the vessels to manoeuvre, was blowing; but the surface of the ocean was as placid as a lake in summer. the build of the stranger left no doubt of her warlike character, and the bold manner in which she sought a meeting with the american ship convinced bainbridge that he had fallen in with an enemy. the "constitution" did not for a time meet the enemy's advances in kind. back of the advancing frigate could be seen the low, dark coast-line of brazil, into whose neutral waters the englishman could retreat, and thus gain protection, if the conflict seemed to go against him. bainbridge determined that the coming battle should be fought beyond the possibility of escape for the vanquished, and therefore drew away gradually as the stranger came on. by noon the two ships were near enough together for flags to be visible, when bainbridge set his colors, and displayed private signals. the enemy did the same; and, though his signals were unintelligible, the flag that fluttered at the masthead was clearly the flag of great britain. bainbridge continued his retreat for an hour longer, then, being far enough from land, took in his main-sail and royals, and tacked toward the englishman. by this time the strange sail which had been sighted in company with the english ship had disappeared. the low-lying coast of brazil had sunk below the horizon. from the deck of the "constitution," nothing could be seen but the vast circle of placid ocean, and the english frigate about a mile to the windward, bearing down to open the fight. the drums beat, and the crew went quietly and in perfect order to their quarters. they were no longer the raw, untrained crew that had joined the ship some months before. they were veterans, with the glorious victory over the "guerriere" fresh in their remembrance, and now animated with a desire to add to their trophies the strange vessel then in sight. as the enemy, which proved to be the "java," thirty-eight, capt. lambert, came nearer, she hauled down her colors, leaving only a jack flying. a jack is a small flag hoisted at the bowsprit cap. the union jack of the united states navy is a blue flag dotted with stars, but without the stripes of the national flag; the jack of great britain has the scarlet cross of st. george on a blue field. the englishman's action in hauling down his ensigns puzzled bainbridge, who sent a shot as an order that they be raised again. the response to this reminder came in the form of a heavy broadside, and the action opened. in the light wind that was blowing, the enemy proved the better sailer, and soon forged ahead. his object was to cross the bows of the american ship, and get in a raking broadside,--the end and aim of most of the naval manoeuvring in those days of wooden ships and heavy batteries. by skilful seamanship, bainbridge warded off the danger; and the fight continued broadside to broadside. the firing on both sides was rapid and well directed. after half an hour of fighting, the "constitution" was seriously crippled by a round shot, which carried away her wheel, and wounded bainbridge by driving a small copper bolt deep into his thigh. for a moment it seemed as though the american ship was lost. having no control over the rudder, her head fell off, her sails flapped idly against the spars, and the enemy was fast coming into an advantageous position. but, though wounded, the indomitable yankee captain was equal to the occasion. tackle was rigged upon the rudder-post between decks, and a crew of jackies detailed to work the improvised helm. the helmsmen were far out of earshot of the quarter-deck: so a line of midshipmen was formed from the quarter-deck to the spot where the sailors tugged at the steering-lines. "hard-a-port!" bainbridge would shout from his station on the quarter-deck. [illustration: marines picking off the enemy.] "hard-a-port! hard-a-port!" came the quick responses, as the midshipmen passed the word along. and so the ship was steered; and, notwithstanding the loss of her wheel, fairly out-manoeuvred her antagonist. the first raking broadside was delivered by the "constitution," and did terrible execution along the gun-deck of the english ship. the two ships then ran before the wind, exchanging broadsides at a distance of half pistol-shot. at this game the american was clearly winning: so the englishman determined to close and board, in the dashing, fearless way that had made the tars of great britain the terror of all maritime peoples. the frigate bore down on the "constitution," and struck her on the quarter; the long jib-boom tearing its way through the rigging of the american ship. but, while this movement was being executed, the american gunners had not been idle; and the results of their labors were very evident, in the rigging of the "java." her jib-boom and bowsprit were so shattered by shot, that they were on the point of giving way; and, as the ships met, the mizzen-mast fell, crashing through forecastle and main-deck, crushing officers and sailors beneath it in the fall, and hurling the topmen into the ocean to drown. the "constitution" shot ahead, but soon wore and lay yard-arm to yard-arm with her foe. for some minutes the battle raged with desperation. a dense sulphurous smoke hung about the hulls of the two ships, making any extended vision impossible. once in a while a fresher puff of wind, or a change in the position of the ships, would give the jackies a glimpse of their enemy, and show fierce faces glaring from the open ports, as the great guns were drawn in for loading. then the gray pall of smoke fell, and nothing was to be seen but the carnage near at hand. the officers on the quarter-deck could better judge of the progress of the fray; and, the marines stationed there took advantage of every clear moment to pick off some enemy with a shot from one of their muskets. high up in the tops of the "constitution" were two small howitzers, with which crews of topmen, under the command of midshipmen, made lively play with grape and canister upon the crowded decks of the enemy. from the cavernous submarine depths of the cock-pit and magazine, to the tops of each ship, not an idler was to be found. chaplains, surgeons, clerks, cooks, and waiters--all were working or fighting for the honor of the flag under which they served. again the british determined to board; and the quick, sharp notes of the bugle calling up the boarders gave warning of their intentions. the men in the tops of the american frigate, looking down from their lofty station, could see the crowd of boarders and marines gathered on the forecastle and in the gang-ways, and could hear the shrill notes of the boatswain's whistle cheering them on. at that moment, however, the american fire raked the enemy with fearful effect, and the volleys of musketry from the marines and topmen made such havoc among the crowded boarders that the attempt was abandoned. the deadly fire of the americans was not slackened. capt. lambert was struck down, mortally wounded; and the command fell upon lieut. chads, who, though himself badly wounded, continued the fight with true british courage. over the side of the "java" hung the wreck of her top-hamper, which every broadside set on fire. yet the british tars fought on, cheering lustily, and not once thinking of surrender, though they saw their foremast gone, their mizzen-mast shivered, even the last flag shot away, and the last gun silenced. when affairs had reached this stage, the "constitution," seeing no flag flying on the enemy, hauled away, and set about repairing her own damages. while thus engaged, the main-mast of the "java" was seen to go by the board, and the ship lay a hopeless wreck upon the water. after making some slight repairs, bainbridge returned to take possession of his prize, but, to his surprise, found a jack still floating over the helpless hulk. it was merely a bit of bravado, however; for, as the "constitution" ranged up alongside, the jack was hauled down. [illustration: in the cross-trees.] the "java" proved to be a rich prize. she was one of the best of the english frigates, and had just been especially fitted up for the accommodation of the governor-general of bombay and his staff, all of whom were then on board. this added to the regular number of officers and crew more than one hundred prisoners, mostly of high rank in british military and social circles. the boarding officer found the ship so badly cut up that to save her was impossible. her loss in men, including her captain henry lambert, and five midshipmen, was forty-eight, together with one hundred and five wounded, among whom were many officers. the "constitution" had suffered much less severely, having but twelve killed and twenty wounded. the ship herself was but little damaged; her chief injury being the loss of her wheel, which was immediately replaced by that of the "java." capt. bainbridge now found himself a great distance from home, with a disabled ship filled with prisoners, many of whom were wounded. even had the wreck of the "java" been less complete, it would have been hazardous to attempt to take her back to the united states through the west india waters that swarmed with british vessels. no course was open save to take the prisoners aboard the "constitution," and set the torch to the disabled hulk. to do this was a work of no little difficulty. the storm of lead and iron that had swept across the decks of the british frigate had left intact not one of the boats that hung from the davits. the "constitution" had fared better; but, even with her, the case was desperate, for the british cannonade had left her but two serviceable boats. to transfer from the sinking ship to the victorious frigate nearly five hundred men, over a hundred of whom were wounded, was a serious task when the means of transfer were thus limited. three days the "constitution" lay by her defeated enemy, and hour after hour the boats plied between the two ships. the first to be moved were the wounded. tackle was rigged over the side of the "java;" and the mangled sufferers, securely lashed in their hammocks, were gently lowered into the waiting boat, and soon found themselves in the sick-bay of the american ship, where they received the gentlest treatment from those who a few hours before sought only to slay them. the transfer of the wounded once accomplished, the work proceeded with great rapidity: and in the afternoon of the third day the "constitution" was filled with prisoners; and the "java," a deserted, shattered hulk, was ready for the last scene in the drama of her career. the last boat left the desolate wreck, and, reaching the "constitution," was hauled up to the davits. the side of the american frigate next to the abandoned ship was crowded with men, who looked eagerly across the water. through the open port-holes of the "java," a flickering gleam could be seen, playing fitfully upon the decks and gun-carriages. the light grew brighter, and sharp-tongued flames licked the outside of the hull, and set the tangled cordage in a blaze. with this the whole ship seemed to burst into fire, and lay tossing, a huge ball of flame, on the rising sea. when the fire was raging most fiercely, there came a terrific explosion, and the great hull was lifted bodily from the water, falling back shattered into countless bits. guns, anchors, and ironwork dragged the greater part of the wreckage to the bottom; and when the "constitution," with all sail set, left the spot, the captive englishmen, looking sadly back, could see only a patch of charred woodwork and cordage floating upon the ocean to mark the burial-place of the sturdy frigate "java." the "constitution" made sail for san salvador, where the prisoners were landed; first giving their paroles not to serve against the "united states" until regularly exchanged. bainbridge then took his ship to boston, where she arrived in february, . the substitution of the wheel of the "java" for that of the "constitution," shot away in battle, has been alluded to. in his biography of capt. bainbridge, fenimore cooper relates a story of interest regarding this trophy. it was a year or two after peace was made with england, in , that a british naval officer visited the "constitution," then lying at the boston navy-yard. the frigate had been newly fitted out for a cruise to the mediterranean; and an american officer, with some pride, showed the englishman over the ship, which was then undoubtedly the finest of american naval vessels. after the tour of the ship had been made, the host said, as they stood chatting on the quarter-deck,-- "well, what do you think of her?" "she is one of the finest frigates, if not the very finest, i ever put my foot aboard of," responded the englishman; "but, as i must find some fault, i'll just say that your wheel is one of the clumsiest things i ever saw, and is unworthy of the vessel." the american officer laughed. "well, you see," said he, "when the 'constitution' took the 'java,' the former's wheel was shot out of her. the 'java's' wheel was fitted on the victorious frigate, to steer by; and, although we think it as ugly as you do, we keep it as a trophy." all criticisms on the wheel ended then and there. the defeat of the "java" closed the warfare on the ocean during . the year ended with the honors largely in the possession of the united states navy. the british could boast of the capture of but two armed vessels,--the "nautilus," whose capture by an overwhelming force we have already noted; and the little brig "vixen," twelve guns, which sir james yeo, with the "southampton," thirty-two, had overhauled and captured in the latter part of november. the capture of the "wasp" by the "poictiers," when the american sloop-of-war was cut up by her action with the "frolic," was an occurrence, which, however unfortunate for the americans, reflected no particular honor upon the british arms. in opposition to this record, the americans could boast of victory in four hard-fought battles. in no case had they won through any lack of valor on the part of their antagonists; for the englishmen had not sought to avoid the battle, and had fought with the dogged valor characteristic of their nation. in one or two instances, it is true that the americans were more powerful than the foe whom they engaged; but, in such cases, the injury inflicted was out of all proportion to the disparity in size of the combatants. the four great actions resulting in the defeat of the "guerriere," the "frolic," the "macedonian," and the "java," showed conclusively that the american blue-jackets were equal in courage to their british opponents, and far their superiors in coolness, skill, discipline, and self-reliance; and these qualities may be said to have won the laurels for the american navy that were conceded to it by all impartial observers. besides the victories over the four british ships enumerated, the americans had captured the "alert," and a british transport bearing a considerable detachment of troops. these achievements, as involving no bloodshed, may be set off against the captures of the "nautilus" and "vixen" by the british. of the number of british merchant-vessels captured, the records are so incomplete that no accurate estimate can be made. to the naval vessels are accredited forty-six captures among the enemy's merchant-marine, and this estimate is probably very nearly accurate. but with the declaration of war, portsmouth, salem, new london, new york, baltimore, and, indeed, every american seaport, fitted out fleet privateers to prey upon the enemy's commerce. the sails of this private armed navy fairly whitened the sea, and few nights were not illuminated by the flames of some burning prize. as their chief object was plunder, the aim of the privateers was to get their prize safely into port; but, when this was impossible, they were not slow in applying the torch to the captured vessel. the injury they inflicted upon the enemy was enormous, and the record of their exploits might well engage the industry of painstaking historians. as an adjunct to the regular navy, they were of great service in bringing the war to a happy conclusion. it is not to be supposed that the british men-of-war and privateers were idle while the americans were thus sweeping the seas. more than one american vessel set sail boldly from some little new england port, freighted with the ventures of all classes of tradesmen, only to be snapped up by a rapacious cruiser. but the mercantile marine of the united states was but small, and offered no such rewards to enterprising privateers as did the goodly fleets of west-indiamen that bore the flag of great britain. and so, while the american privateers were thriving and reaping rich rewards of gold and glory, those of the british were gradually abandoning privateering in disgust. the american prize-lists grew so large, that the newspapers commenced the practice of publishing weekly a list of the enemy's ships taken during the week past. in baltimore, henry niles, in his paper "the weekly register," robbed "the london naval chronicle" of its vainglorious motto,-- "the winds and seas are britain's broad domain, and not a sail but by permission spreads." this sentiment niles printed at the head of his weekly list of british vessels captured by united states vessels,--a bit of satire not often equalled in the columns of newspapers of to-day. chapter vii. the war on the lakes. -- the attack on sackett's harbor. -- oliver hazard perry ordered to lake erie. -- the battle of put-in-bay. let us now abandon for a time our consideration of the progress of the great naval war on the ocean, and turn our attention to a humbler theatre, in which the drama of battle was proceeding with no less credit to the american participants, though with less grand and inspiring accessories. on the great fresh-water lakes which skirt the northern frontier of the united states, the two warring powers contended fiercely for the mastery. but there were no desperate duels between well-matched frigates; nor, indeed, did either the british or american squadron of the lake station boast a craft of sufficient armament to be termed a frigate, until the war was nearly at an end. barges, gunboats, sloops, schooners, and brigs made up the squadrons that fought for the possession of the fresh-water seas; and few either of the jackies of the forecastle or the officers of the quarter-deck were bred to the regular service. with such forces it could only happen that the encounters of the foes should be little more than skirmishes, and that neither in immediate loss of life nor in direct results should these skirmishes be important. such, in fact, was the general character of the hostilities on the lakes, with two noteworthy exceptions,--perry's victory at put-in-bay, and mcdonough's successful resistance of the british on lake champlain. that the war should invade the usually peaceful waters of ontario, erie, and champlain, was inevitable from the physical characteristics of the northern frontier of the united states. great britain held canada; and an invasion of her enemy's territory from that province was a military measure, the advisability of which was evident to the most untaught soldier. no overland expedition could hope to make its way through the dense forests of maine, new hampshire, vermont, or the adirondack region of new york. but the lakes offered a tempting opening for invasion. particularly did the placid, navigable waters of lake champlain, stretching, from the canada line far into the heart of new york, invite the invader; while lakes erie and ontario afforded an opportunity for attacking the americans on what was then, practically, their western frontier. the americans were not slow in perceiving the dangers that threatened their north-western frontier, and began to prepare for its defence most energetically at the first declaration of war. it was a work that taxed to the utmost the resources of the young country. the shores of the lakes as far west as detroit were open to the attacks of the enemy, and, although part of the territory of the united states, were really more accessible to the invaders than to the american defenders. the population was sparse, and the means of transportation very primitive. before the days of railroads, canals, or even well-kept turnpikes, troops, seamen, ordnance, and all munitions of war could only be transported from the cities on the seacoast by the most laborious hauling over roads hardly worthy of the name. nor was the transportation problem solved during the continuance of the war. when in may, , the new united states frigate "superior" lay at her dock at sackett's harbor, her ordnance, stores, and cordage had to be brought from oswego falls, some fifty miles away. a clear water-route by the oswego river and the lake offered itself; but sir james yeo, with his squadron, was blockading the mouth of the harbor, and the chance for blockade-runners was small indeed. to carry the heavy ordnance and cables overland, was out of the question. the dilemma was most perplexing, but yankee ingenuity finally enabled the "superior" to get her outfit. the equipment was loaded upon a small fleet of barges and scows, which a veteran lake captain took to a point sixteen miles from the blockaded harbor. by sailing by night, and skulking up creeks and inland water-ways, the transports reached this point without attracting the attention of the blockading fleet. they had, however, hardly arrived when news of the enterprise came to the ears of the british, and an expedition was sent to intercept the americans, which expedition the yankees successfully resisted. the question then arose as to how the stores were to be taken across the sixteen miles of marsh and forest that lay between the boats and the navy-yard at sackett's harbor. the cannon and lighter stores were transported on heavy carts with great difficulty, but there still remained the great cable. how to move this was a serious question. no cart could bear its ponderous weight of ninety-six hundred pounds. again yankee ingenuity and pluck came to the rescue. two hundred men volunteered to carry the great rope on their shoulders, and in this way it actually was transported. along the shore of the little creek the great cable was stretched out with prodigious labor, and lay there looking like a gigantic serpent. the two hundred men ranged themselves along the line at regular intervals, and at a given signal hoisted the burden to their shoulders. at the word of command, all stepped off briskly together, and the long line wound along the narrow path through the forests. they started out cheerily enough, enlivening the work with songs and jests; but at the end of the first mile all were glad enough to throw down the load, and loiter a while by the roadside. a few minutes' rest, and up and on again. now arms began to ache, and shoulders to chafe, under the unusual burden; but the march continued until noon of the next day, when the footsore and weary carriers marched proudly into sackett's harbor, to find sailors and soldiers assembled to greet them with bands and cannon-firing. in accordance with the custom of the time, these demonstrations of honor were supplemented by the opening of a barrel of whiskey, in honor of the arrival of the cable. this incident, trivial in itself, is typical of that ingenuity and fertility of resource, which, more than any thing else, contributed to the success of the americans, not only in the lake operations of the war of , but in every war the nation has since undertaken. but the advantages gained by yankee enterprise and ingenuity were, perhaps, more evident in the operations on lake ontario and lake erie than in the operations of the armies, or of the fleets upon the ocean. the great contest lay more in the rapid building of ships than in fighting them. at the outset the enemy were better equipped for the struggle than were the americans. the canadian frontier had been longer settled, and could lend more men to the needs of the nation. more than this, the route to the ocean by the st. lawrence river made it really easier to transport naval stores from far-off liverpool to the british naval station on the shores of lake ontario, than to carry like goods across the wooded hills of new york. nor were the british altogether without naval resources upon the lakes at the hour when war was declared. on lake erie the english flag waved over the "royal george," twenty-two; "prince regent," sixteen; "earl of moira," fourteen; "gloucester," ten; "seneca," eight; and "simcoe," eight. opposed to this squadron was but one united states vessel,--the "oneida," a man-of-war brig carrying sixteen twenty-four-pound carronades. on lake erie the british had a squadron of six vessels, carrying in all forty-six guns. hostilities opened early on lake ontario. for some time before the formal declaration of war, a desultory warfare had been waged by the americans and canadians about niagara. canadian schooners had been seized on account of alleged violations of the revenue and embargo regulations of the united states. the resentment of the sufferers was aroused, and they only awaited a suitable opportunity to retaliate. the opportunity soon came, in the form of the declaration of war; and a body of canadian volunteers attacked eight american schooners, near the thousand isles, and burned two of them. with the opening of the war, the united states authorities had fixed upon sackett's harbor as the naval station for lake ontario. in the harbor, on the th of july, , lay the "oneida," which had lately come into port after a short cruise in search of british schooners. at early dawn of the day mentioned, the lookout reported five ships in the offing, and a few minutes later hailed the deck, to report them to be british ships-of-war. the alarm quickly spread over the little town. puny though the british fleet would have appeared upon the ocean, it was of ample power to take the "oneida" and destroy the village. before the villagers fairly understood their peril, a small boat came scudding into the harbor before the wind. it bore a message from the british commander, demanding that the "oneida" and the "lord nelson" (a captured canadian vessel) be surrendered. should the squadron be resisted, he warned the inhabitants that their town should be burned to the ground. commander woolsey, who commanded the "oneida," was a united states officer of the regular service, and a man of courage and fertility of resource. unable to take his vessel out into the lake, he moored her at the entrance of the harbor in such a way that her broadside of nine guns might be brought to bear on the enemy. all hands then set to work getting the other broadside battery ashore; and, by the aid of the villagers, these guns were mounted on a hastily thrown up redoubt on the shore. at the foot of the main street of the village was planted a queerly assorted battery. the great gun, on which the hopes of the americans centred, was an iron thirty-two-pounder, which had lain for years deeply embedded in the muddy ooze of the lake-shore, gaining thereby the derisive name of the "old sow." this redoubtable piece of ordnance was flanked on either side by a brass six-pounder; a pair of cannon that the yankee sailors had, with infinite pains and indomitable perseverance, dredged up from the sunken hulk of a british war-vessel that had filled a watery grave some years. two brass nine-pounders completed this novel armament. it was about eight o'clock in the morning when the british vessels came up within range. alarm guns had been firing from the shore all the morning; and by that time the village was filled with militiamen, who flocked to the scene of action. woolsey, who had taken charge of the shore-batteries, ordered a shot from the thirty-two pounder. the "old sow" spoke out bravely, but the shot missing, only roused the enemy to laughter, which could be heard on shore. the british vessels then began a vigorous cannonade, keeping well out of range of the small guns on shore; although so weak were the american defences, that a vigorous onslaught by the enemy would have quickly reduced the town to submission. as it was, a harmless fire was kept up for about two hours. not a shot took effect, and nothing save the noise and excitement of the cannonading need have deterred the good people of sackett's harbor from observing that sunday morning in accordance with their usual sabbath customs. it was reserved for one shot to put an end to this strange engagement. just as the artillerists who served the iron thirty-two pounder were loading the gun, a cannon-ball struck the ground near the battery. one of the americans ran, and, picking up the spent ball, brought it into the battery, saying, "i've been playing ball with the redcoats, and have caught them out. let's see now if they can catch back again." so saying, he rammed the missile down the muzzle of the long thirty-two, and sent it back with deadly aim. the captured ball crashed into the stern of the "royal george," raked her from stem to stern, killing fourteen men, and wounding eighteen in its course. the marksman, watching the course of his shot, saw the splinters fly from the deck of the british ship; and the americans cheered loudly for the "old sow" as the british squadron put about, and left the sackett's harbor people to celebrate their easily won victory. insignificant though this engagement was, it was the chief battle of the year on lake ontario. the americans strained every nerve to put more armed vessels afloat, and, being left unmolested by the british, managed to have quite a flotilla in commission before winter set its icy seal upon the lake. in september, capt. isaac chauncey was appointed commander-in-chief of the lake navy; and, on his arrival, he proved himself the very man for the place. he rushed ahead the building of new ships, arranged for the transportation of seamen from the seacoast to man the vessels on the lakes, and then, not content with attending only to the building of the ships, took command of the squadron in commission, and fairly swept the lake clear of the enemy's vessels. he met with little opposition as the british retired to their naval station at kingston, remaining there until all further naval operations were checked by the ice. winter, which seriously impeded the work of the british by putting an end to navigation upon the st. lawrence, did away with many of the difficulties of transportation which had so hampered the americans. the roads to the seacoast grew hard, and were soon covered with snow, over which long teams of oxen plodded to and fro until the path was well broken. then began the hauling of supplies from the seaboard. from his post at sackett's harbor, chauncey sent out requisitions for ship-timber, cordage, ordnance, and ship-carpenters. long trains of heavily laden wagons and sledges wound their way across the state from new york or albany to the station at sackett's harbor. agents were appointed in the seacoast towns to enlist seamen for service on the lakes,--a work that required no small powers of persuasion; for the true salt-water jack looks with great disfavor upon the "fish-ponds" of fresh water. but, by dint of munificent offers of bounties and prize-money, several hundred sailors were induced to leave their ships on the ocean, and take service in the infant navy of the lakes. most of the sailors were sent across the state in the dead of winter. the trip was made in huge sleds, drawn by several pairs of horses, and carrying a score or more men each. the jackies enlivened the journey with rollicking songs and stories as the sleds sped over the well-packed roads through the sparsely settled country. one of the largest parties was accompanied by a brass band, with the aid of which the sailors made their entrance to the villages along the road in truly royal style. the sleighs and horses were gayly decked with the national colors. the band led in the first sleigh, closely followed by three other sledges, filled with blue-coated men. before the little tavern of the town the _cortége_ usually came to a halt; and the tars, descending, followed up their regulation cheers with demands for grog and provender. after a halt of an hour or two, the party continued its way, followed by the admiration of every villager, and the envy of every boy large enough to have seafaring ambitions. with all his energy and unswerving fidelity to the cause of his country, chauncey probably did nothing of more direct benefit to the united states than writing a letter to a young naval officer, then stationed at newport, asking him to come west and take charge of the naval operations on lake erie. the name of this young officer was oliver hazard perry, and a year later no name in american history carried with it more fame. hostilities on lake erie had been unimportant up to the time that chauncey sent for perry. the americans had no naval vessel to oppose to the fleet of canadian craft that held the lake. one war-vessel only had shown the american flag on the lake; and she had been fitted out by the army, and had fallen into the hands of the enemy at the surrender of detroit. but this prize was not destined to remain long in the hands of the canadians. early in the autumn of , chauncey had sent lieut. elliott to lake erie, with instructions to begin at once the creation of a fleet by building or purchasing vessels. elliott chose as the site of his improvised navy-yard black rock, a point two miles below buffalo; and there pushed ahead his work in a way that soon convinced the enemy, that, unless the young officer's energy received a check, british supremacy on lake erie would soon be at an end. accordingly, two armed brigs, the "caledonia" and the "detroit," recently captured by the british, came down to put an end to the yankee ship-building. like most of the enemy's vessels on the lakes, these two brigs were manned by canadians, and had not even the advantage of a regular naval commander. on the morning of the th of october, the sentries on the river-side at black rock discovered the two british vessels lying at anchor under the guns of fort erie, a british work on the opposite side of the niagara river, that there flows placidly along, a stream more than a mile wide. zealous for distinction, and determined to checkmate the enemy in their design, elliott resolved to undertake the task of cutting out the two vessels from beneath the guns of the british fort. fortune favored his enterprise. it happened that on that very day a detachment of sailors from the ocean had arrived at black rock. though wearied by their long overland journey, the jackies were ready for the adventure, but had no weapons. in this dilemma elliott was forced to turn for aid to the military authorities, from whom he obtained pistols, swords, and sabres enough to fit out his sailors for the fray. with the arms came a number of soldiers and a small party of adventurous citizens, all of whom enlisted under the leadership of the adventurous elliott. in planning the expedition, the great difficulty lay in getting rid of the too numerous volunteers. by nightfall, the preparations for the expedition were completed. in the underbrush that hung over the banks of the river, two large boats were concealed, ready for the embarkation. at midnight fifty men, armed to the teeth, silently took their places in each of the great barges, and pushed out upon the black surface of the river. all along the bank were crowds of eager watchers, who discussed the chances of success with bated breath, lest the merest whisper should alarm the british sentries on the farther shore. with steady strokes of the muffled oars, the two boats made their way toward the two brigs that could just be seen outlined against the sky. elliott, in the first boat, directed the movements of his men, and restrained the too enthusiastic. so stealthy was the approach, that the foremost boat was fairly alongside of the "detroit" before the british took the alarm. then the quick hail of the sentry brought an answering pistol-shot from elliott; and, amid volleys of musketry, the assailants clambered up the sides of the brigs, and with pistol and cutlass drove the startled crew below. so complete was the surprise, that the british made but little resistance; and the cables of the brigs were cut, sails spread, and the vessels under way, before the thunder of a gun from fort erie told that the british on shore had taken the alarm. at the report of the first shot fired, the dark line of the american shore suddenly blazed bright with huge beacon fires, while lanterns and torches were waved from commanding points to guide the adventurous sailors in their navigation of the captured brigs. but the victors were not to escape unscathed with their booty. the noise of the conflict, and the shouts of the americans on the distant bank of the river, roused the british officers in the fort, and the guns were soon trained on the receding vessels. some field-batteries galloped along the bank, and soon had their guns in a position whence they could pour a deadly fire upon the americans. nor did the spectators on the new york side of the river escape unharmed; for the first shot, fired by the field-battery missed the brigs, but crossed the river and struck down an american officer. almost unmanageable in the swift current and light wind, the two brigs seemed for a time in danger of recapture. the "caledonia" was run ashore under the guns of an american battery; but the "detroit," after being relieved of the prisoners, and deserted by her captors, was beached at a point within range of the enemy's fire. the british made several determined attempts to recapture her, but were beaten off; and, after a day's fighting around the vessel, she was set on fire and burned to the water's edge. the "caledonia," however, remained to the americans, and some months later did good service against her former owners. it was shortly after this occurrence that lieut. perry offered his services for the lakes; and four months later he received a letter from chauncey, saying, "you are the very person that i want for a particular service, in which you may gain reputation for yourself, and honor for your country." this letter was quickly followed by orders from the secretary of the navy to report at once for duty to chauncey at sackett's harbor. perry was overjoyed. the dull monotony of his duties at newport suited little his ardent nature. he longed for active service, and an opportunity to win distinction. his opportunity had at last come; and twenty hours after the receipt of his orders, he and his thirteen-year-old brother were seated in a sleigh and fairly started on the long drive across the country. travelling was a serious matter in those days, and the journey from newport to sackett's harbor required twelve days. on his arrival, perry found that the special service for which he was needed was the command of a naval force on lake erie. he stopped but a short time at sackett's harbor, and then pressed on to erie, the base of the naval operations on the lake of the same name. it was late in march when perry arrived; and the signs of spring already showed that soon the lake would be clear of ice, and the struggle for its control recommence. the young lieutenant was indefatigable in the labor of preparation. he urged on the building of vessels already begun. he arranged for the purchase of merchant schooners, and their conversion into gunboats. he went to pittsburg for supplies, and made a flying trip to buffalo to join chauncey in an attack upon fort george at the mouth of the niagara river. all the time, he managed to keep up a constant fire of letters to the secretary of the navy and to chauncey, begging for more sailors. by summertime, he had five vessels ready for service, but no men to man them. the enemy blockaded him, and he dared not accept the challenge. in july he wrote to chauncey: "the enemy's fleet of six sail are now off the bar of this harbor. what a golden opportunity if we had men!... give me men, sir, and i will acquire both for you and myself honor and glory on this lake, or perish in the attempt." again he wrote: "for god's sake, and yours and mine, send me men and officers; and i will have them all [the british squadron] in a day or two." when the men finally did arrive, he was much disgusted with their appearance, pronouncing them to be "a motley set,--blacks, soldiers, and boys." nevertheless, this same motley crew, headed by the critical young officer, won a victory that effectually crushed the pretensions of the enemy to the control of lake erie. [illustration: perry's recruits.] his crews having arrived, perry was anxious to get out upon the lake, and engage the enemy at once. but this course of action was for a long time impossible. the flotilla lay snugly anchored within the harbor of erie, the entrance to which was closed by a bar. to cross this bar, the ships would have been obliged to send all heavy ordnance ashore; and, as the enemy kept close watch outside the harbor, the american fleet was practically blockaded. for several weeks the americans were thus kept prisoners, grumbling mightily at their enforced inaction, and longing for a chance to get at the enemy. one morning in august word was brought to perry that the blockading fleet had disappeared. instantly all was life and bustle in the harbor. the crews of all the vessels were ordered aboard; and the flotilla dropped down to the bar, intending to cross early in the morning. at dawn the movement was begun. the schooners and other small craft were easily taken outside; but, when it came to the turn of the two gun-brigs, "lawrence" and "niagara," it became evident that mechanical assistance was required. accordingly, a powerful "camel" was hastily improvised, by the aid of which the two vessels were dragged across the bar. hardly had the second brig made the passage in safety, when the british fleet appeared in the offing. tradition says that the opportune absence of the enemy's fleet was caused by a public banquet to which the citizens of port dover had invited commodore barclay and his officers. while the dinner was going merrily on, the americans were hard at work, escaping from the trap in which the british had left them. in responding to a toast at the banquet, barclay said, "i expect to find the yankee brigs hard and fast on the bar at erie when i return, in which predicament it will be but a small job to destroy them." his anticipations were not realized; for, on his arrival, he found the entire squadron safely floating in the deep water outside the bar. had barclay but known it, he would even then have found it "but a small job to destroy them;" for the two brigs, having been stripped of their ordnance, would have been easy prey for the british squadron. but perry's bold action in sending forward two schooners to engage the enemy seemed to alarm the too prudent commodore; and the british bore away, and were soon out of sight. by night perry's flotilla was in readiness for cruising, and set out immediately in pursuit of the foe. barclay seemed to avoid the conflict; and, after some weeks' cruising, the americans cast anchor at put-in-bay, and awaited there the appearance of the enemy. the little flotilla that lay anchored on the placid waters of the picturesque bay consisted of nine vessels, ranging in size from the "trippe," a puny sloop carrying one gun, to the "lawrence" and "niagara," brigs carrying each two long twelves and eighteen short thirty-twos. no very formidable armada was that of a handful of pygmy vessels, commanded by a young officer who had never heard the thunderous cannonade of a naval battle, or seen the decks of his ships stained with the blood of friends and daily companions. yet the work of the little squadron saved the united states from invasion, won for the young commander a never-dying fame, and clothed the vine-clad hills, the pebbly beaches, and the crystal waters of put-in-bay with a wealth of proud, historical associations. [illustration: drilling the raw recruits.] day after day the vessels lay idly at their anchorage, and the sailors grew restless at the long inactivity. perry alone was patient; for to him had come the knowledge that the hostile fleet was getting short of supplies, and would soon be starved out of its retreat at malden. knowing this, he spared no pains to get his men into training for the coming conflict. they were exercised daily at the great guns, and put through severe drills in the use of the cutlass, in boarding, and repelling boarders. by constant drill and severe discipline, perry had made of the motley crew sent him a well-drilled body of seamen, every man of whom had become fired with the enthusiasm of his commander. as the time passed, and the day of battle drew nearer, perry's confidence in his men increased; and he looked upon the coming conflict as one certain to bring glory to his country. at early dawn the jackies on the ships could see the slender form of their commander perched upon the craggy heights of one of the islands, called to this day "perry's lookout," eagerly scanning the horizon in the direction of malden. on the night of sept. , , the commodore felt convinced that on the next day the british would come out to battle. accordingly, a conference of captains was called in the cabin of the flag-ship, and each received directions as to his course of action during the fight. they were urged to force the fighting to close quarters. said perry, "nelson has expressed my idea in the words, 'if you lay your enemy alongside, you cannot be out of your place.'" as the officers were about to depart, perry drew from a locker a large, square blue flag, on which appeared, in white letters, the dying words of the gallant lawrence, "don't give up the ship!" "this," said perry, "shall be the signal for action; and when it appears at the masthead, remember your instructions." the conference then ended; and the captains returned to their ships across the bay, silvered by the light of the moon, to spend the greater part of the night in preparations for the great danger of the coming day. morning dawned bright and clear, with a light breeze blowing, that broke into ripples the surface of the land-locked bay. the rosy light of the rising sun was just reddening the eastern horizon, when, from the lookout in the foretop of the "lawrence," came the long-drawn hail of "sail, ho!" quickly repeated from the other vessels. perry was already on deck. "what does it look like?" he shouted to the lookout. "a clump of square rigged, and fore and afters, sir," was the response. in a few minutes the signals "enemy in sight," and "get under way," were flying from the masthead of the flag-ship; and the merry piping of the boatswains' whistles, and the measured tramp of the sailors around the capstans, told that signals were observed, and were being obeyed. the fleet was soon threading its way through the narrow channels, filled with islands, at the entrance to the bay, and finally came into line on the open lake. not a cloud was in the sky. the lake was calm, with enough wind blowing to admit of manoeuvring, yet gentle enough to be of advantage to the schooners that made up the greater part of each fleet. for some time the americans held back, manoeuvring to get the weather-gauge; but perry's impatience for the fray got the better of his caution, and he determined to close at once. his first officer remonstrated, saying, "then you'll have to engage the enemy to leeward." "i don't care," responded the commodore. "leeward or windward, they shall fight to-day." then, turning to the quartermaster, he called for the battle-flag, which being brought, he mustered the crew aft, and addressed them briefly, telling them of the task before them, and urging them to fight bravely for the victory. "my brave lads," he concluded, "this flag bears the last words of capt. lawrence. shall i hoist it?" "ay, ay, sir!" cried the jackies, in unison; and, as the flag was swiftly run to the masthead, the cheers of the sailors on the deck of the "lawrence" were echoed from the neighboring vessels, as the white letters showed boldly against the blue flag, bearing to each commander the exhortation, "don't give up the ship!" the battle-signal being thus displayed, the vessels moved onward to the attack. as the crew of the "lawrence" stood at their guns, the cooks passed along the decks, handing to each man a bit of food, that his strength might not leave him in the coming struggle. then followed boys with boxes of sand, which they strewed upon the decks, to afford a firm foothold for the men at the guns. the hammocks were stowed along the nettings, to serve as some little protection against flying shot. the men stood silent and pale at their quarters, each occupied with his own grave thoughts, but all determined to fight like brave men and true for the honor of the flag. by perry's side stood his brother, a boy thirteen years old, armed and ready to do his duty as well as the older men. the british came on gallantly. barclay had lost all his diffidence, and brought up his vessels like a veteran. his ships were kept close together; the ship "detroit" under short sail, that the pygmy sloop "little belt" might not be left in the rear. the americans came down in single file, headed by the schooner "scorpion." suddenly through the still air rang out the sharp notes of a bugle-call on the enemy's flag-ship. it was the signal for action; and, as the last notes died away, the bands struck up "rule, britannia." the americans answered with cheers; and in the midst of the cheering, a jet of smoke and fire spurted from the side of the "detroit," and a heavy shot splashed into the water near the "lawrence," while a dull, heavy report came booming over the water. the battle was opened, but five minutes elapsed before a second shot was fired. when it did come, it crashed through the bulwarks of the "lawrence," and sped across her deck, doing no great damage. "steady, lads, steady," cried perry, from his post on the quarter-deck, as he saw an uneasy stir among his men, who longed to return the fire. the commodore was determined to fight at close quarters, and hung out signals for each ship to choose its antagonist, and fight the fight out for itself. it was then high noon, and the battle soon became general. the little schooners "scorpion" and "ariel" pluckily kept their place in the van of the american line, but the fire of the enemy fell most fiercely upon the flag-ship "lawrence." no less than four vessels at one time were grouped about the "lawrence," pouring in a destructive fire, and bent upon destroying the flag-ship and her brave commander; then taking the smaller vessels in detail. the "lawrence" fought bravely, but the odds were too great. the carronades with which she was armed were no match for the long guns of her adversaries. for two hours the unequal combat raged, and no american vessel came to the aid of the sorely smitten flag-ship. amid the hail of cannon-balls and bullets, perry seemed to bear a charmed life. he saw his officers and men falling all about him. john brooks, the lieutenant of marines, fought by the commodore's side. while speaking cheerfully to the commodore, a cannon-ball struck the young lieutenant on the hip, dashing him across the deck against the bulwark, and mutilating him so, that he plead piteously with perry, imploring that he might be put out of his misery with a pistol-shot. from this awful spectacle perry turned to speak to the captain of a gun, when the conversation was abruptly cut short by a shot which killed the seaman instantly. perry returned to the quarter-deck. the first lieutenant came rushing up, his face bloody, and his nose swelled to an enormous size from a splinter which had perforated it. "all the officers in my division are killed," he cried. "for god's sake, give me more!" perry sent some men to his aid; but they soon fell, and the cry for more men arose again. one of the surgeons who served in the cock-pit on that dreadful day states, that, in the midst of the roar of battle, perry's voice was heard calling down the hatchway, and asking any surgeon's mates who could be spared, to come on deck and help work the guns. several went up; but the appeal was soon repeated, and more responded. when no more men could be obtained, the voice of the commodore took a pleading tone. "can any of the wounded pull a rope?" said he; and such was his ascendency over the men, that several poor mangled fellows dragged themselves on deck, and lent their feeble strength to the working of the guns. [illustration: commodore perry at the battle of lake erie.] amid all the carnage, the sailors were quick to notice the lighter incidents of the fray. even the cock-pit, filled with the wounded, and reeking with blood that dripped through the cracks in the deck above, once resounded with laughter as hearty as ever greeted a middy's after-dinner joke in the steerage. lieut. yarnall received a bad scalp-wound, which fairly drenched his face with blood. as he groped his way towards the cock-pit he passed a lot of hammocks stuffed with "cat-tails" which had been stowed on the bulwarks. the feathery down of the "cat-tails" filled the air, and settled thick upon the head and face of the officer, robbing his countenance of all semblance to a human face. as he descended the ladder to the cock-pit, his owl-like air roused the wounded to great shouts of laughter. "the devil has come among us," they cried. [illustration: perry's victory--the battle of lake erie. september , copyright, , by c. klackner.] while talking to his little brother, perry to his horror saw the lad fall at his feet, dashed to the deck by an unseen missile. the commodore's agony may be imagined; but it was soon assuaged, for the boy was only stunned, and was soon fighting again at his post. the second lieutenant was struck by a spent grape-shot, and fell stunned upon the deck. he lay there for a time, unnoticed. perry raised him up, telling him he was not hurt, as no blood could be seen. the lieutenant put his hand to his clothing, at the point where the blow had fallen, and discovered the shot lodged in his coat. coolly putting it in his pocket, he remarked, "you are right: i am not hurt. but this is my shot," and forthwith returned to his duty. it was a strange-looking body of men that fought at the guns of the "lawrence." lean, angular yankee sailors from the seafaring communities of new england stood by the side of swarthy negroes, who, with their half-naked black bodies, in the dense powder-smoke, seemed like fiends in pandemonium. in the rigging were stationed a number of kentucky riflemen, who had volunteered to serve during the battle. the buckskin shirts and leggings gave an air of incongruity to their presence on a man-of-war. their unerring rifles, however, did brave service for the cause of the stars and stripes. at the opening of the action, two tall indians, decked in all the savage finery of war-paint and feathers, strode the deck proudly. but water is not the indian's element, and the battle had hardly begun when one fled below in terror; the other remained on deck, and was killed early in the action. [illustration: making ready to leave the "lawrence."] courageous and self-confident though the american commander was, the moment came when he could no longer disguise the fact that his gallant flag-ship was doomed to destruction before the continuous and deadly fire of her adversaries. there was but one course of action open, and upon this he determined at once. he would transfer his flag to the "niagara," and from the deck of that vessel direct the movements of his fleet. accordingly, the only uninjured boat of the "lawrence" was lowered; and perry sprang into the stern, followed by his little brother. before the boat pushed off, the battle-flag was thrown into her; and, wrapping it about him, perry took a standing position in the stern, and ordered the oarsmen to give way. he steered straight for the "niagara," through the very centre of the fight. the enemy quickly grasped the purpose of the movement, and great guns and muskets were trained on the little boat. shot of all sizes splashed in the water about the boat, splintered the oars, and buried themselves in the gunwale. the crew begged their commander to sit down, and make himself a less conspicuous target for the fire of the enemy; but perry paid but little attention to their entreaties. suddenly the men rested on the oars, and the boat stopped. angrily the commodore demanded the cause of the stoppage, and was told that the men refused to row unless he sat down. with a smile he yielded, and soon the boat was alongside the "niagara." perry sprang to the deck, followed by his boat's crew and a plucky sailor who had swum just behind the boat across the long stretch of water. hardly a glance did the commodore cast at the ship which he had left, but bent all his faculties to taking the new flag-ship into the battle. the "niagara" was practically a fresh ship; for, up to this time, she had held strangely aloof from the battle. now all was to be changed. the battle-flag went to her masthead; and she plunged into the thick of the fight, striking thunderous blows at every ship she encountered. as she passed the american lines, the sailors greeted with cheers their gallant commander. the crippled "lawrence," an almost helpless hulk, left far behind, was forced to strike her flag; although her crew protested loudly, crying out, "sink the ship, and let us go down with her." but the conquered vessel was not destined to fall into the hands of her enemies. already the sight of their commodore on a fresh vessel stimulated the american tars; so that in half an hour the british line was broken, their ships cut to pieces, and the "detroit," their flag-ship, a prize to the "niagara." a white handkerchief was waved at the end of a pike by one of the crew of the "princess charlotte." the firing stopped, the flag was again run up to the masthead of the "lawrence," while a few feeble cheers came faintly over the water from the remnant of her crew. the dense clouds of smoke blowing away, perry saw, by the disposition of his squadron, that the victory was secure. hastily catching off his navy-cap, he laid upon it a sheet of paper torn from an old letter, and wrote to gen. harrison the famous despatch, "_we have met the enemy, and they are ours,--two ships, two brigs, one schooner, and one sloop._" then, with true chivalry, he determined that to his flag-ship "lawrence," that had so stoutly borne the brunt of battle, should belong the honor of receiving the british captains, when they came to surrender their vessels. he returned to the "lawrence;" but the scene there was such that even the excitement of victory could raise no feelings of exultation in his breast. he saw on every side the bodies of officers with whom, but the night before, he had dined in perfect health. the decks were red with blood, and from the cock-pit arose the groans of the wounded. after the formal surrender, to make which the officers picked their way over the deck covered with slain to the quarter-deck, the work of burying the dead of both squadrons was begun. it was about sundown that the sad ceremonies were held; and, as the deep tones of the chaplains reading the burial service arose upon the evening air, the dull, mournful splashing of heavy bodies in the water told that the last scene in the great victory was drawing to an end. chapter viii. on the ocean. -- the "hornet" sinks the "peacock." -- the blockade. -- adventures of the "sally." -- hostilities on chesapeake bay. -- the cruise of the "president." the year , that brought to american sailors upon the lakes such well-earned laurels, opened auspiciously for the stars and stripes upon the ocean. it will be remembered that the "constitution," while on the cruise in the south atlantic that ended with the destruction of the "java," had left the "hornet" off san salvador, blockading the british ship "bonne citoyenne." for eighteen days the "hornet" remained at her post. her captain continually urged the enemy to come out and give him battle, but to no avail. the remembrance of his valuable cargo deterred the englishman, and he remained snug in his harbor. months after, when the occurrence became known in the united states, an unreasoning outcry was raised against the commander of the "bonne citoyenne" for thus avoiding the conflict; but naval men have always agreed that his action was wise and commendable. after eighteen days' service on this blockade, the "hornet" saw a british seventy-four bearing down upon her, bent upon releasing the treasure-ship. against such odds it would have been folly to contend; and the americans, taking advantage of a dark night, slipped away, and were soon beyond pursuit. the vessel continued her cruise in the waters south of the equator, meeting with good fortune, and taking many valuable prizes, from one of which twenty-three thousand dollars in specie were taken. but her cruise was not destined to proceed without serious opposition. on the th of february, as the "hornet" was giving close chase to a suspicious brig near the mouth of the demarara river, a second stranger was sighted in the offing. giving no heed to the newly sighted vessel, the "hornet" continued her chase until the rapidly approaching vessel was clearly made out to be a brig, flying the british flag, and evidently a man-of-war. the "hornet" was immediately cleared for action; and the two hostile vessels began manoeuvring for the weather-gage, as two scientific pugilists spar cautiously for an opening. in this contest of seamanship, capt. lawrence of the "hornet" proved the victor; and a little after five o'clock in the afternoon, the two enemies stood for each other upon the wind, the "hornet" having the weather-gage. as they rapidly neared each other, no sound was heard save the creaking of the cordage, and the dashing of the waves against the vessels' hulls. not a shot was fired until the enemies were dashing past each other, going in opposite directions. the first broadsides were exchanged at half pistol-shot, with very unequal effects. the shot of the "hornet" penetrated the hull of her antagonist, doing terrible execution; while the broadside let fly by the "peacock" whistled through the rigging of the american ship, cutting away the pennant, and killing a topman, who was struck by a round shot, and dashed from his station in the mizzen-top, to fall mangled and lifeless into the sea. hardly were the ships clear, when the british captain put his helm hard up,--a manoeuvre executed with the intention of securing a raking position. but the plan was balked by the cool seamanship of capt. lawrence, who quickly followed up the british vessel, and, getting a position on his quarter, poured in so rapid and accurate a fire that the enemy was fain to haul down his colors and confess defeat. the british ensign had hardly touched the deck, when it was run up again, with the union down, as a token of distress. at this sight, the yankee tars, who had been cheering lustily over their quickly won victory, stopped their rejoicings, and set about giving assistance to the injured britons with as hearty good-will as they had lately shown in their vigorous cannonade. with all possible despatch, a boat was lowered, and lieut. shubrick proceeded on board the prize. he found the "peacock" a complete wreck. shortly after the surrender her main-mast had gone by the board, and her hull was fairly honeycombed with shot-holes. returning to his ship, shubrick reported the condition of the prize. he was immediately ordered to return to the "peacock," and make every effort to save her. accompanied by three boats' crews of american sailors, he again boarded the sinking ship, and bent every energy to the attempt for her salvation. bulwarks were cut away, and the heavy guns were rolled out of the gaps thus made, and cast into the sea. deep down in the hold, and swinging like spiders over the sides of the vessels, sailors tried to stop up with felt-covered blocks of wood the great holes through which the water was pouring. all the time boats were plying between the sinking vessel and the "hornet," transferring the wounded and the prisoners. twilight fell before the work was ended, and it became evident to all that the "peacock" must sink during the night. but the end came even quicker than had been expected. some new rent must have opened in the brig's side; for, with a sudden lurch, she commenced to sink rapidly, bow foremost. several of the english crew were below, searching for liquor; and, caught by the inpouring flood, they found a watery grave in the sinking hulk. three americans were also ingulfed; and five narrowly escaped death by climbing up the rigging to the foretop, which remained above water when the hull rested upon the bottom. in the midst of the excitement and confusion, four british seamen slyly clambered out of the cabin-windows, and, dropping into a boat that was made fast to the stern, made off in the darkness. the americans, eagerly watching the sinking ship, did not detect the fugitives until the boat was far beyond the possibility of recapture. the vessel so quickly destroyed by the "hornet" was the british man-of-war brig "peacock," mounting ten guns, and carrying a crew of two hundred and ten men. in one respect, she was a model ship. among naval men, she had long been known as "the yacht," on account of the appearance of exquisite neatness she always presented. her decks were as white as lime-juice and constant holystoning could keep them. the brasswork about the cabins and the breeches of the guns was dazzling in its brilliancy. white canvas lined the breechings of the carronades. her decks everywhere showed signs of constant toil in the cause of cleanliness. the result of the battle, however, seemed to indicate that capt. peakes had erred, in that, while his ship was perfect, his men were bad marksmen, and poorly disciplined. while their shot were harmlessly passing through the rigging of the "hornet," the americans were pouring in well-directed broadsides, that killed and wounded thirty-eight men, and ended the action in fifteen minutes. the americans lost but one man in the fight, though three more went down in the sinking prize. capt. lawrence now found himself far from home, short of water, and crowded with prisoners. for a time, he feared that to these evils was to be added a second action, while his crew was still fatigued with the labors of the first. during the battle with the "peacock," a second british man-of-war brig, the "espiègle," lay quietly at anchor only four miles away. why she had not joined in the strife, has never been explained. she was clearly visible from the tops of the "hornet" throughout the action, and lawrence expected every moment to see her bear down to the assistance of her consort. but she made no movement; and even after the fight ended, and the "peacock" lay on the bottom of the ocean, the mysterious stranger awoke not from her lethargy. not wishing to engage a second adversary while his ship was crowded with prisoners, lawrence immediately left the scene of action, and laid his course for home. the homeward voyage was rapid and uneventful. no pains were spared to secure the comfort of the prisoners who crowded the ship. the british officers were treated with the greatest consideration; so that, as one said on quitting the ship, they "ceased to consider themselves as captives." the tars, who were consigned to the care of the blue-jackets in the forecastle, were met with less courtesy, but certainly with no less good feeling. they were not spared an occasional taunt or triumphant joke; but when it was learned that by the sinking of their ship the britons had lost all their "toggery," the "hornet's" lads turned to, and soon collected clothing enough to fit out each prisoner with a respectable kit. it was the middle of march before the long, homeward voyage was ended, and the anchor was dropped in the snug harbor of holmes's hole in the island of martha's vineyard. the usual rejoicings followed the news of the victory. lawrence was the hero of the hour; and songs innumerable appeared in the newspapers, extolling the courage and devotion of the brave lads of the "hornet." indeed, the arrival of the "hornet" with her glorious news came at an opportune moment, to cheer the spirits of the american people. the war had begun to assume a serious aspect. continued reverses on the ocean had roused the british ministry to the fact that they were dealing with no contemptible enemy, and the word had gone forth that the americans must be crushed into submission. troops were hurriedly sent to canada, and all the vessels that could be spared were ordered to the coast of the united states. the english had determined upon that most effective of all hostile measures,--a rigorous blockade of their enemy's coast. up and down the coast from new jersey to the carolinas, british frigates and sloops kept up a constant patrol. chesapeake bay was their chief rendezvous; and the exploits of the blockading squadron stationed there, under admiral cockburn, led often to scenes more befitting savage warfare then the hostilities of two enlightened and civilized peoples. on the new england coast, the blockade was less severely enforced. the people of that section had been loud in their denunciations of the war; and the british hoped, by a display of moderation, to seduce the new englanders from their allegiance to the united states,--a hope that failed utterly of fulfilment. even had the british desired to enforce the blockade along the new england shore, the character of the coast, and the skill and shrewdness of the yankee skippers, would have made the task of the blockaders a most difficult one. the annals of the little seafaring-villages along the coast of maine and massachusetts abound in anecdotes of hardy skippers who outwitted the watchful british, and ran their little schooners or sloops into port under the very guns of a blockading man-of-war. among the blockade-runners of the new england coast, capt. dan fernald of portsmouth stood foremost. when a shipload of maine timber was needed at the portsmouth navy-yard, to be converted into a new man-of-war, to capt. fernald was assigned the task of bringing it down from portland past the british frigates, that were ever on the watch for just such cargoes. when the preparations for the building of the seventy-four-gun ship "washington" were making at the navy-yard, capt. fernald was sent to portsmouth for a load of ship's-timber. his cargo was to consist of forty-eight "knees" and the breast-hook of the seventy-four. loaded down with this burden, the schooner "sally" left portland, and headed for her destination. caution led her captain to keep his craft close to the shore, and for a day or two she crept along the coast without being discovered. but head-winds and calms delayed the "sally," and on her fourth day out she was sighted by the british frigate "tenedos." the "sally" was not an imposing craft, and under ordinary circumstances she might have been allowed to proceed unmolested; but on this occasion a number of the oaken knees for the new war-vessel were piled on the deck, and the british captain could clearly make out, through his glasses, that the "sally" was laden with contraband of war. accordingly, he set out in hot pursuit, in the full expectation of overhauling the audacious coaster. capt. fernald, however, had no idea of letting his schooner fall into the hands of the british. he was a wily old skipper, and knew every nook and corner of the maine and new hampshire coasts better than he knew the streets of his native village. apparently unmoved by the pursuit of the man-of-war, he stood at the tiller, and, beyond ordering his crew to shake out the reefs in the sails, seemed to make no great attempt to elude the enemy. but soon the crew noticed that the skipper was taking his schooner rather dangerously close to the shore; and a cry came from a sailor on the bow, that the "sally" was ploughing through the kelp, and would soon be on the rocks. "no matter," sung out the captain; "just heave over a few of them knees, and i guess she'll float clear." overboard went a dozen heavy timbers, and the "sally" sailed smoothly on over the rocks. then the captain glanced back over his shoulder, and chuckled slyly as the majestic frigate, following closely in his track, brought up all of a sudden on the rocks, and was quickly left a fixture by the receding tide. the exasperated englishman sent two eighteen-pound shot skipping over the water after the "sally," but without effect. one shot buried itself in the sand of the beach; and capt. fernald, after picking up the knees that had been thrown overboard, coolly went ashore, dug up the ball, and carried it away as a trophy. he reached his moorings at the navy-yard safely, and was warmly greeted by commodore hull, who asked if the "sally" had been fired upon; and, on being presented with the eighteen-pound shot for a token, exclaimed, "you are a good fellow, and stand fire well." the "tenedos" came not so luckily out of the adventure. by the time a flood tide lifted her clear of the reef, the jagged points of the rocks had pierced her hull, so that she leaked badly, and was forced to go to halifax for repairs. one more adventure in which the "sally" and her wily captain figured is worth recounting. again the dingy schooner was edging her way along the rugged shore, bound for the portsmouth navy-yard. no vessel could have seemed more harmless. her patched and dirty canvas was held in place by oft-spliced ropes and rigging none too taut. her bluff bows butted away the waves in clouds of spray, that dashed over the decks, which seldom received other washing. her cargo seemed to be cord-wood, neatly split, and piled high on deck. while off casco, the wind dropped down, and the "sally" was left floating idly upon the glassy ocean. far in the distance lay an english man-o'-war, also becalmed; but from which a long-boat, stoutly manned, soon put out, and made for the becalmed schooner. the boat was soon within hail, and a trim young officer in the stern-sheets sung out,-- "what craft's that?" "schooner 'sally' of portsmouth," came the answer, in the drawling tones of a down-east skipper. "where from?" "portland." "where bound?" "portsmouth." "what's your cargo." "firewood," responded capt. fernald with a carelessness he was far from feeling; for deep down in the hold, under the cord-wood, were two twenty-four-pounder cannon, thirteen thousand pounds of powder, and about one hundred boarding pikes and cutlasses. the british officer hesitated a moment, as if the little coaster was of too little importance for further examination. "well, i think i'll come aboard," said he carelessly, and soon stood with three or four of his men on the deck of the "sally." after glancing contemptuously about the ill-kept decks, he turned to his men with the sharp order: "clear away some of that wood from the hatchways, and see what's in the hold." the men set to work, passing the cord-wood away from the hatch ways, and piling it upon the after-deck. soon they had worked their way into the hold, and were going deeper and deeper down toward the munitions of war. capt. fernald's blood seemed to stop coursing in his veins. he knew that but one layer of cord-wood then lay above the cannon, and he expected every instant to see the black iron uncovered. but the british officer grew impatient. "that's enough of that work," said he; "there's nothing but wood there. captain, you can proceed on your course." a momentary murmur arose from the english sailors. the "sally" was theirs by right of capture, and they saw no reason for her liberation. "why, lads," said the officer, "it would cost just as much to get this poor fellow's wood-schooner condemned as it would a large ship. as for the prize-money, it would not make a penny apiece." so, tumbling into their boat, the jackies pulled away; shouting to the captain of the "sally" to stow his cargo again, or his old tub would capsize. capt. fernald took their jeers good-naturedly, for he was the victor in that encounter. the occurrence had been observed from the shore; and, when the british sailors were seen swarming over the side of the "sally," a horse-man set off for portsmouth to notify commodore hull that the schooner was captured. it was a sore blow; for the guns and powder were thought to be lost, and munitions of war were hard to be had at that time. but hull soon threw aside the disappointment, and was busily engaged with plans for the vessels then building, when a sentry came in, and reported the "sally" in sight. hull rushed to the water-side. sure enough, there came the battered old schooner, butting her way through the waves of the channel; and, before long, the two cannon were safe in the storehouses, while capt. fernald found himself vested with a reputation for almost superhuman sagacity and luck. not all the encounters between the blockaders and the blockade-runners terminated so happily for the americans. many a coasting-vessel was sent to halifax to swell the coffers of the british prize-courts, or, after being set on fire, was left to lie charred and ruined upon the rocky shore, as a warning to all who violated the blockade. the capture of one united states war-vessel graced the english naval annals of january, ; for the little brig "viper," carrying twelve guns, fell in the way of the british, thirty-two, "narcissus," and straightway surrendered to the overwhelming force of her enemy. among the united states war-vessels caught and held in port by the blockade was the frigate "constellation." she was at the opening of the war the favorite ship of the american navy; her exploits in the war with france having endeared her to the american people, and won for her among frenchmen the name of "the yankee race-horse." notwithstanding her reputation for speed, she is said to have been very crank, and had an awkward way of getting on her beam-ends without much provocation. an almost incredible tale is told of her getting "knocked down" by a squall while chasing a french privateer, and, notwithstanding the delay, finally overhauling and capturing the chase. when war was declared with england, the "constellation" was so thoroughly dismantled, that some months were occupied in refitting before she was ready to put to sea. in january, , she dropped anchor in hampton roads, expecting to set out on an extended cruise the next morning. had she been a day earlier, her career in the war of might have added new lustre to her glorious record in the war with france; but the lack of that day condemned her to inglorious inactivity throughout the war: for on that very night a british squadron of line-of-battle ships and frigates dropped anchor a few miles down the bay, and the "constellation" was fairly trapped. when, by the gray light of early morning, the lookout on the "constellation" saw the british fleet lying quietly at their anchorage down the bay, he reported to capt. stewart; and the latter saw that, for a time, he must be content to remain in port. stewart's reputation for bravery and devotion to his country leaves no doubt that the prospect of prolonged idleness was most distasteful to him. but he had little time to mourn over his disappointment. the position of the frigate was one of great danger. at any moment she might be exposed to attack by the hostile fleet. accordingly, she dropped down abreast of craney island, where she was secure from attack by the british vessels, but still open to the assaults of their boats. to meet this danger, capt. stewart took the most elaborate precautions. his ship was anchored in the middle of the narrow channel; and on either side were anchored seven gunboats, officered and manned by the men of the frigate. around the gunboats and frigate extended a vast circle of floating logs, linked together by heavy chains, that no boarders might come alongside the vessels. the great frigate towered high above the surrounding gunboats, her black sides unbroken by an open port; for the gun-deck ports were lashed down, and the guns housed. not a rope's end was permitted to hang over the side; the stern ladders were removed, and the gangway cleats knocked off. an enemy might as well hope to scale the unbroken front of a massive wall of masonry, as that dark, forbidding hull. from the bulwarks rose on all sides, to the ends of the yards, a huge net made of ratlin stuff, boiled in pitch until it would turn the edge of a cutlass, and further strengthened by nail-rods and small chains. the upper part of the netting was weighted with kentledge, the pigs of iron used for ballast; so that, should the hardy assailants succeed in coming alongside and scaling the side, a few blows of an axe would let fall the heavily weighted nettings, sweeping the boarders into the sea, and covering boats and men with an impenetrable mesh, under which they would be at the mercy of the sailors on the frigate's decks. the carronades and howitzers were loaded with grape; and the officers and men felt that only bravery on their part was essential to the defeat of any force that great britain could send against the ship. heedless of these formidable preparations for their reception, the enemy set under way two expeditions for the capture of the "constellation." in neither case did the antagonists actually come to blows, for the approach of the british was discovered before they came within pistol-shot; and, as their only chance lay in surprising the americans, they retired without striking a blow. the coming of the first expedition was known upon the "constellation" the day before it actually set out. a portuguese merchantman, trying to beat out of the bay, had been stopped by the british, and anchored a few miles below the american frigate. a guard and lookout from the english fleet were stationed on the portuguese to watch the "constellation." in an unguarded moment, these men let fall a hint of the movement under way; and an american passenger on the portuguese vessel quickly carried the news to capt. stewart, and volunteered to remain and aid in the defence. the next night was dark and drizzly; and the british, to the number of two thousand, set out in boats for the "constellation." hardly were they within gunshot, when two lanterns gleamed from the side of a watchful guard-boat; and the roll of drums and sound of hurrying feet aboard the frigate told that the alarm was given. the assailants thereupon abandoned the adventure, and returned to their ship. the next night they returned, but again retreated discomfited. several nights later, a third expedition came up. this time the guard-boat was far down the bay; and, seeing the huge procession of boats, the americans calmly edged in among them, and for some time rowed along, listening to the conversation of the british, who never dreamed that an enemy could be in their midst. suddenly a sailor, more sharp-eyed than the rest, caught sight of the interlopers; and the cry was raised, "a stranger!" the americans tugged at their oars, and were soon lost to sight; but, not being pursued, returned, and accompanied their foes up the bay, and even anchored with the flotilla at a point above the "constellation." the enemy, finding the americans constantly on the watch, abandoned their designs on the ship, and vowed that capt. stewart must be a scotchman, as he could never be caught napping. some days later, an officer, sent with a flag of truce to the british fleet, vastly chagrined the officers there by repeating their remarks overheard by the guard-boat officers who joined the british flotilla in the dark. these three escapes confirmed the reputation borne by the "constellation," as a "lucky ship;" and although she remained pent up in port throughout the war, doing nothing for her country, her luck was unquestioned in the minds of the sailors. with her they classed the "constitution" and "enterprise," while the "chesapeake" and "president" were branded as unlucky. certainly the career of these ships in the war of went far to confirm the superstitious belief of the sailors. in the course of the next two months, chesapeake bay was the scene of two gallant adventures, in which american privateersmen were opposed to the british sailors. on feb. , the privateer schooner "lottery" was standing down the bay under easy sail, out-bound on a voyage to bombay. the schooner was one of the clipper-built craft, for which baltimore ship-builders were famous the world over. her battery consisted of six twelve-pounder carronades, and her crew numbered twenty-five men. near the point at which the noble bay opens into the atlantic ocean, a narrow sheet of water extends into the virginia shore, winding in sinuous courses several miles inland. this is known as lynnhaven bay; and on its placid surface there lay, on the morning of the "lottery's" appearance, four powerful frigates flying the british flag. from their tops the approaching schooner could be seen across the low-lying neck of land that separated the smaller bay from the main body of water. the cry of "sail, ho!" roused the fleet to sudden activity; and an expedition of two hundred men was quickly organized to proceed against the privateer. fortune seemed to favor the british; for hardly had the boats left the fleet, when the fresh breeze died away, and the schooner was left at the mercy of the boats, which, propelled by the long, swinging strokes of man-o'-war oarsmen, bore down rapidly upon her. capt. southcomb of the "lottery" was an american sailor, who had smelt powder before; and he had no idea of yielding up his ship without a struggle. the formidable force sent against him merely moved him to more desperate resistance. when the boats came within range, the guns of the "lottery" opened upon them with a hail of grape and round shot. still the assailants pressed on, and soon came beneath the schooner's lee. dropping their oars, the plucky british tars sprang into the chains, swarmed up the bobstay and over the bow, and used each other's backs as ladders to aid them to reach the schooner's deck. the little crew of privateersmen fought viciously, guarding the side with cutlasses and pistols, hurling the boarders back into the sea, or cutting them down as they reached the deck. cold shot and kentledge were dashed upon the boats, in the hopes of sinking them; while the carronades poured a destructive fire upon such boats as could be reached by their shot. but the conflict was too unequal to last long. the english sailors swarmed over the gunwale on all sides, and, cheering lustily, drove the small remnant of defenders below. capt. southcomb was cut down, and lay mortally wounded upon the deck when the enemy took possession of the ship. when the victors came to look about the captured vessel, they found such proofs of a desperate resistance, that their admiration was open and pronounced. five only of the schooner's crew were unhurt, while the british paid for their success with the loss of thirteen men. capt. southcomb, in a dying condition, was taken aboard the frigate "belvidera," where he received the tenderest treatment, and was shown marked respect on account of his bravery. [illustration: awaiting the boarders.] in the next encounter between the blockaders and a privateer, the british bore away the palm for gallantry. this time the privateersmen had every advantage, while the british carried the day by pure courage. the captured vessels were the privateer schooner "dolphin," of twelve guns, and the letters-of-marque "racer," "arab," and "lynx," of six guns each. the crews of the four vessels aggregated one hundred and sixty men. against this force came five boats manned by one hundred and five british sailors, who pulled fifteen miles in order to attack their foes. wearied though they were by the long pull, the sight of the privateers seemed to arouse new strength in the plucky tars; and, without a thought of the odds against them, they dashed forward, cheering, and calling upon the americans to surrender. had the four schooners been manned by such brave men as those who defended the "lottery," the assailants might have been beaten off. as it was, two vessels surrendered without firing a shot. the crew of the "racer" fought pluckily for a time, but were soon overpowered, and the vessel's guns turned upon the "dolphin." when fire was opened upon this last vessel, her crew, affrighted, leaped overboard from every side; and the "dolphin" was soon in the hands of her enemies, who had lost but thirteen men in the whole action. many a gallant adventure, such as this, is to be laid to the credit of the british tars on the american station during the continuance of the blockade. right dashing fellows were they, at cutting out a coasting-schooner as she lay under the guns of some american earthworks. the lads that have won for england her supremacy upon the seas have never been behindhand at swarming up the sides of an enemy, leaping his taffrail, and meeting him on his own deck with the cold steel. and as the year rolled on, and the blockade along the american coast was made more strict, the meetings between the enemies became more frequent. from every seaport town, yankee privateers were waiting to escape to sea; and they seldom won clear without a brush with the watchful enemy. the british, too, had begun to fit out privateers, though american commerce offered but little enticement for these mercenary gentry. between the ships of the two private armed navies, encounters were common; and the battles were often fought with courage and seamanship worthy of the regular navy. little glory was won by the navy of the united states during the opening months of the year. many ships were laid up in port; while some, like the "constellation," were blockaded by the enemy. the "president" and the "congress" managed to get to sea from boston in april, and entered upon a protracted cruise, in which the bad luck of the former ship seemed to pursue her with malevolent persistence. the two ships parted after cruising in company for a month, and scoured the ocean until the following december, when they returned home, experiencing little but continual disappointments. the "congress" could report only the capture of four british merchantmen, as the result of her eight months' cruise; while the long service had so seriously injured her hull, that she was condemned as unseaworthy, and ended her career, a dismantled hulk reduced to the ignoble service of store-ship at a navy-yard. the "president" was little more fortunate in her search for prizes. after parting with her consort, she beat about in the vicinity of the gulf stream, in the hopes of getting a ship or two returning from the west indies. but day after day passed, and no ship appeared. changing his plan, commodore rodgers made for the north sea, feeling sure that there he would find in plenty the marine game for which he was seeking. but, to his astonishment, not an english ship was to be found. it was then the middle of summer, and the frigate had been at sea for nearly three months. the jackies on the forecastle were weary of the long voyage, and fairly at the end of their occupations for "teasing time." the officers, well knowing the effect of long idleness upon the sailors, were tireless in devising means of employment. the rigging was set up weekly, so that the shrouds and stays were like lines drawn with a ruler. enough rope-yarn was pulled, and spun-yarn spun, to supply a navy-yard for months. laggards were set to scrubbing the rust off the chain cables, and sharpening with files the flukes of the anchors. when such work failed, the men were drilled in the use of cutlasses and single sticks; forming long lines down the gun-deck, and slashing away with right good will at the word of the instructor. but the monotony of a long cruise without a prize cannot long be beguiled by such makeshifts; and it was with the heartiest pleasure that the sailors heard that the commodore had determined to put into port for a time, and take on board stores. it was north bergen, norway, that rodgers chose for this purpose; and an unfortunate choice it proved to be, for a famine prevailed in the country, and only water could be obtained for the ship. leaving the inhospitable port, the "president" was soon again upon the ocean. she quickly took two british merchantmen, from which she replenished her stores. shortly after, two hostile frigates hove in sight, and the "president" fled for her life before them for more than eighty hours. at that season, in those high latitudes, no friendly darkness settled over the ocean to give the fugitive a chance to escape. bright daylight persisted throughout the chase, and the sun never dipped below the horizon. sheer good sailing saved the american frigate, and enabled her to leave her pursuers far in her wake. for some days thereafter, better luck seemed to attend the frigate that so pluckily kept up her operations in seas thousands of miles from a friendly port. with true yankee audacity, she extended her cruise even into the irish channel, and there preyed upon british commerce until the enemy was moved to send a squadron to rout out the audacious intruder. then rodgers set sail for home. on the voyage to the united states, the "president" captured a british armed schooner by a stratagem which taught at least one british officer to respect "yankee cuteness." it was near the last of september that the frigate was flying along before a fresh breeze. her yards were spread with a cloud of snowy canvas, and the wind sung through the straining cordage a melody sweet to the ears of the sailor homeward bound. towards evening, a small sail was made out in the distance; and, as time wore on, it was seen that she was rapidly approaching the "president." rodgers surmised that the stranger might be a british vessel, and determined to lure her within range by strategy. in some way he had obtained knowledge of some of the private signals of the british navy; and in a few minutes from the masthead of the american frigate, there fluttered a row of flags which announced her as the british frigate "sea-horse." the stranger promptly responded, and was made out to be the schooner "highflyer," a little craft noted for her sailing qualities. unsuspectingly the "highflyer" came under the stern of the american frigate, and waited for a boat to be sent aboard. soon the boat came; and one of rodgers's lieutenants, clad in british uniform, clambered up the side, and was received with due honor. he was the bearer of a message from commodore rodgers, requesting that the signal-books of the "highflyer" be sent on board the fictitious "sea-horse" for comparison and revision. this the british captain hastened to do, and soon followed his books to the deck of the frigate, where a lieutenant met him, clothed in full british uniform. a file of marines, dressed in the scarlet coats of the british service, stood on the deck; and the duped englishman greatly admired the appearance of the frigate, remarking to the officer who escorted him to rodgers's cabin, that so trim a craft could only be found in his majesty's service. on entering the cabin, the english officer greeted commodore rodgers with deference, and proceeded at once to tell of naval matters. "i have here," said he, placing a bundle of papers in the commodore's hands, "a numbers of despatches for admiral warren, who is on this station. you may not know that one of the principal objects of our squadron cruising here is the capture of the yankee frigate 'president,' which has been greatly annoying british commerce." rodgers was naturally much interested in this statement, and asked the visitor if he knew much about the commander of the "president." "i hear he is an odd fish," was the response; "and certainly he is devilish hard to catch." rodgers started. he had hardly expected so frank an expression of opinion. "sir," said he emphatically, "do you know what vessel you are on board of?" "why, certainly,--on board of his majesty's ship 'sea-horse.'" "no, sir, you are mistaken," was the startling response. "you are on board of the united states frigate 'president,' and i am commodore rodgers." the astounded englishman sprang to his feet, and rushed to the deck. the sight he saw there was still more startling. the quarter-deck was crowded with officers in united states uniform. the scarlet coats of the marines had vanished, and were replaced by yankee blue. even as he looked, the british flag came fluttering down, the american ensign went up, and the band struck up "yankee doodle." nothing was left to the englishman but to submit; and, with the best grace possible, he surrendered his vessel and himself to the "odd fish," who had so cleverly trapped him. [illustration: "i am commodore rodgers."] three days later, the "president," with her prize, and crowded with prisoners, dropped anchor in the harbor of newport, after a cruise of one hundred and forty-eight days. in actual results, the cruise was far from satisfactory, for but eleven vessels had been taken. but the service rendered the country by annoying the enemy's merchantmen, and drawing the british war-vessels away in chase, was vast. at one time more than twenty british men-of-war were searching for the roving american frigate; and the seafaring people of the united states were thus greatly benefited by the "president's" prolonged cruise. chapter ix. decatur blockaded at new york. -- attempts to escape through long island sound. -- the flag-ship struck by lightning. -- torpedoes. -- fulton's steam frigate. -- action between the "chesapeake" and "shannon." while the "president" was thus roaming the seas, almost within sight of the shores of the british isles, events were occurring along the american coast which were little likely to raise the spirits of the people of the united states. from the "president," the "congress," the "essex," and the smaller vessels that were upholding the honor of the flag upon the ocean, they could hear nothing. but worse than this was it for the good people of new york or boston to go down to the water-side and see stanch united states frigates kept in port by the overwhelming forces of the enemy, that lay watchfully outside the harbor's mouth. for there was no doubt about it: the blockade was daily becoming closer; and in the months of april and may a ship would have found it a hard task to run out of new york harbor without falling into the hands of the british fleet stationed there. but, at that very time, three stout men-of-war floated on the waves of that noble bay, under the command of an officer little used to staying quietly in port in time of war. the officer was stephen decatur: and the ships were the flag-ship "united states;" the captured "macedonian," repaired, and flying the stars and stripes, under the command of the gallant capt. jacob jones; and the sloop-of-war "hornet," capt. biddle. with this force under his command, decatur burned with the desire to get to sea. the watchfulness of the british at the narrows made it useless to think of escaping that way: therefore, he determined to pass up the sound, and reach the ocean by way of the opening between montauk point and block island. at the very outset of this voyage, however, was a serious obstacle. through the narrow channel of the east river, between ward's island and the long island shore, the tides rushed with a mad speed and turbulence, that had won for the strait the significant name of hell gate. the united states government had not then bent its energies to undermining and blowing into bits the jagged rocks that at low tide reared their crests above the swirling eddies. with its tides like mill races, and rocks hidden beneath the treacherous water, hell gate was a fearful place for any ship to make its way through with the uncertain aid of sails alone. still greater were its dangers for the ponderous and deep-laden men-of-war, that required deep water and plenty of sea-room for their movements. such considerations, however, had no weight with decatur, who had seen his ships lying idly at their anchorage off staten island long enough. in the night of may , he accordingly got up anchors and started for the sound. hell gate was passed safely, thanks to a skilful pilot, whom neither the darkness of the night, nor the perils of the narrow channel, could daunt. once past this danger, the three vessels made their way up the sound, with the flag-ship leading. they had gone but a little way when black clouds to the westward told of a coming storm. the cloud-bank came rolling up rapidly; and soon, with a burst of rain, the three vessels were enveloped in the thunder-shower. the lightning flashed through the black clouds, the thunder crashed and roared, and the wind shrieked fiercely through the cordage. the "united states" held her place at the head of the squadron; while behind, at the distance of half a cable's-length, came the "macedonian." suddenly the men on the deck of the latter vessel were horrified to see a jagged flash of lightning cut its zigzag course through the clouds, then dart, straight as an arrow, at the main-mast of the "united states." hoarse cries were heard from the deck of the stricken frigate; and the captain of the "macedonian," fearing lest the "states" should blow up, threw all aback on his ship, to escape the explosion. but happily the thunderbolt had done little serious injury. in its course it had cut away the pendant; shot into the doctor's cabin, extinguishing that worthy's candle, to his vast astonishment; then, gliding away, broke through the ship's hull near the water-line, and plunged into the sea, after ripping off a few sheets of copper from the ship's bottom. no delay was caused by the accident; though the superstitious sailors pronounced it an evil omen, and dismally predicted all sorts of disasters. on the th of may the squadron reached the strait through which decatur hoped to gain the ocean; but, to the intense disappointment of all on board, a formidable british fleet barred all egress. three days later the americans made an attempt to slip out unseen; but, failing in this, they returned to new london harbor, where the two frigates were kept rotting in the mud until the war was ended. the "hornet" luckily managed to run the blockade, and of her exploits we shall hear later. upon the arrival of the three american ships at new london, the enemy guarded the coast with renewed vigilance. the inhabitants made every attempt to drive away the blockaders; and in the course of this prolonged struggle there appeared, for almost the first time in the history of warfare, that most terrible of offensive weapons, the submarine torpedo. during the revolution, two attempts had been made to blow up british men-of-war by means of torpedoes, invented by a saybrook mechanic named bushnell. though the attempts failed, yet the torpedoes demonstrated their tremendous power. before the declaration of the second war with england, robert fulton, the inventor of the steamboat, had made many improvements upon bushnell's designs, and had so thoroughly spread the knowledge of torpedo warfare that it suggested itself to many new englanders as a means of driving the enemy from their coast. the first attempt was well planned, but failed through an entirely accidental combination of circumstances. certain private citizens (for in that day it was thought ignoble for a government to embark in torpedo warfare) fitted out in new york a schooner, the "eagle," in the hold of which ten kegs of powder, together with sulphur and piles of heavy stones, were placed. in the head of one of the casks were two gun-locks, primed, and held in place by two barrels of flour. should either of the barrels be moved, the lock would spring, and the terrible mine would explode with tremendous force. with this dreadful engine of destruction, carefully covered by a cargo of flour and naval stores, the "eagle" left new york, and made her way up the bay, until, near new london, she was overhauled and captured by the british frigate "ramillies." boats were sent out by the english to take possession of the prize; but the crew of the "eagle," seeing the enemy coming, took to their small boats, and succeeded in safely reaching the shore. the captors, on boarding the vessel, were vastly pleased to find that its cargo consisted largely of flour, of which the "ramillies" stood in great need. they at once attempted to get the frigate alongside the prize, that the captured cargo might be readily transferred. but a calm had fallen, and two hours' constant work with sweeps and towing was unavailing. accordingly, this plan of action was abandoned, and the boats were ordered to lighter the cargo from the "eagle" to the frigate. hardly had the first barrel been moved, when, with a roar, and rush of flame and smoke as from a volcano, the schooner blew up. huge timbers, stones, and barrels were sent flying high into the air. the lieutenant and ten men from the frigate, who were on the "eagle" at the time, were blown to atoms; and the timbers and missiles, falling on all sides, seriously injured many men in the boats near by. had the frigate been alongside, where her commander had endeavored to place her, she would have gone to the bottom, with all her crew. an attempt so nearly successful as this could not be long in leading others to make similar ventures. sir thomas hardy, the commander of the "ramillies," was kept in a constant fever of apprehension, lest some night his ship should be suddenly sent to the bottom by one of the insidious torpedoes. several times the ship was attacked; and her escapes were so purely matters of accident, that she seemed almost to be under the protection of some sailors' deity. a norwich mechanic, who had invented a submarine boat with a speed of three miles an hour, succeeded in getting under the bottom of the blockader three times, but was each time foiled in his attempt to attach a torpedo to the ship's hull. another american, a fisherman, succeeded in getting alongside in a whale-boat, unobserved, but was driven away before he could get his torpedo in position. such constant attacks so alarmed hardy, that at last he gave up bringing his ship to anchor, keeping her continually under way, and, as a further precaution, causing her bottom to be swept every two hours throughout the day and night. the use of torpedoes was not confined to the people of new england. new york harbor was closed with a row of them. the british seventy-four "plantagenet," lying off cape henry, virginia, was nearly sunk by one in the charge of mr. mix, an american naval officer. the attack was made near ten o'clock, on an unusually dark night. mix and his associates pulled in a heavy boat to a point near the bow of the menaced vessel. the torpedo was then slipped into the water, with the clockwork which was to discharge it set in motion. the rushing tide carried the destructive engine down toward the frigate; and the americans pulled away into the darkness, to await the explosion. but the clockwork had been badly adjusted, and the torpedo exploded just before it reached the ship. a huge column of water, gleaming with a ghostly sulphurous light, was thrown high in the air, falling with terrific force on the deck of the frigate, which was almost capsized by the shock. a veritable storm of abuse and condemnation followed the introduction of torpedo warfare. all countries and all peoples pronounced it treacherous and cowardly, and the english press was particularly loud in its denunciations. yet the torpedo had won its place in the armaments of nations; and to-day we see all the nations of europe vieing with each other in the invention and construction of powerful and accurate torpedoes and swift torpedo-boats. the germ of another feature of modern naval organization is to be found in the annals of the war of . the first war-vessel propelled by steam was launched by the americans for service in this war. she was designed by robert fulton, and bore the name of "fulton the first." in model she was a queer craft, with two hulls like a catamaran, with the single propelling-wheel mounted between them amidships. her armament was to consist of thirty thirty-two-pounder guns, and two one-hundred-pounder columbiads. a secondary engine was designed to throw floods of water upon the decks and through the port-holes of an enemy. while the vessel was building, reports concerning her reached england; and soon the most ludicrously exaggerated accounts of her power were current in that country. "she mounts forty-four guns," said an english paper, "four of which are one-hundred-pounders, mounted in bomb proofs, and defended by thousands of boarding-pikes and cutlasses wielded by steam; while showers of boiling water are poured over those boarders who might escape death from the rapidly whirling steel." unfortunately for the american cause, this much dreaded vessel did not get into the water in time to take any active part in the war. in june, , while the british blockaders in the sound were exercising all their ingenuity to keep off the torpedoes, there was fought off the massachusetts coast, near boston, an engagement which must go down to history as one of the most brilliant naval duels of the age of sails. the united states frigate "chesapeake" was refitting at boston, after a cruise of four months, during which she had more than justified her reputation as an unlucky ship. though she sailed the waters most frequented by british merchantmen, she returned to port having captured only four vessels. three men-of-war were sighted, but could not be spoken. strangely enough, the frigate sailed over the spot where lay the sunken "peacock" the very day after the "hornet" had fought her famous fight. ill-luck pursued the hapless ship even to her home port; for, as she was entering the port of boston, a sudden squall carried away the topmast, with several men who were aloft at the time. when the "hornet" reached port, after her victory over the "peacock," her gallant captain, james lawrence, was appointed to the command of the "chesapeake." on reaching his ship, he found affairs in a desperate condition. the sailors who had sailed on the long and unproductive cruise were firmly convinced that the frigate's bad luck was beyond remedy. the term of enlistment of many had expired, and they were daily leaving the ship. those who remained were sullen, and smarting under fancied ill-treatment in the matter of the prize-money. to get fresh seamen was no easy task. great fleets of privateers were being fitted out; and sailors generally preferred to sail in these vessels, in which the discipline was light, and the gains usually great. some sailors from the "constitution" were induced to join the "chesapeake;" and these, with the remnant of the frigate's old crew, formed the nucleus of a crew which was filled up with merchant-sailors and foreigners of all nations. before the lists were fairly filled, the ship put to sea, to give battle to an adversary that proved to be her superior. the events leading to the action were simple, and succeeded each other hurriedly. the port of boston was blockaded by two british frigates, the "tenedos" thirty-eight, and the "shannon" thirty-eight. the latter vessel was under the command of capt. philip bowes vere broke, a naval officer of courage, skill, and judgment. his crew was thoroughly disciplined, and his ship a model of efficiency. no officer in the service understood better than he the difference between the discipline of a martinet and the discipline of a prudent and sagacious commander. his ship might not, like the "peacock," merit the title of "the yacht;" but for active service she was always prepared. james, an english naval historian, turns from his usual occupation of explaining the american naval victories by belittling the british ships, and enormously magnifying the power of the victors, to speak as follows of the "shannon:"-- "from the day on which he [capt. broke] joined her, the th of september, , the 'shannon' began to feel the effect of her captain's proficiency as a gunner, and zeal for the service. the laying of the ship's ordnance so that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direction is justly deemed a most important operation, as upon it depends, in a great measure, the true aim and destructive effect of the shot; this was attended to by capt. broke in person. by drafts from other ships, and the usual means to which a british man-of-war is obliged to resort, the 'shannon' got together a crew; and in the course of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent regulations of capt. broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to command as it was dangerous to meet." moreover, the historian goes on to relate that the ship's guns were carefully sighted, and her ammunition frequently overhauled. often a cask would be thrown overboard, and a gun's crew suddenly called to sink it as it bobbed about on the waves astern. practice with the great guns was of daily occurrence. "every day for about an hour and a half in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the state of the weather, the men were exercised at training the guns; and for the same time in the afternoon in the use of the broad-sword, musket, pike, etc. twice a week the crew fired at targets, both with great guns and musketry; and capt. broke, as an additional stimulus beyond the emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that put a shot through the bull's-eye." such was the vessel that in june appeared alone off the entrance to boston harbor, and by her actions seemed to challenge the "chesapeake" to give her battle. indeed, broke's wish to test the strength of the two vessels was so great, that he sent in, by the hands of an american prisoner, a written challenge, the terms and spirit of which showed the writer to be a courageous and chivalric officer and gentleman. "as the 'chesapeake' now appears ready for sea," he wrote, "i request you will do me the honor to meet the 'shannon' with her, ship to ship, to try the fortunes of our respective flags. to an officer of your character, it requires some apology for proceeding to further particulars. be assured, sir, it is not from any doubt i can entertain of your wishing to close with my proposal, but merely to provide an answer to any objection which might be made, and very reasonably, upon the chance of our receiving any unfair support." capt. broke then proceeds to assure lawrence that the other british ships in the neighborhood would be sent away before the day of combat. to the challenge was appended a careful statement of the strength of the "shannon," that lawrence might understand that the ships were fairly matched. but before this challenge reached boston, lawrence had set out to seek the enemy. he had seen the "shannon" lying off the entrance to the port; and, finding out that she was alone, he knew that her presence was in itself a challenge that he could not honorably ignore. nor did he desire to avoid the battle thus offered. he had confidence in his crew, his frigate, and himself, and looked for nothing but victory. to the secretary of the navy, he wrote, "an english frigate is now in sight from my deck. i have sent a pilot-boat out to reconnoitre; and, should she be alone, i am in hopes to give a good account of her before night. my crew appear to be in fine spirits, and i hope will do their duty." in truth, however, the condition of this same crew was such that the captain would have been justified in refusing the challenge. an unusual number of foreign sailors were enrolled, among whom was a portuguese, who, in the ensuing battle, did incalculable injury to the cause of the "chesapeake." the crew had never drilled together; many of the sailors came on board only a few hours before the ship sailed out to battle. all the old sailors were sullen over the delay in the payment of the prize-money of their last cruise. lawrence attempted to allay their discontent by giving them checks for the prize-money; but the sense of injury still lingered in the minds of the men, and they were ill-fitted to do battle for the honor of the flag. added to this evil was the fact that the first and second lieutenants and two acting lieutenants were away on sick-leave, and the ship was thus left short of officers on the eve of battle. regardless of the disadvantages under which he labored, lawrence weighed anchor on the st of june, and started down the harbor. as he approached the ocean, lawrence mustered his crew aft, and eloquently urged them to fight bravely, and do their duty to the country, which had entered upon this war in defence of seamen and their rights. three ensigns were run up; and at the fore was unfurled a broad white flag, bearing the motto, "free trade and sailors' rights." when lawrence closed his speech, and pointed out the flag floating at the fore, the men cheered and went forward, leaving the captain convinced that he could depend upon their loyalty. the morning was bright and cool, with a fresh breeze blowing, before which the "chesapeake" rapidly bore down upon the foe that awaited her. following cautiously in her track came a number of small craft,--pilot-boats, sloops, fishing-smacks, and pleasure-boats,--that had come down the bay to see the outcome of the battle. hundreds of people of boston rode along the coast, in hopes of gaining an outlook from which the progress of the fight might be viewed. at noon the ship rounded boston light, and made out into the open sea. the "shannon" went ahead, under easy sail, making up the coast toward salem. towards five o'clock the "chesapeake" luffed up for a moment; while the pilot clambered down the side, and put off in a small boat. a gun was then fired, as a signal that the americans were ready for action. the "shannon" evidently understood the purport of the signal; for she quickly hove to, and troops of agile jackies clambered up her rigging, and began to take in sail. the "chesapeake" followed suit, and was soon under only topsails and jib. she then laid her course straight for the enemy. [illustration: beating to quarters.] a ship preparing for action in that day was a scene of hurry and confusion that cannot be equalled in this era of machinery and few guns. at the short, broken, rolling beat of the drums, calling the men to quarters, the hurried rush of hundreds of feet began, as the men came pouring from all parts of the ship to their posts. some clambered aloft to their stations in the tops; others invaded the sanctity of the quarter-deck and captain's cabin, where several guns are always mounted. but the most stirring scene is on the long gun-deck where the men gradually fall into their places at the two long rows of great guns that peer through the open ports on either side. all are stripped to the waist; and at many a gun the fair skin of the american sailor gleams white by the side of some swarthy spaniard, or still darker negro. [illustration: the only shot of the "chesapeake".] all quiet down on reaching their stations; and, five minutes after the drum-beats, no sound is heard, save perhaps the steps of the black boys, taking rations of grog around, that the men may "splice the main brace" before going into the fight. thus silently did the "chesapeake" bear down upon her adversary. there was no long-range firing; for the two commanders were veterans, whose chief desire was to settle the dispute yard-arm to yard-arm. gradually the american ship ranged alongside the "shannon," at a distance of half pistol-shot; and, as her foremast came in a line with the "shannon's" mizzen-mast, the latter opened fire with her cabin-guns. for a moment the "chesapeake" was silent, waiting for her guns to bear; then, with sulphuric flashes and a thunderous roar, she let fly her whole broadside. then followed a duel with great guns. the two ships, lying side by side, dealt and received staggering blows. the spectators in small boats, who kept a safe distance, and the crowds of eager watchers on the far-off heights of salem, saw through their spy-glasses the flash of the first broadsides, and the flying splinters that followed the course of the deadly shot. then a heavy cloud of yellow smoke settled over the warring leviathans, and all further incidents of the battle were shut out from view. only the top-masts of the ships, with the half-furled sails and the opposing ensigns flying, could be seen above the smoke. under this vaporous pall, the fighting was sharp and desperate. the first broadside of the "shannon" so swept the decks of the american frigate, that, of one hundred and fifty men quartered on the upper deck, not fifty were upon their legs when the terrible rush of the shot was over. the sailors in the tops of the british frigate, looking down upon the decks of their enemy, could see nothing but a cloud of hammocks, splinters, and wreckage of all kinds, driven fiercely across the deck. both men at the wheel fell dead, but their places were soon filled; while fresh gunners rushed down to work the guns that had been silenced by the enemy's fearful broadside. in a moment the "chesapeake" responded with spirit, and for some time broadsides were exchanged with inconceivable rapidity. the men encouraged each other with cheers and friendly cries. they had named the guns of the frigate, and with each telling shot they cheered the iron-throated monster which had hurled the bolt. "wilful murder," "spitfire," "revenge," "bull dog," "mad anthony," "defiance," "raging eagle," and "viper" were some of the titles born by the great guns; and well the weapons bore out the names thus bestowed upon them. the gunnery of the americans was good, their shot doing much damage to the enemy's rigging. but the effect of the "shannon's" broadsides was such that no men, however brave, could stand before them. they swept the decks, mowing down brave fellows by the score. officers fell on every side. at a critical moment the two ships fouled, exposing the "chesapeake" to a raking broadside, which beat in her stern-ports, and drove the gunners from the after-port. at this moment, lawrence was wounded in the leg, but remained at his post and ordered that the boarders be called up. unhappily a negro bugler had been detailed for the duty usually performed by drummers; and, at this important moment, he could not be found. midshipmen and lieutenants ran about the ship, striving to call up the boarders by word of mouth. in the confusion, the bugler was found skulking under the stem of the launch, and so paralyzed by fear that he could only give a feeble blast upon his instrument. in the din and confusion of battle, the oral orders of the officers only perplexed the men; and the moment for boarding was lost. at that very moment, the turning-point of the conflict, capt. lawrence was struck by a musket-ball, and fell mortally wounded to the deck. his officers rushed to his side, and, raising him gently, were carrying him below, when in a firm voice he cried,-- "tell the men to fire faster, and not give up the ship. fight her till she sinks." with these words on his lips, he was carried to the wardroom. at this moment, the upper deck was left without an officer above the rank of midshipman. the men, seeing their captain carried below, fell into a panic, which was increased by the explosion of an arm-chest, into which a hand-grenade, hurled by a sailor lying out on the yard-arm of the "shannon," had fallen. seeing that the fire of the americans had slackened, capt. broke left his quarter-deck, and, running hastily forward, gained a position on the bow of his ship from which he could look down upon the decks of the "chesapeake." his practised eye quickly perceived the confusion on the deck of the american frigate; and he instantly ordered that the ships be lashed together, and the boarders called up. an old quartermaster, a veteran in the british navy, set about lashing the ships together, and accomplished his task, although his right arm was actually hacked off by the cutlass of an american sailor. the boarders were slow in coming up, and but twenty men followed broke as he climbed to the deck of the "chesapeake." broke led his men straight for the quarter-deck of the frigate. the americans offered but little resistance. not an officer was in sight to guide the men, and the newly enlisted sailors and foreigners fled like sheep before the advance of the boarders. [illustration: on board the "chesapeake."] the british reached the quarter-deck with hardly the loss of a man. here stood mr. livermore, the chaplain of the "chesapeake," who had cruised long with lawrence, and bitterly mourned the captain's fate. determined to avenge the fallen captain, he fired a pistol at broke's head, but missed him. broke sprang forward, and dealt a mighty stroke of his keen cutlass at the chaplain's head, who saved himself by taking the blow on his arm. while the boarders were thus traversing the upper deck, the sailors in the tops of the "chesapeake" were keeping up a well-directed fire, before which many of the englishmen fell. but this resistance was not of long duration; for one of the "shannon's" long nines, loaded with grape, swept clean the "chesapeake's" tops. with this, the british were in full control of the upper deck. up to this time, the americans on the gun-deck had known nothing of the events occurring on the deck above them. when the news of the british assault spread, lieut. budd called upon the men to follow him, and drive the boarders back to their own ship. a number of the marines (who behaved splendidly throughout the fight) and some twenty veteran sailors were all that responded to the call. broke had in the mean time summoned the marines of the "shannon" to his aid; and the british, led by their dashing commander, were pouring in a dense column down the companion-ways to the gun-deck. budd and his handful of followers attacked them fiercely; and, by the very desperation of the onset, the british were forced back a few paces. broke threw himself upon the americans. with his cutlass he cut down the first man who attacked him, and bore down upon the others, dealing deadly blows right and left. his followers came close behind him. the americans fell on every side, and began to retreat before the overwhelming force of their foes. up from the wardroom came lieut. ludlow, already suffering from two dangerous wounds. he placed himself beside the younger officer, and the two strove in every way to encourage their men. but ludlow soon fell, with a gaping wound across his forehead. budd was cut down, and fell through the hatchway to the deck beneath. the sailors, seeing both officers fall, gave way in confusion; and the ship was in the hands of the british. a few marines kept up a fire through the hatchway, but soon were silenced. an english officer, lieut. watts, ran to the halliards to haul down the american flag. but it would seem that the good genius which had watched over that starry banner throughout the war was loath to see it disgraced; for the officer had hardly finished his work, when a grape-shot from his own ship struck him, and he fell dead. the noise of the battle had by this time died away, and the fresh breezes soon carried off the smoke that enveloped the combatants. it was an awful scene thus exposed to view. on the "chesapeake" were sixty-one killed, and eighty-five wounded men. on the "shannon" were thirty-three dead, and fifty wounded. on a cot in the wardroom lay capt. lawrence, his mortal wound having mercifully rendered him unconscious, so that he knew nothing of the loss of his ship. broke had been made delirious by the fevered throbbing of the wound he had so long neglected. everywhere were evidences of carnage and desolation. little time was lost in getting the ships in order after the surrender. the noise of the hammer and saw was heard in every quarter. the wounded were taken to the sick-bay, and the bodies of the dead were committed to the ocean. floods of water and the heavy holystones took from the decks the stains of blood. the galley cooks marched up and down the decks, sprinkling hot vinegar with a lavish hand. the british prize-crew took possession of the captured ship, and in a few hours the captor and captive were well on their way toward halifax. they reached port on the th of june; and the sight of the "shannon," followed by the "chesapeake" with the british ensign flying proudly over the stars and stripes, stirred the little city to the utmost enthusiasm. as the two ships pursued their stately course up the harbor, the british men-of-war on all sides manned their yards, and fired salutes in honor of the victory. the thunders of the cannon brought the town's-people to the water-side, and their cheers rang out lustily to welcome their conquering countrymen to port. capt. lawrence had died the day before; and his body, wrapped in an american flag, lay on the quarter-deck of his frigate. three days later, his body, with that of his gallant lieutenant ludlow, was laid to rest with imposing naval honors, in the churchyard of halifax. but his country, honoring him even in the day of his defeat, was not content that his body should lie in the soil of an enemy's country. two months after the battle, an american vessel, the "henry" of salem, entered the harbor of halifax, under cover of a flag of truce, and took on board the bodies of lawrence and ludlow. they were conveyed first to salem and later to new york, where they now lie under a massive monument of sandstone, in a corner of trinity churchyard. a few feet away, the ceaseless tide of human life rolls on its course up and down broadway; few of the busy men and women pausing to remember that in the ancient churchyard lies the body of the man whose dying words, "don't give up the ship," were for years the watchword and motto of the united states navy. chapter x. cruise of the "essex." -- a rich prize. -- the mysterious letter. -- cape horn rounded. -- capture of a peruvian privateer. -- among the british whalers. -- porter in command of a squadron. -- a boy commander. -- the squadron lays up at nookaheevah. while the events related in the two preceding chapters were occurring along the american coast, a few gallant vessels were upholding the honor of the stars and stripes in far distant lands. to cruise in waters frequented by an enemy's merchantmen, and capture, burn, sink, and destroy, is always a legitimate occupation for the navy of a belligerent nation. yet the nation suffering at the hands of the cruisers invariably raises the cry of "wanton vandalism and cruelty," and brands the officers to whom falls so unpleasant a duty with the name of pirates. such was the outcry raised against paul jones in the revolutionary war; so it was the british described the brilliant service of the little brig "argus" in ; and so the people of the north regarded the career of the "alabama" and other confederate cruisers in the great war for the union. but perhaps no ship had ever a more adventurous career, or wrought more damage to the enemy's commerce, than the united states frigate "essex," under the command of the able officer david porter. of the circumstances which led to the famous cruise of the "essex," some account has already been given. with a full crew, and stores enough to enable her to keep the sea for some months, the ship set sail from the delaware in the autumn of , and headed to the southward with the intention of joining the "constitution" and "hornet" at some point in the tropics. her first point of call was at porto praya, a harbor in the cape verd islands. to the captain's disappointment, he could learn nothing of bainbridge at this place; and he soon departed, after scrupulously exchanging salutes with a rickety little fort, over which floated the flag of portugal. continuing her southward way, the "essex" crossed the equator, on which occasion the jolly tars enjoyed the usual ceremonies attendant upon crossing the line. father neptune and his faithful spouse, with their attendant suite, came aboard and superintended the operation of shaving and dowsing the green hands, whose voyages had never called them before into the southern seas. capt. porter looked upon the frolic indulgently. he was well known as a captain who never unnecessarily repressed the light-heartedness of his crew. two hours daily were set aside during which the crew were free to amuse themselves in any reasonable way. at four o'clock every afternoon, the shrill piping of the boatswain's whistle rang through the ship, followed by the cry, "d'ye hear there, fore and aft? all hands skylark!" no order ever brought a quicker response, and in a minute the decks became a perfect pandemonium. the sailors rushed here and there, clad in all sorts of clothes; boxed, fenced, wrestled; ran short foot-races; played at leap-frog, and generally comported themselves like children at play. fights were of common occurrence; and the two combatants soon became the centre of an interested ring of spectators, who cheered on their favorites with loud cries of "go it, bill. now, jack, lively with yer left." but a sailor has no better friend to-day than the man he fought yesterday; and the fights, like the play, only kept the crew in good spirits and contentment. the day after crossing the equator, the "essex" sighted a sail and gave chase. towards evening the frigate had gained greatly upon the stranger, and porter displayed all the british signals which he had in his possession. the chase made no response, but set a british ensign. by nine o'clock, the "essex" was within musket-shot, and could easily have blown the fugitive out of water; but this porter was loath to do, as he desired to take the brig without doing her any injury. however, as she showed no signs of surrendering, he ordered the marines to give her a volley of musketry. one man on the chase was killed, and a number wounded, upon which her flag was immediately hauled down. she proved to be the british packet "nocton" of ten guns. in her hold was found fifty-five thousand dollars in specie, which was at once taken on board the "essex;" and the "nocton" was sent to the united states under the charge of a prize-crew. before she could make a port, she fell in with a british man-of-war, and was captured after a few hours' chase. two days after parting with the "nocton," the "essex" hove in sight of the island of fernando noronha, off the coast of brazil. for a time the frigate abandoned her warlike character, battened down her ports, housed her guns, hid her large crew between decks, and sailed into the little harbor looking like a large but peaceable british merchantman. an officer clad in plain clothes went ashore, and, meeting the governor, stated that the ship was the "fanny" of london, bound for rio janeiro. during the conversation, the governor remarked that his british majesty's ships, the "acosta" forty-four, and the "morgiana" twenty, had but recently sailed from the port, and had left a letter for sir james yeo, requesting that it be forwarded to england as soon as possible. with this news, the lieutenant returned to the ship. on hearing his report, porter at once surmised that the letter might have been left for him by commodore bainbridge; and he at once sent the officer back, bearing the message that the "fanny" was soon going to london, and her captain would see the letter delivered to sir james yeo, in person. the unsuspecting governor accordingly delivered up the epistle, and it was soon in porter's hands. the note read as follows:-- my dear mediterranean friend,--probably you may stop here. don't attempt to water: it is attended with too many difficulties. i learned, before i left _england_, that you were bound to brazil coast. if so, perhaps we may meet at st. salvador or at rio janeiro. i should be happy to meet and converse on our old affairs of captivity. recollect our secret in those times. your friend of his majesty's ship "acosta," kerr. sir james yeo of his british majesty's ship "southampton." porter read and pondered over this perplexing letter. he felt sure that the letter was from bainbridge; and in the allusion to st. salvador and rio janeiro, he perceived the commodore's wish for a rendezvous at one of those places. but what could be the secret of the times of captivity? suddenly a thought struck him. might there not be something written in sympathetic ink? hurriedly calling for a candle, he held the letter above its flame, and saw, under the influence of the heat, words and sentences appearing where before all was blank paper. "i am bound off st. salvador," it read; "thence off cape frio, where i intend to cruise until the st of january. go off cape frio to the northward of rio, and keep a lookout for me." that afternoon the governor of the island, looking out toward the harbor, was surprised to see the "fanny" standing out under a full spread of canvas. porter had gained all the information that he wished, and was off in search of his consorts. this search he continued until the th of january, cruising up and down off the brazilian coast, and taking one or two small prizes. in this unprofitable service the ship's stores were being rapidly consumed. among other things, the supply of rum began to run short; and in connection with this occurred a curious incident, that well illustrates the character of sailors. the daily rations of bread were reduced one-half, and the rations of salt meat one-third, without a word of remonstrance from the patient crew. next the discovery was made that the rum was giving out, and a proportional reduction in the rations of grog was duly ordered. the jackies put in a vigorous and immediate protest. they were prepared, they said, to go without grog, should the supply of rum be unhappily exhausted; but so long as any of the precious fluid remained, their rations of grog should not be curtailed. but to this porter would not accede, fearing that, should the men be altogether deprived of their grog, the health of the crew might suffer. accordingly, when the crew were piped to "splice the main brace" the next day, they were told that half rations only would be issued; and, if the grog was not taken up in fifteen minutes, the tub would be overturned, and the rum spilled into the sea. so dire a threat was too much for the rebellious seamen: they sprang into line, with their tin cups, and drew their curtailed rations without more ado. some days after this occurrence, the "essex" overhauled a portuguese vessel, from the captain of which porter learned that an american frigate had shortly before fought and sunk an english frigate off the coast of brazil; also, that it was rumored that an american corvette of twenty-two guns had been brought into rio, a prize to a british seventy-four. this intelligence placed capt. porter in some perplexity. he felt convinced that the successful american frigate was the "constitution;" a conjecture in which he was correct, for the news referred to the celebrated action of that ship with the "java." the captured american corvette, he concluded, must be the "hornet;" but herein the captain was wrong, for the "hornet" was at that moment blockading the "bonne citoyenne." porter now found it necessary to decide upon a course of action. the news which he had received made it appear most improbable that he would fall in with either of the united states vessels for which he was seeking. he was far from home, cruising in seas much frequented by british men-of-war. there were no naval stations or outposts belonging to the united states, into which he could put for protection or repairs; for then, as now, the nation ignored the necessity of such supply-stations. to return home was peculiarly distasteful to the captain, who had set sail with the intention of undertaking a long cruise. in this dilemma, he wasted but little time in thought. by rounding cape horn, he would carry the "essex" into the pacific ocean, where british merchantmen abounded and men-of-war were few. it was an adventurous and a perilous expedition to undertake; but porter, having decided upon it, wasted no time in getting under way. that very night he took his ship out of the snug harbor of st. catherine's, and started upon his long voyage around the horn. a winter voyage around cape horn, even in the stoutest of ships, is an undertaking to be dreaded by the most courageous seamen. the "essex" seemed to meet with more than her share of stormy weather. from the night when she set sail from st. catherine's, until she dropped anchor in a harbor of the island of mocha, almost every day witnessed a struggle for supremacy between the raging ocean on the one side, and skilful seamanship and nautical science on the other. capt. porter, however, proved himself ready for every emergency. no peril of the deep was unforeseen, no ounce of prevention unprovided. the safety of his ship, and the health of his men, were ever in his thoughts; and accordingly, when the "essex" rounded into the pacific ocean, both men and ship were in condition to give their best service to the enterprise in which they were embarked. after rounding cape horn, the "essex" made her way northward along the desolate coast of chili, until she reached the island of mocha. here she anchored for a day, giving the crew a much needed run on shore, which they enjoyed with all the zest of schoolboys out for a day's holiday. the island afforded little in the way of fresh stores; but some pigs and horses were shot, and devoured with gusto by men who for over two months had not tasted fresh meat. from this point the frigate made for valparaiso, and, after reconnoitring the port, put in for water and stores. the officers were received with much hospitality by the townspeople, and, after a few days' stay, were tendered a complimentary ball,--an entertainment into which the young officers entered with great glee. but, unhappily for their evening's pleasure, the dancing had hardly begun, when a midshipman appeared at the door of the hall, and announced that a large frigate was standing into the harbor. deserting their fair partners, the people of the "essex" hastened to their ship, and were soon in readiness for the action; while the townspeople thronged the hills overlooking the sea, in the hopes of seeing a naval duel. but the frigate proved to be a spaniard; and, of course, no action occurred. [illustration: the peruvian privateer.] the "essex" remained several days at valparaiso, and during her stay two or three american whalers put into the harbor. from the captains of these craft, porter learned that the peruvians were sending out privateers to prey upon american commerce, and that much damage had already been done by these marauders, who were no more than pirates, since no war existed between peru and the united states. porter determined to put an immediate stop to the operations of the peruvian cruisers, and had not long to wait for an opportunity. a day or two after leaving valparaiso, a sail was sighted in the offing, which was soon near enough to be made out a vessel-of-war, disguised as a whaler. porter hung out the english ensign, and caused an american whaler, with which he had that morning fallen in, to hoist a british flag over the stars and stripes. at this sight, the stranger hoisted the spanish flag, and threw a shot across the bow of the "essex." porter responded by a few shot that whizzed through the rigging just above the spaniard's deck. the latter thereupon sent a boat to the "essex;" and the officer who came aboard, thinking that he was on a british man-of-war, boasted of his ship's exploits among the american whalers. his vessel was the peruvian privateer "nereyda" of fifteen guns, and she had captured two american whalers, whose crews were even then in the hold of the privateer. he admitted that peru had no quarrel with the united states, and no reason for preying upon her commerce. the confession, so unsuspectingly made, gave porter ample grounds for the capture of the offending vessel. curtly informing his astounded visitor that he was on a united states man-of-war, porter ordered the gunners to fire two shots close to the privateer. this was done, and the peruvian quickly hauled down his colors. the american officers, on boarding the prize, found twenty-three american sailors, who had been robbed of all that they possessed, stripped of half their clothing, and thrown into the hold. these unfortunate men were released and sent to the "essex;" after which all the guns and ammunition of the privateer were thrown overboard, and the vessel ordered to return to callao. after this act of summary justice, the "essex" continued in her northward course. she touched at callao; but, much to the disappointment of all on board, there were no british vessels among the shipping at that port. nor could the lookouts, for some days, discern from the masthead any craft other than the double-hulled rafts of logs, called catamarans, in which the natives along the peruvian coast make long voyages. weary of such continued ill-luck, porter determined to make for the galapagos islands, where it was the custom of the british whaling-ships to rendezvous. but it seemed that ill-fortune was following close upon the "essex;" for she sailed the waters about the galapagos, and sent out boats to search small bays and lagoons, without finding a sign of a ship. two weeks passed in this unproductive occupation, and porter had determined to abandon the islands, when he was roused from his berth on the morning of april , , by the welcome cry of "sail, ho!" all hands were soon on deck, and saw a large ship in the offing. all sail was clapped on the frigate; and she set out in hot pursuit, flying the british ensign as a ruse to disarm suspicion. as the chase wore on, two more sail were sighted; and porter knew that he had fallen in with the long-sought whalers. he had no doubt of his ability to capture all three; for in those southern seas a dead calm falls over the ocean every noon, and in a calm the boats of the "essex" could easily take possession of the whalers. by eight o'clock in the morning, the vessel first sighted was overhauled, and hove to in obedience to a signal from the frigate. she proved to be the "montezuma," capt. baxter, with a cargo of fourteen hundred barrels of sperm-oil. baxter visited capt. porter in his cabin, and sat there unsuspectingly, giving the supposed british captain information for his aid in capturing american ships. the worthy whaler little knew, as he chatted away, that his crew was being transferred to the frigate, and a prize-crew sent to take charge of the "montezuma." by noon the expected calm fell over the water; and the boats were ordered away to take possession of the two whalers, that lay motionless some eight miles from the "essex." the distance was soon passed, and the two ships were ordered to surrender, which they quickly did, much astonished to find a united states man-of-war in that region. a breeze shortly after springing up, all the prizes bore down upon the frigate; and the gallant lads of the "essex" had the pleasure of seeing themselves surrounded with captured property to the value of nearly half a million dollars. one of the vessels, the "georgiana," was a good sailer, strongly built, and well fitted for a cruiser. accordingly she was armed with sixteen guns and a number of swivels, and placed under the command of lieut. downes. with this addition to his force, and with the other two prizes following in his wake, porter returned to the galapagos islands. the first sight of the far-off peaks of the desert islands rising above the water was hailed with cheers by the sailors, who saw in the galapagos not a group of desolate and rocky islands, but a place where turtle was plenty, and shore liberty almost unlimited. porter remained some days at the islands, urging the crew of the "essex," as well as the prisoners, to spend much time ashore. signs of the scurvy were evident among the men, and the captain well knew that in no way could the dread disease be kept away better than by constant exercise on the sands of the seashore. the sailors entered heartily into their captain's plans, and spent hours racing on the beach, swimming in the surf, and wandering over the uninhabited islands. after a few days of this sort of life, the squadron put to sea again. the "georgianna" now separated from the fleet, and started on an independent cruise, with orders for a rendezvous at certain specific times. the "essex" continued to hover about the galapagos, in the hopes of getting a few more whalers. she had not long to wait; for the whale ship "atlantic" soon fell in her way, and was promptly snapped up. the captain of this ship was a nantucket man, who had deserted the flag of his country, to cruise under what he thought to be the more powerful flag of great britain. great was his disgust to find that by his treachery he had lost all that he desired to protect. while in chase of the "atlantic," a second sail had been sighted; and to this the "essex" now gave chase. on being overhauled, the stranger at first made some show of fighting; but a shot or two from the guns of the frigate convinced him of the folly of this course, and he surrendered at discretion. the vessel proved to be the whale ship letter-of-marque "greenwich;" a stout ship, of excellent sailing qualities. she carried ten guns, and was in every way a valuable prize. porter had now been in the pacific ocean about three months. on the th of february, the "essex," solitary defender of the flag of the united states in the pacific, had turned her prow northward from cape horn, and embarked on her adventurous career in the most mighty of oceans. now in may, porter, as he trod the deck of his good ship, found himself master of a goodly squadron instead of one stanch frigate. the "essex," of course, led the list, followed by the "georgianna," sixteen guns, forty-two men; "atlantic," six guns, twelve men; "greenwich," ten guns, fourteen men; "montezuma," two guns, ten men; "policy," ten men. of these the "georgianna" had already received her armament and authority as a war-vessel; and the "atlantic" showed such seaworthy qualities that porter determined to utilize her in the same way. accordingly he set sail for tumbez, where he hoped to get rid of some of his prisoners, perhaps sell one or two of his prizes, and make the necessary changes in the "atlantic." while on the way to tumbez, a spanish brig was overhauled. her captain vastly edified capt. porter by informing him that the "nereyda," a peruvian privateer, had recently attacked a huge american frigate, and inflicted great damage upon the yankee. but the frigate proving too powerful, the privateer had been forced to fly, and hastened her flight by throwing overboard all her guns and ammunition. on the th of june, the "essex" with her satellites cast anchor in the harbor of tumbez. the first view of the town satisfied porter that his hopes of selling his prizes there were without avail. a more squalid, dilapidated little seaside village, it would be hard to find. hardly had the ships cast anchor, when the governor came off in a boat to pay a formal visit. though clothed in rags, he had all the dignity of a spanish hidalgo, and strutted about the quarter-deck with most laughable self-importance. notwithstanding his high official station, this worthy permitted himself to be propitiated with a present of one hundred dollars; and he left the ship, promising all sorts of aid to the americans. nothing came of it all, however; and porter failed to dispose of any of his prizes. while the "essex" with her train of captives lay in the harbor at tumbez, the "georgianna" came into port, and was greeted with three cheers by the men of the frigate. lieut. downes reported that he had captured three british ships, carrying in all twenty-seven guns and seventy-five men. one of the prizes had been released on parole, and the other two were then with the "georgianna." this addition to the number of vessels in the train of the "essex" was somewhat of an annoyance to capt. porter, who saw clearly that so great a number of prizes would seriously interfere with his future movements against the enemy. he accordingly remained at tumbez only long enough to convert the "atlantic" into an armed cruiser under the name of the "essex junior," and then set sail, in the hopes of finding some port wherein he could sell his embarrassing prizes. his prisoners, save about seventy-five who enrolled themselves under the american flag, were paroled, and left at tumbez; and again the little squadron put to sea. the "essex junior" was ordered to take the "hector," "catherine," "policy," and "montezuma" to valparaiso, and there dispose of them, after which she was to meet the "essex" at the marquesas islands. on her way to the rendezvous, the "essex" stopped again at the galapagos islands, where she was lucky enough to find the british whaler "seringapatam," known as the finest ship of the british whaling fleet. by her capture, the american whalers were rid of a dangerous enemy; for, though totally without authority from the british crown, the captain of the "seringapatam" had been waging a predatory warfare against such luckless americans as fell in his path. porter now armed this new prize with twenty-two guns, and considered her a valuable addition to his offensive force. she took the place of the "georgianna," which vessel porter sent back to the united states loaded with oil. among the embarrassments which the care of so many prizes brought upon the leader of the expedition was the difficulty of finding commanding officers for all the vessels. this difficulty was enhanced while the flotilla lay off the galapagos islands; for two officers, falling into a dispute, settled their quarrel, after the manner of the day, by a duel. in the contest one, a lieutenant, aged only twenty-one years, was killed, and now lies buried in the sands of the desolate and lonely island. after this occurrence, the need for commanding officers became so imperative that even the purser and chaplain of the "essex" were pressed into the service. midshipmen twelve or fourteen years old found themselves in command of ships. david farragut was one of the boys thus suddenly promoted, and in his journal has left a description of his experience as a boy commander. [illustration: the duel at the galapagos islands.] "i was sent as prize-master to the 'barclay,'" he writes. "this was an important event in my life; and, when it was decided that i was to take the ship to valparaiso, i felt no little pride at finding myself in command at twelve years of age. this vessel had been recaptured from a spanish _guarda costa_. the captain and his mate were on board; and i was to control the men sent from our frigate, while the captain was to navigate the vessel. capt. porter, having failed to dispose of the prizes as it was understood he intended, gave orders for the 'essex junior' and all the prizes to start for valparaiso. this arrangement caused great dissatisfaction on the part of the captain of the 'barclay,' a violent-tempered old fellow; and, when the day arrived for our separation from the squadron, he was furious, and very plainly intimated to me that i would 'find myself off new zealand in the morning,' to which i most decidedly demurred. we were lying still, while the other ships were fast disappearing from view; the 'commodore' going north, and the 'essex junior' with her convoy steering to the south for valparaiso. "i considered that my day of trial had arrived (for i was a little afraid of the old fellow, as every one else was). but the time had come for me at least to play the man: so i mustered up courage, and informed the captain that i desired the topsail filled away. he replied that he would shoot any man who dared to touch a rope without his orders; he 'would go his own course, and had no idea of trusting himself with a d--d nutshell;' and then he went below for his pistols. i called my right-hand man of the crew, and told him my situation; i also informed him that i wanted the main topsail filled. he answered with a clear 'ay, ay, sir!' in a manner which was not to be misunderstood, and my confidence was perfectly restored. from that moment i became master of the vessel, and immediately gave all necessary orders for making sail, notifying the captain not to come on deck with his pistols unless he wished to go overboard; for i would really have had very little trouble in having such an order obeyed." on the th of september, the squadron fell in with the "essex junior," which had come from valparaiso. lieut. downes reported that he had disposed of the prizes satisfactorily, and also brought news that the british frigate "phoebe," and the sloops-of-war "raccoon" and "cherub," had been ordered to cruise the pacific in search of the audacious "essex." more than this, he secured statistics regarding the fleet of british whalers in the pacific, that proved that porter had completely destroyed the industry, having left but one whaler uncaptured. there was then no immediate work for porter to do; and he determined to proceed with his squadron to the marquesas islands, and there lay up, to make needed repairs and alterations. the marquesas are a desolate group of rocky islands lying in the pacific ocean, on the western outskirts of oceanica. in formation they are volcanic, and rise in rugged mountain-peaks from the bosom of the great ocean. sea-fowl of all sorts abound; but none of the lower mammals are to be found on the island, save swine which were introduced by europeans. the people at the time of porter's visit were simple savages, who had seldom seen the face of a white man; for at that early day voyagers were few in the far-off pacific. the island first visited by the "essex" was known to the natives as rooahooga. here the frigate stopped for a few hours. during her stay, the water alongside was fairly alive with canoes and swimming natives. they were not allowed to come on board, but were immensely pleased by some fish-hooks and bits of iron let down to them from the decks of the frigate. not to be outdone in generosity, the islanders threw up to the sailors cocoanuts, fruits, and fish. a boat-crew of jackies that went ashore was surrounded by a smiling, chattering throng of men, women, and children, who cried out incessantly, "_taya, taya_" (friend, friend), and strove to bargain with them for fruits. they were a handsome, intelligent-looking people; tall, slender, and well formed, with handsome faces, and complexion little darker than that of a brunette. the men carried white fans, and wore bracelets of human hair, with necklaces of whales' teeth and shells about their necks,--their sole articles of clothing. both men and women were tattooed; though the women seemed to content themselves with bands about the neck and arms, while the men were elaborately decorated from head to foot. though some carried clubs and lances, they showed no signs of hostility, but bore themselves with that simple air of hospitality and unconscious innocence common to all savage peoples of tropical regions, uncorrupted by association with civilized white men. porter remained but a short time at this island, as its shallow bays afforded no safe anchorage for the vessels. but, charmed as he was with the friendly simplicity of the natives, he determined to remain some time in the vicinity, provided safe anchorage could be found. this essential was soon discovered at nookaheevah, where the ships cast anchor in a fine harbor, which porter straightway dubbed massachusetts bay. hardly had the ship anchored, when a canoe containing three white men came alongside, and was ordered away by the captain, who thought them deserters from some vessel. the canoe then returned to the shore, and the three whites were joined by a vast assemblage of armed natives. porter now began to fear lest he had offended the natives, and proceeded at once to the beach, with four boats well armed and manned. but, by the time the boats' prows grated upon the white sand, every native had disappeared; and the sole figure visible was that of a young man, who advanced, and, giving a formal naval salute, announced himself as midshipman john m. maury, u.s.n. porter was greatly surprised to find a midshipman in so strange a place; but the latter explained it by stating that he was on furlough, and had been left there by a merchant-vessel, which was to call for him. she had never returned, however, and he now hailed the "essex" as an opportunity for escape. a second white man, who then put in an appearance, naked and tattooed like an indian, proved to be an englishman who had been on the island for years, and who, by his knowledge of the language and character of the natives, proved of great assistance to the americans, during the long stay upon which capt. porter had determined. chapter xi. war with the savages. -- the campaign against the typees. -- departure from nookaheevah. -- the "essex" anchors at valparaiso -- arrival of the "phoebe" and "cherub." -- they capture the "essex." -- porter's encounter with the "saturn." -- the mutiny at nookaheevah. it was now the last of october, . capt. porter saw that the work he desired done upon the ships under his charge would occupy about six weeks, and he at once set about forming such relations of peace and amity with the natives as should enable him to procure the necessary supplies and prosecute his work unmolested. much to his dismay, he had hardly begun his diplomatic palaver with the chiefs, when he learned that to keep one tribe friendly he must fight its battles against all other tribes on the island. the natives of nookaheevah were then divided into a large number of tribal organizations. with three of these the americans were brought into contact,--the happahs, the taeehs, and the typees. the taeehs lived in the fertile valley about the bay in which the american squadron was anchored. with these people porter treated first, and made his appearance in their village in great state, being accompanied by the band, the marines, and several boats' crews of jackies. he was hospitably received by the natives, who crowded about to listen to the band, and wonder at the military precision of the marines, whom they regarded as supernatural beings. gattanewa, the chief, expressed his abounding love for the captain, and exchanged names with him, after the custom of the people; but ended by saying that the lawless happahs were at war with the taeehs, and the americans, to gain the friendship of the latter tribe, must make common cause with them against their enemies. to this porter demurred, but the wily chief thereupon brought forward a most conclusive argument. he said that the happahs had cursed his mother's bones; and that, as he and porter had exchanged names, that estimable woman was the captain's mother also, and the insult to her memory should be avenged. it is probable that even this argument might have proved unavailing, had not the happahs the next night descended upon the valley, and, having burned two hundred bread-fruit trees, departed, leaving word that the americans were cowards, and dared not follow them into their mountain fastnesses. porter saw that his food supplies were in danger from these vandals, and his knowledge of savage character convinced him that he could have no peace with any of the natives until the insolence of this tribe was punished. accordingly he notified the taeehs, that, if they would carry a gun to the top of one of the mountain peaks, he would send a party against the happahs. the taeehs eagerly agreed; and, after seeing the gun fired once or twice (a sight that set them fondling and kissing it, to show their reverence for so powerful a weapon), they set off up the steep mountain sides, tugging the gun after them. lieut. downes led the american forces. they had hardly reached the mountain tops, when the fighting began. the happahs were armed with spears, and with slings, from which they threw heavy stones with terrific velocity. they seemed to know no fear, and stood gallantly before the advancing americans, fairly darkening the air with clouds of stones and spears. the americans, though few in number,--forty, opposed to nearly four thousand savages,--pressed forward, suffering but little from the weapons of their foes. from the deck of his frigate in the bay, porter could see the steady advances of his forces, as they drove the happahs from peak to peak. before the americans a huge native strode along, waving wildly the american flag. the howitzer came in the rear, and was every now and then discharged, to drive the foe from some formidable stronghold. so ignorant of fire-arms were the enemy, that they had no idea of their power, often fighting until the muzzle of a musket was laid to their temples before the discharge. but before nightfall this warlike spirit was broken, and the victors returned to their ships, their native allies carrying five dead bodies slung on poles. two only of the americans were wounded. the next day happah ambassadors came to sue for peace; and soon every tribe on the island joined the alliance, save the typees, and a distant tribe that proudly bore the unpronounceable name of hatecaaheottwohos. for two or three weeks peace reigned undisturbed. work was pushed on the vessels. the rats with which the "essex" was infested were smoked out, an operation that necessitated the division of the crew between the shore and the other vessels. porter himself, with his officers, took up his quarters in a tent pitched on the shore. under some circumstances, such a change would have been rather pleasant than otherwise; but the rainy season had now come on, and the tent was little protection against the storms. noticing this, the natives volunteered to put up such buildings as the captain desired, and proceeded to do so in a most expeditious manner. at early dawn four thousand men set about the work, and by night had completed a walled village, containing a dwelling-house for the captain, another for his officers, a cooper's shop, hospital, bake-house, guard-house, and a shed for the sentinel to walk under. for their services the men received old nails, bits of iron hoop, and other metal scraps, with which they were highly delighted. the americans were then living on the terms of the most perfect friendship with the natives. many of the jackies had been taken into the families of the islanders, and all had formed most tender attachment for the beautiful island women; who, in their turn, were devoted to the "malleekees," who were such mighty men of war, and brought them such pretty presents of beads and whales' teeth. the americans entered into the celebrations and festivities of the islanders, watched their dances, joined their fishing expeditions, and soon were on the friendliest footing with their dusky hosts. [illustration: firing the howitzer.] but so pleasant and peaceful an existence was not destined to continue long. the typees, who inhabited the interior of the island, were beginning to stir up strife against the americans; and porter saw that their insolence must be crushed, or the whole native population would unite in war against him. but to begin a war with the typees was far from porter's wish. the way to their country lay over rugged precipices and through almost impenetrable jungles. the light-footed natives could easily enough scale the peaks, or thread the forests; but to porter's sailors it would be an exhausting undertaking. no artillery could be taken into the field, and the immense number of natives that might be arrayed against the sailors made the success of the expedition very uncertain. porter, therefore, determined to try to adjust the difficulty amicably, and with this purpose sent an ambassador to the typees, proposing a peaceful alliance. the reply of the natives is an amusing example of the ignorant vainglory of savage tribes, unacquainted with the power of civilized peoples. the typees saw no reason to desire the friendship of the americans. they had always got along very well without it. they had no intention of sending hogs or fruit to sell to the americans. if the americans wanted supplies, let them come and take them. the americans were cowards, white lizards, and mere dirt. the sailors were weaklings, who could not climb the nookaheevan hills without aid from the natives. this, and much more of the same sort, was the answer of the typees to porter's friendly overtures. this left no course open to the americans save to chastise the insolent barbarians. the departure of the expedition was, however, delayed until a fort could be built for the protection of the american village. this work, a sand-bag battery, calculated to mount sixteen guns, was completed on the th of november, and preparations for the expedition were then begun. and, indeed, it was time that the americans showed that they were not to be insulted with impunity. already the taeehs and happahs were beginning to wonder at the delay, and rumors spread about the village that the whites were really the cowards for which the typees took them. one man, a chief among the happahs, was rash enough to call porter a coward to his face; whereat the choleric captain seized a gun, and, rushing for the offender, soon brought him to his knees, the muzzle of the weapon against his head, begging for mercy. that man was ever after porter's most able ally among the natives. the preparations for war with the typees were completed, and the expedition was about to set out, when a new difficulty arose, this time among the white men. first, a plot was discovered among the british prisoners for the recapture of the "essex junior." their plan was to get the crew drunk, by means of drugged rum, and then rise, seize the vessel, and make off while the american forces were absent on the typee expedition. this plot, being discovered, was easily defeated; and the leaders were put in irons. then porter discovered that disaffection had spread among his crew, which, for a time, threatened serious consequences. but this danger was averted by the captain's manly actions and words, which brought the jackies to his side as one man. on the th of november the long-deferred expedition against the typees left the snug quarters on the shore of massachusetts bay. the expedition went by sea, skirting the shore of the island, until a suitable landing-place near the territory of the hostile tribe was reached. the "essex junior" led the way, followed by five boats full of men, and ten war-canoes filled with natives, who kept up an unearthly din with discordant conches. when the forces landed, the friendly natives were seen to number at least five thousand men; while of the americans, thirty-five, under the command of capt. porter, were considered enough for the work in hand. from the time the fighting began, the friendly natives kept carefully in the rear, and seemed to be only waiting to aid the victors, whether they should be americans or typees. capt. porter and his followers, upon landing, sat down upon the beach for breakfast; but their repast was rudely disturbed by a shower of stones from an ambuscade of typees in the edge of the wood. stopping but a moment to finish their food, the jackies picked up their cutlasses and muskets, and started for the enemy. they were soon in the shady recesses of the tropical forest, but not a typee was to be seen. that the enemy was there, however, was amply attested by the hail of stones that fell among the invaders, and the snapping of slings that could be heard on all sides. this was a kind of fighting to which the sailors were not accustomed; and for a moment they wavered, but were cheered on by their brave leader, and, pushing through the woods, came to a clearing on the banks of a narrow river. but here a sad disaster befell them in the loss of lieut. downes, whose ankle was broken by a stone. he was sent back to the ship, with an escort of five men; and the party, thus reduced to twenty-nine, forded the river, and scaled its high bank, cheering lustily, under a heavy fire from the typees, who made a dogged stand on the farther shore. by this time, the last of their savage allies had disappeared. the advance of the americans was now checked by a jungle of such rank underbrush that the cutlasses of the men made no impression upon it; and they were forced to crawl forward on their hands and knees, under a constant fire from the enemy. from this maze, they burst out upon a clearing, and, looking about them, saw no sign of their savage foes, who had suddenly vanished. the solution of this mystery was soon discovered. after marching a few rods totally unmolested, a sudden turn in the path brought the americans in sight of a formidable stone fortress, perched on a hill commanding the road, and flanked on either side by dense jungles. the wall of the fortress was of stone, seven feet high; and from it, and from the thickets on either side, came such demoniac yells, and such showers of stones, as convinced the americans that they were in front of the typee stronghold. for a time the invaders seemed in danger of annihilation. they were totally unprotected, and flanked by concealed foes, whose missiles were plunging down upon them with deadly effect. some few secured places behind trees, and began a musketry fire; but the alarming cry soon arose that the ammunition was exhausted. five men were immediately despatched to the beach for more cartridges, while the few remaining determined to hold their position at any cost. but to this determination they were unable to adhere. had the typees charged, the whole american force would have been swept away like driftwood before a springtime flood. but the savages neglected their opportunity; and the americans first gained the protection of the bushes, then fell back across the river, and so to the beach. here a council of war was held. they had been beaten back by savages; enormously outnumbered, to be sure, but still opposed by undisciplined warriors armed with rude weapons. the stain of that defeat must be washed out by a victory. upon one point, all were agreed. the happahs had played them false by leading them over the most dangerous roads, and into ambuscades of the enemy. to such treacherous guides, they would not again trust themselves. before he again led his men to battle, porter wished to try diplomacy. although he knew that he had been beaten in the engagement, it would never do to confess defeat before so many savages (for the taeehs and happahs were now swarming about him, discussing the fight). accordingly a messenger was sent to tell the typees that a handful of white men had driven them into their fort, killing and wounding many. now a large re-enforcement of white men was on the beach, ready to drive them from their valley, but that if they would sue for peace they might yet save their lives and their villages. at this the typees laughed. "tell opotee," said they, "that we have plenty of men to spare; while his men are few. we have killed his chief warrior, and wounded many of his people. we are not afraid of his _bouhies_ [muskets]: they often miss fire, and, when they wound, don't hurt much. if the malleekees can drive us from our valley, why don't they come and do it?--not stay on the beach and talk." when porter received this letter, he knew that he must again take the field against the typees, or his half-hearted allies would abandon him and join his foes, giving him endless trouble, and putting a stop to the refitting of the ships in massachusetts bay. he now understood the power of his foes, and accordingly chose two hundred men to go with him on the second expedition. he also determined to leave behind the friendly savages, whose friendship was a very doubtful quality. the forces left the beach that very night, and began their weary march up the mountain-side. it was bright moonlight; so that the narrow mountain paths, the fearful precipices, the tangled jungles, and the swamps and rivers were visible to the marching column. by midnight the americans found themselves perched on the summit of a rocky peak overlooking the typee valley, from which arose sounds of drum-beating, singing, and loud shouts of revelry. the guides who had led the american column said that the savages were rejoicing over their triumph, and were calling upon their gods to send rain and spoil the "malleekees' _bouhies_." porter knew the time was ripe for a surprise, and the men were eager to be led against the enemy; but the guides protested that no mortal men could descend the path leading to the typee village, at night, so precipitous was the descent. the americans were therefore forced to wait patiently until morning. throwing themselves on the ground, the weary sailors were soon asleep, but were waked up in an hour by a heavy burst of rain. they saw the rain falling in sheets, and the sky banked with black clouds that gave little hope of a stoppage. from the valley below rose the triumphant yells of the typees, who were convinced that their gods had sent the shower to spoil the white men's weapons. and, indeed, the floods poured down as though sent for that very service; so that at daybreak the americans found that more than half their powder was spoiled. to make matters worse, the precipitous path leading down into the valley was so slippery that it would have been madness to attempt the descent. accordingly porter determined to retreat to the happah village, and there wait for better weather. before falling back, however, he ordered a volley fired, to show the savages that the fire-arms were not yet useless. the noise of the volley was the first intimation to the typees that the americans were so near them, and their village was at once thrown into the direst confusion. cries of surprise mingled with the beating of drums, the blowing of horns, the shrieks of women and children, and the squealing of pigs being driven to places of safety. in the midst of the tumult the americans retired to the happah village, where they spent the remainder of that day and the following night. the next morning dawned bright and cool after the rain; and the americans sallied forth, determined to end this annoying affray in short order. they soon reached their former station on the cliffs, and, looking down upon the typee territory, saw a beautiful valley, cut up by stone walls into highly cultivated farms, and dotted with picturesque villages. but though their hearts may have been softened by the sight of so lovely a spot, so soon to be laid desolate, they were soon nerved to their work by a party of typees, who were posted on the farther bank of a river that skirted the base of the cliff, and were calling out to the americans, calling them cowards, and daring them to come down and fight. porter gave the command; and the jackies were soon clambering down the cliffs, in the face of a rapid fire from their enemies. the bank of the river once gained, the americans halted to rest for a few minutes, and then, fording the stream, pushed forward straight for the nearest village. the typees hung upon the flank of the advancing column; now and then making fierce charges but always beaten back with severe losses. the sailors suffered but little, and were soon in possession of the village, behind the walls of which the main body halted, while scouting parties were sent out to reconnoitre. after a short halt at this point, the invaders pushed forward to the next village, and so on up the valley, burning each village as soon as it was captured. undismayed by their continued reverses, the typees fought doggedly, scornfully refusing to listen to the peaceful overtures made by the american commander. after marching three or four miles, and fighting for every foot of the way, the americans found themselves before an extensive village, which, from its size, and the strength of its fortifications, was evidently the typee capital. here the savages made a last determined stand, but to no avail. the americans poured over the wall, and were soon in possession of the town. the beauty of the village, the regularity of its streets, and the air of comfort and civilization everywhere apparent, made it hard for porter to give the fateful order that should commit all to the flames. but his duty was clear, and the order was given. leaving the blazing capital behind them, the sailors retraced their steps to the ships, having completed the devastation of the valley that a day before was so peaceful, fertile, and lovely. the spirit of the typees was thoroughly broken by this crushing blow; and for the next few days the ships were besieged by ambassadors from all the island tribes, begging for peace. feeling assured that he should have no further trouble with the natives, porter now exerted all his energies to complete the repairs on the ships, that he might again take the sea. so rapidly did the work progress, that by the th of december the "essex" and "essex junior" were refitted, and stocked with fresh provisions of hogs, cocoanuts, and bananas; the "new zealander," loaded with oil from the other prizes, was ordered to proceed to new york; while the "greenwich," "seringapatam," and "hammond" were to remain at the islands until the "essex" should return for them. these arrangements being made, the war-ships made ready to depart. but now arose a difficulty, ludicrous in its cause, but which threatened to be serious in its effects. the ships had been lying in harbor for about two months; and during that time the sailors, with unlimited shore liberty, had made such ties as bound them closely to the native people. the young girls of the islands, with their comely faces and fair complexions, had played sad havoc with the hearts of the gallant tars of the "essex;" and deep was the grumbling among the sailors when they heard that the time had come for them to bid farewell to their sweethearts. no openly mutinous demonstration was made; but so old a commander could not overlook the fact that some disaffection existed among his crew, and a little investigation disclosed the trouble. there could be no half-way measures adopted in the case, and porter at once gave orders that all further intercourse with the shore should cease. that very night three sailors slipped into the sea, and swam ashore to meet their sweethearts; but the wily captain had stationed a patrol upon the beach, and the three luckless leanders were sent back to the ship in irons. all the next day the native girls lined the shore of the bay, and with pleading gestures besought the captain to let the sailors come ashore, but to no avail. some fair maidens even swam off to the ship, but were gruffly ordered away by the officers. all this was very tantalizing to the men, who hung over the bulwarks, looking at the fair objects of their adoration. but one man only showed signs of rebellion against the captain's authority; and porter, calling him out before the crew, rebuked him, and sent him ashore in a native canoe: while the rest of the jackies sprang into the rigging, set the canvas, and the ship soon left the island, with its sorrowing nymphs, far in her wake. the two vessels turned their heads toward valparaiso, and made the port after an uneventful voyage of fifty-six days. the frigate entered the harbor at once, and cast anchor; while the "essex junior" was ordered to cruise about outside, keeping a close watch for the enemy's ships. the friendship of the people of the town seemed as great as during the first visit of the frigate to the port; and a series of entertainments was begun, that culminated in a grand ball upon the "essex" on the night of the th of february, . for that one night the officers of the "essex junior" were absolved from their weary duty of patrolling the sea at the mouth of the harbor. the vessel was anchored at a point that commanded a view of the ocean; and her officers, arrayed in the splendor of full dress, betook themselves on board of the frigate. at midnight, after an evening of dancing and gayety, lieut. downes left the "essex," and returned to his vessel, which immediately weighed anchor and put to sea. the festivities on the frigate continued a little time longer; and then, the last ladies having been handed down the gangway, and pulled ashore, the work of clearing away the decorations began. while the ship's decks were still strewn with flags and flowers, while the awnings still stretched from stem to stern, and the hundreds of gay lanterns still hung in the rigging, the "essex junior" was seen coming into the harbor with a signal flying. the signal quartermaster rushed for his book, and soon announced that the flags read, "two enemy's ships in sight." at this moment more than half the crew of the "essex" were on shore; but a signal set at the ship's side recalled the men, and in an hour and a half the ship was ready for action; while the "essex junior" cast anchor in a supporting position. the two strange vessels were the "cherub" and the "phoebe," british men-of-war. they rounded into the harbor about eight a.m., and bore down towards the american ships. the "phoebe," the larger of the two englishmen, drew close to the "essex;" and her commander, capt. hillyar, sprang upon the taffrail, and asked after capt. porter's health. porter responded courteously; and, noticing that the "phoebe" was coming closer than the customs of war-vessels in a neutral port permitted, warned the englishman to keep his distance, or trouble would result. hillyar protested that he meant no harm, but nevertheless continued his advance until the two ships were almost fouled. porter called the boarders to the bow; and they crowded forward, armed to the teeth, and stripped for the fight. the "phoebe" was in such a position that she lay entirely at the mercy of the "essex," and could not bring a gun to bear in her own defence. hillyar, from his position on the taffrail, could see the american boarders ready to spring at the word of command, and the muzzles of the cannon ready to blow the ship out of water. there is little doubt that he was astonished to find the "essex" so well prepared for the fray, for he had been told that more than half her crew had gone ashore. relying upon this information, he had probably planned to capture the "essex" at her moorings, regardless of the neutrality of the port. but he had now brought himself into a dangerous position, and porter would have been justified in opening fire at once. but the apologies and protestations of the british captain disarmed him, and he unwisely let the "phoebe" proceed unmolested. in his journal, farragut thus describes this incident: "we were all at quarters, and cleared for action, waiting with breathless anxiety for the command from capt. porter to board, when the english captain appeared, standing on the after-gun, in a pea-jacket, and in plain hearing said,-- "'capt. hillyar's compliments to capt. porter, and hopes he is well.' "porter replied, 'very well, i thank you. but i hope you will not come too near, for fear some accident might take place which would be disagreeable to you.' and, with a wave of his trumpet, the kedge-anchors went up to our yard-arms, ready to grapple the enemy. "capt. hillyar braced back his yards, and remarked to porter, that, if he did fall aboard him, he begged to assure the captain that it would be entirely accidental. "'well,' said porter, 'you have no business where you are. if you touch a rope-yarn of this ship, i shall board instantly.'" notwithstanding porter's forbearance, the incident came near leading to a battle, through the action of one of the crew, who had come off from shore with his brain rather hazy from heavy drinking. this man was standing by a gun, with a lighted brand in his hand, ready to fire the piece, when he thought he saw an englishman grinning at him through one of the open ports of the "phoebe." highly enraged, he shouted out, "my fine fellow, i'll soon stop your making faces!" and reached out to fire the gun; when a heavy blow from an officer, who saw the action, stretched him on the deck. had that gun been fired, nothing could have saved the "phoebe." the two hostile ships cast anchor within long gunshot of the americans, and seemed prepared for a long season in port. for the next few weeks the british and american officers and seamen met frequently on shore; and a kind of friendship sprang up between them, although they were merely waiting for a favorable moment to begin a deadly strife. some incidents, however, took place which rather disturbed the amicable relations of the two parties. at the masthead of the "essex" floated a flag bearing the motto, "free trade and sailors' rights." this flag gave great offence to the british, who soon displayed a flag with the inscription, "god and country, british sailors' best rights. traitors offend both." to this americans responded with, "god, our country and liberty. tyrants offend them." here the debate closed, and seemed to arouse no unfriendly feeling; for porter and hillyar talked it over amicably on shore. in the course of this conversation, porter challenged the "phoebe" to meet the "essex" alone; but hillyar declined the proposition. shortly after this, the crews of the hostile ships began the practice of singing songs _at_ each other; the americans beginning with "yankee doodle," while the british retorted with "god save the king." then the poets of the forecastle set to work, and ground out verses that would prove particularly obnoxious to the enemy. one of the american songs recited at full length the capture of the "guerriere." the character of the poetry may be judged by the first verse. "ye tars of our country, who seek on the main the cause for the wrongs your country sustain, rejoice and be merry, for bragging john bull has got a sound drubbing from brave capt. hull." the british responded with triumphant verses upon the capture of the "chesapeake," news of which had just reached valparaiso. their poetry was quite as bad. "brave broke he waved his sword, and he cried, 'now, lads, aboard; and we'll stop their singing, yankee doodle dandy, o!'" porter now wished to get rid of some of the prizes with which he was encumbered. he could not burn them in the harbor, and the british ships kept too close a watch upon him to permit his ships to leave the harbor for an hour: so he was forced to wait many days for an opportunity. on the th of february the opportunity came; and the "hector" was towed out to sea, and set a-fire. two weeks later, the "phoebe" came alone to the mouth of the harbor, and, after showing her motto-flag, hove to, and fired a gun to windward. this porter understood to be a challenge, and he at once put out in the "essex." but the "phoebe" had no intention of entering a fair and equal fight; for she quickly joined her consort, and the two then chased the "essex" back to port. much talk and a vast deal of correspondence grew out of this affair, which certainly did not redound to the credit of the british. on the th of march the wind blew with such force that the larboard cable of the "essex" parted; and the ship, drifting before the wind, dragged her starboard cable out to sea. knowing that the british ships were in waiting outside, porter lost no time in getting on sail and trying to beat back into the harbor. but, just as the ship was rounding the point, there came up a heavy squall, which carried away the main topmast, throwing several topmen into the sea. in her disabled state the frigate could not regain the harbor; but she ran into a little cove, and anchored within half pistol-shot of the shore. here she was in neutral waters; and, had capt. hillyar been a man of his word, the "essex" would have been safe: for that officer, on being asked by porter whether he would respect the neutrality of the port, had replied with much feeling, "you have paid so much respect to the neutrality of the port, that i feel bound in honor to respect it." but he very quickly forgot this respect, when he saw his enemy lying crippled and in his power, although in neutral waters. hardly had the "essex" cast anchor, when the two british ships drew near, their actions plainly showing that they intended to attack the crippled frigate. the "essex" was prepared for action, the guns beat to quarters; and the men went to their places coolly and bravely, though each felt at his heart that he was going into a hopeless fight. the midshipmen had hardly finished calling over the quarter-lists, to see that every man was at his station, when the roar of the cannon from the british ships announced the opening of the action. the "phoebe" had taken up a position under the stern of the american frigate, and pounded away with her long eighteens; while the "essex" could hardly get a gun to bear in return. the "cherub" tried her fortune on the bow, but was soon driven from that position, and joined her consort. the two kept up a destructive fire, until porter got three long guns out of the cabin-windows, and drove the enemy away. after repairing damages, the british took up a position just out of range of the "essex's" carronades, and began a rapid and effective fire from their long eighteens. such an action as this was very trying to the crew of the "essex." the carronades against which porter had protested when his ship was armed were utterly useless against an enemy who used such cautious tactics. on the deck of the frigate men were falling on every side. one shot entered a port, and killed four men who stood at a gun, taking off the heads of the last two. the crash and roar of the flying shots were incessant. as the guns became crippled for lack of men, the junior officers took a hand in all positions. farragut writes, "i performed the duty of captain's aid, quarter-gunner, powder-boy, and, in fact, did every thing that was required of me.... when my services were not required for other purposes, i generally assisted in working a gun; would run and bring powder from the boys, and send them back for more, until the captain wanted me to carry a message; and this continued to occupy me during the action." once during the action a midshipman came running up to porter, and reported that a gunner had deserted his post. porter's reply was to turn to farragut (the lad was only twelve years old), and say, "do your duty, sir." the boy seized a pistol, and ran away to find the coward, and shoot him in his tracks. but the gunner had slipped overboard, and made his way to the shore, and so escaped. after the "essex" had for some time suffered from the long-range fire of the enemy, capt. porter determined to make sail, and try to close with his foes. the rigging had been so badly shot away that the flying jib was the only sail that could be properly set. with this, and with the other sails hanging loose from the yards, the "essex" ran down upon the british, and made such lively play with her carronades, that the "cherub" was forced to haul off for repairs, and the tide of war seemed to be setting in favor of the americans. but, though the gallant blue-jackets fought with desperation, their chances for success were small. the decks were strewn with dead, the cock-pit was full, and the enemy's shot were constantly adding to the number of dead and dying. young farragut, who had been sent below after some gun-primers, was coming up the ladder, when a man standing at the opening of the hatchway was struck full in the face by a cannon-ball, and fell back, carrying the lad with him. the mutilated body fell full upon the boy, who lay for a time unconscious; then, jumping to his feet, ran, covered with blood, to the quarter-deck. capt. porter saw him, and asked if he was wounded. "i believe not, sir," answered the midshipman. "then," said the captain, "where are the primers?" farragut remembered his errand, and dashed below to execute it. when he emerged the second time, he saw the captain (his adopted father) fall, and running up asked if he was wounded. "i believe not, my son," was the response; "but i felt a blow on the top of my head." he had probably been knocked down by the wind of a passing shot. but the end of the action was now near. dreadful havoc had been made in the ranks of both officers and men. the cock-pit would hold no more wounded; and the shots were beginning to penetrate its walls, killing the sufferers waiting for the surgeon's knife. lieut. mcknight was the only commissioned officer on duty. the ship had been several times on fire, and the magazine was endangered. finally, the carpenter reported that her bottom was so cut up that she could float but a little while longer. on learning this, porter gave the order for the colors to be hauled down, which was done. the enemy, however, kept up their deadly fire for ten minutes after the "essex" had struck. david farragut narrates some interesting incidents of the surrender. he was sent by the captain to find and destroy the signal book before the british should come aboard; and, this having been done, he went to the cock-pit to look after his friends. here he found lieut. cornell terribly wounded. when farragut spoke to him, he said, "o davy, i fear it's all up with me!" and died soon after. the doctor said, that, had this officer been operated upon an hour before, his life might have been saved; but when the surgeons proposed to drop another man, and attend to him, he replied, "no, no, doctor, none of that. fair play's a jewel. one man's life is as dear as another's; i would not cheat any poor fellow out of his turn." surely history nowhere records more noble generosity. soon after this, when farragut was standing on the deck, a little negro boy came running up to inquire about his master, lieut. wilmer, who had been knocked over by a shot. on learning his master's fate, he leaped over the taffrail into the sea, and was drowned. after the "essex" had been formally surrendered, boats were sent to convey the prisoners to the british ships. in one of these farragut was carried to the "phoebe," and there fell into a second battle, in which the victory remained with him. "i was so mortified at our capture that i could not refrain from tears," he writes. "while in this uncomfortable state, i was aroused by hearing a young reefer call out,-- "'a prize! a prize! ho, boys, a fine grunter, by jove.' "i saw at once that he had under his arm a pet pig belonging to our ship, called 'murphy.' i claimed the animal as my own. "'ah,' said he, 'but you are a prisoner, and your pig also!' "'we always respect private property,' i replied; and, as i had seized hold of 'murphy,' i determined not to let go unless 'compelled by superior force.' "this was fun for the oldsters, who immediately sung out,-- "'go it, my little yankee. if you can thrash shorty, you can have your pig.' "'agreed,' cried i. "a ring was formed in an open space, and at it we went. i soon found that my antagonist's pugilistic education did not come up to mine. in fact, he was no match for me, and was compelled to give up the pig. so i took master murphy under my arm, feeling that i had in some degree wiped out the disgrace of the defeat." when the british ships with their prize returned to the quiet waters of the harbor, and began to take account of damages, it was found that the "essex" had indeed fought a losing fight. on the "phoebe," but four men were killed, and seven wounded; on the "cherub," one killed and three wounded, made up the list of casualties. but on the "essex" were fifty-eight killed, and sixty-six wounded; while an immense number of men were missing, who may have escaped to the shore or may have sunk beneath the waves. certain it is some swimmers reached shore, though sorely wounded. one man had rushed on deck with his clothing all aflame, and swam ashore, though scarcely a square inch could be found on his body which was not burned. another seaman had sixteen or eighteen scales of iron chipped from the muzzle of his gun driven into his legs, yet he reached the shore in safety. after some delay, the "essex junior" was disarmed; and the prisoners, having given their paroles, were placed on board her, with a letter of safe-conduct from capt. hillyar to prevent their capture by any british man-of-war in whose path they might fall. but this letter availed them little; for, after an uneventful voyage to the northward, the "essex junior" found herself brought to by a shot from the british frigate "saturn," off sandy hook. the boarding-officer took capt. hillyar's letter to the commander of the "saturn," who remarked that hillyar had no authority to make any such agreement, and ordered the "essex junior" to remain all night under the lee of the british ship. capt. porter was highly indignant, and handed his sword to the british officer, saying that he considered himself a prisoner. but the englishman declined the sword, and was about to return to his ship, when porter said, "tell the captain that i am his prisoner, and do not consider myself any longer bound by my contract with capt. hillyar, which he has violated; and i shall act accordingly." by this porter meant that he now considered himself absolved from his parole, and free to escape honorably if an opportunity should offer. accordingly at seven o'clock the following morning, a boat was stealthily lowered from the "essex junior;" and porter, descending into it, started for the shore, leaving a message, that, since british officers showed so little regard for each other's honor, he had no desire to trust himself in their hands. the boat had gone some distance before she was sighted by the lookout on the "saturn," for the hull of the "essex junior" hid her from sight. as soon as the flight was noticed, the frigate made sail in chase, and seemed likely to overhaul the audacious fugitives, when a thick fog set in, under cover of which porter reached babylon, l.i., nearly sixty miles distant. in the mean time, the "essex junior," finding herself hidden from the frigate by the fog-bank, set sail, and made for the mouth of the harbor. she was running some nine knots an hour when the fog showed signs of lifting; and she came up into the wind, that the suspicion of the british might not be aroused. as it happened, the "saturn" was close alongside when the fog lifted, and her boat soon came to the american ship. an officer, evidently very irate, bounded upon the deck, and said brusquely,-- "you must have been drifting very fast. we have been making nine knots an hour, and yet here you are alongside." "so it appears," responded the american lieutenant coolly. "we saw a boat leave you, some time ago," continued the englishman. "i suppose capt. porter went in it?" "yes. you are quite right." "and probably more of you will run away, unless i cut away your boats from the davits." "perhaps that would be a good plan for you to adopt." "and i would do it very quickly, if the question rested with me." "you infernal puppy," shouted the american officer, now thoroughly aroused, "if you have any duty to do, do it; but, if you insult me further, i'll throw you overboard!" with a few inarticulate sounds, the englishman stepped into his boat, and was pulled back to the "saturn," whence soon returned a second boat, bearing an apology for the boarding-officer's rudeness. the boarders then searched all parts of the ship, mustered her crew on the plea that it contained british deserters, and finally released her, after having inflicted every possible humiliation upon her officers. the "essex junior" then proceeded to new york, where she was soon joined by capt. porter. the whole country united in doing honor to the officers, overlooking the defeat which closed their cruise, and regarding only the persistent bravery with which they had upheld the cause of the united states in the far-off waters of the pacific. before closing the account of porter's famous cruise, the story of the ill-fortune which befell lieut. gamble should be related. this officer, it will be remembered, was left at nookaheevah with the prizes "greenwich," "seringapatam," and "hammond." hardly had the frigate disappeared below the horizon, when the natives began to grow unruly; and gamble was forced to lead several armed expeditions against them. then the sailors under his charge began to show signs of mutiny. he found himself almost without means of enforcing his authority, and the disaffection spread daily. the natives, incited by the half-savage englishman who had been found upon the island, began to make depredations upon the live-stock; while the women would swim out to the ships by night, and purloin bread, aided by their lovers among the crews. to the lieutenant's remonstrances, the natives replied that "opotee" was not coming back, and they would do as they chose; while the sailors heard his orders with ill-concealed contempt, and made but a pretext of obeying them. in the middle of april three sailors stole a boat from the "greenwich," and, stocking it well with ammunition and provisions, deserted, and were never again seen. one month later, mutiny broke out in its worst form. lieut. gamble and his two midshipmen, being upon the "seringapatam," were knocked down by the sailors, gagged, bound, and thrust into the hold. the mutineers then went ashore, spiked the guns in the fort, and then, hoisting the british colors over the captured ship, set sail. lieut. gamble was badly wounded in the foot by a pistol-shot fired by one of his guards. notwithstanding his wound, he, with the two lieutenants and two loyal seamen, was turned adrift in an open boat. after long and painful exertions, they reached the shore, and returned to the bay, where the "greenwich" still lay at anchor. the mutineers, thirteen of whom were englishmen who had enlisted in the american service, steered boldly out to sea, and were nevermore heard of. the half-savage englishman, wilson, was supposed to be at the bottom of this uprising, and some days later a boat's crew from the "greenwich" went ashore to capture him. soon after, gamble, anxiously watching the shore, saw a struggle upon the beach, the natives rushing down on all sides, the boat overturned in the surf, and two white men swimming towards the ship, making signals of distress. mr. clapp, with two men, sprang into a boat, and put off to the aid of the swimmers, leaving gamble alone on the ship. two large canoes loaded with savages then left the beach, and swiftly bore down towards the "essex;" but gamble, lamed though he was, seized a lighted brand, and hobbled along the deck of the ship, firing her guns with such effect that the savages were driven back, the beach cleared, and mr. clapp enabled to save the two struggling men. when the boat returned to the ship, it was learned that midshipman feltus and five men had been basely murdered by the savages. there were now left but seven americans; and of these but two were well, and fit for duty. setting the "greenwich" on fire, this little band boarded the "hammond," and made their way to sea. but between the sandwich islands and honolulu they fell in with the "cherub," by whom they were captured, and kept prisoners for nine months, when, peace being declared, they were released. so ended the last incident of the gallant cruise of the "essex." history has few more adventurous tales to relate. publications of the navy records society vol. xxix. fighting instructions - edited with elucidations from contemporary authorities by julian s. corbett, ll.m. printed for the navy records society mdccccv the council of the navy records society - * * * * * patron h.r.h. the prince of wales, k.g., k.t., k.p. president earl spencer, k.g. vice-presidents bridge, admiral sir cyprian | prothero, g.w., a.g., g.c.b. | ll.d. hawkesbury, lord. | yorke, sir henry, k.c.b. councillors atkinson, c.t. | kipling, rudyard. battenburg, prince louis of, | loraine, rear-admiral sir g.c.b. | lambton, bart. beaumont, vice-admiral sir | lyall, sir alfred c., g.c.i.e. lewis, k.c.b., k.c.m.g. | markham, sir clements r., clarke, col. sir george s., | k.c.b., f.r.s. k.c.m.g. | marsden, r.g. corbett, julian s. | newbolt, henry. desart, the earl of, k.c.b. | parr, rear-admiral a.c. drury, vice-admiral sir | slade, captain edmond j.w., charles, k.c.s.i. | r.n. firth, professor g.h., ll.d. | tanner, j.r. ginsburg, b.w., ll.d. | thursfield, j.r. godley, sir arthur, k.c.b. | tracey, admiral sir richard, hamilton, admiral sir r. | k.c.b. vesey, g.c.b. | watts, philip, d.sc., f.r.s. secretary professor j.k. laughton, d.litt., king's college, london, w.c. treasurer w. graham greene, c.b., admiralty, s.w. the council of the navy records society wish it to be distinctly understood that they are not answerable for any opinions or observations that may appear in the society's publications; for these the responsibility rests entirely with the editors of the several works. preface the inaccessibility of the official fighting instructions from time to time issued to the fleet has long been a recognised stumbling-block to students of naval history. only a few copies of them were generally known to exist; fewer still could readily be consulted by the public, and of these the best known had been wrongly dated. the discovery therefore of a number of seventeenth century instructions amongst the earl of dartmouth's papers, which he had generously placed at the disposal of the society, seemed to encourage an attempt to make something like a complete collection. the result, such as it is, is now offered to the society. it is by no means exhaustive. some sets of instructions seem to be lost beyond recall; but, on the other hand, a good deal of hitherto barren ground has been filled, and it is hoped that the collection may be of some assistance for a fresh study of the principles which underlie the development of naval tactics. it is of course as documents in the history of tactics that the fighting instructions have the greatest practical value, and with this aspect of them in view i have done my best to illustrate their genesis, intention, and significance by extracts from contemporary authorities. without such illustration the instructions would be but barren food, neither nutritive nor easily digested. the embodiment of this illustrative matter has to some extent involved a departure from the ordinary form of the society's publications. instead of a general introduction, a series of introductory notes to each group of instructions has been adopted, which it is feared will appear to bear an excessive proportion to the instructions themselves. there seemed, however, no other means of dealing with the illustrative matter in a consecutive way. the extracts from admirals' despatches and contemporary treatises, and the remarks of officers and officials concerned with the preparation or the execution of the instructions, were for the most part too fragmentary to be treated as separate documents, or too long or otherwise unsuitable for foot-notes. the only adequate way therefore was to embody them in introductory notes, and this it is hoped will be found to justify their bulk. a special apology is, however, due for the introductory note on nelson's memoranda. for this i can only plead their great importance, and the amount of illustrative matter that exists from the pens of nelson's officers and opponents. for no other naval battle have we so much invaluable comment from men of the highest capacity who were present. the living interest of it all is unsurpassed, and i have therefore been tempted to include all that came to hand, encouraged by the belief that the fullest material for the study of nelson's tactics at the battle of trafalgar could not be out of place in a volume issued by the society in the centenary year. as to the general results, perhaps the most striking feature which the collection brings out is that sailing tactics was a purely english art. the idea that we borrowed originally from the dutch is no longer tenable. the dutch themselves do not even claim the invention of the line. indeed in no foreign authority, either dutch, french or spanish, have i been able to discover a claim to the invention of any device in sailing tactics that had permanent value. even the famous tactical school which was established in france at the close of the seven years' war, and by which the french service so brilliantly profited in the war of american independence, was worked on the old lines of hoste's treatise. morogues' _tactique navale_ was its text-book, and his own teaching was but a scientific and intelligent elaboration of a system from which the british service under the impulse of anson, hawke, and boscawen was already shaking itself free. much of the old learning which the volume contains is of course of little more than antiquarian interest, but the bulk of it in the opinion of those best able to judge should be found of living value. all systems of tactics must rest ultimately on the dominant weapon in use, and throughout the sailing period the dominant weapon was, as now, the gun. in face of so fundamental a resemblance no tactician can afford to ignore the sailing system merely because the method of propulsion and the nature of the material have changed. it is not the principles of tactics that such changes affect, but merely the method of applying them. of even higher present value is the process of thought, the line of argument by which the old tacticians arrived at their conclusions good and bad. in studying the long series of instructions we are able to detach certain attitudes of mind which led to the atrophy of principles essentially good, and others which pushed the system forward on healthy lines and flung off obsolete restraints. in an art so shifting and amorphous as naval tactics, the difference between health and disease must always lie in a certain vitality of mind with which it must be approached and practised. it is only in the history of tactics, under all conditions of weapons, movement and material, that the conditions of that vitality can be studied. for a civilian to approach the elucidation of such points without professional assistance would be the height of temerity, and my thanks therefore are particularly due for advice and encouragement to admiral sir cyprian bridge, vice-admiral sir reginald custance, rear-admiral h.s.h. prince louis of battenberg, and to captain slade, captain of the royal naval college. to sir reginald custance and professor laughton i am under a special obligation, for not only have they been kind enough to read the proofs of the work, but they have been indefatigable in offering suggestions, the one from his high professional knowledge and the other from his unrivalled learning in naval history. any value indeed the work may be found to possess must in a large measure be attributed to them. nor can i omit to mention the valuable assistance which i have received from mr. ferdinand brand and captain garbett, r.n., in unearthing forgotten material in the libraries of the admiralty and the united service institution. i have also the pleasure of expressing my obligations to the earl of dartmouth, the earl of st. germans, and vice-admiral sir charles knowles, bart., for the use of the documents in their possession, as well as to many others whose benefits to the society will be found duly noted in the body of the work. contents part i.--early tudor period . introductory. alonso de chaves on sailing tactics espejo de navegantes, _circa_ . introductory. audley's fleet orders, _circa_ orders to be used by the king's majesty's navy by the sea . introductory. the adoption of spanish tactics by henry viii lord lisle, , no. " " no. part ii.--elizabethan and jacobean introductory. the elizabethan origin of ralegh's instructions sir walter ralegh, part iii.--carolingian . introductory. the attempt to apply land formations to the fleet lord wimbledon, . no. " " no. " " no. . introductory. the ship-money fleets, _circa_ the earl of lindsey, part iv.--the first dutch war . introductory. english and dutch orders on the eve of the war, - parliamentary orders, supplementary instructions, _circa_ marten tromp, . introductory. orders issued during the war, and commonwealth orders, part v.--the second dutch war . introductory. orders of the restoration the earl of sandwich, . introductory. monck, prince rupert, and the duke of york the duke of york, his additional instructions, his supplementary order prince rupert, part vi.--the third dutch war to the revolution . introductory. progress of tactics during the war the duke of york, his supplementary orders, the duke of york, - final form of the duke of york's orders, , with additions and observations subsequently made . introductory. mediterranean orders, sir john narbrough, . introductory. the last stuart orders lord dartmouth, part vii.--william iii. and anne . introductory. lord torrington, tourville, and hoste admiral edward russell, . introductory. the permanent instructions, - sir george rooke, part viii.--additional fighting instructions of the eighteenth century introductory, origin and growth of the additional instructions admiral vernon, _circa_ lord anson, _circa_ sir edward hawke, admiral boscawen, sir george rodney, lord hood's additions, part ix.--the last phase . introductory. the new signal book instructions lord howe, . introductory. the signal books of the great war lord howe's explanatory instructions, . introductory. nelson's tactical memoranda the toulon memorandum, the trafalgar memorandum, . introductory. instructions after trafalgar admiral gambier, lord collingwood, - sir alexander cochrane, - . introductory, the signal book of the instructions of appendix. 'further particulars of the trafalgar fight' index part early tudor period i. alonso de chaves, _circa_ ii. sir thomas audley, iii. lord lisle, alonso de chaves on sailing tactics introductory the following extract from the _espejo de navegantes_, or _seamen's glass_, of alonso de chaves serves to show the development which naval tactics had reached at the dawn of the sailing epoch. the treatise was apparently never published. it was discovered by captain fernandez duro, the well-known historian of the spanish navy, amongst the manuscripts in the library of the academy of history at madrid. the exact date of its production is not known; but alonso de chaves was one of a group of naval writers and experts who flourished at the court of the emperor charles v in the first half of the sixteenth century.[ ] he was known to hakluyt, who mentions him in connection with his own cherished idea of getting a lectureship in navigation established in london. 'and that it may appear,' he writes in dedicating the second edition of his _voyages_ to the lord admiral, 'that this is no vain fancy nor device of mine it may please your lordship to understand that the late emperor charles the fifth ... established not only a pilot-major for the examination of such as sought to take charge of ships in that voyage' (_i.e._ to the indies), 'but also founded a notable lecture of the art of navigation which is read to this day in the contractation house at seville. the readers of the lecture have not only carefully taught and instructed the spanish mariners by word of mouth, but also have published sundry exact and worthy treatises concerning marine causes for the direction and encouragement of posterity. the learned works of three of which readers, namely of alonso de chaves, of hieronymus de chaves, and of roderigo zamorano, came long ago very happily to my hands, together with the straight and severe examining of all such masters as desire to take charge for the west indies.' since therefore de chaves was an official lecturer to the contractation house, the admiralty of the indies, we may take it that he speaks with full authority of the current naval thought of the time. that he represented a somewhat advanced school seems clear from the pains he takes in his treatise to defend his opinions against the old idea which still prevailed, that only galleys and oared craft could be marshalled in regular order. 'some may say,' he writes, 'that at sea it is not possible to order ships and tactics in this way, nor to arrange beforehand so nicely for coming to the attack or bringing succour just when wanted, and that therefore there is no need to labour an order of battle since order cannot be kept. to such i answer that the same objection binds the enemy, and that with equal arms he who has taken up the best formation and order will be victor, because it is not possible so to break up an order with wind and sea as that he who is more without order shall not be worse broken up and the sooner defeated. for ships at sea are as war-horses on land, since admitting they are not very nimble at turning at any pace, nevertheless a regular formation increases their power. moreover, at sea, so long as there be no storm, there will be nothing to hinder the using of any of the orders with which we have dealt, and if there be a storm the same terror will strike the one side as the other; for the storm is enough for all to war with, and in fighting it they will have peace with one another.' at first sight it would seem that de chaves in this argument takes no account of superiority of seamanship--the factor which was destined to turn the scale against spain upon the sea. but the following passage with which he concludes shows that he regarded seamanship as the controlling factor in every case. 'and if,' he argues, 'they say that the enemy will take the same thought and care as i, i answer that when both be equal in numbers and arms, then in such case he who shall be more dexterous and have more spirit and fortitude he will conquer, the which he will not do, although he have more and better arms and as much spirit as he will, if he be wanting in good order and counsel. just as happens in fencing, that the weaker man if he be more dexterous gives more and better hits than the other who does not understand the beats nor knows them, although he be the stronger. and the same holds good with any army whatsoever on land, and it has been seen that the smaller by their good order have defeated the stronger.' from the work in question captain fernandez duro gives four sections or chapters in appendix to the first volume of his history,[ ] namely, . 'of war or battle at sea,' relating to single ship actions. . 'the form of a battle and the method of fighting,' relating to armament, fire discipline, boarding and the like. . 'of a battle of one fleet against another.' . 'battle.' in the last two sections is contained the earliest known attempt to formulate a definite fighting formation and tactical system for sailing fleets, and it is from these that the following extracts have been translated. it will be noted that in the root-idea of coming as quickly as possible to close quarters, and in relying mainly on end-on fire, the proposed system is still quite mediæval and founded mainly upon galley tactics. but a new and advanced note is struck in the author's insistence on the captain-general's keeping out of action as long as possible, instead of leading the attack in the time-honoured way. we should also remark the differentiation of types, for all of which a duty was provided in action. this was also a survival of galley warfare, and rapidly disappeared with the advance of the sailing man-of-war, never to be revived, unless perhaps it be returning in the immediate future, and we are to see torpedo craft of the latest devising taking the place and function of the _barcas_, with their axes and augers, and armoured cruisers those of the _naos de succurro_. _espejo de navegantes, circa_ . [+fernandez duro, armada española i. app. +.] _chapter iii.--of a battle between one fleet and another_. [_extract_.] ... when the time for battle is at hand the captain-general should order the whole fleet to come together that he may set them in order, since a regular order is no less necessary in a fleet of ships for giving battle to another fleet than it is in an army of soldiers for giving battle to another army. thus, as in an army, the men-at-arms form by themselves in one quarter to make and meet charges, and the light horse in another quarter to support, pursue, and harass[ ] so in a fleet, the captain-general ought to order the strongest and largest ships to form in one quarter to attack, grapple, board and break-up the enemy, and the lesser and weaker ships in another quarter apart, with their artillery and munitions to harass, pursue, and give chase to the enemy if he flies, and to come to the rescue wherever there is most need. the captain-general should form a detachment of his smaller and lighter vessels, to the extent of one-fourth part of his whole fleet, and order them to take station on either side of the main body. i mean that they should always keep as a separate body on the flanks of the main body, so that they can see what happens on one side and on the other. he should admonish and direct every one of the ships that she shall endeavour to grapple with the enemy in such a way that she shall not get between two of them so as to be boarded and engaged on both sides at once.[ ] * * * * * having directed and set in order all the aforesaid matters, the captain-general should then marshal the other three-quarters of the fleet that remain in the following manner. he should consider his position and the direction of the wind, and how to get the advantage of it with his fleet. then he should consider the order in which the enemy is formed, whether they come in a close body or in line ahead,[ ] and whether they are disposed in square bodies or in a single line,[ ] and whether the great ships are in the centre or on the flanks, and in what station is the flagship; and all the other considerations which are essential to the case he should take in hand. by all means he should do his best that his fleet shall have the weather-gage; for if there was no other advantage he will always keep free from being blinded by the smoke of the guns, so as to be able to see one to another; and for the enemy it will be the contrary, because the smoke and fire of our fleet and of their own will keep driving upon them, and blinding them in such a manner that they will not be able to see one another, and they will fight among themselves from not being able to recognise each other. everything being now ready, if the enemy have made squadrons of their fleet we should act in the same manner in ours, placing always the greater ships in one body as a vanguard to grapple first and receive the first shock; and the captain-general should be stationed in the centre squadron, so that he may see those which go before and those which follow. each of the squadrons ought to sail in line abreast,[ ] so that all can see the enemy and use their guns without getting in each other's way, and they must not sail in file one behind the other, because thence would come great trouble, as only the leading ships could fight. in any case a ship is not so nimble as a man to be able to face about and do what is best.[ ] the rearguard should be the ships that i have called the supports, which are to be the fourth part of the fleet, and the lightest and best sailers; but they must not move in rear of the fleet, because they would not see well what is passing so as to give timely succour, and therefore they ought always to keep an offing on that side or flank of the fleet where the flagship is, or on both sides if they are many; and if they are in one body they should work to station themselves to windward for the reasons aforesaid. and if the fleet of the enemy shall come on in one body in line abreast,[ ] ours should do the same, placing the largest and strongest ships in the centre and the lightest on the flanks of the battle, seeing that those which are in the centre always receive greater injury because necessarily they have to fight on both sides. and if the enemy bring their fleet into the form of a lance-head or triangle, then ours ought to form in two lines [_alas_], keeping the advanced extremities furthest apart and closing in the rear, so as to take the enemy between them and engage them on both fronts, placing the largest ships in the rear and the lightest at the advanced points, seeing that they can most quickly tack in upon the enemy opposed to them. and if the enemy approach formed in two lines [_alas_], ours ought to do the same, placing always the greatest ships over against the greatest of the enemy, and being always on the look-out to take the enemy between them; and on no account must ours penetrate into the midst of the enemy's formation [_batalla_], because arms and smoke will envelope them on every side and there will be no way of relieving them. the captain-general having now arrayed his whole fleet in one of the aforesaid orders according as it seems best to him for giving battle, and everything being ready for battle, all shall bear in mind the signals he shall have appointed with flag or shot or topsail, that all may know at what time to attack or board or come to rescue or retreat, or give chase. the which signals all must understand and remember what they are to do when such signals are made, and likewise the armed boats shall take the same care and remember what they ought to do, and perform their duty.[ ] _chapter iv.--battle_ then the flagship shall bid a trumpet sound, and at that signal all shall move in their aforesaid order; and as they come into range they shall commence to play their most powerful artillery, taking care that the first shots do not miss, for, as i have said, when the first shots hit, inasmuch as they are the largest, they strike great dread and terror into the enemy; for seeing how great hurt they suffer, they think how much greater it will be at close range and so mayhap they will not want to fight, but strike and surrender or fly, so as not to come to close quarters. having so begun firing, they shall always first play the largest guns, which are on the side or board towards the enemy, and likewise they shall move over from the other side those guns which have wheeled carriages to run on the upper part of the deck and poop.[ ] and then when nearer they should use the smaller ones, and by no means should they fire them at first, for afar off they will do no hurt, and besides the enemy will know there is dearth of good artillery and will take better heart to make or abide an attack. and after having come to closer quarters then they ought to play the lighter artillery. and so soon as they come to board or grapple all the other kinds of arms shall be used, of which i have spoken more particularly: first, missiles, such as harpoons [_dardos_] and stones, hand-guns [_escopetas_] and cross-bows, and then the fire-balls aforesaid, as well from the tops as from the castles, and at the same time the calthrops, linstocks, stink-balls [_pildoras_], grenades, and the scorpions for the sails and rigging. at this moment they should sound all the trumpets, and with a lusty cheer from every ship at once they should grapple and fight with every kind of weapon, those with staffed scythes or shear-hooks cutting the enemy's rigging, and the others with the fire instruments [_trompas y bocas de fuego_] raining fire down on the enemy's rigging and crew. the captain-general should encourage all in the battle, and because he cannot be heard with his voice he should bid the signal for action to be made with his trumpet or flag or with his topsail. and he should keep a look-out in every direction in readiness, when he sees any of his ships in danger, to order the ships of reserve to give succour, if by chance they have not seen it, or else himself to bear in with his own ship. the flagship should take great care not to grapple another, for then he could not see what is passing in the battle nor control it. and besides his own side in coming to help and support him might find themselves out of action; or peradventure if any accident befell him, the rest of the fleet would be left without guidance and would not have care to succour one another, but so far as they were able would fly or take their own course. accordingly the captain-general should never be of the first who are to grapple nor should he enter into the press, so that he may watch the fighting and bring succour where it is most needed. the ships of support in like manner should have care to keep somewhat apart and not to grapple till they see where they should first bring succour. the more they keep clear the more will they have opportunity of either standing off and using their guns, or of coming to close range with their other firearms. moreover, if any ship of the enemy takes to flight, they will be able to give chase or get athwart her hawse, and will be able to watch and give succour wherever the captain-general signals. the boats in like manner should not close in till they see the ships grappled, and then they should come up on the opposite side in the manner stated above, and carry out their special duties as occasion arises either with their bases,[ ] of which each shall carry its own, and with their harquebuses, or else by getting close in and wedging up the rudders, or cutting them and their gear away, or by leaping in upon the enemy, if they can climb in without being seen, or from outside by setting fire to them, or scuttling them with augers.[ ] footnotes: [ ] fernandez duro, _de algunas obras desconocidas de cosmografia y de namgaaon, &c._ reprinted from the _revista de navegacion y comercio_. madrid, - . [ ] _armada española desde la union de los reines de castilla y de aragon_. [ ] _entrar y salir_--lit. 'to go in and come out,' a technical military expression used of light cavalry. it seems generally to signify short sudden attacks on weak points. [ ] here follow directions for telling off a fourth of the largest boats in the fleet for certain duties which are sufficiently explained in the section on 'battle' below. [ ] _unos en pos de otros á la hila_--lit. one behind the other in file. [ ] _en escuadrones ó en ala_. in military diction these words meant 'deep formation' and 'single line.' here probably _ala_ means line abreast. see next note. [ ] _cado uno de los escuadrones debe ir en ala_. here _escuadrone_ must mean 'squadron' in the modern sense of a division, and from the context _ala_ can mean nothing but 'line abreast,' 'line ahead' being strictly forbidden. [ ] this, of course, refers to fire tactics ashore. the meaning is that a ship, when she has delivered her fire, cannot retire by countermarch and leave her next in file to deliver its fire in turn. the whole system, it will be seen, is based on end-on fire, as a preparation for boarding and small-arm fighting. [ ] _viniere toda junta puesta in ala_. [ ] this sentence in the original is incomplete, running on into the next chapter. for clearness the construction has been altered in the translation. [ ] this remarkable evolution is a little obscure. the spanish has '_y moviendo asimismo los otros del otro bordo, aquellos que tienen sus carretones que andan per cima de cubierta y toldo_.' [ ] _versos_, breech-loading pieces of the secondary armament of ships, and for aiming boats. bases were of the high penetration or 'culverin' type. [ ] _dando barrenos_. this curious duty of the armed boats he has more fully explained in the section on single ship actions, as follows: 'the ships being grappled, the boat ready equipped should put off to the enemy's ship under her poop, and get fast hold of her, and first cut away her rudder, or at least jam it with half a dozen wedges in such wise that it cannot steer or move, and if there is a chance for more, without being seen, bore half a dozen auger holes below the water-line, so that the ship founders.' the rest of the chapter is concerned with the treatment of the dead and wounded, pursuit of the enemy when victory is won, and the refitting of the fleet. audley's fleet orders, _circa_ introductory the instructions drawn up by thomas audley by order of henry viii may be taken as the last word in england of the purely mediæval time, before the development of gunnery, and particularly of broadside fire, had sown the seeds of more modern tactics. they were almost certainly drafted from long-established precedents, for audley was a lawyer. the document is undated, but since audley is mentioned without any rank or title, it was probably before november , when he became serjeant-at-law and king's serjeant, and certainly before may when he was knighted. it was at this time that henry viii was plunging into his reformation policy, and had every reason to be prepared for complications abroad, and particularly with spain, which was then the leading naval power. the last two articles, increasing the authority of the council of war, were probably insisted on, as mr. oppenheim has pointed out in view of sir edward howard's attempts on french ports in and , the last of which ended in disaster.[ ] footnote: [ ] _administration of the royal navy_, p. . _orders to be used by the king's majesty's navy by the sea_. [+brit. mus. harleian mss. , fol. , et seq.+[ ]] [_extract_.] if they meet with the enemy the admiral must apply to get the wind of the enemy by all the means he can, for that is the advantage. no private captain should board the admiral enemy but the admiral of the english, except he cannot come to the enemy's, as the matter may so fall out without they both the one seek the other. and if they chase the enemy let them that chase shoot no ordnance till he be ready to board him, for that will let[ ] his ship's way. let every ship match equally as near as they can, and leave some pinnaces at liberty to help the overmatched. and one small ship when they shall join battle [is] to be attending on the admiral to relieve him, for the overcoming of the admiral is a great discouragement of the rest of the other side. in case you board your enemy enter not till you see the smoke gone and then shoot off[ ] all your pieces, your port-pieces, the pieces of hail-shot, [and] cross-bow shot to beat his cage deck, and if you see his deck well ridden[ ] then enter with your best men, but first win his tops in any wise if it be possible. in case you see there come rescue bulge[ ] the enemy ship [but] first take heed your own men be retired, [and] take the captain with certain of the best with him, the rest [to be] committed to the sea, for else they will turn upon you to your confusion. the admiral ought to have this order before he joins battle with the enemy, that all his ships shall bear a flag in their mizen-tops, and himself one in the foremast beside the mainmast, that everyone may know his own fleet by that token. if he see a hard match with the enemy and be to leeward, then to gather his fleet together and seem to flee, and flee indeed for this purpose till the enemy draw within gunshot. and when the enemy doth shoot then [he shall] shoot again, and make all the smoke he can to the intent the enemy shall not see the ships, and [then] suddenly hale up his tackle aboard,[ ] and have the wind of the enemy. and by this policy it is possible to win the weather-gage of the enemy, and then he hath a great advantage, and this may well be done if it be well foreseen beforehand, and every captain and master made privy to it beforehand at whatsoever time such disadvantage shall happen. the admiral shall not take in hand any exploit to land or enter into any harbour enemy with the king's ships, but[ ] he call a council and make the captains privy to his device and the best masters in the fleet or pilots, known to be skilful men on that coast or place where he intendeth to do his exploit, and by good advice. otherwise the fault ought to be laid on the admiral if anything should happen but well.[ ] and if he did an exploit without assent of the captains and [it] proved well, the king ought to put him out of his room for purposing a matter of such charge of his own brain, whereby the whole fleet might fall into the hands of the enemy to the destruction of the king's people.[ ] footnotes: [ ] _a book of orders for the war both by land and sea, written by thomas audley at the command of king henry viii. [ ] _i.e._ hinder. [ ] ms. 'the shot of.' the whole ms. has evidently been very carelessly copied and is full of small blunders, which have been corrected in the text above. 'board' till comparatively recent times meant to close with a ship. 'enter' was our modern 'board.' [ ] 'ridden' = 'cleared.' [ ] 'bulge' = 'scuttle.' a ship was said to bulge herself when she ran aground and filled. [ ] the passage should probably read 'hale or haul his tacks aboard.' [ ] _i.e._ 'without,' 'unless.' [ ] it was under this old rule that boroughs lodged his protest against drake's entering cadiz in . [ ] the rest of the articles relate to discipline, internal order of ships, and securing prize cargoes. the adoption of spanish tactics by henry viii introductory these two sets of orders were drawn up by the lord high admiral in rapid succession in august , during the second stage of henry viii's last war with france. in the previous month d'annibault, the french admiral, had been compelled to abandon his attempt on portsmouth and the isle of wight, and retire to recruit upon his own coast; and lord lisle was about to go out and endeavour to bring him to action. the orders, it will be seen, are a distinct advance on those of , and betray strongly the influence of spanish ideas as formulated, by de chaves. so striking indeed is the resemblance in many points; that we perhaps may trace it to henry's recent alliance with charles v. the main difference was that henry's 'wings' were composed of oared craft, and to form them of sufficient strength he had had some of the newest and smartest 'galliasses,' or 'galleys'--that is, his vessels specially built for men-of-war--fitted with oars. the reason for this was that the french fleet was a mixed one, the sailing division having been reinforced by a squadron of galleys from the mediterranean. the elaborate attempts to combine the two types tactically--a problem which the italian admirals had hitherto found insoluble--points to an advanced study of the naval art that is entirely characteristic of henry viii. the main idea of the first order is of a vanguard in three ranks, formed of the most powerful hired merchant ships and the king's own galleons and great ships, and supported by a strong rearguard of smaller armed merchantmen, and by two oared wings on either flank composed of royal and private vessels combined. the vanguard was to be marshalled with its three ranks so adjusted that its general form was that of a blunt wedge. in the first rank come eight of the large merchantmen, mainly hanseatic vessels; in the second, ten of the royal navy and one private vessel; in the third, nineteen second-rate merchantmen. the tactical aim is clearly that the heavy hanseatic ships should, as de chaves says, receive the first shock and break up the enemy's formation for the royal ships, while the third rank are in position to support. the wings, which were specially told off to keep the galleys in check, correspond to the reserve of de chaves, and the importance attached to them is seen in the fact that they contained all the king's galleons of the latest type. in the second set of instructions, issued on august , this order was considerably modified. the fleet had been increased by the arrival of some of the west-country ships, and a new order of battle was drawn up which is printed in the _state papers, henry viii_ (old series), i. . the formation, though still retaining the blunt wedge design, was simplified. we have now a vanguard of ships, a 'battaill' or main body of ships, and one 'wing' of oared 'galliasses, shallops and boats of war.' the 'wing' however, was still capable of acting in two divisions, for, unlike the vanguard and 'battaill,' it had a vice-admiral as well as an admiral. _lord lisle, no._ , . [+le fleming mss. no. +.][ ] _the order of battle_.[ ] the vanguard. these be the ships appointed for the first rank of the vanguard: in primis: the great argosy. the samson lubeck. the johannes lubeck. the trinity of dantzig. the mary of hamburg. the pellican. the morion [of dantzig]. the 'sepiar' of dantzig. = . the second rank of the vanguard: the harry grace à dieu. the venetian. the peter pomegranate. the mathew gonson. the pansy. the great galley. the sweepstake. the minion. the swallow. the new bark. the saul 'argaly.' = (_sic_). the third rank of the vanguard: the 'berste denar.' the falcon lively. the harry bristol. the trinity smith. the margaret of bristol. the trinity reniger. the mary james. the pilgrim of dartmouth. the mary gorge of rye. the thomas tipkins. the gorges brigges. the anne lively. = . the john evangelist. the thomas modell. the lartycke [or 'lartigoe']. the christopher bennet. the mary fortune. the mary marten. the trinity bristol. = . the oared wings. galleys and ships of the right wing: the great mistress of england. the salamander. the jennet. the lion. the greyhound. the thomas greenwich. the lesser pinnace. the hind. the harry. the galley subtle. two boats of rye. = . galleys and ships of the left wing: the anne gallant. the unicorn. the falcon. the dragon. the sacre. the merlin. the rae. the reniger pinnace. the foyst. two boats of rye. = . _the fighting instructions_. _item_. it is to be considered that the ranks must keep such order in sailing that none impeach another. wherefore it is requisite that every of the said ranks keep right way with another, and take such regard to the observing of the same that no ship pass his fellows forward nor backward nor slack anything, but [keep] as they were in one line, and that there may be half a cable length between every of the ships. _item_. the first rank shall make sail straight to the front of the battle and shall pass through them, and so shall make a short return to the midwards as they may, and they [are] to have a special regard to the course of the second rank; which two ranks is appointed to lay aboard the principal ships of the enemy, every man choosing[ ] his mate as they may, reserving the admiral for my lord admiral. _item_. that every ship of the first rank shall bear a flag of st. george's cross upon the fore topmast for the space of the fight, which upon the king's determination shall be on monday, the th of august, _anno_ .[ ] and every ship appointed to the middle rank shall for the space of the fight bear a flag of st. george's cross upon her mainmast. and every ship of the third rank shall bear a like flag upon his mizen[ ] mast top, and every of the said wings shall have in their tops a flag of st. george. _item_. the victuallers shall follow the third rank and shall bear in their tops their flags. also that neither of the said wings shall further enter into fight; but, having advantage as near anigh[ ] as they can of the wind, shall give succour as they shall see occasion, and shall not give care to any of the small vessels to weaken our force. there be, besides the said ships mentioned, to be joined to the foresaid battle fifty sail of western ships, and whereof be seven great hulks of ton apiece, and there is also the number of , of soldiers beside mariners in all the said ships. footnotes: [ ] a similar list of ships is in a ms. in the cambridge university library. [ ] this paper gives the order of the wings and vanguard only. the fifty west-country ships that were presumably to form the rearguard had not yet joined. [ ] ms. 'closing.' [ ] the fleets did not get contact till august . [ ] ms. 'messel.' [ ] ms. 'a snare a nye.' the passage is clearly corrupt. perhaps it should read 'neither of the said wings shall further enter into the fight but as nigh as they can keeping advantage of the wind [_i.e._ without losing the weather-gage of any part of the enemy's fleet] but shall give succour,' &c. _lord lisle, no. ._ [+record office, state papers, henry viii.+] _the order for the said fleet taken by the lord admiral the th day of august, _.[ ] . first, it is to be considered that every of the captains with the said ships appointed by this order to the vanward, battle and wing shall ride at anchor according as they be appointed to sail by the said order; and no ship of any of the said wards or wing shall presume to come to an anchor before the admiral of the said ward. . _item_, that every captain of the said wards or wing shall be in everything ordered by the admiral of the same. . _item_, when we shall see a convenient time to fight with the enemies our vanward shall make with their vanward if they have any; and if they be in one company, our vanward, taking the advantage of the wind, shall set upon their foremost rank, bringing them out of order; and our vice-admiral shall seek to board their vice-admiral, and every captain shall choose his equal as near as he may. . _item_, the admiral of the wing shall be always in the wind with his whole company; and when we shall join with the enemies he shall keep still the advantage of the wind, to the intent he with his company may the better beat off the galleys from the great ships.[ ] footnotes: [ ] the articles are preceded, like the first ones, by a list of ships or 'battle order,' showing an organisation into a vanward, main body (battle), and one wing of oared craft. see introductory note, p. . [ ] of the remaining seven articles, five relate to distinguishing squadronal flags and lights as in the earlier instructions, and the last one to the watchword of the night. it is to be 'god save king henry,' and the answer, 'and long to reign over us.' part ii elizabethan and jacobean sir walter ralegh, the elizabethan origin of ralegh's instructions introductory no fighting instructions known to have been issued in the reign of elizabeth have been found, nor is there any indication that a regular order of battle was ever laid down by the seamen-admirals of her time.[ ] even howard's great fleet of had twice been in action with the armada before it was so much as organised into squadrons. if anything of the kind was introduced later in her reign captain nathaniel boteler, who had served in the jacobean navy and wrote on the subject early in the reign of charles i, was ignorant of it. in his _dialogues about sea services_, he devotes the sixth to 'ordering of fleets in sailing, chases, boardings and battles,' but although he suggests a battle order which we know was never put in practice, he is unable to give one that had been used by an english fleet.[ ] it is not surprising. in the despatches of the elizabethan admirals, though they have much to say on strategy, there is not a word of fleet-tactics, as we understand the thing. the domination of the seamen's idea of naval warfare, the increasing handiness of ships, the improved design of their batteries, the special progress made by englishmen in guns and gunnery led rapidly to the preference of broadside gunfire over boarding, and to an exaggeration of the value of individual mobility; and the old semi-military formations based on small-arm fighting were abandoned. at the same time, although the seamen-admirals did not trouble or were not sufficiently advanced to devise a battle order to suit their new weapon, there are many indications that, consciously or unconsciously, they developed a tendency inherent in the broadside idea to fall in action into a rough line ahead; that is to say, the practice was usually to break up into groups as occasion dictated, and for each group to deliver its broadsides in succession on an exposed point of the enemy's formation. that the armed merchantmen conformed regularly to this idea is very improbable. the faint pictures we have of their well-meant efforts present them to us attacking in a loose throng and masking each other's fire. but that the queen's ships did not attempt to observe any order is not so clear. when the combined fleet of howard and drake was first sighted by the armada, it is said by two spanish eye-witnesses to have been _in ala_, and 'in very fine order.' and the second of adams's charts, upon which the famous house of lords' tapestries were designed, actually represents the queen's ships standing out of plymouth in line ahead, and coming to the attack in a similar but already disordered formation. still there can be no doubt that, however far a rudimentary form of line ahead was carried by the elizabethans, it was a matter of minor tactics and not of a battle order, and was rather instinctive than the perfected result of a serious attempt to work out a tactical system. the only actual account of a fleet formation which we have is still on the old lines, and it was for review purposes only. ubaldino, in his second narrative, which he says was inspired by drake,[ ] relates that when drake put out of plymouth to receive howard 'he sallied from port to meet him with his thirty ships in equal ranks, three ships deep, making honourable display of his masterly and diligent handling, with the pinnaces and small craft thrown forward as though to reconnoitre the ships that were approaching, which is their office.' nothing, however, is more certain in the unhappily vague accounts of the campaign than that no such battle order as this was used in action against the armada. it is not till the close of the west indian expedition of , when, after hawkins and drake were both dead, colonel-general sir thomas baskerville, the commander of the landing force, was left in charge of the retreating fleet, that we get any trace of a definite battle formation. in his action off the isla de pinos he seems, so far as we can read the obscure description, to have formed his fleet into two divisions abreast, each in line ahead. the queen's ships are described at least as engaging in succession according to previous directions till all had had 'their course.' henry savile, whose intemperate and enthusiastic defence of his commander was printed by hakluyt, further says: 'our general was the foremost and so held his place until, by order of fight, other ships were to have their turns according to his former direction, who wisely and politicly had so ordered his vanguard and rearward; and as the manner of it was altogether strange to the spaniard, so might they have been without hope of victory, if their general had been a man of judgment in sea-fights.' here, then, if we may trust savile, a definite battle order must have been laid down beforehand on the new lines, and it is possible that in the years which had elapsed since the armada campaign the seamen had been giving serious attention to a tactical system, which the absence of naval actions prevented reaching any degree of development. had the idea been baskerville's own it is very unlikely that the veteran sea-captains on his council of war would have assented to its adoption. at any rate we may assert that the idea of ships attacking in succession so as to support one another without masking each other's broadside fire (which is the essential germ of the true line ahead) was in the air, and it is clearly on the principle that underlay baskerville's tactics that ralegh's fighting instructions were based twenty years later.[ ] these which are the first instructions known to have been issued to an english fleet since henry viii's time were signed by sir walter ralegh on may , , at plymouth, on the eve of his sailing for his ill-fated expedition to guiana. most of the articles are in the nature of 'articles of war' and 'sailing instructions' rather than 'fighting instructions,' but the whole are printed below for their general interest. a contemporary writer, quoted by edwards in his _life of ralegh_, says of them: 'there is no precedent of so godly, severe, and martial government, fit to be written and engraven in every man's soul that covets to do honour to his king and country in this or like attempts.' but this cannot be taken quite literally. so far at least as they relate to discipline, some of ralegh's articles may be traced back in the _black book of the admiralty_ to the fourteenth century, while the illogical arrangement of the whole points, as in the case of the additional fighting instructions of the eighteenth century, to a gradual growth from precedent to precedent by the accretion of expeditional orders added from time to time by individual admirals. the process of formation may be well studied in lord wimbledon's first orders, where ralegh's special expeditional additions will be found absorbed and adapted to the conditions of a larger fleet. moreover, there is evidence that, with the exception of those articles which were designed in view of the special destination of ralegh's voyage, the whole of them were based on an early elizabethan precedent. for the history of english tactics the point is of considerable importance, especially in view of his twenty-ninth article, which lays down the method of attack when the weather-gage has been secured. this has hitherto been believed to be new and presumably ralegh's own, in spite of the difficulty of believing that a man entirely without experience of fleet actions at sea could have hit upon so original and effective a tactical design. the evidence, however, that ralegh borrowed it from an earlier set of orders is fairly clear. amongst the _stowe mss._ in the british museum there is a small quarto treatise (no. ) entitled 'observations and overtures for a sea fight upon our own coasts, and what kind of order and discipline is fitted to be used in martialling and directing our navies against the preparations of such spanish armadas or others as shall at any time come to assail us.' from internal evidence and directly from another copy of it in the _lansdown mss._ (no. ), we know it to be the work of 'william gorges, gentleman.' he is to be identified as a son of sir william gorges, for he tells us he was afloat with his father in the dreadnought as early as , when sir william was admiral on the irish station with a squadron ordered to intercept the filibustering expedition which sir thomas stucley was about to attempt under the auspices of pope gregory xiii. sir william was a cousin of ralegh's and brother to sir arthur gorges, who was ralegh's captain in the azores expedition of , and who in ralegh's interest wrote the account of the campaign which purchas printed. though william, the son, freely quotes the experiences of the armada campaign of , he is not known to have ever held a naval command, and he calls himself 'unexperienced.' we may take it therefore that his treatise was mainly inspired by ralegh, to whom indeed a large part of it is sometimes attributed. this question, however, is of small importance. the gist of the matter is a set of fleet orders which he has appended as a precedent at the end of his treatise, and it is on these orders that ralegh's are clearly based. they commence with fourteen articles, consisting mainly of sailing instructions, similar to those which occur later in ralegh's set. the fifteenth deals with fighting and bloodshed among the crews, and the sixteenth enjoins morning and evening prayer, with a psalm at setting the watch, and further provides that any man absenting himself from divine service without good cause shall suffer the 'bilboes,' with bread and water for twelve hours. the whole of this drastic provision for improving the seamen's morals has been struck out by a hurried and less clerkly hand, and in the margin is substituted another article practically word for word the same as that which ralegh adopted as his first article. the same hand has also erased the whole numbering of the articles up to no. , and has noted that the new article on prayers is to come first.[ ] the articles which follow correspond closely both in order and expression to ralegh's, ending with no. , where ralegh's special articles relating to landing in guiana begin. ralegh's important twenty-ninth article dealing with the method of attack is practically identical with that of gorges. ralegh, however, has several articles which are not in gorges's set, and wherever the two sets are not word for word the same, ralegh's is the fuller, having been to all appearances expanded from gorges's precedent. this, coupled with the fact that other corrections beside those of the prayer article are embodied in ralegh's articles, leaves practically no doubt that gorges's set was the earlier and the precedent upon which ralegh's was based. an apparent difficulty in the date of gorges's treatise need not detain us. it was dedicated on march , - , to buckingham, the new lord high admiral, but it bears indication of having been written earlier, and in any case the date of the dedication is no guide to the date of the orders in the appendix. the important question is, how much earlier than ralegh's are these orders of gorges's treatise? can we approximately fix their date? certainly not with any degree of precision, but nevertheless we are not quite without light. to begin with there is the harsh punishment for not attending prayers, which is thoroughly characteristic of tudor times. then there is an article, which ralegh omits, relating to the use of 'musket-arrows.' gorges's article runs: 'if musket-arrows be used, to have great regard that they use not but half the ordinary charge of powder, otherwise more powder will make the arrow fly double.' now these arrows we know to have been in high favour for their power of penetrating musket-proof defences about the time of the armada. they were a purely english device, and were taken by richard hawkins upon his voyage to the south sea in . he highly commends them, but nevertheless they appear to have fallen out of fashion, and no trace of their use in jacobean times has been found.[ ] a still more suggestive indication exists in the heading which is prefixed to gorges's appendix. it runs as follows:--'a form of orders and directions to be given by an admiral in conducting a fleet through the narrow seas for the better keeping together or relieving one another upon any occasion of distress or separation by weather or by giving chase. for the understanding whereof suppose that a fleet of his majesty's consisting of twenty or thirty sail were bound for serving on the west part of ireland, as kinsale haven for example.' the words 'his majesty' show the appendix was penned under james i; but why did gorges select this curious example for explaining his orders? we can only remember that it was exactly upon such an occasion that he had served with his father in . there is therefore at least a possibility that the orders in question may be a copy or an adaptation of some which sir william gorges had issued ten years before the armada. certainly no situation had arisen since elizabeth's death to put such an idea into the writer's head, and the points of rendezvous mentioned in gorges's first article are exactly those which sir william would naturally have given. on evidence so inconclusive no certainty can be attained. all we can say is that gorges's appendix points to a possibility that ralegh's remarkable twenty-ninth article may have been as old as the middle of elizabeth's reign, and that the reason why it has not survived in the writings of any of the great elizabethan admirals is either that the tactics it enjoins were regarded as a secret of the seamen's 'mystery' or were too trite or commonplace to need enunciation. at any rate in the face of the gorges precedent it cannot be said, without reservation, that this rudimentary form of line ahead or attack in succession was invented by ralegh, or that it was not known to the men who fought the armada. amongst other articles of special interest, as showing how firmly the english naval tradition was already fixed, should be noticed the twenty-fifth, relating to seamen gunners, the twenty-sixth, forbidding action at more than point-blank range, and above all the fifth and sixth, aimed at obliterating all distinction between soldiers and sailors aboard ship, and at securing that unity of service between the land and sea forces which has been the peculiar distinction of the national instinct for war. as to the tactical principle upon which the elizabethan form of attack was based, it must be noted that was to demoralise the enemy--to drive him into 'utter confusion.' the point is important, for this conception of tactics held its place till it was ultimately supplanted by the idea of concentrating on part of his fleet. footnotes: [ ] hakluyt printed several sets of instructions issued to armed fleets intended for discovery, viz.: . those drawn by sebastian cabota for sir hugh willoughby's voyage in . . those for the first voyage of anthony jenkinson, , which refers to other standing orders. . those issued by the lords of the council for edward fenton in , the th article of which directs him to draw up orders 'for their better government both at sea and land.' but none of these contain any fighting instructions. [ ] boteler's ms. was not published till , when the publisher dedicated it to samuel pepys. the date at which it was written can only be inferred from internal evidence. at p. he refers to 'his majesty's late augmentation of seamen's pay in general.' such an augmentation took place in and . he also refers to the 'late king' and to the colony of st. christopher's, which was settled in , but not to that of new providence, settled in . he served in the cadiz expedition of , but does not mention it or any event of the rest of the war. the battle order, however, which he recommends closely resembles that proposed by sir e. cecil (_post_, p. ). the probability is, then, that his work was begun at the end of james i's reign, and was part of the large output of military literature to which the imminent prospect of war with spain gave rise at that time. [ ] see _drake and the tudor navy_, ii. appendix b. [ ] see article of the instructions of , _post_, p. . [ ] in all previous english instructions the prayer article had come towards the end. in the spanish service it came first, and it was thence probably that ralegh got his idea. [ ] laughton, _defeat of the armada_, i. ; _account, &c_. (_exchequer, queen's remembrancer_), lxiv. , april , ; hawkins's _observations_ (hakl. soc), § lxvi. _sir walter ralegh_, .[ ] [+state papers domestic xcii. f. +.] _orders to be observed by the commanders of the fleet and land companies under the charge and conduct of sir walter ralegh, knight, bound for the south parts of america or elsewhere_. _given at plymouth in devon, the rd of may, _. first. because no action nor enterprise can prosper, be it by sea or by land, without the favour and assistance of almighty god, the lord and strength of hosts and armies, you shall not fail to cause divine service to be read in your ship morning and evening, in the morning before dinner, and in the evening before supper, or at least (if there be interruption by foul weather) once in the day, praising god every night with the singing of a psalm at the setting of the watch. . you shall take especial care that god be not blasphemed in your ship, but that after admonition given, if the offenders do not reform themselves, you shall cause them of the meaner sort to be ducked at yard-arm; and the better sort to be fined out of their adventure. by which course if no amendment be found, you shall acquaint me withal, delivering me the names of the offenders. for if it be threatened in the scriptures that the curse shall not depart from the house of the swearer, much less shall it depart from the ship of the swearer. . thirdly, no man shall refuse to obey his officer in all that he is commanded for the benefit of the journey. no man being in health shall refuse to watch his turn as he shall be directed, the sailors by the master and boatswain, the landsmen by their captain, lieutenant, or other officers. . you shall make in every ship two captains of the watch, who shall make choice of two soldiers every night to search between the decks that no fire or candlelight be carried about the ship after the watch be set, nor that any candle be burning in any cabin without a lantern; and that neither, but whilst they are to make themselves unready. for there is no danger so inevitable as the ship firing, which may also as well happen by taking of tobacco between the decks, and therefore [it is] forbidden to all men but aloft the upper deck. . you shall cause all your landsmen to learn the names and places of the ropes, that they may assist the sailors in their labour upon the decks, though they cannot go up to the tops and yards. * . you shall train and instruct your sailors, so many as shall be found fit, as you do your landsmen, and register their names in the list of your companies, making no difference of professions, but that all be esteemed sailors and all soldiers, for your troops will be very weak when you come to land without the assistance of your seafaring men. . you shall not give chase nor send abroad any ship but by order from the general, and if you come near any ship in your course, if she be belonging to any prince or state in league or amity with his majesty, you shall not take anything from them by force, upon pain to be punished as pirates; although in manifest extremity you may (agreeing for the price) relieve yourselves with things necessary, giving bonds for the same. provided that it be not to the disfurnishing of any such ship, whereby the owner or merchant be endangered for the ship or goods. * . you shall every night fall astern the general's ship, and follow his light, receiving instructions in the morning what course to hold. and if you shall at any time be separated by foul weather, you shall receive billets sealed up, the first to be opened on this side the north cape,[ ] if there be cause, the second to be opened beyond the south cape,[ ] the third after you shall pass degrees, and the fourth from the height of cape verd.[ ] . if you discover any sail at sea, either to windward or to leeward of the admiral, or if any two or three of our fleet shall discover any such like sail which the admiral cannot discern, if she be a great ship and but one, you shall strike your main topsail and hoist it again so often as you judge the ship to be hundred tons of burthen; or if you judge her to be tons to strike and hoist twice; if tons thrice, and answerable to your opinion of her greatness. * . if you discover a small ship, you shall do the like with your fore topsail; but if you discover many great ships you shall not only strike your main topsail often, but put out your ensign in the maintop. and if such fleet or ship go large before the wind, you shall also after your sign given go large and stand as any of the fleet doth: i mean no longer than that you may judge that the admiral and the rest have seen your sign and you so standing. and if you went large at the time of the discovery you shall hale of your sheets for a little time, and then go large again that the rest may know that you go large to show us that the ship or fleet discovered keeps that course. * . so shall you do if the ship or fleet discovered have her tacks aboard, namely, if you had also your tacks aboard at the time of the discovery, you shall bear up for a little time, and after hale your sheets again to show us what course the ship or fleet holds. * . if you discover any ship or fleet by night, if the ship or fleet be to windward of you, and you to windward of the admiral, you shall presently bear up to give us knowledge. but if you think that (did you not bear up) you might speak with her, then you shall keep your luff,[ ] and shoot off a piece of ordnance to give us knowledge thereby. . for a general rule: let none presume to shoot off a piece of ordnance but in discovery of a ship or fleet by night, or by being in danger of an enemy, or in danger of fire, or in danger of sinking, that it may be unto us all a most certain intelligence of some matter of importance. * . and you shall make us know the difference by this: if you give chase and being near a ship you shall shoot to make her strike, we shall all see and know that you shoot to that end if it be by day; if by night, we shall then know that you have seen a ship or fleet none of our company; and if you suspect we do not hear the first piece then you may shoot a second, but not otherwise, and you must take almost a quarter of an hour between your two pieces. * . if you be in danger of a leak--i mean in present danger--you shall shoot off two pieces presently one after another, and if in danger of fire, three pieces presently one after another; but if there be time between we will know by your second piece that you doubt that we do not hear your first piece, and therefore you shoot a second, to wit by night, and give time between. . there is no man that shall strike any officer be he captain, lieutenant, ensign, sergeant, corporal of the field,[ ] quartermaster, &c. . nor the master of any ship, master's mate, or boatswain, or quartermaster. i say no man shall strike or offer violence to any of these but the supreme officer to the inferior, in time of service, upon pain of death. . no private man shall strike another, upon pain of receiving such punishment as a martial court[ ] shall think him worthy of. . if any man steal any victuals, either by breaking into the hold or otherwise, he shall receive the punishment as of a thief or murderer of his fellows. . no man shall keep any feasting or drinking between meals, nor drink any healths upon your ship's provisions. . every captain by his purser, stewards, or other officers shall take a weekly account how his victuals waste. . the steward shall not deliver any candle to any private man nor for any private use. . whosoever shall steal from his fellows either apparel or anything else shall be punished as a thief. . in foul weather every man shall fit his sails to keep company with the fleet, and not run so far ahead by day but that he may fall astern the admiral by night. . in case we shall be set upon by sea, the captain shall appoint sufficient company to assist the gunners; after which, if the fight require it, in the cabins between the decks shall be taken down [and] all beds and sacks employed for bulwarks.[ ] *the musketeers of every ship shall be divided under captains or other officers, some for the forecastle, others for the waist, and others for the poop, where they shall abide if they be not otherwise directed.[ ] . the gunners shall not shoot any great ordnance at other distance than point blank. . an officer or two shall be appointed to take care that no loose powder be carried between the decks, or near any linstock or match in hand. you shall saw divers hogsheads in two parts, and filling them with water set them aloft the decks. you shall divide your carpenters, some in hold if any shot come between wind and water, and the rest between the decks, with plates of leads, plugs, and all things necessary laid by them. you shall also lay by your tubs of water certain wet blankets to cast upon and choke any fire.[ ] . the master and boatswain shall appoint a certain number of sailors to every sail, and to every such company a master's mate, a boatswain's mate or quartermaster; so as when every man knows his charge and his place things may be done without noise or confusion, and no man [is] to speak but the officers. as, for example, if the master or his mate bid heave out the main topsail, the master's mate, boatswain's mate or quartermaster which hath charge of that sail shall with his company perform it, without calling out to others and without rumour[ ], and so for the foresail, fore topsail, spritsail and the rest; the boatswain himself taking no particular charge of any sail, but overlooking all and seeing every man to do his duty. . no man shall board his enemy's ship without order, because the loss of a ship to us is of more importance than the loss of ten ships to the enemy, as also by one man's boarding all our fleet may be engaged; it being too great a dishonour to lose the least of our fleet. but every ship, if we be under the lee of an enemy, shall labour to recover the wind if the admiral endeavours it. but if we find an enemy to be leewards of us, the whole fleet shall follow the admiral, vice-admiral, or other leading ship within musket shot of the enemy; giving so much liberty to the leading ship as after her broadside delivered she may stay and trim her sails. then is the second ship to tack as the first ship and give the other side, keeping the enemy under a perpetual shot. this you must do upon the windermost ship or ships of an enemy, which you shall either batter in pieces, or force him or them to bear up and so entangle them, and drive them foul one of another to their utter confusion[ ]. . the musketeers, divided into quarters of the ship, shall not deliver their shot but at such distance as their commanders shall direct them. . if the admiral give chase and be headmost man, the next ship shall take up his boat, if other order be not given. or if any other ship be appointed to give chase, the next ship (if the chasing ship have a boat at her stern) shall take it. . if any make a ship to strike, he shall not enter her until the admiral come up. . you shall take especial care for the keeping of your ships clean between the decks, [and] to have your ordnance ready in order, and not cloyed with chests and trunks. . let those that have provision of victual deliver it to the steward, and every man put his apparel in canvas cloak bags, except some few chests which do not pester the ship. . everyone that useth any weapon of fire, be it musket or other piece, shall keep it clean, and if he be not able to amend it being out of order, he shall presently acquaint his officer therewith, who shall command the armourer to mend it. . no man shall play at cards or dice either for his apparel or arms upon pain of being disarmed and made a swabber of the ship. * . whosoever shall show himself a coward upon any landing or otherwise, he shall be disarmed and made a labourer or carrier of victuals for the rest. * . no man shall land any man in any foreign ports without order from the general, by the sergeant-major[ ] or other officer, upon pain of death. * . you shall take especial care when god shall send us to land in the indies, not to eat of any fruit unknown, which fruit you do not find eaten with worms or beasts under the tree. * . you shall avoid sleeping on the ground, and eating of new fish until it be salted two or three hours, which will otherwise breed a most dangerous flux; so will the eating of over-fat hogs or fat turtles. * . you shall take care that you swim not in any rivers but where you see the indians swim, because most rivers are full of alligators. * . you shall not take anything from any indian by force, for if you do it we shall never from thenceforth be relieved by them, but you must use them with all courtesy. but for trading and exchanging with them, it must be done by one or two of every ship for all the rest, and those to be directed by the cape merchant[ ] of the ship, otherwise all our commodities will become of vile price, greatly to our hindrance. * . for other orders on the land we will establish them (when god shall send us thither) by general consent. in the meantime i shall value every man, honour the better sort, and reward the meaner according to their sobriety and taking care for the service of god and prosperity of our enterprise. * . when the admiral shall hang out a flag in the main shrouds, you shall know it to be a flag of council. then come aboard him. * . and wheresoever we shall find cause to land, no man shall force any woman be she christian or heathen, upon pain of death. footnotes: [ ] the articles marked with an asterisk do not appear in the gorges set, and were presumably those which ralegh added to suit the conditions of his expedition or which he borrowed from other precedents. [ ] cape finisterre. [ ] cape st. vincent. [ ] ms. cape devert. [ ] ms. 'loofe.' [ ] corporal of the field meant the equivalent of an a.d.c. or orderly. [ ] this appears to be the first known mention of a court-martial being provided for officially at sea. [ ] this passage is corrupt in the ms. and is restored from wimbledon's article , _post_, p. . [ ] this was the spanish practice. there is no known mention of it earlier in the english service. [ ] gorges's article about 'musket-arrows' is here omitted by ralegh. [ ] _i.e._ 'noisy confusion.' shakspeare has 'i heard a bustling rumour like a fray.' [ ] the corresponding article in gorges's set (_stowe mss._ ) is as follows:-- 'no man shall board any enemy's ship but by order from a principal commander, as the admiral, vice-admiral or rear-admiral, for that by one ship's boarding all the fleet may be engaged to their dishonour or loss. but every ship that is under the lee of an enemy shall labour to recover the wind if the admiral endeavour it. but if we find an enemy to leeward of us the whole fleet shall follow the admiral, vice-admiral or other leading ship within musket-shot of the enemy, giving so much liberty to the leading ship, as after her broadside is delivered she may stay and trim her sails. then is the second ship to give her side and the third, fourth, and rest, which done they shall all tack as the first ship and give the other side, keeping the enemy under a perpetual volley. this you must do upon the windermost ship or ships of the enemy, which you shall either batter in pieces, or force him or them to bear up and so entangle them, and drive them foul one of another to their utter confusion.' for the evidence that this may have been drawn up and used as early as , and consequently in the armada campaign, see introductory note, _supra_, pp. - . [ ] 'sergeant-major' at this time was the equivalent to our 'chief of the staff' or 'adjutant-general.' in the fleet orders issued by the earl of essex for the azores expedition in there was a similar article, which ralegh was accused of violating by landing at fayal without authority; it ran as follows:--'no captain of any ship nor captain of any company if he be severed from the fleet shall land without direction from the general or some other principal commander upon pain of death,' &c. ralegh met the charge by pleading he was himself a 'principal commander.'--purchas, iv. . [ ] this expression has not been found elsewhere. it may stand for 'chap merchant,' _i.e._ 'barter-merchant.' part iii carolingian i. viscount wimbledon, ii. the earl of lindsey, the attempt to apply land formations to the fleet, introductory from the point of view of command perhaps the most extraordinary naval expedition that ever left our shores was that of sir edward cecil, viscount wimbledon, against cadiz in . every flag officer both of the fleet and of the squadrons was a soldier. cecil himself and the earl of essex, his vice-admiral, were low country colonels of no great experience in command even ashore, and lord denbigh, the rear-admiral, was a nobleman of next to none at all. even cecil's captain, who was in effect 'captain of the fleet,' was sir thomas love, a sailor of whose service nothing is recorded, and the only seaman of tried capacity who held a staff appointment was essex's captain, sir samuel argall. it was probably due to this recrudescence of military influence in the navy that we owe the first attempt to establish a regular order of battle since the days of henry viii. these remarkable orders appear to have been an after-thought, for they were not proposed until a day or two after the fleet had sailed. the first orders issued were a set of general instructions, 'for the better government of the fleet' dated october , when the fleet was still at plymouth. they were, it will be seen, on the traditional lines. those used by ralegh are clearly the precedent upon which they were drawn, and in particular the article relating to engaging an enemy's fleet follows closely that recommended by gorges, with such modifications as the squadronal organisation of a large fleet demanded. on october , the day the fleet got to sea, a second and more condensed set of 'fighting instructions' was issued, which is remarkable for the modification it contains of the method of attack from windward.[ ] for instead of an attack by squadrons it seems to contemplate the whole fleet going into action in succession after the leading ship, an order which has the appearance of another advance towards the perfected line. two days later however the fleet was becalmed, and cecil took the opportunity of calling a council to consider a wholly new set of 'fighting instructions' which had been drafted by sir thomas love. this step we are told was taken because cecil considered the original articles provided no adequate order of battle such as he had been accustomed to ashore. the fleet had already been divided into three squadrons, the dutch contingent forming a fourth, but beyond this, we are told, nothing had been done 'about the form of a sea fight.' under the new system it will be seen each of the english squadrons was to be further divided into three sub-squadrons of nine ships, and these apparently were to sail three deep, as in drake's parade formation of , and were to 'discharge and fall off three and three as they were filed in the list,' or order of battle. that is, instead of the ships of each squadron attacking in succession as the previous orders had enjoined, they were to act in groups of three, with a reserve in support. the dutch, it was expressly provided, were not to be bound by these orders, but were to be free 'to observe their own order and method of fighting.' what this was is not stated, but there can be no doubt that the reference is to the boarding tactics which the dutch, in common with all continental navies, continued to prefer to the english method of first overpowering the enemy with the guns. this proviso, in view of the question as to what country it was that first perfected a single line ahead, should be borne in mind. as appears from the minutes of the council of war, printed below, love's revolutionary orders met with strong opposition. still, so earnest was cecil in pressing them, and so well conceived were many of the articles that they were not entirely rejected, but were recognised as a counsel of perfection, which, though not binding, was to be followed as near as might be. their effect upon the officers, or some of them, was that they understood the 'order of fight' to be as follows:--'the several admirals to be in square bodies' (that is, each flag officer would command a division or sub-squadron formed in three ranks of three files), 'and to give their broadsides by threes and so fall off. the rear-admiral to stand for a general reserve, and not to engage himself without great cause.'[ ] the confusion, however, must have been considerable and the difference of opinion great as to how far the new orders were binding; for the 'journal of the vanguard' merely notes that a council was called on the th 'wherein some things were debated touching the well ordering of the fleet,' and with this somewhat contemptuous entry the subject is dismissed. still it must be said that on the whole these orders are a great advance over anything we know of in elizabethan times, and particularly in the careful provisions for mutual support they point to a happy reversion to the ideas which de chaves had formulated, and which the elizabethans had too drastically abandoned. footnotes: [ ] 'journal of the vanguard' (essex's flagship), and cecil to essex, _s.p. dom. car. i_, xi. [ ] 'journal of the expedition,' _s. p. dom. car., i_, x. . _lord wimbledon_, , _no._ , _oct._ . [+state papers domestic, car. i, ix.+] _a copy of those instructions which were sent unto the earl of essex and given by sir edward cecil, knight, admiral of the fleet, lieutenant-general and marshal of his majesty's land force now at sea, to be duly performed by all commanders, and their captains and masters, and other inferior officers, both by sea and land, for the better government of his majesty's fleet. dated in the sound of plymouth, aboard his majesty's good ship the anne royal, the third of october_, . . first above all things you shall provide that god be duly served twice every day by all the land and sea companies in your ship, according to the usual prayers and liturgy of the church of england, and shall set and discharge every watch with the singing of a psalm and prayer usual at sea. . you shall keep the company from swearing, blaspheming, drunkenness, dicing, carding, cheating, picking and stealing, and the like disorders. . you shall take care to have all your company live orderly and peaceable, and shall charge your officers faithfully to perform their office and duty of his and their places. and if any seaman or soldier shall raise tumult, mutiny or conspiracy, or commit murder, quarrel, fight or draw weapon to that end, or be a sleeper at his watch, or make noise, or not betake himself to his place of rest after his watch is out, or shall not keep his cabin cleanly, or be discontented with the proportion of victuals assigned unto him, or shall spoil or waste them or any other necessary provisions in the ships, or shall not keep clean his arms, or shall go ashore without leave, or shall be found guilty of any other crime or offence, you shall use due severity in the punishment or reformation thereof according to the known orders of the sea. . for any capital or heinous offence that shall be committed in your ship by the land or sea men, the land and sea commanders shall join together to take a due examination thereof in writing, and shall acquaint me therewith, to the end that i may proceed in judgment according to the quality of the offence. . no sea captain shall meddle with the punishing of any land soldiers, but shall leave them to their commanders; neither shall the land commanders meddle with the punishing of the seamen. . you shall with the master take a particular account of the stores of the boatswain and carpenters of the ship, examining their receipts, expenses and remains, not suffering any unnecessary waste to be made of their provisions, or any work to be done which shall not be needful for the service. . you shall every week take the like account of the purser and steward of the quantity and quality of victuals that are spent, and provide for the preservation thereof without any superfluous expense. and if any person be in that office suspected[ ] for the wasting and consuming of victuals, you shall remove him and acquaint me thereof, and shall give me a particular account from time to time of the expense, goodness, quantity and quality of your victuals. . you shall likewise take a particular account of the master gunner for the shot, powder, munition and all other manner of stores contained in his indenture, and shall not suffer any part thereof to be sold, embezzled or wasted, nor any piece of ordnance to be shot off without directions, keeping also an account of every several piece shot off in your ship, to the end i may know how the powder is spent. . you shall suffer no boat to go from your ship without special leave and upon necessary causes, to fetch water or some other needful thing, and then you shall send some of your officers or men of trust, for whose good carriage and speedy return you will answer. . you shall have a special care to prevent the dreadful accident of fire, and let no candles be used without lanterns, nor any at all in or about the powder room. let no tobacco be taken between the decks, or in the cabins or in any part of the ship, but upon the forecastle or upper deck, where shall stand tubs of water for them to throw their ashes into and empty their pipes. . let no man give offence to his officer, or strike his equal or inferior on board, and let mutinous persons be punished in most severe manner. . let no man depart out of his ship in which he is first entered without leave of his commander, and let no captain give him entertainment after he is listed, upon pain of severity of the law in that case. . if any fire should happen in your ship, notwithstanding your care (which god forbid!), then you shall shoot off two pieces of ordnance, one presently after the other, and if it be in the night you shall hang out four lanterns with lights upon the yards, that the next ships to you may speed to succour you. . if the ship should happen to spend a mast, or spring a leak, which by increasing upon you may grow to present danger, then you shall shoot off two pieces of ordnance, the one a good while after the other, and hang out two lights on the main shrouds, the one a man's height over the other, so as they may be discernible. . if the ship should happen to ran on ground upon any danger (which god forbid!) then you shall shoot off four pieces of ordnance distinctly, one after the other; if in the night, hang out as many lights as you can, to the end the fleet may take notice thereof. . you shall favour your topmasts and the head of your mainmast by bearing indifferent sail, especially in foul weather and in a head sea and when your ship goeth by the wind; lest, by the loss of a mast upon a needless adventure, the service is deprived of your help when there is greatest cause to use it. . the whole fleet is to be divided into three squadrons: the admiral's squadron to wear red flags and red pennants on the main topmast-head; the vice-admiral's squadron to wear blue flags and blue pennants on the fore topmast-heads; the rear-admiral's squadron to wear white flags and white pennants on the mizen topmast-heads.[ ] . the admirals and officers are to speak with me twice a day, morning and evening, to receive my directions and commands, which the rest of the ships are duly to perform. if i be ahead i will stay for them, if to leeward i will bear up to them. if foul weather should happen, you are not to come too near me or any other ship to hazard any danger at all. and when i have hailed you, you are to fall astern, that the rest of the ships in like manner may come up to receive my commands. . you shall make in every ship two captains of the watch, or more (if need be), who shall make choice of soldiers or seamen to them to search every watch in the night between the decks, that no fire or candle be carried about the ship after the watch is set, nor that no candle be burning in any cabin without a lantern, nor that neither but whilst they are making themselves ready, and to see the fire put out in the cook's room, for there is no danger so inevitable as the ship's firing. . you shall cause the landmen to learn the names and places of the ropes that they may assist the sailors in their labours upon the decks, though they cannot go up to the tops and yards. . you shall train and instruct such sailors and mariners as shall be found fit to the use of the musket, as you do your landmen, and register their names in a list by themselves, making no difference for matter of discipline between the sailors and soldiers aboard you. . you shall not give chase nor send aboard any ship but by order from me, or my vice-admiral or rear-admiral; and if you come near any ship in your course belonging to any prince or state you shall only make stay of her, and bring her to me or the next officer, without taking anything from them or their companies by force, but shall charge all your company from pillaging between decks or breaking up any hold, or embezzling any goods so seized and taken, upon pain of severity of the law in that case. . you shall fall astern of me and the admirals of your several squadrons unto the places assigned unto you, and follow their lights as aforesaid, receiving such instructions from me or them in the morning what course to hold. and if you shall at any time be separated from the fleet by foul weather, chase or otherwise, you shall shape your course for the southward cape upon the coast of spain in the latitude of , one of the places of rendezvous; if you miss me there, then sail directly for the bay of cales or st. lucar, which is the other place assigned for rendezvous. . you must have a special care in times of calms and foggy weather to give such a berth one unto the other as to keep your ships clear, and not come foul one of another. especially in fogs and mists you shall sound with drum or trumpet, or make a noise with your men, or shoot off muskets, to give warning to other ships to avoid the danger of boarding or coming foul one of another. . if you or any other two or three of the fleet discover any sail at sea to the windward or leeward of the admiral, which the admiral cannot discern, if she be a great ship you shall signify the same by striking or hoisting of your main topsail so often as you conceive the ship to be hundred tons of burthen; and if you discover a small ship you shall give the like signs by striking your fore topsail; but if you discover many ships you shall strike your main topsail often and put out your ensign in the maintop; and if such ship or fleet go large before the wind, you shall after your sign given do the like, till you perceive that the admiral and the rest of the squadrons have seen your sign and your so standing; and if you went large at the time of discovery of such ship or fleet, you shall for a little time hale aft your sheets and then go large again, that the rest of the fleet and squadrons may know that you go large to show that the ship or fleet discovered keeps that course. . if the ship or fleet discovered have their tacks aboard and stand upon a wind, then if you had your tack aboard at the time of the discovery you shall bear up for a little time, and after hale aft your sheets again to show us what course the ship or fleet holdeth. . if you discover any ship or fleet by night, and they be [to] windward of you, the general or admirals, you shall presently bear up to give us knowledge if you can speak with her; if not, you may keep your luff and shoot off a piece of ordnance by which we shall know you give chase, to the end that the rest may follow accordingly. . for a general rule let no man presume to shoot off any pieces of ordnance but in discovery of ships or fleet by night, or being in danger of the enemy, or of fire, or of sinking, that it may be unto us a most certain intelligence of some matter of importance. . if any man shall steal any victuals by breaking into the hold or otherwise, he shall receive the punishment of a thief and murderer of his fellows. . no man shall keep any feasting or drinking between meals, or drink any health upon the ship's provisions; neither shall the steward deliver any candle to any private man or for any private use. . in foul weather every man shall set his sail to keep company with the rest of the fleet, and not run too far ahead by day but that he may fall astern the admiral before night. . in case the fleet or any part of us should be set upon, the sea-captain shall appoint sufficient company to assist the gunners, after which (if the fight require it) the cabins between the decks shall be taken down, [and] all beds and sacks employed for bulwarks. the musketeers of every ship shall be divided under captains or other officers, some for the forecastle, some for the waist, and others for the poop, where they shall abide if they be not otherwise directed. . an officer or two shall be appointed to take care that no loose powder be carried between [the decks] nor near any linstock or match in hand. you shall saw divers hogsheads in two parts, and, filling them with water, set them aloft the decks. you shall divide your carpenters, some in hold, if any shot come between wind and water, and the rest between the decks, with plates of lead, plugs and all things necessary laid by them. you shall also lay by your tubs of water certain wet blankets, to cast upon and cloak any fire. . the master and boatswain shall appoint a convenient number of sailors to every sail, and to every such company a master's mate or a quartermaster, so as when every man knows his charge and his place, things may be done without noise or confusion; and no man [is] to speak but the officers. . no man shall board any enemy's ship, especially such as command the king's ships, without special order from me. the loss of one of our ships will be an encouragement to the enemy, and by that means our fleet may be engaged, it being a great dishonour to lose the least of our fleet. if we be under the lee of an enemy, every squadron and ship shall labour to recover the wind (if the admiral endeavour it). but if we find an enemy to leeward of us the whole fleet shall follow in their several places, the admirals with the head of the enemy, the vice-admirals with the body, and the rear-admirals with the sternmost ships of the chase, (or other leading ships which shall be appointed) within musket-shot of the enemy, giving so much liberty to the leading ship as after her broadside[ ] delivered she may stay and trim her sails; then is the second ship to give her side, and the third and fourth, with the rest of that division; which done they shall all tack as the first ship and give their other sides, keeping the enemy under perpetual volley. this you must do upon the windermost ship or ships of an enemy, which you shall either batter in pieces, or force him or them to bear up, and so entangle them or drive them foul one of another to their utter confusion. . your musketeers, divided into quarters of the ship, shall not discharge their shot but at such a distance as their commanders shall direct them. . if the admiral or admirals give chase, and be the headmost man, the next ship shall take up his boat if other order be not given, or if any other ship be appointed to give chase, the next ship (if the [ ] chasing ship have[ ] a boat at her stern) shall take it. . whosoever shall show himself a coward upon any landing or otherwise, he shall be disarmed and made a labourer or carrier of victuals for the army. . no man shall land anywhere in any foreign parts without order from me, or by the sergeant-major or other officer upon pain of death. . wheresoever we shall land no man shall force any woman upon pain of death. . you shall avoid sleeping upon the ground and the drinking of new wines, and eating new fruits, and fresh fish until it has been salted three hours, and also forbear sleeping upon the deck in the night time, for fear of the serene[ ] that falls, all which will breed dangerous fluxes and diseases. . when the admiral shall hang out the arms of england in the mizen shrouds, then shall the council of war come aboard; and when that shall be taken in and the st. george hung in the main shrouds, that is for a general council.[ ] for any orders upon the land (if god send us thither) we shall establish them. for matter of sailing or discipline at sea if there be cause you shall receive other directions, to which i refer you. likewise it is ordered between the seamen and the landmen that after the captain of the ship is cabined, he shall if possible lodge the captain of the foot in the same cabin, after the master of the ship is cabined the lieutenant, and after the master's mates the ensign. footnotes: [ ] ms. 'if any suspected persons be in that office,' &c. [ ] this is the first known occasion of red, blue and white flags being used to distinguish squadrons, though the idea was apparently suggested in elizabeth's time. see _navy records society, miscellany_, i. p. . [ ] ms. has 'to the leading ships as after their broadside,' &c. [ ] ms. 'a' [ ] ms. 'with.' [ ] spanish _'sereno,'_ the cold evening air. [ ] the 'council of war' was composed of the flag officers and the colonels of regiments. sir thos. love was also a member of it, but probably as treasurer of the expedition and not as flag captain. the 'general council' included besides all captains of ships and the masters. _lord wimbledon_, , _no._ , _october_ . [+state papers domestic, charles i, xi.+] _instructions when we come to fight with an enemy, sent by the lieutenant-general unto the earl of essex_. . that you shall see the admiral make way to the admiral enemy, so likewise the vice-admiral and the rear-admiral, and then every ship [is] to set upon the next according to his order, yet to have such a care that those that come after may be ready to second one another after the manner here following. . if we happen to be encountered by an enemy at sea, you shall then appoint a sufficient company to assist the gunners. you shall pull down all the cabins betwixt the decks and use the beds and sacks for bulwarks, and shall appoint your muskets to several officers, some to make good the forecastle, some the waist, and others abaft the mast, from whence they shall not stir till they be otherwise directed, neither shall they or the gunners shoot a shot till they be commanded by the captain. . you shall appoint a certain number of mariners to stand by sails and maintops, that every of them knowing his place and duty there be no confusion or disorder in the command; and shall divide carpenters some in hold, some betwixt the decks, with plates of lead, plugs and other things necessary for stopping up breaches made with great shot; and saw divers hogsheads in halves and set them upon the deck full of water, with wet blankets by them to cloak and quench any fire that shall happen in the fight. . no man shall board any enemy's ships without special order, but every ship if we be to leeward shall labour to recover the wind. if we be to windward of them, then shall the whole fleet, or so many of them as shall be appointed, follow the leading ship within musket-shot of the enemy, and give them first the chase pieces, then the broadside, afterwards a volley of small shot; and when the headmost ship hath done, the next ship shall observe the same course, and so every ship in order, that the headmost may be ready to renew the fight against such time as the sternmost hath made an end; by that means keeping the weather of the enemy and in continual fight till they be sunk in the sea, or forced by bearing up to entangle themselves, and to come [foul] one of another to their utter confusion. _lord wimbledon_, , _no._ . [+the earl of st. germans's ms. extract+.[ ]] _at a council of war holden aboard the anne royal, tuesday, the th of october_, . the council, being assembled, entered into consultation touching the form of a sea-fight performed against any fleet or ships of the king of spain or other enemy, and touching some directions to be observed for better preparation to be made for such a fight and the better managing thereof when we should come to action. the particulars for this purpose considerable were many; insomuch that no pertinent consultation could well be had concerning the same without some principles in writing, whereby to direct and bound the discourse. and therefore, by the special command of my lord lieutenant-general, a form of articles for this service (drawn originally by sir thomas love, kt., treasurer for this action, captain of the anne royal and one of the council of war) was presented to the assembly, and several times read over to them. after the reading, all the parts thereof were well weighed and examined, whereby it was observed that it intended to enjoin our fleet to advance and fight at sea, much after the manner of an army at land, assigning every ship to a particular division, rank, file, and station; which order and regularity was not only improbable but almost impossible to be observed by so great a fleet in so uncertain a place as the sea. hereupon some little doubt arose whether or no this form of articles should be confirmed; but then it was alleged that the same articles had in them many other points of direction, preparation, and caution for a sea-fight, which were agreed by all men to be most reasonable and necessary. and if so strict a form of proceeding to fight were not or could not be punctually observed, yet might these articles beget in our commanders and officers a right understanding of the conception and intent thereof; which with an endeavour to come as near as could be to perform, the particulars might be of great use to keep us from confusion in the general. neither could the limiting of every several ship to such a rank or file [and] to such certain place in the same, bring upon the fleet intricacy and difficulty of proceeding, so [long] as (if the proper ships were absent or not ready) those in the next place were left at liberty, or rather commanded, to supply their rooms and maintain the instructions, if not absolutely, yet as near as they could. in conclusion therefore the form of articles which was so presented, read, and considered of, was with some few alterations and additions ratified by my lord lieutenant-general and by the whole council as act of theirs passed and confirmed, and to be duly observed and put in execution by all captains, mariners, gunners, and officers in every ship, and all others, to whom it might appertain, at their perils, leaving only to my lord lieutenant the naming and ranking of the ships of every division in order as they should proceed for the execution of the same articles; which in conclusion were these, touching the whole fleet in general and the admiral's squadron in particular, namely:-- . that when the fleet or ships of the enemy should be discovered the admiral of our fleet with the ships of his squadron should put themselves into the form undermentioned and described, namely, that the same squadron should be separated into three divisions of nine ships in a division, and so should advance, set forward, and charge upon the enemy as hereafter more particularly is directed. that these nine ships should discharge and fall off three and three, as they are filed in this list. anne royal admiral prudence captain vaughan royal defence captain ellis. barbara constance captain hatch talbot captain burdon abraham captain downes. golden cock captain beaumont amity captain malyn anthony captain blague. that these nine ships should second the admiral of this squadron three and three, as they are filed in this list. st. george vice-admiral lesser sapphire captain bond sea venture captain knevet. assurance captain osborne camelion captain seymour return captain bonithon. jonathan captain butler[ ] william captain white hopewell captain ---- that these nine ships should second the vice-admiral of this squadron three and three, as they are filed in this list. convertine rear-admiral globe captain stokes assurance of dover captain bargey. great sapphire captain raymond anne captain wollaston jacob captain gosse. george captain stevens hermit captain turner mary magdalen captain cooper. these three ships should fall into the rear of the three former divisions, to charge where and when there should be occasion, or to help the engaged, or supply the place of any that should be unserviceable. hellen captain mason amity of hull captain frisby anne speedwell captain polkenhorne. . that the admiral of the dutch and his squadron should take place on the starboard side of our admiral, and observe their own order and method in fighting. . that the vice-admiral of our fleet and his squadron should make the like division, and observe the same order and form as the admiral's squadron was to observe, and so should keep themselves in their several divisions on the larboard side of the admiral, and there advance and charge if occasion were when the admiral did. . that the rear-admiral of the fleet and his squadron should also put themselves into the like order of the admiral's squadron as near as it might be, and in that form should attend for a reserve or supply. and if any squadron, ship or ships of ours should happen to be engaged by over-charge of the enemies, loss of masts or yards, or other main distress needing special succour, that then the rear-admiral with all his force, or one of his divisions proportionable to the occasion, should come to their rescue; which being accomplished they should return to their first order and place assigned. . that the distance between ship and ship in every squadron should be such as none might hinder one another in advancing or falling off. . that the distance between squadron and squadron should be more or less as the order of the enemy's fleet or ships should require, whereof the captains and commanders of our fleet were to be very considerate. . that if the enemy's approach happened to be in such sort as the admiral of the dutch and his squadron, or the vice-admiral of our fleet [and] his squadron, might have opportunity to begin the fight, it should be lawful for them to do so until the admiral could come up, using the form, method, and care prescribed. . that if the enemy should be forced to bear up, or to be entangled among themselves, whereby an advantage might be had, then our rear-admiral and his squadron with all his divisions should lay hold thereof and prosecute it to effect. . that the rear-admiral's squadron should keep most strict and special watch to see what squadrons or ships distressed of our fleet should need extraordinary relief, and what advantage might be had upon the enemy, that a speedy and present course might be taken to perform the service enjoined. . that if any ship or ships of the enemy should break out or fly, the admiral of any squadron which should happen to be in the next and most convenient place for that purpose should send out a competent number of the fittest ships of his squadron to chase, assault, or take such ship or ships so breaking out; but no ship should undertake such a chase without the command of the admiral, or at leastwise the admiral of his squadron. . that no man should shoot any small or great shot at the enemy till he came at the distance of caliver or pistol shot, whereby no shot might be made fruitless or in vain; whereof the captains and officers in every ship should have an especial care. . that no man should presume or attempt to board any ship of the enemy without special order and direction from the admiral, or at leastwise the admiral of his squadron. . that if any of our fleet happened to be [to] leeward of the enemy, every of our ships should labour and endeavour what they might to take all opportunity to get to windward of them, and to hold that advantage having once obtained it. . that the captains and officers of every ship should have an especial care as much as in them lay to keep the enemies in continual fight without any respite or intermission to be offered them; which, with the advantage of the wind if it might be had, was thought the likeliest way to enforce them to bear up and entangle themselves, or fall foul one of another in disorder and confusion. . that an especial care should be had in every ship that the gunners should load some of their pieces with case shot, handspikes, nails, bars of iron, or with what else might do most mischief to the enemy's men, upon every fit opportunity, and to come near and lay the ordnance well to pass for that purpose, which would be apt to do great spoil to the enemy. . that the cabins in every ship should be broken down so far as was requisite to clear the way of the ordnance. . that all beds and sacks in every ship should be disposed and used as bulwarks for defence against the shot of the enemy. . that there should be ten, eight, six, or four men to attend every piece of ordnance as the master gunner should choose out and assign them to their several places of service, that every one of them might know what belonged properly to him to do. and that this choice and assignation should be made with speed so as we might not be taken unprovided. . that there should be one, two, or three men of good understanding and diligence, according to the burden of every ship, forthwith appointed to fill cartouches[ ] of powder, and to carry them in cases or barrels covered to their places assigned. . that the hold in every ship should be rummaged and made predy,[ ] especially by the ship's sides, and a carpenter with some man of trust appointed to go fore and after in hold to seek for shot that may come in under water; and that there should be provided in readiness plugs, pieces of sheet lead, and pieces of elm board to stop all leaks that might be found within board or without. . that in every ship where any soldiers were aboard the men should be divided into two or three parts, whereof only one part should fight at once and the rest should be in hold, to be drawn up upon occasion to relieve and rescue the former. . that the men in every ship should be kept as close as reasonably might be till the enemy's first volley of small shot should be past. . that the mariners in every ship should be divided and separated into three or four parts or divisions, so as every one might know the place where he was to perform his duty for the avoiding of confusion. . that the master or boatswain of every ship, by command of the captain, should appoint a sufficient and select number of seamen to stand by and attend the sails. . that more especially they should by like command appoint sufficient helmsmen to steer the ship. . that the sailors and helmsmen should in no sort presume to depart or stir from their charge. . that the mainyard, foreyard, and topsail sheets in every ship should be slung, and the topsail yards if the wind were not too high; hereby to avoid the shooting down of sails. . that there should be butts or hogsheads sawn into two parts filled with salt water, set upon the upper and lower decks in several places convenient in every ship, with buckets, gowns, and blankets to quench and put out wild-fire or other fire if need be. . that if a fight began by day and continued till night, every ship should be careful to observe the admiral of her squadron; that if the admiral fell off and forbore the fight for the present every other ship might do the like, repairing under her own squadron to amend anything amiss, and be ready to charge again when the admiral should begin. . that if any of the ships belonging to any squadron or division happened to be absent or not ready in convenient time and place to keep and make good the order herein prescribed, then every squadron and division should maintain these directions as near as they could, although the number of ships in every division were the less, without attending the coming in of all the ships of every division. . and that these ten ships, in regard of the munition and materials for the army and the horses which were carried in them, should attend the rear-admiral and not engage themselves without order, but should remain and expect such directions as might come from our admiral or rear-admiral. peter bonaventure captain johnson sarah bonaventure captain carew christian captain wharey susan and ellen captain levett william of london captain amadas hope sir thomas pigott, knt. chestnut fortune fox truelove there was no difference between the articles for the admiral's squadron and those for the vice-admiral's and rear-admiral's, save in the names of the ships of every division, and that their squadrons had not any particular reserve, nor above five or six ships apiece in the third division, for want of ships to make up the number of nine; the munition and horse ships which belonged to their squadrons being unapt to fight, and therefore disposed into a special division of ten ships by themselves to attend the general reserve. * * * * * at the rising of the council a motion was made to have some of the best sailers of our fleet chosen out and assigned to lie off from the main body of the fleet, some to sea and some to shoreward, the better to discover, chase, and take some ships or boats of the enemy's; which might give us intelligence touching the plate fleet, whether it were come home or no, or when it would be expected and in what place, and touching such other matters whereof we might make our best advantage. but nothing herein was now resolved, it being conceived, as it seemed, that we might soon enough and more opportunely consider of this proposition and settle an order therein when we came nearer to the enemy's coasts; so the council was dissolved. footnotes: [ ] _a relation touching the fleet and army of the king's most excellent majesty king charles, set forth in the first year of his highness's reign, and touching the order, proceedings, and actions of the same fleet and army_, by sir john glanville, the younger, serjeant-at-law, and secretary to the council of war. [printed for the camden society, , n.s. vol. xxxii.] [ ] elsewhere in the ms. spelt 'boteler.' probably nathaniel boteler, author of the _dialogues about sea services_. [ ] ms. 'carthouses.' [ ] ms. 'pridie'=boteler's 'predy.' 'to make the ship predy,' he says, is to clear for action. 'and likewise to make the hold predy is to bestow everything handsomely there and to remove anything that may be troublesome.'--_dialogues_, . the ship-money fleets, _circa_ introductory that cecil's unconfirmed orders produced some impression beyond the circle of the military flag-officers is clear. captain nathaniel boteler, in the work already cited,[ ] quotes the system they enjoined as the one he would himself adopt if he were to command a large fleet in action. in his sixth dialogue on the 'ordering of fleets,' after recommending the division of all fleets of eighty sail and upwards into five squadrons, an organisation that was subsequently adopted by the dutch, he proceeds to explain his system of signals, and the advantages of scout vessels being attached to every squadron, especially, he says, the 'van and wings,' which looks as though the ideas of de chaves were still alive. boteler's work is cast in the form of a conversation between a landsman admiral and an experienced sea captain, who is supposed to be instructing him. in reply to the admiral's query about battle formations, the captain says that 'neither the whole present age [_i.e._ century] with the half of the last have afforded any one thorough example of this kind.' in the few actions between sailing fleets that had taken place in the previous seventy-five years he says 'we find little or nothing as touching the form of these fights.' being pressed for his own ideas on the subject, he consents to give them as follows: 'i say, then, that wheresoever a fleet is either to give or take a battle with another every way equal with it, every squadron of such fleet, whether they be three in number as generally they are, or five (as we prescribed in the beginning of the dialogue) shall do well to order and subdivide itself into three equal divisions, with a reserve of certain ships out of every squadron to bring up their rears, the which may amount in number to the third part of every one of those divisions. and every one of these (observing a due berth and distance) are in the fight to second one another, and (the better to avoid confusion, and the falling foul one upon another) to charge, discharge and fall off by threes or fives, more or less, as the fleet in gross is greater or smaller; the ships of reserve being to be instructed either to succour and relieve any that shall be anyway engaged and in danger, or to supply and put themselves in the place of those that shall be made unserviceable; and this order and course to be constantly kept and observed during the whole time of the battle. asked if there are no other forms he says: 'some forms besides, and different from this (i know well), have been found prescribed and practised; as for a fleet which consisteth but of a few ships and being in fight in an open sea, that it should be brought up to the battle in one only front, with the chief admiral in the midst of them, and on each side of him the strongest and best provided ships of the fleet, who, keeping themselves in as convenient a distance as they shall be able, are to have a eye and regard in the fight to all the weaker and worser ships of the party, and to relieve and succour them upon all occasions, and withal being near the admiral may both guard him and aptly receive his instructions. and for a numerous fleet they propound that it should be ordered also (when there is sea-room sufficient) into one only front, but that the ablest and most warlike ships should be so stationed as that the agility of the smaller ships and the strength of the other may be communicated[ ] to a mutual relief, and for the better serving in all occasions either of chase or charge; to which end they order that all the files of the front that are to the windwards should be made up of the strongest and best ships, that so they may the surer and speedier relieve all such of the weaker ships, being to leewards of them, as shall be endangered or anyway oppressed by any of the enemy.' all this is a clear echo of de chaves and the system which still obtained in all continental navies. for a large fleet at least boteler evidently disapproved all tactics based on the line abreast, and preferred a system of small groups attacking in line ahead, on cecil's proposed system. asked about the campaign of , he has nothing to tell of any english formation. of the crescent order of the armada he says--and modern research has fully confirmed his statement--that it was not a battle order at all, but only a defensive sailing formation 'to keep themselves together and in company until they might get up to be athwart gravelines, which was the rendezvous for their meeting with the prince of parma; and in this regard this their order was commendable.' how far these ideas really represented current naval opinion we cannot precisely tell, but we know that boteler was an officer held in high enough esteem to receive the command of the landing flotilla at cadiz, and to be described as 'an able and experienced sea captain.' but whatever tendency there may have been to tactical progress under buckingham's inspiring personality, it must have been smothered by the lamentable conduct of his war. later on in the reign, in the period of the 'ship-money' fleets, when charles was endeavouring to establish a real standing navy on modern lines, we find in the earl of lindsey's orders of , which monson selected for publication in his _tracts_, no sign of anything but tactical stagnation. the early tudor tradition seems to have completely re-established itself, and monson, who represents that tradition better than anyone, though he approved the threefold subdivision of squadrons, thought all battle formations for sailing ships a mistake. writing not long after boteler, he says: 'ships which must be carried by wind and sails, and the sea affording no firm or steadfast footing, cannot be commanded to take their ranks like soldiers in a battle by land. the weather at sea is never certain, the winds variable, ships unequal in sailing; and when they strictly keep their order, commonly they fall foul one of another, and in such cases they are more careful to observe their directions than to offend the enemy, whereby they will be brought into disorder amongst themselves.' of lindsey's orders only article is given here out of the thirty-four which monson prints in full. it is the only one relating to tactics. the rest, which follow the old pattern, are the usual medley of articles of war, sailing instructions, and general directions for the conduct of the fleet at sea. we cannot therefore safely assume that article fairly represents the tactical thought of the time. it may be that lindsey's orders were merely in the nature of 'general instructions,' to be supplemented by more particular 'fighting instructions,' as was the practice later. footnotes: [ ] _ante_, p. . [ ] the obsolete meaning of 'communicate' is to 'share' or 'participate,' to 'enjoy in common.' _the earl of lindsey_, . _such instructions as were given in the voyage in by the right honourable robert, earl of lindsey_.[ ] [+monson's naval tracts, book iii. extract+.] art. . if we happen to descry any fleet at sea which we may probably know or conjecture designs to oppose, encounter or affront us, i will first strive to get the wind (if i be to leeward), and so shall the whole fleet in due order do the like. and when we shall join battle no ship shall presume to assault the admiral, vice-admiral or rear-admiral, but only myself, my vice-admiral or rear-admiral, if we be able to reach them; and the other ships are to match themselves accordingly as they can, and to secure one another as cause shall require, not wasting their powder at small vessels or victuallers, nor firing till they come side to side. footnote: [ ] this was a fleet of forty sail, designed, under colour of securing the sovereignty of the seas and protecting commerce against pirates, to assist spain as far as possible against the french and dutch. it never fought. part iv the first dutch war i. english and dutch orders on the eve of the war, - ii. orders issued during the war, - i english and dutch orders on the eve of the war, - introductory from the foregoing examples it will be seen that at the advent of the commonwealth, which was to set on foot so sweeping a revolution in the naval art, all attempts to formulate a tactical system had been abandoned. this is confirmed by the following extract from the orders issued by the long parliament in . it was the time when the revolt of a part of the fleet and a rising in the south eastern counties led the government to apprehend a naval coalition of certain foreign powers in favour of charles. it is printed by granville penn in his _memorials of sir william penn_ as having been issued in , but the original copy of the orders amongst the penn tracts (_sloane mss._ , f. ) is marked as having been delivered on may , , to 'captain william penn, captain of the assurance frigate and rear-admiral of the irish squadron.' they are clearly based on the later precedents of charles i, but it must be noted that penn is told 'to expect more particular instructions' in regard to the fighting article. we may assume therefore that the admiralty authorities already recognised the inadequacy of the established fighting instructions, and so soon as the pressure of that critical time permitted intended to amplify them. amongst those responsible for the orders however there is no name that can be credited with advanced views. they were signed by five members of the navy committee, and at their head is colonel edward mountagu, afterwards earl of sandwich, but then only twenty-two years old.[ ] whether anything further was done is uncertain. no supplementary orders have been found bearing date previous to the outbreak of the dutch war. but there exists an undated set which it seems impossible not to attribute to this period. it exists in the _harleian mss._ ( , ff. b), amongst a number of others which appear to have been used by the duke of york as precedents in drawing up his famous instructions of . to begin with it is clearly later than the orders of , upon which it is an obvious advance. then the use of the word 'general' for admiral, and of the word 'sign' for 'signal' fixes it to the commonwealth or very early restoration. finally, internal evidence shows it is previous to the orders of , for those orders will be seen to be an expansion of the undated set so far as they go, and further, while these undated orders have no mention of the line, those of enjoin it. they must therefore lie between and , and it seems worth while to give them here conjecturally as being possibly the supplementary, or 'more particular instructions,' which the government contemplated; particularly as this hypothesis gains colour from the unusual form of the heading 'instructions for the better ordering.' though this form became fixed from this time forward, there is, so far as is known, no previous example of it except in the orders which lord wimbledon propounded to his council of war in , and those were also supplementary articles.[ ] be this as it may, the orders in question do not affect the position that up to the outbreak of the first dutch war we have no orders enjoining the line ahead as a battle formation. still we cannot entirely ignore the fact that, in spite of the lack of orders on the subject, traces of a line ahead are to be detected in the earliest action of the war. gibson, for instance, in his _reminiscences_ has the following passage relating to blake's brush with tromp over the honour of the flag on may , , before the outbreak of the war:[ ] 'when the general had got half channel over he could see the dutch fleet with their starboard tacks aboard standing towards him, having the weather-gage. upon which the general made a sign for the fleet to tack. after which, having their starboard tacks aboard (the general's ship, the old james, being the southernmost and sternmost ship in the fleet), the rest of his fleet tacking, first placed themselves in a line ahead of the general, who after tacking hauled up his mainsail in the brails, fitted his ship to fight, slung his yards, and run out his lower tier of guns and clapt his fore topsail upon the mast.' if gibson could be implicitly trusted this passage would be conclusive on the existence of the line formation earlier than any of the known fighting instructions which enjoined it; but unfortunately, as dr. gardiner pointed out, gibson did not write his account till , when he was . he is however to some extent corroborated by blake himself, who in his official despatch of may , relating the incident, says that on seeing tromp bearing down on him 'we lay by and put ourselves into a fighting posture'--_i.e._ battle order--but what the 'posture' was he does not say. if however this posture was actually the one gibson describes, we have the important fact that in the first recorded instance of the complete line, it was taken as a defensive formation to await an attack from windward. the only other description we have of english tactics at this time occurs in a despatch of the dutch commander-in-chief in the mediterranean, van galen, in which he describes how captain richard badiley, then commanding a squadron on the station, engaged him with an inferior force and covered his convoy off monte christo in august . when the fleets were in contact, he says, as though he were speaking of something that was quite unfamiliar to him, 'then every captain bore up from leeward close to us to get into range, and so all gave their broadsides first of the one side and then again of the other, and then bore away with their ships before the wind till they were ready again; and then as before with the guns of the whole broadside they fired into my flagship, one after the other, meaning to shoot my masts overboard.'[ ] from this it would seem that badiley attacked in succession in the time-honoured way, and that the old rudimentary form of the line ahead was still the ordinary practice. the evidence however is far from strong, but really little is needed. experience teaches us that the line ahead formation would never have been adopted as a standing order unless there had been some previous practice in the service to justify it or unless the idea was borrowed from abroad. but, as we shall see, the oft-repeated assertion that it was imitated from the dutch is contrary to all the evidence and quite untenable. the only experience the framers of the order of can have had of a line ahead formation must have been in our own service. the clearest proof of this lies in the annexed orders which tromp issued on june , , immediately before the declaration of war, and after he had had his brush with blake, in which, if gibson is to be trusted, tromp had seen blake's line. from these orders it is clear that the dutch conception of a naval action was still practically identical with that of lindsey's instructions of , that is, mutual support of squadrons or groups, with no trace of a regular battle formation. in the detailed 'organisation' of the fleet each of the three squadrons has its own three flag officers--that is to say, it was organised, like that of lord wimbledon in , in three squadrons and nine sub-squadrons, and was therefore clearly designed for group tactics. it is on this point alone, if at all, that it can be said to show any advance on the tactics which had obtained throughout the century, or on those which tromp himself had adopted against oquendo in . yet further proof is to be found in the orders issued by witte corneliszoon de with to his captains in october , as commander-in-chief of the dutch fleet. in these he very strictly enjoins, as a matter of real importance, 'that they shall all keep close up by the others and as near together as possible, to the end that thereby they may act with united force ... and prevent any isolation or cutting off of ships occurring in time of fight;' adding 'that it behoved them to stand by and relieve one another loyally, and rescue such as might be hotly attacked.' this is clearly no more than an amplification of tromp's order of the previous june. it introduces no new principle, and is obviously based on the time-honoured idea of group tactics and mutual support. it is true that de jonghe, the learned historian of the dutch navy, regards it as conclusive that the line was then in use by the dutch, because, as he says, several dutch captains, after the next action, were found guilty and condemned for not having observed their instructions. but really there is nothing in it from which a line can be inferred. it is all explained on the theory of groups. and in spite of de jonghe's deep research and his anxiety to show that the line was practised by his countrymen as well as by the english in the first dutch war, he is quite unable to produce any orders like the english instructions of , in which a line formation is clearly laid down. but whether or not we can accept de jonghe's conclusions as to the time the line was introduced into the dutch service, one thing is clear enough--that he never ventured to suggest that the english copied the idea from his own countrymen. it is evident that he found nothing either in the dutch archives or elsewhere even to raise such an idea in his mind. but, on the other hand, his conspicuous impartiality leads him to give abundant testimony that throughout these wars thoughtful dutch officers were continually praising the order and precision of the english tactics, and lamenting the blundering and confusion of their own. it may be added that dr. gardiner's recent researches in the same field equally failed to produce any document upon which we can credit the dutch admirals with serious tactical reforms. even de ruyter's improvements in squadronal organisation consisted mainly in superseding a multiplicity of small squadrons by a system of two or three large squadrons, divided into sub-squadrons, a system which was already in use with the english, and was presumably imitated by de ruyter, if it was indeed he who introduced it and not tromp, from the well-established commonwealth practice.[ ] footnotes: [ ] the others were john rolle, member for truro, a merchant and politician, who died in november , and who as early as had been proposed, though unsuccessfully, for the navy committee; and three less conspicuous members of parliament: sir walter earle (of the presbyterian party), giles greene, and alexander bence. they were all superseded the following year by the new admiralty committee of the council of state. [ ] _supra_, p. . it may also be noted that these articles are intended for a fleet not large enough to be divided into squadrons--just such a fleet in fact as that in which penn was flying his flag. the units contemplated, _e.g._ in articles - , are 'ships,' whereas in the corresponding articles of the units are 'squadrons.' [ ] gardiner, _dutch war_, i. . [ ] this at least is what van galen's crabbed old dutch seems to mean. 'alsoo naer bij quam dat se couden toe schieter dragen, de elcken heer onder den windt, gaven so elck hare laghe dan vinjt d'eene sijde, dan veer van d'anden sijde, hielden alsdan met haer schepen voor den vindt tal dat se weer claer waren, dan wast alsvooren met cannoneren van de heele lagh en in sonderheijt op mijn onderhebbende schip vier gaven van meeninge masten aft stengen overboort to schieten.' a copy of van galen's despatch is amongst dr. gardiner's _dutch war_ transcripts. [ ] see de jonghe's introduction to his third book on 'the condition of the british and dutch navies at the outbreak of and during the second english war,' _geschiedenis van het nederlandsche zeewesen_, vol. ii. part ii. pp. - , and his digression on tactics, pp. _et seq._, and p. note. de witte's order is p. . _parliamentary orders_, . [+sloane mss. , f. . extract+] _instructions given by the right honourable the committee of the lords and commons for the admiralty and cinque ports, to be duly observed by all captains and officers whatsoever and common men respectively in their fleet, provided to the glory of god, the honour and service of parliament, and the safety of the kingdom of england_. [_fol._ .] if any fleet shall be discovered at sea which may probably be conjectured to have a purpose to encounter, oppose, or affront the fleet in the parliament's service, you may in that case expect more particular directions. but for the present you are to take notice, that in case of joining battle you are to leave it to the vice-admiral to assail the enemy's admiral, and to match yourself as equally as you can, to succour the rest of the fleet as cause shall require, not wasting your powder nor shooting afar off, nor till you come side to side. _supplementary instructions, circa_ . [+harleian mss. , b. draft unsigned+.] _instructions for the better ordering and managing the fleet in fighting_. . upon discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the general's ship, which is putting abroad the sign made for each ship or frigate, they are to make sail and stand with them so nigh as to gain knowledge what they are and of what quality, how many fireships and others, and what order the fleet is in; which being done the frigates or vessels are to speak together and conclude on the report they are to give, and accordingly report to the general or commander-in-chief of the squadron, and not to engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number except it shall appear to them on the place that they have the advantage. . at sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral or he that commands in the second place, and the rear-admiral or he that commands in the third place, are to make what sail they can to come up with the admiral on each wing, as also each ship according to her quality, giving a competent distance from each other if there be sea-room enough. . as soon as they shall [see] the general engage, or [he] shall make a sign by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag on the fore topmast-head, that each ship shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy next unto him. . if any ship shall happen to be over-charged and distressed the next ship or ships are immediately to make towards their relief and assistance upon signal given; which signal shall be, if the admiral, then a pennant in the fore topmast-head; the vice-admiral or commander in the second place, a pennant in the main topmast-head; and the rear-admiral the like. . in case any ship shall be distressed or disabled by loss of masts, shot under water, or otherwise so as she is in danger of sinking or taking, he or they are to give a signal thereof so as, the fleet having knowledge, they may be ready to be relieved. therefore the flagships are to have a special care to them, that such provisions may be made that they may not be left in distress to the mercy of the enemy; and the signal is to be a weft[ ] of the ensign of the ship so distressed. . that it is the duty of the commanders and masters of all the small frigates, ketches and smacks belonging to the fleet to know the fireships that belong to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their motion to do their utmost to cut off their boats (if possible), or if opportunity serve that they lay them on board, fire and destroy them; and to this purpose they are to keep to windward of the fleet in time of service. but in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming on board us by coming between us and them, which by all means possible they are to endeavour, that then, in such a case, they show themselves men in such an exigent,[ ] and shear aboard them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us and destroy them; which service, if honourably done, according to its merit shall be rewarded, and the neglect thereof strictly and severely called to account. . that the fireships belonging to the fleet endeavour to keep the wind, and they with the small frigate's to be as near the great ships as they can, and to attend the signal from the commander-in-chief and to act accordingly. . if any engagement shall happen to continue until night and the general please to anchor, that upon signal given they all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the instructions for sailing; and if the general please to retreat without anchoring, then the signal to be firing two guns so nigh one the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like with two guns more. and the commander of this ship is to sign copies of these instructions to all ships and other vessels of this fleet. given on board the ---- footnotes: [ ] see note, p. . [transcriber's note: the text for this note reads: '_waft_ (more correctly written _wheft_). it is any flag or ensign stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a ship.'--admiral smyth (_sailors' word-book_).] [ ] 'exigent' = exigence, emergency. shakespeare has 'why do you cross me in this exigent?'--_jul. cæs._ v. i. _marten tromp, june_ , . [+dr. gardiner's first dutch war, vol. i. p. . extract+.] _june_ / , . _the resolution of admiral tromp on the distribution of the fleet in case of its being attacked_. each captain is expressly ordered, on penalty of guilders, _to keep near_[ ] the flag officer under whom he serves. also he is to have his guns in a serviceable condition. the squadron under vice-admiral jan evertsen is to lie or sail immediately ahead of the admiral. further captain pieter floriszoon (who provisionally carries the flag at the mizen as rear-admiral) is always to remain with his squadron close astern of the admiral; and the admiral tromp is to take his station between both with his squadron. the said superior officers and captains are to stand by one another with all fidelity; and each squadron when another is vigorously attacked shall second and free the other, using therein all the qualities of a soldier and seaman. footnote: [ ] the dutch has 'troppen' = to gather round (_cf._ our 'trooping the colour'). de with's corresponding order has 'dat zij allen bij den anderen ... gesloten zou den blijven.' _supra_, p. . ii orders issued during the war and introductory the earliest known 'fighting instructions' in any language which aimed at a single line ahead as a battle formation, were issued by the commonwealth's 'generals-at-sea' on march , , in the midst of the dutch war. this is placed beyond doubt by an office copy amongst the duke of portland's mss. at welbeck abbey.[ ] it is of high importance for the history of naval tactics that we are at last able to fix the date of these memorable orders. endless misapprehension on the subject of our battle formations during the first dutch war has been caused by a chronological error into which mr. granville penn was led in his _memorials of penn_ (appendix l). sir william penn's copy of these instructions is merely dated 'march ,'[ ] and his biographer hazarded the very natural conjecture that, as this is an 'old style' date, it meant 'march .' this would have been true of any day in march before the th, but as we now can fix the date as the th, we know the year is really and not .[ ] there was perhaps some anxiety on mr. penn's part to get his hero some share in the orders, and as william penn was not appointed one of the 'generals-at-sea' till december , , he could not officially have had the credit of orders issued in the previous march. this point however is also set at rest by the welbeck copy, which besides the date has the signatures of the generals, and they are those of blake, deane and monck. penn did not sign them at all, but this really in no way affects his claim as a tactical reformer. for as he was vice-admiral of the fleet and an officer of high reputation, his share in the orders was probably as great as that of anyone else. the winter of - was the turning point of the war. the summer campaign had shown how serious the struggle was to be, and no terms for ending it could be arranged. large reinforcements consequently had been ordered, and monck and deane nominated to assist blake as joint generals-at-sea for the next campaign. four days later, on november , , blake had been defeated by tromp off dungeness, and several of his captains were reported to have behaved badly. an inquiry was ordered, and the famous 'laws of war and ordinances of the sea,' prepared by sir harry vane by order of parliament for the better enforcement of discipline, were put in force. notwithstanding these vigorous efforts to increase the strength and efficiency of the sea service, it was not till after the first action of the new campaign that an attempt was made to improve the fleet tactics. the action off portland on february , , and the ensuing chase of tromp, marked the first real success of the war; but though the generals succeeded in delivering a severe blow to the dutch admiral and his convoy, it must have been clear to everyone that they narrowly escaped defeat through a want of cohesion between their squadrons. on the th and th tromp executed a masterly retreat, with his fleet in a crescent or obtuse-angle formation and his convoy in its arms, but nowhere is there any hint that either side fought in line ahead.[ ] on the th the fleet had put into stokes bay to refit, and between this time and march the new orders were produced.[ ] the first two articles it will be seen are practically the same as the 'supplementary instructions' on p. , but in the third, relating to 'general action,' instead of the ships engaging 'according to the order presented,' as was enjoined in the previous set, 'they are to endeavour to keep in a line with the chief,' as the order which will enable them 'to take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy.' article directs that where a flagship is distressed captains are to endeavour to form line between it and the enemy. article however goes still further, and enjoins that where the windward station has been gained the line ahead is to be formed 'upon severest punishment,' and a special signal is given for the manoeuvre. article provides a similar signal for flagships. compared with preceding orders, these new ones appear nothing less than revolutionary. but it is by no means certain that they were so. here again it must be remarked that it is beyond all experience for such sweeping reforms to be so rigorously adopted, and particularly in the middle of a war, without their having been in the air for some time previously, and without their supporters having some evidence to cite of their having been tried and tried successfully, at least on a small scale. the natural presumption therefore is that the new orders only crystallised into a definite system, and perhaps somewhat extended, a practice which had long been familiar though not universal in the service. a consideration of the men who were responsible for the change points to the same conclusion. blake, the only one of the three generals who had had experience of naval actions, was ashore disabled by a severe wound, but still able to take part, at least formally, in the business of the fleet. deane, another soldier like blake, though he had commanded fleets, had never before seen an action, but had done much to improve the organisation of the service, and at this time, as his letters show, was more active and ardent in the work than ever. monck before the late cruise had never been to sea at all, since as a boy he sailed in the disastrous cadiz expedition of ; but he was the typical and leading scientific soldier of his time, with an unmatched power of organisation and an infallible eye for both tactics and strategy, at least so far as it had then been tried. penn, the vice-admiral of the fleet, was a professional naval officer of considerable experience, and it was he who by a bold and skilful movement had saved the action off portland from being a severe defeat for blake and deane. monck's therefore was the only new mind that was brought to bear on the subject. yet it is impossible to credit him with introducing a revolution in naval tactics. all that can be said is that possibly his genius for war and his scientific and well-drilled spirit revealed to him in the traditional minor tactics of the seamen the germ of a true tactical system, and caused him to urge its reduction into a definite set of fighting instructions which would be binding on all, and would co-ordinate the fleet into the same kind of homogeneous and handy fighting machine that he and the rest of the low country officers had made of the new model army. in any case he could not have carried the thing through unless it had commended itself to the experience of such men as penn and the majority of the naval officers of the council of war. and they would hardly have been induced to agree had they not felt that the new instructions were calculated to bring out the best of the methods which they had empirically practised. how far the new orders were carried out during the rest of the war is difficult to say. in both official and unofficial reports of the actions of this time an almost superstitious reverence is shown in avoiding tactical details. nevertheless that a substantial improvement was the result seems clear, and further the new tactics appear to have made a marked impression upon the dutch. of the very next action, that off the gabbard on june , when monck was left in sole command, we have a report from the hague that the english 'having the wind, they stayed on a tack for half an hour until they put themselves into the order in which they meant to fight, which was in file at half cannon-shot,' and the suggestion is that this was something new to the dutch. 'our fleet,' says an english report by an eye-witness, 'did work together in better order than before and seconded one another.' then there is the important testimony of a royalist intelligencer who got his information at the hague on june , from the man who had brought ashore the despatches from the defeated dutch fleet. after relating the consternation which the english caused in the dutch ranks as well by their gunnery as their refusal to board, he goes on to say, 'it is certain that the dutch in this fight (by the relation and acknowledgment of tromp's own express sent hither, with whom i spoke) showed very great fear and were in very great confusion, and the english he says fought in excellent order.'[ ] again, for the next battle--that of the texel--fought on july in the same year, we have the statement of hoste's informant, who was present as a spectator, that at the opening of the action the english, but not the dutch, were formed in a single line close-hauled. 'le aoust' [_i.e._ n.s.], the french gentleman says, 'je découvris l'armée de l'amiral composée de plus de cent vaisseaux de guerre. elle était rangée en trois escadrons et elle faisoit vent-arrière pour aller tomber sur les anglois, qu'elle rencontra le même jour à peu près en pareil nombre rangez _[sic]_ sur une ligne qui tenoit plus de quatre lieues nord-nord-est et sud-sud-ouest, le vent étant nord-ouest. le et le se passèrent en des escarmouches, mais le on en _[sic]_ vint à une bataille decisive. les anglois avoient essaié de gagner le vent: mais l'amiral tromp en aiant toujours conservé l'avantage, et l'étant rangé sur une ligne parallèle à celle des anglois arriva sur eux,' &c. this is the first known instance of a dutch fleet forming in single line, and, so far as it goes, would tend to show they adopted it in imitation of the english formation.[ ] at any rate, so far as we have gone, the evidence tends to show that the english finally adopted the regular line-ahead formation in consequence of the orders of march , , and there is no indication of the current belief that they borrowed it from the dutch. by the english admirals the new system must have been regarded as a success. for the fighting instructions of were reissued with nothing but a few alterations of signals and verbal changes by blake, monck, disbrowe, and penn, the new 'admirals and generals of the fleet of the commonwealth of england,' appointed in december , when the war was practically over. they are printed by granville penn (_memorials of penn_, ii. ), under date march , , but that cannot be the actual date of their issue, for blake was then in the mediterranean, penn in the west indies, and monck busy with his pacification of the highlands. we must suspect here then another confusion between old and new styles, and conjecture the true date to be march , , that is just before monck left for scotland, and a few days before the peace was signed. so that these would be the orders under which blake conducted his famous campaign in the mediterranean, penn and venables captured jamaica, and the whole of cromwell's spanish war was fought. footnotes: [ ] _hist. mss. com._ xiii. ii. . it is from a transcript of this copy made for dr. gardiner that i have been permitted to take the text below. a set of 'instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in sailing' accompanies them. [ ] _british museum, shane mss._ , f. . [ ] the sloane copy is not quite identical with that in the portland mss. the variations, however, are merely verbal and in a few signals, and are of such a nature as to be accounted for by careless transcription. [ ] hoste, the author of the first great treatise on naval tactics, quotes tromp's formation as a typical method of retreat; but his account is vitiated by what seems a curious mistake. he says: 'il rangea son armée en demi-lune et il mit son convoi au milieu: c'est à dire que son vaisseau faisait au vent l'angle obtus de la demi-lune, et les autres s'étendoient de part (_sic_) et d'autre _sur les deux lignes du plus- près_ pour former les faces de la demi-lune qui couvroient le convoi. ce fut en cet ordre qu'il fit vent arrière, foudroiant à droite et à gauche tous les anglois qui s'approchent' but if with the wind aft his two quarter lines bore from the flagship seven points from the wind, the formation would have been concave to the enemy and the convoy could not have been _au milieu_. (_evolutions navales_, pp. , , and plate , p. .) the passage is in any case interesting, as showing that what was then called the crescent or half-moon formation was nothing but our own 'order of retreat,' or 'order of retreat reverted,' of rodney's time. as defined by sir charles knowles in , the order of retreat reverted was formed on two lines of bearing, _i.e._ by the seconds of the centre ship keeping two points abaft her starboard and larboard beams respectively. in the simple order of retreat they kept two points before the beam. [ ] no reference to these orders appears in the correspondence of the generals at this time, unless it be in a letter of john poortmans, deputy-treasurer of the fleet, to robert blackbourne, in which he writes on march : 'the generals want copies of the instructions for commanders of the state's ships printed and sent down.' (_s.p. dom._ , f. .) [ ] _clarendon mss._ , f. . [ ] hoste, _evolutions navales_, p. . dr. gardiner declared himself sceptical as to the genuineness of the french gentleman's narrative, mainly on the ground of certain inaccuracies of date and detail; but, as hoste certainly believed in it, it cannot well be rejected as evidence of the main features of the action for which he used it. _commonwealth orders_, .[ ] [+duke of portland's mss.+] _by the right honourable the generals and admirals of the fleet. instructions for the better ordering of the fleet in fighting_. first. upon the discovery of a fleet, receiving a sign from the general, which is to be striking the general's ensign, and making a weft,[ ] two frigates [ ] appointed out of each squadron are to make sail, and stand with them so nigh as they may conveniently, the better to gain a knowledge of them what they are, and of what quality, and how many fireships and others, and in what posture[ ] the fleet is; which being done the frigates are to speak together and conclude in that report they are to give, and accordingly repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and not to engage if the enemy[ ] exceed them in number, except it shall appear to them on the place they have the advantage: ins. nd. at sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the nd place, and his squadron, as also the rear-admiral, or he that commandeth in chief in the rd place, and his squadron, are to make what sail they can to come up with the admiral on each wing, the vice-admiral on the right wing, and the rear-admiral on the left wing, leaving a competent distance for the admiral's squadron if the wind will permit and there be sea-room enough. ins. rd. as soon as they shall see the general engage, or make a signal by shooting off two guns and putting a red flag over the fore topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy next unto them; and in order thereunto all the ships of every squadron shall endeavour to keep in a line with the chief unless the chief be maimed or otherwise disabled (which god forbid!), whereby the said ship that wears the flag should not come in to do the service which is requisite. then every ship of the said squadron shall endeavour to keep[ ] in a line with the admiral, or _he that commands in chief_[ ] next unto him, and nearest the enemy. inst. th. if any squadron shall happen to be overcharged or distressed, the next squadron or ships are _speedily_[ ] to make towards their relief and assistance upon a signal given them; which signal shall be, in the admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore topmast-head, the vice-admiral or he that commands in chief in the second place a pennant on the main topmast-head, [and] the rear-admiral's squadron the like. inst. th. if in case any ship shall be distressed or disabled for lack of masts, shot under water, or otherwise _in danger of sinking or taking, he or they_,[ ] thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his jack or ensign, and those next him are strictly required to relieve him. inst. th. that if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot be otherwise repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm or ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ships may have notice what it is for; and if it should be that the admiral or any flagship should do so, the ships of the fleet or the respective squadrons are to endeavour to _keep up in a line as close_[ ] as they can betwixt him and the enemy, having always one eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition. inst. th. in case the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, and that other ships of the fleet are to windward of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or the mizen topmast,[ ] every such ship then is to bear up into his wake, _and grain upon severest punishment_[ ] in case the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part thereof to leeward of him, to the end such ships to leeward may come up into the line with their admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and bear up, none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or their luff to gain the wake or grain. inst. th. if the admiral will have any of the ships _to endeavour_[ ] by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the enemy, he will put abroad a red flag at his spritsail, topmast shrouds, forestay or main topmast[ ] stay. he that first discovers the signal shall make sail and hoist and lower his sail[ ] or ensign, that the rest of the ships may take notice of it and follow. inst. th. if we put out a red flag on the mizen shrouds, or mizen yard-arm, we will have all the flagships to come up in the grain and wake[ ] of us. inst. th. if in time of fight god shall deliver any of the enemy's ships into our hands, special care is to be taken to save their men as the present state of our condition will permit in such a case, but that the ships be immediately destroyed, by sinking or burning the same, so that our own ships be not disabled or any work interrupted by the departing of men or boats from the ships; and this we require all commanders to be more than mindful of.[ ] inst. th. none shall fire upon any ship of the enemy that is laid aboard by any of our own ships, but so that he may be sure he endamage not his friend. inst. th. that it is the duty of commanders and masters of all small frigates,[ ] ketches, and smacks belonging to the several squadrons to know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their motions to do their utmost to cut off their boats if possible, or, if opportunity be, that they lay them aboard, seize or destroy them. and to this purpose they are to keep to windward of their squadrons in time of service. but in case they cannot prevent the fireships [coming][ ] on board by clapping between us and them (which by all means possible they are to endeavour), that then in such cases they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us and destroy them; which service (if honourably done) according to its merit shall be rewarded, but the neglect severely to be called to accompt. inst. th. that the fireships in the several squadrons endeavour to keep the wind; and they with the small frigates to be as near the great ships as they can, to attend the signal from the general or commander-in-chief, and to act accordingly. if the general hoist up a white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all small frigates in his squadron are to come under his stern for orders. inst. th. that if any engagement by day shall continue till night and the general shall please to anchor, then upon signal given they all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the 'instructions for sailing'; and if the general please to retreat without anchoring, the signal to be firing two guns, the one so nigh the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like with two guns more. given under our hands at portsmouth, this march th, . robert blake. richard deane. george monck. footnotes: [ ] re-issued in march , by blake, monck, disbrowe, and penn, with some amendments and verbal alterations. as reissued they are in _sloane mss._ , f. , and printed in granville penn's _memorials of sir william penn_, ii. . all the important amendments in the new edition, apart from mere verbal alterations, are given below in notes to the articles in which they occur. [ ] '_waft_ (more correctly written _wheft_). it is any flag or ensign stopped together at the head and middle portion, slightly rolled up lengthwise, and hoisted at different positions at the after-part of a ship.'--admiral smyth (_sailors' word-book_). [ ] the orders of have 'one frigate.' [ ] _i.e._ 'formation.' [ ] , 'enemy's ships.' [ ] , 'get.' [ ] , 'or the commander-in-chief.' [ ] , 'immediately.' [ ] , 'so as she is in danger of being sunk or taken, then they.' [ ] , 'to keep on close in a line.' [ ] , 'mizen topmast-head.' [ ] , 'or grain upon pain of severe punishment.' nothing is more curious in naval phraseology than the loss of this excellent word 'grain,' or 'grayne,' to express the opposite of 'wake.' to come into a ship's grain meant to take station ahead of her. there is nothing now which exactly supplies its place, and yet it has long fallen into oblivion, so long, indeed, that its existence was unknown to the learned editors of the new _oxford dictionary_. this is to be the more regretted as its etymology is very obscure. it may, however, be traced with little doubt to the old norse 'grein,' a branch or prong, surviving in the word 'grains,' a pronged harpoon or fish spear. from its meaning, 'branch,' it might seem to be akin to 'stem' and to 'bow,' which is only another spelling of'bough.' but this is not likely. the older meaning of 'bows' was 'shoulders,' and this, it is agreed, is how it became applied to the head of a ship. there is, however, a secondary and more widely used sense of 'grain,' which means the space between forking boughs, and so almost any angular space, like a meadow where two rivers converge. thus 'grain,' in the naval sense, might easily mean the space enclosed by the planks of a ship where they spring from the stem, or if it is not actually the equivalent of 'bows,' it may mean the diverging waves thrown up by a ship advancing through the water, and thus be the exact analogue of 'wake.' [ ] , 'to make sail and endeavour.' [ ] , 'fore topmast.' [ ] , 'jack.' [ ] , 'wake or grain.' [ ] , 'more than ordinarily careful of.' [ ] it should be remembered that 'frigate' at this time meant a 'frigate-built ship.' the larger ones were 'capital ships' and lay in the line, while the smaller ones were used as cruisers. [ ] inserted from copy. part v the second dutch war i. the earl of sandwich, ii. the duke of york and prince rupert, - i orders of the restoration introductory though several fleets were fitted out in the first years of the restoration, the earliest orders of charles ii's reign that have come down to us are those which the earl of sandwich issued on the eve of the second dutch war. early in the year , when hostilities were known to be inevitable, he had sailed from portsmouth with a squadron of fifteen sail for the north sea. on january th he arrived in the downs, and on february th sailed for the coast of holland.[ ] war was declared on march th following. the orders in question are only known by a copy given to one of his frigate captains, which has survived amongst the manuscripts of the duke of somerset. so far as is known no fresh complete set of fighting instructions was issued before the outbreak of the war, and as monck and sandwich were still among the leading figures at the admiralty it is probable that those used in the last dutch and spanish wars were continued. the four orders here given are supplementary to them, providing for the formation of line abreast, and for forming from that order a line ahead to port or starboard. it is possible however that no other orders had yet been officially issued, and that these simple directions were regarded by sandwich as all that were necessary for so small a squadron. footnote: [ ] _domestic calendar_, - , pp. , . _the earl of sandwich, feb. , _. [+duke of somerset's mss., printed by the historical mss. commission. rep. xv. part vii. p. +.] _orders given by direction of the earl of sandwich to captain hugh seymour,[ ] of the pearl frigate_. , february . on board the london in the downs. if we shall bear up, putting abroad the standard on the ancient[ ] staff, every ship of this squadron is to draw up abreast with the flag, on either side, in such berth as opportunity shall present most convenient, but if there be time they are to sail in the foresaid posture.[ ] if the admiral put up a jack[ ]-flag on the flagstaff on the mizen topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on the starboard side is to clap upon a wind with his starboard tacks aboard, and all the squadron as they lie above or as they have ranked themselves are presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a line. and if the admiral make a weft with his jack-flag upon the flagstaff on the mizen topmast-head and fire a gun, then the outwardmost ship on the larboard side is to clap upon a wind with his larboard tacks aboard, and all the squadrons as they have ranked themselves are presently to clap upon a wind and stand after him in a line. all the fifth and sixth rates[ ] are to lie on that broadside of the admiral which is away from the enemy, looking out well when any sign is made for them. then they are to endeavour to come up under the admiral's stern for to receive orders. if we shall give the signal of hanging a pennant under the flag at the main topmast-head, then all the ships of this squadron are, with what speed they can, to fall into this posture, every ship in the place and order here assigned, and sail and anchor so that they may with the most readiness fall into the above said posture.[ ] footnotes: [ ] son of colonel sir edward seymour, rd baronet, governor of dartmouth. [ ] _i.e._ ensign. [ ] _i.e._ in the 'order of battle' already given. [ ] the earliest known use of the word 'jack' for a flag in an official document occurs in an order issued by sir john pennington to his pinnace captains in . he was in command of the channel guard in search of pirates, particularly 'the seahorse lately commanded by captain quaile' and 'christopher megges, who had lately committed some outrage upon the isle of lundy, and other places.' the pinnaces were to work inshore of the admiral and to endeavour to entrap the piratical ships, and to this end he said, 'you are also for this present service to keep in your jack at your boultsprit end and your pendant and your ordnance.' (_sloane mss._ , f. .) the object of the order evidently was that they should conceal their character from the pirates, and at this time therefore the 'jack' carried at the end of the bowsprit and the pennant must have been the sign of a navy ship. boteler however, who wrote his _sea dialogues_ about , does not mention the jack in his remarks about flags (pp. - ). the etymology is uncertain. the new _oxford dictionary_ inclines to the simple explanation that 'jack' was used in this case in its common diminutive sense, and that 'jack-flag' was merely a small flag. [ ] _i.e._ his cruisers. [ ] in the report of the historical mss. commission it is stated that the position of the ships is shown in a diagram, but i have been unable to obtain access to the document. ii monck, prince rupert and the duke of york introductory it has hitherto been universally supposed that the dutch wars of the restoration were fought under the set of orders printed as an appendix to granville penn's _memorials of penn_. mr. penn believed them to belong to the year , but recent research shows conclusively that these often-quoted orders, which have been the source of so much misapprehension, are really much later and represent not the ideas under which those wars were fought, but the experience that was gained from them. this new light is mainly derived from a hitherto unknown collection of naval manuscripts belonging to the earl of dartmouth, which he has generously placed at the disposal of the society. the invaluable material they contain enables us to say with certainty that the orders which the duke of york issued as lord high admiral and commander-in-chief at the outbreak of the war were nothing but a slight modification of those of , with a few but not unimportant additions. amongst the manuscripts, most of which relate to the first lord dartmouth's cousin and first commander, sir edward spragge, is a 'sea book' that must have once belonged to that admiral. it is a kind of commonplace book, the greater part unused, in which spragge appears to have begun to enter various important orders and other matter of naval interest with which he had been officially concerned, by way of forming a collection of precedents.[ ] amongst these is a copy of the orders set out below, dated from the royal charles, the duke of york's flagship, 'the th of april, ,' by command of his royal highness, and signed 'wm. coventry.' this was the well-known politician sir william coventry, the model, if not the author, of the _character of a trimmer_, who had been made private secretary to the duke on the eve of the restoration, and was now a commissioner of the navy and acting as secretary on the duke's staff. so closely it will be seen do they follow the commonwealth orders of , as modified in the following year, that it would be scarcely worth while setting them out in full, but for the importance of finally establishing their true origin. the scarcely concealed doubts which many writers have felt as to whether the new system of tactics can have been due to the duke of york may now be laid at rest, and henceforth the great reform must be credited not to him, but to cromwell's 'generals-at-sea.' nevertheless the credit of certain developments which were introduced at this time must still remain with the duke and his advisers: rupert, sandwich, lawson, and probably above all penn, his flag captain. for instance, differences will be found in articles and , where, instead of merely enjoining the line, the duke refers to a regular 'order of battle,' which has not come down to us, but which no doubt gave every ship her station in the line, like those which sandwich had prepared for his squadron a few months earlier, and which monck and rupert certainly drew up in the following year.[ ] then again the truculent article of and ordering the immediate destruction of disabled ships of the enemy after saving the crews if possible, which contemporary authorities put down to monck, is reversed. at the end, moreover, two articles are added; one, numbered , embodying numbers and of sandwich's orders of the previous year, with such modifications as were necessary to adapt them to a large fleet, and another numbered enjoining 'close action.' nor is this all. spragge's 'sea book' contains also a set of ten 'additional instructions' all of which are new. they are undated, but from another copy in capt. robert moulton's 'sea book' we can fix them to april th, .[ ] their whole tenour suggests that they were the outcome of prolonged discussions in the council of war; and in the variously dated copies which exist of sections of the orders we have evidence that between the last week in march, when the duke hoisted his flag, and april st, when he put to sea, much time must have been spent upon the consideration of the tactical problem.[ ] the result was a marked advance. in these ten 'additional instructions,' for instance, we have for the first time a clear distinction drawn between attacks from windward and attacks from leeward. we have also the first appearance of the close-hauled line ahead, and it is enjoined as a defensive formation when the enemy attacks from windward. a method of attack from windward is also provided for the case where the enemy stays to receive it. amongst less important developments we have an article making the half-cable's length, originally enjoined under the commonwealth, the regular interval between ships, and others to prevent the line being broken for the sake of chasing or taking possession of beaten ships. finally there are signals for tacking in succession either from the van or the rear, which must have given the fleet a quite unprecedented increase of tactical mobility. nor are we without evidence that increased mobility was actually exhibited when the new instructions were put to a practical test. it was under the old commonwealth orders as supplemented and modified by these noteworthy articles of april , that was fought the memorable action of june rd, variously known as the battle of lowestoft or the second battle of the texel. it is this action that hoste cites as the first in which two fleets engaged in close hauled line ahead, and kept their formation throughout the day. after two days' manoeuvring the english gained the wind, and kept it in spite of all their enemy could do, and the various accounts of the action certainly give the impression that the evolutions of the english were smarter and more complex than those of the dutch. it is true that about the middle of the action one of the new signals, that for the rear to tack first, threw the fleet into some confusion, and that later the van and centre changed places; still, till almost the end, the duke, or rather penn, his flag captain, kept at least some control of the fleet. granville penn indeed claims that the duke finally routed the dutch by breaking their line, and that he did it intentionally. but this movement is only mentioned in a hasty letter to the press written immediately after the battle. if the enemy's line was actually cut, it must have been an accident or a mere instance of the time-honoured practice of trying to concentrate on or 'overcharge' a part of the enemy's fleet. coventry in his official despatch to monck, who was ashore in charge of the admiralty, says nothing of it, nor does hoste, while the duke himself tells us the object of his movement was merely to have 'a bout with opdam.' granville penn was naturally inclined to credit the statement in the newsletter because he believed the action was fought under fighting instructions which contained an article about dividing the enemy's fleet. but even if this article had been in force at the time--and we now know that it was not--it would still have been inapplicable, for it was only designed in view of an attack from leeward, a most important point which modern writers appear unaccountably to have overlooked.[ ] but although we can no longer receive this questionable movement of the duke of york as an instance of 'breaking the line' in the modern sense, it is certain that the english manoeuvres in this action were more scientific and elaborate than ever before--so much so indeed that a reaction set in, and it is this reaction which gave rise to the idea in later times that the order in line ahead had not been used in commonwealth or restoration times. we gather that in spite of the victory there was a widespread conviction that it ought to have been more decisive. it was felt that there had been perhaps too much manoeuvring and not enough hard fighting. in the end the duke of york and sandwich were both tenderly relieved of their command, and superseded by monck. he and rupert then became joint admirals for the ensuing campaign. they had the reputation of being two of the hardest fighters alive, and both were convinced of their power of sweeping the dutch from the sea by sheer hard hitting, a belief which so far at least as monck was concerned the country enthusiastically shared. the spirit in which the two soldier-admirals put to sea in may we see reflected in the hitherto unknown 'additional instructions for fighting' given below. for the knowledge of these remarkable orders, which go far to solve the mystery that has clouded the subject, we are again indebted to lord dartmouth. they are entered like the others in sir edward spragge's 'sea book.' they bear no date, but as they are signed 'rupert' and addressed to 'sir edward spragge, knt., vice-admiral of the blue,' we can with certainty fix them to this time. for we know that spragge sailed in rupert's squadron, and on the fourth day of the famous june battle was raised to the rank here given him in place of sir william berkley, who had been killed in the first day's action.[ ] what share monck had in the orders we cannot tell, but rupert, being only joint admiral with him, could hardly have taken the step without his concurrence, and the probability is that rupert, who had been detached on special service, was issuing a general fleet order to his own squadron which may have been communicated to the rest of the fleet before he rejoined. it must at any rate have been after he rejoined, for it was not till then that spragge received his promotion. both monck and rupert must therefore receive the credit of foreseeing the danger that lay in the new system, the danger of tactical pedantry that was destined to hamper the action of our fleets for the next half century, and of being the first to declare, long before anson or hawke, and longer still before nelson, that line or no line, signals or no signals, 'the destruction of the enemy is always to be made the chiefest care.' in the light of this discovery we can at last explain the curious conversation recorded by pepys, which, wrongly interpreted, has done so much to distort the early history of tactics. the circumstances of monck's great action must first be recalled. at the end of may, he and rupert, with a fleet of about eighty sail, had put to sea to seek the dutch, when a sudden order reached them from the court that the french mediterranean fleet was coming up channel to join hands with the enemy, and that rupert with his squadron of twenty sail was to go westward to stop it. the result of this foolish order was that on june monck found himself in presence of the whole dutch fleet of nearly a hundred sail, with no more than fifty-nine of his own.[ ] seeing an advantage, however, he attacked them furiously, throwing his whole weight upon their van. though at first successful shoals forced him to tack, and his rear fell foul of the dutch centre and rear, so that he came off severely handled. the next day he renewed the fight with forty-four sail against about eighty, and with so much skill that he was able that night to make an orderly retreat, covering his disabled ships with those least injured 'in a line abreadth.'[ ] on the rd the retreat was continued. so well was it managed that the dutch could not touch him, and towards evening he was able near the galloper sand to form a junction with rupert, who had been recalled. together on the th day they returned to the fight with as fierce a determination as ever. though to leeward, they succeeded in breaking through the enemy's line, such as it was. being in too great an inferiority of numbers, however, they could not reap the advantage of their manoeuvre.[ ] it only resulted in their being doubled on, and the two fleets were soon mingled in a raging mass without order or control; and when in the end they parted after a four days' fight, without example for endurance and carnage in naval history, the english had suffered a reverse at least as great as that they had inflicted on the dutch in the last year's action. such a terrific object lesson could not be without its effects on the great tactical question. but let us see how it looked in the eyes of a french eye-witness, who was naturally inclined to a favourable view of his dutch allies. of the second day's fight he says: 'sur les six heures du matin nous apperçumes la flotte des anglais qui revenoit dans une ordre admirable. car ils marchent par le front comme seroit une armée de terre, et quand ils approchent ils s'etendent et tournent leurs bords pour combattre: parce que le front à la mer se fait par le bord des vaisseaux': that is, of course, the english bore down on the dutch all together in line abreast, and then hauled their wind into line ahead to engage. again, in describing the danger tromp was in by having weathered the english fleet with his own squadron, while the rest of the dutch were to leeward, he says: 'j'ai déjà dit que rien n'égale le bel ordre et la discipline des anglais, que jamais ligne n'a été tirée plus droite que celle que leurs vaisseaux forment, qu'on peut être certain que lorsqu'on en approche il les faux [_sic_] tous essuïer.' the very precision of the english formation however, as he points out, was what saved tromp from destruction, because having weathered their van-ship, he had the wind of them all and could not be enveloped. on the other hand, he says, whenever an english ship penetrated the dutch formation it fared badly because the dutch kept themselves 'redoublez'--that is, not in a single line. as a general principle, then, he declares that it is safer to 'entrer dans une flotte d'angleterre que de passer auprès' (_i.e._ stand along it), 'et bien mieux de passer auprès d'une flotte hollandaise que se mêler au travers, si elle combat toujours comme elle fit pour lors.' but on the whole he condemns the loose formation of the dutch, and says it is really due not to a tactical idea, but to individual captains shirking their duty. it is clear, then, that whatever was de ruyter's intention, the dutch did not fight in a true line. later on in the same action he says: 'ruyter de son côté appliqua toute son industrie pour donner une meilleure forme à sa ligne ... enfin par ce moyen nous nous remismes sur une ligne parallèle à celle des anglais.' finally, in summing up the tactical lesson of the stupendous battle, he concludes: 'a la vérité l'ordre admirable de leur [the english] armée doit toujours être imité, et pour moi je sais bien que si j'étais dans le service de mer, et que je commandasse des vaisseaux du roi je songerois à battre les anglois _par leur propre manière et non par celle des hollandoises, et de nous autres, qui est de vouloir aborder_.' in defence of his view he cites a military analogy, instancing a line of cavalry, which being controlled 'avec règle' devotes itself solely to making the opposing force give way, and keeps as close an eye on itself as on the enemy. supposing such a line engaged against another body of horse in which the squadrons break their ranks and advance unevenly to the charge, such a condition, he says, would not promise success to the latter, and the parallel he contends is exact.[ ] from this account by an accomplished student of tactics we may deduce three indisputable conclusions, . that the formation in line ahead was aimed at the development of gun power as opposed to boarding. . that it was purely english, and that, however far dutch tacticians had sought to imitate it, they had not yet succeeded in forcing it on their seamen. . that the english certainly fought in line, and had reached a perfection in handling the formation which could only have been the result of constant practice in fleet tactics. it remains to consider the precisely opposite impression we get from english authority. to begin with, we find on close examination that the whole of it, or nearly so, is to be traced to pepys or penn. the _locus classicus_ is as follows from pepys's _diary_ of july th. 'in the evening sir w. penn came to me, and we walked together and talked of the late fight. i find him very plain, that the whole conduct of the late fight was ill.... he says three things must be remedied, or else we shall be undone by their fleet. . that we must fight in line, whereas we fight promiscuously, to our utter demonstrable ruin: the dutch fighting otherwise, and we whenever we beat them. . we must not desert ships of our own in distress, as we did, for that makes a captain desperate, and he will fling away his ship when there are no hopes left him of succour. . that ships when they are a little shattered must not take the liberty to come in of themselves, but refit themselves the best they can and stay out, many of our ships coming in with very little disableness. he told me that our very commanders, nay, our very flag officers, do stand in need of exercising amongst themselves and discoursing the business of commanding a fleet, he telling me that even one of our flag men in the fleet did not know which tack lost the wind or kept it in the last engagement.... he did talk very rationally to me, insomuch that i took more pleasure this night in hearing him discourse than i ever did in my life in anything that he said.' pepys's enjoyment is easily understood. he disliked penn--thought him a 'mean rogue,' a 'coxcomb,' and a 'false rascal,' but he was very sore over the supersession of his patron, sandwich, and so long as penn abused monck, pepys was glad enough to listen to him, and ready to believe anything he said in disparagement of the late battle. penn was no less bitter against monck, and when his chief, the duke of york, was retired he had sulkily refused to serve under the new commander-in-chief. for this reason penn had not been present at the action, but he was as ready as pepys to believe anything he was told against monck, and we may be sure the stories of grumbling officers lost nothing when he repeated them into willing ears. that penn really told pepys the english had not fought in line is quite incredible, even if he was, as sir george carteret, treasurer of the navy, called him, 'the falsest rascal that ever was in the world.' the fleet orders and the french testimony make this practically impossible. but he may well have expressed himself very hotly about the new instruction issued by monck and rupert which modified his own, and placed the destruction of the enemy above a pedantic adherence to the line. pepys must clearly have forgotten or misunderstood what penn said on this point, and in any case both men were far too much prejudiced for the passage to have any historical value. abuse of monck by penn can have little weight enough, but the same abuse filtered through pepys's acrid and irresponsible pen can have no weight at all.[ ] footnotes: [ ] it is a folio parchment-bound volume, labelled 'royal charles sea book,' but this is clearly an error, due to the fact that the first order copied into it is dated from the royal charles, april , . the first entry, however, is the list of a ship's company which spragge commanded in - , as appears from his noting the deaths and desertions which took place amongst the crew in those years. at this time he is known to have commanded the portland. for some years the book was evidently laid aside, and apparently resumed when in he commissioned the triumph for the dutch war. [ ] see notes _supra_, pp. - , and in the _dartmouth mss., hist. mss. com. rep._ xi. v. . [ ] _harleian mss._ . it contains orders addressed to moulton and returns for the centurion, vanguard and anne, the ships he commanded in - . at p. it has a copy of the above 'additional instructions,' but numbered to , articles to of the dartmouth copy being in one long article. at p. it has the original articles as far as no. . then come two articles numbered as and , giving signals for a squadron 'to draw up in line' and to come near the admiral. they are subscribed 'royal james, admiral.' the royal james was rupert's flagship in , and the two articles may be squadronal orders of his. then, numbered to , come four 'additional instructions for sailing' by the duke of york, relating to chasing, and dated april , . [ ] some of these articles are dated even as late as april , see in the _penn tracts, sloane mss._ , f. , _infra_, p. . [ ] see _post_, p. . for the despatches, &c., see g. penn, _memorials of penn_, ii. - , - . he also quotes a work published at amsterdam in which says: 'le comte de sandwich sépara la flotte hollandaise en deux vers l'une heure du midi.' he explains that by the order for the rear to tack first, sandwich was leading, forgetting coventry's despatch (_ibid._ p. ), which tells how by that time the duke had taken sandwich's place and was leading the line himself, and that it was he, not sandwich, who led the movement upon opdam's ship in the centre of the dutch line. [ ] charnock, _biographia navalis_, i. . [ ] pepys, it must be said, persuaded himself that this order was suggested and approved by the admirals. he traced it to spragge's desire to get away with his chief on a separate command. pepys however was clearly not sure about it, and he almost certainly would have been if the duke of york was really innocent of the blunder. the truth probably can never be known. [ ] vice-admiral jordan to penn, june , _memorials of penn_, ii. . this is the first known instance of the use of the term 'line abreast.' in the published account a different term is used. 'by or in the morning,' it says, 'a small breeze sprang up at n.e. and at a council of flag officers, his grace the lord general resolved to draw the fleet into a "rear line of battle" and make a fair retreat of it.' (_brit. museum_, , m. ( ), p. , and _s.p. dom. car. ii_, vol. .) the french and dutch called it the 'crescent' formation. see note, p. . [ ] see _post_, pp. - . [ ] _mémoires d'armand de gramont, comte de guiche, concernant les provinces unis des pays-bas servant de supplément et de confirmation à ceux d'aubrey du maurier et du comte d'estrades_. londres, chez philippe changuion, . (the italics are not in the original.) _cf._ the similar french account quoted by mahan, _sea power_, _et seq._ [ ] _cf._ a similar conversation that pepys had on october with a certain captain guy, who had been in command of a small fourth-rate of thirty-eight guns in holmes's attack on the shipping at vlie and shelling after the 'st. james's fight' and of a company of the force that landed to destroy bandaris. the prejudice of both pepys and penn comes out still more strongly in their remarks on monck's and rupert's great victory of july , and their efforts to make out it was no victory at all. the somewhat meagre accounts we have of this action all point as before to the superiority of the english manoeuvring, and to the inability or unwillingness of the dutch, and especially of tromp, to preserve the line. _the duke of york, april_ , . [+sir edward spragge's sea book. the earl of dartmouth mss.+] _james, duke of york and albany, earl of ulster, lord high admiral of england and ireland, &c, constable of dover castle, lord warden of the cinque ports, and governor of portsmouth. instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in time of fighting_. upon discovery of a fleet receiving a sign from the admiral, which is to be striking of the admiral's ensign, and making a weft, one frigate appointed out of each squadron are to make sail and stand in with them so nigh as conveniently they may, the better to gain a knowledge of what they are and what quality, how many fireships and others, and in what posture the fleet is; which being done the frigates are to meet together and conclude on the report they are to give, and accordingly to repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief, and not engage if the enemy's ships exceed them in number, except it shall appear to them on the place that they have an advantage. . at the sight of the said fleet the vice-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the second place, and his squadron, and the rear-admiral, or he that commands in chief in the third place, and his squadron are to make what sail they can to come up and put themselves into the place and order which shall have been directed them before in the order of battle. . as soon as they shall see the admiral engage or shall make a signal by shooting off two guns and putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, that then each squadron shall take the best advantage they can to engage with the enemy according to the order prescribed. . if any squadron shall happen to be overcharged and distressed, the next squadron or ships are immediately to make towards their relief and assistance upon a signal given them: which signal shall be in the admiral's squadron a pennant on the fore topmast-head; if any ship in the vice-admiral's squadron, or he that commands in chief in the second place, a pennant on the main topmast-head; and the rear-admiral's squadron the like.[ ] . if any ship shall be disabled or distressed by loss of masts, shot under water or the like, so as she is in danger of sinking or taking, he or the [ship] thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his jack and ensign, and those next to them are strictly required to relieve them.[ ] . that if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy to stop a leak or mend what else is amiss, which cannot otherwise be repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen yard-arm or on the ensign staff, whereby the rest of the ship's squadron may have notice what it is for--and if it should be that the admiral or any flagships should do so, the ships of the fleet or of the respective squadrons are to endeavour to get up as close in a line between him and the enemy as they can, having always an eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition. . if the admiral should have the wind of the enemy and that other ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is then to bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. if the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part thereof to leeward of him, to the end such ships may come up into a line with the admiral, if he shall put abroad a flag as before and bear up, none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or their ship or ships luff, thereby to gain his wake or grain. . if the admiral would have any of the ships to make sail or endeavour by tacking or otherwise to gain the wind of the enemy, he will put up a red flag upon the spritsail, topmast shrouds, forestay, or fore topmast-stay. he that first discovers this signal shall make sail, and hoist and lower his jack and ensign, that the rest of the ships may take notice thereof and follow. . if we put a red flag on the mizen shrouds or the mizen yard-arm, we would have all the flagships to come up in the wake or grain of us. . if in time of fight god shall deliver any of the enemy's ships into our power by their being disabled, the commanders of his majesty's ships in condition of pursuing the enemy are not during fight to stay, take, possess, or burn any of them, lest by so doing the opportunity of more important service be lost, but shall expect command from the flag officers for doing thereof when they shall see fit to command it. . none shall fire upon ships of the enemy that is laid on board by any of our own ships but so as he may be sure he doth not endamage his friends. . that it is the duty of all commanders and masters of the small frigates, ketches and smacks belonging to the several squadrons to know the fireships belonging to the enemy, and accordingly by observing their motion do their utmost to cut off their boats if possible, or if opportunity be that they lay them on board, seize and destroy them, and for this purpose they are to keep to wind[ward] of the squadron in time of service. but in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming aboard of us by clapping between them and us, which by all means possible they are to endeavour, that then in such case they show themselves men in such an exigent and steer on board them, and with their boats, grapnels, and other means clear them from us, and destroy them; which service if honourably done to its merit shall be rewarded, and the neglect thereof strictly and severely called to an account. . that the fireships in every squadron endeavour to keep the wind, and they, with the small frigates, to be as near the great ships as they can, to attend the signal from the admiral and to act accordingly. if the admiral hoist up a white flag at the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head all the small frigates of his squadron are to come under his stern for orders. . if an engagement by day shall continue till night, and the admiral shall please to anchor, that upon signal given they all anchor in as good order as may be, the signal being as in the instructions for sailing; and if the admiral please to retreat without anchoring, then the sign to be by firing of two guns, so near one to the other as the report may be distinguished, and within three minutes after to do the like with two guns more. . if, the fleet going before the wind, the admiral would have the vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap by the wind and come to their starboard tack, then he will hoist upon the mizen topmast-head a red flag, and in case he would have the rear-admiral and the ships on the larboard quarter to come to their larboard tack then he will hoist up a blue flag in the same place. . that the commander of any of his majesty's ships suffer not his guns to be fired until the ship be within distance to [do] good execution; the contrary to be examined and severely punished by the court-martial. footnote: [ ] modified by article of the 'additional instructions,' _post_, p. . _the duke of york, april_ _or_ , . [+sir edward spragge's sea book+.[ ]] _additional instructions for fighting_. . in all cases of fight with the enemy the commanders of his majesty's ships are to endeavour to keep the fleet in one line, and as much as may be to preserve the order of battle which shall have been directed before the time of fight.[ ] . if the enemy stay to fight us, we having the wind, the headmost squadron of his majesty's fleets shall steer for the headmost of the enemy's ships. . if the enemy have the wind of us and come to fight us, the commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to put themselves in one line close upon a wind. . in the time of fight in reasonable weather, the commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to keep about the distance of half a cable's length one from the other,[ ] but so as that according to the discretion of the commanders they vary that distance according as the weather shall be, and the occasion of succouring our own or assaulting the enemy's ships shall require. . the flag officers shall place themselves according to such order of battle as shall be given. . none of the ships of his majesty's fleet shall pursue any small number of ships of the enemy before the main [body] of the enemy's fleet shall be disabled or shall run. . in case of chase none of his majesty's fleet or ships shall chase beyond sight of the flag, and at night all chasing ships are to return to the flag. . in case it shall please god that any of his majesty's ships be lamed in fight, not being in probability of sinking nor encompassed by the enemy, the following ships shall not stay under pretence of securing them, but shall follow their leaders and endeavour to do what service they can upon the enemy, leaving the securing of the lame ships to the sternmost of our ships, being [assured] that nothing but beating the body of the enemy's fleet can effectually secure the lame ships. this article is to be observed notwithstanding any seeming contradiction in the fourth or fifth articles of the [fighting] instructions formerly given. . when the admiral would have the van of his fleet to tack first, the admiral will put abroad the union flag at the staff of the fore topmast-head if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be abroad then the fore topsail shall be lowered a little, and the union flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards. . when the admiral would have the rear of the fleet to tack first, the union flag shall be put abroad on the flagstaff of the mizen topmast-head; and for the better notice of these signals through the fleet, each flagship is upon sight of either of the said signals to make the said signals, that so every ship may know what they are to do, and they are to continue out the said signals until they be answered. given under my hand the th of april, , from on board the royal charles. by command of his royal highness. wm. coventry. footnotes: [ ] also in moulton's sea book, _harl. mss._ , f. but are there dated april , differently numbered, and signed 'james.' [ ] this is article of the complete set, which was modified by rupert's subsequent order of . see p. . [ ] it is interesting to note that the distance adopted by d'estrées and tourville for the french service was a full cable. see hoste, p. . _the duke of york's supplementary order, april , _. [+penn's tracts, sloane mss. , f. +.] _additional instructions for fighting_.[ ] [ .] when the admiral would have all the ships to fall into the order of 'battailia' prescribed, the union flag shall be put into the mizen peak of the admiral ship; at sight whereof the admirals of [the] other squadrons are to answer it by doing the like. [ .] when the admiral would have the other squadrons to make more sail, though he himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the ensign staff of the admiral ship. _for chasing_.[ ] [ .] when the admiral shall put a flag striped with white and red upon the fore topmast-head, the admiral of the white squadron shall send out ships to chase; when on the mizen topmast-head the admiral of the blue squadron shall send out ships to chase. [ .] if the admiral shall put out a flag striped with white and red upon any other place, that ship of the admiral's own division whose signal for call is a pennant in that place shall chase, excepting the vice-admiral and rear-admiral of the admiral's squadron. [ .] if a flag striped red and white upon the main topmast shrouds under the standard, the vice-admiral of the red is to send ships to chase. if the flag striped red and white be hoisted on the ensign staff the rear-admiral of the red is to send ships to chase. on board the royal charles, april, . footnotes: [ ] this is preceded by an additional 'sailing instruction,' with signals for cutting and slipping by day or night. [ ] also in capt. moulton's sea book (_harl. mss._ , p. _b_), headed 'james duke of york &c. additional instructions for sailing.' at foot it has 'given under my hand on board the royal charles this of april, . james,' and the articles are numbered to , no. above forming and . _prince rupert_, . [+sir edward spragge's sea book+.] _additional instructions for fighting_. st. in case of an engagement the commander of every ship is to have a special regard to the common good, and if any flagship shall, by any accident whatsoever, stay behind or [be] likely to lose company, or be out of his place, then all and every ship or ships belonging to such flag is to make all the way possible to keep up with the admiral of the fleet and to endeavour the utmost that may be the destruction of the enemy, which is always to be made the chiefest care. this instruction is strictly to be observed, not-withstanding the seventeenth article in the fighting instructions formerly given out.[ ] ndly. when the admiral of the fleet makes a weft with his flag, the rest of the flag officers are to do the like, and then all the best sailing ships are to make what way they can to engage the enemy, that so the rear of our fleet may the better come up; and so soon as the enemy makes a stand then they are to endeavour to fall into the best order they can.[ ] rdly. if any flagship shall be so disabled as not to be fit for service, the flag officer or commander of such ship shall remove himself into any other ship of his division at his discretion, and shall there command and wear the flag as he did in his own. rupert. for sir edward spragge, knt., vice-admiral of the blue squadron. footnotes: [ ] meaning, of course, article of the 'additional instructions' of april , , which would be no. when the orders were collected and reissued as a complete set. no copy of the complete set to which rupert refers is known to be extant. [ ] it should be noted that this instruction anticipates by a century the favourite english signals of the nelson period for bringing an unwilling enemy to action, _i.e._ for general chase, and for ships to take suitable station for neutral support and engage as they get up. part vi the third dutch war to the revolution i. the duke of york, - ii. sir john narbrough, iii. the earl of dartmouth, progress of tactics during the third dutch war introductory for the articles issued by the duke of york at the outbreak of the third dutch war in march we are again indebted to lord dartmouth's naval manuscripts. they exist there, copied into the beginning of an 'order book' which by internal evidence is shown to have belonged to sir edward spragge. it is similar to the so-called 'royal charles sea book,' and is nearly all blank, but contains two orders addressed by rupert to spragge, april and may , , and a resolution of the council of war held on board the royal charles on may , deciding to attack the dutch fleet in the schoonveldt and to take their anchorage if they retired into flushing. the orders are not dated, but, as they are signed 'james' and countersigned 'm. wren,' their date can be fixed to a time not later than the spring of , for dr. matthew wren, f.r.s., died on june in that year, having served as the lord admiral's secretary since , when coventry resigned his commissionership of the navy. they consist of twenty-six articles, which follow those of the late war so closely that it has not been thought worth while to print them except in the few cases where they vary from the older ones. they are accompanied however in the 'sea book' by three 'further instructions,' which do not appear in any previous set. they are of the highest importance and mark a great stride in naval tactics, a stride which owing to granville penn's error is usually supposed to have been taken in the previous war. for the first time they introduced rules for engaging when the two fleets get contact on opposite tacks, and establish the much-abused system of stretching the length of the enemy's line and then bearing down together. but it must be noted that this rule only applies to the case where the fleets are approaching on opposite tacks and the enemy is to leeward. there is also a peremptory re-enunciation of the duty of keeping the line and the order enforced by the penalty of death for firing 'over any of our own ships.' here then we have apparently a return to the duke of york's belief in formal tactics, and it is highly significant that, although the twenty-six original articles incorporate and codify all the other scattered additional orders of the last war, they entirely ignore those issued by monck and rupert during the four days' battle. we have pretty clear evidence of the existence at this period of two schools of tactical opinion, which after all is no more than experience would lead us to suspect, and which pepys's remarks have already indicated. as usual there was the school, represented by the duke of york and penn, which inclined to formality, and by pedantic insistence on well-meant principles tended inevitably to confuse the means with the end. on the other hand we have the school of monck and rupert, which was inclined anarchically to submit all rules to the solvent of hard fighting, and to take tactical risks and unfetter individual initiative to almost any extent rather than miss a chance of overpowering the enemy by a sudden well-timed blow. knowing as we do the extent to which the principles of the duke of york's school hampered the development of fleet tactics till men like hawke and nelson broke them down, we cannot but sympathise with their opponents. nor can we help noting as curiously significant that whereas it was the soldier-admirals who first introduced formal tactics, it was a seaman's school that forced them to pedantry in the face of the last of the soldier-school, who tried to preserve their flexibility, and keep the end clear in view above the means they had invented. still it would be wrong to claim that either school was right. in almost every department of life two such schools must always exist, and nowhere is such conflict less inevitable than in the art of war, whether by sea or land. yet just as our comparatively high degree of success in politics is the outcome of the perpetual conflict of the two great parties in the state, so it is probably only by the conflict of the two normal schools of naval thought that we can hope to work out the best adjusted compromise between free initiative and concentrated order. it was the school of penn and the duke of york that triumphed at the close of these great naval wars. the attempt of monck and rupert to preserve individual initiative and freedom to seize opportunities was discarded, and for nearly a century formality had the upper hand. yet the duke of york must not be regarded as wholly hostile to initiative or unwilling to learn from his rivals. the second and most remarkable of the new instructions acquits him. this is the famous article in which was first laid down the principle of cutting off a part of the enemy's fleet and 'containing' the rest. though always attributed to the duke of york it seems almost certainly to have been suggested by the tactics of monck and rupert on the last day of the four days' battle, june , . according to the official account, they sighted the dutch early in the morning about five leagues on their weather-bow, with the wind at ssw. 'at eight o'clock,' it continues, 'we came up with them, and they having the weather-gage put themselves in a line to windward of us. our ships then which were ahead of sir christopher myngs [who was to lead the fleet] made an easy sail, and when they came within a convenient distance lay by; and the dutch fleet having put themselves in order we did the like. sir christopher myngs, vice-admiral of the prince's fleet, with his division led the van. next his highness with his own division followed, and then sir edward spragge, his rear-admiral; and so stayed for the rest of the fleet, which came up in very good order. by such time as our whole fleet was come up we held close upon a wind, our starboard tacks aboard, the wind sw and the enemy bearing up to fall into the middle of our line with part of their fleet. at which, as soon as sir christopher myngs had their wake, he tacked and stood in, and then the whole line tacked in the wake of him and stood in. but sir c. myngs in fighting being put to the leeward, the prince thought fit to keep the wind, and so led the whole line through the middle of the enemy, the general [monck] with the rest of the fleet following in good order.' the account then relates how brilliantly rupert fought his way through, and proceeds, 'after this pass, the prince being come to the other side and standing out, so that he could weather the end of their fleet, part of the enemy bearing up and the rest tacking, he tacked also, and his grace [monck] tacking at the same time bore up to the ships to the leeward, the prince following him; and so we stood along backward and forward, the enemy being some to windward and some to leeward of us; which course we four times repeated, the enemy always keeping the greatest part of their fleet to windward, but still at so much distance as to be able to reach our sails and rigging with their shot and to keep themselves out of reach of our guns, the only advantage they thought fit to take upon us at this time. but the fourth time we plying them very sharply with our leeward guns in passing, their windward ships bore up to relieve their leeward party; upon which his highness tacked a fifth time and with eight or ten frigates got to the windward of the enemy's whole fleet, and thinking to bear in upon them, his mainstay and main topmast being terribly shaken, came all by the board.' monck not being able to tack for wounded masts 'made up to the prince,' and then the dutch, after a threat to get between the two admirals, suddenly bore away before the wind for flushing.[ ] the manoeuvre by which myngs attempted from to windward to divide the enemy's fleet and so gain the wind of part of it seems to be exactly what the new instruction contemplated, while its remarkable provision for a containing movement seems designed to prevent the disastrous confusion that ensued after the dutch line had been broken. this undoubtedly is the great merit of the new instruction, and it is the first time, so far as is known, that the principle of containing was ever enunciated. in this it compares favourably with everything we know of until nelson's famous memorandum. its relations to rodney's and howe's manoeuvres for breaking the line must be considered later. for the present it will suffice to note that it seems designed rather as a method of gaining the wind than as a method of concentration, and that the initiation of the manoeuvre is left to the discretion of the leading flag officer, and cannot be signalled by the commander-in-chief. as to the date at which these three 'further instructions' were first drawn up there is some difficulty. it is possible that they were not entirely new in , but that their origin, at least in design, went back to the close of the second war. in spragge's first 'sea book' there is another copy of them identical except for a few verbal differences with those in the second 'sea book.' in the first 'sea book' they appear on the back of a leaf containing some 'sailing instructions by the duke of york,' which are dated november , , and this is the latest date in the book. moreover in this copy they are headed 'additional instructions to be observed in the next engagement,' as though they were the outcome of a previous action. now, as wren died on june (o.s.), and the battle of solebay, the first action of the third war, was fought on may (o.s.), it is pretty clear that it must have been the second war and not the third that was in spragge's mind at the time. still if we have to put them as early as november it leaves the question much where it was. besides the idea of containing the main body of the enemy after cutting off part of his fleet, the death penalty for firing over the line is obviously designed to meet certain regrettable incidents known to have occurred in the four days' battle. nor is there any evidence that they were used in the st. james's fight of july , and as this was the last action in the war fought, the 'next engagement' did not take place till the third war. it is fairly clear therefore that we must regard these remarkable orders as resulting from the experience of the second war, and as having been first put in force during the third one. after the battle of solebay these supplementary articles were incorporated into the regular instructions as articles to . this appears from a ms. book belonging to lord dartmouth entitled 'copies of instructions and other papers relating to the fleets. anno ' it contains a complete copy of both sailing and fighting instructions, with a detailed 'order of sailing' for the combined anglo-french fleet, dated july , , and a corresponding 'order of battle' dated august . it also contains the flag officers' reports made to the duke of york after the battle. instructions for the 'encouragement for the captains and companies of fireships, small frigates, and ketches,' now appear for the first time, and were repeated in some form or other in all subsequent orders. finally, it has been thought well to reprint from granville penn's _memorials of penn_ the complete set of articles which he gives in appendix l. no date is attached to them; granville penn merely says they were subsequent to , and has thereby left an unfortunate impression, adopted by himself and almost every naval historian, both british and foreign, that followed him, that they were used in the campaign of , that is, in the second dutch war. from the fact however that they incorporate the 'further instructions for fighting' countersigned by wren, we know that they cannot have been earlier than , while the newly discovered ms. of lord dartmouth makes it practically certain they must have been later than august . we may even go further. for curiously enough there is no evidence that these orders, on which so much doubtful reasoning has been based, were ever in force at all as they stand. no signed copy of them is known to exist. the copy amongst the penn papers in the british museum which granville penn followed is a draft with no signature whatever. it is possible therefore that they were never signed. in all probability they were completed by james early in for the coming campaign, but had not actually been issued when, in march of that year, the test act deprived him of his office of lord high admiral, and brought his career as a seaman to an end. what orders were used by his successor and rival rupert is unknown. of even higher interest than this last known set of the duke of york's orders are certain additions and observations which were subsequently appended to them by an unknown hand. as it has been found impossible to fix with certainty either their date or author, i have given them by way of notes to the text. they are to be found in a beautifully written and richly bound manuscript in the admiralty library. at the end of the volume, following the instructions, are diagrammatic representations of certain actions in the third dutch war, finely executed in water-colour to illustrate the formation for attack, and to every plan are appended tactical notes relating to the actions represented, and to others which were fought in the same way. the first one dealt with is the 'st. james's fight,' fought on july , , and the dates in the tactical notes, as well as in the 'observations' appended to the articles, range as far as the last action fought in . the whole manuscript is clearly intended as a commentary on the latest form of the duke's orders, and it may safely be taken as an expression of some tactician's view of the lessons that were to be drawn from his experience of the dutch wars. as to the authorship, the princely form in which the manuscript has been preserved might suggest they were james's own meditations after the war; but the tone of the 'observations,' and the curious revival of the word 'general' for 'commander-in-chief,' are enough to negative such an attribution. other indications that exist would point to george legge, lord dartmouth. his first experience of naval warfare was as a volunteer and lieutenant under his cousin, sir edward spragge, in . spragge was in fact his 'sea-daddy,' and with one exception all the examples in the 'observations' are taken from incidents and movements in which spragge was the chief actor. one long observation is directed to precautions to be taken by flag officers in shifting their flags in action, so as to prevent a recurrence of the catastrophe which cost spragge his life. indeed, with the exception of jordan, spragge is the only english admiral mentioned. dartmouth was present at all the actions quoted, and succeeded in constituting himself a sufficient authority on naval affairs to be appointed in to command the first important fleet that was sent out after the termination of the war. these indications however are far too slight to fix him with the authorship, and his own orders issued in go far to rebut the presumption.[ ] another possible author is arthur herbert, afterwards lord torrington. he too had served a good deal under spragge, and had been present at all the battles named. this conjecture would explain the curious expression used in the observation to the seventh instruction, 'the battle fought in .' there was of course more than one battle fought in , but herbert was only present in that of july th, the 'st. james's fight,' represented in the manuscript--and it was his first action. but here again all is too vague for more than a mere guess. but whoever was the author, the manuscript is certainly inspired by someone of position who had served in the last two dutch wars, and its undeniable importance is that it gives us clearly the development of tactical thought which led to the final form of fighting instructions adopted under william iii, and continued till the end of the eighteenth century. the developments which it foreshadows will therefore be best dealt with when we come to consider those instructions. for the present it will be sufficient to note the changes suggested. in the first place we have a desire to simplify signals and to establish repeating ships. secondly, for the sake of clearness the numbering of the articles is changed, every paragraph to which a separate signal is attached being made a separate instruction, so that with new instructions we have thirty-three articles instead of james's twenty-four. thirdly, we have three new instructions proposed: viz., no. , removing from flag officers the right to divide the enemy's fleet at their discretion without signal from the admiral; no. , giving a signal for any squadron that has weathered part of the enemy by dividing or otherwise to bear down and come to close action; and no. , for such a squadron to bear down through the enemy's line and rejoin the admiral. all of these rules are obviously the outcome of known incidents in the late war. there are also suggested additions or alterations to the old articles to the following effect: ( ) when commanders are in doubt or out of sight of the admiral, they are to press the headmost ships of the enemy all they can; ( ) when the enemy 'stays to fight' they are to concentrate on his weathermost ships, instead of his headmost, as under the old rule; ( ) finally, while preserving the line, they are to remember that their first duty is 'to press the weathermost ships and relieve such as are in distress.' it is this last addition to the duke of york's sixteenth article that contains the pith of the author's ideas. all his examples are chosen to show that the system of bearing down together from windward in a line parallel to that of the enemy is radically defective, even if all the advantages of position and superior force are with you, and for this reason--that if you succeed in defeating part of the enemy's line you cannot follow up your success with the victorious part of your own without sacrificing your advantage of position, and giving the enemy a chance of turning the tables on you. thus, if your rear defeats the enemy's rear and follows it up, your own line will be broken, and as your rear in pressing its beaten opponents falls to leeward of the enemy's centre and van it will expose itself to a fatal concentration. his own view of the proper form of attack from windward is to bear down upon the van or weathermost ships of the enemy in line ahead on a course oblique to the enemy's line. in this way, he points out, you can concentrate on the ships attacked, and as they are beaten you can deal with the next in order. for so long as you keep your own line intact and in good order, regardless of your rear being at first too distant to engage, you will always have fresh ships coming into action at the vital point, and will thus be able gradually to roll up the enemy's line without ever disturbing your own order. fortifying himself with the reflection that 'there can be no greater justification than matter of fact,' he proceeds to instance various battles in the late wars to show that this oblique form of attack always led to a real victory, whereas whenever the parallel form was adopted, though in some cases we had everything in our favour and had fairly beaten the dutch, yet no decisive result was obtained. from several points of view these observations are of high interest. not only do they contain the earliest known attempt to get away from the unsatisfactory method of engaging in parallel lines ship to ship, but in seeking a substitute for it they seem to foreshadow the transition from the elizabethan idea of throwing the enemy into confusion to the eighteenth century idea of concentration on his most vulnerable part. in so far as the author recommends a concentration on the weathermost ships his idea is sound, as they were the most difficult for the enemy to support; but since the close-hauled line had come in, they were also the van, and a concentration on the van is theoretically unsound, owing to the fact that the centre and rear came up naturally to its relief. to this objection he appears to attach no weight, partly because no doubt he was still influenced by the old intention of throwing the enemy into confusion.[ ] for since the line ahead had taken the place of the old close formations it seemed that to disable the leading ships came to the same thing as disabling the weathermost. the solution eventually arrived at was of course a concentration on the rear, but to this at the time there were insuperable objections. the rear was normally the most leewardly end of the line, and an oblique attack on it could be parried by wearing together. the rear then became the van, and the attack if persisted in would fall on the leading squadron with the rest of the fleet to windward--the worst of all forms of attack. the only possible way therefore of concentrating on the rear was to isolate it and contain the van by cutting the line. but in the eyes of our author and his school cutting the line stood condemned by the experience of war.[ ] in his 'observations' he clearly indicates the reasons. he would indeed forbid the manoeuvre altogether except when your own line outstretches that of the enemy, or when you are forced to pass through the enemy's fleet to save yourself from being pressed on a lee shore. the reasons given are the disorder it generally causes, the ease with which it is parried, and the danger of your own ships firing on each other when as the natural consequence of the manoeuvre they proceed to double on the enemy. the fact is that fleet evolutions were still in too immature a condition for so difficult a manoeuvre to be admissible. presumably therefore our author chose the attack on the weathermost ships, although they were also the van, as the lesser evil in spite of its serious drawbacks. the whole question of the principles involved in his suggestion is worthy of the closest consideration. for the difficulty it reveals of effecting a sound form of concentration without breaking the line as well as of adopting any form that involved breaking the line gives us the key of that alleged reaction of tactics in the eighteenth century which has been so widely ridiculed. footnotes: [ ] the original draft corrected by lord addington, principal secretary of state, is in _s.p. domestic_, car. ii, . [ ] see _post_, p. . [ ] _cf_. hoste's second remark, _post_, p. . [ ] in the instructions which sir chas. h. knowles drew up about , for submission to the admiralty he has at p. a remark upon rear concentration which helps us to see what was in the author's mind. it is as follows: 'n.b.--in open sea the enemy (if of equal force) will never suffer you to attack their rear, but will pass you on opposite tacks to prevent your doing it: therefor the attempt is useless and only losing time.' _the duke of york_, .[ ] [+spragge's second sea book. dartmouth mss.+] _instructions for the better ordering of his majesty's fleet in fighting_. . discovery of a fleet, striking the admiral's flag and making a weft.[ ] . to come into the order of battle.[ ] . a red flag on the fore topmast-head, to engage.[ ] . if overcharged or distressed, a pennant.[ ] . ditto, a weft with his jack and ensign.[ ] . a pennant on the mizen peak or ensign staff if any ship bear away from the enemy to stop a leak. if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy to stop a leak or mend what is amiss which cannot otherwise be repaired, he is to put out a pennant on the mizen peak or ensign staff, whereby the rest of that ship's squadron may have notice what it is for; and if the admiral or any flagship should be so, the ships of the fleet or of the respective squadrons are to endeavour to get up as close in line between him and the enemy as they can, having always an eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition; and in case any flagship or any other ship in the fleet shall be forced to go out of the line for stopping of leaks or repairing any other defects in the ships, then the next immediate ships are forthwith to endeavour to close the line either by making or shortening sail, or by such other ways and means as they shall find most convenient for doing of it; and if any ship, be it flagship or other that shall happen to be disabled and go out of the line, then all the small craft shall come in to that ship's assistance, upon signal made of her being disabled. if any of the chief flagships or other flagships shall happen to be so much disabled as that thereby they shall be rendered unable for present service, in such case any chief flag officer may get on board any other ship which he may judge most convenient in his own squadron, and any other flag officer in that case may go on board any ship in his division. . a blue flag on the mizen yard or topmast.[ ] . to make sail, a red flag on the spritsail, topmast shrouds, &c.[ ] . a red flag on the mizen shrouds, to come into the wake or grain of us.[ ] . not to endanger one another.[ ] . the small craft to attend the motion of the enemy's fireships.[ ] . a white flag on the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all the small frigates of the admiral's squadron.[ ] . to retreat, four guns.[ ] . none to fire guns till within distance.[ ] . for the larboard and starboard tacks.[ ] . to keep the line.[ ] . if we have the wind of the enemy.[ ] . if the enemy have the wind of us.[ ] . the distance of each ship in time of fight.[ ] . not to pursue any small number of enemy's ships.[ ] . for leaving chase.[ ] . if any ship be disabled in fight.[ ] . the van of the fleet to tack first.[ ] . the rear of the fleet to tack first.[ ] . to fall into the order of battle.[ ] . to make sail.[ ] james. by command of his royal highness. m. wren. footnotes: [ ] this set of orders has marginal rubrics indicating the contents of each article, and where the article does not differ from the orders of i have given the rubric only in the text. [ ] identical with corresponding article of april , . [ ] same as corresponding article of april , . article of those instructions relating to 'not staying to take possession of disabled ships' is here omitted. [ ] these four articles are identical with , , and of april , . [ ] same as article of april , . [ ] same as article of april , . [ ] these three articles are the same as , , and , of 'additional instructions' of april , . the complete set used by monck and rupert in must have been numbered as above. [ ] same as and of 'additional instructions,' april , . [ ] these five articles are the same as to of the 'additional instructions,' april , . [ ] these two articles are the same as the two 'additional instructions' of april , . _the duke of york's supplementary orders_, . [+spragge's second sea book. dartmouth mss.+] _further instructions for fighting_. . to keep the enemy to leeward. in case we have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands towards us and we towards them, then the van of our fleet shall keep the wind, and when _the rear comes_[ ] to a convenient distance of the enemy's rear shall stay until our whole line is come up within the same distance of the enemy's van, and then our whole line is to stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in the van, and in case the enemy tack in the rear first, then he that leads the van of our fleet is to tack first, and the whole line is to follow, standing all along with the same tacks on board as the enemy does. . to divide the enemy's fleet. in case the enemy have the wind of us and we have sea-room enough, then we are to keep the wind as close as we can lie until such time as we see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide their fleet; and if the van of our fleet find that they have the wake of any part of them, they are to tack and to stand in, and strive to divide the enemy's body, and that squadron which shall pass first being come to the other side is to tack again, and the middle squadron is to bear up upon that part of the enemy so divided, which the last is to second, either by bearing down to the enemy or by endeavouring to keep off those that are to windward, as shall be best for service. . to keep the line. the several commanders of the fleet are to take special care that they keep their line, and upon pain of death that they fire not over any of our own ships. (signed) james. by command of his royal highness. (signed) m. wren. footnote: [ ] this must be a copyist's error. in lord dartmouth's ms. book (see _ante_, p. ) it reads 'when they are come.' __the duke of york_, - _. [+spragge's second sea book. dartmouth mss.+] _encouragement for the captains and companies of fireships, small frigates and ketches_. although it is the duty of all persons employed in his majesty's fleet even to the utmost hazard of their lives to endeavour as well the destroying of his majesty's enemies, as the succouring of his majesty's subjects, and in most especial manner to preserve and defend his majesty's ships of war (the neglect whereof shall be at all times strictly and severely punished), nevertheless, that no inducement may be wanting which may oblige all persons serving in his majesty's service valiantly and honourably to acquit themselves in their several stations, we have thought fit to publish and declare, and do hereby promise on his majesty's behalf: that if any of his majesty's fireships perform the service expected of them in such manner that any of the enemy's ships of war of forty guns or more shall be burnt by them, every person remaining in the fireship till the service be performed shall receive on board the admiral, immediately after the service done, ten pounds as a reward for that service over and above his pay due to him; and in case any of them shall be killed in that service it shall be paid to his executors or next relation over and above the ordinary provision made for the relations of such as are slain in his majesty's service; and the captains of such fireships shall receive a medal of gold to remain as a token of honour to him and his posterity, and shall receive such other encouragement by preferment and command as shall be fit to reward him, and induce others to perform the like service. the inferior officers shall receive each ten pounds in money and be taken care of, and placed in other ships before any persons whatsoever. in case any of the enemy's flagships shall be so fired, the recompense shall be double to each man performing it, and the medal to the commander shall be such as shall particularly express the eminence of the service, and his and the other officers' preferments shall be suitable to the merit of it. if any of his majesty's fifth or sixth rate frigates, or any ketches, smacks or hoys in his majesty's service, shall board or destroy any fireships of the enemy, and so prevent any of them from going on board any of his majesty's ships, above the fifth rate, besides the preferment which shall be given to the commanders and officers of such ships performing such service answerable to the merit, the companies of such ships or vessels, or in case they shall be killed in that service, their executors or nearest relations, shall receive to every man forty shillings as a reward, and such persons who shall by the testimony of the commanders appear to have been eminently instrumental in such service shall receive a further reward according to their merit. if the masters of any ketches, hoys, smacks, and other vessels hired for his majesty's service shall endeavour to perform any of the services aforesaid, and shall by such his attempt lose his vessel or ship, the full reward thereof shall be paid by the treasurer of his majesty's navy, upon certificate of the service done by the council of war, and the said commanders and men serving in her shall receive the same recompense with those serving in his majesty's ships or vessels. james.[ ] by command of his royal highness. footnote: [ ] in capt. moulton's sea book _(harleian mss._ , f. ) is another copy of these articles which concludes, 'given on board the royal charles the th of april . james.' and at foot is written 'a copy of his royal highness's command received from his excellency the earl of sandwich.' they probably therefore originated in the second war and were reissued in the third. _final form of the duke of york's orders, _. _with the additions and observations subsequently made_.[ ] [+g. penn, memorials of penn+.] _james, duke of york and albany, earl of ulster, lord high admiral of england, scotland, and ireland, constable of dover castle, lord warden of the cinque ports, and governor of portsmouth, &c._ _instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in fighting_. instruction i. upon discovery of a fleet, and receiving of a signal from the admiral (which is to be the striking of the admiral's ensign, and making a weft), such frigates as are appointed (that is to say, one out of each squadron) are to make sail, and to stand with them, so nigh as they can conveniently, the better to gain knowledge what they are, and of what quality; how many fireships, and others; and what posture their fleet is in; which being done, the frigates are to speak together, and conclude on the report they are to give; and, accordingly, to repair to their respective squadrons and commanders-in-chief; and not to engage (if the enemy's ships exceed them in number), unless it shall appear to them on the place that they have an advantage. instruction ii. at sight of the said fleet, the vice-admiral (or he who commands in chief in the second place), with his squadron; and the rear-admiral (or he who commands in chief in the third squadron), with his squadron; are to make what sail they can to come up, and to put themselves into that order of battle which shall be given them; for which the signal shall be the union flag put on the mizen peak of the admiral's ship; at sight whereof, as well the vice- and rear-admirals of the red squadron, as the admirals, vice-admirals, and rear-admirals of the other squadrons, are to answer it by doing the like. instruction iii. in case the enemy have the wind of the admiral and fleet, and they have sea-room enough, then they are to keep the wind as close as they can lie, until such time as they see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet; and if the van of his majesty's fleet find that they have the wake of any considerable part of them, they are to tack and stand in, and strive to divide the enemy's body; and that squadron that shall pass first, being got to windward, is to bear down on those ships to leeward of them; and the middle squadron is to keep her wind, and to observe the motion of the enemy's van, which the last squadron is to second; and both of these squadrons are to do their utmost to assist or relieve the first squadron that divided the enemy's fleet.[ ] instruction iv. if the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and come to fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall endeavour to put themselves in one line, close upon a wind, according to the order of battle.[ ] instruction v. if the admiral would have any of the fleet to make sail, or endeavour, by tacking or otherwise, to gain the wind of the enemy, he will put a red flag upon the spritsail [_sic_], topmast shrouds, fore-stay, fore topmast-stay; and he who first discovers this signal shall make sail, and hoist and lower his jack and ensign, that the rest of the fleet may take notice thereof, and follow.[ ] instruction vi.[ ] if the admiral should have the wind of the enemy when other ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then, upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard, or mizen topmast, every ship is to bear up into his wake or grain, upon pain of severe punishment. if the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet or any part thereof be to leeward of him, to the end such ships that are to leeward may come up in a line with the admiral (if he shall put a flag as before and bear up); none that are to leeward are to bear up, but to keep his or their ship's luff, thereby to give his ship wake or grain. if it shall please god that the enemy shall be put to run, all the frigates are to make all the sail that possibly they can after them, and to run directly up their broadsides, and to take the best opportunity they can of laying them on board; and some ships which are the heavy sailers (with some persons appointed to command them) are to keep in a body in the rear of the fleet, that so they may take care of the enemy's ships which have yielded, and look after the manning of the prizes.[ ] instruction vii.[ ] in case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stand towards them, and they towards the enemy, then the van of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind; and when they are come within a convenient distance from the enemy's rear, they shall stay until their whole line is come up within the same distance from the enemy's van; and then their whole line is to tack (every ship in his own place), and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can (without endangering their loss of wind); and to stand along with them, the same tacks aboard, still keeping the enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van; and in case the enemy tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's is to tack first, with as many ships, divisions, or squadrons as are those of the enemy's; and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth. instruction viii.[ ] if the enemy stay to fight (his majesty's fleet having the wind), the headmost squadron of his majesty's fleet shall steer for the headmost of the enemy's ships.[ ] instruction ix.[ ] if, when his majesty's fleet is going before the wind, the admiral would have the vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap by the wind and come to their starboard tack, then he will hoist upon the mizen topmast-head a red flag. and in case he would have the rear-admiral and the ships of the larboard quarter to come to their larboard tack, then he will hoist up a blue flag in the same place. instruction x.[ ] if the admiral would have the van of the fleet to tack first, he will put abroad the union flag at the staff on the fore topmast-head, if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be abroad, then the fore topsail shall be lowered a little, and the union flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards. when the admiral would have the rear of the fleet to tack first, the union flag shall be put abroad on the flagstaff of the mizen topmast-head; and for the better notice of these two signals through the fleet, each flagship is, upon sight of either of the said signals, to make the same signals, that so every ship may know what they are to do; and they are to continue out the same signals until they be answered.[ ] instruction xi.[ ] if the admiral put a red flag on the mizen shrouds, or the mizen peak, all the flagships are to come up into his wake or grain. instruction xii.[ ] when the admiral would have the other squadrons to make more sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the ensign staff of the admiral's ships. instruction xiii.[ ] as soon as the fleet shall see the admiral engage, or make a signal, by putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, each squadron shall take the best advantage to engage the enemy, according to such order of battle as shall be given them. instruction xiv.[ ] in time of fight, if the weather be reasonable, the commanders of his majesty's fleet shall endeavour to keep about the distance of half a cable one from another; but so as they may also (according to the direction of their commanders) vary that distance, as the weather shall prove, and as the occasion of succouring any of his majesty's ships or of assaulting those of the enemy shall require. and as for the flag officers, they shall place themselves according to such order of battle as shall be given. instruction xv.[ ] no commander of any of his majesty's ships shall suffer his guns to be fired until the ship be within distance to do good execution; and whoever shall do the contrary shall be strictly examined, and severely punished, by a court-martial. instruction xvi.[ ] in all cases of fight with the enemy, the commanders of his majesty's ships are to keep the fleet in one line, and (as much as may be) to preserve the order of battle which they have been directed to keep before the time of fight.[ ] instruction xvii.[ ] none of the ships of his majesty's fleet shall pursue any small number of the enemy's ships before the main body of their fleet shall be disabled, or run. instruction xviii.[ ] none shall fire upon the ships of the enemy's that are laid on board by any of his majesty's ships, but so as he may be sure he do not endamage his friend. instruction xix.[ ] the several commanders in the fleet are to take special care, upon pain of death, that they fire not over any of their own ships. instruction xx.[ ] it is the duty of all commanders of the small frigates, ketches, and smacks, belonging to the several squadrons (who are not otherwise appointed by the admiral), to know the fireships belonging to the enemies, and accordingly observing their motion, to do their utmost to cut off their boats (if possible); or, if they have an opportunity, to lay them on board, seize, and destroy them; and, to this purpose, they are to keep to windward of their squadron, in time of service. but in case they cannot prevent the fireships from coming on board of his majesty's ships, by clapping between them (which by all possible means they are to endeavour), they are in such an exigent to show themselves men, by steering on board them with their boats, and, with grapnels and other means, to clear his majesty's ships from them, and to destroy them. which service, if honourably performed, shall be rewarded according to its merit; but if neglected, shall be strictly examined, and severely punished.[ ] instruction xxi.[ ] the fireships in the several squadrons are to endeavour to keep the wind; and they (with their small frigates) to be as near the great ships as they can, attending the signal from the admiral, and acting accordingly. if the admiral hoist up a white flag at the mizen yard-arm or topmast-head, all the small frigates in his squadron are to come under his stern for orders. instruction xxii.[ ] in case it should please god that any ships of his majesty's fleet be lamed in fight, and yet be in no danger of sinking, nor encompassed by the enemy, the following ships shall not stay, under pretence of succouring them, but shall follow their leaders, and endeavour to do what service they can against the enemy; leaving the succouring of the lame ships to the sternmost of the fleet; being assured that nothing but beating the body of the enemy's fleet can effectually secure the lame ships, nevertheless, if any ship or ships shall be distressed or disabled, by loss of mast, shot under water, or the like, so that it is really in danger of sinking or taking; that or those ship or ships thus distressed shall make a sign by the weft of his or their jack or ensign, and those next to them are strictly required to relieve them. and if any ships or squadron shall happen to be overcharged or distressed, the next squadron, or ships, are immediately to make towards their relief and assistance. and if any ship shall be necessitated to bear away from the enemy, to stop a leak, or mend what is amiss (which cannot otherwise be repaired), he is to put a pennant on the mizen peak, or ensign staff, whereby the rest of that ship's squadron may have notice what it is for. if the admiral or any flagship should be so, then the ships of the fleet, or of the respective squadrons, are to endeavour to get up as close into a line between him and the enemy as they can; having always an eye to defend him in case the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition. and in case any flagship, or any other ship in the fleet, shall be forced to go out of the line, for stopping of leaks, or repairing of any other defect, then the next immediate ships are forthwith to endeavour to close the line again, either by making or shortening sail, or by such other ways and means as they shall find most convenient for doing of it; and all the small craft shall come in to that ship's assistance, upon a signal made of her being disabled. and if any of the chief flagships, or other flagships shall happen to be so much disabled as that they shall be unfit for present service, in such a case any chief flag officer may go on board any other ship of his own squadron, as he shall judge most convenient; and any other flag officer, in that case, may go on board any ship in his division.[ ] instruction xxiii.[ ] in case of fight, none of his majesty's ships shall chase beyond sight of the admiral; and at night all chasing ships are to return to the fleet. instruction xxiv.[ ] if any engagement by day shall continue till night, and the admiral shall please to anchor, all the fleet are, upon a signal, to anchor, in as good, order as may be, which signal will be the same as in the 'instructions for sailing' _(vid._ instr. xviii.); that is to say, the admiral fires two guns, a small distance one from another, &c. and if the admiral please to retreat without anchoring, then he will fire four guns, one after another, so as the report may only be distinguished; and about three minutes after he will do the like with four guns more.[ ] footnotes: [ ] the later _admiralty ms._ is prefaced by the following _observation_: 'there have happened several misfortunes and disputes for want of a sufficient number of signals to explain the general's pleasure, without which it is not to be avoided; and whereas it hath often happened for want of a ready putting forth and apprehending to what intent the signals are made, they are contracted into a shorter method so that no time might be lost. it is most certain that in all sea battles the flags or admiral-generals are equally concerned in any conflict, and no manner of knowledge can be gained how the rest of the battle goes till such time as it is past recovery. to prevent this let a person fitly qualified command the reserve, who shall by signals make known to the general in what condition or posture the other parts of the fleet are in, he having his station where the whole can best be discovered, and his signals, answering the general's, may also be discerned by the rest of the fleet.' [ ] the _admiralty ms._ has this _observation_: 'unless you can outstretch their headmost ships there is hazard in breaking through the enemy's line, and [it] commonly brings such disorders in the line of battle that it may be rather omitted unless an enemy press you near a lee shore. for if, according to this instruction, when you have got the wind you are to press the enemy, then those ships which are on each side of them shall receive more than equal damages from each other's shot if near, and in case the enemy but observed the seventh instruction--that is, to tack with equal numbers with you--then is your fleet divided and not the enemy's. [ ] the _admiralty ms._ here inserts an additional instruction, numbered , as follows: 'if in time of fight any flagship or squadron ahead of the fleet hath an opportunity of weathering any of the enemy's ships, they shall put abroad the same signal the general makes them for tacking, which, if the general would have them go about, he will answer by giving the same again, otherwise they are to continue on the same line or station.' _observation_.--'for it may prove not convenient in some cases to break the line.' [ ] the _admiralty ms._ adds, 'and as soon as they have the wind to observe what other signals the general makes; and in case they lose sight of the general, they are to endeavour to press the headmost ships of the enemy all they can, or assist any of ours that are annoyed by them.' the whole makes instruction vi. of the _admiralty ms._ an _observation_ is attached to the old instruction as follows:--'this signal was wanting in the battle fought th august, . the fourth squadron followed this instruction and got the wind of the enemy about four in the afternoon, and kept the wind for want of another signal to bear down upon the enemy, as monsieur d'estrées alleged at the council of war the next day. for want of this the enemy left only five or six ships to attend their motion, and pressed the other squadrons of ours to such a degree they were forced to give way.' _cf._ note, p. . [ ] the _admiralty ms._ makes of the three paragraphs of this instruction three separate instructions, numbered , , and , and inserts after the first paragraph a new instruction numbered , with an _observation_ appended. it is as follows: _additional instruction, no. viii.:_ 'when any of his majesty's ships that have gained the wind of the enemy, and that the general or admiral would have them bear down and come to a close fight, he will put abroad the same signal as for their tacking, and hoist and lower the same till it be discerned; at which, they that are to windward shall answer by bearing down upon the enemy. _observation_.--the same in the battle of solebay, sir joseph jordan got the wind and kept it for want of a signal or fireships.' this _observation_ appears to be intended as a continuation of the previous one, the new instruction supplies the missing signal there referred to. [ ] the _admiralty ms._ has this _observation_: 'the th may, ' , the battle fought in the schooneveld, the rear-admiral of their fleet commanded by bankart (? adriaen banckers) upon a signal from de ruyter gave way for some time, and being immediately followed by spragge and his division, it proved only a design to draw us to leeward, and that de ruyter might have the advantage of weathering us. so that for any small number giving way it is not safe for the like number to go after them, but to press the others which still maintain the fight according to the article following. [ ] no. in the _admiralty ms_. with the following _observation_: 'in bearing down upon an enemy when you have the wind, or standing towards them and they towards you, if it is in your power to fall upon any part of their ships, those to windward will be the most exposed; therefore you must use your utmost endeavour to ruin that part. the battle fought in _ _, the headmost or winderly ships were beaten in three hours and put to run before half the rest of the fleet were engaged. we suffered the like on the th of june, for tromp and de ruyter never bore down to engage the body of our fleet, but pressed the leading ships where spragge and his squadron had like to have been ruined.' [ ] _admiralty ms._ no. . [ ] for 'headmost of the enemy's ships' the _admiralty ms_. has 'windmost ships of the enemy's fleet, and endeavour all that can be to force them to leeward.' also this _observation_: 'it may happen that the headmost of their fleet may be the most leewardly, then in such case you are to follow this instruction, whereas before it was said to stand with the headmost ships of the enemy.' [ ] _admiralty ms_. nos. and . it has the _observation_: 'this ought to be for each squadron apart.' [ ] _admiralty ms_. nos. and l . to the first paragraph, or no. , it has the _observation_: 'it may happen that by the winds shifting there may be neither van nor rear; then in that case a signal for each squadron would be better understood, so that you are to follow the th and th of the "sailing instructions." for in the battle of august ' the wind shifted and put the whole line out of order.' [ ] the _admiralty ms_. here inserts a new article, no. : 'if the general would have those ships to windward of the enemy to bear down through their line to join the body of the fleet, he will put abroad a white flag with a cross from corner to corner where it can best be discovered.' [ ] _admiralty ms_. nos. to . [ ] _admiralty ms_. nos, to . [ ] _admiralty ms_. adds: 'having regard to press the weathermost ships and relieve such as are in distress.' it is worth noting that this important relaxation of strict line tactics practically embodies the idea of rupert's additional instruction of . _supra_, p. . [ ] _admiralty ms_. nos. to . [ ] _admiralty ms_. no. . it adds this _observation_: 'when the fleet is to leeward of the enemy you to take care to put yourself in such a station as that you may (when any signal is given) without loss of time tack and stand in to the line. and when any part of the fleet or ships wherein you are concerned are ordered to tack and gain the wind of the enemy, you are to make all the sail you can and keep up with the headmost ships that first tack.' [ ] _admiralty ms. 'observation_: the reward of saving a friend to be equal to that of destroying an enemy.' [ ] _admiralty ms._ nos. and . [ ] _admiralty ms._ no. . [ ] the _admiralty ms._ has the _observation:_ 'in changing ships be as careful as you can not to give the enemy any advantage or knowledge thereof by striking the flag. in case of the death of any flag officer, the flag to be continued aloft till the fight be over, notice to be given to the next commander-in-chief, and not to bear out of the line unless in very great danger. it hath been observed what very great encouragement the bare shooting of an admiral's flag gives the enemy, but this may be prevented by taking in all the flags before going to engage. it was the ruin of spragge in the battle of august ' by taking his flag in his boat, which gave the enemy an opportunity to discover his motion, when at the same [time] we saw three flags flying on board the main topmast-head of three ships which tromp had quitted.' [ ] _admiralty ms._ no. . [ ] _admiralty ms._ nos. and . [ ] the _admiralty ms._ has the _observation_: 'by reason that guns are not so well to be distinguished at the latter end of a battle from chose of the enemy, sky-rockets would be proper signals.' this appears to be the earliest recorded suggestion for the use of rockets for naval signalling. ii mediterranean orders, introductory in narbrough had been sent for the second time as commander-in-chief to the mediterranean, to deal with the barbary corsairs. to enable him to operate more effectively against tripoli, arrangements were on foot to establish a base for him at malta, and meanwhile he had been using the venetian port of zante. it was at this time that charles ii, in a last effort to throw off the yoke of louis xiv, had married his eldest niece, the princess mary, to the french king's arch-enemy william of orange, and relations between france and england were at the highest tension. preparations were set on foot in the british dockyards for equipping a 'grand fleet' of eighty sail; on february was issued a new and enlarged commission to narbrough making him 'admiral of his majesty's fleet in the straits'; sicily, which the french had occupied, was hurriedly evacuated; duquesne, who commanded the toulon squadron, was expecting to be attacked at any moment, and colbert gave him strict orders to keep out of the british admiral's way.[ ] it will be seen that it was in virtue of his new commission, and in expectation of encountering a superior french force, that narbrough issued his orders, and they may be profitably compared with those of lord sandwich on the eve of the second dutch war as the typical fighting instructions for a small british fleet. no collision however occurred; for louis could not face the threatened coalition between spain, holland, and england, and was forced to assent to a general peace, which was signed at nymwegen in the following september. footnote: [ ] corbett, _england in the mediterranean_, ii. - . the official correspondence will be found in mr. tanner's _calendar of the pepys mss._, vol. i., and in the _lettres de colbert_, vol. iii. _sir john narbrough_, . [+egerton mss. , f. +.] _sir john narbrough, knight, admiral of his majesty's fleet in the mediterranean seas for this expedition. instructions for all commanders to place their ships for their better fighting and securing the whole fleet if a powerful enemy sets upon us_. when i hoist my union flag at the mizen peak, i would have every commander in this fleet place himself in order of sailing and battle as prescribed, observing his starboard and larboard ship and leader, either sailing before or by the wind, and so continue sailing in order so long as the signal is abroad. in case a powerful squadron of ships falls with our fleet, and will fight us, and we see it most convenient to fight before the wind, and the enemy follow us, i would have every commander place his ships in this order of sailing prescribed as followeth, and so continue sailing and fighting, doing his utmost to annoy the enemy, so long as shall be required for defence of himself and whole fleet. _larboard side_. portsmouth frigate. newcastle frigate. samuel and henry advice diamond. friendship lion bonaventure. john and joseph pearl frigate. return benjamin and elizabeth concord fountain leopard boneto sloop, baltam^r.[ ] plymouth, admiral. spragge frigate, batchelor.[ ] st. lucar merchant prosperous sapphire frigate mary and martha delight olive branch italian merchant tiger james galley dragon samuel and mary mediterranean james merchant king-fisher frigate. _starboard side_. portland frigate. in case the enemy be to leeward of us, and force us to fight by the wind, then i would have each ship in this fleet to follow each other in a line as afore prescribed, either wing leading the van as the occasion shall require. in case i would have the van to tack first (in time of service) i will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and if i would have the rear of the fleet to tack first i will spread the union flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, each commander being [ready] to take notice of the said signals, and to act accordingly, following each other as prescribed, and be careful to assist and relieve any that is in necessity. in case of separation by foul weather, or by any inevitable accident, and the wind blows hard westerly, then zante road is the place appointed for rendezvous. given under my hand and on board his majesty's ship plymouth, at an anchor in zante road. this th of may, . john narbrough. footnote: [ ] neither baltimore nor batchelor nor any similar names of commissioned officers occur in pepys's navy list, - . tanner, _op. cit._ iii the last stuart orders introductory the next set of orders we have are those drawn up by george legge, first lord dartmouth, for the fleet with which he was entrusted by james ii, to prevent the landing of william of orange in . the only known copy of them is in the _sloane mss._ . it is unfortunately not complete, the last few articles with the date and signature being missing, so that there is no direct evidence that it related to this fleet. there can however be no doubt about the matter. for it is followed by the battle order of a fleet in which both ships and captains correspond exactly with that which dartmouth commanded in . the only other fleet which he commanded was that which in proceeded to the straits to carry out the evacuation of tangier, and it was not large enough to require such a set of instructions. we know moreover that in this year he did actually draw up some fighting instructions, shortly after september , the day his commission was signed, and that he submitted them to king james for approval. on october pepys, in the course of a long official letter to him from the admiralty, writes: 'his majesty, upon a very deliberate perusal of your two papers, one of the divisions of your fleet and the other touching your line of battle, does extremely approve the same, commanding me to tell you so.[ ] lord dartmouth's articles follow those which james had last drawn up in almost word for word, and the only alterations of any importance all refer to the handling of the line in action. there can be practically no doubt therefore that we here have the instructions which pepys refers to, and that the new matter relating to the line of battle originated with dartmouth, as the result of a considerable experience of naval warfare. after leaving cambridge he joined, at the age of , the ship of his cousin, sir edward spragge, and served with him as a volunteer and lieutenant throughout the second dutch war. in , before he was , he commanded the pembroke, and in the fairfax, in sir robert holmes's action with the dutch smyrna fleet, and in the battle of solebay. in he commanded the royal catherine ( ), and served throughout rupert's campaign with distinction. since then, as has been said, he had successfully conducted the evacuation of tangier. if on this occasion he needed advice he had at hand some of the best, in the person of his flag officers, sir roger strickland and sir john berry, two of the most seasoned old 'tarpaulins' in the service, and both in high estimation as naval experts with james. the amendments introduced into these instructions, although not extensive, point to a continued development. we note first that james's articles and are combined in dartmouth's article , so as to ensure the close-hauled line being formed before any attempt is made to divide the enemy's fleet. no such provision existed in the previous instructions. another noteworthy change under the new article is that, whether by intention or not, any commander of a ship is given the initiative in weathering a part of the enemy's fleet if he sees an opportunity. if this was seriously intended it seems to point to a reaction to the school of monck and rupert, perhaps under spragge's influence. dartmouth's next new article, no. , for reforming line of battle as convenient, regardless of the prescribed order of battle, points in the same direction. the only other change of importance is the note inserted in the sixth article, in which dartmouth lays his finger on one of the weak points in james's method of attack from windward by bearing down all together, and suggests a means by which the danger of being raked as the ships come down may be minimised. footnote: [ ] _dartmouth mss. (historical mss. commission_, xi. v. .) _lord dartmouth, oct._ . [+sloane mss. , ff. - +.] _george, lord dartmouth, admiral of his majesty's fleet for the present expedition_. _instructions for the better ordering his majesty's fleet in fighting_. and . _[same as in duke of york's_, .] . if the enemy have the wind of his majesty's fleet, and come to fight them, the commanders of his majesty's ships shall endeavour to put themselves into one line as close upon a wind as they can lie, according to the order of battle given, until such time as they shall see an opportunity by gaining their wakes to divide the enemy's fleet, &c. _[rest as in article of_ ]. . [_same as_ _of_ .] [ ] . if the admiral should have the wind of the enemy, when other ships of the fleet are in the wind of the admiral, then upon hoisting up a blue flag at the mizen yard or mizen topmast, every such ship is to bear up into his wake or grain upon pain of severe punishment. in this case, whether the line hath been broke or disordered by the shifting of the wind, or otherwise, each ship or division are not unreasonably to strive for their proper places in the first line of battle given, but they are to form a line, the best that may be with the admiral, and with all the expedition that can be, not regarding what place or division they fall into or between. if the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, &c. [_rest as in of _]. . in case his majesty's fleet have the wind of the enemy, and that the enemy stands towards them and they towards the enemy, then the van of his majesty's fleet shall keep the wind, and when they are come at a convenient distance from the enemy's rear they shall stay until their own whole line is come up within the same distance from the enemy's van; and then the whole line is to tack, every ship in his own place, and to bear down upon them so nigh as they can without endangering the loss of the wind--[note that they are not to bear down all at once, but to observe the working of the admiral and to bring to as often as he thinks fit, the better to bring his fleet to fight in good order; and at last only to lask away[ ] when they come near within shot towards the enemy as much as may be, and not bringing their heads to bear against the enemy's broadsides]--and to stand along with them the same tacks on board, still keeping the enemy to leeward, and not suffering them to tack in their van. and in case the enemy tack in the rear first, he who is in the rear of his majesty's fleet is to tack first with as many ships or divisions as are those of the enemy's, and if all the enemy's ships tack, their whole line is to follow, standing along with the same tacks aboard as the enemy doth. to . [_same as to of _.] . [_same as of , but with yellow flag instead of red_.] . when the admiral would have the other divisions to make more sail, though himself shorten sail, a white ensign shall be put on the ensign staff for the vice-admiral, a blue for the rear, and for both a striped. . as soon as the fleet shall see the admiral engage or make a signal by putting out a red flag on the fore topmast-head, each division shall take the best advantage they can to engage the enemy, according to such order of battle as shall be given them, and no ship or division whatsoever is upon any pretence to lie by to fight or engage the enemy whereby to endanger parting the main body of the fleet till such time as the whole line be brought to fight by this signal. to . [_same as to of _.] . the several commanders in the fleet are to take special care, upon pain of severe punishment, that they fire not over any of their own ships. . [_same as of _.] . the fireships in their several divisions are to endeavour to keep the wind, and they with the small frigates to be as near the great ships as they can, attending the signal and acting accordingly. . [_same as of _.][ ] footnotes: [ ] article of is omitted, being included in article above. [ ] to sail with a quartering wind. morogues urged this precaution a century later (_tactique navale_, p. ). [ ] the ms. ends abruptly in the middle of this article. part vii william iii and anne i. russell, ii. rooke, lord torrington, tourville and hoste introductory no one document probably possesses so much importance for the history of naval tactics as the instructions issued by admiral russell in . yet it is a remarkable thing that their tenour was unknown--indeed their existence was wholly unsuspected--until a copy of them was happily discovered in holland by sir william laird clowes. by him it was presented to the united service institution, and the thanks of the society are due to him and the institution that these instructions are now at last available for publication. they form part of a complete printed set of fleet instructions, entitled 'instructions made by the right honourable edward russell, admiral, in the year , for the better ordering of the fleet in sailing by day and night, and in fighting.' besides the fighting instructions we have a full set of signals both for day and night properly indexed, instructions for sailing in a fog, instructions to be observed by younger captains to the elder, instructions for masters, pilots, ketches, hoys, and smacks attending the fleet, and the usual instructions for the encouragement of captains and companies of fireships, small frigates and ketches. now this is the precise form in which all fleet instructions were issued, with scarcely any alteration, up to the conclusion of the war of american independence,[ ] and the peculiar importance of this set of articles therefore is, that in them we have the first known example of those stereotyped fighting instructions to which, as all modern writers seem agreed, was due the alleged decadence of naval tactics in the eighteenth century. this being so, they clearly demand the most careful consideration. 'the english,' says captain mahan in his latest discussion of the subject, 'in the period of reaction which succeeded the dutch wars produced their own caricature of systematised tactics,[ ] and this may be taken as well representing the current judgment. but when we come to study minutely these orders of russell, and to study them in the light of the last of the duke of york's and the observations thereon in the _admiralty manuscript_, as well as of the views of the great french admirals of the time, we may well doubt whether the judgment does not require modification. we may doubt, that is, whether russell's orders, so far from being a caricature of what had gone before, were not rather a sagacious attempt to secure that increase of manoeuvring power and squadronal control which had been found essential to any real advance in tactics. in the first place, after noting that these instructions begin logically with two articles for the formation of line ahead and abreast, we are struck by this disappearance of the duke of york's article relating to 'dividing the enemy's fleet.' it is certainly to this disappearance that is mainly due the belief that the new instructions were retrograde. the somewhat hasty conclusion is generally drawn that the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' had been introduced during the dutch wars, and forgotten immediately afterwards. but, as we have already seen, the duke of york's article can hardly be construed as embodying the principle of concentration by 'breaking the line,' and 'containing.' as we know, it only applied to an attack from the leeward which the english, and indeed every power up to that time, did all they knew to avoid, and it cannot safely be assumed to mean anything more than a device for gaining the wind of part of the enemy when you cannot weather his whole fleet; while the 'containing' was intended to prevent the enemy's concentrating on the squadron that performed the manoeuvre. now, although russell's instructions lay down no rule for isolating and containing, they do provide three new and distinct articles by which the admiral can do so if he sees fit. under the duke of york's instructions, it will be remembered, it was left to the van commander to execute the manoeuvre of dividing the enemy's fleet as he saw his opportunity, and under those of lord dartmouth it was left apparently to 'any commander.' with all that can be said for leaving the greatest possible amount of initiative to individual officers, such a system can hardly be called satisfactory, and in any case so important a movement ought certainly to be as far as possible under the control of the commander-in-chief. but under the previous instructions he could not even initiate it by signal. the defect had already been seen, and it will be remembered that the additions and observations to this and the following articles which the _admiralty manuscript_ contains are all directed to remedying the omission. it is to exactly the same end that russell's orders seem designed, and if, as we shall see to be most probable, they were really drawn up by lord torrington, we know that they were used in this way at beachy head. whether the idea of concentration and containing was in the mind of their author we cannot tell for certain, but at any rate the new instructions provide signals by which the admiral can order such movements not only by any squadron, but even by any subdivision he pleases. the freedom of individual initiative it is true is gone, but this, as the _admiralty ms_. indicates, was done deliberately, not as a piece of reactionary pedantry, but as the result of experience in battle. in all other respects the tactical flexibility that was gained is obvious, and was fully displayed in the first engagements in which the instructions were used. so far as we can judge, the current view at this time was that where fleets were equal, every known form of concentration was unadvisable upon an unshaken enemy. the methods of the duke of york's school were regarded as having failed, and the result appears to have been to convince tacticians that with the means at their disposal a strict preservation of the line gave a sure advantage against an enemy who attempted an attack by concentration. tactics, in fact, in accordance with a sound and inevitable law, having tended to become too recklessly offensive, were exhibiting a reaction to the defensive. if the enemy had succeeded in forming his line, it had come to be regarded as too hazardous to attempt to divide his fleet unless you had first forced a gap by driving ships out of the line. this idea we see reflected in the th paragraph of the duke of york's twenty-second article ( ) and in russell's new twenty-third article, enjoining ships to close up any gap that may have been caused by the next ahead or astern having been forced out of the line. briefly stated, it may be said that the preoccupation of naval tactics was now not so much to break the enemy's line, as to prevent your own being broken. but the matter did not end here. it was seen that when your own fleet was superior, concentration was still practicable in various ways, and particularly by doubling. tacticians were now mainly absorbed in working out this form of attack and the methods of meeting it, and russell's elaborate articles for handling squadrons and subdivisions independently may well have had this intention. the new phase of tactical opinion is that which we find expounded in père hoste's famous work, _l' art des armées navales, ou traité des évolutions navales_, published in at the instigation of the comte de tourville. the author was a jesuit, but claims that he is merely giving the result of his experience while serving with the great french admirals of that time, who had learned all they knew either as allies or enemies of the english. 'for twelve years,' he says in his apology for touching naval subjects, 'i have had the honour of serving with monsieur le maréchal d'estrées, monsieur le duc de mortemart, and monsieur le maréchal de tourville in all the expeditions they made in command of naval fleets; and monsieur le maréchal de tourville has been kind enough to communicate to me his lights, bidding me write on a matter which i think has never before been the subject of a treatise.' the whole system of tactics that he develops is based, like russell's, on the single line ahead and the independent action of squadrons. the passages in which he elaborates the central battle idea of concentration by doubling are as follows: 'the fleet which is the more numerous will try to extend on the enemy in such a manner as to leave its rearmost ships astern, which will immediately turn [_se repliera_] upon the enemy to double him, and put him between two fires. _remark i_.--if the more numerous fleet has the wind it will be able more easily to turn its rear upon that of the enemy, and put him between two fires. but if the more numerous fleet is to leeward it ought none the less to leave its rear astern, because the wind may shift in the fight. besides, the fleet that is to leeward can edge away insensibly in fighting to give its rearmost ships a chance of doubling on the enemy by hugging the wind. _remark ii_.--i know that many skilful people are persuaded that you ought to double the enemy ahead; because, if the van of the enemy is once in disorder it falls on the rest of the fleet and throws it infallibly into confusion.' and by the aid of diagrams he proceeds to show that this view is unsound, because the van can easily avoid the danger while the rear cannot. to support his view he instances the entire success with which at the battle of la hogue, russell, having the superior fleet, doubled on tourville's rear. 'to prevent being doubled,' he proceeds, 'you must absolutely prevent the enemy from leaving ships astern of you, and to that end you may adopt several devices when you are much inferior in number. 'i. if we have the wind we may leave some of the enemy's leading ships alone, and cause our van to fall on their second division. in this manner their first division will be practically useless, and if it forces sail to tack upon us it will lose much time, and will put itself in danger of being isolated by the calm which generally befalls in this sort of action by reason of the great noise of the guns. we may also leave a great gap in the centre of our fleet, provided the necessary precautions be taken to prevent our van being cut off. by these means, however inferior we be in numbers, we may prevent the enemy leaving ships astern of us. _example_.--everyone did not disapprove the manner in which admiral herbert disposed his fleet when he engaged the french in the action of bevesier [_i.e._ beachy head] in the year . he had some ships fewer than ours, and he had determined to make his chief effort against our rear. that is why he ordered the dutch leading division to fall on our second division. then he opened his fleet in the centre, leaving a great gap opposite our centre. after which, having closed up the english to very short intervals, he opposed them to our rear, and held off somewhat with his own division so as to prevent the french profiting by the gap which he had left in his fleet to double the dutch. this order rendered our first division nearly useless, because it had to make a very long board to tack on the enemy's van, and the wind having fallen, it was put to it to be in time to share the glory of the action.[ ] 'ii. if the less numerous fleet is to leeward, the gap may be left more in the centre and less in the van, but it is necessary to have a small detachment of men-of-war and fireships so as to prevent the enemy profiting by the gaps in the fleet to divide it. 'iii. others prefer to give as a general rule, that the flag officers of the less numerous fleet attack the flag officers of the enemy's fleet;[ ] for by this means several of the enemy's ships remain useless in the intervals, and the enemy cannot double you. 'iv. others prefer that the three squadrons of the less numerous fleet each attack a squadron of the more numerous fleet, taking care that each squadron ranges up to the enemy in such a manner as not to leave any of his ships astern, but rather leaving several vessels ahead. 'v. finally, there are those who would have the less numerous fleet put so great an interval between the ships as to equalise their line with that of the enemy. but this last method is, without doubt, the least good, because it permits the enemy to employ the whole of its strength against the less numerous fleet. i agree, however, that this method might be preferred to others in certain circumstances; as when the enemy's ships are considerably less powerful than those of the less numerous fleet.' having thus explained the system of doubling, he proceeds to give the latest ideas of his chief on breaking the enemy's line, or, as it was then called, passing through his fleet. 'we find,' he says, 'that in the relations of the fights in the channel between the english and the dutch that their fleets passed through one another.... in this manner the two fleets passed through one another several times, which exposed them to be cut off, taken, and mutually to lose several ships. _remark_.--this manoeuvre is as bold as it is delicate, and consummate technical skill is necessary for it to succeed as happily as it did with the comte d'estrées ... in the battle of the texel, in the year , for he passed through the zealand squadron, weathered it, broke it up, and put the enemy into so great a disorder that it settled the victory which was still in the balance.'[ ] after pointing out by diagrams various methods of parrying the manoeuvre, he proceeds: 'i do not see, then, that we need greatly fear the enemy's passing through us; and i do not even think that this manoeuvre ought ever to be performed except under one of the three following conditions: ( ) if you are compelled to do it in order to avoid a greater evil; ( ) if the enemy by leaving a great gap in the midst of his squadrons renders a part of his fleet useless; ( ) if several of his ships are disabled.... 'sometimes you are compelled to pass through the enemy's fleet to rescue ships that the enemy has cut off, and in this case you must risk something, but you should observe several precautions: ( ) you should close up to the utmost; ( ) you should carry a press of sail without troubling to fight in passing through the enemy; ( ) the ships that have passed ought to tack the moment they can to prevent the enemy standing off on the same tack as the fleet that passes through them.' it is clear, then, that in the eyes of perhaps the finest fleet leader of his time, and one of the finest france ever had, a man who thoroughly understood the value of concentration, the method of securing it by breaking the line was dangerous and unsound. in this he thoroughly endorses the views contained in the 'observations' of the _admiralty ms._ and the modifications of the standing order which they suggest. indeed, hoste's remarks on breaking the line are, in effect, little more than a logical elaboration of those ideas and suggestions. in the 'observations' we have the monition not to attempt the manoeuvre 'unless an enemy press you on a lee shore.' we have the signal for a squadron breaking the enemy's line, but only in order to rejoin the main body, and we have the simple method of parrying the move by tacking with an equal number of ships. the fundamental principles of the problem in both the english and the french author are the same, and a comparison of the two enables us to assert, with no hesitation, that the manoeuvre of breaking the line was abandoned by the tacticians of that era, not from ignorance nor from lack of enterprise, but from a deliberate tactical conviction gained by experience in war. in judging the apparent want of enterprise which our own admirals began to display in action at this time, we should probably be careful to refrain from joining in the unmitigated contempt with which modern historians have so freely covered them. in the typical battle of malaga, for instance, rooke did nothing but carry out the principles which were the last word of tourville's brilliant career. nor must it be forgotten that, although rodney executed the manoeuvre in , and hood provided a signal for its revival which howe at first adopted, it was never in much favour in the british service, seeing that it was only adapted for an attack from to leeward. the manoeuvre of breaking the line which howe eventually introduced was something wholly different both in form and intention from what rodney executed and from what was understood by 'dividing the fleet' in the seventeenth century.[ ] how far the system of doubling was approved by english admirals is doubtful. we have seen that an 'observation' in the _admiralty manuscript_ distrusts it,[ ] but i have been able to find no other expression of opinion on the point earlier than , and that entirely condemns it. it occurs in a set of fleet instructions drawn up for submission to the admiralty by admiral sir charles h. knowles, bart. as knowles was a pupil and _protégé_ of rodney's, we may assume he was in possession of the great tactician's ideas on the point; and in these _fighting and sailing instructions_ the following, article occurs: 'to double the enemy's line--that is, to send a few unengaged ships on one side to engage, while the rest are fighting on the other--is rendering those ships useless. every ship which is between two, has not only her two broadsides opposed to theirs, but has likewise their shot which cross in her favour.'[ ] no signal was provided for 'doubling' in lord howe's or the later signal books, though nelson certainly executed the manoeuvre at the nile. it survived however in the french service, and the english books provided a signal for preventing its execution by a numerically superior enemy. sir alexander cochrane also revived it after trafalgar. knowles's objection to the manoeuvre makes it easy to understand that, however well it suited the french tactics of long bowls or boarding, it was not well adapted to the english method of close action with the guns. with the french service it certainly continued in favour, and the whole of hoste's rules were reproduced by the famous naval expert sébastien-francois bigot, vicomte de morogues--in his elaborate _tactique navale, ou traits des évolutions et des signaux_, which appeared in , and was republished at amsterdam in . not only was he the highest french authority on naval science of his time, but a fine seaman as well, as he proved when in command of the _magnifique_ on the disastrous day at quiberon.[ ] the remainder of the new instructions, though less important than the expansion of the duke of york's third article, all tend in the same direction. so far from insisting on a rigid observance of the single line ahead in all circumstances, the new system seems to aim at securing flexibility, and the power of concentration by independent action of squadrons. this is to be specially noted in the new article, no. , in which signals are provided for particular squadrons and particular divisions forming line of battle abreast. it is true that the old rigid form of an attack from windward is retained, but, ineffective as the system proved, it was certainly not inspired, as is so often said, by a mediæval conception of naval battle as a series of single ship actions. from what has been already said, the well-considered tactical idea that underlay it is obvious. the injunction to range the length of the enemy's line van to van, and rear to rear, or _vice versa_, was aimed at avoiding being doubled at either end of the line; while the injunction to bear down together was obviously the quickest mode of bringing the whole fleet into action without giving the enemy a chance of weathering any part of it by 'gaining its wake.' that it was inadequate for this purpose is well known. it would only work when the two fleets were exactly parallel at the moment of bearing down--as was made apparent at the battle of malaga, where the french from leeward almost succeeded in dividing rooke's fleet as it bore down. still the idea was sound enough. the trouble was that it did not make sufficient allowance for the unhandiness of ships of the line in those days, and their difficulty in taking up or preserving exact formations. as to the authorship of the articles, it must be remembered that the mere fact that they were issued by russell is not enough to attribute them to him. he had had practically no previous experience as a flag officer, and in all probability they followed more or less closely those used by lord torrington in the previous year. torrington was first lord of the admiralty in , and commander-in-chief of the main fleet in . it was not till after his acquittal in december of that year that he was superseded by russell. the instructions moreover seem generally to be designed in close accordance with all we know of torrington's tactical practice, and it is scarcely doubtful that they are due to his ripe experience and not to russell. that the point cannot be settled with absolute certainty is to be the more lamented because henceforth this set of fighting instructions, and not those of rooke in , must be taken as the dominating factor of eighteenth-century tactics. rooke's instructions, except for the modification of a few articles, are the same as russell's, and consequently it has not been thought necessary to print them in full. for a similar reason it has been found convenient to print such slight changes as are known to have been made in the standing form after as notes to the corresponding articles of russell's instructions. footnotes: [ ] see introductory note to rooke's instructions of , p. . [ ] _types of naval officers_, p. . [ ] this plan of attack bears a strong resemblance to that which nelson intended to adopt at trafalgar. 'nelson,' says captain mahan, 'doubtless had in mind the dispositions of tourville and de ruyter.'--_life of nelson_, ii. . hoste, however, it would seem, though a devout admirer of both tourville and de ruyter, gives the credit to lord torrington. it was not introduced officially into the british tactical system until lord howe adopted it in . it was retained in the subsequent signal books and instructions. [ ] this proviso was added to the signal in the edition of , and a corresponding explanatory instruction (no. ) was provided. see _post_, p. . [ ] it should be remembered that neither the dutch nor the english accounts of the action at all endorse this view of d'estrées's behaviour. see also the _admiralty ms._, p. , note . [ ] see _post_, pp. - . [ ] _ante_, p. , note . [ ] printed in . a ms. note says 'these instructions were written in and afterwards very much curtailed, though the general plan is the same.' [ ] lacour gayet, _la marine militaire de la france sous louis_ xv, , pp. - . _admiral edward russell_, . [+from a printed copy in the library of the united service institution+.] _fighting instructions_. i. when the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, one ship ahead of another (according to the method given to each captain), he will hoist a union flag at the mizen peak, and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal.[ ] ii. when the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle, one ship abreast of another (according to the method given to each captain), he will hoist a union flag and a pennant at the mizen-peak, and fire a gun; and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same. iii. when the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his whole squadron to tack, and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will spread a white flag under the flag at the main top-mast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by the flagships in the fleet; and when he would have the admiral of the blue do the same, he will spread a blue flag on that place. iv. when the admiral would have the vice-admiral of the red, and his division, tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will spread a red flag from the cap at the fore topmast-head downward on the backstay. if he would have the vice-admiral of the white do the same, a white flag; if the vice-admiral of the blue, a blue flag at the same place. v. when the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the red and his division tack and endeavour to gain the wind of the enemy, he will hoist a red flag at the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head; if the rear-admiral of the white, a white flag; if the rear-admiral of the blue, a blue flag at the same place, and under the flag a pennant of the same colour. vi. if the admiral be to leeward of the fleet, or any part of the fleet, and he would have them bear down into his wake or grain, he will hoist a blue flag at the mizen peak. vii. if the admiral be to leeward of the enemy, and his fleet, or any part of them, to leeward of him, that he may bring those ships into a line, he will bear up with a blue flag at the mizen peak under the union flag, which is the signal for the line of battle; and then those ships to leeward are to use their utmost endeavour to get into his wake or grain, according to their stations in the line of battle. viii. if the fleet be sailing before the wind, and the admiral would have the vice-admiral and the ships of the starboard quarter to clap by the wind, and come to the starboard tack, then he will hoist upon the mizen topmast-head a red flag. and in case he would have the rear-admiral and the ships of the larboard quarter to come to their larboard tack, then he will hoist up a blue flag at the same place. ix. when the admiral would have the van of the fleet to tack first, he will put abroad the union flag at the flagstaff on the fore topmast-head, and fire a gun, if the red flag be not abroad; but if the red flag be abroad, then the fore topsails shall be lowered a little, and the union flag shall be spread from the cap of the fore topmast downwards, and every flagship in the fleet is to do the same. x. when the admiral would have the rear-admiral of the fleet tack first, he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and fire a gun, which is to be answered by every flagship in the fleet. xi. when the admiral would have all the flagships in the fleet come into his wake or grain, he will hoist a red flag at the mizen peak, and fire a gun; and the flagships in the fleet are to make the same signal. xii. when the admiral would have the admiral of the white and his squadron make more sail, though himself shorten sail, he will hoist a white flag on the ensign staff; if the admiral of the blue, or he that commands in the third post, a blue flag at the same place; and every flagship in the fleet is to make the same signal. xiii. as soon as the admiral shall hoist a red flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, every ship in the fleet is to use their utmost endeavour to engage the enemy, in the order the admiral has prescribed unto them.[ ] xiv. when the admiral hoisteth a white flag at the mizen peak, then all the small frigates of his squadron that are not in the line of battle are to come under his stern. xv. if the fleet is sailing by a wind in a line of battle, and the admiral would have them brace their headsails to the mast, he will hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. then the ships in the rear are to brace to first. xvi. the fleet lying in a line of battle, with their headsails to the mast, and if the admiral would have them fill and stand on, he will hoist a yellow flag on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, and fire a gun; which the flagships in the fleet are to answer. then the ships in the van are to fill first, and to stand on. if it happen, when this signal is to be made, that the red flag is abroad on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head, the admiral will spread the yellow flag under the red. xvii. if the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him, and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is make sail till they come the length of the enemy's rear, and our rear abreast of the enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack first, and every ship one after another, as fast as they can, throughout the line, that they may engage on the same tack with the enemy. but in case the enemy's fleet should tack in their rear, our fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships; and whilst they are in fight with the enemy, to keep within half a cable's length one of another, or if the weather be bad, according to the direction of the commanders. when the admiral would have the ship that leads the van of the fleet (or the headmost ship in the fleet) when they are in a line of battle, hoist, lower, set or haul up any of his sails, the admiral will spread a yellow flag under that at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun; which the flagships that have flags at the main topmast-head are to answer; and those flagships that have not, are to hoist the yellow flag on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun. then the admiral will hoist, lower, set or haul up the sail he would have the ship that leads the van do. xviii. if the admiral and his fleet have the wind of the enemy, and they have stretched themselves in a line of battle, the van of the admiral's fleet is to steer with the van of the enemy's and there to engage them. xix. every commander is to take care that his guns are not fired till he is sure he can reach the enemy upon a point-blank; and by no means to suffer his guns to be fired over by any of our own ships. xx. none of the ships in the fleet shall pursue any small number of the enemy's ships till the main body be disabled or run. xxi. if any of the ships in the fleet are in distress, and make the signal, which is a weft with the jack or ensign, the next ship to them is strictly required to relieve them. xxii. if the admiral, or any flagship, should be in distress, and make the usual signal, the ships in the fleet are to endeavour to get up as close into a line, between him and the enemy, as they can; having always an eye to defend him, if the enemy should come to annoy him in that condition. xxiii. in case any ship in the fleet should be forced to go out of the line to repair damages she has received in battle the next ships are to close up the line. xxiv. if any flagship be disabled, the flag may go on board any ship of his own squadron or division. xxv. if the enemy be put to the run, and the admiral thinks it convenient the whole fleet shall follow them, he will make all the sail he can himself after the enemy, and fire two guns out of his fore-chase; then every ship in the fleet is to use his best endeavour to come up with the enemy, and lay them on board. xxvi. if the admiral would have any particular flagship, and his squadron, or division, give chase to the enemy, he will make the same signal that is appointed for that flagship's tacking with his squadron or division, and weathering the enemy. xxvii. when the admiral would have them give over chase, he will hoist a white flag at the fore topmast-head and fire a gun. xxviii. in case any ship in the line of battle should be disabled in her masts, rigging or hull, the ship that leads ahead of her shall take her a-tow and the division she is in shall make good the line with her. but the commander of the ship so disabled is not on any pretence whatever to leave his station till he has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer with the condition of his ship, and received his directions therein. and in case any commander shall be wanting in his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said commander from his ship and appoint another in his room. xxix. if the admiral would have any flag in his division or squadron cut or slip in the daytime, he will make the same signals that are appointed for those flagships, and their division or squadron, to tack and weather the enemy, as is expressed in the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth articles before going. xxx. when the admiral would have the red squadron draw into a line of battle, abreast of one another, he will put abroad a flag striped red and white on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, with a pennant under it, and fire a gun. if he would have the white squadron, or those that have the second post in the fleet, to do the like, the signal shall be a flag striped red, white, and blue, with a pennant under it, at the aforesaid place. and if he would have the blue squadron to do the like he will put on the said place a genoese ensign, together with a pennant. but when he would have either of the said squadrons to draw into a line of battle, ahead of one another, he will make the aforesaid signals, without a pennant; which signals are to be answered by the flagships only of the said squadrons, and to be kept out till i take in mine. and if the admiral would have any vice-admiral of the fleet and his division draw into a line of battle as aforesaid, he will make the same signals at the fore topmast-head that he makes for that squadron at the main topmast-head. and for any rear-admiral in the fleet and his division, the same signals at the mizen topmast-head; which signals are to be answered by the vice- or rear-admiral. footnotes: [ ] the instructions under which mathews fought his action off toulon in add here the words 'and every ship is to observe and keep the same distance those ships do which are next the admiral, always taking it from the centre.' they were a ms. addition made by mathews himself. see 'v. a----l l----k's rejoinder to a----l m----ws's replies' in a pamphlet entitled _original letters and papers between adm----l m----ws and v. adm----l l----k_. london, , p. . from an undated copy of fighting instructions in the admiralty library we know that this addition was subsequently incorporated into the standing form. [ ] the instructions of , as quoted in the mathews-lestock controversy, add here the words 'and strictly to take care not to fire before the signal be given by the admiral.' this appears also to have been an addition made by mathews in . it was clumsily incorporated in the subsequent standing form thus: 'to engage the enemy and on no account to fire before the admiral shall make the signal, in the order the admiral has prescribed unto them.' see note to article i., _supra._ the permanent instructions, - introductory these like russell's are extracted from a complete printed set, also presented to the united service institution by sir w. laird clowes, and entitled, 'instructions for the directing and governing her majesty's fleet in sailing and fighting, by the right honourable sir george rooke, knight, vice-admiral of england, and admiral and commander-in-chief of her majesty's fleet. in the year .' they also contain all the other matter as in russell's, while another copy has bound with it all the fleet articles of war under the hand of prince george of denmark, then lord high admiral. as they were not issued till , the second year of the war, in which rooke did nothing but carry out a barren cruise in the bay of biscay, we may assume that the cadiz expedition of proceeded under russell's old instructions of the previous war. it was under rooke's new instructions, however, that the battle of malaga was fought in . they were certainly in force in , for a copy of them exists in the log book of the britannia for that year (_british museum, add. mss_. , ff. - ). they were also used by sir clowdisley shovell during his last command; as we know by a printed copy with certain manuscript additions of his own, relating to chasing and armed boats, which he issued to his junior flag officer, sir john norris, in the mediterranean, on april , (_british museum, add. mss._ ). nor is there any trace of their having been changed during the remainder of the war. at the battle of malaga they were very strictly observed, and in the opinion of the time with an entirely satisfactory result; that is to say that, although rooke's ships were foul and very short of ammunition, he was able to prevent toulouse breaking his line and so to fight a defensive action, which saved gibraltar from recapture, and discredited the french navy to such an extent that thenceforth it was entirely neglected by louis xiv's government, and gave little more trouble to our fleets. though no copy of these fighting instructions has been found with a later date than , we know that with very slight modifications they continued in use down to the peace of . the evidence is to be found scattered in proceedings of courts-martial, in chance references in admirals despatches, and in signal books. for instance, in the 'mathews and lestock tracts' _(british museum_, , g), which deal with the courts-martial that followed the ill-fought action off toulon in , eight of the articles then in force are printed. all of them have the same numbering as the corresponding articles of , six are identical in wording, and two, numbers i. and xiii., have only the slight modifications which admiral mathews made, and which have been given above in notes to the similar articles in russell's set. these modifications, as we have seen, were subsequently incorporated into the standing form, and appear in the undated copy of the complete fighting instructions in the admiralty library. again, article xiv. of is referred to in the additional fighting instructions issued by boscawen in .[ ] according to a ms. note by sir c.h. knowles they were re-issued in and , and keppel in was charged under article xxxi. of . finally, there is in the admiralty library a manuscript signal book prepared by an officer, who was present at rodney's great action of april , . in this book, in which is the last date mentioned, there is inserted beside each signal the number of the article in the printed fighting instructions to which it related. in this way we are able to fix the purport of some twenty articles, and all of these correspond exactly both in intention and number with those of . footnote: [ ] see below, p. . _sir george rooke_, . [+from a printed copy in the library of the united service institution+.] articles i. to xvi.--[_the same as russell's of_ , _except for slight modifications of wording and signals_.][ ] art. xvii.--if the admiral see the enemy's fleet standing towards him and he has the wind of them, the van of the fleet is to make sail till they come the length of the enemy's rear and our rear abreast of the enemy's van; then he that is in the rear of our fleet is to tack first, every ship one after another as fast as they can, throughout the line. and if the admiral would have the whole fleet tack together, the sooner to put them in a posture of engaging the enemy, then he will hoist the union flag on the flagstaff's[ ] at the fore and mizen mast-heads and fire a gun; and all the flagships in the fleet are to do the same. but in case the enemy's fleet should tack in their rear, our fleet is to do the same with an equal number of ships, and whilst they are in fight with the enemy to keep within half a cable's length one of another, or if the weather be bad, according to the direction of the commander. art. xviii.--[_same as the remainder of russell's xvii_.] when the admiral would have the ship that leads the van ... by the flagships of the fleet. arts. xix. to xxiii.--[_same as russell's xviii. to xxii_.] art. xxiv.--[_replacing russell's xxiii. and xxviii_.] no ship in the fleet shall leave his station upon any pretence whatsoever till he has acquainted his flag or the next flag officer to him with the condition of his ship and received his direction herein. but in case any ship shall do so, the next ships are to close up the line.[ ] and if any commander shall be wanting in doing his duty, his flag or the next flag officer to him is immediately to send for the said, commander from his ship and appoint another in his room.[ ] arts. xxv. to xxvii., xxix. and xxx.--[_same as russell's_.] art. xxxi.--when the admiral would have the fleet draw into a line of battle one astern of the other with a large wind, and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their starboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a red and white flag at the mizen peak and fire a gun; and if he would have those lead who are to lead with their larboard tacks aboard by a wind, he will hoist a genoese flag at the same place and fire a gun; which is to be answered by the flagships of the fleet. art. xxxii.--when the fleet is in the line of battle, the signals that are made by the admiral for any squadron or particular division are to be repeated by all the flags that are between the admiral and that squadron or division to whom the signal is made. footnotes: [ ] the modifications consist mainly in adding a gun to several of the flag signals, and enjoining the flagships to repeat them. [ ] the undated admiralty copy (_post_ ) has 'flagstaves.' [ ] this manoeuvre was finely executed by sir clowdisley shovell with the van squadron at the battle of malaga. [ ] burchett, the secretary of the navy, in his _naval history_ censures benbow for not having acted on this instruction in or rather on no. of . part viii additional fighting instructions of the eighteenth century i. admiral vernon, _circa_ ii. lord anson, _circa_ iii. sir edward hawke, iv. admiral boscawen, v. sir george rodney, vi. lord hood, origin and growth of the additional instructions introductory although, as we have seen, the 'fighting instructions' of continued in force with no material alteration till the end of the next century, it must not be assumed that no advance in tactics was made. from time to time important changes were introduced, but instead of a fresh set of 'fighting instructions' being drawn up according to the earlier practice, the new ideas were embodied in what were called 'additional fighting instructions.' they did not supersede the old standing form, but were intended to be read with and be subsidiary to it. it is to these 'additional instructions,' therefore, that we have to look for the progress of tactics during the eighteenth century. by one of those strange chances, however, which are the despair of historians in almost every branch and period of their subject, these additional instructions have almost entirely disappeared. although it is known in the usual way--that is, from chance references in despatches and at courts-martial--that many such sets of additional instructions were issued, only one complete set actually in force is known to exist. they are those signed by admiral boscawen on april , , in gibraltar bay, and are printed below. after his capture of louisbourg in the previous year, boscawen had been chosen for the command of the mediterranean fleet, charged with the important duty of preventing the toulon squadron getting round to brest, and so effecting the concentration which the french had planned as the essential feature of their desperate plan of invasion. he sailed with the reinforcement he was taking out on april , and must therefore have issued these orders so soon as he reached his station. there is every reason to believe, however, that he was not their author; that they were, in fact, a common form which had been settled by lord anson at the admiralty. in the shape in which they have come down to us they are a set of eighteen printed articles, to which have been added in manuscript two comparatively unimportant articles relating to captured chases and the call for lieutenants. these may have been either mere 'expeditional' orders, as they were called, issued by boscawen in virtue of his general authority as commander-in-chief on the station, or possibly recent official additions. more probably they were boscawen's own, for, strictly speaking, they should not appear as 'additional fighting instructions' at all. from the series of signal books and other sources we know there already existed a special set of 'chasing instructions,' and yet another set in which officers' calls and the like were dealt with, and both of boscawen's articles were subsequently incorporated into these sets. the printed articles to which boscawen attached them were certainly not new. either wholly or in part they had been used by byng in , for at his court-martial he referred to the 'first article of the additional fighting instructions as given to the fleet by me at the beginning of the expedition,' and this article is identical with no. of boscawen's set. how much older the articles were, or, indeed, whether any were issued before the seven years' war, has never yet been determined. from the illogical order in which they succeed one another it would appear that they were the result of a gradual development, during which one or more orders were added from time to time by the incorporation of 'expeditional' orders of various admirals, as experience suggested their desirability. thus article i. provides, in the case of the enemy being inferior in number, for our superfluous ships to fall out of the line and form a reserve, but it is not till article viii. that we have a scientific rule laid down for the method in which the reserve is to employ itself. still, whatever may have been the exact process by which these additional instructions grew up, evidence is in existence which enables us to trace the system to its source with exactitude, and there is no room for doubt that it originated in certain expeditional orders issued by admiral vernon when he was in command of the expedition against the spanish main in - . amongst the 'mathews and lestock' pamphlets is one sometimes attributed to lestock himself, but perhaps more probably inspired by him. it is dedicated to the first lord of the admiralty, and entitled _a narrative of the proceedings of his majesty's fleet in the mediterranean_, - , including, amongst other matter relating to mathews's action, 'some signals greatly wanted on the late occasion.' at p. are some 'additional signals made use of by our fleet in the west indies,' meaning that of admiral vernon, which lestock had recently left. these signals relate to sailing directions by day and by night, to 'seeing ships in the night' and to 'engaging an enemy in the night,' and immediately following them are two 'additional instructions to be added to the fighting instructions.' the inference is that these two 'additional instructions' were something quite new and local, since they were used by vernon and not by mathews. they are given below, and will be found to correspond closely to articles i. and iii. of the set used by boscawen in the next war. since, therefore, in all the literature and proceedings relating to mathews and lestock there is no reference to any 'additional instructions,' we may conclude with fair safety that these two articles used by vernon in the west indies were the origin and germ of the new system. nor is it a mere matter of inference only, for it is confirmed by a direct statement by the author of the pamphlet. at p. he has this interesting passage which practically clears up the history of the whole matter. 'men in the highest stations at sea will not deny but what our sailing and fighting instructions might be amended, and many added to them, which by every day's experience are found to be absolutely necessary. though this truth is universally acknowledged and the necessity of the royal navy very urgent, yet since the institution of these signals nothing has been added to them excepting the chasing signals, excellent in their kind, by the right honourable sir j---- n----.[ ] not but that every admiral has authority to make any additions or give such signals to the captains under his command as he shall judge proper, which are only expeditional. upon many emergencies our signals at this juncture [_i.e._ in the action before toulon] proved to be very barren. there was no such signal in the book, expressing an order when the admiral would have the ships to come to a closer engagement than when they begun. after what has been observed, it is unnecessary now to repeat the great necessity and occasion there was for it; and boats in many cases, besides their delay and hindrance, could not always perform that duty. 'mr. v[ernon], that provident, great admiral, who never suffered any useful precaution to escape him, concerted some signals for so good a purpose, wisely foreseeing their use and necessity, giving them to the captains of the squadron under his command. and lest his vigilance should be some time or other surprised by an enemy, or the exigencies of his master's service should require him to attack or repulse by night, he appointed signals for the line of battle, engaging, chasing, leaving off chase, with many others altogether new, excellent and serviceable, which show his judgment, abilities, and zeal. the author takes the liberty to print them for the improvement of his brethren, who, if they take the pains to peruse them, will receive benefit and instruction.' here, then, we have indisputable evidence that the system which gave elasticity to the old rigid fighting instructions began with admiral vernon, who as a naval reformer is now only remembered as the inventor of grog. the high reputation he justly held as a seaman and commander amongst his contemporaries has long been buried under his undeserved failure at cartagena; but trained in the flagships of rooke and shovell, and afterwards as a captain under sir john norris in the baltic, there was no one till the day of his death in , at the age of , who held so high a place as a naval authority, and from no one was a pregnant tactical reform more likely to come. the lestock pamphlet, moreover, makes it clear that through all the time of his service--the dead time of tactics as we regard it now--tacticians so far from slumbering had been striving to release themselves from the bonds in which the old instructions tied them. this is confirmed by two manuscript authorities which have fortunately survived, and which give us a clear insight into the new system as it was actually set on foot. the first is a ms. copy of some additional instructions in the admiralty library. they are less full and clearly earlier than those used by boscawen in , and are bound up with a printed copy of the regular fighting instructions already referred to, which contain in manuscript the additions made by mathews during his mediterranean command.[ ] in so far as they differ from boscawen's they will be found below as notes to his set. the second is a highly interesting ms. copy of a signal book dated , in which the above instructions are referred to. it is in the united service institution (_register no._ ). at the end it contains a memorandum of a new article by which hawke modified the established method of attack, and for the first time introduced the principle of each ship steering for her opposite in the enemy's line. it is printed below, and as will be seen was to be substituted for 'articles v. and vi. of the additional fighting instructions by day' then in force, which correspond to articles xv. and xvi. of boscawen's set. it does not appear in the boscawen set, and how soon it was regularly incorporated we do not know. no reference has been found to it till that by rodney, in his despatch of april referred to below. of even higher interest for our purpose is another entry in the same place of an article also issued by hawke for forming 'line of bearing.' here again the older form of the additional fighting instructions is referred to, and the new article is to be inserted after article iv., which was for forming the line ahead or abreast. the important point however is that the new article is expressly attributed to lord anson. now it is known that when anson in april was cruising off finisterre for de la jonquière he kept his fleet continually exercising 'in forming line and in manoeuvres of battle till then absolutely unknown.'[ ] the 'line of bearing' or 'quarter line' must have been one of these, and we therefore reach two important conclusions: ( ) that this great tactical advance was introduced by anson during the war of the austrian succession, and ( ) that the older set of additional fighting instructions was then in existence. another improvement probably assignable to this time was article iv. (of boscawen's set) for battle order in two separate lines. articles v., vi., vii., for extended cruising formations certainly were then issued, for in his despatch after his defeat of de la jonquière anson says: 'at daybreak i made the signal for the fleet to spread in a line abreast, each ship keeping at the distance of a mile from the other [article v.] that there might not remain the least probability for the enemy to pass by us undiscovered.'[ ] then we have the notable article xviii., not in the earlier sets, enjoining captains to pursue any ship they force out of the line, regardless of the contrary order contained in article xxi. of the regular fighting instructions. we have seen the point discussed already in the anonymous commentary on the duke of york's final instructions, and it remained a bone of contention till the end. men like sir charles h. knowles were as strongly in favour of immediately following a beaten adversary as the anonymous commentator was in favour of maintaining the line. knowles's idea was that it was folly to check the ardour of a ship's company at the moment of victory, and he tells us he tried to persuade howe to discard the old instruction when he was drawing up his new ones.[ ] as to the further tactical progress which the boscawen instructions disclose, and which nearly all appear closely related to the events of the war of the austrian succession, when anson was supreme, we may particularly note article i., for equalising the lines and using superfluous ships to form a reserve; article iii. for closer action; article viii. for the reserve to endeavour to 'cross the t,' instead of doubling; and articles ix. and x. for bringing a flying enemy to action. with these internal inferences to corroborate the direct evidence of our documents the conclusion is clear--that during the war of the austrian succession the new system initiated by vernon was developed by anson as a consequence of mathews's miserable action off toulon in , and that its first fruits were gathered in the brilliant successes of hawke and anson himself in . though no complete set later than those used by boscawen is known to exist, we may be certain from various indications that they continued to be issued as affording a means of giving elasticity to tactics, and that they were constantly issued in changing form. thus rodney, in his report after the action off martinique in april , says, 'i made the signal for every ship to bear down and steer for her opposite in the enemy's line, agreeable to the twenty-first article of the additional instructions.' again in a ms. signal book in the admiralty library, which was used in rodney's great action of april , , and drawn up by an officer who was present, a similar article is referred to. but there it appears as no. xvii. of the additional instructions, and its effect is given in a form which closely resembles the original article of hawke:--'when in a line of battle ahead and to windward of the enemy, to alter the course to lead down to them; whereupon every ship is to steer for the ship of the enemy, which from the disposition of the two squadrons it may be her lot to engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept flying.' it is clear, therefore, that between and rodney or the admiralty had issued a new set of 'additional instructions.' the amended article was obviously designed to prevent a recurrence of the mistake that spoiled the action of . in the same volume is a signal which carries the idea further. it has been entered subsequently to the rest, having been issued by lord hood for the detached squadron he commanded in march . there is no reference to a corresponding instruction, but it is 'for ships to steer for (independent of each other) and engage respectively the ships opposed to them.' in lord howe's second signal book, issued in ,[ ] the signal reappears in ms. as 'each ship of the fleet to steer for, independently of each other, and engage respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's line.' and in this case there is a reference to an 'additional instruction, no. ,' indicating that hood, who had meanwhile become first sea lord, had incorporated his idea into the regular 'additional fighting instructions.' take, again, the case of the manoeuvre of 'breaking the line' in line ahead. this was first practised after its long abandonment by a sudden inspiration in rodney's action of april , . in the ms. signal book as used by rodney in that year there is no corresponding signal or instruction. but it does contain one by hood which he must have added soon after the battle. it is as follows:-- 'when fetching up with the enemy to leeward and on the contrary tack to break through their line and endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear.' it also contains another attributed to admiral pigot which he probably added at hood's suggestion when he succeeded to the command in july . it is for a particular ship 'to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to follow her in close order to support each other.' but in both cases there is no corresponding instruction, so that the new signals must have been based on 'expeditional' orders issued by pigot and hood. the same book has yet another additional signal 'for the leading ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle,' apparently the latest of the three, but not specifically attributed either to pigot or hood. with the additional instructions used by rodney the system culminated. for officers with any real feeling for tactics its work was adequate. the criticisms of hood and rodney on graves's heart-breaking action off the chesapeake in show this clearly enough. 'when the enemy's van was out,' wrote hood, 'it was greatly extended beyond the centre and rear, and might have been attacked with the whole force of the british fleet.' and again, 'had the centre gone to the support of the van and the signal for the line been hauled down ... the van of the enemy must have been cut to pieces and the rear division of the british fleet would have been opposed to ... the centre division.' here, besides the vital principle of concentration, we have a germ even of the idea of containing, and rodney is equally emphatic. 'his mode of fighting i will never follow. he tells me that his line did not extend so far as the enemy's rear. i should have been sorry if it had, and a general battle ensued. it would have given the advantage they wished and brought their whole twenty-four ships of the line against the english nineteen, whereas by watching his opportunity ... by contracting his own line he might have brought his nineteen against the enemy's fourteen or fifteen, and by a close action have disabled them before they could have received succour from the remainder.'[ ] read with such remarks as these the latest additional fighting instructions will reveal to us how ripe and sound a system of tactics had been reached. the idea of crushing part of the enemy by concentration had replaced the primitive intention of crowding him into a confusion; a swift and vigorous attack had replaced the watchful defensive, and above all the true method of concentration had been established; for although a concentration on the van was still permissible in exceptional circumstances, the chief of the new articles are devoted to concentrating on the rear. thus our tacticians had worked out the fundamental principles on which nelson's system rested, even to breaking up the line into two divisions. 'containing' alone was not yet clearly enunciated, but by hood's signals for breaking the line, the best method of effecting it was made possible. everything indeed lay ready for the hands of howe and nelson to strike into life. footnotes: [ ] admiral sir john norris had been commander-in-chief in the mediterranean - , in the baltic - and , in the downs in , and the channel and following years. professor laughton tells me that norris's papers and orders for - contain no such signals. he must therefore have issued them later. [ ] catalogue, / . the reason this interesting set has been overlooked is that the volume in which they are bound bears by error the label 'sailing and fighting instructions for h.m. fleet, . record office copy.' the instructions of were of course quite different. [ ] _dict. nat. biog._ vol. ii. p. . [ ] barrow, _life of anson_, p. [ ] _observations on naval tactics, &c._, p. . [ ] in the admiralty library. it is undated, but assigned to - . for the reasons for identifying it as howe's second code see _post_, pp. - . in his first code howe adopted hood's wording almost exactly; see _post_, p. . [ ] _letters of sir samuel hood_, p. ; and cf. _post_, p. _n._ _admiral vernon, circa_ . [+mathews-lestock pamphlets+.[ ]] _an additional instruction to be added to the fighting instructions_. in case of meeting any squadron of the enemy's ships, whose number may be less than those of the squadron of his majesty's ships under my command, and that i would have any of the smaller ships quit the line, i will in such case make the signal for speaking with the captain of that ship i would have quit the line; and at the same time i will put a flag, striped yellow and white, at the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, upon which the said ship or ships are to quit the line and the next ships are to close the line, for having our ships of greatest force to form a line just equal to the enemy's. and as, upon the squadrons engaging, it is not to be expected that the ships withdrawn out of the line can see or distinguish signals at such a juncture, it is therefore strictly enjoined and required of such captain or captains, who shall have their signal or signals made to withdraw out of the line, to demean themselves as a _corps de réserve_ to the main squadron, and to place themselves in the best situation for giving relief to any ship of the squadron that may be disabled or hardest pressed by the enemy, having in the first place regard to the ship i shall have my flag on board, as where the honour of his majesty's flag is principally concerned. and as it is morally impossible to fix any general rule to occurrences that must be regulated from the weather and the enemy's disposition, this is left to the respective captain's judgment that shall be ordered out of the line to govern himself by as becomes an officer of prudence, and as he will answer the contrary at his peril. _memorandum_.--that whereas all signals for the respective captains of the squadron are at some one of the mast-heads, and as when we are in line of battle or in other situations it may be difficult for the ships to distinguish their signal, in such case you are to take notice that your signal will be made by fixing the pennant higher upon the topgallant shrouds, so as it may be most conspicuous to be seen by the respective ship it is made for. _a second additional instruction to the fighting instructions_. if, at any time after our ships being engaged with any squadron of the enemy's ships, the admiral shall judge it proper to come to a closer engagement with the enemy than at the distance we first began to engage, the admiral will hoist a union flag at the main topmast-head and fire a gun on the opposite side to which he is engaged with the enemy, when every ship is to obey the signal, taking the distance from the centre; and if the admiral would have any particular ship do so he will make the same signal with the signal for the captain of that ship. and in case of being to leeward of the enemy, the admiral will at the same time he makes this signal hoist the yellow flag at the fore topmast-head for filling and making sail to windward. and during the time of engagement, every ship is to appoint a proper person to keep an eye upon the admiral and to observe signals. footnote: [ ] 'a narrative of the proceedings of his majesty's fleet in the mediterranean, &c. by a sea officer' london, , pp. - _lord anson, circa_ _. [+ms. signal book, , united service institution+.] _lord anson's additional fighting instruction, to be inserted after article the th in the additional fighting instructions by day_. whereas it may often be necessary for ships in line of battle, to regulate themselves by bearing on some particular point of the compass from each other without having any regard to their bearing abreast or ahead of one another; you are therefore hereby required and directed to strictly observe the following instructions: when the signal is made for the squadron to draw into a line of battle at any particular distance, and i would have them keep north and south of each other, i will hoist a red flag with a white cross in the mizen topmast shrouds to show the quarter of the compass, and for the intermediate points i will hoist on the flagstaff at the mizen top-mast-head, when they are to bear n by e and s by w, one common pennant nne " ssw, two common pennants ne by n " sw by s, three " " ne " sw, a dutch jack. and i will hoist under the dutch jack when i would have them bear ne by e and sw by w, one common pennant ene " wsw, two common pennants e by n " w by s, three " " and fire a gun with each signal. when i would have them bear from each other on any of the points on the nw and se quarters i will hoist a blue and white flag on the mizen topmast shrouds, to show the quarter of the compass and distinguish the intermediate points they are to form on from the n and s in the same manner as in the ne and sw quarter.[ ] ed. hawke. footnote: [ ] from this article it would appear that the correct expression for 'line of bearing' is 'quarter line'--_i.e._ a line formed in a quarter of the compass, and that 'bow and quarter line' is due to false etymology. though hawke approved the formation, it does not appear in the additional instructions used by boscawen in . it was however regularly incorporated in those used in the war of american independence. see _post_, p. , art. iii. _sir edward hawke_, . [+ms. signal book, united service institution+.] _memorandum_, in room of articles v. and vi. of the 'additional fighting instructions by day'[ ] it is in my discretion that this be observed, viz.: when sailing in a line of battle, one ship ahead of another, and i would have the ship that leads with either the starboard or larboard tacks aboard to alter her course in order to lead down to the enemy, i will hoist a dutch jack under my flag at the mizen topmast-head and fire two guns. then every ship of the squadron is to steer for the ship of the enemy that from the disposition of the two squadrons must be her lot to engage, notwithstanding i shall keep the signal for the line ahead flying, making or shortening sail in such proportion as to preserve the distance assigned by the signal for the line, in order that the whole squadron as soon as possible may come to action at the same time.[ ] ed. hawke. _additional signals_. if upon seeing an enemy i should think it necessary to alter the disposition of the ships in the line of battle, and would have any ships change station with each other, i will make the signal to speak with the captains of such ships, and hoist the flag chequered red and blue on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head.[ ] footnotes: [ ] _i.e._ the older set. they were articles xv. and xvi. of the remodelled set used by boscawen in . [ ] this article was presumably issued by hawke when in july he superseded byng in the mediterranean. it seems designed to prevent a recurrence of the errors which lost the battle of minorca, where the british van was crushed by coming into action long before the centre and rear. it is not in the additional instructions of , but reappears in a modified form in those of . [ ] this article is entered in the same signal book, but has no signature. it may therefore have been one of anson's innovations. _admiral boscawen_, .[ ] [+from the original in the admiralty library, / +.] i. in case of meeting with a squadron of the enemy's ships that may be less in number than the squadron under my command, if i would have any of the smaller ships quit the line, that those of the greatest force may be opposed to the enemy, i will put abroad the signal for speaking with the captains of such ships as i would have leave the line, and hoist a flag, striped yellow and white, at the flagstaff at the main topmast-head; then the next ships are to close the line, and those that have quitted it are to hold themselves in readiness to assist any ship that may be disabled, or hard pressed, or to take her station, if she is obliged to go out of the line: in which case, the strongest ship that is withdrawn from the line is strictly enjoined to supply her place, and fill up the vacancy. ii. and in case of meeting with any squadron, or ships of war of the enemy that have merchant-men under their convoy, though the signal for the line of battle should be out, if i would have any of the frigates that are out of the line, or any ship of the line fall upon the convoy, whilst the others are engaged, i will put abroad the pennant for speaking with the captain of such ship or ships, and hoist the flag above mentioned for quitting the line, with a pennant under it; upon which signal, such ship or ships are to use their utmost endeavours to take or destroy the enemy. iii. if at any time while we are engaged with the enemy, the admiral shall judge it proper to come to a closer engagement than at the distance we then are, he will hoist a red and white flag on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire a gun. then every ship is to engage the enemy at the same distance the admiral does; and if the admiral would have any particular ship do so, he will make the same signal, and the signal for speaking with the captain. iv.[ ] when i would have the two divisions of the fleet form themselves into a separate line of battle, one ship ahead of another at the distance of a cable's length asunder, and each division to be abreast of the other, when formed at the distance of one cable's length and a half, i will hoist a flag chequered blue and yellow at the mizen peak, and fire a gun, and then every ship is to get into her station accordingly, *v.[ ] when i would have the fleet spread in a line abreast, each ship keeping at the distance of one mile from the other, i will hoist a flag chequered blue and yellow, on the flagstaff at the mizen top-mast-head, and fire a gun. *vi. when i would have the ships spread in a line directly ahead of each other, and keep at the distance of a mile asunder, i will hoist a flag chequered red and white at the mizen peak, and fire a gun. *vii. and when the signal is made for the ships to spread either abreast or ahead of one another, and i would have them keep at the distance of two miles asunder, i will hoist a pennant under the fore-mentioned flags: then every ship is to make sail, and get into her station accordingly. viii. if i should meet with a squadron of the enemy's ships of war inferior in number to the ships under my command, those ships of my squadron (above the number of the enemy) that happen to fall in either ahead of the enemy's van or astern of his rear, while the rest of the ships are engaged, are hereby required, and directed to quit the line without waiting for the signal, and to distress the enemy by raking the ships in the van and rear, notwithstanding the first part of the twenty-fourth article of the fighting instructions to the contrary. ix. and if i should chase with the whole squadron, and would have a certain number of the ships that are nearest the enemy draw into a line of battle ahead of me, in order to engage till the rest of the ships of the squadron can come up with them, i will hoist a white flag with a red cross on the flagstaff at the main topmast-head, and fire the number of guns as follows:-- when i would have five ships draw into a line of battle, ahead of each other, i will fire one gun. when i would have seven ships draw into a line of battle, ahead of each other, i will fire three guns. x. then those ships are immediately to form the line without any regard to seniority or the general form delivered, but according to their distances from the enemy, viz., the headmost and nearest ship to the enemy is to lead, and the sternmost to bring up the rear, that no time may be lost in the pursuit; and all the rest of the ships are to form and strengthen that line, as soon as they can come up with them, without any regard to my general form of the order of battle. xi. whereas every ship is directed (when sailing in a line of battle) to keep the same distances those ships do who are nearest the admiral, always taking it from the centre: if at any time i think the ship ahead of me is [at] too great a distance, i will make it known to him by putting abroad a pennant at the jib-boom end, and keep it flying till he is in his proper station: and if he finds the ship ahead of him is at a greater distance from him than he is from the [ ]-----(or such ship as my flag shall be flying on board of), he shall make the same signal at his jib-boom end, and keep it flying till he thinks that ship is at a proper distance, and so on to the van of the line. xii. and when i think the ship astern of me is at too great a distance, i will make it known to him by putting abroad a pennant at the cross-jack yard-arm, and keep it flying till he is in his station: and if he finds the ship astern of him is at a greater distance than he is from the ---- (or such ship as my flag shall be flying aboard of) he shall make the same signal at the cross-jack yard-arm, and keep it flying till he thinks that the ship is at a proper distance, and so on to the rear of the line. xiii. and if at any time the captain of any particular ship in the line thinks the ship without him is at a greater distance than those ships who are next the centre, he shall make the above signal: and then that ship is immediately to close, and get into his proper station. xiv.[ ] when the signal is made for the squadron to draw into a line of battle, one ship ahead of another, by hoisting a union flag at the mizen peak and firing a gun, every ship is to make all the sail he can into his station, and keep at the distance of half a cable's length from each other: if i would have them to be a cable's length asunder, i will hoist a blue flag, with a red cross under the union flag at the mizen peak and fire a gun: and if two cables' length asunder, a white and blue flag under the union flag at the mizen peak, and fire a gun: but when i would have the squadron draw into a line of battle, one ship abreast of another, and keep at those distances as above directed, i will hoist a pennant under the said flags at the mizen peak. xv.[ ] when sailing in a line of battle, one ship ahead of another, and i would have the ship who leads to alter her course and lead more to starboard, i will hoist a flag striped white and blue at the fore topmast-head, and fire a gun for every point of the compass i would have the course altered. xvi.[ ] and if i would have the ship that leads to alter her course and lead more to port, i will hoist a flag striped blue and white on the flagstaff at the mizen topmast-head, and fire a gun for every point of the compass i would have the course altered, and every ship in the squadron is to get into her wake as fast as possible. xvii.[ ] when i would have all the fireships to prime, i will hoist a chequered blue and yellow pennant at the mizen topmast-head. *xviii.[ ] notwithstanding the general printed fighting instructions, if at any time, when engaged with an equal number of the enemy's ships, and the ship opposed to any of his majesty's ships is forced out of the line, you are hereby required and directed to pursue her, and endeavour to take and destroy her. _memorandum_.--when the squadron is in a line of battle ahead, and the signal is made for the headmost and weathermost to tack, the ship that leads on the former tack is to continue to lead after tacking.[ ] *xix.[ ] when i would have the ship or ships that chase bring down their chase to me, i will hoist a blue flag pierced with white on the fore topgallant mast, not on the flagstaff. *xx.[ ] when i find it necessary to have the state and condition of the ships in the squadron sent on board me, i will make the signal for all lieutenants, and hoist a blue and white flag at the mizen peak and fire a gun. if for the state and condition of a particular ship, i make the signal for the lieutenant of that ship, with the flag at the mizen peak. given under my hand on board his majesty's ship namur, in gibraltar bay, this april, . e. boscawen (autograph). to capt. medows, of his majesty's ship shannon. by command of the admiral alex. macpherson (autograph). footnotes: [ ] the articles marked with an asterisk are additions subsequent to and not appearing in the earlier _admiralty ms._ / , 'additional fighting instructions by day' (see p. ). [ ] in the earlier _admiralty ms._ this article is numbered vii. and begins 'if the fleet should happen to be in two divisions and i would have them form,' &c. [ ] used by lord anson in . see _supra_, p. . [ ] the earlier _admiralty ms._ has simply 'the ship my flag shall be aboard of.' [ ] article iv, in the earlier _admiralty ms_. it is practically identical except that it has 'she' and 'her' throughout where ships are spoken of, and a few other verbal differences. [ ] articles v. and vi. in the earlier _admiralty ms_. [ ] the equivalent of article xiv. in the earlier _admiralty ms_. which reads thus, 'when i would have the fireships to prime i will hoist a pennant striped red and white on the flagstaff at the fore topmast-head and fire a gun, but in case we are at any time in chase of the enemy's fleet, the fireships are to prime as fast as possible whether the signal be made or not.' the _admiralty ms_. ends here with another article relating to fireships (no. xv.): 'you are to hold his majesty's ship under your command in a constant readiness for action, and in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, if they have the wind of us, to keep your barge manned and armed with hand and fire-chain grapnels on the offside from them, to be ready to assist as well any ship that may be attempted by the fireships of the enemy, as our own fireships when they shall be ordered upon service.' this article disappears from subsequent sets, and was perhaps incorporated into the 'general instructions to captains' to which it more properly belongs. the ms. also contains 'night signals' and private signals for knowing detached ships rejoining at night. [ ] whoever was the author of this article, it was generally regarded as too risky and subsequently disappeared. the article of the 'printed fighting instructions' referred to is no. xxi. [ ] this memorandum, which concludes the printed portion, must have been added in view of the misconception which occurred in knowles's action of . [ ] ms. additions by boscawen. _sir george rodney_, .[ ] [+ms. signal book in the admiralty library+.] . line ahead at one cable. . line abreast at one cable. . quarter lines on various compass bearings. . when in line ahead to alter course to starboard or port together--one gun for every point.[ ] . the same when in line abreast.[ ] . to form order of sailing.[ ] . when in line of battle for the whole fleet to tack together. . when in line of battle for the next ship ahead or on the starboard beam, which is at too great a distance, to close. . the same for the next astern or on the larboard beam. . (_undetermined_.) . the fleet to form in two separate lines ahead at one cable's distance, each division abreast of the other at two cables' distance.[ ] . (?) particular ships to come under the admiral's stern without hail.[ ] . ships to change stations in the line of battle. . when in chase for the headmost ship to engage the sternmost of the enemy, and the next ship to pass, under cover of her fire, and take the ship next ahead, and so on in succession, without respect to seniority or the prescribed order of battle. to engage to windward or leeward as directed by signal.[ ] . the whole fleet being in chase, for some of the headmost ships to draw into line of battle and engage the enemy's rear, at the same time endeavouring to get up with their van. _note_.--these ships to form without any regard to seniority or the order of battle. the ship nearest the enemy is to lead and the sternmost to bring up the rear. _signal_.--red flag with white cross at main topmast-head with one gun for five ships, and three for seven.[ ] . when turning to windward in line of battle for the leading ship to make known when she can weather the enemy. to be repeated from ship to ship to the commander-in-chief. if he should stand on till the sternmost ship can weather them, she is to make it known by hoisting a common pennant at the fore topgallant mast-head; to be repeated as before. the sternmost ship is likewise to do so whenever the squadron shall be to windward of the enemy, and her commander shall judge himself far enough astern of their rear to lead down out of their line of fire. . when in line of battle ahead and to windward of the enemy, to alter course to lead down to them: whereupon every ship is to steer for the ship of the enemy which from the disposition of the two squadrons it may be her lot to engage, notwithstanding the signal for the line ahead will be kept flying.[ ] . when to windward of the enemy or in any other position that will admit, for the headmost ship to lead down out of their line of fire and attack their rear, the second from the leader to pass under her fire, and take the second ship of the enemy, and so on in succession. to engage to starboard or larboard according to signal. . to come to a closer engagement.[ ] . for particular ships to quit the line. . for particular ships to attack the enemy's convoy.[ ] . for all fireships to prime.[ ] . on discovering a superior force. . for three-decked and heavy ships to draw out of their places in the line of battle, and form in the van or rear of the fleet. . to attack the enemy's centre.[ ] . to attack the enemy's rear.[ ] . to attack the enemy's van.[ ] . to make sail ahead on a bearing from the admiral.[ ] . in cruising to form line ahead or abreast at one or two miles' distance.[ ] footnotes: [ ] the actual additional fighting instructions used by rodney for his famous campaign of are lost; what follows are merely the drift of those instructions so far as they can be determined from the references to them in his signal book. it should be noted that by this time those used in the seven years' war had been entirely recast in a more logical form. [ ] _cf._ boscawen's nos. and . [ ] according to sir chas. h. knowles the regular sailing formation at this time for a large fleet was in three squadrons abreast, each formed in bow and quarter line to starboard and port of its flag. he says it was his father's treatise on tactics which induced howe to revert to hoste's method, and adopt the formation of squadrons abreast in line ahead. this, he adds, howe used for the first time when sailing to relieve gibraltar in . thenceforth it became the rule of the service, and the subsequent signal books contain signals for forming line of battle from two, three, and six columns of sailing respectively. this knowles regards as the great reform on which modern tactics were founded. see his _observations on tactics_, . [ ] _cf._ boscawen's no. . [ ] this may be an additional sailing instruction, the various sets of additional instructions not being distinguished in the signal book. [ ] this article may well have been the outcome of hawke's defeat of l'etenduère in , when he chased and engaged practically as the instruction directs, and with complete success. [ ] _cf._ boscawen's nos. and . [ ] this appears to correspond to article xxi. of the additional fighting instructions in use in , to which rodney referred in his report on the action of april in that year. [ ] _cf._ boscawen's no. . [ ] _cf._ boscawen's no. . [ ] _cf._ boscawen's no. . [ ] in connection with these three articles the following dictum attributed to rodney should be recalled: 'during all the commands lord rodney has been entrusted with he made it a rule to bring his whole force against a part of the enemy's, and never was so absurd as to bring ship to ship when the enemy gave him an opportunity of acting otherwise.' and _cf. supra_, p. . [ ] this may be an additional sailing instruction. [ ] _cf._ boscawen's nos. , and . a number of other additional instructions are referred to, but they seem to relate to sailing, chasing or general instructions. no more fighting instructions can be identified. _lord hoods additions_, .[ ] [+ms. signal book in the admiralty library+.] . for the ships to steer for (independent of each other) and engage respectively the ships opposed to them. . when in line of battle, for the leading ship to carry as much sail as her commander judges the worst sailing ship can preserve her station with all her plain sail set. . to prepare to reef topsails together. . when in line of battle or otherwise for the men to go to dinner. . after an action for the ships to signify whether they are in a condition to renew it.[ ] . for ships in chase or looking out to alter course to port or starboard. . to stay by or repair to the protection of prizes or ships under convoy. . when fetching up with the enemy and to leeward, or on a contrary tack, to break through their line, and to endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear. . for the leading ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle. . to signify that the admiral will carry neither top nor stern lights. _note_.--the fleet immediately to close. . for particular ships to reconnoitre the enemy in view, and to return to make known their number and force. . for a particular ship to keep between the fleet and that of the enemy during the night, to communicate intelligence.[ ] . to signify to a ship that she mistakes the signal that was made to her. . to prepare to hoist french or spanish colours. . for a particular ship to open her fire on the ship opposed to her. . when a ship is in distress in battle. . signal to call attention of larboard or starboard line of the division only.[ ] footnotes: [ ] see pp. - . these additional signals are all added in paler ink, with those made by admiral pigot. in the original they occur on various pages without numbers. in the text above they have merely been numbered consecutively for convenience of reference. hood was made a viscount september , , and began to issue these orders on march , , when he had a squadron placed under his command. [ ] ascribed also to pigot. [ ] also ascribed to pigot. [ ] the ms. has also an additional signal ascribed to pigot for a particular ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for the other ships to follow her in close order to support each other. part ix the last phase i. lord howe's first signal book ii. signal books of the great war iii. nelson's tactical memoranda iv. admiral gambier, v. lord collingwood, - vi. sir alexander cochrane's instructions vii. the signal book of the new signal book instructions introductory the time-worn fighting instructions of russell and rooke with their accretion of additional instructions did not survive the american war. some time in that fruitful decade of naval reform which elapsed between the peace of and the outbreak of the great war they were superseded. it was the indefatigable hand of lord howe that dealt them the long-needed blow, and when the change came it was sweeping. it was no mere substitution of a new set of instructions, but a complete revolution of method. the basis of the new tactical code was no longer the fighting instructions, but the signal book. signals were no longer included in the instructions, and the instructions sank to the secondary place of being 'explanatory' to the signal book.[ ] the earliest form in which these new 'explanatory instructions' are known is a printed volume in the admiralty library containing a complete set of fleet instructions, and entitled 'instructions for the conduct of ships of war explanatory of and relative to the signals contained in the signal book herewith delivered.' the signal book is with it.[ ] neither volume bears any date, but both are in the old folio form which had been traditional since the seventeenth century. they are therefore presumably earlier than when the well-known quarto form first came into use, and as we shall see from internal evidence they cannot have been earlier than . nor is there any direct evidence that they are the work of lord howe, but the 'significations' of the signals bear unmistakable marks of his involved and cumbrous style, and the code itself closely resembles that he used during the great war. with these indications to guide us there is little difficulty in fixing with practical certainty both date and authorship from external sources.[ ] in a pamphlet published by admiral sir charles henry knowles in , when he was a very old man, he claims to have invented the new code of numerical signals which howe adopted. the pamphlet is entitled 'observations on naval tactics and on the claims of clerk of eldin,' and in the course of it he says that about he devised this new system of signals, and gave it to howe on his arrival in the summer of that year at newport, in rhode island, 'and his lordship,' he says, 'afterwards introduced them into the channel fleet.' further, he says, he soon after invented the tabular system of flags suggested by the chess-board, and published them in the summer of . to this work he prefixed as a preface the observations of his father, sir charles knowles, condemning the existing form of sailing order, and recommending père hoste's old form in three columns, and this order, he says, howe adopted for the relief of gibraltar in september . he also infers that the alleged adoption of his signals in the channel fleet was when lord howe commanded it before he became first lord of the admiralty for the second time--that is, before he succeeded keppel in december . for during the peace knowles tells us he made a second communication to howe on tactics, of which more must be said later on. the inference therefore is that when knowles says that howe adopted his code in the channel fleet it must have been the first time he took command of it--that is, on april , .[ ] now if, as knowles relates--and there is no reason to doubt this part of his story--howe did issue a new code of signals some time before sailing for gibraltar in , and if at the time, as knowles also says, he had been studying hoste, internal evidence shows almost conclusively that these folios must be the signal book in question. from end to end the influence of hoste's treatise and of rodney's tactics in is unmistakable.[ ] from hoste it takes not only the sailing formation in three columns, but re-introduces into the british service the long-discarded manoeuvre of 'doubling.' for this there are three signals, nos. - , for doubling the van, doubling the rear, and for the rear to double the rear. from hoste also it borrows the method of giving battle to a superior force, which the french writer apparently borrowed from torrington. the signification of the signal is as follows: 'no. . when inferior in number to the enemy, and to prevent being doubled upon in the van or rear, for the van squadron to engage the headmost ships of the enemy's line, the rear their sternmost, and the centre that of the enemy, whose surplus ships will then be left out of action in the vacant spaces between our squadrons.' the author's obligations to the recent campaigns of rodney and hood are equally clear. signal is, 'for ships to steer for independent of each other and engage respectively the ships opposed to them in the enemy's line,' and this was a new form of the signal, which, according to the ms. signal book of , was introduced by hood.[ ] still more significant is signal , 'when fetching up with the enemy to leeward, and on the contrary tack, to break through their line and endeavour to cut off part of their van or rear.' this is clearly the outcome of rodney's famous manoeuvre, and is adopted word for word from the signification of the signal that hood added. pigot, it will be remembered, on succeeding rodney, added two more on the same subject, viz. ( ) 'for the leading ship to cut through the enemy's line of battle,' and ( ) 'for a particular ship specified to cut through the enemy's line of battle, and for all the other ships to follow her in close order to support each other.' neither of these later signals is in the code we are considering, and the presumption is that it was drawn up very soon after rodney's victory and before pigot's signals were known at home. finally there is a ms. note added by sir charles h. knowles to his 'fighting and sailing instructions,' to the effect that in the instructions issued by howe in he modified article xxi. of the old fighting instructions (_i.e._ article xx. of russell's). 'his lordship in ,' it says, 'directed by his instructions that the line [_i.e._ his own line] should not be broken until all the enemy's ships gave way and were beaten.' and this is practically the effect of article xiv. of the set we are considering. in the absence of contrary evidence, therefore, there seems good ground for calling these folio volumes 'howe's first signal book, ,' and with this tentative attribution the explanatory instructions are printed below. as has been already said, these instructions, divorced as they now were from the signals, give but a very inadequate idea of the tactics in vogue. for this we must go to the tactical signals themselves. in the present case the more important ones (besides those given above) are as follows: 'no. . to attack the enemy's rear in succession by ranging up with and opening upon the sternmost of their ships; then to tack or veer, as being to windward or to leeward of the enemy, and form again in the rear.' this signal, which at first sight looks like a curious reversion to the primitive elizabethan method of attack, immediately follows the signals for engaging at anchor, and may have been the outcome of hood's experience with de grasse in . 'no. . in working to gain the wind of the enemy, for the headmost and sternmost ships to signify when they can weather them by signal , p. ; or if to windward of the enemy and on the contrary tack, for the sternmost ship to signify when she is far enough astern of their rear to be able to lead down out of their line of fire.' 'no. . when coming up astern and to windward of the enemy to engage by inverting the line'--that is, for the ship leading the van to engage the sternmost of the enemy, the next ship to pass on under cover of her fire and engage the second from the enemy's rear, and so on. footnotes: [ ] the first attempt to provide a convenient signal book separate from the instructions was made privately by one jonathan greenwood about . he produced a small mo. volume dedicated to admiral edward russell, earl of orford, and the other lords of the admiralty who were then serving with him. it consists of a whole series of well-engraved plates of ships flying the various signals contained in the sailing and fighting instructions, each properly coloured with its signification added beneath. the author says he designed the work as a pocket companion to the printed instructions and for the use of inferior officers who had not access to them. copies are in the british museum and the r.u.s.i. library. [ ] _catalogue_, nos. / and / . [ ] a still earlier signal book attributed to lord howe is in the united service institution, but it is no more than a condensed and amended form of the established one. its nature and intention are explained by no. of the 'explanatory observations' which he attached to it. it is as follows; 'all the signals contained in the general printed signal book which are likely to be needful on the present occasion being provided for in this signal book, the signals as appointed in the general signal book will only be made either in conformity to the practice of some senior officer present, or when in company for the time being with other ships not of the fleet under the admiral's command, and unprovided with these particular signals.' it was therefore probably issued experimentally, but what the 'present occasion' was is not indicated. it contains none of the additional signals of - . [ ] knowles was of course too old in for his memory to be trusted as to details. a note in his handwriting upon a copy of his code in possession of the present baronet gives its story simply as follows: 'these signals were written in , as an idea--altered and published--then altered again in --afterwards arranged differently in , and finally in ; but not printed at sir c.h. knowles's expense until , when they were sent to the admiralty, but they were not published, although copies have been given to sea officers.' [ ] a partial translation of hoste had been published by lieutenant christopher o'bryen, r.n., in . captain boswall's complete translation was not issued till . [ ] note that the signal differs from that which rodney made under article of the additional fighting instructions in his action of april , , and which being misunderstood spoilt his whole attack. _lord howe_, . [+admiralty library / +.] _instructions respecting the order of battle and conduct of the fleet, preparative to and in action with the enemy_. article i. when the signal is made for the fleet to form in order of battle, each captain or commander is to get most speedily into his station, and keep the prescribed distance from his seconds ahead and astern upon the course steered, and under a proportion of sail suited to that carried by the admiral. but when the signal is made for tacking, or on any similar occasion, care is to be taken to open, in succession, to a sufficient distance for performing the intended evolution. and the ships are to close back to their former distance respectively as soon as it has been executed. ii. in line of battle, the flag of the admiral commanding in chief is always to be considered as the point of direction to the whole fleet, for forming and preserving the line. iii. the squadron of the second in command is to lead when forming the line ahead, and to take the starboard side of the centre when forming the line abreast, unless signal is made to the contrary; these positions however are only restrained to the first forming of the lines from the order of sailing. for when the fleet is formed upon a line, then in all subsequent evolutions the squadrons are not to change their places, but preserve the same situation in the line whatever position it may bring them into with the centre, with respect to being in the van or the rear, on the starboard or larboard side, unless directed so to do by signal. suppose the fleet sailing in line ahead on the larboard tack, the second in command leading, and signal is made to form a line abreast to sail large or before the wind, the second squadron in that case is to form on the larboard side of the centre. again, suppose in this last situation signal is made to haul to the wind, and form a line ahead on the starboard tack, in this case the squadron of the third in command is to lead, that of the second in command forming the rear. and when from a line ahead, the squadron of the second in command leading, the admiral would immediately form the line on the contrary tack by tacking or veering together, the squadron of the third in command will then become the van. these evolutions could not otherwise be performed with regularity and expedition. when forming the line from the order of sailing, the ships of each squadron are to be ranged with respect to each other in the line in the same manner as when in order of sailing each squadron in one line; and, as when the second in command is in the van, the headmost ship of his squadron (in sailing order) becomes the leading ship of the line, so likewise the headmost ship of the third squadron (in sailing order) becomes the leading ship of the line, when the third in command takes the van, except when the signal is made to form the line reversed. ships happening to have been previously detached on any service, separate from the body of the fleet, when the signal for forming in order of battle is made, are not meant to be comprehended in the intention of it, until they shall first have been called back to the fleet by the proper signal. iv. when the fleet is sailing in line of battle ahead, the course is to be taken from the ship leading the van upon that occasion; the others in succession being to steer with their seconds ahead respectively, whilst they continue to be regulated by the example of the leading ship.[ ] v. the ships, which from the inequality of their rates of sailing cannot readily keep their stations in the line, are not to obstruct the compliance with the intent of the signal in others; nor to hazard throwing the fleet into disorder by persisting too long in their endeavours to preserve their stations under such circumstances; but they are to fall astern and form in succession in the rear of the line. the captains of such ships will not be thereby left in a situation less at liberty to distinguish themselves; as they will have an opportunity to render essential service, by placing their ships to advantage when arrived up with the enemy already engaged with the other part of the fleet. the ships next in succession in order of battle are to occupy in turn, on this and every other similar occasion, the vacant spaces that would be otherwise left in the line; so that it may be always kept perfect at the appointed intervals of distance. and when the fleet is sailing large, or before the wind, in order of battle, and the admiral makes the signal for coming to the wind on either tack, the ship stationed to lead the line on that tack, first, and the others in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship and of their seconds ahead respectively, are to haul to the wind without loss of time accordingly. and all the signals for regulating the course and motions of the fleet by day or night, after the signal for forming in order of battle has been made, are to be understood with reference to the continuance of the fleet in such order, until the general signal to chase, or to form again in order of sailing, is put abroad. vi. when the fleet is formed on any line pointed out by the compass signal, the relative bearing of the ships from each other is to be preserved through every change of course made, as often as any alteration thereof together shall be by signal directed.[ ] when, on the contrary, the signal to alter the course in succession has been put abroad, the relative bearing of the ships from each other will be then consequently changed; and any alteration of the course subsequently directed to be made by the ships together will thereafter have reference to the relative bearing last established. the same distinction will take place so often as the alteration of course in succession, as aforesaid, shall in future recur. vii. if the admiral should observe that the enemy has altered his course, and the disposition of his order of battle, one, two, three, or any greater number of points (in which case it will be necessary to make a suitable change in the bearing of the ships from each other in the british fleet, supposed to be formed in such respects correspondently to the first position of the enemy), he will make the signal for altering course in succession, according to the nature of the occasion. the leading ship of the line is thereupon immediately to alter to the course pointed out; and (the others taking their places astern of her in succession, as they arrive in the wake of that ship and of their seconds ahead respectively) she is to lead the fleet in line of battle ahead on the course so denoted, until farther order. viii. when it is necessary to shorten or make more sail whilst the fleet is in order of battle, and the proper signal in either case has been made, the fleet is to be regulated by the example of the frigate appointed to repeat signals; which frigate is to set or take in the sail the admiral is observed to do. the ship referred to is thereupon to suit her sail to the known comparative rate of sailing between her and the admiral's ship. hence it will be necessary that the captains of the fleet be very attentive to acquire a perfect knowledge of the comparative rate of sailing between their own and the admiral's ship, so as under whatever sail the admiral may be, they may know what proportion to carry, to go at an equal rate with him. ix. when, the ships of the fleet being more in number than the enemy, the admiral sees proper to order any particular ships to withdraw from the line, they are to be placed in a proper situation, in readiness to be employed occasionally as circumstances may thereafter require--to windward of the fleet, if then having the weather-gage of the enemy, or towards the van and ahead, if the contrary--to relieve, or go to the assistance of any disabled ship, or otherwise act, as by signal directed. the captains of ships, stationed next astern of those so withdrawn, are directly to close to the van, and fill up the vacant spaces thereby made in the line. when, in presence of an enemy, the admiral or commander of any division of the fleet finds it necessary to change his station in the line, in order to oppose himself against the admiral or commander in a similar part of the enemy's line, he will make the signal for that purpose; and the ships referred to on this occasion are to place themselves forthwith against the ships of the enemy, that would otherwise by such alteration remain unopposed. x. when the fleet is sailing in a line of battle ahead, or upon any other bearing, and the signal is made for the ships to keep in more open order, it will be generally meant that they should keep from one to two cables' length asunder, according as the milder or rougher state of the weather may require; also that they should close to the distance of half a cable, or at least a cable's length, in similar circumstances, when the signal for that purpose is put abroad. but in both cases, the distance pointed out to the admiral's second ahead and astern, by the continuance of the flag abroad, as intimated in the signal book, is to be signified from them respectively to the ships succeeding them on either part, by signals. these signals are to be continued either way, onward, throughout the line if necessary. notice is to be taken, in the same manner, of any continued deviation from the limited distance; and to commence between the several commanders of private ships respectively, independent of the admiral's previous example, when they observe their seconds ahead or astern to be at any time separated from them, further than the regulated distance kept by the ships next to the admiral, or that which was last appointed. when the admiral, being before withdrawn from the line, means to resume his station therein, he will make the signal for the particular ships, between which he means to place himself, to open to a greater distance, whether it be in his former station, or in any other part of the line, better suited for his future purpose. xi. when any number of ships is occasionally detached from the fleet for the same purpose, they are, during their separation from the body of the fleet, to comply with all such signals as shall be made at any time, whilst the signal flag appropriated for that occasion remains abroad. but the signals made to all ships so appointed, having the commander of a squadron or division with them, will be under the flag descriptive of such commander's squadron or division, whose signals and instructions they are to obey. xii. great care is to be taken at all times when coming to action not to fire upon the enemy either over or near any ships of the fleet, liable to be injured thereby; nor, when in order of battle, until the proper signal is made, and that the ships are properly placed in respect to situation and distance, although the signal may have been before put abroad. and if, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are then steering down for the enemy in an oblique direction from each other, they are to haul to the wind, or to any order parallel with the enemy, to engage them as they arrive in a proper situation and distance, without waiting for any more particular signal or order for that purpose: regard being only had by the several commanders in these circumstances to the motions of the ships preceding them on the tack whereunto the course more inclines, and upon and towards which the enemy is formed for action, that they may have convenient space for hauling up clear of each other. when our fleet is upon the contrary tack to that of the enemy, and standing towards them, and the admiral makes the signal to engage, the van ship is then to lead close along their line, with a moderate sail, and engage; the rest of the fleet doing the same, passing to windward or to leeward of the enemy, as the admiral may direct. xiii. when weathering the enemy upon the contrary tack, and signal is made to engage their van, the leading ship is then to bear down to the van ship of the enemy, and engage, passing along their line to windward to the sternmost ship of their van squadron, then to haul off close to the wind, the rest of the fleet doing the same in succession.[ ] xiv. no ship is to separate in time of action from the body of the fleet, in pursuit of any small number of the enemy's ships beaten out of the line; nor until their main body be also disabled or broken: but the captains, who have disabled or forced their opponents out of the line, are to use their best endeavours to assist any ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, or the ships nearest to them, to hasten the defeat of the enemy, unless otherwise by signal, or particular instruction, directed.[ ] xv. when any ship in the fleet is so much disabled as to be in the utmost danger and hazard of being taken by the enemy, or destroyed, and makes the signal expressive of such extremity; the captains of the nearest ships, most at liberty with respect to the state of their opponents in the enemy's line, are strictly enjoined to give all possible aid and protection to such disabled ship, as they are best able. and the captain of any frigate (or fireship) happening to be at that time in a situation convenient for the purpose, is equally required to use his utmost endeavours for the relief of such disabled ship, by joining in the attack of the ship of the enemy opposed to the disabled ship, if he sees opportunity to place his ship to advantage, by favouring the attempt of the fireship to lay the enemy on board, or by taking out any of the crew of the disabled ship, if practicable and necessary, as may be most expedient. xvi. no captain, though much pressed by the enemy, is to quit his station in time of battle, if possible to be avoided, without permission first obtained from the commanding officer of his division, or other nearest flag officer, for that purpose; but, when compelled thereto by extreme necessity before any adequate assistance is furnished, or that he is ordered out of the line on that account, the nearest ships and those on each part of the disabled ship's station are timely to occupy the vacant space occasioned by her absence, before the enemy can take advantage thereof. and if any captain shall be wanting in the due performance of his duty in time of battle, the commander of the division, or other flag officer nearest to him, is immediately to remove such deficient captain from his post, and appoint another commander to take the charge and conduct of the ship on that occasion. xvii. when, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, or from bad weather, or otherwise, the admiral hath by signal signified his intention to leave the captains and other commanders at liberty to proceed at their discretion; they are then permitted to act as they see best under such circumstances, for the good of the king's service and the preservation of their ships, without regard to his example. but they are, nevertheless, to endeavour at all times to gain the appointed rendezvous in preference, if it can be done with safety. xviii. the ships are to be kept at all times prepared in readiness for action. and in case of coming to an engagement with the enemy, their boats are to be kept manned and armed, and prepared with hand and fire-chain grapnels, and other requisites, on the off-side from the enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ship of the fleet attempted by the fireships of the enemy; or for supporting the fireships of the fleet when they are to proceed on service. the ships appointed to protect and cover these last, or which may be otherwise in a situation to countenance their operations, are to take on board their crews occasionally, and proceed before them down, as near as possible, to the ships of the enemy they are destined to attempt. the captains of such ships are likewise to be particularly attentive to employ the boats they are provided with, as well to cover the retreat of the fireships boat, as to prevent the endeavours to be expected from the boats of the enemy to intercept the fireship, or in any other manner to frustrate the execution of the proposed undertaking.[ ] xix. if the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag officer may embark on board any private ship that he sees fit, for carrying on the service: but it is to be of his own squadron or division in preference when equally suitable for his purpose. xx. the flag officers, or commanders of divisions, are on all occasions to repeat generally, as well as with reference to their respective divisions, the signals from the admiral, that they may be thereby more speedily communicated correspondent to his intentions. and the purpose of all signals for the conduct of particular divisions is then only meant to be carried into execution when the signal has been repeated, or made by the commanders of such particular divisions respectively. in which circumstances they are to be always regarded and complied with by the ships or divisions referred to, in the same manner as if such signals had been made by the admiral commanding in chief. xxi. when ships have been detached to attack the enemy's rear, the headmost ship of such detachment, and the rest in succession, after having ranged up their line as far is judged proper, is then to fall astern; and (the ship that next follows passing between her and the enemy) is to tack or wear as engaged to windward or leeward, and form in the rear of the detachment. xxii. when the fleet is to tack in succession, the ship immediately following the one going in stays should observe to bear up a little, to give her room; and the moment for putting in stays is that when a ship discovers the weather quarter of her second ahead, and which has just tacked before her. on this and every other occasion, when the fleet is in order of battle, it should be the attention of each ship strictly to regulate her motions by those of the one preceding her; a due regard to such a conduct being the only means of maintaining the prescribed distance between the ships, and of preserving a regular order throughout the line. xxiii. as soon as the signal is made to prepare for battle, the fireships are to get their boarding grapnels fixed; and when in presence of an enemy, and that they perceive the fleet is likely to come to action, they are to prime although the signal for that purpose should not have been made; being likewise to signify when they are ready to proceed on service, by putting abroad the appointed signal. they are to place themselves abreast of the ships of the line, and not in the openings between them, the better to be sheltered from the enemy's fire, keeping a watchful eye upon the admiral, so as to be prepared to put themselves in motion the moment their signal is made, which they are to answer as soon as observed. a fireship ordered to proceed on service is to keep a little ahead and to windward of the ship that is to escort her, to be the more ready to bear down on the vessel she is to board, and to board if possible in the fore shrouds. by proceeding in this manner she will not be in the way of preventing the ship appointed to escort her from firing upon the enemy, and will run less risk of being disabled herself; and the ship so appointed and the two other nearest ships are to assist her with their boats manned and armed. she is to keep her yards braced up, that when she goes down to board, and has approached the ship she is to attempt, she may have nothing to do but to spring her luff. captains of fireships are not to quit them till they have grappled the enemy, and have set fire to the train. xxiv. frigates have it in particular charge to frustrate the attempts of the enemy's fireships, and to favour those of our own. when a fireship of the enemy therefore attempts to board a ship of the line, they are to endeavour to cut off the boats that attend her, and even to board her, if necessary. xxv. the boats of a ship attempted by an enemy's fireship, with those of her seconds ahead and astern, are to use their utmost efforts to tow her off, the ships at the same time firing to sink her. xxvi. in action, all the ships in the fleet are to wear red ensigns. footnotes: [ ] this and article ii. appear to be the first mention of working the fleet by 'guides.' [ ] the original has here the following erasure: 'the same is to be understood of the bearing indicated, though the admiral should shape his course from the wind originally when the signal for forming upon a line of bearing is made.' [ ] it was nelson's improvement on this unscientific method of attack that is the conspicuous feature of his memorandum, , but it must be remembered that howe had not yet devised the manoeuvre of breaking the line in all parts on which nelson's improvement was founded. [ ] _cf._ note , p. . [ ] howe's insistence on these points both here and in articles xxii.-xxv. is curious in view of the fact that the use of fireships in action had gone out of fashion. from to only one english fireship is known to have been 'expended,' and that was by commander callis when he destroyed the spanish galleys at st. tropez in . at the peace of the navy list contained only fireships out of a total of sail. howe had two fireships on the first of june, , but did not use them. the signal books of the great war introductory the second form in which the new fighting instructions, originated by lord howe, have come down to us, is that which became fixed in the service after ; that is, instead of two folio volumes with the signals in one and the explanatory instructions in the other, we have, at least after , one small quarto containing both, and entitled 'signal book for ships of war.' the earliest known example, however, of the new quarto form is a signal book only, which refers to a set of instructions apparently similar to those of . these have not been found, but presumably they were in a separate volume. the signal book is in the admiralty library labelled in manuscript ' - (?),' but, as before, no date or signature appears in the body of it. from internal evidence, however, as well as from collateral testimony, there is little difficulty in identifying it as lord howe's second code issued in . the feature of the book that first strikes us is that, though the bulk of it is printed, all the most important battle signals, as well as many others, have been added in ms., while at the end are the words, 'given on board the queen charlotte, to capt. ----, commander of his majesty's ship the ----, by command of the admiral.' it is thus obvious that the original printed form, which contains many further unfilled blanks for additional signals, was used as a draft for a later edition. no such edition is known to exist in print, but both the original signals and the additions correspond exactly with the ms. code which was used by lord howe in his campaign of . in editing this code for the society in his _logs of the great sea fights_, admiral sturges jackson hazarded the conjecture that it had not then been printed, but was supplied to each ship in the fleet in ms. the admiralty volume goes far to support his conjecture, and it is quite possible that we have here the final draft from which the ms. copies were made. as to the actual date at which the code was completed there is not much difficulty. the queen charlotte was howe's flagship in the channel fleet from - , but it was also his flagship in at the time of the 'spanish armament,' when he put to sea in immediate expectation of war with spain. while the tension lasted he is known to have used the critical period in exercising his fleet in tactical evolutions, in order to perfect it in a new code of signals which he had been elaborating for several years.[ ] it is probable therefore that this signal book belongs to that year, and that it is one of several copies which howe had printed with the battle signals blank for his own use while he was elaborating his system by practical experiment. this conjecture is brought to practical certainty by a rough and much-worn copy of it in the united service institution. it was made by lieut. john walsh, of h.m.s. marlborough, one of howe's fleet, and inside the cover he has written 'earl howe's signals by which the grand fleet was governed , , and .' it was upon the tactical system contained in this book that all the great actions of the nelson period were fought. the alterations which took place during the war were slight. the codes used by howe himself in , and by duncan at camperdown in , follow it exactly. a slightly modified form was issued by jervis to the mediterranean fleet, and was used by him at st. vincent in . no copy of this is known to exist, but from the logs of the ships there engaged it would appear that, though the numbering of the code had been changed, the principal battle signals remained the same. in a new edition was printed in the small quarto form. in this the signal book and the instructions were bound together, and were issued to the whole navy, but here again, though the numbers were changed, the alterations were of no great importance.[ ] reprints appeared in and , but the code itself continued in use till . in that year an entirely new signal book based on sir home popham's code was issued with a fresh set of explanatory instructions, or, as they had come to be called, 'instructions relating to the line of battle and the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an enemy.'[ ] both these sets of 'explanatory instructions' are printed below, but, as we have seen, they throw but little light by themselves on the progress of tactical thought during the great period they covered. they were no longer 'fighting instructions' in the old sense, unless read with the principal battle signals, and to these we have to go to get at the ideas that underlay the tactics of nelson and his contemporaries. now the most remarkable feature of howe's second signal book, , is the apparent disappearance from it of the signal for breaking the line which in his first code, , he had borrowed from hood in consequence of rodney's manoeuvre. the other two signals introduced by hood and pigot for breaking the line on rodney's plan are equally absent. in their stead appears a signal for an entirely new manoeuvre, never before practised or even suggested, so far as is known, by anyone. the 'signification' runs as follows: 'if, when having the weather-gage of the enemy, the admiral means to pass between the ships of their line for engaging them to leeward or, being to leeward, to pass between them for obtaining the weather-gage. n.b.--the different captains and commanders not being able to effect the specified intention in either case are at liberty to act as circumstances require.' in the signal book of the wording is changed. it there runs 'to break through the enemy's line in all parts where practicable, and engage on the other side,' and in the admiralty copy delivered to rear-admiral frederick there is added this ms. note, 'if a blue pennant is hoisted at the fore topmast-head, to break through the van; if at the main topmast-head, to break through the centre; if at the mizen topmast-head, to break through the rear.'[ ] this form of the signification shows that the intention of the signal was something different from what is usually understood in naval literature by 'breaking the line.' by that we generally understand the manoeuvre practised by lord rodney in , a manoeuvre which was founded on the conception of 'leading through' the enemy's line in line ahead, and all the ships indicated passing through in succession at the same point. whereas in lord howe's signal the tactical idea is wholly different. in his manoeuvre the conception is of an attack by bearing down all together in line abreast or line of bearing, and each ship passing through the enemy's line at any interval it found practicable; and this was actually the method of attack which he adopted on june , . in intention the two signals are as wide as the poles asunder. in rodney's case the idea was to sever the enemy's line and cut off part of it from the rest. in howe's case the idea of severing the line is subordinate to the intention of securing an advantage by engaging on the opposite side from which the attack is made. the whole of the attacking fleet might in principle pass through the intervals in the enemy's line without cutting off any part of it. in principle, moreover, the new attack was a parallel attack in line abreast or in line of bearing, whereas the old attack was a perpendicular or oblique attack in line ahead. nothing perhaps in naval literature is more remarkable than the fact that this fundamental difference is never insisted on, or even, it may be said, so much as recognised. whenever we read of a movement for breaking the line in this period it is almost always accompanied with remarks which assume that rodney's manoeuvre is intended and not howe's. probably it is nelson who is to blame. at trafalgar, after carefully elaborating an attack based on howe's method of line abreast, he delivered it in line ahead, as though he had intended to use rodney's method. his reasons were sound enough, as will be seen later. but as a piece of scientific tactics it was as though an engineer besieging a fortress, instead of drawing his lines of approach diagonally, were to make them at right angles to the ditch. when the greatest of the admirals apparently (but only apparently) confused the two antagonistic conceptions of breaking the line, there is much excuse for civilian writers being confused in fact. the real interest of the matter, however, is to inquire, firstly, by what process of thought howe in his second code discarded rodney's manoeuvre as the primary meaning of his signal after having adopted it in his first, and, secondly, how and to what end did he arrive at his own method. on the first point there can be little doubt. sir charles h. knowles gives us to understand that howe still had hoste's treatise at his elbow, and with hoste for his mentor we may be sure that, in common with other tactical students of his time, he soon convinced himself that rodney's manoeuvre was usually dangerous and always imperfect. knowles himself in his old age, though a devout admirer of rodney, denounced it in language of characteristic violence, and maintained to the last that rodney never intended it, as every one now agrees was the truth. nelson presumably also approved howe's cardinal improvement, or even in his most impulsive mood he would hardly have called him 'the first and greatest sea officer the world has ever produced.'[ ] as to the second point--the fundamental intention of the new manoeuvre--we get again a valuable hint from knowles. upon his second visit to the admiralty, after howe had succeeded keppel at the end of , knowles brought with him by request a tactical treatise written by his father, as well as certain of his own tactical studies, and discussed with howe a certain manoeuvre which he believed the french employed for avoiding decisive actions. he showed that when engaged to leeward they fell off by alternate ships as soon as they were hard pressed, and kept reforming their line to leeward, so that the british had continually to bear up, and expose themselves to be raked aloft in order to close again. in this way, as he pointed out, the french were always able to clip the british wings without receiving any decisive injury themselves. in a ms. note to his 'fighting and sailing instructions,' he puts the matter quite clearly. 'in the battle off granada,' he says, 'in the year the french ships partially executed this manoeuvre, and sir charles [h.] knowles (then th lieutenant of the prince of wales of guns, the flagship of the hon. admiral barrington) drew this manoeuvre, and which he showed admiral lord howe, when first lord of the admiralty, during the peace. his lordship established a signal to break through the enemy's line and engage on the other side to leeward, and which he executed himself in the battle of the st of june, .' the note adds that before knowles drew howe's attention to the supposed french manoeuvre he had been content with his original article xiv., modifying article xxi. of the old fighting instructions as already explained. whether therefore knowles's account is precisely accurate or not, we may take it as certain that it was to baffle the french practice of avoiding close action by falling away to leeward that howe hit on his brilliant conception of breaking through their line in all parts. no finer manoeuvre was ever designed. in the first place it developed the utmost fire-face by bringing both broadsides into play. secondly, by breaking up the enemy's line into fragments it deprived their admiral of any shadow of control over the part attacked. thirdly, by seizing the leeward position (the essential postulate of the french method of fighting) it prevented individual captains making good their escape independently to leeward and ensured a decisive _mêlée_, such as nelson aimed at. and, fourthly, it permitted a concentration on any part of the enemy's line, since it actually severed it at any desired point quite as effectually as did rodney's method. whether howe ever appreciated the importance of concentration to the extent it was felt by nelson, hood and rodney is doubtful. yet his invention did provide the best possible form of concentrated attack. it had over rodney's imperfect manoeuvre this inestimable advantage, that by the very act of breaking the line you threw upon the severed portion an overwhelming attack of the most violent kind, and with the utmost development of fire-surface. finally it could not be parried as rodney's usually could in hoste's orthodox way by the enemy's standing away together upon the same tack. by superior gunnery howe's attack might be _stopped_, but by no possibility could it be _avoided_ except by flight. it was no wonder then that howe's invention was received with enthusiasm by such men as nelson. still it is clear that in certain cases, and especially in making an attack from the leeward, as clerk of eldin had pointed out, and where it was desirable to preserve your own line intact, rodney's manoeuvre might still be the best. howe's manoeuvre moreover supplied its chief imperfection, for it provided a method of dealing drastically with the portion of the enemy's line that had been cut off. thus, although it is not traceable in the signal book, it was really reintroduced in howe's third code. this is clear from the last article of the explanatory instructions of which distinguishes between the two manoeuvres; but whether or not this article was in the instructions of we cannot tell. the probability is that it was not, for in the signal book of there is no reference to a modifying instruction. further, we know that in the code proposed by sir charles h. knowles the only signal for breaking the line was word for word the same as howe's. this code he drew up in its final form in , but it was not printed till . the presumption is therefore that until the code of was issued howe's method of breaking the line was the only one recognised. in that code the primary intention of signal 'for breaking through the enemy's line in all parts' is still for howe's manoeuvre, but the instruction provides that it could be modified by a red pennant over, and in that case it meant 'that the fleet is to preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet.' this was precisely rodney's manoeuvre with the proviso for close order introduced by pigot. the instruction also provided for the combining of a numeral to indicate at which number in the enemy's line the attempt was to be made. no doubt the distinction between manoeuvres so essentially different might have been more logically made by entirely different signals.[ ] but in practice it was all that was wanted. it is only posterity that suffers, for in studying the actions of that time it is generally impossible to tell from the signal logs or the tactical memoranda which movement the admiral had in mind. not only do we never find it specified whether the signal was made simply or with the pennant over, but admirals seem to have used the expressions 'breaking' and 'cutting' the line, and 'breaking through,' 'cutting through,' 'passing through,' and 'leading through,' as well as others, quite indiscriminately of both forms of the manoeuvre. thus in nelson's first, or toulon, memorandum he speaks of 'passing through the line' from to-windward, meaning presumably howe's manoeuvre, and of 'cutting through' their fleet from to-leeward when presumably he means rodney's. in the trafalgar memorandum he speaks of 'leading through' and 'cutting' the line from to-leeward, and of 'cutting through' from to-windward, when he certainly meant to perform howe's manoeuvre. whereas howe, in his instruction xxxi. of , uses 'breaking the line' and 'passing through it' indifferently of both forms. all we can do is generally to assume that when the attack was to be made from to-windward howe's manoeuvre was intended, and rodney's when it was made from to-leeward. yet this is far from being safe ground. for the signification of the plain signal without the red pennant over--_i.e._ 'to break through ... and engage on the other side'--seems to contemplate howe's manoeuvre being made both from to-leeward and from to-windward. the only notable disappearances in howe's second code ( ) are the signals for 'doubling,' probably as a corollary of the new manoeuvre. for, until this device was hit upon, rodney's method of breaking the line apparently could only be made effective as a means of concentration by doubling on the part cut off in accordance with hoste's method. this at least is what clerk of eldin seems to imply in some of his diagrams, in so far as he suggests any method of dealing with the part cut off. yet in spite of this disappearance nelson certainly doubled at the nile, and according to captain edward berry, who was captain of his flagship, he did it deliberately. 'it is almost unnecessary,' he wrote in his narrative, 'to explain his projected mode of attack at anchor, as that was minutely and precisely executed in the action.... these plans however were formed two months before, ... and the advantage now was that they were familiar to the understanding of every captain in the fleet.' nelson probably felt that the dangers attending doubling in an action under sail are scarcely appreciable in an action at anchor with captains whose steadiness he could trust. still saumarez, his second in command, regarded it as a mistake, and there was a good deal of complaint of our ships having suffered from each other's fire.[ ] amongst the more important retentions of tactical signals we find that for hoste's method of giving battle to a numerically superior force by leaving gaps in your own line between van, centre and rear. the wording however is changed. it is no longer enjoined as a means of avoiding being doubled. as howe inserted it in ms. the signification now ran 'for the van or particular divisions to engage the headmost of the enemy's van, the rear the sternmost of the enemy's rear, and the centre the centre of the enemy. but with exception of the flag officers of the fleet who should engage those of the enemy respectively in preference.'[ ] this signification again is considerably modified by the explanatory instructions. article xxiv., it will be seen, says nothing of engaging the centre or of leaving regular gaps. the leading ship is to engage the enemy's leading ship, and the rearmost the rearmost, while the rest are to select the largest ships they can get at, and leave the weaker ones alone till the stronger are disabled. it was in effect the adoption of hoste's fifth rule for engaging a numerically superior fleet instead of his first, and it is a plan which he condemns except in the case of your being individually superior to your enemy, as indeed the english gunnery usually made them. the curious signal no. of for attacking the enemy's rear in succession by 'defiling' on the elizabethan plan was also retained. in the signal book of it ran, 'to fire in succession upon the sternmost ships of the enemy, then tack or wear and take station in rear of the squadron or division specified (if a part of the fleet is so appointed) until otherwise directed.' it has been already said that the alterations in the edition of were not of great importance, but one or two additions must be noticed. the most noteworthy is a new signal for carrying out the important rule of article ix. of the instructions of (article x. of ), providing for the formation of a _corps de réserve_ when you are numerically superior to the enemy, as was done by villeneuve on gravina's advice in , although fortunately for nelson it was not put in practice at trafalgar. the other addition appears in ms. at the end of the printed signals. it runs as follows: 'when at anchor in line of battle to let go a bower anchor under foot, and pass a stout hawser from one ship to another, beginning at the weathermost ship,' an addition which would seem to have been suggested by what had recently occurred at the nile. nelson's own order was as follows: '_general memorandum_.--as the wind will probably blow along shore, when it is deemed necessary to anchor and engage the enemy at their anchorage it is recommended to each line-of-battle ship of the squadron to prepare to anchor with the sheet cable in abaft and springs, &c.'[ ] another copy of the signal book has a similar ms. addition to the signal 'prepare for battle and for anchoring with springs, &c.'[ ] it runs thus: 'a bower is to be unbent, and passed through the stern port and bent to the anchor, leaving that anchor hanging by the stopper only.--lord nelson, st. george, march, . if with a red pennant over with a spring only.--commander-in-chiefs order book, march, .' these therefore were additions made immediately before the attack on the danish fleet at copenhagen. no other change was made, and it may be said that howe's new method of breaking the line was the last word on the form of attack for a sailing fleet. how far its full intention and possibilities were understood at first is doubtful. the accounts of the naval actions that followed show no lively appreciation on the part of the bulk of british captains. on the first of june the new signal for breaking through the line at all points was the first howe made, and it was followed as soon as the moment for action arrived by that 'for each ship to steer for, independently of each other, and engage respectively the ship opposed in situation to them in the enemy's line.' the result was an action along the whole line, during which howe himself at the earliest opportunity passed through the enemy's line and engaged on the other side, though as a whole the fleet neglected to follow either his signal or his example. in the next great action, that of st. vincent, the circumstances were not suitable for the new manoeuvre, seeing that the spaniards had not formed line. jervis had surprised the enemy in disorder on a hazy morning after a change of wind, and this was precisely the 'not very probable case' which clerk of eldin had instanced as justifying a perpendicular attack. whether or not jervis had clerk's instance in his mind, he certainly did deliver a perpendicular attack. the signal with which he opened, according to the signification as given in the flagship's log, was 'the admiral intends to pass through the enemy's line.'[ ] there is nothing to show whether this meant howe's manoeuvre or rodney's, for we do not know whether at this time the instruction existed which enabled the two movements to be distinguished by a pennant over. what followed however was that the fleet passed between the two separated spanish squadrons in line ahead as clerk advised. the next thing to do, according to clerk, was for the british fleet to wear or tack together, but instead of doing so jervis signalled to tack in succession, and then repeated the signal to pass through the enemy's line although it was still unformed. it was at this moment that nelson made his famous independent movement that saved the situation, and what he did was in effect as though jervis had made the signal to tack together as clerk enjoined. thereupon jervis, with the intention apparently of annulling his last order to pass through the line, made the signal, which seems to have been the only one which the captains of those days believed in--viz. to take suitable stations for mutual support and engage the enemy on arriving up with them in succession. in practice it was little more than a frank relapse to the methods of the early commonwealth, and it was this signal and not that for breaking the line which made the action general. again, at the battle of camperdown, duncan, while trying to form single line from two columns of sailing, began with the signal for each ship to steer independently for her opponent. this was followed--the fleet having failed to form line parallel to the enemy, and being still in two disordered columns--by signals for the lee or van division to engage the enemy's rear, and as some thought the weather division his centre; and ten minutes later came the new signal for passing through the line. the result was an action almost exactly like that of nelson at trafalgar--that is, though the leading ships duly acted on the combination of the two signals for engaging their opposites and for breaking the line, each at its opposite interval, the rest was a _mêlée_; for, since what was fundamentally a parallel attack was attempted as a perpendicular one, it could be nothing but a scramble for the rear ships. in none of these actions therefore is there any evidence that howe's attempt to impress the service with a serious scientific view of tactics had been successful, and the impression which they made upon our enemies suggests that the real spirit that inspired british officers at this time was something very different from that which howe had tried to instil. writing of the battle of st. vincent, don domingo perez de grandallana, whose masterly studies of the french and english naval systems and tactics raised him to the highest offices of state, has the following passage: 'an englishman enters a naval action with the firm conviction that his duty is to hurt his enemies and help his friends and allies without looking out for directions in the midst of the fight; and while he thus clears his mind of all subsidiary distractions, he rests in confidence on the certainty that his comrades, actuated by the same principles as himself, will be bound by the sacred and priceless law of mutual support. accordingly, both he and all his fellows fix their minds on acting with zeal and judgment upon the spur of the moment, and with the certainty that they will not be deserted. experience shows, on the contrary, that a frenchman or a spaniard, working under a system which leans to formality and strict order being maintained in battle, has no feeling for mutual support, and goes into action with hesitation, preoccupied with the anxiety of seeing or hearing the commander-in-chief's signals for such and such manoeuvres.... thus they can never make up their minds to seize any favourable opportunity that may present itself. they are fettered by the strict rule to keep station, which is enforced upon them in both navies, and the usual result is that in one place ten of their ships may be firing on four, while in another four of their comrades may be receiving the fire of ten of the enemy. worst, of all, they are denied the confidence inspired by mutual support, which is as surely maintained by the english as it is neglected by us, who will not learn from them.'[ ] this was probably the broad truth of the matter; it is summed up in the golden signal which was the panacea of british admirals when in doubt: 'ships to take station for mutual support and engage as they come up;' and it fully explains why, with all the scientific appreciation of tactics that existed in the leading admirals of this time, their battles were usually so confused and haphazard. the truth is that in the british service formal tactics had come to be regarded as a means of getting at your enemy, and not as a substitute for initiative in fighting him. footnotes: [ ] _dictionary of national biography, sub voce_ 'howe,' p. . [ ] a copy of this is in the admiralty library issued to 'thomas lenox frederick esq., rear-admiral of the blue,' and attested by the autographs of vice-admiral james gambier, vice-admiral james young, and another lord of the admiralty, and countersigned by william marsden, the famous numismatist and oriental scholar, who was 'second secretary' from to . another copy, also in the admiralty library, is attested by gambier, sir john colpoys and admiral philip patton, and countersigned by the new second secretary, john barrow, all of whom came to the admiralty under lord melville on pitt's return to office in . two other copies are in the united service institution. [ ] sir home popham's code had been in use for many years for 'telegraphing.' it was by this code nelson's famous signal was made at trafalgar. [ ] in one of the united service institution copies the signal has been added in ms. and the note is on a slip pasted in. in the other both signal and note are printed with blanks in which the distinguishing pennants have been written in. [ ] nelson to howe, january , . _nicolas_, iii. . [ ] sir charles h. knowles did modify his code in this way some time after . for his original signal he substituted two in ms. with the following neatly worded significations: 'no. . to break through the enemy's line together and engage on the opposite side. no. . to break through the enemy's line in succession and engage on the other side.' had these two lucid significations been adopted by howe there would have been no possible ambiguity as to what was meant. [ ] laughton, _nelson's letters and despatches_, p. . ross, _memoir of lord de saumarez_, vol. i. [ ] this last mediæval proviso was omitted in the later editions. it is not found in hoste. [ ] ross, _memoir of saumarez_, i. . nelson refers to 'signal , art. xxxvii. of the instructions,' which must have been a special and amplified set issued by jervis. there is no art. xxxvii. in howe's set. [ ] in the united service institution. [ ] _logs of the great sea fights_, i. . the log probably only gives an abbreviation of the signification. unless jervis had changed it, its exact wording was 'the admiral means to pass between the ships of their line for engaging them to leeward,' &c. see _supra_, p. . [ ] fernandez duro, _armada española_, viii. . _lord howe's explanatory instructions_. [+signal book, +.[ ]] _instructions for the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their engaging, and when engaged, with an enemy_. i. when the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle, each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as expeditiously as possible, and to keep in close order, if not otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the line when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it. ii. the chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle are: that the ships may be able to assist and support each other in action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships greater in number than themselves; and that every ship may be able to fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own fleet. iii. if, after having made a signal to prepare to form the line of battle on either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession, to point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again; they are to be executed in the order in which they were made, excepting such as the admiral may annul previously to his hoisting again the signal for the line. iv. if any part of the fleet should be so far to leeward, when the signal is made for the line of battle, that the admiral should think it necessary to bear up and stand towards them, he will do it with the signal no. hoisted.[ ] the ships to leeward are thereupon to exert themselves to get as expeditiously as possible into their stations in the line. v. ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet, on any separate service, are not to obey the signal for forming the line of battle, unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by signal. vi. ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as directed in article of the general instructions, though in the presence of an enemy.[ ] the captains of such ships will not thereby be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have opportunities of rendering essential service, by placing their ships advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with the other part of the fleet. vii. when the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to place themselves in such a manner that if they were to haul to the wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed, they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. to do this, every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on which the line of battle would sail, viz., on that point of the compass which is seven points from the direction of the wind, or six points if the signal is made to keep _close_ to the wind. as the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or squadron flags, shown with the signal for such a line, will refer to the forming of the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag is uppermost (without considering whether it do or do not form the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind and form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is undermost is to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed.[ ] viii. when a line of bearing has been formed, the ships are to preserve that relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to alter the course together; but if they are directed to alter the course in succession, as the line of bearing will by that be destroyed, it is no longer to be attended to. ix. if the signal to make more or less sail is made when the fleet is in line of battle, the frigate appointed to repeat signals will set the same sails as are carried by the admiral's ship; the ships are then in succession (from the rear if to shorten, or the van, if to make more, sail) to put themselves under a proportion of sail correspondent to their comparative rate of sailing with the admiral's ship. to enable captains to do this it will be necessary that they acquire a perfect knowledge of the proportion of sail required for suiting their rate of sailing to that of the admiral, under the various changes in the quantity of sail, and state of the weather; which will enable them, not only to keep their stations in the line of battle, but also to keep company with the fleet on all other occasions. when the signal to make more sail is made, if the admiral is under his topsails he will probably set the foresail. if the signal is repeated, or if the foresail is set he will probably set jib and staysails. if the foresail, jib, and staysails are set, he will set the topgallant-sails. or in equally weather mainsail. when the signal to shorten sail is made, he will probably take in sail in a gradation the reverse of the preceding. x. ships which are ordered by signal to withdraw from the line are to place themselves to windward of the fleet if it has the weather-gage of the enemy, or to leeward and ahead if the contrary; and are to be ready to assist any ship which may want their assistance, or to act in any other manner as directed by signal. if the ships so withdrawn, or any others which may have been detached, should be unable to resume their stations in the line when ordered by signal to do so, they are to attack the enemy's ships in any part of the line on which they may hope to make the greatest impression.[ ] xi. if the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the ships which, at either extremity of the line, are thereby left without opponents may, after the action is begun, quit the line without waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or assist the ships of the fleet, in the best manner that circumstances will allow. xii. when any number of ships, not having a flag officer with them, are detached from the fleet to act together, they are to obey all signals which are accompanied by the flag appropriated to detachments, and are not to attend to any made without that flag. but if a flag officer, commanding a squadron, or division, be with such detachment, all the ships of it are to consider themselves, for the time, as forming part of the division, or squadron, of such flag officer; and they are to obey those signals, and only those, which are accompanied by his distinguishing flag. xiii. great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy, either over, or very near to, any ships of the fleet; nor, though the signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy. xiv. if, when the signal for battle is made, the ships are steering down for the enemy, they are to haul to the wind, or to any course parallel to the enemy, and are to engage them when properly placed, without waiting for any particular signal; but every ship must be attentive to the motions of that ship which will be her second ahead, when formed parallel to the enemy, that she may have room to haul up without running on board of her. the distance of the ships from each other during the action must be governed by that of their respective opponents on the enemy's line. xv. no ship is to separate from the body of the fleet, in time of action, to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled; unless by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act otherwise. xvi. if any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of being destroyed, or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal, expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate, that may be near, is to use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off, or by joining in the attack of the enemy, or by covering the fireship; or, if necessity require it, by taking out the crew of the disabled ship; or by any other means which circumstances at the time will admit.[ ] xvii. though a ship be disabled, and hard pressed by the enemy in battle, she is not to quit her station in the line, if it can possibly be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do from the commander of the squadron, or division, to which he belongs, or from some other flag officer. but if he should be ordered out of the line, or should be obliged to quit it, before assistance can be sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space become vacant, to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it. xviii. if there should be found a captain so lost to all sense of honour and the great duty he owes his country, as not to exert himself to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them when engaged; the commander of the squadron, or division, to which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from his command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship, till the admiral's pleasure shall be known. xix. when, from the advantage obtained by the enemy over the fleet, or from bad weather, or from any other cause, the admiral makes the signal for the fleet to disperse, every captain will be left to act as he shall judge most proper for the preservation of the ship he commands, and the good of the king's service; but he is to endeavour to go to the appointed rendezvous, if it may be done with safety. xx. the ships are to be kept at all times as much prepared for battle as circumstances will admit; and if the fleet come to action with an enemy which has the weather-gage, boats, well armed, are to be held in readiness, with hand and fire-chain grapnels in them; and if the weather will admit, they are to be hoisted out, and kept on the offside from the enemy, for the purpose of assisting any ships against which fireships shall be sent; or for supporting the fireships of the fleet, if they should be sent against the enemy.[ ] xxi. the ships appointed to protect and cover fireships, when ordered on service, or which, without being appointed, are in a situation to cover and protect them, are to receive on board their crews, and, keeping between them and the enemy, to go with them as near as possible to the ships they are directed to destroy. all the boats of those ships are to be well armed, and to be employed in covering the retreat of the fireship's boats, and in defending the ship from any attempts that may be made on her by the boats of the enemy. xxii. if the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper; but he is to hoist it in one of his own squadron or division if there be one near, and fit for the purpose. xxiii. if a squadron or any detachment be directed by signal to gain or keep the wind of the enemy, the officer commanding it is to act in such manner as shall in his judgment be the most effectual for the total defeat of the enemy; either by reinforcing those parts of the fleet which are opposed to superior force, or by attacking such parts of the enemy's line as, by their weakness, may afford reasonable hopes of their being easily broken, xxiv. when the signal ( ) is made to extend the line from one extremity of the enemy's line to the other, though the enemy have a greater number of ships, the leading ship is to engage the leading ship, and the sternmost ship the sternmost of the enemy; and the other ships are, as far as their situation will admit, to engage the ships of greatest force, leaving the weaker ships unattacked till the stronger shall have been disabled.[ ] xxv. if the admiral, or any commander of a squadron or division, shall think fit to change his station in the line, in order to place himself opposite to the admiral or the commander of a similar squadron or division in the enemy's line, he will make the signal for quitting the line in his own ship, without showing to what other part of the line he means to go; the ships ahead or astern (as circumstances may require) of the station opposed to the commander in the enemy's line are then to close and make room for him to get into it. but if the admiral, being withdrawn from the line, should think fit to return to any particular place in it, he will make the signal no. with the distinguishing signal of his own ship, and soon after he will hoist the distinguishing signal of the ship astern of which he means to take, his station. and if he should direct by signal any other ship to take a station in the line, he will also hoist the distinguishing signal of the ship astern of which he would have her placed, if she is not to take the station assigned her in the line of battle given out. xxvi. when the signal is made for each ship to steer for her opponent in the enemy's line, the ships are to endeavour, by making or shortening sail, to close with their opponents and bring them to action at the same time; but they must be extremely careful not to pass too near each other, nor to do anything which may risk their running on board each other: they may engage as soon as they are well closed with their opponents, and properly placed for that purpose. xxvii. when the signal is made, for ships to form as most convenient, and attack the enemy as they get up with them; the ships are to engage to windward or to leeward, as from the situation of the enemy they shall find most advantageous; but the leading ships must be very cautious not to suffer themselves to be drawn away so far from the body of the fleet as to risk the being surrounded and cut off. xxviii. when signal is made to prepare for battle and for anchoring, the ships are to have springs on their bower anchors, and the end of the sheet cable taken in at the stern port, with springs on the anchor to be prepared for anchoring without winding if they should go to the attack with the wind aft. the boats should be hoisted out and hawsers coiled in the launches, with the stream anchor ready to warp them into their stations, or to assist other ships which may be in want of assistance. their spare yards and topmasts, if they cannot be left in charge of some vessel, should in moderate weather be lashed alongside, near the water, on the off-side from the battery or ship to be attacked. the men should be directed to lie down on the off side of the deck from the enemy, whenever they are not wanted, if the ship should be fired at as they advance to the attack. xxix. when the line of battle has been formed as most convenient, without regard to the prescribed form, the ships which happen to be ahead of the centre are to be considered, for the time, as the starboard division, and those astern of the centre as the larboard division of the fleet; and if the triangular flag, white with a red fly, be hoisted, the line is to be considered as being divided into the same number of squadrons and divisions as in the established line of battle. the ship which happens at the time to lead the fleet is to be considered as the leader of the van squadron, and every other ship which happens to be in the station of the leader of the squadron or division is to be considered as being the leader of that squadron or division, and the intermediate ships are to form the squadrons or divisions of such leaders, and to follow them as long as the triangular flag is flying, and every flag officer is to be considered as the commander of the squadron or division in which he may be accidentally placed. xxx. if the wind should come forward when the fleet is formed in line of battle, or is sailing by the wind in a line of bearing, the leading ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, and every other ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible, till she has got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come aft, the sternmost ship is to continue steering seven points from the wind, and the other ships are to haul close to the wind till they have brought the sternmost ship into their wake, or on the proper point of bearing. xxxi. if signal , to break through the enemy's line, be made without a 'red pennant' being hoisted, it is evident that to obey it the line of battle must be entirely broken; but if a 'red pennant' be hoisted at either mast-head, that fleet is to preserve the line of battle as it passes through the enemy's line, and to preserve it in very close order, that such of the enemy's ships as are cut off may not find an opportunity of passing through it to rejoin their fleet. if a signal of number be made immediately after this signal, it will show the number of ships of the enemy's van or rear which the fleet is to endeavour to cut off. if the closing of the enemy's line should prevent the ships passing through the part pointed out, they are to pass through as near to it as they can. if any of the ships should find it impracticable, in either of the above cases, to pass through the enemy's line, they are to act in the best manner that circumstances will admit of for the destruction of the enemy. footnotes: [ ] similar but not identical instructions are referred to in the signal book of . the above were reproduced in all subsequent editions till the end of the war. [ ] 'ships to leeward to get in the admiral's wake.' [ ] the instructions referred to are the 'general instructions for the conduct of the fleet.' they are the first of the various sets which the signal book contained, and relate to books to be kept, boats, keeping station, evolutions and the like. article ix. is 'if from any cause whatever a ship should find it impossible to keep her station in any line or order of sailing, she is not to break the line or order by persisting too long in endeavouring to preserve it; but she is to quit the line and form in the rear, doing everything she can to keep up with the fleet.' [ ] see at p. , as to the new sailing formation in three columns. [ ] it should be noted that this is an important advance on the corresponding article ix. of the previous instructions, and that it contains a germ of the organisation of nelson's trafalgar memorandum. [ ] the continued insistence on fireship tactics in this and articles xx. and xxi. should again be noted, although from to the number of fireships on the navy list averaged under four out of a total that increased from to . [ ] it should be remembered that at this time there were no davits and no boats hoisted up. they were all carried in-board. [ ] this is a considerable modification of the signification of the signal; see _supra_, p. . nelson's tactical memoranda introductory the first of these often quoted memoranda is the 'plan of attack,' usually assigned to may , when nelson was in pursuit of villeneuve, and it is generally accompanied by two erroneous diagrams based on the number of ships which he then had under his command. but, as professor laughton has ingeniously conjectured, it must really belong to a time two years earlier, when nelson was off toulon in constant hope of the french coming out to engage him.[ ] the strength and organisation of nelson's fleet at that time, as well as the numbers of the french fleet, exactly correspond to the data of the memorandum. to professor laughton's argument may be added another, which goes far actually to fix the date. the principal signal which nelson's second method of attack required was 'to engage to leeward.' now this signal as it stood in the signal book of was to some extent ambiguous. it was no. , and the signification was 'to engage the enemy on their larboard side, or to leeward if by the wind,' while no. was 'to engage the enemy on their starboard side if going before the wind, or to windward if by the wind.' accordingly we find nelson issuing a general order, with the object apparently of removing the ambiguity, and of rendering any confusion between starboard and larboard and leeward and windward impossible. it is in nelson's order book, under date november , , and runs as follows: 'if a pennant is shown over signal no. , it signifies that ships are to engage on the enemy's starboard side, whether going large or upon a wind. 'if a pennant is shown in like manner over no. , it signifies that ships are to engage on the enemy's larboard side, whether going large or upon a wind. 'these additions to be noted in the signal book in pencil only.'[ ] the effect of this memorandum was, of course, that nelson had it in his power to let every captain know, without a shadow of doubt, under all conditions of wind, on which side he meant to engage the enemy. to the evidence of the signal book may be added a passage in nelson's letter to admiral sir a. ball from the magdalena islands, november , . he there writes: 'our last two reconnoiterings: toulon has eight sail of the line apparently ready for sea ... a seventy-four repairing. whether they intend waiting for her i can't tell, but i expect them every hour to put to sea.'[ ] he was thus expecting to have to deal with eight or nine of the line, which is the precise contingency for which the memorandum provides. there can be little doubt therefore that it was issued while nelson lay at magdalena, the first week in november .[ ] the second memorandum, which nelson communicated to his fleet, soon after he joined it off cadiz, is regarded by universal agreement as the high-water mark of sailing tactics. its interpretation however, and the dominant ideas that inspired it, no less than the degree to which it influenced the battle and was in the mind of nelson and his officers at the time, are questions of considerable uncertainty. some of the most capable of his captains, as we shall see presently, even disagreed as to whether trafalgar was fought under the memorandum at all. from the method in which the attack was actually made, so different apparently from the method of the memorandum, some thought nelson had cast it aside, while others saw that it still applied. a careful consideration of all that was said and done at the time gives a fairly clear explanation of the divergence of opinion, and it will probably be agreed that those officers who had a real feeling for tactics saw that nelson was making his attack on what were the essential principles of the memorandum, while some on the other hand who were possessed of less tactical insight did not distinguish between what was essential and what was accidental in nelson's great conception, and, mistaking the shadow for the substance, believed that he had abandoned his carefully prepared project. for those who did not entirely grasp nelson's meaning there is much excuse. we who are able to follow step by step the progress of tactical thought from the dawn of the sailing period can appreciate without much difficulty the radical revolution which he was setting on foot. it was a revolution, as we can plainly see, that was tending to bring the long-drawn curve of tactical development round to the point at which the elizabethans had started. surprise is sometimes expressed that, having once established the art of warfare under sail in broadside ships, our seamen were so long in finding the tactical system it demanded. should not the wonder be the converse: that the elizabethan seamen so quickly came so near the perfected method of the greatest master of the art? the attack at gravelines in with four mutually supporting squadrons in échelon bears strong elementary resemblance to that at trafalgar in . it was in dexterity and precision of detail far more than in principle that the difference lay. the first and the last great victory of the british navy had certainly more in common with each other than either had with malaga or the first of june. in the zenith of their careers nelson and drake came very near to joining hands. little wonder then if many of nelson's captains failed to fathom the full depth of his profound idea. naval officers in those days were left entirely without theoretical instruction on the higher lines of their profession, and nelson, if we may judge by the style of his memoranda, can hardly have been a very lucid expositor. he thought they all understood what with pardonable pride he called the 'nelson touch.' the most sagacious and best educated of them probably did, but there were clearly some--and collingwood, as we shall see, was amongst them--who only grasped some of the complex principles which were combined in his brilliant conception. an analysis of the memorandum will show how complex it was. in the first and foremost place there is a clear note of denunciation against the long established fallacy of the old order of battle in single line. secondly, there is in its stead the reestablishment of the primitive system of mutually supporting squadrons in line ahead. thirdly, there is the principle of throwing one squadron in superior force upon one end of the enemy's formation, and using the other squadrons to cover the attack or support it if need arose. fourthly, there is the principle of concealment--that is, disposing the squadrons in such a manner that even after the real attack has been delivered the enemy cannot tell what the containing squadrons mean to do, and in consequence are forced to hold their parrying move in suspense. the memorandum also included the idea of concentration, and this is often spoken of as its conspicuous merit. but in the idea of concentration there was nothing new, even if we go back no further than rodney. it was only the method of concentration, woven out of his four fundamental innovations, that was new. moreover, as nelson delivered the attack, he threw away the simple idea of concentration. for a suddenly conceived strategical object he deliberately exposed the heads of his columns to what with almost any other enemy would have been an overwhelming superiority. on the other hand, by making, as he did, a perpendicular instead of a parallel attack, as he had intended, he accentuated--it is true at enormous risk--the cardinal points of his design; that is, he departed still further from the old order of battle, and he still further concealed from the enemy what the real attack was to be, and after it was developed what the containing squadron was going to do. concentration in fact was only the crude and ordinary raw material of a design of unmatched subtlety and invention. the keynote of his conception, then, was his revolutionary substitution of the primitive elizabethan and early seventeenth century method for the fetish of the single line. for some time it is true the established battle order had been blown upon from various quarters, but no one as yet had been able to devise any system convincing enough to dethrone it. it will be remembered that at least as early as an additional instruction had provided for a battle order in two lines, but it does not appear ever to have been used.[ ] rodney's manoeuvre again had foreshadowed the use of parts of the line independently for the purpose of concentration and containing. in clerk of eldin had privately printed his _essay_, which contained suggestions for an attack from to-windward, with the line broken up into écheloned divisions in close resemblance to the disposition laid down in nelson's memorandum. in this part of his work was published. meanwhile an even more elaborate and well-reasoned assault on the whole principle of the single line had appeared in france. in the vicomte de grenier, a french flag officer, had produced his _l'art de la guerre sur mer_, in which he boldly attacked the law laid down by de grasse, that so long as men-of-war carried their main armament in broadside batteries there could never be any battle order but the single line ahead. in grenier's view the english had already begun to discard it, and he insists that, in all the actions he had seen in the last two wars, the english, knowing the weakness of the single line, had almost always concentrated on part of it without regular order. the radical defects of the line he points out are: that it is easily thrown into disorder and easily broken, that it is inflexible, and too extended a formation to be readily controlled by signals. he then proceeds to lay down the principle on which a sound battle order should be framed, and the fundamental objects at which it should aim[ ]. his postulates are thus stated: ' . de rendre nulle une partie des forces de l'ennemi afin de réunir toutes les siennes contre celles qui l'on attaque, ou qui attaquent; et de vaincre ensuite le reste avec plus de facilité et de certitude. ' . de ne présenter à l'ennemi aucune partie de son armée qui ne soit flanquée et où il ne pût combattre et vaincre s'il vouloit se porter sur les parties de cette armée reconnues faibles jusqu'à présent.' never had the fundamental intention of naval tactics been stated with so much penetration, simplicity, and completeness. the order, however, which grenier worked out--that of three lines of bearing disposed on three sides of a lozenge--was somewhat fantastic and cumbrous, and it seems to have been enough to secure for his clever treatise complete neglect. it had even less effect on french tactics than had nelson's memorandum on our own. this is all the more curious, for so thoroughly was the change that was coming over english tactics understood in france that villeneuve knew quite well the kind of attack nelson would be likely to make. in his general instructions, issued in anticipation of the battle, he says: 'the enemy will not confine themselves to forming a line parallel to ours.... they will try to envelope our rear, to break our line, and to throw upon those of our ships that they cut off, groups of their own to surround and crush them.' yet he could not get away from the dictum of de grasse, and was able to think of no better way of meeting such an attack than awaiting it 'in a single line of battle well closed up.' in england things were little better. in spite of the fact that at camperdown duncan had actually found a sudden advantage by attacking in two divisions, no one had been found equal to the task of working out a tactical system to meet the inarticulate demands of the tendency which grenier had noticed. the possibilities even of rodney's manoeuvre had not been followed up, and howe had contented himself with his brilliant invention for increasing the impact and decision of the single line. it was reserved for nelson's genius to bring a sufficiently powerful solvent to bear on the crystallised opinion of the service, and to find a formula which would shed all that was bad and combine all that was good in previous systems.[ ] the dominating ideas that were in his mind become clearer, if we follow step by step all the evidence that has survived as to the genesis and history of his memorandum. as early as , when he was hoping to intercept bonaparte's expedition to egypt, he had adopted a system which was not based on the single line, and so far as is known this was the first tactical order he ever framed as a fleet commander. it is contained in a general order issued from the vanguard on june of that year, and runs as follows, as though hot from the lesson of st. vincent: 'as it is very probable the enemy will not be formed in regular order on the approach of the squadron under my command, i may in that case deem it most expedient to attack them by separate divisions. in which case the commanders of divisions are strictly enjoined to keep their ships in the closest possible order, and on no account whatever to risk the separation of one of their ships.'[ ] the divisional organisation follows, being his own division of six sail and two others of four each. 'had he fallen in with the french fleet at sea,' wrote captain berry, who was sent home with despatches after the nile, 'that he might make the best impression upon any part of it that should appear the most vulnerable or the most eligible for attack, he divided his force into three sub-squadrons [one of six sail and two of four each]. two of these sub-squadrons were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it could.'[ ] the exact manner in which he intended to use this organisation he had explained constantly by word of mouth to his captains, but no further record of his design has been found. still there is an alteration which he made in his signal book at the same time that gives us the needed light. we cannot fail to notice the striking resemblance between his method of attack by separate divisions on a disordered enemy, and that made by the elizabethan admirals at gravelines upon the armada after its formation had been broken up by the fireships. that attack was made intuitively by divisions independently handled as occasion should dictate, and nelson's new signal leaves little doubt that this was the plan which he too intended. the alteration he ordered was to change the signification of signal , so that it meant that each of his flag officers, from the moment it was made, should have control of his own division and make any signals he thought proper. but this was not all. by the same general order he made two other alterations in the signal book in view of encountering the french in order of battle. they too are of the highest interest and run as follows: 'to be inserted in pencil in the signal book. at no. . being to windward of the enemy, to denote i mean to attack the enemy's line from the rear towards the van as far as thirteen ships, or whatsoever number of the british ships of the line may be present, that each ship may know his opponent in the enemy's line.' no. . 'i mean to press hard with the whole force on the enemy's rear.'[ ] thus we see that at the very first opportunity nelson had of enforcing his own tactical ideas he enunciated three of the principles upon which his great memorandum was based, viz. breaking up his line of battle into three divisional lines, independent control by divisional leaders, and concentration on the enemy's rear. all that is wanting are the elements of surprise and containing. these, however, we see germinating in the memorandum he issued five years later off toulon. in that case he expected to meet the french fleet on an opposite course, and being mainly concerned in stopping it and having a slightly superior force he is content to concentrate on the van. but, in view of the strategical necessity of making the attack in this way, he takes extra precautions which are not found in the general order of . he provides for preventing the enemy's knowing on which side his attack is to fall; instead of engaging an equal number of their ships he provides for breaking their line, and engaging the bulk of their fleet with a superior number of his own; and finally he looks to being ready to contain the enemy's rear before it can do him any damage. thus, taking together the general order of and the toulon memorandum of , we can see all the tactical ideas that were involved at trafalgar already in his mind, and we are in a position to appreciate the process of thought by which he gradually evolved the sublimely simple attack that welded them together, and brought them all into play without complication or risk of mistake. this process, which crowns nelson's reputation as the greatest naval tactician of all time, we must now follow in detail. shortly before he left england for the last time, he communicated to keats, of the superb, a full explanation of his views as they then existed in his mind, and keats has preserved it in the following paper which nicolas printed. 'memorandum of a conversation between lord nelson and admiral sir richard keats, the last time he was in england before the battle of trafalgar.[ ] 'one morning, walking with lord nelson in the grounds of merton, talking on naval matters, he said to me, "no day can be long enough to arrange a couple of fleets and fight a decisive battle according to the old system. when _we_ meet them" (i was to have been with him), "for meet them we shall, i'll tell you how i shall fight them. i shall form the fleet into three divisions in three lines; one division shall be composed of twelve or fourteen of the fastest two-decked ships, which i shall keep always to windward or in a situation of advantage, and i shall put them under an officer who, i am sure, will employ them in the manner i wish, if possible. i consider it will always be in my power to throw them into battle in any part i choose; but if circumstances prevent their being carried against the enemy where i desire, i shall feel certain he will employ them effectually and perhaps in a more advantageous manner than if he could have followed my orders" (he never mentioned or gave any hint by which i could understand who it was he intended for this distinguished service).[ ] he continued, "with the remaining part of the fleet, formed in two lines, i shall go at them at once if i can, about one third of their line from their leading ship." he then said, "what do you think of it?" such a question i felt required consideration. i paused. seeing it he said, "but i will tell you what _i_ think of it. i think it will surprise and confound the enemy. they won't know what i am about. it will bring forward a pell-mell battle, and that is what i want."[ ] here we have something roughly on all-fours with the methods of the first dutch war. there are the three squadrons, the headlong 'charge' and the _mêlée_. the reserve squadron to windward goes even further back, to the treatise of de chaves and the instructions of lord lisle in . it was no wonder it took away keats's breath. the return to primitive methods was probably unconscious, but what was obviously uppermost in nelson's mind was the breaking up of the established order in single line, leading by surprise and concealment to a decisive _mêlée_. he seems to insist not so much upon defeating the enemy by concentration as by throwing him into confusion, upsetting his mental equilibrium in accordance with the primitive idea. the notion of concentration is at any rate secondary, while the subtle scheme for 'containing' as perfected in the memorandum is not yet developed. as he explained his plan to keats, he meant to attack at once with both his main divisions, using the reserve squadron as a general support. there is no clear statement that he meant it as a 'containing' force, though possibly it was in his mind.[ ] there is one more piece of evidence relating to this time when he was still in england. according to this story lord hill, about , when still commander-in-chief, was paying a visit to lord sidmouth. his host, who, better known as addington, had been prime minister till , and was in pitt's new cabinet till july , showed him a table bearing a nelson inscription. he told him that shortly before leaving england to join the fleet nelson had drawn upon it after dinner a plan of his intended attack, and had explained it as follows: 'i shall attack in two lines, led by myself and collingwood, and i am confident i shall capture their van and centre or their centre and rear.' 'those,' concluded sidmouth, 'were his very words,' and remarked how wonderfully they had been fulfilled.[ ] hill and sidmouth at the time were both old men and the authority is not high, but so far as it goes it would tend to show that an attack in two lines instead of one was still nelson's dominant idea. it cannot however safely be taken as evidence that he ever intended a concentration on the van, though in view of the memorandum of this is quite possible. finally, there is the statement of clarke and mcarthur that nelson before leaving england deposited a copy of his plan with lord barham, the new first lord of the admiralty. this however is very doubtful. the barham papers have recently been placed at the disposal of the society, in the hands of professor laughton, and the only copy of the memorandum he has been able to find is an incomplete one containing several errors of transcription, and dated the victory, october , . in the absence of further evidence therefore no weight can be attached to the oft-repeated assertion that nelson had actually drawn up his memorandum before he left england. coming now to the time when he had joined the fleet off cadiz, the first light we have is the well-known letter of october to lady hamilton. in this letter, after telling her that he had joined on september , but had not been able to communicate with the fleet till the th, he says, 'when i came to explain to them the _nelson touch_ it was like an electric shock. some shed tears and all approved. it was new--it was singular--it was simple.' what he meant exactly by the 'nelson touch' has never been clearly explained, but he could not possibly have meant either concentration or the attack on the enemy's rear, for neither of these ideas was either new or singular. on october he writes to her again: 'the reception i met with on joining the fleet caused the sweetest sensation of my life.... as soon as these emotions were past i laid before them the plan i had previously arranged for attacking the enemy, and it was not only my pleasure to find it generally approved, but clearly perceived and understood.'[ ] the next point to notice is the 'order of battle and sailing' given by nicolas. it is without date, but almost certainly must have been drawn up before nelson joined. it does not contain the belleisle, which nelson knew on october was to join him.[ ] it also does include the name of sir robert calder and his flagship, and on september nelson had decided to send both him and his ship home.[ ] the order is for a fleet of forty sail, but the names of only thirty-three are given, which were all nelson really expected to get in time. the remarkable feature of this order is that it contains no trace of the triple organisation of the memorandum. the 'advanced squadron' is absent, and the order is based on two equal divisions only. then on october , after calder had gone, there is this entry in nelson's private diary: 'sent admiral collingwood the nelson touch.' it was enclosed in a letter in which nelson says: 'i send you my plan of attack, as far as a man dare venture to guess at the very uncertain position the enemy may be found in. but, my dear friend, it is to place you perfectly at your ease respecting my intentions and to give full scope to your judgment for carrying them into effect.' the same day collingwood replies, 'i have a just sense of your lordship's kindness to me, and the full confidence you have reposed in me inspires me with the most lively gratitude. i hope it will not be long before there is an opportunity of showing your lordship that it has not been misplaced.' on these two letters there can be little doubt that the 'plan of attack' which nelson enclosed was that of the memorandum. the draft from which nicolas printed appears to have been dated october , and originally had in one passage 'you' and 'your' for the 'second in command,' showing that nelson in his mind was addressing his remarks to collingwood, though subsequently he altered the sentence into the third person. only one other copy was known to nicolas, and that was issued in the altered form to captain hope, of the defence, a ship which in the order of battle was in collingwood s squadron, but codrington tells us it was certainly issued to all the captains.[ ] so far, then, we have the case thus--that whatever nelson may have really told lord sidmouth, and whatever may have been in his mind when he drew up the dual order of battle and sailing, he had by october reverted to the triple idea which he had explained to keats. meanwhile, however, his conception had ripened. there are marked changes in organisation, method and intention. in organisation the reserve squadron is reduced from the original twelve or fourteen to eight, or one fifth of his hypothetical fleet instead of about one third--reduced, that is, to a strength at which it was much less capable of important independent action. in method we have, instead of an attack with the two main divisions, an attack with one only, with the other covering it. in intention we have as the primary function of the reserve squadron, its attachment to one or other of the other two main divisions as circumstances may dictate. the natural inference from these important changes is that nelson's conception was now an attack in two divisions of different strength, the stronger of which, as the memorandum subsequently explains, was to be used as a containing force to cover the attack of the other, and except that the balance of the two divisions was reversed, this is practically just what clerk of eldin had recommended and what actually happened in the battle. it is a clear advance upon the original idea as explained to keats, in which the third squadron was to be used on the primitive and indefinite plan of de chaves and lord lisle as a general reserve. it also explains nelson's covering letter to collingwood, in which he seems to convey to his colleague that the pith of his plan was an attack in two divisions, and, within the general lines of the design, complete freedom of action for the second in command. how largely this idea of independent control entered into the 'nelson touch' we may judge from the fact that it is emphasised in no less than three distinct paragraphs of the memorandum. such, then, is the fundamental principle of the memorandum as enunciated in its opening paragraphs. he then proceeds to elaborate it in two detailed plans of attack--one from to-leeward and the other from to-windward. it was the latter he meant to make if possible. he calls it 'the intended attack,' and it accords with the opening enunciation. the organisation is triple, but no special function is assigned to the reserve squadron. the actual attack on the enemy's rear is to be made by collingwood, while nelson with his own division and the reserve is to cover him. in the event of an attack having to be made from to-leeward, the idea is different. here the containing movement practically disappears. the fleet is still to attack the rear and part of the centre of the enemy, but now in three independent divisions simultaneously, in such a way as to cut his line at three points, and to concentrate a superior force on each section of the severed line. to none of the divisions is assigned the duty of containing the rest of the enemy's fleet from the outset. it is to be dealt with at a second stage of the action by all ships that are still capable of renewing the engagement after the first stage. 'the whole impression,' as nelson put it, in case he was forced to attack from to-leeward, was to overpower the enemy's line from a little ahead of the centre to the rearmost ship. he does not say, however, that this was to be 'the whole impression' of the intended attack from to-windward. 'the whole impression' there appears to be for collingwood to overpower the rear while nelson with the other two divisions made play with the enemy's van and centre; but the particular manner in which he would carry out this part of the design is left undetermined. the important point, then, in considering the relation between the actual battle and the memorandum, is to remember that it provided for two different methods of attacking the rear according to whether the enemy were encountered to windward or to leeward. the somewhat illogical arrangement of the memorandum tends to conceal this highly important distinction. for nelson interpolates between his explanation of the windward attack and his opening enunciation of principle his explanation of the leeward attack, to which the enunciation did not apply. that some confusion was caused in the minds of some even of his best officers is certain, but let them speak for themselves. after the battle captain harvey, of the téméraire, whom nelson had intended to lead his line, wrote to his wife, 'it was noon before the action commenced, which was done according to the instructions given us by lord nelson.... lord nelson had given me leave to lead and break through the line about the fourteenth ship,' _i.e._ two or three ships ahead of the centre, as explained in the memorandum for the leeward attack but not for the windward. on the other hand we have captain moorsom, of the revenge, who was in collingwood's division, saying exactly the opposite. writing to his father on december , he says, 'i have seen several plans of the action, but none to answer my ideas of it. a regular plan was laid down by lord nelson some time before the action but not acted on. his great anxiety seemed to be to get to leeward of them lest they should make off to cadiz before he could get near them.' and on november , to the same correspondent he had written, 'i am not certain that our mode of attack was the best: however, it succeeded.' here then we have two of nelson's most able captains entirely disagreeing as to whether or not the attack was carried out in accordance with any plan which nelson laid down. captain moorsom's view may be further followed in a tactical study written by his son, vice-admiral constantine moorsom.[ ] his remarks on trafalgar were presumably largely inspired by his father, who lived till . in his view there was 'an entire alteration both of the scientific principle and of the tactical movements,' both of which he thinks were due to what he calls the _morale_ of the enemy's attitude--that is, that nelson was afraid they were going to slip through his fingers into cadiz. the change of plan--meaning presumably the change from the triple to the dual organisation--he thinks was not due to the reduced numbers which nelson actually had under his flag, for the ratio between the two fleets remained much about the same as that of his hypothesis. the interesting testimony of lieutenant g.l. browne, who, as admiral jackson informs us, was assistant flag-lieutenant in the victory and had every means of knowing, endorses the view of the moorsoms.[ ] after explaining to his parents the delay caused by the established method of forming the fleets in two parallel lines so that each had an opposite number, as set forth in the opening words of the memorandum, he says, 'but by his lordship's mode of attack you will clearly perceive not an instant of time could be lost. the frequent communications he had with his admirals and captains put them in possession of all his plans, so that his mode of attack was well known to every officer of the fleet. some will not fail to attribute rashness to the conduct of lord nelson. but he well considered the importance of a decisive naval victory at this time, and has frequently said since we left england that, should he be so fortunate as to fall in with the enemy, a total defeat should be the result on the one side or the other.' next we have what is probably the most acute and illuminating criticism of the battle that exists, from the pen of 'an officer who was present.' sir charles ekin quotes it anonymously; but from internal evidence there is little difficulty in assigning it to an officer of the conqueror, though clearly not her captain, israel pellew, in whose justification the concluding part was written. whoever he was the writer thoroughly appreciated and understood the tactical basis of nelson's plan, as laid down in the memorandum, and he frankly condemns his chief for having exposed his fleet unnecessarily by permitting himself to be hurried out of delivering his attack in line abreast as he intended. it might well have been done, so far as he could see, without any more loss of time than actually occurred in getting the bulk of the fleet into action. loss of time was the only excuse for attacking in line ahead, and the only reason he could suppose for the change of plan. if they had all gone down together in line abreast, he is sure the victory would have been more quickly decided and the brunt of the fight more equally borne. nothing, he thinks, could have been better than the plan of the memorandum if it had only been properly executed. an attack in two great divisions with a squadron of observation--so he summarises the 'nelson touch'--seemed to him to combine every precaution under all circumstances. it allows of concentration and containing. each ship can use her full speed without fear of being isolated. the fastest ships will break through the line first, and they are just those which from their speed in passing are liable to the least damage, while having passed through, they cause a diversion for the attack of their slower comrades. finally, if the enemy tries to make off and avoid action, the fleet is well collected for a general chase. but as nelson actually made the attack in his hurry to close, he threw away most of these advantages, and against an enemy of equal spirit each ship must have been crushed as she came into action. instead of doubling ourselves, he says, we were doubled and even trebled on. nelson in fact presented the enemy's fleet with precisely the position which the memorandum aimed at securing for ourselves--that is to say, he suffered a portion of his fleet, comprising the victory, téméraire, royal sovereign, belleisle, mars, colossus, and bellerophon, to be cut off and doubled on.[ ] the last important witness is captain codrington, of the orion. no one seems to have kept his head so well in the action, and this fact, coupled with the high reputation he subsequently acquired, gives peculiar weight to his testimony. it is on the question of the advanced or reserve squadron that he is specially interesting. on october at p.m., just after they had been surprised and rejoiced by nelson's signal for a general chase, and were steering for the enemy, as he says, 'under every stitch of sail we can set,' he sat down to write to his wife. in the course of the letter he tells her, 'defence and agamemnon are upon the look out nearest to cadiz; ... colossus and mars are stationed next. the above four and as many more of us are now to form an advanced squadron; and i trust by the morning we shall all be united and in sight of the enemy.' clearly then nelson must have issued some modification of the dual 'order of battle and sailing.' many years later in a note upon the battle which codrington dictated to his daughter, lady bourchier, he says that on the th, in spite of collingwood's advice to attack at once, nelson 'continued waiting upon them in two columns according to the order of sailing and the memorable written instruction which was given out to all the captains.'[ ] later still, when a veteran of seventy-six years, he gave to sir harris nicolas another note which shows how in his own mind he reconciled the apparent discrepancy between the dual and the triple organisation. it runs as follows: 'in lord nelson's memorandum of october , , he refers to "an advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships" to be added to either of the two lines of the order of sailing as may be required; and says that this advanced squadron would probably have to cut through "two, three or four ships of the enemy's centre so as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief, on whom every effort must be made to capture";[ ] and he afterwards twice speaks of the enemy's van coming to succour their rear. now i am under the impression that i was expressly instructed by lord nelson (referring to the probability of the enemy's van coming down upon us), being in the orion, one of the eight ships named, that he himself would probably make a feint of attacking their van in order to prevent or retard it.' here then would seem to be still further confusion, due to a failure to distinguish between the leeward and windward form of attack. according to this statement codrington believed the advanced squadron was in either case to attack the centre, while nelson with his division contained the van. but curiously enough in a similar note, printed by lady bourchier on nicolas's authority, there is a difference in the wording which, though difficult to account for, seems to give the truer version of what codrington really said. it is there stated that codrington told nicolas he was strongly impressed with the belief 'that lord nelson directed eight of the smaller and handier ships, of which the orion was one, to be ready to haul out of the line in case the enemy's van should appear to go down to the assistance of the ships engaged to meet and resist them: that to prevent this manoeuvre on the part of the enemy lord nelson intimated his intention of making a feint of hauling out towards their van,' &c. there is little doubt that we have here the true distribution of duties which nelson intended for the windward attack--that is, the advanced squadron was to be the real containing force, but he intended to assist it by himself making a feint on the enemy's van before delivering his true attack on the centre.[ ] from codrington's evidence it is at any rate clear that some time before the th nelson had told off an 'advanced squadron' as provided for in his memorandum, and that the ships that were forming the connection between the fleet and the frigates before cadiz formed part of it. now nelson had begun to tell off these ships as early as the th. on that day he wrote to captain duff, of the mars, 'i have to desire you will keep with the mars, defence and colossus from three to four leagues between the fleet and cadiz in order that i may get information from the frigates stationed off that port as expeditiously as possible.' on the th, writing to sir alexander ball at malta, he speaks of having 'an advanced squadron of fast sailing ships between me and the frigates.' the agamemnon ( ) was added on the th, the day after she joined. on that day nelson entered in his private diary, 'placed defence and agamemnon from seven to ten leagues west of cadiz, and mars and colossus four leagues east of the fleet,' &c,[ ] on the th he wrote to captain hope, of the defence: 'you will with the agamemnon take station west from cadiz from seven to ten leagues, by which means if the enemy should move i hope to have constant information, as two or three ships will be kept as at present between the fleet and your two ships.'[ ] on the th he writes to collingwood, of the belleisle, the fastest two-decker in the fleet, as though she too were an advanced ship, and on the morning of the th he tells him the leviathan was to relieve the defence, whose water had got low. later in the day, when mars and colossus had passed on the signal that the enemy was out, he ordered 'mars, orion, belleisle, leviathan, bellerophon and polyphemus to go ahead during the night.'[ ] on the eve of the battle therefore these six ships, with colossus and agamemnon, made up the squadron of eight specified on the memorandum. the conclusion then is that, though some of the ships destined to form the advanced squadron had not arrived by the th when the memorandum was issued, nelson had already taken steps to organise it, and that on the evening of the th, the first moment he had active contact with the enemy, it was detached from the fleet as a separate unit. up to this moment it would look as though he had intended to use it as his memorandum directed. since with the exception of the agamemnon and the leviathan, which had only temporarily replaced the defence while she watered, the whole of the ships named belonged to collingwood's division, the resulting organisation would have been, lee-line nine ships, weather-line eight ships, and eight for the advanced squadron--an organisation which in relative proportion was almost exactly that which he had explained to keats. it would therefore still have rendered nelson's original plan of attack possible, although it did not preserve the balance of the divisions prescribed in the memorandum. there can be little doubt, however, that nelson on the morning of the battle did abandon the idea of the advanced squadron altogether. early on the th it was broken up again. at o'clock in the morning of that day the captains of the mars, colossus and defence (which apparently was by this time ready again for service) were called on board the victory and ordered out to form a chain as before between the admiral and his frigates.[ ] the rest presumably resumed their stations in the fleet. even if he had not actually abandoned this part of his plan, it is clear that in his hurry to attack nelson would not spend time in reforming the squadron as a separate unit, but chose rather to carry out his design, so far as was possible, with two divisions only. so soon as he sighted the enemy's fleet at daylight on the st, he made the signal to form the line of battle in two columns, and with one exception the whole of the advanced ships took station in their respective divisions according to the original order of battle and sailing.'[ ] the exception was codrington's ship, the orion. no importance however need be attached to this, for although he was originally in collingwood's division he may well have been transferred to nelson's some time before. it is only worthy of remark because codrington, of all the advanced squadron captains, was the only one, so far as we know, who still considered the squadron a potential factor in the fleet and acted accordingly. while belleisle, mars, bellerophon and colossus rushed into the fight in the van of collingwood's line, orion in the rear of nelson's held her fire even when she got into action, and cruised about the _mêlée_, carefully seeking points where she could do most damage to an enemy, or best help an overmatched friend--well-judged piece of service, on which he dwells in his correspondence over and over again with pardonable complacency. he was thus able undoubtedly to do admirable service in the crisis of the action. that the bulk of his colleagues thought all idea of a reserve squadron had been abandoned by nelson is clear, and the resulting change was certainly great enough to explain why some of the captains thought the plan of the memorandum had been abandoned altogether. for not only was the attack made in two divisions instead of one, and in line ahead instead of line abreast, but its prescribed balance was entirely upset. instead of nelson having the larger portion of the fleet for containing the van and centre, collingwood had the larger portion for the attack on the rear. in other words, instead of the advanced squadron being under nelson's direction, the bulk of it was attached to collingwood. if some heads--even as clear as codrington's--were puzzled, it is little wonder. as to the way in which this impulsive change of plan was brought about, codrington says, 'they [the enemy] suddenly wore round so as to have cadiz under their lee, with every appearance of a determination to go into that port. lord nelson therefore took advantage of their confusion in wearing, and bore down to attack them with the fleet in two columns.' this was in the note dictated to lady bourchier, and in a letter of october , , to lord garlies he says, 'we all scrambled into battle as soon as we could.'[ ] codrington's allusion to nelson's alleged feint on the enemy's van brings us to the last point; the question, that is, as to whether, apart from the substitution of the perpendicular for the parallel attack, and in spite of the change of balance, the two lines were actually handled in the action according to the principles of the memorandum for the intended attack from to-windward. lady bourchier's note continues, after referring to nelson's intention to make a feint on the van, 'the victory did accordingly haul to port: and though she took in her larboard and weather studding sails, she kept her starboard studding sails set (notwithstanding they had become the lee ones and were shaking), thus proving that he proposed to resume his course, as those sails would be immediately wanted to get the victory into her former station.' the note in nicolas is to the same effect, but adds that codrington had no doubt that having taken in his weather studding sails he kept the lee ones 'set and shaking in order to make it clear to the fleet that his movement was merely a feint, and that the victory would speedily resume her course and fulfil his intention of cutting through the centre.' and in admiration of the movement codrington called his first lieutenant and said, 'how beautifully the admiral is carrying his design into effect!' though all this was written long after, when his memory perhaps was fading, it is confirmed by a contemporary entry in his log: 'the victory, after making a feint as of attacking the enemy's van, hauled to starboard so as to reach their centre.'[ ] this is all clear enough so far, but now we have to face a signal mentioned in the log of the euryalus which, as she was nelson's repeating frigate, cannot be ignored. according to this high authority nelson, about a quarter of an hour before making his immortal signal, telegraphed 'i intend to push or go through the end of the enemy's line to prevent them from getting into cadiz.' it is doubtful how far this signal was taken in, but those who saw it must have thought that nelson meant to execute howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's leading ships. at this time, according to the master of the victory, he was standing for the enemy's van. nelson also signalled to certain ships to keep away a point to port. the victory's log has this entry: 'at minutes past opened our fire on the enemy's van, in passing down their line.' at minutes past the victory got up with villeneuve's flagship and then broke through the line. now at first sight it might appear that nelson really intended to attack the van and not the centre, on the principle of hoste's old manoeuvre which howe had reintroduced into the signal book for attacking a numerically superior fleet--that is, van to van and rear to rear, leaving the enemy's centre unoccupied.[ ] for the old signal provided that when this was done 'the flag officers are, if circumstances permit, to engage the flag officers of the enemy,' which was exactly what nelson was doing. on this supposition his idea would be that his ships should attack the enemy ahead of villeneuve as they came up. and this his second, the téméraire, actually did. but, as we have seen by instruction xxiv. of , the old rule of had been altered, and if nelson intended to execute hoste's plan of attack he, as 'leading ship,' would or should have engaged the enemy's 'leading ship,' leaving the rest as they could to engage the enemy of 'greatest force.' the only explanation is that, if he really intended to attack the van, he again changed his mind when he fetched up with villeneuve, and could not resist engaging him. more probably, however, the signal was wrongly repeated by the euryalus, and as made by nelson it was really an intimation to collingwood that he meant to cover the attack on the rear and centre by a feint on the van.[ ] however this may be, the french appear to have regarded nelson's movement to port as a real attack. their best account (which is also perhaps the best account that exists) says that just before coming into gun-shot the two british columns began to separate. the leading vessels of nelson's column, it says, passed through the same interval astern of the bucentaure, and then it tells how 'les vaisseaux de queue de cette colonne, au contraire, serrèrent un peu le vent, comme pour s'approcher des vaisseaux de l'avant-garde de la flotte combinée: mais après avoir reçu quelques bordées de ces vaisseaux ils abandonnérent ce dessein et se portèrent vers les vaisseaux placés entre le redoutable et la santa anna ou vinrent unir leurs efforts à ceux des vaisseaux anglais qui combattaient déjà le bucentaure et la santísima trinidad.'[ ] this is to some extent confirmed by dumanoir himself, who commanded the allied van, in his official memorandum addressed to decrès, december , . in defending his failure to tack sooner to villeneuve's relief, he says, 'au commencement du combat, la colonne du nord [_i.e._ nelson's] se dirigea sur l'avant-garde qui engagea avec elle pendant quarante minutes.'[ ] in partial corroboration of this there is the statement in the log of the téméraire, the ship that was immediately behind nelson, that she opened her fire on the santísima trinidad and the two ships ahead of her; that is, she engaged the ships ahead of where nelson broke the line, so that captain harvey as well as dumanoir may have believed that nelson intended his real attack to be on 'the end of the line.' in the face of these facts it is impossible to say categorically that nelson intended nothing but a feint on the van. it is equally impossible to say he intended a real attack. the point perhaps can never be decided with absolute certainty, but it is this very uncertainty that brings out the true merit and the real lesson of nelson's attack. as we now may gather from his captains' opinions, its true merit was not that he threw his whole fleet on part of a superior enemy--that was a commonplace in tactics. it was not concentration on the rear, for that also was old; and what is more, as the attack was delivered, so far from nelson concentrating, he boldly, almost recklessly, exposed himself for a strategical object to what should have been an overwhelming concentration on the leading ships of his two columns. the true merit of it above all previous methods of concentration and containing was that, whether, as planned or as delivered, it prevented the enemy from knowing on which part of their line nelson intended to throw his squadron, just as we are prevented from knowing to this day. 'they won't know what i am about' were his words to keats. the point is clearer still when we compare the different ways in which nelson and collingwood brought their respective columns into action. collingwood in his journal says that shortly before o'clock, that is, an hour before getting into action, he signalled 'for the lee division to form the larboard line of bearing.' the effect and intention of this would be that each ship in his division would head on the shortest course to break the enemy's line in all parts. it was the necessary signal for enabling him to carry out regularly howe's manoeuvre upon the enemy's rear, and his object was declared for all to see.[ ] nelson, on the other hand, made no such signal, but held on in line ahead, giving no indication of whether he intended to perform the manoeuvre on the van or the centre, or whether he meant to cut the line in line ahead. until they knew which it was to be, it was impossible for the enemy to take any step to concentrate with either division, and thus nelson held them both immobile while collingwood flung himself on his declared objective. nothing could be finer as a piece of subtle tactics. nothing could be more daring as a well-judged risk. the risk was indeed enormous, perhaps the greatest ever taken at sea. hawke risked much at quiberon, and much was risked at the nile. but both were sea-risks of the class to which our seamen were enured. at trafalgar it was a pure battle-risk--a mad, perpendicular attack in which every recognised tactical card was in the enemy's hand. but nelson's judgment was right. he knew his opponent's lack of decision, he knew the individual shortcomings of the allied ships, and he knew he had only to throw dust, as he did, in their eyes for the wild scheme to succeed. as jurien de la gravière has most wisely said 'le génie de nelson c'est d'avoir compris notre faiblesse.' yet when all is said, when even full weight is given to the strategical pressure of the hour and the uncertainty of the weather, there still remains the unanswerable criticism of the officer of the conqueror: that by an error of judgment nelson spoilt his attack by unnecessary haste. the moral advantage of pushing home a bold attack before an enemy is formed is of course very great; but in this case the enemy had no intention of avoiding him, as they showed, and he acknowledged, when they boldly lay-to to accept action. the confusion of their line was tactically no weakness: it only resulted in a duplication which was so nicely adapted for meeting howe's manoeuvre that there was a widespread belief in the british fleet, which collingwood himself shared, that villeneuve had adopted it deliberately.[ ] seeing what the enemy's accidental formation was, every ship that pierced it must be almost inevitably doubled or trebled on. it was, we know, the old dutch manner of meeting the english method of attack in the earliest days of the line.[ ] had he given villeneuve time for forming his line properly the enemy's battle order would have been only the weaker. had he taken time to form his own order the mass of the attack would have been delivered little later than it was, its impact would have been intensified, and the victory might well have been even more decisive than it was, while the sacrifice it cost would certainly have been less, incalculably less, if we think that the sacrifice included nelson himself. footnotes: [ ] _nelson's letters and despatches_, p. . [ ] nicolas, _nelson's despatches_, v. , note. it is also given in vol. vii. p. ccxvi, apparently from a captain's copy which is undated. [ ] _ibid._ v. . [ ] professor laughton pointed out (_op. cit._) that the conditions will fit june to august , but that it might have been 'earlier, certainly not later.' [ ] it is very doubtful whether this formation was ever intended for anything but tactical exercises. morogues has a similar signal and instruction (_tactique navale_, p. , ed. ), 'partager l'armée en deux corps, ou mettre l'armée sur deux colonnes; et représentation d'un combat.' anson certainly used it for manoeuvring one half of his fleet against the other during his tactical exercises in . warren to anson, _add. mss._ , p. . [ ] mathieu-dumas, _précis des evénements militaires_, xiii. . [ ] captain boswall, in the preface to his translation of hoste, says grenier's work was translated in . if this was so nelson may well have read it, but i have not been able to find a copy of the translation either in the british museum or elsewhere. [ ] ross, _memoir of saumarez_, i. . [ ] laughton, _nelson's letters and despatches_, . [ ] no. as it stood in the signal book meant, ships before in tow to proceed to port. no. . when at anchor to veer to twice the length of cable. no. . secret instructions to be opened. [ ] it was in the handwriting, nicolas says, of edward hawke locker, esq., the naval biographer and originator of the naval picture gallery at greenwich. he endorsed it, 'copy of a paper communicated to me by sir richard keats, and allowed by him to be transcribed by me, st october, .' [ ] it was certainly not keats himself, though afterwards nelson meant to offer him command of the squadron he intended to detach into the mediterranean. in the expected battle keats, had he arrived in time, was to have been nelson's 'second' in the line. _nelson to sir alexander ball_, october , . [ ] _nelson's despatches_, vii. , note. [ ] nelson's 'advance squadron' must not be confused with the idea of a reserve squadron which gravina pressed on villeneuve at the famous cadiz council of war before trafalgar. gravina's idea was nothing but the old one of a reserve of superfluous ships after equalising the line, as provided by the old english fighting instructions and recommended by morogues. [ ] sidney, _life of lord hill_, p. . [ ] clarke and mcarthur say the letter was to lady hamilton. nicolas, reprinting from the _naval chronicle_, has the addressee's name blank. [ ] nelson to captain duff, october . the order to take her under his command was despatched on september . same to marsden, october . [ ] same to lord barham, september . [ ] see the note on trafalgar dictated by him in _memoirs of sir edward codrington_, edited by lady bourchier, . [ ] _on the principles of naval tactics_, . [ ] _great sea fights_, ii. , note. [ ] see _post_, p. appendix, where this interesting paper is set out in full. [ ] _life of codrington_, ii. - . [ ] it should be noted that the memorandum only enjoins this for an attack from to-leeward, and not for the 'intended attack' from to-windward. [ ] see _nelson's despatches_, vii. ; _life of codrington_, ii. . [ ] nicolas, vii. . before this mars and colossus had had the inside station. see nelson to collingwood, october . [ ] _ibid._, vii. . [ ] nicolas, vii. , , . [ ] memorandum and private diary, nicolas, pp. - . [ ] some doubt has been expressed as to the signals with which nelson opened at daybreak on the st. but their actual numbers are recorded in the logs of the mars, defiance, conqueror and bellerophon, and all but the first in the log of the euryalus repeating frigate. they were no. : 'to form order of sailing in two columns or divisions of the fleet,' which, by the memorandum was also to be the order of battle; no. , with compass signal ene, 'when lying by or sailing by the wind to bear up and sail large on the course pointed out'; no. , prepare for battle. collingwood has in his journal: 'at . the commander-in-chief made the signal to form order of sailing in two columns, and at . to prepare for battle. at . to bear up east.' [ ] _life of codrington_, ii. , . [ ] _great sea fights_, ii. . [ ] a veteran french officer of the old wars took this view of nelson's threat in a study of the battle which he wrote. 'nelson,' he says, 'a d'abord feint de vouloir attaquer la tête et la queue de l'armée. ensuite il a rassemblé ses forces sur son centre, et a abandonné le sort de la bataille à l'intelligence de ses capitaines.' mathieu-dumas, _précis des evénements militaires_, xiv. . [ ] the only trace of notice having been taken by anyone of a signal from nelson at the time stated was collingwood's impatient remark when nelson began to telegraph 'england expects,' &c. 'i wish nelson would stop signalling,' he is reported to have said. 'we all know well enough what we have to do,' as though nelson had been signalling something just before. [ ] _monuments des victoires et conguêtes des français_ from nicolas, vii. . it was also adopted by mathieu-dumas (_op. cit._ xiii. p. ) as the best and most impartial account. he says it was written by a french naval officer called parisot. [ ] jurien de la gravière, _guerres maritimes_, ii. , note. [ ] this highly important signal appears to have been generally overlooked in accounts of the action. yet collingwood's journal is so precise about signals that there can be no doubt he made it. agamemnon in nelson's column answered it under the impression it was general. her log says, 'answered signal no. '--that is, 'to keep on the larboard line of bearing though then on the starboard tack. ditto starboard bearing if on larboard tack.' captain moorsom also says, 'my station was sixth ship in the rear of the lee column; but as the revenge sailed well admiral collingwood made my signal to keep a line of bearing from him which made me one of the leading ships through the enemy's line.' no other ship records the signal. probably few saw it, for in the memorandum which collingwood issued two years later he lays stress on the importance of captains being particularly watchful for the signals of their divisional commander. see _post_, pp. and . [ ] collingwood to marsden, october . same to parker, november . same to pasley, december , . [ ] see _supra_, p. . villeneuve saw this. in his official despatch from the euryalus, november , he says 'notre formation s'effectuait avec beaucoup de peine; mais dans le genre d'attaque que je prévoyais que l'ennemi allait nous faire, cette irrégularité même dans notre ligne ne me paraissait pas un inconvénient.'--jurien de la gravière, _guerres maritimes_, ii. . _lord nelson_, . [+clarke and mcarthur, life of nelson, ii. +.[ ]] _plan of attack_. the business of a commander-in-chief being first to bring an enemy's fleet to battle on the most advantageous terms to himself (i mean that of laying his ships close on board the enemy, as expeditiously as possible, and secondly, to continue them there without separating until the business is decided), i am sensible beyond this object it is not necessary that i should say a word, being fully assured that the admirals and captains of the fleet i have the honour to command will, knowing my precise object, that of a close and decisive battle, supply any deficiency in my not making signals, which may, if extended beyond those objects, either be misunderstood, or if waited for very probably from various causes be impossible for the commander-in-chief to make. therefore it will only be requisite for me to state in as few words as possible the various modes in which it may be necessary for me to obtain my object; on which depends not only the honour and glory of our country, but possibly its safety, and with it that of all europe, from french tyranny and oppression. if the two fleets are both willing to fight, but little manoeuvring is necessary, the less the better. a day is soon lost in that business. therefore i will only suppose that the enemy's fleet being to leeward standing close upon a wind, and that i am nearly ahead of them standing on the larboard tack. of course i should, weather them. the weather must be supposed to be moderate; for if it be a gale of wind the manoeuvring of both fleets is but of little avail, and probably no decisive action would take place with the whole fleet.[ ] two modes present themselves: one to stand on just out of gun-shot, until the van ship of my line would be about the centre ship of the enemy; then make the signal to wear together; then bear up [and] engage with all our force the six or five van ships of the enemy, passing, certainly if opportunity offered, through their line. this would prevent their bearing up, and the action, from the known bravery and conduct of the admirals and captains, would certainly be decisive. the second or third rear ships of the enemy would act as they please, and our ships would give a good account of them, should they persist in mixing with our ships. the other mode would be to stand under an easy but commanding sail directly for their headmost ship, so as to prevent the enemy from knowing whether i should pass to leeward or to windward of him. in that situation i would make the signal to engage the enemy to leeward, and cut through their fleet about the sixth ship from the van, passing very close. they being on a wind and you going large could cut their line when you please. the van ships of the enemy would, by the time our rear came abreast of the van ship, be severely cut up, and our van could not expect to escape damage. i would then have our _rear_ ship and every ship in succession wear [and] continue the action with either the van ship or the second as it might appear most eligible from her crippled state; and this mode pursued i see nothing to prevent the capture of the five or six ships of the enemy's van. the two or three ships of the enemy's rear must either bear up or wear; and in either case, although they would be in a better plight probably than our two van ships (now the rear), yet they would be separated and at a distance to leeward, so as to give our ships time to refit. and by that time i believe the battle would, from the judgment of the admiral and captains, be over with the rest of them. signals from these moments are useless when every man is disposed to do his duty. the great object is for us to support each other, and to keep close to the enemy and to leeward of him. if the enemy are running away, then the only signals necessary will be to engage the enemy on arriving up with them; and the other ships to pass on for the second, third, &c., giving if possible a close fire into the enemy on passing, taking care to give our ships engaged notice of your intention. footnotes: [ ] from the original in the st. vincent papers. also in nicolas, _despatches and letters_, vi. . obvious mistakes in punctuation have been corrected in the text. [ ] _cf._ the similar remark of de chaves, _supra_, p. . _lord nelson_, . [+nicolas, despatches and letters, vii.+[ ]] _memorandum_. _secret_. victory, off cadiz, th october, . thinking it almost impossible to bring a fleet of forty sail of the line into line of battle in variable winds, thick weather, and other circumstances which must occur, without such a loss of time that the opportunity would probably be lost of bringing the enemy to battle in such a manner as to make the business decisive; i have therefore made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing (with the exception of the first and second in command), that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle; placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advance squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-decked ships, _which_ will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct. the second in command will,[ ] after _my_ intentions are made known to him, have the entire direction of his line; to make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed. if the enemy's fleet should be seen to windward in line of battle, and that the two lines and the advanced squadron can fetch them,[ ] they will probably be so extended that their van could not succour their rear. i should therefore probably make the second in command's[ ] signal, to lead through about the twelfth ship from the rear (or wherever he[ ] could fetch, if not able to get as far advanced). my line would lead through about their centre; and the advanced squadron to cut two, three, or four ships ahead of their centre, so far as to ensure getting at their commander-in-chief on whom every effort must be made to capture. the whole impression of the british fleet must be to overpower from two to three ships ahead of their commander-in-chief, supposed to be in the centre, to the rear of their fleet. i will suppose twenty sail of the enemy's line to be untouched; it must be some time before they could perform a manoeuvre to bring their force compact to attack any part of the british fleet engaged, or to succour their own ships; which indeed would be impossible, without mixing with the ships engaged.[ ] something must be left to chance; nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others. shots will carry away the masts[ ] and yards of friends as well as foes; but i look with confidence to a victory before the van of the enemy could succour their rear;[ ] and then the british fleet would most of them be ready to receive their twenty sail of the line, or to pursue them, should they endeavour to make off. if the van of the enemy tacks, the captured ships must run to leeward of the british fleet; if the enemy wears, the british must place themselves between the enemy and the captured and disabled british ships; and should the enemy close, i have no fears as to the result. the second in command will, in all possible things, direct the movements of his line, by keeping them as compact as the nature of the circumstances will admit. captains are to look to their particular line as their rallying point. but in case signals can neither be seen nor perfectly understood, no captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of an enemy. of the intended attack from to-windward, the enemy in the line of battle ready to attack. [illustration][ ] the divisions of the british fleet[ ] will be brought nearly within gunshot of the enemy's centre. the signal will most probably be made for the lee line to bear up together, to set all their sails, even steering sails[ ] in order to get as quickly as possible to the enemy's line and to cut through, beginning from the twelfth ship from the enemy's rear.[ ] some ships may not get through their exact place; but they will always be at hand to assist their friends; and if any are thrown round the rear of the enemy, they will effectually complete the business of twelve sail of the enemy.[ ] should the enemy wear together, or bear up and sail large, still the twelve ships, composing in the first position the enemy's rear, are to be _the_ object of attack of the lee line, unless otherwise directed by the commander-in-chief; which is scarcely to be expected, as the entire management of the lee line, after the intention of the commander-in-chief is signified, is intended to be left to the judgment of the admiral commanding that line. the remainder of the enemy's fleet, thirty-four sail, are to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief, who will endeavour to take care that the movements of the second in command are as little interrupted as possible. footnotes: [ ] sir harris nicolas states that he took his text from an 'autograph [he means holograph] draught in the possession of vice-admiral sir george mundy, k.c.b., except the words in italics which were added by mr. scott, lord nelson's secretary: and from the original issued to captain hope of the defence, now in possession of his son, captain hope, r.n.' [ ] lord nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'in fact command his line and.'--nicolas. [ ] lord nelson originally wrote here but deleted 'i shall suppose them forty-six sail in the line of battle.'--nicolas. [ ] originally 'your' but deleted.--_ibid_. [ ] originally 'you' but deleted.--_ibid_. [ ] in the upper margin of the paper lord nelson wrote and mr. scott added to it a reference, as marked in the text--'the enemy's fleet is supposed to consist of sail of the line, british fleet . if either be less, only a proportionate number of enemy's ships are to be cut off: b. to be / superior to the e. cut off.--_ibid_. [ ] the barham copy reads 'a mast.' [ ] originally 'friends.'--nicolas. [ ] this is the only diagram found in either of nelson's memoranda. it is not in the barham copy. [ ] nelson presumably means the two main divisions as distinguished from the 'advanced squadron.' this distinction is general in the correspondence of his officers and accords with the arrangement as shown in the diagram. the barham copy has 'division' in the singular, as though nelson intended to specify one division only. it is probably a copyist's error. [ ] in the upper margin of the paper, and referred to by lord nelson as in the text 'vide instructions for signal yellow with blue fly. page , eighth flag, signal book, with reference to appendix.'--nicolas. steering-sail, according to admiral smyth (_sailors' word-book_, p. ), was 'an incorrect name for a studding sail,' but it seems to have been in common use in nelson's time. [ ] the barham copy reads 'their rear.' [ ] the barham copy ends here. the second sheet has not been found. nelson and bront�.[ ] instructions after trafalgar introductory the various tactical memoranda issued after trafalgar by flag officers in command of fleets are amongst the most interesting of the whole series. the unsettled state of opinion which they display as the result of nelson's memorandum is very remarkable; for with one exception they seem to show that the great tactical principles it contained had been generally misunderstood to a surprising extent. the failure to fathom its meaning is to be accounted for largely by the lack of theoretical training, which made the science of tactics, as distinguished from its practice, a sealed book to the majority of british officers. but the trouble was certainly intensified by the fact--as contemporary naval literature shows--that by nelson's success and death the memorandum became consecrated into a kind of sacred document, which it was almost sacrilege to discuss. the violent polemics of such men as james, the naval chronicler, made it appear profanity so much as to consider whether nelson's attack differed in the least from his intended plan, and anyone who ventured to examine the question in the light of general principles was likely to be shouted down as a presumptuous heretic. venial as was this attitude of adulation under all the circumstances, it had a most evil influence on the service. the last word seemed to have been said on tactics; and oblivious of the fact that it is a subject on which the last word can never be spoken, and that the enemy was certain to learn from nelson's practice as well as ourselves, admirals were content to produce a colourable imitation of his memorandum, and everyone was satisfied not to look ahead any further. to no one did it occur to consider how the new method of attack was to be applied if the enemy adopted nelson's formation. they simply assumed an endless succession of trafalgars. the first outcome of this attitude of mind is an 'order of battle and sailing,' accompanied by certain instructions, issued by admiral gambier from the prince of wales in yarmouth roads, on july , , when he was about to sail to seize the danish fleet.[ ] his force consisted of thirty of the line, and its organisation and stations of flag officers were as follows: van squadron division . commodore hood (no. in line). division . vice-admiral stanhope (no. ). centre division division .} admiral gambier (no. ). division .} rear squadron division . rear-admiral essington (no. ). division . commodore keats (no. ). gambier's fleet was thus organised in three equal squadrons (the centre one called 'the centre division') and six equal subdivisions. the commander-in-chief was in the centre and had no other flag in his division, similarly each junior flag officer was in the centre of his squadron and led his subdivision, but he had a commodore to lead his other subdivision. these two commodores also led the fleet on either tack. so far all is plain, but when we endeavour to understand by the appended instruction what battle formation gambier intended by his elaborate organisation it is very baffling. possibly we have not got the instruction exactly as gambier wrote it; but as it stands it is confused past all understanding, and no conceivable battle formation can be constructed from it. all we can say for certain is that he evidently believed he was adopting the principles of trafalgar, and perhaps going beyond them. the sailing order is to be also the battle order, but whether in two columns or three is not clear. independent control of divisions and squadrons is also there, and even the commodores are to control their own subdivisions 'subject to the general direction' of their squadronal commanders, but whether the formation was intended to follow that of nelson the instruction entirely fails to disclose. the next is a tactical memorandum or general order, issued by lord collingwood for the mediterranean fleet in , printed in mr. newnham collingwood's _correspondence of lord collingwood_. no order of battle is given; but two years later, in issuing an additional instruction, he refers to his general order as still in force. in this case we have the battle order, and it consists of twenty of the line in two equal columns, with the commander-in-chief and his second in command, second in their respective divisions. there were no other flag officers in the fleet.[ ] the memorandum which is printed below will be seen to be an obvious imitation of nelson's, and nothing can impress us more deeply with the merit of nelson's work than to compare it with collingwood's. like nelson, collingwood begins with introductory remarks emphasising the importance of 'a prompt and immediate attack' and independent divisional control; and in order to remedy certain errors of trafalgar, he insists in addition on close order being kept throughout the night and the strictest attention being paid to divisional signals, thinking no doubt how slowly the rear ships at trafalgar had struggled into action, and how his signal for line of bearing had been practically ignored. then, after stating broadly that he means with the van or weather division to attack the van of the enemy, while the lee or larboard division simultaneously attacks the rear, he differentiates like nelson between a weather and a lee attack. for the attack from to-windward he directs the two divisions to run down in line abreast in such a way that they will come into action together in a line parallel to the enemy; but, whatever he intended, nothing is said about concentrating on any part of the enemy, or about breaking the line in all parts or otherwise. the attack from to-leeward is to be made perpendicularly in line ahead. in this formation his own (the weather column) is to break the line, so as to cut off the van quarter of the enemy's line from the other three quarters, and the lee column is to sever this part of the enemy's line a few ships in rear of their centre. so soon as the leading ships have passed through and so weathered the enemy, they are to keep away and lead down his line so as to engage the rear three fourths to windward. this is of course practically identical with the lee attack of nelson's memorandum. the only addition is the course that is to be taken after breaking the line. one cannot help wondering how far the leading ships after passing the line would have been able to lead down it before they were disabled, but the addition is interesting as the first known direction as to what was to be done after breaking the line in line ahead after rodney's method. seeing the grave and obvious dangers of the movement it is natural that, like nelson, collingwood hoped not to be forced to make it; what he desired was a simple engagement on similar tacks. his 'intended attack' as in nelson's case is clearly that from to-windward. turning then again to the windward attack, we see at once its superficial resemblance to nelson's, but so entirely superficial is it that it is impossible to believe collingwood ever penetrated the subtleties of his great chiefs design. the dual organisation is there and the independent divisional control, but nothing else. the advance squadron has gone, and with it all trace of a containing movement. there is not even the feint--the mystification of the van. concentration too has gone, and instead of the sound main attack on the rear, he is most concerned with attacking the van. true, he may have meant what nelson meant, but if he had really grasped his fine intention he surely must have let some hint of it escape him in his memorandum. but for the windward attack at least there is no trace of these things, and nelson's masterly conception sinks in collingwood's hands into a mere device for expediting the old parallel attack in single line--that is to say, the line is to be formed in bearing down instead of waiting to bear down till the line was complete. we can only conclude, then, that both collingwood and gambier could see nothing in the 'nelson touch' but the swift attack, the dual organisation, and independent divisional control. there is a third document, however, which confirms us in the impression already formed that there were officers who saw more deeply. it is a tactical memorandum issued by admiral the hon. sir alexander forrester inglis cochrane, bart., g.c.b., uncle of the more famous earl of dundonald. it is printed by sir charles ekin, in his _naval battles_, from a paper which he found at the end of a book in his possession containing 'additional signals, instructions, &c.,' issued by sir a.i. cochrane to the squadron under his command upon the leeward islands station.' he commanded in chief on this station from to , but appears never to have been directly under nelson's influence except for a few weeks, when nelson came out in pursuit of villeneuve and attached him to his squadron. he was rather one of rodney's men, under whom he had served in his last campaigns, and this may explain the special note of his tactical system. his partiality for rodney's manoeuvre is obvious, and the interesting feature of his plan of attack is the manner in which he grafts it on nelson's system of mutually supporting squadrons. he does not even shrink from a very free use of doubling which his old chiefs system entailed, and he provides a special signal of his own for directing the execution of the discarded manoeuvre. the 'explanation' of another of his new signals for running aboard an enemy 'so as to disable her from getting away' is also worthy of remark, as a recognition of nelson's favourite practice disapproved by collingwood. yet, although we see throughout the marks of the true 'nelson touch,' cochrane's memorandum bears signs of having been largely founded on an independent study of tactical theory. his obligations to clerk of eldin are obvious. there are passages in the document which seem as though they must have been written with the _essay on naval tactics_ at his elbow, while his expression 'an attack by forcing the fleet from to-leeward' is directly borrowed from morogues' 'forcer l'ennemi au combat elant sous le vent.' on the other hand certain movements are entirely his own, such as his excellent device of inverting the line after passing through the enemy's fleet, a great improvement on collingwood's method of leading down it in normal order. the point is of some interest, for although cochrane's memorandum is over-elaborate and smells of the lamp, yet it seems clear that his theoretical knowledge made him understand nelson's principles far better than most of the men who had actually fought at trafalgar and had had the advantage of nelson's own explanations. all indeed that cochrane's memorandum seems to lack is that rare simplicity and abstraction which only the highest genius can achieve. footnotes: [ ] the signature does not occur to the draught but was affixed to the originals issued to the admirals and captains of the fleet. to the copy signed by lord nelson, and delivered to captain george hope, of the defence, was added: 'n.b.--when the defence quits the fleet for england you are to return this secret memorandum to the victory' captain hope wrote on that paper: 'it was agreeable to these instructions that lord nelson attacked the combined fleets of france and spain off cape trafalgar on the st of october, , they having thirty-three of the line and we twenty-seven,'--nicolas. the injunction to return the memorandum may well have been added to all copies issued, and this may account for their general disappearance. [ ] for this document the society is indebted to commander g.p.w. hope, r.n., who has kindly placed it at my disposal. [ ] for this document the society is again indebted to commander hope, r.n. _admiral gambier_, . [+ms. of commander hope, r.n. copy+.] _order of battle and sailing_.[ ] the respective flag officers will have the immediate direction of the division in which their ships are placed, subject to the general direction of the admiral commanding the squadron to which they belong. the ships in order of battle and sailing are to keep at the distance of two cables' length from and in the wake of each other, increasing that distance according to the state of the weather.[ ] the leading ship of the starboard division is to keep the admiral two points on her weather bow. the leading ship of the lee division is when sailing on a wind to keep the leader of the weather column two points before her beam; when sailing large, abreast of her. (signed) j. gambier. prince of wales, yarmouth roads: july, . footnotes: [ ] for the actual order to which the instructions are appended see introductory note, _supra_, p. . [ ] the normal distance was then a cable and a half. see _post_, p. note. _lord collingwood_, - . [+correspondence of collingwood, p. +.] from every account received of the enemy it is expected they may very soon be met with on their way from corfu and tarentum, and success depends on a prompt and immediate attack upon them. in order to which it will be necessary that the greatest care be taken to keep the closest order in the respective columns during the night which the state of the weather will allow, and that the columns be kept at such a sufficient distance apart as will leave room for tacking or other movements, so that in the event of calm or shift of wind no embarrassment may be caused. should the enemy be found formed in order of battle with his whole force, i shall notwithstanding probably not make the signal to form the line of battle; but, keeping in the closest order, with the van squadron attack the van of the enemy, while the commander of the lee division takes the proper measures, and makes to the ships of his division the necessary signals for commencing the action with the enemy's rear, as nearly as possible at the same time that the van begins. of his signals therefore the captains of that division will be particularly watchful. if the squadron has to run to leeward to close with the enemy, the signal will be made to alter the course together, the van division keeping a point or two more away than the lee, the latter carrying less sail; and when the fleet draws near the enemy both columns are to preserve a line as nearly parallel to the hostile fleet as they can. in standing up to the enemy from the leeward upon a contrary tack the lee line is to press sail, so that the leading ship of that line may be two or three points before the beam of the leading ship of the weather line, which will bring them to action nearly at the same period. the leading ship of the weather column will endeavour to pass through the enemy's line, should the weather be such as to make that practicable, at one fourth from the van, whatever number of ships their line may be composed of. the lee division will pass through at a ship or two astern of their centre, and whenever a ship has weathered the enemy it will be found necessary to shorten sail as much as possible for her second astern to close with her, and to keep away, steering in a line parallel to the enemy's and engaging them on their weather side. a movement of this kind may be necessary, but, considering the difficulty of altering the position of the fleet during the time of combat, every endeavour will be made to commence battle with the enemy on the same tack they are; and i have only to recommend and direct that they be fought with at the nearest distance possible, in which getting on board of them may be avoided, which is alway disadvantageous to us, except when they are flying.[ ] _additional instruction_.[ ] when the signal no. or [ ] is made to form the order, the fleet is to form in one line, the rear shortening sail to allow the van to take their station ahead. if such signal should not be made the captains are referred to the general order of march, . collingwood. ville de paris, th january, . footnotes: [ ] the remaining clauses of the memorandum do not relate to tactics. [ ] from the original in the possession of commander hope, r.n. it is attached to an order of battle in two columns. see _supra_, p. . [ ] sig. : 'form line of battle in open order.' sig. : 'form line of battle in close order at about a cable and a half distant'; with a white pennant, 'form on weather column'; with a blue pennant, 'form on lee column.' _sir alexander cochrane_, - . [+printed in skin's naval battles, pp. seq. (first edit.)+] _modes of attack from the windward, &c._ when an attack is intended to be made upon the enemy's rear, so as to endeavour to cut off a certain number of ships from that part of their fleet, the same will be made known by signal no. , and the numeral signal which accompanies it will point out the headmost of the enemy's ships that is to be attacked, counting always from the van, as stated in page , article (instructions).[ ] the signal will afterwards be made for the division intended to make the attack, or the same will be signified by the ship's pennants, and the pennants of the ship in that division which is to begin the attack, with the number of the ship to be first attacked in the enemy's line. should it be intended that the leading ship in the division is to attack the rear ship of the enemy, she must bear up, so as to get upon the weather quarter of that ship; the ships following her in the line will pass in succession on her weather quarter, giving their fire to the ship she is engaged with; and so on in succession until they have closed with the headmost ship intended to be attacked. the ships in reserve, who have no opponents, will break through the enemy's line ahead of this ship, so as to cut off the ships engaged from the rest of the enemy's fleet. when it is intended that the rear ship of the division shall attack the rear ship of the enemy's line, that ship's pennants will be shown; the rest of the ships in the division will invert their order, shortening sail until they can in succession follow the rear ship, giving their fire to the enemy's ships in like manner as above stated; and the reserve ships will cut through the enemy's line as already mentioned. when this mode of attack is intended to be put in force, the other divisions of the fleet, whether in order of sailing or battle, will keep to windward just out of gun-shot, so as to be ready to support the rear, and prevent the van and centre of the enemy from doubling upon them. this manoeuvre, if properly executed, may force the enemy to abandon the ships on his rear, or submit to be brought to action on equal terms, which is difficult to be obtained when the attack is made from to-windward. when the fleet is to leeward, and the commanding officer intends to cut through the enemy's line, the number of the ship in their line where the attempt is to be made will be shown as already stated. if the ships after passing the enemy's line are to tack, and double upon the enemy's ships ahead, the same will be made known by a blue pennant over the signal ; if not they are to bear up and run to the enemy's line to windward, engaging the ship they first meet with; each succeeding ship giving her fire, and passing on to the next in the rear. the ships destined to attack the enemy's rear will be pointed out by the number of the last ship in the line that is to make this movement, or the pennants of that ship will be shown; but, should no signal be made, it is to be understood that the number of ships to bear up is equal in number to the enemy's ships that have been cut off; the succeeding ships will attack and pursue the van of the enemy, or form, should it be necessary to prevent the enemy's van from passing round the rear of the fleet to relieve or join their cut-off ships. if it is intended that the ships following those destined to engage the enemy's rear to windward shall bear up, and prevent the part of their rear which has been cut off from escaping to leeward, the same will be made known by a red pennant being hoisted over the signal ,[ ] and the number of ships so ordered will be shown by numeral signals or pennants. if from the centre division, a white pennant will be hoisted over the signal. if the rear ships are to perform this service by bearing up, the same will be made known by a red pennant under. the numeral signal or pennants, counting always from the van, will show the headmost ship to proceed on this service.[ ] the ships not directed by those signals are to form in close order, to cover the ships engaged from the rest of the enemy's fleet. when the enemy's ships are to be engaged by both van and centre, the rear will keep their wind, to cover the ships engaged from the enemy to windward, as circumstances may require. when the signal shall be made to cut through the enemy's van from to-leeward, the same will be made known by signal , &c. in this case, if the headmost ships are to tack and double upon the enemy's van, engaging their ships in succession as they get up, the blue pennant will be shown as already stated, and the numeral signal pointing out the last ship from the van which is to tack, which in general will be equal in number to the enemy's ships cut through. the rest of the ships will be prepared to act as the occasion may require, either by bearing up and attacking the enemy's centre and rear, or tacking or wearing to cut off the van of the enemy from passing round the rear of the fleet to rejoin their centre. and on this service, it is probable, should the enemy's ships bear up, that some of the rear ships will be employed--the signal no. will be made accompanied with the number or pennants of the headmost ship--upon which she, with the ships in her rear, will proceed to the attack of the enemy. when an attack is likely to be made by an enemy's squadron, by forcing the fleet from to-leeward, signal will be made with a blue pennant where best seen;[ ] upon which each ship will luff up upon the weather quarter of her second ahead, so as to leave no opening for the leading ship of the enemy to pass through: this movement will expose them to the collected fire of all that part of the fleet they intended to force.[ ] it has been often remarked that nelson founded no school of tactics, and the instructions which were issued with the new signal book immediately after the war entirely endorse the remark. they can be called nothing else but reactionary. nelson's drastic attempt to break up the old rigid formation into active divisions independently commanded seems to have come to nothing, and the new instructions are based with almost all the old pedantry on the single line of battle. of anything like mutually supporting movements there is only a single trace. it is in article xiv., and that is only a resurrection of the time-honoured _corps de réserve_, formed of superfluous ships after your line has been equalised with that of a numerically inferior enemy. the whole document, in fact, is a consecration of the fetters which had been forged in the worst days of the seventeenth century, and which nelson had so resolutely set himself to break. the new signal book in which the instructions appear was founded on the code elaborated by sir home riggs popham, but there is nothing to show whether or not he was the author of the instructions. he was an officer of high scientific attainments, but although he had won considerable distinction during the war, his service had been entirely of an amphibious character in connection with military operations ashore, and he had never seen a fleet action at sea. he reached flag rank in , and was one of the men who received a k.c.b. on the reconstitution of the order in . of the naval lords serving with lord melville at the time none can show a career or a reputation which would lead us to expect from them anything but the colourless instructions they produced. the controlling influence was undoubtedly lord keith. the doyen of the active list, and in command of the channel fleet till he retired after the peace of , he was all-powerful as a naval authority, and his flag captain, sir graham moore, had just been given a seat on the board. a devout pupil of st. vincent and howe, correct rather than brilliant, keith represented the old tradition, and notwithstanding the patience with which he had borne nelson's vagaries and insubordination, the antipathy between the two men was never disguised. however generously keith appreciated nelson's genius, he can only have regarded his methods as an evil influence in the service for ordinary men, nor can there be much doubt that his apprehensions had a good deal to justify them. the general failure to grasp the whole of nelson's tactical principles was not the only trouble. there are signs that during the later years of the war a very dangerous misunderstanding of his teaching had been growing up in the service. in days when there was practically no higher instruction in the theory of tactics, it was easy for officers to forget how much prolonged and patient study had enabled nelson to handle his fleets with the freedom he did; and the tendency was to believe that his successes could be indefinitely repeated by mere daring and vehemence of attack. the seed was sown immediately after the battle and by collingwood himself. 'it was a severe action,' he wrote to admiral parker on november , 'no dodging or manoeuvring.' and again on december , to admiral pasley, 'lord nelson determined to substitute for exact order an impetuous attack in two distinct bodies.' collingwood of course with all his limitations knew well enough it was not a mere absence of manoeuvring that had won the victory. in the same letter he had said that although nelson succeeded, as it were, by enchantment, it was all the effect of system and nice combination.' yet such phrases as he and others employed to describe the headlong attack, taken from their context and repeated from mouth to mouth, would soon have raised a false impression that many men were only too ready to receive. so the seed must have grown, till we find the fruit in lord dundonald's oft-quoted phrase, 'never mind manoeuvres: always go at them.' so it was that nelson's teaching had crystallised in his mind and in the mind perhaps of half the service. the phrase is obviously a degradation of the opening enunciations in nelson's memoranda, a degradation due to time, to superficial study, and the contemptuous confidence of years of undisputed mastery at sea. the conditions which brought about this attitude to tactics are clearly seen in the way others saw us. shortly after trafalgar a veteran french officer of the war of american independence wrote some _reflections_ on the battle, which contain much to the point. 'it is a noteworthy thing,' he says in dealing with the defects of the single-line formation, 'that the english, who formerly used to employ all the resources of tactics against our fleets, now hardly use them at all, since our scientific tacticians have disappeared. it may almost be said that they no longer have any regular order of sailing or battle: they attack our ships of the line just as they used to attack a convoy.'[ ] but here the old tactician was not holding up english methods as an example. he was citing them to show to what easy victories a navy exposed itself in which, by neglect of scientific study and alert observation, tactics had sunk into a mere senile formula. 'they know,' he continues, 'that we are in no state to oppose them with well-combined movements so as to profit by the kind of disorder which is the natural result of this kind of attack. they know if they throw their attack on one part of a much extended line, that part is soon destroyed.' thus he arrives at two fundamental laws: ' . that our system of a long line of battle is worthless in face of an enemy who attacks with his ships formed in groups (_réunis en pelotons_), and told off to engage a small number of ships at different points in our line. . that the only tactical system to oppose to theirs is to have at least a double line, with reserve squadrons on the wings stationed in such a manner as to bear down most easily upon the points too vigorously attacked.' the whole of his far-sighted paper is in fact an admirable study of the conditions under which impetuous attacks and elaborate combinations are respectively called for. but from both points of view the single line for a large fleet is emphatically condemned, while in our instructions of not a hint of its weakness appears. they resume practically the same standpoint which the duke of york had reached a century and a half before. spanish tacticians seem also to have shared the opinion that trafalgar had really done nothing to dethrone the line. one of the highest reputation, on december , , had sent to his government a thoughtful criticism of the action, and his view of nelson's attack was this: 'nothing,' he says, 'is more seamanlike or better tactics than for a fleet which is well to windward of another to bear down upon it in separate columns, and deploy at gun-shot from the enemy into a line which, as it comes into action, will inflict at least as much damage upon them as it is likely to suffer. but admiral nelson did not deploy his columns at gun-shot from our line, but ran up within pistol-shot and broke through it, so as to reduce the battle to a series of single-ship actions. it was a manoeuvre in which i do not think he will find many imitators. where two fleets are equally well trained, that which attacks in this manner must be defeated.'[ ] so it was our enemies rightly read the lesson of trafalgar. the false deductions therefore which grew up in our own service are all the more extraordinary, even as we find them in the new instructions and the current talk of the quarter-deck. but this is not the worst. it is not till we turn to the signal book itself that we get a full impression of the extent to which tactical thought had degenerated and nelson's seed had been choked. the movements and formations for which signals are provided are stubbornly on the old lines of . the influence of nelson, however, is seen in two places. the first is a group of signals for 'attacking the enemy at anchor by passing either outside them or between them and the land,' and for 'anchoring and engaging either within or outside the enemy.' here we have a rational embodiment of the experience of the nile. the second is a similar attempt to embody the teaching of trafalgar, and the way it is done finally confirms the failure to understand what nelson meant. so extraordinary is the signification of the signal and its explanatory note that it must be given in full. '_signal_.--cut the enemy's line in the order of sailing in two columns. _'explanatory note_.--the admiral will make known what number of ships from the van ship of the enemy the weather division is to break through the enemy's line, and the same from the rear at which the lee division is to break through their line. 'to execute this signal the fleet is to form in the order of sailing in two columns, should it not be so formed already; the leader of each column steering down for the position pointed out where he is to cut through the enemy's line. 'if the admiral wishes any particular conduct to be pursued by the leader of the division, in which he happens not to be, after the line is broken, he will of course point it out. if he does not it is to be considered that the lee division after breaking through the line is left to its commander. 'in performing this evolution the second astern of the leader in each column is to pass through the line astern of the ship next ahead [_sic_] of where her leader broke through, and so on in succession, breaking through all parts of the enemy's line ahead [_sic_] of their leaders as described in the plate.' the plate represents the two columns bearing down to attack in a strictly formed line ahead, and the ships, after the leaders have cut through, altering course each for its proper interval in the enemy's line, and the whole then engaging from to-leeward. the note proceeds: 'by this arrangement no ship will have to pass the whole of the enemy's line. if however, in consequence of any circumstance, the rear ships should not be able to cut through in their assigned places, the captains of those ships, as well as of the ships that are deprived of opponents in the enemy's line by this mode of attack, are to act to the best of their judgment for the destruction of the enemy, unless a disposition to the contrary has been previously made. 'it will be seen that by breaking the line in this order the enemy's van ships will not be able to assist either their centre or rear without tacking or wearing for that purpose.' this from cover to cover of the signal book is the sole trace to be found of the great principles for which nelson had lived and died. that lord keith or anyone else could have believed that it adequately represented the teaching of trafalgar is almost incredible. to begin with, the wording of the note contains an inexplicable blunder. the last paragraph shows clearly that the idea of the signal is an attack on the rear and centre, as at trafalgar; yet the ships of each column as they come successively into action are told to engage the enemy's ship _ahead_ of the point where their leaders broke through, a movement which would resolve itself into an attack on their centre and van, and leave the rear free to come into immediate action with an overwhelming concentration on the lee division. that so grave an error should have been permitted to pass into the signal book is bad enough, but that such a signal even if it had been correctly worded should stand for nelson's last word to the service is almost beyond belief. the final outcome of nelson's genius for tactics lay of course in his memorandum, and not in the form of attack he actually adopted. yet this remarkable signal ignores the whole principle of the memorandum. the fundamental ideas of concentration and containing by independent squadrons are wholly missed; and not only this. it distorts nelson's lee attack into a weather attack, and holds up for imitation every vice of the reckless movement in spite of which nelson had triumphed. not a word is said of its dangers, not a word of the exceptional circumstances that alone could justify it, not a word of how easily the tables could be turned upon a man who a second time dared to fling to the winds every principle of his art. it is the last word of british sailing tactics, and surely nothing in their whole history, not even in the worst days of the old fighting instructions, so staggers us with its lack of tactical sense.[ ] footnotes: [ ] _i.e._ the instructions of , _supra_, p. . for signal see p. . [ ] 'to attack on bearing indicated.' [ ] in ekin's text the punctuation of this sentence is obviously wrong and destroys the sense. it should accord, as i have ventured to amend it, with that of the previous paragraph. [ ] signal , 'to close nearer the ship or ships indicated.' [ ] sir charles elkin adds, 'in the same work he has also a signal (no. ) under the head "enemy" to "lay on board," with the following observation:-- '"n.b.--this signal is not meant that your people should board the enemy unless you should find advantage by so doing; but it is that you should run your ship on board the enemy, so as to disable her from getting away."' [ ] mathieu-dumas, _précis des evénements militaires: pièces justificatives_, vol. xiv. p. . [ ] fernandez duro, _armada española_, viii. . [ ] the anonymous veteran of the old french navy, cited by mathieu-dumas, explains exactly how villeneuve might have turned the tables on nelson by forming two lines himself. 'there is,' he concludes, 'no known precedent of a defensive formation in two lines; but i will venture to assert that if admiral villeneuve had doubled his line at the moment he saw nelson meant to attack him in two lines, that admiral would never have had the imprudence of making such an attack.'--_evénements militaires_, xiv. . _the instructions of_ . [+signal book, united service institution+.] _instructions relating to the line of battle and the conduct of the fleet preparatory to their engaging and when engaged with an enemy_. i. the chief purposes for which a fleet is formed in line of battle are, that the ships may be able, to assist and support each other in action; that they may not be exposed to the fire of the enemy's ships greater in number than themselves, and that every ship may be able to fire on the enemy without risk of firing into the ships of her own fleet. ii. on whichever tack the fleet may be sailing, when the line of battle is formed, the van squadron is to form the van, the centre squadron the centre, and the rear squadron the rear of the line, unless some other arrangement be pointed out by signal. but if a change of wind, or tacking, or wearing, or any other circumstance, should alter the order in which the line of battle was formed, the squadrons are to remain in the stations in which they may so happen to be placed, till the admiral shall direct them to take others. iii. when the signal is made for the fleet to form the line of battle, each flag officer and captain is to get into his station as expeditiously as possible; and to keep in close order, if not otherwise directed, and under a proportion of sail suited to that carried by the admiral, or by the senior flag officer remaining in the line, when the admiral has signified his intention to quit it. iv. in forming the line of battle, each ship should haul up a little to windward rather than to leeward of her second ahead, as a ship a little to leeward will find great difficulty in getting into her station, if it should be necessary to keep the line quite close to the wind; and it may also be better to form at a distance a little greater, rather than smaller, than the prescribed distance, as it is easier to close the line than to extend it. v. if the admiral should haul out of the line, the ships astern of him are to close up to fill the vacancy he has made, and the line is to continue on its course, and to act in the same manner as if the admiral had not left it all signals made to the centre will be addressed to the senior officer remaining in it, who, during the absence of the admiral, is to be considered as the commander of the centre squadron. vi. the repeating frigates are to be abreast of the commanders of the squadrons to which they belong, and the fireships and frigates to windward of their squadrons, if no particular station be assigned to them. vii. when the signal to form a line of bearing for either tack is made, the ships (whatever course they may be directed to steer) are to place themselves in such a manner that, if they were to haul to the wind together on the tack for which the line of bearing is formed, they would immediately form a line of battle on that tack. to do this, every ship must bring the ship which would be her second ahead, if the line of battle were formed, to bear on that point of the compass on which the line of battle would sail, viz. on that point of the compass which is six points from the direction of the wind. as the intention of a line of bearing is to keep the fleet ready to form suddenly a line of battle, the position of the division or squadron flags, shown with the signals for such a line, will refer to the forming the line of battle; that division or squadron whose flag is _uppermost_ (without considering whether it do or do not form the van of the line of bearing) is to place itself in that station which would become the van if the fleet should haul to the wind, and form the line of battle; and the division whose flag is _undermost_ is to place itself in that station in which it would become the rear if by hauling to the wind the line of battle should be formed. viii. when a line of bearing has been formed the ships are to preserve their relative bearing from each other, whenever they are directed to alter their course together; but if they are directed to alter their course in succession, as the line of bearing would by that circumstance be destroyed, it is to be no longer attended to. ix. if after having made the signal to prepare to form the line of battle, or either line of bearing, the admiral, keeping the preparative flag flying, should make several signals in succession to point out the manner in which the line is to be formed, those signals are to be carefully written down, that they may be carried into execution, when the signal for the line is hoisted again. they are to be executed in the order in which they are made, excepting such as the admiral may annul previously to his again hoisting the signal for the line. x. if the wind should come _forward_ when the fleet is formed in line of battle, or is sailing by the wind on a line of bearing, the leading ship is to steer seven points from the wind, and every ship is to haul as close to the wind as possible till she has got into the wake of the leading ship, or till she shall have brought it on the proper point of bearing; but if the wind should come _aft_, the ships are to bear up until they get into the wake, or on the proper point of bearing from the leading ship. xi. ships which have been detached from the body of the fleet on any separate service are not to obey the signal for forming the line of battle unless they have been previously called back to the fleet by signal. xii. ships which cannot keep their stations are to quit the line, as directed in article xix. in the general instructions, though in the presence of an enemy. the captains of such ships will not thereby be prevented from distinguishing themselves, as they will have the opportunities of rendering essential service by placing their ships advantageously when they get up with the enemy already engaged with the other part of the fleet. xiii. if the ship of any flag officer be disabled in battle, the flag officer may repair on board, and hoist his flag in any other ship (not already carrying a flag) that he shall think proper, but he is to hoist it in one of his own squadron or division, if there be one near and fit for the purpose. xiv. if the fleet should engage an enemy inferior to it in number, or which, by the flight of some of their ships, becomes inferior, the ships, which at either extremity of the line are thereby left without opponents, may, after the action is begun, quit the line, without waiting for a signal to do so; and they are to distress the enemy, or assist the ships of the fleet in the best manner that circumstances will allow. xv. great care is at all times to be taken not to fire at the enemy either over or very near to any ships of the fleet, nor, though the signal for battle should be flying, is any ship to fire till she is placed in a proper situation, and at a proper distance from the enemy. xvi. no ship is to separate from the body of the fleet in time of action to pursue any small number of the enemy's ships which have been beaten out of the line, unless the commander-in-chief, or some other flag officer, be among them; but the ships which have disabled their opponents, or forced them to quit the line, are to assist any ship of the fleet appearing to be much pressed, and to continue their attack till the main body of the enemy be broken or disabled, unless by signal, or particular instruction, they should be directed to act otherwise. xvii. if any ship should be so disabled as to be in great danger of being destroyed or taken by the enemy, and should make a signal expressive of such extremity, the ships nearest to her, and which are the least engaged with the enemy, are strictly enjoined to give her immediately all possible aid and protection; and any fireship, in a situation which admits of its being done, is to endeavour to burn the enemy's ship opposed to her; and any frigate that may be near is to use every possible exertion for her relief, either by towing her off, or by joining in the attack on the enemy, or by covering the fireship, or, if necessity requires it, by taking out the crew of the disabled ship, or by any other means which circumstances at the time will admit. xviii. though a ship be disabled and hard pressed by the enemy in battle, she is not to quit her station in the line if it can possibly be avoided, till the captain shall have obtained permission so to do from the commander of the division or squadron to which he belongs, or from some other flag officer. but if he should be ordered out of the line, or should be obliged to quit it before assistance can be sent to him, the nearest ships are immediately to occupy the space become vacant to prevent the enemy from taking advantage of it. xix. if there should be a captain so lost to all sense of honour and the great duty he owes his country as not to exert himself to the utmost to get into action with the enemy, or to take or destroy them when engaged, the commander of the squadron or division to which he belongs, or the nearest flag officer, is to suspend him from the command, and is to appoint some other officer to command the ship till the admiral's pleasure shall be known. appendix _further particulars of the trafalgar fight_ [+sir charles ekin's naval battles, pp. et seq. extract+.] the intelligent officer to whom the writer is indebted for this important manuscript was an eye-witness of what he has so ably related, and upon which he has reasoned with so much judgment.[ ] 'the combined fleet, after veering from the starboard to the larboard tack, gradually fell into the form of an irregular crescent; in which they remained to the moment of attack. many have considered that the french admiral intended this formation of the line of battle; but from the information i obtained after the action, connected with some documents found on board the bucentaur, i believe it was the intention to have formed a line ahead, consisting of twenty-one sail--the supposed force of the british fleet--and a squadron of observation composed of twelve sail of the line, under admiral gravina, intended to act according to circumstances after the british fleet were engaged. by wearing together, the enemy's line became inverted, and the light squadron which had been advanced in the van on the starboard tack, was left in the rear after wearing; and the ships were subsequently mingled with the rear of the main body. the wind being light, with a heavy swell, and the fleet lying with their main topsails to the mast, it was impossible for the ships to preserve their exact station in the line; consequently scarce any ship was immediately ahead or astern of her second. the fleet had then the appearance, generally, of having formed in two lines, thus: so that the ship to leeward seemed to be opposite the space left between two in the weather-line. [illustration] 'in the rear, the line was in some places trebled; and this particularly happened where the colossus was, who, after passing the stern of the french swiftsure, and luffing up under the lee of the bahama, supposing herself to leeward of the enemy's line, unexpectedly ran alongside of the french achille under cover of the smoke. the colossus was then placed between the achille and the bahama, being on board of the latter; and was also exposed to the fire of the swiftsure's after-guns. all these positions i believe to have been merely accidental; and to accident alone i attribute the concave circle of the fleet, or crescent line of battle. the wind shifted to the westward as the morning advanced; and of course the enemy's ships came up with the wind, forming a bow and quarter line. the ships were therefore obliged to edge away, to keep in the wake of their leaders; and this manoeuvre, from the lightness of the wind, the unmanageable state of the ships in a heavy swell, and, we may add, the inexperience of the enemy, not being performed with facility and celerity, undesignedly threw the combined fleets into a position, perhaps the best that could have been planned, had it been supported by the skilful manoeuvring of individual ships, and with efficient practice in gunnery. 'of the advantages and disadvantages of the mode of attack adopted by the british fleet, it may be considered presumptuous to speak, as the event was so completely successful; but as the necessity of any particular experiment frequently depends upon contingent circumstances, not originally calculated upon, there can be no impropriety in questioning whether the same plan be likely to succeed under all circumstances, and on all occasions. 'the original plan of attack, directed by the comprehensive mind of our great commander, was suggested on a supposition that the enemy's fleet consisted of forty-six sail of the line and the british forty; and the attack, as designed from to-windward, was to be made under the following circumstances: 'under a supposition that the hostile fleet would be in a line ahead of forty-six sail, the british fleet was to be brought within gun-shot of the enemy's centre, in two divisions of sixteen sail each, and a division of observation consisting of the remaining eight. 'the lee division was by signal to make a rapid attack under all possible sail on the twelve rear ships of the enemy. the ships were to break through the enemy's line; and such ships as were thrown out of their stations were to assist their friends that were hard pressed. the remainder of the enemy's fleet, of thirty-four sail, were to be left to the management of the commander-in-chief.' this able officer then proceeds to describe, by a figure, the plan of attack as originally intended; bearing a very close resemblance to that already given in plate xxviii. fig. ; but making the enemy's fleet, as arranged in a regular line ahead, to extend the distance of five miles; and the van, consisting of sixteen ships, left unoccupied; the whole comprising a fleet of forty-six sail of the line. he then observes: 'if the regulated plan of attack had been adhered to, the english fleet should have borne up together, and have sailed in a line abreast in their respective divisions until they arrived up with the enemy. thus the plan which consideration had matured would have been executed, than which perhaps nothing could be better; the victory would have been more speedily decided, and the brunt of the action would have been more equally felt, &c. 'with the exception of the britannia, dreadnought, and prince, the body of the fleet sailed very equally; and i have no doubt could have been brought into action simultaneously with their leaders. this being granted, there was no time gained by attacking in a line ahead, the only reason, i could suppose, that occasioned the change. 'the advantages of an attack made in two great divisions, with a squadron of observation, seem to combine every necessary precaution under all circumstances. 'the power of bringing an overwhelming force against a particular point of an enemy's fleet, so as to ensure the certain capture of the ships attacked, and the power of condensing such a force afterwards [so] as not only to protect the attacking ships from any offensive attempt that may be made by the unoccupied vessels of the hostile fleet, but also to secure the prizes already made, will most probably lead to a victory; and if followed up according to circumstances, may ultimately tend to the annihilation of the whole, or the greater part of the mutilated fleet. 'each ship may use her superiority of sailing, without being so far removed from the inferior sailing ships as to lose their support. 'the swifter ships, passing rapidly through the enemy's fire, are less liable to be disabled; and, after closing with their opponents, divert their attention from the inferior sailers, who are advancing to complete what their leaders had begun. the weather division, from being more distant, remain spectators of the first attack for some little time, according to the rate of the sailing; and may direct their attack as they observe the failure or success of the first onset, either to support the lee division, if required, or to extend the success they may appear to have gained, &c. 'if the enemy bear up to elude the attack, the attacking fleet is well collected for the commencement of a chase, and for mutual support in pursuit. 'the mode of attack, adopted with such success in the trafalgar action, appears to me to have succeeded from the enthusiasm inspired throughout the british fleet from their being commanded by their beloved nelson; from the gallant conduct of the leaders of the two divisions; from the individual exertions of each ship after the attack commenced, and the superior practice of the guns in the english fleet. 'it was successful also from the consternation spread through the combined fleet on finding the british so much stronger than was expected; from the astonishing and rapid destruction which followed the attack of the leaders, witnessed by the whole of the hostile fleets, inspiring the one and dispiriting the other and from the loss of the admiral's ship early in the action. 'the disadvantages of this mode of attack appear to consist in bringing forward the attacking force in a manner so leisurely and alternately, that an enemy of equal spirit and equal ability in seamanship and gunnery would have annihilated the ships one after another in detail, carried slowly on as they were by a heavy swell and light airs. 'at the distance of one mile five ships, at half a cable's length apart, might direct their broadsides effectively against the head of the division for seven minutes, supposing the rate of sailing to have been four miles an hour; and within the distance of half a mile three ships would do the same for seven minutes more, before the attacking ship could fire a gun in her defence. 'it is to be observed that, although the hull of the headmost ship does certainly in a great measure cover the hulls of those astern, yet great injury is done to the masts and yards of the whole by the fire directed against the leader; and that, if these ships are foiled in their attempt to cut through the enemy's line, or to run on board of them, they are placed, for the most part, _hors de combat_ for the rest of the action. 'or should it fall calm, or the wind materially decrease about the moment of attack, the van ships must be sacrificed before the rear could possibly come to their assistance. 'in proceeding to the attack of october , the weather was exactly such as might have caused this dilemma, as the sternmost ships of the british were six or seven miles distant. by the mode of attacking in detail, and the manner in which the combined fleet was drawn up to receive it, instead of doubling on the enemy, the british were, on that day, themselves doubled and trebled on; and the advantage of applying an overwhelming force collectively, it would seem, was totally lost. 'the victory, téméraire, sovereign, belleisle, mars, colossus and bellerophon were placed in such situations in the onset, that nothing but the most heroic gallantry and practical skill at their guns could have extricated them. if the enemy's vessels had closed up as they ought to have done, _from van to rear_, and had possessed a nearer equality in active courage, it is my opinion that even british skill and british gallantry could not have availed. the position of the combined fleet at one time was precisely that in which the british were desirous of being placed; namely, to have part of an opposing fleet doubled on, and separated from the main body. 'the french admiral, with his fleet, showed the greatest passive gallantry; and certainly the french intrépide, with some others, evinced active courage equal to the british; but there was no nautical management, no skilful manoeuvring. 'it may appear presumptuous thus to have questioned the propriety of the trafalgar attack; but it is only just, to point out the advantages and disadvantages of every means that may be used for the attainment of great results, that the probabilities and existing circumstances may be well weighed before such means are applied. a plan, to be entirely correct, must be suited to all cases. if its infallibility is not thus established, there can be no impropriety in pointing out the errors and dangers to which it is exposed, for the benefit of others. 'our heroic and lamented chief knew his means, and the power he had to deal with; he also knew the means he adopted were sufficient for the occasion; and that sufficed. 'the trafalgar attack might be followed under different circumstances, and have a different result: it is right, therefore, to discuss its merits and demerits. it cannot take one atom from the fame of the departed hero, whose life was one continued scene of original ability, and of superior action.' footnote: [ ] the concluding part of the ms. is devoted to a detailed account of the part played in the action by the conqueror and her two seconds, neptune and leviathan, with the special purpose of showing that villeneuve really struck to the conqueror. in a note the author says, 'i have been thus particular, as the capture of the french admiral has been unblushingly attributed to others without any mention being made of the ship that actually was the principal in engaging her, wishing to do justice to a gallant officer who on that day considered his task not complete until every ship was either captured or beyond distance of pursuit.' the inference is that the author was an officer of the conqueror, defending his captain, israel pellew, younger brother of the more famous edward, lord exmouth. it is possible therefore, and even probable, that this criticism of trafalgar represents the ideas of the pellews. index additional instructions, , , - , - admiral, station of, inline, , , , , , , , , , , , , , - , , . _see also_ flag, and flagship advanced squadron, nelson's, , - , - , _n._, ammunition, supply of, anchor, engaging at, , , d'annibault, admiral, anson, lord, , , - , , _n._, _n_. argall, sir samuel, armada, - , - , , , attack, from to-windward, , - , , , , , , , - , - , , , - . _see also_ line, breaking the oblique, - parallel, , , - , - , , - , , _n_., , , , - perpendicular, , , on contrary tacks, ; on opposite number, - , - , - , , ; in coming up, by defiling, - , , , on superior fleet, - , , - , , , audley, sir thomas, - augers, for scuttling, badiley, captain richard, ball, admiral sir alexander, banckers, admiral adriaen, _n._ barham, admiral lord, barrington, admiral the hon. samuel, baskerville, sir thomas, his battle order, battle orders, _see_ order of battle battles. gravelines ( ), , , isla de pinos ( ), oquendo and tromp ( ), monte christo ( ), dungeness ( ), portland (feb. ), the gabbard (june ), lowestoft or texel, no. ( ), - four days' battle ( ), - , , - st. james's fight ( ), _n._, , - holmes's action ( ), solebay ( ), - , _n._, schoonveldt ( ) , texel, no. ( ), _n_., _n_., _n_., beachy head or bevesier ( ), , la hogue ( ), malaga ( ), , , - , _n._ toulon ( ), _n._, , , finisterre (anson and de la jonquière, ), finisterre (hawke and l'etenduère, ), _n._ havana ( ), _n._ minorca ( ), _n._ quiberon ( ), , granada ( ), martinique ( ), , _n._ chesapeake ( ), les saintes ( ), - , first of june ( ), , , st. vincent ( ), , , camperdown ( ), , , the nile ( ), , copenhagen ( ), trafalgar ( ), , , , _et seq._, - , - , - berkley, admiral sir william, berry, sir john, berry, captain edward, , bilboes, blake, admiral robert, - , - ; orders of, - boarding, , , , , , , , , , , boats in action, - , , - , , - boscawen, admiral edward, , - , , ; his additional instructions, - boswall, captain, his translation of hoste, _n._, _n._ boteler, captain nathaniel, on tactics, , - breaking the line, _see_ line browne, lieutenant g.l., buckingham, george villiers, duke of, , byng, admiral sir george, , _n._ cabins, calder, admiral sir robert bart., calthrops, captains, lists of, - , captains, removal of, in action, , - , carteret, admiral sir george, cartouches, cavalry tactics at sea, , cecil, sir edward, viscount wimbledon, , , - , , , , changing station, _see_ station charles v, emperor, , chasing, , , , - , , , . _see_ also general chase chaves, alonso de, _et seq._ - , , , , , chaves, hieronymus de, clearing for action, , , , clerk of eldin, , , , , close action, , , , , , cochrane, admiral sir alexander, , - , - codrington, admiral sir edward, , - collingwood, admiral lord, , , , _et seq._; his memorandum, - , - 'commander-in-chief,' _n._ concentration, - , _n._, , , , and _n._, , , - by doubling, _see_ doubling; on rear, _see_ rear-concentration on van, - , , - confusing, , , , , , containing, - , , , , - , by feinting, _see_ feints convoy, method of attacking, , , ; of protecting, corporal of the field, corps de réserve, _see_ réserve coventry, sir william, , , , cowardice, _see_ captains, removal of cross-bows, crossing the t, , cruisers, , - , - , , - , , , , ; duties of, in action, , , cruising formations, , , dartmouth, admiral george legge, first lord, ; his instructions, - , dartmouth mss. , , deane, admiral richard, , decrès, defeat, debug, william fielding, first earl of, detached ships, , , , , - , , disabled ships, , , - , - , , , - , - , - , , - ; question of following up, , , , disrobe, colonel john, general at sea, ; orders of, - discipline, , - , - , , dispersing, instructions for, , divisions, independent control of, - , - , - , , . _see also_ sub squadrons; order of battle doubling, , - , , , , , - . drake, sir francis, _n._, ; his sailing order, , duff, captain george, demeanor, vice-admiral, duncan, admiral viscount, , , duodenal, admiral the earl of, tuques, admiral abraham, engaging, _see_ attack equalizing speed, , , , , , essex, robert devereux, earl of, essington, rear-admiral, d'estrées, maréchal, _n._, , etenduère, admiral des herbiers de l', _n_. exmouth, admiral edward pellew, lord, _n_. expeditional orders, - feints, , - fire discipline, - , , , , , , , , , , , , , fire, precautions against, , , , - , fireships, , , - ; instructions for, , , - , , - , , and _n._, - , - flag, shifting the, , , _n._, - , , - flags, squadronal, , - , ; abolished, flagship as objective, , , . , . _see also_ admiral, station of forcing, , foreign views of british tactics, - , - , - frederick, rear-admiral, _n._, frigates, _see_ cruisers galen, admiral johann van, galleys, tactics of, ; used with sailing ships, - gambier, admiral lord, - , ; his instructions, - gambling, - , general chase, , , , 'general' for naval conmander-in-chief, , , general instructions, , george of denmark, prince, gibraltar, , , - glanville, sir john, _n_. gorges, sir william, - , grain, and _n_. grappling, , , , grasse, vice-admiral comte de, , - graves, admiral lord, gravina, admiral, greenwood, jonathan, his signal book, _n_. grenades, grenier, vicomte de, his tactical treatise, group tactics, - , , - , guiche, comte de, on english and dutch tactics, - guides, , - , - gunfire as basis of tactics, gunners and gun crews, , , . _see also_ seamen gunners gunnery, , , . _see also_ close action, and fire discipline hand-guns, harpoons, harvey, captain eliab, , hawke, lord, , , - ; his additional instructions, - , hawkins, sir richard, henry viii, , herbert, admiral, _see_ torrington hill, general lord, holmes, admiral sir robert, _n_. hood, vice-admiral sir samuel, hood, viscount, - ; his additional signals, - , - , hope, captain george, , , _n_. hoste, père paul, his _evolutions navales_, - , - , - , _n._, - , , - , howard of effingham, lord, , howard, sir edward, howe, earl, - , _n._; as first lord, - , _et seq._, - , ; his great manoeuvre, - , , , , , , hygiene, , initiative, - , , . _see also_ divisions, independent control of intervals, , , , , , , - , , - , _n_. jack-flag, and _n_. james ii, . _see also_ york, duke of jervis, admiral sir john, earl of st. vincent, , - jonquière, admiral de la, jordan, admiral sir joseph, , _n_. keats, admiral sir richard goodwin, - , - , , , keith, admiral lord, , keppel, admiral augustus, viscount, , knowles, admiral sir charles, st bart. (_ob._ ), _n._, , knowles, admiral sir charles henry, nd bart. ( - ), , , _n._, - , - , - landing, lasking, lawson, admiral sir john, lestock, admiral, _n._, - lindsey, robert bertie, earl of, - , line. _see also_ orders of battle. abreast, , - , - , ahead, origin of, - , , , , - ; first instructions for, , - , - , - , - ; insistence on, - , , , , - ; close hauled, first use of, ; invented by english, - of bearing, _see_ quarter line breaking the, , - , , , , _n._, - , - , , , , , , - , - ; early objections to, , _n._, - , ; the two methods of, - , - , , - , - ; synonyms for, closing up, , , , equalising, , , , , . _see also_ reserve, corps de forming, as convenient, - , , , inverting, - , , - position of squadrons in, - principles of, stated, , quitting the, , , , , - . _see also_ equalising early spanish use of, - ; early english, - , , , reactions against, - , _n._, , - , - reduplication of, - , - , , _n._, linstocks, lisle, john dudley, lord, - , , louisbourg, love, sir thomas, - , _n._ macpherson, alexander, malta, mathews, admiral, _n._, _n._, , - , medows, captain charles, _mêlée_, , , monck, george, duke of albemarle, - ; orders of, - , , - , - monson, sir william, on tactics, moore, admiral sir graham, moorsom, vice-admiral constantine, - moorsom, captain robert, - , _n._ morogues, bigot de, his _tactique navale_, _n._, , _n._, mortemart, duc de, moulton, captain robert, his seabook, , _n._, _n._, _n._ musket-arrows, mutual support, , , , - , , , - , , , , - , myngs, admiral sir christopher, - narbrough, admiral sir john, - nelson, admiral lord, , , , , , , , - , - his general orders ( - ), , - his memorandum ( ) , - , - , - his memorandum ( ), _n._, - , - , - 'nelson touch,' the, , , , - , norris, admiral sir john, , - oar propulsion, - o'bryen, lieutenant christopher, his translation of hoste, _n._ order of battle, forming, as convenient, - orders of battle. early spanish, - ; english, - , - , _et seq_,, - ; wedge-shaped, , ; baskerville's, ; boteler on, - ; crescent, , , ; in two lines, , , , , , , - , , ; in three lines, , - , order of sailing, , , _n._, ; as order of battle, , , , parisot, his account of trafalgar, _n._ pellew, captain israel, , _n._ penn, admiral sir william, , , , , ; orders of, - , ; his talk with pepys, - pepys, samuel, _n._, - , - perez de grandallana, don domingo, pigot, admiral hugh, , - _n._, , , popham, admiral sir home, , - prayers, , , preparative signals, prizes, treatment of, , quarter line, , - , , , - , ; at trafalgar, - quarters, - , - , , - raking, , ralegh, sir walter, _et seq._, rear-concentration, - , _n._, , , , , , , , , , - , - , - repeating ships, , , , , _n._, , réserve, corps de, , , , , , , , , , , , . . _see also_ equalising and quitting the line reserve squadrons, , , - , , retreat, order of, and _n._, . _see also_ dispersing rockets as signals, _n_. rodney, lord, - , o , - ; additional instructions used by, , _n._, _n._, - , - , - , rooke, admiral sir george, , - , rupert, prince, - , - ; instructions of, - , - , _n._, russell, admiral edward, earl of orford, _et seq._, - , _n_. ruyter, admiral michiel de, , , _n_. sailing order, _see_ order of sailing sailors serving ashore, , sandwich, edward mountagu, earl of, , - , - , saumarez, admiral lord de, scouts, _see_ cruisers sealed orders, seamen gunners, , ship-money fleets, - ships, lists of, - , - , , achille, agamemnon, , - , _n._ anne royal, , assurance, bahama, belleisle, , , , bellerophon, , , _n._, britannia, , bucentaure, , colossus, - , - , , conqueror, , _n._, _n_. defence, , , - defiance, _n_. dreadnought ( ), ; ( ), euryalus, _n._, - leviathan, , _n_. marlborough, mars, - , - , neptune, _n_. orion, - , - pembroke, polyphemus, prince, prince of wales, queen charlotte, redoutable, revenge, , _n_. royal catherine, royal charles, , - royal james, _n_. royal sovereign, , st. george, santa ana, santísima trinidad, - shannon, superb, swiftsure, téméraire, , , , vanguard, victory, , , , , o - , shot-holes, , shovell, admiral sir clowdisley, , _n._ sidmouth, lord, , sign (for signal), signal books, introduction of, and _n._, and _n._ signal officers, , signals, early forms of, , , - , ; improvements in, , _n._, _n._, _n._, , _et seq._, _n._; numerical, slinging yards, smoke, tactical value of, , , , soldiers at sea, , , , , , , ; as admirals, - , , - , spain, orders adopted from, , _n._, _n._ spanish armament, the ( ), squadronal organisation, - , , - , - , - , - , - , stanhope, vice-admiral, station, changing, , , , ; keeping, , , , _see also_ line, quitting the stinkballs, strickland, admiral sir roger, sub-squadrons, - , - , , , - . _see also_ divisions tacking in succession, first signal for, , - tactical exercises, , , _n._ tactics, principles of, - , . _see also_ concentration, confusing, containing, mutual support oscillations in, , dutch, , - , , - , - , , - , french, , - , - , - spanish, - . _see also_ chaves, alonso de treatises on, _see_ hoste, morogues, clerk, grenier, knowles tangier, telegraphing, _n._ tobacco smoking, torrington, admiral arthur herbert, earl of, , , , , toulouse, comte de, tourville, maréchal de, - transports, tromp, admiral marten harpertszoon, - , - ; orders of, tromp, admiral cornelis martenszoon, , _n._ van, concentration on, - , _n._ vane, sir harry, vernon, admiral, - , ; his additional instructions, - villeneuve, admiral, , , - , - , _n._ walsh, lieutenant john, his signal book, warren, vice-admiral sir peter, _n._ weapons for close quarters, , weather-gage, , , , - , , , , , , weft, waft or wheft, , wimbledon, _see_ cecil wing squadrons, - , with, admiral witte de, wren, dr. mathew, f.r.s., , - york, james, duke of, ; his instructions, - , - , ; his school, - , , ; end of his career, zamorano, roderigo, zante, , the navy records society * * * * * _patron_ h.r.h. the prince of wales, k.g., k.t., k.p. _president_ earl spencer, k.g. the navy records society, which has been established for the purpose of printing rare or unpublished works of naval interest, aims at rendering accessible the sources of our naval history, and at elucidating questions of naval archæology, construction, administration, organisation and social life. the society has already issued:-- in : vols. i. and ii. _state papers relating to the defeat of the spanish armada, anno_ . edited by professor j.k. laughton. ( s.) in : vol. iii. _letters of lord hood_, - . edited by mr. david hannay. (_none available_.) vol. iv. _index to james's naval history_, by mr. c.g. toogood. edited by the hon. t.a. brassey. ( _s._ _d._) vol. v. _life of captain stephen martin_, - . edited by sir clements r. markham. (_none available_.) in : vol. vi. _journal of rear-admiral bartholomew james_, - . edited by professor j.k. laughton and commander j.y.f. sulivan. ( _s._ _d._) vol. vii. _hollond's discourses of the navy_, and . edited by mr. j.r. tanner. ( _s._ _d._) vol. viii. _naval accounts and inventories in the reign of henry vii_. edited by mr. m. oppenheim. ( _s._ _d._) in : vol. ix. _journal of sir george rooke_. edited by mr. oscar browning. ( _s._ _d._) vol. x. _letters and papers relating to the war with france_, - . edited by m. alfred spont. ( _s._ _d._) vol. xi. _papers relating to the spanish war_, - . edited by mr. julian corbett. ( _s._ _d._) in : vol. xii. _journals and letters of admiral of the fleet sir thomas byam martin_, - (vol. ii.). edited by admiral sir r. vesey hamilton. (_see_ xxiv.) vol. xiii. _papers relating to the first dutch war_, - (vol. i.). edited by mr. s.r. gardiner. ( _s._ _d._) vol. xiv. _papers relating to the blockade of brest_, - (vol. i.). edited by mr. j. leyland. (_see_ xxi.) in : vol. xv. _history of the russian fleet during the reign of peter the great. by a contemporary englishman_. edited by admiral sir cyprian bridge. ( _s._ _d._) vol. xvi. _logs of the great sea fights_, - (vol. i.). edited by vice-admiral sir t. sturges jackson. (_see_ xviii.) vol. xvii. _papers relating to the first dutch war_, - (vol. ii.). edited by mr. s.r. gardiner, ( _s._ _d._) in : vol. xviii. _logs of the great sea fights_ (vol. ii.). edited by sir t.s. jackson. (_two vols._ _s._) vol. xix. _journals and letters of sir t. byam martin_ (vol. iii.). edited by sir r. vesey hamilton. (_see_ xxiv.) in : vol. xx. _the naval miscellany_ (vol. i.). edited by the secretary. ( _s._) vol. xxi. _papers relating to the blockade of brest_, - (vol. ii.). edited by mr. john leyland (_two vols._ _s._) in : vols. xxii. and xxiii. _the naval tracts of sir william. monson_ (vols. i. and ii.). edited by mr. m. oppenheim. (_two vols._ _s._) vol xxiv. _journals and letters of sir t. byam martin_ (vol. i.). edited by sir r. vesey hamilton. (_three vols._ _s._ _d._) in : vol. xxv. _nelson and the neapolitan jacobins_. edited by mr. h.c. gutteridge.( _s._ _d._) vol. xxvi. _a descriptive catalogue of the naval mss. in the pepysian library_ (vol. i.). edited by mr. j.r. tanner. ( _s._) in : vol. xxvii. _a descriptive catalogue of the naval mss. in the pepysian library_ (vol. ii.). edited by mr. j.r. tanner. ( _s_. _d._) vol. xxviii. _the correspondence of admiral john markkam_, - . edited by sir clements r. markham. ( _s._ _d._) in : vol. xxix. _fighting instructions_, - . edited by mr. julian corbett. _to follow:_ vol. xxx. _papers relating to the first dutch war_, - (vol. iii.). edited by mr. c.t. atkinson. other works in preparation, in addition to further volumes of mr. tanner's _descriptive catalogue_, of _sir william monson's tracts_, of _the first dutch war_, which will be edited by mr. c.t. atkinson, and of _the naval miscellany_, are _the journal of captain_ (afterwards sir john) _narbrough_, - , to be edited by professor j.k. laughton; _official documents illustrating the social life and internal discipline of the navy in the xviiith century_, to be edited by professor j.k. laughton; _select correspondence of the great earl of chatham and his sons_, to be edited by professor j.k. laughton; _select correspondence of sir charles middleton, afterwards lord barham_, - , to be edited by professor j.k. laughton; _reminiscences of commander james anthony gardner_, - , to be edited by sir r. vesey hamilton; and a _collection of naval songs and ballads_, to be edited by professor c.h. firth and mr. henry newbolt. any person wishing to become a member of the society is requested to apply to the secretary (professor laughton, pepys road, wimbledon, s.w.), who will submit his name to the council. the annual subscription is one guinea, the payment of which entitles the member to receive one copy of all works issued by the society for that year. the publications are not offered for general sale; but members can obtain a complete set of the volumes on payment of the back subscriptions. single volumes can also be obtained by members at the prices marked to each. _may_ . printed by spottiswoode and co. ltd., new-street square london navy records society * * * * * report of the council * * * * * _read at the thirteenth annual general meeting, thursday, june_ , . * * * * * the council have to report that the number of members and subscribers on the society's list is ; a net increase of over last year. this is largely due to the additional support received from the admiralty, which has increased the number of its subscriptions to fourteen, as well as to the accession of other departments of the public service and of public institutions, including the war course college, devonport; the war course college, portsmouth; the staff college, camberley; the university of liverpool; the public libraries, cardiff; the public libraries, croydon; and, in his private capacity, the secretary of state for war. the society of swedish naval officers, stockholm, has also been admitted as a subscriber. on the other hand, death has removed nine of our members, and among them two who have, from the beginning, been most active in furthering the ends and promoting the interests of the society. these are:-- captain montagu burrows, r.n., chichele professor of history in the university of oxford, and known to all of us as the author of the _life of hawke_; and rear-admiral sir william wharton, k.c.b., hydrographer to the admiralty. the names of the others are:-- sir w. laird clowes; earl cowper; lord currie, g.c.b.; commander w.m. latham, r.n.; mr. c.a. nankivell; mr. g.r. stevens; commander w.h. watson, r.n.r. while congratulating the society on the improving appearance of the list, the council would again urge on every member the necessity of his individual co-operation in the endeavour to make the work of the society more generally and widely known. to this end they also invite the assistance of the press. it is only by such increased publicity that the numbers, the funds, and therefore the work and usefulness, of the society can be maintained. since the date of the last general meeting the society has issued: for . vol. xxx. _the first dutch war_ (vol. iii.). edited by the late dr. s.r. gardiner and mr. c.t. atkinson. for this year it is proposed to issue _the reminiscences of commander james anthony gardner_, - , edited by sir r. vesey hamilton; and _select correspondence of sir charles middleton, afterwards lord barham_, edited by professor j.k. laughton. these are now well advanced, and will, it is hoped, be issued in the course of the autumn. of the several works in preparation--a list of which will be found in the advertisement at the end of vol. xxx--it is unnecessary to speak here. the society will, however, be interested to learn that copies have been found of the fighting instructions of hawke and rodney. these were described at some length by mr. julian s. corbett in the _times_ of december , and, by the kind permission of the owner, mr. pritchard, will be edited for the society by mr. corbett, and issued--probably next year--either as a separate volume or included in a volume of the miscellany. the balance sheet is appended. abstract of accounts.--january to december , . receipts. £ s. d. £ s. d. | balance brought forward:-- | at messrs. coutts & co. | with treasurer | with secretary | --------- | subscriptions | over-payment on same | --------- | volumes sold | --------- | £ | ========== | audited and found correct:-- w.a. james, } _auditors_. p.h. pridham wippell,} _may _. payments. £ s. d. printing, &c. indexing and transcribing salaries and wages miscellaneous balance carried forward:-- at messrs. coutts & co. £ with treasurer with secretary --------- --------- £ ========= w. graham greene, _hon. treasurer_. note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) the navy as a fighting machine by rear admiral bradley a. fiske u. s. navy former aid for operations of the fleet; president of the u. s. naval institute; gold medallist of the u. s. naval institute and the franklin institute of pennsylvania author of "electricity in theory and practice," "war time in manila," etc. with map preface what is the navy for? of what parts should it be composed? what principles should be followed in designing, preparing, and operating it in order to get the maximum return for the money expended? to answer these questions clearly and without technical language is the object of the book. bradley a. fiske. u. s. naval war college, newport, r. i., september , . contents part i general considerations chapter i. war and the nations ii. naval a, b, c iii. naval power iv. naval preparedness v. naval defense vi. naval policy part ii naval strategy vii. general principles viii. designing the machine ix. preparing the active fleet x. reserves and shore stations xi. naval bases xii. operating the machine strategic map of the atlantic and pacific oceans *** chapters iii and vii were published originally in _the u. s. naval institute_; chapters i, ii, iv, v, and vii in _the north american review_. part i general considerations chapter i war and the nations because the question is widely discussed, whether peace throughout the world may be attained by the friendly co-operation of many nations, and because a nation's attitude toward this question may determine its future prosperity or ruin, it may be well to note what has been the trend of the nations hitherto, and whether any forces exist that may reasonably be expected to change that trend. we may then be able to induce from facts the law which that trend obeys, and make a reasonable deduction as to whether or not the world is moving toward peace. if we do this we shall follow the inductive method of modern science, and avoid the error (with its perilous results) of first assuming the law and then deducing conclusions from it. men have always been divided into organizations, the first organization being the family. as time went on families were formed into tribes, for self-protection. the underlying cause for the organization was always a desire for strength; sometimes for defense, sometimes for offense, usually for both. at times tribes joined in alliance with other tribes to attain a common end, the alliance being brought about by peaceful agreement, and usually ceasing after the end had been attained, or missed, or when tribal jealousies forbade further common effort. sometimes tribes joined to form one larger tribe; the union being either forced on a weaker by a stronger tribe, or caused by a desire to secure a strength greater and more lasting than mere alliance can insure. in the same way, and apparently according to similar laws, sovereign states or nations were formed from tribes; and in later years, by the union of separate states. the states or nations have become larger and larger as time has gone on; greater numbers, not only of people but of peoples, living in the same general localities and having hereditary ties, joining to form a nation. though the forms of government of these states or nations are numerous, and though the conceptions of people as to the purposes and functions of the state vary greatly, we find that one characteristic of a state has always prevailed among all the states and nations of the world--the existence of an armed military force, placed under the control of its government; the purpose of this armed force being to enable the government not only to carry on its administration of internal matters, but also to exert itself externally against the armed force of another state. this armed force has been a prominent factor in the life of every sovereign state and independent tribe, from history's beginning, and is no less a factor now. no instance can be found of a sovereign state without its appropriate armed force, to guard its sovereignty, and preserve that freedom from external control, without which freedom it ceases to exist as a sovereign state. the armed force has always been a matter of very great expense. it has always required the anxious care of the government and the people. the men comprising it have always been subjected to restraint and discipline, compelled to undergo hardships and dangers greater than those of civil life, and developed by a training highly specialized and exacting. the armed force in every state has had not only continuous existence always, but continuous, potential readiness, if not continuous employment; and the greatest changes in the mutual relations of nations have been brought about by the victory of the armed force of one state over the armed force of another state. this does not mean that the fundamental causes of the changes have been physical, for they have been psychological, and have been so profound and so complex as to defy analysis; but it does mean that the actual and immediate instrument producing the changes has been physical force; that physical force and physical courage acting in conjunction, of which conjunction war is the ultimate expression, have always been the most potent instruments in the dealings of nations with each other. is there any change toward peaceful methods now? no, on the contrary; war is recognized as the most potent method still; the prominence of military matters is greater than ever before; at no time in the past has interest in war been so keen as at the present, or the expenditure of blood and money been so prodigal; at no time before has war so thoroughly engaged the intellect and energy of mankind. in other words, the trend of the nations has been toward a clearer recognition of the efficacy of military power, and an increasing use of the instrumentality of war. this does not mean that the trend of the nations has been regular; for, on the contrary, it has been spasmodic. if one hundred photographs of the map of europe could be taken, each photograph representing in colors the various countries as they appeared upon the map at one hundred different times, and if those hundred photographs could be put on films and shown as a moving-picture on a screen, the result would resemble the shifting colored pieces in a kaleidoscope. boundaries advanced and receded, then advanced again; tribes and nations moved their homes from place to place; empires, kingdoms, principalities, duchies, and republics flourished brilliantly for a while, and then went out; many peoples struggled for an autonomous existence, but hardly a dozen acquired enough territory or mustered a sufficiently numerous population to warrant their being called "great nations." of those that were great nations, only three have endured as great nations for eight hundred years; and the three that have so endured are the three greatest in europe now--the french, the british, and the german. some of the ancient empires continued for long periods. the history of practical, laborious, and patient china is fairly complete and clear for more than two thousand years before our era; and of dreamy, philosophic india for almost as long, though in far less authentic form. egypt existed as a nation, highly military, artistic, and industrious, as her monuments show, for perhaps four thousand years; when she was forced by the barbarians of persia into a condition of dependence, from which she has never yet emerged. the time of her greatness in the arts and sciences of peace was the time of her greatest military power; and her decline in the arts and sciences of peace accompanied her decline in those of war. assyria, with her two capitals, babylon and nineveh, flourished splendidly for about six centuries, and was then subdued by the persians under cyrus, after the usual decline. the little kingdom of the hebrews, hardy and warlike under saul and david, luxurious and effeminate under solomon, lasted but little more than a hundred years. persia, rising rapidly by military means from the barbarian state, lived a brilliant life of conquest, cultivated but little those arts of peace that hold in check the passions of a successful military nation, yielded rapidly to the seductions of luxury, and fell abruptly before the macedonian alexander, lasting less than two hundred and fifty years. macedonia, trained under philip, rose to great military power under alexander, conquered in twelve years the ten most wealthy and populous countries of the world--nearly the whole known world; but fell to pieces almost instantly when alexander died. the cities of greece enjoyed a rare pre-eminence both in the arts and sciences of peace and in military power, but only for about one hundred and fifty years: falling at last before the superior military force of macedon, after neglecting the practice of the military arts, and devoting themselves to art, learning, and philosophy. rome as a great nation lasted about five hundred years; and the last three centuries of her life after the death of commodus, about a. d., illustrate curiously the fact that, even if a people be immoral, cruel, and base in many ways, their existence as an independent state may be continued long, if military requirements be understood, and if the military forces be preserved from the influence of the effeminacy of the nation as a whole. in rome, the army was able to maintain a condition of considerable manliness, relatively to the people at large, and thus preserve internal order and keep the barbarians at bay for nearly three hundred years; and at the same time exert a powerful and frequently deciding influence in the government. but the effeminacy of the people, especially of those in the higher ranks, made them the creatures of the army that protected them. in some cases, the emperor himself was selected by the army, or by the pretorian guard in rome; and sometimes the guard removed an emperor of whom it disapproved by the simple expedient of killing him. after the fall of the western empire in , when rome was taken by odoacer, a condition of confusion, approaching anarchy, prevailed throughout europe, until charlemagne founded his empire, about a. d., except that constantinople was able to stand up against all outside assaults and hold the eastern empire together. charlemagne's empire united under one government nearly all of what is now france, germany, austria, italy, belgium, and holland. the means employed by charlemagne to found his empire were wholly military, though means other than military were instituted to preserve it. he endeavored by just government, wise laws, and the encouragement of religion and of education of all kinds to form a united people. the time was not ripe, however; and charlemagne's empire fell apart soon after charlemagne expired. the rapid rise and spread of the mohammedan religion was made possible by the enthusiasm with which mahomet imbued his followers, but the actual founding of the arabian empire was due wholly to military conquest, achieved by the fanatic mussulmans who lived after him. after a little more than a hundred years, the empire was divided into two caliphates. brilliant and luxurious courts were thereafter held by caliphs at bagdad and cordova, with results similar to those in egypt, persia, assyria, and rome; the people becoming effeminate, employed warriors to protect them, and the warriors became their masters. then, effeminacy spreading even to the warriors, strength to resist internal disorders as well as external assaults gradually faded, and both caliphates fell. from the death of charlemagne until the fall of constantinople, in , the three principal nations of europe were those of france, germany, and england. until that time, and dating from a time shortly before the fall of rome, europe was in perpetual turmoil--owing not only to conflicts between nations, but to conflicts between the church of rome and the civil power of the kings and emperors, to conflicts among the feudal lords, and to conflicts between the sovereigns and the feudal lords. the power of the roman church was beneficent in checking a too arrogant and military tendency, and was the main factor in preventing an utter lapse back to barbarism. the end of the middle ages and the beginning of what are usually called "modern times" found only four great countries in the world--france, germany, spain, and england. of these spain dropped out in the latter part of the sixteenth century. the other three countries still stand, though none of them lies within exactly the same boundaries as when modern times began; and austria, which was a part of germany then, is now--with hungary--a separate state and nation. this very brief survey of history shows that every great nation has started from a small beginning and risen sometimes gradually, sometimes rapidly to greatness; and then fallen, sometimes gradually, sometimes rapidly, to mediocrity, dependence, or extinction; that the instrument which has effected the rise has always been military power, usually exerted by armies on the land, sometimes by navies on the sea; and that the instrument which has effected the actual fall has always been the military power of an adversary. in other words, _the immediate instrument that has decided the rise and the fall of nations has been military power_. that this should have been so need not surprise us, since nations have always been composed of human beings, influenced by the same hopes and fears and governed by the same laws of human nature. and as the most potent influence that could be brought to bear upon a man was a threat against his life, and as it was the province of military power to threaten life, it was unavoidable that military power should be the most potent influence that could be brought to bear upon a nation. the history of the world has been in the main a history of war and a narrative of wars. no matter how far back we go, the same horrible but stimulating story meets our eyes. in ancient days, when every weapon was rude, and manipulated by one man only, the injury a single weapon could do was small, the time required for preparation was but brief, and the time required for recuperation after war was also brief. at that time, military power was almost the sole element in the longevity of a tribe, or clan, or nation; and the warriors were the most important men among the people. but as civilization increased, the life not only of individuals but of nations became more complex, and warriors had to dispute with statesmen, diplomatists, poets, historians, and artists of various types, the title to pre-eminence. yet even in savage tribes and even in the conduct of savage wars, the value of wisdom and cunning was perceived, and the stimulating aid of the poet and the orator was secured. the relative value of men of war and men of peace depended during each period on the conditions prevailing then--in war, warriors held the stage; in peace, statesmen and artists had their day. naturally, during periods when war was the normal condition, the warrior was the normal pillar of the state. in how great a proportion of the time that history describes, war was the normal condition and peace the abnormal, few realize now in our country, because of the aloofness of the present generation from even the memory of war. our last great war ended in ; and since then only the light and transient touch of the spanish war has been laid upon us. even that war ended seventeen years ago and since then only the distant rumblings of battles in foreign lands have been borne across the ocean to our ears. these rumblings have disturbed us very little. feeling secure behind the , -mile barrier of the ocean, we have lent an almost incredulous ear to the story that they tell and the menace that they bear; though the story of the influence of successful and unsuccessful wars upon the rise and fall of nations is told so harshly and so loudly that, in order not to hear it, one must tightly stop his ears. that war has not been the only factor, however, in the longevity of nations is obviously true; and it is also true that nations which have developed the warlike arts alone have never even approximated greatness. in all complex matters, in all processes of nature and human nature, many elements are present, and many factors combine to produce a given result. man is a very complex individual, and the more highly he is developed the more complex he becomes. a savage is mainly an animal; but the civilized and highly educated man is an animal on whose elemental nature have been superposed very highly organized mental, moral, and spiritual natures. yet even a savage of the most primitive or warlike character has an instinctive desire for rest and softness and beauty, and loves a primitive music; and even the most highly refined and educated gentleman raises his head a little higher, and draws his breath a little deeper, when war draws near. thus in the breast of every man are two opposing forces; one urging him to the action and excitement of war, the other to the comparative inaction and tranquillity of peace. on the side that urges war, we see hate, ambition, courage, energy, and strength; on the side that urges peace we see love, contentment, cowardice, indolence, and weakness. we see arrayed for war the forceful faults and virtues; for peace the gentle faults and virtues. both the forceful and the gentle qualities tend to longevity in certain ways and tend to its prevention in other ways; but history clearly shows that the _forceful qualities have tended more to the longevity of nations than the gentle_. if ever two nations, or two tribes, have found themselves contiguous, one forceful and the other not, the forceful one has usually, if not always, obtained the mastery over the other, and therefore has outlived it. if any cow and any lion have found themselves alone together, the lion has outlived the cow. it is true that the mere fact of being a lion has not insured long life, and that the mere fact of being a cow has not precluded it; and some warlike tribes and nations have not lived so long as tribes and nations of softer fibre. this seems to have been due, however, either to the environments in which the two have lived, or to the fact that the softer nation has had available some forces that the other did not have. the native indians of north america were more warlike than the colonists from europe that landed on their shores; but the indians were armed with spears and arrows, and the colonists with guns. now, those guns were the product of the arts of peace; no nation that had pursued a warlike life exclusively could have produced them or invented the powder that discharged them. this fact indicates what a thousand other facts of history also indicate, that civilization and the peaceful arts contribute to the longevity of nations--not only by promoting personal comfort, and by removing causes of internal strife, and thus enabling large bodies of people to dwell together happily, but also by increasing their military power. every nation which has achieved greatness has cultivated assiduously both the arts of peace and the arts of war. every nation which has long maintained that greatness has done so by maintaining the policy by which she acquired it. _every nation that has attained and then lost greatness, has lost it by losing the proper balance between the military and the peaceful arts; never by exalting unduly the military, but always by neglecting them, and thereby becoming vulnerable to attack_. in other words, the history of every great nation that has declined shows three periods, the rise, the table-land of greatness, and the decline. during the rise, the military arts hold sway; on the table-land, the arts of peace and war are fairly balanced; during the decline the peaceful arts hold sway. _facilis descensus averni_. the rise is accomplished by expending energy, for which accomplishment the possession of energy is the first necessity; the height of the table-land attained represents the amount of energy expended; the length of time that the nation maintains itself upon this table-land, before starting on the inevitable descent therefrom, represents her staying power and constitutes her longevity as a great nation. how long shall any nation stay upon the table-land? as long as she continues to adapt her life wisely to her environment; as long as she continues to be as wise as she was while climbing up; for while climbing, she had not only to exert force, she had also to guide the force with wisdom. so we see that, in the ascent, a nation has to use both force and wisdom; on the table-land, wisdom; in the decline, neither. among the nations of antiquity one might suppose that, because of the slowness of transportation and communication, and the feebleness of weapons compared with those of modern days, much longer periods of time would be required for the rise of any nation, and also a longer period before her descent began. yet the vast empire of alexander lasted hardly a day after he expired, and the grecian cities maintained their greatness but a century and a half; while great britain, france, and germany have been great nations for nearly a thousand years. why have they endured longer than the others? the answer is hard to find; because many causes, and some of them obscure, have contributed to the result. but, as we observe the kind of constitution and the mode of life of long-lived people, in order to ascertain what kind of constitution and mode of life conduce to longevity in people, so perhaps we may logically do the same with nations. observing the constitution and mode of life of the british, french, and german nations, we are struck at once with the fact that those peoples have been by constitution active, ambitious, intelligent, and brave; and that they have observed in their national life a skilfully balanced relation between the arts of peace and the arts of war; neglecting neither and allowing neither to wax great at the expense of the other. in all those countries the _first_ aim has been protection from both external attack and internal disorder. protection from external attack has been gained by military force and highly trained diplomacy; protection from internal disorder has been gained _first_ by military force, and _second_ by wise laws, just courts, and the encouragement of religion and of those arts and sciences that lead to comfort and happiness in living. china may attract the attention of some as an instance of longevity; but is china a nation in the usual meaning of the word? certainly, she is not a great nation. it is true that no other nation has actually conquered her of late; but this has been largely by reason of her remoteness from the active world, and because other nations imposed their will upon her, without meeting any resistance that required the use of war to overcome. and even china has not lived a wholly peaceful life, despite the non-military character of her people. her whole history was one of wars, like that of other nations, until the middle of the fourteenth century of our era. since then, she has had four wars, in all of which she has been whipped: one in the seventeenth century when the country was successfully invaded, and the native dynasty was overthrown by the tartars of manchuria; one in , when great britain compelled her to cede hong-kong and to open five ports to foreign commerce, through which ports opium could be introduced; one in , with great britain and france, that resulted in the capture of pekin; and one with japan in . since that time (as well as before) china has been the scene of revolutions and wide-spread disturbances, so that, even though a peace-loving and non-resisting nation, peace has not reigned within her borders. the last dynasty was overthrown in . since then a feeble republic has dragged on a precarious existence, interrupted by the very short reign of yuan shih k'ai. this brief consideration of the trend of people up to the present time seems to show that, owing to the nature of man himself, especially to the nature of large "crowds" of men, the direction in which nations have been moving hitherto has not been toward increasing the prevalence of peace, but rather toward increasing the methods, instruments, and areas of war; furthermore, that this direction of movement has been necessary, in order to achieve and to maintain prosperity in any nation. this being the case, what forces exist that may reasonably be expected to change that trend? three main forces are usually mentioned: civilization, commerce, christianity. before considering these it may be well to note newton's first law of motion, that every body will continue in a state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless acted on by some external force; for though this law was affirmed of material bodies, yet its applicability to large groups of men is striking and suggestive. not only do human beings have the physical attributes of weight and inertia like other material bodies, but their mental organism, while of a higher order than the physical, is as powerfully affected by external forces. and though it is true that psychology has not yet secured her newton, and that no one has yet formulated a law that expresses exactly the action of the minds and spirits of men under the influence of certain mental and moral stimuli or forces, yet we know that our minds and spirits are influenced by fear, hope, ambition, hate, and so forth, in ways that are fairly well understood and toward results that often can be predicted in advance. our whole theory of government and our laws of business and every-day life are founded on the belief that men are the same to-day as they were yesterday, and that they will be the same to-morrow. the whole science of psychology is based on the observed and recorded actions of the human organism under the influence of certain external stimuli or forces, and starts from the assumption that this organism has definite and permanent characteristics. if this is not so--if the behavior of men in the past has not been governed by actual laws which will also govern their behavior in the future--then our laws of government are built on error, and the teachings of psychology are foolish. this does not mean that any man will necessarily act in the same way to-morrow as he did yesterday, when subjected to the influence of the same threat, inducement, or temptation; because, without grappling the thorny question of free will, we realize that a man's action is never the result of only one stimulus and motive, but is the resultant of many; and we have no reason to expect that he will act in the same way when subjected to the same stimulus, unless we know that the internal and external conditions pertaining to him are also the same. furthermore, even if we cannot predict what a certain individual will do, when exposed to a certain external influence, because of some differences in his mental and physical condition, on one occasion in comparison with another, yet when we consider large groups of men, we know that individual peculiarities, permanent and temporary, balance each other in great measure; that the average condition of a group of men is less changeable than that of one man, and that the degree of permanency of condition increases with the number of men in the group. from this we may reasonably conclude that, if we know the character of a man--or a group of men--and if we know also the line of action which he--or they-have followed in the past, we shall be able to predict his--or their--line of action in the future with considerable accuracy; and that the accuracy will increase with the number of men in the group, and the length of time during which they have followed the known line of action. le bon says: "every race carries in its mental constitution the laws of its destiny." therefore, the line of action that the entire human race has followed during the centuries of the past is a good index--or at least the best index that we have--to its line of action during the centuries of the future. now, men have been on this earth for many years; and history and psychology teach us that in their intercourse with each other, their conduct has been caused by a combination of many forces, among which are certain powerful forces that tend to create strife. the strongest by far of these forces is the _ego_ in man himself, a quality divinely implanted which makes a man in a measure self-protecting. this ego prompts a man not only to seek pleasure and avoid trouble for himself, but also to gain superiority, and, if possible, the mastery over his fellow men. men being placed in life in close juxtaposition to each other, the struggles of each man to advance his own interests produce rivalries, jealousies, and conflicts. similarly with nations. nations have been composed for the most part of people having an heredity more or less common to them all, so that they are bound together as great clans. from this it has resulted that nations have been jealous of each other and have combated each other. they have been doing this since history began, and are doing it as much as ever now. in fact, mankind have been in existence for so many centuries, and their physical, moral, mental, and spiritual characteristics were so evidently implanted in them by the almighty, that it seems difficult to see how any one, except the almighty himself, can change these characteristics and their resulting conduct. it is a common saying that a man cannot lift himself over the fence by his boot straps, though he can jump over the fence, if it is not too high. this saying recognizes the fact that "a material system can do no work on itself"; but needs external aid. when a man pulls upward on his boot straps, the upward force that he exerts is exactly balanced by the downward reaction exerted by his boot straps; but when he jumps, the downward thrust of his legs causes an equal reaction of the earth, which exerts a direct force upward upon the man; and it is this external force that moves him over the fence. it is this external force, the reaction of the earth or air or water, which moves every animal that walks, or bird that flies, or fish that swims. it is the will of the almighty, acting through the various stimuli of nature, that causes the desire to walk, and all the emotions and actions of men. if he shall cause any new force to act on men, their line of conduct will surely change. but if he does not--how can it change, or be changed; how can the human race turn about, by means of its own power only, and move in a direction the reverse from that in which it has been moving throughout all the centuries of the past? these considerations seem to indicate that nations, regarded in their relation toward each other, will go on in the direction in which they have been going unless acted upon by some external force. will civilization, commerce, or christianity impart that force? inasmuch as civilization is merely a condition in which men live, and an expression of their history, character and aims, it is difficult to see how it could of itself act as an external force, or cause an external force to act. "institutions and laws," says le bon, again, "are the outward manifestation of our character, the expression of its needs. being its outcome, institutions and laws cannot change this character." even if the civilization of a given nation may have been brought about in some degree by forces external to that nation, yet it is clear that we must regard that civilization rather as the result of those forces than as a force itself. besides, civilization has never yet made the relations of nations with each other more unselfish, civilized nations now and in the past, despite their veneer of courtesy, being fully as jealous of each other as the most savage tribes. that this should be so seems natural; because civilization has resulted mainly from the attempts of individuals and groups to enhance the pleasures and diminish the ills of life, and therefore cannot tend to unselfishness in either individuals or nations. civilization in the past has not operated to soften the relations of nations with each other, so why should it do so now? is not modern civilization, with its attendant complexities, rivalries, and jealousies, provocative of quarrels rather than the reverse? in what respect is modern civilization better than past civilization, except in material conveniences due to material improvements in the mechanic arts? are we any more artistic, strong, or beautiful than the greeks in their palmy days? are we braver than the spartans, more honest than the chinese, more spiritual than the hindoos, more religious than the puritans? is not the superior civilization of the present day a mechanical civilization pure and simple? and has not the invention of electrical and mechanical appliances, with the resulting insuring of communication and transportation, and the improvements in instruments of destruction, advantaged the great nations more than the weaker ones, and increased the temptation to great nations to use force rather than decreased it? do not civilization's improvements in weapons of destruction augment the effectiveness of warlike methods, as compared with the peaceful methods of argument and persuasion? diplomacy is an agency of civilization that was invented to avoid war, to enable nations to accommodate themselves to each other without going to war; but, practically, diplomacy seems to have caused almost as many wars as it has averted. and even if it be granted that the influence of diplomacy has been in the main for peace rather than for war, we know that diplomacy has been in use for centuries, that its resources are well understood, and that they have all been tried out many times; and therefore we ought to realize clearly that diplomacy cannot introduce any new force into international politics now, or exert, an influence for peace that will be more potent in the future than the influence that it has exerted in the past. these considerations seem to show that we cannot reasonably expect civilization to divert nations from the path they have followed hitherto. can commerce impart the external force necessary to divert nations from that path? since commerce bears exactly the same relation to nations now as in times past, and since it is an agency within mankind itself, it is difficult to see how it can act as an external force, or cause an external force to be applied. of course, commercial interests are often opposed to national interests, and improvements in speed and sureness of communication and transportation increase the size and power of commercial organizations. but the same factors increase the power of governments and the solidarity of nations. at no time in the past has there been more national feeling in nations than now. even the loosely held provinces of china are forming a chinese nation. despite the fundamental commercialism of the age, national spirit is growing more intense, the present war being the main intensifying cause. it is true that the interests of commerce are in many ways antagonistic to those of war. but, on the other hand, of all the causes that occasion war the economic causes are the greatest. for no thing will men fight more savagely than for money; for no thing have men fought more savagely than for money; and the greater the rivalry, the more the man's life becomes devoted to it, and the more fiercely he will fight to get or keep it. surely of all the means by which we hope to avoid war, the most hopeless by far is commerce. the greatest of all hopes is in christianity, because of its inculcation of love and kindliness, its obvious influence on the individual in cultivating unselfishness and other peaceful virtues, and the fact that it is an inspiration from on high, and therefore a force external to mankind. but let us look the facts solemnly in the face that the christian religion has now been in effect for nearly two thousand years; that the nations now warring are christian nations, in the very foremost rank of christendom; that never in history has there been so much bloodshed in such wide-spread areas and so much hate, and that we see no signs that christianity is employing any influence that she has not been employing for nearly two thousand years. if we look for the influence of christianity, we can find it in the daily lives of people, in the family, in business, in politics, and in military bodies; everywhere, in fact, in christian countries, so long as we keep inside of any organization the members of which feel bound together. this we must all admit, even the heathen know it; but where do we see any evidence of the sweetening effect of christianity in the dealings of one organization with another with which it has no special bonds of friendship? christianity is invoked in every warring nation now to stimulate the patriotic spirit of the nation and intensify the hate of the crowd against the enemy; and even if we think that such invoking is a perversion of religious influence to unrighteous ends, we must admit the fact that the christian religion itself is at this moment being made to exert a powerful influence--not toward peace but toward war! and this should not amaze us; for where does the bible say or intimate that love among nations will ever be brought about? the saviour said: "i bring not peace but a sword." so what reasonable hope does even christianity give us that war between nations will cease? and even if it did give reasonable hope, let us realize that between reasonable hope and reasonable expectation there is a great gulf fixed. therefore, we seem forced to the conclusion that the world will move in the future in the same direction as in the past; that nations will become larger and larger and fewer and fewer, the immediate instrument of international changes being war; and that certain nations will become very powerful and nearly dominate the earth in turn, as persia, greece, rome, spain, france, and great britain have done--and as some other country soon may do. fortunately, or perhaps unfortunately, a certain law of decadence seems to have prevailed, because of which every nation, after acquiring great power, has in turn succumbed to the enervating effects which seem inseparable from it, and become the victim of some newer nation that has made strenuous preparations for long years, in secret, and finally pounced upon her as a lion on its prey. were it not for this tendency to decadence, we should expect that the nations of the earth would ultimately be divided into two great nations, and that these would contend for the mastery in a world-wide struggle. but if the present rate of invention and development continues, improvements in the mechanic arts will probably cause such increase in the power of weapons of destruction, and in the swiftness and sureness of transportation and communication, that some _monster of efficiency_ will have time to acquire world mastery before her period of decadence sets in. in this event, wars will be of a magnitude besides which the present struggle will seem pygmy; and will rage over the surface of the earth, for the gaining and retaining of the mastery of the world. chapter ii naval a, b, c in order to realize what principles govern the use of navies, let us first consider what navies have to do and get history's data as to what navies in the past have done. it would obviously be impossible to recount here all the doings of navies. but neither is it necessary; for the reason that, throughout the long periods of time in which history records them, their activities have nearly always been the same. in all cases in which navies have been used for war there was the preliminary dispute, often long-continued, between two peoples or their rulers, and at last the decision of the dispute by force. in all cases the decision went to the side that could exert the most force at the critical times and places. the fact that the causes of war have been civil, and not military, demands consideration, for the reason that some people, confusing cause and effect, incline to the belief that armies and navies are the cause of war, and that they are to be blamed for its horrors. history clearly declares the contrary, and shows that the only rôle of armies and navies has been to wage wars, and, by waging, to finish them. it may be well here, in order to clear away a possible preconception by the reader, to try and dispel the illusion that army and navy officers are eager for war, in order that they may get promotion. this idea has been exploited by people opposed to the development of the army and navy, and has been received with so much credulity that it seriously handicaps the endeavors of officers to get an unbiassed hearing. but surely the foolishness of such an idea would promptly disappear from the brain of any one if he would remind himself that simply because a man joins the army or navy he does not cease to be a human being, with the same emotions of fear as other men, the same sensitiveness to pain, the same dread of death, and the same horror of leaving his family unsupported after his death. it is true that men in armies and navies are educated to dare death if need be; but the present writer has been through two wars, has been well acquainted with army and navy officers for forty-five years, and knows positively that, barring exceptions, they do not desire war at all. without going into an obviously impossible discussion of all naval wars, it may be instructive to consider briefly the four naval wars in which the united states has engaged. the first was the war of the american revolution. this war is instructive to those who contend that the united states is so far from europe as to be safe from attack by a european fleet; because the intervening distance was frequently traversed then by british and french fleets of frail, slow, sailing ships, which were vital factors in the war. without the british war-ships, the british could not have landed and supported their troops. without the french war-ships the french could not have landed and supported their troops, who, under rochambeau, were also under washington, and gave him the assistance that he wofully needed, to achieve by arms our independence. the war of is instructive from the fact that, though the actions of our naval ships produced little material effect, the skill, daring, and success with which they were fought convinced europeans of the high character and consequent noble destiny of the american people. the british were so superior in sea strength, however, that they were able to send their fleet across the ocean and land a force on the shores of chesapeake bay. this force marched to washington, attacked the city, and burned the capitol and other public buildings, with little inconvenience to itself. the war of the rebellion is instructive because it shows how two earnest peoples, each believing themselves right, can be forced, by the very sincerity of their convictions, to wage war against each other; and because it shows how unpreparedness for war, with its accompanying ignorance of the best way in which to wage it, causes undue duration of a war and therefore needless suffering. if the north had not closed its eyes so resolutely to the fact of the coming struggle, it would have noted beforehand that the main weakness of the confederacy lay in its dependence on revenue from cotton and its inability to provide a navy that could prevent a blockade of its coasts; and the north would have early instituted a blockade so tight that the confederacy would have been forced to yield much sooner than it did. the north would have made naval operations the main effort, instead of the auxiliary effort; and would have substituted for much of the protracted and bloody warfare of the land the quickly decisive and comparatively merciful warfare of the sea. in the spanish war the friction between the united states and spain was altogether about cuba. no serious thought of the invasion of either country was entertained, no invasion was attempted, and the only land engagements were some minor engagements in cuba and the philippines. the critical operations were purely naval. in the first of these, commodore dewey's squadron destroyed the entire far eastern squadron of the spanish in manila bay; in the second, admiral sampson's squadron destroyed the entire atlantic squadron of the spanish near santiago de cuba. the two naval victories compelled spain to make terms of peace practically as the united states wished. attention is invited to the fact that this war was not a war of conquest, was not a war of aggression, was not a war of invasion, was not a war carried on by either side for any base purpose; but was in its intention and its results for the benefit of mankind. the russo-japanese war was due to conflicting national policies. while each side accused the other of selfish ends, it is not apparent to a disinterested observer that either was unduly selfish in its policy, or was doing more than every country ought to advance the interests and promote the welfare of its people. russia naturally had a great deal of interest in manchuria, and felt that she had a right to expand through the uncivilized regions of manchuria, especially since she needed a satisfactory outlet to the sea. in other words, the interests of russia were in the line of its expanding to the eastward. but japan's interests were precisely the reverse of russia's--that is, japan's interests demanded that russia should not do those things that russia wanted to do. japan felt that russia's movement toward the east was bringing her entirely too close to japan. russia was too powerful a country, and too aggressive, to be trusted so close. japan had the same feeling toward russia that any man might have on seeing another man, heavily armed, gradually coming closer to him in the night. japan especially wished that russia should have no foothold in corea, feeling, as she expressed it, that the point of corea under russian power would be a dagger directed at the heart of japan. this feeling about corea was the same feeling that every country has about land near her; it has a marked resemblance to the feeling that the united states has embodied in monroe doctrine. after several years of negotiation in which japan and russia endeavored to secure their respective aims by diplomacy, diplomacy was finally abandoned and the sword taken up instead. japan, _because of the superior foresight of her statesmen_, was the first to realize that diplomacy must fail, was the first to realize that she must prepare for war, was the first to begin adequate preparation for war, was the first to complete preparation for war, was the first to strike, and in consequence was the victor. yet russia was a very much larger, richer, more populous country than japan. russia sent large forces of soldiers to manchuria by the trans-siberian railroad, and japan sent large forces there by transports across the sea of japan. japan could not prevent the passage of soldiers by the railroad, but russia could prevent the passage of transports across the japan sea, provided her fleet could overcome the japanese fleet and get command of the sea. russia had a considerable fleet in the far east; but she had so underestimated the naval ability of the japanese, that the russian fleet proved unequal to the task; and the japanese gradually reduced it to almost nothing, with very little loss to themselves. russia then sent out another fleet. the japanese met this fleet on the th of may, , near the island of tsushima, between corea and japan. the battle was decided in about an hour. the japanese sank practically all the russian ships before the battle was entirely finished, with comparatively small loss to japan. this battle was carried on , miles by sea route from saint petersburg. no invasion of russia or japan was contemplated, or attempted, and yet the naval battle decided the issue of the war completely, and was followed by a treaty of peace very shortly afterward. these wars show us, as do all wars in which navies have engaged, that the function of a navy is not only to defend the coast in the sense of preventing an enemy from landing on it, but also to exert force far distant from the coast. the study of war has taught its students for many centuries that a merely passive defense will finally be broken down, and that the most effective defense is the "offensive-defensive." perhaps the clearest case of a correct offensive-defensive is nelson's defense of england, which he carried on in the mediterranean, in the west indies, and wherever the enemy fleet might be, finally defeating napoleon's plan for invading england--not by waiting off the coast of england, but by attacking and crippling napoleon's fleet off the spanish coast near trafalgar. the idea held by many people that the defense of a country can be effected by simply preventing the invasion of its coasts, is a little like the notion of uneducated people that a disease can be cured by suppressing its symptoms. for even a successful defense of a coast against invasion by a hostile force cannot remove the inimical influence to a country's commerce and welfare which that hostile force exerts, any more than palliatives can cure dyspepsia. every intelligent physician knows that the only way to cure a disease is to remove its cause; and every intelligent military or naval man knows that history teaches that the only way in which a country can defend itself successfully against an enemy is to defeat the armed force of that enemy--be it a force of soldiers on the land, or a force of war-ships on the sea. in naval parlance, "our objective is the enemy's fleet." if the duty of a navy be merely to prevent the actual invasion of its country's coasts, a great mistake has been made by great britain, france, and other countries in spending so much money on their navies, and in giving so much attention to the education and training of their officers and enlisted men. to prevent actual invasion would be comparatively an easy task, one that could be performed by rows of forts along the coast, supplemented by mines and submarines. if that is the only kind of defense required, navies are hardly needed. the army in each country could man the forts and operate the mines, and a special corps of the army could even operate the submarines, which (if their only office is to prevent actual invasion) need hardly leave the "three-mile limit" that skirts the coasts. if the people of any country do not care to have dealings outside; if the nation is willing to be in the position of a man who is safe so long as he stays in the house, but is afraid to go outdoors, the problem of national defense is easy. but if the people desire to prevent interference with what our constitution calls "the general welfare," the problem becomes exceedingly complex and exceedingly grave--more complex and grave than any other problem that they have. if they desire that their ships shall be free to sail the seas, and their citizens to carry on business and to travel in other lands; and if they desire that their merchants shall be able to export their wares and their farmers their grain, also that the people shall be able to import the things they wish from foreign countries, then they must be able to exert actual physical force on the ocean at any point where vessels carrying their exports and imports may be threatened. naval ships are the only means for doing this. the possibility that an armed force sent to a given point at sea might have to fight an enemy force, brought about first the sending of more than one vessel, and later--as the mechanic arts progressed--the increasing of the size of individual vessels, and later still the development of novel types. there are two main reasons for building a small number of large ships rather than a large number of small ships. the first reason is that large ships are much more steady, reliable, safe, and fast than small ships. the second reason is that, when designed for any given speed, the large ships have more space available for whatever is to be carried; one -knot ship of , tons normal displacement, for instance, has about one and a half times as much space available for cargo, guns, and what-not, as four -knot ships of , tons each. these two reasons apply to merchant ships as well as naval ships. a third reason applies to naval vessels only, and is that a few large ships can be handled much better together than a large number of small ships, and embody that "concentration of force" which it is the endeavor of strategy and tactics to secure. a fourth reason is the obvious one that large ships can carry larger guns than small ships. the distinctly military (naval) purpose for which a war-ship is designed necessitates, first, that in addition to her ability to go rapidly and surely from place to place, she be able to exert physical force against an enemy ship or fort, and, second, that she have protection against the fire of guns and torpedoes from enemy ships and forts, against bombs dropped from aircraft, and against mines. this means that a man-of-war, intended to exert the maximum of physical force against an enemy and to be able to withstand the maximum of punishment, must have guns and torpedoes for offense, and must have armor and cellular division of the hull for defense; the armor to keep out the enemy's shells, and the cellular division of the hull to prevent the admission of more water than can fill one water-tight compartment in case the ship is hit. it must be admitted here that, at the present moment, torpedoes hold such large charges of explosive that the cellular division of ships does not adequately protect them. this means that a contest has been going on between torpedo-makers and naval constructors like the contest between armor-makers and gunmakers, and that just now the torpedo-makers are in the lead. for this reason a battleship needs other protection than that imparted by its cellular subdivision. this is given by its "torpedo defense battery" of minor guns of about -inch calibre. by reason of the great vulnerability of all ships to attack below the water-line, the torpedo was invented and developed. in its original form, the torpedo was motionless in the water, either anchored to the ground, or floating on the surface, and was in fact what now is called a "mine." but forty-eight years ago an englishman named whitehead invented the automobile, auto-steering, torpedo, which still bears his name. this torpedo is used in all the navies, and is launched on its mission from battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and other craft of various kinds. most torpedoes are to be found in destroyers--long, fast, frail vessels, averaging about tons displacement, that are intended to dash at enemy ships at night, or under other favorable conditions, launch their torpedoes, and hurry away. the torpedo is "a weapon of opportunity." it has had a long, slow fight for its existence; but its success during the present war has established it firmly in naval warfare. the submarine has followed the destroyer, and some people think will supplant it; though its relatively slow speed prevents those dashes that are the destroyer's rôle. the submarine is, however, a kind of destroyer that is submersible, in which the necessities of submersibility preclude great speed. the submarine was designed to accomplish a clear and definite purpose--a secret under-water attack on an enemy's ship in the vicinity. it has succeeded so well in its limited mission that some intelligent people declare that we need submarines only--ignoring the fact that, even if submarines could successfully prevent actual invasion, they could not carry on operations at a distance from their base of supplies. it is true that submarines may be made so large that they can steam at great speed from place to place, as capital ships steam now, carry large supplies of fuel and food, house their crews hygienically, and need no "mother ship" or tender. but if submarines achieve such size, they will be more expensive to build and run than battleships--and will be, in fact, submersible battleships. in other words, the submarine cannot displace the battleship, but may be developed and evolved into a new and highly specialized type of battleship. the necessity for operating at long distances from a base carries with it the necessity for supplying more fuel than even a battleship can carry; and this means that colliers must be provided. in most countries, the merchant service is so large that colliers can be taken from it, but in the united states no adequate merchant marine exists, and so it is found necessary to build navy colliers and have them in the fleet. the necessity for continuously supplying food and ammunition to the fleet necessitates supply ships and ammunition ships; but the problem of supplying food and ammunition is not so difficult as that of supplying fuel, for the reason that they are consumed more slowly. in order to take care of the sick and wounded, and prevent them from hampering the activities of the well, hospital ships are needed. hospital ships should, of course, be designed for that purpose before being constructed; but usually hospital ships were originally passenger ships, and were adapted to hospital uses later. the menace of the destroyer--owing to the sea-worthiness which this type has now achieved, and to the great range which the torpedo has acquired--has brought about the necessity of providing external protection to the battleships; and this is supplied by a "screen" of cruisers and destroyers, whose duty is to keep enemy destroyers and (so far as is practicable) the submarines at a safe distance. we now see why a fleet must be composed of various types of vessels. at the present moment, the battleship is the primary, or paramount type, the others secondary, because the battleship is the type that can exert the most force, stand the hardest punishment, steam the farthest in all kinds of weather, and in general, serve her country the best. of course, "battleship" is merely a name, and some think not a very good name, to indicate a ship that can take the part in battle that used to be taken by the "ship of the line." the reason for its primacy is fundamental: its displacement or total weight--the same reason that assured the primacy of the ship of the line. for displacement rules the waves; if "britannia rules the waves," it is simply because britannia has more displacement than any other power. the fleet needs to have a means of knowing where the enemy is, how many ships he has, what is their character, the direction in which they are steaming, and their speed. to accomplish this purpose, "scouts" are needed--fast ships, that can steam far in all kinds of weather and send wireless messages across great distances. so far as their scout duties go, such vessels need no guns whatever, and no torpedoes; but because the enemy will see the scout as soon as the scout sees the enemy, and because the enemy will try to drive away the scout by gun and torpedo fire, the scouts must be armed. and this necessity is reinforced by the necessity of driving off an enemy's scouts. in foreign navies the need for getting information in defiance of an enemy's attempts to prevent it, and to drive off the armed scouts of an enemy, has been one of the prime reasons for developing "battle cruisers," that combine the speed of the destroyer with the long steaming radius of the battleship, a battery almost as strong, and a very considerable protection by armor. the aeroplane and the air-ship are recent accessions to the list of fighting craft. their rôle in naval warfare cannot yet be defined, because the machines themselves have not yet reached an advanced stage of development, and their probable performance cannot be forecast. there is no doubt, however, in the minds of naval men that the rôle of aircraft is to be important and distinguished. chapter iii naval power mahan proved that sea power has exercised a determining influence on history. he proved that sea power has been necessary for commercial success in peace and military success in war. he proved that, while many wars have culminated with the victory of some army, the victory of some navy had been the previous essential. he proved that the immediate cause of success had often resulted inevitably from another cause, less apparent because more profound; that the operations of the navy had previously brought affairs up to the "mate in four moves," and that the final victory of the army was the resulting "checkmate." before mahan proved his doctrine, it was felt in a general way that sea power was necessary to the prosperity and security of a nation. mahan was not the first to have this idea, for it had been in the minds of some men, and in the policy of one nation, for more than a century. neither was mahan the first to put forth the idea in writing; but he was the first to make an absolute demonstration of the truth. newton was not the first man to know, or to say, that things near the earth tend to fall to the earth; but he was the first to formulate and prove the doctrine of universal gravitation. in the same way, all through history, we find that a few master minds have been able to group what had theretofore seemed unrelated phenomena, and deduce from them certain laws. in this way they substituted reasoning for speculation, fact for fancy, wisdom for opportunism, and became the guides of the human race. the effect of the acceptance of mahan's doctrine was felt at once. realizing that the influence of sea power was a fact, comprehending great britain's secret, after mahan had disclosed it, certain other great nations of the world, especially germany, immediately started with confidence and vigor upon the increase of their own sea power, and pushed it to a degree before unparalleled; with a result that must have been amazing to the man who, more than any other, was responsible for it. since the words "sea power," or their translation, is a recognized phrase the world over, and since the power of sea power is greater than ever before, and is still increasing, it may be profitable to consider sea power as an entity, and to inquire what are its leading characteristics, and in what it mainly consists. there is no trouble in defining what the sea is, but there is a good deal of trouble in defining what power is. if we look in a dictionary, we shall find a good many definitions of power; so many as to show that there are many different kinds of power, and that when we read of "power," it is necessary to know what kind of power is meant. clearly "sea power" means power on the sea. but what kind of power? there are two large classes into which power may be divided, passive and active. certainly we seem justified, at the start, in declaring that the power meant by mahan was not passive, but active. should this be granted, we cannot be far from right if we go a step further, and declare that sea power means ability to do something on the sea. if we ask what the something is that sea power has ability to do, we at once perceive that sea power may be divided into two parts, commercial power and naval power. the power exerted by commercial sea power is clearly that exerted by the merchant service, and is mainly the power of acquiring money. it is true that the merchant service has the power of rendering certain services in war, especially the power of providing auxiliary vessels, and of furnishing men accustomed to the sea; but as time goes on the power contributable by the merchant service must steadily decrease, because of the relatively increasing power of the naval service, and the rapidly increasing difference between the characteristics of ships and men suitable for the merchant service and those suitable for the naval service. but even in the past, while the importance of the merchant service was considerable in the ways just outlined, it may perhaps be questioned whether it formed an element of _sea power_, in the sense in which mahan discussed sea power. the power of every country depends on all the sources of its wealth: on its agriculture, on its manufacturing activities, and even more directly on the money derived from exports. but these sources of wealth and all sources of wealth, including the merchant service, can hardly be said to be elements of power themselves, but rather to be elements for whose protection power is required. in fact, apart from its usefulness in furnishing auxiliaries, it seems certain that the merchant service has been an element of _weakness_. the need for navies arose from the weakness of merchant ships and the corresponding necessity for assuring them safe voyages and proper treatment even in time of peace; while in time of war they have always been an anxious care, and have needed and received the protection of fighting ships that have been taken away from the fleet to act as convoys. if commercial sea power was not the power meant by mahan, then he must have meant naval power. and if one reads the pages of history with patient discrimination, the conviction must grow on him that what really constituted the sea power which had so great an influence on history, was _naval_ power; not the power of simply ships upon the sea, but the power of a navy composed of ships able to fight, manned by men trained to fight, under the command of captains skilled to fight, and led by admirals determined to fight. trafalgar was not won by the merchant service; nor mobile, manila, or tsushima. if sea power be essentially naval power, it may be interesting to inquire: in what does naval power consist and what are its principal characteristics? if one looks at a fleet of war-ships on the sea, he will be impressed consciously or unconsciously with the idea of power. if he is impressed consciously, he will see that the fleet represents power in the broadest sense--power active and power passive; power to do and power to endure; power to exert force and power to resist it. if he goes further and analyzes the reasons for this impression of power, he will see that it is not merely a mental suggestion, but a realization of the actual existence of tremendous mechanical power, under complete direction and control. in mechanics we get a definition of power, which, like all definitions in mechanics, is clear, definite, and correct. in mechanics, power is the rate at which mechanical work is performed. it is ability to do something in a certain definite time. now this definition gives us a clear idea of the way in which a navy directly represents power, because the power which a navy exerts is, primarily, mechanical; and any other power which it exerts is secondary and derived wholly from its mechanical power. the power of a gun is due wholly to the mechanical energy of its projectile, which enables it to penetrate a resisting body; and the power of a moving ship is due wholly to the mechanical energy of the burning coal within its furnaces. it may be objected that it is not reasonable to consider a ship's energy of motion as an element of naval power, in the mechanical sense in which we have been using the word "power," for the reason that it could be exerted only by the use of her ram, an infrequent use. to this it may be answered that energy is energy, no matter to what purpose it is applied; that a given projectile going at a given speed has a certain energy, whether it strikes its target or misses it; and that a battleship going at a certain speed must necessarily have a certain definite energy, no matter whether it is devoted to ramming another ship or to carrying itself and its contents from one place to another. besides the mechanical power exerted by the mere motion of the ship, and often superior to it, there is the power of her guns and torpedoes. perhaps the most important single invention ever made was the invention of gunpowder. why? because it put into the hands of man a tremendous force, compressed into a very small volume, which he could use instantaneously or refrain from using at his will. its first use was in war; and in war has been its main employment ever since. war gives the best field for the activity of gunpowder, because in war, we always wish to exert a great force at a definite point at a given instant; usually in order to _penetrate_ the bodies of men, or some defensive work that protects them. gunpowder is the principal agent used in war up to the present date. it is used by both armies and navies, but navies use it in larger masses, fired in more powerful guns. of course this does not mean that it would be impossible to send a lot of powder to a fort, more than a fleet could carry, and fire it; but it does mean that history shows that forts have rarely been called upon to fire much powder, that their lives have been serene, and that most of the powder fired on shore has been fired by infantry using muskets--though a good deal has been fired by field and siege artillery. leaving forts out of consideration and searching for something else in which to use gunpowder on a large scale, we come to siege-pieces, field-pieces, and muskets. disregarding siege-pieces and field-pieces, for the reason that the great variety of types makes it difficult to compare them with navy guns, we come to muskets. now the musket is an extremely formidable weapon, and has, perhaps, been the greatest single contributor to the victory of civilization over barbarism, and order over anarchy, that has ever existed up to the present time. but the enormous advances in engineering, including ordnance, during the last fifty years, have reduced enormously the relative value of the musket. remembering that energy, or the ability to do work, is expressed by the formula: e= / mv^ , remembering that the projectile of the modern -inch gun starts at about , f. s. velocity and weighs pounds, while the bullet of a musket weighs only grains and starts with a velocity of , feet per second, we see that the energy of the -inch projectile is about , times that of the bullet on leaving the muzzle. but after the bullet has gone, say , yards, its energy has fallen to zero, while the energy of the -inch projectile is nearly the same as when it started. while it would be truthful, therefore, to say that the energy of the -inch gun within , yards is greater than that of , muskets, it would also be truthful to say that outside of , yards, millions of muskets would not be equal to one -inch gun. not only is the -inch gun a weapon incomparably great, compared with the musket, but when placed in a naval ship, it possesses a portability which, while not an attribute of the gun itself, is an attribute of the combination of gun and ship, and a distinct attribute of naval power. a -inch gun placed in a fort may be just as good as a like gun placed in a ship, but it has no power to exert its power usefully unless some enemy comes where the gun can hit it. and when one searches the annals of history for the records of whatever fighting forts have done, he finds that they have been able to do very little. but a -inch gun placed in a man-of-war can be taken where it is needed, and recent history shows that naval -inch guns, modern though they are, have already done effective work in war. not only are -inch guns powerful and portable, but modern mechanical science has succeeded in so placing them in our ships that they can be handled with a precision, quickness, and delicacy that have no superior in any other branch of engineering. while granting the difficulty of an exact comparison, i feel no hesitation in affirming that the greatest triumph of the engineering art in handling heavy masses is to be found in the turret of a battleship. here again, and even inside of , yards, we find the superiority of the great gun over the musket, as evidenced by its accuracy in use. no soldier can fire his musket, even on a steady platform, himself and target stationary, and the range known perfectly, as accurately as a gun-pointer can fire a -inch gun; and if gun and target be moving, and the wind be blowing, and the range only approximately known, as is always the case in practice, the advantage of the big gun in accuracy becomes incomparable. but it is not only the big projectile itself which has energy, for this projectile carries a large charge of high explosive, which exploding some miles away from where it started, exerts a power inherent in itself, that was exhibited with frightful effect at the battles of tsushima and the skagerak. this brings us to the auto-torpedo, a weapon recently perfected; in fact not perfected yet. here is another power that science has put into the hands of naval men in addition to those she had already put there. the auto-torpedo, launched in security from below the water-line of the battleship, or from a destroyer or submarine, can be directed in a straight line over a distance and with a speed that are constantly increasing with the improvement of the weapon. at the present moment, a speed of knots over , yards can be depended on, with a probability that on striking an enemy's ship below the water-line it will disable that ship, if not sink her. there seems no doubt that, in a very few years, the systematic experiments now being applied to the development of the torpedo will result in a weapon which can hardly be called inferior to the -inch or even -inch gun and will probably surpass it. _controllability_.--if one watches a fleet of ships moving on the sea, he gets an impression of tremendous power. but if he watches niagara, or a thunder-storm, he also gets an impression of tremendous power. but the tremendous power of niagara, or the thunder-storm, is a power that belongs to niagara or the thunder-storm, and not to man. man cannot control the power of niagara or the thunder-storm; but he can control the power of a fleet. speaking, then, from the standpoint of the human being, one may say that the fleet has the element of controllability, while niagara and the thunder-storm have not. one man can make the fleet go faster or slower or stop; he can increase its power of motion or decrease it at his will; he can reduce it to zero. he cannot do so with the forces of nature. _directability_.--not only can one man control the power of the fleet, he can also direct it; that is, can turn it to the right or the left as much as he wishes. but one man cannot change the direction of motion of niagara or the lightning-bolt. _power, controllability, and directability_.--we may say, then, that a fleet combines the three elements of mechanical power, controllability, and directability. _the unit of military power_.--this is an enormous power that has come into the hands of the naval nations; but it has come so newly that we do not appreciate it yet. one reason why we do not and cannot appreciate it correctly is that no units have been established by which to measure it. to supply this deficiency, the author begs leave to point out that, since the military power of every nation has until recently been its army, of which the unit has been the soldier, whose power has rested wholly in his musket, the musket has actually been the unit of military power. in all history, the statement of the number of men in each army has been put forward by historians as giving the most accurate idea of their fighting value; and in modern times, nearly all of these men have been armed with muskets only. it has been said already that the main reason why the invention of gunpowder was so important was that it put into the hands of man a tremendous mechanical power compressed into a very small space, which man could use or not use at his will. this idea may be expressed by saying that gunpowder combines power and great controllability. but it was soon discovered that this gunpowder, put into a tube with a bullet in front of it, could discharge that bullet in any given direction. a musket was the result, and it combined the three requisites of a weapon--mechanical power, controllability, and directability. while the loaded gun is perhaps the clearest example of the combination of the three factors we are speaking of, the moving ship supplies the next best example. it has very much greater mechanical power; and in proportion to its mass, almost as much controllability and directability. the control and direction of a moving ship are very wonderful things; but the very ease with which they are exercised makes us overlook the magnitude of the achievement and the perfection of the means employed. it may seem absurd to speak of one man controlling and directing a great ship, but that is pretty nearly what happens sometimes; for sometimes the man at the wheel is the only man on board doing anything at all; and he is absolutely directing the entire ship. at such times (doubtless they are rare and short) the man at the wheel on board, say the _vaterland_, is directing unassisted by any human being a mass of , tons, which is going through the water at a speed of knots, or miles, an hour, nearly as fast as the average passenger-train. in fact, it would be very easy to arrange on board the _vaterland_ that this should actually happen; that everybody should take a rest for a few minutes, coal-passers, water-tenders, oilers, engineers, and the people on deck. and while such an act might have no particular value, _per se_, and prove nothing important, yet, nevertheless, a brief reflection on the possibility may be interesting, and lead us to see clearly into the essential nature of what is here called "directability." the man at the wheel on board the _vaterland_, so long as the fires burn and the oil continues to lubricate the engines, has a power in his hands that is almost inconceivable. the ship that he is handling weighs more than the , men that comprise the standing army of germany. now can anybody imagine the entire standing army of germany being carried along at miles an hour and turned almost instantly to the right or left by one man? the standing army of germany is supposed to be the most directable organization in the world; but could the emperor of germany move that army at a speed of miles an hour and turn it as a whole (not its separate units) through degrees in three minutes? the _vaterland_ being a merchant ship and not fully representing naval power, perhaps it might be better to take, say, the _pennsylvania_. the weight is about half that of the _vaterland_, that is, it is nearly twice the weight of the men of the british standing army; and the usual speed is about, say, knots. but in addition to all the power of the ship, as a ship, or an energy greater than that of , muskets, she has the power of all the guns, twelve -inch guns, and twenty-two -inch guns, whose projectiles, not including the torpedoes fired from four torpedo-tubes, have an energy at the muzzle equal to , muskets, seven-eighths of all the muskets in the german standing army. now any one who has seen a battleship at battle practice knows that all the various tremendous forces are under excellent direction and control. and while it cannot be strictly said that they are absolutely under the direction and control of the captain, while it must be admitted that no one man can really direct so many rapidly moving things, yet it is certainly well within the truth to say that the ship and all it contains are very much more under the control of her captain than the german standing army is under the control of the kaiser. the captain, acting through the helmsman, chief engineer, gunnery officer, and executive officer, can get very excellent information as to what is going on, and can have his orders carried out with very little delay; but the mere space occupied by an army of , men, and the unavoidable dispersion of its units prevent any such exact control. in other words, the captain of the _pennsylvania_ wields a weapon more mechanically powerful than all the muskets of the german standing army: and his control of it is more absolute than is the kaiser's control of that army. _mechanism vs. men_.--now what is the essential reason for the efficient direction exercised by the helmsman of the _pennsylvania_, and the relative impotency of generals? is it not that the helmsman acts through the medium of mechanism, while the generals act through the medium of men? a ship is not only made of rigid metal, but all her parts are fastened together with the utmost rigidity; while the parts of an army are men, who are held together by no means whatever except that which discipline gives, and the men themselves are far from rigid. in the nature of things it is impossible that an army should be directed as perfectly as a ship. the rudder of a ship is a mechanical appliance that can be depended upon to control the direction of the ship absolutely, while an army has no such a thing as a rudder, or anything to take its place. again, the rudder is only a few hundred feet from the helmsman, and the communication between them, including the steering-engine itself, is a strong reliable mechanism that has no counterpart in the army. the control of the main engines of a ship is almost as absolute as the control of the rudder; and the main engines are not only much more powerful than the legs of soldiers, but they act together in much greater harmony. _inherent power of a battleship_.--possibly the declaration may be accepted now that a battleship of , tons, such as the navies are building now, with, say, twelve -inch guns is a greater example of power, under the absolute direction and control than anything else existing; and that the main reason is the concentration of a tremendous amount of mechanical energy in a very small space, all made available by certain properties of water. nothing like a ship can be made to run on shore; but if an automobile could be constructed, carrying twelve -inch guns, twenty-two -inch guns, and four torpedo-tubes, of the size of the _pennsylvania_, and with her armor, able to run over the land in any direction at knots, propelled by engines of , horse-power, it could whip an army of a million men just as quickly as it could get hold of its component parts. such a machine could start at one end of an army and go through to the other like a mowing-machine through a field of wheat; and knock down all the buildings in new york afterward, smash all the cars, break down all the bridges, and sink all the shipping. _inherent power of a fleet_.--an idea of the power exertable by a fleet of modern ships may be derived from the following comparison. when sherman made his wonderful march to the sea from atlanta to savannah, he made a march whose details are historically known, which was unopposed, which was over a flat country, in good weather, and without the aid of railroad-trains. it was a march, pure and simple; and inasmuch as men are the same now as they were then, it gives excellent data of the way in which purely military or army power can move from one place to another, _while still preserving its character and exercising its functions_. similarly, when admiral schroeder, in november, , went from the east coast of the united states to the english channel, his march was unopposed, its details are known, and it gave an excellent illustration of how naval power can move from one place to another, _while still preserving its character and exercising its functions_. now general sherman was a man of world-wide fame, and so were some of his generals, and sherman's fame will last for centuries. compared with sherman, admiral schroeder was obscure; and compared with sherman's officers, admiral schroeder's were obscure. sherman's soldiers, privates and all, were made glorious for the rest of their lives by having been in sherman's march to the sea, while admiral schroeder's sailors achieved no glory at all. so, the next paragraph is not intended to detract in the slightest from sherman and his army, but simply to point out the change in conditions that mechanical progress has brought about. the statement of comparison is simply that when general sherman marched from atlanta to the sea his army composed , men, and it took him twenty-five days to go about land miles or sea miles; and when admiral schroeder went from our coast to europe he had ships, and he made the trip of more than , sea miles in less than fourteen days. disregarding twenty-eight -inch guns, two hundred and fifty-two -inch guns, and a lot of smaller guns, and disregarding all the torpedoes, admiral schroeder took eighty-four -inch guns, ninety-six -inch guns, eighty-eight -inch guns, and forty-eight -inch guns, _all mounted and available_; which, assuming the power of the modern musket as a unit, equalled more than , , modern muskets. such an enormous transfer of absolute, definite, available power would be impossible on land, simply because no means has been devised to accomplish it. such a transfer on land would be the transfer of ninety times as many soldiers as sherman had (even supposing they had modern muskets) over fifteen times the distance and at thirty times the speed; and as the work done in going from one place to another varies practically as the square of the speed, a transfer on land equivalent in magnitude and speed to schroeder's would be a performance x x ^ = , , times as great as sherman's. this may seem absurd, and perhaps it is; but why? the comparison is not between the qualities of the men or between the results achieved. great results often are brought about by very small forces, as when some state of equilibrium is disturbed, and vice versa. the comparison attempted is simply between the _power_ of a certain army and the power of a certain fleet. and while it is true that, for some purposes, such as overcoming small resistance, great power may not be as efficacious as feeble power or even gentleness, yet, nevertheless, it must be clear that, for the overcoming of _great_ resistance quickly great power must be applied. the existence of a certain power is quite independent of the desirability of using it. the existence of the power is all the writer wishes to insist upon at present; the question of its employment will be considered later. not only is the power of a fleet immeasurably greater than that of an army, but it must always be so, from the very nature of things. the speed of an army, _while exercising the functions of an army_, and the power of a musket, while exercising its functions as a weapon of one soldier, cannot change much from what they were when sherman went marching through georgia. but, thanks to mechanical science, there is no limit in sight to the power to which a fleet may attain. the power of a navy is of recent growth, but it is increasing and is going to continue to increase. every advance of civilization will advance the navy. every new discovery and invention will directly or indirectly serve it. the navy, more than any other thing, will give opportunity for mechanism and to mechanism. far beyond any possible imagination of to-day, it will become the highest expression of the genius of mechanism, and the embodiment of its spirit. the amount of money now being spent by the united states on its navy is so great that the expenditure can be justified only on the basis that great naval power is essential to the country. is it essential, and if so, why? _primary use for a navy_.--to answer this wisely, it may be well to remind ourselves that the principal object of all the vocations of men is directly or indirectly the acquiring of money. money, of course, is not wealth; but it is a thing which can be so easily exchanged for wealth, that it is the thing which most people work for. of course, at bottom, the most important work is the getting of food out of the ground; but inasmuch as people like to congregate together in cities, the thing taken out of the ground in one place must be transported to other places; and inasmuch as every person wants every kind of thing that he can get, a tremendous system of interchange, through the medium of money, has been brought about, which is called "trade." for the protection of property and life, and in order that trade may exist at all, an enormous amount of human machinery is employed which we call "government." this government is based on innumerable laws, but these laws would be of no avail unless they were carried out; and every nation in the world has found that employment of a great deal of force is necessary in order that they shall be carried out. this force is mainly exercised by the police of the cities; but many instances have occurred in the history of every country where the authority of the police has had to be supported by the army of the national government. there is no nation in the world, and there never has been one, in which the enforcement of the necessary laws for the protection of the lives, property, and trade of the people has not depended ultimately on the army; and the reason why the army could enforce the laws was simply the fact that the army had the power to inflict suffering and death. as long as a maritime country carried on trade within its own borders exclusively, as long as it lived within itself, so long as its people did not go to countries oversea, a navy was not necessary. but when a maritime country is not contented to live within its own borders, then a navy becomes essential to guard its people and their possessions on the highways of the sea; to enforce, not municipal or national law, as an army does, but international law. now the desire of the people of a country to extend their trade beyond the seas seems in some ways not always a conscious desire, not a deliberate intent, but to be an effort of self-protection, or largely an effort of expansion; for getting room or employment. as the people of a country become civilized, labor-saving devices multiply; and where one man by means of a machine can do the work of a hundred, ninety-nine men may be thrown out of employment; out of a hundred men who till the soil, only one man may be selected and ninety-nine men have to seek other employment. where shall it be gotten? evidently it must be gotten in some employment which may be called "artificial," such as working in a shop of some kind, or doing some manufacturing work. but so long as a people live unto themselves only, each nation can practically make and use all the machinery needed within its borders, and still not employ all the idle hands; and when the population becomes dense, employment must be sought in making goods to sell beyond the sea. the return comes back, sometimes in money, sometimes in the products of the soil and the mine and the manufactures of foreign lands. in this way every nation becomes like a great business firm. it exports (that is, sells,) certain things, and it imports (that is, buys,) certain things; and if it sells more than it buys it is making money; if it buys more than it sells it is spending money. this is usually expressed by saying that the "balance of trade" is in its favor or against it. in a country like the united states, or any other great nation, the amount of exporting and importing, of buying and selling almost every conceivable article under the sun, is carried on in the millions and millions of dollars; and so perfect has the organization for doing this business become in every great country, that the products of the most distant countries can be bought in almost every village; and any important event in any country produces a perceptible effect wherever the mail and telegraph go. the organization for effecting this in every country is so excellent and so wonderful, that it is like a machine. in fact, it is a machine, and with all the faults of a machine. now one of the faults of a machine, a fault which increases in importance with the complexity of the machine, is the enormous disturbance which may be produced by a cause seemingly trivial. that such is the case with the machine which the commerce of every great nation comprises, every-day experience confirms. so long as the steamers come and go with scheduled regularity, so long will the money come in at the proper intervals and be distributed through the various channels; so long will the people live the lives to which they are habituated; so long will order reign. but suppose the coming and going of all the steamers were suddenly stopped by a blockade. while it may be true that, in a country like the united states, no foreign trade is really necessary; while it may be true that the people of the united states would be just as happy, though not so rich, if they had no foreign trade--yet the sudden stoppage of foreign trade would not bring about a condition such as would have existed if we had never had any foreign trade, but would bring about a chaotic condition which cannot fitly be described by a feebler word than "horrible." the whole machinery of every-day life would be disabled. hundreds of thousands of people would be thrown out of employment, and the whole momentum of the rapidly moving enormous mass of american daily life would receive a violent shock which would strain to its elastic limit every part of the entire machine. it would take a large book to describe what would ensue from the sudden stoppage of the trade of the united states with countries over the sea. such a book would besides be largely imaginative; because in our history such a condition has never yet arisen. although wars have happened in the past in which there has been a blockade of our coast more or less complete, peace has been declared before the suffering produced had become very acute; and furthermore the conditions of furious trade which now exist have never existed before. disasters would ensue, apart from the actual loss of money, owing simply to the sudden change. in a railroad-train standing still or moving at a uniform speed, the passengers are comfortable; but if that same train is suddenly brought to rest when going at a high speed, say by collision, the consequences are horrible in the extreme, and the horror is caused _simply by the suddenness of the change_. the same is true all through nature and human nature. any sudden change in the velocity of any mass has its exact counterpart in any sudden change in the conditions of living of any man or woman, or any sudden change in the conditions under which any organization must carry on its business. the difficulty is not with individuals only, or with the organizations themselves, and does not rest solely on the personal inability of people to accommodate themselves to the losing of certain conveniences or luxuries; but it is an inertia which resists even the strenuous efforts of individuals and organizations to meet new situations promptly, and to grapple effectively with new problems. every organization, no matter how small, is conducted according to some system, and that system is based upon certain more or less permanent conditions, which, if suddenly changed, make the system inapplicable. the larger the organization and the more complex it is, the more will it be deranged by any change of external conditions and the longer time will it take to adapt itself to them. the sudden stoppage of our sea trade, including our coasting trade, by even a partial blockade of our ports, would change practically all the conditions under which we live. there is hardly a single organization in the country which would not be affected by it. and, as every organization would know that every other organization would be affected, but to a degree which could not possibly be determined, because there would be no precedent, it cannot be an exaggeration to declare that the blockading of our principal ports would, entirely apart from direct loss of money and other commodities, produce a state of confusion, out of which order could not possibly be evolved except by the raising of the blockade. in addition to the confusion brought about, there would, of course, be the direct loss of money and non-receipt of imported things; but what would probably be the very worst thing of all would be the numbers of men thrown out of employment by the loss of foreign markets. _so long as a country can keep its people in employment, so long the people will live in comparative order_. but when there are many unemployed men in a country, not only do their families lose the means of subsistence, but the very fact of the men being unemployed leads them into mischief. should the ports of any great commercial nation be suddenly closed, the greatest danger to the country would not be from the enemy outside, but from the unemployed people inside, unless the government gave them employment, by enlisting them in an enormous, improvised army. it will be seen, therefore, that the blockading of the principal ports of any purely commercial country would be a disaster so great that there could not be a greater one except actual invasion. another disaster might be the total destruction of its fleet by the enemy's fleet; but the only _direct_ result of this would be that the people of the country would have fewer ships to support and fewer men to pay. the loss of the fleet and the men would not _per se_ be any loss whatever to the country, but rather a gain. the loss of the fleet, however, would make it possible for the enemy's fleet to blockade our ports later, and thus bring about the horrors of which we have spoken. while it is true that an absolute blockade of any port might be practically impossible at the present day, while it is true that submarines and torpedo-boats might compel blockading ships to keep at such distance from ports that many loopholes of escape would be open to blockade runners, yet it may be pointed out that even a partial blockade, even a blockade that made it risky for vessels to try to break it, would have a very deleterious effect upon the prosperity of the country and of every man, woman, and child within it. a blockade like this was that maintained during the greater part of the civil war by the northern states against the southern states. this blockade, while not perfect, while it was such as to permit many vessels to pass both ways, was nevertheless so effective that it made it impossible for the southern states to be prosperous, or to have any reasonable hope of ever being prosperous. and while it would be an exaggeration to state that the navy itself, unaided by the army, could have brought the south to terms; while it would be an exaggeration to state that all the land battles fought in the civil war were unnecessary, that all the bloodshed and all the ruin of harvests and of homesteads were unnecessary, nevertheless it does seem that so long as the navy maintained the blockade which it did maintain, the people of the south would have been prevented from achieving enough prosperity to carry on an independent government; so that their revolt would have failed. the south, not being able to raise the blockade by means of their navy, might have tried to do so by sending an army into the northern states, to whip the northerners on their own ground; but this would clearly have been impossible. the sentences above are not written with the intention of minimizing the services rendered by the army in the civil war, or of detracting from the glory of the gallant officers and men who composed it, or of subtracting one jot or tittle from a grateful appreciation of their hardships and bloodshed; neither do they dare to question the wisdom of the statesmen who directed that the war should be fought mainly by the army. their sole intention is to point out that, if a meagre naval force could produce so great an effect against a country _mainly agricultural_, a very powerful naval force, blockading effectively the principal ports of a _manufacturing country_, would have an effect so great that it can hardly be estimated. it is plainly to be seen that the effect of a blockade against a purely commercial country by a modern navy would be incomparably greater now than it was fifty years ago, for two very important reasons. one reason is that the progress of modern engineering has made navies very much more powerful than they were fifty years ago; and the other reason is that the same cause has made countries very much more vulnerable to blockade, because it has made so many millions of people dependent upon manufacturing industries and the export of manufactured things, and forced them to live an artificial life. while the united states, for instance, does not depend for its daily bread on the regular coming of wheat from over the sea, yet millions of its people do depend, though indirectly, upon the money from the export of manufactured things; for with countries, as with people, habits are formed both of system and of mode of life, which it is dangerous suddenly to break; so that a country soon becomes as dependent upon outside commerce as a man does upon outside air, and a people suddenly deprived of a vigorous outside commerce would seem to be smothered almost like a man deprived of outside air. a rough idea of the possible effect of a blockade of our coast may be gathered from the fact that our exports last year were valued at more than $ , , , ; which means that goods to this amount were sold, for which a return was received, either in money or its equivalent, most of it, ultimately, as wages for labor. of course no blockade could stop all of this; but it does not seem impossible that it could stop half of it, if our fleet were destroyed by the enemy. supposing that this half were divided equally among all the people in the united states, it would mean that each man, woman, and child would lose about $ in one year. if the loss could be so divided up, perhaps no very great calamity would ensue. but, of course, no such division could be made, with the result that a great many people, especially poor people, earning wages by the day, would lose more than they could stand. suppose, for instance, that a number of people earning about $ a year, by employment in export enterprises, were the people upon whom the actual loss eventually fell by their being thrown out of employment. this would mean that more than a million people--men, women, and children--would be actually deprived of the means of living. it seems clear that such a thing would be a national disaster, for any loss of money to one man always means a loss of money or its equivalent to other men besides. for instance: suppose a owes $ to b, b owes $ to c, c owes $ to d, d owes $ to e, e owes $ to f, f owes $ to g, g owes $ to h, h owes $ to i, and i to j. if a is able to pay b, and does so, then b pays c, and so on, and everybody is happy. but suppose that a for some reason, say a blockade, fails to receive some money that he expected; then a cannot pay b, b cannot pay c, and so on; with the result, that not only does j lose his $ , but nine men are put in debt $ which they cannot pay; with the further result that a is dunned by h, b is dunned by c, and so on, producing a condition of distress which would seem to be out of all proportion to a mere lack of $ , but which would, nevertheless, be the actual result. so in this country of , , people, the sudden loss of $ , , , a year would produce a distress seemingly out of all proportion to that sum of money, because the individual loss of every loser would be felt by everybody else. since to a great manufacturing nation, like ours, the greatest danger from outside (except actual invasion) would seem to be the sudden stoppage of her oversea trade by blockade, we seem warranted in concluding that, since _the only possible means of preventing a blockade is a navy_, the primary use for our navy is to prevent blockade. this does not mean that a fleet's place is on its own coast, because a blockade might be better prevented by having the fleet elsewhere; in fact it is quite certain that its place is not on the coast as a rule, but at whatever point is the best with relation to the enemy's fleet, until the enemy's fleet is destroyed. in fact, since the defensive and the offensive are so inseparably connected that it is hard sometimes to tell where one begins and the other ends, the best position for our fleet might be on the enemy's coast. it may be objected that the coast of the united states is so long that it would be impossible to blockade it. perhaps, but that is not necessary: it would suffice to blockade boston, newport, new york, the delaware, the chesapeake, and the gulf, say with forty ships. and we must remember that blockade running would be much more difficult now than in the civil war, because of the increased power and accuracy of modern gunnery and the advent of the search-light, wireless telegraph, and aeroplane. it may also be objected that the blockading of even a defenseless coast would cost the blockading country a good deal of money, by reason of the loss of trade with that country. true; but war is always expensive, and the blockade would be very much more expensive to the blockaded country; and though it might hold out a long while, it would be compelled to yield in the end, not only because of the blockade itself but because of the pressure of neutral countries; and the longer it held out, the greater the indemnity it would have to pay. the expense of blockading would therefore be merely a profitable investment. the author is aware that actual invasion of a country from the sea would be a greater disaster than blockade, and that defense against invasion has often been urged in great britain as a reason for a great navy; so that the primary reason for a navy might be said to be defense against invasion. but why should an enemy take the trouble to invade us? blockade is easier and cheaper, and can accomplish almost everything that an enemy desires, especially if it be enlivened by the occasional dropping of thousand-pound shells into wall street and the navy-yard. while, however, the _primary_ use of naval power seems to be to prevent blockade, a navy, like any other weapon, may be put to any other uses which circumstances indicate. for instance, the northerners in the civil war used the navy not to prevent blockade, but to make blockade; the japanese used the navy to cover the transportation of their armies to manchuria and corea; and great britain has always used her navy to protect her trade routes. a general statement of the various uses of a navy has been put into the phrase "command of the sea." of course, the probability of getting "command of the sea," or of desiring to get it is dependent on the existence of a state of war, and there are some who believe that the probability of our becoming involved in a war with a great naval nation is too slight to warrant the expense of money and labor needed to prepare the necessary naval power. so it may be well to consider what is the degree of probability. this degree of probability cannot be determined as accurately as the probabilities of fire, death, or other things against which insurance companies insure us; for the reason that wars have been much less frequent than fires, deaths, etc., while the causes that make and prevent them are much more numerous and obscure. it seems clear, however, that, as between two countries of equal wealth, the probability of war varies with the disparity between their navies, and unless other nations are involved, is practically zero, when their navies are equal in power; and that, other factors being equal, the _greatest probability of war is between two countries, of which one is the more wealthy and the other the more powerful_. in reckoning the probability of war, we must realize that _the most pregnant cause of war is the combination of conflicting interests with disparity in power_. and we must also realize that it is not enough to consider the situation as it is now: that it is necessary to look at least ten years ahead, because it would take the united states that length of time to prepare a navy powerful enough to fight our possible foes with reasonable assurance of success. ten years, however, is not really far enough ahead to look, for the simple reason that, while we could get a great many ships ready in ten years, we could not get the entire navy ready as will be explained later. if, for instance, some change in policies or in interests should make war with great britain probable within ten years, we could not possibly build a navy that could prevent our being beaten, and blockaded, and forced to pay an enormous indemnity. is there _no_ probability of this? perhaps there is no great probability; but there certainly is a possibility. in fact, it might be a very wise act for great britain, seeing us gradually surpassing her, to go to war with us before it is too late, and crush us. it has often been said that great britain could not afford to go to war with us, because so many of her commercial interests would suffer. of course, they would suffer for a while; but so do the commercial interests of competing railroads when they begin to cut rates. cutting rates is war--commercial war: but it is often carried on, nevertheless, and at tremendous cost. just now, great britain does not wish to crush us; but it is certain that she can. it is certain that the richest country in the world lies defenseless against the most powerful; and that we could not alter this condition in ten years, even if we started to build an adequate navy now. yet even if the degree of probability of war with great britain, within say ten years, seems so small that we need not consider her, are there no other great powers with whom the degree of probability of war is great enough to make it wise for us to consider them? before answering this question, let us realize clearly that one of the strongest reasons that leads a country to abstain from war, even to seek relief from wrongs, actual or imagined, is a doubt of success; and that that reason disappears if another country, sufficiently powerful to assure success, is ready to help her, either by joining openly with her, or by seeking war herself at the same time with the same country. as we all know, cases like this have happened in the past. great britain knows it; and the main secret of her wealth is that she has always been strong enough to fight any two countries. it is plain that a coalition of two countries against us is possible now. the united states is regarded with feelings of extreme irritation by the two most warlike nations in the world, one on our eastern side and the other on the western. war with either one would call for all the energies of the country, and the issue would be doubtful. but if either country should consider itself compelled to declare war, the other, if free at the time, might see her opportunity to declare war simultaneously. the result would be the same as if we fought great britain, except that our pacific coast would be blockaded besides the atlantic, and we should have to pay indemnity to two countries instead of to one country. a coalition between these two countries would be an ideal arrangement, because it would enable each country to force us to grant the conditions it desires, and secure a large indemnity besides. would great britain interfere in our behalf? this can be answered by the man so wise that he knows what the international situation and the commercial situation will be ten years hence. let him speak. will the importance of naval power increase or decrease? it is clear that the importance to a country of a navy varies with two things--the value of that country's foreign trade and the probability of war. it is also clear that, other things being equal, the probability of a country becoming involved in war varies as the value of her foreign trade; because the causes of friction and the money at stake vary in that proportion. therefore, _the importance to a country of her navy varies as the square of the value of her foreign trade_. in order to answer the question, therefore, we must first consider whether foreign trade--sea trade--is going to increase or decrease. as to the united states alone, the value of our exports is about ten times what it was fifty years ago, and it promises to increase. but the united states is only one country, and perhaps her increase in foreign trade has been due to conditions past or passing. so what is the outlook for the future, both for the united states and other countries? will other countries seek foreign trade? yes. the recent commercial progress of germany, argentina, and japan, shows the growing recognition by civilized and enterprising countries of the benefits of foreign trade, and of the facilities for attaining it which are now given by the advent of large, swift, modern steamers; steamers which are becoming larger and swifter and safer every year, more and more adapted for ocean trade. for not only have the writings of mahan brought about an increase in the sea power of every great country; but this increase has so aroused the attention of the engineering professions that the improvement of ships, engines, and other sea material has gone ahead faster than all the other engineering arts. the reason why the engineering arts that are connected with the sea have gone ahead more rapidly than any other arts is simply that they are given wider opportunity and a greater scope. it is inherent in the very nature of things that it is easier to transport things by water than by land; that water transportation lends itself in a higher degree to the exercise of engineering skill, to the attainment of great results. the underlying reason for this difference seems to be that it is not possible to make any vehicle to travel on land appreciably larger than the present automobile, unless it run on rails; whereas the floating power of water is such that vehicles can be made, and are made, as large as , tons. the _mauretania_, of , tons displacement, has been running for eight years, larger vessels are even now running and vessels larger still will undoubtedly be run; for the larger the ships, the less they cost per ton of carrying power, the faster they go, and the safer they are. sea commerce thus gives to engineers, scientists, and inventors, as well as to commercial men, that gift of the gods--opportunity. the number of ships that now traverse the ocean and the larger bodies of water communicating with it aggregate millions of tons, and their number and individual tonnage are constantly increasing. these vessels cruise among all the important seaports of the world, and form a system of intercommunication almost as complete as the system of railroads in the united states. they bring distant ports of the world very close together, and make possible that ready interchange of material products, and that facility of personal intercourse which it is one of the aims of civilization to bring about. from a commercial point of view, london is nearer to new york than san francisco, and more intimately allied with her. the evident result of all this is to make the people of the world one large community, in which, though many nationalities are numbered, many tongues are spoken, many degrees of civilization and wealth are found, yet, of all, the main instincts are the same: the same passions, the same appetites, the same desire for personal advantage. not only does this admirable system of intercommunication bring all parts of the world very closely together, but it tends to produce in all a certain similarity in those characteristics and habits of thought that pertain to the material things of life. we are all imitative, and therefore we tend to imitate each other; but the inferior is more apt to imitate the superior than vice versa. particularly are we prone to imitate those actions and qualities by which others have attained material success. so it is to be expected, it is already a fact, that the methods whereby a few great nations attained success are already being imitated by other nations. japan has imitated so well that in some ways she has already surpassed her models. with such an example before her, should we be surprised that china has also become inoculated with the virus of commercial and political ambitions? it cannot be many years before she will be in the running with the rest of us, with , , of people to do the work; people of intelligence, patience, endurance, and docility; people with everything to gain and nothing to lose; with the secret of how to succeed already taught by other nations, which she can learn from an open book. if japan has learned our secret and mastered it in fifty years, will china not be able to do it in less than fifty years? before we answer this question, let us realize clearly that china is much nearer to us in civilization than japan was fifty years ago; that china has japan's example to guide her, and also that any degree of civilization which was acquired by us in say one hundred years will not require half that time for another nation merely to learn. the same is true of all branches of knowledge; the knowledge of the laws of nature which it took newton many years to acquire may now be mastered by any college student in two months. and let us not forget, besides, that almost the only difficult element of civilization which other people need to acquire, in order to enter into that world-wide competition which is characteristic of the time we live in, is "engineering" broadly considered. doubtless there are other things to learn besides; but it is not apparent that any other things have contributed largely to the so-called new civilization of japan. perhaps japan has advanced enough in christianity to account for her advance in material power, but if so she keeps very quiet about it. it may be, also, that the relations of the government to the governed people of japan are on a higher plane than they used to be, but on a plane not yet so high as in our own country; but has any one ever seen this claimed or even stated? it may be that the people of japan are more kindly, brave, courteous, and patriotic than they were, and that their improvement has been due to their imitating us in these matters; but this is not the belief of many who have been in japan. one thing, however, is absolutely sure; and that is that japan's advance has been simultaneous with her acquirement of the engineering arts, especially as applied to military and naval matters and the merchant marine. but even supposing that china does not take part in the world-wide race for wealth, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that great britain, germany, france, italy, japan, argentina, and the united states, besides others like sweden, norway, belgium, holland, spain, and portugal, are in the race already; and that several in south america bid fair to enter soon. not only do we see many contestants, whose numbers and ardor are increasing, but we see, also, the cause of this increasing. the cause is not only a clearer appreciation of the benefits to be derived from commerce across the water under conditions that exist now; it is also a growing appreciation of the possibilities of commerce under conditions that will exist later with countries whose resources are almost entirely undeveloped. for four hundred years, we of the united states, have been developing the land within our borders, and the task has been enormous. at one time it promised to be the work of centuries; and with the mechanical appliances of even one hundred years ago, it would have taken a thousand years to do what we have already done. mechanical appliances of all kinds, especially of transportation and agriculture, have made possible what would, otherwise, have been impossible; and mechanical appliances will do the same things in tierra del fuego and zululand. mechanism, working on land and sea, is opening up the resources of the world. and now, another allied art, that of chemistry, more especially biology, is in process of removing one of the remaining obstacles to full development, by making active life possible, and even pleasant, in the tropics. it is predicted by some enthusiasts that, in the near future, it will be healthier and pleasanter to live in the tropics, and even do hard work there, than in the temperate zone. when this day comes, and it may be soon, the development of the riches of lands within the tropics will begin in earnest, and wealth undreamed of now be realized. the opening of the undeveloped countries means a continuing increase of wealth to the nations that take advantage of the opportunity, and a corresponding backsliding to those nations that fail. it means over all the ocean an increasing number of steamers. it means the continuing increase of manufacturing in manufacturing countries, and the increasing enjoyment in them of the good things of all the world. it means in the undeveloped countries an increasing use of the conveniences and luxuries of civilization and an increasing possession of money or its equivalent. it means, throughout all the world, an increase of what we call "wealth." in discussing a subject so great as sea trade, while it may be considered presumptuous to look fifty years ahead, it can hardly be denied that we ought at least to try to look that far ahead. to look fifty years ahead, is, after all, not taking in a greater interval of time than fifty years back; and it certainly seems reasonable to conclude that, if a certain line of progress has been going on for fifty years in a perfectly straight line, and with a vigor which is increasing very fast and shows no sign of change, the same general line of progress will probably keep up for another fifty years. if we try to realize what this means, we shall probably fail completely and become dazed by the prospect. we cannot possibly picture accurately or even clearly to ourselves any definite conditions of fifty years hence; but we certainly are warranted in concluding that by the end of fifty years, practically all of the countries of the world, including africa, will be open to trade from one end to the other; that the volume of trade will be at least ten times as great as it is now; that the means of communication over the water and through the air will be very much better than now; and that there will be scores of appliances, methods, and processes in general use of which we have, as yet, no inkling, and cannot even imagine. now let us call to mind the accepted proverb that "competition is the life of trade," and this will make us see that, accompanying this stupendous trade, extending over, and into, every corner of the world, there will be stupendous competition, involving in a vast and complicated net, every red-blooded nation of the earth. we seem safe in concluding, therefore, that the importance of naval power will increase. a great deal is said and written nowadays about the ability of arbitration to make wars unnecessary, and a good deal also about the possibility of an agreement among the nations, whereby armaments may be limited to forces adequate to insure that every nation shall be compelled to abide by the decision of the others in any disputed case. in view of the number, the earnestness, and the prominence of many of the men interested in this cause; in view of the number of arbitration treaties that have been already signed; in view of the fact that arbitration among nations will simply establish a law among them like the law in any civilized country; in view of the fact that individuals in their dealings with each other sometimes surrender certain of their claims, and even rights, for the common good; in view of the fact that nations, like all business firms, like to cut down expenses, and in further view of the fact that a navy is not directly, but only indirectly, a contributor to a nation's prosperity, it seems probable that arbitration will be more and more used among the nations, and that armaments may be limited by agreement. it is clear, however, that the practical difficulties in the way of making the absolute agreement required are enormous, and that the most enthusiastic advocates of the plan do not expect that the actual limitation of armaments will become a fact for many years. after the necessary preliminaries shall have been arranged, and the conference takes place which shall settle what armament each nation may have, it is plain that it will be to the interest of each nation to keep down the armament of every other nation, and to be allowed as much as possible itself. in this way, the operation of making the agreement will be somewhat like the forming of a trust among several companies, and the advantage will lie with that nation which is the most powerful. for this reason it would seem a part of wisdom for each country to enter the conference with as large a navy as possible. therefore, the probability of an approaching agreement among the nations as to limitation of armaments, instead of being a reason for abating our exertions toward establishing a powerful navy, is really a conclusive reason for redoubling them. this brings us to the important question, "how powerful should our navy be?" this may seem a question impossible to answer. of course it is impossible to answer it in terms of ships and guns; but an approximate estimate may be reached by considering the case of a man playing poker who holds a royal straight flush. such a man would be a fool if he did not back his hand to the limit and get all the benefit possible from it. so will the united states, if she fails to back her hand to the limit, recognizing the fact that in the grand game now going on for the stakes of the commercial supremacy of the world, she holds the best hand. she has the largest and most numerous seaports, the most enterprising and inventive people, and the most wealth with which to force to success all the various necessary undertakings. this does not mean that the united states ought, as a matter either of ethics or of policy, to build a great navy in order to take unjust advantage of weaker nations; but it does mean that she ought to build a navy great enough to save her from being shorn of her wealth and glory by simple force, as france was shorn in . it is often said that the reason for great britain's having so powerful a navy is that she is so situated geographically that, without a powerful navy to protect her trade, the people would starve. while this statement may be true, the inference usually drawn is fallacious: the inference that if great britain were not so situated, she would not have so great a navy. why would she not? it is certain that that "tight little island" has attained a world-wide power, and a wealth per capita greater than those of any other country; that her power and wealth, as compared with her home area, are so much greater than those of any other country as to stagger the understanding; that she could not have done what she has done without her navy; that she has never hesitated to use her navy to assist her trade, and yet that she has never used her navy to keep her people from starving. in fact, the insistence on the anti-starvation theory is absurd. has any country ever fought until the people as a mass were starving? has starving anything to do with the matter? does not a nation give up fighting just as soon as it sees that further fighting would do more harm than good? a general or an admiral, in charge of a detached force, must fight sometimes even at tremendous loss and after all hope of local success has fled, in order to hold a position, the long holding of which is essential to the success of the whole strategic plan; but what country keeps up a war until its people are about to starve? did spain do so in our last war? did russia fear that japan would force the people of her vast territory into starvation? no--starvation has nothing to do with the case. if some discovery were made by which great britain could grow enough to support all her people, she would keep her great navy nevertheless--simply because she has found it to be a good investment. the anti-starvation theory--the theory that one does things simply to keep from starving--does apply to some tropical savages, but not to the anglo-saxon. long after starvation has been provided against, long after wealth has been secured, we still toil on. what are we toiling for? the same thing that great britain maintains her navy for--wealth and power. the real reason for great britain's having a powerful navy applies with exact equality to the united states. now that great britain has proved how great a navy is best for her, we can see at once how great a navy is best for us. that is--since great britain and the united states are the wealthiest countries in the world, and since the probability of war between any two countries is least when their navies are equal in power--the maximum good would be attained by making the united states navy exactly equal to the british navy. chapter iv naval preparedness in a preceding chapter i endeavored to show why it is that the necessities of the naval defense of a country have caused the gradual development of different types of vessels, each having its distinctive work. if those different types operated in separate localities they would lose that mutual support which it is the aim of organization to secure, and each separate group could be destroyed in turn by the combined groups of an enemy. for this reason, the types or groups are combined in one large fleet, and an admiral is placed in command. the command of a fleet is the highest effort of the naval art. its success in time of war demands in the admiral himself a high order of mind and nerve and body; and it demands in all the personnel, from the highest to the lowest, such a measure of trained ability and character that each shall be able to discharge with skill and courage the duties of his station. in order that the material fleet shall be efficient as a whole, each material unit must be efficient as a unit. each ship must be materially sound; each pump, valve, cylinder, gun, carriage, torpedo, and individual appliance, no matter how small, must be in condition to perform its expected task. the complexity of a fleet baffles any mental effort, by even those most familiar with it, to grasp it fully. each dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, submarine, collier, tender, hospital ship, scout, supply ship, and what-not, is a machine in itself, and is filled with scores--in some cases, hundreds--of highly specialized machines, operated by steam, oil, air, electricity, and water. a superdreadnaught is a machine which, including the machines inside of her, costs $ , , ; a battle cruiser more. the personnel is nearly as complicated as the material. not only are there all the various ranks of commissioned officers in the line, medical corps, pay corps, marine corps, etc., but there are ten kinds of warrant officers besides; while in the enlisted personnel there are ninety-one different "ratings" in the navy, and thirteen in the marine corps, besides temporary ratings, such as gun-pointer, gun-trainer, gun-captain, etc. each rank and rating carries its rigidly prescribed duties, as well as its distinctive uniform and pay. that such a multitudinous host of types and individuals, both material and personnel, can be actually combined in one unit fleet, and that fleet operated as a mobile directable organism by its admiral, is a high achievement of the human intellect. how is it done? by discipline, by training, by knowledge, by energy, by devotion, by will; by the exercise of those mental, moral, and spiritual faculties that may be grouped under the one term "mind": the same power that co-ordinates and controls a still more complex machine, the organism of the human body. despite its relative crudeness, a fleet possesses, more fully than any other fruit of man's endeavor, the characteristics of an organism, defined by webster as "an individual constituted to carry on the activities of life by means of parts or organs more or less separate in function, but mutually dependent." and though it must be true that no fleet can approximate the perfection of nature's organisms, nevertheless there is an analogy which may help us to see how a complex fleet of complex vessels has been slowly evolved from the simple galley fleets of earlier days; how its various parts may be mutually dependent yet severally independent; and how all must be made to work as one vast unit, and directed as one vast unit by the controlling mind toward "the end in view." the common idea is that an army consists of a number of soldiers, and a navy of a number of ships. this idea is due to a failure to realize that soldiers and ships are merely instruments, and that they are useless instruments unless directed by a trained intelligence: that the first essential in an army and the first essential in a navy is mind, which first correctly estimates the situation, then makes wise plans to meet it, then carries out those plans; which organizes the men and designs the ships, and then directs the physical power exertable by the men and the ships toward "the end in view." owing to the enormous mechanical power made available in ships by the floating properties of water, machinery is more used by navies than by armies; but this does not mean that machinery can take the place of men more successfully in navies than in armies, except in the sense that navies can use more mechanical power. the abundant use of machines and instruments in navies does not mean that machinery and instruments can take the place of trained intelligence--but exactly the reverse. under the guidance of trained intelligence, a machine or instrument can perform wonders. but it is not the machinery that does the wonders; it is the trained intelligence that devised the instrument or machine, and the trained intelligence that operates it. let the trained intelligence err, or sleep, and note the results that follow. the _titanic_, a mass of , tons, moving through the water at knots an hour, a marvel of the science and skill of man, crashes into an iceberg, because the trained intelligence directing her errs--and is reduced at once to an inert mass of iron and brass. the mighty fleet of russia meets the japanese fleet in tsushima straits; and because the trained intelligence that directed its movements seriously erred, in an engagement decided in less than an hour, is stripped of its power and glory, and transformed into a disorganized aggregation of separate ships--some sunk, some sinking, some in flight. the japanese fleet, on the other hand, because it is directed with an intelligence more highly trained than that which directs the russian fleet, and because, in consequence, the officers and enlisted men perform their various duties not only in the actual battle, but in preparation for it, with a skill greater than that used in the russian fleet, suffers but little damage in the fight--though the advantage in number and size of ships is slightly with the russians. as a consequence of that battle, the war between russia and japan was decided in favor of japan, and terms of peace were soon agreed upon. russia lost practically all the ships that took part in the battle, and several thousand of her officers and sailors--and _she lost the whole object for which she went to war_. the difference between the russian and japanese fleets that gave the victory to the japanese was a difference in trained intelligence and in the relative degrees of preparedness which that difference caused. during the actual battle, the intelligence was that of the officers and men in the respective fleets, in managing the two fleets, the ships themselves, and the guns, engines, and machines of all kinds that those ships contained. it is this factor--trained intelligence--that has decided most of the battles of history, and the course that nations thereafter followed. battles have usually been fought between forces not very different in point of numbers and material, for the reason that a force which knew itself to be weaker than another would not fight unless compelled to fight; and in cases where two forces of widely differing strength have fought, the situation has usually been brought about directly by a superior intelligence. in fact, one of the most frequent and important endeavors of strategy and tactics--used triumphantly by napoleon--has always been such a handling of one's forces as to be superior to the enemy at the point of contact--to "get the mostest men there the firstest," as general forrest is said to have expressed it. the effect of superior-trained intelligence is greatest "at the top," but it can accomplish little unless a fine intelligence permeates the whole. a fine intelligence at the top will so direct the men below, will so select men for the various posts, and will so co-ordinate their efforts, that the organization will resemble a veritable organism: all the various organs fulfilling separately yet accurately their allotted functions; all the fire-control parties, all the gun crews, all the torpedo crews, all the engineer forces properly organized and drilled; all the hulls of the vessels, all the guns, all the torpedoes, all the multifarious engines, machines, and instruments in good material condition and correctly adjusted for use. but it is not only in the actual battle that fine intelligence is required; it is required long before the battle and far distant from the scene--in the "admiralty" at home. the japanese fleet set out fully manned with a highly trained, enthusiastic, and confident personnel; the russian fleet set out manned with a poorly trained and discouraged personnel, only too well aware of their defects. the issue at tsushima was decided before the respective fleets left their respective homes--though that issue was not then known to mortals. the battle emphasized, but did not prove, what had been proved a hundred times before: the paramount importance of preparedness; that _when two forces fight--the actual battle merely secures the decision as to the relative values of two completed machines, and their degrees of preparedness for use_. preparedness of material is not, of course, so important as preparedness of personnel, because if the personnel is prepared, they will inevitably prepare the material. and the preparedness must pervade all grades: for while it is true that the preparedness of those in high command is more important than the preparedness of those in minor posts, yet there is no post so lowly that its good or its ill performance will not be a factor in the net result. an unskilful oiler may cause a hot bearing that will slow down a battleship, and put out of order the column of a squadron; a signalman's mistake may throw a fleet into confusion. perfect preparedness of personnel and material is essential because events follow each other so rapidly in war that no preparation can be made after it has begun. to fight is the most intense work a man can do; and a war is nothing but a fight. no matter how great or how small a war may be, no war can lose the essential qualities of a fight, or (save in the treatment of prisoners) be more brutal or less brutal when fought between two little savage tribes, than when fought between two colossal groups of christian nations, civilized to the highest point. war is the acme of the endeavor of man. each side determines that it will win at all costs and at all hazards; that nobody's comfort, happiness, or safety shall receive the slightest consideration; that everybody's strength and courage must be worked to the limit by night as well as by day, and that there must be no rest and no yielding to any softening influence whatever; that the whole strength and mind of the nation, and of every individual in it, must be devoted, and must be sacrificed, if need be, to the cause at stake. in war, a navy's primary duty has usually been to protect the coast and trade routes of its country; and in order to do this, it has had to be able to oppose to an attacking fleet a defending fleet more militarily effective. if it were less effective, even if no invasion were attempted, the attacking fleet could cripple or destroy the defending fleet and then institute a blockade. in modern times an effective blockade, or at least a hostile patrol of trade routes, could be held hundreds of miles from the coast, where the menace of submarines would be negligible; and this blockade would stop practically all import and export trade. this would compel the country to live exclusively on its own resources, and renounce intercourse with the outside world. some countries could exist a long time under these conditions. but they would exist merely, and the condition of mere existence would never end until they sued for peace; because, even if new warships were constructed with which to beat off the enemy, each new and untrained ship would be sunk or captured shortly after putting out to sea as, on june , , in massachusetts bay, the american frigate _chesapeake_ was captured and nearly half her crew were killed and wounded in fifteen minutes by a ship almost identical in the material qualities of size and armament--the better-trained british frigate _shannon_. for these reasons, every nation that has acquired and has long retained prosperity, has realized that every country liable to be attacked by any navy must either be defended by some powerful country, or else must keep a navy ready to repel the attack successfully. to do this, the defending navy must be ready when the attack comes; because if not ready then, it will never have time to get ready. in regard to our own country, much stress is laid by some intelligent people--who forget the _chesapeake_ and _shannon_--on the , miles of water stretching between the united states and europe. this , miles is, of course, a factor of importance, but it is not a prohibition, because it can be traversed with great surety and quickness--with much greater surety and quickness, for instance, than the , miles traversed by the russian fleet, in , in steaming from russia to japan. the , miles that separate the united states from europe can be traversed by a fleet more powerful than ours in from two to three weeks; and the fleet would probably arrive on our shores in good condition, and manned by full crews of well-trained officers and men, habituated to their duties by recent practice and thoroughly ready to fight, as the _shannon_ was. we could not meet this fleet successfully unless we met it with a fleet more militarily effective; and we could not do this unless we had in the regular service and the reserve a personnel of officers and men sufficiently numerous to man immediately all the vessels that would be needed, and to man in addition all the shore stations, which would have to be expanded to a war basis. the officers and enlisted men, of course, would have to be at least as well trained as the corresponding personnel in the attacking fleet, and have as recent and thorough practice in their respective duties; for otherwise, no matter how brave and devoted they might be, the fate of the american fleet would be the fate of the _chesapeake_. in order to be ready when war breaks, the first essential is a plan for preparation. preparation is divided naturally into two parts: first, preparation of sufficient material and personnel; second, preparation of plans for the conduct of the war after it has begun. these two parts are both considered in what are technically called "war plans." preparation for war has always been known to be essential. lack of preparation has never been due to lack of knowledge, but always to neglect. the difference between the wise and the foolish virgins was not a difference in knowledge but a difference in character. the difference between alexander's little army and the tremendous army of darius was not so much in numbers as in preparedness. trained under philip of macedon for many years, organized for conquest and aggression, prepared to meet any situation that might arise, philip's army carried philip's son from victory to victory, and made him the master of the world. cæsar was great in peace as well as war, but it was by cæsar's army that cæsar's greatness was established; and it was a thoroughness of preparation unknown before that made cæsar's army great. napoleon's successes were built on the splendid preparation of a mind transcendently fitted to grasp both principles and details, and on the comparatively unprepared state of his opponents. the great elector began in a course of laborious and scientific preparation which committed all prussia, as well as the army, to acquiring what now we call "efficiency." as this plan developed, especially under the elector's grandson king frederick william, the next king found himself, as alexander had done, the chief of an army more highly prepared for war than any other. by means of that army he made himself frederick the great, and raised prussia from a minor position to the first rank of european powers. pursuing frederick william's system of progressive preparation, prussia continued her prosperous course till william i defeated austria, then france, and founded the german empire. this does not mean that the only result of developing national efficiency to its highest point is to secure success in war--in fact, we know that it is not. but it does mean that the same quality--efficiency--which tends to prosperity in peace tends also to victory in war. preparing for war was a simple thing in the olden days compared with preparing now, for the reason that the implements of war are much more numerous and complicated than they used to be, especially in navies. a navy is not ready unless all preparations and plans have been made, tested, and kept up to date, to insure that all of the vessels of every kind and all the shore stations will be in material condition, fully equipped and manned by a sufficient and efficient personnel of officers and crews, in time to meet the enemy on advantageous terms, and unless the central authority has already decided what it will do, when any probable emergency shall arise. this was the condition of the german army in . this was also the condition of the british navy, when war broke out in august, ; the british navy was ready; and therefore it was able to assume command of the sea at once, drive its enemy's commerce from the ocean, and imprison its fleets in sheltered ports. in all countries the peace establishment of the army and navy is smaller than the war establishment, for reasons of economy, upon the assumption that there will be enough time after war is declared to get on a war basis before the enemy can strike. but since , all the military nations have realized that the vital struggle of a war takes place _before_ a shot is fired; that _the factors that decide which nation shall be the victor and which the vanquished are determined before the war begins_; that they are simply "functions" of preparedness. germany was ready not only for war but for victory, because her troops were so much better trained, organized, and equipped than those of france, and her war plans so much more complete, that she was able to lay france prostrate, before the enormous resources of that country in men and material could rally in her defense. the relative conditions in which two opposing forces will enter a war, and their relative performances afterward, will depend upon the relative excellence of the war plans made for them, and the thoroughness with which the plans are tested before war breaks. so it is not difficult to see why all the great armies have patterned after germany, and organized special bodies of officers for the preparation and execution of war plans; and why it is that they endeavor to secure for that peculiar duty the most thorough and industrious of their officers. owing to the nature of war itself, the principles of warfare apply in their essentials to navies as well as to armies; and so the navies have patterned after the armies and made plans whereby they can get ready to fight in fleet organization on the ocean with the greatest possible effectiveness in the shortest possible time. during peace times every navy is maintained on a "peace basis"; only such ships and other material being kept in full commission, and only such a number of officers and enlisted men being actively employed, as the appropriations allotted by the government permit. those ships and other material that are not actually in commission are maintained in reserve, a condition of partial readiness, of which several degrees are recognized, in which a reduced number of officers and men are kept on board, and the various structures and apparatus are kept in as high a degree of readiness as circumstances will permit. in order to man in time of war these vessels in reserve, and insure a sufficient personnel in the active fleet, a "naval reserve" is organized in each country, composed of officers and men who have had experience in the regular navy. they are compelled to undergo a specific amount of training each year, to keep themselves in readiness at all times to answer the call for active service on short notice, and to maintain such communication with the government as will make it easy to locate any man at any moment. the act of getting ready, the passing from a state of peace to a state of readiness for fighting, is called "mobilization." mobilization plans are an important element in war plans, but the details of any mobilization plan are of such a confidential nature that it would not be proper to discuss them in public print. there can be no impropriety, however, in making the general statement that in all navies the endeavor is made to keep the mobilization plans continually up to date, and to have them prepared in such detail that every officer and enlisted man in active service, the retired list, the naval reserve, and the naval militia, will become instantly available for a predetermined duty, and that every shore station and every necessary vessel will be ready to take part. the plans prescribe methods in very great detail whereby the ships and other vessels in reserve can be quickly put into commission with full crews of officers and men, all their various equipments, fuel, and ammunition put on board, and the vessels themselves sent out to sea to join the fleet. in addition, plans are made whereby certain auxiliaries can be fitted out at once and put into commission--such as supply ships, ammunition ships, transports, colliers, mine ships, hospital ships, etc. the mass of detailed plans, orders, and instructions is stupendous and bewildering. years of study, trial, and rectification are required to get them into such condition that the plans can be put into immediate and effective use when war breaks out. the work must be done, however, and with the utmost thoroughness, _before_ war breaks out; otherwise it will never be done, if an active enemy is about, because he will strike at once--and then it will be too late. in most of the great naval countries the work of mobilizing the fleet is comparatively easy, for the reason that the coast-line is short and is not far from any part of the interior, enabling reserves to live in fairly close touch with the coast and with naval affairs, and so near the coast that they can get quickly to any port. but the conditions in the united states are more difficult than those in any other country, because of the enormous stretch of our coast, the great average distance from any place in our country to the coast, the difficulty of getting a naval reserve that could be of practical use (owing to the ease with which young men can make a comfortable living on land), and the perilous slowness of the nation as a whole to realize the necessity for preparedness. as an offset to this, we have the , miles of ocean between us and europe, and the , miles between us and asia; and on account of this we may to a certain extent discount the danger of attack and the preparedness required to meet it. but our discount should be reasonable and reasoned out, and certainly not excessive. fortunately the problem of how much time we should allow for mobilizing and joining the fleet is easy, as a moment's thought will show us that it must be simply the two weeks needed for a fleet to come from europe to america; for we must realize that the report of the sailing of the hostile fleet would be the first news we should get of any hostile preparation or intent. the general situation in which every isolated naval nation stands regarding other nations is not complicated, but very plain. each nation has, as possible opponents in its policy, certain countries. the naval forces of those countries and the time in which they can be made ready are known with sufficient accuracy for practical purposes. if any isolated naval nation wishes to carry out a policy which any of those countries will forcibly oppose she must either build a navy equal to that of the other country, or else be prepared to abandon any attempt to force her policies. stating the question in another way, she can carry out only such policies as do not require for their enforcement a navy stronger than she has. it is true that diplomacy and the jealousies of foreign powers unite to make possible the averting of war during long periods of time. diplomacy averted war with germany for forty-three years, but it could not continue to avert war eternally. war finally broke out with a violence unparalleled in history, and possessing a magnitude proportional to the duration of the preceding peace. "long coming long last, short notice soon past" is a sailor's maxim about storms; and it seems not inapplicable to wars. certain it is that the frequent wars of savage tribes are far less terrible than the infrequent wars of enlightened powers. this indicates that, even though a nation may be able to avert war for a long time, war will come some day, in a form which the present war foreshadows; and it suggests the possibility that the longer the war is averted, the more tremendous it will be, the greater the relative unpreparedness of a slothful nation, and the sharper her punishment when war finally breaks upon her. chapter v naval defense there has never been a time since cain slew abel when men have not been compelled to devote a considerable part of their energies to self-defense. in the early ages, before large organizations existed or the mechanic arts had made much progress, defense was mostly defense of life itself. as time went on, and people amassed goods and chattels, and organized in groups and tribes, it came to include the defense of property--not only the property of individuals, but also of the tribe and the land it occupied. still later, defense carne to include good name or reputation, when it was realized that the reputation, even of an organization, could not be destroyed without doing it an injury. at the present day, owing to the complexity of nations and other organizations, and to the long time during which many of them have existed, the question of defense has become extremely difficult. the places in which defense has been brought to its highest excellence are the large cities of the civilized countries; for there we see that defense of the life, property, and reputation of every individual has been carefully provided for. this has been made possible by the intimate intermingling of the people, the absence of racial rivalries, and the fact that the interests of all are identical in the matter of defense of life, property, and reputation; since, no matter how bad any individual may be, he wishes that others shall be good, in order that he himself may be safe. the defense of reputation has two aspects: the practical and the sentimental. the practical aspect regards the defense of that element of reputation which affects ability to "make a living"; while the sentimental aspect is concerned with the purely personal reputation of the individual, or with the reputation of an organization or a nation. the sentimental aspect is much more important, especially in enlightened nations, than is realized by some who have not thought much about it; for there is, fortunately, in every decent man a craving for the esteem and even the affection of his fellow men; and a knowledge that, no matter how wealthy or powerful he may be, he cannot be happy if he knows that he is despised. the fact that individuals organize to acquire the strength of united effort brings about, among organizations, a spirit of competition like that among individuals. it is more intense, however, because no man alone can get up the enthusiasms that ten men acting together can get up, and ten men cannot get up as much as a thousand. the longer any organization is maintained, the sharper this spirit of rivalry grows to be, owing to the feeling of clanship that propinquity and material interests evoke. its acme is found in those organizations called nations, that have lived together, nourished from the same soil, for generations; where the same loves and jealousies and hates that they now feel were felt by their fathers and their grandfathers and great-grandfathers for centuries back. among a people possessing the potentialities of national solidarity and greatness this feeling waxes, into a self-sacrificing devotion to the nation and to the land that bore them. that there should be such a thing is sometimes deplored; because patriotism, like all human qualities, has its bad side and its unfortunate effects. if it were not for patriotism there would probably be no war, and the greatest suffering that the world endures would thus be obviated. but if it were not for patriotism there would be no competition among nations; and in any one nation there would be no national spirit, no endeavor on the part of every man to do his part toward making her strong, efficient, and of good repute or toward making the people individually prosperous and happy. in the same way, on a smaller scale, many people deplore the necessity of competition among organizations, saying that it is ruthless and selfish; that it stamps out the individual; that it makes every man a mere cog in a money-getting machine; that it brings about strife, hatred, jealousies, and sometimes murders; that, if it were not for competition, all men would live together in peace. this may be so; but if it were not for competition there would probably be little of that strenuous, endeavor without which no effective progress in advancing the welfare of men has ever yet been made. of course, it may be that what we call "progress" has really not advanced the welfare of men; that the savage in samoa is as happy as the millionaire in new york; that knowledge itself is not an unmixed benefit; and if we accept this view, we may logically declare that competition, progress, and patriotism are all disadvantages. but who will go so far? it seems to be a fact that we cannot get something for nothing: that every plus has its minus, every joy its pain; that if men succeed in passing beyond the savage state, and in overcoming the forces of nature, so that they can live in houses with every modern luxury and convenience, they must pay for it by a condition of competition that causes personal jealousies among individuals, commercial wars among organizations, physical wars among nations. yet the instinctive desire of every one is for peace and comfort, for the maximum of good with the minimum of exertion; and therefore the normal person dislikes to see interjected into human life the abominable confusion of war. from this it comes about that every nation, even if it consciously brings about a war, always endeavors to make it appear that the other party is the aggressor. for this reason in every country the army and navy are said to be for the "defense" of the country. no nation, no matter how aggressive its policy may secretly be, openly declares that it intends to provoke aggression. this does not mean that any nation ever deliberately raises an army and navy for aggression, and then consciously deceives the world in regard to its intention; for men are so constituted as to feel more or less unconsciously that their interests and desires are proper and those of their opponent wrong; and every nation is so firmly persuaded of the righteousness of its own policies as to feel that any country which exhibits antagonism toward these policies is trying to provoke a fight. now these policies, especially after a nation has adhered to them for long, seem vital in her eyes, and they usually are so. to great britain, whose major policy is that she must be mistress of the seas, it is vital that she should be. her people are surrounded by the ocean, and unless they are willing simply to eke out an agricultural existence, it is essential that she should be able to manufacture articles, send them out in ships to all parts of the world, and receive in return money and the products of other lands. in order that she may be able to do this, she must feel sure that no power on earth can restrain the peaceful sailing to and fro of her exporting and importing ships. this assurance can be had only through physical force; it can be exerted only by a navy. germany has been gradually coming into the same position, and the same clear comprehension, owing to the increase of her population, the growth of their desire for wealth, and their realization of the control by great britain and the united states of large areas of the surface of the earth. germany's determination to break down, at least in part, that overpowering command of the sea which great britain wields has been the result. the ensuing rapid growth and excellence of germany's navy and merchant marine brought germany and england into sharp competition. military and naval men have seen for years that these competing nations would have to go to war some day in "self-defense." in the minds of some people the idea of what constitutes "defense" is rather hazy, and "defense" is deemed almost synonymous with "resistance." perhaps the clearest idea of what constitutes "defense" is given in a sentence in webster's dictionary, that reads: "the inmates of a fortress are _defended_ by its guns, _protected_ by its walls, and _guarded_ against surprise by sentries." the distinction is important, and the partially aggressive character of defense it indicates is exemplified in all walks of human and brute life. any animal, no matter how peaceably inclined, will turn on his aggressor--unless, indeed, he runs away. no one ever saw any brute oppose a merely passive resistance to attack. every man recognizes in himself an instinct to hit back if he is hit. if it be an instinct, it must have been implanted in us for a reason; and the reason is not hard to find in the universal law of self-protection, which cannot be satisfied with the ineffectual method of mere parrying or resisting. naval defense, like military defense, therefore, is not passive defense only, but contains an element of "offense" as well. when the defense contains in large measure the element of offense, it is said in military parlance to be "offensive-defensive"; and the most effective defensive is this offensive-defensive. when a defending force throws off its defensive attitude entirely and advances boldly to attack, it is said to have "assumed the offensive"; but even this assumption, especially if it be temporary--as when a beleaguered garrison makes a sortie--does not rob the situation of its defensive character. for these reasons the dividing line between offense and defense is very vague; and it is made more vague through a realization by all military people that the offense has certain decided advantages over the defense (unless the defense has the advantage of position); so that when strained relations between two nations come, each is so fearful that the other will take the offensive first, when the two nations are near each other, that it is apt to take the offensive first--in real _self-defense!_ a striking illustration is the action of certain european powers in the latter part of july, . in addition to the sincere convictions of either party, there is also apt to be considerable yielding to the temptation to persuade the world that the other party is the aggressor, merely to get the sympathy that usually goes to the innocent victim--the support of what bismarck called "the imponderables." few wars have been frankly "offensive," like the conquests of alexander, cæsar, and pizarro, at least in modern times; each side has usually claimed (and often sincerely believed) that its action was demanded in self-defense and that its cause was just. to some in the united states naval defense means merely defense against invasion. this notion is of recent growth, and certainly was not held by the framers of our constitution. section of article i defines the powers of congress; and although eight of the eighteen paragraphs deal exclusively with measures of defense on sea and land, only one of those paragraphs (the fifteenth) deals with invasion. the, first paragraph reads: the congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, _to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the united states_; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the united states. the juxtaposition of the words "common defense" and "general welfare" in this admirably written paragraph could hardly have been accidental, or have been due to any other cause than a juxtaposition of those ideas in the minds of the constitution's framers. and what more natural connection can there be between any two ideas than between those of common defense and general welfare, since the general welfare of no country has ever continued long unless it was defended. now the general welfare of every maritime power has always been intimately concerned with its sea-borne commerce. it is only by means of sea-borne commerce, for instance, that americans can live in the way americans wish to live. "general welfare" means more than mere existence. a mere existence is the life a savage lives. furthermore, the general welfare of a country requires the safety of its exported and imported goods while on the sea, and includes the right of its citizens to travel with safety in every land, to buy and sell in foreign ports, to feel a proper measure of self-respect and national respect wherever they may go, and to command from the people of the lands they visit a proper recognition of their claims to justice. naval defense may, therefore, be said to consist of three parts: st--defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion. d--defense of the trade routes traversed by ships carrying the exports and imports of the country. d--defense of the national policy, including defense of the nation's reputation, honor, and prestige. of these, defense of the coast against bombardment and invasion is the easiest, and defense of the national policy the most difficult; because in preventing bombardment and invasion the defender has the strategical advantage of being nearer home than the adversary; while in the defense of a country's policy, a naval force may have to "assume the offensive," and go even to the far distant coasts of the enemy--as the russian fleet went to tsushima, where it met its death. in that part of naval defense which is concerned with trade routes, the strategical advantage must go, in general, to that side which is the nearer to the locality where the decisive battle may occur. in laying down a policy of naval defense, however, it is not necessary to consider these three parts separately, because no nation can ever tell whether in the distant future its naval defense will have to be used directly for any one of the three, or for all. in general terms, it may be stated that in nearly all naval wars the fleet has been used more for the defense of the nation's policy than for the actual defense of the coasts or the trade routes. this does not mean that there has never been a bombardment or invasion, or that the defense of trade routes may not have been the cause of the war itself; but it does mean that in actual wars bombardment or invasion has been rare, the capture of merchant vessels has played a minor part, and the deciding events have been battles between two fleets, that were often far from the land of either. owing to the fact that within modern times most of the important countries of the world have been those of continental europe, with frontiers contiguous, and in fact identical, the defense of a country has been largely committed to the army, and most of the wars have been on land. the country standing in exception to this has been great britain, whose isolated and insular situation demanded a defense that was strictly naval. the tremendous advance in recent times of the engineering arts, by which ships became larger and faster, and able to carry more powerful and accurate guns than ever before, has enhanced the value of naval power and enabled great britain to reach all over the surface of the earth, and become more powerful than any continental nation. thus she has made out of the very weakness of her position a paramount tower of strength. naval defense was taken up systematically in great britain in the eighth century by king offa, to whom is credited the maxim, "he who would be secure on land must be supreme at sea"; but it must have dropped to a low ebb by , for william of normandy landed in england unopposed. since that time great britain's naval defense, committed to her navy, has increased steadily in effectiveness and power, keeping pace with the increase in the national interests it defended, and utilizing all the growing resources of wealth and science which the world afforded. until the present crisis, great britain's naval defense did its most important work during napoleon's time, when great britain's standing, like the standing of every other european nation, was subjected to a strain that it could hardly bear. so keenly, however, did the nation and the nation's great leader, pitt, realize the situation that the most strenuous measures were adopted to keep the navy up, press-gangs even visiting the houses of subjects of the king, taking men out and putting them by force on board his majesty's ships. but the british navy, even more than the british army, brought great britain safe out of the napoleonic danger, and made the british the paramount nation of the world. since then great britain has waxed more and more powerful, her avowed policy being that her navy should be equal to any other two; realizing that her aloofness in point of national characteristics and policy from all other nations made it possible that a coalition of at least two great nations might be pitted against her at a time when she could not get an ally. accompanying the growth of the british navy has been the establishment of british foreign trade, british colonies, and british bases from which the navy could work, and the general making of a network of british commerce and british power over the surface of the earth. no other nation has ever dominated so large a part of the surface of the globe as has great britain during the last two centuries; and she has done it by means of her naval power. this naval power has been, in the language of great britain, for the "imperial defense"; not for coast defense alone, but for the defense of all the imperial interests, commercial and political, and even the imperial prestige. and this defense of prestige, it may here be remarked, is not a vainglorious defense, not an exhibition of a swaggering, swashbuckling spirit, but a recognition of the fact that the minds of men are so constituted that the prestige of an individual, an organization, or a nation has a practical value and is an actual force. no government that appreciates its responsibilities will willingly risk the prestige of the nation which it governs, because it knows that any weakening of it will be followed by a weakening of influence and a consequent increase of difficulty in attaining some "end in view." the greatness of the british navy, compared with that of the british army and the other elements of great britain's government, has taken on magnified dimensions during the last half century. so long as war-ships used sails as their principal motive power, so long were they forced to employ methods of construction and equipment that forbade the efficient employment of high-power guns, the attainment of great speed, and the use of instruments of precision; so long, in other words, was their military effectiveness prevented from increasing greatly. but when the british navy decided to abandon sail power altogether and propel their ships by steam, a new phase was entered upon, in which every resource of the engineering arts and the physical sciences was called into requisition; and now, on board a dreadnaught, battle cruiser, destroyer, or submarine, can be found the highest examples of mechanical and electrical art and science. every material resource which the brain and wealth of man can compass is enlisted in her naval defense; and in order to take advantage of the rapidity and certainty of movement they afford for operating fleets and ships, there has been a great advance in methods of operation, or, in military parlance, "staff work." to assist this work, the radio, the cable, and even the humble typewriter have contributed their essential share, with the result that to great britain's naval defense there has been devoted an extraordinary degree of efficiency, continuous effort, a more varied activity, and a larger expenditure of money than to any other object of man's activity. the united states navy, to which is committed the naval defense of the united states, has followed the same lines as the british; and its task, while in some ways easier, is in other ways more difficult. perhaps the chief reason why the naval defense of great britain is so difficult is the extreme closeness of her borders to the borders of her possible foes--for the english channel is only twenty-three miles across from dover to calais. and yet the very narrowness of the channel there lends a certain element of assistance to the defender of either coast against an enemy like germany, because it enables the defender, by simply protecting that narrow area, to prevent an enemy from passing to the sea or from it, except by going around the british isles. but while it is interesting thus to compare the tasks of two navies by comparing the lengths of coast line, populations, wealth, and areas of their countries, or their distances from possible antagonists, such comparisons are really misleading; for the reason that all nations are on a par in regard to the paramount element of national defense, which is defense of national policy. it was as important to belgium as it was to germany to maintain the national policy, and the army of belgium was approximately as strong as that of germany in proportion to her wealth, area, and population; but nevertheless the belgium army was routed, and belgium was conquered by the german army. much has been written to prove that the sole reason for the possession of the paramount navy by great britain is that the soil of great britain cannot support her people. in an essay, entitled "naval power," which i contributed to the _united states naval institute_ in , the fallacy of this was shown; and it was pointed out that even if great britain grew more than enough to feed her people, life could be made unendurable to the , , living there (or to the people in any civilized and isolated country) by an effective blockading fleet. _the question of how great a navy any country needs depends, not on the size, but on the policies of that country, and on the navies of the countries that may oppose those policies_. the navy that a country needs is a navy that can defend its policies, both offensively and defensively. if, for instance, the united states does not wish to enforce any policy that great britain would oppose, or to oppose any policy that great britain would enforce, then we may leave her navy out of consideration. but if we decide that we must maintain a certain policy which a certain country may oppose, then we must have a navy at least equal to hers; because we do not know whether we should have to meet that navy near our coast, or near hers, or far away from both. for the reason, furthermore, that a war with a european power might occur at a period of strained relations with some asiatic power, we must realize the temptation to that asiatic power to seize the opportunity and attack us on the pacific side, knowing that we should need all our navy on the atlantic side. this seems to mean that in order to have an effective naval defense (since we are precluded by our policy from having european allies and no south american country could give us any effective naval help) we must have on each ocean a fleet as strong as that of any nation on that ocean against whose wishes we may have to enforce a policy--or against whose policy we may have to oppose resistance. the essential requirement of any defense is that it shall be adequate; because an inadequate defense will be broken down, while the attack will retain a large proportion of its original strength. in the _united states naval institute_, in , the present writer showed, by means of a series of tables, how, when two forces fight, the force which is originally the more powerful will become gradually more powerful, relatively to the weaker, as the fight goes on. that, for instance, if two forces start with the relative powers of and , the weaker force will be reduced so much more rapidly than the stronger that when it has been reduced to zero the stronger force will have a value of . . the values mentioned indicated the actual fighting strength--strength made up of all the factors--material, physical, and psychic--that constituted it. of course, none of these factors can ever be accurately compared; but nevertheless the tables seemed to prove that in a contest between two forces whose total strengths are as and one force will be reduced to zero, while the other will be reduced not quite one-half. one of the lessons drawn was "the folly of ineffectual resistance." doubtless a clearer lesson would have been "the folly of ineffectual preparedness"; because, when the decision as to resistance or non-resistance is forced upon a nation, the matter is so urgent, the military, political, and international conditions so complex, and the excitement probably so intense, that a wise decision is very difficult to reach; whereas the question of what constitutes effectual preparedness is simple, and needs merely to be approached with calm nerves and an open mind. inasmuch as the psychic element in defense is the strongest single element, it is apparent that if the decision is reached to prepare an effectual defense the nation must be absolutely united, and must appreciate at its full value the debilitating influence of opposition to the measure; for, no matter how much money a nation may expend, no matter how many lives it may sacrifice, its defense cannot have an efficiency proportional to the effort if a considerable number of its citizens are permitted to oppose it. in our own country there has been so much talking and writing recently about defense, that there is danger of the question coming to be considered academic; though no question is more practical, no question is more urgent. _defense must defend_. chapter vi naval policy every country that has a satisfactory navy has acquired it as the result of a far-seeing naval policy, not of opportunism or of chance. the country has first studied the question thoroughly, then decided what it ought to do, then decided how to do it. naval policy has to deal with three elements: material, personnel, and operations, which, though separate, are mutually dependent. a clear comprehension of their actual relations and relative weights can be obtained only by thorough study; but without that comprehension no wise naval policy can be formulated, and therefore no satisfactory navy can be established. the most obvious thing about a navy is its material: the ponderous battleships, the picturesque destroyers, the submarines, the intricate engines of multifarious types, the radio, the signal-flags, the torpedo that costs $ , , the gun that can sink a ship miles away. the united states navy ever since its beginning in has excelled in its material; the ships have always been good, and in many cases they have surpassed those of similar kind in other navies. this has been due to the strong common sense of the american people, their engineering skill, and their inventive genius. the first war-ship to move under steam was the american ship _demologos_, sometimes called the _fulton the first_, constructed in ; the first electric torpedoes were american; the first submarine to do effective work in war was american; the first turret ship, the _monitor_, was american; the first warship to use a screw propeller was the _princeton_, an american; the naval telescope-sight was american. american ships now are not only well constructed, but all their equipments are of the best; and to-day the american battleship is the finest and most powerful vessel of her class in the world. our personnel, too, has always been good. the american seaman has always excelled, and so has the american gunner. no ships have ever been better handled than the american ships; no naval battles in history have been conducted with more skill and daring than those of american ships; no exploits in history surpass those of cushing, hobson, and decatur. in operations, however, in the handling of the navy as a whole, we have never excelled; though no better individual fleet leaders shine in the pages of all history than farragut and dewey. the strategical operating of our material and personnel has not been in accordance with carefully laid plans, but has been left largely to the inspiration of the commander on the spot, both in peace and in war. material has suffered from lack of a naval policy, but only quantitatively, because material is a subject that the people understand. personnel has suffered more, because the people fail to realize the amount of training needed to make a personnel competent to perform their tasks successfully, in competition with the highly trained men of other navies. but operations have suffered incomparably more than material and personnel; because naturally the people do not comprehend the supreme importance of being ready, when war breaks out, to operate the material and personnel skilfully against an active enemy, in accordance with well-prepared strategic plans; nor do they realize how difficult and long would be the task of preparing and testing out those plans. therefore, they fail to provide the necessary administrative machinery.[*] [footnote *: since this was written, the congress has so enlarged the scope of the office of chief of naval operations as to make it a general staff.] in fact, the kind and amount of machinery needed to conduct operations skilfully and quickly cannot be decided wisely until the country adopts some naval policy; and in naval policy the united states must be admitted to have lagged behind almost every other civilized country. spurred as we were to exertion by the coming of the revolutionary war, we constructed hastily, though with skill, the splendid ships that did service in that war. but after the war, interest in the navy waned; and if it had not been for the enormous tribute demanded by the pirates of the barbary coast from our government, and a realization of the fact that not only was it cheaper to build ships and fight the pirates than to pay the tribute, but paying the tribute was a disgraceful act, our navy would have run down even more than it did. yet even with this warning, found our navy in a desperate condition. rallying to the emergency, though too late to accomplish much practical result, we built a number of excellent ships, against the votes of many highly influential men in congress. these ships did gallant service, and redeemed the reputation of americans from the oft-repeated charge of being cowards and merely commercial men, though they were too few to prevent the blockade which british squadrons maintained on our atlantic coast. after the war, the navy was again allowed to deteriorate; and although our ships were excellent, and the officers and men were excellent, and although the war with mexico supplied some stimulation, the war of the rebellion caught us in a very bad predicament. the country rose to this emergency too slowly, as before; but the enemy were even less prepared than we, so that during the four years of the civil war we were able to construct, man, and buy several hundred ships of various kinds; with the result that, at the end of the war, our navy, if not quite so powerful as great britain's, was at least very close to it, and with a recent experience in actual war which the british navy did not possess. after that war, the same story was repeated. the people convinced themselves that they would never again be forced to go to war; that they had seen the folly of it, and the misery of it, and would devote themselves thereafter to the delightful pursuits of peace. gradually the fighting ships of the ironclad class were allowed to go to pieces; gradually even the larger ships of the wooden sailing class fell into disrepair; gradually the idea of war faded from the minds even of naval officers; gradually squadrons and fleets, as such, were broken up, and our ships were to be found scattered singly over all the seas, and swinging idly at their anchors in pleasant ports. fortunately, admiral luce and a very few other officers had learned the salient lessons of war during the rebellion, and sturdily stood up against the decadent tendency of the times. against much opposition, luce succeeded in founding the naval war college at newport, where the study of war as an art in itself was to be prosecuted, and in enlisting captain mahan in the work. in a few years mahan gave to the world that epochal book, "the influence of sea power upon history" (embodying his lectures before the war college), which stirred the nations of europe to such a realization of the significance of naval history, and such a comprehension of the efficacy of naval power, that they entered upon a determined competition for acquiring naval power, which continues to this day. meanwhile, a little before , the people became aroused to the fact that though the country was growing richer, their navy was becoming weaker, while the navies of certain european countries were becoming stronger. so they began in the construction of what was then called "the new navy." the construction of the new ships was undertaken upon the lines of the ships then building abroad, which were in startling contrast with the useless old-fashioned american ships which then were flying our flag. the construction of the material of the navy has progressed since then, but spasmodically. at every session of congress tremendous efforts have been made by people desiring an adequate navy, and tremendous resistance has been made by people who believed that we required no navy, or at least only a little navy. the country at large has taken a bystander's interest in the contest, not knowing much about the pros and cons, but feeling in an indolent fashion that we needed some navy, though not much. the result has been, not a reasonable policy, but a succession of unreasonable compromises between the aims of the extremists on both sides. great britain, on the other hand, has always regarded the navy question as one of the most difficult and important before the country, and has adopted, and for centuries has maintained, a definite naval policy. this does not mean that she has followed a rigid naval policy; for a naval policy, to be efficient, must be able to accommodate itself quickly to rapid changes in international situations, and to meet sudden dangers from even unexpected quarters--as the comparatively recent experience of great britain shows. at the beginning of this century the british navy was at the height of its splendor and self-confidence. britannia ruled the waves, and britannia's ships and squadrons enforced britannia's policies in every sea. the next most powerful navy was that of france; but it was not nearly so large, and seemed to be no more efficient, in proportion to its size. owing to britain's wise and continuing policy, and the excellence of the british sailor and his ships, the british navy proudly and almost tranquilly held virtual command of all the seas. but shortly after this century began, british officers discerned a new and disturbing element gradually developing on the horizon. the first thing which roused their attention to it was the unexpected attack of the japanese torpedo-boats on the russian squadron in port arthur. no war had been declared, and the russian squadron was riding peacefully at anchor. the suddenness of the attack, and the distinct though incomplete success which it achieved, startled the british into a realization of the fact that there had been introduced into warfare on the sea methods and tactics requiring _a higher order of preparation_ than had ever before been known; that the scientific methods which the germans employed so effectively on land in had been adapted by the japanese to naval warfare, and would necessitate the introduction into naval policies of _speedier methods_ than had hitherto been needed. another event which had happened shortly before showed that naval policies would have to be modified, if they were to utilize recent advances in scientific methods. this event was the unprecedented success at target practice of h. m. s. _terrible_, commanded by captain sir percy scott, which proved that by a long and strenuous training and the adoption of instruments of precision, it was possible to attain a skill in naval gunnery never attained before. up to this moment the british navy had almost despised gunnery. inheriting the traditions brought down from howe, rodney, and nelson, permeated with the ideals of the "blue-water school," proud of being british seamen, proud of the pure white of their ships, enamoured of the stimulating breeziness of the quarterdeck and bridge, imbued with almost a contempt for such mathematical sciences as were not directly used in practical navigation, british naval officers exalted seamanship as the acme of their art, and took little interest in gunnery. all the battles of the past had been won by dash and seamanship and dogged persistence. ships had always fought close alongside each other. no science had ever won any naval battle of the past, so why should they bother with science now--and why should they bother with target practice, except just enough to insure that the battery was in order, and that the men were not afraid of their guns? besides, target practice dirtied the ship--a sacrilege to the british naval officer. but the events of the war between japan and russia, especially the naval battles of port arthur, august , , and the sea of japan, may , , riveted their attention on the fact that something more than seamanship and navigation and clean ships would be needed, if the british navy was to maintain its proud supremacy on the sea; for in these battles, overwhelming victories were won purely by superior skill in gunnery, strategy, and tactics. to these causes of awakening was added one still greater, but of like import--the rapid rise of the german navy from a position of comparative unimportance to one which threatened the british navy itself. the fact became gradually evident to british officers that the german navy was proceeding along the same lines as had proceeded the german army. realizing the efficiency of the german government, noting the public declarations of the german emperor, observing the excellence of the german ships, the skill of the german naval officers, and the extraordinary energy which the german people were devoting to the improvement of the german navy--the british navy took alarm. so did the other navies. beginning about , great britain set to work with energy to reform her naval policy. roused to action by the sense of coming danger, she augmented the size and number of vessels of all types; increased the personnel of all classes, regular and reserve; scrapped all obsolete craft; built (secretly) the epochal _dreadnaught_, and modernized in all particulars the british navy. in every great movement one man always stands pre-eminent. the man in this case was admiral sir john fisher, first sea lord of the admiralty, afterward lord fisher. fisher brought about vital changes in the organization, methods, and even the spirit of the navy. he depleted the overgrown foreign squadrons, concentrated the british force in powerful fleets near home, established the war college, inculcated the study of strategy and tactics, appointed sir percy scott as inspector of target practice, put the whole weight of his influence on the side of gunnery and efficiency, placed officers in high command who had the military idea as distinguished from the idea of the "blue-water school," and imbued the entire service with the avowed idea that they must get ready to fight to the death, not the french navy, with its easy-going methods, but the german navy, allied perhaps with some other. at the admiralty he introduced methods analogous to those of the general staff, to maintain the navy ready for instant service at all times, to prepare and keep up to date mobilization plans in the utmost detail, and to arrange plans for the conduct of war in such wise that after a war should break out, all the various probable situations would have been studied out in advance. the work required at the admiralty, and still more in the fleet--night and day and in all weathers--taxed mental and physical endurance to the limit; but the result was complete success; for when war broke out on the st of august, , the british navy was absolutely ready. many complaints have appeared in print about the unreadiness of great britain; but no one who knows anything of the facts supposes that these criticisms include great britain's navy. the united states navy in the early part of this century occupied, relatively to others, a very ill-defined position; but the increased interest taken in it by our people after the spanish war, combined with the destruction of the flower of the russian fleet in the russo-japanese war, and the crushing blow inflicted on the french navy by the maladministration of camille pelletan, resulted in placing our navy, about three years ago, in a position second only to great britain's--a position which it recently has lost. owing to a common origin and language, our navy has always followed the british navy, though at a somewhat respectful distance; and while it is true that in point of mechanical inventions we are ahead, in seamanship, navigation, and engineering on a par, and in gunnery and tactics not far behind, yet we must admit that in policy and in policy's first cousin, strategy, we are very far in the rear. there are many reasons why this should be, the first being that the british navy has nearly always lived under more stimulating conditions than we, because the probability of war has seemed greater, and because the united states has underestimated what reasonable probability there has been, and failed to realize how tremendously difficult would be the task of getting ready for it. owing to the present war, our people have gradually come to see that they must get more ships and other material; but they realize this as only a measure of urgency, and not as a matter of policy. if the emergency passes us by in safety, the people may see in this fact only a confirmation of their notion that war can be postponed _ad infinitum_, and may therefore fail to take due precautions for the future. if so, when we at last become involved in a sudden war, we shall be as unprepared as now; and, relatively to some aggressive nation which, foreseeing this, may purposely prepare itself, we shall be more unprepared. a curious phase of the navy question in our country is the fact that very few people, even the most extreme partisans for or against a large navy, have ever studied it as a problem and endeavored to arrive at a correct solution. few have realized that it is a problem, in the strictest sense of the word; and that unless one approaches it as such his conclusions cannot be correct except by accident. in germany, on the other hand, and equally in japan, the question has been taken up as a concrete problem, just as definite as a problem in engineering. they have used for solving it the method called "the estimate of the situation," originated by the german general staff, which is now adopted in all the armies and navies of civilized countries for the solution of military problems. previous to the adoption of this method the general procedure had been such as is now common in civil life, when a number of people forming a group desire to make a decision as to what they will do in any given contingency. the usual procedure is for some one to suggest that a certain thing be done, then for somebody else to suggest that something else be done, and so on; and then finally for the group to make a decision which is virtually a compromise. this procedure is faulty, and the decisions resulting are apt to be unwise; because it is quite possible that some very important factors may be overlooked, and equally possible that some other factors be given undue weight. furthermore, a measure advocated by a man who has the persuasive and emotional abilities of the orator is more apt to be favorably considered than a measure advocated by a man not possessing those abilities. in the "estimate of the situation" method, on the other hand, the orator has no opportunity, because the procedure is simply an accurate process of reasoning. it is divided into four parts. the first part consists of a careful study of the "mission," ending in a clear determination of what the "mission" really is--that is, _what is the thing which it is desired to do?_ the second part consists of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of the difficulties in the way; the third part consists of a careful study, and eventually a clear comprehension, of what facilities are available with which to overcome the difficulties; the fourth part consists of a careful study of the mission, difficulties and facilities, in their mutual relations, and a "decision" as to what should therefore be done. military and naval people are so thoroughly convinced of the value of this method that they always employ it when making important decisions, writing down the various factors and the successive steps in regular order and in complete detail. in this country, while naval and military people use this method in their comparatively minor problems, the country at large does not use it in deciding the major problem--that is, in deciding how much navy they want, and of what composition. they do not take even the first step toward formulating a naval policy, because they do not study the "mission" of the navy--that is, _they do not study the international and national situations and their bearing on the need for a navy_. yet until they do this they will not be in a sufficiently informed condition of mind to determine what the "mission" is--that is, what they wish the navy to be able to do--because, before they can formulate the mission they must resolve what foreign navy or navies that mission must include. if they decide that the mission of the navy is to guard our coast and trade routes against the hostile efforts of liberia the resulting naval policy will be simple and inexpensive; while if they conclude that the mission of our navy is to guard our coast and trade routes against the hostile acts of _any_ navy the resulting naval policy will be so difficult and costly as to tax the brain and wealth of the country to a degree that will depend on _the length of time that will elapse before the date at which the navy must be ready to fulfil that mission_. this factor reminds us of another factor: _the minimum time in which the navy can get ready to fulfil a given mission_ (for instance, to protect us against any navy); and we cannot decide the mission correctly without taking this factor into account. for example, it would be foolish to decide that the mission of our navy is to protect us _now_ against any navy, including the greatest, when it would take us at least twenty years to develop and train a navy to accomplish that task; and it would be equally foolish to decide that the mission is to protect us against any navy _except_ the greatest, because such a decision could rest on no other ground than present improbability of conflict with the greatest navy, or improbability for the very few years ahead (say two or three) which we poor mortals can forecast. this reasoning seems to indicate that the first step in formulating a naval policy for the united states is to realize that any conclusion as to which navies should be included in the mission of our navy must not exclude any navy about whose peaceful conduct toward us we can entertain a reasonable doubt, _during the period of time which we would require to get ready to meet her_. for instance, inasmuch as it would take us at least twenty years to get ready to protect ourselves against the hostile efforts of the british navy, we cannot exclude even that navy from a consideration of the mission of our own, unless we entertain no doubt of the peaceful attitude of that navy toward us for at least that twenty years. clearly, the problem is not only very important but very difficult--perhaps the most difficult single problem before the country; and for this reason, naval officers have long marvelled that the leading minds of the country do not undertake it. perhaps one reason is that they do not know how difficult it is: that they do not realize the extraordinary complexity of modern ships and engines, and the trained skill required to handle them; that they do not realize what great britain now realizes, that we must prepare for one of the most stupendous struggles ever carried on; that we must have a personnel both of officers and enlisted men trained to the highest point, because they will have to meet officers and enlisted men trained to the highest point; that the training must be such that the skill produced can be exercised by night and day, in cold and heat, in storm and calm, under circumstances of the utmost possible difficulty and danger; that, while it takes four years to build a ship and get her into the fleet as an effective unit, it takes much longer to train an enlisted petty officer as he should be trained, and a lifetime to train officers of the upper grades. perhaps also our leading minds do not realize the intellectual requirements of the higher realms of the naval art, or comprehend what the examples of alexander, cæsar, napoleon, nelson, and farragut prove: that, _in the real crises of a nation's life her most valuable asset is the trained skill in strategy that directs the movements of her forces_. further than this, they may not realize that the greater the danger which they must avert, the earlier they must begin to prepare for it, because the more work in preparation will have to be performed; and yet realization of this truth is absolutely vital, as is also realization of the fact that we have no military power as our ally, and therefore must be ready to meet alone a hostile attack (though perhaps in the far-distant future) from _any_ foreign power. to see that this is true it is merely necessary to note the facts of history, and observe how nations that have long been on terms of friendship have suddenly found themselves at war with each other; and how countries which have always been hostile have found themselves fighting side by side. in the present war, great britain is allied with the two countries toward which, more than toward any other, she has been hostile; and she is fighting the country to which, more than any other, she is bound by ties of consanguinity and common interests. the history of war is so filled with alternations of peace and war between every pair of contiguous countries as to suggest the thought that the mere fact of two countries having interests that are common is a reason why their respective shares in those interests may conflict; that countries which have no common interests have nothing to fight about; that it is only for things in which two nations are interested, and which both desire, that those two nations fight. if our estimate of the situation should lead us to the decision that we must prepare our navy in such a way that, say twenty years hence, it will be able to protect the country against any enemy, we shall then instinctively adopt a policy. the fact of having ahead of us a definite, difficult thing to do, will at once take us out of the region of guesswork, and force us into logical methods. we shall realize the problem in its entirety; we shall see the relation of one part to another, and of all the parts to the whole; we shall realize that the deepest study of the wisest men must be devoted to it, as it is in all maritime countries except our own. the very difficulties of the problem, the very scope and greatness of it, the fact that national failure or national success will hinge on the way we solve it, will call into action the profoundest minds in all the nation. we shall realize that, more than any other problem before the country, this problem is urgent; because in no other problem have we so much lost time to make up for, and in no other work of the government are we so far behind the great nations that we may have to contend against. great britain was startled into a correct estimate of the situation ten years ago, and at once directed perhaps the best of her ability to meet it. certain it is that no other department of the british government is in such good condition as the navy; in no other department has the problem been so thoroughly understood, and so conscientiously worked out, or the success been so triumphant. the underlying reason for this is not so much the individual courage and ability of the officers and men, or even their skill in handling their ships and squadrons, as the fact that great britain has followed a definite naval policy; so that the british nation has had a perfectly clear realization of what it wishes the navy to do, and the navy has had a perfectly clear realization of how to do it. the united states has not yet made a correct estimate of the naval situation; she has not yet reached the point that great britain reached ten years ago. great britain apprehended the danger, and took action before it was too late. shall the united states take action now or wait until it is too late? part ii naval strategy chapter vii general principles strategy is difficult of definition; but though many definitions have been made, and though they do not agree together very well, yet all agree that strategy is concerned with the preparation of military forces for war and for operating them in war--while tactics is the immediate instrument for handling them in battle. strategy thinks out a situation beforehand, and decides what preparations as to material, personnel, and operations should be made. many books have been written on strategy, meaning strategy as applied to armies, but very few books have been written on naval strategy. the obvious reasons are that armies in the past have been much larger and more important than navies; that naval men have only recently had the appliances on board ship for writing on an extensive scale; and that the nature of their occupation has been such that continuous application of the kind needed for thinking out principles and expounding them in books, has only recently been possible. most of the few existing books on naval strategy deal with it historically, by describing and explaining the naval campaigns of the past and such land campaigns as illustrate principles that apply to sea and land alike. perhaps the best books are those of darrieus and mahan. until about fifty years ago, it was only by experience in actual war, supplemented by laborious study of the campaigns of the great commanders, and the reading of books on strategy which pointed out and expounded the principles involved in them, that one could arrive at any clear idea of strategy. but wars have fortunately been so infrequent, the information about them has often been so conflicting, and so many results have been due to chance, that, in default of experience, the mere reading of books did not lead to very satisfactory results, except in the case of geniuses; and therefore war problems and war games were devised, in which the various factors of material and personnel were represented, and made as true to life as possible. the _tactical_ games resulting, which naval strategists now play, employ models of the various craft used in war, such as battleships, submarines, etc., and are governed by rules that regulate the movements of those craft on a sort of big chess-board, several feet square, that represents an area of water several miles square. the _strategic_ games and problems are based on principles similar to those on which the tactical games are based, in the sense that actual operations are carried on in miniature; but naturally, the strategical operations cover several hundred miles, and sometimes thousands. the aim of both the tactical and the strategic games is to determine as closely as possible the laws that decide victory or defeat; and therefore, for any country, the material, personnel and operations it should employ. naturally the results obtained are not quite so convincing as those of actual war or battle; but they are more convincing than can be attained in any other way, as yet devised, especially as many of the operations of the game-board that turn out well in games are tried out afterward by the fleet in peace maneuvers. war games and problems may be compared to the drawings that an architect makes of a house which some one wants to build; the plans and drawings are not so realistic as a real house, but they are better than anything else; and, like the war games, they can be altered and realtered until the best result seems to have been attained, considering the amount of money allowed and other practical conditions. the idea of devising war games and war problems seems to have originated with von moltke; certainly it was first put in practice by his direction. shortly after he became chief of the general staff of the prussian army in , he set to work to carry out the ideas which he had had in mind for several years, while occupying minor posts, but which he had not had the power to enforce. it seems to have become clear to his mind that, if a chess-player acquired skill, not only by playing actual games and by studying actual games played by masters, but also by working out hypothetical chess problems, it ought to be possible to devise a system whereby army officers could supplement their necessarily meagre experience of actual war, and their necessarily limited opportunities for studying with full knowledge the actual campaigns of great strategists, by working out hypothetical, tactical, and strategic problems. von moltke succeeded in devising such a system and in putting it into successful operation. hypothetical problems were prepared, in which enemy forces were confronted with each other under given circumstances of weather, terrain, and distances, each force with its objective known only to itself: for instance, you are in command of such and such a force at such and such a place; you have received orders to accomplish such and such a purpose; you receive information that the enemy, comprising such and such troops, was at a certain time at a certain place, and marching in a certain direction. what do you do? classes of army officers were formed, and compelled to work out the problems exactly as boys at school were compelled to work out problems in arithmetic. the skill of individual officers in solving the problems was noted and recorded; and the problems themselves, as time went on and experience was gained, were made more and more to conform to probable situations in future wars with austria, france, and other countries, actual maps being used, and the exact nature and magnitude of every factor in each problem being precisely stated. by such work, the pupils (officers) acquired the same kind of skill in solving strategic and tactical problems that a boy acquires in solving problems in arithmetic--a skill in handling the instruments employed. now the skill acquired in solving any kind of problem, like the skill developed in any art, such as baseball, fencing, or piano-playing, does not give a man skill merely in doing a thing identically like a thing he has done before: such a skill would be useless, for the reason that identical conditions almost never recur, and identical problems are never presented. similar conditions often recur, however, and similar problems are often presented; and familiarity with any class of conditions or problems imparts skill in meeting any condition or any problem that comes within that class. if, for instance, a man memorizes the sums made by adding together any two of the digits, he is equipped to master any problem of addition; and if he will practise at adding numbers together, he will gradually acquire a certain ability of mind whereby he can add together a long row of figures placed in a sequence he never saw before, and having a sum he never attained before. or a pianist, having acquired the mastery of the technic of the keyboard and the ability to read music, can sit down before a piano he never sat at before and play off instantly a piece of music he never saw before. doubtless moltke had ideas of this kind in mind when his plans for educating strategists and tacticians by problems on paper and by games were ridiculed by the unimaginative, and resisted by the indolent; and certainly no man was ever proved right more gloriously than moltke. in the war with austria in , the prussian army defeated the austrian at sadowa or königgrätz in nineteen days after the declaration of war. in the war with france in , the prussian army routed the french and received the surrender of napoleon iii in seven weeks and two days, not because of superior courage or experience in war, but by more scientific strategy. as henderson says: "even the french generals of divisions and brigades had had more actual experience (in war) than those who led the german army corps. compared with the german rank and file, a great part of their non-commissioned officers and men were veterans, and veterans who had seen much service. their chief officers were practically familiar with the methods of moving, supplying, and maneuvering large masses of troops; their marshals were valiant and successful soldiers. and yet the history of modern warfare records no defeats so swift and complete as those of königgrätz and sedan. the great host of austria was shattered in seven weeks; the french imperial army was destroyed in seven weeks and three days; and to all intents and purposes the resistance they had offered was not much more effective than that of a respectable militia. but both the austrian and the french armies were organized and trained under the old system. courage, experience, and professional pride they possessed in abundance. man for man, in all virile qualities, neither officers nor men were inferior to their foes. but one thing their generals lacked, and that was education for war. strategy was almost a sealed book to them." also, "moltke committed no mistake. long before war had been declared every possible precaution had been made. and these included much more than arrangements for rapid mobilization, the assembly of superior numbers completely organized, and the establishment of magazines. the enemy's numbers, armaments, readiness, and efficiency had been submitted to a most searching examination. every possible movement that might be made, however unlikely, had been foreseen; every possible danger that might arise, however remote, discussed and guarded against"; also, "that the prussian system should be imitated, and her army deprived of its monopoly of high efficiency, was naturally inevitable. every european state has to-day its college, its intelligence department, its schools of instruction, and its course of field maneuvers and field firing." strategy may be divided into two parts, war strategy and preparation strategy; and of these two, preparation strategy is by far the more important. war strategy deals with the laying out of plans of campaign after war has begun, and the handling of forces until they come into contact with the enemy, when tactics takes those forces in its charge. it deals with actual situations, arranges for the provisioning, fuelling, and moving of actual forces, contests the field against an actual enemy, the size and power of which are fairly well known--and the intentions of which are sometimes known and sometimes not. the work of the strategist in war is arduous, pressing, definite, and exciting; and results are apt to follow decisions quickly. he plays the greatest and oldest game the world has ever known, with the most elaborate instruments, and for the largest stakes. in most wars, the antagonists have been so nearly equal in point of personnel and material that the result has seemed to be decided by the relative degrees of skill of the strategists on both sides. this has been the verdict of history; and victorious commanders in all times and in all lands have achieved rarer glories, and been crowned with higher honors, than any other men. preparation strategy deals with the laying out of plans for supposititious wars and the handling of supposititious forces against supposititious enemies; and arranges for the construction, equipment, mobilization, provisioning, fuelling, and moving of supposititious fleets and armies. war strategy is vivid, stimulating and resultful; preparation strategy is dull, plodding, and--for the strategist himself--apparently resultless. yet war strategy is merely the child of preparation strategy. the weapons that war strategy uses, preparation strategy put into its hands. the fundamental plans, the strength and composition of the forces, the training of officers and men, the collection of the necessary material of all kinds, the arrangements for supplies and munitions of all sorts--the very principles on which war strategy conducts its operations--are the fruit of the tedious work of preparation strategy. alexander reaps the benefit of the preliminary labors of his father, philip; william is made german emperor by the toil of moltke. the work of laying out a supposititious campaign, involving supposititious operations against a supposititious enemy, requires of the strategist a thorough estimate of the situation, including a careful estimate of the forces of the enemy, in material and personnel, and of the strategy that will probably govern his operations--whether he will act on the defensive, or assume the offensive; if he is to act on the defensive, how and where will he base his forces, how far will he operate away from his own shores? and if he is to act on the offensive, what direction will his operations take; will he secure an advance base; and if so, where? and as the character of the enemy's operations will depend on the personnel of the enemy general staff and of the high commanders afloat, who comprise the personnel, and what are their characteristics? to decide these questions correctly requires considerable acquaintance with the enemy country, its navy and its policy, a full knowledge of the strategy, personnel, and material of that navy, and a sound conception of strategy itself. but to decide the questions correctly is essential, because the decision will form the basis of the future plans. naturally, as the plan is entirely supposititious and is to take effect at some indefinite time in the future, all the factors that will be in existence at that time cannot be foretold exactly, and therefore must be estimated. this will necessitate several alternate hypotheses; and a war plan including mobilization and operations must be made out, based on each hypothesis. for instance, on the hypothesis that the enemy will take the offensive, one set of plans will have to be prepared on the basis that we shall also take the offensive, and another on the basis that circumstances may be such at that time as to make it wise for us to resort to the defensive; while on the hypothesis that the enemy is to remain on the defensive, a set of plans very different from the other two as to both mobilization and operations must be devised. each set of the plans just suggested may also have to be divided into two or more parts. on the basis that the enemy will remain on the defensive, for instance, the circumstances when the hour for action comes, such as the fact of his being quite unprepared, may indicate the advisability of an attack on him as sudden as it can be made; while, on the other hand, circumstances such as the fact of his being thoroughly prepared may render it necessary for us to send a larger force than we could get ready quickly, especially if the enemy coast be far away, and may therefore indicate the advisability of deliberate movements, and even a protracted delay before starting. but no matter what plan is to be followed, a detailed plan for every probable contingency must be prepared; and it must be elaborated in such detail that it can be put into operation instantly when the fateful instant comes; because the enemy will put his plans into operation at the same time we do, and the one whose plans are executed first will take a long step toward victory. not only must the plans provide some means whereby the plans themselves shall get into full operation instantly when war breaks; other plans must also provide that all the acts which those plans contemplate must be performed. not only must the plans provide that all the prearranged orders for putting the _kearsarge_ into full commission shall be instantly sent by mail, telegraph, and telephone to the proper officials, but other plans must also provide means whereby the officers and men shall actually march on board the _kearsarge_, her ensign and commission pennant be displayed, all the fuel, ammunition, provisions, and equipment be on board and the _kearsarge_ sail at once, and join the commander-in-chief at sea. doubtless the most complicated and comprehensive plans are those for sending a large expedition on an offensive mission to a far-distant coast, especially if that coast be guarded by an efficient navy, if it have outlying islands that would afford good bases for her destroyers and submarines, and if there are not good harbors which our fleet could seize as advance bases, from which to prosecute its future operations. the complexity of the task of planning such an expedition, taking due account, but not exaggerated account, of all the factors, favorable and adverse, is appalling; but the task must be undertaken and accomplished. the most tedious part is the logistics--the arrangements for supplying the fleet on the way and in the distant theatre of operations with the necessary provisions, equipment, and ammunition and, above all, the fuel. the average superdreadnaught consumes about tons of coal per day at full speed, and about tons at knots; and coal or other fuel for all the dreadnaughts, battle cruisers, cruisers of various classes, scouts, destroyers, submarines, ships, aircraft of different kinds, hospital ships, ammunition ships, transports, and the fuel ships themselves, must be provided by means that _must not fail_. while the work of planning an offensive movement to a distant coast is the most tedious and complex, the work of planning a defensive measure against a sudden attack on the coast needs the most concentration of effort; for whatever the plans require to be done must be done at once. this necessitates that the orders to be issued must be as few as possible; that they be as concise and clear as possible; that the things to be done be as few and as simple as possible, and that all possible foresight be exercised to prevent any confusion or misunderstanding, or any necessity on the part of any one for requesting more instructions. when the fateful instant comes, the final command to mobilize puts into execution whichever of the plans already made is to be followed; and for this reason it is clear that the various plans must be kept separate from each other, and each set of plans must include all the various orders that must be signed for carrying it into effect, including the particular word or phrase that directs the execution of that particular set of plans. it is the story that the final order to the british navy in the early part of august, , was the word "go." all the units went immediately, understandingly, unitedly; and the greatest machine the world has ever known was almost instantly in operation at full speed. no such stupendous feat, physically considered, had ever been done before. the mobilization of the prussian army in and of the german army about august , , were as great performances mentally and strategically, but not physically, by reason of the relative feebleness of the forces set in motion. this relative feebleness was due, of course, to the insignificance of muskets compared to navy guns, of railway-trains compared to battleships, etc.--an insignificance far from being neutralized by the greater number of the units, for one -inch shell has an energy equal to that of about , muskets, and no army contains anything approximating the powerfulness of a battleship. not only, however, must the strategist make plans in peace for preparations that culminate in mobilization, and simply insure that the navy shall be ready in material and personnel when war breaks; he must also make plans for operating the navy strategically afterward, along each of the various lines of direction that the war may take. in other words, the work of preparation strategy in making war plans may be divided into two parts--mobilization and operation. the plans of mobilization deal naturally with all the activities concerned, material and personnel, and endeavor to arrange a passing from a state of peace to a state of war in the quickest possible time, and with the least chance of errors and omissions. a considerable degree of imagination is required, an almost infinite patience, and a perfect willingness to work indefinitely without any reasonable expectation of getting tangible results. a more hopeless task can hardly be given any man or body of men than that of working out plans, general and detailed, day after day, for contingencies that will probably never happen, and to guard against dangers that will probably never come; preparing tables, diagrams, and schedules which are almost certainly doomed to rest forever in the sepulchre of the confidential files. yet this work is basic. perhaps it is for that reason, that it is obscure and dull; basic work is apt to be so. the spectacular success of an individual in any walk of life is often but the crowning of the unrecognized, and often utterly unknown work--of other men. strategy is not a science only; it is an art as well; and although the art cannot be practised in its perfection until after the science is well comprehended, yet the art of strategy was born before the science was. this is true of all those departments of man's activity that are divided into sciences and arts, such as music, surgery, government, navigation, gunnery, painting, sculpture, and the rest; because the fundamental facts--say of music--cannot even attract attention until some music has been produced by the art of some musician, crude though that art may be; and the art cannot advance very far until scientific methods have been applied, and the principles that govern the production of good music have been found. the unskilled navigators of the distant past pushed their frail craft only short distances from the land, guided by art and not by science; for no science of navigation then existed. but the knowledge gradually gained, passing first from adept to pupil by word of mouth, and afterward recorded on the written and then the printed page, resulted first in the realization of the fact that various apparently unrelated phenomena were based on the same underlying principles; and resulted later in the perception, and still later in the definite expression, of those underlying principles. using these principles, the navigator expanded the limits of his art. soon we see columbus, superbly bold, crossing the unknown ocean; and magellan piercing the southern tip of the american continent by the straits that now bear his name. but of all the arts and sciences, the art and science that are the oldest and the most important; that have caused the greatest expenditure of labor, blood, and money; that have been the immediate instruments of more changes and greater changes in the history of the world than any other, are the art and the science of strategy. until the time of moltke the art of strategy, like most arts, was more in evidence than the science. in fact, science of any kind is a comparatively recent product, owing largely to the more exact operations of the mind brought about by the birth of the science of measurement, and the ensuing birth and development of the mechanic arts. before moltke's time campaigns were won by wise preparation and skilful execution, as they are now; but the strategical skill was acquired by a general or admiral almost wholly by his own exertions in war, and by studying the campaigns of the great commanders, and reflecting upon them with an intensity that so embedded their lessons in his subjective mind that they became a part of him, and actions in conformity with those lessons became afterward almost automatic. alexander and napoleon are perhaps the best illustrations of this passionate grasping of military principles; for though both had been educated from childhood in military matters, the science of strategy was almost non-existent in concrete form, and both men were far too young to have been able to devote much time or labor to it. but each was a genius of the highest type, and reached decisions at once immediate and wise, not by inspiration, but by mental efforts of a pertinacity and concentratedness impossible to ordinary men. it was because von moltke realized this, realized the folly of depending on ability to get geniuses on demand, and realized further the value of ascertaining the principles of strategy, and then expressing them so clearly that ordinary men could grasp and use them, that he conceived and carried into execution his plan; whereby not only actual battles could be analyzed, and the causes of victory and defeat in each battle laid bare to students, but also hypothetical wars and battles could be fought by means of problems given. the first result of a course of study of such wars and battles, and practice with such problems, was a skill in decision a little like that developed in any competitive game, say tennis, whist, chess, poker, boxing, and the like--whereby any action of your adversary brings an instantaneous and almost automatic reply from you, that you could not have made so skilfully and quickly before you had practised at the game; and yet the exact move of your adversary, under the same conditions, you had never seen before. of course, this skill was a development, not of the science, but of the art, as mere skill always is; but as skill developed, the best methods for obtaining skill were noted; and the principles governing the attainment of success gradually unveiled themselves, and were formulated into a science. naturally, strategy is not an exact science like mathematics, physics, or engineering--at least not now. whether it ever will be cannot be foretold. the reason that strategy (like medicine and most other sciences concerning human beings) is not an exact science is simply because it involves too many unknown quantities--quantities of which our knowledge is too vague to permit of our applying exact methods to them, in the way in which we apply exact methods to the comparatively well-known quantities and elements in the so-called "exact sciences." but a science may be a science even if it is not an exact science; we may know certain important principles sufficiently well to use them scientifically, even if we do not know them with sufficient exactness to permit us to use them as confidently as we should like. we may know, for instance, that it is folly to divide a military force in the presence of an active enemy into such small forces, and at such distances apart, as to let the enemy defeat each small force, one after the other, even if we do not know exactly how far it would be safe to separate two forces of a given size, in the presence of an enemy of a given power. it is well to know a fact in general terms, even if we do not know it in precise terms: it is well to know in general terms that we must not take prussic acid, even if we do not know exactly how much is needed to kill. so the studies and problems instituted by von moltke, and copied in all the armies and navies of the world, have brought about a science of strategy which is real, even though not exact, and which dwells in the mind of each trained strategist, as the high tribunal to which all his questions are referred and by whose decisions he is guided; just as the principles of medicine are the guide alike of the humblest and the most illustrious practitioner, wherever the beneficent art of medicine is practised. it is clear that, in order to be skilful in strategy (in fact, in any intellectual art), not only must a man have its scientific principles firmly imprinted on his mind, but he must make its practice so thoroughly familiar to his mental muscles that he can use strategy as a _trained_ soldier uses his musket--automatically. inasmuch as any man requires years of study and practice--say, of chess--in order to play chess well enough to compete successfully with professional chess-players, it seems to follow that any man must require years of study and practice of the more complicated game of strategy, in order to play strategy well enough to compete successfully with professional strategists. the game of chess looks easy to a beginner; in fact, the kind of game that he thinks chess to be is easy. but after he has learned the moves, he finds the intricacies of the game developing more rapidly than he can master them, and discovers that chess is a game which some men spend their lifetime studying. the full realization of this fact, however, does not come to him until after defeats by better players have forced into his consciousness the almost infinite number of combinations possible, the difficulty of deciding on the correct move at any juncture, and the consequences that follow after wrong moves. so with strategy. the ease and certainty with which orders can be transmitted and received, the precision with which large forces can be quickly despatched from place to place, and the tremendous power exertable by those forces, tend to blind the mind to the fact that transferring any force to any place is merely making a "move," and that the other player can make moves, too. if a man were never to be pitted in strategy against another player, either in games or in actual war, the "infinite variety" of strategy would never be disclosed to his intelligence; and after learning how to make the moves, he might feel willing to tackle any one. illustrations of this tendency by people of great self-confidence are numerous in history, and have not been missing even in the present war, though none have been reported in this country as occurring on the teuton side. there has always been a tendency on the part of a ruling class to seize opportunities for military glory, and the ambition has often been disproportioned to the accompanying ability and knowledge--sometimes on the part of a king, prince, or man of high nobility, sometimes on the part of a minister, sometimes on the part of an army or navy man, who has been indebted to political or social influence for his place. but within the past fifty years, especially since the establishment of the general staff in prussia and the studies of von moltke, the overshadowing importance of strategy has been understood, the necessity of comprehending its principles and practising its technic has been appreciated, and attempts to practise strategy by persons inexpert in strategy have been deprecated. the game of strategy, while resembling in many ways the game of chess, differs from it, of course, in the obvious element of personal danger. it also differs from it in an equally important but less obvious way--its relation to the instruments employed; for in chess those instruments (pieces) are of a number and character fixed by the rules of the game; whereas in strategy the number and character of the instruments (ships, etc.) employed are determined by strategy itself, assisted by engineering. germany realizes this, and therefore has established and followed a system whereby the character of the various material and personnel units of the navy, and even the number of them (under the restrictions of the money alloted), are decided by a body of men who are highly trained in strategy and engineering. there is an intimate connection between policy and strategy, and therefore between naval policy and naval strategy; and while it is difficult to draw the line exactly which separates policy and strategy, it may be said in general that policy is the concern of the government, and strategy is the concern of the navy and army, to be employed by them to carry out the policy. as naval policy and naval strategy are so intimately connected in their essence, it is apparent that the naval policy of a country and its naval strategy should be intimately connected in fact; for the policy cannot be properly carried out if the strategy that tries to execute it is not good, or if the policy requires more naval force or skill than the navy can bring to bear; and the strategy cannot be good if it is called upon to execute a policy impossible to execute, or if the exact end in view of the policy is not distinctly known. some of the greatest mistakes that have been made by governments have been made because of a lack of co-ordination between the government and its navy, so that the policy and the strategy could not work together. we see an illustration of this throughout the history of france, whose civil and naval authorities have not worked harmoniously together, whose naval strategy has apparently been opportunistic and short-sighted, and whose navy in consequence has not been so successful as the large sums of money spent upon it might lead one to expect. across the english channel we see a totally different state of things. in great britain the development of the navy has been going on for more than twelve hundred years, ever since king offa declared that "he who would be secure at home must be supreme at sea." for about eight hundred years thereafter the development was carried on energetically, but in an opportunistic fashion, following the requirements of the hour. in , however, the board of admiralty was established; and with occasional interruptions, especially prior to , the board has continued in existence ever since. a coherent policy of development has thereby been assured, and a wisdom of strategy established which more than any other single factor has made great britain the mistress of the seas, and almost the mistress of the world. the wisdom of her strategy has been due largely to the fact of the close touch maintained between the civil government, including parliament, and the navy; for by its very constitution the board of admiralty includes some of the highest officers of parliament, the cabinet, and the navy. its presiding officer is a member of the cabinet, and also member of parliament; four of the officers are naval officers, high in rank, character, and attainments; and the junior civil lord is a civilian versed in naval matters. all the orders for great movements of the fleets and ships are directed by this board and signed by its secretary, the board, by a fiction of the law, being considered an individual replacing the lord high admiral--which it did, in . the board is supposed to meet every day with all the members present, the vote of each member carrying as much weight as that of any other member. naturally, the first lord of the admiralty being a cabinet officer and a member of parliament, has a far greater influence on broad questions than any other member; and the first sea lord being the person of the most experience in naval matters, has the most weight on strictly naval questions. theoretically, however, neither of these gentlemen can carry a measure opposed to the others; and any member, even a junior, has equal opportunity with the others to bring up and discuss any question and to attempt to procure its passage by the full board; but in the first lord at that time, mr. childers, brought about a change whereby the first lord was made personally responsible to the government. this vastly increased the power of the first lord, relatively to the others. two other navies, the german and the japanese, which with the british, are the most efficient navies in the world, have systems somewhat different from the british. in germany and japan the emperor is the head of the navy, and there is no civilian between him and it. in germany there is no minister of marine, unless the emperor himself may be said to be the minister, which he practically is; and the navy is divided into three parts, each under an admiral. the three parts are the general staff, which deals with war plans and fundamental questions; the naval cabinet, which deals with matters of personnel; and the administrative section, which has to do with questions of material, including money, and the getting of money from parliament. in japan the minister of marine is by law a naval officer, and under him is a chief of staff, also a naval officer. the minister of marine has the direction of the navy as a whole, but the ideas of the chief of staff are supposed to be carried out in matters that are strictly naval. the japanese naval officer has a higher regard for the office of chief of staff than for that of minister of marine, because it is given for professional excellence only. it might seem at first sight that in germany and japan there would be danger of a lack of co-ordination between the civil and the naval authorities, and a tendency for the navy to become unduly self-assertive. of course, one reason why there is no such danger is that the governments of those countries are controlled by men who, though civilians, have great knowledge of international affairs, and of military and naval subjects; another reason is that the navy is so vital a matter, accurate knowledge about it is so general, and interest in it so wide-spread and intense, that there is no great gulf fixed between naval people and civilians. still another reason is the fact that in each country the emperor is trained in military and naval duties as well as in civil duties, and therefore can effect in his own person the co-ordination of the civil and the naval authority: that is, of policy and strategy. such automatic and complete co-ordination is desirable not only in preventing the unnatural barrier between the civil and the military authority which exists in some countries such as ours, but in lightening the labors and enlightening the deliberations of the strategists. if, for instance, a bold policy is to be enforced, and a large sum of money allotted for material and personnel, the strategists will be led to recommendations different from those to which they would be led if a cautious policy were to be pursued, and a small sum of money to be allotted. germany did not turn her eyes seriously toward the navy until the emperor william ii read mahan's book, "the influence of sea power upon history." previous to that epochal event, germany had relied on her army to protect her interests and enforce her rights, being led thereto by the facts of her history and the shortness of her coast-line. but the strategically trained mind of william grasped at once the situation laid bare by mahan; and his military training led him to quick decision and prompt action. the necessary machinery was soon set in motion, with the amazing result that in twenty years the german navy became the second in power and perhaps the first in efficiency in the world. was this feat accomplished by prodigal expenditures in building vessels and other material of all kinds, and enlisting and commissioning a large number of officers and men? no, the expense was less than that of building our navy, even if a liberal allowance be made for the relative cheapness of things in germany; and the mere enlisting and commissioning of officers and men was the simplest part of the undertaking. how was it accomplished? in the simplest way imaginable: by following moltke's plan of solving hypothetical war problems, and adapting the military war game (_kriegspiel_) to naval forces; playing numberless war games, and deciding from those games the naval strategy best adapted to germany's needs--not only in matters of general principle, not only as to tactics, training, education, co-operation with the army, and the size of fleet required to carry out the policy of the nation--but also as to the composition of the fleet, relative proportions of vessels of the various types, and the characteristics of each type. nothing was left to chance; nothing was decided by guessing; no one man's dictum was accepted. the whole problem was attacked in its entirety, and a general solution found; and after this, the various divisions and subdivisions of the problem were attacked and solved, in obedience to the same principles, in accordance with the results obtained at _kriegspiel_. if a very large and complicated engine of new pattern is to be built by any engineering company, no casting of the smallest kind is made until general plans have been outlined, detailed plans prepared from these, and then "working plans" made for the workmen. from the working plans, the workmen construct the various parts; sometimes in number several hundred. finally, the whole intricate machine is put together, and the motive power applied. then all the parts, great and small, begin their allotted tasks, each part perfectly adapted to its work, not too large and not too small; all working together in apparent confusion, but in obedience to law--fulfilling exactly the will of the designing engineer. so, the vast and new machine of the german navy was designed in the drafting-room of the _kriegspiel_; and though it has been gradually strengthened and enlarged since then, each strengthening piece and each addition has been designed in accordance with the original plan, and has therefore harmonized with the original machine. thus the navy has expanded smoothly, symmetrically, purposefully. no other result was to be expected: the strategy having been correct, the result was correct also. perhaps one contributing factor to the success of the german navy has been her staff of officers highly trained in strategy by _kriegspiel_, that insures not only sound advice in general, but also insures that at any time, night or day, a body of competent officers shall be ready at the admiralty to decide what action should be taken, whenever any new situation is reported. this factor is most important; because in naval and military operations, even in time of peace, but especially in war, events follow each other so rapidly, and momentous crises develop so suddenly, that the demand for action that shall be both wise and instantaneous is imperative. the chess-player can linger long over his decisions, because his opponent cannot make his next move meanwhile; but in warfare no such rule or condition can exist. in war, time is as vital a factor as any other: and the strategist, who, like napoleon, can think faster and decide more quickly and accurately than his antagonist is, _ceteris paribus_, sure to win; and even if _ceteris_ are not quite _paribus_, his superior quickness and correctness will overcome great handicaps in material and personnel, as the lives of all the great strategists in history, especially alexander and napoleon, prove convincingly. to bring a preponderating force to bear at a given point ahead of the enemy--to move the maximum of force with the maximum of celerity--has always been the aim of strategy: and probably it always will be, for the science of strategy rests on principles, and principles never change. thus while we see in great britain's navy an example of the effect of a strategy continuous and wise, conducted for three hundred years, we see in the japanese and german navies equally good examples of a strategy equally wise, but of brief duration, which started with the example of the british navy, and took advantage of it. the german and japanese navies did not follow the british navy slavishly, however; for the national military character of their people required the introduction and control of more military and precise methods than those of the primarily sailor navy of great britain. we see, therefore, a curious similarity between the german and japanese navies, and very clear evidence in each of the engrafting of purely military ideals on maritime ideas. and we see not only this, we see the reaction on the british navy itself of the ideals of the german and the japanese, and a decided change during the last ten years from the principles of "the blue-water school"; as evidenced mainly by the institution of a naval war college, including a war staff, the employment at the admiralty of general staff methods, though without the name; and the introduction into naval methods, especially naval gunnery, of mathematical procedures. previous to the japanese-russian war, ten years ago, the strategy of the british navy may be characterized as physical rather than mental, depending on a superior number of ships and men; those ships and men being of a very high grade individually, and bound together by a discipline at once strict and sympathetic. all the personnel from the highest admiral to the humblest sailor prided themselves on being "british seamen," comrades of the sea, on whom their country placed her ultimate reliance. maneuvers on a large scale were held, target practice was carried on with regularity--and navy ships carried the banner of saint george over every sea, and displayed it in every port. tactics and seamanship filled the busy days with drills of many kinds; but strategy, though not quite forgotten, did not command so large a portion of the officers' time and study as it did in germany and japan. the rapid success of the germans and japanese, however, in building up their navies, as instanced by the evident efficiency of the german fleet almost under the nose of england, and the triumph of the japanese fleet in tsushima strait startled the british navy out of her conservatism, and caused her to proceed at full speed toward the modernization of her strategy. with the quick decision followed by quick action that characterizes the seaman everywhere, the british instituted a series of reforms, and prosecuted their efforts with such wisdom and such vigor, that, in the brief space of ten years, the british navy has been almost revolutionized. as in all such movements, the principal delay was in bringing about the necessary mental changes; the mental changes having been accomplished, the material changes followed automatically. the change whereby the german and japanese navies became preceptors to their preceptor is like changes that occur in every-day life, and is one of many illustrations of how a young and vigorous individual or organization, endowed with proper energy and mentality, can appropriate whatever is valuable for its purposes from its elders, and reject whatever those elders have had fastened on them by circumstances or tradition, and develop a superior existence. it is a little like the advantage which a comparatively new city like washington has over an old city like boston, in being started after it was planned, instead of being started haphazard, without being planned at all. the united states navy was started not like the city of washington, but like the city of boston. it was modelled on the british navy; but since the united states has never taken an interest in its navy at all comparable with that taken by great britain in its navy, and since our navy has been built up by successive impulses from congress and not in accordance with a basic plan, the lack of harmoniousness among its various parts reminds one of boston rather than of washington. owing to the engineering and inventive genius of our people and the information we got from europe, inferiority has not occurred in the units of the material: in fact, in some ways our material is perhaps the best of all. neither has inferiority been evidenced in the personnel, as individuals; for the excellent physique and the mental alertness of the american have shown themselves in the navy as well as in other walks of life. in strategy, however, it must be admitted that we have little reason to be proud. we do very well in the elementary parts of the naval profession. in navigation, seamanship, gunnery, and that part of international law that concerns the navy we are as good as any. but of the higher branches, especially of strategy, we have little clear conception. how can we have? strategy is one of the most complex arts the world contains; the masters in that art have borne such names as alexander, cæsar, nelson, and napoleon. naval strategy is naval chess, in which battleships and other craft take the place of queens and other pieces. but it is a more complicated game than chess, for the reason that not only are there more kinds of "pieces," but the element of time exerts a powerful influence in strategy while it does not even exist in chess. the time element has the effect not only of complicating every situation, but also of compelling intense concentration of mind, in order to make decisions quickly; and often it forces decisions without adequate time for consideration, under circumstances of the utmost excitement, discomfort, and personal peril. one dislikes intensely to criticise his own country, even to himself. but when a naval officer is studying--as he should continually do--what must be done, in order to protect his country from attack by some foreign foe, it would be criminal folly for him to estimate the situation otherwise than honestly; and to do this, it is necessary to try to see where his country is weak and where strong, relatively to the possible foes in question. if we do this, and compare the strategical methods employed by--say germany and us--we are forced to admit that the german methods are better adapted to producing economically a navy fitted to contend successfully in war against an enemy. in germany the development of the navy has been strictly along the lines of a method carefully devised beforehand; in our country no method whatever is apparent, at least no logical method. congress, and congress alone, decides what vessels and other craft shall be built, how many officers and men shall wear the uniform. it is true that they consult the report of the secretary of the navy, and ask the opinions of some naval officers; and it is true that the secretary of the navy gets the opinions of certain naval officers including the general board, before making his report. but both the secretary and congress estimate the situation from their own points of view, and place their own value on the advice of naval officers. and the advice of these naval officers is not so valuable, possibly, as it might be; for the reason that it is really irresponsible, since the advisers themselves know that it will not be taken very seriously. the difference between the advice of men held responsible for the results of following their advice, and the advice of men not so held responsible, is well recognized, and is discussed fully in the reports of the moody and the swift boards on the organization of the navy department. furthermore, our officers do not have the machinery of the _kriegspiel_ to help them. it is true that at the naval war college, a war-game apparatus is installed and that war games are played, and war problems solved; but the officers there are very properly engaged in the regular work of a war college, in educating officers in the principles of warfare, and have little time for other work. it is also true that the war games and problems there do lead occasionally to recommendations by the war college to the general board as to various matters; but the connection between the conclusions of the war college and the decisions of congress via the general board and the secretary of the navy is so fragile and discontinuous, that it may truthfully be said that the influence of the war games at our war college has but a faint resemblance to the determining force of the _kriegspiel_ in berlin. it is often said that germany is an empire and the united states a republic, and that _therefore_ the military methods of germany cannot be employed here. the inference is not necessarily correct, however, as is shown by the excellence of the army of france; for, france, although a republic, insists that military strategy only shall control and direct the army. the american congress can do the same with the american navy. whether congress shall so decide or not, the decision will undoubtedly be wise; and we of the navy will do our utmost to make the navy all it should be. in this connection, it should be noted that: . germany has been following a certain strategic system regarding the navy; we a system different from that of any other navy, which has been used now for about one hundred and forty years. both systems have been in operation for a time sufficiently long to warrant our comparing them, by comparing the results they have achieved. . the german navy has been in existence a much shorter time than the american navy, belongs to a much less populous and wealthy country, and yet is not only about per cent larger in material, and more than per cent larger in trained personnel, but if we judge by maneuvers carried on in both peace and war, is much better in organization, morale, and capacity for doing naval work upon the ocean. we do not, of course, know what germany has been doing since the war began on august , ; but all accounts show that germany, like all the other belligerent powers, has been adding units of material and personnel to her navy much more rapidly than they have been destroyed; as well as perfecting her strategy, under the influence of the war's stimulus. leaving out of consideration, however, what she may have been doing since the war began, and neglecting any unauthenticated accounts of her status before it started, we know positively that in the maneuvers of the german fleet were executed by a force of battleships, battle cruisers, small cruisers, flotillas of destroyers (that is seagoing torpedo vessels), submarines, an airship, a number of aeroplanes and special service ships, and mine-sweepers--all in one fleet, all under one admiral, and maneuvered as a unit. _this was nearly three years ago, and we have never come anywhere near such a performance_. in january, , the united states atlantic fleet, capable as to both material and personnel of going to sea and maneuvering together, consisted of battleships and destroyers, mine-depot ships, and mine-training ship, and tugs fitted as mine-sweepers--with no submarines, no aircraft of any kind, no scouts (unless the _chester_ be so considered, which was cruising alone off the coast of liberia, and the _birmingham_, which was flag-ship to the destroyer flotilla). this was the only fleet that we had ready to fight in january, ; because, although more battleships could have been put into commission, this could have been done only by putting out of commission certain smaller vessels, such as cruisers and gunboats; and the battleships would have had to be put into commission very hurriedly, filled up with men fresh from other ships, and no more ready to fight in the fleet against an enemy (whose ships were fully manned with well-trained officers and men, accustomed to the details of their respective ships, and acquainted with each other) than the _chesapeake_ was ready to fight the _shannon_. . in case our system is not so good as that of--say germany--or of any other country having a system equally excellent, we shall _never_ be able to contend successfully against that navy, under equal strategic conditions, unless we have an excess over her in numbers of personnel and material sufficient to counteract our inferiority in efficiency. the efficiency of a navy or an army is exactly what the strategic system makes it. eleven thousand greeks under miltiades, highly efficient and thoroughly trained, defeated , persians at marathon. a greek fleet under themistocies defeated and almost destroyed a much larger persian fleet at salamis. with an army of less than , men, but highly trained by philip of macedon, his father, alexander, in only twelve years conquered ten of the most wealthy and populous countries of the world. cæsar, alaric, attila, charlemagne, and all the great military men from the greatest antiquity down to the present moment have trained and organized bodies of soldiers and sailors, under systems suited to the times, and then waged successful war on peoples less militarily efficient. cortez conquered mexico, and pizarro conquered peru; the british, french, and spanish subdued the indians of north america, and during the latter half of the nineteenth century nearly all the land in the world that was "unoccupied" by europeans or their descendants was taken in possession by european powers. great britain is now mistress of about one-quarter of the land and the population of the globe. russia, france, germany, and the united states govern most of the remainder. these results were brought about almost solely by the exercise of military force:--and of this force, physical courage was not a determining element, because it was just as evident in the conquered as in the conquerors. the determining element was strategy that (under the behest of policy) prepared the military and naval forces in material and personnel before they were used, and directed their operations, while they were being used. of all the single factors that have actually and directly made the history of the world, the most important factor has been strategy. chapter viii designing the machine the most important element connected with a navy is the strategy which directs it, in accordance with which all its plans are laid--plans for preparation before war and plans for operations during war. strategy is to a navy what mind is to a man. it determines its character, its composition, its aims; and so far as external conditions will permit, the results which it accomplishes. it is possible for certain features connected with a navy to be good, even if the strategy directing it be faulty; or for those features to be faulty, even if the strategy directing it be good. experience has shown, however, that, in any organization the influence of the men at the top, and the effect of the policy they adopt, is so great that the whole organization will in the main be good or bad according to the kind of men that control it, and the methods they employ. the better the discipline of the organization, the more completely the quality of the management will influence the whole, and the more essential it becomes that good methods be employed. good discipline means concentration of the effort of the organization; and the more concentrated any effort is, the more necessary that it be directed aright. the simplest illustration of this is seen in naval gunnery; for there the effect of good fire-control is to limit the dispersion of the various shots fired, relatively to each other; to make a number of shots fired simultaneously to bunch closely together, that is to concentrate; getting away from the shotgun effect, and approximating the effect of a single shot. obviously, if the fire-control and the skill of the gunners are so great that the shots fall very close together, the chance of hitting the target is less than if the shots did not fall close together, if the range at which the guns are fired is incorrect. a mathematical formula showing the most effective dispersion for a given error in range was published in the _naval institute_ by lieutenant-commander b. a. long, u. s. n., in december, . so, we see that if the strategy directing a navy is incorrect, we can accomplish little by improving the discipline, and may do harm; when unwise orders have been given in the past, those orders have sometimes been disobeyed with beneficial effect. neither would it avail much to improve the details of the material or personnel, or to spend much money; for there is no benefit to be derived from building fine ships, if they are to be captured by the enemy. if the russian fleet sent to tsushima had been weaker than it was, the loss to russia would have been less. inasmuch as strategy, however, includes all the means taken to make a navy effective, it is obvious that a good strategical direction will be more likely to result in good discipline and good material than would a poor strategy. but this is not necessarily so, for the reason that a strategy may be in the main faulty, and yet be good in certain ways--especially in attention to details, for which a high degree of mentality is not required. in the same way, an individual who is short-sighted and imperfectly educated may be a most excellent and useful member of society, provided he is not permitted to use power in matters beyond his vision. an illustration of how an incorrect point of view does not necessarily injure, but may even benefit in details is shown by certain militia regiments, which are able to surpass some regiments of the regular army in many details of the drill, and in general precision of movement. in fact, a very wise strategical direction has as one of its most important functions the division of study and labor among various lines of action, and in deciding which lines are important and which not: and for this reason may--and often does--limit labor, and therefore perfection of result, along lines which a less wise strategy would not limit. illustrations of the casting aside of rigid and difficult forms of drill during the past fifty years in armies, and the substitution of more easy methods are numerous. this does not indicate, however, that a wise strategy may not encourage rigid forms of drill, for the army which is directed with the greatest strategical skill is the german, and no army has more precise methods, not only of procedure, but of drill. the prussian army of frederick william which frederick the great inherited was not more rigidly drilled in some particulars than the german army of to-day, fought by frederick the great's great-great-great-grandnephew, william ii. so we see that a wise and far-sighted strategy does not necessarily either frown on or encourage attention to details; it merely regulates it, deciding in each case and for each purpose what degree of attention to detail is best. the most obvious work of naval strategy, and therefore the work that impresses people most, is in directing naval forces against an enemy in war. but it is clear that before this can be done effectively strategy must first have made plans of preparation in time of peace; and it is equally clear that, previous to this, strategy must first determine the units of the force and their relation to each other: it must, in other words, design the machine. evidently, therefore, _the work of strategy is three-fold: first, to design the machine; second, to prepare it for war; and, third, to direct its operations during war_. a navy being a machine composed of human and material parts, it is clear that the work of designing it correctly should take account of all the parts at the outset; and not only this--the whole design should be completed before any parts are made and put together if the best results are to be obtained. this is the practice in making material machines in manufacturing establishments--and no other practice there could be successfully pursued. it is the outcome of the experience of tens of thousands of men for many years--and the result of the expenditure of tons of money. this remark as to manufacturing establishments does not include the development of new ideas, for which experimentation or original research is needed; because it is sometimes necessary, when venturing into untrodden fields, to test out by mere trial and error certain parts or features before determining enough of their details to warrant incorporating them in the drawing of the whole machine. similarly, some experiments must be made in the methods, organization, and material of the naval machine; but in this, case, as in the case of manufacturing establishments, the experimental work, no matter how promising or alluring, must be recognized as of unproved and doubtful value; and no scheme, plan, or doctrine must be incorporated in the naval machine, or allowed to pose as otherwise than experimental, until successful trials shall have put it beyond the experimental stage. the naval machine consists obviously of two parts, the personnel and the material; these two parts being independent, and yet mutually dependent, like the parts of any other organism. obviously, the parts are mutually dependent not only in the quantitative sense that the more numerous the material parts the more numerous must be the personnel to operate them, but also in the qualitative sense that the various kinds of material determine the various kinds of personnel that must be provided to operate them with success. gunners are needed to handle guns, and engineers to handle engines. in this respect, personnel follows material. in the galley days only two kinds of personnel were needed--sailors to handle the galleys (most of these being men merely to pull on oars)--and soldiers to fight, when the galleys got alongside of the enemy. ship organization remained in a condition of great simplicity until our civil war; for the main effort was to handle the ships by means of their sails, the handling of the simple battery being a very easy matter. every ship was much like every other ship, except in size; and in every ship the organization was simple and based mostly on the necessities of handling the ship by sails. the first important change from this condition followed the departure of the confederate ironclad _virginia_ (_merrimac_) carrying guns and men from the norfolk navy yard on the th of march, , and her sinking hardly two hours afterward the union sloop of war _cumberland_, carrying guns and men; and then destroying by fire the union frigate _congress_, carrying guns and men. the second step was taken on the following day, when the union _monitor_, guns and men, defeated the _merrimac_. these two actions on two successive days are the most memorable naval actions in history from the standpoint of naval construction and naval ordnance, and perhaps of naval strategy; because they instituted a new era--the era of mechanism in naval war. the next step was the successful attack by the confederate "fish-torpedo boat" _david_, on the union ironclad _housatonic_ in charleston harbor on february , ; and the next was the sinking of the confederate ironclad _albemarle_ by a spar torpedo carried on a little steam-launch commanded by lieutenant w. b. cushing, u. s. n., on october , . these four epochal events in our civil war demonstrated the possibilities of mechanism in naval warfare, and led the way to the use of the highly specialized and scientific instruments that have played so important a part in the present war. during the half-century that has intervened since the _monitor_ and _merrimac_ ushered in the modern era, since the five brave crews of the _david_ lost their lives, and since cushing made his amazing victory, a contest between the sailor and the scientist has been going on, as to which shall be deemed the ultimate master of the sea. as in many contests, the decision has gone unqualifiedly to neither; for he who sails the sea and braves its tempests, must be in heart and character a sailor--and yet he who fights the scientific war-craft of the present day cannot be merely a sailor, like him of the olden kind, but must be what the _new york times_, a few years ago, laughingly declared to be a combination quite unthinkable, "a scientific person and a sailor." each year since the fateful th of march, , has seen some addition to the fighting machinery of navies. some appliances have been developed gradually from their first beginnings, and are to-day substantially what they were at first--but of course improved; among these are the turret, the automobile torpedo, the telescope-sight, the submarine, and the gyrocompass. many other appliances found favor for a while and then, having demonstrated the value of what they attempted and did perform, were gradually supplemented by improved devices, doing the same thing, but in better ways; in this class are many forms of interior-communication apparatus, especially electrical. still other appliances are adaptations to ship and naval life of devices used in civil life--such as the telephone, electric light, and radio. each of these appliances has required for its successful use the educating of men to use it, and frequently the creation and organization of entirely new branches of the service; an illustration is the radio corps in each of our large ships. at the present time the attitude of officers and of the department itself is so much more favorable to new appliances that a clear probability of a new device being valuable is a sufficient stimulus to bring about the education of men to use it; but a very few years ago many devices were lost to us because they were considered "not adapted naval use." now we endeavor to adapt them. the present complexity of our material is therefore reflected in the complexity of the organization of our personnel; and as it is the demands of material that regulate the kind of personnel, and as a machine must be designed and built before men can learn to use it, it follows that our personnel must lag behind our material--that our material as material must be better than our personnel as personnel. it may be answered that all our material is first invented, then designed, and then constructed by men; that men create our material appliances (though not the matter of which they are composed), that the created cannot be better than the creator; and that therefore it is impossible for our material to be better than our personnel. but to this objection it may be pointed out that only a very small proportion of our personnel are employed in creating; that most of them are engaged merely in using the material with whatever degree of skill they possess, and that, if a man uses an instrument with perfect skill, he then succeeds merely in getting out of that instrument all that there is in it. a soldier's musket, for instance, is a very perfect tool--very accurate, very powerful, very rapid; and no marksman in the world is so skilful that he can shoot the musket with all the accuracy and speed of which the gun itself is capable. this indicates that the personnel of a navy is harder to handle than the material, and that therefore the most effort is required to be expended on the personnel. the strength of any system depends on the strength of its weakest part; in any organism, human or material, effort is best expended on the weak points rather than on the strong. recognition of this principle is easy, but carrying out the principle in practice is most difficult. one reason is the difficulty of seeing always where the weak spot is; but a greater difficulty is due to the fact that the principle as above stated must be modified by the consideration that things which are important need attention more than things that are unimportant. a weak point in any organism deserves attention more than a strong point of the same order of importance, or than a strong point in the same class; but not, necessarily more than a strong point of a higher order of importance, or a strong point in another class. it may be more beneficial, for instance, to drill an ineffective turret crew than to try to reduce friction in a training gear already nearly frictionless; or it may be more beneficial to overcome the faults of a mediocre gun-pointer than to develop still more highly the skill already great of another gun-pointer; but, on the other hand, it may be less beneficial to drill boat crews at boat-sailing, even if they need it, than to drill them at landing as armed forces on the beach, though they may do that pretty well; or it may be better not to have boat drill at all and to get under way for fleet drill, even though the ships are very expert at it. it is true that in any endeavor where many things are to be done, as in a navy, it is important that nothing be neglected; and yet, under the superintendence of any one, there are some things the doing of which requires priority over other things. the allotting of the scientifically correct amount of time, energy, and attention to each of the various things claiming one's attention is one of the most difficult, and yet one of the most important problems before any man. it requires an accurate sense of proportion. naturally the problem increases in complexity and importance the higher the position, and the greater the number of elements involved--being more difficult and important for instance in the office of the commander-in-chief of a fleet, whose time and attention have to be divided among multitudinous matters, than in that of captain of a single ship. for this reason, _the higher one is in position, the more imperative it is that he understand all elements involved, and estimate properly their various weights_. the success or non-success of a man in high authority depends largely on how his sense of proportion leads him to allot his time. but a matter fully as important as the allotment of time and attention to the consideration of various matters by the various members of the personnel is the allotment of money for the various items, especially of the material; for, after all, every navy department or admiralty must arrange its demands for ships, guns, men, etc., with reference to the total amount of money which the nation will allot. for this purpose, only one good means of solution has thus far been devised--the game-board. the game-board, naturally, tries out only the units that maneuver on the ocean; it does not try out the mechanism inside those units, because they can be tried out best by engineering methods. the province of the game-board is merely to try out on a very small scale, under proper conventions or agreements, things that could not be tried out otherwise, except at great expense, and very slowly; to afford a medium, half-way between actual trials with big ships and mere unaided reasoning, for arriving at correct conclusions. when the game-board is not used, people conferring on naval problems can do so only by forming pictures in their own minds, endeavoring to describe those pictures to the others (in which endeavor they rarely perfectly succeed) while at the same time, trying to see the pictures that are in the minds of the others--and then comparing all the pictures. the difficulty of doing this is shown by a little paragraph in "the autocrat of the breakfast table," in which dr. holmes points out that when john and thomas are talking, there are really six persons present--the real john, the person john thinks himself to be, the person thomas thinks him to be, the real thomas, the person thomas thinks himself to be, and the person john thinks him to be. the conditions surrounding john and thomas are those of the simplest kind, and the conversation between them of the most uncomplicated character. but when--not two people but--say a dozen or more, are considering highly complicated questions, such as the house naval committee discuss when officers are called to testify before them, no two of the twenty congressmen can form the same mental picture when an officer uses the word--say "fleet." the reason is simply that very few of the congressmen hearing that word have ever seen a fleet; none of them know exactly what it is, and every one forms a picture which is partly the result of all his previous education and experience; which are different from the previous education and experience of every other congressman on the committee. furthermore, no one of the officers uses words exactly as the other officers do; and the english language is too vague (or rather the usual interpretation put on words is too vague) to assure us that even ordinary words are mutually understood. for instance, the question is asked: "do you consider it probable that such or such a thing would happen?" now what does the questioner mean by "probable," and what does the officer think he means? mathematically, the meaning of "probable" is that there is more than per cent of chance that the thing would happen; but who in ordinary conversation uses that word in that way? that this is not an academic point is shown by the fact that if the answer is "no" the usual inference from the answer is that there is no need for guarding against the contingency. yet such an inference, if the word "probable" were used correctly by both the questioner and the answerer, would be utterly unjustified, because the necessity for taking precautions against a danger depends not so much on its probability or improbability, as on the degree of its probability; and to an equal degree on the greatness of the danger that impends. if the occurrence of a small mishap has a probability say of even per cent, there may be little necessity of guarding against it; while if the danger of total destruction has a probability as low as even per cent, we should guard against it sedulously. the more complicated the question, the more elements involved, the more difficult it is to settle it wisely by mere discussion. the effort of the imagination of each person must be directed not so much to getting a correct mental picture of what the words employed describe, as to getting a correct picture of what the person using the words desires them to describe. any person who has had experience in discussions of this character knows what an effort this is, even if he is talking with persons whom he has known for years, and with whose mental and lingual characteristics he is well acquainted: and he also knows how much more difficult it is when he is talking with persons whom he knows but slightly. it may here be pointed out how greatly the imaginations of men differ, and how little account is taken of this difference in every-day life. in poetry and fiction imagination is recognized; and it is also recognized to some extent in painting, inventing, and, in general, in "the arts." but in ordinary life, the difference among men in imagination is almost never noticed. yet a french proverb is "point d'imagination, point de grand general"; and napoleon indicated a danger from untrained imagination in his celebrated warning to his generals not to make "pictures" to themselves of difficulties and disasters. the difference in imagination among men is shown clearly by the difference--and often the differences--between inventors and engineers, and the scarcity of men who are both inventors and engineers. ericsson repudiated the suggestion that he was an inventor, and stoutly and always declared he was an engineer. this was at a time, not very long ago, when it was hardly respectable to be an inventor; when, even though men admitted that some inventors had done valuable work, the work was supposed to be largely a chance shot of a more or less crazy man. yet ericsson was an inventor--though he was an engineer. so were sir william thompson (afterward lord kelvin), helmholtz, westinghouse, and a very few others; so are edison and sperry. many inventors, however, live in their imaginations mainly--some almost wholly. like pegasus, they do not like to be fastened to a plough or anything else material. facts, figures, and blue-prints fill their souls with loathing, and bright generalities delight them. the engineer, on the other hand, is a man of brass and iron and logarithms; in imagination he is blind, in flexibility he resembles reinforced concrete. he is the antipodes of the inventor; he despises the inventor, and the inventor hates him. fortunately, however, there is a little bit of the inventor in most engineers, and a trace of the engineer in most inventors; while in some inventors there is a good deal of the engineer. and once in a while we meet a man who carries both natures in his brain. that man does marvels. despite the great gulf normally fixed, however, between the engineer and the inventor, most of the definite progress of the world for the past one hundred years has been done by the co-ordination of the two; a co-ordination accomplished by "the man of business." now the inventor and engineer type do not exist only in the world of engineering and mechanics, though it is in that world that they are the most clearly recognized; for they exist in all walks of life. in literature, inventors write novels; in business life, they project railroads; in strategy, they map out new lines of effort. in literature, the engineer writes cyclopædias; in business, he makes the projected railroads a success; in strategy, he works out logistics and does the quantitative work. in that part of strategy of which we are now thinking--the designing of the naval machine--the inventor and the engineer clearly have two separate lines of work: one line the conceiving, and the other line the constructing, of strategic and tactical methods, and of material instruments to carry out those methods. clearly, these two lines of work while independent are mutually dependent; and, if properly carried out are mutually assistant. the coworking of the inventor and the engineer is a little like that coworking of theory and practice, which has been the principal factor in bringing about the present amazing condition of human society commonly called "modern civilization." the shortcomings of human speech are most evident in discussing complicated matters; and for this reason speech is supplemented in the engineering arts by drawings of different kinds. no man ever lived who could describe a complicated machine accurately to a listener, unless that machine differed but little from a machine with which the listener was acquainted. but hand a drawing of even a very complicated machine to a man who knows its language--and the whole nature of the object is laid bare to him; not only its general plan and purpose, but its details, with all their dimensions and even the approximate weights. so, when the forces representing a complicated naval situation are placed upon the game-board, all the elements of the problem appear clearly and correctly to each person; the imagination has little work to do, and the chance for misunderstanding is almost negligible. of course, this does not mean that the game-board can decide questions with absolute finality. it cannot do this; but that is only because conditions are represented with only approximate realism, because the rules of the game may not be quite correct, and because sufficient correct data cannot be procured. the difficulties of securing absolute realism are of course insuperable, and the difficulties of getting absolutely correct data are very great. the more, however, this work is prosecuted, the more clearly its difficulties will be indicated, and therefore the more effectively the remedies can be provided. the more the game-board is used both on ship and shore, the more ease will be found in getting correct data for it, and the more correctly conclusions can then be deduced. these remarks, while intended for tactical games, seem to apply to strategical games as well; for both the tactical and the strategical games are simply endeavors to represent actual or probable situations and occurrences in miniature, by arbitrary symbols, in accordance with well-understood conventions. war games and war problems have not yet been accepted by some; for some regard them as games pure and simple and as academic, theoretical, and unpractical. it may be admitted that they are academic and theoretical; but so is the science of gunnery, and so is the science of navigation. in some ways, however, the lessons of the game-board are better guides to future work than "practical" and actual happenings of single battles: for in single battles everything is possible, and some things happen that were highly improbable and were really the result of accident. after nearly every recent war there has been a strong move made toward the adoption of some weapon, or some method, that has attained success in that war. for instance, after our civil war, many monitors were built, and the spar torpedo was installed in all our ships; after the battle of lissa, the ram was exploited as the great weapon of the future; the japanese war established the heavily armed and armored battleships on a secure foundation; and the early days of the present war caused a great rush toward the submarine. yet, in most cases, the success was a single success or a very few successes, and was a little like the throw of a die, in the sense that the result was caused in great measure by accident; that is, by causes beyond the control of man, or by conditions that would probably not recur. the game calls our attention to the influence of chance in war, and to the desirability of our recognizing that influence and endeavoring to eliminate it, when reasoning out the desirability or undesirability of a certain weapon or a certain method. of course, every thoughtful person realizes that few effects in life are due to one cause only, and that most effects are due to a combination of many causes; so that, if any weapon or method succeeds or fails, it is illogical to infer from that one fact that the weapon or method is good or bad. a common illustration is the well-known fact that a marksman may hit the target when his aim is too high or too low, provided that he has erroneously set his sight enough too low or too high to compensate; whereas if he had made only one error instead of two, he would have missed. "two wrongs cannot make a right," but two errors can compensate each other, and often do. the theory of the probability of errors recognizes this. in fact, if it were not true that some errors are plus and some minus, all errors in gunnery (in fact in everything) would be additive to each other, and we should live in a world of error. the partial advantage of the game-board over the occurrences of actual war, for the purpose of studying strategy, lies largely in its ability to permit a number of trials very quickly; the trials starting either with identical situations, or with certain changes in conditions. of course, the game-board has the tremendous disadvantage that it presents only a picture, and does not show a real performance; but the more it is used, and the more fleets and game-boards work together, the more accurate the picture will become, and the more correctly we shall learn to read it. one limitation of the game-board is that it can represent weather conditions only imperfectly--and this is a serious limitation that mayor may not be remedied as time goes on. the theory of the game-board is in fact in advance of the mechanism, and is waiting for some bright inventive genius for the remedy. until this happens, the imagination must do the best it can, and the effect of a certain kind of weather under the other conditions prevailing will have to be agreed upon by the contestants. the term "war game" is perhaps unfortunate, for the reason that it does not convey a true idea of what a "war game" is. the term conveys the idea of a competitive exercise, carried on for sport; whereas the idea underlying the exercise is of the most serious kind, and has no element of sport about it, except the element that competition gives. a war game may be simply a game of sport--and sometimes it is so played; but the intention is to determine some doubtful point of strategy or tactics, and the competitive element is simply to impart realism, and to stimulate interest. when two officers, or two bodies of officers, find themselves on different sides of a certain question, they sometimes "put it on the game-board," to see which side is right. this statement applies most obviously to tactical games; but it applies to strategic games as well; for both are inventions designed to represent in miniature the movements of two opposing forces. the main difference between strategic and tactical games is the difference in size. naturally, the actual means employed are different, but only so different as the relative areas of movement necessitate. in the strategic games, the opposing forces are far apart, and do not see each other; in the tactical games, they operate within each other's range of vision. war games when played for the purpose of determining the value of types of craft and vessels of all kinds, may take on almost an infinite variety of forms; for the combinations of craft of different kinds and sizes, and in different numbers, considered in connection with the various possible combinations of weather, climate, and possible enemy forces, are so numerous as to defy computation. in practice, however, and in a definite problem, the number of factors can be kept down by assuming average conditions of weather, using the fairly well-known enemy force that would appear in practice, and playing games in which the only important variable is the kind of vessel in question. for instance, in the endeavor to ascertain the value of the battle cruiser, games can be played in which battle cruisers are only on one side, or in which they are more numerous, or faster or more powerful on one side than on the other. naturally, the games cannot be as valuable practically as they otherwise would be, unless they consider the amount of money available. for instance, if games are played to ascertain the most effective number and kinds of craft for which to ask appropriations from congress at next session, the solution, unless a money limit were fixed, would be impossible. in other words, the amount of money to be expended must be one of the known or assumed factors in the problem. as this amount can never be known, it must be assumed; and, in order that the whole value of the games may not be lost, in case the amount assumed were incorrect, it is necessary to assume a number of possible sums, the upper limit being above the probable amount to be received, and the lower limit below it, and then work out the answer to the problem, under each assumption. of course, this procedure would be laborious, but most procedures are that bring about the best results. suppose that such a procedure were followed for, say, a year, and that a number of plans, all worked out, were presented to congress when it met: plan no. , for instance, consisting of such and such craft showing (according to the results of the games) the best programme, if $ , , were to be appropriated for the increase of the navy; plan no. , if $ , , were to be appropriated; plan no. , if $ , , were to be appropriated, and so on. each plan being concisely and clearly stated, and accompanied by drawings, sketches, and descriptions, congress could easily and quickly decide which plan it would adopt. this scheme would have the obvious advantage over the present scheme that the professional questions would be decided by professional men, while the financial question would be decided by congress, which alone has the power to decide it. at present, the laymen on the house naval committee spend laborious days interrogating singly, and on different days, various naval officers, who naturally do not always agree. finally, the house naval committee decides on a programme and recommends it to the house. the house discusses it most seriously (the professional points more seriously than the financial point), and decides on something. then the senate committee, using the house decision as a basis, recommends something to the senate, and the senate then decides on something more or less like what the senate committee recommends. then the whole question is decided by a conference committee of three senators and three members of the house. it is to be noted that this committee decides not only how much money the country shall spend on the navy, but also what kinds of vessels navy officers shall use to fight in the country's defense; how many officers there shall be, and how they shall be divided among the various grades! attention is requested here to the _ease_ with which a decision can be made, _provided one does not take into account all of the factors of a problem, or if he is not thoroughly acquainted with them_; and attention is also requested to the _impossibility_ of making a _wise_ decision (except by chance) unless one understands _all_ the factors, takes _all_ into consideration, and then combines them _all_, assigning to each its proper weight. from one point of view, every problem in life is like a problem in mathematics; for if all the factors are added, subtracted, multiplied, and divided correctly (that is, if they are combined correctly), and if correct values are assigned to them, the correct answer is inevitable. in most of the problems of life, however, certainly in the problems of strategy, we do not know all of the factors, and cannot assign them their exactly proper weights; and therefore we rarely get the absolutely correct answer. the best that any man can do is to estimate the factors as accurately as he can, judge as correctly as he can their interaction on each other, and then make his own conclusion or decision. when a man can do this well in the ordinary affairs of life, he is said to be "a man of good judgment"; when he can do it well in a certain line of work--say investments in real estate--he is said to have good judgment in real estate. the use of the word "judgment" here is excellent, because it expresses the act of a judge, who listens patiently to all the evidence in a case and then gives his decision. and the act of the judge, and the act of any man in coming carefully to any decision, consist mainly in estimating the relative values of all the factors, and their relations to each other ("sizing them up" is the expressive slang), and then perceiving with more or less correctness what the answer is. some men do not have good judgment; some men highly educated, brilliant, and well-meaning, seem never to get quite the correct answer to any problem in life. they are said to be unsuccessful and no one knows why. perhaps they lack that instinctive sense of proportion that some men have--a sense as real as an "ear for music"; or perhaps they lack a willingness or a capability to think about a situation with sufficient intentness to force a clear picture of the situation with all its various features upon the mental retina. the ability to make a mental picture, be it of a machine, of any group of material objects, such as the various units of a fleet organized as such, or of any other situation, varies with different men; but like every other kind of ability, it can be strengthened by practice, and assisted by appropriate means. in the engineering arts, the practice is gotten by observing and remembering actual machines; and the assistance is given by drawings of different kinds. in strategy, the practice is given by observing and remembering the movements of actual fleets; and the assistance by means of drawings of different kinds, and by war problems, and the game-board. the game-board represents a number of successive pictures, and is not very different in principle from moving-pictures. in fact, the suggestion has been made repeatedly for several years and is now in process of development that the various situations in tactical games might advantageously be photographed on films and afterward projected in rapid succession on a screen. one of the curious limitations of the naval game board, both in tactical and strategic games, is that it takes no account of personnel; that it assumes that all the various units are manned by crews that are adequate both in numbers and in training. of course, it would be impracticable to test say the relative values of kinds of vessels, unless all the factors of the problem were the same, except the two factors that were competing. therefore the limitation mentioned is not mentioned as a criticism, but simply to point out that the game-board, in common with most of the other means of discussion in naval matters, has gradually led people to think of naval matters in terms of material units only. that such an unfortunate state of affairs has come to pass can be verified by reading almost any paper, even professional, that speaks about navies; for one will be confronted at once with the statement that such and such a navy consists of such and such ships, etc. since when has a navy consisted of brass and iron? since when has the mind and character of man taken a place subordinate to matter? at what time did the change occur whereby the instrument employed dominated the human being who employed it? that this is not an academic point, or an unimportant thing to bear in mind is evidenced by countless facts in history. in order not to tire the reader, mention will be made of only one fact, the well-known fight between the american frigate _chesapeake_, and the british frigate _shannon_ to which i have already referred. these two ships were almost identical in size and in the number and kinds of guns, and in the number of officers and crew, and the battle was fought on june , , in massachusetts bay, under circumstances of weather and other conditions that gave no advantage to either. if material and numbers of personnel were the only factors in the fight, the fight would have continued very long and ended in a draw. did these things occur? no, the _chesapeake_ was captured in a little less than fifteen minutes after the first gun was fired, and nearly half her crew were killed or wounded! it would be tiresome to recount all the battles both on sea and land, in which smaller forces defeated forces numerically greater; but it may not be possible by any other means to force the fact on the attention--even sometimes of naval officers--that material vessels, guns, etc., are merely instruments, and that the work gotten out of any instrument depends not only on the instrument itself, but on the skill with which it is employed. usually, when thinking or speaking of the power of any instrument (or means or method or organization) we mean the power of which it is capable; that is, the result which it can produce, _if used with_ _per cent of skill_. possibly, we are subconsciously aware that we assume perfect skill; but whether we are or not, we have become so accustomed to the tacit acceptance of the phrase, "other things being equal," that we have come to forget that other things may not be equal at all; and that they certainly will not be on the day of trial, if we forget or undervalue those other things, while our antagonist does not. let us always remember, then, that the effective work gotten out of any means or instrument is the product of the maximum capability of the means or instrument and the skill with which it is used; that, for instance, if two fleets fight, which are numerically equal in material and personnel, but in which the skill of the personnel of the a fleet is twice as great as the skill of the personnel of the b fleet, the a fleet will be twice as powerful as the b fleet. it may be objected that it would be absurd to assume the skill of the personnel in one fleet as twice as great as that of the personnel in the other fleet, but it can easily be shown that even so great a disproportion is not impossible, provided the skill in one fleet is very great. the value of superior skill naturally becomes important where the difficulties are great. a very simple illustration is in firing a gun; for even if the skill of one marksman be greater than that of another, it will be unimportant, if the target is so large and so close that even the inferior marksman can hit it at each shot. the probability of hitting a target--so far as overs and shorts are concerned (or deviations to the left and right)--varies with the fraction _a/y_, where _a_ is the half height (or width) of the target, and _y_ is the mean error. the greater the size of the target, and the less the mean error, the greater the probability of hitting. the size of the two targets being fixed, therefore, the smaller the mean error the greater the probability of hitting. the probability of hitting, however (as can be seen by the formula), does not increase greatly with the decrease of error, except in cases where _a/y_ is small, where the mean error is large relatively to the width or height of the target. for instance, if _a/y_ is . in one case, and . in another case, the probability is practically double in the second case; whereas, if _a/y_ is in one case, and in another, the probability increases only per cent; while if it is in one case and in the other, the probability of hitting increases only per cent. this means that if two antagonists engage, the more skilful should, and doubtless will, engage under difficult conditions, where _y_ is considerable relatively to _a_; for instance, at long range. suppose that he engages at such a range that he can make per cent of hits--that is, make per cent of misses; and that his misses relatively to the enemy's is as to --so that the enemy makes per cent of misses. this does not seem to be (in fact it is not) an extreme case: and yet _a_ will hit _b_ twice as often as _b_ will hit _a_. in other words, the effective skill of _a_ will be twice that of _b_. this illustrates the effect of training--because all that training in handling any instrument can do is to attain as closely as possible to the maximum output of the instrument; and as the maximum output is attained only when the instrument is handled exactly as it should be handled, and as every departure is therefore an error in handling, we see that the effect of training is merely to diminish errors. that this illustration, drawn from gunnery, is applicable in general terms to strategy seems clear, for the reason that in every strategical situation, no matter how simple or how complex, there is, and can be only one _best_ thing to do; so that the statement of any strategic situation, if followed by a question as to what is the best thing to do, becomes a problem, to which the answer is--_the best thing to do_. of course, in most strategic problems, there are so many factors almost unknown, and so many factors only imperfectly known, that we can rarely ascertain mathematically what is the best thing to do. nevertheless, there must be a best thing to do, even if we never ascertain exactly what it is. now in arriving at the decision as to the best thing to do, one estimates the weight of each factor and its bearing on the whole. if one estimates each factor correctly, that is, if he makes no errors in any estimate, and if he makes no error in summing up, he will make an absolutely correct decision; and any departure from correctness in decision can result from no other cause than from errors in his various estimates and in their final summation. in other words, skill in strategy is to be attained by the same process as is skill in other arts: by eliminating errors. so, when we take the decisions of the game-board and the war problem, we must not allow ourselves to forget that there has been a tacit assumption that the numbers and the skill of the personnel have been equal on the two sides; and we must supplement our decision as to the best material to be employed by another decision as to how we shall see to it that the assumption of equality of personnel shall be realized in fact--or rather that it shall be realized in fact that our personnel shall get the maximum of effectiveness out of the material. in designing the machine, therefore, we are confronted with the curious fact that, in general, we must design the various material parts before designing the personnel parts that are to operate them. the most obvious characteristic of the personnel parts is that the number of personnel parts shall be sufficient to operate the material parts. to ascertain the number of personnel parts, the only means is actual trial; though naturally, if we have previously ascertained the number of men needed to operate any kind of mechanism, say a certain kind and size of gun, we can estimate quite accurately the number needed to operate a similar gun, even if it differ somewhat from the other gun. after the gun is tried, however, we may have to change our original estimate, not only because the estimate may have been in error, but because the requirement of operating the gun may have changed. for instance, the requirements of fire-control have within very recent years compelled the addition of a considerable number of men to the complements of battleships. now the need of supplying enough men to operate successfully any instrument or mechanism is absolute, for the reasons that the number of things to be done is fixed, and that an insufficient number of men in the ratio for instance of to may mean a falling off in the output of the machine much greater than in the ratio of to . a simple illustration may be taken from the baseball game; for it is obvious that the output of a baseball team, in competition with other teams, would fall off in a much greater ratio than of to , by leaving out one member of the nine. another illustration, or rather an analogy, may be found in machinery made of rigid metal--say a steam-engine; for the omission of almost any part in an engine would entirely stop its operation. not only, however, must we see that the number of personnel parts is sufficient, we must see that they are correctly divided among the various material parts; otherwise there will be too many in one place and too few in another; and while it is better to have too many men than too few, too many men prevent the attainment of the maximum effect. the effect of having too few men, however, is not merely in limiting the effectiveness of the output of the machine; for, if carried to a considerable degree, it prevents due care of the material parts themselves, and causes those material parts to deteriorate. this deterioration may take the form of actual wasting away as by rust; but even if the deterioration does not advance so far as actual wastage, it may easily, and often does, advance to the stage where, although not evidenced by visible rust or by any other indication, so long as the mechanism is not operated at its normal rate, it declares itself very clearly as soon as the mechanism is tried in service. for this reason, all mechanicians realize that it is better for every mechanism not to lie idle, but to be used considerably, though, of course, without being forced unduly. not only also must the personnel be sufficient in number and correctly divided, it must be organized in such manner that the personnel itself will have the characteristics of a machine, in the sense that each unit will be so placed relatively to the hope of reward and the fear of punishment, that he will do his allotted tasks industriously; that he will have the place in the organization for which his character and abilities fit him, and that he will be given such duties and exercises as will fit him more and more for his position, and more and more for advancement to positions higher. not only this, we must exercise foresight in the endeavor that the material parts and the personnel parts shall be ready at the same time, so that neither will have to wait for the other; and to insure the immediate availability when war breaks out, of sufficient trained personnel to man and fight effectively all the material units that we shall need to use. this raises the question: "what units shall we need?" the government itself must, of course, decide this matter; but it may be pointed out that if in any considerable war every unit we possess should not be utilized, the navy could not do as effective work as it otherwise could do. in the present war, the belligerents have not only utilized all the units that they had, they have built very many more, using the utmost possible diligence and despatch. in case we should be drawn into war with any considerable naval nation, all history and all reasoning show that we must do the same. few considerable wars have been waged except with the greatest energy on each side; for each side knows that the scale may be turned by a trifling preponderance on one side; and that if the scale once be turned, it will be practically impossible ever to restore the balance. every advantage gained makes one side relatively weaker to the other than it was before, and increases the chance that the same side will gain another advantage; gains and losses are cumulative in their effect. for this reason, it is essential, if we are to wage war successfully, that we start right, and send each unit immediately out to service, manned with a highly trained and skilful personnel; because that is what our foe will do. the germans meet the difficulty of keeping their personnel abreast of their material very wisely. they utilize the winter months, when naval operations are almost impossible, for reorganizing and rearranging their personnel; so that when spring comes, they are ready in all their ships to start the spring drilling on a systematic plan. the crews being already organized, and the scheme of drills well understood, the work of getting the recruits versed in their relatively simple tasks and the more experienced men skilled in their new positions is quickly accomplished, and the fleet is soon ready for the spring maneuvers. the fundamental requirement of any organization of men is that it shall approach as closely as possible the characteristics of an organism, in which all the parts, though independent, are mutually dependent, each part doing its appropriate work without interfering with any other, but on the contrary assisting it. the most complex organization in the world is that of a navy, due primarily to the great variety of mechanisms in it, and secondarily to the great variety of trained bodies of men for handling those mechanisms. this variety extends from the highest posts to the lowest; and to make such varied organizations work together to a common end is one of the greatest achievements of civilized man. how it is accomplished is not clear at first view. it is not hard to see how a company of soldiers, drawn up in line, can be made to move as one body by order of the captain. but how in a battleship carrying a thousand men does the coal-passer in the fire-room do as the captain on the bridge desires? it may be objected that he does not--that the captain has no wishes regarding the doings of any coal-passer--that all the captain is concerned with is the doings of the ship as a whole. true, in a way; and yet if the various coal-passers, firemen, quartermasters, _et al_., do not do as the captain wishes, the ship as a whole will not. the secret of the success achieved seems to lie in the knitting together of all the personnel parts by invisible wires of common understanding, analogous to the visible wires that connect the helmsman with the steering-engine. in the case of any small body of men, say the force in one fire-room, the connecting wire joining each man to the petty officer in charge of that fire-room is almost visible, because the petty officer is familiar, by experience, with the work of each man; for he has done that work himself, knows just how it should be done, and knows how to instruct each man. but the more complicated the organization is, the more invisible are the communicating wires that tie the men together, and yet the more important it is that those wires shall tie them; it is even more important, for instance, that the wires connecting the chief engineer with all his force shall operate than that the wires in any one fire-room shall operate. and yet not only are there more wires, but the wires themselves that connect the chief engineer to all the men below him, are longer and more subject to derangement, than the wires that connect the petty officer of one fire-room to the individuals under him. the chief engineer, of course, is not tied directly to his coal-passers, but to men close to himself; close not only in actual distance, but in experience, knowledge, and sympathy; men who speak the same languages as he does, who understand what he means when he speaks, and who speak to him in ways he understands. these men immediately under him are similarly tied to their immediate subordinates by wires of knowledge, experience, and sympathy--these to their immediate subordinates, and so on. the same statement applies to the captain in his relations with the chief engineer. the captain may not be an experienced engineer himself; but he is familiar enough with engineering, with its difficulties, its possibilities, and its aims, to converse with the chief engineer in language which both clearly understand. the same principles seem to apply throughout the whole range of the personnel: so that, no matter how large the organization of any navy may be, there is--there must be, if good work is to be done--a network of invisible wires, uniting all together, by a strong yet flexible bond of sympathy. and has the material of the navy no connection with this bond? who knows! brass and steel are said to be lifeless matter. but does any naval man believe this wholly? does any man feel that those battleships, and cruisers, and destroyers, and submarines are lifeless which he himself--with his own eyes--has seen darting swiftly, precisely, powerfully on perfect lines and curves, changing their relative positions through complicated maneuvers without accident or mistake? can we really believe that they take no part and feel no pride in those magnificent pageants on the ocean? from the earliest times, men have personified ships, calling a ship "he" or "she," and giving ships the names of people, and of states; and is not a ship with its crew a living thing, as much as the body of a man? the body of a man is in part composed of bones and muscles, and other parts, as truly things of matter as are the hull and engines of a ship. it is only the spirit of life that makes a man alive, and permits the members of his body, like the members of a ship, to perform their appointed tasks. but even if this notion seems fanciful and absurd, we must admit that as surely as the mind and brain and nerves and the material elements of a man must be designed and made to work in harmony together, so surely must all the parts of any ship, and all the parts of any navy, parts of material and parts of personnel, be designed and made to work in harmony together; obedient to the controlling mind, and sympathetically indoctrinated with the wish and the will to do as that mind desires. chapter ix preparing the active fleet john clerk, of eldin, scotland, never went to sea, and yet he devised a scheme of naval tactics, by following which the british admiral rodney gained his victory over the french fleet between dominica and guadeloupe in april, . clerk devised his system by the simple plan of thinking intently about naval actions in the large, disregarding such details as guns, rigging, masts, and weather, and concentrating on the movements of the fleets themselves, and the doings of the units of which those fleets were made. he assisted his mental processes by little models of ships, which he carried in his pockets, and which he could, and did, arrange on any convenient table, when he desired to study a problem, or to make a convert. he was enabled by this simple and inexpensive device to see the special problems of fleet tactics more clearly than he could have done by observing battles on board of any ships; for his attention in the ships would have been distracted by the exciting events occurring, by the noise and danger, and by the impossibility of seeing the whole because of the nearness of some of the parts. the amazing result was that he formed a clearer concept of naval tactics than any admiral of his time, finally overcame the natural prejudice of the british navy, and actually induced rodney to stake on the suggestion of a non-military civilian his own reputation and the issue of a great sea fight. furthermore, the issue was crowned with success. nothing could be simpler than clerk's method. it was, of course, applied to tactics, but similar methods are now applied to strategy; for strategy and tactics, as already pointed out, are based on similar principles, and differ mainly in the fact that strategy is larger, covers more space, occupies more time, and involves a greater number of quantities. most of the books on naval strategy go into the subject historically, and analyze naval campaigns, and also describe those measures of foresight whereby nations, notably great britain, have established bases all over the world and built up great naval establishments. these books lay bare the reasons for the large successes that good naval strategy has attained, both in peace and war, and constitute nearly all there is of the science of naval strategy. these books and this method of treating naval strategy are valuable beyond measure; but officers find considerable difficulty sometimes in applying the principles set forth to present problems, because of the paucity of data, the remoteness in time and distance of many of the episodes described, and the consequent difficulty of making due allowance for them. now, no study of naval strategy can be thoroughly satisfactory to a naval officer unless it assists him practically to decide what should be done in order to make the naval forces of his country, including himself, better in whatever will conduce to victory in the next war. therefore, at the various war colleges, although the student is given books on strategy to study, the major part of the training is given by the applicatory method, an extension of clerk's, in which the student applies his own skill to solving war problems, makes his own estimate of the situation, solves each problem in his own way (his solution being afterward criticised by the staff), and then takes part in the games in which the solutions presented are tried out. this procedure recognizes the fact that in any human art and science--say medicine, music, or navigation--it is the art and not the science by which one gets results; that the science is merely the foundation on which the art reposes, and that it is by practice of the art and not by knowledge of the science that skill is gained. this does not mean, of course, that we do not need as much knowledge of the science of naval strategy as we can get; for the reason that the naval profession is a growing profession, which necessitates that we keep the application of the principles of its strategy abreast of the improvements of the times, especially in mechanisms; which necessitates, in turn, that we know what those principles are. the applicatory method bears somewhat the same relation to the method of studying books and hearing lectures that exercises in practical navigation bear to the study of the theory. there is one difference, however, as applied to strategy and navigation, which is that the science of navigation is clearly stated in precise rules and formulæ, and the problems in practical navigation are solved by assigning values to quantities like _a, b, c, d_, etc., in the formulæ, and working out the results by mathematics; whereas in strategy, no exact science exists, there are no formulæ, and even the number of assured facts and principles is small. for this reason the art of strategy is more extensive and significant relatively to its science than is the art of navigation to its science. it is a defect of the historical system that it tends to make men do as people in the past have done--to make them work by rule. clerk's method took no note of what had been done before, but confined itself to working out what should be done at the moment (that is, by what we now call the "applicatory method"), taking account of conditions as they are. by combining the two methods, as all war colleges do now, officers get the good results of both. in the studies and exercises at the war colleges, note is taken of the great events that have gone by, and of the great problems now presented; by studying the historical events, and by solving war problems of the present, a certain knowledge of the science of naval strategy, and a certain skill in the art are gained. the studies and the problems naturally are of war situations. yet every war situation was the result of measures taken in time of peace. if these measures had been unwise on the part of one side--say blue--in the design of certain craft, or the adoption, or failure of adoption, of certain plans, then blue's strategic situation in the war would be more unfavorable than it would have been if the measures had been wise. this proves that it is not only in war that strategy should be consulted; that strategy should be made to perform important services in peace as well; that strategic considerations should be the guide to all measures great and small, that not only the major operations in war, but also the minor preparations in peace, should be conducted in accordance with the principles of strategy, and conform to its requirements. by this means, and by this means only, does a system of preparation seem possible in which all shall prepare with the same end in view, and in which, therefore, the best results will be secured in the least time and with the least labor. the naval machine having been designed, the various parts having been furnished by the administrative agencies directing personnel and material, and the consumable stores having been provided by the agencies of supply (all under the guidance and control of strategy, and in accordance with the calculations of logistics), the next step is the same as that with any other machine--to prepare the machine to do its work. the work that strategy has to do in accomplishing the preparation is only in planning; but this planning is not limited to general planning, for it extends to planning every procedure of training and administration, no matter how great or how small. it plans the mobilization of the navy as a whole, the exercises of the fleet, the training of officers and men to insure that the plans for mobilization and fleet exercises shall be efficiently carried out, the exercises of the various craft, and of the various mechanisms of all kinds in those craft, and even the drills of the officers and men, that insure that the various craft and mechanisms shall be handled well. this does not mean that strategy concerns itself directly with the training of mess cooks and coal-passers; and it may be admitted that such training is only under strategy's general guidance. it may be admitted, also, that a considerable part of the training of men in using mechanisms is caused by the requirements of the mechanism itself; that practically the same training is needed for a water-tender in the merchant service as for a water-tender in the navy. nevertheless, we must either declare that the training of mechanicians in the nary has no relation to the demands of preparation of the navy for war, or else admit that the training comes under the broad dominion of strategy. to admit this does not mean at all that the training of a naval radio electrician is not directed in its details almost wholly by electrical engineering requirements; it merely means that the training must be such as to fulfil the requirements of strategy, for otherwise it would have no value. no matter how well trained a man might be in radio work, his work would be useless for naval purposes, if not made useful by being adapted to naval requirements. the fact that strategy controls the training of radio electricians through the medium of electrical means is only one illustration of another important fact, which is that in all its operations strategy directs the methods by which results are to be attained, and utilizes whatever means, even technical means, are the most effective and appropriate. the naval machine having been designed as to both personnel and material, strategy has nothing to do with the material in preparing the machine for use, because the material parts are already prepared, and it is the work of engineering to keep those material parts in a state of continual preparedness. it must be noted, however, that the naval machine differs from most material machines in that its various parts, material as well as personnel, are continually being replaced by newer parts, and added to by parts of novel kinds. strategy must be consulted, of course, in designing the characteristics of the newer and the novel parts; but this work properly belongs in the designing stage, and not in the preparation stage. strategy's work, therefore, in preparing the naval machine for work consists wholly in preparing the personnel. this preparing may be divided into two parts--preparing the existing fleet already mobilized and preparing the rest of the navy. _preparing the fleet_.--the fleet itself is always ready. this does not mean that, in time of profound peace, every ship in the fleet has all its men on board, its chain hove short, and its engines ready to turn over at a moment's notice; but it does mean that this condition is always approximated in whatever degree the necessities of the moment exact. normally, it is not necessary to keep all the men on board; but whenever, or if ever, it becomes so necessary, the men can be kept on board and everything made ready for instant use. it is perfectly correct, therefore, to say that, so far as it may be necessary, a fleet in active commission is always ready. _training_.--before this state of readiness can be attained, however, a great deal of training has to be carried out; and this training must naturally be designed and prosecuted solely to attain this end. unless this end be held constantly in view, and unless the methods of training be adapted to attain it, the training cannot possibly be effective. to go from any point to another point, one must proceed in the correct direction. if he proceeds in another direction, he will miss the point. the training of the fleet naturally must be in doing the things which the fleet would have to do in war. to decide what things these will probably be, resort must be had to the teachings of history, especially the most recent history, and to the teachings of the war problem, the chart maneuver, and the game-board. the part of the personnel which it is the most important to train is, of course, the commander-in-chief himself; and no reason is apparent for supposing that his training should be conducted on principles different from those that control the training of every other person in the fleet. men being the same in general, their qualities differing only in degree, it is logical to conclude that, if a gun-pointer or coxswain is best trained by being made first to understand the principles that underlie the correct performance of his work, and then by being given a good deal of practice in performing it, a commander-in-chief, or a captain, engineer, or gunner, can be best trained under a similar plan. knowledge and practice have always been the most effective means of acquiring skill, and probably will continue to be the best for some time to come. owing to the fact that navies have been in existence for many years, the general qualifications of efficient naval officers are fairly well known; and they have always been the same in the most important particulars, though the recent coming of scientific apparatus has made available and valuable certain types of men not especially valuable before this scientific apparatus appeared. in all navies, and equally in all armies, the qualification that has been the most important has been character. to insure, or rather to do the utmost toward insuring, proper character in its officers, all countries for many years have educated certain young men of the country to be officers in the army and navy, and they have educated young men for no other service. if knowledge were the prime requirement, special training for young men would not be needed; the various educational institutions could supply young men highly educated; and if the government were to take each year a certain number of graduates who could pass certain examinations, the educational institutions would be glad to educate young men to pass them. in securing young men of proper education and physique, little difficulty would be found. special schools could even give sufficient instruction in military and maritime subjects to enable young men to become useful in minor positions on shipboard and in camp, after a brief experience there. in fact, for some of the positions in the army and navy, such as those in the medical corps and others, military or naval training is not needed, or exacted. the truth of these remarks is not so obvious now as it was some years ago, and it has never been so obvious in navies as in armies; because education in the use of the numerous special appliances used in ships could be given less readily by private instruction than in the use of the simpler appliances used in armies. but even now, and even in the navy, the course given at annapolis is usually termed a "training" rather than an education. yet even education, educators tell us, is more a matter of training than a matter of imparting knowledge. this indicates that even for the duties of civil life, the paramount aim of educators is so to train the characters of young men as to fit them for good citizenship. we may assume, therefore, that the primary aim of governments in preparing young men for the army and navy is to develop character along the line needed for useful work in those services. what is that line? probably nine officers in ten would answer this question with the words, "the line of duty." this does not mean that officers are the only people who should be trained to follow the line of duty; but it does mean that, in military and naval schools, the training is more devoted to this than in other schools, except, of course, those schools that train young men for the priesthood or other departments of the religious life. the analogy between the clerical and the military professions in this regard has been pointed out many times; but perhaps the closeness with which the medical profession approximates both in its adherence to the line of duty has not been appreciated as fully as it should be. _duty_.--the reason for the predominance of the idea of duty over any other in naval training is due, of course, to a realization of the fact that more can be accomplished by officers having a strict sense of duty though otherwise lacking, than by officers having any or all the other qualifications, but lacking the sense of duty. as an extreme instance of the doubtful value of highly trained officers who lack the sense of duty, we need but to point to those traitors who, in the past, have turned their powers in the hour of need against the cause they were engaged to fight for. one cannot pursue the path of duty when that path becomes difficult or disagreeable unless the sense of duty is so strong as to resist the temptation to leave the path. to train a man to be strong in this way, we train his character. there are several ways in which a man is tempted to leave the line of duty; of these perhaps the most important are danger, sloth, and love of pleasure. no human being is perfectly strong along any of these lines; and some are most tempted by danger, some by sloth, and some by love of pleasure. sloth and the love of pleasure do not act as hinderances to efficiency in the naval profession any more than they do in other callings. there is no profession, business, or vocation, in which a man's efficiency does not depend largely on his power of resistance to the allurement of sloth and pleasure. in all walks of life, including the usual routine of the naval life, these two factors are the main stumbling-blocks to the success of any man. that is, they are the main stumbling-blocks that training can remove or lessen; the main stumbling-blocks in the way of his attaining that degree of efficiency for which his mental and physical abilities themselves would fit him. natural abilities are not here considered; we are considering merely what training can do to develop men as they are for the naval life. _courage_.--danger is the special influence to divert a man from duty's line that is distinctive of the army and the navy; and therefore to secure ability to overcome this influence is the distinct effort of military training. to train a young man for the army, the training naturally is directed toward minimizing the influence of one class of dangers; while to train a young man for the navy, the training must be directed toward minimizing the influence of another class. of course training toward courage in any line develops courage in other lines; but nevertheless a naval training does not enable a man to ride a plunging cavalry horse with equanimity; nor does training as a cavalryman wholly fit a man to brave the dangers of the deep in a submarine. thirty years ago, the present writer showed commander royal bird bradford, u. s. n., the wonders of the u. s. s. _atlanta_, the first ship of what americans then called "the new navy." when i showed bradford the conning-tower, i remarked that many captains who had visited the _atlanta_ had said that they would not go into the conning-tower in battle. to this bradford replied: "the captain who would not go into the conning-tower in battle would be very brave, but he'd be a d----d fool." the obvious truth of this remark, the intimate connection which it suggested between courage and folly, and the fact often noted in life that to be brave is often to be foolish, contrasted with the fact that in all history the virtue of courage in men has been more lauded than any other virtue, suggests that a brief inquiry into the nature and influence of courage may be interesting. the definitions of courage found in the dictionary are most unsatisfactory, except that they say that the word "courage" comes from the latin "cor," the heart; showing that it is deemed a moral quality, rather than physical or mental. yet the deeds of courage that history and fiction tell, have been deeds of what we call "physical courage," in which heroes and heroines have braved death and physical suffering. far in the background are deeds of "moral courage," though many wise men have told us that "moral courage" is a quality higher than "physical courage," and more important. it is a little difficult to make a clear picture of courage that is physical, as distinguished from courage that is moral; or moral as distinguished from physical. courage seems to be a quality so clearly marked as to be hardly qualifiable by any adjective except an adjective indicating degree--such as "great" or "little"; but if any other adjective may be applied to it, the adjective "moral" seems to be the only one. for courage, no matter how or why displayed, is from its very essence, moral. strictly speaking, how can there be any courage except moral courage? if a man braves death or physical suffering, the quality that enables him to brave it is certainly not physical; certainly it does not pertain to the physical body. the "first law of nature" impels him to escape or yield; and it impels him with a powerful force. if this force be not successfully resisted, the man will yield. now the act of resisting a temptation to escape a physical danger is due to a more or less conscious desire to preserve one's self-respect and the respect of one's fellow men; and therefore, the best way in which to train a man to be brave is to cultivate his self-respect and a desire to have the respect of his fellow men; and to foster the idea that he will lose both if he acts in a cowardly way. naturally, some men are more apt to be cowards as regards physical dangers than are others; and men differ greatly in this way. men of rugged physique, dull imagination, and sluggish nerves are not so prone to fear of physical danger, especially danger far ahead in the future, as are men of delicate physique, keen imagination, and highly strung nervous system; and yet men of the latter class sometimes surpass men of the former class when the danger actually arrives--they seem to have prepared themselves for it, when men of the former class seem in a measure to be taken by surprise. it is the attainment of physical courage, or courage to defy a threat of physical injury, that military training aims at. that it has done so successfully in the past, the history of the valiant deeds of sailors and soldiers bears superabundant witness. this courage has been brought out because it was essential. courage is to a man what strength is to structural materials. no matter how physically strong and mentally equipped a man may be; no matter how perfectly designed and constructed an engine may be, neither the man nor the engine will "stand up to the work," unless the courage in the one case, and the strength of the materials in the other case, are adequate to the stress. while perfect courage would enable a man to approach certain death with equanimity, all that is usually demanded of a man is that he shall dare to risk death, if need be. to do this successfully, a great assistance is a knowledge that even if things look bad, the danger is not so great as it appears. therefore, training confronts men frequently with situations that look dangerous, but which skill and coolness can avert. in this way, the pupil becomes familiar with the face of danger, and learns that it is not so terrible as it seems. nothing else makes a man so brave regarding a certain danger as to have met that danger successfully before. this statement must be qualified with the remark that in some cases a danger, although passed successfully, has been known to do a harm to the nervous system from which it never has recovered. this is especially the case if it was accompanied with a great and sudden noise and the evidence of great injury to others. in cases like this, the shock probably comes too abruptly to enable the man to prepare himself to receive it. the efficacy of a little preparation, even preparation lasting but a few seconds, is worthy of remark. two theories connecting fear and trembling may be noted here: one that a person trembles because he fears; the other, and later, that trembling is automatic, and that a person fears _because he trembles_. but the influence of fear is not only to tempt a man to turn his back on duty and seek safety in flight, for it affects him in many degrees short of this. sometimes, in fact usually, it prevents the accurate operation of the mind in greater or less degree. here again training comes to the rescue, by so habituating a man to do his work in a certain way (loading a gun for instance) that he will do it automatically, and yet correctly, when his mind is almost paralyzed for a time. a very few men are so constituted that danger is a stimulus to not only their physical but their mental functions; so that they never think quite so quickly and so clearly as when in great danger. such men are born commanders. discussion of such an abstract thing as courage may seem out of place in a discussion of "naval strategy"; but while it is true that naval strategy is largely concerned with mental operations, while courage is a moral or spiritual quality, yet strategy concerns itself with the securing of all means to victory, and of these means courage is more important than any other one thing. one plan or one system of training may be better than another; but they differ only in degree, and if one plan fails another may be substituted; but if courage be found lacking, there is no substitute on earth. now, if courage is to be inculcated by some system of training, surely it is not amiss to devote a few minutes to an analysis of the nature of courage, to seek what light we can get as to the best methods of training to employ. _responsibility_.--there is one form of courage which most men are never called upon to use, and that is willingness to take responsibility. most men are never confronted with a situation requiring them to take it. to naval men, however, the necessity comes often, even to naval men in the lower grades; for they are often confronted with situations in which they can accept or evade responsibility. that courage is needed, no one can doubt who has had experience. to accept responsibility, however, is not always best either for the individual or for the cause; often it were better to lay the responsibility on higher authority, by asking for instructions. but the same remark is true of all uses of courage; it is not always best to be brave, either for the individual or for the cause. both the individual and the cause can often be better served by prudence than by her big brother courage. when, however, the conditions require courage in any form, such as willingness to accept responsibility, the man in charge of the situation at the moment must use courage, or--fail. in such cases the decision rests with the man himself. he cannot shift it to another's shoulders, even if he would. even if he decides and acts on the advice of others, the responsibility remains with him. _from the top down, or from the bottom up?_--there are two directions in which to approach the subject of training the personnel--from the top down, and from the bottom up. the latter is the easier way; is it the better? the latter is the easier way, because it is quicker and requires less knowledge. in training a turret crew in this way, for instance, one does not have to consider much outside of the turret itself. the ammunition can be sent up and down, and the guns can be loaded, pointed, and fired with just as much quickness and accuracy as is humanly practicable, without much reference to the ship itself, the fleet, or the navy. in fact, knowledge of outside requirements hinders in some ways rather than advances training of this kind. knowledge, for instance, of the requirements of actual battle is a distinct brake on many of the activities of mere target practice. but while it is easier to train in this way all the various bodies of men that must be trained, it is obvious that by training them wholly without reference to the requirements of the fleet as a whole, the best result that we could expect would be a number of bodies of men, each body well trained as a unit, but the combined units not trained at all as component elements of the whole. the result would be a little like what one would expect from the efforts of an orchestra at playing a selection which the whole orchestra had never played before together, but of which each member of the orchestra had previously learned his part, and played it according to his own ideas, without consulting the orchestra leader. by approaching the subject from the other direction, however, that is, from the top, the training of each organization within the fleet is arranged with reference to the work of the fleet as a whole, the various features of the drills of each organization being indicated by the conditions developed by that work. if this plan be carried out, a longer time will be required to drill the various bodies of men; but when it has been accomplished, those bodies will be drilled, not only as separate bodies, but as sympathetic elements of the whole. of course the desirability of drilling separate divisions of a fleet, ana separate ships, turret crews, fire-control parties, and what-not, in accordance with the requirements of fleet work does not prevent them from drilling by themselves as often as they wish--any more than the necessity of drilling in the orchestra prevents a trombone player from practising on his instrument as much as the police will let him. thus the fact of keeping a fleet together does more than merely give opportunity for acquiring skill in handling the fleet itself, and in handling the various ships so that they will work together as parts of the fleet machine; because it shows each of the various smaller units within the ships themselves how to direct its training. for this reason, the idea so often suggested of keeping the fleet normally broken up into smaller parts, those parts close enough together to unite before an enemy could strike, is most objectionable. it is impossible to keep the fleet together all the time, because of needed repairs, needed relaxation, and the necessity for individual drills that enable a captain or division commander to strengthen his weak points; but nevertheless since the "mission" of training is to attain fighting efficiency in the fleet as a whole, rather than to attain fighting efficiency in the various parts; and since it can be attained only by drilling the fleet as a whole, the decision to keep the fleet united as much as practicable seems inevitably to follow. besides, the statement cannot be successfully controverted that difficult things are usually not so well done as easy things, that drills of large organizations are more difficult than drills of small organizations, and that in every fleet the drills that are done the worst are the drills of the fleet as a whole. how could anything else be expected, when one considers how much more often, for instance, a turret crew is exercised at loading than the fleet is exercised at the difficult movement of changing the "line of bearing"? the older officers remember that for many years we carried on drills at what we called "fleet tactics," though we knew they were only tactical drills. they were excellent in the same sense as that in which the drill of the manual of arms was excellent, or the squad exercises given to recruits. they were necessary; but beyond the elementary purpose of training in ship handling in fleet movements, they had no "end in view"; they were planned with a limited horizon, they were planned from the bottom. _general staff_.--in order to direct the drills of a fleet toward some worthy end, that end itself must be clearly seen; and in order that it may be clearly seen, it first must be discovered. the end does not exist as a bright mark in the sky, but as the answer to a difficult problem; it cannot be found by guessing or by speculating or by groping in the dark. strategy says that the best way in which to find it is by the "estimate of the situation" method. owing to the fact that the commander-in-chief and all his personnel are, by the nature of the conditions surrounding them, on executive duty, the working out of the end in view of any extensive drills seems the task of the navy department; while the task of attaining it seems to belong to the commander-in-chief. owing to the present stage of electrical progress, the navy department has better means of ascertaining the whole naval situation than has the commander-in-chief, and if officers (general staff) be stationed at the department to receive and digest all the information received, and decide on the best procedure in each contingency as it arises, the navy department can then give the commander-in-chief the information he requires and general instructions how to proceed. this does not mean that the department would "interfere" with the commander-in-chief, but simply that it would assist him. the area of discretion of the commander-in-chief should not be invaded; for if it be invaded, not only may orders be given without knowledge of certain facts in the commander-in-chief's possession, but the commander-in-chief will have his difficulties increased by the very people who are trying to help him. he may be forced into disobeying orders, a most disturbing thing to have to do; and he will surely be placed in a position of continuous doubt as to what is expected of him. of course, it must be realized that the difficulties of co-operating with a commander-in-chief at sea, by means of even the most expert general staff, are of the highest order. it is hard to imagine any task more difficult. it must be accomplished, however, or else there will be danger all the time that the commander-in-chief will act as he would not act if he had all the information that the department had. this suggests at once that the proper office of the department is merely to give the commander-in-chief information and let him act on his own judgment. true in a measure; but the commander-in-chief must be given some instructions, even if they be general, for the reason that the commander-in-chief is merely an instrument for enforcing a certain policy. clearly, he must know what the policy is, what the department desires; and the mere statement of the department's desires is of itself an order. if it is admitted that the commander-in-chief is to carry out the orders of the department, it remains merely to decide in how great detail those orders ought to be. no general answer can be given to the question: "in what detail shall the orders be?" the general statement can be made, however, that the instructions should be confined as closely as practicable to a statement of the department's desires, and that this statement should be as clear as possible. if, for instance, the only desire of the department is that the enemy's fleet shall be defeated, no amplification of this statement is required. but if the department should desire, for reasons best known to itself, that the enemy should be defeated by the use of a certain method, then that should be stated also. maybe it would not be wise for the department to state the method the employment of which is desired; maybe the commander-in-chief would be the best judge of the method to be employed. but maybe circumstances of governmental policy dictate the employment of a certain method, even if militarily it is not the best; and maybe also the department might prefer that method by reason of information recently received, which it does not have time to communicate in full. now, if it is desirable for the department to give the commander-in-chief instructions, running the risk of invading his "area of discretion," and of doing other disadvantageous things, it is obvious that the department should be thoroughly equipped for doing it successfully. this means that the department should be provided not only with the most efficient radio apparatus that can be secured, manned, of course, by the most skilful operators, but also with a body of officers capable of handling that particular part of the navy department's work which is the concentrated essence of all its work, the actual handling of the naval forces. the usual name given to such a body of officers is "general staff." such bodies of officers have been developed in navies in recent years, by a desire to take advantage of electrical appliances which greatly increase the accuracy and rapidity of communication over long distances. in days not long ago, before communication by radio was developed, commanders on the spot were in possession of much more information about events in their vicinity, compared with the navy department, than they are now; and the difficulties and uncertainties of communication made it necessary to leave much more to their discretion and initiative. the president of the united states can now by telephone talk to the commander-in-chief, when he is in home waters, and every day sees some improvement in this line. this facility of communication carries with it, of course, the danger of "interfering," one of the most frequent causes of trouble in the past, in conducting the operations of both armies and fleets--a danger very real, very insidious, and very important. the very ease with which interference can be made, the trained instinct of the subordinate to follow the wishes of his superior if he can, the temptation to the superior to wield personally some military power and get some military glory, conspire to bring about interference. this is only an illustration, however, of the well-known fact that every power can be used for evil as well as for good, and is not a valid argument against developing to the utmost the communication between the department and the fleet. it is, however, a very valid argument against developing it unless there be developed simultaneously some means like a "safety device" for preventing or at least discouraging its misuse. the means devised is the general staff; and in some countries like germany it seems to work so well that (unless our information is incorrect) the emperor himself does not interfere. he gives the machine a certain problem to work out, and he accepts the answer as the answer which has a greater probability of being correct than any answer he could get by other means. _training of the staff_.--now, if there is to be at the navy department a body of men who will work out and recommend what instructions should be given to the commander-in-chief, it seems obvious that that body of men should be thoroughly trained. in the german army the training of men to do this work (general staff work) is given only to officers specially selected. certain young officers who promise well are sent to the war college. those who show aptitude and industry are then put tentatively into the general staff. those who show marked fitness in their tentative employment are then put into the general staff, which is as truly a special corps as is our construction corps. how closely this system is followed with the general staff in the german navy, the present writer does not know exactly; but his information is that the system in the navy is copied (though with certain modifications) after the system in the army. how can the general staff at the navy department be trained? in the same way as that in which officers at the war college are trained: by study and by solving war problems by tactical and strategical games. the training would naturally be more extended, as it would be a postgraduate course. there is a difference to be noted between games like war games in which the mental powers are trained, and games like billiards, in which the nerves and muscles receive practically all the training; and the difference refers mainly to the memory. games of cards are a little like war games; and many books on games of cards have been written, expounding the principles on which they rest and giving rules to follow. these books may be said to embody a science of card-playing. no such book on naval strategy has appeared; and the obvious reason is that only a few rules of naval strategy have been formulated. staff training, therefore, cannot be given wholly by studying books; but possibly the scheme suggested to the department by the writer, when he was aid for operations, may be developed into a sort of illustrative literature, which can assist the memory. by this scheme, a body of officers at the navy department would occupy their time wholly in studying war problems by devising and playing strategical and tactical games ashore and afloat. after each problem had been solved to the satisfaction of the staff, each distinctive situation in the approved solution would be photographed in as small a space as practicable, preferably on a moving-picture film. in the solution of problem ; for instance, there might be situations and therefore photographs. these photographs, shown in appropriate succession, would furnish information analogous to the information imparted to a chess student by the statement of the successive moves in those games of chess that one sees sometimes in books on chess and in newspapers. now if the film photographs were so arranged that the moves in the approved solution of, say, problem could be thrown on a screen, as slowly and as quickly as desired, and if the film records of a few hundred such games could be conveniently arranged, a very wide range of situations that would probably come up in war would be portrayed; and the moves made in handling those situations would form valuable precedents for action, whenever situations approximating them should come up in war. it must be borne in mind that in actual life, our only real guide to wise action in any contingency that may arise is a memory, more or less consciously realized, of how a similar contingency has been met, successfully or unsuccessfully, in the past. perhaps most of us do not realize that it is not so much experience that guides us as our memory of experiences. therefore in the training of both officers and enlisted men in strategy, tactics, seamanship, gunnery, engineering, and the rest, the memory of how they, or some one else, did this well and that badly (even if the memory be hardly conscious) is the immediate agency for bringing about improvement. imagine now a strategical system of training for the navy, in which a body of highly trained officers at the department will continuously regulate the exercises of the fleet, guided by the revelations of the _kriegspiel:_ the commander-in-chief will direct the activities of the main divisions of the fleet, carrying out the department's scheme; the commander of each division will regulate the activities of the units of his command in accordance with the fleet scheme; the officer in command of each unit of each division will regulate the activities of each unit in his ship, destroyer, submarine, or other craft in accordance with the division scheme; and every suborganization, in every ship, destroyer, or other craft will regulate likewise the activities of its members; so that the navy will resemble a vast and efficient organism, all the parts leagued together by a common understanding and a common purpose; mutually dependent, mutually assisting, sympathetically obedient to the controlling mind that directs them toward the "end in view." it must be obvious, however, that in order that the navy shall be like an organism, its brain (the general staff) must not be a thing apart, but must be of it, and bound to every part by ties of sympathy and understanding. it would be possible to have a staff excellent in many ways, and yet so out of touch with the fleet and its practical requirements that co-ordination between the two would not exist. analogous conditions are sometimes seen in people suffering from a certain class of nervous ailments; the mind seems unimpaired, but co-ordination between the brain and certain muscles is almost wholly lacking. to prevent such a condition, therefore, the staff must be kept in touch with the fleet; and it must also permit the fleet to keep in touch with the staff, by arranging that, accompanying the system of training, there shall be a system of education which will insure that the general plan will be understood throughout the fleet; and that the means undertaken to execute it will be made sufficiently clear to enable each person to receive the assistance of his own intelligence. no man can do his best work in the dark. darkness is of itself depressing; while light, if not too intense, stimulates the activities of every living thing. this does not mean that every mess attendant in the fleet should be put into possession of the war plans of the commander-in-chief, that he should be given any more information than he can assimilate and digest, or than he needs, to do his work the best. just how much information to impart, and just how much to withhold are quantitative questions, which can be decided wisely by only those persons who know what their quantitative values are. this is an important matter, and should be dealt with as such by the staff itself. to get the maximum work out of every man is the aim of training; to get the maximum work that shall be effective in attaining the end in view, training must be directed by strategy, because strategy alone has a clear knowledge of what is the end in view. _stimuli_.--some men are so slothful that exertion of any kind is abhorrent to them; but these men are few, and are very few indeed among a lot of healthy and normal men such as fill a navy. an office boy, lazy beyond belief in the work he is engaged to do, will go through the most violent exertions at a baseball game; and a darky who prefers a soft resting-place in the shade of an umbrageous tree to laboring in the fields will be stirred to wild enthusiasm by a game of "craps." now why are the office boy and the darky stimulated by these games? by the elements of competition, chance, and possible danger they bring out and the excitement thereby engendered. training, therefore introduces these elements into drills as much as it can. competition alone does not suffice, otherwise all men would play chess; competition and chance combined are not enough, or gentlemen would not need the danger of losing money to make card games interesting; but any game that brings in all three elements will rouse the utmost interest and activity of which a man is capable. games involving these three elements are known by many names; one name is "poker," another name is "business," and another name is "politics." there are many other games besides, but the greatest of all is strategy. now in the endeavor to prepare a fleet by training, no lack of means for exciting interest will be found; in fact no other training offers so many and so great a variety of means for introducing the elements of competition, chance, and danger. the problem is how best to employ them. to do this successfully, it must be realized, of course, that the greatest single factor in exciting interest is the personal factor, since comparatively few men can get much interested in a matter that is impersonal; a boy is more interested in watching a baseball game in which he knows some of the players than in watching a game between teams neither of which he has ever seen; and the men in any ship are more interested in the competition between their ship and some other than between any other two; feeling that _esprit de corps_ by reason of which every individual in every organization personifies the organization as a living thing of which he himself is part. _strategic problems_.--the training of the fleet, then, can best be done under the direction of a trained staff, that staff generously employing all the resources of competition, chance, and danger. the obvious way to do this is to give out to the fleet for solution a continual succession of strategic problems, which the entire fleet will be engaged in solving, and which will be the starting-point for all the drills of the fleet and in the fleet. (some officers prefer the word "maneuver" to "problem.") the arranging of a continual series of war problems, or maneuvers to be worked out in the fleet by "games," will call for an amount of strategical skill second only to the skill needed for operations in war, will deal with similar factors and be founded on similar principles. naturally, the war problems, before being sent to the fleet for solving, would be solved first by the staff, using strategical and tactical games, and other appropriate means; and inasmuch as the scheme of education and training is for the benefit of the staff itself, as well as for the benefit of the fleet, certain members of the staff would go out with the fleet to note in what ways, each problem sent down was defective, in what ways good--and in what ways it could be modified with benefit. the successive situations and solutions, made first by the staff and subsequently by the fleet, can then be photographed and made part of the history of war problems, for the library of the staff. in laying out the war problems, the staff will be guided naturally by the ends in view--first to work out solutions of strategic, logistic, and tactical situations in future wars, and second to give opportunity to the various divisions, ships, turret crews, engineers' forces, etc., for drills that will train them to meet probable contingencies in future wars. this double end will not be so difficult of attainment as might at first sight seem, for the reason that the solution of any problem which represents a situation actually probable will automatically provide all the minor situations necessary to drill the various bodies; and the more inherently probable a situation is, the more probable will be the situations in which the various flag-officers, captains, quartermasters, engineers' forces, turret crews, etc., will find themselves. of course, the prime difficulty in devising realistic problems is the fact that in war our whole fleet would be employed together against an enemy fleet; and as the staff cannot supply an enemy fleet, it must either imagine an enemy fleet, divert a small part of our fleet to represent an enemy fleet, or else divide our fleet into two approximately equal parts, one "red," and one "blue." _first scheme_.--the first scheme has its usefulness in working out the actual handling of the fleet as a whole; and considering the purposes of strategy only, is the most important, though, of course, "contacts" with the enemy cannot be simulated. from the standpoint of fleet tactical drill, and the standpoint of that part of strategy which arranges for handling large tactical situations with success, it is useful, since it provides for the tactical handling of the entire fleet. this certainly is important; for if the personnel are to be so trained that the actual fleet shall be handled with maximum effectiveness in battle, training in handling that actual fleet must frequently be had; the fleet is a machine, and no machine is complete if any of its parts is lacking. it may be objected that it is not necessary for the staff at the department to devise such training, because drills of the entire fleet can be devised and carried out by the commander-in-chief; in fact that that is what he is for. this, of course, is partly true; and it is not the idea of the author that the staff in the department should interfere with any scheme of drills that the commander-in-chief desires to devise and carry out; but it is his idea that the staff should arrange problems to be worked out by the fleet, in which the tactical handling of the fleet should be subordinate to, and carried out for, a strategic purpose. a very simple drill would be the mere transfer of the fleet to a distant point, when in supposititious danger from an enemy, employing by day and night the scouting and screening operations that such a trip would demand. another drill would be the massing of previously separated forces at a given place and time; still another would be the despatching of certain parts of the fleet to certain points at certain times. the problems need not be quite so simple as these, however; for they can include all the operations of a fleet under its commander-in-chief up to actual contact; the commander-in-chief being given only such information as the approximate position, speed, and course of the enemy at a given time, with orders to intercept him with his whole force; or he may be given information that the enemy has divided his force, that certain parts were at certain places going in certain directions at certain speeds at certain times, and he may be directed to intercept those supposititious parts; that is, to get such parts of his fleet as he may think best to certain places at certain times. of the strategic value to the staff of the practical solutions of this class of problems by the fleet, there can be little question; and the records made if kept up to date, would give data in future wars for future staffs, of what the whole fleet, and parts of it acting with the fleet, can reasonably be expected to accomplish, especially from the standpoint of logistics. and it has the advantage of dealing with only one thing; the actual handling of the actual fleet, uncomplicated by other matters, such as interference by an enemy. for the reason, however, that it leaves out of consideration the effects of scouting and of contacts with the enemy, it is incomplete. _second scheme_.--to remedy this incompleteness, resort may be had to the device of detaching a few vessels from the fleet and making each represent a force of the enemy; one destroyer, for instance, to represent a division, four destroyers four divisions, etc. this scheme has the advantage that all the capital ships can be handled together, and that, say three-quarters of the destroyers can be handled without much artificiality on the assumption that four-fourths are so handled; while for merely strategic purposes four destroyers, properly separated, can represent four divisions of destroyers very truthfully. this scheme is useful not only strategically but tactically; for the reasons that the contacts made are actual and visible, and that all the personnel on each side are put to doing things much like those they would do in war. the scheme is extremely flexible besides; for the number of ways in which the fleet can be divided is very great, and the number of operations that can be simulated with considerable accuracy is therefore very great also. the training given to the personnel of the fleet is obviously more varied, interesting, and valuable, than in the first scheme; and the records of the solutions (games played) will form instructive documents in the offices of the staff, concerning situations which the first scheme could not bring out. these records, naturally, will not be so simple as those under the first scheme, because many factors will enter in, some of which will bring up debatable points. for when actual contact occurs, but only "constructive" hits by torpedo and gun are made, much room for difference of opinion will occur, and many decisions will be disputed. to decide disputed questions must, of course, rest with the staff; but those questions must be decided, and if correct deductions from the games are to be made, the decisions must be correct. to achieve correctness in decision the members of the staff must be highly trained. to devise and develop a good scheme of staff training, several years may be required. _third scheme_.--the third kind of game is that in which the fleet is divided into two parts, fairly equal in each of the various elements, battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, etc. this scheme gives opportunity for more realistic situations than the other two, since each side operates and sees vessels and formations similar to those that it would operate and see in war; and it gives opportunity for games which combine both strategical and tactical operations and situations to a greater degree than do the other two schemes. its only weakness is the fact that the entire fleet is not operated as a unit; not even a large fraction, but only about one-half. like each of the other two schemes, however, it has its distinctive field of usefulness. its main advantage is its realism--the fact that two powerful naval forces, each composed of all the elements of a naval force, seek each other out; or else one evades and the other seeks; and then finally they fight a fairly realistic battle; or else one successfully evades the other; or else minor actions occur between detachments, and no major result occurs; just as happens in war. strategically, this scheme is less valuable than the other two; tactically, more so. for the experience and the records of the staff this scheme is less valuable than the other two, but for the training of the fleet it is more so. of course, the division of games for staff and fleet training into three general schemes is arbitrary, and not wholly correct; for no such division really exists, and in practice it would not be observed. the thought of the writer is merely to point out that, in a general way, the schemes may be divided into three classes, and to show the convenience of doing so--or at least of recognizing that there are three general kinds of games, and that each kind has its advantages and likewise its disadvantages. in our navy, only three strategic problems or maneuvers, devised at the department, have been worked out at sea--one in may, and one in october, , and one in august, : all belonged in the second category. they were devised by the general board and the war college, as we had no staff. the solving of the problems by the commander-in-chief aroused the greatest interest not only in the fleet, but in the navy department, in fact, throughout the entire navy, and to a surprising degree throughout the country, especially among the people on the atlantic coast. discussions of the utmost value were aroused and carried on, and a degree of co-operation between the department, the war college, and the fleet, never attained before, was realized. if a routine could be devised whereby such problems could be solved by practical games, say once a month, and the results analyzed and recorded in moving-picture form by the staff in washington, we could see our way in a few years' time to a degree of efficiency in strategy which now we cannot even picture. it would automatically indoctrinate the navy and produce a sympathetic understanding and a common aim, which would permeate the personnel and make the navy a veritable organism. it would attain the utmost attainable by any method now known. attention is respectfully invited to the fact that at the present time naval strategy is mainly an art; that it will probably continue so for many years; that whether a science of naval strategy will ever be formulated need not now concern us deeply, and that the art of naval strategy, like every other art, needs practice for its successful use. naval strategy is so vague a term that most of us have got to looking on it as some mystic art, requiring a peculiar and unusual quality of mind to master; but there are many things to indicate that a high degree of skill in it can be attained by the same means as can a high degree of skill in playing--say golf: by hard work; and not only by hard work, but by doing the same thing--or similar things--repeatedly. now most of us realize that any largely manual art, such as the technic of the piano, needs frequent repetition of muscular actions, in order to train the muscles; but few of us realize how fully this is true of mental arts, such as working arithmetical or strategical problems, though we know how easy it is to "get rusty" in navigation. our mental muscles and whatever nerves co-ordinate them with our minds seem to need fully as much practice for their skilful use as do our physical muscles; and so to attain skill in strategy, we must practise at it. this means that all hands must practise at it--not only the staff in their secret sanctuary, not only the commander-in-chief, not only the division commanders, but, in their respective parts, the captains, the lieutenants, the ensigns, the warrant officers, the petty officers, and the youngest recruits. to get this practice, the department, through the staff, must furnish the ideas, and the commander-in-chief the tools. then, day after day, month after month, and year after year, in port and at sea, by night and by day, the ideas assisted by the tools will be supplying a continuous stimulus to the minds of all. this stimulus, properly directed through the appropriate channels and devoted to wise purposes, will reach the mess attendant, the coal-passer, and the recruit, as well as those in positions more responsible (though not more honorable); and as the harmony of operation of the whole increases, as skill in each task increases, and as a perception of the strategic _why_ for the performance of each task increases, the knowledge will be borne in on all that in useful occupation is to be found the truest happiness; that only uninterested work at any task is drudgery; that interest in work brings skill, that skill brings pleasure in exerting it; and that the greater the number of men engaged together, and the more wise the system under which they work, the greater will be the happiness of each man, and the higher the efficiency of the whole. chapter x reserves and shore stations in the preceding chapter it was pointed out that the work of preparing the naval machine for use could be divided into two parts: preparing the existing fleet and preparing the rest of the navy. the "rest of the navy" consists of the navy department itself, the naval stations, the reserve ships and men, and also the ships and men that must be brought in from civil life. as the department is the agency for preparing the naval stations, the reserves, and the men and ships brought in from civil life, it is clear that the work of preparing the department will automatically prepare the others. the work of preparing any navy department necessitates the preparation and execution of plans, whereby the department itself and all the rest of the navy will be able to pass instantly from a peace footing to a war footing; will be able to pass instantly from a status of leisurely handling and supplying the existing fleet by means of the offices, bureaus, and naval stations, to the status of handling with the greatest possible despatch a force which will be not only much larger, but also much less disciplined and coherent. in time of peace a navy department which is properly administered for times of peace, as most navy departments are, can, by means of its bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., handle the existing fleet, and also these bureaus, naval stations, offices, etc., by labors which for the most part are matters of routine. the department opens for business at a certain time in the morning and closes at a certain time in the afternoon. during office hours the various officials and their clerks fill a few busy hours with not very strenuous labor, and then depart, leaving their cares behind them. the naval stations are conducted on similar principles; and even the doings of the fleet become in a measure matters of routine. all the ordinary business of life tends to routine, in order that men may so arrange their time, that they may have regular hours for work, recreation, and sleep, and be able to make engagements for the future. but when war breaks out, all routine is instantly abolished. the element of surprise, which each side strives to interject into its operations, is inherently a foe to routine. in a routine life, expected things occur--it is the office of routine to arrange that expected things shall occur, and at expected times; in a routine life one is always prepared to see a certain thing happen at a certain time. surprise breaks in on all this, and makes unexpected things occur, and therefore finds men unprepared. it is the office of surprise to catch men unprepared. appreciating this, and appreciating the value of starting a war by achieving some great success, and of preventing the enemy from so doing, military countries in recent years have advanced more and more their preparations for war, even in time of the profoundest peace, in order that, when war breaks out, they may be prepared either to take the offensive at once, or to repel an offensive at once. with whatever forces a nation expects or desires to fight in a war, no matter whether it will begin on the offensive or begin on the defensive, the value to the nation of those forces will depend on how soon they are gotten ready. in a navy, the active fleet may be considered always ready; but the personnel and the craft of various kinds that must be added to it cannot be added to it as quickly as is desirable--because it is desirable that they should be added immediately, which is impossible. it is not in the nature of things that they should get ready as quickly as a fleet that has been kept ready always; but it is essential that the handicap to the operations of the active fleet, due to the tardiness of its additions, should be kept as small as possible. in other words, whatever additions are to be made to the active fleet should be made as quickly as possible. when the additions are made to the fleet (reserve ships and men, ships and men from civil life, etc.) it is clear that those ships and men should at that time be ready for effective work. if the ships are not in condition for effective work by reason of being out of order, or by reason of the ships from civil life not having been altered to suit their new requirements, or by reason of the men not being thoroughly drilled for their new tasks, considerable time will have to be lost by the necessity of getting the ships and the men into proper condition--or else warlike operations will have to be entered into while unprepared, and the classic _chesapeake-shannon_ tragedy re-enacted. therefore, the endeavor must be strongly made to have ready always all the ships and men that are to be added to the fleet; the ships equipped for their duties in the fleet, and the men drilled for their future tasks. the matter of getting ready the navy ships that are in reserve is largely a matter of getting the men to man them, as the ships themselves are kept in repair, and so in a state of readiness, materially speaking. at least this is the theory; and the successful application of the theory, when tested in practice, depends greatly on how large a proportion of the full complements has been kept on board, and on the amount and nature of the cruising which the vessels in reserve have done. the ideal conditions cannot be reached, unless the full complements have been kept on board, and the ships required to make frequent cruises. of course, such a condition is never met in reserve ships; there would be no reason for putting ships in reserve if they were to be so handled. the more closely, however, a ship is kept in that condition of readiness, the more quickly she can be made absolutely ready in her material condition. unless one realizes how and why ships deteriorate in material, it is surprising to see how many faults develop, when ships in reserve, that are apparently in good condition, are put into active service. trouble is not found, of course, with the stationary parts, like the bottoms, and sides, and decks, so much as with the moving parts, especially the parts that have to move and be steam and gas tight at the same time--the parts found mainly in the steam engineering and ordnance departments. defects in the moving parts, especially in the joints, are not apt to be found out until they are moved, and often not until they are moved under the pressure and with the speeds required in service. now "in service" usually means in service in time of peace; but the service for which those ships are kept in reserve is war service, and the requirements of war service are much more rigorous than those of peace service. objection may be made to this statement by remarking that engines turn around and guns are fired just the same in war as in peace, and that therefore the requirements are identical. true in a measure; but vessels and guns are apt to be forced more in war than in peace; and even if they were not, vessels in time of peace are gotten ready with a considerable degree of deliberation, are manned by well-trained men, and are sent to sea under circumstances which permit of gradually working up to full service requirements. but when reserve vessels are mobilized and sent into service for war, everything is done with the utmost haste; and the men, being hurriedly put on board, cannot possibly be as well trained and as ready to do skilful work as men sent on board in peace time; and when reserve vessels get to sea they may be required immediately to perform the most exacting service. for all these reasons, it is highly desirable--it is essential to adequate preparation--that vessels should be kept in a state of material readiness that is practically perfect. every vessel on board of which defects in material develop after she shall have been put into service, when war breaks out, will be a liability instead of an asset. she will be able to render no effective service, and she will require the expenditure of energy by officers and men, and possibly the assistance of other vessels, when their services are needed for other work. but the problem of how to keep reserve vessels in a state of material readiness is easier than the problem of how to keep the reserve men in a state of personnel readiness, which will insure their reporting on board of the reserve ships quickly enough and with adequate training. this problem is so difficult, and its solution is so important, that in great britain, france, germany, japan, and doubtless other navies, men are compelled to go into the reserves, and to remain in for several years after completing their periods of service in the regular navy. in this way, no breaking away from the navy occurs until after reserve service has been completed, and every man who enlists remains in the navy and is subject to its discipline until his reserve period has been passed. thus the question of the reserve is a question that has been answered in those countries, and is therefore no longer a question in them. if battleship _a_ in any of those countries is to be mobilized, the government knows just who are to go on board and when; and knows that every man has recently served in the regular navy, has been kept in training ever since he left it, and that he is competent to perform the duties of his allotted station in battleship _a_. the problem of getting into service the ships that are to be gotten from the merchant service is more difficult, and is perhaps of more importance; that is, it is more important to get into the service some vessels from the merchant service than some reserve ships; more important, for instance, to get colliers to serve the fleet with coal than to commission some antiquated cruisers. naturally, the number and kinds of ships that need to be provided will depend on the nature of the war--whether, for instance, a very large force is to be sent to the other side of the world, to meet a powerful fleet there, or whether a sudden attack on our atlantic coast is to be repelled. the difference, however, is largely numerical; so that if the plans provide for a sufficient number to take part in the distant expedition, it will be easy to get the appropriate number to meet a coast attack. to receive an attack upon the coast, however, provision must be made for vessels and men not needed on an expedition across the seas--that is, for vessels and men that will defend the coast itself from raids and similar expeditions. the work of preparing all that part of the naval machine which in time of peace is separate from the active fleet is purely one of logistics; it is that part of the preparation which calculates what ways and means are needed, and then supplies those ways and means. logistics, having been told by strategy what strategy plans to do, calculates how many and what kinds of vessels, men, guns, torpedoes, fuel, food, hospital service, ammunition, etc., are needed to make possible the fulfilling of those plans; and then proceeds to provide what it has calculated must be provided. this does not mean that strategy should hold itself aloof from logistics and make arbitrary demands upon it; for such a procedure would result in making demands that logistics could not supply; or, through an underestimate of what logistics can supply, in refraining from demanding as much as could be supplied. logistics, of course, does provide what strategy wants, in so far as it can; but in order that satisfactory results may be obtained, the fullest co-operation between strategy and logistics is essential; and to this end frequent conferences are required between the officers representing both. the logistic work of expanding the naval forces to a war basis may evidently be divided into two parts: the adding of vessels and other craft appropriately equipped and manned to the active fleet, and the establishment of a coast-defense force, which will be distributed along the coast and divided among the most important commercial and strategic centres. _adding to the fleet_.--naturally, the additions to the fleet will depend on the service for which the fleet is intended; that is, on the plans of strategy. if the navy were to be gotten ready for a definite undertaking, then the additions to carry out that undertaking could be calculated and prepared; and of course this condition does come up immediately before any war occurs. but in addition to these preparations which are to be made at the last moment (many of which cannot be made until the last moment), the staff must prepare in the leisure of profound peace for several different contingencies. inasmuch as many of the additions will be needed, no matter with what country the war may come; and inasmuch as the same general kind of additions will be made, it is clear that there must underlie all the various plans one general plan, to which modifications must be made to adapt it to special conditions. and as, no matter whether we are to take the offensive or the defensive, no matter whether the fleet is to go far away or stay near our coast, the matter of additions to it is mainly a matter of degree (whether for instance ten extra colliers are needed or a hundred), it seems clear that the general plan should be the one demanding the greatest additions, so that the modifications to adapt it to special cases would consist merely in making subtractions from it. to carry out this plan, strategy must make a sufficiently grave estimate of the situation; and logistics must make calculations to supply the most difficult demands that the estimate of the situation indicates as reasonable, and then arrange the means to provide what the calculations show. if one has provided a little more than is necessary, it is much easier to leave out something later than it is to add more, if one has not provided enough; and one's natural indolence then acts on the side of safety, since it tends to persuade one not to leave off too much; whereas in the opposite case, it tends to assure him that it is not really necessary to take the trouble to provide what it might be hard to get. _the estimate of the situation.--in no field of strategical work is an accurate estimate of the situation more clearly necessary than when it is to form the basis for the precise calculations of logistics_. general strategical plans require a vividness of imagination and a boldness of conception that find no field for exercise in logistics; and tactics requires a quickness of decision and a forcefulness of execution that neither strategy nor logistics need; but neither strategy nor tactics calls for the mathematical exactness that logistics must have, or be of no avail. yet there will be no use in working out the mathematically correct means to produce certain result, if the real nature of the desired result is underrated; there will be no use in working out laboriously how many ships and tons of coal and oil are needed, if the estimate of the situation, to meet which those ships and coal and oil are needed, is inadequate. the first step, therefore, in providing for the expansion of the navy for war, is to estimate the situation correctly. the greatest difficulty in doing this arises from a species of moral cowardice, which tempts a man to underestimate its dangers, and therefore the means required to meet them. _probably no single cause of defeat in war has been so pregnant with disaster as this failure to make a sufficiently grave estimate of the situation_. sometimes the failure seems due more to carelessness than to cowardice; napoleon's disastrous underestimate of the difficulties of his projected russian campaign seems more due to carelessness than to cowardice; but this may be due to a difficulty of associating cowardice with napoleon. but is it not equally difficult to associate carelessness with napoleon? what professional calculator, what lawyer's clerk was ever more careful than napoleon was, when dealing with problems of war? who was ever more attentive to details, who more industrious, who more untiring? and yet napoleon's plans for his russian campaign were inadequate to an amazing degree, and the inadequacy was the cause of his disaster. but whether the cause was carelessness or moral cowardice on his part, the fact remains that he did not estimate the situation with sufficient care, and make due plans to meet it. this unwillingness to look a difficult situation in the face one can see frequently in daily life. great difficulties seem to appall some people. they hate so much to believe a disaster possible, they fear so much to let themselves or others realize that a danger is impending, they are so afraid that other people will think them "nervous," and they shrink so from recommending measures that would cause great exertions or great expenditures, that they are very prone to believe and say that there is no especial danger, and that whatever danger there may be, can be obviated by measures that are easy and cheap to carry out. if we yield to this feeling, we are guilty of moral cowardice, and we vitiate all the results of all our labors. we _must_ make a correct estimate of the situation--or rather we must estimate the situation to be as grave as it is--or our preparations will be of no avail. if we estimate the situation too gravely, we may spend more money and time on our preparations than is quite needed, and our preparations may be more than adequate. it may be that the preparations which prussia made before for war with france were more than adequate. in fact, it looks as if they were, in view of the extreme quickness with which she conquered france. but does any military writer condemn prussia for having made assurance too sure? _the value of superadequate preparation_.--no, on the contrary. the very reasons that make adequate preparation valuable make superadequate preparation even more valuable. the reason is very clear, as is shown by the table on page illustrating the progressive wasting of fighting forces, which the writer published in the _u. s. naval institute_ in an essay called "american naval policy," in april, .[*] [footnote *: i have recently been informed that lieutenant (now commander) j. v. chase, u. s. n., arrived at practically the same results in by an application of the calculus; and that he submitted them to the u. s. naval war college in a paper headed, "sea fights: a mathematical investigation of the effect of superiority of force in."--b. a. f.] table i ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.| | | | | | | | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------| |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at beginning b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in st a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of st period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in nd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of nd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in rd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of rd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | | | |etc.| | | | | | | | | |total damage done by a| | | | | | | | | | | | b| | | | | | | | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- these tables grew out of an attempt to ascertain how the values of two contending forces change as the fight goes on. the offensive power of the stronger force is placed in the beginning at , in each case, and the offensive power of the weaker force at , , , , , , , , and . these values are, of course, wholly arbitrary, and some may say imaginary; but, as they are intended merely to show the comparative strength of the two forces, they are a logical measure, because numerical; there is always some numerical factor that expresses the comparative value of two contending forces, even though we never know what that numerical factor is. two forces with offensive powers of , and respectively may mean , men opposed to men of equal average individual fighting value, commanded by officers of equal fighting ability; or it may mean ships opposed to like ships, manned by officers and men of equal numbers and ability; or it may mean two forces of equal strength, as regards number of men, ships, and guns, but commanded by officers whose relative ability is as , to . it may be objected here that it is ridiculous so to compare officers, because the ability of officers cannot be so mathematically tabulated. this, of course, is true; but the fact that we are unable so to compare officers is no reason for supposing that the abilities of officers, especially officers of high position, do not affect quantitatively the fighting value of the forces they command; and the intention in mentioning this factor is simply to show that the relative values of the forces, as indicated in these tables, are supposed to include all the factors that go to make them up. another convention, made in these tables, is that every fighting force is able to inflict a damage in a given time that is proportional to the force itself; that a force of , , for instance, can do twice as much damage in a given time as a force of can; also that a force can do an amount of damage under given conditions that is proportional to the time in which it is at work; that it can do twice as much damage in two hours, for instance, as in one hour, _provided the conditions for doing damage remain the same_. another convention follows from these two conventions, and it is that there is a period of time in which a given force can destroy a force equal, say, to one-tenth of itself under certain conditions; that there is some period of time, for instance, in which, under given conditions, , men can disable men, or ships disable ship, or guns silence gun. in the conflicts supposed to be indicated in these tables, this period is the one used. it will be plain that it is not necessary to know how long this period is, and also that it depends upon the conditions of the fight. in table i, it is supposed that the chance of hitting and the penetrability are the same to each contestant. in other words, it is assumed that the _effective targets_ presented by the two forces are alike in the sense that, if the two targets are hit at the same instant by like projectiles, equal injuries will be done. in other words, if each contestant at a given instant fires, say a -inch shell, the injury done to one will be the same as that done to the other; not proportionately but quantitatively. for instance, if one force has ships and the other has like ships, all the ships being so far apart that a shot aimed at one ship will probably not hit another, the conditions supposed in table i, column , are satisfied; the chances of hitting are identical for both contestants, and so is the damage done at every hit. table i supposes that the chance of hitting and damaging does not change until the target is destroyed. as the desire of the author is now to show the advantage of having a superadequate force, the following table has been calculated to show the effect of forces of different size in fighting an enemy of known and therefore constant size: table ii ----------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col. |col. |col. | |--------------------------------------------------|------|------|------| |value of offensive power at beginning. a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in st period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of st period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in nd period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of nd period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in rd period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of rd period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | |damage done in th period by a | | | | | b | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power at end of th period a | | | | | b | | | | ----------------------------------------------------------------------- it will be noted that if our force is superior to the enemy's in the ratio of , to , , the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the ratio of , to , , in the proportion of to ; and that if it is superior in the ratio of , to , the fight will last longer than if it is superior in the ratio of to , in the proportion of to . we also see that we should, after reducing the enemy to , have forces represented by , , , and , , respectively, and suffer losses represented by , , and , respectively. now the difference in fighting forces cannot be measured in units of material and personnel only, though they furnish the most accurate general guide. two other factors of great importance enter, the factors of skill and morale. skill is perhaps more of an active agent, and morale is perhaps more of a passive agent, like the endurance of man or the strength of material; and yet in some battles morale has been a more important factor in attaining victory than even skill. it is not vital to this discussion which is the more important; but it is vital to realize clearly that skill and morale are not to be forgotten, when we calculate how many and what kinds of material and personnel units we must provide for a war; and inasmuch as we cannot weigh morale and skill, or even be sure in most cases as to which side will possess them in the superior degree, we are forced in prudence to assume that the enemy may possess them in a superior degree, and that therefore we should secure superadequacy in units of personnel and material; not so much to win victory with the minimum of loss to ourselves, as simply to avert disaster. the present war shows us that the factors of skill and morale, while independent of each other, are closely linked together, and react upon each other. nothing establishes a good morale more than does the knowledge of exceeding skill; and nothing promotes skill more than does an enthusiastic and firm morale. but superadequateness of preparation has a value greater than in merely insuring victory with minimum loss to ourselves, in case war comes, because it exerts the most potent of all influences in preventing war, since it warns an enemy against attacking. at the present day, the laws of victory and defeat are so well understood, and the miseries resulting from defeat are so thoroughly realized, that no civilized country will voluntarily go to war, except for extraneous reasons, if it realizes that the chances of success are small. and as the cumulative consequences of defeats are also realized, and as no country is apt to assume that the morale and skill of its forces are measurably greater than those of a probable antagonist, no country and no alliance is apt to provoke war with a nation whose armed forces are superior in number of units of personnel and material; unless, of course, the nation is markedly inferior in morale and skill, as the persians were to the legions of alexander. it is often insisted that superadequacy in armed force tends to war instead of peace, by inducing a country to make war itself; that the very principles which deter a weak country from attacking a strong country tend to make a strong country attack a weak one. there is some truth in this, of course, and history shows many cases of strong countries deliberately attacking weak ones for the purpose of conquest. analysis of wars, however, in which strong countries have done this, shows that as a rule, the "strong" country was one which was strong in a military sense only; and that the "weak" country was a country which was weak only militarily, but which was potentially strong in that it was possessed of wealth in land and goods. most of the great conquests of history were made by such "strong" over such "weak" countries. such were notably those wars by which persia, assyria, egypt, greece, rome, and spain gained their pre-eminence; and such were the wars by which they later fell. such were the wars of ghenghis khan, tamerlane, mahomet, and napoleon; such were the wars by which most tribes grew to be great nations, and by which as nations they subsequently fell. no greater cause of war has ever existed than a disproportion between countries or tribes of such a character that one was rich and weak, while the other was strong and poor. nations are much like individuals--and not very good individuals. highwaymen who are poor and strong organize and drill for the purpose of attacking people who are rich and weak; and while one would shrink from declaring that nations which are poor and strong do the same, it may nevertheless be stated that they have often been accused of doing so, and that some wars are explainable on that ground and on none other. the wars of cæsar in gaul and britain do not seem to fall in this category, and yet they really do; for rome was poor in julius cæsar's day; and while gaul and britain were not rich in goods, they were rich in land, and rome craved land. of course, there have been wars which were not due to deliberate attacks by poor and strong countries on rich and weak countries; wars like our wars of the revolution, and with mexico, our war of the rebellion, and our spanish war, and many others in which various nations have engaged. the causes of many wars have been so numerous and so complex that the true cause is hard to state; but it may be stated in general that wars in which countries that were both rich and strong, as great britain and france are now, have deliberately initiated an aggressive war are few and far apart. the reason seems to be that countries which are rich tend to become not militaristic and aggressive, but effeminate and pacific. the access of luxury, the refinements of living that the useful and the delightful arts produce, and the influence of women, tend to wean men from the hardships of military life, and to engender a distaste for the confusion, bloodshed, and "horrors" of war. for this reason, the rich countries have shown little tendency to aggression, but a very considerable tendency to invite aggression. physical fighting among nations bears some resemblance to physical fighting among men, in that rich nations and rich men are apt to abstain from it, unless they are attacked; or unless they think they are attacked, or will be. the fact of being rich has the double influence of removing a great inducement to go to war, and of causing a distaste for it. for all of the reasons given above, it would seem advisable when making an "estimate of the situation," in preparation for war, to estimate it as gravely as reasonable probability will permit. the tendency of human nature is to estimate it too lightly; but in matters of possible war, "madness lies that way." this seems to mean that in preparing plans for additions to the fleet for war, we should estimate for the worst condition that is reasonably probable. in the united states, this means that we should estimate for a sudden attack by a powerful fleet on our atlantic coast; and, as such an attack would occasion a tremendous temptation to any foe in asia to make a simultaneous attack in the pacific, we must estimate also for sending a large fleet at the same time on a cruise across the pacific ocean. this clearly means that our estimate must include putting into the atlantic and pacific all the naval vessels that we have, fully manned with fully drilled crews; and adding besides all the vessels from civil life that will be needed. the vessels taken from civil life will be mostly from the merchant service, and will be for such auxiliary duties as those of hospital ships, supply ships, fuel ships, and ammunition ships, with some to do duty as scouts. for the purposes of the united states, therefore, the office of naval strategy in planning additions to our fleet for war, is to make a grave estimate of the naval requirements in both the atlantic and the pacific; to divide the total actual and prospective naval force between the atlantic and the pacific in such a way as shall seem the wisest; to assign duties in general to each force; and then to turn over to logistics the task of making the quantitative calculations, and of performing the various acts, which will be necessary to carry out the decisions made. objection may be made to the phrase just used--"to divide the total force," because it is an axiom with some that one must never divide his total force; and the idea of dividing our fleet, by assigning part to the atlantic and part to the pacific, has been condemned by many officers, the present writer among them. this is an illustration of how frequently phrases are used to express briefly ideas which could not be expressed fully without careful qualifications and explanations that would necessitate many words; and it shows how carefully one must be on his guard, lest he put technical phrases to unintended uses, and attach incorrect meanings to them. as a brief technical statement, we may say, "never divide your force"; but when we say this, we make a condensed statement of a principle, and expect it to be regarded as such, and not as a full statement. the full statement would be: "in the presence of an active enemy, do not so divide your force that the enemy could attack each division in detail with a superior force." napoleon was a past master in the art of overwhelming separate portions of an enemy's force, and he understood better than any one else of his time the value of concentration. and yet a favorite plan of his was to detach a small part of his force, to hold a superior force of the enemy in check for--say a day--while he whipped another force of the enemy with his main body. he then turned and chastised the part which had been held in check by the small detachment, and prevented from coming to the relief of the force that he attacked first. when we say, then, that strategy directs how our naval force should be divided between the atlantic and the pacific, this does not mean that strategy should so divide it that both divisions would be confronted with forces larger than themselves. it may mean, however, that strategy, in order that the force in one ocean shall be sufficient, may be compelled to reduce the force in the other ocean almost to zero. some may say that, unless we are sure that our force--say in the atlantic--is superadequate, we ought to reduce the force in the pacific to actual zero. maybe contingencies might arise for which such a division would be the wisest; but usually such a condition exists that one force is so large that the addition to it of certain small units would increase the force only microscopically; whereas those small units would be of material value elsewhere--say in protecting harbors from the raids of small cruisers. practically speaking, therefore, strategy would divide our naval force into atlantic and pacific fleets, but those fleets might be very unequal in size, owing to the vastly greater commercial and national interests on our atlantic coast, and the greater remoteness of probable enemies on our pacific coast. in estimating the work to be done by the u. s. atlantic fleet, three general objects suggest themselves: . to repel an attack made directly on our atlantic continental coast. . to repel an expedition striving to establish a base in the caribbean, preliminary to an attack on our atlantic continental coast or on the panama canal. . to make an expedition to a distant point, to prevent the occupation of territory by a foreign government in the south atlantic or the pacific. _first object_.--to repel an attack made directly on the atlantic coast, the plan must provide for getting the needed additions to the fleet with the utmost despatch. owing to the keen appreciation by european nations of the value of secrecy and despatch, any attack contemplated by one of them on our atlantic coast would be prepared behind the curtain, and nothing about its preparation would be allowed to be reported to the outside world until after the attacking force had actually sailed. for the force to reach our shores, not more than two weeks would be needed, even if the fleet stopped at mid-atlantic islands to lay in fuel. it is very doubtful if the fact of stopping there would be allowed to be reported, as the commander-in-chief could easily take steps to prevent it. it is possible that merchant steamers might meet the fleet, and report the fact by radio, but it is not at all certain. a great proportion of the steamers met would willingly obey an order not to report it, or even to have their radio apparatus deranged; either because of national sympathy, or because the captain was "insulted with a very considerable bribe." the probability, therefore, would be that we should hear of the departure of the fleet from europe, and then hear nothing more about it until it was met by our scouts. this reasoning shows that to carry out the plans of strategy, logistics would have to provide plans and means to execute those plans, whereby our existing fleet, plus all the additions which strategy demanded, would be waiting at whatever points on the ocean strategy might indicate, before the coming enemy would reach those points. in other words, logistics must make and execute such plans that all the fleet which strategy demands will be at the selected points in less than two weeks from the time the enemy leaves the shores of europe. of course, the conditions will not necessarily be such that strategy will demand that all our reserve ships, especially the oldest ships, shall go out to sea with the active fleet, ready to engage in battle. maybe some of them will be found to be so slow and equipped with such short-range guns, that they would be an embarrassment to the commander-in-chief, instead of an assistance. unless it is clear, however, that any ship, especially a battleship, _would be an embarrassment_, her place is clearly with the fighting fleet. the issue of the battle cannot be known in advance; and as everything will depend upon that issue, no effort and no instrument should be spared that can assist in gaining victory. and even if the older ships might not be of material assistance in the early stages of a battle, they would do no harm because they could be kept out of the way, if need be. in case either side gains a conclusive victory at once, the older ships will do neither good nor harm; but in case a decisive result is not at once attained, and both sides are severely damaged, the old ships, held in reserve, may then come in fresh and whole, like the reserve in land engagements, and add a fighting force which at that time will be most important and may be decisive. probably some of the ships will be too old, however, to fill places of any value in the active fleet. these should be fully manned and equipped, however, for there will be many fields of usefulness for them. one field will be in assisting the land defenses, in protecting the mouths of harbors and mine-fields, in defending submarine bases, and acting as station ships in the coast-defense system. _second object_.--to repel an enemy expedition, striving to establish a base in the caribbean, preparation would have to be made for as prompt a mobilization as possible; for although the threat of invasion of our coast would not carry with it the idea of such early execution as would a direct attack on new york, yet the actual establishment of a base so near our shores would give such advantages to a hostile nation for a future invasion, that measures to prevent it should be undertaken with the utmost possible thoroughness and despatch; because the operation of establishing a base involves many elements of difficulty that an active defender can hinder by aeroplane attacks, etc.; whereas, after a base has once been established and equipped with appropriate defenses, attacks upon it are much less productive of results. the endeavor to establish a base and the opposing effort to prevent it, will offer many opportunities for excellent work on both sides. practically all the elements of naval force will be engaged, and events on the largest possible scale may be expected. the operations will naturally be more extended both in time and distance than in the case of a direct attack upon our coast, and therefore the task of logistics will be greater. actual battle between large forces; minor engagements among aircraft, scouts, submarines, and destroyers; attacks on the train of the invader--even conflicts on shore--will be among the probabilities. _third object_.--to send a large expedition to carry out naval operations in far distant waters--in the south atlantic, for instance, to prevent the extension of a monarchical government in south america, or in the western pacific to defend our possessions there--calls for plans involving more logistical calculation and execution, but permitting a more leisurely procedure. the distances to be traversed are so great, the lack of bases is so distinct and so difficult to remedy, and the impossibility of arriving in time to prevent the seizing of land by any hostile expedition is so evident, that they combine to necessitate great thoroughness of preparation and only such a measure of despatch as can be secured without endangering thoroughness. whether the projected expedition shall include troops, the conditions at the time must dictate. troops with their transports will much complicate and increase the difficulties of the problem, and they may or may not be needed. the critical results can be accomplished by naval operations only; since nothing can be accomplished if the naval part of the expedition fails to secure the command of the sea; and the troops cannot be landed until it has been secured, unless the fact of securing it can safely be relied on in advance. for these reasons, the troops may be held back until the command of the sea has been secured, and then sent out as an independent enterprise. this would seem the more prudent procedure in most cases, since one successful night attack on a group of transports by an active enemy might destroy it altogether. but whether a military expedition should accompany the fleet, or follow a few hundred miles behind, or delay starting until command of the sea has been achieved, it is obvious that the logistic calculations and executive measures for sending a modern fleet to a very distant place, and sustaining it there for an indefinite period, must be of the highest order of difficulty. the difficulty will be reduced in cases where there is a great probability of being able to secure a base which would be able to receive large numbers of deep-draft ships in protected waters, to repair ships of all classes that might be wounded in battle, and to store and supply great quantities of ammunition, food, and fuel. no expedition of such magnitude has ever yet been made--though some of the expeditions of ancient times, such as the naval expedition of persia against greece, b. c. , and the despatch of the spanish armada in more recent days, may have been as difficult, considering the meagreness of the material and engineering resources of those epochs. but even if no military force accompanies the expedition, the enormous quantities of fuel, supplies, ammunition, medical stores, etc., that will be required, especially fuel; the world-wide interest that will be centred on the expedition; the international importance attaching to it; and the unspeakable necessity that the plans shall underestimate no difficulty and overlook no factor, point with a long and steady finger at the necessity of attacking this problem promptly and very seriously, and of detailing the officers and constructing the administrative machinery needed to make the calculations and to execute the measures that the calculations show to be required. _static defense of the coast_.--but besides the mobile fleet which is a nation's principal concern, strategy requires that for certain points on the coast, where large national and commercial interests are centred, arrangements shall be made for what may be termed a "static defense," by vessels, mine-fields, submarines, aircraft, etc., assigned as permanent parts of the defense of these points, analogous to forts on the land. the naval activities of this species of defense will centre on the mine-fields which it is a great part of their duty to defend. to guard these, and to get timely information of the coming of any hostile force or raiding expedition, strategy says we must get our eyes and ears well out from the land. to do this, water craft and aircraft of various kinds are needed; and they must be not only sufficiently numerous over each area to scout the waters thoroughly, but they must be adapted to their purpose, manned by adequate and skilful crews, and organized so as to act effectively together. the work of this patrol system is not to be restricted, however, to getting and transmitting information. certain of the craft must be armed sufficiently to drive off hostile craft, trying to drag or countermine the defensive mine-fields; some must be able to add to the defensive mine-fields by planting mines, and some must be able to pilot friendly ships through the defensive mine-fields; others still must be able to countermine, drag, and sweep for any offensive mines that the enemy may plant. vessels for this patrol work do not have to be very large; in fact, for much of the work in the mine-fields, it were better if they were small, by reason of the ability of small vessels to turn in restricted spaces. it would seem that for the patrol service, the vessels of the revenue marine and lighthouse service (coast guard) are ideally adapted; but, of course, there are only a few in total. these would have to be supplemented by small craft of many kinds, such as tugs, fast motor-boats, fishing-boats, and trawlers. to find men competent to man such vessels and do the kind of work required would not be so difficult as to get men competent to man the more distinctive fighting ships. good merchant sailors, fishermen, and tugboat men would fit into the work with considerable ease, and in quite a short time. strategy declares, however, that a coast guard may be needed a very short time after war breaks out; and that the vessels and the men, with all the necessary equipment and all the necessary organization and training, should be put into actual operation beforehand. not only the fleet, however, but all the bureaus and offices of the navy department, all the navy-yards, and an the radio stations, recruiting stations, hydrographic offices, training stations, and agencies for securing information from foreign countries, will have to pass instantly from a peace basis to a war basis. to do these things quickly and correctly many preliminaries must be arranged; but if the general staff prepares good plans beforehand, arranges measures which will insure that the plans shall be promptly carried out, and holds a few mobilization drills to test them, the various bureaus and offices in the department can do the rest. if the fires have all been lighted, the engine gotten ready, and the boilers filled in time, the engineer may open the throttle confidently, when the critical time arrives, for the engine will surely do its part. but if the proper plans have not been made and executed, the sudden outbreak of war, in which any country becomes involved with a powerful naval country, will create confusion on a scale larger than any that the world has ever seen, and compared with which pandemonium would be a quaker meeting. a realization of facts will come to that country, and especially to the naval authorities, that will overwhelm them with the consciousness of their inability to meet the crisis marching toward them with swift but unhurried tread--confident, determined, unescapable. fear of national danger and the sense of shame, hopelessness and helplessness will combine to produce psychological effects so keen that even panic will be possible. officers in high places at sea and on shore will send telegrams of inquiry and suggestion; civilians in public and private station will do the same. no fitting answers can be given, because there will be no time for reflection and deliberation. the fact that it would be impossible to get the various additions to the fleet and the patrol services ready in time, and the consciousness that it would be useless to do any less, will tend to bring on a desperate resolve to accept the situation and let the enemy do his worst. the actual result, however, will probably be like the result of similar situations in the past; that is, some course of action will be hastily decided on, not in the reasoned-out belief that it can accomplish much, but with the feeling that action of any kind will relieve the nervous tension of the public by giving an outlet for mental and physical exertion and will, besides, lend itself to self-encouragement, and create a feeling that proper and effective measures are being taken. such conditions, though on a much smaller scale, are familiar to naval officers and are suggested by the supposititious order "somebody do something"; and we frequently see people placed in situations in which they do not know what to do, and so they do--not nothing, but anything; though it would often be wiser to do nothing than to do the thing they do do. many of the inane remarks that people make are due to their finding themselves in situations in which they do not know what to say, but in which they feel impelled to say "something." now what kind of "something" would be done under the stimulus of the outbreak of a war for which a country had not laid its plans? can any worse situation be imagined--except the situation that would follow when the enemy arrived? the parable of the wise and foolish virgins suggests the situation, both in the foolishness of the unpreparedness and in the despair when the consequent disaster is seen approaching. in nearly all navies and armies, until the recent enormous increase in all kinds of material took place, the work of getting a navy ready for war in personnel and material was comparatively simple. this does not mean that it was easier then than now; because the facilities for construction, transportation, communication, and accounting were much less than now; but it does mean that the actual number of articles to be handled was much less, and the number of kinds of articles was also much less; and it also means that the various mechanical improvements, while they have facilitated construction, transportation, communication, and accounting, have done so for every nation; so that none of the competing navies have had their labors expedited or made less. on the contrary, the very means devised and developed for expediting work is of the nature of an instrument; and in order to use that instrument successfully, one has to study it and practise with it; so that the necessity for studying and practising with the instrument has added a new and difficult procedure to those before existing. fifty years ago the various mechanisms of naval warfare were few, and those few simple. in our navy department the work of supplying those mechanisms was divided among several bureaus, and each bureau was given the duty and the accompanying power of supplying its particular quota. the rapid multiplication, during the past fifty years, of new mechanisms, and new kinds of mechanisms; the increased expense of those mechanisms compared with that of former mechanisms; the increased size and power of vessels, guns, and engines; the increased size and complexity of the utilities in navy-yards for handling them; the necessity for providing and using means and methods for despatching the resulting "business" speedily, and for guarding against mistakes in handling the multiplicity of details--the increase, in brief, in the number, size, and kinds of things that have to be done in preparation, has brought about not only more labor in doing those things by the various bureaus assigned to do them, but has brought about even more imperiously the demand for means whereby the central authority shall be assured that each bureau is doing its work. and it has brought about more imperiously still a demand that a clear conception shall be formed first of what must be done, and second of the maximum time that can be allowed for doing it. clearly, the forming of a correct conception should not be expected of men not trained to form it; clearly, for instance, mere knowledge of electricity and mere skill in using electrical instruments cannot enable a man to devise radio apparatus for naval use; a certain amount of knowledge of purely naval and nautical matters is needed in addition. clearly, the concept as to the kind of performance to be required of radio apparatus is not to be expected of a mere technician, but is to be expected of a strategist--and equally the ability to design, construct, and supply the apparatus is not to be expected of a strategist, but it is to be expected of a technician. a like remark may be made concerning any mechanism--say a gun, a torpedo, or an instrument, or a vessel of any kind. the strategist, by studying the requirements of probable war, concludes that a certain kind of thing is needed; and the technician supplies it, or does so to the best of his ability. the statement thus far made indicates a division of work into two sharply defined departments; and, theoretically, such a division does exist. this does not mean, however, that the strategist and the technician should work independently of each other. such a procedure would result in the strategist demanding things the technician could not supply, and in the technician supplying things the strategist did not want, under a mistaken impression as to what the strategist wanted. the fullest and most intimate understanding and co-operation must exist between the strategist and the technician, as it must equally between the architect and the builder of a house. from an appreciation of such facts as these, every great navy department, except that of the united states, has developed a general staff, which studies what should be done to prepare for passing from a state of peace to a state of war; which informs the minister at the head of the department what things should be done, and is given power to provide that the various bureaus and offices shall be able to do them when war breaks. this is the scheme which all the navy departments, except the american, have devised, to meet the sudden and violent shock of the outbreak of a modern war. _no other means has yet been devised_, and no other means is even forecasted. the means is extremely simple in principle, but complex beyond the reach of an ordinary imagination in detail. it consists simply in writing down a digest of all the various things that are to be done, dividing the task of doing them among the various bureaus and offices that are authorized by law to do them, and then seeing that the bureaus shall be able to do them in the time allowed. the best way of ascertaining if the bureaus are able to do them is to mobilize--to put into commission and send out to sea all the craft that will be needed, fully equipped with a trained personnel and with a well-conditioned material; and then direct the commander-in-chief to solve a definite strategic problem--say to defend the coast against a hypothetical enemy fleet--the solution including tactical games by day and night. before attempting the solution of a strategic problem by an entire naval force, however, it is usual to hold mobilization exercises of a character less complete, in the same way that any course of training begins with drills that are easy and progresses to drills that are difficult. the simplest of all the preparative drills--if drills they correctly can be called--is the periodical reporting, once a month, or once a quarter, by each bureau and office, of its state of readiness; the report to be in such detail as experience shows to be the best. in the days when each bureau's preparation consisted of comparatively few things to do, the chief of that bureau could be relied on to do the things required to be done by his bureau; and his oral assurance to the secretary that--say all the ships had enough ammunition, or that adequate provision had been made for coal, or that there were enough enlisted men--would fulfil all requirements. but in the past fifty years, the requirements have increased a hundredfold, while the human mind has remained just as it was. so it has seemed necessary to institute a system of periodical preparation reports, to examine them carefully, and to use all possible vigilance, lest any item be forgotten or any work done by two bureaus that ought to be done by only one. who should examine the reports? naturally the same persons as decide what should be done. the same studies and deliberations that fit a person to decide what is needed, fit him to inspect the product that is offered to supply the need; not only to see if it comes up to the specifications, but also to decide whether or not any observed omission is really important; to decide whether, in view of certain practical difficulties, the specifications may be modified; and also to decide whether certain improvements suggested by any bureau should or should not be adopted. this procedure may seem to put the strategy officers "over" the technical officers, to put a lieutenant-commander on the general staff "over" a rear admiral who is chief of bureau; but such an idea seems hardly justified. in any well-designed organization relative degrees of official superiority are functions of rank, and of nothing else; superiority in rank must, of course, be recognized, for the reason that when on duty together the junior must obey the senior. but even this superiority is purely official; it is a matter of position, and not a matter of honor. all the honor that is connected with any position is not by reason of the position itself, but by reason of the honorable service which a man must have rendered in order to attain it, and which he must continue to render in order to maintain it. so, in a navy department, the general staff officers cannot be "over" the bureau officers, unless by law or regulation certain of the staff are made to rank over certain bureau officers. a procedure like this would seem to be unnecessary, except in the case of the chief of staff himself, who might, for the purpose of prompt administration, be placed by law over the bureau chiefs. the importance of the question, however, does not rest on a personal basis, but a national basis. it makes no difference to the nation whether smith is put above jones, or jones above smith; and in all discussions of national matters it is essential to bear in mind clearly not only that national questions must not be obscured by the interjection of the personal element, but also that great vigilance is needed to prevent it. for the reason that questions of the salaries of government officials have been settled in advance, questions of personal prestige and authority are more apt to intrude themselves among them than among men in civil life, whose main object is to "make a living"--and as good a living as they can. in the long struggle that has gone on in the united states navy department between the advocates and the opponents of a general staff, the personal element has clouded the question--perhaps more than any other element. not only in the department itself, but in congress, the question of how much personal "power" the general staff would have has been discussed interminably--as though the personal element were of any importance whatever. such an attitude toward "power" is not remarkable when held by civilians, but it is remarkable when held by men who have had a military or naval training. of course, there is an instinct in all men to crave power; but it is not recognized as an instinct wholly worthy. it is associated in most men's minds with a desire for material possessions, such as money or political position, and not with such aspirations as a desire for honor. in other words, a strong desire for wealth or power, while natural and pardonable, is considered a little sordid; while a desire for honor, or for opportunity to do good service, is held to be commendable. so, when public officials, either military or civilian, condemn a measure because it will give somebody "power," the reason given seems to be incomplete, unless a further reason is given which states the harm that would be done by conferring the "power." military and naval men exercise "power" from the beginning of their careers until their careers are closed; and they exercise it under the sane and restraining influence of responsibility; without which influence, the exercise of power is unjustifiable, and under which influence the exercise of power is a burden--and oftentimes a heavy one. that men trained as military men are trained, should aspire to power for power's own sake, is a little hard to understand--unless it be confessed that the person desiring the power appreciates its pleasing features more than its responsibilities, and regards its duties more lightly than its glories. few men, even those who shoulder responsibility the most courageously, desire responsibility for its own sake--and so the fact of a man ardently desiring "power" seems a good reason for withholding power from him. and what is "power," in the sense in which officials, both military and civilian, use the word? is it ability to do good service, or is it ability to bestow favors in order that favors may be received, to give orders to others coupled with authority to enforce obedience, or to take revenge for injuries received or fancied? of course, "power" is ability to do all these things, good and bad. but if a man desires power simply to do good service, and if he holds a highly conscientious view of the accompanying duties and responsibilities, will he crave "power" as much as some men seem to do? it seems fundamental, then, that any strategic plan for preparing the navy department for war should be framed with a strong endeavor to leave out the personal element, and should regard national usefulness only. if this be done successfully, and if good selections be made of the personnel to do it, it will be found that the members of the personnel will think no more about their "power" than does an officer of the deck while handling a battleship in fleet formation during his four hours on the bridge. in preparing the department for war, one would be in danger of being overwhelmed by the enormousness and the complexity of the task, unless he bore in mind continuously that _it is only when we get into details that any matter becomes complex_; and therefore that if we can get a clear idea of the whole subject, the principles that underlie it, and the major divisions into which it naturally is divided, we can then make those divisions and afterward subdivide those divisions, and later divide the subdivisions; so that the whole subject will seem to fall apart as a fowl does under the hands of a skilful carver. the divisions and subdivisions of the subject having been made, the remaining task, while onerous, will be largely a matter of copying and of filling in blank forms. as all navy departments have means regulated by law such that the actual executive work of recruiting, constructing, and supplying the necessary personnel and material shall be done by certain bureaus and offices, strategy does not need executive power, except for forcing the bureaus and offices to do the necessary work--should such forcing become necessary. strategy being the art of being a general (_strategos_), one cannot conceive of it as bereft of executive power, since we cannot conceive of a general exercising generalship without having executive power. it is true that strategy occupies itself mainly with planning--but so does a general; and it is also true that strategy itself does not make the soldiers march, but neither does a general; it is the colonels and captains and corporals who make the soldiers march. the general plans the campaign and arranges the marches, the halts, the bivouacs, provisions, ammunition, etc., through his logistical officers, and they give the executive officers general instructions as to how to carry out the general's plans. strategy without executive functions would be like a mind that could think, but was imprisoned in a body which was paralyzed. of course, strategy should have executive functions for the purposes of strategy only; under the guidance of policy and to execute policy's behests. policy is the employer, and strategy the employee. chapter xi naval bases the nature of naval operations necessitates the expenditure of fuel, ammunition, and supplies; wear and tear of machinery; fatigue of personnel; and a gradual fouling of the bottoms of the ships. in case actual battles mark the operations, the expenditure of stored-up energy of all kinds is very great indeed, and includes not only damage done to personnel and material by the various agencies of destruction, but actual loss of vessels. to furnish the means of supplying and replenishing the stored-up energy required for naval operations is the office of naval bases. a naval base capable of doing this for a large fleet must be a very great establishment. in such a naval base, one must be able to build, dock, and repair vessels of all kinds, and the mechanisms needed in those vessels; anchor a large fleet in safety behind adequate military and naval protection; supply enough fuel, ammunition, and supplies for all purposes, and accommodate large reserves of material and personnel. inasmuch as a naval base is purely a means for expending energy for military purposes, and has no other cause for its existence, it is clear that it cannot be self-supporting. for this reason it is highly desirable that a naval base shall be near a great city, especially if that city be a large commercial and manufacturing centre. it is true that many large naval bases, such as malta and gibraltar are not near great cities; and it is true that most large naval bases have no facilities for building ships. but it is also true that few large naval bases fulfil all the requirements of a perfect naval base; in fact it is true that none do. the most obvious requirement of a naval base is a large sheet of sheltered water, in which colliers and oil-carriers may lie and give coal and oil to fighting craft, and in which those fighting craft may lie tranquilly at anchor, and carry on the simple and yet necessary repairs and adjustments to machinery that every cruising vessel needs at intervals. without the ability to fuel and repair, no fleet could continue long at work, any more than a man could do so, without food and the repairs which nature carries on in sleep. the coming of oil fuel and the consequent ease of fuelling, the practicability even of fuelling in moderate weather when actually at sea, subtract partially one of the reasons for naval bases; but they leave the other reasons still existent, especially the reasons connected with machinery repairs. the principal repair, and the one most difficult to furnish, is that given by docking in suitable docks. the size and expense of docks capable of carrying dreadnaughts and battle cruisers are so great, and their vulnerability to fire from ships and from aircraft is so extreme, that the matter of dry-docks is perhaps the most troublesome single matter connected with a naval base. the necessity of anchorage areas for submarines is a requirement of naval bases that has only recently been felt; and the present war shows a still newer requirement in suitable grounds for aircraft. the speed of aircraft, however, is so great that little delay or embarrassment would result if the camp for aircraft were not at the base itself. instead of the camp being on culebra, for instance, it might well be on porto rico. the extreme delicacy of aircraft, however, and the necessity for quick attention in case of injuries, especially injuries to the engine, demand a suitable base even more imperiously than do ships and other rugged things. that the vessels anchored in the base should be protected from the fire of ships at sea and from guns on neighboring shores is clear. therefore, even if a base be hidden from the sea and far from it as is the harbor of santiago, it must be protected by guns, or mines, or both; the guns being nearer to the enemy than are the ships in the waters of the base. an island having high bluffs, where large guns can be installed, and approached by gradually shoaling waters in which mines can be anchored, with deeper water outside in which submarines can operate, is desirable from this point of view. ability to store and protect large quantities of provisions is essential, and especially in the case of ammunition and high explosives. for storing the latter, a hilly terrain has advantages, since tunnels can be run horizontally into hills, where explosives can lie safe from attack, even attack from aircraft dropping bombs above them. naturally, the country that has led the world in the matter of naval bases is great britain; and the world at large has hardly yet risen to a realization of the enduring work that she has been quietly doing for two hundred years, in establishing and fortifying commodious resting-places for her war-ships and merchant ships in all the seas. while other nations have been devoting themselves to arranging and developing the interiors of their countries, great britain has searched all the oceans, has explored all the coasts, has established colonies and trading stations everywhere, and formed a network of intimate commercial relations which covers the world and radiates from london. to protect her commercial stations and her merchant ships from unfair dealings in time of peace, and from capture in time of war, and to threaten all rivals with defeat should they resort to war, great britain has built up the greatest navy in the world. and as this navy pervades the world, and as her merchant ships dot every sea and display great britain's ensign in every port, great britain has not failed to provide for their safety and support a series of naval stations that belt the globe. bases are of many kinds, and may be divided into many classes. an evident ground for division is that of locality in relation to the home country. looked at from this point of view, we may divide naval bases into two classes, home bases and distant bases. _home bases_.--a home base is, as its name implies, a base situated in the home country. the most usual type of the home naval base is the navy-yard, though few navy-yards can meet all the requirements of a naval base. the new york navy-yard, for instance, which is our most important yard, lacks three of the most vital attributes of a naval base, in that it has no means for receiving and protecting a large fleet, it cannot be approached by large ships except at high tide, and it could not receive a seriously injured battleship at any time, because the channel leading to it is too shallow. home bases that approach perfection were evidenced after the battle off the skagerak; for the wounded ships of both sides took refuge after the battle in protected bases, where they were repaired and refitted, and resupplied with fighting men and fuel. these bases seem to have been so located, so protected, and so equipped, as to do exactly what bases are desired to do; they were "bases of operations" in the best sense. the fleets of the opposing sides started from those bases as nearly ready as human means and foresight could devise, returned to them for refreshment after the operations had been concluded, and, during the operations, were based upon those bases. if the bases of either fleet had been improperly located, or inadequately protected or equipped, that fleet would not have been so completely ready for battle as, in fact, it was; and it could not have gone to its base for shelter and repairs so quickly and so surely as, in fact, it did. many illustrations can be found in history of the necessity for naval bases; but the illustration given by this battle of may is of itself so perfect and convincing, that it seems hardly necessary or even desirable to bring forward any others. the fact of the nearness to each other of the bases of the two contending fleets--the nearness of germany and great britain in other words--coupled with the nearness of the battle itself to the bases, and the fact that both fleets retired shortly afterward to the bases, bring out in clear relief the efficacy of bases; but nevertheless their efficacy would have been even more strongly shown if the battle had been near to the bases of the more powerful fleet, but far from the bases of the other fleet--as was the case at the battle, near tsushima, in the japan sea. of course the weaker fleet in the north sea battle would not have been drawn into battle under such conditions, because it would not have had a safe refuge to retreat to. it was the proximity of an adequate naval base, that could be approached through protected waters only, which justified the weaker fleet in dashing out and taking advantage of what seemed to be an opportunity. similarly, if the russian fleet in the japan sea had had a base near by, from which it had issued ready in all ways, and to which it could have retired as soon as the battle began to go against it, the russian disaster might not have occurred, and full command of the sea by the japanese might have been prevented. but there being no base or harbor of refuge, disaster succeeded disaster in a cumulative fashion, and the russian fleet was annihilated in deep water. if a naval base were lacking to the more powerful fleet, as was the case in the battle of manila, the effect would in many cases be but slight--as at manila. if, however, the more powerful fleet were badly injured, the absence of a base would be keenly felt and might entail disaster in the future, even though the more powerful fleet were actually victorious. the japanese fleet was practically victorious at the battle of august , near port arthur; but if it had not been able to refit and repair at a naval base, it would have met the russian fleet later with much less probability of success. mahan states that the three main requirements in a naval base are position, resources, and strength; and of these he considers that position is the most important; largely because resources and strength can be artificially supplied, while position is the gift of nature, and cannot be moved or changed. mahan's arguments seem to suggest that the bases he had in mind were bases distant from home, not home bases; since reference is continually made by him to the distance and direction of bases from important strategic points of actual or possible enemies. his arguments do not seem to apply with equal force to home bases, for the reason that home bases are intended primarily as bases from which operations are to start; secondarily as bases to which fleets may return, and only remotely as bases during operations; whereas, distant bases are intended as points from which operations may continually be carried on, during the actual prosecution of a war. the position of a home base, for instance, as referred to any enemy's coasts or bases, is relatively unimportant, compared with its ability to fit out a fleet; while, on the other hand, the position of distant bases, such as hong-kong, malta, or gibraltar, relatively to the coasts of an enemy, is vital in the extreme. it is the positions of these three bases that make them so valuable to their holders; placed at points of less strategic value, the importance of those bases would be strategically less. home bases are valuable mainly by reason of their resources. this does not mean that position is an unimportant factor; it does not mean, for instance, that a naval base would be valuable if situated in the adirondack mountains, no matter how great resources it might have. it does mean, however, that the "position" that is important for a home base is the position that the base holds relatively to large home commercial centres and to the open sea. new york, for instance, could be made an excellent naval base, mainly because of the enormous resources that it has and its nearness to the ocean. philadelphia, likewise, could be made valuable, though philadelphia's position relatively to deep water is far from good. "position," as used in this sense, is different from the "position" meant by mahan, who used the word in its strategic sense. the position of philadelphia relatively to deep water could be changed by simply deepening the channel of the delaware; but no human power could change the strategic position of malta or gibraltar. yet for even home bases, position, resources, and strength must be combined to get a satisfactory result; the "position" not being related to foreign naval bases, however, but to large industrial establishments, mainly in order that working men of various classes may be secured when needed. the requirements of work on naval craft are so discontinuous that steady employment can be provided for comparatively few men only; so that a sort of reservoir is needed, close at hand, which can be drawn up when men are needed, and into which men can be put back, whenever the need for them has ceased. and the same commercial and industrial conditions that assure a supply of skilled workers, assure a supply of provisions and all kinds of material as well. _distant bases_.--distant bases have two fields of usefulness which are distinct, though one implies the other; one field being merely that of supplying a fleet and offering a refuge in distress, and the other field being that of contributing thereby to offensive and defensive operations. no matter in which light we regard a distant naval base, it is clear that position, resources, and strength must be the principal factors; but as soon as we concentrate our attention on the operations that may be based upon it, we come to realize how strong a factor position, that is strategic position, is. the base itself is an inert collection of inert materials; these materials can be useful to the operations of a fleet that bases on it; but if the fleet is operating in the pacific, a base in the atlantic is not immediately valuable to it, no matter what strength and resources the base may have. the functions of a home base are therefore those that the name "home" implies; to start the fleet out on its mission, to receive it on its return, and to offer rest, refuge, and succor in times of accident and distress. the functions of a distant base concern more nearly the operations of a prolonged campaign. a distant base is more difficult to construct as a rule; largely because the fact of its distance renders engineering operations difficult and because the very excellence of its position as an outpost makes it vulnerable to direct attack and often to a concentration of attacks coming from different directions. if naval operations are to be conducted at considerable distance from home, say in the caribbean sea, distant bases are necessary, since without them, the fleet will operate under a serious handicap. under some conditions, a fleet operating in the caribbean without a base there, against an enemy that had established a satisfactory base, might have its normal fighting efficiency reduced per cent, or even more. a fleet is not a motionless fort, whose strength lies only in its ability to fire guns and withstand punishment; a fleet is a very live personality, whose ability to fight well--like a pugilist's--depends largely on its ability to move quickly and accurately, and to think quickly and accurately. the best pugilists are not usually the strongest men, though physical strength is an important factor; the best pugilists are men who are quick as well as strong, who see an advantage or a danger quickly, and whose eyes, nerves, and muscles act together swiftly and harmoniously. a modern fleet, filled with high-grade machinery of all kinds, manned by highly trained men to operate it, and commanded by officers fit to be intrusted with such responsibilities, is a highly developed and sensitive organism--and, like all highly developed and sensitive organisms, exists in a state of what may be called "unstable equilibrium." as pointed out in previous pages, the high skill needed to perform well any very difficult task can be gained only by great practice in overcoming difficulties and eliminating errors of many kinds; and when the difficulties are manifold and great, a comparatively small increase or decrease in the overcoming of them makes a great difference in the results attained. an interesting though possibly not very correct analogy is to be seen in the case of a polished surface; for we readily note that the more highly polished the surface is, the more easily it is sullied. another analogy may be found in the performance of a great pianist or violinist; for a very small failure in his skill for even an instant will produce a painful feeling that could not be produced by a much greater failure in an ordinary performer. another analogy is to be found in the case of a ship that is going at the upper limit of her speed; for a very minor failure of any part of her machinery will produce a much greater slowing than it would if her speed were slower. perhaps apologies are in order for dwelling so long on what may seem to some an academic question, but it does not seem to the writer to be academic at all. certainly, the "condition" of a pugilist, or a fleet, about to fight, is not an academic consideration; and if it is not, no matter which affects this condition can rightfully be considered academic. the whole usefulness of bases is due to their ability to put fleets into good fighting condition and to maintain them in it; and it seems a very proper and useful thing to note that the more highly trained a fleet is, and the more highly organized the various appliances the fleet contains, the more difference results from a falling off in the condition of its personnel and material. this shows the advantage of having a base as close to the place where a fight is going to happen as may be possible. this does not mean, of course, that a fleet should remain for long periods within its base; because a fleet, like any other practiser of any art, needs constant practice. it merely means that the closer the base is to the scene of the operations or the actual battle, the better "tuned up" the personnel and material will be. it also means that this consideration is of the highest practical importance. _advanced bases_.--the extreme desirability of having a base near the scene of operations, even if the base be only temporarily held, has led to the use of what are called "advanced bases." an excellent and modern illustration of an advanced base is the base which the japanese established at the elliot islands about sixty miles from port arthur, which the japanese were besieging. the russian fleet could issue from their base at port arthur whenever the russians wished, and return to it at will. while inside, until the japanese had landed and attacked them from the land side, the russians could make their preparations in security and leisure, and then go out. the japanese fleet, on the other hand, until they had established their base, were forced to remain under way at sea, and to accept action at the will of the russians; so that, although port arthur was besieged, the advantages of the offensive, to some extent, resided with the russians. the establishment of the base did not, of course, change the situation wholly; but it permitted a very considerable relaxation of vigilance and mental strain on the part of the japanese, and a considerable easement of the motive power of their ships. naturally, the japanese made arrangements whereby their heavy ships could remain in comparative tranquillity near the base, while destroyers and scouts of various kinds kept touch with port arthur, and notified the base by wireless of any probable sortie by the russian fleet. the temporary advanced base at the elliot islands was, as temporary advanced bases always must be, quite incomplete in every way as compared with the permanent bases at home. it fulfilled its mission, however, and was in fact as good a base as really was required. the strategic ability of the japanese was indicated quite early in the war by the promptness and skill with which they established this base. of course, all advanced bases are distant bases, but the words usually imply temporariness, as does in fact the word "advance." an instance of an advanced base that has been far from temporary is the island of jamaica, and another is the island of bermuda; another is malta, and still another is gibraltar. these bases form stepping-stones, by which great britain's navy may go by easy stages from one position to another, stopping at a base when desired, or going beyond it without stopping, secure in the knowledge that the base is "under her lee" in case of accident or distress. viewed from the standpoint of operations in an actual war, the strategic value of a certain position for a base is important, no matter whether the operations are offensive or defensive; and the same factors that make a position good for defensive operations make it good for offensive operations also. for instance, if we wish to send a fleet on a hostile expedition to a distant point, it is well to have a base on a salient as far out as practicable from the coast, in order that the fleet may be able to start, full of fuel and supplies, from a place near the distant point; and equally, if we are to receive an attack upon the coast, it is well to have a base far out, in order to embarrass the transit of the enemy toward our coast, by the threat--first against his flank, and later against his rear and his communications. naval bases looked at from this point of view resemble those forts that european nations place along their frontiers. it is true that any base placed at a salient has the weakness of all salients, in that fire can be concentrated on it from several directions; and a naval base has the added disadvantage of a more difficult withdrawal, if attacked by an overwhelming force, and a longer line of communications that has to be protected. but this weakness all distant bases have, from the fact that they are distant; and, naturally, the more distant they are, the more difficult it is to support them, because the longer are their lines of communications. distant naval bases, therefore, are vulnerable in a high degree; they are vulnerable both to direct attack and to an attack on their lines of communications; and the factors that help a base in one way injure it in another. if a naval base is placed on a rock, or a rugged little island that holds nothing else, and on which a hostile army could not land, it is very safe from land attack; whereas, if it is placed on a large and fertile island, on which an invading army could easily land, it is extremely vulnerable to land attack. but, on the other hand, the naval base on the inaccessible island could be starved out by simply breaking its lines of communications, while the naval base on the large and fertile island might be able to survive indefinitely, even though the communications were wholly ruptured. the establishment of any permanent distant naval base is a matter of great expense, even if the natural conditions are favorable. but favorable conditions have rarely existed; and the expense of establishing such bases as malta, gibraltar, and heligoland has been tremendous. an important consideration has been the fact that, unless the base were made so strong that it could not be taken, it might be better not to attempt to fortify it, on the theory that it would be better to let a poor naval base fall into the hands of the enemy than a good one. to this reasoning, the answer is usually made that no base can be made absolutely impregnable, and that sufficient defense will be provided if it makes the task and cost of capturing the base greater than the base is worth. this means simply that the more valuable the base is, the more money should be spent in defending it; and that _it is worse than useless to defend it by any means that is obviously too small, in proportion to its value_. it often happens that the places that have the best position are weak in strength and resources; a notable instance is gibraltar, another is culebra, and the most notable of all is guam. none of these places is fortunate in either resources or natural strength, though gibraltar was strong for the artillery of the time when the base was established there. in fact, it is hard to think of any place that combines in itself the three advantages of a fine strategical position, large resources, and great strength. the three attributes seem almost incompatible; for how can a base far distant from its home be well placed with reference to attacking the lines of communication of any enemy intending to attack the home coast, and yet have its own lines of communications safe? how can it have a sheet of water, just deep enough but not too deep to anchor a large fleet in, with all of its auxiliaries extensive enough to accommodate all the vessels and far enough from the sea to be safe from gun-fire, and yet be on an island so small and so rugged, that an enemy could not land troops near the base and capture it from the land side, as the japanese captured port arthur? the natural strategic advantages of a large and sheltered sheet of water seem to entail the disadvantages of a large island, or a continent. there seems only one way in which to solve the problem of where and how to establish a permanent naval base at a distant point, and that is the way in which the world's preceptor--great britain--has solved it; and the solution is to select a place that has already the advantage of position, and then add to it the artificial advantages of resources and military strength. this brief statement makes the matter seem a little too simple; and so it will have to be modified by adding that the mere fact of a place having a fine position is not quite sufficient, because the place must be of such a character that it is capable of having resources and strength added to it; a sharp pinnacle rock in the middle of the mediterranean, for instance, might have a fine strategic position, and yet be unavailable as a naval base. even here, however, we must pause to note that energy and will could do much toward making even a pinnacle rock a naval base; for we see the gigantic fortress of heligoland erected on what was little but a shoal; and we see the diminutive water areas of malta and gibraltar made to hold in safety the war-ships of the greatest navy in the world. despite the paramount importance of strategic position, we must not forget that a naval base should have sufficient military strength to be able to hold out for a long time against hostile operations, as many bases, notably gibraltar and port arthur, have done, without the assistance of the fleet. the german base at kiao-chau held out for more than two months in , without any external aid. during all the time of siege, even if surrender is ultimately to occur, the enemy's forces are prevented from being utilized elsewhere. this condition was clearly shown during the siege of port arthur, because the large force of japanese troops required to conduct the siege were urgently needed in manchuria--to which region they were sent as soon as port arthur fell. from this point of view, naval bases again look much like fortresses on the land; fortresses like metz and strasburg, that had to be subdued before an enemy could safely pass them. _strategic position of distant bases_.--since the strategic position of an outlying naval base is the principal factor that goes to make its value, it may be well to consider what elements make a strategic position good. to make the problem clear, let us take a concrete case, that of our own country, and consider what elements would constitute a good strategic position for a naval base of the united states, leaving out of consideration for the moment any questions of resources and military strength. in the case of a war with a nation that had only one naval home base, it is clear that the best position for our distant base would be one as close to the enemy's base as possible; because, if placed there, our fleet, if it were the more powerful, could do more to injure the enemy's fleet, or prevent its going out, than if placed at any point more distant from the enemy's base; and if it were less powerful, it could do more to cut the enemy's communications, because it could attack them at or near their source. a poor position would be one far away from both countries, and far away from the line joining them. in the case of a war between this country and norway, for instance, a very poor position for a naval base would be a spot near--say juan fernandez--in the south pacific. in case the enemy country has two home bases of equal importance, the best position for our base clearly would be one equidistant from them, and as near to each as practicable. if the distance from our base to a point half-way between the two bases is shorter than is the distance to it from either base, then a fleet at our base could probably prevent the junction of two forces issuing from those two bases--assuming, of course, that we had a proper system of scouting. our fleet would be able to operate on what are often called "interior lines"--a technical expression that has great efficacy in confusing a simple matter. it is also assumed that our fleet is considerably stronger than either of the two separated enemy forces; otherwise our case would be hopeless. if the two home bases of the enemy are unequal in importance, it would seem that our base should be nearer to the important base than to the other. more strictly speaking, it should be nearer to the base from which the larger force may be expected to come out. if the enemy country have three or more bases, from which parts of a fleet may be expected to come out, the question seems a little more complex; but nevertheless, since the first duty of our fleet would probably be to prevent junctions or a junction, of the separated parts of the enemy's fleet, the best position for our home base would be at a point about equally distant from them all, and as close to them as possible. in the wars between great britain and france in the early part of the nineteenth century, the base of the british fleet for operations on the western and northern coasts of france was as close to the enemy home bases as practicable--though the base was england itself. for operations on france's southern coast, the base was at gibraltar, or some mediterranean island. that any country should be able to hold a distant base close to the home base of a possible naval enemy might seem impossible, if we did not know that great britain holds bermuda and jamaica near to our own coast, and hong-kong actually inside of china, all far away from britain; besides malta and gibraltar in the mediterranean, nearer to the coasts of sometime enemies than to her own. that the united states should own a base far from her own coasts, and near those of other countries, might seem improbable, were it not for the fact that guam is such a base, and is so situated. it is true that guam is not strictly a naval base, because it is not so equipped or fortified; but we are thinking now of position only. in case the enemy country has several home bases, and it is impossible to have our distant base so near to them as to prevent the junction of parts of a fleet issuing from them, the value of the base is less than it otherwise would be. in this case, which is the one in which our country is actually concerned, because of its great distance from other countries, its value becomes merely the usual value attaching to a naval base; and the fact that the entire enemy fleet can operate as a unit, that it can divide into separate forces at will near its own shores, or send out detachments to prey on the long line of communications stretching from our distant base to that base's home, necessitates that the base be fortified in the strongest possible way, and provided with large amounts of supplies. its principal function in war would be to shorten the long trip that our vessels would have to make without refreshment, and therefore the length of their lines of communications, and to enable our vessels to arrive in enemy's waters in better condition of readiness for battle than would otherwise be the case. we have thus far considered the best position for an advanced naval base, in the case of operations against one country only. it seems clear that, if we are to consider operations against two countries separately, and at different times, we should be led to conclude that the case of each country should be decided individually; in the case of wars with norway and portugal, for instance, the best places for our two bases would be as close to the home bases of those countries as possible; and even in the case of fighting two simultaneously, the conclusion would be the same, if the two countries were in widely different directions from us--as are switzerland and china. if we consider the case of war against two contiguous countries simultaneously, however, it would seem better to have one base, situated similarly toward the home bases of the two countries as toward two different home bases in one country--since the two countries would be, in effect, allies; and their fleets would act in reality like separated portions of one fleet. as the united states possesses no island on the atlantic side which is nearer to foreign countries than to our own, and as our interests for the immediate future lie mostly on the atlantic side, it may be well now to apply the general principles just considered to the question of where is a naval base most urgently needed under actual conditions. imagining a war between us and some one european naval power, and imagining a war also between us and two or three allied european naval powers, and realizing the length of our atlantic and gulf coasts, extending from maine to panama, a glance at the map shows us that, apart from the home naval bases on our continental coasts, the position on american soil which is the closest to european bases is on the little island of culebra, which occupies a salient in the northeastern end of the caribbean sea.[*] [footnote *: the acquisition by the united states of the island of saint thomas, about miles east of culebra, if accomplished, will extend the salient just so much farther toward europe.] the only reason an enemy would have for entering the caribbean would be an intention to attack the panama canal region, or an intention to establish an advanced base, from which he could conduct more or less deliberate siege of our atlantic coast and cities. in either case, our fleet would be seriously handicapped if it had no adequate base in the caribbean; because its line of communications north would be exposed to the enemy's operations at all times; and seriously wounded american ships would have little chance of getting repairs; little chance even of making successfully the long trip to norfolk or new york. in case the enemy fleet should start from europe fully prepared in every way, we should be in ignorance of its intended destination; and as the enemy fleet would be stronger than ours (otherwise it would not start) it would doubtless be able to destroy our undefended station at guantanamo, seize some suitable place in the west indies, say the bay of samana, and then establish a base there, unless we had first seized and fortified all suitable localities; and the united states would then find itself in the anomalous position of being confronted near its own coasts with an enemy fleet well based for war, while her own fleet would not be based at all. not only would the enemy fleet be superior in power, but it would possess the strategical advantage, though far from its own shores. the situation, therefore, about a month after the foreign fleet left europe, would be that the caribbean sea would contain a hostile fleet which was not only superior to ours in power, but was securely resting on a base; while ours had no base south of norfolk, the other side of hatteras. our fleet would be in a position similar to that of the russian fleet when it rushed to its destruction in tsushirna straits, though not in so great a degree; because it would have had more recent docking and refitting in our home ports, and the personnel would be fresher. in case, however, we had a naval base strongly fortified and thoroughly equipped, at a salient in the caribbean region, say at culebra, and if our fleet were based upon it, a hostile fleet, even if it were considerably superior to our own, would hesitate to pass it and enter the caribbean, by reason of the continuous threat that the fleet would exert on its communications. even if the hostile fleet should pass culebra, and establish a base farther on, an american force based on culebra would continue to exert this threat on the communications between the hostile base and its mother country. an american base--say at guantanamo--would be very effective in embarrassing hostile operations _west_ of guantanamo, because it would be on the flank of the line of communications extending from europe; but it would be comparatively ineffective in embarrassing operations east of it, since the hostile line of communications would be protected from it by the interposition of its own main body; this interposition necessitating the despatch of defending forces around that main body. the coming hostile force would push before it all resistance, and leave the sea free for the passage of its auxiliaries and supplies. a defending force, operating from guantanamo, in endeavoring to prevent a hostile fleet from establishing a base to the _eastward_ of it, would act much less effectively than a force operating from culebra. not only would the force from guantanamo have to pass around the main body to attack the train; it would again have to pass around the main body to get back to guantanamo; whereas a force operating from culebra could make a direct attack upon the enemy's train, and then a direct retreat to culebra. this comparison assumes, as has been said, that the matter of resources and strength are not in question; that is, that they are equal in our two supposition bases. but, as in practice they would not be equal, the practical point to consider is how much strength and resources can compensate for inferiority of position, and how much position must be insisted on. of course, no correct quantitative answer can be given, except by accident. the problem, unfortunately, cannot be solved by mathematics, for the simple reason that no quantitative values can be assigned to the various factors, and because no mathematical formula now exists that expresses their relations to each other. it may be pointed out, however, that if a position be good, strength and resources can be artificially supplied; and that the cost of doing this, even on a tremendous scale, is relatively small compared to the cost of the fleet which the base will support, and in distress protect. in other words, we may be able to form an estimate of the relative values of bases, say at guantanamo and culebra, even if we cannot ascribe arithmetical values to each, and compare arithmetically those arithmetical values. if, for instance, we see that a fleet costing $ , , , would, if it operated from a base at culebra, be per cent more effective than if it operated from guantanamo, and that it would cost $ , , more to make a strong base there than to make an equally strong one at guantanamo, we should conclude that, since per cent of $ , , is $ , , , it would be wise to spend that $ , , , even if we had to forego the building of one battlesbip. we should come to the same conclusion, if we realized that no matter what their comparative values might be, a base at one place would not meet our necessities, and a base at the other place would. if a base at guantanamo would not meet our necessities in case of an invasion of the caribbean by a naval fleet superior to ours, then it seems idle to discuss the value of guantanamo relative to some other place, no matter how good the position of guantanamo may be, and no matter how nearly it may approximate to adequacy. there is no real usefulness in having a naval base anywhere, unless that naval base can accomplish the purpose for which it is desired. a naval base is desired for purposes of war, and for no other purpose whatever; and to decide on a position for a base without keeping this fact clearly in view, is to act on an underestimate of the situation, the folly of which has been pointed out in previous pages. we may conclude, then, that in deciding on the place for a distant permanent naval base, on which the operations of a whole fleet are to base for war, we should select the best site available, even if military strength and resources may have to be added to it artificially--unless in the case of any site considered the difficulties of adding them are insuperable. the last sentence may seem like shirking the whole question, because it does not state what "insuperable" means; so it may be well to add that in modern days few engineering difficulties are insuperable, as the existence of the fortress at heligoland shows. if the submarine and the mine did not exist, the difficulties would be greater than they actually are; because guns alone, no matter how carefully mounted and protected, could hardly be expected to keep off indefinitely the attack of a heavy fleet, or even to save from injury the fighting and auxiliary vessels anchored in its waters. but the submarine and mine combine to keep fighting ships at distances greater than those over which ship's guns can fire, and reduce the amount of fortification required on shore. one of the principal sources of expense in establishing bases at some points would be that of dredging out harbors sufficiently extensive, while harbors sufficiently extensive are provided already by nature in such localities as samana. but, as pointed out before, harbors on large islands can be taken from the land side, as was port arthur; and adequate protection from land attack is, in many cases, almost impossible if the enemy has command of the sea, as a superior hostile fleet would have in the caribbean; while the hills and waters of culebra and vieques sound could long defy not only actual invasion, but any fleet attack. this brings us face to face with the fact that it may be less expensive to establish and protect a naval base situated on a little island, even if an artificial harbor has to be constructed, than to establish and protect a base on a large island, even if the base on the large island has a large natural harbor and can be more easily defended against bombardment from the sea. it would be cheaper, for instance, to protect a base on culebra than one at guantanamo, or even samana, if the enemy commanded the sea; and cheaper to protect a base on the forbidding rocks of polillo or guam than on the large and fertile island of luzon, with its extensive gulfs and bays, in many of which a fleet in command of the sea could land its force; because protecting a base on a large island would require covering a very large area, and perhaps a long extent of coast. aircraft may exercise an important influence on the choice of the position of a base, perhaps in the direction of choosing a base on a large island rather than on a small one; since the great speed of aircraft tends to lessen the importance of having the base out a great distance from home--so far as purposes of scouting are concerned. it seems probable also that aircraft will soon be recognized as inherently adapted to preventing the landing of hostile troops, by dropping bombs on the troops, while they are in process of disembarkation, while proceeding in small boats to the shore, and while in the act of landing on the beach, with their guns, ammunition, supplies, horses, and impedimenta of various kinds. _co-operating bases_.--discussion of the relative values of positions for bases, say in the caribbean, should not blind our eyes to the fact, however, that no nation is prevented from establishing as many bases as it needs, wherever its flag may float; that the united states, for instance, is not debarred from establishing permanent naval bases at both guantanamo and culebra, should such a procedure seem desirable. the fact that each locality has advantages that the other does not have, suggests the idea that two bases, placed in those localities, would form a powerful combination. in fact, the great value of the position of culebra being its distance toward the enemy, which necessitates a great distance away from our continental coast, and a long line of communications from that coast suggest an intermediate base as a support and stepping-stone. analogous cases are seen in all the countries of europe, in the fortresses that are behind their boundary-lines--the fortresses existing less as individuals than as supporting members of a comprehensive scheme. two bases, one at guantanamo and one at culebra, would in time of war in the caribbean, add a value to our fleet that might make the difference between defeat and victory. the effective work that a fleet can do is a function of the material condition of the ships themselves, and of the physical and mental condition of the personnel that man them. fighting is the most strenuous work that men can do; it calls for the last ounce of strength, the last effort of the intellect, the last struggle of the will; it searches out every physical imperfection in men, in ships, in engines, in joints, in valves. surprise has sometimes been expressed at the quickness with which the japanese defeated the russians at tsushima; but would any one express surprise if a pugilist, fresh from rest, quickly defeated another pugilist who, exhausted from long travelling, staggered hopelessly into the ring? and how would the betting be before a football match, if it were known that one of the teams would enjoy a rest of twenty-four hours before the game, whereas the other team would walk from the railroad to the ball grounds after a trip across the continent? these analogies may seem forced--but are they? a living animal requires hours of rest and refreshment, in order that the tissues expended in action may be repaired by the internal mechanism of the body, and the food consumed be supplied from some external source. a fleet is in exactly the same category, even when operating in times of peace: and in time of war it needs, in addition, a station in which injuries may be repaired--a station analogous to that of the hospital for wounded men. in the caribbean it would seem necessary to successful operations, therefore, to have two bases, one say at guantanamo and one at culebra; the one at culebra to be the principal base, and the one at guantanamo the auxiliary. culebra, by reason of the great work to be accomplished, and the engineering difficulties to be encountered, cannot be gotten ready for several years. reliance, meanwhile, will have to be placed on guantanamo; and as the coming of any war is not usually very long foretold, the urgency of fortifying guantanamo stands out in clear relief. the mutual relations of guantanamo and culebra are much like the mutual relations of pearl harbor in hawaii and guam--and so are the joint relations of each pair to the mother country. culebra and guam are the potential bases of the united states farthest away from the coast in the atlantic and the pacific respectively; and the nearest to countries in europe and asia with any one of which, of course, war will be always possible, and sometimes probable. each is a small and rugged island, admitting of tremendous military strengthening by guns, fortifications, mines, and submarines, but connected to the motherland by a long line of communications. the line of communications of culebra would, of course, be safer than that of guam, because it is shorter than would be the line of an enemy attacking it; whereas, the line of communications of guam would be longer. guantanamo and pearl harbor are both stations about half-way from the home country to culebra and guam respectively; and though greater danger to our vital and commercial interests exists in the atlantic than in the pacific, pearl harbor has been fortified, and guantanamo has not--and neither has culebra. this sentence is not intended as a criticism of the government for fortifying pearl harbor. the hawaiian islands occupy the most valuable strategic position in the pacific, and pearl harbor is the most important strategic place in the hawaiian islands; and it ought to have been strengthened many years ago, and to a greater degree even than is contemplated now. but the sentence is intended as a protest against our continued inertness in failing to establish any suitable naval bases whatever, especially in the caribbean. _distant base in the philippines_.--the difficulty of finding suitable positions for bases is exemplified in the philippines, for no suitable island is to be found there, except some that are within the archipelago itself; and these are so placed that, to reach them, our fleet would have to go through long reaches of water, ideally suited for destroyer and submarine attack. a possible exception is the island of polillo, twenty miles east of the eastern coast of luzon; and in many ways polillo seems ideal. the practical difficulties are so great, however, the status of the islands in our national policy is so ill defined, and the futility of strengthening it, unless guam be adequately strengthened also, is so apparent, that the question has been hardly even mooted. polillo made impregnable, with guam defenseless, supported by an undefended line of communications several thousand miles long to the main country, would in case of war with an active asiatic power be reduced to the zero of effectiveness in whatever was the length of time in which its accumulated stores would be exhausted. this sentence may be modified by saying that the time might be lengthened by the occasional arrival of supply ships and colliers that might come by way of the mediterranean, or the cape of good hope, or any other route which approached the philippines from the southward; and it is possible that, in the unfortunate event of a war between us and some asiatic power, our relations with european countries might be such as to make the use by us of such routes feasible and safe. in view, however, of the conditions of island possession in the pacific as they actually are, and because of the rapid and abrupt changes that characterize international relations, the probability of being able to use such routes seems too small to receive grave consideration. _other bases in the pacific_.--the pacific ocean is so vast, and the interests of the united states there will some day be so great, that the question of establishing naval bases, in addition to bases at pearl harbor, the philippines, and guam, will soon demand attention. the localities that are the most obvious are the panama canal zone and the samoan islands in the south, and the aleutian islands in the north. a moderately far-seeing policy regarding the pacific, and a moderately far-seeing strategy for carrying out the policy, would dictate the establishment and adequate protection of bases in both the southern and the northern regions; so that our fleet could operate without undue handicap over the long distances required. the same principles that govern the selection of positions and the establishment of bases in the atlantic apply in the pacific; the same requirements that a base shall be near where the fleet will conduct its operations--no matter whether those operations be offensive or defensive, no matter whether they concern direct attack or a threat against communications. * * * * * in view of the great value of naval bases, one may be pardoned perhaps for a feeling of surprise that the united states has no real naval base, home or distant. our large navy-yards are our nearest approximation to real bases. the yards at norfolk and bremerton seem to combine the three factors of position, strength, and resources better than do any other stations; though both are surpassed in resources by new york, philadelphia, and boston. bremerton has the greatest natural military strength of all our stations; in fact, it is naturally very strong indeed, because of the length and nature of the waterway leading to it from the sea and the ease with which it could be denied. norfolk is fortunate in its nearness to chesapeake bay and lynn haven roads, and the ease with which the entrance to the chesapeake from seaward could be defended; but the fact that it is only miles from the atlantic coast-line makes it more vulnerable than bremerton to the attack of troops landed by an enemy fleet. the yard at mare island, near san francisco, is faultily placed as regards deep water; but dredging could rectify this. the panama canal zone has great facilities for repairs, docking, and supplies; but it must be adequately fortified in order to be a trustworthy base in the case of operations in its vicinity. new york, by reason of its enormous wealth of every kind, its steamer terminals, and its excessively vulnerable position, within gunshot of ships out in the deep water (a position without parallel in the large cities of the world) must, of course, be protected. the cheapest way to protect it is to do so locally, by means of fortifications, and other shore defenses. the only other means would be by a fleet permanently kept near new york, a measure that would be expensive beyond reason. in case the enemy should inform us that he would reach the vicinity of new york at a certain time, and in case he should fulfil his promise, the fact that new york was properly strengthened would not be very important; since our fleet would go there, and the whole war would be settled by one "stand-up fight." but wars are not so conducted and never have been. from the oldest times till now, and even among savage tribes, finesse has always been employed, in addition to actual force--more perhaps by the weaker than by the stronger side, but very considerably also by the stronger. a coming enemy would endeavor to keep his objective a close secret, and even to mislead us; so that our fleet would have to take a position out at sea, perhaps far away, which would leave our bases open to attack by the enemy fleet or at least exposed to raids. the most effective local defense of a naval base is a combination of mine-fields and heavy guns, which also give protection to which the wounded vessels can retire, as the german vessels did after the north sea battle. unless such protection be provided, swift destroyers can complete the work that guns began, as the japanese destroyers did, after the artillery battle at tsushima. in addition to their value in defending navy-yards from raids, and in giving wounded ships a refuge, the military strengthening of home bases, if such home bases are wisely placed near large commercial centres, prevents actual destruction of those commercial centres themselves, in case an attack is made upon them, either in the absence of the defending fleet, or after that fleet may have been destroyed. the line of engineering advance during recent years, although it has greatly increased the offensive power of war-ships, has increased even more greatly the defensive power of land works. for this reason, it is perfectly possible to defend successfully almost any land position against attack by ships; and it is so easy, that not to do so, is, in the case of large commercial centres, a neglectfulness of the extremest character. one important reason, therefore, for placing a permanent home base near a large commercial centre is the fact that the fortification of one is also the fortification of the other. assuming that new york is to be defended locally, we can state at once that the new york naval station can easily be made to be a permanent naval base of the highest order, and of the most efficient type. in fact, it can be made into a naval base better than any other now in the world, because of the large sheets of water tributary to it in new york bay, hudson river, and long island sound; the proximity of the sea; the untold resources in money, supplies, and men that it could on demand produce, and the ease with which it could be defended. to make such a base, it would be necessary to fortify the vicinity of coney island and the entrances from the ocean to the lower bay, and long island sound; to deepen the channel to the navy-yard, and to make clear and safe the waterway from the east river to long island sound. it would be necessary also to enlarge the navy-yard; and to this end, to buy back the land adjoining it, which the government most unwisely sold to private parties about twenty-five years ago. owing to the position of block island, relatively to the lines of communication of a hostile force coming from europe to attack our eastern coast, and because of the sheltered waters held within it, suitable for small craft, the advisability of establishing a small naval base there is apparent. with a suitable base there and another on martha's vineyard, and the present canal from massachusetts bay to buzzards bay sufficiently enlarged, the whole coast from boston to new york, including narragansett bay, could be made to form one naval base which would have three exits. our own ships could pass from one point to another, and concentrate at will near sandy hook, block island, or massachusetts bay; and, which is equally important, the establishment of an enemy base near new york would be made almost, if not quite, impossible. in case of an attack on our eastern coast, made directly from europe, which could be accomplished easily during the calm months of the summer, the degree of efficiency shown by the bases at norfolk, philadelphia, new york, and boston would influence vitally the condition in which our fleet would go to battle. owing to the traditional policy, or rather lack of policy, of the united states, and the consequent unreadiness of our preparations, we may reasonably assume that war will find us in such a condition that the utmost haste will be necessary to get our whole naval force out to sea in time to prevent the enemy from making an actual bombardment of our shores. we have no reason to suppose that the ships actually cruising in our active fleet will not be ready; we have every reason to believe that they will be ready. but it is inconceivable that we should not try to oppose such an attack with all the naval force that we could muster; which means that we should try to send out many ships from our home bases to join the active fleet at sea. the ease with which the passage of an enemy's fleet up the delaware or chesapeake could be prevented, in case any means of national defense whatever be attempted, compared with the difficulty of defending new york, and combined with the greater damage that an enemy could inflict on new york, mark the vicinity of new york as the probable objective of any determined naval attack upon our coast; no matter whether that attack be made directly from europe, or indirectly from europe by way of the caribbean. to meet such an attack, various parts of the fleet would have to issue from their bases; even parts of the active fleet would probably have had to go to their home ports for some needed repairs or supplies. the first thought of an attacking fleet would naturally be to prevent our ships from getting out, as it was the thought of nelson and other british commanders to prevent the issuing of forces from the ports of france. but in view of the great distance from europe to our coast, and the impossibility of preventing the knowledge reaching us of the departure of the fleet (unless indeed all the powers of europe combined to prevent it), it seems probable that no such issuing could be prevented, and that a very considerable american force would have time to take its station out at sea, prepared to meet the coming foe. the home bases if properly prepared would exert a powerful effect on a battle near them by equipping the fleet adequately and promptly, and also by preventing a possible defeat from becoming a disaster, by receiving wounded ships before they sank. the wounded ships of the enemy, on the other hand, would have no base near by, and only those inconsiderably injured could probably be gotten home. chapter xii operating the machine the naval machine, including the various vessels of all kinds, the bases and the personnel, having been designed, put together, and prepared for its appointed task of conducting war, and the appointed task having at last been laid upon it, how shall the machine be operated--how shall it be made successfully to perform its task? in order to answer this correctly, we must first see clearly what is its task. _war_.--war may be said to be the act of two nations or two sets of nations, by means of which each tries to get its way by physical force. the peaceful methods of diplomacy having been exhausted, arguments and threats having been tried in vain, both parties resort to the oldest and yet the latest court; the same court as that to which resort the lions of the desert, the big and little fishes of the sea, the fowls of the air, and even the blades of grass that battle for the sunshine. the vastness of the issue decided by war, the fact that from its decision there is no appeal, the greatness of the forces that nations can produce, the length of experience of war extending through , wars, and during more than three thousand years of recorded history, the enormous literature of the subject, and the fact that more brain power, energy, and character have been devoted to war than to any other fruit of man's endeavor--combine to give to the conduct of war an importance that no other subject can possess. the thing that each side brings forward against the other side is force; "that which moves or tends to move matter." in all ages, it has been directed primarily against the physical bodies of individual men, threatening each individual man with suffering and death. it appeals to the primal instinct of men, self-preservation, and is the _ultima ratio regum_, the last argument of kings--and not only of kings, but of all other living things as well. the first feeling aroused by the threat against life, or physical well-being, is fear; and, therefore, the first force with which to oppose the threat is a force of the same spiritual nature as fear, but opposite in direction. this force is called in the english language "courage." without courage every man and every nation would be at the mercy of every man or nation that made a threat against it. the inherent necessity for courage is thus apparent; and the reason is therefore apparent, for the fact that in every nation and tribe physical courage has been esteemed the greatest virtue in a man. in latin, we know, the word _virtus_ meant courage, and also virtue--showing that the romans held the two qualities to be identical or similar. in discussing the operations of war, little is usually said of courage. the reason, however, is not that its value is unrecognized, but that its existence is assumed; in the same way as that in which all the other faculties among the men are assumed, such as physical health, ability to march, etc. movements to inspire fear, however, actions to break down the morale, are of frequent use; because, if the morale of the opposing side is broken down, its power of resistance is destroyed. in the operations, therefore, of two contending parties, force is opposed by force. if the forces on both sides could be concentrated at a single point, and exerted in opposite directions, the result would be decided in an instant. such an arrangement has never yet been brought about; though fairly close approximations have been made, when two parties have selected two champions who have fought for them--the victory going by agreement to the side whose champion became the victor. barring such rare occasions, contests in war have usually been between two forces spread over considerable areas of land or water; and the contest has usually been decided by the defeat of one of the two. if in any individual combat, all the forces possessed by both sides had been engaged, and if either force had been annihilated, the entire war between the two parties would have been decided. this was nearly the case in the naval battle off tsushima between the russian and japanese fleets--and the treaty of peace was signed soon after. usually, however, neither party to the quarrel has had all its forces on the field in any one battle, and neither force in the battle has been annihilated. usually, only partial forces have been engaged, and only partial victories have been won; with the result that wars between contending nations have usually consisted of a series of battles, with intervals of rest between. if two opposing forces in any battle were exactly equal in fighting power, neither side in any battle would gain a victory, the two sides would inflict identical amounts of damage on each other, and the two sides would end the battle still equal in force. at rare intervals, such conditions have been approximated; but usually one side has had more fighting power than the other, and has inflicted more damage of various kinds than it has received, with the result that it attained an advantage more or less important over the other, and with the further result that the original disproportion between the two forces was increased. the increase may not necessarily have been due to a greater number of killed and wounded or even to a greater loss of material, such as guns or ships; there may have been no increase in inequality in either of these ways, for the increase in inequality may have consisted in the fact that the weaker force was driven to a position less advantageous to it for conducting operations in the future. but whatever the nature of the advantage gained by the stronger side, the result has been that the weaker side has come out of the battle relatively weaker than it was before. for this reason, it is highly desirable to each side to win each battle. this does not mean that the loss of any one battle by either party to a war means that the party losing that battle will necessarily lose the war; for many battles may be fought by such small portions of the whole nations' forces, or be lost by such small margins that the loss of one battle, or even several battles, may be retrieved; in fact, in few wars have the victories been all on one side. it does mean, however, that each lost battle is a backward step; and that for this reason the effort must be that no battle shall be lost. _strategy and tactics_.--now, to win battles, two things combine, strategy and tactics. the strategy of each side tries to arrange matters so that the forces on its side shall enter each battle with the greatest chance of victory; tactics tries to handle the forces with which it enters a battle in such a way that its side shall gain the victory. strategy prepares for battles; tactics fights them. the tactics of any battle must be in the hands of the commanders-in-chief on both sides. any other arrangement is inconceivable; but the strategy controlling the series of battles in any war cannot now be committed to them solely; though it was usually committed to them until lately. in the days when alexander went to war, or even when napoleon and nelson went to war, twenty-one centuries later, no telegraph by sea and land made swift communication possible; and the commanders on the spot were the only ones in possession of enough information about the contending forces to decide what measures should be taken. even in those days, however, the capitals of the countries engaged in war, by reason of their knowledge of what was passing in the way of policy, exerted an influence on the strategy of the forces on both sea and land; cæsar, for instance, was embarrassed in many of his operations by the roman senate, and it was for this reason that he crossed the rubicon and passed from gaul into italy. when william i and napoleon iii went to war in , however, von moltke had foreseen the effects of the telegraph and of rapid-mail communications, in giving to the headquarters of the army information of a much greater scope and reliability than had previously been the case, and had established a general staff which had elaborated plans whereby not only would the commanders-in-chief in the field have the assistance of information compiled at headquarters, but whereby the general nature of the operations of a war, especially those operations at the outset on which the future conduct of the war would largely depend, would be decided and laid down in advance and during times of peace. the reason for the rapid victory of the prussians over the french in was that the prussians were better prepared in almost every way; especially in the most important thing--the war plans. now, these war plans could not, of course, be of such a kind that they would foresee every contingency and prescribe the conduct to be followed, so that a commander in the field could turn to page of volume , and get directions as to what he ought to do; nor could they furnish the chief of staff, von moltke, with printed recommendations which he should offer to the king. in other words, the war plans could be only plans and, like all plans for future action, could be only tentative, and capable of being modified by events as they should come to pass. they were only plans of preparation, not plans of operation. yet there were plans of preparation for operations; plans prepared in accordance with the principles of strategy, and based on information as to the enemy's resources, skill, point of view, and probable intentions. they formed the general guide for future operations. since , the invention and practical development of the wireless telegraph, and especially its development for use over very great distances, has modified the relations of commanders on the spot to home headquarters, and especially of naval commanders to their navy departments. the wireless telegraph, under circumstances in which it operates successfully, annihilates distance so far as communication is concerned, though it does not annihilate distance so far as transportation is concerned. it improves the sending and receiving of news and instructions, both for the commander at sea and for his department at home; but it does it more effectively for the department than for the man at sea, because of the superior facilities for large and numerous apparatus that shore stations have, and their greater freedom from interruptions of all kinds. this condition tends to place the strategical handling of all the naval machine, including the active fleet itself, more in the hands of the department or admiralty, and less in the hands of the commander-in-chief: and this tendency is confirmed by the superior means for discussion and reflection, and for trial by war games, that exist in admiralties, compared with those that exist in ships. the general result is to limit the commander-in-chief more and more in strategical matters: to confine his work more and more to tactics. such a condition seems reasonable in many ways. the government decides on a policy, and tells the navy department to carry it out, employing the executive offices and bureaus to that end, under the guidance of strategy. strategy devotes itself during peace to designing and preparing the naval machine, and in war to operating it, utilizing both in war and peace the bureaus and offices and the fleet itself. and in the same way as that in which the bureaus and offices perform the calculations and executive functions of logistics, for furnishing the necessary material of all kinds, the fleet performs those of tactics. from this point of view, strategy plans and guides all the acts of navies, delegating one part of the practical work needed to carry out those plans to logistics, and the other part to tactics. operating the naval machine in war means practically operating the active fleet in such a way as to cause victories to occur, to cause the fleet to enter each battle under as favorable conditions as practicable, and to operate the other activities of the navy in such a way that the fleet will be efficiently and promptly supplied with all its needs. strategy employs tactics and logistics to bring these things to pass; but this does not mean that strategy stands apart and simply gives logistics and tactics tasks to do. the three agencies are too mutually dependent for any such procedure and require for their successful working, both individually and together, the most thorough mutual understanding and support. _flanking, t-ing, etc._--it being a fact that no nation can put a force upon the sea that is concentrated at one point; it being a fact that every naval force must be spread over a considerable area and made up of various parts, and that the efficacy of the various parts in exerting force upon a definite enemy depends on the unity of action of the various parts, it results that the most effective way in which to attack any naval force is not to attack all the parts at once, thus enabling all to reply, but to attack the force in such a way that all the parts cannot reply. if we attack a ship for instance, that can fire guns on a broadside and only guns ahead, it is clear that we can do better by attacking from ahead than from either side. similarly, if ships are in a column, steaming one behind the other, each ship being able to fire guns from either side and only ahead, the ships can fire guns on either side and only ahead; and therefore it would be better to attack the column from ahead (to "t" it), than to attack it from either side. it is curious to note how widely this simple illustration can be made to apply to both strategy and tactics; how the effort of each is to dispose our force so toward the enemy's force that we can use our weapons more effectively than he can use his. an extreme illustration might be made by imagining , soldiers standing in line and unable to face except to the front; in which case it is clear that, no matter how perfectly they might be armed, or how quickly and accurately they could fire, one man standing on the flank, or behind them, could kill one soldier after the other, until all the , were killed, and be in no danger himself. in case of attacking a ship or a column of ships from ahead, or of attacking a line of soldiers on the flank, the effectiveness of the method of attack lies in the fact that a number of the weapons that are present in the force attacked cannot be used in reply. [illustration: fig. ] _concentration and isolation_.--the value of "concentration" is often insisted on, but the author desires to call attention to a misunderstanding on this point, to which he called attention in an essay in . to the author, it seems that concentration is a means and not an end, and that the end is what he called "isolation" in the essay. if a man concentrates his mind on any subject, the advantage he gains is that he prevents other subjects from obstructing the application of his mental powers to that subject; he pushes to one side and isolates all other subjects. in this particular activity it does not matter whether we call his act "concentration" or "isolation" because the whole operation goes on inside of his own skull, and concentration on one subject automatically produces isolation or elimination of all others. but when concentration is attempted on external objects, the case is very different, for concentration may not produce isolation at all. for instance, if ships in column _a_ concentrate their fire on the leading ship in column _b_, the other ships in column _b_ are not isolated, and can fire on the ships of column _a_, even more effectively than if column _a_ was not concentrated on the leading ship of _b_, because they are undisturbed by being fired at. if, however, the ships of _a_ "flank" or "t" the ships of column _b_, as shown in fig. , and concentrate on the leader of b, they thereby isolate the other ships, and practically nullify their ability to fire at _a_. [illustration: fig. ] this effect is approximated by an approximate "t-ing" or "flanking," such as is shown in fig. ; because the average distance from the ships of _a_ to the leading ship in _b_ is less than the average distance from the ships in _b_ to any ship in _a_; and because the direction of fire from each ship in _a_ is more nearly abeam than is the direction of fire from the ships of _b_. these positions are very difficult to gain, even if _a_'s speed is considerably greater than _b's_; since all _b_ has to do to prevent it is to head to the right, unless shoals or other dangers such as enemy battleships, _c_, are on that side, co-operating with _a_. [illustration: fig. ] an interesting position is that shown in fig. , which may be assumed by _a_, either for flight, or to get the advantage in torpedo fire. the advantage is that the _a_ ships are running away from torpedoes fired by _b_, while _b_ is running into torpedoes fired by _a_. this advantage is not great if the distance between _a_ and _b_ is so little that _b's_ torpedoes can reach _a_. but if _a_ is able to make this distance equal to the entire range over which _b's_ torpedoes can run, or near it, _b's_ torpedoes cannot reach _a_ at all. [illustration: fig. ] a similar advantage, though in a modified degree, is that shown as possessed by _a_ in fig. . due to the direction of movement of the _a_ and _b_ fleets, it is easier for _a's_ torpedoes to reach _b_, than for _b's_ torpedoes to reach _a_. [illustration: fig. ] positions of advantage are usually gained by superior speed. one of the main reasons for the development of the battle cruiser has been the fact that her high speed and great offensive power enable her to gain positions of advantage and utilize them. the _a_ positions shown in the figures are attainable by battle cruisers against battleships, and are very effective. a procedure analogous to that of flanking is one in which part of a force is attacked when it is separated from the rest of the force, and cannot be supported by it--in that some of the weapons of one force cannot be used. the effect is similar in the two cases, but the events leading up to the two conditions may be quite different. in the former case, that of being flanked, or t'd, the force caught at a disadvantage was together, and was able to operate effectively as one force against a force located in a given direction; but was attacked by a force located in another direction; while in the latter case, the force was divided, and one part was caught, while distant from and entirely unsupported by the other part. the former condition is more likely to result from tactical operations, and the latter from strategical operations--and yet, especially in land operations, the flanking of one force may be brought about by the carefully planned strategical combinations of the other force; and catching one part of the enemy's force unsupported by the other parts may take place during the tactical maneuvers of an actual or a simulated battle. in naval operations, the catching of separated parts of an enemy's force is a more frequent attempt and accomplishment than is that of getting a position where a column of ships can be attacked from ahead or astern. it seldom happens, with the great number of vessels of all kinds which compose a modern fleet, that it is practicable to keep the various parts together, or that it would be desirable to do so. the closest approximation to keeping a large naval force together, is keeping them in column; because in that formation, the ships can be made simply to "follow the leader" without signal, and act like one long, flexible body. but the vessels of a modern fleet would make a column many miles long--a column of battleships alone would be miles long, and the addition of the various cruisers, destroyers, and other vessels, would make a column so long that it would be unwieldy; and if its ends were attacked, the other vessels could not come to their relief. besides, the duties of battleships, battle cruisers, scouts, destroyers, and submarines, are distinct--with the result that, as in land operations, bodies of the various types operate separately and apart from those of other types. not only, also, do the various types operate separately, but often the necessities of a case demand that a certain number--say of battleships--be sent away from the main body on some mission; or that a certain number of destroyers be sent away from the main body of destroyers. any such diversion entails a danger that is sometimes great, and sometimes small; but such diversions and risks cannot be avoided, and should not be avoided when they are necessary, any more than a man should avoid going out of doors, though that act always entails some danger. suppose, for instance, that in the operations of a war carried on in the caribbean, the navy department should get trustworthy information that the enemy had detailed battle cruisers to speed north and bombard new york. the department would probably have to detach a force from the fleet and send it north, to prevent the bombardment. yet not only would the force so sent be in danger until it returned of an attack by a superior force, but the main body from which it was detached would be thereby weakened; furthermore, the information might have been incorrect--it might have been originated and given out by the enemy, in the hope that it would cause such a diversion of force. every operation in war entails a risk more or less great; and if no risks were to be taken, it would be better not to go to war. it is true that some wars have been undertaken in which the preponderance of force was so great that there was very little doubt of the actual outcome, and very little risk taken by one of the two parties. such wars, however, have been very few; and they were hardly wars in the usual sense, any more than the beating of a little boy by a big boy could properly be called a "fight." reference may again be made here to table i on next page, which shows the way in which fights between unequal forces proceed, and the advantage of fighting the separated parts of an enemy rather than the united force. we can see this clearly if we note that, if two forces each aggregating , were in each other's vicinity, and if the entire force _a_ was able to engage half of _b_, or , it would whip half of _b_, and have remaining, with which to engage the other half ( ) of _b_. reference to the end of the third period in this table shows also that if a force of engages a force of , it will have left, after the other has been reduced to zero. so, a force of , that engages two forces of separately, will have more than left, after the others have both been reduced to zero: whereas, if it engages both, when they are united, both sides will be gradually reduced to zero, remaining equal all the time. table i ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.|col.| | | | | | | | | | | | | |----------------------------------------------------------------------------| |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at beginning b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in st a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of st period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in nd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of nd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in rd a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of rd period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | |damage done in th a| | | | | | | | | | | | period b| | | | | | | | | | | |value of offensive power a| | | | | | | | | | | | at end of th period b| | | | | | | | | | | | | |etc.| | | | | | | | | |total damage done by a| | | | | | | | | | | | b| | | | | | | | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- it is interesting to note how this simple fact is the key to most of the operations of strategy and tactics; how--the mechanical tools in the way of ships and guns and torpedoes having been supplied--the key to their successful use is simply to take advantage of all opportunities of isolating one part of the enemy's force from the rest, and then attacking one of the parts with a force superior to it. opportunities lacking, one must, of course, try to create opportunities by inducing the enemy to detach some part of his force, under circumstances such that you can attack it, or the weakened main body, with a superior force. naturally, one must try to prevent a similar procedure by the enemy. this does not mean that the sole effort of naval operations is finesse in either strategy or tactics; sometimes the sole effort is to force a pitched battle by the side that feels superior, and to avoid a pitched battle by the side that feels inferior. before the actual inferiority or superiority has been ascertained, however, the strategy of each commander is to bring about a situation in which his force shall have the advantage. the advantage having been gained and recognized (or an advantage existing and being recognized), strategy insists on forcing a battle, for the reason that _every contest weakens the loser more than it does the winner_. this does not mean that it is always wise to engage a weaker force that is temporarily separated from its main body. it is readily understandable, for instance, that it would be unwise in two cases: . a case in which the weaker force were so little weaker, and were part of a force so much larger than the total of the smaller force, that the gain as between the two forces actually engaged would not be great enough to compensate for the loss entailed. for instance, a reference to table i shows that an _a_ force of , engaging a _b_ force of would have left when _b_ was reduced to zero. this is impressive: but if the _b_ force of were part of a total _b_ force of , , in other words if there were an _a_ force of , near at hand, _b_ would have left with which to oppose , , a proportion a little less advantageous than the proportion he started with-- , to , . . a case by which the _b_ force may have divided with the express purpose of luring _a_ to attack; arrangements having been made whereby the inferior _b_ force would simply hold the _a_ force until the whole _b_ force could come to its assistance; arrangements having been also made that this would be accomplished before the detached part of _b_ should get very badly damaged. attention is invited to table iii, which is a continuation of table i. it represents what would happen if a force of , should fight separately two forces, one of and the other of . in column , _a_ is supposed to have engaged the first, and so to have become reduced to , and to engage afterward. in column , _a_ is supposed to have engaged first, thereby becoming reduced to , and then to engage the force. the table indicates that it makes no difference whether _a_ engages the stronger or the weaker force first. column shows that a force of , the part remaining after a force of , had annihilated a force of , would have left after annihilating a second force of . taken in connection with columns and , this indicates that it is easier to defeat two separated _equal_ forces than two separated _unequal_ forces of the same aggregate value; that the weakest way in which to divide a force is into _equal_ parts. this fact is mathematically demonstrated by mr. f. w. lanchester in a recent book called "air craft in warfare." table iii ------------------------------------------------------------------- | |col. |col. |col. | |---------------------------------------------|------|------|------| |value of offensive at beginning a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in st period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end st period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in d period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end d period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in d period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end d period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | |damage done in th period by a| | | | | b| | | | |value of offensive power at end th period a| | | | | b| | | | ------------------------------------------------------------------ the main advantage of superior speed in naval operations is the ability it gives to secure tactical positions of advantage, and to make desirable strategic dispositions; ability, for instance, to t or flank an enemy force, and to prevent the enemy from t-ing or flanking; also to catch separated parts of an enemy fleet before they can unite, while retaining the ability to divide one's own force without undue risk. for these purposes, speed is an element of the highest value; but the high price that it costs in gun power or armor protection--or both--and the fact that speed cannot always be counted on by reason of possible engine breakdowns and foul bottoms, result in giving to war-ships a lower speed than otherwise they would have. owing to the fact that, for any given horse-power put into a ship, the speed attainable increases with her length; and owing to the further fact that the weight that any ship can carry increases more rapidly than the displacement (weight of the ship complete), the best combination of gun power, armor protection, and speed is attainable in the largest ship. in other words, the larger the ship, the more power it can carry in proportion to its size, and the more quickly that power can be placed where it can do the most good. _strategic operations_.--these may be divided into two classes, offensive and defensive. the two classes are distinct; and yet there is no sharp dividing-line between them any more than there is between two contiguous colors in the spectrum. defensive operations of the kind described by a popular interpretation of the word "defense" would be operations limited to warding off or escaping the enemy's attack, and would be just as efficacious as the passive warding off of the blows of fists. such a defense can never succeed, for the reason that the recipient is reduced progressively in power of resistance as the attacks follow each other, while the attacker remains in unimpaired vigor, except for the gently depressing influence of fatigue. reference to table i will render this point clear, if we make the progressive reductions of the power of one contestant, and no reductions of the power of the other contestant. defensive operations, therefore, include "hitting back"; that is, a certain measure of offensive operations, intended to weaken the ability of the enemy to do damage. in fact, no operations are more aggressively offensive, or more productive of damage to the enemy's personnel and material, than operations that are carried on in order to defend something. no animal is so aggressively belligerent as a female "defending" her young. offensive and defensive operations are nevertheless quite different, especially in two particulars, one being the use of the initiative or attack, and the other the distance to the home. in offensive operations, the attack is made; in defensive operations, the attack is resisted; and even if the resistance takes an aggressive character, and drives the original attacker back to the place he started from, yet the side which has made the original attack has carried on offensive operations, and the other side defensive. offensive operations are, as a rule, carried on farther from home than defensive operations. if _a_ is carrying on offensive operations against _b_, _a_ is usually farther away from his home than _b_ is from his home. we see from this that the offensive has the advantage of the initiative, of making an attack for which the enemy may be unprepared, and has the disadvantage of being far from its home bases; whereas the defensive has the disadvantage of not knowing when or where or whence an attack is to come, and the advantage of the support of various kinds given by home bases. in other words, the offensive has the advantage except in so far as it is impaired by unfavorable conditions. for this reason, every military nation at the outset of war desires to be able to assume the offensive; and only refrains from the offensive from motives of prudence or because, in a particular case, the distance between the adversaries is so great, that the lack of bases would be of greater weight than the advantage of the initiative--or because the situations of the contending parties would be such that the side accepting the defensive rôle and staying near home, might be able to carry on aggressive attacks better than could the other. an illustration of a mistake in taking the offensive, and the wisdom of the other side in accepting the defensive, may be seen in napoleon's expedition against russia; for the russians were able to repel his attack completely, and then to assume a terrible offensive against his retreating, disorganized, and starving army. another illustration was the expedition made by a weak spanish fleet under cervera to the caribbean in . another illustration was that of the russians in the war of ; the practical disadvantages under which the russian fleet operated at tsushima were too great to be balanced by the advantage of the attack; especially as the situation was such that the japanese were able to foretell with enough accuracy for practical purposes the place where the attack would be delivered, and the time. operations on the sea, like operations on the land, consist in opposing force to force, in making thrusts and making parries. if two men or two ships contend in a duel, or if two parallel columns--say of ten ships each--are drawn up abreast each other, the result will depend mainly on the hitting and enduring powers of the combatants; the conditions of the "stand-up fight" are realized, and there is little opportunity for strategy to exert itself. but if any country--say the united states--finds herself involved in war with--say a powerful naval power or powers of europe, and the realization of the fact comes with the suddenness that characterized the coming of war in august, , and we hear the same day that a fleet of battleships, battle cruisers, destroyers, submarines, aircraft, and auxiliaries has left the enemy's country, followed by a fleet of transports carrying troops--there will be immediate need for strategy of the most skilful kind; and this need will continue until either the united states or her enemy has been made to acknowledge herself beaten, and to sue for peace. as such a war will be mainly naval, and as naval wars are characterized by great concentration of force, by each side getting practically all its naval force into the contest, by each side staking its all on the issue of perhaps a single battle (as the russians and japanese did at tsushima) one fleet or the other will be practically annihilated, and its country will be exposed naked to the enemy. the first effort on hearing of the departure of the hostile fleet will be, of course, to get our fleet out to sea, reinforced as much as practicable, by our reserve ships; and to get the coast-guard on their patrol stations. as we should not know the destination of the enemy, we should either have to assume a destination and send our fleet to that place (leaving the other places undefended) or else send our fleet out to sea to some position from which it would despatch scouts in different directions to intercept the enemy, in order that our fleet might meet it and prevent its farther advance. of course, the latter procedure could not be carried out reasonably, unless we had a great enough number of trained scouts to make the interception of the enemy fleet probable; because otherwise the probabilities would be that an enemy having the battle cruisers and scouts that european navies have, would succeed in evading our fleet and landing a force upon our shores; and it could not be carried out reasonably either, if we knew that our fleet was markedly inferior to the coming fleet; because to send out our fleet to meet a much more powerful one in actual battle would be to commit national suicide by the most expeditious method. in case the departure of the enemy fleet occurred in the stormy months of the winter, we might feel warranted in guessing that its immediate destination was the caribbean; yet if our fleet were in the caribbean at the time, and if our coast lacked shore defenses as at present, we might argue that the enemy would take the opportunity to make a direct descent upon our coast, seize a base--say on the eastern end of long island--and march directly on new york. it would be very difficult to plan the development of a line of scouts in such a way that the scouts would intercept an attack directed at some unknown point between boston and the west indies, perhaps in the southern part of the west indies--say margarita island. in fact, it would be impossible; with the result that, unless we intercepted it by simple good luck, the enemy would succeed in landing a force on our eastern coast, or else in the seizing of a base in the west indies or the southern part of the caribbean sea. either one of these acts, successfully performed by an enemy, would give him an advantage; that is, it would make his position relatively to ours better than it was before. it would have the same effect, therefore, as winning a battle; in fact it would constitute the winning of a battle--not a physical battle but a strategic battle. it may be objected that, unless we knew our fleet to be more powerful it would be wiser and more comfortable for all concerned to withdraw our ships to the shelter of their bases, and let the enemy do his worst--on the theory that he could not do anything else so ruinous to us as to sink our fleet. there is of course considerable reasonableness in this point of view; and strategy declares the unwisdom of engaging in battles that are sure to be lost. it must be remembered, however, that the coming fleet will operate at a considerable strategic disadvantage, owing to the necessity for guarding the "train" of auxiliary ships that will come with it, holding fuel and supplies of various kinds; that this handicap will offset a considerable advantage in offensive strength; and that the handicap will be still greater if the enemy fleet have near it a flotilla of transports carrying troops. it must be remembered also that in all probability, we should not have detailed information as to the number of vessels coming, and should not really know whether it was superior to ours or not: though we should be justified in assuming that the coming fleet believed itself to be superior to ours in actual fighting power. absence of trustworthy information on such points is usual in warfare, and is one of the elements that is the most difficult to handle. the navy department would be more able to form a correct estimate on this point than the commander-in-chief until such time as our scouts might come into absolute contact with the enemy's main body; but, until then, all that the department and fleet would know would be that a large hostile force had left europe. they would not know its size or destination. clearly, the first thing we should need would be information. to get this after war has broken out, the only means is scouts. _scouting and screening_.--scouts are needed by every navy; but they are most needed by a navy that has a very long coast-line to protect. if the great commercial centres and the positions that an enemy would desire for advanced bases along the coast, have local defenses adequate to keep off a hostile fleet for, say, two weeks, the urgency of scouts is not quite so absolute; since, even if the hostile fleet evades our scouts and our fleet, and reaches our shores, our fleet will have two weeks in which to get to the place attacked. but if the coast is not only long but also unguarded by shore defenses, the urgency is of the highest order. if we knew our fleet to be the weaker, but if we did not believe it to be so much the weaker as to force it to seek safety in flight, our natural plan would be that of napoleon's in italy in --to keep our force together, and to hurl it against detached parts of the enemy's force, whenever possible. this plan might not be difficult of execution, if the enemy were accompanied by his train of auxiliary and supply ships; since such ships are vulnerable to almost any kind of attack, have almost no means of defense whatever, and therefore require that a part of the fighting force of the main body be detached to guard them. whether the enemy would have his train quite close to him, or a day's steaming behind, say miles, we should not, of course, know. how could we ascertain? if the enemy came along with no scouts ahead, and if we happened to have some scouts located along his line of advance, these scouts faster than his ships, and so heavily armed as not to fear to venture near, our scouts might proceed along the flank of the enemy in daylight, pass along his rear, go entirely around him, and then report to our commander-in-chief by wireless telegraph exactly what craft of all kinds comprised the force, what formation they were in, the direction in which they were steaming, and the speed. such information would be highly appreciated by our commander-in-chief, as it would enable him to decide what he had better do. if, for instance, the scouts reported that the enemy fleet were steaming at a speed of knots an hour, and that the train was proceeding behind the fighting fleet without any guards of any kind around them, our commander-in-chief might decide to keep just out of sight until after dark, and then rush in with all his force of heavy ships and torpedo craft, and destroy the train entirely. but suppose the enemy fleet should advance with a "screen" consisting of a line miles long of, say, destroyers, miles ahead of the main body; followed by a line of, say, battle cruisers, miles behind the destroyers; and with destroyers and battle cruisers on each flank--say, miles distant from the main body. how could our scouts find out anything whatever about the size, composition, and formation of the enemy--even of his speed and direction of advance? the purpose of the "screen" is to prevent our ascertaining these things; and each individual part of the screen will do its best to carry out that purpose. all the vessels of the screen and of the main body will be equipped with wireless-telegraph apparatus and a secret code, by means of which instant communication will be continuously held, the purport of which cannot be understood by our ships. any endeavor of any of our scouts to "penetrate the screen" will be instantly met by the screen itself, out of sight of the enemy's main body; and the screen cannot be penetrated in the daytime, unless we can defeat those members of the screen that try to hold us off. now, inasmuch as all the considerable naval powers of europe have many battle cruisers, and we have no battle cruisers whatever, and no scouts of any kind, except three inefficient ones (the _birmingham_, _chester_, and _salem_) the degree of success that we should have penetrating the screen in the daytime can be estimated by any lawyer, merchant, or schoolboy. the laws of successful scouting and of the use of "search curves" have been worked out mathematically, and they are used to find an enemy of which one has certain information; but they are also used by the enemy to avoid being found, and they aid the enemy that is sought almost as much as they aid the seeker. and the sought has the advantage that the use of force, if force can be employed, breaks up the application of the mathematics of the seeker. it is true that two main bodies of two fleets may stumble against each other in the night-time, or in a fog or heavy mist. to prevent this possible occurrence, or to prevent a night attack by destroyers, no sure means has yet been found except examination before dark of a very large area around the fleet that is sought; but the area is too great for a search rigid enough to give complete security, and will probably be so until swift aircraft can scout over long distances at sea. accepting for the minute the convention that the main body of each side goes at the cruising speed of knots, and that darkness lasts hours, each side will go miles in darkness; and if the two main bodies happen to be going directly toward each other they will approach miles in the darkness of one night. therefore, a coming fleet, in order to feel entirely safe, would in daylight have to inspect by its scouts a circle of miles radius. to insure safety against destroyer attack, the area would have to be much greater on account of the greater speed of destroyers. [illustration] unless our defending fleet knew with reasonable sureness, however, the location, speed, and direction of motion of the coming fleet, so that it could make its dispositions for attack, it would hardly desire to meet the enemy at night, unless it were confident that it would meet the train and not the main fleet or the destroyers. night attacks, both on sea and land, are desirable, if the attacker can inflict surprise on the attacked, and not be surprised himself. in the darkness a flotilla of destroyers may make an attack on the various vulnerable colliers and supply vessels of a fleet, or even on the main body, and achieve a marked success, because that is the rôle they are trained to play. but the tremendous power and accuracy of battleships cannot be utilized or made available in darkness; and therefore a commander-in-chief, anxious to defeat by superior skill a coming fleet larger than his own, would hardly throw away all chance of using skill by risking his main body in a night encounter. every operation planned by strategy is supposed to result from the "decision" which follows the estimate of the situation; even if in some simple or urgent cases, the decision is not laboriously worked out, but is almost unconscious and even automatic. now, it is hardly conceivable that any estimate of the situation would be followed by a decision to go ahead and trust to luck, except in very desperate circumstances. in such circumstances, when hope is almost gone, a desperate blow, even in the dark, may save a situation--as a lucky hand at cards may redeem a gambler's fortune at even the last moment. but strategy is opposed to taking desperate measures; and pugilists and even gamblers recognize the fact that when a man becomes "desperate," his judgment is bad, and his chances of success are almost zero. while it is possible, therefore, that the main bodies of hostile fleets may come together in the night, we may assume that it will not be as part of any planned operations, and therefore not within the scope of this discussion; and that any combat which may result will be one in which strategy will play no part, and in which even tactics will yield first place to chance. but while our defending fleet will have to base most of its decisions on guesses, the coming fleet, on the other hand, having accepted the strategical disadvantage of leaving its base far in rear, will advance with all the advantage of the offensive, especially in knowing where it intends to go and what it desires to do. coming over on a definite mission it will have been able to know what preparations to make; and as the naval powers of europe understand the need of co-ordination between policy and strategy, the fleet will doubtless have had time to make those preparations; it will not have started, in fact, and war will not have been declared, until all those preparations have been made. we may assume that the coming fleet will come across with all possible precautions for protecting itself against detection by the defender's scouts, and therefore against an unexpected attack, by night or by day. it cannot receive an unexpected attack unless surprised; and how can it be surprised, if it has more scouts, faster scouts, and more powerfully armed scouts than the defending fleet has? the possession of the more powerful scouts, however, will be valuable to the enemy, not only for forming a screen as a protection against enemy scouts, but also for scouting and thereby getting information for itself. a numerous squadron of scouts of different kinds, sent out ahead and on each flank would see any of our scouts that saw them; and the scouts that were the more powerful would force the weaker scouts back to the arms of their own main body, toward which the more powerful scouts would, of course, advance. the weaker scouts, therefore, would have no value whatever as a screen, save in retarding the advance of the stronger scouts, and in delaying their getting information. if the coming fleet is more powerful than the defending fleet, and has a more numerous and powerful scouting force, it will, therefore, be able to push back the defending fleet, whether an actual battle occurs or not; and it will be able to bring over, also, a large invading force in transports if its fighting superiority be great enough. furthermore, if we have not fortified and protected the places which the enemy would wish to seize and use as advanced naval bases, the enemy will be able to seize them, and will doubtless do so. of course, this is so obvious as to seem hardly worth declaring; and yet some people hesitate even to admit it, and thereby they assume a passive condition of moral cowardice; for they know that a strong force has always overcome a weaker force that opposed it in war; and that it always will do so, until force ceases to be force. they know that force is that which moves, or tends to move, matter; and that the greater the force, the more surely it will move matter, or anything that opposes it. if, however, we establish naval bases near our valuable commercial and strategic ports, both on our coast and in the caribbean, and if we fortify them so that an enemy could not take them quickly, the condition of the enemy fleet will be much less happy; because it will have to remain out on the ocean, where fuelling and repairing are very difficult, and where it will be exposed, day and night, especially at night, to attack by destroyers and submarines; and in case necessity demands the occasional division of the force, it must beware of attacks on the separated portions of the fleet. the condition of a large fleet under way on an enemy's coast is one requiring much patience and endurance, and one in which the number of vessels is liable to be continuously reduced by the guerilla warfare of the defenders. in the case of our attempting offensive operations against the distant coast of an enemy, we would be in the same position as a foreign enemy would be in when attacking our coast, in that our chances of success would be excellent if our fleet were considerably superior to the defending fleet in fighting power, and in the number and strength of scouts, and if the enemy coast possessed numerous undefended bays and islands which we could seize as bases. but even if the superiority of our fleet in fighting power and scouts was considerably greater than the enemy's our ultimate success would be doubtful, if the enemy's coast and islands were so protected by guns and mines and submarines that we could not get a base near the scene of operations. it is true that the british were able to maintain blockades of the french coast during many weary months without any base nearer than england--a place far away to ships whose only motive power was sails; but destroyers and submarines and mines did not then exist, and these agencies are much more valuable to the defender than to the blockader who has no base at hand. our operations without a base on a distant enemy coast would be apt to degenerate into warding off a continual series of more or less minor attacks by the minor craft of the defender. the commander of our fleet would be constrained to keep his fighting force pretty close together, thus restricting his initiative; lest the entire enemy fleet catch a detached part out of supporting distance of the main body, and annihilate it with little loss to themselves. we could probably shut off most of the enemy's sea-borne commerce; and the war would become one of endurance between our fleet, on the one hand, and the economic forces and the morale of the enemy country on the other hand. in the case of operations carried on far away from the bases of both fleets, operations like those that the french and british carried on in the west indies, the commanders-in-chief will naturally be much less directed by the admiralties at home than will a commander-in-chief operating near home; and the strategical advantage, as affected by the proximity of bases, and by the possession of the better chance for the initiative, will be reduced to its minimum. of course, the victory will go to the more powerful force; but so many factors go to make up power, that it may be difficult to determine which is the more powerful, until after victory itself shall have decided it. supposing the skill to be equal on both sides, the victory will go to the side that possesses the most numerous and powerful vessels of all kinds. but unless there is a very great disproportion, it may be difficult to determine which side has the more powerful ships, even though we may know which side has the more numerous. it is extremely difficult to compare even two single war-ships because we do not know the relative values of their factors. suppose two ships, for instance, to be equal in all ways, except that one ship has ten -inch guns, and the other has twelve -inch guns of higher initial velocity. which is the more powerful ship? suppose one ship has more armor, another more speed. formulæ designed to assign numerical values to fighting ships have been laboriously worked out, notably by constructor otto kretschmer of the german navy; but the results cannot be accepted as anything except very able approximations. furthermore, if ship _a_ could whip ship _b_ under some conditions, _b_ could whip _a_ under other conditions. an extreme illustration would be battleship _a_ engaged with submarine _b_ at close quarters; _b_ being on the surface in one case, and submerged in the other case. _aircraft_.--the influence of aircraft on naval operations is to be very great indeed, but in directions and by amounts that it would not be wise to attempt to predict. the most obvious influence will be in distant scouting, for which the great speed of aircraft will make them peculiarly adapted, as was demonstrated in the battle near the skagerak. it is the belief of the author, however, that the time is close at hand when aeroplanes and dirigibles of large size will be capable of offensive operations of the highest order, including the launching of automobile torpedoes of the whitehead type. _skill_.--the question of skill bears a relation to the question of the material power directed by it that is very vital, but very elusive. if, for instance, ship _c_, firing ten -inch guns on a side, fights ship _d_, firing five like guns on a side, the advantage would seem to be with _c_; but it would not be if each gun on _d_ made three hits, while each gun on _c_ made one hit; a relative performance not at all impossible or unprecedented. similarily, if the head of the admiralty of the _e_ fleet were a very skilful strategist, and the head of the admiralty of the _f_ fleet were not, and if the various admirals, captains, lieutenants, engineers, and gunners of the _e_ fleet were highly skilled, and those of the _f_ fleet were not, the _e_ fleet might be victorious, even if materially it were much the smaller in material and personnel. in case the head of the admiralty of the _e_ fleet were the more skilful, while the officers of the _f_ fleet were, on the average, more skilful than those of the _e_ fleet, it would be impossible to weigh the difference between them; but as a rough statement, it may be said that if the head of the admiralty of either fleet is more skilful than the other, his officers will probably be more skilful than the officers of the other; so pervasive is the influence of the chief. the effectiveness of modern ships and guns and engines and torpedoes, when used with perfect skill, is so great that we tend unconsciously to assume the perfect skill, and think of naval power in terms of material units only. yet daily life is full of reminders that when two men or two bodies of men contend, the result depends in large though varying measure on their relative degrees of skill. whenever one thinks of using skill, he includes in his thought the thing in the handling of which the skill is employed. one can hardly conceive of using skill except in handling something of the general nature of an instrument, even if the skill is employed in handling something which is not usually called an instrument. for instance, if a man handles an organization with the intent thereby to produce a certain result, the organization is the instrument whereby he attempts to produce the result. if a man exercises perfect skill, he achieves with his instrument per cent of its possible effect. if he exercises imperfect skill, he achieves a smaller percentage of its possible effect. to analyze the effectiveness of skill, let us coin the phrase, "effective skill," and agree that, if a man produces per cent of the possible, his effective skill is per cent, and, in general, that a man's effective skill in using any instrument is expressed by the percentage he achieves of what the instrument can accomplish; that, for instance, if a gun is fired at a given range under given conditions, and per cent hits are made in a given time, then the effective skill employed is per cent. from this standpoint we see that imperfect skill is largely concerned with errors. if a man uses, say, a gun, with perfect skill, he commits no error in handling the gun; and the smaller the sum total of errors which he commits in handling the gun, the greater his effective skill and the greater the number of hits. the word "errors," as here used, does not simply mean errors of commission, but means errors of omission as well. if a man, in firing a gun, fails to press the button or trigger when his sights are on, he makes an error just as truly as the man does who presses the button or trigger when the sights are not on. suppose that, in firing a gun, under given conditions of range, etc., the effective skill employed is per cent. this means that per cent of hits are made. but it means another thing equally important--it means that per cent of misses are made. to what are these misses due? clearly they are due to errors made, not necessarily by the man who fires the gun, but by all the people concerned. if the correct sight-bar range were given to the gun, and if the gun were correctly laid and the pointer pressed the button at precisely the right instant, the shot would hit the target, practically speaking. but, in actual practice, the range-finder makes an error, the spotter makes an error, the plotting-room makes an error, the sight-setter makes an error, and the gun-pointer makes an error. the sum total of all of these errors results in per cent of misses. suppose that by careful training these errors are reduced in the relation of to , so that instead of there being per cent of misses there are only per cent. this does not seem a very difficult thing for training to accomplish, but note the result: the hits are increased from per cent to per cent. in other words, by a decrease in errors in the relation of to , the effective skill and the hits are doubled. conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of to , the misses would increase from per cent to per cent, and the hits would be reduced from per cent to . suppose now that the conditions are so very difficult that only per cent of hits is made, or per cent of misses, and that by training the misses are reduced from per cent to per cent. clearly, by a decrease of errors of hardly more than per cent the effective skill and the hits are doubled. conversely, if the errors increased in the ratio of to , the misses would increase from per cent to per cent, and the hits would be reduced from per cent to . but suppose that the conditions are so easy that per cent of hits are made and only per cent of misses. clearly, if the errors were divided by , so that only per cent of misses was made, instead of per cent, the number of hits would increase only per cent, from per cent to per cent. of course, this is merely an arithmetical way of expressing the ancient truths that skill becomes more and more important as the difficulties of handling an instrument increase; and that, no matter how effective an instrument may be when used with perfect skill, the actual result obtained in practice is only the product of its possible performance and the effective skill with which it is used. applying this idea to naval matters, we see why the very maximum of skill is required in our war mechanisms and war organizations, in their almost infinite variety and complexity. the war mechanisms and war organizations of the military nations are capable of enormous results, but only when they are used with enormous skill. there are no other instruments or organizations that need so much skill to handle them, because of the difficulties attending their use and the issues at stake. their development has been a process long and painful. on no other things has so much money been spent; to perfect no other things have so many lives been sacrificed; on no other things, excepting possibly religion, have so many books been written; to no other things has the strenuous exertion of so many minds been devoted; in operating no other things has such a combination of talent and genius and power of will and spirit been employed. a battleship is an instrument requiring skill to handle well, considered both as a mechanism and as an organization. its effective handling calls for skill not only on the part of the captain, but on the part of all hands. the finest dreadnaught is ineffective if manned by an ineffective crew. the number and complexity of the mechanisms on board are so great as to stagger the imagination; and the circumstances of modern warfare are so difficult that, as between two forces evenly matched as to material, a comparatively slight advantage in errors made will turn the scale in favor of the more skilful. a difference in errors, for instance, in the relation of to , under the conditions mentioned above, between two fleets having an equal number of similar ships, would give one side twice as many hits as the other in any given length of time. in march, , the writer published an essay in the _proceedings of the u. s. naval institute_ called "american naval policy," in which the effect of initial superiority in gun-fire was shown in tables. one table showed that an initial advantage of only per cent secured an overwhelming victory by an accumulative effect. now a difference of per cent in hits, under conditions in which the hits were about per cent of the maximum, would mean, roughly speaking, the difference between hits and hits in a given length of time, or a difference between misses and misses; a difference in errors made of a little more than per cent. the conclusion to be drawn is too obvious to be stated. perhaps the conclusion is not broadly new; but possibly the idea is new that so small a difference in errors made will, under conditions of sufficient difficulty, produce such a tremendous difference in results. now, a division is more complex and more difficult to handle perfectly than is a battleship; a squadron more so than a division; a fleet more so than a squadron; a navy more so than a fleet. _necessity for knowledge of the naval machine_.--there is no machine or tool so simple that knowledge of it is not needed in order to use it skilfully. this does not mean that intimate knowledge of the details of construction of a machine is necessary in order to operate it; it does not mean, for instance, that a sharp-shooter must have a profound knowledge of the metallurgy of the metal of which his gun is mainly made, or of the laws of chemistry and physics that apply to powder, or of the laws of ballistics that govern the flight of the bullet to its target. but it does mean that any skilful handler of any machine must know how to use it; that a sharpshooter, for instance, must know how to use his machine--the gun. of course, a sharpshooter's skill is exercised in operating under very limited conditions, the conditions of shooting; and it does not include necessarily the maintenance of his gun in good condition. the operating of some machines, however, includes the maintenance of those machines; and a simple illustration is that of operating an automobile. an automobile is constructed to be operated at considerable distances from home; and a man whose knowledge and skill were limited to steering, stopping, starting, and backing the car--who had no knowledge of its details of construction and could not repair a trifling injury--would have very little value as a chauffeur. a like remark might truthfully be made about the operation of any complex machine; and the more complex the machine, the more aptly the remark would apply. the chief engineer of any electric plant, of any municipal water-works, of any railroad, of any steamship must have the most profound and intimate knowledge of the details of construction and the method of operation of the machine committed to his charge. recognition of this fact by the engineering profession is so complete and perfect as to be almost unconscious; and no man whose reasoning faculties had been trained by the exact methods of engineering could forget it for a moment. the whole structure of that noble science rests on facts that have been demonstrated to be facts, and the art rests on actions springing from those facts; and neither the science nor the art would now exist, if machines created by engineering skill had been committed to the charge of men unskilled. it is obvious that the more complicated in construction any machine is, the more time and study are needed to understand it fully; and that the more complicated its method of operation is, the more practice is needed in order to attain skill in operating it. the more simple the method of operation, the more closely a machine approaches automatism; but even automatic machines are automatic only in so far as their internal mechanisms are concerned; and the fact of their being automatic does not eliminate the necessity for skill in using them. an automatic gun, for instance, no matter how perfectly automatically it discharges bullets, may be fired at an advancing enemy skilfully or unskilfully, effectively or ineffectively. in operating some machines, such as a soldier's rifle, or a billiard cue, the number of mental, nervous, and muscular operations is apparently very few; yet every physician knows that the number is very great indeed, and the operations extremely complex--complex beyond the knowledge of the psychologist, physicist, chemist, and biologist. the operation of more complex mechanisms, such as automobiles, seems to be more difficult, because the operator has more different kinds of things to do. yet that it is really more difficult may be doubted for two reasons; one being that each single operation is of a more simple nature, and the other reason being that we know that a much higher degree of skill is possessed by a great billiardist than by an automobile chauffeur. of course, the reason of this may be that competition among billiardists has been much more keen than among chauffeurs; but even if this be true, it reminds us that _the difficulty of operating any machine depends on the degree of skill exacted_. it also reminds us that, if a machine is to be operated in competition with another machine, the skill of the operator should be as great as it can be made. the steaming competitions that have been carried on in our navy for several years are examples on a large scale of competitive trials of skill in operating machines. these machines are very powerful, very complex, very important; and that supreme skill shall be used in operating them is very important too. for this reason, every man in the engineering department of every ship, from the chief engineer himself to the youngest coal-passer, is made to pass an examination of some kind, in order that no man may be put into any position for which he is unfit, and no man advanced to any position until he has shown himself qualified for it, both by performance in the grade from which he seeks to rise, and by passing a professional examination as to the duties in the grade to which he desires to rise. the same principles apply to all machines; and the common sense of mankind appreciates them, even if the machines are of the human type. a captain of a company of soldiers, in all armies and in all times, has been trained to handle a specific human machine; so has the captain of a football team, so has the rector of a church. the training that each person receives gives him such a subconscious sense of the weights and uses of the various parts of the machine, that he handles them almost automatically--and not only automatically but instantly. the captain on the bridge, when an emergency confronts him, gives the appropriate order instantly. now the word "machine" conveys to the minds of most of us the image of an engine made of metal, the parts of which are moved by some force, such as the expansive force of steam. but machines were in use long before the steam-engine came, and one of the earliest known to man was man himself--the most perfect machine known to him now, and one of the most complicated and misused; for who of us does not know of some human machine of the most excellent type, that has been ruined by the ignorance or negligence of the man to whose care it was committed? a machine is in its essence an aggregation of many parts, so related to each other and to some external influence, that the parts can be made to operate together, to attain some desired end or object. from this point of view, which the author believes to be correct, a baseball team is a machine, so is a political party, so is any organization. before the days of civilization, machines were few in type; but as civilization progressed, the necessity for organizations of many kinds grew up, and organizations of many kinds appeared. then the necessity for knowledge of how to operate those organizations brought about certain professions, first that of the military, second that of the priesthood, and later those of the law, medicine, engineering, etc. as time has gone on, the preparation required for these professions, especially the progressive professions, has become increasingly difficult and increasingly demanded; and the members of the professions have become increasingly strict in their requirements of candidates for membership. now the profession that is the most strict of all, that demands the greatest variety of qualifications, and the earliest apprenticeship, is the military. the military profession serves on both the land and the sea, in armies and navies; and while both the land and the sea branches are exacting in their demands, the sea or naval branch is the more exacting of the two; by reason of the fact that the naval profession is the more esoteric, the more apart from the others, the more peculiar. in all the naval countries, suitable youths are taken in hand by their governments, and initiated into the "mysteries" of the naval profession--mysteries that would always remain mysteries to them, if their initiation were begun too late in life. many instances are known of men who obtained great excellence in professions which they entered late in life; but not one instance in the case of a man who entered the naval profession late in life. and though some civilian heads of navies have shown great mental capacity, and after--say three years'--incumbency have shown a comprehension of naval matters greater than might have been expected, none has made a record of performance like those of the naval ministers of germany and japan; or of admiral barham, as first lord of the admiralty, or sir john fisher as first sea lord, in england. a navy is so evidently a machine that the expression "naval machine" has often been applied to it. it is a machine that, both in peace and in war, must be handled by one man, no matter how many assistants he may have. if a machine cannot be made to obey the will of one man, it is not one machine. if two men are needed, at least two machines are to be operated; if three men are needed there are at least three machines, etc. one fleet is handled by one man, called the commander-in-chief. if there are two commanders-in-chief, there are two fleets; and these two fleets may act in conjunction, in opposition, or without reference to each other. the fact of a machine being operated by one man does not, however, prevent the machine from comprising several machines, operated by several men. a vessel of war, for instance, is operated as a unit by one man; the words "vessel of war," meaning not only the inert hull, but all the parts of personnel and material that make a vessel of war. the captain does not handle each individual machine or man; but he operates the mechanism and the personnel, by means of which all the machines and men are made to perform their tasks. now the naval machine is composed of many machines, but the machines that have to be "operated" in war, using the word "operated" in the usual military sense, are only the active fleet, the bureaus and offices and the bases; including in the bases any navy-yards within them. using the word "operated" still more technically, the only thing to be operated in war is the fleet: but the head of the navy department must also so direct the logistical efforts of the bureaus and offices and bases, that the fleet shall be given the material in fuel, supplies, and ammunition with which to conduct those operations. like the chief engineer of a ship, he must both operate and maintain the machine. the fleet itself is a complex machine, even in time of peace. in war time it is more so, for the reason that many additions are made to the fleet when war breaks out; and these additions, being largely of craft and men held in reserve, or brought in hurriedly from civil life, cannot be so efficient or so reliable as are the parts of the fleet that existed in time of peace. the active fleet consists of battleships, battle cruisers, cruisers of various speeds and sizes, destroyers, submarines, and aircraft. the fleet is under the immediate command of its commander-in-chief, just as the new york naval station is under the command of its commandant; but the commander-in-chief of the fleet is just as strictly under the command of the head of the admiralty or navy department as is the commandant. the commander-in-chief is the principal part of the naval machine that is operated in war; and the ultimate success of the naval machine in war depends largely on the amount and degree of understanding that exists between the commander-in-chief and the head of the navy department. that goodwill and kindly feeling should exist between them may be assumed, since both have the same object in view; but that real understanding should exist between them is more difficult to assume, especially if they have been trained in different schools and have not known each other until late in life. in the latter case, misunderstandings are apt to arise, as time goes on; and if they do, the most cordial good feeling may change into mutual distrust and suspicion, and even hatred. to see that such things have happened in the past, we do not have to look further back in history than the records of our own civil war, especially the records of the mutual relations of the head of the war department and some generals. that a situation equally grave did not exist between the head of the navy department and any of the admirals may be attributed to the fact that the number of naval defeats was less than the number of defeats on land, to the lesser number of persons in the navy, and to the smaller number of operations. perhaps a still greater reason was the greater confidence shown by civilians in their ability to handle troops, compared with their confidence in their ability to handle fleets. even between the navy department and the officers, however, mutual respect and understanding can hardly be said to have existed. this did not prevent the ultimate triumph of the union navy; but that could hardly have been prevented by any means, since the union navy was so much superior to the confederate. _co-operation between the navy department and the fleet_.--in any war with a powerful navy, into which the u. s. navy may enter, the question of co-operation between the department and the fleet will be the most important factor in the portentous situation that will face us. we shall be confronted with the necessity of handling the most complex and powerful machine known to man with the utmost possible skill; and any lack of understanding between the fleet and the department, and any slowness of apprehension or of action by the department, may cause a national disaster. one of the most important dangers to be guarded against will be loss of time. in naval operations the speed of movement of the forces is so great that crises develop and pass with a rapidity unexampled formerly; so that delays of any kind, or due to any causes, must be prevented if that be possible. if a swordsman directs a thrust at the heart, the thrust must be parried--_in time_. [illustration: strategic map of the atlantic and pacific oceans.] submarine warfare of to-day [illustration: the surrender of the german submarine fleet the white ensign is hoisted over the german eagle. _british official photograph_] submarine warfare of to-day how the submarine menace was met and vanquished, with descriptions of the inventions and devices used, fast boats, mystery ships, nets, aircraft, &c. &c., also describing the selection and training of the enormous personnel used in this new branch of the navy by charles w. domville-fife _lieut. r.n.v.r., late of the staff of h.m. school of submarine mining_ author of "submarines & sea power" "submarines of the world's navies" "submarine engineering of to-day" _&c._ _&c._ _&c._ with illustrations london seeley, service & co. limited great russell street science of to-day series new volume . submarine warfare of to-day. by c. w. domville-fife, lieut., r.n.v.r., late of the staff of h.m. school of submarine mining. author of "submarines and sea power," "submarines of the world's navies," "submarine engineering of to-day," _&c._ _&c._ with many illustrations and diagrams. extra crown vo. s. d. nett. already published . electricity of to-day. by c. r. gibson, f.r.s.e. . astronomy of to-day. by cecil g. dolmage, m.a., d.c.l., ll.d., f.r.a.s. . scientific ideas of to-day. by c. r. gibson. . botany of to-day. by professor g. f. scott elliot, m.a., b.sc. . engineering of to-day. by t. w. corbin. . medical science of to-day. by willmott evans, m.d. . mechanical inventions of to-day. by t. w. corbin. . photography of to-day. by h. chapman jones, f.i.c., f.c.s., f.r.p.s. . submarine engineering of to-day. by c. w. domville-fife. . geology of to-day. by professor j. w. gregory, f.r.s. . aircraft of to-day. by charles c. turner, lieut., r.n.v.r. seeley, service & co., ltd., great russell st. =dedicated= to the memory of the late lieut. walter price, r.n.v.r. a true friend and a gallant officer author's note i desire simply to say that i commenced taking an active interest in submarines in . i wrote my first book on the subject, _submarines of the world's navies_, in , and i have watched and written of the rise of these and kindred weapons for the past fifteen years of rapid development in peace and war, finally taking a humble part in the defeat of the great german submarine armada during the years - . c. d.-f. . introduction while great britain remains an island, with dominion over palm and pine, it is to the sea that her four hundred millions of people must look for the key to all that has been achieved in the past and all that the future promises in the quickening dawn of a new era. not only over great britain alone, however, does the ocean cast its spell, for it is the free highway of the world, sailed by the ships of all nations, without other hindrances than those of stormy nature, and navigated without restriction from pole to pole by the seamen of all races. it was the international meeting-place, where ensigns were "dipped" in friendly greeting, and since the dawn of history there has been a freemasonry of the sea which knew no distinction of nation or creed. when the call of humanity boomed across the dark, storm-tossed waters the answer came readily from beneath whatever flag the sound was heard. but in august, , there came a change, so dramatic, so sudden, that maritime nations were stunned. germany, in an excess of war fever, broke the sea laws, and laughed while women and children drowned. crime followed crime, and the great voice of the republican west protested in unison with that of the imperial east. still the black eagle laughed as it flew far and wide, carrying death to whomsoever came within its shadow, regardless of race and sex. but there was an avenger upon the seas, one who had been rocked in its cradle from time immemorial, and to whom the world appealed to save the lives of their seamen. it sailed beneath the white ensign and the blue, and with aid from france, italy and japan it fought by day and by night, in winter gale and snow, and in summer heat and fog, in torrid zone and regions of perpetual ice to free the seas of the traitorous monster who had, in the twentieth century, hoisted the black flag of piracy and murder. for three years this ceaseless war was waged, and then, with her wonderful patience exhausted, the great sister nation of the mother tongue joined her fleets and armies with those of the battle-worn allies and peace came to a long-suffering world. in that abyss of war there was romance sufficient for many generations of novelists and historians. many were the epic fights, unimportant in themselves, but which need only a kingsley or a stevenson to make them famous for all time. so with the happenings to be described in this book, many of them historically unimportant compared with the epoch-making events of which they formed a decimal part, but told in plain words; just records of romance on england's sea frontier in the years - . although jealous of any encroachment on the space available for the description of guerrilla war at sea, there are many things which must first be said regarding the organisation and training of what may appropriately be termed the "new navy," which took the sea to combat the submarine and the mine; also of the novel weapons devised amid the whirl of war for their use, protection and offensive power. into this brief recital of the events leading to the real thing an endeavour will be made to infuse the life and local colour, which, however, would be more appropriate in a personal narrative than in a general description of anti-submarine warfare of to-day, but without which much that is essential could not be written without dire risk of tiring the reader before the first few chapters had been passed. the names of places and ships have necessarily been changed to avoid anything of a personal character, and all references to existing or dead officers and men have been rigidly excluded as objectionable and unnecessary in a book dealing entirely with events. many of the incidents described--written while the events stood out in clear, mental perspective--could no doubt be duplicated and easily surpassed by many whose fortunes took them into zones of sea war during the historic years just past. if such is found to be the case, then the object of this book has been accomplished, for it sets out to tell, not of great epoch-making events, but of the organisation, men, ships, weapons and ordinary incidents of life in what, for lack of a better term, has been called the "new navy"--a production of the world war. it may be that an apology is due for placing yet another war book before a war-weary public, but an effort has been made to make of the following chapters _a record of british maritime achievement_, more than a narrative of sea fighting, although to do this without introducing the human element, the arduous nature of the work, the monotony, the danger and, finally, the compensating moments of excitement would have been to falsify the account and belittle the achievement. there are many books available, full of exciting stories of sea and land war, but no other, so far as the author knows, which describes in detail and in plain phraseology those important "little things"--liable to be overlooked amid the whirl of war--which go to make an anti-submarine personnel, fleet and base, together with an account of "how it was done." contents chapter page i. the task of the allied navies ii. the new navy--training an anti-submarine force iii. a naval university in time of war iv. the new fleets in being v. the hydrophone and the depth charge vi. some curious weapons of anti-submarine warfare vii. mystery ships viii. a typical war base ix. the convoy system x. the mysteries of submarine hunting explained xi. the mysteries of german mine-laying explained xii. the mysteries of minesweeping explained xiii. the mine barrage xiv. off to the zones of war xv. a memorable christmas xvi. the derelict xvii. mined-in xviii. the casualty xix. how h.m. trawler no. lost her refit xx. the raider xxi. the s.o.s. xxii. in the shadow of a big sea fight xxiii. a night attack xxiv. mysteries of the great sea wastes xxv. from out the clouds and the under-seas xxvi. on the sea flank of the allied armies index list of illustrations surrender of the german submarine fleet _frontispiece_ facing page plan of a feet coastal motor boat large heavily armed german submarine motor launch hulls being constructed a feet coastal motor boat at full speed another view of the same boat at full speed dropping depth charges innocent-looking but deadly hidden torpedo tubes of h.m.s. _hyderabad_ after-deck of the _hyderabad_ (before action) after-deck of the _hyderabad_ (prepared for action) mock wheel and compass pedestal of the _hyderabad_ mock wheel and compass pedestal of the _hyderabad_ (collapsed) motor launch cleared for action a wrecked coastal motor boat captive mine-laying submarine a minesweeper a paravane morse signalling motor launch of the naval patrol a monitor [illustration: plan of feet coastal boat, carrying two -inch torpedoes] submarine warfare of to-day chapter i the task of the allied navies the hour was that of the allies' greatest need--the last months of the year . on that fateful th august the british navy was concentrated in the north sea, and the chance for a surprise attack by the german fleet, or an invasion of england by the kaiser's armies, vanished for ever, and with this one chance went also all reasonable possibility of a crushing german victory. although during the years of bitter warfare which followed this silent _coup de main_ the german fleet many times showed signs of awakening ambition, it did not, after jutland, dare to thrust even its vanguard far into the open sea. behind its forts, mines and submarines it waited, growing weaker with the dry-rot of inaction, for the chance that fickle fortune might place a single unit of the allied fleet within easy reach of its whole mailed-fist. with a great and modern fleet--the second strongest in the world--awaiting its chance less than twenty hours' steam from the coast of great britain, it quickly became evident that the old mistress of the seas would have to call upon her islanders to supply a "new navy" to scour the oceans while her main battle squadrons waited and watched for the second trafalgar. faced, then, with the problem of a long blockade, a powerful fleet in readiness to strike at any weak or unduly exposed point of land or squadron, and with similar problems on a decreasing scale imposed by austria in the adriatic and by turkey behind the dardanelles, the work of the main battle fleets became well defined by the commonest laws of naval strategy. all this without taking into account the widespread menace of submarines and mines, and, in the earlier stages of the war, the rounding-up of detached enemy squadrons, such as that under von spee in south american waters, and the protection of the transport and food ships from raiders like the _wolfe_ and the _moewe_. the german high command realised this as quickly as that of the allies. their oversea commerce was strangled within a few days of the declaration of war with great britain, and their fleet was confined to harbour, with the exception of occasional operations against russia in the baltic. from the german standpoint the naval problem resolved itself into one of how best to strike at the lines of communication of the allies, paying special attention, first, to the transport of troops, and, second, to england's food supply. as they alone knew to what extent they would violate the laws of war and of humanity, it became apparent that the submarine and the mine were the only possible weapons which could be used for this purpose in face of the superior fleets of the allies. but the number of these weapons was strictly limited compared with the immense shipping resources at the command of the western powers, so one submarine must do the work of many, and an effort was made to accomplish this by a reign of sea terrorism and inhuman conduct unparalleled in the history of the world. it opened with the sinking of the _lusitania_. the allies had secured and maintained the command of the sea, and _all that it implies_, but to do this with the certainty of correct strategy they had to dedicate almost their entire battle fleet to the purpose for which battle fleets have always been intended--the checkmating or annihilation of the opposing navy. there came a second problem, however, one entirely new to sea warfare, and unconsidered or provided against in its strategic and tactical entirety because hitherto deemed too inhuman for modern war. this was the ruthless use of armed submarines against unarmed passenger and merchant ships, and the scattering broadcast over the seas, regardless of the lives and property of neutrals, of thousands of explosive mines. the type of ship constructed exclusively for open sea warfare against surface adversaries was not the best answer to the submarine. the blockading of the hostile surface fleet did not prevent, or even greatly hinder, the free passage of submarine flotillas, and the building by germany of under-water mine-layers enabled fields of these weapons to be laid anywhere within the carrier's radius of action. in this way the second, or submarine, phase of the naval war opened, and it was to supplement the comparatively few fast destroyers and other suitable ships which could be spared from the main fleets that the "new navy" was formed. the ships the area of the north sea alone exceeds , square miles, and when the whole vast stretch of water encompassed by what was known as the radius of action of hostile submarines, from their bases on the german, belgian, austrian, turkish and bulgarian coasts, had to be considered as a possible zone of operations for german and austrian under-water flotillas, much of the water surface of the world was included. likewise the network of sea communications on which the allies depended for the maintenance of essential transport and communication comprised the pathways of the seven seas. to patrol all these routes adequately, and to guard the food and troop ships, hastening in large numbers to the aid of the motherland from the most distant corners of the earth; to protect the miles sea frontier of the british isles; to give timely aid to sinking or hard-pressed units of the mercantile fleet; to hound the submarine from the under-seas and to sweep clear, almost weekly, several thousand square miles of sea, from belle isle to cape town and the orkneys to colombo, required ships, not in tens, but in thousands. to find these in an incredibly short space of time became the primary naval need of the moment. who that lived through those days will forget the struggle to supply ships and guns? the searching of every harbour for craft, from motor boats to old-time sailing-ships, and from fishing craft to liners. the scouring of the dominions and colonies. how blessed was their aid! help, generous and spontaneous, came from all quarters, including the most unexpected. over five hundred fast patrol boats, or motor launches, in less than twelve months from canada and america. guns from japan. coasting steamers from india, australia, new zealand and south africa. seaplanes from the crown colonies. rifles from canada. machine guns from the united states. ambulances from english and colonial women's leagues. in fact, contributions to the "new navy" from all corners of the earth. to patrol the coasts of britain alone, and to keep its harbours and coastal trade routes clear of mines, needed over ships, with at least an equal number of guns, , rifles and revolvers, and millions of shells. in addition to this huge fleet other smaller squadrons were required for the mediterranean, the suez canal and red sea, the east and west indies, the coasts of the dominions and colonies, and for the russian lines of communication in the white sea. for these oversea bases just under ships were required, exclusive of those locally supplied by the dominions and colonies themselves. all this without considering the main battle fleets or, in fact, any portion of the regular navy, and the ships required for the transport of food, troops and munitions of war, together with their escorts. some idea of the numbers engaged in keeping the allies supplied with the diverse necessities of life and war may be gathered from the fact that the average sailings in and out of the harbours of the united kingdom alone during the four years of war amounted to over a week. the immense fleet forming the new navy was not homogeneous in design, power, appearance or, in fact, in anything except the spirit of the personnel and the flag beneath which they fought--and alas! nearly died. the squadrons, or units, as they were called, consisted of fine steam yachts, liners from the ocean trade routes, sturdy sea tramps, deep-sea trawlers, oilers, colliers, drifters, paddle steamers, and the more uniform and specially built fighting sloops, whalers, motor launches and coastal motor boats. the latter type of craft was aided by its great speed, nearly fifty miles an hour; but more about these ships and their curious armament later. war bases the great auxiliary navy had to be built or obtained without depleting the ordinary mercantile fleets, and the shipbuilding and repairing yards, even in the smallest sea and river ports, worked day and night. the triumph was as wonderful as it was speedy. in less than fifteen months from august, , the new navy was a gigantic force, and its operations extended from the arctic sea to the equator. all units were armed, manned and linked up by wireless and a common cause. before this could be accomplished, however, the problem of maintaining this vast fleet and adequately controlling its operations had to be faced and overcome. the seas adjacent to the coasts of the united kingdom, the mediterranean littoral and colonial waters were divided into "patrol areas" on special secret charts, and each "area" had its own naval base, with harbour, stores, repairing and docking facilities, intelligence centre, wireless and signal stations, reserve of officers and men, social headquarters, workshops and medical department. each base was under the command of an admiral and staff, many of the former returning to duty, after several years of well-earned rest, as captains and commodores, with salaries commensurate with their reduced rank. their staffs consisted of some six to twelve officers of the new navy, with possibly one or two from the "pukka service," and their command often extended over many hundreds of square miles of submarine and mine infested sea. of these bases, which will be fully described in later chapters, there were about fifty, excluding the great dockyards and fleet headquarters, but inclusive of those situated overseas. when it is considered what a war base needs to make it an efficient rendezvous for some hundreds of ships and thousands of men, some idea of the gigantic task of organisation which their establishment, often in poorly equipped harbours and distant islands, required, not only in the first instance, but also with regard to maintenance and supplies, will be realised, perhaps, however, more fully when it is stated that the average ship needs a month spent in docking and overhauling at least once a year, and that the delicate and more speedy units of such a fleet need nearly four times that amount of attention. headquarters staff one of the first requisites of the auxiliary navy was the creation of a headquarters staff at the admiralty, london. this was formed from naval officers of experience both in the regular service and in the two reserves (r.n.r. and r.n.v.r.). forming an integral part of the great british or allied armada, all operations were under the control of the naval war staff, but for purposes of more detailed organisation and administration additional departments were created which exercised direct jurisdiction over their respective fleets. the principal of these was known as the "auxiliary patrol office," under the fourth sea lord and the department of the director of minesweeping. these formed a part of the general staff--if a military term is permissible--and both issued official publications periodically throughout the war, which served to keep the staffs of all the different war bases and the commanding officers of the thousands of ships informed as to current movements and ruses of the enemy. it is unnecessary to detail more closely the work of these departments, especially as much has yet to be said before plunging into the maelstrom of war. a sufficient indication of the colossal nature of the work they were called upon to perform will be found in a moment's reflection of what the administration and control of such a large and nondescript fleet, spread over the world--from the white sea to the east indies--must have meant to the small staff allowed by the exigencies of an unparalleled war. officers and men the greatest problem in modern naval war is, undoubtedly, the supply of trained men. for this reason it has been left to the last to describe how the difficulty was faced and overcome by england and her oversea dominions in . before doing so, however, it may be of interest to give here a few extracts from an excellent little official publication, showing how the british fleet was manned and expanded in bygone days of national peril[ ]: "in time of war there has always been an intimate connection between the royal navy and the merchant service. latterly, and more especially since the russian war of to , this fact tended to be forgotten, partly because men-of-war developed on particular lines and became far more unlike merchantmen than they had ever been before, and also because, by the introduction of continuous service, the personnel of the navy seemed to have developed into a separate caste, distinguished by its associations, traditions and _esprit de corps_, as much by its special training and qualifications, from other seafaring men. this war has proved once again, to such as needed proof, that the two services cannot exist without each other, and that the sea power of the empire is not its naval strength alone, but its maritime strength. even at the risk of insisting on the obvious, it is necessary to repeat that, for an island empire, a war at sea cannot be won merely by the naval action which defeats the enemy; naval successes are of value for the fruit they bear, the chief of which is the power that they give to the victor to maintain his own sea-borne trade and to interrupt that of the enemy. "an elementary way of looking at the problems of manning the royal navy and the merchant service is to consider that there is in the country a common stock of seamen, on which both can draw. but this theory, like many others equally obvious and tempting, has the disadvantage that it leaves important factors out of account and, if worked out, results in an absurdity. thus, shortly before war began there were in the country some , seamen, of whom one-third were in the navy and two-thirds engaged in merchant ships and fishing vessels. there was no considerable body of unemployed seamen. during the war the personnel of the navy was expanded to something like the , which represents the common stock of seamen. therefore, if the theory met the case, there would have been no men left for the merchant service. but the merchant ships, in spite of difficulty and danger, continued to run, employing great numbers of men. and we must not forget to take into account the number of men, amounting to , killed and prisoners of war, who have been lost in the two services during the war. so it comes to this, that the common stock of seamen, or at least of men fit to man ships, has expanded during the war by more than per cent. whence came these extra men? clearly for the most part from the non-seafaring classes. "the navy in november, , employed some , officers and men from the merchant service--viz. , r.n.r. ratings, , trawler reserve, and , mercantile seamen and firemen on transport agreements, plus the officers. if the supposition, made in the absence of statistics, is correct that at this time the number of men in the merchant service itself had decreased proportionately to the loss of tonnage, it would seem that the merchant service needed no considerable inflow of men during the war. in other words, most of those added to the stock of seamen during the war must have gone into the navy. this corresponds with known fact: the navy has, in addition to the reserve men already mentioned, nearly , men to demobilise in order to put its personnel on the footing on which it stood when war broke out. "it will be of interest to see how the personnel of the navy expanded in former wars, and how at the peace it was invariably reduced to something like its pre-war figures. this can readily be done in tabular form: naval personnel (_numbers voted_) year name of war before war maximum after the during war peace } , -- -- }league of augsburg -- , -- } -- -- , } , -- -- }spanish succession -- , -- } -- -- , }austrian , -- -- }succession -- , -- } -- -- , } , -- -- }seven years' war -- , -- } -- -- , }american , -- -- }independence -- , -- } -- -- , }french , -- -- }revolution -- , -- } -- -- , } , -- -- }napoleonic war -- , -- } -- -- , } , -- -- }russian war -- , -- } -- -- , }the present war , -- -- } -- , -- "it appears at once from these figures that the naval expansion during earlier wars was in most cases much greater proportionately than it has been in this. roughly the personnel in this war has been multiplied by three; in earlier wars it was increased six, seven, eight, or even nine fold, if we take the difference between the figures for and . "it is a common error to suppose that our ships in the old wars were manned entirely by seamen. a knowledge of how the men were raised shows that this cannot have been so; and confirmation can be had from a very brief study of ships' muster books. only about a third of the crew of a line-of-battle ship were, in the seaman's phrase, 'prime seamen.' the rest were either only partly trained or were frankly not sailor men. the _victory_ at trafalgar was not an ill-manned ship--here is an analysis of her crew: officers, commissioned and warrant, ; petty officers, including marines, ; able seamen, ; ordinary seamen and boys, ; landsmen, ; marines, ; artificers, ; quarter gunners, ; supernumeraries and domestics, . "during the whole of our naval history down to it was the invariable rule that in peace time the battle fleets were laid up unmanned, and only enough ships were kept in commission to 'show the flag' and to police the sea. this accounts for the very large increase of the naval personnel which immediately became necessary when there was a threat of war; and it accounts also for the difficulty which was always experienced in raising the men. this difficulty was even greater than we are apt to suppose, for the merchant service has never been able to give the navy more than a fraction of the total number of men needed, and the machinery for raising extra men has, until this war, always been of a most primitive nature. "when war came the ships were commissioned, without crews. this could be done because from the latter part of the seventeenth century there was a permanent force of officers. then the officers had to find their own crews. they began by drawing their proportion of marines, and then proceeded to invite seamen to volunteer. in this way they got a number of skilled seamen, men who had been in the navy before, and came back to it either as petty officers or in the hope of becoming so. then warrants to impress seamen would be issued. theoretically the impress was merely a form of conscription, the crown claiming by prerogative the right to the services of its seafaring subjects. practically a good deal of violence was at times necessary, as many of the men, preferring to sail in merchant ships, or wishing to wait for a proclamation of bounty, tried to avoid arrest. the scuffles that took place on these occasions gave the impress service a bad name, not altogether deserved, for real efforts were made to avoid hardship, and in any case the number of men raised in this way was greatly exaggerated by popular report." there was no compulsion during the great war to join any unit of the british fleet. therefore all were either in the regular service, reservists or volunteers. the need was made known not only throughout the british isles, but also from vancouver to cape town, sydney and wellington, and men in all walks of life, but with either the _wander-lust_ or true love of the wide open sea in their blood, rallied from all parts of the far-flung empire to the call of the white ensign. in order to obtain some officers and nearly , trained or semi-trained men, new sources of supply had to be tapped. already the great battle fleets, brought up to full war strength and with adequate reserves, had absorbed nearly all the reserve officers who could be spared from the food and troop transports.[ ] first came the great sea-training establishment of the empire--the mercantile marine and its retired officers and men--already heavily depleted. then the yacht clubs from the fraser to the thames and clyde. thousands of professionals and amateurs came overseas to the training cruisers and the "naval university," canada alone supplying several hundred officers. doctors came from the hospitals and from lucrative private practices. the engineering professions and trades supplied the technical staffs and skilled mechanics. the great banks and city offices yielded the accountants, and the fishing and pleasure-boating communities, not only of great britain, but also of the dominions and colonies, yielded the men in tens of thousands. in this way the personnel of the new navy was completed in a very few months. before passing on to describe, in the detail of personal acquaintance, the severe training of this naval force, a general knowledge of its heterogeneous character is necessary to enable the reader to understand this great assemblage of the sons of the empire. [illustration: a large and heavily armed german submarine of the cruiser type _british official photograph_] in the smoke-filled wardroom and gunroom of the training cruiser, h.m.s. _hermione_ one windy march evening in there were some eighty officers of the auxiliary fleet, and of this number one hailed from distant rhodesia, where he was the owner of thousands of acres of land and a goodly herd of cattle, but who, some time in the past, had rounded the horn in a _wind-jammer_ and taken _sights_ in the "roaring forties." another was a seascape painter of renown both in england and the united states. a third was a member of a pacific coast yacht club. a fourth was the son of an irish peer, the owner of a steam yacht. then came a london journalist, a barrister, a solicitor and a new zealand yachtsman, while sitting at the table was a famous traveller and a _pukka_ commander. in the neighbouring gunroom, among the crowd of sub-lieutenants--all of the same great force, the royal naval volunteer reserve--was a grey-haired veteran from the canadian lakes, a youngster from the clyde, the son of a shipowner from australia and a bronzed mine manager from the witwatersrand. among the engineers and mechanics the same diversity. men from several of the great engineering establishments, a student from a north country university, electrical engineers from the power stations and mechanics from the bench, with here and there one or two with sea-going experience. in the forecastle and elsewhere about the old cruiser--now merely a training establishment--were sailors with years of experience in both sail and steam. fishermen from the hebrides and newfoundland rubbing shoulders with yacht hands from the solent and clyde. from this curiously mixed but excellent raw material a naval personnel, with its essential knowledge and discipline, had to be fashioned in record time by an incredibly small staff of commissioned and warrant officers of the permanent service, aided by the more experienced amateurs. it must, however, not be thought from this that the amateur was converted into a professional seaman in the space of a week or two. three months of specialised training enabled them to take their place in the new fleet, but with some it required a much longer period to enable them to feel that perfect self-confidence when _alone_ in the face of difficulties and dangers which is the true heritage of the sea. to describe here the training of officers and men would be to repeat what will be more fully and personally described in succeeding chapters. it is sufficient to say that the aim was to bring them all to a predetermined standard of efficiency, which would enable the officers to command ships of specific types at sea and in action, and the men to form efficient engineers and deck hands for almost any ship in the navy. the medical branches naturally required no special training and the accountants merely a knowledge of naval systems of financial and general administration. these two branches had their own training establishments. when the period of preliminary training in the cruiser _hermione_ was over the officers were passed on to the royal naval college at greenwich, and from there to one or other of the fifty war bases in the united kingdom, the mediterranean or farther afield. their appointments were to ships forming the fleets attached to each of these bases and generally operating in the surrounding seas. in this way the whole zone of war was covered by an anti-submarine and minesweeping organisation and general naval patrol, which operated in conjunction with, but separate from, the battle fleets, squadrons and flotillas, which were thus left free to perform their true functions in big naval engagements. footnotes: [ ] extract from _naval demobilisation_--issued by the ministry of reconstruction. [ ] the personnel of the new navy consisted of r.n., r.n.r. and r.n.v.r. officers. the former came mostly from the retired list. the r.n.r. needed training only in such subjects as gunnery, tactics, etc. the training of the r.n.v.r. is here described. chapter ii the new navy--training an anti-submarine force having described the _raison d'être_ of the new navy, and how it became a fleet in being, with its own admirals, captains, staffs, bases and all the paraphernalia of war, i can pass on to a more intimate description of the training of the officers and men, preparatory to their being drafted to the scattered units of this great anti-submarine force. lying in the spacious docks at southampton was the old -ton cruiser _hermione_, which had been brought round from her natural base in portsmouth dockyard to act as the depot ship and training establishment for a large section of this new force. not all the officers and men of the auxiliary fleet were, however, destined to pass across its decks. this vessel was reserved for the royal naval volunteer reserve, from which a very considerable proportion of the entire personnel of the new fleet was drawn. nor was h.m.s. _hermione_ the first depot ship of the war-time r.n.v.r. at southampton, for the admiralty yacht _resource ii._ had been used for the first few drafts, but was unfortunately burned to the water's edge. there were also other vessels and establishments at portsmouth, devonport and chatham. these were, however, mainly for the reception and brief training of the more experienced merchant service officers, entered in the royal naval reserve for the duration of the war, and for the surgeons and accountants. the men of the new force were mostly trained in the naval barracks and depot ships situated at the big naval centres, such as portsmouth and chatham. after a few weeks all these establishments were drafting, in a constant stream, the trained human element to the vessels awaiting full complements at the different war bases, or being constructed in the hundreds of shipyards of the empire. about h.m.s. _hermione_, which has been selected as being representative of the training depots of a large section of the auxiliary service, little need be said, beyond the fact that she was commanded, first, by a distinguished officer from the dardanelles, and subsequently by an equally capable officer, who, by the irony of fate, had in pre-war times been a member of the british naval mission to the turkish navy--both of them men whose experience and unfailing tact contributed largely to the success of the thousands of embryo officers trained under their command. the ship herself was a rambling old cruiser, but very little of the actual training was carried out on board. spacious buildings on the quayside provided the training grounds for gunnery, drill, signalling, engineering and all the complicated curricula, of which more anon. lying in the still waters of the dock, alongside the comparatively big grey cruiser, were the trim little hulls of a numerous flotilla of -knot motor launches, newly arrived from canada, with wicked-looking -pounder high-angle guns, stumpy torpedo-boat masts and brand-new white ensigns and brass-bound decks. these were the advance guard of a fleet of over similar craft, to the command of which many of the officers being trained would, after a period of practical experience at sea, eventually succeed. there were besides numerous other mosquito craft, which throbbed in and out of the dock from that vast sheltered arm of the sea called _southampton water_ on mysterious errands, soon to be solved by new recruits in the chilly winds of winter nights and early mornings. this, then, was the mother ship and her children. when once the aft gangway leading up from the dockside to the clean-scrubbed decks had been crossed, and the sentry's challenge answered, the embryo officer left civilian life behind and commenced his training for the stern work of war. it may not be out of place to give here a closer description of the training of the officers and men of the new navy, drawn from personal experience. to do this without the irritating egoism of the personal narrative it will be necessary, as often in future pages, to adopt the convenient "third person." * * * * * the night was fine, but a keen march wind blew from off the sea. the dock lights were reflected in the still waters of the harbour. tall cranes stood out black and clearly defined against the cold night sky. the shadows were deep around the warehouses, stores and other buildings of the busy dockside. lying in the south-western basin was the big grey hull of the cruiser, newly painted, and looking very formidable, with its tall masts and fighting-tops towering into the blue void, and its massive bow rising high above the dock wall. coming from the darkness on board were the tinkling notes of a banjo and the subdued hum of voices. then the loud call of the quartermaster and the ringing of eight bells. a group of newly appointed officers picked their way carefully among the tangled mooring ropes on the quayside and as they approached the warship were duly challenged by the sentries. two of them had only just arrived from distant new zealand. they were all "for training," and on mounting the quarterdeck gangway were politely requested by the smiling quartermaster to report at the ship's office. in order to get from the deck to this abode of paymasters and writers, except by the tabooed "captain's hatchway," there had to be negotiated a long passage leading past the wardroom and the gunroom. in normal times at such an hour this passage would probably have been almost deserted, with the exception of a sentry, but the training was being speeded up to meet the demands of war, and with nearly officers, many of whom fortunately lived ashore, constantly moving to and fro, it became either a semi-dark, congested thoroughfare, in which everyone was curtly apologising for knocking against someone else, or else it contained the steady pressure of a gunroom overflow meeting, with a tobacco-scented atmosphere peculiarly its own. when the formality of reporting arrival had been completed, the embryo officers were taken in tow by the "officer of the day," whose duty it was to introduce them to the gunroom and make them familiar in a general way with the routine of the ship. the officer who performed this ceremony on the night in question has since held a highly responsible post at the admiralty--such is the fortune of war. the first shock came when the work for the following day was explained. it commenced with physical drill on the quayside at a.m. and ended with instruction in signalling at p.m.! . . . . . . . . the early morning was bitterly cold but fine. physical "jerks" was not a dress parade; in fact, some of the early risers on the surrounding transports and ocean mail boats must have wondered what particular form of mania the crowd of running, leaping and arm-swinging men, in all stages of undress on the quayside, really suffered from. breakfast and divisions were the next items on the programme, and the new-comers looked forward to the day's work with the keen interest of freshness. _morning divisions_ and _evening quarters_ are events of some importance in the daily routine of his majesty's ships. they are parades of the entire ship's company, with the exception of those on important duty, marking the beginning and end of the day's work. the crew, or men under training, are mustered in "watches," under their respective officers, and stand to attention at the bugle call. the senior officer taking divisions then enters, a roll is called and the names of those absent reported. the chaplain stands between the lines of men; the order "off caps!" is given and prayers commence. when these are finished certain orders of the day are read out to the assembled ship's company and the parade is over. at evening quarters, on certain days in the week, the names were read out of the officers and men detailed for special duties or for draft to a zone of war. when morning divisions were over the day's work began. the embryo officers were attached to the seamanship class, consisting of about twenty men of all ages. oilskins were donned, for the sky was overcast and the wind keen. they climbed down the steel sides of the cruiser on to the small deck of a tender, which was to convey them out on to the broad but sheltered waters where much of the preliminary practical training was to take place during the following weeks. the instructor, an officer attached for the purpose, then divided his class into two "watches," one being directed to work out the proposed course of the ship on the charts in the cabin and to give the necessary orders to the other watch on deck, who were to carry them into effect as the ship steamed along, with the aid of sextant, compass, wheel, engine-room telegraph, lead and log-line. as all possessed some knowledge of the sea, and had experience in navigating, this work did not prove as difficult as it undoubtedly would to anyone entirely devoid of nautical knowledge. those in the cabin with the charts worked out the compass courses from one point to another, making the necessary allowances for tide, deviation, etc. others of the same watch received reports from the "bridge" and made the correct entries in the log-book. all elementary work, but which needed practice to make perfect, and on the accuracy of which men's lives would depend in the very near future. the watch on deck was engaged in the more practical work of coastal navigation and could see the effect of any mistake made theoretically by their companions below. at midday the watches were reversed. those working at the charts and courses came on deck and the seamen of the morning became the navigating officers of the afternoon. on this particular day the second or port watch had the worst of it. a squally wind and rain had set in, making the work on deck thoroughly wet and uncomfortable. an hour or so later the small ship was rolling and pitching and everyone was drenched. the lead was kept going by hands numb with cold--a foretaste of the long and bitter days and nights to be afterwards spent in wintry seas. the training cruises were continued for many days and were interspersed with lectures on the elements of good seamanship, the more advanced theory and practice of navigation being left for a later course at the royal naval college, greenwich. after seamanship came gunnery. each of the different types of heavy but finely made weapons had to be learned in detail--a feat of memory when it came to the watch-like mechanism of the maxim. guns were disabled and had to be put right. they missed fire and were made by the instructors--old naval gunners--to play every dastardly trick conceivable. the final test which had to be successfully passed was the dismantling of each type of gun used in the auxiliary fleet and the reassembling of it. with gunnery came also the marks and uses of the different kinds of ammunition, the systems of "spotting" and "range-finding." every gun had its officer crew and the rapidity of fire was recorded. each man in turn was chosen to give the necessary orders and to judge the ranges and deflections. in this way not only was the practical work learned by heart, but also the theory of naval gunnery, so far as it related to the smaller types of weapon. the use of the depth charge, both mechanically and tactically, was expounded and practically demonstrated, together with that of the torpedo, the mine, mine laying and sweeping, and the peculiarities of various explosives. rifle and revolver practice was encouraged, and morse and semaphore signalling formed part of the daily routine. the training was not entirely preparatory for work afloat. squad and company drill, rifle and bayonet exercise, and manoeuvring in extended order formed a part of the comprehensive training. one day, not many weeks after their arrival, the officers whose fortunes have been followed found themselves shouting orders and directing by arm and whistle lines of dusty _camarades_ advancing over a common in the most approved military fashion. the training was not all hard work. the gathering of so many men from all quarters of the world, with a wealth of experience and adventure behind them, was in itself a source of mutual interest--and incidentally an education in modern british imperialism. scarcely any part of the world went for long unrepresented in either the wardroom or gunroom of the old cruiser _hermione_ in those days of war, and many were the yarns told of alaska days, hunting in africa, experiences in remote corners of north america, pearling in the pacific and life on the indian frontier, to say nothing of wild nights on the seven seas. grey heads and round, boyish faces, the university and the frontier, with a camaraderie seldom equalled. the period of training in the old cruiser was drawing to a close when each officer was appointed to "boat duty." there were five launches on duty at a time, and their crews had to be instantly ready day and night. the most coveted were the two -knot boats, used almost exclusively for the conveyance of pilots to and from the hospital ships and transports. then came the patrol boat, a slow old tub with a comfortable cabin, and work out on southampton water at night. the three "duty boats" were for emergency use and were held at the disposal of the naval transport officer. the duties on each boat varied and were in the nature of training. the pilot boat was required to lie alongside the cutter, out beyond the harbour, and to convey the pilots at high speed to and from the stream of shipping. it was a pleasant duty which entailed alternate nights in the generous, breezy company of the old sea-dogs of the cutter, with occasional races at half-a-mile a minute through the darkness and spray to the moving leviathans of the ocean. the patrol ambled up and down the sheltered waterways during the day and night, examining the "permits" of fishermen and preventing the movement of small craft during the hours of darkness, when the long lines of troop-ships were leaving for france. the work of the duty boats varied from day to day, but there was always the morning and evening mail to be collected from and delivered to the ships of the auxiliary fleet lying out in the fair-way. when this spell of water-police work was over there came a few days' practice in the handling of the fast sea-going patrol launches, or "m.l.'s," about which so much has since been written in the daily papers. after the cramming received in the lecture-rooms, the arduous drill and the somewhat monotonous work on the slow-moving tenders, the runs seaward on these new and trim little vessels, the manoeuvring at nineteen knots, the breeze of passage and the feeling of controlled power acted as an elixir on both mind and body. then came firing practice in the open sea. the sharp crack of cordite, the tongues of livid flame, the scream of the shells, the white splashes of the ricochet and the salt sea breezes. two days later the preliminary training was over and there loomed ahead a period of hard study at the royal naval college. chapter iii a naval university in time of war built by king charles i. for the stuart navy, and used for over two and a half centuries as the university of the senior service, the royal naval college, greenwich, is a building with an historic past. it has housed, fed and taught many of england's most illustrious sailors. it was to cabin and lecture hall in this fine old building that officers of the new navy went to complete their knowledge of navigation and kindred subjects when their preliminary sea training came to a close. there is but little romance in a highly specialised course of study designed to enable the recipients to find their way with safety, both in sunshine and storm, over the vast water surface of the world. to describe here the subjects taught would only be wearisome and uninteresting. sufficient to say that the course was a most comprehensive one and admirably arranged by masters of the mariner's art. if any fault can be found it is certainly not one of paucity of information, and the proof of its efficacy can be found in the fact that, so far as the author knows, there was not a single ship, afterwards commanded by officers who underwent this training, lost through insufficient knowledge of the art of navigation. the days spent in the naval college were fully occupied by attendance at lectures and the evenings in private study and the preparation of elaborate notes and sketches for the final passing-out examination. there was one moment of each day which was rendered historic by old custom. it came at the conclusion of dinner in the big white hall, when the officer whose turn it happened to be rose to his feet and gave the toast of the navy--"gentlemen, the king!" it was in the grounds of this college that many officers saw their first zeppelin raid. on one occasion it occurred late in the fourth week of the course. nearly all were in their respective studies, surrounded by a mass of papers, charts, drawing instruments and books, making the last determined attack on various knotty problems previous to the final examination. ten p.m. had just been registered by the electric clocks in the famous observatory overlooking the college, when the sound of running feet came down the long corridors. a stentorian voice shouted: "all lights out!" in a moment the whole building, with its labyrinth of corridors, was plunged into ethiopian darkness. doors were opened and a jostling crowd of men groped their way down passages and stone staircases into the grounds. here the admiral and his staff were making sure that no lights were visible. traffic in the near-by thoroughfare had been stopped, and all around lay the great metropolis, oppressively dark and still. a searchlight flashed heavenwards and was followed by other beams. all of these suddenly concentrated on the gleaming white hull of a zeppelin, high in the indigo sky. the ground trembled under the fire of the anti-aircraft batteries. shells whistled and moaned over the college and bright flashes came from little puffs of white smoke high in the central blue. dull-sounding but earth-shaking booms came from different points as the airship dropped her deadly cargo. shrapnel fell on the congested house-tops with a peculiar hiss and thud and ambulances rumbled over the stone-paved high-road. it was a small incident and scarcely worth the space required for its recording, but it served a purpose--to steel the heart and steady the hand for the time to come. chapter iv the new fleets in being back once again on the old cruiser with training completed and awaiting draft to the zones of war. then came the sailing orders. the name of each officer was called in turn and he disappeared into the ship's office, to return a few minutes later carrying a sheaf of white and blue admiralty orders, his face grave or gay according to destination. some were for the spanish main and bemoaned their fate at being ordered to a station so remote from the principal zone of war. others were destined for the mediterranean and comforted themselves with hopes that trouble was brewing elsewhere than in the adriatic, to which a lucky few were appointed. the suez canal and egypt claimed their share, but by far the greater number were bound for the misty northern seas. about the training given to the , men little can be said here because of its diversity. they came as volunteers from all quarters of the globe, were collected at the great depots in portsmouth, chatham and devonport, were trained in the art of signalling, squad drill, gunnery, seamanship and the hundred and one things required by the "handy man," then belched forth into the ships. some had sailed the sea for years before in vessels of all kinds and needed little more than the sense of cohesion and unquestioning obedience imparted by discipline and drill. others knew more of the working of a loom, or the extraction of coal, than of seamanship, and spent a cheerful but arduous few months in training depots and on special ships completing their education. cooks there were who could make little else besides scotch broth, while others, the engineers--or motor mechanics, as they were called when appointed to some of the petrol-driven patrol boats--knew their profession or trade better than they could be taught, and proved themselves untiring and indomitable when it came to the real thing--as will be seen later. having now described the training of both officers and men, we come to the ships they were called upon to navigate down to the seas of adventure. armed liners to set on record the formation of the ships of the new navy in divisions, squadrons or units, and to classify them here under separate headings--an easy enough matter with regular fleets constructed for definite duties--is a task of considerable difficulty with a heterogeneous fleet composed of several thousand vessels with seldom two alike. beginning with the ocean liners, as the largest and most powerfully armed of the new fleet: these were mostly grouped for administrative purposes in one large formation, known as the "tenth cruiser squadron." but when at sea they operated in smaller units and frequently as single ship patrols. their principal zone of activity was the vast stretch of arctic sea extending from norway and north russia to iceland, the hebrides and labrador. their work was arduous in the extreme, as will easily be realised from the nature of the seas in which they primarily operated. strictly speaking, were distinct divisions possible, the tenth cruiser squadron did not form part of the auxiliary navy in its true sense, although many of the officers and men were drawn from newly raised corps. it acted rather as a distinct patrol fleet, filling the wide gap of sea between scotland and the arctic ice. fighting sloops next in order of importance came the newly built screw sloops, with powerful guns and engines. their numbers varied and they were continually being added to. some of these vessels were used for patrol duties and others for minesweeping. the sloop flotillas had many zones of activity. one was the north atlantic, with special care for the coast of ireland. another was the north sea, with a marked preference for the east coast of scotland and the straits of dover. these flotillas also were frequently assigned duties independent of the auxiliary patrol organisation, but nevertheless formed an important part of the vast anti-submarine and anti-mine navy. in the mediterranean also there were a number of patrol gunboats and minesweepers similar to the fighting sloops. their principal base in this region was on italian soil. armed yachts we now come to that portion of the auxiliary fleet whose special care was the seas around the united kingdom and the colonies. first came the armed yachts, over in number, with tonnages varying from one to five hundred. these were obtained from the owners, armed as heavily as their size and strength permitted, and mostly became the flag-ships of patrol flotillas. they were nearly always equipped with wireless, hydrophone listening apparatus, depth charges and all the appliances for anti-submarine warfare. their losses were not heavy considering the dangerous nature of their work and could almost be counted on the fingers of both hands. this was due mainly to their good speed and manoeuvring qualities. they made wonderfully efficient auxiliary warships, maintaining the sea in almost all weathers and accounting for quite a number of u-boats. these vessels were, of course, never used for the rougher work of minesweeping. whalers the whalers were few in number and resembled small destroyers. they were powerful craft and well armed, but their sea-keeping qualities left much to be desired. in fact, to use a naval term, they were dirty boats even in a "lop." it was said that if an officer or man had been for long in one of these ships he was proof against all forms of sea-sickness. a big assertion, as even old sailors will admit--but they call it "liver." minesweepers about the screw and paddle minesweepers little can be said beyond the fact that they numbered about and performed some of the most dangerous work in the war. many of them were old passenger steamers from the clyde, bristol channel, thames and south and east coast resorts, the famous _brighton queen_ being, until her untimely end on a mine off the belgian coast, one of their number. the loss among this class of ship was about per cent. trawlers by far the largest portion of the auxiliary patrol units consisted of armed and commissioned trawlers. their numbers far exceeded , and nearly half were used for the dangerous work of minesweeping. about a trawler little need be said, for beyond what can be seen in the accompanying illustrations there is little of interest until we come to the question of their curious arms and appliances, fit subjects for a special chapter. a large number of these units were fitted with wireless and carried masked batteries of quick-firing guns. to give here their zones of operation would be to set out in detail not only the seas around the british isles, but distant waters such as the mediterranean and the white sea. they had distinct duties to perform, which may be summed up as follows:--( ) minesweeping; ( ) night and day patrols alone or in company over immense areas of sea; ( ) convoy duty; and ( ) fishery guard. their losses were heavy, both in ships and men, amounting to about per cent. many were the lonely sea fights engaged in by these vessels. a few will receive the praise they deserve and the remainder will rest content with the knowledge of duty done. drifters if numbers or losses were the dominant factors the armed drifters should be high in the list. there were engaged considerably over of these craft, and the losses amounted to about per cent. it may be necessary to inform some of my readers that a drifter is not necessarily a vessel that is content to start out on a voyage and rely on _drifting_ to its destination, as its name implies. the term is derived from the drift nets used by these vessels for fishing in time of peace. they are, in almost all respects, small editions of the deep-sea trawler--_minus_ the powerful steam-driven winch for hauling in the trawl nets. [illustration: some of the motor launch hulls being constructed on the banks of the st. lawrence river, canada _yachting monthly_] for war purposes the holds of these, and many other types of auxiliary warships, were converted into officers' cabins, or gun platforms for masked batteries. a few carried special nets in which to entangle the wily "fritz." others had aboard special types of submarine mines, and one, commanded by the author, was used for the transport of wounded from admiral sir david beatty's flag-ship, h.m.s. _lion_, after the jutland fight. these were, as might be expected, good sea boats, and carried out duties of great danger and value. several hundred were fitted with wireless. their zone of operations was far flung, extending from the arctic circle to the equator. it was, however, in the unequal fights with german destroyers in the straits of dover and with austrian torpedo boat destroyers in the adriatic that they made a name for valour. in two of these engagements no less than six and fourteen drifters were sunk in a few minutes. motor launches about the now famous motor launches, or "movies," as they are called in the service, much will be said in later pages. they numbered over , and, with but few exceptions, were a homogeneous flotilla of fast sea-going patrol boats, heavily armed for their size. some idea of their appearance under varying conditions will be gained from a study of the illustrations. they were all commanded by r.n.v.r. officers, whose training on h.m.s. _hermione_ and elsewhere has been described in an earlier chapter. they carried a crew of nine men and two officers, and their zones of operations extended from the icy seas which wash the orkneys and shetlands to the west indies and the suez canal. it may be of interest to give here an extract from the american journal, _rudder_, showing how these vessels came into being.[ ] although the hulls were constructed in canada, and much of the assembling was also carried out on the banks of the st lawrence, the engines came from the united states. it was to the organising ability of mr henry r. sutphen, of the electric boat company, new york, that the delivery of over of these wonderful little craft in less than a year was due. here is that gentleman's story of the "m.l." contract: "it was in february, , that we had our initial negotiations with the british naval authorities. a well-known english shipbuilder and ordnance expert was in this country, presumably on secret business for the admiralty, and i met him one afternoon at his hotel. naturally the menace of the german submarine warfare came into discussion; we both agreed that the danger was a real one, and that steps should be taken to meet it. "i suggested the use of a number of small, speedy gasolene boats for use in attacking and destroying submarines. my idea was to have a mosquito fleet big enough to thoroughly patrol the coastal waters of great britain, each of them carrying a -lb. rapid-fire gun. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing principal characteristics of an armed motor launch. _a._ wheel-house. _b._ searchlight. _c._ chart-room. _d._ navigation lights. _e._ or pounder quick-firing gun. _f._ wheel and indicators in wheel-house. _h._ hand pumps supplementing power pumps in engine-room. _i._ hatchway leading to engine-room. _j._ hatchway leading to wardroom. _k._ life-boat. _l._ officers' cabins. _m._ hatchway leading to officers' cabins. _n._ depth charges ( or ). _o._ deck box containing life-belts. _p._ stern petrol tanks ( ). _q._ officers' sleeping cabin. _r._ officers' mess-room. _s._ galley. _t._ engine-room. _u._ main petrol engines ( ). _v._ reservoirs of compressed air for starting main engines. _w._ foreward petrol tanks. _x._ forecastle and men's quarters. _y._ men's lavatory. _z._ forepeak.] "i explained that i had in mind two distinct types. the first would have an over-all length of about feet, and would be fitted with high-speed engines; such a boat would show a maximum of knots. the alternative would be something around feet in length, with slow turning engines and a speed of knots. i added that my preference was for the larger and slower type. "he asked how many units of that class we could build in a year's time, and i told him that i could guarantee fifty. he said that he would think the matter over, and we parted. "a few days later i had another interview and was told that the british government was ready to give us a contract for fifty vessels of the larger type, the whole lot to be delivered within a year's time. "on april th, , the contract for fifty 'chasers' was signed. . . . . . . . . "the _lusitania_ sailed on her last voyage may st, , and a week later her torpedoing by a german u-boat was reported. my english friend was sailing that same day from new york, and we were giving him a farewell luncheon at delmonico's. when the appalling news was communicated to him he appeared much depressed, as indeed was natural enough, and also very thoughtful. before he said good-bye he intimated to me that he intended advising the admiralty to increase the number of 'chasers'; he asked me if i thought i could take care of a bigger order. i told him that i could guarantee to build a boat a day for so long a period as the admiralty might care to name. "after he reached england we shortly received a cablegram ordering five hundred additional 'sutphens,' our code word for submarine 'chaser'; in other words we were now asked to build five hundred and fifty of these boats and deliver them in complete running order by november th, ." [illustration: fig. .--plan of armed motor launch, showing internal arrangements. _a._ officers' sleeping cabin. _b.b._ bunks. _c._ cupboard. _d._ lavatory. _e.e._ stern petrol tanks. _f._ wardroom. _g._ table. _h._ settee. _i._ galley. _j._ petrol stove. _k._ engine-room. _l.l._ main engines. _m._ compressed air reservoirs. _n._ auxiliary petrol engine driving dynamo, bilge pumps, fire pumps and air compressor. _o._ electric storage batteries, switchboard and electrical starting arrangements for auxiliary engine. _p._ chart-room with petrol tanks below. _q._ magazine. _r._ fresh-water tanks. _s._ forecastle. _t._ bunks for crew. _u._ forecastle lavatory. _v._ watertight forepeak.] the armament of a motor launch consisted of a -pounder quick-firing high-angle gun, capable of throwing a lyddite shell for over four miles, and was as useful against aircraft as it was against submarines. in addition to this heavy gun for small craft they carried about lb. of high explosive in the form of depth charges for bombing under-water craft, a lewis machine gun, rifles and revolvers. these vessels were driven by twin screws connected to twin engines of about h.p. they possessed, in addition, an auxiliary petrol engine of about h.p. for compressing the air required to start the main engines, for working the fire and bilge pumps, and for driving a dynamo to recharge the electric storage batteries. the triple tanks carried over gallons of petrol, and the consumption, when travelling at full speed, was a gallon a minute. many were fitted with wireless, and all of them had on board the most approved pattern of hydrophone, with which to listen below the surface for the movements of hostile submarines. they had electric light in the cabins and for navigation, fighting and mast-head signalling purposes. a moderately powerful searchlight, fitted with a morse signalling shutter, was also part of their equipment. these little miniature warships possessed a small wardroom and sleeping cabin for the officers, a galley with petrol range for cooking, an engine-room, magazine for the ammunition, chart-room, and ample forecastle accommodation for the crew of nine men. all parts of the ship were connected with the bridge by speaking-tubes and electric bells, and the aft deck accommodated a steel life-boat. the duties of these craft varied considerably. for over three years they maintained a constant patrol in the north sea, atlantic, english channel, irish sea, mediterranean, adriatic, suez canal, straits of gibraltar, and in west indian waters. only one who knows by experience can fully appreciate what work in these northern seas, with their winter snows and arctic winds, and their chilly summer fogs, really means to a mere thirty tons of nautical humanity in as many square leagues of storm-swept sea infested with mines and hostile submarines. but when this book has been finished the reader will be in a position to judge for himself. the losses of motor launches were not heavy considering the dangerous nature of their cargoes ( gallons of petrol within a few feet of lb. of high explosive in a wooden hull) and the duties they were called upon to perform in all weathers short of heavy gales. several were blown up with terrible results to those aboard. others caught fire and were burned--allowing only just sufficient time to sink the explosives aboard. a few were smashed to pieces on exposed coasts after struggling for hours amid heavy seas. one struck a mine off ostend. another was destroyed by shell-fire in the mediterranean, and the part they played in the raids on zeebrugge and ostend, in which two were lost and a v.c. gained, is now world famous. coastal motor boats there was, besides m.l.'s, another smaller but faster type of submarine chaser. these little vessels, of which there were about actually in commission, possessed no cabin or other accommodation for long cruises. they were simply thin grey hulls with powerful high-speed engines. they were known as c.m.b.'s, or, to give them their full title, coastal motor boats. the purpose for which they were constructed was to operate from coastal bases, and to be launched from ocean-going ships to chase a hostile submarine which had been located by seaplanes and reported by wireless in a given locality. this, however, was what they were _intended_ for, but bore little relation to the work they actually accomplished. their nickname was "scooters," and they certainly did "scoot" over the sea. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing principal characteristics of a coastal motor boat (c.m.b.). speed miles per hour. _a._ hydroplane hull, so constructed as to rise on to surface when travelling at full speed. _b._ covered wheel-house. _c._ navigating well. _d._ wireless aerials. _e._ depth charges ( small size). _f._ manhole to engine-room.] there were three types of c.m.b.'s. one had a length of only feet, and was intended for carriage on the decks of light cruisers or other moderate-sized surface ships. the armament was a lewis machine gun and two depth charges for anti-submarine warfare. the next class were feet in length and operated from coast bases. these were fitted with one or more whitehead torpedoes, launched by an ingenious contrivance from the stern. class iii. were feet in length, and were commissioned just before the signing of the armistice. they were fitted for mine-laying close up to enemy harbours. [illustration: fig. .--plan of coastal motor boat, showing torpedo in cleft stern. _a._ whale-back or arched deck. _b._ wheel-house. _c._ navigating well. _d._ engine-room. _e._ foreward petrol tanks. _f._ forepeak. _g._ depth charges. _h._ cleft stern with torpedo ready for launching. _i._ whitehead torpedo, launched stern first.] the maximum speed of the -feet c.m.b.'s, which were the most numerous, was knots, or nearly a mile a minute. they were driven by twin screws coupled to twin engines of h.p. each--working at revolutions per minute. being of very shallow draught, some inches, these little vessels could skim, hydroplane fashion, over any ordinary mine-field, and a torpedo fired at them would merely pass under their keel. the risk of destruction from shell-fire was also reduced to a minimum by their small size and great speed. their principal enemies were, however, seaplanes armed with machine guns. [illustration: a -ft. coastal motor boat travelling at full speed _thornycroft & co., ltd._] [illustration: a -ft. coastal motor boat travelling at full speed _thornycroft & co., ltd._] it is not difficult to imagine a fight between a c.m.b. travelling at knots, firing with its little lewis gun at a big seaplane swooping down from the clouds at the rate of miles an hour, and splashing the water around the frail little grey-hulled scooter with bullets from its machine gun. this actually occurred many times off the belgian coast, and is a typical picture of guerrilla war at sea in the twentieth century. [illustration: fig. .--diagram illustrating method of attack by c.m.b. on surface ship (or submarine on surface). _a._ object of attack travelling in direction indicated by arrow _e._ _b._ the position of the c.m.b. after delivering the attack. _c._ the torpedo, released by the c.m.b. at point _d_, travelling on course ending at _f_, which, allowing for movement of ship _a_, is the place where the torpedo should strike its object of attack. from this it will be seen that the torpedo, when released, actually follows the ship from which it is fired until the latter swerves from the straight course, when the torpedo continues until it strikes or misses the object of attack, the speed of the torpedo being about the same or a little less than that of the c.m.b. the total time occupied in such an attack over a course of two miles would be about / minutes before the torpedo struck its object.] the c.m.b. was a purely british design, and the firm largely responsible for the success achieved was messrs john j. thornycroft & company limited. there were bases for these sea-gnats at portsmouth, dover, dunkirk, and in the thames estuary at osea island. from all of these points mid-channel could be reached in less than thirty minutes. although useless in rough weather, a trip in a c.m.b., even on a calm day, was sufficiently exciting. the roar of the engines made speech impossible, and vision when sitting in the little glass-screened well, or conning-tower, was limited by the great waves of greenish-white water which curved upwards from either bow, and rolled astern in a welter of foam. there was an awe-inspiring fury in the thunder of the h.p. engines revolving at per minute, and a feeling of ecstasy in the stiff breeze of passage and the atomised spray. when waves came the slap-slap-slap of the water as the sharp bows cleft through the crest and the little vessel was for a brief moment poised dizzily on the bosom of the swell caused tremors to pass through the thin grey hull, and, to complete the review of sensation, there may be added the human thrill of battle and the indescribable feeling of controlled power beneath one's feet. the c.m.b.'s record of service, although short, is nevertheless a brilliant one. towards the close of the year four of these little vessels coming from the base at dunkirk intercepted five german destroyers returning from a channel raid. the scooters raced towards the enemy in a smother of foam. every quick-firing gun on the german ships spouted shells at the mysterious white streaks approaching them with the speed of lightning. so close did these plucky little ships go to their giant adversaries that the blast of the german guns was felt aboard, but no shells struck them. then the line of c.m.b.'s swerved and their torpedoes were launched at close range. one of the enemy destroyers was hit and badly damaged, while two others had narrow shaves. there was no time for german retaliation. for a brief few minutes the sea around the scooters was ploughed up by the shells from the hun artillery, then the four little attacking craft were five miles distant from the scene of their victory, and presented almost invisible white specks to the enemy gunners. at zeebrugge these craft ran close in under the guns of the shore fortifications, and covered the approach of the landing parties and block-ships with a screen of artificial smoke. at ostend they entered the harbour under heavy fire and ignited flares to enable the block-ships to navigate in the darkness. others, in the same operations, torpedoed the piers and silenced the guns mounted thereon. their exploits savour of old-time sea romance, as, for example, when the little _condor_ ran in under the guns of the fortress of alexandria, or further back in our naval history, when sail and round shot took the place of petrol and torpedoes. for anti-submarine work these wonderfully fast little chasers were used in small flotillas. they were fitted with short-range wireless sets, and when the message came stating that a vessel was being attacked in a certain position, perhaps twenty miles from the coast, a number were instantly released from the leash, and in a fraction of the time taken by larger vessels they were on the scene with torpedoes and lewis guns for surface attack and depth charges for submerged bombing. they were commanded, in many instances, by r.n.v.r. officers of the auxiliary service, and carried two engineers. no crew was necessary, nor was space available for them. the plucky dash of these vessels into the harbours of zeebrugge and ostend, their subsequent operations on the belgian coast, and their losses in the action at the entrance to the heligoland bight in , when they were launched from a big ship, have earned for them high renown in naval history. boom defence ships in addition to all these types of anti-submarine craft there were, forming part of the auxiliary fleet, over ships, mostly trawlers and drifters, engaged in maintaining the great lines of boom defences, closing vast stretches of sheltered waters frequented by the battle fleets, and a considerable number of examination ships, staffed by interpreter officers, whose duty it was to examine all neutral shipping passing through the , miles of the blockade. * * * * * these, then, were the ships of the new navy, and their formation into flotillas, or units, was usually accomplished by grouping four or five vessels of similar type together under the command of the senior officer afloat--mostly a lieutenant r.n.r. or r.n.v.r. in the case of minesweepers the unit nearly always consisted of an even number of ships, because their work was carried out in pairs, and with m.l.'s it usually consisted of five boats, as this was the number required for the intricate tactical work of submarine chasing. there were, of course, units from the united states, french, japanese, italian and brazilian navies, in addition to the formidable british armada. the auxiliary units were all based on one or other of the fifty odd war stations which encompassed not only the coasts of great britain and ireland, but also the littoral of every land in our world-wide empire. the numbers given here do not include the local fleets of purely colonial naval bases, nor the large flotillas of destroyers and "p" boats operating in home and foreign waters in conjunction with the auxiliary navy. if these were incorporated the anti-submarine fleets would be almost doubled. now that the reader is familiar with the _raison d'être_ of the new navy, the personnel, the ships and their formation into fleets, the scope and limitations of their activity, and of the losses they sustained, the way is clear for a description of the curious weapons used, the mysteries of anti-submarine warfare, and the bases themselves before entering the zone of war and seeing something of the actual work of the auxiliary navy. footnote: [ ] _yachting monthly_ and _r.n.v.r. magazine_, august, . chapter v the hydrophone and the depth charge of all the weapons used in the anti-submarine war the two most important were the _hydrophone_ and the _depth charge_. they were employed in conjunction with each other and comprised the surface warship's principal means of offence against submarines operating beneath the surface. the hydrophone resembles a delicate telephone. it is so constructed that when the instrument is lowered over the side of a ship into the sea any noise, such as the movement of a submarine's propellers, can be heard on deck by an operator listening at an ordinary telephone receiver connected to the submerged microphone by an electrified wire. there were many different types of hydrophone in use during the great war. so important was this instrument for the work of submarine hunting that money was spent in millions, and a corps of naval and civil experts were engaged for several years, bringing it to a state of efficiency. each type introduced into the service was an improvement on its predecessor, and there were different patterns for the use of almost each class of vessel. the fast destroyer required a different instrument to the slow-moving trawler. the motor launch could only employ successfully a totally different type to the submarine, and, to add to the difficulties, the german submarines themselves were generously supplied with similar instruments. the games of "hide-and-seek" played on and under the seas with the aid of this wonderful little instrument would have been distinctly amusing had men's lives--and often those of women and children--not been dependent upon the issue. the portable hydrophone, used by some of the smaller and slower vessels of the auxiliary fleet, consisted of a microphone, or delicate mechanical ear, carefully guarded by metal discs from accidental damage, and connected to ear-pieces or ordinary telephone receivers by an electric wire which passed through a battery. where the wire came in contact with the sea water it was heavily insulated and lightly armoured. when it was required to use this instrument the vessel was stopped and the microphone lowered overboard to a depth of about feet. this was the distance down from the surface at which submarine noises could be heard most distinctly. the operator on deck or in the cabin then adjusted the ear-pieces and sat listening for any noises coming through the water. although the sea is a far better conductor than air, the range at which sounds could be heard varied considerably. on a calm day or night the noise of a ship's propellers could frequently be distinguished at from five to seven miles; whereas on a rough day, with the sea splashing and the wind roaring, it was often difficult to hear anything beyond half-a-mile. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing essential parts of a portable hydrophone. _a._ head and ear pieces, by means of which a trained listener hears submarine sounds. _b._ flexible leads to enable an officer to verify reports from listener. _c._ battery box, containing spare set of cells. _d._ terminals. _e._ terminals of spare cells. _f._ flexible armoured electric cable which is lowered over side of ship. _g._ metal case protecting the microphone _h_. _h._ microphone or delicate receiver of submarine sounds, which is submerged (when required, but not when ship is moving) to a depth of about feet, as in small diagram. the sound is detected by the microphone and transmitted up the cable _f_ and wires _b_ to the ear-pieces _a_.] in fine weather a submarine could usually be heard at a distance of about two or three miles. there were, however, many microscopic noises of the under-seas which were picked up and magnified by this type of hydrophone. they were called "water noises," and often made it extremely difficult to differentiate between them and the sound of a moving submarine at a great distance. later types were not so prone to these disturbing influences. to describe here the different natural and artificial noises heard on a portable hydrophone is extremely difficult. one general statement can, however, be made. it is the noise caused by the rapidly revolving propellers of both surface ships and submarines that is the guiding factor in the work of detection by submarine sound. a destroyer travelling at full speed on a calm sea, when heard on a hydrophone resembles the roar of a gigantic dynamo. the sound does not alter as the distance between the _stationary_ listening ship and the _fast-moving_ warship increases or decreases; it continues to be a roar or low hum, according to distance, until it fades out of hearing altogether. the same statement applies also to a slow-moving cargo steamer, only in this case the _single_ propeller is revolving very much slower, and, when listening on a hydrophone about two or three miles distant, each successive beat of the engines can be distinctly heard. the simple movement of a vessel's hull through the water cannot be heard on a hydrophone. therefore for detecting the presence in the vicinity of a _sailing_ ship at night or in a thick fog this instrument is quite useless. the same drawback applies also to the location of a floating derelict or iceberg, and restricts the use of the hydrophone to faithfully reporting the presence of power-driven ships or special sound signals at a range of a few miles. [illustration: fig. .--an improved directional hydrophone fitted through keel of motor launch. the tube _b_, at the lower extremity of which is the microphone, can be raised or lowered from _c_, the cabin of the m.l. this instrument is so arranged that the direction from which the submarine sound is coming can be simply and quickly ascertained.] a german submarine heard at a range of about a mile on a calm night presents a curious sound which almost defies description. its principal constituent consists of a "clankety clank! clankety clank!" at first barely distinguishable from the low swish of the water past the face of the submerged microphone, then louder when the sound has been distinguished and the human ear is on the alert. but when this sound was heard in war there was little time for analysing or noting. it was the call to action. the microphone was hauled to the surface and the chase began, a halt being made every half-mile or so for a further period of listening on the hydrophone. if the sound was louder the commander of the pursuing vessel knew that he was on the right track, and if the sound came up from the sea more indistinct the course was changed and a run of a mile made in the opposite direction, when the vessel was again stopped and the instrument dropped overboard. should this manoeuvre have placed the surface ship in close proximity to the submarine, one or more _depth charges_ were released, and if the explosion of these damaged the comparatively delicate hull or machinery of the under-water craft, she had either to rise to the surface and fight for her life with her two powerful deck guns, or, if badly damaged, sink helplessly to the bottom, emitting oil in large quantities from her crushed tanks. before entering upon a description of the depth charge, however, there is more to say of the hydrophone, which has played such an important part in the defeat of the u-boats. when the advantages of this instrument had been fully demonstrated in the stern trial of war, successful efforts were made to improve upon the original crude appliances. the "water noises" were reduced and, greatest improvement of all, the hydrophone was made "directional." by this is meant that when a sound was heard its approximate direction north, south, east or west of the listening ship could be more or less accurately determined. what this improvement meant to a vessel hunting a submarine in a vast stretch of sea will be easily realised. when the sound came up the wires from the submerged microphone the operator had simply to turn a small handle in order to determine from which direction the noise was coming. if, for example, the sound was first heard away to the east, the instrument was turned to another quarter of the compass. then, if the noise was plainer, the instrument was turned again until the sound decreased in intensity. in this way the line of maximum sound was obtained, and this showed the direction from the listening ship in which the u-boat was operating. [illustration: fig. .--plan showing how microphones or ears _b_ are fitted in a submarine _a_ to enable it to detect the approach of surface craft.] with the perfection of this invention the hydrophone section of the naval service came into being. special courses in the detection of submarine sounds were instituted for officers and also for seamen listeners. the actual movements of a submarine under water at varying distances from a hydrophone were recorded by a phonograph, and records made so that the sounds might be reproduced at will for the education of the ear. surgeons with aural experience estimated the physical efficiency in this respect of would-be volunteers for the hydrophone-listening service, and vessels were formed into special hydrophone flotillas, whose duties consisted of listening in long lines for submarines and when a discovery was made attacking them in the most approved tactical formation, with the aid of depth charges and guns. a considerable measure of success attended these arrangements, and the author spent many cold hours listening at night for the sound of the wily submarine. on more than one occasion an exciting chase resulted. it must, however, be pointed out that there is one great drawback to the successful use of the hydrophone. it exists in the necessity for the listening ship to stop before the hydrophone is hoisted outboard, it being quite impossible to hear anything beyond the roar of the engines of the carrying ship so long as they are in motion. furthermore, all progress through the water must have ceased and the listening ship have become stationary before artificial sounds, such as the propellers of a submarine, can be distinguished from the natural noises of the sea water. now it will at once be apparent that not only does a stationary ship offer a splendid target for under-water attack, but also it allows a somewhat humorous game of hide-and-seek to be played between a hunting vessel and a hunted submarine. nearly all u-boats were fitted with a number of hydrophones and therefore were as well able to receive timely warning of an approaching surface ship as the surface ship was of the presence of the submarine. but the surface ship had the advantage of speed. the result of all this was that when a german submarine heard a surface vessel approaching she dived to the bottom, if the water was not too deep or the sea-bed too rocky. then shutting off her engines she listened. the surface ship, mystified by the sudden cessation of the noise she had been pursuing, also waited, and this stagnation sometimes lasted for hours. then if the surface ship moved, as she was often compelled to do in order to avoid drifting with the tide away from the locality, the submarine moved also, and the one that stopped her engines first detected the other, but could not catch up to her again without deafening her own listening appliance. in which case the next move would probably be in favour of her opponent. all of this is, perhaps, a little complicated, but a moment's pause for reflection will make this curious situation clear to the reader. and so the game went on, with decisive advantage to neither the surface ship nor the submarine. darkness usually intervened and put an end to further manoeuvring, frequently allowing the submarine to escape. a case of this kind occurred to a vessel, of a certain hydrophone flotilla, commanded by the author. for over four hours the u-boat eluded the pursuing surface ships by moving only when they moved and stopping when they too had stopped, darkness and a rising sea eventually favouring the escape of the submarine, which, a few hours later, was able to attack (unsuccessfully) a big surface ship less than thirty miles distant from the scene. nevertheless the hydrophone is a submarine instrument with a brilliant future. it has already been improved out of all resemblance to its original self, and more will undoubtedly follow. it is, however, purely an appliance for the detection of submarines when cruising beneath the surface, and not a weapon for their destruction. it should also be remembered that any improvement made in the efficiency of the hydrophone will benefit not only the surface ship, but also the submarine, for it cannot be supposed that under-water craft will be left without these wonderful submarine ears when their surface destroyers are equipped with them. the alliance between the hydrophone and the depth charge is a natural one. the former instrument enables the surface ship to discover, first, the presence of a submarine in the vicinity, and, secondly, its approximate position. at this point its utility _temporarily_ ceases and that of the depth charge begins. when a surface ship is hot on the track of a moving submarine she endeavours to attain a position directly over the top of her quarry, or even a little ahead, and then releases one or more depth charges according to whether the chance of a hit is good or only poor. from this it will be apparent that whereas the hydrophone is the instrument used for the initial detection of the submarine, and afterwards for enabling the surface ship to get to close quarters with her submerged adversary, it is the depth charge with which the attack is actually made. this weapon is really a powerful submarine bomb. it consists of several hundred pounds of very high explosive encased in a steel shell, with a special firing device which can quickly be set so that the charge explodes at almost any depth below the surface after being released from the above-water vessel. the methods in use during the war for its release from the decks of surface ships were very diverse, the most usual being for a number of these weapons to be fitted on slides and held in place by wire slings which could be released by simply pulling out a greased pin or bolt. when the depth charge rolled off the stern of the surface ship it sank to the "set depth" and then exploded like a submarine mine. the result was a shattering effect exerted through the water for several hundred feet around. if the submarine was close to the explosion her comparatively thin plates were nearly always stove-in. when she was over a hundred feet away, however, the rivets holding her plates together were often loosened, and the resulting leak frequently compelled her to come to the surface, where she could be destroyed by gun-fire. [illustration: dropping depth charges _british official photograph_] it often happened, however, that neither one nor the other of these things occurred, but that the submarine's delicate electrical machinery was thrown out of order by the violence of a depth-charge explosion, even when a considerable distance away. with the electric engines used for submerged propulsion no longer available, and possibly the interior of the vessel in darkness, there were only two courses open. she could either rise to the surface and endeavour to fight it out with the aid of her powerful deck guns, or else sink to the bottom and trust to luck that other depth charges would not be dropped close enough to seriously damage her hull. in the open sea, however, the latter chance was denied because of the depth of water. three hundred feet may be taken as the greatest depth to which an ordinarily constructed fighting submarine can safely descend without running a grave risk of having her plates crushed in by the great water pressure. even at this depth the weight on every square foot of hull surface exceeds / tons. if the damaged submarine rose to the surface the guns of her pursuers were ready and could generally be relied upon to place her at least _hors de combat_ before the hatches of the under-water vessel could be opened and her own guns brought into action. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing how depth charges are carried on the stern of a motor launch. _aa._ depth charges, each containing lb. of high explosive. _b._ hydrostatic device by means of which the charge can be made to explode when it has sunk from the surface to a depth of or feet, and by which it is rendered comparatively safe while on deck. _c._ slings holding charges in place on inclined platform. _d._ greased bolts which, on being pulled out, allow wire slings to fly free and depth charge to roll into the sea. depth charges can only be released from vessels under way, otherwise the explosion which occurs a few seconds after release damages surface vessel.] in shallow water where there was a fairly smooth bottom it generally happened that a submarine damaged by depth charges elected to sink to the sea-bed and trust to luck. this was also frequently resorted to as a means of eluding pursuit even when the u-boat was not damaged by the first few charges dropped. it was then that the hydrophones carried by the surface ships were again brought into use to ascertain if the submarine was still under way. when no sound was heard those on the surface knew that "fritz" was lying doggo, or else that he had escaped. if a number of ships were available a few waited over the spot where it was considered the u-boat was lying, while the others scoured the surrounding seas in circles trying to pick up the sound of the runaway's engines if she had escaped in the mêlée. when nothing further was heard they returned to the scene and set about the work of systematically bombing the surrounding sea-bed. [illustration: fig. .--diagram illustrating a depth charge attack on a submerged submarine. _a._ motor launch, which has dropped a depth charge to destroy a submarine _b_ travelling at a depth of feet below the surface. _c_ is the depth charge sinking as the m.l. steams away from the danger area. _d_ is the point ( feet below the surface) at which it will explode, and _e_ indicates the danger area for the submarine _b_.] as many as one hundred depth charges were dropped in quite a small area of sea and yet a submarine known to have been lying "doggo" in the locality was not damaged. in cases such as this other means, which will be described in a succeeding chapter, were then resorted to. all the foregoing sounds very thorough and hopeful, but in fairness it must be said that submarine hunting is a heart-breaking task. the reader may have noticed that the method of depth-charge attack presupposes the surface vessel to have attained a position almost directly over the top of her enemy, a manoeuvre extremely difficult of achievement even with the most efficient hydrophone. heavy seas, snow and fog have also to be taken into consideration, to say nothing of darkness, the presence of a second submarine, a surf-beaten rock or sandbank and the confusing sounds of passing merchant ships, making a difficult task more difficult, as will be seen when we come to the actual fighting. chapter vi some curious weapons of anti-submarine warfare although modern war has shown that there exists no certain antidote for the submarine, it nevertheless brought into being many curious weapons of attack and defence. it is the purpose of this chapter to describe some of the anti-submarine devices used with more or less successful results during the protracted naval operations against the central powers. indicator nets among the most important of these were the immense meshes of wire known as "indicator nets," which were used to entangle a submarine and then to proclaim her movements to surface ships waiting to attack with guns and depth charges. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing principal features of a line of submerged indicator nets. _aa._ two sections ( feet in breadth) of thin wire-netting with a very wide mesh. _b._ framework of wire rope holding each section of net in place by means of metal clips _c_. _c._ metal clips which expand and release netting from rope frame when a pull of more than lb. is exerted upon them. _d._ line of invisible glass balls, or hollow floats, attached to a surface wire _e_, supporting by wires _f_, the nets which hang down from the surface vertically in long lines ( / to mile in length and feet deep). _g._ heavy iron weights or sinkers holding down the nets by their weight when hanging in water. _h._ wooden floats, attached to each section of net by wires _i_. _j._ canisters of chemical which give off flame and smoke when exposed to sea-water. _k._ lanyard attached to surface wire _e_. when a section of net is pulled out of its wire frame by a submarine passing through the line the float is dragged along the surface by the wire _i_. the lanyard is held back by being attached to surface wire _e_, and pulls a plug out of the canister _j_, exposing the chemical inside to the sea-water (see fig. ).] these nets were made of specially light but strong wire, with a mesh of several feet. they were joined together in lengths of feet by metal clips which opened when a certain strain was exerted on any particular section. their depth was usually about feet, and they were laid in lengths varying from a few hundred yards to two miles. weights at the lower end and invisible glass floats along the top held them suspended vertically from the surface. the floats were kept in place by a wire hawser running along the top of the nets, and to this were attached, at intervals, wooden buoys containing tin cases filled with a chemical compound which, when brought into contact with sea-water, emitted dense smoke by day and flame by night. the -feet sections were linked together, and to the top and bottom ropes, by the metal clips. these clips opened when a submarine headed into that part of the line. the result was that a section of net enveloped the bow of the under-water craft, was detached from the line and carried along, dragging its _indicator float_ on the surface behind. the indicator float, containing the chemical, was attached ( ) to the section of net by a short wire and ( ) to the top rope of the whole line by a lanyard, which, when pulled free, exposed the chemical contents of the canisters in the float to the sea-water. the float was then dragged along the surface burning furiously. as there was nothing to materially impede her progress, a submarine would consequently be unaware that she had passed through a line of nets and was actually towing a flaming buoy. even if she became aware of the tell-tale appendage it would be extremely difficult to clear herself, owing to the forward hydroplanes becoming entangled in the wire-netting, before the fast surface ships, waiting in readiness, had spotted the flaming buoy being towed along and were hot in pursuit. once entangled in such a net, the submarine's chance of avoiding destruction was small. not only did the indicator buoy proclaim her every movement to the pursuing surface ships, so that she could not avoid them by turning, sinking to the bottom or doubling in her tracks, but it also enabled depth charges to be literally dropped on her decks. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing a submarine entangled in a submerged net. the submarine _a_ after passing through a line of nets emerges with her bows enveloped by one section _b_ which she has carried out of its wire-rope frame. the flaming buoy _c_, betraying her movements, is being towed along the surface.] a considerable measure of success attended the use of this ingenious device until "fritz" became shy of waters close inshore, and kept a careful look-out for possible lines of indicator nets when forced to pass through narrow channels and waterways. one of the main disadvantages attending the use of these nets was the impossibility of laying them--or, when laid, of hauling them inboard again, during even moderately rough seas. another difficulty which presented itself when indicator nets were required to be laid in the open sea was the screening of the waiting surface ships from observation. submarines could not be used on account of their slow speed, and when fast patrol craft cruised about openly within easy range of the nets "fritz" suspected a trap and steered clear. even this, however, had its uses. mine nets it was sought to overcome this difficulty by attaching small explosive mines to the nets instead of indicator floats, so that when a submarine passed through a line she unavoidably struck one or other of the attached mines, which instantly exploded. this device also proved fairly successful, but the dangers of handling mined nets were considerable and disasters resulted. furthermore, as such obstructions could not be securely moored in one spot for very long, owing to the action of gales and strong tides, it became necessary for the sake of neutral and allied shipping to maintain a vessel in the vicinity from which warnings could be issued and repairs to the nets effected. this partly defeated the object of mined nets, except for the closing of narrow fair-ways, and their scope as a weapon of attack became strictly limited. the modified sweep this elaborate and costly anti-submarine device was very widely, but not altogether successfully, employed by the auxiliary fleet during the first two years of war. it was nothing more than a long explosive tail towed submerged by a surface ship, the object being to either drag it over a submarine resting on the sea-bed, or else, if the under-water craft was moving, to so manoeuvre the towing surface ship as to swing the tail close to the u-boat, when the heavy charges of t.n.t. attached to the armoured electric cable, forming the tail, would be exploded either by actual contact with the hull of the enemy, or, when sufficiently close to be effective, by the closing of a firing circuit on board the surface ship. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing a vessel towing a modified sweep. this appliance consists of an armoured electric cable _g_ towed in vertical loop under the surface. the floats _d_ support the -lb. charges _e_, which have strikers attached. if a submarine _b_ is lying "doggo" on the sea-bed one or other of these charges may strike her hull and the whole line then blows up, shattering everything in the surrounding sea. if the strikers fitted on the charges do not touch the submarine the whole line can be exploded at will from the surface ship by closing an electric circuit.] excellent in theory but very difficult of accomplishment in actual practice. the diagram given will explain the details of this elaborate contrivance, which, however, was soon discarded for more practical methods, although at least one german submarine is known to have been destroyed by it. lance bombs these little engines of destruction were intended for fighting at close quarters, and can be described here in a few lines because of their guileless simplicity. they consisted of conical explosive bombs on the ends of broom handles! a strong man could whirl one of them round his head, like a two-handed sword or battle-axe, and, when the momentum was sufficient, hurl it over the water for about seventy-five feet. on nose-diving into the sea and hitting the hull of a submarine in the act of rising or plunging, the little bomb, containing about lb. of amatol, was exploded by contact. [illustration: fig. .--a lance bomb. the wooden handle _a_ enables the charge _b_ ( lb. of high explosive) to be whirled round the head and hurled a distance of about twenty yards.] the damage inflicted on one of the earlier types of submarines by an under-water hand-grenade or lance bomb depended entirely upon what part of the vessel happened to be struck. their sphere of usefulness was, from the first, very limited, and the advent of the big cruiser submarine, with armoured conning-tower and -inch guns, rendered them obsolete. smoke screens we now come to a more useful device of the purely defensive type employed to screen surface ships from submarine attack. the very simple mechanical and chemical apparatus needed for making the heavy clouds of smoke needs no description beyond that given in the text, but something must be said here regarding the methods of use. it was not until the third year of the great war had been ushered in by the unprecedented sinking of allied merchantmen by german u-boats that the value of the smoke screen as a means of baffling an under-water attack was fully realised. convoy guards were supplied with the necessary appliances for emitting the fumes with which to cover the movements of the ships under their protection, and so successful was this method of blinding attacking submarines that within a few months thousands of transports, food-ships and warships had been equipped. when a submarine proclaimed her presence in the vicinity of a convoy either by showing too much of her periscope or by a misdirected torpedo, the guard-ships on the flank attacked immediately dropped their smoke buoys as they continued moving at full speed. by this means an impenetrable optical barrier was interposed between the attacking submarine and the fleet of merchantmen under convoy. when thus shielded from attack--a submarine values her small stock of torpedoes (six to ten) too highly to risk the loss of one or more on something she cannot even see--the mercantile fleet altered course so as to present their sterns to the attacking u-boat, while certain prearranged warships belonging to the escort proceeded to the attack with guns and depth charges. this means of masking the movements of ships--by no means new in naval warfare--was employed with conspicuous success in the operations of allied squadrons off zeebrugge. individual merchantmen, when attacked by one or more submarines, often threw out a smoke screen to avoid destruction by the big surface guns of the more modern german craft, and its use to cover the movements of transports was very frequently resorted to. camouflage the use of camouflage, or the deceptive painting and rigging of ships, came first into being owing to the method employed by submarines for judging the speed of passing surface ships by the white wave thrown off from their bows. it is of the utmost importance for the commander of an under-water warship to correctly judge the speed of the vessel he is about to attack before discharging a torpedo at her. if the estimated speed is too high the torpedo will, in all probability, pass ahead of the moving target, and if it is too low it will run harmlessly astern. to cause this to happen as frequently as possible, and valuable torpedoes to be wasted--even if the attacking submarine herself could not then be discovered and destroyed--it became advisable to paint imitation white waves on the bows of slow-moving ships in order to give the appearance of speed. [illustration: fig. .--a camouflaged ship. it will be observed that a vessel so painted would, from a distance of several miles, give the appearance of a ship sinking while headed in the opposite direction.] so successful was this simple form of deceptive paint-work that a special camouflage section of the naval service, with an eminent artist as its director, was formed, and all kinds of grotesque designs were painted on the broadsides and superstructures of almost every british merchantman operating in the submarine danger zone. there was method and meaning in the seemingly haphazard streaks of black, green, blue and white. when looked at from close range only a jumble of colours could at first be seen, but if the distance was increased the effect became instantly apparent. in some cases the deceptive decoration caused big ocean liners to appear small and insignificant. in others it gave the appearance that the vessel was sinking; while quite a favourite ruse was to cause the vessel to appear as if she was travelling in the opposite direction to that which she really was. two-funnelled ships became single-funnelled, when viewed from a distance or in a dim light, by the simple expedient of painting one funnel black and the other light grey. liners with tiers of passenger decks had the latter obscured by contrasts of colouring which were really masterpieces of deceptive art. in fact so deceptive became almost every ship in the dim light of dawn and dusk that collisions were often narrowly averted. it frequently occurred that paint alone was not sufficient to disguise a ship, and woodwork and canvas were resorted to. big guns were made of drain-pipes and shields of the wood from packing-cases. cargo boats were given the appearance of cruisers, and cruisers reduced to the appearance of cargo boats. in this way hostile submarines were induced to attack ships, thinking them unarmed and helpless, when in reality they were small floating forts. but at this point simple camouflage ceases and the famous _mystery ship_ begins. before closing this chapter, however, it must be pointed out that camouflage only came into being when the german u-boats commenced their ruthless submarine warfare. chapter vii mystery ships the "q" boat, or mystery ship, has been surrounded by so much secrecy that to most people its very being is an unknown quantity. yet it is to these curious vessels of all sizes and types that the destruction of many hostile submarines was due, and the dangerous work performed by their intrepid crews equalled anything described in sea romance. the mystery ship was not a specially constructed war vessel, such as a destroyer or cruiser, but merely a merchantman converted into a powerfully armed patrol ship, camouflaged to give the appearance of genuine innocence, but with masked batteries, hulls stuffed with wood to render them almost unsinkable, hidden torpedo tubes, picked gunners, a roving commission and a daring commander and crew. their work was performed on the broad highways of the sea, and they hunted singly or in pairs, often fighting against overwhelming odds with certain death as the price of failure. [illustration: innocent looking but deadly, h.m.s. "hyderabad" the famous "mystery ship," powerfully built to resemble a helpless merchantman. sitting almost flat on the surface of the sea the torpedoes from u-boats ran harmlessly beneath her keel. _thornycroft & co., ltd._] [illustration: the hidden torpedo tubes of h.m.s. "hyderabad" _thornycroft & co., ltd._] the number of these vessels was not large, possibly , but their operations extended far and wide. they roamed the north sea, the atlantic, the english channel, the mediterranean, the arctic ocean and even the baltic, but until challenged were quite unknown to all other vessels of the allied navies. theirs was a secret service, performed amidst great hardships, with no popular applause to spur them on. as all "q" boats--as they were officially called--differed from each other in size and armament, any description given here can only be taken as applying to one or more vessels with which the writer was personally familiar. some of these so-called mystery ships were old sailing schooners, others fine steamships, while quite a number were converted fishing smacks, drifters and trawlers, the method being to give the prospective commander a free hand in the conversion of his ship from a peaceable merchantman to a camouflaged man-of-war, and many were the ingenious devices used. one vessel fitted out for this desperate duty at a scottish base was a steamer of about tons burden. she was armed with a . quick-firing gun hidden in a deck-house with imitation glass windows, the sides of which could be dropped flat on to the deck for the gun to be trained outboard by simply pressing an electric button on the steamer's bridge. two life-boats, one on each side of the aft deck, were bottomless, and formed covers for two additional -pounder guns. a false deck in the bow shielded a pair of wicked-looking torpedo tubes, each containing an -inch whitehead ready for launching; and the crew for each gun were able to reach their respective weapons, without appearing on deck, by means of specially constructed gangways and hatches. the very act of dropping the sides of the aft gun-house hoisted the white ensign, and technically converted this unsuspicious-looking merchantman, which asked only to be allowed to pursue its lawful vocation on the high seas, into a heavily armed warship. this "q" boat had, when met and challenged by the writer's ship, already accounted for no less than three german submarines which had opened the attack from close range, thinking her defenceless. another smaller mystery ship was a converted fishing drifter with a single -pounder gun on a specially strengthened platform fitted in the fish-hold, which had been cleaned, matchboarded and painted to provide accommodation for the crew of picked gunners. this little ship had no torpedo tubes and the muzzle of her gun was hidden beneath fishing nets. there were, however, some very large and elaborately fitted "q" boats. these had specially constructed torpedo tubes low down in the hull, masked . -inch guns in more than one position, special chutes for depth charges, coal bunkers arranged round the vital machinery to protect it from shell-fire, and, moreover, were filled with wood to make them almost unsinkable even if torpedoed. each such vessel was provided with a "panic party," whose duty was to rush to the life-boats when the ship was attacked by a submarine. this gave the final touch to the disguise, and often induced the submarine to save further torpedoes by coming to the surface and continuing the assault with gun-fire. [illustration: fig. .--method of masking a , , or pounder gun. _a._ stern of ship. _b._ shield constructed to resemble a life-boat which can be raised or lowered over gun _c_.] the story of the sinking of the last german submarine in the war by the "q " will give some idea of how these vessels worked. it occurred in the straits of gibraltar, about twenty-four hours before the signing of the armistice. the q was waiting in the straits expecting to intercept three big u-boats on their way back to heligoland. about midnight the first of these craft came along, and sighting the innocent-looking "q" boat prepared to attack her with gun-fire. for nearly an hour the mystery ship "played" the submarine by pretending to make frantic efforts to escape, but all the time allowing the under-water craft to draw closer and closer. the "q" boat was under a heavy fire from the submarine, one shell wounding eleven out of the crew of sixty, another carrying away the mast and a portion of the funnel, but no sign of a gun was yet displayed on board the surface ship. this withholding of fire until the last moment, when the range has become short and the effect certain, is one of the great nerve tests imposed on the crews of all mystery ships. it is an essential of success, for a few wild shots at long range would disclose the fact that the vessel was heavily armed, and the attacking submarine would either sheer off or else submerge and use her torpedoes. when the chase had been on for about fifty minutes, and the submarine was only yards astern, the "panic party" in the "q" boat rushed for the life-boats. the shells were now doing serious damage to both hull and upper works, and the submarine was creeping close to give the _coup de grâce_. at this, the psychological moment, the order to open fire was given. the collapsible deck-house, shielding the . gun, fell away on its hinges. eleven shots were fired in quick succession, all of which struck the submarine. one blew the commander off the conning-tower and another rent a gaping hole in the vessel's hull. in less than fifteen minutes the fight was over and the last u-boat to be sunk in the great war of civilisation had disappeared beneath the waters of the straits of gibraltar.[ ] footnote: [ ] one of the remaining u-boats afterwards succeeded in torpedoing the battleship _britannia_. chapter viii a typical war base the last few chapters have dealt mainly with the weapons used in anti-submarine warfare. we now come to the naval bases on which the fleets armed with these curious devices were stationed for active operations. around the coasts of the british isles there were about forty of these war bases, each with its own patrol flotillas, minesweeping units and hunting squadrons. the harbours, breakwaters and docks had to be furnished with stores, workshops, wireless stations, quarters for officers and men, searchlights, oil-storage tanks, coal bunkers, magazines, fire equipment, guard-rooms, signal stations, hospitals, pay offices, dry docks, intelligence centres and all the vitally necessary stores, machinery and equipment of small dockyards. to do this in the shortest possible time, and to maintain the supplies of such rapidly consumed materials as oil fuel, coal, food, paint, rope and shells for perhaps a hundred ships for an indefinite number of years, it was often necessary to lay down metals and sidings to connect the base with the nearest railway system. at many bases secure moorings had also to be laid by divers, and the channels and fair-ways dredged. the larger bases also required temporary shore defences, and booms arranged across the harbour entrances to prevent hostile under-water attacks. then came the problem of finding the personnel. the ships had already been provided for, but to keep them in fighting condition, and for the work of administration, it was necessary to have a shore navy behind the sea-going units. an admiral from the active or retired list was appointed to each base as the "senior naval officer." then came additions to his staff in the persons of executive and engineer commanders, officers of the reserve, chaplains, surgeons and paymasters. with these departmental chiefs came their respective staffs of warrant officers, petty officers, wireless operators, engine-room artificers, motor mechanics, shipwrights, carpenters, smiths, naval police, signalmen, storekeepers, sick berth attendants and parties of seamen. finally, a generous supply of printed forms and train-loads of stores. this then, in brief outline, was the material which went to form the war bases of the auxiliary, or anti-submarine, fleets. in many cases much more was required, especially at such important depôts as dover, granton and queenstown. about the permanent dockyards, like portsmouth, devonport and rosyth, or the grand fleet bases, nothing need be said here, because they do not come within the scope of this book. the same may also be said of that desolate but wonderful natural anchorage, _scapa flow_, the headquarters of the grand fleet in the misty north. each of these mammoth naval bases had an auxiliary base for anti-submarine and minesweeping divisions. with a knowledge of these essentials a more detailed description of a typical war base and the work of its staff may prove of interest. taking as an example a large depôt, supplying all the needs of over a hundred erstwhile warships, and situated in the centre of the danger zone, we find a central stone pier on which has been erected a perfect maze of wood and corrugated iron buildings, with the tall antennæ of a wireless station, a little look-out tower and a gigantic signal mast from which a line of coloured flags is aflutter in the sea breeze. the shore end of the pier is shut off from prying eyes by a lofty wooden palisade with big gates, in one of which is a small wicket. outside a sentry with fixed bayonet paces to and fro. [illustration: after-deck of the "hyderabad" showing quick-firing gun on disappearing platform. _thornycroft & co., ltd._] [illustration: after-deck of the "hyderabad" showing gun raised to firing position. _thornycroft & co., ltd._] the first person inside the sacred precincts to greet the stranger is a keen-eyed "petty officer of the guard." when the credentials have been examined the visitor is sent under the guidance of a bluejacket to the "officer of the day," whose "cabin" is inside the maze of corrugated iron and weather-board. the doors flanking the passages traversed display cryptic lettering, such as i.o. (intelligence office), s.r. (signal room), s.n.o. (senior naval officer), "commander" (usually the second in command of the base), p.m.s.o. (port minesweeping officer), c.b.o. (confidential book office), m.l.com. (motor launch commander), o.o.w. (officer of the watch), "officers only" (the wardroom and gunroom combined), and, finally, the o.o.d., or the abode of that much-worried individual, the officer of the day, whose duties happily terminate when his twenty-four hours of administrative responsibility are over, only, however, to return in strict rotation. [illustration: fig. .--the central pier of a typical anti-submarine naval base. . wardroom. . sec. to senior naval officer. . admiral's cabin (s.n.o.). . flag commander (or lieutenant). . base intelligence office. . base commander. . chaplain and gift store. . drafting officer. . store officer. . chart-issuing office. . cabin of the officer of the day. . telephone exchange. . warrant officers. . pay office. . fleet paymaster. . paymasters and asst.-paymasters. . writers and w.r.n.s. . engineer-commander's office. . men's quarters (for base duties and reserve). . men's recreation room. . petty officers. . men's mess-room and adjoining galley. . sick-bay. . fleet surgeon. . baths. . baths. . stores. . boom defence office. . king's harbour master. . hull defects office. . police and cells. . coaling office. . wireless cabin. . guard room. . railway platform. . sentry box. . cranes. . berths for armed yachts in harbour. . motor launches in harbour. . drifters. . patrol trawlers. . minesweepers. . whalers. . coastal motor boats. larger ships, such as sloops, destroyers, "p" boats, coaling and ammunition hulks, lying out in basin.] again comes an apologetic examination of credentials, possibly followed by a few minutes with the admiral commanding, and then the grand tour commences. first come the ships lying alongside the stone pier, with their short funnels belching black and very sooty smoke. these are the "stand-off" units, whose crews are enjoying a brief few hours ashore after days or weeks out on the dangerous seas beyond. big drums of oil are being lowered by ropes on to their decks. the sound of hammering comes from more than one engine-room, where machinery is being overhauled. on the decks of several, men with little or no resemblance to the clean "jacks" of the naval review are fondly polishing, painting or greasing the long grey barrels, steel breech mechanism, or the yellow metal training wheels of guns. others are cleaning rifles, which have recently been used with special bullets for sinking floating mines. one ship is washing down decks after coming in late from night patrol; another is receiving its three-monthly coat of grey paint; while on to the deck of a whaler--black and ominous-looking--hundredweights of provisions in boxes and bags are being lowered from the quay. astern of these lie two tiers of light grey spick and span motor launches, their decks spotlessly white, and their small canvas and glass screened wheel-houses ill concealing polished brass indicators, morse signalling key, electric switches, binnacles and other paraphernalia. behind these lie the -knot coastal motor boats, like miniature submarines, with torpedoes in cavities in their aft decks, and little glass-sheltered steering-wells. further towards the head of the pier is a line of big flat scotch motor drifters, built for rough weather with -inch timbers, their decks a maze of wire nets, glass floats and brick-red chemical canisters. on the opposite side of the pier, in front of the s.n.o.'s cabin, lies a big grey yacht with four -pounder guns and an anti-aircraft weapon pointing over the sky-reflecting water. lying out in the basin are big minesweepers, looking more like pre-war third-class cruisers, two slim-looking dark grey destroyers, a dredger and a few nondescript craft. inside the first row of iron sheds are stores, with barrels of tar, drums of paint, immense coils of rope and a naval "william whiteley's"--in which anything from a looking-glass to a ball of string, or a razor to a dish-cloth, can be obtained in exchange for a signed form from the naval store officer, whose cabin near by is a maze of similar forms of all colours. then a worried-looking man hurries by and the o.o.d. smiles. "he's the coaling officer, and there's some twenty ships waiting to get alongside to take the beastly stuff aboard," is the laconic explanation. a cabin marked i.o. is entered--every room is a cabin in a naval base. here the walls are decorated with innumerable charts with mysterious red lines. a curious device, with the names of all the ships belonging to the base painted on wooden slides, reaches across one side. it is the indicator which shows at a glance the ships at sea and those in harbour, the names of those under repair, the unit to which each vessel belongs and when she goes out or comes in for "stand-off." this is the intelligence office, and signals and wireless messages from the patrols and battle fleets are being almost continuously brought in and carried out by messengers. the commanding officer (c.o.) of a minesweeper is making inquiries about tides and the exact position on the chart of a newly located mine-field. another officer is locking a black patent-leather dispatch-case--he is the king's messenger or, more correctly, the "admiralty dispatch bearer," who carries to and from london and the fleets all the secret correspondence and memoranda of the naval war staff and other important departments. a big safe in the corner of the cabin contains the secret codes and ciphers used when transmitting messages, and two overworked officers are busy at near-by desks translating signals to and from "plain english." the next cabin contains the admiral's secretary and his staff of writers. here a flotilla commander is receiving his "sailing orders," without which no ship proceeds on a voyage. adjoining this is the pay office, in which, with the exception of a newly joined recruit mortgaging his pay for two weeks ahead--he knows that he will be at sea for that time--there is a decided air of quietude. the rush in this abode of paymasters comes at the end of each month, when all the officers arrive in a body to demand the meagre fruits of their labours. sandwiched between the clean and varnished cabin of the base commander, who is "taking" defaulters, and the camp-bedded apartment of the o.o.w. is a most interesting little combined cabin and store, presided over by the chaplain. here are piles of woollen socks, cardigans, balaclavas, mitts and other clothes knitted by the thoughtful women of the empire for their sailor sons. here seamen are estimating the cold-resisting qualities of different garments--for winter in the north sea is the next thing to arctic exploration. officers are popping in and out to borrow a pile of books--thrice blessed were the senders of these donations. the corner of the cabin is piled with fresh vegetables, but alas! the cry is apples! no exhortations to righteousness adorn the walls, and the chaplain is joking with a big stoker who is distractedly turning over the cardigans in search for one large enough to encompass his massive frame. a signal boy slips in, gets chocolate, gives a breathless thanks and slips out just in time to avoid the playfully raised hand of the p.o. of his ship. two deck hands, covered in coal dust, put their heads round the door to ask if they can have a bath, and the indefatigable chaplain hands them the keys of the room provided for the purpose by the generous. religion here is more practical than theoretical. if a man swears when the "padre" is present he pays a small fine, which goes to the recreation or other needy fund. the commander is not immune from this law at the base under review, and has more than once been "heavily fined" for giving his true opinion of german sailors and winter weather. the next cabin is that of the o.o.w., a seething mass of officers demanding "duty boats" and pinnaces to convey them to and from their ships lying out in the fair-way. others are expostulating about being ordered to sea during their "stand-off," informing everyone what a rotten service the navy is, crossing-sweeping is a sinecure compared with it. then a few pass on to the cabin near the men's quarters. here the "drafting officer" is trying to palm off a deck hand on the c.o. of a trawler, who is vainly explaining that he must have a signalman. a telephone rings and news comes from the "sick bay" that an engineer has been badly burned and will be unable to go to sea with his ship. the distracted drafting officer searches through his lists of reserves for some competent man to take the place of the casualty. peace reigns in the adjoining department, where a grey-haired veteran is issuing charts, "sailing directions," "tide tables" and "warnings to mariners." in the near-by engineer-commander's office worried experts are wrestling with innumerable problems relating to m.l. motors, steam capstans, steam steering gear, electric dynamos, damaged propellers, broken shafts, boiler cleaning and the numerous imperfections of overworked ships' engines. the boom defence staff is placidly serene. the turn of this department comes after a heavy gale has damaged the submarine nets, chains and buoys. the torpedo officers and their "parties" are discussing the best way of moving four of these steel monsters from a neighbouring depôt ship to a new "q" boat with only a rowing-boat at their disposal--soon the o.o.w. will be called upon to supply a drifter for the purpose. in the ordnance store a veteran p.o. is trying to make his list of returned brass shell-cases correspond with the number of shells supplied to various ships six months before. he knows the sailors' fondness for shell-cases as ornaments in their little far-away homes, and, failing to make all the figures agree, decides that some _must_ have been "washed overboard." the port minesweeping officer is discussing with his sea commanders the clearing of a new mine-field laid by u-c-boats within the past few days, when a sudden stir is caused by the arrival of a signal from the wireless room to the effect that one of his vessels has struck a mine in lat. ---- long. ---- and is sinking. he appeals by telephone to the m.l. commander and in less than ten minutes a flotilla of fast launches is racing at knots to the rescue. [illustration: mock-wheel and compass-pedestal of the "hyderabad" _thornycroft & co., ltd._] [illustration: which collapse and leave a clear range for the guns _thornycroft & co., ltd._] in the admiral's cabin there is to be a conference of senior officers later in the day to decide on the best means of ridding the seas within that area--and each base has its own area of sea--of a hostile submarine which has been inflicting undue loss upon shipping, its latest victim being a danish barque. the combined wardroom and gunroom has some twenty occupants, reading the newspapers and magazines, warming themselves before the two big fires, or talking in little groups. this base has suffered some heavy losses lately, but reference to those "gone aloft" is seldom made, except quietly and a little awkwardly. the talk is of theatres in neighbouring towns, the respective merits of certain types of ships and weapons, the prospects of early leave, the dirty warfare of "fritz" or the "beauties" of the north sea in winter. in this room all questions of rank and precedence are more or less waived. there are, of course, differences, especially when the wardroom, or abode of senior officers, does duty also as a gunroom for the juniors. but here there is camaraderie and an absence of iron discipline, although a sub-lieutenant would be extremely ill advised either to drop the prefix "sir" or to slap the commander on the back in an excess of joviality, relying on "neutral territory" to save him from rebuke. it is, however, no uncommon event to see all ranks of officers engaged in a heated debate, or groups of juniors laughing round the fire while their elders are vainly trying to concentrate their minds on the latest press dispatches. games are played and glasses clink merrily, but in a gunroom there is a very strict limit as to both time and quantity, though none regarding volume or discordance of sound. * * * * * passing on to the organisation of the flotillas for sea, we find in this large base six minesweeping units, two being composed of fast paddle sweepers and four of trawlers. the former are used for distant operations and comprise nine vessels. they work in pairs, but the extra ship is available to sink mines cut up by the sweeps of the others, and to be immediately ready to beat off submarine attacks. the trawlers are engaged in sweeping _daily_ the approaches to the harbour and a recognised channel up and down the coast. their work overlaps with that done by the ships belonging to the neighbouring bases. in this way the "war channel," about which more will be said later, was kept free of mines, and afforded a safe route for ships from the thames to the tyne, and in reality to the northernmost limit of scotland. this important duty was seldom left unperformed even for a day, except during fierce gales. often the discovery of a distant mine-field caused many ships to be concentrated on clearing it, and the number available for the "routine sweeps" was consequently reduced, but longer hours of this arduous and dangerous work made up the difference, and the work went on in summer fog and winter snow for over four years. the anti-submarine patrols were composed of five ships each, under the command of the senior officer of the unit--frequently a lieutenant with the responsibility of a captain. their work lay out on the wastes of sea lying between england and germany. it was seldom that the whole five vessels of each unit cruised together, the usual method being to scatter over the different "beats" and rendezvous in a given latitude and longitude at a specified time and date. they were usually able to communicate with each other and with the base on important matters by wireless. their periods at sea varied from ten days to three weeks, with a four days' "stand off" when they came into harbour. but of this time one day at least was spent in coaling and provisioning the ship ready for the next patrol. this ceaseless vigilance on the grey-green seas of england's frontier was seldom interrupted for more than a few days in the year by impossible gales. anything short of literally mountainous seas did not prevent the trawler patrols from riding out the storm carefully battened down and with just sufficient speed to keep head to sea. the drifters were divided into patrol units, boom defence flotillas and under-water or mine-net units. their work was thus more varied but equally as arduous and risky, as the loss of per cent. of the entire fleet of over ships affords undeniable proof. the periods of sea duty were similar to those of the trawlers. the motor launches at each base had some hundred square miles of sea to guard, and hunted in fives. the rough weather these plucky little ships endured in the open sea in mid-winter, the intense cold--for there was no proper heating appliance--and the state of perpetual wetness made their duties among the most arduous in the sea war. later pages of true narrative will show to the full the work of these gnats of the sea. in addition to all these flotillas there were convoy ships, whaler patrols, "q" boats and a number of special duty ships. the work of the former was of the most exacting character, and left the crews of these vessels but little time ashore. in the base under review so arduous were the duties of the convoy ships that it became a matter of self-congratulation for patrol and sweeper officers and men that their ships were not so employed, and this by men who sailed submarine and mine infested seas for an average of days in each year! it must not be assumed that when in harbour there were no duties to be performed by either officers or men of sea-going ships. they had, on the contrary, to furnish anchor watches, shore sentries, duty crews for emergency pickets, prisoner guards, working and church parties, to attend drills, rifle practice, gun practice and instructional parades. the officers had similar shore duties to perform, which left them little time to rest from the strain of keeping watch and ward on the death-strewn seas. chapter ix the convoy system although the convoy system was employed at the beginning of the war for the transport of the imperial armies to france, and subsequently for all the allied troop movements overseas, it was some three years later before it was extended to the entire british mercantile navy, on which the united kingdom depended for too many of the necessities of civilised life. the rapid development of submarine piracy, however, compelled the admiralty, early in the year , to resort to what was merely a new form of the old system of protecting sea-borne trade. this comprised the collection of all merchant ships passing through the danger zones into nondescript fleets, and the provision of light cruisers, destroyers, torpedo-boats, trawlers and occasionally (for coastal convoys) of patrol launches to escort them. certain types of aircraft were also frequently used for observation and scouting purposes. previous to the adoption of the convoy system a merchantman, whether it was a fast-moving liner or a sturdy but slow ocean tramp, _zigzagged_ through the danger zones with lights out and life-boats ready. many were the exciting runs made in this way, with shells ploughing up the water around and torpedoes avoided only by the quick use of the helm; but the courage of our merchant seamen was of that indomitable character exhibited now for over three centuries, since the days of drake, hawkins, raleigh and the other sea-dogs of old. but the danger zones grew wider as the radius of action of newer and larger german submarines increased. at last no waters were immune, from the arctic circle to the equator, or from heligoland to new york. the hour was one of extreme peril for the sea-divided empire. to lose several hundred ships, with many thousands of lives and much-needed cargoes of food and munitions, when the valiant armies of civilisation were battling with the teuton hordes, was bad enough; but if the enemy had been able, by casting aside the laws of humanity and sea war, to compel british ships to remain in harbour or meet certain destruction on the high seas, the result could only have been the complete failure of the allied cause, the conquest of europe and the fall of the greatest political edifice since imperial rome. between the world and these catastrophes, however, stood the undefeated mercantile marine and the allied navies. councils were held in the historic rooms of whitehall and the old convoy system emerged from the archives of nelson's day. the commerce raiders were no longer the canvas-pressed privateers of the sixteenth, seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, who fought a clean fight, often against great odds, but were submarine pirates of the mechanical age, who only appeared from the sea depths when their victims had been placed _hors de combat_. it is an old axiom of war that new weapons of attack are invariably met by new methods of defence. so it was with the convoy system which gave the death-blow to german hopes of a submarine victory. in order to understand this _new_ method it is necessary to study the accompanying diagram, which, however simple it may appear on paper, is extremely difficult to carry out in practice. at each great port there was a convoy officer, who assembled the merchant ships when they had been loaded and explained to their captains the exact position each ship was to occupy when the fleet was at sea. printed instructions were handed round urging each vessel to keep its correct station, stating the procedure to be adopted in the event of an engine breakdown, giving the manoeuvres which were instantly to be carried into effect when an attack was threatened, and finally the special signals arranged for communication between the merchantmen and their escort by day and by night. the number of vessels composing a convoy varied, but often exceeded twenty big cargo ships, carrying some , tons of merchandise, or six liners, with , troops on board, while the escorting flotilla consisted of a light cruiser, acting as flag-ship, six destroyers, two special vessels ("p" boats) towing observation airships, and some eight or ten trawlers, with possibly one or more seaplanes and several m.l.'s for the first few miles of the voyage. the destroyers were spread out ahead and on the flanks of the fleet, and by using their greatly superior speed were able to zigzag and circle round the whole convoy. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing the disposition of a convoy of troops, munitions or food.] in the event of an attack the whole fleet turned off from the course they were steering at a sharp angle, showing only their sterns to the u-boat. a destroyer acted as rearguard to prevent any of the convoyed ships from straggling. when the fleet had arrived at a rendezvous far out in the open sea, where the danger of a submarine attack was much less, the escort handed over their charges to one or two ocean-going cruisers, which stayed with the merchant ships throughout the remainder of their voyage. [illustration: a motor launch cleared for action _yachting monthly_] the escorting flotilla then cruised about in the vicinity of the rendezvous until an incoming convoy appeared. these ships were then taken over from their mid-ocean cruiser guard and escorted back through the danger zone to port, and so the game of war continued until months became years. all this may sound straightforward and quite simple, but there were difficulties, to say nothing of dangers, which made it a most arduous operation. first came the speed problem. every merchant ship differed in this important respect, so the speed of the slowest unit became the speed of the entire fleet, and this reduction made an attack by under-water craft much easier of accomplishment. hence the call for "standard ships," which is a point that should be borne in mind by future generations as a safeguard against blockade. then came the question of destination, which increased the number of escorting flotillas, and especially ocean cruiser guards, required for a given number of cargo ships. next there was the loading and unloading to be considered, involving long hours and hard work by the men on the quaysides. this great difficulty was one of the reasons for the formation of docker battalions. coaling such big fleets by given times caused many grey hairs to appear where otherwise they would not have been. finally there was the danger of mines having been laid in the fair-ways leading to the port, which necessitated every convoy being met by special vessels to sweep the seas in front of each incoming and outgoing fleet. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing the convoy system.] all this and more had to be contended with and overcome before each convoy was able to sail. then danger and difficulty came hand-in-hand. on a bright morning, with probably a fresh breeze blowing and a choppy sea, the work of the escorting flotilla was easy, but with such climatic conditions the risk of attack was so great in the waters around the coasts that troopships usually left harbour under cover of night. no lights were then allowed, and it will not be difficult for readers to imagine what it meant to be pounding through a black void in a fast-moving destroyer, against, possibly, a heavy head sea, with some twenty or thirty big ships in the darkness and spray around. thick sea-mists were the cause of endless trouble, for the safety of an invisible fleet depended on the vigilance of a half-blind escort. winter gales scattered the ships and rendered signals invisible. attacks came from the most unexpected quarters and often from more than one point of the compass at the same time. however, relief came at last, on that never-to-be-forgotten morning when sir david beatty and his admirals accepted the unconditional surrender of the german fleet and its unsunk submarines. were this chapter to end with the foregoing description of the convoy system the reader would not be in possession of the full facts from which to gauge the importance of the work. something must be said of what was accomplished. first in order of importance came the transport of many millions of soldiers not only from england to france, but also to and from every colony and dominion of the world-wide empire. by august, , the british navy had transported, across seas infested with submarines and mines, a million men without the loss of a single life or a single troopship.[ ] the first canadian army of , men crossed the atlantic in one big fleet of forty liners, under the escort of four cruisers and a battleship, in october, , without accident. transports to the number of were required to convey the first australian army over the , miles of sea to europe, and it was while convoying this huge fleet that the cruiser _sydney_ chased and destroyed the german raider _emden_. the russian force which rendered valuable service in france was safely convoyed over the miles of sea from dalny to marseilles. never once during the four and a half years of war was the supply of food, munitions and reinforcements, or the return of the wounded--to and from the many theatres of land operations--seriously hindered by the german, austrian or turkish navies. turning to the gigantic task of guarding england's food supply, we find, in one notable case, an example of the good work performed almost daily for nearly five years. over merchant ships had been escorted across the north sea to scandinavian ports alone before the disaster of th october befell the convoy on that route. on that occasion the anti-submarine escort of three destroyers were intercepted, midway between the shetland islands and norway, by two heavily armed german cruisers. the destroyers fought to the last to save their charges, but unfortunately only three merchant ships succeeded in getting safely away. five norwegian ships, three swedish and one danish ship were sunk. from this it will be observed that not only british merchantmen were protected by escorts. the second attack on the scandinavian convoy occurred on th december. the escort consisted of two destroyers, the _partridge_ and _pellew_, with four armed trawlers. fortunately the convoy was comparatively a small one, for it was attacked and almost totally destroyed in the north sea by four of the largest german destroyers. h.m.s. _pellew_, although badly damaged, succeeded in returning to england. it may be rightly thought that in both these cases the escorting flotilla was not strong enough, but it should be remembered that if heavier ships had been employed they would have been much less able to cope with a submarine attack. the escort in both cases was purely an anti-submarine defence, and only on the scandinavian and netherlands routes was a surface attack at all possible, because all exits from the north sea were securely closed by the strategic positions occupied by the grand fleet and the battle cruiser squadrons, in conjunction with subsidiary fleets at harwich and extensive mine-fields. when it became apparent that surface as well as submarine attacks on the north sea convoys had to be provided against, other means were promptly adopted, and no further disasters occurred. the strong escort accompanying the transports bringing to europe the first american army were attacked at night by a submarine, but succeeded in avoiding the torpedoes fired. this was due to the smartness with which the united states warships were manoeuvred. three subsequent attacks on the same convoy route also failed. the report of the war cabinet for the year gives some remarkable figures in support of the convoy system. on the atlantic routes about per cent. of the ships were formed into fleets and escorted. from the inauguration of this system the loss on these routes from all causes was . per cent., and if all the trade routes to and from the united kingdom are included, the loss was only . per cent. with these figures in mind, who will deny that the navy is the surest form of national as well as imperial insurance? footnote: [ ] when writing of the navy in this connection due praise should be given to the mercantile marine, which this war has proved to be a very important part of the _true_ sea power of great britain. chapter x the mysteries of submarine hunting explained when all is said and done, anti-submarine warfare is very like big-game hunting. success depends entirely on the initiative, skill and resource of the individual hunter. contrary to general belief, there is, at present, no sovereign remedy for the depredations of under-water craft with their torpedoes and mines. there are, however, several recognised methods of attack and defence employed by surface ships in this newest form of naval warfare. when the new navy took the seas in - , bases were established not only round the coasts of the british isles, but also in the more distant seas. the principal danger zones were, however, the north sea, the english channel, the irish sea, the mediterranean and the eastern portion of the north atlantic. it was through these waters that every hostile submarine must pass on its voyage out and home. this geographical factor restricted the theatre of major operations to some , square miles of sea. minor offensive measures might have to be adopted against individual u-boats cruising at long distances from their bases, as actually occurred off the united states coast, but the fact of germany possessing large submarine bases only along her own north sea coast, and temporary ones on the flanders littoral, enabled a concentration of allied anti-submarine craft to be made in the narrow seas which afforded the only means of entry and exit to and from those bases. the same may be said of austria in the adriatic and of turkey behind the dardanelles. this favourable combination of circumstances would not occur if (however unthinkable) england, france or the united states were ever to wage a rigorous war against shipping. the large number of oversea naval bases possessed by these powers would cause every sea to become a danger zone within a few hours of the commencement of hostilities. no effective concentration of hostile surface craft would be possible with the zone of operations spread over the water surface of the entire globe, and if the bases themselves were secured by predominant battle fleets, or numbers of heavily armed monitors, the seas would quickly become impossible for purposes of hostile transport. this geographical restriction of the german and austrian danger zones made effective concentration of the allied anti-submarine fleets and their devices possible. the , square miles of sea, forming the theatre of major operations, was, on special charts, divided into areas, comprising a few hundred square miles of sea. each area was given a distinctive number, and a base was established for its own patrol and minesweeping fleet. the areas themselves were again subdivided on special charts into squares or sections. each square covered a few leagues of sea and was known by an alphabetical sign. in this way the waters of the submarine danger zone were divided into areas, with their bases and protective fleets, and squares with their respective squadrons or ships. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing division of sea into anti-submarine patrol areas.] each square of sea was covered once or twice daily by its own patrol ship or flotilla. where the danger was less the patrol was not so frequent and the squares were almost indefinite in size, but where the chances of successful operations were exceptional, as in the straits of dover, additional offensive measures were employed (see under _mine barrages_). this, then, was the chess-board on which the game of submarine warfare was played. to facilitate communication between the different patrols spread over the squares of sea, wireless was fitted in many ships, and war signal stations were erected on prominent points of land. each base was able to communicate by wireless with any of its ships out on patrol duty, and was also connected by land-line telegraph, telephone and wireless with _naval centres_. these latter were head intelligence offices, usually situated at the great bases of the battle fleets. in this way any concentration of hostile surface warships noticed by the patrols (sometimes submarines were employed, especially in the heligoland bight) could be communicated in a few minutes to the admirals commanding the grand fleet, the battle cruiser squadron or other large fighting organisations. at the naval centres the movements of hostile submarines were recorded on charts. if, for example, it was reported from a patrol boat that the u had torpedoed a ship in square "c," area , at a.m. (g.m.t.[ ]) on th august, and the patrol had arrived on the scene too late to be of any service, a warning could be wirelessed to hundreds of vessels on the seas surrounding the scene of outrage to keep a careful look-out for the u . [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing how an area is covered by patrols. _a_. unit or flotilla of ships may proceed out from the base on course indicated by arrows _b_, which would be called the "northern inner beat," and return to harbour on course _a_, "northern outer beat." other units of ships would simultaneously follow the course _e_. these and adjacent squares of sea would be covered daily by one or more ships of each unit. the southern half of the area would be patrolled in the same way. the "outer beat" is shown by the arrows _c_, and the "inner beat" by the arrows _d_. the points _+f_ show the possible positions of armed patrols acting independently of any unit or flotilla.] subsequently a further message might come to the naval centre that the same submarine had been chasing a merchantman in square "d," "e" or "f" in the adjoining area. a concentration of fast ships, such as destroyers, m.l.'s or coastal motor boats, could then be made so as to intercept the raider or enclose her in a circle while other vessels hunted her down. in a like manner important convoys coming down the coast, or entering a danger zone from the open sea, could be met by a local flotilla and escorted to a _rendezvous_ with a flotilla from the adjoining area. in this way they were passed through the submarine and mine infested seas to and from their harbour terminus. almost the same methods were employed in dealing with the thousands of german mines. but to describe that part of anti-submarine warfare here would be to encroach on the subject of a succeeding chapter. patrols the _method_ of patrolling the areas and squares of sea was comparatively simple, though the same cannot be said of the actual work. the lines of patrol were called "beats," and there was usually an "inner" and an "outer" beat for each unit or flotilla of ships. if when a ship (or a unit) reached her allotted square, from which the line of patrol extended, she elected to proceed on the _inner beat_, she would generally accomplish the return journey to the point of departure on the _outer beat_, thus covering her respective zone of patrol, but leaving the exact route to the discretion of the commanding officer. in this way no hostile submarine with a knowledge of the system could be sure of when or where a patrol ship would be met. in the same way it was left to the commander of a flotilla to either divide his ships into pairs, single units, or to maintain them as a homogeneous fleet, so that any combination of hostile submarines could not be made which would be sure of being able to attack a _single_ patrol. such an enemy combination might encounter a single ship, but it might also walk into the arms of a whole flotilla; or it might attack a single ship only to find itself surrounded by a following fleet. [illustration: fig. .--diagram illustrating the operations of a hydrophone flotilla composed of armed motor launches. each vessel is given a number, and the flotilla proceeds in line-abreast along the course shown by the dotted lines. each vessel is one mile from the other, and the whole line stops by signal at the point marked with a cross. hydrophones are put in operation, and after a period of listening the flotilla continues on its course, as no submarine sounds are heard. the flotilla turns to head south, and a stop is again made to listen on the hydrophones. this time the sound of a hostile submarine is heard by vessel no. , bearing s.w. this report is confirmed by vessel no. hearing the same sound, bearing a few degrees farther w. the two bearings _a_ and _b_ are then drawn on a chart, and the point where the two lines cross is the approximate position of the invisible submarine. the attack with depth charges is then ordered.] the beats which were most distant from the base were given to the largest ships. this was done because it was often impossible for the more distant patrols to reach a place of shelter before one of the fierce gales which swept the northern seas was upon them. trawlers, large steam yachts and converted merchantmen were usually employed on squares more than one hundred miles distant from a harbour of refuge, while motor launches kept watch and ward on the seas closer inshore. the duration of patrols varied according to their position. some lasted three weeks and others only a few days or hours. when the ships returned to their base after a spell at sea they were given a corresponding "rest" in harbour. a three weeks' patrol meant several days' "stand-off," while a two or three days' patrol entitled the ship to twenty-four hours in the comparative comfort of a harbour. it must not be imagined, however, that a stand-off meant entire idleness or thorough rest. there were duties to perform which robbed it of much that it was intended to give. ships had to be coaled, provisioned, painted or repaired. engines had to be overhauled, sentries posted ashore, a guard to be furnished, and every day one ship in each unit that was in harbour had to be manned and in readiness for emergencies. hydrophone flotillas we now come to the actual methods employed by surface craft when attacking submarines. although, as previously stated, much was left to individual initiative, there were, nevertheless, certain recognised methods. taking as an example the operations of a hydrophone flotilla of armed motor launches, the number of vessels forming the unit was usually five. when out scouting for the enemy they proceeded in line-abreast for about one sea mile, then stopped their engines and listened on their hydrophones for the noise of a submarine cruising in the vicinity. if nothing was heard the mile-long line of miniature warships advanced another mile and again stopped to listen. this manoeuvre was repeated until one or other of the ships heard the familiar sound of a u-boat. nothing might be visible on the surface of the sea, but if this was the case and the noise came up from the ocean depths over the electrified wires of the detector, it was conclusive proof that a submarine was in the near vicinity. the m.l. first detecting the noise hoisted a signal (flag by day and coloured electric light by night), giving the direction from which the sound came (see fig. ). the next ship in the line to receive the sound on its instruments then hoisted a signal, also giving the bearing--_i.e._ n.n.w., e.s.e., etc. if the two coincided in regard to direction, the attack commenced. if, however, they did not agree in this important respect, the line of patrol ships advanced another mile and listened again. the flag-ship of the unit on receiving the direction from one or more ships marked the lines of sound on a chart (as in fig. ), and when this was substantiated by another ship the point where the two lines crossed was known to be the position of the hostile submarine, and the attack was ordered. as to the exact method of an anti-submarine attack little need be said here beyond the fact that the ships advanced at full speed, manoeuvring into a special formation which enabled them to cover about half a square mile of sea with the explosive force of their collective depth charges. when the attack had been completed all vessels engaged resumed their stations and waited with quick-firing guns ready in case the monster should rise from the deep to make a dying effort to destroy her pursuers. the tactical methods of anti-submarine attack were, of course, numerous, and they varied according to the speed of the surface ships engaged. what was possible of accomplishment by fast-moving coastal motor boats or the larger-sized m.l.'s proved impracticable for the more heavily armed but slow-moving trawlers and drifters. the tactics of these latter craft were often of the simplest character, and consisted principally of either independent attacks with the aid of hydrophones and depth charges, or, more frequently, the assumption of an innocent air in order to induce the submarine to open the attack at close range. [illustration: the result of a direct hit a photograph left by the germans in ostend showing a coastal motor boat washed ashore after the great raid. _thornycroft & co., ltd._] in many respects this proved the most effective method of anti-submarine warfare. not only did it frequently cause the under-water craft to rise to the surface and commence the attack by gun-fire, in order not to expend a valuable torpedo on what appeared to be an unarmed and helpless ship, but it also produced a _moral_ effect throughout the german submarine flotillas. when a few u-boats had been either sunk or damaged in this way the news that every allied ship was heavily armed circulated among the enemy personnel, and they became very nervous of attacking in any position except totally submerged. this meant the loss of at least one torpedo, out of from five to ten carried, for every attack made, whether successful or unsuccessful, and the latter were predominant. it soon became apparent that either they must risk surface attacks and so save their torpedoes, or else curtail their cruises to meet the rapid expenditure of their only submarine weapon. this does not, of course, cover the activities of under-water mine-layers, whose nefarious purpose consisted simply of laying their mines wherever they appeared most likely to catch allied shipping. these craft were usually armed with torpedoes as well as mines, to enable them to continue the work of destruction when the cargo of the latter had been safely laid. in this way the problem of combating the german submarine offensive resolved itself into two parts, one being to checkmate the commerce raider and the other the mine-layer. with the second of these difficulties we shall deal in a later chapter. many merchantmen, both allied and neutral, owed their escape to this camouflage warfare, which was brought to a high pitch of perfection and daring in the now famous mystery ships. what may be said to form the second method of anti-submarine warfare was the decoy or camouflage system. of primary importance in this category were the mystery ships already described, but there were also innumerable other _ruses de guerre_ which increased its efficiency. to describe one of these will enable the reader to draw on his own imagination for the remainder. a vessel was steaming in from the atlantic and was about a hundred miles from the cornish coast when she was attacked by a submarine above water. the surface ship was heavily armed, but instead of using her weapons at once she sent out frantic wireless signals for assistance. every few minutes the call went far and wide in plain morse. the shells from the submarine splashed into the sea around, but none struck the target for some minutes. had the surface ship desired, she could in all probability have avoided the under-water craft by using her superior speed, but instead she dropped back, allowing the submarine to catch up to her, and the shells began to burst unpleasantly close. still the frantic wireless calls went forth. first the simple message: "i am being attacked by a large german submarine." then the vehemence increased to: "i am being heavily shelled." a few minutes elapsed and then the call: "help. submarine gaining on me." and finally: "abandoning ship." at this point the submarine was close astern and the liner slowing down preparatory to lowering her life-boats. the shells were damaging her superstructure, but a heavy swell interfered with the german marksmanship. then came the surprise. a life-boat on the liner's poop was hoisted clear of the deck and from under its cover there appeared the lean grey muzzle of a . -inch gun. a few sharp blasts of cordite and the submarine sagged and disappeared. the captain of the liner had noticed when first attacked that the submarine was fitted with wireless and the calls sent out by him were in _plain morse code_. on the strength of these the german commander had saved his torpedoes but lost his ship. * * * * * another form of anti-submarine tactics was the employment of indicator and mined nets around an apparently disabled ship, or in lines across narrow channels known to be used by german submarines on their way to and from their bases. this method has, however, received full mention in other chapters. * * * * * what may be termed the third system of anti-submarine warfare was the use of extensive mine barriers, specially laid to catch submarines attempting to pass through them under water. the surface of the sea was patrolled by shallow-draft vessels and the under-seas guarded by mines. if a submarine was sighted in the vicinity of one of the mine barriers already described she was attacked and forced to submerge herself in order to escape destruction from the guns of the pursuing surface flotilla. from that moment her fate was sealed. by cautious manoeuvring and using to full advantage their great superiority of speed ( - knots against - knots) the surface ships were able to head their quarry into the mine-field. usually the submarine dived deep in order to throw her pursuers off the track, and all unconscious of the deep-laid mines in thousands she plunged to her doom--a heavy rumble, followed by an upheaval of the surface, and the chase was over. this method, when carried out on the vast and scientifically sound principle described in a previous chapter, offers the best possible antidote to the submarine. its employment in the great european war placed the seal of complete success on the allied anti-submarine offensive. it should, however, be remembered that comparatively narrow seas and a restricted zone of major operations made possible of accomplishment with some hundreds of thousands of mines (average cost, £ ) what would in many cases and in many seas have been quite impracticable with as many millions of these difficult weapons. * * * * * the employment of submarines against submarines also forms a method of under-sea warfare which gives considerable scope for both daring and resource. it is of course quite impossible for one of these vessels when totally submerged to fight another in the same blind condition. but with just the small periscopic tube--or eye of the submarine--projecting above the surface, one craft can scout and watch for another to rise to the surface, thinking no enemy is near, in order to replenish her air supply for breathing or for recharging the electric storage batteries which supply the current for submerged propulsion. when such a position obtains the submarine which comes unknowingly to the surface stands a grave danger of being torpedoed by her opponent. this actually occurred to at least one german u-boat during the great war. one or more submarines can also be employed around a slow-moving decoy ship. in this case they would have the advantage of being invisible until the actual moment of attack. the result of such a manoeuvre would be either a gun duel on the surface or the torpedoing of the attacking submarine by one or other vessel of the decoy's submerged escort. it was a ruse of this kind which achieved success in the north sea during the early stages of the war. a trawler was employed to tow a submarine by a submerged hawser. this mode of progress was adopted to enable the submarine to economise the strictly limited supply of electricity carried for under-water propulsion. the trawler then cruised very slowly about, dragging the submarine under the surface behind her. in order to divert any suspicion which might have been aroused by her slow speed she was rigged so as to give the impression that a net was being towed, and the area of operations chosen was well-known fishing-ground. in this curious way days were spent before the desired consummation was reached. then a large u-boat came boldly to the surface and opened fire. instantly the submarine astern of the trawler was released from the tow rope and forged ahead under her own electric engines. the commander of the surface decoy stopped his ship and commenced lowering the small life-boat carried. this was done in order to distract the attention of the germans from the tiny periscope which was planing through the water to the attack. a shell struck the trawler, carrying away her funnel, but did no other damage, and a few seconds later the water around the u-boat rose up in a vast upheaval of white. the plan had succeeded, and when the air cleared of the smoke from the trawler's damaged stack there was nothing afloat on the surface of the sea around--except an ever-widening patch of oil and bubbles. a few minutes later the thin grey line of the british submarine rose above the swell some five hundred yards distant from the scene of her triumph. another means by which one subaqueous fleet can attack another is by laying mines in the seas around the enemy base. * * * * * these simple methods formed what may be termed the backbone of the widespread anti-submarine operations during the great war, but with the experience gained and the brains of almost every nation focussed on the problem of providing an effective counterblast to the under-water warship, there can be little doubt that in the next great naval conflict new and more scientific means of attacking these pests of the sea will have been perfected, though what degree of success they will attain in the stern trial of war the future alone can tell.[ ] footnotes: [ ] greenwich mean time. [ ] for a careful study of the effect of the submarine on the old theories of sea power see _submarines and sea power_, by charles domville-fife (messrs george bell & sons, ltd., london, and messrs lippincotts, new york.). chapter xi the mysteries of german mine-laying explained to those unversed in modern war it may have appeared strange that, although the allied navies held command of the sea from the opening of the great war in to the signature of peace in , the germans were nevertheless able to lay several thousand mines every year off the coasts of england, france and even the most distant colonies and dominions. it often occurred that harbour entrances and narrow fair-ways were repeatedly mined, notwithstanding a vigilant day-and-night watch from the bridges, look-outs and decks of many patrol ships cruising or listening in the vicinity. the explanation is that the mines were laid by large submarines capable of approaching the coast, laying their deadly cargo from specially constructed stern tubes and retreating to comparative safety far out in the broad ocean, without rising more than momentarily to the surface for the purpose of observation. [illustration: a captive mine-laying submarine u.c. off temple pier, london. _sport and general_] this, it may be said, did not absolve the ships listening on their hydrophones, who should have been able to detect the approach of a submarine from the sound of her engines. during the first year of war the hydrophone was a very imperfect instrument, and although the sound might be heard it was quite impossible to tell from what direction it was coming. later on, when the listening appliances had been greatly improved, there still remained two detrimental factors. the noise of breakers beating against rocks, sands or other obstructions destroyed much of the value of these instruments when used close inshore. on dark and rough nights the roar of wind and sea and the lurching of the vessel rendered subaqueous sounds extremely difficult to detect; and in a fair-way or channel used by surface shipping it was frequently impossible, even in fine but dark weather, to tell if the sound coming up from the sea emanated from a surface ship or a submarine. if, in the latter case, the patrol ship started her own engines and moved forward in the darkness to ascertain from whence the noise came, she gave away her presence to the hostile submarine, _also fitted with listening appliances_. whereas if she remained still and waited for the enemy to approach, mines might be laid in the meantime across important fair-ways which it was her duty to guard. german mine-laying submarines were designated u-c boats, and often these vessels would employ a ruse in order to lay their mines in safety. sometimes a decoy would draw the patrols away on a fruitless chase while the mines were being launched from the tubes of another u-c boat. in one case a big armed steamer was attacked with torpedoes while mines were being laid across the line of advance by which a flotilla of warships would be likely to come out to her aid from a near-by base. in these and other ways over mines were laid off the british coast in one year. there were also several raids by surface mine-layers, which succeeded in eluding the network of patrols in the fogs and snows which prevail in the north sea during several months out of every twelve. the two most important of these were the cruises of the _wolfe_ and the _moewe_. the former vessel left germany during the november fogs of , and, by skirting the norwegian coast, succeeded in passing the british patrol flotillas. she carried mines, and after crossing the north sea in high latitudes, proceeded down the mid-atlantic until off the cape of good hope, where the first mine-field was laid. she then crossed the indian ocean, laying fields off bombay and colombo. it was in these seas that she succeeded in capturing a british merchantman. placing a german crew and a cargo of mines aboard, she sent the prize to lay a field off aden, while she herself proceeded to new zealand. in these far-distant waters another field was laid, and a few months later the last of her cargo was discharged off singapore. from this time onward she became a commerce raider. [illustration: fig. .--a typical german mine and sinker. _a._ the mine-casing containing about lb. of high explosive, and the electric firing device which is put in force when the horns _b_ are struck and bent by a passing ship. _b._ horns, made of lead and easily bent if touched by a surface ship, but sufficiently rigid to resist blows by sea-water. _c._ hydrostatic device, operated by the pressure of the water at a given depth, rendering the mine safe until submerged. _d._ slings holding mine to mooring rope _f_. _f._ mooring rope to reel in sinker. _g._ reel of mooring wire, which unwinds when the mine floats to the surface. _h._ iron supports held together (as in small left-hand diagram) by a band round the mine-casing. the mine goes overboard and sinks like this to the bottom. the band is then released by a special device, and the supports drop away, leaving the mine free to float to the surface (as in small right-hand diagram). _i._ a heavy iron sinker which acts as an anchor, holding the mine in one position.] the _moewe_ left germany in december, , and crossed the north sea amid heavy snow squalls. proceeding into the north atlantic, she awaited a favourable opportunity to approach the british coast. this came one wild january night with a rising gale and a haze of snow. all her mines, about in number, were laid off the scottish coast in the teeth of a nor'wester. then, with the "jolly roger at the fore," she steamed out on to the wastes of sea lying between the new world and the old. [illustration: fig. .--diagram illustrating the effect of tide on a moored mine. a vessel is approaching a mine _d_, moored to the bottom by a sinker _h_. the distance from the top of the horns of the mine to the surface of the sea is approximately feet at low tide, and as the vessel's draught is feet she would strike the mine. if, however, the same vessel passed over the same mine a few hours later, at high tide, the level of the sea would have risen feet, and the mine would then be feet below the surface; in which case the ship would just pass over in safety. this is known as the "tide difficulty." there is, in addition, the "dip" of the mine due to the strength of the tidal current. _e_ and _f_ show what is meant by the dip of a mine. it is the deflection from the vertical caused by the ebb and flow of the tide. it frequently causes a mine-field to be quite harmless to passing surface craft except during the period of slack water between tides.] * * * * * we now come to the mines themselves and the method of laying them both above and below the surface. a good idea of the shape, size and general characteristics of these weapons will be obtained from the accompanying diagrams. on being discharged into the sea they automatically adjust themselves to float about ten feet below the surface (according to tide) and are anchored to the bottom by means of a wire mooring rope attached to a heavy sinker. to describe here the mechanical details of all the different types of german submarine mines would occupy many pages with uninteresting technical formulæ. it is sufficient to say that they carried an explosive charge ( to lb. of t.n.t.) sufficient to blow to pieces vessels of several hundred tons and to seriously damage the largest warship. they were intended to float a few feet below the surface--being held down by the mooring rope--but, as there was no means of compensating for the rise and fall of the tide, many of them often showed their horns above the surface at low water and were immersed too deep to be of much use against any but the deepest draught ships at high tide. a reference to fig. will make this difficulty clear. there was scarcely a ship afloat in the zone of operations which did not, during those years of storm, sight one or more of these hateful weapons with their horns showing above the surface. motor launches were employed to scout for them during the hour before and the hour after low water. in this way many hundreds were discovered and destroyed almost as soon as they had been laid. one badly laid mine, which shows on the surface when the tide ebbs, will often give away a whole field of these otherwise invisible weapons, and the work of sweeping them up and destroying them is then rendered comparatively easy. the effect of strong tides on a moored mine is considerable, and will render a field quite harmless for several hours out of every twenty-four. the reason for this is best described with the aid of a diagram. it will be seen from the above that the mine will not remain vertically above its sinker when there is a tide, but will incline at an angle determined by the strength of the current, which, if considerable, will press the weapon down much deeper than the keel of any ship (see fig. ). when the tide turns the mine will first regain its true perpendicular position and then incline in the opposite direction, accommodating itself to the ebb and flow. from this it will be apparent that in places where there is a strong current or tide a mine-field is only dangerous to passing ships of shallow or medium draft for a few hours (during slack water) out of the twenty-four. between the ebb and the flow of a tide there is a short period when the water is almost still. then the movement begins to set in from the opposite direction and gradually gains in speed until about one hour before high or low tide. this period of what is known as "slack water" varies considerably in different places and different weather conditions, but plays an important part in all minesweeping operations. in this way many a ship has passed over a mine-field all unconscious of the fate which would have befallen her had she traversed the same area of sea an hour or so earlier or later. mines which break adrift, or are laid without moorings of any kind, are called _floating mines_. the latter are a direct violation of international law, as they cannot be recovered when once they have been laid, and become a danger to neutral as well as to enemy shipping. the laws of civilised warfare also require even a moored mine to be fitted with some mechanical device which renders it safe when once it has broken adrift from the wire and heavy sinker which holds it in a stated position. the reason for this humanitarian rule is that neutrals can be warned not to approach a given area of sea in which there are moored mines, but if these weapons break adrift--as they frequently do in heavy weather--and float all over the oceans, they would seriously endanger the lives and property of neutral states unless something were done to render them innocuous. the total disregard of all the laws and customs of civilised warfare by the germans in - has now been so well established that it seems almost unnecessary to give yet another instance of this callousness. in the case about to be quoted, however, there is, as the reader will observe, an almost superlative cunning. any cursory examination of a german moored mine will show that there is a device fitted ostensibly to ensure the weapon becoming safe when it breaks adrift from its moorings and thus complying with the hague convention. for several months after the outbreak of war it puzzled many minesweeping officers and men why, with this device fitted, every german _floating_ or _drifting_ mine was dangerous. a few, relying on these weapons being safe when adrift, had endeavoured to salve one and had paid for the experiment with the lives of themselves and their comrades. this caused every mine, whether moored or adrift, to be regarded by seamen as dangerous, notwithstanding the oft-repeated assurances that german mines fulfilled all international requirements in this respect. then a mine which had broken away from its moorings was successfully salved, in face of the great danger involved, and the truth came out. a device _was_ fitted to render it safe, but, with truly hunnish ingenuity, the metal out of which an essential part of this appliance was made was quite unable to bear the strain imposed by its work, and, to make doubly sure, another part was half filed through. the result was that, instead of rendering the mine safe when torn from its moorings by rough seas, the essential parts broke and left the mine fully _alive_. any discovery such as this--_only made at the great risk of salving a live mine_--could be easily explained away by german diplomacy as faulty workmanship in a particular weapon, reliance being placed on the fact that not many mines could be salved in this way without heavy loss of life; but numbers were recovered in spite of the dangers and extraordinary difficulties of such operations, and the guilt was for ever established in the minds of those who sail the seas. little need be said here regarding the method of laying mines from surface ships like the _wolfe_ and _moewe_. the weapons were arranged to run along the decks on railway lines and roll off the stern, or through a large port-hole, into the sea as the vessel steamed along. with submarine mine-layers or u-c boats the method was, however, much more complicated and needs full description. each vessel was fitted with large expulsion tubes in the stern and carried some eighteen to twenty mines. these weapons, although similar in their internal mechanism to the ordinary mine, were specially designed for expulsion from submerged tubes or chambers. the mines were stored in the stern compartment of the submarine, between guide-rails fitted with rollers. they were in two rows and moved easily on the well-greased wheels. the loading was accomplished through water-tight hatchways in the deck above. in order to expel these mines from the interior of the submarine when travelling under the surface each weapon had to be moved into a short expulsion tube or chamber, the inner cap of which was closed when a mine was inside, and the outer or sea-cap opened. a supply of compressed air was then admitted into the back of the tube and the mine forced out into the open sea, in the same way as a torpedo is now expelled from a submerged tube. before another mine could be launched the sea-cap had to be closed, the water blown from the tube, the inner cap opened and a second mine placed ready in the chamber. this, however, did not end the difficulty of laying mines from submarines. the increase in the buoyancy of the boat, due to the loss of weight as each mine was discharged into the sea, had to be instantly and automatically compensated by the admission of quantities of sea-water of equal weight into special tanks, hitherto empty, situated below the mine-tubes. if this had been neglected the submarine would have come quickly to the surface, stern uppermost, owing to the lightening of the hull by the expulsion therefrom of some fifteen weapons weighing many hundreds of pounds each. when the mine was clear of the submarine it sank to the bottom, owing to the weight of the sinker or anchor. after a short immersion, however, a special device enabled the top half, containing the charge of explosive and the contact firing horns, to part company with the heavy lower half, composed of the iron sinker and the reel of mooring wire. the explosive section then floated up towards the surface, unwinding the wire from the sinker. each mine being set, before discharge, to a certain prearranged depth (obtained by the captain of the u-c boat either by sounding wires or from special charts showing the depth of water in feet), the weapon could not rise quite up to the surface, being checked in its ascent, when ten feet from the top, by the mooring wire refusing to unwind farther. this may sound a little involved, but a careful study of the accompanying diagrams will make the various movements of the mine and its sinker, after leaving the submarine, quite clear to the lay reader. there were also other types of mines employed. some were fitted with an automatic device which was actuated by the pressure of the water at a set depth. these weapons could be expelled from submarines without the necessity of knowing and adjusting the depth at which they were to float below the surface. a mine of this pattern rose up, after discharge from the tube, until the pressure of water on its casing was reduced to / lb. per square inch (the pressure which obtains at a depth of ten feet below the surface[ ]), and there the weapon stopped, waiting patiently for its prey. another kind of mine was of the floating variety--tabooed by the hague convention--which drifted along under the surface with no moorings to hold it in one position. now that the reader is familiar with the mines themselves and the actual methods of laying them, we can pass on to a brief review of the german mine-laying policy during the great war. the submarine offensive reached its maximum intensity in - , during which period no less than mines were destroyed by the british navy alone.[ ] of this number about were drifting when discovered. there was, with one small exception, no portion of the coast of the united kingdom which was not mined at least once during those eventful _two_ years, the unmined area being undoubtedly left clear to facilitate a raid or invasion. about minesweeping vessels were blown up or seriously damaged, but the losses among the mercantile marine were kept down to less than ships out of the sailings which, on an average, took place weekly. the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy's submarine fleets in marked the turning of the tide, and from that date onwards there was a steady but sure reduction in the number of mines laid. during the first twelve months of the intensified submarine war the germans concentrated their mine-laying on the food routes from the united states, the sea communications of the grand fleet off the east coast of scotland and the line of supply to france. then, when they commenced to realise the impossibility of starving the sea-girt island, and the weight of the ever-increasing british armies began to tell in the land war, the submarine policy changed to conform with the general strategy of the high command, and the troop convoy bases and routes were the objects of special attack. the arrival in europe of the advance guard of the united states army caused another change in the submarine strategy. from that time onwards the atlantic routes assumed a fresh importance and became the major zone of operations. in the first year of the war the u-c boats discharged their cargoes of mines as soon as they could reach their respective areas of operation. the mines were usually laid close together in one field, frequently situated off some prominent headland, or at a point where trade routes converged. then the enemy learned to respect the british minesweeping and patrol organisation, and endeavoured to lay their "sea-gulls' eggs" in waters which had been recently swept, or where sweeping forces appeared to be weak in numbers. when this failed they played their last card, scattering the mines in twos and threes over wide areas of sea. to meet this new mode of attack large numbers of shallow-draught m.l.'s were employed to scout for the mines at low water. it was about this time that the great allied mine barriers across the entrances and exits to and from the north sea were completed and the losses among the u and u-c boats became heavy. a rapid abatement in the submarine offensive soon became apparent, and utter failure was only a matter of time. footnotes: [ ] the question of water pressures and many other problems of submarine engineering relating to under-water fighting are fully treated in _submarine engineering of to-day_, by the author. [ ] a few of the were british mines no longer required in the positions in which they had been laid. chapter xii the mysteries of minesweeping explained the task which confronted the naval minesweeping organisations in the years succeeding th august was an appalling one. any square yard of sea around the miles of coast-line of the british isles might be mined at any moment of any day or night. there were, in addition, the widely scattered fields laid by surface raiders like the _wolfe_ and the _moewe_, which, as described in a previous chapter, extended their operations to the uttermost ends of the earth. a wonderfully efficient patrol of the danger zones had its effect in reducing the number of submarine mine-layers available to the enemy and in rendering both difficult and hazardous the successful execution of their work, but neither a predominant and subsequently victorious fleet, nor an equally skilful and alert patrol, could guarantee the immunity of any considerable area of sea from mines. the germans laid many thousands of these deadly and invisible weapons in the , square miles of sea around the british isles _alone_ in the face of over warships. to search for these patches of death in the wastes of water may well be likened to exploring for the proverbial "needle in a haystack." yet the sweepers, whose sole duty it was to fill this breach in the gigantic system of allied naval defence, explored daily and almost hourly, for over four years, the vast ocean depths, discovering and destroying some german mines, with a loss of vessels of their number. the result of this silent victory over one of the greatest perils that ever threatened the sea empire was that some food, munition and troop ships were able to enter and leave the ports of the united kingdom _weekly_ with a remarkably small percentage of loss from a peril which might easily have proved disastrous to the entire allied cause. this, then, in broad outline, was the task which confronted this section of the naval service, and its successful accomplishment forged a big link in the steel chain encompassing the glorious victory. before passing on to describe the ships and the appliances used it is first necessary to give a more detailed account of the operations generally included under the heading of minesweeping. as it was impossible to tell exactly where mines would be laid from day to day, an immense area of sea had to be covered by what was known as _exploratory sweeping_. this consisted of many units of ships emerging from the different anti-submarine bases almost every day throughout the year and proceeding to allotted areas of water, where they commenced sweeping north, south, east or west, in an endeavour to discover if the areas in question were safe for mercantile traffic. if no mines were discovered that particular area would be reported safe, but if only one of these weapons was cut from its mooring by a sweep-wire the area would be closed to merchant ships until the sea around was definitely cleared of the hidden danger. this system of open and closed areas entailed an enormous amount of efficient administrative staff work apart from the actual sweeping, and its success was partly dependent upon the vigilance of the patrols employed to divert shipping from dangerous patches of sea. when a mine-field was discovered which interfered with the free movement of a large number of ships a big concentration of sweepers from all the adjacent bases was ordered by telegraph and wireless. the area was isolated by patrols and the mines swept up. in one field no less than - mines were known to have been laid. finally a further exploratory sweep was made, and if nothing further was discovered the area was again opened to traffic, and the sweepers turned their attention either to routine duties or to the clearance of another field. the entrance to every important harbour was swept once or twice a day, and all convoys had sweepers ahead of them when they left or entered such confined waters. the seas adjacent to harbours and naval bases were searched at low water for mines which might be showing above the surface. around the anchorage of the grand fleet in scapa flow a wide belt of sea was kept clear of mines so that at any moment the fleet could reach blue water without risk from these weapons. the same precautions were taken off the firth of forth for the benefit of the battle cruisers, and outside harwich for admiral tyrwhitt's light forces. [illustration: model of a coastal motor boat ( ft.) with torpedo and four depth charges _thornycroft & co., ltd._] a passage known as the "war channel"--about which more will be said later--extending from the downs to newcastle, was swept daily by relays of sweepers operating from the anti-submarine bases along this miles of coast-line. this buoyed and guarded channel formed a line of supply for the great fleets in the north. each big fighting formation was provided with a special flotilla of fast fleet sweepers, which were capable of clearing the seas ahead of the battleships and cruisers moving at knots. this was a separate organisation to what may be described as the routine sweeping of the trade routes. these vessels were always within call of the fleets they served. it has been estimated that over square miles of sea were swept daily by the anti-mine fleets of the british navy during the four years of war. this may not sound a very stupendous figure compared with the area of the danger zone, but in practice it necessitated terribly hard work from dawn to dusk by several thousand ships and many thousands of men in summer heat and winter snow. there was in addition to all this the clearing of british mine-fields no longer required in the positions in which they had been originally laid. this was not entirely an after-the-war problem, for although the great mine barriers were left until peace was assured, there were fields of minor importance which had to be cleared to meet new situations as the years of war passed swiftly by. a notable instance of this was the destruction of a big field of some mines off the moray firth. the foregoing refers only to the minesweeping in the principal danger zones in british waters, no account being taken of the work carried out by allied vessels in the mediterranean, off the coasts of france, italy, greece, gallipoli, and in such distant seas as those washing the shores of new zealand, australia, hong-kong, japan, singapore, bombay, aden, the cape of good hope, the united states, eastern canada, west africa and arctic russia, in all of which mines were laid by surface raiders like the _wolfe_, and afterwards located and cleared by allied warships. from the foregoing some idea of the gigantic nature of the task will be obtained, and we can pass on to a more detailed account of the actual work. minesweeping may be divided into eight well-defined sections, as follows:-- ( ) _fleet sweeping._--keeping clear the sea routes of the battle fleet. ( ) _exploratory sweeping._--searching the sea for isolated groups or fields. ( ) _routine sweeping._--the daily or weekly sweeping of areas, channels and coastal trade routes, largely used by shipping. ( ) _clearing large mine-fields._--big concentrations of ships to rapidly clear important routes temporarily blocked by large mine-fields. ( ) _special shallow-water sweeping._--such as that carried out off the belgian coast by specially constructed shallow-draught ships, frequently with single-ship sweeps. ( ) _convoy sweeping._--precautionary sweeping in front of incoming and outgoing convoys. this was regularly done even if the fair-way was covered by routine sweeping. ( ) _harbour sweeping._--precautionary sweeping usually carried out by small craft at big naval bases such as portsmouth (spithead) and rosyth (firth of forth) inside the submerged defences. ( ) _searching at low tide._--this was done by shallow-draught vessels of the m.l. type in order to locate badly laid mines which might project above the surface at low water. several hundred were discovered in this way. in order to carry out these duties efficiently the heterogeneous fleet of minesweepers was divided into small fleets stationed at the numerous anti-submarine bases, and these were again subdivided into units of ships especially adapted for the different classes of work. each _pair_ of vessels had to be more or less alike in size, draught, speed and manoeuvring ability to enable them to work efficiently in dual harness. consequently there were complete units of vessels specially constructed for dealing rapidly with discovered mine-fields and for use with the battle fleets. shallow-draught vessels of the motor launch type for work in the shallow water off the belgian coast. converted pleasure steamers of the usual thames, mersey and clyde type for convoy sweeping. motor launches for clearing fair-ways and for searching at low water. flotillas of trawlers and drifters for the hard and monotonous routine sweeping on the important coastal trade routes. they comprised in all several thousand ships engaged solely on this work. at each important base there was a port minesweeping officer (p.m.s.o.), with one or more assistants, whose duty it was to administer, under the command of the s.n.o., the fleets in the attached area, and to furnish preliminary telegraphic and detailed reports to the minesweeping staff at the admiralty, who issued a confidential bi-monthly publication to all commanding officers which was a veritable encyclopædia of valuable information regarding current operations, events and enemy tactics. attached to this department was a section of the naval school of submarine mining, portsmouth, where all knotty problems were unravelled and appliances devised to meet all kinds of emergencies. each unit of ships was under the command of a senior officer, responsible for the operations of these vessels, and where big fleets were engaged a special minesweeping officer was placed in supreme command. only by close co-ordination of effort from the staff at whitehall and elsewhere to the units at sea could this gigantic work have been expeditiously accomplished. it frequently happened that any delay due to very severe weather in clearing a field or area meant complete stoppage or chaotic dislocation of the almost continuous stream of merchant shipping entering and leaving a big harbour, which, in turn, disorganised the adjacent harbours to which ships had often to be diverted. it disturbed the railway facilities for the rapid transport of the food or raw materials from the coast to the manufacturing centres, from the sugar on the breakfast-table to the shells for the batteries in france. one hour's delay in unloading a ship may mean three hours' additional delay on the railways, the loss of a shift at a munition works and a day's delay in a great offensive. it is a curious anomaly, made vividly apparent to those in administrative command during the past years of stress, that the more perfect the organisation the greater the delay in the event of a breakdown in the system. there were various methods of minesweeping, but in all of them the object was to cut the mooring wire of any mine that came within the area of the sweep and so cause the mine itself to bob up to the surface, where it could be seen and destroyed by gun-fire. in order to encompass this many kinds of minesweeping gear were devised and given practical trial during the war. the one most generally used, however, was the original but vastly improved sweep. this consisted of a special wire extended between two ships and held submerged by a device known as a kite. this apparatus is best described diagrammatically (fig. ). there was, however, another type of sweep used for exploratory work and also for sweeping in shallow water. it was a one-ship sweep (_i.e._ required only one vessel to drag it), and this can also be best described by a diagram (fig. ). [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing the form of apparatus principally used by british minesweepers. _aa._ sweeping vessels. _bb._ sweep-wire. _cc._ wires holding kites. _dd._ kites which hold sweep-wire at correct depth below the surface by their "kite-like" action when being towed through the water. _e._ mine and mooring. _f._ surface of the sea. _g._ sea-bed.] it will be observed that in all cases the object is to drag a submerged wire through the water at an angle from the ship's course until it encounters the mooring wire of a mine. when this takes place it is the purpose of the sweep-wire to cut the mooring wire and allow the buoyant mine to float up to the surface free of its sinker (see fig. ). in order to effect this various kinds of hard wire with a cutting capacity were used as sweep-wires, and also numerous mechanical devices, all of which are more or less of a secret character; but the object remained the same--to find and cut the mooring wire. [illustration: fig. .--diagrammatic sketch showing principal parts of a single-ship sweep. _a._ towing vessel. _b._ tail wire. _c._ kite holding sweep-wires _d_ at correct depth below the surface. _d._ light sweep-wires held at an angle by spars _e_ and surface hydroplane floats _f_. the dotted lines show how either arm of the sweep swing towards the centre line when exposed to the pull of a mine. this movement of the hydroplane floats indicates to those on board the sweeping vessel that a mine has been caught. the mine _h_ slides down the sweep-wire until the mooring is cut at _g_, and the mine floats freely to the surface.] the introduction of what became known as "delayed action mines"--weapons held down on the sea-bed, after being launched, for varying periods of time, so that sweeping operations might take place above them without their being discovered; then, when the time for which the delay was set had expired, they rose to within ten feet of the surface and became a great danger to shipping in places recently swept and reported clear--caused a new form of sweep to be devised and used in waters where these mines were likely to be sown. [illustration: fig. .--diagram showing mine mooring being cut by sweep-wire. _a._ mine-mooring wire. _b._ hard and cutting face of sweep-wire. the dotted lines _c_ show how the mine floats to the surface by its own buoyancy when the mooring wire holding it down has been cut.] this type of sweep was known as a "bottom sweep," and generally consisted of a chain fitted into the bight of a sweep-wire and dragged along the sea-bed, the idea being to overturn the delayed mine and so upset its mechanism that it would either rise immediately to the surface or else remain for ever harmless at the bottom of the sea. in many cases the heavy chain passing over the horns of the mine would bend and make them useless, so destroying the efficiency of the mine even if it did eventually rise to the correct firing depth. into almost every operation carried out on or under the sea there enters the tide difficulty, and in all mining and minesweeping operations it is one of the most important factors to be considered. the effect of the tide on mine-laying has been dealt with in a previous chapter, and the same difficulties in reverse order are experienced when sweeping the sea for these invisible and dangerous weapons. it has already been shown that a vessel may sometimes pass safely over a mine at high water which would touch her sides or keel and explode if she passed over it at low water when the mine was nearer to the surface. all minesweeping vessels, therefore, need to be of comparatively shallow draught in order to reduce the risk of touching mines, but against this is the fact that shallow-draught ships, even if powerfully engined, have but little grip on the water and experience an undue loss of speed when towing a heavy sweep-wire. such vessels can seldom operate in even moderately heavy weather owing to their rolling and pitching propensities. therefore a vessel of medium--bordering on shallow--draught, with a fairly broad beam, is the best type. here, again, is a difficulty. minesweeping is a type of defensive warfare requiring a vast number of ships successfully to carry on against an enemy well provided with surface and submarine mine-layers, and not even the greatest naval power in the world could seriously contemplate maintaining a peace fleet of, say, such vessels in constant readiness. therefore recourse has to be made, when war comes, to mercantile craft, which seldom possess all the desired qualities. this is what actually occurred in every maritime country at war during the years succeeding august, , and in order to meet the danger attending the use of passenger ships, trawlers and drifters, often with a considerable draught, minesweeping operations were, whenever possible, confined to the three hours before and the three hours after high water. shallow-draught m.l.'s carried out the scouting for mines at low tide. it is difficult to see what would be the fate of a nation hemmed in by mines and devoid of a mercantile fleet sufficiently numerous to provide powerful sweeping units. the trawlers and pleasure steamers were a godsend to england in those years of intensive submarine warfare. this undeniable fact incidentally provides another example--if such is now needed--of naval power resting not entirely on fleets and dockyards, but on every branch and twig of maritime activity. it is difficult to describe in small compass and non-technical language the various tactical formations employed in minesweeping operations. they were many and various. the germans used their vessels in long lines, the ships being connected together by a light wire-sweep plentifully supplied with cutting devices, into which the mooring wire of the mine was expected to obligingly slip. this method suffered from the serious drawback that if any part of the sweep-wire caught on a submerged obstacle, such as a projection of rock, the whole line of ships became disorganised. there were also many other objections to this system, some of which will doubtless be apparent to the thoughtful reader. the formation usually adopted by british minesweepers was that shown in fig. , in which it will be observed that each pair of ships is actually independent of the others, but is acting in company with them, and that the pathway swept by one pair is slightly overlapped by the following pair. in the event of an accident to one ship the next astern can immediately let go its own end of sweep-wire and go to the rescue of any survivors. it may be apropos to say here that the smaller class of minesweeper is usually blown to pieces if she touches a mine. [illustration: fig. .--plan showing the usual formation adopted by british minesweeping vessels. _a._ three pairs of sweepers. _b._ sweep-wires. _c._ a mine entering the sweep of the second pair. _d._ a vessel following the sweepers for the purpose of sinking by gun-fire the mines cut up.] the set of the tide is another important factor which has to be taken into serious consideration when plotting a sweep. this complication enters into every operation, and its salient points will be made quite clear by referring to fig. . the actual speed at which minesweeping operations are carried out depends greatly upon the engine-power of the sweepers themselves. in the case of trawlers and drifters it is seldom possible to drag the - feet of heavy wire through the water at a greater rate than to knots. m.l.'s can accomplish knots with a lighter wire, while big fleet sweepers with engines of several thousand horse-power can clear the seas at - knots. [illustration: fig. .--diagram illustrating the effect of tide on minesweeping operations. _a._ the vessels sweeping along the coast-line _b._ a fast ebb-tide is coming down the estuary _c._ unless an allowance was made for this tide and mark-buoys or ships were placed along the dotted course _d_, the sweepers would unknowingly drift seawards along course _e_, leaving a space _f_ unswept and possibly dangerous to ships entering and leaving the estuary _c_.] sufficient has now been said to enable the reader to realise fully the arduous, exciting and often very hazardous nature of the work. veteran sweepers listen for the loud hum of the wire which proclaims that a mine has been caught. then comes an interval of a few seconds of suspense. sometimes the mine bobs up within a few feet of the ship; at other times it is in the middle or bight of the wire, far astern, and half-way between the two sweeping vessels. when a mine is cut up a few shots from a -pounder, a shattering roar and the mine is destroyed. all that remains is a column of smoke reaching from sea to sky. it frequently happened that the mine became entangled in the sweeping gear and was unknowingly hauled on board with the sweep. when this occurred the position was fraught with extreme peril. any roll of the ship might cause an explosion which would shatter to fragments everything and everyone within range. safety lay in lowering the sweep gently back into the sea--an extremely difficult operation on a rough day. the war channel this carefully guarded fair-way consisted of a -mile stretch of sea, extending along the east coast of england from the downs to newcastle, which was marked on the seaward side by a continuous line of gigantic buoys, two miles apart. it was patrolled day and night by hundreds of small warships, and swept from end to end by relays of sweepers acting in conjunction with each other from the different anti-submarine bases along the coast. the war channel formed a comparatively safe highway for all coastal shipping passing north or south through the danger zone, and vessels from holland, denmark, norway and sweden were able to cross the north sea at any point under escort and proceed independently and safely along the british coast to whichever port could most conveniently accommodate them at the time of their arrival. it also relieved the terrible congestion on the railway lines between the north and south of england by enabling a coast-wise traffic to be carried on between the ports of london, grimsby, hull and newcastle, as well as enabling the numerous iceland fishing fleet to pass up and down the coast in comparative safety on their frequent voyages to and from the fishing grounds of the far north. from the naval or strategic point of view it more or less secured a line of supply for the grand fleet assembled in the misty north. colliers, oilers, ammunition and food ships were able to proceed through the comparatively narrow section of the danger zone with a minimum of risk; and, had it been required, there was available a cleared passage for any squadron from the big fighting formations to come south at high speed to checkmate a bombardment or attempted landing on anything like a grand scale. it may perhaps be wondered why _this_ channel was not extended up the east coast of scotland as far as scapa flow. in the first place, the north sea widens considerably as the higher latitudes are approached, the coast of scotland does not lend itself to a clearly defined channel and the heavy weather which prevails for so many months in the year made the maintenance of gigantic buoys and their moorings almost impossible. secondly, there were various systems of mine defences in this area, and, although not defined by a chain of buoys, the passage north from newcastle to the scottish islands was, in actual fact, maintained by a vast organisation of patrols and sweepers, but over this section of sea supply ships for the grand fleet were nearly always under escort. the area from the scotch to the german coast was looked upon more as a possible battle-ground for the fleets at war than as a route for merchant shipping, owing to the comparatively few big commercial harbours along the eastern shore. laying the moorings of over gigantic buoys in fairly deep water, exceptionally prone to sudden and violent storms, was in itself a noteworthy feat of submarine engineering. the chains and anchors had to be of great strength, and the whole work, which occupied many weeks, was carried out in waters infested with submarines and mines. the task of sweeping this vast stretch of sea almost continuously for four years was by no means either straightforward or without risk. the germans, when they discovered the existence and purpose of this channel, sought to turn it to their own advantage by systematically laying mines around the moorings of the mark-buoys, where they could only be swept up with great difficulty, owing to the sweep-wires fouling the moorings of the buoys. this strategem had to be answered by the creation of "switch lines," or small sections of false channel marked by buoys, while the real channel was only outlined on secret charts. in this way the preservation of the war channel and its use for misleading and entrapping u and u-c boats became a semi-independent campaign, in the same way as that which surrounded the great mine barrages and other activities of the anti-submarine service. mine protection devices it is an axiom of war that new weapons of attack are invariably met by new methods of defence. the mine was no exception to this rule, although up to the present time the various antidotes are in all cases only partial remedies. during the years of war, with the brains of a maritime nation focused on the subject, there were naturally many devices suggested and tried for protecting ships from mines. the great majority of these suggestions may be classified in two groups: ( ) those which sought to deflect the mine from the pathway of the ship; and ( ) those which sought to minimise the result of the explosion. one method from each of these groups was adopted with various modifications to suit different classes of ships. in the first group came the _paravane_, which had as its basis the suspension of a submerged wire around the bow of a ship, which caught and deflected the mine-mooring wire before the horns of the mine itself could reach the sides of the ship. it also cut the mooring and enabled the mine to rise to the surface and be destroyed by gun-fire. [illustration: a paravane hoisting in the starboard paravane of the p.v. mine-defence gear. _topical press_] in order to understand this appliance it is first necessary to know what is the action of the majority of moored mines on coming in contact with a ship. it seldom happens that a vessel strikes a mine dead on the bow or stem-post. the cushion and dislocation of water formed by a big and fast ship around its bows is usually sufficient to cause the mine to swing a few inches away from the bow and to return and strike the ship several feet back on the port or starboard side. a careful study of fig. will show how this is prevented by the deflecting wires of the paravane. the paravanes themselves are submerged torpedo-shaped bodies which hold the wires under the surface and away from the ship's side, deriving their ability to do this from the speed at which they are being towed, submerged, by the ship itself. a piece of string through the axle hole of a small wheel, which is then placed on the ground and pulled along, will give a good idea of the action of the paravane against the passing water. it is not possible to give here the exact details of this highly ingenious device upon which so much scientific and practical attention was wisely bestowed, but sufficient has been said to enable the reader to form a clear conception of how the mine was caught and held away from the ship's side by the deflecting wire of the paravane. this device, in one of its many forms, was fitted not only to warships, but also to many hundreds of merchantmen, and was known to have saved thousands of tons of valuable shipping and cargo. [illustration: fig. .--plan showing the chief characteristics of the paravane mine defence gear. _a._ the bow of the ship. _b._ the paravanes being towed submerged at an outward angle. these appliances maintain a fixed depth below the surface and hold the ends of the deflecting wires _c_ well away from the ship's sides. _c._ the submerged deflecting wires, held at one end by a short projection from the ship's stem-post below the water-line, and at the outer end by the submerged paravanes. _d._ a mine and its mooring caught by the deflecting wires and held away from the ship. in such a case it would slide down the deflecting wire towards the paravane, where the mooring would be cut and the mine would float to the surface.] among those devices which had for their object the minimising of the result of a mine explosion may be mentioned the "blister system" so successfully employed in the construction of monitors and other big ships, the idea being to surround the inner hull with an outer casing which received the effect of the explosion of either a mine or torpedo and left the inner or real hull of the ship water-tight. its one weak feature was that it reduced the speed of the ship and the ease with which she could be manoeuvred. in future types of large and heavily armed ships this drawback will undoubtedly be largely overcome by an increase in engine-power made possible by the development of engineering science. the "blister," although outwardly forming a continuous structure round the entire vessel, extending well above and below the water-line, tapered off towards the bows and stern, and was subdivided into different compartments. in this way an explosion against one section did not necessarily damage any other part. the british monitors which so successfully bombarded the belgian coast and the fortifications of the dardanelles were fitted with blisters, and more than one of them owed their salvation to this means. chapter xiii the mine barrage what undoubtedly forms the most effective counter to unrestricted submarine warfare is the explosive mine barrage, as employed against the german u-boats in the north sea and the straits of dover. the practicability of these barrage systems depends, however, very largely upon the following factors:--( ) the geographical features of the area of operations; ( ) the hydrographical peculiarities of the seas in which the mines have to be laid; ( ) the number of properly equipped mine-laying vessels available; ( ) an adequate and highly trained personnel; and ( ) the mechanical skill and manufacturing power of the nation employing the system. there are several forms of mine barrage. one is simply an elongated mine-field laid across a narrow sea to prevent the safe passage of hostile surface craft. in this case the mines are laid in the ordinary manner and at the ordinary depth below the surface. the anti-submarine barrage, however, consists of an enormous number of mines, laid _at a considerable depth below the surface_ and in such formation as to ensure that a submarine attempting to pass through the cordon _while submerged_ would inevitably collide with one or more of them. with this latter form of barrage the surface of the sea is quite clear of mines and is comparatively safe for the unrestricted movement of a numerous patrol flotilla, which forms part of the system, the under-seas alone being made dangerous by the mines. it will be apparent that if a hostile submarine base is enclosed by one or more of these barrages the under-water craft entering and leaving that base have the choice of travelling _submerged_ across the danger zone and thereby risking contact with the mines, or of performing the passage _on the surface_ and encountering the patrolling ships. in either case, the result is more likely than not to be the destruction of the submarine. in most cases the exact position of the barrage would be unknown to the hostile submarines, which, even if running on the surface, would dive immediately on the approach of a patrol ship. the few lucky ones succeeding in getting safely through the cordon of deep-laid mines, or passing unnoticed the patrol of surface ships on their outward journey--as might be the case in fog--would have the same peril to face on the return to their base, and probably without the aid of thick weather. this double risk would probably have to be taken by every submarine in the active flotilla at least once a month, this being approximately the period they can remain at sea without replenishing supplies of fuel, torpedoes and food. the object of the flotillas of shallow-draught patrol vessels operating in the vicinity of the deep mine barrier is twofold. primarily their duty is to prevent the hostile submarines from running the blockade on the surface and, secondly, to prevent enemy surface craft from emerging from the base and sweeping clear a passage through the mine-field, or of laying counter-mines, which, on being exploded, would detonate some of the blockading deep-laid mines and so destroy a section of the barrier. from this it will be apparent that a force of hostile submarines hemmed in in this way would run a double risk of losing a number of vessels on every occasion on which a sortie was made. this is what actually occurred to the german under-water flotillas in the years - , and, in combination with the other methods employed by the allied navies, was mainly responsible for the failure of the great under-sea offensive. the only bases of the german navy being situated on the north sea littoral, it was possible for the allies to lay a vast mine barrier, stretching from the coast of norway to the scottish islands, and another smaller one across the straits of dover; also to concentrate in the vicinity of these two submarine "trench systems" a very numerous surface patrolling force, thus enclosing the thousands of square miles of sea forming what was sometimes boastfully referred to as the "german ocean" in an almost impenetrable ring of steel and t.n.t. here let us consider the gigantic nature of the task that was successfully accomplished. the distance from the norwegian coast to the orkney islands is approximately miles. it was over this vast expanse of sea, bent at the eastern end so as to rest on the heligoland bight, that the system known as the "northern barrages" extended. no exact statistics of the actual number of mines used is at present available, but reckoning at the low rate of one mine to every feet of sea, with five lines stretching from shore to shore, the number required would be , of these costly and difficult weapons. the number required annually to maintain such a barrage would also be very heavy, and it is safe to assume that _considerably_ over , mines were employed on the northern barrages alone. from this rough estimate some idea of the work of designing, manufacturing, testing, laying, renewing and watching this one field will be obtained. [illustration: fig. .--diagram illustrating a mine barrage, or deep-laid mine-field. the submarine _a_, diving to avoid a surface warship, has become entangled in the mooring of a deep-laid mine which is being dragged down on top of her. these mines are often moored at a depth of feet below the surface, which can then be patrolled by surface warships.] there were, of course, in the actual barrage several mine-fields placed strategically, and probably a far greater number of weapons than that given in the above estimate was needed. there were also the smaller fields lying between the northern barrage and the one across the straits of dover. these were so placed as to catch hostile submarines operating off the east coast of england, or a surface raiding squadron, such as those which in the earlier years of the war bombarded certain british ports. finally, when victory had been achieved, there came the cold-blooded task of clearing these immense areas of sea, not only of german mines, laid haphazardly, but also of the thousands of british mines laid methodically and away from neutral traffic. the english channel barrage differed from the northern line in several important respects. being so much shorter ( miles against ), it could more easily be made perfect. the swift-running tide, however, greatly increased the difficulty of laying effective mine-fields. the lighted barrage this southern system consisted, on the surface, of a number of vessels specially built to ride out the heaviest gale at anchor. these were moored at intervals across the straits of dover, forming two lines from the english to the french coast. the first line extended from folkestone to cape gris nez, and the second line about seven miles to the westward of these points (see fig. ). each vessel was fitted with powerful searchlights for use at night, and the dark spaces of sea between were patrolled by large numbers of armed craft. [illustration: minesweeping gear on a trawler _from a photo by stephen cribb, southsea_] [illustration: fig. .--diagram illustrating the dover lighted barrage. this barrage consisted of two lines of lightships, _e_ and _f_, from england _a_ to france _b_. the first line extended from folkestone _c_ to cape gris nez _d_. the second line _f_ was situated seven miles westwards of the first line. the small top diagram shows how the two pathways of light, with a numerous patrol between, compelled the u-boats to dive in order to avoid observation and destruction by gun-fire. the lower diagram shows the deep-laid mines arranged to receive the u-boats when they attempted to run the blockade in a submerged condition.] by this means the only avenues by which hostile submarines could hope to pass on the surface through the barrage at night were the dark lanes of water between the lightships. it was these points which were closely guarded by strong patrol flotillas, whose duty it was to attack submarines attempting to get through and, with the aid of guns and depth charges, to force them to dive below the surface. here certain destruction awaited them on the submerged mine-fields. if, however, one line of defence was safely passed by a hostile submarine, there was another to be negotiated seven miles farther on, and once a submarine got between the two lines her chances of escape were indeed small, for whichever way she turned the surface would be covered with fast patrol craft and at night lighted by the rays of many searchlights, while the under-seas were almost impassable with mines. if, however, notwithstanding these defensive systems, a submarine succeeded in passing through and getting to work on the lines of communication with the armies in france, there were hydrophone organisations and patrols all down the channel from the lighted barrage to the scilly islands. by this means a u-boat would be seldom out of the hearing of these instruments for more than an hour or so at a time. the success which attended the perfecting of this vast system was such that german submarines based on the flanders coast gave up attempting to pass down the english channel. they tried to go to and from their hunting grounds on the atlantic trade routes round the north coast of scotland. here the great northern systems took their toll. during the first nine months of the year the german submarine flotillas at zeebrugge and ostend lost thirty vessels, and no less than fifteen of these had, at the time of the signing of the armistice, been discovered lying wrecked under the lighted barrage. chapter xiv off to the zones of war hitherto i have dealt with the scientific training of the personnel, the armament and the general organisation of the anti-submarine fleets, leaving it to the imagination of readers to invest the bare recital of facts with the due amount of romance. if, however, a true understanding of this most modern form of naval war is to be obtained, the human aspect must loom large in future pages. war, whether it be _on_ the sea, _under_ the sea, on the land or in the air, is a science in which the human element is of at least equal importance with that of the purely mechanical. it is a science of both "blood and iron." the armed motor launches described in earlier pages, after being built in canada to the number of over , and engined by the united states, were transported across the atlantic on the decks of big ocean-going steamships--more than one of which was torpedoed on the voyage. on their arrival in portsmouth dockyard the guns and depth charges were placed aboard and the vessels thoroughly equipped and fitted out for active service. officers and men were drafted from the training establishments of the new navy at southampton, portsmouth, chatham, greenwich and elsewhere. each little vessel was given a number, and within a few weeks of their arrival from the building yards on the st lawrence they sailed in flotillas out past the fortifications of spithead, _en route_ for their respective war bases. great secrecy had surrounded the construction of these small but powerful craft, and but few naval men, except those directly engaged in the anti-submarine service, had either seen or heard much of them until they commenced arriving at the different rendezvous. among the early flotillas to leave portsmouth dockyard was one of four ships destined for a base on the east coast of scotland, and as these speedy little craft raced away north the expectations of both officers and men ran high. it was in the early summer of , and although the air was crisp, the sea sparkled in the bright sunlight and the sky was a cloudless blue. only a heavy-beam sea off flamborough head had marred the maiden voyage, and they were now on the last hundred miles, with the low-lying farne islands fading into the mist astern. by nightfall, if the wind remained light, they would make the scottish port which was to form their base of operations. hitherto these four brand-new little warships, all white wood, grey paint and polished metal, had been plodding over the miles of sea from portsmouth at what was termed "cruising speed"--a mere knots. the engines had not been opened out to "full ahead" because these delicate pieces of mechanism needed time to settle down to their work before it was safe to drive them to the utmost limit of speed and power, but now that pistons and bearings had been given time to "run in" it was considered safe for the flotilla to increase speed in order to make harbour by nightfall. a hoist of new, bright-coloured flags fluttered from the squat mast of the leading ship. the steady throbbing of the engines grew suddenly to a low staccato roar. the white waves astern rose up almost level with the counters and clouds of fine spray blew across the decks. this rapid movement through the sun-lit water, with the breeze of passage and the tang of the salt sea in every breath, was exhilarating, and the spirits of those aboard rose with the speed. running at nearly half-a-mile a minute, the flotilla forged northwards through clouds of fine, stinging spray, until at a late hour, when the sun was dipping below the horizon and the sea was a sheet of golden light, a smoky line appeared far away to the westward. it was that section of the scottish coast which in future it would be the duty of these boats to patrol, and as the distance lessened those on board gazed in silence at the gigantic cliffs and black rocks, now tinged with the rays of the dying sun and encircled by the endless ripples which alone broke the peaceful surface of the sea, but one and all were picturing this forbidding coast on the stormy winter nights to come. slowly the light faded from the western sky. the cliffs rose up black and sombre, and when the little flotilla turned westwards up the broad waterway leading to the base darkness had closed over land and sea. for some time they picked their way up this sheltered loch. no lights were visible, but more than once a destroyer appeared out of the blackness to make sure of their identity, and each time they were inspected very closely before the guard-ships were satisfied. an armed trawler guided them past dangerous obstructions and then faded into the night. mile after mile of water was then traversed on courses laid down in confidential orders. suddenly a searchlight flashed out from close ahead, followed almost instantly by other blinding rays, which swept the sea for a few seconds, and then all the beams concentrated on the little flotilla, showing up with the clearness of daylight the four low-lying submarine-like hulls gliding speedily through the water. there was a moment's silence, during which the morse signalling lamps of the m.l.'s were being prepared to flash out their message. a searchlight blinked and there followed another brief interval of silence, then, without warning, a tongue of livid flame stabbed the darkness and a shell whistled overhead. it was followed by other flashes and the sharp reports of quick-firing guns. columns of water spouted into the air close to the m.l.'s, whose engines had, luckily, ceased to throb. the firing stopped as suddenly as it had commenced. signals began flashing angrily in many directions. destroyers tore out of the darkness around into the broad circle of light. armed trawlers nosed their way in and wicked grey tubes were trained on the now stationary flotilla. presently the angry flashing of mast head-lights subsided into the regular dot and dash of respectable communication. several destroyers seemed to be having nasty things said to them, which they answered with a feeble wink, and an armed trawler made futile flashes of explanation. a little twinkling star, more lofty and dignified than the rest, called up the leading m.l. and was answered with an alacrity that evidently unnerved it, for it flickered and died out. suddenly it came to life again and winked away at an alarming rate, but all to no purpose, for, true to the old axiom that more haste means less speed, it had to stop and go over the message again, this time sufficiently slow for novices to understand. what it said is a state secret. it is rumoured, however, that several officers were "mentioned in dispatches" for the part they played in this local action, caused by mistaken identity, but alas! their skill and bravery remained unrewarded by an unsympathetic government. chapter xv a memorable christmas no calling tempers the human steel in so short a period as that of the sea. at all times and in every part of the world the sailorman wages a never-ending fight with nature in her wildest and most dreaded modes. when to this is added a conflict of nations and their ships, with all the ingenious death-traps of modern naval science, it merely increases the odds against him and serves to steady his hand and brain in order to overcome them. in a few short weeks the sea had set its stamp on the men of the new navy. faces became bronzed by the sun, wind and spindrift. muscles grew hard and eyes and nerves more steady. each time a vessel went forth on patrol or other duty new difficulties or dangers were met and overcome without advice or assistance, and the confidence of men in themselves and in the ships they worked grew apace. in many of the principal zones of war, such as the north sea and the atlantic, the wind grew colder and the seas more fierce as the short summer passed. duffel or arctic clothing was served out to both officers and men. sea-boots and oilskins became necessary. balaclava helmets, mufflers and other woollen gear appeared, and men became almost unrecognisable bundles of clothing. the ascent at a.m. from the cabin to the cold, wet deck can be likened only to the first plunge of a cold bathing season. casualties became more frequent as the enemy intensified his submarine and mining campaign. the news and sight of sudden death no longer blanched the faces of men who knew that it might be their turn at any moment of every day and night. the stir of suppressed excitement when danger threatened no longer manifested itself in every movement, but rather in the cool, deliberate action of self-confidence. in a word, the raw material was being tempered in the furnace of war. to those in northern seas came the blinding sleet, the slate-grey combers and the innumerable hardships and dangers of winter patrol. a better idea of what these really were will be obtained from the following account of a christmas spent on a german mine-field. * * * * * a bitter wind swept the grey wastes of the north sea and a fine haze of snow, driven by stinging gusts, obscured all except the long hillocks of water which rose and fell around the tiny m.l.--a lonely thirty tons of nautical humanity in as many square leagues of sub-arctic sea. nineteen degrees of frost during the long winter night had flattened the boisterous, foam-capped waves, and now, in the early december dawn, all within vision was of that colourless grey so familiar to those who kept the north sea on the winter patrol. it was one bell in the first watch and three shapeless figures clad in duffel coats with big hoods and wearing heavy sea-boots stood silent in the draughty, canvas-screened wheel-house as m.l. wallowed northwards through the seas which came in endless succession out of the snowy mist. it was just the ordinary everyday patrol duty, when nothing was expected but anything might happen, so eyes were strained seawards in a vain endeavour to penetrate the icy curtain blowing down from the pole. twelve hours more of half-frozen existence stretched in front of these silent watchers, as they clung with stiffened limbs to ropes stretched purposely handy to keep them upright when the little ship lurched more fiercely in a steeper sea. of the three figures in the meagre shelter of the wheel-house there was little to distinguish who or what they were, except, perhaps, a cleaner and more yellowish duffel coat and a big white muffler in which the lieutenant-in-command tried, without success, to keep his teeth from chattering and the icy draught from finding its way into the seemingly endless openings of his woollen clothing. what he had been before the great war and the north sea claimed him was a mystery to those on board, but the people of more than one capital knew his name. near by stood a younger man--a boy before the war--who, although pale and dark-eyed, did not appear to feel the intense cold so much, although the dampness of the long-past summer fogs had chilled him to the bone. he was the sub-lieutenant, and hailed from the great north-west, where canadian winters had hardened his skin to the stinging dry cold. [illustration: fig. .--duffel or arctic clothing.] the immense bundle of nondescript clothing at the wheel was "mac," the coxswain, whose voyages in arctic seas with the iceland fishing fleet numbered more than his years of life, and whose deep-voiced gaelic roar could bring the "watch below" on to the cold, wet deck to their action stations in less time than it would take a new recruit to tumble out of his hammock. although the silence of the sea seems to settle on its watchers in those northern marches, there was an unduly long absence of comment on the nature of the weather and the prospects of "something exciting" turning up out of the icy mist. the reason lay in the subconscious mind of all on deck, for it was christmas morning, , and the thoughts of all were dwelling on past years in the cheery surroundings of english and colonial homes--in vivid contrast to the dismal grey of the north sea. to break the spell of memory both officers felt would be blasphemy, and yet a feeble attempt at conversation was made every now and then for the sake of appearances. to mac, from the orkneys, no such sentiment held sway, for christmas to him meant little compared with new year's day; but this was a special christmas, for a big plum pudding was being boiled on the petrol stove below, and each roll of the little vessel threatened its useful existence. eventually he could keep silent no longer and tentatively suggested a change of course to ease the violent lurching. the wheel was spun round with alacrity as the telegraph rang out below and the engines slowed down to a slow pulsating throb. the sharp bows of the patrol boat rose dripping from each green-grey mass of sea as it rolled up out of the white haze ahead and then fell gently back into the trough. the violent pitching gave place to a more easy see-saw movement, and in spite of the cold, which seemed to grow keener every minute to the half-numbed figures on deck, a grunt of satisfaction escaped the helmsman, and visions of steaming plum duff--a present from the admiral's wife--supplanted the more anxious thoughts of war and the dangers of mine and submarine which lay hidden in the white snow-mists and grey seas around. the four hands in the forecastle, who formed the watch below, were lying on their bunks, for sitting meant holding on, and were discussing orgies on past christmas days and planning future ones with a nonchalance bred of daily rubbing shoulders with danger and death. snatches of popular music hall songs penetrated the closed hatchways, but were drowned by the splash of the sea against the ship's side. this silent battle with monotony, bitter cold and drenching showers of spray, with several numbing hours on deck, followed by an equal time lying on the bunks below--still cold and wet, for fires and dry clothes were almost unknown in the patrol boats during the long winter months in the cruel northern seas--might have lasted all day, until darkness and increasing cold added their quota to the sum of misery, and the day patrol crept silently into harbour, to be relieved by their brethren of the night guard. but such was not to be, for it was a christmas day that will live for ever in the memory of the men on patrol launch no. , to be recalled in the peaceful years ahead to eager listeners at many a fireside. two bells in the afternoon watch had barely struck when from out of the haze ahead came a low reverberating boom! the three figures on the bridge stiffened to alertness and the chilled blood went coursing more warmly through their veins. a few seconds of strained listening, rewarded only by the noise of the sea, then the telegraph was moved forward, a sharp jangle of bells came from the engine-room and forecastle and the slow pulsating of the motors grew to a loud roar. the watch below came tumbling on to the wet deck, to be lashed with clouds of blinding, stinging spray, which now flew high over the little ship as the -horse-power engines drove her at knots through the grey, misty seas. experience had made that dull roar familiar to all on board, and it needed no order from the now hard-faced c.o. to cause every man to don his "capuc" life-belt in readiness for the hidden dangers which they knew to be strewn in the pathways of the sea ahead. mines are moored at a given depth below the surface, usually from six to ten feet. the rise and fall of the tide, therefore, either increases or decreases the stratum of free water above them. this causes these invisible submarine weapons to be more dangerous to shallow-draught vessels, such as motor patrol launches, at low tide, when there is little water between the tops of their horns and the surface, than at high tide. more will, however, be said in a later chapter about mines and the difficulties of laying them. it so happened that on this occasion the tide was low and the mines consequently extremely dangerous to even the shallowest draught type of warship. the speed of the m.l. was increased until the twin engines were revolving at the rate of a minute. the snow haze seemed suddenly to grow thicker and all around the flurries of white blotted out the distant view. the minutes of pounding through the slate-grey seas seemed interminably long, and the flying clouds of icy spray stung every exposed part of the human frame. when about three sea miles had been traversed the engines were stopped and all on board listened for a cry from the sea ahead. the c.o. pulled the peak of his drenched cap farther over his eyes and gazed out into the opaque greyness ahead. minutes passed; but little ships cannot rest quietly on the open sea. the lash of the water and the slapping of the meagre rigging drowned any faint sound there might have been, and once more the engines throbbed to the order "slow ahead!" barely had the ship gathered way before a dark object appeared momentarily in the trough of the sea about two degrees on the starboard bow and the next instant seemed swallowed up. a warning cry from the look-out on the tiny sea-washed fo'c'sle head, a sharp order from the bridge, and, within its own length, the patrol boat swung rapidly to port. at the same moment a dan-buoy splashed overboard to mark the position of the floating mine. a few yards more to the eastward and no. would have appeared in the list of the missing. minutes of tense nerve strain followed, for all knew that the ship was in the midst of a mine-field, and the deadly horns which had been momentarily visible on the surface were but a single example of the many which lurked around. eyes were strained into the grey-green depths, and yet all knew the impossibility of seeing. again the look-out's warning cry and the engines were reversed, but this time it was not a mine, but the victim of one, holding on to a piece of wreckage. willing hands hauled the half-frozen form on board and stanched the blood that still oozed from cuts on the face and neck. blankets and hot-water bottles were soon forthcoming, and the battered remnant--for both a leg and thigh bone were broken--was placed as carefully as the lurching of the ship would allow in the aft-cabin bunk. before this could be accomplished, however, a cry again rang out from the watch on the fo'c'sle head and yet another body was hauled aboard, but the shock or the cold had here taken its toll. the sea around was searched in vain for further survivors. a few planks, a signal locker, a broken life-raft and a meat-safe were all that was left of the trawler _mayflower_, homeward bound from iceland to grimsby. a silence seemed to brood over the patrol boat as she slowly picked her way out of the mine-field. the crew went about their tasks without the usual jests and snatches of song, and the pudding, which but a few short hours before had seemed the most important event of the day, lay unheeded on the floor of the galley, where it had been thrown by the cook in the haste for hot water. in the failing light of the december afternoon the bow of the patrol boat was turned shorewards, and, with a rising sea curling up astern, she raced through the slate-grey water with her burden of living and dead. it was one of those moments which call for a rapid decision on a difficult point, when the order had to be given for the course to be laid for harbour, and the c.o., cold and miserably wet after seven hours on the bridge, wore an anxious look. he knew not which had the greater claim, the desperately wounded man in the cabin or other ships which might bear down on the mine-field during the long bitter night. it was a point on which the rules of war and the dictates of humanity clashed. again the ship was turned into the rapidly darkening east, and all through that bitter night the field of death was guarded. stiffened fingers flashed out the warning signal when black hulls loomed out of the darkness. numbed limbs clung for dear life when green seas washed the tiny decks, and when dawn broke over the waste of tumbling sea the men on m.l. knew that christmas day, , would live for ever in their memory. chapter xvi the derelict there are few things more heart-breaking than sea patrol, which forms the principal duty of anti-submarine fleets. hours, days and even months may pass with nothing to relieve the monotony of grey sea and sky, with occasional glimpses of wave-tossed ships. there are, of course, intervening periods in harbour, when fierce gales howl overhead, and guard duty on rain-swept quaysides, or sentry-go in blinding snowstorms, comes almost as a relief from the sameness of winter days on northern seas. it is, however, the unexpected which generally occurs in war, and during those terrible winters from - it was the ever-present hope of action that kept the spirits of many a sailorman from sinking below the plimsoll line of health. sometimes the happenings were grave and at other times gay, but always they were welcomed eagerly, as providing excitement or change, with something to talk about in the unknown number of dreary weeks ahead. an episode of this kind occurred one snowy january night in on the quayside of a northern seaport. the commanding officer of one of the patrol boats in the harbour was going ashore to stay for the night with some friends. knowing that his ship was due to proceed to sea early the following morning, he took the precaution to place a small alarm clock in the big pocket of his bridge-coat. groping his way in the darkness and blinding snow across the gangway leading from the ship to the quay, he succeeded in reaching the dock wall. almost instantly he was challenged by a military sentry on duty and was about to reply when a loud buzzing noise came from his pocket. he had not thought of ascertaining at what time the alarm clock had been set for and the consequences were distinctly unpleasant. the sentry, hearing the curious buzzing sound coming from the darkness directly he had given the challenge, and thinking it came from some form of bomb, lunged smartly with his bayonet at the spot from which the sound emanated. fortunately the officer was near the edge of the dock wall and did not receive the full effect of the thrust. the bayonet tore his coat and pushed him violently over the edge into the icy water of the harbour. his lusty shouts caused searchlights to be turned on and he was rescued promptly, but the episode, small and unimportant as it was, caused considerable merriment--except to the principal actor--for many days afterwards. all this may sound much like heresy to those who think that naval war means constant fighting, with all the pomp and circumstance of old-time battles. there are, it is true, never-to-be-forgotten moments when the blood surges and pulses beat rapidly, when the months of weary waiting are atoned for in as many minutes of swift action. such were jutland, zeebrugge, heligoland, the falklands and many an unrecorded fight on england's sea frontier in the years just past. such times pass rapidly, however; they are the milestones of war, leaving the weary leagues between, in which there is so much that is sordid and even ghastly, as will be seen from the following. * * * * * the sea offers but few sights more melancholy than the wave-washed derelict--the now desolate, helpless and forlorn thing that was once a _ship_, the home of men--seen in the half-light of a winter dawn, rising and falling sluggishly on the dirty grey swell--the aftermath of storm--with white water washing through its broken bulwarks, yards and sails adrift, a thing without life on the sad sea waves. a wireless message from a ship passing the derelict on the previous day had brought an m.l. from the nearest naval base to search the area, and after a night of wandering over shadowy grey slopes of water the dawn had revealed it less than two miles distant. there could be no doubt as to its nationality, for the white cross of denmark, on the red ground, was painted on the weather-beaten sides, now showing just above the sea. deserted and half-waterlogged, it was being kept afloat by a cargo of timber, some of which could be seen in chaos on the deck. the m.l. approached cautiously, with thick rope fenders over her rubbing-streak to prevent the frail hull from being damaged. this coming alongside other ships in the open sea, except in the very calmest of weather, is a ticklish manoeuvre, and requires considerable skill in the handling of these small and very fragile craft. what would be considered quite a light blow on the stout hull of any ordinary ship would crush in the thin timbers of a patrol launch, for in the construction of these boats speed and shallow draught were the predominant factors considered. when the m.l. had been made fast on the lee-side of the derelict a boarding party scrambled over the damaged bulwarks on to the sea-washed deck. here was a scene of chaos--rigging tangled and swinging loosely from masts and yards; sails torn and shreds still clinging to ropes and spars; loose planks of her deck cargo lying all over the place, and a general air of abandon and desolation difficult to describe. a mass of broken woodwork in the well of the ship was soon discovered to be the remains of a deck-house, and this gave the first clue to the reason for her sorry plight. pieces of shrapnel were found sticking in the timbers, and further search revealed shell-holes through the hull and cut rigging. a signal was flying from the mizen halyards, and the name on the counter, although spattered with shot, was still, in part, decipherable--_rickivik_, copenhafen. so the officer in charge of the boarding party commenced his report with the name of the ship and the port from which she hailed, adding thereto the evident fact that she had been heavily shelled--just a brief statement which left to the imagination all the incidents and, alas! tragedies of an unequal fight. a high-explosive shell had struck the little raised poop, demolishing the hatchway leading to the cabins beneath, and some heavy work with axe and saw would have been necessary to obtain an entry had an easier way not been available through the shattered skylight. in the low-roofed cabin all was disorder. tables and lockers were smashed, and the shell which had burst overhead had filled the place with heavy broken timbers from the deck above. so low was the cabin roof of this small three-masted barque, and so dark the interior, that it was difficult to see about. a lantern was procured and a careful search commenced. the yellow light fell on drawers pulled out and their contents--when worthless--flung on the floor; glasses and bottles smashed and a quaint old china figure lying intact on the broken timbers. but of the ship's papers there was no trace, with the single exception of an old bill of health, issued six years previously in baltimore. then the area of search moved from the cupboards and drawers to the floor--broken by a shell which had evidently penetrated the ship's stern and passed longitudinally through the cabin, exploding near the base of the companion-hatch. presently a startled exclamation, followed by a call for the light, came from the gloom around the stairway. two of the boarding party searching among the debris had stumbled across something which, instinctively, sent a cold shiver through them. the light, when moved in that direction, dimly revealed the body of a man lying face downwards on the floor. only the lower half of the figure was, however, visible, a mass of shattered timbers having collapsed on the head and shoulders. that life had been extinct for some considerable time was evidenced by the sickly odour which hung heavily in the less ventilated parts of the cabin, and the work of extricating the body was not commenced before the whole ship had been searched for possible survivors. this work occupied a considerable time, but nothing of importance was discovered until a slight noise, not unlike the feeble, inarticulate cry of a child in pain, came through the timbers from some distant part of the hold. it was repeated several times, and the sailors, without waiting for orders, set hastily to work to find out the cause. the hatches were carefully removed, but only floating timber could be seen. then the sound came again. this time it was unmistakable and relieved the tension. a little grim laugh from the searchers was followed by much poking about with a long piece of wood on the surface of the flooded hold under the decking, and some minutes later a large pile of timber floated into the light from the open hatchway, supporting a big tortoiseshell cat, looking very wet and emaciated. "ricky"--for such is her name now--proved to be the only living thing on that ill-fated ship. the boarding party returned to the cabin and commenced the objectionable task of extricating the dead body from the mass of wreckage. the work proceeded slowly, for the heavy broken timbers pressed mercilessly on the object beneath, and when at last it lay revealed in the dim lantern light its ghastly appearance caused all to step back in horror. it was a headless corpse! chapter xvii mined-in how many people realise that, with a single unimportant exception, there was no part of the english or scottish coast which was not mined-in at least once by german submarines during - ? harbour entrances, often less than two miles from the shore, were repeatedly blocked by lines of hostile mines, laid by u-c boats through their stern tubes, in which they seldom carried less than fifteen to twenty of these deadly weapons, without the vessels rising to the surface either when approaching the coast, laying the mines or effecting their escape. many important waterways, such as the straits of dover, the mouth of the thames, the approaches to liverpool, the firth of forth, aberdeen, lowestoft and portsmouth, were repeatedly chosen for this form of submarine attack. at one base alone no less than mines were destroyed by the attached anti-submarine flotillas in one year, and round the coasts of the united kingdom an average of about of these invisible weapons were located and destroyed annually. what this meant to the , , tons of mercantile shipping passing to and fro through the danger zone _every month_ will be better realised when it is stated that less than merchant ships were blown up by mines during the three years of intensive submarine warfare. the losses among the minesweeping and patrol flotillas, which were mainly responsible for the crushing defeat of this piratical campaign, were, however, very heavy. they amounted to over ships and several thousand men. few will therefore deny to those who lived and to those who died a share in the glory of the great victory. statistics make but uninteresting reading, and from the following account of what happened off a big scottish seaport while the inhabitants ashore slept in peace and safety a better idea will be obtained of the arduous nature of the work of minesweeping and patrol in time of war than could possibly be imparted by pages of figures. * * * * * the early dusk of a winter evening was settling over a white land and a leaden sea. a mist of sliding snow increased the gloom and blotted out the vessels ahead and astern as the line of patrol boats left the comparative warmth and security of one of the largest northern harbours for twelve hours in the bitter frost on night patrol. the cold was intense and of that penetrating nature which causes men to shiver even in the thickest of clothing. although some eighteen degrees of frost had flattened the sea, a freezing spray still blew in showers over the narrow deck and, for just a few minutes, the lead-grey sky gleamed dully red as the sun dipped below the snow-covered land. the crew of the m.l. moved about the cramped deck stiffly, for they were clad in duffel suits, oilskins and sea-boots, and little but their eyes and hands were visible. the officer on the small canvas-screened bridge was likewise an almost unrecognisable bundle of yellow and white wool and black leather. as a contrast, however, to the whitening deck and snow-clad men, the reflection of a warm yellow light came up through the wardroom hatchway, and more than one longing glance was cast down into the snug interior. these men were not all hardened by long and severe sea training; many of them formed part of the new navy, gaining experience amid the bitter cold and dangers of the grey north sea. a call for the signalman came from the bridge, and a boy, who had been swinging his arms to warm his numbed fingers, responded smartly. the lieutenant-in-command wiped the snow from his eyes as he peered round the canvas side-screen and asked tersely what the next ship ahead was trying to signal. the boy seized his semaphore flags and went out on to the spray-swept fore-deck, steadying himself against the fo'c'sle hatch cover. he flinched at first when the spray stung the exposed parts of his body, and then, with straining eyes and dripping oilskins, he managed, after the words had been repeated several times, to read the signal which was being sent down the line from the leading ship somewhere in the white haze ahead. "proceed independently to allotted stations for night patrol" was the order then conveyed to the bridge and afterwards passed on by flag to the next astern. when the last ship had received the signal each unit of the flotilla swung out of line and disappeared in the sliding snow. as the darkness increased the cold strengthened and a little bitter wind began to moan through the scanty rigging. men stamped their feet and swung their arms to increase the circulation in numbed limbs, and every now and then during the next three hours one member of the watch on deck would disappear for a few minutes down the galley hatchway to drink a cup of hot cocoa, which, so far, the cook had succeeded in keeping warm on the ill-natured petrol stove. at p.m. the first watch was over and half-frozen men climbed stiffly down the iron ladder into the tiny fo'c'sle, where the heat and fugg of oil stoves caused their thawing limbs to throb painfully. the starboard watch, fresh from the heat of the tiny cabin, whose four hours on deck now commenced, were shivering in the icy wind and showers of spray. glancing at the dimly lit chart on the small table cunningly fitted into the front of the wheel-house, the commander noted the approximate position of the ship in the , square miles of sea and snow around, and then turning to the coxswain, whose "trick" it was at the wheel, he gave the necessary orders for the course and speed. the duty of this vessel was to patrol certain approaches to the great harbour on which the flotilla was based until relieved at daybreak by another unit, and, as merchant ships had many times been attacked in these waters, a sharp look-out was necessary. to carry this out effectively in the darkness and driving snow was a task calling for all the qualities of dogged endurance inherent in the british sailor. for over two hours nothing was seen or heard except the moaning of the wind and the lash of the sea, but shortly after midnight one of the look-outs reported the sound of engines away to the starboard. the m.l.'s propellers were stopped and the watch on deck listened intently. the splash of the sea and the many noises of a rolling ship drowned any other sound there might have been, and the patrol was then continued. less than half-an-hour later, however, the clank! clank! clank! of engines again became suddenly audible, and the vessel was turned in the direction of the sound. the engines were put to full speed ahead, and as each comber struck the bows the little ship trembled from stem to stern, and clouds of icy spray swept high over the mast. the big steel hull of some man-o'-war or merchantman might suddenly loom up out of the darkness so close ahead that no skill could avoid a collision, and the eyes of all aboard were gazing alertly into the blackness of the night. five minutes' dash through the blinding, stinging spray and the engines were once more shut off to listen. the curious clanking noise had, however, ceased, and although hydrophones were used to again locate the sound, there was no result, only the ceaseless wash of the sea and the low moaning of the wind. another mile or so of pounding through the waves, followed by an interval of listening, brought the same discouraging result, and the slow, monotonous routine of patrol was continued. the stinging frost of the night became the numbing cold of early morning, and the long hours in the snow and icy spray had left their mark on all. limbs were stiff and sore. the edges of wet and half-frozen sleeves rasped swollen wrists. faces smarted and eyes ached, but little was said in the way of complaint, for men grow hard on northern seas or else succumb to the hardships. when the first dim light of a winter dawn broke reluctantly over the grey tumbling sea and whirling snow another night patrol was over, and the cheering thought came to all that soon the welcome warmth and shelter of club and recreation room would embrace them for the brief hours of daylight, while others kept watch upon the seas. it had been snowing hard for the past twenty-four hours, but as the light of a new day strengthened it eased somewhat, and away to the westward the blue outline of the land became visible. the fitful wind of the night rose to a stiff breeze, but no one paid much attention to the increasing volume of bitter spray which swept the deck as the grey-green rollers put on their white caps of foam, for the ship was heading towards the harbour and their vigil was over until darkness again closed down. few things are more trying to the temper than to be kept waiting for relief after a bad spell at sea, and but few crimes are more heinous than to leave the watched area before another patrol takes up the never-ceasing duties. therefore, if peace and quietness and an absence of insulting signals counted for anything, it ill behove any ship in the day patrol to keep her opposite member of the night guard waiting. this time the relief was late and the m.l. steamed angrily up and down, with all eyes strained shorewards. then the first of the line of armed trawlers and motor launches crawled out of the harbour in a smother of black smoke. when barely half-a-mile of sea separated the incoming and outgoing ships a loud reverberating boom rolled over the sea. so great was the explosion that the shock of it was felt rather than heard, and a gigantic column of black smoke, rising over feet into the air, appeared to engulf the leading unit of the trawler patrol. regardless of the danger, the c.o. of the motor launch sent his swift shallow-draught boat flying over the mine-field into the floating debris. the only two mangled survivors had, however, been picked up by the trawler astern of the ill-fated vessel, which had been literally blown to pieces, nothing remaining afloat when the smoke cleared away except a signal locker and a few timbers. [illustration: a motor launch of the naval patrol _yachting monthly_ _photo by com. sir a. lee guinness_] more than one of the other vessels, whose engines had been stopped immediately the explosion occurred, narrowly escaped drifting down with the tide on to the field of hidden mines, but with the skill and presence of mind gained by similar experiences in the past both the trawler unit and the m.l. flotilla were extricated without further loss. it was evident from the fact that several of the mines were barely submerged and could be dimly seen from the decks that the work of laying them had been done hastily under the cover of night, and a sense of keen sorrow and disappointment pervaded the vessels of the night guard. once again climatic conditions had favoured the enemy. in those long winter hours of impenetrable blackness and driving snow no watch, however efficient, could be relied upon to prevent such operations from being occasionally carried out. it was merely the chance of war, but nevertheless it was felt keenly, and the sense of responsibility was not dispelled until some weeks later. when the _sweepers_ arrived it was soon discovered that the harbour was temporarily mined-in. signals were exchanged with the "senior naval officer" of the base, and the night guard was ordered to assist in preventing shipping from attempting to enter the harbour before the approaches had been swept clear and the mines destroyed. weary ships with disappointed crews once more turned seawards, but the physical discomforts of stinging spray and frequent snowstorms passed almost unnoticed in the efforts of the flotilla to prevent the ceaseless stream of ocean traffic from approaching the danger zone unnoticed in the blinding white haze. tired limbs were forced to continued efforts and numbed faculties were goaded afresh. big ships loomed out of the mists around and were informed of the dangers and directed into the pathways of safety. trawlers returning from the fishing-grounds of the far north had to be intercepted, local craft piloted round the mine-field in the shallow water close inshore, signals flashed to the outer patrols, and the hours of daylight and activity passed quickly by. by seven bells in the afternoon watch the dusk of the long winter night began again to settle over the sea, blotting out one patrol from another. on this as on many other similar nights spent in the bitter frost, thick sea fog or flying spume, in waters infested with mines and hostile submarines, certain senses became dulled, though the brain remained alert and the limbs as active as cramp and cold would allow. but the little incidents of those long hours are lost in blurred memories of cries from the look-out, hulls towering out of the blackness, the flashing of morse lamps, the ceaseless and violent pitching and rolling of a small ship, moments of tense excitement, followed by hours of cold and an utter weariness of the soul. when the first pale streaks of returning daylight had turned to the fiery red of a frosty sunrise, dirty and unshaven men moved painfully about the slippery decks. the sea had flattened in the night and the snowing had ceased, but twenty degrees of frost had gripped the wet decks and the soaked clothing. as the vessels stood towards the shore weary eyes were turned anxiously on the signal station, but not yet was the recall to be hoisted, for although the seas around had been swept clear of mines, there was still a careful inspection to be made before the area could be reported clear, so that ships might come and go. when at last a line of flags fluttered to the distant mast-head away on the hill ashore, and the signal-boy read out, "m.l.'s to return to harbour," there was a feeble cheer. . . . . . . . . on a calm, frosty morning some three weeks later the boats of the old night guard, now doing their spell of day duty, discovered a long trail of thick greenish-black oil on the surface leading seawards. it was evident that a hostile submarine had rested during the previous night on the sandy bottom in the shallow water close inshore and, rising to the surface, had made off at daybreak. the trail was followed and information was quickly received from an iceland trawler, which had passed the submarine on the surface some two hours previous. ships were concentrated by wireless, and although it did not fall to the lot of the m.l.'s to give the _coup de grâce_, they had the satisfaction of returning to harbour with the knowledge that their honour had been retrieved, and yet another german submarine would never again commit outrage on the high seas. chapter xviii the casualty there were duties performed by the new navy which bore no relationship to anti-submarine fighting, or, in fact, to warfare at all, unless it was to the ceaseless battle waged between all who go down to the sea in ships and the elements they seek to master. one such as this occurred at a little northern seaport in the late winter of , unimportant and scarcely worth relating except as an illustration of the diverse services rendered by men of this great force during the years of national peril. * * * * * the gale was at the height of its fury when the march day drew to a close. the whole east coast of scotland, from john o' groats to the mouth of the tweed, was a study in black and white--the white of foam and the black of rocks. all the minesweepers and smaller patrol ships had been confined to their respective bases for several days, and in a certain small harbour many of the officers and crews of the imprisoned ships were spending their time ashore, in the warmth and cheery comfort of hospitable firesides. the boisterous day became a wild night. the wind howled and whistled over the barren moors and through the streets of the small fishing town. houses trembled and chimneys rocked under the blasts. although a watch on the signal tower and elsewhere was religiously maintained, it was of little value, as all that could be seen in the darkness to seawards was a hazy mist of flying spray which the wind whisked from the surface and carried several miles inland. standing back from the sea, and some half-mile from the centre of the little fishing town, stood a substantially built house, more commodious and better furnished than many of its neighbours, which had providentially fallen into the temporary grasp of one of the married officers of the patrol flotilla, who generously kept open house for his less fortunate brothers-in-arms. on this wild winter night the interior looked excessively cosy and inviting. before a big blazing fire of logs sat three officers, talking between copious sips of whisky and soda. their conversation was subdued and their inhalations of cigar smoke long. by their side were the faithful women who had followed them from the comforts of home and the gaieties of the great southern cities to this remote corner of northern scotland. they too were talking among themselves and knitting for the crews of their husbands' ships. this quiet domestic scene would have gone on uninterruptedly until a late hour, for it was seldom that such precious moments of rest and contentment could be snatched amid the ever-recurring duties and the turmoil of war, had it not been for one of the officers who glanced ruefully at his wrist watch and then apologetically informed his host that it was his turn for night duty on the signal tower. scarcely had he risen from the fire and moved towards the door of the room, however, before the dull boom of a gun was borne on the howling wind. all stood still and listened. the women ceased their knitting and looked up apprehensively. then a minute or so later the boom came again, this time in a lull of the storm, and it sounded nearer. the three officers hurried into the hall to get on oilskins and sea-boots, but almost before this could be done there came a report which echoed sharply through the little town. they knew the sound only too well, for the coast was a dangerous one. it was the reply of the life-boat crew to the call of distress, and with one accord they moved towards the door. almost instantly it was thrown violently open and the rush of wind and rain extinguished the hall light. for the next few minutes they were struggling against the gale, battling their way to the lofty little signal station, impeded in every movement by driving rain, flying scud, intense blackness and flapping oilskins. when they had reached the coast and mounted the rough stone steps leading to the elevated look-out tower, a clear sweep of the dark, foam-crested surface was obtained, and the news was shouted above the roar of the gale that somewhere out in the night, amid the tormented waters, a ship was in distress, though the flying spray made it impossible to locate the exact direction. below the signal tower, and built on a mass of rock projecting into the half-sheltered water inside the concrete pier, was the life-boat house. from this point the white rays of a chemical flare lighted up the surface of the sea as far as the harbour bar, which, with its flanking rocks, resembled a seething cauldron. into this the life-boat plunged from its inclined slipway, and was almost instantly swallowed up in the outer ring of darkness and spray. the flare died out suddenly and the night seemed even blacker than before. after a brief struggle with the wind, now blowing at a speed of over seventy miles an hour, the men who had assembled around the signal station made their way out on to the spray-swept breakwater, and there waited for the coloured rocket from the life-boat which would signify that she had found the wreck. nearly an hour passed but no sign came from the darkness and boiling sea. then a light appeared momentarily on the harbour bar and was lost in the smother of white. a few minutes later a grinding crash came from the rocks less than a hundred yards distant from the end of the breakwater. the groups of sailors standing under the lee of the wall, chafing at their apparent helplessness and gazing anxiously out to sea, were suddenly electrified into action by a few sharp orders from the oilskinned commander. a minute or two of seemingly inextricable confusion resulted in the beams of a portable searchlight flashing out from the spray-swept breakwater and lighting up rocks, foam, and a big three-masted norwegian sailing ship, with sails torn, her fore-mast broken off short and every sea lifting high her stern and driving her farther on to the half-hidden tongues of stone. even as the light played on her she heeled over to starboard at an angle of about forty-five degrees with an ominous rending of timbers which sounded above the roar of wind and surf. orders were bellowed through a megaphone, and again men moved quickly in all directions. this time a fiery rocket, bearing a life-line, soared from its tube with a loud hiss and sped across the hundred yards of boiling sea. it straddled the wreck. the thin line it carried was soon exchanged for a stout hawser--hauled from the breakwater--and this was made fast to the stump of the mainmast, which had followed the other "sticks" overboard when the vessel heeled over on the rocks. it was now floating, wrestling and tugging at the mass of confused rigging, and pounding dangerously at the ship's side. one by one the unfortunate norse crew were hauled over the harbour bar in the breeches-buoy by fifty willing british sailors, and the first to come was the captain's wife and little daughter. there was but one casualty, and that among the rescuers. the stretcher was lifted from the ambulance at the door of the substantially built house standing back from the little town. a white-faced woman ran out into the storm. she had spent a year of nights and days half expecting such as this, and now that it had come the blood seemed to ebb from her body, and at first she scarcely heard a familiar voice assuring her that it was only a cut on the head from a broken wire rope. chapter xix how h.m. trawler no. lost her refit an earlier chapter described the periodical overhauls necessary to keep the ships of the hard-worked auxiliary navy in proper fighting condition. these "refits" were needed not only by the ships but also by the men who worked them. they came about once a year and lasted for two or three weeks, during which time the crews were able to go home for at least a few days of much-needed rest. to describe how everyone, from commander to signal-boy, looked forward to these spells of leave is unnecessary. let the reader imagine how he himself would feel after nine or ten months of the monotony and danger, to say nothing of the hardships, of life at sea in time of war. there was, however, another consideration, one seldom referred to but nevertheless unavoidably present in the minds of all. each time a refit came round there were ships which would never be docked again, and comrades who had missed their leave. men told themselves that the luck they had enjoyed for so long could not last, and it is about one of these, in a fight against overwhelming odds, that the following story deals. three of his majesty's armed trawlers were plunging through the sea on their lonely beat in the western ocean. the hebrides lay far to the southward, and less than two days' steam ahead lay the arctic circle. these cheerless surroundings, however, found no echo in the hearts of the watch below on the leading ship of the unit, who were lounging on the settees in the oil-smelling fo'c'sle discussing their prospects of long leave, for their ship was to "blow-down" for a thorough refit when they returned to harbour in less than three weeks' time. on the deck of the same vessel two officers, standing in the shelter of the wheel-house, were sweating and shivering in patches, but also happy with the thought of the forthcoming reunion with their families and the brief enjoyment of the comforts of home after seven long winter months' wandering, with soul-destroying monotony, over the windswept wastes of england's frontier. the watch on deck, with the exception of the helmsman and look-out, crouched under the lee of the iron superstructure, alternately swinging their arms and stamping their heavily booted feet, but they too were mentally impervious to the dismal surroundings. of the second ship in the line the same cheery story cannot be told. she was jealous of the first. it would be another two months at least before she would go in dock for refit; and among the watch below there were three new hands on their first voyage, two of whom would, just then, have preferred the peace and stillness of the sea bottom to the friskiness of the surface. the third trawler was a happy little ship, for although the junior of the unit she had been very fortunate in securing a "fritz" all to her own cheek less than three months before. this, then, was one of the units on the outer hebrides and iceland patrol during the winter of , and they seemed to be the sole occupants of the leagues of water around. it was barely eleven o'clock, greenwich time, when they reached the last ten miles of their beat, and speed was reduced so that they would not have to turn about and begin steaming back over the course they had come until the morning watch went below at midday. this was an artful though harmless arrangement to enable those going off duty to have a meal and at least an hour's rest in peace, as on the voyage back both wind and sea would be astern and the vicious lurching of the small ship reduced to a minimum. the time passed slowly, as it generally did on patrol when nothing exciting was afoot, but a few minutes before the awaited eight bells the officer on duty snatched up the binoculars, and almost simultaneously the look-out gave a warning shout which caused the attention of everyone on deck to suddenly become strained. away to port, less than half-a-mile distant, the thin grey tube of a periscope could be seen planing through the waves, with a fringe of white foam blowing from its base. there was a hoarse cry down the fo'c'sle hatch for "all hands on deck!" the telegraph tinkled for "full ahead!" a signal was made to the ships astern for concerted action. the gun was manned, and the leading trawler, now cleared for action, headed towards her under-water opponent. the other two vessels of the unit put on speed and spread out until all three were line-abreast and about two cables apart. in this formation the chase was maintained for some twenty minutes, when a second submarine appeared above the surface away to starboard. she appeared to be a large vessel and would probably have turned the scale at tons. it was at this early stage in the action that the mistake was made. the leading trawler immediately opened fire, but the range was considerable and the shells fell short. signalling to the other two trawlers to continue the chase of the first submarine sighted, she headed straight for the largest of the two hostile craft to engage her at close range. while this was in progress the first submarine came to the surface and proved to be also a larger craft than had been anticipated. the two trawlers chasing her immediately opened fire, but her superior surface speed soon placed her out of range of the comparatively small guns then carried by the trawler patrols. now came the surprise. almost simultaneously the two submarines opened fire from heavy guns. the shells at first fell wide, but in a moment the british officers realised that they were outranged, for whereas their shells were falling short, those from the enemy whistled over their heads and ploughed up columns of white water over a cable's length astern. to increase speed and so reduce the range became imperative, and the steam-pressure in the trawlers' boilers was raised to bursting point by the simple expedient of screwing down the safety valve. for some minutes it looked as though the effort would be successful, and then the range slowly increased again and "short" after "short" was registered by the gunners. at this psychological moment a german shell carried away the funnel of the leading trawler and smothered her decks with smoke. when a temporary shield had been rigged it was observed that one of the other patrol ships had been crippled by a direct hit and was in a sinking condition. it now became evident that the superior speed and gun-power of the submarines enabled them to keep out of range of the trawlers' weapons and to ply their long-range fire with telling effect. the officer in command of the patrol at once realised the mistake he had made when opening the action, in betraying the power of his own guns before he was sufficiently close to the enemy to ensure hits, and he cursed this want of foresight which looked like costing the life of the flotilla. given one direct hit on each of his two powerful opponents and they would in all probability have been put out of action, but instead he had only the mortification of seeing every shell fired fall short, while his own vessels were being battered to pieces by the long-range guns of an enemy with whom he could not close. the withholding of fire while hostile shells are bursting around is one of the many severe strains imposed on the human mind by modern war, and in anti-submarine tactics it often means the difference between victory and defeat, which, followed to its logical conclusion, is generally life or death. one hope now remained--that by skilful manoeuvring the trawlers could be kept afloat until help arrived; but in those wastes of sea no vessel might pass for many hours, and even then not a warship. such is the working of fate: the leading trawler of the unit was to have been fitted with wireless while under the approaching refit, and with its aid patrol cruisers or fast destroyers could soon have been brought to the scene of operations. thirty minutes later the crippled ship, the junior member, gave three defiant shrieks with her syren and slid under the surface with her colours flying. for over two hours the others manoeuvred to get one on each side of the submarines to enable them to get the few shells remaining in their magazines home on the target, but so great was the disparity of both range and speed that at five in the evening nearly half their crews were dead or wounded, and a little while later the ice-cold water closed over the leading ship. still the other fought on, but as dusk closed over the sea she too went down in this obscure fight. no search for possible survivors was made by the submarines, which glided westwards into the smoky red afterglow, leaving the bitter cold to finish the work of death. . . . . . . . . a big armed liner of the tenth cruiser squadron had heard the distant firing and came upon the scene just before darkness finally closed over. four bodies were still lashed to a raft, but in all except one life was extinct. when the doctors bent over the half-frozen form in which a flicker still lingered they shook their heads. death waged a stern battle even for this last relic, but life triumphed, and when the agony of returning animation had ceased the sole survivor told the cruiser's mess how trawler no. had lost her refit. chapter xx the raider everyone familiar with english history knows that it was a severe gale which destroyed the scattered and defeated units of the spanish armada in , and that, in more modern times, it was the coming of darkness which prevented the british grand fleet from turning the victory of jutland into a decisive rout. such historical examples of the effect of the weather, and even ordinary climatic changes, on the course of naval operations could be multiplied almost indefinitely. not only are the movements of the barometer important factors to be considered in the major operations of naval war but also in minor sea fights. comparatively few people are, however, aware that one of the largest and most destructive of german mine-fields was laid off the british coast during the great war by a surface ship which escaped detection through darkness and storm. * * * * * the barometer had fallen rapidly, and clouds rolled up from the north-west in ragged grey banks which scudded ominously over a cold steely blue sky. for some days the sea had been moderately calm, but it was mid-winter and quiescence of the elements could not be expected to last. slowly the face of the atlantic grew lined with white. it began with a moaning wind which soon developed into a stiff gale, accompanied by heavy storms of sleet and snow. one of his majesty's ships coming up the west coast of ireland found herself heading into the teeth of the gale. as the afternoon wore on the wind increased in violence and the ship rolled and plunged heavily, smothering herself in clouds of flying spume. the driving sleet made it difficult to see more than a cable's length in any direction, and when dusk closed over the storm-swept ocean the ship was headed for a sheltered stretch of water close inshore. every stay and shroud whistled its own tune as the gale roared past. foam-crested waves hurled themselves in a white fury against the plunging, dripping sides, piling up on the port bow and racing aft in cataracts of water which threatened instant death to any luckless sailor caught in their embrace. the lashings on the movable furniture of the decks, although of stout rope, were snapped like spun-yarn, and much-prized, newly painted ventilators, boat-covers, fenders, deck-rails and other necessary adornments were swept overboard by the ugly rushes of green sea. the iron superstructure and bridge-supports resounded to the heavy blows of the water, and the ship trembled as she rose after each ghastly plunge. the blasts of wind which struck the vessel with increasing violence had swept unimpeded over miles of ocean and carried in their breath the edge of the arctic frost. the sleet felt warm compared with it, and the flying spray lost its sting. the forty-eight sea miles lying between the ship and the sheltered strait seemed endless leagues, for the speed had to be considerably reduced to avoid serious damage from neptune's guns. the minutes of twilight grew rapidly less, and with the coming of darkness a new danger threatened. the ship was approaching a rock-strewn coast with no friendly lights to guide her, and every now and then lofty masses of black stone rose up, dimly, from their beds of foam. it was an anxious half-hour, and ears were strained for the warning thunder from surf-beaten rocks which sounded at intervals even above the roar of the gale. fortunately the entrance to the sheltered waterway was broad, and almost before it could be realised the sea grew calm. although the wind still shrieked and moaned, the waves rose barely three feet high. great cliffs, invisible in the darkness and driving sleet, protected the strait, and as the vessel picked her way to a safe anchorage closer under the lee of the land the wind lost its giant strength and the howling receded into the upper air. throughout the night the comparatively small warship rode safely at anchor, innocent of what was taking place out in the blackness and the storm. when morning broke the gale had lost some of its force, and streams of pale watery sunlight shone between the low-flying clouds on to a boisterous sea. . . . . . . . . running before the wind and sea the german raider _frederick_, carefully disguised and loaded with several hundred mines, approached the british coast. the gale was increasing in force as darkness closed down, and heavy showers of sleet shielded her from the view of any passing craft. the weather was ideal for her dark purpose, which was to lay a mine-field over a stretch of sea where it was thought the anglo-american trade routes converged. for the first few days out from wilhelmshaven the weather had been misty with heavy snowfalls, conditions enabling the mine-layer (and afterwards raider) to run the blockade and elude the network of patrols, not, however, without some very close shaves. on one occasion a large auxiliary cruiser passed in a snow squall, and during subsequent movements the raider found herself in the midst of a british fishing fleet, but passed unrecognised in the darkness. and now that she was approaching the british coast, and the scene of actual operations, the barometer again obliged by falling rapidly. it was a wild night and very dark when the first mine splashed overboard. a snowstorm set in, and as the work proceeded heavy seas broke over the vessel, smothering her with spray, but she was comparatively a large ship, built for ocean trade. although the darkness and the snow were conditions favourable to the laying of mines in secret, and without their aid the danger of discovery would have been great, the rising gale and the heavy seas rendered the work both difficult and dangerous, notwithstanding that these deadly weapons were so arranged as to go automatically overboard. before the last of her cargo had been consigned to the deep it was blowing great guns, and one sea after another was breaking over the ship. although sheltered waters lay less than fifty miles distant, to proceed there would mean certain discovery and destruction, so all through that wild night, and for many hours afterwards, the raider sought by every means in her power to battle seawards, away from the coast and danger, heading into the teeth of the gale and out on to the broad bosom of the north atlantic, all unknowing that but for the severity of the storm she must have been observed, probably in the very act of laying the mine-field, by the small warship riding out the north-wester in the more sheltered waters close inshore. * * * * * it is interesting to note that it was on this mine-field a few days later that one of the largest transatlantic liners was sunk. chapter xxi the s.o.s. a great work of rescue was carried on throughout the war on all the seven seas by vessels of both the old and the new navy. this service was rendered to ally, neutral and enemy alike, but no complete record of the gallant deeds performed nor even of the numbers and nationalities of those saved will, in all probability, ever be available, and none is needed, for it was a duty which brought its own reward. typical of the way succour was brought by the naval patrols to those unhappy victims of both sexes left adrift in open boats in calm and rough, sunshine and snow, all over the northern seas by the cowardly _unterseeboten_ of the kultured race was the rescue of the passengers and crew of a liner off the wild west coast of ireland in the winter of . * * * * * it was mid-december, and flurries of snow were being driven before a stinging north-westerly wind. the sea was moderate, but the heavy atlantic swell caused the lonely patrol ship to sink sluggishly into the watery hollows, with only her aerials showing above the surrounding slopes of grey-green sea, and a minute or so later to be poised giddily on the bosoms of acre-wide rollers with nothing but the white mists obscuring the broad horizon. it was a wild wintry scene, pregnant with cold and hardship. the officer who had just come up from the warmth of the wardroom to relieve his "opposite number" on the bridge pulled the thick wool muffler closer round his neck and dug mittened hands deep into the pockets of his duffel coat. in the marconi cabin, situated on the deck of the _sloop_, a young operator was sitting with the receiving instrument fixed to his head and the clean and bright apparatus all around. he was city born and bred, and felt keenly the monotony of life at sea, although to him came the many interesting wireless signals from the vast network of patrols which covered the western ocean--linking the sea-divided units into a more or less homogeneous fleet. presently a message began to spell itself in morse. taking a pencil, the operator scribbled various hieroglyphics on the naval signal paper lying on the desk in front of him; then after a pause of a few seconds he pulled forward a tiny lever and began a rhythmic tap on an ebonite key. it was the "s.o.s." call and the reply that had flashed through the ether. a minute or so later the written signal, giving the appeal for help and the position and name of the torpedoed liner, was handed to the commander. a glance at the chart told that young but experienced officer that he could not hope to bring his ship to the scene of the disaster before dusk closed down, and a message was sparked across the eighty miles of intervening sea asking how long the crippled ship could be kept afloat. to this, however, there came no reply, and the engines of the sloop were put to full speed ahead. a heavy spray now commenced to sweep across the deck in drenching showers, and the snow haze thickened. the pitching of the ship increased as she raced over the ocean swell, driving her sharp bows deep into the masses of sea. the limbs of the watch grew stiff and numb, and a fine coating of wet salt stung their faces. eyes ached from gazing into the bitter wind, and for over four hours the race against approaching night continued. if darkness closed down before that eighty miles of sea was covered all on board realised that the chances of finding any survivors would be greatly diminished. even the strongest vitality could not long resist exposure to the intense cold, and there might be women and children in the sea ahead. many of the officers and crew of the sloop had experienced the agonies of cold, wounds and salt water when cast adrift on wintry seas, and the memory acted like a whip. as the hours went by the greenish tint of the sea slowly turned to leaden-grey, and the pure white of the driving snow contrasted sharply with the quickening dusk of the december night. it was in the last half-hour of the dog watch that the sloop reached the scene of the disaster and the speed was reduced. scattered over the sea around, and floating southwards in grim procession, was a mass of wreckage--a broken raft, a number of deck-chairs, spars and cordage, a life-belt and some oars--but of boats with living freights there was not a sign. steaming slowly round in widening circles, the sloop searched while the light lasted, but the whirling haze of fine snow blotted out the distance, and soon the early darkness of a winter night settled over the sea. the cold became intense. the white beam of a searchlight now flashed out over the black waters. there was a grave risk in this betraying light, one not sanctioned by the theory of war. it made the warship a target for any hostile submarine lurking around, but it seemed impossible to believe that a -ton liner, with probably several hundred human beings on board, could have been so completely obliterated, and to the commander of the sloop the risk seemed justified. other ships might have intercepted the s.o.s. call and reached the scene of the disaster earlier, but the sloop's wireless, although put into action, could not confirm this, and so the search was continued. on and off during the bitter night the white beam of light flashed out through the snow. for a few seconds it swept the sea close around and was then shut off. in the pall-like blackness which followed ears listened intently, but could distinguish nothing except the lash of the sea. the sound-deadening qualities of falling snow would have cut short the range of any cry, for the human voice at its strongest, and with the atmospheric conditions favourable, can seldom be heard more than yards distant. so hour after hour of numbing cold went by with nothing to show except the occasional pathway of light on the grey slopes of sea and the low moaning wind. the snowing ceased, and in the cold stillness which so often precedes daybreak in the north a faint cry came from the sea, at first so indistinct and mingled with water noises that it would never have been heard at all if the engines of the sloop had not been shut off, as they had been at frequent intervals during the night, to enable those on board to listen. the cry was quickly followed by the "snore" of a boat's fog-horn. a few turns of the sloop's propellers and in the grey light of the december dawn a large ship's life-boat could be dimly seen, away to starboard, when it rose on the bosom of the swell. careful manoeuvring placed the warship alongside the boat-load of half-frozen castaways and the work of rescue commenced. it was a sad task. amongst the thirty-two survivors there were twelve women and children, seven of whom had died of cold and exposure during that bitter night. one, a young canadian wife coming home to her wounded soldier husband, had been crushed by the explosion of the first torpedo and suffered agonies in the open boat before sinking into the peace of death. to dwell here on the suffering caused by intense cold, exposure, hunger, thirst, untended wounds, and the mental agony of suspense, often to delicate women and children, when cast adrift on the open sea, would be merely to repeat what has so often been written, and which will live for ever in the memory of sailormen. when the survivors had all been lifted on board--and many had suffered badly from frost-bite--the search for two other life-boats which it was learned had succeeded in getting away from the wrecked liner was commenced. shortly before midday the snowing began again and the wind moaned dismally through the rigging. spurts of icy spray shot upwards from the bows and were blown back across the fore-deck of the ship, searing the skin of the tired men on watch. for several hours the sea around was searched in vain. flurries of snow obscured everything more than a few hundred yards distant. then towards four bells the storm passed and the air cleared of its white fog, but nothing was visible except the wide sweep of colourless heaving sea and leaden sky. it came suddenly--an indescribable explosion with a violent uprush of water, followed by the hoarse shouting of orders, the low groans of wounded men and the sharp crack of cordite. the bows of the sloop had been blown off by a torpedo, and the vessel commenced to rapidly settle down. the two undamaged boats were lowered and the survivors from the liner once again cast adrift to face the horrors of the previous night. rafts floated free with all that were left of the crew of the sloop--two officers and thirty men. their condition was pitiable. there had been no time to get either food or extra clothing, and so heavily laden were the light structures of _capuc_ and wood that the occupants were continually awash. barely had the boats and rafts got clear of the ship before she took the final plunge, going down in a cloud of steam. a few minutes later the u-boat rose to the surface about yards distant, and after remaining there for some time, without making any effort to render assistance, she steamed slowly away. the boats took the rafts in tow, and the wounded, who suffered terribly from the cold and the salt water, were all transferred to the former. one of the women survivors from the torpedoed liner collapsed during the first hour, and although given extra clothing cheerfully discarded by the men, she died soon afterwards. seas washed over the rafts and sent clouds of stinging spray into the crowded life-boats. a biting frost stiffened the wet garments, which rasped the raw and bleeding wrists of the men who tugged at the oars--partly to increase their circulation and partly to keep the boats head-on to the sea. the only hope of rescue lay in keeping afloat until daylight, when the "s.o.s." call sent out before the sloop foundered might bring them aid. the coast of ireland lay miles to the south-east, and so intense was the cold that few expected to live through the night. the gloom of a winter afternoon gave place to darkness, and with the fading of daylight the cold increased. men became numb and were washed unnoticed from the rafts. others were dragged unconscious into the already overcrowded life-boats, which sank so deep in the water with the additional weight that green seas now splashed inboard and baling became necessary. limbs stiffened in the sharp frost and had to be pounded back to life by unselfish comrades. even under cover of the sails the cold was so intense that only five women and two children were left alive by midnight. through the long dark hours men struggled under the drenching showers of bitter spray. when dawn broke, throwing a pale mystic light over the acre-wide atlantic swell, each one knew that life depended on the coming of a ship before the light of day again faded in the west. the snowing had ceased some hours before darkness lifted, and in the clear morning cold men stood up painfully and searched the watery horizon for the sign which would bring them life. just before three bells, as the boats rose on the bosom of the swell, a thin blur of smoke could be seen low down on the eastern horizon. had there been strength left in the worn-out bodies there would have been a cheer, but now only a slight stir of suppressed excitement and many a silent prayer. the limit of human suffering and endurance had, however, not yet been reached. some twenty minutes later it became evident that the ship had not received the wireless call and was passing too far off to be reached by any sound signal short of a big gun. slowly the trail of smoke disappeared in the haze of great distance without even a glimpse of the ship itself. the spirits of all began to sink as hour after hour went by without sight of the hoped-for sail. then, about eight bells, one of the men standing up in the centre of the first officer's boat gave a little inarticulate cry and some few minutes later the dim outline of a big ship hove in sight. the suspense was unbearable. women to whom any sign of religious emotion was alien knelt openly and prayed, while men who had suffered similarly before gazed fixedly at the distant object, knowing how fickle is fortune to sailormen in distress. but the hull grew larger and hope shone on the faces of all. men pulled frantically at the oars, while others waved pieces of sail or clothing to attract attention. now came a surprise. from the pocket of his duffel coat the first officer produced what he had hitherto kept hidden for just such an emergency--a very's pistol, with its small-sized single red rocket. a hoarse cry of joy went up from all in spite of their exhaustion when they saw the rocket soar into the air and burst into a blood-red glow. a short time later keen eyes made out the string of flags which fluttered from the halyards of the oncoming warship, and although minutes seemed like hours, none could quite remember what happened after. some say that the cruiser came alongside them and others that she lowered her boats and steamed round in a circle. but forty-eight survivors were landed in liverpool three days later, leaving in the wastes of the western ocean a murdered two hundred. * * * * * it is interesting to note that survivors from torpedoed ships frequently showed great reluctance to leave their life-boats and go aboard the rescuing vessel, especially when they were within easy sailing distance of a harbour. after being torpedoed, rescued and torpedoed again they often preferred the comparative safety but hardship of the small open boat to the risk and luxury of the big ship. this applied more especially to scandinavian sailors, whose powers in small boats are well known. it should, however, be stated that, so far as british and american seamen were concerned, men sailed again and again, after being torpedoed or mined six, seven and even eight times. it was this remarkable fortitude of the mercantile marine which saved europe from starvation. chapter xxii in the shadow of a big sea fight on the evening of th may six of his majesty's drifters were lying alongside the quay of a scottish naval base having their few hours' "stand-off" after weary days patrolling lines of submerged nets. their officers and crews, with the exception of one sad-faced company on guard duty, were enjoying either the comparative luxury of a corrugated-iron wardroom, situated on a windy stone pier, or a few the more complete relaxation of a brief visit to a theatre in a neighbouring town. there were also many other ships coaling, resting and being repaired, for the base was a large and important one. in the intelligence office an assistant paymaster, weary of decoding cypher wireless messages from flotillas, patrols and sweepers spread far out over the leagues of sea lying between this port and the german coast, sat talking to the executive officer on night duty. about p.m. a messenger from the wireless cabin entered with the familiar signal form and the a.p. spread it out carelessly on the desk in front of him, taking the sturdy little lead-covered decipher book from the safe at his side. a few scratches of the pen beneath the secret signal and the deciphering was complete. he looked up quickly and with a gesture of keen satisfaction handed the signal to the officer temporarily in command of the base. the older man read it and paused for a moment before replying. it was the brief and now historic statement that an action between sir david beatty's battle cruisers and the german high seas fleet was imminent. a crowd of orders to be executed in the event of all kinds of emergencies were rapidly reviewed in his active brain. for a brief space the scene of what was occurring out in the blackness of the north sea occupied his thoughts, for he had fought in the battle of the dogger bank and knew what those brief words really meant. it was the evening of the battle of jutland. rising quickly to his feet, the night duty officer seized the telephone, rang up the admiral commanding, who had gone home to dinner, and hurriedly left the intelligence office to carry out a host of prearranged orders. the "old man," as admirals are invariably called, was evidently ready for the emergency, for his large grey car tore past the sentries at the approaches to the base, and in a few minutes he was closeted with his commanders and other officers in the small matchboarded cabin. charts were pinned down on the table in front of him, and for the next half-hour officers and messengers were kept busy with telephones and other means of rapid concentration. in the neighbouring large town the police had received the order for a "general naval recall" and were active in the streets politely informing officers and men on short leave that their services were required immediately at the bases. in the theatres and cinema halls the cryptic message, "all naval officers and men to return at once to their ships," was given out from the stage or thrown on the screen, a replica of the night before waterloo. men wondered and women grew anxious. did it mean an invasion or an air raid? many were the questions asked as silently seats were left and files of blue and gold streamed out of the places of amusement. taxi-cabs full of officers raced each other along the streets. civilians had to give place to sailors on the tram-cars, and then, in less than thirty minutes, all was quiet again, except for groups of people discussing possibilities in front of the big public buildings. even these soon dispersed when reassuring messages were circulated which hinted at the reason for the recall, and the level-headed scottish citizens went home wondering what the great news would be on the morrow--for the fate of empires might be decided during the night. as each officer and man entered the base the gates were closed. the sentries and the officer of the guard knew nothing "officially," but in the wardroom at the end of the stone quay the news of the action was being discussed in imaginative detail. at p.m. orders were received for certain small ships to get under way with sealed orders. an hour later came the message that six drifters were to be cleared of all their war appliances and were to be given stretchers, cots, slings and other appliances for the carriage of wounded. they were to be ready to proceed to sea at a.m. all was ordered hurry. piles of anti-submarine devices were taken from the holds of these ships. other vessels came alongside and unloaded stretchers, cots and slings, which had been obtained from local naval hospitals and hospital ships. the officers were grouped round a commander in the wardroom having typed orders, which had evidently been prepared long beforehand, carefully explained to them. red cross flags were served out, and by . a.m. all were ready for sea. other ships stole silently out into the blueness of the night to strengthen patrols and prevent hostile submarines from getting into position to attack the main battle fleets on their return to harbour. wireless messages indicating a concentration of german submarines on the lines of communication were received. every armed ship was in great demand, but over the dark waters, lashed by a stiff easterly breeze, the gunners of many batteries gazed steadily as the searchlights played around, investigating everything that moved on the face of the waters. beams flashed heavenwards for hostile aerial fleets. on the dark quaysides and on the decks of the ships hundreds of sailors moved noiselessly about getting ready for sea. columns of smoke from the short funnels of destroyers, trawlers and drifters showed up black against the indigo void, and ever and anon hoarse voices shouted orders, unintelligible from the distance. it was quiet preparation rather than noisy haste, and although an air of suppressed excitement did prevail when the men were mustered and extra hands told off to the different ships by the light of battle lanterns, it was more a feeling of hope than one of satisfaction. for nearly two years these men had quietly fought the elusive submarine, the nerve-shattering mine, and endured uncomplainingly the terrible hardships, arduous work and monotony of patrol, and now their one fervent hope was a glimpse at least of the real thing. in the wardroom on the quay about sixty officers of all ranks were discussing the possibilities of the fight while waiting impatiently for the last command before the relief of action--"carry on as ordered." conversation centred on the grand fleet, under sir john jellicoe, steaming down from the north. many had seen those miles of gigantic warships, whose mere existence had preserved for the entente the command of the sea and all that it implied. others had served in ships whose names have been familiar to englishmen since the days of nelson, and now opined that when at last the "old ship"--perhaps a brand-new super-dreadnought--was going into action on the great day it was their luck to be in command of a "one-horse" boat miles from the field of glory. four bells had struck when the signal came for all ships under orders to proceed to sea. oilskins were rapidly slipped on, for a fine rain had commenced to fall and the damp wind was penetratingly cold at this early hour. almost silently the small grey ships slid out of harbour and were lost in the blueness of the night. * * * * * when dawn broke over the choppy tumbling sea the different flotillas were far apart, each attending to its allotted task. those engaged in patrolling the route by which the battle cruisers would return found themselves acting in conjunction with a division of destroyers, some of whom had been under refit but a few hours previously, but when the tocsin of battle rang out had _made themselves_ ready for sea in an incredibly short time, thereby earning the praise of the commander-in-chief. information had been received, and later in the day was confirmed, that no less than five hostile submarines were known to be waiting in the vicinity with the object of attacking any crippled ships from the battle fleets, and it became the duty of the patrols to clear them away from the lines of communication. for over twenty hours the seas around were churned by the keels of a heterogeneous fleet of ships armed with equally heterogeneous weapons. guns' crews stayed by their weapons until their limbs ached and look-outs searched the sea with burning eyes. through the short dark hours of a may night in northern latitudes searchlights swept the near approaches, while in the black void of sea and sky beyond myriads of mosquito craft moved over the face of the waters with all lights out and their narrow decks cleared for action. alarms were frequent, and the occasional yellow flashes and sharp reports of cordite, some too far distant to be visible, told their own tale. in the treacherous light of early dawn the fins of big porpoises were more than once mistaken for the hunted periscope. * * * * * with the red cross flotilla waiting behind the screen of patrols and defences things had moved rapidly. each little ship had been told off to attend on one or other of the great warships which were hourly expected from the battle zone. stretchers, bedding, cots and slings were piled on the decks, and extra hands had been lent for the work of removing the wounded. another flotilla was in readiness to replace the casualties with reinforcements, which had been concentrated by special trains, in order that the battle fleets and squadrons might be again ready for sea in the shortest possible time. at the base trains and big ships were waiting with every known appliance to alleviate the suffering which was coming in from the sea. it was a typical may morning, with a light easterly breeze, when the first of the great line of ships--h.m.s. _lion_--came into view. a hurricane of cheers greeted her from the deck of every ship that passed. then the gallant _warspite_, low by the stern and scarred and torn by tornadoes of shell; the _new zealand_, scarcely touched by the fiery ordeal; the plucky little light cruiser _southampton_, holed and battered; followed by cruiser after cruiser with attendant destroyers, some with great bright steel splinters of shell still sticking tight in the gouged armour-plate; others with holes plugged with wood and broadsides stained with the bright yellow of high explosives. gun shields caught by the gusts of shell were cut out like fretwork; funnels were blotched with blackened holes; but of them all not one was out of action. few, if any, of the heavy guns and armoured barbettes were damaged, and all except one--the _warspite_--came in proudly under their own steam. this was the return of the battle cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, which, under sir david beatty, had met and defeated practically the entire german navy. steaming back into the northern mist was the grand fleet--the largest assembly of warships ever known--which, had it been given the opportunity so eagerly sought, would undoubtedly have annihilated the remains of von hipper's fleet. an observer from a distance would have found it difficult to believe that this was the fleet which had just fought the greatest sea fight in the history of the world. yet the decks of the seaplane carrier _engadine_ were covered with men in motley clothes, a grim reminder of the severity of the ordeal, for they were the survivors from the thousands who had manned the _princess royal_ and _invincible_. on the high poop a fleet chaplain was surrounded by figures in borrowed duffel suits giving thanks to the god of battles for their rescue. as the engines of each great ship came temporarily to rest a vessel of the red cross flotilla ranged alongside and the more sombre work of war began. a shell through the sick-bay of h.m.s. _lion_ had caused sir david beatty to have many of the wounded on that ship placed in his own cabins. the only casualty on the _new zealand_ was caused by a gust of bursting steel over the signal bridge. a big shell had passed longitudinally through the line of officers' cabins in the battered little _southampton_, and many were the curious escapes from death. in modern naval war a heavy casualty list seems unavoidable, and the deadly nature of a sea fight will perhaps be better realised when it is stated that on one of the battle cruisers there were just over three hundred casualties, of which number very nearly two hundred were killed outright, and this on a ship which still sailed proudly into port in fighting condition. where the shells had burst in the steel flats the fierce heat generated had burnt off the clothes and skin of many who were untouched by the flying slivers of steel, and the crews of the secondary batteries of smaller guns suffered severely. cot cases were the first to be lowered from the decks of the warships to the waiting red cross boats. the patience and care with which this difficult operation was carried out may be gauged from the fact that there were no casualties or deaths during the work of transportation. human forms, swathed from head to foot in yellow picric-acid dressings, were lowered on to the decks or carried down the gangways. by a curious ordinance of fate, _picric acid_, one of the most deadly explosives known, also provides a medical dressing for the alleviation of the pain which in another form it may have caused. the walking wounded, with arms in slings or heads covered in lint, were helped down the ship's sides by smoke-blackened comrades in uniforms torn to shreds by the fierce work of naval war. all serious cases of shell shock were conveyed at the utmost speed by special units to the big and lavishly equipped hospital ships. those with minor injuries were taken ashore and placed in ambulance trains for distribution among the big naval hospitals. so perfect was the organisation that within three hours all the sick-bays had been cleared and fresh crews placed on board. the squadrons were again ready to give battle. twenty-four hours later the patrol flotillas returned to their base to commence once again the dangerous and monotonous but less spectacular work of minesweeping and patrol. their work in preventing a concentration of german submarines on the line of route of the returning fleets and in the removal of the wounded received high praise from the commander-in-chief. in the wardroom on the little stone pier a silent toast was given that night to those who had gone aloft in the greatest sea fight since trafalgar. chapter xxiii a night attack two drifters, about a mile apart, with no lights to indicate their presence, were drifting idly with the ebb tide. it was an oppressively hot night in mid-august. scarcely a ripple disturbed the surface of the sea, but the intense darkness and the absence of stars told of the heavy clouds above. the barometer had been falling rapidly for some hours and all the conditions seemed to indicate a coming storm. the duty of these two vessels was to watch lines of cunningly laid submerged nets (described in an earlier chapter) and to guide the few merchant ships which passed that way through the labyrinth of these defences, laid temporarily as a trap for the wily "fritz" if he should chance to be cruising in the vicinity. the drifters were adequately armed with guns and depth charges to attack any such monster of the deep which betrayed its presence by becoming entangled in the fine wire mesh and so attaching to itself a flaming tail, which would then be dragged along the surface, marking it as a target for all the pleasant surprises lying ready on the decks of the patrols. _fishing for fritz_ was a popular sport in the anti-submarine service until the "fish" became shy and its devotees _blasé_; then the primitive net was changed for the more scientific devices already described. it required infinite patience and meant very hard work, with a _soupçon_ of danger thrown in. for when the tons of steel wire-netting, with its heavy sinkers and floats, had been laid, days were spent in watching and repairing, then endless resource employed to induce a submarine to enter the trap. occasionally the voyage ended in an exciting chase, with the flaming buoy as the guiding light. it was in the early period of the war, when paris was still threatened by the teutonic armies and the allies waited confidently for the clash of the great battle fleets. every dark night on the northern sea eyes and ears were silently watching and listening for the comings and goings which would herald the storm. the strain was great though the work was not spectacular, for all knew that the safety of england, or at least its freedom from invasion, might, for one brief historical instant, depend on the vigilance and nerve of that heterogeneous, irregular horse, the sea patrols. the great cruiser squadrons were scouring the north sea. battle seemed imminent, and that vague wave of human electricity which passes along the firing line before the attack at dawn, and even extends to the lines of communication, was in the air on this dark night in . six bells had just struck when a faint, cool breeze swept across the surface, and a few minutes later the first vivid flash of lightning forked the eastern sky. there was a scramble for oilskins on drifter as the rain came hissing down like a flood released. the storm was severe while it lasted. the thunder rolled over the placid surface. lightning darted athwart the sky, illuminating the black void beneath. for about thirty minutes the sky blazed and roared, then the hiss of the rain ceased and the storm moved slowly northwards, but one of the final flashes revealed something low down on the surface moving stealthily forward. so brief was the glimpse obtained, however, that it seemed merely a phantom--by no means uncommon occurrences when men have been watching for years. when the next flash came the surface of the sea around was clear. as was usual in such cases, half the watch on deck could swear they had seen it, while those who were not looking ridiculed the idea, so the c.o. said nothing and took precautions. the watch below was called and the powerful little gun on the fore-deck manned. then all waited in silence, listening intently for the curious, creaking noise of a submarine under way. in those early days of hostilities there were no elaborate hydrophones for detecting the approach of submarines under the water, and the only hope of a warning came from the possibility of the under-water vessel breaking surface momentarily. the uselessness of the periscope for navigation during darkness, which at present forms the principal limitation of submarines, made it distinctly likely that she would cruise on the surface at night, and if forced to dive would be more or less compelled to quickly rise again in order to ascertain the position of her enemy before it would be possible to fire a torpedo with any chance of success. for these reasons all eyes and ears on the drifter were strained to catch the first glimpse or sound, and dead silence was maintained. it is in times like this that one discovers how acute the senses become when danger lurks in the darkness around. things undetectable under normal conditions can be seen or heard distinctly when life depends on the intelligence so gained. long minutes of silence slipped by and nothing occurred; then came the distant and familiar creaking noise, almost inaudible at first. the gun's crew braced themselves for the stern work ahead. on the rapidity and accuracy of their fire not only their own lives, but also those of their comrades, would probably depend. the gun-layer bent his back and glanced along the grey tube to the tiny blue glow of the electric night sight. the shell was placed in the open breech. then came those interminable seconds before an action begins. the tension would have been almost unsupportable had nearly all of the crew not grown accustomed to life hanging in the balance on the wastes of sea. a flicker of light, at first almost spectral, appeared from out of the darkness some yards to starboard. it grew almost instantly into a bright white flare, illuminating the surface of the black water as it moved along. the pungent smell of burning calcium floated over the sea and the drifter's engines began to throb heavily. the tension relaxed, a subdued cheer broke from the crew of the drifter as she gathered speed, and the morse lamp winked its order for concerted action to the other drifter somewhere in the darkness around. an answering dot-dash-dot of light appeared from away to starboard and the chase commenced in earnest. a few minutes later the glare from the calcium buoy, now being towed through the water at several knots, shone on the faces of the crew as they trained their gun ahead, but the submarine was under the surface and, although probably quite unaware of the flaming tail which was betraying her movements, appeared to know that she was being hunted by surface craft. after running straight ahead for a few minutes she turned eight points to the eastward in an attempt to baffle pursuit. the chase was a fairly long one, as the speed of the drifters was not sufficient to enable them to gain rapidly on their quarry, but the flexibility of the steam-engine gradually gave the surface ships the advantage and they crept up level with the light. then, with their boilers almost bursting and flames spouting from the funnels, they drew ahead until over the submarine itself. depth charges were dropped from the stern of the drifters. the water boiled with the force of the explosions and the light on the buoy went out. still the drifters held their course in the now pall-like blackness, and other bombs splashed into the water astern, to explode with a dull vibration a few seconds after they had sunk from the surface. the engines of the two small surface ships were shut off and every ear became alert, but no sound broke the stillness of the summer night, except the rumble of distant thunder and the gentle lap of the sea against the sides. morse signals winked from one ship to the other and back again. when due precautions had been taken against a further surprise attack, the chivalry of the sea called for a search to be made for possible survivors. this was done with the aid of flares, but only oil and some small debris were found. dan-buoys were dropped to mark the spot and soundings taken. twenty-four fathoms deep was added to the report of the action, and a few days later a diver reported having found the wreck of the u-c . chapter xxiv mysteries of the great sea wastes the piratical warfare of german submarines produced many sea mysteries. some were solved after the lapse of months and even years, while others will, in all probability, remain unknown until the sea gives up its dead. among the latter may be numbered the curious discovery in the north atlantic of a nameless sailing ship, without cargo, identifying papers or crew, but sound from truck to kelson, and with her two life-boats stowed neatly inboard and a half-finished meal on the cabin table. experts examined this vessel when brought into port, but so far have been utterly unable to offer any solution or discover any clue, beyond the fact that she was built and fitted out in some american port and carried an unusually large crew. another similar mystery was the disappearance of a french vessel while on a voyage to new orleans and the discovery eleven months afterwards that she had called for water and food at a small port on the pacific coast of south america. no further trace has so far come to light, nor the reason for her changing course and rounding cape horn. a mystery which remains a mystery to the end of the chapter is likely to be irritating to the imaginative mind, but to the following occurrence there came a solution after the lapse of a few weeks. the spectre of the goodwins it was a pitch-black night, with fine rain driving up from the south-west. the summer gale which had raged for the past twenty-four hours had blown itself out, and although the steep seas still retained their night-caps, the wind came only in fitful gusts. away to starboard an indistinct blur of white foam stretched athwart the sea and the dull roar from the maelstrom of the goodwins rolled across the miles of intervening water. the armed trawler _curlew_ bravely shouldered her way through each green comber as it rose to meet her, lurching over the seas in a smother of spray. oilskinned figures moved warily along the life-lines, for when a wave struck her tons of water swept across her slanting decks, submerging the bulwarks and causing the sturdy ship to groan and tremble from stem to stern. in the little bridge-house the dim light from the binnacle shone on the hard wet face of the commanding officer, who watched the seas as they rose up ahead, giving directions to the man at the wheel, and all the while keeping a watchful eye on the distant blur of foam covering the treacherous shoals. few except sailormen can realise the dangers and anxieties of navigation in times of war. the absence not only of the warning lights which in days of peace flash their signals far out over the seas, marking the innumerable dangers which lie along treacherous coasts, but also of warships and merchantmen rushing through the night with not even the flicker from a port-hole to denote their coming--perhaps at a speed of nearly three-quarters of a mile a minute; a second's indecision on the part of the brain and nerve directing each ship, a momentary forgetfulness of that elusive "right thing to do"--some second danger to attract a flash of attention from the first--even a blinding cloud of spray at the psychological moment and, well, two more ships have gone, with perhaps hundreds of lives. yet these things but seldom happened, and the reason was that all that tireless energy, skill and nerve could do was done on the sea in those years of storm and stress. some two hours later, and just before dawn broke over the tumbling sea, an exceptionally heavy wave struck the trawler full on the port-bow. the hammer-like blows of the water as it poured on board and struck the base of the wheel-house and superstructure momentarily drowned all other sound. when the air had cleared of flying spume a big black hull loomed out of the darkness ahead and seemed suddenly to grow to an immense size, towering high above the trawler's forecastle-head. a blast on the whistle, a sharp order and the trawler swung off to starboard, with the great black mass perilously near. it was a close shave, and the watch held their breath while waiting for the crash and shock which for a brief second seemed inevitable. there was no time for action or signal. the great ship slid past like some black phantom framed in the white of flying scud. it faded into the misty darkness of sea and sky almost as quickly as it had appeared, and, curiously, no sound of throbbing engines accompanied its passage. it took the captain of the patrol but a minute to make up his mind what to do. he gave a quick order to the helmsman and a warning shout to the watch below on deck. the little ship, as she came about, lurched into the trough of a sea and rose shivering from end to end. the next moment an avalanche of white and green water poured over her, flooding the decks and sending clouds of spray high over the funnel and masts. then commenced an exciting chase, with the seas racing up astern and all eyes trying to penetrate the darkness ahead. the faint misty light of a new day had brightened the eastern horizon before the mysterious ship again loomed up ahead. the heavy sea still running made it difficult, however, to distinguish any national or local characteristics which might give a clue to her identity or intentions, and the suspense was keen. the two guns of the patrol vessel were manned, and a three-flag signal fluttered from the jumper-stay but received no immediate reply from the ship ahead. then, after a few minutes' pause, during which time the trawler manoeuvred for the advantage of the light from the breaking dawn, a yellow flash belched from her side and a shell ricochetted off the water just ahead of the mysterious steamer. still there was no response; but it could now be plainly seen that the engines were not working and that she was drifting before the wind and sea. was it merely a _ruse de guerre_ to gain the advantage in the event of an attack, or was she a vessel disabled by the storm which had raged during the past forty-eight hours? neither of these suppositions, however, satisfactorily explained the total disregard of signals and the warning shot which had been fired across her bows. again a line of flags were hoisted on the trawler's halyards, this time a well-known signal from the _international code_, but still no notice was taken of the peremptory order it conveyed. after the chase had been on for over an hour another shot was fired from the trawler. the report echoed across the still boisterous sea and the splash of the shell just cleared the ship's bow. still there was no response, and the trawler's course was altered so that she would soon close in on her quarry. as the light increased it was seen that a stout wire hawser was trailing in the water from the starboard bow, and suspicion of some new evidence of sea _kultur_ increased. when the range had closed to about yards she slowly swung round until almost broadside-on to the trawler, whose guns instantly opened fire in earnest. the third shell struck the large wheel-house of the mystery ship, demolishing it completely. when it became evident that the fire was not going to be returned, the guns of the trawler again ceased, and the two vessels drew close to each other. a partly defaced name, which was rendered indecipherable by the splash of the seas as they struck the counter, could be distinguished with the aid of binoculars in the quickening light of early morning, but neither officers nor crew could be seen, the bridge and decks appearing deserted. not to be misled by this ruse, however--for on similar occasions ships had been blown to pieces at close range by concealed batteries--the _curlew_ approached cautiously, bows-on, offering the smallest possible target, and with her guns trained on the quarry. this sea-stalking is nervy work and must be played slowly. twice the trawler circled round the mysterious ship, and the sun had mounted high, penetrating the banks of cloud which scudded across the summer sky and tingeing the still boisterous sea with flecks of golden light, before it was considered safe to relax all precautions. even then the sea prevented any attempt being made to board the curious craft, and for six hours the trawler clung to the heels of her quarry, which was rapidly drifting far out into the north sea. the danger of attack from hostile submarines was great, and the gunners stood by their weapons although drenched every few seconds by the floods of heavy spray which still poured over the bows. at last patience and endurance were rewarded. the sea calmed sufficiently to enable a boat to be lowered and with difficulty brought up under the lee of the mysterious ship. an armed guard, headed by the sub-lieutenant, eagerly scrambled up the lofty rolling sides. they had scarcely reached the deck before their only means of retreat was cut off. the two men left in the life-boat were unable to keep her off the iron sides of the big ship. she rose like a cork on the crest of a wave until almost level with the top line of port-holes and then dropped back, catching the edges of the rolling-stocks. there was a crash of splintering wood and the next minute two half-drowned men were being hauled up the sides by their comrades on deck. it was an anxious moment, for although the decks seemed deserted there was that curious, uncanny feeling which is ever present when facing an unknown peril. after all it _might_ prove to be a _ruse de guerre_ or some new form of frightfulness. there were only six men from the trawler--a small enough party, however well armed, if it came to a fight--and great caution was observed while exploring the ship. a signal had been arranged in the event of treachery, and the _curlew_, with her guns _and wireless_, would prove a dangerous antagonist. all was well, however, for the ship was deserted. a careful inspection of the cabins showed that the departure of officers and crew had been a hasty one, but all the ship's papers had been carefully removed. the forepeak or bow water-tight compartment was full of water, but the bulk-head had held and kept the vessel afloat. beyond this no damage was visible above the water-line and the condition of both hull and engines was good. she proved to be a spanish ship, and to make the mystery deeper her four life-boats were still on the davits, although swung outboard ready for lowering. in those troublous days the fact of the life-boats being hoisted out in readiness for eventualities conveyed little or nothing, but when a careful search proved that many of the life-belts had gone with the crew the problem became an interesting one. had they been taken on to the deck of a german submarine which had subsequently dived and left them to drown, as was the case with the crew of a british fishing vessel, or had they been conveyed as prisoners of war to germany? against both of these surmises was the fact that _all_ the ship's boats remained, and a german submarine would scarcely be likely to come close alongside even a neutral ship, especially during the bad weather that had prevailed for the past few days. would it remain one of the many mysteries of the great sea war? some few hours later the trawler, with her big "prize"--under her own steam--entered an eastern naval base and berthed her capture with the aid of tugs. * * * * * the explanation came from headquarters several weeks later. the s.s. ----, of barcelona, had grounded on the goodwins about three hours before she nearly ran down the trawler. her crew, thinking that she would rapidly break up in the surf, had fired distress signals and been taken safely ashore in a life-boat. the rising tide and south-westerly wind had done the rest, freeing her from the dangerous sands. chapter xxv from out the clouds and under-seas it has already been shown that the science of aerial warfare is closely allied with that of under-sea fighting. airships and seaplanes play important parts in all anti-submarine operations. they make very efficient patrols and can detect the presence of both submarines and mines under the surface. during the great war there were stations for armed aircraft all round the british coast, and the patrols of the sea and air acted in close co-operation. it often happened that one was able to render important service to the other. an occasion such as this took place off an east coast base in november, . salving an airship a big car dashed up the wooden pier of a small seaport regardless of the violent jolting from the uneven planking. it was pulled up with a jerk when level with one of the little grey patrol boats known by the generic name of m.l.'s, which was lying in the calm water alongside with its air compressor pumping vigorously. two officers of the royal naval air service, with a p.o., carrying a powerful morse signalling lamp, jumped from the car and scrambled down the wooden piles on to the deck of the m.l. a nod from the commanding officer and the mooring ropes were cast off as the telegraph was jammed over to "half ahead." instantly the powerful engines responded to the order and the little ship began rapidly to gather way. when the harbour bar had been crossed the order for full speed was given and the engines settled down to a low staccato roar as they drove the m.l. over the heaving swell. no word had yet been spoken between the officers of the sea and air. a brief telephone message to the little hut on the quayside from the adjacent naval base to the effect that m.l.a was to be ready to embark two officers from the air station and was to proceed in search of an airship which was foundering about twenty miles seawards was all that had been told, and yet not a single second of time was lost in getting under way. all recognised that it was a race to save the lives of men. the little ship cleft the seas, smothering herself with foam, and bluish fumes poured out of the engine-room ventilators. the first half-hour seemed interminably long, and the horizon was continually searched with the aid of powerful glasses for a sign of the wrecked airship. at last a faint speck became visible away to the south-west, and as the distance slowly lessened--terribly slowly, notwithstanding the speed of nearly half-a-mile a minute--the crumpled envelope settling on the water could be distinguished. it was a question of minutes. again the order was shouted down the speaking-tube for more speed, but this time there was no reply. the c.o. rang the telegraph viciously, but without result. the coxswain at the wheel looked up quickly and then shouted an order to a deck hand, who lowered himself down the tiny man-hole in the deck leading to the engine-room. a few seconds later the second engineer appeared at the top of the fo'c'sle hatch and, ducking to avoid a heavy shower of spray, scrambled aft and peered down the man-hole, from which blue fumes, somewhat thicker and more pungent than usual, were rising. the next instant he too disappeared below. the air officers were trying to get into communication with the rapidly sinking airship by means of the powerful morse lamp, but without result, and one of them put his head into the wheel-house and asked anxiously if more speed was possible. just then the second engineer and one of the crew crawled out of the man-hole, pulling a limp figure behind them. the c.o. turned to ascertain what had happened, and the men, very white and shaky, explained in a few gasps that they had found the chief engineer senseless at the bottom of the iron ladder leading up to the deck, and had themselves been nearly gassed by the petrol fumes. glancing at the blue vapour now pouring up the hatchway and out of the ventilators, the c.o. realised the risk of fire and explosion he ran by carrying on at such high speed, but he also knew that men were drowning in the sea some eight miles ahead, and that the few extra knots might make the difference between life and death for them. that the risk must be taken was a foregone conclusion, but how to keep the engines running at that high speed without attention--for it was evident that no man could live for many minutes in the poisonous fumes--was a more difficult problem. this was solved, however, by the second engineer volunteering to go below with a life-line attached, so that he could be hauled up to the deck when giddiness came on. more than once this gallant petty officer had to be pulled up choking and exhausted. he risked instant death from the explosion of the gas from the leaking and overheated pipes and engines, as well as suffocation from the fumes, but he stuck to his post, returning again and again into the poisonous atmosphere. darkness was gradually settling over the sea, and the flickering light of the morse lamp--still asking for a reply--made yellow streaks on the wet fore-deck. presently a faint speck of light blinked amid the dark mass of the airship, but almost instantly went out, and for some time nothing further was seen. barely three miles of heaving sea separated the two ships when the bright glare of a very's light, fired from a pistol, soared into the air. a cheer broke from the dark figures on the deck of the m.l., and a message of hope was eagerly flashed back. the last knot seemed a voyage in itself, but eventually the great dark mass of the still floating envelope loomed up ahead, and almost instantly the clang of the engine-room telegraph, shutting off the leaky engine, gave relief to the plucky second engineer, who had retained consciousness and control through that dreadful twenty minutes by frequently filling his aching lungs above the hatchway. the sea around was a mass of tangled wires, in which the mast and rigging of the m.l. was the first to become entangled. near approach was impossible, so orders were given to lower away the boat. the sturdy little steel-built life-boat splashed into the sea alongside, one minute rising on a wave high above the deck-line and the next disappearing into the dark void below. figures slid down the miniature falls to man her and the next minute were pulling through the tangled wreckage to where the beam of the m.l.'s searchlight showed six airmen clinging to a floating but upturned cupola. numbed with the cold, they fell rather than jumped into the boat as it was pulled alongside. one was insensible and the others were too far gone to utter a word. nothing but the wonderful vitality necessary to the airman as to the sailor had enabled them to hold on in that bitter cold for over two hours after eight hours in the air. the task of extricating the m.l. from the tangle of wire stays and other wreckage was a difficult one. a propeller had entwined itself and become useless (afterwards freed by going astern), the little signal topmast and yard had been broken off by a loop of wire from the gigantic envelope and the ensign staff carried away. after about twenty minutes cutting and manoeuvring, however, she floated free, and a question was raised as to the possibility of salving the airship. by this time another m.l., sent out to assist in the work of rescue, had arrived on the scene, and a conference between the air and sea officers on the senior ship resulted in the attempt at salving being made. wires that were hanging from the nose of the airship were made fast to the stern of the m.l.'s, and all wreckage was, where possible, cut adrift. this, to the uninitiated, may sound a comparatively quick and simple operation, but when it is performed in the darkness, with the doubtful aid of two small searchlights, on a sea rising and falling under the influence of a heavy ground swell, it is anything but an easy or rapid operation, and occupied half the night. the huge mass of the modern airship towered above the little patrol boats like some leviathan of the deep. to attempt its towage over twenty miles of sea seemed almost ludicrous for such small craft, and yet so light and easy of passage was this aerial monster that progress at the rate of three knots an hour was made when once the wreckage had been cut adrift, the weights released and the envelope had risen off the surface of the water. armed trawlers that passed in the night wondered if it was a captive zeppelin and winked out inquiries from their morse lamps. a destroyer came out of the darkness to offer assistance. the cause of much anxiety had been the likelihood of hostile submarines being attracted to the scene by the helplessness of the airship, which had been visible, before darkness closed over, for many miles as she slowly settled down into the sea. this danger, however, passed away with the arrival of the destroyer and the armed trawlers, but another arose which threatened to wreck the whole venture. about a.m. the wind began to freshen from the north-west and the m.l.'s towing the huge bag were immediately dragged to leeward. the combined power of their engines failed to head the airship into the wind and urgent signals for assistance were made to the destroyer and trawlers, who had, fortunately, constituted themselves a rear-guard. a trawler came quickly to the rescue and got hold of an additional wire hanging down from the envelope. the destroyer, in the masterful way of these craft, proceeded to take charge of the operations. her -horse-power engines soon turned the airship into the path of safety, and with this big addition to the towing power it was less than half-an-hour later when the great envelope was safely landed on the quayside, much to the amazement of the townspeople. "unlucky smith" there is, however, another side to this co-operation between fleets of the sea and air. it has more than once occurred that vessels equipped almost exclusively for submarine hunting have been engaged by zeppelins, and actions between seaplanes and under-water craft have been frequent. [illustration: a monitor the bulge of the "blister" will be seen on the water-line near the bow. _british official photograph_] how a large fleet of unarmed fishing vessels were saved and a zeppelin raid on the east coast of england prevented by the timely action of an armed auxiliary proves once again the truth of the old military axiom that it is the unexpected which always happens in war. it had been one of the few really hot summer days granted by a grudging climate. the sea was a sheet of glass, the sky a cloudless blue, except where tinged with the golden glow of sunset. lieutenant smith smiled somewhat grimly as he mounted the little iron ladder and squeezed through the narrow doorway into the wheel-house. he nodded to the skipper--an old trawlerman acting as a chief warrant officer for navigational duties--as a signal for the mooring ropes to be cast off, and mechanically rang the engine-room telegraph. he had done all these things in the same way and at the same time of day for nearly two years. for a long while he had gone forth hopefully, saying to himself each cruise, "it's bound to come soon," but as the weeks grew into months, and the months promised to extend into years, disappointment gained the mastery and duty became appallingly monotonous and uninteresting. this, however, did not cause him to work less strenuously or to neglect to watch the large fishing fleet which he guarded on four nights out of the seven, but each letter he received from old friends in other branches of the king's service brought tidings of excitement, rapid promotion, or at least a little of the pomp and circumstance of war, and he saw himself at the end of it all with nothing to show for years of danger, hardship and impaired health. the worry and the lonely monotony, trivial as he knew them to be, were slowly sapping his nerve and vitality. the trawler glided from the harbour on to the broad expanse of tranquil sea, now aglow with the lights of a summer sunset. slowly the coast-line faded into the blue haze of distance, and all around the watery plain was mottled with the shadowy patches made by the light evening breeze. settling himself in an old deck-chair, which he kept in the wheel-house, smith lit his pipe and allowed his thoughts to wander, but every now and then his eyes would search the sea from slowly darkening east to mellow west. although the summer was well advanced, there were but few hours of darkness out of the twenty-four in these northern latitudes, and when the armed trawler came in sight of the widely scattered fishing fleet, which it was her duty to guard throughout the night, a mystic half-light subdued all colours to a shadowy grey, but a pale amber afterglow still lingered in the sky and the stars were pale. smith lingered a few minutes on deck to finish a cigar before going below for his evening meal. seldom during the past year had all the elements been so long at peace, and the contrast appealed to him as a luxury to be enjoyed at leisure. even the light breeze of sunset had died away, leaving an unruffled calm, and the sails and stumpy funnels of the little fishing craft appeared like "painted ships on a painted ocean." for nearly an hour he sat inhaling the fragrant and satisfying smoke from more than one cigar, preferring the cool of the deck to the stuffy cabin. then a dark blot appeared from out of the luminous blueness of the eastern sky and it travelled rapidly downwards towards his flock. smith watched it for several seconds, then it suddenly dawned upon him that the hand of the destroyer was coming even into this haven of peace, and a fierce resentment entered his soul. he heard the distant shouting of fishermen as they cut adrift their nets and prepared to scatter before the approaching zeppelin, and in a moment he realised that the long-awaited chance had come. it all seemed too unreal to be true, but he rose up quickly and in a few terse sentences gave the necessary orders for the guns' crews and engineers. the whir of the airship's propellers grew rapidly louder and its bulk loomed black against the bright sky. determined, however, to take no risk of failure, lieutenant smith withheld the fire of his guns until the great aerial monster, now travelling down to less than feet, was well within range. attracted by the helplessness of a large number of fishing craft congregated in a comparatively small area of sea, the _destroyer_ dived to the attack like some giant bird of prey, unable in the gloom which shrouded the earth to distinguish the presence of an armed escort. the suspense was painful. then the muzzles of two high-angle guns rose up from the well-deck and superstructure of the armed patrol, and in response to a low-toned order from the c.o., giving the height, time and deflection, they quickly covered the great black body of their objective. tongues of livid flame leapt from their mouths and were followed by sharp reports. a few minutes of heavy firing and the nose of the monster appeared to sag. the men at the guns yelled exultantly, redoubling their efforts, and shell after shell went shrieking heavenwards. suddenly the sea around rose up in huge cascades of foam and a shattering roar, which completely dwarfed the voice of the guns, shook the small ship from stem to stern. everything movable was hurled across the deck. breaking glass flew in all directions, and the aerials at the mast-heads snapped and came tumbling down with a mass of other gear. the cries of injured men arose from different parts of the ship, but still the guns hurled their shells, and the zeppelin, now well down by the head, rose high into the upper air and made off eastwards. after dropping all her bombs in close proximity to the armed trawler she had lightened herself sufficiently to rise out of range, but whether or not she would be able to keep up sufficiently long to reach her base, over miles distant, was extremely doubtful. flames spurted from the short funnel of the patrol as she steamed at full speed after the retreating zeppelin, endeavouring to keep her within range as long as possible. it was a question of seconds. before she finally disappeared in the increasing darkness another long-range hit was observed and the zeppelin receded from view, drifting helplessly. the disappointment at not being able to give the _coup de grâce_ to the aerial destroyer was keenly felt by all on board, for a half success is of little account in the navy. the gunners had done magnificently, the ship had been manoeuvred correctly and four of the crew had been wounded by fragments from the bombs dropped _en masse_, but notwithstanding their exertions and the luck which had brought the zeppelin down from the security of the skies, they had failed to secure the prize legitimately theirs. that the attack on the fishing fleet had been successfully beaten off appeared a minor detail, and the voyage back to port in the quickening light of a beautiful summer morning was a sad pilgrimage. scarcely a word unnecessary for the working of the ship was spoken, except lieutenant smith's brief explanation that it was just his luck. . . . . . . . . about two weeks later the proverbially "unlucky smith" was ordered to report at the office of the admiral commanding, and he had a sharp struggle to maintain a becoming composure when he heard the terse compliment and the mention of a recommendation from that austere officer, coupled with the intelligence that the zeppelin had dropped into the sea off the coast of norway. the spell was broken, and the brisk step and gleam in his dark eyes told their own tale as he walked quickly back to his ship. chapter xxvi on the sea flank of the allied armies it is a mere truism to say that the sea outflanks all land operations in warfare. yet how many people fully realise that the left wing of the allied armies in belgium and france depended for its safety on the naval command of the north sea and english channel? had this sea flank been permanently penetrated or forced back by the german fleet, the result must have been disastrous to a large section of the allied military line, which actually extended from the north sea to the mediterranean. although the security of the north sea flank did not entirely depend upon the naval forces based on dover, dunkirk and harwich--as all operations, whether on land or sea, were overshadowed by the unchallenged might of the grand fleet, which hemmed in the entire german navy--it was upon these light forces, largely composed of units of the new navy, that the brunt of the intermittent flank fighting and the repeated attempts by the enemy to break through--with the aid of all kinds of ruses and weapons--was borne for four and a half historic years. the detailed story of their work on the belgian coast and in the straits of dover could only be told in a separate volume, but the following account of a bombardment and its sequel may not be without interest here. its relevance to anti-submarine warfare lies in the fact that the bombardment was carried out with the object of destroying the nests of these under-water craft established in and around zeebrugge. much that has also been said in former chapters bases its claim to inclusion in this book almost entirely on the fact that although it did not deal exclusively with submarine fighting or minesweeping, it nevertheless formed part of the daily operations of the anti-submarine fleets, and no account of their work would bear any resemblance to the actual truth in which such seemingly extraneous episodes were excluded as irrelevant. the bombardment and its sequel there was a flat calm, with the freshness of early summer in the air. zeebrugge lay away in the darkness some fifteen miles to the south-east--awake, watchful, but unsuspecting--when the british bombarding squadron steamed in towards the coast to take up its allotted position and wait for daybreak. it was a heterogeneous fleet, screened by fast-moving destroyers, torpedo-boats, trawlers, m.l.'s and c.m.b.'s. the great hulls of monitors loomed black against the paling east, and the long thin lines of destroyers moved stealthily across the shadowy sea. no lights were visible, and only the occasional rhythmic thud of propellers and the call of an awakened sea-bird broke the stillness of the morning calm. the sky was not yet alive with the whir of seaplanes, and the air remained undisturbed by the shattering roar of guns and shells. it was that brief space of time in which even nature seems to hold her breath and make ready for the coming storm. the only movement other than the continued circling of destroyers was towards the shallow water close inshore, where powerful tugs were towing large barges--flat-bottomed craft carrying gigantic tripods made of railway metals. at predetermined places these were dropped overboard into the shallow sea and, with their legs embedded in the sandy bottom and their apices towering high above the surface, they formed observation platforms from which, in conjunction with aerial scouts, the fire of the big ships could be accurately directed on to the fortifications ashore. these tripods were laid a distance apart and quite away from the bombarding ships, but a system of range-finding and signalling had been organised and an officer chosen as a "spotter" in each trestle. the post of honour was on one or other of these observation towers, alone with the necessary instruments. the big shells from the shore batteries would scream overhead; some would plough up the water close by, smothering the tripod with spray, and the smaller guns would direct their fire against these eyes of the bombarding fleet. the chances were in favour of a hit, then there would be nothing left of the tripod or the spotter, simply a brief report to the admiral commanding that no. ---- observation post had been destroyed and later a fresh name in the casualty lists. it was, however, accepted as the fortune of war, and many volunteered. the sky brightened until a pale yellow glow suffused the east, while behind the bombarding fleet the western horizon was still a cold, hazy blue. a flight of seaplanes buzzed overhead and a few minutes later the dull reports of anti-aircraft guns echoed across the miles of still water. tiny bright flashes from white puffs of smoke appeared in the central blue, and then having got the range the great guns of the monitors roared away their charges and the scream of shells filled the air. the calm of the morning vanished, and with it the oppressive silence which precedes a battle. it was some time before the german airmen could rise from the ground and evade the british fighting formations. in the meantime a rain of heavy projectiles from the fleet was destroying all that was destroyable of the harbour and works of zeebrugge. with the aid of glasses huge clouds of smoke and sand could be seen rising into the air almost every second. objects discernible one minute had disappeared when the smoke cloud of bursting shells had moved to another point of concentration a short time later. when at last the enemy's planes, in isolated ones and twos, succeeded in hovering over the fleet the surface of the sea was almost instantly broken by great spouts of white water, at first far away, then nearer, and the battle commenced in earnest. a vast cloud of smoke now hung like a black curtain between the fleet and the shore. the m.l.'s were emitting their smoke screen to cover the bombarding ships. shells splashed into the sea all around. the noise and vibration of the air seemed to bruise the senses, and lurid flashes came from the smoking monitors. it was at this stage of the bombardment that the curious and unexpected happened. a white wave raced along the surface towards a monitor. it was too big for the wake of a torpedo and quite unlike the periscope of a submarine. the small, quick-firing guns of all the ships within range were trained on it and the sea around was ploughed up with shell. the white wave swerved to avoid the tornado of shot, but continued to make direct for the hull of the great floating fort at a considerable speed. then, as it drew _very_ near to its objective, a shell went home and the sea was rent by the force of a gigantic explosion, eclipsing that of any known weapon of sea warfare. it was, however, soon discovered that the mysterious wave came from a fast torpedo-shaped boat which was evidently being controlled by electric impulses from a shore wireless station some twelve to fourteen miles distant, the necessary information regarding direction of attack being transmitted by means of wireless signals from a seaplane hovering overhead, the abnormal force of the explosion being due to the heavy charge of high explosive which such a craft was able to carry in her bow, so arranged as to fire on striking the object of attack. with the failure of this ingenious but costly method of attack precautions were at once taken against a repetition and the seaplane hovering inconveniently overhead was driven off. the bombardment was carried on for the allotted span, by which time the shore batteries that still remained in action had found the range, notwithstanding the heavy smoke screen emitted by the m.l.'s. "heavies" were ploughing up the water unpleasantly close to the monitors, one of which was struck, though but little damaged. it was now considered time to draw off seawards, and the spotting officers, perched on their tripods, had to climb down the railway irons under a heavy fire and swim to the ships sent to rescue them. the tripods were then pulled over on to their sides by ropes attached to their summits and left lying in the shallow water. under cover of the smoke screen the bombarding fleet withdrew, after inflicting severe damage on the submarine base of zeebrugge. . . . . . . . . some two weeks previous to this bombardment a warship patrolling off the belgian coast had reported a curious explosion in the direction of nieuport. the night was dark and the stillness of summer rested over the pas-de-calais. waves lapped gently the distant sand-dunes and war seemed a thing far away, remote as the icy winds which blow around the poles. in the conning-tower and at the gun stations both officers and men watched keenly, silently, for the predatory hun. at any moment the thin blackish-brown hulls of a raiding flotilla from the bases at zeebrugge and ostend might slide out of the blueness of the night. the beams of searchlights would momentarily cross and recross the intervening sea and then the guns would mingle their sharp reports with the groans of dying men. to the nerve-racking duties of night patrol in the straits of dover they had grown accustomed--indifferent with the contempt born of familiarity--but this did not cause any relaxation of vigilance. the element of surprise is too important a factor in modern war to be treated lightly. so it happened that when, shortly after eight bells in the middle watch, a momentary flash of lurid flame stabbed the darkness away over the belgian coast, and was followed by the rumble of a great but distant explosion, no one stood on his head or lost his breath blowing up a patent waistcoat, but all remained at the "still." minutes passed and nothing happened. slowly the destroyer crept closer inshore, but the night was dark and no further sound broke its stillness. for two hours she scouted and listened. little more than five miles away lay the german lines, and the theory was that somewhere in that maze of trenches and batteries an explosion had occurred. next day the mystery deepened, for it became known that a large portion of nieuport pier had been blown away during the night. as this little seaport was, however, inside the german lines, the mystery remained unexplained until after the bombardment of zeebrugge, when it became known, in _divers_ manner, that one of the electrically controlled boats had been out on a night manoeuvre and, owing to the difficulties of seaplane observation in the dark, had accidentally struck the breakwater of nieuport. * * * * * many of the patrol boats guarding the straits of dover or minesweeping under the fire of german coast batteries off the belgian sand-dunes spent their days or nights of rest (!) in the french seaport of dunkirk, returning to dover only after considerable periods of work on the opposite coast. it may be thought that there was but little difference between life in the british port and that in the french town, considering the short stretch of sea between them. the following account of a night in dunkirk will, however, give some idea of the advantage gained by having even thirty miles of blue water between an active enemy and a comfortable bed. a night in dunkirk the night seemed uncannily quiet. in time of peace it would have passed unnoticed as just ideal summer weather, but when the human ear had grown accustomed to the almost perpetual thunder of the flanders guns any cessation of the noise gave a feeling of disquietude, only to be likened to the hush of great forests before a tropical storm. the little town of dunkirk, with its many ruins, was bathed in shadow, unrelieved by any artificial light, but the narrow, tortuous harbour showed a silvery streak in the brilliant moonrays. above the sleeping town, with its poilu sentries and english sailors, was the deep indigo sky, spangled with stars. custom had taught the few civilian and the many naval and military inhabitants of dunkirk to regard calm moonlight nights with very mixed feelings. it was seldom indeed that the boche neglected such an opportunity for an air raid. not merely one brief bombardment from the skies, but a succession of them, lasting from dusk until early morning, and repeated night after night while the weather remained favourable. owing to adequate preparations for such attacks the casualties were generally few, but the loss of sleep was nearly always great, unless the individual was so tired with the day's or week's minesweeping, spell in the trenches, or sea patrol that the "popping" of guns and the thud of bombs merely caused a semi-return to consciousness, with a mild, indefinable feeling of vexation at being momentarily disturbed. to the majority, however, it meant not only the loss of sorely needed sleep, but also hard work under trying conditions. to realise fully what it is to be deprived of rest when the brain is reeling and the movement of every limb is an agony, it is necessary to have worked, marched and fought for days and nights incessantly, and then the _moral_ as distinct from the _material_ effect of successive air raids will be duly appreciated by those fortunate ones who spent the years to remote from the menace. although dunkirk on this particular august night seemed uncannily quiet, the hour was not late. by greenwich time it was but a few minutes past nine, and two bells had only just sounded through the many and diverse ships lying in tiers alongside the quays. so warm were the soft summer zephyrs, which scarcely stirred the surface of the water, that on the decks of many of these war-worn sweepers and patrols men lay stretched out under the sky in the sound sleep of exhaustion, while on the quays and at other points in the half-wrecked town steel-helmeted french sentries kept watch. of the british naval forces based on this little french seaport few were ashore, as, without special permission, both officers and men had to remain on their ships after sunset, and those not playing cards or reading in the cabins were lounging and smoking on deck. blot out of the view the ruined houses, the shell-holes in the streets, the guns, the dug-outs and the sentries, and few scenes more unlike the popular conception of a big war base, with the enemy only a few miles distant, can be imagined. but dunkirk in that year of grace, , did not always wear so peaceful a garb. there were frequent periods when the shells whistled over or on to the town, when the earth trembled from the concussion of high explosives, when buildings collapsed or went heavenwards in clouds of dust, when the streets were illumined with the yellow flash of picric acid, or were filled with clouds of poisoned gas, when ambulances clattered over the cobblestones, trains of wounded rolled in from the firing line and the killed and maimed were landed from the sea. the first indication of the change from calm to storm came at the early hour of p.m., when the air raid warning sounded throughout the town. on the quayside all was ordered haste. mooring ropes were cast off with a minimum of shouting, and the larger ships moved slowly down the harbour towards the open sea. the few small vessels left seemed to crouch under the dock walls. sentries left their posts to take shelter in the great dug-outs, constructed of heavy timbers and sand-bags. these were situated at convenient points throughout the battered little town. in the houses some people descended to the cellars, but many remained wherever they happened to be, while in the cabins of the few ships which remained in harbour the games, the reading, the letter-writing and, in a few cases, even the sleeping went on undisturbed. after a short interval of oppressive silence, during which time no light or sound came from the seemingly deserted town, a faint whir of propellers became just audible in the stillness of the summer night. then it died away momentarily. suddenly a bright glare, like that of a star-shell, lit up the roofs and streets, and almost simultaneously came the dull vibrating report of a bomb. it sounded from the direction of the cathedral. searchlights flashed out from various points, but their powerful rays were lost in the luminous vault above. guns roared and bright flashes appeared like summer lightning in the sky. every few seconds the town trembled from the shock of exploding bombs, first at one point and then at another, but nothing could be seen of the raiding squadron. pieces from the shells bursting overhead and fragments of bombs and shattered masonry fell like rain into the streets and into the waters of the harbour. on the quayside a big aerial torpedo had made a crater large enough to bury the horse which it had killed in a near-by stable. a few seconds later another bomb fell close to a minesweeper and a fragment gashed the decks but did not penetrate them. in the cabins the concussion of almost every bomb which fell on shore was felt with curious precision. the glass of wheel-houses and deck cabins was shattered, and the rattle and thud on the decks and iron sides denoted the storm of falling metal. the din of the raid went on for some time and then died away with a final long-range shot from "loose lizzie" on the hills behind. when all was clear heads appeared from hatchways, dug-outs and cellars. people searched the sky curiously in an endeavour to make sure that there was "no deception," although from first to last nothing had been seen of the raiders except by those with the instruments, the searchlights and the guns. the latest news of the damage caused--two houses, a man and a horse--went from mouth to mouth. then the summer night regained its tranquillity and dunkirk slept. . . . . . . . . the familiar boom sounded its loudest in the stillness of the night and the ground seemed to tremble the more violently because of the darkness. it was a.m. the young moon had sunk beneath the horizon and a light film of cloud had drifted over the sky. the old french reservist doing sentry-go on the quay glanced up with a shrug of indifference and slowly shouldering his rifle walked leisurely towards a dug-out. searchlights became busy exploring the sky. this time their rays were not lost in the opaque blueness above, but went up in well-defined columns of light until reflected on the lofty clouds. presently the beams concentrated and, when the eyes had grown accustomed to the glare, little white "butterflies" were seen circling in the upper air. then the guns opened fire and white puffs, like tiny balls of cotton-wool, appeared among the butterflies. the earth trembled with the explosion of falling bombs and the recoil of anti-aircraft batteries. a little flicker of yellow light appeared in the circle of white. the guns increased in violence. the yellow light grew in size. it was falling. the burning machine crashed to earth. the bombs and the gun-fire lasted for some twenty minutes and then ceased suddenly, as if by prearranged signal. allied squadrons were in the air and the distant crackle of machine guns sounded from the skies. it died away, however, almost immediately, but the raiders were chased back to within their own lines minus two of their number. with the coming of dawn two solitary hostile machines circling at a fairly low altitude could be seen. they dropped no bombs, but the reason for their presence was soon apparent. shells from the long-range guns behind the german lines began to moan, whistle and burst in and around the luckless town. a hit was signified by a cloud of smoke, dust and debris, and ambulances again became busy in the stone-paved streets. one shell, carrying sufficient explosive to blow up an average-sized ship, ploughed up the water of the harbour, but did no damage, and by a.m. allied squadrons had chased away the hostile aerial observers. once again the peace of an ideal summer morning reigned over the historic town. the few minesweeping and other ships which had remained in the harbour through the night now commenced to show signs of returning life and activity. heavy brown smoke poured from the funnels of some, the staccato noise of oil engines came from others, and men were busy on the decks of all. the night's "rest" was over and the vital work of sweeping, possibly under an irritating fire from shore batteries and the strain of a necessarily ever-alert patrol, commenced afresh. the steady barometer promised a fine day for the harvesting of mines and, for the ships that returned, another night's _rest_ similar to the previous three! index aberdeen harbour mined, aden, mine-field laid off, admiralty dispatch bearers, aerial attacks, - -- bombs, effect of, -- warfare and submarine fighting, aircraft and convoys, airship, salving of, - allied navies, a memorable christmas, - american first army, transport of, arctic patrol, , -- seas, work in, - area of sea covered daily by sweepers, areas, command of, -- patrol of, - armed liners, armies, transport of, atlantic patrol, - australian first army, transport of, auxiliary patrol office, bases and their fleets, - -- war, , , - battle of jutland, - beatty, sir david, , , blister system on monitors, blockade, naval, boarding parties, - , bombardment of zeebrugge, - bombay, mine-field laid off, bombs, submarine, boom-defence ships, -- staff, _brighton queen_, h.m.s., _britannia_, h.m.s., torpedoed, british coast completely mined-in, -- empire, dangerous position of, call of the white ensign, , camouflaged ships, , canada, officers from, , canadian first army, transport of, case of mistaken identity, - castaways, - casualties, naval, in great war, , casualty, a, chaplains, naval, - christmas day, , - clearing large mine-fields, coastal motor boats, -- construction of, - -- method of attack, -- bases of, -- _v._ german destroyers, -- in actions off zeebrugge and ostend, , , colombo, mine-field laid off, colonial officers, - colonies, aid from, concentration of british fleet, august, , convoy, composition of, - convoy ships, convoy system, - convoying, difficulties of, convoys, minesweeping in front of, , co-operation between fleets of sea and air, cruiser squadron, the tenth, - dan-buoys, danish derelict, - decoy system of attack, - deluding patrols, demobilisation, naval, depth charge, construction of, - -- method of use, - -- attacks with, - , depth charges, , derelict, a, - destruction of a u-c boat, , division of sea into patrol areas, - docker battalions, dominions, aid from, dover lighted barrage, - -- naval base, dover patrols, , - drafting officers, drifter units, , , drifters, loss of in adriatic, -- -- in straits of dover, duffel clothing, dunkirk, a night spent in, - -- patrols, , - effect of danger on human senses, effect of shell fire, electrically controlled boats off zeebrugge, - _engadine_, h.m.s., england's food supply, - evening quarters in warships, examination ships, excitement, suppressed, before an action, exploratory minesweeping, - fight, an epic, - finding the ships, guns and men, firth of forth, mines in, fishing fleets, armed guards with, - fleet sweeping, french ship, mysterious disappearance of, german high sea fleet, -- naval position in , -- submarine bases, -- mine-laying, -- raiders, _wolfe_ and _moewe_, -- mines, description of, , -- -- and hague convention, - -- mine-laying policy, - -- submarine offensive, -- minesweeping, -- submarines, loss of, -- mine-field, a christmas spent on, - grand fleet, , , -- bases, granton naval base, guarding a mine-field, gunboats patrol, gunnery classes, - harbour duties, -- mines at entrance to, - -- sweeping, harwich patrols, _hermione_, training ship for new navy, , - hope of action, hydrophone attack, - -- branch of naval service, -- flotillas, - hydrophones, - -- object of, -- portable, -- -- use of, - -- construction of, - -- limitations in use of, - -- directional, -- -- use of, -- fitted in u and u-c boats, - iceland fishing fleet, , indian ocean, mine-fields in, indicator nets, , , , - intelligence offices in naval bases, , interpreter officers, _invincible_, h.m.s., isolation of mined areas, jellicoe, sir john, king's messengers, lance bombs, life-boat, work of, - lighted barrage, lightning reveals u-boat, _lion_, h.m.s., after jutland, , liverpool harbour mined-in, loss of ships, percentage of, , lowestoft harbour mined-in, _lusitania_, sinking of, manning of british ships in past, mercantile fleets under convoy, -- marine, -- shipping in danger zone, merchant ships, loss of, due to mines, methods of attacking submarines, - mine barrages, , , , , mine-field, christmas on, - mine-fields, deep-laid, , - mine-layers, - mine nets, , mine-protection devices, - mined areas, isolation of, minesweeping, , , , , , - mine-laying from u-c boats, - , mines destroyed by british navy, , , mines, floating, mining school, portsmouth, m.l.'s. see under motor launches modified sweeps, - _moewe_, german raider, monotony, effect of, moonlight, effect of on searchlights, - moral effect of air raids, moray firth, mine-field in, morning divisions in warships, motor launch flotillas, , , - motor launches, admiralty contract for, motor launches, arrival of, -- construction of, - -- description of, -- area patrolled by, -- loss of, -- in actions off zeebrugge and ostend, , mysteries of sea war, - -- of submarine hunting, - -- of german mine-laying, - -- of minesweeping, - mystery ships, , -- numbers employed, national insurance, naval bases, - -- centres, -- college, greenwich, -- policy, british, -- school of submarine mining, -- situation in , navigation, dangers of, in war time, - -- training in, - navy, expansion of, in past wars, nerve tension before action, , nets, submarine, , - new fleets in being, - new navy, composition of, - -- formation into flotillas, - -- growth of, -- officers and men of, , - -- _raison d'être_, _new zealand_, h.m.s., new zealand, officers from, -- waters, mines in, nieuport pier, destruction of, night attacks, - -- patrol, , north sea, area of, -- british naval blockade of, -- gales, northern mine barrage, officers, training, - oil trails, , paravanes, - patrol areas, - , - -- boats, - -- -- on lines of communication during jutland, personnel of new navy, petrol fumes, danger of, - picric acid, for causing and alleviating pain, port minesweeping officers, , _princess royal_, h.m.s., privateers, old and new, - "q" boats, - -- description of, - -- number employed, q , action of, in straits of gibraltar, queenstown naval base, raiders, german, cruises of, red cross work, - refits, rescue work, - , , - rescued crews, _resource ii._, h.m.s., restriction of submarine danger zone, return of fleet from jutland, - rosyth dockyard, routine sweeping, royal naval reserve, -- -- volunteer reserve, royal navy and merchant service, -- -- manning of, in past, - russian army, transport of, -- lines of communication, -- war of - , salving live mines, - scandinavian convoys, - -- -- attacks on, scapa flow, scottish waters, mine-fields in, sea fight, elements of, -- flanks of armies, - -- power, elements of, -- stalking, seamanship classes, - searching for mines, shallow-water sweeping, shell-shock cases, ships of the new navy, - sick bay, shells burst in, singapore mine-field, sinking of last u-boat, sloop flotillas, smoke screens, - , s.o.s., sounds, submarine, - south african mine-fields, _southampton_, h.m.s., southampton water training ground, spanish armada, spectre of the goodwins, spotting officers at zeebrugge, - staff headquarters, standard ships, _submarine engineering of to-day_, submarine hide-and-seek, - -- nets, - -- phase of naval war, - -- sounds, - -- _v._ submarine, -- _v._ merchantman, -- warfare of the future, sutphen, henry r., - _sydney_, h.m.s., tactical methods, - task of allied navies, - tenth cruiser squadron, , theatre of war, principal, thornycroft, messrs john t., & co. ltd., tides, effect of, on moored mines, -- -- on minesweeping, toast of the british navy, tracking u-boats, methods of, - training an anti-submarine force, - transport of allied armies, trawler units, , , treachery, guarding against, tripods (for observation) at zeebrugge, u-boats, fishing for, - , - -- sunk, -- sunk by q , - u-c boats, united states, effect on german mine-laying, -- help from, -- navy, -- warships attacked, university, a naval, - unrecorded sea fights, very's pistols, , _victory_, h.m.s., at trafalgar, von hipper's fleet, war base, a typical, -- bases, , , -- -- description of, - -- cabinet and convoys, -- channel, , - wardrooms in naval bases, _warspite_, h.m.s., waterloo, a replica of, weapons, curious, - weather, effect of, on naval operations, whaler units, - , william whiteley's, a naval, winter patrol, _wolfe_, german raider, wounded, transport of, - yacht clubs, officers from, yacht, armed, zeebrugge, bombardment of, - zeppelin attacks fishing fleet, , zeppelin raids, - zigzagging to avoid u-boats, zones of war, drafting to, - -- vessels leaving for, the riverside press limited, edinburgh * * * * * transcriber's notes: obvious punctuation errors repaired. on pages - , the original uses "depot." on pages and , it uses "depôt." this was retained. page , number was missing from the list. page , fig. ., "hydrophone" changed to "hydroplane" as it seems to make more sense in this situation (hydroplane hull, so constructed) page , "oral" changed to "aural" (aural experience estimated) pages , , , twice, , the designation of the size of the gun was originally printed using a high-dot. as that cannot be replicated here, it has been replaced with a decimal. (with a . quick-firing) (masked . -inch guns) (shielding the . gun) (causes was . ) (only . per cent.) (of a . -inch gun) page , "he" changed to "the" (to the ordinary mine) page , "bteween" changed to "between" (submarine got between the) page , "tinging" changed to "tingeing" (tingeing the still boisterous) page , "fore-peak" changed to "forepeak" to match rest of text. (the forepeak or bow) page , "auti" changed to "anti" (of the anti-submarine fleets) [transcriber's note: obvious printer's errors have been corrected, all other inconsistencies are as in the original. the author's spelling has been maintained. page : "they were fired upon the coreans" has been replaced by "they were fired upon by the coreans". page : "the rescued part arrived in new york" has been replaced by "the rescued party arrived in new york". every chapter heading had an illustration; the corresponding tag has been removed.] the naval history of the united states by willis j. abbot with many illustrations by h. w. mcvicar and w. c. jackson _volume two_ new york: peter fenelon collier, publisher. chapter xii. capture of the "surveyor." -- work of the gunboat flotilla. -- operations on chesapeake bay. -- cockburn's depredations. -- cruise of the "argus." -- her capture by the "pelican." -- battle of the "enterprise" and "boxer." -- end of the year on the ocean. with the capture of the "chesapeake" in june, , we abandoned our story of the naval events along the coast of the united states, to follow capt. porter and his daring seamen on their long cruise into far-off seas. but while the men of the "essex" were capturing whalers in the pacific, chastising insolent savages at nookaheevah, and fighting a gallant but unsuccessful fight at valparaiso, other blue-jackets were as gallantly serving their country nearer home. from portsmouth to charleston the coast was watched by british ships, and collisions between the enemies were of almost daily occurrence. in many of these actions great bravery was shown on both sides. noticeably was this the case in the action between the cutter "surveyor" and the british frigate "narcissus," on the night of june . the "surveyor," a little craft manned by a crew of fifteen men, and mounting six twelve-pound carronades, was lying in the york river near chesapeake bay. from the masthead of the "narcissus," lying farther down the bay, the spars of the cutter could be seen above the tree-tops; and an expedition was fitted out for her capture. fifty men, led by a veteran officer, attacked the little vessel in the darkness, but were met with a most determined resistance. the americans could not use their carronades, but with their muskets they did much execution in the enemy's ranks. but they were finally overpowered, and the little cutter was towed down under the frigate's guns. the next day mr. travis, the american commander, received his sword which he had surrendered, with a letter from the british commander, in which he said, "your gallant and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more than double your number, on the night of the th inst., excited such admiration on the part of your opponents as i have seldom witnessed, and induced me to return you the sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of mine.... in short, i am at a loss which to admire most, the previous arrangement on board the 'surveyor,' or the determined manner in which her deck was disputed, inch by inch." during the summer of , the little gunboats, built in accordance with president jefferson's plan for a coast guard of single-gun vessels, did a great deal of desultory fighting, which resulted in little or nothing. they were not very seaworthy craft, the heavy guns mounted amidships causing them to careen far over in even a sailor's "capfull" of wind. when they went into action, the first shot from the gun set the gunboat rocking so that further fire with any precision of aim was impossible. the larger gunboats carried sail enough to enable them to cruise about the coast, keeping off privateers and checking the marauding expeditions of the british. many of the gunboats, however, were simply large gallies propelled with oars, and therefore confined in their operations to bays and inland waters. the chief scene of their operations was chesapeake bay. this noble sheet of water had been, since the very opening of the year , under the control of the british, who had gathered there their most powerful vessels under the command of admiral cockburn, whose name gained an unenviable notoriety for the atrocities committed by his forces upon the defenceless inhabitants of the shores of chesapeake bay. marauding expeditions were continually sent from the fleet to search the adjacent country for supplies. when this method of securing provisions failed, cockburn hit upon the plan of bringing his fleet within range of a village, and then commanding the inhabitants to supply his needs, under penalty of the instant bombardment of the town in case of refusal. sometimes this expedient failed, as when commodore beresford, who was blockading the delaware, called upon the people of dover to supply him at once with "twenty-five large bullocks and a proportionate quantity of vegetables and hay." but the sturdy inhabitants refused, mustered the militia, dragged some old cannon down to the water-side, and, for lack of cannon-balls of their own, valiantly fired back those thrown by the british, which fitted the american ordnance exactly. soon after this occurrence, a large party from cockburn's fleet landed at havre de grace, and, having driven away the few militia, captured and burned the town. having accomplished this exploit, the marauders continued their way up the bay, and turning up into the sassafras river ravaged the country on both sides of the little stream. after spreading distress far and wide over the beautiful country that borders chesapeake bay, the vandals returned to their ships, boasting that they had despoiled the americans of at least seventy thousand dollars, and injured them to the amount of ten times that sum. by june, , the americans saw that something must be done to check the merciless enemy who had thus revived the cruel vandalism, which had ceased to attend civilized warfare since the middle ages. a fleet of fifteen armed gallies was fitted out to attack the frigate of cockburn's fleet that lay nearest to norfolk. urged forward by long sweeps, the gunboats bore down upon the frigate, which, taken by surprise, made so feeble and irregular a response that the americans thought they saw victory within their grasp. the gunboats chose their distance, and opened a well-directed fire upon their huge enemy, that, like a hawk attacked by a crowd of sparrows, soon turned to fly. but at this moment the wind changed, enabling two frigates which were at anchor lower down the bay to come up to the aid of their consort. the american gunboats drew off slowly, firing as they departed. this attack infused new energy into the british, and they at once began formidable preparations for an attack upon norfolk. on the th of june they moved forward to the assault,--three seventy-four-gun ships, one sixty-four, four frigates, two sloops, and three transports. they were opposed by the american forces stationed on craney island, which commands the entrance to norfolk harbor. here the americans had thrown up earthworks, mounting two twenty-four, one eighteen, and four six pound cannon. to work this battery, one hundred sailors from the "constellation," together with fifty marines, had been sent ashore. a large body of militia and a few soldiers of the regular army were also in camp upon the island. the british set the d as the date for the attack; and on the morning of that day, fifteen large boats, filled with sailors, marines, and soldiers to the number of seven hundred, put off from the ships, and dashed toward the batteries. at the same time a larger force tried to move forward by land, but were driven back, to wait until their comrades in the boats should have stormed and silenced the american battery. but that battery was not to be silenced. after checking the advance of the british by land, the americans waited coolly for the column of boats to come within point-blank range. on they came, bounding over the waves, led by the great barge "centipede," fifty feet long, and crowded with men. the blue-jackets in the shore battery stood silently at their guns. suddenly there arose a cry, "now, boys, are you ready?" "all ready," was the response. "then fire!" and the great guns hurled their loads of lead and iron into the advancing boats. the volley was a fearful one; but the british still came on doggedly, until the fire of the battery became too terrible to be endured. "the american sailors handled the great guns like rifles," said one of the british officers, speaking of the battle. before this terrific fire, the advancing column was thrown into confusion. the boats, drifting upon each other, so crowded together that the oars-men could not make any headway. a huge round shot struck the "centipede," passing through her diagonally, leaving death and wounds in its track. the shattered craft sunk, and was soon followed by four others. the order for retreat was given; and, leaving their dead and some wounded in the shattered barges that lay in the shallow water, the british fled to their ships. midshipman tatnall, who, many years later, served in the confederate navy, waded out with several sailors, and, seizing the "centipede," drew her ashore. he found several wounded men in her,--one a frenchman, with both legs shot away. a small terrier dog lay whimpering in the bow. his master had brought him along for a run on shore, never once thinking of the possibility of the flower of the british navy being beaten back by the americans. so disastrous a defeat enraged the british, who proceeded to wreak their vengeance upon the little town of hampton, which they sacked and burned, committing acts of shameful violence, more in accordance with the character of savages than that of civilized white men. the story of the sack of hampton forms no part of the naval annals of the war, and in its details is too revolting to deserve a place here. it is a narrative of atrocious cruelty not to be paralleled in the history of warfare in the nineteenth century. leaving behind him the smoking ruins of hampton, cockburn with his fleet dropped down the bay, and, turning southward, cruised along the coast of the carolinas. anchoring off ocracoke inlet, the british sent a fleet of armed barges into pamlico sound to ravage the adjoining coast. two privateers were found lying at anchor in the sound,--the "anaconda" of new york, and the "atlas" of philadelphia. the british forces, eight hundred in number, dashed forward to capture the two vessels. the "atlas" fell an easy prey; but the thirteen men of the "anaconda" fought stoutly until all hope was gone, then, turning their cannon down upon the decks of their own vessel, blew great holes in her bottom, and escaped to the shore. after this skirmish, the british landed, and marched rapidly to newbern; but, finding that place well defended by militia, made their way back to the coast, desolating the country through which they passed, and seizing cattle and slaves. the latter they are said to have sent to the west indies and sold. from pamlico sound cockburn went to cumberland island, where he established his winter quarters, and whence he continued to send out marauding expeditions during the rest of the year. very different was the character of sir thomas hardy, who commanded the british blockading fleet off the new england coast. a brave and able officer, with the nature and training of a gentleman, he was as much admired by his enemies for his nobility, as cockburn was hated for his cruelty. it is more than possible, however, that the difference between the methods of enforcement of the blockade on the new england coast and on the southern seaboard was due to definite orders from the british admiralty: for the southern states had entered into the war heart and soul; while new england gave to the american forces only a faint-hearted support, and cried eagerly for peace at any cost. so strong was this feeling, that resolutions of honor to the brave capt. lawrence were defeated in the massachusetts legislature, on the ground that they would encourage others to embark in the needless war in which lawrence lost his life. whatever may have been the cause, however, the fact remains, that hardy's conduct while on the blockade won for him the respect and admiration of the very people against whom his forces were arrayed. [illustration: blue-jackets at the guns.] on june the british blockaders off new york harbor allowed a little vessel to escape to sea, that, before she could be captured, roamed at will within sight of the chalk cliffs of england, and inflicted immense damage upon the commerce of her enemy. this craft was the little ten-gun brig "argus," which left new york bound for france. she carried as passenger mr. crawford of georgia, who had lately been appointed united states minister to france. after safely discharging her passenger at l'orient, the "argus" turned into the chops of the english channel, and cruised about, burning and capturing many of the enemy's ships. she was in the very highway of british commerce; and her crew had little rest day or night, so plentiful were the ships that fell in their way. it was hard for the jackies to apply the torch to so many stanch vessels, that would enrich the whole crew with prize-money could they but be sent into an american port. but the little cruiser was thousands of miles from any american port, and no course was open to her save to give every prize to the flames. after cruising for a time in the english channel, lieut. allen, who commanded the "argus," took his vessel around land's end, and into st. george's channel and the irish sea. for thirty days he continued his daring operations in the very waters into which paul jones had carried the american flag nearly thirty-five years earlier. british merchants and shipping owners in london read with horror of the destruction wrought by this one vessel. hardly a paper appeared without an account of some new damage done by the "argus." vessels were kept in port to rot at their docks, rather than fall a prey to the terrible yankee. rates of insurance went up to ruinous prices, and many companies refused to take any risks whatever so long as the "argus" remained afloat. but the hue and cry was out after the little vessel; and many a stout british frigate was beating up and down in st. george's channel, and the chops of the english channel, in the hopes of falling in with the audacious yankee, who had presumed to bring home to englishmen the horrors of war. it fell to the lot of the brig-sloop "pelican" to rid the british waters of the "argus." on the night of the thirteenth of august, the american vessel had fallen in with a british vessel from oporto, and after a short chase had captured her. the usual result followed. the prisoners with their personal property were taken out of the prize, and the vessel was set afire. but, before the torch was applied, the american sailors had discovered that their prize was laden with wine; and their resolution was not equal to the task of firing the prize without testing the quality of the cargo. besides treating themselves to rather deep potations, the boarding-crew contrived to smuggle a quantity of the wine into the forecastle of the "argus." the prize was then fired, and the "argus" moved away under easy sail. but the light of the blazing ship attracted the attention of the lookout on the "pelican," and that vessel came down under full sail to discover the cause. day was just breaking, and by the gray morning light the british saw an american cruiser making away from the burning hulk of her last prize. the "pelican" followed in hot pursuit, and was allowed to come alongside, although the fleet american could easily have left her far astern. but capt. allen was ready for the conflict; confident of his ship and of his crew, of whose half-intoxicated condition he knew nothing, he felt sure that the coming battle would only add more laurels to the many already won by the "argus." he had often declared that the "argus" should never run from any two-master; and now, that the gage of battle was offered, he promptly accepted. at six o'clock in the morning, the "pelican" came alongside, and opened the conflict with a broadside from her thirty-two pound carronades. the "argus" replied with spirit, and a sharp cannonade began. four minutes after the battle opened, capt. allen was struck by a round shot that cut off his left leg near the thigh. his officers rushed to his side, and strove to bear him to his cabin; but he resisted, saying he would stay on deck and fight his ship as long as any life was left him. with his back to a mast, he gave his orders and cheered on his men for a few minutes longer; then, fainting from the terrible gush of blood from his wound, was carried below. to lose their captain so early in the action, was enough to discourage the crew of the "argus." yet the officers left on duty were brave and skilful. twice the vessel was swung into a raking position, but the gunners failed to seize the advantage. "they seemed to be nodding over their guns," said one of the officers afterward. the enemy, however, showed no signs of nodding. his fire was rapid and well directed, and his vessel manoeuvred in a way that showed a practised seaman in command. at last he secured a position under the stern of the "argus," and lay there, pouring in destructive broadsides, until the americans struck their flag,--just forty-seven minutes after the opening of the action. the loss on the "argus" amounted to six killed and seventeen wounded. no action of the war was so discreditable to the americans as this. in the loss of the "chesapeake" and in the loss of the "essex," there were certain features of the action that redounded greatly to the honor of the defeated party. but in the action between the "argus" and the "pelican," the americans were simply outfought. the vessels were practically equal in size and armament, though the "pelican" carried a little the heavier metal. it is also stated that the powder used by the "argus" was bad. it had been taken from one of the prizes, and afterwards proved to be condemned powder of the british government. in proof of the poor quality of this powder, one of the american officers states that many shot striking the side of the "pelican" were seen to fall back into the water; while others penetrated the vessel's skin, but did no further damage. all this, however, does not alter the fact that the "argus" was fairly beaten in a fair fight. while the british thus snapped up an american man-of-war cruising at their harbors' mouths, the americans were equally fortunate in capturing a british brig of fourteen guns off the coast of maine. the captor was the united states brig "enterprise," a lucky little vessel belonging to a very unlucky class; for her sister brigs all fell a prey to the enemy. the "nautilus," it will be remembered, was captured early in the war. the "vixen" fell into the hands of sir james yeo, who was cruising in the west indies, in the frigate "southampton;" but this gallant officer reaped but little benefit from his prize, for frigate and brig alike were soon after wrecked on one of the bahama islands. the "siren," late in the war, was captured by the seventy-four-gun ship "medway," and the loss of the "argus" has just been chronicled. of all these brigs, the "argus" alone was able to fire a gun in her own defence, before being captured; the rest were all forced to yield quietly to immensely superior force. in the war with tripoli, the "enterprise" won the reputation of being a "lucky" craft; and her daring adventures and thrilling escapes during the short naval war with france added to her prestige among sailors. when the war with england broke out, the little brig was put in commission as soon as possible, and assigned to duty along the coast of maine. she did good service in keeping off privateers and marauding expeditions from nova scotia. in the early part of september, , she was cruising near penguin point, when she sighted a brig in shore that had the appearance of a hostile war-vessel. the stranger soon settled all doubts as to her character by firing several guns, seemingly for the purpose of recalling her boats from the shore. then, setting sail with the rapidity of a man-of-war, she bore down upon the american vessel. the "enterprise," instead of waiting for the enemy, turned out to sea, under easy sail; and her crew were set to work bringing aft a long gun, and mounting it in the cabin, where one of the stern windows had been chopped away to make a port. this action rather alarmed the sailors, who feared that their commander, lieut. burrows, whose character was unknown to them, intended to avoid the enemy, and was rigging the long gun for a stern-chaser. an impromptu meeting was held upon the forecastle; and, after much whispered consultation, the people appointed a committee to go aft and tell the commander that the lads were burning to engage the enemy, and were confident of whipping her. the committee started bravely to discharge their commission; but their courage failed them before so mighty a potentate as the commander, and they whispered their message to the first lieutenant, who laughed, and sent word forward that mr. burrows only wanted to get sea-room, and would soon give the jackies all the fighting they desired. [illustration: the fight with the "boxer."] the americans now had leisure to examine, through their marine-glasses, the vessel which was so boldly following them to the place of battle. she was a man-of-war brig, flying the british ensign from both mastheads and at the peak. her armament consisted of twelve eighteen-pound carronades and two long sixes, as against the fourteen eighteen-pound carronades and two long nines of the "enterprise." the englishman carried a crew of sixty-six men, while the quarter-rolls of the american showed a total of one hundred and two. but in the battle which followed the british fought with such desperate bravery as to almost overcome the odds against them. for some time the two vessels fought shy of each other, manoeuvring for a windward position. towards three o'clock in the afternoon, the americans gained this advantage, and at once shortened sail, and edged down toward the enemy. as the ships drew near, a sailor was seen to climb into the rigging of the englishman, and nail the colors to the mast, giving the lads of the "enterprise" a hint as to the character of the reception they might expect. as the vessels came within range, both crews cheered lustily, and continued cheering until within pistol-shot, when the two broadsides were let fly at almost exactly the same moment. with the first fire, both commanders fell. capt. blyth of the english vessel was almost cut in two by a round shot as he stood on his quarter-deck. he died instantly. lieut. burrows was struck by a canister-shot, which inflicted a mortal wound. he refused to be carried below, and was tenderly laid upon the deck, where he remained during the remainder of the battle, cheering on his men, and crying out that the colors of the "enterprise" should never be struck. the conflict was sharp, but short. for ten minutes only the answering broadsides rung out; then the colors of the british ship were hauled down. she proved to be the sloop-of-war "boxer," and had suffered severely from the broadsides of the "enterprise." several shots had taken effect in her hull, her foremast was almost shot away, and several guns were dismounted. three men beside her captain were killed, and seventeen wounded. but she had not suffered these injuries without inflicting some in return. the "enterprise" was much cut up aloft. her foremast and mainmast had each been pierced by an eighteen-pound ball. her captain lay upon the deck, gasping in the last agonies of death, but stoutly protesting that he would not be carried below until he received the sword of the commander of the "boxer." at last this was brought him; and grasping it he cried, "now i am satisfied. i die contented." the two shattered brigs were taken into portland, where the bodies of the two slain commanders were buried with all the honors of war. the "enterprise" was repaired, and made one more cruise before the close of the war; but the "boxer" was found to be forever ruined for a vessel of war, and she was sold into the merchant-service. the fact that she was so greatly injured in so short a time led a london paper, in speaking of the battle, to say, "the fact seems to be but too clearly established, that the americans have some superior mode of firing; and we cannot be too anxiously employed in discovering to what circumstances that superiority is owing." [illustration: the surrender of the "boxer."] this battle practically closed the year's naval events upon the ocean. the british privateer "dart" was captured near newport by some volunteers from the gunboats stationed at that point. but, with this exception, nothing noteworthy in naval circles occurred during the remainder of the year. looking back over the annals of the naval operations of , it is clear that the americans were the chief sufferers. they had the victories over the "peacock," "boxer," and "highflyer" to boast of; but they had lost the "chesapeake," "argus," and "viper." but, more than this, they had suffered their coast to be so sealed up by british blockaders that many of their best vessels were left to lie idle at their docks. the blockade, too, was growing stricter daily, and the outlook for the future seemed gloomy; yet, as it turned out, in the americans regained the ground they had lost the year before. chapter xiii. on the lakes. -- close of hostilities on lakes erie and huron. -- desultory warfare on lake ontario in . -- hostilities on ontario in . -- the battle of lake champlain. -- end of the war upon the lakes. in considering the naval operations on the great lakes, it must be kept in mind, that winter, which checked but little naval activity on the ocean, locked the great fresh-water seas in an impenetrable barrier of ice, and effectually stopped all further hostilities between the hostile forces afloat. the victory gained by commodore perry on lake erie in september, , gave the americans complete command of that lake; and the frozen season soon coming on, prevented any attempts on the part of the enemy to contest the american supremacy. but, indeed, the british showed little ability, throughout the subsequent course of the war, to snatch from the americans the fruits of the victory at put-in-bay. they embarked upon no more offensive expeditions; and the only notable naval contest between the two belligerents during the remainder of the war occurred aug. , , when a party of seventy-five british seamen and marines attempted to cut out three american schooners that lay at the foot of the lake near fort erie. the british forces were at queenstown, on the niagara river; but by dint of carrying their boats twenty miles through the woods, then poling down a narrow and shallow stream, with a second portage of eight miles, the adventurers managed to reach lake erie. embarking here, they pulled down to the schooners. to the hail of the lookout, they responded, "provision boats." and, as no british were thought to be on lake erie, the response satisfied the officer of the watch. he quickly discovered his mistake, however, when he saw his cable cut, and a party of armed men scrambling over his bulwarks. this first prize, the "somers," was quickly in the hands of the british, and was soon joined in captivity by the "ohio," whose people fought bravely but unavailingly against the unexpected foe. while the fighting was going on aboard the vessels, they were drifting down the stream; and, by the time the british victory was complete, both vessels were beyond the range of fort erie's guns, and safe from recapture. this successful enterprise certainly deserves a place as the boldest and best executed cutting-out expedition of the war. [illustration: on the way to lake erie.] long before this occurrence, capt. arthur singleton, who had succeeded to perry's command, despairing of any active service on lake erie, had taken his squadron of five vessels into lake huron, where the british still held the supremacy. his objective point was the island of michilimackinac (mackinaw), which had been captured by the enemy early in the war. on his way, he stopped and burned the british fort and barracks of st. joseph. at mackinaw he was repulsed, with the loss of seventy men; after which he returned to lake erie, leaving two vessels, the "scorpion" and "tigress," to blockade the nattagawassa river. the presence of these vessels irritated the british, and they at once set about preparations for their capture. on the night of the d of september the "tigress" was captured after a sharp struggle, which, as the british commanding officer said, "did credit to her officers, who were all severely wounded." at the time of the attack, the "scorpion" was several miles away, and knew nothing of the misfortune of her consort. knowing this, the british sent their prisoners ashore, and, hoisting the american flag over the captured vessel, waited patiently for their game to come to them. they were not disappointed in their expectations. on the th the "scorpion" came up, and anchored, unsuspectingly, within two miles of her consort. at early dawn the next morning the "tigress" weighed anchor; and, with the stars and stripes still flying, dropped down alongside the unsuspecting schooner, poured in a sudden volley, and, instantly boarding, carried the vessel without meeting any resistance. with these two skirmishes, the war upon lake erie and lake huron was ended. but on lake ontario the naval events, though in no case comparable with perry's famous victory, were numerous and noteworthy. in our previous discussion of the progress of the war upon lake ontario, we left commodore chauncey in winter quarter at sackett's harbor, building new ships, and making vigorous efforts to secure sailors to man them. his energy met with its reward; for, when the melting ice left the lake open for navigation in the spring of , the american fleet was ready for active service, while the best vessels belonging to the british were still in the hands of the carpenters and riggers. the first service performed by the american fleet was aiding gen. pike in his attack upon york, where the americans burned an almost completed twenty-four-gun ship, and captured the ten-gun brig "gloucester." the land forces who took part in this action were terribly injured by the explosion of the powder-magazine, to which the british had applied a slow-match when they found they could no longer hold their position. this battle was fought april , . one month later, the naval forces co-operated with the soldiery in driving the british from fort george, on the canada side of the niagara river, near lake ontario. perry came from lake erie to take part in this action, and led a landing party under the fire of the british artillery with that dashing courage which he showed later at the battle of put-in-bay. the work of the sailors in this action was cool and effective. their fire covered the advance of the troops, and silenced more than one of the enemy's guns. "the american ships," writes a british historian, "with their heavy discharges of round and grape, too well succeeded in thinning the british ranks." but by this time the british fleet was ready for sea, and left kingston on the th of may; while chauncey was still at the extreme western end of the lake. the enemy determined to make an immediate assault upon sackett's harbor, and there destroy the corvette "gen. pike," which, if completed, would give chauncey supremacy upon the lake. accordingly the fleet under sir james lucas yeo, with a large body of troops under sir george prescott, appeared before the harbor on the th. although the forces which rallied to the defence of the village were chiefly raw militia, the british attack was conducted with so little spirit that the defenders won the day; and the enemy retreated, leaving most of his wounded to fall into the hands of the americans. yeo then returned to kingston; and the american fleet came up the lake, and put into sackett's harbor, there to remain until the completion of the "pike" should give chauncey control of the lake. while the americans thus remained in port, the british squadron made brief incursions into the lake, capturing a few schooners and breaking up one or two encampments of the land forces of the united states. not until the st of july did the americans leave their anchorage. on that day, with the formidable corvette "pike" at the head of the line, chauncey left sackett's harbor, and went up to niagara. some days later, yeo took his squadron to sea; and on the th of august the two hostile fleets came in sight of one another for the first time. then followed a season of manoeuvring,--of challenging and counter-challenging, of offering battle and of avoiding it,--terminating in so inconclusive an engagement that one is forced to believe that neither commander dared to enter the battle for which both had been so long preparing. the american squadron consisted largely of schooners armed with long guns. in smooth weather these craft were valuable adjuncts to the larger vessels, while in rough weather they were useless. yeo's squadron was mostly square-rigged, and was therefore equally serviceable in all kinds of weather. it seems likely, therefore, that the americans strove to bring on the conflict in smooth weather; while the british were determined to wait until a heavy sea should lessen the force of their foes. in this dilemma several days passed away. on the night of the th of august the wind came up to blow, and the rising waves soon demonstrated the uselessness of schooners for purposes of war. at early dawn a fierce gust of wind caused the schooners "hamilton" and "scourge" to careen far to leeward. their heavy guns broke loose; then, crashing down to the submerged beams of the schooners, pulled them still farther over; and, the water rushing in at their hatches, they foundered, carrying with them to the bottom all their officers, and all but sixteen of the men. this loss reduced chauncey's force to more of an equality with that of the british; yet for two days longer the manoeuvring continued, without a shot being fired. on the night of the th the two squadrons formed in order of battle, and rapidly approached each other. at eleven o'clock a cannonade was begun by both parties, and continued for about an hour; though the shot did little material damage on either side. at midnight the british, by a quick movement, cut out and captured two american schooners, and sailed away, without suffering any damage. a month then intervened before the next hostile meeting. in his despatches to his superior authorities, each commander stoutly affirms that he spent the time in chasing the enemy, who refused to give him battle. whether it was the british or the americans that avoided the battle, it is impossible to decide; but it seems reasonable to believe, that, had either party been really determined upon bringing matters to an issue, the other could have been forced into giving battle. on the th of september, the enemies met near the mouth of the genesee river, and exchanged broadsides. a few of the british vessels were hulled, and, without more ado, hauled off into the shallow waters of ambert bay, whither the americans could not follow them. then ensued another long period of peace, broken at last by a naval action in york bay, on the th, in which the british were worsted and obliged to fly, though none of their ships were destroyed or captured. on oct. , chauncey accomplished a really important work, by capturing five british transports, with two hundred and sixty-four men, seven naval and ten army officers. with this achievement, the active work of the ontario squadron ended for the year, as chauncey remained blockading yeo at kingston, until the approach of winter rendered that precaution no longer necessary. the navigable season of opened with the british first upon the lake. the long winter had been employed by the belligerents in adding to their fleets; a work completed first by yeo, who put out upon the lake on the d of may, with eight square-rigged vessels, of which two were new frigates. the americans had given up their unseaworthy schooners, and had a fleet of eight square-rigged vessels nearly ready, but still lacking the cordage and guns for the three new craft. yeo thus had the lake to himself for a time, and began a vigorous campaign by an attack upon oswego, aided by a large body of british troops. succeeding in this enterprise, he set sail for sackett's harbor, and, taking up his position just outside the bar, disposed his vessels for a long and strict blockade. this action was particularly troublesome to the americans at that time; for their new frigates were just ready for their guns and cables, which could not be brought overland, and the arrival of which by water was seemingly prevented by the blockade. it was in this emergency that the plan, already described, for transporting the great cable for the "niagara" overland, on the backs of men, was decided upon. yeo remained on guard at the mouth of the harbor until the th of june, then raised the blockade, and disappeared down the lake. for six weeks the americans continued working on their fleet, to get the ships ready for service. during this time the british gunboat "black snake" was brought into the harbor, a prize to lieut. gregory, who had captured it by a sudden assault, with a score of sailors at his back. on the st of july, the same officer made a sudden descent upon presque isle, where he found a british vessel pierced for fourteen guns on the stocks, ready for launching. the raiders hastily set fire to the ship, and retreated before the enemy could get his forces together. it was july before chauncey set sail from sackett's harbor. he now had under his command a squadron of eight vessels, two of which were frigates, two ship sloops-of-war, and eight brig-sloops of no mean power. yeo had, to oppose this force, a fleet of no less respectable proportions. yet, for the remainder of the year, these two squadrons cruised about the lake, or blockaded each other in turn, without once coming to battle. as transports, the vessels were of some service to their respective governments; but, so far as any actual naval operations were concerned, they might as well never have been built. the war closed, leaving the two cautious commanders still waiting for a satisfactory occasion for giving battle. such was the course of the naval war upon the great lakes; but the thunder of hostile cannon and the cheers of sailors were heard upon yet another sheet of fresh water, before the quarrel between england and the united states was settled. in the north-east corner of new york state, and slightly overlapping the canada line, lies lake champlain,--a picturesque sheet of water, narrow, and dotted with wooded islands. from the northern end of the lake flows the richelieu river, which follows a straight course through canada to the st. lawrence, into which it empties. the long, navigable water-way thus open from canada to the very heart of new york was to the british a most tempting path for an invading expedition. by the shore of the lake a road wound along; thus smoothing the way for a land force, whose advance might be protected by the fire of the naval force that should proceed up the lake. naturally, so admirable an international highway early attracted the attention of the military authorities of both belligerents; and, while the british pressed forward their preparations for an invading expedition, the americans hastened to make such arrangements as should give them control of the lake. her european wars, however, made so great a demand for soldiers upon great britain, that not until could she send to america a sufficient force to undertake the invasion of the united states from the north. in the spring of that year, a force of from ten thousand to fifteen thousand troops, including several thousand veterans who had served under wellington, were massed at montreal; and in may a move was made by the british to get control of the lake, before sending their invading forces into new york. the british naval force already in the richelieu river, and available for service, consisted of a brig, two sloops, and twelve or fourteen gunboats. the american flotilla included a large corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and ten gunboats, or galleys, propelled with oars. seeing that the british were preparing for active hostilities, the americans began to build, with all possible speed, a large brig; a move which the enemy promptly met by pushing forward with equal energy the construction of a frigate. while the new vessels were on the stocks, an irregular warfare was carried on by those already in commission. at the opening of the season, the american vessels lay in otter creek; and, just as they were ready to leave port, the enemy appeared off the mouth of the creek with a force consisting of the brig "linnet" and eight or ten galleys. the object of the british was to so obstruct the mouth of the creek that the americans should be unable to come out. with this end in view, they had brought two sloops laden with stones, which they intended to sink in the narrow channel. but, luckily, the americans had thrown up earthworks at the mouth of the river; and a party of sailors so worked the guns, that, after much manoeuvring, the british were forced to retire without effecting their purpose. about the middle of august, the americans launched their new brig, the "eagle;" and the little squadron put out at once into the lake, under command of capt. thomas macdonough. eight days later, the british got their new ship, the "confiance," into the water. she possessed one feature new to american naval architecture,--a furnace in which to heat cannon-balls. by this time (september, ), the invading column of british veterans, eleven thousand strong, had begun its march into new york along the west shore of the lake. two thousand americans only could be gathered to dispute their progress; and these, under the command of brigadier-gen. macomb, were gathered at plattsburg. to this point, accordingly, macdonough took his fleet, and awaited the coming of the enemy; knowing that if he could beat back the fleet of the british, their land forces, however powerful, would be forced to cease their advance. the fleet that he commanded consisted of the flagship "saratoga," carrying eight long twenty-four-pounders, six forty-two-pound and twelve thirty-two-pound carronades; the brig "eagle," carrying eight long eighteens, and twelve thirty-two-pound carronades; schooner "ticonderoga," with eight long twelve-pounders, four long eighteen-pounders, and five thirty-two-pound carronades; sloop "preble," with seven long nines; and ten galleys. the commander who ruled over this fleet was a man still in his twenty-ninth year. the successful battles of the war of were fought by young officers, and the battle of lake champlain was no exception to the rule. the british force which came into battle with macdonough's fleet was slightly superior. it was headed by the flagship "confiance," a frigate of the class of the united states ship "constitution," carrying thirty long twenty-fours, a long twenty-four-pounder on a pivot, and six thirty-two or forty-two pound carronades. the other vessels were the "linnet," a brig mounting sixteen long twelves; and the "chubb" and "finch" (captured from the americans under the names of "growler" and "eagle"),--sloops carrying respectively ten eighteen-pound carronades and one long six; and six eighteen-pound carronades, four long sixes, and one short eighteen. to these were added twelve gunboats, with varied armaments, but each slightly heavier than the american craft of the same class. the th of september had been chosen by the british for the combined land and water attack upon plattsburg. with the movements of the land forces, this narrative will not deal. the brunt of the conflict fell upon the naval forces, and it was the success of the americans upon the water that turned the faces of the british invaders toward canada. the village of plattsburg stands upon the shore of a broad bay which communicates with lake champlain by an opening a mile and a half wide, bounded upon the north by cumberland head, and on the south by crab island. in this bay, about two miles from the western shore, macdonough's fleet lay anchored in double line, stretching north and south. the four large vessels were in the front rank, prepared to meet the brunt of the conflict; while the galleys formed a second line in the rear. the morning of the day of battle dawned clear, with a brisk north-east wind blowing. the british were stirring early, and at daybreak weighed anchor and came down the lake. across the low-lying isthmus that connected cumberland head with the mainland, the americans could see their adversaries' topmasts as they came down to do battle. at this sight, macdonough called his officers about him, and, kneeling upon the quarter-deck, besought divine aid in the conflict so soon to come. when the little group rose from their knees, the leading ship of the enemy was seen swinging round cumberland head; and the men went to their quarters to await the fiery trial that all knew was impending. the position of the american squadron was such that the british were forced to attack "bows on," thus exposing themselves to a raking fire. by means of springs on their cables, the americans were enabled to keep their broadsides to the enemy, and thus improve, to the fullest, the advantage gained by their position. the british came on gallantly, and were greeted by four shots from the long eighteens of the "eagle," that had no effect. but, at the sound of the cannon, a young game-cock that was running at large on the "saratoga" flew upon a gun, flapped his wings, and crowed thrice, with so lusty a note that he was heard far over the waters. the american seamen, thus roused from the painful revery into which the bravest fall before going into action, cheered lustily, and went into the fight, encouraged as only sailors could be by the favorable omen. soon after the defiant game-cock had thus cast down the gage of battle, macdonough sighted and fired the first shot from one of the long twenty-four pounders of the "saratoga." the heavy ball crashed into the bow of the "confiance," and cut its way aft, killing and wounding several men, and demolishing the wheel. nothing daunted, the british flagship came on grandly, making no reply, and seeking only to cast anchor alongside the "saratoga," and fight it out yard-arm to yard-arm. but the fire of the americans was such that she could not choose her distance; but after having been badly cut up, with both her port anchors shot away, was forced to anchor at a distance of a quarter of a mile. but her anchor had hardly touched bottom, when she suddenly flashed out a sheet of flames, as her rapid broadsides rung out and her red-hot shot sped over the water toward the american flagship. her first broadside killed or wounded forty of the americans; while many more were knocked down by the shock, but sustained no further injury. so great was the carnage, that the hatches were opened, and the dead bodies passed below, that the men might have room to work the guns. among the slain was mr. gamble, the first lieutenant, who was on his knees sighting a gun, when a shot entered the port, split the quoin, drove a great piece of metal against his breast, and stretched him dead upon the deck without breaking his skin. by a singular coincidence, fifteen minutes later a shot from one of the "saratoga's" guns struck the muzzle of a twenty-four on the "confiance," and, dismounting it, hurled it against capt. downie's groin, killing him instantly without breaking the skin; a black mark about the size of a small plate was the sole visible injury. in the mean time, the smaller vessels had become engaged, and were fighting with no less courage than the flag-ships. the "chubb" had early been disabled by a broadside from the "eagle," and drifted helplessly under the guns of the "saratoga." after receiving a shot from that vessel, she struck, and was taken possession of by midshipman platt, who put off from the flagship in an open boat, boarded the prize, and took her into plattsburg bay, near the mouth of the saranac. more than half her people were killed or wounded during the short time she was in the battle. the "linnet," in the mean time, had engaged the "eagle," and poured in her broadsides with such effect that the springs on the cables of the american were cut away, and she could no longer bring her broadsides to bear. her captain therefore cut his cables, and soon gained a position from which he could bring his guns to bear upon the "confiance." the "linnet" thereupon dashed in among the american gunboats, and, driving them off, commenced a raking fire upon the "saratoga." the "finch," meanwhile, had ranged gallantly up alongside the "ticonderoga," but was sent out of the fight by two broadsides from the american. she drifted helplessly before the wind, and soon grounded near crab island. on the island was a hospital, and an abandoned battery mounting one six-pound gun. some of the convalescent patients, seeing the enemy's vessel within range, opened fire upon her from the battery, and soon forced her to haul down her flag. nearly half her crew were killed or wounded. almost at the same moment, the united states sloop "preble" was forced out of the fight by the british gunboats, that pressed so fiercely upon her that she cut her cables and drifted inshore. [illustration: hiram paulding fires the guns.] the "ticonderoga" fought a gallant fight throughout. after ridding herself of the "finch," she had a number of the british gunboats to contend with; and they pressed forward to the attack with a gallantry that showed them to be conscious of the fact, that, if this vessel could be carried, the american line would be turned, and the day won by the english. but the american schooner fought stubbornly. her gallant commander, lieut. cassin, walked up and down the taffrail, heedless of the grape and musket-balls that whistled past his head, pointing out to the gunners the spot whereon to train the guns, and directing them to load with canister and bags of bullets when the enemy came too near. the gunners of the schooner were terribly hampered in their work by the lack of matches for the guns; for the vessel was new, and the absence of these very essential articles was unnoticed until too late. the guns of one division were fired throughout the fight by hiram paulding, a sixteen-year-old midshipman, who flashed his pistol at the priming of the guns as soon as aim was taken. when no gun was ready for his services, he rammed a ball into his weapon and discharged it at the enemy. the onslaught of the british was spirited and determined. often they pressed up within a boat-hook's length of the schooner, only to be beaten back by her merciless fire. sometimes so few were left alive in the galleys that they could hardly man the oars to pull out of the fight. in this way the "ticonderoga" kept her enemies at bay while the battle was being decided between the "saratoga" and the "confiance." for it was upon the issue of the conflict between these two ships, that victory or defeat depended. each had her ally and satellite. under the stern of the "saratoga" lay the "linnet," pouring in raking broadsides. the "confiance," in turn, was suffering from the well-directed fire of the "eagle." the roar of the artillery was unceasing, and dense clouds of gunpowder-smoke hid the warring ships from the eyes of the eager spectators on shore. the "confiance" was unfortunate in losing her gallant captain early in the action, while macdonough was spared to fight his ship to the end. his gallantry and activity, however, led him to expose himself fearlessly; and twice he narrowly escaped death. he worked like a common sailor, loading and firing a favorite twenty-four-pound gun; and once, while on his knees, sighting the piece, a shot from the "confiance" cut in two the spanker-boom, a great piece of which fell heavily upon the captain's head, stretching him senseless upon the deck. he lay motionless for two or three minutes, and his men mourned him as dead; but suddenly his activity returned, and he leaped to his feet, and was soon again in the thick of the fight. in less than five minutes the cry again arose, that the captain was killed. he had been standing at the breach of his favorite cannon, when a round shot took off the head of the captain of the gun, and dashed it with terrific force into the face of macdonough, who was driven across the deck, and hurled against the bulwarks. he lay an instant, covered with the blood of the slain man; but, hearing his men cry that he was killed, he rushed among them, to cheer them on with his presence. and, indeed, at this moment the crew of the "saratoga" needed the presence of their captain to cheer them on to further exertion. the red-hot shot of the "confiance" had twice set fire to the american ship. the raking fire from the "linnet" had dismounted carronades and long guns one by one, until but a single serviceable gun was left in the starboard battery. a too heavy charge dismounted this piece, and threw it down the hatchway, leaving the frigate without a single gun bearing upon the enemy. in such a plight the hearts of the crew might well fail them. but macdonough was ready for the emergency. he still had his port broadside untouched, and he at once set to work to swing the ship round so that this battery could be brought to bear. an anchor was let fall astern, and the whole ship's company hauled in on the hawser, swinging the ship slowly around. it was a dangerous manoeuvre; for, as the ship veered round, her stern was presented to the "linnet," affording an opportunity for raking, which the gunners on that plucky little vessel immediately improved. but patience and hard pulling carried the day; and gradually the heavy frigate was turned sufficiently for the after gun to bear, and a gun's crew was at once called from the hawsers to open fire. one by one the guns swung into position, and soon the whole broadside opened with a roar. meanwhile the "confiance" had attempted the same manoeuvre. but her anchors were badly placed; and, though her people worked gallantly, they failed to get the ship round. she bore for some time the effective fire from the "saratoga's" fresh broadside, but, finding that she could in no way return the fire, struck her flag, two hours and a quarter after the battle commenced. beyond giving a hasty cheer, the people of the "saratoga" paid little attention to the surrender of their chief enemy, but instantly turned their guns upon the "linnet." in this combat the "eagle" could take no part, and the thunder of her guns died away. farther down the bay, the "ticonderoga" had just driven away the last of the british galleys; so that the "linnet" now alone upheld the cause of the enemy. she was terribly outmatched by her heavier foe, but her gallant captain pring kept up a desperate defence. her masts and rigging were hopelessly shattered; and no course was open to her, save to surrender, or fight a hopeless fight. capt. pring sent off a lieutenant, in an open boat, to ascertain the condition of the "confiance." the officer returned with the report that capt. downie was killed, and the frigate terribly cut up; and as by this time the water, pouring in the shot-holes in the "linnet's" hull, had risen a foot above the lower deck, her flag was hauled down, and the battle ended in a decisive triumph for the americans. terrible was the carnage, and many and strange the incidents, of this most stubbornly contested naval battle. all of the prizes were in a sinking condition. in the hull of the "confiance" were a hundred and five shot-holes, while the "saratoga" was pierced by fifty-five. not a mast that would bear canvas was left standing in the british fleet; those of the flagship were splintered like bundles of matches, and the sails torn to rags. on most of the enemy's vessels, more than half of the crews were killed or wounded. the loss on the british side probably aggregated three hundred. midshipman william lee of the "confiance" wrote home after the battle, "the havoc on both sides was dreadful. i don't think there are more than five of our men, out of three hundred, but what are killed or wounded. never was a shower of hail so thick as the shot whistling about our ears. were you to see my jacket, waistcoat, and trousers, you would be astonished to know how i escaped as i did; for they are literally torn all to rags with shot and splinters. the upper part of my hat was also shot away. there is one of the marines who was in the trafalgar action with lord nelson, who says it was a mere flea-bite in comparison with this." the americans, though victorious, had suffered greatly. their loss amounted to about two hundred men. the "saratoga" had been cut up beyond the possibility of repair. her decks were covered with dead and dying. the shot of the enemy wrought terrible havoc in the ranks of the american officers. lieut. stansbury of the "ticonderoga" suddenly disappeared in the midst of the action; nor could any trace of him be found, until, two days later, his body, cut nearly in two by a round shot, rose from the waters of the lake. lieut. vallette of the "saratoga" was knocked down by the head of a sailor, sent flying by a cannon-ball. some minutes later he was standing on a shot-box giving orders, when a shot took the box from beneath his feet, throwing him heavily upon the deck. mr. brum, the master, a veteran man-o'-war's man, was struck by a huge splinter, which knocked him down, and actually stripped every rag of clothing from his body. he was thought to be dead, but soon re-appeared at his post, with a strip of canvas about his waist, and fought bravely until the end of the action. some days before the battle, a gentleman of oswego gave one of the sailors a glazed tarpaulin hat, of the kind then worn by seamen. a week later the sailor re-appeared, and, handing him the hat with a semi-circular cut in the crown and brim, made while it was on his head by a cannon-shot, remarked calmly, "look here, mr. sloane, how the damned john bulls have spoiled my hat!" the last british flag having been hauled down, an officer was sent to take possession of the "confiance." in walking along her gun-deck, he accidentally ran against a ratline, by which one of her starboard guns was discharged. at this sound, the british galleys and gunboats, which had been lying quietly with their ensigns down, got out oars and moved off up the lake. the americans had no vessels fit for pursuing them, and they were allowed to escape. in the afternoon the british officers came to the american flagship to complete the surrender. macdonough met them courteously; and, on their offering their swords, put them back, saying, "gentlemen, your gallant conduct makes you worthy to wear your weapons. return them to their scabbards." by sundown the surrender was complete, and macdonough sent off to the secretary of the navy a despatch, saying, "_sir,_--the almighty has been pleased to grant us a signal victory on lake champlain, in the capture of one frigate, one brig, and two sloops-of-war of the enemy." some days later, the captured ships, being beyond repair, were taken to the head of the lake, and scuttled. some of the guns were found to be still loaded; and, in drawing the charges, one gun was found with a canvas bag containing two round shot rammed home, and wadded, without any powder; another gun contained two cartridges and no shot; and a third had a wad rammed down before the powder, thus effectually preventing the discharge of the piece. the american gunners were not altogether guiltless of carelessness of this sort. their chief error lay in ramming down so many shot upon the powder that the force of the explosion barely carried the missiles to the enemy. in proof of this, the side of the "confiance" was thickly dotted with round shot, which had struck into, but failed to penetrate, the wood. the result of this victory was immediate and gratifying. the land forces of the british, thus deprived of their naval auxiliaries, turned about, and retreated to canada, abandoning forever their projected invasion. new york was thus saved by macdonough's skill and bravery. yet the fame he won by his victory was not nearly proportionate to the naval ability he showed, and the service he had rendered to his country. before the popular adulation of perry, macdonough sinks into second place. one historian only gives him the pre-eminence that is undoubtedly his due. says mr. theodore roosevelt, in his admirable history, "the naval war of ," "but macdonough in this battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war, british or american. he had a decidedly superior force to contend against, and it was solely owing to his foresight and resource that we won the victory. he forced the british to engage at a disadvantage by his excellent choice of position, and he prepared beforehand for every possible contingency. his personal prowess had already been shown at the cost of the rovers of tripoli, and in this action he helped fight the guns as ably as the best sailor. his skill, seamanship, quick eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck are beyond all praise. down to the time of the civil war, he is the greatest figure in our naval history. a thoroughly religious man, he was as generous and humane as he was skilful and brave. one of the greatest of our sea captains, he has left a stainless name behind him." chapter xiv. on the ocean. -- the work of the sloops-of-war. -- loss of the "frolic." -- fruitless cruise of the "adams." -- the "peacock" takes the "�pervier." -- the cruise of the "wasp." -- she captures the "reindeer." -- sinks the "avon." -- mysterious end of the "wasp." the opening of the year found the american coast still rigidly blockaded by the british men-of-war. two or three of the enemy lay off the mouth of every considerable harbor, and were not to be driven from their post by the icy winds and storms of midwinter on the american coast. it was almost impossible for any american vessel to escape to sea, and a matter of almost equal difficulty for such vessels as were out to get into a home port. the frigate "president" had put to sea early in december, , and after a cruise of eight weeks, during which the traditional ill-luck of the ship pursued her remorselessly, managed to dash into new york harbor past the blockading squadron. at boston the blockade was broken by the "constitution." she left port on the st of january, ran off to the southward, and cruised for some weeks in the west indies. here she captured the british man-of-war schooner "pictou," fourteen guns, and several merchant-vessels. she also fell in with the british thirty-six-gun frigate "pique," which fled, and escaped pursuit by cutting through a narrow channel during a dark and squally night. the "constitution" then returned to the coast of the united states, and narrowly escaped falling into the clutches of two british frigates. she managed to gain the shelter of marblehead harbor, and there remained until the latter part of the year. but, while the larger vessels were thus accomplishing little or nothing, two or three small sloops-of-war, of a class newly built, slipped through the enemy's lines, and, gaining the open sea, fought one or two notable actions. of these, the first vessel to get to sea was the new sloop-of-war "frolic;" but her career was short and inglorious, for she had been at sea but a few weeks when she fell in with the enemy's frigate "orpheus" and the schooner "shelburne." a chase ensued, in which the american vessel threw overboard her guns and anchors, and started the water; but to no avail, for she was overhauled, and forced to surrender. her service afloat was limited to the destruction of a carthagenian privateer, which sunk before her guns, carrying down nearly a hundred men. the "adams," a vessel that had suffered many vicissitudes,--having been built for a frigate, then cut down to a sloop-of-war, and finally been sawed asunder and converted into a corvette,--put to sea on the th of january, under the command of capt. charles morris, formerly of the "constitution." she laid her course straight to the eastward, and for some time cruised off the western coast of africa and the canary isles. she met with but little success in this region, capturing only three brigs,--the cargo of one of which consisted of wine and fruit; and the second, of palm-oil and ivory. abandoning the african coast, the corvette turned westward along the equator, and made for the west indies. a large indiaman fell in her way, and was brought to; but, before the americans could take possession of their prize, a british fleet of twenty-five sail, with two men-of-war, hove in sight, and the "adams" was forced to seek safety in flight. she put into savannah for provisions and water, but, hearing that the enemy was in force near by, worked out to sea, and made sail for another cruise. capt. morris took up a position on the limits of the gulf stream, near the florida coast, in the expectation of cutting out an indiaman from some passing convoy. the expected fleet soon came, but was under the protection of a seventy-four, two frigates, and three brigs,--a force sufficient to keep at bay the most audacious of corvettes. morris hung about the convoy for two days, but saw no chance of eluding the watchful guards. he then crossed the atlantic to the coast of ireland. here the "adams" narrowly escaped capture; for she was sighted by a frigate, which gave chase, and would have overhauled her, had not the americans thrown overboard some small cannon, and cut away their anchors. thus lightened, the corvette sped away, and soon left her pursuers behind. continued ill-fortune now reduced the spirits of the sailors of the "adams" to very low ebb. they were forced to struggle unceasingly against the fierce gales which in winter sweep the atlantic. their stock of food and water was giving out; and, to add to their distress, scurvy, the sailors' worst enemy, began to show itself in the ship. they had boldly run into the very waters in which the "argus" had won so rich a reward, yet not a sail gladdened the eyes of the lookout on the "adams." it was then with great disappointment that the jackies saw the prow of the corvette turned homeward, after a cruise that would bring them neither honor nor prize-money. the passage homeward was quickly made, and on the th of august the vessel was in soundings off the coast of maine. night fell, with a dense fog concealing all landmarks from view. through the darkness the corvette sped on at a pace of eleven miles an hour, until, just as day was breaking, the cry of "breakers ahead!" was followed by a heavy blow, indicating that the ship had struck. the force of the blow had not been sufficient to stave in the bottom,--a fortunate fact, for the hold was full of prisoners. nevertheless, she was hard and fast aground, on a ledge of rock that lifted her bow six feet above her stern. morris, who had rushed upon deck at the first alarm, was unable to make out the ship's position, and feared that they were on cashes ledge, a reef so far from the land that it would have been impossible to save in the boats more than half the crew. he had determined, however, to instantly lower the boats and send them off in search of land, when a gust of wind, blowing away the fog, showed a beetling cliff not a hundred yards away. rugged and inhospitable as was the coast thus exposed, it was better than an expanse of ocean; and at once morris set to work landing his prisoners, and the sick, of whom the "adams" had nearly sixty. with spare sails, tents were put up on the beach; and, stores having been landed, the comfort of all was assured, in case the ship should go to pieces. what the desolate shore was to which they were thus forced to turn for shelter, no one knew. all hands now turned to at the capstan, in the hopes of getting the vessel off; and about noon, the tide having reached its flood, she gradually slid off the ledge into deep water. after trying the pumps, to see if any serious leak had been started, the difficult task of taking the ship out of the labyrinth of reefs in which she lay was begun. for more than two miles their course lay through a narrow and tortuous channel, bordered on either side with jagged reefs; but the corvette safely threaded her way between the rocks, and soon lay floating in deep water. the next morning the fog blew away; and the voyagers discovered to their astonishment that they were off mount desert, instead of near portsmouth as they had expected. to return into the cluster of reefs after the little colony of invalids and prisoners that had been left behind, would have been mere folly: so sending two fishing-boats to search out the shore party, and carry them to the nearest village, the "adams" continued her course, intending to put into the penobscot river. while making for this point, a sail was sighted, which proved to be the british brig-sloop "rifleman." the corvette gave chase, but the englishman kept well in the offing; and, as the condition of the american crew was such that to lead them into action would have been imprudent, morris abandoned the pursuit, and, putting into the penobscot, dropped anchor off hampden. here, for the present, we will leave the "adams." the "peacock"--a second of the new sloops-of-war, bearing the name of a captured british vessel--put out from new york in march, and made her way to the southward, selecting as her cruising station the waters off the coast of florida. for some time it seemed that the exertions of the sailors were to be of no avail. not a sail was to be seen, and the chances for prize-money seemed to be small indeed. but on the th of march three merchant-vessels were made out in the offing; while a heavy-built, square-rigged, trim-looking craft that hovered about them was evidently a man-of-war. the strangers seemed to have sighted the american vessel; for the merchantmen were seen to hastily haul up and run off to the north-east, while the man-of-war edged away for the american ship. the stranger was his british majesty's brig sloop-of-war "epervier," of eighteen guns, and carrying a crew of one hundred and twenty-eight men. the "peacock" was a ship-sloop of twenty-two guns, with a crew of one hundred and sixty-six men. the advantage, therefore, lay with the americans; but, in the battle that ensued, the damage they inflicted upon the enemy was out of any proportion to their excess of strength. the two ships bore down gallantly upon each other, and at a little after ten in the morning passed, exchanging heavy broadsides. the shot of each took effect in the rigging; but the "peacock" suffered the more, having her foreyard totally disabled,--an injury that compelled her to run large during the rest of the action, and forego all attempts at manoeuvring. the two vessels having passed each other, the "epervier" eased off, and returned to the fight, running on a parallel course with the american ship. the interchange of broadsides then became very rapid; but the british marksmanship was poor, and few of their shot took effect. the "epervier," on the contrary, suffered severely from the american fire, which took effect in her hull, dismounting several guns, and so injuring the brig that a british naval officer, writing of the action some years later, said, "the most disgraceful part of the affair was that our ship was cut to pieces, and the enemy hardly scratched." the injury aloft which both vessels sustained caused the battle to take on the character of an action at long range. under such conditions, the victory was assured to the side showing the best gunnery. for a moment only did it seem that the vessels were likely to come to close quarters, and the english captain seized that occasion to call up his boarders. but they refused, saying, "she's too heavy for us." and a few minutes later the englishman hauled down his flag, having lost nine killed or mortally wounded, and fourteen wounded. the americans had suffered but little; only two men being injured, and these but slightly. the shot of the enemy had passed through the rigging of the "peacock," while the "epervier" had been hulled forty-five times. the "epervier" proved to be a valuable prize. in her hold specie to the amount of one hundred and eighteen thousand dollars was found; and, when the brig was sold to the united states government, she brought fifty-five thousand dollars: so that the prize-money won by that action kept the sailors in good-humor for many months to come. but, before the prize could be safely carried into an american port, she had a gantlet to run, in which she narrowly escaped capture. after the wreck of battle had been cleared away, the brig and her captor made for savannah, but were sighted and chased by two british frigates. the "peacock," in the hope of drawing away the pursuers, left her prize, and headed out to sea. one frigate only followed her, and the other pressed on hotly after the "epervier," which, to avoid capture, was forced to run into shallow water, whither the heavy frigate could not follow her. but she was not to escape so easily; for the boats of the frigate were lowered, filled with armed men, and set out in pursuit of the brig, which moved but slowly before the light breeze then blowing. the boats soon overhauled the fugitive, and escape seemed hopeless; for the "epervier" was manned by a prize-crew of only sixteen men. but lieut. nicholson, who was in command, determined to try the effect of bluster. accordingly he leaped upon the taffrail, with a speaking-trumpet in his hand, and shouted out orders as if calling a huge crew to quarters. the british, who were within easy range, stopped their advance, and, fearing a destructive broadside from the brig's guns, turned and fled precipitately. the "epervier" continued her course, and reached savannah in safety on the st of may. the "peacock" reached the same port four days later. at the moment when the captured "epervier," flying the stars and stripes, was proudly making her way up the harbor of savannah amid the plaudits of the people of the little city, there sailed from portsmouth, n.h., a vessel that was destined to fight a good fight for the honor of that starry banner; and, after winning a glorious victory, to disappear forever from the face of the ocean, carrying to some unknown grave a crew of as brave hearts as ever beat under uniforms of navy blue. this was the new sloop of war "wasp," named after the gallant little craft that had been taken by the british after her capture of the "frolic." she was a stanch three-master, carrying eleven guns to a broadside. her crew was purely american, not a foreigner among them; but all trained seamen from the seaboard villages and towns of new england,--the homes at that time of probably the hardiest seafaring population in the world. capt. blakely, who commanded the vessel, had been attached to the "enterprise" for some time, but had been ordered to the command of the "wasp" a few days before the former vessel fought her successful battle with the "boxer." blakely, while in command of the "enterprise," had greatly desired to meet an enemy worthy of his metal. great, then, was his chagrin, when the "enterprise," two weeks after he quitted her, fought her gallant battle. in a letter written in january, , he says, "i shall ever view as one of the most unfortunate events of my life having quitted the 'enterprise' at the moment i did. had i remained in her a fortnight longer, my name might have been classed with those who stand so high. i cannot but consider it a mortifying circumstance that i left her but a few days before she fell in with the only enemy upon this station with which she could have creditably contended. i confess i felt heartily glad when i received my order to take command of the 'wasp,' conceiving that there was no hope of doing any thing in the 'enterprise.' but when i heard of the contest of the latter ship, and witnessed the great delay in the equipment of the former, i had no cause to congratulate myself. the 'peacock' has ere this spread her plumage to the winds, and the 'frolic' will soon take her revels on the ocean; but the 'wasp' will, i fear, remain for some time a dull, harmless drone in the waters of her country." notwithstanding his impatience, blakely was forced to endure the restraints of portsmouth navy-yard for nearly three months, while the "wasp" was fitting out; but when she did finally get to sea, on may , , she proved herself to be far from a "dull, harmless drone." slipping unobserved through the british blockading line, the "wasp" made straight for the european coast before a fresh wind, and was soon cruising in the chops of the english channel, where the "argus" had won her laurels and met with her defeat. many english merchantmen were captured and burned, and the terror that spread in english shipping circles recalled the days of the "argus." at daylight on the th of june, the "wasp" sighted two merchantmen, and straightway gave chase. soon a third vessel was discovered on the weather-beam; and, abandoning the vessels first sighted, the american bore down upon the stranger. she proved to be the "reindeer," a british brig-sloop of eighteen guns, carrying a crew of one hundred and eighteen men. although the british vessel was by no means a match in weight of metal for the "wasp," her captain, william manners, brought her into action with a cool gallantry which well justified his reputation as one of the bravest men in the british navy. [illustration: boarding the "reindeer."] at ten o'clock in the morning the ships were near enough to each other to exchange signals, but several hours were spent in manoeuvring for the weather-gage; so that it was not until after three in the afternoon that the action fairly opened. the day was admirably suitable for a naval battle. light clouds floated across the sky, and the gentle breeze that was blowing had sufficient strength to propel the ships without careening them. the surface of the ocean was unusually calm for that quarter, in which a rather choppy sea is usually running. before the light breeze the "wasp" came down upon her foe, bows on, with her decks cleared for action, and the men at their quarters. on the top-gallant forecastle of the "reindeer" was mounted a twelve-pound carronade, and the action was opened by the discharge of this piece. in the position she then held, the "wasp" was unable to reply; and her crew had to bear five effective shots from this gun without being able to fire a shot in return,--an ordeal that less well-disciplined crews might not have endured. for nine minutes the americans returned not a shot; but then the "wasp" luffed up, firing the guns from aft forward as they bore. the two ships were now lying broadside to broadside, not twenty yards apart, and every shot told. for ten minutes this position was held, and the two crews worked like furies in loading and firing the great guns. the roar of the cannon was incessant, and the recoil of the heavy explosions deadened what little way the ships had on when fire was opened. capt. manners was too old an officer not to know, that, in an artillery duel of that kind, the victory would surely rest with the side that carried the heaviest guns: so he ran his vessel aboard the "wasp" on the starboard quarter, intending to board and carry the day with the stubborn, dashing gallantry shown by british seamen when once led to an enemy's deck. at the ringing notes of the bugle, calling up the boarders, the british gathered aft, their faces begrimed with gunpowder, their arms bare, and their keen cutlasses firmly clutched in their strong right hands. the americans took the alarm at once, and crowded forward to repel the enemy. the marines, whose hard duty it is in long-range fighting to stand with military impassiveness, drawn up in line on deck, while the shot whistle by them, and now and then cut great gaps in their straight lines,--the marines came aft, with their muskets loaded and bayonets fixed. before them were sailors with sharp-pointed boarding-pikes, ready to receive the enemy should he come aboard; while close under the bulwarks were grouped the boarders, ready with cutlass and pistol to beat back the flood of men that should come pouring over the side. the grating of the ships' sides told that the vessels were touching; and the next instant the burly british seamen, looming up like giants, as they dashed through the dense murkiness of the powder-smoke, were among the americans, cutting and firing right and left. from the deck of the "reindeer" the marines kept up a constant fire of musketry, to which the sea-soldiers of the "wasp" responded vigorously. marksmen posted in the tops of each vessel picked off men from their enemy's decks, choosing generally the officers. [illustration: the captain of the "reindeer."] sharp and bloody though the british attack was, the boarders could make no way against the stubborn stand of the americans. capt. manners, seeing his men beaten back, sprang forward to rally them. he was desperately wounded. a gun-shot had passed through his thighs, and a grape-shot had cut across the calves of his legs; but, maimed and bleeding to death as he was, he leaped into the rigging, and, cheering and waving his sword, called to his men to follow him to the decks of the yankee. the britons rallied nobly under the encouragement of their brave captain, and again advanced to the assault. but the figure of the daring officer, as he stood thus before his men, waving his sword and calling on them to come on, caught the eye of one of the men in the "wasp's" maintop; and the next instant a ball crashed into the captain's brain, and he fell heavily to the deck, with his dying eyes turned upwards toward the flag in whose service he had given his life. seeing the british captain fall and the men waver, capt. blakely with a cheer called up the boarders of the "wasp;" and in an instant a stream of shouting sailors, cutlass in hand, was pouring over the hammock-nettings, and driving the foe backward on his own decks. the british still fought stubbornly; but their numbers were terribly thinned, and their officers had fallen one by one, until now the captain's clerk was the highest officer left. seeing his men falling back before the resistless torrent of boarders, this gentleman finally struck the flag; and the battle ended, twenty-seven minutes after the "reindeer" had fired the opening gun, and eighteen after the "wasp" had responded. [illustration: the end of the "reindeer."] the execution and damage done on the "reindeer" by the "wasp's" shot were appalling. of her crew of one hundred and eighteen men, thirty-three were killed or fatally wounded, and thirty-four were wounded. the havoc wrought among her officers has already been mentioned. evidence of the accuracy and skill of the american gunners was to be seen in the fact that the brig was completely cut to pieces in the line of her ports. her decks were swept clean of boats, spars, and rigging. her masts were badly shattered, and her foremast soon went by the board. the "wasp" had suffered severely, but was in much better condition than her captured adversary. eleven of her crew were killed or mortally wounded, and fifteen were wounded severely or slightly. she had been hulled by six round and many grape shot, and her foremast had been cut by a twenty-four-pound shot. a few hours' work cleared from her decks all trace of the bloody fight, and she was in condition for another action. but it would have been folly to try to get the crippled "reindeer" to port from that region, swarming with british cruisers: so capt. blakely took the prisoners on the "wasp," put a few of the wounded on a neutral vessel that happened to pass, and, burning the prize, made his way to the harbor of l'orient. he had fought a brave fight, and come out victor after a desperate contest. but, though defeated, the plucky british might well boast of the gallant manner in which they engaged an enemy so much their superior in strength. history nowhere records a more gallant death than that of the british captain, who fell leading his men in a dashing but vain attempt to retrieve the day by boarding. in its manoeuvring, in the courage and discipline of the crews, and in the gallantry of the two captains, the action of the "wasp" and the "reindeer" may well go down to history as a model naval duel of the age of sails. the "wasp" remained in port for several weeks, occupying the time in refitting, and filling the gaps in her crew by enlistment from the american privateers which then were to be seen occasionally in every port of the world. she then put out to sea, and soon fell in with a convoy of ten british merchantmen, under the protection of the seventy-four "armada." though he had no intention of giving battle to the line-of-battle ship, blakely determined to capture one of the merchantmen; and to this end the "wasp" hung upon the skirts of the convoy, making rapid dashes now at one vessel, then at another, and keeping the seventy-four in constant anxiety. finally the swift little cruiser actually succeeded in capturing one of the vessels, and escaping before the heavy seventy-four could get to the scene of the conflict. the prize proved to be a valuable one, for she was laden with iron and brass cannon and military stores. towards nightfall of the same day, sept. , , four more sail were sighted; and the "wasp" at once made off in chase of the most weatherly. at eight o'clock the "wasp" had gained so rapidly upon the chase, that the latter began firing with her stern chaser, and soon after opened with one of her lee guns. all the time the enemy kept up a vigorous signalling with rockets, lanterns, and guns. by half-past nine the "wasp" was within hailing-distance, and an officer posted on the bow hailed the stranger several times; but as she returned no satisfactory answer, and refused to heave to, the "wasp" opened upon her with a twelve-pound carronade, and soon after poured a broadside into her quarter. the two ships ploughed through the black water, under full sail, side by side. the americans had no idea of the identity of their assailant, but, by the flashes of the guns, could see that she was a heavy brig. her ports gleamed brightly with battle-lanterns; and the crowds of sailors in the tops, and the regularity of her fire, showed that she was a man-of-war with a well-disciplined crew, and no mere marauding privateer. for a time this running fight continued at such short range that the only american injured was struck by a wad from the enemy's cannon. the british gunners were poor marksmen, and the "wasp" suffered but little; but it was evident that the american fire was taking effect, for gun after gun on the enemy was silenced. at ten o'clock the americans, receiving no response to their carronade, stopped firing; and capt. blakely, seizing a speaking-trumpet, shouted across the water, "have you struck?" no answer came, and the enemy began a feeble fire. the "wasp" let fly another broadside, and blakely repeated the question. this time an affirmative response came through the darkness; and the "wasp" stopped firing, and made preparations to take possession of her prize. just as the boat was being lowered from the davits, the lookout's cry of "sail, ho!" checked the proceedings. through the black night a cloud of canvas could be seen far astern, denoting the presence of another ship, probably an enemy. the drums of the "wasp" beat fiercely; and the men trooped back to their quarters, ready for a second battle. but in the mean time two more sail hove in sight, and there remained to the "wasp" nothing but flight. she accordingly made off into the darkness, receiving one broadside from one of the newly arrived men-of-war as she departed. so suddenly was she forced to fly, that she was unable to learn the name and condition of the vessel she had forced to surrender. it became known in the united states later that the "wasp's" adversary in the battle in the darkness was the british sloop-of-war "avon," of eighteen guns. she was badly cut up by the fire of the american gunners, losing her mainmast early in the action. at the time she surrendered, she was in a sinking condition; and, had it not been for the timely arrival of the brig-sloop "castilian" and the "tartarus," both british, the crew of the "avon" would have been prisoners on the "wasp," or carried to the bottom in the shattered hulk of their own ship. the loss on the "avon" was ten killed and thirty-two wounded, while on the "wasp" but three men were injured. of all this the gallant capt. blakely was ignorant; and, indeed, it is probable that he never knew with whom he had fought his last battle. for the subsequent history of the "wasp" is more tragic in its unfathomable mystery than is the fate of the bravest ship ever sent to the bottom by the broadsides of an enemy. what was the end of the "wasp," and where her bones now lie, no one knows. for some little time after her battle with the "avon," her movements can be traced. sept. , she captured the british brig "three brothers," and scuttled her; two days later, the brig "bacchus" met the same fate at her hands. sept. , she took the brig "atlanta," eight guns; and, this being a valuable prize, midshipman geisinger of the "wasp" was put on board, and took her safely to savannah. he brought the last news that was heard of the ill-fated cruiser for many years. months passed, and lengthened into years; and still the "wasp" came not into port, nor could any trace of her whereabouts be found. as time passed on, the attempts to account for her delay changed into theories as to the cause of her total disappearance. all sorts of rumors were afloat. according to one account, the ship was wrecked on the african coast, and her gallant lads were ending their weary lives as slaves to the turbaned moors of barbary. another theory was based on the rumor that an english frigate went into cadiz much crippled, and with her crew severely injured, and reported that she had been engaged with a heavy american corvette, which had so suddenly disappeared that she was thought to have sunk with all on board. but, as time passed on, the end of the "wasp" was forgotten by all save a few whose hearts ached for some of the gallant lads thus blotted from the face of the earth. years after, the fate of the daring cruiser was again brought into remembrance by fresh news curiously found. when the officers and crew of the "essex," after that vessel's gallant battle with the "phoebe" and "cherub," were sent to the united states under parole, two officers remained at valparaiso, to give testimony before the prize-court. these gentlemen were lieut. mcknight, and mr. lyman a master's mate. after going to brazil in the "phoebe," the two officers took passage in a swedish brig bound for england. months passed; and, nothing being heard from them, their friends became alarmed for their safety. in that time, before the day of the telegraph and steam transportation, many things might have easily detained the two officers for a year or more, and nothing be heard of them. but, when two years had passed, inquiries began to be made as to their fate, both by their friends and the naval authorities. the first step was to find the vessel upon which they had left brazil. this was a work of time; so that it was many years after the disappearance of the officers when the brig was found lying at a london dock. she was the brig "adonis," and the master proved to be the same who had commanded her when the two officers had taken passage. he readily recalled the circumstance, but claimed that the two passengers had left him in mid-ocean to go aboard an american man-of-war; and in proof of this he brought out the log-book, and, turning back to the year , pointed out the following entries:-- [illustration: the end of the "wasp."] "aug. .--left rio de janeiro; stephen decatur mcknight and james lyman, passengers for england. "oct. .--at eight o'clock in the morning discovered a strange sail giving chase to us, and fired several guns; she gaining very fast. at half-past ten o'clock hove to, and was boarded by an officer dressed in an english doctor's uniform; the vessel also hoisted an english ensign. the officer proceeded to examine my ship's papers, etc., likewise the letter-bags, and took from one of them a letter to the victualling office, london. finding i had two american officers as passengers, he immediately left the ship, and went on board the sloop-of-war. he shortly after returned, took the american gentlemen with him, and went a second time on board the ship. in about half an hour he returned, with messrs. mcknight and lyman; and they informed me that the vessel was the united states sloop-of-war 'wasp,' commanded by capt. blakely, or blake, last from france, where she had refitted; had lately sunk the 'reindeer,' english sloop-of-war, and another vessel, which sunk without their being able to save a single person, or learn the vessel's name; that messrs. mcknight and lyman had now determined to leave me and go on board the 'wasp;' paid me their passage in dollars, at _s._ _d._; and, having taken their luggage on board, the 'wasp' made sail to the southward. shortly after they had left, i discovered that lieut. mcknight had left his writing-desk behind; and i immediately made signal for the 'wasp' to return, and stood towards her. they, observing my signal, stood back, came alongside, and sent their boat on board for the writing-desk; after which they sent me a log-line and some other presents, and made all sail in a direction for the line, and, i have reason to suppose, for the convoy that passed on thursday previous." and so the "wasp," with her ill-fated crew thus re-enforced, passed forever from the sight of man. what was her course after leaving the "adonis," none may ever know. whether some chance spark, touching the deadly stores of her magazine, sent vessel and crew to a sudden but merciful death; or whether, after gallantly battling with some fierce tropical hurricane, she drifted about the trackless ocean a helpless hulk, with a slowly dying crew, carried hither and yon before the winds and the currents, until her timbers, rotting asunder, gave a watery sepulchre to her crew of lifeless bodies, must remain a mystery until the day when the sea shall give up its dead. but, until that day comes, the gallant deeds done by vessel and crew for the flag under which they served should keep the names of the "wasp" and her men ever memorable in the annals of the great nation whose infancy they so gallantly protected. chapter xv. operations on the new england coast. -- the bombardment of stonington. -- destruction of the united states corvette "adams." -- operations on chesapeake bay. -- work of barney's barge flotilla. -- advance of the british upon washington. -- destruction of the capitol. -- operations against baltimore. -- bombardment of fort mchenry. the remaining work of the british blockading squadrons along the atlantic coast demands some attention, and some account must be given of certain land actions which were inseparably connected with the course of naval events. this narrative can well be divided into two parts, each dealing with the operations of one section of the blockading fleet; thus tracing the course of events up to the close of the war on the new england coast, before taking up the proceedings on the chesapeake station. it will be remembered that decatur had been checked in his attempt to break the blockade at the eastern end of long island sound, and was forced to take the frigates "united states" and "macedonian," and the sloop-of-war "hornet," into new london harbor. early in december, , he determined to try to slip out; and choosing a dark night, when wind and tide were in his favor, he dropped down the bay, and was about to put to sea, when bright blue lights blazed up on either side of the harbor's mouth, and the plan was exposed by the treachery of some party never detected. after this failure, the two frigates returned up the river, where they remained until the end of the war. the "hornet" managed to get to sea, and did good service before peace was declared. in april, , the british blockaders on the new england coast began active operations by sending an expedition up the connecticut river to pautopaug point, where the invaders landed, spiked the guns of a small battery, and destroyed twenty-two vessels. thence they proceeded down the river, burning a few more craft on the way, and escaped safely to their ships; although a party of militia, and sailors and marines from decatur's vessels, attempted to cut them off. shortly after this occurrence, a fleet of american gunboats attacked the blockading squadron off new london, and succeeded in inflicting serious damages upon the enemy. in june, the enemy's depredations extended to the massachusetts coast. the little village of wareham was the first sufferer. a sudden descent made by boats' crews from the frigates "superb" and "nimrod" so completely surprised the inhabitants, that the enemy burned the shipping at the wharves, set fire to a factory, and retreated before the villagers fully comprehended the blow that had fallen upon them. like occurrences took place at other coastwise towns; and, in every case, the militia proved powerless to check the enemy. all up and down the new england coast, from maine to the mouth of the connecticut river, the people were panic-stricken; and hardly a night passed without witnessing the flames of some bonfire kindled by the british out of american property. [illustration: the descent on wareham.] in august, , commodore hardy appeared off stonington with a fleet of several vessels, headed by the seventy-four "ramillies." casting anchor near shore, he sent to the mayor and selectmen the following curt note: "not wishing to destroy the unoffending inhabitants residing in the town of stonington, one hour is granted them, from the receipt of this, to remove out of town." this message naturally caused great consternation; and, while messengers were sent in all directions to call together the militia, the answer was returned to the fleet: "we shall defend the place to the last extremity. should it be destroyed, we will perish in its ruins." and, having thus defied the enemy, the farmers and fishermen who inhabited the town set about preparing for its defence. the one battery available for service consisted of two eighteen-pounders and a four-pounder, mounted behind earth breastworks. the gunners were put under the command of an old sailor, who had been impressed into the british navy, where he served four years. the skill he thus acquired in gunnery, he now gladly used against his former oppressors. it was near nightfall when the british opened fire; and they kept up a constant cannonade with round shot, bombs, congreve rockets, and carcasses until near midnight, without doing the slightest damage. the bursting shells, the fiery rockets, and the carcasses filled with flaming chemicals, fairly filled the little wooden village with fire; but the exertions of the people prevented the spread of the flames. the fleet ceased firing at midnight, but there was no peace for the villagers. militia-men were pouring in from the country round about, laborers were at work throwing up breastwork, carriers were dashing about in search of ammunition, and all was activity, until, with the first gleam of daylight, the fire of the ships was re-opened. the americans promptly responded, and soon two eighteen-pound shot hulled the brig "despatch." for an hour or two a rapid fire was kept up; then, the powder giving out, the americans spiked their largest gun, and, nailing a flag to the battery flagstaff, went in search of more ammunition. the british did not land; and the americans, finding six kegs of powder, took the gun to a blacksmith, who drilled out the spike, and the action continued. so vigorous and well directed was the fire of the americans, that the "despatch" was forced to slip her cables and make off to a place of safety. that afternoon a truce was declared, which continued until eight the next morning. by that time, the americans had assembled in sufficient force to defeat any landing party the enemy could send ashore. the bombardment of the town continued; but the aim of the british was so inconceivably poor, that, during the three days' firing, no damage was done by their shot. a more ludicrous fiasco could hardly be imagined, and the americans were quick to see the comical side of the affair. before departing, the british fired over fifteen tons of lead and iron into the town. a quantity of this was picked up by the americans, and offered for sale. in a new york paper appeared the advertisement,-- "just received, and offered for sale, about three tons of round shot, consisting of six, nine, twelve, eighteen, twenty-four, and thirty-two pounds; very handsome, being a small proportion of those which were fired from his britannic majesty's ships on the unoffending inhabitants of stonington, in the recent _brilliant_ attack on that place. likewise a few carcasses, in good order, weighing about two hundred pounds each. apply," etc. a popular bard of the time set forth in rollicking verse the exploits of the british gunners:-- "they killed a goose, they killed a hen, three hogs they wounded in a pen; they dashed away,--and pray what then? that was not taking stonington. "the shells were thrown, the rockets flew; but not a shell of all they threw-- though every house was full in view-- could burn a house in stonington." with this affair, in which the british expended ammunition to the amount of fifty thousand dollars, and lost twenty men killed and fifty wounded, active offensive operations along the connecticut coast ended. farther north, however, the british still raided towns and villages, showing more spirit in their attacks than did hardy at stonington. eastport, me., was captured in july, and converted into a veritable british colony. the inhabitants who remained in the town were forced to take an oath of allegiance to great britain; fortifications were thrown up, and an arsenal established; king george's officials were placed in the custom-house, and thenceforward until the end of the war the town was virtually british. encouraged by this success, the enemy undertook a more difficult task. a formidable fleet of men-of-war and transports, bearing almost ten thousand troops, was fitted out at halifax for the purpose of reducing to british rule all that part of maine lying between passamaquoddy bay and the penobscot river. this expedition set sail from halifax on the th of august, bound for machias; but on the voyage down the coast of maine the brig "rifleman" was encountered, and from her the presence of the united states corvette "adams" in the penobscot river was learned. it will be remembered that the "adams," before entering the river, had chased the british brig. upon learning this, the british naval commander, admiral griffiths, pressed forward to the mouth of the penobscot, and, anchoring there, despatched a land and naval expedition up the river for the capture of the corvette. when the news of this advancing force reached capt. morris, the "adams" was partially out of water, dismantled, and in the hands of the ship carpenters, who were repairing the injuries she had received on the rocks off mount desert. the ship herself was utterly defenceless, but morris made strenuous attempts to collect a land force to defend her. he managed to rally a few hundred militia-men, who, with the sailors and marines, were routed by the enemy on the night of the d of september. finding that the enemy's forces were not to be driven back by so small a body of men, morris retreated, first setting fire to the corvette, which was totally destroyed before the british came up. the retreating sailors were then forced to march over rugged roads to portsmouth, n.h.; and, as walking was an exercise they were little accustomed to, many suffered severely from the unusual exertion. the difficulty of getting provisions along the road led the men to separate into several parties; but, notwithstanding the opportunities thus afforded for desertion, all who were not broken down by the long march ultimately reported for duty at the portsmouth navy-yard. along the southern seaboard the course of the war was even more disastrous to the americans. intelligence which reached the national authorities in the spring of led them to believe that the british were planning an expedition for the capture of washington. grave as was the danger, the authorities were slow to move; and though in july the government called for fifteen thousand troops, and gave their command to gen. winder, yet the actual defensive force about the national capital consisted of but a few hundred militia. the naval defence was intrusted to the veteran commodore barney, who had served with distinction in the revolution, and during the early years of the second war with great britain had commanded the baltimore privateer "rossie." the force put under barney's command consisted of twenty-six gunboats and barges, manned by nine hundred men. chiefly by his own energetic exertions, this force was ready for service in april; and by june the crews were drilled and disciplined, and the commanders schooled in the tactics of squadron evolutions. on the st of that month occurred the first brush with the enemy. the american flotilla was then lying in chesapeake bay, a little below the mouth of the patuxent; and, a portion of the enemy's squadron coming within range, barney ordered out his forces in chase. the british, outnumbered, fled down the bay; but, though barney was rapidly overhauling them, he saw his hopes of victory shattered by the sudden appearance of his britannic majesty's seventy-four gun ship "dragon." thus re-enforced, it became the turn of the british to pursue; and the americans retreated, firing constantly as they fled. the british continuing their advance, barney was forced to take shelter in the patuxent river; and he was gradually forced up that stream as far as the mouth of st. leonard's creek. the enemy then, feeling certain that the americans were fairly entrapped, anchored at the mouth of the river, and awaited re-enforcements. these soon arrived; and on the th of the month the enemy's forces, consisting of a frigate, brig, and two schooners, moved up the river to the mouth of the creek. farther they could not go, owing to shoal-water; but they fitted out a small flotilla of barges, and sent them on up the creek. with this enemy commodore barney was ready to come to close quarters; and he moved down upon the british, who quickly retreated to the shelter of their ships. two or three such sham attacks were made by the enemy, but not until the th of the month did they actually give battle to the americans. on the morning of that day the british advanced in force to the attack; and the peaceful little creek was ablaze with flags and bright uniforms, and the wooded shores echoed back the strains of martial music. twenty-one barges, one rocket-boat, and two schooners formed the british column of attack, which moved grandly up the creek, with the bands playing patriotic airs, and the sailors, confident of victory, cheering lustily. eight hundred men followed the british colors. against this force barney advanced with but five hundred sailors. his sloop and gun-vessels he left at anchor, as being too unwieldy for the narrow shoal-waters of st. leonard's creek; and he met the enemy's flotilla with but thirteen barges. the enemy opened the action at long range with rockets and howitzers. the former were terrible missiles in an action of this character, corresponding to the shells of modern naval warfare. some idea of their destructiveness may be derived from the fact, that one of them, fired at long range, exploded and set fire to a boat, after having first passed through the body of one of her crew. barney had no rockets; and, as the combat at long range was telling upon his men, he at once dashed forward into the midst of the enemy. soon the barges were engaged in desperate hand-to-hand conflicts. the sailors, grappling with their adversary's craft, fought with pistol and cutlass across the gunwales. barney, in a small barge with twenty men, dashed about, now striking a blow in aid of some overmatched american boat, then cheering on some laggard, or applauding some deed of gallantry that occurred in his sight. major william barney, son of the commodore, saw an american barge on fire, and deserted by her crew who feared the explosion of her magazine. running his boat alongside, he jumped into the flaming craft; and by dint of bailing in water, and rocking her from side to side, he succeeded in saving the barge. for more than an hour the action raged, both sides fighting with great vigor and gallantry; but the americans having pierced the british line, the enemy, falling into confusion, turned, and strained every muscle to gain the protection of their ship's guns. the americans followed in hot pursuit; but their course was abruptly checked at the mouth of the creek by a british schooner, whose eighteen guns commanded respect. for a moment the pursuing barges fell back; then, choosing advantageous positions, they opened fire upon the schooner with such effect that she soon turned to escape. she succeeded in getting under the protecting guns of the frigate and sloop-of-war, but was so cut to pieces in the short action that she was run aground and abandoned. the larger vessels now opened fire upon barney's forces; and the flotilla, after a few shots of defiance, returned to its quarters up the creek. [illustration: the battle of the barges.] for the next two weeks all was quiet along the shores of the patuxent and st. leonard's creek. the enemy had learned wisdom from their late defeat, and contented themselves with blockading the mouth of the creek, and leaving barney undisturbed in his retreat. but the doughty commodore had no idea of being thus confined, and during the time of quiet made preparations for an attempt to break the blockade. land forces from washington were sent down to aid in this attempt; and two pieces of artillery were to be mounted on a hill at the mouth of the creek, and thence throw red-hot shot into the enemy's ships. the land forces, however, rendered not the slightest assistance; and a too cautious colonel posted the battery at such a point that no shot could reach the enemy without first passing through a hill. accordingly, when barney led his flotilla gallantly down to the attack, he found that the issue of the conflict rested upon the sailors alone. from the battery, which was expected to draw the enemy's fire, not a single effective shot was fired. the sailors fought nobly, using their heavy long twelves and eighteens with great effect. but they were sadly hampered by their position; for the mouth of the creek was so narrow that but eight barges could lie abreast, and the others coming down from above soon packed the little stream from shore to shore, giving the enemy a mark that the poorest gunner could hardly miss. against the storm of grape and canister that the british poured upon them, the sailors had absolutely no protection. the barges were without bulwarks, and the blue-jackets at the guns and at the oars were exposed to the full force of the british fire. yet in this exposed situation the gallant fellows kept up the fight for nearly an hour, only withdrawing when the last ray of hope for help from the shore battery had vanished. shortly after the americans abandoned the attack, the blockading squadron got under way and stood down the bay. from the way in which one of the frigates was working her pumps, the americans saw that their fire had not been entirely without effect. barney's flotilla had now given the british so much trouble that they determined to destroy it without delay; and an expedition of more than five thousand men--composed of regulars, marines, and a few negroes--was carried up the patuxent, and landed at benedict, where an armed brig had been stationed to cover the disembarkation. it was early dawn when the signal to land was given, and the river was covered in an instant with a well-manned and warlike flotilla. it was hard work for the british sailors, for a strong current was running; but by three o'clock in the afternoon the whole army was landed, and encamped in a strong position on a hill overlooking the village. though no american troops were anywhere in the vicinity, the landing was conducted with the utmost caution. as the prow of each boat grated on the sand, the soldiers leaped on the beach, and instantly drew up in line, ready to repel any attack. after the infantry was landed, about a hundred artillerymen followed, and the same number of sailors dragging howitzers. it is easily understood that this powerful force was not organized solely to destroy barney's pitiful little flotilla. the real purpose of the british commander was to press on into the interior, and capture washington, which the americans had foolishly left without any defences whatever. it came to barney's ears that admiral cockburn had boasted that he would destroy the american flotilla, and dine in washington the following sunday. this news the american commodore sent off to the authorities at the capital, and they then began to make futile preparations to repel the invader. in the mean time the british commenced their march up the shores of the patuxent, meeting with no opposition. barney, knowing that the defence of the national capital was of far greater importance than the fate of his flotilla, landed with four hundred men, and hastened to the american lines before washington. he left the barges under the command of the second lieutenant, mr. frazier, with instructions to set fire to every boat on the appearance of the enemy, and then join the commodore with all the men left under his charge. accordingly, when the invading column reached nottingham, mr. frazier took the flotilla still higher up the creek,--a move that vastly disconcerted the british, who saw their prey eluding them. "but in the main object of our pursuit we were disappointed," wrote a british officer. "the flotilla which had been stationed opposite to nottingham retired, on our approach, higher up the stream; and we were consequently in the situation of a huntsman who sees his hounds at fault, and has every reason to apprehend that his game will escape." but the game never fell into the hands of the ardent hunters; for the next day mr. frazier fulfilled his orders by setting fire to every barge, and, after seeing several of the larger boats blow up, mustered his men, and cut across the country, to join his superior officer. the british naval forces soon after reached pig point, the scene of this destruction, and there remained; while the land forces immediately turned away from the river, and marched upon washington. [illustration: sharp-shooters.] it is not necessary to give in detail the incidents of the series of skirmishes by which the british fought their way to the american capital. they were opposed by raw militia, and the few sailors and marines under barney. the former fled with promptitude at the very first fire, but the sailors and marines fought gallantly. the fighting was sharpest at bladensburg; and here barney's blue-jackets won praise from everybody, even from the enemy whose advance they disputed. barney himself led the americans, and sighted a favorite gun of the sailors' battery, until he fell desperately wounded. this battery commanded the road by which the main column of british advanced; and by its hail of grape and canister it beat back the advancing regiments, and for some time checked their further progress. the british thereupon opened with rockets, and sent out sharp-shooters to pick off the yankee gunners. one of these riflemen was observed by the americans to deliberately build for himself a small redoubt of stones from an old wall; and, lying down behind it, he began a deliberate fire upon the americans. his first bullet went through the cap of one of the sailors, and the second sent a poor fellow to his long account. the marines answered with their muskets; but the fellow's stone rampart saved him, and he continued his fire. barney vowed to put an end to that affair, and, carefully sighting one of his cannon, pulled the lanyard. the heavy round shot was seen to strike the sharp-shooter's defence, and stones and man disappeared in a cloud of dust. meantime, the enemy had thrown out flanking parties under cover of the woods, and had nearly surrounded the little band of sailors. a musket-ball struck barney in the thigh, and he began to grow faint with loss of blood; and, finding that the militia had fled, and the sailors were becoming exhausted, the commodore ordered a retreat. the blue-jackets left the field in good order; but their gallant commander had gone but a few steps, when the pain of his wound forced him to lie down under a tree, and await the coming of the enemy. the british soon came up, led by gen. ross and capt. wainwright of the navy. after learning barney's rank, and courteously offering to secure surgical aid, the general turned to his companion, and, speaking of the stubborn resistance made by the battery, said, "i told you it was the flotilla men."--"yes. you were right, though i could not believe you," was the response. "they have given us the only fighting we have had." meanwhile, the british, having routed the americans at every point, pressed on to washington. the inhabitants fled before them, and the town was almost deserted when the british marched in with banners flying and bands playing. the enemy held the city for only a day; but in that time they did such deeds of vandalism, that even the people and the press of london cried out in indignation. the president's house, the capitol, all the public buildings except the patent office, were burned to the ground. the navy-yard, with the uncompleted ships on the stocks, was likewise burned; but in this the enemy only acted in accordance with the rules of war. it was their destruction of the public buildings, the national archives, and the congressional library, that aroused the wrathful indignation of all fair-minded people, whether americans or europeans. "willingly," said one london newspaper, "would we throw a veil of oblivion over our transactions at washington. the cossacks spared paris, but we spared not the capital of america." a second english journal fitly denounced the proceedings as "a return to the times of barbarism." [illustration: the march on washington.] but, if the invaders are rightly to be blamed for the useless vandalism they encouraged, the american authorities are still more culpable for their neglect of the most ordinary precautions of war. that a national capital, close to the sea, should be left virtually unprotected while the enemy was massing his forces only a few miles away, seems almost unbelievable. but so it was with washington; for five hundred flotilla men were forced to bear the brunt of the attack of five thousand british. true it is that the military authorities had massed seven thousand militia-men for the defence of the city; but such was the trepidation of these untrained soldiers, that they fled before the main body of the british had come into the fight. that the sailors and marines fought bravely, we have the testimony of the british themselves. mr. gleig, a subaltern in the attacking army, writes, "of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the terms which their conduct merits. they were employed as gunners; and not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them were actually bayonneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field." therefore, in the battle of bladensburg, the blue-jackets won nothing but honor, though the results of the battle were so mortifying to the national pride of the people of the united states. on the th of august the british left the smoking ruins of washington behind them, and made for their fleet lying in the patuxent. they feared that the outraged nation would rise upon them, and turn their march into a bloody retreat, like that of the british soldiery from the historic field of lexington. accordingly their departure was by night, immediately after a furious storm of rain and wind. strict orders were issued to all the americans in washington, warning them, under penalty of death, not to leave their houses until the sun rose the next morning. then the british stealthily marched out of the town. "no man spoke above his breath," says subaltern gleig. "our very steps were planted lightly, and we cleared the town without exciting observation." a two days' march brought them to benedict, where the fleet lay in waiting for their reception. [illustration: the burning of washington.] in the mean time, a portion of the british fleet had ascended the potomac as far as alexandria, and, finding that town defenceless, proceeded to dictate to the inhabitants the terms upon which they could save their village from desolation. the british demanded that all naval stores and ordnance, all the shipping and its furniture, all merchandise, and all provisions in the town should be surrendered. several vessels had been scuttled, to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy; these, the british demanded, should be raised, repaired, and delivered to them time, however, did not permit the fulfilment of this condition; but to the others, harsh and humiliating though they were, the inhabitants were forced to accede. heavy laden with the spoils of the village, the pillagers weighed anchor and started down the potomac. but they were not destined to carry away their booty unmolested. news of the expedition reached baltimore, and a large party of the sailors at the navy-yard were sent to the banks of the potomac to cut off the enemy's retreat. they were officered by four men famous in american naval annals,--perry, rodgers, porter, and creighton. at indian head, just below mount vernon, the potomac river narrows and flows swiftly between densely wooded bluffs. at this point the americans threw up redoubts, and, mounting all the cannon that could be gathered on such short notice, prepared to dispute the enemy's passage. when the british fleet hove in sight, they were greeted with a storm of shot from the unsuspected batteries; and they recoiled in confusion. practised american hunters lined the woody shores, and picked off the british sailors with musket-balls. for some time the fleet was thus checked in its progress. finally the admiral determined that only by a bold dash could he escape; and accordingly, massing his vessels and concentrating his fire on the chief battery, he dashed past, and rejoined his superior officer, cockburn, not without paying dearly for his exploit at alexandria. while the british were thus devastating the shores of chesapeake bay, they cast more than one longing look toward the thriving city of baltimore, which, by its violent patriotism, had done much to urge on the war. from the shipyards of baltimore came more than one stout naval vessel that had forced the enemy to haul down his colors. but that which more than any thing else aroused the hatred of the british was the share baltimore took in fitting out and manning those swift privateers, concerning whose depredations upon british commerce we shall have something to say in a later chapter. "it is a doomed town," said vice-admiral warren. "the truculent inhabitants of baltimore must be tamed with the weapons which shook the wooden turrets of copenhagen," cried the editor of a great london paper. but, nevertheless, baltimore did not fall before the invader, although for some time the army and navy of the enemy were united in the attempt to bring desolation upon the obnoxious city. [illustration: planning the attack.] after the fall of washington, the depredations of the british along the shores of chesapeake bay redoubled, and the marauding expeditions thus employed were really feelers thrown out to test the strength of the defenses of baltimore. that the marauders found some opposition, is evident from a passage in the journal of a british officer. "but these hasty excursions, though generally successful, were not always performed without loss to the invaders." on one of these expeditions, sir peter parker, captain of the frigate "menelaus," lost his life. he had been ordered down to the mouth of the bay just after the fall of washington. "i must first have a frolic with the yankees," said he. and accordingly, after a jovial dinner aboard his frigate, he led a night expedition of sailors and marines ashore, expecting to surprise a small body of maryland militia stationed at moorfields. sir peter's frolic turned out disastrously; for the marylanders were on the watch, and received the invaders with a fierce volley. sir peter was gallantly cheering on his men, when a musket-ball cut the main artery in his thigh. "they have hit me, pearce," he said faintly to his lieutenant; "but it's nothing. push on, my brave boys, and follow me." but even thus cheering, he fell back, the words died away in his throat, and he bled to death before a surgeon could be found. it is but right to say, that, though he sailed in cockburn's command, he had none of the cruel brutality which his admiral too often showed. on the th of september a more serious assault was made upon baltimore. the british naval and military forces united in the attack, which was made by land and sea. a force of nine thousand men, including two thousand marines and two thousand sailors, was landed fifteen miles from baltimore, and under the command of gen. ross and admiral cockburn marched gayly inland, never doubting that they would find the americans unprepared, and repeat their exploits at washington. in this expectation they were sadly disappointed; for the maryland militia, aided by a few regulars and seamen, outfought the british at every point, and checked their farther advance. among the slain was gen. ross, who was shot down as he was leading the advance of the british skirmishers. in the mean time, the british fleet had been taking its share in the engagement by attempting to reduce fort mchenry. a large flotilla of frigates, schooners, sloops, and bomb-ketches entered the patapsco river on the morning of the th, and, casting anchor out of the reach of the fort's guns, opened a furious fire. the fort was manned by militia-men and a large detachment of the gallant sailors from barney's flotilla. when the continual falling of shells within the fort told that the enemy had come within range, the guns of fort mchenry opened in response. but, to the intense chagrin of the americans, it was found that their works mounted not a single gun that would carry to the enemy's fleet. there then remained to the garrison only the trying duty of holding their post, and enduring without response a galling fire from the enemy. all the garrison stood to the guns without flinching; while the shrieking shells fell on all sides, and, exploding, scattered deadly missiles in all directions. one shell struck and dismounted one of the twenty-four-pounders, killing and wounding several of its men. admiral cochrane, who commanded the attacking fleet, saw this incident, and ordered three of his bomb-vessels to move up nearer to the fort. this gave the americans the opportunity for which they had been longing, and instantly every gun in the fort opened upon the three luckless ketches. half an hour of this fire sufficed to drive the three vessels back to their original station. night fell, but brought no cessation of the bombardment. but the enemy, while never slackening his fire, had determined to take advantage of the darkness to send out a landing party to take two small batteries on the banks of the patapsco, and then assault fort mchenry from the rear. twelve hundred and fifty men, with scaling-ladders and fascines, left the fleet in barges, and moved up the patapsco towards fort covington and the city battery. but their plan, though well laid, was defeated by the vigilance and courage of the garrisons of the two threatened positions,--sailors all, and many of them men from barney's flotilla, a training-school which seems to have given to the region about chesapeake bay its most gallant defenders. just as the storming party turned the prows of the barges towards the shore, they were discovered; and from mchenry, covington, and the city battery burst a thunderous artillery-fire, that shook the houses in baltimore, and illumined the dark shores of the river with a lurid glare. bold as the british sailors were, they could advance no farther under so terrible a fire. two of the barges were shot to pieces, leaving their crews struggling in the water. a ceaseless hail of grape and canister spread death and wounds broadcast among the enemy; and, after wavering a moment, they turned and fled to their ships. cochrane, seeing his plan for taking the american positions by assault thus frustrated, redoubled the fury of his fire; hoping that, when daybreak made visible the distant shore, nothing but a heap of ruins should mark the spot where fort mchenry stood the night before. a night bombardment is at once a beautiful and a terrible spectacle. the ceaseless flashing of the great guns, lighting up with a lurid glare the dense clouds of smoke that hang over the scene of battle; the roar of the artillery; the shriek of the shell as it leaves the cannon's mouth, slowly dying into a murmur and a dull explosion, as, with a flash of fire, the missile explodes far away,--combine to form a picture, that, despite the horrors of wounds and death, rouses the enthusiasm and admiration of the beholder. when viewed from the deck of one of an attacking fleet, the scene is even more impressive. at each discharge of the great guns, the vessel reels and trembles like a huge animal in agony. the surging waters alongside reflect in their black depths the flash of the cannon and the fiery trail of the flying shell. far in the distance can be seen the flashes of the enemy's guns, each of which may mean the despatch of a missile bringing death and pain in its track. one who has witnessed such a spectacle can readily understand the fascination which men find in the great game of war. [illustration: the star spangled banner.] pacing the deck of the one of the british vessels was a young american, whose temperament was such that he could fully appreciate all the beauties of the scene, even though harassed by anxious fears lest the british should be successful. this man was francis s. key, who had visited the fleet with a flag of truce, but was unable to get away before the bombardment began. when the sun set on the evening of the th, key saw his country's flag waving proudly over the ramparts at which the british guns had been so furiously pounding. would that flag still be there when the sun should rise again? that was the question which key asked himself as he anxiously walked the deck throughout the night, striving to pierce the darkness, and make out, by the lurid lightnings of the cannon, whether the flag was still there. as the night wore on, key took an old letter from his pocket, and on the blank sheet jotted down the lines of the immortal national song, "the star spangled banner." its words merely voice the writer's thoughts; for often during that night he looked anxiously shorewards, to see if "the rockets' red glare, the bombs bursting in air, gave proof, through the night, that our flag was still there." when the anxiously awaited daylight came, fort mchenry still stood; and over it waved defiantly the starry folds of the united states flag. the british saw that, by land and sea, their attack had failed; and early in the morning the fleet, after taking on board the remnant of the land forces, sailed suddenly away, and left baltimore safe. they had bombarded fort mchenry for twenty-five hours, throwing nearly two thousand shells. yet, wonderful as it may appear, only four of the americans were killed, and twenty-four wounded. with this failure the british ended their chief offensive operations along the shores of the chesapeake. the greater part of the fleet and the soldiery then moved southward, to take part in the operations along the gulf coast, that culminated in the disastrous defeat of the invaders at new orleans. chapter xvi. desultory hostilities on the ocean. -- attack upon fort bowyer. -- lafitte the pirate. -- british expedition against new orleans. -- battle at the rigolets. -- attack on new orleans, and defeat of the british. -- work of the blue-jackets. -- capture of the frigate "president." -- the "constitution" takes the "cyane" and "levant." -- the "hornet" takes the "penguin." -- end of the war. the naval incidents of the latter part of conferred little honor upon either of the belligerents. seldom did the meetings between hostile ships rise to the dignity of battles. one or two small american brigs fell a prey to british frigates; but in every instance the disparity of force was so great that the weaker surrendered without striking a blow. such was the case with the sixteen-gun brig "rattlesnake," which escaped from one british frigate by throwing overboard all her guns, only to immediately fall a prey to the "leander." in july of the same year, the united states brig "siren" was captured by the british frigate "medway," off the coast of africa, after a long chase, during which the american hove overboard every thing movable on the brig. not all these petty encounters ended so favorably for the enemy. off new york a cutting-out party of volunteers surprised and captured the british tender "eagle," a small craft carrying one thirty-two-pound howitzer, and fourteen men. ten days later, the frigate "tenedos," which had done such good service on the blockade, suffered the loss of her tender, which was gallantly carried away by the crew of a yankee gunboat. some very desperate combats between american privateers and british naval vessels were fought about this time, and will be duly noted in detail in the chapter treating of the exploits of the private armed navy. as the autumn came on, the british naval forces began to rendezvous in the gulf of mexico, preparatory to the campaign before new orleans. on sept. , a squadron of four british sloops-of-war appeared off mobile, and opened fire upon fort bowyer, which guarded the entrance to mobile bay. the attack was vigorous, and the defence determined. a british land expedition moved upon the fort from the landward side; and the little garrison found itself surrounded by enemies, many of whom were indians, whose savage assistance the british had accepted from the very opening of the war. a small force, only, defended the fort. percy, the british admiral, knew the weakness of the garrison; and, thinking of the ninety-two guns he could bring to bear against the twenty worked by the americans, announced proudly, that he would give the garrison just twenty minutes to surrender. the twenty minutes passed quickly, and still the fort responded savagely to the fire of its assailants. the flag of the british ship "hermes" was shot away; and soon after, a round shot cut her cable, and she drifted upon a sand-bank, and lay helpless, and exposed to a raking fire. her captain, having set her afire, abandoned her; and she soon blew up. the other vessels kept up the attack gallantly for a time. the flagstaff of the fort was shot away; but the flag soon re-appeared, waving from a sponge-staff. the americans then redoubled their fire, which soon told so severely upon the british ships that they were forced to withdraw. in the mean time, the assault of the indians and troops had been checked, and the forces driven back in disorder, thus leaving the victory to the americans. it is not within the province of this work to treat of the military operations that led up to the battle of new orleans. but the last months of witnessed a series of naval incidents trivial in themselves, but deriving importance from their connection with gen. jackson's great victory. over certain incidents in the preparations of the americans for repelling the invasion hangs a shade of romance. to the southward of the quaint, rambling, rose-covered city of new orleans, the tawny flood of the mississippi winds towards the gulf in huge serpentine curves. the shores between which it flows rise scarce higher than the surface of the river itself; and a slight increase in the volume of water, or a strong wind, will serve to turn the whole region into a great, watery marsh. from the mouth of the great river, the whole coast of louisiana, extending north and west, is a grassy sea, a vast expanse of marsh-grass, broken here and there by inlets of the mexican gulf, and sluggish, winding bayous that lead up into the higher lands of the state,--waterways that lead even to the back door of the crescent city herself, but known only to oyster-gatherers, or in to the adventurous men who followed the banner of lafitte the baratarian pirate. pirate he was called then; but it is doubtful whether his misdeeds ever exceeded smuggling, or, at worst, privateering under the protecting flag of some belligerent nation. when all nations were warring, what was easier than for a few gallant fellows, with swift-sailing feluccas, to lurk about the shores of the gulf, and now under the spanish flag, now under the french, or any colors which suited the case, sally out and capture the richly laden indiamen that frequented those summer seas? and when a power known as the united states government, that had its quarters more than a thousand miles from the country of the creoles, passed an outrageous law known as the embargo, what was more natural than that the baratarians, knowing the mysterious waterways that led up to the crescent city, should utilize their knowledge to take ships and cargoes in and out without the formality of a custom-house examination? such were the times that led to the formation and growth of the "piratical" colony of barataria. its leaders and rulers were john and pierre lafitte; one of whom lived in new orleans in the character of a prosperous merchant, while the other led the expeditions which brought in merchandise to stock the former's stores. under the influence of the warlike state of europe, the trade of these worthies throve, and their settlement at grande isle took on the appearance of a prosperous colony and naval station. storehouses and dwellings stood close to the sea. the fertile face of the island was cut up into fruitful plantations and orange-groves. breastworks, well dotted with the muzzles of cannon, commanded the approach by sea. more than once, from behind those ramparts, the baratarians had proved that they could fight, and that they acknowledged the authority of no flag. the creoles of new orleans looked indulgently upon the conduct of the outlaws; but the few americans in the city were highly incensed to see the authority of the united states thus set aside, and vowed that when the war was over the audacious adventurers should be crushed. however, the end came even sooner. on the d of september, a british armed brig anchored near the buccaneers' retreat, and sent a flag of truce ashore. lafitte, with great dignity, received the envoys in his tent, and assured them of his protection, though the whole village was up in arms clamoring for the death of the intruders. the british officer then announced that he had come to secure the aid of lafitte and his followers in the campaign against new orleans. he offered the pirate captain forgiveness for all piracies committed against the british flag,--whereat the chief smiled sardonically,--also thirty thousand dollars in cash, a captain's commission in the british navy, and lands for himself and his followers. it was a tempting bribe; for at that moment lafitte's brother lay in the _calaboza_ at new orleans awaiting trial for piracy, and the americans were preparing rapidly for a descent upon the baratarian stronghold. but, little as he liked the american flag, lafitte liked the british still less: so, asking the englishman to wait a few days for his answer, he sent a report of the occurrence to the new orleans authorities, and offered to co-operate with the americans, if he could be assured of pardon for all offences committed against the government. this document caused some hesitation at new orleans; but the military authorities determined to refuse the offer, and break up the outlaws' nest. accordingly, a few days later, the war schooner "carolina," six gunboats, a tender, and a launch, dropped down the mississippi, and, rounding into the deep blue waters of the gulf, headed for barataria. lafitte had too many friends in new orleans not to know of the force thus sent against him; and, when the americans reached grande terre, they found the pirates at their batteries, and the baratarian flotilla drawn up in order of battle. the contest was sharp, but ended in the rout of the baratarians. their village was burned, their fortifications razed; and, when the triumphant americans returned to new orleans, they brought in their train ten armed prizes and a number of prisoners, although lafitte was not to be found among the latter. thereafter, the baratarians, as an organization, vanished from history. lafitte was afterwards occasionally heard of as a desperado on the more western shores of the mexican gulf; and it is further noticeable, that two guns were served by baratarians under their old lieutenant, dominique yon, on that bloody day when packenham's forces were beaten back on the field of chalmette. early in december the movement of the british upon new orleans took definite shape. on the th of that month, the calm waters of the gulf of mexico, off the chandeleur islands, were the scene of a grand rendezvous of british naval and military forces. all the vessels of cockburn's chesapeake fleet were there, with other men-of-war, transports, and schooners, to the number of fifty vessels. at the head was the towering two-decker "tonnant," carrying the admiral's flag. frigates, corvettes, and sloops-of-war came trooping in the rear; and the transports bore seven thousand men for the capture of the southern city. the british were in high good-humor as the anchors were let fall and the ships swung round with their heads to the tide. the voyage across the gulf from the rendezvous at jamaica had been like a holiday trip. the weather had been fine, and the sea smooth; and the soft air of that semi-tropical region was a never-ending source of delight to sailors who had been suffering the hardships of a northern station. the point at which the british fleet had come to anchor lay about fifty miles due east of new orleans. in that day of sailing-vessels, no enemy could breast the waters of the rolling mississippi and crush the resistance of the city's defenders, as did farragut in . knowing that they could not hope to take their ships up to the levee of the city, the enemy determined to cast anchor near the entrance of lake borgne, and send through a chain of lakes and bayous a mammoth expedition in barges, to a point within ten miles of the city. but this well-laid plan had been betrayed to the americans by lafitte; and a little band of american sailors, under the command of lieut. catesby jones, had taken up a position at the rigolets, and were prepared to dispute the farther progress of the invading forces. five gunboats, and one hundred and eighty-five men, constituted the american force, which for a time held the british in check. finally, the enemy, finding that the swift american cutters could easily evade the lumbering war-vessels, fitted out a fleet of forty-five barges, manned by a thousand veteran british sea-dogs, who had seen service in half a dozen naval wars. the americans had news of the contemplated attack, and made skilful preparations to meet it. the gunboats were moored in a fore and aft line, at a point near the rigolets. their broadsides bore upon the enemy, and the shallowness of the water was such that by no means could they be surrounded. the sailors were prepared for a desperate conflict, and spent the night before the battle in tricing up the boarding-nettings, sharpening cutlasses, and getting small-arms in good trim. in the morning the british came on to the attack. it was a long pull from the fleet to the place of battle: so their commander brought his flotilla to anchor just out of range of the american guns; and there the grim old veterans devoured their dinners, and took their rations of grog, with appetites undisturbed by the thought of the coming conflict. dinner over, the enemy weighed anchor, and dashed forward, with long, swift strokes, into the very flashes of the americans' cannon. the americans knew that their one chance of victory was to keep the overwhelming forces of their foe out of boarding distance, and they worked their guns with a rapidity born of desperation. musket-bullets, grape-shot, and canister poured in a murderous fire upon the advancing boats. but the sturdy old british veterans knew that the best way to stop that fire was to get at the base of it; and they pressed on undauntedly, responding vigorously, meanwhile, with their bow guns. soon they were up to the gunwales of the american flotilla, and the grappling-irons were fixed; then, with sharp blows of cutlasses, deadly play of the pikes, and a ceaseless rattle of small-arms, they poured upon the decks of the americans. the boarding-nettings could not long check so furious a foe, and fell before the fierce slash of the cutlasses. the decks once gained, the overpowering numbers of the englishmen crushed all further resistance; and the flotilla was finally taken, after about one hundred of the enemy and fifty americans had fallen. the american flotilla being thus shattered, there remained no further obstacle to prevent the landing of the invading army. of the advance of that brilliant body of veteran troops over sands and marshes, and through sluggish bayous and canals half-full of stagnant water, until they emerged on the bank of the river, nine miles below new orleans, it is not my purpose to speak further. nor does an account of gen. jackson's vigorous measures of defence and glorious victory come within the province of this narrative. the interesting story of jackson's creation of an army from leather-shirted kentucky riflemen, gay creoles from the creole quarter of the crescent city, swarthy spaniards and mulattoes, nondescript desperadoes from the old band of lafitte, and militia and regulars from all the southern states, forms no part of the naval annals of the war. it is enough to say that the flower of the british army, led by a veteran of the peninsula, recoiled before that motley crew of untrained soldiers, and were beaten back, leaving their gallant leader and thousands of their brave men dead upon the field. the navy was not without some share in this glorious triumph. on the d of december the schooner "carolina" dropped down from new orleans, and opened fire upon the enemy. "now, then, for the honor of america, give it to them!" sung out her commander, as the first broadside was fired. the attack, unexpected as it was, created a panic in the british camp. a feeble reply was made with rockets and musketry; but even this was soon discontinued, and the enemy took refuge under the steep bank of the levee, whither the plunging shot could not follow them. all night the "carolina" kept up her fire; and, when at daybreak she moved away, she left the camp of the enemy in confusion. during the day she renewed the attack, and persisted in her fire until the british threw up a heavy battery on the river's bank, and replied. the lads of the "carolina" promptly accepted the challenge thus offered, and for a time a spirited combat was maintained. but the battery threw red-hot shot, and the schooner was soon set on fire and destroyed. meanwhile the corvette "louisiana" had come down to the scene of action, and in the subsequent engagements did some effective work. when the final onslaught of the british was made, on jan. , , the guns of the "louisiana" were mounted on the opposite bank of the river, and the practised sailors worked them with deadly effect, until the flight of the american militia on that side exposed the battery to certain capture. the sailors then spiked their guns, and marched off unmolested. the sailors of the "carolina," on that day of desperate fighting, were in the centre of jackson's line, between the creoles and the swarthy baratarians under dominique yon. here they worked their howitzers, and watched the scarlet lines of the enemy advance and melt away before that deadly blaze; advance and fall back again in hopeless rout. and among the many classes of fighting men whom jackson had rallied before that british line, none did battle more valiantly for the honor of the nation and the safety of the flowery city of new orleans than did those blue-jackets ashore. it is a fitting commentary upon the folly of war, that the battle of new orleans was fought after the two warring nations had signed a treaty of peace. the lives of some hundreds of brave englishmen and americans were needlessly sacrificed in a cause already decided. far across the atlantic ocean, in the quaint old dutch city of ghent, representatives of england and the united states met, and, after some debate, signed the treaty on the th of december, . but there was then no atlantic cable, no "ocean greyhounds" to annihilate space and time; and it was months before the news of the treaty reached the scene of war. in the mean time, the hostilities were continued by land and sea. the year found the american navy largely increased by new vessels, though the vigilance of the british blockaders kept most of these close in port. the "constitution" was at sea, having run the blockade at boston. in new york harbor were the "president," "peacock," "hornet," and "tom bowline," awaiting a chance to slip out for a cruise to the east indies. it was decided that the vessels should run out singly, and the "president" was selected to make the first attempt. the night of the th of january was dark and foggy, and the blockading fleet was nowhere to be seen. then, if ever, was the time for escape; and the yankee tars weighed anchor and started out through the narrows. in the impenetrable darkness of the night, baffled by head-winds and perplexing currents, the pilots lost their reckoning, and the orders to the man at the wheel were quick and nervous, until an ominous grating of the ship's keel, followed by the loss of headway, told that the frigate was aground. for a time the ship lay helpless, straining all her timbers as each wave lifted her slightly, and then let the heavy hull fall back upon the shoal. by ten o'clock the rising tide floated her off; but, on examination, capt. decatur found that she was seriously injured. to return to port was impossible with the wind then blowing: so all sail was crowded on, in the hopes of getting safely away before the blockading squadron should catch sight of the ship. as luck would have it, the blockaders had been forced from their posts by the gale of the day before, and the "president" had laid her course so as to infallibly fall into their clutches. before daylight the lookout reported two sail in sight, and at daybreak the ship was fairly surrounded by the enemy's vessels. all at once gave chase to the luckless american; and a few hours were enough to show that her sailing qualities were so seriously injured by her pounding on the bar, that the enemy was rapidly overhauling her. decatur adopted every known expedient to increase his ship's speed, but to no avail. after she had been lightened by starting the water, cutting away boats and anchors, chopping up and heaving overboard the ponderous cables, together with spars and provisions, the enemy still gained; and the foremost pursuer, a razee, opened fire. the "president" responded with her stern-chasers, but her shot had no effect. "it is said that on this occasion," writes cooper, "the shot of the american ship were observed to be thrown with a momentum so unusually small, as to have since excited much distrust of the quality of her gunpowder. it is even added, that many of these shot were distinctly seen, when clear of the smoke, until they struck." at six o'clock in the evening, the frigate "endymion" led the british squadron in chase, and had gained a position so close upon the american's beam that her broadsides were rapidly crippling the fugitive. thereupon decatur determined upon a desperate expedient, that sounds like some of his reckless exploits in the war with tripoli. his plan was to bring the "president" about, and run boldly alongside the enemy. every thing was to be sacrificed to the end of getting to close quarters. when once the two ships had grappled, the americans were to board, carry the british ship in a hand-to-hand battle, and then, abandoning the crippled "president," escape in the captured frigate. so desperate a plan needed the cordial co-operation of every man: so it was first presented to the commissioned officers, who gladly embraced the desperate project. the sailors were then sent aft, and decatur addressed them from the quarter-deck. "my lads," said he, "that ship is coming up with us. as our ship won't sail, we'll go on board of theirs, every man and boy of us, and carry her into new york. all i ask of you is to follow me. this is a favorite ship of the country. if we allow her to be taken, we shall be deserted by our wives and sweethearts. what, let such a ship as this go for nothing! 'twould break the heart of every pretty girl in new york." [illustration: "president" and "endymion."] with hearty cheers, the jackies returned to their guns. all were ready for the coming struggle. over the main hatch was mounted a howitzer, with its black muzzle peering down into the hold, ready to scuttle the ship when the boarders should spring upon the enemy's deck. the sun, by this time, had sunk below the horizon, and the darkness of night was gathering over the ocean. the two ships surged toward each other,--great black masses, lighted up on either side by rows of open ports, through which gleamed the uncertain light of the battle-lanterns. on the gun-deck the men stood stern and silent; their thoughts fixed upon the coming battle, or perhaps wandering back to the green fields and pleasant homes they had so recently left, perhaps forever. the gray old yeoman of the frigate, with his mates, walked from gun to gun, silently placing a well-sharpened cutlass, a dirk, and a heavy leather boarding-cap at each man's side. the marines were drawn up in a line amidships; their erect, soldierly air and rigid alignment contrasting with the careless slouchiness of the sailors. butts for the sailors' ridicule as they were during a cruise, the marines knew that, in hand-to-hand conflicts, their part was as dashing as that of their tormentors of the forecastle. when the "president" had come within a quarter of a mile of her adversary, decatur perceived that his enemy was determined to decide the contest at long range. as the "president" hauled down nearer, the "endymion" sheered off, keeping up meanwhile a vigorous cannonade. to this the americans responded in kind; and so much superior was the gunnery of the yankee tars, that the rigging of the enemy was seen to be fast going to pieces, while her guns were being silenced one by one. but her fire did sad havoc among the men of the "president," and particularly among the officers. the first broadside carried away decatur's first lieutenant, mr. babbitt, who was struck by a thirty-two-pound shot, which cut off his right leg below the knee, and hurled him through the wardroom hatch to the deck below, fracturing his wounded leg in two places. shortly after, decatur was knocked to the deck by a heavy splinter. for some time he lay unconscious; then opening his eyes, and seeing a throng of anxious seamen about him, he ordered them to their stations, and resumed his duties. the fire of the "endymion" then slackened; and she lay upon the water, with her sails cut from the yards. at that moment lieut. howell turned to a midshipman standing at his side, and said gayly, "well, we have whipped that ship, at any rate." a flash from the bow of the englishman followed; and he added, "no: there she is again." the midshipman turned to reply, and saw howell stretched dead at his feet, killed by the last shot of the battle. [illustration: the "president" tries to escape.] the enemy was now helpless, and it would have been easy enough for the "president" to choose her position and compel her adversary to strike; but the presence of two more englishmen, rapidly coming up astern, forced the americans to abandon their prey and continue their flight. it was then late in the evening, and the night was dark and starless. every light was extinguished on the american frigate, in the hope that by so doing she might slip away under cover of the night. but the british lookouts were sharp-eyed; and by eleven o'clock two frigates had closed in on the crippled ship, and a third was rapidly coming up astern. all were pouring in rapid broadsides, and the dark waters were lighted up like a fiery sea by the ceaseless flashing of the guns. thus surrounded and overpowered, there remained open to the americans no course but to surrender; and at eleven o'clock at night the "president" made signal that she had struck. her fate, like that of the "chesapeake," had accorded with the superstitious sailors' notion that she was an unlucky ship. in the long running fight, neither the americans nor the british had escaped without severe loss. on the "president" were twenty-four killed and fifty-six wounded; the first, second, and third lieutenants being among the slain. the "endymion" had eleven men killed and fourteen wounded. the two frigates were ordered to proceed to bermuda; but the "president's" bad luck seemed to follow her, for on the way she encountered a terrific gale, by which her masts were carried away, and her timbers so strained that all the upper-deck guns had to be thrown overboard to save the ship. the loss of the "president," at the very mouth of the new york harbor, was certainly a most inauspicious opening for the naval operations of . the people of new york and philadelphia, to whom had come neither the news of peace nor of the glorious success of the american arms at new orleans, were plunged into despondency. "now that great britain is at peace with europe," thought they, "she can exert all her power in the task of subjugating america;" and mournful visions of a return to british rule darkened their horizon. but, even while they were thus saddened by decatur's defeat, a gallant vessel--the monarch of the american navy--was fighting a good fight for the honor of the nation; and out of that fight she came with colors flying and two captive men-of-war following in her wake. it will be remembered that the "constitution" left boston in december, , for an extended cruise. the gallant frigate, always a favorite among man-o'-war's men, carried with her on this cruise a full crew of native americans,--thorough seamen, and as plucky fighters as ever pulled a lanyard or carried a cutlass. her course lay due east; and in january, , she was in the bay of biscay, where she fell in with, and captured, two prizes. after this she cruised about for a month, without encountering an enemy. american privateers and cruisers had fairly driven british merchantmen from the seas, and the tars of the "constitution" found their time hanging heavily on their hands. the captain was an able and considerate officer, and much freedom was allowed the jackies in their amusements. with boxing, broadsword, and single-stick play, drill and skylarking, the hours of daylight were whiled away; and by night the men off duty would gather about the forecastle lantern to play with greasy, well-thumbed cards, or warble tender ditties to black-eyed susans far across the atlantic. patriotic melodies formed no small part of jack's musical _repertoire_. of these, this one, written by a landsman, was for a long time popular among the tuneful souls of the forecastle, and was not altogether unknown in the wardroom. "now coil up y'r nonsense 'bout england's great navy, and take in y'r slack about oak-hearted tars; for frigates as stout, and as gallant crews have we, or how came their "macedon" decked with our stars? yes, how came her "guerriere," her "peacock," and "java," all sent broken-ribbed to old davy of late? how came it? why, split me, than britons we're braver; and that they shall feel, too, whenever we meet. then charge the can cheerily, send it round merrily: here's to our country, and captains commanding; to all who inherit of lawrence the spirit disdaining to strike while a stick is left standing." many were the verses of this notable production; for, to be popular in the forecastle, a song must play a lengthy part in "teasing time." one verse, however, is enough to show the manly, if perhaps unreasoning, pride the blue-jackets took in the triumphs of the navy. but the time of the sailors on this closing cruise of the war was not destined to be spent in sport and singing alone. the noble frigate was not to return to the stagnation of a season of peace in port, without adding yet another honor to her already honorable record. on the morning of the th of february, as the ship was running aimlessly before a light wind, some inexplicable impulse led capt. stewart to suddenly alter his course and run off some sixty miles to the south-west. again the "constitution's" good luck seemed to justify the sailors' belief, for at noon she ran into a group of vessels. the first vessel was sighted on the larboard bow, and, as the frigate overhauled her, proved to be a full-rigged ship. soon after a second sail, also a ship, was sighted; and a few minutes more sufficed to show that both were men-of-war. the one first sighted was the frigate-built corvette "cyane," of thirty-four guns; and the second was the sloop-of-war "levant," of twenty-one guns. for either of these vessels singly, the "constitution," with her fifty-two guns and crew of four hundred and fifty men, was more than a match. yet to attack the two was a bold movement, and this stewart determined to undertake. hardly had the character of the strangers been made out, when the corvette was seen making signals to the sloop; and the two vessels, then about ten miles apart, made all sail to get together before the enemy should overhaul them. this juncture was precisely what stewart wished to prevent; and in a trice the shrill notes of the boatswain's whistle sent the sailors in swarms into the rigging, and the frigate was as if by magic clothed with a broad expanse of canvas. quickly she felt the effect, and bounded through the water after the distant ships like a dolphin chasing a school of flying-fish. the old tars on the forecastle looked knowingly over the side at the foamy water rushing past, and then cast approving glances aloft where every sail was drawing. but their complacency was shattered by a loud crash aloft, which proved to be the main royal-mast which had given way under the strain. another spar was rigged speedily, and shipped by the active tars, and soon the snowy clouds aloft showed no signs of the wreck. at sundown the three vessels were so near each other that their colors could be seen. stewart ran up the stars and stripes, to which the strangers responded by setting the british flag at their mastheads. the purpose of the enemy was to delay the opening of the action until night should give him opportunity to manoeuvre unobserved; but the "constitution," suspecting this, pressed forward hotly, and opened fire a few minutes after six o'clock. by skilful seamanship stewart kept the windward gage of both enemies; and the fight opened with the "cyane" on the port-quarter, and the "levant" on the port-bow of the american frigate. fifteen minutes of fierce cannonading followed, the combatants being within musket-shot most of the time. every gun was engaged; and the heavy broadsides shook the ships, and thundered far over the placid surface of the ocean, which was now faintly illumined by the rising moon. the triangular space between the ships was filled with the dense sulphurous smoke of the burning powder; so that the gunners could see nothing of the enemy at whom they were hurling their ponderous iron bolts. the men in the tops could now and again catch a glimpse of the top hamper of the enemy's ships, but those on the gun-deck were working almost at random. after a few minutes of rapid firing, the fire of the enemy slackened; and stewart directed his gunners to cease until the smoke should have cleared away. at this command a silence, almost oppressive after the heavy cannonading, ensued, broken only by the occasional report of a gun from the unseen enemy, sounding like minute-guns of distress. anxiously stewart waited for the smoke to blow away. when it did so, the "cyane" was seen luffing up, to come under the frigate's stern, and get in a raking broadside. the movement was discovered just in time to be checked. stewart gave a heavy broadside to the "levant;" then, bracing back his topsails, backed his ship down abreast of the "cyane," pouring in rapid broadsides, before which the fire of the corvette died away. two raking broadsides that crashed into the stern of the "levant" sent that craft out of the action, to refit. the frigate then pressed down upon the "cyane," and with a few heavy broadsides forced her to strike. capt. douglass of the "levant" then proved his bravery by standing by his captured consort; although he could have escaped easily, while the "constitution" was taking possession of her prize. no thought of flight seems to have occurred to the gallant briton, though he must have known that there was but little hope of his coming out of the combat victorious. still he gallantly came back into the fight, meeting the "constitution" ploughing along on the opposite tack. broadsides were exchanged at such close range that the yankee gunners could hear the ripping of the planks on the enemy's decks as the solid shot crashed through beam and stanchion. having passed each other, the ships wore, and returned to the attack; but the weight of the american's metal told so severely upon the "levant" that her flag was hauled down, and, firing a gun to leeward, she gave up the fight. as an exhibition of seamanship, this action is unrivalled in naval annals. for stewart to have taken his ship into action with two hostile vessels, and so handle her as not only to escape being raked, but actually rake his enemies, was a triumph of nautical skill. the action was hard fought by both parties. the loss upon the british vessels has never been exactly determined; but it was undoubtedly large, for the hulls were badly cut up by the american's fire. the "constitution" had but three men killed, and twelve wounded. the officers all escaped unhurt. after a few hours' pause to repair damages, stewart took his prizes into porto praya in the cape verde islands, where they arrived on the th of march. the day after the ships reached port, a heavy fog settled over the water, cutting off vision in all directions. as the first lieutenant of the "constitution" was walking the quarter-deck, he heard a young midshipman among the prisoners suddenly exclaim, "there's a large ship in the offing." the lieutenant peered about on every side, but could see nothing, until, looking upward, he saw the top-gallant sails of a large ship moving along above the fog-bank. capt. stewart was quickly notified; and, coolly remarking that the stranger was probably a british frigate, he ordered that the men be sent to quarters, and the ship prepared for action. the lieutenant hastened on deck to execute the orders, but had hardly reached his station when he saw the sails of two more ships gliding along above the fog-bank. hastily he returned to the captain's cabin with the report. stewart showed no emotion or alarm, although he knew well that the fact that he was in a neutral port would be no protection against the british, should they once discover his presence. the affair of the "essex" was still fresh in his mind. calmly he ordered the lieutenant to make sail and take the ship to sea, signalling to the two prizes to follow. the orders were given quietly on deck; and in fifteen minutes the "constitution," under full press of sail, was making her way out of porto praya roads. on the shore were more than a hundred prisoners whom stewart had landed under parole. regardless of the dictates of honor, these men rushed to a portuguese battery, and opened fire on the ships as they passed out. hearing the cannonade, the lookouts on the enemy's vessels looked eagerly for its cause, and caught sight, above the fog, of the rapidly receding topsails of the fugitives. at this sight the british set out in pursuit; and the fog soon clearing away revealed to the americans two ships-of-the-line and a frigate following fast in their wake. the "constitution" and the "cyane" easily kept out of reach of their pursuers; but the "levant" dropped behind, and finally, at a signal from stewart, tacked, and stood back for porto praya. the enemy then abandoned the pursuit of the two foremost vessels, and followed the "levant," but failed to overhaul her before she entered the harbor. this, however, checked the british not a whit. for the laws of nations and the authority of the portuguese flag that floated over the little town, they cared nothing. on they came, and opened fire on the "levant," which had dropped anchor under what was supposed to be a neutral battery. the americans soon discovered their error. not only did the british disregard the neutrality of the port, but the paroled prisoners on shore took possession of the battery, and opened fire upon the beleaguered craft. thus caught between two fires, no hope remained to the americans; and, after a few minutes' gallant but useless defence, the flag of the "levant" was hauled down, and she passed again into the hands of the british. it was late in may before the "constitution" reached new york. peace had then been declared; but none the less were stewart and his men feasted and honored. the old frigate had won for herself a name ever to be remembered by the people of the nation, in whose service she had received and dealt so many hard knocks. "old ironsides," they called her; and even to-day, when a later war has given to the navy vessels whose sides are literally iron, the "constitution" still holds her place in the hearts of the american people, who think of her lovingly by the well-won title of "old ironsides." while we have been following thus stewart and his gallant frigate in their final cruise, some smaller vessels were doing good work for the credit of the american flag. it will be remembered, that, when the "president" left new york bay on her short and disastrous cruise of january, , she left behind her, at anchor, the "peacock," the "hornet," and the "tom bowline." these vessels, knowing nothing of the fate of their former consort, awaited only the coming of a gale sufficient to drive away the blockading squadron. on the d of january it came up to blow; and the three craft, under storm canvas, scudded over the bar, and made for the rendezvous at tristan d'acunha. on the way thither they separated, the "hornet" cruising alone. on the d she sighted a strange sail on the horizon, and, clapping on all sail, bore down upon her. at the same time the stranger sighted the "hornet," and made for her, evidently with hostile intent. the two vessels approached each other until within musket-shot, when the stranger hoisted english colors, and fired a gun. capt. biddle of the american ship was ready for the fray, and opened fire with a broadside. the response of the enemy was vigorous and effective. for fifteen minutes the firing was constant; but the enemy, seeing that the americans were getting the better of the fight, then strove to close and board. this biddle determined to avoid, but called up the boarders to beat back the enemy, should they succeed in closing. "at the instant," he writes, in his official report, "every officer and man repaired to the quarter-deck, when the two vessels were coming in contact, and eagerly pressed me to permit them to board the enemy; but this i would not permit, as it was evident, from the commencement of the action, that our fire was greatly superior, both in quickness and effect. the enemy's bowsprit came between our main and mizzen rigging, on our starboard side, affording him an opportunity to board us, if such was his design; but no attempt was made. there was a considerable swell on; and, as the sea lifted us ahead, the enemy's bowsprit carried away our mizzen-shrouds, stern davits, and spanker-boom, and he hung upon our larboard quarter. at this moment an officer called out that they had surrendered. i directed the marines and musketry men to cease firing; and while on the taffrail, asking if they had surrendered, i received a wound in the neck." this wound, to which the captain so casually alludes, merits more than a passing reference. the fire of both ships had ceased when biddle stepped upon the taffrail; but he had stood there only a moment, when two or three of the officers on the quarter-deck cried out that a man on the englishman was aiming at him. biddle did not hear the caution; but two american marines saw the enemy's movement, and, quickly bringing up their muskets, sent two balls crashing into the brain of the english marksman. he fell back dead, but had fired his piece before falling. the bullet struck biddle in the neck, inflicting a painful, but not serious, wound. the blood flowed freely, however; and two sailors, rushing up, were about to carry their commander to the cock-pit, when he stopped them. determined to do something to stanch the flowing blood, a sailor tore his shirt into bandages, with which he bound up his captain's wound. but let us return to biddle's narrative. "the enemy just then got clear of us; and his foremast and bowsprit being both gone, and perceiving us wearing to give him a fresh broadside, he again called out that he had surrendered. it was with difficulty that i could restrain my crew from firing into him again, as he had certainly fired into us after having surrendered. from the firing of the first gun, to the last time the enemy cried out that he had surrendered, was exactly twenty-two minutes by the watch. she proved to be his britannic majesty's brig "penguin," mounting sixteen thirty-two-pound carronades, two long twelves, a twelve-pound carronade on the top-gallant forecastle, with a swivel on the capstan in the tops." on boarding the prize, biddle found that she had suffered too severely from the american fire to ever be of service again. he accordingly removed the prisoners and wounded to his own ship, and scuttled the "penguin." hardly was this operation accomplished, when two sail were sighted, bearing rapidly down upon the scene of action. nothing daunted, the lads of the "hornet" went to their guns, but were heartily glad to find that the two vessels approaching were the "peacock" and "tom bowline." on their arrival, the latter vessel was converted into a cartel, and sent into rio de janeiro with prisoners; while the "hornet" and "peacock" cruised on toward the indian seas. on april a heavy line-of-battle ship was sighted, and gave chase. in the flight the two sloops parted; the "peacock" going off unmolested, while the "hornet" fled, hotly pursued by the enemy. for a time it seemed as if the little craft must fall a prey to her huge pursuer, which had come up within a mile, and was firing great shot at the scudding sloop-of-war. overboard went cables, guns, spars, shot, every thing that would lighten the "hornet." the sails were wet down, and every thing that would draw was set. by consummate skill biddle at last succeeded in evading his pursuer; and on the th of june the "hornet" entered new york bay, without a boat or anchor, and with but one gun left. but she brought the report that the last naval battle of the war had ended in victory for the americans. [illustration: foundered at sea.] meanwhile the "peacock" was returning from a cruise not altogether void of interest. on parting with the "hornet," she had struck off to the southward, and in the straits of sundra, between borneo and sumatra, had fallen in with the east india company's cruiser "nautilus," of fourteen guns. between these two vessels an unfortunate and silly rencounter followed. the captain of the "nautilus" knew of the declaration of peace; and, as the "peacock" bore down upon his vessel, he shouted through a speaking-trumpet that peace had been declared. to this capt. warrington of the "peacock" paid no attention, considering it a mere ruse on the part of the enemy, and responded by simply ordering the british to haul down their flag. this the englishman very properly refused to do, and gallantly prepared for the unequal combat. two broadsides were then interchanged, by which the "nautilus" was severely cut up, and eight of her crew killed. she then struck her colors. capt. warrington, on sending a boat aboard his adversary, found that the declaration of peace was no ruse, but a truthful statement of facts. his conduct had been almost criminally headstrong; and, though he was profuse in formal apologies, the wrong done could never be righted. the "peacock" then continued her homeward voyage. when this vessel reached port, the last of the cruisers had returned; and the war was over in fact, as it had long been over technically. it has become the fashion to say that it was a useless war, that served no purpose, because the treaty by which it was ended contained no reference to the hateful doctrine of the right of search, which, more than any thing else, had brought on the conflict. yet, though the conduct of the war had not led the british to formally renounce their claims in this respect, the exploits of the american navy had shown that the yankee blue-jackets were prepared to, and would, forcibly resent any attempt on the part of the british to put those claims into practice. the british had entered upon the war gaily, never dreaming that the puny american navy would offer any serious resistance to great britain's domination upon the ocean. yet now, looking back over the three years of the war, they saw an array of naval battles, in the majority of which the americans had been victorious; and in all of which the brilliancy of american naval tactics, the skill of the officers, and the courage and discipline of the crews, put the younger combatants on a plane with the older and more famous naval service. fenimore cooper, in his "history of the navy of the united states," thus sums up the results of this naval war: "the navy came out of this struggle with a vast increase of reputation. the brilliant style in which the ships had been carried into action, the steadiness and accuracy with which they had been handled, and the fatal accuracy of their fire on nearly every occasion had produced a new era in naval warfare. most of the frigate actions had been as soon decided as circumstances would at all allow; and in no instance was it found necessary to keep up the fire of a sloop-of-war an hour, when singly engaged. most of the combats of the latter, indeed, were decided in about half that time. the execution done in these short conflicts was often equal to that made by the largest vessels of europe in general actions; and, in some of them, the slain and wounded comprised a very large proportion of their crews.... the ablest and bravest captains of the english fleet were ready to admit that a new power was about to appear upon the ocean, and that it was not improbable the battle for the mastery of the seas would have to be fought over again." chapter xvii. privateers and prisons of the war. -- the "rossie." -- salem privateers. -- the "gen. armstrong" gives battle to a british squadron, and saves new orleans. -- narrative of a british officer. -- the "prince de neufchatel." -- experiences of american prisoners of war. -- the end. no narrative of the naval exploits of the americans in the second war with great britain can be complete without some account of the achievements of the fleets of privateers which for three years swept the seas, destroying a vast amount of the enemy's property; and, while accomplishing their end by enriching their owners, did, nevertheless, much incidental good to the american cause. seldom has the business of privateering been so extensively carried on as in the war of . for this the reason lay in the rich bait offered by the world-wide commerce of great britain, whose fleets whitened every known sea. privateering must ever be a weapon wielded by the weaker nation against the stronger. and congress, in the very act by which it declared war, authorized the president to issue letters of marque and reprisal to private armed vessels. the declaration of war had hardly been made public, when the hundreds of shipyards from maine to savannah resounded with the blows of hammers and the grating of saws, as the shipwrights worked, busily refitting old vessels, or building new ones, destined to cruise against the commerce of john bull. all sorts of vessels were employed in this service. the atlantic and gulf coasts fairly swarmed with small pilot-boats, mounting one long gun amidships, and carrying crews of twenty to forty men. these little craft made rapid sallies into the waters of the gulf stream, in search of british west indiamen homeward bound. other privateers were huge three-masters, carrying heavy batteries, and able to outsail any of the enemy's ships. on leaving port for a long cruise, these vessels would carry enormous crews, so that captured vessels might be manned and sent home. after a successful cruise, such a privateer returned to port seldom bringing more than one-fifth of the crew with which she had set out. but the favorite rig for a privateer was that of the top-sail schooner,--such a rig as the "enterprise" carried during the war with france. the famous shipyards of baltimore turned out scores of clean-cut, clipper-built schooners, with long, low hulls and raking masts, which straightway took to the ocean on privateering cruises. the armament of these vessels generally consisted of six to ten carronades and one long pivot-gun, going by the pet name of "long tom," mounted amidships. the crew was usually a choice assortment of cut-throats and seafaring vagabonds of all classes,--ready enough to fight if plunder was to be gained, but equally ready to surrender if only honor was to be gained by fighting. yet history records a few actions in which the privateersmen showed a steadiness and courage worthy of seamen of the regular service. the limitations of this work do not permit a complete account of the work of the privateers during the war. although an interesting subject, and one of historical importance, but a few pages can be devoted to it here. properly treated, it would fill a volume; and, indeed, one of the most noted privateersmen has left a narrative of the exploits of the principal privateers, which forms a very considerable tome. the fact that two hundred and fifty private armed cruisers under the american flag captured or destroyed over sixteen hundred british vessels will indicate the importance and extent of the subject. for us a mere sketch of the exploits of some of the principal privateers must suffice. one of the first things to attract the attention of the reader, in the dingy files of some newspaper of - , is the grotesque names under which many of the privateers sailed. the grandiloquent style of the regular navy vanishes, and in its place we find homely names; such as "jack's favorite," "lovely lass," "row-boat," "saucy jack," or "true-blooded yankee." some names are clearly political allusions,--as the "orders in council" and the "fair trade." the "black joke," the "shark," and the "anaconda" must have had a grim significance for the luckless merchantmen who fell a prey to the vessels bearing these names. "bunker hill" and "divided we fall," though odd names to sail under, seemed to bring luck to the two vessels, which were very successful in their cruises. "united we stand" was a luckless craft, however, taking only one prize; while the achievements of the "full-blooded yankee" and the "sine qua non" were equally limited. of the "poor sailor," certainly little was to be expected; and it is with no surprise that we find she captured only one prize. among the most successful privateers was the "rossie" of baltimore, commanded by the revolutionary veteran capt. barney, who left her, finally, to assume command of the american naval forces on chesapeake bay. she was a clipper-built schooner, carrying fourteen guns, and a crew of one hundred and twenty men. the destruction wrought by this one cruiser was enormous. in a ninety days' cruise she captured, sunk, or otherwise destroyed british property to the amount of a million and a half dollars, and took two hundred and seventeen prisoners. all this was not done without some hard fighting. one prize--his britannic majesty's packet-ship "princess amelia"--was armed with nine-pounders, and made a gallant defence before surrendering. several men were killed, and the "rossie" suffered the loss of her first lieutenant. the prisoners taken by the "rossie" were exchanged for americans captured by the british. with the first body of prisoners thus exchanged, barney sent a cool note to the british commander at new brunswick, assuring him that before long a second batch of his captured countrymen should be sent in. several northern seaports shared with baltimore the business of fitting out and manning privateers. the hardy seamen of maine and massachusetts were ever ready for a profitable venture of this kind; and, as the continuation of the war caused the whale-fishery to languish, the sailors gladly took up the adventurous life of privateersmen. the profits of a successful cruise were enormous; and for days after the home-coming of a lucky privateer the little seaport into which she came rang with the boisterous shouts of the carousing sailors. "we still, in imagination, see our streets filled with privateersmen," writes a historian of portsmouth, "in groups, with blue ribbons tied around their hats, inscribed in large letters, 'success to the "fox,"' or whatever vessel they were to sail in. and then another scene, of sailors paid off with so much money that they knew not what to do with it. it was one of these men that, in market square, put his arm around a cow, kissed her, and put a five-dollar bill in her mouth, for a good cud. sometimes they might be seen, finely dressed, walking down the sunny streets, carrying parasols." one portsmouth privateer came to grief in the west indies, and was captured by a british vessel of heavier metal. in the hold of the privateer was a considerable sum of money in gold coin, the existence of which was known only to the captain and his body-servant, a bright negro. the british, on capturing the vessel, put a prize-crew on board, and, while taking the yankee captain upon their own ship, left his negro servant on the prize. watching his opportunity, the negro brought up the gold coin, and dropped it unobserved into a tub of greasy black slush with which he had been slushing down the masts. some days later, the captured vessel reached the port to which she had been sent, and was tied up at a wharf to await condemnation. the faithful servant lingered about the ship for a time, saying that he had no place to go. at last he was gruffly ordered to leave; but, before going, he astonished the mate by begging for the tub of slush, which he said might enable him to earn a few cents along the docks. the mate carelessly told him to take the stuff, and be off; which he promptly did, carrying away with him his tub of slush, with its concealed treasure. it is worthy of note, that this negro, far from home and from the owners of the money, paid it into a bank to the credit of the captain whom he had served. salem, mass., was another great port for privateers to hail from. not less than twenty-five of these predatory gentry fitted out at the quiet little seaside village; and, when the war was ended, few of the inhabitants were unable to tell some tale of personal adventures, cruising against the enemy. indeed, salem had the honor of receiving the first prize captured on the ocean after the declaration of war; for into the harbor came, on the th of june, , the trim privateer schooner "fame," followed close by two ships, from the halliards of which waved the british flag surmounted by the stars and stripes. then the whole town turned out as one man to greet and cheer the captors; but, long before the war was ended, the appearance of a prize in the harbor aroused little excitement. one of the most successful of the rovers sailing from this port was the "dolphin," whose record during the war shows a list of twenty-two captured vessels. her faculty for making long cruises, and turning up in the most unexpected places, made her the dread of all british sea-captains. she was manned by a gallant set of lads, who had no fear of hard fighting; and many of her prizes were won at the cannon's mouth. in january, , the "dolphin" fell in with a british ship and brig cruising together off cape st. vincent. though the enemy outnumbered the privateersmen, and carried heavier metal, yet the "dolphin" went gallantly into the fight, and after a severe battle succeeded in taking both vessels. great was the astonishment of the british at being thus snapped up by a yankee privateer almost under the guns of the rock of gibraltar. the luckless britons were carried to america as prisoners; but so kind was the treatment they met with at the hands of the privateers, that on leaving the "dolphin," at boston, they published a card in which they said, "should the fortune of war ever throw capt. stafford or any of his crew into the hands of the british, it is sincerely hoped he will meet with similar treatment." perhaps the foremost of all the fighting privateers was the "gen. armstrong" of new york; a schooner mounting eight long nines and one long twenty-four on a pivot. she had a crew of ninety men, and was commanded on her first cruise by capt. guy r. champlin. this vessel was one of the first to get to sea, and had cruised for several months with fair success, when in march, , she gave chase to a sail off the surinam river on the coast of south america. the stranger seemed to evince no great desire to escape; and the privateer soon gained sufficiently to discover that the supposed merchantman was a british sloop-of-war, whose long row of open ports showed that she carried twenty-seven guns. champlin and his men found this a more ugly customer than they had expected; but it was too late to retreat, and to surrender was out of the question: so, calling the people to the guns, champlin took his ship into action with a steadiness that no old naval captain could have exceeded. "close quarters and quick work," was the word passed along the gun-deck; and the "armstrong" was brought alongside her antagonist at a distant of half pistol-shot. for nearly an hour the two vessels exchanged rapid broadsides; but, though the american gunners were the better marksmen, the heavy build of the sloop-of-war enabled her to stand against broadsides which would have cut the privateer to pieces. capt. champlin was hit in the shoulder early in the action, but kept his station until the fever of his wound forced him to retire to his cabin. however, he still continued to direct the course of the action; and, seeing that the tide of battle was surely going against him, he ordered the crew to get out the sweeps and pull away from the enemy, whose rigging was too badly cut up to enable her to give chase. this was quickly done; and the "gen. armstrong," though badly injured, and with her decks covered with dead and dying men, escaped, leaving her more powerful adversary to repair damages and make the best of her way home. capt. champlin, on his arrival at new york, was the hero of the hour. for a privateer to have held out for an hour against a man-of-war, was thought a feat worthy of praise from all classes of men. the merchants of the city tendered the gallant captain a dinner, and the stockholders in his vessel presented him with a costly sword. but the "gen. armstrong" was destined to fight yet another battle, which should far eclipse the glory of her first. a new captain was to win the laurels this time; for capt. champlin's wound had forced him to retire, and his place was filled by capt. samuel c. reid. on the th of september, , the privateer was lying at anchor in the roadstead of fayal. over the land that enclosed the snug harbor on three sides, waved the flag of portugal, a neutral power, but unfortunately one of insufficient strength to enforce the rights of neutrality. while the "armstrong" was thus lying in the port, a british squadron, composed of the "plantagenet" seventy-four, the "rota" thirty-eight, and "carnation" eighteen, hove in sight, and soon swung into the harbor and dropped anchor. reid watched the movements of the enemy with eager vigilance. he knew well that the protection of portugal would not aid him in the least should the captain of that seventy-four choose to open fire upon the "armstrong." the action of the british in coming into the harbor was in itself suspicious, and the american had little doubt that the safety of his vessel was in jeopardy. while he was pacing the deck, and weighing in his mind the probability of an assault by the british, he caught sight of some unusual stir aboard the hostile ships. it was night; but the moon had risen, and by its pale light reid saw four large barges let fall from the enemy's ships, and, manned by about forty men each, make toward his vessel. in an instant every man on the privateer was called to his post. that there was to be an attack, was now certain; and the americans determined not to give up their vessel without at least a vigorous attempt to defend her. reid's first act was to warp his craft under the guns of a rather dilapidated castle, which was supposed to uphold the authority of portugal over the island and adjacent waters. hardly had the position been gained, when the foremost of the british boats came within hail, and capt. reid shouted, "boat ahoy! what boat's that?" no response followed the hail; and it was repeated, with the warning, "answer, or i shall fire into you." still the british advanced without responding; and reid, firmly convinced that they purposed to carry his ship with a sudden dash, ordered his gunners to open on the boats with grape. this was done, and at the first volley the british turned and made off. capt. reid then warped his vessel still nearer shore; and bending springs on her cable, so that her broadside might be kept always toward the enemy, he awaited a second attack. at midnight the enemy were seen advancing again, this time with fourteen barges and about five hundred men. while the flotilla was still at long range, the americans opened fire upon them with the heavy "long tom;" and, as they came nearer, the full battery of long nine-pounders took up the fight. the carnage in the advancing boats was terrible; but the plucky englishmen pushed on, meeting the privateer's fire with volleys of musketry and carronades. despite the american fire, the british succeeded in getting under the bow and quarter of the "armstrong," and strove manfully to board; while the americans fought no less bravely to keep them back. the attack became a furious hand-to-hand battle. from behind the boarding-nettings the americans thrust pikes, and fired pistols and muskets, at their assailants, who, mounted on each other's shoulders, were hacking fiercely at the nettings which kept them from gaining the schooner's deck. the few that managed to clamber on the taffrail of the "armstrong" were thrust through and through with pikes, and hurled, thus horribly impaled, into the sea. the fighting was fiercest and deadliest on the quarter; for there were most of the enemy's boats, and there capt. reid led the defence in person. so hot was the reception met by the british at this point, that they drew off in dismay, despairing of ever gaining the privateer's deck. hardly did reid see the enemy thus foiled on the quarter, when a chorus of british cheers from the forecastle, mingled with yells of rage, told that the enemy had succeeded in effecting a lodgement there. calling his men about him, the gallant captain dashed forward and was soon in the front rank of the defenders, dealing furious blows with his cutlass, and crying out, "come on, my lads, and we'll drive them into the sea." the leadership of an officer was all that the sailors needed. the three lieutenants on the forecastle had been killed or disabled, else the enemy had never come aboard. with reid to cheer them on, the sailors rallied, and with a steady advance drove the british back into their boats. the disheartened enemy did not return to the attack, but returned to their ships, leaving behind two boats captured and two sunk. their loss in the attack was thirty-four killed and eighty-six wounded. on the privateer were two killed and seven wounded. [illustration: privateersmen at home.] but the attack was not to end here. reid was too old a sailor to expect that the british, chagrined as they were by two repulses, were likely to leave the privateer in peace. he well knew that the withdrawal of the barges meant not an abandonment, but merely a short discontinuance, of the attack. accordingly he gave his crew scarcely time to rest, before he set them to work getting the schooner in trim for another battle. the wounded were carried below, and the decks cleared of splinters and wreckage. the boarding-nettings were patched up, and hung again in place. "long tom" had been knocked off his carriage by a carronade shot, and had to be remounted; but all was done quickly, and by morning the vessel was ready for whatever might be in store for her. the third assault was made soon after daybreak. evidently the enemy despaired of his ability to conquer the privateersmen in a hand-to-hand battle; for this time he moved the brig "carnation" up within range, and opened fire upon the schooner. the man-of-war could fire nine guns at a broadside, while the schooner could reply with but seven; but "long tom" proved the salvation of the privateer. the heavy twenty-four-pound shots from this gun did so much damage upon the hull of the brig, that she was forced to draw out of the action; leaving the victory, for the third time, with the americans. but now capt. reid decided that it was folly to longer continue the conflict. the overwhelming force of the enemy made any thought of ultimate escape folly. it only remained for the british to move the seventy-four "plantagenet" into action to seal the doom of the yankee privateer. the gallant defence already made by the americans had cost the british nearly three hundred men in killed and wounded; and reid now determined to destroy his vessel, and escape to the shore. the great pivot-gun was accordingly pointed down the main hatch, and two heavy shots sent crashing through the bottom. then applying the torch, to make certain the work of destruction, the privateersmen left the ship, giving three cheers for the gallant "gen. armstrong," as a burst of flame and a roar told that the flames had reached her magazine. this gallant action won loud plaudits for capt. reid when the news reached the united states. certainly no vessel of the regular navy was ever more bravely or skilfully defended than was the "gen. armstrong." but, besides the credit won for the american arms, reid had unknowingly done his country a memorable service. the three vessels that attacked him were bound to the gulf of mexico, to assist in the attack upon new orleans. the havoc reid wrought among their crews, and the damage he inflicted upon the "carnation," so delayed the new orleans expedition, that gen. jackson was able to gather those motley troops that fought so well on the plains of chalmette. had it not been for the plucky fight of the lads of the "gen. armstrong," the british forces would have reached new orleans ten days earlier, and packenham's expedition might have ended very differently. the "plantagenet" and her consorts were not the only british men-of-war bound for new orleans that fell in with warlike yankee privateers. some of the vessels from the chesapeake squadron met a privateer, and a contest ensued, from which the american emerged with less glory than did the lads of the "gen. armstrong." a young british officer in his journal thus tells the story:-- "it was my practice to sit for hours, after nightfall, upon the taffrail, and strain my eyes in the attempt to distinguish objects on shore, or strange sails in the distance. it so happened that on the th i was tempted to indulge in this idle but bewitching employment even beyond my usual hour for retiring, and did not quit the deck till towards two o'clock in the morning of the st [of october]. i had just entered my cabin, and was beginning to undress, when a cry from above of an enemy in chase drew me instantly to the quarter-deck. on looking astern i perceived a vessel making directly after us, and was soon convinced of the justice of the alarm, by a shot which whistled over our heads. all hands were now called to quarters, the small sails taken in; and having spoken to our companion, and made an agreement as to position, both ships cleared for action. but the stranger, seeing his signal obeyed with so much alacrity, likewise slackened sail, and, continuing to keep us in view, followed our wake without approaching nearer. in this state things continued till daybreak,--we still holding our course, and he hanging back; but, as soon as it was light, he set more sail and ran to windward, moving just out of gun-shot in a parallel direction with us. it was now necessary to fall upon some plan of deceiving him; otherwise, there was little probability that he would attack. in the bomb, indeed, the height of the bulwarks served to conceal some of the men; but in the transport no such screen existed. the troops were therefore ordered below; and only the sailors, a few blacks, and the officers kept the deck. the same expedient was likewise adopted in part by capt. price of the 'volcano;' and, in order to give to his ship a still greater resemblance than it already had to a merchantman, he displayed an old faded scarlet ensign, and drew up his fore and main sail in what sailors term a lubberly manner. "as yet the stranger had shown no colors, but from her build and rigging there was little doubt as to her country. she was a beautiful schooner, presenting seven ports of a side, and apparently crowded with men,--circumstances which immediately led us to believe that she was an american privateer. the 'volcano,' on the other hand, was a clumsy, strong-built ship, carrying twelve guns; and the 'golden fleece' mounted eight: so that in point of artillery the advantage was rather on our side; but the american's sailing was so much superior to that of either of us, that this advantage was more than counter-balanced. "having dodged us till eight o'clock, and reconnoitred with great exactness, the stranger began to steer gradually nearer and nearer, till at length it was judged that she was within range. a gun was accordingly fired from the 'volcano,' and another from the transport; the balls from both of which passed over her, and fell into the sea. finding herself thus assaulted, she now threw off all disguise, and hung out an american ensign. when putting her helm up, she poured a broadside with a volley of musketry into the transport, and ran alongside of the bomb, which sailed to windward. "as soon as her flag was displayed, and her intention of attacking discerned, all hands were ordered up; and she received two well-directed broadsides from the 'volcano,' as well as a warm salute from the 'golden fleece.' but such was the celerity of her motion, that she was alongside of the bomb in less time than can be imagined, and actually dashing her bow against the other, attempted to carry her by boarding. capt. price, however, was ready to receive them. the boarders were at their posts in an instant; and jonathan finding, to use a vulgar phrase, that he had caught a tartar, left about twenty men upon the 'volcano's' bowsprit, all of whom were thrown into the sea, and filling his sails sheered off with the same speed with which he had borne down. in attempting to escape, he unavoidably fell somewhat to leeward, and exposed the whole of his deck to the fire of the transport. a tremendous discharge of musketry saluted him as he passed; and it was almost laughable to witness the haste with which his crew hurried below, leaving none upon deck except such as were absolutely wanted to work the vessel. "the 'volcano' had by this time filled and gave chase, firing with great precision at his yards and rigging, in the hope of disabling him. but, as fortune would have it, none of his important ropes or yards were cut; and we had the mortification to see him in a few minutes beyond our reach." [illustration: prison chaplain and jailor.] an exploit of yet another privateer should be chronicled before the subject of the private armed navy can be dismissed. on the th of october, , the brigantine privateer "prince de neufchatel," seventeen guns, was encountered near nantucket by the british frigate "endymion,"--the same ship which was so roughly handled by the "president" in her last battle. about nine o'clock at night, a calm having come on, the frigate despatched a boarding party of a hundred and eleven men in five boats to capture the privateer. the latter vessel was short-handed, having but forty men; but this handful of yankee tars gallantly prepared to meet the attack. the guns were charged with grape and canister, the boarding-nettings triced up, and cutlasses and pistols distributed to the crew. as the british came on, the americans opened fire, notwithstanding which the enemy dashed alongside, and strove fiercely to gain the deck. but in this they were foiled by the gallantry of the defenders, who fought desperately, and cut down the few british who managed to gain a foothold. the conflict was short, and the discomfiture of the enemy complete. after but a few minutes' fighting, one boat was sunk, one captured, and the other three drifted helplessly away, filled with dead and dying. the total loss of the british in this affair was twenty-eight killed and thirty-seven wounded. of the crew of the privateer, seven were killed, and nine only remained unhurt. a narrative of the exploits of, and service done by, the american sailors in the war of would be incomplete if it said nothing of the sufferings of that great body of tars who spent the greater part of the war season confined in british prisons. several thousand of these were thrown into confinement before the war broke out, because they refused to serve against their country in british ships. others were prisoners of war. no exact statistics as to the number of americans thus imprisoned have ever been made public; but the records of one great prison--that at dartmoor--show, that, when the war closed, six thousand american seamen were imprisoned there, twenty-five hundred of whom had been detained from long before the opening of the war, on account of their refusal to join the ranks of the enemy. as i write, there lies before me a quaint little book, put out anonymously in , and purporting to be the "journal of a young man captured by the british." its author, a young surgeon of salem, named waterhouse, shipped on a salem privateer, and was captured early in the war. his experience with british prisons and transport-ships was long; and against his jailors he brings shocking charges of brutality, cruelty, and negligence. the yankee seamen who were captured during the war were first consigned to receiving-prisons at the british naval stations in america. sometimes these places of temporary detention were mouldering hulks, moored in bays or rivers; sometimes huge sheds hastily put together, and in which the prisoners were kept only by the unceasing vigilance of armed guards. "the prison at halifax," writes waterhouse, "erected solely for the safe-keeping of prisoners of war, resembles an horse-stable, with stalls, or stanchions, for keeping the cattle from each other. it is to a contrivance of this sort that they attach the cords that support those canvas bags or cradles, called hammocks. four tier of these hanging nests were made to hang, one above the other, between these stalls, or stanchions.... the general hum and confused noise from almost every hammock was at first very distressing. some would be lamenting their hard fate at being shut up like negro slaves in a guinea ship, or like fowls in a hen-coop, for no crime, but for fighting the battles of their country; others, late at night, were relating their adventures to a new prisoner; others, lamenting their aberrations from rectitude, and disobedience to parents, and headstrong wilfulness, that drove them to sea, contrary to their parents' wish; while others, of the younger class, were sobbing out their lamentations at the thoughts of what their mothers and sisters suffered after knowing of their imprisonment. not unfrequently the whole night was spent in this way; and when, about daybreak, the weary prisoner fell into a doze, he was waked from his slumber by the grinding noise of the locks, and the unbarring of the doors, with the cry of '_turn out!_ _all out!_' when each man took down his hammock, and lashed it up, and slung it on his back, and was ready to answer to the roll-call of the turnkey." from prisons such as this, the prisoners were conveyed in droves to england, in the holds of men-of-war and transports. poorly fed, worse housed, and suffering for lack of air and room, their agony on the voyage was terrible. when they were allowed a few hours' time on deck, they were sure to arouse the anger of the officers by turbulent conduct or imprudent retorts. "one morning as the general and the captain of the 'regulus' (transport) were walking as usual on the quarter-deck, one of our yankee boys passed along the galley with his kid of burgoo. he rested it on the hatchway while he adjusted the rope ladder to descend with his swill. the thing attracted the attention of the general, who asked the man how many of his comrades eat of that quantity for their breakfast. 'six, sir,' said the man, 'but it is fit food only for hogs.' this answer affronted the captain, who asked the man in an angry tone, 'what part of america he came from?' 'near to bunker hill, sir, if you ever heard of that place,' was the answer." on another occasion, a yankee and a slightly wounded british marine got into a dispute, and came to blows. the british captain saw the occurrence, and accused the american of cowardice in striking a wounded man. "i am no coward, sir," said the yankee. "i was captain of a gun on board the 'constitution' when she captured the 'guerriere,' and afterward when she took the 'java.' had i been a coward, i should not have been there." [illustration: king dick and his chaplain.] on one occasion the prisoners on the transport "crown prince," lying in the river medway, took an uncontrollable dislike to the commander of a second transport lying close alongside. their spite was gratified quickly and with great effect. the rations served out to the luckless captives at that time consisted of fish and cold potatoes. the latter edible being of rather poor quality, the prisoners reserved for missiles; and the obnoxious officer could not pace his quarter-deck without being made a mark for a shower of potatoes. vainly did he threaten to call up his marines and respond with powder and lead: the americans were not to be kept down; and for some days the harassed officer hardly dared to show himself upon deck. the place of final detention for most of the prisoners taken in the war with america was dartmoor prison; a rambling collection of huge frame buildings, surrounded by double walls of wood. the number of prisoners confined there, and the length of time which many of them had spent within its walls, gave this place many of the characteristics of a small state, with rulers and officials of its own. one of the strangest characters of the prison was king dick, a gigantic negro, who ruled over the five or six hundred negro prisoners. "he is six feet five inches in height," says one of the prisoners, "and proportionally large. this black hercules commands respect, and his subjects tremble in his presence. he goes the rounds every day, and visits every berth, to see if they all are kept clean. when he goes the rounds, he puts on a large bear-skin cap, and carries in his hand a huge club. if any of his men are dirty, drunken, or grossly negligent, he threatens them with a beating; and if they are saucy they are sure to receive one. they have several times conspired against him, and attempted to dethrone him; but he has always conquered the rebels. one night several attacked him while asleep in his hammock: he sprang up, and seized the smallest by his feet, and thumped another with him. the poor negro, who had thus been made a beetle of, was carried the next day to the hospital, sadly bruised, and provokingly laughed at." king dick, to further uphold his dignity as a monarch, had his private chaplain, who followed his royal master about, and on sundays preached rude but vigorous sermons to his majesty's court. on weekdays the court was far from being a dignified gathering. king dick was a famous athlete, and in the cock-loft, over which he reigned, was to be seen fine boxing and fencing. gambling, too, was not ruled out of the royal list of amusements; and the cries of the players, mingled with the singing of the negroes, and the sounds of the musical instruments upon which they played, made that section of the prison a veritable pandemonium. [illustration: the last volley of the war.] but although some few incidents occurred to brighten momentarily the dull monotony of the prisoners' lot, the life of these unfortunate men, while thus imprisoned, was miserable and hateful to them. months passed, and even years, but there seemed to be no hope for release. at last came the news of the declaration of peace. how great then was the rejoicing! thoughts of home, of friends and kindred, flooded the minds of all; and even strong men, whom the hardships of prison-life had not broken down, seemed to give way all at once to tears of joy. but the delays of official action, "red-tape," and the sluggishness of travel in that day, kept the poor fellows pent up for months after the treaty of peace had been announced to them. nor were they to escape without suffering yet more severely at the hands of their jailors. three months had passed since peace had been declared; and the long delay so irritated the prisoners, that they chafed under prison restraint, and showed evidences of a mutinous spirit. the guards, to whom was intrusted the difficult task of keeping in subjection six thousand impatient and desperate men, grew nervous, fearing that at any moment the horde of prisoners would rise and sweep away all before them. an outbreak was imminent; and the prisoners were like a magazine of gunpowder, needing but a spark of provocation to explode. on april , , matters reached a crisis. the soldiers, losing all presence of mind, fired on the defenceless americans, killing five men and wounding thirty-four. thus the last blood shed in the war of was the blood of unarmed prisoners. but the massacre, horrible and inexcusable as it was, had the effect of hastening the release of the survivors; and soon the last of the captives was on his way home to the country over which peace at last reigned again. chapter xviii. the long peace broken by the war with mexico. -- activity of the navy. -- captain stockton's stratagem. -- the battle at san josÃ�. -- the blockade. -- instances of personal bravery. -- the loss of the "truxton." -- yellow fever in the squadron. -- the navy at vera cruz. -- capture of alvarado. the period of peace which followed the close of the war of was, perhaps, the longest which any nation has ever enjoyed. for the navy of the united states, it was a time of absolute peace, inactivity, even stagnation. the young nation was living literally up to washington's rule of avoiding entanglements abroad, and its people looked with suspicion on the naval branch of the service which had rendered such a good account of itself in the war with great britain. they feared to build and man ships lest possession of a navy might prove an incentive to war. and so when war did come--war, not with europe, but with our nearest neighbor--the united states had little floating force to join in it. fortunately, little was needed. though war was not declared by the united states against mexico until may, , it had been a possibility ever since the establishment of the texan republic by the defeat of the mexicans at san jacinto in , and it had been a great probability since , when it was discovered that both england and france were holding out prospects of assistance to the mexicans in case of conflict with the united states. neither of these european powers was sincere in the diplomatic game which deceived the proud but ignorant mexicans, but neither did either of them scruple to foment a quarrel out of which some selfish, though indefinite, advantage might be gained. indeed they played the diplomatic game so skilfully that they deceived a considerable minority in the united states and made these believe that the admission of texas to the united states would be unwise and inexpedient, and the probable war with mexico a wickedness dire and dreadful. even general grant, when he wrote his book, said that such were his views at the time, though he was then an army officer and trusting to war for advancement. but when hostilities were begun, and victory for american arms followed victory, the protests of the peace party were unheard amid the enthusiastic shoutings of those who took a saner view of the conditions which led to the conflict. mexico claimed title not only to texas, but to california, and if the united states had not gone to war in regard to the former, she would have had to do so in defence of her conquest of the latter. in securing california the navy bore a conspicuous part, and as early as , captain thomas ap-catesby jones, commanding the pacific squadron, was as active as though war had already been declared. in september of that year, with his squadron of four ships, he was at anchor in the harbor of callao, and noticing the suspicious conduct of the british frigate "dublin," which shoved off the port and then bore away, he concluded to follow her and see just what game she sought, as he had been informed by the navy department that england was plotting in mexico against the united states; he had also read in a mexican newspaper that war was likely to be declared, if indeed hostilities had not already begun. captain jones reached monterey on the th of october, and though he saw nothing of the "dublin," he at once insisted on the surrender of the place. the next day he learned that his action had been premature and made what amends he could. so the navy really struck the first official blow that led to this war. when war had been declared, the pacific squadron did not learn of it until after the victories of palo alto and resaca de la palma. captain sloat, in command, at once took prompt action. landing two hundred and fifty seamen and marines under captain mervine, he captured monterey on the d of july. a week later he formally took possession of the splendid bay of san francisco and the neighboring country. he also occupied sutter's fort, on sacramento river, and the towns of bodega and sonoma. in this war it will be noticed throughout this narrative that the naval forces were constantly required to do shore duty, a duty to which they were unaccustomed but which they performed with entire efficiency. the mexicans had no navy worthy of the name and the american sailors were auxiliary to the soldiers. though untrained to this kind of service, and though it was always hard, and sometimes quite ungrateful, they responded to orders with entire cheerfulness; when the service was most perilous then the blue-jackets entered upon it with a gayety that laughed at danger. on the th of july, fremont and his corps of topographical engineers met captain sloat and thereafter co-operated with him. in the "cyane," commander du pont, fremont was sent to san diego with one hundred and fifty riflemen and that place was occupied. on the th of july, the "congress" took possession of san pedro, the port of los angeles, the seat of the mexican government in california. about this time the command of the pacific squadron devolved upon captain robert f. stockton, who was not a whit less vigilant than his predecessors had been. having all the california seaports, captain stockton planned an expedition against los angeles before the well-armed mexican soldiers in the province could be brought together. he landed three hundred and fifty sailors and marines and established a camp at san pedro. captain stockton's biographer says: "there were only about ninety muskets in the whole corps. some of the men were armed with carbines, others had only pistols, swords, or boarding-pikes. they presented a motley and peculiar appearance, with great variety of costume. owing to their protracted absence from home the supplies of shoes and clothing had fallen short, and the ragged and diversified colors of their garments, as well as the want of uniformity in their arms and accoutrements, made them altogether a spectacle both singular and amusing." the mexican forces at los angeles outnumbered captain stockton's land forces three to one, so he resorted to a stratagem to deceive the enemy as to his force. a flag of truce having appeared on the hills, "he ordered all his men under arms and directed them to march three or four abreast, with intervals of considerable space between each squad, directly in the line of vision of the approaching messengers, to the rear of some buildings on the beach, and thence to turn in a circle and continue their march until the strangers had arrived. part of the circle described in the march was concealed from view, so that to the strangers it would appear that a force ten times greater than the actual number was defiling before them. when the two bearers of the flag of truce had arrived he ordered them to be led up to him alongside of the artillery, which consisted of several six-pounders and one thirty-two-pound carronade. the guns were all covered with skins so as to conceal their dimensions except the huge mouth of the thirty-two-pounder at which the captain was stationed to receive his guests.... as his purpose was intimidation he received them with much sternness." they asked for a truce, but stockton demanded and secured an immediate and absolute surrender, as the evident object of the mexicans was to gain time. stockton at once began his tedious march to los angeles, his men dragging the cannon through the sand. on the th of august, he received a message from the mexican general, saying "if he marched on the town he would find it the grave of his men." he replied: "then tell your general to have the bells ready to toll at eight o'clock in the morning. i shall be there at that time." he was as good as his word. the next morning he was joined by fremont and his men, who had come up from san diego and they entered los angeles unopposed. he organized a civil government for the entire state, with major fremont as the head of it, and returning to his ships sailed northward on the th of september, . the news of these operations was sent to washington overland by the famous scout, kit carson. meantime the other ships of the pacific squadron were cruising along the coast and capturing everything with a semblance of mexican ownership. but captain stockton was much disconcerted in october to learn that two mexican generals, released on parole after the fall of los angeles, had gathered a force and were besieging the small garrison there. the "savannah" at once went to the scene. at san pedro it was learned that the garrison had been compelled to capitulate and was awaiting an american cruiser. captain mervine, of the "savannah," landed a detachment of sailors and marines and began the march to the capital. he could not cope with the superior force and had to retire. indeed nearly all the places captured by the active sailors seemed likely now to fall into the hands of the mexicans again. the garrison at monterey was threatened by an uprising of the people; the garrison at san diego was besieged; los angeles was in the hands of the enemy, and the force at the enemy's camp at san bernardino was getting stronger each day. but captain stockton was equal to all demands upon him and made up for inadequate forces by celerity of movement. just when matters were most critical the naval forces learned of the repulse of general stephen kearny by the mexicans under pico. it was indeed with great difficulty that kearny and his dragoons were rescued by the sailors from their invested position near san bernardino. having got what men he could together, captain stockton determined to recapture los angeles. on the th of december, , he began his march of miles to the capital. there were no roads, but the route was through deep ravines, sand-hills, and deserts. the men were poorly armed and badly clothed, and there were few horses to assist in drawing the artillery. never did an american commander have before him a more disagreeable prospect. the men, many of them without foot-covering, became worn-out in the march and begged to rest, but the captain insisted that they must go on, as the mexicans were getting stronger every day. the men responded as best they could. on the th of january, the intrepid stockton found that the enemy was intrenched between him and the san gabriel river. the mexican general changed his mind and crossed the river with the object of interrupting the crossing. but stockton would not be denied, and repulsed the enemy on every side, though outnumbered three to one. this was on the th of january, the anniversary of the battle of new orleans. the next day he fought again, resisting three furious charges of the enemy. on the th he entered los angeles unopposed, and on the th he was joined there by fremont and his corps. these seaports in california were not seriously harassed during the remainder of the war, but they needed to be garrisoned, while the whole coast required watching. a part of the squadron was sent south and also into the bay of california. before the end of every mexican gun on the western coast, save those at acapulco, had been silenced. loreto, la paz, mazatlan, san blas, manzanilla, san antonio, guaymas, and mulye fell to the squadron. sometimes it only needed for a ship or two to appear before a town and it would surrender, but generally an assault or the appearance of a storming party on land was necessary. but the seamen and marines were always invincible in this part of the war, where they were entirely without aid from the army. the most serious predicament in which the americans found themselves in this pacific coast campaign was when lieutenant heywood, of the "dale," with four midshipmen and twenty marines, were shut up in the mission house at san josé, a small village near san lucas. he was surrounded by a large force before he knew it, and two of his midshipmen were taken unawares and captured by an enemy not known to be near. lieutenant heywood maintained himself from the th of november, , till the th of february, , when commander du pont, in the "cyane," came to his rescue. a party of ninety-four seamen and marines, under lieutenant rowan, went ashore and fought its way against six hundred mexicans until they were defeated and heywood and his men rescued. there was nothing after this on the western coast more serious than guerrilla forays. the operations on the western coast were probably, in result, much more important than those of the home squadron in the mexican gulf and the rio grande river. but the latter squadron was the larger, and as it was in constant co-operation with the conquering armies which finally captured the capital of the country, much more has been heard of the doings of the fleet in the east, which was at first commanded by commodore david conner and then by commodore matthew c. perry. the operations on this coast also came in for much criticism, for the various ships were filled with young men overflowing with valor and mad with desire of glory. they were also comparatively close to home and saw the newspapers from new york, washington, and new orleans. in these papers the army was accorded all the glory while the navy was almost ignored. this neglect rankled in the minds of the madcaps, and they blamed commodore conner, an officer of much experience and distinguished record, for not storming every fort and citadel near the coast instead of carrying out his instructions to maintain an efficient blockade of the ports and to co-operate with the army whenever possible. these duties, tiresome and inglorious as they seemed, were of the first importance to the scheme of the campaign, and they were performed with a patience which rose superior to weariness, sickness, and death. the duty required of the blockaders did not require much fighting, but the men were in danger of the coast fevers all the time, and hundreds died. and then at some seasons the fleet was likely to be blown ashore by the fierce "northers" which prevailed. many accidents resulted during these storms, the most serious being the capsizing of the brig "somers," lieutenant raphael semmes (afterward commanding the confederate ship "alabama") commanding, and the loss of more than half her crew. when the war began at palo alto, commodore conner was with his squadron off point isabel, at the mouth of the rio grande river. not knowing the issue of the battle, five hundred seamen and marines were sent to strengthen the garrison at point isabel, where the army supplies were stored, while captain aulick, of the "potomac," with two hundred men, pulled up the rio grande in boats for fifteen miles and until a junction with the army was established at barita. at this time the squadron consisted of the frigates "cumberland" (flagship), "potomac," and "raritan"; the steam frigate "mississippi"; the sloops-of-war "falmouth," "john adams," and "st. mary's"; the steam-sloop "princeton"; and the brigs "lawrence," "porpoise," and "somers." before the close of the war some of these ships were recalled, at least one was wrecked, and the squadron was from time to time largely reinforced. the squadron, now that war had begun, was ordered to blockade the ports of matamoras, on the rio grande; tampico, on the tampico river; alvarado, on the alvarado; coatzalcoalcos, on the river of the same name; tabasco, on the tabasco river; and vera cruz, on the gulf. the rivers mentioned, except the rio grande, are mere creeks, not fit for vessels of any size, and their mouths simply open roadsteads. vera cruz was the only place with anything like a harbor. the ports in yucatan, such as laguna and campeachy, were only visited for supplies of fresh meat. the state of yucatan was not assisting in the war and did not need to be blockaded. by the time general taylor took possession of matamoras, commodore conner's fleet had been considerably augmented by the addition of the sloops-of-war "germantown," "albany," "saratoga" and "decatur"; the steamers "spitfire," "vixen," "alleghany," "scorpion" and "scourge"; the brig "truxton"; the gunboats "reefer," "bonita," and "rebel." a little later, and just before the bombardment of vera cruz, the "ohio," with seventy-four guns, joined, together with the bomb-vessels "vesuvius," "hecla," and "stromboli." there were also a number of small steamers and gunboats to operate in shallow water. these constituted what was called the "mosquito fleet." with so formidable a fleet the sailors felt they were equal to anything, and whenever a larger part of it was operating at one place, it was difficult to restrain the men. the youngsters even thought commodore conner's prudence and conservatism to be timidity, and the writer has before him now a book written twenty-five years after these events, by one who was a midshipman on the flagship, and he quotes the familiar lines about daring to put things to the touch. all this was most unfair, but it indicated that the blue jackets of the mexican war were buttoned over hearts that knew no fear. the blockade of the mexican ports that was maintained was not by any means a paper blockade. it was actual, and the very opposite of the merely formal closing of ports which the united states had so long protested against in other countries. the hardships of the men and officers were fearful and the casualties very great. the tediousness of the service was relieved now and again by daring expeditions into the rivers and ports, where boats were cut out and taken away from beneath batteries on shore. the record of such ventures shows that the navy in and was no whit inferior in dash to the one which made the flag glorious some years before in the war with england. one instance of such a venture is quoted from the "recollections of a naval officer," by captain william harwar parker. he was telling of the blockade at vera cruz in . he says: "one of the finest fellows in the service i often met on green island. i allude to passed midshipman hynson, of maryland. he was drowned in the brig 'somers,' when she capsized in the fall of this year. at the time of her sinking, hynson had both of his arms bandaged and in a sling, and was almost helpless. it was said that when the brig sank he managed to get hold of a spar with another man, and finding it would not support two he deliberately let go his hold. it was like him. the way he happened to have his arm in a sling was this: while the 'somers' was maintaining the blockade of vera cruz, a vessel managed to slip in--i think she was a spanish schooner. the mexicans moored her to the walls of the castle of san juan for safety; but the officers of the 'somers' resolved to cut her out or burn her. hynson was the leading spirit in the affair, though lieutenant james parker, of pennsylvania, was the senior officer. they took a boat one afternoon and pulled in to visit the officers of an english man-of-war lying under sacrificios island. it was quite usual to do this. after nightfall they left the british ship and pulled directly for the schooner, which they boarded and carried. this, be it observed, was directly under the guns of the castle and the muskets of its garrison. the crew was secured, and finding the wind would not serve to take the vessel out, it was resolved to burn her. her captain made some resistance, and the sentinel on the walls called out to know what was the matter. parker, who spoke spanish remarkably well, replied that his men were drunk and he was putting them in irons. the party then set fire to the vessel and got safely away with their prisoners. it was in setting fire to the schooner that hynson got so badly burned." in regard to the personal heroism shown by hynson and others when the "somers" went down, lieutenant raphael semmes, in his book, "service afloat and ashore during the mexican war," said: "those men who could not swim were selected to go into the boat. a large man by the name of seymour, the ship's cook, having got into her, he was commanded by lieutenant parker to come out, in order that he might make room for two smaller men, and he _obeyed the order_. he was afterward permitted to return to her, however, when it was discovered that he could not swim. passed midshipman hynson, a promising young officer, who had been partially disabled by a bad burn received in firing the 'creole' a few days previously, was particularly implored to go into the boat. a lad by the name of nutter jumped out of the boat and offered his place to hynson, and a man by the name of powers did the same thing. hynson refusing both offers, these men declared that then others might take their places, as they were resolved to abide in the wreck with him. hynson and powers were drowned. nutter was saved. when the plunge was made into the sea, sailing-master clemson seized a studding-sail boom, in company with five of the seamen. being a swimmer, and perceiving that the boom was not sufficiently buoyant to support them all, he left it and struck out alone. he perished--the five men were saved." just about this time the first of the gunboats reached the squadron, and the young men of the steerage were intensely amused at the smallness of the vessel. a midshipman from the flagship visited the "reefer." he went alongside of her in the barge, and, not knowing any better, stepped over her port-quarter. lieutenant sterrett, in command, said in his least gentle voice: "sir, there is a gangway to this vessel!" before long even the youngsters learned to respect these little steamers. commodore conner now made an expedition to capture alvarado, but just as he was about ready to begin a bombardment his pilots predicted a "norther," and he hoisted the signal, "return to the anchorage off vera cruz." this was popularly regarded as a _fiasco_, but doubtless the commodore was entirely right, as alvarado might be taken at any time, and subsequently was taken in a manner which has been a joke in the navy ever since. of this something will presently be said. tampico, a town of , inhabitants, miles north of vera cruz, was next proceeded against. the bar at the mouth of the tampico river is considered the most dangerous on the coast, and the larger vessels did not try to cross it. but the smaller steamers and gunboats of the "mosquito fleet" went in, and the town was surrendered without firing a shot. it was then occupied by the army. the next movement was against frontera, at the mouth of the tabasco river, and tabasco, some seventy miles up that little stream. frontera was taken by surprise, and commodore perry, now second in command to commodore conner, moved up the stream with vessels of too heavy draught. he came near losing the "cumberland" in the mud, and, as it was, she was so disabled that when she was pulled from her perch on a bar she had to be sent home for repairs. perry, however, defeated the mexican flotilla and captured all the boats. two of the prizes had to be blown up, but the "champion," a fast river boat, which had run between richmond and norfolk, was taken out and afterward usefully employed as a despatch-boat. in this expedition there was considerable fighting and also some losses both of officers and men. in blockading the port of tuspan, some miles northwest of vera cruz, the brig "truxton," captain carpenter, was stationed. the ship was blown ashore and was under the mexican guns. the captain sent a boat to tell the commodore of the disaster, but before relief could reach him he surrendered. in doing this he was opposed bitterly by all his officers, and the quarter-master on duty positively refused to obey the order to haul down the flag. lieutenant bushrod hunter, who first went for assistance, reached the squadron off vera cruz, as did also lieutenant otway berryman, with a boat's crew, which left before the surrender had been effected. the remainder of the crew were taken to vera cruz as prisoners of war. as soon as commodore conner heard of the disaster he sent captain engle with the "princeton" to tuspan. he made short work of it. he drove the mexicans out of the brig, took what armament was left, and then burned her. the guns taken out of the "truxton" were placed in forts erected to protect tuspan. but these were captured next year by commodore perry and captain breese. the officers and men of the navy had a grudge against tuspan, and the landing detachment which carried the works fought as though each man in it were a demon. it lost three killed, while five officers and six seamen were wounded. during the summer of , the men of the squadron operating in the gulf suffered severely from yellow fever and also from scurvy brought on by a lack of fresh food. it was so bad on the "mississippi" that she had to been sent to pensacola. commodore perry was himself stricken, but he refused to leave, and changed his flag to the "germantown," which remained. this was after the fall of vera cruz, and when the duty of the naval forces was once again only that of blockaders. the investment of vera cruz was the most considerable single piece of work performed by the navy during the war. commodore conner had gathered at vera cruz all his available forces and anxiously awaited the coming of general scott and his army, who were at lobos island, miles north of vera cruz. general taylor, with , men, had just defeated santa anna with , men at buena vista, and two days later, that is, on the th of february, , general scott gave his final orders to his fleet of transports which was to take his army to vera cruz. early in march the transports with , men arrived in front of vera cruz. captain parker, in his book previously quoted, says: "no words can express our excitement as ship after ship crowded with enthusiastic soldiers successively came in; some anchoring near us and others continuing on for the anchorage at anton lizardo. we had been so long on our ships, and for some months so inactive, that we were longing for something to do. i cannot answer for others, but the scene of that day--and i recollect that it was sunday--is so vivid, and the events so firmly fixed in my memory, that i can almost see the ship "diadem" as she grazed our spanker-boom in her desire to pass near enough to speak us, and i can to this day whistle the waltz played by an infantry band on board a transport anchored near us that night, though i have never heard it since." indeed, the naval contingent was most anxious to be in some of the heavy fighting, and the chance seeming near, all was enthusiasm aboard the ships of the squadron. a few days after general scott's arrival he and commodore conner and a large number of principal officers, including captain joseph e. johnston, of the "engineers," made a reconnaissance to decide on the best place to land the army. they selected the mainland abreast of sacrificios island. on the th of march, the steamers "spitfire" and "vixen" and several gunboats ran close inshore and shelled the sand-hills and chaparral in which the enemy might be concealed. only a few horsemen were made to scamper away. the government for this very landing had sent out a number of surf-boats, flat on the bottom and sharp at both ends. each of these carried one hundred men with their arms and accoutrements. they proved most admirable for the service, as the whole army was landed with out a mishap, and, singularly enough, the mexicans did not molest the americans in the least while this important movement was in progress. by midnight of the th of march the whole of the army was ashore. landing the troops having been accomplished, the work of taking the artillery pieces, the ammunition, and supplies was begun, and this consumed a week, each day lasting from four in the morning till ten at night. while this was in progress, general scott was so arranging his troops that he should entirely invest the city, and by the th of march the bombardment began. general scott summoned the authorities to surrender, and gave them a chance to send the women and children out of the city. both invitation and opportunity were declined. and so it came about that many non-combatants were killed in the siege that followed. the sailors not only had to land the army and the materials of war, but they were obliged to help get the siege guns in place. the blue-jacket ashore is nearly always alive to the importance of having a lark, and even in this arduous service they acted very much as though they were on a spree. on one occasion a "norther" came up, and for several days the seamen could not get back to their ships. being idle they had a good time to their hearts' content. it is said that before the end of the first day every jack of them had a horse and was a mounted marine. one of these, a very tough old salt, had for his charger a donkey, and on this animal he rode by general scott's quarters in great pride. "some officers standing by observing that he was, as they thought, seated too far back, called out to him to shift his seat more amidships. 'gentlemen,' said jack, drawing rein, 'this is the first craft i ever commanded, and it's d--d hard if i can't ride on the quarter-deck.'" but there was more serious work immediately in store for the navy than fetching and carrying for the army and rewarding themselves in boyish pranks. the day before the serious bombardment began the squadron was notified by signal from the flagship: "commodore perry commands the squadron." there was rejoicing at this, for perry was regarded as a man who preferred a fight for its own sake rather than to have no fight at all. in this command he proved that he was a good fighter, but he proved also that he knew how to be conservative when necessity made such a course wise. commodore conner went home because his health demanded that he should. the navy department was not dissatisfied with him. but the opportunity for heavy fighting came after perry took the command. from the beginning of the siege the fleet kept up a heavy firing on the city and castle so as to divert the fire from the land forces. general scott soon saw that his guns were not strong enough to batter down the walls of the city, so he requested commodore perry to send him some heavy guns. the commodore's gallant reply was: "certainly, general, but i must fight them." and fight them he did, as we shall see. six heavy pieces of ordnance were landed, and about seamen and volunteers were attached to each gun. three of these were sixty-eight-pounder shell guns and three thirty-two-pounder solid-shot guns. each of these guns weighed about three tons. now each of these had to be dragged through the loose sand, almost knee-deep, for something like three miles before it could be put in the position the engineers had assigned to it. this battery, by the way, was protected by bags of sand piled on each other, and this was the first time that this device had been used. when the battery was in position the officers and men of the ships were so anxious to fight it that, to prevent jealousy, the officers first to be assigned drew lots for the honor. the first day captain aulick commanded, and the next day captain mayo. the naval battery fired with such precision that they did amazing damage to the enemy's works, and on the second day the guns in vera cruz were silenced. then began a parley as to terms, but on the th there was an unconditional surrender. now scott had a foothold in the part of mexico which counted for something, and he was able to begin that masterly march through the valley of mexico and on to the capital of the country. but he never could have obtained this foothold without the assistance of the navy. the country did not recognize this at once, and the newspapers being printed by landsmen, all of the immediate glory was bestowed on general scott. now that vera cruz had fallen and general scott's plans called for a movement toward the interior, it was most desirable for him to have better cavalry. but he lacked horses. singular as it may seem, he called upon the navy to assist in supplying this deficiency. it was known that there were mexican horsemen in and about alvarado, so it was determined to proceed against this place by land and sea, so that the town could be reduced, and the horses secured at the same time. general quitman, with a brigade, was sent by land, so as to keep the horsemen from running away, while the "potomac," captain aulick, and the "scourge," lieutenant charles g. hunter, were sent to appear in front of alvarado. it was evidently intended that captain aulick and general quitman would move on the place on some appointed day. lieutenant hunter did not know what the plans were, and as his boat was much faster than the "potomac" he arrived in front of alvarado long before captain aulick. when the "potomac" did come in sight, a great commotion was noticed in the harbor. the "albany," which had been doing blockading service, came out and informed captain aulick that alvarado had been taken. "by whom?" asked the captain. "by lieutenant hunter, in the 'scourge,'" was the reply. the "scourge," it should be explained, was a very small steamer, carrying one gun and forty men. hunter went up pretty close and observing indications of flinching, he fired three guns and dashed boldly in and captured the place. the horsemen, the capture of whom was the main object of the expedition, were frightened off before general quitman could intercept them. having taken possession of alvarado, lieutenant hunter placed in the town a garrison consisting of a midshipman and two men, and hurried his steamer up the river to a place called tlacotalpan, which he also captured. when general quitman arrived in alvarado with his brigade and the place was gravely handed over to him by passed midshipman william g. temple (afterward a very distinguished officer of high rank) he was greatly amused and laughed heartily. but commodore perry was annoyed and angry. as soon as he could get hold of hunter--not an easy matter, as hunter had gone on his conquering way still further up the river with the intention of taking all the rest of mexico not subjugated by taylor and scott--he placed him under arrest and preferred charges against him. when hunter was shortly tried by court-martial, he was sentenced to be reprimanded by the commodore, the reprimand to be read from the quarter-deck of every vessel in the squadron. the reprimand, prepared by commodore perry, was thought by pretty nearly all the officers of the squadron to be entirely too severe. a military offence had been committed, but it amounted to a mere trifle, and the time was ripe for the people to laugh over such an occurrence. in effect the reprimand was something like this: "who told you to take alvarado? you were sent to watch alvarado, not to take it. you have taken alvarado with but a single gun and not a marine to back you!" then the announcement was made that the squadron would soon move against tabasco, and that hunter should not accompany it, but that he should be dismissed the squadron. and he was sent home. in new york the people made a hero of him, giving him swords and dinners, and securing for him the command of the schooner "taney," in which he made a roving cruise to the mediterranean. as long as he lived he was always spoken of as "alvarado" hunter. a sense of humor is sometimes a dangerous cargo for a public man to carry; but the absence of it also is often dangerous. in this instance commodore perry, because he did not see the amusing aspect of hunter's escapade, made himself so ridiculous that he came near cutting short his own career, which, as will afterward be seen in this history, was destined for greater achievements than any in the past. [illustration: blue-jackets before vera cruz.] the next objective point for the navy was tuspan, where the "truxton" had been lost. the bar at tuspan is dangerous, and even the small steamers of the squadron had their masts hoisted out of them to lighten them. commodore perry hoisted his flag on the "spitfire" and led the way up the river with the boats of the squadron in tow. the first fort on the river below the town, called the pana, was silenced by the gun of the "spitfire" and then stormed by the sailors; two other forts were taken in the same way and the town was occupied. the mexicans made a spirited defence, but did little damage, only one man being killed. among the wounded were captain tatnall, commander whittle, and lieutenant james parker. the guns taken from the "truxton" were found in one of the forts and restored to the fleet. the last naval operation of the war was against tabasco. commodore perry took all of the fleet which could possibly go up the river from frontera. this town was easily captured, but when the ascent of the river began the boats were continually fired upon from the trees and chaparral along the banks. at a place called devil's bend, the passage of the river was interrupted by a sunken obstruction, technically called a _chevaux de frise_. commodore perry did not mean to let this stop him, so he organized a land force of seamen and marines and concluded to march to tabasco. he had numerous skirmishes, but was not stopped. one day his own ships passed him, the _chevaux de frise_ having been raised by attaching rubber bags to it and then inflating them with air. when perry arrived at tabasco he found the american flag flying, the town having fallen without resistance to his own ships. so his own arduous march across country had been all for nothing. this was the last work of the sailors, but the marines of the navy still saw glorious service, as a detachment of them was with general scott, participating in the attack on chapultepec. they were also among the first to enter the city of mexico when that capital surrendered. the navy in the war with mexico did itself credit as it always had before, and reflected honor upon the country, whose flag was upheld with brilliant courage and untiring zeal. chapter xix. the navy in peace. -- surveying the dead sea. -- suppressing the slave trade. -- the franklin relief expedition. -- commodore perry in japan. -- signing of the treaty. -- trouble in chinese waters. -- the koszta case. -- the second franklin relief expedition. -- foote at canton. -- "blood is thicker than water." after the mexican war the navy engaged for twelve years in works of peace varied by a little exciting police duty on the high seas. much was done for commerce and for civilization in the years immediately succeeding , but the story, though important, is not exciting, and is therefore little known. the records of these years afford a fair suggestion of what a navy may do when actual fighting is not necessary, and when its vessels, with the trained sailors and scientists who man them, may be utilized in utilitarian work. shortly after the close of the mexican war, the armed ship "supply," under command of lieutenant lynch, sailed on an expedition to the dead sea. the start was made from new york, and the vessel arrived in the mediterranean only a few weeks after peace had been declared with mexico. at smyrna, lieutenant lynch left the "supply," and went to constantinople to obtain permission to enter the turkish domains. this having been granted, the party sailed for haifa. arriving at this port on the st of march, they left their ship, and set out for the sea of galilee by an overland route, carrying on trucks the boats which had been specially built for navigation in the river jordan. upon reaching tiberias, on the western shore of the sea of galilee, the party divided, one detachment embarking in the boats to navigate the sea of galilee, and the other mounting camels and horses to make the trip by land, with the intention of keeping those who had sailed in view as much as possible, and protecting them from attacks by wandering arabs or aiding them if necessary in the passage of the tortuous and turbulent jordan. eight days were consumed in making this passage, and a distance covered of miles, although if the trip had been made in a straight line instead of along the winding course of the river, it would have been necessary to have traversed only sixty miles. an encampment was established on the desolate banks of the dead sea, and several exploring and scientific expeditions in the neighborhood were made. among the interesting facts gathered was the exact depression of the dead sea below the level of the ocean. this was found to be , feet. the western coast of africa was the scene of the next important activity on the part of the american cruisers. the slave-trade, which in the eighteenth century had assumed extensive proportions, still flourished to a degree which made the condition upon the coast a disgrace to civilization. it was a notorious fact, moreover, that a large proportion of the vessels in the trade were of american build and sailed under the stars and stripes. the united states government was anxious to wipe out this blot upon the nation's fair fame; and consequently, in , sent lieutenant foote, in command of the brig "perry," to african waters. the lieutenant, who, by the way, afterward became the distinguished admiral foote, at once began active cruising off ambrig, a notorious slave mart. the "perry" was constantly at sea, chasing and boarding suspicious vessels, and very often her boats passed through the surf and ran up the jungle-bordered rivers to the slave barracoons. many large slavers were captured, and when, in , the "perry" was succeeded on the african coast by the squadron under commander gregory, lieutenant foote had effectually checked the slave trade. he was thanked for his services by the secretary of the navy. while lieutenant foote was sailing under the blazing sun of africa, another lieutenant, edwin j. de haven, in command of the brigs "rescue" and "advance," was pushing his way northward through the ice of the arctic ocean. the navy department had considered it proper and fitting to aid england in her search for the british commander, sir john franklin and his men, who had sailed into the arctic regions on an exploring expedition, and had been gone so long as to warrant the belief that they were in grave peril, if not already dead. volunteers for the relief expedition had been called for by the department. lieutenant de haven and others had responded, and on may th, , started on their errand of mercy. in july, the party was in baffin's bay, and here the brigs remained embedded in the ice for twenty-one days. on the th of july, by a sudden movement of the floe, an opening at the north presented itself; a north-east breeze sprang up at the same time, and with press of sail the brigs were able to force their way into clear water. for a month afterward there was continual battling with the ice, and slow progress northward. on august th, lieutenant de haven, having in the mean time fallen in with several english relief expeditions, decided to make a search on the shores adjacent to a lancaster sound. here were found three graves, and various signs that franklin and his companions had spent a winter somewhere thereabouts; but there were no indications of the course his vessels, the "erebus" and the "terror," had taken when they had sailed away. throughout the winter the search was continued, and the "rescue" and the "advance" were often in imminent danger of destruction in the masses of ice which pressed against the sides of the ships with enormous force. "every moment," said lieutenant de haven, in his report, "i expected the vessels would be crushed or overwhelmed by the masses of ice forced up far above our bulwarks." but at last, on june th, they forced their way again into the open sea; and as the instructions had been not to spend a second winter in the arctic regions, sail was set for home, and late in the summer of the brigs arrived at new york. the sending of the frigate "mississippi," commanded by captain matthew g. perry, to the coast of halifax, in , averted what threatened to be serious trouble. a dispute had arisen among the american and canadian fishing schooners in those waters, and seven american vessels had been seized by the british cruisers. this caused intense indignation in new england; but captain perry poured oil upon the troubled waters, and in , as a result of his visit, a reciprocity treaty between the united states and canada was signed, and this lasted for ten years. captain perry performed his most important services for the government, however, in japan. the early fifties were an era of exploring expeditions for the navy. there were trips up the rivers into unknown regions of south america and africa. the isthmus of darien was explored, and an ambitious scheme to cut a ship-channel through was found to be impracticable. it was very natural, during this activity in penetrating little-known parts of the world, that attention should have been given to japan, which was a land of mystery to the world at large because of the exclusion of foreigners from that country. in , captain perry was assigned the command of the squadron cruising in the east indies, and was empowered, in addition to his ordinary duties, to make a display of force in the waters of japan in order to obtain better treatment for american seamen cast upon japanese shores, and to gain entry into japanese ports for vessels seeking supplies. he bore a letter, moreover, from the president of the united states to the emperor of japan, written with a view to obtaining a treaty providing for friendly intercourse and commerce with the haughty island kingdom. on the th of july, the squadron, comprising the frigates "mississippi," "susquehanna," and "powhatan"; the corvette "macedonian"; the sloops-of-war "plymouth," "saratoga," and "vandalia"; and the store-ships "supply," "southampton," and "lexington," anchored off the city of uraga, in the bay of jeddo, japan. captain perry decided that the proper course to pursue with the japanese was to assume a very lofty and commanding tone and bearing. he therefore ordered away from the sides of his vessel the boats which swarmed around it, and allowed none but government officials of high rank to come on board. he himself remained in seclusion in his cabin, treating with the japanese through intermediaries. he moved his squadron nearer the capital than was allowable, and then demanded that a special commission, composed of men of the highest rank, be appointed to convey his letter from the president to the emperor. the close proximity of the ships-of-war to the capital, and captain perry's peremptory demand, were not at all to the liking of the japanese; but they were greatly impressed with his apparent dignity and power, and at last consented to receive and consider the letter. fearing treachery, captain perry moved his ships up so that their guns would command the building prepared for his reception, and on the th of july went ashore with an escort of officers and men, who found themselves, on landing, surrounded by about , japanese soldiers under arms. three months were given to the japanese officials to reply to the letter, and captain perry sailed with his squadron for the coast of china. he returned after an interval of three months, and anchored his ships beyond uraga, where the previous conference had been held, and nearer the capital, despite the fact that a place twenty miles below had been appointed for the second meeting. the japanese demurred at this, being so exclusive that they did not wish their capital nor their country even to be seen by foreigners. instead of respecting these wishes, captain perry approached still nearer, until he was only eight miles from tokio. this high-handed policy had the desired effect. five special japanese commissioners met captain perry, and in a building within range of the ships' guns, negotiations were carried on. they resulted, on march st, in the signing of a treaty by the japanese, in which they promised to open two of their ports to american vessels seeking supplies; to give aid to seamen of the united states wrecked upon their shores; to allow american citizens temporarily residing in their ports to enter, within certain prescribed limits, the surrounding country; to permit consuls of the united states to reside in one of the open ports; and, in general, to show a peaceful and friendly spirit toward our government and citizens. this treaty is important, because it opened the door for the peoples of the world to a country which has since proved to be possessed of vast wealth and resources. captain perry received high praise for his firmness and diplomacy in the conduct of the difficult negotiations. one vessel of captain perry's fleet, the "plymouth," had remained at shanghai when the squadron returned to japanese waters, and she played a very active though brief part in the troubles which then existed in china. imperial and revolutionary troops were fighting for supremacy, and the former showed a hostile disposition to the american and english residents of shanghai. an american pilot was captured by an imperial man-of-war, but was retaken in a most spirited manner from the chinese by lieutenant guest, and a boat's crew from the "plymouth." the chinese manifestations of hostility toward foreign residents continued, and on the th of april, , about ninety men from the "plymouth" and american merchant-ships, under the leadership of commander kelly, went ashore, and in conjunction with one hundred and fifty men from a british man-of-war, began an attack upon the imperial camp. the americans had two field-pieces and a twelve-pound boat-howitzer, which, together with the muskets, were used so effectively that, after ten minutes of sharp fighting, the chinese fled in great disorder, leaving a number of dead and wounded upon the field. the american loss was two killed and four wounded. piracy was rampant in the china seas during this period, and so bold and ferocious were the chinese desperadoes that their junks were a great terror to merchant vessels, and seriously interfered with commerce. the "powhatan," another of captain perry's squadron, and the english sloop "rattler," joined forces against a fleet of piratical junks off khulan, in , and completely destroyed them, killing many of the pirates in the attack and taking a large number of prisoners. in happy valley, hong-kong, a monument was erected to commemorate the eight english and american sailors who were killed in the conflict. while the east india squadron was performing these important and gallant services off the coasts of japan and china, the other vessels of the navy were by no means idle. among the conspicuous naval events of the time was the spirited action of commander ingraham at smyrna, in . a young austrian, martin koszta, had lived in new york city two years before, and had declared his intention of becoming an american citizen. he had gone to smyrna on business, and having incurred the displeasure of the austrian government, had been seized, and was a prisoner on board the austrian man-of-war "hussar." commander ingraham, commanding the sloop-of-war "st. louis," demanded that koszta be surrendered, on the ground that he was an american citizen. this being refused, ingraham cleared for action, although the "hussar's" force was much superior to his own. his bold stand brought the austrians to satisfactory terms, and the threatened engagement was averted by the surrender of koszta. there were two arctic expeditions in addition to that of the "rescue" and the "advance" in the early fifties. both of them grew out of the ill-fated arctic explorations of sir john franklin. lady franklin, his wife, was anxious, upon the failure of the first relief expeditions, to send another, and she asked that a surgeon of the united states navy, dr. kane, be permitted to command it. the navy department granted the request, and in june, , the expedition, composed of eighteen men under orders from the department and the patronage of henry grinnell, of new york, and george peabody, the american merchant, of london, began the northwest journey. this search for sir john franklin's ships was also unsuccessful, and the relief party was for a long time in imminent danger of a fate similar to franklin's. after living for two winters imprisoned in the ice in smith's sound, they abandoned their vessel, which had been largely broken up to provide fuel, and started on a journey over the ice in sledges. after eighty-four days of extreme privation and thrilling adventure, they reached driscol bay, where they were found by commander hartstone and lieutenant simms, commanding respectively the "release" and the "arctic," which vessels had been fitted out by order of congress to rescue them. in october, , the united party reached new york. in november, , the presence of the united states ship "germantown," commanded by captain lynch, in the harbor of montevideo, prevented an extensive massacre. there had been a rebellion in paraguay, and the insurrectionists had capitulated. the government troops rushed upon them with the intention of despatching them, when a detachment of united states marines interfered and put an end to the sanguinary scene. three years afterward the marines performed efficient services in montevideo in protecting foreign residents against the insurgents in another rebellion. the rather curious episode of a battle-ship fighting indians occurred in . the sloop-of-war "decatur," commander gansevoort, anchored off seattle, washington, to protect the settlers from attacks from a large body of indians. the savages appeared, and fought the marines, who had landed, with much spirit for six hours. at nightfall they disappeared in the woods, having suffered the loss of a large number of braves. one of the most gallant and important of the minor operations of the navy took place in november of the same year. trouble having arisen between the chinese authorities of the city of canton and the english officials in the vicinity, it was thought that american interests might be injured, and in consequence commander foote stationed his vessel, the sloop-of-war "portsmouth," of the squadron under flag-officer armstrong, near the island of whampoa, and thence proceeded, in several armed boats, to ascend the river to canton to establish an armed neutrality. several americans, however, joined the british in an attack upon the governor's palace, and planted the flag beside the english colors on the wall of the city. commander foote disavowed this act, but as he was returning from an interview with the flag-officer at whampoa, several shots of grape and canister were fired from the forts upon his boat, although it displayed the american flag. the next day the "portsmouth" and the "levant," which had come up the river to lend her aid, proceeded to the canton barrier forts to avenge the insult. the "levant" grounded before coming in range of the forts; but the "portsmouth," under a sharp fire, sailed on until within about yards of the nearest fort; then she opened fire. after she had thrown about shells, the chinese ceased firing. then followed four days of unsatisfactory parley with yeh, the governor of canton, after which commander foote renewed the attack. the "levant" now joined the "portsmouth," and the vessels began a cannonade, which was returned with spirit for an hour. then men, in ten boats, were landed, and stormed the nearest fort, which was taken. five thousand pigtail-wearing soldiers afterward attempted to recapture it, but were repulsed. in like manner, on the following morning, the next fort was taken, with an american loss of but three men. during the afternoon the defenders of the third fort fled. the next morning, in the face of a heavy fire, the fourth and last fort was carried by a rapid assault. the little company of americans was now in possession of four modern forts constructed by european engineers, which had been defended, moreover, by thousands of men. the insult had been avenged, and the affair resulted in a treaty of friendship and commerce with china. there was little love between americans and chinese, however, and three years afterward captain josiah tatnall rendered valuable aid to the english and french gunboats when fired upon by the chinese forts. the boats, under the command of sir james hope, were attempting to remove obstructions in the peiho river when the forts suddenly opened a destructive fire. a desperate conflict followed, in which several hundred of the english were killed. captain tatnall commanded the chartered steamer "toey-wan," which was in the harbor. he forgot his neutrality as he watched the scene. with the exclamation, "blood is thicker than water!" he jumped into his launch and steamed for the british flagship. the boat was struck with a ball, and before its trip was ended sunk, the coxswain being killed and lieutenant trenchart severely wounded. the others who had manned her were rescued, and they helped the english at the guns. captain tatnall afterward used the "toey-wan" to tow up and bring into action the british reserves. his action was a clear violation of the treaty and the neutrality law. he received but slight punishment, however, and gained great popularity in great britain. at eaya, in the feejee islands, in , a sharp conflict took place between the natives and forty men under lieutenant caldwell, who had been sent to destroy the principal village as retribution for the murder of two american citizens. the natives were sent fleeing inland. the secretary of the navy said of the affair, "the gallantry, coolness, and bravery displayed by officers and men was in the highest degree commendable." a somewhat similar episode occurred in the vicinity of kisembo, on the west coast of africa, in . the natives threatened the property and lives of american citizens, and would undoubtedly have put their threats into effect had it not been for the presence and prompt action of commander brent of the sloop-of-war "marion." when an insurrection occurred in the neighborhood of panama, in july, , commander porter landed a body of marines and sailors from his ship, the "st. mary's," which was then stationed on the western coast of mexico. the governor gave up the city of panama to the joint occupancy of the forces of the "st. mary's" and the british ship-of-war "clio," and tranquillity was quickly restored. part iii blue-jackets of ' . chapter i. the opening of the conflict. -- the navies of the contestants. -- dix's famous despatch. -- the river gunboats. the story of the naval operations of the civil war is a record of wonderful energy and inventive skill in improvising and building war-vessels, vigilance and courage in handling them, and desperate bravery and dash displayed by officers and seamen in the great engagements in which vessels of either side took part. yet of the immense body of literature dealing with the war, the greater part is given to telling the story of the great armies of the north and south. the details of the great land battles are familiar to many who have but a vague idea of the service done by the "blue jackets" of the north, and the daring deeds performed by the navies of both sides. when the first mutterings of the storm of war began to be heard, the united states government had at its disposal sixty-nine vessels-of-war, of which twenty-seven were laid up for repairs, or, sailors would say, "out of commission." of the forty-two vessels in commission, twenty-six were absent on missions to the east indies, the african coast, and other distant quarters of the globe. long months must elapse before the most hasty orders could reach them. many were sailing-vessels, and must consume many months of precious time before they could reach the shores of the united states. indeed, though on the inauguration of president lincoln on march , , all these vessels were immediately recalled, not one arrived before the middle of june, and many were delayed until late in the following winter. of the vessels at home, many were old-fashioned sailing-frigates; beautiful with their towering masts and clouds of snowy canvas, but almost useless in that day when steam had become known as the only means of propelling vessels-of-war. [illustration: the "hartford," farragut's flagship.] in officers and men the navy was almost as deficient as in vessels. a long peace had filled the lists of officers with old men past that age in which may be expected the alertness and energy that must be possessed by jack afloat. the lower grades were filled by boyish officers from the naval academy, who had never seen a gun fired in anger. the service was becoming rusty from long idleness. such was the condition of the navy of the united states when abraham lincoln was made president. four years later the navy of the united states consisted of six hundred and seventy-one vessels. no nation of the world had such a naval power. the stern lessons of the great war had taught shipbuilders that wooden ships were a thing of the past. the little "monitor" had by one afternoon's battle proved to all the sovereigns of europe that their massive ships were useless. and all this had been done by a people grappling in deadly strife with an enemy in their very dwellings. the world's history contains no more wonderful story of energy and invention. [illustration: departure of a naval expedition from port royal.] when president lincoln began his term of office, he appointed gideon welles of connecticut secretary of the navy. south carolina had seceded from the union. mississippi, georgia, florida, alabama, and louisiana had followed south carolina. anderson, with a handful of united states troops, was holding fort sumter, expecting every minute to see the puff of smoke from the distant casement of fort moultrie, and hear the shriek of the shell that should announce the opening of the attack. at washington, politicians were intriguing. the loyalty of no man could be regarded as certain. officers of the army and navy were daily resigning, and hastening to put themselves under the command of their various states. in the south all was activity. in the north the popular desire for a compromise hampered the authorities so that no decided stand against the spread of the rebellion could be made. the new secretary of the navy found himself face to face with the certainty of a long and bloody war, yet had under his command a navy hardly adequate for times of peace. to add to his perplexity, many of the oldest and most skilful officers in the navy resigned, saying that their duty to their states was greater than to the united states as a whole. a few revenue officers even went so far as to deliver to the state authorities the vessels of which they were in command. one commander, a georgian, bringing his ship back from foreign waters, hesitated long whether to take it to the navy-yard at new york, or to deliver it to the southern leaders. he finally decided to obey orders, and the ship remained with the united states. some days afterward the commander told his lieutenant of his hesitation. "we all saw it," said the younger officer; "and had you turned the ship's prow towards charleston, you would have been instantly put in irons." the surrender of another naval vessel called forth that famous despatch from john a. dix that will ever be linked with his name. the united states revenue cutter "mcclelland" was lying at new orleans, under the command of capt. breshwood. the revenue service is distinct from the regular navy, and is under the general command of the secretary of the treasury. john a. dix, then secretary of the treasury, suspected that capt. breshwood was about to surrender his vessel to the confederates, and sent an agent to order him to take the vessel to new york. breshwood refused, and instantly dix sent the despatch: "tell lieut. caldwell to arrest capt. breshwood, assume command of the cutter, and obey the order through you. if capt. breshwood, after arrest, undertakes to interfere with the command of the cutter, tell lieut. caldwell to consider him as a mutineer, and treat him accordingly. _if any man attempts to haul down the american flag, shoot him on the spot._" this despatch was intercepted by the confederates, and the cutter was surrendered. but dix's determined words reverberated through the north, and thrilled all hearts with the hope that the time for delay was past, and that the growing rebellion would be put down with a firm hand. so at the opening of the war we find the north with a navy consisting of but a few old-fashioned ships, few sailors, officers everywhere resigning, and a general feeling of distrust of brother officers in all grades. the condition of the south as regards the navy was even worse. the southern states had never done any great amount of ship-building. the people were almost all engaged in farming. the crops of cotton and sugar that they raised were shipped in vessels built in maine, and manned by sailors from the seafaring villages of new england. at the time the war broke out, there was hardly a shipyard in the confines of the confederacy. a few vessels were gained by the treachery of united states officers. the capture of the norfolk navy-yard brought them large quantities of naval stores, and by wonderful activity a few vessels were built for service on inland sounds and rivers. but at no time could the confederacy have been said to have a navy; and, keeping this fact in view, the record the confederates made with two or three vessels is most wonderful. in war-vessels for service on that wonderful network of rivers that make up the waterways of the mississippi valley, the south was not so deficient as in ships of the seagoing class. the long, crescent-shaped levee at new orleans is lined throughout certain seasons of the year by towering river-steamers which ply up and down the mississippi and connecting streams, taking from the plantations huge loads of cotton, sugar, and rice, and carrying to the planters those supplies which can only be furnished by the markets of a great city. the appearance of one of these towering river transports as she comes sailing down the turbid stream of the great father of waters, laden to the water's edge with brown bales of cotton, and emitting from her lofty, red crowned smoke-stacks dense clouds of pitchy black smoke, is most wonderful. unlike ocean-steamers, the river-steamer carries her load upon her deck. built to penetrate far towards the head-waters of rivers and bayous that in summer become mere shallow ditches, these steamers have a very light draught. many of them, whose tiers of white cabins tower sixty or seventy feet into the air, have but three feet of hull beneath the river's surface. the first deck, when the vessel is but lightly loaded, stands perhaps two feet out of water. above this, carried on rows of posts twenty feet high, comes the first cabin. all between is open to the air on either side; so that, as one of the huge river-monsters passes at night, the watcher on the bank can see the stalwart, black, half-naked bodies of the negro stokers, bending before the glowing furnace doors, and throwing in the soft coal, that issues in clouds of smoke from the towering chimneys seventy feet above. the lights in three rows of cabin windows glow; and the unceasing beat of the paddle-wheels mingles with the monotonous puff of the steam from the escape-pipes, and the occasional bursts of music from the open cabin doors. one who for the first time looks on one of these leviathans of the mississippi, pursuing its stately course at night, does not wonder at the frightened negro, who, seeing for the first time a night-steamboat, rushed madly from the river's bank, crying that the angel gabriel had come to blow the last trump. when these boats have taken on their full load of cotton, they present a very different appearance. then all the open space beneath the cabins is filled by a mass of cotton-bales. the hull is so sunken in the water that the lowest tier of cotton-bales is lapped by the little waves that ruffle the surface of the river. the stokers and furnaces are hid from view, and the cabins appear to be floating on one huge cotton bale. generally a great wooden stern-wheel propels this strange craft, adding to the grotesqueness of the sight. it may readily be understood, that vessels of this class, in which strength was subordinated to lightness, and economy to gingerbread decoration, seemed to be but poor materials for vessels-of-war. the tremendous recoil of a rifled cannon fired from one of those airy decks, meant to stand no ruder shock than the vibration caused by dancing pleasure-parties, would shake the whole frail structure to pieces. yet the ingenuity born of necessity, and the energy awakened by the immediate prospect of war, led the confederate engineers to convert some of these pleasure-palaces into the most terrible engines of destruction chronicled in the annals of war. the first step was to sweep off all the towering superstructure of decks, cabins, and saloons; tear away all the fanciful mouldings, the decorated staterooms, and carved and gilded stairways. this left a long, shallow hull, with a powerful engine in the centre, and great paddle-wheels towering on either side; the whole so light that the soldiers of grant's army, when they first saw one, stoutly averred that "those boats could run on a heavy dew." the hull was then thinly plated with iron, and the prow lengthened, and made massive, until it formed the terrible "ram," fallen into disuse since the days of the greek galleys, to be taken up again by naval architects in the nineteenth century. then on the deck was built a pent-house of oak and iron, with sloping sides just high enough to cover the engine. the two towering smoke-stacks, the pride of the old river-steamers, were cut down to squat pipes protruding a foot or two above the strange structure. in the sides were embrasures, from which, when open, peered the iron muzzles of the dogs of war, ready to show their teeth and spit fire and iron at the enemy. this was the most powerful type of the river gunboat, and with them the confederacy was fairly well provided; though it was not long before the war department of the united states was well supplied with similar ships. it was these iron-clad gunboats that used to rouse the anger of the doughty admiral farragut, who persisted in declaring them cowardly engines of destruction, and predicted that as they came into use, the race of brave fighting jack-tars would disappear. on one occasion the admiral was ploughing his way up the mississippi above new orleans, in one of commodore bailey's river iron-clads. the batteries of the enemy on either hand were pounding away at the ascending ships, hurling huge bolts of iron against their mailed sides, with a thunder that was deafening, and a shock that made the stricken ships reel. the admiral stood in the gunroom of one of the iron-clads, watching the men working the guns, in an atmosphere reeking with the smoke of the powder. a look of manifest disapproval was on his face. suddenly an unusually well-directed shot struck a weak point in the armor, and, bursting through, killed two men near the admiral's position. he looked for a moment on the ghastly spectacle, then turning to an officer said, "you may stay here in your iron-clad room if you wish: as for me, i feel safer on deck." and on deck he went, and stayed there while the fleet passed through the hail of shot and shell. the scarcity of iron in the southern states prevented the naval authorities of the newly organized confederacy from equipping a very large fleet of iron-clads. at the outbreak of the war, the tredegar iron works at richmond was the only place in the south where iron plates of a size suitable for plating vessels could be rolled. the demand was of course far in excess of the facilities of the factory, and many were the make-shifts that shipbuilders were forced to. some vessels were plated only about the centre, so as to protect the boiler and engines. others bore such a thin coat of iron that they were derisively called "tin-clads" by the sailors, who insisted that a yankee can-opener was all that was necessary to rip the vessel up. sometimes, when even a little iron was unattainable, bales of cotton were piled up around the sides, like breastworks, for the protection of men and engines. the vessel which captured the united states ship "harriet lane," at galveston, was thus provided; and the defence proved very valuable. one great objection to the cotton-bale bulwarks was the very inflammable nature of the material, since a red-hot shot from the enemy, or a bit of blazing wadding from a gun, would set it smouldering with a dense black smoke that drove the men from their guns until the bales could be thrown overboard; thus extinguishing the fire, but exposing the men to the fire of the enemy. one of the most striking features of the war of secession was the manner in which private citizens hastened to contribute towards the public defence. this was so no less in naval than in military circles. perhaps the greatest gift ever made by a citizen to his government was the gift by "commodore" vanderbilt to the united states of a magnificently equipped ship-of-war, which was named "the vanderbilt" in honor of her donor, and did efficient service in maintaining the blockade on the atlantic coast. mr. james gordon bennett, the present owner of the "new-york herald," put his yacht at the service of the government, and was himself commissioned a lieutenant in the revenue service. chapter ii. fort sumter bombarded. -- attempt of the "star of the west" to re-enforce anderson. -- the naval expedition to fort sumter. -- the rescue of the frigate "constitution." -- burning the norfolk navy-yard. [illustration: fort moultrie.] the first purely warlike event of the civil war was the bombardment and capture of fort sumter in charleston harbor, by the troops of the state of south carolina. at the time when it first became evident that civil war was inevitable, fort sumter was vacant. the only united states troops stationed at charleston were two companies of artillery under major robert anderson. the fortifications of charleston harbor consisted of fort moultrie on the main land (in which anderson's command was stationed), fort pinckney, and fort sumter standing massive and alone in the centre of the harbor. anderson, with his handful of troops in the most vulnerable of the three forts, saw day by day the secession sentiment growing stronger. almost daily some of the privileges of the soldiery were cut off; such as the right of passing through the city, and the right to buy supplies in the public markets. daily could be heard the drum and the tread of the newly organized bodies of state soldiers. anderson saw that his position was a weak one, but could get no orders from headquarters. finally he decided to assume the responsibility of evacuating fort moultrie and occupying fort sumter. to-day it hardly seems as though he could have thought of doing otherwise, but at that time it was a grave responsibility for a man to assume. the whole voice of the north was for compromise, and it was his part to commit the first overt act of war. but he was nobly upheld in his decision by his northern brethren. having decided, he lost no time in carrying his plan into effect. his little corps of troops was drawn up at midnight on the parade, and for the first time informed of the contemplated movement. the guns of fort moultrie were hurriedly knocked from their trunnions, and spiked; the gun-carriages were piled in great heaps, and fired; and every thing that might in any way be used against the united states government was destroyed. then the work of evacuation was begun. a small fleet of row-boats carried the troops to the entrance of the great, sullen fort, standing alone in the middle of the harbor, and made frequent trips bringing supplies and ammunition from the deserted fortress. all was done silently: the oars were muffled, and the commands of the officers were whispered, that no tidings should be told of the movement under way. before sunrise all was completed; and when the rays of the rising sun fell upon the stars and stripes floating from the flagstaff of sumter, the people of charleston turned their eyes from the starry flag to the clouds of smoke arising from fortress moultrie, and comprehended that the war had begun. newspaper correspondents and agents of the federal government, and the southern leaders, rushed for the telegraph-wires; and the news soon sped over the country, that sumter was occupied. the south carolinians at once began to build earthworks on all points bearing on the fort, and were evidently preparing to drive anderson and his troops out. anderson promptly telegraphed to washington for supplies and re-enforcements, and expressed his intention of staying as long as the walls stood. the government was dilatory, but finally concluded to re-enforce the fort, and to that end secured the steamer "star of the west," and began the work of provisioning her for the voyage. it was decided that she should carry no guns: that would look too much like war; and accordingly, on the th of january, this helpless vessel set out to the aid of the beleaguered garrison of fort sumter. the news was at once telegraphed to charleston; and the gunners in the confederate trenches shotted their guns, and awaited the appearance of the steamer. she hove into sight on the morning of the th, and when within range was notified, by a shot across her bows, that she was expected to stop. this signal being disregarded, the firing began in earnest; and the shot and shell fell thick about the ship, which kept pluckily on her course. but it was useless to persist. one shot struck the steamer near the bows, others whizzed through her rigging, and finally her captain saw a tug putting out from the land, towing a schooner crowded with armed men to cut off the "star's" retreat. he gave the command "hard a port." the ship's head swung round, and she steamed away, leaving the garrison to their fate. an old gunner who stood in a casemate of fort sumter, with the lanyard of a shotted gun in his hand, tells the story of how he begged major anderson to let him fire on the rebel batteries. "not yet; be patient," was the response. when the shells began to fall thick about the steamer, he again asked permission to retaliate, but met the same response. then when he saw the white splinters fly from the bow, where the enemies' shell had struck, he cried, "now, surely, we can return _that!_" but still the answer was, "be patient." when the "star of the west," confessing defeat, turned and fled from the harbor, anderson turned and walked away, curtly saying there was no need to fire then, but to save the load for the necessity that was coming. [illustration: anderson's command occupying fort sumter.] [illustration: major robert anderson.] the first naval operation of the war was the expedition fitted out to relieve fort sumter. in itself, this expedition was but an insignificant affair, ending in failure; but as the first warlike action on the part of the united states government, it attracted the greatest attention throughout the nation. in preparing the vessels for sea, great care was taken to keep their destination secret, so that no warning should reach the confederates, who were lying in their batteries about sumter, awaiting the first offensive action of the united states authorities to begin shelling the fortress. while the squadron was fitting out, it was generally supposed that it was intended to carry troops and munitions of war to fort pickens in pensacola harbor, which was invested by the confederates. when the fleet finally sailed, each commander carried sealed orders, upon opening which he first found that the expedition was bound for charleston harbor. notwithstanding all this secrecy, the destination of the fleet was telegraphed to the confederates almost as soon as the last vessel dropped past sandy hook; and the fire from the circle of batteries about the doomed fort in charleston harbor began immediately. when the fleet arrived at its destination, the bombardment was well under way. to attempt to land troops or stores under the withering fire concentrated upon the fort, would have been madness. the only vessel of sufficient strength to engage the batteries, the "pawnee," had been separated from the fleet by a gale a few nights before, and had not yet arrived. sadly the sailors gave up the attempt, and, beating up and down outside the harbor bar, awaited the inevitable end of the unequal conflict. when, finally, after a heroic resistance of several days, major anderson and his little band, worn with constant vigilance and labor, destitute of provisions, and exposed to a constant hail of iron missiles from without and a raging fire within, agreed to capitulate, the united states steamship "baltic," of the fort sumter expedition, took him on board and bore him safely to new york. the main purpose of the expedition had failed, it is true; but the government had made its first decisive move, and public sympathy and confidence were excited. [illustration: fort sumter under fire.] the preparations for the coming struggle were now being pressed forward on every hand. an incident which occurred soon after the fall of sumter awakened the greatest enthusiasm throughout the north. the united states frigate "constitution" was lying at annapolis, where she was being used by the authorities of the naval academy there for a school-ship. although the state of maryland had not seceded from the union, yet secessionists were to be found in great numbers in all parts of the state. a number of them determined to seize the ship. besides being a war-vessel of considerable strength, the "constitution"--or "old ironsides," as she was affectionately called--was famous for her many exploits, and dear to the hearts of americans for her long service under the stars and stripes. "if we can but capture the vessel, and turn her guns against the union," thought the conspirators, "we will strike a heavy blow at the northern sympathizers." and, indeed, it would have been a heavy blow to the nation had they captured the old frigate that did such service under preble in the war with tripoli; and that in the war of forced the british to strike their colors, and gave to the united states navy an equal place on the high seas with any nation of the world. the plans of the conspirators were well laid. the ship was manned by but twenty men, and lay above a bar, over which she could only be carried by the aid of a steam-tug. fortunately the officers and crew were all loyal. for four days and four nights they watched the preparations being made on shore for their capture. mysterious signals flashed from the surrounding hills. armed bodies of men were seen drilling on the shore. all seemed to tend toward certain capture. yet with no chance of escape the brave men kept vigilant guard, with guns shotted and always primed. near annapolis was stationed the eighth massachusetts infantry, with gen. butler in command. news was carried to the general of the perilous position of the "constitution," and he at once determined to hasten to her relief. just as the crew of the old frigate had abandoned all hope, the steamer "maryland" entered the harbor, her guards and decks crowded with the men of the eighth massachusetts. quickly the "constitution" was prepared for sailing. her anchors were slipped, all useless weight cast overboard, and, with the "maryland" as tug, the stately frigate passed slowly over the bar, and out of the grasp of the conspirators. the "constitution" was not the only united states vessel that the confederates were planning to seize. soon after she escaped from their hands, an event occurred by which a vast quantity of naval stores, and the mutilated but still valuable hulls of some of the most powerful war-vessels in the united states navy, fell into their hands. the united states navy-yard at norfolk was one of the most valuable of all the governmental possessions. in the great yard was government property amounting to more than twenty millions of dollars. machine-shops, foundries, dwellings for officers, and a massive granite dry-dock made it one of the most complete navy-yards in the world. an enormous quantity of cannon, cannon-balls, powder, and small-arms packed the huge storehouses. in the magnificent harbor were lying some of the most formidable vessels of the united states navy, including the steam frigate "merrimac," of which we shall hear much hereafter. small wonder was it, that the people of virginia, about to secede from the union, looked with covetous eyes upon this vast stock of munitions of war lying apparently within their grasp. it did not take long for them to persuade themselves that they were right in seizing it; and, once decided, their movements were vigorous and open. of their ability to capture the yard, and gain possession of all the property there, they felt no doubt. the first thing to be done was to entrap the ships so that they should be unable to get out of the harbor. accordingly, on the th of april, three large stone-vessels were sunk directly in the channel, apparently barring the exit of the frigates most effectually. indeed, so confident of success were the plotters, that in a despatch to richmond, announcing the successful sinking of the stone-ships, they said, "thus have we secured for virginia three of the best ships of the navy." but later events showed, that, in boasting so proudly, the virginians were committing the old error of counting chickens before they were hatched. the condition of affairs within the navy-yard now seemed desperate. there appeared to be no chance of getting the vessels beyond the obstructions. the militia of virginia was rapidly gathering in the town. among the naval officers on the ships great dissension existed, as many were southerners, about to resign their posts in the united states service to enter the service of their states. these men would, of course, give no active aid to any movement for the salvation of the united states property in the yard. any assistance must come from the outside; the beleaguered could but passively await the course of events. at seven o'clock on the night of april , the united states steamer "pawnee," which had been lying under the guns of fortress monroe, hoisted anchor, and headed up the bay, on an errand of destruction. it was too late to save the navy-yard with its precious stores. the only thing to be done was to burn, break, and destroy every thing that might be of service to an enemy. the decks of the "pawnee" were black with men,--soldiers to guard the gates, and complete the work of destruction within the yard; blue-jacketed tars to do what might be done to drag the entrapped vessels from the snare set them by the virginians. it was a bright moon-light night. the massive hull of the ship-of-war, black in the cold, white rays of the moon, passed rapidly up the elizabeth river. the sunken wrecks were reached, and successfully avoided; and about nine o'clock the "pawnee" steamed into the anchorage of the navy-yard, to be greeted with cheers from the tars of the "cumberland" and "pennsylvania," who expected her arrival. the townspeople seeing the war-vessel, with ports thrown open, and black muzzles of the guns protruding, took to their houses, fearing she would open fire on the town. quickly the "pawnee" steamed to her moorings. the marines were hurriedly disembarked, and hastened to guard the entrances to the navy-yard. howitzers were planted so as to rake every street leading to the yard. thus secure against attack, the work of the night began. nearly two thousand willing hands were set hard at work, cannon were dismounted and spiked, rifles and muskets dashed to pieces; great quantities of combustibles were piled up in the mammoth buildings, ready to be fired at a given signal. in the mean time, the blue-jackets were not idle. it was quickly decided, that, of all the magnificent vessels anchored in the harbor, the "cumberland" was the only one that could be towed past the obstructions in the river. all hands were set to work removing every thing of value from the doomed vessels to the "cumberland." gunpowder and combustibles were then arranged so as to completely destroy the vessels when ignited. when the moon went down at twelve o'clock, the preparations were complete. all the men were then taken on board the "cumberland" and "pawnee," save a few who were left to fire the trains. as the two vessels started from the moorings, the barracks were fired, the lurid light casting a fearful gleam upon the crowded yards and shrouds of the towering frigate. a little way out in the stream a rocket was sent up from the "pawnee." this was the signal for the firing of the trains. the scene that followed is thus described by an eye-witness:-- "the rocket sped high in air, paused a second, and burst in showers of many colored lights; and, as it did so, the well-set trains at the ship-houses, and on the decks of the fated vessels left behind, went off as if lit simultaneously by the rocket. one of the ship-houses contained the old 'new york,' a ship thirty years on the stocks, and yet unfinished; the other was vacant. but both houses, and the old 'new york,' burned like tinder. the vessels fired were the 'pennsylvania,' the 'merrimac,' the 'germantown,' the 'plymouth,' the 'raritan,' the 'columbia,' and the 'dolphin.' the old 'delaware' and 'columbus," worn-out and disabled seventy-fours, were scuttled, and sunk at the upper docks on friday. "i need not try to picture the scene of the grand conflagration that now burst like the day of judgment on the startled citizens of norfolk, portsmouth, and all the surrounding country. any one who has seen a ship burn, and knows how like a fiery serpent the flame leaps from pitchy deck to smoking shrouds, and writhes to their very top around the masts that stand like martyrs doomed, can form some idea of the wonderful display that followed. it was not thirty minutes from the time the trains were fired, till the conflagration roared like a hurricane, and the flames from land and water swayed and met and mingled together, and darted high, and fell, and leaped up again, and by their very motion showed their sympathy with the crackling, crashing war of destruction beneath. [illustration: destruction of norfolk navy-yard.] "but in all this magnificent scene the old ship 'pennsylvania' was the centre-piece. she was a very giant in death, as she had been in life. she was a sea of flame; and when the iron had entered her soul, and her bowels were consuming, then did she spout forth from every porthole of every deck torrents and cataracts of fire, that to the mind of milton would have represented her a frigate of hell pouring out unending broadsides of infernal fire. several of her guns were left loaded, but not shotted; and as the fire reached them they sent out on the startled morning air minute-guns of fearful peal, that added greatly to the alarm that the light of the fire had spread through the country round about. the 'pennsylvania' burned like a volcano for five hours and a half before her mainmast fell. i stood watching the proud but perishing old leviathan as this emblem of her majesty was about to come down. at precisely half-past nine o'clock the tall tree that stood in her centre tottered and fell, and crushed deep into her burning sides." during this fearful scene the people of the little town, and the virginia militia-men who had been summoned to take possession of the navy-yard, were no idle spectators. hardly had the "pawnee" steamed out into the stream, when the great gates were battered down, and crowds of men rushed in, eager to save whatever arms were uninjured. throughout the fire they worked like beavers, and succeeded in saving a large quantity of munitions of war to be used by the confederacy. the ships that had been fired all burned to the water's edge. one was raised, and re-appeared as the formidable "merrimac" that at one time threatened the destruction of the whole union navy. a great amount of valuable property was saved for the virginians by the coolness of a young boy, the son of one of the citizens of the town. this lad was within the gates of the navy-yard when the troops from the ships rushed in, and closed and barricaded them against the townspeople. he was frightened, and hid himself behind a quantity of boards and rubbish, and lay there a silent and immensely frightened spectator of the work of destruction. an officer passed near him directing the movements of two sailors, who were laying a train of gunpowder to an immense pile of explosives and combustibles in the huge granite dry-dock. the train passed over a broad board; and the boy, hardly knowing what he did, drew away this board, leaving a gap of eight inches in the train. when all the trains were fired, this was of course stopped at the gap; and the dry-dock was saved, and still remains in the norfolk navy yard. chapter iii. difficulties of the confederates in getting a navy. -- exploit of the "french lady." -- naval skirmishing on the potomac. -- the cruise of the "sumter." the disparity of maritime importance between the north and the south, and the consequent difficulties to be overcome by the latter in getting a navy, have been already alluded to. as it has been stated, in river-steamers and ponderous rams the south was fairly well supplied; but what was really needed were ocean-going ships, to break the rigid blockade that was slowly starving the confederacy into submission,--swift cruisers to prey on the commerce of the enemy, and powerful line-of-battle ships, which, by successfully coping with the vessels of the united states on the high seas, should secure for the confederacy recognition, and possibly assistance, from the great powers of europe. but how to get these without shipyards, shipbuilders, or seamen, was a task that baffled the ingenuity of the best minds in the south. immediately upon the organization of the confederate cabinet, an agent was sent to england to negotiate for vessels and guns. but, though this agent was a man of wonderful resources and great diplomacy, he found an almost insuperable obstacle in the universally recognized law of nations, to the effect that no neutral nation shall sell vessels or munitions of war to belligerents. it is true that this agent, capt. bulloch, did succeed in securing three ships,--the "florida," the "shenandoah," and the celebrated "alabama;" but to do so cost an immense amount of diplomacy and the sacrificing of the strength of the vessels to the necessity which existed for making them appear to be merchantmen. to build an iron-clad in a foreign port, was out of the question; and consequently ships so obtained were forced to fly from any well-equipped war-vessel, and only venture to attack unarmed merchantmen. [illustration: the "french lady."] the united states vessels which were delivered into the hands of the confederates by their officers were mainly small revenue cutters, of little use in naval warfare and soon given up or destroyed. not a single ship of this class made any record of distinguished service for the confederacy. several merchant-vessels were captured by the confederates, who concocted the most ingenious plans to secure success. one bright july morning the steamer "st. nicholas" was lying at her dock in baltimore, with steam up, and all prepared for her regular trip down the chesapeake. quite a large number of passengers had bought tickets, and lounged about the decks, waiting for the voyage to begin. among the passengers were a number of mechanics, with tools in their hands, going down the bay in search of work. shortly before the signal to cast off was given, a carriage was driven down the wharf, and a lady, heavily veiled, alighted, assisted by two gentlemen. the gentlemen stated that she was a french lady, and in ill-health. accordingly she was at once assigned a stateroom, to which she retired. soon after, the vessel cast off and headed down the bay. when fairly out of the harbor, the stateroom door opened, and instead of the frail, heavily veiled widow who went in, out strode a black-whiskered man, armed to the teeth. he had no trouble now in speaking english, and at once demanded the surrender of the ship. the honest mechanics dropped their tools, and, drawing concealed weapons, rallied around their leader. they had found the work they started out to seek. the ship was captured, and a new privateer was ready to prey on northern merchant-ships. once in the hands of the conspirators, the vessel was run into a little port where the passengers were landed, and a hundred and fifty more confederates taken aboard. under the command of capt. thomas (the "french lady"), the vessel proceeded to fredericksburg, where she, and three brigs captured on the way, were delivered to the confederate leaders. this adventure so favorably terminated, thomas, with his officers, started back to baltimore, to lay plans for the capture of some other unsuspecting craft. but fortune, which had thus far favored him, deserted him at last. on the vessel upon which the conspirators took passage were two police-officers of baltimore. one of these officers recognized thomas, and quietly laid plans for his capture. in the harbor at baltimore stands fort mchenry. under its frowning casemates the ships of the united states could lie without fear of attack from the thousands of discontented men who made of baltimore a secession city. the captain of the "mary washington" was ordered by lieut. carmichael, the officer of police, to bring the ship into the anchorage, under the guns of the fort. this soon came to the ears of thomas, who with his men rallied on the deck, and, with revolvers drawn, seemed prepared to make a desperate resistance. they were soon convinced that the officers had ample power behind them, and therefore submitted. on arriving at the fort, a company of soldiers was sent aboard the boat, and the prisoners were marched ashore. but thomas was not to be found. search was made in all parts of the boat, without avail; and the officers had decided that he had jumped overboard, with the desperate intention of swimming ashore. just as they were about to give up the search, a noise was heard that seemed to come from a bureau in the ladies' cabin. search was made, and there, coiled up in a narrow bureau-drawer, lay the leader of the band. he had been there two hours, and was helpless from cramp and exhaustion. he was placed in a cell at fort lafayette; but later, having been given the privilege of walking about the fort, managed to escape by making floats of empty tomato-cans, and with their aid swimming almost two miles. he was afterwards recaptured, and remained a prisoner until released by reason of an exchange of prisoners between the north and south. soon after his capture, the federal authorities at baltimore learned that plans had been made to capture other passenger steamers in the same way; but the ringleader being locked up, there was no difficulty in defeating the plans of the band. during the first few weeks of the war, before active hostilities had fairly commenced, events of this nature were of almost daily occurrence. on the potomac particularly, small cruisers were in continual danger of being captured, and put into commission under the confederate flag. a trading schooner loaded with garden-produce, dropping lazily down the river to the bay, would suddenly be boarded by four or five armed men, her crew driven below, and the vessel run into some convenient port on the virginia shore, to re-appear in a day or two with a small rifled cannon mounted on the forecastle, and a crew thirsting to capture more vessels for the confederacy. on one occasion a party of congressmen from washington started down the potomac for an excursion to hampton roads. their vessel was a small tug, which carried a bow-gun carefully screened from observation by tarpaulin. a short distance down the river, a boat with a howitzer was seen putting out into the stream, and shaping its course directly across the bows of the tug. as the two boats drew nearer together, a demand came from the smaller that the tug should be surrendered "to the state of virginia." apparently yielding, the captain of the tug slowed up his vessel, and waited for his assailants to come alongside, which they did until suddenly confronted with the muzzle of a cannon, trained directly on their boat, and a loud voice demanding that they surrender at once, which they accordingly did, and were taken to washington by their triumphant captors. many such trivial events are chronicled by the newspapers of the time. the advantage gained by either side was small, and the only effect was to keep the war sentiment at fever-heat. [illustration: blockading the mouth of the mississippi.] the first regularly commissioned man-of-war of the confederate states was the "sumter," an old passenger steamer remodelled so as to carry five guns. this vessel, though only registering five hundred tons, and smaller than many a steam-yacht of to-day, roamed over the high seas at will for more than a year, burning and destroying the merchant-vessels of the north, and avoiding easily any conflicts with the northern men-of-war. her exploits made the owners of american merchant-vessels tremble for their property; and the united states authorities made the most desperate attempts to capture her, but in vain. in his journal of dec. , , capt. semmes of the "sumter" writes with the greatest satisfaction: "the enemy has done us the honor to send in pursuit of us the 'powhattan,' the 'niagara,' the 'iroquois,' the 'keystone state,' and the 'san jacinto.'" any one of these vessels could have blown the 'sumter' out of water with one broadside, but the cunning and skill of her commander enabled her to escape them all. it was on the st of june, , that the "sumter" cast loose from the levee at new orleans, and started down the mississippi on her way to the open sea. for two months workmen had been busy fitting her for the new part she was to play. the long rows of cabins on the upper deck were torn down; and a heavy eight-inch shell-gun, mounted on a pivot between the fore and mainmasts, and the grinning muzzles of four twenty-four-pounder howitzers peeping from the ports, told of her warlike character. the great levee of the crescent city was crowded with people that day. now and again the roll of the drum, or the stirring notes of "dixie," would be heard, as some volunteer company marched down to the river to witness the departure of the entire confederate navy. slowly the vessel dropped down the river, and, rounding the english turn, boomed out with her great gun a parting salute to the city she was never more to see. ten miles from the mouth of the river she stopped; for anchored off the bar below lay the powerful united states steamer "brooklyn," with three other men-of-war, each more than a match for the infant navy of the confederacy. eleven days the "sumter" lay tugging at her anchors in the muddy current of the great river, but at last the time of action arrived. the news came that the "brooklyn" had started in chase of a vessel, and the mouth of the river was clear. quickly the "sumter" got under way, and with all steam up made for the channel over the bar. she was still six miles from the bar when the "brooklyn" caught sight of her, and abandoning her first chase strove desperately to head her off. it was a time of intense excitement. each vessel was about equally distant from the bar for which each was steaming at the highest possible speed. for the "sumter," it was escape or die. it was too late to fly up the river to the sheltering guns of fort st. philip. should the "brooklyn" get within range, the "sumter" was doomed. the "brooklyn" was the faster vessel of the two, but had the wind in her teeth; while the "sumter" had the advantage of wind and current. at length the pass was reached, and the "sumter" dashed over the bar, and out on the smooth blue water of the gulf of mexico, well ahead of her powerful foe. the "brooklyn" quickly rounded to, and a quick puff of smoke from amidships told the crew of the flying vessel that the terrible pivot-gun of their enemy had sent a warning message after them. but there was but a second of suspense, when a great jet of water springing from the surface of the gulf told that the bolt had fallen short. the "brooklyn" then quickly crowded on all sail, and started in hot pursuit, but after four hours abandoned the chase, put up her helm, and started sullenly back for the river's mouth; while the tars of the "sumter" crowded shrouds and bulwarks, and cheered heartily for the navy of the young confederacy. the "sumter" was now fairly embarked on her career. the open sea was her territory, and all ships floating the stars and stripes at the masthead were to be her prey. she was not a strong vessel; and her orders were to avoid any battles with the powerful ships of the "yankee" navy, but to seize and destroy all merchantmen that should come in her way. her first purpose was to capture these vessels, and by selling them in neutral ports profit by the prize. but the neutral nations soon refused to admit all rebel prizes to their ports; and, as all the ports of the confederacy were closed by the blockade, nothing was left but to burn the vessels when captured. many a floating bonfire marked the way of the little "sumter," and great was the consternation among the ship-owners of the north. when four days out, the "sumter" captured her first prize. she was a fine ship, the "golden rocket" of maine, six hundred and ninety tons. with the united states flag fluttering at the peak, she came sailing proudly towards her unsuspected enemy, from whose peak the red flag of england was displayed as a snare. when the two vessels came within a mile of each other, the wondering crew of the merchantman saw the english flag come tumbling down, while a ball of bunting rose quickly to the peak of the mysterious stranger, and catching the breeze floated out, showing a strange flag,--the stars and bars of the confederacy. at the same minute a puff of smoke from the "long tom" amidships was followed by a solid shot ricochetting along the water before the dismayed merchantman, and conveying a forcible, but not at all polite, invitation to stop. the situation dawned on the astonished skipper of the ship,--he was in the hands of "the rebels;" and with a sigh he brought his vessel up into the wind, and awaited the outcome of the adventure. and bad enough the outcome was for him; for capt. semmes, unwilling to spare a crew to man the prize, determined to set her on fire. it was about sunset when the first boat put off from the "sumter" to visit the captured ship. the two vessels were lying a hundred yards apart, rising and falling in unison on the slow rolling swells of the tropic seas. the day was bright and warm, and in the west the sun was slowly sinking to the meeting line of sky and ocean. all was quiet and peaceful, as only a summer afternoon in southern seas can be. yet in the midst of all that peace and quiet, a scene in the great drama of war was being enacted. nature was peaceful, man violent. for a time nothing was heard save the measured thump of the oars in the rowlocks, as the boats plied to and fro between the two ships, transporting the captured crew to the "sumter." finally the last trip was made, and the boat hoisted to the davits. then all eyes were turned toward the "golden rocket." she lay almost motionless, a dark mass on the black ocean. the sun had long since sunk beneath the horizon; and the darkness of the night was only relieved by the brilliancy of the stars, which in those latitudes shine with wondrous brightness. soon the watches on the "sumter" caught a hasty breath. a faint gleam was seen about the companionway of the "rocket." another instant, and with a roar and crackle, a great mass of flame shot up from the hatch, as from the crater of a volcano. instantly the well-tarred rigging caught, and the flame ran up the shrouds as a ladder of fire, and the whole ship was a towering mass of flame. the little band of men on the "sumter" looked on the terrific scene with bated breath. though they fully believed in the justice of their cause, they could not look on the destruction they had wrought without feelings of sadness. it was their first act of war. one of the officers of the "sumter" writes: "few, few on board can forget the spectacle,--a ship set fire to at sea. it would seem that man was almost warring with his maker. her helpless condition, the red flames licking the rigging as they climbed aloft, the sparks and pieces of burning rope taken off by the wind, and flying miles to leeward, the ghastly glare thrown upon the dark sea as far as the eye could reach, and then the deathlike stillness of the scene,--all these combined to place the "golden rocket" on the tablet of our memories forever." but it was not long before the crew of the "sumter" could fire a vessel, and sail away indifferently, with hardly a glance at their terrible handiwork. the "sumter" continued on her cruise, with varying fortunes. sometimes weeks would pass with no prizes to relieve the tedium of the long voyage. occasionally she would run into a neutral port for coal or water, but most of the time was spent on the open sea. the crew were kept actively employed with drills and exercises; while the officers, yawning over their books or games, longed for the welcome cry from the masthead, "sail ho!" in september the "sumter" captured a brig, the "joseph park;" and the boarding officer, on examining the log-book, found an entry made by her captain on the day of leaving pernambuco: "we have a tight, fast vessel, and we don't care for jeff davis." the unlucky captain had holloaed long before he was out of the wood. the "joseph park" was the last prize the tars of the "sumter" had the pleasure of "looting" for many days. up and down the tropic seas the cruiser travelled, loitering about the paths of ocean commerce to no avail. often enough the long-drawn hail of the lookout in the cross-trees, "sail ho-o-o-o!" would bring the jackies tumbling up from the forecastle, and set the officers peering anxiously through their telescopes. but the sails so sighted proved to be english, french, spanish, any thing but american; and life aboard the "sumter" became as dull as a fisher's where fish are not to be found. in september capt. semmes ran his vessel into a martinique harbor, to make some needed repairs, and give the sailors a run ashore. here they were blockaded for some time by the united states frigate "iroquois," but finally escaped through the cunning of semmes. lying in the harbor near the "sumter" were two yankee schooners, whose captains arranged with the commander of the "iroquois" to signal him if the "sumter" should leave the harbor. if on passing the bar she headed south, a single red light should gleam at the masthead of the schooner; should her course lie northward, two lights would be displayed. semmes, lying at anchor in the bay, and chafing over his captivity, determined to break away. he had noticed the frequent communications between the schooners and the man-of-war, and suspected that his course would be spied out. nevertheless, he determined to dare all, and one black night slipped his cables, and with all lights out, and running-gear muffled, glided swiftly out of the harbor. in the distance he could see the lights of the "iroquois," as she steamed slowly up and down in the offing, like a sentry on guard. up in the cross-trees of the "sumter" sat a sharp-eyed old quarter-master, with orders not to mind the "iroquois," but to keep a close watch on the suspected schooners. soon a light gleamed from the maintop of each. semmes's suspicions grew. "they have signalled our course," said he: "we'll double." the ship's head was quickly brought about, and headed south; then all turned to watch the movements of the "iroquois." she had headed northward, and was exerting every power to catch the flying vessel supposed to be just ahead. satisfied with having so successfully humbugged the enemy, the "sumter" proceeded leisurely on her course to the southward, leaving the "iroquois" steaming furiously in the opposite direction. "i do think, however," writes capt semmes in his log-book, "that a tough old quarter-master, and a grizzled boatswain's mate, who had clean shaven their heads in preparation for a desperate fight, were mightily disgusted." the subsequent career of the "sumter" was uneventful. she captured but few more vessels; and in january of the next year ran into the harbor at gibraltar, where she was blockaded by a powerful united states frigate, and finally sold as being worn out. she had been in commission a little over a year, and in that time had captured eighteen vessels, burned seven, and released two on a heavy ransom to be paid to the confederate government at the end of the war. it is needless to say these ransoms were never paid. capt. semmes, with his crew, proceeded to england, and took command of a mysterious ship, "no. ," just built at liverpool, which soon appeared on the high seas as the dreaded "alabama." chapter iv. the potomac flotilla. -- capture of alexandria. -- actions at matthias point. -- bombardment of the hatteras forts. in petty skirmishes and in general inactivity the forces of both contestants idled away the five months following the fall of fort sumter. the defeat of the union armies at bull run had checked active operations along the potomac. on either side of the river the hostile armies were drilling constantly to bring the raw recruits down to the efficiency of trained soldiers. four hundred thousand men lay in hostile camps within sight of each other. from the national capitol at washington the stars and bars of the confederate flag could be seen floating over the camp at arlington. occasionally the quiet would be broken by the crack of a rifle, as some straggler, on one side or the other, took a casual shot at the sentry pacing on the other side of the broad stream. sometimes a battery would come driving down to the shore, select an advantageous spot, and begin an afternoon's target practice at the hostile camp; but the damage done was immaterial, and after wasting much powder and shot the recruits would limber up their guns and return to their camp. it would have been easy, at almost any time, for either army to have crossed the potomac and invaded the territory of the enemy; but each hung back in apparent dread of taking the first decisive step. abraham lincoln at this time illustrated the existing condition of affairs, by one of those stories which have made him celebrated as a raconteur. a number of politicians, calling at the white house, spoke of the apparent inactivity of the army authorities, and demanded that some decisive move should be made; some powerful preparations to beat back the enemy should he attempt to cross the potomac. "gentlemen," said lincoln, with the twinkle in his eye that always foretold a story, "when i was a boy i saw an incident which i have always recollected, and which seems to me to resemble very much the attitude now assumed by the parties in this impending war. my father owned a dog,--a particularly vicious, aggressive, and pugnacious bull-terrier,--one of these fellows with heavy, short necks, and red, squinting eyes, that seem ever to be on the lookout for a fight. next door to us lived a neighbor who likewise rejoiced in the possession of a canine of appearance and habits of mind similar to our pet. from the date of their first meeting these dogs had been deadly enemies, and had growled and yelped at each other through the picket-fence separating the two yards, until we were forced to keep at least one dog chained continually. the strained relations between the dogs became a matter of general interest, and speculations were rife among the neighbors as to the probable outcome of a hostile meeting. those were the times when a lively dog-fight would draw the merchant from his counter, and the blacksmith from his anvil; and it is even on record that an honorable judge once hurriedly adjourned his court at the premonitory sounds of snarling in the court-house square. well, the knowledge that two dogs, pining for a fight, were being forcibly restrained, was too much to be borne by the people of the village; and a plot was concocted for bringing about a fight. one night two pickets were surreptitiously removed from the fence, leaving an opening of ample size to permit a dog to pass. in the morning our dog was sunning himself in the yard, when the neighbor's dog rushed to his side of the fence, and made remarks not to be borne by any self-respecting canine. then began the usual performance of snarls and barks, and baring of white teeth, as the dogs made frantic efforts to get at each other. the neighbors assembled in a crowd, and the knowing ones predicted a lively time when those two dogs found the hole in the fence. down the line of the fence the two curs walked, their eyes glaring, their jaws snapping, their tongues out, and dropping foam. the racket was tremendous. at each place where the pickets were a little spread, they redoubled their efforts to clinch. they approached the opening. the interest of the spectators redoubled. now they reached the spot; sprung at each other; their jaws touched,--and each, dropping his tail, slunk away to his kennel. gentlemen, the attitude of these armies reminds me of that dog-fight." [illustration: flag of the confederacy.] while the armies of the two contestants were thus idly resting upon their arms, the navy was obliged to discharge duties, which, while they brought some danger, did not gain glory for either officers or men. the joys of washington society were not for the naval officers. the applicant for promotion, who, when asked by an examiner, "where is the post of a colonel when his regiment is drawn up for battle?" responded promptly, "in washington," had been serving in the army, and not with the naval corps. besides the duties of the officers detailed upon the blockading service, there remained to the navy the arduous task of patrolling the potomac river, and preventing as far as possible communication between the shores. this work, as may be readily understood, demanded the most untiring vigilance and the most unflagging energy. the shores on each side of the potomac are indented with bays and tributary streams in which a sloop or large row-boat can easily be concealed during the day. at night it was impossible to prevent boats laden with contraband goods, or conveying the bearers of secret despatches, slipping across the river from the northern side, and running into the concealment afforded by the irregularity of the virginia shore-line. even at this early period of the war, the vigorous blockade of the confederate seaports had created a great lack of many necessaries in the southern states. particularly did the lack of quinine afflict the people of those malarial sections comprised within the limits of the south atlantic and gulf states. so great was the demand for this drug, that the enormous sums offered for it led many a speculative druggist north of mason and dixon's line to invest his all in quinine, and try to run it through the potomac blockade. of course, as the traffic was carried on in small boats, it was impossible to break it up altogether; though by the efforts of the navy it was almost destroyed. briefly stated, the duties of the potomac flotilla may be said to have been to patrol the river from washington to its mouth, to inspect both sides _daily_ if possible, and to observe whether any preparations for batteries were being made at any point, and watch for any transports with troops or provisions, and convoy them to washington. the flotilla consisted of small vessels, lightly armed; the "pawnee," the heaviest of the fleet, being a sloop of less than thirteen hundred tons, with a battery of fifteen guns, none of long range. clearly such an armada as this could be of but little avail against the earthworks which the virginians were busily erecting on every commanding bluff. toward the later part of may, , the federal government determined to send troops across the river and occupy the city of alexandria. the "pawnee" had for some days been lying off the town, completely covering it with her batteries. she had held this position without making any offensive movement; as her commander understood, that, even should he compel the town to surrender, he had not the men necessary for holding the position. on the morning of the th, commander rowan saw two steamers coming down the river, laden with federal troops. he at once sent a boat ashore, and demanded the surrender of the city, which was immediately evacuated by the virginian troops. when the army of occupation landed, it proved to be ellsworth's famous zouave regiment, made up largely of the firemen and "bowery boys" of new york city. ellsworth, while marching through the streets at the head of his command, saw a confederate flag floating from a mast on top of a dwelling. with two of his men he proceeded to enter the house, go on the roof, and tear down the flag. as he came down the stairs, a man carrying a gun stepped from a doorway, and demanded what he did there. "this is my trophy," cried ellsworth, flourishing the bit of striped bunting. "and you are mine," responded the man, quickly bringing his gun up, and discharging it full into ellsworth's breast. the two zouaves, maddened at the death of their commander, shot the slayer through the brain, and plunged their bayonets into his body before he fell. ellsworth's death created the greatest excitement in the north, as it was almost the first blood shed in the war. while the capture of alexandria was in itself no great achievement, it was of importance as the first move of the northern armies into virginia. had the efforts of the navy towards keeping the potomac clear of hostile batteries been supplemented by a co-operating land force, an immense advantage would have been gained at the very outset. as it was, all that could be done was to temporarily check the exertions of the enemy. a battery silenced by the guns from the ships in the daytime could be, and usually was, repaired during the night, and remained a constant menace to the transports going to or from washington. under such circumstances, the work of the potomac flotilla could only be fatiguing and discouraging. much of it had to be performed in row-boats; and the crews of the various vessels were kept rowing up and down the banks of the river, making midnight excursions up creeks to examine suspected localities, and lying in wait for smugglers, and the mail-carriers and spies of the enemy. they were in continual danger of being opened upon by masked batteries and concealed sharp-shooters. the "prize money," the hope of which cheers up the man-o'-wars-man in his dreariest hours, amounted to nothing; for their prizes were small row-boats and worthless river-craft. the few engagements with the enemies' batteries brought little glory or success. in one battle on the th of may, , a flotilla, consisting of the "thomas freeborn" (a paddle-wheel steamer, carrying three guns), the "anacostia," and the "resolute" (a little craft of ninety tons and two guns), engaged the batteries at aquia creek, and pounded away with their pygmy guns for two hours, without doing any visible damage. two days later the bombardment was renewed, and two of the vessels were slightly damaged. a more serious event occurred at matthias point in the latter part of june. matthias point was one of the chief lurking-places of the confederate guerrillas, who, concealed in the dense undergrowth along the banks of the potomac, could pour a destructive fire into any vessels that passed. commander j. h. ward of the "freeborn" planned to break up this ambush, sending a landing party to cut away the trees and undergrowth. the landing party, commanded by lieut. chaplin, was to be covered by the guns of the "freeborn" and "reliance." it was late in the afternoon when they pushed off for the shore. all seemed quiet; and the bursting of the shells, which were occasionally dropped into the woods, seemed to have driven the enemy away. hardly, however, had the sailors begun the work of hewing down the undergrowth, when from all quarters a hot fire was begun, driving them to their boats in a rout. the decks of the two vessels were swept by the storm of lead. commander ward, while sighting the bow-gun of the "freeborn," was struck in the abdomen by a bullet, and died in a few minutes. on the shore the sailors were hurrying into the boats and pushing off to avoid capture. lieut. chaplin acted with great bravery, and succeeded in getting all his men away, with their muskets. the last man left on the shore was unable to swim; and chaplin, taking him on his shoulders, bore him safely to the boat. though the fire of the enemy was concentrated on the two, neither was hurt, although a minie-ball passed through the lieutenant's cap. two months later this same locality was the scene of another bloody disaster to the union arms. on the th of august the "resolute" and the "reliance" were ordered to make a reconnoissance of the neighborhood of matthias point. after steaming about the shore for some time, and noticing nothing of a suspicious character, a boat was seen on the virginia shore, and an officer and five men despatched to capture her. they had just reached her, and were in the act of making fast, when a volley of musketry was fired from the bushes not more than five yards away, and three of the crew were instantly killed, and one wounded. the watchers on the war-vessels, lying in the river, sprang to their guns, and threw several rounds of shell into the cover that sheltered the enemy, soon driving them away. the two uninjured men in the boat succeeded in getting her away with her load of dead and dying. it is easy to understand how exasperating, how infuriating, such service as this must have been to the officers and men of the navy. for a man to risk his life in the heat and excitement of a battle, is as nothing to the feeling that one may be at any time caught in a death-trap, and slaughtered in cold blood. [illustration: naval patrol on the potomac.] a more successful expedition was organized in october, by lieut. harrill of the steamer "union." he had been informed that a large schooner was lying in quantico creek, and that the confederates were massing a number of troops there for the purpose of crossing the river. he at once determined to destroy the schooner. accordingly he manned three boats at half-past two in the morning, and in the darkness proceeded, with muffled oars, toward the mouth of the creek. here some difficulty was experienced, as the entrance is narrow and obstructed by sandbars; but working energetically, and in perfect silence, the sailors overcame all obstacles. once in the creek, they pulled rapidly along within pistol-shot of the shore, until the tall masts of the schooner could be descried in the darkness. one sentry was on guard, who fled wildly as he saw the mysterious boat emerge from the darkness of the night. the grappling-irons were thrown aboard, and the jackies swarmed nimbly up the sides, and began the work of destruction. a huge pile of combustibles was made in the cabin, and hastily set on fire. the flames spread rapidly; and, though they insured the destruction of the schooner, they also lighted up the creek, showing the boats with the sailors bending to their oars to escape the storm of bullets that they knew must follow. the glare of the burning schooner, the reflection of the flames on the water, the flash of the rifles from the shores made a wild picture. occasionally a flash from the river was followed by a deep boom, as a heavy shot left the muzzle of a cannon on the steamers. but through it all, the men escaped; and the projected invasion of the confederates was abandoned, owing to the loss of their schooner. all through the war this untiring patrol of the potomac was continued. among miasmatic vapors and clouds of noxious insects on mud-flats, in narrow channels whose densely wooded banks might conceal legions of hostile sharp-shooters, the river navy kept up its work. earning but little glory, though in the midst of constant peril, the officers and men kept up their work, and contributed not a little to the final outcome of the great conflict. all this time the officers of the naval vessels, riding at anchor in hampton roads, were chafing under the enforced idleness. even the occasional artillery duels with which their army brethren whiled away the time were denied to the wistful blue-jackets. beyond an occasional chase, generally useless, after a fleet blockade-runner, the sailors had absolutely no employment. at last, however, the opportunity came. the first great naval expedition of the war was set under way. from cape henry, at the mouth of the james river, the coast of virginia and north carolina sweeps grandly out to the eastward, like a mammoth bow, with its lower end at beaufort, two hundred miles south. along this coast-line the great surges of mighty ocean, rolling with unbroken course from the far-off shore of europe, trip and fall with unceasing roar upon an almost uninterrupted beach of snowy sand, a hundred and more miles long. near the southern end of this expanse of sand stands a lighthouse, towering solitary above the surrounding plain of sea and sand. no inviting beacon giving notice to the weary marines of safe haven is this steady light that pierces the darkness night after night. it tells of treacherous shoals and roaring breakers; of the loss of many a good ship, whose ribs, half buried in the drifting sand, lie rotting in the salt air; of skies ever treacherous, and waters ever turbulent. it is the light of hatteras. some twenty miles below cape hatteras light occurs the first great opening in the stretch of sand that extends south from cape henry. once he has passed through this opening; the mariner finds himself in the most peaceful waters. the great surges of the atlantic spend themselves on the sandy fringe outside, while within are the quiet waters of pamlico and albemarle sounds, dotted with fertile islands, and bordering a coast rich in harbors. the wary blockade-runner, eluding the watchfulness of the united states blockaders cruising outside, had but to pass the portals of hatteras inlet, to unload at his leisure his precious cargo, and load up with the cotton which grew in great abundance on the islands and fertile shores of the sound. recognizing the importance of this harbor, the confederates had early in the war fortified the point north of hatteras inlet. shortly after the fall of fort sumter, a yankee skipper, daniel campbell, incautiously running his schooner the "lydia francis" too near the stormy cape, was wrecked, and sought shelter among the people at the inlet. when, some days after, he proposed to leave, he was astounded to find that he had been delivered from the sea only to fall a prey to the fortunes of war. he was kept a prisoner for three months; and on his release, going directly to fortress monroe, he proved that he had kept his eyes open to some purpose. he reported to flag-officer stringham that the confederates had two batteries,--one of ten, the other of five guns,--known as fort hatteras and fort clark. with these two forts the confederates claimed that they could control the entrance to albemarle sound. [illustration: the fleet off hatteras.] as soon as this information was received, an expedition for the destruction of these forts was organized. it was necessarily chiefly naval, although a land force under gen. butler went with the fleet. on aug. , , hampton roads presented a scene of the greatest activity. the fleet seemed to have awakened from a long sleep. every vessel was being hastily prepared for sailing. two transports, the "george peabody" and the "adelaide," were crowded with the soldiers of gen. butler's command. from the mainmast of the flagship "minnesota" waved the signal-flags, changing constantly as different orders were sent to the commanders of the other warships. at two o'clock three balls of bunting were run up to the truck, and catching the breeze were blown out into flags, giving the order, "get under way at once." from the surrounding men-of-war came the shrill pipe of the boatswains' whistle, and the steady tramp of the men at the capstan bars as they dragged the anchors to the cat-heads. the nimble blue-jackets, climbing about the shrouds and yards, soon had the snowy clouds of canvas set. the wind was fresh; and with bands playing, and cheers of blue-jackets and soldiers, the stately squadron sailed down the bay. but none on board, save the superior officers, knew whither the fleet was bound. hardly were they fairly on the atlantic, when the course was shaped to the southward, and that much was settled. but whether new orleans, charleston, or beaufort was the point to be attacked, the sailors did not know. the squadron which sailed from hampton roads consisted of the war-vessels "minnesota," "wabash," "pawnee," "monticello," and "harriet lane;" the transports "george peabody" and "adelaide;" and the tug "fanny." soon after rounding cape henry, the vessels became separated; and when the other vessels reached hatteras, on the th, the "minnesota" and "wabash" were nowhere to be seen. as these were the most powerful frigates of the fleet, great fears were felt for the success of the expedition; but at last they appeared on the horizon. a place for landing was selected, and the vessels withdrew into the offing to spend the night. it was determined to begin the attack early the next day. the morning dawned clear, with a calm sea. at four o'clock the men were summoned to breakfast. at seven the operation of landing the troops was begun. all the surf-boats, barges, and lifeboats in the fleet were put to the work. the great war-vessels moved into position, and prepared to cover with a terrific fire the landing of the troops. the first shot was fired by the "wabash," and the cannonading was at once taken up by the rest of the fleet. the vessels were placed so that a whole broadside could be discharged at once. thousands of pounds of iron balls were thrown into the forts. under cover of the cannonading, the disembarkation of the troops began. but the opposition of the enemy was not the only difficulty to be met. during the time consumed in getting ready to land, heavy banks of clouds had been crawling up from the horizon, and the soft wind of morning had grown into a steady blow. cape hatteras was true to its reputation. on the shelving beach, where the troops must land, the great rollers were breaking in torrents of foam. the first lifeboats that attempted the landing were swamped, and the soldiers reached the land wet and chilled through. the surf-boats were stove in. the barges, which had been relied upon to land men in large numbers, proved unmanageable, and were towed away by the "harriet lane." when the attempt to land the troops was given up, it was found that but three hundred and twenty men had been landed. this was too small a party to storm the forts, and the issue of the battle depended upon the great guns of the navy. [illustration: attack on the hatteras forts.] by this time the gunners on the ships had calculated the exact range, and were firing with fearful effect. broadside followed broadside, with the regularity of machinery. it was war without its horrors for the blue-jackets, since bad marksmanship or poor powder prevented the confederate gunners doing any damage. on the gun-deck of the superb frigate "minnesota," the jackies were working their guns as coolly as though they were on drill. the operations of loading and firing were gone through with like clock-work. the officers could watch the course of the shells until they struck, and instruct the men, without undergoing any danger. but in the forts the scene was one of terror. as soon as the gunners of the fleet had secured the range, the shells began crashing into the fort, bewildering the untried soldiers, and driving them from their guns. a shell falling in the fort, and bursting, would sweep clean a space thirty feet square. it was madness to try to work the guns. all sought refuge in the bomb proofs, and an occasional shot was all that showed the presence of any defenders in the forts. soon the confederates decided to abandon fort clark, the smaller of the two, and mass their forces in fort hatteras. as a ruse, to check the bombardment of the ships, the flags on both forts were hauled down. this was, of course, taken as a token of surrender; and as the cannonading stopped, and the clouds of gray gunpowder-smoke lifted, the shrouds of the bombarding squadron were filled with men, and cheer upon cheer rang out in honor of the victory. soon the troops occupied the deserted battery, and the "monticello" was ordered into the inlet to take possession of fort hatteras. she had proceeded only a little way, however, when suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon her from the fort, and at the same time a large body of re-enforcements was seen approaching from the south. the gunners came down from the shrouds, stopped cheering, and began their work again. for a time the "monticello" was in a dangerous position. in a narrow and unknown channel, she was forced to retreat slowly, under heavy fire from the fort, being hit eight times. the heavy fire of the other vessels, however, soon drove the confederate gunners from their guns. the sailors worked untiringly, and seemed enraged by the deceit practised by the enemy. one man, while sponging out a gun, preparatory to reloading it, dropped his sponge overboard. quick as thought he vaulted the gunwale, and re-appeared on the surface of the water swimming for the sponge. recovering it, he in a few moments crawled dripping through a porthole, to report respectfully to the captain of the gun: "just come aboard, sir." the fort abandoned by the confederates had been occupied by the troops that had been landed; and, under cover of the furious bombardment, the work of landing was vigorously prosecuted. night came, and with it a gale so heavy that the vessels had to desert their stations, and withdraw into the offing. when the morning broke, however, the sea had calmed sufficiently to allow the gunners to again set about their terrible work. the second day's firing was even more accurate than that of the first; and the gray-coats were soon compelled to retire to the bomb-proofs, and abandon all attempt to return the fire of the ships. soon three shells in rapid succession burst close to the magazine of the fort, telling plainly to the affrighted defenders that nothing was left for them but surrender. a white flag was raised, and commodore barron went off to the fleet to formally surrender the forts and the eight hundred men of his command. when the terms were concluded, the defeated soldier turned to flag-officer stringham, and asked if the loss of life on the ships had been very large. "not a man has been injured," was the response. "wonderful!" exclaimed the questioner. "no one could have imagined that this position could have been captured without sacrificing thousands of men." but so it was. without the loss of a man, had fallen a most important post, together with cannon, provisions, and nearly seven hundred men. chapter v. the "trent" affair. -- operations in albemarle and pamlico sounds. -- destruction of the confederate fleet. early in the war an event occurred which for a time seemed likely to bring england to the aid of the confederates. the confederate government had appointed as diplomatic commissioners to england two gentlemen, messrs. mason and slidell. they had escaped from mobile on a fleet blockade-runner, and reached havana, where they remained a week waiting for the regular english packet to convey them to liverpool. while in havana they were lavishly entertained by the colony of confederate sympathizers there; and feeling perfectly safe, now that they were outside the jurisdiction of the united states, they made no attempt to conceal their official character, and boasted of the errand upon which they were sent. the united states frigate "san jacinto," which was one of the many vessels kept rushing about the high seas in search of the privateer "sumter," happened to be in the harbor of havana at this time. she was commanded by capt. wilkes, an officer who had made an exhaustive study of international law, particularly as bearing upon the right of a war-vessel to search a vessel belonging to a neutral nation. capt. wilkes, knowing that by capturing the confederate commissioners, he could win for himself the applause of the entire north, determined to make the attempt. by a study of his books bearing on international law, he managed to convince himself that he was justified in stopping the british steamer, and taking from it by force the bodies of messrs. mason and slidell. accordingly he set sail from the harbor of havana, and cruised up and down at a distance of more than a marine league from the coast, awaiting the appearance of the vessel. five days after the "san jacinto's" departure, the commissioners set sail in the british mail-steamer "trent." she was intercepted in the bahama channel by the "san jacinto." when the man-of-war fired a blank cartridge as a signal to heave to, the commander of the "trent" ran the british flag to the peak, and continued, feeling secure under the emblem of neutrality. then came a more peremptory summons in the shape of a solid shot across the bows; and, as the incredulous captain of the "trent" still continued his course, a six-inch shell was dropped within about one hundred feet of his vessel. then he stopped. a boat put off from the "san jacinto," and made for the "trent." up the side of the merchant-vessel clambered a spruce lieutenant, and demanded the immediate surrender of the two commissioners. the captain protested, pointed to the flag with the cross of st. george waving above his head, and invoked the power of her britannic majesty,--all to no avail. the two commissioners had retired to their cabins, and refused to come out without being compelled by actual force. the boat was sent back to the "san jacinto," and soon returned with a file of marines, who were drawn up with their muskets on the deck of the "trent." every british ship which carries mails carries a regularly commissioned officer of the navy, who is responsible for them. this officer on the "trent" was somewhat of a martinet, and his protests at this violation of the rights of a neutral vessel were very vigorous. when the first gun was fired, he rushed below, and soon re-appeared in all the resplendent glory of gold lace and brass buttons which go to make up a naval uniform. he danced about the deck in an ecstasy of rage, and made the most fearful threats of the wrath of the british people. the passengers too became excited, and protested loudly. every thing possible was done by the people of the "trent" to put themselves on record as formally protesting. nevertheless, the commissioners were taken away, carried to new york, and from there sent into confinement at fort warren. when the news of this great achievement became known, wilkes was made the lion of the hour. unthinking people met and passed resolutions of commendation. he was tendered banquets by cities. he was elected a member of learned societies in all parts of the country, and was generally eulogized. even the secretary of the navy, who should have recognized the grave troubles likely to grow out of this violation of the principles of neutrality, wrote a letter to capt. wilkes, warmly indorsing his course, and only regretting that he had not captured the steamer as well as the two commissioners. but fortunately we had wiser heads in the other executive departments of the government. president lincoln and secretary seward quickly disavowed the responsibility for wilkes's action. letters were written to the united states minister in england, charles francis adams, alluding to the proceeding as one for which capt. wilkes as an individual was alone responsible. and well it was that this attitude was taken: for hardly had the news reached england, when with one voice the people cried for war. sympathizing with the south as they undoubtedly did, it needed but this insult to the british flag to rouse the war spirit of the nation. transports loaded with troops were immediately ordered to canada; the reserves were called out; the ordnance factories were set running day and night; while the press of the nation, and the british minister at washington, demanded the immediate release of the captives, and a full apology from the united states. the matter was conducted on this side with the utmost diplomacy. we were undoubtedly in the wrong, and the only thing was to come out with as little sacrifice of national dignity as possible. the long time necessary for letters to pass between this country and england was an important factor in calming the people. minister adams said, that, had the atlantic cable then been in operation, nothing could have prevented a war. in the end the demands of great britain were acceded to, and the commissioners proceeded on their way. the last note of the diplomatic correspondence was a courteous letter from president lincoln to the british minister, offering to allow the british troops _en route_ for canada to land at portland, me., and thus avoid the long winter's march through new brunswick. the peaceful settlement of the affair chagrined the confederates not a little, as they had hoped to gain great britain as a powerful ally in their fight against the united states. soon after the capture of the forts at hatteras inlet, the authorities of the union again turned their attention in that direction, with the result of sending the burnside expedition to albemarle sound. the coast of north carolina is honeycombed with rivers, inlets, and lagoons, which open into the two broad sounds known as pamlico and albemarle, and which are protected from the turbulence of the atlantic by the long ridge of sand which terminates at cape hatteras. while the capture of the hatteras forts had given the union authorities control of hatteras inlet, the chief entrance to the sounds, yet the long, narrow island was broken by other lesser inlets of a size sufficient to permit the passage of light-draught steamers. the confederates had quite a fleet of swift, light vessels of insignificant armament, often only a single gun, with which they occasionally made a descent upon some coaster or merchantman, running close inshore, and dragged her in as a prize. with these swift steamers, too, they effectually controlled all navigation of the sounds. but the greatest advantage that they derived from their control of the sounds was the vast facilities given them for constructing, at their leisure, powerful iron-clads in some of the north carolina shipyards; then sending them to reduce the hatteras forts, and so out into the atlantic to fight for the destruction of the blockade. all these conditions were clear to the authorities of the union; and therefore, in the early part of january, , a joint military and naval expedition was fitted out for operation against the confederate works and steamers in these inland waters. it was in the early days of the war; and the flotilla was one of those heterogeneous collections of remodelled excursion-steamers, tugs, ferry-boats, and even canal-boats, which at that time was dignified with the title of "the fleet." in fitting out this expedition two very conflicting requirements were followed. in the most favorable circumstances, the channel at hatteras inlet is seldom over seven and a half feet: consequently the vessels must be of light draught. but the confederate steamers in the sounds carried heavy rifled cannon, and the armament of the forts on roanoke island was of the heaviest: therefore, the vessels must carry heavy guns to be able to cope with the enemy. this attempt to put a heavy armament on the gun-deck made the vessels roll so heavily as to be almost unseaworthy. [illustration: shores of albemarle sound.] in addition to the armed vessels belonging to the navy, a number of transports accompanied the expedition, bearing the army corps under the command of gen. burnside; and the whole number of craft finally assembled for the subjugation of the north carolina sounds was one hundred and twenty. this heterogeneous assemblage of vessels was sent on a voyage in the dead of winter, down a dangerous coast, to one of the stormiest points known to the mariner. hatteras was true to its reputation; and, when the squadron reached the inlet, a furious north-easter was blowing, sending the gray clouds scudding across the sky, and making the heavy rollers break on the beach and the bar in a way that foretold certain destruction, should any hardy pilot attempt to run his ship into the narrow and crooked inlet. outside there was no safe anchorage, and the situation of the entire squadron was most precarious. several serious mishaps occurred before the vessels got into the small and altogether insufficient harbor between the seaward bar and the "bulkhead" or inner bar. the first vessel to come to grief was one of the canal-boats laden with hay, oats, and other stores. she was without any motive power, being towed by a steam-tug, and, getting into the trough of the sea, rolled and sheered so that she could not be towed. the heavy rolling started her seams, and it was soon evident that she was sinking. with the greatest caution a boat was lowered from one of the steamers, and put off to rescue the crew of the foundering craft. laboriously the sailors worked their way through the tossing sea to the lee side of the "grape-shot," and after much difficulty succeeded in taking off all on board, and the return trip was commenced. all went well until the boat came under the lee of the steamer, and the men were about to clamber up the sides. suddenly an immense sea lifted the vessel high in the air; and in an instant the boat was swamped, and the men were struggling in the icy water. all were ultimately saved, but it was with the greatest difficulty. the "grape-shot," left to her fate, went ashore some fourteen miles above hatteras. her cargo served some practical use, after all; for some horses from the wreck of the "pocahontas" managed to reach the shore, and kept themselves alive by munching the water-soaked hay and oats. the "pocahontas" was one of the steamers chartered by the war department as a horse transport. her actions during this gale furnish a fair illustration of the manner in which the government was often deluded into purchasing almost valueless ships. she started with the burnside expedition from hampton roads, freighted with one hundred and thirteen horses. as soon as the gale off hatteras came on, she began to show signs of unseaworthiness. first the boilers gave way, loosened from their places by the heavy rolling of the ship. all progress had to be stopped until they were patched up. then down fell the grates, extinguishing the fires. then the steering-gear was broken; and, getting into the trough of the sea, she rolled until her smokestack broke its moorings and fell over. finally she sprung a leak and was run ashore. the crew were all saved, but for a long time their chances for life seemed small indeed. ninety of the horses were lost, some having been thrown overboard ten miles from the land. others were left tied in their stalls, to perish when the ship went to pieces in the breakers. those that were thrown overboard near the beach swam ashore through breakers in which no boat nor man could live, and, finding the waste and wreckage from the cargo of the "grape-shot," lived for days on the hay and oats, soaked with sea-water though they were. for two days this gale continued. the outlook for the fleet seemed hopeless. the inner bar of the harbor was absolutely impassable. between the outer bar and the inner were packed seventy vessels. this space, though called a harbor, was almost unsheltered. crowded with vessels as it was, it made an anchorage only less dangerous than that outside. although the vessels were anchored, bow and stern, the violence of the sea was such that they frequently crashed into each other, breaking bulwarks, spars, and wheel-houses, and tearing away standing-rigging. a schooner breaking from its anchorage went tossing and twirling through the fleet, crashing into vessel after vessel, until finally, getting foul of a small steamer, dragged it from its moorings; and the two began a waltz in the crowded harbor, to the great detriment of the surrounding craft. at last the two runaways went aground on a shoal, and pounded away there until every seam was open, and the holds filled with water. a strange mishap was that which befell the gunboat "zouave." she was riding safely at anchor, remote from other ships, taking the seas nobly, and apparently in no possible danger. her crew occupied themselves in going to the assistance of those in the distressed vessels, feeling that their own was perfectly safe. but during the night, the tide being out, the vessel was driven against one of the flukes of her own anchor; and as each wave lifted her up and dropped her heavily on the sharp iron, a hole was stove in her bottom, sinking her so quickly that the crew took to the boats, saving nothing. but the most serious disaster was the total wreck of the "city of new york," a large transport, with a cargo of ordnance stores valued at two hundred thousand dollars. unable to enter the inlet, she tried to ride out the gale outside. the tremendous sea, and the wind blowing furiously on shore, caused her to drag her anchors; and those on board saw certain death staring them in the face, as hour by hour the ship drifted nearer and nearer to the tumbling mass of mighty breakers, that with an unceasing roar, and white foam gleaming like the teeth of an enraged lion, broke heavily on the sand. she struck on monday afternoon, and soon swung around, broadside to the sea, so as to be helpless and at the mercy of the breakers. every wave broke over her decks. the condition of her crew was frightful. in the dead of winter, the wind keen as a razor, and the waves of icy coldness, the body soon became benumbed; and it was with the greatest effort that the men could cling to the rigging. so great was the fury of the wind and waves, that no assistance could be given her. for a boat to venture into that seething caldron of breakers would have been throwing away lives. so the crew of the doomed ship were left to save themselves as best they might. the night passed away, and tuesday morning saw the gale still blowing with unabated force. hoping to lessen the strain on the hull, they cut away the foremast. in falling, it tore away the pipes, and the vessel became a perfect wreck. numbed with cold, and faint for lack of food, the crew lashed themselves to the bulwarks and rigging; and so, drenched by the icy spray, and chilled through by the wind, they spent another fearful night. the next day the fury of the storm seemed to have somewhat abated. the sea was still running high, and breaking over the almost unrecognizable hulk stranded on the beach. with the aid of a glass, sailors on the other ships could see the inanimate forms of the crew lashed to the rigging. it was determined to make a vigorous attempt to save them. the first boat sent out on the errand of mercy was watched eagerly from all the vessels. now it would be seen raised high on the top of some tremendous wave, then, plunging into the trough, it would be lost from the view of the anxious watchers. all went well until the boat reached the outermost line of the breakers, when suddenly a towering wave, rushing resistlessly along, broke directly over the stern, swamping the boat, and drowning seven of the crew. again the last hope seemed lost to the exhausted men on the wreck. but later in the day, the sea having gone down somewhat, a steam-tug succeeded in reaching the wreck and rescuing the crew. the second engineer was the last man to leave the ship. he remained lashed to the mast until all were taken on the tug. then, climbing to the top-mast, he cut down the flag that had waved during those two wild days and nights, and bore it safely away. after this gale died away, the work of getting the squadron over the inner bar was begun. it was a tremendous task. many of the ships drew too much water for the shallow channel, and it was necessary to remove large parts of their cargoes. the bar, which is known as buckhead shoal, was an expanse of quicksand a mile wide, with a tortuous channel ever changing with the shifting sands. many of the ships stranded, and the tugs were constantly busy in towing them off. scarcely would one be safely afloat, than another would "bring up all standing" on some new shoal. two weeks elapsed before all the vessels were safe within the landlocked sound. they were none too soon; for hardly had the last vessel crossed the bar, than the black gathering clouds, the murky, tossing sea, and the foaming billows breaking on the bar, foretold another of the storms for which cape hatteras is famed. through the storm a queer-looking craft was seen approaching the fleet. it was found to be a boat-load of escaping slaves, who had put to sea at random, feeling sure of finding "de yankees" somewhere. from these men much valuable information was obtained. up to this time no one in the fleet, excepting the superior officers, was informed as to the exact destination of the expedition. now as the signal to get under way blew out from the foremast of the flagship, and as the prow of the leading vessel was turned to the northward, all knew, and all cried, "roanoke island." this island was heavily fortified by the confederates, and from its position was a point of considerable strategic importance. it guards the entrance to pamlico sound from albemarle sound, and into pamlico sound open great bays and rivers that penetrate far into the interior of virginia and north carolina. on this island the confederates had erected three forts of formidable strength. these forts commanded the channel through which the vessels would have to pass; and to make the task doubly dangerous, the channel was obstructed with sharpened piles and sunken hulks, so as to be apparently impassable. beyond the obstructions was the confederate fleet, which, though insignificant compared with the attacking squadron, was formidable in connection with the forts. it was the task of the invaders to capture these forts, and destroy the fleet. it was on feb. that the squadron prepared to leave its moorings at hatteras inlet. it was an imposing spectacle. the flagship "philadelphia" led the naval squadron, which advanced with the precision of a body of troops. behind, with less regularity, came the army transports. about one hundred vessels were in the three columns that moved over the placid waters of the sound toward the forts. it was five in the afternoon of a short february day that the fleet came in sight of the forts. signals were made for the squadron to form in a circle about the flagship. the early darkness of winter had fallen upon the scene. the waters of the sound were smooth as a mill-pond. from the white cottages on the shore gleamed lights, and brilliant signal-lanterns hung in the rigging of the ships. through the fleet pulled swift gigs bearing the commanders of the different vessels. the morning dawned dark and rainy. at first it was thought that the fog and mist would prevent the bombardment, but all doubt was put at an end by the signal, "prepare for action," from the flagship. the drums beat to quarters, and soon the guns were manned by sailors stripped to the waist. the magazines were opened; and the surgeons cleared away the cock-pits, and spread out their glistening instruments ready for their work. the fleet got under way, and stood up the channel almost to the point where the obstructions were planted. beyond these were the gunboats of the enemy. the cannonade was begun without loss of time. a portion of the fleet began a vigorous fire upon the confederate gunboats, while the others attacked the forts. the gunboats were soon driven away, and then the forts received the entire fire. the water was calm, and the aim of the gunners was admirable. the forts could hardly respond to the fire, since the great shells, plunging by hundreds into the trenches, drove the men from their guns into the bomb-proof casemates. the officers of the ships could watch with their glasses the effect of every shell, and by their directions the aim of the gunners was made nearly perfect. while the bombarding was going on, gen. burnside set about landing his troops near the southern end of the island. the first boat was fired upon by soldiers concealed in the woods. the "delaware" instantly pitched a few shells into the woods from which the firing proceeded, and in a few minutes the enemy could be seen running out like rats from a burning granary. the landing then went on unimpeded. the boats were unable to get up to the bank, owing to shoal water; and the soldiers were obliged to wade ashore in the icy water, waist-deep, and sinking a foot more in the soft mud of the bottom. the bombardment was continued for some hours after nightfall. a night bombardment is a stirring scene. the passionate and spiteful glare of the cannon-flashes; the unceasing roar of the explosions; the demoniac shriek of the shells in the air, followed by their explosion with a lightning flash, and crash like thunder; the volumes of gray smoke rising upon the dark air,--make up a wonderful and memorable sight. in the morning the bombardment was recommenced, and the work of landing troops went on. eight gunboats were sent to tear away the obstructions in the channel; and there beneath the guns of the enemy's fleet, and the frowning cannon of the forts, the sailors worked with axe and ketch until the barricade was broken, and the eight ships passed to the sound above the forts. in the mean time, the troops on the island began the march against the forts. there were few paths, and they groped their way through woods and undergrowth, wading through morasses, and tearing their way through tangled thickets to get at the enemy's front. the advance was slow, but steady, until the open field before the forts was reached; then a change was ordered, led by the famous hawkins zouaves, who rushed madly upon the fort, shouting their war cry of _zou, zou, zou!_ like a resistless flood the attackers poured over the earthworks, and the frightened defenders fled. before five o'clock the entire island was in the hands of the troops, and the fleet had passed the barricade. during the bombardment the vessels sustained severe injuries. an act of heroism which made the hero celebrated was that of john davis, gunner's mate on board the "valley city." a shell entered the magazine of that ship, and exploded, setting the woodwork on fire. an open barrel of gunpowder stood in the midst of the flames, with sparks dropping about it. at any moment an explosion might occur which would shatter the vessel to fragments. men shrank back, expecting every moment to be their last. with wonderful presence of mind davis threw himself across the open end of the barrel, and with his body covered the dangerous explosive until the fire was put out. [illustration: contrabands escaping to fleet.] as soon as the stars and stripes were hoisted on the flagstaffs of the forts, the confederate fleet, which had been maintaining a desultory fire, fled up the sound, after setting fire to one schooner which had become hopelessly crippled in the battle. she blazed away far on into the night, and finally, when the flames reached her magazine, blew up with a tremendous report, seeming like a final involuntary salute paid by the defeated enemy to the prowess of the union arms. when quiet finally settled down upon the scene, and gen. burnside and commander goldsborough counted up their gains, they found that six forts, twenty-five hundred prisoners, and forty-two great guns had fallen into the hands of the victors. the union loss was forty killed and two hundred wounded. the next day was sunday. it was considered highly important that the success of the day before should be vigorously followed up; and an expedition of fourteen vessels, under capt. rowan, was ordered to follow the retreating confederate fleet and destroy it. the flying squadron was chased as far as elizabeth city on the pasquotauk river. here night overtook the pursuers; and they came to anchor at the mouth of the stream, effectually cutting off all hope of retreat. the confederates in the vessels lying off the town passed an anxious night. outnumbered two to one by the pursuing vessels, they saw no hope of a successful resistance. with a courage which in view of the facts seems to be almost foolhardy, they determined to stick to their ships, and fight to the death. the feelings of the inhabitants of the town were hardly less gloomy. so thoroughly impregnable had they considered the forts at roanoke island, that they had made absolutely no preparations for defence; and now they found their homes upon the eve of capture. the victorious army had not yet had an opportunity to show the merciful way in which the inhabitants of captured cities were treated throughout the war; and the good people of elizabeth city may be excused for fearing, that, with the destruction of their fleet, they were to be delivered into the merciless hands of a lawless enemy. morning dawned bright and clear. with the greatest deliberation the preparations for action were made on the attacking vessels. it was discovered, that, owing to the continuous firing during the roanoke island engagement, but twenty rounds of ammunition per gun were left to each vessel. it was accordingly ordered that no long-distance firing should be done; but each vessel should dash at the enemy, run him down if possible, and then board and fight it out, hand to hand. early in the morning the fleet started up the river. the enemy's fleet was soon sighted, lying behind the guns of a small battery on cobb's point. when within long range, battery and vessels opened a tremendous fire with eighty-pound rifles. the approach of the squadron continued until when within three-quarters of a mile the signal was flung out from the mast of the flagship, "dash at the enemy." then full speed was put on, and firing commenced from bow-guns. the confederates became totally demoralized. the battery was abandoned when the first vessel poured her broadside into it as she passed. before the enemy's fleet was reached, many of his vessels were fired and abandoned. the united states steamship "perry" struck the "sea-bird" amidships, sinking her so quickly that the crew had scarce time to escape. the crew of the "delaware" boarded the "fanny," sabering and shooting her defenders until they fled over the side into the water. the victory was complete and overwhelming. three or four of the victorious vessels at once proceeded to the town, where they found the enemy in full retreat and compelling the inhabitants to set fire to their houses. this was quickly stopped, and the invaders became the protectors of the conquered people. the power of the confederates in this part of the country being so effectually destroyed, the navy was divided into small detachments and sent cruising up the lagoons and rivers opening into the north carolina sounds, merely to show the people the power of the united states government, and to urge them to cease their resistance to its authority. three vessels were sent to edenton. as they came abreast of the village, a company of mounted artillery precipitately fled. a detachment of marines sent ashore found a number of cannon which they destroyed, and a nearly completed schooner to which they set fire. other small places were visited, generally without any opposition being encountered. a somewhat larger force was sent to a small town named winton, as it had been rumored that a force of union men were there disputing the authority of the confederate government, and the navy wished to go to their assistance. the "delaware" and "hudson," in advance of the squadron, came within sight of the landing and warehouses of winton about four in the afternoon. the town itself was hidden from the view of the vessels by a high bluff. it was a clear, quiet afternoon, and all seemed peaceful. the long wharf, running out into the stream, was deserted by all save a negro woman, who, roused from her occupation of fishing, gazed inquisitively at the strange vessels. the place looked like a commercial port going to seed on account of the blockade. the two vessels proceeded on their way unmolested, ranging past the wharf, and apprehending no danger. suddenly from the woods on the bluff a terrific fire was poured upon the vessels. the negress, having served her end as a decoy, fled hastily to shelter. the bluffs seemed to be held by two batteries of light artillery and a considerable force of armed men. fortunately the aim of the artillery men was bad, and the vessels sustained no severe damage. still, they were in a precarious position. the "delaware" was too near to bring her battery to bear, and was obliged to turn slowly in the narrow channel. the "perry," more fortunately situated, opened at once on the enemy with shrapnel. but the contest was unequal, and the two vessels were forced to retreat down the river about seven miles, there to await the remainder of the squadron. two days after, the flotilla began the advance up the river, shelling the town as they ascended. once opposite the town, the troops were landed, and the hawkins zouaves soon had possession of the bluff and town. knapsacks, ammunition, and muskets in considerable quantity fell into the hands of the victors; and, after burning the barracks of the enemy, the squadron returned to the base of operations at roanoke island. chapter vi. reduction of newbern. -- exploits of lieut. cushing. -- destruction of the ram "albemarle." after the destruction of the confederate flotilla at elizabeth city, and the affair at winton, the union fleet remained quietly at anchor off roanoke island, or made short excursions up the little rivers emptying into the sounds. over a month passed in comparative inaction, as the ships were awaiting supplies and particularly ammunition. when finally the transports from new york arrived, and the magazines of the war-vessels were filled with shot and shell and gunpowder, they again turned their attention to the enemy. the victories already won had almost driven the confederates from that part of north carolina which borders on the sounds. roanoke island, elizabeth city, edenton, and plymouth had one after the other yielded to the persuasive eloquence of the ship's cannon, and there was left to the confederates only one fort,--newbern, on the river neuse. as a city newbern is insignificant; but as a military post it was of a good deal of importance, and the confederates had made active preparations for its defence. it was on the th of march, , that commander rowan started from hatteras inlet with a flotilla of thirteen vessels, and army transports bearing three thousand men. the long column steamed down the placid waters of pamlico sound, and, turning into the neuse river, anchored about fifteen miles below the city. although the night before the battle, and within sight of the white steeples of the menaced city, all was quiet and peaceful. the banks of the broad stream were densely wooded, and from them could be heard at times the cry of the whip-poor-will, or the hoot of the night-owl. the vessels were anchored far out in the middle of the stream, so as to avoid the deadly bullets of any lurking sharp-shooters. the lookouts kept a close watch for floating torpedoes; while the sailors off duty spun their yarns in the forecastle, and bet pipes and tobacco on the result of the coming battle. the jolly tars of the burnside expedition had hardly yet learned that war was a serious matter. they had met with but little serious resistance, had captured powerful forts without losing a man, had chased and destroyed the confederate fleet without any serious damage to their own, and felt, accordingly, that war was a game in which it was their part always to win, and the part of the enemy to run away. certainly the fight at newbern did nothing to dispel this idea. when morning broke, the shrill piping of the boatswain's whistle brought the crew to their places on deck. breakfast was served, and leisurely eaten; for it is one of the established theories of the navy, that sailors can't fight on empty stomachs. breakfast over, the work of landing the troops was begun. the point chosen was a broad beach fringed with woods near the anchorage of the vessels. before landing the troops, the ships threw a few shells into the woods, to make certain that they concealed no ambuscade, as in the disastrous affair at matthias point. after two dozen shells had burst, mowing down trees, and driving out frightened animals in plenty, but no sharp-shooters, the long-boats put off from the transports bearing the soldiers for the land attack. as soon as six or seven hundred were landed, they formed in column, and moved rapidly up the beach. the others followed as rapidly as they could be put on shore. the gunboats steamed slowly up the river, keeping abreast of the troops, and throwing shells into the woods ahead of the attacking column. had any confederates prepared to resist the march, they must have been driven out of the forest before the federals came within musket-range. not an atom of resistance was made. the plans of the invaders seemed irresistible. about half-past four in the afternoon, a puff of smoke rose from the river-bank far ahead of the leading vessel, and in a few seconds a heavy shell plunged into the water a hundred yards ahead of the flotilla. the enemy was getting awake to the situation. the gunboats soon returned the fire, and the cannonading was continued at long range, without damage to either side, until sundown, when the troops went into camp, and the vessels chose an anchorage near by. at daylight the next morning, the advance was resumed. the day was so foggy that the usual signals between the vessels could not be seen, and orders from the flagship had to be carried by boat. the fleet proceeded up the river; and, when the fog lifted, the ramparts of fort dixie--the one that had fired on them the night before--were visible. a vigorous bombardment was at once begun; but the fort failed to reply, and a storming-party sent ashore found it empty. hoisting the stars and stripes above the deserted bastions, the ships went on. soon they reached fort ellis. here the firing was sharp on both sides. the fort was a powerful earthwork, well armed with rifles ranging from thirty-two to eighty pounders. the confederates did but little damage with their guns; their aim being bad for want of practice, and their powder of poor quality. still, they fought on with great courage until a shell from the "delaware" burst in the magazine, firing the powder there, and hurling the fort, with large numbers of its brave defenders, high in the air. this ended the fight with fort ellis, and the fleet continued its way up the river. [illustration: flag of south carolina.] shortly after passing fort ellis, two rows of obstructions were met in the channel. the lower barrier was composed of a series of piles driven into the river-bottom, and cut off below the water; back of these came a row of pointed and iron tipped piles pointing down stream at such an angle as to be likely to pierce the hull of any vessel that should run upon them. entwined about these piles was a cable connecting with thirty powerful torpedoes. that any vessel could pierce such a barrier seems almost incredible; yet all the vessels of the flotilla passed, and but two were seriously injured. one of the sharp iron piles drove through the bottom of the "barney," sending the crew to the pumps, and the carpenter down into the hold with his felt-covered plugs. but her damages were quickly repaired, and she went on with the rest of the fleet. right under the guns of fort thompson the second line of obstructions was encountered. it consisted of a line of sunken vessels closely massed, and a _cheval-de-frise_ of stakes and logs, that blocked the entire river, save a small passage close in shore under the guns of the battery. here was more hard work for the sailors; but they managed to creep through, and ranging up in line, broadside to fort thompson, they opened a vigorous cannonade upon that work. the condition of the garrison of the fort was desperate. the troops that had marched up the beach abreast of the vessels began a vigorous attack on the landward face of the fort, while the vessels in the river kept up a vigorous fire on the water-front. soon the gunners of the fort were called away from the river-front to meet the hot assault of the soldiers on the land; and, as the conflict grew close, the ships ceased firing, lest their shell should mow down foe and friend alike. leaving the enemy to the attention of the soldiery, the ships proceeded up the river past two deserted forts that gave no answer to vigorous shelling. just as the last vessel was passing fort thompson, the attacking troops, with a cheer, rushed upon the ramparts; and in a minute the stars and stripes were fluttering from the flagstaff. this was the last resistance encountered, and at two p.m. the victors were in full possession of the city. the war ships sped up the river after three confederate steamers that were endeavoring to escape, and soon captured them. one was run ashore and burned, while the other two were added to the conquering fleet. as a last resort, the flying enemy sent down a huge fire-raft, in the hope of burning some of the union vessels; but this was stopped by the piers of a railroad bridge, and, burning that, effectually cut off newbern's communication with the world. during the entire two days' engagement, the navy did not lose a man on the ships. two of a small landing-party were killed, and eleven, wounded; while of the soldiers there were killed eighty-eight, and wounded three hundred and fifty-two. this victory gave to the united states the entire control of the north carolina sounds and tributary navigable waters. for years after this, the sounds were occupied by a small squadron of the united states navy, mainly blockading cruisers. it was during these three years of occupation that lieut. w. b. cushing performed those wonderfully daring deeds that made him a name and fame apart from all other war-records. these feats so particularly belong to cushing's record, rather than to the history of any years of the war, that they may well be considered together here. the wonderful exhibitions of daring by which this young officer earned his promotion to the rank of a commander, while still hardly more than a boy, were the ascent of new river inlet in the steamer "ellis," for the purpose of destroying the enemy's salt-works, and a blockade-runner at new topsail inlet; and finally, the great achievement of his life, the destruction of the ram "albemarle" in the roanoke river. lieut. cushing entered the navy during the first year of the civil war, being himself at that time but nineteen years old. a comrade who served with him at the time of the destruction of the "albemarle" describes him as about six feet high, very slender, with a smooth face, and dark wavy hair. immediately upon his joining the navy, he was assigned to duty with the blockading squadron on the atlantic coast. he distinguished himself during the first year of the war, at a time when the opportunities of the service were not very brilliant, by unfailing vigilance, and soon won for himself the honor of a command. in november, , he was put in command of the steamer "ellis," and ordered to preserve the blockade of new river inlet on the north carolina coast, not far from the favorite port of the blockade-runners, wilmington. the duties of a blockading man-of-war are monotonous, at best. lying at anchor off the mouth of the blockaded harbor, or steaming slowly up and down for days together, the crew grow discontented; and the officers are at their wits' end to devise constant occupation to dispel the turbulence which idleness always arouses among sailors. inaction is the great enemy of discipline on board ship, and it is for this reason that the metal and trimmings aboard a man-of-war are so continually being polished. a big brass pivot-gun amidships will keep three or four jackies polishing an hour or two every day; and petty officers have been known to go around secretly, and deface some of the snowy woodwork or gleaming brass, when it seemed that surfaces to be polished were becoming exhausted. it is no unusual thing to set a gang of sailors to work rubbing away with polish on the flukes of the great anchors, merely to give them work. but while this sort of occupation may drive dull care away from the heart of jack, his officers are not so easily entertained; and the dull routine of blockading duty at an unfrequented port is most wearisome to adventurous spirits. particularly was this the case with lieut. cushing, and he was constantly upon the lookout for some perilous adventure. one day late in november, information was brought to him that the enemy had established large salt-works at jacksonville, thirty-five miles up the river. even thus early in the war, the vigorous blockade was beginning to tell upon the supplies of the confederates; and one of the articles of which the southern armies were in the greatest need was salt. the distress caused by the lack of it was great. many of the soldiers were in the habit of sprinkling gunpowder upon their food to give it a flavor approaching that of salt. in olden days, particularly in the british navy about the end of the eighteenth century, it was the custom for the captains to issue to their crews, before going into battle, large cups of grog with gunpowder stirred in. it was believed that this mixture made the men fight more desperately. but this theory of the doughty sea-dogs of past generations no longer finds any support, and doubtless the soldiers of the confederacy felt they could fight better upon salt than on their enforced seasoning of gunpowder. at manassas junction, when the confederate army by a rapid movement captured a large provision train, the rush of the soldiers for two or three cars laden with salt was so great that a strong guard had to be stationed to beat back pilferers, and secure a proper division of the much-prized seasoning. the officers of the union navy were well informed of this scarcity of salt throughout the south, and accordingly made it a point to destroy all salt-works along the coast. the officers of the gulf squadron were constantly employed in raiding establishments of this character, of which there were numbers along the coast of louisiana, alabama, and mississippi. cushing, on hearing of the existence of salt-works in the district over which he stood guard, determined to destroy them. but to do this was a matter of no small peril. jacksonville was thirty-five miles up a small stream, in the heart of a country teeming with confederate troops and their guerrilla sympathizers. the densely wooded shores could conceal sharp-shooters, who could easily pick off every man stationed on the steamer's deck. at any point of the entire distance a masked battery might be stationed, that could blow the invading craft out of water, and leave none of her crew uncaptured to tell the tale. nevertheless, the intrepid young commander determined to make the attempt. his vessel was a small steamer, mounting one heavy gun amidships and two smaller cannon on each side. without any mishap the "ellis" and her crew reached the town about noon. on the way up the river a dense column of black smoke appeared ahead, rising above the forest. all thought that the confederates, hearing of their approach, had evacuated the town, firing it as they retreated. all possible steam was put on, and the little gunboat dashed up the river in the hope of saving some of the property of the inhabitants. but, on rounding an abrupt curve in the river, the mystery was solved by the appearance of a fine schooner, loaded with cotton and turpentine, and drifting helplessly, a mass of crackling flames, down the stream. she was clearly a blockade-runner, freighted with the chief products of the country, and had been waiting a chance to slip out past the blockader, and run for some friendly port. cushing's bold move up the river had entrapped her neatly, and her owners had fired her and fled. the fire was a magnificent sight. the inflammable cargo, the tarry ropes and cordage, fed the flames, which leaped from hull to main-truck. the cotton burned sullenly, giving forth immense clouds of dense, black smoke. to save her was hopeless, and the "ellis" kept out of the way of the flying fire-brands and continued on. the expected salt-works were not found, however; and the only trophies to be obtained at the town were about twenty-five stand of arms and two schooners, evidently blockade-runners. the post-office was also visited, and a large mail captured and removed, in the hope of finding therein some valuable information regarding the movements of the enemy. the town itself was one of the sleepy little southern villages, with wide streets, grass-grown and lined with live-oaks. children, and boys too young to have been drafted into the southern army, followed the sailors and marines curiously as they strolled up and down the silent streets. the war had robbed the little city of its men; the blockade had robbed it of its little coasting-trade. such an air of quiet and desolation hung about the place, that the inhabitants probably welcomed the advent of even the hostile sailors as being something to break the monotony. after a stoppage of an hour and a half, the "ellis" started down the river. the quiet of the upward voyage had dispelled any thoughts of danger, but about five o'clock suspicions were re-awakened by the sight of a small encampment on the bank. a few shells thrown over the tents quickly sent the campers scurrying into the woods; and, as the camps seemed to have no artillery, the "ellis" continued without further hostilities. a short distance down the stream the confederates opened upon them with two guns mounted on a lofty bluff. cushing, ever ready for a skirmish, stopped his engine, and cleared away the big pivot-gun for action. the battle-flag was hoisted at the fore, and the crew, with three cheers, set about the work. about an hour of artillery practice followed, when, the enemy being driven from his guns, the "ellis" proceeded on her way. it was now growing dark, and the tide was rapidly falling. the two pilots on the steamer agreed that daylight and high tide were necessary to get the vessel safely out of the river. with great reluctance cushing ordered the anchor to be let fall, and proceeded to make preparations for the night. on both banks of the river could be seen the flash of lanterns, proving that the confederates were aware of the steamer's presence, and were contemplating an attack. to resist such an attack if made in force during the night, seemed almost hopeless; yet the sailors went cheerfully about the work of preparation, getting out cutlasses and revolvers, and putting up the boarding-nettings over the sides. in watchful anxiety the hours wore away. no sound escaped the vigilant ear of the men on duty. but the enemy evidently had abandoned the attack, and when morning broke none were to be seen. with light hearts, and feeling that the worst was past, the little party continued their way, only to find that the worst was yet to come. soon after daylight, the pilot, mistaking the channel, ran the ship so solidly aground that there was clearly no hope of extricating her. all this time she had been towing one of the captured schooners; and cushing, with quick decisiveness, ordered that every thing should be removed from the "ellis" to the schooner. this was quickly done, leaving nothing but the great pivot-gun aboard. but even when so greatly lightened, the ship would not float, and cushing saw that all was lost. as a final expedient he sent a boat's crew back after the cannon that the enemy had abandoned the day before, intending to construct a land-battery with them, and so keep his ship. but the confederates had already removed the guns, so this forlorn hope failed. orders were then given for the crew to take the schooner, and drop down the river for a mile or two. the young captain expressed his intention of remaining aboard his craft, and asked for six volunteers to help him fight the pivot-gun. they were quickly found; and, while the remainder of the crew dropped down the river in the schooner, the devoted little band calmly awaited the beginning of the attack. they did not have long to wait. soon a cannon boomed from the bank, and a heavy shell whizzed over their heads. then another, from another direction, and a third, and a fourth, each from a distinct battery. they were hopeless odds, yet cushing and his command fought on until the gunners, getting the range, dropped shot after shot into the doomed vessel. then fire broke out in three or four places. this was too much; and the seven daring men took to a small boat, and rowed to the schooner. first, however, they loaded the long gun, and turned it on the enemy, in order, as cushing said, "that she might fight for herself when we could do so no longer." once in the schooner, they sailed rapidly down the river; and just as they reached the sound a deep boom announced that the fire had reached the magazine, and the "ellis" was blown into a million pieces. daring as this adventure was, cushing was much distressed at its termination; and in his official report he asks for a general court of inquiry, to determine whether he had properly upheld the honor of the nation's flag. another daring expedition was undertaken by cushing when in command of the "monticello." this was in february, . he was cruising off cape fear river. at smithville, a small town some distance up the river, was a confederate army-post. cushing's plan was to proceed up the river in row-boats, burn any vessels that might be at the dock, capture the commanding officers, and escape before the enemy could recover from the surprise. it was a rash and rather useless expedition, but cushing successfully carried it out. with two boats and twenty men, he went quietly past the guns of the fort, concealed by the blackness of a cloudy night, ascended the river to the town, and landed directly in front of the hotel. a high bank concealed the party from view, and lying in ambush here they managed to capture some negroes, from whom the desired information was obtained. then with two officers and a seaman, cushing walked from the deck to gen. herbert's headquarters in so open a manner as to disarm suspicion. entering the house they met an engineer officer, who tried to raise an alarm, but was quickly captured and gagged. the adjutant-general, never dreaming that any enemy could be so near him, supposed it was a mutiny, and fled hastily, half dressed, to the woods, not even calling out the garrison. cushing then with his speechless prisoner walked calmly back before the long barracks that sheltered a thousand hostile soldiers, and within a few yards of the sentry on the wharf. only when the affrighted adjutant-general returned from his hasty trip to the woods did the confederates know that an enemy had been in their midst. then there was great excitement, arresting of sentries, calling out of guards, and signalling to the fort that hostile boats were in the harbor. but all too late. cushing's coolness, courage, dash, and invincible luck had carried him scot-free through another dare-devil adventure. from the "monticello" cushing made yet another dangerous excursion into the enemy's country. on this occasion he had a more adequate purpose for his perilous errand. it was believed that the confederate ram "raleigh" was in the cape fear river above the town of smithville, the scene of the last adventure. cushing obtained permission from his superior officer to ascend the river, and try to blow up the ram with a torpedo. on the night of the d of june he started, taking with him jones and howarth, the officers who had been with him in the previous trip, and fifteen men. the night was pitchy dark, and all went well as they passed the fort and the little town of smithville. fifteen miles from the river's mouth, they saw the moon suddenly break through the clouds; and the surface of the river suddenly became bright, revealing to the sentries on shore the yankee boat fifteen miles within confederate territory. quickly the boats turned about, and headed down the river; but this was a mere feint, as cushing doubled as soon as he reached the shadow of the opposite bank, and continued his course into the hostile territory. toward morning, when within about seven miles of wilmington, a very stronghold of the confederates, he landed, and hid his boat in a neighboring swamp. the men lay in hiding all day; and, just as they were about to start out again, they captured two boats with a wilmington fishing-party. during the second night cushing crept cautiously up to within three miles of wilmington, closely examining the defences of the town and the obstructions in the river. at daybreak he rowed up one of the creeks until he found the road between fort fisher and wilmington. here he crouched by a hedge until a mounted mail-carrier came by from the fort. the soldier was captured and dismounted, vastly astonished at the sight of a blue-jacket in that region. presently, along came the carrier from the town, on the way to the fort. he too was astonished at the sight, but flung back a scornful answer to the demand that he surrender, and galloped hastily away. in an instant cushing was on the back of the captured horse, and after him; but the fugitive was too well mounted, and escaped. matters were now becoming very serious. the runaway would doubtless give the alarm everywhere. immediate flight was imperative. the men had been away from the boat for some hours, and were famished. food must be had. but how to get it? cushing's solution of the problem was characteristic. having captured some other prisoners, he learned that a store was to be found about two miles off. a prisoner about howarth's size was ordered to strip, and howarth put on his clothing. the change from the trim blue uniform of a yankee naval officer to the slouchy jeans jumper and overalls of a north carolina "cracker" was somewhat amusing, but the disguise was complete. mounting the captured horse, howarth rode off in the character of a "poor-white" farmer come in to do his marketing. he chatted freely with the people he met along the road, and securing his provision, returned to the boat without arousing the least suspicion. snugly ensconced in the thick bushes, the party then proceeded to sup, and after the meal amused themselves in cutting telegraph-wires, and at dark returned to the boat. this was the third night in the river, and cushing prepared to return. embarking with his prisoners, he pulled up to the "raleigh," and found that she would not need his attentions, as she was already a total wreck. then he began the descent of the river. when a little way down the prisoners were set adrift, with neither sails nor oars in order that they might not report the occurrence too soon. the blue-jackets continued their pull down the river. just as they reached the mouth the moon shone out, and a quick hail came from a guard-boat. cushing made no answer, but in a low voice urged his men on, intending to attack the enemy. but in an instant more three boats came out of the shadow, and at the same instant five appeared on the other side. one opening seemed left for the beleaguered boat to dash through. at it they went, but a schooner filled with troops suddenly appeared blockading this last exit. it looked as though all was up, and those in the boat saw before them the cheerful prospect of execution as spies. but cushing's pluck and self-possession, which had never yet failed, still stood by him. he resorted to strategy, and, like the hunted fox, threw his pursuers off the track by doubling. he made a dash so rapid and determined towards the western bar, that all the boats of the enemy rushed to block that point. for an instant his own was in the shadow of a cloud. in that instant he had turned, and headed at full speed for new inlet. his men were as cool as he. with a few vigorous pulls the boat shot out into the breakers where the enemy dared not follow it, and soon after the cutter was hoisted to the davits of the "monticello," uninjured, after a stay of three nights in the heart of the enemy's country. it was near the end of the great war that cushing performed the greatest feat of daring of his adventurous career; and, as on the previous occasions, the scene of the exploit was in the waters tributary to the north carolina sounds. early in the spring of it became evident to the officers of the union squadron in the sounds, that the confederates were making arrangements to drive the yankee ships from those waters, and to re-open the coasting-trade to the people of north carolina. the chief source of alarm to the fleet was a heavy iron-clad which was reported to be building on the roanoke river above plymouth. full descriptions of this vessel were in the hands of the union officers; and they saw clearly that, should she be completed, no vessel of the sound squadron, nor perhaps the entire navy, would be able to do battle against her successfully. the river was too shallow for the war-vessels to go up to the point where the ram was being built, and the channel at hatteras inlet was not deep enough for iron-clads to be brought in to compete with the enemy when finished. the naval authorities repeatedly urged the army to send an expedition to burn the boat; but major-gen. foster, in command of the department of north carolina, declared it was of no importance, as the confederates would never put it to any use. time showed a very different state of affairs. in april, , the ram was completed, and named the "albemarle." her first work was to co-operate with ten thousand confederate troops in the recapture of plymouth, which was accomplished with very little difficulty. lieut. flusser was at plymouth with four small gunboats, and remained bravely at his post as he saw the powerful ram bearing down upon him. it was half-past three in the morning, and the chill, gray dawn was just breaking over the earth. above the river hung a mist, through which the great body of the ram could be seen coming doggedly down to the conflict. the "miami" and "southfield" were lashed together; and, at the order of commander flusser, they started to meet the iron-clad, firing quickly and with good aim. the "albemarle" came on silently, disdaining to fire a gun. with a crash she struck the "miami" a glancing blow on the port-bow, gouging off two great planks. sliding past the wounded craft, she plunged into the "southfield," crushing completely through her side, so that she began to settle at once. the lashings between the gunboats parted, and the "southfield" sank rapidly, carrying part of her crew with her. as the "albemarle" crashed into the two vessels, she fired her bow-gun several times, killing and wounding many of the union sailors, and killing lieut. flusser. when she turned and made a second dash for the "miami," the latter fled down the stream, knowing that to dare the power of the enemy was mere madness. the "albemarle" steamed back to plymouth, and by her aid the town was easily recaptured by the confederates. the squadron in the sounds was now in a state of the greatest anxiety. at any moment the impregnable monster might descend the river and destroy the frail wooden gunboats at her leisure. preparations were made for a desperate battle when the time should come. captains were instructed to bring their ships to close quarters with the enemy and to endeavor to throw powder or shells down her smokestack. every possible means by which a wooden steamer might cope with an iron-clad was provided. [illustration: destruction of the "albemarle."] on the th of may the ram put in an appearance, steaming down the river. deliberately she approached within easy range, then let fly a shot at the "mattabesett" which knocked her launch to pieces and wounded several men. the "mattabesett" ran up to within one hundred and fifty yards of the "albemarle," and gave her a broadside of solid shot from nine-inch dahlgrens and one hundred-pounder rifles. when these shot struck a sloping place on the ram's armor, they glanced off. those that struck full on the plating simply crumbled to pieces, leaving no dent to tell of the blow. one beautifully aimed shot struck the muzzle of one of the cannon on the ram and broke it. the gun was used throughout the fight, however, as the "albemarle" carried but two and could not spare one of them. the "sassacus" followed in line of battle. she delivered her broadside in passing. the ram rushed madly at her, but was evaded by good steering. then the "sassacus" in turn rushed at the ram at full speed, thinking to run her down. she struck amidships at right angles, and with the crash of the collision came a hundred-pound shot from the ram, that passed through the wooden ship from end to end. still the engines of the "sassacus" were kept going, in the hope of pushing the "albemarle" beneath the water. the iron-clad careened slowly, the water washed over her after-deck; the crew of the "sassacus," far out on the bow, tried vainly to drop shells and packages of powder down the ram's smoking chimneys. it was a moment of intense excitement. but the ram was too much for her assailant. recovering from the shock of the collision, she slowly swung around until her bow-gun could be brought to bear on her tormentor, when she let fly a ponderous bolt. it crashed through the side of the steamer and plunged into her boiler. in an instant hot, scalding steam filled the engine-room and spread over the whole ship. cries of agony arose on every side. twenty-one of the crew were terribly scalded. nothing remained but retreat; and the "sassacus" steamed away from her enemy, after making one of the bravest fights in naval history. in the mean time the other gunboats were pounding away at the ram. the "miami" was trying in vain to get an opportunity to discharge a large torpedo. two other vessels were spreading nets about the great ship, trying to foul the propeller. the action continued until dark, when the ram withdrew, uninjured and without losing a man. she had fought alone for three hours against six ships, and had seriously damaged every one of her adversaries. it must also be remembered that she carried but two guns. the "albemarle" lay for a long time idle at her moorings in roanoke river, feeling sure that at her own pleasure she could go into the sounds, and complete the destruction of the fleet. lieut. cushing, then twenty-one years old, begged permission to attempt to destroy her. the authority was gladly granted by the navy department, and cushing began making his plans for the adventure. his first plan was to take a squad of men, with two steam-launches, up the roanoke, and blow the ram up by means of a torpedo. the launches were sent from new york, but one was swamped while crossing delaware bay. cushing, however, was not the man to be balked by an accident: so, cutting down his force one-half, he prepared for the start. thirteen officers and men made up the little party which seemed bound to certain death. the spirit which animated the blue-jackets during the war may be imagined from the fact that many sailors tried to purchase the privilege of going on this perilous expedition, by offering their month's pay to those who had been selected. to understand what a forlorn hope the little boat-load of men were cherishing, we must understand what were the defences of the "albemarle." she lay at a broad wharf, on which was encamped a large guard of soldiers as well as her crew. above and below her, great fires were kept burning on the shores, to prevent any boat approaching unseen. she was surrounded by a boom, or "water-fence," of floating logs, about thirty feet from her hull, to keep off any torpedo-boats. from the mouth of the roanoke to her moorings was about eight miles; the shores being lined on either side by pickets, and a large picket-station being established in mid-stream about one mile below plymouth. to attempt to penetrate this network of defences seemed to be foolhardy. yet cushing's record for dash and courage, and his enthusiasm, inspired his comrades with confidence; and they set out feeling certain of success. on the night of the th of october, the daring band, in their pygmy steamer, steamed rapidly up the river. no word was spoken aboard. the machinery was oiled until it ran noiselessly; and not a light shone from the little craft, save when the furnace-door was hastily opened to fire up. the confederate sentries on the bank saw nothing of the party; and, even when they passed the picket schooners near the wreck of the "southfield," they were unchallenged, although they could see the schooners, and hear the voices of the men, not more than twenty yards away. not until they came into the fitful glare of the firelight were they seen, and then quick hails came from the sentries on the wharf and the "albemarle's" decks. but the light on the shore aided the adventurers by showing them the position of the ram. they dashed up alongside, amid a shower of bullets that seemed to fill the air. on the decks of the ram all was confusion, the alarm rattles were sprung, the bell rung violently. the launch running alongside came into contact with the row of logs, and sheered off to make a dash over it. cushing, who on these dangerous expeditions was like a schoolboy on a holiday, answered with ridicule all hails. "go ashore for your lives," "surrender yourselves, or i shall sink you," he cried, as the gunners on the ram trained a heavy gun on the little launch. now she was headed straight for the ram, and had a run of thirty yards before striking the boom. she reached, and dashed over. cushing, standing in the stern, held in one hand the tiller ropes, in the other the lanyard of the torpedo. he looked up, saw the muzzle of a heavy gun trained directly on his boat: one convulsive pull of the rope, and with a roar the torpedo exploded under the hull of the "albemarle," just as a hundred-pound shot crashed through the bottom of his boat. in a second the launch had disappeared; her crew were struggling in the waves, or lying dead beneath them, and the "albemarle" with a mortal wound was sinking to the bottom. cushing swam to the middle of the river, and headed down stream. most of his companions were killed, captured, or drowned. in the middle of the stream he met woodman, who had followed him on previous expeditions. woodman was almost exhausted. cushing supported him as long as he was able, but was forced to leave him, and the sailor sank to the bottom. the young lieutenant floated down the river until at last he reached the shore, exhausted and faint from a wound in his wrist. he lay half covered with water in a swamp until daylight. while there he heard two confederate officers who passed say that the "albemarle" was a total wreck. that news gave him new energy, and he set about getting safely away. through the thick undergrowth of the swamp he crawled for some hours, until he found a negro who gave him shelter and food. then he plunged again into the swamp, and walked on until he captured a skiff from a rebel picket; and with this he safely reached the fleet,--the only one of the thirteen who set out two days before. so ended the most wonderful adventure of the war. chapter vii. the blockade-runners. -- nassau and wilmington. -- work of the cruisers. while it is undeniably true that the naval battles of the civil war were in many cases unimportant as compared with the gigantic operations of the mighty armies in virginia and tennessee, yet there was one service performed by the navy, alone and unaided, which probably, more than any thing else, led to the final subjugation of the south. this was the blockade. to fully appreciate what a terrible weapon the blockade is when energetically pursued, one need only look at the condition of the south during the latter years of the war. medicines were almost unattainable for love or money. salt was more carefully hoarded than silver. woollen goods for clothing were not to be had. nothing that could not be produced by the people of the revolted states could be obtained at their markets. their whole territory was in a state of siege, surrounded by a barrier only a little less unrelenting than the iron circle the germans drew around besieged paris. almost the first war measure of abraham lincoln was to declare the ports of the confederacy in a state of blockade. at first this seemed a rash proclamation, and one which could not be sustained by the force at the command of the federals. it is a rule of warfare, that "blockades, to be binding, must be effective;" that is, it is not lawful for a nation with a small fleet to declare an enemy's coast in a state of blockade, and then capture such trading-vessels as may happen to run in the way of its cruisers. the nation must have a large enough fleet to station vessels before each of the principal harbors of the enemy, and to maintain a constant and vigilant patrol up and down his coast. if this cannot be done, the blockade is called a "paper blockade," and merchantmen are justified in attempting to evade it. an instance of a "paper blockade" occurred during the early months of the civil war, which will illustrate this point. wilmington, n.c., was throughout the war one of the favorite ports for blockade-runners. from its situation, the many entrances to its harbor, and other natural advantages, it was the most difficult of all the southern ports to keep guarded. with the rest of the confederate ports, wilmington was declared blockaded; but it was long after, before a suitable blockading-fleet was stationed there. in july, , the british brig "herald" left wilmington without molestation. when two days out, she ran across a united states man-of-war, that promptly captured her. the courts, however, decided that a port so little guarded as wilmington was at that time could not be legally called blockaded, and the brig was therefore released. but it did not take many months for the energetic men of the navy department to get together such a fleet of boats of all kinds as to enable them to effectually seal all the ports of the confederacy. a blockading vessel need not be of great strength or powerful armament. all that is necessary is that she should be swift, and carry a gun heavy enough to overawe any merchantman that might attempt to run the blockade. and as such vessels were easy to improvise out of tug-boats, ferry-boats, yachts, and other small craft, it came about that by the last of , the people of the seaport towns of the south, looking seaward from their deserted wharves, could see two or three federal cruisers lying anchored off the outer bar, just out of reach of the guns of shore-batteries. it was a service of no little danger for the blue-jackets. the enemy were ever on the alert to break the blockade by destroying the ships with torpedoes. iron-clad rams were built on the banks of the rivers, and sent down to sink and destroy the vessels whose watchfulness meant starvation to the confederacy. the "albemarle" and the "merrimac" were notable instances of this course of attack. but the greatest danger which the sailors had to encounter was the peril of being wrecked by the furious storms which continually ravage the atlantic coast. the sailor loves the open sea in a blow; but until the civil war, no captain had ever dared to lie tugging at his cables within a mile or two of a lee shore, with a stiff north-easter lashing the sea into fury. in the blockading service of our great naval war, the war of , the method in vogue was to keep a few vessels cruising up and down the coast; and, when it came on to blow, these ships would put out into the open sea and scud for some other point. but in ' we had hundreds of vessels stationed along the enemy's coast; and where a ship was stationed, there she stayed, to meet the fury of the wind and waves by putting out more anchors, and riding out at her cables storms that would have blown the blockader of hundreds of miles from her post. in the earlier years of the war the blockade-runners were nearly all sailing-vessels, schooners, and brigs, that were easily captured. but when the supplies of the south became exhausted, and the merchants of england began building ships especially for this purpose, the duty of the blockading squadron became exciting and often very profitable. the business assumed such proportions that half the shipyards in england were engaged in turning out fast steamers to engage in it. at first it was the custom to send goods in regular ocean-steamers from england to the blockaded port; but this was soon abandoned, as the risk of capture on the long run across the atlantic was too great. not until the plan was adopted of shipping the goods to some neutral port along our coast, and there transferring the cargo to some small, swift vessel, and making the run into the confederate port in a few hours, did the business of blockade-running become very extensive. goods shipped for a neutral point were in no danger of being captured by our cruisers, and therefore the danger of the long trans-atlantic passage was done away with. [illustration: nassau: the haunt of the blockade-runners.] of these neutral points which served as way-stations for the blockade-runners, there were four on or near our coast,--the bermuda islands, which lie about seven hundred miles east of charleston; nassau, which is off the coast of florida, and a little more than five hundred miles southeast of charleston; havana; and the little mexican town of matamoras on the rio grande, opposite brownsville, texas. the bermudas were to some extent used, but their distance from the coast made them inconvenient as compared with nassau or matamoras. their chief trade was with wilmington, which became a favorite port during the latter years of the war. havana was popular for a time, and at first sight would appear to be admirably placed for a blockade-runners' rendezvous. but, though the coast of florida was but one hundred miles distant, it was surrounded by dangerous reefs, its harbors were bad and far apart, and there were no railroads in the southern part of the state to transport the contraband goods after they were landed. besides, key west, the naval station of the union forces in the south, was unpleasantly near, and the gulf blockade was maintained with more rigor than that on the atlantic coast. matamoras was peculiarly well situated for a blockade-running point. it is on the mexican side of the rio grande river, about forty miles above its mouth. goods once landed could be shipped in barges and lighters across the river in absolute safety, since heavy batteries prevented the cruisers of the gulf-squadron from entering the river. as a result of this trade, matamoras became a thriving place. hundreds of vessels lay in its harbor, where now it is unusual to see five at a time. for four years its streets were crowded with heavy freight vans, while stores and hotels reaped a rich harvest from the sailors of the vessels engaged in the contraband traffic. now it is as quiet and sleepy a little town as can be found in all the drowsy land of mexico. but the true paradise of the blockade-runners was nassau, the chief port of the bahama islands, and a colony of great britain. here all the conditions necessary to successfully evade the blockade were to be found. the flag that waved over the island was that of a nation powerful enough to protect its citizens, and to enforce the laws relative to neutrality. furthermore, great britain was undoubtedly in sympathy with the confederates; and so far from prohibiting the efforts of her citizens to keep up trade with the blockaded ports, she encouraged and aided them in every way in her power. and aside from her mere sympathy with the struggles of the young confederacy, england had a most powerful incentive to break down the blockade. in manchester the huge cotton-mills, employing thousands of hands, were shut down for lack of cotton, and the mill-hands were starving for lack of work; while shut up in the blockaded ports of the south were tons upon tons of the fleecy staple, that, once in england, would be worth its weight in gold. it was small wonder that the merchants of england set to work deliberately to fit out blockade-runners, that they might again get their mills running, and their people fed. [illustration: cotton ships at nassau.] the years of the war were lively times for the little town of nassau. hardly had the proclamation of president lincoln announcing the blockade of all confederate ports been issued, when at a bound nassau became prominent as the point of all most suitable for a blockade-runners' rendezvous. its harbor and the surrounding waters were deep enough for merchant-vessels, but too shallow to allow much cruising about by warships of heavy armament. it was within a few hours' running of three confederate ports, and it was protected by the flag of great britain. early in the war the confederates established a consulate in the little town, and the stars and stripes and the stars and bars waved within a few rods of each other. then great shipping-houses of liverpool sent over agents, and established branch houses. great warehouses and wharves were built soon great ocean ships and steamers began unloading their cargoes at these wharves. then swift, rakish schooners began to drop into the harbor, and after discharging heavy loads of cotton would take on cargoes of english goods, and slip out at nightfall to begin the stealthy dash past the watching gunboats. as the war went on, and the profits of the trade increased with its dangers, a new style of craft began to appear in the little harbor. these were the clyde built blockade-runners, on which the workmen of the clyde shipyards had been laboring day and night to get them ready before the war should end. they were long, low, piratical looking craft, with two smoke-stacks raking aft, and with one or two masts for showing signals, for they never hoisted a sail. two huge paddle-boxes towered above the deck amidships, the wheels being of enormous size. no structure of any kind encumbered the deck. even the steersman stood unsheltered at a wheel in the bow. they were painted dark gray, and at night could slip unseen along the water within a stone's-throw of the most watchful lookout on a man-of-war. they burned great quantities of a kind of coal that gave out no smoke, and when steaming at night not a light was allowed on board. many of these strange craft can be seen now along the levees at new orleans, or at the wharves in mobile, where they are used as excursion-steamers or for tug-boats. they were always the merest shells, fitted only for carrying freight, as not many passengers were to be found who desired to be taken into the confederate territory. occasionally, however, some soldier of fortune from abroad would drift from nassau, and thence to the mainland, to join the armies of the confederacy. the confederate agents on the island were always on the lookout for such adventurers, and were ever ready to aid them. sometimes, too, returning agents of the confederacy from europe would make the run through the blockading-fleet; so that the blockade-runners were seldom without two or three passengers, poor though their accommodations might be. for the voyage from nassau to wilmington, three hundred dollars passage money was charged, or more than fifty cents a mile. to guard against treachery, passage could only be obtained through the confederate consul, who carefully investigated the proofs of each applicant's identity before issuing to him a ticket. when the blockade-runner had taken her cargo and passengers aboard, and was prepared for her voyage, every one in the little town came down to the docks to see her start. it was a populace strongly southern in feeling that filled the streets of nassau, and nothing but good wishes were to be heard on every side. perhaps from a house on the hillside, over which floated the stars and stripes, the united states consul might be watching through a spyglass the movements of the steamer, and wishing in his heart that she might fall in with some yankee cruiser; but nevertheless, under his very eyes, the audacious racer slips out, and starts on her stealthy voyage. on leaving the harbor, a quick run of fifteen or twenty miles would be taken along the coast, to try the machinery. great care would be taken to keep within british waters, lest some watchful gunboat should seize the prize thus early in her career. when every thing proved in good working trim, the little vessel's prow would be turned northward, and the perilous voyage begun. for the first day, little danger was to be expected, and the voyage was generally so timed that the outer line of blockaders would be reached just after nightfall. a soldier going to enlist in one of the confederate cavalry regiments thus tells the story of his evasion of the blockade. "after a favorable voyage we reached the desired point off wilmington at the proper time. a brief stoppage was made, when soon the final preparations were completed for running the gauntlet of the federal blockaders, who would become visible shortly, as we approached nearer shore. all the lights in the steamer were extinguished, and all passengers ordered below, only the officers and crew being permitted to remain on deck. the furnaces were replenished with carefully selected coal, which would give the greatest amount of heat and the least smoke. the last orders were given, and every man was at his appointed place. presently the boilers hissed, and the paddle-wheels began to revolve faster and faster, as the fleet little steamer rose higher and higher in the water from the immense force of the rapid strokes; she actually felt like a horse gathering himself up under you for a great leap. after a little while, the few faint sounds from the deck which we could hitherto faintly catch in the cabin ceased altogether, and there was the stillness of death except for the sounds necessarily made by the movements of the machinery. then we realized that we were running for our lives past the line of cruisers, and that at any moment a big shell might come crashing through our cabin, disagreeably lighting up the darkness in which we were sitting. our suspense was prolonged for some minutes longer, when the speed was slackened, and finally we stopped altogether. even then we did not know whether we were safely through the lines, or whether we had been brought to under the guns of a hostile ship, for we could distinguish nothing whatever through the portholes. however, we were soon released from the cabin, and walked on deck, to find ourselves safely through the blockade. in the offing could be descried several of the now harmless blockaders, and near at hand lay the coast of north carolina. soon the gray dawn was succeeded by a brilliant, lovely sunrise, which lighted up cheerfully the low-lying shores and earthworks bristling with artillery, while from a fort near by floated the southern cross, the symbol of the glorious cause for which we had come to fight." when the blockade-runner, after safely running the gauntlet of the warships, steamed leisurely up to the wharves of the blockaded town, every one rushed to the docks to greet her. her captain and crew became at once people of great importance. they were beset on every side for news of the great world outside. the papers that they brought in were bought eagerly by the people, hungering for tidings of something else than the interminable war. the sailors of the steamer, on being paid off, rambled about the streets of the city, spending their money royally, and followed by a train of admiring hangers-on. the earnings of the sailors in case of a successful voyage were immense. a thousand dollars for the four or five days' trip was nothing unusual for common seamen, while the captain often received eight or nine thousand. but the risk of capture, with the confiscation of all property, and some months' imprisonment in a federal fortress, rather marred the attractiveness of the nefarious trade. the profits of a successful voyage to the owner of the ship and cargo were enormous. one of the steamers, specially built for the trade, at large cost, has been known to pay for herself fully in one voyage. indeed, the profits must have been huge to induce merchants to take the risk of absolutely losing a ship and cargo worth half a million of dollars. it is certain, too, that throughout the war the number of vessels captured, while trying to run the blockade, was far in excess of those that succeeded. up to the end of the federal secretary of the navy reported , vessels captured, classified as follows: schooners, ; steamers, ; sloops, ; brigs, ; barks, ; ships, ; yachts and boats, . of course, most of these were small, coastwise vessels. even among the steamers captured, there were but few of the fleet-going, english-built craft. there was no small amount of smuggling carried on between the ports of the north and the blockaded ports. the patriotism of the northern merchant was not always so great as to prevent his embarking in the traffic which he saw enriching his english competitor. many of the schooners captured started from northern ports and worked their way along the coast until that chain of inlets, sounds, and bayous was reached, which borders the coast south of chesapeake bay. once inside the bar, the smuggler could run at his leisure for any of the little towns that stood on the banks of the rivers of virginia and north carolina. the chase of one of these little vessels was a dreary duty to the officers of the blockading-ships. the fugitives were fast clippers of the models that made maine shipbuilders famous, until the inauguration of steam-navigation made a gracefully modelled hull immaterial as compared with powerful machinery. even when the great, lumbering warship had overhauled the flying schooner so as to bring a gun to bear on her, the little boat might suddenly dash into some inlet or up a river, where the man-of-war, with her heavy draught, could not hope to follow. and if captured, the prize was worth but little, and the prize-money, that cheers the sailors' hearts, was but small. but the chase and capture of one of the swift clyde-built steamers was a different matter. perhaps a lookout in the maintop of a cruiser, steaming idly about the atlantic, between nassau and wilmington, would spy, far off on the horizon, a black speck, moving swiftly along the ocean. no curling smoke would tell of the blockade-runner's presence, and nothing could be seen until the hull of the steamer itself was perceptible. with the quick hail of the lookout, the man-of-war would head for the prize, and start in hot pursuit. certain it is that the smuggler started to fly before the watchful lookout on the cruiser caught sight of her. the towering masts and capacious funnels of the man-of-war, with the cloud of black smoke from her furnaces, made her a conspicuous object at distances from which the smuggler would be invisible. with the blockade-runners the rule was to avoid any sail, no matter how innocent it might seem; and the appearance of a cloud of smoke on the horizon was the signal for an immediate change of course, and a flight for safety. when the chase began in this way, the cruiser had but little chance of making a capture, for the superior speed of the merchant-vessel would quickly carry her out of sight. sometimes, however, a favorable wind would enable the pursuer to use her sails, and then the chase would become exciting. with a cloud of canvas set, the man-of-war would gradually overhaul the flying vessel; and when within range, the great bow-gun would be cleared, and with a roar a shell would be sent flying after the prize. all hands would watch its course anxiously. generally it fell short. then another and another messenger would be sent to the enemy, which seldom struck the mark, for gunnery on a rough sea is a difficult art. but the blockade-runner can't stand being used for target-practice long. the cool head of her captain begins to deliberate upon means of getting out of range. mere running before the wind won't do it: so he makes a long detour, and doubles on his course, heading directly into the teeth of the breeze. now the cruiser is at a disadvantage. her sail-power gone, she stands no chance of capturing her game. her shells begin to fall far short of the smuggler, and soon she ceases firing altogether; and the blockade-runner, driven hundreds of miles out of her course, but safe for the time, goes on her way rejoicing. [illustration: blockade-runner in north carolina sounds.] one of the most brilliant captures of the war was that of the blockade-runner "young republic," by the united states gunboat "grand gulf." the "young republic" succeeded in evading the watchfulness of the blockading-squadron about the mouth of the cape fear river, and under cover of the night ran in safely to the anchorage under the guns of the confederate forts. the baffled blockaders saw her moving slowly up the river, while the cannon of the forts on either side thundered out salutes to the daring vessel that brought precious supplies to the confederacy. but the blockading-squadron, though defeated for the time, determined to wait and catch her when she came out. accordingly the "grand gulf," one of the fastest of the united states vessels, was stationed at the mouth of the river, with orders to watch for the "young republic." a week passed, and there was no sign of her. at last, one bright day, the lookout in the tops saw the mast and funnel of a steamer moving along above the forest which lined the river's bank. soon the hull of the vessel came into view; and with a rattle of hawse-chains, her anchors were let fall, and she swung to beneath the protecting guns of the fort. it was clear that she was going to wait there until a dark or foggy night gave her a good chance to slip past the gunboat that watched the river's mouth as a cat watches the mouth of a mouse-hole. with their marine glasses the officers on the gunboat could see the decks of the "young republic" piled high with brown bales of cotton, worth immense sums of money. they thought of the huge value of the prize, and the grand distribution of prize-money, and determined to use every effort to make a capture. strategy was determined upon, and it was decided to give the blockade-runner the chance to get out of the river that she was awaiting. accordingly the gunboat steamed away up the coast a few miles, leaving the mouth of the river clear. when hidden by a projecting headland, she stopped and waited for the blockade-runner to come out. the stokers were kept hard at work making the great fires roar, until the steam-gauge showed the highest pressure the boilers could bear. the sailors got out additional sails, clewed up cordage and rigging, and put the ship in order for a fast run. when enough time had elapsed, she steamed out to see if the "young republic" had taken the bait. officers and crew crowded forward to catch the first sight around the headland. the great man-of-war sped through the water. the headland was rounded, and a cheer went up from the crowd of jackies; for there, in the offing, was the blockade-runner, gliding through the water like a dolphin, and steaming for dear life to nassau. then the chase began in earnest. the "young republic" was one of those long, sharp steamers built on the clyde expressly for running the blockade. her crew knew that a long holiday in port, with plenty of money, would follow a successful cruise; and they worked untiringly to keep up the fires, and set every sail so that it would draw. on the cruiser the jackies saw visions of a prize worth a million and a half of dollars; and the thought of so much prize-money to spend, or to send home, spurred them on. for several hours the chase seemed likely to be a long, stern one; but then the freshening wind filled the sails of the gunboat, and she began to overhaul the fugitive. when within a mile or two, she began firing great shells with her pivot-gun. then the flying blockade-runner began to show signs of fear; and with a good glass the crew could be seen throwing over bale after bale of the precious cotton, to lighten the vessel. in the last thirty miles of the chase the sea was fairly covered with cotton-bales. more than three hundred were passed floating in the water; and the jackies gnashed their teeth, and growled gruffly, at the sight of so much wealth slipping through their fingers. on the high paddle-wheel box of the blockade-runner, the captain could be seen coolly directing his crew, and now and again turning to take a look through his glass at the pursuer. as the chase continued, the certainty of capture became more and more evident. then the fugitives began throwing overboard or destroying every thing of value: furniture, silver-ware, chronometers, the fittings of the cabin, every thing that could benefit their captors, the chagrined blockade-runners destroyed. the officers of the gunboat saw that if they wished to gain any thing by their capture, they must make haste. at the risk of an explosion, more steam was crowded on; and the gunboat was soon alongside the "young republic," and in a position to give her an enormous broadside. the blockade-runner saw that he was caught and must submit. for lack of a white flag, a pillow-case was run up to the masthead, and the beating of the great wheels stopped. the davits amidships of the "grand gulf" are swung out, and a boat's crew, with a lieutenant and dapper midshipman, climb in. a quick order, "let fall there," and the boat drops into the water, and is headed for the prize. another moment, and the stars and stripes supplant the pillow-case waving from the masthead of the "young republic." an officer who went into the boiler-room found that the captured crew had planned to blow up the vessel by tying down the safety-valve, so that an enormous pressure of steam strained the boilers almost to bursting. a quick blow of a hatchet, and that danger was done away with. then, with a prize-crew on board, the "young republic" started on her voyage to new york; while the "grand gulf" returned to wilmington to hunt for fresh game. [illustration: pursuing a blockade-runner.] a curious capture was that of the british schooner "francis," which was running between nassau and the coast of florida. on her last trip she was nearing the coast, when she fell in with a fishing-smack, and was warned that a federal gunboat was not far away. still she kept on her course until sundown, when the breeze went down, and she lay becalmed. the gunboat had been steaming into inlets and lagoons all day, and had not sighted the schooner. when night came on, she steamed out into the open sea, within a quarter of a mile of the blockade-runner, and, putting out all lights, lay to for the night. those on the schooner could see the gunboat, but the lookout on the cruiser did not see the blockade-runner. soon a heavy fog came up, and entirely hid the vessels from each other. the blockade-runners could only hope that a breeze might spring up, and enable them to escape. but now a curious thing occurred. it almost seems as if two vessels on the ocean exercise a magnetic attraction for each other so often do collisions occur where there seems room for all the navies of the world to pass in review. so it was this night. the anxious men on the schooner soon found that the two vessels were drifting together, and they were absolutely powerless to prevent it. at midnight, though they could see nothing, they could hear the men on the gunboat talking. two hours after, the schooner nestled gently up by the side of the gunboat; and a slight jar gave its crew their first intimation that a prize was there, simply waiting to be taken. all they had to do was to climb over the railing. this was promptly done, and the disgusted blockade-runners were sent below as prisoners. half an hour later came a breeze that would have carried them safely to port. the gray sea-fogs played many scurvy tricks with the blockading-fleets, often letting the runners in right under the muzzles of the great guns. it was far easier to spy out a vessel in the darkest night than in the thick gray fog that enveloped all objects like a blanket. one of the strangest of all the pranks played by the fog occurred in december, , in charleston harbor. a wary blockade-runner was creeping out of the harbor, within easy range of the great guns of the fleet, and all hands were trembling, lest at any minute should come the flash of a gun, and shriek of a shell, bearing a peremptory command to heave to. suddenly the flash came, and was followed by the bang! bang! of great guns from all quarters of the fleet. but the fire seemed pointed in another direction; and the runner made the best of her way out to sea, thinking that some less fortunate vessel, trying to come in on the other side of the fleet, had been captured or blown out of the water. it turned out that a small fog-bank had taken the form of a gray steamer moving swiftly over the water, and had been fiercely cannonaded by the whole federal fleet. this occurrence gave the confederates an idea; and they began sending out dummies to engage the fleet, while the true blockade-runners would slip out unobserved in the excitement. one night as the tide was running out with great force, an old hulk was cut adrift from a wharf, and drifted down rapidly upon the federal fleet. it was just after the exploits of the "merrimac" had made confederate rams famous, and the naval officers were a little nervous. the hulk drifted quite into the midst of the fleet before being observed; and when she was hailed she bore down on the largest of the men-of-war as though she were a powerful ram, steered by a commander of desperate bravery. the great gunboat's deck rang with the bo's'n's whistle, as the crew were piped to repel boarders, and to their quarters at the guns. a fierce fire was poured on the hostile craft, that came on sullenly, as if scorning to make reply. one by one the other vessels of the fleet drew near, and concentrated their fire on the wretched lumber schooner. it was too much for her; and she gave up the unequal combat, and sank to the bottom. for days after, the gallant tars of the squadron blockading charleston rejoiced in the destruction of a "rebel ram;" but none of them knew, that, while they were engaged in the desperate contest, two great blockade-runners, heavily laden with cotton, had slipped out of the harbor, and were well under way for nassau. stories of adventure and of desperate pluck and dash abound in the records of the blockade. both among the officers of the blockading-fleets, and the commanders of the runners, were found great courage and fine seamanship. one fact is particularly noticeable to the student of the blockade: an english captain running the blockade would never dare the dangers that a confederate would brave without a tremor. a confederate captain would rush his ship through the hostile fleet, and stick to her until she sunk; while an englishman would run his ship ashore, and take to the woods. the cases of the "hattie," commanded by h. s. lebby, a confederate, and the "princess royal," a fine, staunch, iron steamer, with an english commander and crew, are typical. the "hattie" was the last runner to enter or leave charleston harbor. she was a small, swift steamer; but she made more successful trips than any other runner. men living in charleston to-day, who were interested in the work of this little vessel during the war, say that her cargoes were worth at least fifty millions of dollars. she had numerous narrow escapes, but was never captured. her reputation was such that the confederate authorities selected her as the vessel to bring in army supplies and ammunition, and at least three battles were fought with ammunition brought in her hold. her last entrance to charleston was one night in february, . eighteen federal vessels lay anchored off the harbor, and for a runner to venture in seemed madness. but the captain of the "hattie" was used to taking desperate chances, and he proposed to enter that harbor. the ship had been freshly painted a blue-white, and as she drifted along the water, with all lights out, looked like a bank of mist. she was within two hundred yards of the outer row of blockaders before her presence was detected. suddenly fire was opened on her from the nearest gunboat, and in an instant the air was full of rockets announcing her presence. the little vessel had no means of retaliation: all there was for her to do was to dash through the fire and make for the city. steam was crowded on; and she flew up the channel, running the gauntlet of the fleet, and escaping almost untouched. then came the real peril. just below fort sumter were two barges anchored in the channel, and filled with armed men. past these she dashed, her great speed saving her from boarding; but she received the fire of both boats, which wounded several of her crew, and cut off the fingers of the pilot's hand resting on the wheel. this danger past, there was one more to be met. a large monitor lay anchored up the harbor, and the "hattie" was running so close to her that the commands of the officers in the turret could be clearly heard. one after the other the two great guns were fired, both shots missing; and the "hattie," safely past the gauntlet, sailed up to the dock in triumph. but by that time it was clear that the last days of the war were near at hand, and accordingly the work of unloading and reloading the vessel for her outward trip was pressed with the greatest vigor. all the time she lay at her dock, charleston was being vigorously bombarded by the federal men-of-war lying outside the harbor. the bay fairly swarmed with blockading cruisers; yet a week later the little steamer slipped out through a fleet of twenty-six cruisers without being hailed, and carried her cotton safely to market. when the news of lee's surrender was received, she was lying safe at her dock in nassau. the "princess royal," to which we have alluded, was a large iron screw steamer, freighted with drugs, army supplies, guns, and two engines and boilers for two iron-clads in charleston harbor,--a most valuable and important cargo for the confederates. she made the run from nassau to a point near the coast without adventure, and in the early gray of the morning was stealing up the coast towards the harbor, when a blockader caught sight of her, and started in pursuit. the later began firing when a mile and a half away; and, though there was hardly a chance of the shots taking effect, the cannonade gave the captain of the runner the cold shakes. his boat was one of the fastest on the ocean, and he needed only to put on steam to escape all the blockaders on the coast. but he was a thorough paced coward; and, thinking only of his own safety, he headed the craft for the beach, and with his crew fled into the woods. the valuable ship and her cargo fell into the hands of the federals. sometimes runners were captured through apparently the most trivial accidents. one ship, heavily laden with army supplies, and carrying a large number of passengers, was running through the blockading-fleet, and seemed sure of escape. all lights were out, the passengers were in the cabin, not a word was to be heard on deck, even the commands of the officers being delivered in whispers. suddenly a prolonged cock-crow rent the air, and, with the silence of every thing surrounding, sounded like a clarion peal from a trumpet. the deck-hands rushed for a box of poultry on the deck, and dragged out bird after bird, wringing their necks. the true offender was almost the last to be caught, and avenged the deaths of his brothers by crowing vigorously all the time. the noise was enough to alarm the blockaders; and in a moment the hail, "surrender, or we'll blow you out of water!" brought the unlucky runner to a standstill,--a prisoner. the "southern cross" narrowly escaped capture on account of the stupidity of an irish deck-hand, whose craving for tobacco proved too strong for his discretion. the ship was steaming slyly by two cruisers, and in the darkness would have escaped unseen, when the deck-hand, who had been without a smoke as long as he could stand it, lit a match and puffed away at his pipe. the tiny flame was enough for the cruisers, and they began a spirited cannonade. the "southern cross" ran for her life. the shooting was guess-work, but the gunners on the cruisers showed all the proverbial yankee skill at guessing. the first ball carried away the roof of the pilot-house, and the second ripped away the railing along the deck for thirty feet. but the captain was plucky, and made a run for it. he was forced to pass within a hundred feet of one of the cruisers; and as he saw the muzzles of the great guns bearing on his ship, he heard the command, "heave to, or i'll sink you." but he took his chances, and escaped with only the damage caused by a solid shot crashing through the hull. one of the strangest experiences of all was that of the captain of a blockade-runner putting in to wilmington one bitter cold night, when the snow was blowing in clouds, and the fingers of the men at the wheel and the sailors on watch were frostbitten. the runner had reached the harbor safely; but there in channel lay a blockader in such a position that any ship coming in must pass within a hundred feet of her. the confederate had a light-draught vessel, and tried to squeeze through. when he passed the gunboat, only twelve feet of space separated the two vessels; and he saw a lookout, with his arms on the rail, looking right at the passing vessel. the confederate expected an immediate alarm, but it did not come. wondering at the cause, but happy in his luck, he sped on, and gained the harbor safely. some days after, he learned that the lookout was a dead man, frozen at his post of duty. it will readily be understood that the inducements offered to blockade-runners must have been immense to persuade men to run such risks. the officers and sailors made money easily, and spent it royally when they reached nassau. "i never expect to see such flush times again in my life," said a blockade-running captain, speaking of nassau. "money was as plentiful as dirt. i have seen a man toss up a twenty-dollar gold piece on "heads or tails," and it would be followed by a score of the yellow boys in five seconds. there were times when the bank-vaults could not hold all the gold, and the coins were dumped down by the bushel, and guarded by soldiers. men wagered, gambled, drank, and seemed crazy to get rid of their money. i once saw two captains bet five hundred dollars each on the length of a certain porch. again i saw a wager of eight hundred dollars a side as to how many would be at the dinner-table of a certain hotel. the confederates were paying the english big prices for goods, but multiplying the figures by five, seven, and ten as soon as the goods were landed in charleston. ten dollars invested in quinine in nassau would bring from four hundred to six hundred dollars in charleston. a pair of four-dollar boots would bring from fourteen to sixteen dollars; a two-dollar hat would bring eight dollars, and so on through all the list of goods brought in. every successful captain might have made a fortune in a year; but it is not believed that five out of the whole number had a thousand dollars on hand when the war closed. it was come easy, go easy." chapter viii. dupont's expedition to hilton head and port royal. -- the fiery circle. the great joint naval and military expedition, which in august, , had reduced the forts at hatteras inlet, and, continuing its progress, had, by successive victories, brought roanoke island, newbern, elizabeth city, and the sounds of pamlico and albemarle under the sway of the federal government, was but the first of a series of expeditions intended to drive the confederates from the atlantic seaboard, and secure for the united states vessels safe harbors and coaling stations in the bays and inlets along the south atlantic coast. the proper maintenance of the blockade made it necessary that the seaboard should be in the hands of the federals. for a blockader off charleston or wilmington to be forced to return to hampton roads to coal or to make repairs, would entail the loss of weeks, perhaps months, of valuable time. besides, the sounds and inlets with which that irregular coast is honeycombed were of great use to the confederates, who could construct at their leisure great rams like the "merrimac" or "albemarle," and hurl them against the fleet with the hope of breaking the blockade. such opportunities were eagerly seized by the confederates whenever offered; and in many cases the defeating of their purposes seems almost providential, so great was the seeming disparity between the attacking ram and the forces which finally repulsed it. in reviewing the part of the navy in the civil war, we find that it acted like a great iron band, ever drawing closer and closer about the confederacy, forcing the southern armies from one point after another, until at last the whole coast was in the hands of the unionists, and the confederates were driven into the interior, there to be dealt with by the northern armies. one is reminded of that iron chamber in poe's story, which day by day grows smaller and smaller, until the wretched prisoner within is forced into the pit yawning in the centre. so, during the war, the confederates lost hatteras inlet, roanoke island, hilton head, fernandina, mobile, new orleans, and galveston comparatively early in the struggle. wilmington, behind the almost impregnable bastions of fort fisher, and charleston, surrounded by a cordon of defensive forts, remained the last strongholds of the confederacy on the atlantic coast, until the final downfall of the great uprising. shortly after the capture of the hatteras forts, the navy department saw the need of a harbor and base of naval operations farther south. charleston, with its powerful defences, was deemed impregnable at that time; and elaborate descriptions of the southern coast were prepared, setting forth the advantages and disadvantages of available southern ports. fernandina, brunswick, port royal, and bull's bay, were duly considered; and, while the navy department was debating which point to seize, admiral dupont was diligently fitting out an expedition to be in readiness to attack any that should be determined upon. up to the last moment it was thought that fernandina would be selected. but finally, with the advice of gen. sherman, it was determined to make the attempt to wrest port royal from the confederates. port royal is the general name given to a broad body of water formed by the confluence of the broad and beaufort rivers, and opening into the atlantic ocean on the south carolina coast, about midway between charleston and savannah. no more beautiful region is to be found in the world. far enough south to escape the rigors of the northern winters, and far enough north to be free from the enervating heat of the tropics; honeycombed by broad, salt-water lagoons, giving moisture and mildness to the air,--the country about port royal is like a great garden; and even to-day, ravaged though it was by the storms of war, it shows many traces of its former beauty. it is in this region that are found the famous sea islands, on which grows cotton so much more fleecy and fine of fibre than the product of the interior, that it is known the world over as sea island cotton, and sells at the highest price in the markets of england. in ' the islands bore the great hospitable manor-houses of the southern planters; broad of rooms and wide of piazzas, and always open for the entertainment of travellers, were they friends or strangers. the planters living there were among the wealthiest in the south, at a time when all planters were wealthy. they numbered their slaves by thousands. standing on the broad piazza of one of these southern homes, one could see the rows of rough huts that made up the negro quarters, and hear faintly the sound of the banjo and rude negro melodies, mingling with the music of piano or harp within the parlor of the mansion-house. refined by education and travel, the planters of the region about port royal made up a courtly society, until war burst upon them, and reduced their estates to wildernesses, and themselves to beggary. at the head of the beaufort river stood the little town of beaufort. before the war this was a thriving place; its magnificent harbor made it easily accessible for the largest merchant-ships, and the richly productive country round about furnished heavy cargoes of the fleecy staple that gave to the south the name of the "cotton kingdom." on saturdays and holidays the broad streets of beaufort would be crowded with carriages and horsemen from the neighboring plantations. the planters, in broad-brimmed hats and suits of snowy linen, thronged the broad piazzas of the hotel, or grouped together in the shade of the spreading trees that lined the streets, discussing the cotton crops and prices. now all is changed. beaufort is a sleepy little village, with no sign of trade, domestic or foreign; and the country round about, once dotted with handsome plantation homes, now seems a very wilderness, save where northerners have erected for themselves winter homes on the sea islands. [illustration: fortress monroe.] it was late in october, , when the final determination to attack the forts at port royal was reached. for weeks before, the squadron lying at hampton roads had been making preparations for a great naval movement, and all the newspapers of the north were filled with wise speculations as to its objective point. reporters, correspondents, and editors were alike baffled in their efforts to secure accurate information; and even the commanders of the men-of-war were ignorant of their destination. but it seems that the confederates were warned by some of their sympathizers in washington, and the destination of the fleet was better known south of mason and dixon's line than in the north. on tuesday, oct. , the squadron was all ready for the voyage. it was by far the most powerful fleet ever gathered under the flag of the united states. twenty-five vessels laden with coal had sailed the day before. on the placid waters of the bay, under the frowning walls of fortress monroe, floated fifty men-of-war and transports. the day was clear, and the breeze brisk, and the hearts of the jolly jack-tars bounded within them as they thought of escaping from the long inactivity of a season in port. long-boats bearing despatches rowed from ship to ship; hucksters from the shore came off in dories, dingies, and all variety of queer craft, to drive a farewell bargain with the sailors. the transport vessels were crowded with soldiers in the gay uniforms of militia commands. (it was early in the war then, and they had not learned that a man could fight as well in dingy rags.) the "wabash" was flagship, and aboard her was admiral dupont. when she made the signal for getting under way, all was bustle and animation on all the other vessels of the fleet, and on all sides could be heard the noise of preparation for the start. the boatswains piped away cheerily; and a steady tramp, tramp, from the deck of each ship, and the clicking of the capstan catches, told that the anchors were coming up. soon from the black funnels of the steamers clouds of smoke began to pour, and in the rigging of the sail frigates were crowds of nimble sailors. the commands "all ready! let fall!" rang sharply over the water from the ships. broad sheets of snowy canvas appeared where before were but ropes and spars, and in a moment the whole squadron was under way. the steamers led off briskly, with much churning of the water by their paddle-wheels and "brazen-fins;" after them followed the magnificent sailing frigates, with sail set,--lofty masses of canvas towering toward the skies, and moving with stately grace. at the very head of all went the flagship, the grand old "wabash," with the flag of admiral dupont floating from the fore. none of the commanders knew whither they were bound. all were to follow the flagship, and in event of separation to refer to sealed orders with which each was provided. for the first day all went well. the promise of fair weather given by the beautiful day of starting seemed about to be fulfilled. but on the second night, as they came near the terrible region of cape hatteras, the wind began to freshen, and continued increasing in fierceness until it fairly blew a gale. the night was pitchy dark, and the crews on the vessels could hardly see the craft by which they were surrounded. great as was the danger of being cast on the treacherous shoals of hatteras, the peril of instant destruction by collision was even more imminent. fifty vessels, heavily freighted with human lives, were pitching and tossing within a few rods of each other, and within a few miles of a lee shore. it seemed that the destruction of a large number of the vessels was unavoidable; and the sailors may be pardoned, if, remembering the mishaps of the burnside expedition, they conceived hatteras to be tenanted by an evil spirit, determined to prevent the invasion of confederate territory. to add to the danger, the confederates had extinguished the warning light at the cape, and the navigators of the fleet had nothing to guide them in their course. when morning came, the fleet was pretty well scattered, although still many vessels were near enough together to be in no small danger. the transport "winfield scott," which carried four hundred and fifty soldiers, besides a large crew, was observed to be rolling heavily, and flying signals of distress. from the decks of the "bienville," the nearest steamer, the officers with their glasses could see the crew of the distressed vessel working like beavers, throwing overboard every thing of weight to lighten the ship. notwithstanding all their efforts, she was clearly water-logged, and sunk so low in the water that wave after wave broke over her decks, every now and then sweeping a man away to sure death in the raging sea. it seemed folly to attempt to launch lifeboats in such a furious sea, but the captain of the "bienville" determined to make the attempt to save the men on the doomed "winfield scott." the crew was piped to quarters, and the captain asked for volunteers to go to the rescue. man after man stepped forward, until enough had been secured to man three boats with ten men each. carefully the boats were dropped into the sea, and man after man swung into them; then they put off and started for the sinking ship. but while these preparations were being made, the two ships had been drifting closer and closer together. soon it was seen that a collision was inevitable. fortunately the boats were broadside on, so that the cutting effect of a blow from the bow was avoided. they were presently so near each other that the men began jumping from the deck of the "winfield scot" upon that of the "bienville." the leap, though a perilous one, was made in safety by over thirty men. suddenly a great wave lifted the ships up and dashed them together. three poor wretches, just about to jump, were caught between the vessels and crushed to death. a few sharp cries of agony, and all was over; and the vessels, drifting apart, let their bodies, crushed beyond recognition, fall into the water. by this time the small boats, with their determined crews on board, had succeeded in getting around to the lee side of the sinking ship, and the work of getting the soldiers and sailors over the side was begun. by the most strenuous efforts all were saved, and the "bienville" steamed away, leaving the "winfield scott" to her fate. [illustration: du pont's expedition off cape hatteras.] night came on, with the gale blowing with still greater fury. the wind shrieked through the cordage, and now and again a great wave would sweep across the decks of the crowded vessels, making the men hang on to the rigging for dear life. soon another ship began to go to pieces. the "governor," which had been steaming along near the "wabash" since the time of leaving hampton roads, had become separated from her consort during the gale of the first day. on the second night, those aboard her perceived that she was showing signs of weakness, and was likely to go down with all on board unless aid could be obtained. not a sail, however, was in sight; and every wave seemed about to overwhelm or dash to pieces the frail craft. she labored heavily in the furious sea. by and by the strain on her timbers was such that the port hog-brace broke in two places, weakening the vessel so that her fate was apparent to all. soldiers and sailors worked away with a frantic energy born by the fear of death, and succeeded in bracing up the timbers, so as to avoid, for a time, the breaking-up. soon after, a heavy roll of the vessel broke the smokestack, and it was pitched overboard. luckily it broke some three feet above the deck, so that the fires could still be kept up. then the steam-pipe burst; and with this accident the fate of all on board seemed sealed, for they no longer could keep the vessel's head to the waves, and the great seas came rolling over her, sweeping her decks of every thing movable. they began sending up rockets, and, after some time of anxious waiting, saw an answering signal; so that, through the remainder of that fearful night, the men on the doomed ship felt that, whatever might occur, they had friends at hand. the night was spent in toil at the pumps; and in the morning a faint cheer went up as two vessels were seen, ready to lend assistance. a signal of distress, quickly hoisted, was answered from the nearer, which proved to be the "isaac p. smith." the "smith" sent off a boat and made fast a hawser to the wreck, and took her in tow; but in a few minutes the hawser parted. it became clear that the men must be taken off the sinking ship; but how to do it, was the question. by this time a second ship, the "young rover," had arrived to assist in the rescue. a second cable was put aboard; but this, too, parted. hope seemed lost, when the lookout reported a third ship, the frigate "sabine," coming to the rescue. the "sabine" came to anchor, and sent a hawser aboard the sinking "governor." then the hawser was gradually taken in until the two ships lay close together, stern to stern. spars were rigged over the stern of the frigate, and some thirty men swung over the seething waters to safety. then the two vessels came together with a crash, and about forty men sprang from the sinking ship to the deck of the frigate. but the damage done by the collision was so great that it was deemed prudent to slack up the hawser and let the "governor" drop astern again. those on board busied themselves throwing overboard all things movable, with the intention of lightening the vessel. after some hours of suspense, the work of getting the men off the sinking craft was recommenced, and boats were sent to their assistance. the sea was running too high for them to approach close to the steamer's guards, so they lay off some feet, and the soldiers jumped into them. it was a perilous leap, with the boats pitching one way, and the ship another, and a raging sea of tossing waters between; but it was made bravely by every man, and but seven or eight were lost. soon after the last man left the "governor," she lurched to one side and sank, carrying with her the arms and ammunition of the troops she was transporting. it was on monday morning, nov. , that the flagship "wabash" cast anchor off port royal. in the offing were a few more sail headed for the same point, and during the day some twenty-five vessels of the scattered squadron came up. for the next day ships were constantly arriving, and by tuesday night the whole squadron lay safely anchored in the broad harbor. the defences which the confederates had erected upon hilton head, a lofty bluff overlooking the harbor, were powerfully designed earthworks, poorly armed and manned. the forts were two in number, placed on a commanding elevation, and might have been made impregnable had the confederates taken advantage of the warning sent them by their spies in washington. fort walker had fourteen guns which could bear on an attacking fleet, and fort beauregard had twenty. when the fight began, the gunners found that most of their ammunition was either too large or too small for the guns. to support the forts in their fight, was a wretched little fleet of tugs and schooners, mounting a gun or two each, but absolutely powerless before the smallest of du pont's ships-of-war. indeed, when the battle began, the union navy gave its undivided attention to the forts, and did not even give battle to tatnall's mosquito fleet. thursday morning dawned bright and mild as a morning in june. the shores of the beautiful bay were covered with woods, out of which rung the clear notes of southern song-birds. the scene from the ships was one of the most charming imaginable. the placid bay, the luxuriant shores, the ocean showing across the low-lying ridge of white sand, the forts frowning from the steep headland, the fleet of majestic frigates mustered for the attack, and in the distance the flotilla of defenceless transports, safely out of range, their decks and rigging crowded with fifteen thousand men--all this presented a panorama of life and beauty which few eyes have ever beheld. [illustration: the opening gun.] du pont, in the majestic "wabash," moved down the bay, and, as he came in range of fort walker, sent a shell shrieking from a bow-gun, as signal that the action was begun. the old frigate moved on slowly, making play with the bow-guns until abreast of the fort, when with a crash she let fly her whole broadside. on she went for a few yards, then turning in a grand circle came back, giving the other broadside to the forts as she passed. the other ships fell in behind; and round and round before the forts the fiery circle revolved, spitting out fire and ponderous iron bolts, and making the peaceful shores of the bay tremble with the deep reverberations of the cannon. the confederates, for their part, went into the action with the utmost coolness. they had been assured that their position was impregnable, and had been cautioned to be deliberate and determined in their defence. for a time their artillery service was admirable. but soon they found certain discouraging features about the affair. their guns were too light to have any effect on the fleet, and their powder was of such bad quality that many of their shots fell short. two great guns dismounted themselves, seriously injuring the men who were handling them, and the very first broadside from the fleet dismounted several more. then it was found that the shells for the great parrott guns were too large, and that the shells from other cannon failed to explode, owing to defective fuses. soon the fleet found a point of fire from which it could enfilade the forts, and thereafter a perfect hail of shell and grape-shot fell in the trenches. one shell disabled eleven men. a solid shot struck a gun thought to be perfectly protected, and hurled it, with the men serving it, over the parapet. every twenty minutes a gun was dismounted in fort walker, and at the end of the conflict fort beauregard had but nine serviceable guns. for about four hours there was no cessation of fire on the part of the fleet. round and round the circle the vessels steamed, giving one fort a broadside on the way up, and the other a broadside on the way down. the bombs rose from them in a majestic sweep through the air, and plunged into the fort, exploding with a roar equal to that of a cannon. one ship was commanded by capt. drayton, who rained shot and shell mercilessly against the forts, although one of them was in command of his own brother. at half-past one fort walker was found untenable, and the work of abandoning it was begun. the evacuation was completed in great haste, many valuables were left behind, and not even the guns were spiked. still the entire garrison escaped to mainland, although the federals had three thousand troops who might have made them all prisoners. not long thereafter, fort beauregard also yielded to fate, and the day was won by the federals. [illustration: the fight at hilton head.] the landing of the troops was at once begun. thirty large boats bore a connecticut regiment of one thousand men to the beach. their bright, fresh uniforms, their muskets glittering in the sun, and their regular, swaying stride as they marched up the sandy beach to the martial strains of the regimental band, made a striking picture. they clambered over the ramparts, and in a few moments the stars and stripes floated from the staff which had but lately upheld the flag of the young confederacy. within the forts, all was carnage and confusion: dismounted cannon, surrounded by the dead bodies of the gunners, heaps of shells, and fragments of woodwork, were piled about the parade-ground and in the trenches. the story of the terrific bombardment was graphically told by those horrible evidences of death and destruction. and well might the scene be a horrible one. for over five hours, fifty shot a minute had been discharged at the forts, and most of them did execution. when one recollects that each shot of the great guns cost eight dollars, we get a vivid idea of the money spent in war. immediately upon the capture of hilton head, the victors began making it a great naval and military station. great storehouses were built, wharves constructed, and vast intrenchments thrown up for the defence of the spot. the slaves, escaping from the neighboring plantations, came in droves, begging to be allowed to work; but they received but a cold welcome, for they were still looked upon as property, and the officers did not wish to be charged with enticing them away from their masters. the news of the occupation of hilton head by the northern armies caused the greatest consternation in the cities of charleston and savannah, from both places people fled into the interior, expecting an immediate advance of the union troops. but the armies were set to digging, not to marching, and soon the affrighted citizens returned to their homes. port royal was held by the northern forces until the end of the war, and proved of great value for the proper maintenance of the blockade. its greatest disadvantage was its unhealthiness. of fifteen thousand men landed there in november, five thousand were on the sick-list within a month. chapter ix. the first iron-clad vessels in history. -- the "merrimac" sinks the "cumberland," and destroys the "congress." -- duel between the "monitor" and "merrimac." it will be remembered that when the union forces, alarmed by the threatening attitude of the inhabitants of norfolk and the vicinity, fled from the norfolk navy-yard, leaving every thing there in flames, they left behind them a fine united states frigate, "merrimac," a ship of thirty-five hundred tons, carrying forty guns. the departing federals did their work of destruction fairly well; for the great ship was burnt to the upper edge of her copper sheathing, and sank to the bottom of the river. three or four months after the occupation of the norfolk navy-yard by the confederates, lieut. george m. brooke, an ex-officer of the united states navy, who had resigned that he might follow the fortunes of his state, while looking at the hulk lying in the river-channel, was suddenly inspired with the thought that she might be raised and converted into a formidable vessel-of-war. he carefully matured his plans, and after due consideration proposed to the confederate secretary of the navy, that the "merrimac" be raised and converted into an iron-clad. his plans were approved, and orders were given that they should be carried out. the "merrimac," as originally built, was one of the grand old types of war-vessels. her solid oak sides rose high above the water, and were pierced by a long row of gaping portholes. her masts towered high in the air; and when her great sails were set, her hull seemed crushed beneath so vast an expanse of canvas. when she had been remodelled, her entire appearance was changed. she had no longer the appearance of a ship, but seemed like a house afloat; and tradition says that the old salt on the "cumberland," who first sighted her, reported gravely to the officer of the deck, "quaker meetin'-house floating down the bay, sir." when the hulk had been raised and placed in the dry-dock, the first thing done was to cut it down to the level of the berth-deck; that is, to the level of the deck below the gun-deck in the old rig. then both ends of the ship were decked over for a distance of seventy feet; while the midship section was covered by a sort of roof, or pent-house, one hundred and seventy feet long, and extending about seven feet above the gun-deck. this roof was of pitch pine and oak, twenty-four inches thick, and covered with iron plates two inches thick. the upper part of the roof, being flat, was railed in, making a kind of promenade deck. in the great chamber formed by this roof were mounted ten guns, two of which, the bow and stern guns, were seven-inch rifles, and fairly powerful guns for those days. a strange feature of this ship, and one that was not discovered until she was launched, was that the weight of the iron-plating and the heavy guns she carried sunk her so deep in the water that the low deck forward and aft of the gunroom was always under water; so much so that the commander of another ship in the confederate navy writes that he was obliged always to give the "merrimac" a wide berth, lest he should run his ship on some part of the ram which lay unseen beneath the surface of the water. powerful as this ship was, she had some serious defects. the greatest of these were her engines. they were the same that had been in her as a united states vessel, and had been condemned by a naval board as very defective. naturally several weeks under water had not improved them; but the confederates could not be particular about machinery just then, and the old engines were left in the new ram. it was quickly found that they could not be depended upon more than six hours at a time; and one of the ship's officers, in writing years afterwards, remarks, "a more ill-contrived or unreliable pair of engines could only have been found in some vessels of the united states navy." the second faulty feature about the "merrimac" was that her rudder and propeller were entirely unprotected. the ram which was so much dreaded, and which made the "merrimac" a forerunner of a new class of war-vessels, was of cast-iron, projecting four feet, and so badly secured that it was loosened in ramming the "cumberland," and started a bad leak in the confederate ship. when this formidable vessel was completed, she was christened by her new owners the "virginia;" but the name of the old united states frigate of which she was built stuck to her, and she has ever since been known as the "merrimac," and so we shall speak of her in this narrative. she received as commander commodore franklin buchanan, an ex-union officer of ability and daring, to whom the cadets of the naval academy at annapolis owe the beautiful situation of the academy, and many of its admirable features; for he it was, who, in , under a commission from mr. bancroft, secretary of the navy, organized and located the naval academy, and launched that institution upon its successful career. of officers the "merrimac" had no lack, and good ones they were; but in her crew she was lamentably deficient. most of the crew was made up of men from the army, who knew nothing of seamanship, but who could at any rate fire a gun. a few good sailors were obtained from those who escaped to norfolk after the destruction of the confederate flotilla at elizabeth city by capt. rowan's squadron. they had but little chance for drills and exercise on the new ship, for up to the very hour of sailing she was crowded with workmen getting her ready for the task of breaking down the yankee blockade. when she finally set out to do battle for the south, she was a new and untried ship: not a gun had been fired, and hardly a revolution of her engines had been made. and so she started down the river on her trial trip, but intending, nevertheless, to do battle with the strongest ships of the united states navy. accompanying her were four small confederate gunboats,--the "beaufort," the "yorktown," the "jamestown," and the "teaser." soon rounding out into hampton roads, the little squadron caught sight of the northern fleet at anchor, and made for them. an officer on the "congress" thus tells the story of the events that followed:-- "the th of march was a fine mild day, such as is common in southern virginia during the early spring; and every one on board our ship was enjoying the weather, and pleasing himself with the prospect of going north in a day or two at farthest, and being relieved from the monotony of a blockade at anchor. some of us were pacing the poop, basking in the sun, and watching the gulls, which here, as all over the world, wherever a man-of-war is anchored, manage to find out when it is dinnertime, appearing regularly when the mess-tins are being washed, and the cooks are taking the buckets of broken victuals to the head to throw overboard. then they chatter and scream, and fight for the remnants as they drift astern, until all is consumed, when they betake themselves to fresh fields out of sight until we pipe to dinner again. "one bell had struck some time, when the attention of the quarter-master on watch was drawn to an unusual appearance against the fringe of woods away over in the norfolk channel. after gazing intently some time, he approached the officer of the deck, and presenting him the glass said,'i believe _that thing_ is a-comin' down at last, sir.' "sure enough! there was a huge black roof, with a smokestack emerging from it, creeping down towards sewall's point. three or four satellites, in the shape of small steamers and tugs, surrounded and preceded her. owing to the intervening land, they could not be seen from hampton roads until some time after we had made them out; but, when they did show themselves clear of the point, there was a great stir among the shipping. but they turned up into the james river channel instead of down toward the fort, approaching our anchorage with ominous silence and deliberation. "the officers were by this time all gathered on the poop, looking at the strange craft, and hazarding all sorts of conjectures about her; and when it was plain that she was coming to attack us, or to force the passage, we beat to quarters, the "cumberland's" drum answering ours. "by a little after four bells, or two o'clock, the strange monster was close enough for us to make out her plating and ports; and we tried her with a solid shot from one of our stern-guns, the projectile glancing off her forward casemate like a drop of water from a duck's back. this opened our eyes. instantly she threw aside the screen from one of her forward ports, and answered us with grape, killing and wounding quite a number. she then passed us, receiving our broadside and giving one in return, at a distance of less than two hundred yards. our shot had apparently no effect upon her, but the result of her broadside on our ship was simply terrible. one of her shells dismounted an eight-inch gun, and either killed or wounded every one of the gun's crew, while the slaughter at the other guns was fearful. there were comparatively few wounded, the fragments of the huge shells she threw killing outright as a general thing. our clean and handsome gun-deck was in an instant changed into a slaughter-pen, with lopped-off legs and arms, and bleeding, blackened bodies, scattered about by the shells; while blood and brains actually dripped from the beams. one poor fellow had his chest transfixed by a splinter of oak as thick as the wrist; but the shell-wounds were even worse. the quarter-master, who had first discovered the approach of the iron-clad,--an old man-of-war's man, named john leroy,--was taken below with both legs off. the gallant fellow died in a few minutes, but cheered and exhorted the men to stand by the ship, almost with his last breath. the 'merrimac' had, in the mean time, passed up stream; and our poor fellows, thinking she had had enough of it, and was for getting away, actually began to cheer. for many of them it was the last cheer they were ever to give. we soon saw what her object was; for standing up abreast of the bow of the 'cumberland,' and putting her helm aport, she ran her ram right into that vessel. the gallant frigate kept up her splendid and deliberate, but ineffectual, fire, until she filled and sank, which she did in a very few minutes. a small freight-steamer of the quarter-master's department, and some tugs and boats from the camp-wharf, put off to rescue the survivors, who were forced to jump overboard. in spite of shot from the confederate gunboats, one of which pierced the boiler of the freight-boat, they succeeded in saving the greater number of those who were in the water. seeing the fate of the 'cumberland,' which sank in very deep water, we set our topsails and jib, and slipped the chains, under a sharp fire from the gunboats, which killed and wounded many. with the help of the sails, and the tug 'zouave,' the ship was now run on the flats which make off from newport news point. here the vessel keeled over as the tide continued to fall, leaving us only two guns which could be fought,--those in the stern ports. two large steam-frigates and a sailing-frigate, towed by tugs, had started up from hampton roads to our assistance. they all got aground before they had achieved half the distance; and it was fortunate that they did so, for they would probably have met the fate of the 'cumberland,' in which case the lives of the twelve or thirteen hundred men comprising their crews would have been uselessly jeopardized. "after the 'merrimac' had sunk the 'cumberland,' she came down the channel and attacked us again. taking up a position about one hundred and fifty yards astern of us, she deliberately raked us with eighty-pounder shell; while the steamers we had so long kept up the river, and those which had come out with the iron-clad from norfolk, all concentrated the fire of their small rifled guns upon us. at this time we lost two officers, both elderly men. one was an acting master, who was killed on the quarter-deck by a small rifle-bolt which struck him between the shoulders, and went right through him. the other was our old coast pilot, who was mortally wounded by a fragment of shell. we kept up as strong a fire as we could from our two stern-guns; but the men were repeatedly swept away from them, and at last both pieces were disabled, one having the muzzle knocked off, and the other being dismounted. rifles and carbines were also used by some of our people to try to pick off the 'merrimac's' crew when her ports were opened to fire, but of course the effect of the small-arms was not apparent to us. "it is useless to attempt to describe the condition of our decks by this time. no one who has not seen it can appreciate the effect of such a fire in a confined space. men were being killed and maimed every minute, those faring best whose duty kept them on the spar deck. just before our stern-guns were disabled, there were repeated calls for powder from them; and, none appearing, i took a look on the berth-deck to learn the cause. after my eyes had become a little accustomed to the darkness, and the sharp smoke from burning oak, i saw that the line of cooks and wardroom servants stationed to pass full boxes had been raked by a shell, and the whole of them either killed or wounded,--a sufficient reason why there was a delay with the powder. (i may mention here that the officer who commanded our powder division was a brother of the captain of the 'merrimac.') the shells searched the vessel everywhere. a man previously wounded was killed in the cock-pit where he had been taken for surgical aid. the deck of the cock-pit had to be kept sluiced with water from the pumps, to extinguish the fire from the shells, although dreadfully wounded men were lying on this deck, and the water was icy cold; but the shell-room hatch opened out of the cock-pit, and fire must be kept out of there at all hazards, or the whole of us would go into the air together. in the wardroom and steerage, the bulkheads were all knocked down by the shells, and by the axemen making way for the hose, forming a scene of perfect ruin and desolation. clothing, books, glass, china, photographs, chairs, bedding, and tables were all mixed in one confused heap. some time before this, our commanding officer, a fine young man, had been instantly killed by a fragment of shell which struck him in the chest. his watch, and one of his shoulder-straps (the other being gone), were afterwards sent safely to his father, a veteran naval officer. "we had now borne this fire for nearly an hour, and there was no prospect of assistance from any quarter, while we were being slaughtered without being able to return a shot. seeing this, the officer who had succeeded to the command of the ship, upon consultation with our former captain (who was on board as a guest), ordered our flag to be struck. it is not a pleasant thing to have to strike your flag; but i did not see then, and do not see now, what else we were to do. "a boat now boarded us with an officer from the 'merrimac,' who said he would take charge of the ship. he did nothing, however, but gaze about a little, and pick up a carbine and cutlass,--i presume as trophies. one of the small gunboats then came alongside, and the officer from the 'merrimac' left. the commander of the gunboat said that we must get out of the ship at once, as he had orders to burn her. some of our people went on board of his craft as prisoners, but not many. as her upper deck was about even with our main-deck ports, our surgeon stepped out of one, and told the commanding officer that we had some dreadfully wounded men, and that we must have time to collect them, and place them on board his vessel, and, moreover, that our ship was on fire with no possibility of saving her. the reply was, 'you must make haste: those scoundrels on shore are firing at me now.' in fact, the rifle-balls were 'pinging' about very briskly, scarring the rusty black sides of the poor old frigate; for the twentieth indiana regiment had come down from the camp to the point, and opened fire on the gunboat as she lay alongside of us. our doctor having no desire to be killed, especially by our own people, jumped back into the port, just as the steamer, finding it too hot, shoved off and left us. as soon as she did so, they all opened upon us again; although we had a white flag flying to show we were out of action, and we certainly could not be held responsible for the action of the regiment on shore. after ten or fifteen minutes, however, they all withdrew, and went down the channel, to bestow their attentions upon the frigate 'minnesota' which was hard aground. fortunately the 'merrimac' drew too much water to come near the 'minnesota' at that stage of tide, and the small-fry were soon driven off by the latter ship's battery. night now approaching, the whole rebel flotilla withdrew, and proceeded up the norfolk channel. "although relieved from the pressure of actual battle, we still had the unpleasant consciousness that the fire was making progress in the vicinity of our after-magazine; and we felt as i suppose men would feel who are walking in the crater of a volcano on the verge of eruption. fortunately for us, the 'merrimac' and her consorts had not fired much at our upper works and spars, the principal damage being inflicted upon our lower decks. we had, therefore, the launch and first cutter,--large boats,--which, with a little stuffing of shot-holes, were fit to carry us the short distance between our ship and the shore. the yard and stay-tackles were got up, and the boats put into the water, as soon as possible; the fire gaining, and the sun going down, in the mean time. "by successive boatloads the survivors were all landed; the launch being brought up under the bill port, and the wounded, in cots, lowered into her by a whip from the fore yard, which was braced up for the purpose. this boat was nearly filled with water on her last trip, being a good deal damaged; obliging some of the officers, who had stayed until the last, to jump overboard into the icy cold water, and lean their hands on the gunwale, so as to relieve the boat of a part of their weight. she grounded in water about waist-deep; and the soldiers from the camp waded out and assisted our men in bearing on shore, and to the log hospital of the twentieth indiana, those who were in cots. we had managed to get the body of our gallant young commander on shore in one of the cots, as a wounded man. the mass of the men were so 'gallied,' to use a sailor phrase, by the time the action was over, what with enduring so severe a fire without being able to respond, and also with the knowledge that an explosion of the magazine might occur at any time, that i doubt whether they could have been induced to bring off a man whom they knew to be dead. the officers repeatedly went about the decks looking for wounded men; and i firmly believe that all who were alive were brought off. our poor old ship, deserted by all but the dead, burned till about midnight, when she blew up." the final destruction of the "congress" must have been a most imposing spectacle. a member of the confederate army, who was stationed in one of the batteries near the scene of action, thus describes it: "night had come, mild and calm, refulgent with all the beauty of southern skies in early spring. the moon, in her second quarter, was just rising over the rippling waters; but her silvery light was soon paled by the conflagration of the 'congress,' whose lurid glare was reflected in the river. the burning frigate four miles away seemed very much nearer. as the flames crept up the rigging, every mast, spar, and rope glittered against the dark sky in dazzling lines of fire. the hull, aground upon the shoal, was plainly visible; and upon its black surface each porthole seemed the mouth of a fiery furnace. for hours the flames raged, with hardly a perceptible change in the wondrous picture. at irregular intervals, loaded guns and shells, exploding as the flames reached them, sent forth their deep reverberations, re-echoed over and over from every headland of the bay. the masts and rigging were still standing, apparently intact, when about two o'clock in the morning a monstrous sheet of flame rose from the vessel to an immense height. the ship was rent in twain by the tremendous flash. blazing fragments seemed to fill the air; and, after a long interval, a deep, deafening report announced the explosion of the ship's powder-magazine. when the blinding glare had subsided, i supposed that every vestige of the vessel would have disappeared; but apparently all the force of the explosion had been upward. the rigging had vanished entirely, but the hull seemed hardly shattered; the only apparent change in it was that in two or three places, two or three of the portholes had been blown into one great gap. it continued to burn until the brightness of its blaze was effaced by the morning sun." in the great drama of the first day's fight at hampton roads, the heroic part was played by the frigate "cumberland." on the morning of that fateful th of march, she was swinging idly at her moorings, her boats floating at the boom, and her men lounging about the deck, never dreaming of the impending disaster. it was wash-day, and from the lower rigging of the ship hung garments drying in the sun. about noon the lookout saw a cloud of smoke, apparently coming down the river from norfolk, and at once notified the officer of the deck. it was surmised that it might be the new and mysterious iron-clad "merrimac," about which many rumors were current, but few facts known. quickly the ship was set in trim for action, and the men sent to quarters. all the stern preparations for battle were made--the guns all shotted, the men in position, the magazines opened; shot, shell, cartridges, all in place; the powder-boys at their stations; swords, pistols, boarding-pikes, in the racks. down in the cock-pit the surgeons spread out upon their tables the gleaming instruments, which made brave men shudder with the thought of what a few minutes would bring. the sailors prepared for the fight gayly, never doubting for a moment that victory would be on their side. so paltry had been the resistance that the confederates had heretofore been able to oppose to the northern arms, by sea, that the blue-jackets felt that they had only to open a fight in order to win it. the officers were more serious. rumors had reached them that the "merrimac" was a most powerful vessel, destined to annihilate the navy of the north; and they looked on this first battle with the monster with many misgivings. their fears were somewhat lessened by an article printed in the norfolk papers, a few days previous, denouncing the "merrimac" as a bungling bit of work, absolutely unseaworthy, and unable to stand against the powerful vessels of the north. as it turned out, however, this article was published as a _ruse_ to deceive the northern authorities. the iron ship came steaming sullenly down the bay. the "congress" was the first ship in range, and a puff of smoke from the "merrimac's" bow-gun warned the crew of the frigate that danger was coming. all held their breath an instant, until, with a clatter and whiz, a storm of grape-shot rattled against her sides, and whistled through the rigging. then came a sigh of relief that it was no worse. when the enemy was within a quarter of a mile, the "congress" let fly her whole broadside, and the crew crowded the ports to see the result. the great iron shot rattled off the mailed sides of the monster, like hailstones from a roof. then came the return fire; and the "congress" was riddled with shells, and her decks ran with blood. the "merrimac" passed sullenly on. now it was the turn of the "cumberland." her officers and crew had seen the results of the fire of the "congress," and, with sinking hearts, felt how hopeless was their own position. there was no chance for escape, for no wind filled the sails of the frigate. she lay helpless, awaiting the attack of the iron battery that bore down upon her, without firing a shot or opening a port. at a little past two the mailed frigate had approached the "cumberland" within grape-shot distance. fire was opened upon her with the heaviest guns; and officers and men watched breathlessly the course of their shot, and cried aloud with rage, or groaned in despair, as they saw them fall harmlessly from the iron ship. still they had no thought of surrender. the fire of the "cumberland" was received silently by the "merrimac;" and she came straight on, her sharp prow cutting viciously through the water, and pointed straight for her victim. a second broadside, at point-blank range, had no effect on her. one solid shot was seen to strike her armored sides, and, glancing upward, fly high into the air, as a baseball glances from the bat of the batsman; then, falling, it struck the roof of the pilot-house, and fell harmlessly into the sea. in another instant the iron ram crashed into the side of the "cumberland," cutting through oaken timbers, decks, and cabins. at the same time all the guns that could be brought to bear on the northern frigate were discharged; and shells crashed through her timbers, and exploded upon her decks, piling splinters, guns, gun-carriages, and men in one confused wreck. had not the engines of the ram been reversed just before striking the frigate, her headway would have carried her clear to the opposite side of the doomed ship, and the "cumberland," in sinking, would have carried her destroyer to the bottom with her. as it was, the "merrimac," with a powerful wrench, drew out of the wreck she had made, loosening her iron prow, and springing a serious leak in the operation. she drew off a short distance, paused to examine the work she had done, and then, as if satisfied, started to complete the destruction of the "congress." and well might the men of the "merrimac" be satisfied with their hour's work. the "cumberland" was a hopeless wreck, rapidly sinking. her decks were bloodstained, and covered with dead men, and scattered arms and legs, torn off by the exploding shells. and yet her brave crew stuck to their guns, and fought with cool valor, and without a vestige of confusion. they had had but a few moments to prepare for action; and the long rows of clothes, drying in the rigging, told how peaceful had been their occupation before the "merrimac" appeared upon the scene. yet now that the storm of battle had burst, and its issue was clearly against them, these men stood to their guns, although they could feel the deck sinking beneath them. every man was at his post; and even when the waters were pouring in on the gun-deck, the guns were loaded and fired. indeed, the last shot was fired from a gun half buried in the waves. then the grand old frigate settled down to the bottom, carrying half her crew with her, but keeping the stars and stripes still floating at the fore. the destruction of the "cumberland" being completed, the "merrimac" steamed over to the "congress." this frigate fought well and valorously, but was soon pounded into a helpless condition by the shells of the "merrimac," as shown by the story of her officer, already quoted. when a white flag, floating at her peak, told of surrender, the "merrimac" left her to the attention of the smaller vessels in the confederate flotilla, and set out to find further victims. but by this time the remainder of the federal fleet had taken alarm, and fled into a safe position under the shelter of the federal batteries on shore. the "minnesota" only had been unfortunate in her attempted flight, and was aground on a bar near the scene of the fight. but now only two hours of daylight remained, and the tide was low, and still on the ebb. the heavy iron frigate could not get within effective distance of the "minnesota," her crew were weary with a day's fighting, and so she turned away and headed up the river for norfolk. in taking account of injuries on the ram that night, it was found that the injured numbered twenty-one; many of whom had been shot while alongside the surrendered "congress." not an atom of damage was done to the interior of the vessel, and her armor showed hardly a trace of the terrible test through which it had passed. but nothing outside had escaped: the muzzles of two guns had been shot off; the ram was wrenched away in withdrawing from the "cumberland;" one anchor, the smokestack, steam-pipe, railings, flagstaff, boat-davitts--all were swept away as though a huge mowing-machine had passed over the deck. but, so far as her fighting qualities were concerned, the "merrimac" was as powerful as when she started out from norfolk on that bright spring morning. it can easily be understood that the news of the engagement caused the most intense excitement throughout this country, and indeed throughout the whole world. in the south, all was rejoicing over this signal success of the confederate ship. bells were rung, and jubilees held, in all the southern cities. an officer of the "merrimac," who was despatched post-haste to richmond with reports of the engagement, was met at every station by excited crowds, who demanded that he tell the story of the fight over and over again. at last the starving people of the confederacy saw the way clear for the sweeping away of the remorseless blockade. in the north, the excitement was that of fear. the people of seaboard cities imagined every moment the irresistible iron ship steaming into their harbors, and mowing down their buildings with her terrible shells. the secretary of war said, at a hastily called cabinet meeting in washington: "the 'merrimac' will change the whole character of the war: she will destroy every naval vessel; she will lay all the seaboard cities under contribution. not unlikely we may have a shell or cannon-ball from one of her guns, in the white house, before we leave this room." in this excited state, wild with joy, or harassed with fear, the whole country went to sleep that march night, little dreaming that the morrow would change the whole face of the naval situation, and that even then a little untried vessel was steaming, unheralded, toward hampton roads, there to meet the dreaded "merrimac," and save the remnants of the federal fleet. then no one knew of the "monitor;" but twenty-four hours later her name, and that of her inventor ericsson, were household words in all the states of the union and the confederacy. [illustration: "merrimac" and "cumberland."] capt. john ericsson was a swedish engineer, residing in this country, who had won a name for himself by inventing the screw-propeller as a means of propulsion for steamships. he and a connecticut capitalist, c. s. bushnell by name, had ever since the opening of the war been trying to induce the government to build some iron-clads after a pattern designed by ericsson, and which afterwards became known as the "monitor" pattern. their labors at washington met with little success. after a long explanation of the plan before the wise authorities of the naval board, capt. ericsson was calmly dismissed with the remark, "it resembles nothing in the heavens above, or the earth beneath, or the waters under the earth. you can take it home, and worship it without violating any commandment." finally, however, leave was obtained to build a monitor for the government, provided the builders would take all financial risks in case it proved a failure. so, with this grudging permission, the work of building the warship that was destined to save the federal navy was begun. work was prosecuted night and day, and in one hundred days the vessel was ready for launching. great was the discussion over her. distinguished engineers predicted that she would never float; and many attended the launch expecting to see the vessel plunge from the ways to the bottom of the river, like a turtle from a log. so general was this opinion, that boats were in readiness to rescue her passengers if she went down. but capt. ericsson's plans were well laid. the great vessel glided with a graceful dip into the river, and floated at her cables buoyantly. she was a strange-looking craft. all that was to be seen of her above water was a low deck about a foot above the water, bearing in the centre a large round iron turret pierced with two great portholes. besides the turret, the smooth surface of the deck was broken by two other elevations,--a small iron pilot-house forward, made of iron plates about ten inches thick, and with iron gratings in front; aft of the turret was a low smokestack. beneath the water-line this vessel had some strange features. the upper part of her hull, forming the deck, projected beyond her hull proper about four feet on every side. this projection was known as the "overhang," and was designed as a protection against rams. it was made of white oak and iron, and was impenetrable by any cannon of that day; although now, when steel rifled cannon are built that will send a ball through twenty inches of wrought iron, the original "monitor" would be a very weak vessel. the turret in this little vessel, which held the two guns that she mounted, was so arranged as to revolve on a central pivot, thus enabling the gunners to keep their guns continually pointed at the enemy, whatever might be the position of the vessel. when the time for the first battle actually arrived, it was found that the turret would not revolve properly; but in later ships of the same class this trouble was avoided. it was at two o'clock on the morning after the day on which the "merrimac" had wrought such havoc among the ships of the north, that this queer-looking little vessel steamed into hampton roads. as the gray dawn began to break, she passed under the quarter of the "minnesota," and cast anchor. the tars on the great frigate looked curiously at the strange craft, and wondered if that insignificant "cheese-box on a raft" was going to do battle with the dreaded "merrimac." small hopes had they that their noble frigate would be saved by any such pygmy warship. in the mean time, the men of the "merrimac" up at norfolk were working energetically to prepare her for the destruction of the rest of the union ships. her ram was tightened in its place, her steering apparatus overhauled, and some changes made, and her rickety engine was patched up. at daybreak all was bustle as the ram prepared to move down on the union fleet. but just as she was about to start, her officers saw the queer craft lying by the "minnesota," which they at once knew to be the ericsson "monitor." her appearance was not very terrible; but, nevertheless, the confederates felt that she had appeared at a most inopportune moment for them. still they raised anchor, and started down the bay to meet their mysterious enemy. it was sunday morning, and the sun rose in a cloudless blue sky. a light breeze stirred the surface of the water, and played lazily with the long streaming pennants of the men-of-war. the batteries on both sides of the bay were crowded with men waiting for the great naval battle of the day. up at norfolk a gay holiday party was embarking on steam-tugs, to accompany the confederate ship and witness the total destruction of the union fleet. no thought of defeat ever entered the minds of the proud believers in the new iron-clad of the confederacy. at the first sign of life on board the "merrimac," the "monitor" began her preparations for the battle. in fifteen minutes she was in battle trim. the iron hatches were closed, the dead-light covers put on, and obstructions removed from the main deck, so as to present a smooth surface only twenty-four inches above the water, unbroken, save by the turret and pilot-house. in the pilot-house was lieut. worden, who was to command the "monitor" in this her first battle. [illustration: battle of the "monitor" and "merrimac."] leisurely the "merrimac" came down the bay, followed by her attendant tugs; and, as she came within range, she opened fire on the "minnesota," which was still aground. the frigate responded with a mighty broadside, which, however, rattled off the mailed sides of the ram like so many peas. clearly, every thing depended upon the "monitor;" and that little craft steamed boldly out from behind the "minnesota," and sent two huge iron balls, weighing one hundred and seventy pounds each, against the side of the "merrimac." the shot produced no effect beyond showing the men of the "merrimac" that they had met a foeman worthy of their steel. the "merrimac" slowed up her engines, as though to survey the strange antagonist thus braving her power. the "monitor" soon came up, and a cautious fight began; each vessel sailing round the other, advancing, backing, making quick dashes here and there, like two pugilists sparring for an opening. the two shots of the "monitor" would come banging one after the other against the "merrimac's" armor, like the "one, two" of a skilled boxer. in this dancing battle the "monitor" had an enormous advantage, on account of her size, greater speed, and the way in which she answered her helm. the "merrimac" was like a huge hawk being chased and baited by a little sparrow. her heavy broadsides found nothing to hit in the almost submerged hull of the "monitor." when a ball struck the turret, it glanced off, unless striking fair in the centre, when it fell in fragments, doing no greater damage than to dent the iron plates, and sometimes knocking down the men at the guns inside. the first manoeuvre tried by the "merrimac" was to run down her little antagonist; and she did strike her with a force that dented the iron overhang of the "monitor," and clashed the men in the "merrimac" to the deck, with blood streaming from their nostrils. for a moment it seemed as though the "monitor" must go under; but gradually the terrible ram glanced off, and the little vessel, righting, sent again her terrible two shots at her enemy. in the action of the day before, shot and shell had beaten against the sides of the ram so rapidly that one could not count the concussions. now it was a series of tremendous blows about a minute apart; and, if the men had not been working away at their guns, they could have heard the oak timbers splintering behind the iron plating. at a critical moment in the fight the "merrimac" ran aground; and the "monitor" steamed around her several times, seeking for weak places in which to plant a shot once worden dashed at his adversary's screw, hoping to disable it, but missed by perhaps two feet. two shots from the "monitor" struck the muzzles of two cannon protruding from the portholes of the "merrimac," and broke them off, throwing huge splinters of iron among the gunners inside. and so the battle continued until about noon: gun answered gun with thunderous reports, that echoed back from the batteries on shore in rolling reverberations. the pleasure-seeking tugs from norfolk had scuttled back again out of the way of the great cannon-balls that were skipping along the water in every direction. neither of the combatants had received any serious injury. on board the "monitor" the only hurt was received by a gunner, who was leaning against the iron wall of the turret just as a shot struck outside; he was carried below, disabled. but at last one lucky shot fired from one of the disabled guns of the "merrimac" ended this gigantic contest; sending each contestant to her moorings, without an actual victory for either side. this shot struck full and fair against the gratings of the pilot-house, through which lieut. worden was looking as he directed the course of his ship. the concussion knocked him senseless. flakes of iron and powder were driven into his eyes and face, blinding him completely for the time. he fell back from the wheel, and the "monitor" was left for a moment without her guiding spirit. all was confusion; but in a few moments worden recovered, and gave the order to sheer off. the "monitor" then drew away, while worden was moved to the cabin, and the second officer sent to his station in the turret. lying on a sofa in the cabin, his eyes bandaged, and the horror of life-long blindness upon him, worden asked faintly, "have i saved the 'minnesota'?"--"yes," answered the surgeon. "then," said he, "i die happy." while these scenes were transpiring on the "monitor," the "merrimac" lay quietly awaiting her return. the confederate officers say that she waited an hour, and then, concluding that the "monitor" had abandoned the fight, withdrew to norfolk. the northern officers and historians say that the "merrimac" was in full retreat when the decisive shot was fired. it is hard to decide, from such conflicting statements, to which side the victory belonged. certain it is, that not a man on the "merrimac" was injured, and that all damages she sustained in the fight were remedied before sunrise the next day. later, as we shall see, she challenged the union fleet to a new battle, without response. but with all these facts in view, it must be borne in mind that the purpose of the "merrimac," that bright march sunday, was to destroy the frigate "minnesota:" in that purpose she was foiled by the "monitor," and to that extent at least the "monitor" was the victor. lieut. worden, after the fight, went directly to washington. president lincoln was at a cabinet meeting when he heard of worden's arrival in the city, and hastily rising said, "gentlemen, i must go to _that fellow_." worden was lying on a sofa, his head swathed in bandages, when the president entered. "mr. president," said he, "you do me great honor by this visit."--"sir," replied mr. lincoln, while the tears ran down his cheeks, "i am the one who is honored in this interview." among his crew worden was very much beloved. the following letter, sent him while on a bed of pain, is all the more touching for the rude form in which their affection for their commander is expressed:-- [illustration: handling a gun.] to captain worden. hampton roads, april , . united states monitor. to our dear and honored captain. _dear sir,_--these few lines is from your own crew of the monitor, with their kindest love to you their honored captain, hoping to god that they will have the pleasure of welcoming you back to us again soon, for we are all ready able and willing to meet death or any thing else, only give us back our captain again. dear captain, we have got your pilot-house fixed and all ready for you when you get well again; and we all sincerely hope that soon we will have the pleasure of welcoming you back to it.... we are waiting very patiently to engage our antagonist if we could only get a chance to do so. the last time she came out we all thought we would have the pleasure of sinking her. but we all got disappointed, for we did not fire one shot, and the norfolk papers says we are cowards in the monitor--and all we want is a chance to show them where it lies with you for our captain. we can teach them who is cowards. but there is a great deal that we would like to write to you but we think you will soon be with us again yourself. but we all join in with our kindest love to you, hoping that god will restore you to us again and hoping that your sufferings is at an end now, and we are all so glad to hear that your eyesight will be spaired to you again. we would wish to write more to you if we have your kind permission to do so but at present we all conclude by tendering to you our kindest love and affection, to our dear and honored captain. we remain untill death your affectionate crew the monitor boys. the "merrimac," after being repaired and altered to some extent, sailed down the bay on the th of april, for the purpose, as her officers said, of meeting the "monitor" again. she steamed into the roads, and exchanged a few shots with the union batteries at the rip-raps; but the "monitor," and other union vessels, remained below fortress monroe, in chesapeake bay, out of the reach of the confederate vessel. again, a few days later, the "merrimac" went to hampton roads, and tried to lure the "monitor" to battle; but again the challenge passed unanswered. it is probable that the federal naval authorities did not care to imperil the only vessel that stood between them and destruction, out of mere bravado. had the "monitor" come out, an attempt would have been made to carry her by boarding. the crew of the "merrimac" were prepared for the attack; and four gunboats accompanying her were crowded with men, divided into squads, each with its specified duty. some were to try and wedge the turret, some were to cover the pilot-house and all the openings with tarpaulin, others were to try to throw shells and gunpowder down the smokestack. but all these preparations proved useless, as the "monitor" still remained quietly at her anchorage. on may a third trip was made by the "merrimac." when she came down the bay, she found the union fleet, including the "monitor," hard at work shelling the confederate batteries at sewall's point. as she came towards them, they ceased their cannonade, and retired again to the shelter of fortress monroe. the "merrimac" steamed up and down the roads for some hours; and finally commodore tatnall, in deep disgust, gave the order, "mr. jones, fire a gun to windward, and take the ship back to her buoy." back to norfolk she went, never again to leave that harbor. on the th of may the officers of the "merrimac" noticed that the confederate flag was no longer floating over the shore-batteries. a reconnoissance proved that the land forces had abandoned norfolk, and it was necessary to get the ship away before the union troops arrived and hemmed her in. her pilots declared that if the ship was lightened they could take her up the james river; and accordingly all hands threw overboard ballast and trappings, until she was lightened three feet. then the pilots claimed that with the prevalent wind they could not handle her. it was now useless to try to run her through the union fleet, for the lightening process had exposed three feet of her unarmed hull to the fire of the enemy. it was accordingly determined that she should be destroyed. she was run ashore on craney island, and trains of powder laid all over her, and fired. every gun was loaded, and the doors of the magazine were left open. her crew then started on the march for the interior. it was just in the gray of the morning that a rumbling of the earth was felt, followed by a shock that made all stagger. a column of smoke and flame shot into the air; huge cannon were hurled high above the tree-tops, discharging in mid-air. one shot fell in the woods some distance ahead of the marching crew, and all knew that it marked the end of the mighty "merrimac." chapter x. the navy in the inland waters. -- the mississippi squadron. -- sweeping the tennessee river. we will now leave for a time the blue-water sailors, whose battles, triumphs, and defeats we have been considering, and look at the work done by the tars of both north and south on the great waterways which cut up the central portion of the united states, known as the valley of the mississippi. it was in this section that the navy of the north did some of its most effective work against the confederacy, and it was there that the sailor boys of the south did many deeds of the most desperate valor. there is much of romance about service on the blue ocean which is not to be found in routine duty along the yellow muddy streams that flowed through the territory claimed by king cotton. the high, tapering masts, the yards squared and gracefully proportioned, the rigging taut, and with each rope in its place, of an ocean-frigate, are not seen in the squat, box-like gunboats that dashed by the batteries at vicksburg, or hurled shot and shell at each other in the affair at memphis. but farragut, stanch old sea-dog as he was, did much of his grandest fighting on the turbid waters of the mississippi; and the work of the great fleet at port royal was fully equalled by porter's mortar-boats below new orleans. let us follow the fortunes of the union fleet on their cruises about the great rivers of the interior, and first discover what the work was that they set out to perform. the rivers making up the mississippi system flow for the greater part of their length through the states that had joined the new confederacy. the northern confederate battle-line was along the south bank of the ohio river, and there they had erected batteries that controlled the passage of that river. south of the mouth of the ohio, every river was lined with confederate batteries, and bore on its placid bosom fleets of confederate gunboats. at columbus on the mississippi, not far south of the mouth of the ohio, were strong batteries over which floated the stars and bars of the confederacy. farther down was island number , bearing one of the most powerful fortifications the world has ever seen. then came fort pillow, guarding the city of memphis; then at vicksburg frowned earthworks, bastions, and escarpments that rivalled gibraltar for impregnability. lower down were fortifications at grand gulf, port hudson, and baton rouge. fort henry guarded the tennessee river, and fort donelson the cumberland, and both of these rivers were very important as waterways for the transportation of supplies to the union armies marching into tennessee. it was absolutely necessary that all these fortifications should be swept away, and the rivers opened for navigation down to the gulf of mexico. it was necessary that the work should be done from above; for the forts below new orleans were thought to be impassible, and farragut's passage of them late in the war made all the world ring with his name. it became evident, very early in the war, that no great progress could be made in the task of crushing the powerful insurrection until telling blows had been struck at the confederate control of the inland waterways. when the attention of the war department was turned in that direction, they found but little to encourage them in the prospect. along the thousands of miles of the banks of the mississippi and its tributaries, there was not one gun mounted belonging to the united states, not one earthwork over which floated the starry flag of the union. the confederate positions on this great chain of waterways were, as we have seen, of great strength. to attack them, the armies of the north must first fight their way through whole states populated by enemies. obviously, the war department alone could not complete so gigantic a task, and the services of the navy were called into requisition. so energetically did the navy department prosecute its task, that, by the end of the war, over one hundred federal war-vessels floated on those streams, on which, three years before, no craft dared sail under the american flag. it was a strange navy in looks, but in actions it showed itself worthy of the service in which it was enlisted. many of the steamers built for the river marine were wooden gunboats, hastily remodelled from the hulks of old craft. they were seldom plated with iron, and their machinery was feebly protected by coal bunkers, while their oaken sides were barely thick enough to stop a musket-ball. but the true iron-clad war-vessel made its appearance on the rivers even before it was to be seen in the ocean squadrons. it was as early in the war as july, , that the quarter-master-general advertised for bids for the construction of iron-clad gunboats for service on the mississippi and tributary rivers. the contract was given to james b. eads, an engineer, who during the war performed much valuable service for the united states government, and who in later years has made himself a world-wide fame by the construction of the jetties at the mouth of the mississippi river, by which the bar at the mouth of the great stream is swept away by the mighty rush of the pent-up waters. mr. eads was instructed to build seven iron-clad gunboats with all possible expedition. they were to be plated two and a half inches thick, and, though of six hundred tons burden, were not to draw more than six feet of water. they were to carry thirteen heavy guns each. [illustration: a river-gunboat.] these river-gunboats, like the little "monitor," had none of the grace and grandeur of the old style of sailing-frigate, in which paul jones fought so well for his country. the tapering masts of the mighty frigate, the spidery cordage by which the blue-jackets climbed to loosen the snowy sheets of canvas--these gave way in the gunboat to a single slender flagstaff for signalling, and two towering smoke-stacks anchored to the deck by heavy iron cables, and belching forth the black smoke from roaring fires of pitch-pine or soft coal. instead of the gracefully curved black sides, with two rows of ports, from which peeped the muzzles of great cannon, the gunboat's sides above water sloped like the roof of a house, and huge iron shutters hid the cannon from view. inside, all was dark and stuffy, making battle-lanterns necessary even in daylight fights. the broad white gun-deck, scrubbed to a gleaming white by hollystone and limejuice, on which the salt-water sailors gathered for their mess or drill, was replaced by a cramped room, with the roof hardly high enough to let the jolly tars skylark beneath without banging their skulls against some projecting beam. truly it may be said, that, if the great civil war made naval architecture more powerful, it also robbed the war-vessels of all their beauty. it is hard to appreciate now the immense difficulty experienced in getting those first seven river-gunboats built by the appointed time. the war had just begun, and a people accustomed to peace had not yet found out that those not actually at the seat of war could continue their usual course of life unmolested. rolling-mills, machine-shops, founderies, saw-mills, and shipyards were all idle. working-men were enlisting, or going to the far west, away from the storm of war that was expected to sweep up the mississippi valley. the timber for the ships was still standing in the forests. the engines that were to drive the vessels against the enemy were yet to be built. capt. eads's contract called for the completion of the seven vessels in sixty-five days, and he went at his work with a will. his success showed that not all the great services done for a nation in time of war come from the army or navy. within two weeks four thousand men were at work getting the gunboats ready. some were in michigan felling timber, some in the founderies and machine-shops of pittsburg, and others in the shipyards at st. louis, where the hulls of the vessels were on the stocks. day and night, weekdays and sundays, the work went on; and in forty-five days the first vessel was completed, and christened the "st. louis." the others followed within the appointed time. before the autumn of , the river navy of the united states numbered nearly a score of vessels, while nearly forty mortar-boats were in process of construction. of this flotilla, capt. a. h. foote, an able naval officer, was put in command, and directed to co-operate with the land forces in all movements. the first service to which the gunboats were assigned was mainly reconnoitring expeditions before the front of the advancing union armies. they were stationed at the junction of the ohio and mississippi rivers; and the country about cairo was occupied by a large body of union troops under the command of gen. grant, then a young officer little known. the opening fight of the river campaign was little more than a skirmish; but it proved the superiority of the gunboats over a land-force for the purpose of opening the river. one bright day in september, the "lexington" and "conestoga" were ordered to proceed down the river eight or ten miles, and dislodge a confederate battery that had taken a position on lucas point. the two vessels steamed cautiously down the stream, without encountering any resistance until within easy range of the battery, when the confederates opened with sixteen cannon. the shot and shells fell all about the vessels; but neither was hit, showing that the confederate gunners were not yet used to firing at a moving mark. but the fire of the gunboats was admirably directed; the shells falling among the confederates, dismounting the guns, and driving the gunners from their pieces. it was too hot a spot for any man to hold; and a cavalry corps quickly attached their horses to the guns, and drew them down the river to the shelter of the confederate works at columbus. then the defeated party sent up the gunboat "yankee" to attack the two victors, but this vessel was quickly disposed of. she opened fire at long range, but without success. the first shot from the "conestoga" struck the water a few feet from the "yankee," and, ricochetting, plunged into her hull. the discomfited vessel immediately put about, and started down stream, followed by a heavy fire from the two northern ships. just as she was passing out of range, an eight-inch shell from the "lexington" struck her starboard wheel-house, and shattered the paddle-wheel, totally disabling the vessel, so that she drifted sidelong to her anchorage like a wounded duck. on the return of the northern vessels up the river, they first encountered the form of warfare that proved the most perilous for the sailors of the river navy. confederate sharp-shooters lined the banks, perched in the trees, or hidden in the long, marshy grass; and any unwary tar who showed his head above the bulwarks was made a target for several long rifles in the hands of practised shots. the next active service performed by the gunboats was at the battle of belmont, directly opposite the confederate batteries at columbus. the union troops, landing in force, had driven the confederates from their camp, and were engaged in securing the spoils, when the gunners at columbus, seeing that the camp was in the hands of the enemy, turned their heavy guns on it, and soon drove out the yankees. the confederates had rallied in the woods, and now came pouring out, in the hope of cutting off the union retreat to the boats. on all sides the dark gray columns could be seen marching out of the woods, and pouring down upon the retreating army of the north. batteries were wheeling into position, and staff-officers in travelling carriages were dashing to and fro carrying orders. it seemed a black day for the three or four thousand unionists who were making for their transports with all possible speed. but now was the time for the gunboats to take a hand in the fight. three of them dropped into position, and began a deadly fire upon the confederate line. the huge shells ploughed their way through whole platoons of men. bursting, they would mow down soldiers like saplings before a cyclone. one shell exploded directly beneath an officer's carriage, and threw horses, carriage, and men high in the air. the confederates hastened to get their field-batteries into position, and replied to the deadly fire from the ships, but to no avail. their light artillery was of no effect upon the plated sides of the gunboats, and they saw their cannon dismounted or shattered by the solid shot from the big guns of the iron-clads. they fought bravely, but the conflict was unequal. it was sheer madness for any body of men, with muskets and light artillery, to stand against the fire of the gunboats. the gunboats saved the day. the retreat of the union army was unchecked; and, covered by the war-vessels, the transports returned safely to cairo. on the tennessee river, near the northern boundary of tennessee, the confederates had thrown up certain earthworks to which they gave the name of fort henry. this, with fort donelson, situated near by, formed the principal confederate strongholds in tennessee. gen. grant determined to strike a heavy blow by capturing these two forts; and commodore foote, with his seven gunboats, was ordered to co-operate with the land-forces in the expedition. they started from cairo on feb. , . when a few miles below the fort, the troops were landed and ordered to proceed up the back country, and attack the fort in the rear, while foote should engage it from the river with his gunboats. while the troops were being landed, gen. grant boarded the "essex," and went up the river to get a view of the fort they were about to attack. had it been completed in accordance with the plans of the engineers, it would have been most formidable. time, however, had been short, and the earthworks were far from being completed. there were many points on the river or on the opposite bank, from which a well-directed artillery fire would make them untenable. the confederate commander, gen. tilghman, fully appreciated this fact, and, at the approach of the gunboats, had sent four-fifths of his garrison across the country to fort donelson, being determined to sacrifice as few men as possible in the defence of so untenable a position. while grant and foote were examining the works through their field-glasses, the sullen boom of a great gun came over the waters, and a heavy rifled shot crashed through the stateroom of capt. porter on the "essex." the two commanders concluded that the confederate gunners, though new to war, understood something of artillery practice; and the "essex" was accordingly taken down the river, out of range. the following night was chill and rainy; and the union forces, bivouacking on shore, grumbled loudly over their discomforts. the morning dawned dark; but soon the sun came out, and the preparations for battle were begun. the troops were first despatched on their cross-country march; and, as they departed, commodore foote remarked coolly, that his gunboats would have reduced the fort before the land forces came within five miles of it. this proved to be the fact. the gunboats formed in line of battle, and advanced up the river. the four iron-clads led, steaming abreast. about a mile in the rear, came the three wooden vessels. the fort was soon in range; but both parties seemed anxious for a determined conflict, and no shot was fired on either side as the gunboats came sullenly on. how different must have been the feelings of the two combatants! tilghman, with his handful of men, hardly able to work eight of the eleven guns mounted in his fort, and knowing that his defeat was a mere question of time; foote, with his iron-clads and supporting gunboats, his seventy-two guns, and his knowledge that six thousand men were marching upon the rear of the confederate works. on the one side, all was absolute certainty of defeat; on the other, calm confidence of victory. when the flotilla was within a third of a mile of the fort, the fire began. the gunners on the ships could see the muzzles of the confederate guns, the piles of shells and cannon-balls, and the men at their work. the firing on both sides was deliberate and deadly. the confederates were new to the work, but they proved themselves good marksmen. the first shot was fired from the shore, and, missing the "essex" by but a few feet, plumped into the water, so near the next ship in line as to throw water over her decks. within five minutes, the "essex" and the "cincinnati" were both hit. the armor of the gunboats proved no match for the shots of the confederates, and in many cases it was penetrated. in some instances, shells, entering through the portholes, did deadly damage. on the shore, the shells from the gunboats were doing terrible work. banks of solid earth, eight feet thick, were blown away by the terrible explosions. one, bursting in front of a ten-inch columbiad, filled that powerful gun with mud almost to the muzzle, disabling it for the remainder of the fight. a shot from the "essex" struck the muzzle of a great gun, ripped off a splinter of iron three feet long, and crushed a gunner to pulp. the gun was just about to be fired, and burst, killing or wounding every man of the crew. at the same moment a shell crashed through the side of the "essex," killing men right and left: took off the head of a sailor standing by capt. porter, wounded the captain, and plunged into the boiler. in an instant the ship was filled with scalding steam. the men in the pilot-house were suffocated. twenty men and officers were killed or scalded. the ship was disabled, and drifted out of the fight. while withdrawing, she received two more shots, making twenty in all that had fallen to her share in this hot engagement. but by this time the fort was very thoroughly knocked to pieces. the big twenty-four pounder was dismounted, and five of its crew killed. gun after gun was keeled over, and man after man carried bleeding to the bomb-proofs, until gen. tilghman himself dropped coat and sword, and pulled away at a gun by the side of his soldiers. receiving ten shots while they could only fire one, this little band held out for two long hours; and only when the crew of the last remaining piece threw themselves exhausted on the ground, did the flag come fluttering down. gen. tilghman went to the fleet and surrendered the fort to commodore foote, and grant's army came up more than an hour after the battle was over. to the navy belongs the honor of taking fort henry, while to gen. tilghman and his plucky soldiers belongs the honor of making one of the most desperate fights under the most unfavorable circumstances recorded in the history of the civil war. the fall of fort henry opened the way for the union advance to fort donelson, and marked the first step of the united states government toward regaining control of the mississippi. it broke the northern battle-line of the confederacy, and never again was that line re-established. with fort henry fallen, and gen. tilghman and his little garrison prisoners on the union gunboats, grant's soldier-boys and foote's blue-jackets began active preparations for continuing the conquest of tennessee by the capture of fort donelson. no time was lost. the very night that the stars and stripes were first hoisted over the bastion of fort henry saw three of foote's gunboats steaming up the river on a reconnoitring expedition. before them the confederates fled in every direction. after several hours' advance, they came to a heavy railroad-bridge spanning the river, and effectually preventing further progress. beyond the bridge were several confederate steamers, black with men, and heavily laden with valuable military stores. with all steam on, they were dashing up stream, and rapidly leaving the gunboats behind. enraged at seeing such valuable prizes slipping through their hands, the union gunners sent shell after shell shrieking after the flying boats, but to no avail. a party was hastily landed for the purpose of swinging the draw of the bridge, but found the machinery broken, and the ways on which the bridge swung twisted and bent out of shape. an hour's hard work with axes and crowbars, and the draw was swung far enough to let pass the "conestoga" and the "lexington." they dashed forward like greyhounds slipped from the leash; and, after several hours' hard steaming, a smoke over the tree-tops told that the confederate fugitives were not far ahead. soon a bend in the river was passed; and there, within easy range, were two of the flying steamers. a commotion was visible on board, and boat after boat was seen to put off, and make for the shore; on reaching which the crews immediately plunged into the woods, and were out of sight before the gunboats could get within range. soon light blue smoke curling from the windows of the steamers told that they had been fired; and as the last boats left each vessel, she ceased her onward course, and drifted, abandoned and helpless, down the stream. when within about a thousand yards of the two gunboats, the deserted steamers blew up with such force, that, even at that great distance, the glass was shattered in the "conestoga," and her woodwork seriously damaged. the two gunboats leisurely continued their excursion into the heart of the enemy's country. little or no danger was to be feared. at that time, the confederates had not learned to plant torpedoes in their rivers, to blow the enemy's vessels into fragments. there was no artillery stationed in that section to check their progress, and the only resistance found was an occasional rifle-shot from some concealed sharp-shooter in the bushes on the shore. on the th of february the gunboats reached cerro gordo, tenn.; and here they made a valuable capture. the confederates had been at work for weeks converting the steamer "eastport" into an iron-clad ram; and, as the union vessels came up, they found her almost completed, and absolutely without defence. besides the new vessel, there was in the shipyard a large quantity of lumber and ship-timber, which was of the greatest value to the builders of the river navy. the two gunboats promptly captured all this property; and waiting until the "tyler," which had been detained at the drawbridge, came up, they left her in charge, and continued their raid into the enemy's country. little incident occurred until they reached the head of navigation of the river, where they found all the confederate vessels which had been flying before them for two days. these were burned, and the two gunboats started back down the river, stopping for the "eastport" on the way. the captured vessel was afterwards completed, and served the cause of the union for two years, when she was blown up on the red river. when the raiding expedition reached cairo, the officers found foote getting his squadron together for the attack on fort donelson. this fortification was one strongly relied upon by the confederates for the maintenance of their northern line of battle. it was on the bank of the cumberland river, nearly opposite the site of fort henry on the tennessee. a garrison of at least fifteen thousand men manned the works, and were commanded by no less than three generals; and the fact that there were _three_ generals in command had much to do with the fall of the fort. its strength was rather on its river-front. here the river winds about between abrupt hillsides, and on the front of one of these hills stood fort donelson. the water-batteries were made up of heavy guns, so mounted as to command the river for miles. on the landward side were heavy earthworks, abatis, and sharp pointed _chevaux-de-frise_. against this fortification marched grant with an army of eighteen thousand men, and foote with his flotilla of gunboats. the sunday before the start, foote, who was a descendant of the old puritans, and ever as ready to pray as to fight, attended church in a little meeting-house at cairo. the clergyman did not appear on time; and the congregation waited, until many, growing weary, were leaving the church. then the bluff old sailor rose in his pew, and, marching to the pulpit, delivered a stirring sermon, offering thanks for the victories of the union arms, and imploring divine aid in the coming struggles. the next day he was on his way to hurl shot and shell at the men in the trenches of fort donelson. while the capture of fort henry was a feather in the caps of the sailor-boys of the north, fort donelson must be credited to the valor of the soldiers. against the heavy wall of the water-batteries, the guns of foote's little flotilla pounded away in vain, while the heavy shells from the confederate cannon did dreadful work on the thinly armored gunboats. it was on the th of april that the assault was opened by the "carondelet." this vessel had reached the scene of action before the rest of the flotilla, and by order of the army commander tested the strength of the fort by a day's cannonade. she stationed herself about a mile from the batteries, at a spot where she would be somewhat protected by a jutting point, and began a deliberate cannonade with her bow-guns. one hundred and thirty shots went whizzing from her batteries against the front of the confederate batteries, without doing any serious damage. then came an iron ball weighing one hundred and twenty pounds, fired from a heavy gun, which burst through one of her portholes, and scattered men bleeding and mangled in every direction over the gun-deck. she withdrew a short distance for repairs, but soon returned, and continued the fire the remainder of the day. when evening fell, she had sent one hundred and eighty shells at the fort, with the result of killing one man. this was not promising. the next day the attack was taken up by all the gunboats. the distance chosen this time was four hundred yards, and the fight was kept up most stubbornly. it was st. valentine's day; and as the swarthy sailors, stripped to the waist, begrimed with powder, and stained with blood, rammed huge iron balls down the muzzles of the guns, they said with grim pleasantry, "there's a valentine for the gray-coats." and right speedily did the gray-coats return the gift. shot and shell from the batteries came in volleys against the sides of the gunboats. in the fort the condition of affairs was not serious. the shells chiefly fell in the soft earth of the hilltop above, and embedded themselves harmlessly in the mud. one of the gunners after the fight said: "we were more bothered by flying mud than any thing else. a shell bursting up there would throw out great clots of clay, that blocked up the touch-holes of our guns, spoiled the priming of our shells, and plastered up the faces of our men. of course, now and then a bit of shell would knock some poor fellow over; but, though we were all green hands at war, we expected to see lots more blood and carnage than the yankee gunboats dealt out to us." the gunboats, however, had put themselves in a hot place. twenty heavy guns on the hillside high above were hurling solid shot down on the little fleet. the sailors stuck to their work well; and though the vessels were in a fair way of being riddled, they succeeded in driving the enemy from his lower battery. but the upper battery was impregnable; and the gunners there, having got the correct range, were shooting with unpleasant precision. two of the vessels were disabled by being struck in the steering-chains. on the "carondelet" a piece burst, hurling its crew bleeding on the deck. no vessel escaped with less than twenty wounds, while the flagship was hit fifty-nine times. commodore foote was wounded in the foot by a heavy splinter; a wound from which he never fully recovered, and which for some years debarred him from service afloat. that afternoon's bombardment showed clearly that fort donelson could never be taken by the navy. when foote ordered his gunboats to cease firing and drop back out of position, the confederates swarmed back into the lower battery that they had abandoned; and, after a few hours' work, the fort was as strong as before the fight. it was the first case in the history of the war in which the navy had failed to reduce the fortifications against which it had been ordered. the hatteras forts, the works at roanoke island and at hilton head, fort henry--all had fallen before the cannon of the union sailors; and foote may well be pardoned if he yielded to gen. grant with great reluctance the honor of reducing fort donelson. for two days grant's army invested the fort, and kept up a constant cannonade; then the defenders, despairing of escape, and seeing no use of further prolonging the defence, surrendered. the capture of fort donelson was an important success for the union arms. in addition to the large number of prisoners, and the great quantity of munitions of war captured, the destruction of the fort left the cumberland river open to the passage of the union gunboats, and the confederate battle-line was moved back yet another point. but now was to come a most heroic test of the power of the river-navy and the army of the north. some sixty miles below cairo, the rushing, tawny current of the mighty mississippi turns suddenly northward, sweeping back, apparently, toward its source, in a great bend eight or ten miles long. at the point where the swift current sweeps around the bend, is a low-lying island, about a mile long and half a mile wide. this is known as island no. ; and at the opening of the war, it was supposed to hold the key to the navigation of the mississippi river. here the confederates had thrown up powerful earthworks, the heavy guns in which effectually commanded the river, both up and down stream. the works were protected against a land bombardment by the fact that the only tenable bit of land, new madrid, was held by confederate troops. the shores of the mississippi about island no. present the dreariest appearance imaginable. the missouri shore is low and swampy. in an earthquake-shock rent the land asunder. great tracts were sunk beneath the water-level of the river. trees were thrown down, and lie rotting in the black and miasmatic water. other portions of the land were thrown up, rugged, and covered with rank vegetation, making hills that serve only as places of refuge for water-moccasons and other noxious reptiles. around this dreary waste of mud and water, the river rushes in an abrupt bend, making a peninsula ten miles long and three wide. below this peninsula is new madrid, a little village in the least settled part of missouri; here the confederates had established an army-post, and thrown up strong intrenchments. it was not, however, upon the intrenchments that they relied, but rather upon the impassable morasses by which they were surrounded on every side. in new madrid were posted five or six thousand men; a small fleet of confederate gunboats lay in the stream off the village; and higher up the river was island no. , with its frowning bastions and rows of heavy siege-guns, prepared to beat back all advances of the union troops. [illustration: mortar boats at island no. .] in planning for the attack of this stronghold, the first difficulty found by commodore foote lay in the fact that his gunboats were above the batteries. in fighting down stream in that manner, the ships must be kept at long range: for, should a shot from the enemy injure the engine or boiler of a gunboat, the vessel is doomed; for the rapid current will rush her down under the enemy's guns, and her capture is certain. but the peril of running the batteries so as to carry on the fight from below seemed too great to be ventured upon; and besides, even with island no. passed, there would still be the batteries of new madrid to cope with, and the gunboats of the confederates to take the ships in the rear. so it was determined that the navy should begin a bombardment of the confederate works, while the army under gen. pope should attend to new madrid. accordingly, on march , the whiz of a rifled shell from the flagship "benton" announced to the confederates that the north wanted the mississippi opened for travel. in this engagement use was made for the first time of a new style of vessel known as mortar-boats, which in later conflicts on the rivers did great service. these boats were simple floats, heavily built, and calculated to stand the most terrible shocks. on the float was raised a sort of sheet-iron fort or wall, about five feet high; and in the centre stood one thirteen-inch mortar. the mortar is the earliest of all forms of cannon, and was in use in europe in . its name is derived from its resemblance to an ordinary druggist's mortar. the great thirteen-inch mortars used in the civil war weighed seventeen thousand pounds, and threw a shell thirteen inches in diameter. these shells were so heavy that it took two men to bring them up to the cannon's mouth. in the river-service, the mortar-boats were moored to the bank, and a derrick was set up in such a position that the shells could be hoisted up, and let fall into the yawning iron pot below. foote had fourteen of these monsters pounding away at the confederates, and the roar was deafening. a correspondent of the "chicago times," who was with the fleet at the time of the bombardment, thus describes the manner of using these immense cannon: "the operation of firing the mortars, which was conducted when we were near by, is rather stunning. the charge is from fifteen to twenty-two pounds. the shell weighs two hundred and thirty pounds. for a familiar illustration, it is about the size of a large soup-plate. so your readers may imagine, when they sit down to dinner, the emotions they would experience if they happened to see a ball of iron of those dimensions coming toward them at the rate of a thousand miles a minute. the boat is moored alongside the shore, so as to withstand the shock firmly, and the men go ashore when the mortar is fired. a pull of the string does the work, and the whole vicinity is shaken with the concussion. the report is deafening, and the most enthusiastic person gets enough of it with two or three discharges. there is no sound from the shell at this point of observation, and no indication to mark the course it is taking; but in a few seconds the attentive observer with a good glass will see the cloud of smoke that follows its explosion, and then the report comes back with a dull boom. if it has done execution, the enemy may be seen carrying off their killed and wounded." and so from mortar-boats and gunboats, the iron hail was poured upon the little island, but without effect. when foote with his flotilla first opened fire, he thought that the confederate works would be swept away in a day or two. his ordnance was the heaviest ever seen on the mississippi, and in number his guns were enough to have battered down a mountain. but his days grew to weeks, and still the flag of the confederacy floated above island no. . the men on the mortar-boats were giving way under the tremendous shocks of the explosions. many were rendered deaf for days at a time. the jar of the explosions brought to the surface of the river hundreds of old logs and roots that had lain rotting in the soft ooze of the bottom. when all the mortars were engaged, the surface of the river was covered with foam and bubbles; and men by the thousand went about with their ears stuffed with tow, to protect them against the sound. yet, after weeks of such firing, gen. beauregard telegraphed to richmond, that the yankees had "thrown three thousand shells, and burned fifty tons of gunpowder," without injuring his batteries in the least. the confederates remained passive in their trenches. they had no guns that would carry far enough to reply to foote's mortars, and they did not wish to waste powder. it was galling to stand fire without replying; but, fortunately for them, the fire was not very deadly, and but few were injured. when, however, a shell did fall within the works, it made work enough to repair damages, as by its explosion a hole as large as a small house would be torn in the ground. but for every one that fell within the batteries, twenty fell outside. some strange freaks are recorded of the shells. one fell on a cannon, around which eight or ten men were lying. the gun-carriage was blown to pieces, but not a man was hurt. another fell full on the head of a man who was walking about distributing rations, and not so much as a button from his uniform was ever found. but while the navy was thus playing at bowls with great guns, the army had marched through the interior, captured new madrid, and obtained a foothold below island no. . thus the confederates were surrounded; and the very impassability of the land, that had been an advantage to them, now told against them, for it cut off all hope of re-enforcements. gen. pope's position was such that he could not get at the island, nor secure a commanding position, without aid from the navy. he begged foote to try to run the batteries; but the commodore replied, that the risk was greater than the prospective gain, and continued his cannonade. then a new idea was broached. by cutting a canal through the bayous, swamps, and woods of the peninsula, the lighter vessels could be taken by the fort without risk, and foote would then dare the dangers of a dash by in the gunboats. every one said that such a canal was impossible; but the men of the north were given to doing impossible things in those days, and while foote's mortar-boats continued their thunder, fifteen hundred men were set to work cutting a way through the noisome swamps. a channel forty feet wide must be made. first gangs of men with axes and saws, working in three feet of water, went ahead, cutting down the rank vegetation. as fast as a little space was cleared, a small steamer went in, and with dredge and steam-capstan hauled out the obstructions. in some places the surveyed channel was so filled with drift-wood, fallen trees, and tangled roots, that the labor of a thousand men for a day seemed to make no impression. when the canal was pretty well blocked out, the levee was cut; and the rush of the waters from the great river undermined trees, and piled up new obstacles for the steamers to tow away. amid the foulest vapors the men worked, and more than a thousand were sent to the hospital with chills and fever, and rheumatism. the most venomous snakes lurked in the dark recesses of the swamp; on cypress-stumps or floating logs the deadly water-moccason lay stretched out, ready to bite without warning. wherever there was a bit of dry ground, the workers were sure to hear the rattle of the rattlesnake. sometimes whole nests of these reptiles would be uncovered. the work was continued day and night. when the failing daylight ceased to make its way through the thickly intwined branches of trees and climbing vines, great torches would be lighted, and by their fitful glare the soldiers and sailors worked on in the water and mud. the light glared from the furnaces of the steamers, lighting up the half-naked forms of the stokers. now and then some dry vine or tree would catch a spark from a torch, and in an instant would be transformed into a pillar of fire. after eight days of work the canal was finished, and was found to be of sufficient depth for the passage of the transports. and now commodore foote saw that the time had come when he must attempt to run his gunboats past the forts, be the danger what it might. on april , foote ordered a reconnoissance of the batteries, and this order evoked one of the most daring deeds in the history of the war. the night was pitchy dark, and heavy clouds were driven across the sky by a strong, damp wind, that told of a coming storm. in five boats a party of fifty sailors and fifty soldiers put off from the fleet, prepared to go down and beard the confederate lion in his den. hardly had they started on their perilous expedition, when the rain began falling in sheets, and now and again flashes of lightning made the dark shores visible for an instant, then the black night hid every thing again from view. it was midnight, and the fierceness of the wind added to the terror of the moment. on the banks, the great forest-trees were bending and groaning before the blast, while the broad surface of the river was lashed into foaming billows. under cover of the darkness the little band passed rapidly down the river; past the shore-batteries and past the confederate picket-boats, they sped unseen. when they were within a few feet of the shore, a flash of lightning revealed them for just an instant to the sentries. then all was black, save for the quick flashes of the sentries' guns as they gave the alarm and fell back. the federals landed rapidly, and drove the confused confederates from the battery. then began the work of spiking the guns. every fifth man carried a number of rat-tail files, which were to be driven into the vents of the cannon, and then broken off. while the raiders were engaged in this work, the confederates rallied, and soon drove back the blue-jackets to their boats, with a slight loss in killed and captured. how many guns they had disabled, it is hard to say. in the excitement and glory of successful adventure, the reports were much exaggerated. histories of that date depict the men as calmly spiking _every_ gun, and then retiring deliberately. one writer claims that only one gun was spiked. however, testimony from confederates on duty in the batteries goes to show that four guns were totally disabled. but the true value of the adventure to the union forces was the dash and valor it disclosed, and the encouragement the people received from its success. the next day after this successful exploit, a gunboat, the "carondelet," was made ready to try the dash past the batteries of island no. . again the weather was favorable to the plans of the federals, for the night was as dark and wild as the one before. the day had been clear, and the night opened with so bright a moon that for a time it was thought that the project would have to be abandoned; but toward ten o'clock a heavy thunder-storm came up, and soon the black sky, the wildly waving tree-tops, and the sheets of rain scudding across the river, gave promise of a suitable night. all day the sailors on the "carondelet" had been working busily, getting their vessel in trim for the trip. heavy planks were laid along the deck, to ward off plunging shot. chain cables were coiled about all weak points, cord-wood was piled around the boilers, and the pilot-house was wrapped round and about with heavy hawsers. on the side toward the battery was tied a large barge, piled high with cotton-bales. when the time for starting drew nigh, all lights were extinguished. the guns were run in, and the ports closed. the sailors, heavily armed, were sent to their stations. muskets, revolvers, and sabres were in the racks. down in the boiler-room the stokers were throwing coal upon the roaring fires; and in the engine-room the engineer stood with his hand on the throttle, waiting for the signal to get under way. towards eleven o'clock the time seemed propitious for starting. the storm was at its height, and the roll of the thunder would drown the beat of the steamer's paddles. the word was given; and the "carondelet," with her two protecting barges, passed out of sight of the flotilla, and down towards the cannon of the enemy. for the first half-mile all went well. the vessel sped along silently and unseen. the men on the gun-deck, unable to see about, sat breathlessly, expecting that at any moment a cannon-ball might come crashing through the side into their midst. suddenly from the towering smoke-stacks, burst out sheets of flame five feet high, caused by the burning soot inside, and lighting up the river all about. quickly extinguished, they quickly broke out again; and now from the camp of the alarmed enemy came the roll of the drum, and the ringing notes of the bugle sounding the alarm. a gunboat was bearing down on the works, and the confederates sprang to their guns with a will. the men on the "carondelet" knew what to expect, and soon it came. five signal rockets rushed up into the sky, and in an instant thereafter came the roar of a great gun from one of the batteries. then all joined in, and the din became terrible. with volley after volley the confederates hurled cannon-balls, shells, musket, and even pistol-bullets at the flying ship, that could only be seen an instant at a time by the fitful flashes of the lightning. on the "carondelet" all was still as death. the men knew the deadly peril they were in, and realized how impossible it was for them to make any fight. in the black night, threading the crooked and ever-changing channel of the mississippi river, it was impossible to go more than half-speed. in the bow men were stationed casting the lead, and calling out the soundings to the brave old capt. hoel, who stood on the upper deck unprotected from the storm of bullets, and repeated the soundings to capt. walker. so through the darkness, through the storm of shot and shell, the "carondelet" kept on her way. past the land-batteries, past the rows of cannon on the island, and past the formidable floating battery, she swept uninjured. heavy and continuous as was the fire of the confederates, it was mainly without aim. the hay-barge was hit three times, but not a scar was on the gunboat when she stopped before the water-front of new madrid after twenty minutes' run through that dreadful fire. and now the roar of the great guns had died away, and the men on the vessels of the flotilla up the river were all anxiety to know what had been the fate of their gallant comrades on the "carondelet." all the time the battle raged, the decks of the ships at anchor were crowded with sailors looking eagerly down the river, and trying to make out by the blinding flashes of the cannon the dark form of a gunboat speeding by the hostile camp. now all is silent; the roar of battle is over, the flash of gunpowder no more lights up the night. but what has become of the gallant men who braved that tempest of steel and iron? are they floating down the troubled waters beneath the wreck of their vessel? it was a moment of suspense. after a few minutes' silence, there comes through the strangely quiet air the deep boom of a heavy gun. it had been agreed, that, if the "carondelet" made the passage of the batteries safely, she should fire six heavy guns. the old tars on the decks say softly to themselves, "one." then comes another, and a third, and still more, until suddenly a ringing cheer goes up from the flotilla, louder than the thunder itself. men dance for joy; grizzled tars fall into each other's arms, sing, shout, cry. an answering salute goes booming back, rockets scud up into the clouds; and commodore foote, with a heart too full for talking, goes down into his cabin to be alone. that night's work by the "carondelet" terminated confederate domain on island no. . the next night another gunboat came down, and the two set to work carrying the troops across the river, protecting artillerymen engaged in erecting batteries, and generally completing the investment of the island. in two days every loop-hole of escape for the confederates is closed,--gunboats above and below them, batteries peering down from every bluff, and regiments of infantry, all prepared to move upon the works. they made one or two ineffectual but plucky attempts to ward off capture. one private soldier swam ashore, skulked past the union pickets, and made his way to one of the union mortar-boats. he succeeded in getting to the mortar, and successfully spiked it, thus terminating its usefulness. a second confederate succeeded in reaching the deck of the mortar-boat, but while making his way across the deck tripped and fell. the rat-tail file he was carrying was driven into his side, making a wound from which he died in two hours. a third man, reckless of life, set out in a canoe to blow up a gunboat. he carried with him a fifty-pound keg of gunpowder, which he proposed to strap on the rudder-post of the vessel. he succeeded in getting under the stern of the vessel; but the gleam of his lighted match alarmed the sentry, who fired, hitting him in the shoulder. the confederate went overboard, and managed to get ashore; while his keg of powder, with the fuse lighted, went drifting down stream. soon it exploded, throwing up an immense column of water, and showing that it would have sent the stoutest vessel to the bottom had it been properly placed. but such struggles as these could not long avert the impending disaster. the confederates were hemmed in on every side. it was true that they had a strong position, and could make a desperate resistance; but they were separated from their friends, and their final downfall was but a question of time. appreciating this fact, they surrendered two days after the "carondelet" had passed the batteries; and foote made his second step (this time one of sixty miles) toward the conquest of the mississippi. to-day nothing remains of the once extensive island, save a small sand-bank in the middle of the great river. the rushing current of the father of waters has done its work, and island no. is now a mere tradition. chapter xi. famous confederate privateers. -- the "alabama," the "shenandoah," the "nashville." let us now desert, for a time, the progress of the union forces down the mississippi river, and turn our attention toward the true home of the sailors,--the blue waters of the ocean. we have heard much, from many sources, of the exploits of the confederate commerce-destroyers, privateers, or, as the union authorities and the historians of the war period loved to call them, the "rebel pirates." in the course of this narrative we have already dealt with the career of the "sumter," one of the earliest of these vessels. a glance at the career of the most famous of all the confederate cruisers, the "alabama," will be interesting. this vessel was built in england, ostensibly as a merchant-vessel, although her heavy decks and sides, and her small hatchways, might have warned the english officials that she was intended for purposes of war. before she was finished, however, the customs-house people began to suspect her character; and goaded on by the frequent complaints of the united states minister, that a war-vessel was being built for the confederates, they determined to seize her. but customs-house officials do things slowly; and, while they were getting ready for the seizure, capt. semmes, who had taken command of the new ship, duped them, and got his vessel safely out of english waters. private detectives and long-shore customs officers had been visiting the ship daily on visits of examination; but, by the aid of champagne and jolly good-fellowship, their inexperienced eyes were easily blinded to the manifest preparations for a warlike cruise. but finally came a retired naval officer who was not to be humbugged. a sailor on board thus tells the story of his visit: "he was evidently a naval officer, alert and resolute, and soon silenced the officer's explanations. he looked at the hatchways, shot-racks, and magazines; and, surveying the hammock-hooks on the berth-deck, said, 'you'll have a large crew for a merchant-steamer.' we had taken on board some heavy oak plank, that lay on the main deck; the officer remarked that they were for anchor-stocks, and was shortly answered, 'wouldn't make bad gun-platforms, sir,' which, indeed, was just what they were intended for. with a 'good-morning, sir,' our visitor mounted the side and was gone." this visit alarmed the confederates; and immediate preparations were made to run the ship, which still went by the name of the "no. ," out of the british waters the next day. to disarm suspicion, a large party of ladies and gentlemen were invited aboard; and the ship started down the mersey, ostensibly on her trial trip, with the sounds of music and popping corks ringing from her decks. but peaceful and merry as the start seemed, it was the beginning of a voyage that was destined to bring ruin to hundreds of american merchants, and leave many a good united states vessel a smoking ruin on the breast of the ocean. when she was a short distance down the river, two tugs were seen putting off from the shore; and in a moment the astonished guests were requested to leave the ship, and betake themselves homeward in the tugs. it is unnecessary to follow the voyage of the "no. " to nassau, and detail the way in which cannon, ammunition, and naval stores were sent out from portsmouth in a second vessel, and transferred to her just outside of nassau. it is enough to say that on a bright, clear sunday morning, in the latter part of august, , capt. rafael semmes, late of the confederate cruiser "sumter," a gentleman of middle height, wearing a uniform of gray and gold, his dark mustache waxed to such sharp points that one would think him a frenchman rather than a southerner, stood on the quarter-deck of the "no. ," with his crew mustered before him, reading out his commission from jefferson davis, as commander of the confederate states' steam-sloop "alabama." as he read, an old master's-mate, standing at the peak-halyards, begins pulling at the ropes. the british ensign, carried through the ship's anonymous days, comes fluttering down, and in its place runs up the white naval ensign of the confederacy, with the starry southern cross in the red field of the corner. then the reading is ended. boom! goes the starboard forecastle-gun. the band bursts forth with the stirring notes of dixie; and the sailors, after three ringing cheers, crowd forward to wait for further developments. soon the sailors are summoned aft again, and capt. semmes addresses them. he tells them that, as the "alabama" is to be a ship-of-war, they are released from their shipping contracts, but are invited to ship under the new plan. he briefly details the purpose of the cruise. the "alabama" is to be a bird of passage, flitting from port to port, and hovering about the highways of travel, to lie in wait for the merchant-vessels of the north. armed vessels she will avoid as much as possible, confining her warfare to the helpless merchantmen. it is hardly a glorious programme, but it seems to bear the promise of prize-money; and before the day is over capt. semmes has shipped a crew of eighty men, and with these the "alabama" begins her cruise. the remainder of the sailors are sent ashore, and the "alabama" starts off under sail, in search of her first capture. let us look for a moment at this vessel, perhaps the most famous of all cruisers. she was a fast screw-steamer, of a little more than a thousand tons' burden. her screw was so arranged that it could be hoisted out of the water; and, as the saving of coal was a matter of necessity, the "alabama" did most of her cruising under sail. her hull was of wood, with no iron plating, and her battery consisted of but eight light guns: two facts which made it necessary that she should avoid any conflicts with the powerful ships of the united states navy. her lines were beautifully fine; and, as she sped swiftly through the water, capt. semmes felt that his vessel could escape the northern cruisers as easily as she could overhaul the lumbering merchantmen. the crew was a turbulent one, picked up in the streets of liverpool, and made up of men of all nationalities. terrific rows would arise in the forecastle, and differences between the sailors were often settled by square stand-up fights. the petty officers seldom interfered; one old boatswain remarking, when he heard the noise of blows in the forecastle, "blast them, let 'em slug one another's heads off; it will keep 'em out of mischief." and it generally did, for the combatants were usually fast friends the next day. as soon as the new ship was cleaned up, and put in order, drill began. the men were all green; and hard, steady work at the guns, and with the cutlasses, was necessary to fit them for service. the decks resounded with "right," "left," "head protect," "right overcut." the men were slow in learning; but the officers were southerners, devoted to their cause, and were tireless in getting the crew into shape. after several days of cruising and drill, a vessel was sighted which was unmistakably american. one of the sailors tells the story of her capture graphically. "on the morning of the th of september the cry of 'ship ahoy!' from the masthead brought all hands on deck. sure enough, about two miles to the leeward of us was a fine barque, at once pronounced a 'spouter' (whaler), and an american. in order to save coal,--of which very essential article we had about three hundred tons aboard,--we never used our screw unless absolutely necessary. we were on the starboard tack, and with the fresh breeze soon came alongside. we had the american flag set, and the chase showed the stars and stripes. a gun was fired; and, as we came within hail, we gave the order, 'back your mainsail; i'll send a boat on board of you.' "'cutter away,' and the boat came down from the davits, and we pulled for our first prize. it soon became a vain thing, and tiresome; but this our first essay was a novelty, and we made the stretches buckle with our impatience to get aboard. the bowman hooked on to the chains, and we went up the side like cats. when we got aft, the captain asked in a dazed sort of manner, 'why--why--what does this mean?' the master, fullam, replied, 'you are prize to the confederate steamer "alabama," capt. semmes commanding. i'll trouble you for your papers.' now, this man had been four years out, and had no doubt heard of the trouble at home; but he couldn't realize this, and he stared, and said, 'confederate government--alabama--why, that's a state,' and then was sternly told to get his papers. we were ordered to put the crew in irons, and they, too, seemed utterly dumbfounded; and one poor fellow said to me, 'must i lose all my clothes?' i answered, 'yes,' but advised him to put on all he could, and if he had any money to slip it in his boot. 'money! i h'aint seen a dollar for three years; but i'm obliged to ye all the same.'" then, after searching the vessel for valuables, the captives were taken back to the "alabama," while one boat's-crew remained behind to fire the vessel. "she was loaded with oil," writes sailor haywood; "and, when it caught, a high column of dense black smoke poured out of the hatchways, and spread in vast involutions to the leeward. soon the red forked flames began to climb her masts, and her spars glowed with light; with a crash her mainmast fell, carrying the foremast with it, and sending a shower of sparks high in the air; her stout sides seemed to burst open; and what was a stately ship was now a blackened hulk, the rising sea breaking in white-caps over it, and at last, with a surge and wallow, sinking out of sight." alone, by one of the lee-ports, the ruined american captain stood, looking sadly upon the end of all his long four years' labor. for this he had borne the icy hardships of the arctic seas. the long, dreary four years of separation from wife and home had been lightened by the thought, that by a prosperous voyage he might bring home enough money to stay always in the little shingled cottage in the narrow street of some new england fishing-village; but now all that was over. when he should arrive home he would be penniless, with nothing but the clothes on his back, and all because of a war of the very existence of which he knew nothing. it was hard to bear, but war brings nothing but affliction. after this capture, the "alabama" had a lively season for several weeks, capturing often two or three vessels a day. generally they met with no resistance; but occasionally the blood of some old sea-dog would boil, and he would do the best in his power to injure his captors. a story of one such incident was thus told by one of the "alabama's" crew:-- [illustration: looting a prize.] "when we ran around in search of whalers, we came upon a yankee skipper who didn't know what surrender meant. we were just well to the west of the stormy cape, when one morning after breakfast we raised a whaler. he was headed up the coast, and about noon we overhauled him. he paid no attention to the first shot, and it was only when the second one hulled him that he came into the wind. it was then seen that he had fifteen or sixteen men aboard, and that all were armed with muskets, and meant to defend the ship. the lieutenant was sent off with his boat; but no sooner was he within fair musket-range, than the whaler opened on him, killing one man, and wounding two, at the first volley. the officer pushed ahead, and demanded a surrender; but he got another volley, and the reply that the whaler 'would go to the bottom before he would surrender to a rebel!' "the boat was recalled, and our gunners were instructed to hull the whaler with solid shot. we approached him within rifle-range, and opened fire. every one of the balls plumped through his side at and above the water-line, and he answered with his muskets, severely wounding two men. he was repeatedly hailed to surrender, but in reply he encouraged his men to maintain their fire. we soon had the sea pouring into his starboard side through a dozen holes; and when it was seen that he would soon go down, we ceased firing, and again demanded his surrender. i can remember just how he looked as he sprang upon the rail,--tall, gaunt, hair flying, and eyes blazing,--and shouted in reply,-- "'the 'ben scott' don't surrender! come and take us--if you can.' "five minutes later his craft settled down, bow first. we lowered the boats to save his crew, and, strangely enough, not a man was lost. when we brought them aboard, the yankee skipper walked up to semmes, bareheaded, barefooted, and coatless, and said,-- "'if i'd only have had one old cannon aboard, we'd have licked ye out of yer butes! here we are, and what are ye going to do with us?' "he was voted a jolly good fellow, and the crew were better treated than any other ever forced aboard. in order to give them their liberty, the very next capture we made was bonded, and they were put aboard to sail for home." but now the decks of the "alabama" were getting rather uncomfortably crowded with prisoners, and it became necessary to put into some port where they could be landed. accordingly the ship was headed for martinique, and soon lay anchored in the harbor of that place, where she began coaling. while she lay there, a yankee schooner put into the port, and was about to drop anchor near the dangerous cruiser, when some one gave the skipper a hint; and, with a startled "b'gosh," he got his sails up, and scudded out to sea. the "alabama" lay in port some days. the first set of the sailors who received permission to go ashore proceeded to get drunk, and raised so great a disturbance, that thereafter they were obliged to look on the tropical prospect from the deck of the vessel. the next day a united states war-vessel was seen standing into the harbor, and capt. semmes immediately began to make preparations to fight her. but as she came nearer she proved to be the "san jacinto," a vessel mounting fourteen heavy guns, and altogether too powerful for the "alabama." so thinking discretion the better part of valor, the confederate ship remained safe in the neutral harbor. the "san jacinto" quietly remained outside, thinking that at last the fox was caught. but that same night, with all lights extinguished, and running under full steam, the "alabama" slipped right under the broadside of her enemy, getting clean away, so quietly that the "san jacinto" remained for four days guarding the empty trap, while the "alabama" was off again on another voyage of destruction, and the tuneful souls in the forecastle were roaring out the chorus,-- "oh, our jolly privateer has left old england's shore! lord, send us lots of prizes, but no yankee man-of-war." soon after leaving martinique, the "alabama" made a capture which embarrassed the captain not a little by its size. it was sunday (which capt. semmes calls in his journal "the 'alabama's' lucky day"), when a bit of smoke was seen far off on the horizon, foretelling the approach of a steamer. now was the time for a big haul; and the "alabama's" canvas was furled, and her steam-gear put in running order. the two vessels approached each other rapidly; and soon the stranger came near enough for those on the "alabama" to make out her huge walking-beam, see-sawing up and down amidships. the bright colors of ladies' dresses were visible; and some stacks of muskets, and groups of blue-uniformed men, forward, told of the presence of troops. the "alabama" came up swiftly, her men at the guns, and the united states flag flying from the peak,--a rather dishonorable ruse habitually practised by capt. semmes. in a moment the stranger showed the stars and stripes, and then the "alabama" ran up the white ensign of the confederacy, and fired a blank cartridge. but the stranger had no thought of surrendering, and crowded on all steam and fled. the "alabama" was no match for her in speed, so a more peremptory summons was sent in the shape of a shell that cut the steamer's foremast in two. this hint was sufficient. the huge paddles ceased revolving, and a boat's-crew from the "alabama" went aboard to take possession. the prize proved to be the mail steamer "ariel," with five hundred passengers, besides a hundred and forty marines and a number of army and navy officers. now capt. semmes had an elephant on his hands, and what to do with that immense number of people he could not imagine. clearly the steamer could not be burned like other captures. for two days capt. semmes kept the prize near him, debating what was to be done, and then released her; exacting from all the military and naval officers their paroles that they would not take up arms against the confederacy. after this exploit the "alabama" went into port for a few days, and then headed into the gulf of mexico. here she steamed about, capturing and burning a few united states merchantmen, until on the th of january she found herself off the port of galveston, where a strong blockading fleet was stationed. and here she fought her first battle. about four o'clock of a clear afternoon, the lookout in the cross trees of the united states sloop-of-war "hatteras," stationed off the port of galveston, hailed the officer of the deck, and reported a steamer standing up and down outside. the stranger was watched closely through marine glasses, and finally decided to be a blockade-runner trying to make the port; and the "hatteras" immediately set out in pursuit. this was just what capt. semmes desired. he knew that the ships stationed off galveston were not heavily armed, and he felt sure that if he could entice one away from the rest of the fleet he would be able to send her to the bottom. accordingly he steamed away slowly, letting the "hatteras" gain on him, but at the same time drawing her out of the reach of any aid from her consorts. when about twenty miles away from the fleet, the "alabama" slowed down and finally stopped altogether, waiting for the "hatteras" to come up. the latter vessel came within two hundred yards, and hailed, "what ship's that?"--"her majesty's ship 'petrel,'" answered semmes, pursuing the course of deception that brings so much discredit on his otherwise dashing career. the captain of the "hatteras" answered that he would send a boat aboard; but, before the boat touched the water, a second hail announced, "we are the confederate ship 'alabama,'" and in an instant a heavy broadside crashed into the "hatteras." every one of the shots took effect; and one big fellow from the one hundred and five pounder rifle peeled off six feet of iron plating from the side of the "hatteras," and lodged in the hold. dazed by this unexpected fire, but plucky as ever, the blue-jackets sprang to their guns and returned the fire. the two ships were so close together that a good shot with a revolver could have picked off his man every time, and the sailors hurled taunts at each other between the volleys. not a shot missed the "hatteras:" in five minutes she was riddled with holes, and on fire, and a minute or two later the engineer came up coolly and reported, "engine's disabled, sir;" followed quickly by the carpenter, who remarked, "ship's making water fast; can't float more than ten minutes, sir." there was nothing for it but surrender, and the flag came down amid frantic yells from the "alabama" sailors. semmes got out his boats with wonderful rapidity, and picked up all the men on the "hatteras;" and the defeated vessel sank in ten minutes. one of the strange things about this battle was the small number of men injured. nothing but shells were fired, and they searched every part of the vessels; yet when the fight was over the "alabama" had but one man wounded, while the "hatteras" had two men killed and three wounded. the shells played some strange pranks in their course. one ripped up a long furrow in the deck of the "alabama," and knocked two men high in the air without disabling them. another struck a gun full in the mouth, tore off one side of it, and shoved it back ten feet, without injuring any of the crew. one man who was knocked overboard by the concussion was back again and serving his gun in two minutes. a shell exploded in the coal of the "hatteras," and sent the stuff flying all about the vessel, without injuring a man. with her prisoners stowed away in all available places about her decks, the "alabama" headed for jamaica, and cast anchor in the harbor of port royal. there were several english men-of-war there, and the officers of the victorious ship were lionized and feasted to their hearts' content. the prisoners were landed, the "alabama's" wounds were bound up, and she was made ready for another cruise. [illustration: sinking of the "alabama."] after five days in port, she set out again on her wanderings about the world. week after week she patrolled the waters in all parts of the globe where ships were likely to be met. sometimes she would go a fortnight without a capture, and then the men in the forecastle would grow turbulent and restive under the long idleness. every bit of brass-work was polished hour after hour, and the officers were at their wits' end to devise means for "teasing-time." the men made sword-knots and chafing-gear enough to last the whole navy, and then looked longingly at the captain's mustache, as the only thing left in which a "turk's head" could be tied. music enlivened the hours for a time; but the fiddler was soon voted a bore, and silenced by some one pouring a pint of molasses into the _f_-holes of his instrument. the enraged musician completed the job by breaking it over the head of the joker. after several weeks, they put into cape town. here the practical joker of the crew made himself famous by utterly routing an inquisitive old lady, who asked, "what do you do with your prisoners?" the grizzled old tar dropped his voice to a confidential whisper, and, with a look of the utmost frankness, replied, "we biles 'em, mum. we tried a roast, but there ain't a hounce of meat on one o' them yankee carkages. yes, mum, we biles 'em." the startled old lady gasped out, "good lordy," and fled from the ship. putting out from cape town, the "alabama" continued her weary round of cruising. many vessels were captured, and most of them were burned. one yankee captain proved too much for semmes, as his story will show. his ship was chased by the "alabama" in heavy weather all day, and occasionally fired upon. when the steamer was abeam, "she closed up with us," the captain says, "as near as safety would permit, and, hailing us, asked where we were bound, and demanded the surrender of the ship to the confederate government. i answered through my trumpet, 'come and take me.' conversation being too straining for the lungs amid the howling of the wind and rolling of the huge billows, and the proximity of the vessels too dangerous, we separated a little, and had recourse to blackboards to carry on our conversation. semmes asked where we were bound. i answered, without a blush, 'melbourne,' thinking that possibly he might try to intercept me if he knew that i was to pass through the straits of sunda. then he had the cheek to order me to 'haul down your flag and surrender, escape or no escape,'--on a kind of parole, i suppose he meant. i wrote on the board: 'first capture, then parole,' this answer vexed him, i am sure, for he immediately wrote: 'surrender, or i will sink you.' i wrote: 'that would be murder, not battle.'--'call it what you will, i will do it,' he wrote. 'attempt it, and by the living god, i will run you down, and we will sink together,' i wrote in reply. i knew his threat was vain; for in that heavy sea, rolling his rails under, he did not dare to free his guns, which were already double lashed. they would have carried away their tackles, and gone through the bulwarks overboard. conscious that he had made empty threats, we said no more, but doggedly kept on our course. sail was still further reduced on both vessels, as the wind kept increasing and was now blowing a gale. we were now gradually and surely drawing ahead of the steamer. it was growing dark. rejoicing at my fortunate escape, i gave the valiant semmes a parting shot by hoisting the signal 'good-by.' dipping the star-spangled banner as a salute, i hauled it down, and the steamer was soon lost to sight in the darkness.... i never saw her after our escape; but, indirectly, she forced me to sell my ship in china soon after." but we cannot follow the "alabama" in her career about the world. a full account of her captures would fill volumes; and in this narrative we must pass hastily by the time that she spent scouring the ocean, dodging united states men-of-war, and burning northern merchantmen, until, on the th of june, she entered the harbor of cherbourg, france, and had hardly dropped anchor when the united states man-of-war "kearsarge" appeared outside, and calmly settled down to wait for the confederate to come out and fight. capt. semmes seemed perfectly ready for the conflict, and began getting his ship in shape for the battle. the men, too, said that they had had a "plum-pudding voyage" of it so far, and they were perfectly ready for a fight. the forecastle poet was set to work, and soon ground out a song, of which the refrain was,-- "we're homeward bound, we're homeward bound! and soon shall stand on english ground; but, ere our native land we see, we first must fight the 'kearsargee.'" this was the last song made on board the "alabama," and the poet was never more seen after the fight with the "kearsargee." [illustration: rescue of capt. semmes.] the "kearsarge" had hardly hove in sight when capt. semmes began taking in coal, and ordered the yards sent down from aloft, and the ship put in trim for action. outside the breakwater, the "kearsarge" was doing the same thing. in armament, the two vessels were nearly equal; the "alabama" having eight guns to the "kearsarge's" seven, but the guns of the latter vessel were heavier and of greater range. in the matter of speed, the "kearsarge" had a slight advantage. the great advantage which the "kearsarge" had was gained by the forethought of her commander, who had chains hung down her sides, protecting the boilers and machinery. semmes might easily have done the same thing had the idea occurred to him. it was on sunday, june , that the "alabama" started out to the duel that was to end in her destruction. though sunday was capt. semmes's lucky day, his luck this time seemed to have deserted him. the "alabama" was accompanied in her outward voyage by a large french iron-clad frigate. the broad breakwater was black with people waiting to see the fight. the news had spread as far as paris, and throngs had come down by special trains to view the great naval duel. a purple haze hung over the placid water, through which could be seen the "kearsarge," with her colors flying defiantly, steaming slowly ahead, and ready for the "alabama" to come up. small steamers on every side followed the "alabama," as near the scene of conflict as they dared. one english yacht, the "deerhound," with her owner's family aboard, hung close to the combatants during the fight. no duel of the age of chivalry had a more eager throng of spectators. now the "alabama" has passed the three-mile line, and is on the open sea. the big french iron-clad stops; the pilot-boats, with no liking for cannon-balls, stop too. the "deerhound" goes out a mile or so farther, and the "alabama" advances alone to meet the antagonist that is waiting quietly for her coming. the moment of conflict is at hand; and capt. semmes, mustering his men on the deck, addresses them briefly, and sends them to their quarters; and now, with guns shotted, and lanyards taut, and ready for the pull, the "alabama" rushes toward her enemy. when within a distance of a mile, the first broadside was let fly, without avail. the "kearsarge," more cool and prudent, waits yet awhile; and, when the first shot does go whizzing from her big dahlgren guns, it strikes the "alabama," and makes her quiver all over. clearly it won't do to fight at long range; and capt. semmes determines to close in on his more powerful antagonist, and even try to carry her by boarding, as in the glorious days of paul jones. but the wary winslow of the "kearsarge" will have none of that; and he keeps his ship at a good distance, all the time pouring great shot into the sides of the "alabama." now the two vessels begin circling around each other in mighty circles, each trying to get in a raking position. the men on the "alabama" began to find that their gunpowder was bad and caky; while at the same moment one of the officers saw two big solid shot strike the "kearsarge" amidships, and fall back into the water, revealing the heretofore unsuspected armor. this was discouraging. then came a big shot that knocked over the pivot-gun, and killed half its crew. one sailor saw a shot come in a port, glide along the gun, and strike the man at the breach full in the breast, killing him instantly. the "kearsarge," too, was receiving some pretty heavy blows, but her iron armor protected her vulnerable parts. one shell lodged in her sternpost, but failed to explode. had it burst, the "kearsarge's" fighting would have been over. after an hour the officers of the "alabama" began coming to capt. semmes with grave faces, and reporting serious accidents. at last the first lieutenant reported the ship sinking, and the order was given to strike the flag. she was sinking rapidly, and the time had come for every man to save himself. the "kearsarge" was shamefully slow in getting out her boats; and finally when the "alabama," throwing her bow high in the air, went down with a rush, she carried most of her wounded with her, and left the living struggling in the water. capt. semmes was picked up by a boat from the yacht "deerhound," and was carried in that craft to england away from capture. for so escaping, he has been harshly criticised by many people; but there seems to be no valid reason why he should refuse the opportunity so offered him. certain it is, that, had he not reached the "deerhound," he would have been drowned; for none of the boats of the "kearsarge" were near him when he was struggling in the water. so ended the career of the "alabama." her life had been a short one, and her career not the most glorious imaginable; but she had fulfilled the purpose for which she was intended. she had captured sixty-four merchant-vessels, kept a large number of men-of-war busy in chasing her from one end of the world to the other, and inflicted on american commerce an almost irreparable injury. although the "alabama" was by all means the most noted and the most successful of all the confederate cruisers, there were others that entered upon the career of privateering, and followed it for a while with varying degrees of success. some were captured revenue-cutters, which the confederates armed with a single heavy gun, and turned loose on the ocean in search of yankee schooners. others were merely tugs or pilot-boats. generally their careers were short. in one instance a fine privateer, from which the confederates expected great things, attempted to capture a united states man-of-war, under the delusion that it was a merchant-vessel. the captain of the man-of-war saw the mistake under which the confederate labored, and allowed the privateer to come up within short range, when, with a sudden broadside, he sent her to the bottom, abruptly terminating her career as a commerce destroyer. some quite formidable iron-clad cruisers were built abroad; but in most cases all the diplomacy of the confederate agents proved unavailing to prevent the confiscation of the ships by the neutral governments in whose territory they were built. two iron-clad rams built at liverpool, ostensibly for private parties, but really for the confederate government, were seized by the british authorities. six splendid vessels were built in france, but only one succeeded in getting away to join the confederate service. this one was a ram with armored sides, and was named the "stonewall." the war was nearly over when she was put in commission, and her services for the confederacy amounted to nothing. she made one short cruise, during which she fell in with two united states men-of-war, that avoided a fight with her on account of her superior strength. at the end of her cruise the war was over, and she was sold to the mikado of japan, whose flag she now carries. [illustration: the end of a privateer.] the "nashville" was an old side-wheel passenger-steamer, of which the confederates had made a privateer. her career was a short one. she made one trip to england as a blockade-runner, and on her return voyage she burned three or four united states merchantmen. she then put into the great ogeechee river, where she was blockaded by three union men-of-war. the confederates protected her by filling the river with torpedoes, and anchoring the ship at a point where the guns of a strong fort could beat back all assailants. here she lay for several weeks, while the men on the blockaders were fuming at the thought that they were to be kept idle, like cats watching a rat-hole. at last capt. worden, who was there with his redoubtable monitor "montauk," determined to destroy the privateer, despite the torpedoes and the big guns of the fort. he accordingly began a movement up the river, picking his way slowly through the obstructions. the fort began a lively cannonade; but worden soon found that he had nothing to fear from that quarter, as the guns were not heavy enough to injure the iron sides of the little monitor. but, as he went up the river, the "nashville" took the alarm and fled before him; and it seemed that the most the union fleet could do would be to keep her from coming down again, for with her light draught she could keep well out of range of the monitor's guns. but one morning worden perceived a strange commotion on the "nashville;" and, looking carefully through his glass, he saw that she was aground. now was his time; and at once he pushed forward to a point twelve hundred yards from her, and directly under the guns of fort macallister. from this point he began a deliberate fire upon the doomed privateer. the great guns of the fort were roaring away, and their shells came crashing against the sides of the "montauk;" but to this worden paid no heed. it was splendid long distance practice for his gunners; and, when they got the range, not a shot missed the stranded confederate vessel. from his pilot-house worden could see the crew of the "nashville" escaping in boats, leaping into the water over the sides,--doing anything to escape from that terribly destructive fire. all the time the great fifteen-inch shells were dropping into the vessel with fearful precision. by and by a heavy fog fell upon the scene; but the gunners on the "montauk" knew where their enemy was, and kept up their steady fire, though they could see nothing. when the fog lifted, they saw the "nashville" a mass of flames; and in a moment she blew up, covering the placid surface of the river with blackened fragments. then the "montauk" returned to her consorts, well satisfied with her day's work. [illustration: the "nashville" burning a prize.] the last of the confederate privateers to ravage the ocean was the "shenandoah," originally an english merchant-vessel engaged in the east india trade. she was large, fast, and strongly built; and the astute agent of the confederacy knew, when he saw her lying in a liverpool dock, that she was just calculated for a privateer. she was purchased by private parties, and set sail, carrying a large stock of coal and provisions, but no arms. by a strange coincidence, a second vessel left liverpool the same day, carrying several mysterious gentlemen, who afterwards proved to be confederate naval officers. the cargo of this second vessel consisted almost entirely of remarkably heavy cases marked "machinery." the two vessels, once out of english waters, showed great fondness for each other, and proceeded together to a deserted, barren island near madeira. here they anchored side by side; and the mysterious gentlemen, now resplendent in the gray and gold uniform of the confederacy, stepped aboard the "shenandoah." then the cases were hoisted out of the hold of the smaller vessel; and, when the "machinery" was mounted on the gun-deck of the "shenandoah," it proved to be a number of very fine steel-rifled cannon. then the crew was mustered on the gun-deck, and informed that they were manning the new confederate ship "shenandoah;" and with a cheer the flag was hoisted at the peak, and the newly created ship-of-war started off in search of merchantmen to make bonfires of. from madeira the cruiser made for the southern ocean,--a fresh field not yet ravaged by any confederate vessel. this made the hunting all the better for the "shenandoah," and she burned vessels right and left merrily. in the spring of , she put into the harbor of melbourne, australia, where her officers were lavishly entertained by the citizens. thence she proceeded to the northward, spending some time in the indian ocean, and skirting the asiatic coast, until she reached behrings straits. here she lay in wait for returning whalers, who in that season were apt to congregate in behrings sea in great numbers, ready for the long voyage around cape horn to their home ports on the new england coast. capt. waddell was not disappointed in his expectations, for he reached the straits just as the returning whalers were coming out in a body. one day he captured eleven in a bunch. with one-third his crew standing at the guns ready to fire upon any vessel that should attempt to get up sail, waddell kept the rest of his men rowing from ship to ship, taking off the crews. finally all the prisoners were put aboard three of the whalers, and the eight empty ships were set afire. it was a grand spectacle. on every side were the towering icebergs, whose glassy sides reflected the lurid glare from the burning ships. great black volumes of smoke arose from the blazing oil into the clear blue northern sky. the ruined men crowded upon the three whalers saw the fruits of their years of labor thus destroyed in an afternoon, and heaped curses upon the heads of the men who had thus robbed them. what wonder if, in the face of such apparently wanton destruction as this, they overlooked the niceties of the law of war, and called their captors pirates! yet for the men of the "shenandoah" it was no pleasant duty to thus cruise about the world, burning and destroying private property, and doing warfare only against unarmed people. more than one has left on record his complaint of the utter unpleasantness of the duty; but all felt that they were aiding the cause for which their brothers at home were fighting, and so they went on in their work of destruction. for two months more waddell continued his depredations in the northern seas. many a stout bark from new london or new bedford fell a prey to his zeal for a cause that was even then lost. for the confederacy had fallen. the last volley of the war had been discharged three months before. of this capt. waddell was ignorant, and his warlike operations did not end until the captain of a british bark told him of the surrender of lee and johnston, and the end of the war. to continue his depredations longer would be piracy: so capt. waddell hauled down his confederate flag, and heading for liverpool surrendered his ship to the british authorities, by whom it was promptly transferred to the united states. so ended the last of the confederate privateers. [illustration: "shenandoah" burning whalers.] chapter xii. work of the gulf squadron. -- the fight at the passes of the mississippi. -- destruction of the schooner "judah." -- the blockade of galveston, and capture of the "harriet lane." the naval forces of the united states during the war may be roughly classified as the atlantic fleets, the river navy, and the gulf squadron. the vessels comprising the latter detachment enjoyed some light service during the opening months of the war; but, as the time went on, the blue-jackets of the gulf squadron found that they had no reason to congratulate themselves on securing an easy berth. their blockading duty was not so arduous as that of their brothers along the rugged atlantic coast; but they were harassed continually by confederate rams, which would make a dash into the fleet, strike heavy blows, and then fly up some convenient river far into the territory of the confederacy. one such attack was made upon the squadron blockading the mississippi in october, . some eighty miles below new orleans, the mississippi divides into three great channels, which flow at wide angles from each other into the gulf of mexico. these streams flow between low marshy banks hardly higher than the muddy surface of the river, covered with thick growths of willows, and infested with reptiles and poisonous insects. the point from which these three streams diverge is known as the "head of the passes," and it was here that the blockading squadron of four vessels was stationed. the ships swung idly at their moorings for weeks. the pestilential vapors from the surrounding marshes were rapidly putting all the crews in the sick bay, while the clouds of gnats and mosquitoes that hung about made jack's life a wretched one. they did not even have the pleasurable excitement of occasionally chasing a blockade-runner, for the wary merchants of new orleans knew that there was absolutely no hope of running a vessel out through a river so effectually blockaded. and so the sailors idled away their time, smoking, singing, dancing to the music of a doleful fiddle, boxing with home-made canvas gloves that left big spots of black and blue where they struck, and generally wishing that "johnny reb" would show himself so that they might have some excitement, even if it did cost a few lives. but while the blue-jackets at the mouth of the river were spending their time thus idly, the people in the beleaguered city higher up were vastly enraged at being thus cooped up, and were laying plans to drive their jailers away. occasionally they would take a small fleet of flat boats, bind them together, and heap them high with tar, pitch, and light wood. then the whole would be towed down the river, set on fire, and drifted down upon the fleet. the light of the great fire could be seen far off, and the warships would get up steam and dodge the roaring mass of flames as it came surging down on the swift current. so many trials of this sort failed, that finally the people of the crescent city gave up this plan in disgust. their next plan seemed for a time successful. it was at four o'clock one october morning that the watch on the sloop-of-war "richmond" suddenly saw a huge dark mass so close to the ship that it seemed fairly to have sprung from the water, and sweeping down rapidly. the alarm was quickly given, and the crew beat to quarters. over the water from the other ships, now fully alarmed, came the roll of the drums beating the men to their guns. the dark object came on swiftly, and the word was passed from man to man, "it's a confederate ram." and indeed it was the ram "manassas," which the confederates had been hard at work building in the new orleans shipyards, and on which they relied to drive the blockading squadron from the river. as she came rushing towards the "richmond," two great lights higher up the river told of fire-rafts bearing down upon the fleet, and by the fitful glare three smaller gunboats were seen coming to the assistance of the "manassas." clearly the confederates were attacking in force. the first volley from the fleet rattled harmlessly from the iron-clad sides of the "manassas;" and, not heeding it, she swept on and plunged into the side of the "richmond." the great iron prow cut deep into the wooden sides of the union vessel. heavy oaken timbers were splintered like laths, and the men were violently hurled to the deck. as the ram drew away, the blue-jackets sprang to their guns and gave her a volley. some of the shots must have penetrated her armor, for she became unmanageable. but the darkness prevented the officers of the "richmond" from seeing how much damage they had done, and they did not follow up their advantage. the strange panic that the sight of a ram so often brought upon sailors of the old school fell on the officers of this squadron, and they began hastily getting their ships out of the river. by this time four more confederate steamers had come to the aid of the ram, and were cannonading the northern fleet at long range. in their hurried attempt to escape, the "richmond" and the "vincennes" had run aground. the captain of the latter vessel, fearing capture, determined to fire his vessel and escape with his crew to the "richmond." accordingly he laid a slow-match to the magazine, lighted it, and then, wrapping his ship's colors about his waist in the most theatrical manner, abandoned his ship. but the plan was not altogether a success. as he left the ship, he was followed by a grizzled old sailor, who had seen too much fighting to believe in blowing up his own ship; and, when he saw the smoking slow-match, he hastily broke off the lighted end, and without saying a word threw it into the water. no one observed the action, and the crew of the "vincennes" watched mournfully for their good ship to go up in a cloud of smoke and flame. after they had watched nearly an hour, they concluded something was wrong, and returned to their old quarters. by this time the enemy had given up the conflict, and the united states navy was one ship ahead for the old sailor's act of insubordination. the confederate flotilla returned to new orleans, and reported that they had driven the blockaders away. there was great rejoicing in the city: windows were illuminated, and receptions were tendered to the officers of the confederate fleet. but, while the rejoicing was still going on, the union ships came quietly back to their old position, and the great river was as securely closed as ever. [illustration: fort pensacola.] about a month before the fight with the "manassas," the blue-jackets of the north scored for themselves a brilliant success in the harbor of pensacola. the frigate "colorado" was lying outside the harbor of that city, within clear view of the city front. for some weeks the sailors had been greatly interested in watching the activity of people on shore around a small schooner that was lying in a basin near the navy-yard. with a harbor so thoroughly blockaded as was that of pensacola, there seemed really no need of new vessels; and the haste of the confederates seemed inexplicable, until they saw through their glasses men at work mounting a heavy pivot-gun amidships. that made it clear that another privateer was being fitted out to ravage the seas and burn all vessels flying the united states flag. the gallant tars of the "colorado" determined to go in and burn the privateer before she should have a chance to escape. it was an undertaking of great peril. the schooner was near the navy-yard, where one thousand men were ready to spring to her assistance at the first alarm. on the dock fronting the navy-yard were mounted a ten-inch columbiad and a twelve-pounder field-piece, so placed as to command the deck of the schooner and the wharf to which she was moored. fort pensacola, not far distant, was full of confederate troops. but the union sailors thought that the destruction of the privateer was of enough importance to warrant the risk, and they determined to try the adventure. [illustration: destruction of the schooner "judah."] accordingly, on the first dark night, four boats, containing one hundred officers, sailors, and marines, put off from the side of the "colorado," and headed for the town. all was done with the most perfect silence. the tholes of the oars were wrapped in cloth to deaden their rattle in the rowlocks. no lights were carried. not a word was spoken after the officers in muffled tones had given the order, "give way." through the darkness of the night the heavy boats glide on. every man aboard has his work laid out for him, and each knows what he is to do. while the main body are to be engaged in beating back the guards, some are to spike the guns, and others to fire the schooner in several places. when within a hundred yards of the schooner, they are discovered by the sentry. as his ringing hail comes over the water, the sailors make no reply, but bend to the oars, and the boats fairly leap toward the wharf. bang! goes the sentry's rifle; and the men in the hold of the schooner come rushing up just as the two boats dash against her side, and the sailors spring like cats over the bulwarks. one man was found guarding the guns on the wharf, and was shot down. little time is needed to spike the guns, and then those on the wharf turn in to help their comrades on the schooner. here the fighting is sharp and hand to hand. nearly a hundred men are crowded on the deck, and deal pistol-shots and cutlass-blows right and left. several of the crew of the schooner have climbed into the tops, and from that point of vantage pour down on the attacking party a murderous fire. horrid yells go up from the enraged combatants, and the roar of the musketry is deafening. the crew of the schooner are forced backward, step by step, until at last they are driven off the vessel altogether, and stand on the wharf delivering a rapid fire. the men from the navy-yard are beginning to pour down to the wharf to take a hand in the fight. but now a column of smoke begins to arise from the open companionway; and the blue-jackets see that their work is done, and tumble over the side into their boats. it is high time for them to leave, for the confederates are on the wharf in overwhelming force. as they stand there, crowded together, the retiring sailors open on them with canister from two howitzers in the boats. six rounds of this sort of firing sends the confederates looking for shelter; and the sailors pull off through the darkness to their ship, there to watch the burning vessel, until, with a sudden burst of flame, she is blown to pieces. considering the dashing nature of this exploit, the loss of life was wonderfully small. lieut. blake, who commanded one of the boats, was saved by one of those strange accidents so common in war. as he was going over the side of the "colorado," some one handed him a metal flask filled with brandy, to be used for the wounded. he dropped it into the lower pocket of his overcoat, but, finding it uncomfortable there, changed it to the side pocket of his coat, immediately over his heart. when the boats touched the side of the schooner, blake was one of the first to spring into the chains and clamber aboard. just as he was springing over the gunwale, a confederate sailor pointed a pistol at his heart, and fired it just as blake cut him down with a savage cutlass-stroke. the bullet sped true to its mark, but struck the flask, and had just enough force to perforate it, without doing any injury to the lieutenant. the first death in the fight was a sad one. a marine, the first man to board the schooner, lost his distinguishing white cap in his leap. his comrades followed fast behind him, and, seeing that he wore no cap, took him for one of the enemy, and plunged their bayonets deep in his breast, killing him instantly. he was known to his comrades as john smith, but on searching his bag letters were found proving that this was not his own name. one from his mother begged him to return home, and give up his roving life. he proved to be a well-educated young man, who through fear of some disgrace had enlisted in the marines to hide himself from the world. [illustration: capture of the "harriet lane."] another dashing event occurred on the gulf coast some months later, although in this instance the confederates were the assailants and the victors. galveston had for some time been in the hands of the union forces, and was occupied by three regiments of united states troops. in the harbor lay three men-of-war, whose cannon kept the town in subjection. it had been rumored for some time that the confederates were planning to recapture the city, and accordingly the most vigilant lookout was kept from all the ships. on the st of january, , at half-past one a.m., as the lookout on the "harriet lane" was thinking of the new year just ushered in, and wondering whether before the end of that year he could see again his cosey northern home and wife and friends, he saw far up the river a cloud of black smoke, that rose high in the air, and blotted from sight the shining winter stars. he rubbed his eyes, and looked again. there was no mistake: the smoke was there, and rapidly moving toward him. clearly it was a steamer coming down the river; but whether an armed enemy or a blockade-runner, he could not say. he gave the alarm; and in a moment the roll of the drums made the sailors below spring from their hammocks, and, hastily throwing on their clothes, rush on deck. the drums beat to quarters, and the crew were soon at their guns. over the water came the roll of the drums from the other ships, and from the troops on shore, now all aroused and in arms. for thirty hours the federals had been expecting this attack, and now they were fully prepared for it. the attacking vessels came nearer, and the men on the union ships strained their eyes to see by the faint starlight what manner of craft they had to meet. they proved to be two large river-steamships, piled high with cotton-bales, crowded with armed men, and provided with a few field pieces. clearly they were only dangerous at close quarters, and the "lane" at once began a rapid fire to beat them back. but the bad light spoiled her gunners' aim, and she determined to rush upon the enemy, and run him down. the confederate captain managed his helm skilfully, and the "lane" struck only a glancing blow. then, in her turn, the "lane" was rammed by the confederate steamer, which plunged into her with a crash and a shock which seemed almost to lift the ships out of water. the two vessels drifted apart, the "lane" hardly injured, but the confederate with a gaping wound in his bow which sent him to the bottom in fifteen minutes. but now the other confederate came bearing down under a full head of steam, and crashed into the "lane." evidently the confederates wanted to fight in the old style; for they threw out grappling-irons, lashed the two ships side to side, and began pouring on to the deck of the federal ship for a hand-to-hand conflict. cries of anger and pain, pistol-shots, cutlass blows, and occasional roars from the howitzers rose on the night air, and were answered by the sounds of battle from the shore, where the confederates had attacked the slender union garrison. the sinking steamer took up a position near the "lane," and poured broadside after broadside upon the struggling union ship. but where were the other three union vessels all this time? it seemed as though their commanders had lost all their coolness; for they ran their vessels here and there, now trying to do something to help their friends on shore, now making an ineffectual attempt to aid the "harriet lane." but on board that vessel matters were going badly for the federals. the confederates in great numbers kept pouring over the bulwarks, and were rapidly driving the crew from the deck. capt. wainwright lay dead at the door of the cabin. across his body stood his young son, his eyes blazing, his hair waving in the wind. he held in his right hand a huge revolver, which he was firing without aim into the tossing mass of struggling men before him, while he called on his dead father to rise and help him. a stray bullet cut off two of his fingers, and the pain was too much for the little hero only ten years old; and, dropping the pistol, he burst into tears, crying, "do you want to kill me?" the blue-jackets began to look anxiously for help toward the other vessels. but, even while they looked, they saw all hope of help cut off; for with a crash and a burst of flame the "westfield" blew up. it turned out later, that, finding his ship aground, the captain of the "westfield" had determined to abandon her, and fire the magazine; but in fixing his train he made a fatal error, and the ship blew up, hurling captain and crew into the air. the men on the "harriet lane" saw that all hope was gone, and surrendered their ship. when the captains of the two remaining gunboats saw the stars and stripes fall from the peak, they turned their vessels' prows toward the sea, and scudded out of danger of capture. at the same moment, cheers from the gray-coats on shore told that the confederates had been successful both by land and sea, and the stars and bars once more floated over galveston. chapter xiii. the capture of new orleans. -- farragut's fleet passes fort st. philip and fort jackson. while commodore foote, with his flotilla of gunboats and mortar-boats, was working his way down the mississippi river, making occasional dashes into the broad streams that flow from either side into the father of waters, admiral farragut, with his fleet of tall-sparred, ocean-going men-of-war, was laying his plans for an expedition up-stream. but farragut's first obstacle lay very near the mouth of the broad, tawny river that flows for a thousand miles through the centre of the united states. new orleans, the greatest city of the confederacy, stands on the river's bank, only ninety miles from the blue waters of the gulf of mexico. the confederate authorities knew the value of this great city to their cause, and were careful not to let it go unprotected. long before any thought of civil war disturbed the minds of the people of the united states, the federal government had built below the crescent city two forts, that peered at each other across the swift, turbid tide of the mississippi river. fort st. philip and fort jackson they were called, the latter being named in honor of the stubborn old military hero who beat back the british soldiers at the close of the war of on the glorious field of chalmette near new orleans. fort jackson was a huge star of stone and mortar. in its massive walls were great cavernous bomb-proofs in which the soldiers were secure from bursting shells. it stood back about a hundred yards from the levee, and its casemates just rose above the huge dike that keeps the mississippi in its proper channel. when the river was high from the spring floods of the north, a steamer floating on its swift tide towered high above the bastions of the fort. in the casemates and on the parapets were mounted seventy-five guns of all calibres. by its peculiar shape and situation on a jutting point of land, the fort was able to bring its guns to bear upon the river in three directions. when the storm of civil war burst upon the country, the confederates of new orleans were prompt to seize this and fort st. philip, that stood on the other side of the river. they found fort jackson in the state of general decay into which most army posts fall in times of peace, and they set at work at once to strengthen it. all over the parapet, bomb-proofs, and weak points, bags of sand were piled five or six feet deep, making the strongest defence known in war. steamers plied up and down the river, bringing provision, ammunition, and new cannon, and soon the fort was ready to stand the most determined siege. fort st. philip, across the river, though not so imposing a military work, was more powerful. it was built of masonry, and heavily sodded over all points exposed to fire. it was more irregular in shape than fort jackson, and with its guns seemed to command every point on the river. both were amply protected from storming by wide, deep moats always filled with water. in these two forts were stationed troops made up of the finest young men of new orleans. for them it was a gay station. far removed from the fighting on the frontier, and within an easy journey of their homes, they frolicked away the first year of the war. every week gay parties of pleasure-seekers from new orleans would come down; and the proud defenders would take their friends to the frowning bastions, and point out how easily they could blow the enemy's fleet out of water if the ships ever came within range of those heavy guns. but the ships did not come within range of the guns for many months. they contented themselves with lying at the head of the passes, and stopping all intercourse with the outer world, until new orleans began to get shabby and ragged and hungry, and the pleasure-parties came less often to the forts, and the gay young soldiers saw their uniforms getting old and tattered, but knew not where to get the cloth to replace them. [illustration: levee at new orleans before the war.] in the city no rumble of commerce was heard on the streets. grass grew on the deserted levee, where in times of peace the brown and white cotton-bales were piled by the thousand, waiting for strong black hands to seize and swing them upon the decks of the trim liverpool packets, that lay three or four deep along the river front. the huge gray custom-house that stood at the foot of canal street no longer resounded with the rapid tread of sea-captains or busy merchants. from the pipes of the cotton-presses, the rush of the escaping steam, as the ruthless press squeezed the great bale into one-third its original size, was no longer heard. most of the great towering steamboats that came rushing down the river with stores of cotton or sugar had long since been cut down into squat, powerful gunboats, or were tied up idly to the bank. across the river, in the shipyards of algiers, there seemed a little more life; for there workmen were busy changing peaceful merchant vessels into gunboats and rams, that were, the people fondly hoped, to drive away the men-of-war at the river's mouth and save the city from starvation. from time to time the streets of the city resounded with the notes of drum and fife, as one after the other the militia companies went off to the front and the fighting. then the time came when none were left save the "confederate guards," old gray-haired men, judges, bankers, merchants, gentlemen of every degree, too old for active service at the front, but too young not to burn for the grasp of a gun or sword while they knew that their sons and grandsons were fighting on the bloodstained soil of virginia and tennessee. but, while the city was gradually falling into desolation and decay, preparations were being made by the federal navy for its capture. on the d of february, , admiral farragut sailed from hampton roads in his stanch frigate the "hartford," to take command of a naval expedition intended to capture new orleans. the place of rendezvous was ship island, a sandy island in the gulf of mexico. here he organized his squadron, and started for his post in the mississippi, below the forts. the first obstacle was found at the mouth of the river, where the heavy war-vessels were unable to make their way over the bar. nearly two weeks were occupied in the work of lightening these ships until they were able to pass. the frigate "colorado" was unable to get over at all. the "pensacola" was dragged through the mud by the sheer strength of other vessels of the expedition. while they were tugging at her, a huge hawser snapped with a report like a cannon, and the flying ends killed two men and seriously wounded five others. but at last the fleet was safely past all obstacles, and admiral farragut found himself well established in the lower mississippi, with a force of twenty-five men-of-war, and twenty mortar-schooners; one of the most powerful armadas ever despatched against an enemy. farragut lost no time in getting his ships prepared for the baptism of fire which was sure to come. while he was diligently at work on his preparations, he was visited by some french and english naval officers, who had carefully examined the defences of the confederates, and came to warn him that to attack the forts with wooden vessels, such as made up his fleet, was sheer madness, and would only result in defeat. "you may be right," answered the brave old sailor, "but i was sent here to make the attempt. i came here to reduce or pass the forts, and to take new orleans, _and i shall try it on_." the foreigners remarked that he was going to certain destruction, and politely withdrew. in the mean time, the tars on the mortar-fleet were working industriously to get their ships in fighting-trim. the topmasts were stripped of their sails, and lowered; the loose and standing rigging strapped to the masts; the spars, forebooms, and gaffs unshipped, and secured to the outside of the vessels to avert the danger from splinters, which, in naval actions, is often greater than from the shots themselves. from the main-deck every thing was removed that could obstruct the easy handling of the tremendous mortars; and the men were drilled to skill and alertness in firing the huge engines of death. the work was hastened on the mortar-schooners, because the plan was to rush them into position, and let them harass the confederates with a steady bombardment, while the ships-of-war were preparing for their part in the coming fight. the mortar-fleet was under command of admiral porter, an able and energetic officer. he soon had his ships ready, and began moving them into position along the banks of the river, out of sight of the forts. to further conceal them from the gunners in the forts, he had the masts and rigging wrapped with green foliage; so that, lying against the dense thickets of willows that skirt that part of the river, they were invisible. other boats that were in more exposed positions had their hulls covered with grass and reeds, so that they seemed a part of the swamp that bordered the river. after the line of fire had been obtained by a careful mathematical survey, porter got all his mortar-boats into position, and began his bombardment. the gunners on the mortar-boats could not see the forts; but the range had been calculated for them, and they merely fired mechanically. a lookout, perched on the masthead, could see over the low willow-forest, and watch the course of the shells as they rushed high into the air, and then, falling with a graceful curve, plunged into the forts. the firing was begun on the th of april, and was kept up with a will. the twenty huge mortars keeping up a constant fire, made a deafening roar that shook the earth, and could be heard far up the river at new orleans, where the people poured out into the streets, and gayly predicted defeat for any enemy who should attack "the boys in the forts." the forts were not slow in returning the fire; but as the mortar-vessels were hidden, and did not offer very large marks, their fire was rather ineffective. parties of confederates, old swamp-hunters, and skilled riflemen, stole down through the dense thickets, to pick off the crews of the mortar-schooners. they managed to kill a few gunners in this way, but were soon driven away by the point-blank fire of the supporting gunboats. but all this time the shells were falling thick and fast, driving the soldiers to the bomb-proofs, and tearing to pieces every thing unprotected. one shell set fire to some wooden structures that stood on the parade-ground in fort jackson; and, as the smoke and flames rose in the air, the gunners down the river thought that the fort was burning, and cheered and fired with renewed vigor. the shells that burst upon the levee soon cut great trenches in it, so that the mighty mississippi broke through with a rush, and flooded the country all about. but the forts seemed as strong and unconquered as ever. while the soldiers were crowded together in the bomb-proofs to escape the flying bits of shell, the sailors on the little fleet of confederate vessels anchored above them were busily engaged in getting ready a fire-raft which was to float down the river, and make havoc among the vessels of the union fleet. two such rafts were prepared; one of which, an immense affair, carrying cords of blazing pine-wood, was sent down in the early morning at a time when the vessels were utterly unprepared to defend themselves. luckily it grounded on a sandbar, and burned and crackled away harmlessly until it was consumed. this warned commander porter of the danger in which his mortar-vessels were of a second attack of the same nature; and accordingly he put in readiness one hundred and fifty small boats with picked crews, and well supplied with axes and grapnels, whose duty it was to grapple any future rafts, and tow them into a harmless position. they did not have long to wait. at sundown that night, commander porter reviewed his little squadron of row-boats as they lay drawn up in line along the low marshy shores of the mighty river. the sun sank a glowing red ball beneath the line at which the blue waters of the gulf and the blue arch of heaven seemed to meet. the long southern twilight gradually deepened into a black, moonless night. the cries of frogs and seabirds, and the little flashes of the fireflies, were silenced and blotted out by the incessant roar and flash of the tremendous mortars that kept up their deadly work. suddenly in the distance the sky grows red and lurid. "the fort is burning!" cry the men at the guns; but from the masthead comes the response, "no, the fire is on the river. it is another fire-raft." the alarm was instantly given to all the vessels of the fleet. bright colored signal-lights blazed on the decks, and the dark, slender cordage stood out against the brilliant red and green fires that flickered strangely upon the dark wooded banks of the river. rockets rushed high into the air, and, bursting, let fall a shower of party-colored lights that told the watchers far down the river that danger was to be expected. then the signal-lights went out, and all was dark and silent save where the lurid glare of the great mass of fire could be seen floating in the great curves of the tortuous river toward the crowded ships. it was a time of intense suspense. the little flotilla of fire-boats, organized by commander porter that day, was on the alert; and the blue-jackets bent to their oars with a will, and soon had their boats ranged along a bend far above the fleet. here they waited to catch the fiery monster, and save the ships. the danger came nearer fast. rapidly the flames increased in volume, until the whole surrounding region was lighted up by the glare; while from the floating fire, a huge black column of smoke arose, and blended with the clouds that glowed as though they themselves were on fire. when the raft came into view around a point, it was seen to be too big for the boats to handle unaided, and two gunboats slipped their cables, and started for the thing of terror. from every side the row-boats dashed at the raft. some grappled it, and the sailors tugged lustily at their oars, seeking to drag the mass of flames toward the shore. then the "westfield," under full head of steam, dashed furiously against the raft, crashing in the timbers and sending great clouds of sparks flying high in the air. from her hose-pipes she poured floods of water on the crackling, roaring, blazing mass; while all the time, with her powerful engines, she was pushing it toward the shore. in the mean time, the sailors from the fleet of small boats were swarming upon the raft wherever they could find a foothold free from flame. some carrying buckets dashed water upon the flames, some with axes cut loose flaming timbers, and let them float harmlessly down the river. it was a fight in which all the men were on one side; but it was a grand sight, and was eagerly watched by those on the imperilled vessels. the immediate arena of the conflict was bright as day, but all around was gloom. at last the pluck and determination of the men triumph over the flames. the raft, flaming, smouldering, broken, is towed out of the channel, and left to end its life in fitful flashes on a sandy point. the returning boats are greeted with cheers, and soon darkness and silence fall upon the scene. the mortars cease their thunderous work for the night; and ere long the only sounds heard are the rush of the mighty waters, or the faint cry of the night birds in the forest. the sentinel pacing the deck peers in vain through the gloom. war gives way for a time to rest. [illustration: fire-raft at forts of the mississippi.] hardly had the gray dawn begun to appear, when the roll of the drums on the decks of the ships was heard; and, soon after, the roar of the opening gun was heard from one of the mortar-schooners. again the bombardment was opened. the twenty boats in the mortar-fleet were divided into three divisions, each of which fired for two hours in succession, and then stopped for a time to allow the great cannon to cool. thus a continuous bombardment was kept up, and the soldiers in the forts were given no time to repair the damages caused by the bursting shells. every mortar was fired once in five minutes; so that one shell was hurled towards the fort about every minute, while sometimes three shells would be seen sweeping with majestic curves through the air at the same time. the shells weighed two hundred and fifteen pounds; and when they were hurled into the air by the explosion of twenty pounds of powder, the boat bearing the mortar was driven down into the water six or eight inches, and the light railings and woodwork of buildings at the balize, thirty miles away, were shattered by the concussion. the shells rose high in the air, with an unearthly shriek, and after a curve of a mile and a half fell into or near the forts, and, bursting, threw their deadly fragments in all directions. day after day, and night after night, this went on. if the men on the mortar-schooners showed bravery and endurance in keeping up so exhausting a fire so steadily, what shall we say for the men in the forts who bore up against it so nobly? before noon of the first day of the bombardment, the soldiers of fort jackson saw their barracks burned, with their clothing, bedding, and several days' rations. shells were pouring in upon them from vessels that they could not see. the smooth-bore guns mounted in the embrasures would hardly send a shot to the nearest of the hostile gunboats. then the river broke through its banks, and half the fort was transformed into a morass. an officer in fort jackson said, after the surrender, that in two hours over one hundred shells had fallen upon the parade-ground of that work, tearing it up terribly. for six days this terrible fire was endured; and during the latter half of the bombardment the water stood knee deep on the gun-platforms, and the gunners worked at their guns until their shoes, soaked for days and days, fairly fell from their feet. for bed and bedding they had the wet earth, for rations raw meat and mouldy bread. if there were glory and victory for the union sailors, let there at least be honor and credit granted the soldiers of the gray for the dogged courage with which they bore the terrible bombardment from porter's flotilla. while the mortars were pounding away through those six long days and nights, farragut was getting ready to take his ships past the forts. union scouts and spies had travelled over every foot of land and water about the forts; and the exact strength of the confederates, and the difficulties to be overcome, were clearly known to the federal admiral. one of the chief obstructions was a chain of rafts and old hulks that stretched across the channel by which the fleet would be obliged to ascend the river. under cover of a tremendous fire from all the mortars, two gunboats were sent up to remove this obstruction. the night was dark and favorable to the enterprise, and the vessels reached the chain before they were discovered. then, under a fierce cannonade from the forts, lieut. caldwell put off in a row-boat from his vessel, boarded one of the hulks, and managed to break the chain. the string of hulks was quickly swept ashore by the swift current, and the channel was open for the ascent of the union fleet. [illustration: breaking the chain.] on the d of april, farragut determined that his fleet should make the attempt to get past the forts the following day. he knew that the enemy must be exhausted with the terrible strain of porter's bombardment, and he felt that the opportunity had arrived for him to make a successful dash for the upper river. the fleet was all prepared for a desperate struggle. many of the captains had daubed the sides of their vessels with the river mud, that they might be less prominent marks for the confederate gunners. the chain cables of all the vessels were coiled about vulnerable parts, or draped over the sides amidships to protect the boilers. knowing that it was to be a night action, the gun-decks had been whitewashed; so that even by the dim, uncertain light of the battle lanterns, the gunners could see plainly all objects about them. hammocks and nettings were stretched above the decks to catch flying splinters from the spars overhead. late at night the admiral in his longboat was pulled from ship to ship to view the preparations made, and see that each captain fully understood his orders. it was two o'clock on the morning of the th of april, when the confederates on the parapets of their forts might have heard the shrill notes of fifes, the steady tramp of men, the sharp clicking of capstans, and the grating of chain cables passing through the hawse-holes on the ships below. indeed, it is probable that these sounds were heard at the forts, and were understood, for the confederates were on the alert when the ships came steaming up the river. they formed in a stately line of battle, headed by the "cayuga." as they came up the stream, the gunners in the forts could see the mastheads over the low willow thickets that bordered the banks of the stream. the line of obstructions was reached and passed, and then the whole furious fire of both forts fell upon the advancing ships. gallantly they kept on their way, firing thunderous broadsides from each side. and, while the ships were under the direct fire of the forts, the enemy's fleet came dashing down the river to dispute the way. this was more to the taste of farragut and his boys in blue. they were tired of fighting stone walls. in the van of the confederate squadron was the ram "manassas," that had created such a panic among the blockading squadron a month before. she plunged desperately into the fight. the great frigate "brooklyn" was a prominent vessel in the union line, and at her the ram dashed. the bold hearts on the grand old frigate did not seek to avoid the conflict, and the two vessels rushed together. the ram struck the "brooklyn" a glancing blow; and the shot from her one gun was returned by a hail of cannon-balls from the frigate's tremendous broadside, many of which broke through the iron plating. nothing daunted, the ram backed off and rushed at the frigate again. this time she struck full on the frigate's side. the shock was terrible. men on the gun-deck of the ram were hurled to the deck, with the blood streaming from their nostrils. the frigate keeled over farther and farther, until all thought that she would be borne beneath the water by the pressure of the ram. all the time the spiteful bow-gun of the iron monster was hurling its bolts into her hull. but the blow of the ram had done no damage, for she had struck one of the coils of chain that had been hung down the "brooklyn's" side. the two vessels slowly swung apart; and, after a final broadside from the "brooklyn," the "manassas" drifted away in the pitchy darkness to seek for new adversaries. she was not long in finding one; for as the gray dawn was breaking she suddenly found herself under the very bows of the "mississippi," which was bearing down upon her and seemed sure to run her down. the captain of the "manassas" was an able steersman, and neatly dodged the blow; but in this quick movement he ran his vessel ashore, and she lay there under the guns of the "mississippi," and unable to bring any of her own guns to bear. the captain of the frigate was not slow in taking advantage of this chance to be revenged for all the trouble she had given the union fleet; and he took up a good position, and pounded away with his heavy guns at the iron monster. the heavy shots crashed through the iron plating and came plunging in the portholes, seeking every nook and cranny about the vessel. it was too much for men to stand, and the crew of the "manassas" fled to the woods; while their vessel was soon set on fire with red-hot shots, and blew up with a tremendous report soon after. [illustration: ram "tennessee" at mobile bay.] in the mean time, the ships of the union fleet were doing daring work, and meeting a determined resistance. the flagship "hartford" was met by a tug which pushed a huge burning fire-raft against her sides. there the flaming thing lay right up against the portholes, the flames catching the tarred rigging, and running up the masts. farragut walked his quarter-deck as coolly as though the ship was on parade. "don't flinch from that fire, boys," he sang out, as the flames rushed in the portholes, and drove the men from their guns. "there's a hotter fire than that for those who don't do their duty. give that rascally little tug a shot, and don't let her go off with a whole coat." but the tug did get away, after all; and no one can feel sorry that men plucky enough to take an unarmed tug into a terrible fight of frigates and iron-clads should escape with their lives. the men on the "hartford" fought the flames with hose and buckets, and at last got rid of their dangerous neighbor. then they saw a steamer crowded with men rushing toward the flagship without firing a shot, and evidently intending to board. capt. broome, with a crew of marines, was working a bow-gun on the "hartford." carefully he trained the huge piece upon the approaching steamer. he stepped back, stooped for a last glance along the sights, then with a quick pull of the lanyard the great gun went off with a roar, followed instantly by a louder explosion from the attacking steamer. when the smoke cleared away, all looked eagerly for the enemy; but she had vanished as if by magic. that single shot, striking her magazine, had blown her up with all on board. much of the hardest fighting was done by the smaller vessels on either side. the little confederate "cotton-clad" "governor moore" made a desperate fight, dashing through the union fleet, taking and giving broadsides in every direction. the union vessel "varuna" also did daring work, and naturally these two ships met in desperate conflict. after exchanging broadsides, the "governor moore" rammed her adversary, and, while bearing down on her, received a severe raking fire from the "varuna." the "governor moore" was in such a position that none of her guns could be brought to bear; but her captain suddenly depressed the muzzle of his bow-gun, and sent a shot crashing through _his own_ deck and side, and deep into the hull of the "varuna." the vessels soon parted, but the "varuna" had received her death-wound, and sank in shallow water. the "governor moore" kept on her way, but was knocked to pieces by the fire from the heavy guns of the frigates shortly after. and so the battle raged for five hours. to recount in full the deeds of valor done, would be to tell the story of each ship engaged, and would require volumes. witnesses who saw the fight from the start were deeply impressed by the majesty of the scene. it was like a grand panorama. "from almost perfect silence,--the steamers moving through the water like phantom ships,--one incessant roar of heavy cannon commenced, the confederate forts and gunboats opening together on the head of our line as it came within range. the union vessels returned the fire as they came up, and soon the hundred and seventy guns of our fleet joined in the thunder which seemed to shake the very earth. a lurid glare was thrown over the scene by the burning rafts; and, as the bombshells crossed each other and exploded in the air, it seemed as if a battle were taking place in the heavens as well as on the earth. it all ended as suddenly as it commenced." while this gigantic contest was going on in the river abreast of the forts, the people of new orleans were thronging the streets, listening to the unceasing roar of the great guns, and discussing, with pale faces and anxious hearts, the outcome of the fight. "farragut can never pass our forts. his wooden ships will be blown to pieces by their fire, or dashed into atoms by the 'manassas,'" people said. but many listened in silence: they had husbands, sons, or brothers in that fearful fight, and who could tell that they would return alive? by and by the firing ceased. only an occasional shot broke the stillness of the morning. then came the suspense. had the fleet been beaten back, or was it above the forts, and even now sullenly steaming up to the city? everybody rushed for the housetops to look to the southward, over the low land through which the mississippi winds. an hour's waiting, and they see curls of smoke rising above the trees, then slender dark lines moving along above the tree-tops. "are they our ships?" every one cries; and no one answers until the dark lines are seen to be crossed by others at right angles. they are masts with yard-arms, masts of seagoing vessels, the masts of the invader's fleet. a cry of grief, of fear, of rage, goes up from the housetops. "to the levee!" cry the men, and soon the streets resound with the rush of many feet toward the river. "the river is crooked, and its current swift. it will be hours before the yankees can arrive: let us burn, destroy, that they may find no booty." let one who was in the sorrowful city that terrible april day tell the story. "i went to the river-side. there, until far into the night, i saw hundreds of drays carrying cotton out of the presses and yards to the wharves, where it was fired. the glare of those sinuous miles of flame set men and women weeping and wailing thirty miles away, on the farther shore of lake pontchartrain. but the next day was the day of terrors. during the night, fear, wrath, and sense of betrayal, had run through the people as the fire had run through the cotton. you have seen, perhaps, a family fleeing, with lamentations and wringing of hands, out of a burning house; multiply it by thousands upon thousands: that was new orleans, though the houses were not burning. the firemen were out; but they cast fire on the waters, putting the torch to the empty ships and cutting them loose to float down the river. [illustration: new orleans on approach of fleet.] "whoever could go was going. the great mass that had no place to go to, or means to go with, was beside itself. 'betrayed! betrayed!' it cried, and ran in throngs from street to street, seeking some vent, some victim for its wrath. i saw a crowd catch a poor fellow at the corner of magazine and common streets, whose crime was that he looked like a stranger and might be a spy. he was the palest living man i ever saw. they swung him to a neighboring lamp-post; but the foreign legion was patrolling the town in strong squads, and one of its lieutenants, all green and gold, leaped with drawn sword, cut the rope, and saved the man. this was one occurrence; there were many like it. i stood in the rear door of our store, canal street, soon after re-opening it. the junior of the firm was within. i called him to look toward the river. the masts of the cutter 'washington' were slowly tipping, declining, sinking--down she went. the gunboat moored next her began to smoke all over and then to blaze. my employers lifted up their heels and left the city, left their goods and their affairs in the hands of one mere lad--no stranger would have thought i had reached fourteen--and one big german porter. i closed the doors, sent the porter to his place in the foreign legion, and ran to the levee to see the sights. "what a gathering!--the riff-raff of the wharves, the town, the gutters. such women! such wrecks of women! and all the juvenile rag-tag. the lower steamboat-landing, well covered with sugar, rice, and molasses, was being rifled. the men smashed; the women scooped up the smashings. the river was overflowing the top of the levee. a rain-storm began to threaten. 'are the yankee ships in sight?' i asked of an idler. he pointed out the tops of their naked masts as they showed up across the huge bend of the river. they were engaging the batteries at camp chalmette, the old field of jackson's renown. presently that was over. ah, me! i see them now as they come slowly round slaughterhouse point, into full view: silent, so grim and terrible, black with men, heavy with deadly portent, the long banished stars and stripes flying against the frowning sky. oh for the 'mississippi,' the 'mississippi!' just then she came down upon them. but how? drifting helplessly, a mass of flames. "the crowds on the levee howled and screamed with rage. the swarming decks answered never a word; but one old tar on the 'hartford,' standing with lanyard in hand, beside a great pivot-gun, so plain to view that you could see him smile, silently patted its big black breech and blandly grinned." as the masts of the fleet came up the river, a young man stepped out upon the roof of the city hall, and swiftly hoisted the flag of the state of louisiana. when the ships came up, two officers were sent ashore to demand the surrender of the city; and shoulder to shoulder the two old sailors marched through a howling, cursing mob to the city hall. the mayor refused to surrender the city, saying that farragut already had captured it. the officers went back to their ships, and the flag still floated. two days later the officers, with a hundred sailors and marines, returned and demanded that the flag be hauled down. no one in the city would tear it down, and the federals went up to the roof to lower it themselves. the street and surrounding housetops were crowded with a hostile people, all armed. no one could tell that the fall of the flag would not be followed by a volley from the undisciplined populace. the marines in front of the building stood grouped about two loaded howitzers that bore upon the darkly muttering crowd. violence was in the air. as the two officers rose to go to the roof, the mayor, a young creole, left the room and descended the stairs. quietly he stepped out into the street, and without a word stood before one of the howitzers, his arms folded, eying the gunner, who stood with lanyard in hand, ready to fire at the word of command. the flag fell slowly from the staff. not a sound arose from the crowd. all were watching the mayor, who stood coldly looking on death. the federal officers came down carrying the flag. a few sharp commands, and the marines tramped away down the street, with the howitzers clanking behind them. the crowd cheered for mayor monroe and dispersed, and new orleans became again a city of the united states. chapter xiv. along the mississippi. -- forts jackson and st. philip surrender. -- the battle at st. charles. -- the ram "arkansas." -- bombardment and capture of port hudson. while new orleans was thus excited over the capture of the city, the soldiers in the forts below were debating as to the course they should adopt. they had not surrendered; and although the great bastions were pounded out of shape by the heavy guns of the fleet, yet they were still formidable defences, giving perfect security to the men in the bomb-proofs. but their case was hopeless: for farragut was at new orleans, and could cut off their supplies; while porter, with his mortar-boats, was below them, putting escape out of the question. every now and then a big shell would drop on the parade, and its flying pieces would remind the garrison that their enemies were getting impatient. after waiting a day or two, porter sent a lieutenant with a flag of truce to the fort, calling upon the confederate commander to surrender the two forts and the shattered remnant of the confederate navy. he complimented the confederates upon their gallant defence, but warned them, that, should they refuse to surrender, he would recommence his bombardment with new vigor. the confederates refused to surrender until they heard from new orleans; and the next day the monotonous thunder of the heavy mortars began again, and again the heavy shells began falling thick and fast upon the forts. wearily the gray-coated soldiers settled down to continue what they felt must be a useless defence. the officers did their best to inspirit the men; but all knew that a surrender must come before long, and at last the men mutinously left their guns, and said they would fight no longer. they had borne without flinching a terrible bombardment, and now they felt that to fight longer would be a foolish sacrifice of life. many left the forts, and plunged into the woods to escape the terrible shells. gen. duncan saw that all was lost, and on the night of the th of april sent an officer to the fleet announcing the surrender. on the following day porter proceeded up-stream with his squadron, and anchored off the fort. a boat, manned by six trim sailors in dress uniforms, put off, and soon returned, bringing the commander of the defeated forces and two or three officers. they were received on the "harriet lane," and commodore porter had made great preparations for the meeting. the crews of all the vessels were dressed in snow-white mustering-suits, and the officers in brass-buttoned blue coats and white trousers. the decks were scrubbed, and all traces of the fight cleared away. as the confederate officers came up to the fleet, one of them, a former lieutenant in the union navy, said, "look at the old navy. i feel proud when i see them. there are no half-breeds there: they are the simon-pure." as the confederates came over the side, porter stood, with his officers, ready to receive them. the greatest politeness was observed on either side; and porter writes, "their bearing was that of men who had gained a victory, instead of undergoing defeat." while the papers of capitulation were being signed, a message came from the deck that the huge confederate iron-clad "louisiana" was drifting down upon them, a mass of flames, and there was great danger that she would blow up in the midst of the union fleet. "this is sharp practice, gentlemen," said porter, "and some of us will perhaps be blown up; but i know what to do. if you can stand what is coming, we can; but i will make it lively for those people if anybody in the flotilla is injured." "i told lieut. wainwright to hail the steamer next him," writes capt. porter, "and tell her captain to pass the word for the others to veer out all their riding-chains to the bitter end, and stand by to sheer clear of the burning iron-clad as she drifted down. i then sat down to the table, and said, 'gentlemen, we will proceed to sign the capitulation.' i handed the paper to gen. duncan, and looked at the confederate officers to see how they would behave under the circumstances of a great iron-clad dropping down on them, all in flames, with twenty thousand pounds of powder in her magazines. for myself, i hoped the fire would not reach the powder until the ship had drifted some distance below us. my greatest fear was that she would run foul of some of the steamers. "while i was thinking this over, the officers were sitting as coolly as if at tea-table among their friends. "just then there was a stir on deck, a kind of swaying of the vessel to and fro, a rumbling in the air, then an explosion which seemed to shake the heavens. the 'harriet lane' was thrown two streaks over, and every thing in the cabin was jostled from side to side; but not a man left his seat, or showed any intention of doing so. "i was glad that i had signed before the explosion took place, as i would not have liked to have my autograph look shaky." the destruction of the "louisiana" was a bit of trickery on the part of the confederate naval officers, which farragut punished by sending them north as close prisoners, while the army officers were granted freedom under parole. so ended the confederate control over the mouth of the mississippi; and porter, after waiting long enough to see a blue-coat garrison in forts st. philip and jackson, started up the river to rejoin his chief in new orleans. but, on reaching the city, he found that the energetic admiral had already started out to clear the river of the confederate batteries that lined it on either side as far up as vicksburg. this was a service of no little danger, and one bringing but little satisfaction; for no sooner had the gunboats left one point, from which by hard firing they had driven the confederates, than the latter would return in force, build up again their shattered earthworks, mount new guns, and be once more ready for battle. but more powerful than these little one or two gun-batteries were the confederate works at port hudson, the destruction of which was absolutely necessary for further union successes on the great river. between port hudson and vicksburg, the river was completely under the control of the confederates; and it was a powerful gunboat that could hope to navigate that stretch of water unharmed. farragut determined to attack port hudson, and set the th of march, , as the date for the action. port hudson batteries were perched on a high bluff that overlooks one of those abrupt curves around which the current of the mississippi river sweeps with such terrific force. the heavy guns bore down upon a point at which the ships would almost inevitably be swept out of their course by the swift stream, and where the river was filled with treacherous shifting shoals. naval officers all agreed that to pass those batteries was a more difficult task than had been the passage of the forts below new orleans; yet farragut, eager to get at the stronghold of the foe in vicksburg, determined to make the attempt. the mortar-vessels were stationed below to drive the enemy from his guns with well-directed bombs; while the fleet, led by the stanch old "hartford," should make a bold dash up the river. night fell upon the scene; and the ships weighed anchor, and started upon their perilous voyage. to the side of each man-of-war was bound a gunboat to tow the great vessel out of danger in case of disaster. silently the long string of vessels swept upward towards the batteries; but, as the "hartford" came into range, the watchful confederates gave the alarm, and the nearest battery at once opened fire. then from porter's mortar-schooners far down the river came an answering roar; and, as ship after ship came up into range, she opened with shot and shell upon the works. on the dark river-banks great alarm fires were kindled, lighting up the water with a lurid glare, and making the ships clearly visible to the confederate gunners. but soon the smoke of battle settled down over all; and gunners, whether on shore or on the ships, fired at random. the "hartford" led the way, and picked out the course; and the other vessels followed carefully in her wake. in the mizzen-top of the flagship was stationed a cool old river pilot, who had guided many a huge river steamer, freighted with precious lives, through the mazy channels of the mississippi. there, high above the battle-smoke, heedless of the grape-shot and bits of flying shell whistling around him, he stood at his post, calmly giving his orders through a speaking-tube that led to the wheel-room. now and then the admiral on the deck below would call up, asking about the pilot's safety, and was always answered with a cheery hail. but though the "hartford" went by the batteries, heedless of the storm and lead poured upon her, she found herself alone, when, after firing a last gun, she swept into the clear air and tranquil water out of range of the enemy's guns. she waited some time for the other ships to come up, while all on board watched eagerly, save those who lay moaning on the surgeon's tables in the cock-pit below. the night wore on, and all on board were consumed with anxiety for the fate of the vessels that had dropped behind. the lookout in the tops reported that he could see far down the river a bright red light that could only be caused by a burning vessel. it proved to be the steamer "mississippi," that had grounded under the guns of the batteries, and had been fired and abandoned by her crew. but of this the admiral knew nothing; and when, after an hour or two he heard the dull, heavy boom of an explosion, he went sadly to his cabin, fearing that the lives of many valiant sailors had been sacrificed. there was no way to communicate with the fleet below, and it was not until days afterward that the admiral learned how his fleet had been beaten back by the heavy guns of the confederates and the swift current of the river. the "richmond" grounded at a point within easy range of the batteries, and her crew fought desperately while shell after shell went crashing through her hull. they saw the other vessels of the fleet go drifting by helpless in the mighty current of the river, but they faltered not in their brave defence until they saw their ship a wreck and in flames. then leaving their dead comrades with the "richmond" for a funeral pyre, they escaped to the shore, and threaded their way through miles of morasses and dense thickets until they came to the mortar-boats, where they found refuge and rest. and so that first attack on port hudson ended with farragut above the batteries, and his ships, below. it had only served to prove, that, safe in their heavy earthworks, the confederates could defy any attack by ships alone. this fact was clear to the union authorities, and they began massing troops about the hostile works. two months later, porter's mortar-boats, the frigates and gunboats, and the batteries and muskets of an immense body of troops, opened on the works. while the heavy fire was being kept up, the union armies were closing in, digging trenches, and surrounding the confederates on all sides. the firing came to be short-range work and very deadly. "to show you what cool and desperate fighting it was," says a confederate, "i had at least twenty-five shots at federals not two hundred feet away. in one instance i fired upon a lieutenant who was urging on his men. i wounded him in his left arm. he fired at me with his revolver, and sent a bullet through my cap. next time i hit him in the hip, and he fell;, but, while i was reloading, he raised himself up, and shot the man next to me through the head. the officer was so close to me that i could tell the color of his eyes, and detect a small scar on his face." this sort of work continued for weeks, with occasional charges by the federals. farragut's fleet kept up its bombardment, but did little damage. one of the confederate soldiers said, some time after the war, "one can get used to almost any thing. after the first two or three days, we took the bombardment as part of the regular routine. pieces of shell were continually flying about, and it was the regular thing for a bomb to drop down among us at intervals. i have seen them come down within fifty feet of a sentinel, and throw up a wagon-load of dirt, without his even turning his head. we had but few men hurt by the artillery-fire. i do not believe we averaged one man hit for every thousand pounds of metal thrown. i remember that one day i counted thirteen shells and bombs hurled at the spot where i was posted before we had a man hurt, and he was only slightly wounded." naturally, such work as this could not drive the confederates from their trenches; and the fleet soon concluded to leave the army to capture port hudson, while the ships steamed on up the river toward vicksburg. the army kept up the siege for weeks, until the confederates, hearing of the fall of vicksburg, surrendered. while the union fleet was thus fighting its way up to vicksburg, the confederates were working away at a great ram that they were building in a secluded spot far up the yazoo river. work on the ram was being pushed with the greatest energy; and the union sailors, in their ships on the mississippi, listened daily to the stories of escaping negroes, and wondered when the big ship would come down and give them a tussle. the crew of the ram were no less impatient for the fray; for they were tired of being hidden away up a little river, plagued by mosquitoes and gnats. the dark shades of the heavy forests were seldom brightened by a ray of sun. the stream was full of alligators, that lay lazily on the banks all day, and bellowed dismally all night. the chirp of a bird was rarely heard. in its place were the discordant screams of cranes, or hisses of the moccasins or cotton-mouths. when at last the carpenters' clatter had ceased, and the ram, ready for action, lay in the little river, the crew were mustered on the deck, and told that the new boat had been built to clear the union vessels from the mississippi, and that purpose should be carried out. no white flag was to flutter from that flagstaff; and she should sink with all her crew before she would surrender. any sailor who feared to enter upon such a service might leave the ship at once. no one left; and the "arkansas" started down the river to look for an enemy. she was not long in finding one. at the mouth of the yazoo floated three union gunboats,--the "carondelet," the "tyler," and the "queen of the west." as the ram came down into sight, her men heard the roll of the drums on the decks of the hostile vessels. the gunboats quickly opened fire, which was as promptly returned by the "arkansas;" and, as she came swiftly rushing down the stream, the three vessels fled before her. the men on the ram were all new recruits, and made awkward work of the firing; but as she came to close quarters she sent her shells crashing into the union ships, while the shot she received in return rattled harmlessly off her steel-mailed sides. the "carondelet" was the first vessel to come to grief. she had hardly fired four shots when a heavy solid shot crashed through her side, and rattled against the most delicate part of the engine. she was helpless at once; and hardly had this damage been reported when a second shot came with a burst into an open port, killed five men, and broke its way out the other side. in ten minutes her decks were slippery with blood, and thick strewn with wounded and dead men. the current of the river drifted her upon a sandbar; and she lay there helplessly, now and again answering the galling fire of her foe with a feeble shot. pouring in a last broadside, the "arkansas" steamed past her, and, disregarding the other two vessels, headed for vicksburg, where she knew her aid was sorely needed. the news of her coming preceded her; and, when she came within sight of the steeples of the city, at least ten thousand people were watching her progress, and wondering whether she could pass by the federal batteries and through the federal fleet. the federal fleet was all ready for her, and prepared such a gauntlet for the "arkansas" as had never been run by any vessel. as she came within range, every union gun that could be brought to bear opened; and shot and shell rained from shore-batteries and marine guns upon the tough hide of the ram. as she sped by the vessels, they gave her their broadsides, and the effect was tremendous. as the huge iron balls struck the ship, she keeled far over; and to her crew inside, it seemed as though she was being lifted bodily out of the water. not a shot broke through the armor; but the terrible concussions knocked men down, and made blood come pouring from their nostrils. for new men, her crew fought well and bravely; though two fell flat on their faces, afraid to lift their heads, lest they be taken off by a shell. [illustration: the "arkansas" under fire.] when it was seen that the "arkansas" was likely to pass through the lines unscathed, the federals tried to blockade her way; but she deviated not an inch from her path. the vessel that stood before her had to move aside, or take the chances of a blow from her terrible iron beak. she came straight to the centre of the fleet before opening fire; and when her portholes were opened, and the big guns peered out, they found plenty of targets. her first volley knocked a gunboat to pieces; and in another minute she had crashed into the side of a union ram, sending that unlucky craft ashore for repairs. but the storm of solid shot was too much for her; and she was forced to seek shelter under the bluffs, where the heavy guns of the confederate shore-batteries compelled the union ships to keep a respectful distance. here she lay for several weeks, beating off every assault of the federals, and making a valuable addition to the defences of the city. but, in an evil hour, the confederate authorities decided to send her down the river to recapture baton rouge. when her journey was but half completed, she was pounced upon by several united states vessels, with the "essex" in the lead. her engines breaking down, she drifted upon a sand-bank; and the attacking ships pounded her at their leisure, until, with the fire bursting from her portholes, she was abandoned by her crew, and blazed away until her career was ended by the explosion of her magazine. she had given the federal fleet some hard tussles, but beyond that had done nothing of the work the confederates so fondly hoped of her. while the flotilla of gunboats, led by the "essex," were planning for the destruction of the "arkansas," a small naval expedition, consisting of three gunboats, was threading its way up the narrow channel of the white river in search of some confederate batteries said to be on the banks. within twelve hours from the start, the sailors learned from a ragged negro, whom they captured on the shore, that the confederates had powerful batteries only five miles farther up, and that the river channel was obstructed by sunken vessels. anchor was cast for the night; and in the morning the troops accompanying the expedition were landed, and plunged into the forest with the plan of taking the fort by a rush from the rear. the gunboats began a slow advance up the river, throwing shells into the woods ahead of them. the blue-jackets kept carefully under cover; for, though they could see no foe, yet the constant singing of rifle-bullets about the ships proved that somewhere in those bushes were concealed sharp-shooters whose powder was good and whose aim was true. the "mound city" was leading the gunboats, and had advanced within six hundred yards of the enemy's guns, when a single shot, fired from a masked battery high up the bluffs, rang out sharply amid the rattle of small-arms. it was the first cannon-shot fired by the confederates in that engagement, and it was probably the most horribly deadly shot fired in the war. it entered the port-casemate forward, killed three men standing at the gun, and plunged into the boiler. in an instant the scalding steam came hissing out, filling the ship from stem to stern, and horribly scalding every one upon the gun-deck. the deck was covered with writhing forms, and screams of agony rang out above the harsh noise of the escaping steam and the roar of battle outside. many were blown overboard; more crawled out of the portholes, and dropped into the river to escape the scalding steam, and struggling in the water were killed by rifle-balls or the fragments of the shells that were bursting all around. the helpless gunboat turned round and round in the stream, and drifted away, carrying a crew of dead and dying men. so great was the horror of the scene, that one of the officers, himself unhurt, who saw his comrades thus tortured all about him, went insane. while this scene was going on before the fort, the union troops had come up behind it, and with a cheer rushed over the breastworks, and drove the garrison to surrender. the confederate banner fell from the staff, and the stars and stripes went up in its place. but how great was the price that the federals had to pay for that victory! that night, with muffled drums, and arms reversed, the blue-jackets carried to the grave fifty-nine of their comrades, who twelve hours before were active men. with three volleys of musketry the simple rites over the sailors' graves were ended; and those who were left alive, only said with a sigh, "it is the fortune of war." chapter xv. on to vicksburg. -- bombardment of the confederate stronghold. -- porter's cruise in the forests. while the smaller gunboats were thus making dashes into the enemy's country, destroying batteries and unfinished war-vessels, and burning salt-works, the heavier vessels of the fleet were being massed about vicksburg, and were preparing to aid the army in reducing that city to subjection. we need not describe the way in which gen. grant had been rushing his troops toward that point, how for weeks his engineers had been planning trenches and approaches to the confederate works, until toward the middle part of june, , the people in that city found themselves hemmed in by a huge girdle of trenches, batteries, and military camps. gen. pemberton, with his army of confederate soldiers, had been forced backward from point after point, until at last he found himself in vicksburg, with the prospect of a long siege before him, and no way to get past the inexorable lines of blue that surrounded him. it is true that he had a wonderfully strong position, and many were the tongues that said vicksburg could never be taken. but though stronger than sebastopol, stronger than the rock of gibraltar, vicksburg was destined to fall before that mighty army that encircled it, and was slowly starving the city into subjection. but the union soldiers, looking from their camps toward the confederate citadel, saw that they had before them some severe work before that flag that flaunted over the city should be replaced by the stars and stripes. the city stands on a towering bluff high above the eastern bank of the mississippi river. on that frowning height the busy hands of pemberton's soldiers had reared mighty batteries, that commanded the mississippi for miles up and down stream. to think of carrying the works by assault, was madness. sherman had tried, and was beaten back with terrible loss. then grant, with nearly twenty thousand men, and with the co-operation of the river-flotilla, came upon the stage, and determined to take the city though it kept him at bay for months. all imaginable plans were tried to get the army below the city; for grant's command had come down from cairo, and were at the northern and most impregnable side of the enemy's works. as at island no. , a sharp bend in the river made a long peninsula right under the confederates' guns. grant, remembering the plan adopted before, set to work to cut a canal through the peninsula, so that the gunboats and transports might get below the forts. twelve hundred negroes worked with a will upon this ditch for weeks. then came a terrible rain-storm: the swollen, muddy torrent of the river broke in upon the unfinished canal, and that work was wasted. then a new plan was suggested, this time by commodore david porter, who all through the war showed the greatest delight in taking his big gunboats into ditches where nothing larger than a frog or musk-rat could hope to navigate, and then bringing them out again safe after all. the country back of vicksburg was fairly honeycombed with shallow lakes, creeks, and those sluggish black streams called in the south bayous. porter had been looking over this aqueous territory for some time, and had sent one of his lieutenants off in a steam-launch to see what could be done in that network of ditches. when the explorer returned, he brought cheering news. he was confident that, with tugs and gangs of axemen clearing the way, the gunboats could be taken up the yazoo river, then into a wide bayou, and finally through a maze of small waterways, until they should reach the mississippi again below the vicksburg batteries. then the transports could follow, the troops could march down the other side of the river, be met by the transports, ferried across, and take vicksburg on the flank. it was a beautiful plan; and porter went to grant with it, full of enthusiasm. gen. grant considered the matter for some time, but finally gave his consent, and detailed a number of blue-coated soldiers to aid porter's blue-jackets in the work. they first cut the levees, and let the mighty tide of the mississippi sweep in, filling the bayous to the brim, and flooding all the country round about. then the gunboats plunged in, and were borne along on the rushing tide until they brought up, all standing, against the trunks of trees, or had their smoke-stacks caught by overhanging branches. then came the tug of war; and the axemen were called to the front, and set to work. they chopped their way along for some distance; the rapid current from the river banging the vessels against the trees and stumps, until all the standing rigging and light cabins were swept away. after a good deal of work they saw before them a broad river, wide enough for two vessels to steam abreast. soon they drifted out into it, and the commanding officer sang out cheerily, "on to vicksburg, boys, and no more trees to saw." and so they steamed on, thinking how neatly they should take the "gray-coats" in the rear, when suddenly a bend in the river showed them, just ahead, a fort in the middle of the river, with the channel blocked on either side. that was a surprise. the works were new, and the water was still muddy about the sunken steamers. clearly the wily pemberton had heard of this inland naval expedition, and was determined to check it effectually. the gunboats backed water, and crowded in confused groups. the gunners in the fort took hurried aim, and pulled the lanyards of their cannon, forgetting that those pieces were not loaded. it was hard to tell which party was the more excited at the unexpected meeting. this gave the blue-jackets a chance to collect their thoughts, and in a minute or two the gunboats opened fire; but they were soon convinced that the fort was too much for them, and they turned and crawled back through the woods to the fleet above vicksburg. pemberton scored one point for successful strategy. but, even while this expedition was working its way back to the station of the vessels on the mississippi, porter was starting another through a second chain of water-courses that he had discovered. this time he was so sure of getting into the rear of vicksburg, that he took four of his big iron-clads, and two light mortar-boats built especially for work in the woods. gen. sherman, with a strong army-force, marched overland, keeping up with the gunboats. admiral porter, in his memoirs, gives a graphic picture of this expedition. back of vicksburg the country is low, and intersected in every direction by narrow, tortuous bayous, lined on either side by gloomy morasses or majestic forests. into these little-known water-courses porter boldly led his ponderous iron-clads; while sherman, with a detachment of troops, advanced along the shore, keeping as near the flotilla as possible. seldom have naval vessels been detailed upon so strange a service. for days they steamed on under the spreading branches of trees, that often spanned the bayous in a mighty arch overhead, shutting out all sunlight. for a time this navigation of placid, shady waterways was pleasant enough; but, as they penetrated farther into the interior, the jackies sighed for the blue waters of the ocean, or even for the turbid current of the mississippi. the heavy foliage that gave so grateful a shade also harbored all sorts of animals; and coons, rats, mice, and wildcats, that had been driven to the trees for shelter during the prevailing high water, peered down upon the sailors, and often dropped sociably down upon the decks of the vessels gliding beneath. at some portions of the voyage the flotilla seemed to be steaming through the primeval forest. the bayou was but a few feet wider than the gunboats, and its banks were lined by gnarled and knotted old veterans of the forest,--live oaks, sycamore, and tupelo gum trees that had stood in majestic dignity on the banks of the dark and sullen stream for centuries. sometimes majestic vistas would open; broad avenues carpeted with velvet turf, and walled in by the massive tree trunks, extending from the banks of the stream far back into the country. again, the stately forests would be replaced by fields of waving corn or rice, with the tops of a row of negro cabins or the columned front of a planter's house showing in the distance. then, as the flotilla steamed on, this fair prospect would disappear, and be replaced by noisome cypress brakes, hung thick with the funereal spanish moss, and harboring beneath the black water many a noxious reptile. so through the ever-changing scenery the gunboats moved along, making but little progress, but meeting with no serious obstacle, until one morning there appeared on a bit of high ground, some yards in advance of the leading gunboat, an army officer mounted on an old white horse. it was gen. sherman, and his troops were in camp near by. he greeted the naval forces cheerily, and, rallying porter on the amphibious service into which his gunboats had been forced, warned him that he would soon have not a smokestack standing, nor a boat left at the davits. "so much the better," said the undaunted admiral. "all i want is an engine, guns, and a hull to float them. as to boats, they are very much in the way." a short time only was spent in consultation, and then sherman with his forces left the bayou and plunged into the interior, first warning porter that he would have a hard time getting any farther, even if the enemy did not come down and surround him. but porter was not the man to abandon the advance, so long as there was water enough to float his gunboats. besides, he had gained some ideas regarding navigation in the forests, that enabled him to move his fleet forward with more celerity than at first. when a tree blocked the course of the iron-clads, they no longer stopped to clear it away by work with the axes; but, clapping on all steam, the powerful rams dashed at the woody obstruction, and with repeated blows soon knocked it out of the way. soon after leaving sherman, porter saw that the difficulties he had thus far met and conquered were as nothing to those which he had yet to encounter. the comparatively broad stream up which he had been steaming came to an end, and his further progress must be through cypress bayou, a canal just forty-six feet wide..[??-second period a smudge?] the broadest gunboat was forty-two feet wide, and to enter that narrow stream made retreat out of the question: there could be no turning round to fly. the levees rose on either side of the narrow canal high above the decks of the iron-clads, so that the cannon could not be sufficiently elevated to do effective work in case of an attack. but there were nine feet of water in the great ditch; and that was enough for porter, who pressed boldly on. the country into which the combined military and naval expedition was advancing was in truth the granary of vicksburg. on all other sides of the beleaguered city, the federal lines were drawn so closely that the wagons laden with farm produce could not hope to pass. but here, back of the city, and far from the camps of grant's legions, the work of raising produce for the gallant people of vicksburg was prosecuted with the most untiring vigor. the sight, then, of the advancing gunboats aroused the greatest consternation. from the deck of his vessel porter could see the people striving to save their property from the advancing enemy. great droves of cattle were being driven away far into the interior; negroes were skurrying in all directions, driving poultry and pigs to the safe concealment of the forest; wagons groaning under the weight of farm and garden produce could be seen disappearing in the distance. what the inhabitants could not save they destroyed, in order that it might not profit the invaders. a short distance from the mouth of the bayou "were six thousand bales of cotton piled up on opposite sides of the stream, ready to be taken aboard a steamer when the war should end. as the gunboats advanced slowly, making little headway against the two-knot current of the bayou, porter saw two men, carrying lighted pine-knots, dash up to the cotton, and begin to set it afire. the admiral looked on in disgust. "'what fools these mortals be!'" said he to an officer standing at his side; "but i suppose those men have a right to burn their own cotton, especially as we have no way of preventing them." "i can send a howitzer shell at them, sir," said the officer, "and drive them away." but to this porter demurred, saying that he had no desire to kill the men, and that they might do as they liked with their own. accordingly the officers quietly watched the vandals, until, after twenty minutes' work, the cotton was blazing, and a dense mass of smoke cut off all vision ahead, and rose high in the air. then porter began to suspect that he had made a mistake. the difficulties of navigation in the bayou were great enough, without having smoke and fire added to them. yet to wait for the cotton to burn up might cause a serious delay. on the high bank of the bayou stood a negro begging the sailors to take him aboard. "hallo, there, sambo!" sung out porter, "how long will it take this cotton to burn up?" "two day, massa," responded the contraband; "p'raps tree." that ended the debate. "ring the bell to go ahead fast," said the admiral to the pilot; and away went the flotilla at full speed, plunging into the smoke and fire. it was a hot experience for the sailors. the heavy iron-clads made but slow progress, and were scorched and blistered with the heat. the ports were all shut down, and the crews called to fire-quarters, buckets in hand. to remain on deck, was impossible. porter and his captain made the trial, but had hardly entered the smoke when the scorching heat drove both into the shelter of an iron-covered deck-house. the pilot standing at the wheel seized a flag, and, wrapping it about his face and body, was able to stay at his post. as the flames grew hotter, the sailors below opened the main hatch, and, thrusting up a hose, deluged the deck with floods of water. so, without a man in sight, the huge iron ship moved along between the walls of flame. suddenly came an enormous crash. the gunboat shivered, and for a moment stood still; then, gathering headway, moved on again, though with much ominous grating beneath her keel. soon after she passed out of the smoke and heat, and all hands rushed on deck for a whiff of the fresh, cool air. their first thought was of the cause of the collision; and, looking eagerly astern, they saw a heavy bridge, about fifty feet of which had been demolished by the tremendous power of the ram. this gave porter a hint as to the force he had at his command; and thereafter bridges were rammed as a matter of course whenever they impeded the progress of the iron-clads. the astonishment of the people along the shore may well be imagined. the great and formidable obstacles that stood in the path of the squadron were, as a rule, overcome by the exertion of the great powers of the steam-driven, iron-plated vessels; but at last there came a check, that, though it seemed at first insignificant, terminated the sylvan manoeuvres of the iron-clad navy. after running the gantlet of the burning cotton, butting down trees, and smashing through bridges, the column entered a stretch of smooth water that seemed to promise fair and unobstructed sailing. but toward the end of this expanse of water a kind of green scum was evident, extending right across the bayou, from bank to bank. porter's keen eye caught sight of this; and, turning to one of the negroes who had taken refuge on the gunboat, he asked what it was. "it's nuffin' but willows, sah," he replied. "when de water's out of de bayou, den we cuts de willows to make baskets with. you kin go troo dat like a eel." satisfied with this explanation, the admiral ordered the tug which led the column to go ahead. under a full head of steam, the tug dashed into the willows, but began to slow up, until, after going about thirty yards, she stopped, unable to go forward or back. undaunted by this unexpected resistance, porter cried out that the "cincinnati" would push the tug along; and the heavy gunboat, withdrawing a short distance to gain headway, hurled herself forward, and dashed into the willows with a force that would have carried her through any bridge ever built. but the old fable of the lion bound down by the silken net was here re-enacted. the gunboat did not even reach the tug. the slender willow-shoots trailed along the sides, caught in the rough ends of the iron overhang, and held the vessel immovable. abandoning the attempt to advance, the gunboat strove to back out, but to no avail. then hooks were rigged over the side to break away the withes, and men slung in ropes alongside vigorously wielded sharp cutlasses and saws; but still the willows retained their grip. matters were now getting serious; and, to add to porter's perplexity, reports came in that confederate troops were coming down upon him. then he began to lose confidence in his iron-clads, and wish right heartily for sherman and his soldiers, of whose whereabouts he could gain no knowledge. the enemy did not leave him long in doubts as to their intention, and soon began a vigorous fire of shells from the woods. porter stopped that promptly by manning his mortars and firing a few shells at a range measured by the sound of the enemy's cannon. the immediate silence of the hostile batteries proved the accuracy of the admiral's calculations, and gave him time to devise means for escaping from his perilous position. how to do it without aid from sherman's troops, was a difficult question; and in his perplexity he exclaimed aloud, "why don't sherman come on? i'd give ten dollars to get a telegram to him." the admiral was standing at the moment on the bank of the bayou, near a group of negroes; and an athletic-looking contraband stepped forward, and, announcing himself as a "telegram-wire," offered to carry the note "to kingdum kum for half a dollar." after sharply cross-questioning the volunteer, porter wrote on a scrap of paper, "dear sherman,--hurry up, for heaven's sake. i never knew how helpless an iron-clad could be, steaming around through the woods without an army to back her." "where will you carry this?" asked porter, handing the despatch to the negro. [illustration: porter's flotilla on the red river.] "in my calabash kiver, massa," responded the messenger with a grin; and, stowing the paper away in his woolly hair, he darted away. the telegram being thus despatched, porter again turned his attention to the willows; and, a fortunate rise in the water having occurred, he was able to extricate his vessels and begin his retreat down the bayou. he was somewhat perplexed by the silence of the confederates, from whom he had heard nothing since his mortars silenced their masked batteries. the conundrum was solved by the sound of wood-chopping in the forests ahead, and the discovery shortly after of two heavy logs lying athwart the bayou, and stopping the progress of the vessels. an hour's hard work with axe and saw removed this obstruction; and the tug, slipping through first, shot ahead to prevent any more tree-felling. the loud reports of her howitzer soon carried back to the fleet the news that she had come up with the enemy, and was disputing with them the right to the bayou. the difficulties of the retreat were no less great than those of the advance, with the intermittent attacks of the enemy added. the work of removing heavy, soggy logs, half submerged beneath the black waters of the bayou, clearing away standing trees, and breaking up and removing red-river rafts, wearied the sailors, and left them little spirit to meet the enemy's attacks. the faint sounds of wood-chopping in the distance told too well of the additional impediments yet in store for the adventurous mariners. scouts sent out reported that the enemy had impressed great gangs of negroes, and were forcing them to do the work of felling the trees that were to hem in uncle sam's gunboats, for the benefit of the c.s.a. but the plans of the confederates to this end were easily defeated. porter had not only many willing arms at his command, but the powerful aid of steam. when the gunboats came to a tree lying across the bayou, a landing party went ashore and fastened large pulleys to a tree on the bank. then a rope was passed through the block; and one end having been made fast to the fallen tree, the other was taken aboard a gunboat. the word was then given, "back the iron-clad hard;" and the fallen monarch of the forest was soon dragged across the bayou and out of the way so expert did the jackies become in this work, that they were soon able to clear away the trees faster than the enemy could fell them. the tug then went ahead, and for a time put an end to further tree-chopping, and captured several of the negro axemen. from the captured contrabands porter learned that the attempt to cut off his retreat was directed by the military authorities at vicksburg. this was a startling revelation. he had thought that the confederates were in entire ignorance of his movement; and now it turned out that the wily pemberton had kept a sharp lookout on the marauding gunboats, and was shrewdly planning for their capture. while porter was pondering over this new discovery, a party of scouts came in, bringing in four captured confederates, two of whom were commissioned officers. the commanding officer, a mere boy, was somewhat chagrined at being captured, but felt confident that his friends would recapture him shortly. porter politely asked him to take a glass of wine and some supper. "i don't care if i do," responded the youngster; "and i have the less compunction in taking it, as it belongs to us anyhow. in two hours you will be surrounded and bagged. you can't escape. how in the devil's name you ever got here, is a wonder to me." porter smiled pleasantly, and, helping his guests lavishly, proceeded to question them on the numbers and position of the confederate troops. he learned that a large body of troops had been sent out to surround the iron-clads, and were even then closing in upon the intruders. the danger was imminent, but porter showed no trepidation. "how far off are your troops?" he asked. "about four miles. they will bag you at daylight," was the confident response. "well, gentlemen," said the admiral, "gen. sherman is now surrounding your forces with ten thousand men, and will capture them all before daylight." and so saying the admiral went on deck, leaving his captives lost in wonder; for the information carried to the vicksburg authorities had made no mention of troops. though porter had put on so bold a front before his captives, he really felt much anxiety for the fate of his iron-clads. he could hear nothing from sherman, who might be thirty miles away for all he knew. accordingly he retraced his course for a few miles, to throw the enemy off the scent, and the next day began again his descent of the bayou, bumping along stern foremost amid snags and standing trees. the enemy soon gave evidence that he was on the watch, and opened fire with his artillery from the rear. at this one gunboat steamed back and silenced the artillery for a time, after which she rejoined her fellows. sharp-shooters in the thickets along the levee then began to grow troublesome; and the whistle of the rifle-balls, with an occasional _ping_ as one struck the smokestack, warned the sailors that the deck of a gunboat in a narrow canal was no safe place in time of war. the high levees on either side of the bayou made it impossible to use the guns properly: so porter turned them into mortars, and, by using very small charges of powder, pitched shells up into the air, dropping them into the bushes back of the levee. this somewhat checked the fire of the sharp-shooters, but the decks were still dangerous places to frequent. a rifle-ball struck lieut. wells in the head as he stood talking to porter; and he fell, apparently dead, upon the deck. the admiral beckoned an officer to come and bear away the body; but the newcomer was also hit, and fell across the body of the first. porter concluded that the locality was getting rather hot, and gladly stepped behind a heavy plate of sheet-iron, which an old quarter-master brought him with the remark, "there, sir, stand behind that. they've fired at you long enough." from behind his shield, porter looked out anxiously at the forces by which he was beleaguered. he could see clearly that the confederates were increasing in numbers; and, when at last he saw a long gray column come sweeping out of the woods, his heart failed him, and for a moment he thought that the fate of his flotilla was sealed. but at that very moment deliverance was at hand. the confederates were seen to fall into confusion, waver, and give way before a thin blue line,--the advance guard of sherman's troops. the negro "telegram-wire" had proved faithful, and sherman had come on to the rescue. that ended the difficulties of the flotilla. the enemy, once brought face to face with sherman's men, departed abruptly; and soon the doughty general, mounted on an old gray horse, came riding down to the edge of the bayou, for a word with porter. seeing the admiral on the deck of his gunboat, he shouted out, "hallo! porter, what did you get into such an ugly scrape for? so much for you navy fellows getting out of your element. better send for the soldiers always. my boys will put you through. here's your little nigger. he came through all right, and i started at once. your gunboats are enough to scare the crows: they look as if you had got a terrible hammering." somewhat crestfallen, porter remarked, that he "never knew what helpless things iron-clads could become when they got in a ditch, and had no soldiers about." as sherman declined to come aboard, porter went below to look after his two prisoners. "well, gentlemen," said he, as he entered the cabin, "you were right. we are surrounded by troops." the two confederates were greatly exultant, but assured porter that they would see that he was kindly treated when taken into vicksburg. "to vicksburg!" said he with mock amazement. "who said any thing of vicksburg?" "why, of course you'll be taken there as a prisoner, now that our men have surrounded you." "oh, you are mistaken there!" responded porter. "the troops by whom i am surrounded are sherman's boys, six thousand strong." and at this news the chagrined captives subsided, and began to consider the prospects of a trip to the north, and incarceration in one of the military prisons. sherman's army soon came up in force, and went into camp along the road that skirted the levee. as night fell, the scene took on a wild and picturesque air. in the narrow bayou lay the gunboats, strung out in single file along a line of half a mile. they bore many signs of the hard knocks they had received in their excursion through the woods. boats, davits, steam-pipes, and every thing breakable that rose above the level of the deck, had been swept away by the overhanging boughs, or dashed to pieces by falling trees. the smoke-stacks and wheel-houses were riddled by the bullets of the confederate sharp-shooters. the decks were covered with rubbish of all kinds, and here and there was a fissure that told of the bursting of some confederate shell. the paint was blistered, and peeling off, from the effects of the cotton-fire through which the fleet had dashed. on the shore blazed the camp-fires of sherman's troops; and about the huge flaming piles the weary soldiers threw themselves down to catch a moment's rest, while the company cooks prepared the evening meal. many of the idle soldiers strolled down to the edge of the bayou, and, forming a line along the levee, began chaffing the sailors on the ludicrous failure of their attempt to perform naval evolutions in a swamp. "what's gone with your boats, jack?" sung out one tall fellow in cavalry garb. "been in dry-dock for repairs?" "how do you like playing mud-turtle?" said another. "better stick to salt water after this." "don't go bush-whacking again, unless you have the soldiers with you. you look as if your mothers didn't know you were out." and at this a yell of approval went up all along the line, while the badgered sailors growled and tried to make sharp retorts to the stinging ridicule of the landsmen. so ended this memorable gunboat expedition. it is unparalleled in the history of warfare. the feats performed by the unwieldy iron-clads in the narrow bayous gained for them, from lincoln, the title of "web-footed" gunboats. they had traversed shallow and tortuous channels; they had cleared their path of trees, snags, and even bridges; they had run the gantlet of flaming cotton-bales and confederate bullets. after meeting and overcoming so many obstacles, their final stoppage by a thicket of pitiful willow-shoots irritated the blue-jackets and their commander extremely. porter had penetrated so far into the yazoo country, that he could see how great damage could be inflicted upon the confederates, if the expedition could but be carried out successfully. he had definite information to the effect, that, at yazoo city, the confederates had a thriving shipyard, at which they were pressing forward the construction of steam-rams with which to sweep the mississippi. to reach that point and destroy the vessels, would have been a service thoroughly in accord with his tastes; but the willows held him back. however, he was able to console himself with the thought that the rams were not likely to do the confederates any immediate service; for a truthful contraband, brought in by the union scouts, informed the admiral that "dey has no bottom in, no sides to 'em, an' no top on to 'em, sah; an' dere injines is in richmon'." when the dangers encountered by the gunboats during this expedition are considered, the damage sustained seems surprisingly small. had the confederates acted promptly and vigorously, the intruders would never have escaped from the swamps into which their temerity had led them. a few torpedoes, judiciously planted in the muddy bed of the bayou, would have effectively prevented any farther advance. more than once the confederates posted their artillery within effective range, and opened a rapid and well-directed fire upon the gunboats, but erred in using explosive shells instead of solid shot. "they were evidently greenhorns," wrote porter, exulting over his narrow escape, "and failed to understand that we were iron-clad, and did not mind _bursting_-shell. if they had used solid shot, they might have hurt us." the infantry forces of the enemy were ample to have given the marauding gunboats a vast deal of trouble, if the confederate officers had been enterprising, and had seized upon the opportunities afforded them. night after night the flotilla lay tied up in the centre of a narrow bayou, with the levees towering so high above the gunboats' ports, that the cannon were useless. at such a time, a determined assault by a body of hostile infantry could hardly have been resisted. such an attack was the danger which porter most feared throughout the expedition, and he nightly made preparations for a desperate resistance. the widest part of the bayou was chosen for the anchorage, in order that a strip of water at least four feet wide might separate the gunboats from the shore. the sides of the iron-clads were then greased, and the guns loaded with grape, and elevated as much as possible. landing parties with howitzers were sent ashore, and posted so as to enfilade any attacking force; scouts were sent out in all directions; and the crews of the gunboats slept at their quarters all night, ready for action at the first alarm. but it is doubtful whether even these elaborate precautions could have saved the flotilla, had the confederates brought one regiment to the assault. however, the enemy let the golden moment pass; and, after suffering the agonies of suspense for several days, porter at last saw his gunboats safely anchored by the side of sherman's protecting regiments. sherman and porter held a consultation that night, and concluded that it was useless to try to get around vicksburg by hauling the gunboats through the woods; and the following morning the flotilla started back to the union headquarters on the mississippi. gen. grant was beginning to get impatient. weeks had passed away, and there were still no gunboats or transports below the vicksburg batteries to aid him in carrying out his military plans. he held a long consultation with porter, the outcome of which was that the admiral decided to run his gunboats and transports right through the fire of the confederate guns. [illustration: dummy gunboat passing forts on the mississippi.] but, before sending a vessel through, porter thought that he would test the accuracy of the confederate gunners by giving them a dummy to fire at. he took a large flat boat, and built it up with logs and lumber until it looked like a powerful ram. two huge wheel-houses towered amidships, on each of which was painted, in great, staring letters, "deluded rebels, cave in." from the open ports, the muzzles of what appeared to be heavy rifles protruded; though the guns that seemed so formidable were really only logs of wood. two high smoke-stacks, built of empty pork-barrels, rose from the centre of this strange craft; and at the bottom of each stack was an iron pot, in which was a heap of tar and oakum that sent forth volumes of black smoke when lighted. one dark night the fires in this sham monster were lighted, and she was towed down to the confederate batteries, and set drifting down the river. she was quickly discovered, and the batteries on the bluffs opened on her with a roar. there was nothing about the dummy to be hurt, however; and it was impossible to sink her. so she sailed majestically through the plunging hail of solid shot, and past the terrible batteries that were thought to be a match for any thing afloat. the confederates in the trenches looked at each other in astonishment and dismay. word was sent to gen. pemberton that a powerful yankee iron-clad had passed the batteries unhurt, and was speeding down the stream. the general's first thought was of a gunboat, the "indianola," lately captured from the federals, and now being converted into an iron-clad ram. she must be saved from recapture, even if it should be necessary to destroy her. word was hurriedly sent down the river that a formidable ram was bearing down upon the "indianola;" and, if the latter vessel was not in condition to do battle, she should be blown up. accordingly, while the dummy ram, caught in an eddy of the river, was whirling helplessly around just below vicksburg, the confederates put the torch to their new war-vessel, and she was soon a heap of ashes. porter's little joke was a good one for the united states. but all the time that the union navy was making these futile attempts to get the better of the wily general who held the fort at vicksburg, a constant bombardment of the city was kept up. from gunboats and land batteries, shells were hurled into the streets of the town, tearing down houses, killing men, women, and children, and driving the inhabitants to their cellars, or to deep caves dug in the hills. the fire from the union gunboats was most destructive, for they could drop down to an advantageous point, shell the city until tired, then steam back into safety again. cave-digging in the city became a regular business; and caves brought from twenty to fifty dollars, according to their size. they generally consisted of two or three rooms, and people lived in them quite cheerfully during the time that the iron hail was falling in the city's streets. a northern woman, who was pent up in vicksburg during the siege, tells graphically the story of the bombardment:-- "for many nights we have had but little sleep, because the federal gunboats have been running past the batteries. the uproar when this is happening is phenomenal. the first night the thundering artillery burst the bars of sleep, we thought it an attack by the river. to get into garments, and rush up-stairs, was the work of a moment. from the upper gallery we have a fine view of the river; and soon a red glare lit up the scene, and showed a small boat, towing two large barges, gliding by. the confederates had set fire to a house near the bank. another night, eight boats ran by, throwing a shower of shot; and two burning houses made the river clear as day. one of the batteries has a remarkable gun they call 'whistling dick,' because of the screeching, whistling sound it gives; and certainly it does sound like a tortured thing. added to all this is the indescribable confederate yell, which is a soul-harrowing sound to hear. i have gained respect for the mechanism of the human ear, which stands it all without injury. the streets are seldom quiet at night: even the dragging about of cannon makes a din in these echoing gullies. the other night we were on the gallery till the last of the eight boats got by. next day a friend said to h----, 'it was a wonder you didn't have your heads taken off last night. i passed, and saw them stretched over the gallery; and grape-shot were whizzing up the street just on a level with you.' the double roar of batteries and boats was so great, we never noticed the whizzing. yesterday the 'cincinnati' attempted to go by in daylight, but was disabled and sunk. it was a pitiful sight: we could not see the _finale_, though we saw her rendered helpless. [illustration: passing the vicksburg batteries.] "since that day the regular siege has continued. we are utterly cut off from the world, surrounded by a circle of fire. would it be wise, like the scorpion, to sting ourselves to death? the fiery shower of shells goes on day and night. h----'s occupation, of course, is gone, his office closed. every man has to carry a pass in his pocket. people do nothing but eat what they can get, sleep when they can, and dodge the shells. there are three intervals when the shelling stops,--either for the guns to cool, or for the gunners' meals, i suppose,--about eight in the morning, the same in the evening, and at noon. in that time we have to both prepare and eat ours. clothing cannot be washed, or any thing else done. on the th and d, when the assaults were made on the lines, i watched the soldiers cooking on the green opposite. the half-spent balls, coming all the way from those lines, were flying so thick that they were obliged to dodge at every turn. at all the caves i could see from my high perch, people were sitting, eating their poor suppers at the cave doors, ready to plunge in again. as the first shell again flew, they dived; and not a human being was visible. the sharp crackle of the musketry-firing was a strong contrast to the scream of the bombs. i think all the dogs and cats must be killed or starved: we don't see any more pitiful animals prowling around.... the cellar is so damp and musty, the bedding has to be carried out and laid in the sun every day, with the forecast that it may be demolished at any moment. the confinement is dreadful. to sit and listen as if waiting for death in a horrible manner, would drive me insane. i don't know what others do, but we read when i am not scribbling in this. h---- borrowed somewhere a lot of dickens's novels, and we re-read them by the dim light in the cellar. when the shelling abates, h---- goes to walk about a little, or get the 'daily citizen,' which is still issuing a tiny sheet at twenty-five and fifty cents a copy. it is, of course, but a rehash of speculations which amuses a half-hour. to-day he heard, while out, that expert swimmers are crossing the mississippi on logs at night, to bring and carry news to johnston. i am so tired of corn-bread, which i never liked, that i eat it with tears in my eyes. we are lucky to get a quart of milk daily from a family near, who have a cow they hourly expect to be killed. i send five dollars to market each morning, and it buys a small piece of mule-meat. rice and milk is my main food: i can't eat the mule-meat. we boil the rice, and eat it cold, with milk, for supper. martha runs the gauntlet to buy the meat and milk once a day in a perfect terror. the shells seem to have many different names. i hear the soldiers say, 'that's a mortar-shell. there goes a parrott. that's a rifle-shell.' they are all equally terrible. a pair of chimney-swallows have built in the parlor chimney. the concussion of the house often sends down parts of their nest, which they patiently pick up and re-ascend with." grant's impassable lines about the beleaguered city soon made starvation more to be feared than even the terrible shells from the cannon of the gunboats. necessaries of all sorts became woefully scarce in vicksburg. five dollars could purchase only a little bit of mule's flesh, hardly enough for a meal for two people. flour was not to be had at any price. bread was made of coarse corn-meal or grated peas. the ammunition of the soldiers in the trenches soon began to give out, and the utmost economy was exercised. many of the soldiers were armed with muskets that required caps, and it was not many days before caps were at a great premium. they were generally smuggled into the city through the union lines by fleet-footed carriers, who ran a long gauntlet of union pickets. many were shot down in the attempt, but more succeeded. one man who brought in sixteen thousand caps, was nine days travelling thirteen miles, and was fired on more than twenty times. but, though grant could have starved the city into subjection by simply sitting and waiting, he grew tired of this, and determined to force matters to an issue. the first thing to be done was to get the gunboats and transports past the batteries. the transports were put into shape to stand a cannonade by having their weaker parts covered with cotton-bales; and on one dark night in june, the flotilla started down the river, with the iron-clad gunboats in advance. admiral porter led in the "benton." at eleven o'clock the fleet got under way; and, as the "benton" came abreast of the first batteries, the alarm was given in the confederate camp, and a fierce cannonade began. huge fires were lighted on the shores to light up the river, and make the gunboats visible to the confederate cannoneers. the warships swung grandly around the bend, responding with rapid broadsides to the fire of the forts. all the vessels were hit once or oftener. the heavy smoke that accompanies such fierce cannonading hung over the river, cutting off all view of the surroundings from the sailors. the eddying currents of the river caught the steamers, swinging them now this way, now that, until the perplexed pilots knew not which way their vessels were headed. the blue-jackets at the guns worked away cheerily, knowing that enemies were on every side of them, and that, no matter which way their missiles sped, an enemy was to be found. more than one vessel turned completely around; and once, when the rising breeze cleared away the smoke, the pilot of the "benton" found that he was taking his ship up-stream again, and was in imminent danger of running down a friendly gunboat. but they all passed on without receiving any severe injuries, and at five o'clock in the morning lay anchored far below the city, ready to begin the attack upon the confederate batteries at grand gulf, which were called "the key to vicksburg." chapter xvi. vicksburg surrenders, and the mississippi is opened. -- naval events along the gulf coast. the first grand step toward the capture of vicksburg was made when the river-flotilla followed porter down the mississippi, and past the guns of the confederate batteries. grant, with his army, had followed along the western bank of the great river; and we now find him ready to cross the river, and move upon the vicksburg batteries from the south. but, before this could be done, the confederate works at grand gulf must be silenced; and it again happened that the navy was to be the chief factor in the contest. for this new battle all the blue-jackets were ready and anxious. admiral porter says that "when daylight broke, after the passage of the fleet, i was besieged by the commanding officers of the gunboats, who came to tell me of their mishaps; but, when i intimated that i intended to leave at carthage any vessel that could not stand the hammering they would be subject to at grand gulf, they suddenly discovered that no damage had been done to their vessels, which, if any thing, were better prepared for action than when they started out!" the confederate works at grand gulf mounted eighteen guns; and, as they stood upon high bluffs overlooking the river, they were most formidable. it was decided by the federals that the navy alone should undertake the task of reducing the fortifications,--a decision that was of benefit to the confederates, for their strongest position was along the river-front. four of the guns held a raking position up and down the long stretch of muddy water that swirled and eddied by with a current of seven miles an hour. while the fort had the advantage of position, the gunboats were much stronger in their armament; and the contest was looked forward to as one bound to be desperate. the position of every gun in the batteries, and the size of the garrison, were well known to every commander of a union vessel; and they made the most careful preparations for the assault. the confederates knew that the result of that day's battle would decide the ownership of vicksburg, and they were prepared to offer the most desperate resistance. the orders at every battery were to use shell alone; and the men were instructed to fire carefully, and only after taking deadly aim. in a high tree just outside the fort a lookout was stationed; and at early daylight, on the morning of the th of april, , he signalled that the fleet of gunboats was bearing down upon the works. men who were in the fort that morning saw a strange panorama. the stillness was most profound on the shore and on the river. the boats moved slowly and grandly down, not a man in sight, and with no sign of life. the trees up the river were black with federal spectators; and the chirp of birds was all about the men who stood waiting beside the huge cannon. porter went at his work with a vim which made the forest tremble and the river bubble. for the first few minutes the confederates were appalled by the fierceness of the fire, which stands on record as the fastest in the war; but, when the forts did get down to their work, they went in with a roar that almost deafened the federal soldiers three miles away. great shells burst over the gunboats, or, falling into the water close by their sides, threw up columns of water that deluged the decks. the vessels found the greatest difficulty in getting good positions for the swift-eddying current. one moment they were bow on, the next headed down stream, or up, or whirling around in circles. of course this greatly hurt the aim of the gunners, but it likewise made the vessels poor targets for the confederates. three gunboats--the "benton," "tuscumbia," and "lafayette"-- engaged the upper battery; and nowhere in naval history is found the record of faster firing than was done by these ships. their huge shells tore away at the walls of earth, throwing up tons of dirt with each explosion, but not seeming to affect the strength of the fort at all. not a shot entered an embrasure, though many came near it. one of the confederate artillerists said after the fight,-- "there was not one single minute in all that five hours in which i did not expect death. we all worked away as if in a nightmare, and we all felt that any moment might be our last. the 'benton' fired repeatedly at my gun; and as many as twenty of her shells struck the opening, tearing holes in the parapet ten feet back. twenty times we were almost buried out of sight under the clouds of dirt, and the loose earth was knee deep around our gun when the fight closed. not one of us was hit hard enough to draw blood, and yet we all felt ten years older for that five hours' work. i sighted the gun, and saw fourteen of my shot hit the 'benton,' and six plunge into another." the gunboats fought in a way that showed desperate determination. the first gun from the "lafayette" was answered by a shell which crashed through her side and exploded in a wardroom, knocking every thing into chips. three times the carpenter came up and reported to the captain that the ship was sinking; and each time the reply was, "very well, sir: keep right on firing until the guns are under water." when the ship came out of the fight, she counted up fifty scars. the long-range firing that was carried on at first did not satisfy the "mound city." one particular gunner on the confederate works seemed to cherish a spite against her; and every time the flame leaped from the muzzle of his gun, a solid shot banged against the gunboat's side. this was not to be tamely borne; and the "mound city" rushed up so close to the bank that her bow stirred up the mud, and from that position opened fast and furiously upon the forts with grape and canister. a hail of rifle-bullets fell upon her decks; but she stuck to her post, and succeeded in driving the enemy to the bomb-proofs. but, with all their pluck and rapid firing, the gunners of the fleet were making no impression on the works. gen. grant, who was watching the engagement from a tug in mid-stream, saw this, and determined to rush his soldiers past the fort in transports, while the navy engaged the enemy's guns. this was done quickly, and towards night the ships returned to their post up the river, leaving the confederates in possession of the batteries. but the great point had been gained; and grant's army was moving on vicksburg, with nothing to interfere with its besieging operations. then began that series of attacks and repulses, of building trenches, paralleling, and advancing steadily, until the lines of the federals and the confederates were so close together that the men used to shout jokes and taunts over the breastworks. all the confederates were known as "johnnies," and all union soldiers as "yanks." often "johnny" would call out, "well, yank, when are you coming into town?" sometimes the answer was, "we propose to celebrate the fourth of july there." the "johnnies" did not believe this; but it was true, nevertheless, for on july grant's victorious army marched into vicksburg. a day or two later the confederate works at port hudson and grand gulf were surrendered to the federals, and the mississippi was again open for commerce throughout its length. when the fall of vicksburg had thus left the river clear, admiral porter was ordered to take his fleet up the red river, and clear away any confederate works that he might find on the banks of that stream. gen. a. j. smith, with a strong body of troops, accompanied him; while gen. banks was to march his troops overland from texas, and join the expedition at shreveport. for several days the gunboats pressed forward up the crooked stream, meeting with no opposition, save from the sharp-shooters who lined the banks on either side, and kept up a constant fire of small-arms. shreveport was reached in safety; and, after a short halt, the flotilla started again on their voyage up the river. they had proceeded but a short distance when a courier came galloping down the river's bank, waving a despatch, which he handed to admiral porter. [illustration: manning the yards.] "the despatch read, 'gen. banks badly defeated; return,' here was a dilemma to be placed in,--a victorious army between us and our own forces; a long, winding, shallow river wherein the vessels were continually grounding; a long string of empty transports, with many doubtful captains, who were constantly making excuses to lie by or to land (in other words, who were trying to put their vessels into the power of the confederates); and a thousand points on the river where we could be attacked with great advantage by the enemy; and the banks lined with sharp-shooters, by whom every incautious soldier who showed himself was shot." but, though the admiral clearly saw all the dangers he was exposed to, and which he recounts in the foregoing paragraph, he did not propose to return, but pressed forward. he soon reached the scene of battle, and with the big guns of his boats covered the retreat of the troops; then, having done all there was to be done, started down the river. but now came the great trouble of the whole expedition. those southern rivers are accustomed in summer to fall rapidly until they become mere dry ditches, with a narrow rivulet, hardly deep enough to float a row-boat, flowing down the centre. this was the summer season, and the red river was falling fast. the banks swarmed with gray-coated soldiery, anxious to be on hand to capture the ships. at grand Ã�core the "eastport" became unmanageable, and was blown up. the fleet continued on its way quietly, until a serious obstacle was met. admiral porter writes:-- "one of the 'cricket's' guns was mounted on the upper deck forward, to command the banks; and a crew of six men were kept stationed at it, ready to fire at any thing hostile. "we went along at a moderate pace, to keep within supporting distance of each other. i was sitting on the upper deck, reading, with one eye on the book and the other on the bushes, when i saw men's heads, and sang out to the commanding officer, gorringe, 'give those fellows in the bushes a two-second shell.' a moment after the shell burst in the midst of the people on the bank. "'give them another dose,' i said, when, to my astonishment, there came on board a shower of projectiles that fairly made the little 'cricket' stagger. nineteen shells burst on board our vessel at the first volley. it was the gun-battery of which our prisoner had told us. we were going along at this time about six knots an hour; and, before we could fire another gun, we were right under the battery and turning the point, presenting the 'cricket's' stern to the enemy. they gave us nine shells when we were not more than twenty yards distant from the bank, all of which burst inside of us; and, as the vessel's stern was presented, they poured in ten more shots, which raked us fore and aft. "then came the roar of three thousand muskets, which seemed to strike every spot in the vessel. fortunately her sides were musket-proof. "the 'cricket' stopped. i had been expecting it. how, thought i, could all these shells go through a vessel without disabling the machinery? the rebels gave three cheers, and let us drift on: they were determined to have the whole of us. they opened their guns on the two pump-boats, and sunk them at the first discharge. the poor negroes that could swim tried to reach the shore; but the musketeers picked off those that were in the water or clinging to the wrecks. it was a dreadful spectacle to witness, with no power to prevent it; but it turned out to be the salvation of the 'cricket.' all this took place in less than five minutes. "the moment the 'cricket' received the first discharge of artillery, i went on deck to the pilot-house, saluted by a volley of musketry as i passed along; and, as i opened the pilot-house door, i saw that the pilot, mr. drening, had his head cut open by a piece of shell, and the blood was streaming down his cheeks. he still held on to the wheel. 'i am all right, sir,' he said: 'i won't give up the wheel.' "gorringe was perfectly cool, and was ringing the engine-room bell to go ahead. in front of the wheel-house, the bodies of the men who manned the howitzer were piled up. a shell had struck the gun, and, exploding, had killed all the crew,--a glorious death for them." porter now found himself in a bad fix. his guns could not be elevated enough to bear on the batteries that stood on the crest of the high bluffs. there was nothing to do but to run by at the best possible rate of speed. suddenly the engine stopped, and the vessel floated helplessly down the stream. porter rushed below to discover the trouble. in the engine-room stood the engineer leaning heavily against the throttle. porter shouted at him, but received no reply; then, putting his hand on the man's shoulder, found him dead. the admiral threw the body aside, pulled open the throttle, and the "cricket" glided along past the batteries to a safe refuge down-stream. the other ships came down safely, although more or less cut up; and the flotilla continued its retreat down the stream. for a day or two all went smoothly as a holiday excursion; then came a sudden reverse, that, for a time, seemed to make certain the loss of the entire fleet. at alexandria the red-river bottom is full of great rocks that make it impassable except at the highest water. when porter's gunboats arrived, they found themselves caught in a trap from which there seemed to be no hope of escape. the army was encamped along the banks of the river, and the soldiers began again their jokes upon porter's habit of taking gunboats for an overland journey. the army generals began to get impatient, and advised porter to blow up his ships, as the troops must soon march on and leave him. porter was sick in bed, but this suggestion aroused him. "burn my gunboats!" he cried, springing to his feet. "never! i'll wait here for high water if i have to wait two years." and, indeed, it began to look as though he would be forced to wait nearly that long. [illustration: bailey's dam on the red river.] in this time of suspense, there arose a man equal to the emergency. a certain lieut-col. bailey, who had been a wisconsin lumberman, came to porter, and suggested that a dam should be built to raise the water fourteen feet above the falls. porter jumped at the suggestion, and eight thousand men were set to work. "it will take too much time to enter into the details of this truly wonderful work," writes admiral porter. "suffice it to say that the dam had nearly reached completion in eight days' working-time, and the water had risen sufficiently on the upper falls to allow the 'fort hindman,' 'osage,' and 'neosho' to get down and be ready to pass the dam. in another day it would have been high enough to enable all the other vessels to pass the upper falls. unfortunately, on the morning of the th instant the pressure of water became so great that it swept away two of the stone barges which swung in below the dam on one side. seeing this unfortunate accident, i jumped on a horse, and rode up to where the upper vessels were anchored, and ordered the 'lexington' to pass the upper falls if possible, and immediately attempt to go through the dam. i thought i might be able to save the four vessels below, not knowing whether the persons employed on the work would ever have the heart to renew their enterprise. "the 'lexington' succeeded in getting over the upper falls just in time, the water rapidly falling as she was passing over. she then steered directly for the opening in the dam, through which the water was rushing so furiously that it seemed as if nothing but destruction awaited her. thousands of beating hearts looked on, anxious for the result. the silence was so great as the 'lexington' approached the dam, that a pin might almost be heard to fall. she entered the gap with a full head of steam on, pitched down the roaring torrent, made two or three spasmodic rolls, hung for a moment on the rocks below, was then swept into deep water by the current, and rounded to safely into the bank. thirty thousand voices rose in one deafening cheer, and universal joy seemed to pervade the face of every man present." after the dam was repaired, the rest of the fleet passed down safely. with the escape of the red-river flotilla, the career of admiral porter on the rivers ended. indeed, there was but little work for the river navy remaining. the mississippi, tennessee, and cumberland rivers were opened; and the confederate works on the smaller streams were unimportant, and could be left to fall with the fall of the confederacy, which was near at hand. there was work for fighting sea-captains along the atlantic coast, and thither admiral porter was ordered. he will re-appear at the bombardment of fort fisher. an event which caused the greatest excitement in naval circles at this time, and which for courage and dash has probably never been equalled in the history of the world, was the run of the confederate privateer "florida" past the united states fleet blockading the harbor of mobile. the "florida" was originally a merchant-ship, known as the "oreto;" and under that name she sailed from liverpool, carrying a peaceful cargo, and manned by sailors who had no idea that any thing beyond a peaceable voyage was planned. she was commanded by an english sea-captain; and, although the united states consul at liverpool looked on her with some suspicion, yet he could find no pretext upon which to oppose her departure. hardly had the ship passed the mouth of the mersey, when her course was shaped for nassau, the haven of privateers and blockade-runners. at nassau several officers of the confederate navy were living; and from the anxiety with which they scanned the horizon day after day, through their telescopes, it would seem that they were watching for some friendly craft. the "oreto" arrived safely at nassau; and a young gentleman who had come with her made all possible haste ashore, and delivered to the watchful gentlemen in the town certain letters, which made them first look with the greatest satisfaction at the newly arrived ship, and then begin again their outlook for vessels. the letters were from capt. bulloch, the agent in london of the confederacy; and by them he notified his brother naval officers that he delivered to them the "oreto," an admirably built ship, suited for an armed cruiser. "it has been impossible to get the regular battery intended for her on board," wrote capt. bulloch; "but i have sent out four seven-inch rifled guns, with all necessary equipments, in the steamship 'bahama,' bound for nassau." so here were the naval officers and their ship, but the guns were yet to come; and, when they did come, some shrewd planning would be necessary to get the guns mounted without alarming the british authorities. by the time the "bahama" arrived, the plans were all made. as the steamer came up to the dock, a small schooner slipped alongside, and eight or ten heavy cases were transferred from the larger vessel's hold to the deck of the coaster. then the little vessel sailed over to green cay, a desert island about sixty miles from nassau, where she was soon joined by the "oreto." there the work of changing the peaceful merchantman "oreto" into the war-cruiser "florida" began. the work of transferring the armament, and mounting the guns, was very laborious. the hot sun of august at the equator poured down upon them. exposure and general discomforts told heavily upon them; and before long the yellow-fever, that most terrible scourge of the west indies, broke out among the men. there was no surgeon on board, and the care of the sick fell upon capt. maffitt. two united states men-of-war were hunting through the west indies for the vessel they knew was fitting out somewhere amid the coral reefs and sandy, desolate keys. but maffitt kept up his courage, and before long found himself at sea, with a good stanch ship and crew, that, though short-handed, was made up of the very best material. but he had hardly cut loose from civilization, and started out upon his cruise, when he discovered, that, in the worry and haste of his departure, he had put to sea without rammers or sponges for his guns. he was in a desperate plight. had the smallest united states man-of-war met the "florida," the confederate could not have offered the slightest resistance. she could not have even fired a gun. capt. maffitt ran his vessel into havana in the hopes of being allowed to refit there; but the fortunes of the confederacy were waning fast, and all nations feared to give it aid or comfort. seeing no hope, maffitt determined to dare all things, and make a dash for mobile through the very centre of the blockading-fleet. when the "florida" put out from the harbor of havana, only four or five men were able to be on deck. the rest, with her commander, were below, deathly sick with yellow-fever. under the command of a young lieutenant, her course was laid for mobile; and in a few hours the smoke of the blockading-vessels could be seen rising on the clear air. an english ensign was hoisted, and the fleet ship dashed towards the men-o'-war that lay in wait. a blank cartridge was fired to warn her away, but she paid no heed. then came a solid shot that ploughed up the water before her bow. as this evoked no response, the whole fleet opened fire with shot and shell. "had they depressed their guns but a little," said maffitt afterwards, "the career of the 'florida' would have ended then and there." but, as it was, she sped on, with no signs of damage save the flying ends of cut cordage. she could not respond to the fire, for but three men remained on her deck. so, silently and grimly, she rushed through the fleet, and finally passed the last frigate. quarter of an hour later she anchored under the guns of fort morgan. she had received eight shots in her hull, and her masts were chipped by dozens of fragments of shell. after refitting, the "florida" waited nearly a month for a chance to get out again. finally the moment arrived; and she made her escape, though chased for four hours by the blockaders. once on the open sea, she began the regular career of confederate cruisers, burned unarmed ships, and avoided war-vessels, until she was run down in a neutral port by a union man-of-war, whose commander acted in utter defiance of all the rules of modern warfare. in the career of the "florida," after her escape from mobile, there was nothing of moment; and her capture, treacherous as it was, brought more discredit upon the northern arms than did her depredations work injury to the northern merchant-marine. chapter xvii. operations about charleston. -- the bombardment, the siege, and the capture. we have now reached the period at which the rapid decline in the prospects of the confederacy had become apparent, not only to its enemies, but to its friends. throughout the south the stars and bars floated over only three strongholds of any importance,--charleston, mobile, and wilmington. one after the other these were destined to fall, and their final overthrow was to be the work of the navy. it was no easy task in any one of the three instances to dislodge the confederates from their positions; for though beaten in the middle states, driven from the mississippi, and with their very citadel at vicksburg in the hands of the federals, they still fought with a courage and desperation that for a long time baffled the attacks of the unionists. from the very opening of the war, charleston harbor had been the scene of naval hostilities. the confederates, looking upon their mouldering wharves, and vessels tugging idly at their chains, then looking out to sea past fort sumter, could see the ships of the blockading-squadron maintaining the watchful guard that was slowly reducing the city to penury. what wonder that the blood of the good people of charleston boiled, and that they built, and hurled against their hated enemy, weird naval monsters, shapeless torpedo-boats running beneath the water, or huge rams that might even batter in the heavy walls of fort sumter! one attack so made was successful to a certain extent. it was in february, , that an inventive genius in the beleaguered city brought out a steam torpedo-boat. the craft was about twenty-five feet long, shaped like a cigar, built of boiler iron, and propelled by a screw. she had no smokestack, and her deck barely rose above the surface of the water. running out from her bow was a stout spar fifteen feet long, bearing at its end a huge torpedo charged with two hundred pounds of powder. just before nine o'clock one night, the lookout on the deck of the frigate "housatonic" saw this strange object approaching the ship. it was a bright night, with no sea on. as yet torpedoes were hardly known, so the lookout took it for a large fish, and simply watched with interest its playful movements. not until it came so close that no guns could be brought to bear, did any suspicion of danger enter the lookout's mind. then there was the roll of the alarm-drums; while the men rushed to the side, and poured a fierce fire from small-arms on the mysterious object. the "housatonic" started her engines, and tried to escape; but, before any headway could be gained, the launch dashed alongside, and a slight jar was felt. then, with a tremendous roar, a huge column of water was thrown high in air, washing away men and boats from the deck of the warship. a hole large enough to drive a horse through was rent in the hull of the ship. great beams were broken in twain, the heaviest guns were dismounted, and men were hurled fifty feet into the air. in five minutes the ship had gone to the bottom, and boats from other vessels were picking up the crew. the launch escaped in the excitement. the union sailor-boys did not let the confederates outdo them in dash and pluck. one of the cleverest bits of work in the whole war was done by four boat-crews from two men-of-war on the charleston station. word had been brought to the blockaders, that, far up a little deep and narrow creek, a large steamship was loading with cotton, expecting to reach the ocean through the labyrinth of inlets that fairly honeycomb the south carolina coast. should she once get into that network of waterways, it would require a whole fleet to catch her; for there was no telling at what point she might emerge. it was at once determined to try to capture her as she lay at her deck, and four boats' crews of picked men were sent out on the expedition. it was early evening when they set out; and all through the dark night they pulled away, threading the mazes of the tidal inlets. just as the eastern horizon was beginning to grow gray with the coming dawn, they came in sight of their destination. sure enough, there on the bank of the river was a little southern village, changed into a prosperous town by the blockade-runners that had evidently been making this place a harbor for some time. all was dark and silent as the grave. confident in their fancied security, the blockade-runners had all turned in, leaving no one on guard. the steamer was loaded, and ready to sail in the morning; and the thin wreaths of smoke rising from her smokestack told that the fires were up. stealthily the sailors pulled alongside, and clambered on deck. without a word they stole below, put the crew under guards, and rushed into the engine-room, where they found the engineer dozing on his stool. he was ordered to get under way at once; and, though he looked rather dazed, he obeyed the order. and in fifteen minutes the steamer was speeding down-stream, leaving the old town still asleep. one man alone of all the townspeople had seen the capture. a negro, hiding behind a pile of lumber on the dock, had watched the whole affair, and, as if struck dumb with astonishment, failed to give the alarm until the steamer was out of sight down the winding stream. the blue-jackets took their capture safely out of the enemy's lines, and the next day it was sent to new york as a prize. while the navy was keeping the port of charleston sealed, and every now and then beating back the improvised gunboats that the confederates sent out in the forlorn hope of breaking through the blockade, the armies of the north were closing in upon the doomed city. all the north cried aloud for the capture of charleston. it was the city which fired the first gun of the war. let it be reduced! on every available point of land a union battery was built. far out in the swamps back of the city, where it was thought no living thing save reptiles could exist, the soldiers of the north had raised a battery, mounting one two-hundred-pound gun. when a young lieutenant was ordered to build this battery, he looked the ground over, and reported the thing impossible. "there is no such word as impossible," sternly answered the colonel. "set to work, and call for whatever you need to secure success." [illustration: cutting out a blockade-runner.] the next day the lieutenant, who was a bit of a wag, made a requisition on the quarter-master for one hundred men eighteen feet high, to wade through mud sixteen feet deep. pleasantry is not appreciated in war; and the officer was arrested, but soon secured his release, and built the battery with men of ordinary height. [illustration: war-ships off charleston harbor.] in april, , admiral du pont had lined his iron-clads and monitors up before the beetling walls of fort sumter, and had hurled solid shot for hours, with only the effect of breaking away sharp corners and projecting edges of the fort, but leaving it still as powerful a work of defence as ever. the little monitors exposed to the terrible fire from the guns of sumter were fairly riddled; and, when the signal was finally made to withdraw from the action, the humblest sailor knew that charleston would only fall after a siege as protracted and wearisome as that of vicksburg. the investment of charleston lasted from the date of that first attack upon fort sumter until . from time to time the war-vessels would throw a few shells into the city, as a reminder to the inhabitants that they were under surveillance. early in the siege the swamp angel, as the big gun back in the swamp was called, began sending hourly messages, in the form of two-hundred-pound shells, into the city. in one quarter, where the shells fell thickest, a severe fire was started, which raged fiercely, driving people from their homes, and reducing whole blocks to ashes; while the deadly shells aided in the work of destruction. but the life of the swamp angel, whose shells were the most destructive, was but short; for, after a few days' work, it burst, scattering the sand-bags, of which the battery was built, far and wide over the swamp. the officers of the army, who were bringing their troops nearer and nearer to the city, expected the iron-clad vessels to steam boldly up the harbor, and compel a surrender of the city; but the naval officers dared not, owing to the torpedoes with which the channel was thickly planted. if sumter could only be captured, the torpedoes could be searched out and easily removed; and, with this thought in mind, a number of bold sailors fitted out an expedition to attack the fort. thirty boats, filled with armed men, made their way to the base of the shattered walls of the fort. as they came up, not a sign of life was to be seen about the huge black monster that had so long kept the iron-clads at bay. rapidly and silently the men swarmed from their boats, and, led by three brave officers, began the ascent of the sloping walls. "the johnnies are asleep," they whispered to each other: "we have the fort this time." but the johnnies were wide awake, and waiting behind those grim bastions until the proper moment should arrive. higher and higher climbed the blue-jackets; and they were just about to spring over the last barrier, when there rose before them a wall of men and a deadly fire of musketry, and a storm of hand-grenades cut their ranks to pieces. around the corner of the fort steamed a small gunboat, which opened fire on the assailants. the carnage was terrible; and the sailors were driven back to their boats, leaving two hundred dead and wounded, and three stands of colors, as trophies for the garrison. [illustration: charleston bombarded.] after that grapple with the giant fortress, the federals did not again try to come to close quarters; but, keeping at a distance, maintained a steady fire upon the fort, which drove its defenders from the guns, and enabled the union troops to throw up batteries upon all the neighboring islands. the fleet then remained on blockading-service until feb. , , when the confederates evacuated the city, and left the fort to the victorious federals. five years after the date when major anderson with his little band of soldiers had marched out of sumter, leaving the fort to the enemy, the same gallant officer returned, and with his own hand hoisted the same tattered flag over the almost ruined fortress, amid salvos of artillery and the cheers of a victorious army and navy. chapter xviii. the battle of mobile bay. the last two actions of the united states navy in the civil war were destined to be the grandest successes of a long record of daring and successful exploits. farragut at mobile, and porter at fort fisher, added to their wondrous careers the cap-sheaves of two victories wrested from apparently unconquerable adversaries. it was on a bright august morning in that admiral farragut stood on the deck of his stanch frigate the "hartford," that had borne him through so many desperate battles. around the flagship were clustered the vessels of the gulf squadron. there was the battered old "brooklyn," scarred with the wounds of a dozen fights; the "richmond" and the "itasca," that received their baptism of fire at the fight below new orleans. in all there were fourteen wooden vessels and four iron-clad monitors assembled in front of the strongest combination of harbor defences that warships ever yet dared attack. yet farragut was there that bright summer morning to enter that bay, and batter the forts of the enemy into subjection. to capture the city was not his purpose,--that he left to the army,--but the harbor forts and the great ram "tennessee" must strike their colors to the navy. before arranging for the attack, the admiral made a reconnoissance, the results of which are thus told by one of his officers: "on the afternoon of the day of our arrival, admiral farragut, with the commanding officers of the different vessels, made a reconnoissance on the steam-tender 'cowslip,' running inside of sand island, where the monitors were anchored, and near enough to get a good view of both forts. on the left, some two miles distant, was fort gaines, a small brick-and-earth work, mounting a few heavy guns, but too far away from the ship-channel to cause much uneasiness to the fleet. fort morgan was on the right, one of the strongest of the old stone forts, and greatly strengthened by immense piles of sand-bags covering every portion of the exposed front. the fort was well equipped with three tiers of heavy guns, some of them of the best english make, imported by the confederates. in addition, there was in front a battery of eleven powerful guns, at the water's edge on the beach. all the guns, of both fort and water battery, were within point-blank range of the only channel through which the fleet could pass. the rebels considered the works impregnable, but they did not depend solely upon them. just around the point of land, behind fort morgan, we could see that afternoon three saucy-looking gunboats and the famous ram 'tennessee.' the latter was then considered the strongest and most powerful iron-clad ever put afloat; looking like a great turtle, with sloping sides covered with iron plates six inches in thickness, thoroughly riveted together, and having a formidable iron beak projecting under the water. her armament consisted of six heavy guns of english make, sending a solid shot weighing one hundred and ten pounds,--a small affair compared with the heavy guns of the present time, but irresistible then against every thing but the turrets of the monitors. in addition to these means of resistance, the narrow channel in front of the fort had been lined with torpedoes. these were under the water, anchored to the bottom, and were chiefly in the shape of beer-kegs filled with powder, from the sides of which projected numerous little tubes containing fulminate, which it was expected would be exploded by contact with the passing vessels. "except for what farragut had already accomplished on the mississippi, it would have been considered a foolhardy experiment for wooden vessels to attempt to pass so close to one of the strongest forts on the coast; but when to the forts were added the knowledge of the strength of the ram, and the supposed deadly character of the torpedoes, it may be imagined that the coming event impressed the person taking his first glimpse of naval warfare as decidedly hazardous and unpleasant. so daring an attempt was never made in any country but this, and was never successfully made by any commander except farragut, who in this, as in his previous exploits in passing the forts of the mississippi, proved himself the greatest naval commander the world has ever seen. it was the confidence reposed in him, the recollection that he had never failed in any of his attempts, and his manifest faith in the success of the projected movement, that inspired all around him." when the reconnoissance was completed, the admiral called a council of his captains in the wardroom of the "hartford," and announced that the attack would be made early the following morning. the council over, each commander returned to his ship, there to make ready for the dread business of the morrow. the same writer whom we have before quoted tells how the night before a battle is spent by brave men not afraid of death:-- "at sunset the last order had been issued. every commanding officer knew his duty, and unusual quiet prevailed in the fleet. the waters of the gulf rested for a time from their customary tumult, a gentle breeze relieved the midsummer heat, and the evening closed upon us as peacefully as if we had been on board a yachting squadron at newport. during the early part of the night, the stillness was almost oppressive. the officers of the 'hartford' gathered around the capacious wardroom table, writing what they knew might be their last letters to loved ones far away, or giving to friends messages and instructions in case of death. there were no signs of fear; but, like brave and intelligent men, they recognized the stern possibilities of the morrow, and acted accordingly. "but this occupied but little time; and then, business over, there followed an hour of unrestrained jollity. many an old story was retold, and ancient conundrum repeated. old officers forgot for the moment their customary dignity, and it was evident that all were exhilarated and stimulated by the knowledge of the coming struggle. capt. heywood of the marines proposed a final 'walk-around;' tyson solemnly requested information as to 'which would you rather do or go by fort morgan?' and all agreed they would prefer to 'do.' la rue adams repeated the benediction with which the french instructor at the naval academy was wont to greet his boys as they were going into examination: 'vell, fellows, i hope ve vill do as vell as i hope ve vill do.' finally, chief engineer williamson suggested an adjournment to the forecastle for a last smoke, and the smoking club went forward; but somehow smoke had lost its customary flavor, and, after a few whiffs, all hands turned in, to enjoy what sleep would come." when the morning dawned, the men were called to quarters, and the advance upon the forts was begun at once. it was a foggy morning, and the ships looked like phantom vessels as they moved forward in line of battle, with the "brooklyn" in the van. second came the "hartford," with the admiral high up in the rigging, where he could overlook the whole scene. "nearly every man had his watch in his hand, and waited for the first shot. to us, ignorant of every thing going on above, every minute seemed an hour; and there was a feeling of great relief when the boom of the first gun was heard. this was from the monitor 'tecumseh,' at forty-seven minutes past six o'clock. presently one or two of our forward guns opened, and we could hear the distant sound of the guns of the fort in reply. soon the cannon-balls began to crash through the deck above us, and then the thunder of our whole broadside of twelve dahlgren guns kept the vessel in a quiver. but as yet no wounded were sent down, and we knew we were still at comparatively long range. in the intense excitement of the occasion, it seemed that hours had passed; but it was just twenty minutes from the time we went below when an officer shouted down the hatchway: 'send up an army signal-officer immediately: the 'brooklyn' is signalling.' in a moment the writer was on deck, where he found the situation as follows: the 'brooklyn,' directly in front of us, had stopped, and was backing and signalling; the tide was with us, setting strongly through the channel, and the stopping of the 'brooklyn' threatened to bring the whole fleet into collision and confusion; the advance vessels of the line were trying to back to prevent a catastrophe, but were apparently not able to overcome the force of the current; and there was danger not only of collision, but of being drifted on shore." while the fleet was thus embarrassed and hampered, the gunners in the forts were pouring in their shot thick and fast. on the decks of the ships the most terrible scenes of death were visible. along the port side the bodies of the dead were ranged in long rows, while the wounded were carried below, until the surgeon's room was filled to its last corner. one poor fellow on the "hartford" lost both legs by a cannon-ball, and, falling, threw up both arms just in time to have them carried away also. strange to say, he recovered from these fearful wounds. just as the fight was at its hottest, and the vessels were nearing the line, the passage of which meant victory, there went up a cry from the whole fleet, "the 'tecumseh!' look at the 'tecumseh!'" all eyes were turned on the monitor, and every one saw that she was sinking. she staggered for a moment, and went down with a rush, carrying her brave commander and over a hundred of her crew. a few escaped, the last of whom was the pilot. as the pilot was rushing for the hatchway that led to the open air and to life, he met at the foot of a narrow ladder commander craven. craven stepped back, saying gravely, "after you, pilot;" and the pilot passed out. "there was nothing after me," said he, in relating the story afterwards; "for as i sprang out of the hatchway the water rushed in, carrying all behind me to the bottom." this terrible sight made the ships stop for a moment in some confusion; but farragut signalled sternly from his flagship, "go on," and all advanced again. as the fight grew fiercer, the admiral grew tired of being on the second ship in the line, and ordered the "hartford" to forge ahead. "on board a war steamer the engines are directed by the tap of a bell, the wires connected with which lead to the quarter-deck. one stroke of the bell means 'go ahead;' two, 'stop;' three, 'back;' and four, 'go ahead as fast as possible.' leaning down through the shrouds to the officer on deck at the bell-pull, the admiral shouted, 'four bells, _eight bells_, sixteen bells! give her all the steam you've got!' the order was instantly transmitted, and the old ship seemed imbued with the admiral's spirit; and running past the "brooklyn" and the monitors, regardless of fort, ram, gunboats, and the unseen foe beneath, dashed ahead, all alone, save for her gallant consort, the 'metacomet.'" [illustration: fight at mobile bay.] but by this time the fleet was well abreast of the forts, and now, pouring out broadside after broadside, they swept along past the terrible ramparts. the confederate gunboats had found the fight too hot for them, and had fled for shelter, with the exception of the dreaded "tennessee," which seemed to be holding itself in reserve. it was but a short time before the vessels were safely past the fort, and out of range, floating on the smooth waters of the inner bay. then the crews were piped to breakfast, and all hands began to recount their narrow escapes. but the end was not yet, for the ram "tennessee" was now ready to try her mettle with the fleet. lieut. kinney of the "hartford" tells graphically the story of the desperate fight that the ram carried on alone against the whole attacking flotilla. "we were just beginning to feel the re-action following such a season of extreme peril and excitement, when we were brought to our senses by the sharp, penetrating voice of executive officer kimberly calling all hands to quarters; and a messenger-boy hurried down to us with the word, 'the ram is coming.' every man hastened to his post, the writer to the quarter-deck, where the admiral and fleet-captain were standing. the cause of the new excitement was evident at once. the 'tennessee,' as if ashamed of her failure, had left the fort and was making at full speed directly for the "hartford," being then perhaps a mile and a half distant. the spectacle was a grand one, and was viewed by the rebel soldiers in both forts, who were now out of range of our guns, and lined the walls. few audiences have ever witnessed so imposing a sight. the great ram came on for a single-handed contest with the fleet. she was believed to be invulnerable, and had powerful double engines by which she could be easily handled; while our monitors were so slow-gaited that they were unable to offer any serious obstacle to her approach. farragut himself seemed to place his chief dependence on his wooden vessels. doubtless the crowd of confederate soldiers who watched the fight expected to see the 'tennessee' sink the yankee vessels in detail, and the chances seemed in its favor.... "meanwhile, the general signal, 'attack the enemy,' had gone up to the peak of the 'hartford;' and there followed a general slipping of cables, and a friendly rivalry to see which could quickest meet the foe. the 'monongahela,' with her artificial iron prow, was bravely in the lead, and struck the rebel craft amidships at full speed, doing no damage to the ram, but having her own iron prow destroyed, and being otherwise injured. next came the 'lackawanna,' with a like result. the huge iron frame of the 'tennessee' scarcely felt the shock, while the wooden bow of the union ship was badly demoralized. for an instant the two vessels swung head and stern alongside of each other. in his official report, capt. marchand naïvely remarks:-- "'a few of the enemy were seen through their ports, who were using _most opprobrious_ language. our marines opened on them with muskets: even a spittoon and a holystone were thrown at them from our deck, which drove them away.' "the 'tennessee' fired two shots through her bow, and then kept on for the 'hartford.' the two flag-ships approached each other, bow to bow. the two admirals, farragut and buchanan, had entered our navy together as boys, and up to the outbreak of the war had been warm friends. but now each was hoping for the overthrow of the other; and, had buchanan possessed the grit of farragut, it is probable that moment would have witnessed the destruction of both vessels. for had the ram struck us square, as it came, bows on, it would have ploughed its way half through the 'hartford;' and, as we sank, we should have carried it to the bottom, unable to extricate itself. but the rebel admiral was not desirous of so much glory; and, just as the two vessels were meeting, the course of the 'tennessee' was slightly changed, enough to strike us only a glancing blow on the port-bow, which left us uninjured, while the two vessels grated past each other. he tried to sink us with a broadside as he went by; but only one of his guns went off, the primers in all the others failing. that gun sent a shell that entered the berth-deck of the 'hartford,' and killed five men." but by this time the unequal conflict was becoming too much even for a man of buchanan's courage. the armor of the ram was penetrated in several places, and at last came a shot that almost fatally wounded her commander. with the controlling mind that guided her course gone, the ram was useless; and in a moment a white flag fluttered from the shattered stump of her flagstaff. and so closed the naval battle that effectually ended confederate rule on the gulf coast, and earned for farragut his proudest laurels. chapter xix. the fall of fort fisher. -- the navy ends its work. in noticing the work of the blockading-fleet, we have spoken of the fine harbor of wilmington, and the powerful works that defended its entrance. this confederate stronghold was known as fort fisher, and had been for a long time a cause of anxiety and worry to the northern authorities. the war had gone past fort fisher. to the north and to the south of it, the country was under the sway of the federal authorities; but there in north carolina stood the formidable bastions over which floated, in defiance of the laws of the union, the stars and bars of the rapidly dying confederacy. with its connected batteries, fort fisher mounted seventy-five guns, and was stronger than the celebrated malakoff at sebastopol. to reduce this stronghold, a joint naval and military expedition was fitted out; and gen. butler was placed in command of the land forces, while admiral porter, torn from his beloved western rivers, was given command of the fleet. butler introduced a novel feature at the very opening of the siege. he procured an old steamer, and had her packed full of gunpowder. on a dark night this craft was towed close to the walls of the fort and set afire, in the hopes that she might, in blowing up, tear the works to pieces. but in this the projectors were disappointed; for the explosion, though a terrific one, did absolutely no harm to the confederate works. when porter finally did get into the fort, he asked a soldier what he thought of the attempt to blow them up. "it was a mighty mean trick," responded the southerner satirically. "you woke us all up." after this fiasco had set all the world laughing, butler retired voluntarily, and was succeeded by gen. terry; and on christmas eve of the year the fleet began the bombardment, although the land forces were not yet prepared for the assault. it was the grandest armada that was ever arrayed against any fortress. the thunder of nearly five hundred guns rent the air on that christmas eve, when carols were being sung in christian churches throughout the world. tremendous as was the cannonade, the earthworks were almost a match for it. the fort was not a mass of masonry that these enormous guns might batter down and crumble into rubbish, but a huge bank of earth in which the shells might harmlessly bury themselves. but five hundred cannon are more than a match for any fort, and so they soon proved to be in this instance. earthworks, guns, and men alike went down before them. the iron-clads were stationed about three-quarters of a mile from the fort, a little farther out were the frigates and heavy sloops, and still beyond were the smaller vessels,--all firing to cover themselves; and all along the whole extended line there blazed one almost continuous sheet of flame, while the rolling thunder of the broadsides, and the defiant answering roar from the guns of the forts, shook earth and sea. clouds of dust went up from the bastions of the fort, and mingled with the floating smoke above. within the forts, there was a scene of the most terrible confusion: guns were overturned, piles of cannon-balls were knocked to pieces and scattered about, and two magazines were blown up and scattered fragments all over the parade. in one hour and a quarter all the gunners were driven to the bomb-proofs, and the forts were silenced, not returning a single shot. [illustration: charge of sailors at fort fisher.] on christmas morning gen. terry arrived with all his transports, and the attack was recommenced. early in the morning the ships fell into position and began a slow fire, merely to cover the landing of the troops. again the garrison was driven to the bomb-proofs; and, indeed, so entirely were they chased from their posts, that a federal soldier went into the fort and brought off a confederate flag without ever having been seen by the garrison. all the troops were landed; but for some reason the attack was deferred, much to the disgust of the officers of the fleet, who felt sure that the fort could be taken then by a dash. but the troops returned to their transports or went into camp, and it was not until weeks after that the assault was fairly made. in the mean time, the ships rode out the winter gales at their anchors, doing a little desultory firing to keep the garrison in a state of unrest. on the th of january the heavy bombardment began again, and again the troops were landed. by night it was seen that every gun on the face of the fort was disabled, and it was decided to storm the works the next day. sixteen hundred sailors and four hundred marines were told off as the storming-party. early in the morning the ships began a fierce cannonade, under cover of which the sailors and marines landed, and threw up light breastworks to cover them until the time should be ripe for the charge. the arrangements contemplated a fierce charge by the blue-jackets, armed with their cutlasses and revolvers; while the marines, remaining in the rifle-pits, should cover the advancing party with a hot fire of musketry. the soldiers from the army-camp were to charge the fort on the other side. at three o'clock came the signal that all was ready. the whistles of the ships rent the air; and the blue-jackets, with ringing cheers, dashed in a compact body up the beach. but in an instant the confederate ramparts were black with men, and a furious fire of musketry rained down upon the sailors, who were helpless. the marines in the rifle-pits failed to do what was expected of them, and the sailors halted for a moment in surprise. as they stood, a most destructive fire rained down upon them; and the poor fellows, grasping their useless cutlasses, turned and fled down the beach, leaving great heaps of dead and wounded behind. then the confederates, thinking the day was theirs, sprang on the ramparts, and began a vigorous cheer just as the union soldiers came pouring over the landward face of the fort. then ensued a fierce hand-to-hand fight that lasted for hours. the blue-jackets, encouraged, rushed back to the fight, and now at close quarters swung their cutlasses with deadly effect, until step by step the confederates were driven out of the fort. then the fleet opened upon them, and they fled for dear life while a sailor sprang to the flagstaff and pulled down the confederate flag. fort fisher had fallen. it was a noble victory, and formed a fitting climax to the work of the navy throughout that great war. with the fall of fort fisher, the navy ceased to be a prominent factor in the war. its work was done. along the seacoast, and inland as far as navigable rivers extended, the ships of the north had carried the starry banner; and the sailor-boys of the north had defended it. and their opponents, whether on sea or shore, had shown themselves courageous and dashing, and worthy to be numbered as men of the same nation as those who proved the victors. and who can doubt, that, should the need arise, the sons of these men will show that they have in their veins the blood that animated the blue-jackets of ' ? part iv blue jackets in times of peace chapter i. police service on the high seas. -- war service in asiatic ports. -- losses by the perils of the deep. -- a brush with the pirates. -- admiral rodgers at corea. -- services in arctic waters. -- the disaster at samoa. -- the attack on the "baltimore's" men at valparaiso. -- loss of the "kearsarge." -- the naval review. the years immediately following the civil war were particularly quiet and uneventful for the navy. the department was chiefly engaged in the work of reducing the forces and adapting the navy to the changed conditions. at the termination of the war an immense naval armament had been developed, and the navy had assumed a magnitude which made the united states foremost among the naval powers. this force was gradually reduced to a peace standard. the volunteers were discharged and retired from service. the large number of captured and purchased vessels were disposed of. the home squadrons were withdrawn, and squadrons established abroad. the ships in foreign stations displayed an unprecedented energy and activity, visiting, in , nearly every large port in the world, including several in china which had never before been entered by an american man-of-war. the reception of rear-admiral bell in his flagship, the "hartford," by the japanese, was manifestly more hospitable than that given to any other nation. admiral farragut was made commander of the european squadron in , and he was received with distinguished attention by the sovereigns and dignitaries of europe. the "swatara," of the european squadron, was ordered, in november, , to civita vecchia, a port in italy, to bring to the united states john h. surratt, who was charged with being implicated in the assassination of lincoln. the fugitive was apprehended, but he escaped, and fled into the papal dominions. he was recaptured at alexandria, and in february was delivered to the marshal of the district of columbia. the japanese made further advances of a friendly character toward the united states in , when the "shenandoah," of the asiatic squadron, with the american minister aboard, arrived at the port of hakodadi, and the first salute ever given in honor of a foreign minister was fired. just previous to this, the japanese government had expressed its willingness to open an additional port on the western coast to foreign trade, and commodore goldsborough, in command of the "shenandoah," visited and made surveys of several harbors in which no foreign ship had ever before anchored. news was received by rear-admiral bell, in the autumn of , that the schooner "general sherman" had been wrecked in the ping yang river, one of the streams of corea, and that her officers, crew, and passengers had been murdered by the natives. the rear-admiral despatched one of the vessels of his squadron, the "wachusett," to investigate the matter, and demand from the authorities that the survivors, if any, be delivered on board the "wachusett." the king of corea was communicated with, but without satisfactory results. it was found that there were no survivors of the schooner. a few months afterward information reached rear-admiral bell that a similar outrage had been perpetrated on the southeast end of the island of formosa. it was reported that the american bark "rover" had been wrecked, and all on board murdered. commander febiger, with the "ashuelot," found that the crime had been committed by a horde of savages, who, the authorities of the island said, were not obedient to their laws. rear-admiral bell left shanghai in june, with the "wyoming" and "hartford," with the intention of destroying, if possible, the lurking-places of the savages. on the th of june the vessels anchored half a mile from shore, and officers, sailors, and marines were landed, under the command of commander belknap, of the "hartford," and lieutenant-commander alexander s. mackenzie. as the company approached the hills the natives, dressed in clouts, with their bodies painted, and muskets glistening in the sun, descended to meet them, fighting from the long grass. after delivering their fire, they would retreat, and form ambuscades, into which the men from the ships frequently fell in charging after them. in one of these lieutenant-commander mackenzie was mortally wounded. after fighting under the intensely hot sun for six hours, during which period several of the attacking party suffered sunstroke, they returned to their ships, the expedition having proved a failure. the navy performed a valuable maritime service in , by locating and surveying a shoal which was reported to exist twenty miles west of georges shoal, and directly in the track of vessels bound to and from europe. the shoal was found by commander chandler with the united states steamer "don," and mariners were made cognizant of a danger which probably had been fatal to many vessels. in the same year the "sacramento," captain napoleon collins, while on an important cruise, was wrecked on the reefs off the mouth of the kothapalem river in the bay of bengal. the vessel proved a total wreck, but without loss of life. those aboard effected thrilling escapes by means of rafts. the navy suffered another misfortune in , in the drowning of rear-admiral bell, commander of the asiatic squadron, lieutenant-commander j. h. reed, and ten of the crew of the admiral's barge, which was upset in crossing the bar near osaka, few days after the opening by the japanese of that port and hioto to foreigners. another disaster occurred in . twenty-seven officers and men of the "fredonia" were drowned at arica, on the western coast of south america the "fredonia" and "wateree" were resting at anchor when a shock of earthquake was felt. the sea receded and left the former vessel on the bottom; a moment afterward the wave rolled back, breaking the ship into fragments. the "wateree" was thrown upon the shore; its position was such that the expense of launching would have been greater than the worth of the vessel, and it was consequently sold. a year previous to its catastrophe, the "monongahela," in the harbor of st. croix, was swept from her moorings by the force of an earthquake, and carried by a wave over the warehouses into one of the streets of the town. five of her crew were lost. the vessel, after an interval of some months, was relaunched. the cuban rebellion, which began in , occasioned activity on the part of some of the cruisers to prevent violations of the neutrality law and to protect the interests of american citizens. a company of cuban filibusters, encamped on gardiner's island, near the eastern end of long island, were captured by lieutenant breese, in command of the revenue cutter "mahoning," and fifty marines. the prisoners, to the number of one hundred and twenty-five, were taken to new york. on the island of cuba some outrages were perpetrated upon american citizens by the spanish authorities. rear-admiral hoff, in command of the north atlantic squadron, was ordered to santiago de cuba for the better protection of american interests, and no further aggressions occurred. two disasters in the navy ushered in the year . in the bay of yeddo, on january th, the steam-sloop "oneida," just after leaving yokohama for hong kong, was run into and sunk by the english steamer "bombay," with the loss of twenty officers and ninety-six men. the tug "marie" was sunk in the same month, with a loss of four men, in long island sound. in october of the same year, commander sicard of the "saginaw" determined to run to ocean island, a small island about a hundred miles west of the midways, to rescue any sailors who might have been shipwrecked there. the "saginaw" was herself wrecked on a reef off the perilous coast, but her men, after extreme exertions, landed safely on the shores of the uninhabited island. here they lived for some months. they were rescued by a steamer from the sandwich islands, sent to their aid by the authorities of the islands, who had been informed of the accident by william halford, one of the crew, who, with lieutenant talbot and three others, had volunteered to make the trip from ocean island to honolulu, a distance of , miles, in an open boat. after thirty-one days of great danger and hardship, they arrived off one of the hawaiian group of islands. in attempting to land, the boat was upset in the surf, and all but halford were drowned. at various times during the years and , the marines of the brooklyn navy yard rendered very efficient aid to the revenue officers in quelling riots in brooklyn which grew out of the raiding of illicit distilleries. in july, , captain gilbert was killed and several men wounded by the rioters. [illustration: attack on a corean fort.] the steamer "forward," bearing the san salvador flag, landed desperadoes at guaymas, mexico, in june, , and these outlaws took possession of the custom-house. they forced the foreign merchants to furnish them with funds and goods, and compelled the united states' consul to supply coal for their vessel, their purpose being to become pirates on a large scale. commander low, of the "mohican," upon learning these facts, sailed from mazatlan, and overtook the "forward" while still in the gulf of california. she was attacked in the harbor of boca teacapan by six boatloads of sailors and marines from the "mohican," and was captured and burned. it seemed desirable, in , that some arrangement should be made with the people of corea whereby sailors wrecked upon these shores should have protection. with this end in view our minister to china, accompanied by rear-admiral john rodgers, with the "colorado," the "alaska," the "benicia," the "monocacy," and the "palos," vessels of the asiatic squadron, sailed to corea, anchoring in the sale river. the local authorities were assured that the visit was a perfectly peaceful one, and they in turn gave evidences of a peaceful spirit. but when a party engaged in making surveys and soundings for the safety of commerce had got beyond a point where they could be protected by the cruisers' guns, they were fired upon by the coreans, and were forced to re-pass the corean forts under a fierce cannonade. admiral rodgers and the minister determined that an explanation should be at once demanded. no answer having been received from the coreans after an interval of ten days, it was decided that an attack should be made upon the forts from which the shots had been fired. a party of about of the sailors and marines were landed, and after a march through mud which rose to their knees, the first fort was captured without serious resistance. the next day, other forts were easily taken, and preparations were made to attack the horseshoe-shaped citadel, which was defended by a garrison of a thousand corean soldiers. a few shells from the vessels, judiciously planted among the coreans, frightened and disconcerted them; but they made a stubborn fight until their ammunition gave out. the attacking party swarmed over the walls. then ensued a desperate hand-to-hand fight the coreans expected no quarter, and fought till all who had not fled had been killed or wounded. lieutenant hugh mckee, who was the first man to climb over the ramparts, fell with a mortal wound. two hundred and forty-seven dead coreans were counted within the works. five forts and a large number of flags and cannon had been captured. the gallant conduct of the men of the navy made a deep impression on the people of the china coast and led to the increased consideration and safety of american citizens in those localities. on saturday morning, november , , occurred one of the most disastrous wrecks in the history of the navy. the steam sloop-of-war "huron" struck the rocks near oregon inlet, north carolina, in a heavy gale and was wrecked, with the loss of nearly a hundred officers and men. the boats were washed from the davits and the thirty-four persons who were saved reached the shore by swimming. ensign lucien young landed on the beach after desperate efforts, and spread the alarm. his sturdy activity resulted in the saving of several lives. the members of a naval exploring expedition, which had sailed in the "polaris" for the arctic regions in , were rescued from boats and the floating ice in baffin's bay in , the "polaris" having been abandoned as a wreck. the united states steamer "rodgers," commanded by lieutenant robert m. berry, was detailed in to search for the exploring party organized by james gordon bennett and headed by lieutenant-commander delong, which had embarked in the "jeannette" for the far north and had been last heard of in august, . the "rodgers" was burned and abandoned in st. laurence bay, siberia, in november, ; but lieutenant berry continued his search on the coast. in the early spring he learned that one party from the "jeannette," that of chief-engineer melville, had been saved and was searching for the other two parties which had become separated from the first in a storm while attempting to escape from the arctic seas in open boats after the "jeannette" had been crushed and sunk by the ice. lieutenant berry soon afterward met chief-engineer melville's party and learned that the bodies of lieutenant delong and his companions had been found. search for the other party which had been led by lieutenant chipp was continued, and the navy department fitted out another vessel, the "alliance," to aid in the possible rescue. but lieutenant chipp and his men were never found. [illustration: wreck of united states war-ships off samoa.] during the massacres by egyptian troops under arabi pasha in alexandria, in , when more than two hundred european residents were killed or wounded, the flagship "lancaster," under captain gherardi, was in the harbor and afforded a place of refuge for large numbers of men, women, and children. a large body of marines with a detachment of naval artillery landed in the city and were of much service in restoring order. another arctic expedition was fitted out in the spring of . three vessels, the "thetis," "alert," and "bear," left new york by order of the navy department to search for lieutenant greely and his party, comprising what is known as the lady franklin bay expedition. after a long voyage, in which the vessels were several times in imminent peril, they passed around cape sabine and found lieutenant greely and the seven survivors of his party. their condition was so enfeebled that they could have lived only a little longer. on august th the relief squadron and the rescued party arrived in new york. an insurrection broke out in the united states of colombia in the spring of , during which the city of aspinwall was in great part destroyed. the affair assumed such a serious aspect that the vessels of the north atlantic squadron, under rear admiral jouett, were ordered to aspinwall, and in addition to the fleet, the navy department sent a force consisting of about seven hundred and fifty from new york, for the special purpose of operating on shore. upon his arrival at aspinwall, on april th, rear-admiral jouett issued orders for the landing of a force to open the transit across the isthmus, and on the th, trains were run as usual. on april th, the insurgents capitulated, and shortly afterward the united states naval force was withdrawn. one of the most severe disasters that ever befell the united states navy in time of peace occurred on the th of march, , when, during a hurricane in the harbor of apia, samoa, the "trenton" and "vandalia" were totally wrecked, and the "nipsic" was run on shore to save her from destruction. five officers and forty-six men lost their lives in this catastrophe. nothing that skill and experience could suggest was left undone to avert the disaster, but the vessels were equipped with old-fashioned engines, whose steam-power was not strong enough to withstand the fury of the gale. the value of high-pressure engines in war vessels was illustrated by the british ship "calliope," which was able to steam out to sea, and thus escaped destruction on the reefs. the "trenton" and the "vandalia," which had been two of the best of the old wooden fleet, were abandoned. the "nipsic" sailed for the sandwich islands, where she was refitted for active service. the natives of samoa displayed great heroism in their efforts to save the shipwrecked sailors, and were afterward rewarded by the united states government. fifteen merchant vessels which were in the harbor were either sunk or run upon the shore, and the german naval vessels "elber," "adler," and "olga" were wrecked, with the loss of many men. when the united states cruiser "baltimore" was at anchor in the harbor off valparaiso in october, , shortly after the end of a chilian rebellion, a number of the seamen were given liberty to go on shore. they were attacked by a mob in the streets of valparaiso, and petty officer charles riggin was stabbed, and left to die. another petty officer, johnson, went to his assistance, and was attempting to carry him to an apothecary, when a squad of chilian police, with fixed bayonets, came down the street. when at close quarters, they fired at johnson. a shot passed through his clothes, and another entered riggin's neck, inflicting a death-wound. petty officer hamilton was dragged to jail dangerously wounded. as a result of the attack, two men, riggin and turnbull, died, and eighteen others were disabled by wounds. thirty-six of the "baltimore's" men were arrested, and treated by the chilian police with extreme brutality. investigation proved that all had been perfectly sober and well-behaved. the attack grew out of the bitter hostility of the chilians toward the united states--a feeling largely due to false accusations in reference to the action of the navy during the chilian revolution. the affair caused excitement and indignation in the united states, but was amicably settled. [illustration: wreck of the "kearsarge."] the most important assemblage of naval vessels ever seen in the waters of america took place in april, , in celebration of the columbian quadricentennial. invitations had been sent to all the important maritime powers, and at the rendezvous in hampton roads, on april th, the combined fleet, under the direction of rear-admiral gherardi, of the united states navy, comprised twelve men-of-war of the united states, four of england, three of france, two of italy, two of germany, two of russia, three of brazil, and one of holland. at new york, the squadron was joined by one more russian, three spanish, one argentine vessel, and the "miantonomoh," of the united states navy, making a combined fleet of thirty-five ships-of-war. the president, on board the "dolphin," reviewed the fleet on april th, and the next day the armed battalions of the various nations, to the number of , men, marched through the streets of new york, and were reviewed by the governor of the state. the navy suffered a severe loss in , in the wreck of the famous old man-of-war "kearsarge," the conqueror of the "alabama," which was wrecked february d on roncador reef, while on her way from port au prince to bluefields, nicaragua. eight days later her men were rescued by the "city of para." one of the conspicuous features of the pageants which attended the opening of the kiel canal, between the north and the baltic seas, on june th, , was the fleet of war-vessels which assembled in the harbor at kiel. it was the most remarkable ever seen in any waters, numbering over a hundred of the finest vessels in existence. a number of these, headed by the flagship "new york," belonged to the new navy of the united states. these ships provoked the admiration of all the naval authorities present, and their effective strength was noted and commented upon all over europe. chapter ii. the naval militia. -- a volunteer service which in time of war will be effective. -- how boys are trained for the life of a sailor. -- conditions of enlistment in the volunteer branch of the service. -- the work of the seagoing militia in summer. the _personnel_ of a navy is quite as important as its vessels. it has been said that a ship is worth what her captain and crew are worth. it is certainly true that a man-of-war, of whatever power, would be useless or worse than useless if her officers and men did not understand her wonderfully complicated construction nor know how to handle her. the officers of the united states navy are given this important instruction at the naval academy at annapolis, and the rank and file of the men of the navy, those who fill the positions of seamen and petty officers, are trained at the station in coaster's island harbor, near newport, r.i., and in the training-ships when cruising. the training-station is designed to ensure the thorough efficiency of the corps of men enlisted in the service, and to provide for the manning of the vessels by american citizens instead of by foreigners. there was a time, and not a great while ago, when the gunners and crews of united states men-of-war were, with very few exceptions, aliens, who spoke the english language with difficulty, and who did not have, and could not be expected to have, any of the patriotic spirit which makes effective fighters in naval engagements. while this condition still exists to some extent, the growth of the apprentice system is bringing about a gradual change. as early as an attempt was made to establish a naval apprentice system. in that year congress passed an act making it "lawful to enlist boys for the navy, not under thirteen nor over eighteen years of age, to serve until twenty-one." within a few months several boys were received as apprentices aboard naval vessels. six years later, however, the system was abandoned as a failure, owing to a false impression which had gained wide currency that the apprentices would receive commissions in the navy. capt. s. b. luce and the officers of the practice-ship "macedonian" investigated the apprentice systems at portsmouth and plymouth, england, twenty years afterward, and made such favorable reports that secretary welles was induced to revive it in the united states navy. this was done, and during the civil war the system was in successful operation, but soon after the close of the war it was again abandoned. in the following years the want of intelligent seamen of american birth in the navy was greatly felt, and in secretary of the navy robeson deemed it advisable to resume the enlistment of boys under the naval apprentice law, which was still in existence. as an experiment two hundred and fifty boys were enlisted and placed on the frigates "minnesota" and "constitution" and the sloops of war "portsmouth" and "saratoga," which were commissioned as training-ships. since the training-station and vessels have been very important features of the naval establishment. the regulations governing the enlistment of boys are simple and few in number. the boys must be between the ages of fourteen and sixteen years, of robust form, intelligent, of perfectly sound and healthy constitution, free from all physical defect or malformation, and of good moral character. they must be able to read and write, although in special cases, when a boy shows general intelligence and is otherwise qualified, he may be enlisted notwithstanding the fact that his reading and writing are imperfect. each boy presenting himself for enlistment must be accompanied by his father, mother, or, in case neither is living, by his legally appointed guardian, and must voluntarily sign an agreement to serve in the navy till twenty-one years of age. upon enlistment the boys are rated as third-class apprentices, and are paid $ a month. deserving boys are rated second-class apprentices, and receive pay of $ a month after they have completed their term of service on a cruising training-ship. if they have served a year on a cruising ship of war they are considered properly qualified apprentices, and receive $ a month. as the apprentices become proficient and their services are required, they are transferred to the seagoing vessels. upon the expiration of the enlistment of an apprentice he will, if recommended, receive an honorable discharge, and if he enlists again within three months, will be given pay for this period. the apprentices are under the immediate supervision of the bureau of navigation of the navy department, and applications for enlistment are made to the chief of that bureau at washington, or to the officer commanding either the "vermont," at the brooklyn navy yard, or the "richmond," stationed at the league island yard, philadelphia. these were the recruiting-ships, from which the boys were being sent to the training-station at coaster's island as soon as a squad of twenty were enlisted, at the period of this writing. sometimes there have been more ships in this duty. there are usually about one hundred boys at the station at one time. they are taught to march, handle muskets, revolvers, broadswords, and cannon; they go aloft so as to get practice with the sails, and are also made familiar with the management of boats and oars and boathooks. two hours a day are devoted to lessons, consisting of arithmetic, reading, writing, spelling, geography and grammar. ample time is given for recreation, and innocent social pleasures are encouraged. there are two training-ships, besides the famous old ship "constellation," which figured in the war of , at the station devoted to the use of the boys, and every six months one of these appears at coaster's island, and receives the apprentices who have been at the station for half a year. the vessel then starts on a cruise to europe if it is summer, and to the west indies in the winter. each boy remains aboard a year, only half of the crew being changed at a time. practice aloft and the life in general aboard a sailing vessel give him a broad general foundation of knowledge of the sea and ships, upon which he can build the special training and instruction he afterward gets upon a regular man-of-war. when he is transferred, upon the expiration of his year on the training-ship, he begins the task of mastering the intricacies of a modern ship-of-war. here he remains until his first term of service has expired. if he re-enlists and has shown aptitude for the service, he is sent to washington navy yard for a course of six months' instruction in gunnery and special branches, such as electricity and torpedoes. he becomes a seaman gunner, with the billet and pay of a petty officer. a serious defect in the apprentice system, however, and one which makes it impossible to man the vessels altogether with well-trained american citizens, is the fact that the majority of the apprentices do not re-enlist after receiving their honorable discharge at the age of twenty-one, for the reason that the special training they have received enables them to secure better-paid places in civil life than are possible to them in the navy. in the government service, too, they cannot attain the rank of officers, as there is no such provision for the promotion of enlisted men in the navy as there is in the army. secretary tracy, in his report of , forcibly called the attention of congress to this condition. as a remedy he recommended that there be a statutory extension of the term of enlistment to twenty-four years of age. it was further recommended that the number of apprentices be increased from seven hundred and fifty to fifteen hundred, and that the course in the training-ships be extended by the formation of a special class for training in gunnery on board a ship devoted exclusively to this purpose. congress has as yet taken no action upon these and numerous other recommendations which have been made for the improvement of the apprentice system, and they remain pertinent. the navy, however, in case of war, would not have to depend entirely upon apprentices and graduates of the training-station for its skilled seamen. the naval militia has become an organization that would render very efficient service if called upon by the government. it is composed of about three thousand highly intelligent and well-drilled young men, and has been organized in sixteen states. it bears the same relation to the navy that the national guard does to the regular army, and is therefore wholly under state control; but it is subject to call, of course, by the federal government. the organization of the naval militia has been a growth of the last eight years, and is due in large measure to the reconstruction of the navy and the revival of activity and interest in naval affairs in the united states. it was seen that the new vessels of modern and intricate construction and appliances should, in case of war, be manned by men skilled in the use of these appliances. the apprentice system brought to the navy a supply of apprentices, but the number would be totally inadequate in a naval war. a naval reserve force was an urgent necessity. the first step toward meeting this necessity was made in by senator whitthorne, of tennessee, who in that year introduced a bill "to create a naval reserve of auxiliary cruisers, officers, and men, from the mercantile marine of the united states." the measure did not pass, and the next year another was introduced by senator whitthorne, providing for the enrolment of a naval militia and the organization of naval reserve forces. according to this bill, it was to be lawful for states and territories bordering on sea and lake coasts and navigable rivers to enroll and designate as the naval militia all seafaring men of whatever calling or occupation, and all men engaged in the navigation of the rivers, lakes, and other waters, or in the construction or management of ships and craft, together with ship-owners and their employees, yacht-owners, members of yacht clubs and other associations for aquatic sports, and all ex-officers and former enlisted men of the navy. the bill contemplated a naval reserve artillery and a naval reserve torpedo corps. it did not become a law, but formed a basis for legislation in several of the states shortly afterward, although the original plan, as shown in the proposed measure, was modified to the extent of making the naval militia a state organization and forming it of volunteers irrespective of occupation. massachusetts was the pioneer among the states in the organization of the naval militia. in may, , the legislature passed a bill authorizing the formation of "a naval battalion to be attached to the volunteer militia." this measure was prepared, with the assistance of others, by lieutenant john c. soley, a retired officer of the united states navy, and he was afterward energetic in putting it into successful operation. the next state to provide for a naval militia was pennsylvania, whose legislature made the necessary law in . on the same day the legislature of rhode island "established a naval battalion to be attached to the rhode island militia." in new york, in , a state naval militia of three battalions of naval reserve artillery and a naval reserve torpedo corps, to consist of not less than four companies to a battalion, was established. [illustration: cruiser "columbia" (commerce destroyer).] the practical work of the naval militia began in , when the massachusetts battalion drilled on the receiving-ship "wabash," and the new york battalion on the receiving-ship "minnesota." a very decided impetus was given to the movement in by the appropriation by congress of $ , for arms and equipments for the naval militia, leaving the disbursement of the money to the discretion of the secretary of the navy. within the year california, north carolina, texas, and maryland joined the states having battalions of naval militia, and at its close the force numbered , men. progress was made also in in the method of drilling and instructing the members of some of the battalions. those of new york, massachusetts, and rhode island spent several days aboard the vessels of the squadron of evolution, under the command of rear-admiral j. c. walker, and were given practice with the guns and boats, and participated in the ship's routine duties. further appropriations of $ , each for the naval militia were made in and . the legislatures of vermont and south carolina provided for battalions of the naval militia in , and those which had been authorized, but not yet organized, in maryland and pennsylvania, were formed. during the summer of the members of the north carolina naval militia were drilled on board the "newark." the "wabash," the "chicago," and the "atlanta" were used for drills by the massachusetts battalions, and those of new york received their instruction on the "new hampshire," the "chicago," and the "atlanta." the california naval militia drilled on board the "charleston." the naval militia was increased in by battalions formed in north carolina, michigan, illinois, georgia, and connecticut, under laws of these various legislatures of that year, and the force numbered , officers and men. new jersey and virginia, in , organized battalions of the naval militia, and in that year congress passed an important act, empowering the secretary of the navy to lend temporarily to any state vessels "not suitable or required for the general service, together with such of her apparel, charts, books, and instruments of navigation as he may deem proper, said vessel to be used only by the regularly organized naval militia of the state for the purposes of drill and instruction." even interior states, with no bodies of water other than rivers, have organized naval battalions. at pittsburg the organization owns a small armored gunboat, of the sort that was so useful on inland waters in the civil war. this vessel was presented to the militia by a wealthy manufacturer. few commands, however, are so fortunate. most take advantage of the law authorizing the loan of government ships. under this law the following vessels were lent: the "minnesota" to massachusetts, the "wyandotte" to connecticut, the "new hampshire" to new york, the "portsmouth" and the "ajax" to new jersey, the "st. louis" to pennsylvania, the "dale" to maryland, and the "nantucket" to north carolina. the other states have been compelled to get along without vessels, for the reason that there have been no others available. [illustration: torpedo boat "cushing."] during the summer of the massachusetts brigade of the militia encamped for drill on lovell's island, boston harbor, and the monitor "passaic" was lent to the state. there were also drills and target-practice on the "miantonomoh" and the "atlanta." the forces of connecticut and rhode island received instruction on the "miantonomoh" and the "atlanta" respectively, and new york's battalion spent a week on board the "new york" and the "san francisco" in gardiner's bay, long island. a part of the pennsylvania force had target-practice at sea on board the "new york," and the north carolina battalion received instruction on the "montgomery." [illustration: armored cruiser "new york."] the california division helped to man the "olympia" for a week in , taking the places of the crew; the maryland contingent had a week's cruise on the "dale," and the first naval battalion of new york carried out a scheme of reconnoissance and distant boat work along the northern shore of long island, encamping on shelter island. the party was accompanied by the torpedo boat "cushing." most of the other battalions had their quota of drill and instruction. these details of the summer operations of the naval militia will convey an idea of the manner in which its members are being prepared for the emergencies of war. in addition to the summer work, there is drill in armories in the winter. this course of training, in conjunction with the intelligence and enthusiasm of the young men of the naval militia, who are of the best classes in this country, has made an organization which would doubtless be of very great value in time of war. the uniform of the naval militia consists of a blue cap, blouse, and trousers of blue trimmed with white braid. the working suit is of white duck with white canvas hat. chapter iii. how the navy has grown. -- the cost and character of our new white ships of war. -- our period of naval weakness and our advance to a place among the great naval powers. -- the new devices of naval warfare. -- the torpedo, the dynamite gun, and the modern rifle. -- armor and its possibilities. at the close of the civil war the united states had one of the most formidable navies afloat. the necessities of the war had forced the navy department to the utmost exertion in increasing the number and power of the vessels of the fleets. this work of naval upbuilding and strengthening had been carried on, moreover, till fort fisher fell and hostile operations ceased. the result was that at the close of the war the united states had upon its hands a large number of ships-of-war for which it had no use. the secretary of the navy at once began to reduce the number, and secretaries succeeding him followed the same policy. old vessels which had outlived their usefulness as cruisers were one by one taken out of commission and were not replaced. thus the navy moved steadily on a downward plane. through the seventies and into the eighties this retrogression continued. the lowest ebb was reached in , when the entire naval force numbered only thirty-one vessels in commission, all but four of which were built entirely of wood. they were old-fashioned ships, which had been efficient in a past day, but were totally unfit to cope with the modern warships of foreign naval powers. both their guns and engines were inferior. their sole usefulness, in short, lay in displaying the national flag upon the seas and in the harbors of the commercial world in times of peace. this condition of the navy was referred to by secretary chandler, in his report of , as follows: "it is not the policy of the united states to maintain a large navy, but its reputation, honor, and prosperity require that such naval vessels as it possesses shall be the best which human ingenuity can devise and modern artificers construct. our present vessels are not such and cannot be made such. they should be gradually replaced by iron or steel cruisers, and allowed to go out of commission." it may be of interest to add that in there was only one high-power cannon in the navy, while there were nearly nineteen hundred naval officers, making the proportion of fifty-nine officers for each ship, and one for every five seamen. as the result of secretary chandler's recommendations in his report of , three steel warships and an armed despatch-steamer were authorized by the next congress. the building of these vessels, named the "chicago," the "boston," the "atlanta," and the "dolphin," may be regarded as the first movement toward the making of the new navy of the united states. while progress in naval construction has been so rapid that these ships are a long distance behind the war-vessels of to-day in power, they were then considered to be equal to any afloat in their respective classes. all are unarmored. the "chicago," of forty-five hundred tons displacement and a speed of fourteen knots an hour, was an example of the largest and best unarmored fighting and cruising vessel then built, and, according to secretary chandler, had no superior in speed, endurance, and armament. in the "boston" and "atlanta," each of three thousand tons displacement and a speed of thirteen knots an hour, speed and endurance were supposed to have been given their greatest development, and their fighting power was increased by placing the battery on a central superstructure on the spar-deck and adopting a brig rig, so that the extremities would be clear for a fore and aft fire. the "dolphin," of fifteen hundred tons displacement and a speed of fifteen knots, was designed as an auxiliary in naval operations, and it was expected that she would furnish a model for high-speed commerce-destroyers to be subsequently built. these vessels were constructed at an aggregate cost of over $ , , , in the shipyard of john roach, of chester, pa. the "dolphin" was launched in . the congress which authorized the building of the cruisers also directed that the double-turreted monitors, "puritan," "amphitrite," "terror," and "monadnock," whose keels had been laid several years before, be completed. in accordance with this order they were launched in . in order that the work of the reconstruction of the navy should be carried on as rapidly as possible, the secretary recommended, in and , that seven unarmored cruisers, in addition to the four then in the process of construction, be built. congress adopted his suggestion to the extent of authorizing, in , the construction of two unarmored cruisers, two gunboats, and two armored cruisers. the vessels with which the reconstruction of the navy began--namely the "chicago," the "boston," the "atlanta," and the "dolphin"--were completed about this time, and were in some measure disappointments. it was found that the "dolphin" was better adapted for pleasure trips than for war service, because of the lack of protection against hostile fire. the engines had been so placed as to be exposed above water-line, which was condemned as a serious mistake in a war-vessel without armor-protection. it was realized, too, that the essential characteristic in an unarmored cruiser is great speed. the function she is expected to perform is to destroy commerce; and if she is slower than the merchant-vessels it is useless for her to go to sea; and if she is slower than the iron-clads, and consequently cannot escape from them, she could not long continue her service. the chief objection to the vessels was the lack of a speed equal to that of merchantmen and the cruisers of other countries. the type of protected cruiser with a maximum speed, in some cases as high as twenty knots, developed at this time as a result of the earlier experiments. the torpedo, too, was receiving constant attention, and money was freely spent for its improvement. it was found that vessels at anchor or under slow headway could be protected from torpedoes by being surrounded by a large net. this defence was generally adopted for armored vessels. a stride forward in naval construction in the united states marked the year . before that time a serious obstacle in the way of building up the navy was the lack in the country of manufactories necessary to the construction and armament of a modern war-vessel, namely, that of steel forgings for the heavier guns, of armor for iron-clad vessels, and of secondary batteries, which are an essential portion of the armament. it was important that the country should not be dependent upon foreigners for these necessary implements of warfare, because they are contraband in time of war, and consequently could not then be obtained abroad. secretary of the navy whitney, who succeeded secretary chandler, stipulated, in his advertisements for bids for the contracts of making the armor for the ships under construction, that this armor should be of domestic manufacture. correspondence was also opened with the leading steel manufacturers of the country, offering them inducements to take the matter up. interest was awakened, and it was found upon investigation that armor could be made in the united states as advantageously as abroad. a contract was drawn up with the bethlehem iron company, under which a plant for the production of armor and gun steel was erected at bethlehem, pa., which was designed to be second to none in the world. in the matter of the second batteries, the policy of insisting upon home manufacture was also pursued, with the desired result. congress had authorized, in , the construction of two additional cruisers and two gunboats. in there was further authorization of two armor-clad vessels, each of about six thousand tons, and each to cost, exclusive of armament, not more than $ , , . in the sum of $ , , was appropriated for harbor and coast defence vessels. as a result of this reawakening on the part of congress to the necessity of a respectable navy, and the manifestations of enlightenment in the form of substantial appropriations, secretary whitney was able to state in his report of that upon the completion of the ships under construction, the united states would rank second among the nations in the possession of unarmored cruisers or commerce-destroyers possessing the highest characteristics--namely, size of three thousand tons and upward and a speed of nineteen knots, and more. the vessels, inclusive of the monitors, completed and uncompleted, then composing the navy, were as follows: the "dolphin," "boston," "atlanta," "chicago," whose keels were laid in ; the "charleston" "baltimore," "newark," "philadelphia," "san francisco," protected cruisers, whose keels were laid in and ; and the gunboats "yorktown," "petrel," "concord," "bennington," whose keels were laid in and . in addition to these, there were under construction the dynamite cruiser "vesuvius," with a guaranteed speed of twenty knots an hour, and a first-class torpedo-boat with a speed of twenty-three knots an hour. besides these, five protected cruisers had been authorized, but were not yet in process of construction. [illustration: dynamite cruiser "vesuvius."] the "baltimore," "charlestown," "yorktown," and "petrel" were given their trial trips in , and were accepted by the navy department. the trip of the "baltimore," in particular, was a brilliant success. the horse-power proved to be in excess of the contract requirement, and her highest speed for one hour was . knots--this result being then unparalleled by any warship in the world of the "baltimore's" displacement. when benjamin f. tracy became secretary of the navy, in he called attention to the fact that, while the united states had secured a number of excellent vessels of the cruiser type, it did not as yet possess an efficient navy. he pointed out that the country had two widely separated ocean frontiers to protect, and that there was only one way to protect them, namely, by two separate fleets of armored battle-ships. he said further that in addition to the battle-ships, the condition of the country required at least twenty vessels for coast and harbor defence, and, moreover, that the employment of these ships as floating fortresses demanded that they be equipped with the most powerful batteries and the heaviest of armor. it may be said parenthetically that eight vessels of this type, five of which were reconstructed monitors, were under construction or had been authorized at that time. secretary tracy recommended the authorization by the following congress of eight armored battle-ships. he also said that the united states could not afford to neglect torpedo-boats, with which the foreign naval powers were well supplied, and he recommended that appropriations be made for the construction of at least five of these boats of the first and second class. the year before, the keel of the first of the battle-ships, the "texas," had been laid in the navy-yard at norfolk, va., and in work was begun at the brooklyn navy yard upon another vessel of the same class, the "maine." these vessels are respectively of , and , tons displacement. the construction of a third battle-ship, which had been provided for, had not yet been begun. secretary tracy's recommendations reveal clearly the naval condition in . previous to that year the additions to the navy had consisted chiefly of cruisers of from three to four thousand tons, and of gunboats under two thousand tons; but, acting upon the secretary's report, congress, on june , , authorized, in addition to another armored cruiser, three seagoing coast-line battle-ships. these were an entirely new class of vessels in the united states navy, and their authorization marks another distinct step in its reconstruction. an appropriation was made in for an additional armored cruiser, designed to be a sister ship to the one provided for in . it was the purpose to make these vessels more powerful than any of their type in the navy. their tonnage was fixed at , , and their maximum speed at twenty-two knots. they were to be given coal capacity that would enable them to cruise for great distances without recoaling. this, it will be seen, is an important advantage to a navy so destitute of coaling-stations abroad as that of the united states. the vessels under construction in were the monitors "puritan," "amphitrite," "monadnock," and "terror," which had been begun in , but had been neglected in subsequent years; the "maine," the "texas," the coast-defence vessel "monterey," which was launched in ; the "new york," "cincinnati," "raleigh," "detroit," and a practice-ship, which had been authorized by the act of ; the harbor-defence ram "katahdin;" and gunboats " " and " ," authorized in ; the three battle-ships, "indiana," "massachusetts," and "oregon," and the protected cruiser "no. ," authorized by the act of ; and protected cruiser "no. ," provided for in . three vessels, the "newark," the "concord," and the "bennington," were given their trial trips in . the behavior of the "newark" proved her to be a valuable addition to the list of cruisers. the "concord" and the "bennington," vessels of the gunboat class, similar to the "yorktown," also gave evidences of power and usefulness. they carry a comparatively heavy battery, while their light draught enables them to run into shallow rivers and bays, and thus perform services for which larger vessels are incapacitated. the subject of the organization of a naval militia or reserve had been discussed for some time before secretary tracy assumed his office. he forcibly urged the necessity of such an organization in his first and in following annual reports, until, in , congress appropriated $ , for arms for the militia. this was a decided impetus toward its development, and at the close of the year it existed in six states, an effective, well-drilled, and organized force of eleven hundred men. the year saw considerable progress in the development of the navy. two important vessels, the "iowa," a first-class, seagoing battle-ship of , tons displacement, and the "brooklyn," an armored cruiser of , tons displacement, were provided for by congress. the cruisers "texas," "columbia," "olympia," "raleigh," and "cincinnati," and the gunboats "machias" and "castine" were launched. secretary tracy's administration of the affairs of the navy, which closed in , was one of marked progress and development; and this development was not confined to ships alone. experiments extending over a period of three years had resulted in the adopting of an armor of new composition, namely, nickel-steel, which had been found to be far superior to any before known. the manufacture of torpedoes had been domesticated. since the heavy, rapid-firing guns had been developed and proved successful. the manufacture of armor-piercing shells, of which two firms in europe had had the monopoly, was begun in this period under the care and encouragement of the navy department; and the shells turned out soon surpassed the foreign product. through investigation and experiment conducted by its own agencies, the navy department succeeded in developing a smokeless powder, which gave better results than that made abroad. careful and protracted experiments with high explosives were also carried on, with the result of developing an explosive that can be safely used in shells fired from high-power guns. in , the first year of the administration of secretary herbert, the following vessels were launched: the armored battle-ships "indiana" and "massachusetts;" the protected cruiser "minneapolis;" the unarmored and very rapid cruiser "marblehead;" and the armed coast-defence ram "katahdin." during the same year congress authorized the construction of three new vessels, to be of the class known as light-draft protected gunboats. these are of about twelve hundred tons displacement, and are designed for river service in china and elsewhere. several vessels, namely, the "monterey," "bancroft," "detroit," "new york," armored cruiser of , tons displacement, and the gunboat "machias," were given their trial trips in . the results were in each case satisfactory, and the vessels were added to the effective fleet of the navy. before the united states had been behind the other important nations in the matter of small-arms equipment. the navy was still using the old-fashioned, large-calibre rifle, employing a charge of black powder, and effectively carrying only twelve hundred yards. under secretary herbert's direction, a board of naval officers investigated the improved small arms in use in foreign navies, and made recommendations which resulted in the adoption of a small-calibre magazine rifle, in which is used smokeless powder, and which has an effective range of a mile and a half. a further advantage of the new rifle is that it employs cartridges of such a weight that no less than two hundred rounds can be carried by one man. the cartridges used in the old rifle were so heavy that one man could not carry more than fifty rounds. secretary herbert recommended in his report of that congress authorize the construction of at least one new battle-ship and six torpedo-boats. he said that for the defence of ports the latter are more effective according to cost than any class of vessels. the knowledge of their existence alone will make an enemy chary about approaching within bombarding distance. the value of this boat is recognized by all naval powers, and they are being built abroad in great numbers. the next naval appropriation contained a provision authorizing the construction of three additional torpedo-boats of the general type of the "ericsson," which was then ready for trial. the design for the new boat called for a speed of not less than twenty-four and one-half knots an hour. the battle-ships "indiana," "texas," and "oregon" underwent preliminary trial trips in , and were accepted by the government in . it is of interest to note that until these vessels were put in commission, the navy was still in the condition that existed when president cleveland, in his first message to congress in , made the following statement: "we have not a single vessel that could keep the seas against a first-class vessel of any important power." it is true that vessels of size and power enough to hold their own against the battle-ships of other nations had been under construction for several years, but the united states was still without an available man-of-war of the first class until the "indiana" and the "oregon" joined the fleet. considerable progress in naval affairs marked the year . one of the important events was the adding to the commissioned fleet of the coast-defence monitor "amphitrite," whose keel was laid in . the work of remodelling her was begun in , under the appropriation made by congress in . the "amphitrite" is in some respects an old-fashioned type of vessel, but is nevertheless capable of important service. her displacement is , tons. her armor and armament are heavy, although not so powerful as that of the battle-ships. her main advantage, as with all of the monitors, is that she presents a comparatively small target for the enemy's fire. [illustration: united states battle-ship "indiana."] adopting the spirit of secretary herbert's recommendations in his report of , congress, in , authorized the construction of two coast-line battle-ships of most formidable equipment and power, their cost not to exceed $ , , each. further provision was made for the building of twelve torpedo-boats. an interesting feature of the bill was the stipulation that one of the battle-ships shall bear the historic name "kearsarge," after the famous old man-of-war that was wrecked in on roncador reef. according to the plans of the new ships, they resemble in a general way the "indiana," although they are longer and broader and have a greater displacement, and their batteries are more powerful. a new feature in the arrangement of the guns was decided upon. the vessels will carry two turrets of two stories each. many objections to this plan were advanced, but it was said that all are outweighed by the opportunity which the turrets give of concentrating an enormous quantity of shot on a given point. an estimate has been made that the "kearsarge" will carry enough ammunition to kill or disable a million persons, and that she will be able to discharge it all within a period of five hours. accommodations will be provided for five hundred and twenty officers and men. the "kearsarge" and her sister ship, which will be called the "kentucky," will carry heavier armor and guns and a greater quantity of the latter than any foreign battle-ship in existence or in course of construction. the ram "katahdin" was rejected by the government in , because, upon her official trials, she did not fulfil the speed requirements. she made . knots, while the contract called for knots. congress was asked to purchase the vessel, and finally did so. the armored cruiser "brooklyn," designed to be one of the fastest and most powerful vessels of her class afloat, was launched from cramp's shipyard in philadelphia in . she is the sister ship to the "new york," which was put in commission in . a matter of significance, as showing the rapid progress in the art of naval construction within a few years, was the taking out of commission in of the "chicago," to be refitted with engines and boilers that will give her powers approaching those of the newer vessels. two years will be required for this work, and when she is complete she will travel three knots an hour faster than heretofore, and in many respects will be substantially a new ship. the official trial trip of the battle-ship "massachusetts," which occurred in , was a source of gratification to the navy department and to all others who are anxious to see the united states take respectable rank among the naval powers. the primary business of a battle-ship is to fight; hence her guns and not her speed are of the first importance. naval experts have agreed that the "massachusetts" and her sister ships, the "indiana" and the "oregon," have larger and more effective batteries than any man-of-war afloat or in progress of construction. the "massachusetts" has now proved, by steaming at the rate of . knots for four hours, with a maximum speed of . knots, that she is superior to all other battle-ships in speed as well as in armament. her performance is unparalleled in naval history, and makes her the foremost war-vessel of the world. the "indiana" is a trifle slower. she steamed . knots for four hours, but under the disadvantage of a bottom that had never been cleaned. she would probably go half a knot faster with a clean bottom. as a representative specimen of the battle-ships which belong to the navy, a few details of the "massachusetts'" armament may be of interest. she has thirty guns in all. the chief of these are four of thirteen-inch calibre, which are the largest in use in modern navies; a pair of them can be fired every three minutes. the eight-inch guns are next in size. there are four of them, and they can be fired every minute. in addition to these, there are two six-inch rifles, twenty six-pounders, and four one-pounders. the six-inch guns can be fired twice a minute, and the six-pounders twenty times in the same period. in a fight lasting thirty minutes, these guns would throw forty-one and a half tons of metal, of which forty-four thousand pounds would be the share of the thirteen-inch guns, thirty thousand pounds the share of the eight-inch, six thousand pounds of the six-inch, and thirty-six hundred pounds of the others. the total weight of the "massachusetts'" broadside is , pounds, and of her head or astern fire , pounds. another of the monitors, the "monadnock," was added to the navy in . she was launched in , and was then practically left alone until the acts of , , and provided for her completion. she is now a formidable vessel, with heavy guns which can be made to bear on a point a small boat's length from the ship's side, or can bombard at a distance of six miles. while the successive secretaries of the navy, during the last fourteen years, have been chiefly active in increasing the number of ships-of-war, they have not altogether neglected defences on the coast. some of the larger seacoast cities have succeeded in obtaining a part of the heavy gun and mortar batteries that would be necessary in repelling attacks without the aid of battle-ships. the cities of new york and san francisco have now mounted and ready for action powerful pneumatic dynamite gun batteries, the most destructive engines of war in existence. each of these guns is capable of hurling a projectile carrying five hundred pounds of the most powerful explosive known to man, and is able to destroy the strongest iron-clad. in the naval battle of sinope in the crimean war, a shell designed to explode on striking the object was used for the first time. when the high explosives, such as dynamite and gun-cotton, appeared, the idea suggested itself that they might be used in the shells with vastly greater effect than gunpowder, which had been employed. the objection, however was that these explosives are so sensitive that there was great danger of their exploding at the outset of the journey from the sudden shock of being hurled from the ordinary high-power guns and mortars. captain zalinski, of the united states artillery, suggested a method of gun construction by which the shells could be projected by a steady pressure of compressed air instead of by the sudden force of powder gases. this system has been steadily improved until the pneumatic dynamite gun now works perfectly and is a marvel of destructiveness. the united states possesses six and great britain one of the seven dynamite guns that have thus far been manufactured for coast defence. the "iowa," a battle-ship of the first class whose keel was laid in , was launched in march, . she is the largest vessel of the navy now afloat, her displacement being , tons, which is over a thousand tons greater than that of the "massachusetts," "indiana," or "oregon." it will be seen that progress toward the building of the new navy of the united states has been steady since the first move was made in . as a result of this development, the navy now consists, counting the vessels built and authorized by congress, prior to , the naval appropriations bill for that year still pending at this writing, of about seventy modern ships-of-war. these include eight battle-ships, six coast-defence steel-clads, two armored cruisers, one armored ram, thirteen protected cruisers, eighteen gunboats and unprotected cruisers, and about two dozen torpedo-boats. this fleet gives the united states sixth place in the list of naval powers, being outranked in number of vessels by england, france, russia, germany, or italy, in the order named. a true idea of the comparative fighting strength of the united states navy is not conveyed, however, by its rank in the numerical strength of the fleet. the _personnel_ of the navy and the power of the individual ships must be considered. it is generally conceded that the united states has the finest fighting men and vessels in the world. these advantages would, in all probability, enable us to whip germany or italy in a series of naval contests; therefore, it is thought by naval critics that we really hold fourth position among the naval powers. england is still a long way ahead of us, the english navy now numbering nearly five hundred vessels, of which one hundred and twenty are armored cruisers. but, comparing the navies ship to ship, the united states fleet, so far as it goes, is superior even to that of great britain. the battle-ships, while somewhat smaller, are more effective fighters. the english navy has no armored cruisers as fast or as powerful as the "new york" and "brooklyn;" and the commerce-destroyers, "columbia" and "minneapolis," are the fastest vessels, either of war or peace, that have gone to sea. that this new navy of ours will ever have to meet so stern an ordeal as that through which the sailors of ' went is wholly improbable. in multiplying the number and the effectiveness of fighting machines the nations of the world have seemingly lessened the likelihood of war. international disputes which once would have put the territory of all europe ablaze are now settled by the peaceful devices of diplomacy. but behind the diplomat must be the gun, and it will be a sorry day for the united states when, if ever, the sense of security bred of an avowed national policy of non-intervention in foreign affairs shall lead this people to neglect the naval arm of the republic. part v. the naval war with spain. chapter i. the state of cuba. -- pertinacity of the revolutionists. -- spain's sacrifices and failure. -- spanish barbarities. -- the policy of reconcentration. -- american sympathy aroused. -- the struggle in congress. -- the assassination of the "maine." -- report of the commission. -- the onward march to battle. a short time after the inauguration of william mckinley as president of the united states in march, , it became apparent that the disordered condition of cuba under spanish rule was destined inevitably to become an issue which the united states must help to settle. for two years a great part of the island had been in open and determined revolt against spanish rule. though the forces of the king had been able to hold the seaports, thus cutting off the insurgents from regular communication with the outer world and making impotent their efforts to secure recognition from foreign powers, the patriots under maceo and gomez held control of the interior, established a government of their own, enforced order, and levied taxes. enormous sacrifices were made by the spanish people to re-establish sovereignty in the island. more than , troops were sent thither to be cruelly cut down by plague and pestilence. a nation, long on the verge of bankruptcy, incurred uncomplainingly prodigious additional indebtedness to save for its boy king--alphonso xiii. was at this time but twelve years old--its most precious possession in the west, the pearl of the antilles. queen isabella of spain pawned her jewels that columbus might have the means to press his voyage of discovery into unknown seas, but in the closing years of this century the people of spain pawned their national assets, put even themselves and their posterity in pawn to hold for spain the last relics of the empire which columbus won for her. though we were forced to draw the sword upon spain in the cause of humanity and human liberty, the man of reason, and of a sense of justice, will not withhold from the people of that sorely chastened nation admiration for their loyalty and the sacrifices they made in their national cause. but the spanish people were cruelly betrayed by their own rulers. the generals whom they sent to cuba gave less thought to the suppression of the insurrection than to filling their own pockets. out of the millions and millions of pesetas set aside by an already impoverished people for the needs of war, a great part was stolen by generals and by army contractors. the young conscripts, sent from spain to a land where the air is pestilential to the unacclimated, were clothed and shod in shoddy; their food invited disease, and when they fell ill it was found that the greed of the generals had consumed the funds that should have provided sufficient hospital service. comparatively few fell before the bullets or machetes of the insurgents--for, as we shall see, the revolutionists adopted the tactics of fabius--but by thousands they succumbed to fevers of every kind. death without glory was the hapless lot of the spanish conscript. the patriot generals, maximo gomez and antonio maceo, met this situation with consummate skill. the military problem which confronted them was one which chiefly demanded self-restraint. they were lamentably destitute of arms and munitions of war. cartridges were a dearly prized acquisition, and it is worth noting, as an indication of the venality which corrupted the spanish army, that a considerable share of the insurgent ammunition was obtained by direct traffic with the spanish soldiers. but in the main the patriots were armed with heterogeneous firearms and the machete--a heavy, sword-like knife, used, in peace, for cutting cane. the latter at close quarters was a formidable weapon, and the insurgents became singularly proficient in its use; developing a style of machete play almost as exact and scientific as the school of the rapier in ancient france. this disparity in weapons, however, made it imperative that the insurgents should avoid pitched battles with the invaders, who were armed with mauser rifles, that do deadly work at two miles' distance. accordingly, gomez and maceo confined themselves to harrying the spanish army of occupation on every side and destroying all vestiges of spanish authority outside the large towns. warfare of this sort inevitably develops into the most cruel, the most barbarous of conflicts. so it was in this case. that cuba might be made desolate, unable to pay anything toward the price of its own subjection, the insurgents relentlessly destroyed standing crops, burned great fields of standing sugar cane, destroyed mills, dynamited railroads, tore up roads, and demolished aqueducts. that the peaceful inhabitants--the pacificos--might not give aid or comfort to the revolutionists, general weyler caused them to be driven from their farms and herded in the towns still under spanish rule. there they stayed, in squalid huts or under thatched sheds, and starved. systematically, with devilish ingenuity, spain planned to crush cuba, not by fighting the revolutionists, but by starving women and children, old men and peaceful farm hands. it is estimated, and conservatively, that more than , people had been starved to death before the united states interfered. indeed, it was upon the hapless pacificos that the horrors of war chiefly descended. they were ruined, but that was the least. their property, the honor of their women, and their lives were held to be the legitimate spoil of any spanish soldier, and the tacit legalization of loot, rapine, and murder was taken full advantage of. more inhuman even than the regular soldiery were the guerrillas, licensed free companions, who roamed the island ever in search of spoil. the deeds of these wretches beggar description, and so foul was the repute of their corps that prisoners from their number taken by the cubans were instantly put to death. it is just to say here that the testimony of americans who served with gomez and maceo proves that those leaders enforced humane and orderly conduct upon their followers. the death penalty was more than once imposed upon useful and brave soldiers, who had been guilty of outrage. nothing could more vividly indicate the moral difference between the cuban and the spaniard than the contrast between their methods of prosecuting the war. though outlawed, the revolutionists observed with scrupulous exactness the rules of civilized warfare, while the spaniards murdered helpless prisoners, even killing the wounded in their beds, had recourse to torture and to nameless mutilation, in order to wreak their hatred, and let loose a swarm of bandits and ruffians to prey upon the defenseless people of the island. out of warfare such as this, waged on an island only a few hours' sail from our coast, and in which were heavy american interests, it was inevitable that invasion of american rights should proceed, and the wrath of the american people be awakened. our citizens owned large plantations in cuba, which were destroyed either by the spaniards or the insurgents. many americans living in the island or visiting there, were arrested by the spanish authorities, and one, at least, dr. ruiz, was murdered in morro castle, while another a newspaper correspondent, was cut to pieces by guerrillas. for spanish outrages upon the lives or property of american citizens, claims aggregating $ , , were on file with the united states department of state before the declaration of war. the general sympathy of the american people with the insurgents, as well as the hope of profit, led to repeated efforts by our citizens to smuggle arms and munitions of war to the cubans, and in time it became necessary to employ a great part of the united states navy in police duty on the high seas for the purpose of stopping the filibusters. this service in behalf of spain was exceedingly repugnant to the american mind, and contributed greatly to the growing feeling of irritation toward spain. history in coming ages, however, will relate, to the unending horror and glory of the american people, that humanitarian considerations, rather than regard for imperiled interests, brought the united states into a war which most emphatically their people did not desire. the great new york newspapers, day by day, printed circumstantial accounts of the frightful sufferings in cuba. one journal secured a great number of photographs of scenes amid the starving reconcentrados, which, greatly enlarged, were publicly exhibited in all parts of the union. these pictures, showing the frightful distortions of the human body as the result of long starvation, showing little children, mere skeletons, looking mutely down on the dead bodies of their parents, brought home to the mind of the people the state of life in a neighboring land as no writing, however brilliant, could. a cry went up from every part of the united states that a christian duty was imposed upon our nation to interfere for the alleviation of such horrible suffering. charity came to the rescue with free contributions of provisions, and congress made a heavy appropriation of money for the relief of the cubans. but everywhere the opinion grew that philanthropy alone could not right this great wrong, but that the strong hand of the united states must reach forth to pluck out the spaniard from the land he ravaged. and when a number of senators and representatives in congress made journeys to cuba, and returning, described in formal addresses at the capitol the scenes of starvation and misery, this opinion hardened into positive conviction. then, almost as if planned by some all-knowing power, came a great and inexplicable disaster, which made american intervention inevitable and immediate. during the latter years of the cleveland administration the representatives of american interests in cuba urged that a united states ship-of-war should be permanently stationed in havana harbor. the request was reasonable, the act in thorough accord with the custom of nations. but, fearing to offend spain, president cleveland avoided taking the step and president mckinley for months imitated him. in time this act, which in itself could have had no hostile significance, came to be regarded as an expression of hostility to spain, and all the resources of spanish diplomacy were exerted to prevent any american warship from entering havana harbor. ultimately, however, the pressure of public opinion compelled the executive to provide for representation of american authority in the disordered island, and the battle-ship "maine"--a sister ship to the "iowa," a picture of which appears elsewhere in this volume--was sent to havana. the night of february the "maine" lay quietly at her anchorage in the havana harbor. her great white hull, with lights shining brilliantly from the ports aft where the officers' quarters were, gleamed in the starlight. on the berth deck the men swung sleeping in their hammocks. the watch on deck breathed gratefully the cool evening air after the long tropic day. captain sigsbee was at work in his cabin, and the officers in the wardroom were chatting over their games or dozing over their books. the lights of the town and of the ancient fortress of morro shone brightly through the purpling light. not far away the spanish man-of-war "alfonso xiii." lay at her moorings, and an american merchantman, brightly lighted, was near. the scene was peaceful, quiet, beautiful. true, in the minds of many officers and men on the american warship there was a lurking and indefinable sense of danger. their coming had been taken by the spaniards in havana as a hostile act. though all the perfunctory requirements of international courtesy had been complied with, salutes interchanged, visits of ceremony paid and returned, there was yet in the spanish greeting an ill-concealed tone of anger. in the cafés spanish officers cursed the yankees and boasted of their purpose to destroy them. on the streets american blue-jackets, on shore leave, were jostled, jeered, and insulted. yet the ill-temper of the spaniards, though apparent, was so ill defined that no apprehension of a positive attack was felt. as is the practice on men-of-war, however, the utmost vigilance was maintained. only the employment of a boat patrol and the use of torpedo nettings were lacking to give the "maine" the aspect of a ship in an enemy's harbor. then came the disaster that shocked the world. a disaster in which it is impossible not to suspect the element of treachery. a disaster which if purely accidental, occurring to a hated ship in a port surrounded by men who were enemies at heart, was the most extraordinary coincidence in history. the story is brief. not until this war is ended and the authority of the united states is employed to clear up the mystery, can the real narrative of the destruction of the "maine" be told. this much we know: at about half-past nine those on the "maine" who lived to tell the tale heard a sudden dull explosion, with a slight shock, then a prolonged, deep, furious roar, which shook the ship to its very vitals. the people on the other ships in the harbor saw the whole forward portion of the "maine" suddenly become a flaming volcano belching forth fire, men, huge pieces of steel, and bursting shells. portions of the ship's hull rained down on decks a thousand yards away. when the first fierce shock of the explosion was past, it was seen that the "maine" was on fire and was rapidly sinking. how wonderful is the power of discipline upon the human mind! on the great battle-ship, with hundreds of its men blown to pieces or penned down by steel débris to be drowned in the rapidly rising waters, there was no panic. captain sigsbee, rushing from his cabin door, is met by the sergeant of marines who serves him as orderly. not a detail of naval etiquette is lacking. sergeant william anthony salutes: "i have to report, sir, that the ship is blown up and is sinking," he says, as he would report a pilot boat in the offing. the captain reaches the deck to find his officers already at work, the men who have not been injured all at their stations. boats are lowered and ply about the harbor to rescue survivors. though the flames rage fiercely, and the part of the ship which they have not yet reached is full of high explosives, there is no panic. at the first alarm every man has done what years of drill and teaching have taught him to do. the after-magazines have been flooded, the boats' crews called away. even preparations for a fight had been attempted. lieutenant jenkins, hearing the first explosion, sprang so quickly for his station at a forward gun that he was caught in the second explosion and slain. though a bolt from heaven or a shock from hell had struck the "maine," it brought death only--not fear nor panic. the work of rescuing survivors and caring for the wounded was pushed apace, for the ship sunk rapidly, until only her after-superstructure was above the water. boats from the spanish man-of-war joined in the work of mercy and her officers, as though conscious that the suspicion of treachery was first in every man's mind, exerted themselves in every way to show solicitude for the wounded and sorrow for the disaster. when all was done that could be done, and the roll of the ship's company was called, it was found that brave americans were lost in havana harbor--a friendly port. some lie there yet, penned down beneath the gnarled and scorched steel which formed the gallant "maine"; others lie in lonely graves on the adjacent shore, where, before this war is ended, the american flag shall be raised above them to be their avenger and their monument. * * * * * it will be necessary to outline in only the most terse and condensed form the political and military events which succeeded the destruction of the "maine" and led up to the declaration of war. the news of the great disaster was received at home with horror, speedily turning to anger. the government, rightly desiring to proceed calmly and in accordance with regularly ascertained facts, strove to calm the public temper, but with little success. it gave out as captain sigsbee's first report of the disaster a cable message, which contained no charge of treachery, advised caution, and urged a suspension of judgment. but presently it became rumored about washington that this dispatch was, in fact, sent under orders; that the captain's first report formally charged the spaniards with blowing up the ship. in the newspapers the discussion raged and theories of the disaster were plentiful, but, after long weeks of careful study of the evidence, the naval board of inquiry presented the following report: when the "maine" arrived at havana, she was conducted by the regular government pilot to buoy no. , to which she was moored in from five to six fathoms of water. the state of discipline on board, and the condition of her magazines, boilers, coal-bunkers, and storage compartments, are passed in review, with the conclusion that excellent order prevailed, and that no indication of any cause for an internal explosion existed in any quarter. at eight o'clock on the evening of february everything had been reported secure, and all was quiet. at . o'clock the vessel was suddenly destroyed. there were two distinct explosions, with a brief interval between them. the first lifted the forward part of the ship very perceptibly; the second, which was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume, is attributed by the court to the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines. the evidence of the divers establishes that the after-part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the explosion. the forward part was completely demolished. upon the evidence of a concurrent external cause the finding of the court is as follows: at frame the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship and six feet above the keel when in its natural position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water; therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured. the outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed v-shape, the after-wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from frame to frame ), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward. at frame the vertical keel is broken in two and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plates. this break is now about six feet below the surface of the water and about thirty feet above its normal position. in the opinion of the court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship, at about frame , and somewhat on the port side of the ship. the conclusions of the court are: that the loss of the "maine" was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of her crew. that the ship was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of her forward magazines; and, that no evidence has been obtainable fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the "maine" upon any person or persons. [illustration: partial view of the wreck of the "maine."] to-day, in the midst of war with spain, we have no more definite, no more authoritative knowledge of the cause of this disaster than this. spain, indeed, through her official commission, decided that the explosion was wholly internal, but the american people is not convinced. battleships are not in the habit of blowing themselves up, and it is the expectation that the establishment of american authority in cuba will be followed by the unraveling of this murderous plot. undoubtedly an anecdote told of captain robley d. evans (fighting bob) of the navy expresses the popular conviction: "the admiral in command of the united states fleet at key west should have sailed for havana on getting news of the 'maine's' destruction," said evans. "he should have reduced the forts, seized the city, discovered the assassins, and hanged them." "but that would have been defiance of the orders of the navy department," responded his auditor, aghast. "perhaps so," admitted evans, "but the man who did it would have been the next president of the united states." while the "maine" court of inquiry was in session measures looking toward war were rapidly taken. march , a bill, which had passed both houses of congress without a dissenting voice, became a law, appropriating $ , , to be expended for the national defense. out of this sum the navy department bought two brazilian cruisers building in england, which were rechristened the "new orleans" and "albany." a flotilla of yachts, seagoing tugs, and merchantmen was bought and refitted. the great american liners "st. paul," "city of paris," "city of new york," and "st. louis" were chartered and made into auxiliary cruisers. all europe was ransacked for purchasable warships and torpedo boats, with the result of proving that no nation, however rich, can equip itself with a navy in an emergency. not one battle-ship was available for purchase, and only four cruisers, of doubtful quality. and while this work of preparation was going hurriedly on the country was drifting into war with what seemed at the time inexplicable slowness, but to the calmer backward glance of history will appear dangerously swift in the face of our great lack of preparation. what might be termed the milestones on the march to battle were these: _april ._--consul general fitz hugh lee recalled from havana. _april ._--message of the president on cuba, recommending that we have power to intervene forcibly without "recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent government." _april ._--the house passed a resolution directing the president to intervene in cuba at once, and authorizing him to use the land and naval forces of the united states to stop the war. _april ._--the senate passed a joint resolution, as a substitute for the house resolution, declaring the island to be free, recognizing the republic, demanding relinquishment of authority in cuba by spain, and withdrawal of spanish forces; directing the president to call out the militia in addition to regular land and naval forces, and, finally, disclaiming any intention to annex the island. _april ._--senate resolution adopted by the house, with the proviso recognizing the republic of cuba stricken out. both houses agreed to the report in this form. _april ._--ultimatum to spain, cabled at a.m.--a formal demand that spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of cuba, and withdraw its land and naval forces from cuba and cuban waters. president signed cuban joint resolutions at . . señor polo y bernabé, the spanish minister, was notified. he at once requested his passports. _april ._--general woodford, the american minister at madrid, left spain. the president directed the secretary of the navy to order the vessels of the north atlantic squadron to proceed without delay to cuban waters to blockade havana and other ports of the island. _april ._--president mckinley signed the proclamation calling for , volunteers. _april ._--formal declaration of war recommended by the president, and a bill "declaring that war exists between the united states of america and the kingdom of spain," passed by both houses. and so the united states embarked on its first war with any european power, save england--a war forced upon us by every consideration of humanity--a war which shall be of great advantage or of great harm to our republic, according as its fruits are wisely or wrongly administered. chapter ii. the opening days of the war. -- the first blow struck in the pacific. -- dewey and his fleet. -- the battle at manila. -- an eye-witness' story. -- delay and doubt in the east. -- dull times for the blue-jackets. -- the discovery of cervera. -- hobson's exploit. -- the outlook. strangely enough the first warlike stroke at spain was not delivered in or about cuba, where the quarrel arose, but in the other hemisphere, in the far-away waters of the asiatic pacific, where the american flag is almost a stranger and the power and wealth of the great american republic are unknown. in the philippine islands spain retains one of the colonies with which she once encircled the globe. more than , , people--a peace-loving, kindly, intelligent race--are there ruled by the spaniards, and as the rule was of the characteristic spanish kind, with all the accompaniments of slaughter, dishonor, and extortion, the natives--as in cuba--were in a chronic state of rebellion. one uprising, which had assumed very considerable proportions, was reported by the spaniards as suppressed just before our declaration of war. that event, however, aroused the revolutionists again and, as we shall see, they were of the greatest service to us as allies. when war was declared an american squadron of six warships lay at hong kong. the vessels were the "olympia," protected cruiser; "raleigh," "baltimore," and "boston," cruisers; "concord" and "petrel," gunboats, and the revenue cutter "mcculloch." not a very powerful fleet--not a battle-ship nor even an armored cruiser among them--but the ships carried crews of as sturdy yankee blue-jackets as ever trained a gun, and when the time came for daring an enemy's fire the little "petrel" was as dashing and defiant as the stoutest of steel-clads could be. in command of the squadron was admiral george dewey, a vermonter, who served with farragut and had his baptism of fire at the forts below new orleans. in time of peace the war record of a subaltern is quickly forgotten, and dewey patiently climbed the ladder of promotion until found him a commodore and in command of the asiatic squadron, without anybody's remembering particularly that this officer in far hong kong had seen fighting and knew how to bear himself under fire. it is a significant fact that when he had won the first great victory of the war, and the newspapers were searching everywhere for stories illustrative of his character, it was discovered that he had chiefly impressed himself on the washington mind by his excessive punctiliousness in matters of dress. four days after the declaration of war there was a commotion on the ships of dewey's squadron. the signal to weigh anchor flew from the foremast of the "olympia," and everybody knew that the admiral had received fighting orders. for some days past the ships had been in their battle rigging. the white paint had been covered by a dull greenish-gray. all woodwork, railings, and unnecessary hamper had been stripped off and sent ashore. the officers' baggage was reduced to the barest necessities. nothing was left anywhere on board which could be turned into a cloud of flying splinters by a shell, or which cumbered the decks to the inconvenience of the gunners. the warships which, in time of peace, were as bright and sparkling as a well-kept yacht, had put on the sullen, vicious air of war. dewey's objective point when he set sail from the harbor of hong kong was the asiatic squadron of spain, under the command of admiral montojo. there was every reason to believe that he would find the enemy under the protecting guns of the forts that guarded the harbor of manila. in themselves the spanish ships were no match for the american fleet. three good ships had admiral montojo--the "reina cristina," the "castilla," and the "don antonio de ulloa"; but his others were old-fashioned and lacking in modern armament. but should they take positions under the guns of the spanish forts, at the end of a channel plentifully guarded by mines and torpedoes, the disparity in forces would disappear. as it occurred this was precisely what they did, giving admiral dewey opportunity to put into practice tactics which it seems he had studied for months in anticipation of exactly such an emergency. on the night of april the american ships arrived at the entrance of manila harbor, unseen by the sentries on the forts. it was known that montojo was inside, and every light was extinguished and every noise hushed on the yankee ships, for the admiral had planned a midnight entrance to the stronghold. the ships were stripped for action, boats covered with canvas, nettings spread to prevent splinters from flying, partitions removed, and ammunition hoists and bullet shields put up. at midnight the entrance to the harbor began, the ships steaming in single column at about six knots an hour, with the "olympia" leading. strangely enough not a single torpedo or mine in the channel was exploded, though the spaniards discovered the advance of the ships and opened fire from the forts. the first shot in answer was fired by a gunner on the "boston," without orders. he saw the flash of a gun on a shore battery and instantly fired his piece without altering its elevation. that dismantled a gun in the spanish works and killed thirty men. for a few hours after passing the forts the wearied blue-jackets slept at their guns. with the approach of day came the signal from the flagship to prepare for action. in the gray dawn the spanish fleet could be seen about two miles distant, at such a point that their fire could be re-enforced by the guns of the forts. a most graphic story of the action that followed, as seen from the view-point of "the man behind the gun," whom captain mahan eulogizes, is told by chief gunner evans of the "boston," from whose narrative i quote the following paragraphs: [illustration: dewey at manila.] "we were steaming very slowly, but increasing speed as the dawn increased. in the gray daylight we could make out a line of ships anchored in front of the city. then we steamed ahead faster. the ships ahead proved to be merchantmen, and at daylight we could discern the spanish fleet further down the bay, and then it was 'full ahead!' the spanish fleet did not advance to meet us, and apparently made no move on the defensive. possibly our audacity had for the moment paralyzed them. but it was not for long. in twenty minutes or so they opened a terrific cannonading at long range. the batteries and forts around manila opened fire at the same time. every man on the ship was now wide awake and at his post. i knew that it would not be long before there would be some hot work, and i served my men with a cup of coffee and a piece of hardtack, and a little later gave them each a drink of whisky and water. "according to orders, we did not respond to the spanish guns until our ships came into position. then the flagship opened fire, and then i followed with two hours of cannonading which i do not believe has ever been equaled in naval warfare. the shots from the 'olympia' were the prearranged signal for the other ships to do the same. "we soon discovered that the batteries of cavité were very heavily mounted, and the ordnance included several ten-inch guns, and we were not long in finding out that the 'don antonio de ulloa' and the 'reina cristina,' the flagship, carried much heavier guns than we thought. we began to fear that our ships had met their match. as hot as the battle was, the heat of the sun was equally so, and i had my men who were bringing up the ammunition throw off every vestige of clothing except their shoes. "the spanish guns had opened upon us at . a.m., and it was fully . before we began to reply. but when we did, we made every shot tell, for our gunners demonstrated that their opponents were no match for them in accuracy, although the spaniards had every advantage and should have known the exact range of every point in the harbor, while of the american fleet not a single gunner had ever as much as been in the harbor before. "by . we had circled three times, and were starting for the fourth when the spanish admiral came out in the 'reina cristina' and gallantly assailed us; but we made it hot for him. i don't know how in the world he escaped with his life. while he was standing on the bridge a shot from one of our ships--i think it was the 'concord'--blew the bridge clean over; in fact, shot it right from under him, but the admiral was apparently uninjured, for a few minutes later i saw him walking the deck as calmly as though he was on parade. it was getting too hot for him, and he evidently saw that his ship was no match for us, and he turned to get back to his fleet. "just as the 'reina cristina' swung around an eight-inch shell from the port battery, which i was tending, struck her square astern, and set her on fire. by this time other gunners had got the range, and if ever a ship was riddled it was the 'reina cristina.' i do not think it was fifteen minutes from the time the shell from the 'boston' struck her when she went down with, it is said, over two hundred men. the admiral, however, had escaped in a small boat and made for the 'isla de cuba,' where he again hoisted his flag. "after we had circled five times, we withdrew. the smoke was so dense that we could hardly distinguish friend from foe. our men had worked three long hours with scarcely a mouthful of food. i had, however, kept my men well supplied with whisky and water. i gave each a small drink about every twenty minutes. "after we had withdrawn, and the clouds of smoke had lifted enough so that we could see, admiral dewey signaled the ships to report the number of killed and wounded. it would have done your heart good to have heard the shouts and cheers that went up as ship after ship ran up the signal to indicate that she had no killed and none wounded worth reporting. it was one of the most thrilling moments of the entire battle. "it was a wise move on admiral dewey's part in withdrawing at that moment, for our men were rapidly becoming exhausted. for my own part i do not think i could have held out another half hour, and neither could my men. we were not only wearied physically, but the nervous strain was something awful. i called my men into the gunroom and served each with a good stiff drink of whisky and told them to take all the rest they could get. i went into the chartroom, as it was about the coolest place on the ship, and threw myself on the chart table. i was too nervous to sleep and too exhausted to move. i just lay there sort of dazed. "soon after ten o'clock we advanced again, and the 'baltimore' opened the fight. as many of the spanish ships had been disabled, what we most feared now was the forts. the 'baltimore' sailed right into the very teeth of the guns, any one of which could have annihilated her, and only bad marksmanship of the spanish gunners saved her from destruction, and she did not retreat until she had practically silenced the fort. "my ship, the 'boston,' was perhaps struck oftener during the battle than any of the american ships, but in every instance it was small shot or shell, making a glancing blow that did no particular harm. after the first hour or so of the battle, if we had received a damaging shot, the chances are that we would have all gone down, for out of all the ship's boats, only two were of any value, the others having been shattered to pieces. "we were circling in line with the other ships when the 'isla de cuba' swung around to give us a broadside. the guns in the port battery got the range on the 'isla de cuba,' and sent in a shot that struck in amidships and made her tremble from stem to stern. i was watching at the porthole at the time. the other guns of the 'boston' followed the example of the port gunner, and for a few minutes it seemed that the 'isla de cuba' was crumbling to pieces like a falling building in an earthquake. we turned, and the starboard guns did equally good work, and when the spanish flag came tumbling down we let out a yell that was heard around the world, figuratively speaking, if not literally. "i can never forget the scene after the battle. the forts were smoking, and scattered all through the bay were the hulks of once magnificent spanish ships. some were drifting helplessly about, as though the men on board seemed not to know what to do and had lost their heads entirely. rigging was trailing in the water and only remnants remained of the lifeboats. over at one end of the bay was the wreck of the once magnificent 'reina cristina.' further along were smoking hulks, and here and there could be seen only the masts and rigging above water. "to add to the horror of the scene, hundreds of corpses came floating by, and it seemed as though the bay was full of dead spaniards, although i believe less than a thousand were killed. i really think that the sight in the harbor that afternoon impressed men more with the horrors of war than did anything which occurred during the actual battle. "during all the fight my men, except for a little while during the interval for breakfast, were stripped to the bare skin and wore only their shoes. the thermometer was over one hundred, and to this was added the heat of the fire of the guns, until it made one's blood fairly boil." the plan of action was for the fleet to revolve in a great circle or ellipse before the delivering their fire from starboard and port batteries alternately. the first shot from the "olympia" was a -pound shell, aimed at the cavité fort, and discharged with a shout from all hands, "remember the maine!" after two hours' fighting the fleet withdrew for breakfast, returning to action in about two hours, and after the spanish surrender the little "petrel" was sent in to destroy, by boats' crews, the ships in the inner harbor. commodore dewey's official report of the action is a model of modesty and brevity. it came in these two cable messages: manila, may .--squadron arrived at manila at daybreak this morning. immediately engaged the enemy, and destroyed the following spanish vessels: "reina cristina," "castilla," "don antonio de ulloa," "isla de luzon," "isla de cuba," "general lezo," "marquis de duero," "cano," "velasco," "isla de mindanao," a transport, and water battery at cavité. the squadron is uninjured, and only a few men are slightly wounded. only means of telegraphing is to american consul at hong kong. i shall communicate with him. dewey. cavitÃ�, may .--i have taken possession of naval station at cavité, on philippine islands. have destroyed the fortifications at bay entrance, paroling the garrison. i control bay completely, and can take city at any time. the squadron is in excellent health and spirits. spanish loss not fully known but very heavy. one hundred and fifty killed, including captain of "reina cristina." i am assisting in protecting spanish sick and wounded; sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. much excitement at manila. will protect foreign residents. dewey. it is little short of marvelous that no lives were lost on the american ships--though a month later captain gridley of the "olympia" died from the effect of the concussion of his own guns. the vessels were handled with a daring amounting almost to bravado, yet so poor was the marksmanship of the spaniards that little or no damage was suffered. it is to be kept in mind that, despite the disparity in the armament of the fleets, the spanish works at cavité mounted guns of twice the weight of any that dewey's ships bore. yet, when the action was over, the american vessels were practically uninjured, and perfectly capable of fulfilling the threat sent by admiral dewey, that if another shot was fired he would lay manila in ashes. at the time these words are written, that threat alone keeps order in manila bay. dewey with his ships is there, holding the town at the muzzles of his guns and waiting for the re-enforcements of troops, which were dispatched to his aid from san francisco almost a month after his victory--an unconscionable delay. some , troops will be sent to his aid, and with the insurgents, who were greatly encouraged and strengthened by the american victory, will forever destroy spain's power in the philippines. * * * * * in the waters of the gulf of mexico and the caribbean sea, where it was expected the fighting would come first and be most decisive, the war lagged languidly for weeks. for a few days the jackies found some excitement and some hope of profit in capturing unsuspecting spanish merchantmen, but soon the dull and deadly monotony of the peaceful blockade settled down upon the fleet, and sampson's men grilled grimly under a blazing sun by day and slept uneasily by their guns at night, week after week, without a touch of battle to vary the dull round. the spanish ships "vizcaya" and "oquendo," which had been in the harbor of havana when war was declared, had slipped away, and there was no enemy afloat in the neighborhood save puny gunboats and torpedo boats that clung close to the protecting guns of the fortresses. blockading is the most trying duty the blue-jacket has to discharge. destitute wholly of glory, the element of danger is still ever present in a form which is particularly trying to the nerves. every night brought danger of an attack by torpedo boats. these swift and sinister craft might at any time dart out of havana harbor, discharge their fatal bolt, and send a good ship to the bottom as speedily as went the "maine." that the spaniards at no time even seriously attempted a torpedo-boat attack on the blockading squadron seems to reflect on their courage. but what they lacked apparently in courage they made up in shrewdness. for weeks the best efforts of our board of strategy and our board of naval intelligence were baffled by the mysterious movements of the spanish fleet under admiral cervera. this squadron, which numbered among its vessels the powerful armored cruisers "vizcaya," "maria teresa," "cristobal colon," and "almirante oquendo," was reported now at the canaries, then at cadiz, then dashing through the suez canal to overwhelm dewey at manila, then off the coast of new england,--whereat boston and portland were mightily alarmed,--then bound south to capture or destroy the "oregon,"--which was painfully making the voyage around cape horn,--then at martinique, and, in short, at every conceivable point of menace. as a result of these conflicting reports, two american fleets were reduced to impotence. the "flying squadron" of fast cruisers under commodore schley was kept for weeks at moorings in hampton roads ready to be dispatched for protection of our northern coasts, while the squadron of battle-ships under admiral sampson was made to steam hither and yon in the caribbean sea looking for an enemy's fleet which much of the time lay snugly on the other side of the atlantic. accordingly, up to june , the results of naval operations in west indian waters were almost _nil_. powder had been burned indeed as when, on april , the spanish works at matanzas were bombarded and silenced by the "new york," "puritan," and "cincinnati," of admiral sampson's squadron, and on may the works at san juan, porto rico, were similarly tested. deeds of conspicuous gallantry, too, were done, as when ensign worth bagley lost his life while gallantly engaging spanish gunboats and shore batteries with the torpedo boat "winslow" at cardenas. but these actions, though seized upon eagerly by a public hungry for war news, were inconclusive and trivial. the shore batteries were quickly repaired and strengthened, and the great object of capturing havana seemed at the middle of june even further off than it had when war was declared. nevertheless, may and june saw a marked progress in the work of preparation for active hostilities. the army was mobilized and a great camp established at tampa, fla. schley's flying squadron, finally relieved from apprehension as to the course of the spanish fleet, left hampton roads to increase the naval strength in west indian waters. the great battle-ship "oregon," after a record-beating voyage around cape horn, in which her machinery met and withstood every imaginable strain, arrived at the rendezvous. and finally it was definitely learned that admiral cervera, with spain's principal effective fleet, was actually in west indian waters, and had entered the port of santiago de cuba for coal and repairs. there he was trapped by an exploit which has conferred new glory on the united states navy and has added a new name to the roster of dashing heroes like somers and gushing. the harbor of santiago de cuba is one of the most easily defended in the world. steep hills rise abruptly from either side of the harbor's mouth, which is scarce half a mile wide, with a channel so narrow that two vessels could scarcely pass in it. into the brow of the hills are built batteries which, with plunging shot, command the entrance completely. an abrupt turn in the interior shore line makes the whole inner bay invisible from without, so for days the officers and men of the united states blockading fleet outside were ignorant whether cervera's entire fleet was cooped up within. to send in a boat to make a reconnoissance would have been suicidal, for the channel, difficult at all times, was blocked by mines and torpedoes. for this reason, too, there could be no repetition of dewey's exploit at manila. accordingly, admiral sampson was confronted with a problem which seemed likely to tax the patience rather than the daring of his men. there seemed to be no opportunity for more exciting duty than a long blockade, unless the spaniards should conclude to come out and fight--a most unlikely decision for them to reach. the forts, in all probability, could be reduced by the ships' cannon, but, even with that done, to enter the harbor in single file, so that the undisturbed fire of cervera's fleet could be directed upon the americans, ship by ship, as they entered the bay, would have been a most hazardous undertaking. the situation was not made more pleasing to the admiral by the fact that he was not sure of having all the spanish ships in the trap. some might not have entered santiago, but might be at that very time devastating portions of the coast of the united states. while the admiral was considering the problem thus presented to him, there appeared at his cabin a young lieutenant, richmond p. hobson, a graduate of the naval academy in . the scientific side of naval duty had always chiefly attracted this young man. graduating at the head of his class, he studied naval construction for two years in british dockyards. above all things a student, a contributor to magazines, a delver into mathematical and structural problems, this young officer outlined to the admiral an exploit of reckless daring and volunteered himself to perform it. [illustration: the "zealandia" leaving san francisco with troops for the philippines. (drawn, after a photograph, by william ritschel.)] it was folly, urged hobson, to keep the entire american fleet watching at the door to that harbor. the spaniards, doing nothing and daring nothing themselves, were still reducing admiral sampson's powerful squadron to complete impotence. if the entrance to the harbor were obstructed one or two ships would serve to prevent the spaniards from escaping, and the remainder of the american fleet would be released to take part in more vigorous warfare. by sinking a vessel, an old collier heavily laden, in the channel this could be accomplished, and hobson volunteered to perform the feat. it was an invitation to almost certain death, for the fire of three batteries and part of the spanish fleet, besides the explosion of the mines, must be braved before the narrow spot in which the ship was to be sunk could be reached. but hobson thought he could do this, scuttle his ship, and escape with his men by swimming to a launch which should accompany him at a distance. "do you really expect to escape alive?" asked one of the officers as he outlined his project. "ah! that is another thing," replied the lieutenant. "i suppose the estrella battery will fire down on us a bit, but the ships will throw their searchlights in the gunners' faces and they won't see much of us. then, if we are torpedoed, we should even then be able to make the desired position in the channel. it won't be so easy to hit us, and i think the men should be able to swim to the dingey. i may jump before i am blown up, but i don't see that it makes much difference what i do. i have a fair chance of life either way. if our dingey gets shot to pieces, we shall then try to swim for the beach right under morro castle. we shall keep together at all hazards. then we may be able to make our way alongside, and perhaps get back to the ship. we shall fight the sentries or a squad until the last, and we shall only surrender to overwhelming numbers." the plan being approved by the admiral, volunteers were asked from the fleet, by signal, to accompany hobson. practically the whole fleet responded. one man was wanted from each ship, but on the "brooklyn" and on the "texas" pleaded to be taken. finally these seven were selected: osborn deignan, a coxswain of the "merrimac"; george f. phillips, a machinist of the "merrimac"; john kelly, a water-tender of the "merrimac"; george charette, a gunner's mate on the flagship "new york"; daniel montague, a seaman of the cruiser "brooklyn"; j. c. murphy, a coxswain of the "iowa"; randolph clausen, a coxswain of the "new york." to man the launch which was detailed to follow the "merrimac "--the ship chosen--four men and naval cadet joseph w. powell were taken. in the end they, too, proved to be heroes. the steel steamer "merrimac," loaded with , tons of coal, was then given to hobson and prepared for sinking. an eye-witness, who followed the "merrimac" as nearly as safety would permit, thus tells the story in the new york _sun_: "cadet powell and his crew saw the 'merrimac' head straight for estrella point, which is on the east side of the harbor, back of the morro. they knew that just before she reached that point the engines were to be stopped and the momentum allowed to carry her on. then the flimsy wooden props holding the bonnets of her sea-valves in place were to be kicked aside, the helm put hard to starboard, and the starboard bower anchor let go. this would steer the ship directly across the channel and check her headway. "at the same time seven reduced eight-inch charges, containing eighty pounds of brown powder in copper cases and protected by pitch from water, were to be set off separately. these charges were suspended about ten feet below the water-line at intervals of thirty feet, and connected by a series of dry batteries. as the ship steered across the channel the forward port powder charge was to be exploded. then, as the stern swung into position, the anchor lashed on the starboard quarter was to be let go and the other six charges exploded in succession. a catamaran and lifeboat were slung aft on the starboard side ready for the seven men to drop into them. "the crew in the steam launch watched the course of the old collier with eyes strained. the moon had sunk behind the horizon. it was . o'clock. on, on the heroes went. lieutenant hobson stood on the bridge of the old collier, dressed in full uniform. the other six men were at their posts, clad in tights, to aid their escape in case they had to swim a long distance. "the watchers saw her head straight for estrella point, saw her swing hard across the channel, apparently undiscovered, heard five of the seven charges explode, and then began a screaming, flashing, death-dealing fire from the spanish ships and batteries that hid the rest from view. "the battery on dead man's point, square in the center of the harbor, opened the fire and soon directed its guns against the launch. in the face of this hell, with ten-and twelve-inch guns blazing at them at this short range, cadet powell and the crew of his launch continued to search for the men of the 'merrimac.' [illustration: morro castle, santiago de cuba.] "they saw then the guns of the 'cristobal colon,' admiral cervera's flagship, and of the old cruiser 'reina mercedes,' which had been considered gunless, trained on them and thundering in their ears. "still they searched with never as much as a faint cry for help or the sign of a single arm raised in mute appeal to guide them. those on the battle-ship looking into the mouth of the harbor saw only a sheet of flame which, with the roar of the guns, lasted thirty-five minutes. by this time dawn had tinged the land and sky with light, and the tiny launch could be seen loitering by the shore. on the west side of the harbor, in the center of the channel, just where hobson had promised to sink his vessel, could be seen the tops of the 'merrimac's' masts. the harbor was blocked." hobson and his gallant men were not lost. a shot from one of the batteries destroyed the boat in which they had expected to reach the launch, but on a raft they escaped from their sinking vessel, only to be captured by the spaniards. with sailor-like chivalry and hearty admiration for a gallant deed admiral cervera sent word to the fleet of their safety and offered to exchange them as soon as the necessary formalities could be complied with. * * * * * the closing words of this chapter must be penned just as the decisive action of the war seems to be at hand. cervera is hemmed in at santiago with a vastly superior force confronting him. the batteries at the harbor's mouth have been demolished by the fire of the fleet. at caimanera, thirty miles away, the united states flag is flying on the shore and a battalion of united states marines--"soldiers and sailors, too"--are there installed and have twice beaten back the attack of spaniards in double their number. on great transports general shafter's army of , men is steaming from key west to caimanera, where the invasion of cuba will begin. the order has gone forth to reduce porto rico, and by the time these words reach the reader, general coppinger's army may be landed there. fitzhugh lee, the gallant, is held in reserve for havana, where he served his country as consul general during the trying days that led up to the war. hesitation and doubt have vanished. the dreary days of delay are over. the end is near--the end of spanish misrule in the west indies. chapter iii. the spanish fleet makes a dash from the harbor. -- its total destruction. -- admiral cervera a prisoner. -- great spanish losses. -- american fleet loses but one man. when the event was least expected the spaniards made a desperate dash from the harbor, seeking freedom but finding only death. july d the land forces of general shafter were closing in on santiago. there had been hard fighting for two days, in which both sides had shown dogged courage, but the spaniards had been beaten back into the city, which the americans almost completely invested. though shafter had but few heavy siege guns, many of the shells from his field artillery fell in the streets of the town and produced a panic there. admiral cervera had landed some of his rapid-fire guns in aid of general linares, and his marines fought with the spanish soldiers. but as the american advance continued he saw that he would be caught in a trap and ground to pieces between shafter and sampson. so he made up his mind to the desperate chance of slipping out and trying to run past the american squadron. [illustration: the protected cruiser "olympia," admiral dewey's flagship.] [illustration: admiral george dewey.] [illustration: acting rear admiral w. t. sampson.] [illustration: rear-admiral montgomery sicard.] [illustration: commodore w. s. schley.] [illustration: captain a. s. barker, _late of the "oregon"; now of the "newark."_] [illustration: captain "jack" philip, _of the battle-ship "texas."_] [illustration: commodore j. crittenden watson. _second in command of the gulf squadron._] [illustration: ensign worth bagley of the "winslow." _the first american officer killed by the enemy._] [illustration: cadet george t. pettengill. _who fired the first shot of the war._] [illustration: captain f. w. dickins. _chief of bureau of navigation._] [illustration: commodore john a. howell. _commanding inner line of coast defenses._] [illustration: brig.-gen. h. c. hasbrouck. _commandant of fort monroe._] [illustration: captain c. e. clark. _of the battle-ship "oregon."_] [illustration: admiral f. m. bunce. _commandant of brooklyn navy yard._] [illustration: bombardment of spanish ports and fleet at santiago de cuba, july , .] [illustration: "maria teresa" and "vizcaya" burning on the beach near santiago.] [illustration: the flagship "new york," followed by the "vixen," closing on the "cristobal colon," while the latter was being run ashore west of santiago.] [illustration: effect of a single spanish shot on upper deck of the battle-ship "texas".] [illustration: _part of crew of "texas"_ band of the "oregon" playing funeral march after the defeat of the "colon".] [illustration: engineer battalion unloading tools at siboney.] [illustration: "st. louis." a transport. "suwanee." "vixen." auxiliary cruisers protecting landing.] [illustration: commodore watson's fleet for service in spanish waters.] at . on the morning of the d the lookout on the "texas" saw smoke rising above morro castle. immediately after, the black prow of a warship appeared in the channel coming out at full speed. it was the "almirante oquendo." instantly the "texas" broke out with bunting signaling to all the vessels of the fleet that the spaniards were coming out. on every side rung out the bugles and clattered gongs calling the crews of the american ships to quarters. admiral sampson with the "new york" was far away, and commodore schley with the "brooklyn" commanded the fleet. the odds were not so greatly in favor of the americans, for the spaniards had four armored cruisers and two torpedo-boat destroyers, while the americans had five battle-ships, one armored cruiser and a yacht. the superiority of the spaniards in rapid-fire guns was very great. the "brooklyn," thinly clad with armor, dashed first into the fray and was soon engaged with four armored vessels, each her superior; the "iowa," "texas" and "oregon" rushed to her aid. it was soon apparent that the spaniards were more intent on running than fighting. nevertheless, they kept up a rapid fire, but showed the bad marksmanship which characterized montojo's gunners at manila. one shell from the "oquendo" crashed through the pilot-house of the "texas" just after captain philip had left it for the securer retreat of the conning tower, and one exploded in the smokestack. these were about the most effective shots aimed by the enemy. a correspondent of the new york "journal" and the "sun" stationed aboard the "texas" sent the most graphic account of the battle which has at this date, july , been printed. some extracts from it will give a clear account of the fighting: "almost before the leading ship was clear of the shadow of morro castle the fight had begun. admiral cervera started it by a shell from the 'almirante oquendo,' to which he had transferred his flag. it struck none of the american vessels. in a twinkling the big guns of the 'texas' belched forth their thunder, which was followed immediately by a heavy fire from our other ships. the spaniards turned to the westward under full steam, pouring a constant fire on our ships, and evidently hoping to get away by their superior speed. "the 'texas,' still heading in shore, kept up a hot exchange of shots with the foremost ships, which gradually drew away to the westward under the shadow of the hills. the third of the spanish vessels, the 'vizcaya' or 'infanta maria teresa,' was caught by the 'texas' in good fighting range, and it was she that engaged the chief attention of the first battle-ship commissioned in the american navy. the 'texas' steamed west with her adversary, and as she could not catch her with speed she did with her shells. "the din of the guns was so terrific that orders had to be yelled close to the messengers' ears, and at times the smoke was so thick that absolutely nothing could be seen. once or twice the -inch guns in the turrets were swung across the ship and fired. the concussion shook the great vessel as though she had been struck by a great ball, and everything movable was splintered. the men near the guns were thrown flat on their faces. "meanwhile the 'oregon' had come in on the run. she passed the 'texas' and chased after commodore schley, on the 'brooklyn,' to head off the foremost of the spanish ships. the 'iowa' also turned her course westward, and kept up a hot fire on the running enemy. "at . o'clock the third of the spanish ships, the one that had been exchanging compliments with the 'texas,' was seen to be on fire and a mighty cheer went up from our ships. the spaniard headed for the shore and the 'texas' turned her attention to the one following. the 'brooklyn' and 'oregon,' after a few parting shots, also left her contemptuously and made all steam and shell after the foremost two of the spanish ships, the 'almirante oquendo' and the 'cristobal colon.' "just then the two torpedo-boat destroyers 'pluton' and 'furor' were discovered. they had come out after the cruisers without being seen, and were boldly heading west down the coast. 'all small guns on the torpedo boats' was the order on the 'texas,' and in an instant a hail of shot was pouring all about them. a -pounder from the starboard battery of the 'texas,' under ensign gise, struck the foremost torpedo boat fairly in the boiler. "a rending sound was heard above the roar of battle. a great spout of black smoke shot up from that destroyer and she was out of commission. the 'iowa,' which was coming up fast, threw a few complimentary shots at the second torpedo-boat destroyer and passed on. the little 'gloucester,' formerly a yacht, then sailed in and finished the second boat." the "gloucester" of which the correspondent speaks was in command of lieutenant-commander wainwright, who had been the executive officer of the "maine." for two months after the disaster to that vessel wainwright lived on a united states ship in the harbor of havana, refusing to set foot on shore until he could go "with a landing party of marines." in his attack on the torpedo-boat destroyers--vastly superior to his craft in weight and armament--he threw prudence to the winds and fought with a fierceness bred of bitter hatred for the dons. his was the most stirring display of personal courage shown on a day when all were brave. to return to the correspondent's account: "gun for gun and shot for shot the running fight was kept up between the spanish cruisers and the four american vessels. at . o'clock the 'infanta maria teresa' and 'vizcaya' were almost on the beach, and were evidently in distress. as the 'texas' was firing at them a white flag was run up on the one nearest her. 'cease firing,' called captain philip, and a moment later both the spaniards were beached. clouds of black smoke arose from each, and bright flashes of flame could be seen shining through the smoke. boats were visible putting out from the cruisers to the shore. the 'iowa' waited to see that the two warships were really out of the fight, and it did not take her long to determine that they would never fight again. the iowa' herself had suffered some very hard knocks. "the 'brooklyn,' 'oregon' and 'texas' pushed ahead after the 'colon' and 'almirante oquendo,' which were now running the race of their lives along the coast. at . o'clock, when admiral cervera's flagship, the 'almirante oquendo,' suddenly headed in shore, she had the 'brooklyn' and 'oregon' abeam and the 'texas' astern. 'the brooklyn' and 'oregon' pushed on after the 'cristobal colon,' which was making fine time and which looked as if she might escape, leaving the 'texas' to finish the 'almirante oquendo.' this work did not take long. the spanish ship was already burning. at . o'clock down came a yellow and red flag at her stern. just as the 'texas' got abeam of her she was shaken by a mighty explosion. "the crew of the 'texas' started to cheer. 'don't cheer, because the poor devils are dying,' called captain philip, and the 'texas' left the 'almirante oquendo' to her fate to join in the chase of the 'cristobal colon.' "that ship in desperation was plowing the waters at a rate that caused the fast 'brooklyn' trouble. the 'oregon' made great speed for a battle-ship, and the 'texas' made the effort of her life. never since her trial trip had she made such time. "the 'brooklyn' might have proved a match to the 'cristobal colon' in speed, but she was not supposed to be her match in strength. "it would never do to allow even one of the spanish ships to get away. straight into the west the strongest chase of modern times took place. the 'brooklyn' headed the pursuers. she stood well out from the shore in order to try to cut off the 'cristobal colon' at a point jutting out into the sea far ahead. the 'oregon' kept a middle course about a mile from the cruiser. the desperate don ran close along the shore, and now and then he threw a shell of defiance. the old 'texas' kept well up in the chase under forced draught for over two hours. "the fleet spaniard led the americans a merry chase, but she had no chance. the 'brooklyn' gradually forged ahead, so that the escape of the 'cristobal colon' was cut off at the point above mentioned. the 'oregon' was abeam of the 'colon' then, and the gallant don gave it up. "at . o'clock he headed for the shore, and five minutes later down came the spanish flag. none of our ships was then within a mile of her, but her escape was cut off. the 'texas,' 'oregon' and 'brooklyn' closed in on her and stopped their engines a few hundred yards away. "commodore schley left the 'brooklyn' in a small boat and went aboard the 'cristobal colon' and received the surrender. meantime the 'new york,' with admiral sampson on board, and the 'vixen' were coming up on the run. commodore schley signaled to admiral sampson; 'we have won a great victory; details will be communicated.' "then for an hour after the surrender in that little cove under the high hills was a general fourth of july celebration, though a little premature. our ships cheered one another, the captains indulged in compliments through the megaphones, and the 'oregon' got out its band, and the strains of the 'star-spangled banner' echoed over the lines of spaniards drawn up on the deck of the last of the spanish fleet, and up over the lofty green-tipped hills of the cuban mountains. "commodore schley, coming alongside the 'texas' from the 'cristobal colon' in his gig, called out cheerily, 'it was a nice fight, jack, wasn't it?' "the veterans of the 'texas' lined up and gave three hearty cheers and a tiger for their old commander-in-chief. captain philip called all hands to the quarter-deck, and with bared head, thanked god for the almost bloodless victory. "'i want to make public acknowledgment here,' he said, 'that i believe in god the father almighty. i want all you officers and men to lift your hats and from your hearts offer silent thanks to the almighty.' "all hats were off. there was a moment or two of absolute silence, and then the overwrought feelings of the ship's company relieved themselves in three hearty cheers for their beloved commander." by this victory the naval power of spain was effectively and finally crushed. she lost four fine armored ships and two large destroyers. in killed, wounded and prisoners her loss exceeded eighteen hundred men, while but one american was slain. among the prisoners was admiral cervera, whose dignified bearing in the presence of disaster won for him the high regard of the americans, his foes. the value of the property lost to bankrupt spain exceeded thirteen million dollars, and it is probable that before these words reach the reader the final price of cervera's daring dash will be paid by the surrender of santiago. operations upon the sea operations upon the sea a study by freiherr von edelsheim in the service of the german general staff in translated from the german new york the outdoor press copyright, , by the outdoor press published november, vail-ballou company binghamton and new york foreword this book is of especial importance at this time, for if germany is to reach the degree of advantage which her military preparedness seemed to prophesy, it is plain that her navy must become increasingly active, and play a far different rôle than that it has assumed in the early stages of the war. covering this phase of the german operations the present volume must appeal as forecasting movements strictly within the bounds of actuality. a literal translation is all that has been attempted, with absolutely no embellishment to make it "popular" or easy reading. with characteristic bluntness this german officer brushes aside non-essentials and goes to the main point in daring fashion. for that very reason it is exceedingly pertinent to present-day discussions. issued as a military study in germany, semi-official in nature, to characterize it mildly, the material herein published for the first time in english reveals the theories of at least a portion of the military arm of the german government, which it is only fair to state may not represent the convictions of the german people. americans, as neutral but extremely interested observers of happenings of the moment, cannot be blamed, however, for making note of revelations that may come from either side in the conflict. beyond that, there are evidences on every hand that the patriotic citizens of this country are waking to the necessity to face more securely the difficulties a peace-loving nation may meet because of its lack of enthusiasm for war. the publishers. preface the purpose of this book is to estimate the value of operation over the sea as demonstrated in modern warfare, to point out the most important factors in its accomplishment, to describe the powerful expedients provided by germany for such an enterprise, and to broaden the sphere of studying these important questions of interest to our fatherland. the author. contents page introduction theoretical views i principles of operations over the sea ii accomplishment of sea transportation preparations during peace preparations at the outbreak of war embarkation sea voyage landing operations reembarkation application i consideration of landing operations against powers that can be reached only by sea ii views on colonial expeditions iii concluding views operations upon the sea introduction within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the sea in connection with wars on land. the war between japan and china, between america and spain, between england and the transvaal, and finally the chinese expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods of transporting troops over the sea. whilst moltke has shown the insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of preparing for and conducting a war across the sea. germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is more efficient, than any other country. the excellent training and readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, germany has the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by england's. finally, the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords additional security in transporting troops. these especially favorable factors make possible a wide field for germany's activity in world politics. it is feasible for us to build strong military forces which will be of great use to the empire in this direction, to secure by fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have attained in europe. in this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic participation in world politics. this shows the advisability of impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to direct attack and that have hitherto held germany in little respect, with the size and strength of our army. that is why we must keep in mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea. these operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war as well as for colonial requirements. all, however, emphasize the problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on land and which make distinct demands for preparation. these newly found difficulties should be carefully examined by germany. theoretical views i. principles of operations over the sea since steamers have supplanted sailing ships for commercial intercourse it is possible to transport our large troop forces in them; but fixed plans should be formulated with the view of making use of these strong and numerous vessels in over-seas operations. the main difficulty arises in the fact that all sea and land fighting forces must be combined. however, any consequent friction can easily be avoided if the army and fleet, in time of peace, become familiar with their mutual dependence and with the need of individual cooperation. it is plain, therefore, that operations over the sea should be planned for in advance. there is no prospect of success unless the parts of the complicated mechanism are individually prepared. the selection of a favorable time and situation for operations is an important factor in its success. if an unexpected landing could be made the opponents would not succeed in making a strong defense, nor would they be able to concentrate sufficient forces to oppose the invasion. hence the preparation of the land operations must be so thoroughly advanced that in case of war the rapidity of mobilizing and transporting would assure an advantageous surprise. how difficult and costly this task is has been demonstrated by the united states in its expedition to cuba and by england in transporting its first troops to south africa. the object of the operation must by all means be concealed and the preliminary preparations should be planned so as to delude the opponents. napoleon's expedition against egypt and the manner in which it was undertaken even to-day remains a standard example. a landing operation on an enemy's shore is generally possible only where one is superior in naval strength to that which the enemy can muster at a critical time. after a landing a victory at sea by our opponents would not be of benefit to them, in case they have not provided sufficient land fighting forces successfully to combat the invasion. therefore, it is imperative at least to strengthen our german battle fleet so greatly that it would assure the troops a safe passage, and also defeat or hold in check that portion of the enemy's naval forces which they could readily employ. if the transports sail ahead of the fleet there is the possibility that with a reverse at sea the landing operations could not be carried through. the rule to be followed is to employ for operations over the sea all available battleships, part in the regular fleet and part as an escort for the protection of the transports. in no case should the land forces be transported on battleships, for they would restrict the fighting value of the ships. so, for example, the french admiral gauthaunce-- --in spite of his superior battle fleet was compelled to withdraw to toulon before the english fleet because his ships had suffered in fighting value through the presence of land troops. only the largest steamships are to be considered for transports because they have a greater field for action, can carry more troops and require a smaller escort of battleships, thereby giving a small battle fleet like ours more available strength, which is, of course, of great value. naturally, the ships should be loaded to a capacity in proportion to the length of the voyage. in cases where the distance is not great the transport ships can make the trip twice, but it is important that the principal part of the expedition go in the first transports so as not to land an inefficient force on the enemy's coast. the whole purpose of the enterprise might be defeated through lack of aggressive strength of the landing troops. the number of troops to be landed must be greater than the estimated number of the enemy. as they must be able to assume the offensive, it is desirable that the militia be debarred and only well drilled forces, under experienced officers, be sent over. such a combination gives the required fighting value. in spite of the difficulty experienced in transporting horses, the cavalry is an extremely valuable adjunct in operations of invasion, playing a great part in offensive movements and in assisting the field and heavy artillery. the cavalry will also be able to prevent an attack on the infantry, which might otherwise inflict damage hard to retrieve. in the crimean war marshal st. arnault was hindered in the pursuit of the routed russians because of the deficiency in the cavalry and artillery in the french army. he had only one hundred troopers at his disposal, and his guns, drawn by only four horses, were greatly hampered in their movements. the difficulties in transporting large cavalry and artillery divisions can be overcome through modern methods. the extent of our merchant marine makes it possible to forward the necessary number of troops, but it must be remembered that on account of our present political position we can send only as strong a force as we can afford to dispense with at home, without endangering the country. the management of the complete operation over the sea as a rule can be better executed by an army officer than by a naval officer, for the success of the enterprise depends principally on the land operations. this leadership would usually fall to the commanding officer of the transport fleet and escorting squadron. it is out of the question to change commands at such a critical period as disembarking. with us the commander-in-chief of the transport troops is lower in rank than the commander of the escorting squadron, a designation which the vicissitudes of war have found very disadvantageous. more than one well-planned operation has been restrained by the commanding admiral because he sacrificed favorable conditions from the standpoint of land operations to gain a slight advantage from a naval standpoint. on the other hand, napoleon i, against the advice of his admirals, disembarked his troops in egypt, and thereby kept them from sharing the fate of the fleet. after successful landings it may be necessary to place the transport fleet and its escort in command of the chief of the land troops. even the battle fleet should be under his direction when a change of base is necessary or when the land and sea forces are in joint action. for technical naval questions the chief command would be assigned to an officer of the admiral staff. in a joint attack on a coast city the advantage of harmony and cooperation is readily seen. in the battle on the alma this fact was demonstrated, the striking of the fleet on the flank was not ordered by the commander of the land forces and was not brought about in unison with the land attack. ii. accomplishment of sea transportation preparations during peace. whether the operations be large or small, full preparations must be made during peace. these preparations include first of all the drawing up of plans through the study of political and military relations. then the operations can be carried out under international jurisdiction, avoiding thereby any disturbances of importance. the possibilities of friction must be given careful thought. first of all, a base for prospective operations must be determined by exhaustive investigations as to landings that may be suitable. while the first inquiries are made by naval officers, they can only be completed by army officers. the following essential points must be kept in view in searches made by naval officers: i. to determine the naval strength required for protection of the transport fleet and to settle the question of communication with home ports. ii. to decide upon proper and specific points on the respective coasts, from a marine standpoint. iii. to investigate all harbor facilities for the disembarking of the troops, and to ascertain the number and size of ships the harbor will admit so as to insure the protection of the land and sea flank. iv. to study the enemy's coast defenses and decide upon the strength required to attack them. the researches of the army officers concern principally the following: i. the aim of the operations is to overcome the obstacles as reported by the naval officers. ii. the number of troops which the opponents can muster against the invasion should be estimated. iii. all questions as to climate, water supply, and equipment necessary should be decided. all this information has been shown to be of distinct value, and perhaps would cause us to alter, within the next year, the disposition of the line of battle in case of war. through a well ordered intelligence department definite plans can be made. regarding operations which require troops fitted for tropical service, capable officers and forces should be reviewed and inspected during times of peace and made note of accordingly. the division would make a suitable unit for large operations and could be formed from different army corps. these divisions should be so equipped that they could operate independently in customary situations. fuller preparations should be made for the sending of heavy artillery, the telegraph and airship divisions. these formations would be important problems during the voyage at sea. an especially skilled staff is needed. to this end, loading transports and landing maneuvers for the heavy artillery and other heavy divisions should take place annually in suitable harbors on coasts that present the right opportunities for the troops. an enlarged command of officers and subordinate officers would show sufficient strength in a relatively short time. incidentally it might be possible to have these maneuvers take place in our foreign possessions, where we could better determine the actual needs of operations of this sort. this training would bring forth the simplest and best means for the adjustment of our merchant marine for transporting troops. all other expedients for the voyage would likewise be shown. some of this needed experience has already been acquired through our expedition to china. just as a detailed plan of mobilization is required for any war on land, a complete plan is necessary for operations over the sea which embraces also the railway trip to the harbor and the rapid execution of the tasks involved in embarking. on account of limited facilities only one division can be handled on a railroad. the necessity for transfer by wagons to the ships requires enlarged railway stations and piers in many places. furthermore, many different supply depots must be built and maintained. in these depots building material should be held in reserve for the alterations that are needed for the transformation of the merchant ships into transports. all other apparatus for successful transporting, such as extra lifting contrivances, flat-bottom boats, gang planks, and so forth, should be stored in advance. usually, these adjuncts are lacking in the merchant marine. light railroad rolling stock for use in the tropics or in difficult land conditions is also recommended. in addition to these supply depots there must be in all harbors large warehouses containing clothing, food and coal. the small requirements of our transport to china did not emphasize sufficiently the value of advance preparations, but it is evident that within a few days over one hundred steamers should be provided with such accommodations. to do this in an emergency would require too much time aside from the difficulty that might be encountered in securing skilled labor. for long distance transportation our large harbors on the north and east seas can be utilized equally well for embarkation. speed is the chief requisite. in order to lessen the distance of transporting, operations toward the west must be conducted from the north sea ports and toward the east from our east sea ports. this does not preclude the possibility of towing the transports from the east sea through the kaiser wilhelm canal to the north sea should it be found desirable, but it would involve a waste of time. the smaller harbors should not be used for embarking for large enterprises because they lack the necessary facilities. they might be utilized to advantage in a smaller way, provided sufficient means were at hand to take care of one division a day. especially suitable harbors on the north sea are emden, wilhelmshaven and bremerhaven, in connection with bremen, and cuxhaven with hamburg and glückstadt. these are the harbors that should have complete preparations made for possible expeditions. bremerhaven is by far the best. in every respect it would take first place for embarkation, because of its extensive wharfs. from this point two or more divisions could be shipped daily without difficulty. cuxhaven is not so well situated, but its connection with hamburg is important. if it were brought up to full development it could take care of two divisions a day which hamburg could well supply. glückstadt is an especially important base because most of our live stock exporting business is carried on there. it is recommended that a short double-track railroad be built from elmshorn to glückstadt, making a connection with the reserve corps frontier. in glückstadt one infantry division and part of a cavalry division can be shipped. in wilhelmshaven all the essential features are at hand, but it is doubtful whether, in view of simultaneous mobilization of the fleet, this place can be chosen for the embarkation of land troops. in any event, it would be necessary to enlarge the harbor buildings. the railroad facilities would also have to be increased. while emden is favorably situated, an examination discloses many drawbacks. it needs better dock facilities and railroads to bring it up to standard and in order to relieve the extensive shipping of troops at wilhelmshaven. under existing circumstances leer and papenburg could be used for transporting purposes, and these two with emden could handle one division. the situation on the baltic sea is peculiarly unfavorable, no harbor, with the exception of kiel, being deep enough to accommodate our larger steamships. at danzig the dredging of navigable waters and extension of docks should be planned, which are of great importance from a military standpoint. the other smaller ports on the baltic are at present not suitable for transporting troops. the kiel harbor could not be utilized for the loading of large transports because of the same conditions that affect wilhelmshaven, namely, the delay that might hinder the rapid mobilizing of the fleet, which would not be permitted. the docks at kiel must therefore be greatly enlarged so that they could thoroughly satisfy simultaneously the demands of the battle and transport fleets. pillau and swinemünde should be authorized to extend their very small docks. on the other hand, the large dry docks in danzig, stettin and kiel should be in a position, within the shortest possible time, to provide the necessary buildings for transporting, if the materials and warehouses are planned correctly. of the greatest importance in operations over the sea is the provision of the proper number of ships. defects in preparations in time of peace would hinder successful execution and would give the enemy time to take the necessary precautions to oppose an invasion. yet it should be stated that england, at the outbreak of the boer, although lacking full preparation during peace, in the course of a few weeks procured the required number of ships for the first shipment. the problem of ship control would at best fall to the loading commission, which should be settled upon as an established authority to make a comprehensive survey and appraise the german steamers for military transporting. this commission should also list the foreign-owned steamers which might be available in the harbors for use in emergencies. through close commercial relations this control can be extended to neighboring foreign ports (amsterdam, rotterdam, copenhagen) to the end that we might charter several large foreign steamers. the construction of stables for horses on our commercial ships would cause delay, as we have pointed out previously. it would seem advantageous to have our subsidized steamship companies to build several ships which can be quickly adjusted for shipping horses. this ought to be an easy matter with ships used for shipping cattle. the hamburg-american line, it is known, will readily provide such a ship. the management of the transport depots and the training of the dry-dock and harbor personnel would obviously fall to the loading commission. in a similar way, the navy would be permitted to divide the sea-fighting strength, in the event of mobilization, into a fleet of warships and an escort for the transport fleet, assuring effective protection and a fighting force equal in rank to the enemy. preparations at the outbreak of war. actual preparations for war cannot be kept secret for any length of time. opponents would receive information through secret channels, which would give them opportunity to concentrate and equip their forces. the immediate preparations before the outbreak of war dare not be instituted generally, but as soon as the decision for operations is conceived, they must be promptly inaugurated. the aim should be to keep the opponents in uncertainty for a short time, and then a rapidly executed operation would take them unawares. an unexpected attack depends largely upon rapidity of movement. incidentally, diplomatic pressure should be avoided if possible because such friction would lessen considerably the chances for a successful undertaking. in connection with wars on land the preliminary preparations are simplified, for under these circumstances most of the battleships and troops have been equipped and prepared for action. the methods to be employed by the battleships to carry out the operations would vary and must be left to the discretion of the chosen naval expert. it should be pointed out in this connection, however, that with a small battle fleet like ours it is most necessary to concentrate our full strength for the defense and execution of the land operations. we must endeavor, therefore, in time of peace to get our fleet forces out of foreign waters and keep the battle fleet together. thus the great political questions would be decided only upon the european scene. a rapid mobilization of our sea fighting forces, namely, those which belong to the battle fleet, is of great advantage, but the calling in from foreign waters of such forces would undoubtedly serve to create suspicion. the kaiser wilhelm canal affords us the means to concentrate these forces quickly as may be required either in the north or baltic sea. if the demands for ships and supplies exceed our advance preparations, proper methods should be employed to seize quickly what is needed and immediate reparation made. plans should also be made to secure sufficient reenforcements of troops. in large operations where all our ships are employed, after they are successfully loaded and started on the voyage the transports arriving from foreign waters can be equipped. all ships belonging to hostile nations that are lying in our harbors we would of course seize and utilize for transports. while the distribution of our transport steamers at the various points of embarkation will have been taken care of by the loading commission, various difficulties would be encountered in altering the vessels that by chance are at the disposal of the commission for transports, such as unforeseen defects and inaccurate measurements of the foreign chartered steamers arriving in our ports. the adjustment and equipment of these ships must be expedited so that the troops can be despatched in masses as fast as they arrive. once the ships reach the selected harbors the necessary rearrangements probably can be made simultaneously with the loading, depending upon the advance preparations and the presence of a skilled staff of workmen. the time needed will depend somewhat upon the length of the voyage to be made. in england the steamers for transporting troops to cape town, which is a long trip, were prepared in four days for the infantry and in seven days for the cavalry and artillery. the consuming of such time, even for a long sea voyage, must be considered poor execution. at the time of our expedition to china we had the ships complete in a short time. for one steamer, the discharge of the cargo, readjustment for transport and reloading, with the exception of the cavalry, not more than two days need be consumed. for short distances, according to english and russian estimates, one day is required for infantry and two to two and one-half days for cavalry and artillery. these periods can be greatly shortened through the efficiency of the building staff, as pointed out previously. the formation of the expedition corps must of course be established in the annual maneuvers. various factors, such as seasons, political aims, present situation of opponents, extent of material for the available ships, all bear witness to the urgency of taking up measures in advance for facilitating the work of mobilization. the speedy concentration of troops and materials at the points of embarkation will make heavy demands upon the railroads, even though the haul is short, and the shipment comparatively small. arrangements should therefore be made with the railroads to have on hand at all times sufficient rolling stock for these purposes, to guarantee the prompt departure of the transports. it is urged that authority be given the loading commission to supervise and direct this work. it must be taken into consideration that part of the troops are inexperienced reserves and good order must be maintained. a high standard of efficiency should prevail, to lessen the burdens of executing orders. numerous machine gun divisions increase the fighting strength and do not require great space or support. the usefulness of a cyclist division depends entirely upon the condition of the roads in the hostile country. for the reasons stated previously, cavalry would not suffer in distribution of strength, which is customary in wars on land. in large over-seas operations it is recommended that a special cavalry division or brigade be formed for reconnoitering purposes. beyond this, the strength of the cavalry division must be sufficient to render possible an independent operation. it would also be of great value to the field artillery, of which an ample supply is on hand. especially important is the method of distributing supply trains, for these require a great deal of space and render landing very difficult. they also hinder the rapid movement of the expedition corps. when the transports do not remain in close communication with the troops after landing, a very large supply of stores is necessary to make the army independent of the vessels. there should be added, therefore, a reserve ammunition column to that already provided. a fixed amount of supplies should be determined upon, taking due consideration of the extent of the voyage. the troops could requisition some materials from the hostile country. embarkation. proper loading is the business of the land forces and should be conducted by trained officers so as to ensure the shipment of materials and men. to make landing effective the necessary supplies should go on the vessels with the troops. a loading plan should be so drawn up in advance as to meet all emergencies. the length of time consumed for loading depends on the distance of the voyage. at the most the limit of a short sea voyage for us has been considered about forty-eight hours. this is too small an estimate; it should undoubtedly be doubled. the italian general staff estimates the length of a short sea voyage to be five days. besides, to preserve the fighting worth of our troops, we must allow sufficient time for rest. the troop transport capacity of a ship has heretofore been calculated by the ship's tonnage, that is, sixty per cent. of the ship's capacity is net ton loading space. the necessary space for us, for a long sea voyage, is set at two tons for each man and six to seven tons for each horse. the english and russian estimates are about the same. but the english transports to cape town accommodated a larger number of troops than was thought possible, and the american transports to cuba were increased by one-third. as for the arrangements which must be made for sleeping, cooking and washing and for a hospital service, we need not go any further here, as they have been discussed at length in the press. the stowing of equipment and baggage should be done in such a way as to make the articles available on landing in the order in which they are needed. the ship's space required for maintenance supplies for man and horse figures relatively as about one to five. coming next to the loading of the artillery, the rule should be to place all common and machine guns on deck. a certain amount of ammunition should be stowed so as to be quickly accessible. this is an essential measure to afford the transport protection from some privateer. the guns should be securely placed to prevent their movement by the motion of the sea and to render feasible their use on deck. trials will soon be made to find the suitable means whereby field artillery may be put to successful use on shipboard, and this testing will certainly repay us. all rolling stock will be stowed away firmly in the freight space without removing the wheels. the material and personnel of the field hospital should be divided among the ships, so that a ship's hospital division may be formed. the airship division should be placed on deck in such fashion that observation flights may be made during the voyage. the shipping of horses is especially difficult. by former methods the horses had to stand the entire trip and had practically no exercise. this left them in a weakened condition and made necessary a long rest after arrival. for a war transport, in which is required a rapid and successful offensive, such horses are not useful. because of the important work to be done by them after landing, careful attention should be given to the horses to keep them in good working condition. to this end, proper nourishment must be given and facilities provided for daily exercise while on the transports, which should consume at least three-quarters of an hour for each horse. ships that are built particularly for the transportation of horses can be adjusted with four decks over each other, including upper deck stables and two courses for exercise, so that a transport of from three to four thousand net tons capacity can carry over one thousand horses. three ships would accommodate two cavalry brigades. on every large steamer many horses can be shipped for a long trip, in addition to its regular quota of men and supplies. after the transports have been prepared, about seven hundred and fifty horses, equal to one cavalry regiment, or six batteries, can be loaded daily on the lower decks. cleanliness, ventilation and care are the three most important factors for the good health of the horses. every horse transport must be given ventilating apparatus to assure sufficient fresh air. artificial ventilation is to be preferred to natural ventilation, for if the latter becomes too strong the horses' lungs are easily affected. through this cause, for example, the american transport to cuba lost the greater number of their horses. likewise condensers are required for the necessary quantities of drinking water. it is recommended that each ship be given its own condenser. the provision of only one or two large condensers on special ships which supply the entire demand of the transport fleet, as the americans employed in their expedition to cuba, has not proved practical. for the short sea voyage, our transports would be able to despatch substantially more troops, through germany's geographical position. the strength of near-by powers requires, though, the immediate utilization of all ships and materials at our disposal, if the operations are to succeed. for short expeditions, the general rule will be to ship as many troops as the transports will carry. the forces will bivouac on the upper and lower decks and receive only straw bags and covers. they will keep their whole baggage with them. cooking will be done in large field kettles. if time permits, it is recommended that the same adjustments as for a long journey be made for the horses, at least to provide separate stalls. this will prevent heavy losses in case of rough weather. guns and accessories can be disposed of in the same manner as for long voyages. the length of time for embarkation depends on whether the loading can be done from the wharves of the harbors or whether the troops and materials must be taken out by lighters and then transferred to the ships. the latter method is a waste of time and is dependent on wind and weather. the time required for loading is as follows: fifteen minutes for one hundred men, one minute for one horse, ten minutes for a cannon. in an operation by the russians, , men, including infantry and cavalry, were embarked in eight hours. in our loading of east asia transports, it required one to one and one-half hours to load one battalion. the speed of our loading has amazed departmental circles in general. it is certain, though, that this time can be greatly reduced through detailed preparation and training. napoleon i, in the year , had ostensibly drilled his troops so well that he could plan to put , men and their materials on shipboard in two hours. it must be remembered that everything, troops, guns and supplies must eventually be landed on open coasts. portable flat-bottom boats and building materials for piers must therefore be carried on the transports. special vessels must accompany the transport fleet with large reserve supplies of food, equipment, ammunition, coal and so forth. a cable-laying ship is also required. we must now consider to what extent germany is able to load forces for the execution of operations which involve only a short voyage, in which success depends so much on speed. for embarkation on the north sea, hamburg and bremen alone could furnish so many steamers capable of being converted into transports, that with their tonnage capacity the loading of four infantry divisions is possible in a period of four days. with the addition of ships from emden, wilhelmshaven, glückstadt and kiel we would be able to despatch in the same length of time, at least six infantry divisions, or five infantry and one cavalry division. to these must be added several especially large and fast german steamers, partly for the shipment that might be delayed and partly to expedite the return to home waters. a large number of troops can also be shipped from baltic ports. besides this, a repeated trip of the transport fleet is possible if the command of the sea is maintained continuously. for longer sea voyages, in which the importance of speed is not so great, our transport fleet can be greatly increased through chartering or purchasing ships of foreign nations. still, we are at present in the position to despatch about four infantry divisions, with present available ships, within ten or twelve days. sea voyage. for transporting troops over the sea, it is the chief problem of the navy to clear the course to the hostile shore. all enterprises of this kind are dependent on the battle fleet, whose first aim, therefore, must be to run down and attack the enemy's fleet which the transports might encounter; if the opportunity is afforded our fleet must bring about an engagement for the command of the sea at least by the time of embarkation. as the mobilizing of the battle ships is finished before the transport fleet is ready to put to sea, they can undertake an early offensive to make secure the passage of the expedition. also, throughout the voyage offensive operations can be undertaken by the battle fleet, in waters distant from the transport, which would serve the same ends of keeping the course clear. the escorts of the transport squadron should consist of just enough ships to give immediate protection. a large number would increase unnecessarily the size of the transport fleet without increasing its safety, while every addition of strength to the battle fleet is of the greatest value. the task of the escorts is only to protect the transports from attacks by single or several small vessels of the enemy. our torpedo boats are particularly adapted for escort service, and make it feasible to restrict the number of large battle ships used for this purpose. during the assembling of the transports, these boats may devote themselves to secure the safety of the traffic between the loading harbors. the departure of the transports from the various harbors must be so regulated that they sail in close union, to assure a safe voyage and a quick landing. the loading commission must take appropriate means to expedite the loading in those harbors farthest removed from the central assembling points. as a rule, the transport steamers would sail with the battle fleet; but in the english expedition to south africa and ours to east asia, this rule was not followed. an essential requirement is that the transports put to sea as soon as the loading is complete. they cannot wait for news of the success of the battle fleet. a certain risk is involved, but it is not great, for the transport fleet can always turn back. only an early departure would insure successful, unexpected landing. the shorter the voyage the greater the necessity for a surprise attack. in the event of our battle fleet being attacked, it does not follow that the transport operations must be abandoned, for if the voyage be short an energetic continuation of the venture will command a fair prospect of success. even the victor in a great naval battle might not be able to carry out an attack against the transport squadron. an individual hostile battle ship or cruiser would find it difficult to break into the transport fleet. an important factor in the sea voyage, perhaps the most important, is the weather. for short distances, it is possible to a certain degree to choose favorable weather for the passage, with the help of scientific forecasts. conditions might be such that a delay would not harm the operations. adverse weather conditions would more seriously affect long-distance transporting, to a degree that might cause abandonment. our vessels must be so improved as to make them independent of wind and weather, to make certain the speed of the voyage and to permit the establishing of a time record. for the time of the passage, the highest speed of the slowest boat is the standard, which could probably be increased by towing with tugs. in putting to sea all transport ships must retain the order of position they are to take in the squadron; this order is not broken until after leaving the harbor, so that the object of the voyage is known only to the home officials. the advance guard of troops will sail in the fastest ships so that they can make the unexpected landing. the pioneer and airship divisions are placed with the advance guard. the ships which have artillery ride on the flank of the troop transports. then follow the ships carrying supplies. the cable ship comes last. the laying of the cable gives a continuous communication with the home country. for extensive voyages, preparations must be made for taking on coal on the open sea. the commander-in-chief of the expedition corps should be on a transport steamer so that in event of a fight the transport fleet will not be without proper guidance. on long sea voyages, gymnastics, drilling and target practise can be pursued. ample daily exercising of the horses will occupy the greater part of the time of the cavalry. for short sea voyages these features are not so necessary. in general, strict discipline must be exercised to overcome the tediousness of the trip. while the command of the troops on every transport is in the oldest officer, the command of the ship remains in the hands of the captain, who is inferior in rank to the commander of the troops. if this captain has not served in the german navy, a midshipman may be signed as a coordinate officer. it is our policy to provide every transport ship with a naval officer. landing. military history shows that an attempt to prevent a really bold landing is never successful. the defense must either scatter its forces along the coast to be protected, or concentrate its full strength to cover one point, while the assailant, through the mobility of its transport, can keep its landing plan uncertain, and under the protection of long-range guns on the ships can throw more troops quickly on the land than the defense is able to concentrate in the same time. a simultaneous landing at different places is hazardous if the opponent can muster considerable strength. an expedition is seldom so large that disadvantages arise through landing at one point. on the other hand, it would require a great many battleships for the protection of numerous landing places. a division of the forces weakens all of them, and great difficulty would be found in uniformly managing the start of the operations for want of time and means. therefore, it is recommended, when the situation permits, to select one central place for landing. for the disembarking a harbor is of course the most advantageous; less advantageous but always favorable is an enclosed, protected bay; the most unfavorable is the open coast. yet a landing on the open coast would encounter little resistance if it is carried out with great speed. if the chosen landing place be near a bay or a seaport town, it would be the mission of the first landed advance guard to seize this port, to make it possible for the transport fleet to disembark the mass of troops, horses and materials. the occupation of a good harbor will greatly hasten the unloading, prevent a hostile attack from the sea and add greatly to the ability of the landing corps to carry on the operations. if a seizure of a port is not possible, the landing of the entire expedition must take place by means of prepared disembarking contrivances. every transport must be equipped for landing on an open coast. the best landing place is a site nearest the object of the operations, which would force the opponents to a decision before they were thoroughly prepared. clear coast regions within range of the ships' guns are desirable, as is also quiet, deep water near to the landing site. it is possible to land within range of important hostile garrisons and fortifications. russian landing maneuvers have demonstrated the truth of this statement. fortifications are effective against landing enterprises only when sufficient troops are on hand to defend the coast. if the assailant is successful in landing a detachment of troops out of the range of the fortifications, the latter would be ineffective for defense. the best security, however, for the initial landing is its unexpected delivery. reconnoitering of the coast site by boats sent beforehand is an absurdity, for the opponents immediately become acquainted with the landing plans and are given time for preparations for defense. of great importance for rapid, well-regulated landing is uniform management through the signal service of the ships and the telephone service on land, which can be installed advantageously. in anchoring the ships must be the correct distance apart, to avoid crowding. the execution of the landing as a rule is as follows: the advance guard rides ahead, on the last stretch, with its own escort of battleships, and lands, if possible, unawares, usually at night. if the landing be on an open coast, the mass of troops which follow should immediately throw up earthworks. the entire disembarking must be made with great speed, for the quicker the landing is accomplished the less the danger of being disturbed. the most favorable time for attacking the coast is at dawn, for the landing can take place unknown to the enemy and day be used for disembarking. as the ships do not carry a sufficient number of patent boats for landing on an open coast, special flat-bottom boats should be prepared for unloading horses and heavy material. the english employ collapsible boats for landing men, which accommodate a crew of fifty, while the russians have flat-bottom boats capable of holding two hundred men, or one complete cannon. it is recommended that we be permitted to try the russian model, which has been well tested. small power boats should be employed for tugging, as rowing would be a waste of valuable time. to permit horses to swim ashore is to be condemned, for it would cause confusion and delay, and we know from experience that a large number are sometimes lost. the americans, in their landing in cuba, lost seven per cent. of their horses. for the landing of artillery and heavy materials small landing bridges must be erected on the beach, for which prepared material is carried on the transports. the assembling of the troops must not be permitted on the beach, for all space there must be kept for the landing of supplies. if a landing near a harbor is successful, the advance guard will strive to take the same unawares, to seize those coast sentinels at hand and to destroy the telegraph and signal service along the coast. if all this is successful, the transport fleet will be signaled to draw near. the advantage is apparent in landing in a large harbor or bay, which affords the possibility of protection from a sea attack, through the mining of the waters or through the guard of a limited number of battleships. earthworks, equipped with cannon and machine guns, must be thrown up for the protection from the land side. the piers must be distributed to make sufficient room for disembarking. the existing plans for improvising landing bridges and gangways should be extended, in order to expedite the landing. the piers and bridges will be used for ships carrying horses, artillery and heavy materials, while the infantry land by boats, under the protection of large guns on shore or of the escorting battleships, should the battle fleet maintain command of the sea. the landed troops should be supplied provisions for many days so that they can begin operations independent of the supply trains. the time required for landing is considerably less than for loading. the natural desire of the troops to land quickly helps to shorten the time. one writer gives the following data: lord cochran landed , men on the open coast of america in five hours; in the crimean war the english accomplished the disembarking of , men, guns and about horses in less than eleven hours. the french are slower on account of their handling of supply trains. the russians, in their landing maneuvers in the black sea, have landed a slow division in eleven and one-half hours, where the steamers had to anchor five to six kilometers from the coast. the marine writer degories figures that under average conditions it is possible to land , infantry, , cavalry and guns in six hours. if the landing can be made in a harbor, this time can be essentially lessened. after the disembarking of the expedition, the further task of the transport fleet and its escort of battleships depends on the maritime strength of the country attacked. if the assailant continues in command of the sea, the transport fleet can remain as a floating base for the landed corps and can effect the reenforcement of the expedition. if the assailant is not in command of the sea, then the transport fleet must attempt to evade the operations of the hostile fleet, by an immediate retreat to home waters. operations. the operations of the landed expedition corps on the whole can be conducted according to the principles set down by the commanders of the troops, but these principles must take into account the particular conditions under which the forces operate. the well-known marine writer, mahan, emphasizes the fact that a landing operation must be offensive to succeed. military history shows that after boldly carried out landings at abukir and cape breton, for example, the success of the extensive operations was impaired, almost lost, because of lack of energy and rapidity of execution of offensive movements. the assembled strength must be thrown forward on the line of least resistance. defensive strategy should be used only when a delay is necessary to receive expected reenforcements. the primary aim of the operations is to dispose of hostile forces, within the shortest possible time and with the least loss to ourselves. during the progress of the operations the country through which the troops pass can be drawn upon to supplement equipment and supplies, but the speed of the advance and the efficiency of the troops must not be decreased through extended raids. while the distance to the objective of the invasion is generally not great, it should be our endeavor to be independent of our base of supplies. much progress has been made in the methods of making condensed foods, for man and horse, which will help to solve the problem of provisions. the army of invasion can also take an important site in the hostile country and utilize it as a base of operations. continuous communication with the home country is therefore not absolutely necessary. in a densely populated and rich country it is easy to secure provisions and supplies. the maintenance of long lines of communications is hazardous in that it requires excessive guard duty. when the battle fleet has gained command of the sea it will be in a position to protect continuously the base on the coast, and would also make it possible for the corps of invasion to select new bases. sherman's march to savannah in the civil war has shown the practicability of this plan. after one objective has been attained, it should be possible for the expedition to reembark to land at some other point on the coast for further operations. against the enemy's defenses we must throw our full strength and avoid enterprises that involve a delay or a weakening of our forces. dearly purchased victories will in the end defeat our own aims. if the operations of the troops are carried on along the coast, or if the objective of the operations is a harbor or a coast fortification, the battle fleet should act in unison with the land forces. battleships are superior to the field artillery, as they can be moved at will and so are hard to put out of action. continuous bombardment from the battleships would prove effective aid for the troops. it is important, then, that the command of land and naval forces be joined in a commander-in-chief who would direct the field forces as well as the naval forces. small coast defenses of seaport cities could not for any length of time withstand such a combined attack. it is certain also that present-day coast defenses could not withstand an energetic attack from the land side. they are more vulnerable than inland fortresses because they are open to attack simultaneously from land and water. however, if the battle fleet cannot gain the command of the sea, and must retreat before the opposing forces, the operations of the landed troops must be conducted wholly as a war on land. reembarkation. a reembarkation of the expedition corps is possible only when the battle fleet is able to prevent attack from the sea. in the event of defeat on land, reembarkation is not absolutely impossible, for if good order is maintained the improvised defenses of the landing sites, with the help of the fleet, will sufficiently delay the pursuers. if the reembarking must take place from some other point, preparations for its defense must be made in advance. when the reembarkation is done with the aim in view of attacking at another place, the rules as explained in the chapter on "embarkation" must be adhered to. for such an operation, more time is essential, and pressure of the enemy should not be permitted to interfere with its management. application i. consideration of landing operations against powers that can be reached only by sea the recognized military complication with england and america affords an interesting example on account of the difference in distances in which the transporting of troops takes place, on account of the strength of the sea and land fighting forces of the two opponents, and lastly on account of the difference in the territorial extensions of the aforesaid countries, and on the whole challenges various measures. a conflict with england must be fixed in the eye of germany, for the great german struggle for commerce represents to england just as great a danger as the advance of russia against india. beginning operations with a naval war with england, we could almost foresee the result. england has brought about the existence of such a powerful, active navy that we, with the best defenses we have, would hardly be able to win a decisive victory. only by closing an alliance with russia would the strength of england be injured indeed, but never by a direct threat from these provinces. but an alliance with france would in fact menace england. the latter, however, through her geographical location and through her large and timely expenditures, which every combined operation demands, could make possible by proper equipment a maritime superiority against this alliance. england's weakness is in just that which forms our strength, namely, the land army. the english army responds to neither quantity nor quality of its great and powerful position in comparison with the extent of the land; therefore england, from convictions, proceeds so that every invasion of the land can be prevented by the fleet. these convictions are in no way justified, for while england in developing a powerful sea-fighting strength has every day prepared for war, she has not had a view of the consequences of confronting and beating a really weaker sea opponent with its fighting units. these are the measures which germany, in case of a threatened war with england, must adopt and practise: our endeavors must be to engage the fleet, if possible; to throw part of our land forces upon the english coast, so that the conflict on the sea can be carried to the enemy's land, where our troops are already superior in quality to england's, and so that a victory for england's powerful naval strength could have but the smallest influence. the army fighting strength of england under the commander-in-chief is composed of the army reserve, the militia, the volunteers and the yeomanry. in the event of an unexpected invasion, only the commander-in-chief and army reserve can be considered to any extent, for the militia needs so much time to assemble and equip that they would be in a weak position to assist the commander-in-chief in the first decisive battle. the volunteers and yeomanry cannot in so short a time be trained for war or be mobilized for action. also their insignificant fighting value must be kept in view, beside which our well-trained troops will not let them seem as menacing opponents. the english army is formed of three army corps with three divisions to each corps. a third to a half of these corps is comprised of militia, so that either it must be first completed, and then it would be too late for cooperation in the first decisive battle, or it would be so untrained that it really cannot be said to reach the strength of a division. of two army corps, two divisions and one cavalry brigade are in ireland, the greater part of which must remain there to prevent the undertaking of a german invasion through ireland even though it brought about the longed-for freedom. the preparation for defense should also be considered. this might consist of one army corps with three divisions, or one army corps comprised of two divisions, with perhaps a cavalry brigade made up from three army corps. whereas the army strength of an english division is about , men, a german division carries , men, hence four german divisions and a cavalry division would have a superiority over the english army. but we are in a position to set over in england, in the shortest time, six divisions of infantry, or five divisions of infantry and one cavalry division. how a well regulated operation against england is to be conducted across the sea, obviously cannot be forecasted here. the passage in moderate weather is a little over thirty hours' ride from our north sea harbors. the english coast affords extensive stretches of shore which are suitable for landing troops. the land contains such large resources that the invading army can procure a living therefrom. on the other hand, the extent of the island is not so great that the english land defenses could ever succeed in timely destroying a successful invading force. it is improbable that germany could carry on for very long a well regulated war necessitating considerable reenforcement of troops. the supplies would have to be furnished for the greater part on land. maintaining communication with the home country can therefore readily be seen to be of importance. it is conclusive that the first aim of every operation of invasion in england is their field army, and the second must be london. it is probable that these two objectives would fall together, in that the field army, on account of the small value of the volunteers, is needed for the protection of london fortifications, so as not to leave the metropolis insufficiently defended. powerful public opinion would demand this for fear that london would fall into the hands of the invaders. but if london is taken by the invading army this would still be only one of the many war ports which must be seized, to secure a base of supplies and for the further operations which have every view to concluding the overthrow of england. operations against the united states of north america must be entirely different. with that country, in particular, political friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not been lacking in recent years, and has, until now, been removed chiefly through acquiescence on our part. however, as this submission has its limit, the question arises as to what means we can develop to carry out our purpose with force, in order to combat the encroachment of the united states upon our interests. our main factor here is our fleet. our battle fleet has every prospect of victoriously defeating the forces of the united states, widely dispersed over the two oceans. it is certain that after the defeat of the united states fleet, the great extension of unprotected coast line and powerful resources of that country would compel them to make peace. there is no effective method to force this opponent to relinquish its maritime operations, even though there is only a trifling number of american merchantmen, except the simultaneous blockading with our sea forces of american ports, which can only be taken with heavy losses, while our fleet demonstrated the actual limited worth of the unpacified american colonies. it must be deemed a possibility that the battle fleet of the united states would not risk an engagement at sea except to avoid a disaster, but would await, in its fortified harbors, a favorable opportunity to strike. it is evident, then, that a naval war against the united states cannot be carried on with success without at the same time inaugurating action on land. because of the great extensions of the united states it would not be satisfactory for the operation of an invading army to be directed toward conquering the interior of the land. it is almost a certainty, however, that a victorious assault on the atlantic coast, tying up the importing and exporting business of the whole country, would bring about such an annoying situation that the government would be willing to treat for peace. if the german invading force were equipped and ready for transporting the moment the battle fleet is despatched, under average conditions these corps can begin operations on american soil within at least four weeks. to what extent we will be able to succeed has already been considered. the united states at this time is not in a position to oppose our troops with an army of equal rank. its regular army actually totals , men, of whom not more than , are ready to defend the home country. of these at least , men are required to guard indian territory and for the garrisoning of coast-wise fortifications, so that only a regular army of , is available for field service. there is also a militia of , men, the larger number of whom have not been trained since the last war summons, and they are poorly equipped with inferior rifles and still more poorly drilled. if an unexpected invasion of the united states is prevented by the length of time for the transporting of troops, and only an unexpected landing can take place, it must be emphasized that the weakness and inexperience of their regular army would essentially facilitate a quick invasion. for the continued occupation of as large a territory as the united states, if they can oppose us for any length of time, an important fighting force will be necessary, to protect the operating lines and to carry on a successful warfare. an invading operation will be difficult to reenforce, in that a second trip of the transport fleet will be required, in order to despatch the necessary number of troops, at such a great distance. it is upon the whole questionable whether there is anything to be gained in occupying for any length of time so large a stretch of land as the united states. the fact that one or two of her provinces are occupied by the invaders would not alone move the americans to sue for peace. to accomplish this end the invaders would have to inflict real material damage by injuring the whole country through the successful seizure of many of the atlantic seaports in which the threads of the entire wealth of the nation meet. it should be so managed that a line of land operations would be in close juncture with the fleet, through which we would be in a position to seize, within a short time, many of these important and rich cities, to interrupt their means of supply, disorganize all governmental affairs, assume control of all useful buildings, confiscate all war and transport supplies, and lastly, to impose heavy indemnities. for enterprises of this sort small land forces would answer our purpose, for it would be unwise for the american garrisons to attempt an attack. their excellently developed net of railways will enable them to concentrate their troops in a relatively short time at the various recognized landing points on the coast. but there are many other splendid landings, and it appears feasible for the invading corps to conduct its operations on these points with the cooperation of the fleet. the land corps can either advance aggressively against the concentrated opposing forces, or through embarking evade an attack and land at a new place. as a matter of fact, germany is the only great power which is in a position to conquer the united states. england could of course carry out a successful attack on the sea, but she would not be prepared to protect her canadian provinces, with which the americans could compensate themselves for a total or crushing defeat on the sea. none of the other great powers can provide the necessary transport fleet to attempt an invasion. ii. views on colonial expeditions all operations for colonial expeditions can be undertaken successfully because of the small forces necessary to transport over the sea to make war upon a country which does not possess modern equipment and trained troops. just such an expedition was unostentatiously carried out in china before our own eyes. the sending of an expedition to east asia affords an interesting example of what can be done. without resistance we have set up governments at a distance from the home country. it is possible with the aid of the fleet to secure similar results. however, there are many obstacles to be overcome. it is imperative that in time of peace we should prepare in every possible way for war in foreign lands which have any commercial value for us. inasmuch as the german army has determined upon larger divisions of troops, the problems of operations on the distant sea falls to the navy. in the future the conducting of such operations will rest with the general staff. it will be necessary to continue the preparations, described fully in the forepart of this book, for the carrying out of operations against such countries as asia, africa and south america. good judgment must be used in the selection of methods. the execution of the first operations would require the constantly combined efforts of the general staff and the admiral staff. our excellent knowledge of east asia has given us the necessary technical preparation in the way of equipment. the chartering of transport ships for service to china should not be difficult in consequence of the large size of the expedition. the expedition corps would require eighteen ships, material and supplies would take five. the greater part of this number would be amply supplied by our two large steamship companies, the north german lloyd and the hamburg-american line. the charter of these steamship companies provides for their use as transports if needed for expeditions of this sort. the disadvantages of this arrangement once appeared in the delay through a labor strike, when it was necessary to transport part of the unfinished ships to wilhelmshaven. another drawback is that not enough room is provided in these ships. on the steamers of the hamburg-american line, for example, only sixty-five per cent. of their normal passenger capacity can be utilized for troops which means at the most an approximate displacement of three net tons, so that only one man instead of two can be carried. an adjustment should be reached to the end that the entire freight capacity of the steamers could be counted upon. the interior arrangements of a steamer to be used for troop transport must be planned according to law. fire-extinguishers, life-saving apparatus and other necessities must be provided for; numerous tables and benches which can be drawn up to the ceiling should be in the troops rooms, and should also be found up on deck. hospital arrangements for two and one-half per cent. of the transport strength should be provided. the active troops of the expedition corps are at present drawn from volunteers, the reserve and the militia, and grouped in new formations. through this the home defenses may be benefited, but the expedition corps would not be up to standard, even though the newly formed troops would have sufficient time to concentrate. it is advisable for such an expedition to employ active, well-trained soldiers for the main part, while the balance could be made up of reserves. it is also to be recommended that in the near future we form a fixed body of troops trained for hospital service. such a formation would have great intrinsic worth. a few words should be said about the organizing of a colonial army, which would be called upon to play an essential part in german military operations over the sea. it would be of extraordinary value in preserving order in our colonies and would also be of assistance in commercial aims. the colonial army would constitute a picked body of men, suitable for service in hot climates and uncivilized countries, who would be able to fight effectively against colonies with which we might be at war. there would still remain, however, the need of preparation of our home forces for colonial expeditions. we are not assured at present of the assembling of the necessary number of qualified troops without drawing on our regular army. it requires a good deal of time to procure the equipment for an expedition to east asia. therefore, contracts with capable firms should be made, to make delivery in the shortest possible time. while the equipment of the infantry with up-to-date weapons is easily accomplished, it is noteworthy that only about thirty horses can be loaded by the english system. some effort should be made to solve the horse problem. the purchasing of horses in australia, america and south china has ceased, in consequence of the knowledge that only a small percentage can withstand the change of climate. it would be impossible to employ joint cavalry forces, due to lack of mounts. it is imperative to find the means for forming a mounted infantry, for there is an insufficient number of advanced cavalry troops to meet an emergency. it would be advantageous if large brigades now idle could be moved for operations in eastern china. past experience in china has emphasized the great importance of cavalry for operations in large countries. the losses in newly purchased horses would be greater than if we would send trained horses accustomed to military service. the great loss in transporting horses is no longer to be feared. the experience of the english in transporting horses to cape town proves the worth of their loading system. and it should be pointed out that the prussian horses, through their training, can endure climatic changes and the hardships of sea transportation much better than the english horses. the thirty horses on the transport must be well taken care of to reach east asia. the ships should be fitted out with this aim in view. accidents usually occur in crossing the equator. the red sea and the indian ocean are especially difficult to cross. this could be overcome by sending the transport by way of cape town, where a part of the trip could be made south through the tropic of cancer. it has been demonstrated that horses not older than from ten to sixteen years should be selected for service abroad. no fear need be felt as to the feeding of the horses, for our horses are accustomed to little corn. sometimes feedings of soaked rice with molasses added have given favorable results. a possible help for the outfitting of the artillery would be the purchasing in italy of native mules and loading them at genoa. in english sea-transporting these animals have demonstrated their exceptional powers of resistance. they are preferable to horses because they can endure hardships better and can more easily be accustomed to conditions in east asia. while we have a large variety of artillery, our expedition corps must be equipped with mountain guns which can be carried by beasts of burden. this is often necessary in colonial expeditions. experience shows that it is difficult to move the heavy artillery of the field army over bad roads, and the large guns would not get very far. this is true also of the steel-boat bridge trains. it is surprising that our collapsible boats, universally approved as superior, are not utilized. our military arrangements have not included a suitable hospital service, because the ambulances are too heavy and unwieldy. the french seem to have been afforded very good service by the so-called cacolets--saddle horses with pack saddles for the sick and wounded. these are excellent for use in colonial countries. a light wagon model is generally recommended for supplies, for despite the condition of the roads they must be able to follow the troops. it is a question how the unfavorable conditions of communication with our men-of-war can be improved. once the forces and supplies are in bremen and bremerhaven no difficulties would be found in embarking. for the future a central place is recommended from which the expedition corps can sail. if thorough preparations are made the loading of the transports can be accomplished in two or three days; by the old method of loading it took two days for each ship. to facilitate the work, the loading should be done simultaneously on both sides of the steamer. the greater part of the supplies can be brought by tugs from bremen to bremerhaven. the troops can consequently embark at quai in about four hours. the vessels, which have been arranged to utilize all available space, can also carry all accouterments, ammunition and supplies. great delay and inconvenience might be caused by not accurately calculating the massive proportions of the military shipment. it is therefore above all argument that the military authorities and not the steamship company should oversee the loading so that it would be done properly from a military standpoint. through a haphazard loading, the detached troops might not go in the same boat with their belongings, and they might not even know where their individual effects were stowed. disembarking would be difficult and delayed, causing the forces to wait a long time for the unloading of their guns and ammunition. with regard to the sea voyage, it is very advantageous for us that the sailing of the joint fleet is not required. the trip by transport would take from forty-two to fifty-seven days. the trip from shanghai to taku can be made successfully with the aid of our battle fleet. the transports should sail without artillery equipment, so that no difficulty would be experienced in getting letters-of-marque; but if they could have on deck even a small amount of the guns which they have on board, they would have nothing to fear from privateers or auxiliary cruisers. upon arrival at taku, considerable difficulties might be encountered, for it is reported that it is practically impossible to procure the extra help needed. considering a landing at tsingtau, it should be noted that there has not been provided a sufficient number of disembarking boats. this situation proves that under all circumstances the troop transport must be equipped independently to land its troops and supplies. experience has taught us that a great deal of preparation is necessary to undertake colonial expeditions and it behooves us now to lay a foundation for future operations over the sea. iii. concluding views many operations of our army, under protection of the fleet, can be conducted in hitherto unexpected directions; many commands which our fleet may not be able to carry out alone can be accomplished by the combination of the land and sea forces. now if the army across the sea is able to resist our strength, it is necessary to prepare in advance to have our battle fleet so strong that it will be in a position to assist materially in any undertaking of our troops. from studies of the strength of our various opponents across the sea whom we must aim at, because their neighboring territory is of great importance to us, it is plain that we must enlarge our fleet to protect our commercial interests. it is essential that the speed of our battle fleets be increased. not the least important thing to realize is the fact that as a rule it is impossible to undertake large operations across the sea, and to carry them out successfully, unless exhaustive preparations are made during times of peace. the end note: project gutenberg also has an html version of this file which includes the original illustrations. see -h.htm or -h.zip: (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h/ -h.htm) or (http://www.gutenberg.net/dirs/ / / / / / -h.zip) +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | transcriber's note: | | | | inconsistent hyphenation in the original document has | | been preserved. | | | | the original book used bold face as a means to find the | | index entries. this has not been reproduced in this | | e-book. | | | | obvious typographical errors have been corrected. for | | a complete list, please see the end of this document. | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ sound military decision u.s. naval war college naval institute press annapolis, maryland this book is the edition of a book originally published in by the u.s. naval war college. contents _sound military decision_ index sound military decision u.s. naval war college newport, rhode island november , sound military decision was first published at the naval war college in . it included the essential features of the estimate of the situation which, since , had been issued at intervals in a series of revised editions. the new material that was added in was intended to assist in enlarging the viewpoint and in broadening the basis of professional judgment. primarily intended for the purposes of the naval war college, this work is the cumulative result of years of untiring and loyal effort on the part of the college staff and student body. equally important have been the advice and assistance contributed by other officers of wide professional experience and attainment. the objective has been a brief but inclusive treatment of the fundamentals of the military profession, i.e., the profession of arms. the emphasis, naturally, is on the exercise of mental effort in the solution of military problems, more especially in our navy. an enormous literature has been consulted, and research has included all available and pertinent military writings. care has also been taken to include, from civil sources, the findings of those authoritative works which deal with related matters and with the applicable underlying truths. in a work of this type and scope, it is manifestly not possible to illustrate the abstract text by historical examples and analogies. these are complementary features of the war college resident and correspondence courses; provision for the necessary historical background is otherwise the concern of the individual student. in this edition of sound military decision no radical changes have been made; the revision has been confined to rearrangement and amplification of the subject matter. e.c. kalbfus, rear admiral, u.s. navy, president. [illustration: sound military decision the solution of military problems through the studied employment of the natural mental processes (foreword) the scientific approach to the solution of military problems part i professional judgment in its relation to the successful conduct of war (chapter i) command and its problems (chapter ii) mental processes and human tendencies the fundamental military principle (ch. iii) leading to sound military decision (ch. iv) the application of the fundamental military principle the two major applications, i.e.,-- the selection of objectives the determination of operations (ch. v) the four steps in the solution of a military problem part ii--planning (ch. vi) the first step the estimate of the situation the decision (ch. vii) the second step the detailed plan part iii--execution (ch. viii) the third step the directives (ch. ix) the fourth step the supervision of the planned action] table of contents (see chart on page xxxx) page foreword science of war--scientific investigation--fundamental considerations--art of war--scientific method--leadership and training--sound decision--judgment--the approach to the solution of military problems--fundamental philosophy--technique of solution--process of education--outline of the discussion. part i. professional judgment in its relation to the successful conduct of war. chapter i command and its problems the implementation of national policy--the primary function of the armed forces--military strategy and tactics--command of the armed forces--unity of effort--the chain of command--mutual understanding--indoctrination. ii mental processes and human tendencies natural mental processes--the necessity for logical thought--principles in their relation to logical thought--value and limitations of lists of principles of war--formulation and use of principles--summary of fundamental considerations. iii basic principles applicable to military problems (the fundamental military principle) review of conclusions--procedure--suitability, feasibility, and acceptability--fundamental principle for attainment of an end--interdependency of factors--special nature of war--factors in war--the objective in war--military operations--salient features--the fundamental military principle--corollaries. iv the application of the fundamental military principle (objectives--their selection and attainment) the basis for solution of a military problem--the major components of a military problem--essential elements--selection of correct military objectives-- determination of effective military operations--physical objectives--relative positions--apportionment of fighting strength--freedom of action--summary. v the four steps in the solution of a military problem a situation--the incentive--the assigned objective--the motivating task--the natural mental processes--the approach to the solution--the first step--the basic problem--tasks-- the mission--survey of factors of fighting strength--courses of action--reflective thinking--naval operations--analysis and selection of courses of action--the decision--the second step--the third step--the fourth step--sequence of events in the four steps--the use of a form in the solution of problems--conclusion. *part ii. the exercise of professional judgment in planning. vi the selection of a correct objective (including the determination, in proper detail, of the action required for its attainment) the first step--the solution of a basic problem (the estimate of the situation) process of solving a problem--sections of the estimate form--establishment of the basis for solution of the problem--determination of suitable, feasible, and acceptable courses of action--examination into the capabilities of the enemy--selection of the best course of action--the decision. vii the resolution of the required action into detailed operations (the second step--the solution of subsidiary problems) assumptions--alternative plans--application of the essential elements of a favorable military operation-- testing for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability-- formulation of tasks--organization of task groups-- application of the fundamental military principle to the determination of objectives embodied in tasks--assembly of measures for freedom of action--preparation of subsidiary plans. *part iii. the exercise of professional judgment in the execution of the plan viii the inauguration of the planned action (the third step--the formulation and issue of directives) scope of the third step--military plans and military directives--essentials of military directives-- restatement of the decision--standard forms for plans and directives--the order form--types of naval directives. ix the supervision of the planned action (the fourth step) nature of the discussion--goal of planning--importance of execution--the incentive--conditions in war-- recognition of new problems--nature of readjustments required--importance of the will of the commander-- problems involving modification of the basic plan-- problems challenging integrity of basic plan--further procedure applicable to such problems of the fourth step--the running estimate of the situation--journal and work sheet--special remarks as to entries--summary. *conclusion *appendix outline form of an operation plan tabular form of the estimate of the situation *index * not included in the limited issue for use in part i of the correspondence course. foreword from the earliest days of recorded history, the facts associated with military operations of the past have been constantly studied. the result has been the accumulation of a mass of information from which conclusions have been drawn as to the causes of success and failure. although scattered through countless volumes, and nowhere completely systematized and classified, this accepted body of knowledge constitutes the basis for the science of war. scientific investigation--that is, the collection, verification, and classification of facts--follows the recurrent procedure of successive analysis, hypothesis, theory, and test. the application of this process to the campaigns of history reveals fundamentals common to all, irrespective of whether the sphere of action has been land, sea, or air. in the ceaseless struggle for supremacy between the offense and the defense, great technological changes have taken place. the successful conduct of war, however, has always depended on effective operations for the creation or maintenance of favorable military situations, whose essential elements have remained unchanged throughout the years (see page ). these fundamental considerations (see page ), whatever the detailed form of their presentation, are the basis for the successful conduct of war. the need of such a basis has been felt from very early times. it was not, however, until the early part of the nineteenth century that students of warfare appear to have recorded the view that the conduct of war is susceptible of reduction to scientific analysis, and that only through a reasoned theory can the true causes of success and failure be explained. such a scientific analysis of any subject has for its chief practical aim the improvement of the art, or practice, of that subject. forming an important part of the science of war are those new developments in weapons and in other technological fields which, with the passage of time, have brought about great changes in methods of waging war. it is only through founding the art of war--the application of the science of war to actual military situations--on the fundamental truths discovered through the science of war, that changes in method, due to technological evolution, can be made most effective. in preparing for war, the only practicable peacetime tests are usually restricted to those afforded by examples of the past, by problems such as chart (map) and board maneuvers, and by fleet and field exercises. while the military profession can afford to neglect none of them, such tests can never be conclusive. this fact, however, far from justifying resort to any other procedure, emphasizes the necessity for utilization of the scientific method in order to arrive at conclusions which are as exact as possible. an exact result is, of course, the aim of all scientific research, but exactitude necessarily depends on the establishment of correct relationships among facts which have so far come to light. consequently, there is great variation in the degree of accuracy which actually characterizes the several sciences. if it be maintained that only those studies which have resulted in exact conclusions may properly be regarded as sciences, then it can hardly be said that many sciences, now regarded as such, exist; for the findings of medicine, biology, chemistry, and even physics are continually being revised in the light of new data. the science of war necessarily includes knowledge gained in other fields. in war, as in medicine or any other practical activity, the more inclusive and dependable the body of knowledge available as a basis for action, the more probable it is that the application of this knowledge, the art (page ), will be effective. realization of these facts has led to renewed emphasis on the scientific approach to the solution of military problems. the fallacy of staking the future upon the possible availability of a military genius in time of need became clear when it was appreciated that more than one nation, hitherto victorious in arms, had been defeated and humiliated when genius no longer led its forces. there followed in the military profession a conviction that, although extraordinary inherent capacity can be recognized and utilized when known to exist, it is safer and wiser to develop by training the highest average of ability in leadership than to trust to untrained "common sense" or to the possible advent of a genius. history has abundantly proved the folly of attempting, on any other basis, to cope with the unpredictable occurrence of genius in the hostile leadership. with the actual exercise of leadership in war restricted to the reality of war, there is emphasized the need of peacetime training--training of subordinates in efficient performance, and, more important, training of those who will be placed by the state in positions of responsibility and command. campaigns of the twentieth century reflect the intensity of mental training among the armed forces of the greater powers; the planning and conduct of war have acquired a precision, a swiftness, and a thoroughness before unknown. the study and analysis of past campaigns, the sifting of technical details from fundamental truths, and the shrewd combination of the theoretical and the practical form the basis of this training. the proper solution of military problems requires the reaching of sound decision as to what is to be done. upon the soundness of the decision depends, in great part, the effectiveness of the resulting action. both are dependent on the possession of a high order of professional judgment, fortified by knowledge and founded on experience. theoretical knowledge supplements experience, and is the best substitute in its absence. judgment, the ability to understand the correct relationship between cause and effect, and to apply that knowledge under varying circumstances, is essential to good leadership. professional judgment is inherently strengthened by mental exercise in the application of logical processes to the solution of military problems. the approach, presented herein, to the solution of military problems is intended to assist the military profession in reaching sound decisions as to ( ) the selection of its correct objectives, the ends toward which its action is to be directed under varying circumstances; ( ) planning the detailed operations required; ( ) transmitting the intent so clearly as to ensure inauguration of well-coordinated action; and ( ) the effective supervision of such action. the student of war will find in these pages a fundamental military philosophy whose roots go down to very ancient times. in the technique described for the solution of military problems, experienced officers will recognize a system with which they are already familiar. this system, constantly under study to improve its details, has been in use in our military services for many years. the foundation of this philosophy and of the system for its practical utilization rests on the concept of relative or proportional values. in the military environment, change, rather than stability, is especially to be expected, and the relationships existing among the essential elements of a military situation are, in fact, the significant values. such values, themselves, vary with the viewpoint of the person concerned. accordingly, because of the difference in objectives (defined above), what is strategy as viewed by a commander on a higher echelon may have more of a tactical aspect to those on a lower (page ). immediate objectives and ultimate objectives (page ) can scarcely be understood in their true proportions unless the point of reference is clear. the point of view of the commander, as established by the position he occupies in the chain of command, is, therefore, to be taken into consideration in every phase of the solution of a problem,--in the determination of the appropriate effect desired (page ), of relative fighting strength (page ), and of courses of action and the detailed operations pertaining thereto (page ). on the basis of these facts, instantaneous and easy understanding of all the elements involved is not to be expected. were such understanding possible, the expert conduct of war would be one of the easiest, instead of one of the most difficult, of human activities. it is only through a gradual assimilation of its fundamentals that the profession of arms is to be mastered. a process of true education is involved,--that of enlarging the viewpoint and broadening the basis of professional judgment (see page i),--and its essentials are the proper foundation for any system of self-improvement in the exercise of mental power. there is no easy road to the goal of military effort. part i, hereafter, discusses professional judgment in its basic relation to the successful conduct of war. this treatment examines the responsibilities of the armed forces, discusses the role of the commander, indicates the natural mental processes employed in the solution of military problems, formulates and explains the fundamental military principle, and concludes with an outline of the procedure for its further application in parts ii and iii. part ii is concerned with the solution of the problems encountered during the planning stage. part iii discusses the execution of the plan,--the directives and the supervision of the action,--but the treatment as to details is chiefly from the standpoint of the mental effort. during hostilities the vital issues which hinge on alert supervision create an accentuated demand for the intelligent exercise of professional judgment. its possession to a highly developed degree and its exercise on a foundation of knowledge and experience, are prerequisite to attainment of the highest standards in the conduct of war. the following pages are intended, therefore, to provide a fundamental basis upon which the commander, by thoughtful study and reflection, may develop his professional judgment to the end that its exercise result in sound military decision, essential alike to wise planning and to consistently effective action. part i professional judgment in its relation to the successful conduct of war chapter i command and its problems the foreword, preceding, has explained the scientific approach to the solution of military problems. it has been brought to notice that the science of war can be utilized to further sound military decision and, so, to improve the practice of war, i.e., the art of war, whether under assumed or actual conditions. the foreword has also stressed the importance of education for the development of judgment in the application of mental power to the solution of military problems. chapter i, which now follows, deals with the armed forces in their relation to national policy, and discusses, specifically, the role of the commander with respect to the use of mental power as a recognized component of fighting strength. emphasis is placed on the important subjects of military strategy and tactics, unity of effort, the chain of command, authority and responsibility, organization, mutual understanding, loyalty, and indoctrination. the implementation of national policy. organized government exists for the purpose of bringing into systematic union the individuals of a state for the attainment of common ends. the primary national objective (page ) is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of essential security for the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community. whatever the form of government, the power and authority of the state are vested in an individual, or in a grouping of individuals, whose voice is the voice of the state. in the prosecution of the chief aim of organized government, the state crystallizes the many conflicting desires and views of its people into policies, internal and external. each policy is a method of procedure for attaining one or more national objectives. internal policies are rendered effective by enforcement of the laws of the state. external policies, to become effective, require recognition by other states, tacitly or by agreement. when there is conflict between the policies of one state and those of another, peaceful means of settlement are usually sought. if peaceful (diplomatic) means fail to settle the point at issue, the state abandons the policy in question, defers action to enforce it, or adopts stronger measures. such measures may take the form of psychological, political, or economic pressure. they may even include the threat to employ armed force before actually resorting to the imposition of physical violence. during actual hostilities, also, every means of pressure known to man, in addition to physical violence, may be employed. whether the use of armed force to impose or to resist the imposition of policy constitutes a legal state of war is a political question which does not affect the tasks the armed forces may be called on to perform. war, therefore, is to be understood herein as any condition in which one state employs physical violence against another, or against an organized part of itself which may be in rebellion. by agreement among nations, effort has been made to discountenance aggressive warfare. the distinction between aggression and self-defense is, however, not a matter of agreement. war is still employed as an instrument of national policy. no nation has, as yet, manifested willingness to relinquish the right to employ armed force in resisting aggression, nor the right to decide what constitutes self-defense. states still maintain and employ armed forces as a means of promoting and expanding, as well as of defending, their welfare and interests. the primary function of the armed forces. whether war is an ethical institution is not a matter within the purview of the armed forces. their primary function is, when called upon to do so, to support and, within the sphere of military effort, to enforce the policy of the state. the performance of this function constitutes the chief reason for their existence. the fundamental objective of the armed forces is, therefore, the reduction of the opposing will to resist. it is attained through the use of actual physical violence or the threat thereof (page ). this fact constitutes the underlying motive of every military plan, whether for the conduct of a minor or contributory operation, or for the prosecution of a major campaign. the final outcome is dependent on ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the enemy, for land is the natural habitat of man (page ). since opposition is to be expected, the military problem is primarily concerned with the application of power--mental, moral, and physical--in overcoming resistance, or in exerting effort to resist. the application of power implies effort, i.e., the exertion of strength. the mental, moral, and physical power at the disposal of the armed forces depends on the effort which can be exerted by the human and material components of their fighting strength. the skillful employment of fighting strength, as a weapon more effective than the enemy's under a given set of circumstances, is the goal toward which the armed forces direct their effort. the elements of the material component--arms, ammunition, and other equipment--are indispensable. they are impotent, however, without the direction and energy supplied by the human component, its moral and mental elements nicely balanced and judiciously compounded with physical fitness. a true concept of the art of war will insist that the necessity for the achievement of a high standard of technical and administrative skill not be permitted to outweigh the need for maximum development of other mental attainments, and of the moral components of fighting strength. the moral elements include all the essential attributes of personal character, and more especially those qualities of courage, loyalty, decisiveness, modesty, patience, tolerance of the opinions of others, and fearlessness of responsibility which are characteristics of true military leadership. the maintenance of a high ethical standard is essential to the establishment and continuance of mutual confidence. the qualifications essential to the proper application of the mental elements include a creative imagination and the ability to think and to reason logically, fortified by practical experience and by a knowledge of the science of war. an unmistakable mark of mental maturity is the ability to distinguish between preconceived ideas and fundamental knowledge. intellectual honesty, unimpaired by the influence of tradition, prejudice, or emotion, is the essential basis for the effective employment of mental power. the numerical size of the armed forces, in their correct perspective as an instrument of the state, as well as the extent to which they are supplied with material components of fighting strength, are matters to be determined by the state after consultation with the responsible military authorities. the development of the essential military qualities of the instrument is the special charge of the armed forces. it is their task to weld the assemblage of men, armed and maintained by the state, into an harmonious whole, skilled in technique and imbued with a psychological and mental attitude which will not admit that any obstacle is insuperable. the advisory function. understanding between the civil representatives of the state and the leaders of the armed forces is manifestly essential to the coordination of national policy with the power to enforce it. therefore, if serious omissions and the adoption of ill-advised measures are to be avoided, it is necessary that wise professional counsel be available to the state. while military strategy may determine whether the aims of policy are possible of attainment, policy may, beforehand, determine largely the success or failure of military strategy. it behooves policy to ensure not only that military strategy pursue appropriate aims, but that the work of strategy be allotted adequate means, and be undertaken under the most favorable conditions. these considerations require that the military profession be qualified, through the possession of mental power, clear vision, and capacity for expression, to advise the state in military matters. there is thus accentuated the need for mental training, as set forth previously in the foreword. military strategy and tactics. military strategy as distinguished by objectives (page ) representing a larger, further, or more fundamental goal, is differentiated from tactics in that the latter is concerned with a more immediate or local aim, which should in turn permit strategy to accomplish its further objective. consequently, every military situation has both strategical and tactical aspects. the nature of the objectives to be attained at a particular time, and the action to be taken to that end, may be governed chiefly by strategical, or chiefly by tactical, considerations. whether an operation is distinctively strategical or tactical will depend, from the standpoint of the commander concerned, on the end which he has in view. to attain its objective, strategy uses force (or threatens such use) (see page ) as applied by tactics; tactics employed for a purpose other than that of contributing to the aims of strategy is unsound. proper tactics, therefore, has a strategic background. definition of tactics as the art of handling troops or ships in battle, or in the immediate presence of the enemy, is not all-inclusive. such a view infers that the field of battle is the only province of tactics, or that strategy abdicates when tactics comes to the fore. actually, while tactical considerations may predominate during battle, their influence is not confined to the immediate presence of the enemy. tactical dispositions are frequently adopted for convenience, for time saving, or for other reasons, long before entry into the immediate presence of the enemy. nor do strategical considerations end when battle is joined. tactics, unguided by strategy, might blindly make sacrifices merely to remain victor on a field of struggle. but strategy looks beyond, in order to make the gains of tactics accord with the strategic aim. strategy and tactics are inseparable. it is thus the duty of tactics to ensure that its results are appropriate to the strategic aim, and the duty of strategy to place at the disposal of tactics the power appropriate to the results demanded. the latter consideration imposes upon strategy the requirement that the prescribed aim be possible of attainment with the power that can be made available. consequently, while the attainment of the aims of strategy, generally depends upon the results gained by tactics, strategy is initially responsible for the success of tactics. it is therefore in the province of strategy to ensure that the attainment of tactical objectives furthers, exclusively, the aims of strategy, and also that the tactical struggle be initiated under conditions favorable for the attainment of the designated objectives. command of the armed forces. the initial requisite to the effective use of the armed forces is an agency authorized to direct them. command directs the armed forces. it is vitalized and personified in the commander, the human directing head, both of the whole and of organized groupings in descending scale of importance. its responsibility, during peace, is the perfection of the armed forces to the point of readiness for war and, during the conflict, their effective employment. training for command, to be effective, is necessarily dependent upon an understanding of the position occupied by the commander, and of the role which he plays. accordingly, this understanding is an essential in the study of that aspect of command training which has as its purpose the development of ability to reach sound decision. the ideal of military command combines the best of human qualities with sound knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the armed forces. it recognizes in war a form of human activity whose conduct, like that of all other human activities, is subject to natural law. it applies to the mastery of the problems of war, therefore, the natural mental processes of human thought (see chapter ii); it adapts these natural processes to a specific purpose, and consciously develops their use to the maximum degree for the attainment of this end. as command ascends the scale, its viewpoint broadens. experience and added knowledge, with increasing authority and responsibility, lead to a concept of war more and more comprehensive, with the resultant growth in ability to evolve and put into effect a general plan for the effective control of collective effort. unity of effort. an objective is best attained by effective application of properly directed effort, exerted by a single individual or by groups of individuals. where individuals are collectively concerned, unity of effort is the most important single factor contributory to the common success. the basic condition to be sought by the armed forces is an harmonious whole, capable of putting forth combined effort, intensified in strength because of the collective feature, and rendered effective by its unity. the chain of command. within the limits of human capacity, an organization can exert its combined effort with greater effect the more closely the exercise of command represents the act of a single competent commander. to divide the supreme command in any locality, or to vest it in a body rather than in an individual, is necessarily to diffuse responsibility. in that degree there is then incurred the danger, through confusion of wills and ideas, of delaying decision and of creating corresponding diffusion of effort. realization of this danger has led the military profession to entrust command, subject to justifiable exceptions (see page ), to a single head, while ensuring, by careful selection and training of personnel, that competent individuals are available for this duty. although this method is in seeming conflict with the restriction imposed by recognized limitations of human capacity, the difficulty is effectively met through the chain of command, whereby responsibility is assigned and authority is transmitted without lessening of ultimate responsibility. responsibility and authority, the latter properly apportioned to the former, are inseparably inherent in command, and may not justifiably be severed from one another. in the abstract, the chain of command consists of a series of links, through which responsibility and authority are transmitted. the supreme commander is thus linked with his successively subordinate commanders, and all are disposed on, so to speak, a vertical series of levels, each constituting an echelon of command. by means of the chain of command, a commander is enabled to require of his immediate subordinates an expenditure of effort which, in the aggregate, will ensure the attainment of his own objective (page ). he thus assigns tasks to his immediate subordinates, whom he holds directly responsible for their execution without, however, divesting himself of any part of his initial responsibility. the accomplishment of each of these assigned tasks will involve the attainment of an objective, necessarily less in scope than that of the immediate superior but a contribution to the attainment of the latter. the character and magnitude of the objective of the highest echelon involved will have considerable bearing upon the number of echelons required for its attainment. whatever the number, a commander on a particular echelon occupies the position of an immediate subordinate to a commander on the next higher echelon, and that of an immediate superior with relation to a commander on the next lower echelon. within these confines, authority is exercised and accomplishment exacted, both to the extent calculated to ensure unity of effort. there may frequently be found two or more commanders occupying coordinate positions on the same echelon, all with the same immediate superior, and all charged with loyalty to him and to each other in the attainment of a common objective. in no case, however, will a commander be directly answerable to more than one immediate superior for the performance of the same duty. thus is fulfilled the requirement that the command, although relatively narrower in scope as the scale is descended, be reposed in a single head. the experience gained and the knowledge acquired during early service on the lower echelons provide a basis for later expansion of viewpoint, a better understanding of the position occupied by the subordinate and of the obligations of higher command, including its dependence on subordinates. as the echelons of command are ascended, the details involved become more and more numerous, because of the increased scope of the problems. on the higher echelons, therefore, staff assistance is provided so that the commander may be left free to consider matters in their major aspects. the staff of a commander is not, however, a part of the chain of command; its members, as such, exercise no independent authority. a chain of command is not created by the subdivision of the officer corps into grades on a basis of relative rank. such subdivision is for the purpose of classification from the standpoint of potential competency and capacity for responsibility, and carries no authority to command by virtue of rank alone. organization, systematized connection for a specific purpose, is first necessary. the armed forces, during peace, are usually subdivided into permanent major organizations for the purpose of attaining and maintaining readiness for action. from the several grades of the officer corps, a permanent chain of command is instituted by the process of organization, the supreme command being reposed in a commander-in-chief. the basis of the permanent organization is that chosen as best suited to attain and maintain readiness. its choice requires consideration of many factors, such as the types of weapons and vessels, their intended uses, and their capabilities, severally and in combination. further specific demands are met by temporary arrangements effected through "task organization". whether the organization be permanent or temporary, its establishment places in effect a chain of command applicable to that organization throughout its continuance. habitual and studied adherence to the chain of command in administrative matters, in consultation, in the exchange of information, and in the issue of directives is essential to mutual understanding, and therefore to unity of effort. the right of a commander, however, because of the responsibility he shoulders, to deal directly with subordinates more than one echelon removed is not relinquished because of the existence of the chain of command. circumstances may arise which require him to issue orders directly to any person under his command. fully aware, however, of the value of unity of effort, and recognizing that failure to deal through his immediate subordinate, no matter what the exigency, cannot but tend to weaken the chain of command, he will, as soon as the state of the emergency permits, inform intervening commanders of the action he has been compelled to take. mutual understanding. the chain of command, though providing the necessary linkage, does not of itself ensure that the command organization will be adequate, nor can it ensure that unity of effort will result. to meet the requirement of adequacy, there is needed in the person of each commander not only the ability to arrive at sound military decision, to plan, and to direct the operations of his command, but also an appreciation of the position which he occupies in his relationship to his immediate superior, on the one hand, and to his own immediate subordinates on the other. to meet the requirement of unity of effort, it is also essential that there exist a state of mutual understanding throughout the chain of command. loyalty is not merely a moral virtue; it is a great military necessity. to establish and to cultivate a state of mutual understanding from which will flow mutual loyalty born of mutual confidence (page ) are prime obligations of command. within the limits of responsibility and resultant authority, individual initiative will follow. on a foundation of intelligent cooperation and resolute determination, the acts of the lowest commander will be in accordance with the desires of the highest. this, in effect, will constitute unity of effort, accomplished through the vesting of command in a single head. the final aim of mutual understanding is attained when, in the absence of specific instructions, each subordinate commander in the chain acts instinctively as his immediate superior, if present, would have him act, and also cooperates intelligently with commanders occupying coordinate positions on the same echelon. for this reason there is need, on all echelons, of a complete grasp of the significance of the relationship between immediate superior and immediate subordinate, and of the obligations of each to the other. the proper relationship is such that a subordinate, even though separated from his commander, can confidently take action as if the latter were present. to this end, the competent commander will earlier have cultivated the personal relationship between his immediate superior and himself, and between himself and his subordinates. it is through such close relationship that mutual understanding is best developed and harmony promoted, so that intelligent and cordial unity of effort may exist among the personnel of a command. the commander, however competent, necessarily relies on his subordinates. recognizing the psychological factors involved, he will therefore manifest confidence in their abilities, display sympathetic interest in their efforts, and evince pride in their achievements. he will also exercise patience with the mistakes which will inevitably occur, without condonement, however, of disaffection, neglect, or carelessness. the commander may reasonably expect, by the same token, that this attitude will characterize his immediate superior. in the absence of his superior, and faced with a changing situation, a commander may be forced to the conclusion that his assigned task requires modification or alteration. conditions permitting, he will of course communicate with proper authority, and will make constructive representations. if he is without adequate communications facilities, or if circumstances have imposed restrictions on communications facilities otherwise available, he takes action according to the dictates of his own judgment, guided by the known views of his superior. on occasions when he believes that the immediate situation so requires, he may even depart from his instructions. he realizes that in so doing he accepts the gravest of military responsibilities. at the same time, however, he recognizes that to fail to take the indicated action may disclose a lack of the higher qualities of courage, judgment, initiative, and loyalty (page ). he will, of course inform his superior of his action at the first available opportunity. in the meantime, he has been enabled to act intelligently and fearlessly because of the existence of a state of mutual understanding. indoctrination. both the necessary process and the final result of establishing a state of mutual understanding are sometimes known as indoctrination. the word carries the dual meaning of "the act of indoctrinating" and "the state of being indoctrinated". in common with the word doctrine, it has its root in the latin verb which means "to teach". a doctrine, in its pure meaning, is that which is taught, or set forth for acceptance or belief. it does not follow that every doctrine is necessarily sound, nor that it is founded on conviction reached as the result of intelligent thought. nor is the encouragement of a belief, by means of the spread of a doctrine, necessarily inspired by good motives. the preaching of doctrine known to be false is frequently encountered in many human activities. the deliberate spread of false propaganda is an example. but, whatever the motive and whether the doctrine be sound or false, the act of indoctrination is intended to shape opinion and thus influence action. manifestly, to be along permanently useful lines, indoctrination flows from sound philosophy, i.e., is rooted in truth. all teachings, all opinions that may be advanced, all expressions of viewpoint, i.e., all doctrine, is therefore to be scrutinized, first from the standpoint of validity, and then from that of usefulness of application. it is the responsibility of command to ensure that these conditions are met before doctrine is pronounced. military doctrine, in its broad sense, is a digest of the accepted beliefs of the military profession. in a narrower sense a military doctrine may be confined to the views of a single commander on a specific subject. the object of military doctrine, however, is always to furnish a basis for mutual understanding to the end that prompt and harmonious action by subordinate commanders may ensue without the necessity for referring every problem to superior authority before taking action (page ). doctrine thus provides a basis for action in possible situations when, for whatever reason, precise instructions have not been issued. the term "doctrine" is inappropriate as a description of the content of orders or instructions prescribing specific methods of action for a particular tactical operation in a situation existent or assumed under circumstances of the moment. the precise instructions thus issued, though they may be the result of doctrine, and may themselves constitute a basis for development of doctrine, are manifestly of the nature of something ordered rather than presented as authoritative opinion. in the broad field of the conduct of war, with its diversified demands, a common viewpoint as to the application of fundamentals is an essential to unity of effort. if the members of the military profession have this common viewpoint, their reasoned beliefs as to the best general methods of waging a particular war may be expected more nearly to approach unanimity. the attainment of unity of effort therefore calls for an understanding of fundamentals (page i), a basic indoctrination which is not only sound but also common to all commanders of the chain of command. wars come and go. their effects are painful, but when their wounds are healed mankind is prone to forget and to hope, even to assume, that peace will henceforth be unbroken. psychological and economic forces then not infrequently impel the state to subordinate the national defense in favor of other interests. during such periods the burdens of command are enlarged. its responsibility is not lessened, but the means for effective discharge thereof are withheld. the effective conduct of war thus requires that understanding exist (see pages and ) between the civil representatives of the state and the leaders of the armed forces in the coordination of policy with the preparation and the use of power to enforce it. of the leaders of the armed forces, as a whole or in combinations, such conduct of war demands the expression of the highest of human qualities, coupled with intimate knowledge of fundamentals, an appreciation of the capacities and limitations of the technique, and the ability to fit the practical details into the general plan in their true relation thereto. the need for these qualities is manifestly not restricted to the hour of supreme test, when the weapon of the state, the armed forces, is wielded with hostile purpose. the forging of the weapon, and its adequate preparation for use, are not matters susceptible of deferment until the crucial hour. the exacting requirements of war are essentially such as to preclude the readiness of the requisite intricate instrument and its skillful use without previous studied effort during peace. it follows that where the peacetime effort of the armed forces is directed toward the attainment of a war time objective of a specific, rather than of a vaguely general character, and the necessary components of fighting strength are provided accordingly, the readiness of the instrument is more likely to be adequate, and the application of power more likely to be successful. history records, as facts, that certain states have given their armed forces great stimulus by early clear definition of policy while, in other cases, failures and disappointments have resulted from a lack thereof. military problems are not confined to those presented after war is begun. mental power (see pages and ), which includes the ability to solve military problems in peace and in war and to arrive at sound decisions, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength because it is the source of professional judgment. the development of such ability in those who may be charged with the successful conduct of war (page ) may not safely be postponed. chapter ii mental processes and human tendencies the discussion in chapter ii deals, first, with the natural mental processes employed by the normal mature human being before taking deliberate action. with the necessity for logical thought thus established, there arises a need for valid statements of cause and effect, i.e., of relationships resulting from the operation of natural laws, for use as reliable rules of action. the discussion of this subject explains the dangers inherent in the use of faulty rules, emphasizes the role played by the various factors applicable in particular cases, and describes the method of formulating reliable rules, i.e., principles. all living beings and their surroundings are understood, on the basis of informed authority, to be governed in their characteristic activities by natural law (page ). the natural forces inherent in living things and in their environment are continually reacting upon each other, either maintaining the existing condition or creating a new one, each of which is a situation or state of affairs. there is thus always a relationship (page ) existing between such natural forces and the resultant condition which they produce. the natural forces are causes; the resultant conditions are effects. it is a recognized natural phenomenon that every effect is the result of a certain cause, or of a combination of causes, and that each effect is itself, in turn, the cause of additional effects. action and reaction are the basis of natural law. cause and effect, the latter being the cause of further effects, follow each other in ceaseless succession in the world of human affairs. except by putting proper natural causes into action, it is impossible to produce the effect desired. it follows that specific knowledge of causes is necessary for the planned production of specific effects. toward the accumulation of such knowledge the methods of science (pages and ) are constantly directed. the uncertainties of war are largely the outgrowth of the fact that the minds of men are pitted against one other. because of this, a knowledge of the manner in which the human mind seeks its way out of difficulties is a great military asset. consideration is next given, therefore, to the natural mental processes employed (page ) and to certain human tendencies which have been known to militate against their successful employment. the mental processes employed by the normal mature human being before taking deliberate action, or in making studied provision for possible future action, are natural procedures, in that they employ the intellectual powers bestowed by nature, without artificial modification or embellishment. when the individual concerned has a background of adequate knowledge and experience, his ability to solve problems is limited only by his native intellectual endowment. that he falls short does not necessarily indicate, however, that the limit of native endowment has been reached. it happens frequently that latent powers have not been cultivated, or have not been utilized. a problem is, by definition, a perplexing question. in any human activity, a problem appears when a perplexity arises as to a way out of a difficulty inherent in a situation. the question involved then is, what is a way, more especially the best way, out of the seeming difficulty? to determine the best way out of the difficulty, i.e., the best solution of the problem, involves: ( ) the establishment of the proper basis for the solution of the problem, ( ) the actual solution of the problem through the employment of the reasoning power in the consideration of various possible solutions and the selection of the best solution, and ( ) the conclusion, i.e., the decision, embodying the best solution. considered in greater detail, the process has its inception in a combination of circumstances, existent or assumed, which, constitutes a situation. no problem will result however, unless the situation involves an apparent difficulty. even in such a case, a problem will result only if such involvement exists and gives rise to a perplexity as to a way, more especially as to the best way, out of the seeming difficulty. the problem will require solution only when accompanied by an incentive which demands a changed situation or resistance against a threatened change. a recognition of the incentive thus necessarily involves realization of a desire or need to maintain the existing situation or to change it into a new one. such realization may come on the initiative of the person confronted with the situation, or because he has received instructions from someone in authority. in either case, the effect so indicated is the outcome of a desire for change or for resisting change, and may therefore be regarded properly as an effect desired (page ). as so far outlined, therefore, the establishment of the correct basis for the solution of the problem involves ( ) a grasp of the salient features of the situation, ( ) a recognition of the incentive, and ( ) an appreciation of the effect desired. the "appropriate" effect desired will necessarily be suitable to the further effects (page ) which are inherent in the situation. an effect to be attained is accepted as appropriate when, after due examination, its relationship with the further effects involved, in all their pertinent implications, has been found to be in accordance with the dictates of sound judgment. the establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem will also require an understanding of the resources involved, as influenced by the conditions obtaining, for the maintenance of the existing situation or for the creation of a new one. the resources available, as influenced by the conditions obtaining, are correctly considered on a relative basis as compared to those of any persons who may oppose the effort. with the basis for the solution of the problem established in this manner, the actual solution involves the consideration of one or more plans, i.e., proposed methods of procedure, and the selection of the one considered to be the best. the person concerned, taking cognizance of the present condition, i.e., the existing situation, first considers whether this situation, if maintained, will be suitable to the appropriate effect desired. then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates one or more images of future conditions, i.e., mental pictures of new situations, which will also be suitable to this end. the maintenance of the existing situation, or the creation of a new one, will in each case involve a plan. necessarily, each such plan includes provision for ( ) an effect to be produced by the person solving the problem, which effect will be the maintenance of the existing situation or the creation of a new one as visualized by himself, and ( ) the action required to produce this effect and so to attain the appropriate effect desired, already established as an essential part of the basis of his problem. after systematic examination of such plans, those retained for further consideration can be subjected to a comparison as to their relative merits. the best plan, selected accordingly, is then incorporated into a decision as to the procedure to be adopted. this decision is then available as a general plan, or may be developed into one, to serve as a basis if necessary for a more detailed plan for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. later development, herein, of the details of this procedure will disclose many ramifications. the treatment, so far, points to the fact that the best method of reaching sound decision is through systematic thought which employs logic, i.e., sound reasoning, as its machinery. the necessity for logical thought. logical thought separates the rational from the irrational. its use avoids the wastefulness of the trial-and-error method. by its insistent employment, dormant powers of reasoning are awakened, and the danger that attends instinctive, spontaneous, impulsive, or emotional acceptance of conclusions (page ) is lessened. the evil effects of an inclination to dodge the issue or of a disinclination to face the facts are thus also avoided. the fallacy of employing the reasoning power to justify conclusions already reached, whether on the basis of tradition or habit, or because of the bias or bent of a school of thought, or because of the tendency of human nature to accept plausible suggestions, is also made apparent. through the deliberate practice of testing and weighing, the faculty of arriving swiftly at accurate decisions is strengthened and is brought more quickly into play when time is a matter of immediate concern. principles in their relation to logical thought. because of the necessity for the exercise of judgment (page ) in the systematic arrangement of thought, the relationship between cause and effect, as expressed in principles, is of great assistance in applying logical processes to the problems of human life. a principle establishes a correct relation between cause and effect. the word, derived from the latin "principium", meaning a foundation, beginning, source, origin, or cause, has, because a cause implies an effect, acquired in correct usage the significance of a true statement of relationship between cause and effect. a principle, so formulated, is a natural law (page ) because it expresses a fact of nature; it thus becomes a reliable rule of action and may be confidently adopted as a governing law of conduct. if basic in its field, such a rule or law becomes a general or fundamental principle with respect thereto; each such basic truth may be the basis for the determination of many corollary or subordinate principles dealing with the details of the particular subject. the formulation of a principle, therefore, requires the determination of the causes that generate a particular effect (or effects), and the accurate expression of the resultant relationship. such expression frequently takes the form of a proportion. in the mathematical sciences the proportion may represent a precise balance; its statement may be an exact formula. in other sciences, a definite relationship between cause and effect has likewise been established in many cases, though not always with mathematical precision. comparable exactitude has not been attained, in some cases, because the field has not been so thoroughly explored; moreover, greater difficulty is experienced, at times, in isolating the cause, or causes. the balance represented by such equations, therefore, is based on quantities whose weights vary within wide ranges. (see page .) human conduct does not lend itself to analysis as readily as do mathematical and physical phenomena. the advance in the psychological and sociological sciences is not so marked as in the physical, and the actions and reactions of the mind of man have not yet proved to be susceptible of reduction to exact formulae. nevertheless, man, in his intuitive search for valid guides for his own action, has been able, with the advance of time, greatly to improve his own lot through the medium of the scientific approach to human problems. the insistent search of the human mind for reliable rules of action is a recognized natural phenomenon. as understood on the basis of expert investigation of the subject, this trait results from the recognition, conscious or otherwise, by countless generations of mankind, of the relationships between cause and effect as evidenced in the workings of the laws of nature (page ). a logical outcome, therefore, of experience, this instinctive demand of the mind constitutes a force which defies opposition. properly utilized, this force affords a powerful and natural aid in the solution of problems. inasmuch as a valid rule, or principle, is of great assistance in arriving at sound decisions and in formulating effective plans (see page ), this demand for reliable guides is logical, as well as natural. in any event, the demand for such guidance, if not met by provision for reliable rules of action, may result in the adoption of faulty rules, with frequent unfortunate consequences. the formulation of principles, already referred to in this connection, constitutes in itself a recognized problem (see also page ) of great difficulty; for it is a human failing to avoid the mental effort involved in thinking through such a problem, and to rely on rules whose plausibility and seeming simplicity are frequently a measure of their incompleteness and inaccuracy. since the earliest days, man has attempted to formulate the relationships between causes and effects without, however, always possessing the specific knowledge essential to accuracy. pithy statements have always had great appeal to man, as evidenced by the existence of proverbs, maxims, and adages preserved from times of great antiquity. frequently, however, such statements are not expressive of the truth. sometimes, again, they state facts, without, nevertheless, expressing the whole truth. only when the relationship between cause and effect has been demonstrated to be always true can the trained, inquiring mind receive its statement as a valid guide, acceptable as a principle in the light of the knowledge of the day. to rely upon rules of action which do not express the whole truth is to court the danger of encountering exceptions which may entail serious consequences. the value of those rules known to be inexpressive of the whole truth lies in the fact that they may invite attention to circumstances which are sometimes encountered, or may suggest methods of action which are sometimes appropriate. danger lies in the fact that such rules may fail to give proper emphasis to other circumstances or other methods which are encountered or are more appropriate in other cases. such a rule may fail to consider the entire problem. its use, therefore, implies the necessity of recognizing cases to which it is not applicable. this may frequently be difficult in the active operations of war, when nervous strain and the urgency of events are handicaps to quick and accurate thinking (see page ). to express the whole truth, a rule of action calls to attention all circumstances, or causes, which may ever influence the result. the saying that "the exception proves the rule" is properly interpreted only in the older sense that an exception "tests" the rule, indicating by the mere fact of exception that the rule is to such extent incomplete. subject to variations of phraseology, the old adage "circumstances alter cases" is the sole reliable and fundamental rule of action. a corresponding maxim of the military profession, "it depends on the situation", has its root in recognition of the same fact, i.e., that the action taken in any situation depends, properly, on the circumstances of the case, and that the relationship between cause and effect (page ) is always the governing consideration. the principles deduced hereafter (chapter iii) have these irrefutable findings as their foundation. factors. a situation is by definition (page ) a combination of circumstances, which are the effects of certain causes. to these causes, the term "factors", long in use in the military profession, is customarily applied in many other activities. through their influence as causes, these factors operate to produce, as their effects, the circumstances which, in combination, constitute the situation. a combination of factors, therefore, gives to each situation its distinctive character, differentiating it from other situations. to maintain an existing situation, it is necessary to preserve, in total effect, the influence of factors already present, or to introduce new factors to offset the influence of any which tend to cause a change. to change the situation, it is necessary to introduce factors which will exert the desired influence; or, change may be effected by altering the influence of factors already present. to say, therefore, that "it depends on the situation", as in the maxim cited (above), is to state that under all circumstances, the proper action depends on, or is determined by, the influence of the factors involved. any valid rule, or principle, will accordingly take into account the factors applicable to the case. the application of any rule will similarly take into account the influence of the particular factors involved. the danger of the application of such factors to all circumstances, without due circumspection as to their value in the existing situation, lies in the fact that, in any particular combination of circumstances, they do not necessarily carry equal weight. if this view be accepted, it follows that in many situations certain factors may, after mature deliberation, be rejected, or relegated to a relatively inferior status, without detracting from their potential value as fundamental considerations (page ) in all situations. value and limitations of lists of principles of war. the human preference for catchwords has, by many writers on the science and art of war, been extended to the attempted condensation of a principle or of several principles into a single all-inclusive word or phrase. as a result, varying lists of abstract nouns and phrases have been advanced to constitute epitomes of the principles of war. subject to minor differences in number and in designation, the list most frequently encountered comprises the objective, superiority, the offensive, economy of force, movement, cooperation, surprise, security, and simplicity. to rely on a list of this nature, as a condensation of the fundamentals of war, has been known to cause confusion and to result in failure to recognize the principles which are intended to be brought to mind. for example, misunderstanding has resulted from the designation of the single word, surprise, as a "principle of war". on the one hand, it has been denied that surprise embodies a principle, the reason being advanced that it is neither always necessary, nor feasible, nor even desirable to attempt to obtain surprise. on the other hand, the acceptance of the word surprise (see page ), as itself expressing a universal truth (which it of course does not except by inference), has been known to result in the incorrect belief that surprise is always essential to success. action based on such a viewpoint is the equivalent of applying general treatment to specific cases, regardless of circumstances. thus there have resulted distortions of the simple fact that a relationship exists between the employment of the unexpected, and the creation of a disadvantage which will hamper an opponent. the correct formulation of a principle, or of several principles, governing the employment of surprise, will result in a definite statement that its appropriate employment is dependent upon the various factors (page ) that make up the situation, the influence of each of which requires evaluation in each separate situation. analysis, in like manner, of the so-called "principle of the objective" as a "principle of war" will show that the objective of a military force is, in itself, no more a principle of war than the direction of a physical force is, in itself, a principle of mechanics. both concepts, however, involve certain matters of fact which can best be explained by principles. such principles take note of the factors pertaining to the subjects, and indicate the underlying relationships in a manner to be later shown herein. certainly the preceding list (above) of isolated expressions includes no item which, in the abstract, may not properly be considered as possibly vital from the strategical and tactical standpoints. but that these expressions are always vital, and that there are no other considerations, can scarcely be accepted as final. even if this objection could be removed by the inclusion of all factors well known to be vital, the fact would still remain that these expressions, standing alone, fail to satisfy the real need; i.e., they fail to indicate any practical application of the concepts which they are intended to imply. they do no more than provide a useful point of origin for further inquiry. when understood on this basis, they possess a certain value. * * * * * the concept underlying the application of principles is correct with respect to military problems, as well as for all others (page ). this purpose, however, cannot be served by a mere collection of nouns or noun-phrases. such expressions make no statements of cause and effect. their meaning is therefore left to inference and to the idiosyncrasy of individual interpretation. the formulation, moreover, of useful principles cannot be satisfactorily established by the more-or-less random selection of matters, however important, pertaining to the subject at hand. what is required is a systematic analysis of the essentials of the subject, with resultant emphasis on the fundamental causes and effects whose relationships are to be expressed. formulation and use of principles. the formulation of a principle, referred to previously (page ) as itself a difficult problem, requires a citation of the factors pertaining to the subject. on the basis of these factors as causes, the principles, when properly formulated, also state the effects which may properly be expected. (see page .) the relationship between causes and effects, or between effects and their causes, may be expressed in various ways. the requirement is that the expression be one of fact and that, if the principle purport to cover the entire subject, all of the pertinent facts (page ) be stated, though not necessarily all the details involved. * * * * * in addition to the principles of general application (chapter iii), the later discussion herein includes numerous other principles, with reference to matters of detail (pages - ). to some of these principles the treatment invites special attention. all principles included have been phrased with due care, to ensure conformity with the requirements above stated. the preferred form, herein, for the usual statement of cause and effect is through the use of phraseology such as that certain effects "depend on" or are "dependent on" certain causes, or that certain causes "determine" certain effects, or that the latter "are determined by" certain causes. from the standpoint of the exercise of judgment, it is a principle that the due determination of effects to be produced depends on the proper consideration of pertinent factors. once the principles applicable to any subject have been formulated in necessary detail, the evaluation of the cited factors with respect to a particular situation becomes the vital procedure as to any problem where that subject is involved. in the course of this evaluation, corollary or subordinate principles may be of assistance (page ). in military problems, however, the evaluation usually involves many factors not susceptible of reasonably exact determination by the use of formulae (see page ). in such cases, experience, education, and training afford the only secure basis for judgment which will produce reliable conclusions. the principles, therefore, provide reliable guides by citing the factors to be evaluated in order to arrive at desired results, but the principles cannot replace logical thought in the evaluation of the factors. in formulating principles (see also page ) as practical guides for action, as well as in using them when formulated, failure to give consideration to all pertinent factors may result in vitiating the effort based on their application. danger also lies in the fact that any particular factor will infrequently have the same value--the same influence on the situation--in any two problems (page ). therefore, in each situation, each factor requires to be weighed in connection with the others. the soundness of the resulting conclusion will depend on the extent of the knowledge available (page ) and on its useful employment. summary of fundamental considerations. the factors (page ) involved in determining the nature of an effect and of the action to attain it become fundamental considerations (page ) when it is desired to arrive at such a result under a particular set of circumstances. the relationships obtaining between the desired effect and the action to attain it, on the one hand, and the factors involved, on the other, are best expressed in the form of principles. the next chapter is therefore devoted to the development of basic principles applicable to military problems. chapter iii basic principles applicable to military problems (the fundamental military principle) on the basis of the previous discussion as to the natural mental processes and as to principles useful in their employment, chapter iii discusses the requirements for the attainment of an end in human affairs. the fundamental principle thus derived is then applied to the needs of the military profession, so as to develop the fundamental military principle. this principle indicates the requirements of a correct military objective and of the action for its attainment. review of conclusions as to principles. on the premise that all human activities and their environment are governed by natural laws (page ), the preceding chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the natural mental processes employed in meeting the problems of human life. this analysis has stressed four fundamental truths: ( ) that a valid rule, or principle, when complete, embraces all known phenomena pertinent to the relationship established. ( ) that the logical application of principles to particular incidents will take account of all the factors of the principles, and of all known conditions of the incidents. ( ) that such principles afford great assistance in arriving at sound conclusions, and that the human mind, if without access to such valid guides, tends to adopt faulty rules in the effort to serve the same purpose. ( ) that rules of action, however, even though they be valid, cannot be depended upon to replace the employment of logical thought. procedure for developing military principles. logically, the next stage in the treatment of this subject is to develop certain basic principles applicable, more especially, to the solution of military problems. the development of such principles starts, on the basis already established in this discussion, with a reference to the natural mental processes used by the normal mature human being before taking deliberate action (page ). under such circumstances, the person who is to solve the problem has first to establish a basis for his solution. to arrive at this basis, which involves an understanding of the appropriate effect desired, the person concerned requires a grasp of the salient features of the situation, a recognition of the incentive, and an appreciation of the effect which he has been directed to produce or has adopted on his own initiative. to complete the basis for his solution, he also requires an understanding of comparative resources as influenced by the conditions obtaining at the time. during the actual solution of the problem, the person concerned takes cognizance first, of the existing situation, picturing it in his mind. then, unless satisfied that he desires no change, he creates for himself mental images of future situations. the pictured condition decided upon after consideration of the pertinent factors involved, be it the situation to be maintained or a new situation to be created, constitutes an effect he may produce for the further attainment of the appropriate effect desired, already established as an essential part of the basis of his problem. (see page .) with the existing situation and a new situation now clear, what action is he to take to change the one into the other? or, if no change is desired, what action is he to take to maintain the existing situation? what acts or series of acts should he decide upon, plan in detail, inaugurate, and supervise (page ), to attain the effect which he has envisaged for the further attainment of the appropriate effect desired? the correct solution of problems therefore hinges on the requirements involved in the effects to be produced and in the action to produce them. if these requirements are ascertained, a principle can be formulated as a valid guide for the solution of human problems. requirements for the attainment of an end. the discussion to this point has established the fact that an end in view, a result to be produced, an effect desired, is very closely connected with a further effect which the attainment of the former is intended to produce. human motives spring from deep-seated incentives often derived from distant sources, so that, even when the person concerned is acting wholly on his own initiative, he will rarely, if ever, be uninfluenced by some further effect desired, inherent in his situation (see page ). an end in view, therefore, from the viewpoint of the person who is endeavoring to visualize its accomplishment as a method for attainment of a further aim, will necessarily achieve such further aim, or at least contribute to its achievement. the first requirement, accordingly, of such an end in view is that it be suitable to any further aim, whatever that aim may be. it may be said, therefore, that a correct end in view satisfies the requirement of suitability as to the appropriate effect desired, whatever this further effect may be. important as suitability is, however, a reasonably responsible person will recognize that this consideration, alone, does not satisfy all requirements. an end in view remains a mere desire, without possibility of attainment, unless such a result is practicable of accomplishment. a correct end in view, therefore, satisfies also the requirements of feasibility. consideration of feasibility calls for a survey of comparative resources (page ). such a survey will cover the extent of the resources (means available) of those making the effort, as compared to the resources (means opposed) of those who may oppose it. full account is also to be taken, as to feasibility, of the natural and artificial conditions which the effort will encounter before it can produce the contemplated result. the responsible person will ask himself where the effort is most likely to be successful, and what obstacles, in addition to those represented by opponents, he will be required to surmount. the effects of such conditions may alter the ratio otherwise presented by comparative resources. consideration of the characteristics of the field of action may thus disclose features which will greatly influence the possibility of accomplishment, as well as the character of the effort to be made, from the standpoint of feasibility. the second requirement, therefore, is that of feasibility with respect to comparative resources, i.e., the means available and opposed, as influenced by the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action. although believed to be both suitable and feasible, the requirements for the attainment of an end are not yet completely established. there is still required a reckoning of a profit-and-loss account of the whole undertaking, to estimate whether it will be advantageous. what will be the cost, and what will be the gain? is the effort worth while? or should one be content with venturing less and gaining less? what is the bearing on possible future action? the consequences as to costs, always important considerations in dealing with human problems, are frequently the paramount determinant. the third requirement, therefore, is acceptability with respect to the consequences as to costs. these requirements invite attention to the factors, already discussed, whose influence (see page as to factors) determines the character of the effort required to attain an end. the fundamental principle for the attainment of an end. here, then, are the broad fundamental considerations which affect the solution of every human problem. in a narrower field, the considerations may fall within more specific limits, but a principle sufficiently broad to be applicable to all cases appears to comprehend those inclusive factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. a review of these paragraphs will disclose that the factors pertaining to the several requirements may be so grouped as to constitute a single fundamental principle governing the attainment of an end in human affairs,--as follows: in any human activity, the attainment of a correct end in view depends on fulfillment of the requirements of suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor of the appropriate effect desired, feasibility of the effort required, on the basis of comparative resources, as determined by the means available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs, which factors are in turn dependent on each other. the interdependency of the factors. as previously observed (page ), the factors cited in the foregoing principle are themselves interdependent. this fact results from working of natural law (page ), for it is a recognized phenomenon that every effect is the result of certain causes, and that every effect is itself, in turn, the cause of further effects (page ). accordingly, when the evaluation of any factor is under consideration, its value as an unknown quantity can be determined to the extent that the values of the other pertinent factors are known. (see page , as to the discussion of the quantities in an equation.) the significance of each, in any situation, is therefore determined by the influence of the other factors. the relationships existing among them can best be expressed in the terms of four corollary principles (page ), next to be discussed. * * * * * for example, questions frequently arise as to what is the appropriate effect to be desired in a particular situation. whether a desired effect is feasible of attainment, and whether certain consequences, though undesirable, will be acceptable, in view of the gains, can be determined by evaluation of the means available and opposed, influenced by the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and of the consequences as to costs. if a desired effect is thereby found to be not feasible of attainment, or to be unacceptable as to consequences, deferment of such effort is indicated. a proper solution in such case would adopt some lesser effect, in conformity with the further aim, feasible of accomplishment, and acceptable as to its consequences. if (with respect to the further aim, mentioned above) the person concerned is acting under the instructions of another, there will frequently be injected into the equation, in addition to the factors already noted, a further effect desired, indicated by higher authority. such an indication will often operate to narrow the limits of the problem. this is true even if the person concerned is acting wholly on his own initiative and responsibility (pages - ). these considerations lead to the formulation of what may be called the corollary principle for determination of the appropriate effect to be desired in human affairs,--as follows: in any human activity, the appropriate effect to be desired (i.e., an end in view, a result to be accomplished) depends on fulfillment of the requirements of suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor of the further effect desired (if such further effect is indicated), feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the basis of comparative resources, as determined by the factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs. * * * * * if, to take a further example, the known factors include the appropriate effect desired, the means opposed, the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and the consequences as to costs, the only unknown remains the means available. the question then is, what means need be made available for the accomplishment of the contemplated effort? the answer to this question may be found in the application of what may be called the principle for the determination of the proper means to be made available in human affairs,--as follows: in any human activity, the proper means to be made available depend on fulfillment of the requirements of suitability of the means (in kind and amount) to accomplish the end in view, as determined by the factor of the appropriate effect desired, feasibility of the effort to make such means available on the basis of comparative resources as determined by the factor of the means opposed, influenced by the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action, and acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs. * * * * * the influence of physical conditions in the field of action may be illustrated by any case where ends otherwise feasible of attainment cannot be achieved without effecting changes in such conditions. the resolution of the uncertainty then requires study to determine what suitable changes can be made. changes for such a purpose may take various forms, such as the construction of physical features in the area involved, or the destruction of such features already existing; or, again, both methods may be employed. examples of such changes have existed and still exist in profusion, some of them, military and non-military, being on such a scale as radically to alter the previous status with respect to entire nations. the question as to what changes ought to be effected in the prevailing physical conditions, in order to attain a certain objective, can be answered by the application of what may be called the principle for the determination of the proper physical conditions to be established in the field of action,--as follows: in any human activity, the proper physical conditions to be established in the field of action depend on fulfillment of the requirements of suitability of such conditions to the end in view, as determined by the factor of the appropriate effect desired, feasibility of effort to establish such conditions, on the basis of comparative resources, as determined by the factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the physical conditions existing in the field of action, and acceptability of the results of the effort involved, as determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs. * * * * * the factor of consequences as to costs also calls for special notice. the influence of this factor frequently justifies abandonment of suitable ends in view, even though their attainment has been determined to be feasible, because the loss involved would out-weigh the gain. immediate success may be attained at such cost as to prevent the attainment of larger ends (see the discussion, pages and , of the relationship of strategy and tactics). on the other hand, the circumstances of the case may well justify loss, however great, because the alternative is unacceptable, even though the consequences involve complete destruction. moreover, the need for swift and aggressive action in many activities (notably in war), for resolute prosecution of the plan, for timely seizure of opportunity, and for acceptance of justified risks, requires that consideration of consequences as to costs never be emphasized beyond its proper weight. to determine such proper weight calls, frequently, for judgment of the highest order, and is, in the military profession, a direct responsibility of command. this responsibility can be discharged by the application of what may be called the corollary principle for the determination of acceptable consequences as to costs,--as follows: in any human activity, the acceptable consequences as to costs depend on fulfillment of the requirements of suitability of the end in view, as determined by the factor of the appropriate effect desired, and feasibility of the effort to attain the end in view, on the basis of comparative resources, as determined by the factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action. special nature of war as a human activity. a principle found, by careful analysis, to be governing as to human activities of any nature, is also applicable to the problems of war. this is true because war is a human activity, differing from other human activities only in the specialized character of the factors that enter. the effect desired in war has a character distinctly military and, ultimately, through the reestablishment of a favorable peace, a political character (see pages - ). the means available (or opposed) in war are the human and material components of fighting strength (page ). the physical conditions prevailing in the field of action are, in war, the characteristics of the theater of operations. fighting strength is thus derived from the means available (or opposed) in war, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater. relative fighting strength (comparative resources in war) involves a comparison of means available with means opposed, due account being taken of the influence exerted on both by the characteristics of the theater. in war, relatively large masses of human beings oppose each other with hostile intent, while the means available and opposed, and the physical conditions established by the operations of war in the theater of action, tend more and more to acquire a highly specialized character. the consequences as to costs, in war, also assume a special significance, inasmuch as they may materially influence the development of entire nations or of the world situation. factors as universal determinants in war. tabulated for convenient reference and expressed in terms in general use in the military profession, the factors governing the attainment of an end in war are therefore: (a) the nature of the appropriate effect desired, (b) the means available and opposed, (c) the characteristics of the theater of operations, and (d) the consequences as to costs. these factors, thus expressed in abstract form, are the universal determinants of the nature of the objective and of the character of the action to attain it. their further resolution into factors of more concrete form is indicated hereinafter (see chapter vi, in the discussion of section ii of the estimate form). the objective in war. the objective (page ), a term long in use in the military profession in connection with the "objective point", has acquired by extension the significance of something more than the physical object of action. the latter, as explained later (page ), is properly denominated the "physical objective". in the abstract, an "objective", in present general usage as well as in the military vocabulary, is an end toward which action is being directed, or is to be directed; in brief, an end in view, a result to be attained, an effect desired (pages and ). an objective is an effect to be produced for the attainment of a further objective, itself a further effect. as already demonstrated (page and following), the attainment of an end, in any human activity, requires action to maintain the existing situation or to create a new one. therefore, in war, a special form of human activity, the attainment of an objective requires that action be actual imposition of an outside agency. the attainment of a correct military objective (discussed in detail in chapter iv) requires, accordingly, the creation or maintenance of a favorable military situation. an objective, in the sense of an end in view, a result to be accomplished, is manifestly an objective in mind. as already indicated (page ), however, military usage also assigns to the term "objective" an additional meaning, a meaning exclusively concrete. results in war are attained through the actual or threatened use of physical force (pages and ) directed with relation to something tangible, such as, for example, some physical element of the enemy's strength. action as to this tangible feature (e.g., if it is destroyed, occupied, neutralized, or otherwise dealt with) will result in, or further the attainment of, an effect desired. thus the physical objective occupies a sharply defined position in warfare, in that it establishes the physical basis of the objective and indicates the geographical direction of the effort. since the physical objective is always an object--be it only a geographical point--, it is more than a mental concept; it is an objective in space. for example, the objective being "the destruction of the enemy battleship", the physical objective is the enemy battleship. as used herein the expression "the objective" or "the military objective" (page ), when unqualified, ordinarily indicates the mental objective. the term is properly applicable to a physical objective when the context makes the meaning clear. ordinarily, and always when clarity demands, a tangible focus of effort is herein denoted a "physical objective". military operations. appropriate action to create or maintain a situation will take the form of a military operation. an operation, in the basic sense, is merely an act, or a series of acts. the word is derived from the latin opus, meaning "work". a military operation is therefore an act, or a series of included acts (i.e., work), of a military character. a military operation may consist of an entire campaign, or even of several such, constituting a clearly defined major stage in a war; or such an operation may consist of portions thereof. the term is also applied, properly, to entire series of acts on the part of successive commands, from the higher to the lower echelons, to and including distinctive military actions which relate to the merest routine. a plan of action to attain a military objective is, therefore, a plan of military operations, including supporting measures (see page ), considered or adopted as a method of procedure for the achievement of that end (see page ). such a plan or method of procedure requires action with relation to correct physical objectives in such a manner as to attain the objective, i.e., to maintain the existing situation or to create a new one, conformably to the appropriate effect desired. a plan of military operations may be regarded as reasonably effective if the direction or geographical trend of the effort provides for proper action with relation to the correct physical objectives; if the force concerned utilizes positions advantageous in relation to those of the opponent; if the fighting strength is so apportioned as to provide for requisite power at points likely to be decisive, without undue weakening at other points; and if future actions, in seeking the effect desired, will be unhampered by obstacles with which the force cannot cope. these essentials apply to all of the various combinations of circumstances, i.e., situations (page ), which may materialize as action progresses and the original situation unfolds. a properly conceived plan of military operations therefore makes provision, necessarily, for certain salient features of such operations, as follows: the physical objectives involved, the relative positions utilized, the apportionment of fighting strength, and the provisions for freedom of action. as will later be observed (chapters vii and viii), the content of plans for naval operations may be classified under the headings listed above. in such plans the salient features noted will be observed, also, to occur, subject to certain exceptions, in the sequence above indicated. similar observations are applicable as to plans systematically prepared for direction of forces operating on land and in the air. a military operation which is progressing favorably, whatever the medium of action, may therefore be justifiably stated to include provision for the following salient features: effective action with relation to correct physical objectives, projection of military action from advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting strength, and ensurance of adequate freedom of action. since, at any moment of its successful prosecution, a military operation presents, inherently (page ), a favorable military situation, the salient features of such an operation constitute, also, the salient features of a favorable military situation. manifestly, any deficiencies in these respects will indicate that in certain particulars the situation is not entirely favorable, if not actually unfavorable. determination of the salient features. because the form which a military operation takes, in the effort to attain a military objective, depends upon the factors which are the universal determinants (page ) of the character of the effort, the salient features of such an operation are determined by the same factors. a valid guide as to determination of the salient features of a favorably progressing military operation, seen (above) to be identical with those of a favorable military situation, may therefore be formulated as a principle for determining these salient features, as follows: the determination of } { suitability, as determined by } { the factor of the appropriate correct physical objectives, } { effect desired. } { advantageous relative } { feasibility, by reason of positions, } { relative fighting strength, } depends { as determined by the factors proper apportionment of } on { of the means available and fighting strength, and } their { opposed, influenced by the } { factor of the characteristics provision for adequate } { of the theater of operations, freedom of action } { and } { } { acceptability, as determined } { by the factor of the } { consequences as to costs. since the particular character of each salient feature of a situation, or of an operation, is determined by the influence, exerted by the identical factors (as noted), there is a resulting interdependency, important though indirect, among the several features. this interdependency is explained hereafter. (chapter iv). the fundamental military principle. the fundamental principle for the attainment of an end in human affairs (page ) has invited attention to the factors, pertinent to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability, seen to be applicable, as well, to any military effort (page ). as also noted, a military effort will necessarily consist of military operations, whose salient features depend upon the same factors. the factors, in turn, have been observed (page and following) to be interdependent. [illustration: the fundamental military principle (diagram)] these considerations lead to the formulation of a derivative of the fundamental principle for the attainment of an end in human affairs, in the form of the fundamental military principle the attainment of a military objective (the creation or maintenance of a favorable military situation) depends on effective operations involving the salient features of effective action with relation to correct physical objectives, projection of action from advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting strength, and ensurance of adequate freedom of action, each fulfilling the requirements of suitability, as determined by the factor of the appropriate effect desired, feasibility, by reason of relative fighting strength as determined by the factors of the means available and opposed, influenced by the factor of the characteristics of the theater of operations, and acceptability, as determined by the factor of the consequences as to costs, which factors are in turn dependent on each other. * * * * * the fundamental military principle, as a valid guide, encounters no exception in the field it purports to cover. as a practical guide, it brings to attention, in broad outline, all the causes and effects which are involved. the principle affords a proper basis for the formulation of corollary principles for the determination, in any particular situation, of any element noted therein whose value may be unknown but may be ascertained by reference to other pertinent elements which constitute known quantities. (see pages - .) as later explained (chapter iv), the two major applications of the principle relate to the selection of a correct military objective and to the determination of effective military operations to attain an objective (see page ). a corollary principle of the correct military objective will accordingly state that the selection of a correct military objective depends on the due consideration of the salient features and the factors cited in the fundamental military principle. the application of this corollary is discussed in section ii of chapter iv. a corollary principle of effective military operations will similarly state that the determination of effective operations for the attainment of a military objective depends on the due consideration of the salient features and the factors cited in the fundamental military principle. the application of this corollary is explained in section iii of chapter iv. these principles can be used as a basis for formulating the plans of the commander concerned, and, accordingly, for determining his own action. they can also be used as a basis for rendering sound opinions, when requested of the commander, as to plans and actions contemplated by higher authority. the principles are in like manner applicable for purposes of historical study involving analysis of operations of the past. chapter iv the application of the fundamental military principle (objectives--their selection and attainment) section i of chapter iv discusses the major components of all military problems. section ii deals with the fundamental considerations having to do, generally, with the first of these components, i.e., the selection of correct military objectives; the application, more specifically, is reserved for chapter vi. section iii deals with the fundamental considerations having to do, generally, with the second of the two major components, i.e., the determination of effective military operations for the attainment of such objectives; the application, more specifically, is reserved for chapter vii. the selection of objectives has a secondary application, also, to the discussion in chapter vii, while the determination of operations has a similar application to that in chapter vi. both subjects, i.e., as to objectives and as to operations, have application also to chapter ix. the chart on page ii shows these relationships. i. major components of military problems. in the two preceding chapters, the study of the natural mental processes has brought to notice that, to meet the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability as to consequences in the proper solution of a military problem, it is first necessary to establish a sound basis for that solution. such a basis involves an understanding of the appropriate effect desired and of relative fighting strength (see pages and ). in each situation an understanding of the appropriate effect desired, from the standpoint of suitability, requires: ( ) a grasp of the salient features of the situation, favorable and unfavorable, including the perplexity inherent therein, ( ) a recognition of the incentive to solution of the problem, i.e., a realization of the desire or need for attaining a certain effect, an objective (page ) which will be the maintenance or creation of a favorable military situation, and ( ) an appreciation of this objective in its relationship to the next further result to be accomplished by its attainment. an understanding of relative fighting strength involves consideration of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater of operations. with this understanding there is provided a sound basis for the determination, later, of the feasibility of courses of action and of their acceptability with respect to consequences as to costs. in the premises, the ability to understand the nature of a military problem is dependent on the knowledge, experience, character, and professional judgment of the commander. these qualities enable him to grasp the significance of the salient features of the situation. the same personal characteristics are instrumental in the recognition of the incentive. analysis indicates that an incentive may arise ( ) by reason of a directive issued by higher authority, or ( ) from the fact that a decision already reached by the commander has introduced further problems, or ( ) because of the demands of the situation. however, the primary consideration in understanding the nature of the problem is the appreciation of the objective from which the problem originates, i.e., the just estimation or accurate evaluation of this objective. such consideration is primary because appreciation of this objective involves, as necessary concomitants, a grasp of the salient features of the existing situation (to be maintained or changed) and a recognition of the incentive. correct appreciation of this objective, in its relationship to the further effect to be produced, is thus the principal consideration in reaching an understanding of the appropriate effect desired. it is, to repeat, through an understanding of this factor and of the factors of relative fighting strength that the commander establishes the basis for the solution of his problem. (see section i of chapter vi, page ). the solution of a military problem. when the commander has thus obtained an understanding of the basis of his problem, the actual procedure of solution is undertaken through the consideration of the factors involved in their influence on the various plans for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired, as thus established. the best plan, selected and embodied in outline in the decision, can then be further developed, if necessary, into a general plan for the commander's force and, finally, into a detailed plan, as the solution of the problem. (see page .) the major components of a military problem. each plan considered by the commander will involve (page ) two major considerations: namely--an effect to be produced and the action required to produce it; or, in military terms, a correct military objective (or objectives) and effective operations for its attainment. the selection of correct military objectives and the determination of effective operations for their attainment are therefore the two major components of a military problem, because they are the principal considerations on which depends the soundness of military decision. to meet these requirements is a prime function of command, one which demands professional judgment of the highest order. the major components of a military problem are of course intimately connected, because a purposeful action, accomplished, is equivalent to an objective, attained. furthermore, the attainment of an objective involves the accomplishment of effective operations. because of the importance of the subject, the relationship between these two major components deserves very careful analysis. as has been observed (page ), the action to be taken depends, in the first instance, on the effect to be produced. therefore, the objective is, as compared to the action to attain it, the paramount matter. moreover, there is necessarily included, in the procedure of selecting a correct objective, a consideration as to whether the action to that end will be feasible and as to whether the consequences involved will be acceptable on the basis of the costs which will be exacted. if, then, the objective has been correctly selected in any situation, this procedure will have included, as a necessary incidental, the determination also, in the proper detail, of the operations required for its attainment. of the two major components involved in the selection of the best plan, the primary relates, therefore, to correct objectives. accordingly, this consideration is most aptly expressed in terms of the "selection" of objectives. the "determination" of necessary operations is a proper expression of the procedure therein involved, because this procedure, though also involving a major component of the problem is dependent on the primary consideration of objectives. a valid guide for practical use during the process of solving military problems will therefore provide a basis, primarily, for the selection of correct objectives. however, the procedure for such selection, though requiring consideration of the action involved in attaining objectives, will seldom call for a complete analysis of such operations. therefore, it is also desirable, for the solution of military problems, to provide a valid guide for the determination of effective operations, in detail. this guide may be used on occasions when, the correct objective having been selected, the only remaining problem is to work out the detailed operations involved. the fundamental military principle, developed in the preceding chapter, has been formulated to fulfill the requirements described in the preceding paragraph. through the exhaustive analysis of the elements involved, there has been provided, in the form of a single fundamental principle, a valid guide for the selection of correct military objectives and for the due determination of effective operations for their attainment. in the present chapter, the abstract application of the principle is discussed in terms of fundamental considerations. section ii of the chapter deals with the selection of objectives; this subject, in more specific terms, is later expanded in chapter vi. section iii of the present chapter deals with the determination of operations; this subject, in more specific terms, is expanded in chapter vii. the present chapter affords a treatment applicable to military problems of any nature. later expansion is applicable, more especially, to naval problems. this arrangement of the subject matter has been adopted for two reasons. first, discussion of fundamental considerations, thus taken up at the present point, immediately follows the formulation of the principle (in chapter iii). furthermore, a fundamental treatment, prior to chapters vi and vii, permits maximum brevity in the discussion, therein. the commander, having mastered the fundamentals dealt with here, can later follow the detailed procedure with minimum distraction due to reference to the preceding discussion. essential elements involved. as previously stated, the problems of war differ from those of other human activities with respect, only (page ), to the specialized character of the factors that enter. the final outcome is dependent (page ) on ability to isolate, occupy, or otherwise control the territory of the enemy. the sea, though it supplements the resources of land areas, is destitute of many essential requirements of man, and affords no basis, alone, for the secure development of human activities. land is the natural habitat of man. the sea provides routes of communication between land areas. the air affords routes of communication over both land and sea. these facts inject into military operations certain factors peculiar to movement of military forces by land, sea, and air (page ). there are also involved the specialized demands of a technique for the imposition of and the resistance to physical violence. in addition there appear those factors related to the psychology of human reactions to armed conflict. in any situation involving opposing armed forces, the problem, as in any human activity (page ), is, from the standpoint of each opponent, a matter of maintaining existing conditions or of bringing about a change. the method employed, if the action is to be effective, will follow lines calculated to shape the ensuing progressive changes in circumstances toward the attainment of the end in view. the action to be taken will be ineffective if it does not support the calculated line of endeavor, i.e., if it is not suitable or adequate forcibly to shape the course of events either toward the creation of a desired new and more favorable situation, or the maintenance of the original conditions. the analysis of the principal components of a military problem--i.e., the military objectives and the military operations appropriate to the effort for their attainment--therefore requires a study of such objectives and operations in terms, respectively, of a favorable military situation (page ) and of a favorably progressing military operation (page ). as has been observed, the salient features of such a situation or operation are, from the abstract viewpoint, identical, as are also the factors which determine the character of such features (page ). as a covering word for such features and factors, alike, the term "elements" appears especially suitable, inasmuch as it properly comprises the constituent parts of any subject, as well as the factors which may pertain thereto. accordingly, the analysis, following, of the procedure for selection of correct military objectives is made in terms of the essential elements of a favorable military situation. for like reasons, the analysis of the procedure for determining the character of the detailed operations required is made in terms of the essential elements of a favorably progressing military operation. (for these elements, see the salient features and the factors cited in the fundamental military principle, page .) ii. selection of correct military objectives nature of military objectives. in the previous discussion (page ), the military objective has been defined as the end toward which action is being, or is to be, directed. as such it has been noted as an objective in mind. the tangible focus of effort, the physical objective toward which the action is directed, has been observed to be an objective in space. the physical objective is always an object, be it only a geographical point, while the objective, being a mental concept, is a situation to be created or maintained. the term "objective" requires circumspection, not only in the manner of its expression (see page ), but in its use. the latter is true because the purport of the objective under consideration will vary with the viewpoint of the echelon concerned. for instance, the proper visualization of an objective, as an "effect desired" (page ), calls for a correct answer to the question, "who desires this effect to be produced?" (see page ). a variety of viewpoints is thus a natural characteristic of the chain of command (pages - ), whose functioning creates what may be called a "chain of objectives". necessary exceptions aside, the commander expects to receive, from his immediate superior, an assigned objective, which that superior thus enjoins the commander to attain. the commander, in turn, through the use of the natural mental processes already explained, decides on an objective, for the general effort of his own force, to attain the objective assigned by his immediate superior. as a subordinate, a commander to whom an objective has been assigned is responsible to his immediate superior for its attainment. the commander may, however, also occupy the position of an immediate superior to one or more commanders on the next lower echelon. in such capacity, he may assign objectives to these immediate subordinates. by attaining such an assigned objective, each of these subordinates thus contributes to the success of the complete effort planned by his immediate superior, to the extent represented by his own assigned share of the effort. a commander can scarcely expect to receive in full the intelligent support of his subordinate commanders, unless he makes clear to them the character of his own planned effort. it is customary, therefore, when assigning an objective to a subordinate, also to inform him of the purpose which its attainment is intended to further. stated differently, a commander, when imposing upon an immediate subordinate an effect which he is to produce, informs him, at the same time, of the nature of the military result which he, the immediate superior, has determined to bring about. this is the part of wisdom, not merely of choice. it acquaints the immediate subordinate with the objective of the immediate superior and thus enables the former to comprehend wherein the attainment of his own assigned objective is expected to contribute to the attainment of the effect desired by his superior. since the attainment of the assigned objectives will represent the consummation of the general plan of the immediate superior, the purpose of each of these assignments is to assist in the attainment of the objective announced, for his entire force, by the immediate superior (see also page ). from the viewpoint of the subordinate, the objective thus assigned by the immediate superior becomes the appropriate effect desired, essential to the determination of the accomplishment which the former is to effect by his own effort. on occasion, also, the full scope of the appropriate effect desired may require consideration of the objectives of higher echelons in the chain of command, so far as such objectives may be known or deduced. the responsibility of the immediate superior, in the matter of ensuring that his immediate subordinates understand the purpose of their assigned objectives, is in no respect less than that which falls upon these subordinates in the execution of their own assignments. by failing to provide subordinate commanders, through whatever methods, with a knowledge not only of the details of his plan but of the general objective which their integrated effort is calculated to attain, the superior may actually subject his undertaking to the risk of failure. the decision as to the general plan (page ) for the attainment of his assigned objective provides the commander with an objective which he himself has originated. with the plan for the attainment of his general objective clearly fixed in mind, the commander may now proceed to the selection of one or more objectives of a specific nature, the integrated attainment of which will ensure the attainment of his assigned objective. the instructions which he may then give, severally, to his immediate subordinates in a detailed plan of operations, thus indicate to the latter their assigned objectives. (see also page .) the source of the incentive (page ) has an intimate connection with the assigned objective. furthermore, whatever the origin of the incentive, the ability to select correct objectives is an essential element in the mental equipment of the commander. for example, if the incentive arises by reason of a directive received from higher authority, such directive will presumably assign an objective, specific or inferred. the commander to whom such an objective is assigned is responsible for a correct understanding of all the implications involved, including the relationship between the assigned objective and the general objective of the next higher commander, which represents the purpose of the assigned objective. on occasion it will also be necessary for the commander to consider the relationships involved with the further objectives of the higher command (page ). again, without any suggestion of cavilling at orders received, the commander may also find occasion to examine, with care, the implications of his assigned objective, because of his responsibility for taking correct action in the premises (page ). if the incentive arises from a decision previously made by the commander, it follows that such decision will have embodied an objective, selected by the commander himself. if the incentive arises because of the demands of the situation, the commander is responsible for recognition of the necessity for action and for the correct selection of an appropriate objective, to be adopted by him as a basis for his own action as if it were assigned by higher authority. an assigned objective having been established with respect to the basis for his problem, the commander is always responsible for the correct selection of an objective to serve as the end in view for the general, integrated action of his subordinate commanders. once such an objective has been selected, the commander is further responsible for selecting, on the basis provided thereby, correct objectives to be assigned to his subordinate commanders. for various practical reasons, therefore, the responsibility of the commander requires of him the ability to select correct objectives. on the basis of classification with respect to the authority making the selection, analysis will demonstrate the existence of two types of objectives. these two types of objectives are (see page as to effects and further effects), namely, ( ) the assigned objective (page ) ordinarily indicated by higher authority, exceptionally determined by the commander for himself, and ( ) the objective typically selected by the commander, himself, as the end in view for the integrated effort of his subordinates. it will be noted that in the latter category there will fall, not only the general objective referred to immediately above, but numerous other objectives for whose attainment provision may be needed during the actual prosecution of the effort or in anticipation thereof. procedure for selection of correct military objectives. the fundamental military principle (page ), properly applied, is the basis for the selection of any or all of such objectives. the procedure involves the direct application of the corollary principle of the correct military objective. according to this principle, the selection of a correct military objective depends on due consideration of the salient features noted, i.e., correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for adequate freedom of action. these features, discussed in greater detail hereafter (in this chapter), are determined by factors cited in the principle (pages - ). the first factor being the appropriate effect desired, a correct military objective is selected, in the first instance, by reference to the requirement of suitability as to this factor. this appropriate effect desired may be indicated by the higher command (page ), or may be determined by the commander himself as hereinafter explained (page ). when the appropriate effect desired has been established, the next consideration is, "what physical objective (or objectives) can be found, action with relation to which will, if successful, attain this effect?" for example, if the appropriate effect desired were the "reduction of enemy battleship strength" in a certain area, then an enemy battleship appearing therein would manifestly be a correct physical objective. a suitable action with relation thereto would be "to destroy the enemy battleship", in which case the objective involved in the action would be "the destruction of the enemy battleship". any lesser accomplishment, such as infliction of damage on the enemy battleship, or its repulse, or its diversion elsewhere, would also be suitable to the appropriate effect desired, though not in the same degree. each such visualized accomplishment, suitable to the appropriate effect desired, may properly be considered as a tentatively selected objective. an objective having been tentatively selected on the basis of the appropriate effect desired, its final selection will naturally depend, as indicated in the principle, on the feasibility of the effort involved in the attainment of each such objective, and on the acceptability of the consequences as to costs. in investigating such feasibility, account is taken of the relative fighting strength. with relation to the enemy battleship, for example (see above), the commander would consider the means available to him and the means opposed (including the enemy battleship and any supporting forces), as influenced by the characteristics of the theater. this investigation will include, necessarily, a sufficient analysis of the salient features of the operation required to attain each objective. such features include the nature of the physical objectives (the battleship and any other forces, for instance), the possibilities of relative position, the problems involved in apportioning the forces on either side, and the proper considerations as to freedom of action. a similar study with respect to the acceptability of the consequences to be expected, as to the costs involved in the operation, will provide a basis for a conclusion as to that factor. if the attainment of an objective is found to be infeasible, or feasible only at the expense of unacceptable consequences, the proposed objective will naturally be rejected, and some other objective will be considered (page ). the objective finally adopted as the best will be that which, all things considered, is best adapted to the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability, as outlined in the fundamental military principle. the appropriate effect desired, as the basis for the objective. as will be appreciated from the foregoing discussion, the first factor in the selection of a correct objective is the "appropriate effect desired". the evaluation of this factor is not always easy, for reasons which will be explained. the procedure (as indicated by the principle of the appropriate effect to be desired--page ) is the same as for the selection of an objective. this identity of procedure is natural, because the appropriate effect desired, used as a basis for selecting the commander's general objective, itself involves the appreciation of an objective. the latter is, in fact, one of the "chain of objectives" previously mentioned (page ). under conventional conditions this objective is selected by higher authority, and is assigned to the commander in his instructions from the next higher echelon (page ). the objective so indicated will of course, under sound procedure, have been selected by higher authority on the basis embodied in the fundamental military principle. when an established chain of command (page ) is in effective operation, the path to the appropriate effect desired will therefore normally be indicated through an assigned objective, by the immediate superior. this assignment, however, or the failure to receive such an indication, does not relieve the commander from the responsibility for taking correct action on his own initiative. such necessity may arise should he find, in the exercise of a sound discretion, that his instructions need modification or alteration, or even that it is necessary for him to depart from his instructions under circumstances of great emergency (page - ). furthermore, the objective may be adopted by (rather than assigned to) the commander concerned, on his own initiative, in order to meet the demands of a situation (page ) as to which the higher command has not yet had time or opportunity to act. moreover, even when an objective is assigned by higher authority in the usual course, it may be expressed in such terms as to require examination in order to enable the commander to appreciate it (page ), as to its bearing on his operations. in fact, studious analysis may be necessary for this purpose. for example, if the objective so indicated does not specify a clearly-defined goal, the commander will need to make a thorough study in order to appreciate the full implications intended. he may find it necessary to analyze his immediate superior's instructions pertaining to the entire force of which his command is a part, and to consider, also, the objectives indicated for other commanders, on his own echelon, who also belong to that force. on occasion, also, higher authority may acquaint the commander with the general plan adopted by the superior, and may order action--such as movement in a certain direction or to a certain locality--without assigning a more definite objective. should it happen in emergency that later developments prevent higher authority from making such an assignment, the commander may find himself under the necessity of selecting, for himself, an appropriate objective, to be adopted by him as if it were assigned. should the commander find that his instructions do not clearly indicate an objective, or should he find that the one indicated is not applicable under the circumstances of the case, he will select an appropriate objective for his own guidance as if it were assigned by higher authority. he will make such selection through use of the same procedure already described herein as applicable to the selection of an objective of any sort. in such case he puts himself in his superior's place, in order to arrive at a reasoned conclusion such as the higher commander, if apprised of the circumstances, would desire to adopt. circumstances permitting, the commander will of course communicate with higher authority, and will make constructive representations. (see page .) the appropriate effect desired, as the first factor to be applied in selecting such an objective, will naturally involve the objective indicated in the general plan for the immediate superior's entire force. this general plan is normally announced by the superior for the guidance of the commander and of other commanders on the same echelon. if, however, this further objective is not known to the commander, he will endeavor to obtain a proper point of reference. to this end, he will use his knowledge of the objective assigned to his immediate superior, or of the further intentions of the higher command with respect to the conduct of the operations, or of the campaign, or of the war. the provisions for the formulation of plans and orders (chapters vii and viii) take account of the fact that the commander may require definite information as to the objectives of higher echelons. in organizations where a state of mutual understanding has been well established, the commander will rarely be without some guidance in the premises (see also page ), by reason of the chain of objectives indicated in plans and orders of the higher command (page ). from the viewpoint of the commander, this relationship among objectives presents to him a series, from the present or immediate objective to others more distant in time. thus there may be one or more intermediate objectives, leading away from the immediate one to the ultimate objective, so far as the concern of the moment is involved. this relationship of immediate, intermediate, and ultimate objectives may also exist in situations where the commander, operating on his own initiative and responsibility, determines such a chain of objectives for himself. such a situation frequently arises in a campaign or a major operation, and is normal, also, as to minor operations (see page , as to physical objectives). as already observed, the relationship of objective and further objective is the criterion for distinguishing between strategical and tactical considerations, from the viewpoint of the commander concerned (pages and ). what has been noted in the foregoing as to the objective (singular) is also applicable to situations where such an objective involves two or more objectives collectively considered. iii. determination of effective military operations as noted with respect to the fundamental military principle (page ), the effort required for the attainment of a military objective involves military operations (page ), whose salient features are listed in the principle. these features, including physical objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action, will now be discussed to indicate how they are correctly determined by the factors, also cited in the principle, pertaining to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. such determination is accomplished through application of the corollary principle of effective military operations (page ). physical objectives fundamental considerations. an operation, however splendidly conceived and faultlessly executed, involves waste of effort if directed with relation to wrong physical objectives. since a physical objective constitutes the tangible focus of effort (page ) toward the attainment of the effect desired, its correct determination is of paramount importance both before and during the prosecution of operations. as has been demonstrated (page ), the consideration of possible physical objectives (in space) is essential to the selection of suitable objectives (in mind). moreover, action with reference to one or more physical objectives is the necessary basis for determining the feasibility and acceptability of a plan. military objectives can be achieved only through the application of power, actually or by threat (page ), with reference to physical objectives. the determination of correct physical objectives is followed, if more than one such objective is found, by the selection of the one or more which are best adapted to the requirements of the situation. the procedure for determination and for selection is a matter for painstaking mental effort, based on the considerations now to be presented. the term "military objective" is frequently used in military literature to distinguish physical objectives which are combatant in character from those which are noncombatant. the considerations which follow are applicable to physical objectives of all categories. procedure for determination and selection of correct physical objectives. in a particular set of circumstances, the field wherein correct physical objectives may be found and the best selected, is that of an existent or probable theater of action. the determination of a physical objective, when correct, initially satisfies the requirement of suitability with respect to the nature of the objective,--this being, in such case, the appropriate effect desired (page ). physical objectives not suitable, with relation to the objective to be attained, are manifestly incorrect physical points of orientation with respect to the operations involved in the effort to attain such an objective. it may be found, however, that the selection of a single physical objective will not fulfill this requirement. a commander may find it necessary to direct his effort simultaneously, or in succession, with relation to more than one physical objective. when a succession of physical objectives has to be dealt with, the selection will necessarily include such a series. such a case might occur where a campaign has been found necessary in the form of successive stages as essential features. the visualized termination of each successive stage may be marked by the successful application of effort with respect to one or more physical objectives. such a series of physical objectives may frequently also occur in operations on a smaller scale; even in very minor actions such a succession of efforts is normal. (see page , as to objectives.) the choice as to the specific nature of physical objectives will extend, for example, from the enemy's organized forces as a whole to the physical body of an individual combatant. within this range will be included all manner of physical elements of enemy fighting strength, singly and in combination, such as troops, ships, geographical points, lines and areas, fortifications, bases, and supplies. the physical objective may take the form of a fixed geographical position, the occupation of which, because of its inherent advantages, may be, for example, an essential preliminary to further progress. the position may, for instance, be merely a point in the ocean (page ), a rendezvous beyond which, although its occupation may be uncontested, it has been deemed unwise to proceed without further information or additional strength. the physical objective, therefore, does not always take the form of some element of the enemy fighting strength; not infrequently, the occupation of a correct physical objective may be uncontested by the enemy. however, intervening armed forces of the enemy may constitute the physical objective for application of successful effort before a further physical objective may be dealt with. the possibility of enemy opposition may, therefore, place the selection of one or more physical objectives on an indeterminable basis at the time of the original solution of the problem. this may require a commander to defer his choice until the situation has become more fully developed. for example, his objective may be the occupation of a certain harbor, preliminary to the establishment of a base. the harbor is then a correct physical objective, perhaps the only physical objective which need be dealt with, if there are no other obstacles to prevent or interrupt the operation. armed forces of the enemy may, however, stand as an obstacle to the undisputed occupation of the harbor and, therefore, to the attainment of the objective. in such case they become, for the time being, the correct physical objective. while the armed forces of the enemy may frequently present appropriate physical objectives, this is not always the case (see above). it is true that, in war, the armed forces of the enemy, until they can no longer offer effective resistance, prevent the full attainment of the objective of the state. accordingly, from the broad viewpoint, they may constitute the legitimate and proper physical objective of the opposing armed forces. armed forces of the enemy which are present in opposition to any projected operations are likely to offer proper physical objectives. these facts, however, do not restrict a commander, in his choice of a physical objective, to the armed forces of the enemy. nor do these considerations require him to search for and destroy the enemy forces before directing his effort toward the attainment of an objective under circumstances where the enemy is seen to be incapable of presenting effective opposition. the correct physical objective may change several times during the course of an operation. this is particularly to be expected in a naval tactical engagement of considerable scope. while the enemy fleet, as a whole, may properly be considered in such a case to be the physical objective, the component parts of each fleet, the types of vessels and their combinations, may, from time to time, find in their opponents a variety of physical objectives, the particular identity of which can scarcely be predicted with assurance. it is here that the importance of the correct selection of physical objectives stands out in bold relief. infliction of loss on enemy forces, or support of own forces hard pressed, may always seem tempting immediate objectives in war. however, there may be occasions when disengagement or refusal to engage an enemy force, even though it be of manifestly inferior strength, may be appropriate to the attainment of the end in view. necessity for speed or secrecy, or other demands, may make the required operations unacceptable. (see page as to the offensive and the defensive.) land, as the natural habitat of man (page ), is always the principal store-house of his indispensable resources, as well as the primary scene of his activities. naval operations, therefore, have always in view the eventual maintenance or creation of a favorable military situation in critical land areas. from this fundamental viewpoint, the eventual physical objective of military operations is always a land objective. * * * * * the suitability of a physical objective having been determined, the next consideration is the feasibility (page ) of taking such action, with relation thereto, as will, if successful, attain the objective in mind. feasibility is determined by evaluation of the factors of means available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater, in order to assess relative fighting strength (see page ). in connection with the effort involved with relation to any physical objective, questions of feasibility may make it desirable or necessary to visualize the detailed operations which arise from considerations of relative position, of apportionment of fighting strength, and of provision for freedom of action. of particular interest with respect to such operations, it is noted that the premature disclosure of a selected physical objective is a military error. by appearing, however, to operate against more than one physical objective, a commander may lead the enemy to overstrain his resources in the effort to protect them all. thus the commander may reduce the resistance to be encountered in dealing with what have already, or may finally, become the selected physical objectives. feints in several directions may even divert all of the enemy's effective defense from the vital points (see also page ). * * * * * after the suitability of a physical objective has been established, as well as the feasibility of the contemplated action with relation thereto, such action is next considered from the standpoint of acceptability with reference to the consequences as to costs. the specific factors involved in acceptability as to consequences have previously been mentioned (page ). * * * * * when the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability have been satisfied, the locality, the opposing force, or other subject of consideration may be regarded as a correct physical objective. when more than one correct physical objective has been determined and a choice is indicated, such selection will also be founded on the foregoing requirements. no doctrine, no advance instructions, can replace the responsible judgment of a commander as to his correct physical objectives. on occasion, higher authority may request recommendations (see page , as to opinions) with respect to such objectives. the duty of a commander to depart from his instructions under certain conditions, and the grave responsibility which he thereby assumes, have also been referred to (page ). relative positions fundamental considerations. the relative positions occupied or susceptible of occupancy by armed forces are matters which demand constant and intelligent attention before and during hostilities. being fruitful sources of advantage or disadvantage, such relative positions assume primary importance where enemy forces are concerned, and are scarcely of less importance from the standpoint of the correct apportionment of the subdivisions of one's own forces, and from the viewpoint of their freedom of action. during periods of actual tactical contact, the successful delivery of the decisive thrust against selected physical objectives is greatly furthered by the occupancy and maintenance of advantageous relative positions. the fundamental significance of relative position lies in the fact that position is the basis of movement, for movement is merely a change of position. speed is the rate at which movement takes place. the particular factors to be reckoned with are, therefore, time and space. in skillful utilization of these elements lies the successful employment of relative position in the creation or maintenance of a favorable military situation, whether the movement be by land, sea, or air (page ). the necessity for movement may be an important consideration in determining possible or likely theaters of operations. where transportation between two or more positions within a certain area is essential to the successful conduct of a war, the area which includes the routes between these positions, or a portion of such routes, becomes at once a possible or likely theater. such an area may be normally within the control of one or the other of the belligerents, or the control may be in dispute. certain of the positions themselves may belong to neither of the belligerents. the area itself may be a land area, or a sea area, or a combination of the two. it may be an area which borders upon the sea, or an island area. in any case, the air is a common characteristic. the movement of a force is properly regarded, not as an even flow, but as a series of steps from one position to another. the movement may or may not be continuous. pauses are usual, their occurrence and duration being a matter dependent upon circumstances and calling for the exercise of sound professional judgment. intermediate positions may be utilized, successively, so as to facilitate occupancy of the final position which is the goal of that phase of operations (page ). this procedure often effects an ultimate saving of time. in many cases, other advantages also may accrue. the foregoing considerations are applicable to changes of position whether in the direction of the enemy, toward a flank, or to the rear. flanking maneuvers and retrograde movements, both sometimes profitably employed to decoy the enemy, may frequently be utilized to gain advantageous relative position. the proper objective of each is the maintenance of a favorable situation, or the alteration of an unfavorable one, either locally or with reference to the larger phases of operations, through measures involving apportionment of fighting strength, or obtaining advantages of position, or retaining or gaining freedom of action. combinations of forward, flanking, or retrograde movements are frequent in war, the skillful combination of the offensive and the defensive (see page ) being no less applicable to the problem of relative position than to the other elements of a favorable military operation. procedure for determination and selection of advantageous relative positions. since the various positions to be occupied become physical objectives for the time being, their proper determination and selection are governed by the same considerations which apply to physical objectives (see page and following). thus, it becomes necessary to consider, first, as to suitability, whether the position, once gained, will permit the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. secondly, consideration is required as to feasibility. are the available means adequate to gain or to maintain such position? in answering this question, due regard is paid to opposing means and to the characteristics of the theater. finally, there is to be considered, as to acceptability, whether the consequences as to costs, in terms of relative fighting strength, will be such, if the position is gained or maintained, as to permit the attainment of the objective. the possible effect of these consequences on future action, whether the attempt succeeds or fails, may be vitally significant. * * * * * with regard to suitability, the factor of the appropriate effect desired calls for special consideration of the requirements with a view to future action. this is true because of the relationship which naturally exists between successive positions (page ) if changes of location from one to another are to be integrated into movement calculated to accomplish the effect desired. each position, itself for the time being a physical objective, offers certain advantages or involves certain disadvantages with relation to a further physical objective. the position of the latter, in turn, presents possibilities (or denies them) with respect to future movement. the influence of considerations with respect to time (in addition to those noted above with regard to space) is also a factor whose importance increases when urgency is a matter of immediate concern. with regard to feasibility, the technical capabilities and limitations of the armed forces (page ) are, of course, among the principal factors. these capabilities and limitations are respectively promoted and imposed primarily by considerations peculiar to the particular medium of movement involved. with specific regard to the areas within which military operations may suitably be undertaken, the fundamental distinctions created by recognized political sovereignty require attention. that part of the surface of the earth which comprises its land area is recognized as the property or the charge of one or another of the sovereign states, although in certain cases the title may be in dispute. the air above a nation's territorial domain is generally understood to be part of that domain. the point to be observed is that there are no land areas which belong equally to all nations. accordingly; because of the factor of neutral sovereignty, both land and air forces of belligerent states may be under the necessity of following indirect routes to their physical objectives. in the case of the sea, however, all those portions of the earth's surface which are covered by water (exclusive only of the recognized territorial waters of the several nations), i.e., the high seas, are presumably common property. the same applies to the air above the sea. these considerations, and the fact that the surface of the sea is a broad plane, permit open sea areas to be traversed by a variety of routes to an extent not applicable in the case of land areas and the air above them. in addition, the fact that technological developments have been such as to permit movement, not only on the surface of the sea and through the air above but also beneath the surface, gives distinctive characteristics to the sea when considered as a theater of operations. the surface of the sea has, from the earliest days to the present, provided roads over which human beings in greatest numbers and the resources of the world in greatest weight and volume can be transported in single carriers. from the standpoint of any belligerent it is imperative that, during war, these roads be kept open to the extent demanded by the needs of the state. it is equally imperative that an enemy be deprived of the advantage which their use might otherwise afford. in both cases localized (even though temporary) control, not only of the surface but of the water beneath and the air above, may be essential. it is pertinent, also, to note at this point the interest of neutrals, or of unneutral nonbelligerent powers, in keeping open the trade routes via the high seas. such interest may constitute an important factor in the calculations of a belligerent state. considerations of maximum capacity for speed represent the utmost possibilities with respect to movements (i.e., change of positions) (page ) in a given medium within a given time limit. a knowledge of maximum speed potentialities, one's own and those of the enemy, is required if changes in position are intelligently to be made. a knowledge of the variety of conditions, controllable and otherwise, which affect or preclude the employment of maximum speed, is likewise a requisite. poor material condition, inadequate training, and incorrect methods of operation are preventable or correctable. the limitations on speed which are imposed by logistics, and by natural obstacles such as the hydrography, the climate, the wind, the weather, and the state of the sea, are susceptible of greatest possible adjustment to circumstances only by the exercise of foresight and judgment. all these conditions indicate the close relationship that exists between relative position and freedom of action (page ). the same observations apply to considerations of maximum capacity for endurance, the ability to operate without necessity for replenishment from an outside source. radius of action is decreased or increased accordingly with resultant restrictions, or otherwise, on freedom of action. with respect to the freedom of action of armed forces, also a consideration in relation to feasibility, the logistics of a military operation, of whatever scope, constitutes a problem which begins when the plan is in process of formulation. this problem ends only when the necessity for sustaining the movement, and for retaining the position gained, no longer exists. ships and other means of conveyance, surface, subsurface, and air, are incapable of providing the necessities of life and the implements of warfare beyond the capacity built into them. operations which extend beyond the limits of such capacity must cease unless replenishment and support, possible only from other sources, are provided. the logistics problem may be so difficult as to cause rejection of a course of action involving distant operations. from the standpoint of supply, military movements by land, sea, and air are, therefore, vitally associated with positions on land and with their relation to the area of operations (see also page ). the same observations apply in larger scope to the state itself, which, because of economic vulnerability with respect to certain essential raw materials, may be compelled to seek support from outside sources lest supplies on hand become exhausted. in all cases, great importance attaches to the geographical location of sources of supply in their relation to a required point of delivery and to the routes which lie between. it follows that enemy sources of supply may be suitable physical objectives (see page ). their destruction or capture, or the severance of the enemy's lines of communication with them, may seriously restrict his freedom of action. from the standpoint of the relative position of its features, and apart from their inherent military value, the characteristics of the theater of military operations may exert an important influence upon the shaping of events. each characteristic merits consideration as a potential means of facilitating or obstructing movement. some localities may have been developed as repair, supply, or air bases. others may be sources of essential raw materials. certain points may be heavily fortified. island formations may be valuable to either opponent, or to both, because of the capacity and security of their harbors, the character of their terrain, or their positions relative to each other. the inherent military value of the several features of the theater may be enhanced or vitiated by the relative position which each occupies with respect to other features, and with reference to the location of the armed forces involved. so-called "strategic points", historically significant in connection with military operations, derive their importance by reason of their relative position with reference to routes of movement. the possibilities of utilizing or of changing the characteristics of a theater of operations, to assist, hamper, or deny movement, are governed by considerations previously discussed (see the principle of the proper physical conditions to be established in the field of action--page ). in planning the creation or maintenance of a favorable military situation from the standpoint of relative position, there may, therefore, profitably be included an examination into: (a) the relation which may exist between the geographical location of the subdivisions of one's own forces and ( ) those of the enemy, ( ) geographical areas under one's own control, and positions within those areas, ( ) geographical areas not under one's own control, and positions within those areas, ( ) areas coveted or in dispute, ( ) fixed actual and potential repair and operating bases and sources of supply and replenishment, own and enemy, controlled or otherwise. (b) the relation existing among the geographical locations listed immediately above, including the effect of possible changes in control. (c) the bearing of the sun and moon, and the direction of the wind and sea. (d) the length and vulnerability of possible lines of communication. (e) the time and distance, and resulting relative speeds, involved in movements necessary to change or to maintain an existing relation. (f) the measures incident to adequate freedom of action. a more detailed analysis of the factors influencing relative position is made in section i-b of the estimate form (chapter vi). * * * * * in connection with the factor of consequences as to costs, the requirement as to acceptability is a weighing of expected gains and of reasonably anticipated losses, a balancing of the one against the other, with due attention to the demands of future action, (see page ). military movement normally involves an inescapable expenditure of military resources. the characteristics of the theater, alone, will exact their due toll, even if no enemy be present. in the presence of the enemy, such expenditures may increase with great rapidity. the fundamental consideration here is whether the resultant losses are disproportionate to the gains. avoidance of movement is frequently the correct decision, because movement, if it offers no advantages, is scarcely justifiable even if it entails no material loss. movement, merely for the sake of moving, is not a profitable military operation. however, the conduct of military operations without major movement is a concept inherently defensive (page ), even apathetic, whose outcome, against an energetic enemy, can rarely be other than defeat. in the execution of advantageous movement to achieve correct military objectives, the competent commander is always ready to accept the losses which are inseparable from his gains. * * * * * the foregoing considerations as to advantageous relative positions are applicable, not only in the realm of the commander's decisions as to his own action, but also to his judgments rendered when higher authority calls for recommendations (see page ). apportionment of fighting strength fundamental considerations. the assignment of a task may be expected to carry with it availability of fighting strength deemed adequate by higher authority for accomplishment of the operation involved. in appropriate instances, the higher command may call for recommendations as to the amount and character of the means deemed adequate by the subordinate for performance of the task with which he is, or is to be, charged (page ). in any case, means having been made available, it remains for a commander to whom an objective has been assigned to apportion these available resources in such manner as to provide the requisite strength at points likely to be decisive, without unduly weakening other points. in effect, he is charged with a practical adjustment of means to ends. this responsibility is discharged by the effective utilization of means and prevention of waste nicely balanced through full consideration of all essential elements of a favorable military operation. the procedure involved has been indicated (see the corollary principle for the determination of the proper means to be made available--page ). the relation between the strength to be brought to bear in dealing with a selected physical objective, the tactical concern of the moment, and that necessary to the attainment of the strategical aim (see pages and ), constitutes a fundamental consideration in effecting such a balance. in making a correct apportionment, there will be involved not only the physical elements of fighting strength, but the mental and moral as well. with respect to mental and moral factors, the capabilities of particular commanders and organizations may be an important factor in apportioning forces to tasks. in the physical field, numbers and types occupy a prominent position, each however, requiring consideration from the standpoint of the existing situation. thus, forces composed of appropriate types and suitably equipped and trained may exercise greater effect than numerically larger forces not so well adjusted to the requirements of the situation. on the other hand, numerical considerations become predominant under conditions otherwise substantially equal. these considerations, viewed in the light of the relationship of naval operations to land areas (page ), indicate the importance which may attach to immediate availability, with a naval force, in addition to its own air strength, of a proper complement of land forces (with appropriate air strength) which are organized, equipped, and trained for amphibious operations. the same considerations point also to the vital importance of due provision, with respect to the armed forces of a state, for joint operations involving concerted action on land, by sea, or in the air. in connection with the capabilities of particular commanders (page ), it will be appreciated how important it is, more especially in amphibious or joint operations, for responsible officers to have a correct understanding of the powers and limitations of the several types of military forces involved, be their primary medium of movement the land, the sea, or the air. factors of dispersion and concentration are also involved in apportionment of fighting strength. while undue dispersion may result in lack of adequate fighting strength where required, a certain degree of dispersion may be necessary to meet the demands of movement and of freedom of action. serious errors in this regard, however, may result in inability to furnish support where needed, and in consequent punishment or isolation of one or more valuable detachments. in distant operations some dispersion is required to safeguard long lines of communication. the requirements for this purpose may sometimes be so great that, unless the total available strength is adequate, a due apportionment to the guarding of long lines of communication may so weaken the main force as to prevent the attainment of the objective. (see also page .) proper dispersion is, therefore, a requirement to be met, while undue dispersion is to be avoided. but realization is also necessary, in this connection, that there is an equal danger in over-concentration. an undue concentration of means at any point may subject such a force to unnecessary loss. another disadvantage may be lack of adequate fighting strength elsewhere. accordingly, axiomatic advice that it is unwise to divide a total force, while containing a sound element of caution, is misleading and inadequate, for division is often necessary or desirable. to be adequate, a maxim or rule relating to division of force should indicate when, and in what measure, such division may or may not be necessary or desirable. (see also page .) similarly inadequate, however true as a generality, is the statement that the requirements of effective warfare are met by bringing superiority to bear at the decisive time and place. such an injunction is of little assistance in solving practical problems as to the appropriate degree of superiority, and as to the proper time and place. in like manner, any rule is faulty which advises a commander to seek the solution of his problems by always bringing to bear his elements of strength against the hostile elements of weakness. it may be found, on occasion, that it is necessary or desirable to act with strength against strength. but it is equally faulty to maintain that action, to be effective, seeks always to deal with the enemy by first destroying his elements of strength. even when the strongest opposition cannot be defeated by direct action of this nature, success may still be possible by first disposing of elements of weakness. when the stronger elements of a hostile combination cannot be defeated without undue loss, yet cannot stand without the weaker, consideration may well be given to an apportionment of fighting strength on the basis of seeking a decision against the latter. the defeat of a relatively small force at a distance from the area where the main forces are concentrated in opposition, may hasten the attainment of the ultimate objective. the main effort, where the greater force is employed, may be identical with the effort contributing most directly to the final result. this identity, however, does not always exist, and the decisive influence is frequently exerted by a relatively small force, sometimes at a distance from the principal area of action. diversions (see also as to feints, page ) are not likely to be profitable unless constituting a sufficient threat, or unless offering apparent advantages to the enemy which he feels that he cannot forego. success will attend justified diversions if they lead the enemy to reapportion his fighting strength to meet the threat, either because he expects repetitions (see page , as to raids), or because the area involved may become a new theater of action, or for other pertinent reasons. means which are inadequate for the attainment of an objective if used in one effort may sometimes be rendered adequate by utilizing them in a series of successive impulses. similarly, the effect of employing means otherwise adequate may be intensified by the delivery of attacks in waves. procedure for determining proper apportionment. the fundamental considerations outlined above as to apportionment of fighting strength have application both to the offensive and the defensive (see also discussion on page ). as to all of these considerations, the solution for the particular situation is to be found only through an analysis of the factors applying to the particular problem. thus, the first consideration relates to suitability, and requires that the apportionment of means be suitable both as to type and as to amount, in order to produce the appropriate effect desired in view of the means opposed and of the influence of the characteristics of the theater. the fundamentals involved, applicable in all human activities (see the principle of the proper means to be made available--page ), are the factors cited above. these are also, of course, indicated in the fundamental military principle. the correct apportionment may also be influenced by any military changes to be effected in the characteristics of the theater (as indicated in the principle of proper physical conditions to be established--page ). thus, the establishment of a well defended base may operate, properly, to reduce the requirements for apportionment of a force for a particular duty in that locality. similarly, the proper use of fortifications, obstacles, demolitions, and routes by land, sea, and air, as well as facilities for exchange of information and orders, all operate to increase fighting strength relative to that of the enemy. the next consideration, that of feasibility, takes account of the type and of the amount of means that can be apportioned in view of the means available. in connection with the foregoing there will be appropriate requirements for the operation as a whole and for its component operations. all of these requirements may call for analysis of the relative positions to be utilized, with reference to the selected physical objectives, and of the requirements for adequate freedom of action. finally, the requirement of acceptability as to the factor of consequences will call for consideration of the results of the allotments of forces to particular tasks. this is necessary in order to arrive at reasonable conclusions as to the military costs involved either in event of the success of the effort or in event of its failure, and with respect, more especially, to the effects on future action. the attainment of the objective, however suitable as to the effect desired, may be found, on the basis of due study, to be infeasible or to involve unacceptable consequences. the inescapable conclusion is then that an increase in relative fighting strength is required or that another objective, feasible of attainment and acceptable with respect to consequences, is necessarily to be adopted (see page - ). freedom of action fundamental considerations. in providing for proper apportionment of fighting strength, a commander may attain the end in view by increasing the physical, mental, or moral elements of his own strength, relative to the enemy's, or by decreasing the enemy's strength through imposing restrictions on hostile freedom of action. freedom of action will enable a commander to prosecute his plan in spite of restrictive influences. that enemy interference will, to a greater or less extent, impose restrictions on freedom of action is to be expected. restrictions may also be imposed by physical conditions existing in the theater of operations, and by deficiencies and omissions which are within the field of responsibility of the commander to correct. even with fighting strength adequate to overcome enemy opposition and physical handicaps, deficiencies and omissions within a commander's own field may become effective checks to further progress unless avoided through the exercise of foresight. to this end, it is desirable to consider certain possibilities which are likely to promote freedom of action if properly exploited, and to restrict it if neglected. to a considerable extent, a commander has within his own control the degree of influence which his force will exert in the creation or the maintenance of a favorable military situation. the power applied by a military force is determined not only by the fighting strength of its component commands, but also by the degree of coordination of their several efforts in the attainment of the objective (see also page ). whatever the inability of the commander to influence the other aspects of a situation, the ability of his command to act unitedly is a matter largely in his hands. when time permits, subordinate commanders, apprised of contemplated tasks in general terms, may be called upon to submit recommendations as to the detailed instructions to be issued them, as well (page ) as to the means to be allotted for the purpose. by this procedure, individual initiative (page ) is fostered and the higher command enabled to utilize the first-hand knowledge and experience gained on lower echelons without, however, divesting the higher command of any of its responsibility. the command system may provide for unified action through unity of command or through cooperation resulting from mutual understanding. on the assumption that commanders are competent and that communications are adequate, unity of command is the more reliable method. however, it cannot be obtained everywhere and at all times, because of the necessary decentralization of the command system in areas distant from the commander. in such areas, unity of effort may sometimes be assured by provision for local unity of command. at other times, unity of effort may depend entirely on cooperation between adjacent commands within the same area. (see page .) organization (see page ), the mechanism of command, is most effective when, through the establishment of authority commensurate with responsibility (page ) and through the assignment of tasks to commanders with appropriate capabilities (see also page ), the highest possible degree of unity of command is attained. the command organization and mutual understanding are of primary importance as methods of ensuring maximum power with available fighting strength, and of affording consequent maximum contribution to freedom of action. deficiencies in technical training are capable of imposing grave restrictions upon freedom of action. material equipment, even though it may represent the acme of perfection in design and construction, will not surely function unless skillfully operated and maintained. even though mobility and endurance be otherwise assured, the capacity which they represent is not susceptible of effective employment unless the methods of movement, i.e., of effecting change in relative position (page ), are intelligently planned and are developed to a point which assures facility of operation when in the hands of skilled personnel. tactical training, not omitting that required for joint operations (page ), is one of the vital factors of fighting strength, with respect, more especially, to its contributions to freedom of action. a state of high and stable morale (page ), founded upon sound discipline, is an invaluable characteristic of fighting strength. an understanding of the human being is therefore an important feature of the science of war. discipline, in its basic meaning, is the treatment suitable to a disciple. the objective of discipline is therefore the creation and maintenance of the spirit of willingness to follow where the commander leads. the exercise of leadership is not restricted, however, to those occasions when the commander can be physically present. the exigencies of war and the requirements of control prevent the commander from being always, personally, in the forefront of action. these restrictions as to considerations of space however, impose no limitations on leadership in terms of time. the influence of the competent commander is a factor always acting to shape the situation according to his will (page ), though the necessities of the moment may compel his presence elsewhere. the ability to create and maintain a faithful following who will execute the commander's will wherever he may be (page ) is, accordingly, a primary attribute of command. with this objective in mind, the true disciplinarian runs no risk of confusing harshness with the exercise of justice. he understands the difference between an overbearing arrogance, arising from unconscious ignorance, and the pride which springs from a justified self-respect. he appreciates the distinction between mere stubbornness, which would alienate his followers, and the necessary firmness which binds the bonds between the leader and the led. he realizes that comradeship, without presumptuous familiarity, is the firmest foundation for mutual loyalty (page ). he knows that kindness and consideration, without suggestion of pampering, will not be mistaken for weakness by any subordinate worthy of the name. military subordination, which implies a proud obedience without trace of servility, is the essential basis for the development of the qualities of command. it is an old adage that, to know how to command, one must know how to obey. in the profession of arms, every man is at once a leader and a follower; the uncertainties of war may suddenly confront any individual, even on the lowest echelon, with the call to exercise command. the requirements of sound discipline are thus the correct basis for all training. by proper training of his command, by instilling in it a spirit of resolute determination and by otherwise fostering its morale, and by weakening the morale of the enemy, a commander may increase his own fighting strength and reduce that of the opposition. when a command is inured to the ill effects of fear, despondency, lack of confidence, and other weakening influences, it may more effectually employ measures calculated to upset the morale of the enemy. in connection with these measures, surprise, when judiciously conceived and successfully employed, may be a most potent factor. surprise (see page ) is the injection of the unexpected for the purpose of creating an unfavorable military situation for the enemy. its effect is particularly telling when it results in disruption of enemy plans, and thus promotes the execution of one's own. the raid, an offensive measure swiftly executed, often by surprise, and followed by a withdrawal, may be a valuable operation when employed to attain objectives within its capacity. the collection of information, the destruction of important enemy equipment or supplies, the neutralization of enemy positions, the severing of physical means of communication and transport, and the like, are suitable objectives. the attritional effect of repeated raids may be very great. skillfully executed raids frequently produce panic among the populace and thus, by political pressure, cause a change in the existing apportionment of fighting strength to the extent of upsetting military plans in other theaters. this is particularly likely to occur when there is fear, justified or otherwise, of repetition (see page ). however, because a raid necessarily includes a withdrawal and cannot, therefore, accomplish the occupation of territory (see page ), it can have only indirect bearing, however important, upon the final outcome of the hostilities against a strong and competent enemy. like other forms of surprise, the raid, injudiciously employed, may serve only to disclose one's presence, and thus to betray more important future plans. if the raid fails to attain its objective, it may even strengthen enemy morale. the form which surprise may take is not confined to the stratagem, the ruse, or the sudden appearance. any unexpected display of novel methods or of fighting strength, moral, mental, or physical, the last-named sometimes assuming the character of new and especially effective weapons or equipment, is included in the category of surprise. the potential value of such methods or weapons is, however, reduced or even completely vitiated by the leakage of advance information concerning them, not only as to their details, but as to the fact of their existence. other conditions remaining unchanged, an offensive surprise measure is therefore more likely to be effective when the opponent has not been given time to prepare a defense against it. on the other hand, where there is knowledge that an opponent or possible opponent is taking steps of a new or unusual nature and no adequate defense is prepared, the equivalent of surprise has been granted him. security measures are necessary in order to minimize or prevent surprise, or to defeat other efforts aimed at disruption of plans. protection brings security; its basic objective is the conservation of fighting strength for future employment. primarily requiring the maintenance of secrecy and the exercise of vigilance and foresight, security may be furthered by efficient scouting, by appropriate dispositions and formations within the command, and by the use of protective detachments and of various types of works in the sphere of engineering. previous discussion (pages and ), with respect to relative position and to the apportionment of fighting strength, has indicated how, through fortification and related measures, the commander may increase relative fighting strength and thereby promote his own freedom of action while restricting that of the enemy. a commander will be hampered in maintaining his fighting strength at its maximum unless he has arranged for, and has at his disposal, adequate logistics support. because of its intimate relationship to mobility and endurance, such support is an essential to freedom of action. logistics support requires provision for procurement and replenishment of supplies, for evacuation, proper disposition, and replacement of ineffective personnel, and for material maintenance. freedom of action is restricted beyond those limits to which logistics support can be extended. (see page .) the initiative is of paramount importance in ensuring freedom of action. if the initiative is seized and maintained with adequate strength, the enemy can only conform; he cannot lead. if initiative is lost, freedom of action is restricted in like measure. the offensive, properly employed, is a method of seizing the initiative, and of regaining it if lost. even though there be an actual numerical superiority in fighting strength, an offensive will, however, seldom assume practical form unless founded on an offensive mental attitude, which ever seeks the favorable and suitable opportunity to strike. completely to abandon the offensive state of mind is to forswear victory. whether physically on the defensive or the offensive, the competent commander is always engaged in a mental and moral attack upon the will of the enemy commander (see page ). by effective attack upon the hostile will, the commander disintegrates the enemy's plan, i.e., the enemy's reasoned decision, as well as the detailed procedure on which the enemy relies to carry this decision into effect. it does not follow that offensive action is possible or even desirable under all circumstances. even with superior strength the most skillful commander will scarcely be able, always, to apportion forces in such manner as everywhere to permit the assumption of the offensive. without adequately superior strength, it may be necessary to adopt the defensive for considerable periods. if the offensive mental attitude is retained, together with fixed determination to take offensive measures as soon as appropriate to do so, the calculated and deliberate adoption of the defensive, for the proper length of time, may best promote the ultimate attainment of the objective. it is of the utmost importance, however, that a static defensive be not adopted as a settled procedure (see page ) beyond the time necessary to prepare for an effective offensive. both the offensive and the defensive have their places in an operation whose broad character is primarily either defensive or offensive. in operations which involve movement over a considerable distance, a combination of the offensive and the defensive is usually found necessary (see also references to distant operations on pages and ). though the movement itself be offensive, the ensurance of freedom of action may require both defensive measures and tactically offensive action. the enemy, primarily on the defensive, may be expected to seize every opportunity to employ the offensive. thus, a judicious combination of the offensive and the defensive has been found to be sound procedure (see also page ), provided that the general defensive is always viewed as a basis for the inauguration, at the proper moment, of the offensive. the methods employed during the period of the defensive are best calculated to promote freedom of action if they are designed to facilitate a ready assumption of the offensive as soon as conditions favorable to the offensive have been created. familiarity with the physical characteristics of the actual and possible theaters of operations, and accurate intelligence of the strength, distribution, and activities of enemy forces likely to be encountered, are of primary importance in the promotion of freedom of action. additions to this store of knowledge may be made by a continuous interpretation and dissemination of new information collected, analyzed, and evaluated by persistent effort. of equal importance is the denial of information to the enemy. in connection with counter-information measures (see page ), the scrutiny of information of a military nature intended for popular consumption demands the exercise of sound professional judgment prior to publication. a resourceful enemy is ever alert to evaluate and turn to his own advantage all available information, including that ostensibly innocuous. as to all of the foregoing considerations, a fund of professional knowledge, previously acquired through study, or experience, or both, and coupled with a sound concept of war, is the best basis for devising suitable, feasible, and acceptable measures for freedom of action. with a given fighting strength, the ensurance of freedom of action, within the field of responsibility of a commander, requires consideration of such matters as: (a) efficient provisions for exercise of command, (b) effective training, (c) a state of high and stable morale, founded on (d) sound discipline, (e) the offensive spirit, (f) the initiative, (g) surprise, (h) security, (i) adequate logistics support, (j) adequate intelligence and counter-intelligence. a more detailed analysis of such factors is provided hereafter (chapter vi, as to section i-b of the estimate form). with proper provision made in these respects, the commander will be better able to deal with those restrictions on freedom of action imposed by the enemy and by adverse geographical conditions. with respect to restrictions that in a particular situation may be due to the latter cause, it will at once be appreciated how greatly freedom of action may depend on the selection of correct physical objectives, on utilization of advantageous relative positions, and on an effective apportionment of fighting strength. each measure, or each operation, for freedom of action, if it is to meet the requirements of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability, will be planned on the basis of the foregoing considerations and will take account, also, of the inherent requirements of that measure, or operation, for freedom of action for itself. on occasion, higher authority may request the recommendations of the commander (see page , as to opinions) with reference to provision for freedom of action. such recommendations will properly be based on the elements considered in the preceding discussion. iv. summary all these considerations involve the proper evaluation of the factors applicable (page ) to the particular problem. each objective, prior to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, will require examination of its suitability with regard to the appropriate effect desired; of its feasibility with respect to the action contemplated as to physical objectives, relative positions, the concurrent apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action; and, finally, of its acceptability with reference to consequences as to costs. chapter v the four steps in the solution of a military problem chapter v discusses the four steps in the application of mental effort to the successful attainment of a military objective. emphasis is placed on such matters as: the estimate of the situation in basic problems, together with certain details as to tasks, the mission, courses of action, and the decision; the formulation of detailed plans, including subsidiary plans; directives; the running estimate of the situation; and the use of forms in the solution of problems. in chapter ii it has been brought to notice that every problem, regardless of its type and scope, has its source in a perplexity created by an apparent difficulty inherent in a situation. where there is a sufficient incentive to change or maintain the situation, the problem is one which requires solution. (see page .) a situation may be actual or assumed. in broad outline, an actual military situation is always likely to present a picture of opposing organizations of human beings, each possessed of fighting strength and disposed in a locality or localities which constitute relative positions with reference to each other. this picture may be expected to assume various aspects as action progresses (see page ). the concern of the commander is to control the unfolding of the original situation, to the end that he may attain the effect he desires (page ). (see also chapter ix.) the incentive to solve a problem is provided by a realization, on the part of the individual concerned, of a need to make provision for the attainment of an objective. in the ease of a military problem, such incentive may result ( ) from a directive issued by higher authority, usually in the form of an assigned task, or ( ) from the fact that a decision already reached by the commander has introduced further problems, or ( ) from a recognition of the demands of the situation. (see page .) an objective is best attained by the successful application of properly directed effort. there is thus an essential and continuing relationship between the incentive to solve a problem, and the task which assigns the objective (or objectives) and thus motivates the procedure necessary for the attainment of the objective(s) so assigned (page ). such a task may, therefore, be referred to as the motivating task. the natural mental processes which normal human beings employ in solving their problems of business, public affairs, or even personal matters, have been previously described as the natural processes for employment in the solution of military problems (see chapter ii). in adapting these natural processes to military requirements (page ), the only difference imposed is that of studied insistence that the factors peculiar to the conduct of war, as recognized in the fundamental military principle (page ), receive thorough analytical treatment from the professional viewpoint. the same observations apply when the field of military operations is restricted to that which primarily concerns the naval branch of the military profession. no fundamental difference in the solution of problems is introduced thereby. the only variations in the application of the fundamental military principle are those due to the fact that the sea provides the theater of naval operations with distinctive characteristics (see page ). the approach to the solution studies of the subject indicate that the successful attainment of an assigned military objective involves the application of mental effort in four distinct steps (see page ), in fixed sequence, as follows: ( ) the selection, by the commander, of a correct objective (or objectives) by achieving which he may attain his assigned objective(s). such selection includes the determination, in proper detail, of the action required. ( ) the resolution of the required action into detailed military operations. ( ) the formulation of a directive, or directives, with the intention of immediately inaugurating planned action. ( ) the supervision of the planned action. in the chapters which follow, the fundamental procedure distinctive of each of these steps will be treated separately and in the sequence shown. the sequence of the steps is fixed because of the consequential nature of the relationship among the procedures distinctive of the several steps. the complete solution of a problem involves, necessarily, all four steps. each step deals with a distinctive type of problem, or problems, pertaining to an aspect of the comprehensive problem whose solution requires all four steps. no step after the first can properly be undertaken unless the included problems involved in the preceding steps have been solved. it does not follow that the completion of one step necessarily requires that the next step be undertaken immediately. it will be seen, for instance, that the first two steps are concerned with planning, the latter two more especially with execution. it is not always necessary that a plan be executed; it may be drawn up as a precautionary measure. it is possible, therefore, that the first step only may be taken; i.e., that the procedure for the attainment of a particular assigned objective may be determined for the sole purpose of making provision against a contingency, at that particular time merely an obscure probability. or, as may frequently be the case during peace, the procedure may terminate, for the time being, with the completion of the second step. in such cases, certain of the necessary military operations are worked out in the desired detail as a provision against future possibilities, are listed, and filed for reference as needed. parts ii and iii, which follow, deal primarily with the solution of those problems of the naval commander which require familiarity with the entire process, i.e., all of the four steps given above. for simplicity of presentation, the procedure is described throughout from the mental standpoint of the same commander. the arrangement of subject matter conforms to this basis. the several types of problems, classified according to the source of the incentive (page ), are discussed in connection with the appropriate step. when a problem typical of a previous step arises during the process, the sequence of steps is interrupted thereby, but is resumed by a mental return, on the part of the commander, to the proper earlier step. the first step the mental procedure distinctive of the first step (more fully discussed in chapter vi) deals with the usual case where a commander becomes acquainted with the nature of his assigned objective through receipt of a directive from his immediate superior, ordinarily in the form of an assigned task or assigned tasks. in the discussion of the first step, this most likely type of problem is chosen for description, i.e., the one where the motivating task (see page ) comes directly from the immediate superior. for purposes of reference, this problem may conveniently be termed a basic problem. in such a case the original situation which gives character to the problem may be similarly referred to as the basic situation. the full solution of a basic problem always involves a basic estimate of the situation, a basic decision, a basic plan of operations, and one or more basic directives. it may, as will be shown, also require certain additional directives. the military estimate of the situation, based on the natural mental processes (pages - and ), is introduced in the first step. the reason for making such an estimate is to provide a basis for a plan to accomplish the assigned task. the estimate constitutes a systematic procedure for selection of a correct objective (or objectives), suitable to the appropriate effect desired, feasible of attainment, and acceptable as to the consequences involved in its achievement. the selection of such an objective or objectives involves, incidentally (see page ), the determination, in the proper detail, of the action required. this estimate procedure is founded on the fundamental military principle (page ). the procedure is the same as previously indicated for the correct selection of objectives (section ii of chapter iv). on the basis of a summary of the situation, a recognition of the incentive, and an appreciation of the assigned objective(s) (page ), the estimate of a basic problem enables the commander to obtain, first, an understanding of (page ) the appropriate effect desired. as a result of this procedure, he can then correctly formulate his mission (discussed hereinafter). for the further understanding of all details pertaining to the situation (page ), the estimate next determines relative fighting strength through a survey of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater. with the basis for solution of the problem thus established, the actual solution (page ), conforming to the system indicated in the fundamental military principle, starts with consideration of pertinent methods of procedure, as tentative solutions of the problem. these take the form of military operations, each denominated a course of action (discussed in detail hereinafter). each such course embodies, specifically or inferentially, an objective to be achieved for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. each course also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken. every pertinent course of action is tested to determine whether it meets the requirements of suitability as to the appropriate effect desired, of feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength, and of acceptability with respect to the consequences as to costs. enemy courses of action are subjected to the same treatment. each course of action which passes the tests is compared with each retained enemy course, after which those courses of action not rejected on this basis are compared with each other. the best is then selected and embodied in the decision. the decision, accordingly, expresses a general plan of action (or provides a basis therefor), including the commander's general objective (page ) for the attainment of the assigned objective. the decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken. the estimate procedure is applicable not only to the problem of the first step, viewed as a whole, but also to the numerous included problems. these present themselves during the procedure of solution, and call for "estimates within the estimate". for example, the proper nature of the objective embodied in the assigned task (discussed hereinafter), if not clear in the directive received, may be determined by the use of the natural mental processes. this is done through the application of the fundamental military principle, as previously described (page ). similarly, the solution of the included problems as to the salient features of the operations involved (correct physical objectives, etc.) can be arrived at through the same processes. the procedure is that indicated previously (in section iii of chapter iv). the estimate procedure may, however, be somewhat varied, as to details, in accordance with the nature of the problem. such adaptation is applicable, for example, as to the special features which distinguish certain types of strategical and tactical problems. every military situation has both strategical and tactical aspects (see discussion of strategy and tactics, pages and ). the character of the effort to be exerted at a particular time, and the nature of the objectives to be attained, may be governed chiefly by strategical, or chiefly by tactical, considerations. this fact may affect details in the estimate of the situation, e.g., as to the weight to be given various factors. the essential difference between strategy and tactics has been shown to lie in the end in view. it follows, then, that estimates of broad strategical situations and of localized tactical situations tend to differ from each other. the former lead to decisions as to such matters, among others, as whether a battle shall be fought. the latter lead to decisions, among others, as to the comprehensive tactical methods to be followed in furtherance of strategical aims. certain distinctions of method as to such estimates are noted hereinafter with respect to the analysis of fighting strength and with reference to courses of action. tasks. the assignment of tasks to subordinates is an essential function of the chain of command, applicable to all of the echelons of command, from the highest to the lowest (page ). on the lowest echelons, such as that of a gun's crew or a fireroom watch, operations thus prescribed involve numerous small specialized tasks, each requiring the performance of a simplified routine by a few trained men. although earlier training in the performance of such tasks is calculated to remove the necessity of solving the problems of the lowest echelons in the four studied steps stated above, it is only when the same methods of logical thought have previously been applied to the solution of these problems that this state of affairs can be brought about. properly conceived, each assigned task indicates, either specifically or inferentially, an objective (or objectives). the relationships existing among the echelons of command, with reference to objectives, have previously been noted. (see page .) these relationships, because a correctly conceived task specifies or infers an objective, are equally applicable as to such tasks. the manner of expressing tasks calls for special comment (see also page , as to expressing objectives). the commander may find in the expression of his task a statement, only, of the action required. for example, the order "proceed toward the enemy battle line" involves movement, indicating merely a change in relative position. no provision appears as to a future condition or state of affairs. again, the task may be expressed as an order to "attack the enemy battle line." in this case, the enemy battle line is the physical objective, but no specific future condition to result from the attack is indicated. here the action and the physical objective are given, but the objective is left to be inferred. if the commander can ascertain, from the directives he receives, his task expressed in terms of accomplishment, he may be able to visualize the action, the physical objective, and the condition to be created. the order "destroy the enemy battleship" (indicating, as the objective, "the destruction of the enemy battleship"), results, when successfully completed, in a new condition which is the objective of the action against the physical objective. accordingly, a task expressed in such terms of accomplishment conveys precise information as to the objective; yet such an expression of the task does not prevent freedom of action, with opportunity for exercise of initiative. the commander who is assigned such a task can clearly visualize the results demanded of him, and may feel at liberty to employ any one or all of the methods at his disposal. however, it is not always possible or even desirable to express tasks in terms of accomplishment. for example, where the future situation cannot be adequately visualized, either because of the doubtful values of certain factors or because of possible changes in circumstances, it may be impracticable to assign a definite task in terms of accomplishment. under such conditions, and sometimes for other proper reasons, it may be desirable to afford a trusted and competent subordinate a corresponding measure of freedom of action. in such a case, the indication of the commander's general objective for his entire force, together with a directive for action along a certain general line, without prescription of a definite objective, may be especially appropriate to the situation. such is the frequent usage in the issue, for example, of directives of the type known as letters of instruction (chapter viii). again, where immediate response is desired, and where the objective may be understood by implication, the task may be better expressed in terms of action, rather than of accomplishment. this is frequently the case where the task is assigned by word of mouth, by memorandum, or by signal. in the last-named instance, the signal, when it constitutes a command fully understood by previous usage or experience, may convey a practically instantaneous comprehension of the objective. in many such instances, however, an inferred objective will require more analysis. the expression of the task in terms of action is frequently desirable, more especially during an engagement, when tactical considerations are uppermost. under such circumstances, two or more objectives may be suitable to the appropriate effect desired, but their degree of suitability, and the influence of the factors pertaining to feasibility and acceptability, may vary rapidly with the course of events. in such conditions, an order such as "attack" without indicating a specific physical objective, may be best calculated to attain desired results, for the reason, more especially, that it affords the subordinate a proper freedom of action. in many cases, the instructions received by a commander will set forth more than one task, often of varying importance. the proper bearing of such a double or multiple task upon his future action is set forth, together with other relevant matters, in the discussion of the mission, which follows. on occasion, a higher commander, in assigning a task, may elect to specify, also, the course of action to be pursued by a subordinate for the attainment of the assigned objective: for example-- "deny enemy bases in area abcd by capturing x island". here the task is to deny the enemy the use of available bases in the area described; in addition, the higher commander has specified that this be accomplished by the adoption of a predetermined course of action (page ), expressed in the words "by capturing x island." higher authority has in this case made the subordinate's estimate of the situation for him, and has thus arrived at the decision which the subordinate would ordinarily reach for himself. such procedure may be deemed advisable under certain circumstances: for example, when time is pressing; when a close control of the situation is an important factor; when the qualifications of the subordinate are unknown, as yet doubtful, or known to be inadequate for the operation in hand; or, for various other reasons which may suggest themselves according to the nature of the problem. occasionally, higher authority, for similar reasons, may also prescribe the action to be taken, in considerable detail. examples occur during operations of unusual complexity, or when the personnel factors call for special care in coordination of the action. sometimes, higher authority, instead of announcing both the task and the predetermined course of action, may indicate only the latter; in the example given above, the higher commander would then direct, "capture x island". the directive might also include, in some detail, the action to be taken to this end. procedure such as noted in the foregoing examples involves certain special considerations from the viewpoint of the subordinate. these considerations are discussed hereafter (page ). the mission. in our naval service an assigned task, coupled with its purpose, is known as a mission. as explained previously (page ), the purpose indicates the larger aim which is to be served by the execution of the task. the task indicates the assigned objective, i.e., what is to be accomplished; the purpose, the further objective to be served thereby. the word mission is a derivative of the latin verb, "to send". its use implies the act of sending someone, or of being sent, as an agent for some special duty, a duty imposed by one in authority. although an individual, free to do so, may select his own mission, and thereby send himself on a special duty, this is not usually the case where an effective military chain of command exists. normally the sending authority is the immediate superior; the agent, the immediate subordinate. the mission, once assigned, does not change until it has been accomplished or until it has been modified or revoked by higher authority, usually the immediate superior by whom it was assigned. as previously explained in this connection, the designation of a purpose, linked with a task, is an essential element of a mission as treated herein. it is essential to unity of effort that the purpose of the mission of a commander be common with that of other commanders of the same echelon who are to participate in the effort enjoined by their superior's directives. directives expressed in the order form (page and chapter viii) facilitate clear recognition of this purpose, which appears in the general plan of action prescribed in the second paragraph of that form. the commander may consider the relationship thus: my assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of carrying out my designated part of my immediate superior's general plan. it is customary to simplify the foregoing to the statement that the mission is: (task) (statement of the assigned task), (purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of (statement of the superior's general plan). the words "assist in", etc., may frequently be understood and therefore omitted. the foregoing expression of a mission affords, as later explained (chapter vi), a method for clear visualization of the effect desired by higher authority. (see also page .) all of his assigned tasks which materially influence the commander's decision (hereinafter discussed) are properly included in his mission; other tasks, naturally, may be omitted in this connection. in the case of a double or multiple task (page ), all the tasks may be related to a single purpose, or the included tasks may each, or in certain combinations, be linked separately to appropriate purposes. survey of factors of fighting strength. the feasibility and acceptability of action for the attainment of an objective are dependent (see the fundamental military principle--page ) on the factors of fighting strength. fighting strength (page ) is derived from the means available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater of operations. a survey of these factors, in proper detail according to the nature of the problem, is therefore a necessary phase in the process of its solution. such a survey completes the basis for the study of courses of action. courses of action. the estimate process naturally takes account (page ) of methods for attaining the objective indicated in the assigned task. the military profession has, from time to time, applied a variety of terms to designate such methods. terms so used include, among others, "plans open to us" (or "to the enemy"), "lines of action", and "courses of action". the last-noted, having been standard in our naval service for many years, is the term used in this discussion. each course of action is thus a plan of military operations for the attainment of the assigned objective, and each thus indicates (page ) "an act or a series of acts" which may be undertaken to that end. until a final selection is made for embodiment in the decision, each course of action is a tentative solution of the problem. for the reason given below, a course of action, while under consideration as a tentative solution of the problem, is also correctly conceived as indicating an objective and, in proper detail, the action for its attainment. when embodied in the decision, the adopted course of action or combination of courses becomes the commander's general plan (or the basis thereof) for the employment of his force; such a general plan will naturally indicate the commander's general objective (page ) and, in proper detail, the action to be taken for its attainment (page ). the objective may be specifically stated or may be inferred (see page ; also page for the corresponding discussion of the expression of tasks); but, in any event, clear thinking demands that the objective be definitely envisaged. there is a manifest advantage in such definite envisaging of the objectives involved in courses of action. suitability as to the appropriate effect desired--the first requirement in the selection of a correct objective (page )--is much more readily tested on this basis. the practical bearing of this fact becomes apparent during the early stages (chapter vi) of the process of solving military problems. frequent examples of naval courses of action include (see page ): ( ) "to destroy the enemy force." here the objective, "destruction of the enemy force", is specifically indicated. ( ) "to divert the enemy force." here also the objective, in this case "diversion of the enemy force", is specifically indicated. ( ) "to evade the enemy." here again the objective, "evasion of the enemy", is specifically indicated. ( ) "to cover friendly and neutral trade." here the objective, "protection of friendly and neutral trade by the utilization of advantageous covering positions", is more or less inferred. ( ) "to escort trade." here the objective, "protection of trade by escorting it in convoys", is more or less inferred. ( ) "to patrol the trade routes." here the objective, e.g., "protection of trade by patrolling the trade routes", is inferred. ( ) "to raid." here the objective, e.g., "infliction of loss and damage by raiding", is inferred. in the foregoing instances, the action to be taken is indicated in general terms. the extent to which the action may properly be indicated depends on the nature of the problem and is necessarily left to the judgment of the commander. two possibilities, between which there may be various intermediate cases, are as follows: (a) to destroy the enemy force by simultaneous attacks on the escort and convoy. (b) to destroy the enemy force by an attack with the main force on the escort, following this immediately by an attack on the convoy with a flanking force before the convoy can scatter so widely as to make ineffective the pursuit of any of its units. for a further application, it will be noted that the national policies referred to early in this discussion (page ) are national courses of action, considered and adopted as methods of attaining national objectives. the expression "courses of action", in the sense of a plan considered or adopted as a solution of the problem, has the defect that it appears to emphasize the action, rather than the paramount component, i.e., the objective. so long as this fact is borne in mind, the limitations of the term "courses of action" need not operate to influence, adversely, the solution of the problem. as noted above, the commander brings to mind courses of action by the mental act of "envisaging", i.e., "viewing with the mind's eye or conceptionally", "seeing as a mental image", bringing fully and distinctively to view. how is this done? although the time available for the process depends on the particular problem, the process itself is the same for all. during the clarification of the problem, the commander will have entertained certain ideas,--ideas as to such matters as the existing situation, the desired new situation, the possible physical objectives, the relative positions and movements of the forces involved, and related matters. his training and experience cause these ideas to evoke others, which are associated in his mind with problems of the past,--in particular, with the bearing of such ideas on the outcome of those problems. this process of thinking, if it is to be effective as well as reflective, requires mental access to certain sources of ideas. these sources may lie in the study of history, or in the wealth of doctrine and instructions gathered into official manuals and into other professional writings, or in the commander's own practical experience. logicians who have investigated this natural process point out that suggested solutions are the resurrection of ideas from past experience. good thinking demands access to a large storehouse of ideas connected in various and flexible ways. the best available knowledge is the main source from which reflective thinking obtains relevant and promising suggestions for a solution. by such resort to analogy, the commander utilizes the accumulations of past experience. sometimes he finds that the courses of action thus suggested are exactly suitable as tentative solutions for his problem. in other instances, of course, only parts of the present situation are found to be analogous to those previously encountered. even then, however, the similarity of the facts may be helpful in providing suggestions. guidance based on limited or partial similarity has been demonstrated to be better than purely intuitive thinking. the commander cannot be content, however, to depend wholly on the guidance of the past. sometimes, moreover, he may not be able to obtain suggestions by analogy. new suggestions, ideas not drawn from past experience, are very desirable; they are possible, also, in the sense that the result of the analysis of past experience may be reassembled, in imagination, in novel ways. new courses of action, overlooked in the past, may be contrived. original combinations, not previously entertained, may be devised. readiness to employ the novel and the new, as well as to utilize the old, is a prime qualification for command. reflective thinking of this nature requires adequate knowledge of the capabilities of weapons, so that new possibilities may be perceived as to coordination in their use. while analogy looks backward to find applicable lessons, the search for novelty seeks suggestions from potentialities not heretofore utilized. the development of the full possibilities of new weapons is an important source of forward thinking. such thinking constantly integrates the current developments in war. the competent commander does not wait for history to be made; he makes it. familiarity with experimentation, research, and new performance is also a fruitful source of suggestions. when used, this method results in advance demands by the armed forces for new weapons not yet supplied. closely allied to analogy is the application of ordered and classified knowledge as to the nature of warfare. aware of the effects which can be brought about by the weapons at his disposal, the commander identifies his objective with one or more of these effects. the application of ordered and classified knowledge of naval warfare starts, naturally, with a consideration of its objectives, and proceeds thereafter to the study of the various classes of operations which may be utilized to this end. naval effort has as its objective the keeping open of sea communications (see page ). command of the sea exists for one belligerent when he possesses and can exercise the ability to move surface traffic, while also being able to prevent the enemy from doing so. naval warfare, therefore, logically includes operations for the purpose of gaining, maintaining, or disputing command of sea areas, especially under conditions where freedom of movement and the keeping open of sea communications are of vital importance. such operations may be classified under the headings: ( ) for securing command of sea areas, ( ) in sea areas not under command, and ( ) in sea areas under command. on the basis of this classification, specific operations, broadly considered, appear to be limited in number. as to classification ( ), applicable operations are: to destroy the enemy naval forces, to contain them, or to divert them. for ( ), applicable operations are: to raid, to make war against enemy trade, to attack or defend naval lines of communication, and to conduct amphibious warfare requiring overseas movement. for ( ), applicable operations are: to blockade trade, to defend own coastal and critical areas, to safeguard expeditions against enemy territory, and to carry out offensive operations against enemy coastal objectives. manifestly, each such operation, broadly viewed, may be considered, in an estimate of the situation, as a course of action. each such course of action (or operation) will involve, if developed into a more or less complete plan of action, numerous detailed operations which constitute parts of the whole. (see page .) there can be no rigid line of demarcation, always applicable, between courses of action and the more detailed operations pertaining thereto. for example, "to raid" may be, in one instance, an operation of such a character, from the viewpoint of the commander, as to be envisaged, correlatively with "to destroy", as one of his courses of action. yet, in another problem, a raid may be visualized, properly, as a detailed operation pertaining, in a subordinate capacity, to a more comprehensive operation envisaged as a course of action "to destroy". similarly, what is a broad course of action from the viewpoint of one echelon in the chain of command, may be correctly viewed, on a higher echelon, as a detailed operation. operations assigned in tasks imposed by higher authority become the basis for the determination of courses of action on the next lower echelon, a procedure which continues throughout the chain of command until specialized, on the lowest echelons, in the form of a simplified routine (see page ). while the list of courses of action given above is made up from the viewpoint of broad strategical problems, a similar list can be assembled for other problems. for example, the order, "destroy enemy naval forces", if taken as the motivating task of a tactical estimate, will be the basis for certain courses of action, constituting, when complete (see below), a well-recognized general plan for a naval battle. this plan will in turn call for various detailed operations on the part of the several subdivisions of the force under the commander who makes the estimate (see page ). as a tentative solution of the problem a course of action may be complete or partial, i.e., it may, if carried out, provide for the complete attainment of the objective; or, such complete attainment may require a combination of several of the courses of action under study. the exclusive consideration of courses of action of the complete type possesses the advantage of minimizing the total number of solutions under study. this simplifies the procedure of analysis and of comparing courses of action with each other, because of the relatively small number of courses to be tested and to be compared. however, it is frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to visualize complete courses of action, especially during the early stages of the estimate. sometimes the initial visualization of partial courses and their eventual combination into a complete solution will be found necessary. therefore, either or both of the foregoing systems of formulating courses of action may be found appropriate, according to individual preference and the nature of the particular problem. individuals, comparable with respect to knowledge, appear to vary greatly in their ability to produce the appropriate suggestion, as to courses of action, at the right time. the reason for this phenomenon is not altogether clear, but it is known that thinking seems to be limited not merely by the range of knowledge, but by whatever part of it becomes available when needed. this point invites attention to another procedure which is open to the commander with respect to stimulating reflective thinking. this procedure recognizes the fact that, when two or more minds attack a problem, together, the combined effort often increases the applied mental power. this fact is universally recognized, for example, in the utilization of staff assistance (page ). inherent and acquired ability have unquestionably much to do with the possibilities of visualizing single courses of action with respect to their completeness as to attainment of the objective. one method of visualization seems to be the mental picturization of more or less detailed operations, followed by their combination, through rapid synthesis, into complete courses of action. an example of this method would occur where several rather specific operations were visualized, involving seizure of certain localities as a defensive measure. if it were then observed that the objective in each such case was "denial to the enemy of a particular naval-base site in the area abcd", an appropriate expression of a comprehensive course of action would be "to deny the enemy naval-base sites in the area abcd". another method of visualizing appropriate courses of action seems to involve initial recognition, in the first instance, of such courses as broad and comprehensive general plans, without first visualizing and combining their details. this method appears to be more usual after considerable experience or training. it is therefore possible that this second method is merely a practiced development of the first, the process of synthesis being so rapidly accomplished that it becomes subconscious. the nature of the particular problem has also an unquestioned bearing on this subject. in instances where no single course of action can be found which is adequately expressive of complete attainment of the objective, the final selection of a method of attaining the objective will necessarily be through a combination of the courses of action under study (page ). for example, if the assigned task were to "protect trade in sea area abcd", the extent of the area, together with its geographical position relative to locations from which enemy attacks could be launched, might not be such as to permit the attainment of the objective by a single course of action such as "to escort trade in convoys" or "to patrol the trade routes". both of these courses of action might be necessary, and, in addition, perhaps, the further course "to cover focal points m and n". each of these courses of action has, as its objective, the establishment of a protected area or areas, stationary or moving, for the safe passage of merchant vessels. however, for purposes of expressing the course of action involved, the contemplated procedure is in this case better indicated by a combination expressed in terms of action, the objective being inferred as a matter of mutual understanding. the less particularized expression of the course of action in terms of the objective would, in this instance, convey a less definite idea of the procedure under consideration. similar considerations pertain frequently to naval problems, more especially to those involving naval engagements of considerable scope. the solution of such a problem takes, typically, the form of an operation consisting, not of a single "act", but of "a series of acts", i.e., of a number of stages or phases of battle, each being a preparation for the one following, until the final stage provides for the attainment of the assigned objective. for example, a first consideration might be "to reduce enemy carrier aircraft strength by" certain pertinent operations. a second consideration might be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed by" certain operations in order to force the enemy to accept battle. a third might be "to reduce enemy battle-line speed, life, and hitting power by gunfire" within certain range bands, in order to exploit own strength and enemy weakness at those ranges. a fourth might be "to continue reduction of enemy battle-line strength by gunfire, closing to" such a range as is suitable to that end. finally, a fifth consideration might be "to inflict conclusive damage on enemy battle-line with torpedoes". all of the foregoing partial courses (other possibilities having been studied and discarded) might then be combined into one operation as the selected course of action "in order to destroy the enemy battleship strength",--such destruction being the assigned objective. the degree of detail in which a course of action may be visualized for purposes of the estimate will vary with the same factors, i.e., personal facility and the nature of the problem. practice in the solution of problems appears to develop such facility that entire plans can be visualized as courses of action, each plan reasonably complete as to details with reference to physical objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength, and provision for freedom of action. however, it is rarely, if ever, necessary to visualize courses of action minutely in an estimate of a basic problem; the extent to which they are viewed mentally, as detailed plans, need only be such as to fulfill the requirements of the particular problem (see section i of chapter iv). the statement of a course of action, for purposes of the estimate, will naturally be along broad and comprehensive lines, although some important matters of detail (relatively speaking) may be added if this is found desirable as the estimate proceeds. it is with these considerations in mind that the standard practice has been developed of formulating courses of action, while under study as tentative solutions of the problem, in broad terms, appropriate to general plans of action. the commander may find, on occasion, what appears, on first examination, to be an exception to the rule, herein treated as valid, that a course of action, correctly conceived, always contains the two elements ( ) objective, specific or inferred, and ( ) action for its attainment. however, apparent exceptions to this principle are due to special conditions which, on proper analysis, reveal no actual exceptions. certain examples, now to be discussed, demonstrate this fact. for instance, when the higher commander deems such procedure advisable (page ), he may make his subordinate's estimate of the situation, as well as his own, and may accordingly indicate both a task and a predetermined course of action for the subordinate to pursue: for example: "deny enemy base sites in area abcd by capturing x island." in such a case the higher commander has indicated the predetermined course of action in the words "by capturing x island". this expression indicates a specific objective, the capture of x island. the expression also indicates, though not in any detail, the action to be taken, i.e., it specifies "capture", rather than "occupation", "isolation", or some other form of control (page ). any further development of the action is left for the subordinate to determine. the procedure to be followed by the subordinate commander in solving such a problem is described hereafter (page ) in the discussion of the analysis of courses of action. in any event, it is manifest that there is here no exception to the rule that a course of action, correctly conceived, contains the two elements of objective and action for its attainment. a further example may occur when the higher commander, instead of indicating both the task and the predetermined course of action, indicates only the latter (page ), by directing "capture x island". once the subordinate has recognized this directive as containing a predetermined course of action, but not a normal task, he realizes that the objective so indicated would ordinarily be left for him to select. he also realizes that the action to be taken for its attainment is left for him to determine, in further detail. in this case, then, what is really a predetermined course of action appears in the guise of a task. when the commander, receiving the directive, has recognized this fact, he proceeds in the manner hereafter indicated (page ) in the discussion of the analysis of courses of action. in any event, it is manifest that here, also, there is no exception to the rule that a course of action, correctly conceived, contains the two elements of objective and action for its attainment. in such a case as the foregoing, how does the commander recognize that the apparent task is really a predetermined course of action? he could easily go astray because the directive, until analyzed, appears to contain a normal task. the directive indicates an objective, thereby resembling a task. the directive will usually indicate, at least in some degree, the action which the subordinate is to take. hence, so far as superficial appearance is concerned, the subordinate commander may easily mistake the predetermined course of action for a normal task. however, he discovers the difference when he endeavors to find courses of action which are appropriate to this apparent task. the commander will then discover that, while he can visualize actions whose accomplishment will attain the objective indicated in the apparent task, he cannot visualize any objective completely suitable to the case (page ), intermediate between the assigned objective and the indicated action. he can state the assigned objective in other words and adopt such a statement as an expression of his general objective, but the two objectives, the one he selects and the assigned one, will really be identical. this inability to visualize an objective of the commander's own selection, suitable to the case, is inevitable, because higher authority has already done this for him. he may find it advisable to develop further the action needed for the attainment of the indicated objective. on occasion this, also, will have been predetermined by the higher commander. the foregoing considerations have been given special emphasis and deserve careful study, because an appreciation of these facts is necessary to a true understanding of the nature of correctly conceived courses of action. analysis and selection of courses of action. after one or more courses of action have been determined as tentative solutions of his problem, the commander will be confronted with the necessity of deciding upon that course of action, or combination of courses of action, which will best attain the assigned objective, i.e., be the best way out of the seeming difficulty. the analysis, in each case, will settle suitability on the basis of the appropriate effect desired, feasibility on the basis of relative fighting strength as established by a survey of means available and opposed, influenced by the characteristics of the theater, and acceptability on the basis of consequences as to costs. in connection with these considerations, the detailed operations involved in each course will be analyzed so far as may be necessary (page ) and with respect to correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, proper apportionment of fighting strength, and adequate freedom of action (see the fundamental military principle--page ). a selection shown to be best, from the standpoint of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of the consequences, will be adopted as the decision. the tests of courses of action to determine whether they fulfill the requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of acceptability as to consequences take account of the usual included determinants as listed and explained below. the list is not rigid, and the commander, according to the nature of his problem, may desire to omit certain of the items or to include any other considerations which may be applicable. with respect to suitability, the commander considers the following: ( ) general. the test for suitability (see also page ) calls for conformity as to both the nature and the scope of the motivating task. with respect to conformity in nature, the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of action, if carried out successfully, will or will not contribute to the accomplishment of the task. as to scope, the test leads to a conclusion as to whether the course of action, if carried out successfully, will or will not accomplish the task in full; and, if not in full, to what extent. the factor of urgency is also considered here. it is frequently possible for the commander, merely by concentrating his thought on this particular perplexity, to conclude at once that the course of action is suitable. in other cases, a considerable amount of study may be needed. this analytical study consists in breaking down the course of action into its component parts, i.e., the detailed operations which naturally grow out of it. this procedure is similar to that described later (chapter vii), with respect to formulating a plan, but during the basic estimate the procedure, when utilized, is for a different reason--solely that of assisting in the analysis. ( ) details, (a) conformity as to nature. will the course of action, if successfully carried out, contribute, at least in some degree, to the accomplishment of the task? if not, such a course is rejected. courses that do contribute, however, are not rejected until the possibilities of combination have been examined, later. (b) completeness. if the course of action is successfully carried out, will it accomplish in full the motivating task? if not, how much will it contribute towards such accomplishment? with what other courses of action can it be combined, to accomplish the motivating task in full? with what others can it be combined to accomplish the motivating task in part, and in such case how nearly does the combination contribute to full accomplishment? this examination may lead to combinations of certain partial solutions. (c) desirability as to urgency. the commander now considers the element of time. complete accomplishment of the motivating task within his own theater may come too late to meet the requirements of the common effort of the entire force. synchronization with the action of other task-group commanders may be so important that timing becomes vital. as to this consideration, two courses of action, equally competent, may differ greatly in their qualification relating to urgency; one may be found highly desirable and the other completely unsatisfactory. as to feasibility, the commander considers the following: ( ) general. the test for feasibility (see page ) is concerned with whether the course of action is practicable. has it reasonable chances of success under the particular circumstances? are the difficulties surmountable? is it easily practicable, practicable with some difficulty, or very difficult? the commander, if he concludes that the course of action is not a practicable one, rejects it from further consideration in the estimate of the situation. however, care is taken at this point not to dismiss, abruptly, courses of action which may later be combined advantageously with one or more others. here, again, as noted for the suitability test, the commander may sometimes profitably analyze the course of action by breaking it down into more detailed operations. as a result of the tests discussed above, the commander is able to make a list of courses of action upon which his confirmed judgment has bestowed the qualities of suitability and feasibility. he is also able to take stock to see how many of the solutions are complete, how many are incomplete, and in the latter case to what extent they constitute partial solutions. it is, of course, desirable to have as many complete solutions as possible, and at this point it may be possible to merge two or more incomplete solutions into a single course of action which better fulfills the test of suitability. the commander can also take stock, similarly, of the degree of feasibility, already referred to, as to the retained courses of action. ( ) details, (a) prospects of success. here the several courses of action are considered relatively, with respect to the chance of success in each. in the rating of courses on this basis, the commander excludes consideration of losses except as they may influence success or failure. he notes, however, his considered expectations as to losses. losses may appear to be so great that success is doubtful. certain courses of action may be particularly vulnerable to enemy opposition because of the types of weapons involved or because of favorable enemy positions. choice of such a course would permit the enemy an initial advantage. (b) facility of execution. this subject has to do with the relative ease or difficulty of carrying out the several courses of action. on the basis of the existing situation, each course of action may be compared with all the others to determine their relative merits with regard to the facility of execution. consideration is given to the action involved against the several physical objectives; to the movements needed in making new dispositions; to the relative adequacy of the forces as to numbers and types of weapons; and to the measures required for freedom of action. a review of the previous discussion of these elements (chapter iv) may be very helpful in connection with this comparison. as to freedom of action, for example, the commander may ask himself which course is best from the standpoint of using the initiative to advantage; and which course of action lends itself best to the advantageous use of surprise. as the commander reflects on these matters, other similar questions may be suggested. (c) utilization of own strength and exploitation of enemy weakness. in his original visualization of each course of action, the commander has naturally considered how to utilize his own strength to best advantage, and how best to exploit enemy weakness. in fact, especially in a detailed tactical estimate, these considerations may have been predominant in envisaging the courses of action. a careful evaluation of the merits of each course of action in this respect is accordingly necessary before a choice is made. with regard to acceptability of consequences as to costs, the commander considers the following: ( ) general. the process of putting a course of action to proof as a tentative solution of the problem remains incomplete until the course has been tested to determine its consequences as to costs, so far as these can be visualized in advance. the process involves an evaluation of the diminution in total advantage which will result in the event of failure, and a comparison of gains with losses in the event of success. the situation to be expected, if the course of action is carried out, is visualized in order to determine the future effect on the creation or maintenance of an ultimately favorable military situation. in testing each course of action for acceptability as to its consequences (page ), the commander considers the cost of success, the cost of failure, and the possible gain and loss in perspective with the united effort as a whole. questions which he may pose include: if the course of action is successful, will the costs be so prohibitive as to adversely affect the successful accomplishment of the further effort? if a tactical situation is under consideration, will the costs prevent the accomplishment of the strategical aim? if the course of action fails, what will be its effect? will it cause the entire plan to fail? will its failure affect, for example, the national morale? if the command--and ultimately the state--can afford the losses and other disadvantages which will be incurred as a result of either the success or the failure of the contemplated effort, a course of action may be considered as acceptable from the standpoint of consequences as to costs. as previously noted with respect to suitability, it may be desirable to consider, with regard to consequences, the detailed operations which may be involved in each course of action. courses of action involving excessive consequences as to costs are rejected. notation is made of the relative degree of acceptability, with respect to consequences as to costs, of those courses of action which are retained. ( ) details. (a) the results of success and of failure. each course of action is examined to visualize the situation which would be brought about for the commander and for the enemy in case of success or of failure. the relative possibilities of recovery toward a more favorable situation are weighed. this consideration involves relative risks, for it may be that a certain course, otherwise satisfactory, might entail intolerable conditions should failure ensue. the costs are measured in terms of fighting strength. it has to be considered whether the sacrifices involved are worth the gains which will follow; whether the objectives if attained will be sufficiently valuable when the need of fighting strength to accomplish further aims is considered. (b) comparison of gains and costs. when costs are found to be in excess of the over-all gains, this fact may be the basis for rejecting any courses of action which are less desirable than others. however, retention of a course found to be costly may be justified for sound reasons. * * * * * when, as in the example given previously (page ), the commander receives a directive such as "deny enemy base sites in the area abcd by capturing x island", he carries through his estimate of the situation in the usual manner. he notes, however, that the capture of x island has been indicated as a predetermined course of action. he makes a proper survey of the factors of relative fighting strength. he considers all pertinent courses of action. he goes through this procedure in order to reach an understanding of all the elements of his problem. he wishes to understand the necessary background. he realizes the importance of a grasp of the considerations which have led higher authority to arrive at the predetermined course of action. by carrying through the usual estimate procedure, including the analysis of all pertinent courses of action, he assists himself to arrive at a proper concept of the action to be taken to capture x island. in this way he establishes a sound basis for formulating a detailed plan (in the second step), for inaugurating planned action (in the third step), and for supervising this action (in the fourth step). he also establishes a basis for any constructive representations which he finds it advisable to make to higher authority (page ). in another example previously given (page ), the higher commander indicates only the predetermined course of action (by a directive "capture x island") and omits the statement of the true underlying task. the subordinate, on discovering this fact, deduces the underlying task and carries through the estimate procedure, modified, as explained for the previous example. in addition to the merits as previously stated, this method has a further advantage. the deduction of the underlying task enables the commander to judge whether any advisable or necessary deviation or departure from the predetermined course of action (page ) involves merely a variation from the letter of his instructions or, more important, from their spirit. for instance, the directive, as in the case previously discussed, may have been "capture x island". the higher commander when issuing this order, may have stated his own general plan to be "this force will protect the base at a." the commander, on receipt of this directive, then deduces his true task. this is "deny enemy bases in area abcd" ("by capturing x island"--a predetermined course of action), the purpose of the mission being "in order to protect the base at a". now it may be found that the enemy, unconcerned as to x island, is moving to reinforce y island and to use it as a base to attack the base at a. the commander then properly decides to capture y island, instead of x island. by his identification of the predetermined course of action as such, and by his correct deduction of the true underlying task, the commander has established a sound basis for the solution of his problem. he can now, with confidence, defer or abandon the capture of x island, and can devote his efforts to the capture of y island. his confidence is justified because he knows his decision to be in accordance with the spirit of his instructions. naturally, if the higher commander directed, "this force will protect the base at a----", and added, later in his directive, "deny enemy base sites in area abcd by capturing x island", the subordinate commander's deductions would have been made more easily. * * * * * the full play of the reasoning power is called for in the process of visualizing courses of action and of selecting the best. this process is the crux of the first step. here the knowledge of the relationship between cause and effect is applied. here, also, the commander is brought fully to realize that, to reach a sound decision, there is a requirement for a studied development of each stage by which the human mind passes from recognition of a necessity for action to the ultimate conviction as to the best course to pursue. as essential background for the utilization of his intellectual powers in this process, the commander requires knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the technique of his profession and of the weapons of his calling. to the necessary knowledge gained through his own experience, either in actual warfare or in peacetime exercises simulating this experience, he adds the equally essential familiarity with the science of war, and with the lessons to be drawn from historical instances of success and failure. in effect, it is here brought home to him that, on a fundamental basis of earnest thought, mental ability, character, knowledge, and experience, finally rests the soundness of decision (see page ). the decision. the word "decision" has the primary meaning of a conclusion. a decision (conclusion) is essential as a starting point for further procedure. sound decision is the essential preliminary to wise planning and effective action. the range within which military decisions may fall extends from the instantaneous resolve to meet an emergency, to the conditional intentions of a distant future. within this range will be found many decisions which the commander is necessarily called upon to reach during the four steps toward the attainment of an assigned objective. the course of action, or the combination of courses, as finally selected by the commander upon the termination of the first step, represents his conclusion as to his outlined plan for the attainment of his assigned objective. this conclusion will indicate, specifically or inferentially, his general objective, as selected by himself, and--in proper detail--the action required for its attainment. (see pages and ). the conclusion is thus his decision, which provides the general plan, or the basis therefor, from which he will, in the second step, develop a detailed plan of operations for his force. illustration of the foregoing process may profitably be initiated with respect to the highest echelon involved in the case of a state. the primary national objective of organized government (chapter i, page ) is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of essential security for the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community. this aim, as embodied in basic policy (see pages and ), is the objective visualized by the people of the state, or by its policy-forming elements, in the capacity of an organized government. for the maintenance of the condition represented in this policy, or for the creation of such a condition not already existing, an appropriate task of the state, as the political embodiment of the national will, might be to maintain or establish friendly (at least, not hostile) governments and social systems in those key localities of the world whence, otherwise, effective threats may arise. the national mission (the mission of the state) then becomes:-- (task) to maintain or establish friendly (at least, not hostile) governments and social systems in those key localities of the world whence, otherwise, effective threats may arise, (purpose) in order to ensure envisaged prosperity and essential security for the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community. a national estimate of the situation, by the highest authority of the state, to determine the effect to be attained for the accomplishment of the foregoing mission, takes account of the possibilities of accomplishment through psychological, political, economic, or military pressure, or by combinations thereof. as a result of this accounting, the state adopts a national decision which indicates the best way of accomplishing its mission. to carry out this decision, each of the primary subdivisions of the state's organization is assigned a specific task or tasks, whose total effect is designed to achieve the result embodied in the national decision. the task of each such primary subdivision is linked to a purpose which is the attainment of the objective indicated in the national decision. in like manner, each organization of the national armed forces is governed in its action by a task assigned to it as a result of a decision made by the proper authority on the next higher echelon. each commander is thus provided with a mission which consists of an assigned task and of a purpose as indicated by the general objective decided upon by his immediate superior. the second step the second step, that of resolving the required action into detailed military operations, may now be undertaken unless the decision reached in the first step is intended for future reference only. during the second step the commander, if he carries the procedure through to its logical end, visualizes his proposed operations as tasks, in order to ensure their proper formulation. he may, if it is his intent to issue a directive or directives for the execution of his plan of operation, or a part thereof, arrange his procedure so as to facilitate the third step. the common characteristic of problems of the second step is that they deal with matters pertaining to the support of the action decided upon in the first step, and that they are properly problems for the commander who made that decision, and not for his subordinates, to solve. such problems are appropriately termed subsidiary problems. their full solution involves subsidiary estimates, subsidiary decisions, and, not infrequently, distinct subsidiary plans and subsidiary directives. each detailed operation derived, during the second step, from the outlined plan of operations (as embodied in the basic decision) is determined upon the basis of an estimate procedure essentially similar to the basic estimate. there is thus a series of subsidiary estimates for this purpose. such estimates tend to be abbreviated and informal, since the necessary data, and often much of the consideration as to the subsidiary courses of action, may be available from the basic estimate. unless the detailed operations are of such a character as to require development into subsidiary plans as a basis for subsidiary directives, such operations are merely embodied, in the form of tasks or otherwise as may be appropriate, in the basic plan. in the excepted cases, where subsidiary plans, in detailed form, are necessary or desirable, such a plan may be the result of a more formal and specialized subsidiary estimate. chapter vii is devoted to a discussion of the second step. * * * * * the problem involved in the first step has been conveniently termed the basic problem because it is directly concerned with the attainment of the assigned objective (page ). the solution of the basic problem in the first step, and of its corollary in the second step, completes the planning stage. the third step the third step consists of the formulation, and--if appropriate--the issue, of the directives which convey to the subordinate the will and intent of the commander. from the mental standpoint, the third step begins when the commander forms the intent of immediately promulgating his directives for the execution of the planned action. whether or not the third step is partially combined with the second, its problem is a separate one. its complete solution inaugurates the action planned in the second step. the third step is discussed and developed in chapter viii. the fourth step the fourth step, which calls for mental effort in the solution of the problem of supervising the action, requires a constant, close observation of the unfolding of the original situation. the procedure employed is customarily termed the running estimate of the situation. only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation is unfolding along the lines desired by him, as promulgated in the directives of the third step. in effect, the commander, after action is begun, considers the changing situation as a variable in the problem presented for his solution by the original (basic) situation. with the march of events, he is, therefore, constantly critical to detect whether variations from the original situation are in accordance with his design or whether these variations have introduced new incentives which demand modification or alteration of his plan, or its complete abandonment. the fourth step is discussed and developed in chapter ix. sequence of events in the four steps when all of the elements of the entire procedure of the four steps are present, they take, from the viewpoint of the same commander throughout, the following form: ( ) first step: the commander, confronted with a strategical situation (page ), makes a strategical estimate and comes to a strategical decision. the problem, the estimate, and the decision are basic. ( ) second step: the commander now is confronted with a particular problem, one proceeding from his basic problem and involving the details of a plan of execution to carry out the decision reached in the first step; this problem consists, itself, of numerous other problems of detail, which require solution by the commander himself. the basic decision has embodied an outlined plan, strategical in nature, for an operation to accomplish the motivating task of the first step. this plan requires resolution into the detailed operations necessary for its full accomplishment. each such detailed operation, as part of the outlined plan embodied in the strategical decision, calls for a proper estimate. though usually not formal in nature, more especially if the necessary data can be found in the basic estimate, such estimates are fundamentally the same as for the basic problem. the assembly of such detailed operations results in the formulation of a basic plan. at this point, additional problems may present themselves, these being frequently tactical in nature. such, for example, may be sortie plans, approach plans, and battle plans. other specialized plans (training, intelligence, logistics, etc.) may be needed. the data essential for the solution of such problems are more detailed than for the usual strategical basic problem. in some instances, such subsidiary plans may be developed directly from the basic decision by procedures distinctive of the second step. in other instances, solution may require an additional subsidiary estimate, along the lines typical of the first step. these subsidiary estimates lead to subsidiary decisions, which in turn require to be resolved into the necessary detailed operations. ( ) third step: in the third step, the directives, if the basic problem was strategical in nature, will be of a strategical character. however, if subsidiary tactical problems were also involved, tactical directives will frequently be included. logistics directives and other specialized instructions may also be a feature. ( ) fourth step: the supervision of the planned action, in the fourth step, may involve a new strategical problem, perhaps several. in such event each new basic problem will initiate a new series of problems, with corresponding directives, as described above. changes in strategical plans may be called for. if no strategical changes are involved, there may nevertheless be introduced one or more new tactical or logistics problems, with corresponding changes in the subsequent procedure. the fourth step may, however, merely involve changes in supporting plans (tactical, logistics, etc.), with resultant changes in the directives involved. finally, the fourth step may involve changes, for clarification, in the directives formulated in the third step. variations in the foregoing procedure are frequent. the most usual is perhaps the case where the commander, receiving a tactical (instead of a strategical) mission, solves such a tactical problem as a basic problem in the first step; resolves his decision into detailed tactical operations in the second step; issues a tactical directive or directives in the third step; and supervises his planned tactical action in the fourth step. phraseology as to "course of action", "operation", and "task". it is important to avoid the possibility of becoming confused because each of the terms "a course of action", "an operation", and "a task", is correctly visualized as "an act or a series of acts". in the first step, the selected course of action (see page ) indicates the "act or series of acts" decided upon as representing, in general terms, an effort for attainment of a specified objective and is therefore stated as a comprehensive method of attaining that objective. the decision thus adopts this course of action as a general plan of operations, or as a basis therefor. in the second step, the required action is developed to place it upon a practical, workable basis as a detailed plan to be executed. the "act or series of acts" represented by the selected "course of action" has now become a detailed "act or series of acts". as such, it is now susceptible of being assigned, in whole or in part, to subordinate commanders as "tasks". the cycle within that particular echelon is completed when the tasks are thus assigned. the commander has thereby charged his immediate subordinates with the commission of specific "acts or series of acts". each such subordinate commander necessarily decides on the best method of accomplishing his assigned task, i.e., on the course of action (act or series of acts) which will best accomplish the effort required of him. the procedure (for each commander on that echelon) thus begins anew until an echelon is reached where the character of the required action has already been determined as a matter of routine (see page ). the use of a form in the solution of problems the natural mental processes (see page ) are employed in all of the four steps. the processes, in each step, require modification to an extent dependent upon the factors to be evaluated. a form has been adopted for the application of the mental processes in the first step. this form, long known to the military profession as the outline of the estimate of the situation (see appendix), sets forth in a logical manner and order the several considerations likely to influence the selection of correct military objectives in problems of wide, as well as of lesser, scope. the use of this form is conducive to uniformity of reasoning. it centers the attention upon essentials, in order to ensure that no material factor bearing on the solution of the problem is overlooked. it guides thought along a specific path and, through the influence of suggestion, deliberately increases the expenditure of mental effort. the procedure indicated in the form contributes to the decision reached as a result of an estimate of the situation, only to the extent that it provides an outline for, and encouragement of, systematic analysis and reasoning. to prove successful in stimulating rather than stifling creative thought, flexibility is a characteristic of any form capable of application in such dissimilar circumstances as may be presented by the varying scope of military problems. the estimate form is such a flexible guide. if a commander, in solving a problem, feels the need of greater flexibility, he may, of course, modify or adapt the form to his particular needs. in so doing, however, he bears in mind that departure from orderly processes of reasoning, on which the form is based, tends, through possible neglect of fundamental considerations, to lead to the omission of essential features of the analysis. on the other hand, a rigid following of the form may frequently cause much repetition. this may be avoided, unless desired for emphasis or other appropriate reasons, by reference back to preceding portions of the estimate. it is also to be noted, however, that the estimate form is adapted to a progressive procedure. very frequently the earlier consideration of some aspect of the problem can later be expanded both in scope and in proper detail by reason of additional information which has become available during the intervening stages of the procedure. the distinction between certain strategical and tactical problems (page ) may introduce variations in the handling of the estimate form, and may affect the weight to be given the various factors. the use of the estimate form, as described in chapter vi, applies in full to problems which embrace the complete scope of broad strategical concepts. it is suitable also for problems of limited scope, for which certain modifications or abbreviations are required. when applied to problems of a detailed tactical nature, the emphasis on the factors of fighting strength is somewhat different from that for strategical problems. for certain subsidiary problems (page ), the form may be closely applicable or may require considerable adaptation. in no case is it difficult to modify the form to suit the requirements of the problem. an estimate of a relatively broad strategical situation may normally be reduced to writing, because time is usually available. on the other hand, an estimate of a localized tactical situation frequently requires almost instantaneous decision. except in the preparation of plans to meet contingencies, such an estimate can rarely be given the elaborate form frequent in estimates of situations which are broadly strategical in nature. when such tactical plans are prepared well in advance of the event, the commander bases the estimate upon various assumptions as to the circumstances of a probable situation. the written solution of tactical situations under various assumptions is a valuable feature of training to this end. during the second step, i.e., the resolution of the action, as embodied in the decision, into the detailed operations required, the method considered most helpful is to arrange the procedure on the basis of the salient features of a military operation (page and section iii of chapter iv). this procedure facilitates not only the determination of the necessary operations, but also the later formulation of directives. the second step, like the first, makes use of the estimate procedure. this is inevitable, in view of the fact that the mental processes are identical (page ) for the solution of the problem of both steps. the application of the estimate procedure to the second step may be tested, aside from the logic of the theory involved, by careful analysis of examples. for instance, if the basic decision was to determine the location of enemy forces in the area abcd, this becomes the basis for a plan embodying the best method of determining the location of such enemy forces (an operation, or a series of operations). one method of procedure (course of action) to achieve this objective may be to search the area by aircraft; another may involve a search by cruisers; another by destroyers; another by submarines; etc. the operation or operations finally determined upon may be any one of these, or a combination of two or more of them, perhaps of all of them. the fundamental procedure leading to this conclusion is identical with that of the basic estimate. there are a number of possible variations of the fundamental mental processes applicable to the second step, according to the facility and the preference of the commander. practice seems to develop such facility (see also page ) that entire plans, each properly integrated with respect to physical objectives, relative positions, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action, may be visualized separately from each other. at the other extreme, the elementary procedure is to utilize these salient features of such a plan, successively, to suggest detailed operations. the features after the first are then used either to adapt or to complete the operations suggested by preceding features, or to suggest new operations. this elementary procedure, being the simpler and more methodical of the two, is the one explained hereafter (chapter vii). however, there are various possibilities as to procedures intermediate between these extremes. one such procedure would visualize operations primarily on the basis of correct physical objectives, adapting and completing such operations by reference to the other features; the procedure would then utilize relative positions, etc., to suggest additional operations, which in turn may be similarly adapted or completed. the commander is of course at liberty to use the procedure best suited to his own working methods and to the particular situation; naturally, he bears full responsibility for any errors due to a faulty choice of procedure. from the standpoint of the exercise of mental power in the solution of military problems, the second step may be taken to include the assembly of the commander's conclusions in the form of directives. the third step begins, however (page ), when the commander forms the intent of immediately promulgating such directives. the third step makes use of the order form. in our naval service, this form is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written directives pertaining to operations other than routine. the subject matter is presented in a logical sequence which experience has shown to be effective. the order form assists in the solution of the problem by providing a comprehensive vehicle with which all echelons are familiar. in the fourth step, i.e., the supervision of the planned action, the prime essential is the maintenance by the commander of a running estimate (page ). for this purpose there is a definite technique of which the estimate form provides the basis, and by means of which the solution of this important problem is aided. conclusion as to the approach to the solution of military problems the foregoing considerations indicate that planned attainment of a military objective requires the application of mental effort in four distinct steps. the sequence of the four steps necessarily is fixed because of the consequential relationship among the problems typical of the several steps. the mission, in the first step, furnishes the nature of the appropriate effect desired. until modified or revoked by higher authority, it clearly remains the governing influence throughout the entire range of mental effort which, in conjunction with the moral and physical effort, is calculated to result finally in the attainment of the assigned objective. the procedure involved, being natural and universal, is fundamentally the same even in those tactical situations where the commander performs all of the steps in almost instantaneous succession. the estimate form, as presented herein, is adaptable to military problems of any nature. the systematic approach represented in the form is subject to adaptation by the competent commander--provided that the essentials are preserved--in any manner appropriate to his personal preference and to the nature of his particular problem. the essentials of the military estimate of the situation, as a specialized use of the natural mental processes, are inherent in the proper application of the fundamental military principle (see page ). the estimate form merely provides a more detailed guide for the use of the principle. facility in the use of the principle will enable the competent commander, once he has formed a proper understanding of the basis for solution of a problem, to solve the problem correctly without reference to the estimate form. reference to the form may be necessary in problems of broad scope, in order to ensure a complete survey of factors of fighting strength. time, in such cases, is usually available for purposes of a detailed study. subject to this exception, the principle, alone, may be used effectively as a basis for sound military decision,--a fact of particular significance where time (page ) is an element of immediate concern. that this procedure may be successfully and repeatedly applied in the fast-moving events of the decisive tactical engagement is, more particularly, the goal of mental preparation for the exercise of command. part ii the exercise of professional judgment in planning chapter vi the selection of a correct objective (including the determination, in proper detail, of the action required for its attainment) the first step--the solution of a basic problem (the estimate of the situation) the type of problem distinctive of the first step, now to be discussed, is a basic problem. it is the most likely type when an organized chain of command is in effective operation, the incentive for solution being derived from a directive issued by higher authority (chapter v). the problem of the first step is described by the question, "what objective should i select, and what action (in outline) should i take for its attainment, in order to achieve the objective assigned to me by higher authority?" the procedure for solution of the type of problem distinctive of the first step is that already indicated as applicable to all military problems, i.e., a specialized employment of the natural mental processes (chapter ii) through the application of the fundamental military principle. the studied application of the principle is assisted through the estimate form which provides a more detailed guide. the fundamentals of the estimate form have already been discussed (chapter v). except for emphasis, or to afford a basis for further detailed discussion, the basic matters previously dealt with are not repeated in the present chapter. it is therefore advisable, before studying the details applicable to the first step, to make an adequate review of the pertinent portions of the preceding chapter. with the necessary background thus provided, the estimate form can be followed with a minimum of distraction caused by reference to related subjects. for special emphasis, it is repeated here (see also page ) that the estimate form is a flexible guide. the commander is of course at liberty to vary the procedure according to his particular needs and the nature of his problem; however, he will bear in mind that errors of commission or of omission arising by reason of departure from the essential features of the procedure may disrupt orderly reasoning. the estimate form is divided into sections and sub-sections, each of which presents a subject for consideration. the form follows, sequentially, the salient features of the natural mental process described in chapter ii. it will be seen, from an examination of the section headings listed below, that section i has to do with establishing the basis for solution of the problem; sections ii, iii, and iv relate to the actual process of solution through consideration of various courses of action; while section v states the conclusion reached. i. establishment of the basis for solution of the problem. ii. determination of suitable, feasible, and acceptable courses of action. iii. examination into the capabilities of the enemy. iv. selection of the best course of action. v. the decision. a tabular form inserted in the appendix lists the foregoing headings and their principal subdivisions within the estimate form. for convenience, the appended form also includes page references to the discussion in this chapter. section i establishment of the basis for solution of the problem as noted in the fundamental military principle, each objective, prior to its selection, and each operation, prior to its adoption, requires examination from the standpoint of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. suitability involves the factor of the appropriate effect desired; feasibility involves the factors of the means available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater; and acceptability involves the factor of the consequences as to costs. in order to establish a sound basis for the solution of a military problem, one which will permit the tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability (see pages - ) to be intelligently applied, it is necessary that the factors involved be studied. a. the appropriate effect desired. the appropriate effect desired, the first factor listed, is the goal toward which the commander is working. he is enabled to form an understanding of this essential aspect of his problem through ( ) a grasp of the salient features of the situation, ( ) a recognition of the incentive to solution, and ( ) an appreciation of the assigned objective. he expresses this understanding by ( ) formulating the mission. the sequence in which the commander takes up these considerations is a matter for his own choice. usually, directives from higher authority (see chapter viii as to the order form) give him, first, information as to the situation; thereafter, such directives assign him a task (or tasks) involving one or more assigned objectives. for this reason, the sequence so indicated is the one utilized here. ( ) summary of the situation. before the commander can decide whether he wishes to maintain the existing situation or to change it, he requires a mental picture of its salient features. on beginning the estimate, the available information is therefore briefly summarized. the picture presented here will show in broad outline (page ) the opposing forces as disposed in localities which constitute relative positions with reference to each other. details are reserved for section i-b of the estimate. the appropriate data are noted on the chart, and study of the chart goes hand in hand with the development of the estimate. the summary of the situation may include statements as to present activities of own and enemy forces. it may recite significant occurrences. it does not attempt to compare or to deduce; such processes are deferred until section i-b. the commander extracts, from the information furnished by higher authority, such data as are pertinent to his own problem. he includes these data in his own summary, supplementing them by information from other sources, to the extent deemed advisable. in the exercise of judgment as to the content of his summary, the commander is influenced by the fact that the summary is the point of departure for visualizing the appropriate effect desired. ( ) recognition of the incentive. in basic problems (the type now under discussion, see page ), the commander finds his incentive in directives received from higher authority. under the procedure of the estimate, a notation of that fact, with a citation of the directive(s), is all that is required to indicate that the commander has formed a proper recognition of his incentive. ( ) appreciation of the assigned objective. a correct understanding of the nature and of the involvements of the assigned objective is, naturally, an essential to the establishment of the basis for the solution of a problem of the first step. at this stage of the estimate the commander cannot, however, expect always to reach a final conclusion as to this matter. he will have opportunity for further consideration, later, in section ii. it will be realized that, after intervening portions of the estimate have been worked out, the commander will be in a position to examine the assigned objective again, and to make a more thorough analysis. in a basic problem, the commander is assigned his objective by higher authority, usually in the form of an assigned task. although, as stated on page , such task may be expressed by one of various methods, a properly conceived task always indicates, either specifically or inferentially, an objective (or objectives). whatever method of expression may have been employed by higher authority, the commander will facilitate his appreciation of the assigned objective if he now sets down his assigned task, scrutinizes it carefully, and then makes note of the objective which is either specifically or inferentially indicated by that task. (see pages - ). the commander's basis for solving the problem is not complete, however, with merely a statement of his own objective. full visualization of the effect desired is not obtained until the commander appreciates not only the result which he, himself, is required to accomplish, but also the next further result which is expected to eventuate as, at least in part, an effect of his accomplishment. his goal, as an "effect desired", includes not only the effect desired of him by higher authority, but also the effect which his immediate superior desires to be accomplished by that superior's entire force. occasionally, full appreciation of the commander's objective will require, also, consideration of the further effects desired by yet higher successive echelons. the natural requirement is that the goal be so clearly defined as to obviate any material doubt as to the implications involved in the commander's assigned objective. when the goal has been thus defined, there results a linking of effect and further effect, of objective and further objective,--in short, of task and purpose,--the importance of which has previously been emphasized (page ). in making notation of this further objective for the solution of problems typical of the first step, the commander normally sets down the general plan of his immediate superior for the employment of the latter's entire force. when the linking of objective to objective, echelon by echelon, has involved no complication, the immediate superior's general plan will be a sufficient indication of the purpose for which the commander is to carry out his task. ( ) formulation of the mission. the linking of the commander's assigned task to the general plan of his immediate superior permits the commander to formulate his mission (page ). his assigned task becomes the task of his mission; his superior's general plan becomes the purpose of his mission. in this manner he crystallizes into a clear statement the part of the common effort which he is to carry out, indicating the assigned objective he is himself to attain, as well as the further objective to whose attainment his effort is to contribute. in establishing the basis for solution of his problem with respect to suitability, the commander may have considered his assigned objective before studying his situation. if so, he may now desire to modify his earlier statement of that objective, before incorporating it in the formulation of his mission, to the end that a more clear-cut and concise expression may be obtained. the relationship (restated from page for emphasis) is expressed in the following; my assigned task is to be accomplished for the purpose of carrying out my designated part of my superior's general plan. this formula is customarily simplified to the following: (task) (statement of the assigned task), (purpose) in order to assist in the successful execution of (statement of the superior's general plan). the words "assist in the successful execution of" may frequently be understood and therefore omitted. the mission, thus formulated, clearly indicates the appropriate effect desired, i.e., the factor which establishes the basis for the solution of the problem from the standpoint of suitability. b. relative fighting strength. as indicated in the fundamental military principle, the second and third requirements for a sound solution of the problem are feasibility of accomplishment and acceptability of the consequences as to costs. both requirements have to do with the factors of relative fighting strength. fighting strength is derived from the means available as influenced by the characteristics of the theater. relative fighting strength is determined by a weighing of these factors against the means opposed, as influenced also by the characteristics of the theater. these are the factors, then, which are next studied in the estimate. they are studied in order to complete the establishment of the basis for the solution of the problem. * * * * * the factor of consequences, as listed in the fundamental military principle, is related to the factors pertinent to feasibility. this is true because consequences are assessed, in the estimate, on the basis of the envisaged results of proposed actions. these results are necessarily predicated on the grounds established by consideration of the factors of relative fighting strength. the study of relative fighting strength thus provides not only a sound basis for the determination, later, of the feasibility of courses of action, but also of their acceptability with respect to consequences as to costs. particular emphasis is placed on the conclusion as to relative fighting strength, to the end that specific advantages may be ascertained. such a study is primarily concerned with information:--its collection, its analysis, its evaluation, and its interpretation so as to convert it into military (naval) intelligence (page ), with a view to its use by the commander in the solution of his problem. information as to forces present and as to their positions is of course prerequisite to a clear comprehension of the possibilities as to physical objectives, as to relative positions, as to apportionment of fighting strength, and as to freedom of action. the commander may choose whether he shall, in his estimate, first consider the means available and opposed, or reverse the order and give priority to the characteristics of the theater. in a particular situation, the significance of these characteristics is frequently determined by the capabilities and limitations of the means available and opposed. for this reason, these means are first discussed in this treatment, which thereafter includes the analysis of the characteristics of the theater. the capabilities and limitations of the means, and the significance of the characteristics of the theater, may be expressed in terms of certain specific factors (page ). each of these factors may influence, or be influenced by, any or all of the others. situations occur in which certain factors exert little or no influence. yet, in other situations, these same factors have a paramount effect. the classification of factors utilized in the following treatment is applicable to most military problems. a list of pertinent factors, to be of real use in the solution of problems, is required, first, to be complete, so that no factor will be overlooked, and, second, to be simple, so that, as far as practicable, all similar data may be discussed under one heading. with respect to the factors set forth in succeeding pages, the solution of a particular problem may call for a different listing. such listing may involve, in some cases, the contraction or the omission of certain of the headings. in other cases, an expansion will be necessary or desirable under certain headings, in considerably greater detail than shown here. for example, section i-b of a national estimate may involve reference to several volumes of printed books or of similar data, while, even in ordinary strategical situations, numerous charts, books of sailing directions, and other compilations may require study. where such references are not standard and generally available, they may be appended, preferably in condensed form. the proper listing of pertinent factors will depend on the nature of the problem. ( ) survey of the means available and opposed. the application of power, actually or by threat, is dependent on the ability of the human and material components of fighting strength to develop energy and to exert effort for purposes of combat (page ). these components, as ranged on one side or the other, constitute the means available and opposed. (see page ). analysis of these means requires a classification of the various factors which influence the situation. for a broad strategical estimate made by the state, economic and political factors require intensive study; physical objectives, relative position, apportionment of fighting strength, and freedom of action are all involved in such a survey. for a strategical estimate made by a high military commander, these factors frequently enter to a lesser extent. such a commander is concerned only with the effect which these factors will have on the operations projected for the particular theater involved in his problem. from his point of view, the economic and political factors often have little bearing on the elements of a favorable military situation. in such a case, the commander concentrates in this section on the factors more directly relating to the armed forces; his important considerations deal with such matters as numerical strength, types of weapons, disposition, and factors as to freedom of action. for strategical estimates of lesser scope, the commander further restricts his study accordingly. in detailed tactical estimates the commander requires an exhaustive comprehension of the fighting capabilities of his own and the enemy armed forces, because his selection of physical objectives and his use of relative position are affected by such considerations. this is manifestly true for studied tactical estimates made in advance to meet contingencies, but its import is not always fully understood in its bearing on the unfolding situation after the battle begins. at that time, the most precise knowledge is called for, under the then rapidly changing conditions. (chapter ix.) in the form treated herein, those matters particularly applicable to broad estimates are included under "general factors". these are followed by the factors more directly applicable to the armed forces. (a) general factors. (i) political factors. the prosecution of the war is directly influenced by such internal conditions as the strength of the national government and its capacity for unified effort, the moulding and maintaining of a firm public opinion in support of war aims, the neutralization of subversive propaganda, and the degree to which the government can make available necessary resources, both domestic and foreign. external relations modify the conduct of war, always affecting broad estimates of the employment of national forces. the wartime factors which influence these relations include the effect of the clash between foreign opinion and national policy, the national bias of interested neutrals and of unneutral non-belligerent governments, and the normal attitude of such neutrals and non-belligerents toward each belligerent. the diplomatic skill of the opposing governments and the ability of propaganda to sway public opinion abroad may well determine the manner in which neutrality will be enforced. alliances, including those that are known and those that are secret, directly influence an estimate. when a war of any importance breaks out in any part of the world, all states are affected to some degree. one may have an alliance which, though not requiring active participation in the war, will call for collaboration with the efforts of a belligerent. another alliance may require active participation, while still another state may attempt to maintain strict neutrality. every state remaining at peace will thus be in a status ranging from that of a non-belligerent, with more or less close ties to one of the contestants, to a position of strict impartiality. the estimate of the international situation becomes more complex as the magnitude of the war increases. a correct appreciation of the status of each state concerned is of first importance in any broad estimate of the conduct of war. (ii) economic factors. the capacity, organization, and mobilization of industry influence the rapidity and adequacy with which material is prepared for, and supplied to, the armed forces. the acceptance by the civilian population of sacrifices, caused by the diversion to war uses of the productive capacity of industry, will have a direct bearing upon the industrial capacity of that state. the ability and willingness to finance the war effort, which includes the ability to tax, to float internal loans, and to create foreign credits, may well determine the extent and duration of the national capability for war. the dependence of a nation upon the continuation of foreign trade, including the necessity of obtaining new markets and new sources of supply, affects its strength. no state yet has complete autarchy. thus, there is the necessity of obtaining from foreign sources certain of the raw materials which are indispensable to the war effort. as each belligerent may endeavor to deny sources of raw materials to the other, a portion of the fighting power may be required for trade protection. (iii) psychological factors. the maintenance of a stable morale (page ) at a high level is a primary concern. such stability inures the nation or command against the full effects of surprise, fear, disappointment, despondency, and other weakening moral influences, while at the same time taking full advantage of those influences which strengthen the moral fiber of a people. training and experience influence morale, playing a part difficult to overestimate. they provide a basis for evaluating discipline. a study of the history of the state may prove valuable in estimating the present condition in this respect; a nation or command which may be classed as a veteran has an advantage over a beginner at the art of war. another important factor relates to the existence of the skills necessary for the production and use of the material means of war. the control of skilled personnel is a psychological consideration of great importance. unity of effort, or the lack of it, especially between management and labor, may be one of the most important factors of the estimate. special attention is desirable as to national inventiveness and versatility in the production of new and surprising means of war or in development of methods that in any way contribute to a successful war effort. racial or national characteristics may affect the estimates of morale and training. reactions of various races or groups to the conditions of war have been sufficiently recorded, on the basis of past performance, to prove of some value. service traditions may furnish clues for correct evaluation of psychological factors. while only the physical elements of fighting strength are susceptible of quantitative comparison, failure to take account of mental and moral factors may involve serious error. nevertheless, in many situations, such factors remain relatively indeterminate until subjected to test. inferences may be drawn, and deductions made, on a basis of peace-time observation and of historical precedent. in these, racial and national characteristics may figure prominently. history, however, has taught that, in a conflict between modern industrial and military nations, it is unwise to entertain any assumption other than that of moral equality until such time as the conflict has demonstrated the existence of a difference, and the degree thereof, or unless prior experience, observation, and acquaintance unquestionably warrant otherwise. (iv) information and counter-information measures. operations of war are tremendously affected by the information which each belligerent possesses of the others. it is therefore of vital importance to weigh the efficiency of the belligerents in the employment of means of obtaining, denying, and utilizing information. there may appropriately be considered present, probable, or possible use or non-use of indirect methods such as: study of press, captured documents, and material; reports from other friendly units; interrogation of prisoners of war, deserters, inhabitants, and escaped or exchanged prisoners; radio direction-finding; efficiency of cryptography; interception of enemy radio, telegraph, telephone, and mail communications; espionage; censorship; propaganda; efficiency of communications systems, ashore and afloat, which include all means of interchange of thought. in this connection it will be recalled that information, however accurate and appropriate, is useless if it cannot be conveyed in time. the direct methods of obtaining information are military operations intended for that purpose, such as observation, reconnaissance, scouting, trailing. counter-information measures are no less important than those pertaining to collection of information. such measures include all provisions for secrecy, such as censorship, counter-espionage, cryptography, control of own communications, security of documents, camouflage, and applicable tactical operations. (b) factors more directly applicable to armed forces, (i) vessels, including aircraft. the numbers and characteristics, of the ships and aircraft of the various nations of the world are known with less and less accuracy from the time when war becomes a probability. the information available is given intense and comparative scrutiny, under the specific headings of the factors of the estimate form as later enumerated. (ii) land forces, including land-based aviation. important facts concerning the land forces of the enemy, including his land-based aviation, will be known, probably, to a lesser extent than in the case of the naval forces. the value of a comparison--naval, land, or air--may depend upon whether the intelligence service has improved the accuracy of these data, maintained them up to date, and collected accurate additional information. (iii) personnel. the status of enemy personnel as to the sufficiency of numbers effectively to man all implements, as to training, morale, skill, stamina, and willingness to accept the supreme sacrifice, can seldom be accurately known. unless there is positive information to the contrary, the wise commander will assume in this respect that the status of the personnel available to his opponent is at least equal to that of his own command. full consideration will be given to all known facts concerning own personnel, to the end that its worth in any proposed situation may be properly evaluated. the basic discussion of the psychological factors (page ) is applicable here as to the respective armed forces. personal characteristics of commanders, so far as known, deserve full study, since they have an important bearing on relative fighting strength. the military value of the various units and forces is a similar consideration. the present attitude and past actions of enemy commanders and of their commands, and the factor of racial, national, and service characteristics, may furnish clues for correct evaluation in this connection. (iv) material. the material characteristics of the commander's own implements of war are generally known to him. the characteristics of enemy material can only be estimated from such data as have become available, but are not to be underestimated. material characteristics embrace armament, life, and mobility. armament relates to the caliber and number of guns, and to other weapons such as torpedoes, mines, depth-charges and aircraft (with their own weapons). it also includes chemical agents and other instrumentalities, together with the types, potentialities as to range, and the number or amount of each available, both for immediate use and as replacements. ammunition supply is a factor here. in the evaluation of foreign armaments, sufficient data are often available to make a reasonable estimate, but care is desirable not to underestimate. life is the ability to withstand punishment; it is expressed in terms of standards which can be clearly visualized. for a vessel, life is the ability to absorb damage while carrying out its assigned task. in the absence of definite factual data, evaluation of the life of foreign vessels will sometimes prove difficult. here, again, an underestimate is dangerous. mobility is capability of movement. it is compounded of the elements of speed, radius, and the ability to operate under imposed conditions of weather, visibility, hydrography, and other possible obstacles to certain and free movement. mobility is one of the most important factors pertaining directly to relative position, to apportionment of fighting strength, and to freedom of action. closely related factors are the organization, disposition, and methods of operation of the enemy, and of own forces. accurate knowledge of these factors, before an operation, greatly enhances the possibilities of dealing effectively with the enemy. the condition of the implements of war embraces such factors as the efficiency of motive machinery, the integrity of underwater compartments and other material construction, and physical endurance. the last applies not only to material, but also to living beings, and involves the ability to withstand the wasting effects of operations, whether due to fatigue, hardship, disease, worry, wounds, or other causes. here again, it is obvious that the commander will often have only an imperfect idea of the condition of the enemy in this respect. his experience will lead him to form an accurate estimate of his own condition. definitely, unless he has positive information to the contrary, he assumes that the condition of the enemy is no worse or better than his own. (see also the psychological factors, page and the personnel factor, page ). (v) logistics support is of primary concern to the commander. in the naval service, this is particularly true of the strategical estimate. while the factor may also have some bearing on a tactical estimate, logistics support will rarely change sufficiently, during a naval battle, to affect the outcome. this support exercises a dominant influence upon the fighting power of armed forces. it is concerned with the availability, adequacy, and supply of the following: material: items such as fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, food, clothing, spare parts, repair materials, animals, and general supplies. personnel: military and civilian; number and quality of replacements. facilities: factors such as bases; manufacture and repair facilities, afloat and ashore; shelter; sanitation; hospitalization; recreation; transportation; education; counter-espionage; counter-propaganda. the limitation imposed upon operations by logistics represents the final limit of a commander's plan of action. ( ) survey of the characteristics of the theater of operations. the characteristics of the theater of operations exert an influence, always important, sometimes paramount, upon the possibility of attaining the objective, and upon the strategical and tactical operations that may be employed. at this point in his estimate the commander utilizes his charts, intelligence reports, and hydrographic publications to make a factual study of the theater. this study is not for the purpose, at this time, of drawing any conclusions as to possible courses of action, but to furnish data which will assist in consideration of later sections of the estimate. the study may be made under several important headings, as follows: (a) hydrography. a study of the hydrography will determine the depth of water, the existence of shoals, the presence of unusual currents, the rise and fall of the tides, the availability of channels, and other pertinent features. these are recorded for later use. shallow water may permit mining or may prevent the operation of submarines. on the other hand, the ability to mine in shallow water may be curtailed by strong currents or by the rise and fall of the tide. again, the depth of water, the strength of currents, and the range of the tide may determine the feasibility of netting the entrance to a port or base. in a tactical action, advantage may be taken of shoals to limit the freedom of action of the enemy, without, however, interfering with that of one's own forces. (b) topography. the topography of the area is also frequently of interest to the naval commander. in actions close to the shore, the character of the coast may play an important role. a high bluff, combined with considerations as to light, may create a very definite advantage or disadvantage in a naval tactical situation. topography may be a most important consideration in determining what bases are to be used. the commander makes note of the topography of the various possible bases; later in his estimate, the natural features lending assistance to the defense of the various sites may play an important part in the selection of bases. the use of channels may depend upon the topography of the bordering land. questions arise as to whether such land can be seized and held, or, if in friendly hands, whether it can afford adequate protection to the channel. in any landing operation, the topography of the area to be occupied may be the controlling factor. (c) weather. the seasonal weather in the theater will have a direct bearing upon operations. the use of aircraft, the employment of light forces, the habitability of ships over long periods, the use of smoke, the range at which a gun action may be fought, the effect of spray and gases,--these considerations are but some of the matters which will be affected by weather. the possession of, and the position of, meteorological stations within the theater are of growing importance in the successful planning of coordinated air, submarine, and surface operations. (d) daylight and dark periods. it may be well under this heading to put in tabular form the times of sunrise, sunset, moonrise, moonset, the phases of the moon, and the duration of morning and evening twilight. when, for example, the commander is considering night destroyer attacks, the operation of submarines, or the type of protective screens he desires to use, he may profitably refer to these tabulations. (e) relative location and distance. no part of the study of the characteristics of the theater is of greater importance than that pertaining to relative location and distance. at this point it may be found advantageous to place in tabular form the distances between the important positions within the geographical area of the theater. this study furnishes knowledge as to the availability of certain localities for use in support of, or in cooperation with, forces at other localities, and as to distances in relation to steaming capabilities of the various units which make up the commander's force. (f) lines of transportation and supply. the usual sea routes which pass through the theater are an important subject of study; also, particular focal points, defiles, and restricted waters which are, or may prove to be, critical areas with respect to own or enemy forces. other items are the significant routes from home or enemy territory, i.e., the lines of communication, the terminal points, and the flanking positions along these lines. (g) facilities and fortifications. the facilities for the support, upkeep, and repair of the units of the commander's forces and of the opposing force, as well as the fortifications existing within the area, may require consideration. other features which may render a port or base of value, or which may indicate a possible necessity of denying it to the enemy, also merit attention. (h) communications. in strategical estimates, more particularly in broad ones covering large theaters, study of communications involves not only those means under the commander's control, but also his relation to the system of regional and national communications operated by his government. examination is made into the established physical stations; such examination includes radio, cables, and perhaps land wires. in tactical estimates the means of communication which affect the engagement are more directly those under the control of the commander. an examination into the organization of the means to meet conditions prevailing in the theater is appropriate here. another aspect of communications is that of maintaining all forms against enemy interference. the importance of this feature in planning may not safely be overlooked, and careful study is indicated to provide for guaranteeing communications during action. the characteristics of the theater, as they relate to this feature, are considered here. for the same reason, consideration of interference with enemy communications is included, so far as significance attaches to them with respect to the theater of operations. this portion of the estimate form varies greatly with the type of problem under consideration. however, in all estimates, this is the place where the commander searches the theater for factors affecting communications for the particular problem. * * * * * with the completion of this subsection of the estimate, the commander has assembled and placed in workable form the information to which he expects to refer in the succeeding parts of the estimate. ( ) conclusions as to relative fighting strength. having surveyed the means available and opposed, as well as the characteristics of the theater of operations, the commander will find it useful to summarize the pertinent information available, in order that the strength and weakness of own and enemy forces can be readily visualized and compared. thus the existing advantages and disadvantages are made apparent, and conclusions are drawn as to relative fighting strength. a satisfactory procedure is to place strength and weakness factors in parallel columns for own and enemy forces. from careful consideration of the facts so far determined in section i-b, there are extracted and expressed briefly the pertinent strength and weakness factors. it is usually easier to determine all the strength and weakness factors in detailed tactical estimates than in broad strategical estimates. the former deal in relatively more factual terms, with definite comparisons such as with respect to maximum speeds, numbers and caliber of guns, numbers and types of aircraft, numbers and types of torpedoes, and other such items which give the factual basis for comparison. in broad strategical estimates, this factual basis is present, e.g., as to distances, radii of ships, geographical locations of forces, and the like. but other factors may not be so definite, especially as regards enemy forces. for example, it will often be difficult for the commander to say that the enemy's logistics problem is easier or more difficult than his own, unless he has a good idea of the amount of fuel, ammunition, and stores available to the enemy within the time limits involved. the evaluation of training, spirit, health, and courage of personnel is, as previously noted, relatively easy to determine for own forces, but more or less of a conjecture in regard to the enemy. the value of the entries in the parallel columns at this point of the estimate will depend upon the skill of the commander in judging the factual data contained in all of the known factors of strength and weakness. the proper entries to be made will depend upon circumstances. in one estimate, for example, the anti-aircraft armament available to a carrier group will be of vital importance. in another estimate of the same carrier group, anti-aircraft defense will be of no importance because no enemy aircraft can be employed in the situation being estimated. again, in a local tactical situation, if the ships involved have just been fueled, the economical steaming radius may be of no immediate importance. and while the total amount of high-test gasoline which can be produced in a state in the coming year may be vital to a broad strategical estimate involving war against trade, that information may be of little use in a tactical estimate of a localized, fleeting situation. thus, in determining what factors to evaluate, and in assessing their relative value, the commander considers only such as can possibly affect the effort to be made in the theater under consideration. the summary of strength and weakness factors is, then, a summary of those factors which the commander considers will affect the character of his effort. this summary indicates the relative importance of such factors. a mere list of facts will not serve the purpose. what is needed here is a series of evaluations and conclusions which may result from a study of the pertinent details. with the circumstances attending his particular problem clearly in mind, the commander carefully reviews each of the factors of fighting strength in the theater; he classes each as either a strength or weakness factor for himself or his opponent, and enters it in the proper column. a strength factor for one is not necessarily entered as a weakness factor for the opponent:--what is required is a well-digested summary of the factors which give to either side an advantage or a disadvantage as compared to the other. note the estimate procedure has, to this point, established the basis for the solution of the problem through evaluation of the factors pertaining to the requirements of suitability, of feasibility, and of acceptability of the consequences as to costs. on this basis, the commander is ready to consider such courses of action as may be pertinent. to this end, he has a choice of procedures. he may first consider courses of action for himself. he may prefer, however, to consider first those which are applicable to the enemy. if the commander considers his own courses of action first, this procedure has an advantage in that it narrows, later, the scope of enemy courses which are pertinent to his situation. this is true because consideration of enemy courses may in such a case be restricted to those which give promise of countering, effectively, his own courses of action. this procedure may also have a certain psychological advantage, in that the commander may thereby avoid becoming unduly impressed by the potentialities of enemy action. occasionally, prior consideration of enemy courses may tend to put the commander, unnecessarily, on the mental defensive. first consideration of his own courses of action is especially appropriate for a commander whose mission requires him to assume the initiative, particularly when the relative fighting strength indicates that he can compel enemy action to conform to his. this is frequently the case when enemy action will chiefly affect details rather than the general trend of the operations. these reflections indicate that first consideration of his own courses of action will very frequently be advantageous to the commander. such a sequence is therefore indicated preferentially in the estimate form, and next discussed. however occasions may arise when consideration in the reverse order is preferable. sometimes the prior consideration of enemy potentialities has the advantage of making the commander's estimate more complete with respect to the obstacles which he is to overcome. furthermore, when the effectiveness of his future action is seen to depend chiefly upon what the enemy can do, or when the initiative lies manifestly with the enemy, and when the commander's mission requires him to frustrate enemy action, rather than to assume the initiative himself, the prior consideration of enemy courses of action may be indicated. the commander may therefore consider the subject matter of sections ii and iii in the order hereinafter followed, or he may reverse that order. section ii determination of suitable, feasible, and acceptable courses of action a. analysis of the assigned objective. in order further to clarify the problem, consideration of the commander's courses of action may profitably commence with an analysis (page ) of the assigned objective. section i-a contained an appreciation of this objective on the basis of the salient features of the situation. a close examination is now possible in the light of the additional information furnished by the full details (section i-b) as to the means available and opposed, and as to the characteristics of the theater (page ). accordingly, the mission (page ), is now again stated, and is restudied. the task is thoughtfully examined anew, in view of the forces and positions now known. the purpose is scrutinized with equal care, because it indicates the further end in view for the common effort. now, obstacles to success which, in section i-a, could not fully be appreciated can be examined against the background afforded by visualization of the enemy's ability to oppose the attainment of the assigned objective. this analysis calls for such discussion by the commander as is essential to better understanding of his assigned objective. some restatement and repetition may be desirable as to the subjects already discussed under the appreciation of the assigned objective. in solving certain types of problems, where simple estimates, only, are required, there may be no necessity for further treatment. even in these cases, however, the commander restates his mission in this subsection, in order to ensure a clear comprehension of its task and purpose, as a sound basis for his further solution of the problem. b. survey of courses of action. the fundamental military principle (page ) represents an equation (page ) based on five factors: the appropriate effect desired, the means available, the means opposed, the characteristics of the theater, and the consequences as to costs. of these five factors, all but the last (the consequences as to costs) have by this time, in the course of the estimate, been assigned values as definite as the commander's information and his study permit. from this point on, the problem is to evolve tentative solutions (courses of action) and to test them (page ), severally, by reference to the factors. the tests as to suitability and feasibility can now be made with reference to the known factors. the test as to acceptability of the consequences involves an unknown factor. however, for each tentative solution of the problem, a value can be assigned for this factor, because all five factors are interdependent (pages and following), so that the value of any of them can be set by a study of the others. it is through this procedure that evaluation of the consequences factor is accomplished (an application of the corollary principle of the acceptable consequences as to costs, page ). by means of the standard tests, the several tentative solutions are also compared to each other in the light of envisaged enemy action, so as to enable the commander to select the best solution. * * * * * the commander now, as a result of his reflective thinking as to courses of action, makes a list of those which he has visualized for himself. there may be one course of action, or many; ordinarily there are several. examples of courses of action have been given in the basic discussion of the subject (pages and ). in listing his courses, the commander can add to clarity of thought and of expression by visualizing the objective embodied in each course and by envisaging also, the action, expressed in proper detail, for its attainment. this process is naturally the more important when the objective is inferred rather than specifically expressed, and when the action involved calls for more description than can be obtained merely by stating the objective. for example, the commander may include a course of action such as "to raid enemy trade in the area efgh". the objective is here inferred; it is not clearly stated. the commander may therefore be well advised to add a notation of what the objective is; indeed, more than one objective may be involved. objectives thus inferred might include, when specifically stated, the infliction of damage on enemy trade, the infliction of damage on enemy combatant forces protecting such trade, the disruption of enemy supply arrangements, or such others as may be applicable. this clear visualization is essential to the establishment of the relationship between the assigned objective and the objective inherent in the course of action (page ). if, for instance, the motivating task is to "divert enemy forces to the area efgh", the commander may consider the course of action "to raid enemy trade in area efgh". by infliction of damage to, and by disruption of, enemy supply (objectives of his raiding), he expects to accomplish the diversion of enemy forces to the area efgh, because the enemy will wish to protect his trade against such raids. the relationship between the assigned objective and the objective inferred in the course of action is thus made clear. with regard to expression of the action to be taken, the commander may properly desire to be more explicit than by merely saying, for example, "to destroy the enemy". here the objective is clear (it is "the destruction of the enemy"), but the expression of the action is so general that additional description may be needed. examples of more explicit statement have been given previously (page ). on occasion the higher commander may predetermine the commander's course of action for the attainment of the objective assigned to the latter. circumstances under which such procedure may be properly applicable, and the effect which it has on the commander's estimate, have been previously discussed (page ). c. application of tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. the courses of action which the commander has envisaged are now subjected to test (page ). this essential stage in thought is intended to put the courses of action to proof as tentative solutions of the problems. the principle here recognized is that suggestion has no logical nor rightful claim upon action or belief until it has received adequate confirmation. such confirmation is, in part, provided by these tests. the tests applied are for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to consequences. each of these tests is a separate one. each course of action is formally subjected to test. when the tests are completed, the courses of action stand classified in these respects. during these tests, some courses of action may be rejected; such are then omitted in the final classification. these formal tests are not to be confused with the preliminary tests already given by the commander to each course of action as it occurs to mind. necessarily, there is such a preliminary test, because the commander does not wish to entertain inappropriate courses of action. for a competent commander, the mental power to envisage solutions of a military problem is so much grounded in experience that appropriate suggestions are most likely to occur; in fact, discriminating thought with respect to military problems is natural for such a commander. this immediate discrimination is, however, merely the preliminary test. it prevents setting up wooden soldiers only to knock them down, but it does not necessarily subject each suggested solution to a thorough analysis. the commander may apply the tests to each course of action as it occurs to his mind. this procedure, however, may be rendered impossible by the fertility of suggestion; perhaps the commander has thought of several courses of action practically simultaneously. it is, therefore, often better to apply the tests to all of the courses of action, in turn, during a separate stage of the process of thinking. this is the procedure indicated herein, as standard, by the sequence of steps in this section of the estimate. the process of testing, itself, may bring to mind those combinations of courses of action previously referred to (page ). the degree of formality characteristic of the tests varies with the nature of the problem. in a broad strategical estimate, these tests may be searching and extensive; they may then consume much time. yet, if the commander, in making a quick decision of great urgency in actual battle, does not apply the tests, he may adopt a course of action leading to tragic results. in such circumstances, the competent commander, under pressure of danger, grasps the whole complex situation without loss of time. he is not carried away by any chance impressions. he does not overlook what is significant in the unexpected event. because he is mentally prepared for the exercise of command (page ) he sees things in their true proportions (page ). in immediate response, he coolly chooses the same course of action which he would adopt if he had time for careful deliberation. in making the tests, the commander rejects courses of action found unsuitable in that they will not, if successfully prosecuted, contribute to the attainment of the objective. he does not, as yet, reject courses of action found to be promising of only partial accomplishment of the task, because there may be later possibilities of effecting combinations to this end. the commander also rejects, at this point, courses of action found to be infeasible of accomplishment. he is careful, however, not to reject, abruptly, any which may later be found to be feasible in combination with other courses. similarly, the commander now rejects courses of action found to involve excessive consequences as to costs. here, again, however, he bears in mind the possibilities of later combinations. the commander does not, as yet, make a selection of one course of action in preference to another. he merely desires to restrict further thought, toward his decision, to those which are found, on the basis of the estimate so far, to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable. he may, however, make a selection to the extent of effecting proper combinations whose applicability has already been demonstrated. the commander also takes stock, at this stage of the estimate, of the relative degree of suitability, feasibility, and acceptability of retained courses, so far as can be substantiated. d. listing retained courses of action. the foregoing process indicates to the commander the courses of action which may properly be retained as suitable, as feasible, and as acceptable. he therefore draws up a list of retained courses and classifies them according to the degree of their suitability, of their feasibility, and of their acceptability with respect to consequences. this list does not necessarily represent the final combinations of courses of action; the incomplete solutions may yet become part of the course of action finally selected. also it is not impossible that combinations already made will subsequently be recombined as a result of further analysis. it may be apparent to the commander at this time that he does not have, as yet, any course of action which fulfills the test of suitability as to scope, either originally or by combination. a later conclusion is made (section v) as to final combinations to achieve full scope. this conclusion, however, may point the way, as later observed, to a decision adopting an objective short of that which would, if achieved, lead to the accomplishment of the motivating task. section iii examination into the capabilities of the enemy while the commander realizes that the fundamental military principle (page ) governs the enemy's problem no less than his own, he has to accept more of hypothesis and conjecture (the so-called "fog of war") in applying the principle to the enemy's situation. the method of reflective thinking utilized (section ii) for the commander's own problem calls for certain further safeguards in application to the enemy capabilities, since they are of course usually not so well known to the commander as are his own. capabilities, in the meaning applicable herein, indicate actions which the force concerned, unless forestalled or prevented from taking such actions, has the capacity to carry out. such potentialities of the enemy are of course among the vital factors to be considered in estimating the situation. in his estimate, however, the commander's interest is not confined to what the enemy will probably do; probabilities are subject to change, and do not, therefore, cover the whole field of capabilities. the commander is not exclusively interested in what the enemy may intend to do, or even in what the enemy may be known, at the time, to intend to do; such intentions are also subject to change. the commander is interested in everything that the enemy can do which may materially influence the commander's own courses of action. in reaching a conclusion as to enemy capabilities, the commander makes an estimate from the enemy's viewpoint and considers that the enemy commander, faced with the counterpart of his own situation, is endeavoring to attain objectives in furtherance of his own mission. each commander is endeavoring to create for himself a favorable military situation, and to prevent his opponent from succeeding in the same intent. the physical objectives for each may be the other's armed forces; certain positions, sea areas, harbors, or territory may also be likely physical objectives. in such a parallel building up of plans, it is possible that the opposing forces may not come, at least for a time, into actual conflict. more especially in the initial stages, the respective plans may lead to operations in different parts of the theater. again, the geographical direction of search may cause the forces to miss contact. moreover, unless one commander definitely makes provision to seek out and engage, the two forces, each on the defensive, may find themselves "shaking fists" at each other across an ocean area. notwithstanding this possibility, however, a conclusion, on an insufficient basis, that the enemy will or will not seek him out and engage him, or that the enemy will or will not do anything else, may be fraught with the most serious consequences for the commander. accordingly, in estimating the enemy's situation, he puts himself in the enemy's position, while subordinating his own hopes and desires. he credits the enemy with the possession of good judgment and of the resolution and ability to apply with skill the fundamentals of effective warfare, subject, naturally, to the justified conclusions which the commander has drawn (section i-b) on the basis of the available factual data as to relative fighting strength. a. survey of the enemy's problem. this portion of the commander's estimate pertains, of course, to the existing situation as viewed by the enemy. this fact, alone, may inject into the problem certain factors which differ from those applicable with respect to the commander's view of his own problem, as determined to this point. ( ) summary of the enemy's situation. frequently it may happen that the enemy does not have certain significant information. the fact of such lack of information may have been established by the conclusions drawn as to relative fighting strength (section i-b). if this be the case, notation of the fact is made at this point in the commander's estimate of the enemy's situation. if doubt exists as to the extent and accuracy of the enemy's information, it will be desirable to credit the enemy with any knowledge which it would be dangerous for the commander to conclude was not available to his opponent. in summarizing the enemy's situation, the commander may brief the procedure by indicating those significant features of his own situation, as summarized in section i-a and as particularized in section i-b, which he does not consider are known to the enemy. the commander will also indicate here any items of important information as to which he has only a suggestion or an inkling, but which he considers may be known in greater detail to the enemy. ( ) analysis of the effect desired by the enemy. it may appear on first thought that the best basis for determining the pertinent enemy courses of action is to make a deduction of the enemy's mission. sometimes, undoubtedly, this is the case. however, it is not always possible to deduce the enemy's mission correctly. if the deduction is incorrect the remainder of the estimate will be on an unsound basis. if, as may happen, the enemy's plan has been captured, or if, by some other method, conclusive information has been obtained, it may be possible to state the enemy's mission. even then, however, the enemy's mission may sometimes be changed. it is thus evident that the commander, by restricting his thought, may frequently fail to consider all of the enemy capabilities which may materially influence his own course of action. with this precaution in mind, the commander, at this point in his estimate, proceeds to analyze the effect desired by the enemy. the commander intends to use his deductions, if such use appears to be sound, to narrow the field of consideration as to enemy courses of action. however, he reminds himself that such restriction will be dangerous unless it is established on sound grounds. the first mental act toward determining the effect desired by the enemy is to form a reasoned opinion as to the situation which the enemy wishes to maintain or to create. the maintenance or creation of this situation, existent or to be brought about, is an enemy objective. from earlier association with the enemy, from intelligence of his peacetime preparations, and from a knowledge of his political and military history, his broad current policies are generally matters of common report. the motives impelling the enemy to action may thus be evident. past or present tendencies of the enemy, along certain specific lines of endeavor, may be known. these may be corroborated by the enemy action which has recently occurred. in military undertakings of major scope the objectives of the enemy are often difficult of concealment. a survey of the objectives which the enemy has been pursuing may allow a reasoned opinion to be formed as to the enemy's immediate objectives,--whether, at least, his future action will be offensive or defensive. the importance to be attached by the enemy to certain physical objectives may be indicated by the broad aims known to exist. present composition and disposition of the enemy's forces may betray the effort which he intends. circumstances, clearly disadvantageous to the commander's forces, may disclose what his enemy's aim may be for maintaining or creating a favorable (enemy) military situation. however scant or incomplete the data from such sources or from others, the commander seeks to gain, by piecing together, a composite basis of workable value in arriving at a sound conclusion as to the enemy's future action. the enemy objective thus visualized may serve as the purpose of the enemy's mission. the situation thus envisaged may be specific or broad in nature, depending on the soundness of the deductions. this, in turn, will depend on the extent and character of the information available. it may now be possible to deduce a definite task, which when accomplished, will attain the indicated purpose. however, as previously stated, it is not desirable to be unduly specific. the commander reflects on the several possibilities which if carried out will attain the purpose. by being inclusive instead of restrictive in this matter, he avoids the danger of overlooking enemy capabilities. moreover, the information available will not always justify the derivation of a specific task. by this process of reasoning, the commander may arrive at a studied opinion as to the enemy's appropriate effect desired. the commander's safeguard is that he has not been too restrictive or specific. he expects to encompass within his conclusion the limits of the enemy's objectives and actions, so that his own planned action will not fail to cover all enemy action which can materially influence the situation. situations may be encountered when, in the equation referred to in section ii-b (page ), no value can be assigned the factor of the appropriate effect desired which will constitute a sufficient basis for deducing enemy courses of action. such situations are not unusual, especially in problems of lesser scope. in such cases, the commander is compelled to consider all possible enemy courses of action which can materially influence his own plan. therefore, in instances of this nature, it is apparent that the procedure of giving first consideration to the commander's own courses of action affords the advantage of (see page ) narrowing the field as to the enemy capabilities. b. survey of enemy capabilities. if, then (to repeat, because of the importance of the matter), the commander believes that he has, in the deduced enemy effect desired, a sufficient basis for evolving all pertinent enemy capabilities, he now proceeds, by the mental process described in section ii, to list the enemy courses of action which he thinks merit attention. if there be no adequate basis, the commander will find it desirable to list all enemy courses of action which can materially affect his own effort. the survey of fighting strength (section i-b) has established, through consideration of the "means available and opposed", and of the "characteristics of the theater", the limitations of enemy capabilities from the standpoint of feasibility. because, however, so much of the enemy's situation is usually conjectural, it is important to give the most searching attention to the comparison summary in section i-b,--in fact, to consider fully every element of weakness and strength, and of advantage and disadvantage. such a study will disclose every possibility which the enemy might exploit. the commander may thus determine, for example, the enemy strength which can be moved into positions within time limits that can affect the commander's courses of action; he can also examine into possibilities of obtaining information concerning the enemy's moves. such a study enables the commander to envisage the enemy operations which presumably can materially affect his own plans. he may now list the presumed capabilities of the enemy, in the form of courses of action, for purposes of further analysis. naturally, he lists courses which appear to be suitable, feasible, and acceptable as to consequences, but formal tests are deferred until the next phase of the estimate. c. application of tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. having listed pertinent enemy courses of action as described above, the commander next tests them for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to their consequences. the procedure is the same as for his own courses of action (section ii). however, since the enemy's appropriate effect desired, if deducible at all, is often only an approximation, the test for suitability is usually less rigid or absolute than for the commander's own courses of action. by the same token, since the enemy's fighting strength will usually include elements of conjecture and hypothesis, the test for feasibility may be less reliable than when applied to the commander's own courses. in fact, if there are any reasonable doubts as to feasibility of an enemy course of action, it is properly retained for further consideration. the same considerations and the same safeguard apply with respect to acceptability of the consequences. d. listing retained enemy courses of action. all enemy courses of action which, after test, are retained for further study are now listed by the commander. while it is manifestly of advantage to the commander if the number of enemy courses can reasonably be reduced to only a few or even to one, it is important that no material enemy capability be neglected because of undue restriction of the field. the previous analysis will have indicated, at least, in some cases, the degree of suitability and feasibility, and will have enabled the commander to form a considered opinion as to any preference, from the enemy viewpoint, on the basis of consequences as to costs. in many instances, therefore, it will be possible to arrange retained enemy courses in order of priority, i.e., the more likely being listed before the less likely. in case of doubt, the higher priority is awarded by the commander to enemy courses which are more dangerous from his (the commander's) point of view. in other instances, no priority can properly be indicated. as a result of this study, the commander may now be able to combine certain enemy courses. in any case, he closes this portion of the estimate with a list of them, classified so far as he finds justifiable, and thus made available for further effective use in the estimate. section iv selection of the best course of action the extent to which detail is desirable in section iv of the estimate will vary with the nature of the problem (page ). experience usually demonstrates, however, that an estimate in only the necessary detail escapes the danger inherent in undue detail which would tend to befog the main issues. as the commander proceeds with his estimate, he will recognize the need for additional examination into details, and will conduct such examination accordingly. a. analysis and comparison of retained courses of action. the next step in the estimate is the natural one of comparing the commander's retained courses of action with those of the enemy which have been retained for further study. this process consists of executing, in imagination, the plan contained in each of the commander's courses of action, against that in each of the enemy's. one method is for the commander to take the initiative with each of his plans and mentally to push it through with vigor. by this procedure, he concentrates his thought on the effect to be produced, on the changed situation which that effect will bring about for the enemy, on the modification in the enemy's effort which will be caused, on the resulting obstacles which these modifications will create, and on the provisions which will have to be made to overcome the obstacles. it will at once be apparent that the commander may have to re-estimate the enemy situation during this analysis. such necessity arises because of the changes made by his own course of action upon the enemy situation. the commander will desire to reach a studied conclusion as to what counter action the enemy may take when the nature of the planned action against him becomes evident. this re-estimate of the situation may be brief, as it is an adjustment of factors which are familiar through previous examination. sometimes the re-estimate will have been made mentally, before reaching this point, and adjustments may already have been made in the written estimate, in anticipation of this contingency. sometimes the commander may find it desirable, after reaching this point, to re-write, at least in part, his original enemy estimate (section iii). the particular procedure adopted is unimportant; the important feature is to recognize that such a re-estimate process is normal, and especially so with reference to this portion of the estimate. the foregoing discussion illustrates the point that an examination into enemy capabilities is not complete if the commander puts himself in the enemy's place merely for the purpose of estimating the original situation from the enemy viewpoint. in addition, the commander examines each of the enemy's modified problems which the changed situation, created by the execution of the commander's plan, has superimposed upon the enemy's original problem. thus only can the commander analyze the various ways whereby the enemy may oppose his own proposed courses of action. thus only may sound conclusion later be reached, in the next subsection of the estimate, as to what course of action, or combination of courses, is the best. the comparison of plan against plan thus far has been restricted to the method whereby the commander takes the initiative with each of his own retained courses of action. another method is to imagine the enemy as taking the initiative, carrying through each of his courses against each of the commander's courses. this method is applicable, for instance, to cases where the enemy is able to initiate action which, by its nature, would frustrate the execution of any of the commander's courses. the choice of methods is a matter of judgment on the part of the commander. it is rarely that courses of action can be compared without resolving each, to some extent, into the detailed operations which it comprises. however, this analysis is confined, as previously explained (see page ), to the details whose consideration is necessary for purposes of a sound comparison. in some cases there may be need for study in the greatest detail. generally, however, the requirement can be met by considering for each operation the kind of action, the types of weapons, and the physical objectives. during the progress of these analyses of the impact of operations upon each other, there may occur to mind further operations which an alert and awakened enemy may undertake in opposition; the counter to these operations may also suggest itself. the use of the chart, with positions and forces plotted, is here frequently essential; in tactical problems diagrams and tables showing possibilities of position, distance, speed, maneuver, gun ranges, relative strength in types and weapons are useful. * * * * * through the procedure described above, the commander is afforded further opportunity to test his courses of action, as to suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. he can, once more, view each of his courses from the standpoint of its suitability. the visualized enemy action may introduce considerations, not previously realized, as to whether certain of his own courses are suitable to the appropriate effect desired, when results are envisaged on the basis of the possible opposition. as to feasibility, the analysis permits him to make a further estimate of the enemy capabilities with respect to obstructing or preventing the desired outcome of his (the commander's) courses of action. in addition, by visualizing the pertinent operations involved, he enables himself to evaluate the costs to be expected. should the commander conclude, at this stage, that further consideration of any of his courses, so far retained, is not justified, he will naturally reject such courses so as to confine further analysis within narrower limits. should he find, during his analysis, that further combinations should be made among his retained courses, he makes such combinations and uses them in his comparison. however, he defers, until the next subsection, his choice of the course to be finally selected, or his conclusion that none can justifiably be adopted. the process of comparison is confined to deduction, rearrangement, and justified rejection, preliminary to weighing and selecting in the next subsection. b. determination of the best course of action. the commander is now ready to ponder over his retained courses of action as further analyzed in the light of enemy opposition. all of these courses, if carried out, are presumably competent, in varying extent, to attain the appropriate effect desired. he will now examine and consider them with the specific intent of coming to a conclusion as to which one, or which combination, he will select as the best. the analysis of each course of action in comparison with each enemy course has made possible a comparison, to this end, of the commander's retained courses with each other. at this point, therefore, the commander again assembles his retained courses of action. he includes the combinations which the preceding analysis has indicated belong properly together. he then considers the final tabulation in the light of the considerations now to be noted. the conclusive tests are now made for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability as to consequences. because of the importance of this terminal analysis, it is desirable that the tests be as precise as possible. the commander now has, in addition to his list of the retained courses of action, a summarized comparison of each with the others, under the several pertinent headings. he next examines this all-inclusive summary, with the intent of selecting the best course of action. it may be found that one, or another, or a combination, is best. again, there is the possibility of considering, as best, a course of action which, if carried out, will only complete an initial stage toward the accomplishment of the motivating task. if the result of the analysis has demonstrated that there is no satisfactory course of action, this fact is here stated, with a notation as to the reasons for such opinion. in this case the commander faces a dilemma. usually a task imposed on the commander by higher authority will be a carefully considered assignment of part of the superior's planned effort. the commander may expect normally to find that his own estimate of the situation will yield courses of action which, if successfully carried out, will accomplish the task assigned. the reasoned plan of the superior is a safeguard in this respect. nevertheless, realism requires that the commander be fully prepared to meet the possible dilemma:--when he cannot envisage a course of action for accomplishing the assigned task, or when, of the several courses of action under consideration, he finds none satisfactory, what is he to do? (see page ). under these circumstances the commander reviews his estimate in all its aspects. by minute re-examination he endeavors to find ways of accomplishing his assigned task. if he cannot accomplish the task, he seeks for ways whereby he can further such accomplishment so far as is reasonably feasible. if unable, in any degree, to further the accomplishment of his task, he endeavors to contribute, so far as he feasibly and acceptably can, to the accomplishment of the purpose of his mission. it is to be expected, of course, that, if unable to accomplish his assigned task, the commander will make constructive representations (page ) to higher authority. the latter may then assign additional forces or may otherwise alter the problem,--for example, by assigning a new task. however, a situation such as described may occur when the commander is alone in a distant theater or when for other reasons he finds himself unable to communicate, in time, with higher authority. in such a situation the commander is under the necessity of determining, for himself, a task which is suitable, feasible, and acceptable under the circumstances (page ). it is evident that, at some point in the foregoing procedure, the commander has been forced to abandon the solution of his basic problem, because he has found that there is no sound solution. he has not completely abandoned the solution of his original problem, because he has not yet exhausted all of its possibilities. however, the solution of the original problem has unquestionably entered a new phase, or step. the new step presents the commander with a new problem, a phase in the solution of the original problem; the new problem is related to the abandoned basic problem, because it arises out of the same situation, which has not changed. the new problem is, however, differentiated from the basic problem because it is based on a different incentive. the incentive for the solution of the new problem arises directly out of a decision made by the commander himself, i.e., his decision that no sound solution for the basic problem can be found. the new problem is one for the commander himself to solve, i.e., it cannot properly be delegated to a subordinate for solution, because its solution is necessary as a basis for the commander's detailed plan. for these reasons the new problem is, by definition (page ), a subsidiary problem, of the type distinctive of the second step. at what point in the solution of the original problem does the commander abandon the basic problem and proceed with the solution of the new, subsidiary problem which has arisen as described? there are various possible answers, all with a basis of reason, to this question. from the standpoint of theoretical precision, it might be said that the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that its motivating task cannot be accomplished. it might also be said that the basic problem is abandoned when the conclusion is reached that the commander can in no way contribute toward the accomplishment of the motivating task. practical experience indicates, however, that the basic estimate can profitably be utilized until the conclusion is reached that no contribution can be made to the purpose of the mission. at this point a new estimate, subsidiary to the basic estimate, necessarily begins. this view is confirmed, theoretically, by the fact that, at this point in the procedure, a radical change occurs with respect to the appropriate effect desired. in such circumstances, the commander concludes that he cannot contribute, in any degree, to the accomplishment of his immediate superior's general plan. the incentive for the solution of the subsidiary problem will therefore arise, on the basis thus adopted, when the commander has concluded that he cannot contribute to the accomplishment of his basic mission, and that he is under the necessity of evolving a new mission for himself. his basic decision (see discussion, hereafter, of section v of the estimate form) will reflect this conclusion and will thereby afford him a basis for the solution of his subsidiary problem. problems of the foregoing nature, where the commander justifiably departs from his instructions, are not unusual during the first step. however, they are scarcely typical of that step so long as an organized chain of command is in effective operation. in the more usual case, the commander, at this point in his estimate, makes note of his selected course of action. whether he selects a single course or a combination, the selection is thereafter known as the best course of action (singular). section v the decision in the final section of the estimate the commander is concerned with a decision as to the selection of an objective or objectives determined by himself, for the attainment of the appropriate effect desired. this decision also indicates, in proper detail, the action to be taken for the attainment of the commander's selected objective. the decision reached at this point becomes the commander's general plan of action or provides the basis therefor. it is accordingly so important that when it has been formally stated in a basic problem it is thenceforth known as the decision. the statement of the decision. frequently the statement of the decision may be merely a restatement of the best course of action. such phraseology is often adequate, provided, naturally, that the selected course of action has been, itself, correctly expressed (page ). sometimes, however, the commander may desire, at this point in his estimate, to develop such expression more fully. he may at this point develop his selected course into a general plan, or he may defer this development to the second step. in any event the commander now scrutinizes his selected course of action to ensure that its expression conveys exactly the meaning which he has in mind. he bears in mind, also, that his decision will settle the pattern of his future action. if the selected objective is inferred, rather than specifically stated, the commander will then ensure that the inference, with all its vital implications, is plain. as to the statement of the action required to achieve this objective, the commander realizes that the pattern laid down by the decision is merely a shape or general outline. the details will be introduced later. the decision covers the general outline of the action contemplated for the entire force. if, for example, only a part of the commander's force is to act, while the remainder is to remain inactive, the decision will cover not only the kind of activity but also the extent of the inactivity. however, for convenience in stating the decision, such inactivity may be inferred, rather than expressly stated, so long as the meaning is made clear. thus, if the force, except for a raiding task group, is to remain inactive for the time being, the decision may properly be "to raid enemy communications in the area ---- with a task group consisting of ----", so long as the commander is satisfied that the implication is clear, under the circumstances, that the remainder of his force is to remain inactive. the commander may properly include brief summarizing remarks as to the methods, broadly viewed, whereby he intends to take action. however, he introduces such detail only to the extent that he feels amplification is needed, either for his own benefit or for the assistance of others who may use his estimate. deductions or inferences which the commander wishes to note may, at this point, be included with the decision as corollaries (see next page). where combinations of courses of action have been made in selecting the best course, the meaning can sometimes be improved at this point by modification of the previous wording. when, as previously discussed (page ), the commander has concluded that he cannot feasibly or acceptably adopt any course of action which will accomplish his task, contribute in any measure to its accomplishment, or even contribute in any degree to the accomplishment of the purpose of his mission, he records that fact in his decision. his study of the problem will by this time, however, have given him the necessary data for a conclusion as to what his new mission should be. he therefore closes his basic estimate with a decision, coupled with a purpose therefor, (see below), which will serve as a new mission, i.e., as an appropriate effect desired. this provides a basis for his solution of a subsidiary problem whose incentive is derived from this decision. of course, if the commander has had time and opportunity to represent his situation on this basis to higher authority, and has received a new task therefrom, the new task, coupled with the purpose also indicated by higher authority, will provide the mission for the solution of a new basic problem. the purpose of the decision. the purpose of the decision is identical with the motivating task,--provided, of course, that the decision, if carried out, will accomplish that task in full. when stated, the purpose is usually connected with the decision by the words "in order to". if the commander has concluded that he will take action by stages, the decision may cover only the first stage. in all cases where the decision will only partially accomplish the motivating task, appropriate words to link the decision to its purpose may be such as "to assist in" or "preparatory to". the statement of this purpose, in connection with the decision, is frequently helpful and is sometimes necessary in making clear the exact relationship between the decision and the motivating task. in the next planning step, where the detailed operations are determined, this purpose is an important guide because each detailed operation is expected to contribute to the accomplishment, not only of the decision, but also of the motivating task. corollaries to the decision. the decision may involve certain deductions or inferences, either delimiting or amplifying its nature. the commander may find it desirable to make note of these matters in connection with his decision. he may later wish to use these notes when formulating his plan. since these matters relate to deductions or inferences which naturally follow as results of the decision they are properly referred to as "corollaries" to the decision. the nature of such corollaries may best be shown by an example. it is supposed, for instance, that the commander has made the decision "to guard the eastern caribbean barrier against enemy penetration". during the course of his estimate of the situation, he has come to the conclusion that his operations to carry out this decision will extend into the area limited by port x on the north, and port y on the south. this conclusion is a deduction, which immediately assumes importance when the decision is made. the commander states this deduced conclusion here, in connection with the decision, for future guidance in resolving the decision into detailed operations, as well as for later use in his directives to limit the action of his subordinates. no particular form is specified for such corollaries. it is satisfactory to list them as corollary i, corollary ii, etc. they do not constitute a part of the decision. relation of the decision to the detailed plan and directives. the decision is the basis for the commander's plan of action for his entire force. this plan is promulgated in one or more directives. the decision, as it appears in the estimate, is not yet the concern of subordinate commanders. it does not become their concern until it is used in directives. as incorporated in the commander's detailed plan and in his directives, the decision, whether further developed or not, constitutes the commander's general plan and is referred to in those terms. the decision, as it appears in the estimate, is not bound by any rigid specifications as to form. later (chapter vii), when the commander prepares for the inauguration of planned action by the formulation and issue of directives, he assumes the obligation of conveying the substance of his decision to his subordinates in clear language. at that time he will again have to subject its expression to scrutiny, and may find that he has to make modifications solely for clarification. chapter vii the resolution of the required action into detailed operations (the second step--the solution of subsidiary problems) the problem of the second step may be stated in question form as follows: "what action should i take for the attainment of my objective as selected in the first step?" [sidenote: for convenience a tabular form, inserted in the appendix, page , gives page references to the principal subdivisions of this chapter.] having arrived at his basic decision, the commander, if he wishes to put it into effect, will proceed to formulate a plan of action which can be cast into the forms of directives for execution. in making such a plan, he provides for operations in the detail proper for his situation. he thereby expands the general plan, indicated in or developed from his basic decision, into a complete plan which can readily be placed in the order form (chapter viii) as a directive or directives for the guidance of his subordinates. the procedure involved in formulating such a detailed plan of action has been described previously in general terms (chapter v). the method of determining the salient features of the operations required has also been discussed (in section iii of chapter iv). therefore, these matters are not repeated at this point. the problems distinctive of this procedure (the second step, as described in chapter v) are subsidiary problems, in the sense that the incentive for their solution arises by reason of a decision already made by the commander, i.e., the basic decision, and because they are problems which the commander recognizes are to be solved by himself and not by his subordinates. assumptions. the commander's plan has been derived from an estimate of the situation based on the best information available to him. complete and accurate information is frequently lacking; hence, many military plans consider contingencies which, to make a plan possible, have been accepted in the estimate as assumptions. the word assumption, when used to denote a basis for a plan, signifies "the taking of something for granted". it does not mean a conjecture, guess, or probability. the proposed action, resulting from a decision made under an assumption, is designed to be taken only upon the disclosure of the truth of the assumption. the fact that the assumption upon which the plan is based may prove false indicates the advisability of developing several plans based upon various sets of assumptions. it would be erroneous to believe that all contingencies can be foreseen, and to be content with a particular set of plans, all of which may prove to be wrong. it is not to be expected that a plan based upon assumptions will, in all respects, be suitable for use in an actual situation. for example, it will seldom occur that an elaborate battle plan, based upon assumptions as to the various types, dispositions, and strengths of forces present, the weather conditions, and the intent of the enemy, can be used without changes. on the other hand, a plan for the sortie of a fleet from a harbor under assumptions that high visibility exists, that airplanes can operate, and that hostile submarines will be the only force in opposition, may frequently be found entirely applicable to the actual situation, or so nearly so as to require only slight modification. it is possible so to standardize such plans that only minor variables need be indicated when the plan is to be used. the visualization of valid and useful assumptions frequently makes the most serious demands on professional knowledge and judgment. alternative plans. the word "alternative" is generally applied to contingent plans intended to accomplish a common task, but developed from varying sets of assumptions. "a choice between several" is the meaning of the word as here used. when such choice becomes necessary in a situation not yet clarified, that plan will be selected which has been derived from the set of assumptions considered by the commander as most likely to be correct. the selected plan is usually called the plan or the "accepted plan", and the other plans, coming from other less likely but still possible sets of assumptions, are called alternative plan no. , alternative plan no. , etc. naval tactical situations particularly lend themselves to the drawing up of alternative plans in advance. there are numerous general categories of such tactical plans. among these the battle plan is of paramount concern. others include plans for sortie, entrance, defense while cruising, etc. in each category, alternative plans may be developed, based on various sets of assumptions. alternative plans evolved in advance of detailed information may be found useful as a general basis for action. circumstances may prove to be different from those previously visualized. the correct procedure is to keep the plans up to date, testing them, by the latest information, in a running estimate (chapter ix). the commander will thus have a foundation for sound decision in the circumstances which actually arise. still another use of alternative plans merits consideration. early coordinated action during actual operations may be demanded although neither time nor the information available has permitted a detailed estimate. if the commander has drawn up, in advance, plans based on assumptions as to conditions that conceivably might exist, he will be better able to appreciate the situations which actually arise. he can thus direct the necessary action with more rapidity and understanding than if completely unprepared because of lack of planning. if he informs his subordinates of his proposed action under certain assumed conditions, he will facilitate cooperation, because better mutual understanding will exist. the advance alternative plans here discussed are not necessarily confined to problems confronting a commander during actual war operations. they may profitably be drawn up in peace, and may be the basis of training exercises. application of the essential elements of a favorable military operation in the solution of the problems distinctive of the second step, the commander starts with a consideration of the salient features of a favorably progressing military operation. this procedure is appropriate because any series of these problems, considered as a whole, pertains to the single problem of determining the most effective operation, or series of operations, for carrying his basic decision into effect. if the action contemplated in the basic decision is of such a nature as to call for successive included efforts in more than one stage, the commander limits his consideration, should he find such restriction advisable on sound grounds, to the operation or operations included in the first stage. * * * * * on this basis, the commander considers, first, the feature of correct physical objectives. he has first to determine what his correct physical objectives will be. this determination may or may not present a perplexity. frequently, the procedure of the first step (chapter vi) will have plainly indicated one or more, perhaps all, of the physical objectives involved. in some cases, also, the basic decision will have plainly pointed out the action to be taken, and with respect to what physical objectives. in these instances, the commander may, with little further analysis or none, set down the operations which he considers necessary or desirable with respect to these physical objectives. in other cases, however, the action indicated in the decision, though plainly indicating the commander's intent--that is, his calculated line of endeavor--may not have designated the numerous physical objectives as to which his effort is to be exerted. for example, the decision "to interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime routes" is quite clear, but what are the numerous exertions of force required, and with relation to what physical objectives? immediately there is a perplexity. guided by the analysis made in his previous estimate of the situation, the commander now determines what the physical objectives are, action as to which will contribute to the accomplishment of the effort. the sum total of the actions taken against these physical objectives is properly equivalent to the accomplishment of the action indicated in his decision. he may not be able at this time to determine all of the correct physical objectives, but he can determine certain correct ones (for the method, see section iii of chapter iv). the correct physical objectives having been determined, so far as can be done at this time, the commander studies each thoroughly, developing the possibilities of certain effective actions (operations) with reference thereto. for instance, in the case of a commander who has been ordered to "interrupt enemy trade on the southern maritime routes", he might develop one operation "to bomb enemy facilities at port x", and another "to capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade routes" (with an indication of the routes involved). the operations thus developed are now listed in a definite sequence, in order to provide a proper basis for the further procedure. the commander may find it desirable to state them in their order of importance. sometimes, however, it may be found advantageous to list the operations in chronological sequence, i.e., in the order of their execution. this point is further discussed hereafter (pages and ). the commander is at liberty, of course, to use either method according to its helpfulness in enabling him to visualize the elements of his problem. * * * * * the commander now considers the second feature: advantageous relative positions. he may already occupy an advantageous geographical location or locations (see pages (bottom) and (top)), or he may desire to improve his positions in certain respects. an advantageous position might be between the enemy and his base, in order to deny it to him. another advantageous position might be to windward of the enemy, for the purpose of making a destroyer attack under the protection of a smoke screen. the commander now reconsiders, from the viewpoint of "advantageous relative positions", the operations deduced with respect to "correct physical objectives". as a result of this reconsideration, he may find that certain of these operations may be retained without change, whereas others may require modification. suppose, for example, that two of the operations listed are those noted above, viz: "to bomb enemy facilities at port x", and "to capture or destroy enemy shipping along trade routes between the ---- parallels of north latitude and the ---- meridians of west longitude." from the viewpoint of relative position, it may appear that the first operation is not affected seriously, if at all. therefore, this operation may be left unchanged. however, the second operation may be definitely affected by relative position, because the best method of interrupting enemy trade may be to employ raiding forces in focal areas. therefore this operation might be altered to the form, "to capture or destroy enemy trade by raiding focal areas" (with a designation of the areas). the commander's study is now likely to suggest operations which were not apparent when the analysis was confined to the correct physical objectives, alone. new physical objectives may appear to require attention. if so, all such new operations are added to the list compiled. * * * * * the commander may now study his list of operations, compiled to this point, from the standpoint of the third feature, proper apportionment of fighting strength. however, if the commander considers such apportionment now, his subsequent study of the fourth element--"adequate freedom of action"--may develop a need for further operations which will in turn call for a re-analysis as to his apportionment of fighting strength. therefore, for purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the commander now defers consideration of such apportionment, and that he proceeds at this point to study measures for ensuring adequate freedom of action. this study requires consideration of such matters as training, morale, surprise, secrecy, cooperation, intelligence, logistics, and provisions (communications, location of the commander, and the like) for effective exercise of command. (see page ). the commander exercises his judgment as to the degree of detail in which such matters should be treated, according to the nature of his problems. if any such subject--for example, communications--involves the development of a subsidiary plan (page ), the measures noted in connection with the formulation of the basic plan may be stated along broad lines, such as: "to provide for effective communications." any specific matters of considerable importance may also be included,--for example, as to secrecy with respect to the use of communications. other details may then be deferred until the commander takes up the necessary subsidiary plan. otherwise, all pertinent operations in connection with these measures are naturally noted at this point. certain of these measures for freedom of action are now to be discussed in some detail because of their important bearing on basic plans. in certain operations contemplated by the commander, there may be a requirement for additional training, sometimes of a special nature. this may be true, for instance, if an operation involves the landing of an expeditionary force. conditions permitting, the commander will naturally desire to make provision for training exercises. if time or other conditions do not permit necessary training, he may find it desirable to modify his plans accordingly. the salient features of a subsidiary training problem are discussed hereafter (page ), and may well be considered at this point in developing the basic plan. the commander may already have noted, in considering operations suggested by his previous study of the situation, a need for certain action as to security, secrecy, and intelligence. any additional operations of this nature, not previously noted, may well be incorporated at this point. security of his own plan, and secrecy therefor, are important considerations with reference to intelligence activities. the requirements as to intelligence and counter-intelligence features are primary considerations as to any plan. such considerations involve the collection of information and its conversion into intelligence. the hampering of enemy intelligence activities is a related consideration. the collection of useful information, and its denial to the enemy, call for a definite plan. when information has been collected, it is subjected to the processes (page ) of analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination. collection, to be consistently effective, calls for specific directives to, or requests on, the appropriate collecting agencies. analysis determines the source of the information and the circumstances under which it was obtained. evaluation determines its degree of reliability. interpretation consists of drawing conclusions; when information thus takes the form of facts (so far as they can be ascertained) and of sound conclusions drawn therefrom, it becomes military (naval) intelligence. it is then disseminated to those concerned and is used in the solution of the commander's own problems. the basis for collection of such data is the determination of the essential elements of information desired by the commander. the notation of these essential elements, for later incorporation in his directive(s), naturally constitutes a primary feature of his basic plan. the essential elements of information are frequently formulated as questions--e.g., will the enemy do this? is the enemy doing that? what are the principal topographic features of y island, with respect to so and so? these questions cover the essential matters of perplexity as to enemy courses of action and as to the characteristics of the theater. each enemy course of action, for example, may provide the basis for a question; or, if the scope of the problem has narrowed sufficiently, such question may deal with one of the enemy's possible operations, related to a course of action which he may be pursuing or is known to be pursuing. on the basis of the essential elements of information, the commander provides for proper reconnaissance activities by the several collecting agencies under his command, or for appropriate requests to be made by him on other collecting agencies. a sound plan will always make adequate provision for such measures. these subjects are treated in more detail in the later discussion (page ) of intelligence problems. * * * * * in connection with freedom of action, the commander will also make adequate provision for logistics support. in its unrestricted sense, the term "logistics" relates to the supply and movement of a military force, and to such related matters as the disposition and replacement of ineffective personnel. logistics measures, as comprehended in the development of the basic plan, exclude movement primarily of a strategical or tactical nature, but include movement related primarily to supply and similar matters. this requirement gives rise to the necessity for logistics measures which may further call for operations such as to provide fuel oil and supplies at rendezvous x and y, and tender facilities at port d. an incidental requirement will relate to movements of train ships. hence, the commander formulates these, also, and includes them in his list of operations for later assignment as logistics tasks. (page ). fuel oil may likewise be required at port d, but if the commander knows that ample fuel oil is in store there, no operation to cover this feature is required of him. the solution of logistics problems is further discussed hereafter (page ). * * * * * the commander has now, it may be presumed, evolved all of the operations that his analysis tells him are appropriate with respect to correct physical objectives, advantageous relative positions, and freedom of action. therefore, he now studies all of these operations from the viewpoint of the remaining element--proper apportionment of fighting strength. this consideration involves, initially, a determination of what forces will be necessary to carry out the operations listed. the commander thereby determines the requirements, as to forces, for each such operation. for example, the operation "to locate an enemy force" may require the use of several types of naval vessels and aircraft. the commander determines what method of search is best for the purposes of this specific operation; thereafter, he determines what forces are necessary to conduct the search. the procedure has previously been indicated (in the principle of the proper means to be made available--page ). in this study the commander will often find it necessary to divide some of the more extensive operations into component parts, suitable for later assignment as tasks for subordinates. fundamentally, there is no difference between an operation and a task, except that the latter includes also the idea of imposing on another person, or assigning to him, a definite amount of work or duty (page ). at this stage, then, the commander deals with components suitable for performance by available weapons, in the usual units, or combinations of units, in which they are effective. of course, when an operation meets this requirement without subdivision into components, it need not be subdivided. these component parts are not yet actually tasks, because the commander does not plan to assign them at this time to any one for execution. however, the components are visualized as clearly, and are formulated as definitely, as is possible at this point. the requirement is that they be acts that available forces can perform. the method of breaking down an operation into component parts is one of analysis and deduction. having visualized the manner whereby the operation can contribute to the accomplishment of the effort, the commander has now to determine the means to be employed to this end. experience and knowledge tell him what numbers and types of ships, aircraft, and other weapons, if properly employed, will attain the effect desired. each component part will indicate both the action and the physical objectives of the action. for each component, the commander estimates what forces are required. he knows the extent of the armed forces available, and he can, if his total force is adequate, adjust matters to allow each component a force capable of carrying it out. for example, a component operation might call for a search by destroyers, but the commander might find that his destroyers were in such poor relative position as to prevent them from reaching the point of origin in time. therefore he would be unable to conduct the search by using destroyers alone. he might now consider a search by aircraft. a study of this proposal might indicate that it could be carried out in part by aircraft, but that available aircraft were inadequate to carry it out in its entirety. in such event, consideration would be in order of the possibility of conducting this search by use of other forces also, e.g., submarines and cruisers. in case the commander believes an indicated operation to be infeasible, he first restudies that operation to see whether he can modify it, without adversely affecting the accomplishment of the effort. he may even find that he can eliminate it by including its essential features in some other operation. if the commander finds that his forces are inadequate for the accomplishment of an effort in one stage, but that they are adequate for its accomplishment in successive stages, he may draw a conclusion as to which of the operations he can carry out first. on this basis, he may proceed with the formulation of tasks to include these operations, leaving the remainder to a future time (see page ). it may be that all operations set down cannot be accomplished by the forces available, but that they will be possible of accomplishment if other forces are provided. this knowledge, of the sum total of forces required for the action indicated in the decision, is an essential. it is only by such a searching inquiry that the commander ensures that the operations resolved from the decision will result in a full solution of his problem. usually the forces available will be found adequate, because the superior who provided them gave consideration, on his part, to the requirements. however, if the forces available are not deemed adequate, the commander either modifies the operations, or restricts them, or subdivides them into parts for performance in succession by stages. in any such case, conditions permitting, he makes constructive representations, together with a report of the facts, to his superior (see page ). testing for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. each of the operations finally deemed necessary or desirable is now tested as to its suitability, its feasibility, and its acceptability as to consequences. the considerations involved have been explained previously (section iii of chapter iv) and are therefore not repeated here. the testing process will eliminate those operations found not suitable, feasible, or acceptable. in addition, the tests may lead to the elimination of operations which, while both suitable and feasible, do not contribute enough toward the accomplishment of the effort to warrant their retention. for example, among the operations listed might be one to capture x island and one to capture y island, both suitable and feasible. the commander, having analyzed these proposals, might conclude that the capture of y island would not constitute a sufficient contribution to warrant its adoption as an operation at this time. therefore, he might omit this operation, or he might defer it to a later stage. a feasible operation may similarly be rejected or deferred out of preference for another which can more readily be accomplished. the tests may also reveal important facts as to the relative consequences with respect to costs. for example, two operations might both be acceptable as to this factor, but one might be less acceptable than the other. accordingly, the less acceptable operation might be omitted, or might be deferred for the time being. upon the completion of the tests, all operations retained are listed for further development. the formulation of tasks the correct resolution of the decision into the detailed operations required is further ensured by the visualization of these operations as tasks. tasks so formulated (page ), become a basis for the preparation of directives. to prepare a plan as a basis for directives, or for use as such, the commander first finds it desirable to formulate and assemble the various tasks. the tasks are formulated as a result of his study of ( ) those operations which do not require to be broken down, and which may now be rewritten as tasks, and of ( ) the component parts of the more extensive operations (see page , bottom). each of the tasks, as now listed, is tested for suitability, for feasibility, and for acceptability with respect to the consequences as to costs. in view of the fact that the operations have all been thoroughly tested, this process now becomes not a formal analysis but merely a check. the organization of task forces and task groups the commander now classifies the tasks on the basis of their suitability for accomplishment by appropriate task forces or subdivisions thereof, i.e., task groups. in so doing he endeavors to avoid forming any more classifications than are necessary for the accomplishment of the full effort. note: in the remainder of this work, the term task group, except as may otherwise be indicated, will be understood in the inclusive sense of either "task force" or "task group". tasks are assigned to task groups on the basis of such factors as the nature and geographical location of physical objectives, the existing disposition of the several units, their capabilities, and their freedom of action. the last-named may be the determinant, and, because of the importance of such considerations, tasks which would otherwise fall to one group might be assigned to another. features influencing a change might include lack of training of the personnel available in the first group, or the special qualifications of a particular commander, or a justified desire to adhere to a previously determined permanent task organization. logistics tasks, i.e., those requiring operations for placing logistics measures in effect, require the same careful consideration as do combat tasks. (see page ). certain tasks apply to all of the task groups, or pertain to the general conduct of the common effort. among such may be provision for security, for unity among the subdivisions, and for intelligence activities (page ). in order to avoid repetition, these tasks are assembled in one group. the commander analyzes the requirements of fighting strength for each task group. he then, from the means available to him, assigns the necessary strength to each group, making adjustment between the theoretical requirements and the actual strength available. he is familiar with the types of vessels and aircraft constituting his command, and with their military characteristics; with the capabilities and cooperative qualities of his commanders; with the degree of training of his various units; and with the geographical location of physical objectives. he recognizes that each task requires adequate strength for its accomplishment. because these requirements have been thoroughly considered during the study of the effective apportionment of fighting strength, he is able to make adjustments as necessary. the commander now fully organizes each classification of tasks and its corresponding task group by naming the task group (or task force), by making notation of its composition and of the rank and name of its commander, and then by listing the tasks of each group. the principal task (or tasks) may be listed first, the other tasks following in the order of their importance. if preferred, the sequence of tasks may be chronological. also, either major or minor tasks may be listed chronologically. (see pages and ). if the chronological sequence of tasks is utilized, that fact, in order to avoid confusion, is clearly indicated. thus organized, the whole plan can be transferred almost bodily into the order form (chapter viii). application of the fundamental military principle to the determination of objectives embodied in tasks in formulating tasks for the several task groups, the commander has now visualized, for each such group, an objective (or objectives) for the subordinate to attain. in selecting these objectives, the commander has placed himself, mentally, in the subordinate's situation, visualizing the problem which the subordinate is to solve. on this basis the commander has apportioned the strength needed for the attainment of the objectives assigned to his subordinates. this procedure, of evident importance, is frequently one of considerable difficulty, because a higher commander, lacking detailed information of the situation which may confront a subordinate cannot always anticipate all the obstacles to the latter's success. in formulating tasks, and in apportioning strength, by the procedure already described, the commander has applied the fundamental military principle. now, to ensure the practical adjustment of means to ends (page ), the commander reviews the process in the light of that principle, so that he may be assured that he has selected a correct objective (or objectives) for each subordinate. by using the tests indicated in the principle, the commander confirms the suitability of each objective so selected, satisfies himself of its feasibility of attainment, and assures himself that the costs involved will be acceptable. if these requirements cannot be so satisfied, necessary adjustments are in order. these tests may frequently be of a routine nature, by reason of the previous painstaking tests of the several operations involved. however, such final tests cannot be omitted without incurring the danger of selecting incorrect objectives for subordinates to attain. the assembly of measures for freedom of action having completed the classification of his tasks, the commander next assembles the measures determined upon as necessary for ensuring adequate freedom of action. when the subject matter is not too bulky, these measures are incorporated in their proper place in the basic plan. otherwise, instructions as to these matters will be issued as annexes. the various measures are assembled under the classification shown below: (a) measures required for security, for cooperation, and for intelligence activities. (b) measures for logistics support. these cover provision for procurement and replenishment of supplies, disposition and replacement of ineffective personnel, satisfactory material maintenance, sanitation, battle casualties, and the like. (c) measures for the exercise of command. these include provision for communications, location of rendezvous, zone time to be used, and the location of the commander. this classification corresponds to that used in the order form (page ). experience has indicated that such a classification facilitates the transmission of instructions to subordinate commanders. if desired, the material which will be required to be incorporated in paragraph ( ) of the order form (see pages , , and ) may be also assembled at this point. the preparation of subsidiary plans as previously noted (page ), certain subsidiary problems require the preparation of subsidiary plans to be included with the directive as annexes. in broad strategical estimates, the solution of such subsidiary problems involves a vast amount of mental effort; even in restricted estimates, these problems may require most intensive thought. it is therefore appropriate at this point to discuss, in some detail, the nature of these subsidiary problems. during the solution of his basic problem and later, during the process of evolving his basic plan, the commander may become aware of the need for further action of a supporting nature with respect to his basic mission, distinct from that which he intends to assign as tasks to subordinate commanders. if the nature of this action involves perplexity, he will be confronted with new problems to be solved. when he recognizes that such problems exist and are to be solved by himself, this awareness is a recognition of the incentive. for example, one of these problems may involve a battle in which the entire force will participate, or perhaps a sortie requiring coordination of the several subdivisions of his force. others will be concerned with measures recognized as necessary for ensuring freedom of action. these problems give rise to the subsidiary plans previously referred to (page ). they are not necessarily subsidiary in importance; even the battle plan, the basis for the culmination of tactical effort, may result from the solution of a subsidiary problem. the word "subsidiary", as here used, merely indicates that the problem has its origin in the commander's own decision. when the incentive is thus recognized during the solution of the basic problem or during the second step, the commander solves these new problems, and includes their solutions as a part of the directives prepared for the carrying out of the basic plan. as will be seen later (chapter viii), there is a prescribed place for such solutions in the usual form in which directives are issued. often, however, because of extent and bulk, these solutions are included with the directives as annexes. the commander will desire to provide for all contingencies, but he can rarely, during the planning stage, see completely into the future, so as to foretell all pertinent events which may befall. during the unfolding of events, therefore, unforeseen subsidiary problems will probably arise. whether visualized during planning, or encountered during the execution of the plan, these problems have the same relationship with the basic problem. reference is later made (chapter ix) to subsidiary problems which arise during the action. subsidiary problems, according to their nature in each case, may be solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step or by that distinctive of the second. in many instances either may be applicable, the choice being a matter of convenience. battle plans, for example, can demonstrably be formulated by the use of either procedure. thus, a decision "to destroy the enemy in a daylight fleet engagement" may be used as the basis for an estimate of the situation, by the procedure distinctive of the first step, in order to reach a decision as to the plan, in outline, for the contemplated engagement. however, the same result can also be attained through the procedure distinctive of the second step, with the basic decision as the point of departure. a solution also can be reached by a method which is, in effect, intermediate between the procedures of the first and second steps. for example, the basic (broad strategical) decision noted above can be taken, in a detailed tactical estimate, as the only suitable, feasible, and acceptable course of action. then, in section iv of the estimate, a study of the more detailed operations involved can be developed into an outlined plan for the battle. thus, a single course of action, expanded to include the outlined plan so developed, can then be adopted as the decision and can in turn be expanded by second-step methods into a detailed tactical plan. on the grounds of simplicity, the procedure distinctive of the second step is preferable, when it is applicable to the particular problem. therefore, when a subsidiary plan is to be developed directly from a basic decision, this is frequently the better procedure. this comment is applicable not only to battle plans but also to other subsidiary plans such as sortie plans, entrance plans, and logistics plans. the commander may find it necessary, however, to expand the study of fighting strength made in section i-b of the basic estimate, in order to obtain the detailed data needed for formulating the subsidiary plan. in spite of the relative simplicity of the second-step method, cases occur where the procedure of the first step is nevertheless preferable. for example, a basic decision making provision for a major campaign, divided into stages of some scope, may involve, as part of one of these stages, an operation to capture an island. such an operation may itself require a considerable effort on the part of the whole force; yet the operation may be so specialized or localized, or both, with reference to the entire effort contemplated in the basic decision, that the solution of this subsidiary problem can best be accomplished through the procedure distinctive of the first step. the commander will therefore necessarily be the judge, in each case, as to the particular procedure to be adopted. there are wide variations in the requirements of the estimate form, when used for the solution of subsidiary problems. this is natural because these problems vary widely in nature. they include, on the one hand, problems dealing directly with the conflict of armed forces, for which the form is especially designed. on the other hand, these problems include those dealing with the factors related to freedom of action. to be suitable for this purpose, the form requires modification in varying degrees. certain examples are included in the latter part of this chapter (page and following). the application of the procedure of the first step to the solution of such subsidiary problems requires provision for deriving, in each case, a (subsidiary) mission appropriate to the problem. of the two elements of the mission, the (subsidiary) purpose is first determined, because the (subsidiary) task will necessarily be suitable to the (subsidiary) purpose. these elements of the (subsidiary) mission may be obtained from one or more of the operations into which the basic decision has been resolved. they may also be obtained from a preceding subsidiary problem, already solved. in illustration of the preceding, discussion is first centered on a strategical problem of usual type, involving a subsidiary tactical problem calling for the detailed employment of weapons in a naval engagement. other illustrations will deal with subsidiary problems relating to particular aspects of freedom of action. in the first example it is supposed that the commander has already solved a basic problem of broad strategical scope, and has arrived at a decision which contemplates an engagement. a further logical act of planning is now to develop a battle plan. such development involves the solution of a subsidiary problem. in this case the commander is supposed to have found it desirable to solve this subsidiary problem by the procedure distinctive of the first step. in this problem, the situation summarized is an imaginary one. it may eventuate either through the natural future developments of the situation existing at the time of the solution of the basic problem, or it may confront the commander during the execution of the plans derived from the decision of that (basic) problem. the battle plan finally to be formulated will be for use under the conditions assumed in this situation. the commander will desire to draw up a battle plan as a provision for the situation which he believes most likely to eventuate. however, as he cannot be certain that this situation will occur, he may also desire to assume other situations, i.e., prepare in advance for other contingencies. it is then necessary for him to solve several problems, each differing from the others in the assumptions (page ) as to the form the situation may take. the summary of the situation therefore requires a brief statement of the conditions which are assumed. in addition, such parts of the basic problem may be included as are deemed pertinent to the new problem in hand. in his new problem the purpose of the (subsidiary) mission may readily be obtained from the basic problem. suppose the assigned task, motivating the estimate of the basic problem, to have been to "prevent enemy convoy from reaching destination". this, the motivating task of the basic problem, then becomes a suitable (subsidiary) purpose for the mission of the subsidiary problem. for the mission of the subsidiary problem, a motivating task, suitable to the purpose thus determined, will be found in the decision of the basic problem. suppose the decision in this case to have been "to destroy the enemy convoy". the task thus determined for the subsidiary problem becomes an assigned task in the sense that it is assigned by the commander to himself, instead of to a subordinate; however, it is also an assigned task in the sense that it has been indirectly assigned by the immediate superior, because it has been derived, in the basic estimate, from the motivating task which was directly assigned by the superior. the two elements, of task and purpose, when linked together, enable the commander to visualize the appropriate effect desired, as the basis for his subsidiary estimate,--a procedure identical with that followed in a basic estimate. as in the latter, the commander can now formulate his subsidiary mission, as:-- (task) to destroy the enemy convoy, (purpose) in order to prevent it from reaching its destination. the mission of the subsidiary problem is thus seen to be identical with the basic decision linked to the purpose of that decision. however, this is not always the case. a subsidiary problem may merely involve the execution by the commander, i.e., under his own immediate direction, of a designated part of his general plan. or, such a problem may involve execution, by the commander, of one or more of the detailed operations for the accomplishment of his general plan or of a part thereof. the commander may also find it necessary to solve numerous subsidiary problems of relatively restricted scope pertaining either to his general plan or to a part thereof or to the detailed operations involved. in some of these cases the purpose of the subsidiary mission may be readily apparent. in others, its nature may become clear only after the application of considerable mental effort. in every case the determination of a proper (subsidiary) purpose involves visualization of a situation which the commander desires to bring about or to maintain. the (subsidiary) task, appropriate to the (subsidiary) purpose, will always necessarily be suitable to the latter. this task is then the motivating task for the solution of the particular subsidiary problem in hand. this will be the case whether the commander makes a simple mental solution or produces a more complex one in which the formal written estimate of the situation is employed. in the former instance, the brevity of the mental process tends to obscure this fact. an example might occur in a situation where the commander has received an order to "protect the base at a". it is then supposed that, after estimating the situation, he has reached the decision "to deny the enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of a", the purpose of the decision being, of course, "in order to protect the base at a". the action required might then be undertaken in two stages. the first stage might be confined to the area abcd. if, then, all available base sites in this area, except y island, were already securely in friendly hands, the commander would find it necessary to make provision for an operation to deny the use of this island to the enemy. if this operation is of such a nature that the commander desires to execute it under his own direct control, instead of assigning it to a subordinate, it presents a subsidiary problem which the commander, himself, has to solve. the commander has now determined the necessity of solving a subsidiary problem relating to the accomplishment of a designated part of his general plan. he has also determined the necessity of solving another subsidiary problem presented by an operation pertaining to the first stage of the accomplishment of his general plan. each subsidiary problem requires an estimate of the situation although "the brevity of the mental process tends to obscure this fact" (page ). in making his basic estimate, the commander may have discovered the need for these subsidiary estimates. in this case, he may have included them in his estimate, as "estimates within the estimate" (page ), in his analysis of the operations involved in the various courses of action which he considered. for instance, his basic decision may have included the capture of y island, and he may have covered this feature by a corollary to that decision, as follows: corollary: as a first stage, to deny the enemy the use of available base sites in the area abcd, by capturing y island. however, the commander may not discover the desirability or need of solving these subsidiary problems until the second step, when resolving the basic decision into the detailed operations required. in this case, he might make due provision at that time for the operations involved in the subsidiary problems. the mental procedure would be the same in either event. the commander may find, however, that he prefers to make a separate, subsidiary estimate with respect to the determination of the stages of his operation, including the details as to the performance of the first stage. in this case he finds a proper mission for his subsidiary estimate in the basic decision, linked to its purpose. this mission would be as follows:-- (task) to deny the enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of a, (purpose) in order to protect the base at a. during the subsidiary estimate the commander may discover, in his study of the area abcd, the necessity for an operation to deny y island to the enemy, and may even go so far, in this study, as to decide on the capture of this island. the decision, settling on this area as the scene of the first stage of his effort, may then include provision for the capture of the island, as follows: decision: to deny the enemy the use of base sites in the area abcd as a first stage toward denying him the use of all base sites within effective bombing range of the base at a. corollary: to capture y island. however, the commander may not take up the matter of denying y island, specifically, to enemy use until he studies the detailed operations required for the accomplishment of the action involved in his first stage. in such event, he may make provision for the capture of the island in his subsidiary plan for the execution of the first stage. he may find, on the other hand, that he prefers to make a separate, subsidiary estimate as to this feature. if so, the mission for this subsidiary estimate would be identical with the decision (less the corollary, but plus the purpose of the estimate), i.e.,-- (task) to deny the enemy the use of base sites within effective bombing range of the area abcd as a first stage (purpose) toward denying him the use of all base sites within effective bombing range of the base at a. during this estimate the commander considers the various courses of action whereby he can deny to the enemy all bases in the area of the first stage. concluding that y island is the only base site not securely in friendly hands, and that the best method of denying it to the enemy is to capture it himself, he reaches a decision as follows: decision: to capture y island, in order to deny to the enemy the use of the only available base site in the area abcd. in each of the foregoing cases, the commander is said to have "deduced" the mission for his subsidiary problem. as has been demonstrated, the process of deduction is merely the application of the natural mental processes through the use of the estimate of the situation. whether the estimate is formal or informal, detailed or brief, written or mental, is immaterial; in any case, the estimate results in a decision which provides, with its purpose, a proper mission for the succeeding problem which has been presented by solution of its predecessors. in logical sequence, from problem to problem, the procedure outlined in the preceding discussion enables the commander to derive a correct mission for the problem involving the capture of y island. clear visualization of such a subsidiary mission is frequently of great importance, and may be difficult unless the procedure has been carefully traced from each problem to the next. in this particular example, if the commander finds that the capture of y island is of such a specialized and localized nature (page ) as to call for a formal estimate (as may frequently be the case in capturing a well-defended island base), he will be especially desirious of deriving a correct (subsidiary) mission as a basis for this estimate. in this instance a correct mission would be:-- (task) to capture y island, (purpose) in order to deny to the enemy the use of the only available base site in the area abcd. this mission is identical with the decision, linked to its purpose, of the preceding subsidiary problem. * * * * * subsidiary problems relating to training (page ), when solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step, involve estimates of the situation very similar to those explained previously (chapter vi). section i-a of such a training estimate will include a summary of the salient features of the existing situation, from the strategical or tactical viewpoint, together with a statement of the salient features of the operations to be carried out for which the projected training is designed. the incentive will be found in a previous decision calling for the operations which require the training to be given. the assigned objective will be the making of adequate provision for training appropriate to the projected operations. the (subsidiary) mission will be:-- (task) to provide appropriate training, (purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action during the operations contemplated. (in each particular case the operations contemplated will be indicated by proper phraseology in the mission or by reference to the preceding summary of the situation.) section i-b of a training estimate will take account of the training factors cited in the estimate form (chapter vi) for a basic problem, but will specify details with respect to both own and enemy forces. this section will also cover existing facilities for training, as well as the characteristics of the theater which have now or may have a bearing on the training to be given. section ii will discuss the various possible procedures for affording the appropriate training. section iii will deal with any measures which may be adopted by the enemy (through actual attack, through propaganda, or any other methods) to hinder or prevent the desired training. section iv will be devoted to the selection of the best training procedure. section v will state the decision as to the essentials of the training to be given and as to the method of giving the training. the decision will be in such detail as to constitute a general plan, or a proper basis therefor, from which a detailed plan may be developed. a detailed training plan, developed from the foregoing decision, will assemble the necessary information and assumptions, will state the general plan for training, and will prescribe the appropriate training tasks. it will also include any proper coordinating measures, make provision for the logistics of the training plan, and finally provide for the exercise of command and for supervision over the training. a training plan may be briefed by annexing appropriate documents,--e.g., a program and a schedule. the commander will ordinarily issue a schedule for training to be given under his own supervision; he will usually issue a program for training to be given by his subordinates, who will in turn prepare their own schedules. * * * * * subsidiary problems involving intelligence (page ), when solved by the procedure distinctive of the first step, call for an intelligence estimate along the lines indicated, in general, in chapter vi. section i-a of the estimate will include a summary of the salient features of the present situation and of the contemplated strategical and tactical operations. the incentive, to be found in a previous decision of the commander, will be noted. the assigned objective will be the making of provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and of the theater of operations. the mission will be:-- (task) to make provision for adequate intelligence of the enemy and of the theater of operations, (purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the operations contemplated. section i-b of the intelligence estimate will take account of the factors as to intelligence and as to related matters which are noted in the estimate form (chapter vi) for a basic estimate. section ii will consider the possible procedures for obtaining information, i.e., for its collection, including reports from collecting agencies. section iii will consider the capabilities of the enemy as to counter-intelligence measures. section iv will compare the various procedures open for the collection of information and for reports thereof. section v will include a decision as to the essential elements of information desired. the decision will be in sufficient detail to serve as a general plan (or a basis therefor), to be developed into a detailed plan for obtaining information and for converting it into intelligence. a detailed intelligence plan will include appropriate information and assumptions. it will state the general plan for obtaining intelligence. this statement will include the essential elements of information desired. the plan will include appropriate tasks for information-collecting agencies, with times and destinations for reports of information. the task for each collecting agency will be based on the general plan (above); such task will also be synchronized with the projected operations prescribed for such agency in current operation orders (chapter viii). the agency's inherent capabilities--its limitations as well as its powers--will be given due consideration. requests to be made on collecting agencies not under the commander's control will be noted in the information (as to own forces) given in the plan (see above). logistics arrangements will include, for example, provisions for handling prisoners of war, the disposition of captured documents and other materials, and the supply of maps, charts, and photographs. counter intelligence measures will be specified where applicable. these include such matters as censorship, press relations, camouflage, and propaganda. finally, the plan will include provision for the rendition of routine and special reports, for special charts (or maps) accompanying or pertinent to such reports, and for any intelligence conferences. the essential elements of information desired are frequently stated in question form. each question deals with an enemy course of action or with one or more of the enemy operations pertaining to such a course (page ). the tasks assigned to collecting agencies, or the requests made on collecting agencies not under the commander's control, will call for information (negative, if desired, as well as positive) as to specific indications of the enemy's action--past, present, or intended--and of the characteristics of the theater as related thereto. the indications to be sought for and reported are carefully determined by the commander in expectation that information obtained as to such matters will enable him to draw conclusions which will answer the questions posed by the essential elements of information. for example, essential elements of information, with corresponding indications, may be as follows: essential elements indications . will the enemy patrol the a. presence or absence of enemy trade route from a to b? forces (number and types of vessels) between meridians--and--, as far north as--and as far south as--. b. times enemy forces observed in area noted. c. apparent activity of enemy forces so noted. . will the enemy cover focal a. presence or absence of enemy points m and n? forces (numbers and types of vessels) in (a specified area or areas). b. times enemy forces observed in areas noted in a, above. c. apparent activity of enemy so noted. d. has m or n been prepared as a naval base; an air base for seaplanes, for land planes? is m or n readily accessible to enemy battleships? what are the characteristics of the available entrances to sheltered anchorages? (etc.) another type of subsidiary problem which may call for a separate subsidiary plan relates to logistics (page ). this problem is particularly applicable to the planning stage, because the contingencies which it involves can, to a considerable degree, be foreseen. in this case the situation which the commander usually desires to bring about is adequate freedom of action with respect to supply and related matters. he wishes to solve this problem so completely during the present step that a logistics plan, concurrently executed with his basic plan, will require minimum subsequent attention. a logistics estimate by the procedure distinctive of the first step will include in section i-a a summary of the pertinent features of the existing strategical and tactical situation, and of contemplated strategical and tactical operations. it will also include a statement of the salient features of the existing logistics situation. the incentive, to be found in a previous decision of the commander, will be noted. the assigned objective will be the making of adequate provision for logistics support. the mission will be:-- (task) to make provision for adequate logistics support, (purpose) in order to contribute to freedom of action in the operations contemplated. (in each particular case the operations contemplated will be indicated by proper phraseology in the mission or by reference to the summary of the situation). section i-b of the estimate will take account of the logistics factors cited in the estimate form (chapter vi) for a basic estimate, but will specify details to the further extent necessary. section ii will discuss the various possible procedures for affording appropriate logistics support of the various categories. section iii will discuss enemy actions to hamper or prevent adequate logistics support. section iv will deal with selection of the best logistics procedure. section v will state the decision as to the essential elements of the logistics support to be afforded, in such detail as will constitute a general plan (or a proper basis therefor) from which a detailed plan can be developed. a detailed logistics plan, developed from the foregoing estimate, will assemble the necessary information and assumptions. it will state the general plan for logistics support. it will then provide for appropriate action as to each type of logistics support, or will state proper tasks for the several subdivisions of the force concerned therewith. it will include, also, any coordinating measures. it will, finally, make provision for exercise of command with reference to logistics support, as well as for any necessary or desirable time elements and similar considerations. * * * * * from all of the foregoing discussions it is apparent that the numerous possible subsidiary problems are all related to the basic problem either directly or through an intervening subsidiary problem. the nature of this relationship is seen through the (subsidiary) purpose, determined for the particular (subsidiary) task; therefore, the understanding of the problem involves a statement or visualization of the (subsidiary) purpose in each case. part iii the exercise of professional judgment in the execution of the plan chapter viii the inauguration of the planned action (the third step--the formulation and issue of directives) in the discussion which now follows, it is demonstrated that, if the second step (chapter vii) has been carried through completely, the formulation of directives requires only the completion of details of the order form, which is explained. the various types of naval plans and directives are also described. scope of the third step. as previously stated (in chapter v, on page ), the inauguration of the planned action (the third step) begins when the commander forms the intention of immediately promulgating, as one or more directives, his solution of the problem represented by the second step. the third step ends at the moment when the problem becomes one of supervising the planned action in the course of its execution. military plans and military directives. a plan is a proposed scheme, procedure, or method of action for the attainment of an objective. it is one of the essential links between decision and action. a directive, in the general sense, initiates or governs conduct or procedure. it is the means by which one's will or intent is made known to others. sometimes the word is employed as a synonym for "order"; at others, it carries the significance of various instructions ranging from the simple to the complex; at still others, it denotes a plan formulated to be placed in effect in a particular contingency or when so directed. in all cases, a directive, to be suitable as a guide for others, has as its origin a plan. the words plan and directive are used herein as follows:--a plan may exist only in the mind. even if formulated and set down in writing, it may receive no distribution. a plan continues to be exclusively a plan so long as it concerns the originating commander alone, and it never loses its identity as a proposed procedure or method of action. when, however, the commander forms the intent of promulgating the plan immediately, the plan becomes also a directive. at this point, as noted in the preceding paragraph ("scope of the third step"), the execution phase begins, from the standpoint of the exercise of mental power, with the inauguration of the planned action. a directive may therefore be ( ) an order effective upon receipt, in which case it may be an order placing in effect a plan already issued; or a directive may be ( ) a formulated plan which the commander intends to issue immediately to his subordinates. accordingly, certain written instruments prepared under the designation of plans are also included under the classification of directives. in the use of these terms hereinafter, the distinction between a plan viewed as a basis for a directive, and a plan intended to be promulgated as a directive, will be indicated in the context. whether written or mental, the complete plan will cover the scope of the decision, and will be the commander's method of procedure for his future conduct of operations. a commander may, or may not, formulate his complete plan in writing, or embody it in a formal directive which will provide for the execution, in full, of the decision of his estimate. he may find that his plan divides into several parts, and he may make separate provision for the execution of each of these parts. while the integrity of a plan depends upon the soundness of its essential details, the plan is properly formulated as a directive or directives projected in detail, only so far into the future as the commander's estimate of the situation assures him of reasonable freedom of action (see page ). where the commander divides his plan into parts for separate accomplishment, he will naturally exercise care that each part is, in itself, the suitable basis for a complete and homogeneous plan. successful execution of all these plans results in the complete accomplishment of his decision. directives required to further the success of a particular operation may be issued without awaiting formulation of the entire plan. parts of the plan may be transmitted as fragmentary directives to guide the action of subordinates in instantaneous or early execution. such cases are far more frequent than are those in which a formal written plan, to guide either the operations in their entirety or a part thereof, is prepared and distributed as a directive. effective action by the subordinate is thus not delayed by the absence of complete written directives. the commander, more especially during war, may be the only individual who is conversant with the entire plan. he may consider that the necessity for secrecy is paramount, or that there are features to whose details he is unwilling to commit himself until the situation is clearer. however, he may usually expect to disclose its scope and general features to his immediate superior, and the plan in its entirety to his next junior; or, in the interests of mutual understanding, to all his subordinates of the next lower echelon or even to his entire command. the scope of the plan also may be a determining factor. if the plan covers an entire campaign or an extended series of operations, its dissemination is less likely and less general than if it is concerned with only a minor operation. during peace, in exercises simulating war, the complete plan is frequently given circulation for purposes of training. subsidiary plans. subsidiary plans, discussed in chapter vii (page ), are frequently issued as annexes to the operation plan (page ) which carries into effect the basic decision. the commander will be the judge as to whether alternative subsidiary plans are necessary or desirable under the circumstances. essentials of military directives. general. by the issue of directives, a commander communicates to his subordinates his plans or such parts of them as he desires. directives may be oral or written, or may be transmitted by despatch. whether a directive is to be effective upon receipt, or under specified conditions, or at a specific time, or upon further instructions from the commander, will be evident from its nature, or will be prescribed in the body of the directive itself. the manner of determining the details of a plan has been discussed in chapter vii. the matter contained therein is pertinent to the preparation of a plan that is not to be issued as a directive as well as to one that is to be so issued. the various categories of directives customarily employed in our naval service, and standard forms for these, are described hereinafter. the essentials of a military directive which is designed to govern the execution of a plan are: (a) that it indicate the general plan for the common effort of the entire force. (b) that it organize the force with a view to the effective accomplishment of this plan. (c) that it assign tasks to the subdivisions of the force, such that the accomplishment of these tasks will result in the accomplishment of the plan adopted for the entire force. (d) that it make appropriate provision for coordination among subdivisions, for logistics support, and for the collection of information and the dissemination of intelligence, that it state the conditions under which the plan is to become effective; and that it indicate the location of the commander during the period of execution. some of these essentials may have found their expression in previous instructions, or may be unnecessary because of the state of mutual understanding. on the other hand, the directive may include annexes in the form of alternative and subsidiary plans, letters of instructions (page ), and other material designed to be of assistance in the intelligent accomplishment of the assigned task. in issuing a directive, whether written or oral, except such a fragmentary order as has previously been described (page ), a commander has the following definite responsibilities: (a) to ensure that subordinates understand the situation,--therefore, to give them pertinent available information. (b) to set forth clearly the general plan to be carried out by his entire force, as well as the tasks to be accomplished by each subdivision of his force. (c) to provide each of these subdivisions with adequate means to accomplish its assigned task. (d) to allow subordinate commanders appropriate discretion within the limits of their assigned tasks, without, however, sacrifice of the necessary coordination. he will also bear in mind that a directive will best convey his will and intent and will be most easily understood by his subordinates if it is clear, brief, and positive. clarity demands the use of precise expressions susceptible of only the desired interpretation. normally, the affirmative form is preferable to the negative. the importance of clarity has been summed up in the saying, "an order which can be misunderstood will be misunderstood". if misunderstandings arise on the part of trained subordinates the chief fault often lies with the person who issued the directive. brevity calls for the omission of superfluous words and of unnecessary details. short sentences are ordinarily more easily and rapidly understood than longer ones. brevity, however, is never to be sought at the expense of clarity. the attainment of brevity often requires considerable expenditure of effort and of time. but time is not to be sacrificed in the interests of obtaining brevity in directives, when the proper emphasis should rather be on initiating early action. positiveness of expression suggests the superior's fixity of purpose, with consequent inspiration to subordinates to prosecute their tasks with determination. the use of indefinite and weakening expressions leads to suspicion of vacillation and indecision. such expressions tend to impose upon subordinates the responsibilities which belong to and are fully accepted by a resolute superior. restatement of the decision for use in the directive except where special considerations exist to the contrary, it will be found that the expression of the decision for use in a directive will most clearly indicate the intent of the commander if stated in terms of the objective to be attained by his force (i.e., of the situation to be created or maintained) and of the outlined action for its attainment (page ). such expression is usually possible in problems of broad strategical scope (page ). in other cases difficulty may be encountered. for instance, in tactical problems dealing with the detailed employment of weapons, the action may necessarily be couched in the terms of a series of acts (see page ). no precise form is prescribed; thoughts clearly expressed are more important than form. it is customary to begin with "this force (or group) will", and then state with brevity the decision as (and if) modified, adding the motivating task which is the purpose of the decision. the motivating task is connected with the preceding statement by words such as "in order to", "to assist in", or "preparatory to", as the case may be. since his original expression of the decision in the first step (chapter vi), the commander has studied the operations required to carry it out. he therefore has gained a knowledge, which he did not then have, of how his action is to be carried out. he may now be able to compile a brief of these operations, applicable to all of them and therefore informative to all subordinate commanders. he may be able to say how, or even where and when, the effort of his force will be exerted. as an illustration, if his decision is "to destroy enemy battle-line strength", his operations might be described "by gun action at long range during high visibility". should the commander, solely for the purpose of making his intent clearer to his subordinate commanders, now decide to include the latter phrase in the re-wording of his decision, he may do so at this point. it may sometimes be necessary to restate the decision for another reason. it will be recalled that the commander is frequently obliged to recognize that he cannot carry out all of these operations, and that he therefore decides to issue a directive to carry out certain ones selected for the first stage (page ). in such a case, he may not now be able to use the full decision as originally determined. in that event he couches the decision in terms of the partial accomplishment inherent in the operations to be undertaken. standard forms for plans and directives form. experience has shown that military directives usually give best results if cast in a standard form well known alike to originator and recipient. such a form tends to prevent the omission of relevant features, and to minimize error and misunderstanding. however, a commander may find that lack of opportunity to facilitate mutual understanding by personal conference requires that one or more subordinates receive instructions in greater detail than a standard form seems to permit. a letter of instructions may then be appropriate. the commander himself is the best judge as to the application of a form to his needs of the moment, and as to the necessity for adherence to form in whatever particular. useful as form is, it is important to keep in mind that it is the servant and not the master. the standard form in use in our naval service, long known as the order form, is applicable, with certain modifications, to all written plans and directives. the order form will now be described in detail from the standpoint of its general application to all classes of directives, including the commander's written plan, whether or not promulgated as a directive. the order form. because of established usage, and for other reasons noted hereinafter, it is desirable that certain clerical details be handled as follows: (a) to minimize errors, all numerals are spelled out, except paragraph numbers and those in the heading. (b) for emphasis, and to minimize errors, all geographical names and names of vessels are spelled entirely with capitals. (c) to standardize arrangement and facilitate reading, a narrow left-hand margin is left abreast the heading and the task organization, and a wider margin is left abreast the paragraphs. (d) for the same reasons, the main paragraph numbers are indented in the wider margin. (e) for emphasis, the task-force or task-group titles of the task organization, wherever occurring, are underlined. the sequence in which the subject matter is presented is a logical arrangement which experience has shown to be effective. since every item has a definite place in the form, formulation is simplified, and ready reference is facilitated. in a written directive, the prescribed paragraph numbering is always followed, even if no text is inserted after a number. this practice serves as a check against accidental omission, and as confirmatory evidence that omissions are intentional. for example, if there is no new information to be disseminated, the paragraph number " " is written in its proper place, followed by the words "no further information". when the subject matter to be presented under any one paragraph is voluminous, it may be broken up into a number of subparagraphs. except in paragraph , these subparagraphs are unlettered. the heading contains: in the upper right-hand corner in the following sequence: (a) the title of the issuing officer's command, such as northern scouts, or advanced force, etc., preceded by the titles, in proper order within the chain of command, of all superior echelons or of such higher echelons as will ensure adequate identification. (b) the name of the flagship, as u.s.s. augusta, flagship. (c) the place of issue: for example, newport, r.i., or, at sea, lat. °- ' n., long. °- ' w. (d) the time of issue: that is, the month, day, year, and hour; for example, july , ; . in the upper left-hand corner in the following sequence: (e) the file notations and classification: secret or confidential, the classification being underlined and spelled with capitals. this classification is repeated on succeeding pages, (f) the type and serial number of the directive, such as operation plan no. , the words operation plan being underlined. this is repeated on succeeding pages. the body. the task organization, which consists of a tabular enumeration of task forces or task groups, the composition of each, and the rank and name of its commander, is the beginning of the body of the directive. it is customary to omit the name of the issuing officer from any task force or task group commanded by him. any unit included in a force named in the task organization is, by virtue of that fact, directed to act under the command of the commander of the specified force. when so desired for additional ready identification, task forces and their subdivisions may be numbered. in our naval service, systematic methods for such numerical designation are indicated from time to time by proper authority. numerals for this purpose are entered in the task organization to the left of the title of each appropriate task force or subdivision thereof. the numerals may be placed in parentheses. the directive is addressed for action solely to the commanders of the task forces or task groups listed in the task organization. train vessels assigned exclusively to particular combatant task forces are listed among the units of those forces in the task organization. if the directive is to be used for assigning tasks involving strategical or tactical movement directly to the train, or to any train units, such units are grouped together to form a separate task force. if instructions to the train are to be issued in another directive, the train need not appear as a separate force in the task organization. as a matter of general custom, the train is usually not included as a task force unless it is to accompany, or act in tactical concert with, some one or more of the combatant task forces listed. each task force named in this table, together with its numerical designation, is preceded by a separate letter, (a), (b), (c), etc., and its assigned task is set forth in a similarly lettered subparagraph in paragraph . paragraph is the information paragraph. it contains such available information of enemy and own forces as is necessary for subordinates to understand the situation and to cooperate efficiently. paragraph contains no part of the tasks assigned by the commander. information of the enemy and that of own forces, and assumptions where pertinent, are usually set forth in separate unlettered subparagraphs. when deemed advisable, unless secrecy or other considerations forbid, paragraph may include statements of the general plans of various higher echelons in the chain of command. a statement of the general plan of the next higher commander will frequently be included. for the same reasons, the commander will often include in this paragraph a statement of his own assigned task, unless, of course, this point is adequately covered in the statement of his general plan in paragraph . inclusion of such matters may enable subordinates to gain a clearer visualization of the relationships existing among the several objectives envisaged by the higher command. to promote cooperation, paragraph may also state the principal tasks of coordinate forces of the commander's own echelon; for like reasons, the principal tasks of other task forces of the command not listed in the task organization may be included. where the immediate superior has prescribed particular methods to other forces for cooperation and security, these may also be set forth as a matter of information. (see page .) in this paragraph, distinction is drawn between information which is based upon established facts, and that of merely probable accuracy. the latter is not to be confused with assumptions which, in operation plans, are accepted as a basis. (see page .) when writing their own information paragraphs, subordinate commanders do not necessarily copy verbatim the information contained in the order of their superior. good procedure calls for them to digest that information, select what is essential, and present it with any additional information considered necessary. care is taken to include necessary information of coordinate task forces. paragraph states the general plan of the complete force under the command of the officer who issued the directive. if several directives are issued for carrying out a single, complete plan (see, for example, discussion of fragmentary orders, page ), then paragraph is usually the same in all of them. the amount of detail given in this paragraph is sufficient to ensure a clear comprehension by the subordinates as to what is to be accomplished by the force as a whole. it is customary to begin with the words, "this force will", followed by a statement of the general plan and, unless secrecy or other considerations forbid, by the purpose of the effort embodied therein. (see restatement of the decision, page ). paragraph assigns individual tasks to all of the task forces listed in the task organization. this paragraph is divided into as many subparagraphs, (a), (b), (c), etc., as there are task forces enumerated in the task organization. each subparagraph commences with the designating letter in parentheses, followed by the title of the task force, underlined. normally the tasks for each task force are stated in order of their importance. if preferred, however, the sequence of tasks may be chronological, i.e., in the order of their execution. each method has certain advantages, according to the nature of the situation. where the chronological sequence is utilized, that fact is clearly indicated, in order to avoid confusion. (see also page ). after the statement of the tasks, these subparagraphs conclude with such detailed instructions as are necessary. in cases where the entire force is listed in the task organization, the proper formulation of tasks requires that the accomplishment of all the tasks of paragraph result in the accomplishment of the general plan set forth for the entire force in paragraph . on the other hand, where several directives are issued, each to a different part of the force, with a paragraph common to all, then the accomplishment of the tasks of all of the paragraphs , of the several directives is properly equivalent to the accomplishment of the general plan prescribed in the common paragraph . where two or more task forces have identical task assignments, only the common subparagraph need be written after the title of the task forces concerned, thus: (a) submarine detachment, (b) air patrol, (assignment of the common task or tasks). if the train has been included as a separate force of the task organization, it will be given its tasks as to tactical and strategical movement in a separate subparagraph of paragraph . in order to avoid repetition, task assignments and instructions which apply to all task forces, or which pertain to the general conduct of the operation, are embodied in a final subparagraph, designated as (x). it is particularly necessary that there be included in this subparagraph the measures (e.g., as to cooperation, security, intelligence, and the like) pertaining to freedom of action and applicable to the force as a whole. any tasks or instructions applicable to individual task forces, only, will have been included in the appropriate earlier subparagraph(s) (i.e., (a), (b), (c), etc.). to avoid repetition in these subparagraphs, coordinating instructions applying to more than one task force may also be included, when convenient to do so, in paragraph (x). paragraph (x) of operation plans and battle plans prescribes, in addition to other applicable matters, the time and/or manner of placing the plan in effect. paragraph is the logistics paragraph. it sets forth the availability of services and supplies, and describes and gives effect to the general plan for the logistics support of the operation. if the information and instructions as to logistics are long and detailed, they may be embodied in a separate logistics plan, which is referred to in paragraph , and is attached as an annex. paragraph is not used for assigning tasks as to movement, either for the train or for any other subdivision of the force. paragraph is the command paragraph. it contains instructions considered necessary for the control of the command during the operation, such as the plan of communications, zone time to be used, rendezvous, and location of the commander. paragraph completes the body. the ending consists of the signature, the list of annexes, the distribution, and the authentication, as noted below: the signature of the commander issuing the directive, with his rank and command title, is placed at the end, for example: john doe, vice admiral, commander northern scouts. annexes consist of amplifying instructions which are so extensive as to make them undesirable for inclusion in the directive itself. they contain detailed instructions, in written form or in the form of charts or sketches. separate communications, logistics, sortie, movement, cruising, intelligence, scouting, screening, approach and deployment plans may be, and frequently are, disseminated as annexes to a directive. alternative plans may also be annexed. annexes are referred to in the appropriate paragraph of the body of the directive, and are listed and serially lettered in capitals at the end near the left-hand margin, immediately below the body and the signature, and above the distribution. the distribution indicates to whom the directive will be transmitted and the medium of transmission. the recording of this distribution in the directive is essential for the information of all concerned. standard distribution may be indicated, as distribution i, ii, etc. authentication. unless signed by the issuing officer, each copy of the directive distributed is authenticated by the signature, rank, and designation of the flag secretary, with the addition of the seal whenever possible. campaign plans. campaign plans (see page ), when communicated to officers on the highest echelons, are usually, in the order form, modified as follows: heading. no change. task organization. not usually used. paragraph . in addition to the information to be furnished, a statement is given of the assumptions (page ) forming the basis of the plan. paragraph . no change. paragraph . this shows the stages into which the campaign has been divided; the several operations which will be undertaken in each stage, and the order of their accomplishment; and usually the forces to be made available for the first stage. paragraph . no change. paragraph . no change. if it be found desirable, however, to employ a letter of instructions instead of a formal directive, this may be done. in this case the letter sets forth the essential features of the subject matter as above described for the order form. sample outline form. for convenient reference, the outline form of an operation plan is appended (see page ). the operation order follows the same form, the essential difference being that the operation order makes no provision for assumptions, and is effective upon receipt unless otherwise provided in the body of the order. types of naval directives naval directives in common use are: war plans, campaign plans, operation plans, operation orders, battle plans, and battle orders. basic war plans designate operating forces, assign broad strategical tasks to these forces, and, where required, delimit theaters of operations. these plans also assign duties to the supporting services such as naval communications, etc. requirements as to logistics plans are also included. accepted usage designates, as contributory plans, the subsidiary plans which are prepared in support of basic war plans. campaign plans. a campaign, as initially visualized, is a clearly defined major stage of a war. a campaign, after it has passed into history, sometimes bears the name of a leader, or a seasonal or geographical designation. it may consist of a single operation, or of successive or concurrent operations. the operations of a campaign have properly a definite objective, the attainment or abandonment of which marks the end of the campaign. (see also page , as to operations.) a campaign plan indicates what might be called the "schedule of strategy" which the commander intends to employ to attain his ultimate objective for the campaign. such a plan usually sets forth the stages into which he proposes to divide the campaign, shows their sequence, and outlines: (a) the general plan for the entire campaign. (b) the general plan involved in each stage and the order of accomplishment, so far as the commander has been able to project his action into the future, and usually, (c) the forces to be made available for the first stage. the campaign plan is primarily for the guidance of the commander himself. when necessary for information or approval, it is forwarded to higher authority. to provide the necessary background, it may sometimes be furnished to the principal subordinates. in any case, the interests of secrecy demand that its distribution be extremely limited. operation plans. an operation plan may cover projected operations, or may be contingent upon the occurrence of a particular event, or combination of events. it may be issued in advance of the event. it is placed in effect at a specified time or by special order, as prescribed in the body of the plan itself. it provides for either a single operation, or for a connected series of operations to be carried out simultaneously or in successive steps. it is prepared for dissemination to task-force commanders. usually, an operation plan covers more complex operations than does an operation order, and projects operations over a greater time and space. it allows more latitude to subordinate commanders, and provides for less direct supervision by the issuing officer. it has typically the distinguishing feature of including, in paragraph , the assumptions upon which the plan is based. to provide for eventualities under varying sets of assumptions, the commander may formulate several alternative operation plans (see pages and ). operation orders. an operation order deals with an actual situation, usually of limited scope, in which the commander considers that he possesses sufficient reliable information to warrant an expectation that certain specific operations can be initiated and carried through to completion as ordered. the operation order does not include assumptions and, unless it contains a proviso to the contrary, is effective upon receipt. under the conditions obtaining in modern warfare, there are few occasions where the operation plan will not accomplish the full purpose of the operation order. the use of the operation plan removes the undesirable feature of imposing possible restriction on the latitude allowed the subordinate without, in any degree, lessening the authority of the commander. battle plans. a battle plan sets forth methods for the coordinated employment of forces during battle. if prepared in advance, it usually is based on certain assumptions which are clearly stated in the plan. battle plans may merely include provisions for a particular combat, or they may include provisions for a connected series of separate or coordinate engagements, possibly culminating in a general action, and all directed toward the early attainment of a specified tactical objective. such combats may range in scope from engagements between small forces to engagements between entire fleets. battle orders are generally limited to the despatches required to place a battle plan in effect, and to direct such changes in plan, or to initiate such detailed operations, as may be necessary during the progress of battle. chapter ix the supervision of the planned action (the fourth step) the discussion in chapter ix invites attention to the special considerations which influence the supervision of the planned action. the running estimate, which employs the procedure typical of the fourth step, is described in detail. nature of discussion. as explained previously (foreword, page ), the vast and important subject of the execution of the plan is treated herein, as to details, chiefly from the standpoint of the mental effort. after the commander has issued a directive placing a plan in effect, it is his responsibility to supervise the execution of the planned action. through the collection, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of new information (page ), he will be able to maintain a grasp of present progress and of future possibilities. he will correct deficiencies and errors in the plan and in its execution. he will guide the direction of effort toward the attainment of the objective. he will ensure that his forces conform their movement in correct relation to the physical objectives and to each other. he will reapportion strength to meet new conditions, through comparison of his accrued losses with respect to those he has anticipated. he will take appropriate measures for freedom of action. if a new plan is needed, the commander will evolve one and adopt it. if the old plan requires changes as to its larger aspects, he will make such changes. otherwise, he will modify details of his plan as the situation may demand, always, however, endeavoring to retain the integrity of the larger aspects. he will issue additional directives as may be required from time to time. goal of planning. the function of planning (part ii, preceding) is to afford a proper basis for effective execution. effective action, therefore, is the goal of planning. otherwise, planning is aimless, except as a mental exercise. such mental exercise, though it be with no thought of specific application in the realm of action, has nevertheless the same fundamental aim as if the planning were so intended. the aim of such mental exercise is the inculcation of habits of thought which will provide a sound basis for effective action. importance of execution. sound planning is, as explained in previous chapters, the best basis for consistently effective action. yet, important as planning is, the effective outcome of plans depends upon their execution. while an unsound plan affords no firm basis for successful action, recognition has long been accorded to the companion fact that a perfect plan, poorly executed, may not provide as firm a foundation for success as a reasonably good plan, carried out with resolution. no plan, moreover, can be confidently expected to anticipate all eventualities. notwithstanding every effort to foresee all possibilities, unexpected changes are to be regarded as normal. this fact emphasizes the importance of effective supervision of the planned action. the importance of such supervision reaches its maximum during actual hostilities; then (page ) the necessity for alert supervision creates an accentuated demand for the intelligent application of mental power to the solution of military problems. professional judgment then assumes supreme importance because vital issues may hinge upon the decisions reached during the development of the action. conditions in war. standards of performance in peacetime exercises cannot be a conclusive guide as to what may be expected under the conditions of war. in the conduct of hostilities against a strong and determined enemy, men and materiel do not always function at their best. commanders undergo extreme strains. orders are often misinterpreted or go astray. men, and the machines which they operate, frequently give less effective service than under the conditions of peace. in war, mistakes are normal; errors are usual; information is seldom complete, often inaccurate, and frequently misleading. success is won, not by personnel and materiel in prime condition, but by the debris of an organization worn by the strain of campaign and shaken by the shock of battle. the objective is attained, in war, under conditions which often impose extreme disadvantages. it is in the light of these facts that the commander expects to shape his course during the supervision of the planned action. the incentive. during the supervision of the action, problems calling for decision may derive their incentive, as already noted (page ) either from a directive issued by superior authority, or by reason of a decision which the commander himself has already made, or because of a recognition, by the commander concerned, of an incentive originating from the demands of the situation. in the event that the incentive appears in the form of a new task assigned by a higher echelon, the commander's problem may become, relatively, simple. in such a case he is relieved of the necessity of recognizing for himself that the time is ripe for a new decision. this fact, however, in no wise alters his fundamental responsibility for taking action, or for abstaining therefrom, in accordance with the actual demands of the situation (page ) in the event that the assigned task requires modification or alteration, or, further, in the event that circumstances even call for a departure from his instructions. should modification, alteration, or departure be in order, the commander is responsible for recognition of the fact that the demands of the situation have introduced further problems. such recognition, therefore, irrespective of whether higher authority has issued instructions covering the new situation, constitutes an incentive to take action. no commander is justified in taking wrong action, or in taking none, merely because no instructions have been received. the ability to recognize the fact that the situation presents a new problem is therefore a primary qualification for command. recognition of new problems. the supervision of the planned action, as the fourth step (see chapter v) of the exercise of mental effort in the solution of military problems, therefore constitutes in itself a problem, in that it involves fundamentally the ability to recognize the existence of new situations which present new problems for solution. to recognize such new problems requires a constant, close observation of the unfolding of the original situation. only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation is unfolding along the lines which he desires and as promulgated in the directives formulated in the third step (see chapter v and chapter viii). in effect, the commander, after action has begun, considers the changing situation as a variable in the problem presented by the original situation. with the march of events he is, therefore, constantly critical to detect whether variations in the original situation are in accordance with his design or whether these variations demand a departure from his plan. nature of readjustments required. if variations in the original situation are in accordance with his design, the commander has the assurance that all goes well, and that the unfolding of the situation is following his intent. however, if this is not the case, changed circumstances may demand recognition of the fact that a new problem has presented itself. in this event a new incentive, arising from the demands of the situation, calls for the solution of the new problem by the procedure distinctive of the first step (chapter vi). should directives of higher authority introduce a new incentive, the commander solves such a new problem, also, by employing the procedure distinctive of the first step. on the other hand, the commander may find that the changed situation motivates merely a modification of his previously determined operations and of his directives already in force. in other words, while his basic problem (chapters v and vi) may remain the same, need may arise for certain deviations from the decisions arrived at in the first and second steps of its solution. should this be the case, each such problem will require solution by a return to the procedures described (chapter vii) with reference to the second step. in the event of a demonstrated need, not for any change of plan, but for a clarification of directives, the procedure involved is that distinctive of the third step (chapter viii). the commander may not safely view the succession of events with complacency, even though the situation appears to be unfolding according to plan. perhaps the enemy may be purposely lessening his opposition, in order to prepare for the launching of an offensive elsewhere. as the situation unfolds, everything is viewed with intelligent suspicion. it is also possible that, during the progress of an operation, an unforeseen opportunity may present itself to take advantage of a new situation and to strike the enemy a more serious blow than that originally intended. unwise caution is to be avoided no less than undue temerity. where a change appears, after proper consideration, to be indicated, no hesitancy is justified in abandoning the original plan. blind adherence to plan is to be condemned no less than unwarranted departures from predetermined procedure. obstinate insistence on the use of a certain method, to the exclusion of others calculated to attain the same effect, may jeopardize the success of the effort. undue emphasis on the particular means to be used, and on the manner of their employment, may exact a penalty by obscuring the objective. on the other hand, undesirable departures from plan involve a corresponding penalty, because changes, unless duly justified by the situation, increase the possibility of failure. frequency of such changes, to the point of vacillation, is a sure indication of a lack of aptitude for the exercise of command. importance of the will of the commander. it is accordingly clear that qualification for the exercise of command requires the mental capacity to recognize the need for changes in plan, or for no change. no less essential, however, are the moral qualities required to carry justified changes into effect, or to resist the pressure of events in favor of changes not justified by the situation. (see also pages , , and .) hence the universal importance accorded, by the profession of arms, to the will of the commander. this is the quality which, together with the mental ability to understand what is needed, enables the commander to bend events in conformity with his plan (page ), or, where such shaping of circumstances is infeasible, to ensure for his command every possible advantage which can be obtained. a recognized defect of certain forms of theoretical problems lies in the fact that they indicate, themselves, the time when a decision is needed. in other words, they fail to vest the commander with responsibility for the decision that the time has come for a decision to be made. hence the great importance, from the viewpoint of timing, of those problems and exercises which partake more fully of the reality of war. the successful conduct of war, notwithstanding its demand for utmost mental power, is founded predominantly on those moral qualities (see pages and ) which spring less from the intellect than from the will. problems involving modifications of the basic plan relatively minor deviations from decisions reached during the first and second steps of the solution of a military problem are frequently required during the action phase, because of incentives arising from the demands of the situation. such requirements will not occasion serious dislocation in the predetermined effort of the competent commander. however, more momentous situations are also to be expected. these will present new problems for the commander to solve. such new problems, so long as they do not challenge the integrity of the basic plan, will not prevent the competent commander from proceeding with his predetermined effort if he takes appropriate action in due time to control the unfolding situation. to maintain such control may call for the exercise of outstanding qualities of the mind and of the will. for example, it is assumed that the commander's basic decision was to destroy an enemy convoy, the purpose of the decision being to prevent the convoy from reaching its destination. now, it is supposed that, during the supervision of the action planned for the destruction of the enemy convoy, the commander receives information of a hostile reinforcement. it is further supposed that this reinforcement, if it joins the enemy convoy's escort, can jeopardize the success of the basic plan. the commander is now confronted with a serious situation which, if not controlled by action of the right kind, at the right time, and at the right place, may result in shattering his basic plan. however, if the commander takes action along correct lines in due time, he can still preserve the integrity of his basic plan and so continue to control the shaping of the situation. having re-examined his solution of his basic problem and found it sound, the commander finds himself under the necessity of resolving a perplexity as to what to do about the enemy reinforcement. in this case, he concludes that his proper action is to prevent the enemy reinforcement from protecting the convoy. this task, self-assigned because of the demands of the situation, becomes the basis for the mission of his new problem, the mission being:-- (task) to prevent the enemy reinforcements from protecting the convoy, (purpose) in order to contribute to the eventual destruction of the convoy. the commander now considers the various courses of action open to him for the accomplishment of this mission. he also considers the enemy courses of action. he then considers each of the former in relation to each of the latter. he compares, on this basis, each of his retained courses of action with the others and so selects the best course of action. finally, he arrives, in this manner, by the same process as in a basic problem (chapter vi), at a decision as to the best course of action. should this decision be to sink the enemy reinforcement, its statement linked to its purpose, would be:-- to destroy the enemy reinforcement, in order to prevent it from protecting the convoy. problems challenging the integrity of the basic plan during the planned action, a change in the situation may have the effect of challenging the integrity of the basic plan. the commander is then faced by a problem calling for the exercise of the highest order of ability. while problems of this type probably occur with least frequency, they are the most important of those which may be encountered during the fourth step. because such a problem, arising from the demands of a new situation, requires a re-estimate of the basic situation, the essential procedure is the same as for a basic problem (chapter vi), but certain modifications necessarily appear. summary of the situation. while a commander will rarely find himself operating without instructions, the importance of problems arising when no directive applies is not lessened by the fact that such problems may infrequently occur. when the commander is faced with a situation not covered in orders of his superior, action may be necessary before he can inform higher authority and receive instructions. usually this situation will be an emergency. often it will not allow time for a written estimate. the fact that such a situation has arisen, and the reasons causing the commander to conclude that it has arisen, are appropriately included in section i-a of the estimate, under the "summary of the situation". recognition of the incentive. the conclusion on the part of the commander that the situation requires him to make provision for its maintenance, or for a change, which in either case calls for a departure from his basic decision, constitutes a recognition of his new incentive. appreciation of the objective. frequently the new incentive will indicate that the objective embodied in the commander's present task is no longer suitable, but that the purpose of his mission still applies. by modifying the objective indicated in his assigned task, but adhering to that in the purpose of his mission, he may be able to visualize a new objective which will be appropriate to the new circumstances. in this case the retained purpose assists the commander to select a new objective which he can confidently adopt as the basis for a new task which he assigns to himself. if neither the commander's task nor the purpose of his mission apply in the new situation, the evolution of a proper new objective may be much more difficult. under such circumstances the commander, by the use of such information as may be in his possession, will first endeavor to deduce an objective whose attainment constitutes a suitable purpose. such a deduction will be made on the basis of the larger circumstances of the war, the campaign, or the operation. having made this determination, the commander will then deduce a task appropriate to the new situation and in furtherance of the adopted purpose. (see chapter iv, page .) formulation of the new mission. an appropriate new task having been determined, as well as a proper purpose, the commander is now in a position to formulate his mission. the procedure to this end is the same as described (chapter vi) with respect to the estimate of a basic problem. other items of the estimate. for such problems of the fourth step, other items of the estimate form require no essential modification of the procedures described (chapter vi) as applicable for the first step. the further procedure applicable to such problems of the fourth step after the commander has reached his new decision, the further course of events may call for the resolution of the required new action into detailed operations and for the inauguration of a new planned effort. in such case, these procedures are accomplished through processes essentially similar to, and fortified by the experience gained in, those distinctive of the second and third steps. (chapters vii and viii, respectively). the new planned effort having been inaugurated, its supervision continues, in turn, through the critical observation and the appropriate action described herein as distinctive of the fourth step. the running estimate of the situation the procedure employed in the constant, close observation of the unfolding of the situation--to the end that justified changes of plan may be initiated, while those uncalled-for may be avoided--is known as the "running estimate of the situation". such an estimate, as indicated by its name, is intended to keep pace with the flow of events, so that the commander may be assured, at any time, that his concurrent action will be based on sound decision. to this end, there is a definite technique for which the standard estimate form provides the basis. this technique is an aid for solution of the problem involved in the supervision of the planned action. aim of the technique involved. any procedure adopted to this end is properly intended to assist in the supervision of the planned action, but not to restrict the commander to particular methods. flexibility is a prime consideration. the ultimate aim of the technique is (see also page ) the rapid and successful exercise of mental effort in the fast-moving events of the tactical engagement. it is under such conditions, more especially, that effective supervision of the planned action becomes a problem calling for every facility that can be afforded the commander. nature of the technique. the solution of this problem requires mentally or in writing according to the particular case, (a) the assembly of information as to events bearing on the situation, and (b) the organization of this knowledge in a manner permitting its ready use. accordingly, it will be found helpful, where circumstances permit written records to be kept, to provide for (a) a journal (a form of diary) of events, with a file to support it, and (b) a work sheet to organize applicable information in proper form for use. the journal affords a basis for the work sheet. the latter in turn facilitates the procedure, continuous while the action lasts, of estimating the situation so that a decision maybe rendered at any time desired. where written records are unnecessary or impracticable, the same fundamental process is nevertheless employed. the fact that the process is then wholly mental, without extraneous aids, involves no change in the basic character of the essential procedure. journal. the journal, to serve the purpose indicated above, is kept in a form permitting entry of essential data as to information needed for the running estimate. such data may include (see the suggested form, next page) the appropriate heading of the journal, the entries applicable to each item of pertinent information, and the authentication with which the journal, for any chosen period, is closed. * * * * * journal (organization, staff subdivision, etc.) from: ................................................. (date and hour) to: ................................................... (date and hour) place: ................................................ ----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+------- tor | tod | time | serial| from | to |incidents, messages,|action | | dated| no. | |(action)| orders, etc. |taken ----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+------- | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | ----+-----+------+-------+------+--------+--------------------+------- the heading of the journal is completed by inserting the designation of the organization and, where appropriate, the staff subdivision concerned, as well as the date and hour of beginning and closing the journal, and the place (or general area) where the commander is located. each entry includes, where appropriate, a time notation: for example, as to the occurrence of an incident; the receipt (tor) or despatch (tod) of a message; the receipt or issue of an order. the serial number assigned to the entry is recorded. the "time dated" is the date and hour of the incident, or, in the case of the message or order, the date and hour appearing thereon. entry of the nature of incidents or of the content of messages and orders, etc., is made under the heading "incidents, messages, orders, etc."; for example: as to an incident: enemy bombed light forces in screen from northward. as to a message: our troops held up on beach a since this date. in the case of a message or order, the source and the action addressee(s) are recorded in the columns marked "from" and "to (action)" respectively. the content of the despatch or order then follows. the amount of detail to be included depends upon the needs of the work sheet (see below) in its capacity as a basis for the running estimate of the situation. further details can be ascertained, if needed, by reference to the journal file. the action taken ("none" entered, if none is taken) is indicated briefly under that heading. in the case of the above entry as to the enemy bombing light forces, the "action taken" might, for example read: prepared for torpedo attack. a single journal may be maintained for the commander concerned; or, if so desired, separate journals may be kept, for their respective purposes, by the several principal officers of his staff. the journal itself and its use are readily adaptable to informal methods of preparation and maintenance. the journal form may be prepared hastily, as needed or desired. where appropriate, the journal form may be made up in quantity by printing, multigraphing, or other practicable methods. journal file. the file to support the journal is merely an assembly of the records (messages, records of oral orders, and the like) from which the journal is compiled. each item of the file bears a serial number corresponding to that of its entry in the journal. an ordinary spike-file is frequently adequate for safe-keeping of these records while in use. when the journal is closed, the corresponding journal-file is filed with the journal, in accordance with standing instructions or in compliance with any particular disposition directed by the commander concerned or by higher authority. work sheet. the usual form of the work sheet follows the form of the estimate of the situation. a single work sheet may be kept for the commander concerned, or, if so desired, separate work sheets may be maintained, for their respective purposes, by the several principal subdivisions of his staff. if a single work sheet is maintained, entries by the several staff subdivisions may be facilitated by dividing the work sheet among them, provided that the entire document can always be promptly assembled for use as needed. the work sheet, while an important official document, is ordinarily informal in nature. the various headings, items, or titles (other than the main heading) are merely copied, ordinarily, from the usual estimate form. an example of a work sheet is as follows (see next page): work sheet (for running estimate of the situation) ........................................ (organization, staff subdivision, etc.) from: .................................. (date and hour) to: .................................... (date and hour, if pertinent) place: ................................. i. establishment of the basis for solution of the problem. a. the appropriate effect desired. ( ) summary of the situation. (note: no other heading would be entered on the first page.) * * * ( ) recognition of the incentive. (note: no other heading would be entered on the (initial) (second) page.) * * * ( ) appreciation of the assigned objective. (note: no other heading would be entered on the (initial) (third) page.) ( ) formulation of the mission. (note: no other heading would be entered on the (initial) (fourth) page.) * * * b. (note: this and subsequent headings are entered in the manner indicated as to section i-a, above.) the remaining necessary headings and subheadings of the estimate form would be entered similarly, in due order, on succeeding pages. the use of a voluminous work-sheet is facilitated by entering item headings in a narrow column at the left, and by cutting away unused space below the several headings in such column, so that all the headings (or the more important ones) can be seen at a glance. a person using the work-sheet can then readily find any page desired. the main heading (top, first page) is filled out in the same manner as for the journal. the other headings, for subdivisions of the work sheet, are ordinarily transcribed from the usual estimate form, according to the needs for the purpose of the particular work sheet. such needs will vary with circumstances. as has also been noted, the estimate form, itself (chapter vi), varies with the situation. for these reasons, the work-sheet form is necessarily flexible, and will rarely be prescribed in detail. reproduction by printing, etc., will not be so frequent as in the case of more rigid forms. the work sheet is authenticated only if it is filed (see below), or if authentication is desired for other reasons. the work sheet is, in fact, as indicated by its name, merely a vehicle to facilitate the performance of important mental work. when the work sheet has served its purpose, it is usually destroyed. it is not, ordinarily, a permanent record, since such purpose is served by the journal and its file. when a formal estimate is made up from the work sheet, such estimate may serve the purpose of an additional record. if no formal estimate is made up for a given period and the commander desires the corresponding work sheet to be preserved for record, he may so direct. ordinarily, the work sheet is not destroyed or filed (and a new one started) at any specified time. the work sheet is kept current by marking out old entries no longer applicable; by inserting new entries; and by inserting fresh pages when old ones have been filled. the old pages, unless otherwise desired, may be destroyed. a separate page of the work sheet is ordinarily used for each item under which entries are to be made. this procedure applies not only to principal headings, but also to subordinate titles, according to the convenience of the user. the procedure of devoting a separate page, initially, to each item of the form enables additional pages to be inserted, where needed. manifestly, the amount of space needed for particular items of the form cannot always be foreseen. the entries, for example, under the "summary of the situation", in section i-a of the estimate form, may require little space or a great deal, depending upon the occurrence of events and upon the period of time covered by the particular work sheet. the same considerations are applicable as to other items. when a work sheet is used as the basis for rendering special reports (e.g., as to intelligence or operations), its form follows that used for such reports. it is, therefore, in essence, merely an outline-form, for entry of applicable data. procedure as to entries. when a report, a plan, a dispatch, or other pertinent item is received, its applicable content may first be entered on the chart (or charts) maintained by the commander (or by his staff). thereafter the usual procedure would be an entry in the journal, followed by a corresponding entry in the work sheet. the document so received and recorded would then be placed in the journal file. this procedure is subject to proper variation, as desired. immediate entry of data on the chart enables the commander and staff to study the implications of the item, without waiting for completion of routine clerical work. outgoing messages, instructions, etc., after approval or signature by the commander, are handled by a similar routine. where applicable, such routine involves appropriate entry on the chart, in the journal, and in the work sheet. the routine of entry is preferably based on a copy (or copies), in order to avoid delay in dispatch. staff organization and functioning. the commander may desire important documents to be handed to him at once, on receipt. he may, of course, call for them at any time. he naturally will not, however, permit any unnecessary delay to occur in the usual routine disposition of such items. the routine exists to assist him, and its arbitrary disruption, if he has properly defined the essential routine in the first instance, cannot but work to his disadvantage. few things are more disturbing to the functioning of a staff than undue eccentricity on the part of the commander or of senior members of the staff. for instance, a personal habit to be rigorously suppressed--a habit not infrequently in evidence, especially under strain of active operations--is that of absent-mindedly pocketing documents needed in the work under way. this subject might, but for limitations of space, be illustrated by numerous other examples whose homely character may not safely be permitted to detract from their considered importance to unity of effort. where circumstances permit, it is desirable that incoming and outgoing items be reproduced in quantity sufficient to supply separate copies for the commander and for the several interested members of his staff. a competent staff brings to the commander's attention all the items necessary--but only those necessary--for his proper performance of his duties. inordinate attention by the commander to unnecessary detail cannot but tend to distract his attention from his proper duties. the importance of smooth and effective functioning of a staff emphasizes the need for an established, though flexible, procedure. such procedure, if reasonably standardized, facilitates unity of action, not only within staffs, but also among the several commanders, and their staffs, throughout the chain of command. the same fundamentals apply as to staff organization. if proper functioning of staffs is generally understood, and if staffs are correctly organized to perform their functions, the basis for their sound organization will become a matter of general understanding. such organization, so understood, becomes a powerful influence in behalf of unity of effort. staff functions--i.e., characteristic activities of staffs--divide fundamentally into two classifications. these may be referred to, for convenience of terminology, as "general" and "special". the latter have to do with the characteristic operations of the command, rather than of the commander; they therefore relate to such matters as routine administration and to the technical aspects of movement, of the use of weapons, and of supply, sanitation, and hospitalization. the administrative, technical, and supply staff, thus broadly considered, may be said to be concerned with special functions relating to the operations of the command. by contrast, the functions of the commander, as such, have to do with the necessary supervision of these special functions and, more especially, with the important duty of planning for the future employment of the command. the supervisory and planning activities may, for purposes of differentiation from the specialties noted above, be properly described as general functions. they relate more particularly to the duties performed personally by the commander or, where such duties become too onerous for performance by one person, by specifically designated members of his staff. in our naval service, the higher commanders are provided, where appropriate, with a chief of staff, who coordinates and supervises the work of the entire staff. provision is also made, where the nature and amount of the work to be done calls for such assignment, for the detail of additional staff officers to perform the important general functions mentioned above. appropriate provision is also made for staff officers to care for the special functions inherent in the character of the particular command. the important general functions referred to are those relating to intelligence duties, and to operations. intelligence duties have to do with the collection of information as to the enemy and the theater of operations, the analysis of this information, its evaluation, its conversion into intelligence by the process of drawing conclusions, i.e., by interpretation, and, finally, its dissemination to the command or to other appropriate destinations (page ). intelligence estimates and plans have been discussed previously (chapters vii and viii). operations, in the sense in which the term is employed in this connection, relate to the strategical or tactical activities of the command, as distinguished from routine functions pertaining to such matters as administration and supply. operations, therefore, as a term employed in contradistinction to intelligence activities, refer more especially to the performance of the commander's own force, while intelligence functions are oriented more particularly with respect to the activities of the enemy. operation plans, which may include subsidiary intelligence plans, have been discussed previously (chapters vii and viii). further details in this connection are touched on hereafter with respect to rendition of reports and estimates. reports. the work-sheet facilitates the rendition, at any time, of such special reports as may be required by higher authority, or by the commander from his staff. the appropriate staff officer is prepared at all times to render a report, oral or written, informal or formal, brief or detailed, of the situation of the command and of other friendly forces, or of the situation with reference to the enemy. no less important than rendition of reports to the commander and to higher authority is the duty of the staff, or of the commander if he lacks such staff assistance, to insure that subordinate commands receive pertinent information at the proper time. cooperating friendly forces will also require such information. this need is sometimes met by the issue of periodical reports or bulletins. however, during the intervals between such reports, and at all times when such reports are lacking, it is a primary duty of the commander and staff to ensure that all concerned are informed as to the situation. the work sheet is a valuable aid for the performance of this duty. oral estimates. when called for by higher authority, or by the commander from his staff, oral estimates of the situation can be rendered promptly and effectively by reference to the work sheet. estimates called for by the commander are presented by the appropriate staff officers. presentation is made to the commander or, if so directed, to the chief of staff, the latter being prepared to render, in turn, an estimate to the commander. oral estimates desired by higher authority are made by the commander, or by the staff officer concerned, at the direction of his commander. partial estimates may be called for from time to time as to particular aspects of the situation. in the larger staffs, the work is facilitated if each principal staff officer is prepared to present his appropriate portion of the estimate. in such case the intelligence officer deals with matters relating to the enemy; the operations officer deals with those relating to own forces, etc. the entire staff acts as a team in the presentation of a well-rounded estimate which will bring all pertinent matters to the attention of the commander so that he may arrive at a sound decision. should the commander call also for recommendations as to the decision or decisions to be made, the appropriate members of the staff will be prepared to submit their views. they will be prepared, as well, to answer at any time the calls of higher authority for information, for the conclusions of the commander, or for his recommendations. should the commander have no staff for the performance of the foregoing functions, such detailed duties devolve upon him personally. certain further aspects of estimates of the situation, with reference to the circumstances obtaining during the supervision of the planned action, are noted under the discussion of written estimates, which follows. written estimates. the foregoing remarks as to oral estimates are no less applicable to those submitted in written form, whether formal or informal, partial or full, brief or detailed. the nature of an estimate, as to these characteristics, will largely depend on the time element. a long and detailed estimate, often desirable when time is available, may be wholly impracticable when the press of events requires rapid decision. the written estimate, even if informal, partial, or brief, would frequently be out of place in situations where an oral estimate would be adequate or, if not adequate, would be all that could be accomplished under the circumstances of the case. special remarks as to entries entries on charts. entries on charts are made by the usual conventional signs and symbols. colors are employed where appropriate. information not yet confirmed is indicated as doubtful; e.g., by a question mark. special remarks, comments, or other notations may also be entered, but in such a manner as not to obscure other data on the chart. where operations of land forces are involved, maps are prepared by the methods prescribed for own land forces. the higher naval staffs, or those of forces specially designated for such operations, may include army officers who will look after these matters; marine officers may also be assigned such duties. special charts or maps are those prepared for special purposes. a chart (or map) maintained to show the existing situation is known as a "situation chart" (or map). charts (or maps) prepared for particular operations are known as "operations charts" (or maps). entries in journals. entries in journals, already referred to, are purely factual. such entries may be complete copies of the content of incoming or outgoing orders or messages. again, as already indicated (page ), entries may consist of condensations of such matters. the oral instructions of the commander are also appropriate items for entry, when the matter is of sufficient importance. the journal may also make note of the movements of the commander, his staff officers, and other persons. other pertinent happenings may also be made the subject of entry. entries in work sheets. entries in the work sheet, since it is the basis for estimates of the situation, are both factual and otherwise. all matters entered in the journal are normally appropriate for notation in the work sheet. information not yet confirmed is indicated as doubtful. the work sheet is also the proper place for notation of matters of conjecture (noted as such) and for other like items related to estimates of the situation. the various considerations influencing the commander and staff, with respect to current operations, are proper entries in the work sheet. its informal character affords wide latitude as to entries which may be considered worthy of record in this manner. the underlying consideration is that anything may and should be entered which will be of value in preparing estimates or rendering the special reports for which the work sheet is to provide the basis. a succinct running account of the situation is kept posted to date under the appropriate heading of the work sheet. entry is also made of the incentive which motivates the solution of the problem presented by the situation. notation is made as to whether the incentive arises from a task imposed by higher authority or is derived by the commander from other sources (see page ). in either case, the work sheet is the proper place for the entry of such facts and of the reasons which have led the commander to regard this incentive as motivating his actions in the situation existing at the time. information of the enemy, after receipt from the various collecting agencies (radio, observers, subordinate forces, etc.), is subject to the usual procedures of analysis, evaluation, interpretation, and dissemination (page ). analysis determines the source and the circumstances which led to the dispatch of the message. evaluation determines its degree of reliability. interpretation calls for drawing conclusions. the resulting intelligence is then disseminated to those concerned, either within the command or elsewhere. since information of the enemy does not become intelligence until converted thereinto by the process of drawing conclusions, this important procedure is recorded briefly in the work sheet. such record makes available, for inclusion in estimates or in reports, the reasons which have formed the basis for such conclusions. information of friendly forces, with any deductions drawn therefrom, is similarly entered in the appropriate portions of the work sheet. the facts and conclusions as to fighting strength of own and enemy forces are important entries. the summary of fighting strength includes proper conclusions as to the relative fighting strength of the opposing forces, own and enemy's. the work sheet is also the proper document for other entries pertinent to estimates of the situation: e.g., the determination of own courses of action, the examination into enemy capabilities, and the selection of own best course of action. the commander's decisions, as rendered from time to time, are also entered for purposes of temporary record. summary the work sheet, therefore, if properly utilized, contains the running estimate of the situation, and is supported by the journal and the journal file. by the use of the running estimate and its supporting documents, the commander is enabled to keep himself apprised of the developments of the situation. on this basis he is able to detect the necessity for any changes in his plan and to arrive promptly at decisions in accordance with such needs. these decisions become the basis for new or modified plans and directives, to cause the action of his command to conform to changes in the situation. where the full procedure described in this chapter is unnecessary or impracticable, a suitable modification without fundamental change will be found applicable. the mental process, even if no records are kept in writing, applies to the supervision of the planned action in every situation. conclusion the discussion of "sound military decision" now closes with a brief review of the application of mental power to the solution of military problems. mental power, which includes the ability to arrive at sound solutions of military problems, is a recognized essential component of fighting strength because (page ) it is the source of professional judgment. the procedure most likely to ensure sound solutions is the studied employment of a natural mental process, differing in no fundamental respect from that effectively utilized in all other human activities. the basic mental procedure remains unchanged, irrespective of the nature of the problem,--be it simple or complex, its solution instantaneous or slow. the procedure is especially adapted to the needs of the profession of arms through the use of the fundamental military principle. by outlining the essential elements involved, this principle, a valid guide for the solution of military problems, covers the full scope of the application of mental power as a recognized component of fighting strength. it is more especially during the swift-moving action of the tactical engagement that moral capacity to command, and mental ability to solve military problems, experience the maximum pressure of events. it is then, also, that the responsibility of the commander creates an added demand for intelligent application of mental power because of the vital issues which may hinge upon his decisions. that this pressure be successfully sustained, and this responsibility effectively discharged, is the goal of any system of mental training in the profession of arms (page ). on a fundamental basis of earnest thought, mental ability, character, knowledge, and experience, finally rests the soundness of decision. outline form of an operation plan titles of the superior echelons, file notations title of the force, secret (or confidential) name of ship, flagship. operation plan place of issue, no. ---- date and hour of issue. task organization. (a) task force title, rank and name of its commander. composition of task force. (b) (similarly enumerate other task forces after appropriate letter (b), (c), etc.) . information. information of enemy and own forces affecting the plan and needed by subordinate commanders. if no further information is available, the statement "no further information" is inserted. distinction is made between matters of conjecture and of fact. if desired, indicate the tasks and general objectives of higher echelons and of coordinate forces of the commander's echelon, and of other forces of the command, not listed in the task organization. if desired, include general measures prescribed by the immediate superior for cooperation and security. assumptions. statement of the assumptions upon which the plan is based. assumptions are things taken for granted as the basis for action. . the general plan for the whole force actually under the command of the officer issuing the plan, and, if desired, the methods of executing it, and its purpose. if additional matter is needed to convey clearly the will and intent of the commander, such matter may be added. . (a) title of task force (a), followed by a statement of the principal task, other tasks, and detailed instructions for the particular task force. tasks may be stated, if preferred, in chronological order. include directions as to cooperation, security, and intelligence activities. (b) title of task force (b), followed by a subparagraph of similar substance and arrangements as in (a) above. (x) instructions that apply to all task forces or that pertain to the general conduct of the operation, including, if desired, coordinating instructions applying to more than one task force. include, particularly, measures for cooperation, security, and intelligence activities. include statement of the time and/or manner in which the operation plan is to be placed in effect. . broad instructions concerning logistics measures necessary to the operation, or reference to logistics annex, if one has been prepared in connection with the operation. . measures necessary to the exercise of command, such as plan of communications, zone time to be used, rendezvous, and location of commander during operation. (signature) rank, title of command. annexes. a. (name) b. do note--the operation order (see page ) follows this form except that it makes no provision for assumptions, distribution and is effective on receipt unless otherwise provided in the body of the order. (authentication) (seal) tabular forms tabular form of the estimate of the situation section page i. establishment of the basis for solution of the problem. a. the appropriate effect desired ( ) summary of the situation ( ) recognition of the incentive ( ) appreciation of the assigned objective ( ) formulation of the mission b. relative fighting strength (to include only such of the following factors as appear to be necessary background for the later reasoning in sections ii to iv.) ( ) survey of the means available and opposed *(a) general factors (i) political factors (ii) economics factors (iii) psychological factors (iv) information and counter-information measures (b) factors more directly applicable to the armed forces (i) vessels, including aircraft (ii) land forces, including land-based aviation (iii) personnel (iv) material (v) logistics ( ) survey of the characteristics of the theater of operations (a) hydrography (b) topography (c) weather (d) daylight and dark periods (e) relative location and distance (f) lines of transportation and supply (g) facilities and fortifications (h) communications ( ) conclusions as to relative fighting strength ii. determination of suitable, feasible, and acceptable courses of action. a. analysis of the assigned objective b. survey of courses of action c. application of tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability d. listing retained courses of action iii. examination into the capabilities of the enemy a. survey of the enemy's problem ( ) summary of the enemy's situation ( ) analysis of the effect desired by the enemy b. survey of enemy capabilities c. application of tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability d. listing retained enemy courses of action iv. selection of the best course of action. a. analysis and comparison of retained courses of action b. determination of the best course of action v. the decision * usually included only in an estimate of broad scope. on the reverse side, page , will be found a tabular form of the resolution of the required action into detailed operations. caution. this folder is merely a guide, provided in order to facilitate reference to the subject matter of chapters vi and vii. it is not possible to arrive at sound military decision by its use alone. tabular form of the resolution of the required action into detailed operations page . assumptions - . alternative plans - . application of the essential elements of a favorable military operation - (a) correct physical objectives - ( ) effective action with relation to (b) advantageous relative positions (c) freedom of action - (d) proper apportionment of fighting strength - . testing of operations for suitability, feasibility and acceptability - (a) listing of retained operations . the formulation of tasks (a) testing of tasks for suitability, feasibility and acceptability . the organization of task forces and task groups - (a) grouping of tasks - (b) assignment of necessary strength (c) completion of the organization . application of the fundamental military principle to the determination of objectives embodied in tasks . the assembly of measures for freedom of action - . the assembly of information . the preparation of subsidiary plans - index index a acceptable consequences as to costs, principle for determination of , acceptability, application of test for , , , , , , , action, effective, against correct physical objectives freedom of (see freedom of action) physical conditions prevailing in field of supervision of the , action, courses of, (see courses of action) annexes to order form application of essential elements of favorable military operations - tests for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability - , - , , , , , the fundamental military principle - apportionment of fighting strength, during amphibious operations discussion of - dispersion and concentration involved in , diversion, bearing of, on feasibility and acceptability of , joint operations numerical considerations procedure for determining proper a salient feature of a military situation (operation) , , , types, training and equipment of forces appropriate effect desired, assigned objective becomes as the basis for the objective definition of enemy's operations studied from viewpoint of - forms part of basis for solution of problem principle for determination of requirements for an understanding of suitability as to - areas, coveted or in dispute geographical not under one's own control geographical under one's own control no land, belong equally to all nations sea, not under command sea, securing command of sea, under command armament, material factor of armed forces, command of factors more directly applicable to function and character of fundamental objective of initial requisite to effective use of art of war, a true concept of, requirement of - foundation of assumptions, defined and discussed , may form basis of estimate authentication, order form b basic, decision estimate of the situation problem problems challenging integrity of, plan(s) problems involving modification of, plan(s) situation war plans basis, of science of war for solution of problem , , , , , , battle plans - , blind adherence to plan condemned body of order form brevity, required in directives c campaign plans, defined form of campaigns of twentieth century reflect intensity of mental training capabilities of enemy, examination into - examination not complete under certain conditions survey of cause and effect correct relation between, established by principles natural forces and resultant conditions principles as valid statements of challenge to integrity of basic plan characteristics, commander's personal influence of, on fighting strength , , of (field) theater of (action) operations , , - , , , , , - racial or national clarity, required in directives command, adherence to chain of, essential to mutual understanding chain of , echelons of mental preparation for paragraph, in order form responsibility and authority inherent in the ideal of training for unity of commander, may depart from his instructions may modify or alter assigned task relation of, to subordinates staff of a the personification of command communication(s), lines of , plans, as an annex provision for study of in strategical and tactical estimates - component(s), human and material, of fighting strength , major, of military problems - mental power, recognized essential, of fighting strength , parts of an operation assigned as tasks condition(s), influence of, on resources of armed forces , of material in war, peacetime exercises not a conclusive guide to consequences as to costs, principle for determination of acceptable constructive representations, establishing basis for corollaries to the decision corollary principle, of the correct military objective of effective military operations correct military objective(s), corollary principle of the selection of - correct physical objectives, effective action against , course(s) of action, analysis and selection of , analysis of, settles suitability, feasibility and acceptability as tentative solutions, complete or partial , , classified as to suitability, feasibility and acceptability combination of enemy's combination of, into complete solution , comparison of, summarized consideration of operations involved in defined degree of detail in which, may be visualized varies determination and selection of the best - each, embodies 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of action supervision of planned action - suspicion, intelligent, everything to be viewed with t tactics, and strategy inseparable differentiated from strategy by end in view task(s) as a predetermined course of action assignment of, to subordinates , , expressed in terms of accomplishment forces and task groups , , formulation of logistics manner of expressing - modification of, may be required by changing situation motivating , of the mission , , organization , , , properly conceived, indicate an objective re-examination of underlying technique, nature of, in solution of problems tentative solution(s) of problem(s) , , , tests for suitability, feasibility and acceptability - , , , , theater of operations, survey of characteristics of - training, measures for peacetime subsidiary problem relating to tactical transportation and supply, lines of types of naval directives u undesirable departures from plan involve penalty unforeseen opportunity to strike enemy may be presented unity of effort, adherence to chain of command, essential to between management and labor most important single factor , mutual understanding requisite to v versatility, as a psychological factor vessels, including aircraft, as a factor applicable to armed forces w war, a human activity and subject to natural law as understood herein conditions in, peacetime exercises not conclusive guide to effective conduct of, requirements and demands of specialized nature of, as a human activity warfare, naval, discussion of , weather will of the commander, importance of work sheet, description of - entries in facilitates oral estimates facilitates special reports facilitates written estimates summary of * * * * * +-----------------------------------------------------------+ | typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | page : circumtances replaced with circumstances | | page : skillfull replaced with skillful | | page : therof replaced with thereof | | page : caried replaced with carried | | | +-----------------------------------------------------------+ https://archive.org/details/torpedowarsub fultrich torpedo war, and submarine explosions. by robert fulton fellow of the american philosophical society, and of the united states military and philosophical society. the liberty of the sea will be the happiness of the earth. new-york: printed by william elliot, water-street. new york reprinted william abbatt being extra no. of the magazine of history with notes and queries contents page torpedo war, &c. plate i plate ii plate iii plate iv, fig. fig. plate v, fig. & fig. thoughts -- on the probable effect of this invention estimate of the force to attack so formidable a blockade fleet manner of arranging the boats until wanted first mode of attack second mode of attack on -- the imaginary inhumanity of torpedo war a view -- of the political economy of this invention editor's preface in view of the prominent part played in the present world war by torpedoes and submarines, the subject of our extra no. is peculiarly timely. the original of is very scarce, only one copy having been sold at auction in many years: nor are copies to be found in any but a few of our libraries. fulton's claims for his invention have been fully substantiated and some of his predictions, made more than a century ago, are remarkably interesting, in view of the events of the past five months. his estimate of our population in has already been exceeded in fact, and only his plan of affixing torpedoes to their prey by means of harpoons seems--for it was made in the days of wooden ships--fantastic, in these days of iron clads. he could not foresee that almost exactly a century would elapse before his invention would be extensively used--though he cautiously says "it is impossible to foresee to what degree torpedoes may be improved and rendered useful." in the joline collection of autograph letters, sold this month, was an extremely interesting letter of fulton's, addressed to gen. william duane. a part reads: "new york, march , i am happy to find you continue the firm friend to torpedoes; an infant art which requires only support and practice to produce a change in maritime affairs of immence (_sic_) importance to this country. expecting the enemy here, i have not been idle, i have prepared torpedoes with locks that strike fire by concussion, and four with clockwork locks." the letter is of great interest throughout, and tells of his plans for blowing up the enemy or driving them from new york waters, his regret that he had not enough torpedoes for the chesapeake; and contains a list of the cost of various sorts, &c. we regret that we could not secure permission to copy the whole of it. torpedo war, &c. _to james madison, esq. president of the united states, and to the members of both houses of congress._ gentlemen, in january last, at kalorama, the residence of my friend joel barlow, i had the pleasure of exhibiting to mr. jefferson, mr. madison, and a party of gentlemen from the senate and house of representatives, some experiments and details on torpedo defence and attack; the favourable impression which the experiments appeared to make on the minds of the gentlemen then present; and my conviction that this invention, improved and practised to the perfection which it is capable of receiving, will be of the first importance to our country, has induced me to present you in the form of a pamphlet a description of my system, with five engravings, and such demonstrations as will give each of you an opportunity to contemplate its efficacy and utility at your leisure; and enable you to form a correct judgment on the propriety of adopting it as a part of our means of national defence. it being my intention to publish hereafter a detailed account of the origin and progress of this invention, and the embarrassments under which i have laboured to bring it to its present state of certain utility; i will now state only such experiments and facts as are most important to be known, and which, proving the practicability of destroying ships of war by this means, will lead the mind to all the advantages which we may derive from it. i believe it is generally known that i endeavoured for many years to get torpedoes introduced into practice in france, and in england; which, though unsuccessful, gave me the opportunity of making numerous very interesting experiments on a large scale; by which i discovered errors in the combinations of the machinery and method of fixing the torpedoes to a ship; which errors in the machinery have been corrected: and i believe i have found means of attaching the torpedoes to a vessel which will seldom fail of success. it is the result of my experience which i now submit to your consideration; and hoping that you will feel an interest in the success of my invention, i beg for your deliberate perusal and reflection on the following few pages. gentlemen who have traced the progress of the useful arts, know the years of toil and experiment, and difficulties which frequently pass, before the utility and certain operation of new discoveries have been established; hence it could not be expected, that torpedoes should be rendered useful without encountering many difficulties; and i am aware, that in the course of farther essays other difficulties will appear; but from my past experience i feel confident, that any obstacle which may arise can be surmounted by attention and perseverance: of this gentlemen will be better able to judge, after examining the following facts and details: note on vessels of war of the united states from which a comparative estimate may be made of their expence, and the expence of armed torpedo boats; also the degree of protection which a given sum would effect, expended in either way. _the ship constitution_ guns first cost, dollars , annual expence when in commission, dollars , draft of water, feet _the wasp_ guns first cost, dollars , annual expence in commission, dollars , draft of water, feet _a gun boat_ first cost, fitted for sea, dollars , annual expence in commission, dollars , men number of gun boats of the united states this work having been published in haste, the errors of the press, and those of diction, shall be corrected in the second edition. (for tables, see pages - ) [illustration: plate i.] plate i _is a view of the brig dorothea, as she was blown up on the th of oct. ._ to convince mr. pitt and lord melville that a vessel could be destroyed by the explosion of a torpedo under her bottom, a strong built danish brig, the _dorothea_, burthen tons, was anchored in walmer road, near deal, and within a mile of walmer castle, the then residence of mr. pitt. two boats, each with eight men, commanded by lieutenant robinson, were put under my direction. i prepared two empty torpedoes in such a manner, that each was only from two to three pounds specifically heavier than salt water; and i so suspended them, that they hung fifteen feet under water. they were then tied one to each end of a small rope eighty feet long: thus arranged, and the brig drawing twelve feet of water, the th day of october was spent in practice. each boat having a torpedo in the stern, they started from the shore about a mile above the brig, and rowed down towards her; the uniting line of the torpedoes being stretched to its full extent, the two boats were distant from each other seventy feet; thus they approached in such a manner, that one boat kept the larboard the other the starboard side of the brig in view. so soon as the connecting line of the torpedoes passed the buoy of the brig, they were thrown into the water, and carried on by the tide, until the connecting line touched the brig's cable; the tide then drove them under her bottom. the experiment being repeated several times, taught the men how to act, and proved to my satisfaction that, when properly placed on the tide, the torpedoes would invariably go under the bottom of the vessel. i then filled one of the torpedoes with one hundred and eighty pounds of powder, and set its clockwork to eighteen minutes. every thing being ready, the experiment was announced for the next day, the th, at five o'clock in the afternoon. urgent business had called mr. pitt and lord melville to london. admiral holloway, sir sidney smith, captain owen, captain kingston, colonel congreve, and the major part of the officers of the fleet under command of lord keath were present; at forty minutes past four the boats rowed towards the brig, and the torpedoes were thrown into the water; the tide carried them, as before described, under the bottom of the brig, where, at the expiration of eighteen minutes, the explosion appeared to raise her bodily about six feet; she separated in the middle, and the two ends went down; in twenty seconds, nothing was to be seen of her except floating fragments; the pumps and foremast were blown out of her; the fore-topsail-yard was thrown up to the cross-trees; the fore-chain plates with their bolts, were torn from her sides; the mizen-chain-plates and shrouds, being stronger than those of the foremast, or the shock being more forward than aft, the mizenmast was broke off in two places; these discoveries were made by means of the pieces which were found afloat. the experiment was of the most satisfactory kind, for it proved a fact much debated and denied, that the explosion of a sufficient quantity of powder under the bottom of a vessel would destroy her.[a] there is now no doubt left on any intelligent mind as to this most important of all facts connected with the invention of torpedoes; and the establishment of this fact alone, merits the expenditure of millions of dollars and years of experiment, were it yet necessary, to arrive at a system of practice which shall insure success to attacks, with such formidable engines. for america, i consider it a fortunate circumstance that this experiment was made in england, and witnessed by more than a hundred respectable and brave officers of the royal navy; for, should congress adopt torpedoes as a part of our means of defence, lords melville, castlereagh, and mulgrave, have a good knowledge of their combination and effect. lord grenville, earls gray and st. vincent[b], have on their minds a strong impression of their probable consequences. sir home popham, sir sidney smith, and colonel congreve, the latter now celebrated for his ingenious invention of pyrotecnic arrows or rockets, were my friends and companions in the experiments; they are excellent and brave men, and from my knowledge of those noblemen and gentlemen, and their sentiments on this subject, i can predict that they would feel much disposed to respect the rights, nor enter the waters of a nation who should use such engines with energy and effect. [footnote a: twenty minutes before the _dorothea_ was blown up, capt. kingston asserted, that if a torpedo were placed under his cabin while he was at dinner, he should feel no concern for the consequence. occular demonstration is the best proof for all men.] [footnote b: the morning of my first interview with earl st. vincent he was very communicative. i explained to him a torpedo and the _dorothea_ experiment. he reflected for some time, and then said, pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed, to encourage a mode of war which they who commanded the seas did not want, and which, if successful, would deprive them of it.] this fortunate experiment left not the least doubt on my mind that the one which i made in the harbour of new-york in august , would be equally successful. the brig was anchored, the torpedoes prepared and put into the water in the manner before described; the tide drove them under the brig near her keel, but in consequence of the locks turning downwards, the powder fell out of the pans and they both missed fire. this discovery of an error in the manner of fixing the locks to a torpedo, has been corrected. on the second attempt, the torpedo missed the brig; the explosion took place about one hundred yards from her, and threw up a column of water ten feet diameter sixty or seventy feet high. on the third attempt she was blown up: the effect and result much the same as that of the _dorothea_ before described. about two thousand persons were witnesses to this experiment. thus, in the course of my essays, two brigs, each of two hundred tons, have been blown up. the practicability of destroying vessels by this means, has been fully proved. it is also proved, that the mechanism will ignite powder at any required depth under water within a given time. it now remains to point out means by which torpedoes may be used to advantage with the least possible risque to the assailants. plate ii represents the anchored torpedo, so arranged as to blow up a vessel which should run against it; b is a copper case two feet long, twelve inches diameter, capable of containing one hundred pounds of powder. a is a brass box, in which there is a lock similar to a common gun-lock, with a barrel two inches long, to contain a musket charge of powder: the box, with the lock cocked and barrel charged, is screwed to the copper case b. h is a lever which has a communication to the lock inside of the box, and in its present state holds the lock cocked and ready to fire. c is a deal box filled with cork, and tied to the case b. the object of the cork is to render the torpedo about fifteen or twenty pounds specifically lighter than water, and give it a tendency to rise to the surface. it is held down to any given depth under water by a weight of fifty or sixty pounds as at f: there is also a small anchor g, to prevent a strong tide moving it from its position. with torpedoes prepared, and knowing the depth of water in all our bays and harbours, it is only necessary to fix the weight f at such a distance from the torpedo, as when thrown into the water, f will hold it ten, twelve, or fifteen feet below the surface at low water, it will then be more or less below the surface at high water, or at different times of the tide; but it should never be so deep as the usual draught of a frigate or ship of the line. when anchored, it will, during the flood tide, stand in its present position; at slack water it will stand perpendicular to the weight f, as at d; during the ebb it will be at e. at ten feet under water the waves, in boisterous weather, would have little or no tendency to disturb the torpedo; for that if the hollow of a wave should sink ten feet below what would be the calm surface, the wave would run twenty feet high, which i believe is never the case in any of our bays or harbours. all the experience which i have on this kind of torpedo is, that in the month of october , i had one of them anchored nine feet under water, in the british channel near dover; the weather was severe, the waves ran high, it kept its position for twenty-four hours, and, when taken up, the powder was dry and the lock in good order. the torpedo thus anchored, it is obvious, that if a ship in sailing should strike the lever h, the explosion would be instantaneous, and she be immediately destroyed; hence, to defend our bays or harbours, let a hundred, or more if necessary, of these engines be anchored in the channel, as for example, the narrows, to defend new-york. [illustration: plate ii.] the figure to the right of the plate is an end view of the torpedo h. h shews its lever forked, to give the better chance of being struck. having described this instrument in a way which i hope will be understood, i may be permitted to put the following question to my readers, which is, knowing that the explosion of one hundred pounds of powder, or more if required, under the bottom of a ship of the line, would destroy her, and seeing, that if a ship in sailing should strike the lever of an anchored torpedo, she would be blown up, would he have the courage, or, shall i say, temerity, to sail into a channel where one or more hundred of such engines were anchored? i rely on each gentleman's sense of prudence and self-preservation, to answer this question to my satisfaction. should the apprehension of danger become as strong on the minds of those who investigate this subject as it is on mine, we may reasonably conclude that the same regard to self-preservation, will make an enemy cautious in approaching waters where such engines are placed; for, however brave sailors may be, there is no danger so distressing to the mind of a seaman, or so calculated to destroy his confidence, as that which is invisible and instantaneous destruction. the consideration which will now present itself, is, that the enemy might send out boats to sweep for and destroy the torpedoes. it is therefore proper to examine the nature of such an operation, and its chance of success. suppose two hundred torpedoes to be placed in three miles of channel, the enemy's boats, in attempting to sweep for them, would be exposed to the fire of our land batteries, or necessitated to fight our boats, for whenever they leave their ships and take to boats, we can be as well armed and active at boat fighting as they; and thus opposed by batteries and boats, they would have three or more square miles of channel to sweep, which, even if successful, would be a work of time, and were they to get up some of the torpedoes, they could not ascertain if all were destroyed, for they could not know whether five or five hundred had been put down; nor could they prevent our boats throwing in additional numbers each day and night. it therefore amounts to an impossibility for an enemy to clear a channel of torpedoes, provided it were reasonably guarded by land batteries and row boats. added to the opposition which might be made to the enemy, there is a great difficulty in clearing a channel of torpedoes with any kind of sweep or drag, so as to establish full confidence in sailing through it. it is only they who put them down and know the number, that could tell when all were taken up. to facilitate the taking of them up, i have, since plate ii was engraved, thought of a very useful and simple piece of mechanism which, being screwed to the box c, will hold the torpedo under water at any given depth, and for any number of days. they may be set to stay under water a day, week, month, or year, and on the day which shall be previously determined, they will rise to the surface; at the same instant each will lock its lever h so that it cannot strike fire, and the torpedo may be handled with perfect safety. not having time to engrave this improvement, it shall be exhibited to congress in a working model, by which it will also be better understood. i will now suppose the enemy to be approaching a port; a signal announces them; our boats run out and throw into the channel two hundred torpedoes, set each to days. should the enemy sail among them, the consequence will teach future caution; should they cruise or anchor at a distance, what could they do? they not knowing the number of torpedoes which were put down, nor the day on which they were to rise to the surface, could not have their boats out exposed to our fire, and waiting from day to day for a time uncertain. whereas, our officers, knowing the number which were put down, and the day they were to rise to the surface, would have their boats ready to take them in, and at the same time replace them with others set for ten, fifteen, twenty, or more days. viewing this subject in all its bearings, the impression on my mind is, that it would be impossible for an enemy to enter a port where anchored torpedoes were thus used, without their incurring danger of such a kind, that courage could not guard them from its consequences. prudence and justice would warrant their abandoning such an enterprise; and the probability is, that knowing us to be thus prepared, they never would attempt it, or should they, and only one vessel were to be destroyed, we might calculate on its good effect to protect us from future hostile enterprises. [illustration: plate iii.] plate iii _represents a clockwork torpedo, as prepared for the attack of a vessel while at anchor or under sail, by harpooning her in the larboard and starboard bow._ b is a copper case to contain one hundred or more pounds of powder; c a cork cushion to give the whole torpedo such a buoyancy, that it will be only from two to three pounds heavier than salt water. to ascertain such weight, when it is charged with powder and the lock screwed on, it is put into a large tub of sea water. c is to have fifteen or twenty inch-holes bored in its sides and top, to let the water rush in and the air out, otherwise, the air would prevent its immediately sinking. a is a cylindric brass box, about seven inches diameter and two inches deep, in which there is a gun-lock with a barrel two inches long, to receive a charge of powder and a wad, which charge is fired into the powder of the case b. in the brass box a there is also a piece of clockwork moved by a spring, which being wound up and set, will let the lock strike fire in any number of minutes which may be determined within one hour. k is a small line fixed to a pin, which pin holds the clockwork inactive; the instant the pin is withdrawn the clockwork begins to move, and the explosion will take place in one, two, three, or any number of minutes for which it has been set; the whole is so made as to be perfectly tight and keep out the water, although under a pressure of twenty-five or thirty perpendicular feet. d is a pine box two feet long, six or eight inches square, filled with cork; it is ten or fifteen pounds lighter than water, and floats on the surface; the line from it to the torpedo is the suspending line, which must be of a length in proportion to the estimated draft of water of the vessel to be attacked; vessels of a certain number of guns usually draw within a few feet of the same draft of water; the suspending line should be from four to eight feet longer than the greatest draft of the vessel, that it may bend round the curve of her side, and lay the torpedo near her keel. from the torpedo and the float d, two lines, each twenty feet long, are united at e, from thence one line goes to the harpoon, the total length of the line from the torpedo to the harpoon being about fifty feet, according to the length of the vessel to be attacked, will, when the ship is harpooned in the bow, bring the torpedo under her bottom near midship. see the harpoon. it is a round piece of iron, half an inch diameter and two feet long, the butt one inch diameter, the exact calibre of the harpoon-gun; in the head of the harpoon there is an eye, the point six inches long is barbed, the line of the torpedo is spliced into the eye of the harpoon, a small iron or tough copper link runs on the shaft of the harpoon, to the link the torpedo-line is also tied, and at such a distance, that when the harpoon is in the gun it will form a loop as at h, but when fired, the link will slide along to the butt of the harpoon, and, holding the rope and harpoon parallel to each other, the rope will act like a tail or rod to a rocket, and guide it straight; without this precaution, the butt of the harpoon would turn foremost, and make a very uncertain shot. f is the harpoon-gun, made strong, and to work on a swivel in a stanchion fixed in the stern-sheets of a boat. my experience with this kind of harpoon and gun, is, that i have harpooned a target of six feet square fifteen or twenty times, at the distance of from thirty to fifty feet, never missing, and always driving the barbed point through three inch boards up to the eye, which practice was so satisfactory, that i did not consider it necessary to repeat it. the object of harpooning a vessel on the larboard and starboard bow, is, to fix one end of the torpedo-line, then, if the ship be under sail, her action through the water will draw the torpedo under her; if she be at anchor, the tide will drive it under her, where, at the expiration of the time for which the clockwork was set, the explosion will destroy her. this being the kind of torpedo and clockwork by which the _dorothea_ in walmer roads, and the brig in new-york harbour were blown up, and the harpoon having succeeded to fix the line to the target, these two experiments shall be combined, and the mode of practice, with the prospect of success and risque to the assailants, examined. [illustration: plate iv. _fig. ._ _fig. ._] plate iv, fig. represents the stern of a row-boat; a platform about four feet long, three feet wide, is made on her stern on a level with the gunwale, and projecting over the stern fifteen or eighteen inches, so that the torpedo, in falling into the water, may clear the rudder. on the platform, the torpedo and its suspending line of cork are to be laid, and the harpoon-line carefully coiled as at f, so that when the harpoon is fired, the line may develope with ease: very pliable well greased, or white line would be best for this purpose. the harpoon and gun are so well engraved as require no explanation. b is the copper case to hold one hundred or one hundred and fifty pounds of powder. c, the box of cork to diminish its tendency to sink and bring it to a specific gravity of only two or three pounds more than sea-water. its suspending box of cork explained in plate iii is not seen in this figure, lest the drawing should be confused; it can be imagined in its proper place. a, is the brass box with the clockwork lock; d, the pin which prevents the clockwork moving; the line from the pin is tied to a bolt, or otherwise fixed to the boat as at e. thus fastened, when the torpedo is pulled into the water, the pin d will remain in the boat, and the clockwork will begin to act. the man who shall be stationed at the gun, and who may be called the harpooner, is to steer the boat and fire when sufficiently near. if he fixes his harpoon in the bow of the enemy, it will then only be necessary to row away; the harpoon and line being fixed to the ship, will pull the torpedo out of the boat, and at the same instant set the clockwork in motion. this reduces the attack of each boat to one simple operation, that only of firing with reasonable attention. should the harpooner miss the ship, he can save his torpedo and return to the attack. while i was with the british blockading fleet off the coast of boulogne in and , i acquired some experience on the kind of row-boat best calculated for active movements, and which i now believe well adapted to a harpooning and torpedo attack; hence i propose clinker-built boats, each twenty-seven feet long, six feet extreme breadth of beam, single banked, and six long oars; one blunderbuss, on a swivel, on the larboard and one on the starboard bow; one ditto on the larboard and one on the starboard quarter, total four, for which cartridges should be prepared, each containing twelve half-ounce balls. to work the blunderbusses, in case of need, two mariners should be placed in the bow, two in the stern; each of those men to be provided with a horse-pistol and cutlass, and each oarsman a cutlass, in case of coming to close quarters with a boat of the enemy. _total of boat's crew_ harpooner. bowman. marines. oarsmen. total men. such boats would be active well armed, and, if good men, may be said to be strong handed, and well prepared to make good a retreat, or act on the defensive, in case of encountering the enemy's boats. fig. a, is a bird's eye view of a vessel at anchor; b, her cable; ee, two torpedoes; cd, is their coupling line, about feet long; it is here represented touching the cable collapsing, and the torpedoes driving by the tide under the vessel. this is the manner in which the _dorothea_ in walmer roads, and the brig in new-york harbour, were blown up. [illustration: plate v. _fig. ._ _fig. ._ _fig. ._] plate v. fig. a, shews a torpedo, with the harpoon-line fixed to the centre of its end; when the line is thus fixed, the tide cannot drive the torpedo under a vessel, for the pressure of the current being equal on both sides, it will hang perpendicular to its suspending box of cork c, fig. , and remain as at b, where, exploding, it would blow the water perpendicular to c, and up the side of the ship; the lateral movement of the water from b to e would give her a sudden cant to one side, but do her no injury. this has been proved by the following practice. on the first of october, , captain siccombe, in a galley with eight men and his coxswain, placed two torpedoes in the manner described, plate iv, fig. , between the buoy and cable of a french gun-brig, in boulogne roads. the tide drove them until they both lay perpendicular to her sides. when the french saw captain siccombe advancing without answering the countersign, they exclaimed that the infernal machines were coming, and fired a volley of musketry at his boat, but without touching a man.[c] the moment the french fired, fearing the effect of the explosions, they all ran aft and were in the greatest confusion. the tide drove captain siccombe's boat so far down, that he was obliged to cross under the brig's stern, where, seeing her men collected, and expecting another volley, he discharged at them two blunderbusses, each containing fifteen half-ounce balls[d], and was rowing away, when both torpedoes exploded, but, to his astonishment, the brig was not destroyed. on the same night, lieutenant payne, of captain owen's ship _l'immortality_, placed two torpedoes across the bow of another french gun-brig; he received their fire, had one man wounded, rowed to some distance, and waited till he saw the explosion of the torpedoes, which did not appear to do any injury to the vessel. when captain siccombe called on me in the morning and reported these circumstances, i was much at a loss to account for the brig not being blown up. defective in the experience which this failure gave me, i had not reflected, that if the copper case, with the clockwork and powder, weighed specifically fifteen or twenty pounds more than water, it would hang like a heavy pendulum to its suspending cork-box c, and if the coupling line were fixed in the centre of the end, as at a, fig. , the action of the tide being equal on both sides, would have no tendency to sheer or drive it from its perpendicular position. after about half an hour's consideration, i was forcibly impressed with this error in arrangement, as the real cause of captain siccombe's and lieutenant payne's failure. [footnote c: they had got some idea of these machines, from an attempt which had been made with them against the boulogne flotilla, in oct. , called the catamaran expedition.] [footnote d: the report on this attack in the french papers, acknowledged that the brig had five men killed and eight wounded: this from two blunderbusses shews that the persons in the vessel attacked have to fear the small arms of the torpedo boats.] i immediately had a large tub made, then filling a copper case with powder, i screwed on to it the clockwork lock, and tied to it the pine box c, then suspending the whole torpedo by a line in the tub of seawater; the end of the suspending line was tied to one end of a scale-beam. i then filled the pine box c with cork, until the whole volume of the torpedo and box of cork would, when just covered with water, hold three pounds in equilibrio in the scale on the other end of the beam. the torpedo being then three pounds heavier than water, had a sufficient tendency to sink; and being so balanced, would, while under water, be easy moved by a slight pressure to either side. then, instead of tying the coupling line to the end of the torpedo, as at a, i tied it to a bridle, as at b, which presenting the side on an angle to the tide, the pressure of the current in the direction of the arrow, would cause the torpedo to sheer from b to g. this arrangement perfectly succeeded to sheer the torpedo from its perpendicular c, and the side of the vessel to e, near the keel, a position, near which it should be to do execution. in this situation, the explosion being under the vessel, would have a great body of water to remove laterally, before it could get out by a line curving round her side. the water, when acted on in so instantaneous a manner as by the explosion of one hundred or one hundred and fifty pounds of powder, does, for the instant, operate like a solid body; hence the explosion raises the vessel up with a great force, acting on a small portion of her bottom, which portion giving way, is the same in effect, as though a high sea had lifted her fifteen or twenty feet, and let her down on the point of a rock of three or four feet diameter. this, i believe, accounts for the certain destruction which will follow all explosions that take place near the keel. in all cases when the explosion is under water, the action will be perpendicular to the surface, as from b to c, for in the perpendicular, there are less particles to remove, and less resistance than in any diagonal, as for example, from b to d. the french papers, giving an account of the attack of captain siccombe and lieutenant payne, acknowledged that the torpedoes blew up along side of the gun-brigs, but gave them only a violent shock and cant to one side; they spoke of the engines as things of little consequence and not to be feared. it is now, however, evident, that they owed the safety of the two brigs to the trifling circumstance of the torpedoes not being properly balanced in water, and the coupling lines not being tied to a bridle, so as to make the torpedoes sheer under the bottoms of the brigs. fig. is a bird's eye view of a ship of the line, either at anchor or under sail, and the torpedo boats rowing on to the attack. i am sensible that there are strong prejudices against the possibility of row-boats attacking a ship or ships of the line, with any reasonable hope of success; i will, therefore, commence my reasoning and demonstrations by the following questions. what is the basis of the aggression and injustice of one nation towards another? is it not a calculation on their power to enforce their will? what is the basis of all courage and obstinate perseverance in battle? is it not a calculation on some real or presumed advantage? a frigate of guns is not expected to engage a ship of eighty guns, for every rational calculation is against her, and to strike her colours would be no dishonour. if i now prove that all the calculations are in favour of the torpedo boats, it shall hereafter be no dishonour for a ship of the line to strike her colours, and tamely submit to superior science and tactics. i will run my calculations against a third rate, an gun ship, she being the medium between first rates of guns and fifth rates of guns. i will suppose her to enter one of our ports or harbours in a hostile manner; her draft of water, when loaded, is twenty-two feet; her full complement of men six hundred. were we to oppose to the enemy an gun ship, she would cost four hundred thousand dollars; we would also have to give her a full complement of six hundred men. if she engaged the enemy, the chances are equal that she would be beaten; if an obstinate engagement, she might have from one to two hundred men killed and wounded, and be so shattered as to require repairs to the amount of forty or fifty thousand dollars; she might be taken and lost to the nation, and add to the strength of the enemy. it is now to be seen if six hundred men and a capital of four hundred thousand dollars, the value of an eighty gun ship, cannot be used to better advantage in a torpedo attack or defence. men at to a boat, would man boats, boats at one hundred dollars each $ , torpedoes complete, one hundred and fifty dollars each, powder included , harpoon-guns, thirty dollars each , blunderbusses, twenty dollars each , pair of pistols, fifteen dollars a pair , cutlasses, three dollars each , contingencies , ------ total $ , the pay and provisions for six hundred men, whether in an gun ship or in torpedo boats, may be estimated, for the present, to amount to the same sum annually. here is an establishment of fifty boats with their torpedoes, and armed complete, for , dollars; the economy , dollars.[e] it is evident the ship could not put out fifty boats to contend with our fifty; she could not, in fact, put out twenty; therefore, as to boat fighting, the enemy could have no chance of success, and would have to depend for protection on her guns and small arms. unless in a case of great emergency, the attack should be in the night, for if an enemy came into one of our harbours to do execution, the chances would be much against her getting out and to any great distance before night. in a night usually dark, rowboats, if painted white, and the men dressed in white, cannot be seen at the distance of three hundred yards; and there are nights so dark, that they cannot be seen if close under the bow. i might here draw into my calculations on chances that an enemy, who understood the tremendous consequences of a successful attack with torpedoes, would not like to run the risk of the night being dark. but in any night, the fifty boats closing on the vessel in all direction, would spread or divide her fire, and prevent it becoming concentered on any one or more boats. boats which row five miles an hour, and which all good boats can do for a short time, run at the rate of one hundred and forty yards a minute. at the distance of three hundred yards from the ship, they take the risque of cannon shot, which must, from necessity, be random and without aim, on so small a body as a boat, running with a velocity of one hundred and forty yards a minute. at two hundred yards from the ship, the boats must take the chance of random discharges of grape and cannister shot; and at one hundred yards from the ship, they must run the risque of random musket; each boat will, therefore, be two minutes within the line of the enemy's fire before she harpoons, and two minutes after she has harpooned before she gets out of the line of fire, total, four minutes in danger[f]: the danger, however, is not of a very serious kind, for, as before observed, no aim can be taken in the night at such quick moving bodies as row-boats; yet some men might be killed, and some boats crippled[g]; in such an event, the great number of boats which we should have in motion, could always help the unfortunate. but what would be the situation of the enemy, who had their six hundred men in one vessel? the torpedo boats closing upon her, twenty-five on the larboard and twenty-five on the starboard bow, some of them would certainly succeed to harpoon her between the stem and main chains, and if so, the explosion of only one torpedo under her would sink her, killing the greatest part of the people who were between decks, and leave those who might escape to the mercy of our boats to save them. [footnote e: as each boat with a torpedo, and armed complete, costs four hundred and eighty-six dollars, this economy would pay for seven hundred and eighty-nine boats; hence, eight hundred and thirty-nine torpedo boats, with torpedoes and arms, could be fitted out for the sum which one gun ship would cost.] [footnote f: a deduction may be made from this time; after harpooning, if the ship were anchored in a current which ran one mile and a half an hour, that would be two feet three lines a second; hence, if the distance from the harpoon to the torpedo were sixty feet, thirty seconds would be sufficient for the tide to push it under the keel; its clockwork might be set to explode in one minute from the time the torpedo fell out of the boat. if a vessel were under sail, running more than two miles an hour, one minute would be sufficient time for the clockwork to act before explosion. after explosion there would, of course, be no resistance, and the probability is, that all hands would be too much occupied in attempting to save themselves, to keep them under any discipline. thus each torpedo boat would not be more than three minutes within the line of the enemy's fire.] [footnote g: it is very easy to make the boats so that they cannot be sunk.] i now beg of my reader to meditate on this kind of attack, and make up his mind on which are in the greatest danger, the six hundred men in the ship or the six hundred men in the boats? are not the chances fifty to one against the ship, that she would be blown up before she could kill two hundred men in the boats? should this appear evident, or be proved by future practice, no commander would be rash enough to expose his ship to such an attack. to give a fair comparative view of the two modes of fighting, i have, in these calculations, made the number of men on each side equal; by the same rule, if twenty ships of guns were to come into one of our ports, we should be necessitated to have one thousand boats and twelve thousand men; but such a preparation would not be necessary. it can never be necessary for us to have more boats than are sufficient to meet the boats which the enemy could put out to oppose us; an gun ship, which is to work her guns, cannot be encumbered with many boats; they usually have: launch, which is a bad rowing boat, long-boat, which may row well, the captain's barge, a good row-boat, yawl or galley, a good row-boat. they may, in some cases, have two more boats, total number, six; therefore, twelve boats on our part would be sufficient to attack an gun ship[h]; particularly as all our boats would be built expressly for running, and our business is to run to harpoon and not to fight; for this purpose our six oarsmen, in each boat, never quit their oars, while our four marines keep up a running fire. the six or eight boats, if the enemy could put out so many, could not prevent our twelve boats closing on the ship. if our boats came into contact with the boats of the enemy, the contest would be reduced to boat fighting; the ship could not use her cannon or small arms against us without firing on her own boats. if we succeeded to drive the boats under the guns of the ship, we should follow so close, that her guns and small arms could not be used, for in the night and amidst a number of boats in confusion, they could not discriminate between friends and enemies. on this theory, if twenty ships of guns, or a force to that amount, were to enter one of our ports, two hundred and forty boats, with two thousand, eight hundred and eighty men would be sufficient, and perhaps more than sufficient, for the attack; and the following view of chances exhibits a strong probability, that such a force of torpedo boats and men would destroy the twenty ships of the line within one hour. [footnote h: while organizing a system of torpedo attack against the boulogne flotilla, during the administration of mr. pitt, it was determined that men should be taken from lord keath's blockading fleet to man the boats; but a difficulty occurred how to carry a sufficient number of good active boats. finding that the ships of war could not take on board more than their usual number, without being encumbered, four ordnance vessels were to be prepared, with large hatchways, to receive a number of boats in the hole, and to carry torpedoes. lord melville was impeached, mr. pitt died, and my system was opposed by lords grenville and howic, and the new administration. i mention this, my experience, to shew that ships of war cannot carry a sufficient number of boats to contend with the boats which we could bring into action; they may, indeed, bring with them ordnance ships to carry boats; but, if they unman the ships to man the boats, the ship will be less formidable in her fire; and i believe it is self-evident, that they who have to cross three thousand miles of sea, cannot be so well furnished with boats as we who command the land.] let the attack be in the night. the enemy must be at anchor; twenty vessels could not keep under way in narrow waters which could not be well known to their pilots. if they put out their boats, they could not bring into action more than six good boats from each ship, total, one hundred and twenty boats. each ship would be a point from which their boats could depart, or to which they could retreat, total, twenty positions; in these twenty positions, twelve thousand men would be exposed to torpedo explosion, which is the same, in effect, as a mine under a fortification. we, with two hundred and forty boats, exposing only two thousand, eight hundred and eighty men, would have the whole of our shores to depart from or retreat to; being the assailants, and having it in our power to approach in every direction, the enemy could not know a feint from a real attack, nor could they tell which ship we would attack first; they, consequently, could not concentrate their boats; each vessel would be necessitated to keep her own boats on the look-out, and to aid in protecting her; while we should have the power to divide our force, or concentre one hundred boats on one vessel, as circumstances might require; hence, every thing is in favour of the success of the torpedo attack, while the greatest danger is to be apprehended for the ships. having given my experience and theory on anchored and harpoon torpedoes: a system, which i hope will, by every friend to america and humanity, be considered of some interest to the united states. i am aware of the doubts which may arise, as to the success of harpooning, in the minds of men in general, and particularly of those who have no experience, who are so impressed with the imaginary tremendous fire of an gun ship, or a ship of war, that the question has often been put to me, where will you find men who have courage to approach in boats within twenty feet of an gun ship, to harpoon her? i answer, that the men in the boats, who are not more than three minutes within the line of the enemy's fire, are not so much in danger, nor does it require so much courage, as to lie yard-arm and yard-arm, as is usual in naval engagements, and receive broadsides, together with grape-shot and volleys of small arms, for forty or sixty minutes. it is not so great a risque, nor does it require so much courage, as to approach a vessel in boats, climb her sides, and take her by boarding, yet this has frequently been done. this risque is not so great, nor does it require so much courage, as to enter a breach which is defended by interior works and close ranges of cannon, flanked by howitzers or carronades loaded with cannister or grape-shot, and the parapet crowded with infantry; yet such breaches have been forced, and cities taken by assault, with numerous examples of this kind. i hope there can be no doubt of sufficient courage to make a torpedo attack. in the instances of captain siccombe and lieutenant payne, before mentioned, they considered the risque of so little importance, that they went to the attack without any apparent concern; and the sailors, who were offered a few guineas for each gun of a vessel which they should destroy, used all their influence with the officers to be permitted to be of the party. but i will not propose a project so novel, and look to others to execute it. if torpedoes be adopted as a part of our means of defence, with a reasonable number of men organized and practised to the use of them, if it be thought proper to put such men under my command, and an enemy should then enter our ports, i will be responsible to my fellow-citizens for the courage which should secure success. while i propose this, i wish it to be understood, that i do not desire any command or public employment. my private pursuits are the guarantee of an independence and freedom of action, which is always grateful to my feelings; they are useful and honourable amusements, and the most rational source of my happiness. _estimate for an anchored torpedo_ thirty-two pounds of copper, at seventy-five cents a pound $ . a lock in a brass box, water-tight . one hundred pounds of powder, twenty cents a pound . machinery to let it rise to the surface in a given time, rope, cork-box, anchor, and weights . ------ total $ . in page , i have given an estimate for a clockwork and harpooning torpedo. the torpedo will cost $ . each boat, armed complete . _estimate for an establishment in our most important and vulnerable ports._ | | anchored | clockwork | boats | torpedoes | torpedoes +-------+-----------+---------- boston, | | | new-york, | | | in the delaware, | | | chesapeake, | | | charleston, | | | new-orleans, | | | +-------+-----------+---------- total, | | | boats, at three hundred and thirty-six dollars each , dolls. anchoring torpedoes, eighty-four dollars each , clockwork torpedoes, one hundred and fifty dollars each , -------------- total , dolls. having mentioned the ports in which it is most probable the enemy would attempt to make an impression, calculations can be made for a like mode of defending other situations--a _minutiae_, which i am not prepared to enter into, nor is it necessary in the present state of this disquisition. i have shewn a strong power, in boats and torpedoes, to defend six of our principal ports. gentlemen will please to look to the numbers allotted to each port, and reflect, whether an enemy would not be inclined to respect a force so active and tremendous in its consequences; a force, which under the cover of the night, could follow them into every position within our waters, and pursue them for some leagues from our shores into the open sea; yet those establishments would not require an expenditure of four hundred thousand dollars; for the cutlasses and fire-arms to arm the boats, and the powder for the torpedoes, are already in our arsenals and magazines. and what is four hundred thousand dollars in a national point of view? a sum, which would little more than build and fit out for sea two ships of guns. after reflecting on these experiments and demonstrations, i hope no one will, for a moment, hesitate in deciding, that the two thousand, seven hundred torpedoes and six hundred and fifty boats, before estimated, will be a better protection for six of our sea-ports, than two ships of thirty or any other number of guns. to man the boats in the different ports, nothing more will be necessary than a marine militia; they can be as numerous as any possible necessity could require; and should be exercised to row and use the torpedoes until the practice became familiar; after which practice, once a month would be sufficient. corps thus formed, would be no expence to the national government; torpedoes would require no repairs, and the boats, carefully laid up in houses built for the purpose, would last many years. to compare torpedoes with the usual marine establishments, and the superior protection which they give, for any specific sum expended, i have stated this prospect of economy; but i do not consider economy, in the commencement of such a system, as an object of primary importance. let our fellow-citizens be convinced. convince the people of europe of the power and simple practice of these engines, and it will open to us a sublime view of immense economy in blood and treasure. as we are not in actual hostility, and have no opportunity to try experiments on an enemy, my opinion is, that we should immediately prepare for such an event; and to satisfy the public, we should, without loss of time, make the following experiment: purchase a strong ship; make six torpedoes; build two good row-boats, and prepare them as for action, with twelve men each. let the ship be anchored, and the men practised in harpooning, throwing the torpedoes, and observing the action of the tide in driving them under her bottom. after practising on her while at anchor, the ship to be got under way in moderate and stiff breezes, and while under way, the men to row at and harpoon her, letting the torpedoes fall into the water, and observing the action of the current in driving them under her bottom. when the men have been so exercised as to be certain of harpooning the ship, the torpedoes to be charged, a committee appointed, or the whole of congress witness the effect, the ship to be put under way, the helm lashed, her men take to the boat, the torpedo boats advance, harpoon her, and blow her up. the success of such an experiment will shew the value of the system; to which courage must be added in case of an actual engagement. _probable expence of such an experiment_ a strong though old ship; dolls. six torpedoes, one hundred and fifty dollars each two boats, one hundred dollars each two harpoon-guns ---- total, dolls. twenty-four men can be chosen from the sailors in government employ. thoughts _on the probable effect of this invention_ at the time a new discovery is made in physics or mathematical science, the whole of its consequences cannot be foreseen. in the year , bartholomew schwartz is said to have invented gun-powder; twenty-five years after, a very imperfect kind of cannon was constructed of welded bars of iron, others of sheet-iron, rolled in the form of a cylinder and hooped with iron rings; in some cases, they were made of leather, strengthened with plates of iron or copper; balls of stone were used; and it was not until the beginning of the fifteenth century, that is, one hundred and seventy years after the invention of powder, that iron balls were introduced into practice. muskets were not used until the year , or one hundred and ninety-one years after the invention of gun-powder. the spaniards were the first who armed their foot-soldiers in this manner--they had matchlocks; but firelocks, that is, locks with flints, were not used until the beginning of the eighteenth century, one hundred and eighty years after the invention of muskets, and three hundred and eighty years after the invention of powder. when firelocks were first invented, marshal sax had so little confidence in a flint, that he ordered a match to be added to the lock with a flint, lest the flint should miss fire[i]: such is the force of habit and want of faith in new inventions. [footnote i: i have seen one of these firelocks in the collection of ancient arms, rue de bacq. paris.] although cannon, fire-arms, and the whole detail of ammunition, now appear extremely simple, yet we here see the very slow advances to their present state of perfection; and they are still improving: hence i conclude, that it is now impossible to foresee to what degree torpedoes may be improved and rendered useful. when schwartz invented powder, it may be presumed that his mind did not embrace all its consequences, or perceive that his discovery would supercede the use of catapultas, armour, bows and arrows, and totally change the whole art of war. he certainly could have no conception of such a combination of art as we now see in ships of the line; those movable fortifications, armed with thirty-two pounders, and furnished with wings, to spread oppression over every part of the ocean, and carry destruction to every harbour of the earth. in consequence of the invention of gun-powder, ships of war have been contrived, and increased to their present enormous size and number[j]; then may not science, in her progress, point out a means by which the application of the violent explosive force of gun-powder shall destroy ships of war, and give to the seas the liberty which shall secure perpetual peace between nations that are separated by the ocean? my conviction is, that the means are here developed, and require only to be organized and practised, to produce that liberty so dear to every rational and reflecting man; and there is a grandeur in persevering to success in so immense an enterprise--so well calculated to excite the most vigorous exertions of the highest order of intellect, that i hope to interest the patriotic feelings of every friend to america, to justice, and to humanity, in so good a cause. [footnote j: compared with existing military marines, i consider all galleys and vessels of war, which were in use previous to the invention of powder, as very insignificant. it is probable that four gun ships in open sea would destroy all that ever existed at any one time.] i have shewn that a ship of guns and six hundred men, could have little chance of resisting fifty torpedo boats of twelve men each, equal six hundred men. if it can be admitted possible that an gun ship will be necessitated to retreat before fifty boats, she must run so far that the boats cannot follow her, that is, more than eight or ten leagues; therefore, boats could follow a ship over the narrow parts of the baltic or british channel; but i will confine my remarks to the british channel, between boulogne and romney, from calais to dover, and from ostend to the mouth of the thames. if i can shew that in those waters the british fleets would be compelled to retreat before torpedo boats or perish, it follows, that they must yield to a like system of attack in every other sea; and the like combination of power which can force them to yield, will act on all ships of war to their total annihilation. let the coast of boulogne be the scene for action; suppose the british to have one hundred ships of guns, or a force to that amount, equal eight thousand guns and sixty thousand men; this is a greater power than ever has been engaged in one action. i have mentioned large ships, because the strength of a fleet depends more on the size of the ships and weight of metal, than on their number; in such case, the line will not be so much extended as if the vessels were smaller and more numerous; the signals can be seen and answered from the extremities of the line with more certainty, and the order of battle can be better kept. the length of a ship, from the point of the bowsprit to the stern, may be estimated at forty fathoms, and the distance between two ships one hundred fathoms, consequently, the one hundred ships would form one line of fourteen thousand fathoms, or twenty-eight thousand yards, equal to near sixteen miles. such a line could not see and answer signals from the van and rear to the centre. it could, however, be formed into four divisions of twenty-five ships each, and they again could be subdivided; but the tactics which must be adhered to when two fleets of near equal force engage, will be of little utility when the attack is made by a sufficient number of torpedo boats. estimate of the force to attack so formidable a blockading fleet men, sixty thousand, a number equal to the british; they cannot all be sailors, nor is it necessary they should, but men, who with six weeks exercise can learn to row well, for to row with tolerable dexterity, is all the nautical knowledge required. to divide the sixty thousand men, twelve in a boat, will require five thousand boats, each of which will be so light, that its twelve men can draw it on the beach above high water mark, or on the sands or plane, in a few minutes, or launch it into the water with equal facility. manner of arranging the boats until wanted a boat being six feet wide and twenty-seven feet long, if a space of twelve feet wide and thirty-nine feet long be allowed for each boat, four hundred and forty of them would range side by side in the distance of one mile, then leaving twelve feet from the stems of the first row to the sterns of the second, and a like space between each line, the five thousand boats could be laid up on a beach or plane one mile long, one hundred and fifty yards wide, and give sufficient room for the men to get at the boats without confusion; this plan would not require the expence of forming a bason or harbour. thus arranged, each boat with its torpedo, harpoon-guns, arms, and oars, in their places, and the twelve men in their stations, six on each side of the boat, the whole could be run into the water and manned in an hour, which facility of embarking is of the first importance for rapid movements, and to take advantage of the weather.[k] [footnote k: when the british fleet is becalmed before boulogne, the french flotilla is becalmed also, and cannot make any advantageous movements. the calms which lay the british fleet under great disadvantage, will give every possible advantage to the torpedo boats, and will be the most favourable time for the attack.] estimate for the preparations boats, one hundred dollars each , dolls. torpedoes, one hundred and fifty dollars each , harpoon-guns, thirty dollars each , --------- total , , dolls. this is equal to , _l._ sterling or about the value of three ships of guns; it is equal to , , livres, a sum of little importance to france, it being not equal to the expences of her government for one day; the men she has, and three times the number if required; the powder for the torpedoes and arms for the men, are in her magazines. suppose the boats and torpedoes prepared, the harpooners exercised, and the men practised to the oars. the intrepidity of the french, in an assault, has been so often proved, that there can be no question as to their courage to rush on to the attack in any case where there is a reasonable hope of success. it is obvious, that the british ships could not put out a sufficient number of boats to oppose five thousand torpedo boats; consequently, they have not other means of resistance than to manoeuvre and defend themselves from their ports and decks, in the best manner they can devise. it is now necessary, in calculating the chances of success, to examine various modes of attack and defence; i therefore beg of the reader, never to lose sight of the facility with which the whole of the french boats can be run into the water, manned, and ready for action, or again drawn up on the shore, and with how much ease every advantage may be taken of calms and favourable circumstances; he must also separate from his mind the idea of boats attempting to fight ships; such an attempt would be absurd; it is torpedoes, those instruments of instantaneous destruction, which are to decide the contest; the boats are but the means of harpooning and attaching the torpedoes to the ships: this is the whole object of the attack. in defence, it is to be considered by what means a ship or ships could prevent the boats approaching so near as to harpoon them in the larboard and starboard bow, and make good their retreat? i will name the calm months of june, july, and august, as most favourable for the enterprise. let it be recollected, that in all attacks of this kind, the boats row at the rate of five miles an hour, or one hundred and forty-six yards a minute; at the distance of four hundred and thirty-eight yards or three minutes from the ship, they will risk random round shot[l]; at two hundred and nineteen yards or one and a half minutes from the ship, they risk one discharge of grape; at one hundred yards or forty seconds from the ship, they risk one volley of small arms, before they harpoon. after harpooning, it is probable the ship's crew would be more occupied about their own safety, than in standing deliberately to fire at the boats. and thus, each boat will not be more than four minutes within the line of the ship's random shot: such rapidity and decision in attack, gives incalculable advantages to the boats. [footnote l: all shot from cannon, carronades, or howitzers, against boats, must be random: a boat is too small and moves too quick to admit of taking aim; and in the night, musket shot will be random also.] first mode of attack in a calm and usually dark night, the ships at anchor, either in one line or parallel lines, or promiscuously. the torpedo boats to be formed into divisions, each division to consist of fifty boats, and to attack one ship. suppose the ships first attacked to be those nearest the land; in a calm they could not get under way, nor could they change their positions; a ship, by having a spring on her cable, might possibly bring her broadside to bear on the boats; but as the fire of the broadside could do little injury until the boats were within four hundred and thirty-eight yards, or three minutes, of her bow, and, as three minutes after coming within the line of fire is to decide the contest, i conceive that her broadside could not protect her; if the boats, at six hundred yards distance, run for her bow, it would be impossible for her to change her position so quick by a spring on her cable, as the boats could change their direction to keep under her bow. if the ships were in one line, and the headmost first attacked, she could receive no assistance from the vessel astern, for she would lie between the stern ship and the boats, and receive the fire which might be directed for them. if the ships lay in several parallel lines, or promiscuously, and the next line were on her larboard, the larboard ship would be distant at least one hundred fathoms, and while the boats were bearing down, might fire broadsides on them when they were at the distance of two hundred yards; but the moment they closed in with the ship she must cease her fire, otherwise she would do more injury to the ship than to the boats; the larboard ship would, therefore, only have an opportunity to fire two minutes at the boats, in which time, she might possibly discharge two broadsides; but as the boats could keep in a line with the bow of the vessel attacked, and there is more danger from the larboard or starboard ship than the one attacked, a better mode would be to attack the headmost ship of each line at the same time; in such case, each ship would be necessitated to reserve her whole fire for her own defence; she could not assist the next ship, and thus each vessel would be as much exposed and left to her own resources, as though there were not another ship within three leagues of her. the succeeding ships of the line, or lines, could be attacked in like manner: hence, this mode of attacking any number of vessels with an equal number of divisions of boats, amounts to nothing more than a repetition of an attack with fifty boats on one ship, and it does not appear to me possible, that her fire could repel fifty boats, or prevent them lodging ten, fifteen, or twenty harpoons, if necessary, in her larboard and starboard bow. i leave to nautical men and experienced commanders, to shew to the public how a ship or ships of war, anchored in a calm as before stated, could resist such an attack, and their total destruction in a few hours. but commanders, seeing the danger of being becalmed while at anchor, may keep the fleet under way. second mode of attack in the night, the ships under way, calm, or light breezes of not more than four knots an hour. ships of the line, that are under way, seldom approach nearer each other than a cable's length; this precaution, is to prevent their running foul and causing confusion; when expecting an enemy of equal force, the custom is to form one line; admitting, that to oppose the torpedo boats, they preserved this usual order of battle, close hauled and under easy sail, to let the boats come up, here, as in the case of being at anchor, each ship must apply her whole fire against the division of boats which attack her; she cannot aid the ship next to her. as the boats, advancing under cover of the night, each division will, in three minutes from the time they arrive within danger of cannon shot, be in with the bow of the destined ship, and fire their harpoons into her. therefore it appears, that her chance while under way is very little better than when at anchor. if, as the boats advance, a ship turns her bow to meet them, she facilitates their harpooning her. will any other order of battle than one right line, give more security? would two, three, or four parallel lines, give better protection? in such case, the line nearest the boats would be attacked first, and the other lines taken in succession. were the ships to form a crescent, the headmost vessels would be first attacked, in this form, they might surround a number of boats and get them between two fires; but whatever situation the boats may be in, after they arrive within the range of grape-shot they can, in a few minutes, be under the bow of the ship, where they will be safe from all fire except small arms; but to arrive under her bow, amounts to a moral certainty of effecting her destruction. therefore, with the immense advantage which torpedoes give to an attack with boats, it is of little consequence whether it be made in the night or day, in a calm or a breeze of from four to six knots. if the ships engage with the boats, their case will be desperate. in all my reflections on this kind of war, i see no chance for their escape other than by retreat; and the moment english ships of war retreat before torpedo boats, that moment the power of the british marine is for ever lost, and with it the political influence of the nation. in this view of chances, i have calculated the number of men in the boats equal to the number in the ships, and estimated five thousand boats to be brought into action; but in all cases when there are sufficient torpedo boats to drive in the boats of the ships, there will be sufficient to attack the fleet; the one hundred ships could not put six hundred good boats in motion, therefore, one thousand torpedo boats would suffice for the attack; they could be formed into fifty divisions of twenty boats each; they would have every advantage, in a calm, of directing fifty or one hundred boats against one vessel, while the ships would not have the power to concentrate their fire on the boats; the ships could not be defended, unless there were transports or ordinance vessels expressly for carrying good row-boats, the number of which should be sufficient to repel the torpedo boats; but if ships can only be protected by boats, it follows, that they will cease to be of use, and the contest for the command of the channel must be decided by boat fighting. in such case, the nation which could put in action the greatest number of boats, and was least dependent on commerce, would have a decided advantage. england is more dependent on commerce than france; her merchant vessels could be attacked, destroyed, and her trade ruined; yet the commerce of france could not be more, nor so much, injured as it is at present. in such an event, england, who has usurped the dominion of the ocean and laid all nations under contribution, would be the most humble supplicant for the liberty of the seas. and then the emperor of france would have a noble opportunity to display a magnanimity of soul, a goodness of heart, which would add lustre to his great actions, and secure to him the admiration of the civilized world, by granting to so ingenious, industrious, enterprising, and estimable a people, a perfect liberty of commerce.[m] [footnote m: a government, and particularly a monarchy or aristocracy, may be in the habitual practice of vice, while the people are in the habitual practice of virtue. in an aristocracy, where the army, navy, places, and pensions, are in the power of the few, the voice of the people has little or no influence. the genius, industry, and enterprise of the english, have converted a barren island into the most fruitful and beautiful spot on earth; their improvements in the useful arts, have made them the greatest and most useful manufacturing people that ever existed. in proportion as the people, by their industry, increased the riches of the nation, the government found a facility in raising revenue, and have loaded the virtuous people with taxes to the amount of twenty-five or more millions a year, to pay for ruinous wars, the conquest of america, the establishment of the bourbons, and the balance of europe.] i have now run this subject to a conclusion, in which i do not hesitate to say, that two thousand torpedo boats and twenty-four thousand men, would take the command of the british channel from boulogne to romney, from calais, gravelines, dunkirk and ostend, to the mouth of the thames, and that the command of the commerce of those narrow seas, would command the british nation; but there the power of torpedo boats must cease--a nation cannot send such boats to sea to depredate on commerce, nor to foreign countries on expeditions of conquest, and therefore the seas must be free. on _the imaginary inhumanity of torpedo war_ in numerous discussions which i have had on this subject and its consequences, it has been stated, that instead of giving liberty to the seas, its tendency would be to encourage piracy and buccaneering, by enabling a few men in a boat to intimidate and plunder merchant vessels, thereby producing greater evil than the existing military marines. this idea, is similar to one which might have arisen on the invention of muskets, which, giving to an individual the power of certain death at the distance of fifty or a hundred yards, robbers might infest the highways, and from an ambush, shoot the traveller and take his property; yet there is not so much robbery now as before the invention of gun-powder; society is more civilized; it is not so much divided into feuds, or clans, to secrete and protect villainy; and all civilized society will, in their own defence, combine against the robber, who has little chance to escape. in like manner, as an individual, instigated by revenge, might with an air-gun shoot his neighbour, or by means of gun-powder blow up his barn or buildings; but society combine against such atrocious acts, and he who would commit them, could have little other prospect before him than the gibbet. in the case of pirates or buccaneers, they could not make a torpedo without some intelligent workmen, who would be a means of discovery. were they to take a prize, they must have some port to carry it to, or it could be of no use to them; were they to plunder a ship, they could not carry much in a torpedo boat, and the boat must have a port to go to, where neighbours or spectators, observing her suspicious character, would lead to investigation; added to which, pirates are seldom constant in their attachment to each other, and each would suspect the other turning informer. it would be difficult for a torpedo boat to depart from any port of america, and return without being detected. it is certainly much more easy and secure for an individual to go on the highway and rob, yet how seldom is that done. when nations combine against pirates, there is no reason to fear that individuals can make a bad use of this invention. but men, without reflecting, or from attachment to established and familiar tyranny, exclaim, that it is barbarous to blow up a ship with all her crew. this i admit, and lament that it should be necessary; but all wars are barbarous, and particularly wars of offence. it is barbarous for a ship of war to fire into a peaceable merchant vessel, kill part of her people, take her and the property, and reduce the proprietor with his family from affluence to penury. it was barbarous to bombard copenhagen, set fire to the city, and destroy innocent women and children. it would be barbarous for ships of war to enter the harbour of new-york, fire on the city, destroy property, and murder many of the peaceable inhabitants; yet we have great reason to expect such a scene of barbarism and distress, unless means are taken to prevent it; therefore, if torpedoes should prevent such acts of violence, the invention must be humane. when a fortress is besieged, and a mine driven under the citadel, the powder laid, and the train ready to light, it is the custom for the besiegers to send to the commander of the besieged, to inform him of the preparations, and leave it to his judgment to surrender or risque the explosion; if he will not surrender after such warning, and he, with his men, should be blown up, he is to be charged with the inhumanity, and not the besiegers. should government adopt torpedoes as a part of our means of defence, the europeans will be informed of it, after which, should they send hostile ships into our ports among anchored torpedoes or torpedo boats, and such ships should be blown up, the inhumanity must be charged to them, and not to the american government or to this invention. having, in the preceding chapter, given details for a system of french torpedo boats, which could command the narrow parts of the british channel, i may be accused of enmity to england and partiality to france; yet i have neither hatred nor particular attachment to any foreign country. i admire the ingenuity, industry, and good faith of the english people; i respect the arts, sciences, and amiable manners of the people of france. there is much in each of those countries which we may copy to great advantage. but my feelings are wholly attached to my country, and while i labour for her interest in this enterprise, i am happy that the liberty of the seas, which i believe can be effected, will not only benefit america; it will be an immense advantage to england, to france, and to every other nation. convinced of this, i have viewed military marines as remains of ancient warlike habits, and an existing political disease, for which there has hitherto been no specific remedy. satisfied in my own mind, that the torpedoes now discovered, will be an effectual cure for so great an evil. to introduce them into practice, and prove their utility, i am of opinion, that blowing up english ships of war, or french, or american, were there no other, and the men on shore, would be humane experiments of the first importance to the united states and to mankind. a view _of the political economy of this invention_ at the death of queen elizabeth, in , the royal navy consisted of the following vessels. ships of guns. of of of of of of of of of of -- --- total guns, with hoys. when equipped for sea, it carried men. at the death of king james i. in , the royal navy amounted to sixty-two sail; the money expended per annum was fifty thousand pounds sterling, equal to , dollars, cents. at the death of king william, in - , the navy consisted of ships of the line, including fourth rates; frigates fire ships --- total the whole navy mounting about guns, and to completely man the ships, it would take , men; the sum allowed per annum for the navy, was , , pounds sterling, equal to , , dollars, cents. thus in one century, it increased in vessels and men six fold, and in expence twenty fold. in , the royal navy consisted of ships of the line } ships of guns } frigates } sloops } principal force for combat, gun vessels } gun barges } bombs } fire ships } store ships yachts tenders advice boats armed transports dutch hoys river barges convalescent ship hired ships and cutters. --- total annual expence, , , pounds sterling, equal , , dollars, cents; at present, i have not time to ascertain the exact number of men, which however amount to more than one hundred thousand. from to , the number of vessels have been increased four fold, and the expence twelve fold; the expence is now two hundred and seventy times greater than at the death of king james i, one hundred and eighty-five years ago. state of the maritime power of nations about the year taken from arnauld ---------+--------------+------------+------------+-------+------+------- | ships of | | | total | total| total nations | the line | frigates | sloops |vessels|cannon| seamen ---------+--------------+------------+------------+-------+------+------- | ships guns | guns | | | | | | | | | | | from to| from to| | | | spain | - | | | | , | , portugal | - | - | | | , | , naples | - | | | | , | , venice | - | | | | , | , ottoman | | | | | | empire | - | - | galliots| | , | , holland | - | - | | | , | , denmark | - | - | chebecks| | , | , sweden | - | - | gallies | | , | , russia | - | - | various | | , | , france | - | - | various | | , | , england | - | | | | , | , ---------+--------------+------------+------------+-------+------+------- , , taking the whole of these fleets, and estimating their expence by that of the british marine, it must amount to about twenty-six millions of pounds sterling per annum, equal to , , dollars, cents. can we reflect on this table and not feel, in the most sensible manner, the folly of the eleven european nations, who support such establishments for their mutual oppression? is there an american who, after viewing these horrid consequences of divided europe and her barbarous policy, that can for a moment harbour a wish, that these happy states should be divided, and each petty government, in proportion to its resources, augment its fleets and armies either for defence or to gratify a mad ambition, by depredating on its neighbours? if there be such men, they are in a state of political insanity, and the worst enemies to the american people. the humane and excellent dean tucker, in his work on political economy, published during the american revolution, has observed, "that the wars of europe, for the last two hundred years, have, by the confession of all parties, really ended in the advantage of none, but to the manifest detriment of all. suffice it to remark, that had each of the contending powers employed their subjects in cultivating and improving such lands as were clear of all disputed titles, instead of aiming at more extended possessions, they had consulted both their own and their people's greatness much more efficaciously, than all the victories of a cesar or an alexander." this important truth should be deeply impressed on the mind of every american. but i will return to the fleets of europe, and endeavour to point out the principal causes of the great increase of those engines of oppression, and from whence the wealth has arisen to support such expences. i will also shew the increasing resources which will, if science does not check it, enable england hereafter to support a marine of fifteen hundred armed ships, with as much ease as she now does seven hundred and sixty. in , the british nation could not possibly have paid for the expence of such a navy as it possessed in , and in , the resources of the nation were not equal to the expence of the navy of . the reason is, that since , the sciences have developed immense resources. chemistry and mechanics have multiplied the produce of productive labour, and increased the riches of every nation in europe; the commerce of china and the east-indies has been opened; russia and sweden have become civilized and commercial; south america, the west india islands, and north america, have, from a few hundred persons, grown to a population of at least twenty-five millions; who have created a vast and productive commerce, of which there was no conception two centuries ago. agriculture has every where been improved; the earth produces more for a given labour; manufactures are carried on, in various degrees of perfection, in every country and district of country, which, creating surplus wealth to pay for luxuries, returns millions of riches on so enterprising and commercial a people as the english, which, added to their own improvements in mechanism, manufactures, and agriculture, enables the government, at this day, to expend thirteen millions of pounds sterling, annually, on their marine. yet the people in general live better, have more enjoyments, and because they have more enjoyments, they are in reality not more oppressed than the people of , who paid only fifty thousand pounds to the marine. such is the natural consequence of a general cultivation of the useful arts; but a just government and a wise people, should take care that the wealth which the useful arts give to them, should not be uselessly expended. as imports and exports are the consequence of increased population and industry, the following will shew how the expences of the british marine have not only kept pace, but gained on her sources of wealth. _table of british imports, exports, and expence of the marine, in pounds sterling._ in imports , , _l._ exports , , _l._ -------------- total , , _l._ _expence of the marine_ , , _l._ or one thirteenth of the whole imports and exports. in imports , , _l._ export of british manufactures , , _l._ export of foreign goods , , _l._ -------------- total , , _l._ _expence of the navy_ , , _l._ or about one seventh of the total imports and exports. in , the population of the united states was estimated at , , ; with this population, we import from england to the amount of seven millions sterling per annum, for which we pay, in direct and circuitous trade, equal seven millions, making our imports from england, and exports to pay for them fourteen millions, or equal to one seventh of the imports and exports of england. therefore, as it is the profits of trade which support the british marine, we pay one seventh of its whole expence, or about two millions sterling, and, in fact, support one seventh of seven hundred and sixty armed ships, equal . thus we cherish an evil of which we complain, and unless we can destroy it, we must continue to nourish it. in , the population of england and wales amounted to , , ; in , to , , ; it did not double in the last century notwithstanding the great increase of trade. as her population is now equal to one person for every six acres, there is a powerful check on its increase, and the rational calculation is, that it will not double, or rise to eighteen millions in the next two centuries. but the united states is doubling its population in about twenty-five years, or, for probable correctness, say in thirty years; consequently, in we shall have; , , , , , , , , even then, the acres of the united states will be more than ten to an individual. as our habits and customs are english, it is a reasonable calculation, that in years, we shall take from them to the amount of , , , , , , this is more than they now send to all the world, which wealth resulting from american labour, being turned into england, will increase her resources equal to the maintenance of her present marine: for, as i before stated, if of seven millions which we now import, we furnish funds for the seventh part of her naval expences, or say two millions. seven is into fifty-six, the imports of ninety years hence, eight times; the united states will, therefore, furnish sixteen millions sterling per annum, to support the british marine, and enable england to double her present naval establishment. thus we are continually aiding and supporting, the only tyranny which can oppress us, or disturb our tranquility. i am aware that, opposed to this statement, it will be said that we shall become manufacturers, and hereafter import, in proportion to our population, less from england; but, in a vast country like the united states, where lands are cheap, and men can easy be provided for in agricultural pursuits; it will be difficult for the manufactures to keep pace with the population. we are now much greater manufacturers than we were twenty-five years ago; yet our imports increase; the manufactures of england have augmented ten fold in the last century. although her population has not doubled, yet her exports and imports have kept near even pace with each other. the consequence of manufactures, is to create abundance and give the means of purchasing luxuries; therefore, more persons enjoy the luxuries of fine articles. england has her manufactures established and her people taught; she has the start of all the world, which she will keep for very many years; nor can such superiority be an injury to america, or to france, or any other nation, provided the profits are not expended on a military marine to oppress them.[n] then what is to be done to arrest this enormous evil, this organizing system of oppression? one of three things must be done: we must have a marine of a force to be respected, or we must suffer our commerce to be as limited as the british government may think proper, and be laid under contribution; or, military marines must be destroyed, and liberty given to the seas. [footnote n: many appear to be of opinion, that if bonaparte could get the command of the seas, or had it in his power, he would reduce london to ashes, and destroy the arts and manufactures of england. carthage is always cited as an example of a conqueror's vengeance. this, however, has never been my opinion, because it is not justified by any act of his life. in all the countries he has conquered, he has ever respected the sciences and useful arts; he has not burned vienna, berlin, or madrid. had he no other motive, his own fame, in a great measure, depends on the protection which he may give to the sciences. but, independent of this, i believe he well understands the benefit which europe receives from english arts and industry; and his war is not against them, but against the manner in which their profits are applied; that is, against the marine, and interference of the british government in all the concerns of the continent.] what kind of a marine would obtain for us that consideration and respect which would give to our merchant ships unmolested admittance into the ports of europe? fifty ships of guns each, and thirty thousand men, certainly could not guarantee to us such respect. russia has a greater naval force, and dare not show a ship out of the baltic. yet fifty such ships would cost the united states twenty-five millions of dollars, and seven millions of dollars a year; which, added to repairs, dock-yards, arsenals, navy-boards, and agents, may be estimated at ten millions a year. but even could such a marine secure to us a reasonable liberty of commerce, america could not now bear such an expenditure; and where is the additional commerce to pay for ten millions a year, expended to protect it? should our resources, in twenty years, enable us to support such a marine, i have shewn, that the british can augment their fleets also, and spare a force to meet us at sea. but were america to try her finances to the utmost, and establish a marine equal to fifty ships of guns, it would be to us the greatest of misfortunes; for so many persons would become interested in obtaining a support from it, that, like england, we should continue adding, until our successors would find it a power superior to their liberty--one which would load them with taxes, press their children into senseless wars, nor leave them permission to complain. should we ever be necessitated to have a marine of a force to be respected, such are the accumulated evils under which our posterity must suffer. but if science and energy should sweep military marines from the ocean, america will be the garden of the world--an example for europe to imitate. when we contemplate the immense sums which are expended in european marine establishments, and calculate the infinite good which might have been done with the capital, we have to lament that man, instead of gratifying his ambition in wars and devastation, has not sought a more noble and lasting fame in promoting the arts, the sciences, and civilization. the annual expence of the navy of great britain amounts to upwards of thirteen millions a year; as long as war continues, the expence will not be diminished; but taking the chance of war and peace for the succeeding twenty-five years, and estimate that the marine will cost ten millions a year, the expenditure in twenty-five years will be two hundred and fifty millions of pounds sterling. if driven to have a marine, such might be the expenditure of our successors; if we can avoid it, the capital might be expended in useful work. i will now give a short sketch of the improvements which might be made in america for such a sum: first, twelve canals, running from the eastern and northern parts of the united states to the south, each fifteen hundred miles long, and fifty miles distant from each other, equal to eighteen thousand miles; thirty canals, running from the sea coast to the interior, each six hundred miles long and fifty miles apart, or eighteen thousand miles--total, thirty-six thousand miles, at three thousand pounds sterling a mile, amounting to one hundred and eight millions. canals to this extent, would intersect a country fifteen hundred miles long six hundred miles wide, equal nine hundred thousand square miles, or seven hundred and fifty-six millions of acres, not an acre of which would be more than twenty-five miles from canal carriage; and which acres, allowing six to an individual which is equal to the density of english population, or say seven, allowing for rivers, roads, and canals, would be ample space in a country which, by its improvements, must be fertile for one hundred and eight millions of inhabitants. d, two thousand bridges, at thirty thousand pounds sterling each, equal; , , two thousand and fifty public establishments for education, at forty thousand pounds sterling each , , the canals; , , ----------- total , , the two hundred and fifty millions, raised by loan and funded at five per cent. would, if expended on a marine, lay a tax on the people of , , _l._ sterling a year, equal to , , dollars a year, with a horde of excise-men and tax-gatherers, to torment honest industry. but if expended on canals, the profits to transport would pay the interest, and give inconceivable advantages to the people. such communications would facilitate every species of industry. canals bending round the hills, would irrigate the grounds beneath, and convert them into luxuriant pasturage. they would bind a hundred millions of people in one inseparable compact--alike in habits, in language, and in interest; one homogeneous brotherhood, the most invulnerable, powerful, and respectable on earth. say, legislators, you who direct the destinies of this great nation, shall americans, like servile creatures of established habits, imitate european vices, or copy them because they are familiar? shall they nourish a useless marine, lay the basis for its increase, and send it down the current of time to futurity with all its complicated evils? shall such a system consume our resources, deprive the earth of improvements, draw into its vortex ambitious men, divert the best talents of our country from useful works, and interest them in its support--creating non-productive labourers, who must be the consumers of the produce of the productive class, and diminish their enjoyments? or will you search into the most hidden recesses of science, to find a means for preventing such incalculable evils? and direct the genius and resources of our country to useful improvements, to the sciences, the arts, education, the amendment of the public mind and morals. in such pursuits, lie real honour and the nation's glory; such are the labours of enlightened republicans--those who labour for the public good. every order of things, which has a tendency to remove oppression and meliorate the condition of man, by directing his ambition to useful industry is, in effect, republican. every system, which nourishes war and its consequent thousands of idlers and oppressors, is aristocratic in its effects, whatever may be its name. these sentiments exhibit my political creed, the object of all my exertions; and these principles, practised by americans, will create for them a real grandeur of character, which will secure to them the respect and admiration of the civilized world. finis _number and nature of ordnance for each of the ships in the british navy_ ------+-------+-----------------------------------++------------------- |number | number of guns of each nature || carronades rates | of +----+----+----+----+----+----+-----++----+----+----+---- | guns | | | | | | | || | | | ------+-------+----+----+----+----+----+----+-----++----+----+----+---- st --| | | - | | - | | - | || | | - | - | | | | | | | | || | | | d --| | - | | - | | | - | - || | - | | - | | | | | | | | || | | | {| | - | | - | | - | | } || | | | - {| | - | | - | | - | | -} || | - | | - d {| | - | | - | | - | | -} || | | | - {| | - | - | | | - | | - || - | | | - | | | | | | | | || | | | th {| | - | - | | - | | - | || - | - | - | - {| | - | - | | - | | - | || - | | - | | | | | | | | | || | | | {| | - | - | - | | | - | || - | - | | - th {| | - | - | - | | | | - || | - | - | - {| | - | - | - | - | | - | || - | | - | - | | | | | | | | || | | | {| | - | - | | - | - | | || - | | - | - th {| | - | - | - | - | - | | || - | | | - {| | - | - | - | - | - | | - || - | - | - | | | | | | | | | || | | | sloops| | - | - | - | - | - | - | || - | - | - | ------+-------+----+----+----+----+----+----+-----++----+----+----+---- for "notes on vessels of war of the united states" see pages and . _dimensions of ships, number of men, and draught of water_ -------+------------+---------+-----------------------+------------------ number | length on | extreme | compliment of | depth of water of guns|the gun-deck| breadth |sailors | marines | required for each -------+------------+---------+--------+--------------+------------------ | ft. in. | ft. in. | num. | officers | feet | | | | cap. subs.| | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | cap. subs.| | | | | lieutenants.| | | | | subaltern. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | do. | | | | | sergeant. | | | | | do. | -------+------------+---------+--------+--------------+----------------- n. b. the usual complement of marines is one for every gun in the ship for "notes on vessels of war of the united states" see pages and . * * * * * * transcriber's note: the plates were moved to the start of the section describing them. hyphenation was standardized. the table of contents was added by the transcriber. the cambridge manuals of science and literature naval warfare cambridge university press london: fetter lane, e.c. c.f. clay, manager [illustration] edinburgh: princes street berlin: a. asher and co. leipzig: f.a. brockhaus new york: g.p. putnam's sons bombay and calcutta: macmillan and co., ltd. _all rights reserved_ naval warfare by james r. thursfield m.a. hon. fellow of jesus college, oxford with an introduction by rear-admiral sir charles l. ottley k.c.m.g., c.b., m.v.o. sometime director of naval intelligence and secretary to the committee of imperial defence cambridge: at the university press new york: g.p. putnam's sons _with the exception of the coat of arms at the foot, the design on the title page is a reproduction of one used by the earliest known cambridge printer, john siberch, _ contents page introduction by sir charles ottley vii preface xiii chap. i. introductory ii. the command of the sea iii. disputed command--blockade iv. disputed command--the fleet in being v. disputed command in general vi. invasion vii. commerce in war viii. the differentiation of naval force ix. the distribution and supply of naval force index introduction the title chosen by its author for this little volume would assuredly commend it to the naval service, even if that author's name were not--as it is--a household word with more than one generation of naval officers. but to such of the general public as are not yet familiar with mr thursfield's writings a brief word of introduction may perhaps be useful. for the matters herein dealt with are by no means of interest only to the naval profession. they have their bearing also on every calling and trade. in these days when national policy is at the mercy of the ballot-box, it is not too much to say that a right understanding of the principles of maritime warfare is almost as desirable amongst civilians as amongst professional sailors. regrettable indeed would it be if the mere fact that this little book bears a more or less technical title should tempt the careless to skip its pages or pitch it to that dreary limbo which attends even the best of text-books on subjects which we think do not concern us. the fruits of naval victory, the calamities attendant on naval defeat are matters which will come home--in bacon's classic phrase--to the business and the bosoms of all of us, landsmen and seamen alike. most englishmen are at least dimly aware of this. they realise, more or less reluctantly perhaps, that a decisive british defeat at sea under modern conditions would involve unspeakable consequences, consequences not merely fatal to the structure of the empire but destructive also of the roots of our national life and of the well-being of almost all individuals in these islands. elementary prudence insists on adequate safeguards against evils so supreme, and amongst those safeguards the education of the people to-day occupies a foremost place. our empire's destinies for good and evil are now in the hands of the masses of the people. sincerely as all lovers of ordered freedom may rejoice in this devolution of political power to the people, thoughtful men will be apt to reflect that an uninstructed crowd is seldom right in its collective action. if ministerial responsibility has dwindled, _pro tanto_ that of each one of his majesty's lieges has enormously increased; and it is more incumbent on the nation's rank and file to-day than ever in the past to equip themselves with the knowledge necessary to enable them to record their votes aright. it is from this point of view that this manual should be read. it epitomises the principles upon which success in naval warfare depends. it shows how the moral factor in all cases and at every epoch dominates and controls the material; how the "_animus pugnandi_," as mr thursfield calls it, the desire to get at the enemy in "anything that floats," transcends every other weapon in a nation's armoury; how if that spirit is present, all other difficulties can be surmounted, and how without it the thickest armour, the biggest all-shattering guns shrivel in battle to the measure of mere useless scrap iron. this is the message of the book for the seaman. but--and this is of the essence of the whole matter--for the landsman it has also a lesson of a very different kind. his responsibility is for the material factor in naval war. let him note the supreme value of the moral factor; let him encourage it with all possible honour and homage, but let him not limit his contribution to the nation's fighting capital to any mere empty lip-service of this kind. the moral factor is primarily the sailor's business. the landsman's duty is to see to it that when war comes our sailors are sent to sea, not in "anything that floats" but in the most modern and perfect types of warship that human ingenuity can design. how can this fundamental duty be brought home to the individual englishman? certainly not by asking him to master the niceties of modern naval technique, matters on which every nation must trust to its experts. but, the broad principles of naval warfare are to-day precisely as they were at salamis or lepanto; and to a people such as ours, whose history from its dawn has been moulded by maritime conditions, and which to-day more than ever depends upon free oversea communications for its continued existence, these broad principles governing naval warfare have so real a significance that they may wisely be studied by all classes of the community. tactics indeed have profoundly altered, and from age to age may be expected to change indefinitely. but so long as the sea remains naval warfare will turn upon the command of the sea; a "fleet in being" will not cease to be as real a threat to its foe as it was in the days of torrington; invasion of oversea territory will always be limited by the same inexorable factors which for centuries have told in favour of the british race and have kept the fields of england inviolate from the tread of a conqueror. there are indications that still more heavy sacrifices will be demanded from the british taxpayer for the upkeep of the fleet in the future than has been the case even in the recent past. nothing but iron necessity can justify this unfruitful expenditure, this alienation of the national resources in men and money to the purposes of destruction. even as it is, naval administrators are finding it increasingly difficult to carry all sections of politicians and the whole of the masses of this country with them in these ever-increasing demands. the best way of ensuring that future generations of englishmen will rise to the necessary height of a patriotic sense of duty and will record their votes in support of such reasonable demands is to prepare their minds by an elementary knowledge of what naval warfare really means. no englishman, so far as the writer is aware, is better fitted than mr thursfield to undertake this task, and this little book is a very excellent example of the way in which that task should be fulfilled. it unites--very necessarily--a high degree of condensation with a simplicity of language and a lucidity of exposition both alike admirable. and mr thursfield's right to be heard on naval questions is second to that of no civilian in these islands. his relations with the british navy have been for more than a quarter of a century of the closest kind. his reputation in the particular field of literary endeavour which he has made his own ranks high amongst writers as celebrated as admiral mahan, sir george sydenham clarke (lord sydenham), the late sir john colomb, and his brother the late admiral p.h. colomb, sir j.k. laughton, admiral sir cyprian bridge, admiral sir r.n. custance, mr julian corbett, mr david hannay, mr archibald hurd, and others. in the domain of naval history, its philosophy and its literature, he has done brilliant work. when it is added that mr thursfield is known to have been, for many years, one of the chief naval advisers of _the times_, enough will probably have been said to ensure a sympathetic attention for this the veteran author's latest publication. c.l. ottley _ th july _ preface intelligent readers of this little manual will perceive at once that it pretends to be nothing more than an introduction, quite elementary in character, to the study of naval warfare, its history, and its principles as displayed in its history. as such, i trust it may be found useful by those of my countrymen who desire to approach the naval problems which are constantly being brought to their notice and consideration with sound judgment and an intelligent grasp of the principles involved in their solution. it is the result of much study and of a sustained intimacy with the sea service, both afloat and ashore, such as few civilians have been privileged to enjoy in greater measure. even so, i should have thought it right, as a civilian, to offer some apology for undertaking to deal with so highly technical and professional a subject, were i not happily relieved of that obligation by the kindness of my friend rear-admiral sir charles l. ottley, who has, at the instance of the editors of this series, contributed to this volume an introduction in which my qualifications are set forth with an appreciation which i cannot but regard as far too flattering. it would ill become me to add a single word--unless it were of deprecation--to credentials expounded on such high authority. i should hope that readers who have found this volume useful to them will not confine their studies to it. abundant materials for a deeper and more comprehensive study of the subject will be found in the several works incidentally mentioned or quoted in my text, and in the writings of those other contemporary authors with whom sir charles ottley has done me the high honour to associate myself. in these several works further guidance to a still more sustained study of the subject will be found, and in this regard i would specially mention the admirable _short history of the royal navy_, by mr david hannay--two volumes which, in addition to their other and more conspicuous merits, contain a well-selected list of authorities to be consulted prefixed to each chapter. these references, which in truth cover the whole subject, will, i trust, better serve the purpose of the advanced or advancing student than any such bibliography as i could compile on a scale commensurate with the form and purpose of the present manual. readers of my other writings on naval topics will, perhaps, observe that in one or two cases, where the same topics had to be discussed, i have not hesitated to reproduce, with or without modification, the language i had previously employed. this has been done deliberately. the topics so treated fell naturally and, indeed, necessarily within the scope of the present volume. to exclude them because i had discussed them elsewhere was impossible. wherever i found i could improve the language previously employed in the direction of greater lucidity and precision i have done so to the best of my ability, so that the passages in question are close paraphrases rather than mere transcripts of those which occur elsewhere. but i have not attempted to disguise or weaken by paraphrase any passages which still seemed to me to convey my meaning better than any other words i could choose. changes in the methods, though not in the principles, of naval warfare are in these days so rapid and often so sudden that one or two topics have emerged into public prominence even since the present volume was in type. i desire therefore to take this opportunity of adding a few supplementary remarks on them. the first, and possibly in the long run the most far-reaching of these topics, is that of aviation, which i have only mentioned incidentally in the text. that aviation is still in its infancy is a truism. but to forecast the scope and direction of its evolution is as yet impossible. for the moment it may perhaps be said that its offensive capacity--its capacity, that is, to determine or even materially to affect the larger issues of naval warfare--is inconsiderable. i say nothing of the future, whether immediate or remote. any day may witness developments which will give entirely new aspects to the whole problem. in the meanwhile the chief functions of aircraft in war will probably be, for some time to come, those of scouting, observation, and the collection and transmission of intelligence not obtainable by any other means. offensive functions of a more direct and formidable character will doubtless be developed in time, and may be developed soon; but as i am no prophet i cannot attempt to forecast the direction of the evolution, to determine its limits, or to indicate its probable effects on the methods of naval warfare as expounded in the following pages. i will, however, advance two propositions which will not, i believe, be gainsaid by competent authorities. they are true for the moment, though how long they may remain true i do not know. one is that no aircraft yet constructed can take or keep the air in all conditions of weather. the number of days in the year in which it can do so in safety can only be represented by the formula -_x_, in which _x_ is as yet an unknown quantity, though it is no doubt a quantity which will diminish as the art of aviation is developed. the other is that there is as yet no known method of navigating an aircraft with accuracy and precision out of sight of land. the air-currents by which it is affected are imperceptible to those embarked, variable and indeterminate in their force and direction, and quite incapable of being charted beforehand. in these conditions an airman who sought to steer by compass alone, say, from bermuda to new york, might perchance find himself either at halifax, on the one hand, or at charleston on the other. in my chapter on "invasion" no mention is made of those subsidiary forms of military enterprise across the sea which are known as raids. i have treated invasion as an enterprise having for its object the subjugation of the country invaded, or at least the subjection of its people and their rulers to the enemy's will. as such it requires a force commensurate in numbers with the object to be attained, and it stands to reason that this force must needs be so large that its chances of evading the vigilance of an enemy who is in effective command of the sea must always be infinitesimal. a raid, on the other hand, is an enterprise of much lesser magnitude and much smaller moment. its method is to elude the enemy's naval guard at this or that point of his territory; and, having done so, its purpose is to land troops at some vulnerable point of the territory assailed, there to create alarm and confusion and to do as much harm as they can--which may be considerable before their sea communications are severed by the defending naval force assumed to be still in effective command of the sea affected. if that command is maintained, the troops engaged in the raid must inevitably be reduced sooner or later to the condition of a forlorn hope which has failed. if, on the other hand, that command is overthrown, then the troops aforesaid may prove to be the advanced guard of an invasion to follow. thus, although a successful raid may sometimes be carried out in the teeth of an adverse command of the sea, yet it cannot be converted into an invasion until that adverse command has been assailed and overthrown. it is thus essentially fugitive in character, possibly very effective as a diversion, certain to be mortifying to the belligerent assailed, and not at all unlikely to cause him much injury and even more alarm, but quite incapable of deciding the larger issues of the conflict so long as his command of the sea remains unchallenged. it is perhaps expedient to say this much on the subject, because the programme of the naval manoeuvres of this year is known to have included a series of raids of this fugitive character. whether, or to what extent, any of these operations were adjudged to have been successful i do not know. i am only concerned to point out that, whether successful or not, their utmost success can throw little or no light on the problem of invasion unless in the course of the same operations the defenders' command of the sea was adjudged to have been overthrown. in my chapter on "the differentiation of naval force" i endeavoured to define the functions of the so-called "battle-cruiser" and to forecast its special uses in war. at the same time i pointed out that "it is held by some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a hybrid and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can be given." it would appear that the views of these high authorities have now been adopted, in some measure at least, by the admiralty. since the chapter in question was in type it has been officially announced that the battle-cruiser has been placed in temporary, and perhaps permanent, abeyance. its place is to be taken by a special type of fast battleship, vessels in every way fit to lie in a line and yet, at the same time, endowed with qualities which, without unduly increasing their size and displacement, will enable them to discharge the special functions which i assigned to the battle-cruiser in the line of battle. this is done by employing oil instead of coal as the source of the ship's motive power. the change thus adumbrated would seem to be in the natural order of evolution, and at the same time to be in large measure one rather of nomenclature than of substance. the battle-cruiser, as its name implies, is itself essentially a fast battleship in one aspect and an exceedingly powerful cruiser in another. in the fast battleship which is to replace it, the battle function will be still further developed at the expense of the cruiser function. but its speed will still qualify it to be employed as a cruiser whenever occasion serves or necessity requires, just as the battle-cruiser was qualified to lie in a line and do its special work in a fleet action. the main difference is that the fast battleship is much less likely to be employed as a cruiser than the battle-cruiser was; but i pointed out in the text that the employment even of the battle-cruiser in cruiser functions proper was likely to be only occasional and subsidiary. the decision to use oil as the exclusive source of the motive power of fast battleships, and of certain types of small cruisers of exceptional speed, is undoubtedly a very significant one. it may be taken to point to a time when oil only will be employed in the propulsion of warships and coal will be discarded altogether. but that consummation can only be reached when the internal combustion engine has been much more highly developed for purposes of marine propulsion than it is at present. at present oil is only employed in large warships for the purpose of producing steam by the external combustion of the oil. but it may be anticipated that a process of evolution, now in its initial stages in the diesel and other internal combustion engines, will in course of time result in the production of an internal combustion engine capable of propelling the largest ships at any speed that is now attainable by existing methods. when that stage is reached oil will, for economic reasons alone, undoubtedly hold the field for all purposes of propulsion in warships. it is held by some that this country will then be placed at a great disadvantage, inasmuch as it possesses a monopoly of the best steam coal, whereas it has no monopoly of oil at all, and probably no sufficient domestic supply of it to meet the needs of the fleet in time of war. but oil can be stored as easily as coal and, unlike coal, it does not deteriorate in storage. to bring it in sufficient supplies from abroad in time of war should be no more difficult for a power which commands the sea than to bring in the supplies of food and raw material on which this country depends at all times for its very existence. moreover, even if we continued to depend on coal alone, that coal, together with other supplies in large quantities, must, as i have shown in my last chapter, be carried across the seas in a continuous stream to our fleets in distant waters, and one of the great advantages of oil over coal is that it can be transferred with the greatest ease to the warships requiring it at any rendezvous on the high seas, whether in home waters or at the uttermost ends of the globe, which may be most conveniently situated for the conduct of the operations in hand. for these reasons i hold that no serious apprehension need be entertained lest the supply of oil to our warships should fail so long as we hold the command of the sea. if ever we lost the command of the sea we should not be worrying about the supply of oil. oil or no oil, we should be starving, destitute and defenceless. it only remains for me to express my gratitude to my friend sir charles ottley, not merely for an introduction in which i cannot but fear that he has allowed his friendship to get the better of his judgment, but also for his kindness in devoting so much of his scanty leisure to the reading of my proofs and the making of many valuable suggestions thereon. i have also to thank my friend captain herbert w. richmond, r.n., for his unselfish kindness in allowing me to make use of his notes on the dunkirk campaign which he has closely studied in the original papers preserved at the admiralty and the record office. to my son, lieutenant h.g. thursfield, r.n., i am also indebted for many valuable suggestions. finally, my acknowledgments are due to the editors of this series and the syndics of the cambridge university press for their uniform courtesy and consideration. j.r.t. _ th september ._ naval warfare chapter i introductory war is the armed conflict of national wills, an appeal to force as between nation and nation. naval warfare is that part of the conflict which takes place on the seas. the civilized world is divided into separate, independent states or nations, each sovereign within its own borders. each state pursues its own ideas and aims and embodies them in a national policy; and so far as this policy affects only its own citizens, it is subject to no control except that of the national conscience and the national sense of the public welfare. within the state itself civil war may arise when internal dissensions divide the nation into two parties, of which either pursues a policy to which the other refuses to submit. in this case, unless the two parties agree to separate without conflict, as was done by sweden and norway a few years ago, an armed conflict ensues and the nation is divided into two belligerent states which may or may not become, according to the fortune of war, separate, independent, and sovereign in the end. the great example of this in our own time was the war of secession in america, which, happily for both parties, ended without disruption, in the surrender of the weaker of the two, and after a time in a complete reconciliation between them. thus war may arise between two parties in a single state, and when it does the two parties become, to all intents and purposes, separate, independent, and sovereign states for the time being, and are, for the most part, so regarded and treated by other independent states not taking part in the conflict. for this reason, though the origin of a civil war may differ widely in all its circumstances and conditions from that of a war between two separate states, sovereign and independent _ab initio_, yet as soon as a state of war is established, as distinct from that of a puny revolt or a petty rebellion, there is, for a student of war, no practical difference between a civil war and any other kind of war. both fall under the definition of war as the armed conflict of national wills. between two separate, sovereign, independent nations a state of war arises in this wise. we have seen that the internal policy of an independent state is subject to no direct external control. but states do not exist in isolation. their citizens trade with the citizens of other states, seeking to exchange the products of their respective industries to the advantage of both. as they grow in prosperity, wealth, and population, their capital seeks employment in other lands, and their surplus population seeks an outlet in such regions of the earth as are open to their occupation. thus arise external relations between one state and another, and the interests affected by these relations are often found--and perhaps still more often believed--by one state to be at variance with those of another. in pursuit of these interests--which, as they grow and expand, become embodied in great consolidated kingdoms, great colonial empires, or great imperial dependencies, and tend to be regarded in time as paramount to all other national interests--each state formulates and pursues an external policy of its own which may or may not be capable of amicable adjustment to the policy of other states engaged in similar enterprises. it is the function of diplomacy to effect adjustments such as these where it can. it succeeds much more often than it fails. conflicting policies are deflected by mutual agreement and concession so as to avoid the risk of collision, and each state, without abandoning its policy, modifies it and adjusts it to the exigencies of the occasion. sometimes, however, diplomacy fails, either because the conflicting policies are really irreconcilable, or because passion, prejudice, national ambition, or international misunderstanding induces the citizens of both states and their rulers so to regard them. in that case, if neither state is prepared so to deflect its policy as to avert collision, war ensues. the policy remains unchanged, but the means of further pursuing it, otherwise than by an appeal to force, are exhausted. war is thus, according to the famous definition of clausewitz, the pursuit of national policy by other means than those which mere diplomacy has at its command--in other words by the conflict of armed force. each state now seeks to bend its enemy's will to its own and to impose its policy upon him. the means of pursuing this policy vary almost indefinitely. but inasmuch as war is essentially the conflict of armed force, the primary object of each belligerent must in all cases be to subdue, and, in the last resort, to destroy the armed forces of the adversary. when that is done all is done that war can do. how to do this most speedily and most effectively is the fundamental problem of war. there is no cut-and-dried solution of the problem, because although war may be considered, as it has been considered above, in the abstract, it is the most concrete of all human arts and, subject to the fundamental principle above enunciated, its particular forms may, and indeed must, vary with the circumstances and conditions of each particular war. many commentators on war distinguishing, with clausewitz, between "limited" and "unlimited" war, would further insist that the forms of war must vary with its objects. i cannot follow this distinction, which seems to me to be inconsistent with the fundamental proposition of clausewitz, to the effect that war is the pursuit of policy by means of the conflict of armed force. if you desire your policy to prevail you must take the best means that are open to you to make it prevail. it is worse than useless to dissipate your energies in the pursuit of any purpose, however important in itself, which does not directly conduce, and conduce better than any other purpose you could pursue, to that paramount end. the only limitation of your efforts that you can tolerate is that they should involve the least expenditure of energy that may be necessary to make your policy prevail. but that is a question of the economics of war; it is not a question of "limited war" or of "war for a limited object." your sole object is to bend the enemy to your will. that object is essentially an unlimited one, or one that is limited only by the extent of the efforts which the enemy makes to withstand you. the only sure way of attaining this object is to destroy his armed forces. if he submits before this is done it is he that limits the war, not you. bacon's unimpeachable maxim in this regard is often misinterpreted. "this much is certain," he says, "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will." that is indisputable, but its postulate is that the belligerent has secured the command of the sea; that is, as i shall show hereafter, that he has subdued, if not destroyed, the armed forces of the enemy afloat. having done that he may, in a certain sense, take as much or as little of the war as he chooses; but he must always take as much as will compel the enemy to come to terms. naval warfare is no essential part of the armed conflict between contending states. in some cases it exercises a decisive influence on the conduct and issue of the conflict, in others none at all or next to none. but sea power, that is, the advantage which a nation at war derives from its superiority at sea, may largely affect the issue of a war, even though no naval engagements of any moment may take place. in the crimean war the unchallenged supremacy of england and france on the seas alone made it possible for the allies to invade the crimea and undertake the siege of sebastopol; while the naval campaigns of the allies in the baltic, although they resulted in no decisive naval operation, yet largely contributed to the success of the allied arms in the crimea by compelling russia to keep in the north large bodies of troops which might otherwise have turned the scale against the allies in the south. in the war of , between france and austria, with the sardinian kingdom allied to the former, the superiority of the allies at sea enabled considerable portions of the french army to be transported from french to piedmontese ports, and by threatening the flank of the austrian line of advance, it accelerated the concentration of the allies on the ticino. it also enabled the allies to maintain a close blockade of the austrian ports in the adriatic, and might have led to an attack from the sea on the austrian rear in venetia had not the military reverses of austria in lombardy brought the war to an end. in the war of secession in america the issue was largely determined, or at least accelerated, by the close but not impenetrable blockade established by the north over the ports and coasts of the south, and by the co-operation of farragut on the mississippi with the federal land forces in that region. on the other hand, in the war of there was no naval conflict worth mentioning between austria and prussia, because prussia had no navy to speak of; but as italy, a naval power, was the ally of prussia, and as austria had a small but very efficient naval force led by a great naval commander, the conflict between these two powers led to the battle of lissa, in which the italian fleet was decisively defeated, though the triumph of prussia over the armies of austria saved italy from the worst consequences of defeat, and indeed obtained for her, in spite of her military reverses on land, the coveted possession of venetia. in the war of again, although the supremacy of france on the seas was never seriously challenged by prussia, yet her collapse on land was so sudden and complete that her superiority at sea availed her little or nothing. the maritime trade of prussia was annihilated for the time, but it was then too insignificant a factor in the economic fabric of prussia for its destruction to count for much, and the fleets of france rode triumphant in the north sea and the baltic; but finding no ships to fight, having no troops to land, and giving a wide berth to fortifications with which they were ill-equipped--as ships always are and always must be--to contend without support from the military arm, their presence was little more than an idle and futile demonstration. in the boer war the influence of england's unchallenged supremacy at sea, albeit latent, was decisive. the boers had no naval force of any kind; but no nation not secure in its dominion of the seas could have undertaken such a war as england then had to wage, and it was perhaps only the paramount sea power of this country that prevented the conflict taking a form and assuming dimensions that would have taxed british endurance to the uttermost and must almost certainly have entailed the loss of south africa to the empire. certain naval features of the cuban war between spain and the united states, and of the war in the far east between russia and japan, will be more conveniently considered in subsequent chapters of this manual. the normal correlation and interdependence of naval and military forces in the armed conflict of national wills is sufficiently illustrated by the foregoing examples. in certain abnormal and exceptional cases each can act and produce the desired effect without the other. in a few extreme cases it is hard to see how either could act at all. if, for instance, spain and switzerland were to fall out, how could either attack the other? they have no common frontier, and though spain has a navy, switzerland has no seaboard. cases where naval conflict alone has decided the issue are those of the early wars between england and holland. neither could reach the other except across the sea, there was no territorial issue directly involved, and the object of both combatants was to secure a monopoly of maritime commerce. but as territorial issues, and territorial issues involving the sea and affected by it directly or indirectly, are nearly always at stake in great wars, history affords few examples of great international conflicts in which sea power does not enter as a factor, often of supreme importance. it must of course enter as a factor of paramount importance in any war between an insular state and a continental one--as in the war between russia and japan--or between two continental states which--as in the war between spain and the united states--have no common frontier on land. war being the armed conflict of national wills, it is manifest that the opposing wills cannot in cases such as these be brought into armed conflict unless one state or the other is in a position to operate on the sea. the first move in such a conflict must of necessity be made, by one belligerent or the other, on the sea. this involves the conception of "the command of the sea," and as this is the fundamental conception of naval warfare as such, our analysis of naval warfare must begin with an exposition of what is meant by the command of the sea. chapter ii the command of the sea we have seen that when two states go to war the primary object of each is to subdue and if possible to destroy the armed forces of the other. until that is done either completely, or to such an extent as to induce the defeated belligerent to submit, the conflict of wills cannot be determined, and the two states cannot return to those normal relations, involving no violence or force, which constitute a state of peace. if they have a common frontier this circumstance indicates what is, as a general rule, the best and most efficient way of securing the object to be attained. the armed forces of both belligerents lie at the outset within their respective frontiers. if those of either can be constrained by the superior strategy of the other to keep within their own territory, the initial advantage lies with the belligerent who has so constrained them, and the war has in common parlance been carried into the enemy's country. in other words, the invasion of the enemy's territory has begun, and pressure has been brought to bear on his will which, if maintained without intermission and with an intensity duly proportioned to its growing extent, must in the end subdue it. to this there is no alternative. to invade the enemy's territory at all is to inflict a reverse on his armed forces, which would assuredly have prevented the invasion if they could. the territory in the rear of the invading army is in greater or less degree brought under the control of the invader and thereby temporarily lost to the invaded state. if this process is continued the authority and the resources of the invaded state are progressively diminished, until at last when the capital is occupied and the remainder of the invaded country lies open to the advance of the invader, the defeated state must sue for peace on such terms as the invader may concede, because it has nothing left to fight for, and no force wherewithal to fight. this is of course merely an abstract and generalized description of the course of a war on land, but i need not consider its concrete details nor analyse any of the conditions which may, and in the concrete often do, impede or deflect its course, because my sole purpose is to show how armed force operates in the abstract to subdue the will of the belligerent who is worsted in the conflict. it operates by the destruction of his armed forces, by the occupation of his territory, and by the consequent extinction of his authority and appropriation of his resources. he can only recover the latter and liberate his territory by submitting to such terms as the invader may dictate or concede. naval warfare aims at the same primary object, namely, the destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat; but it cannot by itself produce the same decisive effect, because there is no territory which naval force, as such, can occupy and appropriate. the sea is not territory. it is not nor can it be made subject to the authority of an enemy in the same sense that the land can, nor does it possess any resources in itself such as on the land can be appropriated to the disadvantage and ultimate discomfiture of a belligerent whose territory has been invaded. the sea is the common highway of all nations, and the exclusive possession of none. apart from its fisheries, which, outside the territorial waters of any particular state, are open to all nations, it is of no use, except as a highway, to any state. but its use as a highway is the root of all sea power, the foundation of all naval warfare. it is only by this highway that an island state can be invaded, only by this highway that an island state, or a state having no common frontier with its adversary, can encounter and subdue the armed forces of the enemy, whether on sea or on land. moreover, the sea as a highway differs in many important respects from such highways or other lines of communication as serve for the transit and transport of armed forces and their necessary supplies on land. in one sense it is all highway, that is, it can be traversed in every direction by ships, wherever there is water enough for them to float. for military purposes land transit is confined to such highways as are suitable to the march of an army accompanied by artillery and heavy baggage and supply trains, or to such railways as can more expeditiously serve the same purpose. hence an army advancing in an enemy's country cannot advance on a very broad front, nor can it outmarch its baggage and other supplies except for a very limited time and for some exceptional purpose. sea transport is subject to no such limitations. ships carry their own supplies with them, and a fleet of ships, whether of transports or of warships, can move on as broad a front as is compatible with the exercise of due control over their combined movements. moreover, within certain limits and with certain exceptions, where the waters to be traversed are narrow, ships and fleets can vary their line of transit and advance to such an extent as to render the discovery of their whereabouts a matter of some difficulty. the same conditions affect the transit of such merchant vessels as, carrying the flag of one belligerent, are liable to capture by the other. hence the primary aim of all naval warfare is and must be so to control the lines of communication which traverse the seas affected, that the enemy cannot move his warships from one point to another without encountering a superior force of his adversary, and that his merchant ships cannot prosecute their voyages without running extreme risk of capture by the way. this is called, in time-honoured phraseology, securing the command of the sea, and the true meaning of this phrase is nothing more nor less than the effective control of all such maritime communications as are or can be affected by the operations of either belligerent. this control may extend, according to circumstances, to all the navigable seas of the globe, or it may be confined, for all practical purposes, to the waters adjacent to the respective territories of the two belligerents. in theory, however, its effect is unlimited, and so it must be in practice, where the territories of one belligerent or the other are widely scattered over the globe. that is the sense in which "the sea is all one." it is important to note that the phrase "command of the sea" has no definite meaning except in war. in time of peace no state claims to command the sea or to control it in any way. but in any war in which naval force is engaged each belligerent seeks to secure the command of the sea for himself and to deny it to his enemy, that is to close the highway which the sea affords in time of peace to his warships and his merchant vessels alike. as regards the enemy's warships, moreover, he seeks to secure his own command by their destruction or capture. this is not always possible, because if the naval forces of the two belligerents are very unequally matched, it is always open to the weaker of the two to decline the conflict by keeping his main fleets in ports unassailable by naval force alone, and seeking to reduce the superiority of his adversary by assailing him incessantly with torpedo craft. he may also attempt the hazardous enterprise of sending out isolated cruisers to prey upon his adversary's commerce afloat. but in the case supposed, where the superiority of one side is so great as to compel the main fleets of the other to seek the protection of their fortified ports, such an enterprise is, as i shall show in a subsequent chapter, not only extremely hazardous in itself, but quite incapable of inflicting such loss on the superior adversary as would be likely to induce him to abandon the conflict. nevertheless the command of the sea is not established, or at best it is only partially, and it may be only temporarily, established by driving the main fleets of the enemy into ports which are inaccessible to naval force alone. they must not only be driven there but compelled to remain there. this has generally been done in the past, and according to many, but not all, naval authorities, it will generally have to be done in the future by the operation known as blockade, whereby the enemy is prevented from coming out, or is compelled if he does come out to fight a superior force lying in wait outside. as a matter of fact, inasmuch as a blockade to be really deterrent must be conducted by a blockading force superior to that which is blockaded--for otherwise the latter need not shun an engagement in the open with the former--it can rarely be the interest of the blockader to prevent the exit of his adversary, since by the hypothesis if he could get him out he could beat him. but the blockade must nevertheless be maintained, because, although the blockaded fleet cannot by that means be destroyed, it can, at any rate, be immobilized and wiped off the board so long as it remains where it is. the situation in which a blockade is set up by one belligerent and submitted to by the other is not identical with an effective command of the sea, though in certain circumstances it may approximate very closely to it. the blockaded forces may not be so thoroughly intimidated by the superior forces of the blockaders that they could not or would not, if they could, seek a favourable opportunity for breaking or evading the blockade imposed upon them. they may merely be waiting in a position unassailable by naval force alone until the blockading forces are so weakened through incessant torpedo attack, through the wear and tear inflicted on them by the nature of the service on which they are engaged, through stress of weather, through the periodical necessity which compels even the best found ships to withdraw temporarily from the blockade for the purposes of repair, refit, and replenishment of their stores, and through the fatigue imposed on their officers and crews by the incessant vigilance which a blockade requires as to afford them a favourable opportunity of challenging a decision in the open. or, again, if the forces of the blockaded belligerent are distributed between two or more of his fortified ports, he may attempt an evasion of the blockade at two or more of them for the purpose of combining the forces thus liberated and attacking one or more of the blockading fleets in superior force before they can re-establish their own superiority by concentration. broadly speaking, this was the plan of operations adopted, or rather attempted, by napoleon in the memorable campaign which ended at trafalgar. it was frustrated by the persistent energy of nelson, by the masterly dispositions of barham at the admiralty, by the tenacity with which cornwallis maintained the blockade at brest, and by the instinctive sagacity with which other commanders of the several blockading and cruising squadrons nearly always did the right thing at the right moment, divined barham's purpose, and carried it out almost automatically. practically, napoleon was beaten and his projected invasion of england was abandoned many weeks before trafalgar was won. but the command of the sea was not thereby secured to england. it needed trafalgar and the destruction of the french and spanish fleets there accomplished to effect that consummation. england thenceforth remained in effective and almost undisputed command of the sea, and the peninsular campaigns of wellington were for the first time rendered possible. the contrasted phases of the conflict before and after trafalgar are perhaps the best illustration in history of the vast and vital difference between a command of the sea in dispute and a command of the sea established. trafalgar was the turning-point in the long conflict between england and napoleon. chapter iii disputed command--blockade i have so far treated blockade as the initial stage of a struggle for the command of the sea. that appears to me to be the logical order of treatment, because when two naval powers go to war it is almost certain that the stronger of the two will at the outset attempt to blockade the naval forces of the other. the same thing is likely to happen even if the two are approximately equal in naval force, but in that case the blockade is not likely to be of long duration, because both sides will be eager to obtain a decision in the open. the command of the sea is a matter of such vital moment to both sides that each must needs seek to obtain it as soon and as completely as possible, and the only certain way to obtain it is by the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy. the advantage of putting to sea first is in naval warfare the equivalent or counterpart of the advantage in land warfare of first crossing the enemy's frontier. if that advantage is pushed home and the enemy is still unready it must lead to a blockade. it is, moreover, quite possible that even if both belligerents are equally ready--i am here assuming them to be approximately equal in force--one or other, if not both, may think it better strategy to await developments before risking everything in an attempt to secure an immediate decision. in point of fact, the difference between this policy and the policy of a declared blockade is, as i am about to show, almost imperceptible, especially in modern conditions of naval warfare. it is therefore necessary to consider the subject of blockade more in detail. other subjects closely associated with this will also have to be considered in some detail before we can grasp the full purport and extent of what is meant by the command of the sea. there are two kinds of blockade--military and commercial. the former includes the latter, but the latter does not necessarily involve the former, except in the sense that armed naval force is necessary to maintain it. by a commercial blockade a belligerent seeks to intercept the maritime commerce of the enemy, to prevent any vessels, whether enemy or neutral, from reaching his ports, and at the same time to prevent their egress to the same extent. this in certain circumstances may be a very effective agency for bending or breaking the enemy's will and compelling his submission, but i reserve its consideration for more detailed treatment hereafter. it is with military blockade that i am here more especially concerned. we have seen that the paramount purpose of all naval warfare, and, indeed, of all warfare, is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy. his armed forces are in the last resort the sole instrument of his will, and their destruction to such an extent as is necessary to subdue his will is the sole agency by which peace can be restored. whatever the extent of the war, whether it is limited or unlimited, in the sense assigned to those words by clausewitz and his followers, the conflict of national wills out of which the quarrel arose must in some way be composed, either by concessions on both sides or by the complete subjection of one side to the other, before it can come to an end. it follows that the main object of a military blockade can rarely be to keep the enemy's forces sealed up, masked, and to that extent immobilized in the blockaded ports. its real object is to secure that if they do come out they shall be observed, shadowed, and followed until such time as they can be encountered by a superior force, and if possible destroyed. the classical text on this topic is a letter written on august , , by nelson to the lord mayor of london, acknowledging a vote of thanks passed by the corporation, and addressed to nelson as commanding the fleet blockading toulon. nelson said in his reply: "i beg to inform your lordship that the port of toulon has never been blockaded by me: quite the reverse--every opportunity has been offered to the enemy to put to sea, for it is there that we hope to realize the hopes and expectations of our country, and i trust that they will not be disappointed." what nelson here meant was that the so-called blockade of the port--it was a common, but, as he held, an erroneous expression--was merely incidental to the operation he was conducting. his main objective was the armed forces of the enemy lying unassailable within the blockaded port. he could not make them put to sea but he gave them every opportunity of doing so. so far from wishing to keep them in, his one desire was to get them out into the open, "for it is there that we hope to realize the hopes and expectations of our country"--that is to get a decision in favour of the british arms. now, this being the object of a military blockade, its methods will be subordinated to that object. in the days of sailing ships the method which commended itself to the best naval authorities of the time was to have an inshore squadron, consisting mainly of frigates and smaller craft, but strengthened if necessary by a few capital ships, generally two-deckers, closely watching the entrance to the port, but keeping outside the range of its land defences. this was supported at a greater distance in the offing by the main blockading fleet of heavier ships of the line, cruising within narrow limits and keeping close touch with the inshore squadron. such a method is no longer practicable owing to the development of steam navigation, and to the introduction into naval warfare of the locomotive torpedo, and of special vessels designed to make the attack of this weapon extremely formidable and extremely difficult to parry. the inshore squadron of the old days was liable to no attack which it could not parry if in sufficient force, and if too hardly pressed it could always fall back on the main blockading fleet, which was unassailable except by a corresponding force of the enemy. the advent of the torpedo and of its characteristic craft has changed all this. no naval power can now afford to place its battleships at a fixed station, or even in close touch with a fixed rendezvous, which is within reach of an enemy's torpedo craft. the torpedo vessel which operates only on the surface is, it is true, formidable only at night; in the daytime it is powerless in attack and extremely vulnerable. but the submarine is equally formidable in the daytime, and its attack even in the daytime is far more insidious and difficult to parry than that of the surface torpedo vessel is at night. the effective range of the surface torpedo vessel is thus, for practical purposes, half the distance which it can traverse in any given direction from its base between dusk and dawn--say from one hundred to two hundred miles, according to its speed and the season of the year. the speed of the submarine is much less, but it can keep the sea for many days together, sinking beneath the surface whenever it is threatened with attack. it can also approach a battleship or fleet of battleships in the same submerged condition, and experience has already demonstrated that its advance in that condition to within striking distance is extremely difficult to detect. moreover, even if its presence is detected in time, the only certain defence against it is for the battleship to steam away from it at a speed greater than any submarine has ever attained or is likely to attain in the submerged condition. it should further be noted that torpedo craft engaged in offensive operations of this character are not confined to the blockaded port as a base. any sheltered anchorage will serve their purpose, provided it is sufficiently fortified to resist such attacks from the sea as may be anticipated. thus, in the conditions established by the advent of the torpedo and its characteristic craft, there would seem to be only two alternatives open to a fleet of battleships engaged in blockade operations. either it must be stationed in some sheltered anchorage outside the radius of action of the enemy's surface torpedo craft, and if within that radius adequately defended against torpedo attack--as togo established a flying base for the use of his fleet, first at the elliot islands and afterwards at dalny, for the purpose of blockading port arthur; or it must cruise in the open outside the same limits, keeping in touch with its advanced cruisers and flotillas by means of wireless telegraphy, and thereby dispensing with anything like a fixed rendezvous. it is not, perhaps, imperative that it should always cruise entirely outside the prescribed radius, because experience in modern naval manoeuvres has frequently shown that it is a very difficult thing for torpedo craft, moving at random, to discover a fleet which is constantly shifting its position at high speed, especially when they are at any moment liable to attack from cruisers and torpedo craft of the other side. thus a modern blockade will, so far as battle fleets are concerned, be of necessity rather a watching blockade than a masking or sealing up blockade. if the two belligerents are unequal in naval strength it will probably take some such form as the following. the weaker belligerent will at the outset keep his battle fleet in his fortified ports. the stronger may do the same, but he will be under no such paramount inducement to do so. both sides will, however, send out their torpedo craft and supporting cruisers with intent to do as much harm as they can to the armed forces of the enemy. if one belligerent can get his torpedo craft to sea before the enemy is ready, he will, if he is the stronger of the two, forthwith attempt to establish as close and sustained a watch of the ports sheltering the enemy's armed forces as may be practicable; if he is the weaker, he will attempt sporadic attacks on the ports of his adversary and on such of his warships as may be found in the open. if the enemy is so incautious as to have placed any of his capital ships or other important craft in a position open to the assault of torpedo craft--as russia did at port arthur at the opening of the war with japan--or if he has been so lacking in vigilance and forethought as not to have taken timely and adequate measures for meeting sporadic attacks of the kind indicated, such attacks may be very effective and may even go so far to redress the balance of naval strength as to encourage the originally weaker belligerent to seek a decision in the open. but the forces of the stronger belligerent must be very badly handled and disposed for anything of the kind to take place. the advantage of superior force is a tremendous one. if it is associated with energy, determination, initiative, and skill of disposition no more than equal to those of the assailant, it is overwhelming. the sea-keeping capacity, or what has been called the enduring mobility, of torpedo craft, is comparatively small. their coal-supply is limited, especially when they are steaming at full speed, and they carry no very large reserve of torpedoes. they must, therefore, very frequently return to a base to replenish their supplies. the superior enemy is, it is true, subject to the same disabilities, but being superior he has more torpedo craft to spare and more cruisers to attack the torpedo craft of the enemy and their own escort of cruisers. when the raiding torpedo craft return to their base he will make it very difficult for them to get in and just as difficult for them to get out again. he will suffer losses, of course, for there is no superiority of force that will confer immunity in that respect in war. but even between equal forces, equally well led and handled, there is no reason to suppose that the losses of one side will be more than equal to those of the other; whereas if one side is appreciably superior to the other it is reasonable to suppose that it will inflict greater losses on the enemy than it suffers itself, while even if the losses are equal the residue of the stronger force will still be greater than that of the weaker. it is true that the whole art of war, whether on sea or on land, consists in so disposing your armed forces, both strategically and tactically, that you may be superior to the enemy at the critical point and moment, and that success in this supreme art is no inherent prerogative of the belligerent whose aggregate forces are superior to those of his adversary. but this is only to say that success in war is not an affair of numbers alone. it is an affair of numbers combined with hard fighting and skilful disposition. chapter iv disputed command--the fleet in being we have seen that blockade is only a means to an end, that end being the destruction or surrender of the armed forces of the enemy. we have seen also that that end cannot be obtained by blockade alone. all that a military blockade can do is by a judicious disposition of superior force, either to prevent the enemy coming out at all, or to secure that if he does come out he shall be brought to action. the former method is only applicable where the blockader's superiority of force is so great that his adversary cannot venture at the outset to encounter his main fleets in the open, and in that case the establishment of a blockade of this character is for many purposes practically tantamount to securing the command of the sea to the blockader so long as the blockade can be maintained. such a situation, however, can very rarely arise. there are very few instances of it in naval history, and there are likely to be fewer in the future than there have been in the past. the closest blockade ever established and maintained was that of brest by cornwallis from to , when napoleon was projecting the invasion of england. yet it would be too much to say that during those strenuous years ganteaume never could have got out, had he been so minded, and it is not to be forgotten that for some time during the crisis of the campaign he was forbidden by napoleon to make the attempt. moreover, such a situation, even when it does arise, amounts at best to a stalemate, not to a checkmate. it leaves the enemy's fleet "a fleet in being," immobilized and wiped off the board for the moment, but nevertheless so operating as to immobilize the blockading fleet in so far as the chief effort of the latter must be concentrated on maintaining the blockade. it is necessary to dwell at some length on this conception of "a fleet in being." admiral mahan, the great historian of sea power--whose high authority all students of naval warfare will readily acknowledge and rarely attempt to dispute--speaks of it in his _life of nelson_ as a doctrine or opinion which "has received extreme expression ... and apparently undergone extreme misconception." on the other hand, admiral sir cyprian bridge tells us in the _encyclopædia britannica_ (_s.v._ "sea-power") that "the principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the bottom of all sound strategy." of a principle which, according to one high authority, lies at the bottom of all sound strategy, and according to another has received extreme expression and undergone misconception equally extreme, it is plainly essential that a true conception should be obtained before it can be applied to the elucidation of any of the problems of naval warfare. now what is this much-debated principle? it is best to go to the fountain-head for its elucidation. the phrase "a fleet in being" was first used by arthur herbert, earl of torrington, in his defence before the court martial which tried and acquitted him for his conduct of the naval campaign of , and especially of the battle of beachy head, which was the leading event--none too glorious for british arms--of that campaign. "both as a strategist and as a tactician," says admiral bridge, "torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. the only english admirals who can be placed above him are hawke and nelson." yet he was regarded by many of his contemporaries, and has been represented by many historians, merely as the incapable seaman who failed to win the battle of beachy head, and thereby jeopardized the safety of the kingdom at a very critical time. the situation was as follows. the country was divided between the partisans of james ii. and the supporters of william iii. james was in ireland, where his strength was greatest, and william had gone thither to encounter him, his transit having been covered by a small squadron of six men-of-war, under the command of sir cloudesley shovel. the army was with william in ireland, and great britain could only be defended on land by a hastily levied militia. its sole effective defence was the fleet; and the fleet, although reinforced by a dutch contingent, was, for the moment, insufficient to defend it. the chief reliance of james was upon the friendship and forces, naval and military, of louis xiv. here was a case in which the security of england against insurrection at home and invasion from abroad depended on the sufficiency and capacity of her fleets to maintain the command of the sea--that is, either to defeat the enemy's naval forces or to keep them at bay, and thereby to deny freedom of transit to any military forces that louis might attempt to launch against british territory. the french king resolved to make a determined attempt to wrest the command of the sea from his adversaries, and by overpowering the allied fleets of england and holland in the channel, to open the way for a successful invasion and a successful insurrection to follow. a great fleet was collected at brest, under the supreme command of tourville, and a squadron from toulon under château-renault was ordered to join him in the channel, so as to enable him to threaten london, to foment a jacobite insurrection in the capital, to land troops in torbay, and to occupy the irish channel in such force as to prevent the return of william and his army. now, of course, none of these objects could be attained unless the allied fleets in the channel and adjacent waters could be either decisively defeated in the open or else so intimidated by the superior forces of the enemy as to decline a conflict and retire to some place of safety. on the broad principle that the paramount object of all warfare is the destruction of the armed forces of the enemy, tourville, if he felt himself strong enough, was bound to seek out the allied fleet and challenge it to a decisive combat. on the same principle, torrington, if he felt himself strong enough, was bound to pursue the same aggressive strategy, and by thoroughly beating the french to frustrate all their objects at once. but torrington was not strong enough and knew that he was not strong enough. he had foreseen the crisis and warned his superiors betimes, entreating them to take adequate measures for dealing with it. they took no such measures. on the contrary, the dispositions they made were calculated rather to aggravate the danger than to avert it. early in the year a fleet of sixteen sail of the line under killigrew had been sent in charge of a convoy to cadiz with orders to prevent, if possible, the exit of the toulon fleet from the mediterranean and to follow it up should it make good its escape. this strategy was unimpeachable if only killigrew could make sure of intercepting château-renault and defeating him, and if the naval forces left in home waters when killigrew was detached were sufficient to give a good account of the fleet that tourville was collecting at brest. but in its results it was disastrous, for killigrew, delayed by weather and by the many preoccupations, commercial and strategic, entailed by his instructions was unable either to bar the passage of the toulon fleet or to overtake it during its progress towards the channel. hence château-renault was able to effect his junction with tourville unmolested, while killigrew did not reach plymouth until after the battle of beachy head had been fought, when, tourville being victorious in the channel, he was obliged to carry his squadron into the hamoaze so as to be out of harm's way. shovel, having escorted the king and his troops to ireland, was equally unable to carry out his orders to join torrington in the channel, since tourville stood in the way. hence, although fully alive to the strategic value, in certain contingencies, of the forces under killigrew and shovel, torrington was compelled to rely mainly on the force under his immediate command, the insufficiency of which he had many months before pointed out and vainly implored his superiors to redress. the result of all this was that no adequate steps were, or could be, taken, to prevent the advance of tourville in greatly superior force into the channel. torrington hoisted his flag in the downs at the end of may, and even then the dutch contingent had not joined in the numbers promised. hence it was impossible to keep scouts out to the westward as the dutch had undertaken to do, and the first definite intelligence that torrington received of the advance of the french was the information that on june they were anchored in great force to the westward of the isle of wight. three days later, having in the meanwhile received a dutch reinforcement bringing his force up to fifty-five sail of the line and twenty fire-ships, he offered them battle in that position, but it was declined. his own comment on this hazardous adventure may here be quoted: "i do acknowledge my first intention of attacking them, a rashness that will admit of no better excuse than that, though i did believe them stronger than we are, i did not believe it to so great a degree.... their great strength and caution have put soberer thoughts into my head, and have made me very heartily give god thanks they declined the battle yesterday; and indeed i shall not think myself very unhappy if i can get rid of them without fighting, unless it may be upon equaller terms than i can at present see any prospect of.... a council of war i called this morning unanimously agreed we are by all manner of means to shun fighting with them, especially if they have the wind of us; and retire, if we cannot avoid it otherwise, even to the gunfleet, the only place we can with any manner of probability make our account good with them in the condition we are in. we have now had a pretty good view of their fleet, which consists of near, if not quite, eighty men-of-war fit to lie in a line and thirty fire-ships; a strength that puts me beside hopes of success, if we should fight, and really may not only endanger the losing of the fleet, but at least the quiet of our country too; for if we are beaten they, being absolute masters of the sea, will be at great liberty of doing many things they dare not attempt while we observe them and are in a possibility of joining vice-admiral killigrew and our ships to the westward. if i find a possibility, i will get by them to the westward to join those ships; if not, i mean to follow the result of the council of war." the strategy here indicated is plain, and, in my judgment, sound. it may be profitably compared with that of nelson as explained to his captains during his return from the west indies whither he had pursued villeneuve. villeneuve was on his way back to european waters and nelson hoped to overtake him. he had eleven ships of the line in his fleet and villeneuve was known to have not less than eighteen. yet, though nelson did not shrink from an engagement on his own terms, he was resolved not to force one inopportunely. "do not," he said to his captains, "imagine i am one of those hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage without an adequate object. my object is partly gained"--that is, villeneuve had been driven out of the west indies. "if we meet them we shall find them not less than eighteen, i rather think twenty, sail of the line, and therefore do not be surprised if i do not fall on them immediately; we won't part without a battle. i think they will be glad to leave me alone, if i will let them alone; which i will do, either till we approach the shores of europe, or they give an advantage too tempting to be resisted." torrington's attitude was the same as nelson's, except perhaps that he lacked the ardent faith to say with nelson, "we won't part without a battle." he would not think himself very unhappy if he could get rid of tourville without a battle. but the situations of the two men were different. nelson knew, as he said himself, that "by the time that the enemy has beat our fleet soundly, they will do us no harm this year." if, that is, by the sacrifice of eleven ships of his own he could wipe out eighteen or twenty of the enemy, destroying some and disabling as many as he could of the rest, he would leave the balance of naval force still strongly in favour of his country, more strongly in fact than if he fought no action at all. torrington, on the other hand, knew that "if we are beaten they, being absolute masters of the sea, will be at great liberty of doing many things they dare not attempt while we observe them and are in a possibility of joining vice-admiral killigrew and our ships to the westward." killigrew and shovel had twenty-two sail of the line between them, and torrington, in the dispatch above quoted, had requested that they should be ordered to advance to portsmouth, whence, if the french pursued him to the eastward, they might be able to join him "over the flats" of the thames. as he had fifty-five sail of the line himself, with a possibility of reinforcements from chatham, the concentration off the thames of the whole of the forces available would have enabled him to encounter tourville on something like equal terms; and from that, assuredly, he would not have shrunk. meanwhile he would wait, watch, observe, and pursue a defensive strategy. if tourville should withdraw to the westward he would follow him and get past him if he could, and in that case, having picked up killigrew and shovel, he would be in a position to take the offensive on no very unequal terms and not to part from tourville without a battle. but the strategy of torrington--admirable and unimpeachable as, according to such high authorities as admiral bridge and the late admiral colomb, it was--did not at all commend itself to mary and her council, who, during william's absence in ireland, were left in charge of the kingdom. they wanted a battle, although torrington had plainly told them that it could not be a victory and might result in a disastrous and even fatal defeat. "we apprehend," they said in a dispatch purporting to come from mary herself, "the consequences of your retiring to the gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather you should, upon any advantage of the wind, give battle to the enemy than retreat further than is necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy." torrington, of course, never intended to retire to the gunfleet--which was an anchorage protected by sandbanks off the coast of essex to the north of the thames--if he could avoid doing so. but unless he went there, there was no advantage to be got upon the enemy by retreating to the eastward, because there alone could he get reinforcements from chatham and possibly be joined by killigrew and shovel "over the flats"; which is what he meant by saying that the gunfleet was "the only place we can with any manner of probability make our account with them in the position we are in." on the other hand, if the french gave him an opportunity he would, if he could, get past them to the westward and there join killigrew and shovel in a position of much greater advantage. but in his actual situation, not being one of "those hot-brained people who fight at immense disadvantage without an adequate object," he knew that a battle was the last thing which he ought to risk and the first that the french must desire. however, as a loyal seaman, who knew how to obey orders, he did as he was told. the french had pressed him as far as beachy head and there he gave battle, taking care so to fight as to risk as little as possible. he was beaten, as he expected to be, and the dutch, who had been the most hotly engaged, were very severely handled by the french. but though his losses were considerable, for he had to destroy some of his ships to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy, he saved his fleet from the destruction which must have befallen it had he fought otherwise than he did. as the day advanced and the battle raged, the wind dropped and the tide began to ebb. torrington, taking advantage of this, anchored his fleet, while the french drifted away to the westward. when the tide again began to flow he again took advantage of it and retreated to the eastward. the french made some show of pursuit, but torrington made good his retreat into the thames, where, the buoys having been taken up, the french could not follow him. finally, the french withdrew from the channel, having accomplished nothing beyond an insignificant raid on teignmouth. torrington was tried by court martial and acquitted, though he was never again employed afloat. but the fact remains that, as admiral bridge says, "most seamen were at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with torrington." as to his conduct of the battle, which has so unjustly involved him in lasting discredit with the historians, though not with the seamen, he said in his defence before the court martial: "i may be bold to say that i have had time and cause enough to think of it, and that, upon my word, were the battle to be fought over again, i do not know how to mend it, under the same circumstances." again, as to his general conduct of the campaign, he said: "it is true that the french made no great advantage of their victory though they put us to a great charge in keeping up the militia; but had i fought otherwise, our fleet had been totally lost, and the whole kingdom had lain open to an invasion. what, then, would have become of us in the absence of his majesty and most of the land forces? as it was, most men were in fear that the french would invade; but i was always of another opinion; for i always said that, _whilst we had a fleet in being_, they would not dare to make an attempt." this is the first appearance of the phrase "a fleet in being" in the terminology of naval warfare. its reappearance in our own day and its frequent employment in naval discussion are due to the masterly analysis of torrington's strategy and tactics which the late admiral colomb gave in his illuminating work on _naval warfare_. in order to avoid giving it the extreme expression which, according to admiral mahan, it has received from some writers, and involving it in that extreme misconception which he thinks it has undergone at the hands of others--or it may be of the same--i have thought it worth while to examine at some length the campaign which gave rise to it so as to ascertain exactly what was in the mind of torrington when he first used it. it is plain that torrington held, as all great seamen have held, that the primary object of every belligerent is to destroy the armed forces of the enemy. he was so circumstanced that he could not do that himself, because the forces which might have been at his disposal for the purpose, had the circumstances been other than they were, were so divided and dispersed that the enemy might overcome them in detail. that the enemy would do this, if he could, he did not doubt, and it was equally certain that it must be his immediate object to prevent his doing it. his own force being by far the strongest of the three opposed to tourville, it must be upon him that the brunt of the conflict would fall. nothing would suit him better than that tourville should turn back and attempt to force a battle on either killigrew or shovel to the westward, because in that case he could hang upon tourville's rear and flanks and take any opportunity that offered to get past him and concentrate the british forces to the westward of him. but tourville gave him no such opportunity. he pressed him hard and might have pressed him back even to the gunfleet if torrington had not been ordered by mary and her advisers to give battle "upon any advantage of the wind." but even in fighting the battle, which his own judgment told him ought not to be fought, he never lost sight of the paramount necessity of so fighting it as to give tourville no decisive advantage. the victory was a barren one to tourville. it gave him no command of the sea and for that reason he was unable to prosecute any enterprise of invasion. the command of the sea remained in dispute, and unless the dispute could be decided in tourville's favour he would have fought and won the battle of beachy head in vain, as the event showed that he did. torrington held that his "fleet in being," even after the reverse at beachy head, was a sufficient bar to the further enterprises of tourville, nor can tourville's subsequent action be explained on any other hypothesis than that he shared torrington's opinion and acted on it. the truth is, that the doctrine of the fleet in being, as understood and illustrated by torrington, is in reality the counterpart and complement of the doctrine of the command of the sea as expounded above. "i consider," said the late sir geoffrey hornby, a strategist and tactician of unrivalled authority in his time, "that i have command of the sea when i am able to tell my government that they can move an expedition to any point without fear of interference from an enemy's fleet." this condition cannot be satisfied so long as the enemy has a fleet in being, that is a fleet strategically at large, not itself in command of the sea, but strong enough to deny that command to its adversary by strategic and tactical dispositions adapted to the circumstances of the case. thus command of the sea and a fleet in being are mutually exclusive terms. so long as a hostile fleet is in being there is no command of the sea; so soon as the command of the sea is established there is no hostile fleet in being. each of these propositions is the complement of the other. nevertheless, the mere statement of these abstract propositions solves none of the concrete problems of naval warfare. war is not governed by phrases. it is governed by stern and inexorable realities. the question whether a particular fleet in any particular circumstances is or is not a fleet in being is not a question of theory, it is a question of fact. the answer to it depends on the spirit, purpose, tenacity, and strategic insight of those who control its movements. no fleet is a fleet in being unless inspired by what may be called the _animus pugnandi_, that is, unless, if and when the opportunity offers, it is prepared to strike a blow at all hazards. for this reason the russian fleet in sebastopol at the time of the invasion of the crimea was not a fleet in being, although it had a splendid opportunity, which a nelson would assuredly have found too tempting to be resisted, of showing its mettle when the french warships were employed as transports; and the allies might have been made to pay heavily for their neglect to blockade it had it been inspired by an effective _animus pugnandi_. on the other hand, the four ill-fated spanish cruisers which crossed the atlantic to take part in the cuban war were a true fleet in being, however inferior and forlorn, and were so regarded by the united states authorities so long as they remained strategically at large. even when two of them and two destroyers were known to be in santiago, the secretary of the united states navy telegraphed to admiral sampson, "essential to know if all four spanish cruisers in santiago. military expedition must wait this information." the same thing happened in the war between russia and japan. the first act of japan in that war was by a torpedo attack on the russian fleet at port arthur, so to depress the _animus pugnandi_ of the latter as practically to deprive it for a time of the character of a fleet in being--a character which it only partially recovered afterwards under the brief influence of the heroic but ill-fated makaroff. this being accomplished, the invasion of manchuria ensued as a matter of course. the ascendency thus established by the japanese fleet at the outset, though assailed more than once, was nevertheless maintained throughout the subsequent operations until the russian fleet at port arthur, deprived of the little character it ever possessed as a true fleet in being, was reduced to the condition of what admiral mahan has aptly called a "fortress fleet," and was surrendered at the fall of the fortress. many other illustrations of the principle of the fleet in being might be given. the history of naval warfare is full of them. but they need not be multiplied as they all point the same moral. that moral is, that a fleet in being to be of any use must be inspired by a determined and persistent _animus pugnandi_. it must not be a mere "fortress fleet." torrington can never have imagined for a moment that the fleet which, in spite of the disastrous orders of mary and her council, he had saved from destruction, would by its mere existence prevent a french invasion. he had kept it in being in order that he might use it offensively whenever occasion should arise, well knowing that so long as it maintained that disposition tourville would be paralysed for offence. "whilst we observe the french," he said, "they cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running a great hazard." such hazards may be run for an adequate object, and to determine rightly when they may be run and when they may not is perhaps the most searching test of a naval commander's capacity and insight. it is a psychological question rather than a strategic one. such a commander must know whether his adversary's _animus pugnandi_ is so keen and so unflinching as to invest his fleet, albeit inferior, with the true character of a fleet in being, or whether, on the other hand, it is so feeble as to turn it into a mere fortress fleet. but that is only to say that in war the man always counts for far more than the machine, that the best commander is a man "with whom," as admiral mahan says of nelson, "moral effect is never in excess of the facts of the case, whose imagination produces to him no paralysing picture of remote contingencies." _bene ausus vana contemnere_, as livy says of alexander's conquest of darius, is the eternal secret of successful war. chapter v disputed command in general the condition of disputed command of the sea is the normal condition at the outbreak of any war in which operations at sea are involved between two belligerents of approximately equal strength, or indeed between any two belligerents, the weaker of whom is sufficiently inspired by the _animus pugnandi_--or it may be by other motives rather political than strategic in character--to try conclusions with his adversary in the open. this follows immediately from the nature of command of the sea, which is, it will be remembered, the effective control over the maritime communications of the waters in dispute. i must here repeat, that the phrase command of the sea has no definite meaning in time of peace. no nation nowadays seeks in time of peace to control maritime communications, that is, to exercise any authority or constraint over any ships, whether warships or merchant vessels--other than those flying its own flag--which traverse the seas on their lawful occasions. there was, indeed, a time when england claimed what was called the "sovereignty of the seas," that is, the right to exact at all times certain marks of deference to her flag, in the form of certain salutes of ceremony, from all ships traversing the seas surrounding the british islands, the narrow seas as they were called. but that is an entirely different thing from the command of the sea in a strategic sense, and has in fact no connection with it. it has long been abandoned and it need only be mentioned here in order to be carefully distinguished from the latter. any nation seeking to exercise or secure the command of the sea in this sense would in so doing engage in an act of war, and would be regarded as so engaging by any other nation whose rights and interests were in any way affected by the act. hence the difference between the two is plain. the claim to the sovereignty of the seas and the exaction of the ceremonial observance--the lowering of a flag or a sail--which symbolized it, was not in itself an act of war, though it might lead to war if the claim were resisted. an attempt to assert or secure the command of the sea is, on the other hand, in itself an act of war and would never be made by any nation not prepared to take the consequence in the instant outbreak of hostilities. for what is it that a nation seeks to do when it attempts to exercise or secure the command of the sea? it seeks to do nothing more and nothing less than to deny freedom of access to the waters in dispute to the ships, whether warships or merchant ships, of some other nation. it denies the common right of highway, which is the essential attribute of the sea, to that other nation, and seeks to secure the monopoly of that right for itself. in other words, it seeks to drive its adversary's warships from the sea, and either by the capture of his merchant vessels to appropriate the wealth they contain or by destroying them to deprive the adversary of its enjoyment. this is all that naval warfare as such can do. if the enemy is not constrained by the destruction of his warships and the extinction of his maritime commerce to submit to his victorious adversary's will, other agencies, not exclusively naval in character, must be employed to bring about that consummation. this means that military force must be brought into operation, either for the invasion of the defeated adversary's territory or for the occupation of some of his possessions lying across the seas, if he has any. if he has none, or if such as he has are not worth taking or holding--either as a permanent possession or as what is called a material guarantee to be used in the subsequent negotiations for peace--then the only alternative is invasion. but that is a subject which demands a chapter to itself. it rarely happens, however, that a great naval power is devoid of transmarine possessions altogether, or that such as it holds are esteemed by it to be of so little value or importance that their seizure by an enemy would leave matters _in statu quo_. sea power is, as a rule, the outcome of a flourishing maritime commerce. maritime commerce as it expands, tends, even apart from direct colonization, to bring territorial occupation in its train. the origin and history of the british rule in india is a signal illustration of this tendency. there are other causes of territorial expansion across the seas, as admiral mahan has pointed out in his latest work on _naval strategy_, but it is a rule which admits of no exceptions that territorial possessions across the seas, however they may have been acquired, compel the power which holds them to develop a navy which, in the last resort, must be capable of defending them. it was not, indeed, the needs of maritime commerce which induced the united states to acquire puerto rico and the philippines. their acquisition was, as it were, a by-product of victorious sea power. but the vast expansion of the united states navy which the last dozen years have witnessed is the direct result and the logical consequence of their acquisition. applying these principles to the defence of the british empire we see at once that the command of the sea, in the sense already defined, is essential to its successful prosecution. the case is not merely exceptional, it is absolutely unique. the british isles might recover from the effects of a successful invasion, as other countries have done in like case. but the destruction of their maritime commerce would ruin them irretrievably, even if no invasion were undertaken. half the maritime commerce of the world is carried on under the british flag. the whole of that commerce would be suppressed if an enemy once secured the command of the sea. the british isles would be starved out in a few weeks. whether an enemy so situated would decide to invade or invest--that is, so to impede our commerce that only an insignificant fraction of it could by evasion reach our ports--is a question not so much of strategy as of the economics of warfare. but really it hardly matters a pin which he decided to do. we should have to submit in either case. what would happen to our dominions, dependencies, and colonies is plain. those which are defenceless the enemy would seize if he thought it worth his while. in the case supposed they could obtain no military assistance from the mother-country. but those which could defend themselves he would have to overcome, if he could, by fighting. the great dominions of the empire would not fall into an enemy's lap merely because he had compelled the united kingdom to sue for peace. to subdue them by force of arms would be a very formidable undertaking. such are the tremendous effects of an adverse command of the sea on an insular kingdom and an oceanic empire, which carries on--not by virtue of any artificial monopoly, but solely by virtue of its hardly won ascendency in the economic struggle for existence--half the maritime commerce of the world. on the other hand, its effects on any nation which does not depend on the sea for its existence can never be so overwhelming and may even be insignificant. germany was very little affected by the command of the sea enjoyed by france in the war of . but in view of the enormous growth of german maritime commerce in recent years, a superiority of france at sea equal to that which she enjoyed in would now be a much more serious menace to germany. in all such cases the issue must be decided by military operations suitable to the circumstances and the occasion--operations in which naval force may take an indispensable part even though it may not directly decide the issue. it was, for example, the united states army that captured santiago and secured the deliverance of cuba; but it was the united states navy alone that enabled the troops to be in cuba at all and to do what they did there. again, in the war between russia and japan it was the capture of port arthur and the final overthrow at tsu-shima of all that remained of russia's effective naval forces that induced russia to entertain overtures for peace. but the reduction of port arthur was mainly the work of the military arm and the continued successes of the japanese armies in manchuria must have contributed largely to russia's surrender. these successes were, it is true, rendered possible by the japanese navy alone. it cannot be said that the japanese ever held the undisputed command of the sea until after tsu-shima had been fought and won. but at the very outset of the war they established such an ascendency over the russian naval forces in far eastern waters that the latter were in the end reduced to something less than even a "fortress fleet." at port arthur, writes admiral mahan, the fleet was "neither a fortress fleet, for except the guns mounted from it, the fleet contributed nothing to the defence of the place; nor yet a fleet in being, for it was never used as such." its _animus pugnandi_ was fatally depressed on the first night of the war, and finally extinguished after the action of august . the truth is, that in all the larger achievements of sea power--those, that is, to which a combination of naval and military force is indispensable--it is impossible to disengage the influence of one of these factors on the final issue from that of the other, and perhaps idle to attempt do to so. they act, as it were, like a chemical combination, not like the resultant of two separate but correlated mechanical forces, and their joint effect may be just as different from what might be the effect of either acting separately as water is different from the oxygen and hydrogen of which it is composed. but their operation in this wise can only begin after the command of the sea has been secured, or at least has been so far established as to reduce to a negligible quantity the risk of conducting military operations across seas of which the command is still nominally in dispute. now there are several phases or stages in the enterprise of securing the command of the sea; but they all depend on the power and the will to fight for it. there is no absolute command of the sea, except in the case of hostilities between two belligerents, separated by the sea, one of whom has no naval force at all. the solitary case in history of this situation is that of the war in south africa. a similar situation would arise if one of two belligerents had completely destroyed all the effective naval force of the other. but that is a situation of which history affords few, if any, examples. between these two extremes lies the whole history of naval warfare. there is, moreover, one characteristic of naval warfare which has no exact counterpart in the conduct of military enterprises on land. this is the power which a naval belligerent has of withdrawing his sea-going force out of the reach of the sea-going force of the enemy by placing it in sheltered harbours too strongly fortified for the enemy to reduce by naval power alone. the only effective answer to this which the superior belligerent can make is, as has already been shown, to establish a blockade of the ports in question. this procedure is analogous to, but not identical with, the investment by military forces of a fortress in which an army has found shelter in the interior of the enemy's country. but the essential difference is that the land fortress can be completely invested so that no food or other supplies can reach it, whereas a sea fortress cannot, unless it is situated on a small island, be completely invested by naval force alone. in the one case, even if no assault is attempted, starvation must sooner or later bring about the surrender of the fortress together with any military force it contains, whereas in the other the blockaded port being, as a rule, in open communication with its own national territory, cannot be reduced by starvation. moreover, for reasons already explained, a maritime fortress cannot nowadays be so closely blockaded as to prevent the exit of small craft almost at all times or even to prevent the exit of squadrons of battleships in circumstances favourable to the enterprise. now the exit of small craft equipped for torpedo attack is a much more serious threat to the blockader than the exit of small craft, not so equipped, was in the old days of close blockade. in those days small craft could do no harm to ships of the line or even to frigates, whereas a torpedo craft is nowadays in certain circumstances the equal and more than the equal of a battleship. for these reasons the escape from a blockaded port of a squadron of battleships might easily be regarded by the blockading enemy as a less serious and even much more welcome incident of the campaign than the frequent issue of swarms of torpedo craft skilfully handled, daringly navigated, and sternly resolved to do or die in the attempt to reduce the battle superiority of the enemy. it follows from these premisses that a naval blockade--or a connected series of blockades--can never be regarded as equivalent to an established command of the sea. at its best it can only achieve a temporary command of the sea in a state of unstable and easily disturbed equilibrium. at its worst, that is when it is least close and least effective, and when the _animus pugnandi_ of the enemy is unimpaired and not to be intimidated, and is therefore ready at all times to take advantage of "an opportunity too tempting to be resisted," it amounts to a state of things in which the "fleet in being" becomes the dominant factor of the situation. it is mainly a psychological problem and scarcely a strategic problem at all to determine when the actual situation approximates to either of these extremes, and the principle embodied in the words _bene ausus vana contemnere_ is the key to the solution of this problem. if the blockaded fleet is merely a fortress fleet, or not even that, as was the russian fleet at port arthur for some time after the first night of the war, and even more after the critical but indecisive conflict of august , then it is legitimate, as togo triumphantly showed, to regard the situation so established as so far equivalent to a temporary command of the sea that military operations, involving the security of oversea transit and the continuity of oversea supply, might be undertaken with no greater risk than is always inseparable from a vigorous initiative in war. but had the russian naval commanders been inspired--as, perhaps, the ill-fated makaroff alone was--with a genuine _animus pugnandi_, they might have perceived that their one chance of bringing all the japanese enterprises, naval and military, to nought, was by fighting togo's fleet "to a frazzle," even if their own fleet perished in the conflict. then the baltic fleet, if it had any fight in it at all, must have made short work of what remained of togo's fleet, and the japanese communications with manchuria being thereby severed, russia might have dictated her own terms of peace. the real lesson of that war is not that a true fleet in being can ever be safely neglected, but that a fleet which can be neglected with impunity is no true fleet in being. it should never be forgotten that the problems of naval warfare are essentially psychological and not mechanical in their nature. their ultimate determining factors are not material and ponderable forces operating with measurable certainty, but those immaterial and imponderable forces of the human mind and will which can be measured by no standard other than the result. by the material standard so popular in these days, and withal so full of fallacy, nelson should have been defeated at trafalgar and rozhdestvensky should have been victorious at tsu-shima. it is, of course, idle to press the doctrine of the command of the sea and the principle of the fleet in being so far as to affirm that no military enterprise of any kind can be prosecuted across the sea unless an unassailable command of the sea has first been established. such a proposition is disallowed by the whole course of naval history, which is, in truth, for the most part, the history of the command of the sea remaining in dispute, often for long periods, between two belligerents, the balance inclining sometimes to one side and sometimes to the other, according to the fortune of war. the whole question is in the main one of degree and of circumstances. broadly speaking, it may be said that the larger the military enterprise contemplated the more complete must be the command of the sea before it can be prosecuted with success and the more certain the assurance of its continuance in unimpaired efficiency until the objects of the enterprise are accomplished. conversely, the strength, even if inferior, of the fleet in being, its strategic disposition, its tactical efficiency, and, above all, its _animus pugnandi_ must all be accurately gauged by a naval commander before he can safely decide that a military expedition of any magnitude can be undertaken without fear of interference from an enemy's fleet. it was the neglect of these principles that ruined the athenian expedition to syracuse. it was equally the neglect of the same principles that entailed the failure of napoleon's expedition to egypt and the ultimate surrender of the army he had deserted there. it was the politic recognition of them that, as admiral mahan has shown in a brilliant passage, compelled hannibal to undertake the arduous passage of the alps for the purpose of invading italy instead of transporting his troops by sea. the limits of legitimate enterprise across seas of which the command although firmly gripped is not unassailably established, are perhaps best illustrated by the story of craig's expedition to malta and sicily towards the close of the trafalgar campaign. this remarkable episode, which has received less attention than it deserves from most historians, has been represented by mr julian corbett in his instructive work on _the campaign of trafalgar_ as the masterly offensive stroke by which pitt hoped to abate, and, if it might be, to overthrow the military ascendency which napoleon had established in europe. that view has not been universally accepted by mr corbett's critics, but the episode is entitled to close attention for the light it throws on the central problem of naval warfare. pitt had concluded a treaty with russia, which involved not merely naval but military co-operation with that power in the mediterranean. craig's expedition was the shape which the military co-operation was to take. it consisted of some five thousand troops, and when it embarked in april it was convoyed by only two ships of the line in its transit over seas which, for all the government which dispatched it knew, might be infested at the time by more than one fleet of the enemy. here, then, is a case in which the doctrine of the command of the sea and the principle of the fleet in being might seem to be violated in a crucial fashion. but the men who directed the arms of england in those days knew what they were about. long before they allowed the expedition to start they had established a close and, as they thought, an effective blockade of all the atlantic and mediterranean ports in which either french or spanish warships ready for sea were to be found. nevertheless we have here a signal illustration of the essential difference between a command of the sea which has been made absolute by the destruction of the enemy's available naval forces--as was practically the case after trafalgar--and one which is only virtual and potential, because, although the enemy's fleets have for the time been masked or sealed up in their ports, they may, should the fortune of war so determine, resume at any time the position and functions of a true fleet in being. on the strength of a command of the sea of this merely contingent and potential character pitt and his naval advisers had persuaded themselves that the way to the mediterranean was open for the transit of troops. craig's transports, accordingly, put to sea on april . but a week before villeneuve with his fleet had left toulon for the last time, had evaded nelson's watch, and passing rapidly through the straits, had called off cadiz, and picking up such spanish ships as were there had disappeared into space, no man knowing whither he had gone. he might have gone to the east indies, he might have gone to the west indies, as in fact he did, or he might be cruising unmolested in waters where he could hardly fail to come across craig's transports with their weak escort of two ships of the line. it was a situation which no one had foreseen or regarded as more than a contingency too remote to be guarded against when craig's expedition was allowed to start. how nelson viewed the situation may be seen from his reply to the admiralty, written on his receipt of the first intimation that the expedition was about to start. "as the 'fisgard' sailed from gibraltar on the th instant, two hours after the enemy's fleet from toulon had passed the straits, i have to hope she would arrive time enough in the channel to give their lordships information of this circumstance _and to prevent the rear-admiral and troops before mentioned_"--that is craig's expedition--"_from leaving spithead_." in other words, nelson held quite plainly that had the admiralty known that villeneuve was at sea outside the straits they would not have allowed craig to start. that nelson was right in this assumption is proved by the fact that acting on the inspiration of barham--perhaps the greatest strategist that ever presided at whitehall--the admiralty, as soon as they had grasped the situation, sent orders to calder off ferrol, that if he came in contact with the expedition he was to send it back to plymouth or cork under cruiser escort and retain the two ships of the line which had so far escorted it under his own command. the fact was that if craig's expedition once passed finisterre it would find itself totally without the naval protection on which the admiralty relied when it was dispatched. villeneuve was outside the straits no one knew where, and had been reinforced by the spanish ships from cadiz. nelson, whose exact whereabouts was equally unknown to the admiralty, was detained in the mediterranean by baffling winds and also by the necessity of making sure before quitting his station that villeneuve had not gone to the levant. orde, who had been blockading cadiz with a weak squadron which had to retire on villeneuve's approach, had convinced himself, on grounds not without cogency, that villeneuve was making for the northward, and had, quite correctly on this hypothesis, fallen back on the fleet blockading brest, being ignorant of the peril to which craig was exposed. thus craig's expedition seemed to be going straight to its doom unless calder could intercept it and give it orders to return. however, craig and knight, whose flag flew in one of the ships of the line escorting the expedition, passed finisterre without communicating with calder, and having by this time got wind of their peril, they hurried into lisbon, there to await developments in comparative safety, though their presence caused great embarrassment to the portuguese government and raised a diplomatic storm. it was not until craig and knight had ascertained that villeneuve was out of the way and that nelson had passed the straits that they put to sea again and met nelson off cape st vincent. nelson had by this time satisfied himself, after an exhaustive survey of the situation, that villeneuve had gone to the west indies, and resolved to follow him there as soon as he had sped the expedition on its appointed way. but so apprehensive was he of the spanish ships remaining at carthagena, that, inferior to villeneuve as he was, he detached the "royal sovereign" from his own squadron, and placed her under knight's command. it only remains to add that the expedition reached its destination in safety and that its result was the battle of maida, fought in the following year--the first battle in which napoleon's troops crossed bayonets with british infantry and were beaten by an inferior force. the expedition was also the indirect cause of the battle of trafalgar itself, for it was in order to frustrate the coalition with russia of which it was the instrument that napoleon had ordered villeneuve to make for the mediterranean when he finally left cadiz to encounter nelson on his path. thus was it, as mr corbett says, "to prove the insidious drop of poison--the little sting--that was to infect napoleon's empire with decay and to force his hand with so tremendous a result." yet it very nearly miscarried at the outset. nelson and barham--between them a combination of warlike energy and strategic insight, without a parallel in the history of naval warfare--both realized the tremendous risks it ran. it may be argued that had villeneuve gone to the north he would have found himself in the thick of british squadrons closing in on brest and vastly superior in force. yet allemand, who had escaped a few weeks later from rochefort, was able to cruise in these very waters for over five months without being brought to book. it is true that the destruction or capture of five thousand british troops would not seriously have affected the larger issues of the naval campaign, but it would have broken up the coalition with russia by which pitt set so much store, and which mr corbett at any rate represents as having exercised a decisive influence on the ultimate fortunes of napoleon. the moral of the whole story seems to be that competent strategists--for the world has known none more competent and none more intrepid than nelson and barham--will not risk even a minor expedition at sea unless its line of advance is sufficiently controlled by superior naval force to ensure its unmolested transit. the principle thus exhibited in the case of a minor expedition manifestly applies with immensely increased force to those larger expeditions which assume the dimensions of an invasion. it was not until long after trafalgar had been fought, and the command of the sea had been secured beyond the possibility of challenge, that the campaigns in the peninsula were undertaken--campaigns which ended and were always intended to end, should the fortune of war so decree, in the invasion of france and the overthrow of napoleon. this opens up the whole question of invasion, which will be discussed in the next chapter. chapter vi invasion england has not been invaded since a.d. , when, the country having no fleet in being, william the conqueror effected a landing and subjugated the kingdom. during the eight centuries and more that have since elapsed, every country in europe has been invaded and its capital occupied, in many cases more than once. it is by no means for lack of attempts to invade her that england has been spared the calamity of invasion for more than eight hundred years. it is not because she has had at all times--it may indeed be doubted if she has had at any time--organized military force sufficient to repel an invader, if he could not be stopped at sea. it is because she can only be invaded across the sea, and because whenever the attempt has been made she has always had naval force sufficient to bring the enterprise to nought. it is merely a truism to say that the invasion of hostile territory across the sea is a much more difficult and hazardous enterprise than the crossing of a land frontier by organized military force. but it is no truism to say that the reason why it is so much more difficult and more hazardous is that there is no real parallel between the two cases. i assume a vigorous defensive on the part of the adversary assailed in both cases--a defensive which, though commonly so called, is really offensive in its nature. the essential difference lies in this, that two countries which are separated by the sea have no common frontier. each has its own frontier at the limit of its territorial waters, but between these two there lies a region common to both and from which neither can be excluded except by the superior naval force of the other. for the moment an expeditionary force emerges from its own territorial waters--which may be any distance from a few miles up to many thousands of miles from the territorial waters of the adversary to be assailed--it must be prepared to defend itself, and naval force alone can afford it an adequate measure of defence. military forces embarked in transports are defenceless and practically unarmed. they cannot defend themselves with their own arms, nor can the transports which carry them be so armed as to afford adequate defence against the smallest warship afloat, least of all against torpedo craft. hence, unless the sea to be traversed has been cleared of the naval forces of the enemy beforehand, the invading military force must be covered by a naval force sufficient to overcome any naval force which the enemy is able to bring against it. if the latter can bring a fleet--as he must be able to do if the invasion is to be prevented--the covering fleet must be able to beat any fleet that he can bring. that condition being satisfied, however, it is clear that the covering fleet must be terribly hampered and handicapped in the ensuing conflict by the presence of a huge and unwieldy assemblage of unarmed transports filled with disarmed men, and by the consequent necessity of defending it against the attack of those portions of the enemy's naval force to which, albeit not suitable for engaging in the principal conflict, the transports would offer an otherwise defenceless prey. hence the escorting fleet must be stronger than its adversary in a far larger proportion than it need be if naval issues pure and simple were alone at stake--so strong indeed that, if the transports were out of the way, its victory might be taken as certain. but if that is so it is manifest that the prospects of successful invasion would be immeasurably improved by seeking to decide the naval issue first--as tourville very properly did in the beachy head campaign--and keeping the transports in hand and in port until it had been decided in favour of the intending invader. this is the eternal dilemma of invasion across a sea of which the command has not previously been secured. if you are not strong enough to dispose of the enemy's naval force you are certainly not strong enough to escort an invading force--itself helpless afloat--across the sea in his teeth. if you are strong enough to do this you will certainly be wise to beat him first, because then there will be nothing left to prevent the transit of your troops. in other words, command of the sea, if not absolutely and in all cases indispensable to a successful invasion, is at any rate the only certain way of ensuring its success. naval history from first to last is full of illustrations of the principles here expounded. i will examine one or two of them, and i must take my illustrations mainly from the naval history of britain, first, because britain, being an island, is the only country in europe which cannot be invaded except across the sea, and secondly, because britain for that very reason has often been subjected to attempts at invasion and has always frustrated them by denying to her adversary that sufficiency of sea control which, if history is any guide, is essential to successful invasion. but first i will examine two cases which might at first sight seem to militate against the principles i have enunciated. the brilliant campaign of cæsar which ended in the overthrow of pompey and his cause at pharsalus, was opened by cæsar's desperate venture of carrying his army across the adriatic to the coast of epirus, although pompey's fleet was in full command of the waters traversed. this is one of those exceptions which may be said to prove the rule. cæsar had no alternative. pompey was in illyria, and if cæsar could not overthrow pompey on that side of the adriatic it was certain that pompey would overthrow cæsar on the other side. for this reason, and perhaps for this reason alone, cæsar was compelled to undertake a venture which he must have known to be desperate. how desperate it was is shown by the fact that, not having transports enough to carry more than half his army at once, he had to send his transports back as soon as he had landed, and they were all destroyed on their way back to brundusium. antony his lieutenant did, indeed, succeed after a time in getting the remainder of his army across, but not before cæsar had been reduced to the utmost straits. the whole enterprise moreover was not, strictly speaking, an invasion of hostile territory. the inhabitants of the territory occupied by both combatants were neutral as between them, and were willing to furnish cæsar with such scanty supplies as they had. again, an army in those days needed no ammunition except the sword which each soldier carried on his person, and that kind of ammunition was not expended in fighting. hence cæsar had no occasion to concern himself with the security of his communications across the sea--a consideration which weighs with overwhelming force on the commander of a modern oversea expedition. "a modern army," as the late lord wolseley said, "is such a complicated organism that any interruption in the line of communications tends to break up and destroy its very life." an army marches on its belly. if it cannot be fed it cannot fight. after the battle of talavera wellington was so paralysed by the failure of the spanish authorities to supply his troops with food that he had to abandon the offensive for a time and to retreat towards his own line of communication with the sea. cæsar on the other hand abandoned the sea, which could not feed him, and trusted to the resources of the country. the difference is vital. the one risk that cæsar ran was the destruction of his army afloat, and that he ran not because he chose but because he must. the risk of destruction on land he was prepared to run, and this, at any rate, was, as the event proved, a case of _bene ausus vana contemnere_. again, napoleon's descent on egypt is another exception which proves the rule, and proves it still more conclusively. napoleon evaded nelson's fleet and landed his army in egypt. the army so landed left egypt in british transports, having laid down its arms and surrendered just before the conclusion of the peace of amiens; and but for the timely conclusion of that short-lived armistice, every french soldier who survived the egyptian campaign might have seen the inside of a british prison. this was because napoleon, who never fathomed the secrets of the sea, chose to think that to evade a hostile fleet was the same thing as to defeat it. he managed for a time to escape nelson's attentions by the skin of his teeth, and fondly fancied that because he had done so the dominion of the east was won. he was quickly undeceived by the battle of the nile. that victory destroyed the fleet which had escorted his army to egypt and thereby made it impossible for the army ever to return except by consent of the power which he never could vanquish on the sea. the battle of the nile, wrote a frenchman in egypt, "is a calamity which leaves us here as children totally lost to the mother country. nothing but peace can restore us to her." nothing but the so-called peace of amiens did restore them. if it be argued, as it often has been, that napoleon's successful descent on egypt proves that military enterprises of large moment may sometimes be undertaken without first securing the command of the sea to be traversed, surely the battle of the nile and its sequel are a triumphant refutation of such an argument. such enterprises are merely a roundabout way of presenting the belligerent who retains the command of the sea with as many prisoners of war as survive from the original expedition. i need not labour the point which the unbroken testimony of history from the time of the norman conquest has established, that all attempts to invade england have been made in the past and must be made in the future across a sea not commanded by the intending invader. if he has secured the command of the sea beforehand, there is nothing to prevent the invasion except the consideration that he can attain his end--that is, the subjugation of the nation's will--at less cost to himself. that being premised, let us consider how the intending invader will set about his task. there are three ways, and three ways only. first, he may seek to overpower the british naval defence on the seas, that is to obtain the command of the sea. if he can do that, the whole thing is done. or secondly, he may collect the military forces destined for the invasion in ports suitable for the purpose, and when all is ready he may cover their embarkation and transit by a naval force sufficient to overcome any naval force which this country can direct against it. i have already shown, however, that a force sufficient to do this with any certainty, or even with any reasonable prospect of success, must needs be more than sufficient to overpower the british naval defence and thereby to secure the command of the sea, if the enemy were freed from the entangling and wellnigh disabling necessity of providing for the safe conduct of an unwieldy host of otherwise defenceless transports. in other words he is putting the cart before the horse, a procedure which has never yet succeeded in getting the cart to its destination. this second alternative is then merely a clumsy and extremely inefficient way of attaining the same end as the first, and need only be mentioned in order to exclude it from further consideration. there remains only a third alternative. this is to assemble the invading military force at suitable ports as before, and to attempt to engage the attention of the defending naval force by operations at a distance for a time sufficient to secure the unmolested transit of the military expedition. this is the method which has nearly always been employed by an enemy projecting an invasion of this country. it has never yet succeeded, because it always leads in the end to a situation which is practically indistinguishable from that involved in the second alternative, which i have already discussed and excluded. the naval and the military elements in the enterprise of invasion being now, by the hypothesis, separated in space and for that reason incapable of being very exactly combined in time, a whole series of highly indeterminate factors is thereby introduced into the problem to be solved by the invader. there are elements of naval force, to wit, all manner of small craft, which are not required for the main conflict of fleets--and it is this conflict which alone can secure the command of the sea--but which are eminently adapted for the impeachment and destruction of unarmed transports. these will be employed in the blockade of the ports in which the military forces are collecting. if the assailant employs similar craft to drive the blockaders away, the defender will bring up larger craft to stiffen his blockading flotillas. the invading force will therefore still be impeded and impeached. the process thus goes on until, if it is not otherwise decided by the conflict of the main fleets at a distance, the contending naval forces of both sides are attracted to the scene of the proposed embarkation, there to fight it out in the conditions involved in the second alternative considered above, conditions which i have already shown to be the least favourable to the would-be invader. in a masterly analysis mr julian corbett has shown that the british defence against a threatened invasion has always been conducted on these lines, that the primary objective of the defence has been the troops and their transports, and that the vigorous pursuit of this objective has always resulted in a decision being obtained as between the main fleets of the two belligerents. that the decision has always been in favour of the british arms is at once a lesson and a warning--a lesson that immunity from invasion can only be ensured by superiority at sea, a warning that such superiority can only be secured by the adequate preparation, the judicious disposition, and the skilful handling of the naval forces to be employed, as well as by an unflinching _animus pugnandi_. but no nation which goes to war can hope for more or be content with less than the opportunity of obtaining a decision in these conditions. the issue lies on the knees of the gods. a few illustrations may here be cited. we have seen how in the beachy head campaign tourville, having failed to force a decision on torrington's fleet in being, could not turn aside with torrington at his heels and killigrew and shovel on his flank to bring over an invading force from france. he was paralysed by that abiding characteristic of french naval strategy which impelled the french naval commanders to fix their eye on ulterior objects and blinded them to the fact that the best way to attain those objects was to destroy the naval forces of the enemy whenever the opportunity offered of so obtaining a decision. hence their preference for the leeward position in action, their constant reluctance to fight a decisive action, their habitual direction of their fire at the masts and sails of the enemy rather than at his hulls, and in tourville's case his failure to annihilate torrington's fleet in being, resulting in the total miscarriage of the schemes for invasion, to be followed by internal insurrection, which, as admiral colomb has shown, were the kernel of the french plan of campaign. in the case of the armada in the previous century, the task of invasion was entrusted to parma, who had collected troops for the purpose, and vessels for their transport, in the ports of the spanish netherlands. but justin of nassau kept a close watch outside, and parma could not move. he summoned medina sidonia with the armada to his assistance, but he summoned him in vain, for the armada, harassed throughout the channel, and, as it were, smoked out of calais, was finally shattered at gravelines. precisely the same thing happened in the eighteenth century during the seven years' war. troops and transports were being collected in the morbihan, but their exit was blocked by a british naval force stationed off the ports. conflans with the french main fleet was at brest, and there he was blockaded by hawke. evading the blockade, conflans put to sea and straightway went to release the troops and transports, hopelessly blockaded in the morbihan. but hawke swooped down on him and destroyed him in quiberon bay, boscawen having previously destroyed at lagos the fleet which de la clue was bringing from toulon to effect a junction with conflans. one more illustration may be cited, and i will treat it at some length, because it presents certain features which give it peculiar significance in relation to current controversies. this is the projected invasion of england by france in . it is, so far as i know, the solitary instance in our naval history which shows the enemy framing his plans on the lines of what is now known as "a bolt from the blue"--that is, he projected a surprise invasion, at a time when the two countries were nominally at peace, in the hope that the first overt act of the war he was contemplating might be the landing of his troops on british soil. in , when this project was conceived, england and france were, as i have said, nominally at peace, but troops belonging to both had fought at dettingen, not in any direct quarrel of their own, but because england was supporting maria theresa and france was supporting her enemies. the fleets of both powers were jealously watching each other in the mediterranean, a situation which led early in to the too notorious action of mathews off toulon. nevertheless, until the very end of no direct conflict with france was anticipated by the english government. yet france was already secretly preparing her "bolt from the blue." she had resolved to support the pretender's cause and to prepare an invasion of england in which the pretender's son was to take part, and on landing in england to rally his party to the overthrow of the hanoverian dynasty. the bolt was to be launched from dunkirk and directed at the thames, the intention being to land the invading force at blackwall. some ten thousand french troops to be employed in the expedition were sent into winter-quarters in and around dunkirk, but this aroused no suspicion in england, because this region was the natural place for the left flank of the french army to winter in, and dunkirk contained no transports at the time. transports were, however, being taken up under false charter-parties at french ports on the atlantic and in the channel, and were ordered as soon as ready to rendezvous secretly and separately at dunkirk. at first the intention was for the expeditionary force to make its attempt without any support from the french fleet. but marshal saxe, who was to command it and knew that the thames and its adjacent waters were never denuded of naval force sufficient to make short work of a fleet of unarmed transports, flatly declined to entertain this project and demanded adequate naval support for the enterprise. accordingly a powerful fleet, held to be sufficient to contain or defeat any british fleet that was thought likely to be able to challenge it, was fitted out with all secrecy at brest and placed under the command of de roquefeuil. even he was not told its destination, and false rumours on the subject were allowed to circulate among those who were concerned in its preparation. so far everything seemed to be going well. the blow was timed for the first week in january, but the usual delays occurred, and for a month or more after the date originally fixed, the expeditionary force and its escort were separated by the whole length of northern france. yet even before the date originally fixed, england had got wind of the preparations. from the middle of december brest had been kept under watch, and orders had been issued to the dockyards to prepare for sea as many ships of the line as were available. these preparations were continued, without intermission, until the end of january, the purpose and destination of the armament at brest still being unknown. then two alarming pieces of intelligence reached england at the same time. one was that roquefeuil had put to sea on january (o.s.) with twenty-one sail of the line, and before being lost sight of by the british cruiser told off to watch him, had been seen to be clearly standing to the northward. the other was that prince charles, the son of the pretender, had left rome and had landed without hindrance in france. this, being a direct violation of the treaty of utrecht, was naturally held to give to the sailing of the brest fleet the complexion of a direct hostile intent. it was on february that these facts were known, and on february , sir john norris, a veteran of barfleur and la hogue, who was now well over eighty years of age, but as the event showed was still fully equal to the task entrusted to him, was ordered to hoist his flag at portsmouth and to "take the most effectual measures to prevent the making of any descent on the kingdoms." norris hoisted his flag on the th, and by the th he had eighteen sail of the line under his command. subsequently his force was increased to twenty. nothing was known of the movements of the french fleet since january , when the frigate set to watch it had finally lost sight of it. it was in fact still off the mouth of the channel, baffled by adverse winds and gales and vainly seeking to make headway against them. if it had gone to the mediterranean, mathews off toulon would be placed in grave jeopardy, and there were some projects for detaching a powerful squadron of norris's ships to his support. if, on the other hand, it was aiming at the channel, norris with his whole force would be none too strong to encounter and defeat it. this was norris's dilemma, and it was not until february that he learned from the duke of newcastle that an embargo had been laid on all shipping at dunkirk, where some fifty vessels of one hundred and fifty to two hundred tons had by this time assembled. these might at a pinch and for a short transit be estimated to be capable of transporting some ten thousand troops. but an embargo, although clear proof of hostile intent, was not necessarily a sign of impending invasion. it was a common expedient, preliminary to war, whereby you deprived your enemy of ships and men very necessary to his purposes and secured ships and men equally necessary to your own. hence no strategic connexion could with any certainty be held to exist between the embargo at dunkirk and the sailing of the french fleet from brest. on the other hand it was clearly dangerous to uncover the channel so long as the destination of the brest fleet was unknown, and, although newcastle had suggested to norris that he should divide his fleet and send the major part of it to reinforce mathews in the mediterranean, yet norris strongly demurred to the suggestion, and before the time came to act on it the situation had so far developed as to disallow it altogether. on february , norris received information that a french fleet of at least sixteen sail of the line had been seen the day before off the start. this convinced him that the french had some scheme to the eastward in hand; and as he had frigates watching the channel between the isle of wight and cape barfleur he was equally convinced that the french had so far no appreciable armed force to the eastward of him. newcastle, however, did not share this conviction. he had received numerous reports of movements of french ships in the channel to the eastward of the isle of wight and other information which pointed to a concentration at dunkirk. as a matter of fact no french men-of-war were at this time east of the isle of wight, and the vessels reported to newcastle must have been transports making for dunkirk and magnified into ships of the line by the fog of war. newcastle, accordingly, ordered norris to go forthwith to the downs. foul winds prevented norris from sailing at once from st helen's, and on the th, the day before he did sail, he received further information which confirmed his conviction that the french were still to the westward. but newcastle's orders remained peremptory, and on the th he sailed with eighteen ships, and anchored in the downs on the th. there he found two more ships awaiting him, while two others were on their way to join him from plymouth. i pause here for a moment to point out that norris's desire, over-ruled by newcastle, to remain at portsmouth was thoroughly well advised. he knew that there was naval force enough in the thames and the downs to dispose of any expedition coming from dunkirk unless it were escorted by the brest fleet, or by a very considerable detachment therefrom. he was well assured that no such detachment could have eluded the vigilance of his frigates, and he felt that in these circumstances he could better impeach roquefeuil by lying in wait for him at spithead or st helen's than by preceding him to the downs. how right he was in this appreciation will be seen from a closer consideration of the movements of the french fleet. it was not until february that roquefeuil received his final orders off the start. he was directed to detach de baraille, his second in command, with five ships. these were to go forthwith to dunkirk and escort saxe's expedition, while he himself with the remainder of his fleet was to blockade norris at portsmouth and defeat him if he could. but roquefeuil and his council of war found these orders too hazardous for execution. they resolved not to divide the fleet until at least norris, presumed to be at portsmouth, had been disposed of. on the th, the day on which norris had anchored in the downs, they looked into spithead and persuaded themselves that they had seen norris there with eleven sail of the line. judging that the weather was too bad for a successful blockade, roquefeuil then passed on up the channel, convinced that norris was now behind him with too weak a force to be of any effect. baraille was then sent on with his detachment to dunkirk, but by this time saxe had lost heart and declined to sail until roquefeuil's whole fleet was at hand to escort him. it never was at hand to escort him, and the expedition never sailed. roquefeuil, with his fleet now greatly reduced, anchored off dungeness on the nd, and never got any further. what had happened in the meanwhile was this. norris remained in the downs, being held there for some time by a gale. he was not unaware of what was going on at dunkirk, but he hesitated to proceed thither lest the french fleet behind him should be covering another expedition coming from some french port in the channel. he sent to reconnoitre, however, and on the st received information that four sixty-gun ships--these were, no doubt, baraille's detachment--were at anchor off gravelines, and there covering the transports at dunkirk. on the nd, roquefeuil appeared off dungeness and anchored there. as soon as he knew roquefeuil's whereabouts, norris resolved to attack him without delay. the wind, being n.w., was favourable to his enterprise, and at the same time made it impossible for the expedition to leave dunkirk. should the wind change before roquefeuil was brought to action and defeated, norris held that he was strong enough to detach a force to impeach saxe and baraille, and at the same time to give a good account of roquefeuil. but matters did not exactly turn out in this wise. on the th norris left the downs, with a light wind from the n.w., and an ebb tide in his favour, making for dungeness, where roquefeuil was still lying. his appearance in the offing was roquefeuil's first information that norris was to the eastward of him in superior force, and it greatly disconcerted roquefeuil. he held a hasty council of war and decided to cut and run. by this time the tide had turned and the wind had fallen, so that he could not stir until the tide again began to ebb. norris, similarly disabled, had anchored some few miles to the eastward, intending to make his attack as soon as wind and tide allowed. but during the night a furious gale from the n.e. sprang up, which drove most of norris's ships from their anchors, and when daylight came the french were nowhere to be seen. roquefeuil had slipped his cables, and with the gale behind him was hurrying back to brest. norris went after him as far as beachy head, but there gave up the chase and returned to the downs, to make sure that saxe and baraille, for whom the wind was now favourable, might find their way barred should they attempt to set sail. the transports, however, were by now in no position to move, nor was either saxe or baraille in any mind to allow them to move. they both realized that the game was up. the troops were in the transports, and they suffered greatly in the gale that frustrated norris' attack on roquefeuil. but that was merely an accident of warfare. it was not the gale that shattered the expedition, nor did it save england from invasion. on the contrary, while it played havoc with the transports and troops at dunkirk, it also saved roquefeuil's fleet from destruction at dungeness. but, gale or no gale, the transports and troops never could have crossed so long as norris held on to the downs. nor could they have crossed had norris been allowed to remain at portsmouth as he desired; for in that case baraille could not have been detached. to point the moral of this memorable story, i cannot do better than quote mr julian corbett's comment on it. "the whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had exhibited the normal course of degradation. for all the nicely framed plan and perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle fleet with his transports, and we on our part were able to forestall it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of a central mass on a revealed and certain line of passage." we were certainly taken at a disadvantage at the outset, for the "bolt from the blue" was preparing some time before any one in england got wind of it. the country had been largely denuded of troops for foreign enterprises, scotland was deeply disaffected, the jacobites were full of hope and intrigue, the ministry was supine and feeble, the navy was deplorably weak in home waters, and such ships as were available had been dispersed to their ports for refit. nevertheless with all these conditions in its favour the projected "bolt from the blue" was detected and anticipated--tardily, it is true, and with no great sagacity except on the part of norris--long before the expedition was ready to start. surely the moral needs no further pointing. by these instances, and others which might be quoted, the law seems to be established that in default of an assured command of the sea the fleet which seeks to cover an invasion is drawn by irresistible attraction towards the place of embarkation, and that the same attraction brings it there--if not earlier--into conflict with the superior forces of the enemy. if in the trafalgar campaign, which i have no space to examine in detail, the law does not seem to operate to the extent that it did in the other cases examined, that is only because the disposition of the british fleets was so masterly that napoleon never got the opportunity he yearned for of bringing his fleets to the place of embarkation. they were outmanoeuvred beforehand and finally overthrown at trafalgar. there is indeed a fourth alternative which has been advanced by some speculative writers, though history lends it no countenance, and it has never, i believe, been taken seriously by any naval authority of repute. i cannot take it seriously myself. it assumes that some naval power, suitably situated as regards this country, might without either provocation or overt international dispute, clandestinely take up transport--either a comparatively small number of very large merchant vessels or a very large number of barges, lighters, or what not to be towed by steam vessels--might clandestinely put an army with all its necessary _impedimenta_ on board the transports so provided and then clandestinely, and without either notice or warning, send them to sea, with or without escort, with intent to effect a landing at some suitable point on the english coast. the whole theory seems to me to involve at least three monstrous improbabilities: first, a piratical intent on the part of a civilized nation; secondly, a concealment of such intent in conditions wellnigh incompatible with the degree of secrecy required; and thirdly, a precision and a punctuality of movement in the operations of embarkation, transit, and landing of which history affords no example, while naval opinion and experience scoff at them as utterly impracticable. of course the future may not resemble the past, and naval wars of the future may not be conducted on a pattern sealed by the unbroken teaching of over eight hundred years. but that is an assumption which i cannot seriously entertain. chapter vii commerce in war the maritime trade of a nation at war has always been regarded by the other belligerent as his legitimate prey. in the dutch wars the suppression of the enemy's commerce was the main objective of both parties to the conflict. in all wars in which either belligerent has any commerce afloat worth considering one belligerent may always be expected to do all that he can for its capture or suppression, while the other will do as much as he can for its defence. in proportion to the volume and value of the national trade afloat is the potency of its destruction as an agency for bringing the national will into submission. if, for example, the maritime trade of england could be suppressed by her enemies, england would thereby be vanquished. her commerce is her life-blood. on the other hand there are nations, very powerful in war, which either by reason of their geographical position, or because their oversea trade is no vital element in their national economy, would suffer comparatively little in like circumstances. it thus appears that the volume and value of the national trade afloat is the measure of the efforts which an enemy is likely to make for its suppression. but it is not directly the measure of the efforts which a nation so assailed must make for its defence. the measure of these efforts is determined not by the volume and value of the trade to be protected but by the amount and character of the naval force which the enemy can employ in assailing it. in the boer war british maritime commerce was unassailed and uninterrupted in all parts of the world, and yet not a single ship of the british navy was directly employed in its protection. if on the other hand england were at war with a naval power of the first rank, she might have to employ the whole of her naval resources in securing the free transit of her maritime commerce. so long as she can do this with success she need give no thought to the menace of possible invasion. a command of the sea so far established as to secure freedom of transit for the vast and ubiquitous maritime commerce of this country is also, of necessity, so far established as to deny free transit to the transports of an enemy seeking to invade. the greater includes the less. it may at first sight seem to be an anomaly--some, indeed, would represent it as a mere survival of barbarism--that whereas in war on land the private property of an enemy's subjects is, by the established law and custom of civilized nations, not liable to capture or destruction without compensation to its owners, the opposite rule still prevails in war at sea. but a little consideration will, i think, show that the analogy sought to be established between the two cases is a very imperfect one. war on land does _ipso facto_ suspend in large measure the free transport of commerce in transit. as between the two belligerents it interrupts it altogether. moreover, throughout the territory occupied by the enemy, the railways, and in large measure the roads, are practically monopolized for the movements of his troops and the transport of his supplies--in a word for the maintenance of his communications. there can have been little or no consignment of goods from paris to berlin or _vice versa_ during the war of , and even though at certain stages of the war goods might have been consigned, say, from lyons to geneva, or from lille to brussels, yet such cases are really only the counterparts of the frequent failure of one belligerent's cruisers to intercept the merchant vessels of the other on the high seas. again, in the case of a beleaguered fortress, the besiegers would never dream of allowing a convoy of food or of munitions of war--or for the matter of that of merchandise of any kind--to enter the fortress. they would intercept it as a matter of course, and if necessary they would appropriate it to their own use. the upshot of it all is that even in war on land the transit of all commerce, albeit the private property of some one, is practically suspended within the area of the territory occupied, and very seriously impeded throughout the whole country subject to invasion. it is not, therefore, true to say without many qualifications that in war private property is respected on land and not respected at sea. the only difference that i can discern is that by the law and custom of nations private property cannot be appropriated on land, whereas at sea it can. but this difference is not really essential. the essential thing in both cases is that the wealth of the enemy is diminished and the credit of his traders destroyed--a far more important matter in these days than the destruction of this or that cargo of his goods--by the suspension of that interchange of commodities with other nations which is the chief element of national prosperity, and may be, as in the case of england, the indispensable condition of national existence. indeed, although private property on land is exempt from capture, and at sea it is not, yet there are many nations which would suffer far more from the interruption of their mercantile communications which war on land entails than they would from the destruction of their commerce at sea. for these reasons i hold that the proposed exemption of private property from capture or molestation at sea is a chimerical one. war is essentially an act of violence. it operates by the destruction of human life as well as by all other agencies which are likely to subdue the enemy's will. among these agencies the capture or destruction of commerce afloat is by far the most humane since it entails the least sacrifice of life, limb, or liberty, and at the same time its coercive pressure may in some cases, though not in all, be the most effective instrument for compelling the enemy's submission. moreover, it is not proposed to exempt from capture or destruction such merchant vessels of the enemy--or even of a neutral for that matter--as attempt to break a blockade. now the modern conditions of blockade are such that the warships conducting it may be stationed hundreds of miles from the blockaded port or ports, and their outlying cruisers, remaining in touch with each other and with the main body, may be much further afield. within the area of the organized patrol thus established, every vessel seeking to enter a blockaded port or to issue from it will still be liable to capture. in these conditions the proposal to exempt the remainder of the enemy's private property afloat from capture would be a mockery. there would not be enough of such property afloat to pay for the cost of capture. it is an axiom of naval warfare that an assured command of the sea is at once the best defence for commerce afloat and an indispensable condition for any such attack on it as is likely to have any appreciable effect in subduing the enemy's will. war is an affair not of pin-pricks but of smashing blows. "the harassment and distress," says admiral mahan, "caused to a country by serious interference with its commerce will be conceded by all. it is doubtless a most important secondary operation of naval war, and is not likely to be abandoned until war itself shall cease; but regarded as a primary and fundamental measure sufficient in itself to crush an enemy, it is probably a delusion, and a most dangerous delusion, when presented in the fascinating garb of cheapness to the representatives of a people." here again we may discern some of the larger implications of that potent and far-reaching agency of naval warfare, the command of the sea. if a belligerent not aiming at the command of the sea, and having no sufficient naval force wherewithal to secure it, thinks to crush his enemy by directing sporadic attacks on his commerce, he will, if history is any guide, soon find out his mistake. his naval forces available for this purpose, are, by the hypothesis, inferior to those of the enemy. it is certain that they will sooner or later be hunted down and destroyed. moreover, the mercantile flag of the weaker belligerent will, as i have shown, disappear from the sea from the very outset of the conflict; and the maritime commerce of such a belligerent must be of very insignificant volume if the loss entailed by its suppression is not greater than that likely to be inflicted by such a belligerent on the enemy's commerce which crosses the seas under the _ægis_ of a flag which commands them. admiral mahan has estimated that during the whole of the war of the french revolution and empire the direct loss to england "by the operation of hostile cruisers did not exceed - / per cent. of the commerce of the empire; and that this loss was partially made good by the prize ships and merchandise taken by its own naval vessels and privateers." it should be noted, however, that the royal commission on food supply was of opinion that per cent. would be a more accurate estimate. it is also well known that during the same period the maritime commerce of england was doubled in volume while that of france was annihilated. in point of fact the risks run in war by commerce afloat are measured very exactly by the degree in which the flag which covers it has secured the command of the sea--that is, be it always remembered, the control of the maritime communications affected. during the war of american independence, when british supremacy at sea was seriously challenged and at times was in grave jeopardy--owing quite as much to faulty disposition as to inferiority of force--premiums of fifteen guineas per cent. were paid in on ships trading to the far east; whereas from the spring of until the close of the struggle with napoleon no premiums exceeding half that rate were paid. yet to the very end of the war british merchant vessels were being seized even in the channel almost every day. there is, however, good reason to think that many of these seizures were in reality collusive operations undertaken for the purpose of carrying on clandestinely the direct trade with the continent which napoleon sought in vain to suppress. the full history of the memorable conflict between the berlin decrees of napoleon and the british orders in council, is still to be written. some very illuminating side-lights are thrown on it by mr david hannay in a volume entitled _the sea-trader, his friends and enemies_. it would seem to follow from these premisses--fortified as they are by other historical examples that might be cited--that of two belligerents in a naval war, that one which establishes and maintains an effective command of the sea will be absolute master of the maritime commerce of the other, while his own maritime commerce, though not entirely immune, will suffer no such decisive losses as will determine or even materially affect the course and issue of the war; and that he may indeed emerge from the war much stronger and more prosperous than he was at the beginning. such is assuredly the teaching of history, and although vast changes have taken place alike in respect of the methods, opportunities, implements, and international conventions of naval war and in respect of the conditions, volume, and national importance of maritime commerce, yet i think it can be shown that the sum total of these changes has made on the whole rather for the advantage of the superior belligerent than otherwise. in the first place privateering--formerly a very effective weapon in the hands of the weaker belligerent--is now abolished. it is true that the declaration of paris, which recorded and ratified its abolition, has not been formally accepted by all the naval powers of the world; but it is also true that since its promulgation no naval power has sought to revive privateering. it is indeed held by some that the right claimed by certain maritime powers to convert merchant ships of their own nationality into warships by arming and commissioning them on the high seas is, or may be, equivalent to the revival of privateering in its most dangerous and aggressive form. but those who argue thus appear to overlook the fact that this process of conversion on the high seas is by the seventh convention of the second hague conference hedged round with a series of restrictions which differentiate the warship thus improvised very sharply from the privateer of the past. the following are the leading provisions of this convention:-- . a merchant ship converted into a warship cannot have the rights and duties appertaining to vessels having that status unless it is under the direct authority, immediate control, and responsibility of the power the flag of which it flies. . merchant ships converted into warships must bear the external marks which distinguish the warships of their nationality. . the commander must be in the service of the state and duly commissioned by the proper authorities. his name must figure on the list of the officers of the fighting fleet. . the crew must be subject to military discipline. . every merchant ship converted into a warship is bound to observe in its operations the laws and customs of war. . a belligerent who converts a merchant ship into a warship must, as soon as possible, announce such conversion in the list of its warships. this convention has been accepted and ratified by all the great maritime powers. it is true that it gives the converted merchant ship what may be called the dog's privilege of taking a first bite with impunity, but it makes it very difficult for any second bite to be taken. such a vessel may as a merchant ship have obtained coal and other supplies in a neutral port before conversion, but she cannot after conversion return to the same or another neutral port and repeat the process; nor can she easily play the game which some have attributed to her of being a merchant ship one day, a warship the next, and a merchant ship again on the third. further, as a weapon to be employed against england in particular, the method of conversion here prescribed would seem to be largely discounted by the fact that this country could, if it were so disposed, convert as many merchant ships into warships in this way as all the rest of the world put together. it will be argued, perhaps, that a belligerent when hard pressed will not respect the provisions of a mere paper convention, but will, if it suits him, treat them as non-existent. in that case it is not easy to see why he should ever have accepted and ratified them. the preamble of this very convention recites that "whereas the contracting powers have been unable to come to an agreement on the question whether the conversion of a merchant ship into a warship may take place upon the high seas, it is understood that the question of the place where such conversion is effected remains outside the scope of this agreement, and is in no way affected by the following rules." in other words some of the very powers which have ratified the convention as it stands categorically declined to add to it a provision forbidding altogether the conversion of a merchant ship into a warship on the high seas. if this does not mean that, while reserving their freedom of action in this respect, they are prepared to abide by the provisions of a convention which they have not less categorically accepted and ratified we are driven to the absurd conclusion that all international law is a nullity. secondly, the practical disappearance of the sailing ship from the seas has profoundly modified all the pre-existing conditions affecting the attack and defence of commerce afloat. in the days of sailing, all vessels were compelled to sail according to the wind, that is, to take devious courses whenever the wind was adverse, so that some of them might at all times be found scattered over very wide areas of the seas connecting the ports of departure with those of arrival. accordingly the sporadic attack on commerce by isolated warships cruising at large within the limits of trade routes, which might be hundreds of miles in width, was often productive of very appreciable results. there were few blank coverts on the seas to be drawn. nowadays a steamer can always take the most direct course to her destination. as a consequence, trade routes have now been narrowed down to what may more fittingly be called lines of communication, and these lines possess the true characteristic of all lines, namely, that they have practically no breadth. thus the areas bounded by these lines are nowadays all blank coverts. any one who happens to cross the atlantic, as i have crossed it more than once, by one of the less frequented routes, will know that the number of vessels sighted in a voyage quite as long as any warship could take without coaling may often be counted on the fingers of one hand. another characteristic of these lines is that though their points of departure and destination are fixed, yet the lines joining these points may be varied if necessary to such an extent that any warship hovering about their ordinary direction would be thrown entirely off the scent. on the other hand their ports of departure and destination being fixed, the lines of communication must inevitably converge as they approach these points. there are other points also more in the open at which several lines of communication may intersect. at these "terminal and focal points," as mr corbett has aptly called them, the belligerent, being by hypothesis inferior to his adversary, must needs endeavour to concentrate his attack on his enemy's commerce, because at any other points the game would not be worth the candle. but it is precisely at these points that the superior adversary will concentrate his defence, and being superior, will take care to do so in force sufficient for the purpose. so far as the remaining portions of the lines of communication need any direct defence at all this can be afforded, if and when necessary, by collecting the merchant ships about to traverse them into convoys and giving them an escort sufficiently powerful to deal effectually with attacks which from the nature of the case can only be sporadic and intermittent. be it remembered that the last thing a warship bent on commerce destruction wants is to encounter an enemy in superior or even in equal force. the moment she does so her game is up. thirdly, the substitution of steam for sails has very largely reduced the enduring mobility of the commerce-destroying warship. in time of war no warship will ever go further from the nearest available supply of coal than is represented by considerably less than half of the distance that she can steam at full speed with her bunkers full. if she does so she runs the risk, if chased, of burning her last pound of coal before she has reached shelter. coaling at sea is only possible in exceptional circumstances, and is in any case a very tedious operation. a warship which attempts it will be taken at a great disadvantage if an enemy catches her in the process. colliers, moreover, are exposed to capture while proceeding to the appointed rendezvous, and if they fail to reach it the warship awaiting them will be placed in extreme danger. all these difficulties and dangers may be surmounted once and again, but they must needs put a tremendous handicap in the long run on the commerce-destroying efforts of a belligerent who is not superior to his adversary at sea. of course if he is superior at sea the enemy's commerce will be at his mercy, and nothing can prevent its destruction or at least its total suppression. but that is not the hypothesis we are considering. fourthly, the power of the modern warship to send her prizes into court for adjudication, or to destroy them off-hand on capture is much more limited than was that of her sailing predecessor. if she sends them into port she must either put a prize crew on board or escort them herself. in the former case the prizes, and in the latter case both prizes and their captors are liable to recapture, a liability which becomes the greater in proportion as the enemy is superior at sea. as to the former alternative, moreover, the crew of a modern man-of-war is highly specialized, and in particular its engine-room complement, which must furnish a portion of every prize crew, is at the outset no greater than is required for the full fighting efficiency of the ship. it is probable, therefore, that the captor would in nearly all cases adopt the alternative of destroying his prizes at sea. in that case there will be no prize money for any one concerned, but that is perhaps a minor consideration. a far more important consideration is that before destroying the prize the captor must take its crew on board and provide food and accommodation for them. any other course would be sheer piracy and would inevitably lead to drastic reprisals. now, before the captor had destroyed many prizes in this fashion--especially if even one of them happened to be a passenger steamer well filled with passengers--she would find herself gravely embarrassed by the number of her prisoners, and the need of providing for them even in the roughest fashion. a captain having to fight his ship even with a few hundreds of prisoners on board would be in no very enviable position. the foregoing are the leading considerations which appear to me to govern the problem of the attack and defence of maritime commerce in modern conditions of naval warfare. i have discussed the question in greater detail in a work entitled _nelson and other naval studies_, and as i have seen no reason to abandon or substantially to modify the conclusions there formulated, i reproduce them here for the sake of completeness:-- . all experience shows that commerce-destroying never has been, and never can be, a primary object of naval war. . there is nothing in the changes which modern times have witnessed in the methods and appliances of naval warfare to suggest that the experience of former wars is no longer applicable. . such experience as there is of modern war points to the same conclusion and enforces it. . the case of the "alabama," rightly understood, does not disallow this conclusion but rather confirms it. . though the volume of maritime commerce has vastly increased, the number of units of naval force capable of assailing it has decreased in far greater proportion. . privateering is, and remains abolished, not merely by the fiat of international law, but by changes in the methods and appliances of navigation and naval warfare which have rendered the privateer entirely obsolete. . maritime commerce is much less assailable than in former times, because the introduction of steam has confined its course to definite trade routes of extremely narrow width, and has almost denuded the sea of commerce outside these limits. . the modern commerce destroyer is confined to a comparatively narrow radius of action by the inexorable limits of her coal supply. if she destroys her prizes she must forgo the prize money and find accommodation for the crews and passengers of the ships destroyed. if she sends them into port she must deplete her engine-room complement and thereby gravely impair her own efficiency. . torpedo craft are of little or no use for commerce destruction except in certain well-defined areas where special measures can be taken for checking their depredations. of course all this depends on the one fundamental assumption that the commerce to be defended belongs to a power which can, and does, command the sea. on no other condition can maritime commerce be defended at all. chapter viii the differentiation of naval force a warship, considered in the abstract, may be defined as a vessel employed, and generally constructed, for the purpose of conveying across the seas to the place of conflict, the weapons that are to be used in conflict, the men who are to use them, and all such stores, whether of food or other supplies, as will give to the vessel as large a measure of enduring mobility as is compatible with her displacement. if we confine our attention to the period posterior to the employment of the gun on shipboard as the principal weapon of offence, and if we regard the torpedo as a particular kind of projectile, and the tube from which it is discharged as a particular kind of gun, we may condense this definition into the modern formula that a warship is a floating gun-carriage. with the methods and implements of sea warfare anterior to the introduction of the gun we need not concern ourselves. they belong to the archæology of the subject. it suffices to point out that in all periods of naval warfare the nature of the principal weapon employed, and to some extent that of the motive power available, have not only governed the structure of the ship and determined the practicable limit of its displacement, but have also exercised a dominant influence over the ordering of fleets and their disposition in action. sea tactics have never been more elaborate than they were in the last days of the galley period which came to an end with the battle of lepanto in , less than a score of years before the defeat of the armada in . but the substitution of sails for oars as the motive power of the warship and the more general employment of the gun as the principal weapon of offence necessarily entailed radical changes in the tactical methods which had been slowly evolved during the galley period. at first all was confusion and a sea-fight was reduced for a time to a very disorderly and tumultuous affair. "we went down in no order," wrote an officer who was present at trafalgar, "but every man to take his bird." this is a very inaccurate and even more unintelligent account of the tactics pursued at trafalgar; but it might very well stand for a picturesque summary of the tactical confusion which prevailed at the period of the armada and for half a century afterwards. gradually, however, order was again evolved out of the prevailing chaos. but it was not the old order. it was a new order based on the predominance of the gun and its disposition on board the ship. to go down in no order and for each man to take his bird would mean that each ship, whether large or small, would be free as far as circumstances permitted to select an adversary not disproportioned in strength to herself, so that there was no very pressing need for the fleet to consist of homogeneous units, nor for the elimination of comparatively small craft from a general engagement. but in the course of the dutch wars the practice was slowly evolved of fighting in a compact or close-hauled line, the ships being ranged in a line ahead--that is, each succeeding ship following in the wake of her next ahead--in order to give free play to the guns disposed mainly on the broadside, and being, for purposes of mutual support, disposed as closely to each other as was compatible with individual freedom of evolution and manoeuvre. this disposition necessarily involved the exclusion from the line of battle of all vessels below a certain average or standard of fighting strength, since it was no longer possible for "every man to take his bird" and a weak ship might find herself in conflict with an adversary of overpowering strength in the enemy's line. hence the main fighting forces of naval belligerents came in time to be composed entirely of "ships fit to lie in a line," as torrington phrased it, of "capital ships," as they were frequently called in former days, of "line of battle ships" or "ships of the line," as afterwards they were more commonly called, or of "battleships" as is nowadays the accepted appellation. other elements of naval force not "fit to lie in a line" were also required, as i am about to show, and took different forms at different times, but the root of the whole evolution lies in the elimination of the non-capital ship from the main fighting line. in a very instructive chapter of his _naval warfare_, admiral colomb has traced the whole course of this gradual "differentiation of naval force." but for my purpose it suffices to cite the briefer exposition of a french writer quoted by admiral mahan in his _influence of sea power upon history_:-- "with the increase of the power of the ship of war, and with the perfecting of its sea and warlike qualities, there has come an equal progress in the art of utilizing them.... as naval evolutions become more skilful, their importance grows from day to day. to these evolutions there is needed a base, a point from which they depart and to which they return. a fleet of warships must always be ready to meet an enemy; logically, therefore, this point of departure for naval evolutions must be the order of battle. now since the disappearance of galleys, almost all the artillery is found upon the sides of a ship of war. hence it is the beam that must necessarily and always be turned toward the enemy. on the other hand it is necessary that the sight of the latter must never be interrupted by a friendly ship. only one formation allows the ships of the same fleet to satisfy fully these conditions. that formation is the line ahead. the line, therefore, is imposed as the only order of battle, and consequently as the basis of all fleet tactics. in order that this line of battle, this long thin line of guns, may not be injured or broken at some point weaker than the rest, there is at the same time felt to be the necessity of putting in it only ships which, if not of equal force, have at least equally strong sides. logically it follows, at the same moment in which the line ahead became definitely the order for battle, there was established the distinction between the 'ships of the line' alone destined for a place therein, and the lighter ships meant for other uses." but the need for other and lighter ships "meant for other uses" and not "fit to lie in a line," is equally demonstrable. the function of battleships is to act in concert. they must therefore be concentrated in fleets sufficiently strong to give a good account of the enemy's fleets opposed to them. this does not necessarily mean that all the fleets of a belligerent must be concentrated in a single position. but it does mean that if disposed in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy they must be so disposed and connected, that, moving on interior lines, they can always bring a superior force to the point of contact with the enemy. subject to this paramount condition, that of being able to concentrate more rapidly than the enemy can, dispersal of naval force--not of units but of organized fighting fleets--is generally a better disposition than extreme concentration. but it is a fatal error in strategy so to disperse your fleets as to expose them to the risk of being overpowered by the enemy in detail. the fleets of capital ships thus organized, and disposed as occasion may require and sound strategy dictate, are not, however, by any means to be regarded as autonomous and self-sufficing organisms. they are rather to be regarded as the moving base of a much larger organization, much more widely dispersed, consisting of lighter vessels not fit to lie in a line, but specially adapted to discharge functions which capital ships cannot as such discharge, yet which are indispensable either to the full efficiency of the latter or to the maintenance of an effective command of the sea. the first of these functions is the collection and rapid transmission of intelligence as to the enemy's dispositions and movements over as wide an area of the waters in dispute as is compatible with communication rapid enough to allow of counter-movements being made before it is too late. the development of wireless telegraphy has largely extended this area, but it is not without limits in practice, and those limits are already narrower than the extreme range of a single transmission by wireless telegraphy. for example, a warship in the levant might, if the conditions were exceptionally favourable, communicate by direct wireless with another warship in the orkneys. but the information thus transmitted would hardly be likely directly to influence the movements and dispositions of the latter. if it did it would probably not be through the immediate initiative of the admiral commanding in the north sea, but through the supreme control of all the naval forces of the belligerent affected, exercised through the general staff of the navy at the seat of government. it may here be remarked in passing that the development of wireless telegraphy will probably be found in war to strengthen this supreme control and to weaken to that extent the independent and isolated initiative of individual commanders-in-chief. but that is not necessarily a disadvantage, and even so far as it is disadvantage at all it is more than balanced by the immense corresponding advantage of keeping the war staff at all times in direct touch with every part of the field of naval operations, and thereby making it the focus of all available information, and the directing authority for all the larger strategy of the campaign. except in degree, moreover, there is nothing new in this. when nelson was returning across the atlantic, after chasing villeneuve out of the west indies, his only way of informing the admiralty of the nature of the situation was to send on bettesworth in the brig "curieux" with his news. nowadays a modern "curieux" would be able to send on the news as soon as she came within fifteen hundred or possibly two thousand miles from the british isles, and nelson at the same distance might have received his orders direct from the admiralty. but the special point to note is that as soon as bettesworth's information was received at the admiralty, barham, the first lord of the admiralty, instantly issued orders which profoundly modified the dispositions of the fleets engaged in blockading the french ports and led directly to calder's action off finisterre, and in the sequel to the abandonment by napoleon of all his projects of invasion and the destruction of the allied fleets at trafalgar. there were giants in those days both afloat and ashore. but the giants afloat did not resent the interference of the giants ashore, and, as mr corbett has shown, the trafalgar campaign was conducted with consummate sagacity by barham, who embodied in himself the war staff of the time. such is the transcendent importance of intelligence, and of its collection, transmission, collation, interpretation, and translation into supreme executive orders. its collection and transmission is mainly the function of cruising ships disposed either individually or in small groups for the purpose, and at such a distance from the main body of battleships as is not incompatible with the movements of the latter being controlled and directed, either by their immediate commanders, or by the war staff at the centre, according to the information received from the outlying cruisers. such cruising vessels may vary in size and strength from the modern battle-cruiser, so heavily armed and armoured as to be not incapable of taking a place, on occasion, in the line of battle, down to the smallest torpedo craft which is endowed with sufficient enduring mobility to enable her to keep the sea and to cruise as near as may be to the enemy's ports. i have already indicated the other collateral functions which will have to be discharged by torpedo craft in case of a blockade and pointed out the vital distinction which differentiates them from the small craft of the past in that in certain circumstances they are capable of taking a formidable part in a fleet action even as against the most powerful battleships. but we are here considering them solely from the point of view of their cruising functions, whether as guarding their own shores or watching those of the enemy with a view to fighting on occasion and to observation at all times. their supports will be cruisers of larger size, disposed at suitable distances in the rear, and themselves supported in like manner by successive cordons or patrols of cruisers increasing in size and power, until we come to the battle fleet as the concentrated nucleus of the whole organization. this is merely an abstract or diagrammatic exposition of such an organization, and it is of course liable to almost infinite variation in the infinite variety of warlike operations at sea, but it serves to exhibit the _rationale_ of the differentiation of naval force into battleships, cruisers, and small craft. it has sometimes been argued that, inasmuch as the torpedo craft is, or may be, in certain conditions, more than a match for even the biggest battleship, battleships together with all intermediate ships between the battleship and the torpedo vessel, are not unlikely to be some day regarded as superfluous and in consequence to be discarded altogether from the naval armament of even a first-class maritime power. it is true that the range and accuracy of the torpedo have latterly undergone an immense development, so that a range of even ten thousand yards or five sea-miles is no longer beyond its powers. it is true that the development of the submarine vessel has vastly intensified the menace of the torpedo and it may soon be true that the development of aircraft will add a new and very formidable menace to the supremacy of the battleship. but except for this last consideration, which is at present exceedingly speculative, a little reflection will disclose the underlying fallacy of arguments of this kind. the enduring mobility of the torpedo craft is necessarily limited. it is incapable of that wide range of action which is required of warships if they are to establish and maintain any effective command of the sea. it is exceedingly vulnerable to ships of a larger size, and of more ample enduring mobility. these again will be vulnerable in their turn to ships of a still larger size and thus the logic of the situation brings us back to the battleship once more with its characteristic functions. it may perhaps be urged that this chain of argument takes too little account of the submarine vessel which is at present singularly invulnerable because for the most part invisible to any vessels, whether big or little, which operate only on the surface and even if discovered betimes by the latter, is not very readily assailable by them. but of two things one. either the submarine vessel will remain small and therefore weak, and lacking in enduring mobility, in which case it can never establish and maintain an effective command of the sea. or it will grow indefinitely in size, in which case it will fall under the inexorable stress of the logic which brings us back once more to the battleship. it may be that the battleship of the still distant future will be a submersible battleship. but many exceedingly complex problems of construction and stability will have to be solved before that consummation is reached. lastly, the specific function of the so-called battle-cruiser would seem to need some further elucidation. at first sight this hybrid type of vessel might seem to be an anomalous intrusion into the time-honoured hierarchy of battleship, cruiser, and small craft, which the ripe experience of many wars, battles, and campaigns had finally established in the last golden days of the sailing ship period. it is indeed held by some high authorities that the battle-cruiser is in very truth a hybrid and an anomaly, and that no adequate reason for its existence can be given. in face of these opinions i cannot presume to dogmatize on the subject. but some not wholly irrelevant considerations may be advanced. the battle-cruiser is, as its name implies, a vessel not only fitted by the nature of its armour and armament "to lie in a line," whenever occasion may require, but also exceedingly well qualified by its armour and armament, and still more by its speed, to discharge many of the functions of a cruiser either alone or in company with other cruisers. in this latter capacity, it can overhaul nearly every merchant ship afloat, it can scout far and wide, it can push home a vital reconnaissance in cases where a weaker and slower cruiser would have to run away if she could, it can serve as a rallying point to a squadron of smaller cruisers engaged in the defence of this or that vital line of communication, and alone or in company with a consort of the same type it can hold the terminal and focal points of any such line against almost any number of hostile cruisers inferior in defensive and offensive powers to itself. such are its powers and capacities when acting as a cruiser proper. but it may be thought that in the stress of conflict it will have very little opportunity of displaying these very exceptional powers because an admiral in command of a fighting fleet will never, when anticipating an engagement with the enemy, consent to weaken his fighting line by detaching so powerful a unit for scouting or other cruising purposes. that is as it may be. it will depend on many circumstances of the moment not to be clearly anticipated or defined beforehand; on the strength of the enemy's force, on the personality, sagacity, and fortitude of the admiral--whether he is or is not a man of the mettle and temper ascribed to nelson by admiral mahan in a passage already quoted--on the comparative need as determined by the circumstances of the moment of scouting for information, of cruising for the defence of trade, or of strengthening the battle line for a decisive conflict to the uttermost extent of the nation's resources. it is unbecoming to assume that in the crisis of his country's fate an admiral will act either as a fool or as a poltroon. it is the country's fault if a man capable of so acting is placed in supreme command, and for that there is no remedy. but it is sounder to assume that the admiral selected for command is a man not incapable of disposing his force to the best advantage. "we must," said lord goschen, on one occasion, "put our trust in providence and a good admiral." if a nation cannot find a good admiral in its need it is idle to trust in providence. it remains to consider the function of the battle-cruiser in the line of battle. the lines of battle in former times were often composed of ships of varying size and power. there was a legitimate prejudice against ships of excessive size, although their superior power in action was recognized--we have the unimpeachable testimony on that point of nelson's hardy, a man of unrivalled fighting experience to whom nelson himself attributed "an intuitive right judgment"--because they were unhandy in manoeuvre and slow in sailing as compared with ships of more moderate dimensions. but except for difficulties of docking--a very serious consideration from the financial point of view--hardly any limit can be assigned to the size of the modern warship on these particular grounds. quite the contrary. other things being equal, the bigger the ship the higher the speed, and it is well known that ships of the dreadnought type are as handy to steer as a torpedo boat. for tactical reasons, moreover, it is not expedient to lengthen the line of battle unduly. hence there is a manifest advantage in concentrating offensive power, as far as may be, in single units. on the other hand, the experience and practice of the eighteenth century showed conclusively that there was also a distinct advantage in having in the line of battle a certain number of ships which, being smaller than their consorts, were more handy and faster sailing than the latter. the enemy might not want to fight. very often he did not, and by crowding all possible sail he did his best to get away. in this case the only way to bring him to action was for the pursuing admiral to order "a general chase"--that is, to direct his ships, disregarding the precise line of battle, to hurry on with all possible sail after the enemy so that the fastest ships of the pursuing fleet might bring individually to action the laggards of the retreating fleet and hold them until the main body of the pursuing fleet came up. in this case the retreating admiral must either return to the succour of his ships astern and thereby accept the general action which he sought to avoid, or abandon his overtaken ships to the enemy without attempting to rescue them. hawke's action in quiberon bay and duncan's action off camperdown are two of the most memorable examples of this particular mode of attack, and their brilliant results are a striking testimony to its efficacy. if ever in the naval battles of the future it becomes expedient for an admiral to order a general chase, it stands to reason that ships of the battle-cruiser type will be invaluable for the purpose. their speed will enable them to hold the tail of the enemy's line, and their power will enable them to crush it unless the retreating admiral who seeks to avoid a decisive action turns back to succour such of his ships as are assailed and thereby renders a decisive action inevitable. there is, moreover, another function to be assigned to the battle-cruiser in a general action, and that is a function which was defined once for all by nelson himself in the immortal memorandum in which he explained to his captains the mode of attack he proposed to carry out at trafalgar. "i have," wrote nelson, "made up my mind to keep the fleet in that position of sailing ... that the order of sailing is to be the order of battle, placing the fleet in two lines of sixteen ships each, with an advanced squadron of eight _of the fastest sailing two-decked ships_ which will always make, if wanted, a line of twenty-four sail, on whichever line the commander-in-chief may direct." owing to the lack of ships this disposition was not adopted on the day of trafalgar, but the principle involved is not affected by that circumstance. that principle is that a squadron of the fastest sailing ships in the fleet was to be detached from the two fighting lines entrusted with the initial attack, and reserved or "refused" until the development of the main attack had disclosed to the commander-in-chief the point at which the impact of this "advanced squadron" would by superior concentration on that point secure that the enemy should there be decisively overpowered. the essence of the matter is that the ships so employed should by virtue of their superior speed be endowed with a tactical mobility sufficient to enable them to discharge the function assigned to them. i need hardly insist on the close analogy which subsists between nelson's "advanced squadron" and a modern squadron of battle-cruisers similarly employed, and although the conflict of modern warships must needs differ in many essential respects from the conflicts of sailing ships in nelson's days, yet i think a clear and authoritative exposition of one at least of the uses and functions of the battle-cruiser in a fleet action may still be found in what i have called elsewhere "the last tactical word of the greatest master of sea tactics the world has ever known, the final and flawless disposition of sailing ships marshalled for combat." chapter ix the distribution and supply of naval force the measure of naval strength required by any state is determined mainly by the naval strength of its possible adversaries in the event of war, and only in a secondary degree by the volume of the maritime interests which it has to defend. paradoxical as the latter half of this proposition may seem at first sight, it can easily be shown to be sound. the maritime interests, territorial and commercial, of the british empire are beyond all comparison greater than those of any other state in the world; but if no other state possessed a naval force strong enough to assail them seriously, it is manifest that the naval force required to defend them need be no greater than is sufficient to overcome the assailant, and would not therefore be determined in any degree by the volume of the interests to be defended. each state determines for itself the measure of naval strength which it judges to be necessary to its security. no state expects to have to encounter the whole world in arms or makes its provision in view of any such chimerical contingency. the utmost that any state can do is to adjust its naval policy to a rational estimate of all the reasonably probable contingencies of international conflict, due regard being had to the extent of its financial resources and to such other requirements of national defence as circumstances impose on it. germany, for example, has proclaimed to all the world in the preamble to the navy law of that-- "in order to protect german trade and commerce under existing conditions, only one thing will suffice, namely, germany must possess a battle fleet of such strength that even for the most powerful naval adversary a war would involve such risks as to make that power's own supremacy doubtful. for this purpose it is not absolutely necessary that the german fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power, for, as a rule, a great naval power will not be in a position to concentrate all its forces against us." i am not concerned in any way with the political aspects of this memorable declaration. but its bearing on the naval policy of the british empire is manifest and direct. england is beyond all question "the greatest naval power" in the world. the declaration of germany thus lays upon england the indefeasible obligation of taking care that by no efforts of any other power shall her "own supremacy"--that is her capacity to secure and maintain the command of the sea in all reasonably probable contingencies of international conflict--be rendered doubtful. there is no state in the world on which decisive defeat at sea would inflict such irretrievable disaster as it would on england and her empire. these islands would be open to invasion--and if to invasion to conquest and subjugation--the commerce of the whole empire would be annihilated, and the empire itself would be dismembered. i need not attempt to determine what measure of naval strength is required to avert this unspeakable calamity. it suffices to say that whatever the measure may be it must be provided and maintained at all hazards. that is merely the axiomatic expression of the things that belong to our peace. it will be observed that the german declaration assumes that "a great naval power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all its forces against" a single adversary. this raises at once the question of the distribution of naval force, or of what has been called the peace strategy of position. i shall endeavour to discuss the problem with as little reference as may be to an actual state of war between any two individual and specific naval powers. i shall merely assume that of two possible belligerents one is so far stronger than the other as to look with confidence to being able in the event of war to secure and maintain its own command of the sea; and in order not to complicate the problem unduly i shall include in the term "belligerent" not merely a single power but an alliance of one or more separate powers, while still adhering to the assumption that the relative strength of the two belligerents is as defined above. if england is one of the powers affected it is manifest from what has already been said that this assumption is a legitimate one. in such a situation it stands to reason that the concentration of the whole force of the stronger belligerent against the whole force equally concentrated of the weaker belligerent would not be necessary and would very rarely be expedient. the stronger belligerent would of course seek, in time of war, so to dispose his forces as to make it impossible for the weaker fleets of his adversary to take the sea without being brought to a decisive action, and he would so order his peace strategy of position as to further that paramount purpose. but it does not follow that being superior in the measure above defined he would need to concentrate all his available forces for that purpose. he would concentrate so much of his forces as would ensure victory in the encounters anticipated--so far as mere numbers apart from fighting efficiency can ensure victory--and the residue would be available for other and subsidiary purposes. if there were no residue, then the required superiority would not have been attained, and the belligerent who has neglected to attain it must take the consequences. one of these consequences would certainly be that the other and subsidiary purposes above mentioned would have to be neglected until the main issue was decided, and if these purposes were of any moment he would have so far to pay the penalty of his neglect. nothing is more fatal in warfare than to attempt to be equally strong everywhere. if you cannot do everything you desire at once you must concentrate all your energies on doing the most important and the most vital things first. when the tree is cut down the branches will fall of themselves. the history of the war of american independence is full of illustrations of the neglect of this paramount principle. england was worsted much more by faulty distribution than by insufficiency of force. at the same time it must be observed that the outlying and subsidiary purposes of the conflict cannot be of vital moment so long as the superior belligerent is at firm grips with the central forces of his adversary. we are dealing with the assumption that of two belligerents one is so far superior to the other that he may entertain a reasonable confidence of being able to deny the command of the sea to his adversary and in the end to secure it for himself. it is an essential part of this assumption that the forces of the superior belligerent will be so disposed as to make it exceedingly difficult and, subject to the fortune of war, practically impossible for any considerable portion of the enemy's forces to act on a vigorous offensive without being speedily brought to book by a superior force of his adversary, and that the peace strategy of the latter will have been ordered to that end. so long as this is the case the virtual command of the sea will be in the hands of the superior belligerent, even though his forces may be so concentrated, in accordance with the dispositions of the enemy, as to leave many regions of the sea apparently unguarded. they are adequately guarded by the fact that the enemy is _ex hypothesi_ unable to reach them--or if by a successful evasion of his adversary's guard he manages to send a detachment, large or small, to aim at some outlying objective, the initial superiority of force possessed by his adversary will always enable the latter to send a superior force in pursuit of the fugitive. much harm may be done before the fugitive is brought to book, but no state, however strong, need ever expect to go to war without running risks and suffering occasional and partial reverses. it is thus a pure delusion to assume, as loose thinkers on the subject too often assume, that the command of the sea must be either surrendered or imperilled by a superior belligerent who, apparently neglecting those regions of the sea which are not immediately assailed or threatened, concentrates his forces in the positions best calculated to enable him to get the better of his adversary, or who in time of peace so orders his strategy of position as to secure that advantage at once should war unhappily break out. not long ago the leader of the opposition in the house of commons used the following words:--"ten years ago we not only had the command of the sea, but we had the command of every sea. we have the command of no sea in the world except the north sea at this moment." those who have followed and assimilated the exposition of the true meaning of the command of the sea given in these pages will readily discern how mischievous a travesty of that meaning is contained in these words. there is, as i have shown, no such thing as a command of the sea in time of peace. the phrase is merely a definition of the paramount objective of naval warfare as such. ten years ago we had no command of any sea because we were not at war with any naval power. the concentration of a large portion of our naval forces in the north sea is no surrender of our command of the sea in any part of the world, because that command does not exist, never has existed in time of peace, and never can exist even in time of war until we have fought for it and secured it. the concentration in question is, together with the simultaneous disposition of the residue of our naval forces in different parts of the world, merely the expression of that peace strategy of position which, in the judgment of those who are responsible for it, is best calculated in the more probable, yet possibly quite remote, contingencies of international conflict, to enable our fleets to get the better of our enemies and thereby ultimately to secure the command of the sea in any and every part of the world in which we have maritime interests to defend. there are, it is true, some disadvantages involved in a close and sustained concentration of naval forces, especially in home waters. naval officers lose in breadth and variety of experience and in the self-reliance which comes of independent command, while the prestige of the flag is in some measure diminished by the infrequency of its appearance in distant seas. but these, after all, are subsidiary considerations which must be subordinated to the paramount needs of a sound strategy, whether offensive or defensive. it follows from the foregoing exposition of the principles which govern the strategic distribution of naval force in peace and war that a great naval power must often maintain fleets of considerable strength in distant seas. england has for many generations maintained such a fleet in the mediterranean, and it is hard to see how any reasonably probable change in the international situation could absolve her from that obligation. there are other and more distant stations on which she has maintained and still does maintain squadrons in a strength which has varied greatly from time to time in accordance with the changing phases of international relations and of strategic requirements as affected thereby. the measure of these requirements is determined from time to time by the known strength of the hostile forces which would have to be encountered in any reasonably probable contingencies of international conflict. but there is one antecedent requirement which is common to all considerable detachments of naval force in distant waters. in order to maintain their efficiency and mobility they must have a naval base conveniently situated within the limits of their station to which they may resort from time to time for repair, refit, and supply. the need for supply at the base is less paramount than that for refit and repair, because it is manifest that the control of maritime communications which has enabled the requisite stores to reach the base will also enable them to reach the ships themselves, wherever they may be at the moment. but for all refit and repair which cannot be effected by the ships' companies themselves, with the aid of an attached repair ship, the ships must go to the base, and that base must be furnished with docks capable of receiving them. it is essential to note that the base is there for the sake of the ships. the ships are not there for the sake of the base. it is a fatal inversion of all sound principles of naval strategy to suppose that the ships owe, or can afford, to the base any other form of defence than that which is inherent in their paramount and primary task of controlling the maritime communications which lead to it. so long as they can do this the base will be exposed only to such attacks as can be delivered by a force which has evaded but not defeated the naval guard, and to this extent the base must be fortified and garrisoned; for, of course, if the naval guard has been decisively defeated, the control of maritime communications has passed into the hands of the enemy, and nothing but the advance of a relieving naval force, too strong for the enemy to resist, can prevent the base being invested from the sea and ultimately reduced. it will be seen from this how absurd it is ever to speak of a naval base as commanding the adjacent seas. as such it does not command, and never can command, any portion of the sea which lies beyond the range of its own guns. all that it ever does or can do is, by its resources for repair, refit, and supply, to enable the fleet based upon it constantly to renew its efficiency and mobility, and thereby to discharge its appointed task of controlling the maritime communications entrusted to its keeping. but such command is in all cases exercised by the fleet and not by the base. if the fleet is not there or not equal to its task, the mere possession of the base is nearly always a source of weakness and not of strength to the naval power which holds it. it is held by some that the occupation of naval bases in distant seas by a power which is not strong enough to make sure of controlling the maritime communications which alone give to such bases their strategic value and importance is a great advantage to such a power and a corresponding disadvantage to all its possible adversaries in war. it will readily be seen from what has been said that this is in large measure a delusion. as against a weaker adversary than itself the occupation of such bases may be an appreciable advantage to the power which holds them, but only if the adversary in question has in the waters affected interests which are too important to be sacrificed without a struggle. on the other hand, as against an adversary strong enough to secure the command of the sea and determined to hold it at all hazards, the occupation of such distant bases can very rarely be of any advantage to the weaker belligerent and may very often expose him to reverses which, if not positively disastrous, must always be exceedingly mortifying. of two things one. either the belligerent in such a plight must detach a naval force sufficient to cover the outlying base, and thus, by dispersing naval forces which he desired to keep concentrated, he must expose his detachment to destruction by a stronger force of the enemy, or he must leave the base to its fate, in which case it is certain to fall in the long run. in point of fact the occupation of distant bases by any naval power is merely the giving of hostages to any and every other power which in the day of conflict can establish its command of the sea. that is the plain philosophy of the whole question. it only remains to consider very briefly the question of the supply of fleets operating in distant waters. in a very interesting and suggestive paper on the "supply and communications of a fleet," admiral sir cyprian bridge has pointed out that "in time of peace as well as in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used on board ship, viz., naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, etc." of these the consumption of victualling stores is alone constant, being determined by the number of men to be victualled from day to day. the consumption of nearly all the other stores will vary greatly according as the ship is more or less at sea, and it is safe to say that for a given number of ships the consumption will be much greater in time of war, especially in coal, engineers' stores, and ordnance stores, than it is in time of peace. but in peace conditions admiral bridge estimated that for a fleet consisting of four battleships, four large cruisers, four second-class cruisers, thirteen smaller vessels of various kinds, and three torpedo craft, together with their auxiliaries, the _minimum_ requirements for six months--assuming that the ships started with full supplies, and that they returned to their principal base at the end of the period--would be about tons of stores and ammunition, and , tons of coal, without including fresh water. the requirements of water would not be less than , tons in the six months, and of this the ships could distil about half without greatly increasing their coal consumption; the remainder, some , or , tons, would have to be brought to them. in time of war the requirements of coal would probably be nearly three times as great as in time of peace, and the requirements of ammunition--estimated in time of peace at tons--might easily be ten times as great. thus in addition to the foregoing figures we have , tons of water, and in war time a further _minimum_ addition of some , tons of coal and , tons of ammunition, making in all a round total of , tons for a fleet of the size specified, which was approximately the strength of the china fleet, under the command of admiral bridge, at the time when his paper was written. all these supplies have to be delivered or obtained periodically and at convenient intervals in the course of every six months. they are supplies which the ships must obtain as often as they want them without necessarily going back to their principal base for the purpose, and even the principal base must obtain them periodically from the home sources of supply. there are two alternative ways of maintaining this continuous stream of supply. one is that in advance of the principal base, what is called a secondary base should be established from which the ships can obtain the stores required, a continuous stream of transports bringing the stores required to the secondary base from sources farther afield, either from the principal base or from the home sources of supply. the other method is to have no secondary base--which, since it contains indispensable stores, must be furnished with some measure of local defence, and which, as a place of storage, may turn out to be in quite the wrong place for the particular operations in hand--but to seize and occupy a "flying base," neither permanent nor designated beforehand, but selected for the occasion according to the exigencies of the strategic situation, and capable of being shifted at will in response to any change in those exigencies. history shows that the latter method has been something like the normal procedure in war alike in times past and in the present day. the alternative method is perhaps rather adapted to the convenience of peace conditions than to the exigencies of war requirements. during his watch on toulon nelson established a flying base at maddalena bay, in sardinia, and very rarely used the more distant permanent base at gibraltar. togo, as i have stated in an earlier chapter, established a flying base first at the elliot islands and afterwards at dalny, during the war in the far east. instances might easily be multiplied to show in which direction the experience of war points, and how far that direction has been deflected by the possibly deceptive teaching of peace. i shall not, however, presume to pronounce _ex cathedrâ_ between two alternative methods each of which is sanctioned by high naval authority. i will only remark in conclusion that though the establishment of permanent secondary bases may, in certain exceptional cases, be defensible and even expedient, yet their multiplication, beyond such exceptional cases of proved and acknowledged expediency, is very greatly to be deprecated. the old rule applies--_entia non sunt præter necessitatem multiplicanda._ * * * * * my task is now finished--i will not say completed, for the subject of naval warfare is far too vast to be exhausted within the narrow compass of a manual. i should hardly exaggerate if i said that nearly every paragraph i have written might be expanded into a chapter, and every chapter into a volume, and that even so the subject would not be exhausted. all i have endeavoured to do is to expound briefly and in simple language the nature of naval warfare, its inherent limitations as an agency for subduing an enemy's will, the fundamental principles which underlie its methods, and the concrete problems which the application of those methods presents. tactical questions i have not touched at all; strategic questions only incidentally, and so far as they were implicated in the discussion of methods. political issues and questions of international policy i have eschewed as far as might be, and so far as it was necessary to deal with them i have endeavoured to do so in broad and abstract terms. of the many shortcomings in my handling of the subject no one can be more conscious than i am myself. yet i must anticipate one criticism which is not unlikely to be made, and that is that i have repeated and insisted on certain phrases and ideas such as "command of the sea," "control of maritime communications," "the fleet in being," "blockade," and the like, until they might almost be regarded as an obsession. rightly or wrongly that has, at any rate, been done of deliberate intent. the phrases in question are in all men's mouths. the ideas they stand for are constantly misunderstood, misinterpreted, and misapplied. i hold that, rightly understood, they embody the whole philosophy of naval warfare. i have therefore lost no opportunity of insisting on them, knowing full well that it is only by frequent iteration that sound ideas can be implanted in minds not attuned to their reception. index aircraft, alabama, the, alexander, his conquest of darius, allemand, his escape from rochefort, , amiens, peace of, _animus pugnandi_, , , , , , , , , antony, mark, armada, the, , bacon, quoted, baraille, de, his part in the dunkirk campaign, , barham, lord, , ; and nelson, , ; his conduct of the trafalgar campaign, base, flying, ; naval, battle-cruiser, its functions, - beachy head, battle of, , ; campaign of, , berlin decrees, bettesworth, blockade, ; a form of disputed command, - ; military, its methods, ; military and commercial, bolt from the blue, , boscawen, at lagos, brest, , ; blockaded by cornwallis, ; blockaded by hawke, ; de roquefeuil at, , bridge, admiral sir cyprian, on a fleet in being, ; on supply and communications of a fleet, ; his estimate of torrington, , ; on torrington's trial, brundusium, cæsar at, cadiz, killigrew at, cæsar, his pharsalian campaign, , calais, the armada at, calder, his action off finisterre, ; barham's instructions to, camperdown, duncan at, cape st vincent, meeting of nelson with craig and knight off, capital ships, carthagena, spanish ships at, charles, prince, château-renault, , clausewitz, his definition of war, ; on limited and unlimited war, , colomb, admiral, on differentiation of naval force, ; on torrington's strategy, , , command of the sea, , , - , , , , , , , , , , , , ; its true meaning, , ; no meaning except in war, , command of the sea, disputed, in general, - commerce, maritime, extent of british, ; in war, - ; its modern conditions, - concentration of naval force, its conditions, conflans, at brest, corbett, mr julian, , ; on the dunkirk campaign, ; on commerce in war, ; on craig's expedition, , ; on projects of invasion, ; on the trafalgar campaign, cornwallis, and the blockade of brest, , craft, small, , craig, his expedition to the mediterranean, - cuba, its deliverance by the united states, dalny, togo at, , dettingen, downs, the, norris ordered to, duncan, at camperdown, dungeness, roquefeuil anchors at, ; norris at, ; norris and roquefeuil at, dunkirk, troops collected at, ; embargo at, ; saxe and baraille at, egypt, napoleon's descent on, elliott islands, togo at, , embargo, at dunkirk, farragut, fleets, and base, their true relation, fleet in being, phrase first used by torrington, ; defined, , ; a form of disputed command, - fleets, supply of, food supply, royal commission on, fortress fleet, , ; admiral mahan on, , ganteaume, at brest, general chase, general staff, the, germany, navy law of , goschen, lord, quoted, gravelines, , gunfleet, the, , , hague conference, hannay, mr david, hannibal, his passage of the alps, hardy, nelson's, on big ships, hawke, ; blockades brest ; at quiberon bay, hornby, sir geoffrey, on the command of the sea, invasion, , - ; dilemma of, invasion over sea, three ways of, james ii., justin of nassau, and the armada, killigrew, vice-admiral, , , , , , ; his expedition to cadiz, ; his return to plymouth, . knight, rear-admiral, escorts craig, lagos, boscawen and de la clue at, lepanto, battle of, line of battle, the, lisbon, craig and knight at, lissa, battle of, louis xiv., maddalena bay, nelson's base at, mahan, admiral, on commerce at sea, , ; on a fleet in being, , ; on a fortress fleet, , ; on hannibal's passage of the alps, ; on nelson, , ; on territorial expansion, maida, battle of, makaroff, admiral, , manchuria, ; japanese successes in, maria theresa, mary, queen, her orders to torrington, , mathews, his action off toulon, ; in the mediterranean, , medina sidonia, and the armada, mediterranean, the, england's position in, , merchant vessels, conversion of into warships at sea, - morbihan, the, troops collected in, napoleon, , ; and the campaign of trafalgar, , ; his descent on egypt, , ; his ignorance of the sea, naval force, differentiation of, - ; distribution and supply of, - naval strength, measure of, naval warfare, defined, ; special characteristic of, ; its limitations, ; philosophy of, ; its primary aim, nelson, , , , ; his advanced squadron, ; and barham, , ; his base at maddalena bay, ; on the blockade of toulon, ; on craig's expedition, ; evaded by napoleon, ; evaded by villeneuve, ; at trafalgar, ; his trafalgar memorandum, ; his pursuit of villeneuve, , newcastle, duke of, nile, battle of the, norman conquest, the, , norris, sir john, ; in the downs, ; leaves the downs, ; and roquefeuil at dungeness, ; at st helen's, , north sea, concentration in, orde, sir john, raises the blockade of cadiz, orders in council, the british, parma, duke of, and the armada, peace strategy of position, , , philippines, the, acquired by the united states, pitt, , , , plymouth, killigrew at, pompey, at pharsalus, , port arthur, ; how blockaded by togo, , ; its capture by japan, , ; first japanese attack on, ; russian fleet at, , pretender, the, privateering, , property, private, at sea, - puerto rico, acquired by the united states, quiberon bay, battle of, , rochefort, allemand escapes from, , roquefeuil, de, at brest, , ; anchors at dungeness, ; puts to sea, ; and norris at dungeness, ; off the start, , rozhdestvensky, at tsu-shima, sampson, admiral, santiago, ; its capture by the united states, saxe, marshal, at dunkirk, ; with baraille at dunkirk, sea, its characteristics, sea power, , , , , sea transport, sebastopol, siege of, , shovel, sir cloudesley, , , , , , sovereignty of the seas, , st helen's, norris at, , start, the, de roquefeuil off, , submarine, the, , , supply, of fleets, two alternative methods of, syracuse, athenian expedition to, talavera, battle of, teignmouth, french raid on, telegraphy, wireless, , togo, admiral, ; his method of blockading port arthur, , torbay, tourville's projected descent on, torpedo craft, , , , torpedo, the locomotive, torrington, arthur herbert, earl of, , , , , ; anchors at beachy head, ; admiral bridge on, , , ; colomb on, ; on a fleet in being, , ; ordered to give battle, ; his strategy, , ; tried by court martial, ; warns mary and her council, toulon, château-renault at, tourville, , , , , , , ; at brest, ; in the channel, trade routes, trafalgar, ; campaign of, , ; and craig's expedition, ; its significance, tsu-shima, battle of, its effects, , utrecht, treaty of, villeneuve, pursued by nelson, ; driven out of the west indies, ; leaves toulon, war, defined, ; its origin, ; its primary object, ; of american independence, , ; boer, , , ; civil, , ; crimean, ; cuban, , ; in the far east, ; of , ; of , ; of , , ; of secession in america, , ; the seven years', wars, the dutch, , war staff, , wellington, ; his peninsular campaigns, william the conqueror, william iii., wolseley, lord, on communications, printed by turnbull and spears, edinburgh the cambridge manuals of science and literature published by the cambridge university press under the general editorship of p. giles, litt.d., master of emmanuel college, and a.c. seward, f.r.s., professor of botany in the university of cambridge. a series of handy volumes dealing with a wide range of subjects and bringing the results of modern research and intellectual activity within the reach both of the student and of the ordinary reader. volumes now ready history and archaeology ancient assyria. by rev. c.h.w. johns, litt.d. ancient babylonia. by rev. c.h.w. johns, litt.d. a history of civilization in palestine. by prof. r.a.s. macalister, m.a., f.s.a. the peoples of india. by j.d. anderson, m.a. china and the manchus. by prof. h.a. giles, ll.d. the evolution of modern japan. by j.h. longford. the civilization of ancient mexico. by lewis spence. the vikings. by prof. allen mawer, m.a. new zealand. by the hon. sir robert stout, k.c.m.g., ll.d., and j. logan stout, ll.b. 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[ rt] carets and curly brackets indicate a superscripted number, letter or symbol. ^{ } an underscore and curly brackets indicate a subscript. h_{ }o bold text is surrounded by =equal signs= and italic text is surrounded by _underscores_.] [illustration: _the "suna" before the explosion._] [illustration: _the torpedo._] [illustration: _the "suna" after the explosion._] griffin & c^{o.} portsmouth. w.f. mitchell del. torpedoes and torpedo warfare: containing a complete and concise account of the rise and progress of submarine warfare; also a detailed description of all matters appertaining thereto, including the latest improvements. by c. w. sleeman, esq., late lieut. r.n., and late commander imperial ottoman navy. _with fifty-seven full-page illustrations, diagrams, woodcuts, &c._ portsmouth: griffin & co., , the hard, (_publishers by appointment to h.r.h. the duke of edinburgh._) london agents: simpkin, marshall, & co. . _all rights reserved._] preface. in the following pages the author has endeavoured to supply a want, viz. a comprehensive work on torpedo warfare, brought down to the latest date. the information has been obtained while practically engaged in torpedo work at home and abroad, and from the study of the principal books which have already appeared on the subject, and to the authors of which he would now beg to express his acknowledgments, viz.: "submarine warfare," by lieut.-commander barnes, u.s.n.; "notes on torpedoes," by major stotherd, r.e.; "art of war in europe," by general delafield, u.s.a.; "life of fulton," by c. d. colden; "torpedo war," by r. fulton; "armsmear," by h. barnard; "treatise on coast defence," by colonel von scheliha; professional papers of the royal engineers; "the engineering"; "the engineer"; "scientific american"; "iron"; &c., &c. the author is also desirous of thanking the following gentlemen, to whom he is indebted for much of the valuable information contained herein:-- messrs. siemens brothers, messrs. thornycroft and co., messrs. yarrow and co., captain c. a. mcevoy, adam street, w.c., mr. l. lay, messrs. j. vavaseur and co. london, . contents. page preface iii chapter i. the early history of the torpedo--remarks on the existing state of torpedo warfare chapter ii. defensive torpedo warfare--mechanical submarine mines--mechanical fuzes--mooring mechanical mines chapter iii. defensive torpedo warfare (_continued_)--electrical submarine mines--electrical fuzes--insulated electric cables--electric cable joints--junction boxes--mooring electrical submarine mines chapter iv. defensive torpedo warfare (_continued_)--circuit closers--firing by observation--voltaic batteries--electrical machines--firing keys and shutter apparatus--testing submarine mines--clearing a passage through torpedo defences chapter v. offensive torpedo warfare--drifting torpedoes--towing torpedoes--locomotive torpedoes--spar torpedoes--general remarks on offensive torpedoes chapter vi. torpedo vessels and boats--the _uhlan_--the _alarm_--the _destroyer_--thornycroft's torpedo boats--yarrow's torpedo boats--schibau's torpedo boats--herreshoff's torpedo boats--torpedo boat attacks--submarine boats chapter vii. torpedo operations--the crimean war ( - )--the austro-italian war ( )--the american civil war ( - )--the paraguayan war ( - )--the austrian war ( )--the franco-german war ( - )--the russo-turkish war ( - ) chapter viii. on explosives--definitions--experiments--gunpowder--picric powder--nitro-glycerine--dynamite--gun-cotton--fulminate of mercury--dualin--lithofracteur--horsley's powder--torpedo explosive agents--torpedo explosions chapter ix. torpedo experiments--chatham, england, --austria--carlscrona, sweden, --kiel, prussia--england, --copenhagen, denmark, --carlscrona, sweden, - --portsmouth, england, - --pola, austria, --portsmouth, england, --experiments with countermines--the medway, england, --stokes bay, england, --carlscrona, sweden, chapter x. the electric light--the nordenfelt and hotchkiss torpedo guns--diving chapter xi. electricity appendix. mcevoy's single main systems siemens' universal galvanometer tables synopsis of the principal events that have occurred in connection with the history of the torpedo index list of plates. destruction of turkish gunboat "suna" (_frontispiece_). i. fulton's torpedoes. ii. frame torpedoes, buoyant mechanical mines. iii. singer's and mcevoy's mechanical mines. iv. extempore mechanical mine, mechanical primers. v. mechanical fuzes. vi. form of case of submarine mines. vii. electric fuzes. viii. electric cables, extempore cable joints. ix. permanent joints for electric cables. x. junction boxes, mechanical turk's head. xi. moorings for submarine mines. xii. steam launch for mooring submarine mines. xiii. mathieson's circuit closer. xiv. austrian circuit closer, mercury circuit closer. xv. mcevoy's magneto electro circuit closer. xvi. russian submarine mine, firing by observation. xvii. apparatus for firing by observation. xviii. systems of defence by submarine mines. xix. firing batteries, testing batteries. xx. firing keys, shutter apparatus. xxi. shutter apparatus. xxii. galvanometers for testing. xxiii. siemens' universal galvanometer. xxiiia. ditto ditto. xxiv. ditto ditto. xxiva. ditto ditto. xxv. shunt, commutator, rheostat. xxvi. wheatstone's bridge. xxvii. test table, differential galvanometer. xxviii. methods of testing--armstrong--austrian. xxix. drifting torpedoes. xxx. harvey's towing torpedo. xxxi. ditto ditto. xxxii. systems of attack with harvey's sea torpedo. xxxiii. ditto ditto. xxxiv. ditto ditto. xxxv. german and french towing torpedoes. xxxvi. whitehead's fish torpedoes. xxxvii. thornycroft's boat apparatus for fish torpedoes. xxxviii. lay's locomotive torpedo. xxxix. ditto ditto. xl. ditto ditto. xli. ditto ditto. xlii. ditto ditto. xliii. ditto ditto. xliv. mcevoy's duplex spar torpedoes. xlv. the "alarm" torpedo ship. xlvi. the "destroyer" torpedo ship. xlvii. thornycroft's torpedo boats. xlviii. ditto ditto. xlix. yarrow's torpedo boats. l. ditto ditto. li. russian torpedo boat, herreshoff's torpedo boat. lii. submarine mine explosion. liii. ditto ditto. liv. mcevoy's single main system. [illustration] torpedoes and torpedo warfare. chapter i. the early history of the torpedo.--remarks on the existing state of torpedo warfare. the earliest record we have of the employment of an infernal machine at all resembling the torpedo of the present day, was in at the siege of antwerp. here by means of certain small vessels, drifted down the stream, in each of which was placed a magazine of gunpowder, to be fired either by a trigger, or a combination of levers and clockwork, an italian engineer, lambelli, succeeded in demolishing a bridge that the enemy had formed over the scheldt. so successful was this first attempt, and so tremendous was the effect produced on the spectators, by the explosion of one of these torpedoes, that further investigation of this new mode of naval warfare was at once instituted. but it was not until some two hundred years after that any real progress was effected, though numerous attempts were made during this period, to destroy vessels by means of sub-marine infernal machines. it was owing to the fact, that the condition which is now considered as essential in torpedo warfare, viz., that the charge must be submerged, was then entirely ignored, that so long a standstill occurred in this new art of making war. _captain bushnell, the inventor of torpedoes._--to captain david bushnell, of connecticut, in , is most certainly due the credit of inventing torpedoes, or as he termed them submarine magazines. for he first proved practically that a charge of gunpowder could be fired under water, which is incontestably the essence of submarine warfare. _submarine boat._--to captain bushnell is also due the credit of first devizing a submarine boat for the purpose of conveying his magazines to the bottom of hostile ships and there exploding them. _drifting torpedoes._--another plan of his for destroying vessels, was that of connecting two of his infernal machines together by means of a line, and throwing them into the water, allowing the current to carry them across the bows of the attacked ship. _mode of ignition._--the ignition of his magazines was generally effected by means of clockwork, which, when set in motion, would run for some time before exploding the machines, thus enabling the operators to get clear of the explosion. captain bushnell's few attempts to destroy our ships off the american coast in and , with his submarine boat, and his drifting torpedoes were all attended with failure, a result generally experienced, where new inventions are for the first time subjected to the test of actual service. _robert fulton._--robert fulton, an american, following in his footsteps, some twenty years after, revived the subject of submarine warfare, which during that interval seems to have been entirely forgotten. a resident in france, in , he is found during that year making various experiments on the seine with a machine which he had constructed, and by which he designed "to impart to carcasses of gunpowder a progressive motion under water, to a certain point, and there explode them."[a] _fulton's failures._--though these first essays of his resulted in failure, fulton thoroughly believed in the efficacy of his schemes, and we find him, during that and succeeding years, vainly importunating the french and dutch governments, to grant him aid and support in carrying out experiments with his new inventions, whereby he might perfect them, and thus ensure to whichever government acceded to his views, the total destruction of their enemy's fleets. _bonaparte aids fulton._--though holding out such favourable terms, it was not until , when bonaparte became first consul, that fulton's solicitations were successful, and that money was granted him to carry out a series of experiments. in the following year ( ), under bonaparte's immediate patronage, fulton carried out various and numerous experiments in the harbour of brest, principally with a submarine boat devised by him (named the _nautilus_), subsequently to his invention of submarine carcasses as a means of approaching a ship and fixing one of his infernal machines beneath her, unbeknown to the crew of the attacked ship. _first vessel destroyed by torpedoes._--in august, , fulton completely destroyed a small vessel in brest harbour by means of one of his submarine bombs, then called by him for the first time, torpedoes, containing some twenty pounds of gunpowder. this is the first vessel known to have been sunk by a submarine mine. _bonaparte's patronage withdrawn._--notwithstanding the apparent success, and enormous power of fulton's projects, on account of a failure on his part to destroy one of the english channel fleet, at the end of , bonaparte at once withdrew his support and aid. disgusted with this treatment, and having been previously pressed by some of england's most influential men, to bring his projects to that country, so that the english might reap the benefit of his wonderful schemes, fulton left france, and arrived in london, in may, . _pitt supports fulton._--mr. pitt, then prime minister, was much struck with fulton's various schemes of submarine warfare, and after examining one of his infernal machines, or torpedoes, exclaimed, "that if introduced into practice, it could not fail to annihilate all military marines."[b] though having secured the approval of mr. pitt, and a few other members of the government, he was quite unable to induce the english to accept his schemes in toto, and at once employ them in the naval service. twice fulton attempted to destroy french men-of-war, lying in the harbour of boulogne, by means of his drifting torpedoes, but each time he failed, owing as he then explained, and which afterwards proved to be the case, to the simple mistake of having made his machines specifically heavier than water, thus preventing the current from carrying them under a vessel's bottom. _destruction of the "dorothea."_--though in each of the above-mentioned attempts fulton succeeded in exploding his machines, and though on the th october, , in the presence of a numerous company of naval and other scientific men, he completely demolished a stout brig, the _dorothea_, off walmer castle, by means of his drifting torpedoes, similar to those employed by him at boulogne, but considerably improved, still the english government refused to have anything further to do with him or his schemes. england, at that time, being mistress of the seas, it was clearly her interest to make the world believe that fulton's schemes were impracticable and absurd. earl st. vincent, in a conversation with fulton, told him in very strong language, "that pitt was a fool for encouraging a mode of warfare, which, if successful, would wrest the trident from those who then claimed to bear it, as the sceptre of supremacy on the ocean."[c] wearied with incessant applications and neglect, and with failures, not with his inventions, but in inducing governments to accept them, he left england in , and returned to his native country. _application to congress for help._--arrived there, he lost no time in solicitating aid from congress to enable him to carry out experiments with his torpedoes and submarine boats, practice alone in his opinion being necessary to develop the extraordinary powers of his invention, as an auxiliary to harbour defence. by incessant applications to his government, and by circulating his torpedo book[d] among the members, in which he had given detailed accounts of all his previous experiments in france and england, and elaborate plans for rendering american harbours, etc., invulnerable to british attack, a commission was appointed to inquire into and practically test the value of these schemes. they were as follows:-- .--_drifting torpedoes._--two torpedoes connected by a line floated in the tide at a certain depth, and suffered to drift across the bows of the vessel to be attacked; the coupling line being arrested by the ship's cable would cause the torpedoes to be forced under her bottom; this plan is represented and will be readily understood by fig. . .--_harpoon torpedo._--a torpedo attached to one end of a line, the other part to a harpoon, which was to be fired into the bows of the doomed vessel from a piece of ordnance mounted in the bows of a boat, specially constructed for the purpose; the line being fixed to the vessel by the harpoon, the current, if the vessel were at anchor, or her progress if underweigh, would carry the torpedo under her bottom. fig. represents this type of fulton's submarine infernal machine. .--_spar torpedo._--a torpedo attached to a spar suspended by a swivel from the bowsprit of a torpedo boat, so nearly balanced, that a man could easily depress, or elevate the torpedo with one hand, whilst with the other he pulled a trigger and exploded it. .--_block ship._--block ships, that is vessels from to tons, constructed with sides impervious to cannon shot, and decks made impenetrable to musket shot. a spar torpedo _a, a, a_, to be carried on each bow and quarter fig. represents this curious craft. _stationary mines._--stationary buoyant torpedoes for harbour defence, to be fired by means of levers attached to triggers. this kind of mine is shown at fig. . .--_cable cutters._--cable cutters, that is submarine guns discharging a sharp piece of iron in the shape of a crescent, with sufficient force to cut through ship's cables, or other obstructions.[e] _practical experiments._--various and exhaustive experiments were carried out in the presence of the commissioners, tending generally to impress them with a favourable view of fulton's many projects. as a final test, the sloop _argus_ was ordered, under the superintendence of commodore rodgers, to whom fulton had previously explained his mode of attack, to be prepared to repel all attempts made against her by fulton, with his torpedoes. _defence of the "argus."_--though repeated attempts were made, none were successful, owing to the energetic, though somewhat exaggerated manner in which the defence of the sloop had been carried out. she was surrounded by numerous spars lashed together, nets down to the ground, grappling irons, heavy pieces of metal suspended from the yard arms ready to be dropped into any boat that came beneath them, scythes fitted to long spars for the purpose of mowing off the heads of any who might be rash enough to get within range of them. as robert fulton very justly remarked, "a system, then only in its infancy, which compelled a hostile vessel to guard herself by such extraordinary means could not fail of becoming a most important mode of warfare." three of the commissioners reported as favourably as could be expected, considering its infancy, on the practical value of fulton's scheme of torpedo warfare. _congress refuse aid._--but on the strength of commodore rodgers's report, which was as unfair and prejudiced, as the others were fair and unprejudiced, congress refused fulton any further aid, or to countenance any further experiments that he might still feel inclined to prosecute. though undeterred by this fresh instance of neglect, and still having a firm belief in the efficacy of his various torpedo projects, yet other important matters connected with the improvement of the steam engine occupied his whole time and prevented him from making any further experiments with his submarine inventions. _mode of firing, ._--up to , that is to say for nearly sixty years after the invention of torpedoes, mechanical means only were employed to effect the ignition of the torpedo charges, such as levers, clockwork, and triggers pulled by hand; with such crude means of exploding them, it is not extraordinary to find, that all the attempts made to destroy hostile ships, resulted in failure. [illustration: fulton's torpedoes. plate i] briefly reviewing the history of the torpedo during its first period of existence, viz., from captain bushnell's invention of submarine magazines in , down to the introduction of electricity, as a means of exploding submarine mines, by colonel colt, in , we find that due to the unwearied exertions, and numerous experiments carried out by captain bushnell, mr. r. fulton and others, the following very important principles in the art of torpedo warfare were fully proved:-- .--that a charge of gunpowder could be exploded under water. .--that any vessel could be sunk by a torpedo, provided only the charge were large enough. .--that it was possible to construct a boat which could be navigated, and remain for several hours under water, without detriment to her crew. .--that a ship at anchor could be destroyed, by means of drifting torpedoes, or by a submarine or ordinary boat, armed with a spar torpedo. .--that a vessel underweigh could be destroyed by means of stationary submarine mines, and by the harpoon torpedo. these principles, which at the time were fully admitted, laid the foundations of the systems of torpedo warfare, that are at the present day in vogue, all over the world. _second epoch._--the second epoch in the life of the torpedo dates from , when colonel colt, then a mere lad, commenced experiments with his submarine battery. _colt's experiments._--his first public essay, was on the th june, , when he exploded a case of powder in new york harbour, while himself standing at a great distance off. having by numerous successful experiments satisfactorily proved that vessels at anchor could be sunk by means of his electrical mines, colonel colt engaged to destroy a vessel underweigh by similar means, which feat he successfully accomplished on th april, . _colt's electric cable._--the electric cable as used by colonel colt, was insulated by cotton yarn, soaked in a solution of asphaltum and beeswax, and the whole enclosed in a metal case. _colt's reflector._--on examining colt's papers after his death, one was found illustrating one of his many devices for effecting the explosion of a submarine mine at the proper instant. _description of reflector._--one set of conducting wires from all the mines is permanently attached to a single pole of a very powerful firing battery, the other wires lead to metal points which are attached to marks on a chart of the channel in front of the operator and which marks correspond with the actual positions of the mines in the channel. a reflector, is arranged to throw the image of a hostile vessel on the chart, and as this image passes over either of the wire terminations on it, the operator with the other battery wire, completes the circuit, and explodes the torpedo, over which by her image thrown on the chart, the vessel is supposed to be at that precise moment.[f] in his experiment with a vessel under weigh, colt had probably taken the precaution of laying down several circles of mines, and thus aided by cross staffs, ensured the experiment being a success. with regard to the invention of the word torpedo, for submarine infernal machines, dr. barnard in his life of colt says, "that fulton used the word torpedo, probably on account of its power of stunning or making torpid, and that a long way through the water,--in so naming it, he buildeth better than he knew, for colt's torpedoes being fired by electricity may with special fitness take its name from the electric eel."[g] _theoretical knowledge._--though many opportunities have occurred during the last thirty-five years for practically testing the effectiveness of torpedoes when employed on actual service, especially during the american civil war ( - ) and the late turco-russian war ( - ), yet in so far as the offensive and electrical portion of submarine warfare is concerned, our knowledge of them is still principally theoretically. _failure of offensive torpedoes._--the manipulation of the ordinary spar or outrigger torpedo boats, and of the various automatic torpedoes, appears simple enough, when practice is made with those submarine weapons during peace time, also the results of such practice is without doubt uniformly successful, yet when the crucial test of actual service is applied, as was the case during the war of , with the whitehead and spar torpedoes, then a succession of failures had to be recorded.[h] the cause of this want of success in war-time with offensive torpedoes, lies in the fact, that during peace time the experiments and practice carried out with them, are done so, under the most favourable circumstances, that is to say in daylight, and the nerves of the operators not in that high state of tension, which would be the case, were they attacking a man-of-war on a pitch dark night, whose exact position cannot be known, and from whose guns at any moment a sheet of fire may be belched forth, and a storm of shot and bullets be poured on them, whilst on actual service, this would in nine out of ten instances be the case. some uncertainty must and will always exist in offensive torpedo operations when carried out in actual war, where, as in this case, the success of the enterprise depends almost wholly on the state of a man's nerves, yet this defect, a want of certainty, may to a considerable extent be eradicated were means to be found of carrying out in time of peace, a systematic practice of this branch of torpedo warfare, under circumstances similar to those experienced in war time, and this is not only possible, but practicable. _moral effect of torpedoes._--we now come to the moral effect of torpedoes, which is undoubtedly the very essence of the vast power of these terrible engines of war. each successive war that has occurred, in which the torpedo has taken a part, since captain bushnell's futile attempt in to destroy our fleet by drifting numerous kegs charged with gunpowder down the delawarre, teem with proofs of the great worth of torpedoes in this respect alone. that such a dread of them should and always will be met with in future naval wars, at times creating a regular torpedo scare or funk, is not extraordinary, when it is remembered that these submarine weapons of the present day, are capable of sinking the finest ironclad afloat, and of launching into eternity without a moment's warning or preparation, whole ships' crews. the torpedoes existing at the present day have, without doubt, reached a very high degree of excellence, in so far as their construction, fuzes, cables, &c., both electrically and mechanically, is concerned, but much has yet to be done to develop their actual effectiveness. the result of the numerous and exhaustive experiments that have of late years been carried out by england, america, and europe prove that the necessary distances between stationary submarine mines are by far greater than those within which the explosions are effective. therefore it will be found necessary to supplement those submarine harbour defences, by automatic torpedoes that can be controlled and directed from the shore, as well as by specially constructed torpedo boats. _automatic arrangements._--and to ensure certainty, which is the desideratum in torpedo warfare, circuit closers, or other automatic arrangements for exploding the submarine mines, must be employed, as the system of firing them by judgment is not at all a sure one. _ship defence._--the problem, which occupies the attention of naval and other scientific men, at the present day, is how best to enable a ship to guard herself against attacks from the fish and other automatic torpedoes, and this without in any way impairing her efficiency as a man-of-war. the means of such defence, should most certainly be inherent in the vessel herself, outward methods, such as nets, booms, etc., are to great extent impracticable, besides one of the above mentioned torpedoes, being caught by such obstructions would, on exploding, most probably destroy them, thus leaving the vessel undefended against further attacks. _mechanical mines._--several ingenious methods have of late been devised for the purpose of obviating one of the principal defects common to all kinds of mechanical submarine mines, the most efficient and practical of which will be found fully described in the following pages, viz., the great danger attendant on the mooring of such mines; but as yet, no really practical mode of rendering mechanical mines safe, after they have once been moored and put in action, has been discovered, were such to be devised, a very difficult and extremely important problem of defensive torpedo warfare would be solved. _electrical mines._--in regard to electrical submarine mines, much has been done by torpedoists in general to simplify this otherwise somewhat complicated branch of defensive torpedo warfare, by adopting the platinum wire fuze, in the place of the high tension one, by the employment of leclanché firing batteries, by the simplification of the circuit closer, and discarding the use of a circuit breaker, by altering the form of torpedo case, and whenever possible by enclosing the circuit closer in the submarine mine. the necessity of a very elaborate system of testing should, if possible, be overcome, for a system of submarine mines that requires the numerous and various tests that are at the present day employed, to enable those in charge of them to know for certain that when wanted the mines will explode, cannot be considered as adaptable to actual service. it must be remembered that the safety of many ports, etc., will in future wars depend almost entirely on the practical efficiency of electrical and mechanical mines. as yet, in actual war, little or no experience has been gained of the real value of a mode of coast defence by electrical mines, excepting from a moral point of view, though in this particular they have most undoubtedly been proved to be exceedingly effective. a submarine mine much wanted on active service, is one that can be carried on board ships, capable of being fitted for use at a moment's notice, and of being easily and rapidly placed in position by the ordinary boats of a man-of-war. it should be a self-acting electrical mine, with the circuit closing apparatus enclosed in the torpedo case, and capable of carrying about lbs. of guncotton. this form of mine would be found extremely useful to secure the entrance to a harbour, etc., where ships might happen to be anchored for the night, or which might have been wrested from the enemy, etc. they should be capable of being placed in position and picked up again, in the shortest possible space of time. _offensive torpedoes._--coming to the question of offensive torpedoes there still seems to be a great difference of opinion as to the real value of the whitehead fish torpedo, and this point will never be finally settled until that weapon has been more thoroughly tested on actual service; from a specially built torpedo boat, by which is meant a thornycroft or yarrow craft, the spar torpedo would seem to be the most effective weapon. torpedo vessels for the special purpose of experimenting with the whitehead torpedo have been built by england, america, and several continental governments, so that we may soon hope to get some more decided opinion as to the utility of that weapon. when manipulated from the shore, or large ships, the lay torpedo boat, if only its speed be increased will prove an exceedingly effective submarine weapon, for the purposes of offence, active defence, or clearing harbours, etc., of mines, in fact, it may be more truly said of this weapon, than of the whitehead, "that it can do everything but speak." captain harvey has greatly improved his towing torpedo, but it is still a somewhat complicated and difficult weapon to manipulate by ordinary persons, that is, those not specially trained for the work. drifting torpedoes under certain circumstances should prove invaluable, but little or no improvement has been effected in this direction. submarine boats have also remained _in statu quo_, though for the purpose of clearing an enemy's harbour of mines, it seems impossible to devise any better method. electric lights are now universally adopted for use on board ship, and will play a very important part in the defence of ships against torpedo attacks in future wars. glancing back on what has been effected in the matter of improving the system of torpedo warfare in all its branches during the last few years, with the exception of the vast improvements in the form and construction of steam torpedo boats, their engines, etc., very little has been done, owing principally to the want of that practical knowledge which unfortunately can only be gained from their employment in actual war. the late turco-russian war afforded a splendid opportunity for applying the crucial test of actual service to both the offensive and defensive branches of torpedo warfare, yet little or no light was thrown on the somewhat shadowy subject of submarine warfare. the present struggle between peru and chili may furnish some experience, but it will not be very satisfactory, as hardly any knowledge of manipulating torpedoes is possessed by either side. footnotes: [footnote a: c. d. colden's "life of fulton."] [footnote b: c. d. colden's "life of fulton."] [footnote c: c. d. colden's "life of fulton."] [footnote d: "torpedo warfare," by r. fulton, .] [footnote e: c. d. colden's "life of fulton."] [footnote f: johnston's cyclopædia.] [footnote g: armsmear.] [footnote h: see chapter vii.] chapter ii. defensive torpedo warfare.--mechanical mines.--mechanical fuzes.--mooring mechanical mines. by defensive torpedo warfare is meant the protection of harbours, rivers, etc., by means of various descriptions of torpedoes moored beneath the surface of the water. submarine, or sea mine, is the term that has been generally adopted to designate this particular species of torpedo. _submarine mines.--defence in future wars._--the very conspicuous part played by submarine mines, in the many wars that have taken place since the introduction of the torpedo as a legitimate mode of naval warfare, when their manipulation was comparatively little understood, and construction very imperfect, proves that, with the experience so gained, and the vast improvements that have been, and are daily being effected, in all that appertains to the art of torpedo warfare, the protection of harbours, etc., will in future wars depend in a great measure on the adoption of a systematic and extensive employment of submarine mines. the utility and power of this mode of coast defence has been fully exemplified in actual war, more especially during the franco-german war ( - ) and the late turco-russian war ( - ). _torpedoes in the franco-german war._--in the former instance, the superiority of the french over the germans, in the matter of ships, was more than neutralised, by the use on the part of the latter of electrical, mechanical, and dummy mines for the protection of their harbours, etc. in regard to the utility of the latter, it is on record that a certain german port was entirely defended by dummy mines, the burgomaster of that place having been unable to obtain men to place the active mechanical ones in position, owing to the numerous and serious accidents that had previously occurred in other german ports at the commencement of the war, in mooring the latter kind of submarine mine. the effect, so far as keeping the french fleet at a distance was concerned, was precisely the same, as though active instead of dummy mines had been employed, thus still further proving the vast moral power possessed by torpedoes. _torpedoes in the russo-turkish war._--in the war of , the turks, though possessing a powerful fleet in the black sea and flotilla on the danube, made little or no use of their superiority over the russians in this respect. they failed to even attempt to destroy the bridges formed by the russians over the danube, nor did they make any attempt to capture poti, re-take kustendje, or to create diversions on the russian coast in the black sea. had the latter service alone been effectually carried out, by which means, a large force of the enemy would have been held in check, immense help would have been afforded to the ottoman armies in europe and asia. again, during the whole of the war, the russian port of odessa was never sighted, and sebastopol only once by the ottoman fleet. _cause of failure of the ottoman fleet._--the cause of this repeated neglect on the part of the turkish fleet may be traced almost entirely to the assumption (which in nine out of ten cases was an erroneous one) on the part of the naval pashas and beys that every russian harbour, etc., was a mass of submarine mines, and this in several instances extending many miles to seaward. so also, some of the many failures experienced by the russians in their numerous torpedo boat attacks, were due in a great measure to an erroneous supposition on the part of the captain of the russian steamer, _constantine_ (employed to convoy the torpedo boats), that the turks had defended the entrance, to a distance of some miles to seaward, of their harbours, etc., and thus the torpedo boats were dispatched to the attack some miles off the entrance, causing them, owing to the darkness, to enter the harbour in which the turkish vessels were lying, in a very straggling manner. and to a similar reason the failure of the russians to capture sulina, in the attack made on that place in october, , was principally owing to their not daring to send their popoffkas to attack from the sea. one of the chief points of usefulness of an extensive and systematic employment of submarine mines, will be to minimise the number of vessels necessary for the protection of harbours, etc., thus enabling a far larger number of ships to operate at sea against those of an enemy, this especially applies to countries like england and america possessing a large extent of seacoast, numerous harbours, rivers, etc., which it would be necessary to defend in the event of war. _science of torpedo warfare._--the science of defensive torpedo warfare may be considered to consist of:-- .--the arrangement of the mines in positions, such that it would not be possible for a hostile vessel attempting to force a passage into a harbour, etc., defended by such means, to pass more than one line of them, without coming within the destructive radius of some one or other of the remaining mines. note.--the difficulty of attaining the above effect, lies in the fact that the destructive radius of a submarine mine, is considerably less than the distance that must be maintained between them, to prevent injury by concussion to the cases, circuit closers, electric cables, etc., of such mines on the explosion of an adjacent one. as an illustration of the above, take the case of a lb. guncotton submarine mine. now the destructive radius of a sea-mine is found by the formula r = [ rt]( � c), where r is the destructive radius in feet of a mine moored at its most effective depth, and c is the charge (guncotton) in lbs. in the above case r would be about feet, which in so far as the actual destruction of a ship is concerned, may be taken as correct, but if injury to a vessel's engines, boilers, etc., be also taken into consideration, and as the vessel would most probably be underweigh on such an occasion, this would be a very vital and important consideration, r would under those circumstances be more than doubled. now the necessary interval for safety between such mines, according to torpedo authorities, is equal to r, and should certainly be not less than r, which in this case would give about feet, therefore assuming the radius of destruction to be feet, it is seen that there would be under those conditions a clear undefended space of about feet between each couple of lb. mines in the same line. .--the combined arrangement of submarine mines with forts and batteries, in such a manner, that every one of the former shall be well covered by the guns of the latter, and also that it would be impossible for an enemy's ships to get within effective range of the forts, or batteries, without moving over ground where mines were laid. note.--this applies to the defence of the more important harbours, etc., in which case the submarine mines (which would be chiefly electrical ones) would only act as auxiliaries to the land defences. to effectually carry out the above, there can be no question but that they who plan the forts, etc., should also plan the systems of submarine defence. a harbour, river, etc., which it is necessary to protect by electrical submarine mines, etc., and where no land defences exist, should have its mines supported by a powerful ship or ships, as maybe thought desirable. _success in torpedo warfare._--the two most important conditions essentially necessary to the successful employment of torpedoes, both offensive and defensive, are:-- . certainty of action. . simplicity of manipulation. without the former this mode of naval warfare is comparatively useless, while without the latter the former condition is rarely obtained, more especially in the case of offensive torpedoes. submarine mines are divided into separate classes, viz.:-- . mechanical mines. . electrical mines. _mechanical mines._--by this description of submarine mines, is meant those whose charges are fired by mechanical means alone. _mechanical mines in the american civil war._--during the civil war of america ( - ), the confederates depended almost entirely on mechanical submarine mines for the protection of their harbours, rivers, etc., and to this extensive use of such mines may be traced nearly the whole of the federal disasters afloat. in the principal wars that have subsequently occurred, though this form of submarine mine has been to a certain extent used, it has generally been only as an auxiliary to the more effective electrical torpedo, and owing to the deterrent effect produced by the numerous torpedo successes that characterised the american civil war, on naval commanders, etc., few vessels have been destroyed by their means, the effect of the employment of defensive torpedoes having been almost wholly a moral one. _mechanical mines for coast defence._--the experience hitherto gained, with regard to the employment of mechanical mines for coast defence in actual war, proves that they will be found exceedingly valuable in the following positions:-- .--in combination with booms or other obstructions placed in defence of narrow channels, etc., which are intended to be completely blocked up. .--in shallow water on the flanks of electrical mines. .--in protecting unfrequented bays, channels, etc., and a long line of seacoast, which may otherwise be entirely undefended. note.--in this latter instance, though the mines may not be covered by any guns, still they will be of great use, in so far, that being mechanical ones, they cannot be rendered useless by the process of cutting cables, etc., but must be destroyed, which in time of peace is a work of considerable labour and danger, and, therefore, would in the time of war, cause at the very least, serious delay to an enemy desirous of effecting a landing, etc., at a point so protected. there are numerous objections against their employment, the principal ones being:-- .--that they are all, more or less dangerous to place in position. .--that they cannot be tested when moored. .--that they are as dangerous to friend as to foe, when once placed in action. .--that an exploded, or known damaged mine cannot be replaced. note.--the above objections, especially and , constitute without doubt very serious defects in a system of defence by mechanical mines, and in the case of purely mechanical ones, it seems almost impossible to eradicate any of them, though, notwithstanding, under the particular circumstance before-mentioned, these species of defensive torpedo will be found extremely useful. _the advantages of mechanical mines._--they possess a few advantages, which are as follows:-- .--they are comparatively cheap. .--they can be kept in store and ready for use at a moment's notice. .--they do not require specially trained men to manipulate them. .--extempore ones can be easily and readily made. _best kinds of mechanical mines._--among the very numerous and various kinds of mechanical submarine mines that have been devised the following may be considered as the most effective, and practicable of them all:-- .--frame torpedoes. .--buoyant mines. this includes:-- _a._--barrel mine. _b._--brook's mine. .--singer's mine. .--mcevoy's improved mine. .--extempore mine. _frame torpedoes._--this form of defensive mine is shown at fig. . it consists of a frame work which is formed of four strong timbers _a_, _a_, _a_, _a_, these being kept parallel and only a few feet apart by means of cross timbers _b_, _b_. a cast-iron torpedo _c_, _c_, _c_, in the shape of a shell, is bolted to the head of each of the timbers _a_, _a_, _a_, containing about thirty pounds of fine grained gunpowder, and fitted with a percussion fuse, which is so placed that it would come into contact with a vessel striking against the framework, directly or not. one end of the frame is securely anchored, the other, that on which the torpedoes are fixed, is kept at its proper distance below the surface of the water by means of chains, _d_, _d_, and anchors. to prevent the frame from sinking when sodden with water, the uprights _e_, _e_, are provided. this form of mechanical mine, which performs the double function of torpedo and obstruction, was much used by the confederates, and found extremely useful, no passage was attempted to be forced by the federals where these torpedoes were known to be placed. _stake torpedo._--fig. represents another form of the frame torpedo. it consists of a piece of timber, _a_, its heels secured by a heavy metal shoe _b_, working in a universal joint in the mooring, _c_. at the head of the piece of timber is secured a torpedo _d_, containing about fifty pounds of gunpowder, and fitted with four or five sensitive fuzes. the proper angle of inclination is obtained by securing the upper end of the timber to an anchor as shown at _e_. as a proof of the efficiency of this species of mechanical mine, even though having been in position for a great length of time, the u.s. gunboat, _jonquil_, was nearly destroyed whilst attempting to remove some similar torpedoes which had been in position for two years. [illustration: frame torpedoes, buoyant mechanical mines. plate ii.] _the barrel torpedo._--one description of this form of mechanical submarine mine is shown at fig. . it consists of a barrel _a_, to the ends of which are attached two cones of pine _b_, _b_, for the purpose of preventing the current from turning the mine over. to ensure its being watertight, pitch is poured into the interior through the bunghole, and the barrel rolled about, so that the inside may be evenly covered. the outside was also thoroughly coated with pitch. these mines usually contain about lbs. of gunpowder, and are exploded by means of percussion or chemical fuzes (_c_, _c_, _c_,) generally five in number, screwed into sockets on each side and on the top of the bilge of the barrels. to keep them upright a weight _d_ is hung below the mine. this kind of mechanical mine was much used by the confederates, and to some extent by the turks in their late war with russia. they are cheap, convenient, and under certain circumstances very effective. one of the objections to their use is the difficulty of mooring them securely in strong currents, as otherwise they are very liable to shift their positions. three confederate vessels were "hoisted by their own petards," from this cause.[i] _brook's torpedo._--another form of buoyant mechanical mine is represented at fig. . it was designed for the express purpose of preventing its discovery by dragging, etc., by the enemy. it consists of the torpedo case _a_, formed of copper, which is attached to a spar _b_, the lower end of which is secured to an universal joint in its anchor _c_. five percussion or chemical fuzes _d_, _d_, _d_, are screwed into the head of the copper case. _turtle torpedo._--to increase the danger and uncertainty of any attempt to remove this form of buoyant mine, a turtle torpedo _a_, is attached to it by a wire _e_. this torpedo contains about lbs. of gunpowder, and is exploded by means of a friction primer which passes through a watertight joint _f_, and is attached to the wire _e_. whether this combination would prove effective, has yet to be seen, but the buoyant mine alone was considered one of the most dangerous used by the confederates. _singer's mechanical mine._--an elevation and section of this form of mechanical mine is shown at fig. . it consists of an air chamber _a_, and a powder chamber _b_; in the latter is fixed a rod of iron _c_, one end of which rests in a cup formed in a lug _d_, where there is a screw by means of which the rod _c_ may be screwed against the bottom of the torpedo case, on the interior. in the cup is placed the fulminating substance. a heavy cast iron cap _a b_ rests upon the top of the case and is prevented from falling off by a low rim of tin, which enters an aperture in the cap as at _e_: a wire _f_ connects this cap with a pin _g_, which keeps a plunger _h_ at rest. the head of this plunger _h_ is directly beneath the bottom of the rod _c_, within the case; by means of a spring _i_, directly the pin _g_ is drawn out, which is done by a hostile vessel striking against the mine and knocking off the cap _a b_, the plunger _h_ is forced against the bottom of the case and drives the rod _c_ into the cup containing the fulminate, and so explodes the torpedo. the case of these mines, as used by the confederates, was formed of tin, and they contained from to lbs. of powder. a safety pin _k_ is provided to prevent a premature explosion due to the pin _g_ being accidentally withdrawn. this form of submarine mine was one of the most successful and most extensively employed of all, on the part of the confederates. though no accidents are stated to have occurred in placing this mine in position, yet the fact of the iron rod _c_ having to be fixed for action, and that close against the interior of the bottom of the case, before the charge of powder has been put in, is an element of great danger, for a comparatively slight blow beneath it, which might easily occur in transport, etc., would explode the torpedo prematurely. _mcevoy's improved singer's mine._--to obviate this defect captain mcevoy has designed an improved mode of ignition for singer's mine. this is shown at fig. . the form of case, and arrangement of heavy cap are similar to those in singer's mine. the mode of ignition is as follows:--in the powder chamber _b_ is fixed a friction fuze _f_, which by means of a piece of wire secured to a length of chain _k_, _k_, is connected with the heavy cast iron cap _a b_. the piece of wire passes through a diaphragm of thin metal _h_, which is soldered all around, thus forming a complete watertight joint. premature explosion is prevented by passing a link of the chain, through a slot in the bolt _c_, securing it there by a pin of bent wire _l_. the dotted line of chain _k_, _k_, shows its position during the process of mooring this form of singer's torpedo. the manner of lowering this and also singer's mine is shown at fig. . a buoy _x_, is attached by means of a line, in the former case to the pin _l_, fig. , in the latter case to the pin _k_, fig. , the pulling out of either, sets their respective mines in action. [illustration: singer's and m^{c}evoy's mechanical mines. plate iii.] _mathieson's cement safety plug_.--in the place of the safety pin _l_, fig. , employed by captain mcevoy in his improved form of singer's mine, quartermaster-sergeant mathieson, late royal engineers, employs a plug or disc of soluble cement, so arranged that the action of the sea-water after the mine has been placed in position destroys the plug or disc, and so frees the chain which is connected with the fuze and the heavy cap of the torpedo. this plan does away with the necessity of using a buoy and line as shown in fig. , and also affords ample time for the men engaged in mooring the mine to get far away before it is ready for action. _mechanical mine_.--the extempore mechanical submarine mine, shown at fig. , will be found to possess all the qualities which are necessary to a perfect mine of that description. it is extremely simple, it can be readily and quickly made, all the materials of which it is constructed are at hand on board every man-of-war, and it is certain in its action. it consists of a barrel _a_, which is thoroughly coated inside and out with hot pitch, etc., to make it watertight, a block of wood _b_, secured to the top of the cask _a_, and having a recess cut in it to receive a round shot _c_, also a hole through which a strop _d_, is passed, and another hole to receive a toggle _e_. at the bottom of the cask on the inside, is fixed a wooden frame work _f, f_, to the top of which two ordinary gun friction tubes are fixed _g_, _g_. a piece of wood _h_, is secured to the bottom of the cask on the outside, bored with two holes, one to receive a thin iron rod _i_, the other for the safety pin _k_. wires _x_, _x_, secure the gun tubes _g_, _g_, to one end of the iron rod _i_, the other end of which is connected by means of a rope lanyard to the shot _c_. weights are slung beneath the barrel to keep the mine upright. the principle of action of this form of mechanical mine is precisely similar to that of captain mcevoy's improved singer's mine, and need not, therefore, be described. _mcevoy's mechanical primer_.--a sectional view of this apparatus is represented by fig. . it consists of two brass tubes fitting accurately one within the other, of which _a_, _a_, is the inner one. to this inner tube are affixed two brass diaphragms _b_, _b_. a brass spindle _c_, carries a weight _d_, which is regulated by a spring, _e_. a locking rod, _f_, moves in a ball and socket joint at _g_. a hammer _h_, which is shown in fig. , at full cock, is kept in that position by the rod _f_. a vessel, striking the mine, in which this apparatus is placed causes the weight, _d_, to cant over, allowing the rod, _f_, to be forced upwards by means of the spring _e_, and so frees the hammer _h_, which falls on a nipple _i_, on which is placed the percussion substance, and so explodes the mine. _mcevoy's papier maché safety plug._--to prevent a premature explosion during transport, etc., of a mine in which this apparatus is placed, a plug of papier maché, which is soluble in water, is inserted in the two spaces _p_, _p_, by which the spindle _c_, is prevented from moving to one side or the other. the use of a papier maché, instead of a cement plug for the purposes of safety, is a great improvement, as by the simple process of pressure, any period of time that it is necessary should elapse before the complete destruction of the plug, can be readily and certainly obtained, which when a cement plug, formed of different ingredients is used, is not always the case. _mcevoy's mechanical mines._--captain mcevoy has also devised a plan, whereby a mechanical mine of the foregoing form may be placed in a state of safety, even after it has been rendered active. in the place of the aforesaid papier maché wad at _p_, fig. , he uses a plunger which fits into the cavity _p_, of the heavy weight _d_. this plunger is always kept in a position clear of the weight by means of a spiral spring, unless it is desired to render the mine inactive when the plunger is forced into the aforesaid cavity and kept there by means of a pin inserted above it. above this there is another plunger, acted on by a spiral spring sufficiently powerful to enable it to force the previous mentioned plunger into the safety position; this upper plunger is rendered inactive by means of a pin. the mine being placed in position, that pin which is keeping the lower plunger inserted in the cavity _p_, of the weight _d_, is withdrawn and the mine rendered active. to the pin of the upper plunger is attached a line which is anchored some distance from the mine in a known position. then to render the mine inactive for the purpose of picking it up, etc., it is only necessary to raise the aforesaid line, and draw out the pin of the upper plunger, which by means of the strong spiral spring will force the lower plunger into the safety position, and render the mine inactive. whether this invention is a practicable one or not, remains to be proved, but anyhow it is a step in the right direction. [illustration: extempore mechanical mine, mechanical primers. plate ] _abel's mechanical primer._--this is shown in section and elevation at fig. (a and b). _a_, _a_, is the powder chamber in which the priming charge is placed; _b_ is a screw plug to close the chamber; _c_ is a flexible india rubber tube; _d_, _d_, are screw bands; _e_ is a glass tube containing oil of vitriol enclosed in a lead tube; _f_ which contains the explosive mixture; _g_, an eye at the head of the primer to receive the firing line; _h_, _h_ are segmental guards; _i_ is the guard ring; and _j_ the safety screw pin. this apparatus is screwed into a socket in the upper part of the torpedo case, as shown at fig. (c). _mode of action._--when placed in position, to render the primer ready for action, the guard ring, _i_, is pulled off, first having removed the safety pin _j_, when the segmental guards _h_, _h_, will fall away, leaving the india rubber tube _c_, _c_, exposed. a sufficient strain being brought on the rope secured to the ring _g_, the lead tube _f_ bends, causing the fracture of the glass tube _e_, thus igniting the priming charge and exploding the mine. a submarine mine so fitted may be fired at will, by bringing a line, from the ring _g_, to the shore, or it may be made self-acting by connecting two of them together, etc. _percussion and chemical fuzes._--many forms of this mode of mechanical ignition have been from time to time devised, of which the following are the most important ones:-- _sensitive fuze._--it consists of an inner cylinder _a_, _a_, fig. , of composition metal, - / " diameter, and - / " long, having a thread cut on its outside, and a bouching _b_, - / " diameter and " long with a sexagonal projection _c_, for applying a wrench, also with an external and internal thread. the upper end of the inner cylinder _a_, is solid for ", and is perforated by three holes _d_, _d_, _d_, in each of which a percussion primer is placed _e_, _e_. a piece of thin, soft and well annealed copper _f_ is soldered to the upper end of the bouching _b_, to keep moisture from the primers, and is so thin that a slight blow will crush without breaking it. a safety cap can be screwed on to the external thread above the projection _c_. _rain's detonating composition._--the detonating composition employed in this and many other forms of percussion fuzes by the confederates, etc., consisted of a combination of fulminate of mercury and ground glass, and was invented by, and is named after, general rains, chief of the torpedo bureau, at richmond, during the civil war ( - ). so sensitive was this composition that seven pounds pressure, applied to the head of one of the primers, would explode it. when required for use the internal cylinder _a_, containing the primers _e_, _e_, is screwed up until contact between them and the copper cap _f_ is secured. _mcevoy's percussion fuze._--fig. represents a longitudinal section, full size, of the mechanical percussion fuze, used by captain mcevoy in connection with his drifting torpedo, which latter will be hereafter described. _a_ is a piece of metal, having an external and internal thread, and a projection _b_, to which is applied the spanner for screwing it into the torpedo case. this piece _a_ is hollow at its upper end, and is closed by means of a thin copper dome _c_, which is soldered to it. screwed into the piece _a_ is the plug, or nipple _d_, with a hole through it from end to end, it is rammed full of mealed powder, and then a fine hole is drilled through the composition. a cavity _e_ at the head of the plug, or nipple _d_, is filled with a fulminating substance. a spiral spring _f_, encircles the plug _d_, on which a cap _g_ rests; _h_ is a needle in this cap. the action of this fuze will be readily understood from the plan of the fuze at fig. . a safety cap is provided, which fits into the slots _i_, _i_, and is fixed there by means of a set screw. _improved form of jacobi's fuze._--the section shown in fig. is an improved form of the chemical fuze, invented by professor jacobi, and used by the russians in their land and sea mines during the crimean war ( - ). it consisted of a small glass tube _a_, containing sulphuric acid, enclosed in a lead cylinder _b_. a mixture of chlorate of potash and white sugar surrounds the tube and holds it in position; _c_ is a primer filled with mealed powder in connection with the charge of the mine. the action of this fuze is as follows:--on a vessel striking against the lead cylinder _b_, it is crushed in, breaking the glass tube containing the sulphuric acid, and thus causes it (acid) to flow into the mixture of chlorate of potash and white sugar, producing fire, which by means of the primer _c_, passes into the charge, and explodes the mine. [illustration: mechanical fuzes. plate v.] _defect of chemical fuze._--the defect of the chemical fuze just described is its slow rate of ignition when compared to gunpowder. this may be remedied by adding a small quantity of sulphuret of antimony or perro cyanide of potassium. both the turks and the germans employed, as a mode of ignition for their mechanical submarine mines, the chemical fuze described above, with but slight modifications in the shape of the lead cylinder and manner of fixing the fuze into the torpedo case. mechanical fuzes, both percussion and chemical, which require a blow to effect their ignition, are to a certain extent defective when applied to submarine mechanical mines (which are always buoyant ones) in so far that a hostile vessel passing over ground supposed to be defended by torpedoes of any description, would do so at as slow a rate of speed as it would be possible to proceed at, and would, under those circumstances, _push away_ rather than strike a buoyant mine, with which she might come in contact. during the american civil war and the russo-turkish war, especially in the former, there are several instances on record of vessels passing over buoyant mechanical mines unharmed, whilst similar vessels have afterwards been destroyed by those self-same mines; and the only cause for such apparent inconsistency being the above-mentioned one, viz., the pushing rather than striking effect produced on a buoyant mine by a vessel under weigh proceeding at a very slow speed, or merely drifting with the current. _steward's safety-cock arrangements._--to obtain security to a certain extent in placing mechanical submarine mines in position, which, as has been previously stated, is one of the defects common to all forms of such torpedoes, many ingenious methods have been devised, such as safety caps to their fuzes, safety pins, soluble plugs, &c. another method, suggested by captain harding steward, r.e., which it is intended should be used in connection with the other safety arrangements, is shown at fig. . it consists of a stop-cock _a_, which, in connection with a tube, is introduced between the fuze and the charge. it is so arranged that when the cock is turned in the direction of the tube, as shown in section _b_ at _e_, the gas on formation can pass easily through and explode the charge; but when the cock is shut off, the gas on formation escapes through the side _d_, as shown in section _c_. to prevent destruction of the charge through leakage under the pressure of the water, the cone in connection with the stop-cock should fit very accurately, and, as an additional preventive, the escape hole should be covered with a waterproof plaster, which at a moderate depth would keep the water out and yet offer no material resistance to the escape of the gas if the stop-cock were shut off, as at _c_. the efficiency of this arrangement, as far as relates to its cutting off the gas from the charge, has been satisfactorily proved by practical experiments. _mooring mechanical mines._--this description of defensive torpedo will rarely be used in deep-water channels, &c., and on account of the impossibility of ascertaining whether such a mine has drifted or otherwise, it should not be moored in a very rapid current. such being the case, an ordinary mushroom anchor, heavy stone, &c., and single steel wire mooring-rope, will be generally found quite sufficient to keep such mines in position. when only a few mechanical submarine mines are moored in position, and at some distance apart, it would be found a useful plan to moor them each with three anchors, one anchor being up-stream. by this method, at low water, on the up-stream anchor being raised, the mine would show itself, and might in that position be approached and rendered inactive. were this plan to be adopted when several such mines are in position, there would be the danger of the up-stream anchor on being raised, bringing up to the surface, and probably in contact with the boat at work, a mine to which that particular anchor does not belong, an explosion being the result. footnotes: [footnote i: "submarine warfare," by commander s. barnes, u.s.n.] chapter iii. defensive torpedo warfare--_continued_. by electrical submarine mines is meant those whose charges are ignited by the agency of electricity. _submarine mines during the crimean and american wars._--it was during the crimean war ( - ) that this description of defensive torpedoes was for the first time employed on actual service. several of the principal russian harbours were protected by this form of submarine mine, but owing to the smallness of their charges, and to the want of electrical knowledge on the part of the russian officers and men in charge of them, none of the ships of the allies were sunk, or even rendered _hors de combat_ by this mode of harbour defence, though in several instances ground known to be covered with submarine mines was passed over by both english and french vessels of war. subsequently the confederates, during the american civil war, employed electrical submarine mines in considerable numbers for the defence of their numerous harbours, rivers, &c.; but though in so far as the size of the torpedo charges was concerned, they did not make the same mistake as the russians, yet, owing to the absence of proper electrical apparatus, and the want of any practical knowledge of the manipulation of electrical sea mines, on the part of the confederate torpedoists, they were almost entirely unsuccessful in destroying the federal warships; the _commodore jones_ being the sole instance, out of the large number of vessels belonging to the northerners which were sunk and severely injured by torpedoes, of a war steamer being sunk by means of electrical submarine mines. in the franco-german and russo-turkish wars which have lately occurred, electrical sea mines were very extensively used in coast defence, but with the exception of the loss of the gunboat _suna_ to the turks, during the latter struggle, by this form of defensive torpedo, no other damage to vessels resulted from their use, yet owing to the vast moral power possessed by these submarine weapons, they were enabled to most effectually carry out the work of defence entrusted to their care. of late years many important discoveries have been made in the science of electricity, and vast improvements have been effected in electrical apparatus, to which causes may be traced the vastly improved system of electrical submarine mines as adopted by the english, american, and principal european governments at the present day, as compared with those that have hitherto been employed. the certainty of action when required of electrical submarine mines, which is of course the desideratum of all torpedoists, has, by the improved mode and manner of ascertaining the exact electrical condition of each particular mine, and of the system as a whole, which is at present in vogue, been made almost absolute. _advantages of electrical submarine mines._--this form of defensive torpedo possesses numerous important advantages, the principal of which are as follows:-- .--they are always absolutely under control. note.--by detaching or connecting the firing battery, which is effected by means of a plug, key, &c., they may be respectively rendered harmless, or dangerous. thus friendly ships may pass over them in safety, whilst those of the enemy are debarred from so doing. on this account harbours, &c., protected by such mines are termed "harbours of refuge." .--fresh mines may be added to a system of such defensive torpedoes, thereby allowing an exploded mine to be replaced. note.--this is a very important point in connection with a system of defence by submarine mines, as in the case of a deep water channel, a hostile vessel being sunk by one of them, would not become an obstruction, as, were the channel a comparatively shallow one would most probably be the result, and therefore it would be necessary to put a fresh mine in the place of the exploded one; this would also apply were a mine to be prematurely ignited, or if any portion of its firing apparatus were injured. .--at night, or in a fog, no vessel can pass through a channel, &c., so protected without affording a means of ascertaining her presence. note.--this is also a very important advantage of a system of defence by electrical sea mines, affording as it does a complete safeguard against surprise. .--the power of obtaining proof, without going near it, by a system of testing that the electrical condition of the mine, &c., is perfect. note.--this again is an extremely important point. for were a charge to become wet, one of the electric cables of the mine broken, or damaged, &c., it would instantly be made apparent at the firing station, and could be at once remedied. .--they can be raised for examination, or removed when no longer required, with ease and safety. such are some of the chief advantages of employing the agency of electricity to effect the ignition of the charge in a system of defence by submarine mines. _defects of electrical submarine mines._--the following are the chief defects connected with the use of electrical mines:-- .--the number of wires that are required to be used with them. .--the necessity of employing specially trained men in their manipulation. in time there seems little doubt but that the former obstacle will be to a considerable extent overcome, but the latter must always be a flaw in an otherwise perfect system of coast defence by submarine mines. _rules to be observed in using electrical submarine mines._--in connection with a system of electrical submarine mines the following rules should be carefully observed:-- .--they should be moored in deep channels, that is to say, where the larger class of vessels would in attempting to force a passage be obliged to go. note.--mechanical submarine mines should never be used under these circumstances, as the difficulties of mooring them and keeping them in position would be very considerable, also a vessel being sunk in a very deep channel would not necessarily block it, and as a mechanical mine cannot be replaced, a gap would be left in the defence. .--they should be placed in the narrowest parts of the channel. note.--the object of this rule is evident, fewer mines being required, and consequently in the case of electrical ones, a far less number of wires are needed, which gives an increase of simplicity, and consequently more effectiveness. this point should be observed in connection with mechanical, as well as electrical submarine mines. .--they should where practicable be moored on the ground. note.--the advantages attendant on an observance of this rule are:-- _a._--increased vertical effect. _b._--avoidance of mooring difficulties. _c._--less liability of shifting from its original position. _d._--less chance of its being discovered and rendered useless by an enemy. _e._--by far heavier charges may be conveniently employed. .--where possible, no indication whatever should be given of the position of the mines by their circuit closers, or in the case of small buoyant ones, by the mines themselves. note.--in some instances this will be almost impracticable, as for example, where there is a very great rise and fall of tide. for instance, at noel bay in the bay of fundy, the rise is over fifty feet. here, when circuit closers, or small buoyant mines are used, both of which ought never to be more than twenty feet below the surface, long before low water they would be found floating on the surface in full view. many attempts have been made to overcome this difficulty, but as yet no really practicable means have been devised. .--the stations where the firing batteries, &c., are placed, should be in the defensive work likely to be held the longest, thus enabling the mines to be commanded up to the last moment. .--the electric cables should be laid in positions such that their discovery by the enemy would be extremely difficult, and almost impossible. note.--this may be to a certain extent effected by leading them from the mines to the firing and observing stations by circuitous routes, and by burying them in trenches. .--they should not be thrown away on boats. notes.--as they can in all cases be fired by will, even when circuit closers are used, this rule is easily observed. but to prevent an enemy's boats from rendering the mines useless, a line of small torpedoes might be placed in advance of the large ones, or the circuit closers themselves might be charged. at night, or in foggy weather it will be necessary to employ guard-boats, electric lights, &c., to protect them against damage by an enemy's boats, &c. in the foregoing pages of this chapter will be found the requirements and conditions essential to a perfect system of electrical submarine mines for the defence of a harbour, river, &c.; in the following pages a general description of the component parts of such defensive torpedoes, under the following heads--form and construction of case; electrical fuzes; electric cables; watertight joints; junction boxes; and mode of mooring, will be considered. _form and construction of torpedo case._--the case of a submarine mine should be capable of fulfilling the following conditions:-- . it must be able at great depths to withstand a great pressure of water, and remain perfectly watertight. note.--this in the case of a charge of gunpowder being an imperative necessity. . as a buoyant mine, it must be capable of affording a considerable excess of buoyancy, by which it may be rendered stationary when moored. note.--this is generally obtained by having an air space within the torpedo, thus requiring a much larger case in which the charge is enclosed than would otherwise be necessary, causing increased difficulties in transportation, mooring, and raising them for examination, &c. . when explosive agents which require a certain time for thorough combustion are used as the charge, such as gunpowder, picric powder, gun-cotton (not fired by detonation), &c., a much stronger case is necessary to obtain the full explosive effect than would be the case were detonated charges, under the same conditions, employed. note.--this is an extremely important point, for if a weak case is employed with a charge of gunpowder, &c., fired by a fuze primed with powder only, a portion of it on being fired would generate a sufficient quantity of gas to burst the case, thus blowing out the remainder of the charge before its ignition had been effected. . it should be of such a form that the complete ignition of the charge is obtained by the employment of the least number of fuzes possible to effect this result. note.--this point is especially to be observed when gunpowder is the explosive agent. the various forms of defensive torpedo cases may be classed under the following heads:-- .--spherical shape. .--cylindrical shape. .--conical shape. _spherical shape._--this form of case is theoretically the very best one possible to devise, but on account of the difficulty of constructing it, and its comparative costliness, such a form may be put aside as being impracticable. _cylindrical shape._--torpedoists in general have hitherto adopted the cylindrical form of case as being the best adaptable for both ground and buoyant mines containing a heavy charge. the confederates employed exclusively this shape for their electrical submarine mines, which were ground ones, and the austrians in the war of " " approved of this form of case for their electrical submarine mines, which were buoyant ones. figs. and represent respectively the american and austrian mines. in england the cylindrical shape has up to quite lately found most favour with her torpedoists for both buoyant and ground mines. at fig. is represented a -lb. buoyant electrical mine, surrounded by a wooden jacket, _e_, and having its circuit closer, _c_, enclosed within it; and at fig. is shown a -lb. electrical mine, which may be used either as a buoyant or ground one. for large ground mines, the best form of torpedo case seems to be that of the turtle mine, which is shown at fig. . a heavy charge may be contained in it; it forms its own anchor; and it would withstand an explosion of an adjacent mine without sustaining any injury. at present the cylindrical shape is the form generally used, though as far as retaining its position on the ground in a strong tide, it cannot be compared to the turtle form. [illustration: form of case of submarine mines. plate vi.] _the conical shape._--hitherto this shape of submarine mine case was only used in connection with mechanical mines, but now it is the form considered most suitable for all buoyant mines, electrical or mechanical. at fig. is shown the conical shaped mechanical mine, employed by the confederates for use with sensitive fuzes. the conical form of torpedo case lately approved of by the english torpedo authorities is somewhat similar to that one, the charge being contained in a kind of box hung from the top of the case, and the circuit closer is screwed into the bottom of the case; surrounding the upper part of the case is a thick buffer of wood, by which damage to the mine is prevented by the passage of friendly ships. this is altogether a very neat and serviceable form of torpedo case. this form of case is also more difficult to discover by dragging, and easier to retain in position. _electrical fuzes._--the fuzes employed in connection with electrical submarine mines may be divided into two classes:-- . platinum wire bridge fuzes. note.--that is where the evolution of heat is caused by a large _quantity_ of the electric force flowing through a good conductor of large section, such as the copper core of electric cables, being suddenly checked by a very thin wire composed of a metal which compared with the conductor offers a very great resistance, such as _platinum_. . high tension fuzes. note.--that is where the evolution of heat is caused by the electric spark, or by the electric discharge taking place through a substance which offers very great resistance to the passage of the electric force. _platinum wire fuze._--this is the form of electrical fuze most commonly used, and which will most certainly supersede altogether the high tension fuze. there are numerous advantages accruing from the use of platinum wire fuzes, the chief of which are here enumerated:-- _a._--great facilities for, and entire safety whilst testing the circuit. _b._--extreme simplicity of manufacture. _c._--non-liability to deteriorate. _d._--perfect insulation of the electric cables used in connection with submarine mines not necessary. _english service platinum wire fuze._--the following is a description of the platinum wire fuze of the form adopted in the english service, a section of which is shown at fig. . it consists of a head of ebonite _a_, hollowed out, in which a metal mould is fixed, the wires which have been previously bared are inserted into holes in this mould, and firmly fixed thereto by means of a composition poured into the mould, whilst hot; this is shown at _b_. the two bared ends of the wires which project beyond the metal mould, as _c_, _c_, are connected by a bridge of platinum-silver wire · " in diameter and weighing · grs. per yard. this is effected as follows:-- a very fine shallow groove is made in the flat ends of the bare wires _c_, _c_, and the platinum-silver wire is laid across in the incisions, and fixed there by means of solder. the length of the bridge _d_ is · ." a tube _e_, made of tin, and soldered to a brass socket _f_, is fixed by means of cement to the ebonite head _a_; in this tube is placed the fulminate of mercury, the open end of the tube _g_ being closed with a pellet of red lead and shellac varnish; around the bridge of the fuze is placed some loose gun-cotton. _mcevoy's platinum wire fuze._--another form of platinum wire fuze, which has been devised by captain mcevoy, formerly of the confederate service, is shown at fig. . it consists of the head _a_, formed of a mixture of ground glass, or portland cement, worked up with sulphur as a base: this mixture when hot is poured into a mould, in which the two insulated copper wires, _b_, _b_, have been previously placed; when cold, the mixture with the wires affixed is removed from the mould, and the platinum wire bridge _c_ being secured to the bare ends of the copper wires, the whole is firmly fixed in a brass socket _d_, by means of cement; the space _e_ is filled with loose dry gun-cotton, so as to surround the bridge _c_; a copper tube _f_, closed at one end, is partly filled with fulminate of mercury, and when the fuze is required for service, this tube is secured to the brass socket _d_ by means of cement. in this form of low tension fuze there is no liability whatever of any injury being caused to the bridge by the working of the wires in the head, or by damp even after lying in the water for a month or more. one peculiarity of this fuze is that the composition is run over the insulated wires without materially softening the dielectric, or affecting in the slightest degree the insulation of the wires. _high tension fuzes._--the high tension fuze was devised for use with electrical submarine mines, in the place of the platinum wire fuze, on account of the little knowledge possessed, in the early days of submarine warfare, in regard to the manipulation of voltaic batteries. platinum wire requires a temperature of some ° f. to heat it to incandescence, and therefore necessitates the use of a powerful voltaic battery, both in intensity and power, to effect the ignition of gunpowder by this means at considerable distances. the grove and bunsen pile were the only suitable form of voltaic battery known at the period of the introduction of high tension fuzes, both of which possessed the defects of uncertainty and inconstancy, and also were by far too cumbersome and too difficult to keep in effective working order to be of any real practicable value. high tension fuzes may be ignited by means of either an electro-magneto machine, an electro-dynamo machine, a frictional machine, or by a voltaic battery, generating an electric current of high intensity. various kinds of this form of electrical fuze have been designed, the principal of which are as follows:-- .--statham's fuze. .--beardslee's fuze. .--von ebner's fuze. .--abel's fuze. .--extempore fuze. _statham's fuze._--a section and elevation of this electric fuze are shown at fig. ; _a_, _b_ is a gutta percha tube, with an opening cut in it, as shown in figure. the interior of this vulcanised gutta percha tube is coated with a thin layer of sulphide of copper, which coating is obtained by leaving a bare copper wire for some time in connection with the above-mentioned tube. the extremities of two insulated copper wires _c_, _c_, considerably smaller than the conducting wires, are uncovered, scraped, and then inserted into the tube _a_, _b_, with an interval of · inch between them. the wires are then bent as shown in the figure, and the priming placed between the terminals. the whole is covered with a gutta percha bag, which is filled with fine grained gunpowder. the priming substance is composed of fulminate of mercury worked up with gum water. the objection to this fuze, which was used by the allies in their destruction of the russian fortifications at sebastopol, is the want of sensitiveness of sulphide of copper, and the consequent necessity of a very powerful firing battery. _beardslee's fuze._--this high tension fuze is shown at fig. . it consists of a cylindrical piece of soft wood a, which is about three-quarters of an inch in length and in diameter; two copper nails, _b_, _b_, are driven through this piece of wood _a_, in such a way that while the two heads come together as close as possible without absolutely touching, the pointed ends are some distance apart from each other, and project through the wood _a_; two insulated copper wires, _c_, _c_, are firmly soldered to these projecting ends, and a piece of soft wax, _d_, is pressed around the junction points. in a groove, across the heads of the copper nails, is placed a little black lead, to which is added a minute quantity of some substance, the nature of which is known only to mr. beardslee. several folds of paper are wrapped round the wooden cylinder, forming a cylinder about - / inches long, one end of which is tightly fastened round the insulated wires as at _e_. the other end of the cylinder is then filled with powder, _f_, and closed by a piece of twine. the whole fuze is then coated with black varnish. though not highly sensitive, beardslee's fuze is exceedingly efficient, and extremely simple. _von ebner's fuze._--this form of fuze was devised by colonel von ebner of the austrian engineers. a section and elevation of it is shown at fig. . it consists of an outer cylinder, _a_, of gutta percha, and an inner one of copper, _b_, which latter encloses a core formed of ground glass and sulphur, _c_, which core is cast round the two conducting wires _d_, _d_ in such a way that they are completely insulated from one another. in the first instance the wire is in one continuous length, the opening _e_ being subsequently made, and carefully gauged, so as to ensure a uniform break, or interval in the conductor of each fuze. the priming composition, which consists of equal parts of sulphide of antimony and chlorate of potash, is placed in the hollow _f_, to which is added some powdered plumbago, for the purpose of increasing the conducting power of the composition. this mixture is put into the hollow, _f_, of the fuze under considerable pressure, the terminals being connected with a sensitive galvanometer, in circuit with a test battery, and the pressure applied so as to obtain, as far as possible, uniformity in the electrical resistance of each fuze. the austrians employed this form of high tension fuze in connection with a frictional machine for the electrical mines used in their defence of venice, &c. during the war of . _abel's fuze._--mr. abel devised a high tension fuze, which in was extensively experimented with; the beardslee and von ebner fuze being based upon the principles applied for the first time in abel's fuze. [illustration: electrical fuzes. plate vii] many modifications of it have been from time to time devised by mr. abel; a section and elevation of the more recent form of his fuze is shown at fig. . it consists of _b_, _b_, a body of beech wood, hollowed for half its length, in which space the priming charge is placed; it is also perforated by three holes, one vertical for the reception of the capsule of sensitive mixture, the other two horizontal, in which the conducting wires are placed; _a_, _a_ are two insulated copper wires, passing into the vertical hole, and resting on the sensitive mixture; in a cavity, _d_, of the body of the fuze is placed some mealed powder, which is fired by the ignition of the sensitive mixture on the passage of the electrical current. the insulated wires used in connection with this fuze consist of two copper wires, about inches long, and · inch in diameter, enclosed in a covering of gutta percha · inch in diameter, and separated about · inch from each other. at one end the wires are bared to · inch, at the other they are merely cut across by a very sharp pair of scissors. this end of the double covered wire is inserted into a paper cylinder _c_, _c_, which holds a small quantity of the priming mixture. this capped end of the wires is inserted into the wooden body of the fuze through the vertical hole _i_, and projects · inch into the cavity _d_. the bare ends of the double covered wires are pressed into small grooves in the head of the cylinder _e e_, and each extremity is bent into one of the small channels _d' d'_, which are at right angles to the vertical perforation. _d' d'_ are two small copper tubes driven into these channels over the wire ends, to keep the wires in position, and to form the opening into which the conducting wires _f_ are inserted and bent round, as at _e'_. the priming mixture of abel's original fuze, which was the one used by the confederates, was composed of parts of subphosphide of copper, parts of subsulphide of copper, and parts of chlorate of potash. these ingredients reduced to a very fine state of division, and intimately mixed, in a mortar, with the addition of a little alcohol, are dried at a low temperature and preserved in bottles until required for use. the sensitive mixture used by mr. abel more recently for his submarine electrical high tension fuzes, is composed of an intimate mixture of graphite and fulminate of mercury. by the process of ramming, the electrical resistance of the fuze is regulated. _extempore fuzes._--it may be necessary in some cases, when a specially manufactured fuze is not attainable, to make a fuze on the spot. the following is a neat and simple method of constructing an extempore high tension fuze. _fisher's extempore fuze._--this form of fuze was devised by lieutenant now captain fisher, r.n. it consists of a small disc of gutta percha, through which the ends of two wires are inserted about / inch apart, their ends terminating in small copper plates formed by hammering down the wire. these flat ends should be fixed parallel, and in the first place in contact with one another, also should be level with the surface of the gutta percha. the other two extremities of the wires are then placed in circuit with a sensitive galvanometer and a test battery; the needle of the former deflects violently, there being a complete metallic circuit; the flat ends of the wires or poles of the fuze are then separated very carefully, until the needle just ceases to deflect. in the space thus formed, a little scraped charcoal is placed, and rammed in by a piece of wood. by the application of pressure, any degree of sensitiveness may be attained, merely observing the deflection of the galvanometer needle. over the charcoal a little powdered resin is shaken, and pressed down, by which means the charcoal is fixed in position, and owing to the inflammability of the resin, the ignition of the gunpowder priming is ensured. the disc of gutta percha is then placed in an empty snider ball cartridge, &c., and by the application of a little warm gutta percha applied externally, the holes where the projecting ends of the wires pass are closed, and the disc is fixed and insulated. the case is then filled with some mealed powder and fine grained powder, on the top of which is placed a little cotton wool, and the whole pressed down tightly with the finger, the open end of the case being then choked, as in beardslee's fuze and abel's extempore one. the apex is then covered with some warm gutta percha, and the whole of the fuze coated over with red sealing-wax dissolved in methylated spirits. _insulated electric cables._--for the work of defence by electrical submarine mines, the wires along which the electric current flows have, on account of their being led underground and through the water, to be covered with some substance which shall prevent the current during its passage from escaping to earth, or in other words, they (the wires) must be insulated. the substances in general use for such purposes are as follows:-- .--gutta percha. .--ordinary india rubber. .--hooper's material. _gutta percha._--this substance was used by messrs. siemens in the cables manufactured by them for the austrian government in , and is to some extent still employed, though hooper's material or vulcanised india rubber, has been found to be more suitable. the dielectric, gutta percha, possesses the following advantages:-- _a._--it can be put on the conducting wire, as an unbroken tube. _b._--it only absorbs per cent. of water. _c._--it has the property of clinging to the metallic conductor, by which is meant, that should it (conductor) be cut through, and any strain be brought on the cable, there is a tendency on the part of the gutta percha to cling to the conducting wire, thereby not increasing the fault. the defects of such an insulator are:-- _a._--its liability to become hard and brittle when exposed to dry heat, and consequently it requires to be stored under water. _b._--it becomes comparatively a bad dielectric at ° f. _c._--it becomes plastic at high temperatures, which causes the conducting wire to alter its position. in some particulars ordinary india rubber is a better insulator than gutta percha, but this substance is equally inferior to hooper's material, &c. the advantages possessed by this substance are:-- _a._--it is not easily affected by a dry heat. _b._--it is a very excellent dielectric. the defects of this mode of insulation are:-- _a._--it must be put on the conducting wires in a series of jointed pieces. _b._--it does not cling to the conducting wire, so that if the electric cable be cut, and any strain be brought on it (cable), the previous fault is increased. _c._--it absorbs per cent. of water. _hooper's material._--this insulating material consists of an inside coating of pure india rubber, then another similar coating in conjunction with oxide of zinc, which is termed the separator, and an outside coating of india rubber combined with sulphur. the use of the separator is to prevent any damage to the conducting wires by the action of the sulphur. the three coatings are then baked for some hours at a very high temperature, which fuses the whole into a solid mass, and vulcanises the outer coating. the properties of the pure india rubber which is in contact with the metallic conductor are thus preserved, while any decay of the outer covering is prevented by the vulcanising process. the advantages claimed by mr. hooper for this mode of insulating electric submarine cables, are:-- _a._--high insulation. _b._--flexibility. _c._--capability of withstanding the bad effects of dry heat. the qualifications essential to a perfect insulated electrical cable for use with submarine mines are as follows:-- .--capacity to bear a certain amount of strain without breaking. .--perfect insulation, or at least as nearly so as it is possible to obtain, and composed of a substance capable of being readily stored, and kept for a considerable length of time without being injured. .--pliability so that it may be wound on, or paid out from, a moderately sized drum without injury. .--provided with an external covering capable of protecting the dielectric from injury when used in situations where there is a rocky or shingly bottom, &c. the insulated wire of a submarine cable is technically spoken of as its _core_. by a _cable_ is meant to be understood any piece of covered wire. several forms of submarine electrical cables have been devised, all of which more or less possess the qualifications enumerated above. the following are some of the most effective:-- .--siemens's cable. .--hooper's cable. .--gray's cable. .--service cable. _siemens's cable._--this form of cable is represented at fig. . it consists of a strand _a_, which is composed of three or more copper wires formed by laying up the several single copper wires spirally, several layers of gutta percha, or india rubber, _b_, two coverings of hemp, saturated with stockholm tar, _c_ and _d_, and several plies of copper tape _e_, wound on, so that each strip overlaps the preceding one, as shown at fig. . the conductivity of the copper employed for the strand is equal to at least per cent. of that of pure copper. this exterior covering of copper tape is a patent of messrs. siemens brothers, and when once laid down, the cable so covered is very efficiently protected, and of course it is little affected by the action of the sea water. this mode of protection has one great defect, viz., that in the event of a kink occurring in paying out the line, and at the same time a sharp strain being applied, the copper tape at that point is extremely likely to destroy the insulation by being drawn in such a way as to cut through the dielectric. on this account great care must be observed in handling this form of cable. in practice precautions must be taken to prevent the copper tape covering from being brought into contact with any iron, for were such to happen, electrical action would at once ensue, causing the iron to corrode with enormous rapidity. in some of siemens's cables, vulcanised india rubber replaces the gutta percha insulation. iron covered cables, either galvanised or plain, are manufactured as well as the copper tape covered ones by that firm. _hooper's cable._--this form of cable is represented at fig. . it consists of a metal conducting wire, generally copper, _a_, covered with an alloy to protect it from chemical action, the insulating substance _b_, known as hooper's material, previously described at page , a covering of tarred hemp _c_, and an outer covering of iron wires (no. b. w. g.), each of which is separately covered with tarred hemp and wound on spirally, _d_. gray's cable is very similar to the one just described, the chief difference in it as compared with hooper's being the absence of the separator. _silvertown cables._--the following is a description of the core of an electrical submarine cable, which is used by the english government, and is supposed to contain all the advantages of the foregoing, and none of their defects. it consists of a strand conductor of four copper wires (no. b. w. g.) of quality not less than per cent. of pure copper, and possessing an electrical resistance of not more than ohms per nautical mile. this strand is tinned and insulated with vulcanised india rubber to a diameter of · inch, and then covered with a layer of felt, and the whole subjected to a temperature of ° f. under steam pressure. this forms the core of the various kinds of cables employed in connection with a system of defence by electrical submarine mines, which are enumerated as follows:-- .--single core armoured cable. .--multiple cable. .--circuit closer cable. .--single core unarmoured cable. .--special cables for firing by cross bearings. _single core armoured cable._--this form of cable is used in connection with each mine of a group or system, and also to connect forts, &c. across an arm of the sea. over the core, which has been fully described, is laid a spiral covering of tanned, picked russian hemp, over this are laid ten galvanised iron wires (no. b. w. g.), each one of which is covered with a similar hemp, which is laid in an opposite spiral to the former similar covering, with a twist of one revolution in about thirteen inches; in order to prevent these wires from gaping when the cable is kinked, a further covering of two servings of hemp passed spirally in opposite directions is laid, and the whole passed through a hot composition of a tar and pitch mixture. exterior diameter of this cable is / inch. its weight in air is - / cwt., and in water - / cwt. per nautical mile. the breaking strain of a cable thus manufactured is - / cwt., and its cost about £ per nautical mile. a diagram of this cable is shown at fig. . _multiple cable._--this form of cable is employed in cases where it is necessary to carry a large number of cables into the firing station, &c. it consists of seven single cores formed into a strand, over which a padding of hemp fibres is laid longitudinally, and over this again is laid an armouring of sixteen (no. b. w. g.) galvanised iron wires, each one of which is covered with a layer of tarred tape put on spirally with a twist of one revolution in inches. the exterior covering consists of two layers of hemp and composition, which is laid on with a short twist, and in opposite directions. the external diameter of this cable is - / inch. its weight in air and water is - / cwt., and - / cwt. respectively per nautical mile. its breaking strain is cwt., and cost about £ per nautical mile. this form of cable is used in connection with a junction box, from which the single armoured cables leading to the different mines radiate, and is shown at fig. . _circuit closer cable._--this cable, which connects the mine and circuit closer, has been found to be subjected to exceptional wear and tear, and therefore requires a special form of exterior protection. the core of this cable is the same as the one described at page , also it is covered with a similar padding of hemp, but instead of the iron wires as in the case of the multiple cable, &c., nine strands, each of which is composed of fourteen no. bessemer steel wires, are wound on, each such strand being covered with hemp, which is put on with a twist of one revolution in every - / inches, the external covering being the same as in other cables. this form of armouring for an electric cable possesses the qualifications of pliability, lightness, and great tensile strength. its weight in air is - / cwt., and in water - / cwt. per nautical mile. its breaking strain cwt., and cost about £ per nautical mile. _single core unarmoured cable._--this form of cable is used in a system of defence by submarine mines to connect the detached works of a maritime fortress, &c., for the purpose of telegraphing. it consists of the ordinary service core, over which are laid two servings of tarred hemp, put on spirally. the weight of this cable in air is - / cwt., and in water - / cwt. per nautical mile; its breaking strain is - / cwt., and its cost per nautical mile is about £ . _special cables._--in firing electrical submarine mines by means of cross bearings, a special cable is employed. as a general rule there would be three lines of mines placed to converge on one of the stations. each of these lines would be provided with a conducting wire in connection with the firing arrangements, while one line of wire in connection with the firing station would be required for telegraphing. for the purpose in question a four cored cable is used. _land service cable._--the cable employed for this service consists of a core formed similar to that of the multiple cable, described at page ; over which is laid a padding of hemp, and finally two servings of tarred hemp laid spirally in opposite directions are wound on. its weight in air is cwt., and in water - / cwt. per nautical mile. its breaking strain - / cwt., and cost per nautical mile about £ . _sea service cable._--this consists of a similar core to the land service cable, and padding of hemp, over which is laid an armouring of fifteen no. galvanised iron wires, each one being covered with tarred tape, and finally the ordinary servings of tarred hemp. its weight in air is - / cwt., and in water - / cwt. per nautical mile. its breaking strain - / cwt., and cost per nautical mile about £ . when frictional electricity is used to fire high tension fuzes, it has been found by experiment that if several lines of insulated cables are laid in the same trench for a few hundred yards, the inductive effect of the electrical charge generated by a frictional machine is so great that its discharge through one cable is sufficient not only to fire the fuze in immediate connection with it, but by induction every other fuze in connection with the remaining wires laid in the trench. and this effect equally occurs when the electric cables are some feet apart, provided they run parallel for a few hundred yards, and whether the shore ends of the cables, the fuzes in connection with which are not intended to be fired, are insulated, or put directly to earth, the connections beyond the fuzes being to earth, or even insulated, provided a very few yards of conductor exist beyond the fuze. the length of wire which it is necessary to use between the mine and its circuit closer would be quite sufficient for the purpose of effecting ignition by induction. with platinum wire fuses there is no danger whatever of the above happening, nor in the case of high tension fuzes is there so much danger of ignition by induction, when a constant instead of a frictional electric battery is used to generate the current. another mode of protecting an insulated cable is to place it, as it were, in the core of a hempen cable. in forming the rope on the cable, great care is necessary to prevent any serious amount of torsion, or tension coming on the insulated wire, either of which would most assuredly result in injury to the cable. this form of cable might in connection with obstructions, &c., be of great use, as on account of its closely resembling an ordinary rope, it would be very unlikely to excite suspicion, and so would most probably be cut, the result of which, by previous arrangement, would be an explosion of a mine, or by means of a galvanometer, &c., an indication that the obstructions, &c., were being interfered with. _jointing electrical cables._--this is a very important point in connection with a system of defence or offence by electrical torpedoes. in many instances it will be found necessary to join either two lengths of cable, or an insulated wire and a cable, together, in both of which cases, great care must be used in making the joints, so that the insulation and the continuity of the circuit may be perfect. [illustration: electric cables, extempore cable joints. plate viii] many species of junctions have been from time to time devised, the most practical and generally employed of which are:-- .--india rubber tube joint. .--mathieson's joint. .--beardslee's joint. .--mcevoy's joint. .--permanent junction. _india rubber tube joint._--this form of joint is a very useful one for extempore purposes, being easily and quickly made, and being very effective. at fig. is shown a sketch of such a junction. about · inches of the copper conductor of the two insulated cables are laid bare and connected together by means of nicoll's metallic joint, as shown at fig. , or by turning one of the conductors round the other, their ends being carefully pressed down by means of pliers, to prevent any chance of the india rubber tube being pierced; over the splice thus formed serve some twine, and over the whole put a coating of india rubber cement, grease, &c., then draw the vulcanised india rubber tube, which has been previously placed on one of the insulated cables, over the splice _a_, as shown at _b_, and secure it firmly by means of twine, _c_, _c_, and then to prevent any strain being brought on the joint, form a half-crown as shown in fig. at _a_. in forming the splice, it is very important that the metallic ends should be perfectly clean. the danger to this mode of jointing of the piercing of the tube by the ends of the conductors is entirely removed by employing the nicoll metallic joint, which is formed as follows:-- _nicoll metallic joint._--one of the conducting wires, as _a_, fig. , is formed into a spiral twist by means of a very simple instrument, and the other wire _b_, which is left straight, is inserted into the spiral, the whole being placed on an anvil, and pressed closely and securely together by a single blow of a hammer. _mathieson's joint._--this somewhat complicated, though very effective mode of jointing, which is adopted in the english torpedo service, is shown at fig. , in elevation and section. it consists of two ebonite cylinders _a_, _a_, through which the cables to be connected are passed. within these cylinders an ebonite tube _b_, _b_ is placed, the ends of which are wedge-shaped, and which press against two vulcanite rings _c_, _c_; in the interior of this tube _b_, _b_ is the metallic joint _d_ of the two cables. the centre of the tube _b_, _b_ is of square section, and fits into a hollow of similar form in the cylinders _a_, _a_, the object of this being to prevent any twisting of the wires during the process of screwing up, which would be liable to injure the metallic joint _d_. the manner of making this joint will be easily understood from the figure. with this, as with all other temporary joints, it is advisable to form a half-crown in the cable, including the joint. _beardslee's joint._--this form of temporary joint when used with strand conductors, which are composed of a number of small wires, has been found to be exceedingly useful and effective, the only defect of such a joint being the liability of straightening the wires of the conductors should a direct strain be brought upon the wire extremities. fig. represents a section of this joint; it consists of an ebonite cylinder _a_, one end of which is solid, and the other open and fitted with a screw thread, into which is screwed a plug _b_; through both the plug _b_, and the solid end of the cylinder _a_, perforations are made just large enough to admit the insulated wires _c_, _c_; about half an inch of the extremities of these wires are bared and cleaned, and then passed, the one through the plug _b_, a disc of vulcanised india rubber _d_, and a metal disc _e_, and the end of the strand conductor turned back on the face of this metal disc, the other through the perforation in the solid end of the cylinder _a_, then through similar discs _d_ and _e_, and the end of the strand conductor treated in the same manner as the former one; then by means of the screw plug _b_, the two metallic discs _b_, _b_, and consequently the bare extremities of the strand conductors are brought into close metallic contact. _mcevoy's joint for iron wire covered cable_.--this form of joint is shown in section at fig. . two brass caps _a_, _a_ are slipped over the ends of the cables required to be joined, then the iron wire and other coverings of the cables down to the insulating substance are removed, the former being bent back close against the bottom of the caps _a_, _a_, as shown in fig. at _b_, _b_; the cores of the cables are then joined by an india rubber temporary joint _c_, which has been described at page : the whole is then placed in the body of the joint, and the brass caps _a_, _a_ screwed up, jamming the bent back iron wires against a solid piece of brass _d_, _d_, by which means a firm and perfect joint is made in the cables. [illustration: permanent joints for electric cables. plate ix] fig. represents a section of a mcevoy temporary joint for single cored unarmoured cables, which seems to fulfil all the conditions necessary to a perfect joint of that description. this joint is, with the exception of there being two screw plugs instead of one, very similar to beardslee's joint described at page ; this alteration is a great improvement, remedying as it does the one defect of beardslee's joint, viz., the liability of the cables to be drawn apart due to any great tension being brought on them. a permanent joint in electrical submarine cables, which from its nature requires to be an exceptionally good one, is a somewhat difficult and troublesome operation, and also requires a considerable time to form a thoroughly reliable one. _siemens's methods of jointing._--the following methods, and instructions for forming such joints, are those adopted by messrs. siemens brothers in connection with their telegraph cables, and which will be found generally applicable to all insulated cables. _the formation of a joint in the conductor of an insulated cable._--the conductor is either covered with a gutta percha or an india rubber dielectric. in both cases cut off the dielectric so as to bare the conductor-wire for a length of about three inches, taking care never to cut at right angles to the conductor-wire, for fear of injuring it with the cutting-knife or scissors. then clean the wires forming the strand with file-card and emery-paper, and solder them into a solid bar for a length of about one inch. having soldered the wires, forming the ends of the two lengths of conductors to be joined, into two solid rods, file each of them off in a slanting manner, so that they will form a scarf-joint when put together. place the two ends of strand in the two small vices on a stand which is supplied for the purpose, so that the two scarfed ends overlap each other, and bind them round with a piece of fine black iron wire, in the shape of a spiral, so as to keep the ends close together, then solder the two ends together by applying a hot soldering iron. then remove the iron binding wire and clean up the joint, filing off all unnecessary solder. and make a band of four fine tinned copper wires, and bind them tightly side by side round the joint, covering the whole length of the scarf, and then solder the band and joint solidly together. then make another band of four fine tinned copper wires and bind them round the joint in the same manner as before, but extending about a quarter of an inch beyond each end of the other binding wire, the parts only of this second binding which project beyond the end of the first binding are to be soldered, so that the centre part remains loose and may keep up a connection between the two ends by forming a spiral between them in the event of the scarf giving way and the two ends of the conductor separating slightly. this form of joint is called the "spring" joint. the finished joint should be washed with spirit of wine and brushed, so as to take away all particles of soldering flux, and to avoid oxidation of the wire. the washed joint should then be dried with a piece of cloth and exposed to the flame of a spirit lamp to dry it thoroughly. a cable conductor ought never to be jointed with the help of soldering acid, but with that of resin, sal ammoniac, or borax only, so that any chance oxidation, and consequently destruction, of the conducting wire may be avoided. there are other modes of jointing conductors, such as the twisting and scale joint, but the foregoing method will sufficiently explain this part of electric cable work. _the formation of a joint in an india rubber insulated cable._--in making a joint in any insulated cable, the very greatest care must be taken to keep the hands, tools, and materials clean and dry. remove the felt for about twelve inches from each end of the core by soaking it with mineral naphtha and then rubbing it off clean with the file-card. the cleaned surface sear with a red-hot iron, to burn off all remaining fibres of the felt. wash these seared ends clean with naphtha. then cut off about four inches of the insulating material (taking care never to cut at right angles to the conducting wire for fear of injuring it) so as to leave enough of the conductor bare to join and solder in the manner described at page . after the conductor is jointed and soldered, clean again the seared parts of the insulator with the glazed side of the squares of cloth moistened with mineral naphtha, so as to leave a clean adhesiveness only; taper again the insulating material down to the conductor for about two inches on each side of the conductor-joint with a pair of curved and very clean scissors. the tapering must be completed in such slanting way that the different layers of the dielectric are so far exposed as to enable a secure laying on of the new jointing material. india rubber core consists chiefly of three layers of insulating material: the first layer next to the strand is called the pure or brown; the second layer is the white or separating; the third layer is the light red or jacket rubber. coat the conductor with a pure (brown) rubber tape tightly laid on in a spiral form, commencing at the spot where the separator (white) ends, across the corresponding place on the opposite side of the joint and back again in a contrary direction. the ends are fastened down by pressing a clean, heated searing-iron or a heated knife on them. by doing so the band will stick; the remaining portions of the band to be cut off with the scissors. lay on tightly the separating india rubber tape in the same manner, but beginning where the jacket or outer layer of rubber ends. one lap will be sufficient. complete the insulation by lapping on tightly two layers of red india rubber tape: the last lap must cover each end of the core to four inches on each side of the conductor-joint, or extend to the searing or tackiness, but not beyond it. lay on three tight bindings of the cloth tapes, all in the same direction, care being taken to avoid wrinkles. the ends of the cloth tapes are cemented down with a thin coating of india rubber cement. immerse the joint in the jointing-bath at ° to ° f. and gradually raise the heat so that in half an hour the temperature will be ° f., at which temperature keep the joint for twenty minutes: then take it out and let it cool in the open air. _the formation of a joint in a gutta percha insulated cable._--having jointed the conducting wires in the manner described at page , clean and dry the joint well and cover the bare conductor with a thin layer of compound. this is best done by heating a small stick of compound to nearly its melting point, and rubbing it over the bare conductor, which has been previously heated with the flame of a spirit-lamp. heat the gutta percha covering of both ends gently until it is quite soft, without, however, causing it to bubble or burn. draw, then, with the fingers, the gutta percha coverings of both ends down, tapering them off until they meet in the middle of the joint; heat them sufficiently to make them adhere together. apply a layer of compound on the tapered-off gutta percha in the same manner as described for coating the bare conductor, and cover it with a first coating of gutta percha sheet to about half the thickness necessary to finish the joint. this is done by heating a small sheet of gutta percha, of about one-eighth of an inch in thickness, until it is quite soft, and by pressing it in that state round the joint to the required size; the greatest care to be taken to expel all the air. the projecting lips are then cut off with a pair of curved scissors. the seam thus produced is to be rubbed with a hot iron until it is completely closed and the joint well rounded off. apply another layer of compound and a second layer of gutta percha in exactly the same manner as described for the first layer; care, however, is to be taken to get the seam in this second layer of gutta percha not over, but as nearly as possible right opposite to, the seam in the layer underneath. the whole to be worked as cylindrical as possible, and to a size not exceeding the original core. the joint, so far finished, is then to be cooled with water until the gutta percha is quite consolidated. another, the overlapping gutta percha joint, is made in the following manner:-- cut off the two ends of the core, so that the gutta percha and the conductor-wire are flush. warm the gutta percha for a distance of about three inches from each of the ends with the flame of a spirit lamp, and, when sufficiently soft, push it back until it forms an enlargement. the two ends of the conductor are then to be soldered according to instructions for making joint in conductors. to have a perfectly clean surface of the two gutta percha enlargements, remove all impurities by the way of peeling them with a sharp knife. warm gently both knobs and the copper joint, and cover the whole length of the bare wire with compound, planing it with a warm smoothing-iron. draw then with the fingers one of the warmed and softened knobs carefully up to the other knob or enlargement, leaving on its way a perfect tube of gutta percha upon the wire, decreasing gradually to the thickness of the copper strand towards the other knob. any superfluous gutta percha is removed. this scarf is finished with a warm smoothing-iron, so as to unite it to the compound on the wire strand, and a thin layer of compound is also put over the scarf in the same manner as before. the other knob is then warmed and drawn in the same way over the tube already formed, which is at the same time heated sufficiently to make the two adhere. apply a layer of compound on the second scarf of gutta percha, covering it in the same manner as described for coating the bare conductor, and cover it with a small sheet of gutta percha in the same manner as described above, so as to make the finished joint to the size of the core as manufactured. _rules to be observed in forming joints._--the following rules must be carefully observed in forming either a temporary or permanent joint:-- .--in laying bare the conductor, the dielectric should be warmed and then pulled off, so preventing any chance of it being damaged, which might be the case were the dielectric to be cut off. .--for a perfect junction, soldering is necessary. .--the wires before connection should be carefully cleaned, and the hands of those performing the work must be dry. .--gutta percha should not be given too much heat, for it then becomes oily and will not, in that state, properly adhere. .--grease and dirt must be scrupulously avoided. great care is absolutely necessary in making junctions, as they are the principal sources of defect in the insulation of electrical submarine cables. _junction boxes._--when it is necessary to employ a multiple cable, a junction box is used to facilitate the connection of the several separate wires diverging from the extremities of such a cable. in one angle of such a box the multiple cable is introduced, while the separate cables make their exit on the opposite sides and pass to the different mines. different views of a junction box are shown at fig. , where _a_ is a plan of the top or lid, _b_ a plan of the bottom, with the lid off, _c_ an elevation, and _d_ a section of the box. the manner of using the junction box is as follows:-- the multiple cable is put in at _a_, and secured there by means of a nipping hook, shown at fig. , which hook passes through the bottom of the junction and is made secure by means of a nut. the single core cables radiating from the junction box pass through the openings _b_, _b_, _b_ on the sides, and angle opposite to where the multiple cable a enters. each multiple cable is composed of seven cores, and each of these is connected by means of joints with the mine cables within the junction box, and each of these seven cables is secured by means of a nipper similar to, but smaller than, the one shown at fig. , which are also secured by means of nuts, as in the case of the multiple cable nipping hook. when all the connections are made, the lid _a_ is placed so as to rest on the studs _c_, _c_, _c_, and firmly secured by a bolt _d_, which is made water-tight by means of a washer and nut. by means of the nipping hooks, which take any strain that may be brought on the cables, the connections within the box are ensured against injury by such a cause. to enable the whole to be lifted together for the purposes of examination of the cables, &c., a buoyed rope is connected to the eye-bolt _e_. for this service a dummy circuit closer is the best form of buoy, it having great buoyancy and resembling in appearance an active circuit closer. a junction box should be placed in such a position as to be easily attained, even in the presence of an enemy, and its buoy should, if possible, not be seen. it is also very essential that it should be in a safe and guarded position, for any injury to the junction box or multiple cable would be fatal to the group of mines in connection. in the following cases, special junction boxes are used:-- .--a seven cored armoured cable to be connected direct to another length of the same. .--a single armoured cable to be connected as in foregoing instance. .--a t junction box for the branch system of electrical contact mines. _junction box for multiple cables._--at fig. is represented a plan of lower half of this form of junction box. it consists of a pair of cast iron plates of precisely similar form to the one shown at fig. , and so made as to be capable of being fastened tightly together by means of four bolts and nuts passing through the holes _a_, _a_. the grooves _b_, _b_ at the two extremities are just large enough to grip the armoured cable firmly, when the upper and lower parts are screwed together. a larger space is provided in the hollow for the joint. _junction box for single cored cables._--for this purpose a junction box similar to, but smaller than the one above described is employed. _t junction box._--this form of junction box is employed when the system of electrical contact mines on branches from a single cable is used. this system is dependent on the use of a platinum wire fuze in connection with a platinum wire bridge in each branch close to its junction with the main cable. this form of junction box, which is shown at fig. is very similar to the one used for the connection of two multiple cables, only differing in its shape, which is that of a t. _a_ is a disconnector, which will be described further on; _b_, _b_, _b'_ are the armoured electric cables, _b_, _b_ being the main, and _b'_ the branch cable in connection with the forked joint formed within the t junction box; _c_, _c_, _c_ are turk's heads formed to prevent any strain being brought on the forked joint. this form of turk's head is made by turning back the wires of the cable armouring, and frapping them round with spun yarn until the necessary size and shape is attained. _mcevoy's turk's head._--another form of turk's head, devised by captain mcevoy, is shown at fig. . it consists of two separate pieces of brass, _a_ and _b_, the former screwing over the latter. the mode of using it is as follows:-- slip the piece of brass _b_ over the cable _c_, and turn back the wires of the cable _d_, _d_, &c., so that they lie against the shoulder of the brass piece _b_, then slip the other piece of brass _a_ over the cable and screw it on the piece _b_, firmly jamming the turned back wires _d_, _d_, &c. this is a very neat and quick method of forming a turk's head, and it should be invariably used in preference to the foregoing method, which is clumsy, and which takes some time to form. the section of a disconnector is shown at fig. . it consists of an iron cover, or dome _a_, which is provided with a screw fitting on to another screw on the ebonite body _b_ of the apparatus. when the dome _a_ is screwed tightly down on the washer _i_, the whole is made perfectly watertight. _c_, _c_ are insulated terminals for connecting the cores of the branch and main cables after their armouring has been removed, as shown at fig. . _d_, _d_ are two copper conducting wires (no. b. w. g.) passing through the centre of the ebonite body _b_, and projecting into the interior of the apparatus. these wires are held in position and insulated by means of a composition formed of a mixture of pitch, tallow, beeswax and gutta percha. this composition is put on whilst hot and allowed to cool gradually, when it becomes hard and durable. great care is necessary to ensure the cavity within the ebonite body _b_ being completely filled, as otherwise a leakage might occur, owing to the great pressure of water at depths where the disconnection would be generally used. _f_ is a boxwood cover which is slipped on, and fits fairly tight to the ebonite body _b_; _g_ is a piece of thin platinum wire, weighing · grains to the yard, and being / inch in length; _h_ is an ebonite pin, which passes through two small holes in the boxwood cover _f_, into which it fits tightly, and in such a position as to be directly beneath the platinum wire bridge _g_, when the boxwood cover _f_ is fixed on. the pin _h_ is pushed through the holes in the cover _f_ from the outside, so as to pass beneath the bridge _g_ after the priming has been inserted, and the cover has been placed on. when prepared for use, the platinum wire bridge _g_ is surrounded by some loose gun-cotton priming, sufficient in quantity to blow off the boxwood cover _f_, without destroying the dome _a_; the cover _f_ being blown off, carries the ebonite pin _h_ with it, and through the platinum wire bridge _g_, thereby rupturing it, and breaking the continuity of the circuit. the object of so doing is to cut off the connection of an exploded mine, so that the full amount of the firing current is available for the other mines, and not suffered to be wasted by passing through the exposed wire of the broken circuit, which, were the disconnector not employed, would be the case. when any particular mine of a system is struck, the current passes through the main cable _b_, the disconnector _a_ (which is in connection with that mine), and branch cable _b'_ to the fuze, and so explodes the mine, and destroys the platinum wire bridge _g_ of the disconnector at practically the same instant. the effect of the latter operation would be to cut off and insulate the branch cable of the exploded mine, and so prevent any loss of the electrical current, when another mine of that system is required to be fired. the platinum wire bridge _g_ is / inch long, while that of the fuze is / inch, the object of this difference in length of the bridges being to ensure the former one _g_ being fired, and thus the insulation made doubly sure. many other forms of disconnectors have been devised, but none have proved in practice so effective as the one just described. [illustration: junction boxes. mechanical turk's head. plate x] _mooring electrical submarine mines._--this is one of the most difficult problems to be solved in connection with a system of submarine mines. the objects to be attained in mooring are as follows:-- .--the mines should preserve the exact positions in which they are laid down. note.--from the comparatively small radius of destructive effect, of even heavily charged submarine mines, it will be understood how absolutely essential, in the case of mines fired by judgment, it is that this object should be attained. .--the mooring chains, or ropes, must be so arranged that no twisting whatever should occur, as otherwise fracture of the insulated wire would be likely to happen. .--in the case of buoyant mines, their distance from the bottom must be so adjusted, that at no time shall a vessel passing over them be out of their vertical range of destruction, nor shall they be visible. the difficulties attendant upon the efficient mooring of submarine mines are immense, as will be understood when the action of gales of wind, and strong tides, which latter vary continually in their direction and in their rise and fall, are taken into consideration. the foregoing remarks apply more particularly to a system of buoyant submarine mines, as those placed on the ground are comparatively easy to moor. several modes of mooring buoyant submarine mines have been suggested, the most practicable of which are as follows:-- .--ladder moorings. .--fore and aft moorings. .--austrian method of mooring. .--single rope mooring. _ladder mooring._--this is a method of mooring, which in places where it may be necessary to place the anchors far apart will be found useful. the circuit closer is connected to the mine by two ropes which lead thence to two anchors, the ropes being separated by wooden rounds, or spreaders, to feet long, by which the tendency to twisting is prevented. the anchors are placed some feet apart. the only defect of the ladder mooring is the quantity of sea-weed, &c., that is liable to be lodged on the rounds, thus causing the circuit closer to be drawn out of its proper position. _fore and aft mooring._--this mode may be advantageously employed in a tideway where the current runs very strong, that is to say, five knots per hour, or more. it consists simply of two anchors, one of which is moored up, and the other down the stream. _austrian method of mooring._--this method of mooring, adopted by the austrians during the war of , is shown at fig. . it consists of a wooden triangular platform on which several heavy weights _a_, _a_, _a_ are placed; the mine is attached to this platform by means of three wire ropes _b_, _b_, _b_, connected to the angles of the latter, and fastened to three chains, which by means of a catch holds the mine at the position required. this catch consists of a pulley attached to the extremity of the wire rope of the platform, through which the mooring chain of the mine is passed, and fastened by a key at the required depth by means of a self-acting arrangement. this key, which is of considerable weight, slips down as the mine is being hauled into position, but the moment the chain is slacked, two arms catch into a link of the chain, and so hold the mine in position. the weight of such a key is about lbs. it is fitted with nuts, &c., to enable it to be taken to pieces. this plan of mooring proved very effective in the harbours of the adriatic, where there is hardly any tide or current to twist the mooring ropes, or otherwise disturb the mines. the austrians have lately adopted the mushroom sinker in place of the wooden platform and weights, for their anchor. _single rope mooring._--this simple method of mooring has after numerous exhaustive experiments been adopted as the most practicable and effective of all others. whenever possible, a wire instead of hempen cable should be used to connect the mine and its circuit closer to the mooring anchor, as the former is less liable to twist, kink, or wear from friction than the latter. a ground mine with circuit closer attached is represented at fig. , where _a_ is the wire mooring rope, _b_ the electric cable leading from the mine to the circuit closer, _c_, and _c_ the cable leading from the firing station to the mine; _d_ is the oblong sinker attached to the mine, and _e_ the tripping chain leading to the shore, to which the cable _c_ is attached at intervals, so that by underrunning the electric cable, the tripping chain may be easily picked up, and the mine raised. [illustration: moorings for submarine mines. plate xi] at fig. is shown a buoyant mine. the only difference in the mooring of this and the one before described, is that instead of resting on its anchor on the ground, it is moored at a certain distance above its anchor _d_, to which it is secured by a chain _e_. fig. represents an electro contact mine. _m_ is the mine with circuit closer enclosed, _a_ the wire mooring rope, _d_ the mushroom anchor, and _b_ the electric cable leading from the mine to the disconnector _d_. the mushroom sinker or anchor, which is undoubtedly the most effective of all other forms of mooring anchors used for the purposes of anchoring submarine mines, is shown at _e_, fig. ; the legs are added for use on rocky or hard bottoms, under which circumstances the weight of the anchor should also be increased. for ground mines the form of sinker shown at _d_, fig. is employed; it is of an oblong shape, and hollowed out in the centre to allow of its being lashed close up to the mine. large blocks of stones with their bases slightly hollowed are useful as extempore moorings, so also is the one shown at fig. , which consists of a strong heavy wooden shaft _a_, with a number of wooden arms _b_, _b_ attached to its base; this form of extempore sinker was considered very efficient by the american authorities. the wooden weighted platform, which was described at page , is also a very useful form of extempore sinker. for dead weight moorings, pigs of ballast, heavy stones, &c., may be used. the weight of the anchor or sinker for mooring submarine mines is a very important consideration. it will depend on the amount of buoyancy of the mine, on the strength of current, and on the nature of the bottom, also whether the mines are to be hauled down to, or moored with the anchor. stotherd uses the following formula: w = [ rt](b^{ } + p^{ }) where b is the excess of the flotation over the weight of the charge of a given submarine mine; p is the pressure exerted by any given current on the same buoyant mine; w the weight of sinker necessary to overcome the tendency of the mine to move. in still water p becomes nothing, and therefore w equal to b, that is, in still water double the buoyancy of a mine is a sufficient weight for its anchor. the value of p may be found from the formula p = · � v^{ }, where v is the velocity of the current in miles per hour. from this equation p will be found in terms of pressure in pounds per square foot of flat surface, which is nearly double that on the curved surface of a cylinder. in regard to the amount of buoyancy of a submarine mine, it has been found by actual practice that in the case of a mine moored in still water it should certainly be not less than the weight of the charge, whilst if subjected to the lateral pressure due to a current, it should be not less than three times the pressure exerted by the current. it is always necessary to allow an excess of buoyancy over the calculated amount to counteract any leakage, or other disturbing cause which might otherwise materially affect the efficiency of the mine. there are two modes of placing a mine in position; either by attaching the anchor, with the cable necessary for the depth of water, to the mine, and lowering both together, or by placing the anchor first, and then hauling the mine down to it, and by means of a catch, fastening it at the required depth. the first mode is exceedingly simple, but except under very favourable circumstances cannot be relied on when firing by observation is the means adopted to explode a system of submarine mines. the second plan is practically easy to carry out, and by it a mine may be placed more accurately. to enable either of the above methods to be properly carried out, specially fitted steamboats, &c., are requisite. at fig. is represented a feet launch fitted for laying down a submarine mine by the first of the two modes enumerated above. [illustration: steam launch for mooring submarine mines. plate xii.] _a_ is the mine; _b_ is the electric cable carried from the drum _c_ to the charge, and connected for use; _d_ is the circuit closer, which is attached to the mine by its electric cable and mooring rope; _f_ is the mushroom sinker attached by means of its mooring chain to the mine, it is suspended by a slip rope _g_, which passes over a small crutch fitted with a sheave _h_; _i_ is a hollow iron derrick, and _k_ the tackle and fall for lifting mine into boat; this derrick is formed of an iron tube about inches diameter, / inch thick, and feet inches long; it is attached to an iron tube mast of similar diameter and thickness to the derrick, but feet inches long, an iron chain feet inches long and / inch diameter, connects the derrick to the mast; _m_ is a leading sheave to keep the cable clear whilst it is being paid out; _l_ is a crab, for working the tackle _k_, &c., and _c_ is the drum on which the electric cable is wound. in connection with the defence of a harbour by a system of electrical submarine mines of large size, it will be necessary to employ a service of steamtugs, steamboats, mooring-barges, &c., specially fitted for such work. one of the great advantages of the hauling down method of placing mines in position, is, that the anchors, with the cables connected thereto, may be carefully and accurately got into position during the time of peace, and the mines themselves, which should be kept in store ready fitted for immediate use, need not be placed in position until they are actually required. the drums used for reeling a multiple cable on, are capable of holding half a nautical mile in length. that used for a single core armoured cable is similar to but smaller than the aforesaid drum, and is capable of stowing one nautical mile of such a cable. for transportation wooden drums are ordinarily used. chapter iv. defensive torpedo warfare--_continued_. _closing the electric circuit._--in connection with the system of coast defence by means of electrical submarine mines, there are two distinct methods of effecting the closing of the electric circuit, and consequently, the firing battery being connected, the explosion of the mine or mines, which methods may be used separately, or in combination, and are as follows:-- .--the self-acting method. .--the firing by judgment, or observation method. during the early days of submarine defensive warfare, the latter method alone was used, owing to the absence of anything like a practicable form of self-acting apparatus; but within the last few years, the former has almost entirely superseded the latter method, except in very exceptional cases; this revolution being due to the vast improvements that have been, and still are being effected in the system of firing electrical submarine mines automatically. _use of circuit closers._--electrical submarine mines may by means of an apparatus, termed a _circuit closer_, be rendered self-acting; that is to say, by the action of a vessel coming in contact with such an apparatus, which may be either within the mine itself, or within a buoy attached to the mine, the electric circuit is closed, and the mine in connection with the circuit closer so struck, exploded. the essential feature of such a mode of closing the electric circuit is, that electrical submarine mines may be rendered either active or harmless, at the will of the operator, which is effected by the putting in, or taking out of a plug, by which means the firing current is either thrown in, or out of the circuit. _circuit closers._--many different forms of circuit closers have been devised, among which the following seem the most suitable and are those generally used:-- .--mathieson's inertia circuit closer. .--mathieson's spiral spring circuit closer. .--austrian self-acting circuit closer. .--mcevoy's mercury circuit closer. .--mcevoy's weight magneto circuit closer. _mathieson's circuit closer._--this form of circuit closer has been adopted by the english government in connection with their system of defence by electrical submarine mines. the details of this apparatus are shown at pl. xiii. fig. , _a_ is a gun-metal dome screwed on to a metal base _b_, its foot resting on a gutta percha washer _c_, so as to exclude any water; _d_ is a cap screwed on to the top of the dome, and made watertight by the leather washer _e_; _f_ is a guard cap screwed into the cap _d_, this is to keep the spindle of the circuit closer steady during transport, and would be removed when the apparatus is prepared for service; _g_ is the ebonite base plug through which pass the insulated wires _e_ and _l_; _h_ is an hexagonal collar, working in the metal base plate _b_, by means of which, and the brass collar _i_, and the leather washer _k_, the base plug is secured, and water is excluded from the interior of the circuit closer; _l_, _l_, _l_ are brass columns supporting a circular ebonite piece _m_; _n_ is a metal bridge screwed on to the base plate _b_, into which is screwed the spindle _p_, both of which are prevented from moving after being screwed up by the set screws _r_ and _s_. the spindle _p_ carries a leaden ball _t_, which is supported upon the rest _v_, and is secured in position by the screw nut _w_; _x_ is an india rubber ring, the object of which is to prevent any damage being done to the spindle should the ball when set in action by a heavy blow from a passing vessel be brought into contact with the dome; is a brass disc attached to the spindle carrying an ebonite disc , connected to it by screws; is a brass contact ring also fixed to the ebonite disc , provided with a screw , for the attachment of one of the base plug wires, and with platinised projections , , , fig. . the contact ring is completely insulated from the spindle and brass disc . three contact springs , are attached to the circular ebonite piece _m_, and the faces opposite to the platinised projections of the disc are also platinised. shows the contact screws of the connecting pieces, which serve also as adjusting screws to regulate the sensitiveness of the apparatus, the points of which as well as their bearings on the springs are platinised. the springs are connected together by means of the wires , fig. , one end of which is secured to the connecting piece by the screw , and the other passes through to the top of the ebonite piece, and is attached to the top of the spring next in succession to that to which it is fixed below. one terminal of a coil of ohms resistance (which is used for testing purposes) is attached to the line _l_, terminal of the ebonite base plug, which latter is also connected to the screw , on the circumference of the contact ring ; the other terminal of the resistance coil is connected to the earth, _e_ terminal of the base plug. a bare copper wire of no. b. w. g. connects the top of the last contact spring with the set screw _s_; a piece of similar wire jointed to it is passed round one of the brass collars and connected to the screw _r_. as a precaution against bad contact, the contact springs are connected together by bare wires _a_, _b_, _c_. this completes the connections for the signalling circuit, the earth being formed by the body of the instrument; _d_ is a hole left in the metal base for the passage of the insulating wire which connects the earth plate to the earth _e_ terminal of the base plug. _testing current._--for testing purposes the current from the test battery arrives by the line wire _l_, and passes thence through the resistance coil to earth by means of the wire _e_, which is attached to a zinc earth plate placed in a recess in the jacket of the circuit closer. _action of the circuit._--the action of the apparatus is as follows:-- _closer._--on the circuit closer being struck, the weight of the lead ball _t_ causes the steel rod _p_ to be deflected and brings the brass ring in contact with one of the springs ; the signalling current which up to this moment has been passing through the ohms coil to earth, then passes to the contact ring (avoiding the resistance coil) thence to the spring which is in contact with it, and from there by means of the wire connections to the set screws _s_ and _r_, and so to earth through the metal body of the apparatus; the effect of the resistance coil being thus eliminated, is to strengthen the signalling current, and thus enable it to work the shutter apparatus, by which means the firing current is thrown into circuit and the mine exploded. [illustration: mathieson's circuit closer. plate xiii] _circuit breaker._--by altering the mode of connecting the wires, the above apparatus may be used as a circuit breaker, that is to say, the signal may be given, and the mine exploded by the cessation of a passing current, instead of by the closing of the electric circuit. this system was specially designed for use with platinum wire fuzes, but is rarely used. _circuit closer of electro contact mines._--when the inertia circuit closer is employed in connection with electro contact mines, the circular ebonite piece _m_ is replaced by a similar shaped piece of brass, and which is in metallic connection through the brass pillars _l_, _l_, _l_ with the mass of the metal of the apparatus which forms the earth plate. the insulated wire of the base plug is connected to one pole of a platinum wire fuze, the other pole of which is connected by another wire to the outer metal rim of the disc of the spindle. as long as the circuit closer remains undisturbed, a break will remain in the circuit, which is due to the ebonite insulation between the spindle and the outer metal rim of the disc; but the moment the apparatus is struck, which causes the spindle to vibrate, the outer metal rim will come in contact with one of the springs completing the circuit, through the circular metal portion and the pillars of the circuit closer to earth. _adjustment of circuit closer._--the sensitiveness of mathieson's inertia circuit closer is determined by the distance between the disc and the springs , , , which is regulated by means of the adjusting screws , , , which press against the inner faces of the springs. owing to the great weight of the leaden ball, when by any cause the circuit closer is inclined for a length of time, a permanent set is given to the spindle, thereby destroying the adjustment of the instrument. _improvements in the inertia circuit closer._--to remedy this very serious defect, a cylinder of india rubber is substituted for the leaden ball; a circuit closer so fitted is also less affected by the action of counter mines, which is a very important advantage. _mathieson's spiral spring circuit closer._--a sectional elevation of this form of circuit closer is shown at fig. . it consists of a brass base _a_, provided with a grooved flange for carrying a gutta percha washer, and it has also an hexagonal projection for the purpose of screwing the circuit closer into the gun-metal mouth of its air-tight cylinder, or buoy; _b_ is a brass dome enclosing the apparatus for the purpose of protecting it from injury, and also by means of india rubber washers to prevent an ingress of water, should the circuit closer case become injured, and leak; _c_ is a brass collar to which the brass contact springs _i_, _i_ are attached, and which are regulated by the set screws _j_, _j_; a brass spiral spring _d_ carries a metal rod _e_, which supports a brass ball _f_, surrounded by an india rubber band _h_. a contact disc _g_ is secured to the base of the spindle _e_, but insulated from it by an ebonite boss; _k_ is an ebonite base plug with two channels in it, through which the wires _m_, _m^{ }_ pass. _an improvement on the inertia circuit closer._--this instrument is a vast improvement on the inertia apparatus previously described, being more simple and more certain in its action, a desideratum in all circuit closers; but notwithstanding, up to the present time mathieson's inertia apparatus has been used by our government, to the exclusion of all other instruments of a similar nature, some of which were proved to be far superior when subjected to the crucial test of actual practice. _austrian self-acting circuit closer._--this form of circuit closing apparatus, which is purely a self-acting one, that is to say, a mine so fitted cannot be fired at will, is shown at fig. . it consists of several buffers _a_, _a_, _a_, which by means of strong springs are held in position, their heads projecting outside the torpedo case _b_; on being pressed in by the contact of a passing vessel, the ends of these buffers would be forced against a ratchet wheel _c_, which is also kept in position by means of a spring. several strong pieces of wood _d_, _d_ within the case keep the buffers and their attached arms in the proper direction, and also afford rigidity to the torpedo case. the brass ratchet wheel _c_ being put in motion carries round with it a central arrangement _e_, the lower part of which is shown at fig. , _a_. this portion consists of a cylinder of brass _f_ divided into two parts insulated one from the other by a piece of ebonite _g_; on one side of this cylinder there are three arms of brass, _h_, _i_, and _k_, and on the other there are two arms, _l_ and _m_, all of which are insulated from each other. [illustration: austrian circuit closer, mercury circuit closer. plate xiv] the arm _h_ is close to, but insulated from a metal plate _n_, which latter is permanently connected with the conducting wire leading from the firing battery, and thus while in a state of rest is electrically charged; beyond the arm _i_ is a spring _o_, which is connected with the earth, and in such a position that when the central portion is moved round, this spring _o_ comes in contact with the arm _i_, and the plate _n_ with the arm _h_ simultaneously, and the circuit is thus completed through earth to the battery, but the current of electricity does not pass through the fuze. the arms _k_, _l_ on the opposite sides of the cylinder, and consequently insulated one from the other, are connected with the fuze, and the arm _m_ is connected with the earth. on a further pressure of the vessel on the buffer, the arm _i_ is pushed beyond the spring, and in contact therewith, and consequently the circuit by earth to the battery is broken, while the contact of the arm _h_ and plate _n_ is still retained, and the current is passed by the arm _k_ through the fuze to the arm _l_, and then to earth through the arm _m_, thus completing the electric circuit of the firing battery through the fuze, and to exploding the mine. the spring acts as a circuit breaker, and by means of an intensity coil in connection with the firing battery, the current is only passed through the fuze when at the point of greatest intensity. by detaching the firing battery, the channel defended by such submarine mines may be rendered safe. _fuze only in circuit at moment of firing it._--one of the principal objects to be gained by the employment of such an arrangement for the closing of the electric circuit in connection with submarine mines, is the prevention of premature explosion from induction which might be caused by the proximity of any atmospheric electricity, the fuze in this system being entirely cut out of circuit until the moment when it is necessary to fire it. the austrians employed this form of circuit closing instrument during the war of , and still continue to use it in connection with their coast defence by submarine mines. _mcevoy's mercury circuit closer._--at fig. is represented a longitudinal section of a circuit closer of this construction. it is placed in the mine in such a manner that when undisturbed it maintains an approximately upright position. it consists of a metal tube _a_ into which the cup _b_ of vulcanite, or other insulating material is fixed. the cup is contracted at some distance from the top by the perforated plug _c_, which is also of insulating material; _d_ is a metal pin fixed into the bottom of the cup _b_, it is connected with the wire _e_, which is insulated and passes to the battery; _f_ is a metal plug closing the tube _a_ and the cup _b_ at the top; _g_ is a wire attached to the plug _f_, and passing from it to an earth connection. the cup _b_ is filled with mercury up to the level of the plug _c_. by the contact of a passing vessel the instrument would be tilted sufficiently to cause the mercury to flow into contact with the metal plug _f_, thus completing the electric circuit and exploding the mine. this form of circuit closer, though not generally adopted, would, on account of its being less liable to derangement by the motion of the waves, or by the explosion of an adjacent or counter mine, seem to fulfil the many requirements of a circuit closer for general service. _mcevoy's weight magneto circuit closer._--this form of circuit closer, which is shown in section and plan at figs. and , is one of the most important improvements that has ever been effected in such apparatus, and bids fair to become universally adopted. a heavy metal conical shaped weight _a_ (fig. ), hollowed out in its base and working in a ball and socket joint _b_, rests on a solid brass base _c_, and is so arranged that on the apparatus being struck, the weight _a_ will fall over, pivoting on one of its supports _d_, _d_; _e_ is a band of india rubber, encircling the weight _a_, for the purpose of preventing a jar on its falling against the sides of the brass cylinder _f_, which contains the weight _a_ and joint _b_. a brass rod _g_, connected to the ball and socket joint, passes through the base _c_, through a strong spiral spring _h_ (which latter rests on an adjusting screw _k_), through a piece of ebonite _l_, which supports the bobbins and core _m_, _m_^{ }; then between these bobbins _m_, _m_^{ } through an armature _n_, which is pivoted at _p_; and lastly through a slight spiral spring _o_, which is kept in position by the adjusting screw _i_. the armature _n_ is fitted with a small piece of brass _r_, so arranged that when it (the armature) is in the position shown in fig. , this piece of brass _r_ does not make contact with the two strips of metal, _s_, _s_, between which it, _r_, works; but when the armature _n_ is in contact with the cores of the bobbins _m_, _m_^{ }, then the piece of brass _r_ makes contact with the metal strips _s_ _s_, and so makes a short circuit for the electric current. an ordinary telephone _t_, fig. , in which some small shot, bells, &c., are placed, is fixed to the top of the brass cylinder _f_. _action of circuit closer._--the action of this apparatus is as follows:-- on the mine carrying this form of circuit closer being struck by a passing vessel, the weight _a_ is caused to fall over towards the side of the brass cylinder _f_, thus allowing the strong spiral spring _h_ to act on the brass rod _g_ in an upward direction, by which means the armature _n_ is brought into contact with the soft iron cores of the bobbins _m_, _m_^{ }. [illustration: m^{c.}evoy's magneto electro circuit closer. plate xv] the connections of the wires are made as follows:-- the line wire _w_ is led through the base of the apparatus and connected to a piece of brass under the ebonite support _l_, in connection with one of the wires of the bobbin _m_, the other wire of which is attached to the metal strip _s_; the wires of the bobbin _m_^{ } are connected, the one to the metal strip _s__{ }, the other to a piece of brass under the ebonite support _l_; from this latter piece of brass a wire _w__{ } is led to the brass screw _x_. the wires _w__{ }, _w__{ }, from the fuzes are led, the one to the brass screw _x_, the other to a screw _y_, which forms through the metal of the apparatus the earth plate. one of the wires of the telephone _t_ is connected to the brass screw _x_, the other _w__{ } is connected to the piece of brass to which the line wire _w_ is also attached. while the circuit closer remains in a state of rest, the current from the signalling battery flows along the line wire _w_, up the telephone wire _w__{ }, through the telephone which has a high resistance, then by the wire _w__{ } through the fuzes, and to earth by the wire _w__{ }. on the circuit closer being struck, by which cause the armature _n_ is brought up to the cores of the bobbins _m_, _m_^{ }, and the piece of brass _r_ in contact with the metal strips _s_, _s__{ }, the signalling current, instead of circulating through the high resistance of the telephone _t_, passes round the bobbin _m_, down the metal strip _s_, across the brass piece _r_, up the metal strip _s__{ }, round the bobbin _m__{ } (thus forming an electro magnet of _m_, _m__{ }), and by the wire _w_, direct through the fuzes to earth, and so explodes the torpedo. the effect of the telephone resistance being cut out, is to strengthen the signalling current, and enable it to work the shutter apparatus and so throw the firing battery in circuit and explode the mine. the advantages of this circuit closing apparatus are:-- .--simplicity. .--compactness. .--increased certainty of action, due to the sustained contact of the armature _n_, on the apparatus being struck. .--additional means of testing a system of electrical submarine mines, which is afforded by the telephone:-- when this form of circuit closer is put in action by a friendly vessel coming in contact with it, or when experiments are being made, the signalling current must be reversed, so that no doubt may exist as to the armature _n_ having dropped, on the apparatus coming to rest. the telephone test indicates whether the circuit closer is in position or not, the shot, &c., within the telephone being shaken about by the movement of the buoyant circuit closer, the noise so created is readily distinguished by the receiving telephone at the station. another form of submarine mine is that known as the "electro mechanical" mine. the difference between this form and an ordinary mechanical mine is, that the exploding agent is electricity, and that it may be converted into an electro contact mine if desirable. _description of a russian electro._--the electro mechanical mine, used by the russians during the late turco-russian war, is shown in elevation and section at figs. and . _mechanical submarine mine, used by them during the late turco-russian war._--_a_ is the conical shaped case; _b_ the loading hole; _c_ the base plug; _d_, _d_, &c., are five horns, screwed into the head of the case _a_; these are composed of a glass tube _a_, containing a chlorate of potash mixture, enclosed in a lead tube _b_, over which is screwed a brass safety cylinder _c_; when ready for action this latter tube _c_ is removed; directly beneath each of the horns _a_, on the inside of the case, as at _e_, is a thin brass cylinder, closed at one end by a piece of wood _d_, and containing several pieces of zinc and carbon, arranged in the form of a battery, the zinc and carbon wires _z_ and _x_ being led through the piece of wood _d_; _f_ is a copper cylinder containing the priming charge of gun-cotton _g_, and detonating fuse _f_; the terminals of the fuze are connected to two insulated wires, _w_ and _w__{ }, the former of which is led direct to the loading hole _b_, and attached on the inside to the five zinc connecting wires _z_, &c.; the latter is attached to one end of a safety arrangement _s_, the other end of which is connected to the wire _w__{ }, which is attached on the inside to the carbon wires _x_, &c.; the safety arrangement _s_ consists of an ebonite cylinder, containing a brass spiral spring fixed to one end of it, and pressing against a brass plate at the other, thus preserving a metallic connection between the wires _w__{ }, and _w__{ }; the mine is rendered inactive by pressing the spring down, and inserting a piece of ebonite between it and the plate. _its action._--the action of this form of electro mechanical submarine mine is very simple; the brass safety cylinders _c_, _c_, &c., being removed on a vessel striking either of the horns, _d_, _d_, &c., the lead tube _b_ is bent, causing the glass tube _a_ to be broken, and the mixture contained therein to flow into the cylinder _e_, instantly generating a current of electricity in the zinc carbon battery, and exploding the mine. _mode of converting into an electro contact or observation mine._--to convert this mine into an electro contact one, it is only necessary to connect the wires _w__{ } and _w__{ } to other wires leading from the shore; also by replacing the horns _d_, _d_ by solid brass screw plugs, the mine may be converted into an ordinary observation one. in this case the two wires _w_ and _w__{ } attached to the fuze _f_, terminals would have to be connected to the observation instruments on shore. _turkish vessel sunk._--it was by means of one of these electro mechanical mines, that the turkish gunboat _suna_ was sunk at soulina. firing by observation, that is to say, effecting the ignition of an electrical submarine mine at the precise moment of a hostile vessel being vertically over it, through the agency of one or two observers stationed at a very considerable distance from the mine, should, with the very perfect self-acting circuit closers that exist at the present time, be resorted to only in very exceptional cases, or in connection with the self-acting system. there are two defects, which are common to all methods of firing submarine mines by observation, and these are:-- .--at night time, or in foggy weather, it cannot be employed. .--it is necessary to employ at least two observers, at a considerable distance apart, who to effect a proper action at the right moment, must work in perfect unison. these defects alone are sufficient to explain the preference given to a self-acting method of closing the electric circuit at the precise moment of a vessel being in position over a mine by those governments who have adopted electrical submarine mines as a means of coast defence. _methods of firing by observation._--there are several methods of firing by observation, of which the following are the ones principally used:-- .--by pickets or range stakes. .--by cross bearings. .--by intersectional arcs fitted with telescopes. .--the prussian system. _intersection by pickets or range stakes._--in narrow channels and at short distances, this system of ascertaining the relative position of a hostile vessel and a submarine mine may be used, provided that skilled and careful men are employed to work it. two or more pickets or stakes are arranged in front of the firing station in such a manner that a vessel passing up the channel on the prolongation of these stakes will be over a mine. this arrangement should of course always be considered as an extempore one; it was used on several occasions by the confederates during the american civil war. _firing by cross bearings._--the simplest method of so determining the relative position of a vessel and a submarine mine, and exploding it at the right moment, is that in which observers are placed on the prolongation of the mines. this mode is shown at fig. , where _m__{ }, _m__{ }, _m__{ }, &c., and _n__{ }, _n__{ }, _n__{ }, &c., are the mines; _a_ and _b_, the points in prolongation of the mines where the observers are stationed; _d_ the firing battery, and _s_, and _s__{ } two hostile vessels. at the stations _a_ and _b_ firing keys are placed, at the former one for each separate mine, perfectly distinct and insulated from each other, at the latter a single key. the pivot points of the series of keys at _a_ are connected by separate wires to one pole of the firing battery _d_, the other pole of which is connected by a single cored insulated cable to the pivot point of the key at _b_; the contact points of the series of keys at _a_ are connected by separate line wires as _a m__{ }, _a m__{ }, _a m__{ }, &c., to the different mines, while the contact point of the key at _b_ is put to earth. thus it will be seen that, in the case of the row of mines, _m__{ }, _m__{ }, &c., unless the key at _b_, and the key at _a_, of either of those mines are both pressed down at the same instant, no current can pass, and therefore none of those mines can be exploded. [illustration: russian submarine mine, firing by observation. plate xvi] in the case of the vessel _s_, though at _c_, she is on the prolongation of the line _a m__{ }, _c_, and therefore the key of the mine _m__{ }, is pressed down at _a_, yet not being on the prolongation of the line _b_, _e_, the key at _b_ is not pressed down, therefore the firing battery is not thrown in circuit, or the mine _m__{ } exploded, but when the vessel _s_ reaches the position _n_, that is over the mine _m__{ }, she being on the prolongation of the lines _a m__{ }, and _b e_, the key (_m__{ }) at _a_, and the key at _b_ would both be pressed down, and therefore the mine _m__{ } exploded, and the ship destroyed. in the case of a vessel passing through an interval between any two mines at such a distance as to be out of the radius of destructive effect of either of the mines belonging to the first row (which is shown at _s__{ },) only the key at _b_ would be pressed down, and thus the vessel enabled to pass safely through, but only to come to grief at the second or third row of mines, provided they have been properly placed, and separate though similar arrangements as in the case of the line of mines, _m__{ }, _m__{ }, &c. have been made. _firing by a preconcerted signal._--at fig. is represented a somewhat similar, though a much simpler plan of the foregoing system, by employing a preconcerted signal at the station _b_ in the place of the firing key and insulated cable, as in the former case. the only material difference in the arrangement of these two methods, is that in the latter case the pole of the firing battery at _a_, which in the former case was connected to the firing key at _b_, is put direct to earth. as will be readily understood, this latter system requires great coolness and nerve on the part of the operator at _a_, who has not only to watch the vessel passing across his intersections, but also to be on the alert to receive the signal from the observer at _b_. should it ever be necessary to adopt this latter system, it will be found advisable to employ two men at station _a_, one to watch station _b_, the other to attend to the firing key and intersections. a separate signal-flag for each line of mines, and also a separate firing arrangement, would be required. as in many cases it would not be practicable to have a station in such an advanced position as at _b_, in figs. and , on account of the danger of its being cut off by an enemy, another combination becomes necessary. in this instance the station _b_ is placed on the opposite side of the river, &c., to that on which the station _a_ is placed, and a series of firing keys, instead of a single one, is here used, necessitating a multiple cable between the stations _a_ and _b_, in the place of single cored cable; the manner of manipulating this method is very similar to that previously described. _firing by intersectional arcs fitted with telescopes._--the foregoing methods of firing by cross bearings are replete with many serious defects, to remedy which, to a considerable extent, special arrangements have been devised, that is, the employment of intersectional arcs fitted with telescopes at the stations _a_ and _b_. figs. and show the arrangements of these arcs, the former being the one used at the firing station _a_, the latter at the converging station _b_. at each station one arc is provided for each row of mines placed in position. the firing arc fig. consists of a cast iron frame _a_, with three feet _b_, _b_, _b_, these being provided with levelling screws. to ascertain when this frame is level, a circular spirit level is attached thereto, a telescope _d_ provided with one horizontal and three vertical cross wires, supported on y's, admitting of vertical motion and attached to an upright _e_. a mill-headed screw _f_ enables the telescope _d_ to be raised or lowered; the telescope, which is rigidly connected to a vernier _g_, traversing over a graduated arc _h_, can be moved rapidly in a lateral direction by means of a rack and pinion arrangement _i_, and it can be clamped in any position by means of the screw _h_. sights are fixed on the telescope in a vertical plane passing through its axis. to the outer rim of the frame of the arc, which is smooth, are secured the sights _l l_ (shown on a large scale at fig. ), to give the direction of the mines. these sights are provided each with a brass point of v form, _m_, and a binding screw, _n_, in metallic connection with each other, but insulated by means of an ebonite plate from the rest of the metal of the sight. one end of a short piece of insulated wire is attached to the binding screw _n_, and the other passes through a hole in the base of the sight and projects below it; _o_ is a brass tube rigidly connected to and moving with the upright carrying the telescope _d_, and projecting in front of this latter. a brass spring _p_ (see fig. ) is attached to, but insulated from the outer extremity of this tube, and is so arranged as to make contact with the v point _m_ on the sight, by means of a corresponding projection fitted to its under side. an insulated wire passing the tube _o_, the outer end of which is connected to a screw on the spring _p_, forms a metallic connection between this projection and the firing key. at fig. is shown an enlarged view of the front of the sight; in addition to the v projection _m_, and binding screw _n_, it is fitted with a capstan-headed screw to bear against the inner rim of the frame, and a thin wire upright _t_ for giving the alignment of the mine, to which a disc is attached, on which the number of the mine is affixed. when the distance between the station and the mine is only about one mile, an ordinary eyepiece is used in the place of the telescope _d_. at fig. is represented the arc employed at the converging station, which with the exception of there being no tube _o_, and only one sight, is precisely similar in construction to the one used at the firing station, and which has been described. [illustration: apparatus for firing by observation. plate xvii] _application of the intersectional arc method._--the application of the method of firing by observation, by means of intersectional arcs fitted with telescopes, is shown at fig. . _c_, _d_, and _e_ are three of the larger kind of arcs, one being used for each row of mines at the firing station _a_. at the converging station _b_, one of the smaller arcs is used for each row of mines, as shown at _f_, _g_, and _h_. _s_, _s__{ }, _s__{ }, are the signalling apparatus, the _f_ terminals of which are connected to the sights _l_, _l_, _l_, fig. , of arcs _c_, _d_, _e_. firing keys _a_, _a_, _a_ at station _a_ are connected to each arc, and to three of the cores of the cable connecting the two stations _a_ and _b_, respectively. at the converging station _b_, three firing keys _b_, _b_, _b_ are connected to earth and to three cores of the connecting cable respectively. the remaining core of this cable is connected to the recording instruments _d_, _e_. the action of the arcs, &c., will be readily understood from the diagram at fig. . this arrangement does not interfere with the action of the circuit closer, as all that is effected by the observing arc circuit is to put the signalling battery current at the converging station _b_ to earth instead of at the circuit closer. _prussian system of firing by observation._--the principle on which this system is based, depends upon the proposition that if _c d_, in the triangle shown in fig. , be always kept parallel to _h b_, then _a c_, _c d_, _d a_ bear exactly the same proportion to each other as _a b_, _b h_, _h a_ do to one another; so that by means of the small triangle _a d c_, the lengths of the sides of the large triangle _a b h_ can be obtained, and hence the position of the point _h_, the base _a b_ being of course known. in fig. at _a_ there is a slate table representing the roadstead, and upon it the exact position of every torpedo is laid down, corresponding to their position in the roadstead. at _a_ and _b_, yards apart, telescopes having cross wires are placed; at _a_ a long narrow straight-edged strip of glass _a d_ is arranged to move in unison with the telescope at _a_; and by the application of dynamo electricity, a similarly constructed piece of glass _c d_ moves in exact unison with the telescope at _b_, and having its pivot at _c_; that is to say, _c d_ keeps parallel with _b h_, the line of sight of the observer at _b_. then if the observers at _a_ and _b_ have got a ship in their telescopes, the point of intersection _d_ of the two pieces of glass _a d_ and _c d_ gives the position of the ship on the slate table at _a_, and when this point _d_ comes over the position of any one mine on the slate, it is known that the ship is over that particular mine in the harbour, and she may be destroyed accordingly, by throwing the firing battery into circuit. by the employment of electricity and a mirror, the great defect of this method, viz., the necessity of employing four people to manipulate it, would be remedied. the foregoing is a modification of siemens's method of ascertaining distances at sea, &c. _rules observed in planting mines._--in placing a system of submarine mines in position, the following are some of the chief points to be attended to, this work depending in a great measure on local circumstances, and on the method that is to be adopted in exploding and mooring them:-- .--the plan of defence must be carefully laid down on a chart, on a scale of not less than six inches to the mile, and on this plan are to be marked the sites of the observing stations, the positions of each mine, circuit closer, and junction box, with their corresponding numbers, and also of the electric cables. .--the position of each mine having been determined, should be marked off by buoys. .--the utmost care should be taken to lay the electric cables, so that they shall be as far as possible away from the mines in the vicinity of which it may be necessary to take them, so as to lessen the liability of injury to them, by the explosion of the latter. .--the electric cables should be laid parallel, and never be allowed to cross directly over each other, otherwise the operation of underrunning them will be much complicated, also a certain amount of slack should be allowed to facilitate in picking the cables up for repair, &c. .--every manner of device is to be used to conceal the electric cables, such as laying dummies, making detours inland, &c. .--all marks indicating position of the mines to be removed, after the mines have been placed in position. .--the identity of each cable and mine to be very carefully preserved throughout, by means of a number. .--a number of electro contact mines should be placed in advance of the leading line of mines, at irregular intervals, to prevent the enemy, having once ascertained the position of one mine of a line, from knowing within limits the position of the others of that line. [illustration: systems of defence by submarine mines. plate xviii] in connection with a system of defence by electrical submarine mines, the following batteries are required:-- .--firing battery. .--signalling, or shutter battery. .--testing battery. .--telegraph battery. _firing battery._--the firing battery should be suited to the nature of the fuze employed, and should possess considerable excess of power to enable it to overcome accidental defects, such as increased resistance in the various connections, or defective insulation in the line wire, &c. as platinum wire or low tension fuzes are now universally adopted as the mode of ignition for submarine mines, it will be only necessary to describe those electrical batteries which are most suitable as an exploding agent in connection with such fuzes; these are as follows:-- .--siemens's dynamo low tension machine. .--von ebner's voltaic battery. .--chromic acid or bichromate voltaic battery. .--leclanché's voltaic battery. _siemens's low tension dynamo electrical machine._--this instrument consists of an electro magnet and an ordinary siemens armature, which, by the turning of a handle, is caused to revolve between the poles of the electro magnet. the coils of the electro magnet are in circuit with the wire of the revolving armature, and during rotation the residual magnetism of the soft iron electro magnet cores at first excites weak currents which pass into the electro magnet coils, increasing the magnetism of the core, thus inducing still stronger currents in the armature wire. this accumulation by mutual action goes on until the limit of magnetic saturation of the iron cores of the electro magnets is reached. by the automatic action of the machine, the powerful current so produced is sent into the leading wire or cable to the fuze to be exploded. in this apparatus the electric current passes continuously through the line wire until a sufficiently powerful current is generated to heat or fuze the bridge of the fuze, and so ignite the gun-cotton priming. the coils of the armature and electro magnets are wound with wire of large diameter, to a total resistance of to siemens units, or · to · ohms, in about , windings. with a platinum wire weighing · grains per yard, - / inches can be fuzed on short circuit, and inches can be heated to redness. the total weight of this machine, which is manufactured by messrs. siemens brothers, is about lbs. _advantages of siemens's dynamo electrical machine._--the advantages of such a machine over voltaic apparatus are:-- .--the absence of chemical agents. .--there is less liability to get out of order. .--no special knowledge is required to work them, or to keep them in order. .--greater durability. the great defect of this and all similar machines is that the electric force has to be developed by turning a handle for a certain time before it is possible to generate a current sufficiently powerful to ignite a fuze, which defect, in connection with a system of defence by self-acting submarine mines, particularly at night, renders them inferior to voltaic batteries, as under such circumstances, an apparatus is required that will cause an electric current to flow at any moment when the circuit is completed. the application of steam power would to a certain extent remedy the above-mentioned defect, but the cost of such a method, compared to that of a voltaic arrangement, would be far too great to allow of its superseding the latter arrangement. _von ebner's voltaic battery._--this form of voltaic battery, which may be considered as a modification of that known as smee's, was designed by baron von ebner, colonel of the austrian imperial corps of engineers, for use in connection with the austrian system of submarine defence, by self-acting electrical mines. a section of one of these cells is shown at fig. . it consists of a glass vessel _a_, to contain the diluted sulphuric acid, within which is suspended a plate _b_ of platinised lead, which is bent round into a cylindrical form to fit close around the inner surface of the glass vessel. in the centre of this latter is hung a porcelain perforated cup _c_, containing some cut-up zinc and mercury to keep it (the zinc) amalgamated. the top of each cell is furnished with a porcelain cover, through which the wires attached to the positive and negative poles of the cell project. due to the large quantity of liquid contained in the cell, the tendency to alter its internal resistance is retarded; also by the arrangement of the porcelain cup, above detailed, the consumption of zinc and mercury, which in an ordinary voltaic battery is very considerable, is materially diminished. _chromic acid or bichromate battery._--this form of battery is very similar to grove's, the difference being that, in the place of the nitric acid as the exciting liquid, either chromic acid, or a solution of bichromate of potash, sulphuric acid and water is substituted. a form of this battery, as designed by dr. hertz, is used in connection with the german system of torpedo defence. _leclanché voltaic battery._--this form of voltaic battery was invented by m. leclanché, some twelve years ago. at fig. is shown a cell of this battery in its original form. the positive pole _a_ consists of a plate of graphite in a porous pot _b_, and surrounded by a mixture of peroxide of manganese and graphite. the negative pole _c_ is a rod or pencil of amalgamated zinc. the whole is enclosed in an outer vessel of glass _d_ containing a solution of sal ammoniac. a modified form of the leclanché cell as used in a firing battery is shown at fig. . it consists of an ebonite trough or outer vessel _a_ about " long, " deep, and - / " wide. the negative pole or zinc plate _b_ is of similar shape to the trough _a_, but with its base removed, and does not fit the trough exactly, the space between it and the trough being left to ensure the former being completely surrounded by the sal ammoniac solution; the positive pole, or carbon element, consists of four gas carbon plates _c_ attached together at their head by means of lead, and enclosed in a flannel bag, in which they are firmly embedded in the peroxide of manganese mixture; the positive element is of such a shape that it fits loosely between the sides, and is nearly of the same height as the zinc plate. the object of such a form of cell was to obtain an electric current of large _quantity_, with as few cells as possible, by which means the loss of power which might occur from the employment of a great number of small cells is avoided. _advantages of a leclanché firing battery._--the advantages of the leclanché firing battery are:-- .--the absence of chemical action when the battery circuit is not complete, and consequently there is no waste of material. .--requires little or no looking after. .--it may be kept ready for action in store without in any way deteriorating. .--it is comparatively very cheap. these advantages combine to make a leclanché battery the most suitable of any other form of electrical battery for use as the exploding agent for electrical submarine mines, and it is now universally used for such purposes. _signalling battery._--the signalling battery should be so constituted as to be capable of working the electro magnet of the shutter apparatus effectually when the circuit is closed direct to earth, and yet not so powerful as by the continuous passage of the current generated by it to fire the fuze in the mine. in the case of a platinum wire fuze being in the circuit, plenty of power may be given to the battery without fear of a premature explosion from this cause, but in the case of a high tension fuze it is necessary to be very careful in order to guard against such a contingency. as in the case of a signalling or shutter battery, the electric current will be continually flowing, it is necessary to employ a constant battery, or one that requires least trouble and expense to maintain it in working order, and it is for this reason that a modified form of daniell battery has been adopted to work the shutter apparatus. _daniell signalling battery._--at fig. is shown the manner of arranging a daniell cell. a glass or porcelain vessel _a_ contains a saturated solution of sulphate of copper, in which is immersed a copper cylinder _b_ open at both ends and perforated by holes; at the upper part of this cylinder there is an annular shelf _d_, also perforated by holes, and below the level of the liquid; this is for the purpose of supporting crystals of sulphate of copper for the replacing of that decomposed as the electrical action proceeds. inside the cylinder _b_ is a thin porous vessel _c_ of unglazed earthenware; this contains either water, or a solution of common salt, or dilute sulphuric acid, in which is placed the cylinder of amalgamated zinc _e_. two strips of copper _p_ and _n_, fixed by binding screws to the copper and to the zinc, serve for connecting the elements in series, or otherwise. for the purposes of testing, either the leclanché or daniell battery specially arranged, or the menotti battery, which is really a modification of the daniell, may be used. [illustration: firing batteries, testing batteries. plate xix] _description of a menotti cell._--a menotti cell, shown at fig. , consists of a copper cup containing some crystals of sulphate of copper and covered with a fearnought diaphragm _a_, placed at the bottom of an ebonite cell _b_; over this cup is put some sawdust, and resting on top of this is a disc of zinc _c_ on another piece of fearnought. the upper portion of the zinc and its connection with the insulated wire are carefully insulated. fresh water poured on the sawdust renders the battery active. _description of a menotti test battery._--fig. represents a plan of the top of such a test battery with a -ohm galvanometer attached thereto. the connections are made as follows:-- one of the wires _w_ of the object to be tested is attached to the terminal _f_, which is also connected by an insulated wire to the copper cup _a_; the other main wire _w__{ } is attached to the terminal _g_ of the galvanometer; _h_, the other terminal of the galvanometer, is connected by a short piece of wire _k_ to the terminal _l_ of the contact key _m_; and the contact point _n_ is in connection with the zinc plate _c_; thus the current from the battery flows along the wire _w_ through the object to be tested, back along the wire _w__{ }, through the coils of the galvanometer, along the wire _k_ to the contact key _m_, and if this is pressed down to the zinc plate _c_, so completing the circuit. to steady the needle of the galvanometer a bar magnet is used, which is inserted in the space _r_. the whole of the apparatus is enclosed in a leathern case fitted with a cover and strap. this is a very compact and simple form of test battery, and will be found extremely useful in boats, &c., when placing mines in position. _telegraph battery._--for the purposes of telegraphing between torpedo stations, &c., a form of leclanché battery, known as no. commercial pattern, is generally used. _voltaic batteries._--the following points in connection with the use of voltaic batteries, which are taken from beechey's 'electro telegraphy,' should be carefully observed:-- .--each cell of a battery should be carefully insulated. .--the floors and tables in the battery room should be kept scrupulously clean and dry, so as to prevent the least leakage or escape of the current. .--the plates of a battery should be clean. .--porous cells should be examined, and cracked ones replaced. .--no sulphate of zinc or dirt should be allowed to collect at the lips of the cells. in the case of a daniell battery-- .--the solutions should be inspected daily, and crystals of sulphate of copper added as required. .--the zinc plate must not touch the porous cell, or copper will be deposited on it (the zinc). .--the battery should be charged with sulphate of zinc from the first. .--the copper solution must be watched and prevented from rising over the edge of the porous jar, the tendency of such solutions being to mix with each other by an action termed _osmosis_. these being in addition to foregoing general directions for voltaic batteries. _defects in a voltaic battery on its current becoming deficient._--on the electric current of a voltaic battery becoming deficient, the following defects should be looked for:-- .--solutions exhausted; for instance, sulphate of copper in a daniell's entirely or nearly gone, leaving a colourless solution. .--terminals or connections between the cells corroded, so that instead of metallic contact there are oxides of almost insulating resistance intervening in the circuit. .--cells empty, or nearly so. .--filaments of deposited metals stretching from electrode (pole) to electrode (pole). also intermittent currents are sometimes produced by loose wires or a broken electrode, which alternately makes and breaks contact when shaken. inconstant currents are also sometimes produced when batteries are shaken. the motion shakes the gases off the electrodes, thus increasing temporarily the electro-motive force of the battery. _firing keys and shutter apparatus._--the following is a description of the various firing keys and shutter signalling apparatus, which is used in connection with a system of electrical submarine mines. by means of the former the firing or other batteries may be thrown into circuit at will, whilst by means of the latter the firing battery is thrown in circuit without the aid of an operator, and a signal at the same instant given, indicating that a certain mine of the system has been struck. _description of a series of firing keys._--at fig. is shown a plan and section of a series of firing keys as arranged for firing several mines by observation. it consists of a strong wooden frame _a_, of a convenient form for the purpose of attaching it to the firing table by screws through the holes _b_, _b_. on this frame a series of keys _c_, _c_, _c_ are fixed at convenient intervals. these consist of a strong brass spring firmly screwed to a series of brass plates _d_, _d_, _d_ on the front of the wooden box _a_. from these latter short copper wires pass through the woodwork, and of such a length that, when required, the mine wires may be easily attached by means of binding screws, as shown at _f_. the inner end of each key is fitted with an ebonite knob (which is shown at _c_ in the section) to insulate the hand of the operator when using the key. on the frame, and directly under each of the ebonite knobs, are arranged a series of metallic points _g_, _g_, _g_, so placed that on either of the keys _c_ being pressed down, a perfect contact is made between it and its respective metallic point; _h_, _h_, _h_ are copper wires leading from the metallic points _g_, _g_, _g_ through the box, and of such a length that binding screws _f_, _f_, _f_ can be easily attached to them when necessary. a single firing key of an improved form is shown at fig. . it consists of a strong wooden box _a a_, weighted at the bottom with lead in order to steady the key on the table, &c., on which it may be placed; on the inside of the bottom of the box is fixed a piece of ebonite, by which means the metallic point _b_, and the terminal of the firing key _c_, are insulated from each other; _d d'_ are two terminals at the end of the box, to which the circuit wires are attached, one of these terminals is connected in metallic circuit to the firing key at _c_, the other one to the metallic point _b_; a wooden cover _h_, fitted with a catch _k_, protects the connections of the wires; by means of a plate, and catch _e e_, the key can be rendered inactive, thus preventing the danger of a premature closing of the electric circuit; by means of a spring _s_ a break is always established between the key and the metallic point. it is immaterial to which of the two terminals _d d'_ either wire is connected. _the morse firing key._--this form of key is so well known in connection with the morse telegraph, that it is not necessary to describe it. it is usually employed in torpedo work in connection with a testing and firing table. _the shutter apparatus._--the shutter signalling and firing apparatus was devised to enable the firing battery current to be thrown in circuit without the aid of a personal operator, the signalling current (which is always kept in circuit) at the same instant ringing a bell, by which is known the particular mine that has been struck. at fig. is represented a diagram of such an apparatus. _a_ is an armature working on a pivot between the two horns of an electro magnet _b b_, and held in position by a spiral spring _c_; the latter is in connection with a regulating screw, by which more or less pressure may be brought to bear in an opposite direction to that of the attractive action of the electro magnet. a stud _i_ regulates the distance to which the armature may be drawn back; _d_ is a shutter on which a reference number for each mine should be indicated, attached to a lever pivoted at the point _e_, the inner arm of which is just long enough to catch under the point of the armature _a_; when a current of sufficient strength is passed through the coils _b b_ of the electro magnet, the armature _a_ is attracted, releasing the lever attached to the shutter _d_, which by its own weight falls into the position shown by the dotted lines. _f_ and _g_ are two mercury cups, the former being in connection with the signalling current, and the latter with the firing current. when the lever is horizontal and the shutter drawn up and ready for action, the circuit of the signalling battery _s_ is completed through the mercury cup _f_, along an arm _h_ of the lever to the pivot _e_, and thence to the mine by the line wire _w_. when the circuit closer is struck by a passing vessel, and consequently the shutter thrown into the position shown by the dotted lines, another arm _k_, a prolongation of the lever, falls into the mercury cup _g_, which latter is in connection with the firing battery _f_. the armature _a_ is prevented from coming into actual contact with the horns of the electro magnet by two small studs. the object of this is to prevent any effect of residual magnetism which might otherwise interfere with the rapidity of action of the armature when released and drawn back by the spring _c_. [illustration: firing keys, shutter apparatus. plate xx] _the object of employing mercury cups._--mercury cups were devised in the place of the springs used in connection with the original design of a shutter apparatus, for the reason that electrical circuits dependent on the pressure of springs are always liable to interruption from dirt or oxide intervening between the points of contact. _shutter apparatus used with a circuit breaker._--when the circuit breaking system is used with the shutter signalling apparatus, the action of the armature in releasing the lever must be reversed; that is to say, that when the current is passing and the armature _a_ attracted to the electro magnet _b b_, the shutter _d_ must be held up, and when the current ceases, and the armature _a_ drawn back by the spring _c_, the lever must be released, and the shutter allowed to fall. this is effected by altering the end of the lever, so that it hooks into, instead of abutting against the armature _a_. to each shutter apparatus an electric bell is fitted, by which notice is given when a circuit closer has been struck. for general service, a box containing seven such shutter signalling and firing apparatus has been adopted, a plan of which is represented at figs. , and . the connections of the different circuits are as follows:-- the insulated wire of the upper bobbin of the electro magnet is connected to the spring of the armature; the pivot of the lever is connected with the right-hand terminal _b_, or main line connection on the top of the box; the insulated wire from the lower bobbin is connected to the middle brass plate _k_ in the front ledge of the apparatus, the circuit from _b_ to _k_ being thus completed. the front adjoining brass plate _a_, provided with a terminal, is connected with the negative pole of the signalling battery, the positive pole being put to earth. on a brass plug being put in the hole _l_, the signalling current will flow to the plate _k_, thence through the lower and upper bobbin to the spring of the armature, along the latter to the shutter lever, and from the pivot through the main line wire to the mine. the innermost brass plates _h h_ are all connected in the same metallic circuit, and to them are attached by means of the binding screw _d_ the test battery and galvanometer. thus on the brass plug being removed from _l_, and placed in _m_, the signalling battery is cut out of circuit, and the test battery thrown in. in this way the condition of each individual mine may be ascertained while the connections of the remaining mines are left undisturbed. the positive pole of the firing battery (the negative being to earth) is connected to the terminal _s_ at the right-hand corner of the lower ledge of the box; the plate to which the terminal _s_ is fixed is divided at _g_, the left-hand portion being connected to a bar which runs horizontally the whole length of the box, and in metallic connection with each mercury cup _g_, fig. . a brass plug is placed in the hole _g_, and when from any cause the lever drops, the firing battery will be thrown into circuit, and the mine to which the lever that has fallen is attached will be exploded. _shutter instrument and observing telescope._--each mine is given a number, which is put on the disc of the shutter instrument connected to it, and also on the corresponding tablet _c_. from the brass plate in connection with the spring _c_, fig. , a wire is taken to the terminal _f_, fig. , on top of the box. from this terminal a wire is led to the connections of the observing telescope, and thus the mines can be fired by judgment if required, without the aid of the circuit closer. the signal battery current is always circulating, even when the system is in a state of rest, but in consequence of the resistance placed in this circuit, which may be either a resistance coil in the circuit, added to the resistance of the fuzes, when high tension fuzes are used, or only the former resistance in the case of low tension fuzes, this current is too feeble to form an electro magnet; directly, however, a circuit closer is struck, this resistance is cut out, and thus the signal battery current becomes sufficiently powerful to work the electro magnet of that particular mine. the circuit of the signal battery, and that to the observing telescope, are broken the instant the lever commences to fall. to enable the apparatus to be used on the circuit breaking system, a spare lever _e_ is provided for that purpose with each box. the object to be gained by a system of testing is to ascertain the condition of the electrical submarine mines placed in the defence of a harbour, &c., and should there exist any fault, not only to detect its exact position and cause, but also its magnitude, so that it may be at once determined whether it is necessary to remedy the fault, or whether the electrical apparatus is sufficiently powerful to overcome the defect. _tests._--there are two distinct kinds of tests, viz.:-- .--mechanical tests. .--electrical tests. [illustration: shutter apparatus. plate xxi] mechanical tests are applied to ascertain that the mechanical arrangements of the shutter apparatus, circuit closers, and all similar appliances work efficiently and easily; that the several parts of the mine case when put together for service are thoroughly watertight; that the chains, wire cables, and ropes in connection with the mooring apparatus are of sufficient strength to perform the work required of them; that the weights of the anchors, or sinkers, are such as to keep the mines in position after submersion; and that the case of the mine be sufficiently strong to enable it to bear the external pressure due to the depth at which it may be submerged for a considerable time without any leakage. the foregoing tests of the mine case and moorings would of course be performed during the process of manufacture, but to prevent any chance of failure they should be repeated before being employed on actual service. _electrical tests._--electrical tests are those which are applied to the several component parts of the system, to ascertain that the electrical conditions necessary to a successful result exist. the importance of being able to carry out the above in its entirety is understood when it is remembered that a submarine mine becomes practically valueless unless it acts efficiently at the single instant of time that it would be required so to do. _list of instruments used in testing._--the following are some of the instruments that are employed in connection with a system of electrical tests:-- .--thomson's electrometer. .--thomson's reflecting galvanometer. .--astatic galvanometer. .--differential galvanometer. .--detector galvanometer. .--three coil galvanometer. .--thermo galvanometer. .--siemens's universal galvanometer. .--a shunt. .--commutator. .--rheostat. .--resistance coils. .--wheatstone's balance. electrometers indicate the presence of a statical charge of electricity, by showing the force of attraction or repulsion between two conducting bodies placed near together. this force depending in the first place on the quantity of electricity with which the conducting bodies are charged, ultimately depends on the difference of potential between them; an electrometer is therefore strictly an instrument for measuring difference of potential.[j] sir william thomson's quadrant electrometer is the most perfect form of electrometer yet constructed, and the one usually employed in cable testing. it consists of a very thin flat aluminium needle spread out into two wings, and hung by a wire from an insulated stem inside a leyden jar, which contains a cupful of strong sulphuric acid, the outer surface of which forms the inner coating of the leyden jar. a wire stretched by a weight connects the aforesaid needle with this inner coating. a mirror, rigidly attached to this needle by a rod, serves to indicate the deflection of the needle by reflecting the image of a flame on to a scale. the needle hangs inside four quadrants, which are insulated by glass stems: each pair of opposite quadrants are in electrical connection. above and below the quadrants two tubes, at the same potential as the needle, serve to screen it and the wires in connection with it from all induction except that produced by the four quadrants. suppose the needle charged to a high negative potential (-), then if the quadrants are symmetrically placed, it will deflect neither to the right nor to the left, so long as the near quadrants are at the same potential. if one of these be positive relatively to the other, the end of the needle under them will be repelled from the negative quadrant to the positive one, and at the same time the other end of the needle will be repelled from in the opposite direction. this motion will be indicated by the motion of the spot of light reflected by the mirror, and the number of divisions which the spot of light traverses on the scale measures in an arbitrary unit the difference of potential between the + and - quadrants. the reflecting electrometer being a very delicate instrument, requires careful handling, and should only be used by a practised electrician. its use would therefore be restricted to important stations, and special tests of a delicate nature. _thomson's reflecting galvanometer._--a galvanometer is an instrument intended to detect the presence of a current and measure its magnitude. the most sensitive galvanometer as yet constructed is the reflecting galvanometer of sir william thomson, a diagram of which is shown at fig. . a small piece of magnetised steel watch spring, / ths of an inch long, is fastened with shellac on the back of a little round concave mirror, and of about the size of a fourpenny piece. this is suspended by a piece of unspun silk thread in the centre of a coil of many hundred turns of fine copper wire insulated with silk, and well protected between the turns with varnish. the two ends of the coils are soldered to terminal screws _a_, _b_, so that any conducting wire can be joined up to it as required. the little mirror hangs in the middle of its coil, with the magnet lying horizontally. by means of a lamp _l_ placed behind the screen, the light of which passes through a slit _m_, and is thrown on the face of the mirror, a spot of light is reflected on the scale _n_. when a current passes through the coil, the little magnet is deflected, and since the magnet is attached to the mirror, which is very light, both are deflected as forming one body, and the spot of light moves accordingly along the scale _n_. a powerful steel magnet _s_ is placed above the coil, and can be moved up or down, whereby the directive force of the earth may be increased or weakened. this magnet _s_ is used to steady the spot of light, which otherwise would shake about, and there would be no certainty about the measurement. a second magnet _t_ is placed perpendicular to the magnetic meridian, to adjust the zero of the instrument, i.e., to bring back the spot of light to a fiducial mark at the centre of the scale when no current is passing. this instrument should only be used at important stations, and when special tests of a delicate nature are required to be applied. _astatic galvanometer._--an astatic galvanometer is that in connection with which an astatic needle is employed, by the use of which the sensitiveness of a galvanometer is greatly increased. an astatic needle is a combination of magnetised needles _with their poles turned opposite ways_. at fig. a diagram of such an instrument is shown. two magnets _d_ and _c_ are joined, with the north pole of one over the south pole of the other, forming one suspended system. in the ordinary form of astatic galvanometer the needles _d_ and _c_ are about two inches long, and are each covered by a coil, these latter being so joined that the current must circulate in opposite directions round the two so as to deflect both magnets similarly. the deflection of the needles _d_ and _c_ is observed by means of a pointer or glass needle _a_, _b_, rigidly connected with the astatic system by a prolongation of the brass rod connecting the needles _d_ and _c_. the coils are flat and of the shape indicated in fig. , and are also made in two halves, placed side by side with just sufficient space between them to allow the rod to hang freely. this form of galvanometer, though less delicate than the preceding one, is still a very sensitive one, and should only be applied in the case of fine and delicate tests. _differential galvanometer._--a differential galvanometer consists of a magnetic needle surrounded by two separate coils of equal length and material carefully insulated from each other and wound in opposite directions. in using it one circuit acts against the other. if a current of equal strength were passing through each there would be no deflection of the needle, because the influence in both directions is equal. if one current were stronger than the other, the needle would be deflected by the stronger. this form of galvanometer will be found extremely useful in connection with a system of electrical tests. latimer clark's double shunt differential galvanometer is the instrument best adapted for submarine mine tests. _detector galvanometer._--a detector galvanometer is usually made with a vertical needle, and is employed to detect and roughly estimate the strength of a current where no particular accuracy is required. it consists of a magnetic needle pivoted in the centre of a coil of insulated wire, and having an index needle attached to move with it, the latter appearing on a dial, divided into equal arcs or portions: a diagram of such an instrument is shown at fig. . this instrument should be of small size and portable form, and as sensitive as it is possible to make it, under such conditions. _three coil galvanometer._--the three coil galvanometer is provided with a vertical needle, and is in other respects very similar in appearance to the detector galvanometer before described. it is formed with three coils of , , and ohms resistance; each coil is connected with a brass plate on the top of the box which encloses the whole, and may be switched into circuit by means of a plug at will. the object of the three resistances is to suit the different resistances that may occur, with a perfect, or imperfect state of the electrical combination in connection with each mine. a diagram of this instrument is shown at fig. , the dotted portions are inside the case. _thermo galvanometer._--a thermo galvanometer is an instrument used to ascertain the power of a firing battery which is employed to ignite platinum wire or low tension fuzes. the form of thermo galvanometer generally used in connection with a test table, is arranged as follows:-- two ebonite studs, fitted with brass connecting screws, are fixed to the lid of a box containing some resistance coils, and placed in circuit with them; these studs, placed about · of an inch apart, are arranged to receive a piece of platinum wire which is stretched from one stud to the other; the firing battery being placed in circuit with the platinum wire, and the resistance coils, its working power would then be tested by the fusion of the wire through a given electrical resistance, as indicated by the resistance coils put in circuit. another form of thermo galvanometer, which is very compact and portable, is shown at fig. . it consists of a wooden box _a_, with a cover of ebonite _b_, within the box is placed a resistance coil _c_; _d_ and _e_ are two ebonite standards · " apart, the former of which is connected by a copper wire with the terminal _f_, the latter to the terminal _g_; the terminal _h_ is similarly connected to the contact piece _k_, and the terminal _l_ to the firing key _m_, at _n_; the resistance coil _c_ is connected to the terminal _g_ and to the copper wire _n_; the platinum wire (of which several lengths are used, according to the resistance of the coil _c_) is placed between the standards _d_ and _e_. to test a battery, it is only necessary to connect it to the terminals _f_ and _h_, when by pressing down the key _m_ the power of the battery, according as to its fusing or not the platinum wires, will be ascertained; the use of the terminals _g_ and _l_ is to cut out the resistance, which is effected by connecting them by means of a copper wire. _siemens's universal galvanometer._--siemens's universal galvanometer is an instrument combining in itself all the arrangements necessary for the following operations:-- .--for measuring electrical resistances. .--for comparing electromotive forces. .--for measuring the intensity of a current. the instrument which is shown in elevation and plan at pl. xxiii., figs. and respectively, consists of a sensitive galvanometer which can be turned in a horizontal plane, combined with a resistance bridge (the wire of which bridge instead of being straight is stretched round part of a circle). the galvanometer has an astatic needle, suspended by a cocoon fibre, and a flat bobbin frame wound with fine wire. the needle swings above a cardboard dial divided in degrees; as however, when using the instrument the deflection of the needle is never read off, but the needle instead always brought to zero, two ivory limiting pins are placed at about degrees on each side of zero. the galvanometer is fixed on a graduated slate disc, round which the platinum wire is stretched. underneath the slate disc three resistance coils of the value of , , and siemens' units are wound on a hollow wooden block, which protrudes at one side, and on the projection carries the terminals for the reception of the leading wires from the battery and unknown resistance. the adoption of three different resistance coils enables the measuring of large as well as small resistances with sufficient accuracy. [illustration: galvanometers for testing. plate xxii] the whole instrument is mounted on a wooden disc, which is supported by three levelling screws, so that it may be turned round its axle. on the same axle a lever is placed which bears at its end an upright arm, carrying a contact roller. this roller is pressed against the platinum wire round the edge of the slate disc by means of a spring acting on the upright arm, and forms the junction between the _a_ and _b_ resistances of a wheatstone's bridge, which resistances are formed by the platinum wire on either side of the contact roller, one of the three resistance coils forming the third resistance of the bridge. _g_ is the galvanometer, _k_ a milled head from which the needles are suspended, and by turning _k_ they can be raised or lowered, _m_ is the head of a screw which arrests or frees the needle when in motion. _h__{ }, _h__{ }, _h__{ }, _h__{ }, are the terminals of the respective ends of the three resistance coils, viz., , , and units, which are wound on the wooden block _c_; these terminals may be connected to each other by means of stoppers, and therefore one or more of the resistances may be brought into circuit as desired, and to the ends of these terminals the wires of the artificial resistances are connected as shown on diagrams pl. xxiv., figs. , , _a_ and _b_; _f_ is the graduated slate disc, round which the platinum wire is stretched in a slight groove at the edge of the disc, and is inserted in such manner that about half its diameter protrudes beyond the slate. the ends of the platinum wire are soldered to two brass terminals _l_ and _l_^{ }, which are placed at the angles formed by the sides of the gap in the slate disc, and which form the junctures, as in the ordinary resistance bridge, between _a_, _n_, and the galvanometer on one side, and _b_, _x_, and the galvanometer on the other side, of the parallelogram. the terminal _l_ is permanently connected by a thick copper wire or metal strip to terminal _h__{ }, and the other terminal _l_^{ } is connected in a similar manner to terminal iii. slate is adopted for the material of which to make the disc _f_, because it is found by experience to be the material which is the least sensitive to variations in the weather or temperature. the slate disc is graduated on its upper edge through an arc of degrees, zero being in the centre, and the graduations figured up to on each side at the terminals _l_ and _l_^{ } of the bridge wire. in the centre of the circular plate _e_ of polished wood, supported upon three levelling screws _b_, _b_, _b_, a metal boss is inserted, in which turns the vertical pin _a_ which carries the instrument. this pin, being well fitted to the boss, supports the instrument firmly, but at the same time allows it to be turned freely round its vertical axis without losing its horizontal position when once obtained. on the arm _d d_, which turns on the pin _a_, and somewhat behind the handle _g_, there is a small upright brass arm _d_ turning between two screw points _r_, and carrying in a gap at its upper end a small platinum jockey pulley _e_ turning on a vertical axis. this pulley forms the movable contact point along the bridge wire, against which it is kept firmly pressed by means of a spring acting on the arm _d_. the arm _d d_, which is insulated from the other parts of the apparatus, is permanently connected with the terminal i. on the top of _d_ a pointer _z_ or a vernier is fixed, which laps over the upper edge of the slate disc and points to the graduations. to the pin _a_ is attached a circular disc of polished wood _c_, about one inch thick, and having a groove turned in its edge for the reception of the insulated wires composing the resistances. the disc _c_ has a projection _c_, which carries the five insulated terminals marked i., ii., iii., iv., v., as shown on figs. and , pl. xxiii. terminals iii. and iv. can be connected by a plug, ii. and v. by the contact key _k_. terminal i. is in connection with the lever _d d_. figs. and , pl. xxiii. show the shunt box supplied with the galvanometer if specially desired; the copper connecting arms _a_, _a_ are screwed to the terminals ii. and iv. by inserting a plug at _c_ (fig. , pl. xxiii.), the galvanometer is put out of circuit altogether, whilst by plugging either of the other holes shunts of the value of / , / , or / , are introduced into the circuit, and the effect upon the galvanometer is reduced to / , / , / , respectively of what it would have been without the insertion of the shunt. figs. and , pl. xxiii., show a battery commutator allowing to bring into the circuit four different amounts of battery power. it is placed in the battery circuit whenever consecutive tests with different batteries are desired to be made, it being only necessary to change the place of the stopper in the battery commutator, the terminal screw _a_ of the battery commutator being connected to terminal v. of the galvanometer, and the screws _b_, _b_, _b_, _b_ to various sections of the battery: see diagram of connections, fig. , pl. xxiv. the application of the universal galvanometer will be clear from the diagrams on pl ii.; instructions, however, for its practical use are added further on, and also tables for use when measuring conducting resistances. as will be seen from diagram, fig. , pl. xxiv., the proportion between the unknown resistance x, and the artificial resistance _n_ is, when the deflection is read off on the side of the slate disc marked _a_: x : _n_ = + _a_ : - _a_ or, x = (( + _a_) / ( - _a_)) � _n_. but if read off on the _b_ side of the disc-- x = (( - _a_) / ( + _a_)) � _n_. the values of these two fractions, for every half degree, will be found in the columns headed _a_ and _b_ of the table in the appendix. [illustration: siemen's universal galvanometer. plate xxiii] [illustration: siemen's universal galvanometer. plate xxiii^a] [illustration: siemen's universal galvanometer. plate xxiv] [illustration: siemen's universal galvanometer plate xxiv^a] _measuring electrical resistances._--for this purpose the instrument is arranged as a wheatstone's balance. the connections are made as shown at pl. xxiv., figs. and , where _x_ is the unknown resistance. _a._--the needle _i_ is to be brought to the zero point of the small cardboard scale by turning the galvanometer _g_ round its vertical axis, taking care that the needle moves with perfect freedom. _b._--the pointer or vernier _z_ is to be brought, by means of the handle _g_, to the zero point of the large scale on the slate disc. _c._--a plug is to be inserted between the terminals marked iii. and iv. _d._--the holes , , and are, two of them, to be plugged, and one left open, according to the extent of the unknown resistance to be measured; either or must be left open if the resistance is small, and if it is large. _e._--the two ends of the unknown resistance are to be connected to terminals ii. and iv. _f._--the two poles of some galvanic battery are to be connected to terminals i. and v. when the above-mentioned connections have been made, and on depressing the key _k_, the battery current is sent into the combination and deflects the needle, say, to the right-hand or _b_ side of the instrument, the pointer or vernier _z_ must then be pushed, by means of the handle _g_, to the _b_ side of the instrument. if this is found to increase the deflection of the needle _i_, the pointer _z_ should be pushed to the other or _a_ side of the instrument beyond the zero point of the large scale until the needle remains stationary when the key _k_ is depressed. the number indicated by the vernier _z_ should be read off carefully, and notice taken whether it is on the _a_ or _b_ side of the large scale. this number must then be referred to the galvanometer table,[k] when the figure opposite to the number, multiplied by the resistance unplugged, is the resistance of _x_. the value of the resistance to be determined will be thus found by a single operation. supposing the reading to be on the _a_ side of the large scale, the resistance _n_ unplugged having been units, we get according to the before-mentioned law of resistance bridge the following proportion (see fig. , pl. xxiv.):-- x : = + : - x = (( + ) / ( - )) � x = units. for measuring very small resistances a single cell will be found sufficient; but for large resistances more should be used, say, to . if very accurate measurements of small resistances are to be taken, the screw at the end of the moving arm _d d_ should receive one battery wire, terminal v. receiving the other. _comparing electromotive forces._--for this purpose professor e. du bois-reymond's modification of poggendorff's compensation method is used. the connections are made as shown at pl. xxiv., figs. and . for comparing two electromotive forces _e__{ } and _e__{ }, a third electromotor of higher electromotive force _e__{ } is used, and two separate tests taken. the manipulations _a_ and _b_ are to be the same as before. _c._--the hole between iii. and iv. to be left unplugged. _d._--plugs to be inserted in , and . _e._--the two poles of the electromotor of an electromotive force _e__{ } are to be connected to the terminals iii. and v. _f._--the poles of the battery whose electromotive force _e__{ } is to be compared are connected to terminals i. and iv. in such a manner that the similar poles of the two electromotors are joined to terminals i. and iii., and to iv. and v. respectively. when depressing the key _k_ the galvanometer needle will be deflected and can be brought back to zero by turning the pointer _z_ either to the right or to the left. should for instance the pointer have to be brought to ° on the _a_ side we have the following equation-- e_{ } = e_{ } � (( - ) / ( + _n_)) ( ), where _n_ is the resistance of the battery _e__{ }. the electromotor _e__{ } is now to be inserted in the place of _e__{ }, and the galvanometer needle, when it deflects, again brought back to zero by moving the pointer _z_. if for instance the pointer has to be pushed to ° on the _b_ side to obtain equilibrium we have-- e_{ } = e_{ } � (( + ) / ( + _n_)) ( ). by eliminating _n_ from equations and we have e_{ } : e_{ } = ( - ) / ( + ) = : ( ). the two electromotive forces are in the same proportion as the two observed distances of the pointer _z_ from ° on the _a_ side of the instrument. _for measuring the intensity of a current._--for this purpose the instrument is simply used as a sine galvanometer. the connections are made as shown at pl. xxiv., figs. _a_ and . the manipulations _a_, _b_, _c_, and _d_ same as in the second case. _e._--connect one pole of a battery to terminal ii. and put the other pole to earth. _f._--connect the line to terminal iv. the galvanometer is then to be turned in the same direction as the needle is deflected until the needle coincides with the zero point. whilst this is being done the large scale on the slate disc will move under the pointer _z_, which must be left stationary; the sine of the angle indicated by _z_ will thus give the value proportionate to the strength of the current. should the shunt box be required, it has to be connected with terminals ii. and iv. fig. shows the same connections as fig. , but without the shunt box, and with the battery commutator. fig. _{a} shows diagram of the same connections but with the key _k_, and fig. _{b} the same without the key. _a shunt._--a "shunt" is a second path offered to a current traversing a given circuit, or portion of a circuit, so as to diminish the amount of the current flowing through that portion of the circuit. in the diagram shown at fig. the shunt diminishes the amount of the current flowing along the circuit between _a_ and _b_. if only /nth of the current is to pass along the circuit between _a_ and _b_ (of resistance _r_) then the resistance of the shunt must equal r/(n - ). by the aid of shunts it is quite possible to make use of very sensitive instruments to measure powerful currents. _commutators or switch plates._--a commutator or switch plate is an apparatus by which the direction of currents may be changed at will, or by which they may be opened or closed. bertin's commutator, which is represented at fig. , consists of a small base of hard wood on which is an ebonite plate, this by means of the handle _m_ is turned about a central axis between two stops _c_ and _c'_. on the disc are fixed two copper plates, one of which _o_ is always positive, being connected by the axis and by a plate (+) with the binding screw _p_, which receives the positive electrode of the battery; the other copper plate _i_, _e_, bent in the form of a horse-shoe, is connected by friction below the disc with a plate (-), which plate is connected with the negative electrode _n_. on the opposite side of the board are two binding screws _b_, and _b'_, to which are attached two elastic metal plates _r_, and _r'_. on the disc being turned as shown in the figure, the current coming by the binding screw _p_ passes into the piece _o_, the plate _r_, and finally the binding screw _b_, which by means of a copper wire leads the current to the apparatus in connection with _b_; then returning to the binding screw _b'_, the current reaches the plate _r'_, the piece _i_, _e_, and so to the battery by the binding screw _n_. if the disc is turned so that the handle _m_ is half way between _c_ and _c'_, the pieces _o_ and _i_, _e_, being no longer in contact with the plates _r_ and _r'_, the current will not pass. if _m_ is turned as far as _c_, the plate _o_ will then touch _r'_, and the current pass to _b'_, and return by _b_, thus reversing its direction. "peg" switches are also often used; they are arranged so that the removal or insertion of a brass peg or plug cuts out, or completes a circuit. _rheostat._--a rheostat is an instrument used for the comparison of resistances. [illustration: shunt, commutator, rheostat. plate xxv] wheatstone's rheostat, which is shown in elevation at fig. , consists of two cylinders _a_ and _b_, one of brass and the other of non-conducting material, so arranged that a copper wire can be wound off the one on to the other by turning a handle _c_. the surface of the non-conducting cylinder _b_ has a screw thread cut in it for its whole length, in which the turns of the copper wire lie, so that its successive convolutions are well insulated from each other. two binding screws _d_, _d'_ connected with the ends of the copper wire are provided, to which the circuit wires are connected. a scale is attached at _e_, by means of which the number of convolutions on _b_ can be read off; and parts of a revolution are indicated on a circle at one end. the handle _c_ can be shifted from one cylinder to the other. supposing the rheostat introduced into a circuit, and the whole of the copper wire wrapped on the metal cylinder _a_, then, on account of the large section of this metal cylinder, its resistance may be entirely neglected, but for every convolution of the wire on the non-conducting cylinder =b=, a specific resistance is introduced into the circuit. the amount of resistance can thus be varied as gradually as desired by winding on and off the cylinder _b_. this instrument is often used in connection with the thermo galvanometer. _resistance box._--the general arrangement of a resistance box is shown in the diagram fig. . between two terminal binding screws _t_ and _t__{ } secured on a vulcanite slab are fixed a series of brass junction pieces _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_; each of these is connected by a resistance coil to its neighbour, as shown at , , , and . a number of brass conical plugs with insulating handles of vulcanite are provided, which can be inserted between any two successive junction pieces, as between _t_ and _a_, or _a_ and _b_. with all the plugs inserted, the electrical current will flow direct from _t_ to _t__{ }, the large metallic junction pieces directly connected by the plugs would offer no sensible resistance; but if all the plugs were removed, then the current would flow through each of the coils , , , and , and the resistance in the circuit would be the sum of the resistances of those four coils. with the plugs arranged as in the figure, the current would flow through coil only, and the resistance in the circuit would be equal to the resistance of that coil. _wheatstone's balance._--the electrical conductivity of a body is determined by ascertaining the ratio between the resistance of a certain length of the conductor in question, having a given section, to that of a known length of a known section of some substance taken as a standard. for this purpose wheatstone's bridge in connection with a box of resistance coils is the most convenient method. at fig. is shown wheatstone's balance (post-office pattern), and at fig. the apparatus is reduced into the form of a parallelogram, which is the usual diagram of wheatstone's bridge. the theory of the bridge is as follows: four conductors _a b_, _b c_, _a d_, and _d c_ are joined at _a_ and _c_ to the poles of a battery _z_; the resistance between _a_ and _b_ is _r_; that between _a_ and _d_ is _r_; that between _d_ and _c_ is _r__{ }; and that between _b_ and _c_ is _x_, the unknown resistance to be measured. a convenient constant ratio is chosen for _r__{ } and _r_, such as equality to , to , or to ; and then _r__{ } is adjusted until no current flows through the galvanometer _g_; when this is the case we have r : _r_=r_{ } : _x_, or _x_ = (_r_/r) � r_{ }; so that if _r_ = r/ , _x_ will be equal to r_{ }/ . two keys _a_ and _b_ are inserted; the current is wholly cut off the four conductors until contact is made at _a_; and then after the currents in the four conductors have come to their permanent condition, contact is made at _b_ to test whether any current flows through the galvanometer. the three resistances _r_, _r__{ } and _r_ and the resistance of the galvanometer should be small if _x_ is small, and great if _x_ is great. the conductors _a b_ and _a d_ of the bridge are each formed of three resistance coils having a resistance of , , and ohms respectively, inserted between the terminals _b_ and _d_ of the balance, fig. . the conductor _d c_ is formed of a set of resistance coils from up to ohms, amounting altogether to , ohms, inserted between the terminals _d_ and _c_ of the balance; in the balance, a brass plug being inserted between the terminals _d_ and _d__{ }, they may be considered as one terminal _d_. the conductor _b c_ is the wire to be tested, and is connected to the terminals _b_ and _c_ of the balance. _measurement of resistances._--when a resistance is to be measured that is within the range of the coils in _r__{ }, _r_ and _r_ are made equal. the needle of the galvanometer will move in a different direction, either to the right or to the left, according as the resistance in _r__{ } is greater or less than the line wire _x_. the needle remains at zero only when the resistance in _r__{ } is equal to that in _x_. for _r_ : _r_ :: _r__{ } : _x_. [illustration: wheatstone's bridge. plate xxvi] when the resistance of _x_ is greater than that of _r__{ }, as in an insulation test, the resistance in _r_ is made _less_ than that in _r_, in order that _r_ and _r_ may have such a proportion one to the other as will enable the coils in _r__{ } to balance a resistance in _x_, greater than their own, that is to say, greater than , ohms; thus _r_ : _r_ :: _r__{ } : _x_, or : :: , : , , , the resistance in the line to be tested would be , , ohms, supposing the values of _r_, _r_ and _r__{ } to be respectively , , and , ohms. when the resistance to be tested is less than that of the least coil in _r__{ } ( ohm), then the resistance in _r_ is made greater than in _r_. thus _r_ : _r_ :: _r__{ } : _x_, or : :: : · ; the resistance of the line to be tested would in this case be / of an ohm. _manipulation._--in all cases the key in connection with the battery should first be depressed, then the galvanometer key, making very short contacts by the latter, just sufficient to show the direction of the deflection, until the coils in _r__{ } are nearly adjusted, otherwise considerable time will be lost in making a series of tests, owing to the swing given to the needle, which will take some little time before it again remains steady at zero. when once the coils in _r__{ } are adjusted, and a balance obtained, it should be ascertained whether the needle will remain steady when contact is made and broken. _test tables._--in connection with a system of testing electrical submarine mines, for the sake of convenience and simplicity it is necessary to use a table (termed a "test table"), on which all the apparatus used for the purpose of testing are fixed. several forms of tables have been designed for such a purpose. at fig. is shown the method of arranging such a table.[l] _a_ is an astatic galvanometer placed between two switch plates, _b_ and _c_; ten other similar switch plates, , , , , _d_, , , , _e_, and , are arranged in front of the galvanometer _a_; _f_, _g_, and _h_ are three terminal plates; _k_ is a box of resistance coils used in connection with the thermo galvanometer _m_; _l_ is a firing key, and _n_ a battery commutator; _o_ is a three-coil galvanometer; _r_ is a wheatstone balance (post-office pattern). the ten switch plates, , , , , _d_, &c., are used for the connection of any particular line to be tested, as well as for the earth connections and instruments employed in that operation. _"sea cell" tests._--the arrangement shown in the figure is that required in connection with the sea cell test, and mr. brown's method of keeping certain earth plates in a bucket instead of in the sea. if two plates of suitable metal to form a voltaic battery are placed in salt water and connected by a metallic conductor, a battery is at once formed capable of producing considerable deflection on a moderately delicate galvanometer. testing by this arrangement has been termed the "sea cell" test. _arranging earth plates._--mr. brown's, assistant-chemist to the war department, method of arranging the earth plates is as follows:-- a series of earth plates, such as copper, carbon, tin, zinc, &c., are placed in a bucket filled with sea water, and which is placed in the testing room. the water in the bucket is put in connection with the water of the sea by means of a conducting wire, terminating at one end with a zinc plate in the bucket, and at the other with a zinc plate in the sea. by this means the tests made with the different earth plates in the bucket are identical with those made with corresponding earths placed absolutely in the sea, and therefore these latter may be done away with, the sea cell tests being entirely carried out by means of the bucket earth plates. in addition to the bucket earth plates there will be several other earth plates in connection with the testing room, these being placed in the sea, such as the zinc earth for the firing battery, the zinc earth for the signalling battery, &c. _connections of switch plates._--the switch plate _d_ is used for the connection of any particular mine cable which it may be required to test. the switch plate _e_ is connected with a zinc earth plate used for testing the firing battery. this must always be in the sea. the switch plate is in connection with a zinc earth in the bucket; is attached to a copper earth plate in the bucket; is attached to a carbon earth plate in the bucket; to a tin earth plate in the bucket; is used for connection with the zinc signalling earth connection in the sea; is attached to a copper earth plate used for the sea cell test, or any other purpose required, in the sea; is attached to a zinc earth plate in the sea; and is a common zinc earth in the sea. the terminal plates _g_ and _h_ are used for the connection, for testing purposes of the negative and positive poles, of the firing battery, and _f_ is connected with a zinc earth in the sea, for a similar purpose. these plates are in connection with the resistance coils _k_ and the thermo galvanometer _m_, employed for testing the firing battery, the circuit being closed by the firing key _l_. other ways of using these plates may of course be adopted if desired. the resistance coils _k_ range from · to ohms, and are composed of wire adapted for the passage of a quantity current. a reversing key is generally used in connection with a testing battery and the three-coil galvanometer _o_. this reversing key would consist of two bridges completely insulated from each other, the upper one attached to the negative, the lower one to the positive pole of the test battery. in their normal position both keys press against the upper bridge, and until one or other of the keys is pressed down no current will pass, the direction of the current being altered by pressing down a different key. the point of each key is provided with a terminal and connected, the one to a zinc earth through the switch plate , the other to one terminal of the three-coil galvanometer when the tests are to be applied. the wheatstone balance _r_ is used in finding the resistances of electrical cables, balancing fuzes, &c. by means of a commutator, _n_, the necessary number of cells for any particular test may be thrown in circuit when required. _test of platinum wire fuze for conductivity._--the platinum wire fuze may be tested electrically as follows:-- if placed in circuit with a few cells of a daniell or leclanché battery and a detector galvanometer, before the platinum wire bridge of the fuze is fixed, there should be no deflection of the needle, for no metallic circuit exists; if it did, such would be fatal to the efficiency of the fuze. if similarly placed in circuit after the bridge has been fixed, a considerable deflection of the needle should result, such deflection being due to the current passing through the metallic bridge, which to be efficient ought to be the sole medium through which the circuit is completed. _test of resistance of platinum wire fuze._--the electrical resistance of a platinum wire fuze is ascertained by means of the wheatstone's balance _r_ and galvanometer _a_, fig. . the terminals of the fuze are connected to the binding screws of the balance, the commutator _n_ and galvanometer _a_ being connected up in circuit. the resistance of the coils is then adjusted by taking out plugs until the needle of the galvanometer _a_ is brought to zero, when the sum of the resistances indicated by the unplugged coils will be equal to that of the fuze. the resistance of a platinum wire fuze might also be ascertained by means of a differential galvanometer instead of a wheatstone balance. the electrical resistance of / " of fine platinum wire, weighing · grains to the yard, is / of an ohm nearly (schaw). _testing high tension fuzes._--high tension fuzes require very delicate and careful management in testing them, due to the high electrical resistance of such fuzes, which ranges from to ohms, combined with the danger of premature explosion when testing even with a small number of battery cells. very sensitive galvanometers, such as the reflecting galvanometer, should if possible be used, otherwise the mode of making the tests for conductivity and resistance of a high-tension fuze is similar to that already given for a platinum wire fuze. detonating fuzes should always be placed in an iron case during the process of testing. _insulation test for electrical cables._--to test an electrical cable for insulation, it should first be put in a tank of water, or in the sea, and allowed to soak for at least forty-eight hours. the object of this is to allow the water to penetrate the outer protection of hemp and iron wires, &c., and to search out and get into any weak places there may be in the insulation under the armouring. at fig. is shown the method of performing this test. _a_ is a tank holding the electrical cable, which has been in soak for forty-eight hours; _b_ is an astatic galvanometer; _c_, _z_ a leclanché or daniell battery of great power; and _c_ is an ordinary firing key. one end of the electric cable _d_ is connected to the galvanometer _b_ through the firing key _c_; the other end of the cable is very carefully insulated; one pole of the battery is connected to the galvanometer _b_, the other is put to earth in the tank at _f_; should the insulation be perfect, no deflection of the needle should follow on the key being pressed down. a very slight deflection might be observed on a moderately sensitive galvanometer, due to the current passing through the insulation; its whole length being immersed, the surface through which such a current would pass would be large, and the sum of the infinitesimally small quantities escaping over the whole length, would in the aggregate be sufficient to deflect the needle to a small extent in completing the circuit of the battery. should any considerable deflection occur, it would indicate a defect or leak in the insulation of the cable, the extent of which would be roughly measured by the amount of such deflection. by using a reflecting galvanometer a very much more delicate test would be obtained, but for the comparatively short lengths of electric cables used in connection with submarine mines, such accuracy is hardly necessary. to test an electric cable for conductivity, it would be only necessary to expose the metallic conductor _g_, and put it in the water of the tank. if the conductivity were good, then the whole of the current would pass through the cable and the needle of the galvanometer would be violently deflected. if the continuity were broken, no deflection would be observed. _defects observed in the conductivity of the cable._--to ascertain the position of a defect in the insulation of a cable, as indicated by the tests above described, it would be only necessary to keep a continuous current flowing through the cable, and gradually take it out of the tank. if the fault existed at a single point, the deflection of the needle would be suddenly reduced at the moment of that point of the cable being lifted out of the water, and therefore its position would be determined with considerable accuracy. should several defects exist as each was lifted out, a sudden reduction of the deflection would occur. _discharge test._--the conductor of an electrical cable may be broken without destroying the insulation, and on applying the foregoing tests, good insulation would be indicated, but no conductivity, and no information would be given as to the position of the fault. under such circumstances the following test must be applied:-- put one pole of a very powerful battery to earth, and charge one end of the defective cable, then immediately discharge it through a reflecting galvanometer, and note the extreme limit of the swing of the needle, then, charge the other end of the cable in a similar manner, and discharge it through the same galvanometer, noting as before the swing of the needle. this should be done three or four times, and the average of the deflections taken. then the position of the fault would be indicated by the proportion between the average deflections in each case, and the cable might safely be cut at that point. should the precise position of the fault not be discovered in thus cutting the cable, each section should be tested again for conductivity, and that in which a fault was still found to exist should be again tested by the discharge as before. _test of electrical resistance of cable._--this is effected by balancing it against the wheatstone balance, in a similar manner to that explained for a fuze. the electrical resistance of the conductor of a cable affords a very correct indication of the quality of the metal of which it is composed. for a very delicate test the reflecting galvanometer should be used. _electrical test of insulated joints._--insulated joints and connections, whether of a permanent or temporary nature, should be tested electrically, in a precisely similar manner to that explained for electric cables. they should be soaked for forty-eight hours, and then tested for insulation, conductivity, and electrical resistance. in testing permanent joints special tests are carried out, which are described by mr. culley in his 'handbook of practical telegraphy.' voltaic batteries should be subjected to the following tests:-- .--for potential. .--for internal resistance. .--for electromotive force. for the purpose of testing the potential of a battery, one pole should be put to earth, and with the other one pair of the quadrants of a thomson's reflecting galvanometer should be charged; when this is done, a certain deflection of the spot of light will occur, and the amount of such deflection, as compared with that produced by a standard cell applied to the instrument in a similar manner, would give the relative value of the potential of the battery. the following method of determining the internal resistance of a battery is that recommended by mr. latimer clark in his book on electrical measurements. the instrument employed is a double shunt differential galvanometer, a diagram of which is shown at fig. . connect the battery and a set of resistance coils in circuit between the terminals _a_ and _d_, and insert plugs in the resistance coils so that they give no resistance; insert plugs at _a_ and _c_, and also both the shunt plugs at _a_ and _d_. the current will now flow through one half of the galvanometer circuit only, being, however, reduced to / of its amount by the shunt _d_; the deflection of the needle must be carefully read. the plug _a_ must now be removed to _b_, which causes the battery current to flow through both halves of the galvanometer (each being shunted). the circuit will now be as shown in the figure, and the needle will of course be deflected somewhat more than before. now unplug the resistance coils which are in circuit with the battery until the deflection of the needle is reduced to its original amount, and the resistances unplugged will be equal to the internal resistance of the battery. the following is another method of ascertaining the internal resistance of a battery cell. a circuit is formed, consisting of the battery cell, a rheostat, and a galvanometer, and the strength _c_ is noted on the galvanometer. a second cell is then joined with the first, so as to form one of double the size, and therefore half the resistance, and then by adding a length _l_ of the rheostat, the strength is brought to what it originally was, _c_. then if _e_ is the electromotive force, and r the resistance of cell, _r_ the resistance of the galvanometer, and other parts of the circuit, the strength _c_ in the one case is c = e / (r + _r_), and in the other = e / (( / )r + _r_ + _l_), and since the strength in both cases is the same, r = _l_, i.e., the internal resistance of the cell is equal to twice the resistance corresponding to the length _l_ of the rheostat wire. the comparative electromotive force of a battery may be determined by means of a double shunt differential galvanometer in the following method, as recommended by mr. latimer clark. "this can only be done relatively in terms of some other standard battery. first determine the resistance of the standard and of the other cells to be measured; then insert the shunt plugs at _a_ and _d_, fig. , and also at _c_ and _b_, and join up the standard cell in circuit with a resistance coil to the terminals _a_ and _d_, and unplug the resistance coils until a convenient deflection is obtained, say °; note the sum of the resistances in circuit, including that of the battery galvanometer, resistance coil and connecting wires; now change the battery for another, and by unplugging the resistance coils bring the needle again to the same deflection, °; having again found the total resistance in the circuit, the relative electromotive force will be directly proportional to these resistances." the electromotive force of a battery may also be measured statically by means of thomson's quadrant electrometer, the poles of the battery being connected with the two chief electrodes of the instrument, in which arrangement no current will pass, and the electromotive force will be directly indicated by the difference of potential observed. in the case of a quantity battery, that is, a battery capable of fusing a fine platinum wire, its electromotive force and internal resistance may be determined by means of the resistance coils _k_, and thermo galvanometer _m_, shown at fig. . _tests after submersion._--after an electrical submarine mine has been placed in position, it should be immediately tested to ascertain that all is right, and similar tests should be applied at intervals to ascertain that the charge remains dry; that the insulation and conductivity of the electric cable remains the same; and that its electrical resistance indicates a state of efficiency. the nature of the tests applied to determine these points will depend upon the nature of the combination in which the mine is arranged. the manner of applying the "sea cell" test, by which is ascertained the condition of a system of electrical submarine mines, will be readily understood from the following examples. the arrangements for testing to ascertain whether a charge is dry, or wet, is shown at fig. . _z_ is a plate of zinc introduced in the circuit within the charge, and between the fuze and the shore; another earth plate of carbon _x_ is connected with the electric cable beyond the fuze, forming the ordinary earth connection of the system at that point; and at home a copper earth plate _c_ is used. first, in the case of a dry charge with the insulation and conductivity of the cable, good; under these circumstances there would be formed a sea cell between the earth plates _x_, and _c_, which would produce a certain deflection of the needle of a galvanometer _g_, which is placed in the circuit, and in a certain direction. secondly, in the case of a charge becoming wet, through leakage, with the insulation and conductivity of the cable, good; under these circumstances, a sea cell would be formed between the plates _c_ and _z_, causing a different deflection of the needle in amount and in direction, by which it would be at once indicated that the charge had become wet. [illustration: test table, differential galvanometer. plate xxvii] _"sea cell" test for insulation._--again, in the case of the insulation of the electric cable being damaged to such an extent as to expose the copper conductor. under these circumstances there would be formed a sea cell between the copper earth plate _c_, and the exposed copper conductor of the cable, by which a certain definite deflection of the galvanometer would be observed, which deflection would differ in character from that produced by the copper carbon sea cell, when the insulation of the cable was good, and the system in working order, and therefore it would indicate that some change in the electrical conditions of the system had occurred. the fact that a leak existed in the insulation would be proved by changing the earth plate at home from copper to zinc, carbon, tin, &c. in the case of no deflection being produced on the galvanometer, on applying the sea cell test, a want of continuity, or inefficient connections would be indicated. the foregoing afford examples of the vast utility of the "sea cell" in connection with a system of electrical tests for submarine mines, numerous variations of which may be effected by employing a series of earth plates, of different metals, at the home end of the circuit, in connection with a carbon and zinc earth plate at the other end. and the mode of manipulating these tests may, by means of numerous switch plates, as shown at fig. , be made extremely simple and efficient. _armstrong's system of electrical testing._--a very simple method of testing electrical submarine mines, with which low tension fuzes are used, has been devised by captain armstrong, r.e., and is shown at fig. . _a_ is the electric cable leading from the shore; _b_ the cable attached to a polarised relay _c_, and connecting the charge through the fuze _f_ to the earth; _b'_ the cable, attached to another polarised relay _c'_, and connecting the mine with the circuit closer; the polarised relay _c_, in the mine, is arranged to be worked by a positive current, that is to say, the wire surrounding the core is so wound as to increase the polarity of the electro magnet, near the armature _d_, when a positive current is passed through it, and to diminish the polarity when a negative current is passed through the wire surrounding the core; the polarised relay _c'_ within the circuit closer is arranged to be worked by a negative current, the coil being so wound as to produce an influence exactly the reverse of _c_. then, a positive current passing along the line wire _a_, the armature _d_ in the charge will be attracted, while _d'_ will remain unaffected; again, if a negative current be circulated, the armature _d'_ within the circuit closer will be attracted, while the armature _d_ will remain unaffected. two insulated wires forked together are wound round each electro magnet, one a thin wire (_g_ and _g'_) having a considerable resistance, about ohms, being connected direct to the earth plates _e_ and _e'_, and the other a thick wire (_h_ and _h'_) offering a very small resistance, and so arranged that when the armature is attracted, they may be in contact with and complete the circuit through the armature to earth. the thin wire coils are so arranged that a certain number of leclanché cells (ten or twelve, as may be desired) will make the electro magnets act, while with fewer cells the current would be too weak, and would therefore pass through them to earth without affecting the armature. by means of the three-coil galvanometer, a table of the deflections, obtained by the foregoing system of testing, should be carefully recorded, when the circuit is known to be in good working order, so that any defect in the circuit would be at once indicated on the application of the various tests, by the results so obtained differing from those originally recorded. when a system of submarine mines is placed in position for the purposes of practice and experiment, every trouble should be taken to endeavour to fix the exact position of any defect that may exist, also to ascertain its magnitude, &c., but in time of war, should a defect exist in the system, no time must be lost in such operations, but the mine at once lifted, and the fault repaired, or a fresh one laid in its place, unless the presence of an enemy or other imperative cause should prevent such work being done. _austrian testing table._--the following is a description of the austrian testing table, and their mode of making electrical tests with it, in connection with their system of self-acting electrical submarine mines. [illustration: methods of testing.--armstrong,--austrian. plate xxviii] its design is shown at fig. ; _c z_ represents the battery with one pole to earth at _e_, and the other in connection with an intensity coil _a_, through which the current passes to the contact plate _b_. when it is desired to put the system of mines in connection with the table, in a state of preparation to be fired by the contact of a vessel, a plug is inserted between the contact plates _b_ and _f_, and the current passes through the galvanometer _g_, and electrically charges the conducting wires connecting the mines with the battery, through the several binding screws on the contact plates, numbering , , , &c. the fact that the charge has been fired is also at once indicated on the galvanometer _g_. _test to discover an exploded charge._--it then becomes necessary to ascertain which particular mine of the system has been exploded; for this purpose a separate circuit in connection with a single cell _d_ is employed. this cell is in connection through a galvanometer _g'_ (a more sensitive instrument than the galvanometer _g_) with the pivot of the key _h_, and rheotome _r_, which latter is connected, as shown by the dotted lines, with each individual mine of the system attached to the contact plates numbered , , , &c. the handle of the rheotome is moved round, to each number in succession and directly it is placed in contact with that corresponding to the exploding mine, the electrical circuit is completed through the exposed end of the fractured wire, and this is indicated by the galvanometer _g'_. during the testing process the firing battery _c z_ must be disconnected; this is done by raising one of the bridges _i i_ with which each group of ten mines is provided. _insulation test._--the rheotome and testing galvanometer _g'_ are also used to test the insulation of the electric cables connecting the mines to the testing table. this is done in precisely the same manner as testing for an exploded mine: the handle of the rheotome is turned round, and each cable connected in succession with the testing circuit as before; should the galvanometer _g'_ remain stationary, the insulation is good; but should a defect of insulation exist, the current passing through it would act on and deflect the galvanometer, indicating the particular line in which it exists, and, roughly, its extent in proportion to the deflection shown; should the fault be considerable, the defective cable should be at once detached, as the current lost through it might so diminish the working power of the firing battery, as to prevent it exploding any of the fuzes attached to the group in connection with it. by the above arrangement, the insulation of each line can be tested at any moment required. in making the delicate test for insulation, which should invariably be done at leisure, and, if possible, when an enemy's vessels are not in the vicinity of the mines, a large number of daniell's or other cells of suitable form should always be used. to do this, it would only be necessary to connect such a battery in place of a single cell permanently arranged, as described, in the testing circuit, and to proceed with the details of the operation as before. as the cable would, in actual work, always be charged with the full power of a firing battery, the value of its insulation to resist an electrical charge at such a high potential would be an important point to determine. the fuzes being entirely out of the circuit till the moment of the action arrives, no danger of a premature explosion need be apprehended; if a fuze were in such a position as to be fired prematurely, it would be exploded, in connection with the firing circuit, independently of the operation of testing the insulation of the cables. _to render a channel safe._--in order to render the channel safe for a friendly vessel, it is only necessary to remove the plug from between the contact plates _b_ and _f_; this disconnects the firing battery from the circuit. _defence of harbours by booms, &c._--booms or cables supported by rafts may also be employed in the defence of harbours, or rivers, either by themselves, or in combination with submarine mines; in the latter case, the booms, &c., may be moored either in advance of the mines, or in rear of the front row, this last method of mooring them being the most effective one. there are a great variety of forms in which a boom may be constructed. the qualities essential for a good and practicable boom are:-- .--great strength. .--great power of resistance. .--convenience in handling. .--easy to manipulate. .--its materials easily procurable. _construction of a boom._--the general construction of a boom consists of a main cable, buoyed up at intervals by floats. the main cable may be either wire, chain, or rope, the former being very much superior for this purpose to chain or rope. the floats consist of balks of timber built round the main cable and bound together by means of iron hoops &c. a space is left between each float, by which a certain amount of flexibility in the boom is obtained, without which it would be of comparatively little use, as it might be easily overrun. it must be borne in mind, in constructing all such booms, that the smaller the proportion of timber used in forming the floats to the cable, consistent with buoyancy, the stronger will be the structure. a very important feature in connection with such a mode of defence is the manner of mooring it; for if it be moored so as to be unyielding, then its sole power of resisting a vessel charging it is the actual strength of the materials composing the structure, but if it be moored so that it is capable of yielding to a sudden blow, this force will be to some extent absorbed, and resistance of the defence greatly increased. the raft employed to support the main cable should be moored by means of very heavy chains (without anchors) in the direction of the attack, and with ordinary anchors and cables on the other side. as a rule, the booms should be moored obliquely to the direction of the current, where there is any, as the tendency of the current to overrun the boom when so placed will be less, and also a ship ramming it must place herself athwart the current to attack the boom at right angles. _clearing a passage through the torpedo defences of an enemy._--the subject of clearing a passage through the torpedo defences of an enemy is one fraught with innumerable difficulties, on account of the varied nature and impracticability of obtaining accurate and _certain_ information of such defences, and thus it is impossible to lay down any fixed rule or plan for carrying out such an operation. in fact, it will be only under the most favourable circumstances that such a service will be successfully accomplished, that is to say, in the case of a harbour or river defended by submarine mines but unsupported by guns, or guard boats, or where the electric light is used. numerous methods have been devised from time to time to effect the destruction of an enemy's submarine defences, among which are the following:-- .--projecting frames, &c., from the bows of a vessel. .--creeping and sweeping by boats. .--countermining. _projecting frames, &c., from the bows of a vessel._--this method was adopted by the federals during the american civil war of - , and in many instances it was the means of saving their ships when proceeding up rivers which had been torpedoed by the confederates, though notwithstanding this precaution several vessels were sunk. the submarine mines against which this mode of defence was used, were in nine cases out of ten mechanical ones, and therefore the framework defence afforded a better means of protection then, than would be the case now that electrical ground mines and circuit closers are used, as the framework would catch the circuit closer only, and the vessel would probably be over the mine when the explosion took place. the americans moor their circuit closers in rear of their mines, so that a vessel fitted with a bow frame or not, coming in contact with the former must be right over the charge at the instant of explosion. against ground electrical mines fired at will, the bow net, &c., is no protection whatever, still under certain circumstances it would be found extremely useful. _sweeping for submarine mines._--this method of clearing a channel of submarine mines could not possibly be carried out under artillery fire, but in waters not so defended it would prove of some value. where only buoyant mines, or ground mines with circuit closers are to be cleared away, two or more boats dragging a hawser between them would be sufficient to discover them, and so lead to their destruction; but where dummy mines and inverted creepers are moored in addition, another method of sweeping must be resorted to, viz., that of bringing an explosive charge of gun-cotton to act on the obstruction grappled, and thus destroy it. this is effected by lashing a charge to each end of the sweep, so that whatever is grappled may slide along it, until caught by hooks, which are attached for this purpose to the centre of the charge. on grappling an obstruction, the two boats drop their anchors, one hauling in, the other veering out the sweep, until the charge is hooked by the obstruction; this being effected, the boats move out of range, and the charge is fired. _creeping for electrical cables, &c._--creeping is the method employed for picking up the electric cables of the enemy's submarine mines, and is effected by boats towing an ordinary grappling iron, or specially prepared creeper on the ground. in both sweeping and creeping it would be found necessary to employ a diver, who would ascertain the nature of the grappled obstructions which could not be easily raised by the boats. the lay torpedo boat, which is fully described in the chapter on offensive torpedoes, is capable of being used for the foregoing purposes. _countermining._--countermining, that is, the destruction of submarine mines by the explosion of other mines dropped close to them, will under certain conditions prove of great use in clearing harbours of mines. this method could not be operated in waters properly guarded and swept by artillery fire. there are two distinct methods of laying out countermines, viz.:-- .--in a boat, which may be either towed, or hauled out to its destination, or may be steered, and controlled by electricity. .--by attaching them to buoys so that they are suspended at the proper depths, and then hauled out by means of a warp to an anchor which has been previously placed in position. both of the foregoing methods have been successfully manipulated in practice, the first method, where the boat carrying the countermines is towed either by a pulling or steam boat being the most practicable one. a large amount of material would be required for clearing a channel by means of countermines: for example, if the mines to be attacked require -lb. gun-cotton charges to be used, - / tons of the explosive, besides cables, buoys, &c., would be required to clear a passage about one mile in length and feet in width. a ship's launch will carry about twelve of these -lb. countermines, with all the gear attached thereto. experiments to ascertain the effect of countermining have been carried out in england and europe for the last five years, some of which are given at length in the chapter on "torpedo experiments." during the turco-russian war, a portion of the danube was swept in the ordinary and most simple manner by the turks, and five russian electro contact buoyant mines were picked up; one other exploded during the process of dragging it to the surface, but no injury occurred to those at work. _destruction of passive obstructions._--to clear away booms, or other passive obstructions, if not possible to cut them away, they may be destroyed by outrigger boats exploding their torpedoes underneath, and in contact, or by attaching charges of gun-cotton at intervals, and then exploding them simultaneously. when a chain is horizontal, and therefore somewhat taut, a charge of - / lbs. of gun-cotton (this explosive, being the most effective and convenient for such purposes, should always be used) will be found sufficient to destroy it, no matter what size, and whether the chain is in or out of the water, the charge being of course placed in contact with it. great uncertainty must always attend the supposed clearance of a channel, or passage of submarine mines, as was exemplified during the american civil war, when most of the northerners' vessels were destroyed while moving over ground which had been previously carefully dragged, and buoyed, and this fact, coupled with the tediousness and danger of performing such a service, proves the enormous value of a system of defence by submarine mines. footnotes: [footnote j: 'electricity and magnetism,' by professor f. jenkins.] [footnote k: see appendix.] [footnote l: as constructed by mr. j. mathieson, late r.e., at the silvertown telegraph works, essex.] chapter v. offensive torpedo warfare. the term "torpedo" is applicable more particularly to offensive submarine mines than to those employed for the purposes of defence, and therefore by _torpedoes_ will be understood every kind of submarine explosive weapon designed to be used for active attack against vessels, &c., no matter how they may be manipulated. _offensive torpedo warfare still in its infancy._--though during the seventeen or eighteen years that torpedoes have been considered as a legitimate mode of naval warfare there have occurred three big wars, in each of which submarine weapons, offensive and defensive, have played an important part, still the subject of _offensive_ torpedo warfare must be even now considered as in its infancy, and therefore any opinions expressed as to the merits and demerits of the various apparatus in connection therewith can but be based on the theoretical capabilities of each torpedo, and on the results of experiments carried out with them during peace time, which latter as a rule are conducted under far too favourable conditions to be relied upon. _their use during the civil war in america._--during the american civil war, the only offensive submarine weapon that was used was the outrigger or spar torpedo, which in those days was a crude and imperfect machine, and manoeuvred from boats possessing all the features which a torpedo boat should _not_ possess. still under these unfavourable conditions ships were sunk by such means by both federals and confederates, proving that in future wars this mode of attack, favoured by the vast and important improvements that have lately been effected both in connection with the torpedoes and torpedo boats, should play a prominent part, and prove a most destructive mode of attack. _their use in the franco-german and russo-turkish wars._--in the franco-german war of - , offensive torpedo warfare was not resorted to by either side, the french fleet being deterred from entering german waters by the submarine mines placed, or at least supposed to be placed, in position. from the russo-turkish war much light was expected by torpedoists to be thrown on the subject of torpedo warfare, but alas, little or nothing was done to settle any of the many vexed questions which exist in regard to offensive submarine weapons. the torpedo experience of that struggle tended rather to prove that the vast importance hitherto attached to torpedo attack was much exaggerated. one of the causes which led to the failure of offensive submarine weapons, when employed on active service, seems to be due to the fact that, owing to the extremely small radius of the destructive effect of such weapons, it is absolutely necessary for complete success to explode the mine in actual contact with the attacked vessel; to ensure which, at night time, in an unknown harbour, with the position of the vessel attacked somewhat uncertain, and even without the additional obstacles of guard boats, booms, electric lights, &c., is a service of infinite difficulty, and one which may easily terminate in a failure. the foregoing would more especially apply to the spar torpedo attack, but in an attack with the whitehead fish, or towing torpedo, there would be an additional cause of failure, viz., the complicated nature of their manipulation. torpedoes may be divided into four classes, viz.:-- .--drifting or floating torpedoes. .--towing torpedoes. .--locomotive torpedoes. .--outrigger or spar torpedoes. _drifting or floating torpedoes._--by "drifting" or "floating" torpedoes are meant all those submarine machines which are dependent on the tide or current of a stream for their action and motion. during the american civil war this mode of attacking vessels was constantly employed by the confederates, and though not successful in destroying any of the federal ships, was the means of considerably hampering the movements of their river flotillas. drifting torpedoes might be advantageously used for the destruction of pontoon bridges, booms, &c., and in this way, had the turks in their late war used them, the russians would have found the crossing of the danube a matter of infinite danger and difficulty; in fact, by a systematic use of such weapons, combined with a little dash on the part of the ottoman flotilla on the danube, that river should have been to the russians an impassable barrier. to use these torpedoes most effectively, especially against a single vessel, a thorough knowledge of the force and direction of currents should be gained before proceeding to undertake an operation in which these submarine weapons are used. another point to be remembered is, that if such a torpedo were started with the flood, for example, towards an enemy, and did not explode, there would be a chance of its being returned to the starting-place by the ebb tide. in this class the following torpedoes seem the most practicable:-- .--lewis's drifting torpedo. .--mcevoy's drifting torpedo. .--american extempore drifting torpedo. _description of lewis's drifting torpedo._--"lewis's" drifting torpedo, designed for the express purpose of destroying booms or other floating obstructions placed round a vessel at anchor for the purposes of defence, is shown at fig. . it consists of a box _a_, containing the charge and fitted with several detonating fuzes. this box is attached to one side of a beam _b_, and within inches of one extremity, the beam being about feet long and inches square; to the opposite side, of the same end of the beam _b_ a heavy weight _c_, resting in a shoe _d_, is attached by a long iron rod _e_, which reaches to the other extremity of the beam, and is there connected to a bell-crank lever and spring _f_, a pressure on which detaches the weight _c_; a chain _g_, feet long, connects the weight loosely with the upper end of the beam, and another chain _h_, feet inches long, connects it with a point more than feet below the centre of the beam. the apparatus is so constructed that it floats nearly vertical with the top of the beam just above the surface of the water. on the machine drifting against the boom or other obstruction, the spring or lever _f_ at the upper extremity is pressed down, thus releasing the weight _c_, which falling, becomes suspended by the two chains _g_ and _h_, and brings the beam into an inclined position. the weight of this mass of iron and the chain suspending it are suddenly brought to bear on the top of the beam, dragging it under water and clear of the boom, &c. at the same time the lower end, released from the weight, rises, and the whole apparatus is carried forward by the current against the side of the vessel, on striking which the torpedo is exploded. _description of mcevoy's drifting torpedo._--"mcevoy's" drifting torpedo is intended to be floated, singly or in groups, by the aid of tides or currents against vessels at anchor, bridges, &c. at fig. is shown a plan of this form of drifting torpedo. it consists of the body of the torpedo _a_, which contains the charge, at the side of which is placed the loading hole _b_; _c_ is the tube containing the priming charge; _d_ is the framework surrounding and protecting the wheel or screw _e_; _f_ is the fuze pillar, in the centre of which is a steel rod _g_, and on the top a thin steel plate _h_ is placed; _i_ is the nipple for the percussion cap; _k_ is a horizontal bar, turning and resting on top of the fuze pillar _f_; _m_ is the lever for supporting the hammer _n_ when it is set; _l_ is the screw barrel supporting the wheel or screw _e_; _o_ is a safety pin; _q_ is the supporting chain, and _p_ the spring for working the hammer _n_. by means of a buoy or log of wood, from which the torpedo is suspended, it can be adjusted so that the explosion shall occur at the requisite depth. to prepare the torpedo for use, unscrew the fuze pillar _f_, take off the horizontal bar _k_, place a percussion cup on the nipple _i_, and screw it tightly against the end of the steel rod _g_. the fuze pillar is then ready for use, and should be screwed into the body _a_. then fill the torpedo with the explosive and close the loading hole _b_. the hammer _n_ is then set by drawing it back and bringing the end of the lever _m_ against it, at the same time running the screw barrel _l_ under the lever _m_, so that its end catches the screw of the barrel, as shown in the figure. the safety pin _o_ is then put in its place and secured by a few parts of thread, which by a sharp jerk on the safety line will be easily broken. [illustration: drifting torpedoes. plate xxix] the horizontal lever _k_, which carries the lever _m_ and propeller _e_, rotates on the top of the fuze pillar _f_, and is prevented from rising by means of a screw. the torpedo being let go, the safety pin _o_ is pulled out by means of a line which is attached to it. the propeller will not revolve whilst the torpedo is drifting with the current, but the instant it is stopped by the action of the current the wheel will be caused to revolve, and after a few revolutions it will unscrew the barrel from under the end of the lever _k_, and the latter, dropping the hammer _n_, will be forced by the spring _p_ into contact with the thin steel plate _h_ on the top of the fuze pillar, which blow is transmitted by means of the steel rod _g_ to the percussion cap, and the torpedo exploded. _american extempore drifting torpedo._--this form of drifting torpedo, which is readily made, was used in great numbers by the confederates, and though not successful in sinking any federal ships, caused their vessels considerable annoyance and delay. at fig. is shown a sketch of this torpedo. it consists of a tin case containing about lbs. of powder. a stiff wire _a_, _b_ passes through a hole punctured in a strip of tin _c_, and a stuffing box _d_; the end _a_ of the wire is covered with fulminate, and so arranged that the friction caused by its passage through the strip of tin _c_ will ignite it; a number of wires lead from _b_ to pieces of driftwood on the surface _e_, _e_, _e_, and the case is supported at the proper depth by a line attached to a section of log. _towing torpedoes._--by towing torpedoes are meant those submarine machines which are so shaped and arranged, that when towed from a ship or boat in motion they will diverge to a considerable extent, thus enabling the towing vessel to pass clear of the ship attacked, and yet near enough to allow of the torpedo being brought in contact with some part or other of her hull. towing torpedoes were for the first time employed on actual service during the late russo-turkish war, when a modified form of the well-known harvey torpedo, designed by a german officer, was used by the russians, but in no case was it successful. in this class of submarine offensive machines may be placed the following:-- .--harvey's towing torpedo. .--menzing's towing torpedo. .--the french towing torpedo. _harvey's torpedo._--this form of towing torpedo was invented conjointly by captain john harvey and commander frederick harvey, r.n., and is intended to be used at sea both as a means of offence and defence. at fig. is shown in elevation the small sized harvey towing torpedo, in which all the latest improvements that have been devised are represented. _a_ is the case of the torpedo, formed of muntz's metal, but not provided, as the original ones were, with an exterior case of wood; by this alteration greater capacity combined with extreme lightness is obtained, which undoubtedly much enhances the value of the small size torpedo which is intended to be carried by and manoeuvred from boats; _b_ is the principal or after lever, hinged on the top of torpedo at _c_, and rests, when ready for action, in a crutch formed in the top of the exploding bolt _d_; _e_ is the foremost lever, hinged at _f_, and kept in position on the after lever _b_ by a groove formed in it and a lashing which passes through a slot in the principal lever, as at _g_; _h_ is the side lever, pivoted at _i_, and exerting a pressure on the firing bolt _d_ by means of a lanyard which is passed through the bolt _k_ and over the principal lever _b_; _l_ is the top lever, pivoted at _m_, and exerting a pressure on the bolt _d_ by means of a lanyard which is passed through the bolt _n_ and over the principal lever _b_; this top lever _l_ has been added to ensure the action of the torpedo, on its striking sideways against a vessel; _o_ and _t_ are handles, to the former of which the lashings of the levers _h_ and _l_ are secured; _p_ is the ring used for attaching the buoy rope; _r_, _r_ are two loading holes, made in the side of the torpedo case, by which a charge of gun-cotton may be quickly and efficiently stowed; this also is a new feature in the small size torpedo; _s_ is the rudder formed for the purpose of controlling the direction of the torpedo when the tow line is suddenly slacked. in regard to the large size torpedo, the construction of the case remains as in the original ones, the improvements being, the enlargement of the loading and fuze holes, and the addition of the top lever _l_, as shown at fig. . the small size torpedo is capable of holding lbs. of water, whilst the large size one will contain lbs. of water, or about lbs. and lbs. of gun-cotton respectively. the slings are made of best italian hemp, and consist of a span of four legs, which are secured to lugs at the corners of the torpedo and connected to an iron thimble, which is shown at fig. ; this thimble is made suitable for either wire or hemp rope, and is so arranged that should the seizing become slack, the parts of the slings cannot become detached from the thimble. [illustration: harvey's towing torpedo. plate xxx] the legs of the slings should be so fitted that when stretched alongside the torpedo they extend foot beyond the stem for the large torpedo and inches for the small one; the four legs should be so fitted that when an equal strain is brought on them, the thimble should be on a level with the upper lugs, and the upper fore span form an angle of ° to ° with the side of the torpedo; this is shown at fig. . this arrangement gives the best divergence with the least strain on the tow rope, and is suitable when the torpedo is kept at short scope, as well as when a long length of tow line is out. the mode of attaching the foremost and side levers is shown at fig. . before reeving the lanyards they should be well greased in the wake of the fair leads, but not where they are made fast. the lanyards should be made up like a reef point. care should be taken that the short arm of the side lever _h_ is brought close into the fair lead, and its lanyard should be set up sufficiently taut to give a slight spring in the principal lever _b_ by the strain thus brought on it. this lever _b_ has a steel fish on the top, in order to prevent it taking a permanent bend. if the side lever lanyard is properly set up, the bolt will spring down about / th of an inch when the safety key is withdrawn, owing to the spring in the lever, and the shrinking of the lanyard; this brings the muzzle / th of an inch nearer the pin without disturbing the side lever. the bolt is so arranged that the torpedo can be fired by either of the following methods:-- .--mechanically. .--electrically at will. .--electrically on contact or at will. _mechanically._--in this case the bottom of the inner cylinder, as at _a_, fig. , is fitted with the ordinary mechanical chemical fuze, ignition being effected by the breaking of the glass vessel containing the sulphuric acid on being forced into contact with the needle _n_, by the action of the levers on the torpedo striking a vessel. _electrically at will._--for this purpose a platinum wire fuze is used, one terminal being connected to earth through the bolt, the other to a wire leading up through the core of the bolt, and connected by means of an ebonite joint with a single cored electrical cable leading from the torpedo vessel. _electrically on contact, or at will._--in this case, a resistance coil is inserted in addition to the fuze, and is so arranged that on the bolt being forced down a short circuit is formed, cutting out the resistance coil (about ohms), and thus enabling the battery to fire the fuze, which, owing to the ohms resistance in the circuit, it was previously unable to effect. should the bolt so arranged be required to be fired at will, it is only necessary to put a more powerful battery in circuit, and so fire the fuze through the ohms resistance. _exploding bolt._--the exploding bolt is fitted to act with a pressure of from to lbs. on its head for the large size torpedo, and from to lbs. for the small size one. the bolts are all the same size, and differ only in the direction of the slot for the safety key _k_, being port or starboard bolts accordingly. the muzzle of the exploding bolt stands inch off the pin when in the safety position, that is, when the safety key rests on the brass work of the priming case. the safety key is secured in the slot of the exploding bolt, as shown at fig. , by eight or nine parts of strong whitey-brown thread secured to the key, passed round the bolt, and securely knotted; the parts of the thread should come away with the key, in order that none of the parts may be worked down the tube by the exploding bolt. in the event of the large torpedo being cut away in deep water after the withdrawal of the safety key, it will explode by pressure on the head of the bolt at about sixty fathoms depth; the small one at about thirty fathoms. _buoys._--the buoys are of two sizes, and are made of solid cork (such cork only being used as will ensure great floating power after being immersed for a time); each buoy is built upon a galvanised iron tube running longitudinally through; on the ends of the tube are screwed wooden cones, which bind all together, and render the buoy indestructible. two buoys are used for each torpedo, the larger buoys for the large size torpedo, and the smaller buoys for the small size torpedo. the buoy rope is of hemp, about five or six fathoms in length and two inches in circumference, an eye being spliced in the end nearest the torpedo; to this eye is bent the tow rope, with a single or double sheet bend forming the knot by which the torpedo is towed; the other end of the buoy rope is passed through one of the rings in the stern end of the torpedo (according to whether working in deep or shallow water), then through the tube of the first buoy, and an overhand knot made in the rear; then through the next buoy, and a knot in the rear of that. recently, captain harvey has adopted a large and a small buoy for each torpedo, the large one being practically sufficient, the smaller one being added in the event of the other one becoming sodden. _brakes._--the brakes are used for the purpose of controlling the tow ropes; they can be fixed by screws into the deck at the most convenient place for command, and in a properly constructed torpedo vessel would be placed below the water line, to prevent exposure of the men working them. they are so arranged as to admit of the tow rope being quickly veered, and at the same time are sufficiently powerful to bring the torpedo to the surface when required. success greatly depends on the skilful handling of these brakes, for in conjunction with the cork buoys they give the operator command of the depth at which the enemy is to be struck. unless a very high rate of speed is required, one handspike will control the tow rope; the other strap can be thrown off the drum, and the handspike allowed to lie on the deck ready to be thrown into gear, if necessary. the surface of the drum in contact with the strap should be powdered with rosin to increase the friction. the tow rope should be so reeled up that in veering the reel may revolve towards the men at the handspike. the spindle will contain several tow ropes, that, in the event of one torpedo being cut away, another can be immediately bent. the brake for small torpedo requires only one drum and handspike. it can be fitted to a steam launch by placing an extra thwart across near one of the others. care should be taken that the riding turns lie fairly over each other, to prevent a jamb when veering. the brakes, both large and small, are so made as to ensure durability, they being considered a part of the ship's furniture. brake for safety key line is a small reel on the same principle. when going a slow speed, it may not be necessary, as the safety key line can be attended by hand; but when going ten or eleven knots, it will be found of considerable advantage, both in keeping the bight of the safety key line from dragging astern, thereby lessening the divergence of the torpedo, and also in drawing the safety key when a strong stop is used. _arrangements for launching and towing the torpedoes._--a yard across either the main or mizen mast of a torpedo vessel, from to feet above the water line, is a very convenient method for launching and towing. the leading block on the yard, through which the tow rope is rove, may be fitted to a traveller on the yard with an inhaul and outhaul, that the distance out from the ship's side may be regulated as convenient. in a large vessel, the leading block for tow rope can be fixed to the end of the quarter-boat's davits. the brakes for commanding the tow rope should be screwed firmly to the deck. in a vessel properly constructed for the service, they would be on the lower deck, the tow rope having been led along the yard, and down each side of the mast. a leading block for the tow rope is placed on the deck by span or bolt a few feet in front of the brake. the safety key reel, if used, must be fixed in a convenient position on deck, that the man attending it can see how to control it; in a properly constructed vessel he would be in the pilot house. the safety key line leads through a small leading block on the ensign staff or some convenient point abaft the lead of the tow rope, to feet above the water. the leading block on the yard may be fitted with a lizard, if thought necessary. a sharp instrument should be kept by the brakes ready to sever the tow rope. in large men of war, arrangements are made for carrying a loaded torpedo and two buoys in a convenient position on each side of the vessel, in such a manner that the tow line can be bent, the exploding bolt screwed in, the levers adjusted, and the torpedoes and buoys dropped simultaneously when required. _preparing the torpedoes for use._--the torpedoes, port and starboard, loaded and ballasted, having been hoisted out of the torpedo room, are placed on the deck on their own sides, with their heads forward under the leading block, and the buoys placed abaft them and strung together; the exploding bolts are now entered into the torpedoes, and forced down until their safety keys rest on the brass work, taking care that each safety key points in the direction of the eye through which its lanyard has to pass; the levers are now secured by their lanyards, as explained at pages and . the eye at the end of the buoy rope is now rove through the large or small ring in the stern end of the torpedo. the tow rope having been previously rove through the leading block on the deck and on the yard, is rove through the thimble of the slings from forward aft, and bent, with a single or double sheet bend, to the eye of the buoy rope. the safety key line having been previously rove through the leading block on the ensign staff, and the lanyard on the safety key having been led through the eye of the handle, making a fair lead with the slit in the bolt, are bent together with a double sheet bend, and stopped to the eye of the handle by a split yarn of suitable strength, the yarn having been first secured to the line by a round turn outside the bend. the line should also be stopped with another split yarn round all parts of the slings close up to the thimble, having first made an overhand knot in the line at a distance a few inches longer than that between the eye bolt and the thimble. the crew having been stationed at their respective posts, the handles having been shipped on the tow reel, the tow line is then reeled up until the torpedo will launch clear, and swing out under the leading block on the yard. hold the torpedo by the handspikes, and take off the handles of the brake. in swinging out, care should be taken that in starting from the deck the fore slings do not foul the fore top lever. the stern of the torpedo can be steadied by keeping a slight strain on the buoy rope. the safety key line must be kept clear, and not checked, or it might break the stop and draw out the key before intended. the buoys must be placed in a proper position and hands stationed by them to launch them overboard the instant the torpedo takes the water. it would be better to stop the screw, if circumstances would allow of it, when lowering the torpedo and buoys into the water, to prevent the chance of the buoys fouling the screw. the torpedo, on reaching the water, will _immediately_ diverge clear of the ship; the buoys being launched, as the strain comes on the buoy rope, they will be towed clear away from the screw, and full speed may be put on at once. the men at the handspikes must veer steadily, occasionally checking the torpedo, that it may be kept near the surface, and not allowed to dive, which it will do if the tow rope is slacked up altogether, and then a sudden strain brought on it. eventually it will come to the surface, when the bow is pointed up by the strain on the tow rope; greater the speed the more quickly will it be brought to the surface. in shallow water this should be particularly attended to, as in diving it might strike the bottom and injure the levers, and, if the safety key has been withdrawn, explode; moreover, it brings an undue strain on the tow rope. the torpedo can now be gradually veered out to the distance required, the safety key line so attended that a sufficient strain is kept on it as not to allow of a long bight of line dragging astern of the torpedo; at the same time having due regard to the strength of the yarn by which the line is stopped to the handle of the torpedo. the distance veered must depend upon the nature of attack. the tow line should be marked with knots every fathoms: under some circumstances the torpedo would be close to the ship until passing the enemy; at other times veered to fathoms it will be found most suitable. the full divergence of ° is obtained up to fathoms; beyond that the bight of the tow rope in the water drags the torpedo astern, unless the tow rope is triced much higher up, which has its disadvantage; to fathoms of tow rope gives the best command of the torpedo, veering or fathoms of tow line suddenly will always sink the torpedo some feet below the surface. should it become necessary to use the torpedoes with a stern board, they can be so used, but in this case the port torpedo is used on the starboard, bow and starboard on the port; all other arrangements being exactly the same. in rough weather, advantage should be taken of the roll, and the torpedo allowed to swing out from the yard, and be let go by the run, checking the tow rope immediately the torpedo is in the water. it is not absolutely necessary to ease the vessel when launching; the torpedo can be launched at full speed. in the event of its being found necessary to cut adrift the torpedo, in consequence of coming suddenly across a friendly vessel, the tow rope should be cut near the brake, and if the buoy rope has been rove through the large stern ring, the torpedo will sink and be lost, the buoy only remaining. if the buoy rope has been rove through the small stern ring, the torpedo will be suspended by the buoy rope; and should the safety key not have been withdrawn, can be recovered with safety. in the event of wishing to recover it when the buoy rope has been rove through the large ring, a toggle must be lashed on the tow rope abaft the leading block on the yard, when it can be recovered by the buoy rope; as a general rule, however, it will be found best to expend the torpedo, and not attempt its recovery. [illustration: harvey's towing torpedo. plate xxxi] [illustration: systems of attack with harvey's towing torpedo. plate xxxii] _recovering the torpedo._--should the safety key have been withdrawn, great caution is necessary. tongs, shown at fig. , for going round the upper part of the bolt, to take the place of the safety key, when once clasped and secured round the bolt, render the torpedo safe to handle; this could only be done from a boat. with the safety key in, there is no danger in hoisting it inboard again by its own tow rope, and hoisting up the buoys at the same time with a grapnel. _different methods of using the torpedo._--there are two methods of employing the torpedo, either of which may be adopted, according to circumstances. .--when it is towed with a length of line varying from to fathoms, and dipped when in position to strike the attacked vessel. .--when it is kept suspended from the yard, &c., and dropped at the spot, where according to the first method it would have been dipped. in the first method, it is not necessary to withdraw the safety key till just before dipping; in the second method the safety key line is belayed at about twenty fathoms, and the key withdrawn when the line is tautened by the ship going ahead. _tactics._--description of the various attacks that may be made with the harvey torpedo against a ship at anchor or under way. in the following diagrams _t_ is the torpedo vessel, _s_ the ship attacked. [illustration] ...... the track. ------ the tow rope. o-o-o the torpedo. _attacking a vessel moored head and stern._--in this case the torpedo vessel steers in for the bow or quarter of the vessel attacked, according to the direction of the current, and on the side approached launches the torpedo between the moorings, as at _a_; leaving the tow rope slack, the torpedo vessel proceeds ahead or astern against the current, and when at a sufficient distance off, the tow rope is held fast, which will cause the torpedo to diverge into contact with the vessel attacked, as shown by fig. . _attacking a vessel at anchor by crossing her bow._--in this case the torpedo is sufficiently diverged when near to the vessel with a good scope of tow rope out. after having crossed her bow, proceeding onwards, the tow rope will be brought obliquely across her cable, and the torpedo will swing into her, as shown at fig. . it may be here remarked, that in all cases the depth of the explosion can be obtained by the sudden slacking of the tow rope; and the tow rope once under the keel, causes the torpedo to be hauled down near to it before exploding. _attacking a vessel at anchor by coming up from astern on either side._--in this case the torpedo is launched when on the quarter of the vessel attacked, as at _a_, the tow rope left slack. after steaming ahead some distance, hold fast the tow rope, when, by continuing to steam on, the torpedo will diverge into contact with the bottom of the vessel attacked, as shown at fig. . _when skilfully performed_, the total destruction of the enemy is certain, since the torpedo is springing from a depth to the surface, and will, in consequence, strike near her keel. the torpedo vessel can pass at her greatest speed, and, if thought necessary, near enough to clear away any of the ordinary obstructions, such as booms, nets, &c. _passing down between two lines of vessels at anchor._--in this case it would be impossible to fire at the torpedo vessel, for fear of injury to their friends. two or more torpedo vessels following each other with preconcerted signals would cause great destruction. see fig. . _attacking a vessel in motion from right ahead._--in this case two torpedoes are launched, port and starboard, each diverging to its full extent; when passing the vessel attacked, one or the other of the tow ropes is brought across the cut-water, and by the simultaneous motion of the two vessels in opposite directions, the torpedo is brought alongside of or under the bottom of the vessel attacked, as shown at fig. . the torpedo vessel should keep the masts of her enemy in one until close to, when either torpedo will be used, according to the movement of the enemy. at the time of the tow rope taking the cut-water, the brake is suddenly eased up; the tow rope will then pass under the bottom, when by checking the tow rope the torpedo will be hauled under the bottom. to execute this attack, judgment, skill, and nerve of the highest order will be required, as the risk of being run down will be imminent. _the attack from astern._--in this case two torpedoes are launched, and diverged as in the previous case; it is assumed in this instance that the torpedo vessel can outspeed the vessel attacked, which will enable her to bring a torpedo under the run of the attacked vessel, as shown at fig. . [illustration: systems of attack with harvey's towing torpedo. plate xxxiii] [illustration: systems of attack with harvey's towing torpedo. plate xxxiv] _if chased by a hostile vessel, and unable to face her._--in this case veer a torpedo astern, having first obtained a position a little on the bow of the chasing vessel. when it is known by the length of the tow rope out that the torpedo is about abreast of her bow, hold fast the tow rope, which will cause the torpedo to diverge, and be brought into contact, as shown at fig. . as a last resort drop spanned torpedoes. torpedoes can be used with a stern board, if necessary. the port torpedo, in this case, will be launched on the starboard side, and the starboard on the port side. it should be here remarked that, although great speed is essential in the torpedo vessel to come up with the enemy and choose an advantageous position, it is not advisable to tow the torpedoes, if it can be avoided, at a greater speed than knots; because the strain brought upon the towing gear is excessive, and the torpedo would require a large addition of ballast to keep it sufficiently immersed to attain the full divergence. there is, however, one style of attack in which the highest speed can be maintained, viz. by dropping the torpedo alongside in passing. this mode of attack is one of the best, particularly under cover of darkness, against a ship at anchor. the position of the torpedo is known, and the tow line is never in contact with the enemy during the operation; a skilled hand at the brakes is all that is required, the vessel keeping a straight course at the highest speed, passing as close as possible to the enemy, in order to clear away all obstructions. the tow rope must not be checked by the brake too suddenly. _defensive purposes._--the harvey torpedo may be used as a means of defence by large ships against a torpedo vessel attacking with that species of submarine weapon, as the latter would be forced to pass outside the former vessel's torpedo, and thus decrease the chance of a successful dip. again, in the case of an attack by the ram, these torpedoes afford some protection, as a deterrent. _night time._--though a dark night and tempestuous are favourable to a surprise, yet in the case of a harvey torpedo attack it is essential that the weapon should be seen to dip it at the proper time, therefore daylight is necessary to this species of torpedo attack. _value of the harvey torpedo._--the harvey torpedo is undoubtedly of considerable value when _ably handled_, yet the skill and judgment required is very great, and can only be acquired by _constant_ practice. _description of the menzing towing torpedo._--this modified form of the harvey towing torpedo was designed by captain menzing, of the german navy, to remedy what is considered by the germans as the chief defect of that weapon, viz. its liability to injure friendly vessels, and also to do away with the necessity of using two torpedoes, one for each side of a ship. at fig. is shown a plan and elevation of this towing torpedo. _a_ is the body of the torpedo, somewhat similar to the harvey, but narrower at the stern, and bevelled on both sides towards the bow; _b_ is an iron frame placed in the bow, capable of being turned either to the right or left; _c_ is the hole for the introduction of the fuze, and _d_ is the loading hole; _e_ is a rudder placed at the stern of the torpedo; _f_, _f_ are levers, by pressure against which the torpedo may be fired mechanically, or electrically at will; these levers are connected to a block of wood fitted with stops to prevent them being pushed too far over; _s_ and _p_ are two towing ropes, one on each side of the torpedo, which pass from its stern through the point of the frame _b_, and thence to the vessel, these are also connected to the rudder _e_ in such a manner that on either of the ropes _s_ and _p_ being tautened the rudder _e_ is turned in the opposite direction; _w_ is an electric cable, strong enough to bear the whole pressure of the torpedo when being towed right aft. to diverge the torpedo on the starboard quarter of the ship, the line _s_ must be slackened, and the whole towing strain brought on the rope _p_, causing the frame _b_ to be pulled over to a knot _k_ in the rope _p_, made at the proper position to ensure the torpedo towing at the correct angle from the course of the vessel, and at the same time causing the rudder _e_ to be turned to starboard; this is shown at fig. by the dotted lines. to diverge the torpedo on the port quarter, the towing rope _p_ would be slackened and the whole strain brought on the rope _s_, and an action opposite to that already described would be the result. two cork buoys are used, similar to those employed with the harvey torpedo; one being attached at a distance of feet from the stern of the torpedo, and the other at such a distance astern that the torpedo would be placed at a distance below the surface to allow of safety to a friendly vessel. [illustration: german and french towing torpedoes. plate xxxv] the torpedo is manipulated in a similar manner to the harvey, the circuit being closed at the moment of the first buoy disappearing, at which time the torpedo would be about ten feet below the surface. the two buoys are together capable of supporting the torpedo, and thus by means of the second one it may be picked up, should it be necessary to cut the towing ropes. _description of the french towing torpedo._--the towing torpedo used by the french is represented in section and plan at fig. . _a_ is the body of the torpedo, formed of wood enclosed in a thin steel case; _b_ is the head made of cork; _c_ is the case containing the charge, which is generally lbs. of dynamite, this case is supported by the bolt _d_ resting on the plate _e_; _f_, _f_ are whiskers, which are connected to the plate _e_; _g_ and _h_ are hollow tubes, one end of _g_ being attached to the case _e_, and one end of _h_ to the rear end of the body of the torpedo _a_, and they are so arranged that when the case _c_ is released, its weight will draw out the tube _g_, which slides along the tube _h_ to nearly the full extent of the latter; _k_, _k_ are bolts, to which the towing sling is attached; _l_ is the fuze, and _n_ is a small gun used for firing the torpedo at will. the hole in the plate _e_ through which the bolt _d_ passes is larger than the latter, so that when the plate is moved backwards by pressure being applied to the whiskers the bolt is freed from support, and case _c_ attached to it falls. the modes of firing are as follows:-- .--the automatic plan of firing is effected by the tube _h_, after it has fallen a certain distance, corresponding to a depth of feet for the case _c_, drawing down by means of a line attached to it a plug contained in the body _a_, which completes the circuit of the firing battery. .--the plan of releasing the charge at will is effected by means of the small gun _n_, which is fired by electricity, and by its firing forces back the plate _e_, thus releasing the charge, which is then exploded, as previously explained. _locomotive torpedoes._--by "locomotive" torpedoes are meant those that possess within themselves the power to move through the water, when once started in a given direction. of this species of submarine weapons, the following are the most efficient and are the ones most generally used:-- .--the whitehead fish torpedo. .--the lay torpedo. _invention and adoption of the fish torpedo._--the idea developed by the fish torpedo is due to an austrian marine artillery officer, who is now dead. in , mr. robert whitehead, then superintendent of iron works at fiume, acting upon the suggestions of a captain lupuis of the austrian army, commenced a series of experiments to ascertain the practical value of the above idea, the result being a fish torpedo, commonly called "the whitehead," which though far inferior to the fish torpedo of the present day, was then considered to be a fearful and wonderful weapon. the austrians were the first to purchase this weapon, and two years later, in , mr. whitehead came to england, and prosecuted numerous experiments with his fish torpedo under the supervision of several english officers, and on the th of october of the same year he succeeded in completely destroying an old hulk moored at the mouth of the medway. the fairly successful results of these experiments induced the english government to purchase the secret and several of mr. whitehead's fish torpedoes, under the following conditions:-- .--the right of manufacturing them in england. .--to be kept fully informed of all improvements, as soon as made. .--the right of using all such improvements. and the total amount paid to mr. k. whitehead at that time was the sum of seventeen thousand five hundred pounds, which did not include the sum of two thousand five hundred pounds claimed for the expenses attendant on the medway experiments. since then a large number of whitehead's fish torpedoes have been purchased from time to time, especially during the turco-russian war, when some two hundred were ordered, also great numbers have been manufactured at woolwich. the english fish torpedo, as far as can be ascertained, is a vastly superior weapon to the whitehead fish torpedo, possessing as it does increased speed, and therefore far greater accuracy. besides austria and england, nearly all the european governments have purchased the whitehead secret and torpedoes, but in the case of some of them, the last two clauses of the english conditions of purchase were omitted. [illustration: whitehead's fish torpedo. plate xxxvi] the turkish is the only government that has obtained the whitehead secret and torpedoes without paying for it. this was managed as follows:-- "on the night of the th of december, , the russians made an attack with whitehead torpedoes on an ottoman squadron lying in the harbour of batoum, but owing to a want of practical knowledge of the manipulation of such weapons, no vessels were sunk or damaged, but two fish torpedoes, one in perfect condition, were found the next morning high and dry on the beach at that place." the american government have up to the present time not sanctioned the purchase of the costly whitehead torpedo, preferring their own locomotive torpedo, which will be fully described further on. on a government purchasing the fish torpedo, a certain number of their naval or military officers are sent to fiume in austria, where mr. r. whitehead's manufactories are situated, and where the necessary very exhaustive experiments with his torpedoes are carried out, and are there thoroughly instructed in the manipulation of these machines, and are also supplied with a double set of drawings of the various parts of the torpedo. these officers, and all others whom it may be necessary to initiate into the mysteries of the whitehead secret, are bound on their honour not to divulge it. _employment of fish torpedoes in war._--the fish torpedo has been employed on actual service on three known occasions only, in two of which it failed to fulfil its deadly mission. on the th of may, , a whitehead fish torpedo was fired by h.m.s. _shah_ against the peruvian ironclad _huascar_, but failed to strike her, owing to the latter vessel altering her course at the moment of the torpedo being discharged. the next instance of the employment of the whitehead torpedo was that one mentioned at page . the last and only successful attempt yet made occurred on the th of january, , when the russian steamer _constantine_ fired a whitehead torpedo against a turkish guard vessel off the harbour of batoum, and completely destroyed her. _description of torpedo._--a general view of the whitehead fish torpedo is shown at fig. . it is divided into three parts, connected together by screws. .--the charge chamber. .--the adjustment chamber, in which is placed what is known as the secret. .--the air and engine chamber. vertical and horizontal steel fins are fitted for the purpose of maintaining the torpedo in an upright position whilst passing through the discharge tube, or frame; the former fins run nearly the whole length of the weapon, while the latter are considerably shorter. the motive power of the torpedo is compressed air, forced by means of a powerful steam air compressing pump into a portion of the steel chamber ( ) at a tension of upwards of pounds to the square inch, which is equivalent to about sixty atmospheres, and which by means of a set of small three cylinder brotherhood engines, contained in the steel chamber ( ), drives two screw propellers. these engines are capable of exerting a force of forty indicated horses, and yet only weigh about thirty-five pounds, from which it will be understood that to attain these results the workmanship and materials employed in their manufacture are of the very highest order and fineness. the torpedo is made of various sizes, ranging from ' long and " maximum diameter to ' long and " maximum diameter. _capabilities of the fish torpedo._--the capabilities of the fish torpedo are as follows:-- .--if adjusted for a certain depth, from to feet, and projected from above water, or if started from the surface, or if discharged from a submerged tube, it will rapidly attain that depth, and maintain it during the run. .--if fired in still water, it will make a straight run in the line of projection, provided that an allowance has been made for the deflection due to transverse currents. .--it can be adjusted to stop after having run any distance up to its extreme range, and after stopping to sink, float, or explode. .--its range and speed vary considerably, according to the pattern of the torpedo. -------+----------------------------------------------+----------------- | whitehead fish torpedo. | woolwich fish | | torpedo. +--------------+---------------+---------------+----------------- | ' long, " | ' long, " | ' long, " | · ' long, " | max. diam. | max. diam. | max. diam. | max. diam. yards. | one screw. | two screws. | two screws. | two screws. -------+--------------+---------------+---------------+----------------- | .. | .. | knots. | - / knots. | - / knots. | .. | .. | .. | .. | - / knots. | - / knots. | - / knots. | knots. | .. | knots. | knots. | .. | knots. | .. | knots. | .. | - / knots. | .. | .. | knots. | .. | - / knots. | knots. | .. | knots. | .. | - / knots. -------+--------------+---------------+---------------+----------------- pressure of air in engines varies for distance and speed from atmospheres to atmospheres. _placing the charge._--the explosive is generally placed in what is termed the cartridge case, which case is similar in shape to the interior of the charge chamber ( ), and is fixed thereto by means of wooden wedges. _ignition._--the method of ignition is mechanical, and is arranged as follows:--extending from the nose of the torpedo to the cartridge case is a tube terminating in a copper case, in which is placed the priming charge and detonating composition; within this tube is a steel rod some feet long, fitted with a needle point at its inner end, and its outer end screwed into a frame; this frame is capable of moving in and out, and is connected with a spiral spring which tends to force it, and consequently the steel rod, or striker, inwards. by compressing this spiral spring, the inner end of the frame is butted against a catch, by which it is prevented from acting. on this catch being released, no matter by what means, the spring is brought into action and forces the frame and steel striker inwards, the needle point of the latter coming into contact with the detonator fires the priming charge, and so explodes the torpedo. the foremost extremity of the torpedo, which is termed the nose piece, is so fitted that it is capable of being forced inwards, but in a position of rest its inner edge is just clear of the catch. on a pressure being brought on the nose piece in a direct line with the length of the torpedo, it will be forced inwards, the result being the releasing of the catch and explosion of the torpedo. in addition to the nose piece, horizontal and vertical levers, or whiskers, may also be used, a slight pressure on either of which will similarly effect the explosion of the torpedo; also cutters for penetrating nets, &c., are fitted to the nose piece when desired. _safety wedge and key._--for safety purposes a wedge is employed, which when in the safety position prevents the catch from acting; this wedge is so arranged that it may be withdrawn by the action of the machinery after the torpedo has run a certain distance, and also may be replaced by similar means in the safety position on the completion of the run. as an additional precaution a safety key is used, which is inserted in the head of the torpedo through the spring of the frame. _description of adjustment apparatus._--for adjusting the length of range for withdrawing and replacing the safety wedge, &c., the following apparatus is employed. two cog wheels, a large and a small one, are fixed on the upper part of the after end of the torpedo, just in front of the screw propellers: the small wheel is fitted with a certain number of teeth, thirty for instance, which gears into an endless screw attached to the propeller in such a manner that one revolution of the propeller moves the wheel one tooth, therefore thirty revolutions would turn the wheel one complete revolution. the big wheel is fitted with much larger teeth than the small one, and by means of a pin on the latter wheel is moved round one tooth for every complete revolution of the small wheel, and clamped in this new position by a spring catch, which is also worked by the pin on the small wheel. in front of these wheels is a stud which works fore and aft in a slot, and attached to a spring which tends to draw it to the after end of the slot. this stud is connected by means of a wire rod to the valve that admits the compressed air to the engines; when the stud is in the fore part of the slot the valve is open, and when in the after part it is closed. _adjusting length of range._--by means of a lever the spring of the stud is compressed, and the stud moved to the fore part of the slot; then the big wheel is moved round until a stud on its face is the required number of teeth above the lever. for every thirty revolutions of the propeller, and consequently one tooth of the big wheel, a certain known distance is traversed, which varies according to the pattern of the torpedo. _adjusting apparatus._--when the propeller has made the number of revolutions corresponding to the length of range required, and consequently has moved the big wheel the number of teeth it was set above the lever, the stud on the big wheel presses against the lever and so releases the spring in the slot, causing the slot stud to fly from the fore part to the after part of the slot, by which action the valve admitting the compressed air to the engines is closed, and consequently the engines cease to work. attached to the axle of the big wheel is a small brass arm, which is connected by means of a brass rod to the safety wedge, and is so arranged that after the required number of revolutions of the propeller, the safety wedge will be drawn out; or it may be drawn out at the instant of the torpedo leaving the tube, carriage, &c. also by means of an additional lever at the fore part of the torpedo, which is connected by means of a wire rod to the valve that admits the air to the engines, and by arranging the attachment of the safety wedge to the brass rod from the big wheel, so that on the wedge being withdrawn it is released from that brass rod, on the torpedo having completed its run, the action of closing the valve which admits the air to the engines causes the additional lever to force the wedge into the safety position. _torpedo to float at end of run._--this is due to the difference of buoyancy at the end of a run from what it was at the commencement, owing to the compressed air being used in working the engines. _torpedo to sink at end of run._--this is effected by means of the adjustment chamber ( ), in the after end of which there is a spiral spring valve, which can be attached to the brass rod on the outside of the torpedo that works the valve which admits air to the engines, in such a way that on the valve being closed, and therefore the run of the torpedo completed, the spiral spring valve is opened, admitting water to the adjustment chamber ( ) of sufficient amount to sink the torpedo. _to explode the torpedo at end of run._--this is effected by connecting the vertical firing whisker to the rod which otherwise would be connected to the safety wedge lever, by which means, on the valve admitting air to the engines being closed, a force is transmitted to the vertical whisker instead of to the safety wedge lever, and consequently the torpedo is exploded. _adjusting the depth._--a small wheel, the face of which is marked in feet, is placed on the left side of the fore part of the adjustment chamber ( ). to adjust for depth, by means of a key turn the wheel until the number corresponding to the depth of run required is opposite the pointer. the torpedo is maintained at the desired depth by means of certain mechanical apparatus contained within the adjustment chamber ( ), and which constitutes what is termed the secret of the fish torpedo. this chamber is connected by screws to the foremost and after chambers of the torpedo, in such a manner that by means of a number of small holes bored round the circumference, as shown at ( ), fig. , the faces of the chamber are exposed to the pressure of the water, which varies with the depth to which the torpedo descends. within the adjustment chamber is an endless strong spiral spring, attached to the after face of the chamber, and so arranged that after being set to a certain tension, capable of resisting an equivalent pressure on the outside of the aforesaid face, any increase or decrease in this exterior pressure will cause the spiral spring to work a rod by which the horizontal rudders of the torpedo are regulated, and thus the desired depth for which the spring is set is maintained. the course of the torpedo is represented by a series of curves, above and below the line, representing the depth it is set for, these curves gradually decreasing until at yards' distance from where the torpedo was started the curves are so small that the path of the torpedo is almost identical to that of a straight line. within this adjustment chamber is also placed an automatic balance, which also assists to maintain the torpedo at the desired depth, by reason of its swinging forward on the torpedo descending, and swinging aft on its rising, which motion is used to regulate the horizontal rudders. the above is merely a general idea of the arrangement used in the whitehead fish torpedo, to enable it to reach and maintain whatever depth it may be necessary to use it at from to feet. _projecting the torpedo._--the fish torpedo may be projected in various ways, viz.:-- .--through a submerged tube in the stem, or on the broadside. .--from a carriage above the surface. .--from the surface. _discharging torpedo through a submerged tube in the stem._--in this case a tube is fitted to an orifice in the stem; this opening is as far below the water line as possible, and is closed by a watertight cap and a sluice valve; the inner end of the tube is fitted with a watertight door; the torpedo being prepared for action is placed inside the tube, the inner door closed, and the tube filled with water; then the watertight cap and sluice valve are opened, and the torpedo started by means of a piston which is worked by compressed air. this piston can be worked from deck, and so the torpedo fired at the proper instant. to prevent the torpedo from slipping out of the tube, a stop is placed in the fore end of it, which can be withdrawn at the same time as the compressed air is admitted behind the piston. the torpedo being clear of the tube, the sluice valve and watertight cap are closed, and the tube emptied of the water, the projecting piston being at the same time forced back. _on the broadside._--in this case, the discharging tube works inside an iron casing, through a stuffing box at the inner end, and in a shield attached to the outer end of the tube. this shield, placed on the fore side of the orifice, is of such a length as to protect the torpedo from the pressure of the water passing the vessel. the mode of discharging the torpedo in this case is similar to that used when projecting it through the stem. _comparison of the stem and broadside methods of projecting the torpedo._--the former method of projecting the torpedo seems the most suitable to specially built torpedo vessels, but not so to large ironclads, on account of the difficulty of fitting a tube to the stem of such a ship, and also that in so doing the efficiency of the vessel as a ram would be impaired. in regard to the accuracy of the firing of the above methods, both seem equally good, though in the case of firing on the broadside it would be necessary to prepare carefully calculated tables of deflection, any mistake in the using of which would be fatal to a successful torpedo shot. _projecting a torpedo from above water._--in this case an iron carriage is used, which is fitted with a frame, in which the torpedo rests; the outer end of this frame is provided with a lip, some few feet long, by which means the rear end of the torpedo is slightly canted up on leaving the frame, and any undue strain on the tail of the torpedo is prevented. the frame is mounted in the iron carriage in such a way that it can be elevated or depressed by means of a screw, as in the case of a gun mounted in an ordinary carriage. the torpedo is ejected from the frame by means of a piston as previously explained, a small reservoir of air being attached to the carriage, so that it can be used at any port. _firing a torpedo from the surface._--the torpedo possesses sufficient buoyancy to float with a small portion of its upper surface above water; such being the case, it is only necessary to set the various adjustments, point it in the required direction, and by hand turn back the lever on the upper part of the weapon (which opens a communication between the air chamber and the engines), when it will instantly dart off and very rapidly attain the depth it is set for. _method of firing a fish torpedo from a boat._--to manipulate a fish torpedo from a boat, it may be carried in a light frame, which can be lowered or raised by means of a pair of davits. when required to discharge the torpedo, the frame containing it is lowered into the water, so as to bring the torpedo about two feet below the surface, the head being somewhat lower than the tail. _thornycroft's method of firing fish torpedoes from a boat._--another method, which has been patented by mr. j. i. thornycroft, of the firm of j. i. thornycroft and co., steam launch builders, and which is fitted to the torpedo boats built by them for foreign governments, is shown in elevation and plan at figs. and . the apparatus consists of two or more bent levers _a_ securely and rigidly fixed on a shaft _b_, which works in bearings fixed on the deck of the vessel _c_ from which the torpedo is to be discharged. on the ends of the levers _a_ furthest from the shaft _b_ are pivoted other levers _d_, to which the cradle or case _e_ for sustaining the torpedo is suspended. the other ends of each of these levers are connected to the vessel by means of rods or tubes _f_, jointed at each end in such a way that when the shaft _b_ is made to revolve in its bearings, the case containing the torpedo is guided over the side of the vessel and close to it, and is held in a position convenient for discharging the torpedo, as shown at fig. . the shaft _b_ may be made to revolve by means of ropes _g_ and pulleys _h_ attached to the levers _a_, or by hydraulic or steam pressure, as may be found most convenient. the torpedo case can be towed alongside the vessel if necessary without deranging the apparatus. the torpedo case is carried in the angles of the bent levers, and is stowed away so that neither it nor the suspending levers project at all beyond the hull of the vessel; also when lowered, the levers and suspending rods fold over one another so as to occupy very little space, and the torpedo is suspended close to the hull. also the torpedo during the operation of lowering as well as when in a firing position remains close to the side of the vessel, thereby obviating any risk or inconvenience from excessive leverage which would have a tendency to capsize the boat. for especially built torpedo launches, the above mode of carrying and launching the fish torpedo is certainly the best yet devised. _woolwich fish torpedo._--in the woolwich torpedo, the engines exert a force of nearly indicated horses, and work up to revolutions per minute; the total weight of the torpedo fully charged ( lbs. of gun-cotton) is about lbs. [illustration: thornicroft's boat apparatus for fish torpedoes. plate xxxvii] the whitehead fish torpedo costs about _l._, while the woolwich one costs only _l._ _the lay torpedo boat._--priority of invention of this torpedo was on the th of june, , awarded by the commissioners of patents to mr. john louis lay, several other persons having claimed the invention, among whom was colonel von scheliha, an officer of the russian army. this locomotive torpedo, or more properly called torpedo boat, has been for several years adopted by the american government, during which time it has undergone a series of exhaustive experiments, which has proved it to be a most valuable and efficient weapon of offence and defence. lately the russian government have adopted it, and intend using it extensively in the defence of their harbours, &c. _general description of the torpedo._--at fig. is shown a longitudinal section of a lay torpedo boat constructed and provided with guiding and controlling apparatus, and with means for propelling it by ammoniacal gas. fig. is a horizontal section of the same; _a_ is the hull or body of the boat, which has conical ends _a_^{ }, _a_^{ }, and is formed of thin plate iron, or steel, or other suitable material. the section in the end _a_^{ } forms the magazine containing the charge of dynamite or other explosive material; _a_^{ } is the section containing the gas reservoir or holder; the compartment _a_^{ } contains the apparatus for holding and paying out the electric cable; the compartment _a_^{ } in the end _a_^{ } contains the motor engine, the steering apparatus, and other parts to be hereinafter described. all of these compartments or sections are separated from each other by means of air-tight bulkheads _a_^{ }. the torpedo boat may be propelled by means of a single screw, double screw, or two screws. in the latter method, which is shown at figs. and , the propellers _b_ and _c_ are made to revolve in opposite directions; the shaft _d_ of the propeller _b_ is hollow or tubular, and the shaft _e_ of the screw _c_ passes through the same; these screws are actuated by an engine shown at _f._ _h_, _h_ are the horizontal rudders, or side wings, two forward and two aft; these wings are mounted on shafts or spindles passing transversely through the boat; these rudders may be set to occupy a horizontal position, or a more or less inclined position in the proper direction, to cause the submerging of the boat by the action of the water on the said rudders as the boat moves forward, and they are adjusted before starting. _n_, _n_ are two guide rods, one aft and one forward, which project up from the boat to enable the operator to determine its position at any part of its run, and in the case of a night attack they are provided with lights; the said rods can be raised or lowered at the will of the operator. _q_ is the electric cable, which affords a medium of communication between the operator on shore, &c., and the torpedo boat, whereby it may be started, stopped, steered, fired, and has her position ascertained; this cable is carried in the boat in a coil arranged longitudinally in the air-tight chamber _a_^{ } in the reel frame _r_, and is payed out as the torpedo progresses through a tube _s_, projecting aft under the boat and beyond the rudders and propellers, so that the said cable will not be fouled by the same; or it may be payed out through a hollow shaft in the centre of the boat. one end of this cable is connected to a keyboard at the station on shore or on board of the ship or other structure from which the torpedo boats are controlled. this keyboard is provided with a suitable battery or other means for generating the electric current, as hereinafter described. the said cable is composed of several wires, each of which is insulated from the others. one of these wires is connected with the mechanism for starting and stopping the boat, one is connected with the steering apparatus, one serves for indicating to the operator at all times the exact position of the rudder, one is connected with mechanism for elevating and depressing the said guide rods, and one serves for firing the charge in the magazine. the motive power for effecting the necessary movements of the mechanism or apparatus in performing the above operations is obtained from the aforesaid engines, which are provided with suitable valves arranged in combination with electro magnets, shunts, and the devices connected with the said wires of the cable, as hereinafter set forth. this form of cable has since been replaced by one which consists of two wires only, the one for performing all of the necessary operations, exclusive of the firing or exploding of the magazine, and the other exclusively for this latter purpose. this improvement is effected by employing a series of relays or resistance coils, or a multiple, or compound relay in the boat. the advantages gained by this improved form of cable are:-- .--increased flexibility. .--a greater length of cable may be coiled in a given space. .--a thicker coat of insulating material may be used, thereby more perfectly insulating it. .--it is much cheaper. two rudders are generally used, one below and one above the boat, as shown at _u_, fig. . these rudders are operated and controlled by means of a small auxiliary engine _t_, fig. , which is started, stopped, and reversed by the electric current conducted through the cable _q_ in connection with magnets attached directly to a valve forming part of the said engine. this valve is so actuated by the magnets that when the current passes in one direction the engine _t_ will move the rudder to starboard, and when the current acts in the opposite direction it will turn the rudder to port. the mechanism for firing the charge in the magazine _a_^{ } is clearly shown in fig. , and operates as follows:--projecting from the front extremity or stem of the boat is a rod or pin _v_, which extends through a suitable packing box _w_ into the said magazine or charge chamber; when the boat strikes an object, the said rod is forced inward into contact with the springs or points _x_, thereby closing an electrical circuit and igniting a cartridge, shown at _y_, in the magazine. the charge in the magazine can also be fired at any moment by the operator on shore closing a circuit on the keyboard and thereby cutting out one of two resistance coils placed in the circuit to prevent accidental or premature discharge--that is to say, there are two resistance coils. the battery is not sufficiently powerful to fire through both resistance coils at the same time. when the boat strikes an object, the resistance coil in the magazine is cut out by the driving inward of the rod _v_, as above described; the battery then fires through the one on the keyboard. on the other hand, if the operator desires to fire the torpedo boat before she touches the object of attack, he manipulates the switch to cut out the coil in the keyboard, the charge then being fired through the coil in the magazine. this arrangement of the two resistance coils is very effectual in preventing accidents. in some instances the magazine is made detachable from the hull of the boat, so that on striking an object it will descend or drop down in the water before exploding. this modification is shown at figs. and . the magazine _a_* is attached at its lower side to the boat by a chain or other suitable connection. at its upper edge it is held by a rod _a_*, as shown in fig. . this rod is fitted to slide in dovetailed bearings, as shown at _b_*, and when this magazine is in its place on the boat the said rod is engaged with a catch or stop _c_*, but when the said rod is driven against any object it is forced back and released from the said catch or stop, and the magazine then drops, as in fig. , and is fired. to effect the firing a ball _d_* is used and placed in a tube containing two springs or plates _e_* and arranged in an upwardly inclined position, as shown in fig. , one of the said springs being connected with the cable and the other with a wire that passes through the cartridge to earth. while the magazine is in the position shown in fig. the circuit is incomplete, but when the magazine drops the said ball falls into the position shown in fig. ; the circuit is then completed, and the magazine is fired. the electrical or electro-magnetic apparatus for generating, directing, and controlling the currents, whereby the above-described operations are effected, may be of any suitable kind, the following being the form of apparatus usually employed. a battery _r_, shown at fig. , consists of any desired or requisite number of cells constructed and arranged in any suitable manner, and connected by proper conducting wires with the keyboard _s_. the latter is provided with a series of pole changers _s_^{ }, _s_^{ }, _s_^{ }, _s_^{ }, and switches _s_^{ }, _s_^{ }, and is shown in fig. . each of these pole changers is arranged to effect and control one of the above-named operations, and is therefore connected with one of the aforesaid insulated wires forming the cable. for instance, the pole changer _s_^{ } effects the starting and stopping of the propelling engine; _s_^{ } controls the steering apparatus; _s_^{ } is connected with the steering index; _s_^{ } operates or adjusts the aforesaid guiding rods; and the switches _s_^{ }, _s_^{ } control and effect the firing of the charge in the magazine. [illustration: lay's locomotive torpedo. plate xxxviii] [illustration: lay's locomotive torpedo. plate xxxix] the connections between these pole changers and switches, and the apparatus they operate or control on board the boat, are as follows--that is to say, the said propelling engines have a throttle valve, which controls the admission of the gas from its generator or reservoir to the cylinders of the said engine, and in combination with this valve in the boat there is a shunt and set of electro magnets. the armature of the latter is connected with a lever, which is pivoted so that the action of the electric current in one direction through these magnets will pull one end of the said lever down, and the action of the current in the other direction will pull its other end down--that is to say, by reversing the current through these magnets the movement of the said lever is reversed; and this lever, connected by suitable means with the slide of the said throttle valve, will open or close the same, and thereby start or stop the engine as required. for operating and controlling the above-described steering apparatus, and indicating the position of the rudder to the operator on shore, the following devices are employed, in combination with the pole changers _s_^{ }, _s_^{ } on the keyboard:--the pole changers are geared together by insulated toothed wheels, which are fixed on the spindles or axes of the said pole changers, so that the latter work accurately together and maintain the same relative positions to each other. the pole changer _s_^{ } is connected by one of the said insulated cable wires with a shunt on board the boat, which shunt is connected with a set of magnets arranged in combination with the valve of the engine that drives the steering apparatus, and which valve is reversed or opened and closed by the reversal of the currents through the said magnets, as above described, and the said engine moves the rudder to port or starboard at the will of the operator. in order that the operator may know the exact position of the rudder at any moment, a series of pins or projections fixed on an arc or other portion of the rudder stock, and arranged in combination with an insulated spring projecting into the path of the said series of pins, are employed. this spring is connected by one of the cable wires with the pole changer _s_^{ } on the keyboard, which is geared with and moves in unison with the pole changer _s_^{ }, so that the electric current that controls the steering engine, and the current that returns the indication of the rudder's position, will both be reversed simultaneously. a separate battery is connected with the index on the said keyboard, whereby a constant current is maintained between this index and the indicating apparatus on the boat. the current passing from the said spring to the shore is made to indicate the position of the rudder by the index on the keyboard by the contrivance shown in fig. . this contrivance consists of a set of magnets _w_, which have a vibrating armature _w_^{ } pivoted to oscillate between them. one end of the armature lever is provided with insulated spring pawls _w_^{ }, which take into ratchet wheels _w_^{ }. on the same shafts on which these ratchet wheels are fixed are wheels _w_* formed with insulated teeth and geared with each other. the shaft of one of these wheels is geared by bevel pinions _w_^{ } with a vertical shaft _w_^{ }, to which is attached the index needle or finger _x_**, fig. . therefore it will be obvious that this index finger is placed in connection with the aforesaid spring and series of pins attached to the rudder yoke on board the boat. now it will be obvious that when the rudder is turned in either direction these pins will come successively in contact with the said spring, and at each contact and separation the circuit will be made and broken, and an impulse will be transmitted through the cable, whereby a corresponding movement will be transmitted to the said index finger or pointer _x_** on the keyboard. the pole changer _s_^{ } is connected with another of the insulated wires of the cable, which on board the boat is connected with a shunt and set of magnets arranged in combination with the aforesaid cylinders that operate the said guiding rods, so that by sending the current in one direction the said rods will be raised, and by sending the current in the opposite direction the said rods will be lowered. the switch _s_^{ } is connected with another of the said insulated wires of the cable, which forms the circuit, including the aforesaid two resistance coils. by adjusting this switch the operator completes the circuit through the two resistance coils, and then, but not till then, the charge can be exploded, either by the operator, or by the action of the firing pin or rod when the same is driven in and cuts out the other resistance coils as above described. the resistance coil _x_^{ }, fig. , is connected to the binding screws , by the wires and . these binding screws are in metallic connection with the two springs _x_, but otherwise they are carefully insulated. one pole of the fuze _y_ is connected to the binding screw , the other put to earth through the body of the boat, as at _e_; the main wire is connected to the binding screw . now when the operator cuts out the resistance coil at the firing station, which is done by moving the switch _s_^{ }, the electric current is sufficiently powerful to ignite the fuze _y_ through the resistance coil _x_^{ }, so that at any moment the torpedo may be exploded by the operator on shore, or by the contact between the torpedo and the attacked vessel the rod _v_ will be driven in, and, coming in contact with the springs _x_, will bridge over the space that originally existed between them and so cut out the resistance coil _x_^{ }, and the torpedo will be exploded automatically. _capabilities of the lay torpedo boat._--the capabilities of the lay torpedo boat are as follows:-- .--it may be launched from the shore, a vessel, or a structure, and be kept under observation, and accurately guided or directed to the ship or other object to be attacked; and it may be exploded at any desired moment, or it may be caused to return to the original point of departure without being fired. .--it may be totally and instantaneously submerged to prevent its destruction or capture by the enemy, and it may be raised to the surface, as soon as the danger has passed, in a condition fit for immediate action. .--it may be used as a tug or towing boat to take out a number of torpedoes, which may be sunk and exploded when desired. .--it may be used in connection with certain apparatus to clear away obstructions found to prevent the entrance of ships into harbours, and it may also be used to clear harbours of mines, &c. _launching the lay torpedo boat._--for facilitating the launching and controlling of the lay torpedo boats, a structure or submarine fort is used. this structure may be square, or oblong, and may be made to carry any number of the torpedo boats. the body is constructed of plate or sheet iron of suitable strength and stiffened with angle iron, or otherwise, and divided longitudinally or transversely into watertight compartments, into which the water is admitted to sink the said structure. at the top or upper side, cylinders or tubes are placed, each of which is capable of containing and launching one of the torpedo boats. at the forward end of each tube is a door, or cover secured to a rod or shaft fitted to turn in suitable bearings; this rod or shaft is provided with an arm which is connected to the piston rod of an engine worked by gas contained in a reservoir, or by other suitable means. the slide or other valve which controls the admission of the gas, &c., to this engine is arranged in connection with electro magnets, connected by a suitable cable with a keyboard on shore, or wherever the operator's station may be. by sending an electric current through this cable in one direction through the electro magnets, the door is closed; and by sending such a current in the opposite direction it is opened. the cables carried in the torpedo boats, and through which the mechanism on board each torpedo boat is operated and controlled, are also in this case connected with the keyboard, which must be provided with a number of sets of pole changers and switches, or equivalent devices, corresponding with the number of boats to be controlled by means of the said keyboard. this apparatus will form a very convenient adjunct to fortifications or stations liable to be attacked by sea. the said fort may be prepared for use by placing torpedo boats in the said tubes, and may be kept floating until the enemy's ships have arrived closely enough to permit the determination of the point where the said fort can be most advantageously located for operating against the said ships. the fort is then towed to this point, or taken as near as possible thereto on rails, and towed the remainder of the distance. it is then submerged, and will be ready for immediate operation. the said fort is provided with suitable valves for the admission of water to sink the same, and with means for forcing in air through the pipe _p_* to expel the water when the fort is to be raised. when it is desired to launch either of the said torpedo boats, the door of its tube or cylinder is first opened by sending a current through the cable that controls the door, as above described. then the current is sent through the boat's cable to start her propelling engines. the said boat will then emerge from the cylinder or tube and will rise to the surface, or as near the surface as may be desired, and may then be directed and controlled by the operator at the keyboard, as previously described. and one after another of the said torpedo boats may be thus launched and exploded, without giving to the enemy any clue to the point or position from which they are being sent. [illustration: lay's locomotive torpedo. plate xl] _launching the torpedo from a ship._--the method of launching the lay torpedo boat from an ironclad or other large ship is shown at fig. . the tubes or cylinders _s_ in which the torpedo boats _a_ are held are, in the apparatus shown at fig. , closed at their inner ends by plates, or covers _s_^{ }, which are provided with suitable water-tight and insulating packing boxes _s_^{ } for the passage of the electric cables of the said torpedo boats, each cable being connected with the keyboard, which is placed in any convenient part of the ship, and at their outer ends the said tubes are furnished with strong and well-fitted slide valves, or sluice gates _s_^{ }, which are opened by screws, connected by gearing with a hand wheel, and shaft _s_^{ }, _s_^{ }, for the admission and exit of the said torpedo boats. also these cylinders are provided with packing pieces at their sides, arranged to be pressed by screws or otherwise up to the sides of the torpedo boats in these cylinders, and thereby hold them firmly and immovably in rough weather. _the method of sinking and raising a lay torpedo boat._--the apparatus by which this is effected is shown at fig. , which is a longitudinal section of a portion of a torpedo boat. the hull _a_ of the torpedo boat is provided with a water chamber _l_, which has holes or apertures _l_^{ } in the bottom of the same, and is also provided with an air cock at _l_^{ }. in connection with this chamber is arranged a small cylinder _m_, provided with a piston _m_^{ }, whose rod _m_^{ } is attached to the lever of the said cock. a spiral spring _m_^{ } is provided to resist the inward movement of the said piston. the said small cylinder _m_ is connected by a pipe _m_^{ } with a valve chest, in which is arranged a slide valve _m_^{ }. the said slide valve is connected by a rod or rods to the lever or levers _m_^{ }, whose fulcrum is at _m_*, and the said levers are connected by the links or rods _m_^{ } with the armatures of electro magnets _n_, which are included in the circuit of the cable, whereby the boat is controlled from the keyboard at the station; _o_ is a pipe extending from the said valve chest to the aforesaid water chamber _l_; _p_ is a feed pipe by which gas is conducted from the reservoir or generator to the valve chamber. when it is desired to sink the torpedo boat an electric current is sent in one direction through the said magnets, and thereby operates the slide valve to admit gas to the cylinder _m_ in front of the piston _m_^{ }, which is thus forced inward and opens the air cock _l_^{ }. the opening of this cock permits the escape of the air from the water chamber _l_, and consequently the entrance of water through the apertures _l_^{ }, and the boat then immediately sinks. when it is desired to raise the boat a current is sent in the opposite direction through the said electro magnets, thereby operating the said valve and piston in such a manner as to close the cock _l_^{ } and open the port _o_^{ } and the pipe _o_, thereby allowing the gas to pass from the valve chamber into the compartment _l_; this gas by its pressure expels the water from the said compartment, and the boat then having its normal buoyancy restored immediately rises to the surface. _the lay torpedo boat used as a tug to take out a number of small torpedoes._--this arrangement is shown at figs. and . the small vessels or torpedoes are designed to be first sunk and then exploded, chiefly for clearing harbour or the like of mines or other obstructions. these results are accomplished by means of the following devices and arrangements, that is to say, each of the small vessels or torpedoes _f_ is provided with apparatus which is included in an electrical circuit formed by a suitable insulated cable _g_, extending throughout the train of small vessels or torpedoes _f_. one vessel of this train, preferably the rear one, is connected with the station by an electrical cable _h_, which is payed out from a coil or coils, or a reel or reels, in the said vessel as the same travels through the water. this cable _h_ connects with the cable _g_, which is connected with the towing boat _a_, and passes through the series of boats _f_ to the said cable _h_. one wire of the said cable is arranged in combination with sealed or covered apertures in the bottom of a compartment or compartments of these small vessels _f_, as shown at _i_, the covers of these apertures being so formed as to be ruptured or destroyed by the explosion of a cartridge or cartridges placed in the said compartment or compartments. when a current of electricity is sent through the aforesaid wire of the cable it will explode the said cartridges and open the apertures, thereby admitting water into the said compartments so that the vessel _f_ will sink. the cable _g_ that passes through the train of torpedoes or vessels _f_ is so arranged that when a current passes through the other wire of the said cable it will fire cartridges placed in the charge chambers or magazines of the said small vessels, as shown at _j_. the part of the cable or towing line _g_, which connects the towing boat _a_ with the train of small boats or torpedoes _f_, is attached to a hook or other device, which can be disengaged by sending a current through the cable _k_, connecting the boat _a_ with the shore or other station. it will be understood that when being used for this purpose the said boat _a_ is not or need not be charged with explosive material. [illustration: lay's locomotive torpedo. plate xli] the aforesaid towing boat _a_ takes the train of torpedoes _f_ to any required position. it is then disengaged from the train, leaving the said small vessels or torpedoes _f_ floating in such position. then by sending a current first through one wire of the cable _h_ the boats _f_ are first sunk by the explosion of the cartridges and opening of the apertures, as above described. they may then be discharged immediately by sending a current through the other wire of said cable _h_ and firing the cartridges in their magazines, or they may be left submerged to form mines which may be exploded at any desired moment. the said small vessels or torpedoes may be provided with vertical rods to indicate their position to the operator at the station; these rods are shown at _l_, and they should be made hollow to allow the air in the water compartments or chambers to escape to permit the water to enter the same when the vessels _f_ are to be sunk; or other suitable provision may be made for the escape of the air from these compartments. the said vessels _f_ are preferably made cylindrical with conical ends, and are provided with suitable insulating and water-tight packing boxes, as shown at _f_^{ } for the cable _g_ to pass through at the stem and stern of each vessel. _the lay torpedo in clearing obstructions._--for this purpose the torpedo boat is provided with an apparatus, shown at figs. and , in combination with the electric cable, whereby the said boat is controlled and guided, and there is arranged in the boat _a_ a compartment _a_^{ }, from which extends down into the water a line or rod _u_, provided at its outer end with a hook or claw _u_^{ }, properly formed to take hold of any chain or bar with which it may come in contact. in the said compartment _a_^{ }, and upon the upper end of the said line or rod _u_, is placed a small case or cylinder _u_^{ } containing a charge of dynamite or other explosive material and a cartridge or fulminating cap, or a bottle of sulphuric acid, surrounded with a certain quantity of chlorate of potash and sugar. this case or cylinder _u_^{ } is shown detached and drawn to an enlarged scale at fig. , and it will be seen that the said case is provided with a tube containing a cartridge, or a phial filled with explosive substance at , and a ball or weight at . the said case is fitted to slide upon the said line or rod _u_, and when placed at the upper end thereof and not held or retained will slide to the lower end of the same. in the said compartment _a_^{ } is arranged at _u_^{ } an electro-magnetic apparatus, included in the circuit of the said cable, and connected with a bolt or catch which in its normal position holds the said explosive case and prevents its running down on the grappling line or rod _u_. this explosive case is also provided at its lower end with a grappling hook _u_^{ }. when the grappling hook _u_^{ }, on the lower or outer end of the line or rod _u_, engages with any obstruction the boat will be stopped, and this stoppage will be indicated on the keyboard. the operator by this indication is apprised of the stoppage of the boat by an obstruction, and by sending a current through the cable by means of a switch provided for this purpose on the keyboard he can immediately release the explosive case _u_^{ }, which runs down the line or rod _u_, and engages by its grappling hook _u_^{ } with the hook _u_^{ }. the line or rod _u_ is then disengaged from the boat _a_, and the explosive case _u_^{ } turns or falls over. as it turns over the ball or weight contained in the tube drops on the said phial , fractures it, and thereby allows the acid to mix with the explosive or fulminating charge and explode the case _u_^{ }. this explosion will rupture or destroy the obstructing chain or bar, so that the ironclad ships or other vessels can pass freely and safely into the harbour or beyond the point where it was intended to stop them. _used to clear away mines and electric cables._--for this purpose there is an implement _v_ provided, fig. , somewhat of an anchor form, but with four or any desired number of arms _v_^{ } extending outward at a suitable angle from its shank _v_^{ }. in the neck of each of these arms are fitted two small plain or toothed discs _v_^{ }, which are so arranged as to present their teeth to any object lying in the angle or corner formed by and between the arms _v_^{ } and shank _v_^{ } of the said implement, as shown at _w_. in using this implement it may be attached to a line or cable coiled in the torpedo boat, which, in this case, is used without being charged with explosive material, and is sent in advance of any ship that has to enter or pass through the suspected water. this line must be arranged in combination with a detaching apparatus controlled by electro-magnetic apparatus included in the circuit of the cable which connects the torpedo boat with the keyboard at the operating station. [illustration: lay's locomotive torpedo. plate xlii] by sending a current from the station the operator releases the said implement or its line from the detaching hook or holding device. the said implement then sinks to the bottom; then the said boat returns to the ship, paying out the said line as she so returns. the end of this line is then taken by a steam tug or other vessel, and the said grappling implement is thereby dragged along through the water over which the ships are to advance, thus breaking any wires or cables that may be in its course. this operation is shown at fig. , in which _a_ is the towing boat, _k_ the controlling cable, _v_ the said implement, _v_* the line attached to the implement _v_, _x_ _x_ submerged mines, and _x_^{ } _x_^{ } are the mine cables. in some instances it may not be practicable to reach the enemy's ship or other object of attack directly from the station to which the torpedo boat is connected, and from which it is controlled. in this case a small boat, &c., is used in addition, which should be so arranged as to present to the enemy's view as slight a surface as possible. this mode of attack is shown at fig. , where _a_ is the torpedo boat, and _n_ is the small auxiliary boat. this boat _n_ is provided with a keyboard and battery like that described at page , and the electric cable _l_, carried on and payed out from the torpedo boat _a_, is connected with the keyboard. the boat _n_ is also attached to and towed by the torpedo boat _a_ by the tow line _o_; and the torpedo boat is steered and guided by means of the said keyboard in the boat _n_. the auxiliary boat is designed to contain two men, who lie down, one at the bow, the other in any convenient position abaft him; the latter has control of the keyboard, while the former by the aid of a telescope keeps the torpedo boat in view, and transmits his orders to the man at the keyboard. on arriving at such a distance from the enemy as to render an attack practicable, the tow line _o_ is disengaged, and the torpedo boat _a_, guided and controlled, and fired from the boat _n_. the torpedo boat being exploded, the auxiliary boat can be rowed back to the station or ship to which it belongs. by this means the range of action of the torpedo boat is greatly extended, and with comparatively slight danger to those employed in making the attack. a more recent form of the lay torpedo boat is shown at figs. , , and , where fig. is a plan or top view of such a boat, fig. is a side elevation of the same, and fig. is a midship section on the line _x x_. _a_ is the hull of the boat, _a_ is the main or central portion of the said hull, _b_, _b_ are side or auxiliary portions of the same. these parts _a_ and _b_ may be oval or circular in transverse section; they are constructed of thin steel or other suitable sheet metal, and secured together by riveting or bolting. the side or auxiliary portion _b_ form the reservoirs or chambers for the gas; they also serve to contain the propelling engines. _c_ is the magazine, _d_ the chamber or compartment for containing the coiled cable, _e_ is the compartment containing the electrical steering and other apparatus, _f_ is the firing rod or pin, _g_ is the water ballast chamber, _h_ is the cable, _i_ the paying-out tube, _j_, _j_ are the screws or propellers which rotate in opposite directions, and _k_, _k_ are the sight or guiding rods. the parts of the apparatus or mechanism whereby the various operations of the torpedo boat are effected are connected to the cable and controlled by electric currents transmitted from the station through the cable, as previously described. the lay torpedo boat weighs about ton, its length is feet, and speed knots per hour. _spar or outrigger torpedo._--by a spar or outrigger torpedo is meant a torpedo which is carried at the end of a pole or spar projecting from a boat or vessel, and which may be fired either by contact or at will. this system of submarine offence has up to the present time been the only one that has successfully stood the crucial test of actual warfare. during the civil war in america the spar torpedo attack was resorted to by the confederates and federals, principally by the former, the result being the loss of two large men of war and severe injury to several other ships composing the federal fleet, and the loss of one vessel of war belonging to the southerners. the spar torpedo was also used on several occasions by the russians in their attacks on the turkish ships in the war of - , but in only one attempt was it the means of sinking a turkish vessel. _description of mcevoy's duplex spar torpedo._--at fig. is shown a sketch of captain mcevoy's improved patent duplex spar torpedo, which is the form most generally used at the present time, and which seems to fulfil all the requirements of such a submarine weapon, viz.:-- .--handiness, at the same time capable of containing a charge of gun-cotton sufficient in contact to destroy the most powerful vessel afloat. .--certainty of action. .--capable of being fired either on contact or at will. .--mode of attaching the spar simple and very secure. [illustration: lay's locomotive torpedo. plate xliii] in fig. , _a_ is the case, capable of containing some lbs. of gun-cotton; _b_ is the tube through which the three wires _w_, _w_^{ }, and _w_^{ } are led; _c_ is the socket in which the wooden or steel spar is introduced and secured, _d_ is the striker, which is attached to a brass contact plate within the head of the case _a_ in such a manner that any pressure either on the head or side of the striker _d_ will force the aforesaid plate in contact with the two studs to which the battery wires are attached; _e_ is a cradle affixed to the striker _d_ to ensure its action on contact being made by the torpedo with the attacked vessel; the explosive is inserted at _f_, the socket _c_ being made to screw on and off. when a hollow steel spar is used, the battery wires are sometimes led through the interior of the torpedo and the spar, by which means they are well protected; the only objection to this method of leading the wires being the probability of injury to them, should the spar be broken on contact, or by a shot. _mcevoy's arrangement of torpedo wires._--at fig. is shown the arrangement of wires as devised by captain mcevoy, whereby the spar torpedo may be exploded at will or on contact. _c_ and _z_ are the poles of the firing battery, to which are attached respectively the wires _d_ and _d_^{ }; _f_ is the fuze, which is placed in the centre of the charge, and to the poles of which the wire _d_^{ } is attached, the other end of this wire being connected with the stud _s_; to the stud _s_^{ } is attached the other end of the wire _d_, and at the point _c_ in the same wire is inserted a contact breaker; another wire _d_^{ } is connected to the wires _d_ and _d_^{ } at the points _r_ and _r_^{ } respectively, and at the point _k_ in this same wire is inserted a firing key, which latter is shown in section at fig. , from which the mode of connecting the two ends of the wires and of using the key will be at once apparent. the contact breaker is somewhat similar to the firing key, but there is no spring in it, contact being made or broken by screwing the two parts together or apart. the object of the contact breaker is to prevent the torpedo being exploded by contact, and so to place the control of the weapon entirely in the hands of the operator. as will be seen from fig. , if contact is broken at _c_, it is impossible to fire the torpedo unless the firing key _k_ be pressed in; but should contact be made at _c_, then either by means of the firing key _k_, or by the torpedo striking the hostile vessel, its ignition will be effected. the foregoing method of arranging the spar torpedo wires is certainly very neat and effective, and is at the present time in extensive use. as yet it has not been adopted by the english government, they still preferring to fire the spar torpedo at will alone. the different methods of manipulating the spar torpedo from boats will be described in the following chapter. _general remarks on offensive torpedoes._--the torpedoes that have been described in this chapter are the only ones that at the present time can be considered as having been proved to be practically useful, and which in future wars may be employed against ships with some chance of success. the spar, the whitehead fish, and the harvey towing torpedo have each been subjected to the test of actual service, the former weapon being the only one that has under those conditions been successfully used. taking this fact into consideration, also the high pitch of excellence that has been attained in the construction of steam torpedo boats, and also the results of the numerous exhaustive experiments that have been from time to time carried out in england, america, and europe, with various modifications of the locomotive, towing, and spar torpedoes, there can be no two opinions as to which of the numerous species of offensive submarine weapons is the most practicable and effective, and that is the spar or outrigger torpedo. to manipulate successfully locomotive and towing torpedoes in an attack against hostile vessels, the operators must be not only unusually fearless and self-possessed, but also must possess a thorough practical knowledge of the complicated method of working and manoeuvring those weapons--in fact, they must be specialists; whilst in the case of the spar torpedo, which may be fired by contact, it is only necessary to employ men capable of handling a boat well, and possessed of dash and pluck, to ensure an attack by such means being generally successful. of course under some circumstances, such as in a general action, when the locomotive and towing torpedoes are manipulated from specially constructed torpedo vessels, they will prove of great value, and the fish torpedo fired from a boat, in close proximity to the attacked vessel, in smooth water, and unmolested, would sink a vessel which under the same circumstances, owing to her being protected by booms, might prove impregnable to a spar torpedo attack; but such favourable conditions will not often occur in war time. [illustration: m^{c.} evoy's duplex spar torpedo. plate xliv] as an offensive submarine weapon of defence, the lay torpedo boat should prove of real value; and also manoeuvred from specially constructed vessels, it seems capable of being used in a variety of ways. as yet little is known of this weapon, all the experiments carried out with it having been confined to america; but now that russia has adopted it, and one or two have also been secured by the peruvians, its practical value will become more generally known. chapter vi. torpedo vessels, boats, and submarine boats. _employment of torpedo ships._--torpedo ships, that is to say, sea-going vessels, very fast, handy and impregnable, specially designed to carry and operate offensive submarine weapons, such as locomotive, towing, and the spar torpedoes, especially the former, are now considered as a necessary and valuable adjunct to a fleet, their special work being to give the coup de grâce to disabled ironclads in a general action; they will also be used to attack the ships of a blockading force, and against rival torpedo vessels. as a general rule these torpedo ships will be armed with the ram and torpedoes only, heavy guns being dispensed with, though the nordenfelt and other machine guns will be considered necessary. _the german torpedo vessel uhlan._--this torpedo vessel was built in germany by the stettin engine company, and launched in . she is armed with a contact torpedo charged with dynamite carried on a -foot ram, lying deeply under the water line. to protect the vessel from the effects of the discharge of the torpedo, she is built with two complete parts, sliding one within the other, and having a considerable extent of intermediate space between them. this space is filled with a tough and elastic material (cork and marine glue), which even in the case of the bows being carried away, would afford a second line of resistance. the _uhlan_ carries an engine of one thousand indicated horse power. the steam is supplied by belleville's tubular generator. these engines occupy by far the greater space of the vessel, only a very small portion being left for her crew and coal. this great power of the engines is necessitated by the fact that she has to be driven at a very high speed, at the same time she has a very great draught, also the greatest facility of steering has to be attained; hence the proportion of width to length, to feet. in order to save the crew at the worst, a raft is constructed, which is also filled with a mixture of cork and marine glue, and is placed near the helm. the mode of operating with the _uhlan_ is as follows:-- the dynamite torpedo is affixed to the point of the ram by the aid of divers. the rudder is then fixed, and the crew opening a wide port on the vessel's side, jump on the aforesaid raft. the steamer then rushes forward, and explodes its torpedo in contact with the hostile vessel. the crew hold on to the torpedo ship, and in case she is not injured board her again and repeat the manoeuvre, if necessary.[m] this is a novel form of torpedo boat, but does not seem to be a very practicable method of torpedo attack. _admiral porter's torpedo ship alarm._--the _alarm_ torpedo ship was built from plans designed by admiral david d. porter, u.s.n. her total length, which includes a ram feet long, is feet; her beam is feet inches, and her draught of water is feet. she is built of iron on the bracket plate system, that is to say, she has a double hull, one shell being constructed inside the other. her double bottom is divided into a number of water-tight compartments. the whole interior of the vessel is also built in compartments, which may be hermetically closed, so that in case of both the shells being ruptured, it would still be impossible to fill the entire ship with water. she is steered by the same apparatus which propels her, viz. the fowler wheel, which is illustrated at fig. . this wheel turns on a vertical shaft, and its paddles are feathered by an eccentric cam in such a manner that at one part of their revolution they have a pushing and drawing action on the water, while at another part they present only their edges. in fact it is simply a feathering paddle wheel, turned horizontally instead of vertically. by suitably turning the cam wheel, which is done from the helm, the feathering of the paddles is caused to occur at different points; and in this way the vessel may be turned, or rather her stern twisted around, as if on a pivot. at the same time, by suitably adjusting the paddles, the ship goes ahead, or astern, the engine meanwhile running in the same direction. by the apparatus above described it is considered that the _alarm_ is afforded not only a means of speed, but of being handled with the utmost readiness, which latter is absolutely essential in such a vessel, as she must always meet her antagonist bows on. the steering is accomplished from the wheel house located aft on the deck, or below deck, as all the appliances in the wheel house for steering, &c., are duplicated below. by means of a hand lever beneath the wheel, steam is admitted to a small auxiliary engine which works the cam that adjusts the paddles. then by turning the horizontal hand wheel in either direction, the helmsman controls the movement of the cam, as desired. just above the wheel is a dial with a pointer, which enables him to note the position of the paddles, and so adjust them as ordered. inside the wheel house there are also devices for communicating with the men working the bow gun, and with those managing the torpedoes. _her armament--engines._--at fig. is shown the spar and mode of working it. it consists of a long hollow iron cylinder lying on its supports between decks. its outboard end rests in a kind of trough, and to this extremity the torpedo is fixed. the spar is controlled by means of tackles and a steam winch. the side spars are feet, and the bow spar feet in length. if the hostile vessel is defended by torpedo guards, by means of a mechanical contrivance the torpedo signals the fact, and is not exploded until the vessel has forced the obstructions. the engines of the _alarm_ are compound, with four cylinders, the condenser being placed between them. there are four cylindrical tubular boilers with an aggregate heating surface of , square feet. her speed is about knots. her upper deck is only feet above the water. she is fitted with an electric light, and also with machine guns on her broadside.[n] this is undoubtedly a most formidable vessel, both as a ram and a torpedo ship, and if capable of performing all that is expected of her, will prove a valuable addition to the united states navy. [illustration: the "alarm" torpedo ship. plate xlv] _captain ericsson's torpedo vessel "destroyer."_--this torpedo vessel was devised and built by captain john ericsson. the _destroyer_ is feet long, feet deep, and feet beam, extreme; both ends of her hull are precisely alike, and terminate with very fine wedges. the rudder is attached to a vertical wrought iron post welded to a prolongation of the keel, just abaft the propeller, as shown at fig. . the tillers consist of thin plates of iron riveted on opposite sides of the rudder, a few inches from its bottom. these tillers are operated by straight rods connected to the pistons of horizontal hydraulic cylinders of inches diameter, which are attached to the sides of the keel. the steering gear by the above arrangement is placed feet below the water line, while the top of the rudder is feet below the same, and thus perfect security is afforded to this most important feature of a torpedo vessel. the intention of the designer in constructing this vessel is to render her so far impregnable, that in attacking bow on she can defy the opponent's fire, at the same time offering absolute protection to her commander and steersman, and also protecting the base of her funnel. the leading feature of the construction of the hull of the _destroyer_ is its being provided with an intermediate curved deck, which extends from stem to stern, and which is composed of plate iron strongly ribbed, and perfectly water-tight. this intermediate deck supports a heavy solid armour plate, fixed transversely to the line of keel, and feet from the bow, inclined at an angle of °, and supported on its after side by a wood backing feet inches in thickness. behind this formidable shield the steering wheel is manipulated, a wire rope extending from its barrel to a four-way cock placed near the stern, by means of which water pressure is admitted alternately to the hydraulic cylinders, previously mentioned, the motion of whose pistons actuate the rudder. the lower division of the vessel is ventilated by powerful blowers, and contains the machinery; it also affords a safe retreat for the crew during the attack. the upper division is filled with blocks of cork, excepting a small part near the bow, occupied by the aforesaid armour plate and wood backing. the deck house is feet long, and composed of plate iron, riveted water-tight to the upper part of the hull. as there are no openings in the sides of this deck house, the vessel may be run with her upper deck under water. _armament of the "destroyer."_--the _destroyer_ is to be armed with torpedoes somewhat similar to the projectile torpedo, drawings of which were submitted by captain ericsson, the inventor, to emperor napoleon iii. in . the present weapon is composed of a solid block of light wood, the explosive charge being contained in a metallic vessel inserted at its forward end. instead of being circular, as was the case with the original torpedo, its transverse section is square, with parallel top and bottom and vertical sides, forming very sharp wedges at both ends, cased with steel plates. the extreme length of the _destroyer_ torpedo is feet. ignition is effected by means of a percussion fuze placed in the head of the weapon. _operating the torpedo._--the method of operating the torpedo is that of inserting it into a horizontal tube near the bottom of the vessel, provided with valves for keeping out the sea during the process of insertion, as shown at fig. . when near the hostile vessel, this valve is opened, and the torpedo expelled by a piston actuated by steam power, the expulsion being effected without recourse to gunpowder or other explosive agent. the area of the actuating piston of the _destroyer_ is square inches, while the sectional area of the projectile is only square inches; this difference in size of the two areas is a special and important feature of the invention, as will be understood from the following: the tension of the acting medium in the _destroyer_ exceeds lbs. per square inch, therefore the torpedo will be pushed out by a force of ( � ) / = lbs. per square inch, and as the distance passed by the piston while impelling the torpedo is feet, an energy of nearly , , foot-pounds will be imparted to the projectile. when making an attack, it is intended that the vessel should at the instant of firing her torpedo reverse her engines, this retrograde motion being greatly assisted by the recoil, which must attend the discharge of a body weighing some , lbs. impelled by the aforesaid enormous force, and moving through a distance of feet before reaching the water.[o] certainly this new system of submarine attack seems feasible, but it has yet to prove, in common with all other new inventions, whether its theoretical capabilities are also practical ones. at fig. is shown a general view of this novel torpedo vessel under weigh. [illustration: the "destroyer" torpedo ship. plate xlvi] _torpedo boats._--in offensive torpedo warfare, whether using the spar, locomotive, or towing torpedo, especially in the case of the former class of submarine weapons, to ensure a successful attack it is absolutely essential to operate those weapons from steam boats, which are capable of fulfilling as near as possible the conditions herein enumerated:-- .--they should be capable of steaming at least knots per hour. .--their engines should be noiseless, and easily managed. .--they should be extremely handy. .--no smoke should enable their approach to be detected, or glare from their fires. .--that it should be possible to raise steam in them in a few minutes. .--they should be built in water-tight compartments, and covered fore and aft to prevent being swamped. .--the crews should be protected as far as practicable from rifle fire. in addition to the foregoing, for the purpose of rendering these craft capable of defending themselves against the attack of guard boats, and also of being employed as such, and on river expeditions, &c., they should be built sufficiently strong to enable them to carry a small gun either in the bows or stern; this would apply more especially to those torpedo boats which are part of a ship's stores. during the last four years a very large number of torpedo boats have been built, which more or less fulfil the aforesaid conditions, nearly the whole of which have been constructed by the two english firms, viz. messrs. thornycroft and co. and messrs. yarrow and co., and to the latter firm is due the honour of constructing the fastest vessel as yet in the world. up to the present time, a specially built torpedo boat has on only one occasion been used on active service, viz. at the attack on a turkish monitor on the th of june, , which is detailed at length in the following chapter. this boat was one of messrs. thornycroft and co.'s launches, and from all accounts she behaved wonderfully well under the most untoward circumstances. _thornycroft torpedo launches._--messrs. thornycroft and co., of chiswick, london, have during the last six years built a large number of torpedo launches for the english government and for several of the principal european governments. _norwegian launch._--the first torpedo boat ever built by this firm was the one shown at fig. , for the norwegian government. this boat was feet in length by feet inches beam, drew feet of water, and the stipulated speed was english statute miles, or nearly knots per hour; which speed was not to be ascertained by a mere measured mile trial, but was to be miles through the water in a run of one hour's duration. the hull of the vessel was constructed entirely of steel plates and angle bars, and, as may be seen from the diagram, was divided into six water-tight compartments, _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, _e_, _f_. the compartments marked _a_ and _f_ in the stem and stern were for stores; those marked _b_ and _e_ were fitted with seats for the crew, and were provided with movable steel covers, so that on going into action, or during rough weather, they might be completely covered. the compartments _c_ and _d_ are for the steersman and the machinery respectively, and were covered completely by steel plating / of an inch in thickness--a thickness sufficient to withstand snider or martini-henry bullets, fired from a distance of twenty paces. the compartment _d_ was furnished with a hood, having slits / of an inch wide, all round, through which the steersman could see with sufficient distinctness to direct his course easily. motion was communicated from the wheel to the tiller by means of steel wire ropes, which it was originally intended should be encased in wrought iron tubes. the possibility however of these tubes being bent by a shot, and so jamming the wire ropes, led to this arrangement being abandoned, and the ropes were simply run through eyes at intervals along the side. the armament consisted of a cylindro-conical shaped torpedo towed from the top of the funnel, round which a ring was fitted with two pulleys for the towing rope, the strain being taken off by means of two stays attached forward. the length of this torpedo was feet and the diameter inches, and with a speed of knots it has diverged to about degrees from the direction of the boat's motion when running in smooth water. the torpedo is worked by means of a small winch and brake fixed on the after part of the engine room skylight; davits are provided for dropping the torpedo overboard. the engines were compound, of the usual inverted double cylinder direct acting type, capable of developing about indicated horse power, and were fitted with a surface condenser, so that the vessel could run in salt water, without danger of injuring her boiler. a small tank contained a supply of fresh water, to make good deficiencies arising through leakage, and from steam escaping at the safety valves, &c. the circulating, air, and feed pumps were driven by a separate engine. the boiler was of the locomotive type, the shell being made of bessemer steel; the fire box and its stays of copper, and the tubes of solid drawn brass. on the official trial, which took place on the thames on the th of october, , the number of revolutions done in the hour was found to be , , and the number required to do a mile in still water was . the distance run in the hour was then, , / = · , or very nearly - / miles. the steam pressure during the trial averaged lbs. per square inch, and the vacuum - / inches. _swedish and danish boats._--boats of the same size and similar in all particulars to the foregoing one--excepting the engines, which are improved by driving the air pump, feed pump, and circulating pumps off the main engines, and abolishing the auxiliary engine, which performed these duties in the case of the norwegian boat--were made for the swedish and danish governments. the result was an increase of speed to · miles in the case of the swedish boat, and to · miles, or - / knots, in the case of the danish boat. there is no information regarding the armament of the swedish boat, but the danish boat was armed with two spindle-shaped torpedoes feet long and - / inches diameter, somewhat like the whitehead torpedo. they were placed on deck longitudinally near the funnel, so as to facilitate launching, and were arranged to be towed from an upright pole feet high, placed about feet from the stem. a small winch was fixed on either side aft, to pay out the towing line, and to bring back the torpedo. by these arrangements the torpedo could be projected at a large angle from the direction of the boat's motion, and at considerable velocity. the speed of the boat when towing one of these torpedoes is about knots. _austrian and french boats._--the next size of torpedo vessel is that supplied to the austrian and french governments, which is shown at fig. . the dimensions are:--length, feet; beam, feet inches; draught of water, feet inches. the guaranteed speed in the case of the austrian boat was knots in a run of one hour's duration, and in the case of the french boats knots, in a run of two hours' duration. these boats were built of somewhat thicker plating than the feet type, and the armour was extended. they were divided into six water-tight compartments, and they differed from the scandinavian boats in having the spaces forward and aft of the machinery permanently decked, instead of being covered with movable steel covers only. the machinery was somewhat similar to that in the scandinavian boats, excepting that the engines were capable of developing indicated horse power, and that the air was supplied to the furnace by being forced into an air-tight stoke hole, instead of being forced directly under the fire grate. the armament of these vessels consisted of two torpedoes attached to the end of wooden poles, - / inches diameter and about feet long, connected to the battery by insulated wires, and arranged to be fired either by coming in contact with the enemy's vessel or at any distance from it, at the will of the operator. the torpedoes themselves were simply copper cases, of sufficient size, in the case of the austrian boat, to contain , cubic centimetres of explosive, and in the case of the french boats, to contain kilogrammes of dynamite. the mode of arranging the wires is similar to that explained at page . the method of manipulating the torpedo poles consists of two tubes riveted together at right angles, so as to form something like the letter t. the torpedo pole is put through the horizontal tube, which is free to move round the centre of the vertical tube, and the vertical tube is free to move through a quarter circle at right angles to the centre line of the vessel. in attacking in front, the vertical tube is laid over till it is parallel to the water surface, and the horizontal tube is allowed to incline sufficiently far to allow of the end of the pole, when run out, to be depressed from to feet below the water-line. it is held in this position by a pair of blocks attached to the top of a short mast. in attacking on the broadside, the vertical tube is laid over till it assumes a position such as to allow of the pole, when swung round, to touch an enemy's vessel at about or feet below the water line. the speed trials of the austrian boat took place on the th of september, , when she did , revolutions on her hour's run on the thames, and the number of revolutions required to do a knot in still water was found to be . this gives the distance run in the hour as · knots, or · knots over the contract speed. the steam pressure averaged lbs. per square inch, and the vacuum - / inches during the run. in the case of the french boats, the total number of revolutions done in the two hours' run in the roadstead off cherbourg was , , and the number required to do a knot in still water was found to be , so that the distance run in the two hours was · knots, or just over the contract speed. during the two hours, the average steam pressure was lbs. per square inch, and the vacuum inches. the austrian boat was sent to her destination on board a steamer, but the french boats, under the command of an experienced captain, steamed by themselves from chiswick to cherbourg, not crossing at the nearest points and running along the shore, but going boldly from dover direct to cherbourg. shortly after the arrival of the french boats in cherbourg, they were altered so as to attack in front only, as the french authorities found that these small vessels were better adapted for resisting the effects of an explosion at the bow than at any other part. the arrangement adopted is shown at fig. , and consisted of a steel pole about feet in length, having one end about inches diameter, and solid, and the other about - / inches diameter, and hollow; this pole was mounted at its solid end on small pulleys, which ran upon two ropes stretched fore and aft of the vessel; the other end, to which the torpedo was attached, was led over a pulley fixed on the bow. ropes passing over pulleys to a windlass in the after compartment were attached to the inboard end, and by turning the windlass the pole was drawn backwards or forwards as required. it will be observed that as the pole is drawn forward, the inboard end being constrained to move in a line parallel to the deck, the outer end is depressed in the water, and is so adjusted that when the pole is run out to its full extremity, the torpedo is depressed to about - / feet below the water level. _dutch and italian boats._--the third size of boat built by this firm for the dutch and italian governments are feet long and feet beam, and are guaranteed to do a speed of knots. these boats are similar in design to the austrian and french boats previously described, but differ from them in having engines of indicated horse power, and in having more free board forward, so as to make them better sea boats. the dutch type are armed with the outrigger torpedo, as fitted to the french boats, and the italian type with the whitehead fish torpedo. _the "lightning" type of boat._--now comes the _lightning_ type of vessel, which is shown at fig. . this vessel, built for the english government, is feet long over all, feet inches beam, and draws about feet of water. the machinery on board the _lightning_ is similar in design to that already described, and is capable of indicating horse power. the hull of the _lightning_ is made of heavier plating than usually employed, and her lines are fuller, as she is intended for use in a tolerably rough sea if necessary; and in order that she may be able to remain at sea for some time, cabin accommodation on a scale larger than in any of the other boats is provided for the officers and crew. the steering gear is arranged so that the vessel may be steered from the deck, or from the conning tower, and the usual telegraph gear is fitted to communicate from the deck, or from the conning tower, to the engine room. the top of the conning tower is supported on three screws, so arranged that it may be raised or lowered, and the space for sight adjusted according to the range of vision required, or the risk to be run from the enemy's missiles. the _lightning_ is armed with fish torpedoes, which are discharged from her deck forward by means of a discharging apparatus. the torpedoes are charged with air, by means of one of mr. brotherhood's air-compressing pumps. the _lightning_ on her preliminary runs attained a speed on the measured mile of · knots per hour, a speed which will be somewhat reduced when she has her torpedoes, &c., on board, but which will then be over knots per hour. several torpedo boats have been built and are in process of construction by this firm for the english government. [illustration: thornycroft's torpedo boats. plate xlvii] _french boats._--the next size of boats is the feet type, as shown at fig. . of this type of torpedo launch several have been built and are now under construction for the french government. these vessels are feet inches beam; draught of water about feet. they are built of heavier plating than the _lightning_, and are guaranteed to maintain a speed of knots. the propellers in these boats are placed in front of the rudder, so as to give increased readiness in steering. in order to prevent oxidation as far as possible, the plates and frames below the water line are galvanised. a spark-catching apparatus is fitted to the base of the funnel, so as to prevent the position of the boat being betrayed to the enemy at night. the armament of these vessels consist of an outrigger arrangement similar to that described at page . they are also well adapted for the whitehead torpedo. they are also provided with a strong buffer in the bows for deadening the shock, in the event of their coming into contact with an enemy's vessel at too high a rate of speed. _"second class" boats and mode of manipulating the fish torpedoes from them._--another type of thornycroft torpedo boats, several of which have been built for continental governments, and which is termed "second class," is shown at fig. . these boats are feet long, feet inches beam, and draw some feet of water; their guaranteed speed being knots per hour. the mode of carrying the whitehead fish torpedo, and manipulating it from such a boat by means of mr. j. i. thornycroft's invention, which has been fully described at page , is shown at figs. and , where fig. represents both torpedoes housed, and fig. one torpedo in the firing position, the other one being housed. four of this type of thornycroft torpedo boats were attached to h.m.s. _hecla_ during her recent cruise in the mediterranean, and have been very favourably reported on as follows:--they do not suffer from the blows of the sea, nor from the strains incident upon hoisting in and out; nor yet when they are suspended ready for lowering, in which latter position they have frequently remained for twenty-four hours; that under careful management they are perfectly safe in a heavy sea, and they possess good manoeuvring powers. the thornycroft torpedo frames were found to perform well the services for which they are intended. when proceeding at ordinary speed they are nearly noiseless, and cannot be seen on a dark night at a distance of yards. _the thornycroft propeller._--all the torpedo boats built by this firm are fitted with the propeller invented by mr. thornycroft, and which bears his name. it is a modification of what is known as the dundonald propeller, the principal difference being that in the dundonald propeller the blades are inclined backward in straight lines, while in the thornycroft propeller they are curved. _experiment at cherbourg._--the following account of an experiment which took place at cherbourg in march , whereby to test the efficiency of a thornycroft torpedo boat in exploding a spar torpedo under the bottom of a vessel proceeding ahead at the time, is taken from the _times_, under date the th of march, . [illustration: thornycroft's torpedo boats. plate xlviii] "admiral jaurez, who commands the squadron, ordered a disabled ship, the _bayonnaise_, during a rather rough sea, to be towed out by a steamer belonging to the navy. a second lieutenant, m. lemoinne, was sent for, and informed that he had been selected to make the experiment of launching the thornycroft against the _bayonnaise_ while both were in full sail. he accepted the mission without hesitation, picked out two engine men and a pilot, and went down with them into the interior of the thornycroft, of which only a small part was above water; this visible portion being painted of a greyish colour, so as to be easily confused with the sea. the torpedo was placed so as to project from the bow of the vessel, at the extremity of which were two lateen sailyards about three metres in length. the towing steamer then took up its position in front of the squadron, and the thornycroft also assumed the position assigned for it; an interval of three or four marine miles separating the torpedo boat and the _bayonnaise_. on a signal being given, both were set in motion, the steamer advancing in a straight line, and the thornycroft obliquely, so as to take the _bayonnaise_ in flank. the steam tug went at knots an hour, going at full speed in order to escape the thornycroft. the latter went at knots an hour, a rate not attained by any vessel in the squadron. the chase lasted about an hour, the squadron keeping in the rear, so as to witness the operations. at the end of that time the distance between the thornycroft and the _bayonnaise_ had sensibly diminished, and at a given moment the former, in order to come up with the latter at the requisite distance, had to slacken speed to knots an hour. the whole squadron watched this last phase of the struggle with breathless interest, and people asked themselves whether the shock of the torpedo would not infallibly destroy the little vessel which bore it. it was feared that the lives of the second lieutenant, lemoinne, and his three companions were absolutely sacrificed. however, the two vessels got visibly nearer. all at once the thornycroft put on a last spurt, and struck the _bayonnaise_ with its whole force on the starboard bow. the sea was terribly agitated, a deafening report was heard, and the _bayonnaise_, with a rent as big as a house, sank with wonderful rapidity. as for the thornycroft, rebounding by the shock about fifteen metres off, even before the explosion occurred, it went round and round for a few moments, and quietly resumed the direction of the squadron. no trace remained of the _bayonnaise_; it was literally swallowed up by the sea." the experiment was a most complete success, the torpedo boat not being in the least degree injured. _the power of flotation of a thornycroft boat after being pierced by a rifle shot._--on the th of july, , messrs. thornycroft and co. made an experiment with one of their torpedo boats to ascertain under what conditions flotation is still retained after the boat has been pierced by a rifle shot. the torpedo boat experimented on was similar to the one which has been described at page . a martini-henry was fired through her side, about a foot under water in the stoke hole. whilst at anchor the water entered in sufficient quantity to fill an ordinary size bucket in twenty-five seconds, but when she was driven ahead less water entered, and on the speed of knots being reached, little or no water entered. the hole was a little more than three quarters of an inch in diameter. the engagement on the danube between the torpedo boat _schootka_ and some turkish vessels, in which the former vessel was pierced by bullets, but yet did not sink, led to the above experiment being carried out. _efficiency of thornycroft's engines._--as a practical proof of the efficiency of the engines supplied by messrs. thornycroft and co. to their torpedo boats, a similar engine has been used for over two years to work the various machines in connection with their works at chiswick. _torpedo boats built by messrs. yarrow and co._--messrs. yarrow and co., of the isle of dogs, london, are also very well-known torpedo boat builders, and have during the last four years constructed a considerable number of such vessels for the english and different continental governments, and, as has been before stated, they are the constructors of the fastest vessel in the world. _dutch torpedo launch._--in this firm built a torpedo launch for the dutch government, specially designed for ocean purposes. it was feet long, feet beam, and - / feet deep. she was driven by a pair of inverted direct acting engines. the boiler was of the locomotive type, with a working pressure of lbs. per square inch, and capable of exerting a force of some indicated horses. _russian torpedo boat._--this firm also constructed for the russian government two torpedo steamers feet in length. the guaranteed speed of these vessels being knots per hour. in the russian government ordered one hundred exactly similar boats to be constructed, mostly at st. petersburg, thus proving the high estimation held by that government of messrs. yarrow and co.'s torpedo boats. _description of a yarrow torpedo launch._--figs. , , and show an elevation, section, and plan of a torpedo boat, yarrow type, a large number of which have been built for the russian and other continental governments. the length of this boat is feet, its beam feet, and draught of water feet. she is built of steel of the best quality, no other metal possessing the requisite strength and stiffness for scantling, and plates of such lightness. it is divided into eight compartments by seven transverse bulkheads, the forward and after compartments being used for stores, the two central ones enclosing the machinery, while the steersman and operator are placed in the compartment immediately abaft the engines. the steersman's head projects above the deck, and is protected by a rifle proof steel truncated cone, the top part of which is movable like the visor of a helmet. the hull is decked over from end to end with a curved shield, the midship plating of which is capable of resisting rifle shots, even at close quarters; its curved form being well adapted for giving the maximum strength to the structure, and quickly frees itself from any large body of water. [illustration: yarrow's torpedo boats. plate xlix] the propelling machinery consists of a pair of inverted compound condensing engines. the revolutions per minute at full speed are about , and the indicated horse power about . the propeller is of steel. the funnel is fixed at one side of the centre line, to be out of the way of the bow torpedo pole and gear. this type of torpedo boat attains a speed of from - / to - / knots per hour. the armament of some of these boats consists of three spar torpedoes, a bow, and two quarter ones. the bow pole, which is strong and heavy, is hauled out and in by means of a small auxiliary engine. boats similar to these, but of larger dimensions, viz. feet long and feet beam, have also been constructed by this firm. speed from to knots per hour. _english torpedo boats._--the following account of two torpedo boats which had been originally built by this firm for the russian government, but, owing to the proclamation issued by the english government at this time prohibiting torpedo boats leaving england, were seized by the customs authorities when on the point of completion, and were ultimately purchased by the english government, is an extract from the _times_ under date the th of july, . "these vessels are each feet long with feet beam, and draw, when fully equipped for service, an average of feet of water. they are strongly constructed of steel, and are fitted with compound surface condensing engines capable of indicating horse power. the high pressure steam cylinder of these engines is - / inches in diameter, and the low pressure - / inches, both having a inch stroke. these boats are at present known by their builders' numbers, one being no. and the other no. . the former is propelled by a three-bladed screw, feet inches diameter and feet pitch; and the latter by a two-bladed screw of similar proportions. messrs. yarrow adopt supplementary engines for driving the air pump, circulating pump, and feed pumps; they consider this plan preferable to that of working these pumps direct off the main engine, as is sometimes done. one advantage in having separate pumping engines is that, whether the vessel is in motion or stationary, a powerful means is available for pumping her out, should the necessity arise. it is estimated by her builders that if the air pump and circulating pump were both utilised for this purpose, the water could be pumped out as fast as it could enter either of these vessels through one hundred holes made in the skin by martini-henry rifle bullets. if this is the case, these craft may be deemed safe from sinking so long as their machinery is working efficiently. the boiler is of the locomotive type, placed in the forward part of each vessel, and has a closed stoke hole. in connection with the boiler a very important improvement has been introduced by messrs. yarrow. this consists in a means of rendering the closed stoke hole safe for the men in the event of the collapse of a boiler tube--a contingency which cannot be absolutely guarded against. its efficiency was proved beyond all question upon a previous trial of one of these boats. this was no. , which was tried on the th of may last under the supervision of the admiralty officials. upon that occasion an accidental rupture of one of the boiler tubes occurred nearly at the close of the runs over the measured mile, which so far had been very successful. when the boiler tube gave way the steam rushed out of the foremost hatchway from the compartment in which the smoke box end of the boiler is situated, and soon after from the two funnels. the men in the stoke hole, however, being shut off from the boiler, were uninjured, and remained at their post several minutes after the first outburst of steam. the accident, although an untoward event, was considered by the admiralty officials as affording a highly satisfactory proof of the efficiency of mr. yarrow's invention. "the engines are placed amidships, and each vessel has spacious cabin accommodation aft, as it is intended that they may be used either as despatch or torpedo boats. for the latter purpose the cabin framings above deck are removed and replaced by steel plating. they are steered from the cabin, there being a look-out for the steersman just above deck level. the deck is clear of all obstructions, the two funnels being placed one on either side. they are fitted with balanced rudders and steer well, answering their helms very quickly." the trials of these two torpedo boats are taken from the _engineer_ under date the th of july, . at that time these boats completely eclipsed in speed everything that had hitherto been done. at fig. is shown in elevation this type of torpedo launch. "the trials were personally conducted by mr. yarrow, under the superintendence of the authorities from whitehall, and consisted in a two hours' run without stopping, during which time the boats were tested at the measured mile at long reach. each boat was run six times over the mile, three runs with the tide and three runs against it. the boats and machinery are similar in every respect, excepting that no. is fitted with a three-bladed propeller, and no. a two-bladed one, their diameters and pitch being the same in both cases. the weights on board were accurately weighed, and amounted to tons in each boat, including coals, water, crew, and ballast. "_trial of no. ._ min. sec. knots per hour. st run down occupied · st run up " · nd run down " · nd run up " · rd run down " · rd run up " · mean of the six runs, · knots per hour. mean steam pressure, lbs. per square inch. vacuum, - / inches. mean revolutions of main engines per minute, . "_trial of no. ._ min. sec. knots per hour. st run down occupied - / · st run up " - / · nd run down " - / · nd run up " · rd run down " · rd run up " · mean of the six runs, · knots per hour. mean steam pressure, lbs. per square inch. vacuum, inches. mean revolutions per minute, . "the highest speeds were obtained by no. , during the third runs up and down, the mean of which give · knots, which is equal to - / statute miles per hour, during which time the engines were making revolutions per minute. at the close of the runs, the bearings were found to be in first-class condition, and there was not the least sign of anything getting warm during any part of the trials." _spanish torpedo boat._--the following description of a torpedo boat built by this firm for the spanish government, enumerating all the improvements that have of late been effected in the construction of such vessels by members of this firm, is taken from the _engineering_ under date the st of february, . "the alterations have a twofold character, and have reference to the arrangements for discharging the products of combustion from the furnaces and to those for steering the vessel. in brief, the boat is funnelless and is fitted with two rudders, one at each end. the main object in dispensing with the funnel is to enable the torpedo boat to approach as closely as possible to an enemy without being seen, a secondary, although still an important, consideration, being the absence of any obstruction to the steersman's view, such as a funnel on deck. the outlets for the smoke in the present instance are two ports, one on either side of the vessel, and placed about feet in from the bow. each of these smoke ports is fitted with a damper, and the smoke can be turned through either or both of the passages as desired. the control of these dampers is given to the steersman, who, on approaching an enemy, can direct the products of combustion through the port on the unexposed side of the vessel. the emission of smoke by day and of the glare and sparks by night are thus to a very large extent hidden from view, thus enabling the torpedo boat to approach very closely to the point of attack without being observed. the outlets are fitted with valves which are kept open by the blast, but which close on being struck by a passing wave. should the vessel have to be out when a heavy sea is running the ports are closed, and a spare funnel is rigged up on deck, on one side. although the smoke ports are placed forward in this boat, it is intended to place them aft in the next that messrs. yarrow build, as that arrangement will obviate the inconvenience at present experienced by those on deck from the heated gases of the furnace being carried along it at times by the wind, when on a certain course. [illustration: yarrow's torpedo boats. plate l] "the steering powers of the boat have next had attention from messrs. yarrow, and they have sought to remedy the defective steering common to these large quick-speed torpedo craft. to do this they have fitted the vessel under notice with two balanced rudders, one of which is placed forward about feet from the bow, and the other in its usual position at the stern with the screw abaft it. both rudders are connected with the same steering gear, and are operated simultaneously by one steersman. the forward rudder can be raised out of the water into a casing inside the boat if desired by means of a screw cut on the upper part of its spindle. by the same means, by unscrewing the collar on the spindle, the rudder can be released and dropped into the water should the necessity arise for so doing, by reason of its becoming fouled or damaged. in trials which have been made with this double-steering system, it has been found that when steaming at high speeds the forward rudder has a much greater control over the motion of the boat than the stern one. the reason assigned for this is that at high speeds the forward part of the boat is lifted out of the water, and consequently offers a diminished side resistance to any turning motion brought to bear upon it. "the boat in which these improvements have been introduced is feet long by feet beam and feet inches deep. she is fitted with compound engines having inch and - / inch cylinders, with a inch stroke, and making revolutions per minute when running at full speed. she is propelled by a three-bladed screw feet inches in diameter and feet pitch. put through some evolutions with the view of testing her steering powers, the double rudder arrangement was found to answer exceedingly well, and she turned a circle of a diameter equal to about three times her own length in minute seconds. she turned equally well either going ahead or astern, and in fact her steering capabilities were satisfactorily demonstrated. the new arrangement for carrying off the smoke also answered very well, with the exception that the heated gases occasionally swept the deck, which objectionable result will be avoided in future boats." these boats are to be armed with spar torpedoes, and with the whitehead fish torpedo, the cradles and fittings for which are shown at fig. . _the fastest vessel in the world._--another type of torpedo boat, of which one of the same dimensions has been built by this firm for the english government, is shown at fig. . this vessel is as yet the fastest vessel in the world. the trials with this boat were made in march of this year, and were as follows:-- runs. time, knots knots min. sec. per hour. per hour. first = · } second = · } mean of first pair = · third = · } fourth = · } mean of second pair = · fifth = · } sixth = · } mean of third pair = · giving as a mean · knots per hour, or - / statute miles. the boat was fully equipped for active service, i.e. with a load of - / tons on board. it was found during the trial that at speeds of and knots the vibration of the boat was considerable, but when running over knots it was hardly perceptible; the excessive vibration taking place when the revolutions of the engines became a multiple of the natural vibration of the boat. torpedo boats are at the present time being built by this firm for the english, french, spanish, austrian, and italian governments. _russian torpedo boats, built by mr. s. schibau, prussia._--mr. s. schibau, of elbing, eastern prussia, in constructed ten torpedo boats for the russian government, similar to the one shown at fig . these boats are each feet long, and feet inches beam. they are built of steel plates about an eighth of an inch thick. their engines consist of three cylinder compounds, with surface condensers; and they run at revolutions per minute, at full speed, driving a screw feet in diameter. they have been variously armed, some with the spar, some with the whitehead fish, and some with the harvey towing torpedo. their speed is about knots per hour. _messrs. herreshoff's torpedo._--messrs. herreshoff, of rhode island, u.s.a., have also constructed several torpedo boats. one of these, built for the english government, is shown in section at fig. . this boat is feet inches long, feet inches beam, and feet inches deep; she draws about foot inches of water. [illustration: russian torpedo boat, herreshoff's torpedo boat. plate li] "the vessel is constructed with five water-tight bulkheads, and her hull is of composite construction below the water line, having a steel framing covered with wood planking. the upper part of the hull is wholly of steel, the plates being / inch thick, the top sides sloping inwards and the upper work forming a protective superstructure for the crew and machinery. she is propelled by a screw which is placed beneath the vessel in a central position, and which is driven by a direct acting condensing engine placed in the forward part of the boat. the diameters of the steam cylinders are - / inches and inches respectively, with inch stroke, and they are of horse power estimated. there is an independent feed pump and air pump. the stoke hold is enclosed and is supplied with air by a sturtevant blower, which is driven by an independent engine of - / horse power. the propeller is a two-bladed screw inches in diameter and feet pitch, the screw shaft being feet in length. the vessel is steered by means of a balanced rudder placed a short distance from the stern and under the ship, the helmsman being located in a stern cabin with a protected look-out raised just above the deck. the hull and machinery together weigh tons, but with the working crew of four men and fuel, stores, and two torpedoes on board, boat weighs about - / tons. "steam is supplied by a herreshoff coil boiler, which constitutes another novelty in this boat. this boiler consists of a circular combustion chamber, which in the present instance is feet in diameter internally, and within which is a coil of about feet of inch pipe coiled to nearly the diameter of the chamber. this coil is continued at the top so as to form a kind of dome under the cover of the combustion chamber. by the side of the boiler is a separator, into which the steam passes before it goes to the engine. the water from the feed pump is admitted at the top of the coil, and during its course to the bottom the greater portion of it becomes converted into steam. having passed through the entire length of the coil, the steam and water are discharged together into the separator in such a manner that the water is entirely separated from the steam, and can be blown off as required. the steam is taken from the top of the separator, and returns through a short coil placed inside the combustion chamber, where it becomes superheated, and is led thence to the engines. it is claimed for this boiler that it cannot explode destructively, inasmuch as there is but a very small quantity of water in it at any time, and that it is distributed along the entire length of the coil. a rupture at any point would only be attended by a moderate blowing off of steam. the rapid circulation of the water is found to prevent the deposit of salts, the surplus water not converted into steam carrying with it all impurities. a good working pressure can be obtained within a few minutes of lighting the fire, and the boiler can be blown off in a few seconds. the large combustion chamber enables the full economy of the fuel to be realised."[p] this vessel is guaranteed for a speed of knots per hour. she can be propelled ahead or astern with equal speed, and can be brought to a dead stop when going full speed within a distance equal to her own length. her turning powers are equally good. her armament will probably be the fish torpedo. _ordinary torpedo boat._--the most efficient and simple method of fitting and working a spar torpedo from an ordinary steam launch or pinnace is shown at fig. . this method will be readily understood from the figure; the dotted lines show the position of the spar and upright, when rigged in. the speed of this type of torpedo boat ranges from to knots. occasions would no doubt occur in time of war when a torpedo attack by such boats would be a feasible matter, and therefore everything should be done to render these boats fit for that special service. _defects._--the most important defects of such craft are:-- .--the noise created by their engines, thus rendering an undetected approach to a hostile vessel impracticable. .--their liability to be swamped by the explosion of the torpedo. of course there are many minor defects, but above are the principal ones, both of which might, to a considerable extent, be modified. _torpedo boat attacks._--it is impossible to attempt more than a very general idea of how to conduct a torpedo boat attack, as so much depends upon the circumstances, ever changing, under which each particular attack would have to operate. the spar and the fish torpedo are the submarine weapons that can best be manipulated from boats, the towing torpedo requiring a more roomy craft than the torpedo boat generally is to operate it from with any chance of success. _methods of protecting ships from boat torpedo attacks._--the principal methods that exist at the present time of protecting a ship from a boat torpedo attack are as follows:-- .--booms by themselves, or supporting nets hung vertically, surrounding the ship at a distance of or feet from the side of the vessel. .--a crinoline of wire, or chain, fixed by stays to the vessel's side, but capable of being lifted out of the water if required. .--the above methods supplemented by guard boats, and a cordon of boats. .--a cordon of boats, that is, boats connected at certain distances by means of hawsers, or chain cables, and at a distance of some or yards from the vessel, supplemented by guard boats, but without other protection. .--electric lights and torpedo guns. these latter are small guns capable of penetrating the side of a torpedo boat and of being depressed at a very small angle. as it is against these defences that torpedo boats would have to contend, therefore they have been described previous to explaining the mode of conducting a torpedo boat attack. the first two methods of defence are of course quite impracticable when the attacked vessel is one of a blockading squadron, and it is against such vessels that a torpedo boat attack will generally be used and oftenest be successful. in the case of a vessel forced to anchor in a harbour which is accessible to the torpedo boats of the enemy, by the application of either of the first two methods, supplemented by guard boats and electric lights, she would undoubtedly be almost impregnable against a torpedo boat attack, even were the boats armed with the fish torpedo, though she would of course not be in that state of readiness which is essential to a man-of-war's efficiency. as a general rule, no man-of-war should anchor unless absolutely necessary in the vicinity of an enemy's ports, and then should retain the power of moving in any direction in the quickest space of time possible, using the electric light and guard boats as a means of protection. an attack by boats armed with the spar torpedo must always partake of the nature of a forlorn hope, this especially applying to the boats themselves, the crews of which, provided they are supplied with good life belts, would seem to run a far greater risk of a wetting and a prison than of being shot. not less than four torpedo boats should compose the attacking force. the crews of the boats, consisting of only those actually required, should fully understand "_that the hostile vessel is to be torpedoed_," i.e. they are not to give up the attack on the vessel opening fire, nor in the case of one or more of the torpedo boats being sunk, but to remember that one boat is sufficient to effectually carry out the object of the attack, viz. the sinking of the ship. in making the attack, one boat should be directed on each bow, and one on each quarter, the final rush being as combined as possible. there must not be the _slightest hesitation_, and each boat must make _direct_ for her point of attack. the cause of the russians failing so often in their torpedo boat attacks during the war of ' may be traced to the absence of anything like a system, and to their giving up the attack directly they supposed themselves discovered. when using the towing torpedo, two boats only could be used, and they should make the attack, either coming down from ahead, one on each side of the vessel, or coming up from the stern, one on each side of the vessel, or by the boats crossing the bow and stern of the vessel in different directions. in the case of the fish torpedo the attack must be conducted in a different manner, the object in this case being to get within a certain distance only of the vessel undetected, and from thence send the missile on its deadly course. the distance should not be more than yards; the closer up to yards the better. in connection with such an attack, the torpedo boats might be supported by guard boats, whose particular duty it would be to engage the enemy's guard boats and so leave the torpedo boats free to do their particular work. it has been suggested to use the electric light from the bows of torpedo boats, but this would do away with one of the chief characteristics of such boats, viz. their invisible and unknown approach, on which the whole success of the attack in a great measure depends. _fosberry's patent torpedo boat protective._--to enable torpedo vessels and boats to remain afloat after being struck by shot from mitrailleuses, rifles, and other arms usually employed against such craft, and at the same time to retain their structural lightness, colonel g. v. fosberry, of the english army, has designed the following method, which is based upon the discovery that when india-rubber or the like is placed and secured on a metal plate, and is penetrated or punctured by a rifle bullet or similar projectile, which also passes through the metal plate, the hole or orifice so formed in the india-rubber will, after the projectile has passed through it and the metal plate, immediately be closed by the elasticity of the surrounding portions, so that no water can follow the projectile through the said hole or orifice. india-rubber or other elastic material, or a combination of such materials, in the form of sheets, belts, or coats, is placed upon or around those portions of the hull of the boat which are to be protected. vulcanised or mineralised india-rubber is the material usually employed by colonel fosberry. between the metal plates and the india-rubber covering an intermediate substance, generally kamptulicon, is interposed, which is cemented or riveted to the said metal plates, and to which the india-rubber is attached. this intermediate substance, which is the feature of the invention, must be of such a nature that it may be caused to adhere closely and tightly to all parts of the metal, and also to the india-rubber covering, while the same are unperforated, but when the said india-rubber covering and the metal plate under the same are perforated by a bullet, the portion of the said intermediate substance adjacent to the perforation must be detached from the elastic covering and metal plate, and leave the former free to act like a valve, and close up over the hole so that no water may enter; and this intermediate substance, as applied by the inventor in the immediate vicinity of the perforation, will by the effect of the shot be so broken up and detached from the india-rubber covering as to allow the same to recover its original position independently of the new shape or position of the injured and deformed metal plate. should the india-rubber be placed upon the metal plates and be so attached to the said plates as to adhere and conform to them in or after their deformation, a hole made in the india-rubber would remain open; on the other hand, should the india-rubber without any intermediate substance be attached to the metal plate in such a manner that it will recover its position after perforation, water would penetrate between the metal and the india-rubber, and by the pressure of this water the india-rubber would be liable to be detached from a large area of the metal plate, and so become ineffective or even dangerous to the boat. moreover, if the india-rubber is fixed directly upon the metal plates, in the case of a shot passing completely through the boat, that is to say, passing into the boat at one side and out at the other side, a large portion of the india-rubber adjacent to the hole made by the shot in leaving the boat will be torn or destroyed, but this will not be the case in boats constructed according to colonel fosberry's patent. the french government have recently applied this invention to one of their torpedo boats with very successful results, thereby proving that it is not merely a theoretical idea. _submarine boats._--submarine boats, if they could be constructed to fulfil the conditions hereinafter enumerated which are essential to a perfect boat of that nature, would for many reasons be a very important point solved in connection with torpedo operations, and therefore it is most extraordinary that a practicable submarine boat has not yet been designed and built. _bushnell's submarine boat._--the first submarine vessel built for torpedo purposes was designed and constructed by david bushnell in . this vessel, operated by a sergeant esra lee, was employed in an attempt in or thereabouts on the _eagle_, an english man-of-war, which proved unsuccessful, owing to the sergeant not being thoroughly versed in the management of his curious craft. she was soon afterwards sunk in the hudson river, but was subsequently recovered by the inventor, though never used again. this vessel was capable of holding one person, and air sufficient to support him thirty minutes without receiving fresh air, and is fully described in 'barnes's submarine warfare.' _qualifications essential to a submarine boat._--a submarine boat should possess the following qualifications:-- .--it should be of sufficient displacement to carry the machinery necessary for propulsion, and the men and materials for performing the various operations. .--it should be of such a form that it may be easily propelled and steered. .--it should have sufficient interior space for the crew to work in. .--it should be capable of carrying sufficient pure air to support its crew for a specified time, or of having the means of purifying the air within the boat, and exhausting the foul air. .--it should be able to rise and sink at will to the required depth, either when stationary or in motion. .--it should be so fitted that the crew possess the means of leaving the boat without requiring external assistance. .--it should carry a light sufficient to steer by, and to carry on the various operations. .--it should possess sufficient strength to prevent any chance of its collapsing at the greatest depth to which it may be required to manipulate it. the results of former experiments with such boats prove that manual power, which was the original mode of propulsion, is not the motive power best adapted to such a boat; compressed air, gas as used in the lay torpedo boat, and steam, are all of them far preferable to the original method, but which of these modern ones is the most practicable has yet to be decided. the most difficult point to be overcome in connection with a submarine boat is that of steering it correctly when beneath the surface of the water. _confederate submarine boat._--the confederate submarine torpedo boat that sunk the federal vessel of war _housatonic_ on the th of february, , was built of boiler iron, ' long, ' beam (extreme), ' high in the centre. she carried a crew of nine men. she was propelled by means of a screw propeller worked by eight of the crew, her greatest speed being four knots an hour in smooth water. she carried a sufficient quantity of air to enable the crew to remain submerged for the space of two to three hours. two fins were fitted on the outside for rising and falling at will, when in motion. there were two manholes provided, fitted with bull's-eyes. this boat was intended to pass under a vessel's bottom, towing a torpedo after her, which was arranged to explode on contact. she was the means of drowning fourteen men before she made her last attempt, when nine others were added to the above list. in her successful attack on the _housatonic_, she was armed with the bow spar torpedo, and was sunk, owing to her running into the hole formed by the explosion of her torpedo. about three years after the american civil war was over, this submarine boat was recovered. divers went down, and found her lying alongside the hull of the _housatonic_, with the remains of the nine men in her. _french submarine boat "plongeur."_--the boat termed the _plongeur_ was designed by admiral bougois and m. brune, and was exhibited at the paris exhibition of . she was ' long, ' deep, and fitted with centre and bilge keels. she carried two small tanks containing compressed air, and four large tanks were placed at the bottom of the boat for the purpose of sinking her, these latter tanks communicating with the water outside and the air tanks. she also was fitted with a compass for steering by, a water gauge to show the depth of submersion, and an air gauge to show the pressure of air in the boat. rectangular valves were placed at the bottom of the boat for entrance or exit therefrom, for the use of divers, and to affix torpedoes to a ship's bottom. on the top a circular opening for entrance and exit was arranged, also an iron cupola fitted with bull's-eyes. she was also fitted with an apparatus for spraying water through the air in the interior of the boat on its becoming foul, and escape valves for releasing any foul air were placed at the top of the boat. the water tanks were filled by means of pumps, and emptied by means of the compressed air. she was propelled by a three-bladed screw worked by four men. her rate of progression was about four knots per hour. the anchors consisted of two inch shot, fitted with wire rope cables, working through watertight stuffing boxes. this vessel has been subjected to some experiments, but with what results is not generally known. one of the most important uses to which a submarine boat would be put in connection with torpedo operations would be "to discover the exact position and number of an enemy's submarine mines, and if necessary destroy them," the former being an operation in the present day quite impossible to perform, and the latter one rarely to be depended on. footnotes: [footnote m: extract from 'european ships of war,' &c., by j. w. king, u.s.n., page .] [footnote n: extract from _engineering_, under date april , .] [footnote o: extract from letter of captain ericsson that appeared in _engineer_, under date nov. , .] [footnote p: extract from the engineering of the th of january, .] chapter vii. torpedo operations. a review, however brief, of the numerous torpedo operations that have of late years been carried out in actual war, must prove not only of great interest, but of material aid to those who may be desirous of studying this branch of naval warfare, for the experience so gained ought alone to be the basis on which a system of submarine offence and defence should be constructed. no new torpedo invention should be adopted, however theoretically perfect it may be, until it has been subjected to a very severe practical test, under conditions as nearly analogous to those that would occur on active service as it would be possible to obtain. the vast importance of a carefully planned and executed system of submarine _defence_ is an established fact, and it only remains to discover what are the best weapons for, and most practicable mode of manipulating a system of submarine offence, to establish torpedo warfare in all its branches as a necessary function of naval warfare. it would be a mere waste of time to dwell on the anglo-french and american wars of the beginning of this century ( - ); though during that period various attempts were made by fulton and others to destroy hostile vessels by means of submarine infernal machines, inasmuch as they all partook more or less of the nature of experiments, and were all failures, but come at once to the crimean war ( - ), when what may be termed a systematic employment of torpedoes for harbour defence was first employed. crimean war ( - ). _defence of sebastopol harbour, &c._--the russians employed a large quantity of submarine mines, both electrical and mechanical, principally the latter, in their defence of the harbours of sebastopol, sveaborg, and cronstadt. according to general delafield, u.s.a., the arrangement of the mechanical mines was entirely new, the conception and idea of an eminent russian chemist, professor jacobi. _electrical mines._--no mention is made by the general of the employment of electrical mines, but the fact of a hulk being captured by the allies at yenikale, with a number of torpedoes on board, and all the arrangements necessary to explode them by electricity, such as voltaic piles, electric fuzes, several miles of conducting wire, &c., is sufficient proof of this type of submarine mine being extensively used by the russians in their harbour defences. many of their mechanical mines were picked up by the allies, several of which were found to have their safety caps on. owing to this neglect, and the smallness of the charge of the torpedoes (only some lbs. of gunpowder), it is not to be wondered at that no serious injury was done to any ships of the allied squadron. deterred most probably by the failures of bushnell, fulton, and others in previous years with the submarine and other torpedo boat attacks, nothing of this description was attempted by either side. _russian mechanical mines._--the russian mechanical mines consisted of barrels of powder fitted with fuzes, so arranged that a blow would smash a glass tube containing sulphuric acid, causing the acid to mix with some chlorate of potash, resulting in combustion and the explosion of the mine. austro-italian war ( ). _defence of venice by von ebner._--during this brief struggle, defensive torpedo operations were carried out under the direction of colonel von ebner, of the imperial austrian engineers. the harbour of venice was protected by a most elaborate system of submarine mines, devised by the above-named officer. though the importance of his system was proved by the fact of no attempt being made on venice, yet no opportunity was afforded of _practically_ testing its efficiency. american civil war ( - ). _cause of the present importance of the torpedo._--the prominent position the torpedo now holds as a most important and legitimate function of naval warfare is owing without doubt to the successful and extensive employment of them on the part of the confederates during this long and bloody struggle. _reasons which induced the confederates to employ torpedoes._--the numerous harbours and navigable rivers in the possession of the southerners, the few ships of war at their disposal, the overwhelming fleet of the northerners, and the introduction for the first time of ironclads in naval warfare, are the principal causes which forced the confederates to resort to torpedoes as a means of offence and defence. though a few rude and extempore submarine mechanical mines were met with by the federals during the earliest part of the war, it was not until many months after the commencement of hostilities that the confederates, finding themselves quite unable to cope with their rivals on the sea, set to work in earnest to organise a system of submarine warfare on a grand scale. _torpedo corps formed, &c.--loss of "cairo."_--by october, , a secret service torpedo corps, with headquarters at richmond, was in full swing, and the principal harbours and rivers of the confederates were systematically protected by means of electrical and mechanical mines, also a scheme of offence by drifting and spar torpedoes was in preparation, and in december of the same year they experienced the first-fruits of their labour by the total destruction of the federal war steamer _cairo_. the following brief review of the numerous torpedo operations carried out by both sides, and the effect their use had on the war, will be sufficient to enable the general reader to gain some idea of the vast importance of this submarine weapon in future warfare. fuller and more detailed accounts will be found in commander s. barnes's, u.s.n., colonel von scheliha's, and captain h. steward's torpedo works. _every species of torpedo used--frame torpedoes at charleston, &c.--federal ship disasters--small effect of electrical mines--loss of the "commodore jones," &c._--every species of submarine mine seems to have been used by the southerners for their harbour and river defence, the most effectual of which were the barrel, frame, and singer's torpedoes. these were all mechanical, fired by means of sensitive concussion fuzes. at charleston and elsewhere the frame torpedo, which also acted as an obstruction, was largely used, and where this species of mine was known to be laid, the northerners never attempted to force a passage. out of some thirty or forty federal ships sunk or injured by torpedoes, by far the larger proportion of such disasters was effected by means of the barrel and singer's mines. though electrical mines were very extensively used on the st. james river and at charleston, &c., yet only one federal steamer, the _commodore jones_, was sunk, and only one other, the _commodore barney_, was injured. _case of the "new ironsides."_--the federal ship _new ironsides_, at the attack on charleston in , was anchored for one hour and a half exactly over a lbs. electrical mine, which despite all the efforts of the confederates could not be exploded. the reason of this was owing to the deterioration of the primer, due to too constant testing. _welden railway._--a notable instance of the effect of torpedoes on the war was the saving of the welden line of communication in december, . the welden railway was the principal artery of communication to richmond for the confederates. to intercept this, by destroying the railway bridges, a fleet of nine federal gunboats was sent up the roanoke river; when nearly arrived at their destination, and though every precaution in the shape of bow projecting spars, creeping, &c., was taken, seven of the vessels were either sunk or severely injured by submarine mines. thus the expedition ended in a most disastrous failure. _general butler's attack on richmond._--again, in april, , general butler's attack on richmond utterly failed, owing to the federal fleet being unable to co-operate with him, the destruction of the _commodore jones_ completely checking any further advance of admiral lee's ships, thus allowing the confederates to employ the garrisons of their river batteries in their land line of entrenchments. _more than one line of torpedoes required._--the capture of the spanish fort at mobile in april, , by a federal fleet under admiral lee, proves the necessity of employing more than one line of torpedoes, where the safety of a position depends almost entirely on those means of defence, as this one did. here, though several federal vessels were either sunk or severely damaged, yet the fort was captured. _boat torpedo attacks._--in regard to boat torpedo attacks, the confederates were only successful in two out of many attempts made by them to sink federal vessels. _the "housatonic" and "minnesota."_--these successes were the complete destruction of the housatonic by a submarine boat, fitted with a spar torpedo, and serious injury caused to the _minnesota_ by the explosion of a contact spar torpedo, carried by an ordinary gig, commonly termed "david's." in the former instance the attacking boat was sunk,[q] in the latter instance she was uninjured. _destruction of the "albemarle."_--on the part of the federals, lieutenant cushing with a steam launch fitted with a wood and lay torpedo, succeeded in sinking the confederate ram _albemarle_. the boat in this instance was swamped by the column of water thrown up on the explosion of the torpedo, she having been driven full speed at the albemarle. _ship spar torpedoes._--on both sides, spar torpedoes fitted to the bows of ships, and also on rafts slung over the bows, were somewhat extensively used, but on no occasion were they the means of injuring or sinking any vessels. to increase the difficulties of the northerners in searching for submarine mines, the southerners laid down a great number of dummy torpedoes, also erected false torpedo stations, and laid false wires. it must always be borne in mind, in connection with the torpedo operations above detailed, that the apparatus were very crude, and the operators at the commencement inexperienced. paraguayan war ( - ). _torpedoes employed by the paraguayans._--during their protracted struggle with the brazilians, the paraguayans employed submarine mines for the protection of their river forts, &c. _loss of the "rio janeiro"--brazilian fleet entrapped._--on the nd of september, , the brazilian ironclad _rio janeiro_, after being well-battered by the guns of the curupaity fort, was sunk by a torpedo. later on, near the same place, a whole fleet of brazilian war ships were entrapped by the paraguayans, between two rows of submarine mines, but owing to faulty arrangements they escaped unharmed. austrian war ( ). _venice, pola, &c., protected by torpedoes._--during this war, torpedoes for the defence of venice, pola, &c., were extensively used by the austrians, under the direction of baron von ebner, but as in ' no opportunity was afforded of proving their practical worth, though morally they were of great value, the austrian harbours so defended being considered impregnable by the enemy, and therefore no attempt was made to force them. franco-german war ( - ). little or nothing in the matter of torpedo operations was attempted by the germans, and on the part of the french nothing whatever. _germans employed submarine mines._--electrical and mechanical mines were placed in several of the german harbours, the former containing about lbs. of dualine, the latter some lbs. of gunpowder. the only attempt to destroy french ships by means of offensive torpedoes was made by the german vessel the _grille_, off rügen, which resulted in failure. in laying down and in picking up after the war was over their mechanical mines, several exploded, killing some ten to fifteen men. _boats necessary._--towards the end of the war, the germans were constructing special torpedo boats, believing that such were necessary for the complete defence of harbours. this war added another proof of the moral worth of submarine mines; the french fleet not daring to approach german waters _supposed_ to be defended by such means. russo-turkish war ( - ). _superiority of turkey to russia in the matter of ships._--on the danube, in the black sea, and mediterranean, where the principal naval portion of the war was carried out, turkey was possessed of a fleet of ships infinitely superior to russia, both in point of numbers and strength, and therefore, to enable her to hold her own against this vast superiority of the turks, the russians resorted to an extensive employment of torpedoes, for both offensive and defensive purposes. _russian torpedoes._--for many years previous to the outbreak of hostilities in april, , the russians had been studying the subject of torpedo warfare in all its branches, a certain number of their naval and military officers and men having every year passed through a regular course of torpedo study, at a school specially formed for such a purpose; they had also laid in large stores of submarine mines, spar torpedoes, and were in possession of the whitehead and towing torpedoes, and also several electric lights, and a few months after war was declared they obtained a fast thornycroft torpedo boat. _turkish torpedoes._--on the other hand, the turks were only in possession of a number of those huge, unwieldy lbs. buoyant mines, and one electric light; circuit closers, contact mines, boats (steam or otherwise) fitted for use with torpedo, or offensive torpedoes, being conspicuous by their absence. thus it will be seen that in the matter of submarine offence and defence, the russians were as superior to the turks as the latter were to the former in the matter of ships. _turkish defensive torpedo operations._--the defensive torpedo operations carried out by the ottoman naval officers and men were as follows:-- the harbour of batoum in the black sea was protected by a few lbs. buoyant mines, arranged to be fired by observation. the mouth of the bosphorus and the dardanelles were similarly defended. for this work great praise is due to those who executed the work, for the very strong current and great depth met with in those waters would render such a service a work of great difficulty, even when properly constructed mooring boats, and men trained to such, were employed, both of which in this particular instance were absent. soulina, one of the mouths of the danube, and suda bay (candia) were also protected by similar means. _russian defensive torpedo operations._--the russian defensive torpedo operations were very extensive, their principal harbours in the baltic, as well as those in the black sea, were carefully defended by electro-contact mines of the latest type; so also they protected their numerous bridges across the danube, double and sometimes treble rows of such mines being moored on either side, and in addition they also placed several mines in the danube, on the chance of destroying the turkish danube flotilla. _destruction of turkish gunboat "suna" by a russian submarine mine._--the only instance that occurred during this war of a vessel being sunk by a stationary submarine mine was that of the turkish gunboat _suna_, at soulina, in october, , on the occasion of the unsuccessful attack on that place made by the combined russian and roumanian flotilla. about a.m. on the morning of the attack, a "loftcha" containing two of the enemy's electro-contact mines, fitted for laying down, was captured by the turks, from which it was evident that the russians had been employed during the night in torpedoing the reach immediately above the turkish defences. however, not heeding this very practical warning, the pacha in command of the soulina squadron ordered the _kartal_ (a paddle-wheel tug vessel) and the _suna_ (an old wooden gunboat) to reconnoitre up the river; they accordingly started, the _kartal_ leading the way. at . a.m., about fifteen minutes after the two vessels had left their moorings, an explosion was heard, and almost at the same instant the unfortunate gunboat _suna_ was observed to go down head foremost, her masts only remaining above water. the _kartal_, which at the time of the catastrophe was some distance in advance, at once turned back to the assistance of her consort, and managed to save a number of the gunboat's crew, this work having to be performed under a galling fire from the allied flotilla. owing to this day being the "feast of bairam," the unfortunate gunboat was dressed with masthead flags, thus four turkish ensigns fell into the hands of the enemy, the pacha refusing permission for any attempt to be made to save them. the reason that the _kartal_ escaped the fate of her consort was due to her only drawing some feet of water, while the _suna_ drew at least feet. the gunboat struck the mine that sunk her on her port bow, the effect of the explosion being to completely smash in that side of her bow, dismount her foremost guns, and carry away her foremast just above the deck (the mast remained standing, though inclined forward); the second lieutenant of the _suna_, who was at the time of the explosion standing on her fore bridge, was thrown off and killed, and some twelve of the crew were killed and wounded. to complete the destruction of the _suna_, another torpedo was exploded under her port quarter by the russians. the torpedo that was used on this occasion is detailed at page . _offensive torpedo operations._--the numerous boat torpedo attacks made by the russians against the turkish fleet will now be considered. the following accounts have been carefully compiled from two sources, viz. an article written by captain chardonneau, which appeared in the 'revue maritime et coloniale,' , and which has been recently translated for the journal of the royal united service institution by lieutenant j. meryon, r.n., and notes taken by the author during his service with the imperial ottoman navy ( - ). st affair. _the batoum attack._--the first torpedo boat attack occurred on the night of the th- th of may at batoum.[r] on the night of the attack there were lying in the harbour several vessels of the ottoman fleet, including ironclads, transports, despatch-boats, &c. these vessels were totally unprotected by guard boats, booms, electric lights, &c., and only the usual number of sentries were posted, the turks at that time not quite believing in such boat attacks, thus offering peculiar advantages for a torpedo attack. four torpedo boats formed the attacking force, viz. the _tchesme_, _sinope_, _navarino_, and the _soukoum kalé_. these boats were carried by a ship of the maritime company of odessa, named _grand duke constantine_. she was an iron screw steamer, able to steam about knots per hour, and fitted to hoist up the above-mentioned torpedo boats. she was armed with four -pounders, and torpedoes. early in the evening of the th the _constantine_ left poti, and proceeded off the harbour of batoum, her captain (lieutenant de vaisseau makaroff) deeming it advisable to lay to seven miles from the harbour, the supposition that the turks had placed submarine mines off the entrance being the cause of his so doing. about p.m. the four torpedo boats started to the attack, makaroff being in command of one of them. they were all painted sea green, and possessed a high speed. the night being dark, and having been despatched some distance off, they reached the entrance in somewhat straggling order. the _tchesme_, commanded by lieutenant zatzarennyi, and armed with a towing torpedo, was the first to enter the harbour, and, without waiting for her consorts, dashed at the ottoman fleet, and succeeded in getting close to a large turkish paddle-wheel transport, and her commander dipping his torpedo, struck the ship under her quarter; but that little something which so often causes a failure in this mode of warfare occurred, and no explosion followed the pressing down of the firing key, much to the chagrin and disgust of zatzarennyi. as might be supposed, by this time an alarm had been raised, and guns, rifles, &c., were fired in and from every direction, causing the torpedo boats to beat a precipitate and hasty retreat. fortunately the turks were not possessed of any steamboats, nor were any of their ships ready to dash out, or the defeat would have been a far more disastrous one than was the case. neither of the boats were damaged, nor any of the crews injured. the failure of this first attempt was due in a great measure to the mode of attack, no system or unanimity of action on the part of the four commanders being observable; and also to the somewhat half-hearted support given to the _tchesme_, for had her three consorts only dashed at the turkish ships as boldly, one at least of the ottoman fleet would have been sunk, the only defence resorted to being their guns and small arms. the moral effect of torpedoes was displayed here, causing the _constantine_ to lay too far off the entrance to the harbour, thus decreasing the chance of her boats making a successful attack. the russian version finishes up by saying, "although this first endeavour was unsuccessful, the authors of it were received at sebastopol with enthusiasm." nd affair. _the matchin attack._--the second attempt was made on the th- th of may on two turkish monitors, the _fettu islam_ and the _duba saife_, and a small river steamer, the _kilidj ali_, lying at anchor off matchin.[s] four russian torpedo boats were sent to the attack, viz. the _czarowitch_, lieutenant doubasoff; the _xénie_, lieutenant chestakoff; the _djiquite_, midshipman persine; and the _czarevna_, midshipman bali. the total number of officers and men carried by these boats on this occasion was forty-six. the night of the attack was rainy, but not completely dark, since the moon was above the horizon during nearly the whole of the expedition. the force left brailoff at one o'clock on the morning of the th, and advanced in two columns up the river, finding great difficulty in stemming the strong current. a boat from the _duba saife_, rowing guard some yards in advance of the squadron, observed the approach of the russian boats, but allowed them to pass on their voyage of destruction without attempting to stop them, or alarm the vessels. on reaching within yards of the _duba saife_, dubasoff in the _czarowitch_ was challenged, and failing to give the correct answer was immediately fired at; but, nothing daunted by the hail of shot and bullets, he dashed on, and succeeded in exploding one of his spar torpedoes on the port side of the _duba saife_, just under her quarter, a column of water and _débris_ being thrown up to a height of feet, which partly filled his boat, but notwithstanding managed to get safely away. the monitor not sinking as soon as expected, chestakoff in the _xénie_ dashed in, and completed the work of destruction, the unfortunate ship sinking in a very few minutes after this last explosion. the _djiquite_ was struck in the stern, and had to be run ashore for repairs, but eventually all four boats reached brailoff in safety. the russians allowed to neither killed nor wounded, which, when the time they were exposed to the fire of the three turkish ships (about twenty minutes), the number of men (forty-six) engaged, and their very close quarters, seems miraculous. the _duba saife_, thus lost to the turks, carried two cm. krupp guns, and a crew of some sixty officers and men, few of whom were saved. lieutenants dubasoff and chestakoff were decorated with the th class of the cross of saint george, and three seamen received the insignia of the order of military merit. this attack was conducted in a most gallant manner, and far more systematically than the batoum affair. if instead of holding one of the boats in reserve, which was part of dubasoff's plan, and the remaining three attacking one vessel, the force had divided itself into two parties, and had made a simultaneous attack on both the monitors, the probability is that the _fettu islam_ would have shared the fate of her consort. the officer of the turkish guard boat was tried by court-martial, but what his ultimate fate was is not generally known. he certainly deserved nothing less than death. rd affair. _the soulina attack._--the third attempt took place on the th- th of june, , on a turkish squadron lying at anchor off soulina.[t] this squadron consisted of the three ironclads _feteh bulend_, _moocardemikhair_, and _idglalieh_, and a tug, _kartal_. the russian attacking force consisted of six torpedo boats, viz. the no. , lieutenant poutschin; the no. , lieutenant rojdestvenski; the _tchesme_, lieutenant zatzarennyi; the _sinope_, the _navarino_, and the _soukoum kalé_. the no. was a specially constructed torpedo boat, feet long, and very fast. all were armed with spar torpedoes, with the exception of the _tchesme_, which carried a towing torpedo. the boats were convoyed from odessa by the _constantine_, some being carried, and some being towed; another steamer, the _vladimir_, supported her. the turkish squadron were anchored in quarter line, about one mile from the harbour; the _kartal_, under weigh, being used as an advance guard, and a few boats rowing guard close to the ships being _the only means of protection_ adopted by the turks. passive obstructions, such as booms, nets, crinolines, &c., were not thought of, much less used. on arriving about five miles from soulina, the boats were formed into two groups, the first consisting of the no. , the no. , and the _tchesme_, and despatched on their way. the working of their engines was scarcely heard, and all lights were carefully hidden by tarpaulins. the first casualty that happened was the disabling of the _tchesme_, by the electric wire of her towing torpedo fouling the screw, this obliging her to return to the _constantine_. aided by good fortune, and by the darkness of the night, the no. and the no. succeeded in getting close to ( yards) one of the turkish vessels, the _idglalieh_, before being discovered, when they were at once hailed, and, not answering, a tremendous fire of big guns and rifles was directed on them from the _idglalieh_, which was promptly followed by that of the whole squadron, though from the other ships nothing of the boats could be seen. according to the russians, the no. succeeded in exploding her torpedo close to, if not in contact with, a turkish vessel, but from eyewitnesses on board the squadron only one explosion was heard, viz. that of lieutenant poutschin's torpedo. any way, no damage whatever was experienced by the ottoman squadron. the no. came down on the _idglalieh's_ starboard bow, fouled her cable, and swung alongside, exploding one of her torpedoes in so doing, but with no other result than a wetting to those of the ironclad's crew, who were on the forecastle. alongside poutschin remained for some minutes, but at last managed to get clear, and then was either sunk by the _idglalieh's_ fire, or, as he avers, on finding his screw foul, he sunk his boat, rather than let her fall into the hands of the turks. poutschin and four of his crew were picked up, after being some hours in the water, by the squadron's boats. the no. seems to have suffered severely, her funnel being bent, the axle of the steering wheel damaged, sixteen rivets were started, and the iron keel plate had dropped some inches, and finally the lower part of her rudder broken, and one of the blades of her screw bent aft; part of this damage was no doubt the effect of the explosion of her torpedo, which was probably not in position, but unless she ran over some loose stones of the soulina breakwater, the damage to her keel and rudder cannot be accounted for. the second group of boats had followed up the first, but on hearing the noise of the explosions and roar of the guns and rifles they returned to the _constantine_. that ship, on observing the firing, endeavoured to close the land, but she grounded, and remained until daylight in a difficult position, but at last got afloat, and returned to odessa with five out of her six torpedo boats. lieutenant rojdestvenski, the commander of the no. , received the th class of the cross of saint george, and three seamen the insignia of the order of military merit. on the part of the no. and no. , this was a most gallant affair, though unsuccessful, but as regards the remainder of the boats the less said the better. had the turkish squadron slipped the instant the alarm was given, and steamed full speed in the direction of odessa, the _constantine_ and her convoy might have been cut off. both the _moorcademikhair_ and _feteh bulend_ were knot ships, and therefore considerably faster than the enemy. but, as usual, the turks were far too dilatory to take advantage of the occasion. th affair. _the rustchuk attack._--the fourth torpedo attack was made on the afternoon of the th of june, , on a turkish monitor off rustchuk. the only russian torpedo boat sent to the attack on this occasion was a thornycroft named the _choutka_, commanded by lieutenant skrydloff, and accompanied by a celebrated russian artist, verechtckaguine by name. the instant the torpedo boat was observed, so well directed and steady a fire was kept up by the monitor that both the lieutenant and the artist were badly wounded, and the electric wires of the torpedo severed, thus obliging the _choutka_ to beat a retreat. according to the russian account, the monitor was struck by the boat's torpedo spar, but the above seems the more likely version. this was certainly a most audacious attack, and had the turks only succeeded in hitting the _choutka_ with her big gun, it would have ended fatally for the russians; as it was, the boat was struck by several bullets, but none of the crew were wounded. th affair. _the aluta attack._--the fifth attack was made on the th of june, , on a turkish monitor off the mouth of the aluta, in the river danube. this attempt, like the last, took place in broad daylight. four russian boats were sent forward, but in spite of the captain of the turkish vessel doing all he could to run the boats down, none of them succeeded in getting sufficiently near the vessel to enable a torpedo to be placed in contact. the captain of the monitor took the precaution to rig his lower booms out, and so managed to keep the enemy's boats at a respectful distance, they imagining that mines were fixed to the ends of the booms. after two hours of this dodging about, the russians, finding the case hopeless, abandoned the attack. the russian account states-- st, that the captain of the monitor was an englishman; nd, that the vessel was protected by nets and torpedoes lashed to the extremities of her booms--both of which statements are radically wrong. the torpedo boats forming the attack were the _choutka_, midshipman niloff, and the _mina_, sub-lieutenant arens, both armed with the spar torpedo. unless indeed the russians acted up to the old proverb which says "discretion is the best part of valour," it is difficult to understand how four small easily handled boats could have been for one hour endeavouring to strike a ship (which ship was at the same time being manoeuvred with a view of running them down) without either effecting their object or being sunk or damaged in the attempt. the russians, though unsuccessful, behaved gallantly. midshipman niloff was severely wounded, but no mention is made as to the number of the crew that were killed and wounded, or of the damage received by the boats. niloff received the th class of the cross of st. george, and arens the order of military merit. the turkish captain, ali bey, behaved most pluckily and skilfully. the only wonder is that both the boats were not sunk by the monitor's fire. th affair. _the soukoum kaleh attack._--the sixth attempt was made on the rd- th of august, , on a turkish ironclad, the _assari shefket_, at the time lying at anchor off soukoum kaleh.[u] four torpedo boats composed the attacking force, viz. the _sinope_, lieutenant pisarefski; the _torpedoist_, midshipman nelson hirst; the _navarino_, lieutenant vichnevetski; and the _tchesme_, lieutenant zatzarennyi, the latter officer being in command. these boats had been brought to the entrance of the harbour by the _constantine_, and were despatched on their mission of destruction about half past ten. an eclipse of the moon occurred on this night, and, taking advantage of this fact, the four russian torpedo boats dashed into the harbour at full speed and made for the turkish vessel. fortunately for the safety of his ship and lives of his crew, the captain of the turkish ironclad had several boats rowing guard round his ship, and otherwise everything on board in readiness for immediate action. on the attacking flotilla nearing the guard boats, blue lights were burnt, rifles fired, &c., and the alarm given to those on the look-out in the _assari shefket_. the moment the enemy were within range, such a well-directed and heavy fire was poured on them that the attack was completely foiled. one of the russian torpedoes was exploded, but failed to do more than throw a quantity of water up. the next morning a pole with torpedo fixed on it was found by the turks, and on the strength of this and the numerous fragments of wood similarly found, one if not more of the enemy's boats it was supposed must have been sunk, or much knocked about. this was a much better planned and executed attack, but was unsuccessful owing to the extreme vigilance of the turks. this attempt will always be remembered by the turks, on account of the general order that appeared in the papers on the part of the russians, in which "the brilliant exploit and successful destruction of the turkish ironclad _assari shefket_" was set forth at great length; she at the time that this appeared being quietly at anchor off the dockyard at stamboul, not having received any damage whatever. th affair. _the second batoum attack._--the seventh attempt was made on the night of the th- th of december, , on several turkish men-of-war anchored in the harbour of batoum (the scene of the first russian torpedo attempt and failure). four boats composed the attacking force, viz. the _tchesme_, lieutenant zatzarennyi, in command, armed with a whitehead fish torpedo, containing kilog. of gun-cotton, fitted to fire from a tube under the boat's keel; the _sinope_, lieutenant stchelinski, armed with a similarly charged fish torpedo, fitted to fire from a raft, which was towed by the boat, and two other boats, armed with spar and towing torpedoes. the means employed at batoum for the safeguard of the ottoman fleet there against such an attack was that of guard boats and a barrier formed of logs of wood, with planks secured to them, so arranged by means of weights that the planks remained perpendicular to the surface of the water when in position. owing to the extreme darkness of the night, the russians managed to evade the guard boats, and when, as they imagined, some to yards from a turkish ironclad, the _tchesme_ and _sinope's_ whitehead fish torpedoes were started on their deadly mission; but, owing most probably to the want of practice of manipulating these somewhat delicate instruments, also to the darkness, and the slight swell there was on at the time, both missed their mark, and were landed high and dry on the beach astern of the ship. one of these weapons was perfect, the other minus her fore compartment, this having been knocked off by the torpedo colliding with some hard object. no explosion was heard or seen by the turks. this was the second time that the fish torpedo had been employed on actual service, and, as in the previous instance, failed. the guard boats and barrier of the turks seem to have been of little avail. th affair. _the final attack._--the eighth and last attempt was made on the night of the th- th of january, . this was originally intended to be an attack on the turkish fleet at batoum, but on entering that harbour the two russian torpedo boats, the _tchesme_, lieutenant zatzarennyi, and the _sinope_, lieutenant stchelinski, were met by a turkish revenue steamer, against which the boats discharged their whitehead torpedoes, resulting in her complete destruction, at the same time arousing the squadron, and causing the boats to beat a retreat. though the vessel destroyed was not a frigate, yet the expedition was successful in so far as proving that it is possible to project whitehead fish torpedoes from boats at a distance of to yards from an enemy's ship, on a dark night, and strike her with them. this concludes the whole of the offensive torpedo operations that were carried out during the war, of which two out of eight attempts were successful, which is without doubt a fair percentage. there seems every probability that the present struggle between chili and peru, in the pacific, will afford torpedoists further experience of the various offensive torpedoes, when subjected to the test of active service. footnotes: [footnote q: see page .] [footnote r: a turkish port, situated on the east coast of the black sea, capable of holding several large ships when anchored head and stern, but otherwise only a few.] [footnote s: a town situated on the south bank of the danube, about eight miles from brailoff.] [footnote t: one of the principal mouths of the danube.] [footnote u: a place taken from the russians in the early part of the war, situated on the east coast of the black sea.] chapter viii. on explosives. explosion may be defined as the sudden or extremely rapid conversion of a solid or liquid body of small bulk into gas or vapour, occupying very many times the volume of the original substance, and which in addition is highly expanded by the heat generated during the action. this sudden or very rapid expansion of volume is attended by an exhibition of force which is more or less violent, according to the constitution of the original body and the circumstances of the explosion. any substance capable of undergoing such a change on the application of heat or other disturbing cause is called an "explosive." _explosive force._--explosive _force_ is _directly_ proportional to the heat of combustion and the volume of gas, and _inversely_ to the specific heat of the mixed products. explosive _effect_ is _directly_ proportional to the volume of gas produced and the temperature of the explosion, and _inversely_ as the time required for the change to take place. _explosive effect and force compared._--explosive effect depends upon the rapidity with which the conversion is effected, while the same amount of explosive force may act suddenly or gradually. as before stated, explosions are more or less violent according to the _circumstances_ under which they take place. these may be considered as follows:-- .--the physical state of the explosive substance. .--the external conditions under which the explosive body is fired. .--the mode of firing. _the physical state of the explosive substance._--numerous instances may be cited to show the influence the physical condition of an explosive body has upon its explosion. thus, gunpowder may, by merely varying the size, shape, and density of the grain, be made to ignite rapidly but burn comparatively slowly, or be made to ignite more slowly, but once inflamed to burn very rapidly. again, gun-cotton in a loose, uncompressed state, will, if ignited, only flash off; if it is spun into threads or woven into webs, its rate of combustion may be so much reduced that it can be used in gunnery or for a quick fuze; while if powerfully compressed and damp it burns slowly. wet gun-cotton requires a primer of dry gun-cotton and a fulminate fuze to explode; dry, it may be exploded by a fulminate fuze, &c. then nitro-glycerine, when exploded by grains of fulminate of mercury, and at a temperature above ° f., is very violently detonated; below ° f. it freezes and cannot be similarly exploded. to obtain the full effect of all explosives, confinement is absolutely necessary. the more rapid the explosion the less confinement required, approaching in the case of some explosives to so small an amount that it need not, for practical purposes, be considered. thus a charge of nitro-glycerine or gun-cotton, when detonated in the open air, will destroy wrought iron rails, large blocks of stones, balks of timber, &c. in the case of the former body, the confinement of the atmosphere is sufficient. in the latter, the mechanical cohesion due to compression is sufficient restraint. abel states that if the film of atmosphere surrounding the nitro-glycerine, not exceeding / inch in thickness, be removed, the explosive effect is much lessened. a large charge of gunpowder fired in the ordinary way under water requires a strong case to retain the gases until the action has become general, or, owing to its slow rate of burning, the case would be broken before the whole of the charge had been ignited, and part of the charge drowned. this is often to be noticed when firing fine-grained powder in heavy guns. igniting the charge at several points diminishes the confinement needed. _mode of firing._--the application of heat, directly or indirectly, is the principal means of causing an explosion. the flame from a percussion cap or primer, or a platinum wire heated to incandescence by an electric current, will _directly_ ignite a charge. friction, concussion, &c., will _indirectly_ ignite a charge due to the conversion of mechanical energy into heat. it would appear that when one explosive body is used as a means of firing another, the resultant explosion is due to the blow suddenly formed by the gas of the firing charge acting percussively upon the mass to be exploded. if such were the case, then the most powerful explosive would be the best agent for causing an explosion. but it is not so. for example, nitro-glycerine, which is far more powerful than fulminate of mercury, requires more than grains to explode gun-cotton, while only grains of the latter is needful for the same work, &c. a small quantity of an explosive substance which is sensitive to friction or percussion is often used to ignite the original charge. _detonation._--the instantaneous explosion of the whole mass of a body is defined as "detonation." the essential difference between an explosion and a detonation is the comparative suddenness of the transformation of the solid or liquid explosive substance into gas and vapour. some explosive bodies, such as the fulminates, &c., always detonate, while the detonation of others depends on the mode of firing. nitro-glycerine always explodes violently, but when fired with an initiatory charge of fulminate of mercury it is much more powerful than when fired with gunpowder. compressed gun-cotton in the air-dry state can be detonated by grains of fulminate of mercury embedded in the material, but when it contains per cent. of water over and above the per cent. which exists normally in the air-dry substance, grains of the fulminate will not always do so. _theory of detonation._--the theory of detonation is not yet thoroughly understood. that it is not alone due to the heat caused by the impact of the mechanical energy of the particles of gas, set free from the initiatory charge on the principal mass, is proved by the fact of its being possible to detonate wet gun-cotton. professor bloxam terms detonation to be "sympathetic" explosion. experiments carried on in england by professor abel, and in france by mm. champion and pellet, tend to show that it is due to the vibratory action of the detonating agent. thus a glass may withstand a strong blow, though a particular note or vibration will smash it. all explosive compounds and mixtures, including gunpowder, are susceptible of violent explosion through the agency of a detonation. _roux and sarrau._--roux and sarrau divide explosions into two orders:-- st order.--detonations. nd order.--simple explosions. simple explosions are produced by direct inflammation, or by a small charge of gunpowder. detonations are obtained from nitro-glycerine, gun-cotton, &c., by exploding with fulminate of mercury. they state that fulminate of mercury does not detonate gunpowder; but if the exploding charge is a small amount of nitro-glycerine, itself detonated by fulminate of mercury, then an explosion of the first order is obtained. the relative effects were approximately measured by determining the quantities necessary to rupture small cast iron shells of supposed equal strength. _results of their experiments._--the following are some of the results:-- +---------------+---------------------------+ | | explosive effect. | | +---------------------------+ | | nd order. | st order. | +---------------+-------------+-------------+ |gunpowder | · | · | |gun-cotton | · | · | |nitro-glycerine| · | · | +---------------+-------------+-------------+ according to the above table, nitro-glycerine is more than ten times, and gun-cotton more than six times, as powerful as gunpowder fired in the ordinary way ( nd order). the want of reciprocity between two detonating agents is shown in a remarkable degree by the following experiments, carried out by professor abel:-- .--the detonation of / ounce of gun-cotton (the smallest quantity that can be thus applied) induced the simultaneous detonation of nitro-glycerine, enclosed in a vessel of sheet tin, and placed at a distance of inch from the gun-cotton. .--the detonation of / ounce of gun-cotton produces the same effect with an intervening space of inches between the substances. .--the detonation of ounces of nitro-glycerine in _close contact_ with compressed gun-cotton failed to accomplish the detonation of the latter, which was simply dispersed in a fine state of division, in all the instances but one, in a large number of experiments. explosive agents are divided into explosive mixtures and compounds. in the former the ingredients are mechanically mixed, and can be separated by mechanical means. in the latter the ingredients are chemically combined, and can only be separated by chemical change. _torpedo explosive agents._--the explosive agents that are practically the most important, as far as their employment as torpedo charges are concerned, are as follows:-- _explosive mixtures._--a.--explosive mixtures. .--gunpowder. } nitrate class .--ammonium picrate, or picric powder. } _explosive compounds._--b.--explosive compounds. .--nitro-glycerine. .--dynamite (no. ). .--gun-cotton. .--fulminate of mercury. a.--explosive mixtures. _gunpowder._--this explosive mixture is composed of seventy-five parts of nitre (saltpetre), fifteen parts of charcoal, and ten parts of sulphur. on being ignited, the oxygen which is feebly held by the nitrogen combines with the carbon, forming carbonic oxide gas, whilst the sulphur unites with the potassium of the nitre, the whole combination being accompanied by a great evolution of heat and expansion of gas, and the nitrogen is set free. _properties, &c._--a spark, friction between hard bodies, or a temperature of ° f., are any of them sufficient to cause an explosion of gunpowder. slight moisture, due to damp air, &c., produces caking and deterioration. wetting causes permanent destruction. frost does not injure it. it can be fired by ordinary methods. it can be transported and handled with safety and great ease. it is not a suitable explosive agent for torpedoes, on account of its liability to be injured by damp, as well as its not being sufficiently violent, though for the sake of convenience, &c., it is often employed for such work. the effect produced by the explosion of a charge of gunpowder, ignited by the ordinary method, is that of an uplifting rather than a shattering effect. this evil may be greatly remedied, when gunpowder is used as the charge of a torpedo, by firing it with a detonator, by which means its fullest explosive effect is developed. _picric powder._--the picrates are salts of picric acid. picric acid is formed by the action of nitric acid on carbolic acid. the picrate employed by professor abel is prepared from picric acid and ammonium. this preparation, or salt mixed with nitre (saltpetre), forms abel's picric powder. _properties, &c._--it is prepared for use in a similar manner to gunpowder, and it can be handled in the same way. it is less violent than dynamite or gun-cotton, though much more so than gunpowder. it is difficult to explode it by blows or friction. if flame be applied to it, the part touched burns, but the combustion does not become general. this explosive agent will probably be used for spar torpedoes, when gun-cotton or dynamite are not employed. b.--explosive compounds. _nitro-glycerine._--nitro-glycerine is formed by the action of nitric acid upon glycerine at a low temperature. the manufacture of this compound consists, first, in the slow mixture of the glycerine with the acid, at a low temperature; secondly, in washing the nitro-glycerine from the excess of acid with water. the nitric acid before use is mixed with a certain proportion of strong sulphuric acid, so that the water formed during the reaction may be taken up, and thus any dilution of the nitric acid is prevented. nitro-glycerine is composed of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen, as indicated by the equation _c_{ }h_{ }n_{ }o_{ }_. _properties, &c._--at ordinary temperatures nitro-glycerine is an oily liquid, having a specific gravity of · . freshly made it is creamy white and opaque, but clears and becomes colourless on standing for a certain time, depending on the temperature. it does not mix with, nor is it affected by, water. it has a sweet, aromatic taste, and produces a violent headache if placed upon the tongue. the opaque, freshly made nitro-glycerine does not freeze until the temperature is lowered to °- ° below zero, f., but, when cleared, it freezes at °- ° f. nitro-glycerine freezes to a white crystalline mass, and in this state it can be thawed by placing the vessel containing it in water, at a temperature not over ° f. if flame is applied to freely exposed nitro-glycerine, it burns slowly without explosion. nitro-glycerine in a state of decomposition becomes very sensitive, exploding violently when struck, even when unconfined. pure nitro-glycerine does not spontaneously decompose at any ordinary temperature, but if it contains any free acid, then decomposition may happen. when pure, it is not sensitive to friction, or moderate percussion. if struck with a hammer, only the particle receiving the blow explodes, the remainder being scattered. the firing point of nitro-glycerine is about ° f., though it begins to decompose at a lower temperature. the mode of firing nitro-glycerine usually employed is that of a fulminate of mercury detonating fuse. nitro-glycerine in the frozen state cannot be fired even by large charges of fulminate. in one instance, lbs. of liquid nitro-glycerine exploded in a magazine containing lbs. of the same substance in a frozen state, but failed to fire the latter, only breaking it up and scattering it in every direction. _dynamite._--this explosive compound is merely a preparation in which nitro-glycerine is itself presented for use, its explosive properties being those of the nitro-glycerine contained in it, as the absorbent is an inert body. dynamite is formed of seventy-five parts of nitro-glycerine absorbed by twenty-five parts of a porous siliceous earth or "kieselguhr." the best substitute for "kieselguhr" is ashes of bog-head coal. dynamite is a loose, soft, readily moulded substance, of a buff colour. the preparation of dynamite is very simple. the nitro-glycerine is mixed by means of wooden spatulas with the fine white powder (kieselguhr) in a leaden vessel. it freezes at °- ° f., and when solidly frozen cannot be exploded, but if in a pulverised state it can be exploded, though with diminished violence. it can be easily thawed, by placing the vessel containing it in hot water. friction or moderate percussion does not explode it. its firing point is ° f. if flame be applied to it, it burns with a strong flame. it is fired by means of fulminate of mercury, and its explosive force is about seven times that of gunpowder. for ground and buoyant mines, where actual contact between the hostile vessel and the torpedo will be rarely achieved, this being next to nitro-glycerine the most violent of all known explosive agents, and being cheaply and readily procured, is the very best explosive for such torpedoes. that it is not generally adopted is owing to its containing a large proportion of that seemingly dangerous substance, nitro-glycerine, which makes the handling of dynamite a somewhat hazardous operation. according to professor abel, there are now as many as fifteen dynamite factories in different parts of the world (including a very extensive one in scotland) working under the supervision of mr. nobel, the originator of the nitro-glycerine industry; and six or seven other establishments exist where dynamite or preparations of very similar character are also manufactured. the total production of dynamite in was only eleven tons, while in it amounted to tons. this explosive compound is most extensively used for general blasting purposes all over the world, and for this purpose, owing to its cheapness and the convenience in manipulating it, is far superior to compressed gun-cotton. gun-cotton is formed by the action of concentrated nitric acid on cotton, its composition being indicated by the formula _ch_{ }(no_{ })_{ }o_{ }_. professor abel's process for manufacturing pulped and compressed gun-cotton is as follows:-- cotton waste is the form of cotton used; it is picked and cleaned, thoroughly dried at ° f., and then allowed to cool. the strongest nitric and sulphuric acids are employed, mixed in the proportion of one part of the former to three of the latter by weight. these are mixed in large quantities, and stored in cast-iron tanks. the cotton in -lb. charges is immersed in the acid mixture, which is contained in a trough surrounded by cold water. after being subjected to the action of the acid for a short space of time, the cotton is taken up, placed upon a perforated shelf, and as much as possible of the acid squeezed out of it. it is then put into jars, covered with fresh acid, and the jars placed in fresh water, remaining there for twenty-four hours. to remove the acid, the gun-cotton from the jars is thrown into a centrifugal strainer, by which nearly all the acid is expelled. it is then diffused quickly in small quantities through a large volume of water, and again passed through a centrifugal machine. the next process is that of thoroughly washing the gun-cotton, for the purpose of removing the traces of the acid still adhering to it. by pulping, which operation is performed in pulping engines or beaters, the washing is expeditious and thorough. a _beater_ is an oblong tub in which is placed a revolving wheel carrying strips of steel on its circumference. from the bottom under the wheel project similar steel strips. the action of this machine is as follows:-- by the rotation of the wheel, the gun-cotton which is suspended in water circulates around the tub, and is drawn between the two sets of steel projections, by which it is reduced to a state of _pulp_. the bottom of the tub is movable, and thus the space through which the gun-cotton must pass may be contracted, as the operation proceeds. the pulping being complete, the contents are run into _poachers_ for the final washing. a _poacher_ is a large oblong wooden tub. on one side at the middle is placed a wooden paddle-wheel, which extends half way across the tub. in the poacher the pulped gun-cotton is stirred for a long time with a large quantity of water. the revolution of the paddle-wheel keeps up a constant circulation, and care is taken that no deposit occurs in any part of the tub. having converted the cotton into gun-cotton, reduced it to a state of pulp, and thoroughly washed it, the next process is to separate the water from the pulp, and compress it into cakes or discs. this is accomplished by means of two presses, the first of which has hollow cylinders, in which perforated plungers work upwards. these plungers having been drawn down, the cylinders are filled with the water-laden pulp, and their tops covered with a weight; the plungers are then forced up by hydraulic power, compressing the pulp, and forcing the water to escape through their perforations. the second one is used to more solidly compress the cylindrical masses of gun-cotton formed by the action of the first press, a pressure of tons to the inch being in this case applied. about per cent. of moisture still remains in the discs, which can be readily removed by drying. _properties._--cotton converted into gun-cotton is little changed in appearance, though the latter is harsher to the touch than the former. if a flame be applied to dry loose gun-cotton, it flashes up, without explosion; if compressed it burns rapidly, but quietly. moist compressed gun-cotton under the same circumstances burns away slowly. gun-cotton containing to per cent. of water is ignited with much difficulty on applying a highly heated body. as it leaves the hydraulic press upon being converted from the pulped state to masses, it contains about per cent. of water; in this condition it may be thrown on to a fire or held in a flame without exhibiting any tendency to burn; the masses may be perforated by means of a red-hot iron, or with a drilling tool, and they may with perfect safety be cut into slices by means of saws revolving with great rapidity. if placed upon a fire and allowed to remain there, a feeble and transparent flame flickers over the surface of the wet gun-cotton from time to time as the exterior becomes sufficiently dry to inflame; in this way a piece of compressed gun-cotton will burn away very gradually indeed. to test the safety of wet gun-cotton, the following two experiments among many have been made:-- quantities of wet gun-cotton, cwt. each, packed in one instance in a large, strong wooden case, and in the other in a number of strong packing cases, were placed in small magazines, very substantially built of concrete and brickwork. large fires were kindled around the packages in each building, the doors being just left ajar. the entire contents of both buildings had burned away, without anything approaching explosive action, in less than two hours. this comparatively great safety of wet gun-cotton, coupled with the fact that its detonation in that state may be readily accomplished through the agency of a small quantity of dry gun-cotton, termed a "primer," which, by means of a fulminating fuze, or detonator, is made to act as the initiative detonating agent, gives it important advantages over other violent explosive agents, when used for purposes which involve the employment of a considerable quantity of the material, on account of the safety attending its storage and necessary manipulation. from experiments conducted by engineer officers in austria, it was found that if boxes containing dry compressed gun-cotton are fired into from small arms, even at a short range, the gun-cotton is generally inflamed, but never exploded, the sharpness of the blow essential to effect an explosion, which the bullet might otherwise give, being diminished by its penetration through the side of the box before reaching the explosive. wet gun-cotton, containing even as little as per cent. of water, is never inflamed on these conditions. dynamite, on the other hand, is invariably detonated when struck by a bullet on passing through the side of the box. gun-cotton is insoluble in and unaffected by water. the firing point of gun-cotton is about ° f. the temperature of explosion of gun-cotton is about ° f., being more than double that of gunpowder. gun-cotton is not sensitive to friction or percussion. if not perfectly converted or thoroughly washed, gun-cotton is liable to spontaneous decomposition, which under favourable conditions may result in explosion. compressed gun-cotton is free from such danger, as it may be kept and used saturated with water. it is stored in the wet state, care being taken that it is not exposed to a temperature that will freeze the water in the cakes, as if this occurs they are liable to be disintegrated by the expansion of the water in freezing. gun-cotton is the agent most extensively used for all kinds of military engineering and submarine operations in great britain, it being especially manufactured by the english government for that express purpose; but in other countries it is not so manufactured, and therefore, as it is little used for other than military purposes, it is not to any extent privately manufactured, as is the case with other explosives, such as dynamite, dualine, lithofracteur, &c., and thus, in case of war, would be somewhat difficult to obtain out of england. compared with dynamite, it is not so violent, and occupies more space, weight for weight, and also requires a more complicated means of detonating it. on the other hand, gun-cotton is infinitely safer to store and manipulate, and is not so subject to detonation by concussion (not being so sensitive) as dynamite. _fulminate of mercury._--fulminate of mercury is formed by the action of mercuric nitrate and nitric acid upon alcohol. the mode of preparation is as follows:-- dissolve one part of mercury in twelve parts of nitric acid, and pour this solution into twelve parts of alcohol. pour this mixture into a vessel which is placed in hot water until it darkens and becomes turbid and begins to evolve dense white fumes, then remove it from the water. the reaction goes on, with strong effervescence and copious evolution of dense white ethereal vapours. if red fumes appear, cold alcohol should be added to check the violence of the action. the operation should be performed at a distance from a fire or flame, and in a strong draught, so that the vapours may be carried off. when the liquid clears, and the dense white fumes are no longer given off, further action is stopped by filling up with cold water. the fulminate settles to the bottom of the vessel as a grey crystalline precipitate. the liquid is then poured off, and the fulminate washed several times by decantation or upon a filter. dry fulminate of mercury explodes violently when heated to ° f., when forcibly struck by the electric spark, &c. when wet it is inexplosive, and therefore it is always kept wet, being dried in small amounts when required for use. fulminate of mercury is applied in many ways, either pure or mixed with other substances, as in percussion caps, percussion powder, primers, detonators, &c. for the purpose of detonating nitro-glycerine or its preparations, grains of the fulminate are sufficient, but to detonate gun-cotton grains are necessary. the fulminate in detonating fuzes should be enclosed in a copper case or cap, and must never be loose. the fulminate should be wet when charging the detonators, as it is very dangerous to handle when dry. great care is requisite in handling this explosive compound. in addition to the foregoing explosive compounds and mixtures, the following explosive agents have also been employed for the purposes of submarine operations, though only to a small extent. _dualin._--dualin is a nitro-glycerine preparation formed by mixing sawdust and saltpetre with that substance. this preparation, inferior to dynamite, was employed by the germans as the explosive agent for their submarine mines during the franco-german war ( - ). _lithofracteur._--lithofracteur is also a preparation of nitro-glycerine. it is composed of the following materials:--nitro-glycerine, kieselguhr, coal, soda, saltpetre, and sulphur. this explosive agent, also inferior to dynamite, is used, though not very extensively, by the french for their submarine mines. _horsley's powder._--horsley's powder is a chlorate mixture formed of potassium, chlorate, and galls. this explosive mixture was formerly used by captain harvey for his towing torpedo, but has recently been discarded for compressed gun-cotton. _abel's detonation experiments._--the following are the results of experiments carried out by professor abel, c.b., f.r.s., on the subject of detonation:-- .--a fuze containing rather more than ounce of gunpowder, strongly confined, exploded in contact with a mass of compressed gun-cotton, _only inflames it_, although the explosion of the fuze is apparently a sharp one. .-- grains of fulminate of mercury, exploded unconfined on the surface of a piece of compressed gun-cotton, only inflames or disperses it. .--a fuze containing grains of fulminate of mercury, strongly confined, exploded in contact with compressed gun-cotton, or dynamite, detonates it with certainty. .--an equal quantity of fulminate of mercury, similarly confined, does not detonate _uncompressed_ gun-cotton in which it is imbedded, but merely disperses and inflames it. .-- grains of compressed gun-cotton, detonated in proximity to dynamite, _detonates the latter_. .-- ounces of dynamite, and very much larger quantities, detonated in contact with compressed gun-cotton, only disperses it. .--a wrought-iron rail can be destroyed by detonating ounces of compressed gun-cotton placed unconfined on the rail. .--a piece of wet gun-cotton, quite uninflammable, removed from a fire, and detonated upon a block of granite, using a small primer of dry gun-cotton, shatters the block. .--a submerged charge of wet gun-cotton, open on all sides to the water, and merely confined around the dry initiative, or primer, by means of a net, can be exploded. _explosive agents in torpedoes._--the explosive agents that at the present time are most generally used in torpedoes are gunpowder, gun-cotton in the wet compressed state, and dynamite, and these may be compared as to their properties and their explosive effects. _gunpowder._--gunpowder is a familiar material, in general use for all military purposes. it can be handled and transported with safety and ease, and it can be fired by ordinary methods. but for submarine purposes it has the disadvantage of being very easily injured by water, so that it is absolutely necessary to enclose it in water-tight cases. _gun-cotton._--gun-cotton is free from liability to accidents, and in this matter, and the safety of its manufacture, it compares favourably with gunpowder. it is peculiarly adapted to submarine work, being unaffected by water. and as it may be kept in water, ready for use, it can be safely carried on board ship in large quantities. it is far more violent in its action when detonated than gunpowder. the chief objection to its use is, that being applied only for special purposes, it is not readily obtained. also it requires a peculiar and somewhat complicated mode of firing it. _dynamite._--dynamite is more easily manufactured than the two foregoing explosives. the fact of it containing nitro-glycerine, which has a bad reputation, has militated against its use as a torpedo explosive agent, though for blasting purposes it is most extensively used. though not directly affected by water, its firing is hindered when diffused through water. another disadvantage is its high freezing point. like gun-cotton, it requires special means to fire it, though much simpler, and also is much more powerful than gunpowder. the explosive effect of dynamite or gun-cotton is a rending or a shattering one, while that of gunpowder is an uplifting or heaving one. again, it is necessary when using gunpowder that the object be in the line of least resistance, but with dynamite or gun-cotton the effect is nearly equal in every direction, therefore for submarine operations, either dynamite or gun-cotton is the explosive agent that should be invariably used. _size of torpedo charges._--for permanent mines, a charge of lbs. to lbs. of gun-cotton is quite sufficient, though too large a charge cannot be employed, except as regards the matter of convenience. for buoyant mines, lbs. to lbs. of gun-cotton is an ample charge, and for contact mines, lbs. to lbs. of gun-cotton is sufficient. in spar torpedoes, where lightness is a consideration, gun-cotton charges of lbs. to lbs. will be found ample, and similarly in the case of the towing or locomotive torpedoes. of course, with regard to such a submarine weapon as the lay torpedo boat, any size charge may be carried, according to the wish of the builder. _torpedo explosions illustrated._--at fig. is represented a sketch of a torpedo explosion, from a photograph taken at the moment the column of water was at its greatest elevation. the torpedo contained lbs. of gun-cotton, and was exploded under feet of water. the height of the column thrown up measured feet, and the diameter at the base feet. [illustration: submarine mine explosion. plate lii] [illustration: submarine mine explosions. plate liii] at fig. is shown a sketch of two submarine mine explosions from an instantaneous photograph; the schooner which is shown in the sketch happened to be passing at the moment of explosion, thus affording a comparison as to the size of the columns of water thrown up. the column on the left was due to the explosion of a submarine mine containing lbs. gunpowder at a depth of feet below the surface. that on the right was the result of an explosion of a similar mine, but at a depth of feet below the surface. its extreme height was feet. chapter ix. torpedo experiments. the following are some of the more important torpedo experiments that have been carried out in england and europe, to investigate the subject of submarine explosions as applied to ships and to mines, &c., these experiments extending over a space of thirteen years. _experiment at chatham, england, ._--this experiment was carried out to ascertain the effect of gunpowder torpedoes on the bottom of a wooden ship. target:--h.m.s. _terpsichore_, a wooden sloop of war. torpedo:-- lbs. of fine-grained powder. two were used. they were placed on the ground, about ' below the ship's keel, and ' horizontally clear of her side. effect of explosion:--a hole of about ' radius was made, about ' nearly vertical from the charge; the _terpsichore_ sinking a few minutes after the explosion. _experiment in austria._--the object of this experiment was to ascertain the effect of a very large charge of gun-cotton exploded at some distance from the side of a wooden vessel. target:--a wooden sloop. torpedo:-- lbs. of gun-cotton, placed ' below the surface of the water, and ' horizontally from the bottom of the vessel. effect of explosion:--complete destruction of the vessel. _experiments at carlscrona, sweden, ._--these experiments were made to investigate the effect of submarine contact mines, charged with dynamite, against a strong wooden vessel, as well as against a double-bottomed iron vessel. they were carried out under the supervision of lieut.-colonel zethations, of the royal swedish navy. target:--the hull of a gun frigate, which had been built in ; it had been cut down to the battery deck, and the copper removed. her timbers and planking were quite sound; timbers of oak about " square, and " apart; planking of swedish pine, - / "; bottom strengthened inside with wrought-iron diagonal bands, " by - / "; inside planking running half way up to the battery deck of oak; " thick. this completes the wooden target. on the port side a quadrangular opening was made, and fitted with a construction representing a strong double iron bottom, firmly fastened to an oaken frame that had been put on inside, on the four sides of the opening, and with through-going bolts, " in diameter, to the timbers. torpedoes:--no. .-- lbs. dynamite, enclosed in / " iron case. it was placed on the starboard side, amidships, ' below the water line, and ' " from the bottom of the ship. no. .-- lbs. dynamite, enclosed in a glass vessel. it was placed on the starboard side, - / ' below the water line, ' from the bottom of the ship, and ' from her stern. no. .-- lbs. dynamite, enclosed in / " iron case. it was placed on the port side, - / ' below the water line, ' from the bottom of the ship, and ' from her stern. no. .-- lbs. dynamite, in a case as above. it was placed on the port side, - / ' below the water line, - / ' from the bottom of the ship, and ' from her stern. no. .-- lbs. dynamite, in case as above. it was placed - / ' below the water line, - / ' from the centre of the _iron_ bottom. these five torpedoes were fired at the same moment. effect of explosion:--the hull of the ship was lifted about a foot, and sunk in - / minutes. no. mine.--timbers broken and thrown inside, into the hold, on a space of about ' � '; three more timbers on one side of this hole broken; inside oak planking rent off on a length of '; two iron bands torn up and bent, one of them broken in two places; outside planking torn off on a space of ' � '; several planks still higher up broken. no. mine.--timbers blown away on a space of about ' square; inside planking torn off on a length of '; two iron bands broken, and torn up and bent; and outside planking rent off on a space of ' � '. no. mine.--timbers blown away on a space of - / ' � ' at one end, and ' at the other; inside planking off for a length of '; one iron band torn up, and one broken; outside planking off on a space of ' � ' � '. no. mine.--timbers blown away on a space ' � '; on the sides of this hole, ten timbers were broken; two iron bands torn up, and one broken; inside planking off for a length of '; outside planking off for a space of ' � ' � ', and feet. no. mine.--the gas sphere of this mine had hit the middle of the outside plates on one of the angle-iron ribs. this rib was torn from the timbers and bent up, nearly ' in the middle, but not broken. there was an oval hole in the outside plates ' � ' between two ribs, which ribs, with the plates on edge riveted to them, were bulged out about inches. the inner plate, one large piece was blown up in a vertical position, after having cut all the bolts and rivets, sixty of ", and thirty of / ", save those that fastened the lower side to the oaken frame and timbers. on a length of ' and height of ', the bottom, on all sides of the iron construction, had been bent inwards; the greatest bend was about "; three deck beams above had been broken. by the joint effect of all the mines, almost all the iron deck beam knees had been rent from the side, and there was an opening between deck and hull on both sides for a length of about feet. _experiment at kiel._--target:--a large gun-boat, greatly strengthened internally by solid balks of timber. torpedo:-- lbs. gunpowder. it was placed nearly under her keel, at a distance of feet. effect of explosion:--complete destruction of the vessel. _experiment in england, ._--target:--a rectangular iron case ' long, ' high, and ' wide, divided into six compartments by means of one longitudinal bulkhead midway between the front and rear faces of the target, and two athwartship bulkheads equidistant from the ends of the target. thickness of front and rear faces / ", of longitudinal bulkhead / ", of athwartship bulkheads / ". torpedo:-- lbs. of gunpowder, enclosed in a spar torpedo case and fired by two detonators. it was exploded in contact with the target, - / ' below the surface of the water, and ' from top of target. effect of explosion on the target:--"front of centre compartment destroyed and top blown off. plate representing inner skin destroyed. back of centre compartment (rear face of the target) much bulged, and penetrated; the hole measured ' � ". large portions of the target were thrown to a height of to feet, and from to yards' distance." the effect of explosion on a ship's pinnace, which had been placed feet from and at right angles to the front face of the target, with steam up, and canopy and shield in position, was that a large quantity of water was thrown back in the boat, putting the fires out, and filling the boat up to her thwarts, but otherwise the boat was uninjured. _experiments at copenhagen, denmark, in ._--the object of these experiments was to ascertain if a ship's armoured side would be seriously injured by a torpedo exploded in contact with it. st experiment. target:-- " thick, and ' � ', supported in a horizontal position on a substructure consisting of " timber resting on two pieces of " timber under two sides, and completely supported by earth up to lower edge of substructure. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a square wooden case - / " high, and · " � · "; it was placed on the middle of the earth with " of earth tamping; this tamping representing the resistance of a thin stratum of water. effect of explosion:--the plate was broken into four pieces, and substructure crushed. nd experiment. target:-- " thick, and ' � - / ', supported in a horizontal position on a substructure as above, but resting on four piles of " x " timber. torpedo:-- · lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a wooden case " high, and " � ". it was laid with one edge on the plate, the other edge " above the plate; same tamping as above. effect of explosion:--the plate broken into three pieces, and substructure crushed. rd experiment. target:-- " thick, and ' " � ' ", supported in a horizontal position on a substructure as above, but eight piles of " � " timber used. plate bolted to the structure with eights. torpedo:-- · lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a wooden case, of same thickness as the harvey torpedo, and " � " � "; it was placed with surface against the plate, one edge " and the other - / " from the plate; tamping as before. effect of explosion:--plate bulged - / " in the middle; substructure completely crushed. th experiment. target:-- " thick, and ' " � ' "; this was the same plate as used in the previous experiment, laid with bulge uppermost on two beams under the short sides. torpedo:-- · lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a cylindrical tin box - / " � '; it was placed on top of plate " from one side and with ends - / " from edge of plate; tamping as before. effect of explosion:--a corner of the plate broken off. th experiment. target:--same plate placed vertically in the earth. torpedo:-- · lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a cylindrical tin box · " � "; it was placed on timber, so as to rest against the face and centre of the plate; tamping as usual. effect of explosion:--plate broken into four pieces, two of which were large; pieces hurled over parapet, one fell at a distance of feet. _experiments at carlscrona, sweden, in - ._--these experiments were carried out by the swedish torpedo authorities, to ascertain the effect of different sized charges of dynamite and gunpowder, enclosed in divers cases, and exploded at various distances from a target which represented in all respects, with the exception of the armour, a section of the side of h.m.s. _hercules_ before the boiler room, she being at that time one of the most powerful vessels afloat. target:-- ' in length, and fitted into the side of an old line of battle ship. similar in shape to a wing tank, and comprised a double bottom in four water-tight compartments, a wing passage in two water-tight compartments, and two large water-tight compartments in rear of all. it extended from ' above the water line to within about ' of the vessel's keel. the thickness of the plates forming the target were:--outer bottom, lower portion / "; part where torpedo took effect, / ". inner bottom, and wing passage bulkhead, / ". vertical and longitudinal frames, both solid and bracket, / ". the longitudinal frames were bracket frames, with the exception of the second, which was solid and water-tight, with its outer edge about ' below the water line. the vertical frames, of which there were seven, were placed ' apart, the central one being solid and water-tight, the others being bracket frames. the ship was moored in feet of water; the charges were detonated, one fuze being used in all but no. experiment, when five fuzes were employed. st experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in cylindrical steel case, no air space; height · ", diameter · ", and thickness / ". it was placed · ' from the target, opposite no. frame, and · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--ship appeared to be lifted bodily. a rivet in the midship longitudinal bulkhead of fore compartment was loosened. the torpedo was fired from the ship, and the shock felt was not very great. nd experiment. torpedo:-- · lbs. of dynamite, in cylindrical steel case, no air space; height ", diameter ", and thickness / ". it was placed · ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--ship appeared to be lifted bodily. a leak was started in the outer bottom opposite to charge, caused by the loosening of five rivets. rd experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of gunpowder, rifle small grain, enclosed in cylindrical steel case placed inside an iron case, with an air space all round; steel case, - / " � - / " � / "; iron case " � " � / ". it was placed ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface. effect of explosion:--centre of ship lifted bodily, as if her back was broken; ship then rolled heavily to port. on board fire engines and troughs displaced several feet: shores and struts started, showing that the shock was considerable. the outer bottom on each side of the centre dividing plate indented to a depth of to - / inches; numerous rivets started, and some sheared. the leak was considerable, owing to the number of rivets that were started. the strength of the plates was not considered to be materially affected by the indentations; the rivets, in number, were replaced; and the target prepared for the next experiment. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed as in first experiment. it was placed ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--ship rolled slightly to port. a bolt securing the midship transverse bulkhead to beam was sheared. no damage done to the target. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in steel cylindrical case, no air space, · " � " � / ". it was placed ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--a rivet in outer bottom, above water line at fore end of target, was sheared. a few rivets in outer bottom opposite charge, and two in after compartment, were started, but no leak was perceptible. several shores slightly displaced. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed as in first experiment. it was placed · ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--ship not lifted as much as was the case in no. experiment; but explosion much sharper. on board, fire engines were capsized, and vertical shores displaced. outer bottom opposite charge indented to a depth of about / an inch, other parts less bulged, and many rivets started. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed as in first experiment. it was placed ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--effect very great; ship hurled suddenly to starboard. on going on board two minutes after the explosion, the fore compartment was found full, the after compartment became full ten minutes later. shores and struts were considerably displaced, and there was evidence that the ship had sustained a severe shock. outer bottom injured over an area ' � ', the plates being split in all directions; one piece, ' square, was torn completely off, and an irregular hole was formed in the outer skin ' � '. in the inner bottom below the wing passage bulkhead a piece ' � ' was blown completely out; the wing passage bulkhead was torn from the longitudinal frame and split from top to bottom. the inner skin above the upper longitudinal frame was torn from the latter, and forced in and upwards, but was not otherwise damaged. the vertical bracket frames nos. and , the latter opposite the torpedo, were destroyed, but the solid frame no. was almost uninjured. the outer bottom, where it was not torn off, was forced in ', or ' beyond where the _inner_ bottom had been. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of gunpowder, enclosed in a buoyant cylindrical / " iron case. it was placed · ' from no. frame, · " below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--the ship and target had been thoroughly repaired, and were in good condition when this experiment was made; the ship was in this case moored in feet of water. no effect was produced on the target by the explosion. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a cylindrical steel case with arched ends. it was placed · ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--effect produced apparently equal to that by no. charge of lbs. of gunpowder at '; indentation being from / to - / inches in the outer skin opposite the torpedo. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a case similar to that used in the th experiment. it was placed · ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--hole produced in outer skin, · ' � ' to '; inner skin only bulged and slightly cracked in two places. above the longitudinal frame, a bulge was made in the outer skin ' � ', with the above-mentioned hole; below the longitudinal frame the indentation was ' � ' and · " deep, with two horizontal cracks ' x ', and several inches broad. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of gunpowder, enclosed in a cylindrical case of / " steel, placed in a / " steel case, with lbs. of buoyancy. ignition effected by a glass igniting bottle. it was placed · ' from no. frame, · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--there was but little upcast of water outside the ship, but a great upcast through the ship. she immediately lurched to starboard, and on boarding her five minutes after, the target was found full of water. the effect on the target was as follows, above the nd longitudinal frame, where strengthened by the wing passage bulkhead:--outer bottom blown away from the th to the th frames for a length of feet and a height of - / feet, and bent in - / feet. inner bottom bent in and broken through between the th and th frames, with an irregular hole ' square, and between the th and th frames, a similar sized hole. wing passage bulkhead was bent in " to ", and riven for a length of '; in the water-tight middle bulkhead athwartships the rivets in two vertical joints were completely torn away. between the nd and rd longitudinal frames, and below the wing passage bulkhead, both the inner and outer bottoms were completely blown away for a length of feet and a height of feet. the vertical and horizontal frames between the two bottoms had kept their position unchanged, and excepting that the bracket plate by frame no. was bent, cracked, and torn away, the damage they had sustained was limited to some comparatively slight bending. the open hole formed in the target measured square feet in outer bottom, and square feet in inner bottom. comparing the effect of this torpedo with the th, lbs. of dynamite; with the latter charge the breach was made at the cost of the bottom plates as well as the vertical and longitudinal frames, which were completely torn asunder and strained; with the gunpowder charge, only the bottom plates were broken through, whilst the plates whose directions were nearly parallel to the lines of explosive effect were but little affected. _experiments at portsmouth, england, - ._--the object of these experiments was to ascertain the effect of lbs. gun-cotton torpedoes exploded at various distances from a target representing the double bottom of h.m.s. _hercules_. they were carried out in stokes bay, under the supervision of officers belonging to the torpedo department of the royal engineers, and a torpedo committee, composed of naval and military officers. the _oberon_, the vessel chosen for these experiments, was fitted with a double bottom, representing as nearly as possible that of the _hercules_ without the armour; also with a surface condenser, and its connections; a donkey kingston feed-valve; and athwartship water-tight bulkheads, which divided the ship into seven water-tight compartments. the outer skin was composed of / " and / " iron plates. in her starboard side at different points were fixed forty-four crusher gauges, and over each side were suspended six shots, each fitted with a crusher gauge. displacement of the _oberon_ about tons. the ship was anchored head and stern. her mean draught of water during the experiments was feet. st experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of gun-cotton, in discs saturated with water, and enclosed in an iron cylindrical case, " � " � / ", with arched ends; the primer consisted of two dry discs, and two detonators. it was placed ' horizontal from the target, and opposite the condenser on the starboard side; ' below the surface of the water, on the ground. effect of explosion:--no damage was done to the hull, or condenser, but light articles, such as bunker plates, gratings, tank lids, &c., were displaced. nd experiment. torpedo:--as in first experiment. it was placed on the ground, ' horizontal and opposite the condenser on the starboard side, ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--no damage was done to the hull, of condenser, but the bunker plates, gratings, &c., were displaced to a greater extent than in the previous experiment. rd experiment. torpedo:--as before. it was placed on the ground, ' horizontal, and opposite the condenser on the starboard side; ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--no damage was done to the hull. flanges of the condenser inlet pipe were cracked, and several of the joint bolts were broken. the condenser had been thrown up bodily, and had torn away its holding down bolts; but it was not as well secured as it would have been had it formed part of the machinery of a ship. th experiment. torpedo:--as before. it was placed on the ground, ' horizontal, and opposite the condenser on the starboard side; ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--outer bottom on starboard indented over a length of about ', being forced in between the frames; maximum indentation, / ". many bracket frames were disturbed, and outer angle iron of water-tight longitudinal was started for a length of ', and made to leak slightly. the shell of the condenser was cracked in two places, ' and ' in length. bolts securing condenser, and flanges of pipes and valves, were all more or less damaged. condenser was rendered unserviceable. th experiment. torpedo:--same charge as before, but the primer consisted of four dry discs, and two detonators. it was placed · ' horizontal, opposite no. frame, on the starboard side, ' from the stern; ' below the surface of the water, and ' from the ground. effect of explosion:--bow observed to be lifted several feet. several angle irons and bracket frames were cracked, and numerous rivets in outer bottom were broken off. the outer bottom on the starboard side was indented between the frames, and brackets were disturbed over a space of feet; inner bottom uninjured. th experiment. torpedo:--as in previous experiment. it was placed on the ground, · ' horizontal, opposite no. frame on the starboard side, and feet from the stern; · ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--several plates in the outer bottom were cracked, and outer bottom made to leak in several places, owing to the fractures in the plates, rivets being started, and seams being opened. considerably more damage was effected than in previous experiment, but inner bottom still remained uninjured. th experiment. torpedo:--as in the th experiment. it was placed on the ground, immediately under the edge of the outer bottom, - / ' from the target, and opposite no. frame, ' from the stern; ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--outer and inner bottom broken entirely asunder at no. frame on the starboard side, and between nos. and on the portside. a fracture was caused in the outer bottom extending from the shelf plate to upper edge of strake next the keel on the starboard side, and from the shelf plate to upper edge of flat keel plate on the port side. a fracture was also caused in the inner skin extending from the topside to the outer edge of the garboard strake on the starboard side, and from the topside to upper edge of garboard strake on the port side; this including a fracture of the keel at no. . the vertical keel, the longitudinals, as well as numerous bracket plates and angle irons, were broken, and about rivets in the outer bottom were rendered defective. the outer bottom was indented over a considerable length, the indentation being greatest between the frames, and the maximum being inches. the inner bottom was not indented or damaged, with the exception of the fractures before mentioned. _experiments at pola, austria, ._--these experiments were carried out to determine the effect of very heavy charges of dynamite on an iron pontoon fitted with a double bottom, similar to that of h.m.s. _hercules_. target:--an iron pontoon ' long and ' beam, with circular ends and fitted with a double bottom, also a condenser and two kingston valves. st experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite. it was ' horizontally from the keel, ' actual distance from the side, and opposite amidships, · ' below the surface of the water, and ' from the ground. pontoon:--draught of water ', and moored in ' of water. effect of explosion:--the pontoon moved away bodily a distance of feet; a few rivets in the outer bottom were started, and the outer skin was slightly indented between the frames; the maximum indentation being · ". no other damage was sustained by the hull. several of the screws securing the flanges of the kingston valves were slightly loosened. nd experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of dynamite. it was placed ' horizontally from the keel, ' actual distance from the side, and opposite amidships; ' below the surface of the water, and ' from the ground. pontoon:--draught of water · ', and moored in ' of water. effect of explosion:--the pontoon, which had been more rigidly moored than in the previous experiment, was moved bodily away a distance of feet. many rivets were loosened, and a few connecting the angle irons were sheared; also the outer skin was slightly indented. no damage was done to the condenser or kingston valves. _experiment in the sea of marmora, ._--this experiment was carried out by turkish officers attached to their naval school at halki, an island in the sea of marmora, about eight miles from stamboul. it consisted in destroying a turkish schooner by the explosion of an -lb. gun-cotton mine in contact with her, moored in feet of water, and feet beneath the surface. _experiment at carlscrona, sweden, ._--this experiment was a continuation of those previously carried out in - , and which have been detailed at page , &c. target:--the same as had been used for the previous experiments ( - ), and which had been thoroughly repaired. experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of gunpowder, enclosed in a buoyant cylindrical / " steel case with domed ends, and contained in an inner / " steel case. it was ignited by two von ebner fuzes placed in a charge of / lb. of gunpowder and enclosed in a glass bottle. it was placed ' horizontally from the water line, · ' actual distance from target, and opposite no. (middle) frame of target, ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--the ship was moored in ' of water. she was lifted by the explosion, rolled over to port, and then settled to starboard, sundry large pieces of timber being thrown up in the air. the outer bottom of the target was broken through above the second longitudinal frame, from the fourth to the seventh frames laterally, and from the top of the target to the second longitudinal frame vertically, the hole made measuring about ' high by ' wide, or about square feet in area. the inner bottom was also broken through between the top of the target and second longitudinal frame, and between the fourth and seventh vertical frames, the hole made being about square feet in area. the bracket frames within the damaged area were but little damaged. the wing passage bulkhead was broken through opposite to nos. and frames, the holes made being respectively and square feet in area. through these holes the force of the explosion had made its way to the horizontal iron deck, forming the top of the target, which was completely broken through a little abaft no. frame, the hole made measuring about square feet in area. a piece of this iron deck, weighing, with the iron fastenings attached to it, about lbs., was thrown ' against the upper deck beams. the target below the second longitudinal frame was comparatively but little injured. the outer bottom was indented and cracked in one or two places, but the inner bottom was uninjured. in addition to the damage to the target, the ship herself sustained serious injury, eleven of the lower deck beams, with their knees being broken (six being broken completely across). the main keel immediately under the target was also opened at the scarf, and the back of the ship was apparently broken. the hull had given out laterally to such an extent as to prevent the ship being taken into dock. _experiments at portsmouth, england, ._--the object of the following experiments was to determine the effect of comparatively small charges of gunpowder and gun-cotton exploded in actual contact with an ironclad, as would be the case in a torpedo attack either with locomotive towing or spar torpedoes. target:--the same as used in the experiments of - , which have been detailed at page , &c., viz., the _oberon_ fitted to represent h.m.s. _hercules_ without the armour. her mean draught was ', and she was moored in - / ' of water. the _oberon_ had been placed in a thorough state of repair. st experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of gun-cotton in slabs, saturated with water. total weight of charge lbs. it was enclosed in a / " iron case with cast iron ends. it was placed at ' actual distance from the nearest side of the case to the target, and opposite no. frame on the port side, ' below the surface of the water. effect of the explosion:--the effect upon the vessel was unappreciable. this charge represented the large whitehead fish torpedo, and its position corresponded to that of this torpedo when striking a net at a small angle with the keel. nd experiment. torpedo:--the harvey towing torpedo, charged with lbs. of gunpowder, primed with gunpowder, and fired by means of an electric fuze. it was placed at ' actual distance from the target, measuring from the centre of the torpedo, and opposite no. solid frame on the starboard side, the vertical axis of the torpedo being at right angles to the vessel's side, - / ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--this and the two following torpedoes were fired simultaneously. the outer bottom was blown in from the upper edge of the flat keel plate to the underside of the water-tight longitudinal, and fore and aft from no. to no. frames; an area ' � - / '. flat keel plates were broken between no. and no. frames, and the th strake of the bottom plating was broken, and the frames for that space blown in. two holes were blown through the inner bottom, measuring respectively ' � ' and ' � ', making the total area of the inner bottom destroyed, square feet. rd experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. of granulated gun-cotton, saturated with water; total weight of charge being about lbs. it was enclosed in a / " iron case, - / " � " � - / ", the primer being - / lbs. of slab gun-cotton, included in the lbs. it was placed at ' actual distance from the target, measuring from the centre of the case, and opposite no. - / solid frame on the starboard side; - / ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--outer bottom blown in from upper edge of the lower longitudinal to the lower edge of the upper longitudinal between nos. and frames; an area of � feet. the butts of the flat keel were started and the plating broken across no. - / frame from the flat keel plate to the upper deck. shelf plate at nos. - / and - / frames was broken. nos. , , and frames were blown in from first to third longitudinal; lower longitudinal from no. to also blown in. two holes were blown through the inner bottom, measuring respectively � · ' and ' � · ', making the total area of inner bottom destroyed square feet. a steam launch with steam up and outrigger torpedo gear in place, one pole being rigged out, was placed with the stem of the boat ' horizontally from the torpedo. she was uninjured and shipped very little water. th experiment. torpedo:-- lbs. oz. of gun-cotton in slabs, saturated with water, total weight about lbs. it was enclosed in a / " iron case - / " � - / " � "; primer being oz. of gun-cotton, included in the lbs. oz. it was placed at ' actual distance from the target measuring from the centre of the case, and opposite no. - / solid frame on the port side; - / ' below the surface of the water. effect of explosion:--outer bottom and frames injured in a similar manner to that described in the third experiment. outer angle irons of the st, nd, and rd longitudinals were started in the wake of the broken place. a hole was blown through the inner bottom, measuring · ' � ', or about square feet in area. the bolts of the outer bottom plate of stern post much open, and at nos. and on the port side the upper two strakes were buckled and the shelf plate started. a steam launch, arranged in the same manner as in the fourth experiment, was uninjured, and shipped but little water. _experiments with countermine._--the following experiments have been carried out in england and other countries to ascertain some reliable data for countermining operations. st experiment. _experiments in the medway, england, ._--countermine:-- lbs. of compressed gun-cotton, enclosed in a / " iron case. it was moored at a depth of ' below the surface of the water. submarine mines:--a series of similar cases containing coal dust, &c., were moored at distances of ' to ' from the countermine, and feet below the surface. effect of explosion:--the submarine mine at ' distance was completely destroyed; the dome of its circuit closer was dented in. nd experiment. countermine:--as before, but moored ' below the surface. submarine mines:--as before, but moored at distances of ' to ' from the countermine, and ' below the surface. effect of explosion:--the submarine mine case at ' distance was dented, but remained water-tight; the copper guard of fuze piece collapsed, and the earth connection of the fuzes was ruptured; the dome of its circuit closer was dented. rd experiment. countermine:--as before, but moored ' below the surface. submarine mines:--as before, but moored at distances of ' to ' from the countermine. effect of explosion:--the submarine mine case at ' distance was dented, but it did not leak. st experiment. _experiments at stokes bay, england, ._--countermine:-- lbs. of gun-cotton, enclosed in a / " iron case. it was placed on the ground, in ' of water. submarine mines:--six ground mines, / " thick cases, fitted with circuit, ' below the surface, at distances of ' to ' from the countermine. effect of explosion:--submarine mines at ' and ' distance were destroyed, and their circuit closers thrown out of adjustment; submarine mines at ' and ' distance were much bulged, and leaked, and their circuit closer spindles were bent; submarine mine at ' distance was uninjured, but its circuit closer was thrown out of adjustment. nd experiment. countermine:-- lbs. of gun-cotton enclosed in case, thickness no. b. w. g. it was moored ' below the surface, in ' of water. submarine mines:--five similar mines placed at same depth, at distances of ' to ' from the countermine. effect of explosion:--the submarine mine at ' distance showed continued or dead earth, two screws broken, and its case dented; the other mines were uninjured. st experiment. _experiments at carlscrona, sweden, ._--countermines:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a case - / " � " � / ". it was moored - / ' below the surface, the depth of water being feet. submarine mines:--(_a_) cast iron ground lb. mines, dome shaped, - / " � - / " � "; (_b_) cylindrical cases, wrought iron, empty, - / " � - / " � / "; (_c_) cylindrical cases, wrought iron, charged, - / " � - / " � / "; (_d_) cylindrical cases, wrought iron, - / " � - / " � / "; (_e_) spherical cases, wrought iron, - / " � / "; (_f_) spherical cases, tinned steel, " � / ". effect of explosion:--(_b_) mine, at ' distance, was destroyed, and one at ' distance was slightly bulged; (_c_) mine, ' distance, mouthpiece injured and case leaky; (_d_) mine, ' distance, a rivet started. nd experiment. countermine:--as before, but moored at - / ' below the surface; depth of water, feet. submarine mines:--as before. effect of explosion:--(_a_) mine, at ' distance, split in two; (_b_) mine, ' distance, destroyed; at ' distance, fractured; at ' distance, indented but not fractured; (_c_) mine, ' distance, case much bulged, and leaky; (_d_) mine, at ' distance, rivets started, case half full of water; at ' distance, sunk, several rivets started; (_e_) mine, at ' distance, bolt loosened; (_f_) mine, at ' distance, not injured. rd experiment. countermine:-- lbs. of dynamite, enclosed in a case, - / " � - / " � / ". it was moored - / ' below the surface; depth of water as before. submarine mines:--as before. effect of explosion:--(_b_) mine, at ' distance, sunk and not recovered; at ' distance, very much indented; (_c_) mine, at ' distance, case much indented and leaky; (_f_) mine, at - / ' distance, uninjured. th experiment. countermine:--as before, but moored - / ' below the surface. effect of explosion:--(_a_) mine, at ' distance, completely stove in; (_c_) mine, at ' distance, case indented but charge dry; (_e_) mine, at ' distance, slightly leaky; (_f_) mine, at - / ' distance, upper half indented in three places. it was also discovered during the above experiments that submarine mines charged with dynamite can be caused to explode by the detonation of a charge of the same explosive, at distances from it considerably beyond those at which the cases themselves are damaged by a similar charge. to prevent the foregoing, it is necessary to pack the dynamite very carefully, using at the same time special precautions. chapter x. the electric light--torpedo guns--diving. electric lights combined with fast steam launches as guard boats and specially constructed torpedo guns, such as the nordenfelt and hotchkiss machine guns, are at the present time the only _truly practicable_ means afforded to a man-of-war of defending herself against the attack of torpedo boats, whether these latter are armed with the spar, fish, or towing torpedo; the torpedo gun sinking the boats after the electric light and guard boats have detected their approach and position. as has been before stated, nets, shields, booms, &c., placed around a vessel of war, must, however slightly constructed, affect to a considerable degree her efficiency, by decreasing her power of moving quickly in any desired direction, which is essential to the utility of such a vessel in time of war; and thus on electric lights, guard boats, and torpedo guns must the safety of ships in future wars really depend, when attacked by torpedo boats. _the electric light._--the phenomenon of the _voltaic arc_ was first discovered by sir humphry, then mr., davy at the beginning of the present century. the following is an account of the matter as given by him in his "elements of chemical philosophy":-- "the most powerful combination that exists, in which number of alternations is combined with extent of surface, is that constructed by the subscription of a few zealous cultivators and patrons of science in the laboratory of the royal institution. it consists of instruments, connected together in regular order, each composed of ten double plates arranged in cells of porcelain, and containing in each plate thirty-two square inches; so that the whole number of double plates is , , and the whole surface , square inches. this battery, when the cells were filled with sixty parts of water, mixed with one part of nitric acid, and one part of sulphuric acid, afforded a series of brilliant and impressive effects. when pieces of charcoal about an inch long and one-sixth of an inch in diameter were brought near each other (within the thirtieth or fortieth part of an inch), a bright spark was produced, and more than half the volume of the charcoal became ignited to whiteness, and by withdrawing the points from each other, a constant discharge took place through the heated air, in a space equal at least to four inches; producing a most brilliant ascending arch of light, broad, and conical in form in the middle. when any substance was introduced into this arch, it instantly became ignited. platina melted as readily in it as wax in the flame of a common candle; quartz, the sapphire, magnesia, lime, all entered into fusion; fragments of diamond, and points of charcoal and plumbago, rapidly disappeared, and seemed to evaporate in it, even when the connection was made in a receiver exhausted by the air pump; but there was no evidence of their having previously undergone fusion." the philosopher also showed that, when the voltaic or electric arc is produced in the exhausted receiver of an air pump, the phenomena are as brilliant in character, and the charcoal points can be more widely separated, thus proving that the electric light is quite independent of the oxygen of the air for its support. owing to the crude nature of the voltaic batteries of that day, and also to the great expense of maintaining a large battery of that nature, nothing practical resulted from davy's discovery of the electric or voltaic arc. professor faraday, the great physicist, by his discovery of the principle of magneto-electricity, has enabled the electric light to be brought into practical use. as early as pixii applied the principle practically in the construction of a magneto-electric machine with revolving magnets; he was followed by laxton, clark, nollet, holmes, and others, who made machines with fixed magnets. in dr. werner siemens, of berlin, introduced the "siemens' armature," which, from its compact form, permitted a very high velocity of rotation in an intense magnetic field, giving powerful alternating currents, which, when required, were commutated into one direction. the latest improvement has been that from the magneto-electric to the dynamo-electric machine. it is due to both dr. siemens and sir c. wheatstone. induced currents are directed through the coils of the electro-magnets which produce them, increasing their magnetic intensity, which in its turn strengthens the induced currents, and so on, accumulating by mutual action until a limit is reached. _siemens' electric light._--the following is a description of messrs. siemens brothers' dynamo-electric light apparatus, which, for use on board ship against boat torpedo attacks, &c., is equal, if not superior, to any similar apparatus yet produced, and which is extensively used in the german and other european navies. this apparatus was one of many others experimented on by dr. tyndal and mr. douglas, m.i.c.e., for the trinity house. dr. tyndal says: "i entirely concur in the recommendation of mr. douglas, that the siemens machine recently tried at the south foreland be adopted for the lizard. from the first i regarded the performance of this handy little instrument as wonderful. it is simple in principle, and so moderate in cost that a reserve of power can always be maintained without much outlay. by coupling two such machines together, a great augmentation of the light is moreover obtainable." _principle._--when a closed electrical circuit is moved in the neighbourhood of a magnetic pole, so as to cut the lines of magnetic force, a current is generated in the circuit, the direction of which depends upon whether the magnetic pole is n or s; it also depends on the direction of motion of the circuit, and according to the law of lenz, the current generated is always such as to oppose the motion of the closed circuit. all magneto-electric and dynamo-electric machines are based on the principle stated above, and are subject to many modifications. the name _dynamo_-electric machine is given to it, because the electric current is not induced by a _permanent magnet_, but is accumulated by the mutual action of electro-magnets and a revolving wire cylinder or armature. it is found that, as the dynamic force required to drive the machine increases, so also does the electric current; it is therefore called a dynamo-electric machine. _description._--in the machine here described, of which fig. is an elevation, fig. a part elevation, and fig. a longitudinal section, the electric current is produced by the rotation of an insulated conductor of copper wire or armature coiled in several lengths, , , , &c., up to , and in several layers, longitudinally, upon a cylinder with a stationary iron core _nn' ss'_, so that the whole surface of the armature is covered with longitudinal wires and closed at both ends, as in fig. . this revolving armature is enclosed to the extent of two-thirds of its cylindrical surface by curved soft iron bars _nn__{ }, _ss__{ }. [illustration: fig. .] the curved bars are the prolongations of the cores of the electro-magnets _e e e e_. they are held firmly together by screws to the sides or bottom of the cast iron frame of the machine, making it compact and strong. the coils of the electro-magnet form with the wires of the revolving armature one continuous electric circuit, and, when the armature is caused to rotate, an electric current (which at first is very feeble) is induced by the remanent magnetism in the soft iron bars and directed through the collecting brushes into the electro-magnet coils, thus strengthening the magnetism of the iron bars,[v] which again induce a still more powerful current in the revolving armature. the electric current thus becomes stronger and stronger, and the armature therefore revolves in a magnetic field of the highest intensity, the limit of which is governed by the limit of saturation of the soft iron. at each revolution the maximum magnetic effect upon each convolution of the armature is produced just after it passes through the middle of both magnetic fields, which are in a vertical plane passing through the axis of the machine (i. e. _n__{ }_s__{ } in fig. ). the minimum effect is produced when in a plane at right angles to it, i. e. horizontal. [illustration: fig. .] according to the law of lenz already referred to, when a circuit starts from a neutral position on one side of an axis towards the pole of a magnet, it has a direct current induced in it, and the other part of the circuit which approaches the opposite pole of the magnet has an inverse current induced in it; these two induced currents are, however, in the same direction as regards circuit. a similar current will also be induced in all the convolutions of wire in succession as they approach the poles of the magnets. these currents, almost as soon as they are induced, are collected by terminal rollers or brushes _b_, usually the latter, placed in contact with the commutator in the position which gives the strongest current. the position giving the strongest current gives also the least spark, so that when there are no sparks at the commutator the best lighting effect is produced. fig. shows position of brushes when the armature revolves in the direction indicated by the arrow. the circumference of the revolving armature is divided into an even number of equal parts, each opposite pair being filled with convolutions of insulated wire wound parallel to the axis of the armature. the ends of these wires are brought to a commutator and connected to the segments either by screws or by soldering. the brushes collect the electric currents as they are induced, which is nearly constant and continuous. the collecting brushes are combs of copper wire placed tangentially to the cylindrical commutator, and press lightly upon it with an elastic pressure. [illustration: fig. .] _power and light produced._--an increase of the armature speed produces a corresponding increase in the current produced, but not in the same proportion. the current increases more rapidly than the speed, and could be made to reach any intensity but for considerations explained below. with increase of current there is also increase of heat. the speed for continuous work must not be taken too high, because the heat developed at high velocities might destroy the insulation of the coils of the electro-magnet. the speed given for this machine produces no such injurious heating effect. the strength of the current is also influenced by the resistance of the electric lamp and its leading wires. with an electric lamp in a circuit of proper resistance the armature should revolve at the rate given in the following table. the heating will then reach its maximum, which is very moderate, in about three hours after which there will be no further change. ------------------------------------------------------------------ table. -------+---------------------+---------------------+-------------- size. |number of revolutions|intensity of light in|hp (actual) to | of armature. | standard candles. | drive. -------+---------------------+---------------------+-------------- medium | to | , to , | - / to -------+---------------------+---------------------+-------------- the intensity of the unassisted light is given in standard candles. the standard here used is a stearine candle consuming grammes per hour. _regulation._--from the fact that a closed circuit rotating in a magnetic field experiences resistance to its motion which a broken circuit does not, motive power to any extent is only required when the circuit is closed. an interruption of the current is therefore equivalent to removing the load from the motor, which for mechanical reasons may be injurious to it and for electrical reasons to the dynamo machine. the sudden interruption of the circuit of the large machine produces an electric tension so dangerously high as to strain or destroy the insulation of the machine. when contact is again made after such interruption, the increase of speed resulting from the interruption causes a momentary current of great intensity, accompanied by sparks at the commutator. in order that the light may be quite steady the speed should be as uniform as possible. as too high an increase of speed may result in temporary extinction of the light, it ought never to be permitted. the motor should therefore be provided with a good and sensitive governor, that will keep the speed perfectly uniform however the steam and load may vary. a large and heavy fly-wheel is also very useful in keeping the speed nearly uniform during change of load. although the circuit, when the machine is in full action, should never be suddenly interrupted, interruption arising from the extinction of the light is _not_ dangerous, because it is always preceded by a decrease in the strength of the current. when it is desired to divert the current into another circuit it is advisable to stop the machine. although in practice with small machines this is rarely done, with large machines it is necessary. _self-acting shunt._--for great security, especially with the two machines coupled together, where the electric current is strong and the light equivalent to about , candles, it is advisable to insert in the circuit a self-acting shunt. [illustration: fig. .] this is placed between the lamp and machine and connected to both leading wires. its principle is as follows:-- the terminal _m_, fig. , is joined by a short connecting wire to one terminal of the machine. the terminal _l m_ is connected to the remaining terminal of the machine and also to one of the lamp terminals. the terminal _l_ is connected to the other terminal of the lamp. the shunt contains a small electro-magnet _e_ mounted upon a square wooden slab or baseboard with its armature a, a contact c, and, below the slab, a resistance coil _w_, which is equal to the resistance of the electric arc of the light, about s. _u._[w] as long as the lamp is burning well, the current circulates in the coils of the electro-magnet, and the armature _a_ being strongly attracted, there is no contact at _c_. the resistance coil _w_ is therefore not in electrical circuit. when the light is extinguished the current in the coils of the electro-magnet ceases, and the armature is withdrawn by the spring _f_ making contact at _c_. this offers to the electric current a path through _w_ of equal resistance to that of the lamp, and the current is subjected to scarcely any change, so that the motor has practically no cause to alter its rate. when the carbon points of the lamp again touch, the electric current returns to them, breaking contact at _c_, re-establishing the former conditions. _direction of rotation._--the armature may revolve in either direction. if it becomes necessary to drive it in the opposite direction to that for which the machine has been made, it is only necessary to reverse the brushes, placing their points in the direction of motion, and to change two of the wire connections, which operations can be effected in a few minutes. fig. shows the position of brushes for one direction of rotation and fig. that for the other. [illustration: fig. .] _conducting or leading wires._--the leading wires are usually of copper of high electrical conductivity. they must be insulated from one another the whole of their length and not placed too close together. as their resistance affects the intensity of the light very much, the section must be carefully proportioned to the distance of the lamp from the machine. the best practical result is obtained when their resistance together with that of the lamp is equal to the total internal resistance of the dynamo machine. wires of various sizes are therefore required. decrease in strength of the current caused by a leading wire of too high resistance can be overcome by a higher velocity, which is obtained only by increased motive power, but if the wire is much too small, it will become heated. the proper remedy is to increase the sectional area of the leading wire. bright sparks should never be allowed to appear at the commutator and brushes, as sparks result from a rapid burning of the metallic parts. they can easily be avoided by properly inclining the two arms which carry the brushes. the position of the brushes yielding the least spark at the commutator is that giving the highest intensity of light in the electric arc. the commutator should, while in motion, be freely oiled, to prevent the brushes wearing away too rapidly. the sticky oil should from time to time be removed by washing with paraffine oil or benzoline. _wear and tear._--the chances of stoppage so common to the old forms of electric light apparatus have in this form been reduced to a minimum, and now do not exceed those that arise with machines generally. the trinity house report states that the siemens' machine worked well for a month without any necessity for stopping. the brushes are the only parts which wear away, and they are very easily replaced. in thick weather they should be connected in what is called parallel circuit (or parallel arc, or for "quantity"), because it has been found that when they are so arranged the intensity of the electric light produced exceeds by some twenty per cent. the intensity of the sum of the two when worked separately. thus the two machines, giving respectively a candle power of , and , when worked separately (total , ), have given when coupled up in parallel circuit a light equivalent to , candles; just as in telegraphy it has been found that the rate of sending can be increased from to per cent. when the apparatus is coupled up in parallel arc. for this reason it is usual to employ two machines of medium size instead of one machine of large size. the intense light so produced is also much more uniform than from one large machine. _automatic electric lamp._--automatic electric lamps have been constructed with spring clockwork to cause the carbons to approach one another to a certain point, when, by means of an electro-magnet, the clockwork is checked, and the carbon points are allowed to burn away to such a distance that, by the decrease of current, the clockwork is released and the carbons caused to approach again. with such lamps the clockwork has been a source of trouble, and it is liable to get out of order. _siemens' patent electric lamp._--the lamp here described is actuated without clockwork; it also automatically separates the carbons after they have approached too closely or touch, and, by this combined action of approaching and separating, the carbon points are kept at a proper distance apart, and a steady light is obtained. the working parts are represented in the diagram fig. , and at fig. is shown the size employed on board ship. _e_ is the horse-shoe magnet with the armature _a_ placed in front of its poles a short distance from them. a regulating screw _b_ with the spiral spring _f_ is attached to the lever _a'_, forcing it against the stop _d_, and withdrawing the armature from the poles of the electro-magnet. when a current traverses the coils of the latter of sufficient strength to attract the armature and overcome the tension of the spring _f_, contact is made at _c_, which diverts the current from those coils. the consequent release of the armature breaks contact at _c_, the armature is again attracted, and this action is repeated, producing a vibrating motion of the lever and armature, which continues as long as there is sufficient current to overcome the tension of the spring. [illustration: fig. .] the spring pawl _s_ at the upper end of the lever _a'_, and oscillating with it, actuates a ratchet-wheel _u_, which is in gear with a train of wheels and the carbon holders; it thus opposes their tendency to approach by pushing them apart, tooth by tooth, until the current is so much weakened by the increased length of electric arc that the armature and lever cease to oscillate enough to move the teeth of the ratchet-wheel, and it rests near the stop _d_. while in this position the spring pawl is released from the ratchet-wheel and the preponderating weight of the upper carbon holder causes the carbon points to approach again. increase of current follows decrease of resistance, the armature again oscillates, and this cycle of action is continuously repeated. when in action the movements of the carbons are scarcely perceptible, but when, by any external cause, the carbons are separated so as to extinguish the light, they immediately run together until they touch, when they ignite and separate to a proper working distance by means of the electro-magnet above described. the only operation requiring attention in the use of this lamp is the adjustment of the tension of the spring _f_. when this tension is once regulated to the current at disposal, the lamp will continue to give a steady light as long as the current remains uniform. the relative rate of consumption of the two carbon points differs. the positive carbon burns away rather more than twice as quickly as the negative carbon. [illustration: fig. .] the duration of the light depends mainly on the lengths and sizes of the carbons. provision is made in this lamp that the rack which supports the negative carbon may be made to gear either into the teeth of the same pinion as that of the positive carbon, or into one of about half the size. by these means the light, when once focussed in a reflector, will remain in focus as long as the carbons last, whether permanent or reversed currents are employed. besides its twofold application, the lamp is very compact, is simple in construction, and therefore not likely to get out of order, and it is capable of being regulated with great precision. there is no spring to be wound up. the contact need not be cleaned, as the sparks are scarcely perceptible. by removing two screws in the outside casing, all the chief working parts can be easily removed and inspected. carbons are made from the hard carbon deposited in the interior of gas retorts, also from graphite. various sizes, both square and round in section, of from to mm. in diameter, are used in the electric lamp according to the intensity of the electric current. those commonly employed are from to mm. in diameter. the carbons supplied with the siemens patent lamp are coated with a thin film of copper. this enhances the cost somewhat, but it greatly improves the result, as the carbons burn longer, and do not split, when so coated. by coating them the resistance is diminished, except at the points, so that all the heat is concentrated in the electric arc, and a brighter light is the result. when two dynamo machines are coupled together (see page ), to give a very powerful current, the sizes up to mm. are required. the consumption varies a little, but the average is from to inches per hour. [illustration: fig. .] _concentration of light._--two kinds of concentrating apparatus are supplied in combination with the automatic lamp, both of which are capable of giving a powerful parallel beam, which will reach to an enormous distance, and are well adapted for naval purposes. the one kind consists of a parabolic reflector of stout metal, its concave surface being silvered and burnished. the apparatus is mounted with a ball-and-socket joint upon a wooden stand, as shown in fig. . the other kind is the fresnel catadioptric lens or holophote, fig. , which may be substituted for the reflector, and gives a more powerful beam than one given by reflection. the lens is surrounded by a metal case or lantern, in which is placed the electric lamp upon a slide for focussing. behind the carbon points a hemispherical reflector is placed, to catch all the back rays, and reflect them back through the lamp focus. the entire lantern is capable of revolving on horizontal rollers, and swings upon pivots. two handles are placed at the back to manipulate it. [illustration: fig. .] as the electric arc is much too bright to be looked into with the naked eye, both concentrating apparatus are supplied with a lens, called a focus or flame observer, by means of which an image of the burning carbons is thrown upon small screens at the back, so that the lamp can be easily adjusted without fatigue to the eye. the focus observer is shown on the lamp in holophote, fig. . _precautions._--before starting the apparatus, the electric lamp terminals and those of the dynamo machine must be _connected up_ by means of the leading wires provided with each set of apparatus. the terminals are marked _c_ and _z_ respectively, and they should be connected, _c_ of machine to _c_ of the lamp, and _z_ of the machine to _z_ of the lamp, in order that the electric current may be sent in the proper direction through the carbons of the lamp. should it, however, be found that the top carbon (which should consume twice as fast as that of the bottom one) does not consume so fast as the bottom one, it may be assumed that the dynamo machine has reversed its poles, and the leading wires will consequently require changing across. this reversal of poles, though possible, is of _very rare_ occurrence. [illustration: fig. .] the dynamo-electric machine should not be driven without its proper leading wires to lamp and lamp being connected up, or at least an external resistance equivalent to that of the lamp (which is approximately one siemens' unit) must be inserted. in other words, the machine must not be driven when a wire of small resistance connects the two terminals _c_ and _z_. this is expressed more briefly by saying the machine must not be _short-circuited_. if it is short-circuited when in motion the electric current becomes so powerful that it will leap from segment to segment of the commutator, where very bright and large sparks will be seen, and if continued would destroy the insulation, thus weakening the current generated. the leading wires should never be disconnected suddenly while the machine is revolving at its full speed, as such a sudden interruption will produce an intense spark, which will burn the ends of the wire where the contact is suddenly broken. when it becomes necessary to disconnect the wires, the belt should be pushed on to the loose pulley by means of the striking gear, or the steam engine should be stopped. it may be here stated that all connections should be cleaned bright and screwed tightly, to ensure perfect metallic contacts being made. _coupling two machines._--at fig. is shown a diagram of how to make the connections when coupling two machines in parallel circuit. _mm'_, _m_, _m'_, represent the ends of the wires of the electro-magnets; _bb'_ are the branches; _c_ and _z_ are the terminals of each machine respectively. [illustration: fig. .] the three ways in which the various wire connections of these machines are joined up, and which are enough for all ordinary purposes, are given below in paragraphs (_a_), (_b_), and (_c_). (_a_) when the machine is working _singly_ and revolving in the direction indicated in fig. , the following connections are made:-- _m_ is connected with _b_, _m'_ " _b'_, _m_ " _z_, _m'_ " _c_, and the leading wires of the lamp are connected with _c_ and with _z_ as explained. (_b_) when working _singly_ and revolving in the direction indicated in fig. :-- _m_ is connected to _b'_, _m'_ " _b_, _m_ " _z_, _m'_ " _c_. thus the only change necessary when the machine is to be driven in the opposite direction to that for which it is made, is to disconnect at _b_ the wire from _m_ to _b_ and at _b'_ the wire from _m'_ to _b'_, and to cross them. the machine will then be connected as above (_b_). (_c_) when working _two_ machines in parallel circuit, as in fig. , they must be connected as follows (that on the left of the page being called the first machine, and that on the right the second machine):-- _c_ of first to _c_ of the second. _z_ " _z_ " _m_ " _b_ " _b_ " _m_ " _m'_ " _b'_ " _b'_ " _m'_ " and then connect _c_ and _z_ of the second machine with the leading wires of the lamp. the connections _m_ to _z_ and _m'_ to _c_ in each machine are the same as in cases (_a_) and (_b_). they do not require to be altered, and may therefore be left out of consideration in all three cases (_a_), (_b_), and (_c_). the whole of the connections here indicated can be quickly made by means of a cross-bar commutator or switch, which is supplied with the machines in cases where such changes are likely to be required frequently. this is usually attached to a wall, leading wires being taken to it from the dynamo machines separately, and others from the switch being led to the electric lamps. the leading wires from machine to lamp should, whenever possible, be kept _separate_, to prevent them rubbing together and making contact. a distance of two inches is quite sufficient to prevent accidents of any kind. when the leading wires are erected in places where they are likely to rub and chafe against hard substances, it is advisable to enclose each wire separately in india-rubber tubing at all the points where they are likely to be rubbed. this becomes very important on board ship, where everything is in motion, and special care is in consequence required. some dynamo machines are coupled direct to the crank shaft of the steam engines; they require the same kind of attention as others, that is to say, they should be driven at a uniform speed, should be well oiled as well as the steam-engine, and they should be kept clean and free from sharp grit. _application._--the electric light used in the case of a _direct_ attack by torpedo boats, without the assistance of guard boats, will not prove of much assistance, on account of the very small space covered by the beam of light, and therefore if the direction of attack is not exactly known, the beam of light must be kept continually sweeping round the horizon on the chance of picking out the attacking boats, and thus, while flashing in one direction, they may be approaching in another, and effect their deadly mission. every man-of-war should be fitted with at least three electric lights, whereby the above-mentioned want of space covered would be to a considerable degree obviated. if a powerful beam of light be thrown in a particular direction, and there kept stationary, all boats or vessels crossing its path at a distance not exceeding yards from the ship using the electric light, would become distinctly visible to observers placed behind the light; these vessels remaining visible as long as they continue in such a position that the beam of light acts as a background to them. under very favourable circumstances, the distance at which the above effect may be observed is much increased. the parabolic reflector extends only about an arc of ° at yards' distance from the light. one defect of this form of reflector is, that it is rapidly dimmed by spray, rain, and by the particles given off by the carbons. the catadioptric lens, or holophote, gives a far more powerful but a more concentrated beam than the parabolic reflector. by means of such a beam of light, a torpedo boat may be discerned at about one mile distance. by adding divergent lens to the holophote, a less powerful and less concentrated beam of light will be thrown out; in this case about ° of surrounding water would be well illuminated at about yards' distance, while without the divergent lens there would be only about ° so illuminated but far more brilliantly. the distance at which objects can be detected by the electric light depends on their size and _colour_, more particularly on the latter. the observer should as a rule be well removed from the light. in the case of an electric light being thrown on the observer, the vessel, &c., using it would to that observer be invisible, the light only being seen; also when directed on any particular object, surrounding objects would be thrown into shade. the electric light will be found very useful for signal purposes by fitting a plane mirror in front of the catadioptric lens; so arranged that it be turned to any desired angle to the axis of the beam of light. by altering the angle of the mirror, the reflected beam of light can be swept from the horizon on one side, through the zenith, to the horizon on the other side. the time of passing the zenith being equivalent to the long and short flashes of the usual night signal code. in addition to using the electric light to detect the approach of torpedo boats, it may be used by the boats themselves to prevent the attacked vessel from discerning them. in turret ships, electric lights may be so arranged that the instant an object is brought into the field of the beam of light, the turret guns will be bearing on it. one great disadvantage of electric lights is the impossibility of protecting them from the enemy's fire, and this is a defect that cannot be eradicated, though it may be lessened, by manipulating them from the tops of a ship. _torpedo guns._--hitherto by torpedo guns has been meant small guns mounted on carriages so constructed that a shot may be fired into the water only a few feet from the ship's side, or mitrailleuses, gatlings, &c. here the term is applied only to machine guns, which are constructed to fire either volleys, or, extremely rapidly, single shot, each shot of which would be capable of _penetrating_ and _sinking_ torpedo boats, such as messrs. yarrow and thornycroft are daily launching from their yards. of such weapons there are at present only two, viz., the "nordenfelt" and "hotchkiss" gun. the former has, after very exhaustive experiments, been adopted by the english, austrian, swedish, and other naval authorities, while the latter has been adopted by the french government. _nordenfelt torpedo gun._--this gun, as it at present is constructed, consists of four barrels of inch calibre. the barrels are fixed in a horizontal plane, and are not moved during the firing; and the movement of the lever, the loading, the firing, and the extracting are all performed in the same plane, so that the _elevation_ of the gun is not disturbed by the firing. the gun is fed by means of hoppers, each of which contains ten rounds per barrel, _i. e._, forty shots. the continuous supply of cartridges, as well as the firing and extracting, are all performed by one motion of the lever, thus enabling the gunner to use his left hand to lay the gun. a volley of four shots can be fired at the same moment, or one shot can be fired separately. eight shots can be fired in - / seconds; twenty, thirty, or forty shots can be fired at a rapidity of two hundred shots per minute without difficulty. the recoil being taken up by the whole framework of the gun does not in the least disturb the aim. the entire mechanism of the gun can be opened up without undoing a single screw, in less than seconds. all the four spiral firing springs can be taken out, without opening the rest of the mechanism, in - / seconds. all the parts of the mechanism are made interchangeable, so that reserved parts can at any time be substituted. the gun can be placed on half cock, so that the strikers do not act; and for further security the lever can be locked. the carrier block, without which the gun cannot be fired, is loose, and can be taken away, in case it becomes necessary to abandon a gun, which is thus made useless to the enemy. the bullets are solid steel, weighing about / lb. at yards at right angles this gun will penetrate a / inch steel plate, which represents the thickness of the plates of a torpedo boat. at yards at right angles it will penetrate one / inch steel plate placed in front of a / inch steel plate with a space of feet between them, this target representing the plates and boiler of a torpedo boat. at the same distance, at ° angle against the line of fire, it will penetrate a / ", / ", or / " steel plate. the holes in some instances are from to inches in length, and - / inches in height. angle of depression °, of elevation °, and of direction °. weight of the gun - / cwt., and weight of carriage - / cwt. _hotchkiss torpedo gun._--this gun consists of a group of five barrels, revolving on a central shaft, a breech block, containing the firing mechanism, a feeding hopper, and the necessary hand crank for training and firing. the gun is mounted on trunnions attached to a vertical column, which rests in a suitable socket bolted to the ship's side; by this means a universal motion is obtained. the essential difference between this and the nordenfelt gun is, that the _barrels_ and mechanism are put into rotatory motion. another point of difference is that single shots only can be fired, and not a volley, as in the nordenfelt gun. with the hotchkiss gun, only some thirty shots can be fired in one minute at an advancing torpedo boat. the weight of the hotchkiss steel shot is about lb., but owing to the low velocity of the gun, its penetrative power is little more than that of the nordenfelt / lb. bullet. the object to be gained in firing at an attacking torpedo boat is to sink her, and not merely to kill or disable her crew, for supposing the attack to be made with a contact spar torpedo, and the boat to have reached within yards' distance from the ship, then, even if all the crew (probably two or three men) were disabled or killed, the boat would, if not sunk, still carry out its work of destruction; therefore the projectiles to be used under such circumstances should be only those capable of penetrating a torpedo boat's plates, _i. e._, solid steel shot, not shells. _diving._--in laying down and in picking up submarine mines, divers will be found extremely useful; also in clearing a passage in a river, &c., of an enemy's torpedoes in time of war. during the late turco-russian war, the harbour of soukoum kaleh taken by the turks was _popularly_ supposed to have been cleared of its mines by native divers (lazees), but as the torpedoes so captured were never seen at stamboul, it must have been a stretch of imagination; probably such would have been done, had there been any mines in the harbour to clear away. the following is a general description of messrs. siebe and gorman's improved diving apparatus. the apparatus consists of . an air-pump. . the diving dress. . the breast-plate. . the helmet. . the boots. . the crinoline. _air-pump._--this improved air-pump consists of two double action cylinders, each cylinder capable of supplying about cubic inches per revolution. the advantage of this air-pump is, that it can supply air to two divers, working independently and at different levels, each diver being in direct connection with one of the cylinders. the air-pipes are in lengths of feet and feet, made of vulcanised india-rubber with a galvanised iron wire imbedded; this protects from corrosion, and allows the air to pass through the pipes with less friction. _diving dress._--the diving dress is made of solid sheet india-rubber, covered on both sides with tanned twill; it has a double collar, the inner one to pull up round the neck, and the outer one of vulcanised india-rubber to go over the breast-plate and form a water-tight joint. the cuffs are also of vulcanised india-rubber, and fit tightly round the wrist, making, when secured by the vulcanised india-rubber rings, a water-tight joint, at the same time leaving the diver's hand free. _breast-plate._--the breast-plate is made of tinned copper, and has a valve in front, by which the diver can regulate the pressure of air inside his dress and helmet. the outer edge of the breast-plate is of brass, and is secured by screws to the outer collar of the dress. _helmet._--the helmet is made of tinned copper, and has a segment bayonet screw at the neck, corresponding to that of the breast-plate, which enables the helmet to be removed from the breast-plate by one-eighth of a turn. it has three strong plate glasses in brass frames, protected by guards; two oval at sides, and a round one on the front; the front one can be unscrewed, to enable the diver to give and take orders. at the side is an outlet valve, which, by inserting a finger, the diver can close, and so rise to the surface. the valve allows the foul air to escape, and prevents the entrance of the water. an elbow tube is securely fitted on the helmet, to which is fixed an inlet valve, to which the air-pipe is attached. the inlet valve is made that the air can enter, but in case of a break in the air-pipe it cannot escape. the front and back weights are of lead, heart-shaped, and weigh about lbs. each. _boots._--the boots are made of stout leather, with leaden soles, and are secured over the instep by a couple of buckles and straps. each boot should weigh at least lbs. _crinoline._--the crinoline or shackle is used for deep water; it is placed round the body and tied in the front of the stomach: being supported by braces, it affords protection to the stomach, and enables the diver to breathe more freely. _ladder._--an iron ladder should be provided with stays to bear against the side of the boat from which the diving is carried on, to which may be attached (if working in deep water) an ordinary rope ladder, with ash rounds, and weighted at the end. some divers have the ladder only feet long, to the last round a rope with a weight attached, which rests on the ground; by that means they descend. _directions for using the apparatus._--the ladder having been fixed, the position of the pump should be decided on, and it should be securely lashed by means of the ropes attached to the handles down to a stage, into which the _screw-eyes_ should be fastened if necessary; the pump should be placed out of the way of the divers, the men attending on them, and all the men employed. the best position for the pump is facing the head of the ladder, and about six feet from it. while the diver is dressing, the pump should be prepared for use, the winch handles should be taken out of the pump case, the nipples protecting the crank axles removed, the nuts being replaced on their screws. the nuts for the ends of the crank axles are taken off, the fly-wheel placed on the shaft, and the winch handles put on, and secured by the nuts, which are screwed home with the spanner. the pump is always worked in its case. the flaps covering the pressure gauges and that at the back of the pump case should be opened, the screw on the overflowing nozzle of the cistern removed, and the cistern filled with water; the caps of the air delivery pipes should be removed, the necessary lengths of air-pipe should be put together carefully with washers in place, and all the screws must be worked home by means of the _two_ double-ended spanners. the air-pipes should be tested by holding the palm of the hand to the end of the pipe, till the pressure shown on the pressure gauge is considerably above that corresponding to the depth the diver is to descend. _dressing the diver--crinoline only for deep water._--the diver having taken off his own clothes, puts on a guernsey, a pair of drawers, very carefully adjusted outside the guernsey, and securely fastened by the tape round the waist, to prevent them from slipping down, and then a pair of inside stockings. if the water be cold, the diver may put on two or more of each of the above articles. he then puts on the crinoline and woollen cap, drawing the latter well over his ears; some divers find relief from putting cotton saturated with oil in their ears. the _shoulder pad_ is then put on, and tied under the diver's arms. he then gets into the diving-dress, which in cold weather should be slightly warmed, drawing it well up to his waist; he next puts his arms into the sleeves, an assistant opening the cuffs by means of the cuff expanders, or by inserting the first and second fingers of both hands, taking care to keep his fingers straight. the diver, by pushing, forces his hand through the cuff. he puts on a pair of outside stockings and a canvas overall to preserve the dress from injury. the diver then sits down, and the inner collar of the dress is drawn well up and tied round the neck with a piece of spun yarn, and the breast-plate put on, great care being taken that the india-rubber of the outer collar is not torn in putting it over the projecting screws of the breast-plate. the four pieces of the breast-plate band, which with the thumbscrews had been previously placed for safety in one of the boots, are then put over the outer collar, and secured to the projecting screws by means of the thumbscrews; the centre screw of each plate should be tightened first. it will generally be sufficient if the thumbscrews be screwed up hand-tight, the spanner being only used when necessary. the canvas overall is now adjusted and the boots are put on. the rings are passed over the cuffs, and the sleeves of the overall are drawn down to cover them. if gloves are to be used, the rings will be put on over them, as well as the cuffs. the helmet (without the front bull's-eye) is then put on; before doing so, the attendant should blow through the outlet valve of the helmet; he can do so by placing his head in the interior, and placing his mouth to the hole where the air escapes. blow strongly; if in proper working order, the valve will vibrate. a loop of the life line is placed round the diver's waist, the line brought up in front of the man's body, and secured with a piece of small rope passing round his neck, or to the stud on the helmet. the waist-belt is buckled on with the knife on the left side, the end of the air-pipe being passed from the front, through the ring on the belt on the man's left, and up to the inlet valve on the helmet, to which it is secured; the upper part of the pipe is then made fast by a lashing to the stud on the left of the helmet. the diver then steps on the ladder, and two men are told off to _man the pump_. the weights are then put on, the front weight first, the clips being placed over the studs on the breast-plate. the back weights are then put on, and the clip lashings over the hooks on the helmet, and the two are secured to the diver's body by means of the lashing from the back weight, which is passed round the waist, through the thimble beneath the front weight, and tied to the other end of the lashing at the back weight. when the signalman is sure that all is right, and that the diver understands all the signals, he gives the word _pump_, and screws the centre bull's-eye into the helmet securely; this done, he takes hold of the life line and "pats" the top of the helmet, which is the signal for the diver to descend. _signals employed._--the signalman is the responsible person, and must be very vigilant all the time the diver is down; occasionally he will give one pull on the life line, and the diver should return the signal by one pull signifying "all right;" if the signal be not returned, the diver must be hauled up, but if the diver wishes to work without being interrupted by signal, he gives one pull on the line, independently, for "all right; let me alone." if the signalman feels any irregular jerks, such as might be occasioned by the diver falling into a hole, he should signal to know if he is all right, and if he does not receive any reply, he should haul him up immediately. if the diver from any cause is unable to ascend the ladder, and wishes to be pulled up, he gives four sharp pulls on the life line. if while being hauled up the diver gives one pull, it signifies "all right; don't haul me any more." the diver should be hauled up slowly and steadily. if the signalman wishes the diver to come to the surface, he gives four sharp pulls on the line, on which the diver should answer "all right," return to the foot of the ladder, and signal to be hauled up. _one_ pull on the air-pipe signifies that the diver wants more air. _two_ pulls on the life line and _two_ pulls on the air-pipe in rapid succession, signify that the diver is foul and cannot release himself, and requires the help of another diver; on receiving such a signal, no attempt should be made to haul the diver to the surface. the above signals are to be invariably used; but other signals may be arranged as is most convenient for any particular work, as a great variety can be made with the life line and air-pipe. the diver can communicate with the surface by means of a slate. further information on this subject, especially with regard to the foregoing diving apparatus, will be found in messrs. siebe and gorman's "manual for divers." footnotes: [footnote v: in wrought iron there is always some residual magnetism; there is therefore no necessity to start the magnetism with a permanent magnet.] [footnote w: siemens' unit.] chapter xi. electricity. _theory of electricity._--the theory most readily understood, and which most satisfactorily explains the various electrical phenomena, is as follows:-- "that every substance and every atom of the world is pervaded by a peculiar, subtle, imponderable fluid which is termed _electricity_, but which is not known to exist, or remains in a state of _electrical equilibrium_, until evoked by certain causes." the effect of causing a disturbance of this equilibrium is to increase the normal, or natural, electricity in some particles, and to equally decrease it in other particles, i.e. what one loses the other gains. an excess of natural electricity is denoted by the term _positive_, or mathematical symbol (+) while a deficiency is denoted by the term _negative_, or symbol (-). _like electricities repel each other._ that is to say, two bodies charged with an excess of, or positive, electricity, being brought together repel each other, neither wishing to increase the excess that has been evoked in them. similarly in the case of two bodies charged with a deficiency of, or negative, electricity, neither wish to add to the deficiency already there. in both these cases there can be no tendency to electrical equilibrium, which is the principle at work. in the former case, there being already too much, more will but increase the disturbance. in the latter case, further deficiency will but add to the irregularity. _unlike electricities attract each other._ that is to say, if two bodies, one charged with positive, or having an excess of electricity, the other charged with negative, or having a deficiency of electricity, be brought together, they will attract each other; both being desirous of altering their existing state, the one by decreasing its excess, and the other by decreasing its deficiency of electricity. in this case, there will be a tendency to equilibrium, caused by attraction. the earth is supposed to be a vast reservoir of electricity, from which a quantity can be drawn to fill up a deficiency, and which is always ready to receive an excess from other bodies. every body in nature has its own natural quantity of electricity, and when an object is negatively electrified, or has a deficiency in its normal quantity, there is a tendency to receive a supply from any convenient source. such an object would receive electricity from the earth if means were afforded; and a body _positively_ electrified, would tend to part with its excess in the same manner. where such facilities for establishing electrical equilibrium are afforded, the result is the passage of a _current_ of electricity. _conductors._--sensible effects can be produced by electricity at great distances from the source, provided there be a medium of communication, that is, good _conductors_ to transfer it. when a glass rod is rubbed with a piece of silk, it becomes charged with an excess of, or positive, electricity, and at the same time the silk becomes charged with negative electricity. the glass rod will retain the positive electricity upon it for some time, unless touched with the wet hand, a wet cloth, a metal, &c., when it will instantly cease to be electrified. the electricity is then said to have been conducted away, and the bodies which allow it to run off the glass are called _conductors_ of electricity. metals, water, the human body, charcoal, damp wood, and many other bodies are conductors. those bodies which conduct electricity hardly at all, such as the air, silk, glass, sealing wax, gutta percha, india rubber, &c., are termed _nonconductors_ or _insulators_. strictly speaking, all substances _conduct_ electricity in some degree, and a _nonconductor_ is merely a _bad_ conductor. in the following table the bodies are arranged in their order of conductivity, i.e. each substance conducts better than that which precedes it; the first-named body is the best insulator, and the last-named one is the best conductor. dry air. ebonite. paraffin. shellac. india rubber. gutta percha. resin. sulphur. sealing wax. glass. silk. wool. dry paper. porcelain. dry wood. stone. pure water. rarefied air. sea water. saline solutions. acids. charcoal, or coke. mercury. lead. tin. iron. platinum. zinc. gold. copper. silver. though two substances are near one another in the above list, they do not necessarily approach one another in their power of conducting. for instance, taking the conducting power of pure silver as represented by the number , then pure copper will be equal to · , gold will be equal to · , while zinc will be only equal to · , and pure water, which is half-way down the list, will offer , millions more resistance than silver to the passage of the electric current. the metals being the best known conductors, are usually employed as the means of transferring the electric current from one place to another. _electric circuit._--the conditions attending this operation are different from those of any other known method of transmission. a complete _circuit_ must always be formed by the electric current, i.e. it cannot start from one place _a_, travel to another place _b_, and cease there, but the current must be completed before it can be said to have reached _b_. there cannot be a current of electricity without a means of recombination, which recombination must be at the _source_, or place of original disturbance. this "place of disturbance" or _source_ must be considered as having two sides, i.e. at some spot the normal or natural electrical equilibrium is disturbed, and electricity is separated into too much (positive) on one side, and too little (negative) on the other side. if then no means of recombination be afforded, the electricities remain separated, and no current exists; but if a _conductor_ be made to connect the two sides, electricity is set in motion, and a current established. originally to form a circuit between two stations _a_ and _b_, a conducting wire and a return wire were necessary, but in steinway discovered that the earth itself answered all the purposes of a return wire, in fact under favourable conditions much better. thus, to form a circuit between _a_ and _b_, a conducting wire is required, and a buried metal plate at _a_ and _b_, the earth by these means taking the place of the return wire. the aforesaid metal plates are technically termed _earth plates_. the greater the size of the earth plates (up to certain limits), the deeper they are buried, and the better the conducting power of the soil surrounding them, the better conductors the plates become, or the less resistance the earth portion of the circuit offers. if either plate be not in communication with the earth, or else be separated from the wire, the circuit is not complete, or, as it is termed, "it is broken," and no current will flow, the signal not made, torpedo not fired, &c. _"short" circuit._--due to the fact that recombination, or a tendency to equilibrium, is always at work when electricity has been evoked, the conducting path along which the electric current flows must be covered with a nonconducting substance, or, as it termed, "insulated," or else the current would not perform its duty, but escape to earth, and so form what is termed a "short circuit." a current of electricity always chooses the _easiest path_ to effect recombination, or electrical equilibrium. _insulators, &c._--on land, telegraph wires are as a rule laid above the ground, and therefore require supporting at every few yards; this is done by means of posts, and as these are formed of substances which are conductors of electricity, the wires require to be insulated from them. the insulators generally employed for such purposes are cup-shaped pieces of porcelain, or pottery, fixed to the head of the telegraph posts. by means of these insulators, the current of electricity is prevented from escaping to the earth by the post conductors. a certain amount of leakage, or loss of electricity, must occur at each of these posts, as there is no such thing as a perfect insulator. when the wires are laid on the ground or under ground, or under water, they are insulated by covering them with gutta percha, india rubber, &c., and any loss of current is thus prevented. _methods of generating electricity._--for the purposes of torpedo warfare there are two methods of evoking electricity, viz.-- .--by _chemical action_. .--by _friction_. _by chemical action._--_chemical action_ is the chief source of free electricity, the representative of which is the galvanic, or voltaic, battery. the electricity so generated is also termed dynamical electricity, due to there being a constant electric current, so long as the poles of the battery producing it are kept closed; the electricity being thus in a _dynamic_ or moving state. by chemical action is signified that which occurs when two or more substances so act upon one another as to produce a third substance differing altogether from the original ones in its properties, or when one substance is brought under such conditions that it forms two or more bodies differing from the original ones in their properties. _definition and properties of a voltaic cell._--the _voltaic_ cell consists of an insulating jar, containing a liquid, in which are placed two plates or pieces of dissimilar metals; the liquid must be composed of two or more chemical elements, one of which at least tends to combine with one or other of the metals, or _with both in different degrees_. by a voltaic _battery_ is meant a number of cells above one; this term, however, is often applied to a single cell when working by itself. a "_simple_ voltaic cell," "element," or "couple," consists of two metals placed in a conducting liquid. if two metals--for instance, zinc and copper--are placed in water slightly acidulated, without touching each other, no effect is apparent; but if they be made to touch, bubbles of hydrogen gas are formed over the copper plate, and continue forming these until the plates are separated. after being in contact for some time, the copper plate will be found unaltered in weight, but the zinc plate will have lost weight, and the portion so lost will be found in the liquid in the form of sulphate of zinc. the same effects are also produced by connecting the two plates by means of some conducting substance, instead of placing them in contact. zinc is invariably employed as one of the metal plates, on account of the ease with which it dissolves in dilute acids; and the greatest results are obtained when the second metal plate is not acted upon at all by the liquid, for then the whole effect due to the oxidation of the zinc plate is obtained; but when the second plate is also chemically acted upon, then only the effect due to the difference between the two chemical actions is obtained, for, as will be explained further on, they each act in directly opposite directions. _voltaic current._--the voltaic current makes its appearance under the general laws of electrical action. when a body charged with an _excess_ of, or _positive_, electricity, is connected with the earth, electricity is transferred _from_ the charged body to the earth; and similarly when a body is charged with a _deficiency_ of, or _negative_, electricity, is connected with the earth, electricity is transferred _from_ the earth to the body. generally whenever two conductors in different electrical conditions are put in contact, electricity will flow from one to the other. that which determines the direction of the transfer is the relative _potential_ of the two conductors. electricity always flows from a body at _higher potential_ to one at _lower potential_, when the two are in contact, or connected by a conductor. when no transfer of electricity takes place under these conditions, the bodies are said to be at the _same potential_, which may be either _high_ or _low_. the _potential_ of the earth is assumed to be _zero_. _definition of potential._--"the _potential of a body or point, is the difference between the potential of the body or point, and the potential of the earth_." difference of potential for electricity is analogous to difference of level for water. now, since, when a metal is placed in a vessel containing a liquid, electricity is produced, the liquid becomes of a different potential to the metal, each being electrified in an opposite way; and therefore, as above stated, there being a _difference_ of potentials, electricity will tend to flow from one to the other. this is evidence of a _force_ being in action, for there can be no motion without some force to produce it. _electro-motive force._--_electro-motive force_ is the name given to a peculiar force to which is due the property of producing a difference of potentials. when it is said that zinc and water produce a definite electro-motive force, what is meant is, that by their contact a certain definite difference of potentials is produced. the _electro-motive force_ of a voltaic element may be termed its _working_ power, in the same way as the pressure of steam is the working power of a steam engine, though this is not to be considered as the real source of power, which, as will be seen, is uncertain. due to the difference of potential of the metal and the liquid, a current of electricity will flow from one to the other, causing the chemical decomposition of the liquid, and the reaction may be taken as the origin of the power employed. but while the expenditure of energy (which is necessary to produce a _force_) is accounted for by taking the chemical action as the source of power, the preceding cause of this chemical action, viz. the flowing of the current of electricity due to the difference of potential of the metal and the liquid, must also have first involved the expenditure of energy; thus the real source of power is very uncertain. _electrolytes._--as before stated, a voltaic cell consists of two plates of dissimilar metals, which must be immersed in a liquid composed of two or more chemical elements, one of which at least will combine with one or other of the metals, or both in a different degree. those liquids which are thus decomposed by the passage of a current of electricity are termed _electrolytes_. the elements, then, forming the electrolyte may have chemical affinity for both metals, though in a greater degree for one than the other. "oxygen" is the most important element of an electrolyte, and to the _affinity for oxygen of the metals_ is the magnitude of the result and effect. _terms electro-positive and electro-negative._--all metals have a definite relation to each other as to the potential which any one may have when brought into contact with another. thus, when zinc is brought into contact with copper, the former has a potential positive to the latter, i.e. a current of electricity will tend to flow from the zinc to the copper. the metals may be so placed in a list that each one would be positive to any of those that follow it; it is then said to be electro-positive to them, and they are electro-negative to it. as those metals which are electro-positive to others have a greater affinity for oxygen, and those that are electro-negative to others a less affinity for this element, the terms electro-positive and electro-negative signify, in effect, greater or less affinity for this element. conversely, oxygen will combine more readily with the former than with the latter. the following list shows the commoner metals arranged in electro-chemical order. + zinc. lead. tin. iron. antimony. copper. silver. --gold. take the case of a voltaic cell composed of zinc and copper plates immersed in water. the passage of electricity through the water will decompose it into its elements hydrogen and oxygen, the latter having an affinity for both the plates, but considerably more so for the zinc plate. then, an electro-motive force will be generated at each metal, and these forces will act in opposition to each other, but the greater strength of the one will overcome the weaker, and the real power of the electric current will be the difference between the two. _definition of "elements."_--the battery plates are termed the positive and negative _elements_. a voltaic battery has two _poles_--a positive and a negative--which are the terminations of the plates. _direction of current._--the course of the current in a voltaic cell is as follows:--_within_ it leaves the electro-positive plate (or element), and flows to the electro-negative plate, but _outside_ the cell (or as it were on its return path) it flows from the positive _pole_ to the negative _pole_. the current always leaves the battery by the positive _pole_, and thus the copper is the negative _element_, but the positive _pole_, because the current leaves the battery by it; and the zinc is the positive element because the current begins there, _within_ the cell, and the negative _pole_ because it ends there, _outside_. the positive pole is the terminal of the negative plate, and _vice versâ_. there is but one current from a battery, viz. a positive one; what is called a negative current is merely the positive current passing in the reverse direction from the same pole, that is, the positive pole. _single and double fluid batteries._--galvanic batteries may be divided into single fluid and double fluid batteries. the simplest form of galvanic cell practically in use is a single fluid cell, consisting of a zinc and a copper element, immersed in water slightly acidulated by the addition of a little sulphuric acid. in a battery of several cells, the zinc and copper plates are generally soldered together in pairs, and placed in a long stoneware or glass trough, divided into separate cells by means of partitions. by filling the cells with sand, this battery is made more portable, the plates being thus supported, and the liquid prevented from splashing about during transit. in this form it is called the _common sand battery_. _action in a single fluid cell._--the following process goes on in the single fluid cell when the circuit is closed--that is, when the battery is set to work. the water (composed of hydrogen and oxygen) is decomposed by the passage of the electric current, and oxide of zinc is formed. the oxygen of the water having greater affinity for the zinc, leaves the hydrogen. the zinc during the process is being consumed, as coal is consumed when it burns, while combining with the oxygen of the air. this oxide of zinc combines with the sulphuric acid, and forms sulphate of zinc; this salt is found to accumulate in solution in the liquid of the cell. at the same time the hydrogen of the water goes to the negative or copper plate, and gathers over it in bubbles. the process will be better seen by the accompanying plan of the chemical decomposition and recombinations. sulphuric acid } zinc } }sulphate of zinc found at { oxygen } oxide of zinc } positive plate. water{ hydrogen hydrogen found at negative plate. no _single fluid_ cell can give a constant electro-motive force because of the _polarisation_ of the plates. _definition of the term polarisation._--the word _polarisation_ means that the plates become coated with the products of the decomposition of the _electrolyte_, producing a diminution of current. in the above described battery, the hydrogen gathers on the surface of the copper plate, and an _electro-motive force_ is set up which counteracts the electro-motive force producing the current--the copper plate is said to be _polarised_. by the bubbles of hydrogen collecting on the face of the negative plate, the _surface_ in contact with the liquid is gradually decreased; thus the plate becomes practically smaller, and a single fluid cell which at starting gave a good current soon shows that it is really weakened. the consequence is that the zinc is consumed extravagantly as well as the acid, and the cell working with poor results. also the _resistance_ of the cell is increased, due to the sulphuric acid, which is added to the water to increase its conductivity, being gradually used up, by combining with the oxide (see plan) and forming sulphate of zinc. liquids are very bad conductors of electricity; the greater part of the ordinary internal resistance of a battery arises from this cause. the common sand battery is the worst of all batteries as regards constancy of electro-motive force, the _polarisation_ being greater in this battery than any other because the gas cannot readily escape. the common copper and zinc cell is the next in order of demerit. the _smee_ single fluid cell, in which the negative plate is a platinum instead of a copper one, is better than the copper zinc cell, because the free hydrogen does not stick to the rough surface of the platinum plate so much as to the copper. _double fluid batteries._--all the defects of the single fluid battery, which are as follows-- . diminution of electro-motive force, . inconstancy, . increase of internal resistance, are remedied in the _double fluid_ battery, of which the _daniell's cell_ was the first invented, and is a good example. of this kind of cell many forms are in use, but the principle is the same throughout. there is a positive and negative element, and the cell is divided into two receptacles for the two fluids. in the most constant form of daniell cell, the zinc is plunged into a semi-saturated solution of sulphate of zinc, the copper in a saturated solution of sulphate of copper, and these two solutions are separated either by a porous barrier, or by taking advantage of the different specific gravities of the two solutions. by a _saturated_ solution is meant a liquid which has dissolved as much of the substance as it possibly can. _the chemical action of a daniell cell._--the chemical action of this form of daniell cell is as follows:-- the zinc electrode combines with oxygen; the oxide thus formed combines with sulphuric acid and forms sulphate of zinc. oxide of copper is separate from the sulphate; and the copper in this oxide is separated from the oxygen. the oxygen of the water is separated at the zinc electrode from the hydrogen, and at the other electrode this hydrogen recombines with the oxygen from the oxide of copper. this alternate decomposition and recombination of the elements of water can neither increase nor decrease the e.m.f. of the cell, the actions being equal and opposite. the result of the series of actions above described is that the sulphuric acid and oxygen of the sulphate of zinc are transmitted to the zinc, combine with it, and form fresh sulphate of zinc; the sulphuric acid and oxygen of the sulphate of copper are transmitted to the zinc set free by the above process, and reconvert it into sulphate of zinc; the copper of the sulphate of copper is transmitted to the copper electrode, and remains adhering to it. the whole result is therefore the substitution of a certain quantity of sulphate of zinc for an equivalent quantity of sulphate of copper, together with a deposition of copper on the copper or negative electrode.[x] the following is a plan of the process:-- zinc............} } .{ sulphate of zinc found } oxide of zinc..} . { at positive plate. water { oxygen..} }. { hydrogen.................}......} { sulphuric acid.....} } water. sulphate of { { oxygen..} copper { oxide of copper { { copper at negative { copper....{ plate. _description of the "callaud" and "marié-davy" batteries._--the voltaic batteries in general use for the different purposes of torpedo warfare have been fully described in chapter iv., and therefore it will be only necessary here to explain the construction of the "callaud" and "marié-davy" batteries, these being much used abroad in connection with telegraphy. the _callaud_ cell, named from the inventor, is a modification of the daniell cell, and is also called a _gravity_ battery, the liquids being simply prevented from mixing by the law of gravity forbidding the heavier of the two from rising through the lighter. it consists of a thin plate of copper, which is laid on the bottom of a good _insulating_ jar having an _insulated_ wire leading up the side, and on this plate are placed crystals of sulphate of copper. a solution of sulphate of zinc is then poured in, and on the top is fitted a zinc plate, which forms the positive element. the vessel must not be shaken, or the sulphate of copper when dissolving will mix with the solution above it. the _marié-davy_ cell consists of a carbon electrode in a paste of proto-sulphate of mercury and water contained in a porous pot, and a zinc electrode in dilute sulphuric acid, or in sulphate of zinc. _the circuit._--in connection with the manipulation of batteries, there is one important item to consider, viz. the _resistance_ in the _circuit_, which may be divided into _external_ and _internal_. _resistances._--the _external_ resistance in practice is that which exists in the conducting line, and the various instruments connected with it. the _internal_ resistance is that which exists in the battery itself. all known conductors oppose a sensible _resistance_ to the passage of an electric current, and the strength of the current, or in other words, the quantity of electricity passing per second from one point to another, when a constant difference of potentials is maintained between them, depends on the _resistance_ of the wire on the conductor joining them. a bad conductor does not let the electricity pass so rapidly as a good conductor, that is, it offers more _resistance_. resistance in a wire of constant section and material is _directly_ proportional to the _length_, and _inversely_ proportional to the _area of the cross section_. the electrical resistance of a conductor must not be considered as analogous to mechanical resistance, such as the friction which water experiences in passing through a pipe, for this frictional resistance _is not_ constant when different quantities of water are being forced through the pipe, whereas electrical resistance is constant whatever quantity of electricity be forced through the conductor. _application of ohm's law._--_ohm's law_, which governs the strength of the current, is expressed by the equation c = e / r or r = e / c or e = cr. where c is the strength of the current; e is the e.m.f. or difference of potentials; and r is the resistance of the circuit. */ in words, _ohm's law_ means that the strength of the current is _directly_ proportional to the e.m.f., and _inversely_ proportional to the resistance of the circuit. as before stated, the resistance of the circuit consists of an _external_ and an _internal_ resistance, therefore when these resistances are separately considered, the equation c = e / r must be converted into c = e / (_x_ + _r_), where _x_ is the external, and _r_ the internal, resistance. the resistance of the battery or the _internal resistance_ depends on the size of the plates and the distance between them, that is, it is _directly_ proportional to the distance, and _inversely_ proportional to the size. the _electro-motive_ force of a battery is dependent generally on the number of cells joined in _series_, and not on the _size_ of the plates. the cells of a battery may be joined in two ways, as follows:-- . in series: that is, by connecting the negative element of one cell to the positive element of another, and so on. . in multiple arc: that is, by connecting negative to negative, and positive to positive; which is the same as increasing the size of the cells. if the conductor between the battery poles be such that the _external_ resistance _x_ may be practically left out, then c = e / _r_, and no change in the strength of the current will be effected by adding any number of cells in series, as _r_ will increase equally with _e_, and therefore _c_ will remain the same; but if under the same conditions the cells be joined in _multiple arc_, then _r_ will decrease as _e_ increases, and therefore _c_ will be increased. thus with a short circuit of small external resistance, the strength of the current will be increased by increasing the size of the plates, or by joining the cells in multiple arc, but not in series. if the conductor between the poles of the battery be such that the external resistance _x_ becomes very great, then c = e / (_x_ + _r_), where _x_ is very great compared to _r_. by joining the cells in multiple arc _r_ is decreased, but _e_ and _x_ remain the same, and therefore _c_ is not materially altered, as _x_ is very great compared to _r_. by connecting the cell in series, _r_ is increased, and so is _e_, but as _r_ is still very small compared to _x_, the strength of the current _c_ is increased. thus with a long circuit of great _external_ resistance, the strength of the current will be increased by joining the cells in series, but not in multiple arc. when the external resistance _x_ is neither very large nor very small in comparison with the battery or internal resistance _r_, then the strength of the current _c_ will be increased by adding the cells in series, and also in multiple arc. by the former process the e.m.f. _e_ is increased more than the resistance of the circuit _r_ or (_x_ + _r_), and by the latter process, the e.m.f. _e_ is unaltered, whilst the circuit resistance (_x_ + _r_) is decreased. all the above may be practically demonstrated by the employment of suitable _galvanometers_. _frictional electricity._--_frictional_ electricity is produced by the friction of two insulators. there is _no difference whatever in kind_ between "voltaic" and "frictional" electricity. _comparison with voltaic electricity._--the electricity generated by friction possesses a great electro-motive force, producing on even a small conductor a large charge, whereas the electricity generated by the galvanic cell possesses a very small electro-motive force, and produces only a small charge on a small conductor. but when the conductor is large, the electricity produced by the galvanic cell will almost instantaneously charge the conductor to the maximum potential it can produce, the galvanic cell developing an immense quantity of electricity by the chemical reaction; whereas the quantity developed by friction between two insulators is so small, that if it be diffused over a large conductor the potential of the conductor will be very little increased. the late professor faraday has proved that one cell of a voltaic pile possesses the same quantity of electricity as an ordinary sized frictional machine after being wound round , times, thus showing the contrast between the qualities of frictional and voltaic electricity. the electricity of the frictional machine and that of the galvanic battery may be made to produce the same effect, there being no difference in kind between them. frictional electricity can be made to pass in a current, but it is comparatively feeble. again, voltaic electricity can be made to produce a spark, but under ordinary circumstances it scarcely amounts to anything. _description of a frictional electric machine._--a frictional electrical machine consists of a vulcanite or glass disc or cylinder, which is made to revolve between cushions or rubbers of leather or silk. by the friction the (silk) rubbers become negatively, and the glass disc or cylinder positively, electrified. the revolving disc immediately after contact with the fixed rubbers passes close by a series of brass points, which are connected with a _condenser_. these points collect the positive electricity of the glass, the rubbers being put to earth. the positive electricity which the glass loses is supplied through the rubber; a stream of negative electricity flows from the rubbers to the earth during the charging of the conductor or condenser; in other words, the positive electricity flows from the earth to the rubber, whence it crosses to the glass disc and so to the condenser. _definition of a "condenser."_--a _condenser_ is an arrangement for accumulating a large quantity of electricity on a comparatively small surface. _the "leyden jar."_--the _leyden jar_, which is the original type of the condenser, or accumulator, consists of a glass jar coated inside and out, up to within a few inches of the mouth, with tinfoil pasted on, but having no connection with each other. the mouth is usually closed by means of a wooden stopper, through which a brass rod passes, to the head of which is affixed a brass knob, &c., the rod and knob being metallically connected with the _inner_ coating by means of a chain. the "leyden jar" may be charged either by connecting the _outer_ coating to earth (the rubbers of the machine being also to earth), and the _inner_ coating to the conductor of the machine; or else by connecting the outer coating to the rubbers, and the inner coating to the conductor, a complete circuit being necessary to charge the jar as highly as the frictional electrical machine will admit of. the _conductor_ of the machine being charged, also forms a kind of leyden jar, the conductor in this case being the inner coating, the air, the _dielectric_, and the nearest surrounding conductors, such as the walls of the room, &c., being the outer coating. _meaning of "dielectric."_--by _dielectric_ is meant a non-conducting medium, which in the case of the "leyden jar" is the glass. _frictional electricity very little used for torpedo purposes._--frictional electricity is now seldom used in connection with torpedo warfare, as on account of its very great power, or electro-motive force, a very perfectly insulated cable must be employed, which is somewhat difficult to obtain; it is also necessary to employ a condenser, which requires a certain time to charge. for these and other reasons, frictional electricity has been abandoned for the far more practical voltaic electricity. _magnetism._--a _magnet_ is a piece of steel, which has the peculiar property, among others, of attracting iron to its ends. certain kinds of iron ore, termed the _loadstone_, have the same properties. the word "_magnet_" is taken from the country magnesia, where the loadstone was first discovered. magnetism in a body is considered to be a peculiar condition caused by electrical action. both electricity and magnetism have the power of communicating their properties to other bodies without being in contact with them, i.e. _inducing_ the power, which on the bodies being placed far apart becomes insensible. _the "poles" of a magnet._--every magnet has two _poles_, called the _north_ and _south_ poles. a magnetic steel needle if pivoted on an upright point, or suspended from its centre, will fix itself, pointing north and south; in england the end of the needle pointing to the north is termed the north pole, but in france it is termed the south pole. the reason of this difference is owing to the fact that the north pole of one magnet attracts the south pole of another, and therefore, as the earth is considered as one vast magnet, the end of the magnetic needle attracted to the north pole of earth magnet should be the south pole of the magnet; thus the french south pole in a magnet is the english north pole, and _vice versâ_. _permanent magnets._--a piece of steel when magnetised is termed a _permanent_ magnet, because it retains its magnetism for a considerable length of time; but soft iron cannot be permanently magnetised. a piece of soft iron rendered magnetic by induction retains a portion of its magnetism for some time after it has been removed from the magnetic field, by reason of what is called its _coercive force_. this remnant of magnetisation is called _residual magnetism_. _effect of an electrical current on a magnetic needle._--a magnetic bar or needle pivoted on its centre will point north and south, but if an electric current is caused to flow along a wire parallel to and either over or under the magnetic needle, the latter will be turned from its position, and remain so as long as the current continues; on the current ceasing the needle will resume its original position. the magnetic needle can be turned either to the east or the west, according to the direction and course of the electrical current. thus:-- current from s. to n. _over_ deflects to w. current from n. to s. _under_ deflects to w. current from n. to s. _over_ deflects to e. current from s. to n. _under_ deflects to e. the galvanometer, the "mirror," and "thomson's reflector" all depend on this principle for their usefulness. these instruments have been fully described in chapter iv. _the electro-magnet._--if a piece of insulated wire be coiled round a rod of soft iron, and a current of electricity be made to pass through the coil, the iron core becomes magnetic as long as the current passes; when the current ceases the magnetism disappears. during the passage of the electric current, the iron core possesses all the properties of a magnet. therefore if a piece of iron were placed near its poles it would be attracted and released from attraction as often as the current passed or ceased; and supposing such a piece of iron to be retained by a spring, &c., a series of movements, attraction, and drawing back would be effected. a piece of iron so arranged is termed an _armature_, and the instrument is called an _electro-magnet_. the coil of wire must be carefully insulated, or else the electric current will pass through the iron core to earth instead of performing its proper work. an electro-magnet is much more powerful than a steel magnet of equal dimensions, and depends on the strength of the current by which the magnetism is induced, and the number of turns of wire round the core. the north and south poles of an electro-magnet are determined by the direction in which the current flows through the wire. at the _south_ pole the current passes _with_ the hands of a watch, and at the _north_ pole _against_ the hands of a watch. _definition of the "ohm."_--the "ohm" is the standard used for electrical resistance; it is obtained by observing what effect is produced by a current of electricity on a certain conductor in a certain time. the ohm is a small coil of german silver wire representing the resistance overcome by a current in a certain time. footnotes: [footnote x: jenkins' 'electricity.'] appendix. _mcevoy's single main system._--hitherto in connection with a system of electrical submarine mines, it has been necessary to employ either a single cable between each submarine mine and the torpedo station, or a single cable, termed a "multiple cable," containing a limited number of insulated wires, leading from the station, and branching off from a junction box to each mine, by which considerable cost and complication is incurred. to remedy the above serious defects of such a system, and also to simplify the arrangement of electrical tests, captain mcevoy has devised and patented the following apparatus; at the firing, or torpedo station, the end of the single main cable, that is, the single core cable leading to the junction box, is connected to a make and break contact apparatus, by which, by the movement of a dial or pointer around a fixed centre, a battery can be successively put in connection with the wire, and disconnected from it, in a somewhat similar manner to wheatstone's step by step dial telegraphs. in the junction box at the opposite end of the single core main cable is an electro-magnetic apparatus for working a dial or pointer in exact unison with the aforesaid dial or pointer at the torpedo station. this junction box dial or pointer serves as a contact maker to put the wire of the main cable successively in contact with the branch wires leading to the several torpedoes, as it is caused to turn with a step by step motion by the sending of a succession of currents from the firing station. as the contact maker completes the circuit between the main cable and one of the branch wires, the current passes from the cable through the wire, and through the fuze of that particular torpedo to "earth"; but when any one or other of the torpedoes is to be exploded, the circuit between the main cable and the torpedo wire being completed, it is only necessary to send a current through the main cable of sufficient strength to ignite the fuze, and so explode the mine. the strength of the current used for giving the aforesaid step by step motion to the junction box dial or pointer is not sufficient to cause the ignition of the fuzes in the torpedoes. again, if it be desired that the torpedoes should be so arranged that when any of them are struck by a passing vessel, the fact of its having been struck should be instantly signalled to the firing station. the dial apparatus in the junction box is arranged so that at one point of its revolution, termed the "zero point," all the torpedo branch wires are in circuit with the main cable, and that then a constant current is passing from the firing station through all the circuit closers, and out through resistance coils to "earth." in this case, if one of the circuit closers be struck, and therefore short circuit formed, the current passes direct to earth without going through the aforesaid resistance, and the fact of its having done so is at once indicated by a galvanometer at the firing point, by the movement of which a bell is rung at the station. the operator can then explode such torpedo at once by merely switching in the firing battery. at the same time the passage of the strong firing current may fuze a connection in the junction apparatus, by which the exploded torpedo is detached, i.e. the direct "earth" connection of such a torpedo is cut off, and the remaining submarine mines are left in proper working order; this effect may also be arrived at by other means. _general description of apparatus._--the following is a general description of this exceedingly clever and useful invention:-- at fig. is shown a diagram view of the apparatus. _a_ is the instrument at the firing point on the shore or vessel; _b_ is the cable wire led to a submerged box situated near the spot where the several torpedoes are grouped; _c_ is the instrument enclosed in the submerged box; _d_, _d_ are insulated wires led away from the box to the several torpedoes, there being a separate wire for each torpedo. each of the wires _d_ is coupled to one or other of a series of metallic contact pieces _e_ ranged in a circle round the axis of a metallic pointer _f_, which can be turned with a step by step motion and successively brought into electrical contact with the several contact pieces _e_. the axis of the pointer is in electrical communication with the wire of the cable. the wire from the cable is first led to the coils of an electro magnet _g_, and thence passes to the axis of the pointer. _h_ is a magnetic armature in front of the electro magnet _g_; when a positive current of sufficient strength is sent through the cable the armature is rocked in one direction, and when a negative current is sent, it is rocked in the opposite direction. from the armature motion is transmitted to a pawl which works into the teeth of a ratchet wheel on the axis of the pointer _f_, so that by sending a succession of reversed currents of sufficient strength through the cable, the pointer _f_ is turned with a step by step motion and is successively brought into electrical contact with the several contact pieces _e_. [illustration: m^{c.}evoy's single main system plate liv.] in the instrument, at the firing point _a_ is a handle, by the turning of which a step by step motion is given to the pointer of a dial _b_ and a simultaneous movement to the pointer _f_ of the instrument _c_ in the submerged box. when the handle _a_ has made a half turn it couples one pole of the battery to the cable and the other to the earth connection, and when it has made a complete turn the connections are reversed. the pointer of the dial _b_ then moves forward from one division of the dial to the next, and simultaneously the pointer _f_ is turned in unison with it. the operator at the firing point can therefore always see which of the torpedoes is in electrical connection with the wire of the cable, and he can test each torpedo in succession by moving a handle, say at _h_, to cause the current passing back from the torpedo to pass through a galvanometer at _e_, and by the movement of the needle of the galvanometer it can be seen whether the resistance of the circuit through this torpedo is in its normal and proper working state. when the pointer of the dial _b_ is brought to zero, or as it is marked in the drawing to "signal," then the pointer _f_ of the apparatus _c_ is in electrical communication with a contact point which is coupled to all of the branch wires _d_, and usually the apparatus is left in this condition, the handle _a_ being then locked and prevented from turning by a bolt actuated by a handle at _g_. the current from the battery at the firing point then passes to earth through the resistances in all of the torpedoes. if now any one or other of the torpedoes is struck by a passing vessel and the wire from its fuze put directly to earth, so that the current passes freely to earth instead of having first to pass through the resistance, the fact of the current passing freely to earth is notified at the firing point by the movement of the needle of a galvanometer _d_; the movement of the needle of this galvanometer effects an electrical connection by which a small battery is caused to sound a bell at _c_. the operator at the firing point can then if he pleases at once fire the torpedo that has been struck by moving a handle at _f_ and coupling up to the wire of the cable a battery of greater strength; the strong firing current will pass to earth through the fuze of the torpedo that has been struck, and will ignite this fuze, but will not affect the fuzes of the other torpedoes, as to pass through these fuzes it has also to pass through resistances which impede its passage and reduce its strength, so that the portion of the current which passes to earth through them is not of sufficient strength to ignite the fuzes. when the fuze of any one or other of the torpedoes is exploded by the passing of a strong firing current through it, the wire leading from the box _c_ to this torpedo is simultaneously cut off from electrical connection with the contact pin _e_ to which it was previously connected, and this pin is put to earth through a resistance either somewhat greater or less than the resistances in the torpedoes, so that the firing of one or more of the torpedoes does not interfere with the power of being able to turn the pointer _f_ of the apparatus _c_ in unison with the pointer of the dial _b_. afterwards the operator at the firing point can ascertain which of the torpedoes has been fired by passing the pointer of the dial _b_ to each of the divisions of the dial in succession, and ascertaining by the galvanometer a the resistance of the circuit through each of the torpedoes, so that he at once ascertains which torpedo has been put to earth through the greater or less resistance. the cutting off of the wire _d_ from its contact _e_ when a strong current is passed through it may be effected by the wire being coiled around an iron core forming an electro magnet, which when a strong current is passed through the wire is of sufficient strength to shift the position of a contact apparatus and then effect the required alterations in the connections, but which is not of sufficient strength to effect any change when the weaker currents used for the signalling and testing operations are passed through the wire. it will be evident that with the above described apparatus any one or other of the torpedoes can if desired be exploded by the operator at the firing point whenever he desires to do so. to effect this he would by turning the handle _a_ bring the pointer of the dial _b_ opposite to the division of this dial; that would indicate that the cable had been brought into electrical communication with the torpedo required to be exploded, and then when it is ascertained by previously adjusted sight points that the vessel is above the torpedo, he can fire the torpedo by passing a strong firing current to the cable. in this way the apparatus can be used for firing any one or other of a group of sunken torpedoes, or if the torpedoes are buoyant ones, they need not be fitted with apparatus for putting the wire from their fuze directly to earth whenever the torpedo is struck by a passing vessel. the same arrangement of apparatus can also be used for firing any one or other of a number of mines or torpedoes on land and for separately testing the firing mechanism of each mine whenever desired. captain mcevoy's single main system will shortly undergo a series of experiments under the supervision of the english torpedo authorities at chatham, which will most probably result in its adoption by the english government, and also by the principal continental powers. table[y] showing the value of the fractions a and b for every half degree. -------+-------------+-------------+ | a | b | arc. | + [alpha]| - [alpha]| +-------------+-------------+ [alpha]| - [alpha]| + [alpha]| -------+-------------+-------------+ | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | 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· | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | | · | · | · | · | · | -------+-------------+-------------+ a synopsis of the principal events that have occurred in connection with the history of the torpedo. ---------+-------------+---------------------------+------------+--------------------------------- date. |operator, &c.| event. | place. | remarks. ---------+-------------+---------------------------+------------+--------------------------------- . | italian | attack on a bridge formed | antwerp. |bridge completely destroyed. | engineer, | over the scheldt. | | vessels, each carrying a heavily | zambelli. | | | charged magazine, fired by | | | | clockwork, were carried by the | | | | stream against the bridge. | | | | . | captain d. | numerous small experiments| america. |by which he proved that a charge | bushnell. | with gunpowder charges. | | of gunpowder could be fired | | | | under water. | | | | . | " | attack on the english | new york. |boat managed by sergeant e. lee. | | frigate h.m.s. _eagle_ by| | attack failed, owing to his | | his submarine torpedo | | inexperience in manipulating | | boat. | | this novel kind of craft. | | | | . | " | attack on the english | new london.|drifting torpedoes employed. | | man-of-war h.m.s. | | crew of a prize schooner astern | | _cerberus_ by his | | of the _cerberus_ hauled one of | | drifting torpedoes. | | the torpedoes on board, which | | | | exploded, killing men and | | | | destroying a boat. | | | | . | " | attack on english ships by| " |this failed, owing to the ships | | numerous floating | | having previously hauled into | | torpedoes. known by the | | dock to avoid the ice, but it | | name of "battle of kegs."| | created a great amount of | | | | confusion and alarm among the | | | | crews of the vessels. | | | | . | r. fulton. | experiments with torpedoes| france. |these first attempts were | | on the seine. | | generally failures. | | | | july , | " | experiments with his | brest, |these experiments were successful . | | submarine boat named the | france. | in so far as proving that with | | _nautilus_. | | such a boat he could descend to | | | | any given depth and reascend to | | | | the surface at will, and that he | | | | could remain below for a | | | | considerable time. | | | | august | " | attempted to sink a small | " |completely successful. this is . | | vessel by means of one of| | the first vessel known to be | | his torpedoes. | | destroyed by means of a torpedo. | | | | charge of submarine mine lbs. | | | | gunpowder. | | | | . | " | attempted to destroy one | off |owing to the ship altering her | | of the english channel | boulogne, | position at the moment of | | fleet by means of his | france. | setting the torpedo adrift, this | | drifting torpedoes. | | attack failed. | | | | oct. , | " |catamarran expedition under| boulogne, |failed, owing to a mistake in the . | | lord keith to destroy the| france. | construction of the torpedoes. | | french fleet. | | the mines exploded, but did no | | | | damage to the french ships. | | | | oct. | " | similar expedition. | " |similar failure, owing to causes . | | | | above mentioned. | | | | oct. , | " |attempted to destroy a brig| dover, |the brig was completely . | | _dorothea_ with his | england. | demolished. two torpedoes | | drifting torpedoes. | | employed, each charged with | | | | lbs. gunpowder and fired by | | | | clockwork. | | | | july , | " | experiment on a large hulk| new york, |finally successful, several . | | brig. | america. | attempts being necessary, owing | | | | to faulty construction. | | | | oct. | " | attack on the u.s. sloop | new york. |failed, owing to the very . | | _argus_ for finally | | ingenious though elaborate | | testing the efficacy of | | defence of the vessel, carried | | his torpedo schemes. | | out under the directions of | | | | commodore rodgers. | | | | . | mr. mix. | attack on the english | lynn, haven|complete failure, though six | | frigate h.m.s. | bay, | different attempts were made. | | _plantagenet_ with his | america. | | | drifting torpedoes. | | | | | | june , | " |attack on h.m.s. _ramilies_| new york. | an utter failure. . | | by blowing up a schooner | | | | alongside. | | | | | | . | captain |experiment with a submarine| moulsford, |idea was to fasten the torpedo by | johnson. | boat carrying a torpedo | berks, | means of screws to the bottom of | | on its back. | england. | the hostile vessel. trial proved | | | | successful, but the english | | | | government refused to sanction | | | | the project as being too | | | | diabolical. | | | | july , | colonel | experiment on a raft with | ware pond, | successful. . | samuel | his submarine battery. | america. | | colt. | | | | | | | . | general | destruction of the wreck | portsmouth,|he is stated to have employed | paisley, | of the _royal george_ by| england. | galvanic firing to explode the | r.e. | submarine mines. | | mines. | | | | . | captain | experiment on the _john | england. | successful. details not known. | warner. | o'gaunt_. | | | | | | june , | colonel s. | experiment to explode a | new york. |successful. the operator was at a . | colt. | submarine mine by | | great distance from the torpedo. | | electricity. | | | | | | july , | " | experiment on the u.s. | castle |successful. the operator was on . | | gunboat _boxer_ with | garden, | board u.s. man-of-war at some | | electric submarine mines.| new york. | distance from the place where | | | | the explosion occurred. | | | | aug. , | colonel s. | similar experiment on a | potomac |successful, the operator being . | colt. | schooner. | river, | stationed at a distance of | | | america. | miles from where the mine was | | | | placed. | | | | oct. , | " | similar experiment on the | new york. |successful. the operator being on . | | brig _volta_, tons. | | board the revenue cutter | | | | _ewing_, at a considerable | | | | distance from the scene of the | | | | explosion. | | | | april ,| " | experiment to destroy a | potomac |successful. the vessel was, at . | | vessel of tons _under| river, | the time of the explosion, | | weigh_ by electric | america. | sailing at the rate of knots | | submarine mines. | | per hour, and to prevent the | | | | possibility of any collusion | | | | between the operator and crew, | | | | they left the ship a few moments | | | | before the catastrophe. operator | | | | miles distant. probably | | | | several mines were placed in the | | | | form of a circle. | | | | july, | captain | experiment with his | brighton, | the vessel completely destroyed. . | warner. | invisible shell, on a | england. | | | barque of tons. | | | | | | jan. , | colonel s. |experiment with an electric| new york. |successful. the operator being at . | colt. | submarine mine. | | a distance of miles from | | | | where the explosion took place. | | | | . | professor | discovered the explosive | .. |brought into use for military | schonbein.| agent "gun-cotton." | | purposes about , by | | | | professor abel. | | | | . | sobrero. | discovered the explosive | .. |brought into use about , for | | agent nitro-glycerine. | | blasting purposes by m. alfred | | | | nobel, a swede. | | | | . | russians. | attempted destruction of | cronstadt. |several torpedoes were exploded | | the english men-of-war | | near these ships, but with no | | _merlin_ and _firefly_, | | other results than a wetting to | | by stationary submarine | | some of their men. | | mines. | | | | | | feb. , |confederates.|federal gunboats attempting| america. |considerably delayed, caused by . | | to force the savannah | | the submarine mines, but no | | river. | | actual damage done. this was | | | | their first appearance in a | | | | practical form during the civil | | | | war. | | | | dec. , | " | destruction of the federal|yazoo river,|two torpedoes exploded under her; . | | ironclad _cairo_, by | america. | vessel much shattered, and sunk | | stationary torpedoes. | | in minutes. first vessel | | | | destroyed in this war. | | | | feb. , | " | the federal monitor | ogeechee |she was saved from sinking by . | | _montauk_, severely | river, | being run on the mud, thus | | damaged by a submarine | georgia. | enabling the hole to be | | mine. | | temporarily closed, and the | | | | vessel taken to port royal. | | | | july , | " | the federal ironclad |yazoo river.|the vessel went down in . | | gunboat _baron de kalb_, | | minutes. as she was sinking a | | sunk by a submarine mine.| | second torpedo exploded under | | | | her stern. no lives were lost. | | | | aug. , | " | the federal gunboat |james river.|the ship was, at the time of the . | | _commodore barney_ | | explosion, steaming knots, and | | severely damaged. | | ran into it, losing men, and | | | | being some what severely | | | | damaged. it was an electric | | | | submarine mine charged with | | | | lbs. gunpowder. | | | | oct. , | " | boat torpedo attack on the| charleston.|failed. it was made by a boat . | | federal ship _ironsides_.| | armed with a spar torpedo with | | | | lbs. gunpowder. | | | | . | " | confederate steamers | |owing to the shifting of the | | _marion_ and _ettiwa_ | " | position of barrel torpedoes. | | destroyed by their own | | | | mines. | | | | | | . | " | confederate flag of truce |james river.| the same cause. | | boat _shultz_. | | | | | | feb. , | " | boat torpedo attack on the|charleston. |successful, the ship being sunk. . | | federal frigate | | a submarine boat was employed on | | _housatonic_. | | this occasion, and owing to her | | | | running into the hole made by | | | | her torpedo, went down with the | | | | ship. | | | | march , | " | boat torpedo attack on the|north edisto|failed, owing to the torpedo spar . | | federal ship _memphis_. |river, south| being broken by the vessel's | | | carolina. | screw. | | | | april , | " | destruction of the federal| st. john's |this was effected by a floating . | | transport _maple leaf_. | river, | torpedo. | | | florida. | | | | | april , | " | boat torpedo attack on the|james river.|the ship was severely damaged, . | | federal ship _minnesota_.| | but not sunk. spar torpedo, | | | | charge lbs. gunpowder. | | | | april ,| " | boat torpedo attack on the|charleston. |failed, owing to the boat being . | | federal frigate _wabash_.| | discovered. | | | | may , | " | loss of the _commodore |james river.|completely demolished by an . | | jones_. | | electric torpedo, lbs. | | | | gunpowder. this part of the | | | | river having been carefully | | | | dragged. | | | | aug. , |confederates.|loss of the federal monitor| mobile bay.|this occurred during the federal . | | _tecumseh_. | | attack on the defences of mobile | | | | bay, the ship disappearing | | | | almost instantaneously. the | | | | captain and of the crew were | | | | killed. | | | | oct. , | federals. | boat torpedo attack on the| near |the only federal torpedo success . | | confederate ironclad | plymouth, | during the war. the boat was | | _albemarle_. | america. | armed with the wood and lay | | | | disconnecting spar torpedo. the | | | | ship was sunk. | | | | dec. , |confederates.| loss of the federal | roanoke |the latter vessel was proceeding . | | steamers _otsego_ and | river. | to the assistance of the former. | | _bazeby_. | | both were totally destroyed. | | | | . | m. a. nobel.| introduction of dynamite. | .. |a modified form of the explosive | | | | nitro-glycerine. | | | | . | captain |first series of experiments| fiume, |the idea of such a weapon | lupuis and | with the fish torpedo. | austria. | previously known, but not acted | mr. | | | on. | whitehead. | | | | | | | jan. , |confederates.|loss of the federal monitor|charleston. |completely destroyed by a barrel . | | _patapsco_. | | torpedo, sinking in a few | | | | minutes. sixty-two officers and | | | | men drowned. | | | | march , | " |loss of the federal steamer|near |the place where this catastrophe . | | _harvest moon_. | georgetown.| occurred had been previously | | | | swept for torpedoes. | | | | march | " | loss of two federal |mobile bay. |these losses occurred in the to april,| | monitors, and three | | final attack on mobile, at the .| | gunboats. | | close of the war. | | | | sept. , |paraguayans. | loss of the brazilian war |currupaity, |completely destroyed by a . | | steamer _rio janeiro_. | paraguay. | stationary torpedo at the | | | | bombardment of currupaity by the | | | | brazilian fleet. | | | | . | england. | adoption of the electric | | | | light in the navy. | | | | | | may , | english. | torpedo attack by h.m.s. | .. |this is the first whitehead fish . | | _shah_ on the peruvian | | torpedo ever fired against an | | ironclad _huascar_. | | hostile ship. it failed, owing | | | | to the _huascar_ being at too | | | | great a distance. | | | | may , | russians. |russian torpedo boat attack| batoum. |failed. a turkish ship was struck . | | on several turkish ships.| | by a towing torpedo, but it | | | | failed to explode. | | | | may , | " | russian torpedo boat | matchines, |successful. a turkish monitor, . | | attack on the turkish | river | _duba saife_, was sunk. | | ships _fettu islam_, | danube. | | | _duba saife_, and _kilidj| | | | ali_. | | | | | | june , | " | russian torpedo boat | sulina, |failed. the russian torpedo boat . | | attack on the turkish | mouth of | no. was sunk, and her | | ironclads _feteh bulend_,| the | commander, lieutenant poutschin, | | _moocardemikhair_, and | danube. | with his crew, taken prisoner. | | _idglalieh_. | | the attack was made by six | | | | boats. | | | | june , | " | turkish monitor attacked |rutschuk, on|failed. the officer in command of . | | by the russian spar | the danube.| the boat being severely wounded, | | torpedo boat_choutka_. | | and the torpedo wires cut. this | | | | attack was made in the daytime. | | | | june , | " | two russian torpedo boats |mouth of the|failed, owing to the spirited . | | attacked a turkish | aluta, | defence on the part of the | | monitor. | danube. | turks. another day affair. | | | | aug. , | " | the turkish ironclad | soukoum |failed. the captain of the . | | _assari shefket_ attacked| kaleh. | _assari shefket_ had placed | | by four russian torpedo | | guard boats in advance of his | | boats. | | ship, by which he was warned of | | | | the approach of the torpedo | | | | boats, and so enabled to foil | | | | the attack by a well-directed, | | | | hot fire. | | | | oct. , | " | loss of turkish gunboat | sulina. |the gunboat was sunk by striking . | | _suna_ at the russian | | an electro-contactmine, placed | | attack on sulina. | | by the russians about / mile | | | | above the turkish defences. | | | | about fifteen officers and men | | | | killed and wounded. | | | | dec. , | " | turkish squadron attacked | batoum. |failed. the russians fired two . | | by four russian torpedo | | whitehead fish torpedoes (the | | boats, two being armed | | first attack of this nature | | with the whitehead fish | | during the war), both of which | | torpedo. | | were picked up by the turks. | | | | jan. , | " |attack on turkish ships by | batoum. |successful. a turkish revenue . | | two russian torpedo boats,| | steamer on guard being sunk. | | armed with the whitehead | | final torpedo attack made in the | | fish torpedo. | | russo-turkish war ( - ). ---------+-------------+---------------------------+------------+--------------------------------- footnotes: [footnote y: see page .] errata. on page (line ) insert words "could be destroyed" after "anchor." on page , (middle of page) "fig. " should be "fig. ." on page ( th line from bottom) "e" should be "d." index. a. abel, experiments by professor, abel's detonation experiments, ---- high tension fuzes, ---- mechanical primer, action, chemical, ---- ----, in a daniell cell, ---- ---- single fluid cell, adjustments of whitehead's fish torpedo, the, admiral porter's torpedo ship _alarm_, ---- ----, the armament of, adoption of the fish torpedo, the invention and, advantages of electrical submarine mines, the, ---- ---- mechanical mines, the, agents, torpedo explosive, air pump, the, _alarm_, admiral porter's torpedo ship, _albemarle_, destruction of the, aluta, the russian torpedo boat attack off the, american civil war, the, ---- ----, mechanical mines in the, ---- ----, torpedoes during the, ---- ----, submarine mines during the, ---- extempore drifting torpedoes, apparatus, directions for using the diving, ----, firing keys and shutter, ----, siemens' electric light, ---- ----, conducting wires for, ---- ----, rotation of armatures in, ---- ----, wear and tear of, ----, the shutter, ---- used with a circuit breaker, shutter, application of ohm's law, the, ---- ---- the electric light, the, arcs, firing by intersectional, _argus_, fulton's attempt against the, armatures in siemens' electric light apparatus, rotation of, armoured cables, single cored, armstrong's system of electrical testing, arrangement of earth plates, brown's, ---- ---- wires in mcevoy's spar torpedo, arrangements, steward's safety cock, astatic galvanometer, the, attack with harvey's torpedoes, methods of, attacks, boat torpedo, ---- ----, methods of protecting ships against, austrian method of mooring, the, ---- ---- testing, the, ---- self-acting circuit closers, ---- testing table, the, ---- torpedo experiments, ---- ---- launches, thornycroft's, ---- war, torpedo operations during the, austro-italian war, torpedo operations during the, automatic arrangements, ---- electric lamps, b. balance, wheatstone's, ---- ----, manipulation of, ---- ----, measurement of resistances by, barrel torpedoes, batoum, russian torpedo boat attack at, , batteries, bichromate, ----, double fluid, ----, firing, batteries, leclanché's voltaic, ----, menotti test, ----, signalling, ---- ----, daniell's, ----, single and double fluid, ----, telegraph, ----, voltaic, ----, von ebner's, battery test for electro-motive force, voltaic, ---- ---- internal resistance, voltaic, ---- ---- potential, voltaic, beardslee's high tension fuze, ---- joint, bearings, firing by cross, bichromate batteries, boat, bushnell's submarine, , ----, confederate submarine, ----, experiment at cherbourg, torpedo, ----, french submarine, a, ----, lay torpedo, the, ---- ----, capabilities of the, ---- ----, clearing obstructions with the, ---- ----, improved form of the, ---- ----, launching the, ---- ----, method of sinking and raising the, ---- ----, used as a tug, ---- ---- to clear away mines, ----, _lightning_, thornycroft's torpedo, ----, torpedo, attack at batoum, , ---- ---- rustchuk, ---- ---- soukoum kaleh, ---- ---- soulina, ---- ---- off matchin, ---- ---- the aluta, ---- ----, the final, ---- ----, attacks, , ---- ----, methods of protecting ships against, ---- ----, protective, fosberry's patent, boats, submarine, ---- ----, qualifications essential to, ----, torpedo, ---- ----, english, ---- ----, herreshoff's, ---- ----, ordinary type of, ---- ----, schibau's russian, ---- ----, spanish, ---- ----, thornycroft's, ---- ----, yarrow's, booms, construction of, ----, defence of harbours by, boots for divers, boxes, junction, ---- ----, for multiple cables, ---- ---- single cored cables, ----, resistance, brakes for harvey's torpedoes, breaker, the circuit, breast-plate for divers, brook's torpedoes, brown's arrangement of earth plates, buoys for harvey's torpedoes, bushnell, the inventor of torpedoes, bushnell's drifting torpedoes, ---- mode of ignition, ---- submarine boat, , c. cable, colt's electric, ---- cutters, fulton's, cables, circuit closer, ----, creeping for electric, ----, defects observed in the conductivity of, ----, hooper's, ----, insulated electric, ----, insulation test for electric, ----, jointing electric, ----, junction boxes for multiple, ---- ---- single cored, ----, land service, ----, multiple, ----, sea service, ----, siemens' electric, ----, silvertown electric, ----, single cored armoured, ---- ---- unarmoured, ----, special, ----, test of electrical resistance of, _cairo_, the loss of the, calland and marié-davy batteries, description of the, capabilities of lay's torpedo boat, ---- ---- whitehead's fish torpedo, carlscrona, experiments with countermines at, ----, torpedo experiments at, , , case, conical-shaped torpedo, ----, cylindrical-shaped torpedo, ----, form and construction of torpedo, ----, spherical-shaped torpedo, cell, action in a single fluid, ----, chemical action of a daniell, ----, definition and properties of a voltaic, ----, description of a menotti, ----, tests for insulation, sea, ---- ----, sea, charges, size of torpedo, chatham, torpedo experiments at, chemical action, ---- fuzes, ---- ----, defects of, cherbourg, torpedo boat experiment at, circuit breakers, ---- closer cables, ---- closers, austrian self-acting, ---- ----, electro-contact mine, ---- ----, mathieson's inertia, ---- ----, improvements in, ---- ---- spiral spring, ---- ----, mcevoy's mercury, ---- ---- weight magneto, ---- ----, the use of, ----, closing the electric, ---- resistances, ----, short, ----, the electric, civil war, torpedo operations during the american, ----, torpedoes in the american, clearing a passage through torpedo defences, coil galvanometer, the three, colt, experiments by colonel, colt's electric cable, ---- reflector, _commodore jones_, the loss of the, commutators or switch plates, comparing electro-motive forces, composition, rain's detonating, compounds, explosive, concentration of the electric light, condenser, definition of a, conductivity of cables, defects observed in the, ----, test of platinum wire fuze for, conductors, confederate submarine boat, connections of switch plates, construction of booms, ---- ---- torpedo case, copenhagen, torpedo experiments at, countermining, countermines, experiments with, ---- ---- at carlscrona, ---- ---- stokes bay, ---- ---- in the medway, coupling dynamo-electric machines, methods of, creeping for electric cables, crimean war, submarine mines during the, ---- ----, torpedo operations during the, crinoline for divers, cross bearings, firing by, current, direction of, ----, measuring the intensity of a, ----, the voltaic, d. daniell's signalling battery, defects observed in the conductivity of cables, ---- of chemical fuses, ---- electrical submarine mines, defence of harbours by booms, ----, ship, defences, clearing a passage through torpedo, defensive purposes, harvey's torpedo for, ---- torpedo operations, russian, ---- ----, turkish, ---- ---- warfare, definition and properties of a voltaic cell, ---- of a condenser, ---- potential, ---- the ohm, ---- ---- term explosion, ---- ---- explosive force, ---- ---- polarization, description of a frictional electric machine, ---- ---- series of firing keys, ---- ---- yarrow's torpedo boat, ---- ---- calland's and marié-davy's batteries, ---- ---- siemens' electric light apparatus, ---- ---- whitehead's fish torpedo, _destroyer_, ericsson's torpedo vessel, destruction of passive obstructions, the, ---- ---- the _albemarle_, ---- ---- _duba saife_, ---- ---- _suna_, detector galvanometer, the, detonating composition, rain's, detonation, ---- experiments, abel's, ----, theory of, dielectric, gutta percha as a, ----, meaning of, differential galvanometer, the, direction of current, directions for using the diving apparatus, discharge test, the, disconnector, the, diver, dressing the, divers, boots for, ----, breast plate for, ----, crinoline for, ----, helmet for, ----, ladder for, diving, ---- dress, the, ----, signals employed in, _dorothea_, fulton's destruction of the, double fluid batteries, ---- ----, single and, drifting torpedoes, ---- ----, american extempore, ---- ----, bushnell's, ---- ----, fulton's, ---- ----, lewis's, ---- ----, mcevoy's, dualin, _duba saife_, destruction of the, duplex spar torpedo, mcevoy's, ---- ----, arrangement of wires in, dutch torpedo launches, thornycroft's, ---- ----, yarrow's, dynamite, dynamo-electric machines, methods of coupling, ---- machine, siemens' low tension, e. earth plates, browne's arrangement of, effect compared, explosive force and, efficiency of thornycroft's boat engines, electric cables, creeping for, ---- ----, hooper's, ---- ----, insulated, ---- ----, insulation test for, ---- ----, jointing, ---- ----, siemens', ---- ----, silvertown, ---- circuit, closing the, electric circuit, the, ---- fuses, ---- lamps, automatic, ---- ----, siemens' patent, ---- light apparatus, siemens', ---- ----, conducting wires for, ---- ----, light produced by, ---- ----, rotation of armatures in, ---- ----, wear and tear of, ---- ----, application of the, ---- ----, concentration of the, ---- ----, precautions in manipulating, ---- ----, self-acting shunt for siemens', ---- ----, the, ---- machine, description of a frictional, ---- machines, methods of coupling dynamo, electrical resistance of cables, test of the, ---- resistances, measuring, ---- submarine mines, , ---- ----, advantages of, ---- ----, defects of, ---- ----, mooring, ---- ----, rules for using, ---- test of insulated joints, ---- testing, armstrong's system of, ---- tests, electricity, frictional, ----, methods of generating, ----, theory of, electro-contact mines, circuit closers for, electrolytes, electro-positive and electro-negative, the terms, electro-magnet, the, electro-mechanical mines, russian, electrometers, ----, thomson's quadrant, electro-motive force, ---- ----, voltaic battery test for, ---- forces, comparing, employment of torpedo ships, the, engines, efficiency of thornycroft's boat, england, torpedo experiments in, english service platinum wire fuse, the, ---- torpedo boats, yarrow's, ericsson's torpedo vessel _destroyer_, experiment at cherbourg, torpedo boat, ---- with a torpedo boat, flotation, experiments, abel's detonation, ---- by professor abel, ---- ---- roux and sarrau, ----, colt's torpedo, ----, fulton's practical, ----, torpedo, at carlscrona, , , ---- ---- chatham, ---- ---- copenhagen, ---- ---- kiel, ---- ---- pola, ---- ---- portsmouth, , ---- ----, fulton's french, ---- ----, in austria, ---- ---- england, ---- ---- turkey, ---- with countermines, ---- ---- at carlscrona, ---- ---- stokes bay, ---- ---- in the medway, explosion, definition of the term, explosive agents, torpedo, ---- compounds, ---- force and effect compared, ---- ----, definition of the term, ---- mixtures, ---- substance, physical state of the, explosions, illustrated torpedo, extempore drifting torpedoes, american, ---- high tension fuzes, ---- ----, fisher's, ---- mechanical mine, f. failure of offensive torpedoes, the, fastest vessel in the world, the, final russian torpedo boat attack, the, firing batteries, ---- by cross bearings, ---- ---- intersectional arcs, ---- ---- observation, ---- ---- preconcerted signal, ---- harvey's torpedoes, mode of, ---- keys, ---- ----, description of a series of, ---- ----, morse, ----, mode of, ---- ----, in , ---- whitehead torpedoes, thornycroft's method of, fish torpedo, adjustments of whitehead's, ---- ----, description of the, ---- ----, invention and adoption of the, ---- ----, methods of projecting the, ---- ----, the mode of ignition of the, fish torpedoes in war, employment of, ---- ----, thornycroft's method of firing, ---- ----, woolwich, fisher's extempore high tension fuze, floating torpedoes, flotation experiment with a torpedo boat, fluid batteries, double, ---- ----, single and double, fluid cell, action in a single, force compared, explosive effect and, ----, definition of the term explosive, ----, electro-motive, ----, voltaic battery test for electro-motive, forces, comparing electro-motive, fore and aft mooring, form of lay's torpedo boat, an improved, ---- ---- torpedo case, fosberry's patent torpedo boat protective, frame torpedoes, frames, projecting, franco-german war, torpedo operations during the, ---- ----, torpedoes in the, french submarine boat _plongeur_, ---- torpedo launches, thornycroft's, , ---- towing torpedoes, frictional electric machine, description of a, ---- electricity, fulminate of mercury, fulton, robert, fulton's attempt against the _argus_, ---- block ship, ---- cable cutters, ---- destruction of the _dorothea_, ---- drifting torpedoes, ---- failures, ---- french torpedo experiments, ---- harpoon torpedoes, ---- practical experiments, ---- return to america, ---- spar torpedoes, ---- stationary submarine mines, fuzes, abel's, ----, beardslee's, ----, chemical, ----, defects of chemical, ----, electric, ----, extempore, ----, extempore, fisher's, ---- for conductivity, test of platinum wire, ----, high tension, ----, improved form of jacobi's, ----, mcevoy's percussion, ----, percussion, ----, platinum wire, ----, ----, english service, ----, ----, mcevoy's, ----, sensitive, ----, statham's, ----, test of resistance of platinum wire, ----, testing high tension, ----, von ebner's, g. galvanometer, astatic, ----, detector, ----, differential, ----, tables, siemens' universal, ----, thermo, ----, thomson's reflecting, ----, three coil, ----, universal, siemens', generating electricity, methods of, german torpedo vessel _uhlan_, the, gun, the nordenfelt torpedo, ----, hotchkiss torpedo, gun-cotton, gunpowder, guns, torpedo, gutta-percha as a dielectric, h. harbours by booms, defence of, harpoon torpedoes, fulton's, harvey's towing torpedo, ---- ----, brakes for, ---- ----, buoys for, ---- ----, for defensive purposes, ---- ----, launching, ---- ----, methods of attack with, ---- ----, mode of firing, ---- ----, tactics with, ---- ----, the value of, helmet for divers, herreshoff's torpedo boats, high tension fuzes, hooper's electric cables, ---- material, horsley's powder, hotchkiss torpedo gun, the, i. ignition, bushnell's mode of, ---- of whitehead's fish torpedo, mode of, illustrated torpedo explosions, improved form of lay's torpedo, an, india rubber tube joint, the, inertia circuit closer, mathieson's, ---- ----, improvements in, instrument and observing telescope, shutter, instruments used in testing, insulated electric cables, ---- joints, electrical test of, insulation, sea cell tests for, ---- test for electric cables, insulators, intensity of a current, measuring the, internal resistance, voltaic battery test for, intersectional arcs, firing by, invention and adoption of the fish torpedo, the, italian torpedo launches, thornycroft's, j. jacobi's fuze, improved form of, jar, the leyden, jointing electric cables, joints, beardslee's, ----, electrical test of insulated, ----, india rubber tube, ----, mathieson's, ----, mcevoy's, ----, nicholl's metallic, ----, rules to be observed in forming, ----, siemens' permanent, _jones_, the loss of the _commodore_, junction boxes, ---- ---- for multiple cables, ---- ---- single cored cables, ---- ----, t, k. keys, firing, ---- ----, description of a series of, ---- ----, morse, kiel, torpedo experiments at, knowledge, theoretical, l. ladder for divers, ---- mooring, lamps, automatic electric, ----, siemens' patent electric, land service cables, launch, description of a yarrow torpedo, ---- for placing moorings, steam, launches, thornycroft's torpedo, ---- ---- austrian and french torpedo, ---- ---- dutch and italian torpedo, ---- ---- french torpedo, ---- ---- norwegian torpedo, ---- ---- swedish and danish torpedo, ----, yarrow's dutch torpedo, ---- ---- russian torpedo, launching harvey's torpedo, mode of, ---- lay's torpedo boat, law, the application of ohm's, lay's torpedo boat, ---- ----, an improved form of, ---- ----, capabilities of, ---- ----, launching, ---- ----, method of sinking and raising, ---- ----, used as a tug, ---- ----, in clearing obstructions, ---- ----, to clear away mines, leclanché's voltaic battery, lewis's drifting torpedo, leyden jar, the, light, siemens' electric, ---- ----, conducting wires for, ---- ----, concentration of, ---- ----, precautions in manipulating, ---- ----, rotation of armatures in, ---- ----, wear and tear of, ----, the electric, ---- ----, application of, _lightning_, thornycroft's torpedo boat, lithofracteur, locomotive torpedoes, loss of the _cairo_, ---- ---- _commodore jones_, m. machine, description of a frictional electric, ----, siemens' low tension dynamo-electric, machines, methods of coupling dynamo-electric, magnet, the electro, magnetism, magneto circuit closer, mcevoy's weight, magnets, permanent, main system, mcevoy's single, manipulation of wheatstone's balance, the, marié-davy battery, description of the, matchin, russian torpedo boat attack at, material, hooper's insulating, mathieson's cement safety plug, ---- circuit closer, inertia, ---- ----, improvements in, ---- ----, spiral spring, ---- joint, mcevoy's drifting torpedo, ---- duplex spar torpedo, ---- improved singer's mine, ---- joint, ---- mechanical mine, ---- ---- primer, ---- ---- turk's head, ---- mercury circuit-closer, ---- papier maché safety plug, ---- percussion fuzes, ---- platinum wire fuzes, ---- single main system, ---- weight magneto circuit-closer, measurement of resistance by wheatstone's balance, measuring electrical resistances, ---- the intensity of a current, mechanical mines, , ---- ----, advantages of, ---- ----, best kinds of, ---- ----, extempore, ---- ----, for coast defence, ---- ----, in the american war, ---- ----, mcevoy's, ---- ---- improved singer's, ---- ----, mooring, ---- ----, russian electro, ---- ----, singer's, mechanical primer, abel's, ---- ----, mcevoy's, ---- tests, medway, experiments with countermines in the, menotti cell, description of the, ---- test batteries, menzing's towing torpedo, mercury circuit-closer, mcevoy's, ----, fulminate of, metallic joint, nicholl's, method of carrying fish torpedoes, thornycroft's, ---- ---- sinking and raising lay's torpedo, ---- ---- testing, the austrian, methods of attack with harvey's torpedoes, ---- ---- coupling dynamo-electric machines, ---- ---- generating electricity, ---- ---- protecting ships against torpedo attacks, ---- ---- projecting whitehead's fish torpedo, mines, submarine, electrical, , ---- ----, advantages of, ---- ----, defects of, ---- ----, mooring, ---- ----, in the american war, ---- ----, electro-contact, circuit-closers for, ---- ----, fulton's stationary, ---- ----, mechanical, , ---- ----, advantages of, ---- ----, extempore, ---- ----, mcevoy's, ---- ----, improved singer's, ---- ----, mooring, ---- ----, russian electro, ---- ----, singer's, ---- ----, rules to be observed in planting, ---- ----, sweeping for, mixtures, explosive, mode of firing harvey's torpedoes, ---- ----, in , monitor _duba saife_, destruction of the turkish, mooring, austrian method of, ---- electrical submarine mines, ----, fore and aft, ----, ladder, ----, launch for placing, mooring mechanical mines, ----, single rope, morse firing keys, multiple cables, ---- ----, junction boxes for, n. nicholl's metallic joint, nitro-glycerine, nordenfelt torpedo gun, the, norwegian torpedo launches, thornycroft's, o. observation, firing by, ---- ----, prussian system of, observing telescope, shutter apparatus and, obstructions, destruction of passive, ----, lay's torpedo in clearing away, offensive torpedo operations, russian and turkish, ---- ---- warfare still in its infancy, ---- torpedoes, failure of, , ---- ----, general remarks on, ohm, definition of the, ohm's law, application of, operations, torpedo, ---- ----, during the american civil war, ---- ---- austrian war, ---- ---- austro-italian war, ---- ---- crimean war, ---- ---- franco-german war, ---- ---- paraguayan war, ---- ---- russo-turkish war, ---- ---- defensive, russian, ---- ----, turkish, ---- ---- offensive, turkish and russian, ordinary type of torpedo boat, the, ottoman fleet, cause of failure of the, outrigger torpedoes, spar or, p. papier maché safety plug, mcevoy's, paraguayan war, torpedo operations during the, passage through torpedo defences, clearing a, passive obstructions, destruction of, patent electric lamp, siemens', ---- torpedo boat protective, fosberry's, percussion fuzes, ---- ----, mcevoy's, permanent joint, siemens', ---- magnets, physical state of the explosive substance, the, picric powder, planting submarine mines, rules to be observed in, plates, brown's arrangement of earth, ----, connections of switch, platinum wire fuze for conductivity, test of, ---- ----, test of resistance of, ---- ---- fuzes, ---- ----, english service, ---- ----, mcevoy's, _plongeur_, french submarine boat, plug, mathieson's cement safety, ----, mcevoy's papier maché safety, pola, torpedo experiments at, polarization, definition of the term, porter's torpedo ship _alarm_, admiral, portsmouth, torpedo experiments at, , potential, definition of, ----, voltaic battery test for, powder, horsley's, ----, picric, precautions in manipulating the electric light, primer, abel's mechanical, ----, mcevoy's, projecting frames for torpedo ship defence, ---- whitehead's fish torpedo, methods of, propeller, thornycroft's screw, properties of a voltaic cell, definition and, prussian system of firing by observation, the, q. quadrant electrometers, thomson's, qualifications essential to submarine boats, the, r. rain's detonating composition, reflecting galvanometer, thomson's, reflector, colt's, remarks on offensive torpedoes, general, resistance boxes, ---- of cables, test of electrical, ---- platinum wire fuze, test of, ----, voltaic battery test for internal, resistances by wheatstone's balance, measurement of, ----, circuit, ----, measuring electrical, rheostat, the, rope mooring, single, rotation of armatures in siemens' electric light apparatus, roux and sarrau, experiments by, rules in connection with submarine mines, ---- to be observed in forming cable joints, ---- ---- planting mines, russian and turkish offensive torpedo operations, ---- defensive torpedo operations, ---- electro-mechanical mines, ---- torpedo boat attack at batoum, , ---- ---- matchin, ---- ---- rustchuk, ---- ---- soukoum kaleh, ---- ---- soulina, ---- ---- off the aluta, ---- ----, the final, ---- ---- boats, schibau's, ---- ---- launch, yarrow's, ---- torpedoes, russo-turkish war, torpedo operations during the, ---- ----, torpedoes during the, , rutschuk, russian torpedo attack at, s. safety cock arrangement, steward's, ---- plug, mathieson's cement, ---- ---- mcevoy's papier maché, schibau's russian torpedo boats, science of torpedo warfare, the, sea cell test for insulation, ---- ---- tests, ---- service cables, second class torpedo launches, thornycroft's, self-acting circuit closer, the austrian, sensitive fuzes, service cables, land, ---- ----, sea, ---- platinum wire fuze, english, ship _alarm_, admiral porter's torpedo, ---- defence, ----, fulton's block, ships against torpedo attacks, methods of protecting, ----, employment of torpedo, shunt, definition of a, ---- for siemens' electric light, self-acting, shutter apparatus, firing keys and, ---- ----, the, ---- used with a circuit breaker, ---- instrument and observing telescope, siemens' electric cables, ---- ---- light apparatus, ---- ----, conducting wires for, ---- ----, description of, ---- ----, power and light produced by, ---- ----, rotation of armatures in, ---- ----, self-acting shunt for, ---- ----, wear and tear of, ---- low tension dynamo machine, ---- patent electric lamp, ---- permanent joints, ---- universal galvanometer, ---- ---- tables, signal, firing by preconcerted, signals employed in diving, silvertown electric cables, singer's mechanical mine, ---- ----, mcevoy's improved, single and double fluid batteries, ---- cored armoured cables, ---- ---- unarmoured cables, ---- fluid cell, action in a, ---- main system, mcevoy's, ---- rope moorings, size of torpedo charges, soukoum kaleh, russian torpedo attack at, soulina, russian torpedo attack at, spanish torpedo boats, yarrow's, spar or outrigger torpedoes, ---- torpedo, mcevoy's duplex, ---- torpedoes, fulton's, special cables, spherical shaped torpedo case, the, spiral spring circuit closer, mathieson's, stake torpedoes, state of the explosive substance, the physical, statham's high tension fuze, stationary mines, fulton's, steward's safety cock arrangement, stokes bay, experiments with countermines at, submarine boat, bushnell's, , ---- ----, confederate, ---- ----, french, ---- boats, ---- ----, qualifications essential to, ---- mines ---- ----, during the crimean and american wars, ---- ----, rules for using, ---- ----, sweeping for, ---- ----, electrical, ---- ----, advantages of, ---- ----, defects of, ---- ----, mooring, submersion, tests after, success in torpedo warfare, elements of, _suna_, destruction of the turkish vessel, swedish torpedo launch, thornycroft's, sweeping for submarine mines, switch plates, commutators or, ---- ----, connections of, synopsis, system, mcevoy's single main, ---- of electrical testing, armstrong's, ---- ---- firing by observation, prussian, ---- ---- tests, object of, t. t junction box, the, table, the austrian testing, tables, siemens' universal galvanometer, ----, test, tactics with harvey's torpedoes, telegraph batteries, telescope, shutter instrument and observing, tension dynamo machines, siemens' low, ---- fuses, testing high, term torpedo, definition of the, terms electro-positive and electro-negative, the, test battery, the menotti, ----, discharge, ---- for electrical cables, insulation, ---- of electrical resistance of cables, ---- ---- insulated joints, electrical, ---- ---- platinum wire fuze for conductivity, ---- ---- resistance, ---- tables, testing, armstrong's system of electrical, ----, austrian method of, ---- high tension fuzes, ----, instruments used in, ---- table, austrian, tests after submersion, ----, electrical, ---- for insulation, sea cell, ----, mechanical, ----, object of a system, ----, sea cell, theoretical knowledge of torpedoes, theory of detonation, the, ---- ---- electricity, the, thermo galvanometer, the, thomson's quadrant electrometer, ---- reflecting galvanometer, thornycroft's boat engines, efficiency of, ---- method of carrying fish torpedoes, ---- propeller, ---- torpedo launches, ---- ----, austrian and french, ---- ----, danish and swedish, ---- ----, dutch and italian, ---- ----, french, ---- ----, norwegian, ---- ----, second class, three coil galvanometer, torpedo attacks, boat, , ---- ----, methods of protecting ships against, ---- boat, lay's, ---- ----, capabilities of, ---- ----, an improved form of, ---- ---- attack, russian, at batoum, , ---- ---- ---- ---- matchin, ---- ---- ---- ---- rustchuk, ---- ---- ---- ---- soukoum kaleh, ---- ---- ---- ---- soulina, ---- ---- ----, off the aluta, ---- ---- ----, the final, ---- ---- experiment at cherbourg, ---- ---- for flotation, ---- ---- _lightning_, thornycroft's, ---- ---- protective, fosberry's patent, ---- boats, ---- ----, herreshoff's, ---- ----, ordinary type of, ---- ----, schibau's russian, ---- ----, yarrow's, ---- ----, description of a, ---- ---- dutch, ---- ---- english, ---- ---- russian, ---- ---- spanish, ---- case, form and construction of, ---- ----, conical shaped, ---- ----, cylindrical shaped, ---- ----, spherical shaped, ---- charges, size of, ---- defences, clearing a passage through, ---- experiments at carlscrona, , , ---- ---- chatham, ---- ---- copenhagen, ---- ---- kiel, ---- ---- pola, ---- ---- portsmouth, , ---- ---- in austria, ---- ---- england, ---- ---- turkey, ---- explosive agents, torpedo guns, ---- ----, hotchkiss, ---- ----, nordenfelt, ---- invention and adoption of the fish, ---- launches, thornycroft's, ---- operations, ---- ---- during the austro-italian war, ---- ---- crimean war, ---- ---- franco-german war, ---- ---- paraguayan war, ---- ---- russo-turkish war, ---- ----, russian defensive, ---- ----, turkish defensive, ---- ---- and russian offensive, ---- ship _alarm_, admiral porter's, ---- ---- _destroyer_, ericsson's, ---- ---- _uhlan_, the german, ---- ships, employment of, ---- spar, mcevoy's duplex, ---- ---- or outrigger, ----, the term, ---- warfare, defensive, ---- ----, elements of success, ---- ----, science of, ---- ---- still in its infancy, offensive, ----, whitehead's fish, ---- ----, adjustments of, ---- ----, capabilities of, ---- ----, methods of projecting, ----, woolwich fish, the, ----, american extempore drifting, ----, barrel, ----, brook's, ----, bushnell's drifting, ---- ----, invention of, ----, drifting, ----, floating, ----, frame, ----, fulton's drifting, ---- ---- harpoon, ---- ---- spar, ----, general remarks on offensive, ---- in war, the employment of fish, ----, lewis's drifting, ----, locomotive, ----, mcevoy's drifting, ----, moral effect of, ----, offensive, ---- ----, failure of ----, stake ----, towing ---- ----, french, ---- ----, harvey's, ---- ----, methods of attack with, ---- ----, the value of, ---- ----, mensing's, ----, turtle turkey, torpedo experiments in, turkish defensive torpedo operations, ---- monitor _duba saife_, destruction of the, ---- offensive torpedo operations, ---- ship _suna_, loss of the, ---- torpedoes, ---- war, torpedoes during the russo-, turk's head, mcevoy's mechanical, turtle torpedoes, u. _uhlan_, the german torpedo vessel, unarmoured cables, single cored, universal galvanometer, siemens', ---- ----, tables, use of circuit closers, the, v. vessel _destroyer_, ericsson's torpedo, ---- in the world, the fastest, ---- _uhlan_, the german torpedo, voltaic batteries, ---- battery, leclanché's, ---- ----, von ebner's, ---- ----, test for electro-motive force, ---- ---- internal resistance, ---- ---- potential, ---- cell, definition and properties of a, ---- current, the, von ebner's high tension fuze, ---- ---- voltaic battery, w. war, employment of fish torpedoes in, ----, torpedo operations during the american civil, ---- ---- austrian, ---- ---- austro-italian, ---- ---- crimean, ---- ---- franco-german, ---- ---- paraguayan, ---- ---- russo-turkish, ----, torpedoes during the american civil, ---- ----, russo-turkish, warfare, defensive torpedo, ----, elements of success in torpedo, ----, science of torpedo, ---- still in its infancy, offensive torpedo, wars, submarine mines in the crimean and american, wear and tear of siemens' electric light apparatus, welden railway saved by torpedoes, the, wheatstone's balance, ---- ----, manipulation of, ---- ----, measurement of resistances by, whitehead's fish torpedo, ---- ----, adjustments of, ---- ----, capabilities of, ---- ----, methods of projecting, ---- ----, mode of ignition of, wire fuze for conductivity, test of platinum, ---- ----, test of resistance of platinum, wire fuzes, platinum, ---- ----, english service, ---- ----, mcevoy's, wires in mcevoy's spar torpedo, arrangement of, woolwich fish torpedo, the, y. yarrow's torpedo boats, ---- ----, english, ---- ----, spanish, ---- ---- launch, description of a, ---- ---- launches, dutch, ---- ----, russian, griffin and co., publishers by appointment to h.r.h. the duke of edinburgh, , the hard, portsmouth. publications of j. griffin & co., naval publishers, (_by appointment, to h.r.h. the duke of edinburgh_.) , the hard, portsmouth. london agents:--simpkin, marshall, and co., london. the duel: a naval war game, invented and arranged by capt. philip h. colomb, r.n., with explanations and rules of the game, and the necessary scales, and large drawing block. price s. d. "captain colomb's war game will prove very useful to all executive officers. it will become the naval chess." "i think it will prove of much advantage to the service. it will open the eyes of many men who have hitherto thought and talked of the subject perhaps intelligently but not accurately." torpedoes and torpedo warfare: offensive and defensive. being a complete history of torpedoes and their application to modern warfare. by c. sleeman, esq., late lieutenant r.n., and late commander imperial ottoman navy. vol., royal vo., with illustrations and plates. price s. vocabulary of sea words. in english, french, german, spanish, and italian. by commander the hon. a. c. littleton, r.n. for the use of officers of the royal and mercantile navies, yachtsmen, travellers, &c. strongly bound and interleaved throughout. price s. d. "in addition to the english terms used in connection with the sea, we have the same in french, german, spanish and italian.... not merely to the seafaring man, but also to the ordinary traveller, this book recommends itself."--_u.s. gazette._ "it is handy in size and complete in all respects, provision having been made by blank leaves between each page for any additions that may have to be made."--_broad arrow._ problems in naval tactics. by vice-admiral randolph, c.b. with four full-page diagrams. demy vo. s. _griffin & co., publishers, , the hard, portsmouth._ captain colomb's naval tactics _in preparation._ queen's regulations and admiralty instructions--_new edition_, . s. d. manual of gunnery, corrected to . the ships of the royal navy rd edition. portraits of ships, beautifully lithographed in colors from original drawings. demy to. blue cloth, extra gilt, s.; best morocco, £ s.; russia, £ s. d. '_among illustrated works, none has appeared of greater interest than this upon the royal navy._'--_times._ '_as an illustrated gift-book, independent of its historic interest, "the royal navy," from the truthfulness of its illustrations, cannot but recommend itself, not only to the royal service, but also to the public._'--_united service gazette._ '_this beautiful work does credit to all concerned in its production._'--_pall mall gazette._ the war ships of europe crown vo. illustrated. s. d. by chief-engineer king, u.s.a. descriptions of the construction, armour and fighting power of the ironclads of england and other european powers of the present day. revised and corrected throughout, and with additional notes by an english naval architect. "a valuable and interesting contribution to maritime literature ... interesting to the public ... and instructive to the naval executive generally."--_united service gazette._ "the book is invaluable as a brief but accurate description of the fighting powers of the ironclads of england and other european powers of the present day."--_broad arrow._ "the whole volume possesses a deep interest. its details are trustworthy."--_john bull._ the armies of europe and asia demy vo. illustrated. s. by major-general upton, u.s.a. embracing official reports on the armies of japan, china, india, persia, italy, russia, austria, germany, france, and england. accompanied by letters descriptive of a journey from japan to the caucasus. "his sketch of travel, though most unpretentious in manner, is highly interesting as a preliminary introduction to the very important results of this military tour. the value of this work, particularly as a book of reference, may be estimated from the fact that it contains the results of a lengthened and searching inquiry into matters connected with the great armies of the world, which was conducted by officers of proved ability and enjoying exceptional advantages.... it abounds in useful information, and may be studied with no little advantage by those who wish to improve their knowledge of the art of modern war."--_united service gazette._ _griffin & co., publishers, , the hard, portsmouth._ the sailor's pocket book = rd edition.= s. d. by captain f. g. d. bedford, r.n. a collection of practical rules, notes, and tables, for the use of the royal navy, the mercantile marine, and yacht squadrons. with colored signal flags, charts, and illustrations. bound in leather, pages, and carefully compiled index. "a nautical cyclopædia."--_liverpool albion._ "the most perfect and complete of any publication of the kind."--_u.s. gazette._ "a valuable addition to a yachtsman's library."--_land and water._ "valuable and excellently arranged little work."--_pall mall gazette._ "a volume quite indispensable."--_the graphic._ "an admirable and much wanted little book."--_edinburgh review._ capt. sir george s. nares' seamanship = th edition.= demy vo. s. beautifully engraved woodcuts, and plates of flags, accurately colored. '_it is the best work on seamanship we have._'--_standard._ '_is a book for the instruction of young officers, and of reference for older ones it cannot be excelled, many most valuable additions are made in this edition. the book should be the officers' vade mecum._'--_united service gazette._ '_every necessary particular is given so fully and completely as to leave nothing to be desired._'--_shipping gazette._ captain alston's "seamanship" = nd edition.= crown vo. cloth, s. d. contains illustrations of rigging, sails, masts, &c.; with instructions for officers of the merchant service, by w. h. rosser; forming a complete manual of practical seamanship. "the illustrations, of which there are , are well executed, and the reviser has brought down to the present day all changes in the rig and build of ships of war. the frontispiece gives sectional views of the screw steamship _russia_ of the cunard line, and h.m.s. _monarch_."--_shipping gazette._ "it has been revised and enlarged by commander r. h. harris, r.n., and includes a treatise on nautical surveying by staff-commander may, and also some useful instructions for officers of the merchant service. the book seems well adapted for junior officers of the navy, and the sound advice and high moral tone of its introduction give it an additional recommendation."--_liverpool mercury._ the rigger's guide. th thousand. new edition. revised and enlarged. cloth, s. by charles bushell. fully illustrated. being the best and only complete book of the rigging of ships. "this is a valuable little book, adapted to suit every class of ship, whether steam or sailing vessel, and should form part of the kit of every youngster adopting the profession of the sea. many oldsters will also find it valuable, from the general information it contains. the present is the sixth edition, which has been carefully revised and corrected."--_u. s. gazette._ _griffin & co., publishers, , the hard, portsmouth._ the navy of to-day; its moral and intellectual condition. crown vo. sewed, s; cloth, s. d. "in the navy of to-day, we have a number of thoughtfully written essays which deserve to obtain the widest publicity."--_broad arrow._ "a little work which all should peruse who have the interests of the navy at heart."--_christian world._ "we can with confidence recommend the navy of to-day as a book well worthy of attentive reading. we recommend chap. v. more particularly to the earnest consideration of naval officers."--_u.s. gazette._ sea terms and phrases. english and french. by lieut. e. pornain, french navy. for the use of officers of royal and mercantile navies, engineers, shipbuilders, ship owners, merchants, ship brokers. crown vo. s. "a copy should be possessed by everyone whose profession, occupation, or interests bring them into relationship with a seafaring life."--_british mercantile review._ "a nautical phrase book in two languages ... a completeness which leaves nothing to be desired."--_hampshire telegraph._ the active list of admirals and captains. by capt. william arthur, r.n. demy vo. with particulars exhibiting the progress, &c., of officers, of the royal navy, from their entry into the service to jan. st, . the active list of all commanders and lieutenants: corrected to july st, . by lieut. m. r. hayes, r.n. demy vo. s. d. showing dates of entry, and commissions, ages, and amount of sea time, causes of special promotions, special acquirements, comparative progress with other officers, list of all officers now on the active list who were promoted to the rank of commander from flag-lieut. or her majesty's yacht, the age and sea time of commanders, and other interesting particulars. harvey's sea torpedoes. with plates, s. d. _griffin & co., publishers, , the hard, portsmouth._ on the relative merits of simple and compound engines. demy vo. s. d. by niel macdougall, esq. with numerous diagrams and illustrations. "the book will prove instructive and interesting to all engaged in marine engineering pursuits, and the engineer officers of the royal navy in particular are heartily recommended it."--_broad arrow._ "mr. macdougall has treated this much-debated and highly-important question of the relative merits of simple and compound engines in a vigorous, practical, and highly creditable manner."--_naval science._ journal book and diary, for the use of the officers of the royal navy. after the style and size of letts's diary. containing two days on a page, with ruled paper, and a printed journal form to each day, for recording course and distance, wind and weather, barometer and thermometer, latitude and longitude, &c. containing also a variety of useful information--regulations and course of study for the royal naval college, greenwich; course of instruction, examination, and regulations for passing through h.m. gunnery ships; foreign monies and their english equivalents; and a table showing the probable state of the active list of flag officers for the next ten years; also notable events--navy and army; directions for making a will; area of the principal states of the world; passports, &c., &c. _prices, strongly bound_:-- one year, s. d.; years, s. d.; years, s. d.; one year (interleaved) s. d.; years (interleaved) s. d. "we would direct the attention of naval officers to a very complete naval diary, which has just been compiled and published. it has only to be shown to be appreciated."--_u.s. gazette._ our peril afloat; or, collisions and how to avoid them. with illustrations. s. by captain p. h. colomb, r.n. (gold medalist, royal u.s. institution.) contents: part i. the rule of the road at sea: its history and present condition; part ii. the theory and practice of avoiding collision at sea; and the regulations issued by order in council. _griffin & co., publishers, , the hard, portsmouth._ nautical surveying. by commander may, r.n., f.r.g.s. reprinted from "alston's seamanship." with charts. s. d. "the treatise is simple and clear in arrangement, and written with the especial object of instructing the officers of the naval service in general, and only deals with the use of such instruments as are found on board of every man-of-war. we have never met with any treatise on nautical surveying by any means so well calculated to answer the purpose for which it was written."--_naval science._ the manual of the hydrometer. = nd edition.= illustrated. cloth. s. d. by lionel swift, r.n. '... has been treated in the clear and simple manner which has been already manifested by mr. swift, in his accurate description of the history and philosophy of the hydrometer.'--_army and navy gazette._ 'will be found of considerable interest to engineers and all those who are interested in the safe and economical working of steam engines.'--_shipping and mercantile gazette._ _by authority of the lords of the admiralty._ questions & answers on the ammunition instruction. for officers passing through h.m. gunnery establishments. paper s.; cloth, s. d. by j. kite, instructing gunner, h.m.s. "excellent." "this book is a valuable _multum in parvo_. all the multifarious details connected with ammunition instruction, are dealt with ably and concisely."--_portsmouth times._ traverse tables cloth, s. d. with simple and brief method of correcting compass courses. by commander r. e. edwin, r.n. "lieutenant edwin has been at great pains and trouble, and he will probably save many hundreds of persons from calculations which are frequently wearisome to the flesh."--_broad arrow._ definitions in navigation and nautical astronomy. (from various authorities.) =new edition.= with diagrams. demy vo. cloth, s. d. for the use of the naval cadets, h.m.s. "britannia." _griffin & co., publishers, , the hard, portsmouth._ land of the white bear. the cruise of the "pandora," to the arctic seas in . by lieut. f. g. innes-lillingston, r.n. with beautiful full-page illustrations. cloth gilt, s. "the volume is prettily got up, and the views of arctic scenery are about the best we have seen in any recent work of the kind."--_athenæum._ "thanks to english pluck and perseverance, combined, in so many instances, with the ability to write a book, we have become as familiar with arctic-life scenes and adventures as they can be made so by description. in the present well-got-up little volume, we have an account of the first voyage of the _pandora_.... we can heartily recommend lieut. innis-lillingston's narrative--his first attempt, as he tells us, at book-writing--as giving a graphic account, in a very unpretentious style, of his most interesting, but perilous cruise.... as a gilt book, we can also recommend the _land of the white bear_, for it is exceedingly well illustrated, and both in letter-press and binding is in the messrs. griffin's usually good style."--_u.s. gazette._ the last four days of the "eurydice." by captain e. h. verney, r.n. with portrait of the "eurydice." cloth. s. d. "capt. verney has done his work remarkably well, and with the best possible taste. he does not moralize or try to improve the occasion, but, writing with a restrained pathos and a graphic touch, he lets the stern simple facts speak for themselves."--_athenæum._ "the circumstances attending the foundering are given as far as they are known, and also details of the ship and its armament, with lists, of the officers and crew who perished. the book forms an interesting souvenir of the melancholy event."--_court journal._ memoir of commodore j. g. goodenough, c.b. by clements r. markham, c.b., f.r.s. with portrait. crown vo., cloth. s. d. "a complete account of a singularly beautiful career."--_broad arrow._ "a touching memento of the gallant sailor."--_court journal._ the history of h.m.s. "victory." s. cloth; paper, d. = th thousand.= by commander w. j. l. wharton, r.n. a most interesting memoir of the famous ship in which nelson won his crowning triumph and death. _griffin & co., publishers, , the hard, portsmouth._ modern naval hygiene. cloth. s. translated from the french by john buckley, esq., staff-surgeon, r.n. the west coast of africa, as seen from the deck of a man-of-war. illustrated. demy vo., cloth. s. d. by captain h. dyer, r. n. "we think the friends of the late commander dyer have done well in publishing this little volume as a memorial to one whom they loved, both as a genial companion and an officer. "the character of the book, which since it bears the stamp-mark of merit, needs no eulogy to make it a successful publication. "that large class of readers which takes pleasure in perusing books of travel cannot do better than read this well-printed volume."--_broad arrow._ light from h.m.s. 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"fuze" is usually used in the english language to mean more complicated fuses. inconsistencies in italic usage was retained. for example, on page , "r" is referenced originally without italics in an equation and after on the same page is italicized when mentioned. page , "principle" changed to "principal" (principal ones being) page , " '" changed to " "" (about " long, " deep) page , "northerners'" changed to "northerners'" (most of the northerners' vessels) page , "torpedos" changed to "torpedoes" (whitehead's fish torpedoes have) page , " " changed to " " ( atmospheres) page , equal sign added to equation (( � ) / = lbs) page , "thornicroft's" changed "thornycroft's" on plate xlvii. page , "thornicroft's" changed "thornycroft's" on plate xlviii. page , "poustchin" changed to "poutschin" (alongside poutschin remained for some) page , "spaces" changed to "space" (intervening space of) page , subscript for o in chemical formula was unreadable. " " was presumed and added. (the formula _ch_{ }(no_{ })_{ }o_{ }_) page , "seimens" changed to "siemens" (due to both dr. siemens) page , "seimens" changed to "siemens" (that the siemens machine) page , this paragraph seems to be missing a word but was retained as printed as the word could not be presumed by research. "oxygen" is the most important element of an electrolyte, and to the _affinity for oxygen of the metals_ is the magnitude of the result and effect. page , "calland" changed to "callaud" (calland and marié-davy) page , "dislectric" changed to "dielectric" (gutta-percha as a dielectric) page , advertising page, "portsmouth." added to publisher line at bottom of page. original ended with (_griffin & co publishers, , the hard,_) some principles of maritime strategy julian s. corbett london [illustration: _sir julian corbett (courtesy d.m. schurman)_] contents introduction the theoretical study of war--its use and limitations part i. theory of war i. the theory of war ii. natures of wars--offensive and defensive iii. natures of wars--limited and unlimited iv. limited war and maritime empires v. wars of intervention--limited interference in unlimited war vi. conditions of strength in limited war part ii. theory of naval war i. theory of the object--command of the sea ii. theory of the means--the constitution of fleets iii. theory of the method--concentration and dispersal of force part iii. conduct of naval war i. introductory-- . inherent differences in the conditions of war on land and on sea . typical forms of naval operations ii. methods of securing command-- . on obtaining a decision . blockade iii. methods of disputing command-- . defensive fleet operations--"a fleet in being" . minor counter-attacks iv. methods of exercising command-- . defence against invasion . attack and defence of trade . attack, defence, and support of military expeditions appendix: the "green pamphlet" index * * * * * introduction the theoretical study of war--its use and limitations * * * * * at first sight nothing can appear more unpractical, less promising of useful result, than to approach the study of war with a theory. there seems indeed to be something essentially antagonistic between the habit of mind that seeks theoretical guidance and that which makes for the successful conduct of war. the conduct of war is so much a question of personality, of character, of common-sense, of rapid decision upon complex and ever-shifting factors, and those factors themselves are so varied, so intangible, so dependent upon unstable moral and physical conditions, that it seems incapable of being reduced to anything like true scientific analysis. at the bare idea of a theory or "science" of war the mind recurs uneasily to well-known cases where highly "scientific" officers failed as leaders. yet, on the other hand, no one will deny that since the great theorists of the early nineteenth century attempted to produce a reasoned theory of war, its planning and conduct have acquired a method, a precision, and a certainty of grasp which were unknown before. still less will any one deny the value which the shrewdest and most successful leaders in war have placed upon the work of the classical strategical writers. the truth is that the mistrust of theory arises from a misconception of what it is that theory claims to do. it does not pretend to give the power of conduct in the field; it claims no more than to increase the effective power of conduct. its main practical value is that it can assist a capable man to acquire a broad outlook whereby he may be the surer his plan shall cover all the ground, and whereby he may with greater rapidity and certainty seize all the factors of a sudden situation. the greatest of the theorists himself puts the matter quite frankly. of theoretical study he says, "it should educate the mind of the man who is to lead in war, or rather guide him to self-education, but it should not accompany him on the field of battle." its practical utility, however, is not by any means confined to its effects upon the powers of a leader. it is not enough that a leader should have the ability to decide rightly; his subordinates must seize at once the full meaning of his decision and be able to express it with certainty in well-adjusted action. for this every man concerned must have been trained to think in the same plane; the chief's order must awake in every brain the same process of thought; his words must have the same meaning for all. if a theory of tactics had existed in , and if captain carkett had had a sound training in such a theory, he could not possibly have misunderstood rodney's signal. as it was, the real intention of the signal was obscure, and rodney's neglect to explain the tactical device it indicated robbed his country of a victory at an hour of the direst need. there had been no previous theoretical training to supply the omission, and rodney's fine conception was unintelligible to anybody but himself. nor is it only for the sake of mental solidarity between a chief and his subordinates that theory is indispensable. it is of still higher value for producing a similar solidarity between him and his superiors at the council table at home. how often have officers dumbly acquiesced in ill-advised operations simply for lack of the mental power and verbal apparatus to convince an impatient minister where the errors of his plan lay? how often, moreover, have statesmen and officers, even in the most harmonious conference, been unable to decide on a coherent plan of war from inability to analyse scientifically the situation they had to face, and to recognise the general character of the struggle in which they were about to engage. that the true nature of a war should be realised by contemporaries as clearly as it comes to be seen afterwards in the fuller light of history is seldom to be expected. at close range accidental factors will force themselves into undue prominence and tend to obscure the true horizon. such error can scarcely ever be eliminated, but by theoretical study we can reduce it, nor by any other means can we hope to approach the clearness of vision with which posterity will read our mistakes. theory is, in fact, a question of education and deliberation, and not of execution at all. that depends on the combination of intangible human qualities which we call executive ability. this, then, is all the great authorities ever claimed for theory, but to this claim the chief of them at least, after years of active service on the staff, attached the highest importance. "in actual operations," he wrote in one of his latest memoranda, "men are guided solely by their judgment, and it will hit the mark more or less accurately according as they possess more or less genius. this is the way all great generals have acted.... thus it will always be in action, and so far judgment will suffice. but when it is a question not of taking action yourself, but of convincing others at the council table, then everything depends on clear conceptions and the exposition of the inherent relations of things. so little progress has been made in this respect that most deliberations are merely verbal contentions which rest on no firm foundation, and end either in every one retaining his own opinion, or in a compromise from considerations of mutual respect--a middle course of no actual value."[ ] [ ] clausewitz, _on war_, p. ix. the references are to colonel graham's translation of the third german edition, but his wording is not always followed exactly. the writer's experience of such discussions was rich and at first hand. clear conceptions of the ideas and factors involved in a war problem, and a definite exposition of the relations between them, were in his eyes the remedy for loose and purposeless discussion; and such conceptions and expositions are all we mean by the theory or the science of war. it is a process by which we co-ordinate our ideas, define the meaning of the words we use, grasp the difference between essential and unessential factors, and fix and expose the fundamental data on which every one is agreed. in this way we prepare the apparatus of practical discussion; we secure the means of arranging the factors in manageable shape, and of deducing from them with precision and rapidity a practical course of action. without such an apparatus no two men can even think on the same line; much less can they ever hope to detach the real point of difference that divides them and isolate it for quiet solution. in our own case this view of the value of strategical theory has a special significance, and one far wider than its continental enunciators contemplated. for a world-wide maritime empire the successful conduct of war will often turn not only on the decisions of the council chamber at home, but on the outcome of conferences in all parts of the world between squadronal commanders and the local authorities, both civil and military, and even between commanders-in-chief of adjacent stations. in time of war or of preparation for war, in which the empire is concerned, arrangements must always be based to an exceptional degree on the mutual relation of naval, military, and political considerations. the line of mean efficiency, though indicated from home, must be worked out locally, and worked out on factors of which no one service is master. conference is always necessary, and for conference to succeed there must be a common vehicle of expression and a common plane of thought. it is for this essential preparation that theoretical study alone can provide; and herein lies its practical value for all who aspire to the higher responsibilities of the imperial service. so great indeed is the value of abstract strategical study from this point of view, that it is necessary to guard ourselves against over-valuation. so far from claiming for their so-called science more than the possibilities we have indicated, the classical strategists insist again and again on the danger of seeking from it what it cannot give. they even repudiate the very name of "science." they prefer the older term "art." they will permit no laws or rules. such laws, they say, can only mislead in practice, for the friction to which they are subject from the incalculable human factors alone is such that the friction is stronger than the law. it is an old adage of lawyers that nothing is so misleading as a legal maxim, but a strategical maxim is undoubtedly and in every way less to be trusted in action. what then, it will be asked, are the tangible results which we can hope to attain from theory? if all on which we have to build is so indeterminate, how are any practical conclusions to be reached? that the factors are infinitely varied and difficult to determine is true, but that, it must be remembered, is just what emphasises the necessity of reaching such firm standpoints as are attainable. the vaguer the problem to be solved, the more resolute must we be in seeking points of departure from which we can begin to lay a course, keeping always an eye open for the accidents that will beset us, and being always alive to their deflecting influences. and this is just what the theoretical study of strategy can do. it can at least determine the normal. by careful collation of past events it becomes clear that certain lines of conduct tend normally to produce certain effects; that wars tend to take certain forms each with a marked idiosyncrasy; that these forms are normally related to the object of the war and to its value to one or both belligerents; that a system of operations which suits one form may not be that best suited to another. we can even go further. by pursuing an historical and comparative method we can detect that even the human factor is not quite indeterminable. we can assert that certain situations will normally produce, whether in ourselves or in our adversaries, certain moral states on which we may calculate. having determined the normal, we are at once in a stronger position. any proposal can be compared with it, and we can proceed to discuss clearly the weight of the factors which prompt us to depart from the normal. every case must be judged on its merits, but without a normal to work from we cannot form any real judgment at all; we can only guess. every case will assuredly depart from the normal to a greater or less extent, and it is equally certain that the greatest successes in war have been the boldest departures from the normal. but for the most part they have been departures made with open eyes by geniuses who could perceive in the accidents of the case a just reason for the departure. take an analogous example, and the province of strategical theory becomes clear at once. navigation and the parts of seamanship that belong to it have to deal with phenomena as varied and unreliable as those of the conduct of war. together they form an art which depends quite as much as generalship on the judgment of individuals. the law of storms and tides, of winds and currents, and the whole of meteorology are subject to infinite and incalculable deflections, and yet who will deny nowadays that by the theoretical study of such things the seaman's art has gained in coherence and strength? such study will not by itself make a seaman or a navigator, but without it no seaman or navigator can nowadays pretend to the name. because storms do not always behave in the same way, because currents are erratic, will the most practical seaman deny that the study of the normal conditions are useless to him in his practical decisions? if, then, the theoretical study of strategy be approached in this way--if, that is, it be regarded not as a substitute for judgment and experience, but as a means of fertilising both, it can do no man harm. individual thought and common-sense will remain the masters and remain the guides to point the general direction when the mass of facts begins to grow bewildering. theory will warn us the moment we begin to leave the beaten track, and enable us to decide with open eyes whether the divergence is necessary or justifiable. above all, when men assemble in council it will hold discussion to the essential lines, and help to keep side issues in their place. but beyond all this there lies in the theory of war yet another element of peculiar value to a maritime empire. we are accustomed, partly for convenience and partly from lack of a scientific habit of thought, to speak of naval strategy and military strategy as though they were distinct branches of knowledge which had no common ground. it is the theory of war which brings out their intimate relation. it reveals that embracing them both is a larger strategy which regards the fleet and army as one weapon, which co-ordinates their action, and indicates the lines on which each must move to realise the full power of both. it will direct us to assign to each its proper function in a plan of war; it will enable each service to realise the better the limitations and the possibilities of the function with which it is charged, and how and when its own necessities must give way to a higher or more pressing need of the other. it discloses, in short, that naval strategy is not a thing by itself, that its problems can seldom or never be solved on naval considerations alone, but that it is only a part of maritime strategy--the higher learning which teaches us that for a maritime state to make successful war and to realise her special strength, army and navy must be used and thought of as instruments no less intimately connected than are the three arms ashore. it is for these reasons that it is of little use to approach naval strategy except through the theory of war. without such theory we can never really understand its scope or meaning, nor can we hope to grasp the forces which most profoundly affect its conclusions. * * * * * part one theory of war * * * * * chapter one the theory of war * * * * * the last thing that an explorer arrives at is a complete map that will cover the whole ground he has travelled, but for those who come after him and would profit by and extend his knowledge his map is the first thing with which they will begin. so it is with strategy. before we start upon its study we seek a chart which will show us at a glance what exactly is the ground we have to cover and what are the leading features which determine its form and general characteristics. such a chart a "theory of war" alone can provide. it is for this reason that in the study of war we must get our theory clear before we can venture in search of practical conclusions. so great is the complexity of war that without such a guide we are sure to go astray amidst the bewildering multiplicity of tracks and obstacles that meet us at every step. if for continental strategy its value has been proved abundantly, then for maritime strategy, where the conditions are far more complex, the need of it is even greater. by maritime strategy we mean the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substantial factor. naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to the action of the land forces; for it scarcely needs saying that it is almost impossible that a war can be decided by naval action alone. unaided, naval pressure can only work by a process of exhaustion. its effects must always be slow, and so galling both to our own commercial community and to neutrals, that the tendency is always to accept terms of peace that are far from conclusive. for a firm decision a quicker and more drastic form of pressure is required. since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided--except in the rarest cases--either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do. the paramount concern, then, of maritime strategy is to determine the mutual relations of your army and navy in a plan of war. when this is done, and not till then, naval strategy can begin to work out the manner in which the fleet can best discharge the function assigned to it. the problem of such co-ordination is one that is susceptible of widely varying solutions. it may be that the command of the sea is of so urgent an importance that the army will have to devote itself to assisting the fleet in its special task before it can act directly against the enemy's territory and land forces; on the other hand, it may be that the immediate duty of the fleet will be to forward military action ashore before it is free to devote itself whole-heartedly to the destruction of the enemy's fleets. the crude maxims as to primary objects which seem to have served well enough in continental warfare have never worked so clearly where the sea enters seriously into a war. in such cases it will not suffice to say the primary object of the army is to destroy the enemy's army, or that of the fleet to destroy the enemy's fleet. the delicate interactions of the land and sea factors produce conditions too intricate for such blunt solutions. even the initial equations they present are too complex to be reduced by the simple application of rough-and-ready maxims. their right handling depends upon the broadest and most fundamental principles of war, and it is as a standpoint from which to get a clear and unobstructed view of the factors in their true relations that a theory of war has perhaps its highest value. the theory which now holds the field is that war in a fundamental sense is a continuation of policy by other means. the process by which the continental strategists arrived at it involved some hard philosophical reasoning. practical and experienced veterans as they were, their method is not one that works easily with our own habit of thought. it will be well, therefore, to endeavour first to present their conclusions in a concrete form, which will make the pith of the matter intelligible at once. take, now, the ordinary case of a naval or military staff being asked to prepare a war plan against a certain state and to advise what means it will require. to any one who has considered such matters it is obvious the reply must be another question--what will the war be about? without a definite answer or alternative answers to that question a staff can scarcely do more than engage in making such forces as the country can afford as efficient as possible. before they take any sure step further they must know many things. they must know whether they are expected to take something from the enemy, or to prevent his taking something either from us or from some other state. if from some other state, the measures to be taken will depend on its geographical situation and on its relative strength by land and sea. even when the object is clear it will be necessary to know how much value the enemy attaches to it. is it one for which he will be likely to fight to the death, or one which he will abandon in the face of comparatively slight resistance? if the former, we cannot hope to succeed without entirely overthrowing his powers of resistance. if the latter, it will suffice, as it often has sufficed, to aim at something less costly and hazardous and better within our means. all these are questions which lie in the lap of ministers charged with the foreign policy of the country, and before the staff can proceed with a war plan they must be answered by ministers. in short, the staff must ask of them what is the policy which your diplomacy is pursuing, and where, and why, do you expect it to break down and force you to take up arms? the staff has to carry on in fact when diplomacy has failed to achieve the object in view, and the method they will use will depend on the nature of that object. so we arrive crudely at our theory that war is a continuation of policy, a form of political intercourse in which we fight battles instead of writing notes. it was this theory, simple and even meaningless as it appears at first sight, that gave the key to the practical work of framing a modern war plan and revolutionised the study of strategy. it was not till the beginning of the nineteenth century that such a theory was arrived at. for centuries men had written on the "art of war," but for want of a working theory their labours as a whole had been unscientific, concerned for the most part with the discussion of passing fashions and the elaboration of platitudes. much good work it is true was done on details, but no broad outlook had been obtained to enable us to determine their relation to the fundamental constants of the subject. no standpoint had been found from which we could readily detach such constants from what was merely accidental. the result was a tendency to argue too exclusively from the latest examples and to become entangled in erroneous thought by trying to apply the methods which had attained the last success to war as a whole. there was no means of determining how far the particular success was due to special conditions and how far it was due to factors common to all wars. it was the revolutionary and napoleonic wars, coinciding as they did with a period of philosophic activity, that revealed the shallowness and empirical nature of all that had been done up to that time. napoleon's methods appeared to his contemporaries to have produced so strenuous a revolution in the conduct of land warfare that it assumed a wholly new aspect, and it was obvious that those conceptions which had sufficed previously had become inadequate as a basis of sound study. war on land seemed to have changed from a calculated affair of thrust and parry between standing armies to a headlong rush of one nation in arms upon another, each thirsting for the other's life, and resolved to have it or perish in the attempt. men felt themselves faced with a manifestation of human energy which had had no counterpart, at least in civilised times. the assumption was not entirely true. for although the continent had never before adopted the methods in question, our own country was no stranger to them either on sea or land. as we shall see, our own revolution in the seventeenth century had produced strenuous methods of making war which were closely related to those which napoleon took over from the french revolutionary leaders. a more philosophic outlook might have suggested that the phenomenon was not really exceptional, but rather the natural outcome of popular energy inspired by a stirring political ideal. but the british precedent was forgotten, and so profound was the disturbance caused by the new french methods that its effects are with us still. we are in fact still dominated by the idea that since the napoleonic era war has been essentially a different thing. our teachers incline to insist that there is now only one way of making war, and that is napoleon's way. ignoring the fact that he failed in the end, they brand as heresy the bare suggestion that there may be other ways, and not content with assuming that his system will fit all land wars, however much their natures and objects may differ, they would force naval warfare into the same uniform under the impression apparently that they are thereby making it presentable and giving it some new force. seeing how cramping the napoleonic idea has become, it will be convenient before going further to determine its special characteristics exactly, but that is no easy matter. the moment we approach it in a critical spirit, it begins to grow nebulous and very difficult to define. we can dimly make out four distinct ideas mingled in the current notion. first, there is the idea of making war not merely with a professional standing army, but with the whole armed nation--a conception which of course was not really napoleon's. it was inherited by him from the revolution, but was in fact far older. it was but a revival of the universal practice which obtained in the barbaric stages of social development, and which every civilisation in turn had abandoned as economically unsound and subversive of specialisation in citizenship. the results of the abandonment were sometimes good and sometimes bad, but the determining conditions have been studied as yet too imperfectly to justify any broad generalisation. secondly, there is the idea of strenuous and persistent effort--not resting to secure each minor advantage, but pressing the enemy without pause or rest till he is utterly overthrown--an idea in which cromwell had anticipated napoleon by a century and a half. scarcely distinguishable from this is a third idea--that of taking the offensive, in which there was really nothing new at all, since its advantages had always been understood, and frederick the great had pressed it to extremity with little less daring than napoleon himself--nay even to culpable rashness, as the highest exponents of the napoleonic idea admit. finally, there is the notion of making the armed forces of the enemy and not his territory or any part of it your main objective. this perhaps is regarded as the strongest characteristic of napoleon's methods, and yet even here we are confused by the fact that undoubtedly on some very important occasions--the austerlitz campaign, for example--napoleon made the hostile capital his objective as though he believed its occupation was the most effective step towards the overthrow of the enemy's power and will to resist. he certainly did not make the enemy's main army his primary objective--for their main army was not mack's but that of the archduke charles. on the whole then, when men speak of the napoleonic system they seem to include two groups of ideas--one which comprises the conception of war made with the whole force of the nation; the other, a group which includes the cromwellian idea of persistent effort, frederick's preference for the offensive at almost any risk, and finally the idea of the enemy's armed forces as the main objective, which was also cromwell's. it is the combination of these by no means original or very distinct ideas that we are told has brought about so entire a change in the conduct of war that it has become altogether a different thing. it is unnecessary for our purpose to consider how far the facts seem to support such a conclusion, for in the inherent nature of things it must be radically unsound. neither war nor anything else can change in its essentials. if it appears to do so, it is because we are still mistaking accidents for essentials, and this is exactly how it struck the acutest thinkers of napoleonic times. for a while it is true they were bewildered, but so soon as they had had time to clear their heads from the din of the struggle in which they had taken part, they began to see that the new phenomena were but accidents after all. they perceived that napoleon's methods, which had taken the world by storm, had met with success in wars of a certain nature only, and that when he tried to extend those methods to other natures of war he had met with failure and even disaster. how was this to be explained? what theory, for instance, would cover napoleon's successes in germany and italy, as well as his failures in spain and russia? if the whole conception of war had changed, how could you account for the success of england, who had not changed her methods? to us the answer to these questions is of living and infinite importance. our standpoint remains still unchanged. is there anything inherent in the conception of war that justifies that attitude in our case? are we entitled to expect from it again the same success it met with in the past? the first man to enunciate a theory which would explain the phenomena of the napoleonic era and co-ordinate them with previous history was general carl von clausewitz, a man whose arduous service on the staff and the actual work of higher instruction had taught the necessity of systematising the study of his profession. he was no mere professor, but a soldier bred in the severest school of war. the pupil and friend of sharnhorst and gneisenau, he had served on the staff of blücher in , he had been chief of the staff to wallmoden in his campaign against davoust on the lower elbe, and also to the third prussian army corps in the campaign of . thereafter for more than ten years he was director of the general academy of war at berlin, and died in as chief of the staff to marshal gneisenau. for the fifty years that followed his death his theories and system were, as he expected they would be, attacked from all sides. yet to-day his work is more firmly established than ever as the necessary basis of all strategical thought, and above all in the "blood and iron" school of germany. the process by which he reached his famous theory can be followed in his classical work _on war_ and the _notes_ regarding it which he left behind him. in accordance with the philosophic fashion of his time he began by trying to formulate an abstract idea of war. the definition he started with was that "war is an act of violence to compel our opponent to do our will." but that act of violence was not merely "the shock of armies," as montecuccoli had defined it a century and a half before. if the abstract idea of war be followed to its logical conclusion, the act of violence must be performed with the whole of the means at our disposal and with the utmost exertion of our will. consequently we get the conception of two armed nations flinging themselves one upon the other, and continuing the struggle with the utmost strength and energy they can command till one or other is no longer capable of resistance. this clausewitz called "absolute war." but his practical experience and ripe study of history told him at once that "real war" was something radically different. it was true, as he said, that napoleon's methods had approximated to the absolute and had given some colour to the use of the absolute idea as a working theory. "but shall we," he acutely asks, "rest satisfied with this idea and judge all wars by it however much they may differ from it--shall we deduce from it all the requirements of theory? we must decide the point, for we can say nothing trustworthy about a war plan until we have made up our minds whether war should only be of this kind or whether it may be of another kind." he saw at once that a theory formed upon the abstract or absolute idea of war would not cover the ground, and therefore failed to give what was required for practical purposes. it would exclude almost the whole of war from alexander's time to napoleon's. and what guarantee was there that the next war would confirm to the napoleonic type and accommodate itself to the abstract theory? "this theory," he says, "is still quite powerless against the force of circumstances." and so it proved, for the wars of the middle nineteenth century did in fact revert to the pre-napoleonic type. in short, clausewitz's difficulty in adopting his abstract theory as a working rule was that his practical mind could not forget that war had not begun with the revolutionary era, nor was it likely to end with it. if that era had changed the conduct of war, it must be presumed that war would change again with other times and other conditions. a theory of war which did not allow for this and did not cover all that had gone before was no theory at all. if a theory of war was to be of any use as a practical guide it must cover and explain not only the extreme manifestation of hostility which he himself had witnessed, but every manifestation that had occurred in the past or was likely to recur in the future. it was in casting about for the underlying causes of the oscillations manifested in the energy and intensity of hostile relations that he found his solution. his experience on the staff, and his study of the inner springs of war, told him it was never in fact a question of purely military endeavour aiming always at the extreme of what was possible or expedient from a purely military point of view. the energy exhibited would always be modified by political considerations and by the depth of the national interest in the object of the war. he saw that real war was in fact an international relation which differed from other international relations only in the method we adopted to achieve the object of our policy. so it was he arrived at his famous theory--"that war is a mere continuation of policy by other means." at first sight there seems little enough in it. it may seem perhaps that we have been watching a mountain in labour and nothing but a mouse has been produced. but it is only upon some such simple, even obvious, formula that any scientific system can be constructed with safety. we have only to develop the meaning of this one to see how important and practical are the guiding lines which flow from it. with the conception of war as a continuation of political intercourse before us, it is clear that everything which lies outside the political conception, everything, that is, which is strictly peculiar to military and naval operations, relates merely to the means which we use to achieve our policy. consequently, the first desideratum of a war plan is that the means adopted must conflict as little as possible with the political conditions from which the war springs. in practice, of course, as in all human relations, there will be a compromise between the means and the end, between the political and the military exigencies. but clausewitz held that policy must always be the master. the officer charged with the conduct of the war may of course demand that the tendencies and views of policy shall not be incompatible with the military means which are placed at his disposal; but however strongly this demand may react on policy in particular cases, military action must still be regarded only as a manifestation of policy. it must never supersede policy. the policy is always the object; war is only the means by which we obtain the object, and the means must always keep the end in view. the practical importance of this conception will now become clear. it will be seen to afford the logical or theoretical exposition of what we began by stating in its purely concrete form. when a chief of staff is asked for a war plan he must not say we will make war in such and such a way because it was napoleon's or moltke's way. he will ask what is the political object of the war, what are the political conditions, and how much does the question at issue mean respectively to us and to our adversary. it is these considerations which determine the nature of the war. this primordial question settled, he will be in a position to say whether the war is of the same nature as those in which napoleon's and moltke's methods were successful, or whether it is of another nature in which those methods failed. he will then design and offer a war plan, not because it has the hall-mark of this or that great master of war, but because it is one that has been proved to fit the kind of war in hand. to assume that one method of conducting war will suit all kinds of war is to fall a victim to abstract theory, and not to be a prophet of reality, as the narrowest disciples of the napoleonic school are inclined to see themselves. hence, says clausewitz, the first, the greatest and most critical decision upon which the statesman and the general have to exercise their judgment is to determine the nature of the war, to be sure they do not mistake it for something nor seek to make of it something which from its inherent conditions it can never be. "this," he declares, "is the first and the most far-reaching of all strategical questions." the first value, then, of his theory of war is that it gives a clear line on which we may proceed to determine the nature of a war in which we are about to engage, and to ensure that we do not try to apply to one nature of war any particular course of operations simply because they have proved successful in another nature of war. it is only, he insists, by regarding war not as an independent thing but as a political instrument that we can read aright the lessons of history and understand for our practical guidance how wars must differ in character according to the nature of the motives and circumstances from which they proceed. this conception, he claims, is the first ray of light to guide us to a true theory of war and thereby enable us to classify wars and distinguish them one from another. jomini, his great contemporary and rival, though proceeding by a less philosophical but no less lucid method, entirely endorses this view. a swiss soldier of fortune, his experience was much the same as that of clausewitz. it was obtained mainly on the staff of marshal ney and subsequently on the russian headquarter staff. he reached no definite theory of war, but his fundamental conclusions were the same. the first chapter of his final work, _précis de l'art de la guerre_, is devoted to "la politique de la guerre." in it he classifies wars into nine categories according to their political object, and he lays it down as a base proposition "that these different kinds of war will have more or less influence on the nature of the operations which will be demanded to attain the end in view, on the amount of energy that must be put forth, and on the extent of the undertakings in which we must engage." "there will," he adds, "be a great difference in the operations according to the risks we have to run." both men, therefore, though on details of means they were often widely opposed, are agreed that the fundamental conception of war is political. both of course agree that if we isolate in our mind the forces engaged in any theatre of war the abstract conception reappears. so far as those forces are concerned, war is a question of fighting in which each belligerent should endeavour by all means at his command and with all his energy to destroy the other. but even so they may find that certain means are barred to them for political reasons, and at any moment the fortune of war or a development of the political conditions with which it is entangled may throw them back upon the fundamental political theory. that theory it will be unprofitable to labour further at this point. let it suffice for the present to mark that it gives us a conception of war as an exertion of violence to secure a political end which we desire to attain, and that from this broad and simple formula we are able to deduce at once that wars will vary according to the nature of the end and the intensity of our desire to attain it. here we may leave it to gather force and coherence as we examine the practical considerations which are its immediate outcome. * * * * * chapter two natures of wars-- offensive and defensive * * * * * having determined that wars must vary in character according to the nature and importance of their object, we are faced with the difficulty that the variations will be of infinite number and of all degrees of distinction. so complex indeed is the graduation presented that at first sight it appears scarcely possible to make it the basis of practical study. but on further examination it will be seen that by applying the usual analytical method the whole subject is susceptible of much simplification. we must in short attempt to reach some system of classification; that is, we must see if it is not possible to group the variations into some well-founded categories. with a subject so complex and intangible the grouping must of course be to some extent arbitrary, and in some places the lines of demarcation will be shadowy; but if classification has been found possible and helpful in zoology or botany, with the infinite and minute individual variations with which they have to deal, it should be no less possible and helpful in the study of war. the political theory of war will at any rate give us two broad and well-marked classifications. the first is simple and well known, depending on whether the political object of the war is positive or negative. if it be positive--that is, if our aim is to wrest something from the enemy--then our war in its main lines will be offensive. if, on the other hand, our aim be negative, and we simply seek to prevent the enemy wresting some advantage to our detriment, then the war in its general direction will be defensive. it is only as a broad conception that this classification has value. though it fixes the general trend of our operations, it will not in itself affect their character. for a maritime power at least it is obvious that this must be so. for in any circumstances it is impossible for such a power either to establish its defence or develop fully its offence without securing a working control of the sea by aggressive action against the enemy's fleets. furthermore, we have always found that however strictly our aim may be defensive, the most effective means of securing it has been by counter-attack over-sea, either to support an ally directly or to deprive our enemy of his colonial possessions. neither category, then, excludes the use of offensive operations nor the idea of overthrowing our enemy so far as is necessary to gain our end. in neither case does the conception lead us eventually to any other objective than the enemy's armed forces, and particularly his naval forces. the only real difference is this--that if our object be positive our general plan must be offensive, and we should at least open with a true offensive movement; whereas if our object be negative our general plan will be preventive, and we may bide our time for our counter-attack. to this extent our action must always tend to the offensive. for counter-attack is the soul of defence. defence is not a passive attitude, for that is the negation of war. rightly conceived, it is an attitude of alert expectation. we wait for the moment when the enemy shall expose himself to a counter-stroke, the success of which will so far cripple him as to render us relatively strong enough to pass to the offensive ourselves. from these considerations it will appear that, real and logical as the classification is, to give it the designation "offensive and defensive" is objectionable from every point of view. to begin with, it does not emphasise what the real and logical distinction is. it suggests that the basis of the classification is not so much a difference of object as a difference in the means employed to achieve the object. consequently we find ourselves continually struggling with the false assumption that positive war means using attack, and negative war being content with defence. that is confusing enough, but a second objection to the designation is far more serious and more fertile of error. for the classification "offensive and defensive" implies that offensive and defensive are mutually exclusive ideas, whereas the truth is, and it is a fundamental truth of war, that they are mutually complementary. all war and every form of it must be both offensive and defensive. no matter how clear our positive aim nor how high our offensive spirit, we cannot develop an aggressive line of strategy to the full without the support of the defensive on all but the main lines of operation. in tactics it is the same. the most convinced devotee of attack admits the spade as well as the rifle. and even when it comes to men and material, we know that without a certain amount of protection neither ships, guns, nor men can develop their utmost energy and endurance in striking power. there is never, in fact, a clean choice between attack and defence. in aggressive operations the question always is, how far must defence enter into the methods we employ in order to enable us to do the utmost within our resources to break or paralyse the strength of the enemy. so also with defence. even in its most legitimate use, it must always be supplemented by attack. even behind the walls of a fortress men know that sooner or later the place must fall unless by counter-attack on the enemy's siege works or communications they can cripple his power of attack. it would seem, therefore, that it were better to lay aside the designation "offensive and defensive" altogether and substitute the terms "positive and negative." but here again we are confronted with a difficulty. there have been many wars in which positive methods have been used all through to secure a negative end, and such wars will not sit easily in either class. for instance, in the war of spanish succession our object was mainly to prevent the mediterranean becoming a french lake by the union of the french and spanish crowns, but the method by which we succeeded in achieving our end was to seize the naval positions of gibraltar and minorca, and so in practice our method was positive. again, in the late russo-japanese war the main object of japan was to prevent korea being absorbed by russia. that aim was preventive and negative. but the only effective way of securing her aim was to take korea herself, and so for her the war was in practice positive. on the other hand, we cannot shut our eyes to the fact that in the majority of wars the side with the positive object has acted generally on the offensive and the other generally on the defensive. unpractical therefore as the distinction seems to be, it is impossible to dismiss it without inquiring why this was so, and it is in this inquiry that the practical results of the classification will be found to lie--that is, it forces us to analyse the comparative advantages of offence and defence. a clear apprehension of their relative possibilities is the corner stone of strategical study. now the advantages of the offensive are patent and admitted. it is only the offensive that can produce positive results, while the strength and energy which are born of the moral stimulation of attack are of a practical value that outweighs almost every other consideration. every man of spirit would desire to use the offensive whether his object were positive or negative, and yet there are a number of cases in which some of the most energetic masters of war have chosen the defensive, and chosen with success. they have chosen it when they have found themselves inferior in physical force to their enemy, and when they believed that no amount of aggressive spirit could redress that inferiority. obviously, then, for all the inferiority of the defensive as a drastic form of war it must have some inherent advantage which the offensive does not enjoy. in war we adopt every method for which we have sufficient strength. if, then, we adopt the less desirable method of defence, it must be either that we have not sufficient strength for offence, or that the defence gives us some special strength for the attainment of our object. what, then, are these elements of strength? it is very necessary to inquire, not only that we may know that if for a time we are forced back upon the defensive all is not lost, but also that we may judge with how much daring we should push our offensive to prevent the enemy securing the advantages of defence. as a general principle we all know that possession is nine points of the law. it is easier to keep money in our pocket than to take it from another man's. if one man would rob another he must be the stronger or better armed unless he can do it by dexterity or stealth, and there lies one of the advantages of offence. the side which takes the initiative has usually the better chance of securing advantage by dexterity or stealth. but it is not always so. if either by land or sea we can take a defensive position so good that it cannot be turned and must be broken down before our enemy can reach his objective, then the advantage of dexterity and stealth passes to us. we choose our own ground for the trial of strength. we are hidden on familiar ground; he is exposed on ground that is less familiar. we can lay traps and prepare surprises by counter-attack, when he is most dangerously exposed. hence the paradoxical doctrine that where defence is sound and well designed the advantage of surprise is against the attack. it will be seen therefore that whatever advantages lie in defence they depend on the preservation of the offensive spirit. its essence is the counter-attack--waiting deliberately for a chance to strike--not cowering in inactivity. defence is a condition of restrained activity--not a mere condition of rest. its real weakness is that if unduly prolonged it tends to deaden the spirit of offence. this is a truth so vital that some authorities in their eagerness to enforce it have travestied it into the misleading maxim, "that attack is the best defence." hence again an amateurish notion that defence is always stupid or pusillanimous, leading always to defeat, and that what is called "the military spirit" means nothing but taking the offensive. nothing is further from the teaching or the practice of the best masters. like wellington at torres vedras, they all at times used the defensive till the elements of strength inherent in that form of war, as opposed to the exhausting strain inherent in the form that they had fixed upon their opponents, lifted them to a position where they in their turn were relatively strong enough to use the more exhausting form. the confusion of thought which has led to the misconceptions about defence as a method of war is due to several obvious causes. counter-attacks from a general defensive attitude have been regarded as a true offensive, as, for instance, in frederick the great's best-known operations, or in admiral tegetthoff's brilliant counterstroke at lissa, or our own operations against the spanish armada. again, the defensive has acquired an ill name by its being confused with a wrongly arrested offensive, where the superior power with the positive object lacked the spirit to use his material superiority with sufficient activity and perseverance. against such a power an inferior enemy can always redress his inferiority by passing to a bold and quick offensive, thus acquiring a momentum both moral and physical which more than compensates his lack of weight. the defensive has also failed by the choice of a bad position which the enemy was able to turn or avoid. a defensive attitude is nothing at all, its elements of strength entirely disappear, unless it is such that the enemy must break it down by force before he can reach his ultimate objective. even more often has it failed when the belligerent adopting it, finding he has no available defensive position which will bar the enemy's progress, attempts to guard every possible line of attack. the result is of course that by attenuating his force he only accentuates his inferiority. clear and well proven as these considerations are for land warfare, their application to the sea is not so obvious. it will be objected that at sea there is no defensive. this is generally true for tactics, but even so not universally true. defensive tactical positions are possible at sea, as in defended anchorages. these were always a reality, and the mine has increased their possibilities. in the latest developments of naval warfare we have seen the japanese at the elliot islands preparing a real defensive position to cover the landing of their second army in the liaotung peninsula. strategically the proposition is not true at all. a strategical defensive has been quite as common at sea as on land, and our own gravest problems have often been how to break down such an attitude when our enemy assumed it. it usually meant that the enemy remained in his own waters and near his own bases, where it was almost impossible for us to attack him with decisive result, and whence he always threatened us with counterattack at moments of exhaustion, as the dutch did at sole bay and in the medway. the difficulty of dealing decisively with an enemy who adopted this course was realised by our service very early, and from first to last one of our chief preoccupations was to prevent the enemy availing himself of this device and to force him to fight in the open, or at least to get between him and his base and force an action there. probably the most remarkable manifestation of the advantages that may be derived in suitable conditions from a strategical defensive is also to be found in the late russo-japanese war. in the final crisis of the naval struggle the japanese fleet was able to take advantage of a defensive attitude in its own waters which the russian baltic fleet would have to break down to attain its end, and the result was the most decisive naval victory ever recorded. the deterrent power of active and dexterous operations from such a position was well known to our old tradition. the device was used several times, particularly in our home waters, to prevent a fleet, which for the time we were locally too weak to destroy, from carrying out the work assigned to it. a typical position of the kind was off scilly, and it was proved again and again that even a superior fleet could not hope to effect anything in the channel till the fleet off scilly had been brought to decisive action. but the essence of the device was the preservation of the aggressive spirit in its most daring form. for success it depended on at least the will to seize every occasion for bold and harassing counter-attacks such as drake and his colleagues struck at the armada. to submit to blockade in order to engage the attention of a superior enemy's fleet is another form of defensive, but one that is almost wholly evil. for a short time it may do good by permitting offensive operations elsewhere which otherwise would be impossible. but if prolonged, it will sooner or later destroy the spirit of your force and render it incapable of effective aggression. the conclusion then is that although for the practical purpose of framing or appreciating plans of war the classification of wars into offensive and defensive is of little use, a clear apprehension of the inherent relative advantages of offence and defence is essential. we must realise that in certain cases, provided always we preserve the aggressive spirit, the defensive will enable an inferior force to achieve points when the offensive would probably lead to its destruction. but the elements of strength depend entirely on the will and insight to deal rapid blows in the enemy's unguarded moments. so soon as the defensive ceases to be regarded as a means of fostering power to strike and of reducing the enemy's power of attack it loses all its strength. it ceases to be even a suspended activity, and anything that is not activity is not war. with these general indications of the relative advantages of offence and defence we may leave the subject for the present. it is possible of course to catalogue the advantages and disadvantages of each form, but any such bald statement--without concrete examples to explain the meaning--must always appear controversial and is apt to mislead. it is better to reserve their fuller consideration till we come to deal with strategical operations and are able to note their actual effect upon the conduct of war in its various forms. leaving therefore our first classification of wars into offensive and defensive we will pass on to the second, which is the only one of real practical importance. * * * * * chapter three natures of wars-- limited and unlimited * * * * * the second classification to which we are led by the political theory of war, is one which clausewitz was the first to formulate and one to which he came to attach the highest importance. it becomes necessary therefore to examine his views in some detail--not because there is any need to regard a continental soldier, however distinguished, as an indispensable authority for a maritime nation. the reason is quite the reverse. it is because a careful examination of his doctrine on this point will lay open what are the radical and essential differences between the german or continental school of strategy and the british or maritime school--that is, our own traditional school, which too many writers both at home and abroad quietly assume to have no existence. the evil tendency of that assumption cannot be too strongly emphasised, and the main purpose of this and the following chapters will be to show how and why even the greatest of the continental strategists fell short of realising fully the characteristic conception of the british tradition. by the classification in question clausewitz distinguished wars into those with a "limited" object and those whose object was "unlimited." such a classification was entirely characteristic of him, for it rested not alone upon the material nature of the object, but on certain moral considerations to which he was the first to attach their real value in war. other writers such as jomini had attempted to classify wars by the special purpose for which they were fought, but clausewitz's long course of study convinced him that such a distinction was unphilosophical and bore no just relation to any tenable theory of war. whether, that is, a war was positive or negative mattered much, but its special purpose, whether, for instance, according to jomini's system, it was a war "to assert rights" or "to assist an ally" or "to acquire territory," mattered not at all. whatever the object, the vital and paramount question was the intensity with which the spirit of the nation was absorbed in its attainment. the real point to determine in approaching any war plan was what did the object mean to the two belligerents, what sacrifices would they make for it, what risks were they prepared to run? it was thus he stated his view. "the smaller the sacrifice we demand from our opponent, the smaller presumably will be the means of resistance he will employ, and the smaller his means, the smaller will ours be required to be. similarly the smaller our political object, the less value shall we set upon it and the more easily we shall be induced to abandon it." thus the political object of the war, its original motive, will not only determine for both belligerents reciprocally the aim of the force they use, but it will also be the standard of the intensity of the efforts they will make. so he concludes there may be wars of all degrees of importance and energy from a war of extermination down to the use of an army of observation. so also in the naval sphere there may be a life and death struggle for maritime supremacy or hostilities which never rise beyond a blockade. such a view of the subject was of course a wide departure from the theory of "absolute war" on which clausewitz had started working. under that theory "absolute war" was the ideal form to which all war ought to attain, and those which fell short of it were imperfect wars cramped by a lack of true military spirit. but so soon as he had seized the fact that in actual life the moral factor always must override the purely military factor, he saw that he had been working on too narrow a basis--a basis that was purely theoretical in that it ignored the human factor. he began to perceive that it was logically unsound to assume as the foundation of a strategical system that there was one pattern to which all wars ought to conform. in the light of his full and final apprehension of the value of the human factor he saw wars falling into two well-marked categories, each of which would legitimately be approached in a radically different manner, and not necessarily on the lines of "absolute war." he saw that there was one class of war where the political object was of so vital an importance to both belligerents that they would tend to fight to the utmost limit of their endurance to secure it. but there was another class where the object was of less importance, that is to say, where its value to one or both the belligerents was not so great as to be worth unlimited sacrifices of blood and treasure. it was these two kinds of war he designated provisionally "unlimited" and "limited," by which he meant not that you were not to exert the force employed with all the vigour you could develop, but that there might be a limit beyond which it would be bad policy to spend that vigour, a point at which, long before your force was exhausted or even fully developed, it would be wiser to abandon your object rather than to spend more upon it. this distinction it is very necessary to grasp quite clearly, for it is often superficially confused with the distinction already referred to, which clausewitz drew in the earlier part of his work--that is, the distinction between what he called the character of modern war and the character of the wars which preceded the napoleonic era. it will be remembered he insisted that the wars of his own time had been wars between armed nations with a tendency to throw the whole weight of the nation into the fighting line, whereas in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries wars were waged by standing armies and not by the whole nation in arms. the distinction of course is real and of far-reaching consequences, but it has no relation to the distinction between "limited" and "unlimited" war. war may be waged on the napoleonic system either for a limited or an unlimited object. a modern instance will serve to clear the field. the recent russo-japanese war was fought for a limited object--the assertion of certain claims over territory which formed no part of the possessions of either belligerent. hostilities were conducted on entirely modern lines by two armed nations and not by standing armies alone. but in the case of one belligerent her interest in the object was so limited as to cause her to abandon it long before her whole force as an armed nation was exhausted or even put forth. the expense of life and treasure which the struggle was involving was beyond what the object was worth. this second distinction--that is, between limited and unlimited wars--clausewitz regarded as of greater importance than his previous one founded on the negative or positive nature of the object. he was long in reaching it. his great work _on war_ as he left it proceeds almost entirely on the conception of offensive or defensive as applied to the napoleonic ideal of absolute war. the new idea came to him towards the end in the full maturity of his prolonged study, and it came to him in endeavouring to apply his strategical speculations to the practical process of framing a war plan in anticipation of a threatened breach with france. it was only in his final section _on war plans_ that he began to deal with it. by that time he had grasped the first practical result to which his theory led. he saw that the distinction between limited and unlimited war connoted a cardinal distinction in the methods of waging it. when the object was unlimited, and would consequently call forth your enemy's whole war power, it was evident that no firm decision of the struggle could be reached till his war power was entirely crushed. unless you had a reasonable hope of being able to do this it was bad policy to seek your end by force--that is, you ought not to go to war. in the case of a limited object, however, the complete destruction of the enemy's armed force was beyond what was necessary. clearly you could achieve your end if you could seize the object, and by availing yourself of the elements of strength inherent in the defensive could set up such a situation that it would cost the enemy more to turn you out than the object was worth to him. here then was a wide difference in the fundamental postulate of your war plan. in the case of an unlimited war your main strategical offensive must be directed against the armed forces of the enemy; in the case of a limited war, even where its object was positive, it need not be. if conditions were favourable, it would suffice to make the object itself the objective of your main strategical offensive. clearly, then, he had reached a theoretical distinction which modified his whole conception of strategy. no longer is there logically but one kind of war, the absolute, and no longer is there but one legitimate objective, the enemy's armed forces. being sound theory, it of course had an immediate practical value, for obviously it was a distinction from which the actual work of framing a war plan must take its departure. a curious corroboration of the soundness of these views is that jomini reached an almost identical standpoint independently and by an entirely different road. his method was severely concrete, based on the comparison of observed facts, but it brought him as surely as the abstract method of his rival to the conclusion that there were two distinct classes of object. "they are of two different kinds," he says, "one which may be called territorial or geographical ... the other on the contrary consists exclusively in the destruction or disorganisation of the enemy's forces without concerning yourself with geographical points of any kind." it is under the first category of his first main classification "of offensive wars to assert rights," that he deals with what clausewitz would call "limited wars." citing as an example frederick the great's war for the conquest of silesia, he says, "in such a war ... the offensive operations ought to be proportional to the end in view. the first move is naturally to occupy the provinces claimed" (not, be it noted, to direct your blow at the enemy's main force). "afterwards," he proceeds, "you can push the offensive according to circumstances and your relative strength in order to obtain the desired cession by menacing the enemy at home." here we have clausewitz's whole doctrine of "limited war"; firstly, the primary or territorial stage, in which you endeavour to occupy the geographical object, and then the secondary or coercive stage, in which you seek by exerting general pressure upon your enemy to force him to accept the adverse situation you have set up. such a method of making war obviously differs in a fundamental manner from that which napoleon habitually adopted, and yet we have it presented by jomini and clausewitz, the two apostles of the napoleonic method. the explanation is, of course, that both of them had seen too much not to know that napoleon's method was only applicable when you could command a real physical or moral preponderance. given such a preponderance, both were staunch for the use of extreme means in napoleon's manner. it is not as something better than the higher road that they commend the lower one, but being veteran staff-officers and not mere theorists, they knew well that a belligerent must sometimes find the higher road beyond his strength, or beyond the effort which the spirit of the nation is prepared to make for the end in view, and like the practical men they were, they set themselves to study the potentialities of the lower road should hard necessity force them to travel it. they found that these potentialities in certain circumstances were great. as an example of a case where the lower form was more appropriate jomini cites napoleon's campaign against russia in . in his opinion it would have been better if napoleon had been satisfied to begin on the lower method with a limited territorial object, and he attributes his failure to the abuse of a method which, however well suited to his wars in germany, was incapable of achieving success in the conditions presented by a war with russia. seeing how high was napoleon's opinion of jomini as a master of the science of war, it is curious how his views on the two natures of wars have been ignored in the present day. it is even more curious in the case of clausewitz, since we know that in the plenitude of his powers he came to regard this classification as the master-key of the subject. the explanation is that the distinction is not very clearly formulated in his first seven books, which alone he left in anything like a finished condition. it was not till he came to write his eighth book _on war plans_ that he saw the vital importance of the distinction round which he had been hovering. in that book the distinction is clearly laid down, but the book unhappily was never completed. with his manuscript, however, he left a "note" warning us against regarding his earlier books as a full presentation of his developed ideas. from the note it is also evident that he thought the classification on which he had lighted was of the utmost importance, that he believed it would clear up all the difficulties which he had encountered in his earlier books--difficulties which he had come to see arose from a too exclusive consideration of the napoleonic method of conducting war. "i look upon the first six books," he wrote in , "as only a mass of material which is still in a manner without form and which has still to be revised again. in this revision the two kinds of wars will be kept more distinctly in view all through, and thereby all ideas will gain in clearness, in precision, and in exactness of application." evidently he had grown dissatisfied with the theory of absolute war on which he had started. his new discovery had convinced him that that theory would not serve as a standard for all natures of wars. "shall we," he asks in his final book, "shall we now rest satisfied with this idea and by it judge of all wars, however much they may differ?"[ ] he answers his question in the negative. "you cannot determine the requirements of all wars from the napoleonic type. keep that type and its absolute method before you to use _when you can_ or _when you must_, but keep equally before you that there are two main natures of war." [ ] clausewitz, on war, book viii, chap, ii in his note written at this time, when the distinction first came to him, he defines these two natures of war as follows: "first, those in which the object is the _overthrow of the enemy_, whether it be we aim at his political destruction or merely at disarming him and forcing him to conclude peace on our terms; and secondly, those in which our object is _merely to make some conquests on the frontiers of his country_, either for the purpose of retaining them permanently or of turning them to account as a matter of exchange in settling terms of peace."[ ] it was in his eighth book that he intended, had he lived, to have worked out the comprehensive idea he had conceived. of that book he says, "the chief object will be to make good the two points of view above mentioned, by which everything will be simplified and at the same time be given the breath of life. i hope in this book to iron out many creases in the heads of strategists and statesmen, and at least to show the object of action and the real point to be considered in war."[ ] [ ] ibid, preparatory notice, p. vii. [ ] ibid, p. viii that hope was never realised, and that perhaps is why his penetrating analysis has been so much ignored. the eighth book as we have it is only a fragment. in the spring of --an anxious moment, when it seemed that prussia would require all her best for another struggle single-handed with france--he was called away to an active command. what he left of the book on "war plans" he describes as "merely a track roughly cleared, as it were, through the mass, in order to ascertain the points of greatest moment." it was his intention, he says, to "carry the spirit of these ideas into his first six books"--to put the crown on his work, in fact, by elaborating and insisting upon his two great propositions, viz. that war was a form of policy, and that being so it might be limited or unlimited. the extent to which he would have infused his new idea into the whole every one is at liberty to judge for himself; but this indisputable fact remains. in the winter in view of the threatening attitude of france in regard to belgium he drew up a war plan, and it was designed not on the napoleonic method of making the enemy's armed force the main strategical objective, but on seizing a limited territorial object and forcing a disadvantageous counter-offensive upon the french. the revolutionary movement throughout europe had broken the holy alliance to pieces. not only did prussia find herself almost single-handed against france, but she herself was sapped by revolution. to adopt the higher form of war and seek to destroy the armed force of the enemy was beyond her power. but she could still use the lower form, and by seizing belgium she could herself force so exhausting a task on france that success was well within her strength. it was exactly so we endeavoured to begin the seven years' war; and it was exactly so the japanese successfully conducted their war with russia; and what is more striking, it was on similar lines that in moltke in similar circumstances drew up his first war plan against france. his idea at that time was on the lines which jomini held should have been napoleon's in . it was not to strike directly at paris or the french main army, but to occupy alsace-lorraine and hold that territory till altered conditions should give him the necessary preponderance for proceeding to the higher form or forcing a favourable peace. in conclusion, then, we have to note that the matured fruit of the napoleonic period was a theory of war based not on the single absolute idea, but on the dual distinction of limited and unlimited. whatever practical importance we may attach to the distinction, so much must be admitted on the clear and emphatic pronouncements of clausewitz and jomini. the practical importance is another matter. it may fairly be argued that in continental warfare--in spite of the instances quoted by both the classical writers--it is not very great, for reasons that will appear directly. but it must be remembered that continental warfare is not the only form in which great international issues are decided. standing at the final point which clausewitz and jomini reached, we are indeed only on the threshold of the subject. we have to begin where they left off and inquire what their ideas have to tell for the modern conditions of worldwide imperial states, where the sea becomes a direct and vital factor. * * * * * chapter four limited war and maritime empires-- development of clausewitz's and jomini's theory of a limited territorial object, and its application to modern imperial conditions * * * * * the german war plans already cited, which were based respectively on the occupation of belgium and alsace-lorraine, and jomini's remarks on napoleon's disastrous russian campaign serve well to show the point to which continental strategists have advanced along the road which clausewitz was the first to indicate clearly. we have now to consider its application to modern imperial conditions, and above all where the maritime element forcibly asserts itself. we shall then see how small that advance has been compared with its far-reaching effects for a maritime and above all an insular power. it is clear that clausewitz himself never apprehended the full significance of his brilliant theory. his outlook was still purely continental, and the limitations of continental warfare tend to veil the fuller meaning of the principle he had framed. had he lived, there is little doubt he would have worked it out to its logical conclusion, but his death condemned his theory of limited war to remain in the inchoate condition in which he had left it. it will be observed, as was natural enough, that all through his work clausewitz had in his mind war between two contiguous or at least adjacent continental states, and a moment's consideration will show that in that type of war the principle of the limited object can rarely if ever assert itself in perfect precision. clausewitz himself put it quite clearly. assuming a case where "the overthrow of the enemy"--that is, unlimited war--is beyond our strength, he points out that we need not therefore necessarily act on the defensive. our action may still be positive and offensive, but the object can be nothing more than "the conquest of part of the enemy's country." such a conquest he knew might so far weaken your enemy or strengthen your own position as to enable you to secure a satisfactory peace. the path of history is indeed strewn with such cases. but he was careful to point out that such a form of war was open to the gravest objections. once you had occupied the territory you aimed at, your offensive action was, as a rule, arrested. a defensive attitude had to be assumed, and such an arrest of offensive action he had previously shown was inherently vicious, if only for moral reasons. added to this you might find that in your effort to occupy the territorial object you had so irretrievably separated your striking force from your home-defence force as to be in no position to meet your enemy if he was able to retort by acting on unlimited lines with a stroke at your heart. a case in point was the austerlitz campaign, where austria's object was to wrest north italy from napoleon's empire. she sent her main army under the archduke charles to seize the territory she desired. napoleon immediately struck at vienna, destroyed her home army, and occupied the capital before the archduke could turn to bar his way. the argument is this: that, as all strategic attack tends to leave points of your own uncovered, it always involves greater or less provision for their defence. it is obvious, therefore, that if we are aiming at a limited territorial object the proportion of defence required will tend to be much greater than if we are directing our attack on the main forces of the enemy. in unlimited war our attack will itself tend to defend everything elsewhere, by forcing the enemy to concentrate against our attack. whether the limited form is justifiable or not therefore depends, as clausewitz points out, on the geographical position of the object. so far british experience is with him, but he then goes on to say the more closely the territory in question is an annex of our own the safer is this form of war, because then our offensive action will the more surely cover our home country. as a case in point he cites frederick the great's opening of the seven years' war with the occupation of saxony--a piece of work which materially strengthened prussian defence. of the british opening in canada he says nothing. his outlook was too exclusively continental for it to occur to him to test his doctrine with a conspicuously successful case in which the territory aimed at was distant from the home territory and in no way covered it. had he done so he must have seen how much stronger an example of the strength of limited war was the case of canada than the case of saxony. moreover, he would have seen that the difficulties, which in spite of his faith in his discovery accompanied his attempt to apply it, arose from the fact that the examples he selected were not really examples at all. when he conceived the idea, the only kind of limited object he had in his mind was, to use his own words, "some conquests on the frontiers of the enemy's country," such as silesia and saxony for frederick the great, belgium in his own war plan, and alsace-lorraine in that of moltke. now it is obvious that such objects are not truly limited, for two reasons. in the first place, such territory is usually an organic part of your enemy's country, or otherwise of so much importance to him that he will be willing to use unlimited effort to retain it. in the second place, there will be no strategical obstacle to his being able to use his whole force to that end. to satisfy the full conception of a limited object, one of two conditions is essential. firstly, it must be not merely limited in area, but of really limited political importance; and secondly, it must be so situated as to be strategically isolated or to be capable of being reduced to practical isolation by strategical operations. unless this condition exists, it is in the power of either belligerent, as clausewitz himself saw, to pass to unlimited war if he so desires, and, ignoring the territorial objective, to strike at the heart of his enemy and force him to desist. if, then, we only regard war between contiguous continental states, in which the object is the conquest of territory on either of their frontiers, we get no real generic difference between limited and unlimited war. the line between them is in any case too shadowy or unstable to give a classification of any solidity. it is a difference of degree rather than of kind. if, on the other hand, we extend our view to wars between worldwide empires, the distinction at once becomes organic. possessions which lie oversea or at the extremities of vast areas of imperfectly settled territory are in an entirely different category from those limited objects which clausewitz contemplated. history shows that they can never have the political importance of objects which are organically part of the european system, and it shows further that they can be isolated by naval action sufficiently to set up the conditions of true limited war. jomini approaches the point, but without clearly detaching it. in his chapter "on great invasions and distant expeditions," he points out how unsafe it is to take the conditions of war between contiguous states and apply them crudely to cases where the belligerents are separated by large areas of land or sea. he hovers round the sea factor, feeling how great a difference it makes, but without getting close to the real distinction. his conception of the inter-action of fleets and armies never rises above their actual co-operation in touch one with the other in a distant theatre. he has in mind the assistance which the british fleet afforded wellington in the peninsula, and napoleon's dreams of asiatic conquest, pronouncing such distant invasions as impossible in modern times except perhaps in combination with a powerful fleet that could provide the army of invasion with successive advanced bases. of the paramount value of the fleet's isolating and preventive functions he gives no hint. even when he deals with oversea expeditions, as he does at some length, his grip of the point is no closer. it is indeed significant of how entirely continental thought had failed to penetrate the subject that in devoting over thirty pages to an enumeration of the principles of oversea expeditions, he, like clausewitz, does not so much as mention the conquest of canada; and yet it is the leading case of a weak military power succeeding by the use of the limited form of war in forcing its will upon a strong one, and succeeding because it was able by naval action to secure its home defence and isolate the territorial object. for our ideas of true limited objects, therefore, we must leave the continental theatres and turn to mixed or maritime wars. we have to look to such cases as canada and havana in the seven years' war, and cuba in the spanish-american war, cases in which complete isolation of the object by naval action was possible, or to such examples as the crimea and korea, where sufficient isolation was attainable by naval action owing to the length and difficulty of the enemy's land communications and to the strategical situation of the territory at stake. these examples will also serve to illustrate and enforce the second essential of this kind of war. as has been already said, for a true limited object we must have not only the power of isolation, but also the power by a secure home defence of barring an unlimited counterstroke. in all the above cases this condition existed. in all of them the belligerents had no contiguous frontiers, and this point is vital. for it is obvious that if two belligerents have a common frontier, it is open to the superior of them, no matter how distant or how easy to isolate the limited object may be, to pass at will to unlimited war by invasion. this process is even possible when the belligerents are separated by a neutral state, since the territory of a weak neutral will be violated if the object be of sufficient importance, or if the neutral be too strong to coerce, there still remains the possibility that his alliance may be secured. we come, then, to this final proposition--that limited war is only permanently possible to island powers or between powers which are separated by sea, and then only when the power desiring limited war is able to command the sea to such a degree as to be able not only to isolate the distant object, but also to render impossible the invasion of his home territory. here, then, we reach the true meaning and highest military value of what we call the command of the sea, and here we touch the secret of england's success against powers so greatly superior to herself in military strength. it is only fitting that such a secret should have been first penetrated by an englishman. for so it was, though it must be said that except in the light of clausewitz's doctrine the full meaning of bacon's famous aphorism is not revealed. "this much is certain," said the great elizabethan on the experience of our first imperial war; "he that commands the sea is at great liberty and may take as much or as little of the war as he will, whereas those that be strongest by land are many times nevertheless in great straits." it would be difficult to state more pithily the ultimate significance of clausewitz's doctrine. its cardinal truth is clearly indicated--that limited wars do not turn upon the armed strength of the belligerents, but upon the amount of that strength which they are able or willing to bring to bear at the decisive point. it is much to be regretted that clausewitz did not live to see with bacon's eyes and to work out the full comprehensiveness of his doctrine. his ambition was to formulate a theory which would explain all wars. he believed he had done so, and yet it is clear he never knew how complete was his success, nor how wide was the field he had covered. to the end it would seem he was unaware that he had found an explanation of one of the most inscrutable problems in history--the expansion of england--at least so far as it has been due to successful war. that a small country with a weak army should have been able to gather to herself the most desirable regions of the earth, and to gather them at the expense of the greatest military powers, is a paradox to which such powers find it hard to be reconciled. the phenomenon seemed always a matter of chance-an accident without any foundation in the essential constants of war. it remained for clausewitz, unknown to himself, to discover that explanation, and he reveals it to us in the inherent strength of limited war when means and conditions are favourable for its use. we find, then, if we take a wider view than was open to clausewitz and submit his latest ideas to the test of present imperial conditions, so far from failing to cover the ground they gain a fuller meaning and a firmer basis. apply them to maritime warfare and it becomes clear that his distinction between limited and unlimited war does not rest alone on the moral factor. a war may be limited not only because the importance of the object is too limited to call forth the whole national force, but also because the sea may be made to present an insuperable physical obstacle to the whole national force being brought to bear. that is to say, a war may be limited physically by the strategical isolation of the object, as well as morally by its comparative unimportance. * * * * * chapter five wars of intervention-- limited interference in unlimited war * * * * * before leaving the general consideration of limited war, we have still to deal with a form of it that has not yet been mentioned. clausewitz gave it provisionally the name of "war limited by contingent," and could find no place for it in his system. it appeared to him to differ essentially from war limited by its political object, or as jomini put it, war with a territorial object. yet it had to be taken into account and explained, if only for the part it had played in european history. for us it calls for the most careful examination, not only because it baffled the great german strategist to reconcile it with his theory of war, but also because it is the form in which great britain most successfully demonstrated the potentiality for direct continental interference of a small army acting in conjunction with a dominant fleet. the combined operations which were the normal expression of the british method of making war on the limited basis were of two main classes. firstly, there were those designed purely for the conquest of the objects for which we went to war, which were usually colonial or distant oversea territory; and secondly, operations more or less upon the european seaboard designed not for permanent conquest, but as a method of disturbing our enemy's plans and strengthening the hands of our allies and our own position. such operations might take the form of insignificant coastal diversions, or they might rise through all degrees of importance till, as in wellington's operations in the peninsula, they became indistinguishable in form from regular continental warfare. it would seem, therefore, that these operations were distinguished not so much by the nature of the object as by the fact that we devoted to them, not the whole of our military strength, but only a certain part of it which was known as our "disposal force." consequently, they appear to call for some such special classification, and to fall naturally into the category which clausewitz called "war limited by contingent." it was a nature of war well enough known in another form on the continent. during the eighteenth century there had been a large number of cases of war actually limited by contingent--that is, cases where a country not having a vital interest in the object made war by furnishing the chief belligerent with an auxiliary force of a stipulated strength. it was in the sixth chapter of his last book that clausewitz intended to deal with this anomalous form of hostility. his untimely death, however, has left us with no more than a fragment, in which he confesses that such cases are "embarrassing to his theory." if, he adds, the auxiliary force were placed unreservedly at the disposal of the chief belligerent, the problem would be simple enough. it would then, in effect, be the same thing as unlimited war with the aid of a subsidised force. but in fact, as he observes, this seldom happened, for the contingent was always more or less controlled in accordance with the special political aims of the government which furnished it. consequently, the only conclusion he succeeded in reaching was that it was a form of war that had to be taken into account, and that it was a form of limited war that appeared to differ essentially from war limited by object. we are left, in fact, with an impression that there must be two kinds of limited war. but if we pursue his historical method and examine the cases in which this nature of war was successful, and those in which it was unsuccessful, we shall find that wherever success is taken as an index of its legitimate employment, the practical distinction between the two kinds of limited war tends to disappear. the indications are that where the essential factors which justify the use of war limited by object are present in war limited by contingent, then that form of war tends to succeed, but not otherwise. we are brought, in fact, to this proposition, that the distinction "limited by contingent" is not one that is inherent in war, and is quite out of line with the theory in hand--that, in reality, it is not a _form_ of war, but a _method_ which may be employed either for limited or unlimited war. in other words, war limited by contingent, if it is to be regarded as a legitimate form of war at all, must take frankly the one shape or the other. either the contingent must act as an organic unit of the force making unlimited war without any reservations whatever, or else it should be given a definite territorial object, with an independent organisation and an independent limited function. our own experience seems to indicate that war by contingent or war with "a disposal force" attains the highest success when it approaches most closely to true limited war--that is, as in the case of the peninsula and the crimea, where its object is to wrest or secure from the enemy a definite piece of territory that to a greater or less extent can be isolated by naval action. its operative power, in fact, appears to bear some direct relation to the intimacy with which naval and military action can be combined to give the contingent a weight and mobility that are beyond its intrinsic power. if, then, we would unravel the difficulties of war limited by contingent, it seems necessary to distinguish between the continental and the british form of it. the continental form, as we have seen, differs but little in conception from unlimited war. the contingent is furnished at least ostensibly with the idea that it is to be used by the chief belligerent to assist him in overthrowing the common enemy, and that its objective will be the enemy's organised forces or his capital. or it may be that the contingent is to be used as an army of observation to prevent a counterstroke, so as to facilitate and secure the main offensive movement of the chief belligerent. in either case, however small may be our contribution to the allied force, we are using the unlimited form and aiming at an unlimited and not a mere territorial object. if now we turn to british experience of war limited by contingent, we find that the continental form has frequently been used, but we also find it almost invariably accompanied by a popular repugnance, as though there were something in it antagonistic to the national instinct. a leading case is the assistance we sent to frederick the great in the seven years' war. at the opening of the war, so great was the popular repugnance that the measure was found impossible, and it was not till frederick's dazzling resistance to the catholic powers had clothed him with the glory of a protestant hero, that pitt could do what he wanted. the old religious fire was stirred. the most potent of all national instincts kindled the people to a generous warmth which overcame their inborn antipathy to continental operations, and it was possible to send a substantial contingent to frederick's assistance. in the end the support fully achieved its purpose, but it must be noted that even in this case the operations were limited not only by contingent but also by object. it is true that frederick was engaged in an unlimited war in which the continued existence of prussia was at stake, and that the british force was an organic element in his war plan. nevertheless, it formed part of a british subsidised army under prince ferdinand of brunswick, who though nominated by frederick was a british commander-in-chief. his army was in organisation entirely distinct from that of frederick, and it was assigned the very definite and limited function of preventing the french occupying hanover and so turning the prussian right flank. finally it must be noted that its ability to perform this function was due to the fact that the theatre of operations assigned to it was such that in no probable event could it lose touch with the sea, nor could the enemy cut its lines of supply and retreat. these features of the enterprise should be noted. they differentiate it from our earlier use of war limited by contingent in the continental manner, of which marlborough's campaigns were typical, and they exhibit the special form which marlborough would have chosen had political exigencies permitted and which was to become characteristic of british effort from pitt's time onward. in the method of our greatest war minister we have not only the limit by contingent but also the limit of a definite and independent function, and finally we have touch with the sea. this is the really vital factor, and upon it, as will presently appear, depends the strength of the method. in the earlier part of the great war we employed the same form in our operations in north-western europe. there we had also the limited function of securing holland, and also complete touch with the sea, but our theatre of operations was not independent. intimate concerted action with other forces was involved, and the result in every case was failure. later on in sicily, where absolute isolation was attainable, the strength of the method enabled us to achieve a lasting result with very slender means. but the result was purely defensive. it was not till the peninsular war developed that we found a theatre for war limited by contingent in which all the conditions that make for success were present. even there so long as our army was regarded as a contingent auxiliary to the spanish army the usual failure ensued. only in portugal, the defence of which was a true limited object, and where we had a sea-girt theatre independent of extraneous allies, was success achieved from the first. so strong was the method here, and so exhausting the method which it forced on the enemy, that the local balance of force was eventually reversed and we were able to pass to a drastic offensive. the real secret of wellington's success--apart from his own genius--was that in perfect conditions he was applying the limited form to an unlimited war. our object was unlimited. it was nothing less than the overthrow of napoleon. complete success at sea had failed to do it, but that success had given us the power of applying the limited form, which was the most decisive form of offence within our means. its substantial contribution to the final achievement of the object is now universally recognised. the general result, then, of these considerations is that war by contingent in the continental form seldom or never differs generically from unlimited war, for the conditions required by limited war are seldom or never present. but what may be called the british or maritime form is in fact the application of the limited method to the unlimited form, as ancillary to the larger operations of our allies--a method which has usually been open to us because the control of the sea has enabled us to select a theatre in effect truly limited.[ ] [ ] wellington's view of the essential factor was expressed to rear admiral martin, who was sent to spain by the admiralty to confer with him in september . "if anyone," he said, "wishes to know the history of this war, i will tell them it is our maritime superiority gives me the power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so." (_letters of sir t. byam martin_) [navy records society], ii, p. . but what if the conditions of the struggle in which we wish to intervene are such that no truly limited theatre is available? in that case we have to choose between placing a contingent frankly at the disposal of our ally, or confining ourselves to coastal diversion, as we did at frederick the great's request in the early campaigns of the seven years' war. such operations can seldom be satisfactory to either party. the small positive results of our efforts to intervene in this way have indeed done more than anything to discredit this form of war, and to brand it as unworthy of a first-class power. yet the fact remains that all the great continental masters of war have feared or valued british intervention of this character even in the most unfavourable conditions. it was because they looked for its effects rather in the threat than in the performance. they did not reckon for positive results at all. so long as such intervention took an amphibious form they knew its disturbing effect upon a european situation was always out of all proportion to the intrinsic strength employed or the positive results it could give. its operative action was that it threatened positive results unless it were strongly met. its effect, in short, was negative. its value lay in its power of containing force greater than its own. that is all that can be claimed for it, but it may be all that is required. it is not the most drastic method of intervention, but it has proved itself the most drastic for a power whose forces are not adapted for the higher method. frederick the great was the first great soldier to recognise it, and napoleon was the last. for years he shut his eyes to it, laughed at it, covered it with a contempt that grew ever more irritable. in he called craig's expedition a "pygmy combination," yet the preparation of another combined force for an entirely different destination caused him to see the first as an advance guard of a movement he could not ignore, and he sacrificed his fleet in an impotent effort to deal with it. it was not, however, till four years later that he was forced to place on record his recognition of the principle. then, curiously enough, he was convinced by an expedition which we have come to regard as above all others condemnatory of amphibious operations against the continent. the walcheren expedition is now usually held as the leading case of fatuous war administration. historians can find no words too bad for it. they ignore the fact that it was a step--the final and most difficult step--in our post-trafalgar policy of using the army to perfect our command of the sea against a fleet acting stubbornly on the defensive. it began with copenhagen in . it failed at the dardanelles because fleet and army were separated; it succeeded at lisbon and at cadiz by demonstration alone. walcheren, long contemplated, had been put off till the last as the most formidable and the least pressing. napoleon had been looking for the attempt ever since the idea was first broached in this country, but as time passed and the blow did not fall, the danger came to be more and more ignored. finally, the moment came when he was heavily engaged in austria and forced to call up the bulk of his strength to deal with the archduke charles. the risks were still great, but the british government faced them boldly with open eyes. it was now or never. they were bent on developing their utmost military strength in the peninsula, and so long as a potent and growing fleet remained in the north sea it would always act as an increasing drag on such development. the prospective gain of success was in the eyes of the government out of all proportion to the probable loss by failure. so when napoleon least expected it they determined to act, and caught him napping. the defences of antwerp had been left incomplete. there was no army to meet the blow--nothing but a polyglot rabble without staff or even officers. for a week at least success was in our hands. napoleon's fleet only escaped by twenty-four hours, and yet the failure was not only complete but disastrous. still so entirely were the causes of failure accidental, and so near had it come to success, that napoleon received a thorough shock and looked for a quick repetition of the attempt. so seriously indeed did he regard his narrow escape that he found himself driven to reconsider his whole system of home defence. not only did he deem it necessary to spend large sums in increasing the fixed defences of antwerp and toulon, but his director of conscription was called upon to work out a scheme for providing a permanent force of no less than , men from the national guard to defend the french coasts. "with , men in transports at the downs," the emperor wrote, "the english can paralyse , of my army, and that will reduce us to the rank of a second-class power."[ ] [ ] _correspondance de napoléon_, xix, , september. the concentration of the british efforts in the peninsula apparently rendered the realisation of this project unnecessary--that is, our line of operation was declared and the threat ceased. but none the less napoleon's recognition of the principle remains on record--not in one of his speeches made for some ulterior purpose, but in a staff order to the principal officer concerned. it is generally held that modern developments in military organisation and transport will enable a great continental power to ignore such threats. napoleon ignored them in the past, but only to verify the truth that in war to ignore a threat is too often to create an opportunity. such opportunities may occur late or early. as both lord ligonier and wolfe laid it down for such operations, surprise is not necessarily to be looked for at the beginning. we have usually had to create or wait for our opportunity--too often because we were either not ready or not bold enough to seize the first that occurred. the cases in which such intervention has been most potent have been of two classes. firstly, there is the intrusion into a war plan which our enemy has designed without allowing for our intervention, and to which he is irrevocably committed by his opening movements. secondly, there is intervention to deprive the enemy of the fruits of victory. this form finds its efficacy in the principle that unlimited wars are not always decided by the destruction of armies. there usually remains the difficult work of conquering the people afterwards with an exhausted army. the intrusion of a small fresh force from the sea in such cases may suffice to turn the scale, as it did in the peninsula, and as, in the opinion of some high authorities, it might have done in france in . such a suggestion will appear to be almost heretical as sinning against the principle which condemns a strategical reserve. we say that the whole available force should be developed for the vital period of the struggle. no one can be found to dispute it nowadays. it is too obviously true when it is a question of a conflict between organised forces, but in the absence of all proof we are entitled to doubt whether it is true for that exhausting and demoralising period which lies beyond the shock of armies. * * * * * chapter six conditions of strength in limited war * * * * * the elements of strength in limited war are closely analogous to those generally inherent in defence. that is to say, that as a correct use of defence will sometimes enable an inferior force to gain its end against a superior one, so are there instances in which the correct use of the limited form of war has enabled a weak military power to attain success against a much stronger one, and these instances are too numerous to permit us to regard the results as accidental. an obvious element of strength is that where the geographical conditions are favourable we are able by the use of our navy to restrict the amount of force our army will have to deal with. we can in fact bring up our fleet to redress the adverse balance of our land force. but apart from this very practical reason there is another, which is rooted in the first principles of strategy. it is that limited war permits the use of the defensive without its usual drawbacks to a degree that is impossible in unlimited war. these drawbacks are chiefly that it tends to surrender the initiative to the enemy and that it deprives us of the moral exhilaration of the offensive. but in limited war, as we shall see, this need not be the case, and if without making these sacrifices we are able to act mainly on the defensive our position becomes exceedingly strong. the proposition really admits of no doubt. for even if we be not in whole-hearted agreement with clausewitz's doctrine of the strength of defence, still we may at least accept moltke's modification of it. he held that the strongest form of war--that is, the form which economically makes for the highest development of strength in a given force--is strategic offensive combined with tactical defensive. now these are in effect the conditions which limited war should give--that is, if the theatre and method be rightly chosen. let it be remembered that the use of this form of war presupposes that we are able by superior readiness or mobility or by being more conveniently situated to establish ourselves in the territorial object before our opponent can gather strength to prevent us. this done, we have the initiative, and the enemy being unable by hypothesis to attack us at home, must conform to our opening by endeavouring to turn us out. we are in a position to meet his attack on ground of our own choice and to avail ourselves of such opportunities of counter-attack as his distant and therefore exhausting offensive movements are likely to offer. assuming, as in our own case we always must assume, that the territorial object is sea-girt and our enemy is not able to command the sea, such opportunities are certain to present themselves, and even if they are not used will greatly embarrass the main attack--as was abundantly shown in the russian nervousness during their advance into the liaotung peninsula, due to the fear of a counter-stroke from the gulf of pe-chi-li. the actual situation which this method of procedure sets up is that our major strategy is offensive--that is, our main movement is positive, having for its aim the occupation of the territorial object. the minor strategy that follows should be in its general lines defensive, designed, so soon as the enemy sets about dislodging us, to develop the utmost energy of counter-attack which our force and opportunities justify. now if we consider that by universal agreement it is no longer possible in the present conditions of land warfare to draw a line between tactics and minor strategy, we have in our favour for all practical purposes the identical position which moltke regarded as constituting the strongest form of war. that is to say, our major strategy is offensive and our minor strategy is defensive. if, then, the limited form of war has this element of strength over and above the unlimited form, it must be correct to use it when we are not strong enough to use the more exhausting form and when the object is limited; just as much as it is correct to use the defensive when our object is negative and we are too weak for the offensive. the point is of the highest importance, for it is a direct negation of the current doctrine that in war there can be but one legitimate object, the overthrow of the enemy's means of resistance, and that the primary objective must always be his armed forces. it raises in fact the whole question as to whether it is not sometimes legitimate and even correct to aim directly at the ulterior object of the war. an impression appears to prevail--in spite of all that clausewitz and jomini had to say on the point--that the question admits of only one answer. von der goltz, for instance, is particularly emphatic in asserting that the overthrow of the enemy must always be the object in modern war. he lays it down as "the first principle of modern warfare," that "the immediate objective against which all our efforts must be directed is the hostile main army." similarly prince kraft has the maxim that "the first aim should be to overcome the enemy's army. everything else, the occupation of the country, &c., only comes in the second line." it will be observed that he here admits that the process of occupying the enemy's territory is an operation distinct from the overthrow of the enemy's force. von der goltz goes further, and protests against the common error of regarding the annihilation of the enemy's principal army as synonymous with the complete attainment of the object. he is careful to assert that the current doctrine only holds good "when the two belligerent states are of approximately the same nature." if, then, there are cases in which the occupation of territory must be undertaken as an operation distinct from defeating the enemy's forces, and if in such cases the conditions are such that we can occupy the territory with advantage without first defeating the enemy, it is surely mere pedantry to insist that we should put off till to-morrow what we can do better to-day. if the occupation of the enemy's whole territory is involved, or even a substantial part of it, the german principle of course holds good, but all wars are not of that character. insistence on the principle of "overthrow," and even its exaggeration, was of value, in its day, to prevent a recurrence to the old and discredited methods. but its work is done, and blind adherence to it without regard to the principles on which it rests tends to turn the art of war into mere bludgeon play. clausewitz, at any rate, as general von caemmerer has pointed out,[ ] was far too practical a soldier to commit himself to so abstract a proposition in all its modern crudity. if it were true, it would never be possible for a weaker power to make successful war against a stronger one in any cause whatever--a conclusion abundantly refuted by historical experience. that the higher form like the offensive is the more drastic is certain, if conditions are suitable for its use, but clausewitz, it must be remembered, distinctly lays it down that such conditions presuppose in the belligerent employing the higher form a great physical or moral superiority or a great spirit of enterprise--an innate propensity for extreme hazards. jomini did not go even so far as this. he certainly would have ruled out "an innate propensity to extreme hazards," for in his judgment it was this innate propensity which led napoleon to abuse the higher form to his own undoing. so entirely indeed does history, no less than theory, fail to support the idea of the one answer, that it would seem that even in germany a reaction to clausewitz's real teaching is beginning. in expounding it von caemmerer says, "since the majority of the most prominent military authors of our time uphold the principle that in war our efforts must always be directed to their utmost limits and that a deliberate employment of lower means betrays more or less weakness, i feel bound to declare that the wideness of clausewitz's views have inspired me with a high degree of admiration." [ ] _development of strategical science._ now what clausewitz held precisely was this--that when the conditions are not favourable for the use of the higher form, the seizure of a small part of the enemy's territory may be regarded as a correct alternative to destroying his armed forces. but he clearly regards this form of war only as a make-shift. his purely continental outlook prevented his considering that there might be cases where the object was actually so limited in character that the lower form of war would be at once the more effective and the more economical to use. in continental warfare, as we have seen, such cases can hardly occur, but they tend to declare themselves strongly when the maritime factor is introduced to any serious extent. the tendency of british warfare to take the lower or limited form has always been as clearly marked as is the opposite tendency on the continent. to attribute such a tendency, as is sometimes the fashion, to an inherent lack of warlike spirit is sufficiently contradicted by the results it has achieved. there is no reason indeed to put it down to anything but a sagacious instinct for the kind of war that best accords with the conditions of our existence. so strong has this instinct been that it has led us usually to apply the lower form not only where the object of the war was a well-defined territorial one, but to cases in which its correctness was less obvious. as has been explained in the last chapter, we have applied it, and applied it on the whole with success, when we have been acting in concert with continental allies for an unlimited object--where, that is, the common object has been the overthrow of the common enemy. the choice between the two forms really depends upon the circumstances of each case. we have to consider whether the political object is in fact limited, whether if unlimited in the abstract it can be reduced to a concrete object that is limited, and finally whether the strategical conditions are such as lend themselves to the successful application of the limited form. what we require now is to determine those conditions with greater exactness, and this will be best done by changing our method to the concrete and taking a leading case. the one which presents them in their clearest and simplest form is without doubt the recent war between russia and japan. here we have a particularly striking example of a small power having forced her will upon a much greater power without "overthrowing" her--that is, without having crushed her power of resistance. that was entirely beyond the strength of japan. so manifest was the fact that everywhere upon the continent, where the overthrow of your enemy was regarded as the only admissible form of war, the action of the japanese in resorting to hostilities was regarded as madness. only in england, with her tradition and instinct for what an island power may achieve by the lower means, was japan considered to have any reasonable chance of success. the case is particularly striking; for every one felt that the real object of the war was in the abstract unlimited, that it was in fact to decide whether russia or japan was to be the predominant power in the far east. like the franco-german war of it had all the aspect of what the germans call "a trial of strength." such a war is one which above all appears incapable of decision except by the complete overthrow of the one power or the other. there was no complication of alliances nor any expectation of them. the anglo-japanese treaty had isolated the struggle. if ever issue hung on the sheer fighting force of the two belligerents it would seem to have been this one. after the event we are inclined to attribute the result to the moral qualities and superior training and readiness of the victors. these qualities indeed played their part, and they must not be minimised; but who will contend that if japan had tried to make her war with russia, as napoleon made his, she could have fared even as well as he did? she had no such preponderance as clausewitz laid down as a condition precedent to attempting the overthrow of her enemy--the employment of unlimited war. fortunately for her the circumstances did not call for the employment of such extreme means. the political and geographical conditions were such that she was able to reduce the intangible object of asserting her prestige to the purely concrete form of a territorial objective. the penetration of russia into manchuria threatened the absorption of korea into the russian empire, and this japan regarded as fatal to her own position and future development. her power to maintain korean integrity would be the outward and visible sign of her ability to assert herself as a pacific power. her abstract quarrel with russia could therefore be crystallised into a concrete objective in the same way as the quarrel of the western powers with russia in crystallised into the concrete objective of sebastopol. in the japanese case the immediate political object was exceptionally well adapted for the use of limited war. owing to the geographical position of korea and to the vast and undeveloped territories which separate it from the centre of russian power, it could be practically isolated by naval action. further than this, it fulfilled the condition to which clausewitz attached the greatest importance--that is to say, the seizure of the particular object so far from weakening the home defence of japan would have the effect of greatly increasing the strength of her position. though offensive in effect and intention it was also, like frederick's seizure of saxony, a sound piece of defensive work. so far from exposing her heart, it served to cover it almost impregnably. the reason is plain. owing to the wide separation of the two russian arsenals at port arthur and vladivostock, with a defile controlled by japan interposed, the russian naval position was very faulty. the only way of correcting it was for russia to secure a base in the straits of korea, and for this she had been striving by diplomatic means at seoul for some time. strategically the integrity of korea was for japan very much what the integrity of the low countries was for us, but in the case of the low countries, since they were incapable of isolation, our power of direct action was always comparatively weak. portugal, with its unrivalled strategical harbour at lisbon, was an analogous case in our old oceanic wars, and since it was capable of being in a measure isolated from the strength of our great rival by naval means we were there almost uniformly successful. on the whole it must be said that notwithstanding the success we achieved in our long series of wars waged on a limited basis, in none of them were the conditions so favourable for us as in this case they were for japan. in none of them did our main offensive movement so completely secure our home defence. canada was as eccentric as possible to our line of home defence, while in the crimea so completely did our offensive uncover the british islands, that we had to supplement our movement against the limited object by sending our main fighting fleet to hold the exit of the baltic against the danger of an unlimited counter-stroke.[ ] [ ] the strategical object with which the baltic fleet was sent was certainly to prevent a counter-stroke--that is, its main function in our war plan was negative. its positive function was minor and diversionary only. it also had a political object as a demonstration to further our efforts to form a baltic coalition against russia, which entirely failed. public opinion mistaking the whole situation expected direct positive results from this fleet, even the capture of st. petersburg. such an operation would have converted the war from a limited one to an unlimited one. it would have meant the "overthrow of the enemy," a task quite beyond the strength of the allies without the assistance of the baltic powers, and even so their assistance would not have justified changing the nature of the war, unless both sweden and russia had been ready to make unlimited war and nothing was further from their intention. whether or not it was on this principle that the japanese conceived the war from the outset matters little. the main considerations are that with so favourable a territorial object as korea limited war was possible in its most formidable shape, that the war did in fact develop on limited lines, and that it was entirely successful. without waiting to secure the command of the sea, japan opened by a surprise seizure of seoul, and then under cover of minor operations of the fleet proceeded to complete her occupation of korea. as she faced the second stage, that of making good the defence of her conquest, the admirable nature of her geographical object was further displayed. the theoretical weakness of limited war at this point is the arrest of your offensive action. but in this case such arrest was neither necessary nor possible, and for these reasons. to render the conquest secure not only must the korean frontier be made inviolable, but korea must be permanently isolated by sea. this involved the destruction of the russian fleet, and this in its turn entailed the reduction of port arthur by military means. here, then, in the second stage japan found herself committed to two lines of operation with two distinct objectives, port arthur and the russian army that was slowly concentrating in manchuria--a thoroughly vicious situation. so fortunate, however, was the geographical conformation of the theatre that by promptitude and the bold use of an uncommanded sea it could be reduced to something far more correct. by continuing the advance of the korean army into manchuria and landing another force between it and the port arthur army the three corps could be concentrated and the vicious separation of the lines of operations turned to good account. they could be combined in such a way as to threaten an enveloping counter-attack on liao-yang before the russian offensive concentration could be completed. not only was liao-yang the russian point of concentration, but it also was a sound position both for defending korea and covering the siege of port arthur. once secured, it gave the japanese all the advantages of defence and forced the russians to exhaust themselves in offensive operations which were beyond their strength. nor was it only ashore that this advantage was gained. the success of the system, which culminated in the fall of port arthur, went further still. not only did it make japan relatively superior at sea, but it enabled her to assume a naval defensive and so to force the final naval decision on russia with every advantage of time, place, and strength in her own favour. by the battle of tsushima the territorial object was completely isolated by sea, and the position of japan in korea was rendered as impregnable as that of wellington at torres vedras. all that remained was to proceed to the third stage and demonstrate to russia that the acceptance of the situation that had been set up was more to her advantage than the further attempt to break it down. this the final advance to mukden accomplished, and japan obtained her end very far short of having overthrown her enemy. the offensive power of russia had never been so strong, while that of japan was almost if not quite exhausted. approached in this way, the far eastern struggle is seen to develop on the same lines as all our great maritime wars of the past, which continental strategists have so persistently excluded from their field of study. it presents the normal three phases--the initial offensive movement to seize the territorial object, the secondary phase, which forces an attenuated offensive on the enemy, and the final stage of pressure, in which there is a return to the offensive "according," as jomini puts it, "to circumstances and your relative force in order to obtain the cession desired." it must not of course be asked that these phases shall be always clearly defined. strategical analysis can never give exact results. it aims only at approximations, at groupings which will serve to guide but will always leave much to the judgment. the three phases in the russo-japanese war, though unusually well defined, continually overlapped. it must be so; for in war the effect of an operation is never confined to the limits of its immediate or primary intention. thus the occupation of korea had the secondary defensive effect of covering the home country, while the initial blow which admiral togo delivered at port arthur to cover the primary offensive movement proved, by the demoralisation it caused in the russian fleet, to be a distinct step in the secondary phase of isolating the conquest. in the later stages of the war the line between what was essential to set up the second phase of perfecting the isolation and the third phase of general pressure seems to have grown very nebulous. it was at this stage that the japanese strategy has been most severely criticised, and it was just here they seem to have lost hold of the conception of a limited war, if in fact they had ever securely grasped the conception as the elder pitt understood it. it has been argued that in their eagerness to deal a blow at the enemy's main army they neglected to devote sufficient force to reduce port arthur, an essential step to complete the second phase. whether or not the exigencies of the case rendered such distribution of force inevitable or whether it was due to miscalculation of difficulties, the result was a most costly set-back. for not only did it entail a vast loss of time and life at port arthur itself, but when the sortie of the russian fleet in june brought home to them their error, the offensive movement on liao-yang had to be delayed, and the opportunity passed for a decisive counter-stroke at the enemy's concentration ashore. this misfortune, which was to cost the japanese so dear, may perhaps be attributed at least in part to the continental influences under which their army had been trained. we at least can trace the unlimited outlook in the pages of the german staff history. in dealing with the japanese plan of operations it is assumed that the occupation of korea and the isolation of port arthur were but preliminaries to a concentric advance on liao-yang, "which was kept in view as the first objective of the operations on land." but surely on every theory of the war the first objective of the japanese on land was seoul, where they expected to have to fight their first important action against troops advancing from the yalu; and surely their second was port arthur, with its fleet and arsenal, which they expected to reduce with little more difficulty than they had met with ten years before against the chinese. such at least was the actual progression of events, and a criticism which regards operations of such magnitude and ultimate importance as mere incidents of strategic deployment is only to be explained by the domination of the napoleonic idea of war, against the universal application of which clausewitz so solemnly protested. it is the work of men who have a natural difficulty in conceiving a war plan that does not culminate in a jena or a sedan. it is a view surely which is the child of theory, bearing no relation to the actuality of the war in question and affording no explanation of its ultimate success. the truth is, that so long as the japanese acted on the principles of limited war, as laid down by clausewitz and jomini and plainly deducible from our own rich experience, they progressed beyond all their expectations, but so soon as they departed from them and suffered themselves to be confused with continental theories they were surprised by unaccountable failure. the expression "limited war" is no doubt not entirely happy. yet no other has been found to condense the ideas of limited object and limited interest, which are its special characteristics. still if the above example be kept in mind as a typical case, the meaning of the term will not be mistaken. it only remains to emphasise one important point. the fact that the doctrine of limited war traverses the current belief that our primary objective must always be the enemy's armed forces is liable to carry with it a false inference that it also rejects the corollary that war means the use of battles. nothing is further from the conception. whatever the form of war, there is no likelihood of our ever going back to the old fallacy of attempting to decide wars by manoeuvres. all forms alike demand the use of battles. by our fundamental theory war is always "a continuation of political intercourse, in which fighting is substituted for writing notes." however great the controlling influence of the political object, it must never obscure the fact that it is by fighting we have to gain our end. it is the more necessary to insist on this point, for the idea of making a piece of territory your object is liable to be confused with the older method of conducting war, in which armies were content to manoeuvre for strategical positions, and a battle came almost to be regarded as a mark of bad generalship. with such parading limited war has nothing to do. its conduct differs only from that of unlimited war in that instead of having to destroy our enemy's whole power of resistance, we need only overthrow so much of his active force as he is able or willing to bring to bear in order to prevent or terminate our occupation of the territorial object. the first consideration, then, in entering on such a war is to endeavour to determine what the force will amount to. it will depend, firstly, on the importance the enemy attaches to the limited object, coupled with the nature and extent of his preoccupations elsewhere, and, secondly, it will depend upon the natural difficulties of his lines of communication and the extent to which we can increase those difficulties by our conduct of the initial operations. in favourable circumstances therefore (and here lies the great value of the limited form) we are able to control the amount of force we shall have to encounter. the most favourable circumstances and the only circumstances by which we ourselves can profit are such as permit the more or less complete isolation of the object by naval action, and such isolation can never be established until we have entirely overthrown the enemy's naval forces. here, then, we enter the field of naval strategy. we can now leave behind us the theory of war in general and, in order to pave the way to our final conclusions, devote our attention to the theory of naval warfare in particular. * * * * * part two theory of naval war * * * * * chapter one theory of the object-- command of the sea * * * * * the object of naval warfare must always be directly or indirectly either to secure the command of the sea or to prevent the enemy from securing it. the second part of the proposition should be noted with special care in order to exclude a habit of thought, which is one of the commonest sources of error in naval speculation. that error is the very general assumption that if one belligerent loses the command of the sea it passes at once to the other belligerent. the most cursory study of naval history is enough to reveal the falseness of such an assumption. it tells us that the most common situation in naval war is that neither side has the command; that the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea. the mere assertion, which no one denies, that the object of naval warfare is to get command of the sea actually connotes the proposition that the command is normally in dispute. it is this state of dispute with which naval strategy is most nearly concerned, for when the command is lost or won pure naval strategy comes to an end. this truth is so obvious that it would scarcely be worth mentioning were it not for the constant recurrence of such phrases as: "if england were to lose command of the sea, it would be all over with her." the fallacy of the idea is that it ignores the power of the strategical defensive. it assumes that if in the face of some extraordinary hostile coalition or through some extraordinary mischance we found ourselves without sufficient strength to keep the command, we should therefore be too weak to prevent the enemy getting it--a negation of the whole theory of war, which at least requires further support than it ever receives. and not only is this assumption a negation of theory; it is a negation both of practical experience and of the expressed opinion of our greatest masters. we ourselves have used the defensive at sea with success, as under william the third and in the war of american independence, while in our long wars with france she habitually used it in such a way that sometimes for years, though we had a substantial preponderance, we could not get command, and for years were unable to carry out our war plan without serious interruption from her fleet. so far from the defensive being a negligible factor at sea, or even the mere pestilent heresy it is generally represented, it is of course inherent in all war, and, as we have seen, the paramount questions of strategy both at sea and on land turn on the relative possibilities of offensive and defensive, and upon the relative proportions in which each should enter into our plan of war. at sea the most powerful and aggressively-minded belligerent can no more avoid his alternating periods of defence, which result from inevitable arrests of offensive action, than they can be avoided on land. the defensive, then, has to be considered; but before we are in a position to do so with profit, we have to proceed with our analysis of the phrase, "command of the sea," and ascertain exactly what it is we mean by it in war. in the first place, "command of the sea" is not identical in its strategical conditions with the conquest of territory. you cannot argue from the one to the other, as has been too commonly done. such phrases as the "conquest of water territory" and "making the enemy's coast our frontier" had their use and meaning in the mouths of those who framed them, but they are really little but rhetorical expressions founded on false analogy, and false analogy is not a secure basis for a theory of war. the analogy is false for two reasons, both of which enter materially into the conduct of naval war. you cannot conquer sea because it is not susceptible of ownership, at least outside territorial waters. you cannot, as lawyers say, "reduce it into possession," because you cannot exclude neutrals from it as you can from territory you conquer. in the second place, you cannot subsist your armed force upon it as you can upon enemy's territory. clearly, then, to make deductions from an assumption that command of the sea is analogous to conquest of territory is unscientific, and certain to lead to error. the only safe method is to inquire what it is we can secure for ourselves, and what it is we can deny the enemy by command of the sea. now, if we exclude fishery rights, which are irrelevant to the present matter, the only right we or our enemy can have on the sea is the right of passage; in other words, the only positive value which the high seas have for national life is as a means of communication. for the active life of a nation such means may stand for much or it may stand for little, but to every maritime state it has some value. consequently by denying an enemy this means of passage we check the movement of his national life at sea in the same kind of way that we check it on land by occupying his territory. so far the analogy holds good, but no further. so much for the positive value which the sea has in national life. it has also a negative value. for not only is it a means of communication, but, unlike the means of communication ashore, it is also a barrier. by winning command of the sea we remove that barrier from our own path, thereby placing ourselves in position to exert direct military pressure upon the national life of our enemy ashore, while at the same time we solidify it against him and prevent his exerting direct military pressure upon ourselves. command of the sea, therefore, means nothing but the control of maritime communications, whether for commercial or military purposes. the object of naval warfare is the control of communications, and not, as in land warfare, the conquest of territory. the difference is fundamental. true, it is rightly said that strategy ashore is mainly a question of communications, but they are communications in another sense. the phrase refers to the communications of the army alone, and not to the wider communications which are part of the life of the nation. but on land also there are communications of a kind which are essential to national life--the internal communications which connect the points of distribution. here again we touch an analogy between the two kinds of war. land warfare, as the most devoted adherents of the modern view admit, cannot attain its end by military victories alone. the destruction of your enemy's forces will not avail for certain unless you have in reserve sufficient force to complete the occupation of his inland communications and principal points of distribution. this power is the real fruit of victory, the power to strangle the whole national life. it is not until this is done that a high-spirited nation, whose whole heart is in the war, will consent to make peace and do your will. it is precisely in the same way that the command of the sea works towards peace, though of course in a far less coercive manner, against a continental state. by occupying her maritime communications and closing the points of distribution in which they terminate we destroy the national life afloat, and thereby check the vitality of that life ashore so far as the one is dependent on the other. thus we see that so long as we retain the power and right to stop maritime communications, the analogy between command of the sea and the conquest of territory is in this aspect very close. and the analogy is of the utmost practical importance, for on it turns the most burning question of maritime war, which it will be well to deal with in this place. it is obvious that if the object and end of naval warfare is the control of communications it must carry with it the right to forbid, if we can, the passage of both public and private property upon the sea. now the only means we have of enforcing such control of commercial communications at sea is in the last resort the capture or destruction of sea-borne property. such capture or destruction is the penalty which we impose upon our enemy for attempting to use the communications of which he does not hold the control. in the language of jurisprudence, it is the ultimate sanction of the interdict which we are seeking to enforce. the current term "commerce destruction" is not in fact a logical expression of the strategical idea. to make the position clear we should say "commerce prevention." the methods of this "commerce prevention" have no more connection with the old and barbarous idea of plunder and reprisal than orderly requisitions ashore have with the old idea of plunder and ravaging. no form of war indeed causes so little human suffering as the capture of property at sea. it is more akin to process of law, such as distress for rent, or execution of judgment, or arrest of a ship, than to a military operation. once, it is true, it was not so. in the days of privateers it was accompanied too often, and particularly in the mediterranean and the west indies, with lamentable cruelty and lawlessness, and the existence of such abuses was the real reason for the general agreement to the declaration of paris by which privateering was abolished. but it was not the only reason. the idea of privateering was a survival of a primitive and unscientific conception of war, which was governed mainly by a general notion of doing your enemy as much damage as possible and making reprisal for wrongs he had done you. to the same class of ideas belonged the practice of plunder and ravaging ashore. but neither of these methods of war was abolished for humanitarian reasons. they disappeared indeed as a general practice before the world had begun to talk of humanity. they were abolished because war became more scientific. the right to plunder and ravage was not denied. but plunder was found to demoralise your troops and unfit them for fighting, and ravaging proved to be a less powerful means of coercing your enemy than exploiting the occupied country by means of regular requisitions for the supply of your own army and the increase of its offensive range. in short, the reform arose from a desire to husband your enemy's resources for your own use instead of wantonly wasting them. in a similar way privateering always had a debilitating effect upon our own regular force. it greatly increased the difficulty of manning the navy, and the occasional large profits had a demoralising influence on detached cruiser commanders. it tended to keep alive the mediaeval corsair spirit at the expense of the modern military spirit which made for direct operations against the enemy's armed forces. it was inevitable that as the new movement of opinion gathered force it should carry with it a conviction that for operating against sea-borne trade sporadic attack could never be so efficient as an organised system of operations to secure a real strategical control of the enemy's maritime communications. a riper and sounder view of war revealed that what may be called tactical commercial blockade--that is, the blockade of ports--could be extended to and supplemented by a strategical blockade of the great trade routes. in moral principle there is no difference between the two. admit the principle of tactical or close blockade, and as between belligerents you cannot condemn the principle of strategical or distant blockade. except in their effect upon neutrals, there is no juridical difference between the two. why indeed should this humane yet drastic process of war be rejected at sea if the same thing is permitted on land? if on land you allow contributions and requisitions, if you permit the occupation of towns, ports, and inland communications, without which no conquest is complete and no effective war possible, why should you refuse similar procedure at sea where it causes far less individual suffering? if you refuse the right of controlling communications at sea, you must also refuse the right on land. if you admit the right of contributions on land, you must admit the right of capture at sea. otherwise you will permit to military powers the extreme rights of war and leave to the maritime powers no effective rights at all. their ultimate argument would be gone. in so far as the idea of abolishing private capture at sea is humanitarian, and in so far as it rests on a belief that it would strengthen our position as a commercial maritime state, let it be honourably dealt with. but so far as its advocates have as yet expressed themselves, the proposal appears to be based on two fallacies. one is, that you can avoid attack by depriving yourself of the power of offence and resting on defence alone, and the other, the idea that war consists entirely of battles between armies or fleets. it ignores the fundamental fact that battles are only the means of enabling you to do that which really brings wars to an end-that is, to exert pressure on the citizens and their collective life. "after shattering the hostile main army," says von der goltz, "we still have the forcing of a peace as a separate and, in certain circumstances, a more difficult task ... to make the enemy's country feel the burdens of war with such weight that the desire for peace will prevail. this is the point in which napoleon failed.... it may be necessary to seize the harbours, commercial centres, important lines of traffic, fortifications and arsenals, in other words, all important property necessary to the existence of the people and army." if, then, we are deprived of the right to use analogous means at sea, the object for which we fight battles almost ceases to exist. defeat the enemy's fleets as we may, he will be but little the worse. we shall have opened the way for invasion, but any of the great continental powers can laugh at our attempts to invade single-handed. if we cannot reap the harvest of our success by deadening his national activities at sea, the only legitimate means of pressure within our strength will be denied us. our fleet, if it would proceed with such secondary operations as are essential for forcing a peace, will be driven to such barbarous expedients as the bombardment of seaport towns and destructive raids upon the hostile coasts. if the means of pressure which follow successful fighting were abolished both on land and sea there would be this argument in favour of the change, that it would mean perhaps for civilised states the entire cessation of war; for war would become so impotent, that no one would care to engage in it. it would be an affair between regular armies and fleets, with which the people had little concern. international quarrels would tend to take the form of the mediaeval private disputes which were settled by champions in trial by battle, an absurdity which led rapidly to the domination of purely legal procedure. if international quarrels could go the same way, humanity would have advanced a long stride. but the world is scarcely ripe for such a revolution. meanwhile to abolish the right of interference with the flow of private property at sea without abolishing the corresponding right ashore would only defeat the ends of humanitarians. the great deterrent, the most powerful check on war, would be gone. it is commerce and finance which now more than ever control or check the foreign policy of nations. if commerce and finance stand to lose by war, their influence for a peaceful solution will be great; and so long as the right of private capture at sea exists, they stand to lose in every maritime war immediately and inevitably whatever the ultimate result may be. abolish the right, and this deterrent disappears; nay, they will even stand to win immediate gains owing to the sudden expansion of government expenditure which the hostilities will entail, and the expansion of sea commerce which the needs of the armed forces will create. any such losses as maritime warfare under existing conditions must immediately inflict will be remote if interference with property is confined to the land. they will never indeed be serious except in the case of complete defeat, and no one enters upon war expecting defeat. it is in the hope of victory and gain that aggressive wars are born. the fear of quick and certain loss is their surest preventive. humanity, then, will surely beware how in a too hasty pursuit of peaceful ideals it lets drop the best weapon it has for scotching the evil it has as yet no power to kill. in what follows, therefore, it is intended to regard the right of private capture at sea as still subsisting. without it, indeed, naval warfare is almost inconceivable, and in any case no one has any experience of such a truncated method of war on which profitable study can be founded. the primary method, then, in which we use victory or preponderance at sea and bring it to bear on the enemy's population to secure peace, is by the capture or destruction of the enemy's property, whether public or private. but in comparing the process with the analogous occupation of territory and the levying of contributions and requisitions we have to observe a marked difference. both processes are what may be called economic pressure. but ashore the economic pressure can only be exerted as the consequence of victory or acquired domination by military success. at sea the process begins at once. indeed, more often than not, the first act of hostility in maritime wars has been the capture of private property at sea. in a sense this is also true ashore. the first step of an invader after crossing the frontier will be to control to a less or greater extent such private property as he is able to use for his purposes. but such interference with private property is essentially a military act, and does not belong to the secondary phase of economic pressure. at sea it does, and the reason why this should be so lies in certain fundamental differences between land and sea warfare which are implicit in the communication theory of naval war. to elucidate the point, it must be repeated that maritime communications, which are the root of the idea of command of the sea, are not analogous to military communications in the ordinary use of the term. military communications refer solely to the army's lines of supply and retreat. maritime communications have a wider meaning. though in effect embracing the lines of fleet supply, they correspond in strategical values not to military lines of supply, but to those internal lines of communication by which the flow of national life is maintained ashore. consequently maritime communications are on a wholly different footing from land communications. at sea the communications are, for the most part, common to both belligerents, whereas ashore each possesses his own in his own territory. the strategical effect is of far-reaching importance, for it means that at sea strategical offence and defence tend to merge in a way that is unknown ashore. since maritime communications are common, we as a rule cannot attack those of the enemy without defending our own. in military operations the converse is the rule. normally, an attack on our enemy's communications tends to expose their own. the theory of common communications will become clear by taking an example. in our wars with france our communications with the mediterranean, india, and america ran down from the channel mouth past finisterre and st. vincent; and those of france, at least from her atlantic ports, were identical for almost their entire distance. in our wars with the dutch the identity was even closer. even in the case of spain, her great trade routes followed the same lines as our own for the greater part of their extent. consequently the opening moves which we generally made to defend our trade by the occupation of those lines placed us in a position to attack our enemy's trade. the same situation arose even when our opening dispositions were designed as defence against home invasion or against attacks upon our colonies, for the positions our fleet had to take up to those ends always lay on or about the terminal and focal points of trade routes. whether our immediate object were to bring the enemy's main fleets to action or to exercise economic pressure, it made but little difference. if the enemy were equally anxious to engage, it was at one of the terminal or focal areas we were almost certain to get contact. if he wished to avoid a decision, the best way to force him to action was to occupy his trade routes at the same vital points. thus it comes about that, whereas on land the process of economic pressure, at least in the modern conception of war, should only begin after decisive victory, at sea it starts automatically from the first. indeed such pressure may be the only means of forcing the decision we seek, as will appear more clearly when we come to deal with the other fundamental difference between land and sea warfare. meanwhile we may note that at sea the use of economic pressure from the commencement is justified for two reasons. the first is, as we have seen, that it is an economy of means to use our defensive positions for attack when attack does not vitiate those positions, and it will not vitiate them if fleet cruisers operate with restraint. the second is, that interference with the enemy's trade has two aspects. it is not only a means of exerting the secondary economic pressure, it is also a primary means towards overthrowing the enemy's power of resistance. wars are not decided exclusively by military and naval force. finance is scarcely less important. when other things are equal, it is the longer purse that wins. it has even many times redressed an unfavourable balance of armed force and given victory to the physically weaker power. anything, therefore, which we are able to achieve towards crippling our enemy's finance is a direct step to his overthrow, and the most effective means we can employ to this end against a maritime state is to deny him the resources of seaborne trade. it will be seen, therefore, that in naval warfare, however closely we may concentrate our efforts on the destruction of our enemy's armed forces as the direct means to his overthrow, it would be folly to stay our hands when opportunities occur, as they will automatically, for undermining his financial position on which the continued vigour of those armed forces so largely depends. thus the occupation of our enemy's sea communications and the confiscatory operations it connotes are in a sense primary operations, and not, as on land, secondary. such, then, are the abstract conclusions at which we arrive in our attempt to analyse the idea of command of the sea and to give it precision as the control of common communications. their concrete value will appear when we come to deal with the various forms which naval operations may take, such as, "seeking out the enemy's fleet," blockade, attack and defence of trade, and the safeguarding of combined expeditions. for the present it remains to deal with the various kinds of sea command which flow from the communication idea. if the object of the command of the sea is to control communications, it is obvious it may exist in various degrees. we may be able to control the whole of the common communications as the result either of great initial preponderance or of decisive victory. if we are not sufficiently strong to do this, we may still be able to control some of the communications; that is, our control may be general or local. obvious as the point is, it needs emphasising, because of a maxim that has become current that "the sea is all one." like other maxims of the kind, it conveys a truth with a trail of error in its wake. the truth it contains seems to be simply this, that as a rule local control can only avail us temporarily, for so long as the enemy has a sufficient fleet anywhere, it is theoretically in his power to overthrow our control of any special sea area. it amounts indeed to little more than a rhetorical expression, used to emphasise the high mobility of fleets as contrasted with that of armies and the absence of physical obstacles to restrict that mobility. that this vital feature of naval warfare should be consecrated in a maxim is well, but when it is caricatured into a doctrine, as it sometimes is, that you cannot move a battalion oversea till you have entirely overthrown your enemy's fleet, it deserves gibbeting. it would be as wise to hold that in war you must never risk anything. it would seem to have been the evil influence of this travestied maxim which had much to do with the cramped and timorous strategy of the americans in their late war with spain. they had ample naval force to secure such a local and temporary command of the gulf of mexico as to have justified them at once in throwing all the troops they had ready into cuba to support the insurgents, in accordance with their war plan. they had also sufficient strength to ensure that the communications with the expeditionary force could not be interrupted permanently. and yet, because the spaniards had an undefeated fleet at sea somewhere, they hesitated, and were nearly lost. the japanese had no such illusions. without having struck a naval blow of any kind, and with a hostile fleet actually within the theatre of operations, they started their essential military movement oversea, content that though they might not be able to secure the control of the line of passage, they were in a position to deny effective control to the enemy. our own history is full of such operations. there are cases in plenty where the results promised by a successful military blow oversea, before permanent command had been obtained, were great enough to justify a risk which, like the japanese, we knew how to minimise by judicious use of our favourable geographical position, and of a certain system of protection, which must be dealt with later. for the purpose, then, of framing a plan of war or campaign, it must be taken that command may exist in various states or degrees, each of which has its special possibilities and limitations. it may be general or local, and it may be permanent or temporary. general command may be permanent or temporary, but mere local command, except in very favourable geographical conditions, should scarcely ever be regarded as more than temporary, since normally it is always liable to interruption from other theatres so long as the enemy possesses an effective naval force. finally, it has to be noted that even permanent general command can never in practice be absolute. no degree of naval superiority can ensure our communications against sporadic attack from detached cruisers, or even raiding squadrons if they be boldly led and are prepared to risk destruction. even after hawke's decisive victory at quiberon had completed the overthrow of the enemy's sea forces, a british transport was captured between cork and portsmouth, and an indiaman in sight of the lizard, while wellington's complaints in the peninsula of the insecurity of his communications are well known.[ ] by general and permanent control we do not mean that the enemy can do nothing, but that he cannot interfere with our maritime trade and oversea operations so seriously as to affect the issue of the war, and that he cannot carry on his own trade and operations except at such risk and hazard as to remove them from the field of practical strategy. in other words, it means that the enemy can no longer attack our lines of passage and communication effectively, and that he cannot use or defend his own. [ ] in justice to wellington, it should be said that his complaints were due to false reports that exaggerated a couple of insignificant captures into a serious interruption. to complete our equipment for appreciating any situation for which operations have to be designed, it is necessary to remember that when the command is in dispute the general conditions may give a stable or an unstable equilibrium. it may be that the power of neither side preponderates to any appreciable extent. it may also be that the preponderance is with ourselves, or it may be that it lies with the enemy. such preponderance of course will not depend entirely on actual relative strength, either physical or moral, but will be influenced by the inter-relation of naval positions and the comparative convenience of their situation in regard to the object of the war or campaign. by naval positions we mean, firstly, naval bases and, secondly, the terminals of the greater lines of communication or trade-routes and the focal areas where they tend to converge, as at finisterre, gibraltar, suez, the cape, singapore, and many others. upon the degree and distribution of this preponderance will depend in a general way the extent to which our plans will be governed by the idea of defence or offence. generally speaking, it will be to the advantage of the preponderating side to seek a decision as quickly as possible in order to terminate the state of dispute. conversely, the weaker side will as a rule seek to avoid or postpone a decision in hope of being able by minor operations, the chances of war, or the development of fresh strength, to turn the balance in its favour. such was the line which france adopted frequently in her wars with us, sometimes legitimately, but sometimes to such an excess as seriously to demoralise her fleet. her experience has led to a hasty deduction that the defensive at sea for even a weaker power is an unmixed evil. such a conclusion is foreign to the fundamental principles of war. it is idle to exclude the use of an expectant attitude because in itself it cannot lead to final success, and because if used to excess it ends in demoralisation and the loss of will to attack. the misconception appears to have arisen from insistence on the drawbacks of defence by writers seeking to persuade their country to prepare in time of peace sufficient naval strength to justify offence from the outset. having now determined the fundamental principles which underlie the idea of command of the sea, we are in a position to consider the manner in which fleets are constituted in order to fit them for their task. * * * * * chapter two * * * * * theory of the means-- the constitution of fleets * * * * * in all eras of naval warfare fighting ships have exhibited a tendency to differentiate into groups in accordance with the primary function each class was designed to serve. these groupings or classifications are what is meant by the constitution of a fleet. a threefold differentiation into battleships, cruisers, and flotilla has so long dominated naval thought that we have come to regard it as normal, and even essential. it may be so, but such a classification has been by no means constant. other ideas of fleet constitution have not only existed, but have stood the test of war for long periods, and it is unscientific and unsafe to ignore such facts if we wish to arrive at sound doctrine. the truth is, that the classes of ships which constitute a fleet are, or ought to be, the expression in material of the strategical and tactical ideas that prevail at any given time, and consequently they have varied not only with the ideas, but also with the material in vogue. it may also be said more broadly that they have varied with the theory of war, by which more or less consciously naval thought was dominated. it is true that few ages have formulated a theory of war, or even been clearly aware of its influence; but nevertheless such theories have always existed, and even in their most nebulous and intangible shapes seem to have exerted an ascertainable influence on the constitution of fleets. going back to the dawn of modern times, we note that at the opening of the sixteenth century, when galley warfare reached its culmination, the constitution was threefold, bearing a superficial analogy to that which we have come to regard as normal. there were the galeasses and heavy galleys corresponding to our battleships, light galleys corresponding to our cruisers, while the flotilla was represented by the small "frigates," "brigantines," and similar craft, which had no slave gang for propulsion, but were rowed by the fighting crew. such armed sailing ships as then existed were regarded as auxiliaries, and formed a category apart, as fireships and bomb-vessels did in the sailing period, and as mine-layers do now. but the parallel must not be overstrained. the distinction of function between the two classes of galleys was not so strongly marked as that between the lighter craft and the galleys; that is to say, the scientific differentiation between battleships and cruisers had not yet been so firmly developed as it was destined to become in later times, and the smaller galleys habitually took their place in the fighting line. with the rise of the sailing vessel as the typical ship-of-war an entirely new constitution made its appearance. the dominating classification became twofold. it was a classification into vessels of subservient movement using sails, and vessels of free movement using oars. it was on these lines that our true royal navy was first organised by henry the eighth, an expert who, in the science of war, was one of the most advanced masters in europe. in this constitution there appears even less conception than in that of the galley period of a radical distinction between battleships and cruisers. as henry's fleet was originally designed, practically the whole of the battleships were sailing vessels, though it is true that when the french brought up galleys from the mediterranean, he gave some of the smartest of them oars. the constitution was in fact one of battleships and flotilla. of cruisers there were none as we understand them. fleet scouting was done by the "row-barges" and newly introduced "pinnaces" of the flotilla, while as for commerce protection, merchant vessels had usually to look after themselves, the larger ones being regularly armed for their own defence. the influence of this twofold constitution continued long after the conditions of its origin had passed away. in ever-lessening degree indeed it may be said to have lasted for two hundred years. during the dutch wars of the seventeenth century, which finally established the dominant status of the sailing warship, practically all true sailing vessels--that is, vessels that had no auxiliary oar propulsion--took station in the line. the "frigates" of that time differed not at all from the "great ship" in their functions, but only in their design. by the beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the old tendency to a threefold organisation began to reassert itself, but it was not till the middle of the century that the process of development can be regarded as complete. down to the end of the war of the austrian succession--a period which is usually deemed to be one of conspicuous depression in the naval art--the classification of our larger sailing vessels was purely arbitrary. the "rates" (which had been introduced during the dutch wars) bore no relation to any philosophical conception of the complex duties of a fleet. in the first rate were -gun ships; in the second, -gun ships--all three-deckers. so far the system of rating was sound enough, but when we come to the third rate we find it includes -gun ships, which were also of three decks, while the bulk of the rest were -gun two-deckers. the fourth rate was also composed of two-decked ships--weak battle-units of and guns--and this was far the largest class. all these four rates were classed as ships-of-the-line. below them came the fifth rates, which, though they were used as cruisers, had no distinct class name. they differed indeed only in degree from the ship-of-the-line, being all cramped two-deckers of and guns, and they must be regarded, in so far as they expressed any logical idea of naval warfare, as the forerunners of the "intermediate" class, represented in the succeeding epochs by -gun ships, and in our own time by armoured cruisers. the only true cruiser is found in the sixth rate, which comprised small and weakly armed -gun ships, and between them and the "forties" there was nothing. below them, but again without any clear differentiation, came the unrated sloops representing the flotilla. in such a system of rating there is no logical distinction either between large and small battleships or between battleships and cruisers, or between cruisers and flotilla. the only marked break in the gradual descent is that between the -gun two-deckers and the -gun cruisers. as these latter vessels as well as the sloops used sweeps for auxiliary propulsion, we are forced to conclude that the only basis of the classification was that adopted by henry the eighth, which, sound as it was in his time, had long ceased to have any real relation to the actuality of naval war. it was not till anson's memorable administration that a scientific system of rating was re-established and the fleet at last assumed the logical constitution which it retained up to our own time. in the first two rates appear the fleet flagship class, three-deckers of and guns respectively. all smaller three-deckers are eliminated. in the next two rates we have the rank and file of the battle-line, two-deckers of increased size-namely, seventy-fours in the third rate, and sixty-fours in the fourth. here, however, is a slight break in the perfection of the system, for the fourth rate also included -gun ships of two decks, which, during the progress of the seven years' war, ceased to be regarded as ships-of-the-line. war experience was eliminating small battleships, and therewith it called for a type intermediate between battleships and cruisers, with whose functions we shall have to deal directly. in practice these units soon formed a rate by themselves, into which, by the same tendency, -gun ships were destined to sink half a century later. but most pregnant of all anson's reforms was the introduction of the true cruiser, no longer a small battleship, but a vessel specialised for its logical functions, and distinct in design both from the battle rates and the flotilla. both -gun and -gun types were abolished, and in their place appear two cruiser rates, and the fifth consisting of -gun true frigates, and the sixth of -gun frigates, both completely divorced from any battle function. finally, after a very distinct gap, came the unrated sloops and smaller craft, which formed the flotilla for coastwise and inshore work, despatch service, and kindred duties. the reforms of the great first lord amounted in fact to a clearly apprehended threefold constitution, in which the various groups were frankly specialised in accordance with the functions each was expected to perform. specialisation, it will be observed, is the note of the process of development. we have no longer an endeavour to adapt the fleet to its multifarious duties by multiplying a comparatively weak nature of fighting-ship, which could act in the line and yet be had in sufficient numbers to protect commerce, but which was not well fitted for either service. instead we note a definite recognition of the principle that battleships should be as powerful as possible, and that in order to permit of their due development they must be relieved of their cruising functions by a class of vessel specially adapted for the purpose. the question we have to consider is, was this specialisation, which has asserted itself down to our own times, in the true line of development? was it, in fact, a right expression of the needs which are indicated by the theory of naval war? by the theory of naval war it must be reiterated we mean nothing but an enunciation of the fundamental principles which underlie all naval war. those principles, if we have determined them correctly, should be found giving shape not only to strategy and tactics, but also to material, whatever method and means of naval warfare may be in use at any given time. conversely, if we find strategy, tactics, or organisation exhibiting a tendency to reproduce the same forms under widely differing conditions of method and material, we should be able to show that those forms bear a constant and definite relation to the principles which our theory endeavours to express. in the case of anson's threefold organisation, the relation is not far to seek, though it has become obscured by two maxims. the one is, that "the command of the sea depends upon battleships," and the other, that "cruisers are the eyes of the fleet." it is the inherent evil of maxims that they tend to get stretched beyond their original meaning. both of these express a truth, but neither expresses the whole truth. on no theory of naval warfare can we expect to command the sea with battleships, nor, on the communication theory, can we regard the primary function of cruisers as being to scout for a battle-fleet. it is perfectly true that the control depends ultimately on the battle-fleet if control is disputed by a hostile battle-fleet, as it usually is. it is also true that, so far as is necessary to enable the battle-fleet to secure the control, we have to furnish it with eyes from our cruiser force. but it does not follow that this is the primary function of cruisers. the truth is, we have to withdraw them from their primary function in order to do work for the battle-fleet which it cannot do for itself. well established as is the "eyes of the fleet" maxim, it would be very difficult to show that scouting was ever regarded as the primary function of cruisers by the highest authorities. in nelson's practice at least their paramount function was to exercise the control which he was securing with his battle-squadron. nothing is more familiar in naval history than his incessant cry from the mediterranean for more cruisers, but the significance of that cry has become obscured. it was not that his cruisers were not numerous in proportion to his battleships--they were usually nearly double in number--but it was rather that he was so deeply convinced of their true function, that he used them to exercise control to an extent which sometimes reduced his fleet cruisers below the limit of bare necessity. the result on a memorable occasion was the escape of the enemy's battle-fleet, but the further result is equally important. it was that the escape of that fleet did not deprive him of the control which he was charged to maintain. his judgment may have been at fault, but the strategical distribution of his force was consistent throughout the whole period of his mediterranean command. judged by his record, no man ever grasped more clearly than nelson that the object of naval warfare was to control communications, and if he found that he had not a sufficient number of cruisers to exercise that control and to furnish eyes for his battle-fleet as well, it was the battle-fleet that was made to suffer, and surely this is at least the logical view. had the french been ready to risk settling the question of the control in a fleet action, it would have been different. he would then have been right to sacrifice the exercise of control for the time in order to make sure that the action should take place and end decisively in his favour. but he knew they were not ready to take such a risk, and he refused to permit a purely defensive attitude on the part of the enemy to delude him from the special function with which he had been charged. if the object of naval warfare is to control communications, then the fundamental requirement is the means of exercising that control. logically, therefore, if the enemy holds back from battle decision, we must relegate the battle-fleet to a secondary position, for cruisers are the means of exercising control; the battle-fleet is but the means of preventing their being interfered with in their work. put it to the test of actual practice. in no case can we exercise control by battleships alone. their specialisation has rendered them unfit for the work, and has made them too costly ever to be numerous enough. even, therefore, if our enemy had no battle-fleet we could not make control effective with battleships alone. we should still require cruisers specialised for the work and in sufficient numbers to cover the necessary ground. but the converse is not true. we could exercise control with cruisers alone if the enemy had no battle-fleet to interfere with them. if, then, we seek a formula that will express the practical results of our theory, it would take some such shape as this. on cruisers depends our exercise of control; on the battle-fleet depends the security of control. that is the logical sequence of ideas, and it shows us that the current maxim is really the conclusion of a logical argument in which the initial steps must not be ignored. the maxim that the command of the sea depends on the battle-fleet is then perfectly sound so long as it is taken to include all the other facts on which it hangs. the true function of the battle-fleet is to protect cruisers and flotilla at their special work. the best means of doing this is of course to destroy the enemy's power of interference. the doctrine of destroying the enemy's armed forces as the paramount object here reasserts itself, and reasserts itself so strongly as to permit for most practical purposes the rough generalisation that the command depends upon the battle-fleet. of what practical use then, it may be asked, is all this hairsplitting? why not leave untainted the conviction that our first and foremost business is to crush the enemy's battle-fleet, and that to this end our whole effort should be concentrated? the answer is to point to nelson's dilemma. it was a dilemma which, in the golden age of naval warfare, every admiral at sea had had to solve for himself, and it was always one of the most difficult details of every naval war plan. if we seek to ensure the effective action of the battle-fleet by giving it a large proportion of cruisers, by so much do we weaken the actual and continuous exercise of control. if we seek to make that control effective by devoting to the service a large proportion of cruisers, by so much do we prejudice our chance of getting contact with and defeating the enemy's battle-fleet, which is the only means of perfecting control. the correct solution of the dilemma will of course depend upon the conditions of each case--mainly upon the relative strength and activity of the hostile battle-fleet and our enemy's probable intentions. but no matter how completely we have tabulated all the relevant facts, we can never hope to come to a sound conclusion upon them without a just appreciation of all the elements which go to give command, and without the power of gauging their relative importance. this, and this alone, will ultimately settle the vital question of what proportion of our cruiser force it is right to devote to the battle-fleet. if the doctrine of cruiser control be correct, then every cruiser attached to the battle-fleet is one withdrawn from its true function. such withdrawals are inevitable. a squadron of battleships is an imperfect organism unable to do its work without cruiser assistance, and since the performance of its work is essential to cruiser freedom, some cruisers must be sacrificed. but in what proportion? if we confine ourselves to the view that command depends on the battle-fleet, then we shall attach to it such a number as its commander may deem necessary to make contact with the enemy absolutely certain and to surround himself with an impenetrable screen. if we knew the enemy was as anxious for a decision as ourselves, such a course might be justified. but the normal condition is that if we desire a decision it is because we have definite hopes of success, and consequently the enemy will probably seek to avoid one on our terms. in practice this means that if we have perfected our arrangements for the destruction of his main fleet he will refuse to expose it till he sees a more favourable opportunity. and what will be the result? he remains on the defensive, and theoretically all the ensuing period of inaction tends to fall into his scale. without stirring from port his fleet is doing its work. the more closely he induces us to concentrate our cruiser force in face of his battle-fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids. experience, then, and theory alike dictate that as a general principle cruisers should be regarded as primarily concerned with the active occupation of communications, and that withdrawals for fleet purposes should be reduced to the furthest margin of reasonable risk. what that margin should be can only be decided on the circumstances of each case as it arises, and by the personal characteristics of the officers who are responsible. nelson's practice was to reduce fleet cruisers lower than perhaps any other commander. so small indeed was the margin of efficiency he left, that in the campaign already cited, when his judgment was ripest, one stroke of ill-luck--a chance betrayal of his position by a neutral--availed to deprive him of the decision he sought, and to let the enemy's fleet escape. we arrive, then, at this general conclusion. the object of naval warfare is to control maritime communications. in order to exercise that control effectively we must have a numerous class of vessels specially adapted for pursuit. but their power of exercising control is in proportion to our degree of command, that is, to our power of preventing their operations being interfered with by the enemy. their own power of resistance is in inverse proportion to their power of exercising control; that is to say, the more numerous and better adapted they are for preying on commerce and transports, the weaker will be their individual fighting power. we cannot give them as a whole the power of resisting disturbance without at the same time reducing their power of exercising control. the accepted solution of the difficulty during the great period of anson's school was to provide them with a covering force of battle units specially adapted for fighting. but here arises a correlative difficulty. in so far as we give our battle units fighting power we deny them scouting power, and scouting is essential to their effective operation. the battle-fleet must have eyes. now, vessels adapted for control of communications are also well adapted for "eyes." it becomes the practice, therefore, to withdraw from control operations a sufficient number of units to enable the battle-fleet to cover effectively the operations of those that remain. such were the broad principles on which the inevitable dilemma always had to be solved, and on which anson's organisation was based. they flow naturally from the communication theory of maritime war, and it was this theory which then dominated naval thought, as is apparent from the technical use of such phrases as "lines of passage and communication." the war plans of the great strategists from anson and barham can always be resolved into these simple elements, and where we find the admiralty grip of them loosened, we have the confusion and quite unnecessary failures of the war of american independence. in that mismanaged contest the cardinal mistake was that we suffered the enemy's battle-fleets to get upon and occupy the vital lines of "passage and communication" without first bringing them to action, an error partly due to the unreadiness of a weak administration, and partly to an insufficient allocation of cruisers to secure contact at the right places. so far, then, the principles on which our naval supremacy was built up are clear. for the enemies with whom we had to deal anson's system was admirably conceived. both spain and france held the communication theory so strongly, that they were content to count as success the power of continually disturbing our control without any real attempt to secure it for themselves. to defeat such a policy anson's constitution and the strategy it connoted were thoroughly well adapted and easy to work. but it by no means follows that his doctrine is the last word. even in his own time complications had begun to develop which tended to confuse the precision of his system. by the culminating year of trafalgar there were indications that it was getting worn out, while the new methods and material used by the americans in made a serious rent in it. the disturbances then inaugurated have continued to develop, and it is necessary to consider how seriously they have confused the problem of fleet constitution. firstly, there is the general recognition, always patent to ourselves, that by far the most drastic, economical, and effective way of securing control is to destroy the enemy's means of interfering with it. in our own service this "overthrow" idea always tended to assert itself so strongly, that occasionally the means became for a time more important than the end; that is to say, circumstances were such that on occasions it was considered advisable to sacrifice the exercise of control for a time in order quickly and permanently to deprive the enemy of all means of interference. when there was reasonable hope of the enemy risking a decision this consideration tended to override all others; but when, as in nelson's case in the mediterranean, the hope was small, the exercise of control tended to take the paramount place. the second complexity arose from the fact that however strong might be our battleship cover, it is impossible for it absolutely to secure cruiser control from disturbance by sporadic attack. isolated heavy ships, taking advantage of the chances of the sea, could elude even the strictest blockade, and one such ship, if she succeeded in getting upon a line of communication, might paralyse the operations of a number of weaker units. they must either run or concentrate, and in either case the control was broken. if it were a squadron of heavy ships that caused the disturbance, the practice was to detach against it a division of the covering battle-fleet. but it was obviously highly inconvenient and contrary to the whole idea on which the constitution of the fleet was based to allow every slight danger to cruiser control to loosen the cohesion of the main fleet. it was necessary, then, to give cruiser lines some power of resistance. this necessity once admitted, there seemed no point at which you could stop increasing the fighting power of your cruisers, and sooner or later, unless some means of checking the process were found, the distinction between cruisers and battleships would practically disappear. such a means was found in what may be called the "intermediate" ship. frigates did indeed continue to increase in size and fighting power throughout the remainder of the sailing era, but it was not only in this manner that the power of resistance was gained. the evil results of the movement were checked by the introduction of a supporting ship, midway between frigates and true ships-of-the-line. sometimes classed as a battleship, and taking her place in the line, the -gun ship came to be essentially a type for stiffening cruiser squadrons. they most commonly appear as the flagships of cruiser commodores, or stationed in terminal waters or at focal points where sporadic raids were likely to fall and be most destructive. the strategical effect of the presence of such a vessel in a cruiser line was to give the whole line in some degree the strength of the intermediate ship; for any hostile cruiser endeavouring to disturb the line was liable to have to deal with the supporting ship, while if a frigate and a -gun ship got together they were a match even for a small ship-of-the-line. in sailing days, of course, this power of the supporting ship was weak owing to the imperfection of the means of distant communication between ships at sea and the non-existence of such means beyond extreme range of vision. but as wireless telegraphy develops it is not unreasonable to expect that the strategic value of the supporting or intermediate ship will be found greater than it ever was in sailing days, and that for dealing with sporadic disturbance the tendency will be for a cruiser line to approximate more and more in power of resistance to that of its strongest unit. for fleet service a cruiser's power of resistance was hardly less valuable; for though we speak of fleet cruisers as the eyes of the fleet, their purpose is almost equally to blindfold the enemy. their duty is not only to disclose the movements of the enemy, but also to act as a screen to conceal our own. the point was specially well marked in the blockades, where the old -gun ships are almost always found with the inshore cruiser squadron, preventing that squadron being forced by inquisitive frigates. important as this power of resistance in the screen was in the old days, it is tenfold more important now, and the consequent difficulty of keeping cruisers distinct from battleships is greater than ever. the reason for this is best considered under the third and most serious cause of complexity. the third cause is the acquisition by the flotilla of battle power. it is a feature of naval warfare that is entirely new.[ ] for all practical purposes it was unknown until the full development of the mobile torpedo. it is true that the fireship as originally conceived was regarded as having something of the same power. during the dutch wars--the heyday of its vogue--its assigned power was on some occasions actually realised, as in the burning of lord sandwich's flagship at the battle of solebay, and the destruction of the spanish-dutch fleet at palermo by duquesne. but as the "nimbleness" of great-ships increased with the ripening of seamanship and naval architecture, the fireship as a battle weapon became almost negligible, while a fleet at anchor was found to be thoroughly defensible by its own picket-boats. towards the middle of the eighteenth century indeed the occasions on which the fireship could be used for its special purpose was regarded as highly exceptional, and though the type was retained till the end of the century, its normal functions differed not at all from those of the rest of the flotilla of which it then formed part. [ ] but not without analogous precedent. in the later middle ages small craft were assigned the function in battle of trying to wedge up the rudders of great ships or bore holes between wind and water. see fighting instructions (navy record society), p. . those functions, as we have seen, expressed the cruising idea in its purest sense. it was numbers and mobility that determined flotilla types rather than armament or capacity for sea-endurance. their primary purpose was to control communications in home and colonial waters against weakly armed privateers. the type which these duties determined fitted them adequately for the secondary purpose of inshore and despatch work with a fleet. it was, moreover, on the ubiquity which their numbers gave them, and on their power of dealing with unarmed or lightly armed vessels, that we relied for our first line of defence against invasion. these latter duties were of course exceptional, and the navy list did not carry as a rule sufficient numbers for the purpose. but a special value of the class was that it was capable of rapid and almost indefinite expansion from the mercantile marine. anything that could carry a gun had its use, and during the period of the napoleonic threat the defence flotilla rose all told to considerably over a thousand units. formidable and effective as was a flotilla of this type for the ends it was designed to serve, it obviously in no way affected the security of a battle-fleet. but so soon as the flotilla acquired battle power the whole situation was changed, and the old principles of cruiser design and distribution were torn to shreds. the battle-fleet became a more imperfect organism than ever. formerly it was only its offensive power that required supplementing. the new condition meant that unaided it could no longer ensure its own defence. it now required screening, not only from observation, but also from flotilla attack. the theoretical weakness of an arrested offensive received a practical and concrete illustration to a degree that war had scarcely ever known. our most dearly cherished strategical traditions were shaken to the bottom. the "proper place" for our battle-fleet had always been "on the enemy's coasts," and now that was precisely where the enemy would be best pleased to see it. what was to be done? so splendid a tradition could not lightly be laid aside, but the attempt to preserve it involved us still deeper in heresy. the vital, most difficult, and most absorbing problem has become not how to increase the power of a battle-fleet for attack, which is a comparatively simple matter, but how to defend it. as the offensive power of the flotilla developed, the problem pressed with an almost bewildering intensity. with every increase in the speed and sea-keeping power of torpedo craft, the problem of the screen grew more exacting. to keep the hostile flotilla out of night range the screen must be flung out wider and wider, and this meant more and more cruisers withdrawn from their primary function. and not only this. the screen must not only be far flung, but it must be made as far as possible impenetrable. in other words, its own power of resistance must be increased all along the line. whole squadrons of armoured cruisers had to be attached to battle-fleets to support the weaker members of the screen. the crying need for this type of ship set up a rapid movement for increasing their fighting power, and with it fell with equal rapidity the economic possibility of giving the cruiser class its essential attribute of numbers. as an inevitable result we find ourselves involved in an effort to restore to the flotilla some of its old cruiser capacity, by endowing it with gun armament, higher sea-keeping power, and facilities for distant communication, all at the cost of specialisation and of greater economic strain. still judged by past experience, some means of increasing numbers in the cruising types is essential, nor is it clear how it is possible to secure that essential in the ranks of the true cruiser. no point has been found at which it was possible to stop the tendency of this class of vessel to increase in size and cost, or to recall it to the strategical position it used to occupy. so insecure is the battle-squadron, so imperfect as a self-contained weapon has it become, that its need has overridden the old order of things, and the primary function of the cruising ship inclines to be no longer the exercise of control under cover of the battle-fleet. the battle-fleet now demands protection by the cruising ship, and what the battle-fleet needs is held to be the first necessity. judged by the old naval practice, it is an anomalous position to have reached. but the whole naval art has suffered a revolution beyond all previous experience, and it is possible the old practice is no longer a safe guide. driven by the same necessities, every naval power is following the same course. it may be right, it may be wrong; no one at least but the ignorant or hasty will venture to pass categorical judgment. the best we can do is to endeavour to realise the situation to which, in spite of all misgivings, we have been forced, and to determine its relations to the developments of the past. it is undoubtedly a difficult task. as we have seen, there have prevailed in the constitution of fleets at various times several methods of expressing the necessities of naval war. the present system differs from them all. on the one hand, we have the fact that the latest developments of cruiser power have finally obliterated all logical distinction between cruisers and battleships, and we thus find ourselves hand in hand with the fleet constitution of the old dutch wars. on the other, however, we have armoured cruisers organised in squadrons and attached to battle-fleets not only for strategical purposes, but also with as yet undeveloped tactical functions in battle. here we come close to the latest development of the sailing era, when "advanced" or "light" squadrons began to appear in the organisation of battle-fleets. the system arose towards the end of the eighteenth century in the mediterranean, where the conditions of control called for so wide a dispersal of cruisers and so great a number of them, that it was almost imperative for a battle-squadron in that sea to do much of its own scouting. it was certainly for this purpose that the fastest and lightest ships-of-the-line were formed into a separate unit, and the first designation it received was that of "observation squadron." it remained for nelson to endeavour to endow it with a tactical function, but his idea was never realised either by himself or any of his successors. side by side with this new element in the organisation of a battle-fleet, which perhaps is best designated as a "light division," we have another significant fact. not only was it not always composed entirely of ships-of-the-line, especially in the french service, but in , the year of the full development, we have sir richard strachan using the heavy frigates attached to his battle-squadron as a "light division," and giving them a definite tactical function. the collapse of the french navy put a stop to further developments of either idea. whither they would have led we cannot tell. but it is impossible to shut our eyes to the indication of a growing tendency towards the system that exists at present. it is difficult at least to ignore the fact that both nelson and strachan in that culminating year found the actuality of war calling for something for which there was then no provision in the constitution of the fleet, but which it does contain to-day. what nelson felt for was a battleship of cruiser speed. what strachan desired was a cruiser fit to take a tactical part in a fleet action. we have them both, but with what result? anson's specialisation of types has almost disappeared, and our present fleet constitution is scarcely to be distinguished from that of the seventeenth century. we retain the three-fold nomenclature, but the system itself has really gone. battleships grade into armoured cruisers, armoured cruisers into protected cruisers. we can scarcely detect any real distinction except a twofold one between vessels whose primary armament is the gun and vessels whose primary armament is the torpedo. but even here the existence of a type of cruiser designed to act with flotillas blurs the outline, while, as we have seen, the larger units of the flotilla are grading up to cruiser level. we are thus face to face with a situation which has its closest counterpart in the structureless fleets of the seventeenth century. that naval thought should have so nearly retraced its steps in the course of two centuries is curious enough, but it is still more striking when we consider how widely the underlying causes differ in each case. the pressure which has forced the present situation is due most obviously to two causes. one is the excessive development of the "intermediate" ship originally devised for purposes of commerce protection, and dictated by a menace which the experience of the american war had taught us to respect. the other is the introduction of the torpedo, and the consequent vulnerability of battle-squadrons that are not securely screened. nothing of the kind had any influence on the fleet constitution of the seventeenth century. but if we seek deeper, there is a less obvious consideration which for what it is worth is too striking to be ignored. it has been suggested above that the constitution of fleets appears to have some more or less recognisable relation to the prevalent theory of war. now, amongst all our uncertainty we can assert with confidence that the theory which holds the field at the present day bears the closest possible resemblance to that which dominated the soldier-admirals of the dutch war. it was the "overthrow" theory, the firm faith in the decisive action as the key of all strategical problems. they carried it to sea with them from the battlefields of the new model army, and the dutch met them squarely. in the first war at least their commerce had to give place to the exigencies of throwing into the battle everything that could affect the issue. it is not of course pretended that this attitude was dictated by any clearly conceived theory of absolute war. it was due rather to the fact that, owing to the relative geographical conditions, all attempts to guard trade communications were useless without the command of the home waters in the north sea, and the truth received a clinching moral emphasis from the british claim to the actual dominion of the narrow seas. it was, in fact, a war which resembled rather the continental conditions of territorial conquest than the naval procedure that characterised our rivalry with france. is it then possible, however much we may resist the conclusion in loyalty to the eighteenth-century tradition, that the rise of a new naval power in the room of holland must bring us back to the drastic, if crude, methods of the dutch wars, and force us to tread under foot the nicer ingenuity of anson's system? is it this which has tempted us to mistrust any type of vessel which cannot be flung into the battle? the recurrence of a formidable rival in the north sea was certainly not the first cause of the reaction. it began before that menace arose. still it has undoubtedly forced the pace, and even if it be not a cause, it may well be a justification. * * * * * chapter three * * * * * theory of the method-- concentration and dispersal of force * * * * * from the point of view of the method by which its ends are obtained, strategy is often described as the art of assembling the utmost force at the right time and place; and this method is called "concentration." at first sight the term seems simple and expressive enough, but on analysis it will be found to include several distinct ideas, to all of which the term is applied indifferently. the result is a source of some confusion, even to the most lucid writers. "the word concentration," says one of the most recent of them, "evokes the idea of a grouping of forces. we believe, in fact, that we cannot make war without grouping ships into squadrons and squadrons into fleets."[ ] here in one sentence the word hovers between the formation of fleets and their strategical distribution. similar looseness will embarrass the student at every turn. at one time he will find the word used to express the antithesis of division or dispersal of force; at another, to express strategic deployment, which implies division to a greater or less extent. he will find it used of the process of assembling a force, as well as of the state of a force when the process is complete. the truth is that the term, which is one of the most common and most necessary in strategical discussion, has never acquired a very precise meaning, and this lack of precision is one of the commonest causes of conflicting opinion and questionable judgments. no strategical term indeed calls more urgently for a clear determination of the ideas for which it stands. [ ] daveluy, _l'esprit de la guerre navale_, vol. i, p. , note. military phraseology, from which the word is taken, employs "concentration" in three senses. it is used for assembling the units of an army after they have been mobilised. in this sense, concentration is mainly an administrative process; logically, it means the complement of the process of mobilisation, whereby the army realises its war organisation and becomes ready to take the field. in a second sense it is used for the process of moving the army when formed, or in process of formation, to the localities from which operations can best begin. this is a true strategical stage, and it culminates in what is known as strategic deployment. finally, it is used for the ultimate stage when the army so deployed is closed up upon a definite line of operations in immediate readiness for tactical deployment--gathered up, that is, to deal a concentrated blow. well as this terminology appears to serve on land, where the processes tend to overlap, something more exact is required if we try to extend it to the sea. such extension magnifies the error at every step, and clear thinking becomes difficult. even if we set aside the first meaning, that is, the final stage of mobilisation, we have still to deal with the two others which, in a great measure, are mutually contradictory. the essential distinction of strategic deployment, which contemplates dispersal with a view to a choice of combinations, is flexibility and free movement. the characteristic of an army massed for a blow is rigidity and restricted mobility. in the one sense of concentration we contemplate a disposal of force which will conceal our intention from the enemy and will permit us to adapt our movements to the plan of operations he develops. in the other, strategic concealment is at an end. we have made our choice, and are committed to a definite operation. clearly, then, if we would apply the principles of land concentration to naval warfare it is desirable to settle which of the two phases of an operation we mean by the term. which meaning, then, is most closely connected with the ordinary use of the word? the dictionaries define concentration as "the state of being brought to a common point or centre," and this coincides very exactly with the stage of a war plan which intervenes between the completion of mobilisation and the final massing or deployment for battle. it is an incomplete and continuing act. its ultimate consequence is the mass. it is a method of securing mass at the right time and place. as we have seen, the essence of the state of strategic deployment to which it leads is flexibility. in war the choice of time and place will always be influenced by the enemy's dispositions and movements, or by our desire to deal him an unexpected blow. the merit of concentration, then, in this sense, is its power of permitting us to form our mass in time at one of the greatest number of different points where mass may be required. it is for this stage that the more recent text-books incline to specialise concentration--qualifying it as "strategic concentration." but even that term scarcely meets the case, for the succeeding process of gathering up the army into a position for tactical deployment is also a strategical concentration. some further specialisation is required. the analytical difference between the two processes is that the first is an operation of major strategy and the other of minor, and if they are to be fully expressed, we have to weight ourselves with the terms "major and minor strategic concentration." such cumbrous terminology is too forbidding to use. it serves only to mark that the middle stage differs logically from the third as much as it does from the first. in practice it comes to this. if we are going to use concentration in its natural sense, we must regard it as something that comes after complete mobilisation and stops short of the formation of mass. in naval warfare at least this distinction between concentration and mass is essential to clear appreciation. it leads us to conclusions that are of the first importance. for instance, when once the mass is formed, concealment and flexibility are at an end. the further, therefore, from the formation of the ultimate mass we can stop the process of concentration the better designed it will be. the less we are committed to any particular mass, and the less we indicate what and where our mass is to be, the more formidable our concentration. to concentration, therefore, the idea of division is as essential as the idea of connection. it is this view of the process which, at least for naval warfare, a weighty critical authority has most strongly emphasised. "such," he says, "is concentration reasonably understood--not huddled together like a drove of sheep, but distributed with a regard to a common purpose, and linked together by the effectual energy of a single will."[ ] vessels in a state of concentration he compares to a fan that opens and shuts. in this view concentration connotes not a homogeneous body, but a compound organism controlled from a common centre, and elastic enough to permit it to cover a wide field without sacrificing the mutual support of its parts. [ ] mahan, _war of _, i, . if, then, we exclude the meaning of mere assembling and the meaning of the mass, we have left a signification which expresses coherent disposal about a strategical centre, and this it will be seen gives for naval warfare just the working definition that we want as the counterpart of strategic deployment on land. the object of a naval concentration like that of strategic deployment will be to cover the widest possible area, and to preserve at the same time elastic cohesion, so as to secure rapid condensations of any two or more of the parts of the organism, and in any part of the area to be covered, at the will of the controlling mind; and above all, a sure and rapid condensation of the whole at the strategical centre. concentration of this nature, moreover, will be the expression of a war plan which, while solidly based on an ultimate central mass, still preserves the faculty of delivering or meeting minor attacks in any direction. it will permit us to exercise control of the sea while we await and work for the opportunity of a decision which shall permanently secure control, and it will permit this without prejudicing our ability of bringing the utmost force to bear when the moment for the decision arrives. concentration, in fact, implies a continual conflict between cohesion and reach, and for practical purposes it is the right adjustment of those two tensions--ever shifting in force--which constitutes the greater part of practical strategy. in naval warfare this concentration stage has a peculiar significance in the development of a campaign, and at sea it is more clearly detached than ashore. owing to the vast size of modern armies, and the restricted nature of their lines of movement, no less than their lower intrinsic mobility as compared with fleets, the processes of assembly, concentration, and forming the battle mass tend to grade into one another without any demarcation of practical value. an army frequently reaches the stage of strategic deployment direct from the mobilisation bases of its units, and on famous occasions its only real concentration has taken place on the battlefield. in continental warfare, then, there is less difficulty in using the term to cover all three processes. their tendency is always to overlap. but at sea, where communications are free and unrestricted by obstacles, and where mobility is high, they are susceptible of sharper differentiation. the normal course is for a fleet to assemble at a naval port; thence by a distinct movement it proceeds to the strategical centre and reaches out in divisions as required. the concentration about that centre may be very far from a mass, and the final formation of the mass will bear no resemblance to either of the previous movements, and will be quite distinct. but free as a fleet is from the special fetters of an army, there always exist at sea peculiar conditions of friction which clog its freedom of disposition. one source of this friction is commerce protection. however much our war plan may press for close concentration, the need of commerce protection will always be calling for dispersal. the other source is the peculiar freedom and secrecy of movements at sea. as the sea knows no roads to limit or indicate our own lines of operation, so it tells little about those of the enemy. the most distant and widely dispersed points must be kept in view as possible objectives of the enemy. when we add to this that two or more fleets can act in conjunction from widely separated bases with far greater certainty than is possible for armies, it is obvious that the variety of combinations is much higher at sea than on land, and variety of combination is in constant opposition to the central mass. it follows that so long as the enemy's fleet is divided, and thereby retains various possibilities of either concentrated or sporadic action, our distribution will be dictated by the need of being able to deal with a variety of combinations and to protect a variety of objectives. our concentrations must therefore be kept as open and flexible as possible. history accordingly shows us that the riper and fresher our experience and the surer our grip of war, the looser were our concentrations. the idea of massing, as a virtue in itself, is bred in peace and not in war. it indicates the debilitating idea that in war we must seek rather to avoid than to inflict defeat. true, advocates of the mass entrench themselves in the plausible conception that their aim is to inflict crushing defeats. but this too is an idea of peace. war has proved to the hilt that victories have not only to be won, but worked for. they must be worked for by bold strategical combinations, which as a rule entail at least apparent dispersal. they can only be achieved by taking risks, and the greatest and most effective of these is division. the effect of prolonged peace has been to make "concentration" a kind of shibboleth, so that the division of a fleet tends almost to be regarded as a sure mark of bad leadership. critics have come to lose sight of the old war experience, that without division no strategical combinations are possible. in truth they must be founded on division. division is bad only when it is pushed beyond the limits of well-knit deployment. it is theoretically wrong to place a section of the fleet in such a position that it may be prevented from falling back on its strategical centre when it is encountered by a superior force. such retreats of course can never be made certain; they will always depend in some measure on the skill and resource of the opposing commanders, and on the chances of weather: but risks must be taken. if we risk nothing, we shall seldom perform anything. the great leader is the man who can measure rightly to what breadth of deployment he can stretch his concentration. this power of bold and sure adjustment between cohesion and reach is indeed a supreme test of that judgment which in the conduct of war takes the place of strategical theory. in british naval history examples of faulty division are hard to find. the case most commonly cited is an early one. it occurred in during the second dutch war. monk and rupert were in command of the main fleet, which from its mobilisation bases in the thames and at spithead had concentrated in the downs. there they were awaiting de ruyter's putting to sea in a position from which they could deal with him whether his object was an attack on the thames or to join hands with the french. in this position a rumour reached them that the toulon squadron was on its way to the channel to co-operate with the dutch. upon this false intelligence the fleet was divided, and rupert went back to portsmouth to cover that position in case it might be the french objective. de ruyter at once put to sea with a fleet greatly superior to monk's division. monk, however, taking advantage of thick weather that had supervened, surprised him at anchor, and believing he had a sufficient tactical advantage attacked him impetuously. meanwhile the real situation became known. there was no french fleet, and rupert was recalled. he succeeded in rejoining monk after his action with de ruyter had lasted three days. in the course of it monk had been very severely handled and forced to retreat to the thames, and it was generally believed that it was only the belated arrival of rupert that saved us from a real disaster. the strategy in this case is usually condemned out of hand and made to bear the entire blame of the reverse. monk, who as a soldier had proved himself one of the finest strategists of the time, is held to have blundered from sheer ignorance of elementary principles. it is assumed that he should have kept his fleet massed; but his critics fail to observe that at least in the opinion of the time this would not have met the case. had he kept the whole to deal with de ruyter, it is probable that de ruyter would not have put to sea, and it is certain portsmouth and the isle of wight would have lain open to the french had they come. if he had moved his mass to deal with the french, he would have exposed the thames to de ruyter. it was a situation that could not be solved by a simple application of what the french call the _masse centrale_. the only way to secure both places from attack was to divide the fleet, just as in nelson in the same theatre was compelled to divide his defence force. in neither case was division a fault, because it was a necessity. the fault in monk's and rupert's case was that they extended their reach with no proper provision to preserve cohesion. close cruiser connection should have been maintained between the two divisions, and monk should not have engaged deeply till he felt rupert at his elbow. this we are told was the opinion of most of his flag-officers. they held that he should not have fought when he did. his correct course, on kempenfelt's principle, would have been to hang on de ruyter so as to prevent his doing anything, and to have slowly fallen back, drawing the dutch after him till his loosened concentration was closed up again. if de ruyter had refused to follow him through the straits, there would have been plenty of time to mass the fleet. if de ruyter had followed, he could have been fought in a position from which there would have been no escape. the fault, in fact, was not strategical, but rather one of tactical judgment. monk over-estimated the advantage of his surprise and the relative fighting values of the two fleets, and believed he saw his way to victory single-handed. the danger of division is being surprised and forced to fight in inferiority. this was not monk's case. he was not surprised, and he could easily have avoided action had he so desired. to judge such a case simply by using concentration as a touchstone can only tend to set up such questionable habits of thought as have condemned the more famous division which occurred in the crisis of the campaign of , and with which we must deal later. apart from the general danger of using either words or maxims in this way, it is obviously specially unwise in the case of concentration and division. the current rule is that it is bad to divide unless you have a great superiority; yet there have been numerous occasions when, being at war with an inferior enemy, we have found our chief embarrassment in the fact that he kept his fleet divided, and was able thereby to set up something like a deadlock. the main object of our naval operations would then be to break it down. to force an inferior enemy to concentrate is indeed the almost necessary preliminary to securing one of those crushing victories at which we must always aim, but which so seldom are obtained. it is by forcing the enemy to attempt to concentrate that we get our opportunity by sagacious dispersal of crushing his divisions in detail. it is by inducing him to mass that we simplify our problem and compel him to choose between leaving to us the exercise of command and putting it to the decision of a great action. advocates of close concentration will reply that that is true enough. we do often seek to force our enemy to concentrate, but that does not show that concentration is sometimes a disadvantage, for we ourselves must concentrate closely to force a similar concentration on the enemy. the maxim, indeed, has become current that concentration begets concentration, but it is not too much to say that it is a maxim which history flatly contradicts. if the enemy is willing to hazard all on a battle, it is true. but if we are too superior, or our concentration too well arranged for him to hope for victory, then our concentration has almost always had the effect of forcing him to disperse for sporadic action. so certain was this result, that in our old wars, in which we were usually superior, we always adopted the loosest possible concentrations in order to prevent sporadic action. true, the tendency of the french to adopt this mode of warfare is usually set down to some constitutional ineptitude that is outside strategical theory, but this view is due rather to the irritation which the method caused us, than to sober reasoning. for a comparatively weak belligerent sporadic action was better than nothing, and the only other alternative was for him to play into our hands by hazarding the decision which it was our paramount interest to obtain. sporadic action alone could never give our enemy command of the sea, but it could do us injury and embarrass our plans, and there was always hope it might so much loosen our concentration as to give him a fair chance of obtaining a series of successful minor decisions. take, now, the leading case of . in that campaign our distribution was very wide, and was based on several concentrations. the first had its centre in the downs, and extended not only athwart the invading army's line of passage, but also over the whole north sea, so as to prevent interference with our trade or our system of coast defence either from the dutch in the texel or from french squadrons arriving north-about. the second, which was known as the western squadron, had its centre off ushant, and was spread over the whole bay of biscay by means of advanced squadrons before ferrol and rochefort. with a further squadron off the coast of ireland, it was able also to reach far out into the atlantic in order to receive our trade. it kept guard, in fact, not only over the french naval ports, but over the approaches to the channel, where were the home terminals of the great southern and western trade-routes. a third concentration was in the mediterranean, whose centre under nelson was at sardinia. it had outlying sub-centres at malta and gibraltar, and covered the whole ground from cape st. vincent outside the straits to toulon, trieste, and the dardanelles. when war broke out with spain in , it was considered advisable to divide this command, and spanish waters outside the straits were held by a fourth concentration, whose centre was off cadiz, and whose northern limit was cape finisterre, where it joined the ushant concentration. for reasons which were personal rather than strategical this arrangement was not continued long, nor indeed after a few months was there the same need for it, for the toulon squadron had changed its base to cadiz. by this comprehensive system the whole of the european seas were controlled both for military and trade purposes. in the distant terminal areas, like the east and west indies, there were nucleus concentrations with the necessary connective machinery permanently established, and to render them effective, provision was made by which the various european squadrons could throw off detachments to bring up their force to any strength which the movements of the enemy might render necessary. wide as was this distribution, and great as its reach, a high degree of cohesion was maintained not only between the parts of each concentration, but between the several concentrations themselves. by means of a minor cruiser centre at the channel islands, the downs and ushant concentrations could rapidly cohere. similarly the cadiz concentration was linked up with that of ushant at finisterre, and but for personal friction and repulsion, the cohesion between the mediterranean and cadiz concentrations would have been equally strong. finally, there was a masterly provision made for all the concentrations to condense into one great mass at the crucial point off ushant before by any calculable chance a hostile mass could gather there. for napoleon's best admirals, "who knew the craft of the sea," the british fleet thus disposed was in a state of concentration that nothing but a stroke of luck beyond the limit of sober calculation could break. decrès and bruix had no doubt of it, and the knowledge overpowered villeneuve when the crisis came. after he had carried the concentration which napoleon had planned so far as to have united three divisions in ferrol, he knew that the outlying sections of our western squadron had disappeared from before ferrol and rochefort. in his eyes, as well as those of the british admiralty, this squadron, in spite of its dispersal in the bay of biscay, had always been in a state of concentration. it was not this which caused his heart to fail. it was the news that nelson had reappeared at gibraltar, and had been seen steering northward. it meant for him that the whole of his enemy's european fleet was in a state of concentration. "their concentration of force," he afterwards wrote, "was at the moment more serious than in any previous disposition, and such that they were in a position to meet in superiority the combined forces of brest and ferrol," and for that reason, he explained, he had given up the game as lost. but to napoleon's unpractised eye it was impossible to see what it was he had to deal with. measuring the elasticity of the british naval distribution by the comparatively cumbrous and restricted mobility of armies, he saw it as a rash and unwarlike dispersal. its looseness seemed to indicate so great a tenderness for the distant objectives that lay open to his scattered squadrons, that he believed by a show of sporadic action he could further disperse our fleet, and then by a close concentration crush the essential part in detail. it was a clear case of the enemy's dispersal forcing us to adopt the loosest concentration, and of our comparative dispersal tempting the enemy to concentrate and hazard a decision. it cannot be said we forced the fatal move upon him intentionally. it was rather the operation of strategical law set in motion by our bold distribution. we were determined that his threat of invasion, formidable as it was, should not force upon us so close a concentration as to leave our widespread interests open to his attack. neither can it be said that our first aim was to prevent his attempting to concentrate. every one of his naval ports was watched by a squadron, but it was recognised that this would not prevent concentration. the escape of one division might well break the chain. but that consideration made no difference. the distribution of our squadrons before his naval ports was essential for preventing sporadic action. their distribution was dictated sufficiently by the defence of commerce and of colonial and allied territory, by our need, that is, to exercise a general command even if we could not destroy the enemy's force. the whole of nelson's correspondence for this period shows that his main object was the protection of our mediterranean trade and of neapolitan and turkish territory. when villeneuve escaped him, his irritation was caused not by the prospect of a french concentration, which had no anxieties for him, for he knew counter-concentrations were provided for. it was caused rather by his having lost the opportunity which the attempt to concentrate had placed within his reach. he followed villeneuve to the west indies, not to prevent concentration, but, firstly, to protect the local trade and jamaica, and secondly, in hope of another chance of dealing the blow he had missed. lord barham took precisely the same view. when on news of villeneuve's return from the west indies he moved out the three divisions of the western squadron, that is, the ushant concentration, to meet him, he expressly stated, not that his object was to prevent concentration, but that it was to deter the french from attempting sporadic action. "the interception of the fleet in question," he wrote, "on its return to europe would be a greater object than any i know. it would damp all future expeditions, and would show to europe that it might be advisable to relax in the blockading system occasionally for the express purpose of putting them in our hands at a convenient opportunity." indeed we had no reason for preventing the enemy's concentration. it was our best chance of solving effectually the situation we have to confront. our true policy was to secure permanent command by a great naval decision. so long as the enemy remained divided, no such decision could be expected. it was not, in fact, till he attempted his concentration, and its last stage had been reached, that the situation was in our hands. the intricate problem with which we had been struggling was simplified down to closing up our own concentration to the strategical centre off ushant. but at the last stage the enemy could not face the formidable position we held. his concentration was stopped. villeneuve fell back on cadiz, and the problem began to assume for us something of its former intricacy. so long as we held the mass off ushant which our great concentration had produced, we were safe from invasion. but that was not enough. it left the seas open to sporadic action from spanish ports. there were convoys from the east and west indies at hand, and there was our expedition in the mediterranean in jeopardy, and another on the point of sailing from cork. neither barham at the admiralty nor cornwallis in command off ushant hesitated an hour. by a simultaneous induction they both decided the mass must be divided. the concentration must be opened out again, and it was done. napoleon called the move an _insigne betise_, but it was the move that beat him, and must have beaten him, whatever the skill of his admirals, for the two squadrons never lost touch. he found himself caught in a situation from which there was nothing to hope. his fleet was neither concentrated for a decisive blow nor spread for sporadic action. he had merely simplified his enemy's problem. our hold was surer than ever, and in a desperate attempt to extricate himself he was forced to expose his fleet to the final decision we required. the whole campaign serves well to show what was understood by concentration at the end of the great naval wars. to lord barham and the able admirals who interpreted his plans it meant the possibility of massing at the right time and place. it meant, in close analogy to strategic deployment on land, the disposal of squadrons about a strategical centre from which fleets could condense for massed action in any required direction, and upon which they could fall back when unduly pressed. in this case the ultimate centre was the narrows of the channel, where napoleon's army lay ready to cross, but there was no massing there. so crude a distribution would have meant a purely defensive attitude. it would have meant waiting to be struck instead of seeking to strike, and such an attitude was arch-heresy to our old masters of war. so far we have only considered concentration as applied to wars in which we have a preponderance of naval force, but the principles are at least equally valid when a coalition places us in inferiority. the leading case is the home campaign of . it was strictly on defensive lines. our information was that france and spain intended to end the war with a great combined effort against our west indian islands, and particularly jamaica. it was recognised that the way to meet the threat was to concentrate for offensive action in the caribbean sea everything that was not absolutely needed for home defence. instead, therefore, of trying to be strong enough to attempt the offensive in both areas, it was decided to make sure of the area that was most critical. to do this the home fleet had to be reduced so low relatively to what the enemy had in european waters that offence was out of the question. while rodney took the offensive area, lord howe was given the other. his task was to prevent the coalition obtaining such a command of home waters as would place our trade and coasts at their mercy, and it was not likely to prove a light one. we knew that the enemy's plan was to combine their attack on the west indies with an attempt to control the north sea, and possibly the straits of dover, with a dutch squadron of twelve to fifteen of the line, while a combined franco-spanish fleet of at least forty sail would occupy the mouth of the channel. it was also possible that these two forces would endeavour to form a junction. in any case the object of the joint operations would be to paralyse our trade and annoy our coasts, and thereby force us to neglect the west indian area and the two spanish objectives, minorca and gibraltar. all told we had only about thirty of the line on the home station, and though a large proportion of these were three-deckers, a good many could not be ready for sea till the summer. inferior as was the available force, there was no thought of a purely passive defence. it would not meet the case. something must be done to interfere with the offensive operations of the allies in the west indies and against gibraltar, or they would attain the object of their home campaign. it was resolved to effect this by minor counterstrokes on their line of communications to the utmost limit of our defensive reach. it would mean a considerable stretch of our concentration, but we were determined to do what we could to prevent reinforcements from reaching the west indies from brest, to intercept french trade as occasion offered, and, finally, at almost any risk to relieve gibraltar. in these conditions the defensive concentration was based on a central mass or reserve at spithead, a squadron in the downs to watch the texel for the safety of the north sea trade, and another to the westward to watch brest and interrupt its transatlantic communications. kempenfelt in command of the latter squadron had just shown what could be done by his great exploit of capturing guichen's convoy of military and naval stores for the west indies. early in the spring he was relieved by barrington, who sailed on april th to resume the ushant position. his instructions were not to fight a superior enemy unless in favourable circumstances, but to retire on spithead. he was away three weeks, and returned with a french east india convoy with troops and stores, and two of the ships of-the-line which formed its escort. up to this time there had been no immediate sign of the great movement from the south. the franco-spanish fleet which had assembled at cadiz was occupied ineffectually in trying to stop small reliefs reaching gibraltar and in covering their own homeward-bound trade. the dutch, however, were becoming active, and the season was approaching for our baltic trade to come home. ross in the north sea had but four of the line to watch the texel, and was in no position to deal with the danger. accordingly early in may the weight of the home concentration was thrown into the north sea. on the th howe sailed with barrington and the bulk of the fleet to join ross in the downs, while kempenfelt again took the ushant position. only about half the brest squadron had gone down to join the spaniards at cadiz, and he was told his first duty was to intercept the rest if it put to sea, but, as in barrington's instructions, if he met a superior squadron he was to retire up channel under the english coast and join hands with howe. in spite of the fact that influenza was now raging in the fleet, he succeeded in holding the french inactive. howe with the same difficulty to face was equally successful. the dutch had put to sea, but returned immediately they knew of his movement, and cruising off the texel, he held them there, and kept complete command of the north sea till our baltic trade was safe home. by the end of may it was done, and as our intelligence indicated that the great movement from cadiz was at last about to begin, howe, to whom a certain discretion had been left, decided it was time to shift the weight to his other wing and close on kempenfelt. the government, however, seemed to think that he ought to be able to use his position for offensive operations against dutch trade, but in the admiral's opinion this was to lose hold of the design and sacrifice cohesion too much to reach. he informed them that he had not deemed it advisable to make detachments from his squadron against the trade, "not knowing how suddenly there might be a call, for the greater part of it at least, to the westward." in accordance, therefore, with his general instructions he left with ross a strong squadron of nine of the line, sufficient to hold in check, and even "to take and destroy," the comparatively weak ships of the dutch, and with the rest returned to the westward.[ ] his intention was to proceed with all possible expedition to join kempenfelt on the coast of france, but this, owing to the ravages of the influenza, he was unable to do. kempenfelt was forced to come in, and on june th the junction was made at spithead. [ ] the dutch were believed to have sixteen of the line--one seventy-four, seven sixty-eights, and the rest under sixty guns. in ross's squadron were one three-decker and two eighties. for three weeks, so severe was the epidemic, they could not move. then came news that the cadiz fleet under langara had sailed the day howe had reached spithead, and he resolved to make a dash with every ship fit to put to sea to cut it off from brest. he was too late. before he could get into position the junction between langara and the brest squadron was made, and in their full force the allies had occupied the mouth of the channel. with the addition of the brest ships the combined fleet numbered forty of the line, while all howe could muster was twenty-two, but amongst them were seven three-deckers and three eighties, and he would soon be reinforced. three of ross's smallest ships were recalled, and five others were nearly ready, but for these howe could not wait. the homeward-bound jamaica convoy was at hand, and at all hazards it must be saved. what was to be done? so soon as he sighted the enemy he realised that a successful action was out of the question. early in the morning of july th, "being fifteen leagues s.s.e. from scilly," langara with thirty-six of the line was seen to the westward. "as soon," wrote howe, "as their force had been ascertained, i thought proper to avoid coming to battle with them as then circumstanced, and therefore steered to the north to pass between scilly and the land's end. my purpose therein was to get to the westward of the enemy, both for protecting the jamaica convoy and to gain the advantage of situation for bringing them to action which the difference in our numbers renders desirable." by a most brilliant effort of seamanship the dangerous movement was effected safely that night, and it proved an entire success. till howe was met with and defeated, the allies would not venture into the channel, and his unprecedented feat had effectually thrown them off. assuming apparently that he must have passed round their rear to seaward, they sought him to the southward, and there for a month beat up and down in ineffective search. meanwhile howe, sending his cruisers ahead to the convoy's rendezvous off the south-west coast of iceland, had taken his whole fleet about two hundred miles west of the skelligs to meet it. northerly winds prevented his reaching the right latitude in time, but it mattered little. the convoy passed in between him and the south of ireland, and as the enemy had taken a cast down to ushant, it was able to enter the channel in safety without sighting an enemy's sail. ignorant of what had happened, howe cruised for a week practising the ships "in connected movements so particularly necessary on the present occasion." then with his fleet in fine condition to carry out preventive tactics in accordance with kempenfelt's well-known exposition,[ ] he returned to seek the enemy to the eastward, in order to try to draw them from their station at scilly and open the channel. on his way he learnt the convoy had passed in, and with this anxiety off his mind he bore up for the lizard, where his reinforcements were awaiting him. there he found the channel was free. from lack of supplies the enemy had been forced to retire to port, and he returned to spithead to make preparations for the relief of gibraltar. while this work was going on, the north sea squadron was again strengthened that it might resume the blockade of the texel and cover the arrival of the autumn convoys from the baltic. it was done with complete success. not a single ship fell into the enemy's hands, and the campaign, and indeed the war, ended by howe taking the mass of his force down to gibraltar and performing his remarkable feat of relieving it in the face of the spanish squadron. for the power and reach of a well-designed concentration there can be no finer example. [ ] see post, pp. - . if, now, we seek from the above and similar examples for principles to serve as a guide between concentration and division we shall find, firstly, this one. the degree of division we shall require is in proportion to the number of naval ports from which the enemy can act against our maritime interests and to the extent of coastline along which they are spread. it is a principle which springs from the soul of our old tradition that we must always seek, not merely to prevent the enemy striking at our heart, but also to strike him the moment he attempts to do anything. we must make of his every attempt an opportunity for a counterstroke. the distribution this aim entailed varied greatly with different enemies. in our wars with france, and particularly when spain and holland were in alliance with her, the number of the ports to be dealt with was very considerable and their distribution very wide. in our wars with the dutch alone, on the other hand, the number and distribution were comparatively small, and in this case our concentration was always close. this measure of distribution, however, will never stand alone. concentration will not depend solely upon the number and position of the enemy's naval ports. it will be modified by the extent to which the lines of operation starting from those ports traverse our own home waters. the reason is plain. whatever the enemy opposed to us, and whatever the nature of the war, we must always keep a fleet at home. in any circumstances it is essential for the defence of our home trade terminals, and it is essential as a central reserve from which divisions can be thrown off to reinforce distant terminals and to seize opportunities for counterstrokes. it is "the mainspring," as lord barham put it, "from which all offensive operations must proceed." this squadron, then, being permanent and fixed as the foundation of our whole system, it is clear that if, as in the case of the french wars, the enemy's lines of operation do not traverse our home waters, close concentration upon it will not serve our turn. if, on the other hand, as in the case of the dutch wars, the lines do traverse home waters, a home concentration is all that is required. our division will then be measured by the amount of our surplus strength, and by the extent to which we feel able to detach squadrons for offensive action against the enemy's distant maritime interests without prejudicing our hold on the home terminals of his lines of operation and our power of striking directly he moves. these remarks apply, of course, to the main fleet operations. if such an enemy has distant colonial bases from which he can annoy our trade, minor concentrations must naturally be arranged in those areas. next we have to note that where the enemy's squadrons are widely distributed in numerous bases, we cannot always simplify the problem by leaving some of them open so as to entice him to concentrate and reduce the number of ports to be watched. for if we do this, we leave the unwatched squadrons free for sporadic action. unless we are sure he intends to concentrate with a view to a decisive action, our only means of simplifying the situation is to watch every port closely enough to interfere effectually with sporadic action. then, sporadic action being denied him, the enemy must either do nothing or concentrate. the next principle is flexibility. concentration should be so arranged that any two parts may freely cohere, and that all parts may quickly condense into a mass at any point in the area of concentration. the object of holding back from forming the mass is to deny the enemy knowledge of our actual distribution or its intention at any given moment, and at the same time to ensure that it will be adjusted to meet any dangerous movement that is open to him. further than this our aim should be not merely to prevent any part being overpowered by a superior force, but to regard every detached squadron as a trap to lure the enemy to destruction. the ideal concentration, in short, is an appearance of weakness that covers a reality of strength. * * * * * part three conduct of naval war * * * * * chapter one introductory * * * * * i. inherent differences in the conditions of war on land and on sea before attempting to apply the foregoing general principles in a definite manner to the conduct of naval war, it is necessary to clear the ground of certain obstacles to right judgment. the gradual elucidation of the theory of war, it must be remembered, has been almost entirely the work of soldiers, but so admirable is the work they have done, and so philosophical the method they have adopted, that a very natural tendency has arisen to assume that their broad-based conclusions are of universal application. that the leading lines which they have charted are in a certain sense those which must govern all strategy no one will deny. they are the real pioneers, and their methods must be in the main our methods, but what we have to remember is that the country we have to travel is radically different from that in which they acquired their skill. a moment's consideration will reveal how far-reaching the differences are. let us ask ourselves what are the main ideas around which all the military lore turns. it may be taken broadly that the general principles are three in number. firstly, there is the idea of concentration of force, that is, the idea of overthrowing the enemy's main strength by bringing to bear upon it the utmost accumulation of weight and energy within your means; secondly, there is the idea that strategy is mainly a question of definite lines of communication; and thirdly, there is the idea of concentration of effort, which means keeping a single eye on the force you wish to overthrow without regard to ulterior objects. now if we examine the conditions which give these principles so firm a footing on land, we shall find that in all three cases they differ at sea, and differ materially. take the first, which, in spite of all the deductions we have to make from it in the case of limited wars, is the dominating one. the pithy maxim which expresses its essence is that our primary objective is the enemy's main force. in current naval literature the maxim is applied to the sea in some such form as this: "the primary object of our battle-fleet is to seek out and destroy that of the enemy." on the surface nothing could look sounder, but what are the conditions which underlie the one and the other? the practical value of the military maxim is based upon the fact that in land warfare it is always theoretically possible to strike at your enemy's army, that is, if you have the strength and spirit to overcome the obstacles and face the risks. but at sea this is not so. in naval warfare we have a far-reaching fact which is entirely unknown on land. it is simply this--that it is possible for your enemy to remove his fleet from the board altogether. he may withdraw it into a defended port, where it is absolutely out of your reach without the assistance of an army. no amount of naval force, and no amount of offensive spirit, can avail you. the result is that in naval warfare an embarrassing dilemma tends to assert itself. if you are in a superiority that justifies a vigorous offensive and prompts you to seek out your enemy with a view to a decision, the chances are you will find him in a position where you cannot touch him. your offence is arrested, and you find yourself in what, at least theoretically, is the weakest general position known to war. this was one of our earliest discoveries in strategy. it followed indeed immediately and inevitably upon our discovery that the most drastic way of making war was to concentrate every effort on the enemy's armed forces. in dealing with the theory of war in general a caveat has already been entered against the too common assumption that this method was an invention of napoleon's or frederick's, or that it was a foreign importation at all. in the view at least of our own military historians the idea was born in our civil wars with cromwell and the new model army. it was the conspicuous feature that distinguished our civil war from all previous wars of modern times. so astonishing was its success--as foreign observers remarked--that it was naturally applied by our soldier-admirals at sea so soon as war broke out with the dutch. whatever may be the claims of the cromwellian soldiers to have invented for land warfare what is regarded abroad as the chief characteristic of the napoleonic method, it is beyond doubt that they deserve the credit of it at sea. all three dutch wars had a commercial object, and yet after the first campaign the general idea never was to make the enemy's commerce a primary objective. that place was occupied throughout by their battle-fleets, and under monk and rupert at least those objectives were pursued with a singleness of purpose and a persistent vehemence that was entirely napoleonic. but in the later stages of the struggle, when we began to gain a preponderance, it was found that the method ceased to work. the attempt to seek the enemy with a view to a decisive action was again and again frustrated by his retiring to his own coasts, where either we could not reach him or his facilities for retreat made a decisive result impossible. he assumed, in fact, a defensive attitude with which we were powerless to deal, and in the true spirit of defence he sprang out from time to time to deal us a counterstroke as he saw his opportunity. it was soon perceived that the only way of dealing with this attitude was to adopt some means of forcing the enemy to sea and compelling him to expose himself to the decision we sought. the most cogent means at hand was to threaten his commerce. instead, therefore, of attempting to seek out his fleet directly, our own would sit upon the fairway of his homeward-bound trade, either on the dogger bank or elsewhere, thereby setting up a situation which it was hoped would cost him either his trade or his battle-fleet, or possibly both. thus in spite of the fact that with our increasing preponderance our preoccupation with the idea of battle decision had become stronger than ever, we found ourselves forced to fall back upon subsidiary operations of an ulterior strategical character. it is a curious paradox, but it is one that seems inherent in the special feature of naval war, which permits the armed force to be removed from the board altogether. the second distinguishing characteristic of naval warfare which relates to the communication idea is not so well marked, but it is scarcely less important. it will be recalled that this characteristic is concerned with lines of communication in so far as they tend to determine lines of operation. it is a simple question of roads and obstacles. in land warfare we can determine with some precision the limits and direction of our enemy's possible movements. we know that they must be determined mainly by roads and obstacles. but afloat neither roads nor obstacles exist. there is nothing of the kind on the face of the sea to assist us in locating him and determining his movements. true it is that in sailing days his movements were to some extent limited by prevailing winds and by the elimination of impossible courses, but with steam even these determinants have gone, and there is practically nothing to limit the freedom of his movement except the exigencies of fuel. consequently in seeking to strike our enemy the liability to miss him is much greater at sea than on land, and the chances of being eluded by the enemy whom we are seeking to bring to battle become so serious a check upon our offensive action as to compel us to handle the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" with caution. the difficulty obtruded itself from the moment the idea was born. it may be traced back--so far at least as modern warfare is concerned--to sir francis drake's famous appreciation in the year of the armada. this memorable despatch was written when an acute difference of opinion had arisen as to whether it were better to hold our fleet back in home waters or to send it forward to the coast of spain. the enemy's objective was very uncertain. we could not tell whether the blow was to fall in the channel or ireland or scotland, and the situation was complicated by a spanish army of invasion ready to cross from the flemish coast, and the possibility of combined action by the guises from france. drake was for solving the problem by taking station off the armada's port of departure, and fully aware of the risk such a move entailed, he fortified his purely strategical reasons with moral considerations of the highest moment. but the government was unconvinced, not as is usually assumed out of sheer pusillanimity and lack of strategical insight, but because the chances of drake's missing contact were too great if the armada should sail before our own fleet could get into position. our third elementary principle is the idea of concentration of effort, and the third characteristic of naval warfare which clashes with it is that over and above the duty of winning battles, fleets are charged with the duty of protecting commerce. in land warfare, at least since laying waste an undefended part of your enemy's country ceased to be a recognised strategical operation, there is no corresponding deflection of purely military operations. it is idle for purists to tell us that the deflection of commerce protection should not be permitted to turn us from our main purpose. we have to do with the hard facts of war, and experience tells us that for economic reasons alone, apart from the pressure of public opinion, no one has ever found it possible to ignore the deflection entirely. so vital indeed is financial vigour in war, that more often than not the maintenance of the flow of trade has been felt as a paramount consideration. even in the best days of our dutch wars, when the whole plan was based on ignoring the enemy's commerce as an objective, we found ourselves at times forced to protect our own trade with seriously disturbing results. nor is it more profitable to declare that the only sound way to protect your commerce is to destroy the enemy's fleet. as an enunciation of a principle it is a truism--no one would dispute it. as a canon of practical strategy, it is untrue; for here our first deflection again asserts itself. what are you to do if the enemy refuses to permit you to destroy his fleets? you cannot leave your trade exposed to squadronal or cruiser raids while you await your opportunity, and the more you concentrate your force and efforts to secure the desired decision, the more you will expose your trade to sporadic attack. the result is that you are not always free to adopt the plan which is best calculated to bring your enemy to a decision. you may find yourself compelled to occupy, not the best positions, but those which will give a fair chance of getting contact in favourable conditions, and at the same time afford reasonable cover for your trade. hence the maxim that the enemy's coast should be our frontier. it is not a purely military maxim like that for seeking out the enemy's fleet, though the two are often used as though they were interchangeable. our usual positions on the enemy's coast were dictated quite as much by the exigencies of commerce protection as by primary strategical reasons. to maintain a rigorous watch close off the enemy's ports was never the likeliest way to bring him to decisive action--we have nelson's well-known declaration on the point--but it was the best way, and often the only way, to keep the sea clear for the passage of our own trade and for the operations of our cruisers against that of the enemy. for the present these all-important points need not be elaborated further. as we proceed to deal with the methods of naval warfare they will gather force and lucidity. enough has been said to mark the shoals and warn us that, admirably constructed as is the craft which the military strategists have provided for our use, we must be careful with our navigation. but before proceeding further it is necessary to simplify what lies before us by endeavouring to group the complex variety of naval operations into manageable shape. ii. typical forms of naval operations in the conduct of naval war all operations will be found to relate to two broad classes of object. the one is to obtain or dispute the command of the sea, and the other to exercise such control of communications as we have, whether the complete command has been secured or not. it was on the logical and practical distinction between these two kinds of naval object, as we have seen, that the constitution of fleets was based in the fulness of the sailing period, when maritime wars were nearly incessant and were shaping the existing distribution of power in the world. during that period at any rate the dual conception lay at the root of naval methods and naval policy, and as it is also the logical outcome of the theory of war, we may safely take it as the basis of our analysis of the conduct of naval operations. practically, of course, we can seldom assert categorically that any operation of war has but one clearly defined object. a battle-squadron whose primary function was to secure command was often so placed as to enable it to exercise control; and, _vice versa_, cruiser lines intended primarily to exercise control upon the trade routes were regarded as outposts of the battle-fleet to give it warning of the movements of hostile squadrons. thus cornwallis during his blockade of brest had sometimes to loosen his hold in order to cover the arrival of convoys against raiding squadrons; and thus also when nelson was asked by lord barham for his views on cruiser patrol lines, he expressed himself as follows: "ships on this service would not only prevent the depredations of privateers, but be in the way to watch any squadron of the enemy should they pass on their track.... therefore intelligence will be quickly conveyed, and the enemy never, i think, lost sight of."[ ] instructions in this sense were issued by lord barham to the commodores concerned. in both cases, it will be seen, the two classes of operation overlapped. still for purposes of analysis the distinction holds good, and is valuable for obtaining a clear view of the field. [ ] nelson to barham, august . take, first, the methods of securing command, by which we mean putting it out of the enemy's power to use effectually the common communications or materially to interfere with our use of them. we find the means employed were two: decision by battle, and blockade. of the two, the first was the less frequently attainable, but it was the one the british service always preferred. it was only natural that it should be so, seeing that our normal position was one of preponderance over our enemy, and so long as the policy of preponderance is maintained, the chances are the preference will also be maintained. but further than this, the idea seems to be rooted in the oldest traditions of the royal navy. as we have seen, the conviction of the sea service that war is primarily a question of battles, and that battles once joined on anything like equal terms must be pressed to the last gasp, is one that has had nothing to learn from more recent continental discoveries. the cromwellian admirals handed down to us the memory of battles lasting three, and even four, days. their creed is enshrined in the robust article of war under which byng and calder were condemned; and in the apotheosis of nelson the service has deified the battle idea. it is true there were periods when the idea seemed to have lost its colour, but nevertheless it is so firmly embedded in the british conception of naval warfare, that there would be nothing left to say but for the unavoidable modification with which we have to temper the doctrine of overthrow. "use that means," said its best-known advocate, "when you can and when you must." devoutly as we may hold the battle faith, it is not always possible or wise to act upon it. if we are strong, we press to the issue of battle when we can. if we are weak, we do not accept the issue unless we must. if circumstances are advantageous to us, we are not always able to effect a decision; and if they are disadvantageous, we are not always obliged to fight. hence we find the apparently simple doctrine of the battle was almost always entangled in two of the most difficult problems that beset our old admirals. the most thorny questions they had to decide were these. in the normal case of strength, it was not how to defeat the enemy, but how to bring him to action; and in casual cases of temporary weakness, it was not how to sell your life dearly, but how to maintain the fleet actively on the defensive so as at once to deny the enemy the decision he sought and to prevent his attaining his ulterior object. from these considerations it follows that we are able to group all naval operations in some such way as this. firstly, on the only assumption we can permit ourselves, namely, that we start with a preponderance of force or advantage, we adopt methods for securing command. these methods, again, fall under two heads. firstly, there are operations for securing a decision by battle, under which head, as has been explained, we shall be chiefly concerned with methods of bringing an unwilling enemy to action, and with the value to that end of the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet." secondly, there are the operations which become necessary when no decision is obtainable and our war plan demands the immediate control of communications. under this head it will be convenient to treat all forms of blockade, whether military or commercial, although, as we shall see, certain forms of military, and even commercial, blockade are primarily concerned with forcing the enemy to a decision. our second main group covers operations to which we have to resort when our relative strength is not adequate for either class of operations to secure command. in these conditions we have to content ourselves with endeavouring to hold the command in dispute; that is, we endeavour by active defensive operations to prevent the enemy either securing or exercising control for the objects he has in view. such are the operations which are connoted by the true conception of "a fleet in being." under this head also should fall those new forms of minor counter-attack which have entered the field of strategy since the introduction of the mobile torpedo and offensive mining. in the third main group we have to deal with the methods of exercising control of passage and communication. these operations vary in character according to the several purposes for which the control is desired, and they will be found to take one of three general forms. firstly, the control of the lines of passage of an invading army; secondly, the control of trade routes and trade terminals for the attack and defence of commerce; and thirdly, the control of passage and communication for our own oversea expeditions, and the control of their objective area for the active support of their operations. for clearness we may summarise the whole in tabulated analysis, thus:-- . methods of securing command: (a) by obtaining a decision. (b) by blockade. . methods of disputing command: (a) principle of "the fleet in being." (b) minor counter-attacks. . methods of exercising command: (a) defence against invasion. (b) attack and defence of commerce. (c) attack, defence, and support of military expeditions. * * * * * chapter two methods of securing command * * * * * i. on obtaining a decision whatever the nature of the war in which we are engaged, whether it be limited or unlimited, permanent and general command of the sea is the condition of ultimate success. the only way of securing such a command by naval means is to obtain a decision by battle against the enemy's fleet. sooner or later it must be done, and the sooner the better. that was the old british creed. it is still our creed, and needs no labouring. no one will dispute it, no one will care even to discuss it, and we pass with confidence to the conclusion that the first business of our fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. no maxim can so well embody the british spirit of making war upon the sea, and nothing must be permitted to breathe on that spirit. to examine its claim to be the logical conclusion of our theory of war will even be held dangerous, yet nothing is so dangerous in the study of war as to permit maxims to become a substitute for judgment. let us examine its credentials, and as a first step put it to the test of the two most modern instances. both of them, it must be noted, were instances of limited war, the most usual form of our own activities, and indeed the only one to which our war organisation, with its essential preponderance of the naval element, has ever been really adapted. the first instance is the spanish-american war, and the second that between russia and japan. in the former case the americans took up arms in order to liberate cuba from spanish domination--a strictly limited object. there is no evidence that the nature of the war was ever clearly formulated by either side, but in just conformity with the general political conditions the american war plan aimed at opening with a movement to secure the territorial object. at the earliest possible moment they intended to establish themselves in the west of cuba in support of the colonial insurgents. everything depended on the initiative being seized with decision and rapidity. its moral and physical importance justified the utmost risk, and such was the conformation of the sea which the american army had to pass, that a strictly defensive or covering attitude with their fleet could reduce the risk almost to security. yet so unwisely dominated were the americans by recently rediscovered maxims, that when on the eve of executing the vital movement they heard a spanish squadron was crossing the atlantic, their own covering force was diverted from its defensive position and sent away to "seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it." puerto rico was the most obvious point at which to seek it, and thither admiral sampson was permitted to go, regardless of the elementary truth that in such cases what is obvious to you is also usually obvious to your enemy. the result was that not only did the americans fail to get contact, but they also uncovered their own army's line of passage and paralysed the initial movement. in the end it was only pure chance that permitted them to retrieve the mistake they had made. had the spanish squadron put into a cuban port in railway communication with the main royalist army, such as cienfuegos or havana, instead of hurrying into santiago, the whole campaign must have been lost. "it appears now," wrote admiral mahan, in his _lessons of the war with spain_, "not only that the eastward voyage of our havana division was unfortunate, but it should have been seen beforehand to be a mistake, because inconsistent with a well and generally accepted principle of war, the non-observance of which was not commanded by the conditions. the principle is that which condemns eccentric movements. by the disregard of rule in this case we uncovered both havana and cienfuegos, which it was our object to close to the enemy's division." whether or not we regard admiral mahan's exposition of the error as penetrating to the real principle that was violated, the movement was in fact not only eccentric, but unnecessary. had the americans been content to keep their fleet concentrated in its true defensive position, not only would they have covered their army's line of passage and their blockade of the territorial objective, but they would have had a far better chance of bringing the spaniards to action. the spaniards were bound to come to them or remain outside the theatre of operations where they could in no way affect the issue of the war except adversely to themselves by sapping the spirit of their own cuban garrison. it is a clear case of the letter killing the spirit, of an attractive maxim being permitted to shut the door upon judgment. strategical offence in this case was not the best defence. "seeking out the enemy's fleet" was almost bound to end in a blow in the air, which not only would fail to gain any offensive result, but would sacrifice the main defensive plank in the american war plan upon which their offensive relied for success. to stigmatise such a movement as merely eccentric is to pass very lenient censure. in the russo-japanese war we have a converse case, in which judgment kept the aphorism silent. it is true that during the earlier stage of the naval operations the japanese did in a sense seek out the enemy's fleet, in so far as they advanced their base close to port arthur; but this was done, not with any fixed intention of destroying the russian fleet--there was small hope of that at sea--but rather because by no other means could they cover the army's lines of passage, which it was the function of the fleet to secure, the true offensive operations being on land. never except once, under express orders from tokio, did either admiral togo or admiral kamimura press offensive movements in such a way as to jeopardise the preventive duty with which the war plan charged them. still less in the later stage, when everything depended on the destruction of the baltic fleet, did admiral togo "seek it out." he was content, as the americans should have been content, to have set up such a situation that the enemy must come and break it down if they were to affect the issue of the war. so he waited on the defensive, assured his enemy must come to him, and thereby he rendered it, as certain as war can be, that when the moment for the tactical offensive came his blow should be sure and sudden, in overwhelming strength of concentration, and decisive beyond all precedent. clearly, then, the maxim of "seeking out" for all its moral exhilaration, for all its value as an expression of high and sound naval spirit, must not be permitted to displace well-reasoned judgment. trusty servant as it is, it will make a bad master, as the americans found to their serious jeopardy. yet we feel instinctively that it expresses, as no other aphorism does, the secret of british success at sea. we cannot do without it; we cannot do with it in its nakedness. let us endeavour to clothe it with its real meaning, with the true principles that it connotes. let us endeavour to determine the stuff that it is made of, and for this purpose there is no better way than to trace its gradual growth from the days when it was born of the crude and virile instinct of the earliest masters. the germ is to be found in the despatch already mentioned which drake wrote from plymouth at the end of march in . his arguments were not purely naval, for it was a combined problem, a problem of defence against invasion, that had to be solved. what he wished to persuade the government was, that the kernel of the situation was not so much parma's army of invasion in flanders, as the fleet that was preparing in spain to clear its passage. the government appeared to be acting on the opposite view. howard with the bulk of the fleet was at the base in the medway within supporting distance of the light squadron that was blockading the flemish ports in concert with the dutch. drake himself with another light squadron had been sent to the westward with some indeterminate idea of his serving as an observation squadron, or being used in the mediaeval fashion for an eccentric counterstroke. being invited to give his opinion on this disposition, he pronounced it vicious. in his eyes, what was demanded was an offensive movement against the enemy's main fleet. "if there may be such a stay or stop made," he urged, "by any means of this fleet in spain, so that they may not come through the seas as conquerors, then shall the prince of parma have such a check thereby as were meet." what he had in his mind is clearly not so much a decision in the open as an interruption of the enemy's incomplete mobilisation, such as he had so brilliantly effected the previous year. for later on he says that "next under god's mighty protection the advantage of time and place will be the only and chief means for our good, wherein i most humbly beseech your good lordships to persevere as you have begun, for with fifty sail of shipping we shall do more upon their own coast than a great many more will do here at home; and the sooner we are gone, the better we shall be able to impeach them." he does not say "destroy." "impeach" meant "to prevent." clearly, then, what he had in his mind was a repetition of the previous year's strategy, whereby he had been able to break up the spanish mobilisation and "impeach" the armada from sailing. he did not even ask for a concentration of the whole fleet for the purpose, but only that his own squadron should be reinforced as was thought convenient. the actual reasons he gave for his advice were purely moral--that is, he dwelt on the enheartening effect of striking the first blow, and attacking instead of waiting to be attacked. the nation, he urged, "will be persuaded that the lord will put into her majesty and her people courage and boldness not to fear invasion, but to seek god's enemies and her majesty's where they may be found." here is the germ of the maxim. the consequence of his despatch was a summons to attend the council. the conference was followed, not by the half measure, which was all he had ventured to advise in his despatch, but by something that embodied a fuller expression of his general idea, and closely resembled what was to be consecrated as our regular disposition in such cases. the whole of the main fleet, except the squadron watching the flemish coast, was massed to the westward to cover the blockade of parma's transports, but the position assigned to it was inside the channel instead of outside, which tactically was bad, for it was almost certain to give the armada the weather gage. no movement to the coast of spain was permitted--not necessarily, be it remembered, out of pusillanimity or failure to grasp drake's idea, but for fear that, as in the recent american case, a forward movement was likely to result in a blow in the air, and to uncover the vital position without bringing the enemy to action. when, however, the sailing of the armada was so long delayed drake's importunity was renewed, with that of howard and all his colleagues to back it. it brought eventually the desired permission. the fleet sailed for coruña, where it was known the armada, after an abortive start from lisbon, had been driven by bad weather, and something like what the government feared happened. before it could reach its destination it met southerly gales, its offensive power was exhausted, and it had to return to plymouth impotent for immediate action as the armada finally sailed. when the spaniards appeared it was still in port refitting and victualling. it was only by an unprecedented feat of seamanship that the situation was saved, and howard was able to gain the orthodox position to seaward of his enemy. so far, then, the government's cautious clinging to a general defensive attitude, instead of seeking out the enemy's fleet, was justified, but it must be remembered that drake from the first had insisted it was a question of time as well as place. if he had been permitted to make the movement when he first proposed it, there is good reason to believe that the final stages of the spanish mobilisation could not have been carried out that year; that is to say, the various divisions of the armada could not have been assembled into a fleet. but information as to its condition was at the time very uncertain, and in view of the negotiations that were on foot, there were, moreover, high political reasons for our not taking too drastic an offensive if a reasonable alternative existed. the principles, then, which we distil from this, the original case of "seeking out," are, firstly, the moral value of seizing the initiative, and, secondly, the importance of striking before the enemy's mobilisation is complete. the idea of overthrow by a great fleet action is not present, unless we find it in a not clearly formulated idea of the elizabethan admirals of striking a fleet when it is demoralised, as the armada was by its first rebuff, or immediately on its leaving port before it had settled down. in our next naval struggle with the dutch in the latter half of the seventeenth century the principle of overthrow, as we have seen, became fully developed. it was the keynote of the strategy which was evolved, and the conditions which forced it to recognition also emphasised the principles of seeking out and destroying. it was a case of a purely naval struggle, in which there were no military considerations to deflect naval strategy. it was, moreover, a question of narrow seas, and the risk of missing contact which had cramped the elizabethans in their oceanic theatre was a negligible factor. yet fresh objections to using the "seeking out" maxim as a strategical panacea soon declared themselves. the first war opened without any trace of the new principle. the first campaign was concerned in the old fashion entirely with the attack and defence of trade, and such indecisive actions as occurred were merely incidental to the process. no one appears to have realised the fallacy of such method except, perhaps, tromp. the general instructions he received were that "the first and principal object was to do all possible harm to the english," and to that end "he was given a fleet in order to sail to the damage and offence of the english fleet, and also to give convoy to the west." seeing at once the incompatibility of the two functions, he asked for more definite instructions. what, for instance, was he to do if he found a chance of blockading the main english fleet at its base? was he to devote himself to the blockade and "leave the whole fleet of merchantmen to be a prey to a squadron of fast-sailing frigates," or was he to continue his escort duty? full as he was of desire to deal with the enemy's main fleet, he was perplexed with the practical difficulty--too often forgotten--that the mere domination of the enemy's battle strength does not solve the problem of control of the sea. no fresh instructions were forthcoming to clear his perplexity, and he could only protest again. "i could wish," he wrote, "to be so fortunate as to have only one of these two duties--to seek out the enemy, or to give convoy, for to do both is attended with great difficulties." the indecisive campaign which naturally resulted from this lack of strategical grip and concentration of effort came to an end with tromp's partial defeat of blake off dungeness on th november . though charged in spite of his protests with a vast convoy, the dutch admiral had sent it back to ostend when he found blake was in the downs, and then, free from all preoccupation, he had gone to seek out his enemy. it was the effect which this unexpected blow had upon the strong military insight of the cromwellian government that led to those famous reforms which made this winter so memorable a landmark in british naval history. monk, the most finished professional soldier in the english service, and deane, another general, were joined in the command with blake, and with their coming was breathed into the sea service the high military spirit of the new model army. to that winter we owe not only the articles of war, which made discipline possible, and the first attempt to formulate fighting instructions, in which a regular tactical system was conceived, but also two other conceptions that go to make up the modern idea of naval warfare. one was the conviction that war upon the sea meant operations against the enemy's armed fleets in order to destroy his power of naval resistance as distinguished from operations by way of reprisal against his trade; and the other, that such warfare required for its effective use a fleet of state-owned ships specialised for war, with as little assistance as possible from private-owned ships. it was not unnatural that all four ideas should have taken shape together, so closely are they related. the end connotes the means. discipline, fleet tactics, and a navy of warships were indispensable for making war in the modern sense of the term. the results were seen in the three great actions of the following spring, the first under the three generals, and the other two under monk alone. in the last, he carried the new ideas so far as to forbid taking possession of disabled vessels, that nothing might check the work of destruction. all were to be sunk with as much tenderness for human life as destruction would permit. in like manner the second war was characterised by three great naval actions, one of which, after monk had resumed command, lasted no less than four days. the new doctrine was indeed carried to exaggeration. so entirely was naval thought centred on the action of the battle-fleets, that no provision was made for an adequate exercise of control. in our own case at least, massing for offensive action was pressed so far that no thought was given to sustaining it by reliefs. consequently our offensive power suffered periods of exhaustion when the fleet had to return to its base, and the dutch were left sufficient freedom not only to secure their own trade, but to strike severely at ours. their counterstrokes culminated in the famous attack upon sheerness and chatham. that such an opportunity was allowed them can be traced directly to an exaggeration of the new doctrine. in the belief of the british government the "st. james's fight"--the last of the three actions--had settled the question of command. negotiations for peace were opened, and they were content to reap the fruit of the great battles in preying on dutch trade. having done its work, as was believed, the bulk of the battle-fleet for financial reasons was laid up, and the dutch seized the opportunity to demonstrate the limitations of the abused doctrine. the lesson is one we have never forgotten, but its value is half lost if we attribute the disaster to lack of grasp of the battle-fleet doctrine rather than to an exaggeration of its possibilities. the truth is, that we had not obtained a victory sufficiently decisive to destroy the enemy's fleet. the most valuable lesson of the war was that such victories required working for, and particularly in cases where the belligerents face each other from either side of a narrow sea. in such conditions it was proved that owing to the facility of retreat and the restricted possibilities of pursuit a complete decision is not to be looked for without very special strategical preparation. the new doctrine in fact gave that new direction to strategy which has been already referred to. it was no longer a question of whether to make the enemy's trade or his fleet the primary objective, but of how to get contact with his fleet in such a way as to lead to decisive action. merely to seek him out on his own coasts was to ensure that no decisive action would take place. measures had to be taken to force him to sea away from his own bases. the favourite device was to substitute organised strategical operations against his trade in place of the old sporadic attacks; that is, the fleet took a position calculated to stop his trade altogether, not on his own coasts, but far to sea in the main fairway. the operations failed for lack of provision for enabling the fleet by systematic relief to retain its position, but nevertheless it was the germ of the system which afterwards, under riper organisation, was to prove so effective, and to produce such actions as the "glorious first of june." in the third war, after this device had failed again and again, a new one was tried. it was charles the second's own conception. his idea was to use the threat of a military expedition. some , men in transports were brought to yarmouth in the hope that the dutch would come out to bar their passage across the open north sea, and would thus permit our fleet to cut in behind them. there was, however, no proper coordination of the two forces, and the project failed. this method of securing a decision was not lost sight of; anson tried to use it in the seven years' war. for two years every attempt to seek out the enemy's fleet had led to nothing but the exhaustion of our own. but when pitt began his raids on the french coast, anson, who had little faith in their value for military purposes, thought he saw in them definite naval possibilities. accordingly when, in , he was placed in command of the channel fleet to cover the expedition against st. malo, he raised the blockade of brest, and took up a position near the isle of batz between the enemy's main fleet and the army's line of passage. the brest fleet, however, was in no condition to move, and again there was no result. it was not till that there was any clear case of the device succeeding, and then it was not used deliberately. it was a joint anglo-russian expedition in the mediterranean that forced from napoleon his reckless order for villeneuve to put to sea from cadiz, and so solved the problem out of which nelson had seen no issue. lissa may be taken as an analogous case. but there the italians, treating the territorial attack as a real attack instead of as a strategical device, suffered themselves to be surprised by the austrian fleet and defeated. this instance serves well to introduce the important fact, that although our own military expeditions have seldom succeeded in leading to a naval decision, the converse was almost always true. the attempt of the enemy to use his army against our territory has been the most fertile source of our great naval victories. the knowledge that our enemy intends to invade these shores, or to make some serious expedition against our oversea dominions or interests, should always be welcomed. unless history belie herself, we know that such attempts are the surest means of securing what we want. we have the memories of la hogue, quiberon, and the nile to assure us that sooner or later they must lead to a naval decision, and the chance of a real decision is all we can ask of the fortune of war. enough has now been said to show that "seeking out the enemy's fleet" is not in itself sufficient to secure such a decision. what the maxim really means is that we should endeavour from the first to secure contact in the best position for bringing about a complete decision in our favour, and as soon as the other parts of our war plan, military or political, will permit. if the main offensive is military, as it was in the japanese and american cases, then if possible the effort to secure such control must be subordinated to the movement of the army, otherwise we give the defensive precedence of the offensive. if, however, the military offensive cannot be ensured until the naval defensive is perfected, as will be the case if the enemy brings a fleet up to our army's line of passage, then our first move must be to secure naval contact. the vice of the opposite method of procedure is obvious. if we assume the maxim that the first duty of our fleet is to seek out the enemy wherever he may be, it means in its nakedness that we merely conform to the enemy's dispositions and movements. it is open to him to lead us wherever he likes. it was one of the fallacies that underlay all napoleon's naval combinations, that he believed that our hard-bitten admirals would behave in this guileless manner. but nothing was further from their cunning. there is a typical order of cornwallis's which serves well to mark their attitude. it was one he gave to admiral cotton, his second in command, in july on handing over to his charge the western squadron off ushant: "if the french put to sea," he says, "without any of your vessels seeing them, do not follow them, unless you are absolutely sure of the course they have taken. if you leave the entrance of the channel without protection, the enemy might profit by it, and assist the invasion which threatens his majesty's dominions, the protection of which is your principal object." it is indeed a common belief that nelson never permitted himself but a single purpose, the pursuit of the enemy's fleet, and that, ignoring the caution which cornwallis impressed upon cotton, he fell into the simple trap. but it has to be noted that he never suffered himself to be led in pursuit of a fleet away from the position he had been charged to maintain, unless and until he had made that position secure behind him. his famous chase to the west indies is the case which has led to most misconception on the point from an insufficient regard to the surrounding circumstances. nelson did not pursue villeneuve with the sole, or even the primary, object of bringing him to action. his dominant object was to save jamaica from capture. if it had only been a question of getting contact, he would certainly have felt in a surer position by waiting for villeneuve's return off st. vincent or closing in to the strategical centre off ushant. further, it must be observed that nelson by his pursuit did not uncover what it was his duty to defend. the mediterranean position was rendered quite secure before he ventured on his eccentric movement. finally, we have the important fact that though the moral effect of nelson's implacable persistence and rapidity was of priceless value, it is impossible to show that as a mere strategical movement it had any influence on the course of the campaign. his appearance in the west indies may have saved one or two small islands from ransom and a good deal of trade from capture. it may also have hastened villeneuve's return by a few days, but that was not to our advantage. had he returned even a week later there would have been no need to raise the rochefort blockade. barham would have had enough ships at his command to preserve the whole of his blockades, as he had intended to do till the _curieux's_ news of villeneuve's precipitate return forced his hand before he was ready. if we desire a typical example of the way the old masters used the doctrine of seeking out, it is to be found, not in nelson's magnificent chase, but in the restrained boldness of barham's orders to cornwallis and calder. their instructions for seeking out villeneuve were to move out on his two possible lines of approach for such a time and such a distance as would make decisive action almost certain, and at the same time, if contact were missed, would ensure the preservation of the vital defensive positions. barham was far too astute to play into napoleon's hands, and by blindly following his enemy's lead to be jockeyed into sacrificing the position which his enemy wished to secure. if our maxim be suffered to usurp the place of instructed judgment, the almost inevitable result will be that it will lead us into just the kind of mistake which barham avoided. ii. blockade under the term blockade we include operations which vary widely in character and in strategical intention. in the first place, blockade may be either naval or commercial. by naval blockade we seek either to prevent an enemy's armed force leaving port, or to make certain it shall be brought to action before it can carry out the ulterior purpose for which it puts to sea. that armed force may be purely naval, or it may consist wholly or in part of a military expedition. if it be purely naval, then our blockade is a method of securing command. if it be purely military, it is a method of exercising command, and as such will be dealt with when we come to consider defence against invasion. but in so far as military expeditions are normally accompanied by a naval escort, operations to prevent their sailing are not purely concerned with the exercise of command. naval blockade, therefore, may be regarded for practical purposes as a method of securing command and as a function of battle-squadrons. commercial blockade, on the other hand, is essentially a method of exercising command, and is mainly an affair of cruisers. its immediate object is to stop the flow of the enemy's sea-borne trade, whether carried in his own or neutral bottoms, by denying him the use of trade communications. from the point of view of the conduct of war, therefore, we have two well-defined categories of blockade, naval and commercial. but our classification must go further; for naval blockade itself is equally varied in intention, and must be subdivided. strictly speaking, the term implies a desire to close the blockaded port and to prevent the enemy putting to sea. but this was not always the intention. as often as not our wish was that he should put to sea that we might bring him to action, and in order to do this, before he could effect his purpose, we had to watch the port with a fleet more or less closely. for this operation there was no special name. widely as it differed in object from the other, it was also usually called blockade, and nelson's protest against the consequent confusion of thought is well known. "it is not my intention," he said, "to close-watch toulon"; and again, "my system is the very contrary of blockading. every opportunity has been offered the enemy to put to sea." it is desirable, therefore, to adopt terms to distinguish the two forms. "close" and "open" express the antithesis suggested by nelson's letter, and the two terms serve well enough to mark the characteristic feature of each operation. close blockade, it is true, as formerly conceived, is generally regarded as no longer practicable; but the antithetical ideas, which the two forms of blockade connote, can never be eliminated from strategical consideration. it must always be with the relations of these two forms, whatever shape they may take in future, that the strategy of naval blockade is chiefly concerned. with regard to commercial blockade, in strict analysis it should be eliminated from an inquiry that concerns methods of securing command and postponed to that section of exercising command which deals with the attack and defence of trade. it is, however, necessary to treat certain of its aspects in conjunction with naval blockade for two reasons: one, that as a rule naval blockade is indissolubly united to a subordinate commercial blockade; and the other, that the commercial form, though its immediate object is the exercise of control, has almost invariably an ulterior object which is concerned with securing control; that is to say, while its immediate object was to keep the enemy's commercial ports closed, its ulterior object was to force his fleet to sea. commercial blockade, therefore, has an intimate relation with naval blockade in its open form. we adopt that form when we wish his fleet to put to sea, and commercial blockade is usually the most effective means we have of forcing upon him the movement we leave him free to attempt. by closing his commercial ports we exercise the highest power of injuring him which the command of the sea can give us. we choke the flow of his national activity afloat in the same way that military occupation of his territory chokes it ashore. he must, therefore, either tamely submit to the worst which a naval defeat can inflict upon him, or he must fight to release himself. he may see fit to choose the one course or the other, but in any case we can do no more by naval means alone to force our will upon him. in the long run a rigorous and uninterrupted blockade is almost sure to exhaust him before it exhausts us, but the end will be far and costly. as a rule, therefore, we have found that where we had a substantial predominance our enemy preferred to submit to commercial blockade in hope that by the chances of war or the development of fresh force he might later on be in a better position to come out into the open. that he should come out and stake the issue in battle was nearly always our wish, and it was obvious that too rigorous a naval blockade was not the way to achieve the desired end, or to reap the strategical result which we might expect from paralysing his commerce. consequently where the desire for a decision at sea was not crossed by higher military considerations, as in the case of imminent invasion, or where we ourselves had an important expedition in hand, it was to our interest to incline the enemy's mind towards the bolder choice. the means was to tempt him with a prospect of success, either by leading him to believe the blockading force was smaller than it was, or by removing it to such a distance as would induce him to attempt to evade it, or both. a leading case of such an open blockade was nelson's disposition of his fleet off cadiz when he was seeking to bring villeneuve to action in . but merely to leave a port open does not fulfil the idea of open blockade, and in this case to opportunity and temptation nelson added the pressure of a commercial blockade of the adjacent ports in hope of starving villeneuve into the necessity of taking to the sea. finally, in a general comparison of the two forms, we have to observe that close blockade is characteristically a method of securing local and temporary command. its dominating purpose will usually be to prevent the enemy's fleet acting in a certain area and for a certain purpose. whereas open blockade, in that it aims at the destruction of an enemy's naval force, is a definite step towards securing permanent command. enough has now been said to show that the question of choice between close and open blockade is one of extreme complexity. our naval literature, it is true, presents the old masters as divided into two schools on the subject, implying that one was in favour of the close form always, and the other of the open form. we are even led to believe that the choice depended on the military spirit of the officer concerned. if his military spirit was high, he chose the close and more exacting form; if it were low, he was content with the open and less exacting form. true, we are told that men of the latter school based their objections to close blockade on the excessive wear and tear of a fleet that it involved, but it is too often suggested that this attitude was no more than a mask for a defective spirit. seldom if ever are we invited to compare their decisions with the attendant strategical intention, with the risks which the conditions justified, or with the expenditure of energy which the desired result could legitimately demand. yet all these considerations must enter into the choice, and on closer examination of the leading cases it will be found that they bear a striking and almost constant relation to the nature of the blockade employed. in considering open blockade, three postulates must be kept in mind. firstly, since our object is to get the enemy to sea, our position must be such as will give him an opportunity of doing so. secondly, since we desire contact for a decisive battle, that position must be no further away from his port than is compatible with bringing him to action before he can effect his purpose. thirdly, there is the idea of economy--that is, the idea of adopting the method which is least exhausting to our fleet, and which will best preserve its battle fitness. it is on the last point that the greatest difference of opinion has existed. a close blockade always tended to exhaust a fleet, and always must do so. but, on the other hand, it was contended that the exhaustion is compensated by the high temper and moral domination which the maintenance of a close blockade produces in a good fleet, whereas the comparative ease of distant and secure watch tended to deterioration. before considering these opposed views, one warning is necessary. it is usually assumed that the alternative to close blockade is watching the enemy from one of our own ports, but this is not essential. what is required is an interior and, if possible, a secret position which will render contact certain; and with modern developments in the means of distant communication, such a position is usually better found at sea than in port. a watching position can in fact be obtained free from the strain of dangerous navigation and incessant liability to attack without sacrifice of sea training. with this very practical point in mind, we may proceed to test the merits of the two forms on abstract principles. it was always obvious that a close naval blockade was one of the weakest and least desirable forms of war. here again when we say "weakest" we do not mean "least effective," but that it was exhausting, and that it tended to occupy a force greater than that against which it was acting. this was not because a blockading fleet, tempered and toughened by its watch, and with great advantage of tactical position, could not be counted on to engage successfully a raw fleet of equal force issuing from port, but because in order to maintain its active efficiency it required large reserves for its relief. so severe was the wear and tear both to men and ships, that even the most strenuous exponents of the system considered that at least a fifth of the force should always be refitting, and in every case two admirals were employed to relieve one another. in one of the highest authorities in the service considered that to maintain an effective close blockade of brest two complete sets of flag-officers were necessary, and that no less than one-fourth of the squadron should always be in port.[ ] [ ] captain philip patton to sir charles middleton, june . _barham papers_, ii, . patton had probably wider war experience than any officer then living. he was regarded as possessing a very special knowledge of personnel, and as vice admiral became second sea lord under barham in . now these weaknesses, being inherent in close blockade, necessarily affected the appreciation of its value. the weight of the objection tended of course to decrease as seamanship, material, or organisation improved, but it was always a factor. it is true also that it seems to have had more weight with some men than with others, but it will appear equally true, if we endeavour to trace the movement of opinion on the subject, that it was far from being the sole determinant. it was in the seven years' war under anson's administration that continuous and close blockade was first used systematically, but it was hawke who originated it. in the first three campaigns the old system of watching brest from a british western port had been in vogue, but it had twice failed to prevent a french concentration in the vital canadian theatre. in the spring of hawke was in command of the channel fleet with the usual instructions for watching, but being directed to stand over and look into brest, he intimated his intention, unless he received orders to the contrary, to remain off the port instead of returning to torbay. his reason was that he had found there a squadron which he believed was intended for the west indies, and he considered it better to prevent its sailing than to let it put to sea and try to catch it. in other words, he argued that none of the usual western watching ports afforded a position interior to the usual french route from brest to the west indies. since rumours of invasion were in the air, it was obviously the better course to deal with the enemy's squadrons in home waters and avoid dispersal of the fleet in seeking them out. in spite of extraordinarily bad weather, therefore, he was permitted to act as he advised. with boscawen as relief, the new form of blockade was kept up thenceforward, and with entire success. but it must be noted that this success was rather due to the fact that the french made no further effort to cross the atlantic, than to the fact that the blockade was maintained with sufficient strictness to prevent their doing so. in certain states of weather our fleet was forced to raise the blockade and run to torbay or plymouth. such temporary reversions to the open form nearly always afforded an opportunity for the french to get away to the southward with two or three days' start. against any attempt, however, to get to the east or the north in order to dispute command of the channel or other home waters the system was thoroughly efficient, and was unaffected by the intervals of the open form. it may have been these considerations which in the war of american independence induced so fine an officer as howe to be strongly in favour of a reversion to the old system. the vital theatre was then again across the atlantic, and there was no serious preparation for invasion. it should also be borne in mind in judging howe against hawke, that in the seven years' war we had such a preponderance at sea as permitted ample reserves to nourish a close blockade, whereas in the latter war we were numerically inferior to the hostile coalition. since it was impossible to prevent the french reaching the west indies and north america if they so determined, our policy was to follow them with equal fleets and reduce the home force as low as that policy demanded and as was consistent with a reasonable degree of safety. the force required might well be inferior to the enemy, since it was certain that all attempts upon the channel would be made with an unwieldy and ill-knit force composed of spanish and french units. in howe's opinion this particular situation was not to be solved by attempting to close brest, and nothing can be more misleading than to stretch such an opinion beyond the circumstances it was intended to meet. he did not consider it was in his power to close the port. the enemy, he held, could always be in readiness to escape after a gale of wind by which the blockading squadron would be drawn off or dispersed, the ships much damaged, and the enemy enheartened. "an enemy," he said, "is not to be restrained from putting to sea by a station taken off their port with a barely superior squadron." the experience of appears to contradict him. then a barely superior squadron did succeed in preventing ganteaume's exit, but though the squadron actually employed was barely superior, it had ample fleet reserves to sustain its numbers in efficiency. it was, moreover, only for a short time that it had to deal with any real effort to escape. after may th, ganteaume was forbidden to put to sea. there were certainly several occasions during that famous blockade when he could have escaped to the southward had napoleon wished it. this case, then, cannot be taken to condemn howe's judgment. his special function in the war plan was, with a force reduced to defensive strength, to prevent the enemy obtaining command of our home waters. it was certainly not his duty to undertake operations to which his force was not equal. his first duty was to keep it in being for its paramount purpose. to this end he decided on open blockade based on a general reserve at spithead or st. helen's, where he could husband the ships and train his recruits, while at the same time he protected our trade and communications and harassed those of the enemy. kempenfelt, than whom there was no warmer advocate of activity, entirely approved the policy at least for the winter months, and in his case no one will be found to suggest that the idea was prompted by lack of spirit or love of ease. so far as the summer was concerned there was really little difference of opinion as to whether the fleet should be kept at sea or not, for sea-training during summer more than compensated for the exhaustion of material likely to be caused by intermittent spells of bad weather. even for the winter the two policies came to much the same thing. thus in hawke's blockade at the end of , during the critical month from mid-october to mid-november, he was unable to keep his station for nearly half the time, and when he did get contact with conflans it was from torbay and not ushant. still it may be doubted if without the confidence bred of his stormy vigil the battle of quiberon would have been fought as it was. with all this experience fresh in his mind kempenfelt frankly advocated keeping the fleet in port for the winter. "suppose," he wrote from torbay in november , "the enemy should put to sea with their fleet (that is, from brest)--a thing much to be wished for by us--let us act wisely and keep ours in port. leave them to the mercy of long nights and hard gales. they will do more in favour of you than your fleet can." far better he thought to devote the winter to preparing the fleet for the next campaign so as to have "the advantage of being the first in the field." "let us," he concluded, "keep a stout squadron to the westward ready to attend the motions of the enemy. i don't mean to keep them at sea, disabling themselves in buffeting the winds, but at torbay ready to act as intelligence may suggest."[ ] it will be seen, therefore, that the conclusion that close blockade was always the best means of rendering the fleet most efficient for the function it had to perform must not be accepted too hastily. the reasons which induced howe and kempenfelt to prefer open blockade were mainly based on this very consideration. having in mind the whole of the surrounding conditions, in their highly experienced opinion careful preparation in the winter and tactical evolutions in the summer were the surest road to battle fitness in the force available. [ ] _barham papers_, i, . on the other hand, we have the fact that during the war of american independence the open system was not very successful. but before condemning it out of hand, it must be remembered that the causes of failure were not all inherent in the system. in the first place, the need of relieving gibraltar from time to time prevented the western squadron devoting itself entirely to its watch. in the next place, owing to defective administration the winters were not devoted with sufficient energy to preparing the fleet to be first in the field in the spring. finally, we have to recognise that the lack of success was due not so much to permitting the french to cross the atlantic, as to the failure to deal faithfully with them when contact was obtained at their destination. obviously there is nothing to be said for the policy of "seeking out" as against that of preventing exit unless you are determined when you find to destroy or to be destroyed. it was here that rodney and his fellows were found wanting. the system failed from defective execution quite as much as from defective design. in the next war howe was still in the ascendant and in command of the channel fleet. he retained his system. leaving brest open he forced the french by operating against their trade to put to sea, and he was rewarded with the battle of the first of june. no attempt was made to maintain a close blockade during the following winter. the french were allowed to sail, and their disastrous cruise of january fully justified kempenfelt's anticipations. so great was the damage done that they abandoned all idea of using their fleet as a whole. howe's system was continued, but no longer with entirely successful results. in the french were able to make descents upon ireland, and howe in consequence has come in for the severest castigations. his method is contemptuously contrasted with that which st. vincent adopted four years later, without any regard to the situation each admiral had to meet, and again on the assumption that the closing of brest would have solved the one problem as well as it did the other. in we were not on the defensive as we were in . the french fleet had been practically destroyed. no invasion threatened. with a view to forcing peace our policy was directed to offensive action against french trade and territory in order by general pressure to back our overtures for a settlement. the policy may have been mistaken, but that is not the question. the question is, whether or not the strategy fitted the policy. we were also, it must be remembered, at war with holland and expecting war with spain, an eventuality which forced us to keep an eye on the defence of portugal. in these circumstances nothing was further from our desire than to keep what was left of the brest fleet in port. our hope was by our offensive action against french maritime interests to force it to expose itself for their defence. to devote the fleet to the closing of brest was to cripple it for offensive action and to play the enemy's game. the actual disposition of the home fleet was designed so as to preserve its offensive activity, and at the same time to ensure superiority in any part of the home waters in which the enemy might attempt a counterstroke. it was distributed in three active squadrons, one in the north sea, one before brest, and one cruising to the westward, with a strong reserve at portsmouth. it is the location of the reserve that has been most lightly ridiculed, on the hasty assumption that it was merely the reserve of the squadron before brest; whereas in truth it was a general reserve designed to act in the north sea or wherever else it might be needed. at the same time it served as a training and depot squadron for increasing our power at sea in view of the probable addition of the spanish fleet to napoleon's naval force. to have exhausted our fleet merely to prevent raids leaving brest which might equally well leave the texel or dunkirk was just what the enemy would have desired. the disposition was in fact a good example of concentration--that is, disposal about a strategical centre to preserve flexibility for offence without risking defensive needs, and yet it is by the most ardent advocates of concentration and the offensive that howe's dispositions at this time have been most roundly condemned. in the end the disposition did fail to prevent the landing of part of the force intended for ireland, but it made the venture so difficult that it had to be deferred till mid-winter, and then the weather which rendered evasion possible broke up the expedition and denied it all chance of serious success. it was, in fact, another example of the working of kempenfelt's rule concerning winter weather. so far as naval defence can go, the disposition was all that was required. the irish expedition was seen leaving brest by our inshore cruiser squadron. it was reported to colpoys, who had the battle-squadron outside, and it was only a dense fog that enabled it to escape. it was, in fact, nothing more than the evasion of a small raiding force--an eventuality against which no naval defence can provide certain guarantee, especially in winter. it was under wholly different conditions that at the end of hawke's system was revived. st. vincent's succession to the control of the fleet coincided with napoleon's definite assumption of the control of the destinies of france. our great duel with him had begun. the measures he was taking made it obvious we were once more facing the old life and death struggle for naval supremacy; we were openly threatened with invasion, and we had a distinct preponderance at sea. in short, we have to recognize the fact that the methods of the seven years' war were revived when the problems and factors of that war were renewed. as those problems grew more intense, as they did after the peace of amiens, and the threat of invasion became really formidable, so did the rigour of the close blockade increase. under cornwallis and gardner it was maintained in such a way as to deny, so far as human effort could go, all possibility of exit without fighting. in spite of the importance of dealing with the enemy's squadrons in detail no risks were taken to bring ganteaume to decisive action. our first necessity was absolute local command. the acuteness of the invasion crisis demanded that the brest fleet should be kept in port, and every time ganteaume showed a foot the british admiral flew at him and drove him back. once only during the continuation of the crisis was the rigour of this attitude relaxed, and that was to deal with what for the moment was the higher object. it was to meet villeneuve on his return from the west indies, but even then so nicely was the relaxation calculated, that ganteaume was given no time to take advantage of it. the analogy between the conditions of the blockade which st. vincent inaugurated and those of the seven years' war becomes all the more significant when we note that while cornwallis and gardner in home waters were pressing close blockade to its utmost limit of rigour, nelson in the mediterranean was not using it at all. yet with him also the chief concern was to prevent an invasion. his main function, as he and his government saw it, was to prevent a descent from southern france upon neapolitan or levantine territory. why, then, did he not employ close blockade? it is usually assumed that it was because of his overpowering desire to bring the toulon squadron to action. occasional expressions in his letters give colour to such a view, but his dispositions show clearly that his desire to bring the fleet to action was kept in scientific subordination to the defensive duty with which he was charged. close blockade was the most effectual means of securing this end, but in his case one of the conditions, which we have found always accompanying successful close blockade, was absent. he had no such preponderance of force as would enable him to nourish it up to the point of perfect continuity. in the circumstances the close form was too weak or exhausting for him to use with the force at his disposal. if this case be not considered conclusive as to nelson's views, we have a perfectly clear endorsement from his pen in . it is a particularly strong testimony, for he was at the time actually charged with defence against the invasion of england. with several cruiser squadrons he had to prevent the enemy's force issuing from a number of ports extending from flushing to dieppe, and he was directing the operations from the downs. on the approach of winter he was impressed with the inexpediency of attempting to continue a close blockade, and wrote to the admiralty as follows: "i am of opinion, and submit to their lordships' better judgment, that care should be taken to keep our squadrons compact and in good order ... under dungeness to be their principal station.... in fine weather our squadrons to go out and show themselves, but never to risk either being crippled or drawn into the north sea; thus we shall always be sure of an effective force, ready to act as occasion calls for it."[ ] [ ] to evan nepean, september . nicolas, _nelson despatches_, iv, . the case of course is not entirely in point, for it concerns the question of direct resistance to invasion and not to securing general command. its value is that it gives nelson's views on the broad question of balancing the risks--that is, the risk of relaxing close watch against the risk of destroying the efficiency of the ships by maintaining it too rigorously. with nelson holding this view, it is not surprising to find that as late as naval opinion was not quite settled on the relative advantages of close and open blockade even in the case of threatened invasion. just a year before trafalgar was fought, cornwallis pressed the admiralty for more strength to enable him to keep his blockade efficient. lord melville, who at this time had barham at his elbow, replied recommending the "policy of relaxing the strictness of blockade, formerly resorted to." he protested the means available were insufficient for "sustaining the necessary extent of naval force, if your ships are to be torn to pieces by an eternal conflict with the elements during the tempestuous months of winter."[ ] melville was craving for a decisive action to end the insupportable strain. "allow me to remind you," he added, "that the occasions when we have been able to bring our enemy to battle and our fleets to victory have generally been when we were at a distance from the blockading station." in the end, as we know, cornwallis had his way, and the verdict of history has been to approve the decision for its moral effect alone. such conflicts must always arise. "war," as wolfe said, "is an option of difficulties," and the choice must sway to the one side or the other as the circumstances tend to develop the respective advantages of each form. we can never say that close blockade is better than open, or the reverse. it must always be a matter of judgment. [ ] for barham's final views, , see _barham papers_, iii, - . are there, then, no principles which we can deduce from the old practice for the strengthening of judgment? certain broad lines of guidance at least are to be traced. the main question will be, is it to our advantage, in regard to all the strategical conditions, to keep the enemy in and get him to sea for a decision? presumably it will always be our policy to get a decision as soon as possible. still that desire may be overridden by the necessity or special advantage of closely blockading one or more of his squadrons. this situation may arise in two ways. firstly, it may be essential to provide for the local and temporary command of a certain theatre of operations, as when an invasion threatens in that area, or when we wish to pass a military expedition across it, or from special exigencies in regard to the attack or defence of commerce. secondly, even where we are seeking a great decision, we may blockade one squadron closely in order to induce a decision at the point most advantageous to ourselves; that is to say, we may blockade one or more squadrons in order to induce the enemy to attempt with one or more other squadrons to break that blockade. in this way we may lead him either to expose himself to be struck in detail, or to concentrate where we desire his concentration. for any of these reasons we may decide that the best way of realising our object is to use close blockade, but the matter does not end there. we have still to consider whether close blockade is within the limit of the force we have available, and whether it is the best method of developing the fullest potentialities of that force. close blockade being the more exhausting form will require the greater strength; we cannot blockade closely for any length of time without a force relatively superior; but if by open blockade of a squadron we permit it to put to sea with contact assured, we know that, even with a slightly inferior force, we can so deal with it as to prevent its getting local control sufficient to break down our mobile flotilla defence or to interfere seriously with our trade. finally, there is the question of risk. in the old days, before free movement and wireless telegraphy, and before the flotilla had acquired battle power, there was always to be faced the risk of not getting contact in time to prevent mischief. this consideration was specially dominant where the enemy had a squadron within or near the critical theatre of operations. therefore when the invasion threatened, our developed policy was to blockade brest closely at almost any sacrifice. there was always a vague possibility that by evasion or chance of wind a squadron so close to the line of invasion might get sufficient temporary command in the vital area before it could be brought to action. it was a possibility that was never realised in the narrow seas, and since mobility of fleets and means of distant communication have so greatly increased in range and certainty, and since the power of resistance in the flotilla has become so high, the risk is probably much less than ever, and the field for open blockade is consequently less restricted. there is no need, however, to accept these principles as incontrovertible. even if we take the great blockade of - , which has most firmly dominated thought on the subject ever since, it may be argued with some plausibility that the situation could have been solved more quickly and effectually by letting ganteaume get out from brest into the open, at least as far as admiral togo was forced to permit the russians to emerge from port arthur, though his reasons for keeping them in were even stronger than ours in . but in any case, the whole trend of the evidence will admit no doubt as to the inherent weakness of close blockade as a form of war. as under modern developments the possibilities of open blockade have increased, so the difficulties and dangers of close blockade have certainly not decreased. it is also probable that certain advantages which in the sailing era went far to compensate for its weakness have lost much of their force. a sailing fleet cooped up in port not only rapidly lost its spirit, but, being barred from sea-training, could not be kept in a condition of efficiency, whereas the blockading fleet was quickly raised to the highest temper by the stress of vigilance and danger that was its incessant portion. so long as the strain did not pass the limit of human endurance, it was all to the good. in the old days, with very moderate reliefs, the limit was never reached, and the sacrifices that were made to those exhausting vigils were rewarded twentyfold in exuberant confidence on the day of battle. can we expect the same compensation now? will the balance of strength and weakness remain as it used to be? in the face of the vast change of conditions and the thinness of experience, it is to general principles we must turn for the answer. what, in fact, is the inherent weakness of close blockade? strategical theory will at once reply that it is an operation which involves "an arrest of the offensive," a situation which is usually taken to exhibit every kind of drawback. close blockade is essentially an offensive operation, although its object is usually negative; that is, it is a forward movement to prevent the enemy carrying out some offensive operation either direct or by way of counterstroke. so far the common tendency to confuse "seeking out the enemy's fleet" with "making the enemy's coast your frontier" may be condoned. but the two operations are widely different in that they have different objectives. in "seeking out," our objective is the enemy's armed force. in "making the enemy's coast our frontier," the objective is inseparable from the ulterior object of the naval war. in this case the objective is the common communications. by establishing a blockade we operate offensively against those communications. we occupy them, and then we can do no more. our offensive is arrested; we cannot carry it on to the destruction of the enemy's fleet. we have to wait in a defensive attitude, holding the communications we have seized, till he chooses to attack in order to break our hold; and during that period of arrest the advantage of surprise--the all-important advantage in war--passes by a well recognised rule to our enemy. we, in fact, are held upon the defensive, with none of the material advantages of the defensive. the moral advantage of having taken the initiative remains, but that is all. the advantage which we thus gain will of course have the same kind of depressing effect upon the blockaded fleet as it had of old, but scarcely in so high a degree. the degradation of a steam fleet in port can scarcely be so rapid or debilitating as it was when nine-tenths of seamanship lay in the smart handling of sails. for the blockading fleet it is also true that the effects of weather, which formerly were the main cause of wear and tear, can scarcely be so severe. but, on the other hand, the physical strain to officers and men, and the difficulty of supply, will be far greater, so long at least as coal is the chief fuel. the wind no longer sets a measure on the enemy's movements. vigilance close and unremitting beyond all our predecessors knew is the portion of the blockaders to prevent surprise. furthermore, in the old days surprise meant at worst the enemy's escape; now it may mean our own destruction by mine or torpedo. it is unnecessary to labour the point. it is too obvious that a close blockade of the old type exhibits under present conditions the defects of "arrested offence" in so high a degree as practically to prohibit its use. what, then, can be done? must we rest content in all situations with howe's system, which riper experience condemned for cases of extreme necessity? cannot the old close blockade be given a modern form? assuredly it can. in old days the shoreward limit of the blockading fleet was just beyond the range of the coast batteries, and this position it held continuously by means of an inshore squadron. in these days of mobile defence that limit is by analogy the night range of destroyers and the day range of submarines, that is, half the distance they can traverse between dark and dawn or dawn and dark respectively, unless within that limit a torpedo-proof base can be established. a blockade of this nature will correspond in principle to a close blockade of the old type; nor in practice, as was proved in the japanese blockade of port arthur, will its incidents be materially different. the distance at which the battle-squadron must keep will seem at first sight to deny it certainty of immediate contact--the essence of close blockade. but in truth other new factors already noticed will reduce that distance relatively. quicker and more certain means of communication between the admiral and his scouts, the absolute freedom of movement and the power of delaying the enemy's actual exit by mining, may go far to bring things back to their old relations. at port arthur they did so entirely. if then, as in that case, our paramount object is to keep the enemy in, there seems still no reason why we should not make our dispositions on the principle of close blockade. distances will be greater, but that is all. nor must it be forgotten that for a squadron to take station off a port in the old manner is not the only means of close blockade. it may still effect its purpose, at least temporarily, by supporting mining vessels or block ships--"sinkers," as they used to be called. the latter expedient, it is true, had little success in the latest experiments, but even in the russo-japanese war its possibilities were by no means exhausted. we have therefore to conclude that where the strategical conditions call obviously for close blockade, our plan of operations will be modified in that direction with the means still at our disposal. if, however, our object is not so sharply defined, if in spite of our desire to deny the enemy the sea we are ready to take risks in order to bring about a decision, the case is not so clear. it will be observed that the looseness which the new conditions force upon close blockade-increasing as they are in intensity year by year-must tend more and more to approximate it in practice to open blockade. the question will therefore present itself whether it would not be more in accordance with the fundamental elements of strength to adopt open blockade frankly for all purposes. we should thus substitute a true defensive disposition for an arrested offence, and, theoretically, that in itself is a great advantage. the practical benefits, whatever the correlative drawbacks, are equally clear, nor are they less great now than they appeared to howe and kempenfelt. we avoid exhaustion of machinery, coal, and men, and this, at least for the necessary flotilla screen, will be greater than anything that had to be faced in former days. we have at least the opportunity of occupying a position secure from surprise, and of keeping the fleet continually up to its highest striking energy. finally, assuming the geographical conditions give reasonable promise of contact, a quick decision, which modern war demands with ever greater insistence, is more probable. in such a disposition of course contact can rarely be made certain. the enemy, whom the hypothesis of blockade assumes to be anxious to avoid action, will always have a chance of evasion, but this will always be so, even with the closest blockade now possible. we may even go further and claim for open blockade that in favourable conditions it may give the better chance of contact. for by adopting the principle of open blockade we shall have, in accordance with the theory of defence, the further advantages of being able the better to conceal our dispositions, and consequently to lay traps for our enemy, such as that which nelson prepared for villeneuve in the gulf of lyons in . the objection to such a course which appears to have the most weight with current opinion is the moral one, which is inseparable from all deliberate choices of the defensive. if the watching fleet remains in a home fortified base, it may be assumed that the usual moral degradation will set in. but the method does not entail the inglorious security of such a base. a sound position may well be found at a spot such as admiral togo occupied while waiting for the baltic fleet, and in that case there was no observable degradation of any kind. nor is there much evidence that this objection weighed materially with the opponents of howe's view. their objection was of a purely physical kind. open blockade left the enemy too much freedom to raid our trade routes. the watching system might be sufficient to keep an unwilling battle-fleet in port or to bring a more adventurous one to action, but it could not control raiding squadrons. this was certainly barham's objection. "if," he wrote to pitt in , "the french should have any intention of sending their fleet to sea with this easterly wind, and lord howe continues at torbay, our mediterranean and jamaica convoys are in a very critical situation. both fleets must by this time be drawing near the channel, and cannot enter it while the easterly wind holds." this danger must always be with us, especially in narrow waters such as the north sea. in more open theatres the difficulty is not so obtrusive, for with sufficient sea room trade may take naturally or by direction a course which our watching dispositions will cover. thus with nelson in the case of toulon, his normal positions on the sardinian coast covered effectually the flow of our trade to the levant and the two sicilies, which was all there was at the time. the truth is, that in endeavouring to decide between open and close blockade we find ourselves confronted with those special difficulties which so sharply distinguish naval warfare from warfare on land. we cannot choose on purely naval considerations. in naval warfare, however great may be our desire to concentrate our effort on the enemy's main forces, the ulterior object will always obtrude itself. we must from the first do our best to control sea communications, and since those communications are usually common, we cannot refrain from occupying those of the enemy without at the same time neglecting and exposing our own. thus in the case of brest a close blockade was always desirable, and especially at convoy seasons, because the great trade routes which passed within striking distance of the port were all common, whereas in the region of toulon the main lines were not common except along the coasts of africa and southern italy, and these nelson's open blockade amply secured. the general conclusion, then, is that however high may be the purely naval and strategical reasons for adopting open blockade as the best means of securing a decision against the enemy's fleet, yet the inevitable intrusion of the ulterior object in the form of trade protection or the security of military expeditions will seldom leave us entirely free to use the open method. we must be prepared, in fact, to find ourselves at least at times faced with the necessity of using a form of blockade as nearly modelled on the old close blockade as changed conditions will permit. * * * * * chapter three methods of disputing command * * * * * i. defensive fleet operations--"a fleet in being" in dealing with the theory of sea command, attention was called to the error of assuming that if we are unable to win the command we therefore lose it. it was pointed out that this proposition, which is too often implied in strategical discussion, denies in effect that there can be such a thing as strategical defensive at sea, and ignores the fact that the normal condition in war is for the command to be in dispute. theory and history are at one on the point. together they affirm that a power too weak to win command by offensive operations may yet succeed in holding the command in dispute by assuming a general defensive attitude. that such an attitude in itself cannot lead to any positive result at sea goes without saying, but nevertheless even over prolonged periods it can prevent an enemy securing positive results, and so give time for the other belligerent to dominate the situation by securing his ends ashore. it is seldom that we have been forced even for a time to adopt such an attitude, but our enemies have done so frequently to our serious annoyance and loss. in the seven years' war, for instance, the french by avoiding offensive operations likely to lead to a decision, and confining themselves to active defence, were able for five campaigns to prevent our reducing canada, which was the object of the war. had they staked the issue on a great fleet action in the first campaign, and had the result been against them, we could certainly have achieved our object in half the time. in the end, of course, they failed to prevent the conquest, but during all the time the catastrophe was postponed france had abundant opportunity of gaining offensively elsewhere territory which, as she at all events believed, would have compelled us to give up our conquest at the peace. again, in our last great naval war napoleon by avoiding general actions was able to keep the command in dispute till by alliances and otherwise he had gathered force which he deemed sufficient to warrant a return to the offensive. eventually that force proved unequal to the task, yet when it failed and the command passed to his enemy, he had had time to consolidate his power so far that the loss of his fleet seemed scarcely to affect it, and for nine years more he was able to continue the struggle. such examples--and there are many of them--serve to show how serious a matter is naval defence in the hands of a great military power with other means of offence. they tell us how difficult it is to deal with, and how serious therefore for even the strongest naval power is the need to give it careful study. and not for this reason only, but also because the strongest naval power, if faced with a coalition, may find it impossible to exert a drastic offensive anywhere without temporarily reducing its force in certain areas to a point relatively so low as to permit of nothing higher than the defensive. the leading case of such a state of affairs, which we must further consider presently, was our own position in the war of american independence, when, as we have seen, in order to secure an adequate concentration for offence in the west indies we were forced to reduce our home fleet to defensive level. what, then, do we mean by naval defence? to arrive at a right answer we must first clear our mind of all confusing shadows cast by the accidents of land defence. both on land and at sea defence means of course taking certain measures to defer a decision until military or political developments so far redress the balance of strength that we are able to pass to the offensive. in the operations of armies the most usual means employed are the holding of positions and forcing our superior enemy to exhaust his strength in attacking them. consequently the idea of military defence is dominated by the conception of entrenched positions and fortresses. in naval warfare this is not so. at sea the main conception is avoiding decisive action by strategical or tactical activity, so as to keep our fleet in being till the situation develops in our favour. in the golden age of our navy the keynote of naval defence was mobility, not rest. the idea was to dispute the control by harassing operations, to exercise control at any place or at any moment as we saw a chance, and to prevent the enemy exercising control in spite of his superiority by continually occupying his attention. the idea of mere resistance was hardly present at all. everything was counterattack, whether upon the enemy's force or his maritime communications. on land, of course, such methods of defence are also well known, but they belong much more to guerilla warfare than to regular operations. in regular warfare with standing armies, however brilliantly harassing operations and counter-attack are used, the fundamental conception is the defended or defensible position. similarly at sea, although the essence of defence is mobility and an untiring aggressive spirit rather than rest and resistance, yet there also defended and defensible positions are not excluded. but they are only used in the last resort. a fleet may retire temporarily into waters difficult of access, where it can only be attacked at great risk, or into a fortified base, where it is practically removed from the board and cannot be attacked at all by a fleet alone. but the occasions on which such expedients can be used at sea are far rarer than on land. indeed except for the most temporary purposes they can scarcely be regarded as admissible at sea, however great their value on land. the reason is simple. a fleet withdrawing to such a position leaves open to the enemy the ulterior object, which is the control of sea communications, whereas on land an army in a good position may even for a prolonged period cover the ulterior object, which is usually territory. an army in position, moreover, is always doing something to exhaust its opponent and redress the unfavourable balance, but a fleet in inactivity is too often permitting the enemy to carry on operations which tend to exhaust the resources of its own country. for a maritime power, then, a naval defensive means nothing but keeping the fleet actively in being-not merely in existence, but in active and vigorous life. no phrase can better express the full significance of the idea than "a fleet in being," if it be rightly understood. unfortunately it has come to be restricted, by a misunderstanding of the circumstances in which it was first invented, to one special class of defence. we speak of it as though it were essentially a method of defence against invasion, and so miss its fuller meaning. if, however, it be extended to express defence against any kind of maritime attack, whether against territory or sea communications, its broad truth will become apparent, and it will give us the true conception of the idea as held in the british service. the occasion on which it was first used was one that well exhibits the special possibilities of a naval defensive. it was in the year , when, in alliance with the dutch, we were at war with france, and though really superior, had been caught in a situation which placed us temporarily at a great disadvantage in home waters. the french by a surprising rapidity of mobilisation and concentration had stolen a march on us before either our mobilisation or our concentration was complete. king william, with the best of the army, was in ireland dealing with a french invasion in support of james, and a squadron of seven sail under sir cloudesley shovel had been detached into the irish sea to guard his communications. another squadron, consisting of sixteen of the line, british and dutch, had been sent to gibraltar under admiral killigrew to take down the trade and to keep an eye on chateaurenault, who with a slightly inferior squadron was at toulon. it was assumed he would probably make a push for brest, where the french main fleet was mobilising under the comte de tourville, and killigrew had orders to follow him if he got through the straits. chateaurenault did get through; killigrew failed to bring him to action, and instead of following him immediately, he went into cadiz to complete his arrangements for forwarding his outward-bound convoy and escorting the one he was to bring home. what of course he should have done, according to the practice of more experienced times, was to have left this work to a cruiser detachment, and failing contact with chateaurenault, should have closed at once to the strategical centre with his battle-squadron. meanwhile the home fleet, which lord torrington was to command, was still unformed. it lay in three divisions, at the downs, portsmouth, and plymouth, while a considerable part of the promised dutch contingent had not made its appearance. it was a splendid chance for the french to seize the command of the channel before the concentration could take place and to crush the british in detail. accordingly, on june th, as soon as chateaurenault had arrived, tourville put to sea with some seventy of the line. the day before, however, torrington, having hoisted his flag in the downs, had massed his two main divisions at portsmouth, and by the time tourville appeared off the isle of wight he had with later arrivals, both dutch and british, about fifty-six of the line in st. helen's road. not knowing that the toulon contingent had joined, he put to sea intending to fight, but on discovering the great superiority of the french, he decided in concert with his council of war to act on the defensive, and before offering battle to endeavour to secure a concentration with killigrew and shovel and the plymouth division by getting to the westward. if he found this course impossible without fighting an action, his plan was to retire before tourville "even to the gunfleet," where amidst the shoals of the thames estuary he felt he would have a good chance of repelling an attack with success. there, too, he counted on being reinforced not only by the ships still at chatham, but also possibly by ships from the westward which might steal along the coast and join him "over the flats" by channels unknown to the french. to fight as he was he considered to be only playing the enemy's game. "if we are beaten," he said in communicating his plan to the government, "they being absolute masters of the sea will be at great liberty of doing many things which they dare not do whilst we observe them and are in a possibility of joining admiral killigrew and our ships to the westward." it was a plan conceived on the best principles of defence--waiting till the acquisition of fresh force justified a return to the offensive. it is further interesting as a pure case of naval defence, with no ulterior object other than control of home waters. in the minds of the government there was no apprehension of any definite attempt to invade across the channel, but the invasion of ireland was in full progress, and all nourishment of it must be stopped and our own communications kept free. there was, moreover, serious anxiety lest the french should extend their operations to scotland, and there was killigrew's homeward-bound convoy approaching. the situation was one that obviously could not be solved effectually except by winning a general command of the sea, but in torrington's judgment it could be rendered innocuous by holding the command in dispute. his design, therefore, was to act upon the defensive and prevent the enemy achieving any positive result until he was in a position to fight them with a fair chance of victory. a temporary defensive he considered was the only way to win the command, while to hazard a decision in inferior strength was the best way to lose it. nothing could be in closer harmony with the principles of good strategy as we understand them now. it was undoubtedly in advance of anything that had been done up to that time, and it was little wonder if the government, as is usually said, failed to appreciate the design. their rejection of it has come in for very severe criticism. but it would seem that they misunderstood rather than failed to appreciate. the earl of nottingham, who was at the head of the government, believed, as his reply to the admiral clearly shows, that torrington meant to retire to the gunfleet at once; whereas it is equally clear to us that the gunfleet was to be his extreme point, and that he did not mean to retire so far unless the french forced him. the minister failed, as others have done since, to grasp what the admiral meant by "a fleet in being." he thought that in torrington's view a fleet safe in port and not in contact with the enemy was "in being," whereas torrington had no such idea. as nottingham conceived the admiral's intention he saw that although it might preserve the fleet, it would expose everything else to destruction; that is, he was oppressed with the special characteristic of naval warfare which always permits action against the ulterior object when the enemy denies you any chance of acting against his armed force. under this misapprehension, which indeed was not justified by the words of torrington's despatch, he procured from the queen an order in these terms: "we apprehend," it ran, "the consequences of your retiring to the gunfleet to be so fatal, that we choose rather you should upon any advantage of the wind give battle to the enemy than retreat farther than is necessary to get an advantage upon the enemy." it was, however, left to his discretion to proceed to the westward to complete his concentration that way, provided, it said, "you by no means ever lose sight of the french fleet whereby they may have opportunity of making attempts upon the shore or in the rivers of medway or thames, or get away without fighting." this order has been very hardly dealt with by modern critics, although it clearly contemplates true preventive observation, and even, as the last words suggest, the idea contained in nelson's well-known saying, "that by the time the enemy had beat our fleet soundly they would do us no more harm this year." it is true that nelson could rely on the proved superiority of the british at that time unit for unit, but it is also true that nottingham and his colleagues in the government had information which led them greatly to underestimate tourville's strength. this was evident on the face of nottingham's despatch which covered the order, so evident indeed that torrington might well perhaps have suspended the execution of an order so obviously based on incorrect information. but knowing probably what intrigues were going on against him at court, he chose to regard it as a peremptory command to engage whenever he found himself to windward. much as a more scientific view of naval strategy may admire torrington's conception, there seems no reason for losing temper over the government's plan. it was certainly one way of solving the problem, and seeing how large were our reserves, a defeat need not have meant disaster. still, it was doubtless dictated by an inability to grasp, the strategical strength of torrington's novel plan, a plan which was not only safer, but was calculated to achieve greater positive results in the end. the real fallacy of the government's plan was that although it had a specious appearance of a bold offensive, it could have achieved nothing but a negative result. the most a battle could have given in the circumstances could only have left the command in dispute, and the worst would have given the enemy a positive result, which must have gravely compromised william's campaign in ireland. on these lines torrington replied to the government. dealing with their anxiety for the ships to the westward and the mediterranean convoy, whose danger was their expressed reason for forbidding him the gunfleet, he pointed out that they could not run much hazard if they took care of themselves. for, as he repeated, "while we observe the french, they cannot make any attempt on ships or shore without running great hazard, and if we are beaten, all is exposed to their mercy." thus without specially noticing the minister's misinterpretation of his despatch, he intimated that his intention was observation, and not simple retreat. by the time torrington sent this reply he had been pressed back as far as beachy head; it was no longer possible to get to the westward; and the following day, finding himself to windward, he attacked. but still confirmed in his idea of defence, and carrying it on to his tactics, he refused to give the french the chance of a real decision, and disengaged as soon as a drop in the wind permitted. so far he felt justified in interpreting orders which he knew were founded on false information. he was sure, as he said in justification of the way he fought the action, "that the queen could not have been prevailed with to sign an order for it, had not both our weakness and the strength of the enemy been disguised to her." so severely was his fleet crippled that he believed his plan could no longer act. "what the consequences of this unfortunate battle may be," he wrote in his journal, "god almighty only knows, but this i dare be positive in, had i been left to my liberty i had prevented any attempt upon the land, and secured the western ships, killigrew, and the merchantmen." actually in all this he was successful. slowly retiring eastward he drew the french after him as far as dover before he ran to the nore; and tourville was unable to get back to the westward, till all the endangered ships were safe in plymouth. in spite of torrington's being forced to fight an action at the wrong time and place, his design had so far succeeded. not only had he prevented the french doing anything that could affect the issue of the war, but he had completely foiled tourville's plan of destroying the british fleet in detail. that he had done, but retribution by passing to the offensive was no longer in his power. that tourville or his government was impressed with the efficacy of the method was demonstrated the following year, when he in his turn found himself in an inferiority that denied him hope of a successful battle decision. during the summer he kept his fleet hovering off the mouth of the channel without giving the british admiral a chance of contact. his method, however, differed from that of torrington, and he only achieved his negative object by keeping out of sight of his enemy altogether. in his opinion, if a fleet remained at sea in close observation of an active enemy an action could not be avoided. "if (the admiral)," he wrote in his memorandum on the subject, "be ordered to keep the sea to try to amuse the enemy and to let them know we are in a position to attack in case they attempt a descent, i think it my duty to say that in that case we must make up our mind to have to fight them in the end; for if they have really sought an action, they will have been able to fight, seeing that it is impossible to pirouette so long near a fleet without coming to grips."[ ] this is as much as to say that a sure point of temporary retreat is necessary to "a fleet in being," and this was an essential part of torrington's idea. [ ] delarbre, _tourville et la marine de son temps_, p. . (author's note.) in torrington's and tourville's time, when ships were unhandy and fleet tactics in their infancy, the difficulty of avoiding action, when a determined enemy had once got contact, were undoubtedly great, unless a port of retreat was kept open. but as the art of naval warfare developed, the possibilities of "a fleet in being" were regarded as much wider, at least in the british service. it was nearly a hundred years before we were again forced to use the same device on a large scale, and then it was believed that superior speed and tactical precision were factors that could be counted on to an almost unlimited extent. in the darkest days of the war of american independence we have a memorandum of the subject by kempenfelt, which not only gives the developed idea of "a fleet in being" and the high aggressive spirit that is its essence, but also explains its value, not merely as a defensive expedient, but as a means of permitting a drastic offensive even when you are as a whole inferior. "when you know the enemy's designs," he says, "in order to do something effectual you must endeavour to be superior to them in some part where they have designs to execute, and where, if they succeed, they would most injure you. if your fleet is divided as to be in all places inferior to the enemy, they will have a fair chance of succeeding everywhere in their attempts. if a squadron cannot be formed sufficient to face the enemy's at home, it would be more advantageous to let your inferiority be still greater in order by it to gain the superiority elsewhere." "when inferior to the enemy, and you have only a squadron of observation to watch and attend upon their motions, such a squadron should be composed of two-decked ships only [that is, ships of the highest mobility] as to assure it purpose. it must have the advantage of the enemy in sailing, else under certain circumstances it will be liable to be forced to battle or to give up some of its heavy sailers. it is highly necessary to have such a flying squadron to hang on the enemy's large fleet, as it will prevent their dividing into separate squadrons for intercepting your trade or spreading their ships for a more extensive view. you will be at hand to profit from any accidental separation or dispersion of their fleet from hard gales, fogs, or other causes. you may intercept supplies, intelligence, &c, sent to them. in fine, such a squadron will be a check and restraint upon their motions, and prevent a good deal of the mischief they might otherwise do." three years before, when first called to be chief of the staff in the channel, he had emphasised the same points. "much," he wrote in july , "i may say all, depends upon this fleet. 'tis an inferior against a superior fleet. therefore the greatest skill and address is requisite to counteract the designs of the enemy, to watch and seize the favourable opportunity for action, and to catch the advantage of making the effort at some or other feeble part of the enemy's line; or if such opportunities don't offer, to hover near the enemy, keep him at bay, and prevent his attempting anything but at risk and hazard; to command their attention, and oblige them to think of nothing but being on their guard against your attack."[ ] [ ] _barham papers_, i, . it was on these lines the war was conducted. the west indian area, in which lay the enemy's principal object, was treated as the offensive theatre and the home waters as the defensive. inferior as was the channel fleet to the home fleet of the allies, its defensive operations proved adequate to prevent their achieving any success. nor was this all, for kempenfelt was able to demonstrate the positive side of his theory in the most brilliant and convincing manner. in dealing with concentration we have seen how, in command of such a flying squadron as he postulated, he was able off ushant to seize a favourable opportunity for action, which resulted in his capturing a convoy of military stores essential to the french operations in the west indies under the nose of de guichen with an escort of nearly twice his force. nelson certainly shared kempenfelt's views as to the possibilities of an inferior fleet kept actively in being. "as to our fleet," he wrote from the mediterranean in , "under such a commander-in-chief as sir john jervis nobody has any fear ... we are now twenty-two sail of the line. the combined fleet will not be above thirty-five.... i will venture my life sir john jervis defeats them. i do not mean by a regular battle, but by the skill of our admiral and the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen. this country is the most favourable possible for that skill with an inferior fleet; for the winds are so variable, that some one time in twenty-four hours you must be able to attack a part of a large fleet, and the other will be becalmed or have a contrary wind. therefore i hope the government will not be alarmed for our safety." such a conception of the defensive may indeed be said to have become current in the british service. it was part of the reasoning which in , after villeneuve's escape from the mediterranean, decided sir john orde to fall back on ushant instead of entering the straits. "i dare believe," he wrote, "lord nelson will be found in condition with his twelve of the line and numerous frigates to act on the defensive without loss and even to hang on to the skirts of the enemy's fleet should it attempt any material service, especially when encumbered with troops." in all this consideration of the potentialities of "a fleet in being" operating defensively it must never be forgotten that we are dealing with its possibilities in relation to a general command of the sea--to its general power of holding such command in dispute, as torrington used it. its power of preventing a particular operation, such as oversea invasion, is another matter, which will always depend upon the local conditions. if the "fleet in being" can be contained in such a way that it is impossible for it to reach the invading line of passage, it will be no bar to invasion. in , so far as torrington's fleet was concerned, the french, had they been so minded, might have made a descent, say, at portsmouth while torrington was at the nore. but torrington's fleet was not the only factor. his retreat forced tourville to leave behind him unfought the squadrons of shovel and killigrew, and so far as commanding a line of invasion passage was concerned tourville was himself as well contained as torrington. the conditions of naval defence against invasion are in fact so complex compared with those of general naval defence that they must be treated later as a special branch of the subject. the doctrine of the "fleet in being" as formulated and practised by torrington and developed by kempenfelt goes no further than this, that where the enemy regards the general command of a sea area as necessary to his offensive purposes, you may be able to prevent his gaining such command by using your fleet defensively, refusing what nelson called a regular battle, and seizing every opportunity for a counterstroke. to use it as it was used by the french in the case of tourville's famous deterrent cruise, where the whole object of the french was offensive and could not be obtained except by offence, is quite another thing. it is indeed difficult to understand the admiration with which his _campagne au large_ has been treated in france. he kept the sea off the mouth of the channel for fifty days in the summer of , and for forty of those days our channel fleet was making no systematic effort to seek him out. he had been sent to sea in hope of intercepting our great "smyrna convoy," which was then the backbone of our oversea trade. russell with the british main fleet simply took positions to cover its approach until it was safe, knowing presumably that tourville must come to him if he wished to accomplish his purpose. when the convoy was safe russell proceeded off ushant, that is, between the enemy and his base. tourville's communications were thus cut, his line of retreat threatened, and he seized the first opportunity to elude russell and to return into port. beyond taking a few ships from one of the west india convoys, he accomplished nothing. the central french offensive in ireland was broken at the battle of the boyne, and the prestige of england at sea was restored. it is true our trade suffered in the north sea, but this was not directly due to the concentration which tourville's cruise forced upon us, but rather to the failure of the dutch--apparently by a misunderstanding-to provide for an effective blockade of dunkirk. to british eyes it will seem that the heresy which was latent in tourville's instructions was a seed that choked all the finer aspirations of the french navy. in the plan of his cruise may possibly be defended as sufficiently aggressive, since, seeing how unstable was william's new throne, a resounding blow at british trade, combined with an expected victory in ireland, might have been enough to upset it. but afterwards the idea was stretched to occasions it would not fit. it seems to have bred a belief that where the object of the war plainly depended on winning a real command of the sea, that object could yet be attained by naval defensive operations. many times it is true a policy which had starved the navy of france left no other course open to her seamen, and had they in their inferiority attempted the offensive, the end must have been swifter if not more certain. in criticising the maritime history of france we must be careful to distinguish policy from strategy. it was not always the defensive strategy that was bad, but the policy that condemned her admirals to negative operations. seeing that she was a continental power with continental aspirations, it was often a policy from which her military exigencies permitted no escape. nevertheless the policy was twice accursed: it cursed her when she was weak, and cursed her when she was strong. the prolonged use of the defensive bred a habit of mind which seems to have rendered her incapable of striking hard when she had the strength. in no other way at least can we account for the behaviour of so high-spirited a nation when her chance of revenge came in the war of american independence. it is here in its moral reactions lies the danger of the defensive, a danger so insidious in its working as to tempt us never to utter the word. yet with the voice of torrington, kempenfelt, and nelson in our ears, it would be folly to ignore it for ourselves, and still more to ignore the exhausting strain its use by our enemy may impose upon us. it must be studied, if for no other reasons than to learn how to break it down. nor will the study have danger, if only we keep well in view the spirit of restless and vigilant counter-attack which kempenfelt and nelson regarded as its essence. true, some of the conditions which in the days of sails made for opportunity have passed away, but many still remain. shifts of wind and calms will no longer bring them, but weather thick or violent can yet make seamanship, nimbleness, and cohesion tell as it always did; and there is no reason to doubt that it is still possible for hard sea-training to make "the activity and spirit of our officers and seamen" give the results which nelson so confidently expected. ii. minor counter-attacks for the weaker of two belligerents minor-attack has always exercised a certain fascination. where a power was so inferior in naval force that it could scarcely count even on disputing command by fleet operations, there remained a hope of reducing the relative inferiority by putting part of the enemy's force out of action. such hopes were rarely realised. in drake succeeded in stopping the spanish invasion by such a counter-attack on the cadiz division of the armada while it was still unmobilised. in the dutch achieved a similar success against our chatham division when it was demobilised and undefended, and thereby probably secured rather more favourable terms of peace. but it cannot be said that the old wars present any case where the ultimate question of command was seriously affected by a minor counterattack. the advent of the torpedo, however, has given the idea a new importance that cannot be overlooked. the degree of that importance is at present beyond calculation. there is at least no evidence that it would be very high in normal conditions and between ordinarily efficient fleets. the comparative success of the opening japanese attack on the port arthur squadron is the only case in point, and where only one case exists, it is necessary to use extreme caution in estimating its significance. before we can deduce anything of permanent value we must consider very carefully both its conditions and results. to begin with, it was a new experience of a new class of weapon, and it by no means follows that the success of a new expedient will be repeated with anything like equal result. it will not be irrelevant again to recall the case of fireships. at the outset of the sailing era in , this device prepared the way for a decisive success against a fleet in the open. in the succeeding wars the new weapon found a prominent place in the organisation of sea-going fleets, but its success was never repeated. against ships in ill-defended harbours it did occasionally produce good results, and during the infancy of tactics its moral and even material effects in fleet actions were frequently demonstrated. but as naval science developed and the limitations of the weapon were more accurately measured, it was able to achieve less and less, till in the eighteenth century it was regarded as almost negligible. even its moral effect was lost, and it ceased to be considered as a battle unit. now, if we examine closely the port arthur case, we shall find it pointing to the existence of certain inherent conditions not dissimilar from those which discredited fireships as a decisive factor in war. in spite of the apparently formidable nature of a surprise attack by torpedo the indications from the one case in point are that these conditions make for greater power in the defence than in the attack. the first condition relates to the difficulty of locating the objective accurately. it is obvious that for this kind of operation the most precise intelligence is essential, and of all intelligence the most difficult to obtain in war is the distribution of an enemy's fleet from day to day. the japanese had fairly certain information that the bulk of the port arthur squadron was lying in the outer anchorage, but it had been constantly moving, and there was a report that three battleships had just been detached from it. the report was false, but the result was that of the five divisions of destroyers which the japanese had available, two were diverted against dalny, where no enemy was found. such uncertainty must always exist, and in no circumstances is it likely to be less than where, as in the japanese case, the attack is made before declaration, and while the ordinary channels of intelligence are still open. further, it is to be noted that in spite of the fact that relations for some weeks had been highly strained, and a surprise torpedo attack was regarded as probable, the russians had taken no precautions to confuse their enemy. it is obvious that measures to prevent accurate locating can, and should, be taken in such cases. we may go further. from confusing the enemy by such means it is but a step to lead him to a wrong conclusion, and to lay for him a trap which may swallow up the bulk of his destroyer force in the first hours of the war. it is to be feared, however, that the risks of such an eventuality are so great in minor counter-attacks of this nature, that it will probably be very difficult to tempt an inferior enemy to expose his flotilla in this way. this view receives emphasis from the second point which the port arthur case serves to demonstrate, and that is the great power of even the flimsiest defence against such attacks; in other words, the chances of success can scarcely ever be great enough to justify the risk. everything was in favour of the japanese. orders had been issued in the russian squadron for two or three nights previously to prepare for a torpedo attack, but so low had discipline fallen, that the orders were obeyed in a very perfunctory manner. guns were not loaded, their crews were not at quarters, nor were the nets got out. the only real precaution taken was that two destroyers and no more had been sent out as guard patrol, but even they were forbidden to fire on anything they met until they had reported to the admiral or had themselves been fired on. defence against a surprise attack could scarcely have been more feeble, and yet so high was the nervous tension in the attacking force, that it proved stronger than could reasonably have been expected. the mere existence of the patrol and the necessity of evading it threw the japanese approach into a confusion from which it was unable to recover entirely, and the attack lost its essential momentum and cohesion. again, defective as were the arrangements in the squadron itself, and lax as were its training and discipline, no torpedo hits were made, so far as we can judge, after the russian guns and searchlights got into play. such development of strength in the defence seems inherent in the conditions of minor attack, and there appears to be no reason for expecting better results for such attacks in normal cases. but in deducing principles from the port arthur case, it must always be remembered that it was far from normal. it was a blow before declaration, when the menace of strained relations, though realised, had been almost entirely ignored by the russians. in such exceptional and almost incredible circumstances a minor attack might always be counted on for a certain measure of success. to this we have to add the fact that the russian squadron was not ordinarily efficient, but appears to have fallen into a lax condition such as could scarcely recur in the case of any other naval power. finally, we must ask what, with every condition abnormally in favour of the attack, was the actual material result? did it have any real influence on the ultimate question of command? it is true that it so far swung the balance in favour of the japanese that they were able to exercise the local control long enough to land their troops and isolate port arthur. but the japanese plan for securing ultimate command rested on their power of taking port arthur by military operation and sustaining the siege from the sea. yet in spite of every condition of success the physical effect of the blow was so small, that even without the help of an adequate dockyard the squadron recovered from it and became potent again before the siege could even be formed. the minor attacks which followed the first blow were all failures, and whether delivered at the port or upon the squadron in the open had no appreciable effect whatever. at the same time it must be remembered that since that war the art of torpedo warfare has developed very rapidly. its range and offensive power have increased in a higher ratio than the means of resisting it. still those means have advanced, and it is probable that a squadron in a naval port or in a properly defended anchorage is not more easy to injure than it ever was; while a squadron at sea, so long as it constantly shifts its position, still remains very difficult to locate with sufficient precision for successful minor attack. the unproved value of submarines only deepens the mist which overhangs the next naval war. from a strategical point of view we can say no more than that we have to count with a new factor, which gives a new possibility to minor counterattack. it is a possibility which on the whole tells in favour of naval defence, a new card which, skilfully played in combination with defensive fleet operations, may lend fresh importance to the "fleet in being." it may further be expected that whatever the effective possibilities of minor operations may ultimately prove to be in regard to securing command, the moral influence will be considerable, and at least at the beginning of a future war will tend to deflect and hamper the major operations and rob of their precision the lines which formerly led so frankly to the issue by battle. in the absence of a sufficient volume of experience it would be idle to go further, particularly as torpedo attack, like fireship attack, depends for success more than any other on the spirit and skill of officers and men. with regard to the torpedo as the typical arm of mobile coastal defence, it is a different matter. what has been said applies only to its power towards securing command of the sea, and not to the exercise or to disputing the exercise of command. this is a question which is concerned with defence against invasion, and to that we must now turn. * * * * * chapter four methods of exercising command * * * * * i. defence against invasion in methods of exercising command are included all operations not directly concerned with securing command or with preventing its being secured by the enemy. we engage in exercising command whenever we conduct operations which are directed not against the enemy's battle-fleet, but to using sea communications for our own purposes, or to interfering with the enemy's use of them. such operations, though logically of secondary importance, have always occupied the larger part of naval warfare. naval warfare does not begin and end with the destruction of the enemy's battle-fleet, nor even with breaking his cruiser power. beyond all this there is the actual work of preventing his passing an army across the sea and of protecting the passage of our own military expeditions. there is also the obstruction of his trade and the protection of our own. in all such operations we are concerned with the exercise of command. we are using the sea, or interfering with its use by the enemy; we are not endeavouring to secure the use or to prevent the enemy from securing it. the two categories of operation differ radically in conception and purpose, and strategically they are on wholly different planes. logically, of course, operations for exercising command should follow those for securing command; that is to say, that since the attainment of command is the special object of naval warfare, and since that command can only be obtained permanently by the destruction of the enemy's armed forces afloat, it follows that in strictness no other objects should be allowed to interfere with our concentration of effort on the supreme end of securing command by destruction. war, however, is not conducted by logic, and the order of proceeding which logic prescribes cannot always be adhered to in practice. we have seen how, owing to the special conditions of naval warfare, extraneous necessities intrude themselves which make it inevitable that operations for exercising command should accompany as well as follow operations for securing command. war being, as it is, a complex sum of naval, military, political, financial, and moral factors, its actuality can seldom offer to a naval staff a clean slate on which strategical problems can be solved by well-turned syllogisms. the naval factor can never ignore the others. from the outset one or more of them will always call for some act of exercising command which will not wait for its turn in the logical progression. to a greater or less extent in all ordinary cases both categories of operation will have to be put in motion from the beginning. hence the importance of realising the distinction between the two generic forms of naval activity. in the hurry and stress of war confusion between them is easy. by keeping a firm grip upon the difference we can see at least what we are doing. we can judge how far any given operation that may be called for is a sacrifice of security to exercise, how far such a sacrifice may be justified, and how far the one end may be made to serve the other. by applying the distinction as a test much error may be avoided. the risk we take may be great, but we shall be able to weigh it accurately against the value of the end, and we shall take it with our eyes open and of set purpose. above all, it will enable the staff to settle clearly for each squadronal commander what is to be his primary objective, and what the object or purpose of the operations entrusted to him. it is above all in this last consideration, and particularly in the determination of the objective, that lies the main practical value of the distinction. this will become clear the moment we begin to consider defence against invasion, which naturally takes the first place amongst operations for the exercise of control. of all the current assumptions, not one is so confusing for the finer adjustments of strategy as that which affirms that the primary objective of our fleet is always the enemy's fleet. of the battle-fleet and its attendant units it is of course true, so long at least as the enemy has a battle-fleet in being. it is true, that is, of all operations for securing control, but of operations for exercising control it is not true. in the case we have now to consider-defence against invasion-the objective of the special operations is, and always has been, the enemy's army. on this fundamental postulate our plans for resisting invasion have always been constructed from the year of the armada to . in the old service tradition the point was perfectly well established. admirals' instructions constantly insist on the fact that the transports are the "principal object." the whole disposition of the fleet during hawke's blockade in was based on keeping a firm hold on the transports in the morbihan, and when he sought to extend his operations against the rochefort squadron, he was sharply reminded by anson that "the principal object of attention at this time" was, firstly, "the interception of the embarkations of the enemy at morbihan," and secondly, "the keeping of the ships of war from coming out of brest." similarly commodore warren in , when he had the permanent frigate guard before brest, issued orders to his captains that in case of encountering enemy's transports under escort they were "to run them down or destroy them in the most expeditious manner possible previous to attacking the ships of war, but to preserve such a situation as to effect that purpose when directed by signal." lord keith's orders when watching napoleon's flotilla were to the same effect. "directing your chief attention," they run, "to the destruction of the ships, vessels, or boats having men, horses, or artillery on board (in preference to that of the vessels by which they are protected), and in the strict execution of this important duty losing sight entirely of the possibility of idle censure for avoiding contact with an armed force, because the prevention of debarkation is the object of primary importance to which every other consideration must give way."[ ] [ ] _admiralty secretary's in-letters_, , august . in tactics, then, the idea was the same as in strategy. the army was the primary objective round which all dispositions turned. in the french service the strength and soundness of the british practice was understood at least by the best men. when in napoleon consulted ganteaume as to the possibility of the flotilla of transports effecting its passage by evasion, the admiral told him it was impossible, since no weather could avail to relax the british hold sufficiently. "in former wars," he said, "the english vigilance was miraculous." to this rule there was no exception, not even when circumstances rendered it difficult to distinguish between the enemy's fleet and army as objectives. this situation could occur in two ways. firstly, when the invading army was designed to sail with the battle-fleet, as in the case of napoleon's invasion of egypt; and secondly, when, although the design was that the two should operate on separate lines, our system of defence forced the fleet to come up to the army's line of passage in order to clear it, as happened in the case of the armada and the french attempt of . in the latter case the invading army, whose objective was unknown, was at dunkirk, and a french fleet was coming up the channel to cover the passage. sir john norris, in command of the home fleet, was in the downs. though his name is now almost forgotten, he was one of the great founders of our naval tradition, and a strategist of the first order. in informing the government of his plan of operations, he said he intended to proceed with his whole squadron off dunkirk to prevent the transports sailing. "but," he says, "if they should unfortunately get out and pass us in the night and go northward, i intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them; and with the remainder of my squadron either to fight the french fleet now in the channel, or observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or i shall pursue the embarkation with all my strength." in this case there had been no time to organise a special squadron or flotilla, in the usual way, to bar the line of passage, and the battle-fleet had to be used for the purpose. this being so, norris was not going to allow the presence of an enemy's battle-fleet to entice him away from his grip on the invading army, and so resolutely did he hold to the principle, that he meant if the transports put to sea to direct his offensive against them, while he merely contained the enemy's battle-fleet by defensive observation. in the egyptian case there was no distinction between the two objectives at all. napoleon's expedition sailed in one mass. yet in the handling of his fleet nelson preserved the essential idea. he organised it into three "sub-squadrons," one of six sail and two of four each. "two of these sub-squadrons," says berry, his flag-captain, "were to attack the ships of war, while the third was to pursue the transports and to sink and destroy as many as it could"; that is, he intended, in order to make sure of napoleon's army, to use no more than ten, and possibly only eight, of his own battleships against the eleven of the enemy. many other examples could be given of british insistence on making the enemy's army the primary objective and not his fleet in cases of invasion. no point in the old tradition was more firmly established. its value was of course more strongly marked where the army and the fleet of the enemy endeavoured to act on separate lines of operation; that is, where the army took the real offensive line and the fleet the covering or preventive line, and where consequently for our own fleet there was no confusion between the two objectives. this was the normal case, and the reason it was so is simple enough. it may be stated at once, since it serves to enunciate the general principle upon which our traditional system of defence was based. an invasion of great britain must always be an attempt over an uncommanded sea. it may be that our fleet predominates or it may be that it does not, but the command must always be in dispute. if we have gained complete command, no invasion can take place, nor will it be attempted. if we have lost it completely no invasion will be necessary, since, quite apart from the threat of invasion, we must make peace on the best terms we can get. now, if the sea be uncommanded, there are obviously two ways in which an invasion may be attempted. firstly, the enemy may endeavour to force it through our naval defence with transports and fleet in one mass. this was the primitive idea on which the spanish invasion of philip the second was originally planned by his famous admiral, santa-cruz. ripening military science, however, was able to convince him of its weakness. a mass of transports and warships is the most cumbrous and vulnerable engine of war ever known. the weaker the naval defence of the threatened country, the more devoutly will it pray the invader may use this device. where contact with the enemy's fleet is certain, and particularly in narrow seas, as it was in this case, such a course will give the defender all the chances he could desire, and success for the invader is inconceivable, provided always we resolutely determine to make the army in its transports our main objective, and are not to be induced to break our head against its escort. where, however, contact is not certain, the invasion over an uncommanded sea may succeed by evasion of the defender's battle-fleet, as it did in the case of napoleon's invasion of egypt. but that operation belongs to an entirely different category from that which we are now considering. none of the factors on which the traditional system of british defence is based were present. it was an operation over an open sea against a distant and undetermined objective that had no naval defence of its own, whereas in our own case the determining factors are permanent naval defence, an approximately determined objective, and a narrow sea where evasion by any force of invasion strength is impossible. napoleon's exploit was in fact nothing more than the evasion of an open blockade which had no naval defence beyond it. the vital importance of these things will appear as we proceed and note the characteristics which marked every attempt to invade england. from such attempts we of course exclude the various descents upon ireland, which, not being of invasion strength, fall into another class, to be dealt with hereafter. since the expedient of forcing an invasion by the strength of a powerful battleship escort has always been rejected as an inadmissible operation, the invader has had no choice but to adopt a separate line for his army, and operate with his fleet in such a way as may promise to prevent the enemy controlling that line. that, in short, is the problem of invasion over an uncommanded sea. in spite of an unbroken record of failure scored at times with naval disaster, continental strategists from parma to napoleon have clung obstinately to the belief that there is a solution short of a complete fleet decision. they have tried every conceivable expedient again and again. they have tried it by simple surprise evasion and by evasion through diversion or dispersal of our naval defence. they have tried it by seeking local control through a local naval success prepared by surprise, or by attempting to entice our fleet away from home waters to a sufficient extent to give them temporarily local superiority. but the end has always been the same. try as they would, they were faced ultimately by one of two alternatives--they must either defeat our covering battle-fleet in battle, or they must close their own battle-fleet on the transports, and so set up the very situation which it was their main design to avoid. the truth is, that all attempts to invade england without command of the sea have moved in a vicious circle, from which no escape was ever found. no matter how ingenious or complex the enemy's design, a determined hold on their army as the primary naval objective has always set up a process of degradation which rendered the enterprise impracticable. its stages are distinct and recurrent, and may be expressed as it were diagrammatically as follows:-- two lines of operation having been decided on, the invading army is gathered at a point as close as possible to the coast to be invaded; that is, where the intervening sea is narrowest, and where the army's passage will be exposed to interference for the shortest time. the covering fleet will operate from a point as distant as convenient, so as to entice the enemy as far as possible from the army's line of passage. the defender replies by blockading the army's ports of departure with a flotilla of light vessels capable of dealing with transports, or by establishing a mobile defence of the threatened coasts which transports cannot break unaided, or more probably he will combine both expedients. the first fallacy of the invasion plan is then apparent. the narrower the sea, the easier it is to watch. pure evasion becomes impossible, and it is necessary to give the transports sufficient armed strength by escort or otherwise to protect them against flotilla attack. the defender at once stiffens his flotilla defence with cruisers and intermediate ships, and the invader has to arrange for breaking the barrier with a battle-squadron. so weak and disturbing a position is then set up that the whole scheme begins to give way, if, that is, the defender has clung stubbornly to the strategy we always used. our battle-fleet refused to seek out that of the invader. it has always held a position between the invader's fleet and the blockaded invasion base, covering the blockade and flotilla defence. to enable a battle-squadron to break our hold and to reinforce the army escort, the invader must either force this covering position by battle, or disturb it so effectively as to permit the reinforcing squadron to evade it. but since _ex hypothesi_ he is trying to invade without securing the command by battle, he will first try to reinforce his transport escort by evasion. at once he is faced with new difficulty. the reinforcement entails dividing his fleet, and this is an expedient so vicious and disturbing to morale, that no invader has ever been found to risk it. and for this reason. to make evasion possible for the detached squadron, he must bring up the rest of his force and engage the attention of the enemy's fleet, and thus unless he is in very great superiority, and by hypothesis is not--he runs the hazard of having his two divisions beaten in detail. this method has sometimes been urged by governments, but so loud have been the protests both from the fleet and the army, that it has always been dropped, and the invader finds himself at the end of the vicious circle. unable to reinforce his transport escort sufficiently without dividing his battle-fleet, he is forced to bring his whole force up to the army or abandon the attempt till command shall have been secured by battle. thus the traditional british system has never failed to bring about the deadlock, and it will be observed it is founded on making the invading army the primary objective. we keep a hold on it, firstly, by flotilla blockade and defence stiffened as circumstances may dictate by higher units, and secondly, by battle-fleet cover. it is on the flotilla hold that the whole system is built up. it is the local danger to that hold which determines the amount of stiffening the flotilla demands, and it is the security of that hold which determines the position and action of the battle-fleet. a few typical examples will serve to show how the system worked in practice under all kinds of conditions. the first scientific attempt to work on two lines of operation, as distinguished from the crude mass methods of the middle ages, was the spanish enterprise of . though internal support from catholic malcontents was expected, it was designed as a true invasion, that is, a continuing operation for permanent conquest. parma, the military commander-in-chief, laid it down that the spanish fleet would have not only to protect his passage and support his landing, but also "to keep open his communications for the flow of provisions and munition." in advising the dual line of operation, parma's original intention was to get his army across by surprise. as always, however, it proved impossible to conceal the design, and long before he was ready he found himself securely blockaded by a dutch flotilla supported by an english squadron. so firm indeed was the english hold on the army, that for a time it was overdone. the bulk of the english fleet was kept on the line of passage under howard, while drake alone was sent to the westward. it was only under the great sailor's importunity that the disposition, which was to become traditional, was perfected, and the whole fleet, with the exception of the squadron supporting the flotilla blockade, was massed in a covering position to the westward. the normal situation was then set up, and it could only have one result. surprise was out of the question. parma could not move till the blockade was broken, nor in face of the covering fleet could the spanish fleet hope to break it by a sudden intrusion. the vague prospects the spaniards had conceived of keeping the english fleet away from the line of passage by threatening a descent in the west country or blockading it in a western port would no longer do. no such expedient would release parma, and the duke of medina-sidonia was ordered to proceed direct to dunkirk if possible without fighting, there to break the blockade and secure the passage. there was some idea in the king's mind that he would be able to do this without a battle, but parma and every seasoned spanish sailor knew that the english fleet would have to be totally defeated before the transports could venture out of port. such a battle was indeed inevitable, and the english dispositions secured that the spaniards would have to fight it under every disadvantage which was inherent in the plan of dual lines of operation. the english would secure certain contact at such a distance from the line of passage as would permit prolonged harassing attacks in waters unfamiliar to the enemy and close to their own sources of support and supply. no battle to the death would be necessary until the spaniards were herded into the confined and narrow waters which the army's passage demanded, and where both sections of the british fleet would be massed for the final struggle. they must arrive there dispirited with indecisive actions and with the terrors of unknown and difficult seas at the highest point. all this was no matter of chance. it was inherent in the strategical and geographical conditions. the english dispositions had taken every advantage of them, and the result was that not only was the spanish army unable even to move, but the english advantages in the final battle were so great, that it was only a lucky shift of wind that saved the armada from being driven to total destruction upon the dutch banks. in this case, of course, there had been ample time to make the necessary dispositions. it will be well to follow it with an example in which surprise came as near to being complete as it is possible to conceive, and where the arrangements for defence had to be improvised on the spur of the moment. a case in point was the french attempt of . in that year everything was in favour of the invader. england was undermined with jacobite sedition; scotland was restless and threatening; the navy had sunk to what is universally regarded as its worst for spirit, organisation, and command; and the government was in the hands of the notorious "drunken administration." for three years we had been making unsuccessful war with spain, and had been supporting maria theresa on the continent against france, with the result that our home defence was reduced to its lowest ebb. the navy then numbered sail--about equal to that of france and spain combined--but owing to the strain of the war in the mediterranean and transatlantic stations only forty-three, including eighteen of the line, were available for home waters. even counting all cruising ships "within call," as the phrase then was, the government had barely one-fourth of the fleet at hand to meet the crisis. with the land forces it was little better. considerably more than half the home army was abroad with the king, who was assisting the empress-queen as elector of hanover. between france and england, however, there was no war. in the summer the king won the battle of dettingen; a formal alliance with maria theresa followed in the autumn; france responded with a secret alliance with spain; and to prevent further british action on the continent, she resolved to strike a blow at london in combination with a jacobite insurrection. it was to be a "bolt from the blue" before declaration and in mid-winter, when the best ships of the home fleet were laid up. the operation was planned on dual lines, the army to start from dunkirk, the covering fleet from brest. the surprise was admirably designed. the port of dunkirk had been destroyed under the treaty of utrecht in , and though the french had been restoring it secretly for some time, it was still unfit to receive a fleet of transports. in spite of the warnings of sir john norris, the senior admiral in the service, the assembling of troops in its neighbourhood from the french army in flanders could only be taken for a movement into winter quarters, and that no suspicion might be aroused the necessary transports were secretly taken up in other ports under false charter-parties, and were only to assemble off dunkirk at the last moment. with equal skill the purpose of the naval mobilisation at brest was concealed. by false information cleverly imparted to our spies and by parade of victualling for a long voyage, the british government was led to believe that the main fleet was intended to join the spaniards in the mediterranean, while a detachment, which was designed to escort the transports, was ostensibly equipped for a raid in the west indies. so far as concealment was concerned the arrangement was perfect. yet it contained within it the fatal ingredient. the army was to strike in the thames at tilbury; but complete as was the secrecy, marshal saxe, who was to command, could not face the passage without escort. there were too many privateers and armed merchantmen always in the river, besides cruisers moving to and fro on commerce-protection duty. the division, therefore, which we supposed to be for the west indies was to be detached from the brest fleet after it entered the channel and was to proceed to join the transports off dunkirk, while the marquis de roquefeuil with the main fleet held what british ships might be ready in portsmouth either by battle or blockade. nothing could look simpler or more certain of success. the british government seemed quite asleep. the blow was timed for the first week in january, and it was mid-december before they even began to watch brest with cruisers regularly. on these cruisers' reports measures were taken to prepare an equal squadron for sea by the new year. by this time nearly twenty of the line were ready or nearly so at the nore, portsmouth, and plymouth, and a press was ordered to man them. owing to various causes the french had now to postpone their venture. finally it was not till february th that roquefeuil was seen to leave brest with nineteen of the line. the news reached london on the th, and next day norris was ordered to hoist his flag at spithead. his instructions were "to take the most effectual measures to prevent the making of any descent upon the kingdoms." it was nothing but news that the young pretender had left rome for france that led to this precaution. the government had still no suspicion of what was brewing at dunkirk. it was not till the th that a dover smuggler brought over information which at last opened their eyes. a day or two later the french transports were seen making for dunkirk, and were mistaken for the brest fleet. orders were consequently sent down to norris to follow them. in vain he protested at the interference. he knew the french were still to the westward of him, but his orders were repeated, and he had to go. tiding it up-channel against easterly winds, he reached the downs and joined the nore division there on the th. history usually speaks of this false movement as the happy chance which saved the country from invasion. but it was not so. saxe had determined not to face the thames ships without escort. they were ample to destroy him had he done so. in truth the move which the government forced on norris spoilt the campaign and prevented his destroying the brest fleet as well as stopping the invasion. roquefeuil had just received his final orders off the start. he was instructed by all possible means to bring the main british fleet to action, or at least to prevent further concentration, while he was also to detach the special division of four of the line under admiral barraille to dunkirk to escort the transports. it was in fact the inevitable order, caused by our hold on the army, to divide the fleet. both officers as usual began to be upset, and as with medina-sidonia, they decided to keep company till they reached the isle of wight and remain there till they could get touch with saxe and pilots for the dover strait. they were beset with the nervousness that seems inseparable from this form of operation. roquefeuil explained to his government that it was impossible to tell what ships the enemy had passed to the downs, and that barraille when he arrived off dunkirk might well find himself in inferiority. he ended in the usual way by urging that the whole fleet must move in a body to the line of passage. on arriving off portsmouth, however, a reconnaissance in thick weather led him to believe that the whole of norris's fleet was still there, and he therefore detached barraille, who reached dunkirk in safety. not knowing that norris was in the downs, saxe began immediately to embark his troops, but bad weather delayed the operation for three days, and so saved the expedition, exposed as it was in the open roads, from destruction by an attack which norris was on the point of delivering with his flotilla of fireships and bomb vessels. the brest squadron had an equally narrow escape. saxe and his staff having heard rumours of norris's movement to the downs had become seized with the sea-sickness which always seems to afflict an army as it waits to face the dangers of an uncommanded passage. they too wanted the whole fleet to escort them, and orders had been sent to roquefeuille to do as he had suggested. all unconscious of norris's presence in the downs with a score of the line more powerful than his own, he came on with the fifteen he had still with his flag to close on barraille. norris was informed of his approach, and it was now he wrote his admirable appreciation, already quoted, for dealing with the situation. "as i think it," he said, "of the greatest consequence to his majesty's service to prevent the landing of these troops in any part of the country, i have ... determined to anchor without the sands of dunkirk, where we shall be in the fairest way for keeping them in." that is, he determined to keep hold of the army regardless of the enemy's fleet, and as saxe's objective was not quite certain, he would do it by close blockade. "but if," he continued, "they should unfortunately get out and pass in the night and go northward [that is, for scotland], i intend to detach a superior force to endeavour to overtake and destroy them, and with the remainder of my squadron either fight the french fleet now in the channel, or observe them and cover the country as our circumstances will admit of; or i shall pursue the embarkation [that is, follow the transports] with all my strength." this meant he would treat the enemy's army offensively and their fleet defensively, and his plan was entirely approved by the king. as to which of the two plans he would adopt, the inference is that his choice would depend on the strength of the enemy, for it was reported the rochefort squadron had joined roquefeuille. the doubt was quickly settled. on the morrow he heard that roquefeuille was at dungeness with only fifteen of the line. in a moment he seized all the advantage of the interior position which roquefeuille's necessity to close on the army had given him. with admirable insight he saw there was time to fling his whole force at the enemy's fleet without losing his hold on the army's line of passage. the movement was made immediately. the moment the french were sighted "general chase" was signalled, and roquefeuille was within an ace of being surprised at his anchorage when a calm stopped the attack. the calm was succeeded by another furious gale, in which the french escaped in a disastrous _sauve qui peut_, and the fleet of transports was destroyed. the outcome of it all was not only the failure of the invasion, but that we secured the command of home waters for the rest of the war. the whole attempt, it will be seen, with everything in its favour, had exhibited the normal course of degradation. for all the nicely framed plan and the perfect deception, the inherent difficulties, when it came to the point of execution, had as usual forced a clumsy concentration of the enemy's battle-fleet with his transports, and we on our part were able to forestall it with every advantage in our favour by the simple expedient of a central mass on a revealed and certain line of passage. in the next project, that of , a new and very clever plan was devised for turning the difficulty. the first idea of marshal belleisle, like that of napoleon, was to gather the army at ambleteuse and boulogne, and to avoid the assemblage of transports by passing it across the strait by stealth in flat boats. but this idea was abandoned before it had gone very far for something much more subtle. the fallacious advantage of a short passage was dropped, and the army was to start from three widely separated points all in more open waters--a diversionary raid from dunkirk and two more formidable forces from havre and the morbihan in south brittany. to secure sufficient control there was to be a concentration on the brest fleet from the mediterranean and the west indies. the new feature, it will be observed, was that our covering fleet--that is, the western squadron off brest--would have two cruiser blockades to secure, one on either side of it. difficult as the situation looked, it was solved on the old lines. the two divisions of the french army at dunkirk and morbihan were held by cruiser squadrons capable of following them over the open sea if by chance they escaped, while the third division at havre, which had nothing but flat boats for transport, was held by a flotilla well supported. its case was hopeless. it could not move without a squadron to release it, and no fortune of weather could possibly bring a squadron from brest. hawke, who had the main blockade, might be blown off, but he could scarcely fail to bring to action any squadron that attempted to enter the channel. with the morbihan force it was different. any time that hawke was blown off a squadron could reach it from brest and break the cruiser blockade. the french government actually ordered a portion of the fleet to make the attempt. conflans however, who was in command, protested his force was too weak to divide, owing to the failure of the intended concentration. boscawen had caught and beaten the mediterranean squadron off lagos, and though the west indian squadron got in, it proved, as in napoleon's great plan of concentration, unfit for further service. the old situation had arisen, forced by the old method of defence; and in the end there was nothing for it but for conflans to take his whole fleet to the morbihan transports. hawke was upon him at once, and the disastrous day of quiberon was the result. the dunkirk division alone got free, but the smallness of its size, which permitted it to evade the watch, also prevented its doing any harm. its escort, after landing its handful of troops in ireland, was entirely destroyed; and so again the attempt of the french to invade over an uncommanded sea produced no effect but the loss of their fleet. the project of marked these principles even more strongly, for it demonstrated them working even when our home fleet was greatly inferior to that of the enemy. in this case the invader's idea was to form two expeditionary forces at cherbourg and havre, and under cover of an overwhelming combination of the spanish and french fleets, to unite them at sea and seize portsmouth and the isle of wight. it was in the early summer we got wind of the scheme, and two cruiser squadrons and flotillas were at once formed at the downs and channel islands to watch the french coasts and prevent the concentration of transports. spain had not yet declared war, but she was suspected, and the main fleet, under the veteran sir charles hardy, who had been norris's second in command in , was ordered to proceed off brest and prevent any spanish squadron that might appear from entering that port. the french, however, outmanoeuvred us by putting to sea before hardy could reach his station and forming a junction with the spaniards off finisterre. the combined fleet contained about fifty of the line, nearly double our own. the army of invasion, with dumouriez for its chief of the staff, numbered some , men, a force we were in no condition to meet ashore. everything, therefore, was in favour of success, and yet in the navy, at least, a feeling of confidence prevailed that no invasion could take place. the brains of the naval defence were lord barham (then sir charles middleton) at the admiralty and kempenfelt as chief of the staff in the fleet; and it is to their correspondence at this time that we owe some of the most valuable strategical appreciations we possess. the idea of the french was to come into the channel in their overwhelming force, and while they destroyed or held hardy, to detach a sufficient squadron to break the cruiser blockade and escort the troops across. kempenfelt was confident that it could not be done. he was sure that the unwieldy combined mass could be rendered powerless by his comparatively homogeneous and mobile fleet, inferior as it was, so long as he could keep it at sea and to the westward. the appreciation of the power of a nimble inferior fleet which he wrote at this time has already been given.[ ] when the worst of the position was fully known, and the enemy was reported off the mouth of the channel, he wrote another to middleton. his only doubt was whether his fleet had the necessary cohesion and mobility. "we don't seem," he said, "to have considered sufficiently a certain fact that the comparative force of two fleets depends much upon their sailing. the fleet that sails fastest has much the advantage, as they can engage or not as they please, and so have always in their power to choose the favourable opportunity to attack. i think i may safely hazard an opinion that twenty-five sail of the line coppered would be sufficient to harass and tease this great unwieldy combined armada so as to prevent their effecting anything, hanging continually upon them, ready to catch at any opportunity of a separation from night, gale or fog, to dart upon the separated, to cut off convoys of provisions coming to them, and if they attempted an invasion, to oblige their whole fleet to escort the transports, and even then it would be impossible to protect them entirely from so active and nimble a fleet." [ ] _supra_, p. . here we have from the pen of one of the greatest masters the real key of the solution--the power, that is, of forcing the mass of the enemy's fleet to escort the transports. hardy, of course, knew it well from his experience of , and acted accordingly. this case is the more striking, since defence against the threatened invasion was not the whole of the problem he had to solve. it was complicated by instructions that he must also prevent a possible descent on ireland, and cover the arrival of the great convoys. in reply, on august st, he announced his intention of taking station ten to twenty leagues w.s.w. of scilly, "which i am of opinion," he said, "is the most proper station for the security of the trade expected from the east and west indies, and for the meeting of the fleets of the enemy _should they attempt to come into the channel_." he underlined the last words, indicating, apparently, his belief that they would not venture to do so so long as he could keep his fleet to the westward and undefeated. this at least he did, till a month later he found it necessary to come in for supplies. then, still avoiding the enemy, he ran not to plymouth, but right up to st. helen's. the movement is always regarded as an unworthy retreat, and it caused much dissatisfaction in the fleet at the time. but it is to be observed that his conduct was strictly in accordance with the principle which makes the invading army the primary objective. if hardy's fleet was no longer fit to keep the sea without replenishment, then the proper place to seek replenishment was on the invader's line of passage. so long as he was there, invasion could not take place till he was defeated. the allies, it was true, were now free to join their transports, but the prospect of such a movement gave the admiral no uneasiness, for it would bring him the chance of serving his enemy as the spaniards were served in . "i shall do my utmost," he said, "to drive them up the channel." it is the old principle. if the worst comes to the worst, so long as you are able to force the covering fleet upon the transports, and especially in narrow waters, invasion becomes an operation beyond the endurable risks of war. so it proved. on august th count d'orvilliers, the allied commander-in-chief, had made the lizard, and for a fortnight had striven to bring hardy to decisive action. until he had done so he dared neither enter the channel with his fleet nor detach a squadron to break the cruiser blockades at the invasion bases. his ineffectual efforts exhausted his fleet's endurance, which the distant concentration at finisterre had already severely sapped, and he was forced to return impotent to brest before anything had been accomplished. the allies were not able to take the sea again that campaign, but even had it been in their power to do so, hardy and kempenfelt could have played their defensive game indefinitely, and with ever-increasing chances, as the winter drew near, of dealing a paralysing blow. there was never any real chance of success, though it is true dumouriez thought otherwise. he believed the enterprise might have gone through if a diversion had been made by the bulk of the fleet against ireland, and under cover of it a _coup de main_ delivered upon the isle of wight, "for which," he said, "six or eight of the line would have been enough." but it is inconceivable that old hands like hardy and kempenfelt would have been so easily beguiled of their hold on the line of passage. had such a division been detached up the channel from the allied fleet they would surely, according to tradition, have followed it with either a superior force or their whole squadron. the well-known projects of the great war followed the same course. under napoleon's directions they ran the whole gamut of every scheme that ever raised delusive hope before. beginning from the beginning with the idea of stealing his army across in flat-boats, he was met with the usual flotilla defence. then came his only new idea, which was to arm his transport flotilla to the point of giving it power to force a passage for itself. we replied by strengthening our flotilla. convinced by experiment that his scheme was now impracticable, he set his mind on breaking the blockade by the sudden intrusion of a flying squadron from a distance. to this end various plausible schemes were worked out, but plan after plan melted in his hand, till he was forced to face the inevitable necessity of bringing an overwhelming battle force up to his transports. the experience of two centuries had taught him nothing. by a more distant concentration than had ever been attempted before he believed he could break the fatal hold of his enemy. the only result was so severely to exhaust his fleet that it never could get within reach of the real difficulties of its task, a task which every admiral in his service knew to be beyond the strength of the imperial navy. nor did napoleon even approach a solution of the problem he had set himself--invasion over an uncommanded sea. with our impregnable flotilla hold covered by an automatic concentration of battle-squadrons off ushant, his army could never even have put forth, unless he had inflicted upon our covering fleet such a defeat as would have given him command of the sea, and with absolute control of the sea the passage of an army presents no difficulties. of the working of these principles under modern conditions we have no example. the acquisition of free movement must necessarily modify their application, and since the advent of steam there have been only two invasions over uncommanded seas--that of the crimea in , and that of manchuria in --and neither of these cases is in point, for in neither was there any attempt at naval defence. still there seems no reason to believe that such defence applied in the old manner would be less effective than formerly. the flotilla was its basis, and since the introduction of the torpedo the power of the flotilla has greatly increased. its real and moral effect against transports must certainly be greater than ever, and the power of squadrons to break a flotilla blockade is more restricted. mines, again, tell almost entirely in favour of defence, so much so indeed as to render a rapid _coup de main_ against any important port almost an impossibility. in the absence of all experience it is to such theoretical considerations we must turn for light. theoretically stated, the success of our old system of defence depended on four relations. firstly, there is the relation between the rapidity with which an invasion force could be mobilised and embarked, and the rapidity with which restlessness in foreign ports and _places d'armes_ could be reported; that is to say, the chance of surprise and evasion are as the speed of preparation to the speed of intelligence. secondly, there is the relation of the speed of convoys to the speed of cruisers and flotilla; that is to say, our ability to get contact with a convoy after it has put to sea and before the expedition can be disembarked is as the speed of our cruisers and flotilla to the speed of the convoy. thirdly, there is the relation between the destructive power of modern cruisers and flotillas against a convoy unescorted or weakly escorted and the corresponding power in sailing days. fourthly, there is the relation between the speed of convoys and the speed of battle-squadrons, which is of importance where the enemy's transports are likely to be strongly escorted. on this relation depends the facility with which the battle-squadron covering our mobile defence can secure an interior position from which it may strike either the enemy's battle-squadron if it moves or his convoy before it can complete its passage and effect the landing. all these relations appear to have been modified by modern developments in favour of the defence. in the first ratio, that of speed of mobilisation to speed of intelligence, it is obviously so. although military mobilisation may be still relatively as rapid as the mobilisation of fleets, yet intelligence has outstripped both. this is true both for gaining and for conveying intelligence. preparations for oversea invasion were never easy to conceal, owing to the disturbance of the flow of shipping that they caused. elaborate precautions were taken to prevent commercial leakage of intelligence, but they never entirely succeeded. yet formerly, in the condition of comparative crudeness with which international trade was then organised, concealment was relatively easy, at least for a time. but the ever-growing sensitiveness of world-wide commerce, when market movements are reported from hour to hour instead of from week to week, has greatly increased the difficulty. and apart from the rapidity with which information may be gathered through this alert and intimate sympathy between exchanges, there is the still more important fact that with wireless the speed of conveying naval intelligence has increased in a far higher ratio than the speed of sea transit. as regards the ratio between cruiser and convoy speeds, on which evasion so much depends, it is the same. in frigate days the ratio appears to have been not more than seven to five. now in the case at any rate of large convoys it would be nearly double. of the destructive power of the flotilla, growing as it does from year to year, enough has been said already. with the advent of the torpedo and submarine it has probably increased tenfold. in a lesser degree the same is true of cruisers. in former days the physical power of a cruiser to injure a dispersing convoy was comparatively low, owing to her relatively low excess of speed and the restricted range and destructive power of her guns. with higher speed and higher energy and range in gun power the ability of cruisers to cut up a convoy renders its practical annihilation almost certain if once it be caught, and consequently affords a moral deterrent against trusting to evasion beyond anything that was known before. the increased ratio of battle-fleet speed to that of large convoys is equally indisputable and no less important, for the facility of finding interior positions which it implies goes to the root of the old system. so long as our battle-fleet is in a position whence it can cover our flotilla blockade or strike the enemy's convoy in transit, it forces his battle-fleet in the last resort to close up on the convoy, and that, as kempenfelt pointed out, is practically fatal to the success of invasion. from whatever point of view, then, we regard the future chances of successful invasion over an uncommanded sea, it would seem that not only does the old system hold good, but that all modern developments which touch the question bid fair to intensify the results which our sea service at least used so confidently to expect, and which it never failed to secure. ii. attack and defence of trade the base idea of the attack and defence of trade may be summed up in the old adage, "where the carcase is, there will the eagles be gathered together." the most fertile areas always attracted the strongest attack, and therefore required the strongest defence; and between the fertile and the infertile areas it was possible to draw a line which for strategical purposes was definite and constant. the fertile areas were the terminals of departure and destination where trade tends to be crowded, and in a secondary degree the focal points where, owing to the conformation of the land, trade tends to converge. the infertile areas were the great routes which passed through the focal points and connected the terminal areas. consequently attack on commerce tends to take one of two forms. it may be terminal or it may be pelagic, terminal attack being the more profitable, but demanding the greater force and risk, and pelagic attack being the more uncertain, but involving less force and risk. these considerations lead us directly to the paradox which underlies the unbroken failure of our enemies to exercise decisive pressure upon us by operations against our trade. it is that where attack is most to be feared, there defence is easiest. a plan of war which has the destruction of trade for its primary object implies in the party using it an inferiority at sea. had he superiority, his object would be to convert that superiority to a working command by battle or blockade. except, therefore, in the rare cases where the opposed forces are equal, we must assume that the belligerent who makes commerce destruction his primary object will have to deal with a superior fleet. now, it is true that the difficulty of defending trade lies mainly in the extent of sea it covers. but, on the other hand, the areas in which it tends to congregate, and in which alone it is seriously vulnerable, are few and narrow, and can be easily occupied if we are in superior force. beyond those areas effective occupation is impossible, but so also is effective attack. hence the controlling fact of war on commerce, that facility of attack means facility of defence. beside this fundamental principle we must place another that is scarcely less important. owing to the general common nature of sea communications, attack and defence of trade are so intimately connected that the one operation is almost indistinguishable from the other. both ideas are satisfied by occupying the common communications. the strongest form of attack is the occupation of the enemy's terminals, and the establishment of a commercial blockade of the ports they contain. but as this operation usually requires the blockade of an adjacent naval port, it also constitutes, as a rule, a defensive disposition for our own trade, even when the enemy's terminal area does not overlap one of our own. in the occupation of focal areas the two ideas are even more inseparable, since most, if not all, such areas are on lines of communication that are common. it will suffice, therefore, to deal with the general aspect of the subject from the point of view of defence. it was in conformity with the distinction between fertile and infertile areas that our old system of trade defence was developed. broadly speaking, that system was to hold the terminals in strength, and in important cases the focal points as well. by means of a battle-squadron with a full complement of cruisers they were constituted defended areas, or "tracts" as the old term was, and the trade was regarded as safe when it entered them. the intervening trade-routes were left as a rule undefended. thus our home terminals were held by two battle-squadrons, the western squadron at the mouth of the channel, and the north sea or eastern squadron with its headquarters usually in the downs. to these was added a cruiser squadron on the irish station based at cork, which was sometimes subordinate to the western squadron and sometimes an independent organisation. the area of the western squadron in the french wars extended, as we have seen, over the whole bay of biscay, with the double function, so far as commerce was concerned, of preventing the issue of raiding squadrons from the enemy's ports, and acting offensively against his atlantic trade. that of the north sea squadron extended to the mouth of the baltic and the north-about passage. its main function during the great naval coalitions against us was to check the operations of dutch squadrons or to prevent the intrusion of french ones north-about against our baltic trade. like the western squadron, it threw out divisions usually located at yarmouth and leith for the protection of our coastwise trade from privateers and sporadic cruisers acting from ports within the defended area. similarly, between the downs and the western squadron was usually one or more smaller squadrons, mainly cruisers, and generally located about havre and the channel islands, which served the same purpose for the norman and north breton ports. to complete the system there were flotilla patrols acting under the port admirals and doing their best to police the routes of the coastwise and local traffic, which then had an importance long since lost. the home system of course differed at different times, but it was always on these general lines. the naval defence was supplemented by defended ports of refuge, the principal ones being on the coast of ireland to shelter the ocean trade, but others in great numbers were provided within the defended areas against the operations of privateers, and the ruins of batteries all round the british shores testify how complete was the organisation. a similar system prevailed in the colonial areas, but there the naval defence consisted normally of cruiser squadrons stiffened with one or two ships-of-the-line mainly for the purpose of carrying the flag. they were only occupied by battle-squadrons when the enemy threatened operations with a similar force. the minor or interior defence against local privateers was to a large extent local; that is, the great part of the flotilla was furnished by sloops built or hired on the spot, as being best adapted for the service. focal points were not then so numerous as they have become since the development of the far eastern trade. the most important of them, the straits of gibraltar, was treated as a defended area. from the point of view of commerce-protection it was held by the mediterranean squadron. by keeping watch on toulon that squadron covered not only the straits, but also the focal points within the sea. it too had its extended divisions, sometimes as many as four, one about the approaches to leghorn, one in the adriatic, a third at malta, and the fourth at gibraltar. in cases of war with spain the latter was very strong, so as to secure the focal area against cartagena and cadiz. on one occasion indeed, in - , as we have seen, it was constituted for a short time an independent area with a special squadron. but in any case the gibraltar area had its own internal flotilla guard under the direction of the port admiral as a defence against local privateers and pirates. the general theory of these defended terminal and focal areas, it will be seen, was to hold in force those waters which converging trade made most fertile, and which therefore furnished an adequate field for the operations of raiding squadrons. in spite of the elaborate defensive system, such squadrons might, and sometimes did, intrude by surprise or stealth, and were then able to set at defiance both convoy escorts and the cruiser outposts. but, as experience proved, the system of terminal defence by battle-squadrons made it impossible for such raiding squadrons to remain long enough on the ground to cause any serious interruption or to do serious harm. it was only by a regular fleet of superior strength that the system could be broken down. in other words, the defence could only fall when our means of local control was destroyed by battle. so much for the defended areas. with regard to the great routes that connected them, it has been said they were left undefended. by this is meant that the security of ships passing along them was provided for, not by patrols but by escort. the convoy system was adopted, and the theory of that system is that while vessels are on the great routes they are normally liable only to sporadic attack, and they are consequently collected into fleets and furnished with an escort sufficient to repel sporadic attack. in theory, cruiser escort is sufficient, but in practice it was found convenient and economical to assign the duty in part to ships-of-the-line which were going out to join the distant terminal squadron or returning from it for a refit or some other reason; in other words, the system of foreign reliefs was made to work in with the supplementary escort system. where no such ships were available and the convoys were of great value, or enemy's ships-of-the-line were known to be out, similar units were specially detailed for convoy duty to go and return, but this use of battle units was exceptional. such a method of dealing with the great routes is the corollary of the idea of defended areas. as those areas were fertile and likely to attract raiding squadrons, so the great routes were infertile, and no enemy could afford to spend squadrons upon them. it is obvious, however, that the system had its weak side, for the mere fact that a convoy was upon a great route tended to attract a squadron, and the comparative immunity of those routes was lost. the danger was provided for to a great extent by the fact that the enemy's ports from which a squadron could issue were all within defended areas and watched by our own squadrons. still, the guard could not be made impenetrable. there was always the chance of a squadron escaping, and if it escaped towards a critical trade-route, it must be followed. hence there were times when the convoy system seriously disturbed our dispositions, as, for instance, in the crisis of the trafalgar campaign, when for a short time our chain of defended areas was broken down by the escape of the toulon squadron. that escape eventually forced a close concentration on the western squadron, but all other considerations apart, it was felt to be impossible to retain the mass for more than two days owing to the fact that the great east and west indies convoys were approaching, and villeneuve's return to ferrol from martinique exposed them to squadronal attack. it was, in fact, impossible to tell whether the mass had not been forced upon us with this special end in view. in the liability to deflection of this kind lay the most serious strategical objection to the convoy system. it was sought to minimise it by giving the convoys a secret route when there was apprehension of squadronal interference. it was done in the case just cited, but the precaution seemed in no way to lessen the anxiety. it may have been because in those days of slow communication there could be no such certainty that the secret route had been received as there would be now. modern developments and changes in shipping and naval material have indeed so profoundly modified the whole conditions of commerce protection, that there is no part of strategy where historical deduction is more difficult or more liable to error. to avoid such error as far as possible, it is essential to keep those developments in mind at every step. the more important of them are three in number. firstly, the abolition of privateering; secondly, the reduced range of action for all warships; and thirdly, the development of wireless telegraphy. there are others which must be dealt with in their place, but these three go to the root of the whole problem. difficult as it is to arrive at exact statistics of commerce destruction in the old wars, one thing seems certain--that the bulk of captures, which were reckoned in hundreds and sometimes even in thousands, were due to the action of privateers. further, it seems certain that, reckoning at least by numbers, the greater part of the damage was done by small privateers operating close to their bases, either home or colonial, against coastwise and local traffic. the complaints of merchants, so far as they are known, relate mainly to this kind of work in the west indies and home waters, while accounts of serious captures by large privateers on the high seas are comparatively rare. the actual damage done by the swarm of small vessels may not have been great, but its moral effects were very serious. it was impossible for the strongest governments to ignore them, and the consequence was a chronic disturbance of the larger strategical dispositions. while these dispositions were adequate to check the operations of large privateers acting in the same way as regular cruisers, the smaller ones found very free play amidst the ribwork of the protective system, and they could only be dealt with by filling up the spaces with a swarm of small cruisers to the serious detriment of the larger arrangements. even so, the proximity of the enemy's ports made escape so easy, that the work of repression was very ineffective. the state of the case was indeed almost identical with a people's war. the ordinary devices of strategy failed to deal with it, as completely as napoleon's broadly planned methods failed to deal with the _guerilleros_ in spain, or as our own failed for so long in south africa. by the abolition of privateering, then, it would seem that the most disturbing part of the problem has been eliminated. it is, of course, uncertain how far the declaration of paris will hold good in practice. it is still open even to the parties to it to evade its restrictions to a greater or less extent by taking up and commissioning merchantmen as regular ships of war. but it is unlikely that such methods will extend beyond the larger privately owned vessels. any attempt to revive in this way the old _picaresque_ methods could only amount to a virtual repudiation of statutory international law, which would bring its own retribution. moreover, for home waters at least, the conditions which favoured this _picaresque_ warfare no longer exist. in the old wars the bulk of our trade came into the thames, and thence the greater part of it was distributed in small coasting vessels. it was against this coastwise traffic that the small, short-range privateers found their opportunity and their richest harvest. but, now that so many other great centres of distribution have established themselves, and that the bulk of the distribution is done by internal lines of communication, the channel is no longer the sole artery, and the old troublesome disturbance can be avoided without a vital dislocation of our commercial system. the probability, then, is that in the future the whole problem will be found to be simplified, and that the work of commerce protection will lie much more within the scope of large strategical treatment than it ever did before, with the result that the change should be found to tell substantially in favour of defence and against attack. the reduction of range of action is scarcely less important. in the old days a cruising ship could be stored for six months, and so long as she could occasionally renew her fuel and water, she was free to range the sea outside the defended areas for the whole of the period with unimpaired vitality. for such pelagic operations her movement was practically unrestricted. she could run for two or three days from a superior enemy or chase for as long without loss of energy, and she could wait indefinitely at a likely spot, or change her ground, as danger or hope of plunder dictated. so long as she had men left to man her prizes, her power of mischief was almost unlimited. all this is now changed. the capacity of each cruise of a ship to-day is very small. she is confined to short dashes within a strategically defended area, or if she is bent on pelagic operations, is compelled to proceed so far to find undefended waters that her coal will scarcely permit of more than a few days' actual cruising. a couple of chases at high speed during that period may force her to return at once, subject only to the precarious possibility of renewing her coal from a prize. she has, further, to face the fact that manning prizes must necessarily reduce her capacity for speed, which depends so much on a fully manned engine-room. this will tend to jeopardise her chances of return through or near defended areas. the only escape from this difficulty is to sink the captured ship. but this course has objections scarcely less weighty than the other. no power will incur the odium of sinking a prize with all hands, and their removal to the captor's ship takes time, especially in bad weather, and the presence of such prisoners in a cruiser in any number soon becomes a serious check on her fighting power. in the case of large ships, moreover, the work of destruction is no easy matter. in the most favourable circumstances it takes a considerable time, and thus not only eats into the cruiser's endurance, but decreases her chances of evasion. from these and similar considerations it is obvious that the possibilities of operations on the great trade-routes are much less extensive than they were formerly, while to speak of cruisers "infesting" those routes is sheer hyperbole. under modern conditions it is scarcely more feasible than it would be to keep up a permanent blockade of the british islands. it would require a flow of ships in such numbers as no country but our own can contemplate possessing, and such as could not be maintained without having first secured a very decided preponderance at sea. the loss of radius of action therefore, though it does not increase the power of defence, sensibly lessens that of attack by pelagic operations. for the great increase in the powers of defence we must turn to the extraordinary development in the means of distant communication. under former conditions it was possible for a cruising ship to remain for days upon a fertile spot and make a number of captures before her presence was known. but since most large merchantmen have been fitted with wireless installations, she cannot now attack a single one of them without fear of calling down upon her an adversary. moreover, when she is once located, every ship within wireless reach can be warned of her presence and avoid her. she must widely and constantly shift her position, thereby still further reducing her staying power. on the whole, then, it would appear that in so far as modern developments affect the problem, they certainly render pelagic operations far more difficult and uncertain than they used to be. upon the great routes the power of attack has been reduced and the means of evasion has increased to such an extent as to demand entire reconsideration of the defence of trade between terminal areas. the whole basis of the old system would seem to be involved. that basis was the convoy system, and it now becomes doubtful whether the additional security which convoys afforded is sufficient to outweigh their economical drawbacks and their liability to cause strategical disturbance. over and above the considerations already noticed, there are three others, all of which favour the security of our trade by permitting a much more extended choice of route. the first is, that steam vessels are not forced by prevailing winds to keep to particular courses. the second is, that the improvements in the art of navigation no longer render it so necessary to make well-known landfalls during transit. the third is, that the multiplication of our great ports of distribution have divided the old main flow of trade to the channel into a number of minor streams that cover a much wider area and demand a greater distribution of force for effective attack. it will be obvious that the combined effect of these considerations is to increase still further the chances of individual vessels evading the enemy's cruisers and to lessen the risk of dispensing with escort. nor are the new practical difficulties of sporadic operations on the great routes the only arguments that minimise the value of convoys. we have also to remember that while the number of vessels trading across the ocean has enormously increased since , it is scarcely possible, even if the abolition of privateering prove abortive, that the number of cruisers available for pelagic attack could exceed, or even equal, the number employed in sailing days. this consideration, then, must also be thrown into the scale against convoys; for it is certain that the amount of serious operative damage which an enemy can do to our trade by pelagic operation is mainly determined by the ratio which his available cruiser strength bears to the volume of that trade. this aspect of the question is, however, part of a much wider one, which concerns the relation which the volume of our trade bears to the difficulty of its defence, and this must be considered later. it remains, first, to deal with the final link in the old system of defence. the statement that the great routes were left undefended will seem to be in opposition to a prevailing impression derived from the fact that frigates are constantly mentioned as being "on a cruise." the assumption is that they in effect patrolled the great routes. but this was not so, nor did they rove the sea at will. they constituted a definite and necessary part of the system. though that system was founded on a distinction between defended terminals and undefended routes, which was a real strategical distinction, it was impossible to draw an actual line where the one sphere began and the other ended. outside the regularly defended areas lay a region which, as the routes began to converge, was comparatively fertile. in this region enemies' cruisers and their larger privateers found the mean between risk and profit. here too convoys, as they entered the zone, were in their greatest danger for fear of their escorts being overpowered by raiding squadrons. consequently it was the practice, when the approach of convoys was expected, to throw forward from the defended area groups of powerful cruisers, and even battleship divisions, to meet them and reinforce their escorts. outward-bound convoys had their escorts similarly strengthened till they were clear of the danger zone. the system was in regular use both for home and colonial areas. in no sense did it constitute a patrol of the routes. it was in practice and conception a system of outposts, which at seasons of special risk amounted to an extension of the defended areas combining with a reinforcement of the convoy escorts. focal points of lesser importance, such as capes finisterre and st. vincent, were similarly held by one or two powerful cruisers, and if necessary by a squadron. as has been already explained, owing to the peculiar conditions of the sea and the common nature of maritime communications, these dispositions were adopted as well for attack as defence, and the fertile areas, for the defence of which a frigate captain was sent "on a cruise," were always liable to bring him rich reward. his mission of defence carried with it the best opportunities for attack. in the full development of the system patrol lines did exist, but not for the great routes. they were established to link up adjacent defended areas and as a more scientific organisation of the cruiser outposts. in the gibraltar and the home areas were thus connected by a patrol line which stretched from cape st. vincent through the finisterre focal area to cape clear, with a branch extending to the strategical centre off ushant. the new system was introduced at a time when we had reason to expect that the french and spanish fleets were to be devoted entirely to operations in small raiding squadrons against our trade and colonies. special provision was therefore necessary to locate any such squadrons that might elude the regular blockades, and to ensure that they should be adequately pursued. the new lines were in fact intelligence patrols primarily, though they were also regarded as the only means of protecting efficiently the southern trade-route where it was flanked by french and spanish ports.[ ] [ ] it should be said that cornwallis did not regard this system as new except for the extension from finisterre to st. vincent, which nelson advised. in acknowledging the order from ushant he wrote, "the instructions ... are nearly the same as have generally been given. i can therefore only guess why a copy of the order was sent to me."--_admiralty, in-letters_, , september . the whole system, it will be observed, though not conflicting with the main object of bringing the enemy's fleets to action, did entail an expenditure of force and deflecting preoccupations such as are unknown in land warfare. large numbers of cruisers had to be employed otherwise than as the eyes of the battle-squadrons, while the coming and going of convoys produced periodical oscillations in the general distribution. embarrassing as was this commercial deflection in the old wars, an impression appears to prevail that in the future it must be much more serious. it is argued plausibly enough not only that our trade is far larger and richer than it was, but also that, owing to certain well-known economic changes, it is far more a matter of life and death to the nation than in the days when food and raw material did not constitute the bulk of our imports. in view of the new conditions it is held that we are more vulnerable through our trade now than formerly, and that, consequently, we must devote relatively more attention and force to its defence. if this were true, it is obvious that war with a strong naval combination would present difficulties of the most formidable kind, greater indeed than we have ever experienced; for since with modern developments the demand for fleet cruisers is much greater than formerly, the power of devoting cruisers to trade defence is relatively much less. it cannot be denied that at first sight the conclusion looks irreproachable. but on analysis it will be found to involve two assumptions, both of which are highly questionable. the first is, that the vulnerability of a sea power through its maritime trade is as the volume of that trade. the second is, that the difficulty of defending sea-borne trade is also as its volume--that is to say, the larger the amount of the trade, the larger must be the force devoted to its protection. this idea indeed is carried so far, that we are frequently invited to fix the standard of our naval strength by comparing it with the proportion which the naval strength of other powers bears to their sea-borne trade. it is hoped that the foregoing sketch of our traditional system of trade defence will avail to raise a doubt whether either assumption can be accepted without very careful consideration. in the history of that system there is no indication that it was affected by the volume of the trade it was designed to protect. nor has any one succeeded in showing that the pressure which an enemy could exert upon us through our commerce increased in effect with the volume of our seaborne trade. the broad indications indeed are the other way--that the greater the volume of our trade, the less was the effective impression which an enemy could make upon it, even when he devoted his whole naval energies to that end. it is not too much to say that in every case where he took this course his own trade dwindled to nothing, while ours continually increased. it may be objected that this was because the only periods in which he devoted his main efforts to trade destruction were when we had dominated his navy, and being no longer able to dispute the command, he could do no more than interfere with its exercise. but this must always be so whether we have positively dominated his navy or not. if he tries to ignore our battle-fleets, and devotes himself to operations against trade, he cannot dispute the command. whatever his strength, he must leave the command to us. he cannot do both systematically, and unless he attacks our trade systematically by sustained strategical operation, he cannot hope to make any real impression. if, now, we take the two assumptions and test them by the application of elementary principles, both will appear theoretically unsound. let us take first the relation of vulnerability to volume. since the object of war is to force our will upon the enemy, the only way in which we can expect war on commerce to serve our end is to inflict so much damage upon it as will cause our enemy to prefer peace on our terms to a continuation of the struggle. the pressure on his trade must be insupportable, not merely annoying. it must seriously cripple his finance or seriously threaten to strangle his national life and activities. if his total trade be a hundred millions, and we succeed in destroying five, he will feel it no more than he does the ordinary fluctuations to which he is accustomed in time of peace. if, however, we can destroy fifty millions, his trade equilibrium will be overthrown, and the issue of the war will be powerfully affected. in other words, to affect the issue the impression made on trade must be a percentage or relative impression. the measure of a nation's vulnerability through its trade is the percentage of destruction that an enemy can effect. now, it is true that the amount of damage which a belligerent can inflict with a given force on an enemy's commerce will vary to some extent with its volume; for the greater the volume of commerce, the more fertile will be the undefended cruising grounds. but no matter how fertile such areas might be, the destructive power of a cruiser was always limited, and it must be still more limited in the future. it was limited by the fact that it was physically impossible to deal with more than a certain number of prizes in a certain time, and, for the reasons already indicated, this limit has suffered a very marked restriction. when this limit of capacity in a given force is passed, the volume of commerce will not affect the issue; and seeing how low that capacity must be in the future and how enormous is the volume of our trade, the limit of destructive power, at least as against ourselves, provided we have a reasonably well-organised system of defence, must be relatively low. it must, in fact, be passed at a percentage figure well within what we have easily supported in the past. there is reason, therefore, to believe that so far from the assumption in question being true, the effective vulnerability of sea-borne trade is not in direct but in inverse proportion to its volume. in other words, the greater the volume, the more difficult it is to make an effective percentage impression. similarly, it will be observed that the strain of trade defence was proportioned not to the volume of that trade, but to the number and exposure of its terminals and focal points. whatever the volume of the trade these remained the same in number, and the amount of force required for their defence varied only with the strength that could readily be brought to bear against them. it varied, that is, with the distribution of the enemy's bases and the amount of his naval force. thus in the war of with the united states, the west indian and north american areas were much more exposed than they had been when we were at war with france alone and when american ports were not open to her as bases. they became vulnerable not only to the united states fleet, but also in a much higher degree to that of france, and consequently the force we found necessary to devote to trade defence in the north atlantic was out of all proportion to the naval strength of the new belligerent. our protective force had to be increased enormously, while the volume of our trade remained precisely the same. this relation of trade defence to terminal and focal areas is of great importance, for it is in the increase of such areas in the far east that lies the only radical change in the problem. the east indian seas were always of course to some extent treated as a defended area, but the problem was simplified by the partial survival in those regions of the old method of defence. till about the end of the seventeenth century long-range trade was expected to defend itself, at least outside the home area, and the retention of their armament by east indiamen was the last survival of the practice. beyond the important focal area of st. helena they relied mainly on their own power of resistance or to such escort as could be provided by the relief ships of the east indian station. as a rule, their escort proper went no farther outward-bound than st. helena, whence it returned with the homeward-bound vessels that gathered there from india, china, and the south sea whaling grounds. the idea of the system was to provide escort for that part of the great route which was exposed to attack from french or spanish colonial bases on the african coasts and in the adjacent islands. for obvious reasons this system would have to be reconsidered in the future. the expansion of the great european powers have changed the conditions for which it sufficed, and in a war with any one of them the system of defended terminal and focal areas would require a great extension eastward, absorbing an appreciable section of our force, and entailing a comparatively weak prolongation of our chain of concentrations. here, then, we must mark a point where trade defence has increased in difficulty, and there is one other. although minor hostile bases within a defended area have lost most of their menace to trade, they have acquired as torpedo bases a power of disturbing the defence itself. so long as such bases exist with a potent flotilla within them, it is obvious that the actual provision for defence cannot be so simple a matter as it was formerly. other and more complex arrangements may have to be made. still, the principle of defended areas seems to remain unshaken, and if it is to work with its old effectiveness, the means and the disposition for securing those areas will have to be adapted to the new tactical possibilities. the old strategical conditions, so far as can be seen, are unaltered except in so far as the reactions of modern material make them tell in favour of defence rather than of attack. if we desire to formulate the principles on which this conclusion rests we shall find them in the two broad rules, firstly, that the vulnerability of trade is in inverse ratio to its volume, and secondly, that facility of attack means facility of defence. the latter, which was always true, receives special emphasis from modern developments. facility of attack means the power of exercising control. for exercise of control we require not only numbers, but also speed and endurance, qualities which can only be obtained in two ways: it must be at the cost of armour and armament, or at the cost of increased size. by increasing size we at once lose numbers. if by sacrificing armament and armour we seek to maintain numbers and so facilitate attack, we at the same time facilitate defence. vessels of low fighting power indeed cannot hope to operate in fertile areas without support to overpower the defence. every powerful unit detached for such support sets free a unit on the other side, and when this process is once begun, there is no halting-place. supporting units to be effective must multiply into squadrons, and sooner or later the inferior power seeking to substitute commerce destruction for the clash of squadrons will have squadronal warfare thrust upon him, provided again the superior power adopts a reasonably sound system of defence. it was always so, and, so far as it is possible to penetrate the mists which veil the future, it would seem that with higher mobility and better means of communication the squadronal stage must be reached long before any adequate percentage impression can have been made by the sporadic action of commerce destroyers. ineffectual as such warfare has always been in the past, until a general command has been established, its prospects in the future, judged by the old established principles, are less promising than ever. finally, in approaching the problem of trade protection, and especially for the actual determination of the force and distribution it requires, there is a dominant limitation to be kept in mind. by no conceivable means is it possible to give trade absolute protection. we cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. we cannot make war without losing ships. to aim at a standard of naval strength or a strategical distribution which would make our trade absolutely invulnerable is to march to economic ruin. it is to cripple our power of sustaining war to a successful issue, and to seek a position of maritime despotism which, even if it were attainable, would set every man's hand against us. all these evils would be upon us, and our goal would still be in the far distance. in the second naval power in the world was at war with an enemy that could not be considered a naval power at all, and yet she lost ships by capture. never in the days of our most complete domination upon the seas was our trade invulnerable, and it never can be. to seek invulnerability is to fall into the strategical vice of trying to be superior everywhere, to forfeit the attainment of the essential for fear of risking the unessential, to base our plans on an assumption that war may be waged without loss, that it is, in short, something that it never has been and never can be. such peace-bred dreams must be rigorously abjured. our standard must be the mean of economic strength--the line which on the one hand will permit us to nourish our financial resources for the evil day, and on the other, when that day comes, will deny to the enemy the possibility of choking our financial vigour by sufficiently checking the flow of our trade. iii. attack, defence, and support of military expeditions the attack and defence of oversea expeditions are governed in a large measure by the principles of attack and defence of trade. in both cases it is a question of control of communications, and in a general way it may be said, if we control them for the one purpose, we control them for the other. but with combined expeditions freedom of passage is not the only consideration. the duties of the fleet do not end with the protection of the troops during transit, as in the case of convoys, unless indeed, as with convoys, the destination is a friendly country. in the normal case of a hostile destination, where resistance is to be expected from the commencement of the operations, the fleet is charged with further duties of a most exacting kind. they may be described generally as duties of support, and it is the intrusion of these duties which distinguish the naval arrangements for combined operations most sharply from those for the protection of trade. except for this consideration there need be no difference in the method of defence. in each case the strength required would be measured by the dangers of interference in transit. but as it is, that standard will not serve for combined expeditions; for however small those risks, the protective arrangements must be sufficiently extensive to include arrangements for support. before dealing with this, the most complex aspect of the question, it will be well to dismiss attack. from the strategical point of view its principles differ not at all from those already laid down for active resistance of invasion. whether the expedition that threatens us be small or of invasion strength, the cardinal rule has always been that the transports and not the escort must be the primary objective of the fleet. the escort, according to the old practice, must be turned or contained, but never treated as a primary objective unless both turning and containing prove to be impracticable. it is needless to repeat the words of the old masters in which this principle lies embalmed. it is seldom that we find a rule of naval strategy laid down in precise technical terms, but this one is an exception. in the old squadronal instructions, "the transports of the enemy are to be your principal object," became something like a common form. nor did this rule apply only to cases where the transports were protected by a mere escort. it held good even in the exceptional cases where the military force was accompanied or guarded by the whole available battle strength of the enemy. we have seen how in norris was prepared to follow the french transports if necessary with his whole force, and how in nelson organised his fleet in such a way as to contain rather than destroy the enemy's battle-squadron, so that he might provide for an overwhelming attack upon the transports. exceptions to this as to all strategical rules may be conceived. conditions might exist in which, if the enemy's battle-fleet accompanied his transports, it would be worth our while, for ulterior objects of our own, to risk the escape of the transports in order to seize the opportunity of destroying the fleet. but even in such a case the distinction would be little more than academical; for our best chance of securing a decisive tactical advantage against the enemy's fleet would usually be to compel it to conform to our movements by threatening an attack on the transports. it is well known that it is in the embarrassment arising from the presence of transports that lies the special weakness of a fleet in charge of them. there is, however, one condition which radically differentiates comparatively small expeditions from great invasions and that is the power of evasion. our experience has proved beyond dispute that the navy alone cannot guarantee defence against such expeditions. it cannot be sure of preventing their sailing or of attacking them in transit, and this is especially the case where an open sea gives them a free choice of route, as in the case of the french expeditions against ireland. it is for this reason that, although an adequate navy has always proved sufficient to prevent an invasion, for defence against expeditions it must be supplemented by a home army. to perfect our defence, or, in other words, our power of attack, such an army must be adequate to ensure that all expeditions small enough to evade the fleet shall do no effective harm when they land. if in numbers, training, organisation, and distribution it is adequate for this purpose, an enemy cannot hope to affect the issue of the war except by raising his expeditions to invasion strength, and so finding himself involved in a problem that no one has ever yet solved for an uncommanded sea. still, even for expeditions below invasion strength the navy will only regard the army as a second line, and its strategy must provide in the event of evasion for co-operation with that line. by means of a just distribution of its coastal flotilla it will provide for getting contact with the expedition at the earliest moment after its destination is declared. it will press the principle of making the army its objective to the utmost limit by the most powerful and energetic cruiser pursuit, and with wireless and the increased ratio of cruiser speed, such pursuit is far more formidable than it ever was. no expedition nowadays, however successful its evasion, can be guaranteed against naval interruption in the process of landing. still less can it be guaranteed against naval interference in its rear or flanks while it is securing its front against the home army. it may seek by using large transports to reduce their number and secure higher speed, but while that will raise its chance of evasion, it will prolong the critical period of landing. if it seek by using smaller transports to quicken disembarkation, that will decrease its chances of evasion by lowering its speed and widening the sea area it will occupy in transit. all the modern developments in fact which make for defence in case of invasion over an uncommanded sea also go to facilitate timely contact with an expedition seeking to operate by evasion. nor must it be forgotten, since the problem is a combined one, that the corresponding developments ashore tell with little less force in favour of the defending army. such appear to be the broad principles which govern an enemy's attempts to act with combined expeditions in our own waters, where by hypothesis we are in sufficient naval strength to deny him permanent local command. we may now turn to the larger and more complex question of the conduct of such expeditions where the naval conditions are reversed. by the conduct, be it remembered, we mean not only their defence but also their support, and for this reason the starting-point of our inquiry is to be found, as above indicated, in the contrast of combined expeditions with convoys. a convoy consists of two elements--a fleet of merchantmen and an escort. but a combined expedition does not consist simply of an army and a squadron. it is an organism at once more complex and more homogeneous. its constitution is fourfold. there is, firstly, the army; secondly, the transports and landing flotilla--that is, the flotilla of flat-boats and steamboats for towing them, all of which may be carried in the transports or accompany them; thirdly, the "squadron in charge of transports," as it came to be called, which includes the escort proper and the supporting flotilla of lighter craft for inshore work; and lastly, the "covering squadron." such at least is a combined expedition in logical analysis. but so essentially is it a single organism, that in practice these various elements can seldom be kept sharply distinct. they may be interwoven in the most intricate manner. indeed to a greater or less extent each will always have to discharge some of the functions of the others. thus the covering squadron may not only be indistinguishable from the escort and support, but it will often provide the greater part of the landing flotilla and even a portion of the landing force. similarly, the escort may also serve as transport, and provide in part not only the supporting force, but also the landing flotilla. the fourfold constitution is therefore in a great measure theoretical. still its use is not merely that it serves to define the varied functions which the fleet will have to discharge. as we proceed it will be seen to have a practical strategical value. from a naval point of view it is the covering squadron which calls first for consideration, because of the emphasis with which its necessity marks not only the distinction between the conduct of combined expeditions and the conduct of commercial convoys, but also the fact that such expeditions are actually a combined force, and not merely an army escorted by a fleet. in our system of commerce protection the covering squadron had no place. the battle-fleet, as we have seen, was employed in holding definite terminal areas, and had no organic connection with the convoys. the convoys had no further protection than their own escort and the reinforcements that met them as they approached the terminal areas. but where a convoy of transports forming part of a combined expedition was destined for an enemy's country and would have to overcome resistance by true combined operations, a covering battle-squadron was always provided. in the case of distant objectives it might be that the covering squadron was not attached till the whole expedition assembled in the theatre of operations; during transit to that theatre the transports might have commerce protection escort only. but once the operations began from the point of concentration, a covering squadron was always in touch. it was only where the destination of the troops was a friendly country, and the line of passage was well protected by our permanent blockades, that a covering squadron could be dispensed with altogether. thus our various expeditions for the assistance of portugal were treated exactly like commercial convoys, but in such cases as wolfe's expedition to quebec or amherst's to louisburg, or indeed any of those which were continually launched against the west indies, a battle-squadron was always provided as an integral part in the theatre of operations. our arrangements in the crimean war illustrate the point exactly. our troops were sent out at first to land at gallipoli in a friendly territory, and to act within that territory as an army of observation. it was not a true combined expedition, and the transports were given no covering squadron. their passage was sufficiently covered by our channel and mediterranean fleets occupying the exits of the baltic and the black sea. but so soon as the original war plan proved ineffective and combined offensive operations against sebastopol were decided on, the mediterranean fleet lost its independent character, and thenceforth its paramount function was to furnish a covering squadron in touch with the troops. seeing how important are the support duties of such a force, the term "covering squadron" may seem ill-chosen to describe it. but it is adopted for two reasons. in the first place, it was the one employed officially in our service on the last mentioned occasion which was our last great combined expedition. in preparing the descent on the crimea, sir edmund lyons, who was acting as chief of the staff to sir james dundas, and had charge of the combined operations, organised the fleet into a "covering squadron" and a "squadron in charge of transports." in the second place, the designation serves to emphasise what is its main and primary function. for important as it is to keep in mind its support duties, they must not be permitted to overshadow the fact that its paramount function is to prevent interference with the actual combined operations--that is, the landing, support, and supply of the army. thus in , when shovel and peterborough were operating against barcelona, shovel was covering the amphibious siege from the french squadron in toulon. peterborough required the assistance of the marines ashore to execute a _coup de main_, and shovel only consented to land them on the express understanding that the moment his cruisers passed the signal that the toulon squadron was putting to sea, they would have to be recalled to the fleet no matter what the state of the land operations. and to this peterborough agreed. the principle involved, it will be seen, is precisely that which lyons's term "covering squadron" embodies. to quote anything that happened in the crimean war as a precedent without such traditional support will scarcely appear convincing. in our british way we have fostered a legend that so far as organisation and staff work were concerned that war was nothing but a collection of deterrent examples. but in truth as a combined operation its opening movement both in conception and organisation was perhaps the most daring, brilliant, and successful thing of the kind we ever did. designed as the expedition was to assist an ally in his own country, it was suddenly called upon without any previous preparation to undertake a combined operation of the most difficult kind against the territory of a well-warned enemy. it involved a landing late in the year on an open and stormy coast within striking distance of a naval fortress which contained an army of unknown strength, and a fleet not much inferior in battle power and undefeated. it was an operation comparable to the capture of louisburg and the landing of the japanese in the liaotung peninsula, but the conditions were far more difficult. both those operations had been rehearsed a few years previously, and they had been long prepared on the fullest knowledge. in the crimea everything was in the dark; even steam was an unproved element, and everything had to be improvised. the french had practically to demobilise their fleet to supply transport, and so hazardous did the enterprise appear, that they resisted its being undertaken with every military argument. we had in fact, besides all the other difficulties, to carry an unwilling ally upon our backs. yet it was accomplished, and so far at least as the naval part was concerned, the methods which achieved success mark the culmination of all we had learnt in three centuries of rich experience. the first of the lessons was that for operations in uncommanded or imperfectly commanded seas there was need of a covering squadron differentiated from the squadron in charge of transports. its main function was to secure the necessary local command, whether for transit or for the actual operations. but as a rule transit was secured by our regular blockading squadrons, and generally the covering squadron only assembled in the theatre of operations. when therefore the theatre was within a defended terminal area, as in our descents upon the northern and atlantic coasts of france, then the terminal defence squadron was usually also sufficient to protect the actual operations. it thus formed automatically the covering squadron, and either continued its blockade, or, as in the case of our attack on st. malo in , took up a position between the enemy's squadron and the expedition's line of operation. if, however, the theatre of operation was not within a terminal area, or lay within a distant one that was weakly held, the expedition was given its own covering squadron, in which the local squadron was more or less completely merged. whatever, in fact, was necessary to secure the local control was done, though, as we have seen, and must presently consider more fully, this necessity was not always the standard by which the strength of the covering squadron was measured. the strength of the covering squadron being determined, the next question is the position or "tract" which it should occupy. like most other strategical problems, it is "an option of difficulties." in so far as the squadron is designed for support--that is, support from its men, boats, and guns--it will be desirable to station it as near as possible to the objective; but as a covering squadron, with the duty of preventing the intrusion of an enemy's force, it should be as far away as possible, so as to engage such a force at the earliest possible moment of its attempt to interfere. there is also the paramount necessity that its position must be such that favourable contact with the enemy is certain if he tries to interrupt. usually such certainty is only to be found either in touch with the enemy's naval base or in touch with your own landing force. where the objective is the local naval base of the enemy these two points, of course, tend to be identical strategically, and the position of the covering squadron becomes a tactical rather than a strategical question. but the vital principle of an independent existence holds good, and no matter how great the necessity of support, the covering squadron should never be so deeply engaged with the landing force as to be unable to disentangle itself for action as a purely naval unit in time to discharge its naval function. in other words, it must always be able to act in the same way as a free field army covering a siege. where the objective of the expedition is not the local naval base, the choice of a position for the covering squadron will turn mainly on the amount of support which the army is likely to require. if it cannot act by surprise, and serious military resistance is consequently to be expected, or where the coast defences are too strong for the transport squadron to overpower, then the scale will incline to a position close to the army, though the extent to which, under modern conditions, ships at sea can usefully perform the delicate operation of supporting an infantry attack with gun fire, except by enfilading the enemy's position, remains to be proved. a similar choice will be indicated where strong support of men and boats is required, as when a sufficiency of flat-boats and steam towage cannot be provided by the transports and their attendant squadron; or again where the locality is such that amphibious operations beyond the actual landing are likely to be called for, and the assistance of a large number of boats and seamen acting with the army is necessary to give it the amphibious tactical mobility which it would otherwise lack. such cases occurred at quebec in , where saunders took his covering battle-squadron right up the st. lawrence, although its covering functions could have been discharged even better by a position several hundreds of miles away from the objective; and again in at alexandria, where lord keith ran the extremest hazard to his covering functions in order to undertake the supply of general abercromby's army by inland waters and give him the mobility he required. if, on the other hand, the transport squadron is able to furnish all the support necessary, the covering squadron will take station as close as possible to the enemy's naval base, and there it will operate according to the ordinary laws of blockade. if nothing is desired but to prevent interference, its guard will take the form of a close blockade. but if there be a subsidiary purpose of using the expedition as a means of forcing the enemy to sea, the open form will be employed; as, for instance, in anson's case above cited, when he covered the st. malo expedition not by closely blockading brest, but by taking a position to the eastward at the isle de batz. in the japanese operations against manchuria and the kuantung peninsula these old principles displayed themselves in undiminished vitality. in the surprise descents against seoul and at takusan the work of support was left entirely with the transport squadron, while admiral togo took up a covering position far away at port arthur. the two elements of the fleet were kept separate all through. but in the operations for the isolation and subsequent siege of port arthur they were so closely united as to appear frequently indistinguishable. still, so far as the closeness of the landing place to the objective permitted, the two acted independently. for the actual landing of the second army the boats of the covering squadron were used, but it remained a live naval unit all through, and was never organically mingled with the transport squadron. its operations throughout were, so far as modern conditions permit, on the lines of a close blockade. to prevent interference was its paramount function, undisturbed, so far as we are able to judge, by any subsidiary purpose of bringing the enemy to decisive action. all through the operations, however, there was a new influence which tended to confuse the precision of the old methods. needless to say it was the torpedo and the mine. their deflective pressure was curious and interesting. in our own operations against sebastopol, to which the port arthur case is most closely comparable, the old rules still held good. on the traditional principle, dating from drake's attack on san domingo in , a landing place was chosen which gave the mean between facility for a _coup de main_ and freedom from opposition; that is, it was chosen at the nearest practicable point to the objective which was undefended by batteries and out of reach of the enemy's main army. in the handling of the covering squadron admiral dundas, the commander-in-chief, gave it its dual function. after explaining the constitution of the transport squadron he says, "the remainder of my force ... will act as a covering squadron, and where practicable assist in the general disembarkation." with these two objects in mind he took a station near enough to the landing place to support the army with his guns if it were opposed, but still in sight of his cruisers before sebastopol, and at such a distance that at the first sign of the russians moving he would have time to get before the port and engage them before they could get well to sea; that is, he took a position as near to the army as was compatible with preventing interference, or, it may be said, his position was as near to the enemy's base as was compatible with supporting the landing. from either aspect in fact the position was the same, and its choice presented no complexity owing mainly to the fact that for the first time steam simplified the factors of time and distance. in the japanese case the application of these principles was not so easy. in selecting the nearest undefended point for a landing, it was not only batteries, or even the army in port arthur, or the troops dispersed in the liaotung peninsula that had to be considered, but rather, as must always be the case in the future, mines and mobile torpedo defence. the point they chose was the nearest practicable bay that was unmined. it was not strictly out of mobile defence range, but it so happened that it lay behind islands which lent themselves to the creation of fixed defences, and thus it fulfilled all the recognised conditions. but in so far as the defences could be turned by the russian fleet a covering squadron was necessary, and the difficulty of choosing a position for it was complicated by the fact that the objective of the combined operations was not merely port arthur itself, but also the squadron it contained. it was necessary, therefore, not only to hold off that squadron, but to prevent its escape. this indicated a close blockade. but for close blockade a position out of night torpedo range is necessary, and the nearest point where such a position could be secured was behind the defences that covered the disembarkation. consequently, in spite of what the strategical conditions dictated, the covering squadron was more or less continuously forced back upon the army and its supporting force, even when the support of the battle-squadron was no longer required. in the conditions that existed nothing was lost. for the lines of the japanese fixed defences were so near to the enemy's base, that by mining the entrance of the port admiral togo ensured that the enemy's exit would be slow enough for him to be certain of getting contact from his defended anchorage before the russians could get far to sea. what would happen in a case when no such position could be secured is another matter. the landing place and supply base of the army must be secured against torpedo attack, and the principle of concentration of effort would suggest that the means of defence should not be attenuated by providing the covering squadron with a defended anchorage elsewhere. thus it would appear that unless the geographical conditions permit the covering squadron to use one of its own national bases, the drift of recent developments will be to force it back on the army, and thus tend to confuse its duties with those of the transport squadron. hence the increased importance of keeping clear the difference in function between the two squadrons. to emphasise the principle of the covering squadron, these two cases may be contrasted with the lissa episode at the end of the austro-italian war of . in that case it was entirely neglected, with disastrous results. the austrian admiral, tegethoff, with an inferior fleet had by higher order been acting throughout on the defensive, and was still in pola waiting for a chance of a counter-stroke. persano with the superior italian fleet was at ancona, where he practically dominated the adriatic. in july the italians, owing to the failure of the army, were confronted with the prospect of being forced to make peace on unfavourable terms. to improve the position persano was ordered to take possession of the austrian island of lissa. without any attempt to organise his fleet on the orthodox british principle he proceeded to conduct the operation with his entire force. practically the whole of it became involved in amphibious work, and as soon as persano was thus committed, tegethoff put to sea and surprised him. persano was unable to disentangle a sufficient force in time to meet the attack, and having no compact squadron fit for independent naval action, he was decisively defeated by the inferior enemy. according to british practice, it was clearly a case where, if the operation were to be undertaken at all, an independent covering squadron should have been told off either to hold tegethoff in pola or to bring him to timely action, according to whether the island or the austrian fleet was the primary objective. the reason it was not done may be that persano was not given a proper landing force, and he seems to have considered that the whole strength of his fleet was needed for the successful seizure of the objective. if so, it is only one more proof of the rule that no matter what fleet support the landing operations may require, it should never be given in an imperfectly commanded sea to an extent which will deny the possibility of a covering squadron being left free for independent naval action. the length to which the supporting functions of the fleet may be carried will always be a delicate question. the suggestion that its strength must be affected by the need of the army for the men of the fleet or its boats, which imply its men as well, will appear heretical. a battle-squadron, we say, is intended to deal with the enemy's battle-squadron and its men to fight the ships, and the mind revolts at the idea of the strength of a squadron being fixed by any other standard. theoretically nothing can seem more true, but it is an idea of peace and the study. the atmosphere of war engendered a wider and more practical view. the men of the old wars knew that when a squadron is attached to a combined expedition it is something different from a purely naval unit. they knew, moreover, that an army acting oversea against hostile territory is an incomplete organism incapable of striking its blow in the most effective manner without the assistance of the men of the fleet. it was the office, then, of the naval portion of the force not only to defend the striking part of the organism, but to complete its deficiencies and lend it the power to strike. alone and unaided the army cannot depend on getting itself ashore, it cannot supply itself, it cannot secure its retreat, nor can it avail itself of the highest advantages of an amphibious force, the sudden shift of base or line of operation. these things the fleet must do for it, and it must do them with its men.[ ] [ ] the japanese in the late war attempted to do this work by means of a highly organized army disembarkation staff, but except in perfect conditions of weather and locality it does not seem to have worked well, and in almost all cases the assistance of the navy was called in. the authority for this view is abundant. in , for instance, when general maitland was charged with an expedition against belleisle, he was invited to state what naval force he would require. he found it difficult to fix with precision. "speaking loosely, however," he wrote, "three or four sail of the line and four or five active frigates appear to me to be properly adequate to the proposed service. the frigates to blockade." (meaning, of course, to blockade the objective and prevent reinforcements reaching it from the mainland, always one of the supporting functions of the squadron attached to the transports.) "the line-of-battle ships," he adds, "to furnish us with the number of men necessary for land operations." in this case our permanent blockading squadrons supplied the cover, and what maitland meant was that the battleships he asked for were to be added to the transport squadron not as being required for escort, but for support. st. vincent, who was then first lord, not only endorsed his request, but gave him for disembarkation work one more ship-of-the-line than he had asked for. at this time our general command of the sea had been very fully secured, and we had plenty of naval force to spare for its exercise. it will be well to compare it with a case in which the circumstances were different. when in the expedition under admiral christian and general abercromby was being prepared for the west indies, the admiral in concert with jervis drew up a memorandum as to the naval force required.[ ] the force he asked for was considerable. both he and jervis considered that the escort and local cover must be very strong, because it was impossible to count on closing either brest or toulon effectually by blockade. but this was not the only reason. the plan of operations involved three distinct landings, and each would require at least two of the line, and perhaps three, "not only as protection, but as the means by which flat-boats must be manned, cannon landed, and the other necessary services of fatigue executed." christian also required the necessary frigates and three or four brigs "to cover [that is, support] the operations of the smaller vessels [that is, the landing flotillas doing inshore work]." the main attack would require at least four of the line and seven frigates, with brigs and schooners in proportion. in all he considered, the ships-of-the-line [the frigates being "otherwise employed"] would have to provide landing parties to the number of men "for the flat-boats, landing and moving guns, water, and provisions," and this would be their daily task. the military force these landing parties were to serve amounted to about , men. [ ] sir hugh cloberry christian was an officer of high distinction with a remarkable record of battle service. he had been serving as howe's second captain just before his promotion to flag rank in , and died as commander-in-chief at the cape at the early age of fifty-one. lord barham, it must be said, who as sir charles middleton was then first sea lord, objected to the requirements as excessive, particularly in the demand for a strong escort, as he considered that the transit could be safeguarded by special vigilance on the part of the permanent blockading squadrons. the need for large shore parties he seems to have ignored. his opinion, however, is not quite convincing, for from the first he had taken up an antagonistic attitude to the whole idea of the expedition. he regarded the policy which dictated it as radically unsound, and was naturally anxious to restrict the force that was to be spent upon it. his opposition was based on the broad and far-sighted principles that were characteristic of his strategy. he believed that in view of the threatening attitude of spain the right course was to husband the navy so as to bring it up to a two-power standard for the coming struggle, and to keep it concentrated for decisive naval action the moment spain showed her hand. in short, he stoutly condemned a policy which entailed a serious dissipation of naval force for a secondary object before a working command of the sea had been secured. it was, in fact, the arrangements for this expedition which forced him to resign before the preparations were complete. but it is to be observed that his objections to the plan were really due, not to the principle of its organisation, but to our having insufficient force to give it adequate naval support without prejudicing the higher consideration of our whole position at sea.[ ] [ ] on analogous grounds almost every military critic has condemned the policy of this disastrous expedition as involving a dispersal of our slender military force at a time when everything called for its concentration in europe. it is obvious that the foregoing considerations, beyond the strategical reactions already noted, will have another of the first importance, in that they must influence the choice of a landing place. the interest of the army will always be to fix it as near to the objective as is compatible with an unopposed landing. the ideal was one night's march, but this could rarely be attained except in the case of very small expeditions, which could be landed rapidly at the close of day and advance in the dark. in larger expeditions, the aim was to effect the landing far enough from the objective to prevent the garrison of the place or the enemy's local forces offering opposition before a footing was secured. the tendency of the navy will usually be in the opposite direction; for normally the further they can land the army away from the enemy's strength, the surer are they of being able to protect it against naval interference. their ideal will be a place far enough away to be out of torpedo range, and to enable them to work the covering and the transport squadron in sound strategical independence. to reduce these divergencies to a mean of efficiency some kind of joint staff is necessary, and to ensure its smooth working it is no less desirable to ascertain, so far as possible, the principles and method on which it should proceed. in the best recent precedents the process has been for the army staff to present the limits of coast-line within which the landing must take place for the operation to have the desired effect, and to indicate the known practicable landing points in the order they would prefer them. it will then be for the naval staff to say how nearly in accordance with the views of the army they are prepared to act. their decision will turn on the difficulties of protection and the essentials of a landing place from the point of view of weather, currents, beach and the like, and also in a secondary measure upon the extent to which the conformation of the coast will permit of tactical support by gun-fire and feints. if the naval staff are unwilling to agree to the point or points their colleagues most desire, a question of balance of risk is set up, which the higher joint staff must adjust. it will be the duty of the naval staff to set out frankly and clearly all the sea risks the proposal of the army entails, and if possible to suggest an alternative by which the risk of naval interference can be lessened without laying too heavy a burden on the army. balancing these risks against those stated by the army, the superior staff must decide which line is to be taken, and each service then will do its best to minimise the difficulties it has to face. whether the superior staff will incline to the naval or the military view will depend upon whether the greater danger likely to be incurred is from the sea or on land. where the naval conditions are fairly well known the line of operations can be fixed in this way with much precision. but if, as usually happens, the probable action of the enemy at sea cannot be divined with sufficient approximation, then assuming there is serious possibility of naval interference, the final choice within the limited area must be left to the admiral. the practice has been to give him instructions which define in order of merit the points the army desire, and direct him to select the one which in the circumstances, as he finds them, he considers within reasonable risk of war. similarly, if the danger of naval interference be small and the local conditions ashore imperfectly known, the final choice will be with the general, subject only to the practicable possibilities of the landing place he would choose. during the best period of our old wars there was seldom any difficulty in making things work smoothly on these lines. after the first inglorious failure at rochefort in the practice was, where discretion of this kind had been allowed, for the two commanders-in-chief to make a joint coast-reconnaissance in the same boat and settle the matter amicably on the spot. it was on these lines the conduct of our combined operations was always arranged thenceforth. since the elder pitt's time it has never been our practice to place combined expeditions under either a naval or a military commander-in-chief and allow him to decide between naval and military exigencies. the danger of possible friction between two commanders-in-chief came to be regarded as small compared with the danger of a single one making mistakes through unfamiliarity with the limitations of the service to which he does not belong. the system has usually worked well even when questions arose which were essentially questions for a joint superior staff. the exceptions indeed are very few. a fine example of how such difficulties can be settled, when the spirit is willing, occurred in the crimea. the naval difficulties, as we have already seen, were as formidable as they could well be short of rendering the whole attempt madness. when it came to the point of execution a joint council of war was held, at which sat the allied staffs of both services. so great were the differences of opinion between the french and british generals, and so imperfectly was the terrain known, that they could not indicate a landing place with any precision. all the admirals knew was that it must be on an open coast, which they had not been able to reconnoitre, where the weather might at any time interrupt communications with the shore, and where they were liable to be attacked by a force which, until their own ships were cleared of troops, would not be inferior. all these objections they laid before the council general. lord raglan then said the army now perfectly understood the risk, and was prepared to take it. whereupon the allied admirals replied that they were ready to proceed and do their best to set the army ashore and support it at any point that should be chosen. there remains a form of support which has not yet been considered, and that is diversionary movements or feints by the fleet to draw the enemy's attention away from the landing place. this will naturally be a function of the covering battle-squadron or its attendant cruisers and flotilla. the device appears in drake's attack on san domingo in , an attack which may be regarded as our earliest precedent in modern times and as the pattern to which all subsequent operations of the kind conformed so far as circumstances allowed. in that case, while drake landed the troops a night's march from the place, the bulk of the fleet moved before it, kept it in alarm all night, and at dawn made a demonstration with the boats of forcing a direct landing under cover of its guns. the result was the garrison moved out to meet the threat and were surprised in flank by the real landing force. passing from this simple case to the most elaborate in our annals, we find saunders doing the same thing at quebec. in preparation for wolfe's night landing he made a show of arrangements for a bombardment of montcalm's lines below the city, and in the morning with the boats of the fleet began a demonstration of landing his marines. by this device he held montcalm away from wolfe's landing place till a secure footing had been obtained. similar demonstrations had been made above the city, and the combined result was that wolfe was able to penetrate the centre of the french position unopposed. such work belongs of course to the region of tactics rather than of strategy, but the device has been used with equal effect strategically. so great is the secrecy as well as the mobility of an amphibious force, that it is extremely difficult for an enemy to distinguish a real attack from a feint. even at the last moment, when a landing is actually in progress, it is impossible for the defenders to tell that all the troops are being landed at the one point if a demonstration is going on elsewhere. at quebec it was not till montcalm was face to face with wolfe that he knew he had to deal with the whole british force. still less from a strategical point of view can we be certain whether a particular landing represents an advance guard or is a diversionary operation to mask a larger landing elsewhere. this is a special difficulty when in the case of large operations the landing army arrives in echelon like the second japanese army. in that instance the naval feint was used strategically, and apparently with conspicuous effect. the russians were always apprehensive that the japanese would strike for newchuang at the head of the gulf of pe-chi-li, and for this reason general stakelberg, who had command of the troops in the peninsula, was not permitted to concentrate for effective action in its southern part, where the japanese had fixed their landing place. admiral togo, in spite of the strain on his fleet in effecting and securing the disembarkation of the army, detached a cruiser squadron to demonstrate in the gulf. the precise effect of this feint upon the russian staff cannot be measured with certainty. all we know is that stakelberg was held back from his concentration so long that he was unable to strike the japanese army before it was complete for the field and able to deal him a staggering counter-stroke. this power of disturbing the enemy with feints is of course inherent in the peculiar attributes of combined expeditions, in the facility with which their line of operation can be concealed or changed, and there seems no reason why in the future it should be less than in the past. good railway connections in the theatre of the descent will of course diminish the effect of feints, but, on the other hand, the means of making them have increased. in mine-sweeping vessels, for instance, there is a new instrument which in the russo-japanese war proved capable of creating a very strong impression at small cost to the fleet. should a flotilla of such craft appear at any practicable part of a threatened coast and make a show of clearing it, it will be almost a moral impossibility to ignore the demonstration. on the whole then, assuming the old methods are followed, it would seem that with a reasonable naval preponderance the power of carrying out such operations over an uncommanded sea is not less than it has proved to be hitherto. the rapidity and precision of steam propulsion perhaps places that power higher than ever. it would at any rate be difficult to find in the past a parallel to the brilliant movement on seoul with which the japanese opened the war in . it is true the russians at the last moment decided for political reasons to permit the occupation to take place without opposition, but this was unknown to the japanese, and their arrangements were made on the assumption that their enemy would use the formidable means at his disposal to obstruct the operation. the risk was accepted, skillfully measured, and adequately provided for on principles identical with those of the british tradition. but, on the other hand, there has been nothing to show that where the enemy has a working command of the sea the hazard of such enterprises has been reduced. against an enemy controlling the line of passage in force, the well-tried methods of covering and protecting an oversea expedition will no more work to-day than they did in the past. until his hold is broken by purely naval action, combined work remains beyond all legitimate risk of war. * * * * * appendix * * * * * the "green pamphlet" * * * * * war course * * * * * strategical terms and definitions used in lectures on naval history by julian s. corbett, esq., l.l.m. * * * * * naval strategy naval strategy does not exist as a separate branch of knowledge. it is only a section of a division of the art of war. the study for officers is the art of war, specialising in naval strategy. the true method of procedure then is to get hold of a general theory of war, and so ascertain the exact relations of naval strategy to the whole. war is a form of political intercourse, a continuation of foreign politics which begins when force is introduced to attain our ends. objects. we seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or immediate. immediate objects (also called "primary") are the ends of particular operations or movements. but it must be remembered that every primary object has also its ulterior object; that is, every operation must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war. strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. classified by the object it is major strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; minor strategy, with primary objects. this also means that every operation of an army or fleet must be regarded in a double light, _i.e._, it must be planned and conducted in relation ( ) to the general progress of the war; ( ) to the object to which it is immediately directed. major strategy (always regarding the ulterior object) has for its province the plan of the war, and includes: ( ) selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; ( ) selection of the force to be used, i.e., it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces. note.--major strategy in its broadest sense has also to deal with the whole resources of the nation for war. it is a branch of statesmanship. it regards the army and navy as parts of one force, to be handled together; they are instruments of war. but it also has to keep in view constantly the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and its commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). the friction of these two considerations is inherent in war, and we call it the deflection of strategy by politics. it is usually regarded as a disease. it is really a vital factor in every strategical problem. it may be taken as a general rule that no question of grand strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and vice versa. for a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and vice versa. to decide a question of grand strategy without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. this interaction has to be accepted by commanding officers as part of the inevitable "friction of war." a good example is pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the baltic to assist frederick the great during the seven years war, for fear of compromising our relations with the scandinavian powers. minor strategy has for its province the plans of operations. it deals with-- ( ) the selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation. ( ) the directing of the force assigned for the operation. minor strategy may be of three kinds:-- ( ) naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only. ( ) military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only. ( ) combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together. note.--it will be seen that what is usually called naval strategy or fleet strategy, is only a sub-division of a division of strategy, and that, therefore, strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. note.--naval strategy, being only a part of general strategy, is subject to the same friction as major strategy, though in a less degree. individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government, or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient. example.--boscawen's attack on de la motte on the eve of the seven years war. nature of object the solution of every strategical problem, whether of major or minor strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view. all objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative. a positive object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves. a negative object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something. where the object is positive, strategy is offensive. where the object is negative, strategy is defensive. example.--when togo attacked rojesvensky his primary object was offensive, _i.e._, to capture or destroy the russian fleet. his ulterior object was to maintain the defensive function which had been assigned to the japanese fleet. notes.--this is a good example of true defensive; that is, togo's operations, though drastically offensive in action, were all strictly within the strategical defensive sphere assigned to him. the offensive, being positive in its aim is naturally the more effective form of war (_i.e._, it leads more directly to a final decision), and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger power. the defensive, being negative in its aim, is naturally the stronger form of war; _i.e._, it requires less force, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker power. note.--the general truth of this proposition is not affected by apparent exceptions where the contrary appears to be true. _the offensive must not be confused with the initiative._ it is possible to seize the initiative, under certain conditions, by taking a defensive position from which the enemy is bound to dislodge us or abandon the operation. in most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy. the advantages of the offensive are well known. its disadvantages are:-- ( ) that it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications. ( ) that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground. ( ) that it continually increases the difficulty of retreat. the advantages of defence are chiefly:-- ( ) proximity to base. ( ) familiar ground. ( ) facility for arranging surprise by counter attack. note.--in modern naval warfare these advantages--that is, the advantages of fighting on your own ground--are specially high as giving greater facility for the use of mine and torpedo. the disadvantages are mainly moral or when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position. general characteristics of the defensive. true defensive means waiting for a chance to strike. note.--when the dutch burnt our ships at chatham, we were not acting on the defensive, we had laid them up and were doing nothing at all. the strength and the essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. a well designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. a general defensive policy may consist of a series of minor offensive operations. the maxim is: if you are not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become so-- ( ) either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise; ( ) or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies. except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the defensive alone we can never acquire anything, we can only prevent the enemy acquiring. but where we are too weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. as a cover or support for the offensive, the defensive will enable us to intensify the attack; for by assuming the defensive in one or more minor theatres of operation we can reduce our forces in those theatres to a minimum, and concentrate to a maximum for the offensive in the most important theatre. offensive operations used with a defensive intention (a) counter attacks. (b) diversions. (a) _counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. it is this form of attack which constitutes what clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence." (b) _diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations. diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. if well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. they should, therefore, be small. the nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own. it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies the breach of the law of concentration which they involve. this power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions. note.--_diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks_. _eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. they have a positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. being in the category of the weaker form of war, eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions. examples.--_diversion._--our raid on washington in . landing force, about , men. object, according to official instructions, "a diversion on the coasts of united states of america in favour of the army employed in the defence of canada"; _i.e._, the intention was negative--preventative--defensive. . _eccentric attack._--operations against new orleans in . intended force , to , men. object, "to obtain command of embouchure of the mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to acquire. compare rochefort expedition (diversion) and belleisle (eccentric attack) in the seven years war. note .--this distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions, as used by elizabethan strategists. raids = diversions. incursions = eccentric attacks. invasions = true direct offence. compare these with sir john ardagh's classification (report of royal commission on reserve forces, ):-- "raids," not exceeding , men. "small expeditions," not exceeding , men. "dangerous invasion," not exceeding , men. nature of ulterior object from the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_. ( ) war with _limited object_ ("limited war") is where we merely seek to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions, or interests; _e.g._, spanish-american war, where the object was the liberation of cuba. ( ) _war with an unlimited object_ is where we seek to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, franco-german war. note.--ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the immediate (primary or secondary) objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the immediate objects may be defensive, and _vice versâ_. example .--japanese position in the late war. ulterior object of the war (to drive russians from manchuria) was offensive (positive). function or ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the russian naval force. this was offensive (positive). example .--in the spanish-american war the ulterior object of the war was (for the americans) to eject the spanish government from cuba. this was offensive. the ulterior object of the fleet was to prevent the spaniards sending reinforcements or interfering with the intended american invasion. this was defensive. the primary object of the fleet was to bring the spanish fleet to action. this was offensive. system of operations having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war." this depends upon:-- ( ) the theatre of the war. ( ) the means at our disposal. . _theatre of the war._--usually defined as "all the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each other." this is insufficient. for an island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. truer definition: "geographical areas within which lie the ulterior objects of the war and the subordinate objects that lead up to them." a "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations." . _theatre of operations_.--is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only. an "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking. a "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend. a truer definition is, "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation." consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another. where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive. objective an objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the _objective_. lines of operation a line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives." lines of operation may be exterior or interior. we are said to hold the interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. such a position is called an interior position. "exterior lines" and "exterior position" are the converse of these. lines of communication this expression is used of three different things:-- ( ) _lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point which the operating force has reached. ( ) _lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to each other's support. ( ) _lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._, leading back to the base. these three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century. ashore, lines of passage and communication are roads, railways, waterways, &c. at sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied. in land strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. maritime strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so even more than land strategy, as will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval operations. maritime communications the various kinds of maritime communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:-- ( ) its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond to the communications of armies operating ashore). these tend to increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c). ( ) the communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base. ( ) trade routes, that is the communications upon which depend the national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of belligerents' possessions. n.b.--such "lines of passage and communication" are the preoccupation of naval strategy; that is to say, problems of naval strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication" and this is probably the best method of solving them. naval strategy considered as a question of passage and communication by "naval strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the fleet. such operations must always have for their object "passage and communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy. proof i.--_deductive_.--we say the aim of naval strategy is to get command of the sea. what does this mean? it is something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. we cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. admiral colomb's theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false analogy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. what then is the value of the sea in the political system of the world? its value is as a means of communication between states and parts of states. therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. corollary.--the command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the dutch in the th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations. proof ii.--_inductive_, from history or past experience.--history shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold. . the prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war). examples.--the operations of rooke in the first years of the war of the spanish succession, - , to secure the adhesion of savoy and portugal to the grand alliance. operations of nelson to maintain the alliance of the kingdom of naples. in the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to savoy and portugal what they stood to lose by joining louis xiv than to act immediately against the toulon fleet. in the second, the neapolitan alliance was essential to our operations in the eastern mediterranean; the destruction of the toulon fleet was not. . the protection or destruction of commerce. . the furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore. note.--the above is the best working "definition of naval strategy," as emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major strategy. these functions may be discharged in two ways:-- ( ) by direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c). ( ) by getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. note.--the power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that naval strategy is mainly a question of communications. but not entirely. circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time to get general control of the communications. (that is, political and military considerations may deflect normal operation of naval strategy.) example.--rooke's capture of gibraltar in , in the face of the unshaken toulon fleet. japanese invasion of manchuria. command of the sea command of the sea exists only in a state of war. if we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have (a) adequate naval positions; (b) an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks out. various conditions of command . it may be (a) general; (b) local. (a) _general command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations. this condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea. note.--command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to force our will upon him. (b) _local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation. . both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent. (a) _temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). this condition existed after togo's first action. (b) _permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. this condition existed after tsushima. . command, whether general, local, or temporary, may be in three different states:-- (a) with us. (b) with the enemy. (c) in dispute. if in dispute, it may be that:-- ( ) we have preponderance. ( ) our enemy has preponderance. ( ) neither side preponderates. command in dispute the state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it. the state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea. it is to the advantage of the preponderating navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision. hence the french tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with england. the truth of this appears from the fact that _general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations_. in a state of dispute the preponderating power may concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view. the weaker power may take advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere. _rule ._ so long as a state of dispute can force the preponderating power to concentrate, operating by evasion is possibly open to the weaker. _rule ._ in a state of dispute although the weaker power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own. examples.--this condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the seven years war, until hawke and boscawen obtained a decision by defeating conflans and de la cloue; also in the great war up to trafalgar. should command of the sea always be the primary object? when the preponderating power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere. under certain conditions, therefore, it may not be the primary function of the fleet to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it, because general command may be in dispute while local command may be with us, and political or military considerations may demand of us an operation, for which such local command is sufficient, and which cannot be delayed until we have obtained a complete decision. from the above it will appear "command of the sea" is too loose an expression for strategical discussion. for practical purposes should be substituted "_control of passage and communication_." the question then in the consideration of any proposed operation or line of operations will be, not "have we the command of the sea?" but "can we secure the necessary lines of communication from obstruction by the enemy?" methods of securing control . _permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions. . _local and temporary control_ may be secured by:-- (a) a defensive action not necessarily entirely successful (containing). (b) forcing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion). (c) superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing). blockade blockades are of two natures, according to the object review. the object may be:-- (d) blockade. i. _close blockade_ to prevent the enemy putting to sea. the object being usually to secure local or temporary control. ii. _observation blockade_, to force the enemy to put to sea _by occupying the common lines of communications_ (_see_ below). in this case you are seeking a decision as a step towards general control. both natures are operations upon the lines of passage and communication, but in case ( ) the primary intention is defensive, to secure our own line; in case ( ) the primary intention is offensive, to seize the enemy's line and compel him to expose himself in an attempt to recover it. general rules for conducting blockades in case ( ) (defensive intention) blockade should be as close as is compatible with security from torpedo attack. in case ( ) (offensive intention) it should be as distant as is compatible with bringing enemy to action if he comes out. examples:--_case_ ( ): first stage of togo's blockade of port arthur. _case_ ( ): nelson off toulon. _confusion of the two_: sampson's attempt to close santiago simultaneously with an attempt to force cervera to sea. the peculiarity of maritime communications since the whole idea of command of the sea and the whole theory of blockade rest on the control of communications, neither can be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications. ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point. at sea the reverse is the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent tend to run approximately parallel, if, indeed, they are not identical. thus, in the case of a war with germany, the object of which lay in the eastern mediterranean, or in america, or south africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical. this was also the case in all our imperial wars with france. _this peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ nearly all our current maxims of naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on naval thought. it is at the root of the fundamental difference between military and naval strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion, which has arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and operations against them in each case. on land the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that as a rule we cannot do so without exposing our own. at sea, on the contrary, since the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get your fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. example.--this was usually done in our old wars with france, by our getting a fleet off brest before the french could sail. hence the maxim "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like. but these maxims are not universally true, witness togo's strategy against rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast. take again the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. here again togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim. the true maxim is "the primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action." the enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always. example.--opening of war of spanish succession. the operations of were to secure some point (cadiz, gibraltar, or ferrol) on the spanish trade communications, the french lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. these last two lines were identical. .--chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of savoy, and particularly of portugal, and with same object in view, rooke's official instructions directed that the french fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened our communications. result.--by we had gained a naval position from which france could not eject us, and she abandoned struggle for sea communications. but nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable:-- (a) because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet. (b) because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt _to control the common communications_. (c) because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, sir palmes fairborne's solution of the problem in (_england in the mediterranean_, vol. ii., p. ). also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign. this was what happened in . rooke was unable to seek out the toulon fleet, but by seizing gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of inevitable strategical law). compare togo's strategy and that of the americans in . practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is they have been the outcome on an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet, _e.g._, gravelines, la hogue, quiberon, trafalgar, tsushima. similarly the great actions of the old dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet. final note in applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind:-- ( ) that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it except at heavy cost. ( ) that seeing that the defensive is a stronger form of war than the offensive, it is _prima facie_ better strategy to make the enemy come to you than to go to him and seek a decision on his own ground. * * * * * war course * * * * * notes on strategy * * * * * part one general principles and definitions introductory naval strategy is a section of the art of war. the study for officers is the art of war, which includes naval strategy. war is the application of force to the attainment of political ends. major and minor strategy we seek our ends by directing force upon certain objects, which may be ulterior or primary. _primary objects_ are the special objects of particular operations or movements which we undertake in order to gain the ulterior object of the campaign. consequently it must be remembered that every particular operation or movement must be regarded, not only from the point of view of its special object, but also as a step to the end of the campaign or war. strategy is the art of directing force to the ends in view. there are two kinds--major strategy, dealing with ulterior objects; minor strategy, with primary objects. every operation of an army or fleet must be planned and conducted in relation ( ) to the general plan of the war; ( ) to the object to which it is immediately directed. major strategy, always regarding the ulterior object, has for its province the plan of the war and includes: ( ) selection of the immediate or primary objects to be aimed at for attaining the ulterior object; ( ) selection of the force to be used, _i.e._, it determines the relative functions of the naval and military forces. major strategy in its broadest sense deals with the whole resources of the nation for war. it is a branch of statesmanship which regards the army and navy as parts of one force, to be handled together as the instrument of war. but it also has to keep in constant touch with the political and diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of the instrument), and the commercial and financial position (by which the energy for working the instrument is maintained). the friction due to these considerations is inherent in war, and is called the deflection of strategy by politics. it is usually regarded as a disease. it is really a vital factor in every strategical problem. it may be taken as a general rule that no question of major strategy can be decided apart from diplomacy, and _vice versâ_. for a line of action or an object which is expedient from the point of view of strategy may be barred by diplomatic considerations, and _vice versâ_. to decide a question of major strategy, without consideration of its diplomatic aspect, is to decide on half the factors only. neither strategy or diplomacy has ever a clean slate. this inter-action has to be accepted as part of the inevitable "friction of war." a good example is pitt's refusal to send a fleet into the baltic to assist frederick the great during the seven years' war, for fear of compromising our relations with the scandinavian powers. minor strategy has for its province the plans of operations. it deals with-- ( ) the selection of the "objectives," that is, the particular forces of the enemy or the strategical points to be dealt with in order to secure the object of the particular operation. ( ) the direction of the force assigned for the operation. minor strategy may, therefore, be of three kinds:-- ( ) naval, where the immediate object is to be attained by a fleet only. ( ) military, where the immediate object is to be attained by an army only. ( ) combined, where the immediate object is to be attained by army and navy together. it will be seen, therefore, that what is usually called naval strategy or fleet strategy is only a sub-division of strategy, and that therefore strategy cannot be studied from the point of view of naval operations only. naval strategy, being a part of general strategy, is subject to the same friction as major strategy, though in a less degree. individual commanders have often to take a decision independently of the central government or headquarters; they should, therefore, always keep in mind the possible ulterior effects of any line of action they may take, endeavouring to be sure that what is strategically expedient is not diplomatically inexpedient. example.--for example, take boscawen's attack on de la motte on the eve of the seven years' war in . his orders were to prevent the troops and warlike stores which de la motte was taking out from reaching canada. it was not diplomatically expedient to open hostilities; but if boscawen succeeded, the result would have been worth the diplomatic consequences it would entail. he missed the expedition, but captured two isolated vessels; thus striking the first blow in such a way as to entail the utmost amount of harm with the least possible good. offensive and defensive _nature of object_ upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between _offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be based. consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of major or minor strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view. all objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative. a _positive_ object is where we seek to assert or acquire something for ourselves. a _negative_ object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something. where the object is positive, strategy is offensive. where the object is negative, strategy is defensive. this is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular operation is offensive or defensive. ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and _vice versâ_. for example, in the russo-japanese war the ulterior object of the war (to drive russians from manchuria) was offensive (positive). the ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the russian naval force. this was offensive (positive). _relation of offensive to defensive_ the offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger power. the defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war, since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker power. in most cases where the weaker side successfully assumes the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy. the advantages of the offensive are well known. its disadvantages are:-- that it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications, and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground. the advantages of the defensive are chiefly:-- proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground, facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of organising in advance. the disadvantages of the defensive are mainly moral. they become, however, real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position. _functions and characteristics of the defensive_ true defensive means waiting for a chance to strike. to assume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel strong enough to attack. it may mean that we see our way by using the defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to hit harder. a well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. unless it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. thus, in , the french, by assuming the defensive in the channel, threatened an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on minorca. this power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare, since the mobility of fleets enables them to pass instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive without any warning. when we assume the defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay aside attack. the whole strength and essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke. the stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the burning of our ships at chatham by the dutch. but in that case we were not _acting on the defensive_ at all. we had laid up our battle fleet and were doing nothing. we were purely passive, in expectation of peace. it is really an instance of the successful use of defensive _by the dutch_. being no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they assumed the defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a counter-stroke. it was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get better terms of peace. so far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. clausewitz calls it "a shield of blows." it is often called _offensive-defensive,_ or _active defence_. neither term is really necessary. for a defensive which excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea. the old elizabethan term _preventive_ most closely expresses the idea. the most important function of the defensive is that of covering, buttressing, and intensifying the main attack. no plan of campaign, however strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the use of the defensive. without some use of the defensive the cardinal principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. to develop the highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective, the defensive must be assumed everywhere else. because it is only by using the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre. in considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: if not relatively strong enough to assume the offensive, assume the defensive till you become so-- ( ) either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise; ( ) or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies. it must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. but where we are too weak to assume the offensive it is often necessary to assume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to accumulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pass to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. at sea we have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. but that is no reason for neglecting its study. in despising the defensive ourselves we have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. the bulk of our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by our enemies assuming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on land. we have seldom succeeded in treating this attitude with success, and it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so. _offensive operations used with a defensive intention_ (a) counter attacks. (b) diversions. _counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. it is this form of attack which constitutes what clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence." _diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations. diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. if well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. they should, therefore, be small. the nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own. diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies their use. this power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions. _diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks. eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. they have a positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions. examples.--diversion.--our raid on washington in . landing force, about , men. object, according to official instruction, "a diversion on the coasts of united states of america in favour of the army employed in the defence of canada"; _i.e._, the intention was negative--preventive--defensive. _eccentric attack._--operations against new orleans in . intended force, , to , men. object, "to obtain command of the embouchure of the mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to acquire. compare rochefort expedition (diversion) with those against martinique and belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the seven years' war. this distinction gives a threefold classification of combined expeditions, as used by elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions. these correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric attacks, and true direct offensive. limited and unlimited wars from the nature of the ulterior object we get an important classification of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_. ( ) _war with limited object_ ("limited war") is where the object is merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions or interests; _e.g._, spanish-american war, where the object was the liberation of cuba. ( ) _war with an unlimited object_ is where the object is to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, franco-german war. plans of war _system of operations_ having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war." apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon-- ( ) the theatre of the war. ( ) the various theatres of operation available within it. . _theatre of the war._--usually defined as "all the territory upon which the hostile parties may assail each other." this is insufficient. for an island power the theatre of war will always include sea areas. truer definition: "geographical areas within which must lie the operations necessary for the attainment of the ulterior objects of the war and of the subordinate objects that lead up to them." a "theatre of war" may contain several "theatres of operations." . _theatre of operations._--is generally used of the operations of one belligerent only. an "operation" is any considerable strategical undertaking. a "theatre of operations" is usually defined as embracing all the territory we seek to take possession of or to defend. a truer definition is: "the area, whether of sea or land or both, within which the enemy must be overpowered before we can secure the object of the particular operation." consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another. where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive. as the plan of war determines the theatres of operation in the theatre of war, so in each theatre of operation it determines the _lines of operation_ and the _objectives_. _objective_ an objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." thus, where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the _objective_. "objective" in ordinary use is frequently confused with "object." for purposes of strategical discussion it is desirable to keep them sharply distinguished. _objective_ is the end of some particular movement or operation, and is the special concern of the officer in command. _object_ is the end of a system of operations and is the special concern of the general staff or director of the war. an _objective_ is some definite point which we wish to get from the enemy or prevent his occupying, or some part of his strength which we wish to destroy. it is incorrect to use the term of anything we already possess. thus, vladivostock is often said to have been rojesvensky's _objective_. it was, strictly speaking, only his _destination_. to reach it and concentrate with the units already there was the _primary object_ of the operations entrusted to him. he had no true _objective_ before him except togo's fleet. an _objective_ is always subordinate to some _object_. it is a step to the attainment of that object. _lines of operation_ a line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives." lines of operation may be _exterior_ or _interior_. we are said to hold the _interior_ lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or assistance. such a position is called an _interior position_. "exterior lines" and "exterior positions" are the converse of these. _lines of communication_ this expression is used of three different things:-- ( ) _lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point which the operating force has reached. ( ) _lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to each other's support. ( ) _lines of retreat_, which are usually lines of supply reversed, _i.e._, leading back to the base. for naval purposes these three ideas are best described by the term "lines of passage and communication," which were in use at the end of the th century, and they may be regarded as those waters over which passes the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied. _maritime communications_ the various kinds of maritime communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:-- ( ) its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond to the communications of armies operating ashore). these have greatly increased in importance strategically with the increased dependence of modern fleets on a regular supply of coals, stores, ammunition, &c. ( ) the communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea base, that is, communication between the advanced and the main base. ( ) trade routes, that is, the communications upon which depend the national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of belligerents' possessions. in land strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. maritime strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so, as will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of naval operations; that is to say, all problems of naval strategy can be reduced to terms of "passage and communication," and this is probably the best method of solving them. * * * * * part two naval strategy considered as a question of passage and communication naval strategy defined by "naval strategy" we mean the art of conducting the major operations of the fleet. such operations have for their object "passage and communication"; that is, the fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy. we say the aim of naval strategy is to get command of the sea. this means something quite different from the military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. we cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. the value of the sea in the political system of the world is as a means of communication between states and parts of states. therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned. the command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the dutch in the th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations. history shows that the actual functions of the fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold:-- . the furtherance or hindrance of military operations ashore. . the protection or destruction of commerce. . the prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading neutrals as to participating in the war). examples.--the operations of rooke in the first years of the war of the spanish succession, - , to secure the adhesion of savoy and portugal to the grand alliance. operations of nelson to maintain the alliance of the kingdom of naples. in the first case, there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to savoy and portugal what they stood to lose by joining louis xiv, than to act immediately against the toulon fleet. in the second, the neapolitan alliance was essential to our operations in the eastern mediterranean; the destruction of the toulon fleet was not. in this way we get a _definition of the aim of naval strategy_, expressed in terms of the actual functions of the fleet. for practical purposes it will be found the most useful definition as emphasising the intimate connection of naval strategy with the diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major strategy. these functions of the fleet may be discharged in two ways:-- ( ) by direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landings, raiding parties, &c.). ( ) by getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against the enemy's territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours. the power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to that of the first--direct attack. indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second. thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that naval strategy is mainly a question of communications. but not entirely. circumstances have arisen when the fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action against territory before there is time to get general control of the communications. (that is, political and military considerations may deflect the normal operation of naval strategy.) examples.--rooke's capture of gibraltar in , in the face of the unshaken toulon fleet. holmes's capture of emden in . still, the fact remains that the key to the effective performance of the fleet's duties is almost always to secure communications as soon as possible by battle. command of the sea command of the sea exists only in a state of war. if we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have adequate naval positions, and an adequate fleet to secure the command when war breaks out. command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war and to force our will upon him. _various conditions of command_ . it may be (a) general; (b) local. (a) _general command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of passage and communication or to use or defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations. this condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea. (b) _local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in one or more theatres of operation. . both general and local command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent. (a) _temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our passage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign). this condition existed after togo's first action. it was also that at which napoleon aimed in his instructions to villeneuve in . (b) _permanent command_ is when time ceases to be a vital factor in the situation, _i.e._, when the possibility of the enemy's recovering his maritime position is too remote to be a practical consideration. this condition existed after tsushima. _command in dispute_ the state of dispute is the most important for practical strategy, since it is the normal condition, at least in the early stages of the war, and frequently all through it. the state of dispute continues till a final decision is obtained, _i.e._, till one side is no longer able to send a squadron to sea. _it is to the advantage of the preponderating navy to end the state of dispute by seeking a decision._ hence the french tradition to avoid decisive actions as a rule when at war with england. it must be remembered that _general command of the sea is not essential to all oversea operations_. in a state of dispute the preponderating power may concentrate or be induced to concentrate in one theatre of operations, and so secure the local or temporary command sufficient for obtaining the special object in view, while the weaker power takes advantage of such local concentration to operate safely elsewhere. thus in a state of dispute, although the weaker power may not be able to obstruct the passage and communication of the stronger, it may be able to defend its own. examples.--this condition of dispute existed during the first three years of the seven years' war, until hawke and boscawen obtained a decision by defeating conflans and de la clue; also in the great war up to trafalgar. when the preponderating power fails or neglects to get command (_i.e._, leaves the general command in dispute), the disadvantage to him is not so much the danger to his own operations as the facility given to the enemy for carrying out counter operations elsewhere. methods of securing control. . _permanent general control_ can only be secured by the practical annihilation of the enemy's fleet by successful actions. . _local and temporary control_ may be secured by-- (a) an action not necessarily entirely successful (containing). (b) inducing concentration on the enemy elsewhere (diversion). (c) superior concentration so as to render impotent the enemy's force available in the special theatre of operations (masking or containing). (d) blockade. _action of a fleet off an enemy's port_ a belligerent fleet off an enemy's port may carry out three different operations, for certain purposes; each quite separate from the others, and intended to obtain an entirely different result:-- ( ) _close blockade._--this is to prevent the enemy's fighting ships from putting to sea. in this case the object is to secure local control for some purpose that is not purely naval, such as was carried out by the japanese off port arthur in , so as to enable their transports to cross the yellow sea without fear of molestation from any of the russian ships in port arthur. since the cruisers in vladivostok were able to emerge (that port not being blockaded), the operation was not complete, and a danger of interference always existed. this method of blockade is far more difficult to carry out in the present day, than formerly; owing to the existence of submarines and torpedo craft, the blockading ships have to remain further away from the port; there have to be inner lines of cruisers, scouts and destroyers; and quick concentration takes longer owing to the greater space covered by the blockading force, and more ships of all natures are required for the same reason. greater and more vigilance are required than in former days, because the enemy's ships can come out regardless of weather (thick weather would be their opportunity), and it is most important that not a single craft, from a battleship to a torpedo boat, be allowed to escape. this method of blockade includes the commercial blockade, and all countries would be informed of its having been established. ( ) _commercial blockade._--to prevent floating commerce from entering or leaving the blockaded harbour. the blockading force would not be powerful enough to prevent a squadron of battleships or cruisers from entering or leaving the port blockaded; and it would not be instituted outside a fortified military port, or one containing a strong naval force. but it would be able to stop scouts and torpedo craft from entering or emerging, unless in very great numbers; and if unable to stop them from emerging, would give warning of their escape and the direction in which they are going. in both these forms of blockade it is usual, as a matter of courtesy, to allow neutral armed ships belonging to foreign navies to enter and leave for their own purposes, presumably connected with the subjects of their own country who are in the blockaded port. this, however, is not a right, and the country to which the blockading ships belong has a right to refuse it, and to back her refusal by force. all countries must be notified of a properly instituted commercial blockade, in accordance with international agreement. ( ) _observing a port._--this, with its subsidiary operations, should be conducted in such a way as to induce the enemy to put to sea, the object of observing the port being primarily a naval one, viz., to bring him to decisive action. the principal observing force (consisting of battleships and cruisers) would be either in one squadron, or more, provided that they were in supporting reach of each other, and so placed as to be able to cut off the enemy's fleet on emerging from the port observed before it can get dangerously near its probable objective, and yet sufficiently far out to ensure a battle before it can regain the shelter of its own ports. it is also worth noting that the battle should, if possible, be fought so as to make it difficult for the enemy's damaged ships to obtain the shelter of a friendly neutral's harbours before being captured. the observed port must be watched closely, so that immediate notice of the enemy's exit may be given; and this would be done by small cruisers, scouts and destroyers, which should be strong and numerous enough to attack any torpedo craft trying to get to sea. in order to induce the enemy's main force to put to sea it is important that every means be used to prevent his knowing that our fleet is observing the port, or if that be impossible, to do nothing which will lead him to suppose that his port is being observed. this operation is not a blockade. subsidiary operations to induce the enemy's fleet to put to sea, may take the form of a diversion on the enemy's coast, or against some important part of his sea-borne trade, either by the observing fleet or by a force affiliated to it, or by any oversea movements calculated to interfere seriously with the enemy's war plan. _concentration_ the guiding feature of modern preparation for war is to be ready for rapid action. it is true at sea, more even than on land, that upon the first movements depend the initiative, the power of controlling the enemy's strategy, and of making him conform to our movements. this readiness for rapid action will depend on a proper distribution of the fleet so as to meet all the requirements. the distribution of the fleet should be dominated by the idea of concentration, but it must be understood clearly what concentration means. clausewitz says:--"the best strategy is always to be sufficiently strong, at first generally, then at the decisive point. there is therefore no higher or simpler law for strategy than this--keep your forces together." the maxim "keep your forces together" does not, however, necessarily mean keeping them all concentrated in one mass, but rather keeping them so disposed that they can unite readily at will. at sea it is more difficult than on land to foretell where the decisive point will be; but since it is quicker and easier at sea to concentrate forces at any particular point than on land, in applying this maxim for our purposes, the rule should be to dispose the forces at sea so as to be able to concentrate them in time at the decisive point so soon as this point is determined, and also so as to conceal from the enemy what it is intended to make the decisive point. if the forces are rightly disposed within due limits, adequate control of all the lines of passage and communication can be assured, and if the enemy undertakes any operations it should be possible to ensure that sufficient forces can be concentrated in time to defeat his object. on the other hand, if the forces are concentrated in one mass, there can be little chance of deceiving or confusing the enemy, while it gives him an opportunity of successfully carrying out some operation by evasion. the peculiarity of maritime communications since the whole idea of command of the sea rests on the control of communications, it cannot be fully apprehended without a thorough understanding of the nature of maritime communications. ashore, the respective lines of communications of each belligerent tend as a rule to run more or less approximately in opposite directions, until they meet in the theatre of operations or the objective point. at sea, the reverse is frequently the case; for in maritime warfare the great lines of communications of either belligerent often tend to run approximately parallel if, indeed, they are not identical. thus, in the case of a war with germany, the object of which lay in the eastern mediterranean, or in america, or south africa, our respective lines of communication would be identical. this was also the case in all our imperial wars with france. _this peculiarity is the controlling influence of maritime warfare._ nearly all our current maxims of naval strategy can be traced to the pressure it exerts on naval thought. it is at the root of the fundamental difference between military and naval strategy, and affords the explanation of much strategical error and confusion which have arisen from applying the principles of land warfare to the sea without allowing for the antagonistic conditions of the communications and the operations against them in each case. on land, the chief reason for not always striking the enemy's communications at once is that, as a rule, we cannot do so without exposing our own. at sea, on the contrary, when the great lines are common to both, we cannot defend our own without striking at the enemy's. therefore, at sea, the obvious opening is to get our fleet into such a position that it controls the common lines, unless defeated or evaded. this was usually done in our old wars with france, by our attempting to get a fleet off brest before the french could sail. hence the maxims "that the proper place for our fleets is off the enemy's coast," "the enemy's coast is our true frontier," and the like. but these maxims are not universally true; witness togo's strategy against rojesvensky, when he remained correctly upon his own coast. take, again, the maxim that the primary object of the fleet is to seek out the enemy's fleet and destroy it. here, again, togo's practice was the reverse of the maxim. the true maxim is "the primary object of the fleet is to secure communications, and if the enemy's fleet is in a position to render them unsafe it must be put out of action." the enemy's fleet usually is in this position, but not always. example.--opening of the war of the spanish succession. the operations of were to secure some point (cadiz, gibraltar, or ferrol) on the spanish trade communications, the french lateral communications, and our own lines of passage to the mediterranean, where was to be our chief theatre of operation. these last two lines were identical. in , the chief operations had for their object to secure the alliance of savoy, and particularly of portugal. rooke's official instructions directed that the french fleet was to be ignored unless it threatened the common communications. result.--by we had gained a naval position from which france could not eject us, and she abandoned the struggle for sea communications. but nine times out of ten the maxim of seeking out the enemy's fleet, &c., is sound and applicable-- (a) because for us _general permanent command_ is usually essential to ultimate success, and this cannot be obtained without destroying the enemy's fleet. (b) because usually the enemy's fleet opens with an attempt to _dispute the control of the common communications_. (c) because usually the functions of the fleet are so complex (_i.e._, the calls upon it so numerous) that it will seek to strike a blow which will solve all the difficulties; _e.g._, sir. palmes fairborne's solution of the problem in . also it must be remembered that nine times out of ten the most effective way of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" (_i.e._, forcing an action on him) is to seize a position which controls communications vital to his plan of campaign. this was what happened in . rooke was unable to seek out the toulon fleet, but by seizing gibraltar he made it come to him (not intentionally, but by the operation of strategical law). practically all great naval actions have been brought about in this way, that is, they have been the outcome of an effort to clear essential communications from the enemy's fleet; _e.g._, gravelines, la hogue, quiberon, trafalgar, tsushima. similarly the great actions of the old dutch wars were brought about because our geographical position placed us astride the dutch trade communications, and they were forced to seek a decision against our fleet. in applying the maxim of "seeking out the enemy's fleet" it should be borne in mind that if you seek it out with a superior force you will probably find it in a place where you cannot destroy it, except at very heavy cost. it is far better to make it come to you, and this has often been done by merely sitting on the common communications. again, if you seek out the enemy's fleet without being certain of getting contact, you may merely assist it in evading you, and enable it to get into a position on your own communications, from which it may be very costly to dislodge it. it was for this reason that the elizabethan government kept the fleet in home waters in . sampson, in the spanish-american war, was actually permitted to make this mistake. by going to seek out cervera without being sure of contact, he left him a clear run into cienfuegos or even havana, which it was the main function of the fleet to prevent. captain mahan has since modified this maxim as follows:--"seek out the enemy's fleet, if you are sure of getting contact." a truer maxim would seem to be "seek contact with the enemy's fleet in the most certain and favourable manner that is open to you." to seek out the enemy's fleet is only one way of doing this, and not always the best way. it must be remembered that other conditions being equal, it is an obvious advantage to fight in your own waters rather than in those of the enemy, and more likely to ensure that a defeat of the enemy will be decisive. rn war college portsmouth january * * * * * index abercromby, general sir ralph, , absolute war, , - alexandria, alsace-lorraine, - , ambleteuse, amherst, general lord, anglo-japanese treaty, anson, admiral lord, - , , , antwerp, armada, spanish, - , - , , , , articles of war, austerlitz campaign, , bacon, sir francis, baltic fleet, , , , baltic trade, barcelona, barham, admiral sir charles middleton, , - , , - , , , , , barraille, admiral, - barrington, admiral samuel, - batz, isle de, , beachy head, belgium, - , belleisle, marechal de, , belleisle, berry, captain sir edward, biscay, bay of, , , black sea, blake, colonel robert, blockade, method of, , , - , , , , - , - , , , , ; ethics of, ; tactical and strategic, ; insecurity of, ; close and open, , , - , - , - , , - , , , , - , , ; theory of, , , , , - , , - , blücher, field marshal gebhard von, boscawen, admiral edward, , , , , boulogne, brest, , , - , , , , - , - , , - , - , - , , , bruix, admiral, byng, admiral sir george, cadiz, - , , , , , , , , , caemmerer, general von, - calder, admiral sir robert, , canada, , - , , , , , , cape clear, caribbean sea, carkett, captain robert, cartagena, channel islands, , charles ii of england, charles of austria, , , chateaurenault, admiral comte de, - chatham, , , cherbourg, christian, admiral sir hugh, cienfuegos, , clausewitz, general karl von, - , , - ; theory, , - , - , - , - , - , - , , ; his service, - ; _on war_, , ; his war plans, colpoys, admiral sir john, command at sea, theory of, - , - commerce prevention, communications, maritime, , , - , ; common theory of, - , conflans, admiral comte de, , - , , copenhagen, cornwallis, admiral sir william, , , , , - coruña, cotton, admiral sir charles, covering squadron, , - , craig's expedition, crimea, , , , , - , cromwell, , , , , cuba, , , , , _curieux_, dalny, dardanelles, , davout, louis-nicolas, deane, colonel richard, declaration of paris, , dettingen, dogger bank, downs, the, - , , , , , - , , drake, sir francis, , - , , - , , , , dumouriez, general, , dundas, admiral sir james, , dungeness, , dunkirk, , , , - , - duquesne, admiral abraham, egypt, - , elliot islands, ferrol, , , , finisterre, cape, , , - , , , flanders, , frederick the great, - , , , - , - , - , , , gallipoli, ganteaume, admiral comte, , - , , gardner, admiral lord, - gibraltar, , , , , - , , , , , , , gneisenau, field marshal august von, goltz, general von der, , guichen, admiral comte de, , hanover, , hardy, admiral sir charles, - havana, , havre, - , hawke, admiral sir edward, , - , , , , - , , henry viii, - holland, , howe, admiral earl, , - , - , , , - howard of effingham, admiral lord, , - , iberian peninsula, , - , , - , india, ireland, , , , , - , , , , , , jamaica, , , , , jervis, sir john, , jomini, general baron de, - , , - , - , , , , kamimura, admiral, keith, admiral lord, , kempenfelt, admiral richard, , - , , - , , , , - , , , , killigrew, admiral henry, - , , korea, , , - , - kraft zu hohenlohe-ingelfingen, prince, kuantung peninsula, lagos, la hogue, , , langara, admiral don juan, - leghorn, leith, liaotung peninsula, , , , liao-yang, , light squadrons, ligonier, general lord, limited war, , , - , - , lisbon, , lissa, , , lizard, the, , louisburg, , lyons, admiral sir edmund, - mack, general, mahan, admiral, n, , maitland, general, malta, , manchuria, , , , , , , maria theresa, marlborough, john, duke of, maxims: "conquest of water territory," ; "enemy's coast our frontier," ; "eyes of the fleet," , , - ; "fleet in being," , ; "the sea is all one," ; "seeking out the enemy's fleet," , , , , - , - , , , , , - medina-sidonia, duke of, , mediterranean, , , , - , , , - , , , , , , , , , , , , , medway, , melville, lord, - middleton. _see_ barham minorca, , , moltke, general von, , , , - monk, george, duke of albemarle, - , , - montecuculi, prince, montcalm, general marquis de, morbihan, , - mukden, napoleon, - , , , , , , , , - , ; methods, - , , - , - , , , , , , , - , - ; views on naval warfare, , , , , , ; his russian campaign, , ; on "pygmy combinations," ; his conversion, - narrow seas, , nelson, admiral lord, , - , , , , ; his influence, - , ; his use of cruisers, - , ; on defensive fleet operations, - , ; on blockade, , , - , ; his strategy, , , - , , , new model army, , ney, marshal michael, nile, norris, admiral sir john, - , , , , north sea, , , , , , , - , , , , nottingham, daniel finch, earl of, - observation squadrons, offence, theory of, - , - orde, admiral sir john, orvilliers, admiral comte de, palermo, paris, declaration of, , parma, prince alexander farnese, duke of, - , , - pe-chi-li, gulf of, , persano, admiral, - philip ii, pitt, william, earl of chatham, - , , , plymouth, , , , , , , pola, - port arthur, , - , , , - , - , - , , portsmouth, , , , - , portugal, , , , , , privateering, - prussia, , - , puerto rico, quebec, , , - quiberon, , , , , raglan, general lord, "real war," revolution, french, , rochefort, , , , , , , , rodney, admiral sir george b., , , roquefeuille, admiral marquis de, - ross, admiral john, , rupert, prince, - , russell, admiral edward, ruyter, admiral de, - st. helena, st. james's fight, - st. vincent, admiral sir john, , , , , , , st. vincent, cape, , san domingo, , santa cruz, marquess of, santiago, , sampson, admiral, , , sandwich, admiral, the earl of, sardinia, , saunders, admiral sir charles, , saxe, marshal, - saxony, - , scilly, , - , sebastopol, , , seoul, , , , sharnhorst, general gerhard von, shovel, admiral sir cloudesley, - , , sicily, , silesia, , skelligs, the, smyrna convoy, sole bay, spanish armada, - , - , , , , spithead, , , , stakelberg, general, - strachan, admiral sir richard, - strategy, naval and maritime, ; major and minor, - , - tegetthoff, admiral, , - texel, the, , - , , thames, the, - , , , - , theory of war, - , - tilbury, togo, admiral, , , , , , , , , - , torbay, - , - , torres vedras, , torrington, admiral lord, - , , , toulon, , , , , , - , - , , , , , - , , , , tourville, admiral comte de, - , , - , - trafalgar, , , , , , , trieste, tromp, admiral martin h., - tsushima, , , , unlimited war, - , - ushant, - , , - , , - , , utrecht, villeneuve, admiral, , - , , - , , , , , , vladivostock, walcheren, - warren, commodore sir john b., wars: anglo-american ( ), , ; anglo-dutch, ; anglo-spanish ( ), ; american independence, , , , , , , ; austro-italian ( ), , , ; crimean, , - ; franco-german ( ), , , ; franco-russian ( ), , , - ; russo-japanese, , , , , - , , , , , , - ; seven years', , , , , , , , - , - , , , , - , , ; spanish-american, , - , , , ; spanish succession, , , , wellington, duke of, , , , , , west indies, , , - , , - , , , - , , , , , - , , western squadron, , , , , , wight, isle of, , , , , wolfe, general, , , , - yalu, yarmouth, yellow sea, sea-power and other studies by admiral sir cyprian bridge, g.c.b. preface the essays collected in this volume are republished in the hope that they may be of some use to those who are interested in naval history. the aim has been to direct attention to certain historical occurrences and conditions which the author ventures to think have been often misunderstood. an endeavour has been made to show the continuity of the operation of sea-power throughout history, and the importance of recognising this at the present day. in some cases specially relating to our navy at different periods a revision of the more commonly accepted conclusions--formed, it is believed, on imperfect knowledge--is asked for. it is also hoped that the intimate connection between naval history in the strict sense and military history in the strict sense has been made apparent, and likewise the fact that both are in reality branches of the general history of a nation and not something altogether distinct from and outside it. in a collection of essays on kindred subjects some repetitions are inevitable, but it is believed that they will be found present only to a moderate extent in the following pages. my nephew, mr. j. s. c. bridge, has very kindly seen the book through the press. _june_ . contents i. sea-power. ii. the command of the sea. iii. war and its chief lessons. iv. the historical relations between the navy and the merchant service. v. facts and fancies about the press-gang. vi. projected invasions of the british isles. vii. over-sea raids and raids on land. viii. queen elizabeth and her seamen. ix. nelson: the centenary of trafalgar. x. the share of the fleet in the defence of the empire. xi. naval strategy and tactics at the time of trafalgar. xii. the supply and communications of a fleet. index. ten of the essays included in this volume first appeared in the _encyclopoedia_britannica_, the _times_, the _morning_post_, the _national_review_, the _nineteenth_century_and_after_, the _cornhill_magazine_, and the _naval_annual_. the proprietors of those publications have courteously given me permission to republish them here. special mention must be made of my obligation to the proprietors of the _encyclopoedia_britannica_ for allowing me to reproduce the essays on 'sea-power' and 'the command of the sea.' they are the owners of the copyright of both essays, and their courtesy to me is the more marked because they are about to republish them themselves in the forthcoming edition of the _encyclopoedia_. the paper on 'naval strategy and tactics at the time of trafalgar' was read at the institute of naval architects, and that on 'the supply and communications of a fleet' at the hong-kong united service institution. i sea-power[ ] [footnote : written in . (_encyclopoedia_britannica_.)] sea-power is a term used to indicate two distinct, though cognate things. the affinity of these two and the indiscriminate manner in which the term has been applied to each have tended to obscure its real significance. the obscurity has been deepened by the frequency with which the term has been confounded with the old phrase, 'sovereignty of the sea,' and the still current expression, 'command of the sea.' a discussion--etymological, or even archæological in character--of the term must be undertaken as an introduction to the explanation of its now generally accepted meaning. it is one of those compound words in which a teutonic and a latin (or romance) element are combined, and which are easily formed and become widely current when the sea is concerned. of such are 'sea-coast,' 'sea-forces' (the 'land- and sea-forces' used to be a common designation of what we now call the 'army and navy'), 'sea-service,' 'sea-serpent,' and 'sea-officer' (now superseded by 'naval officer'). the term in one form is as old as the fifteenth century. edward iii, in commemoration of the naval victory of sluys, coined gold 'nobles' which bore on one side his effigy 'crowned, standing in a large ship, holding in one hand a sword and in the other a shield.' an anonymous poet, who wrote in the reign of henry vi, says of this coin: for four things our noble showeth to me, king, ship, and sword, and _power_of_the_sea_. even in its present form the term is not of very recent date. grote [ ] speaks of 'the conversion of athens from a land-power into a sea-power.' in a lecture published in , but probably delivered earlier, the late sir j. r. seeley says that 'commerce was swept out of the mediterranean by the besom of the turkish sea-power.'[ ] the term also occurs in vol. xviii. of the 'encyclopædia britannica,' published in . at p. of that volume (art. persia) we are told that themistocles was 'the founder of the attic sea-power.' the sense in which the term is used differs in these extracts. in the first it means what we generally call a 'naval power'--that is to say, a state having a considerable navy in contradistinction to a 'military power,' a state with a considerable army but only a relatively small navy. in the last two extracts it means all the elements of the naval strength of the state referred to; and this is the meaning that is now generally, and is likely to be exclusively, attached to the term owing to the brilliant way in which it has been elucidated by captain a. t. mahan of the united states navy in a series of remarkable works.[ ] the double use of the term is common in german, though in that language both parts of the compound now in use are teutonic. one instance out of many may be cited from the historian adolf holm.[ ] he says[ ] that athens, being in possession of a good naval port, could become '_eine_bedeutende_ _seemacht_,' i.e. an important naval power. he also says[ ] that gelon of syracuse, besides a large army (_heer_), had '_eine_ _bedeutende_seemacht_,' meaning a considerable navy. the term, in the first of the two senses, is old in german, as appears from the following, extracted from zedler's 'grosses universal lexicon,' vol. xxxvi:[ ] 'seemachten, seepotenzen, latin. _summae_ _potestates_mari_potentes_.' 'seepotenzen' is probably quite obsolete now. it is interesting as showing that german no more abhors teuto-latin or teuto-romance compounds than english. we may note, as a proof of the indeterminate meaning of the expression until his own epoch-making works had appeared, that mahan himself in his earliest book used it in both senses. he says,[ ] 'the spanish netherlands ceased to be a sea-power.' he alludes[ ] to the development of a nation as a 'sea-power,' and[ ] to the inferiority of the confederate states 'as a sea-power.' also,[ ] he remarks of the war of the spanish succession that 'before it england was one of the sea-powers, after it she was _the_ sea-power without any second.' in all these passages, as appears from the use of the indefinite article, what is meant is a naval power, or a state in possession of a strong navy. the other meaning of the term forms the general subject of his writings above enumerated. in his earlier works mahan writes 'sea power' as two words; but in a published letter of the th february , he joins them with a hyphen, and defends this formation of the term and the sense in which he uses it. we may regard him as the virtual inventor of the term in its more diffused meaning, for--even if it had been employed by earlier writers in that sense--it is he beyond all question who has given it general currency. he has made it impossible for anyone to treat of sea-power without frequent reference to his writings and conclusions. [footnote : _hist._of_greece_, v. p. , published in , but with preface dated .] [footnote : _expansion_of_england_, p. .] [footnote : _influence_of_sea-power_on_history_, published ; _influence_of_sea-power_on_the_french_revolution_and_empire_, vols. ; _nelson:_the_embodiment_of_the_sea-power_of_great_ _britain_, vols. .] [footnote : _griechische_geschichte_. berlin, .] [footnote : _ibid_. ii. p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. ii. p. .] [footnote : leipzig und halle, .] [footnote : _influence_of_sea-power_on_history_, p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. p. .] [footnote : _ibid_. p. .] there is something more than mere literary interest in the fact that the term in another language was used more than two thousand years ago. before mahan no historian--not even one of those who specially devoted themselves to the narration of naval occurrences--had evinced a more correct appreciation of the general principles of naval warfare than thucydides. he alludes several times to the importance of getting command of the sea. this country would have been saved some disasters and been less often in peril had british writers--taken as guides by the public--possessed the same grasp of the true principles of defence as thucydides exhibited. one passage in his history is worth quoting. brief as it is, it shows that on the subject of sea-power he was a predecessor of mahan. in a speech in favour of prosecuting the war, which he puts into the mouth of pericles, these words occur:-- _oi_meu_ _gar_ouch_exousiu_allaeu_autilabeiu_amachei_aemiu_de_esti_ _gae_pollae_kai_eu_uaesois_kai_kat_aepeirou_mega_gar_ _to_tes_thalassaes_kratos_. the last part of this extract, though often translated 'command of the sea,' or 'dominion of the sea,' really has the wider meaning of sea-power, the 'power of the sea' of the old english poet above quoted. this wider meaning should be attached to certain passages in herodotus,[ ] which have been generally interpreted 'commanding the sea,' or by the mere titular and honorific 'having the dominion of the sea.' one editor of herodotus, ch. f. baehr, did, however, see exactly what was meant, for, with reference to the allusion to polycrates, he says, _classe_maximum_valuit_. this is perhaps as exact a definition of sea-power as could be given in a sentence. [footnote : _herodotus_, iii. in two places; v. .] it is, however, impossible to give a definition which would be at the same time succinct and satisfactory. to say that 'sea-power' means the sum-total of the various elements that go to make up the naval strength of a state would be in reality to beg the question. mahan lays down the 'principal conditions affecting the sea-power of nations,' but he does not attempt to give a concise definition of it. yet no one who has studied his works will find it difficult to understand what it indicates. our present task is to put readers in possession of the means of doing this. the best, indeed--as mahan has made us see--the only effective way of attaining this object is to treat the matter historically. whatever date we may agree to assign to the formation of the term itself, the idea--as we have seen--is as old as history. it is not intended to give a condensed history of sea-power, but rather an analysis of the idea and what it contains, illustrating this analysis with examples from history ancient and modern. it is important to know that it is not something which originated in the middle of the seventeenth century, and having seriously affected history in the eighteenth, ceased to have weight till captain mahan appeared to comment on it in the last decade of the nineteenth. with a few masterly touches mahan, in his brief allusion to the second punic war, has illustrated its importance in the struggle between rome and carthage. what has to be shown is that the principles which he has laid down in that case, and in cases much more modern, are true and have been true always and everywhere. until this is perceived there is much history which cannot be understood, and yet it is essential to our welfare as a maritime people that we should understand it thoroughly. our failure to understand it has more than once brought us, if not to the verge of destruction, at any rate within a short distance of serious disaster. sea-power in ancient times the high antiquity of decisive naval campaigns is amongst the most interesting features of international conflicts. notwithstanding the much greater frequency of land wars, the course of history has been profoundly changed more often by contests on the water. that this has not received the notice it deserved is true, and mahan tells us why. 'historians generally,' he says, 'have been unfamiliar with the conditions of the sea, having as to it neither special interest nor special knowledge; and the profound determining influence of maritime strength on great issues has consequently been overlooked.' moralising on that which might have been is admittedly a sterile process; but it is sometimes necessary to point, if only by way of illustration, to a possible alternative. as in modern times the fate of india and the fate of north america were determined by sea-power, so also at a very remote epoch sea-power decided whether or not hellenic colonisation was to take root in, and hellenic culture to dominate, central and northern italy as it dominated southern italy, where traces of it are extant to this day. a moment's consideration will enable us to see how different the history of the world would have been had a hellenised city grown and prospered on the seven hills. before the tarquins were driven out of rome a phocoean fleet was encountered ( b.c.) off corsica by a combined force of etruscans and phoenicians, and was so handled that the phocoeans abandoned the island and settled on the coast of lucania.[ ] the enterprise of their navigators had built up for the phoenician cities and their great off-shoot carthage, a sea-power which enabled them to gain the practical sovereignty of the sea to the west of sardinia and sicily. the control of these waters was the object of prolonged and memorable struggles, for on it--as the result showed--depended the empire of the world. from very remote times the consolidation and expansion, from within outwards, of great continental states have had serious consequences for mankind when they were accompanied by the acquisition of a coast-line and the absorption of a maritime population. we shall find that the process loses none of its importance in recent years. 'the ancient empires,' says the historian of greece, ernst curtius, 'as long as no foreign elements had intruded into them, had an invincible horror of the water.' when the condition, which curtius notices in parenthesis, arose, the 'horror' disappeared. there is something highly significant in the uniformity of the efforts of assyria, egypt, babylon, and persia to get possession of the maritime resources of phoenicia. our own immediate posterity will, perhaps, have to reckon with the results of similar efforts in our own day. it is this which gives a living interest to even the very ancient history of sea-power, and makes the study of it of great practical importance to us now. we shall see, as we go on, how the phenomena connected with it reappear with striking regularity in successive periods. looked at in this light, the great conflicts of former ages are full of useful, indeed necessary, instruction. [footnote : mommsen, _hist._rome_, english trans., i. p. .] in the first and greatest of the contests waged by the nations of the east against europe--the persian wars--sea-power was the governing factor. until persia had expanded to the shores of the levant the european greeks had little to fear from the ambition of the great king. the conquest of egypt by cambyses had shown how formidable that ambition could be when supported by an efficient navy. with the aid of the naval forces of the phoenician cities the persian invasion of greece was rendered comparatively easy. it was the naval contingents from phoenicia which crushed the ionian revolt. the expedition of mardonius, and still more that of datis and artaphernes, had indicated the danger threatening greece when the master of a great army was likewise the master of a great navy. their defeat at marathon was not likely to, and as a matter of fact did not, discourage the persians from further attempts at aggression. as the advance of cambyses into egypt had been flanked by a fleet, so also was that of xerxes into greece. by the good fortune sometimes vouch-safed to a people which, owing to its obstinate opposition to, or neglect of, a wise policy, scarcely deserves it, there appeared at athens an influential citizen who understood all that was meant by the term sea-power. themistocles saw more clearly than any of his contemporaries that, to enable athens to play a leading part in the hellenic world, she needed above all things a strong navy. 'he had already in his eye the battle-field of the future.' he felt sure that the persians would come back, and come with such forces that resistance in the open field would be out of the question. one scene of action remained--the sea. persuaded by him the athenians increased their navy, so that of the vessels comprising the greek fleet at artemisium, had been provided by athens, which also sent a large reinforcement after the first action. though no one has ever surpassed themistocles in the faculty of correctly estimating the importance of sea-power, it was understood by xerxes as clearly as by him that the issue of the war depended upon naval operations. the arrangements made under the persian monarch's direction, and his very personal movements, show that this was his view. he felt, and probably expressed the feeling, exactly as--in the war of arnerican independence--washington did in the words, 'whatever efforts are made by the land armies, the navy must have the casting vote in the present contest.' the decisive event was the naval action of salamis. to have made certain of success, the persians should have first obtained a command of the Ægean, as complete for all practical purposes as the french and english had of the sea generally in the war against russia of - . the persian sea-power was not equal to the task. the fleet of the great king was numerically stronger than that of the greek allies; but it has been proved many times that naval efficiency does not depend on numerical superiority alone. the choice sections of the persian fleet were the contingents of the ionians and phoenicians. the former were half-hearted or disaffected; whilst the latter were, at best, not superior in skill, experience, and valour to the greek sailors. at salamis greece was saved not only from the ambition and vengeance of xerxes, but also and for many centuries from oppression by an oriental conqueror. persia did not succeed against the greeks, not because she had no sea-power, but because her sea-power, artificially built up, was inferior to that which was a natural element of the vitality of her foes. ionia was lost and greece in the end enslaved, because the quarrels of greeks with greeks led to the ruin of their naval states. the peloponnesian was largely a naval war. the confidence of the athenians in their sea-power had a great deal to do with its outbreak. the immediate occasion of the hostilities, which in time involved so many states, was the opportunity offered by the conflict between corinth and corcyra of increasing the sea-power of athens. hitherto the athenian naval predominance had been virtually confined to the Ægean sea. the corcyræan envoy, who pleaded for help at athens, dwelt upon the advantage to be derived by the athenians from alliance with a naval state occupying an important situation 'with respect to the western regions towards which the views of the athenians had for some time been directed.'[ ] it was the 'weapon of her sea-power,' to adopt mahan's phrase, that enabled athens to maintain the great conflict in which she was engaged. repeated invasions of her territory, the ravages of disease amongst her people, and the rising disaffection of her allies had been more than made up for by her predominance on the water. the scale of the subsequent syracusan expedition showed how vigorous athens still was down to the interruption of the war by the peace of nicias. the great expedition just mentioned over-taxed her strength. its failure brought about the ruin of the state. it was held by contemporaries, and has been held in our own day, that the athenian defeat at syracuse was due to the omission of the government at home to keep the force in sicily properly supplied and reinforced. this explanation of failure is given in all ages, and should always be suspected. the friends of unsuccessful generals and admirals always offer it, being sure of the support of the political opponents of the administration. after the despatch of the supporting expedition under demosthenes and eurymedon, no further great reinforcement, as nicias admitted, was possible. the weakness of athens was in the character of the men who swayed the popular assemblies and held high commands. a people which remembered the administration of a pericles, and yet allowed a cleon or an alcibiades to direct its naval and military policy, courted defeat. nicias, notwithstanding the possession of high qualities, lacked the supreme virtue of a commander--firm resolution. he dared not face the obloquy consequent on withdrawal from an enterprise on which the popular hopes had been fixed; and therefore he allowed a reverse to be converted into an overwhelming disaster. 'the complete ruin of athens had appeared, both to her enemies and to herself, impending and irreparable. but so astonishing, so rapid, and so energetic had been her rally, that [a year after syracuse] she was found again carrying on a terrible struggle.'[ ] nevertheless her sea-power had indeed been ruined at syracuse. now she could wage war only 'with impaired resources and on a purely defensive system.' even before arginusæ it was seen that 'superiority of nautical skill had passed to the peloponnesians and their allies.'[ ] [footnote : thirwall, _hist._greece_, iii. p. .] [footnote : grote, _hist._greece_, v. p. .] [footnote : _ibid._ p. .] the great, occasionally interrupted, and prolonged contest between rome and carthage was a sustained effort on the part of one to gain and of the other to keep the control of the western mediterranean. so completely had that control been exercised by carthage, that she had anticipated the spanish commercial policy in america. the romans were precluded by treaties from trading with the carthaginian territories in hispania, africa, and sardinia. rome, as mommsen tells us, 'was from the first a maritime city and, in the period of its vigour, never was so foolish or so untrue to its ancient traditions as wholly to neglect its war marine and to desire to be a mere continental power.' it may be that it was lust of wealth rather than lust of dominion that first prompted a trial of strength with carthage. the vision of universal empire could hardly as yet have formed itself in the imagination of a single roman. the area of phoenician maritime commerce was vast enough both to excite jealousy and to offer vulnerable points to the cupidity of rivals. it is probable that the modern estimate of the sea-power of carthage is much exaggerated. it was great by comparison, and of course overwhelmingly great when there were none but insignificant competitors to challenge it. mommsen holds that, in the fourth and fifth centuries after the foundation of rome, 'the two main competitors for the dominion of the western waters' were carthage and syracuse. 'carthage,' he says, 'had the preponderance, and syracuse sank more and more into a second-rate naval power. the maritime importance of the etruscans was wholly gone.... rome itself was not exempt from the same fate; its own waters were likewise commanded by foreign fleets.' the romans were for a long time too much occupied at home to take much interest in mediterranean matters. the position of the carthaginians in the western basin of the mediterranean was very like that of the portuguese long afterwards in india. the latter kept within reach of the sea; 'nor did their rule ever extend a day's march from their ships.'[ ] 'the carthaginians in spain,' says mommsen, 'made no effort to acquire the interior from the warlike native nations; they were content with the possession of the mines and of stations for traffic and for shell and other fisheries.' allowance being made for the numbers of the classes engaged in administration, commerce, and supervision, it is nearly certain that carthage could not furnish the crews required by both a great war-navy and a great mercantile marine. no one is surprised on finding that the land-forces of carthage were composed largely of alien mercenaries. we have several examples from which we can infer a parallel, if not an identical, condition of her maritime resources. how, then, was the great carthaginian carrying-trade provided for? the experience of more than one country will enable us to answer this question. the ocean trade of those off-shoots or dependencies of the united kingdom, viz. the united states, australasia, and india, is largely or chiefly conducted by shipping of the old country. so that of carthage was largely conducted by old phoenicians. these may have obtained a 'carthaginian register,' or the contemporary equivalent; but they could not all have been purely carthaginian or liby-phoenician. this must have been the case even more with the war-navy. british india for a considerable time possessed a real and indeed highly efficient navy; but it was officered entirely and manned almost entirely by men from the 'old country.' moreover, it was small. the wealth of india would have sufficed to furnish a larger material element; but, as the country could not supply the _personnel_, it would have been absurd to speak of the sea-power of india apart from that of england. as soon as the romans chose to make the most of their natural resources the maritime predominance of carthage was doomed. the artificial basis of the latter's sea-power would not enable it to hold out against serious and persistent assaults. unless this is perceived it is impossible to understand the story of the punic wars. judged by every visible sign of strength, carthage, the richer, the more enterprising, ethnically the more predominant amongst her neighbours, and apparently the more nautical, seemed sure to win in the great struggle with rome which, by the conditions of the case, was to be waged largely on the water. yet those who had watched the struggles of the punic city with the sicilian greeks, and especially that with agathocles, must have seen reason to cherish doubts concerning her naval strength. it was an anticipation of the case of spain in the age of philip ii. as the great elizabethan seamen discerned the defects of the spanish naval establishment, so men at rome discerned those of the carthaginian. dates in connection with this are of great significance. a comprehensive measure, with the object of 'rescuing their marine from its condition of impotence,' was taken by the romans in the year b.c. four _quoestores_ _classici_--in modern naval english we may perhaps call them port-admirals--were nominated, and one was stationed at each of four ports. the objects of the roman senate, so mommsen tells us, were very obvious. they were 'to recover their independence by sea, to cut off the maritime communications of tarentum, to close the adriatic against fleets coming from epirus, and to emancipate themselves from carthaginian supremacy.' four years afterwards the first punic war began. it was, and had to be, largely a naval contest. the romans waged it with varying fortune, but in the end triumphed by means of their sea-power. 'the sea was the place where all great destinies were decided.'[ ] the victory of catulus over the carthaginian fleet off the Ægatian islands decided the war and left to the romans the possession of sicily and the power of possessing themselves of sardinia and corsica. it would be an interesting and perhaps not a barren investigation to inquire to what extent the decline of the mother states of phoenicia, consequent on the campaigns of alexander the great, had helped to enfeeble the naval efficiency of the carthaginian defences. one thing was certain. carthage had now met with a rival endowed with natural maritime resources greater than her own. that rival also contained citizens who understood the true importance of sea-power. 'with a statesmanlike sagacity from which succeeding generations might have drawn a lesson, the leading men of the roman commonwealth perceived that all their coast-fortifications and coast-garrisons would prove inadequate unless the war-marine of the state were again placed on a footing that should command respect.'[ ] it is a gloomy reflection that the leading men of our own great maritime country could not see this in . a thorough comprehension of the events of the first punic war enables us to solve what, until mahan wrote, had been one of the standing enigmas of history, viz. hannibal's invasion of italy by land instead of by sea in the second punic war. mahan's masterly examination of this question has set at rest all doubts as to the reason of hannibal's action.[ ] the naval predominance in the western basin of the mediterranean acquired by rome had never been lost. though modern historians, even those belonging to a maritime country, may have failed to perceive it, the carthaginians knew well enough that the romans were too strong for them on the sea. though other forces co-operated to bring about the defeat of carthage in the second punic war, the roman navy, as mahan demonstrates, was the most important. as a navy, he tells us in words like those already quoted, 'acts on an element strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining influence on the history of that era, and consequently upon the history of the world, has been overlooked.' [footnote : r. s. whiteway, _rise_of_the_portuguese_power_ _in_india_ p. . westminster, .] [footnote : j. h. burton, _hist._of_scotland_, , vol. i. p. .] [footnote : mommsen, i. p. .] [footnote : _inf._on_hist._, pp. - .] the attainment of all but universal dominion by rome was now only a question of time. 'the annihilation of the carthaginian fleet had made the romans masters of the sea.'[ ] a lodgment had already been gained in illyricum, and countries farther east were before long to be reduced to submission. a glance at the map will show that to effect this the command of the eastern basin of the mediterranean, like that of the western, must be secured by the romans. the old historic navies of the greek and phoenician states had declined. one considerable naval force there was which, though it could not have prevented, was strong enough to have delayed the roman progress eastwards. this force belonged to rhodes, which in the years immediately following the close of the second punic war reached its highest point as a naval power.[ ] far from trying to obstruct the advance of the romans the rhodian fleet helped it. hannibal, in his exile, saw the necessity of being strong on the sea if the east was to be saved from the grasp of his hereditary foe; but the resources of antiochus, even with the mighty cooperation of hannibal, were insufficient. in a later and more often-quoted struggle between east and west--that which was decided at actium--sea-power was again seen to 'have the casting vote.' when the whole of the mediterranean coasts became part of a single state the importance of the navy was naturally diminished; but in the struggles within the declining empire it rose again at times. the contest of the vandal genseric with majorian and the african expedition of belisarius--not to mention others--were largely influenced by the naval operations.[ ] [footnote : schmitz, _hist._rome_, p. .] [footnote : c. torr, _rhodes_in_ancient_times_, p. .] [footnote : gibbon, _dec._and_fall_, chaps. xxxvi. xli] sea-power in the middle ages a decisive event, the mohammedan conquest of northern africa from egypt westwards, is unintelligible until it is seen how great a part sea-power played in effecting it. purely land expeditions, or expeditions but slightly supported from the sea, had ended in failure. the emperor at constantinople still had at his disposal a fleet capable of keeping open the communications with his african province. it took the saracens half a century ( - a.d.) to win 'their way along the coast of africa as far as the pillars of hercules';[ ] and, as gibbon tells us, it was not till the commander of the faithful had prepared a great expedition, this time by sea as well as by land, that the saracenic dominion was definitely established. it has been generally assumed that the arabian conquerors who, within a few years of his death, spread the faith of mohammed over vast regions, belonged to an essentially non-maritime race; and little or no stress has been laid on the extent to which they relied on naval support in prosecuting their conquests. in parts of arabia, however, maritime enterprise was far from non-existent; and when the mohammedan empire had extended outwards from mecca and medina till it embraced the coasts of various seas, the consequences to the neighbouring states were as serious as the rule above mentioned would lead us to expect that they would be. 'with the conquest of syria and egypt a long stretch of sea-board had come into the saracenic power; and the creation and maintenance of a navy for the protection of the maritime ports as well as for meeting the enemy became a matter of vital importance. great attention was paid to the manning and equipment of the fleet.'[ ] at first the fleet was manned by sailors drawn from the phoenician towns where nautical energy was not yet quite extinct; and later the crews were recruited from syria, egypt, and the coasts of asia minor. ships were built at most of the syrian and egyptian ports, and also at obolla and bushire on the persian gulf,' whilst the mercantile marine and maritime trade were fostered and encouraged. the sea-power thus created was largely artificial. it drooped--as in similar cases--when the special encouragement was withdrawn. 'in the days of arabian energy,' says hallam, 'constantinople was twice, in and , attacked by great naval armaments.' the same authority believes that the abandonment of such maritime enterprises by the saracens may be attributed to the removal of the capital from damascus to bagdad. the removal indicated a lessened interest in the affairs of the mediterranean sea, which was now left by the administration far behind. 'the greeks in their turn determined to dispute the command of the sea,' with the result that in the middle of the tenth century their empire was far more secure from its enemies than under the first successors of heraclius. not only was the fall of the empire, by a rational reliance on sea-power, postponed for centuries, but also much that had been lost was regained. 'at the close of the tenth century the emperors of constantinople possessed the best and greatest part' of southern italy, part of sicily, the whole of what is now called the balkan peninsula, asia minor, with some parts of syria and armenia.[ ] [footnote : hallam, _mid._ages_, chap. vi.] [footnote : ameer ali, syed, _short_hist._saracens_, p. ] [footnote : hallam, chap. vi.; gibbon, chap. li.] neglect of sea-power by those who can be reached by sea brings its own punishment. whether neglected or not, if it is an artificial creation it is nearly sure to disappoint those who wield it when it encounters a rival power of natural growth. how was it possible for the crusaders, in their various expeditions, to achieve even the transient success that occasionally crowned their efforts? how did the christian kingdom of jerusalem contrive to exist for more than three-quarters of a century? why did the crusades more and more become maritime expeditions? the answer to these questions is to be found in the decline of the mohammedan naval defences and the rising enterprise of the seafaring people of the west. venetians, pisans, and genoese transported crusading forces, kept open the communications of the places held by the christians, and hampered the operations of the infidels. even the great saladin failed to discern the important alteration of conditions. this is evident when we look at the efforts of the christians to regain the lost kingdom. saladin 'forgot that the safety of phoenicia lay in immunity from naval incursions, and that no victory on land could ensure him against an influx from beyond the sea.'[ ] not only were the crusaders helped by the fleets of the maritime republics of italy, they also received reinforcements by sea from western europe and england, on the 'arrival of _malik_ankiltar_ (richard coeur de lion) with twenty shiploads of fighting men and munitions of war.' [footnote : ameer ali, syed, pp. , .] participation in the crusades was not a solitary proof of the importance of the naval states of italy. that they had been able to act effectively in the levant may have been in some measure due to the weakening of the mohammedans by the disintegration of the seljukian power, the movements of the moguls, and the confusion consequent on the rise of the ottomans. however that may have been, the naval strength of those italian states was great absolutely as well as relatively. sismondi, speaking of venice, pisa, and genoa, towards the end of the eleventh century, says 'these three cities had more vessels on the mediterranean than the whole of christendom besides.'[ ] dealing with a period two centuries later, he declares it 'difficult to comprehend how two simple cities could put to sea such prodigious fleets as those of pisa and genoa.' the difficulty disappears when we have mahan's explanation. the maritime republics of italy--like athens and rhodes in ancient, catalonia in mediæval, and england and the netherlands in more modern times--were 'peculiarly well fitted, by situation and resources, for the control of the sea by both war and commerce.' as far as the western mediterranean was concerned, genoa and pisa had given early proofs of their maritime energy, and fixed themselves, in succession to the saracens, in the balearic isles, sardinia, and corsica. sea-power was the themistoclean instrument with which they made a small state into a great one. [footnote : _ital._republics_, english ed., p. .] a fertile source of dispute between states is the acquisition of territory beyond sea. as others have done before and since, the maritime republics of italy quarrelled over this. sea-power seemed, like saturn, to devour its own children. in , in a great sea-fight off meloria, the pisans were defeated by the genoese with heavy loss, which, as sismondi states, 'ruined the maritime power' of the former. from that time genoa, transferring her activity to the levant, became the rival of venice, the fleets of the two cities in met near cyprus in an encounter, said to be accidental, that began 'a terrible war which for seven years stained the mediterranean with blood and consumed immense wealth.' in the next century the two republics, 'irritated by commercial quarrels'--like the english and dutch afterwards--were again at war in the levant. sometimes one side, sometimes the other was victorious; but the contest was exhausting to both, and especially to venice. within a quarter of a century they were at war again. hostilities lasted till the genoese met with the crushing defeat of chioggia. 'from this time,' says hallam, 'genoa never commanded the ocean with such navies as before; her commerce gradually went into decay; and the fifteenth century, the most splendid in the annals of venice, is till recent times the most ignominious in those of genoa.' venice seemed now to have no naval rival, and had no fear that anyone could forbid the ceremony in which the doge, standing in the bows of the _bucentaur_, cast a ring into the adriatic with the words, _desponsamus_te,_mare,_in_signum_veri_perpetuique_dominii_. the result of the combats at chioggia, though fatal to it in the long-run, did not at once destroy the naval importance of genoa. a remarkable characteristic of sea-power is the delusive manner in which it appears to revive after a great defeat. the persian navy occasionally made a brave show afterwards; but in reality it had received at salamis a mortal wound. athens seemed strong enough on the sea after the catastrophe of syracuse; but, as already stated, her naval power had been given there a check from which it never completely recovered. the navy of carthage had had similar experience; and, in later ages, the power of the turks was broken at lepanto and that of spain at gravelines notwithstanding deceptive appearances afterwards. venice was soon confronted on the sea by a new rival. the turkish naval historian, haji khalifeh,[ ] tells us that, 'after the taking of constantinople, when they [the ottomans] spread their conquests over land and sea, it became necessary to build ships and make armaments in order to subdue the fortresses and castles on the rumelian and anatolian shores, and in the islands of the mediterranean.' mohammed ii established a great naval arsenal at constantinople. in the turks, 'for the first time, equipped a fleet with which they drove that of the venetians out of the grecian seas.'[ ] the turkish wars of venice lasted a long time. in that which ended in the decline of the venetians' naval power was obvious. 'the mussulmans had made progress in naval discipline; the venetian fleet could no longer cope with theirs.' henceforward it was as an allied contingent of other navies that that of venice was regarded as important. dyer[ ] quotes a striking passage from a letter of Æneas sylvius, afterwards pope pius ii, in which the writer affirms that, if the venetians are defeated, christendom will not control the sea any longer; for neither the catalans nor the genoese, without the venetians, are equal to the turks. [footnote : _maritime_wars_of_the_turks_, mitchell's trans., p. .] [footnote : sismondi, p. .] [footnote : _hist._europe_, i. p. .] sea-power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the last-named people, indeed, exemplified once more the rule that a military state expanding to the sea and absorbing older maritime populations becomes a serious menace to its neighbours. even in the fifteenth century mohammed ii had made an attack on southern italy; but his sea-power was not equal to the undertaking. suleymân the magnificent directed the ottoman forces towards the west. with admirable strategic insight he conquered rhodes, and thus freed himself from the danger of a hostile force on his flank. 'the centenary of the conquest of constantinople was past, and the turk had developed a great naval power besides annexing egypt and syria.'[ ] the turkish fleets, under such leaders as khair-ad-din (barbarossa), piale, and dragut, seemed to command the mediterranean including its western basin; but the repulse at malta in was a serious check, and the defeat at lepanto in virtually put an end to the prospect of turkish maritime dominion. the predominance of portugal in the indian ocean in the early part of the sixteenth century had seriously diminished the ottoman resources. the wealth derived from the trade in that ocean, the persian gulf, and the red sea, had supplied the mohammedans with the sinews of war, and had enabled them to contend with success against the christians in europe. 'the main artery had been cut when the portuguese took up the challenge of the mohammedan merchants of calicut, and swept their ships from the ocean.'[ ] the sea-power of portugal wisely employed had exercised a great, though unperceived, influence. though enfeebled and diminishing, the turkish navy was still able to act with some effect in the seventeenth century. nevertheless, the sea-power of the turks ceased to count as a factor of importance in the relations between great states. [footnote : seeley, _british_policy_, i. p. .] [footnote : whiteway, p. .] in the meantime the state which had a leading share in winning the victory of lepanto had been growing up in the west. before the union of its crown with that of castile and the formation of the spanish monarchy, aragon had been expanding till it reached the sea. it was united with catalonia in the twelfth century, and it conquered valencia in the thirteenth. its long line of coast opened the way to an extensive and flourishing commerce; and an enterprising navy indemnified the nation for the scantiness of its territory at home by the important foreign conquests of sardinia, sicily, naples, and the balearic isles. amongst the maritime states of the mediterranean catalonia had been conspicuous. she was to the iberian peninsula much what phoenicia had been to syria. the catalan navy had disputed the empire of the mediterranean with the fleets of pisa and genoa. the incorporation of catalonia with aragon added greatly to the strength of that kingdom. the aragonese kings were wise enough to understand and liberal enough to foster the maritime interests of their new possessions.[ ] their french and italian neighbours were to feel, before long, the effect of this policy; and when the spanish monarchy had been consolidated, it was felt not only by them, but by others also. the more spanish dominion was extended in italy, the more were the naval resources at the command of spain augmented. genoa became 'spain's water-gate to italy.... henceforth the spanish crown found in the dorias its admirals; their squadron was permanently hired to the kings of spain.' spanish supremacy at sea was established at the expense of france.[ ] the acquisition of a vast domain in the new world had greatly developed the maritime activity of castile, and spain was as formidable on the ocean as in the mediterranean. after portugal had been annexed the naval vessels of that country were added to the spanish, and the great port of lisbon became available as a place of equipment and as an additional base of operations for oceanic campaigns. the fusion of spain and portugal, says seeley, 'produced a single state of unlimited maritime dominion.... henceforth the whole new world belonged exclusively to spain.' the story of the tremendous catastrophe--the defeat of the armada--by which the decline of this dominion was heralded is well known. it is memorable, not only because of the harm it did to spain, but also because it revealed the rise of another claimant to maritime pre-eminence--the english nation. the effects of the catastrophe were not at once visible. spain still continued to look like the greatest power in the world; and, though the english seamen were seen to be something better than adventurous pirates--a character suggested by some of their recent exploits--few could have comprehended that they were engaged in building up what was to be a sea-power greater than any known to history. [footnote : prescott, _ferdinand_and_isabella_, introd. sects. i. ii.] [footnote : g. w. prothero, in m. hume's _spain_, - , p. .] they were carrying forward, not beginning the building of this. 'england,' says sir j. k. laughton, 'had always believed in her naval power, had always claimed the sovereignty of the narrow seas; and more than two hundred years before elizabeth came to the throne, edward iii had testified to his sense of its importance by ordering a gold coinage bearing a device showing the armed strength and sovereignty of england based on the sea.'[ ] it is impossible to make intelligible the course of the many wars which the english waged with the french in the middle ages unless the true naval position of the former is rightly appreciated. why were crecy, poitiers, agincourt--not to mention other combats--fought, not on english, but on continental soil? why during the so-called 'hundred years' war' was england in reality the invader and not the invaded? we of the present generation are at last aware of the significance of naval defence, and know that, if properly utilised, it is the best security against invasion that a sea-surrounded state can enjoy. it is not, however, commonly remembered that the same condition of security existed and was properly valued in mediæval times. the battle of sluys in rendered invasion of england as impracticable as did that of la hogue in , that of quiberon bay in , and that of trafalgar in ; and it permitted, as did those battles, the transport of troops to the continent to support our allies in wars which, had we not been strong at sea, would have been waged on the soil of our own country. our early continental wars, therefore, are proofs of the long-established efficiency of our naval defences. notwithstanding the greater attention paid, within the last dozen years or so, to naval affairs, it is doubtful if the country generally even yet recognises the extent to which its security depends upon a good fleet as fully as our ancestors did nearly seven centuries ago. the narrative of our pre-elizabethan campaigns is interesting merely as a story; and, when told--as for instance d. hannay has told it in the introductory chapters of his 'short history of the royal navy'--it will be found instructive and worthy of careful study at the present day. each of the principal events in our early naval campaigns may be taken as an illustration of the idea conveyed by the term 'sea-power,' and of the accuracy with which its meaning was apprehended at the time. to take a very early case, we may cite the defeat of eustace the monk by hubert de burgh in . reinforcements and supplies had been collected at calais for conveyance to the army of prince louis of france and the rebel barons who had been defeated at lincoln. the reinforcements tried to cross the channel under the escort of a fleet commanded by eustace. hubert de burgh, who had stoutly held dover for king john, and was faithful to the young henry iii, heard of the enemy's movements. 'if these people land,' said he, 'england is lost; let us therefore boldly meet them.' he reasoned in almost the same words as raleigh about four centuries afterwards, and undoubtedly 'had grasped the true principles of the defence of england.' he put to sea and defeated his opponent. the fleet on which prince louis and the rebellious barons had counted was destroyed; and with it their enterprise. 'no more admirably planned, no more fruitful battle has been fought by englishmen on water.'[ ] as introductory to a long series of naval operations undertaken with a like object, it has deserved detailed mention here. [footnote : _armada_, introd. (navy records society).] [footnote : hannay, p. .] the sixteenth century was marked by a decided advance in both the development and the application of sea-power. previously its operation had been confined to the mediterranean or to coast waters outside it. spanish or basque seamen--by their proceedings in the english channel--had proved the practicability of, rather than been engaged in, ocean warfare. the english, who withstood them, were accustomed to seas so rough, to seasons so uncertain, and to weather so boisterous, that the ocean had few terrors for them. all that was wanting was a sufficient inducement to seek distant fields of action and a development of the naval art that would permit them to be reached. the discovery of the new world supplied the first; the consequently increased length of voyages and of absence from the coast led to the second. the world had been moving onwards in other things as well as in navigation. intercommunication was becoming more and more frequent. what was done by one people was soon known to others. it is a mistake to suppose that, because the english had been behindhand in the exploration of remote regions, they were wanting in maritime enterprise. the career of the cabots would of itself suffice to render such a supposition doubtful. the english had two good reasons for postponing voyages to and settlement in far-off lands. they had their hands full nearer home; and they thoroughly, and as it were by instinct, understood the conditions on which permanent expansion must rest. they wanted to make sure of the line of communication first. to effect this a sea-going marine of both war and commerce and, for further expansion, stations on the way were essential. the chart of the world furnishes evidence of the wisdom and the thoroughness of their procedure. taught by the experience of the spaniards and the portuguese, when unimpeded by the political circumstances of the time, and provided with suitable equipment, the english displayed their energy in distant seas. it now became simply a question of the efficiency of sea-power. if this was not a quality of that of the english, then their efforts were bound to fail; and, more than this, the position of their country, challenging as it did what was believed to be the greatest of maritime states, would have been altogether precarious. the principal expeditions now undertaken were distinguished by a characteristic peculiar to the people, and not to be found in connection with the exploring or colonising activity of most other great nations even down to our own time. they were really unofficial speculations in which, if the government took part at all, it was for the sake of the profit expected and almost, if not exactly, like any private adventurer. the participation of the government, nevertheless, had an aspect which it is worth while to note. it conveyed a hint--and quite consciously--to all whom it might concern that the speculations were 'under-written' by the whole sea-power of england. the forces of more than one state had been used to protect its maritime trade from the assaults of enemies in the mediterranean or in the narrow seas. they had been used to ward off invasion and to keep open communications across not very extensive areas of water. in the sixteenth century they were first relied upon to support distant commerce, whether carried on in a peaceful fashion or under aggressive forms. this, naturally enough, led to collisions. the contention waxed hot, and was virtually decided when the armada shaped course to the northward after the fight off gravelines. the expeditions against the spanish indies and, still more, those against philip ii's peninsular territory, had helped to define the limitations of sea-power. it became evident, and it was made still more evident in the next century, that for a great country to be strong it must not rely upon a navy alone. it must also have an adequate and properly organised mobile army. notwithstanding the number of times that this lesson has been repeated, we have been slow to learn it. it is doubtful if we have learned it even yet. english seamen in all ages seem to have mastered it fully; for they have always demanded--at any rate for upwards of three centuries--that expeditions against foreign territory over-sea should be accompanied by a proper number of land-troops. on the other hand, the necessity of organising the army of a maritime insular state, and of training it with the object of rendering effective aid in operations of the kind in question, has rarely been perceived and acted upon by others. the result has been a long series of inglorious or disastrous affairs like the west indies voyage of - , the cadiz expedition of , and that to the ile de ré of . additions might be made to the list. the failures of joint expeditions have often been explained by alleging differences or quarrels between the naval and the military commanders. this way of explaining them, however, is nothing but the inveterate critical method of the streets by which cause is taken for effect and effect for cause. the differences and quarrels arose, no doubt; but they generally sprang out of the recriminations consequent on, not producing, the want of success. another manifestation of the way in which sea-power works was first observed in the seventeenth century. it suggested the adoption of, and furnished the instrument for carrying out a distinct maritime policy. what was practically a standing navy had come into existence. as regards england this phenomenon was now of respectable age. long voyages and cruises of several ships in company had been frequent during the latter half of the sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth. even the grandfathers of the men who sailed with blake and penn in could not have known a time when ships had never crossed the ocean, and squadrons kept together for months had never cruised. however imperfect it may have been, a system of provisioning ships and supplying them with stores, and of preserving discipline amongst their crews, had been developed, and had proved fairly satisfactory. the parliament and the protector in turn found it necessary to keep a considerable number of ships in commission, and make them cruise and operate in company. it was not till well on in the reign of queen victoria that the man-of-war's man was finally differentiated from the merchant seaman; but two centuries before some of the distinctive marks of the former had already begun to be noticeable. there were seamen in the time of the commonwealth who rarely, perhaps some who never, served afloat except in a man-of-war. some of the interesting naval families which were settled at portsmouth and the eastern ports, and which--from father to son--helped to recruit the ranks of our bluejackets till a date later than that of the launch of the first ironclad, could carry back their professional genealogy to at least the days of charles ii, when, in all probability, it did not first start. though landsmen continued even after the civil war to be given naval appointments, and though a permanent corps, through the ranks of which everyone must pass, had not been formally established, a body of real naval officers--men who could handle their ships, supervise the working of the armament, and exercise military command--had been formed. a navy, accordingly, was now a weapon of undoubted keenness, capable of very effective use by anyone who knew how to wield it. having tasted the sweets of intercourse with the indies, whether in the occupation of portugal or of spain, both english and dutch were desirous of getting a larger share of them. english maritime commerce had increased and needed naval protection. if england was to maintain the international position to which, as no one denied, she was entitled, that commerce must be permitted to expand. the minds of men in western europe, moreover, were set upon obtaining for their country territories in the new world, the amenities of which were now known. from the reign of james i the dutch had shown great jealousy of english maritime enterprise. where it was possible, as in the east indian archipelago, they had destroyed it. their naval resources were great enough to let them hold english shipping at their mercy, unless a vigorous effort were made to protect it. the dutch conducted the carrying trade of a great part of the world, and the monopoly of this they were resolved to keep, while the english were resolved to share in it. the exclusion of the english from every trade-route, except such as ran by their own coast or crossed the narrow seas, seemed a by no means impossible contingency. there seemed also to be but one way of preventing it, viz. by war. the supposed unfriendliness of the dutch, or at least of an important party amongst them, to the regicide government in england helped to force the conflict. the navigation act of was passed and regarded as a covert declaration of hostilities. so the first dutch war began. it established our claim to compete for the position of a great maritime commercial power. the rise of the sea-power of the dutch, and the magnitude which it attained in a short time and in the most adverse circumstances, have no parallel in history. the case of athens was different, because the athenian power had not so much been unconsciously developed out of a great maritime trade, as based on a military marine deliberately and persistently fostered during many years. thirlwall believes that it was solon who 'laid the foundations of the attic navy,'[ ] a century before salamis. the great achievement of themistocles was to convince his fellow-citizens that their navy ought to be increased. perhaps the nearest parallel with the power of the dutch was presented by that of rhodes, which rested largely on a carrying trade. the rhodian undertakings, however, were by comparison small and restricted in extent. motley declares of the seven united provinces that they 'commanded the ocean,'[ ] and that it would be difficult to exaggerate the naval power of the young commonwealth. even in the days of spain's greatness english seamen positively declined to admit that she was stronger than england on the sea; and the story of the armada justified their view. our first two dutch wars were, therefore, contests between the two foremost naval states of the world for what was primarily a maritime object. the identity of the cause of the first and of the second war will be discerned by anyone who compares what has been said about the circumstances leading to the former, with monk's remark as to the latter. he said that the english wanted a larger share of the trade enjoyed by the dutch. it was quite in accordance with the spirit of the age that the dutch should try to prevent, by force, this want from being satisfied. anything like free and open competition was repugnant to the general feeling. the high road to both individual wealth and national prosperity was believed to lie in securing a monopoly. merchants or manufacturers who called for the abolition of monopolies granted to particular courtiers and favourites had not the smallest intention, on gaining their object, of throwing open to the enterprise of all what had been monopolised. it was to be kept for the exclusive benefit of some privileged or chartered company. it was the same in greater affairs. as mahan says, 'to secure to one's own people a disproportionate share of the benefits of sea commerce every effort was made to exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.' the apparent wealth of spain was believed to be due to the rigorous manner in which foreigners were excluded from trading with the spanish over-sea territories. the skill and enterprise of the dutch having enabled them to force themselves into this trade, they were determined to keep it to themselves. the dutch east india company was a powerful body, and largely dictated the maritime policy of the country. we have thus come to an interesting point in the historical consideration of sea-power. the elizabethan conflict with spain had practically settled the question whether or not the expanding nations were to be allowed to extend their activities to territories in the new world. the first two dutch wars were to settle the question whether or not the ocean trade of the world was to be open to any people qualified to engage in it. we can see how largely these were maritime questions, how much depended on the solution found for them, and how plain it was that they must be settled by naval means. [footnote : _hist._greece_, ii. p. .] [footnote : _united_netherlands_, ii. p. .] mahan's great survey of sea-power opens in , midway between the first and second dutch wars. 'the sailing-ship era, with its distinctive features,' he tells us, 'had fairly begun.' the art of war by sea, in its more important details, had been settled by the first war. from the beginning of the second the general features of ship design, the classification of ships, the armament of ships, and the handling of fleets, were to remain without essential alteration until the date of navarino. even the tactical methods, except where improved on occasions by individual genius, altered little. the great thing was to bring the whole broadside force to bear on an enemy. whether this was to be impartially distributed throughout the hostile line or concentrated on one part of it depended on the character of particular admirals. it would have been strange if a period so long and so rich in incidents had afforded no materials for forming a judgment on the real significance of sea-power. the text, so to speak, chosen by mahan is that, notwithstanding the changes wrought in naval _matériel_ during the last half-century, we can find in the history of the past instructive illustrations of the general principles of maritime war. these illustrations will prove of value not only 'in those wider operations which embrace a whole theatre of war,' but also, if rightly applied, 'in the tactical use of the ships and weapons' of our own day. by a remarkable coincidence the same doctrine was being preached at the same time and quite independently by the late vice-admiral philip colomb in his work on 'naval warfare.' as a prelude to the second dutch war we find a repetition of a process which had been adopted somewhat earlier. that was the permanent conquest of trans-oceanic territory. until the seventeenth century had well begun, naval, or combined naval and military, operations against the distant possessions of an enemy had been practically restricted to raiding or plundering attacks on commercial centres. the portuguese territory in south america having come under spanish dominion in consequence of the annexation of portugal to spain, the dutch--as the power of the latter country declined--attempted to reduce part of that territory into permanent possession. this improvement on the practice of drake and others was soon seen to be a game at which more than one could play. an expedition sent by cromwell to the west indies seized the spanish island of jamaica, which has remained in the hands of its conquerors to this day. in an english force occupied the dutch north american settlements on the hudson. though the dispossessed rulers were not quite in a position to throw stones at sinners, this was rather a raid than an operation of recognised warfare, because it preceded the formal outbreak of hostilities. the conquered territory remained in english hands for more than a century, and thus testified to the efficacy of a sea-power which europe had scarcely begun to recognise. neither the second nor the third dutch war can be counted amongst the occurrences to which englishmen may look back with unalloyed satisfaction; but they, unquestionably, disclosed some interesting manifestations of sea-power. much indignation has been expressed concerning the corruption and inefficiency of the english government of the day, and its failure to take proper measures for keeping up the navy as it should have been kept up. some, perhaps a good deal, of this indignation was deserved; but it would have been nearly as well deserved by every other government of the day. even in those homes of political virtue where the administrative machinery was worked by or in the interest of speculating capitalists and privileged companies, the accumulating evidence of late years has proved that everything was not considered to be, and as a matter of fact was not, exactly as it ought to have been. charles ii and his brother, the duke of york, have been held up to obloquy because they thought that the coast of england could be defended against a naval enemy better by fortifications than by a good fleet and, as pepys noted, were 'not ashamed of it.' the truth is that neither the king nor the duke believed in the power of a navy to ward off attack from an island. this may have been due to want of intellectual capacity; but it would be going a long way to put it down to personal wickedness. they have had many imitators, some in our own day. the huge forts which stud the coast of the united kingdom, and have been erected within the memory of the present generation, are monuments, likely to last for many years, of the inability of people, whom no one could accuse of being vicious, to rate sea-power at its proper value. it is much more likely that it was owing to a reluctance to study questions of naval defence as industriously as they deserved, and to that moral timidity which so often tempts even men of proved physical courage to undertake the impossible task of making themselves absolutely safe against hostile efforts at every point. charles ii has also been charged with indifference to the interests of his country, or worse, because during a great naval war he adopted the plan of trying to weaken the enemy by destroying his commerce. the king 'took a fatal resolution of laying up his great ships and keeping only a few frigates on the cruise.' it is expressly related that this was not charles's own idea, but that it was urged upon him by advisers whose opinion probably seemed at the time as well worth listening to as that of others. anyhow, if the king erred, as he undoubtedly did, he erred in good company. fourteen hundred years earlier the statesmen who conducted the great war against carthage, and whose astuteness has been the theme of innumerable panegyrics since, took the same 'fatal resolution.' in the midst of the great struggle they 'did away with the fleet. at the most they encouraged privateering; and with that view placed the war-vessels of the state at the disposal of captains who were ready to undertake a corsair warfare on their own account.'[ ] in much later times this method has had many and respectable defenders. mahan's works are, in a sense, a formal warning to his fellow-citizens not to adopt it. in france, within the last years of the nineteenth century, it found, and appears still to find, adherents enough to form a school. the reappearance of belief in demonstrated impossibilities is a recognised incident in human history; but it is usually confined to the emotional or the vulgar. it is serious and filled with menaces of disaster when it is held by men thought fit to administer the affairs of a nation or advise concerning its defence. the third dutch war may not have settled directly the position of england in the maritime world; but it helped to place that country above all other maritime states,--in the position, in fact, which great britain, the united kingdom, the british empire, whichever name may be given it, has retained up to the present. it also manifested in a very striking form the efficacy of sea-power. the united provinces, though attacked by two of the greatest monarchies in the world, france and england, were not destroyed. indeed, they preserved much of their political importance in the state system of europe. the republic 'owed this astonishing result partly to the skill of one or two men, but mainly to its sea-power.' the effort, however, had undermined its strength and helped forward its decline. [footnote : mommsen, ii. p. .] the war which was ended by the peace of ryswick in presents two features of exceptional interest: one was the havoc wrought on english commerce by the enemy; the other was torrington's conduct at and after the engagement off beachy head. mahan discusses the former with his usual lucidity. at no time has war against commerce been conducted on a larger scale and with greater results than during this period. we suffered 'infinitely more than in any former war.' many of our merchants were ruined; and it is affirmed that the english shipping was reduced to the necessity of sailing under the swedish and danish flags. the explanation is that louis xiv made great efforts to keep up powerful fleets. our navy was so fully occupied in watching these that no ships could be spared to protect our maritime trade. this is only another way of saying that our commerce had increased so largely that the navy was not strong enough to look after it as well as oppose the enemy's main force. notwithstanding our losses we were on the winning side in the conflict. much misery and ruin had been caused, but not enough to affect the issue of the war. torrington's proceedings in july were at the time the subject of much angry debate. the debate, still meriting the epithet angry, has been renewed within the last few years. the matter has to be noticed here, because it involves the consideration of a question of naval strategy which must be understood by those who wish to know the real meaning of the term sea-power, and who ought to learn that it is not a thing to be idly risked or thrown away at the bidding of the ignorant and the irresponsible. arthur herbert, earl of torrington--the later peerage is a viscounty held by the byng family--was in command of the allied english and dutch fleet in the channel. 'the disparity of force,' says mahan, 'was still in favour of france in , but it was not so great as the year before.' we can measure the ability of the then english government for conducting a great war, when we know that, in its wisdom, it had still further weakened our fleet by dividing it (vice-admiral killigrew having been sent to the mediterranean with a squadron), and had neglected, and indeed refused when urged, to take the necessary steps to repair this error. the government having omitted, as even british governments sometimes do, to gain any trustworthy intelligence of the strength or movements of the enemy, torrington suddenly found himself confronted by a considerably superior french fleet under tourville, one of the greatest of french sea-officers. of late years the intentions of the french have been questioned; but it is beyond dispute that in england at the time tourville's movements were believed to be preliminary to invasion. whether tourville deliberately meant his movement to cover an invasion or not, invasion would almost certainly have followed complete success on his part; otherwise his victory would have been without any valuable result. torrington saw that as long as he could keep his own fleet intact, he could, though much weaker than his opponent, prevent him from doing serious harm. though personally not a believer in the imminence of invasion, the english admiral knew that 'most men were in fear that the french would invade.' his own view was, 'that whilst we had a fleet in being they would not dare to make an attempt.' of late years controversy has raged round this phrase, 'a fleet in being,' and the strategic principle which it expresses. most seamen were at the time, have been since, and still are in agreement with torrington. this might be supposed enough to settle the question. it has not been allowed, however, to remain one of purely naval strategy. it was made at the time a matter of party politics. this is why it is so necessary that in a notice of sea-power it should be discussed. both as a strategist and as a tactician torrington was immeasurably ahead of his contemporaries. the only english admirals who can be placed above him are hawke and nelson. he paid the penalty of his pre-eminence: he could not make ignorant men and dull men see the meaning or the advantages of his proceedings. mahan, who is specially qualified to do him full justice, does not devote much space in his work to a consideration of torrington's case, evidently because he had no sufficient materials before him on which to form a judgment. the admiral's character had been taken away already by macaulay, who did have ample evidence before him. william iii, with all his fine qualities, did not possess a military genius quite equal to that of napoleon; and napoleon, in naval strategy, was often wrong. william iii understood that subject even less than the french emperor did; and his favourites were still less capable of understanding it. consequently torrington's action has been put down to jealousy of the dutch. there have been people who accused nelson of being jealous of the naval reputation of caracciolo! the explanation of torrington's conduct is this:-- he had a fleet so much weaker than tourville's that he could not fight a general action with the latter without a practical certainty of getting a crushing defeat. such a result would have laid the kingdom open: a defeat of the allied fleet, says mahan, 'if sufficiently severe, might involve the fall of william's throne in england.' given certain movements of the french fleet, torrington might have manoeuvred to slip past it to the westward and join his force with that under killigrew, which would make him strong enough to hazard a battle. this proved impracticable. there was then one course left. to retire before the french, but not to keep far from them. he knew that, though not strong enough to engage their whole otherwise unemployed fleet with any hope of success, he would be quite strong enough to fight and most likely beat it, when a part of it was trying either to deal with our ships to the westward or to cover the disembarkation of an invading army. he, therefore, proposed to keep his fleet 'in being' in order to fall on the enemy when the latter would have two affairs at the same time on his hands. the late vice-admiral colomb rose to a greater height than was usual even with him in his criticism of this campaign. what torrington did was merely to reproduce on the sea what has been noticed dozens of times on shore, viz. the menace by the flanking enemy. in land warfare this is held to give exceptional opportunities for the display of good generalship, but, to quote mahan over again, a navy 'acts on an element strange to most writers, its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood.' whilst torrington has had the support of seamen, his opponents have been landsmen. for the crime of being a good strategist he was brought before a court-martial, but acquitted. his sovereign, who had been given the crowns of three kingdoms to defend our laws, showed his respect for them by flouting a legally constituted tribunal and disregarding its solemn finding. the admiral who had saved his country was forced into retirement. still, the principle of the 'fleet in being' lies at the bottom of all sound strategy. admiral colomb has pointed out a great change of plan in the later naval campaigns of the seventeenth century. improvements in naval architecture, in the methods of preserving food, and in the arrangements for keeping the crews healthy, permitted fleets to be employed at a distance from their home ports for long continuous periods. the dutch, when allies of the spaniards, kept a fleet in the mediterranean for many months. the great de ruyter was mortally wounded in one of the battles there fought. in the war of the spanish succession the anglo-dutch fleet found its principal scene of action eastward of gibraltar. this, as it were, set the fashion for future wars. it became a kind of tacitly accepted rule that the operation of british sea-power was to be felt in the enemy's rather than in our own waters. the hostile coast was regarded strategically as the british frontier, and the sea was looked upon as territory which the enemy must be prevented from invading. acceptance of this principle led in time to the so-called 'blockades' of brest and toulon. the name was misleading. as nelson took care to explain, there was no desire to keep the enemy's fleet in; what was desired was to be near enough to attack it if it came out. the wisdom of the plan is undoubted. the hostile navy could be more easily watched and more easily followed if it put to sea. to carry out this plan a navy stronger in number of ships or in general efficiency than that of the enemy was necessary to us. with the exception of that of american independence, which will therefore require special notice, our subsequent great wars were conducted in accordance with the rule. sea-power in the eighteenth century and early part of the nineteenth century in the early part of the eighteenth century there was a remarkable manifestation of sea-power in the baltic. peter the great, having created an efficient army, drove the swedes from the coast provinces south of the gulf of finland. like the earlier monarchies of which we have spoken, russia, in the baltic at least, now became a naval state. a large fleet was built, and, indeed, a considerable navy established. it was a purely artificial creation, and showed the merits and defects of its character. at first, and when under the eye of its creator, it was strong; when peter was no more it dwindled away and, when needed again, had to be created afresh. it enabled peter the great to conquer the neighbouring portion of finland, to secure his coast territories, and to dominate the baltic. in this he was assisted by the exhaustion of sweden consequent on her endeavours to retain, what was no longer possible, the position of a _quasi_ great power which she had held since the days of gustavus adolphus. sweden had been further weakened, especially as a naval state, by almost incessant wars with denmark, which prevented all hope of scandinavian predominance in the baltic, the control of which sea has in our own days passed into the hands of another state possessing a quickly created navy--the modern german empire. the war of the spanish succession left great britain a mediterranean power, a position which, in spite of twice losing minorca, she still holds. in the war of the austrian succession, 'france was forced to give up her conquests for want of a navy, and england saved her position by her sea-power, though she had failed to use it to the best advantage.'[ ] this shows, as we shall find that a later war showed more plainly, that even the government of a thoroughly maritime country is not always sure of conducting its naval affairs wisely. the seven years' war included some brilliant displays of the efficacy of sea-power. it was this which put the british in possession of canada, decided which european race was to rule in india, and led to a british occupation of havannah in one hemisphere and of manila in the other. in the same war we learned how, by a feeble use of sea-power, a valuable possession like minorca may be lost. at the same time our maritime trade and the general prosperity of the kingdom increased enormously. the result of the conflict made plain to all the paramount importance of having in the principal posts in the government men capable of understanding what war is and how it ought to be conducted. [footnote : mahan, _inf._on_hist._ p. .] this lesson, as the sequel demonstrated, had not been learned when great britain became involved in a war with the insurgent colonies in north america. mahan's comment is striking: 'the magnificence of sea-power and its value had perhaps been more clearly shown by the uncontrolled sway and consequent exaltation of one belligerent; but the lesson thus given, if more striking, is less vividly interesting than the spectacle of that sea-power meeting a foe worthy of its steel, and excited to exertion by a strife which endangered not only its most valuable colonies, but even its own shores.'[ ] we were, in fact, drawing too largely on the _prestige_ acquired during the seven years' war; and we were governed by men who did not understand the first principles of naval warfare, and would not listen to those who did. they quite ignored the teaching of the then comparatively recent wars which has been alluded to already--that we should look upon the enemy's coast as our frontier. a century and a half earlier the dutchman grotius had written-- quæ meta britannis litora sunt aliis. [footnote : _influence_on_hist._ p. .] though ordinary prudence would have suggested ample preparation, british ministers allowed their country to remain unprepared. instead of concentrating their efforts on the main objective, they frittered away force in attempts to relieve two beleaguered garrisons under the pretext of yielding to popular pressure, which is the official term for acting on the advice of irresponsible and uninstructed busybodies. 'depuis le début de la crise,' says captain chevalier, 'les ministres de la grande bretagne s'étaient montrés inférieurs à leur tâche.' an impressive result of this was the repeated appearance of powerful and indeed numerically superior hostile fleets in the english channel. the war--notwithstanding that, perhaps because, land operations constituted an important part of it, and in the end settled the issue--was essentially oceanic. captain mahan says it was 'purely maritime.' it may be true that, whatever the belligerent result, the political result, as regards the _status_ of the insurgent colonies, would have been the same. it is in the highest degree probable, indeed it closely approaches to certainty, that a proper use of the british sea-power would have prevented independence from being conquered, as it were, at the point of the bayonet. there can be no surprise in store for the student acquainted with the vagaries of strategists who are influenced in war by political in preference to military requirements. still, it is difficult to repress an emotion of astonishment on finding that a british government intentionally permitted de grasse's fleet and the french army in its convoy to cross the atlantic unmolested, for fear of postponing for a time the revictualling of the garrison beleaguered at gibraltar. washington's opinion as to the importance of the naval factor has been quoted already; and mahan does not put the case too strongly when he declares that the success of the americans was due to 'sea-power being in the hands of the french and its improper distribution by the english authorities.' our navy, misdirected as it was, made a good fight of it, never allowed itself to be decisively beaten in a considerable battle, and won at least one great victory. at the point of contact with the enemy, however, it was not in general so conspicuously successful as it was in the seven years' war, or as it was to be in the great conflict with the french republic and empire. the truth is that its opponent, the french navy, was never so thoroughly a sea-going force as it was in the war of american independence; and never so closely approached our own in real sea-experience as it did during that period. we met antagonists who were very nearly, but, fortunately for us, not quite as familiar with the sea as we were ourselves; and we never found it so hard to beat them, or even to avoid being beaten by them. an englishman would, naturally enough, start at the conclusion confronting him, if he were to speculate as to the result of more than one battle had the great suffren's captains and crews been quite up to the level of those commanded by stout old sir edward hughes. suffren, it should be said, before going to the east indies, had 'thirty-eight years of almost uninterrupted sea-service.'[ ] a glance at a chart of the world, with the scenes of the general actions of the war dotted on it, will show how notably oceanic the campaigns were. the hostile fleets met over and over again on the far side of the atlantic and in distant indian seas. the french navy had penetrated into the ocean as readily and as far as we could do ourselves. besides this, it should be remembered that it was not until the th april . when rodney in one hemisphere and suffren in the other showed them the way, that our officers were able to escape from the fetters imposed on them by the _fighting_ _instructions_,--a fact worth remembering in days in which it is sometimes proposed, by establishing schools of naval tactics on shore, to revive the pedantry which made a decisive success in battle nearly impossible. [footnote : laughton, _studies_in_naval_hist._ p. .] the mighty conflict which raged between great britain on one side and france and her allies on the other, with little intermission, for more than twenty years, presents a different aspect from that of the war last mentioned. the victories which the british fleet was to gain were generally to be overwhelming; if not, they were looked upon as almost defeats. whether the fleet opposed to ours was, or was not, the more numerous, the result was generally the same--our enemy was beaten. that there was a reason for this which can be discovered is certain. a great deal has been made of the disorganisation in the french navy consequent on the confusion of the revolution. that there was disorganisation is undoubted; that it did impair discipline and, consequently, general efficiency will not be disputed; but that it was considerable enough to account by itself for the french naval defeats is altogether inadmissible. revolutionary disorder had invaded the land-forces to a greater degree than it had invaded the sea-forces. the supersession, flight, or guillotining of army officers had been beyond measure more frequent than was the case with the naval officers. in spite of all this the french armies were on the whole--even in the early days of the revolution--extraordinarily successful. in 'the most formidable invasion that ever threatened france,' as alison calls it, was repelled, though the invaders were the highly disciplined and veteran armies of prussia and austria. it was nearly two years later that the french and english fleets came into serious conflict. the first great battle, which we call 'the glorious first of june,' though a tactical victory for us, was a strategical defeat. villaret-joyeuse manoeuvred so as to cover the arrival in france of a fleet of merchant vessels carrying sorely needed supplies of food, and in this he was completely successful. his plan involved the probability, almost the necessity, of fighting a general action which he was not at all sure of winning. he was beaten, it is true; but the french made so good a fight of it that their defeat was not nearly so disastrous as the later defeats of the nile or trafalgar, and--at the most--not more disastrous than that of dominica. yet no one even alleges that there was disorder or disorganisation in the french fleet at the date of anyone of those affairs. indeed, if the french navy was really disorganised in , it would have been better for france--judging from the events of and --if the disorganisation had been allowed to continue. in point of organisation the british navy was inferior, and in point of discipline not much superior to the french at the earliest date; at the later dates, and especially at the latest, owing to the all-pervading energy of napoleon, the british was far behind its rival in organisation, in 'science,' and in every branch of training that can be imparted without going to sea. we had the immense advantage of counting amongst our officers some very able men. nelson, of course, stands so high that he holds a place entirely by himself. the other british chiefs, good as they were, were not conspicuously superior to the hawkes and rodneys of an earlier day. howe was a great commander, but he did little more than just appear on the scene in the war. almost the same may be said of hood, of whom nelson wrote, 'he is the greatest sea-officer i ever knew.'[ ] there must have been something, therefore, beyond the meritorious qualities of our principal officers which helped us so consistently to victory. the many triumphs won could not have been due in every case to the individual superiority of the british admiral or captain to his opponent. there must have been bad as well as good amongst the hundreds on our lists; and we cannot suppose that providence had so arranged it that in every action in which a british officer of inferior ability commanded a still inferior french commander was opposed to him. the explanation of our nearly unbroken success is, that the british was a thoroughly sea-going navy, and became more and more so every month; whilst the french, since the close of the american war, had lost to a great extent its sea-going character and, because we shut it up in its ports, became less and less sea-going as hostilities continued. the war had been for us, in the words of mr. theodore roosevelt, 'a continuous course of victory won mainly by seamanship.' our navy, as regards sea-experience, especially of the officers, was immensely superior to the french. this enabled the british government to carry into execution sound strategic plans, in accordance with which the coasts of france and its dependent or allied countries were regarded as the english frontier to be watched or patrolled by our fleets. [footnote : laughton, _nelson's_lett._and_desp._ p. .] before the long european war had been brought to a formal ending we received some rude rebuffs from another opponent of unsuspected vigour. in the quarrel with the united states, the so-called 'war of ,' the great sea-power of the british in the end asserted its influence, and our antagonists suffered much more severely, even absolutely, than ourselves. at the same time we might have learned, for the americans did their best to teach us, that over-confidence in numerical strength and narrow professional self-satisfaction are nearly sure to lead to reverses in war, and not unlikely to end in grave disasters. we had now to meet the _élite_ of one of the finest communities of seamen ever known. even in the americans had a great maritime commerce, which, as mahan informs us, 'had come to be the wonder of the statesmen of the mother country.' in the six-and-thirty years which had elapsed since then this commerce had further increased. there was no finer nursery of seamen than the then states of the american union. roosevelt says that 'there was no better seaman in the world' than the american, who 'had been bred to his work from infancy.' a large proportion of the population 'was engaged in sea-going pursuits of a nature strongly tending to develop a resolute and hardy character in the men that followed them.'[ ] having little or no naval protection, the american seaman had to defend himself in many circumstances, and was compelled to familiarise himself with the use of arms. the men who passed through this practical, and therefore supremely excellent, training school were numerous. very many had been trained in english men-of-war, and some in french ships. the state navy which they were called on to man was small; and therefore its _personnel_, though without any regular or avowed selection, was virtually and in the highest sense a picked body. the lesson of the war of should be learned by englishmen of the present day, when a long naval peace has generated a confidence in numerical superiority, in the mere possession of heavier _matériel_, and in the merits of a rigidly uniform system of training, which confidence, as experience has shown, is too often the forerunner of misfortune. it is neither patriotic nor intelligent to minimise the american successes. certainly they have been exaggerated by americans and even by ourselves. to take the frigate actions alone, as being those which properly attracted most attention, we see that the captures in action amounted to three on each side, the proportionate loss to our opponents, considering the smallness of their fleet, being immensely greater than ours. we also see that no british frigate was taken after the first seven months of a war which lasted two and a half years, and that no british frigate succumbed except to admittedly superior force. attempts have been made to spread a belief that our reverses were due to nothing but the greater size and heavier guns of our enemy's ships. it is now established that the superiority in these details, which the americans certainly enjoyed, was not great, and not of itself enough to account for their victories. of course, if superiority in mere _matériel_, beyond a certain well-understood amount, is possessed by one of two combatants, his antagonist can hardly escape defeat; but it was never alleged that size of ship or calibre of guns--greater within reasonable limits than we had--necessarily led to the defeat of british ships by the french or spaniards. in the words of admiral jurien de la gravière, 'the ships of the united states constantly fought with the chances in their favour.' all this is indisputable. nevertheless we ought to see to it that in any future war our sea-power, great as it may be, does not receive shocks like those that it unquestionably did receive in . [footnote : _naval_war_of_ _, rd ed. pp. , .] sea-power in recent times we have now come to the end of the days of the naval wars of old time. the subsequent period has been illustrated repeatedly by manifestations of sea-power, often of great interest and importance, though rarely understood or even discerned by the nations which they more particularly concerned. the british sea-power, notwithstanding the first year of the war of , had come out of the great european conflict unshaken and indeed more preeminent than ever. the words used, half a century before by a writer in the great french 'encyclopédie,' seemed more exact than when first written. '_l'empire_des_mers_,' he says, is, 'le plus avantageux de tous les empires; les phoeniciens le possédoient autre fois et c'est aux anglois que cette gloire appartient aujourd'hui sur toutes les puissances maritimes.'[ ] vast out-lying territories had been acquired or were more firmly held, and the communications of all the over-sea dominions of the british crown were secured against all possibility of serious menace for many years to come. our sea-power was so ubiquitous and all-pervading that, like the atmosphere, we rarely thought of it and rarely remembered its necessity or its existence. it was not till recently that the greater part of the nation--for there were many, and still are some exceptions--perceived that it was the medium apart from which the british empire could no more live than it could have grown up. forty years after the fall of napoleon we found ourselves again at war with a great power. we had as our ally the owner of the greatest navy in the world except our own. our foe, as regards his naval forces, came the next in order. yet so overwhelming was the strength of great britain and france on the sea that russia never attempted to employ her navy against them. not to mention other expeditions, considerable enough in themselves, military operations on the largest scale were undertaken, carried on for many months, and brought to a successful termination on a scene so remote that it was two thousand miles from the country of one, and three thousand from that of the other partner in the alliance. 'the stream of supplies and reinforcements, which in terms of modern war is called "communications,", was kept free from even the threat of molestation, not by visible measures, but by the undisputed efficacy of a real, though imperceptible sea-power. at the close of the russian war we encountered, and unhappily for us in influential positions, men who, undismayed by the consequences of mimicking in free england the cast-iron methods of the great frederick, began to measure british requirements by standards borrowed from abroad and altogether inapplicable to british conditions. because other countries wisely abstained from relying on that which they did not possess, or had only imperfectly and with elaborate art created, the mistress of the seas was led to proclaim her disbelief in the very force that had made and kept her dominion, and urged to defend herself with fortifications by advisers who, like charles ii and the duke of york two centuries before, were 'not ashamed of it.' it was long before the peril into which this brought the empire was perceived; but at last, and in no small degree owing to the teachings of mahan, the people themselves took the matter in hand and insisted that a great maritime empire should have adequate means of defending all that made its existence possible. [footnote : _encyclopédie_, th jan. , art. 'thalassarchie.'] in forms differing in appearance, but identical in essentials, the efficacy of sea-power was proved again in the american secession war. if ever there were hostilities in which, to the unobservant or short-sighted, naval operations might at first glance seem destined to count for little, they were these. the sequel, however, made it clear that they constituted one of the leading factors of the success of the victorious side. the belligerents, the northern or federal states and the southern or confederate states, had a common land frontier of great length. the capital of each section was within easy distance of this frontier, and the two were not far apart. in wealth, population, and resources the federals were enormously superior. they alone possessed a navy, though at first it was a small one. the one advantage on the confederate side was the large proportion of military officers which belonged to it and their fine training as soldiers. in _physique_ as well as in _morale_ the army of one side differed little from that of the other; perhaps the federal army was slightly superior in the first, and the confederate, as being recruited from a dominant white race, in the second. outnumbered, less well equipped, and more scantily supplied, the confederates nevertheless kept up the war, with many brilliant successes on land, for four years. had they been able to maintain their trade with neutral states they could have carried on the war longer, and--not improbably--have succeeded in the end. the federal navy, which was largely increased, took away all chance of this. it established effective blockades of the confederate ports, and severed their communications with the outside world. indispensable articles of equipment could not be obtained, and the armies, consequently, became less and less able to cope with their abundantly furnished antagonists. by dominating the rivers the federals cut the confederacy asunder; and by the power they possessed of moving troops by sea at will, perplexed and harassed the defence, and facilitated the occupation of important points. meanwhile the confederates could make no reply on the water except by capturing merchant vessels, by which the contest was embittered, but the course of the war remained absolutely unaffected. the great numbers of men under arms on shore, the terrific slaughter in many battles of a war in which tactical ability, even in a moderate degree, was notably uncommon on both sides, and the varying fortunes of the belligerents, made the land campaigns far more interesting to the ordinary observer than the naval. it is not surprising, therefore, that peace had been re-established for several years before the american people could be made to see the great part taken by the navy in the restoration of the union; and what the americans had not seen was hidden from the sight of other nations. in several great wars in europe waged since france and england made peace with russia sea-power manifested itself but little. in the russo-turkish war the great naval superiority of the turks in the black sea, where the russians at the time had no fleet, governed the plans, if not the course, of the campaigns. the water being denied to them, the russians were compelled to execute their plan of invading turkey by land. an advance to the bosphorus through the northern part of asia minor was impracticable without help from a navy on the right flank. consequently the only route was a land one across the danube and the balkans. the advantages, though not fully utilised, which the enforcement of this line of advance put into the hands of the turks, and the difficulties and losses which it caused the russians, exhibited in a striking manner what sea-power can effect even when its operation is scarcely observable. this was more conspicuous in a later series of hostilities. the civil war in chili between congressists and balmacedists is specially interesting, because it throws into sharp relief the predominant influence, when a non-maritime enemy is to be attacked, of a navy followed up by an adequate land-force. at the beginning of the dispute the balmacedists, or president's party, had practically all the army, and the congressists, or opposition party, nearly all the chilian navy. unable to remain in the principal province of the republic, and expelled from the waters of valparaiso by the balmacedist garrisons of the forts--the only and doubtful service which those works rendered to their own side--the congressists went off with the ships to the northern provinces, where they counted many adherents. there they formed an army, and having money at command, and open sea communications, they were able to import equipment from abroad, and eventually to transport their land-force, secured from molestation on the voyage by the sea-power at their disposal, to the neighbourhood of valparaiso, where it was landed and triumphantly ended the campaign. it will have been noticed that, in its main outlines, this story repeated that of many earlier campaigns. it was itself repeated, as regards its general features, by the story of the war between china and japan in - . 'every aspect of the war,' says colomb, 'is interesting to this country, as japan is to china in a position similar to that which the british islands occupy to the european continent.'[ ] it was additionally interesting because the sea-power of japan was a novelty. though a novelty, it was well known by english naval men to be superior in all essentials to that of china, a novelty itself. as is the rule when two belligerents are contending for something beyond a purely maritime object, the final decision was to be on land. korea was the principal theatre of the land war; and, as far as access to it by sea was concerned, the chief bases of the two sides were about the same distance from it. it was possible for the chinese to march there by land. the japanese, coming from an island state, were obliged to cross the water. it will be seen at once that not only the success of the japanese in the struggle, but also the possibility of its being carried on by them at all, depended on sea-power. the japanese proved themselves decisively superior at sea. their navy effectually cleared the way for one army which was landed in korea, and for another which was landed in the chinese province of shantung. the chinese land-forces were defeated. the navy of japan, being superior on the sea, was able to keep its sister service supplied or reinforced as required. it was, however, not the navy, but the army, which finally frustrated the chinese efforts at defence, and really terminated the war. what the navy did was what, in accordance with the limitations of sea-power, may be expected of a navy. it made the transport of the army across the sea possible; and enabled it to do what of itself the army could not have done, viz. overcome the last resistance of the enemy. [footnote : _naval_warfare_, rd ed. p. .] the issue of the spanish-american war, at least as regards the mere defeat of spain, was, perhaps, a foregone conclusion. that spain, even without a serious insurrection on her hands, was unequal to the task of meeting so powerful an antagonist as the united states must have been evident even to spaniards. be that as it may, an early collapse of the spanish defence was not anticipated, and however one-sided the war may have been seen to be, it furnished examples illustrating rules as old as naval warfare. mahan says of it that, 'while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own differentiating it from others, nevertheless in its broad analogies it falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginnings unto this day.'[ ] the spaniards were defeated by the superiority of the american sea-power. 'a million of the best soldiers,' says mahan, 'would have been powerless in face of hostile control of the sea.' that control was obtained and kept by the united states navy, thus permitting the unobstructed despatch of troops--and their subsequent reinforcement and supply--to spanish territory, which was finally conquered, not by the navy, but by the army on shore. that it was the navy which made this final conquest possible happened, in this case, to be made specially evident by the action of the united states government, which stopped a military expedition on the point of starting for cuba until the sea was cleared of all spanish naval force worth attention. [footnote : _lessons_of_the_war_with_spain_, p. .] the events of the long period which we have been considering will have shown how sea-power operates, and what it effects. what is in it will have appeared from this narrative more clearly than would have been possible from any mere definition. like many other things, sea-power is composed of several elements. to reach the highest degree of efficacy it should be based upon a population naturally maritime, and on an ocean commerce naturally developed rather than artificially enticed to extend itself. its outward and visible sign is a navy, strong in the discipline, skill, and courage of a numerous _personnel_ habituated to the sea, in the number and quality of its ships, in the excellence of its _matériel_, and in the efficiency, scale, security, and geographical position of its arsenals and bases. history has demonstrated that sea-power thus conditioned can gain any purely maritime object, can protect the trade and the communications of a widely extended empire, and whilst so doing can ward off from its shores a formidable invader. there are, however, limitations to be noted. left to itself its operation is confined to the water, or at any rate to the inner edge of a narrow zone of coast. it prepares the way for the advance of an army, the work of which it is not intended, and is unable to perform. behind it, in the territory of which it guards the shores, there must be a land-force adjusted in organisation, equipment, and numbers to the circumstances of the country. the possession of a navy does not permit a sea-surrounded state to dispense with all fixed defences or fortification; but it does render it unnecessary and indeed absurd that they should be abundant or gigantic. the danger which always impends over the sea-power of any country is that, after being long unused, it may lose touch of the sea. the revolution in the constructive arts during the last half-century, which has also been a period of but little-interrupted naval peace, and the universal adoption of mechanical appliances, both for ship-propulsion and for many minor services--mere _matériel_ being thereby raised in the general estimation far above really more important matters--makes the danger mentioned more menacing in the present age than it has ever been before. ii the command of the sea[ ] [footnote : written in . (_encyclopoedia_britannica_.)] this phrase, a technical term of naval warfare, indicates a definite strategical condition. the term has been substituted occasionally, but less frequently of late years, for the much older 'dominion of the sea' or 'sovereignty of the sea,' a legal term expressing a claim, if not a right. it has also been sometimes treated as though it were identical with the rhetorical expression 'empire of the sea.' mahan, instead of it, uses the term 'control of the sea,' which has the merit of precision, and is not likely to be misunderstood or mixed up with a form of words meaning something different. the expression 'command of the sea,' however, in its proper and strategic sense, is so firmly fixed in the language that it would be a hopeless task to try to expel it; and as, no doubt, writers will continue to use it, it must be explained and illustrated. not only does it differ in meaning from 'dominion or sovereignty of the sea,' it is not even truly derived therefrom, as can be briefly shown. 'it has become an uncontested principle of modern international law that the sea, as a general rule, cannot be subjected to appropriation.'[ ] this, however, is quite modern. we ourselves did not admit the principle till ; the russians did not admit it till ; and the americans, and then only tacitly, not till . most european nations at some time or other have claimed and have exercised rights over some part of the sea, though far outside the now well-recognised 'three miles' limit.' venice claimed the adriatic, and exacted a heavy toll from vessels navigating its northern waters. genoa and france each claimed portions of the western mediterranean. denmark and sweden claimed to share the baltic between them. spain claimed dominion over the pacific and the gulf of mexico, and portugal over the indian ocean and all the atlantic south of morocco.[ ] the claim which has made the greatest noise in the world is that once maintained by the kings of england to the seas surrounding the british isles. like other institutions, the english sovereignty of the sea was, and was admitted to be, beneficent for a long period. then came the time when it ought to have been abandoned as obsolete; but it was not, and so it led to war. the general conviction of the maritime nations was that the lord of the sea would provide for the police of the waters over which he exercised dominion. in rude ages when men, like the ancients, readily 'turned themselves to piracy,' this was of immense importance to trade; and, far from the right of dominion being disputed by foreigners, it was insisted upon by them and declared to carry with it certain duties. in , not only english merchants, but also 'the maritime people of genoa, catalonia, spain, germany, zealand, holland, frisia, denmark, norway, and several other places of the empire' declared that the kings of england had from time immemorial been in 'peaceable possession of the sovereign lordship of the sea of england,' and had done what was 'needful for the maintenance of peace, right, and equity between people of all sorts, whether subjects of another kingdom or not, who pass through those seas.'[ ] the english sovereignty was not exercised as giving authority to exact toll. all that was demanded in return for keeping the sea safe for peaceful traffic was a salute, enforced no doubt as a formal admission of the right which permitted the (on the whole, at any rate) effective police of the waters to be maintained. the dutch in the seventeenth century objected to the demand for this salute. it was insisted upon. war ensued; but in the end the dutch acknowledged by solemn treaties their obligation to render the salute. the time for exacting it, however, was really past. s. r. gardiner[ ] maintains that though the 'question of the flag' was the occasion, it was not the cause of the war. there was not much, if any, piracy in the english channel which the king of england was specially called upon to suppress, and if there had been the merchant vessels of the age were generally able to defend themselves, while if they were not their governments possessed force enough to give them the necessary protection. we gave up our claim to exact the salute in . [footnote : w. e. hall, _treatise_on_international_law_, th ed. , p. .] [footnote : hall, pp. , .] [footnote : j. k. laughton, 'sovereignty of the sea,' _fortnightly_ _review_, august .] [footnote : _the_first_dutch_war_ (navy records society), .] the necessity of the foregoing short account of the 'sovereignty or dominion of the seas' will be apparent as soon as we come to the consideration of the first struggle, or rather series of struggles, for the command of the sea. gaining this was the result of our wars with the dutch in the seventeenth century. at the time of the first dutch war, - , and probably of the later wars also, a great many people, and especially seamen, believed that the conflict was due to a determination on our part to retain, and on that of the dutch to put an end to, the english sovereignty or dominion. the obstinacy of the dutch in objecting to pay the old-established mark of respect to the english flag was quite reason enough in the eyes of most englishmen, and probably of most dutchmen also, to justify hostilities which other reasons may have rendered inevitable. the remarkable thing about the dutch wars is that in reality what we gained was the possibility of securing an absolute command of the sea. we came out of the struggle a great, and in a fair way of becoming the greatest, naval power. it is this which prompted vice-admiral p. h. colomb to hold that there are various kinds of command, such as 'absolute or assured,' 'temporary,' 'with definite ulterior purpose,' &c. an explanation that would make all these terms intelligible would be voluminous and is unnecessary here. it will be enough to say that the absolute command--of attempts to gain which, as colomb tells us, the anglo-dutch wars were the most complete example--is nothing but an attribute of the nation whose power on the sea is paramount. it exists and may be visible in time of peace. the command which, as said above, expresses a definite strategical condition is existent only in time of war. it can easily be seen that the former is essential to an empire like the british, the parts of which are bound together by maritime communications. inability to keep these communications open can have only one result, viz. the loss of the parts with which communication cannot be maintained. experience of war as well as reason will have made it evident that inability to keep open sea-communications cannot be limited to any single line, because the inability must be due either to incapacity in the direction of hostilities or insufficiency of force. if we have not force enough to keep open all the communications of our widely extended empire, or if--having force enough--we are too foolish to employ it properly, we do not hold the command of the sea, and the empire must fall if seriously attacked. the strategic command of the sea in a particular war or campaign has equal concern for all maritime belligerents. before seeing what it is, it will be well to learn on high authority what it is not. mahan says that command, or, to use his own term, 'control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbours. on the contrary, history has shown that such evasions are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker party, however great the inequality of naval strength.'[ ] the anglo-french command of the sea in - , complete as it was, did not enable the allies to intercept the russian ships in the north-western pacific, nor did that held by the federals in the american civil war put an early stop to the cruises of the confederate vessels. what the term really does imply is the power possessed from the first, or gained during hostilities, by one belligerent of carrying out considerable over-sea expeditions at will. in the russian war just mentioned the allies had such overwhelmingly superior sea-power that the russians abandoned to them without a struggle the command of the sea; and the more recent landing in south africa, more than six thousand miles away, of a large british army without even a threat of interruption on the voyage is another instance of unchallenged command. in wars between great powers and also between secondary powers, if nearly equally matched, this absence of challenge is rare. the rule is that the command of the sea has to be won after hostilities begin. to win it the enemy's naval force must be neutralised. it must be driven into his ports and there blockaded or 'masked,' and thus rendered virtually innocuous; or it must be defeated and destroyed. the latter is the preferable, because the more effective, plan. as was perceptible in the spanish-american war of , as long as one belligerent's fleet is intact or at large, the other is reluctant to carry out any considerable expedition over-sea. in fact, the command of the sea has not been secured whilst the enemy continues to have a 'fleet in being.'[ ] [footnote : _influence_of_sea-power_on_history_, , p. .] [footnote : see _ante_, sea-power, p. .] in a greatly superior franco-spanish fleet was covering the siege of gibraltar. had this fleet succeeded in preventing the revictualling of the fortress the garrison would have been starved into surrender. a british fleet under lord howe, though much weaker in numbers, had not been defeated and was still at large. howe, in spite of the odds against him, managed to get his supply-ships in to the anchorage and to fight a partial action, in which he did the allies as much damage as he received. there has never been a display of higher tactical skill than this operation of howe's, though, it may be said, he owes his fame much more to his less meritorious performance on the first of june. the revictualling of gibraltar surpassed even suffren's feat of the capture of trincomalee in the same year. in the french, assuming that a temporary superiority in the mediterranean had given them a free hand on the water, sent a great expedition to egypt. though the army which was carried succeeded in landing there, the covering fleet was destroyed by nelson at the nile, and the army itself was eventually forced to surrender. the french had not perceived that, except for a short time and for minor operations, you cannot separate the command of the mediterranean or of any particular area of water from that of the sea in general. local command of the sea may enable a belligerent to make a hasty raid, seize a relatively insignificant port, or cut out a vessel; but it will not ensure his being able to effect anything requiring considerable time for its execution, or, in other words, anything likely to have an important influence on the course of the war. if great britain has not naval force enough to retain command of the mediterranean, she will certainly not have force enough to retain command of the english channel. it can be easily shown why it should be so. in war danger comes less from conditions of locality than from the enemy's power to hurt. taking up a weak position when confronting an enemy may help him in the exercise of his power, but it does not constitute it.[ ] a maritime enemy's power to hurt resides in his fleet. if that can be neutralised his power disappears. it is in the highest degree improbable that this end can be attained by splitting up our own fleet into fragments so as to have a part of it in nearly every quarter in which the enemy may try to do us mischief. the most promising plan--as experience has often proved--is to meet the enemy, when he shows himself, with a force sufficiently strong to defeat him. the proper station of the british fleet in war should, accordingly, be the nearest possible point to the enemy's force. this was the fundamental principle of nelson's strategy, and it is as valid now as ever it was. if we succeed in getting into close proximity to the hostile fleet with an adequate force of our own, our foe cannot obtain command of the sea, or of any part of it, whether that part be the mediterranean or the english channel, at any rate until he has defeated us. if he is strong enough to defeat our fleet he obtains the command of the sea in general; and it is for him to decide whether he shall show the effectiveness of that command in the mediterranean or in the channel. [footnote : in his _history_of_scotland_ ( ). j. h. m. burton, speaking of the orkney and shetland isles in the viking times, says (vol. i. p. ): 'those who occupied them were protected, not so much by their own strength of position, as by the complete command over the north sea held by the fleets that found shelter in the fiords and firths.'] in the smaller operations of war temporary command of a particular area of water may suffice for the success of an expedition, or at least will permit the execution of the preliminary movements. when the main fleet of a country is at a distance--which it ought not to be except with the object of nearing the opposing fleet--a small hostile expedition may slip across, say the channel, throw shells into a coast town or burn a fishing village, and get home again unmolested. its action would have no sort of influence on the course of the campaign, and would, therefore, be useless. it would also most likely lead to reprisals; and, if this process were repeated, the war would probably degenerate into the antiquated system of 'cross-raiding,' discarded centuries ago, not at all for reasons of humanity, but because it became certain that war could be more effectually waged in other ways. the nation in command of the sea may resort to raiding to expedite the formal submission of an already defeated enemy, as russia did when at war with sweden in ; but in such a case the other side cannot retaliate. temporary command of local waters will also permit of operations rather more considerable than mere raiding attacks; but the duration of these operations must be adjusted to the time available. if the duration of the temporary command is insufficient the operation must fail. it must fail even if the earlier steps have been taken successfully. temporary command of the baltic in war might enable a german force to occupy an aland isle; but unless the temporary could be converted into permanent command, germany could make no use of the acquisition, which in the end would revert as a matter of course to its former possessors. the command of the english channel, which napoleon wished to obtain when maturing his invasion project, was only temporary. it is possible that a reminiscence of what had happened in egypt caused him to falter at the last; and that, quite independently of the proceedings of villeneuve, he hesitated to risk a second battle of the nile and the loss of a second army. it may have been this which justified his later statement that he did not really mean to invade england. in any case, the english practice of fixing the station of their fleet wherever that of the enemy's was, would have seriously shortened the duration of his command of the channel, even if it had allowed it to be won at all. moreover, attempts to carry out a great operation of war against time as well as against the efforts of the enemy to prevent it are in the highest degree perilous. in war the british navy has three prominent duties to discharge. it has to protect our maritime trade, to keep open the communications between the different parts of the empire, and to prevent invasion. if we command the sea these duties will be discharged effectually. as long as we command the sea the career of hostile cruisers sent to prey on our commerce will be precarious, because command of the sea carries with it the necessity of possessing an ample cruiser force. as long as the condition mentioned is satisfied our ocean communications will be kept open, because an inferior enemy, who cannot obtain the command required, will be too much occupied in seeing to his own safety to be able to interfere seriously with that of any part of our empire. this being so, it is evident that the greater operation of invasion cannot be attempted, much less carried to a successful termination, by the side which cannot make head against the opposing fleet. command of the sea is the indispensable preliminary condition of a successful military expedition sent across the water. it enables the nation which possesses it to attack its foes where it pleases and where they seem to be most vulnerable. at the same time it gives to its possessor security against serious counter-attacks, and affords to his maritime commerce the most efficient protection that can be devised. it is, in fact, the main object of naval warfare. iii war and its chief lessons[ ] [footnote : written in . (_naval_annual_, .)] had the expression 'real war' been introduced into the title of this chapter, its introduction would have been justifiable. the sources--if not of our knowledge of combat, at least of the views which are sure to prevail when we come to actual fighting--are to be found in two well-defined, dissimilar, and widely separated areas. within one are included the records of war; within the other, remembrance of the exercises and manoeuvres of a time of peace. the future belligerent will almost of a certainty have taken a practical part in the latter, whilst it is probable that he will have had no personal experience of the former. the longer the time elapsed since hostilities were in progress, the more probable and more general does this absence of experience become. the fighting man--that is to say, the man set apart, paid, and trained so as to be ready to fight when called upon--is of the same nature as the rest of his species. this is a truism; but it is necessary to insist upon it, because professional, and especially professorial, strategists and tacticians almost invariably ignore it. that which we have seen and know has not only more, but very much more, influence upon the minds of nearly all of us than that of which we have only heard, and, most likely, heard but imperfectly. the result is that, when peace is interrupted and the fighting man--on both sea and land--is confronted with the problems of practical belligerency, he brings to his attempts at their solution an intellectual equipment drawn, not from knowledge of real war, but from the less trustworthy arsenal of the recollections of his peace training. when peace, especially a long peace, ends, the methods which it has introduced are the first enemies which the organised defenders of a country have to overcome. there is plenty of evidence to prove that--except, of course, in unequal conflicts between highly organised, civilised states and savage or semi-barbarian tribes--success in war is directly proportionate to the extent of the preliminary victory over the predominance of impressions derived from the habits and exercises of an armed force during peace. that the cogency of this evidence is not invariably recognised is to be attributed to insufficient attention to history and to disinclination to apply its lessons properly. a primary object of the _naval_annual_--indeed, the chief reason for its publication--being to assist in advancing the efficiency of the british navy, its pages are eminently the place for a review of the historical examples of the often-recurring inability of systems established in peace to stand the test of war. hostilities on land being more frequent, and much more frequently written about, than those by sea, the history of the former as well as of the latter must be examined. the two classes of warfare have much in common. the principles of their strategy are identical; and, as regards some of their main features, so are those of the tactics followed in each. consequently the history of land warfare has its lessons for those who desire to achieve success in warfare on the sea. that this has often been lost sight of is largely due to a misapprehension of the meaning of terms. the two words 'military' and 'army' have been given, in english, a narrower signification than they ought, and than they used, to have. both terms have been gradually restricted in their use, and made to apply only to the land service. this has been unfortunate; because records of occurrences and discussions, capable of imparting much valuable instruction to naval officers, have been passed over by them as inapplicable to their own calling. it may have been noticed that captain mahan uses the word 'military' in its right sense as indicating the members, and the most important class of operations, of both land- and sea-forces. the french, through whom the word has come to us from the latin, use it in the same sense as mahan. _un_militaire_ is a member of either a land army or a navy. the 'naval _and_ military intelligence' of the english press is given under the heading 'nouvelles militaires' in the french. our word 'army' also came to us direct from the french, who still apply it equally to both services--_armée_de_ _terre,_armée_de_mer_. it is a participle, and means 'armed,' the word 'force' being understood. the kindred words _armada_ in spanish and portuguese, and _armata_ in italian--equally derived from the latin--are used to indicate a fleet or navy, another name being given to a land army. the word 'army' was generally applied to a fleet in former days by the english, as will be seen on reference to the navy records society's volumes on the defeat of the spanish armada. this short etymological discussion is not inappropriate here, for it shows why we should not neglect authorities on the history and conduct of war merely because they do not state specially that they are dealing with the naval branch of it. a very slight knowledge of history is quite enough to make us acquainted with the frequent recurrence of defeats and disasters inflicted on armed forces by antagonists whose power to do so had not been previously suspected. it has been the same on the sea as on the land, though--owing to more copious records--we may have a larger list of events on the latter. it will not be denied that it is of immense importance to us to inquire how this happened, and ascertain how--for the future--it may be rendered highly improbable in our own case. a brief enumeration of the more striking instances will make it plain that the events in question have been confined to no particular age and to no particular country. it may be said that the more elaborately organised and trained in peace time an armed force happened to be, the more unexpected always, and generally the more disastrous, was its downfall. examples of this are to be found in the earliest campaigns of which we have anything like detailed accounts, and they continue to reappear down to very recent times. in the elaborate nature of its organisation and training there probably never has been an army surpassing that led by xerxes into greece twenty-four centuries ago. something like eight years had been devoted to its preparation. the minute account of its review by xerxes on the shores of the hellespont proves that, however inefficient the semi-civilised contingents accompanying it may have been, the regular persian army appeared, in discipline, equipment, and drill, to have come up to the highest standard of the most intense 'pipeclay' epoch. in numbers alone its superiority was considerable to the last, and down to the very eve of platæa its commander openly displayed his contempt for his enemy. yet no defeat could be more complete than that suffered by the persians at the hands of their despised antagonists. as if to establish beyond dispute the identity of governing conditions in both land and maritime wars, the next very conspicuous disappointment of an elaborately organised force was that of the athenian fleet at syracuse. at the time athens, without question, stood at the head of the naval world: her empire was in the truest sense the product of sea-power. her navy, whilst unequalled in size, might claim, without excessive exaggeration, to be invincible. the great armament which the athenians despatched to sicily seemed, in numbers alone, capable of triumphing over all resistance. if the athenian navy had already met with some explicable mishaps, it looked back with complacent confidence on the glorious achievements of more than half a century previously. it had enjoyed many years of what was so nearly a maritime peace that its principal exploits had been the subjection of states weak to insignificance on the sea as compared with imperial athens. profuse expenditure on its maintenance; the 'continued practice' of which pericles boasted, the peace manoeuvres of a remote past; skilfully designed equipment; and the memory of past glories;--all these did not avail to save it from defeat at the hands of an enemy who only began to organise a fleet when the athenians had invaded his coast waters. ideal perfection as a regular army has never been so nearly reached as by that of sparta. the spartan spent his life in the barrack and the mess-room; his amusements were the exercises of the parade ground. for many generations a spartan force had never been defeated in a pitched battle. we have had, in modern times, some instances of a hectoring soldiery arrogantly prancing amongst populations whose official defenders it had defeated in battle; but nonesuch could vie with the spartans in the sublimity of their military self-esteem. overweening confidence in the prowess of her army led sparta to trample with ruthless disdain on the rights of others. the iniquitous attack on thebes, a state thought incapable of effectual resentment, was avenged by the defeat of leuctra, which announced the end of the political supremacy and the military predominance of sparta. in the series of struggles with carthage which resulted in putting rome in a position enabling her eventually to win the dominion of the ancient world, the issue was to be decided on the water. carthage was essentially a maritime state. the foundation of the city was effected by a maritime expedition; its dominions lay on the neighbouring coast or in regions to which the carthaginians could penetrate only by traversing the sea. to carthage her fleet was 'all in all': her navy, supported by large revenues and continuously maintained, was more of a 'regular' force than any modern navy before the second half of the seventeenth century. the romans were almost without a fleet, and when they formed one the undertaking was ridiculed by the carthaginians with an unconcealed assumption of superiority. the defeat of the latter off mylæ, the first of several, came as a great surprise to them, and, as we can see now, indicated the eventual ruin of their city. we are so familiar with stories of the luxury and corruption of the romans during the decline of the empire that we are likely to forget that the decline went on for centuries, and that their armed forces, however recruited, presented over and over again abundant signs of physical courage and vigour. the victory of stilicho over alaric at pollentia has been aptly paralleled with that of marius over the cimbri. this was by no means the only achievement of the roman army of the decadence. a century and a quarter later--when the empire of the west had fallen and the general decline had made further progress--belisarius conducted successful campaigns in persia, in north africa, in sicily, and in italy. the mere list of countries shows that the mobility and endurance of the roman forces during a period in which little creditable is generally looked for were not inferior to their discipline and courage. yet they met with disastrous defeat after all, and at the hands of races which they had more than once proved themselves capable of withstanding. it could not have been because the later roman equipment was inferior, the organisation less elaborate, or the training less careful than those of their barbarian enemies. though it is held by some in these days that the naval power of spain in the latter part of the sixteenth century was not really formidable, that does not appear to have been the opinion of contemporaries, whether spaniards or otherwise. some english seamen of the time did, indeed, declare their conviction that philip the second's navy was not so much to be feared as many of their fellow-countrymen thought; but, in the public opinion of the age, spain was the greatest, or indeed the one great, naval state. she possessed a more systematically organised navy than any other country having the ocean for a field of action had then, or till long afterwards. even genoa and venice, whose operations, moreover, were restricted to mediterranean waters, could not have been served by more finished specimens of the naval officer and the man-of-war's man of the time than a large proportion of the military _personnel_ of the regular spanish fleet. as basques, castilians, catalans, or aragonese, or all combined, the crews of spanish fighting ships could look back upon a glorious past. it was no wonder that, by common consent of those who manned it, the title of 'invincible' was informally conferred upon the armada which, in , sailed for the english channel. how it fared is a matter of common knowledge. no one could have been more surprised at the result than the gallant officers who led its squadrons. spain furnishes another instance of the unexpected overthrow of a military body to which long cohesion and precise organisation were believed to have secured invincibility. the spanish was considered the 'most redoubtable infantry in europe' till its unexpected defeat at rocroi. the effects of this defeat were far-reaching. notwithstanding the bravery of her sons, which has never been open to question, and, in fact, has always been conspicuous, the military superiority of spain was broken beyond repair. in the history of other countries are to be found examples equally instructive. the defeats of almansa, brihuega, and villaviciosa were nearly contemporary with the victories of blenheim and ramillies; and the thousands of british troops compelled to lay down their arms at the first named belonged to the same service as their fellow-countrymen who so often marched to victory under marlborough. a striking example of the disappointment which lies in wait for military self-satisfaction was furnished by the defeat of soubise at rossbach by frederick the great. before the action the french had ostentatiously shown their contempt for their opponent. the service which gloried in the exploits of anson and of hawke discerned the approach of the seven years' war without misgiving; and the ferocity shown in the treatment of byng enables us now to measure the surprise caused by the result of the action off minorca. there were further surprises in store for the english navy. at the end of the seven years' war its reputation for invincibility was generally established. few, perhaps none, ventured to doubt that, if there were anything like equality between the opposing forces, a meeting between the french and the british fleets could have but one result--viz. the decisive victory of the latter. experience in the english channel, on the other side of the atlantic, and in the bay of bengal--during the war of american independence--roughly upset this flattering anticipation. yet, in the end, the british navy came out the unquestioned victor in the struggle: which proves the excellence of its quality. after every allowance is made for the incapacity of the government, we must suspect that there was something else which so often frustrated the efforts of such a formidable force as the british navy of the day must essentially have been. on land the surprises were even more mortifying; and it is no exaggeration to say that, a year before it occurred, such an event as the surrender of burgoyne's army to an imperfectly organised and trained body of provincials would have seemed impossible. the army which frederick the great bequeathed to prussia was universally regarded as the model of efficiency. its methods were copied in other countries, and foreign officers desiring to excel in their profession made pilgrimages to berlin and potsdam to drink of the stream of military knowledge at its source. when it came in contact with the tumultuous array of revolutionary france, the performances of the force that preserved the tradition of the great frederick were disappointingly wanting in brilliancy. a few years later it suffered an overwhelming disaster. the prussian defeat at jena was serious as a military event; its political effects were of the utmost importance. yet many who were involved in that disaster took, later on, an effective part in the expulsion of the conquerors from their country, and in settling the history of europe for nearly half a century at waterloo. the brilliancy of the exploits of wellington and the british army in portugal and spain has thrown into comparative obscurity that part of the peninsular war which was waged for years by the french against the spaniards. spain, distracted by palace intrigues and political faction, with the flower of her troops in a distant comer of europe, and several of her most important fortresses in the hands of her assailant, seemed destined to fall an easy and a speedy prey to the foremost military power in the world. the attitude of the invaders made it evident that they believed themselves to be marching to certain victory. even the british soldiers--of whom there were never many more than , in the peninsula, and for some years not half that number--were disdained until they had been encountered. the french arms met with disappointment after disappointment. on one occasion a whole french army, over , strong, surrendered to a spanish force, and became prisoners of war. before the struggle closed there were six marshals of france with nearly , troops in the peninsula. the great efforts which these figures indicate were unsuccessful, and the intruders were driven from the country. yet they were the comrades of the victors of austerlitz, of jena, and of wagram, and part of that mighty organisation which had planted its victorious standards in berlin and vienna, held down prussia like a conquered province, and shattered into fragments the holy roman empire. in the british navy was at the zenith of its glory. it had not only defeated all its opponents; it had also swept the seas of the fleets of the historic maritime powers--of spain, of france, which had absorbed the italian maritime states, of the netherlands, of denmark. warfare, nearly continuous for eighteen, and uninterrupted for nine years, had transformed the british navy into an organisation more nearly resembling a permanently maintained force than it had been throughout its previous history. its long employment in serious hostilities had saved it from some of the failings which the narrow spirit inherent in a close profession is only too sure to foster. it had, however, a confidence--not unjustified by its previous exploits--in its own invincibility. this confidence did not diminish, and was not less ostentatiously exhibited, as its great achievements receded more and more into the past. the new enemy who now appeared on the farther side of the atlantic was not considered formidable. in the british navy there were , men. in the united states navy the number of officers, seamen, and marines available for ocean service was less than --an insignificant numerical addition to the enemies with whom we were already contending. the subsequent and rapid increase in the american _personnel_ to , shows the small extent to which it could be considered a 'regular' force, its permanent nucleus being overwhelmingly outnumbered by the hastily enrolled additions. our defeats in the war of have been greatly exaggerated; but, all the same, they did constitute rebuffs to our naval self-esteem which were highly significant in themselves, and deserve deep attention. rebuffs of the kind were not confined to the sea service, and at new orleans our army, which numbered in its ranks soldiers of busaco, fuentes de onoro, and salamanca, met with a serious defeat. when the austro-prussian war broke out in , the austrian commander-in-chief, general benedek, published an order, probably still in the remembrance of many, which officially declared the contempt for the enemy felt in the imperial army. even those who perceived that the prussian forces were not fit subjects of contempt counted with confidence on the victory of the austrians. yet the latter never gained a considerable success in their combats with the prussians; and within a few weeks from the beginning of hostilities the general who had assumed such a lofty tone of superiority in speaking of his foes had to implore his sovereign to make peace to avoid further disasters. at the beginning of the franco-german war of , the widespread anticipation of french victories was clearly shown by the unanimity with which the journalists of various nationalities illustrated their papers with maps giving the country between the french frontier and berlin, and omitting the part of france extending to paris. in less than five weeks from the opening of hostilities events had made it certain that a map of the country to the eastward of lorraine would be practically useless to a student of the campaign, unless it were to follow the route of the hundreds of thousands of french soldiers who were conveyed to germany as prisoners of war. it is to be specially noted that in the above enumeration only contests in which the result was unexpected--unexpected not only by the beaten side but also by impartial observers--have been specified. in all wars one side or the other is defeated; and it has not been attempted to give a general _résumé_ of the history of war. the object has been to show the frequency--in all ages and in all circumstances of systematic, as distinguished from savage, warfare--of the defeat of the force which by general consent was regarded as certain to win. now it is obvious that a result so frequently reappearing must have a distinct cause, which is well worth trying to find out. discovery of the cause may enable us to remove it in the future, and thus prevent results which are likely to be all the more disastrous because they have not been foreseen. professional military writers--an expression which, as before explained, includes naval--do not help us much in the prosecution of the search which is so eminently desirable. as a rule, they have contrived rather to hide than to bring to light the object sought for. it would be doing them injustice to assume that this has been done with deliberate intention. it is much more likely due to professional bias, which exercises over the minds of members of definitely limited professions incessant and potent domination. when alluding to occurrences included in the enumeration given above, they exhibit signs of a resolve to defend their profession against possible imputations of inefficiency, much more than a desire to get to the root of the matter. this explains the unremitting eagerness of military writers to extol the special qualities developed by long-continued service habits and methods. they are always apprehensive of the possibility of credit being given to fighting bodies more loosely organised and less precisely trained in peace time than the body to which they themselves belong. this sensitiveness as to the merits of their particular profession, and impatience of even indirect criticism, are unnecessary. there is nothing in the history of war to show that an untrained force is better than a trained force. on the contrary, all historical evidence is on the other side. in quite as many instances as are presented by the opposite, the forces which put an unexpected end to the military supremacy long possessed by their antagonists were themselves, in the strictest sense of the word, 'regulars.' the thebans whom epaminondas led to victory over the spartans at leuctra no more resembled a hasty levy of armed peasants or men imperfectly trained as soldiers than did napoleon's army which overthrew the prussians at jena, or the germans who defeated the french at gravelotte and sedan. nothing could have been less like an 'irregular' force than the fleet with which la galissonnière beat byng off minorca, or the french fleets which, in the war of american independence, so often disappointed the hopes of the british. the records of war on land and by sea--especially the extracts from them included in the enumeration already given--lend no support to the silly suggestion that efficient defence can be provided for a country by 'an untrained man with a rifle behind a hedge.' the truth is that it was not the absence of organisation or training on one side which enabled it to defeat the other. if the beaten side had been elaborately organised and carefully trained, there must have been something bad in its organisation or its methods. now this 'something bad,' this defect--wherever it has disclosed itself--has been enough to neutralise the most splendid courage and the most unselfish devotion. it has been seen that armies and navies the valour of which has never been questioned have been defeated by antagonists sometimes as highly organised as they were, and sometimes much less so. this ought to put us on the track of the cause which has produced an effect so little anticipated. a 'regular' permanently embodied or maintained service of fighting men is always likely to develop a spirit of intense professional self-satisfaction. the more highly organised it is, and the more sharply its official frontiers are defined, the more intense is this spirit likely to become. a 'close' service of the kind grows restive at outside criticism, and yields more and more to the conviction that no advance in efficiency is possible unless it be the result of suggestions emanating from its own ranks. its view of things becomes narrower and narrower, whereas efficiency in war demands the very widest view. ignorant critics call the spirit thus engendered 'professional conservatism'; the fact being that change is not objected to--is even welcomed, however frequent it may be, provided only that it is suggested from inside. an immediate result is 'unreality and formalism of peace training'--to quote a recent thoughtful military critic. as the formalism becomes more pronounced, so the unreality increases. the proposer or introducer of a system of organisation of training or of exercises is often, perhaps usually, capable of distinguishing between the true and the false, the real and the unreal. his successors, the men who continue the execution of his plans, can hardly bring to their work the open mind possessed by the originator; they cannot escape from the influence of the methods which have been provided for them ready made, and which they are incessantly engaged in practising. this is not a peculiarity of the military profession in either branch--it extends to nearly every calling; but in the profession specified, which is a service rather than a freely exercised profession, it is more prominent. human thought always has a tendency to run in grooves, and in military institutions the grooves are purposely made deep, and departure from them rigorously forbidden. all exercises, even those designed to have the widest scope, tend to become mere drill. each performance produces, and bequeaths for use on the next occasion, a set of customary methods of execution which are readily adopted by the subsequent performers. there grows up in time a kind of body of customary law governing the execution of peace operations--the principles being peace-operation principles wholly and solely--which law few dare to disobey, and which eventually obtains the sanction of official written regulations. as scharnhorst, quoted by baron von der goltz, said, 'we have begun to place the art of war higher than military virtues.' the eminent authority who thus expressed himself wrote the words before the great catastrophe of jena; and, with prophetic insight sharpened by his fear of the menacing tendency of peace-training formalism and unreality, added his conviction that 'this has been the ruin of nations from time immemorial.' independently of the evidence of history already adduced, it would be reasonable to conclude that the tendency is strengthened and made more menacing when the service in which it prevails becomes more highly specialised. if custom and regulation leave little freedom of action to the individual members of an armed force, the difficulty--sure to be experienced by them--of shaking themselves clear of their fetters when the need for doing so arises is increased. to realise--when peace is broken--the practical conditions of war demands an effort of which the unfettered intelligence alone seems capable. the great majority of successful leaders in war on both elements have not been considerably, or at all, superior in intellectual acuteness to numbers of their fellows; but they have had strength of character, and their minds were not squeezed in a mould into a commonplace and uniform pattern. the 'canker of a long peace,' during recent years at any rate, is not manifested in disuse of arms, but in mistaken methods. for a quarter of a century the civilised world has tended more and more to become a drill-ground, but the spirit dominating it has been that of the pedant. there has been more exercise and less reality. the training, especially of officers, becomes increasingly scholastic. this, and the deterioration consequent on it, are not merely modern phenomena. they appear in all ages. 'the sword of the saracens,' says gibbon, 'became less formidable when their youth was drawn from the camp to the college.' the essence of pedantry is want of originality. it is nourished on imitation. for the pedant to imitate is enough of itself; to him the suitability of the model is immaterial. thus military bodies have been ruined by mimicry of foreign arrangements quite inapplicable to the conditions of the mimics' country. more than twenty years ago sir henry maine, speaking of the war of american independence, said, 'next to their stubborn valour, the chief secret of the colonists' success was the incapacity of the english generals, trained in the stiff prussian system soon to perish at jena, to adapt themselves to new conditions of warfare.' he pointed out that the effect of this uncritical imitation of what was foreign was again experienced by men 'full of admiration of a newer german system.' we may not be able to explain what it is, but, all the same, there does exist something which we call national characteristics. the aim of all training should be to utilise these to the full, not to ignore them. the naval methods of a continental state with relatively small oceanic interests, or with but a brief experience of securing these, cannot be very applicable to a great maritime state whose chief interests have been on the seas for many years. how is all this applicable to the ultimate efficiency of the british navy? it may be allowed that there is a good deal of truth in what has been written above; but it may be said that considerations sententiously presented cannot claim to have much practical value so long as they are absolute and unapplied. the statement cannot be disputed. it is unquestionably necessary to make the application. the changes in naval _matériel_, so often spoken of, introduced within the last fifty years have been rivalled by the changes in the composition of the british navy. the human element remains in original individual character exactly the same as it always was; but there has been a great change in the opportunities and facilities offered for the development of the faculties most desired in men-of-war's men. all reform--using the word in its true sense of alteration, and not in its strained sense of improvement--has been in the direction of securing perfect uniformity. if we take the particular directly suggested by the word just used, we may remember, almost with astonishment, that there was no british naval uniform for anyone below the rank of officer till after . now, at every inspection, much time is taken up in ascertaining if the narrow tape embroidery on a frock collar is of the regulation width, and if the rows of tape are the proper distance apart. the diameter of a cloth cap is officially defined; and any departure from the regulation number of inches (and fractions of an inch) is as sure of involving punishment as insubordination. it is the same in greater things. till --in which year the change came into force--there was no permanent british naval service except the commissioned and warrant officers. not till several years later did the new 'continuous service' men equal half of the bluejacket aggregate. now, every bluejacket proper serves continuously, and has been in the navy since boyhood. the training of the boys is made uniform. no member of the ship's company--except a domestic--is now allowed to set foot on board a sea-going ship till he has been put through a training course which is exactly like that through which every other member of his class passes. even during the comparatively brief period in which young officers entered the navy by joining the college at portsmouth, it was only the minority who received the special academic training. till the establishment of the _illustrious_ training school in , the great majority of officers joined their first ship as individuals from a variety of different and quite independent quarters. now, every one of them has, as a preliminary condition, to spend a certain time--the same for all--in a school. till a much later period, every engineer entered separately. now, passing through a training establishment is obligatory for engineers also. within the service there has been repeated formation of distinct branches or 'schools,' such as the further specialised specialist gunnery and torpedo sections. it was not till that uniform watch bills, quarter bills, and station bills were introduced, and not till later that their general adoption was made compulsory. up to that time the internal organisation and discipline of a ship depended on her own officers, it being supposed that capacity to command a ship implied, at least, capacity to distribute and train her crew. the result was a larger scope than is now thought permissible for individual capability. however short-lived some particular drill or exercise may be, however soon it is superseded by another, as long as it lasts the strictest conformity to it is rigorously enforced. even the number of times that an exercise has to be performed, difference in class of ship or in the nature of the service on which she is employed notwithstanding, is authoritatively laid down. still more noteworthy, though much less often spoken of than the change in _matériel_, has been the progress of the navy towards centralisation. naval duties are now formulated at a desk on shore, and the mode of carrying them out notified to the service in print. all this would have been quite as astonishing to the contemporaries of nelson or of exmouth and codrington as the aspect of a battleship or of a -inch breech-loading gun. let it be clearly understood that none of these things has been mentioned with the intention of criticising them either favourably or unfavourably. they have been cited in order that it may be seen that the change in naval affairs is by no means one in _matériel_ only, and that the transformation in other matters has been stupendous and revolutionary beyond all previous experience. it follows inevitably from this that we shall wage war in future under conditions dissimilar from any hitherto known. in this very fact there lies the making of a great surprise. it will have appeared from the historical statement given above how serious a surprise sometimes turns out to be. its consequences, always significant, are not unfrequently far-reaching. the question of practical moment is: how are we to guard ourselves against such a surprise? to this a satisfactory answer can be given. it might be summarised in the admonitions: abolish over-centralisation; give proper scope to individual capacity and initiative; avoid professional self-sufficiency. when closely looked at, it is one of the strangest manifestations of the spirit of modern navies that, though the issues of land warfare are rarely thought instructive, the peace methods of land forces are extensively and eagerly copied by the sea-service. the exercises of the parade ground and the barrack square are taken over readily, and so are the parade ground and the barrack square themselves. this may be right. the point is that it is novel, and that a navy into the training of which the innovation has entered must differ considerably from one that was without it and found no need of it during a long course of serious wars. at any rate, no one will deny that parade-ground evolutions and barrack-square drill expressly aim at the elimination of individuality, or just the quality to the possession of which we owe the phenomenon called, in vulgar speech, the 'handy man.' habits and sentiments based on a great tradition, and the faculties developed by them, are not killed all at once; but innovation in the end annihilates them, and their not having yet entirely disappeared gives no ground for doubting their eventual, and even near, extinction. the aptitudes still universally most prized in the seaman were produced and nourished by practices and under conditions no longer allowed to prevail. should we lose those aptitudes, are we likely to reach the position in war gained by our predecessors? for the british empire the matter is vital: success in maritime war, decisive and overwhelming, is indispensable to our existence. we have to consider the desirability of 'taking stock' of our moral, as well as of our material, naval equipment: to ascertain where the accumulated effect of repeated innovations has carried us. the mere fact of completing the investigation will help us to rate at their true value the changes which have been introduced; will show us what to retain, what to reject, and what to substitute. there is no essential vagueness in these allusions. if they seem vague, it is because the moment for particularising has not yet come. the public opinion of the navy must first be turned in the right direction. it must be led to question the soundness of the basis on which many present methods rest. having once begun to do this, we shall find no difficulty in settling, in detail and with precision, what the true elements of naval efficiency are. iv[ ] the historical relations between the navy and the merchant service [footnote : written in . (_the_times_.)] the regret, often expressed, that the crews of british merchant ships now include a large proportion of foreigners, is founded chiefly on the apprehension that a well-tested and hitherto secure recruiting ground for the navy is likely to be closed. it has been stated repeatedly, and the statement has been generally accepted without question, that in former days, when a great expansion of our fleet was forced on us by the near approach of danger, we relied upon the ample resources of our merchant service to complete the manning of our ships of war, even in a short time, and that the demands of the navy upon the former were always satisfied. it is assumed that compliance with those demands was as a rule not voluntary, but was enforced by the press-gang. the resources, it is said, existed and were within reach, and the method employed in drawing upon them was a detail of comparatively minor importance; our merchant ships were manned by native-born british seamen, of whom tens of thousands were always at hand, so that if volunteers were not forthcoming the number wanted could be 'pressed' into the royal service. it is lamented that at the present day the condition of affairs is different, that the presence in it of a large number of foreigners forbids us to regard with any confidence the merchant service as an adequate naval recruiting ground in the event of war, even though we are ready to substitute for the system of 'impressment'--which is now considered both undesirable and impossible--rewards likely to attract volunteers. the importance of the subject need not be dwelt upon. the necessity to a maritime state of a powerful navy, including abundant resources for manning it, is now no more disputed than the law of gravitation. if the proportion of foreigners in our merchant service is too high it is certainly deplorable; and if, being already too high, that proportion is rising, an early remedy is urgently needed. i do not propose to speak here of that matter, which is grave enough to require separate treatment. my object is to present the results of an inquiry into the history of the relations between the navy and the merchant service, from which will appear to what extent the latter helped in bringing the former up to a war footing, how far its assistance was affected by the presence in it of any foreign element, and in what way impressment ensured or expedited the rendering of the assistance. the inquiry has necessarily been largely statistical; consequently the results will often be given in a statistical form. this has the great advantage of removing the conclusions arrived at from the domain of mere opinion into that of admitted fact. the statistics used are those which have not been, and are not likely to be, questioned. it is desirable that this should be understood, because official figures have not always commanded universal assent. lord brougham, speaking in the house of lords in of tables issued by the board of trade, said that a lively impression prevailed 'that they could prove anything and everything'; and in connection with them he adopted some unnamed person's remark, 'give me half an hour and the run of the multiplication table and i'll engage to payoff the national debt.' in this inquiry there has been no occasion to use figures relating to the time of lord brougham's observations. we will take the last three great maritime wars in which our country has been engaged. these were: the war of american independence, the war with revolutionary france to the peace of amiens, and the war with napoleon. the period covered by these three contests roughly corresponds to the last quarter of the eighteenth and the first fifteen years of the nineteenth century. in each of the three wars there was a sudden and large addition to the number of seamen in the navy; and in each there were considerable annual increases as the struggle continued. it must be understood that we shall deal with the case of seamen only; the figures, which also were large, relating to the marines not being included in our survey because it has never been contended that their corps looked to the merchant service for any appreciable proportion of its recruits. in taking note of the increase of seamen voted for any year it will be necessary to make allowance also for the 'waste' of the previous year. the waste, even in the latter part of the last century, was large. commander robinson, in his valuable work, 'the british fleet,' gives details showing that the waste during the seven years' war was so great as to be truly shocking. in lord brassey (_naval_annual_) allowed for the _personnel_ of the navy, even in these days of peace and advanced sanitary science, a yearly waste of per cent., a percentage which is, i expect, rather lower than that officially accepted. we may take it as certain that, during the three serious wars above named, the annual waste was never less than per cent. this is, perhaps, to put it too low; but it is better to understate the case than to appear to exaggerate it. the recruiting demand, therefore, for a year of increased armament will be the sum of the increase in men _plus_ the waste on the previous year's numbers. the capacity of the british merchant service to supply what was demanded would, of course, be all the greater the smaller the number of foreigners it contained in its ranks. this is not only generally admitted at the present day; it is also frequently pointed out when it is asserted that the conditions now are less favourable than they were owing to a recent influx of foreign seamen. the fact, however, is that there were foreigners on board british merchant ships, and, it would seem, in considerable numbers, long before even the war of american independence. by george ii, c. , foreigners, not exceeding three-fourths of the crew, were permitted in british vessels, 'and in two years to be naturalised.' by george ii, c. , exemption from impressment was granted to 'every person, being a foreigner, who shall serve in any merchant ship, or other trading vessel or privateer belonging to a subject of the crown of great britain.' the acts quoted were passed about the time of the 'jenkins' ear war' and the war of the austrian succession; but the fact that foreigners were allowed to form the majority of a british vessel's crew is worthy of notice. the effect and, probably, the object of this legislation were not so much to permit foreign seamen to enter our merchant service as to permit the number of those already there to be increased. it was in that lord, then commander, duncan reported that the crew of the hired merchant ship _royal_ _exchange_ consisted 'to a large extent of boys and foreigners, many of whom could not speak english.' in by george iii, c. , merchant ships were allowed to have three-fourths of their crews foreigners till the st february . acts permitting the same proportion of foreign seamen and extending the time were passed in , , , , , and . a similar act was passed in . it was in contemplation to reduce the foreign proportion, after the war, to one-fourth. in it was enacted ( george iii, c. ), 'for the encouragement of british seamen,' that after the expiration of six months from the conclusion of the war, vessels in the foreign, as distinguished from the coasting, trade were to have their commanders and three-fourths of their crews british subjects. from the wording of the act it seems to have been taken for granted that the proportion of three-fourths _bona_fide_ british-born seamen was not likely to be generally exceeded. it will have been observed that in all the legislation mentioned, from the time of george ii downwards, it was assumed as a matter of course that there were foreign seamen on board our merchant vessels. the united states citizens in the british navy, about whom there was so much discussion on the eve of the war of , came principally from our own merchant service, and not direct from the american. it is remarkable that, until a recent date, the presence of foreigners in british vessels, even in time of peace, was not loudly or generally complained of. mr. w. s. lindsay, writing in , stated that the throwing open the coasting trade in had 'neither increased on the average the number of foreigners we had hitherto been allowed to employ in our ships, nor deteriorated the number and quality of british seamen.' i have brought forward enough evidence to show that, as far as the merchant service was the proper recruiting ground for the british navy, it was not one which was devoid of a considerable foreign element. we may, nevertheless, feel certain that that element never amounted to, and indeed never nearly approached, three-fourths of the whole number of men employed in our 'foreign-going' vessels. for this, between , and , men would have been required, at least in the last of the three wars above mentioned. if all the foreign mercantile marines at the present day, when nearly all have been so largely increased, were to combine, they could not furnish the number required after their own wants had been satisfied. during the period under review some of the leading commercial nations were at war with us; so that few, if any, seamen could have come to us from them. our custom-house statistics indicate an increase in the shipping trade of the neutral nations sufficient to have rendered it impossible for them to spare us any much larger number of seamen. therefore, it is extremely difficult to resist the conclusion that during the wars the composition of our merchant service remained nearly what it was during peace. it contained a far from insignificant proportion of foreigners; and that proportion was augmented, though by no means enormously, whilst war was going on. this leads us to the further conclusion that, if our merchant service supplied the navy with many men, it could recover only a small part of the number from foreign countries. in fact, any that it could give it had to replace from our own population almost exclusively. the question now to be considered is, what was the capacity of the merchant service for supplying the demands of the navy? in the year the number of seamen voted for the navy was , . owing to a fear of a difficulty with spain about the falkland islands, the number for the following year was suddenly raised to , . consequently, the increase was , , which, added to the 'waste' on the previous year, made the whole naval demand about , . we have not got statistics of the seamen of the whole british empire for this period, but we have figures which will enable us to compute the number with sufficient accuracy for the purpose in hand. in england and wales there were some , seamen, and those of the rest of the empire amounted to about , . large as the 'waste' was in the royal navy, it was, and still is, much larger in the merchant service. we may safely put it at per cent. at least. therefore, simply to keep up its numbers-- , --the merchant service would have had to engage fully fresh hands. in view of these figures, it is difficult to believe that it could have furnished the navy with , men, or, indeed, with any number approximating thereto. it could not possibly have done so without restricting its operations, if only for a time. so far were its operations from shrinking that they were positively extended. the english tonnage 'cleared outwards' from our ports was for the years mentioned as follows: , , ; , , ; , . owing to the generally slow rate of sailing when on voyages and to the great length of time taken in unloading and reloading abroad--both being often effected 'in the stream' and with the ship's own boats--the figures for clearances outward much more nearly represented the amount of our 'foreign-going' tonnage a century ago than similar figures would now in these days of rapid movement. after the navy was reduced and kept at a relatively low standard till . in that year the state of affairs in america rendered an increase of our naval forces necessary. in we were at war with france; in with spain as well; and in december we had the dutch for enemies in addition. in september we were again at peace. the way in which we had to increase the navy will be seen in the following table:-- ------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | total | | | seamen | | | additional | | | voted for | | | number | | year. | the navy | increase. | 'waste.' | required. | |-------------------------------------------------------| | | , | -- | -- | -- | | | , | , | | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | ------------------------------------------------------- it cannot be believed that the merchant service, with its then dimensions, could have possibly satisfied these great and repeated demands, besides making up its own 'waste,' unless its size were much reduced. after , indeed, there was a considerable fall in the figures of english tonnage 'outwards.' i give these figures down to the first year of peace. , tons 'outwards.' , " " , " " , " " , " " , " " , " " , " " at first sight it would seem as if there had, indeed, been a shrinkage. we find, however, on further examination that in reality there had been none. 'during the [american] war the ship-yards in every port of britain were full of employment; and consequently new ship-yards were set up in places where ships had never been built before.' even the diminution in the statistics of outward clearances indicated no diminution in the number of merchant ships or their crews. the missing tonnage was merely employed elsewhere. 'at this time there were about vessels of private property employed by the government as transports and in other branches of the public service.' of course there had been some diminution due to the transfer of what had been british-american shipping to a new independent flag. this would not have set free any men to join the navy. when we come to the revolutionary war we find ourselves confronted with similar conditions. the case of this war has often been quoted as proving that in former days the navy had to rely practically exclusively on the merchant service when expansion was necessary. in giving evidence before a parliamentary committee about fifty years ago, admiral sir t. byam martin, referring to the great increase of the fleet in , said, 'it was the merchant service that enabled us to man some sixty ships of the line and double that number of frigates and smaller vessels.' he added that we had been able to bring promptly together 'about , or , men of the mercantile marine.' the requirements of the navy amounted, as stated by the admiral, to about , men; to be exact, , . the number of seamen in the british empire in was , . in the next year the number showed no diminution; in fact it increased, though but slightly, to , . how our merchant service could have satisfied the above-mentioned immense demand on it in addition to making good its waste and then have even increased is a thing that baffles comprehension. no such example of elasticity is presented by any other institution. admiral byam martin spoke so positively, and, indeed, with such justly admitted authority, that we should have to give up the problem as insoluble were it not for other passages in the admiral's own evidence. it may be mentioned that all the witnesses did not hold his views. sir james stirling, an officer of nearly if not quite equal authority, differed from him. in continuation of his evidence sir t. byam martin stated that afterwards the merchant service could give only a small and occasional supply, as ships arrived from foreign ports or as apprentices grew out of their time. now, during the remaining years of this war and throughout the napoleonic war, great as were the demands of the navy, they only in one year, that of the rupture of the peace of amiens, equalled the demand at the beginning of the revolutionary war. from the beginning of hostilities till the final close of the conflict in the number of merchant seamen fell only once--viz. in , the fall being . in , however, the demand for men for the navy was less than half that of . the utmost, therefore, that sir t. byam martin desired to establish was that, on a single occasion in an unusually protracted continuance of war, the strength of our merchant service enabled it to reinforce the navy up to the latter's requirements; but its doing so prevented it from giving much help afterwards. all the same, men in large numbers had to be found for the navy yearly for a long time. this will appear from the tables which follow:-- revolutionary war ------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | total | | | seamen | | | additional | | | voted for | | | number | | year. | the navy | increase. | 'waste.' | required. | |-------------------------------------------------------| | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | -- | -- | | | , | , | absorbed | , | | | | | by | | | | | | previous | | | | | |reduction.| | ------------------------------------------------------- napoleonic war ------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | total | | | seamen | | | additional | | | voted for | | | number | | year. | the navy | increase. | 'waste.' | required. | |-------------------------------------------------------| | | / , \ | | | | | | \ , / | , | -- | , | | | , | | , | , | | | | |(for nine | | | | | | months) | | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | , | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | -- | , | , | | | , | reduction | -- | -- | | | / , \ | | | | | | \ , / | do. | -- | -- | ------------------------------------------------------- (no 'waste' is allowed for when there has been a reduction.) it is a reasonable presumption that, except perhaps on a single occasion, the merchant service did not furnish the men required--not from any want of patriotism or of public spirit, but simply because it was impossible. even as regards the single exception the evidence is not uncontested; and by itself, though undoubtedly strong, it is not convincing, in view of the well-grounded presumptions the other way. the question then that naturally arises is--if the navy did not fill up its complements from the merchant service, how did it fill them up? the answer is easy. our naval complements were filled up largely with boys, largely with landsmen, largely with fishermen, whose numbers permitted this without inconvenience to their trade in general, and, to a small extent, with merchant seamen. it may be suggested that the men wanted by the navy could have been passed on to it from our merchant vessels, which could then complete their own crews with boys, landsmen, and fishermen. it was the age in which dr. price was a great authority on public finance, the age of mr. pitt's sinking fund, when borrowed money was repaid with further borrowings; so that a corresponding roundabout method for manning the navy may have had attractions for some people. a conclusive reason why it was not adopted is that its adoption would have been possible only at the cost of disorganising such a great industrial undertaking as our maritime trade. that this disorganisation did not arise is proved by the fact that our merchant service flourished and expanded. it is widely supposed that, wherever the men wanted for the navy may have come from, they were forced into it by the system of 'impressment.' the popular idea of a man-of-war's 'lower deck' of a century ago is that it was inhabited by a ship's company which had been captured by the press-gang and was restrained from revolting by the presence of a detachment of marines. the prevalence of the belief that seamen were 'raised'--'recruited' is not a naval term--for the navy by forcible means can be accounted for without difficulty. the supposed ubiquity of the press-gang and its violent procedure added much picturesque detail, and even romance, to stories of naval life. stories connected with it, if authentic, though rare, would, indeed, make a deep impression on the public; and what was really the exception would be taken for the rule. there is no evidence to show that even from the middle of the seventeenth century any considerable number of men was raised by forcible impressment. i am not acquainted with a single story of the press-gang which, even when much embellished, professes to narrate the seizure of more than an insignificant body. the allusions to forcible impressment made by naval historians are, with few exceptions, complaints of the utter inefficiency of the plan. in mr. david, hannay's excellent 'short history of the royal navy' will be found more than one illustration of its inefficient working in the seventeenth century. confirmation, if confirmation is needed, can be adduced on the high authority of mr. m. oppenheim. we wanted tens of thousands, and forcible impressment was giving us half-dozens, or, at the best, scores. even of those it provided, but a small proportion was really forced to serve. mr. oppenheim tells us of an act of parliament ( charles i) legalising forcible impressment, which seems to have been passed to satisfy the sailors. if anyone should think this absurd, he may be referred to the remarkable expression of opinion by some of the older seamen of sunderland and shields when the russian war broke out in . the married sailors, they said, naturally waited for the impressment, for 'we know that has always been and always will be preceded by the proclamation of bounty.' the most fruitful source of error as to the procedure of the press-gang has been a deficient knowledge of etymology. the word has, properly, no relation to the use of force, and has no etymological connection with 'press' and its compounds, 'compress,' 'depress,' 'express,' 'oppress,' &c. 'prest money is so-called from the french word _prest_--that is, readie money, for that it bindeth all those that have received it to be ready at all times appointed.' professor laughton tells us that 'a prest or imprest was an earnest or advance paid on account. a prest man was really a man who received the prest of d., as a soldier when enlisted.' writers, and some in an age when precision in spelling is thought important, have frequently spelled _prest_ pressed, and _imprest_ impressed. the natural result has been that the thousands who had received 'prest money' were classed as 'pressed' into the service by force. the foregoing may be summed up as follows:-- for years at least there never has been a time when the british merchant service did not contain an appreciable percentage of foreigners. during the last three (and greatest) maritime wars in which this country has been involved only a small proportion of the immense number of men required by the navy came, or could have come, from the merchant service. the number of men raised for the navy by forcible impressment in war time has been enormously exaggerated owing to a confusion of terms. as a matter of fact the number so raised, for quite two centuries, was only an insignificant fraction of the whole. v facts and fancies about the press-gang[ ] [footnote : written in , (_national_review_.)] of late years great attention has been paid to our naval history, and many even of its obscure byways have been explored. a general result of the investigation is that we are enabled to form a high estimate of the merits of our naval administration in former centuries. we find that for a long time the navy has possessed an efficient organisation; that its right position as an element of the national defences was understood ages ago; and that english naval officers of a period which is now very remote showed by their actions that they exactly appreciated and--when necessary--were able to apply the true principles of maritime warfare. if anyone still believes that the country has been saved more than once merely by lucky chances of weather, and that the england of elizabeth has been converted into the great oceanic and colonial british empire of victoria in 'a fit of absence of mind,' it will not be for want of materials with which to form a correct judgment on these points. it has been accepted generally that the principal method of manning our fleet in the past--especially when war threatened to arise--was to seize and put men on board the ships by force. this has been taken for granted by many, and it seems to have been assumed that, in any case, there is no way of either proving it or disproving it. the truth, however, is that it is possible and--at least as regards the period of our last great naval war--not difficult to make sure if it is true or not. records covering a long succession of years still exist, and in these can be found the name of nearly every seaman in the navy and a statement of the conditions on which he joined it. the exceptions would not amount to more than a few hundreds out of many tens of thousands of names, and would be due to the disappearance--in itself very infrequent--of some of the documents and to occasional, but also very rare, inaccuracies in the entries. the historical evidence on which the belief in the prevalence of impressment as a method of recruiting the navy for more than a hundred years is based, is limited to contemporary statements in the english newspapers, and especially in the issues of the periodical called _the_naval_chronicle_, published in , the first year of the war following the rupture of the peace of amiens. readers of captain mahan's works on sea-power will remember the picture he draws of the activity of the press-gang in that year, his authority being _the_naval_chronicle_. this evidence will be submitted directly to close examination, and we shall see what importance ought to be attached to it. in the great majority of cases, however, the belief above mentioned has no historical foundation, but is to be traced to the frequency with which the supposed operations of the press-gang were used by the authors of naval stories and dramas, and by artists who took scenes of naval life for their subject. violent seizure and abduction lend themselves to effective treatment in literature and in art, and writers and painters did not neglect what was so plainly suggested. a fruitful source of the widespread belief that our navy in the old days was chiefly manned by recourse to compulsion, is a confusion between two words of independent origin and different meaning, which, in ages when exact spelling was not thought indispensable, came to be written and pronounced alike. during our later great maritime wars, the official term applied to anyone recruited by impressment was 'prest-man.' in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and part of the eighteenth century, this term meant the exact opposite. it meant a man who had voluntarily engaged to serve, and who had received a sum in advance called 'prest-money.' 'a prest-man,' we are told by that high authority, professor sir j. k. laughton, 'was really a man who received the prest of d., as a soldier when enlisted.' in the 'encyclopædia metropolitana' ( ), we find:-- 'impressing, or, more correctly, impresting, i.e. paying earnest-money to seamen by the king's commission to the admiralty, is a right of very ancient date, and established by prescription, though not by statute. many statutes, however, imply its existence--one as far back as richard ii, cap. .' an old dictionary of james i's time ( ), called 'the guide into the tongues, by the industrie, studie, labour, and at the charges of john minshew,' gives the following definition:--'imprest-money. g. [gallic or french], imprest-ànce; _imprestanza_, from _in_ and _prestare_, to lend or give beforehand.... presse-money. t. [teutonic or german], soldt, from salz, _salt_. for anciently agreement or compact between the general and the soldier was signified by salt.' minshew also defines the expression 'to presse souldiers' by the german _soldatenwerben_, and explains that here the word _werben_ means prepare (_parare_). 'prest-money,' he says, 'is so-called of the french word _prest_, i.e. readie, for that it bindeth those that have received it to be ready at all times appointed.' in the posthumous work of stephen skinner, 'etymologia linguæ anglicanæ' ( ), the author joins together 'press or imprest' as though they were the same, and gives two definitions, viz.: ( ) recruiting by force (_milites_cogere_); ( ) paying soldiers a sum of money and keeping them ready to serve. dr. murray's 'new english dictionary,' now in course of publication, gives instances of the confusion between imprest and impress. a consequence of this confusion has been that many thousands of seamen who had received an advance of money have been regarded as carried off to the navy by force. if to this misunderstanding we add the effect on the popular mind of cleverly written stories in which the press-gang figured prominently, we can easily see how the belief in an almost universal adoption of compulsory recruiting for the navy became general. it should, therefore, be no matter of surprise when we find that the sensational reports published in the english newspapers in were accepted without question. impressment of seamen for the navy has been called 'lawless,' and sometimes it has been asserted that it was directly contrary to law. there is, however, no doubt that it was perfectly legal, though its legality was not based upon any direct statutory authority. indirect confirmations of it by statute are numerous. these appear in the form of exemptions. the law of the land relating to this subject was that all 'sea-faring' men were liable to impressment unless specially protected by custom or statute. a consideration of the long list of exemptions tends to make one believe that in reality very few people were liable to be impressed. some were 'protected' by local custom, some by statute, and some by administrative order. the number of the last must have been very great. the 'protection books' preserved in the public record office form no inconsiderable section of the admiralty records. for the period specially under notice, viz. that beginning with the year , there are no less than five volumes of 'protections.' exemptions by custom probably originated at a very remote date: ferrymen, for example, being everywhere privileged from impressment. the crews of colliers seem to have enjoyed the privilege by custom before it was confirmed by act of parliament. the naval historian, burchett, writing of , cites a 'proclamation forbidding pressing men from colliers.' every ship in the coal trade had the following persons protected, viz. two a.b.'s for every ship of tons, and one for every tons in larger ships. when we come to consider the sensational statements in _the_naval_chronicle_ of , it will be well to remember what the penalty for infringing the colliers' privilege was. by the act & william iii, c. , sect. , 'any officer who presumes to impress any of the above shall forfeit to the master or owner of such vessel £ for every man so impressed; and such officer shall be incapable of holding any place, office, or employment in any of his majesty's ships of war.' it is not likely that the least scrupulous naval officer would make himself liable to professional ruin as well as to a heavy fine. no parish apprentice could be impressed for the sea service of the crown until he arrived at the age of eighteen ( & anne, c. , sect. ). persons voluntarily binding themselves apprentices to sea service could not be impressed for three years from the date of their indentures. besides sect. of the act of anne just quoted, exemptions were granted, before , by anne, c. ; and george ii, c. . by the act last mentioned all persons fifty-five years of age and under eighteen were exempted, and every foreigner serving in a ship belonging to a british subject, and also all persons 'of what age soever who shall use the sea' for two years, to be computed from the time of their first using it. a customary exemption was extended to the proportion of the crew of any ship necessary for her safe navigation. in practice this must have reduced the numbers liable to impressment to small dimensions. even when the admiralty decided to suspend all administrative exemptions--or, as the phrase was, 'to press from all protections'--many persons were still exempted. the customary and statutory exemptions, of course, were unaffected. on the th november their lordships informed officers in charge of rendezvous that it was 'necessary for the speedy manning of h.m. ships to impress all persons of the denominations exprest in the press-warrant which you have received from us, without regard to any protections, excepting, however, all such persons as are protected pursuant to acts of parliament, and all others who by the printed instructions which accompanied the said warrant are forbidden to be imprest.' in addition to these a long list of further exemptions was sent. the last in the list included the crews of 'ships and vessels bound to foreign parts which are laden and cleared outwards by the proper officers of h.m. customs.' it would seem that there was next to no one left liable to impressment; and it is not astonishing that the admiralty, as shown by its action very shortly afterwards, felt that pressing seamen was a poor way of manning the fleet. though the war which broke out in was not formally declared until may, active preparations were begun earlier. the navy had been greatly reduced since the peace of amiens, and as late as the nd december the house of commons had voted that ' , seamen be employed for the service of the year , including , marines.' on the th march an additional number was voted. it amounted to , men, of whom were to be marines. much larger additions were voted a few weeks later. the total increase was , men; viz. , seamen and , marines. it never occurred to anyone that forcible recruiting would be necessary in the case of the marines, though the establishment of the corps was to be nearly doubled, as it had to be brought up to , from , . attention may be specially directed to this point. the marine formed an integral part of a man-of-war's crew just as the seamen did. he received no better treatment than the latter; and as regards pecuniary remuneration, prospects of advancement, and hope of attaining to the position of warrant officer, was, on the whole, in a less favourable position. it seems to have been universally accepted that voluntary enlistment would prove--as, in fact, it did prove--sufficient in the case of the marines. what we have got to see is how far it failed in the case of the seamen, and how far its deficiencies were made up by compulsion. on the th march the admiralty notified the board of ordnance that twenty-two ships of the line--the names of which were stated--were 'coming forward' for sea. many of these ships are mentioned in _the_naval_chronicle_ as requiring men, and that journal gives the names of several others of various classes in the same state. the number altogether is thirty-one. the aggregate complements, including marines and boys, of these ships amounted to , . the number of 'seamen' was , , though this included some of the officers who were borne on the same muster-list. the total number of seamen actually required exceeded , . the _naval_ _chronicle_ contains a vivid, not to say sensational, account of the steps taken to raise them. the report from plymouth, dated th march, is as follows: 'several bodies of royal marines in parties of twelve and fourteen each, with their officers and naval officers armed, proceeded towards the quays. so secret were the orders kept that they did not know the nature of the business on which they were going until they boarded the tier of colliers at the new quay, and other gangs the ships in the catwater and the pool, and the gin-shops. a great number of prime seamen were taken out and sent on board the admiral's ship. they also pressed landsmen of all descriptions; and the town looked as if in a state of siege. at stonehouse, mutton cove, morris town, and in all the receiving and gin-shops at dock [the present devonport] several hundreds of seamen and landsmen were picked up and sent directly aboard the flag-ship. by the returns last night it appears that upwards of useful hands were pressed last night in the three towns.... one press-gang entered the dock [devonport] theatre and cleared the whole gallery except the women.' the reporter remarks: 'it is said that near men have been impressed in this neighbourhood.' the number--if obtained--would not have been sufficient to complete the seamen in the complements of a couple of line-of-battle ships. naval officers who remember the methods of manning ships which lasted well into the middle of the nineteenth century, and of course long after recourse to impressment had been given up, will probably notice the remarkable fact that the reporter makes no mention of any of the parties whose proceedings he described being engaged in picking up men who had voluntarily joined ships fitting out, but had not returned on board on the expiration of the leave granted them. the description in _the_naval_chronicle_ might be applied to events which--when impressment had ceased for half a century--occurred over and over again at portsmouth, devonport, and other ports when two or three ships happened to be put in commission about the same time. we shall find that the reported as impressed had to be considerably reduced before long. the reporter afterwards wisely kept himself from giving figures, except in a single instance when he states that 'about forty' were taken out of the flotilla of plymouth trawlers. reporting on th march he says that 'last thursday and yesterday'--the day of the sensational report above given--'several useful hands were picked up, mostly seamen, who were concealed in the different lodgings and were discovered by their girls.' he adds, 'several prime seamen were yesterday taken disguised as labourers in the different marble quarries round the town.' on th october the report is that 'the different press-gangs, with their officers, literally scoured the country on the eastern roads and picked up several fine young fellows.' here, again, no distinction is drawn between men really impressed and men who were arrested for being absent beyond the duration of their leave. we are told next that 'upon a survey of all impressed men before three captains and three surgeons of the royal navy, such as were deemed unfit for his majesty's service, as well as all apprentices, were immediately discharged,' which, no doubt, greatly diminished the above-mentioned . the reporter at portsmouth begins his account of the 'press' at that place by saying, 'they indiscriminately took every man on board the colliers.' in view of what we know of the heavy penalties to which officers who pressed more than a certain proportion of a collier's crew were liable, we may take it that this statement was made in error. on th march it was reported that 'the constables and gangs from the ships continue very alert in obtaining seamen, many of whom have been sent on board different ships in the harbour this day.' we do not hear again from portsmouth till may, on the th of which month it was reported that 'about men were obtained.' on the th the report was that 'on saturday afternoon the gates of the town were shut and soldiers placed at every avenue. tradesmen were taken from their shops and sent on board the ships in the harbour or placed in the guard-house for the night, till they could be examined. if fit for his majesty's service they were kept, if in trade set at liberty.' the 'tradesmen,' then, if really taken, were taken simply to be set free again. as far as the reports first quoted convey any trustworthy information, it appears that at portsmouth and plymouth during march, april, and the first week of may, men were 'picked up,' and that of these many were immediately discharged. how many of the were not really impressed, but were what in the navy are called 'stragglers,' i.e. men over-staying their leave of absence, is not indicated. _the_times_ of the th march , and th may , also contained reports of the impressment operations. it says: 'the returns to the admiralty of the seamen impressed (apparently at the thames ports) on tuesday night amounted to , of whom no less than two-thirds are considered prime hands. at portsmouth, portsea, gosport, and cowes a general press took place the same night.... upwards of seamen were collected in consequence of the promptitude of the measures adopted.' it was added that the government 'relied upon increasing our naval forces with , seamen, either volunteers or impressed men, in less than a fortnight.' the figures show us how small a proportion of the , was even alleged to be made up of impressed men. a later _times_ report is that: 'the impress on saturday, both above and below the bridge, was the hottest that has been for some time. the boats belonging to the ships at deptford were particularly active, and it is supposed they obtained upwards of men.' _the_ _times_ reports thus account for men over and above the stated to have been impressed at plymouth and portsmouth, thus making a grand total of . it will be proved by official figures directly that the last number was an over-estimate. before going farther, attention may be called to one or two points in connection with the above reports. the increase in the number of seamen voted by parliament in march was . the reports of the impressment operations only came down to may. it was not till the th june that parliament voted a further addition to the navy of , seamen. yet whilst the latter great increase was being obtained--for obtained it was--the reporters are virtually silent as to the action of the press-gang. we must ask ourselves, if we could get , additional seamen with so little recourse to impressment that the operations called for no special notice, how was it that compulsion was necessary when only men were wanted? the question is all the more pertinent when we recall the state of affairs in the early part of . the navy had been greatly reduced in the year before, the men voted having diminished from , to , . what became of the , men not required, of whom about , must have been of the seaman class and have been discharged from the service? there was a further reduction of , to take effect in the beginning of . sir sydney smith, at that time a member of parliament, in the debate of the nd december , 'expressed considerable regret at the great reductions which were suddenly made, both in the king's dockyards and in the navy in general. a prodigious number of men,' he said, 'had been thus reduced to the utmost poverty and distress.' he stated that he 'knew, from his own experience, that what was called an ordinary seaman could hardly find employment at present, either in the king's or in the merchants' service.' the increase of the fleet in march must have seemed a godsend to thousands of men-of-war's men. if there was any holding back on their part, it was due, no doubt, to an expectation--which the sequel showed to be well founded--that a bounty would be given to men joining the navy. the muster-book of a man-of-war is the official list of her crew. it contains the name of every officer and man in the complement. primarily it was an account-book, as it contains entries of the payments made to each person whose name appears in it. at the beginning of the nineteenth century it was usual to make out a fresh muster-book every two months, though that period was not always exactly adhered to. each new book was a copy of the preceding one, with the addition of the names of persons who had joined the ship since the closing of the latter. until the ship was paid off and thus put out of commission--or, in the case of a very long commission, until 'new books' were ordered to be opened so as to escape the inconveniences due to the repetition of large numbers of entries--the name of every man that had belonged to her remained on the list, his disposal--if no longer in the ship--being noted in the proper column. one column was headed 'whence, and whether prest or not?' in this was noted his former ship, or the fact of his being entered direct from the shore, which answered to the question 'whence?' there is reason to believe that the muster-book being, as above said, primarily an account-book, the words 'whether prest or not' were originally placed at the head of the column so that it might be noted against each man entered whether he had been paid 'prest-money' or not. however this may be, the column at the beginning of the nineteenth century was used for a record of the circumstances of the man's entering the ship, whether he had been transferred from another, had joined as a volunteer from the shore, or had been impressed. i have examined the muster-book of every ship mentioned in the admiralty letter to the board of ordnance above referred to, and also of the ships mentioned in _the_naval_chronicle_ as fitting out in the early part of . there are altogether thirty-three ships; but two of them, the _utrecht_ and the _gelykheid_, were used as temporary receiving ships for newly raised men.[ ] the names on their lists are, therefore, merely those of men who were passed on to other ships, in whose muster-books they appeared again. there remained thirty-one ships which, as far as could be ascertained, account for the additional force which the government had decided to put in commission, more than two-thirds of them being ships of the line. as already stated, their total complements amounted to , , and the number of the 'blue-jackets' of full age to at least , . the muster-books appear to have been kept with great care. the only exception seems to be that of the _victory_, in which there is some reason to think the number of men noted as 'prest' has been over-stated owing to an error in copying the earlier book. ships in did not get their full crews at once, any more than they did half a century later. i have, therefore, thought it necessary to take the muster-books for the months in which the crews had been brought up to completion. [footnote : the words 'recruit' and 'enlist,' except as regards marines, are unknown in the navy, in which they are replaced by 'raise' and 'enter.'] an examination of the books would be likely to dispel many misconceptions about the old navy. not only is it noted against each man's name whether he was 'pressed' or a volunteer, it is also noted if he was put on board ship as an alternative to imprisonment on shore, this being indicated by the words 'civil power,' an expression still used in the navy, but with a different meaning. the percentage of men thus 'raised' was small. sometimes there is a note stating that the man had been allowed to enter from the '----shire militia.' a rare note is 'brought on board by soldiers,' which most likely indicated that the man had been recaptured when attempting to desert. it is sometimes asserted that many men who volunteered did so only to escape impressment. this may be so; but it should be said that there are frequent notations against the names of 'prest' men that they afterwards volunteered. this shows the care that was taken to ascertain the real conditions on which a man entered the service. for the purposes of this inquiry all these men have been considered as impressed, and they have not been counted amongst the volunteers. it is, perhaps, permissible to set off against such men the number of those who allowed themselves to be impressed to escape inconveniences likely to be encountered if they remained at home. of two john westlakes, ordinary seamen of the _boadicea_, one--john (i.)--was 'prest,' but was afterwards 'taken out of the ship for a debt of twenty pounds'; which shows that he had preferred to trust himself to the press-gang rather than to his creditors. without being unduly imaginative, we may suppose that in there were heroes who preferred being 'carried off' to defend their country afloat to meeting the liabilities of putative paternity in their native villages. the muster-books examined cover several months, during which many 'prest' men were discharged and some managed to desert, so that the total was never present at anyone time. that total amounts to . it is certain that even this is larger than the reality, because it has been found impossible--without an excessive expenditure of time and labour--to trace the cases of men being sent from one ship to another, and thus appearing twice over, or oftener, as 'prest' men. as an example of this the _minotaur_ may be cited. out of twenty names on one page of her muster-book thirteen are those of 'prest' men discharged to other ships. the discharges from the _victory_ were numerous; and the _ardent_, which was employed in keeping up communication with the ships off brest, passed men on to the latter when required. i have, however, made no deductions from the 'prest' total to meet these cases. we can see that not more than men, and probably considerably fewer, were impressed to meet the increase of the navy during the greater part of . admitting that there were cases of impressment from merchant vessels abroad to complete the crews of our men-of-war in distant waters, the total number impressed--including these latter--could not have exceeded greatly the figures first given. we know that owing to the reduction of , as stated by sir sydney smith, the seamen were looking for ships rather than the ships for seamen. it seems justifiable to infer that the whole number of impressed men on any particular day did not exceed, almost certainly did not amount to, . if they had been spread over the whole navy they would not have made per cent. of the united complements of the ships; and, as it was, did not equal one-nineteenth of the , seamen ('blue-jackets') raised to complete the navy to the establishment sanctioned by parliament. a system under which more than , volunteers come forward to serve and less than men are obtained by compulsion cannot be properly called compulsory. the plymouth reporter of _the_naval_chronicle_ does not give many details of the volunteering for the navy in , though he alludes to it in fluent terms more than once. on the th october, however, he reports that, 'so many volunteer seamen have arrived here this last week that upwards of £ bounty is to be paid them afloat by the paying commissioner, rear-admiral dacres.' at the time the bounty was £ s. for an a.b., £ s. for an ordinary seaman, and £ for a landsman. taking only £ as the full amount paid, and assuming that the three classes were equally represented, three men were obtained for every £ , or in all, a number raised in about a week, that may be compared with that given as resulting from impressment. in reality, the number of volunteers must have been larger, because the a.b.'s were fewer than the other classes. some people may be astonished because the practice of impressment, which had proved to be so utterly inefficient, was not at once and formally given up. no astonishment will be felt by those who are conversant with the habits of government departments. in every country public officials evince great and, indeed, almost invincible reluctance to give up anything, whether it be a material object or an administrative process, which they have once possessed or conducted. one has only to stroll through the arsenals of the world, or glance at the mooring-grounds of the maritime states, to see to what an extent the passion for retaining the obsolete and useless holds dominion over the official mind. a thing may be known to be valueless--its retention may be proved to be mischievous--yet proposals to abandon it will be opposed and defeated. it is doubtful if any male human being over forty was ever converted to a new faith of any kind. the public has to wait until the generation of administrative conservatives has either passed away or been outnumbered by those acquainted only with newer methods. then the change is made; the certainty, nevertheless, being that the new men in their turn will resist improvements as obstinately and in exactly the same way as their predecessors. to be just to the board of admiralty of , it must be admitted that some of its members seem to have lost faith in the efficacy of impressment as a system of manning the navy. the lords commissioners of that date could hardly--all of them, at any rate--have been so thoroughly destitute of humour as not to suspect that seizing a few score of men here and a few there when tens of thousands were needed, was a very insufficient compensation for the large correspondence necessitated by adherence to the system (and still in existence). their lordships actively bombarded the home office with letters pointing out, for example, that a number of british seamen at guernsey 'appeared to have repaired to that island with a view to avoid being pressed'; that they were 'of opinion that it would be highly proper that the sea-faring men (in jersey as well as guernsey), not natives nor settled inhabitants, should be impressed'; that when the captain of h.m.s. _aigle_ had landed at portland 'for the purpose of raising men' some resistance had 'been made by the sailors'; and dealing with other subjects connected with the system. a complaint sent to the war department was that 'amongst a number of men lately impressed (at leith) there were eight or ten shipwrights who were sea-faring men, and had been claimed as belonging to a volunteer artillery corps.' we may suspect that there was some discussion at whitehall as to the wisdom of retaining a plan which caused so much inconvenience and had such poor results. the conclusion seems to have been to submit it to a searching test. the coasts of the united kingdom were studded with stations--thirty-seven generally, but the number varied--for the entry of seamen. the ordinary official description of these--as shown by entries in the muster-books--was 'rendezvous'; but other terms were used. it has often been thought that they were simply impressment offices. the fact is that many more men were raised at these places by volunteering than by impressment. the rendezvous, as a rule, were in charge of captains or commanders, some few being entrusted to lieutenants. the men attached to each were styled its 'gang,' a word which conveys no discredit in nautical language. on th november the admiralty sent to the officers in charge of rendezvous the communication already mentioned--to press men 'without regard to any protections,'--the exceptions, indeed, being so many that the officers must have wondered who could legitimately be taken. the order at first sight appeared sweeping enough. it contained the following words: 'whereas we think fit that a general press from all protections as above mentioned shall commence at london and in the neighbourhood thereof on the night of monday next, the th instant, you are therefore (after taking the proper preparatory measures with all possible secrecy) hereby required to impress and to give orders to the lieutenants under your command to impress all persons of the above-mentioned denominations (except as before excepted) and continue to do so until you receive orders from us to the contrary.' as it was addressed to officers in all parts of the united kingdom, the 'general press' was not confined to london and its neighbourhood, though it was to begin in the capital. though returns of the numbers impressed have not been discovered, we have strong evidence that this 'general press,' notwithstanding the secrecy with which it had been arranged, was a failure. on the th december , just a month after it had been tried, the admiralty formulated the following conclusion: 'on a consideration of the expense attending the service of raising men on shore for his majesty's fleet comparatively with the number procured, as well as from other circumstances, there is reason to believe that either proper exertions have not been made by some of the officers employed on that service, or that there have been great abuses and mismanagement in the expenditure of the public money.' this means that it was now seen that impressment, though of little use in obtaining men for the navy, was a very costly arrangement. the lords of the admiralty accordingly ordered that 'the several places of rendezvous should be visited and the conduct of the officers employed in carrying out the above-mentioned service should be inquired into on the spot.' rear-admiral arthur phillip, the celebrated first governor of new south wales, was ordered to make the inquiry. this was the last duty in which that distinguished officer was employed, and his having been selected for it appears to have been unknown to all his biographers. it is not surprising that after this the proceedings of the press-gang occupy scarcely any space in our naval history. such references to them as there are will be found in the writings of the novelist and the dramatist. probably individual cases of impressment occurred till nearly the end of the great war; but they could not have been many. compulsory service most unnecessarily caused--not much, but still some--unjustifiable personal hardship. it tended to stir up a feeling hostile to the navy. it required to work it machinery costly out of all proportion to the results obtained. indeed, it failed completely to effect what had been expected of it. in the great days of old our fleet, after all, was manned, not by impressed men, but by volunteers. it was largely due to that that we became masters of the sea. vi projected invasions of the british isles[ ] [footnote : written in . (_the_times_.)] the practice to which we have become accustomed of late, of publishing original documents relating to naval and military history, has been amply justified by the results. these meet the requirements of two classes of readers. the publications satisfy, or at any rate go far towards satisfying, the wishes of those who want to be entertained, and also of those whose higher motive is a desire to discover the truth about notable historical occurrences. putting the public in possession of the materials, previously hidden in more or less inaccessible muniment-rooms and record offices, with which the narratives of professed historians have been constructed, has had advantages likely to become more and more apparent as time goes on. it acts as a check upon the imaginative tendencies which even eminent writers have not always been able, by themselves, to keep under proper control. the certainty, nay the mere probability, that you will be confronted with the witnesses on whose evidence you profess to have relied--the 'sources' from which your story is derived--will suggest the necessity of sobriety of statement and the advisability of subordinating rhetoric to veracity. had the contemporary documents been available for an immediate appeal to them by the reading public, we should long ago have rid ourselves of some dangerous superstitions. we should have abandoned our belief in the fictions that the armada of was defeated by the weather, and that the great herbert of torrington was a lubber, a traitor, and a coward. it is not easy to calculate the benefit that we should have secured, had the presentation of some important events in the history of our national defence been as accurate as it was effective. enormous sums of money have been wasted in trying to make our defensive arrangements square with a conception of history based upon misunderstanding or misinterpretation of facts. pecuniary extravagance is bad enough; but there is a greater evil still. we have been taught to cherish, and we have been reluctant to abandon, a false standard of defence, though adherence to such a standard can be shown to have brought the country within measurable distance of grievous peril. captain duro, of the spanish navy, in his 'armada invencible,' placed within our reach contemporary evidence from the side of the assailants, thereby assisting us to form a judgment on a momentous episode in naval history. the evidence was completed; some being adduced from the other side, by our fellow-countryman sir j. k. laughton, in his 'defeat of the spanish armada,' published by the navy records society. others have worked on similar lines; and a healthier view of our strategic conditions and needs is more widely held than it was; though it cannot be said to be, even yet, universally prevalent. superstition, even the grossest, dies hard. something deeper than mere literary interest, therefore, is to be attributed to a work which has recently appeared in paris.[ ] to speak strictly, it should be said that only the first volume of three which will complete it has been published. it is, however, in the nature of a work of the kind that its separate parts should be virtually independent of each other. consequently the volume which we now have may be treated properly as a book by itself. when completed the work is to contain all the documents relating to the french preparations during the period - , for taking the offensive against england (_tous_les_documents_se_rapportant_ _à_la_préparation_de_l'offensive_contre_l'angleterre_). the search for, the critical examination and the methodical classification of, the papers were begun in october . the book is compiled by captain desbrière, of the french cuirassiers, who was specially authorised to continue his editorial labours even after he had resumed his ordinary military duties. it bears the _imprimatur_ of the staff of the army; and its preface is written by an officer who was--and so signs himself--chief of the historical section of that department. there is no necessity to criticise the literary execution of the work. what is wanted is to explain the nature of its contents and to indicate the lessons which may be drawn from them. nevertheless, attention may be called to a curious misreading of history contained in the preface. in stating the periods which the different volumes of the book are to cover, the writer alludes to the peace of amiens, which, he affirms, england was compelled to accept by exhaustion, want of means of defence, and fear of the menaces of the great first consul then disposing of the resources of france, aggrandised, pacified, and reinforced by alliances. the book being what it is and coming whence it does, such a statement ought not to be passed over. 'the desire for peace,' says an author so easily accessible as j. r. green, 'sprang from no sense of national exhaustion. on the contrary, wealth had never increased so fast.... nor was there any ground for despondency in the aspect of the war itself.' this was written in by an author so singularly free from all taint of chauvinism that he expressly resolved that his work 'should never sink into a drum and trumpet history.' a few figures will be interesting and, it may be added, conclusive. between when the war began and when the peace of amiens interrupted it, the public income of great britain increased from £ , , to £ , , , the war taxes not being included in the latter sum. the revenue of france, notwithstanding her territorial acquisitions, sank from £ , , to £ , , . the french exports and imports by sea were annihilated; whilst the british exports were doubled and the imports increased more than per cent. the french navy had at the beginning , at the end of the war , ships of the line; the british began the contest with and ended it with . even as regards the army, the british force at the end of the war was not greatly inferior numerically to the french. it was, however, much scattered, being distributed over the whole british empire. in view of the question under discussion, no excuse need be given for adducing these facts. [footnote : - . _projets_et_tentatives_de_débarquement_ _aux_iles_britanniques_, par Édouard desbrière, capitaine breveté aux er cuirassiers. paris, chapelot et cie. . (publié sous la direction de la section historique de l'État-major de l'armée.)] captain desbrière in the present volume carries his collection of documents down to the date at which the then general bonaparte gave up his connection with the flotilla that was being equipped in the french channel ports, and prepared to take command of the expedition to egypt. the volume therefore, in addition to accounts of many projected, but never really attempted, descents on the british isles, gives a very complete history of hoche's expedition to ireland; of the less important, but curious, descent in cardigan bay known as the fishguard, or fishgard, expedition; and of the formation of the first 'army of england,' a designation destined to attain greater celebrity in the subsequent war, when france was ruled by the great soldier whom we know as the emperor napoleon. the various documents are connected by captain desbrière with an explanatory commentary, and here and there are illustrated with notes. he has not rested content with the publication of mss. selected from the french archives. in preparing his book he visited england and examined our records; and, besides, he has inserted in their proper place passages from captain mahan's works and also from those of english authors. the reader's interest in the book is likely to be almost exclusively concentrated on the detailed, and, where captain desbrière's commentary appears, lucid, account of hoche's expedition. of course, the part devoted to the creation of the 'army of england' is not uninteresting; but it is distinctly less so than the part relating to the proceedings of hoche. several of the many plans submitted by private persons, who here describe them in their own words, are worth examination; and some, it may be mentioned, are amusing in the _naïveté_ of their anglophobia and in their obvious indifference to the elementary principles of naval strategy. in this indifference they have some distinguished companions. we are informed by captain desbrière that the idea of a hostile descent on england was during a long time much favoured in france. the national archives and those of the ministries of war and of marine are filled with proposals for carrying it out, some dating back to . whether emanating from private persons or formulated in obedience to official direction, there are certain features in all the proposals so marked that we are able to classify the various schemes by grouping together those of a similar character. in one class may be placed all those which aimed at mere annoyance, to be effected by landing small bodies of men, not always soldiers, to do as much damage as possible. the appearance of these at many different points, it was believed, would so harass the english that they would end the war, or at least so divide their forces that their subjection might be looked for with confidence. in another class might be placed proposals to seize outlying, out not distant, british territory--the channel islands or the isle of wight, for example. a third class might comprise attempts on a greater scale, necessitating the employment of a considerable body of troops and meriting the designation 'invasion.' some of these attempts were to be made in great britain, some in ireland. in every proposal for an attempt of this class, whether it was to be made in great britain or in ireland, it was assumed that the invaders would receive assistance from the people of the country invaded. indeed, generally the bulk of the force to be employed was ultimately to be composed of native sympathisers, who were also to provide--at least at the beginning--all the supplies and transport, both vehicles and animals, required. every plan, no matter to which class it might belong, was based upon the assumption that the british naval force could be avoided. until we come to the time when general bonaparte, as he then was, dissociated himself from the first 'army of england,' there is no trace, in any of the documents now printed, of a belief in the necessity of obtaining command of the sea before sending across it a considerable military expedition. that there was such a thing as the command of the sea is rarely alluded to; and when it is, it is merely to accentuate the possibility of neutralising it by evading the force holding it. there is something which almost deserves to be styled comical in the absolutely unvarying confidence, alike of amateurs and highly placed military officers, with which it was held that a superior naval force was a thing that might be disregarded. generals who would have laughed to scorn anyone maintaining that, though there was a powerful prussian army on the road to one city and an austrian army on the road to the other, a french army might force its way to either berlin or vienna without either fighting or even being prepared to fight, such generals never hesitated to approve expeditions obliged to traverse a region in the occupation of a greatly superior force, the region being pelagic and the force naval. we had seized the little islands of st. marcoff, a short distance from the coast of normandy, and held them for years. it was expressly admitted that their recapture was impossible, 'à raison de la supériorité des forces navales anglaises'; but it was not even suspected that a much more difficult operation, requiring longer time and a longer voyage, was likely to be impracticable. we shall see by and by how far this remarkable attitude of mind was supported by the experience of hoche's expedition to ireland. hoche himself was the inventor of a plan of harassing the english enemy which long remained in favour. he proposed to organise what was called a _chouannerie_ in england. as that country had no _chouans_ of her own, the want was to be supplied by sending over an expedition composed of convicts. hoche's ideas were approved and adopted by the eminent carnot. the plan, to which the former devoted great attention, was to land on the coast of wales from to _forçats_, to be commanded by a certain mascheret, of whom hoche wrote that he was 'le plus mauvais sujet dont on puisse purger la france.' in a plan accepted and forwarded by hoche, it was laid down that the band, on reaching the enemy's country, was, if possible, not to fight, but to pillage; each man was to understand that he was sent to england to steal , f., 'pour ensuite finir sa carrière tranquillement dans l'aisance,' and was to be informed that he would receive a formal pardon from the french government. the plan, extraordinary as it was, was one of the few put into execution. the famous fishguard invasion was carried out by some fourteen hundred convicts commanded by an american adventurer named tate. the direction to avoid fighting was exactly obeyed by colonel tate and the armed criminals under his orders. he landed in cardigan bay from a small squadron of french men-of-war at sunset on the nd february ; and, on the appearance of lord cawdor with the local yeomanry and militia, asked to be allowed to surrender on the th. at a subsequent exchange of prisoners the french authorities refused to receive any of the worthies who had accompanied tate. at length were allowed to land; but were imprisoned in the forts of cherbourg. the french records contain many expressions of the dread experienced by the inhabitants of the coast lest the english should put on shore in france the malefactors whom they had captured at fishguard. a more promising enterprise was that in which it was decided to obtain the assistance of the dutch, at the time in possession of a considerable fleet. the dutch fleet was to put to sea with the object of engaging the english. an army of , was then to be embarked in the ports of holland, and was to effect a diversion in favour of another and larger body, which, starting from france, was to land in ireland, repeating the attempt of hoche in december , which will be dealt with later on. the enterprise was frustrated by the action of admiral duncan, who decisively defeated the dutch fleet off camperdown in october. it might have been supposed that this would have driven home the lesson that no considerable military expedition across the water has any chance of success till the country sending it has obtained command of the sea; but it did not. to bonaparte the event was full of meaning; but no other french soldier seems to have learned it--if we may take captain desbrière's views as representative--even down to the present day. on the rd february bonaparte wrote: 'opérer une descente en angleterre sans être maître de la mer est l'opération la plus hardie et la plus difficile qui ait été faite.' there has been much speculation as to the reasons which induced bonaparte to quit the command of the 'army of england' after holding it but a short time, and after having devoted great attention to its organisation and proposed methods of transport across the channel. the question is less difficult than it has appeared to be to many. one of the foremost men in france, bonaparte was ready to take the lead in any undertaking which seemed likely to have a satisfactory ending--an ending which would redound to the glory of the chief who conducted it. the most important operation contemplated was the invasion of england; and--now that hoche was no more--bonaparte might well claim to lead it. his penetrating insight soon enabled him to see its impracticability until the french had won the command of the channel. of that there was not much likelihood; and at the first favourable moment he dissociated himself from all connection with an enterprise which offered so little promise of a successful termination that it was all but certain not to be begun. an essential condition, as already pointed out, of all the projected invasions was the receipt of assistance from sympathisers in the enemy's country. hoche himself expected this even in tate's case; but experience proved the expectation to be baseless. when the prisoners taken with tate were being conducted to their place of confinement, the difficulty was to protect them, 'car la population furieuse contre les français voulait les lyncher.' captain desbrière dwells at some length on the mutinies in the british fleet in , and asks regretfully, 'qu'avait-on fait pour profiter de cette chance unique?' he remarks on the undoubted and really lamentable fact that english historians have usually paid insufficient attention to these occurrences. one, and perhaps the principal reason of their silence, was the difficulty, at all events till quite lately, of getting materials with which to compose a narrative. the result is that the real character of the great mutinies has been altogether misunderstood. lord camperdown's recently published life of his great ancestor, lord duncan, has done something to put them in their right light. as regards defence against the enemy, the mutinies affected the security of the country very little. the seamen always expressed their determination to do their duty if the enemy put to sea. even at the nore they conspicuously displayed their general loyalty; and, as a matter of fact, discipline had regained its sway some time before the expedition preparing in holland was ready. how effectively the crews of the ships not long before involved in the mutiny could fight, was proved at camperdown. though earlier in date than the events just discussed, the celebrated first expedition to ireland has been intentionally left out of consideration till now. as to the general features of the undertaking, and even some of its more important details, the documents now published add little to our knowledge. the literature of the expedition is large, and captain chevalier had given us an admirable account of it in his 'histoire de la marine française sous la première république.' the late vice-admiral colomb submitted it to a most instructive examination in the _journal_of_the_ _royal_united_service_institution_ for january . we can, however, learn something from captain desbrière's collection. the perusal suggests, or indeed compels, the conclusion that the expedition was doomed to failure from the start. it had no money, stores, or means of transport. there was no hope of finding these in a country like the south-western corner of ireland. grouchy's decision not to land the troops who had reached bantry bay was no doubt dictated in reality by a perception of this; and by the discovery that, even if he got on shore, sympathisers with him would be practically non-existent. on reading the letters now made public, one is convinced of hoche's unfitness for the leadership of such an enterprise. the adoration of mediocrities is confined to no one cult and to no one age. hoche's canonisation, for he is a prominent saint in the republican calendar, was due not so much to what he did as to what he did not do. he did not hold the supreme command in la vendée till the most trying period of the war was past. he did not continue the cruelties of the jacobin emissaries in the disturbed districts; but then his pacificatory measures were taken when the spirit of ferocity which caused the horrors of the _noyades_ and of the terror had, even amongst the mob of paris, burnt itself out. he did not overthrow a constitutional government and enslave his country as bonaparte did; and, therefore, he is favourably compared with the latter, whose opportunities he did not have. his letters show him to have been an adept in the art of traducing colleagues behind their backs. in writing he called admiral villaret-joyeuse 'perfide,' and spoke of his 'mauvaise foi.' he had a low opinion of general humbert, whom he bracketed with mascheret. grouchy, he said, was 'un inconséquent paperassier,' and general vaillant 'un misérable ivrogne.' he was placed in supreme command of the naval as well as of the military forces, and was allowed to select the commander of the former. yet he and his nominee were amongst the small fraction of the expeditionary body which never reached a place where disembarkation was possible. notwithstanding all this, the greater part of the fleet, and of the troops conveyed by it, did anchor in bantry bay without encountering an english man-of-war; and a large proportion continued in the bay, unmolested by our navy, for more than a fortnight. is not this, it may be asked, a sufficient refutation of those who hold that command of the sea gives security against invasion? as a matter of fact, command of the sea--even in the case in question--did prevent invasion from being undertaken, still more from being carried through, on a scale likely to be very formidable. the total number of troops embarked was under , , of whom were lost, owing to steps taken to avoid the hostile navy, before the expedition had got fully under way. it is not necessary to rate hoche's capacity very highly in order to understand that he, who had seen something of war on a grand scale, would not have committed himself to the command of so small a body, without cavalry, without means of transport on land, without supplies, with but an insignificant artillery and that not furnished with horses, and, as was avowed, without hope of subsequent reinforcement or of open communications with its base--that he would not have staked his reputation on the fate of a body so conditioned, if he had been permitted by the naval conditions of the case to lead a larger, more effectually organised, and better supplied army. the commentary supplied by captain desbrière to the volume under notice discloses his opinion that the failure of the expedition to ireland was due to the inefficiency of the french navy. he endeavours to be scrupulously fair to his naval fellow-countrymen; but his conviction is apparent. it hardly admits of doubt that this view has generally been, and still is, prevalent in the french army. foreign soldiers of talent and experience generalise from this as follows: let them but have the direction of the naval as well as of the military part of an expedition, and the invasion of england must be successful. the complete direction which they would like is exactly what hoche did have. he chose the commander of the fleet, and also chose or regulated the choice of the junior flag officers and several of the captains. admiral morard de galles was not, and did not consider himself, equal to the task for which hoche's favour had selected him. his letter pointing out his own disqualifications has a striking resemblance to the one written by medina sidonia in deprecation of his appointment in place of santa cruz. nevertheless, the french naval officers did succeed in conveying the greater part of the expeditionary army to a point at which disembarkation was practicable. now we have some lessons to learn from this. the advantages conferred by command of the sea must be utilised intelligently; and it was bad management which permitted an important anchorage to remain for more than a fortnight in the hands of an invading force. we need not impute to our neighbours a burning desire to invade us; but it is a becoming exercise of ordinary strategic precaution to contemplate preparations for repelling what, as a mere military problem, they consider still feasible. no amount of naval superiority will ever ensure every part of our coast against incursions like that of tate and his gaol-birds. naval superiority, however, will put in our hands the power of preventing the arrival of an army strong enough to carry out a real invasion. the strength of such an army will largely depend upon the amount of mobile land force of which we can dispose. consequently, defence against invasion, even of an island, is the duty of a land army as well as of a fleet. the more important part may, in our case, be that of the latter; but the services of the former cannot be dispensed with. the best method of utilising those services calls for much thought. in , when the 'first army of england' menaced us from the southern coast of the channel, it was reported to our government that an examination of the plans formerly adopted for frustrating intended invasions showed the advantage of troubling the enemy in his own home and not waiting till he had come to injure us in ours. vii over-sea raids and raids on land[ ] [footnote : written in . (_the_morning_post_.)] it has been contended that raids by 'armaments with , , , and , men on board respectively' have succeeded in evading 'our watching and chasing fleets,' and that consequently invasion of the british isles on a great scale is not only possible but fairly practicable, british naval predominance notwithstanding. i dispute the accuracy of the history involved in the allusions to the above-stated figures. the number of men comprised in a raiding or invading expedition is the number that is or can be put on shore. the crews of the transports are not included in it. in the cases alluded to, humbert's expedition was to have numbered officers and other ranks, and were put on shore in killala bay. though the round number, , represents this figure fairly enough, there was a per cent. shrinkage from the original embarkation strength. in hoche's expedition the total number of troops embarked was under , , of whom were lost before the expedition had got clear of its port of starting, and of the remainder only a portion reached ireland. general bonaparte landed in egypt not , men, but about , . in the expeditions of hoche and humbert it was not expected that the force to be landed would suffice of itself, the belief being that it would be joined in each case by a large body of adherents in the raided country. outside the ranks of the 'extremists of the dinghy school'--whose number is unknown and is almost certainly quite insignificant--no one asserts or ever has asserted that raids in moderate strength are not possible even in the face of a strong defending navy. it is a fact that the whole of our defence policy for many generations has been based upon an admission of their possibility. captain mahan's statement of the case has never been questioned by anyone of importance. it is as follows: 'the control of the sea, however real, does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbours.' it is extraordinary that everyone does not perceive that if this were not true the 'dinghy school' would be right. students of clausewitz may be expected to remember that the art of war does not consist in making raids that are unsuccessful; that war is waged to gain certain great objects; and that the course of hostilities between two powerful antagonists is affected little one way or the other by raids even on a considerable scale. the egyptian expedition of deserves fuller treatment than it has generally received. the preparations at toulon and some italian ports were known to the british government. it being impossible for even a moltke or--comparative resources being taken into account--the greater strategist kodama to know everything in the mind of an opponent, the sensible proceeding is to guard against his doing what would be likely to do you most harm. the british government had reason to believe that the toulon expedition was intended to reinforce at an atlantic port another expedition to be directed against the british isles, or to effect a landing in spain with a view to marching into portugal and depriving our navy of the use of lisbon. either if effected would probably cause us serious mischief, and arrangements were made to prevent them. a landing in egypt was, as the event showed, of little importance. the threat conveyed by it against our indian possessions proved to be an empty one. upwards of , hostile troops were locked up in a country from which they could exercise no influence on the general course of the war, and in which in the end they had to capitulate. suppose that an expedition crossing the north sea with the object of invading this country had to content itself with a landing in iceland, having eventual capitulation before it, should we not consider ourselves very fortunate, though it may have temporarily occupied one of the shetland isles _en_route_? the truth of the matter is that the egyptian expedition was one of the gravest of strategical mistakes, and but for the marvellous subsequent achievements of napoleon it would have been the typical example of bad strategy adduced by lecturers and writers on the art of war for the warning of students. the supposition that over-sea raids, even when successful in part, in any way demonstrate the inefficiency of naval defence would never be admitted if only land and sea warfare were regarded as branches of one whole and not as quite distinct things. to be consistent, those that admit the supposition should also admit that the practicability of raids demonstrates still more conclusively the insufficiency of defence by an army. an eminent military writer has told us that 'a raiding party of french landed in ireland without opposition, after sixteen days of navigation, unobserved by the british navy; defeated and drove back the british troops opposing them on four separate occasions... entirely occupied the attention of all the available troops of a garrison of ireland , strong; penetrated almost to the centre of the island, and compelled the lord-lieutenant to send an urgent requisition for "as great a reinforcement as possible."' if an inference is to be drawn from this in the same way as one has been drawn from the circumstances on the sea, it would follow that one hundred thousand troops are not sufficient to prevent a raid by one thousand, and consequently that one million troops would not be sufficient to prevent one by ten thousand enemies. on this there would arise the question, if an army a million strong gives no security against a raid by ten thousand men, is an army worth having? and this question, be it noted, would come, not from disciples of the blue water school, 'extremist' or other, but from students of military narrative. the truth is that raids are far more common on land than on the ocean. for every one of the latter it would be possible to adduce several of the former. indeed, accounts of raids are amongst the common-places of military history. there are few campaigns since the time of that smart cavalry leader mago, the younger brother of hannibal, in which raids on land did not occur or in which they exercised any decisive influence on the issue of hostilities. it is only the failure to see the connection between warfare on land and naval warfare that prevents these land raids being given the same significance and importance that is usually given to those carried out across the sea. in the year , the year of wagram, napoleon's military influence in central germany was, to say the least, not at its lowest. yet colonel schill, of the prussian cavalry, with men, subsequently increased to infantry and squadrons, proceeded to wittenberg, thence to magdeburg, and next to stralsund, which he occupied and where he met his death in opposing an assault made by french troops. he had defied for a month all the efforts of a large army to suppress him. in the same year the duke of brunswick-oels and colonel dornberg, notwithstanding the smallness of the force under them, by their action positively induced napoleon, only a few weeks before wagram, to detach the whole corps of kellerman, , strong, which otherwise would have been called up to the support of the grande armée, to the region in which these enterprising raiders were operating. the mileage covered by schill was nearly as great as that covered by the part of hoche's expedition which under grouchy did reach an irish port, though it was not landed. instances of cavalry raids were frequent in the war of secession in america. the federal colonel b. h. grierson, of the th illinois cavalry, with another illinois and an iowa cavalry regiment, in april made a raid which lasted sixteen days, and in which he covered miles of hostile country, finally reaching baton rouge, where a friendly force was stationed. the confederate officers, john h. morgan, john s. mosby, and especially n. b. forrest, were famous for the extent and daring of their raids. of all the leaders of important raids in the war of secession none surpassed the great confederate cavalry general, j. e. b. stuart, whose riding right round the imposing federal army is well known. yet not one of the raids above mentioned had any effect on the main course of the war in which they occurred or on the result of the great conflict. in the last war the case was the same. in january , general mischenko with , sabres and three batteries of artillery marched right round the flank of marshal oyama's great japanese army, and occupied niu-chwang--not the treaty port so-called, but a place not very far from it. for several days he was unmolested, and in about a week he got back to his friends with a loss which was moderate in proportion to his numbers. in the following may mischenko made another raid, this time round general nogi's flank. he had with him fifty squadrons, a horse artillery battery, and a battery of machine guns. starting on the th, he was discovered on the th, came in contact with his enemy on the th, but met with no considerable hostile force till the th, when the japanese cavalry arrived just in time to collide with the russian rearguard of two squadrons. on this general mischenko 'retired at his ease for some thirty miles along the japanese flank and perhaps fifteen miles away from it.' these russians' raids did not alter the course of the war nor bring ultimate victory to their standards. it would be considered by every military authority as a flagrant absurdity to deduce from the history of these many raids on land that a strong army is not a sufficient defence for a continental country against invasion. what other efficient defence against that can a continental country have? apply the reasoning to the case of an insular country, and reliance on naval defence will be abundantly justified. to maintain that canada, india, and egypt respectively could be invaded by the united states, russia, and turkey, backed by germany, notwithstanding any action that our navy could take, would be equivalent to maintaining that one part of our empire cannot or need not reinforce another. suppose that we had a military force numerically equal to or exceeding the russian, how could any of it be sent to defend canada, india, and egypt, or to reinforce the defenders of those countries, unless our sea communications were kept open? can these be kept open except by the action of our navy? it is plain that they cannot. viii queen elizabeth and her seamen[ ] [footnote : written in . (_nineteenth_century_and_after_, .)] an eminent writer has recently repeated the accusations made within the last forty years, and apparently only within that period, against queen elizabeth of having starved the seamen of her fleet by giving them food insufficient in quantity and bad in quality, and of having robbed them by keeping them out of the pay due to them. he also accuses the queen, though somewhat less plainly, of having deliberately acquiesced in a wholesale slaughter of her seamen by remaining still, though no adequate provision had been made for the care of the sick and wounded. there are further charges of obstinately objecting, out of mere stinginess, to take proper measures for the naval defence of the country, and of withholding a sufficient supply of ammunition from her ships when about to meet the enemy. lest it should be supposed that this is an exaggerated statement of the case against elizabeth as formulated by the writer in question, his own words are given. he says: 'instead of strengthening her armaments to the utmost, and throwing herself upon her parliament for aid, she clung to her moneybags, actually reduced her fleet, withheld ammunition and the more necessary stores, cut off the sailor's food, did, in short, everything in her power to expose the country defenceless to the enemy. the pursuit of the armada was stopped by the failure of the ammunition, which, apparently, had the fighting continued longer, would have been fatal to the english fleet.' the writer makes on this the rather mild comment that 'treason itself could scarcely have done worse.' why 'scarcely'? surely the very blackest treason could not have done worse. he goes on to ask: 'how were the glorious seamen, whose memory will be for ever honoured by england and the world, rewarded after their victory?' this is his answer: 'their wages were left unpaid, they were docked of their food, and served with poisonous drink, while for the sick and wounded no hospitals were provided. more of them were killed by the queen's meanness than by the enemy.' it is safe to challenge the students of history throughout the world to produce any parallel to conduct so infamous as that which has thus been imputed to an english queen. if the charges are true, there is no limit to the horror and loathing with which we ought to regard elizabeth. are they true? that is the question. i respectfully invite the attention of those who wish to know the truth and to retain their reverence for a great historical character, to the following examination of the accusations and of the foundations on which they rest. it will not, i hope, be considered presumptuous if i say that--in making this examination--personal experience of life in the navy sufficiently extensive to embrace both the present day and the time before the introduction of the great modern changes in system and naval _matériel_ will be of great help. many things which have appeared so extraordinary to landsmen that they could account for their occurrence only by assuming that this must have been due to extreme culpability or extreme folly will be quite familiar to naval officers whose experience of the service goes back forty years or more, and can be satisfactorily explained by them. there is little reason to doubt that the above-mentioned charges against the great queen are based exclusively on statements in froude's history. it is remarkable how closely froude has been followed by writers treating of elizabeth and her reign. he was known to have gone to original documents for the sources of his narrative; and it seems to have been taken for granted, not only that his fidelity was above suspicion--an assumption with which i do not deal now--but also that his interpretation of the meaning of those who wrote the papers consulted must be correct. motley, in his 'history of the united netherlands,' published in , had dwelt upon the shortness of ammunition and provisions in the channel fleet commanded by lord howard of effingham; but he attributed this to bad management on the part of officials, and not to downright baseness on that of elizabeth. froude has placed beyond doubt his determination to make the queen responsible for all shortcomings. 'the queen,' he says, 'has taken upon herself the detailed arrangement of everything. she and she alone was responsible. she had extended to the dockyards the same hard thrift with which she had pared down her expenses everywhere. she tied the ships to harbour by supplying the stores in driblets. she allowed rations but for a month, and permitted no reserves to be provided in the victualling offices. the ships at plymouth, furnished from a distance, and with small quantities at a time, were often for many days without food of any kind. even at plymouth, short food and poisonous drink had brought dysentery among them. they had to meet the enemy, as it were, with one arm bandaged by their own sovereign. the greatest service ever done by an english fleet had been thus successfully accomplished by men whose wages had not been paid from the time of their engagement, half-starved, with their clothes in rags, and so ill-found in the necessaries of war that they had eked out their ammunition by what they could take in action from the enemy himself. the men expected that at least after such a service they would be paid their wages in full. the queen was cavilling over the accounts, and would give no orders for money till she had demanded the meaning of every penny that she was charged.... their legitimate food had been stolen from them by the queen's own neglect.' we thus see that froude has made elizabeth personally responsible for the short rations, the undue delay in paying wages earned, and the fearful sickness which produced a heavy mortality amongst the crews of her channel fleet; and also for insufficiently supplying her ships with ammunition. the quotations from the book previously referred to make it clear that it is possible to outdo froude in his denunciations, even where it is on his statements that the accusers found their charges. in his 'history of england'--which is widely read, especially by the younger generation of englishmen--the rev. j. franck bright tells us, with regard to the defensive campaign against the armada: 'the queen's avarice went near to ruin the country. the miserable supplies which elizabeth had alone allowed to be sent them (the ships in the channel) had produced all sorts of disease, and thousands of the crews came from their great victory only to die. in the midst of privations and wanting in all the necessaries of life, the sailors had fought with unflagging energy, with their wages unpaid, with ammunition supplied to them with so stingy a hand that each shot sent on board was registered and accounted for; with provisions withheld, so that the food of four men had habitually to be divided among six, and that food so bad as to be really poisonous.' j. r. green, in his 'history of the english people,' states that: 'while england was thrilling with the triumph over the armada, its queen was coolly grumbling over the cost and making her profit out of the spoiled provisions she had ordered for the fleet that had saved her.' the object of each subsequent historian was to surpass the originator of the calumnies against elizabeth. in his sketch of her life in the 'dictionary of national biography,' dr. augustus jessopp asserts that the queen's ships 'were notoriously and scandalously ill-furnished with stores and provisions for the sailors, and it is impossible to lay the blame on anyone but the queen.' he had previously remarked that the merchant vessels which came to the assistance of the men-of-war from london and the smaller ports 'were as a rule far better furnished than the queen's ships,' which were 'without the barest necessaries.' after these extracts one from dr. s. r. gardiner's 'student's history of england' will appear moderate. here it is: 'elizabeth having with her usual economy kept the ships short of powder, they were forced to come back' from the chase of the armada. the above allegations constitute a heavy indictment of the queen. no heavier could well be brought against any sovereign or government. probably the first thing that occurs to anyone who, knowing what elizabeth's position was, reads the tremendous charges made against her will be, that--if they are true--she must have been without a rival in stupidity as well as in turpitude. there was no person in the world who had as much cause to desire the defeat of the armada as she had. if the duke of medina sidonia's expedition had been successful she would have lost both her throne and her life. she herself and her father had shown that there could be a short way with queens--consort or regnant--whom you had in your power, and whose existence might be inconvenient to you. yet, if we are to believe her accusers, she did her best to ensure her own dethronement and decapitation. 'the country saved itself and its cause in spite of its queen.' how did this extraordinary view of elizabeth's conduct arise? what had froude to go upon when he came forward as her accuser? these questions can be answered with ease. every government that comes near going to war, or that has gone to war, is sure to incur one of two charges, made according to circumstances. if the government prepares for war and yet peace is preserved, it is accused of unpardonable extravagance in making preparations. whether it makes these on a sufficient scale or not, it is accused, if war does break out--at least in the earlier period of the contest--of not having done enough. political opponents and the 'man in the street' agree in charging the administration with panic profusion in one case, and with criminal niggardliness in the other. elizabeth hoped to preserve peace. she had succeeded in keeping out of an 'official' war for a long time, and she had much justification for the belief that she could do so still longer. 'she could not be thoroughly persuaded,' says mr. david hannay,[ ] 'that it was hopeless to expect to avert the spanish invasion by artful diplomacy.' whilst reasonable precautions were not neglected, she was determined that no one should be able to say with truth that she had needlessly thrown away money in a fright. for the general naval policy of england at the time, elizabeth, as both the nominal and the real head of the government, is properly held responsible. the event showed the perfect efficiency of that policy. [footnote : _a_short_history_of_the_royal_navy_, pp. , .] the war having really come, it was inevitable that the government, and elizabeth as its head, should be blamed sooner or later for not having made adequate provision for it. no one is better entitled to speak on the naval policy of the armada epoch than mr. julian corbett,[ ] who is not disposed to assume that the queen's action was above criticism. he says that 'elizabeth has usually been regarded as guilty of complete and unpardonable inaction.' he explains that 'the event at least justified the queen's policy. there is no trace of her having been blamed for it at the time at home; nor is there any reason to doubt it was adopted sagaciously and deliberately on the advice of her most capable officers.' mr. david hannay, who, as an historian, rightly takes into consideration the conditions of the age, points out that 'elizabeth was a very poor sovereign, and the maintenance of a great fleet was a heavy drain upon her resources.' he adds: 'there is no reason to suppose that elizabeth and her lord treasurer were careless of their duty; but the government of the time had very little experience in the maintenance of great military forces.' [footnote : _drake_and_the_tudor_navy_, , vol. ii. p. .] if we take the charges against her in detail, we shall find that each is as ill-founded as that of criminal neglect of naval preparations generally. the most serious accusation is that with regard to the victuals. it will most likely be a surprise to many people to find that the seamen of elizabeth were victualled on a more abundant and much more costly scale than the seamen of victoria. nevertheless, such is the fact. in the contract allowance for victualling was - / d. a day for each man in harbour, and d. a day at sea. there was also an allowance of d. a man per month at sea and d. in harbour for 'purser's necessaries.' mr. oppenheim, in whose valuable work[ ] on naval administration the details as to the elizabethan victualling system are to be found, tells us that in the rate was raised to d. a day in harbour and - / d. at sea; and that in it was again raised, this time to - / d. in harbour and d. at sea. these sums were intended to cover both the cost of the food and storage, custody, conveyance, &c., the present-day 'establishment charges.' the repeated raising of the money allowance is convincing proof that the victualling arrangements had not been neglected, and that there was no refusal to sanction increased expenditure to improve them. it is a great thing to have mr. oppenheim's high authority for this, because he is not generally favourable to the queen, though even he admits that it 'is a moot point' how far she was herself responsible. [footnote : _the_administration_of_the_royal_navy,_ _ - _. london, .] if necessary, detailed arguments could be adduced to show that to get the present value of the sums allowed in we ought to multiply them by six[ ] the sum allowed for each man's daily food and the 'establishment charges'--increased as they had been in --did little more than cover the expenditure; and, though it does not appear that the contractor lost money, he nevertheless died a poor man. it will be hardly imputed to elizabeth for iniquity that she did not consider that the end of government was the enrichment of contractors. the fact that she increased the money payment again in may be accepted as proof that she did not object to a fair bargain. as has been just said, the elizabethan scale of victualling was more abundant than the early victorian, and not less abundant than that given in the earlier years of king edward vii.[ ] as shown by mr. hubert hall and thorold rogers, in the price-lists which they publish, the cost of a week's allowance of food for a man-of-war's man in , in the money of the time, amounted to about s. - / d., which, multiplied by six, would be about s. d. of our present money. the so-called 'savings price' of the early twentieth century allowance was about - / d. a day, or s. - / d. weekly. the 'savings price' is the amount of money which a man received if he did not take up his victuals, each article having a price attached to it for that purpose. it may be interesting to know that the full allowance was rarely, perhaps never, taken up, and that some part of the savings was till the last, and for many years had been, almost invariably paid. [footnote : see mr. hubert hall's _society_in_the_elizabethan_ _age_, and thorold rogers's _history_of_agriculture_and_prices_, vols. v. and vi. froude himself puts the ratio at six to one.] [footnote : it will be convenient to compare the two scales in a footnote, observing that--as i hope will not be thought impertinent--i draw on my own personal experience for the more recent, which was in force for some years after i went to sea. weekly ---------------------------------------------- | | | early | | | elizabethan | victorian | | | scale | scale | |----------------------------------------------| | beef | lbs. | lbs. | | biscuit | " | " | | salted fish | " | none | | cheese | / lb. | " | | butter | " | " | | beer | gallons | " | | vegetables | none | - / lbs. | | spirits | " | / pint | | tea | " | - / oz. | | sugar | " | " | | cocoa | " | " | ---------------------------------------------- there is now a small allowance of oatmeal, pepper, mustard, and vinegar, against which we may set the 'purser's necessaries' of elizabeth's day. in that day but little sugar was used, and tea and cocoa were unknown even in palaces. it is just a question if seven gallons of beer did not make up for the weekly allowance of these and for the seven-eighths of a pint of spirits. tea was only allowed in , and was not an additional article. it replaced part of the spirits. the biscuit allowance is now - / lbs. weekly. the victorian dietary is more varied and wholesome than the elizabethan; but, as we have seen, it is less abundant and can be obtained for much less money, even if we grant that the 'savings price'--purposely kept low to avoid all suggestion that the men are being bribed into stinting themselves--is less than the real cost. the excess of this latter, however, is not likely to be more than per cent., so that elizabeth's expenditure in this department was more liberal than the present. such defects as were to be found in the elizabethan naval dietary were common to it with that of the english people generally. if there was plenty, there was but little variety in the food of our ancestors of all ranks three centuries ago. as far as was possible in the conditions of the time, elizabeth's government did make provision for victualling the fleet on a sufficient and even liberal scale; and, notwithstanding slender pecuniary resources, repeatedly increased the money assigned to it, on cause being shown. in his eagerness to make queen elizabeth a monster of treacherous rapacity, froude has completely overreached himself, he says that 'she permitted some miserable scoundrel to lay a plan before her for saving expense, by cutting down the seamen's diet.' the 'miserable scoundrel' had submitted a proposal for diminishing the expenses which the administration was certainly ill able to bear, the candid reader will draw his own conclusions when he finds that the queen did not approve the plan submitted; and yet that not one of her assailants has let this appear.[ ] [footnote : it may be stated here that the word 'rations' is unknown in the navy. the official term is 'victuals.' the term in common use is 'provisions.'] it is, of course, possible to concede that adequate arrangements had been made for the general victualling of the fleet; and still to maintain that, after all, the sailors afloat actually did run short of food. in his striking 'introduction to the armada despatches' published by the navy records society, professor sir john laughton declares that: 'to anyone examining the evidence, there can be no question as to victualling being conducted on a fairly liberal scale, as far as the money was concerned. it was in providing the victuals that the difficulty lay.... when a fleet of unprecedented magnitude was collected, when a sudden and unwonted demand was made on the victualling officers, it would have been strange indeed if things had gone quite smoothly.' there are plenty of naval officers who have had experience, and within the last ten years of the nineteenth century, of the difficulty, and sometimes of the impossibility, of getting sufficient supplies for a large number of ships in rather out-of-the-way places. in the comparative thinness of population and insufficiency of communications and means of transport must have constituted obstacles, far greater than any encountered in our own day, to the collection of supplies locally and to their timely importation from a distance. 'you would not believe,' says lord howard of effingham himself, 'what a wonderful thing it is to victual such an army as this is in such a narrow corner of the earth, where a man would think that neither victuals were to be had nor a cask to put it in.' no more effective defence of elizabeth and her ministers could well be advanced than that which mr. oppenheim puts forward as a corroboration of the accusation against them. he says that the victualling officials 'found no difficulty in arranging for , men in and in after timely notice.' this is really a high compliment, as it proves that the authorities were quite ready to, and in fact did, learn from experience. mr. oppenheim, however, is not an undiscriminating assailant of the queen; for he remarks, as has been already said, that, 'how far elizabeth was herself answerable is a moot point.' he tells us that there 'is no direct evidence against her'; and the charge levelled at her rests not on proof, but on 'strong probability.' one would like to have another instance out of all history, of probability, however strong, being deemed sufficient to convict a person of unsurpassed treachery and stupidity combined, when the direct evidence, which is not scanty, fails to support the charge and indeed points the other way. the lord admiral himself and other officers have been quoted to show how badly off the fleet was for food. yet at the close of the active operations against the armada, sir j. hawkins wrote: 'here is victual sufficient, and i know not why any should be provided after september, but for those which my lord doth mean to leave in the narrow seas.' on the same day howard himself wrote from dover: 'i have caused all the remains of victuals to be laid here and at sandwich, for the maintaining of them that shall remain in the narrow seas.' any naval officer with experience of command who reads howard's representations on the subject of the victuals will at once perceive that what the admiral was anxious about was not the quantity on board the ships, but the stock in reserve. howard thought that the latter ought to be a supply for six weeks. the council thought a month's stock would be enough; and--as shown by the extracts from howard's and hawkins's letters just given--the council was right in its estimate. anyone who has had to write or to read official letters about stocks of stores and provisions will find something especially modern in howard's representations. though the crews of the fleet did certainly come near the end of their victuals afloat, there is no case of their having actually run out of them. the complement of an ordinary man-of-war in the latter part of the sixteenth century, judged by our modern standard, was very large in proportion to her size. it was impossible for her to carry provisions enough to last her men for a long time. any unexpected prolongation of a cruise threatened a reduction to short commons. a great deal has been made of the fact that howard had to oblige six men to put up with the allowance of four. 'when a large force,' says mr. d. hannay, 'was collected for service during any length of time, it was the common rule to divide four men's allowance among six.' there must be still many officers and men to whom the plan would seem quite familiar. it is indicated by a recognised form of words, 'six upon four.' i have myself been 'six upon four' several times, mostly in the pacific, but also, on at least one occasion, in the east indies. as far as i could see, no one appeared to regard it as an intolerable hardship. the government, it should be known, made no profit out of the process, because money was substituted for the food not issued. howard's recourse to it was not due to immediate insufficiency. speaking of the merchant vessels which came to reinforce him, he says: 'we are fain to help them with victuals to bring them thither. there is not any of them that hath one day's victuals.' these merchant vessels were supplied by private owners; and it is worth noting that, in the teeth of this statement by howard, dr. jessopp, in his eagerness to blacken elizabeth, says that they 'were, as a rule, far better furnished than the queen's ships.' the lord admiral on another occasion, before the fight off gravelines, said of the ships he hoped would join him from portsmouth: 'though they have not two days' victuals, let that not be the cause of their stay, for they shall have victuals out of our fleet,' a conclusive proof that his ships were not very short. as to the accusation of deliberately issuing food of bad quality, that is effectually disposed of by the explanation already given of the method employed in victualling the navy. a sum was paid for each man's daily allowance to a contractor, who was expressly bound to furnish 'good and seasonable victuals.'[ ] professor laughton, whose competence in the matter is universally allowed, informs us that complaints of bad provisions are by no means confined to the armada epoch, and were due, not to intentional dishonesty and neglect, but to insufficient knowledge of the way to preserve provisions for use on rather long cruises. mr. hannay says that the fleet sent to the coast of spain, in the year after the defeat of the armada, suffered much from want of food and sickness. 'yet it was organised, not by the queen, but by a committee of adventurers who had every motive to fit it out well.' it is the fashion with english historians to paint the condition of the navy in the time of the commonwealth in glowing colours, yet mr. oppenheim cites many occasions of well-founded complaints of the victuals. he says: 'the quality of the food supplied to the men and the honesty of the victualling agents both steadily deteriorated during the commonwealth.' lord howard's principal difficulty was with the beer, which would go sour. the beer was the most frequent subject of protest in the commonwealth times. also, in , lord (then sir edward) hawke reported: 'our daily employment is condemning the beer from plymouth.' the difficulty of brewing beer that would stand a sea voyage seemed to be insuperable. the authorities, however, did not soon abandon attempts to get the right article. complaints continued to pour in; but they went on with their brewing till , and then gave it up as hopeless. [footnote : see 'the mariners of england before the armada,' by mr. h. halliday sparling, in the _english_illustrated_magazine_, july , .] one must have had personal experience of the change to enable one to recognise the advance that has been made in the art of preserving articles of food within the last half-century. in the first drury lane pantomime that i can remember--about a year before i went to sea--a practical illustration of the quality of some of the food supplied to the navy was offered during the harlequinade by the clown, who satisfied his curiosity as to the contents of a large tin of 'preserved meat' by pulling out a dead cat. on joining the service i soon learned that, owing to the badness of the 'preserved' food that had been supplied, the idea of issuing tinned meat had been abandoned. it was not resumed till some years later. it is often made a joke against naval officers of a certain age that, before eating a biscuit, they have a trick of rapping the table with it. we contracted the habit as midshipmen when it was necessary to get rid of the weevils in the biscuit before it could be eaten, and a fairly long experience taught us that rapping the table with it was an effectual plan for expelling them. there is no more justification for accusing queen elizabeth of failure to provide well-preserved food to her sailors than there is for accusing her of not having sent supplies to plymouth by railway. steam transport and efficient food preservation were equally unknown in her reign and for long after. it has been intimated above that, even had she wished to, she could not possibly have made any money out of bad provisions. the victualling system did not permit of her doing so. the austere republican virtue of the commonwealth authorities enabled them to do what was out of elizabeth's power. in , 'beer and other provisions "decayed and unfit for use" were licensed for export free of customs.' mr. oppenheim, who reports this fact, makes the remarkable comment that this was done 'perhaps in the hope that such stores would go to holland,' with whose people we were at war. as the heavy mortality in the navy had always been ascribed to the use of bad provisions, we cannot refuse to give to the sturdy republicans who governed england in the seventeenth century the credit of contemplating a more insidious and more effective method of damaging their enemy than poisoning his wells. one would like to have it from some jurist if the sale of poisonously bad food to your enemy is disallowed by international law. that there was much sickness in the fleet and that many seamen died is, unfortunately, true. if howard's evidence is to be accepted--as it always is when it seems to tell against the queen--it is impossible to attribute this to the bad quality of the food then supplied. the lord admiral's official report is 'that the ships of themselves be so infectious and corrupted as it is thought to be a very plague; and we find that the fresh men that we draw into our ships are infected one day and die the next.' the least restrained assertor of the 'poisonous' food theory does not contend that it killed men within twenty-four hours. the armada reached the channel on the th of july ( th, new style). a month earlier howard had reported that 'several men have fallen sick and by thousands fain to be discharged'; and, after the fighting was over, he said of the _elizabeth_jonas_, she 'hath had a great infection in her from the beginning.' lord henry seymour, who commanded the division of the fleet stationed in the straits of dover, noted that the sickness was a repetition of that of the year before, and attributed it not to bad food, but to the weather. 'our men,' he wrote, 'fall sick by reason of the cold nights and cold mornings we find; and i fear me they will drop away faster than they did last year with sir henry palmer, which was thick enough.' 'the sickness,' says professor laughton, 'was primarily and chiefly due to infection from the shore and ignorance or neglect of what we now know as sanitary laws.... similar infections continued occasionally to scourge our ships' companies, and still more frequently french and spanish ships' companies, till near the close of the eighteenth century.' it is not likely that any evidence would suffice to divert from their object writers eager to hurl calumny at a great sovereign; but a little knowledge of naval and of military history also would have saved their readers from a belief in their accusations. in the fleet in the west indies commanded by admiral hosier, commemorated in glover's ballad, lost ten flag officers and captains, fifty lieutenants, and seamen. in the seven years' war the total number belonging to the fleet killed in action was ; whilst the number that died of disease and were missing was , . from to , out of , men voted by parliament for the navy, , were 'sent sick.' in the summer, , the french fleet cruising at the mouth of the english channel, after landing , had still about men sick. at the beginning of autumn the number of sick had become so great that many ships had not enough men to work them. the _ville_de_paris_ had sick, and lost . the _auguste_ had sick, and lost . on board the _intrépide_ died out of sick. these were the worst cases; but other ships also suffered heavily. it is, perhaps, not generally remembered till what a very late date armies and navies were more than decimated by disease. in the house of commons affirmed by a resolution, concerning the walcheren expedition: 'that on the th of august a malignant disorder showed itself amongst h.m. troops; and that on the th of september the number of sick amounted to upwards of , men. that of the army which embarked for service in the scheldt sixty officers and men, exclusive of those killed by the enemy, had died before the st of february last.' in a volume of 'military, medical, and surgical essays'[ ] prepared for the united states' sanitary commission, and edited by dr. wm. a. hammond, surgeon-general of the u.s. army, it is stated that, in our peninsular army, averaging a strength of , officers and men, the annual rate of mortality from the th of december to the th of may was per cent. of the officers and per cent. of the men. we may calculate from this that some , officers and men died. there were - / per cent., or over , , 'constantly sick.' out of , french soldiers sent to the crimea in - , the number of killed and those who died of wounds was , the number who died of disease was , . at the same date navies also suffered. dr. stilon mends, in his life of his father,[ ] admiral sir william mends, prints a letter in which the admiral, speaking of the cholera in the fleets at varna, says: 'the mortality on board the _montebello_, _ville_de_paris_, _valmy_ (french ships), and _britannia_ (british) has been terrible; the first lost in three days, the second in three days, the third in ten days, but the last lost in one night and the subsequent day.' kinglake tells us that in the end the _britannia's_ loss went up to . with the above facts before us, we are compelled to adopt one of two alternatives. we must either maintain that sanitary science made no advance between and , or admit that the mortality in elizabeth's fleet became what it was owing to ignorance of sanitary laws and not to intentional bad management. as regards care of the sick, it is to be remembered that the establishment of naval and military hospitals for the reception of sick soldiers and sailors is of recent date. for instance, the two great english military hospitals, netley and the herbert, are only about sixty years old. [footnote : philadelphia, .] [footnote : london, .] so far from our fleet in having been ill-supplied with ammunition, it was in reality astonishingly well equipped, considering the age. we learn from mr. julian corbett,[ ] that 'during the few years immediately preceding the outbreak of the war, the queen's navy had been entirely re-armed with brass guns, and in the process of re-armament a great advance in simplicity had been secured.' froude, without seeing where the admission would land him, admits that our fleet was more plentifully supplied than the armada, in which, he says, 'the supply of cartridges was singularly small. the king [philip the second] probably considered that a single action would decide the struggle; and it amounted to but fifty rounds for each gun.' our own supply therefore exceeded fifty rounds. in his life of vice-admiral lord lyons,[ ] sir s. eardley wilmot tells us that the british ships which attacked the sebastopol forts in october 'could only afford to expend seventy rounds per gun.' at the close of the nineteenth century, the regulated allowance for guns mounted on the broadside was eighty-five rounds each. consequently, the elizabethan allowance was nearly, if not quite, as much as that which our authorities, after an experience of naval warfare during three centuries, thought sufficient. 'the full explanation,' says professor laughton, 'of the want [of ammunition] seems to lie in the rapidity of fire which has already been mentioned. the ships had the usual quantity on board; but the expenditure was more, very many times more, than anyone could have conceived.' mr. julian corbett considers it doubtful if the ammunition, in at least one division of the fleet, was nearly exhausted. [footnote : _the_spanish_war_, - (navy records society), , p. .] [footnote : london, , p. .] exhaustion of the supply of ammunition in a single action is a common naval occurrence. the not very decisive character of the battle of malaga between sir george rooke and the count of toulouse in was attributed to insufficiency of ammunition, the supply in our ships having been depleted by what 'mediterranean' byng, afterwards lord torrington, calls the 'furious fire' opened on gibraltar. the rev. thomas pocock, chaplain of the _ranelagh_, byng's flag-ship at malaga, says:[ ] 'many of our ships went out of the line for want of ammunition.' byng's own opinion, as stated by the compiler of his memoirs, was, that 'it may without great vanity be said that the english had gained a greater victory if they had been supplied with ammunition as they ought to have been.' i myself heard the late lord alcester speak of the anxiety that had been caused him by the state of his ships' magazines after the attack on the alexandria forts in . at a still later date, admiral dewey in manila bay interrupted his attack on the spanish squadron to ascertain how much ammunition his ships had left. the carrying capacity of ships being limited, rapid gun-fire in battle invariably brings with it the risk of running short of ammunition. it did this in the nineteenth century just as much as, probably even more than, it did in the sixteenth. [footnote : in his journal (p. ), printed as an appendix to _memoirs_relating_to_the_lord_torrington_, edited by j. k. laughton for the camden society, .] to charge elizabeth with criminal parsimony because she insisted on every shot being 'registered and accounted for' will be received with ridicule by naval officers. of course every shot, and for the matter of that every other article expended, has to be accounted for. one of the most important duties of the gunner of a man-of-war is to keep a strict account of the expenditure of all gunnery stores. this was more exactly done under queen victoria than it was under queen elizabeth. naval officers are more hostile to 'red tape' than most men, and they may lament the vast amount of bookkeeping that modern auditors and committees of public accounts insist upon, but they are convinced that a reasonable check on expenditure of stores is indispensable to efficient organisation. so far from blaming elizabeth for demanding this, they believe that both she and burleigh, her lord treasurer, were very much in advance of their age. another charge against her is that she defrauded her seamen of their wages. the following is froude's statement:-- 'want of the relief, which, if they had been paid their wages, they might have provided for themselves had aggravated the tendencies to disease, and a frightful mortality now set in through the entire fleet.' the word 'now' is interesting, froude having had before him howard's and seymour's letters, already quoted, showing that the appearance of the sickness was by no means recent. elizabeth's illiberality towards her seamen may be judged from the fact that in her reign their pay was certainly increased once and perhaps twice.[ ] in the sailor's pay was raised from s. d. to s. a month. a rise of pay of per cent. all at once is, i venture to say, entirely without parallel in the navy since, and cannot well be called illiberal. the elizabethan s. would be equal to £ in our present accounts; and, as the naval month at the earlier date was the lunar, a sailor's yearly wages would be equal to £ now. the year's pay of an a.b., 'non-continuous service,' as elizabeth's sailors were, is at the present time £ s. d. it is true that the sailor now can receive additional pay for good-conduct badges, gunnery-training, &c., and also can look forward to that immense boon--a pension--nearly, but thanks to sir j. hawkins and drake's establishment of the 'chatham chest,' not quite unknown in the sixteenth century. compared with the rate of wages ruling on shore, elizabeth's seamen were paid highly. mr. hubert hall states that for labourers 'the usual rate was d. or d. a day.' ploughmen received a shilling a week. in these cases 'board' was also given. the sailor's pay was s. a week with board. even compared with skilled labour on shore the sailor of the armada epoch was well paid. thorold rogers gives, for , the wages, without board, of carpenters and masons at d. and s. a day. a plumber's wages varied from - / d. to s.; but there is one case of a plumber receiving as much as s. d., which was probably for a single day. [footnote : mr. halliday sparling, in the article already referred to (p. ), says twice; but mr. oppenheim seems to think that the first increase was before elizabeth's accession.] delay in the payment of wages was not peculiar to the elizabethan system. it lasted very much longer, down to our own times in fact. in the seamen of the fleet were kept without their pay for several months. in the great majority of cases, and most likely in all, the number of these months was less than six. even within the nineteenth century men-of-war's men had to wait for their pay for years. commander c. n. robinson, in his 'british fleet,'[ ] a book that ought to be in every englishman's library, remarks: 'all through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was the rule not to pay anybody until the end of the commission, and to a certain degree the practice obtained until some fifty years ago.' as to the nineteenth century, lord dundonald, speaking in parliament, may be quoted. he said that of the ships on the east indies station, the _centurion's_ men had been unpaid for eleven years; the _rattlesnake's_ for fourteen; the _fox's_ for fifteen. the elizabethan practice compared with this will look almost precipitate instead of dilatory. to draw again on my personal experience, i may say that i have been kept without pay for a longer time than most of the people in lord howard's fleet, as, for the first two years that i was at sea, young officers were paid only once in six months; and then never in cash, but always in bills. the reader may be left to imagine what happened when a naval cadet tried to get a bill for some £ or £ cashed at a small spanish-american port. [footnote : london, .] a great deal has been made of the strict audit of the accounts of howard's fleet. the queen, says froude, 'would give no orders for money till she had demanded the meaning of every penny that she was charged.' why she alone should be held up to obloquy for this is not clear. until a very recent period, well within the last reign, no commanding officer, on a ship being paid off, could receive the residue of his pay, or get any half-pay at all, until his 'accounts had been passed.'[ ] the same rule applied to officers in charge of money or stores. it has been made a further charge against elizabeth that her officers had to meet certain expenditure out of their own pockets. that certainly is not a peculiarity of the sixteenth-century navy. till less than fifty years ago the captain of a british man-of-war had to provide one of the three chronometers used in the navigation of his ship. even later than that the articles necessary for cleaning the ship and everything required for decorating her were paid for by the officers, almost invariably by the first lieutenant, or second in command. there must be many officers still serving who have spent sums, considerable in the aggregate, of their own money on public objects. though pressure in this respect has been much relieved of late, there are doubtless many who do so still. it is, in fact, a traditional practice in the british navy and is not in the least distinctly elizabethan. [footnote : this happened to me in .] some acquaintance with present conditions and accurate knowledge of the naval methods prevailing in the great queen's reign--a knowledge which the publication of the original documents puts within the reach of anyone who really cares to know the truth--will convince the candid inquirer that elizabeth's administration of the navy compares favourably with that of any of her successors; and that, for it, she deserves the admiration and unalloyed gratitude of the nation. ix[ ] [footnote : written in . (_cornhill_magazine_.)] nelson: the centenary of trafalgar [the following article was read as an address, in compliance with the request of its council, at the annual meeting of the navy records society in july . it was, and indeed is still, my opinion, as stated to the meeting in some prefatory remarks, that the address would have come better from a professed historian, several members of the society being well known as entitled to that designation. the council, however, considered that, as nelson's tactical principles and achievements should be dealt with, it would be better for the address to be delivered by a naval officer--one, moreover, who had personal experience of the manoeuvres of fleets under sail. space would not suffice for treating of nelson's merits as a strategist, though they are as great as those which he possessed as a tactician.] centenary commemorations are common enough; but the commemoration of nelson has a characteristic which distinguishes it from most, if not from all, others. in these days we forget soon. what place is still kept in our memories by even the most illustrious of those who have but recently left us? it is not only that we do not remember their wishes and injunctions; their existence has almost faded from our recollection. it is not difficult to persuade people to commemorate a departed worthy; but in most cases industry has to take the place of enthusiasm, and moribund or extinct remembrances have to be galvanised by assiduity into a semblance of life. in the case of nelson the conditions are very different. he may have been misunderstood; even by his professional descendants his acts and doctrines may have been misinterpreted; but he has never been forgotten. the time has now come when we can specially do honour to nelson's memory without wounding the feelings of other nations. there is no need to exult over or even to expatiate on the defeats of others. in recalling the past it is more dignified as regards ourselves, and more considerate of the honour of our great admiral, to think of the valour and self-devotion rather than the misfortunes of those against whom he fought. we can do full justice to nelson's memory without reopening old wounds. the first thing to be noted concerning him is that he is the only man who has ever lived who by universal consent is without a peer. this is said in full view of the new constellation rising above the eastern horizon; for that constellation, brilliant as it is, has not yet reached the meridian. in every walk of life, except that which nelson chose as his own, you will find several competitors for the first place, each one of whom will have many supporters. alexander of macedon, hannibal, cæsar, marlborough, frederick the great, and napoleon have been severally put forward for the palm of generalship. to those who would acclaim richelieu as the first of statesmen, others would oppose chatham, or william pitt, or cavour, or bismarck, or marquis ito. who was the first of sculptors? who the first of painters? who the first of poets? in every case there is a great difference of opinion. ask, however, who was the first of admirals, and the unanimous reply will still be--'nelson,' tried as he was by many years of high command in war. it is not only amongst his fellow-countrymen that his preeminence is acknowledged. foreigners admit it as readily as we proclaim it ourselves. we may consider what it was that gave nelson this unique position among men. the early conditions of his naval career were certainly not favourable to him. it is true that he was promoted when young; but so were many other officers. nelson was made a commander only a few months after the outbreak of war between great britain and france, and was made a post-captain within a few days of the declaration of war by spain. an officer holding a rank qualifying him for command at the outset of a great war might well have looked forward confidently to exceptional opportunities of distinguishing himself. even in our own days, when some trifling campaign is about to be carried on, the officers who are employed where they can take no part in it vehemently lament their ill-fortune. how much more disheartening must it have been to be excluded from active participation in a great and long-continued conflict! this was nelson's case. as far as his hopes of gaining distinction were concerned, fate seemed to persecute him pertinaciously. he was a captain of more than four years' seniority when the treaty of versailles put an end to the war of american independence. yet, with the exception of the brief nicaragua expedition--which by the side of the important occurrences of grand naval campaigns must have seemed insignificant--his services during all those years of hostilities were uneventful, and even humdrum. he seemed to miss every important operation; and when the war ended--we may almost say--he had never seen a ship fire a broadside in anger. there then came what promised to be, and in fact turned out to be, a long period of peace. with no distinguished war service to point to, and with the prospect before him of only uneventful employment, or no employment afloat at all, nelson might well have been disheartened to the verge of despondency. that he was not disheartened, but, instead thereof, made a name for himself in such unfavourable circumstances, must be accepted as one of the most convincing proofs of his rare force of character. to have attracted the notice, and to have secured the confidence, of so great a sea-officer as lord hood constituted a distinction which could have been won only by merit so considerable that it could not long remain unrecognised. the war of american independence had still seven months to run when lord hood pointed to nelson as an officer to be consulted on 'questions relative to naval tactics,' professor laughton tells us that at that time nelson had never served with a fleet. lord hood was one of the last men in the world to go out of his way to pay to a youthful subordinate an empty compliment, and we may confidently base our estimate of an officer's merits on lord hood's belief in them. he, no doubt, gave a wide signification to the term 'tactics,' and used it as embracing all that is included in the phrase 'conduct of war.' he must have found out, from conversations with, and from the remarks of, the young captain, whom he treated as intimately as if he was his son, that the latter was already, what he continued to be till the end, viz. a student of naval warfare. this point deserves particular attention. the officers of the navy of the present day, period of peace though it be, can imitate nelson at least in this. he had to wait a long time before he could translate into brilliant action the result of his tactical studies. fourteen years after lord hood spoke of him as above related, by a 'spontaneous and sudden act, for which he had no authority by signal or otherwise, except his own judgment and quick perceptions,' nelson entirely defeated the movement of the enemy's fleet, contributed to the winning of a great victory, and, as captain mahan tells us, 'emerged from merely personal distinction to national renown.' the justification of dwelling on this is to be found in the necessity, even at this day, of preventing the repetition of mistakes concerning nelson's qualities and disposition. his recent biographers, captain mahan and professor laughton, feel constrained to tell us over and over again that nelson's predominant characteristic was not mere 'headlong valour and instinct for fighting'; that he was not the man 'to run needless and useless risks' in battle. 'the breadth and acuteness of nelson's intellect,' says mahan, 'have been too much overlooked in the admiration excited by his unusually grand moral endowments of resolution, dash, and fearlessness of responsibility!' in forming a true conception of what nelson was, the publications of the navy records society will help us greatly. there is something very remarkable in the way in which mr. gutteridge's volume[ ] not only confirms captain mahan's refutation of the aspersions on nelson's honour and humanity, but also establishes professor laughton's conclusions, reached many years ago, that it was the orders given to him, and not his amour, which detained him at naples at a well-known epoch. the last volume issued by the society, that of mr. julian corbett,[ ] is, i venture to affirm, the most useful to naval officers that has yet appeared among the society's publications. it will provide them with an admirable historical introduction to the study of tactics, and greatly help them in ascertaining the importance of nelson's achievements as a tactician. for my own part, i may say with gratitude that but for mr. corbett's valuable work i could not have completed this appreciation. [footnote : _nelson_and_the_neapolitan_jacobins_.] [footnote : _fighting_instructions_, - .] the most renowned of nelson's achievements was that performed in his final battle and victory. strange as it may seem, that celebrated performance has been the subject of much controversy, and, brilliant as it was, the tactics adopted in it have been freely, and indeed unfavourably, criticised. there is still much difference of opinion as to the preliminary movements, and as to the exact method by which nelson's attack was made. it has been often asserted that the method really followed was not that which nelson had expressly declared his intention of adopting. the question raised concerning this is a difficult one, and, until the appearance of mr. julian corbett's recent work and the interesting volume on trafalgar lately published by mr. h. newbolt, had not been fully discussed. the late vice-admiral p. h. colomb contributed to the _united_service_magazine_ of september a very striking article on the subject of nelson's tactics in his last battle, and those who propose to study the case should certainly peruse what he wrote. the criticism of nelson's procedure at trafalgar in its strongest form may be summarised as follows. it is affirmed that he drew up and communicated to the officers under his orders a certain plan of attack; that just before the battle he changed his plan without warning; that he hurried on his attack unnecessarily; that he exposed his fleet to excessive peril; and, because of all this, that the british loss was much heavier and much less evenly distributed among the ships of the fleet than it need have been. the most formidable arraignment of the mode of nelson's last attack is, undoubtedly, to be found in the paper published by sir charles ekins in his book on 'naval battles,' and vouched for by him as the work of an eye-witness--almost certainly, as mr. julian corbett holds, an officer on board the _conqueror_ in the battle. it is a remarkable document. being critical rather than instructive, it is not to be classed with the essay of clerk of eldin; but it is one of the most important contributions to the investigation of tactical questions ever published in the english tongue. on it are based nearly, or quite, all the unfavourable views expressed concerning the british tactics at trafalgar. as it contains a respectfully stated, but still sharp, criticism of nelson's action, it will not be thought presumptuous if we criticise it in its turn. notwithstanding the fact that the author of the paper actually took part in the battle, and that he was gifted with no mean tactical insight, it is permissible to say that his remarks have an academic tinge. in fact, they are very much of the kind that a clever professor of tactics, who had not felt the responsibilities inseparable from the command of a fleet, would put before a class of students. between a professor of tactics, however clever, and a commanding genius like nelson the difference is great indeed. the writer of the paper in question perhaps expressed the more general opinion of his day. he has certainly suggested opinions to later generations of naval officers. the captains who shared in nelson's last great victory did not agree among themselves as to the mode in which the attack was introduced. it was believed by some of them, and, thanks largely to the _conqueror_ officer's paper, it is generally believed now, that, whereas nelson had announced his intention of advancing to the attack in lines-abreast or lines-of-bearing, he really did so in lines-ahead. following up the path of investigation to which, in his article above mentioned, admiral colomb had already pointed, we can, i think, arrive only at the conclusion that the announced intention was adhered to. before the reasons for this conclusion are given it will be convenient to deal with the suggestions, or allegations, that nelson exposed his fleet at trafalgar to unduly heavy loss, putting it in the power of the enemy--to use the words of the _conqueror's_ officer--to 'have annihilated the ships one after another in detail'; and that 'the brunt of the action would have been more equally felt' had a different mode of advance from that actually chosen been adopted. now, trafalgar was a battle in which an inferior fleet of twenty-six ships gained a victory over a superior fleet of thirty-three. the victory was so decisive that more than half of the enemy's capital ships were captured or destroyed on the spot, and the remainder were so battered that some fell an easy prey to the victor's side soon after the battle, the rest having limped painfully to the shelter of a fortified port near at hand. to gain such a victory over a superior force of seamen justly celebrated for their spirit and gallantry, very hard fighting was necessary. the only actions of the napoleonic period that can be compared with it are those of camperdown, the nile, and copenhagen. the proportionate loss at trafalgar was the least in all the four battles.[ ] the allegation that, had nelson followed a different method at trafalgar, the 'brunt of the action would have been more equally felt' can be disposed of easily. in nearly all sea-fights, whether nelsonic in character or not, half of the loss of the victors has fallen on considerably less than half the fleet. that this has been the rule, whatever tactical method may have been adopted, will appear from the following statement. in rodney's victory ( th april ) half the loss fell upon nine ships out of thirty-six, or one-fourth; at 'the first of june' it fell upon five ships out of twenty-five, or one-fifth; at st. vincent it fell upon three ships out of fifteen, also one-fifth; at trafalgar half the loss fell on five ships out of twenty-seven, or very little less than an exact fifth. it has, therefore, been conclusively shown that, faulty or not faulty, long-announced or hastily adopted, the plan on which the battle of trafalgar was fought did not occasion excessive loss to the victors or confine the loss, such as it was, to an unduly small portion of their fleet. as bearing on this question of the relative severity of the british loss at trafalgar, it may be remarked that in that battle there were several british ships which had been in other great sea-fights. their losses in these latter were in nearly every case heavier than their trafalgar losses.[ ] authoritative and undisputed figures show how baseless are the suggestions that nelson's tactical procedure at trafalgar caused his fleet to suffer needlessly heavy loss. [footnote : camperdown loss out of , : per cent. the nile " " , : . " copenhagen " " , : . " _trafalgar_ , " " , : . " ] [footnote : ---------------------------------------------------------------------- | | | | | | trafalgar | | ship | action |killed|wounded|total|--------------------| | | | | | |killed|wounded|total| |----------------------------------------------------------------------| |_ajax_ | rodney's | | | | | | | | |(ap. , )| | | | | | | |_agamemnon_ | " | | | | | | | |_conqueror_ | " | | | | | | | |_defence_ | st june | | | | | | | |_bellerophon_| the nile | | | | | | | |_swiftsure_ | " | | | | | | | |_defiance_ | copenhagen | | | | | | | |_polyphemus_ | " | | | | | | | ---------------------------------------------------------------------- [in only one case was the trafalgar total loss greater than the total loss of the same ship in an earlier fight; and in this case (the _defiance_) the number of killed at trafalgar was only about two-thirds of the number killed in the other action.] it is now necessary to investigate the statement that nelson, hastily and without warning, changed his plan for fighting the battle. this investigation is much more difficult than that into the losses of the british fleet, because, whilst the latter can be settled by arithmetic, the former must proceed largely upon conjecture. how desirable it is to make the investigation of the statement mentioned will be manifest when we reflect on the curious fact that the very completeness of nelson's success at trafalgar checked, or, indeed, virtually destroyed, the study of tactics in the british navy for more than three-quarters of a century. his action was so misunderstood, or, at any rate, so variously represented, that it generally passed for gospel in our service that nelson's method consisted merely in rushing at his enemy as soon as he saw him. against this conception his biographers, one after another, have protested in vain. at the outset of this investigation it will be well to call to mind two or three things, simple enough, but not always remembered. one of these is that advancing to the attack and the attack itself are not the same operations. another is, that, in the order of sailing in two or more columns, if the ships were 'by the wind' or close-hauled--the column-leaders were not abeam of each other, but bore from one another in the direction of the wind. also, it may be mentioned that by simple alterations of course a line-abreast may be converted into a line-of-bearing and a line-of-bearing into a line-ahead, and that the reverse can be effected by the same operation. again, adherence to a plan which presupposes the enemy's fleet to be in a particular formation after he is found to be in another is not to be expected of a consummate tactician. this remark is introduced here with full knowledge of the probability that it will be quoted as an admission that nelson did change his plan without warning. no admission of the kind is intended. 'in all cases of anticipated battle,' says mahan, 'nelson was careful to put his subordinates in possession both of his general plans and, as far as possible, of the underlying ideas.' the same biographer tells us, what is well worth remembering, that 'no man was ever better served than nelson by the inspiration of the moment; no man ever counted on it less.' the plan announced in the celebrated memorandum of th october indicated, for the attack from to windward, that the british fleet, in what would be called on shore an echelon of two main divisions and an 'advance squadron,' would move against an enemy assumed to be in single line-ahead. the 'advance squadron,' it should be noted, was not to be ahead of the two main divisions, but in such a position that it could be moved to strengthen either. the name seems to have been due to the mode in which the ships composing the squadron were employed in, so to speak, 'feeling for' the enemy. on th october six ships were ordered 'to go ahead during the night'; and, besides the frigates, two more ships were so stationed as to keep up the communication between the six and the commander-in-chief's flag-ship. thus eight ships in effect composed an 'advance squadron,' and did not join either of the main divisions at first. when it was expected that the british fleet would comprise forty sail-of-the-line and the enemy's fleet forty-six, each british main division was to be made up of sixteen ships; and eight two-deckers added to either division would increase the strength of the latter to twenty-four ships. it is interesting to note that, omitting the _africa_, which ship came up late, each british main division on the morning of st october had nine ships--a number which, by the addition of the eight already mentioned as distinct from the divisions, could have been increased to seventeen, thus, except for a fraction, exactly maintaining the original proportion as regards the hostile fleet, which was now found to be composed of thirty-three ships. during the night of th- st october the franco-spanish fleet, which had been sailing in three divisions and a 'squadron of observation,' formed line and stood to the southward, heading a little to the eastward of south. the 'squadron of observation' was parallel to the main body and to windward (in this case to the westward) of it, with the leading ships rather more advanced. the british main divisions steered wsw. till a.m. after that they steered sw. till a.m. there are great difficulties about the time, as the notation of it[ ] differed considerably in different ships; but the above hours are taken from the _victory's_ log. at a.m. the british fleet, or rather its main divisions, wore and stood n. by e. as the wind was about nw. by w., the ships were close-hauled, and the leader of the 'lee-line,' i.e. collingwood's flag-ship, was when in station two points abaft the _victory's_ beam as soon as the 'order of sailing' in two columns--which was to be the order of battle--had been formed. [footnote : except the chronometers, which were instruments of navigation so precious as always to be kept under lock and key, there were no clocks in the navy till some years after i joined it. time on board ship was kept by half-hour sand-glasses.] about a.m. the enemy's fleet was sighted from the _victory_, and observed to bear from her e. by s. and be distant from her ten or twelve miles. the distance is corroborated by observed bearings from collingwood's flag-ship.[ ] viewed from the british ships, placed as they were relatively to it, the enemy's fleet must have appeared as a long single line-ahead, perhaps not very exactly formed. as soon as the hostile force was clearly made out, the british divisions bore up and stood to the eastward, steering by the _victory's_ compass ene. the position and formation of the british main divisions were by this made exactly those in which they are shown in the diagram usually attached to the celebrated memorandum of th october . the enemy must have appeared to the british, who were ten or twelve miles to windward of him, and on his beam, as if he were formed in line-ahead. he therefore was also in the position and formation assigned to him in that diagram. [footnote : it would necessitate the use of some technicalities to explain it fully; but it may be said that the bearings of the extremes of the enemy's line observed from his flag-ship prove that collingwood was in the station that he ought to have occupied when the british fleet was in the order of sailing and close to the wind.] at a time which, because of the variety in the notations of it, it is difficult to fix exactly, but somewhere between and a.m., the enemy's ships wore together and endeavoured to form a line to the northward, which, owing to the direction of the wind, must have been about n. by e. and s. by w., or nne. and ssw. the operation--not merely of wearing, but of both wearing and reforming the line, such as it was--took more than an hour to complete. the wind was light; there was a westerly swell; the ships were under easy sail; consequently there must have been a good deal of leeway, and the hostile or 'combined' fleet headed in the direction of cadiz, towards which, we are expressly told by a high french authority--chevalier--it advanced. nelson had to direct the course of his fleet so that its divisions, when about to make the actual attack, would be just opposite the points to which the respective hostile ships had advanced in the meantime. in a light wind varying in force a direct course to those points could not be settled once for all; but that first chosen was very nearly right, and an alteration of a point, viz. to e. by n., was for a considerable time all that was necessary. collingwood later made a signal to his division to alter course one point to port, which brought them back to the earlier course, which by the _victory's_ compass had been ene. the eight ships of what has been referred to as the 'advance squadron' were distributed between the two main british divisions, six being assigned to collingwood's and two to nelson's. they did not all join their divisions at the same time, some--probably owing to the distance at which they had been employed from the rest of the fleet and the feebleness of the breeze--not till several hours after the combined fleet had been sighted. collingwood preserved in his division a line-of-bearing apparently until the very moment when the individual ships pushed on to make the actual attack. the enemy's fleet is usually represented as forming a curve. it would probably be more correct to call it a very obtuse re-entering angle. this must have been largely due to gravina's 'squadron of observation' keeping away in succession, to get into the wake of the rest of the line, which was forming towards the north. about the centre of the combined fleet there was a gap of a mile. ahead and astern of this the ships were not all in each other's wake. many were to leeward of their stations, thus giving the enemy's formation the appearance of a double line, or rather of a string of groups of ships. it is important to remember this, because no possible mode of attack--the enemy's fleet being formed as it was--could have prevented some british ships from being 'doubled on' when they cut into the enemy's force. on 'the first of june,' notwithstanding that the advance to the attack was intended to be in line-abreast, several british ships were 'doubled on,' and even 'trebled on,' as will be seen in the experiences on that day of the _brunswick_, _marlborough_, _royal_sovereign_, and _queen_charlotte_ herself. owing to the shape of the hostile 'line' at trafalgar and the formation in which he kept his division, collingwood brought his ships, up till the very moment when each proceeded to deliver her attack, in the formation laid down in the oft-quoted memorandum. by the terms of that document nelson had specifically assigned to his own division the work of seeing that the movements of collingwood's division should be interrupted as little as possible. it would, of course, have been beyond his power to do this if the position of his own division in the echelon formation prescribed in the memorandum had been rigorously adhered to after collingwood was getting near his objective point. in execution, therefore, of the service allotted to his division, nelson made a feint at the enemy's van. this necessitated an alteration of course to port, so that his ships came into a 'line-of-bearing' so very oblique that it may well have been loosely called a 'line-ahead.' sir charles ekins says that the two british lines '_afterwards_ fell into line-ahead, the ships in the wake of each other,' and that this was in obedience to signal. collingwood's line certainly did not fall into line-ahead. at the most it was a rather oblique line-of-bearing almost parallel to that part of the enemy's fleet which he was about to attack. in nelson's line there was more than one alteration of course, as the _victory's_ log expressly states that she kept standing for the enemy's van, which we learn from the french accounts was moving about n. by e. or nne. in the light wind prevailing the alterations of course must have rendered it, towards the end of the forenoon, impossible to keep exact station, even if the _victory_ were to shorten sail, which we know she did not. as admiral colomb pointed out, 'several later signals are recorded which were proper to make in lines-of-bearing, but not in lines-ahead.' it is difficult to import into this fact any other meaning but that of intention to preserve, however obliquely, the line-of-bearing which undoubtedly had been formed by the act of bearing-up as soon as the enemy's fleet had been distinguished. when collingwood had moved near enough to the enemy to let his ships deliver their attacks, it became unnecessary for nelson's division to provide against the other's being interrupted. accordingly, he headed for the point at which he meant to cut into the enemy's fleet. now came the moment, as regards his division, for doing what collingwood's had already begun to do, viz. engage in a 'pell-mell battle,'[ ] which surely may be interpreted as meaning a battle in which rigorous station-keeping was no longer expected, and in which 'no captain could do very wrong if he placed his ship alongside that of the enemy.' [footnote : nelson's own expression.] in several diagrams of the battle as supposed to have been fought the two british divisions just before the moment of impact are represented as converging towards each other. the spanish diagram, lately reproduced by mr. newbolt, shows this, as well as the english diagrams. we may take it, therefore, that there was towards the end of the forenoon a convergence of the two columns, and that this was due to nelson's return from his feint at the hostile van to the line from which he intended to let go his ships to deliver the actual attack. collingwood's small alteration of course of one point to port slightly, but only slightly, accentuated this convergence. enough has been said here of nelson's tactics at trafalgar. to discuss them fully would lead me too far for this occasion. i can only express the hope that in the navy the subject will receive fuller consideration hereafter. nelson's last victory was gained, be it remembered, in one afternoon, over a fleet more than per cent. his superior in numbers, and was so decisive that more than half of the hostile ships were taken. this was the crowning effort of seven years spent in virtually independent command in time of war--seven years, too, illustrated by more than one great victory. the more closely we look into nelson's tactical achievements, the more effective and brilliant do they appear. it is the same with his character and disposition. the more exact researches and investigations of recent times have removed from his name the obloquy which it pleased some to cast upon it. we can see now that his 'childlike, delighted vanity'--to use the phrase of his greatest biographer--was but a thin incrustation on noble qualities. as in the material world valueless earthy substances surround a vein of precious metal, so through nelson's moral nature there ran an opulent lode of character, unimpaired in its priceless worth by adjacent frailties which, in the majority of mankind, are present without any precious stuff beneath them. it is with minds prepared to see this that we should commemorate our great admiral. veneration of nelson's memory cannot be confined to particular objects or be limited by locality. his tomb is wider than the space covered by dome or column, and his real monument is more durable than any material construction. it is the unwritten and spiritual memorial of him, firmly fixed in the hearts of his fellow-countrymen. x the share of the fleet in the defence of the empire[ ] [footnote : written in . (_naval_annual_, .)] at the close of the great war, which ended in the downfall of napoleon, the maritime position of the british empire was not only predominant--it also was, and long remained, beyond the reach of challenge. after the stupendous events of the great contest such successes as those at algiers where we were helped by the dutch, at navarino where we had two allies, and at acre were regarded as matters of course, and no very grave issue hung upon any one of them. for more than half a century after nelson's death all the most brilliant achievements of british arms were performed on shore, in india or in the crimea. there were also many small wars on land, and it may well have seemed to contemporaries that the days of great naval contests were over and that force of circumstances was converting us into a military from a naval nation. the belief in the efficacy of naval defence was not extinct, but it had ceased to operate actively. even whilst the necessity of that form of defence was far more urgent, inattention to or ignorance of its true principles had occasionally allowed it to grow weak, but the possibility of substituting something else for it had not been pressed or even suggested. to this, however, we had now come; and it was largely a consequence of the crimean war. in that war the british army had nobly sustained its reputation as a fighting machine. for the first time after a long interval it had met in battle european troops, and had come out of the conflict more renowned for bravery than ever. nothing seemed able to damp its heroism--not scantiness of food, not lack of clothing amidst bitter cold, not miserable quarters, not superior forces of a valiant enemy. it clung to its squalid abodes in the positions which it was ordered to hold with a tenacious fortitude that had never been surpassed in its glorious history, and that defied all assaults. in combination with its brave allies it brought to a triumphant conclusion a war of an altogether peculiar character. the campaign in the crimea was in reality the siege of a single fortress. all the movements of the western invaders were undertaken to bring them within striking distance of the place, to keep them within reach of it, or to capture it. every battle that occurred was fought with one of those objects. when the place fell the war ended. the one general who, in the opinion of all concerned, gained high distinction in the war was the general who had prolonged the defence of sebastopol by the skilful use of earthworks. it was no wonder that the attack and defence of fortified places assumed large importance in the eyes of the british people. the command of the sea held by the allied powers was so complete and all-pervading that no one stopped to think what the course of hostilities would have been without it, any more than men stop to think what the course of any particular business would be if there were no atmosphere to breathe in. not a single allied soldier had been delayed on passage by the hostile fleet; not a single merchant vessel belonging to the allies had been captured by a hostile cruiser. supplies and reinforcements for the besieging armies were transported to them without escort and with as little risk of interruption as if the operations had been those of profound peace. no sooner was the crimean war over than another struggle took place, viz. the war of the indian mutiny, and that also was waged entirely on land. here again the command of the sea was so complete that no interruption of it, even temporary, called attention to its existence. troops and supplies were sent to india from the united kingdom and from hong-kong; horses for military purposes from australia and south africa; and in every case without a thought of naval escort. the experience of hostilities in india seemed to confirm the experience of the crimea. what we had just done to a great european nation was assumed to be what unfriendly european nations would wish to do and would be able to do to us. it was also assumed that the only way of frustrating their designs would be to do what had recently been done in the hope of frustrating ours, but to do it better. we must--it was said--depend on fortifications, but more perfect than those which had failed to save sebastopol. the protection to be afforded by our fleet was deliberately declared to be insufficient. it might, so it was held, be absent altogether, and then there would be nothing but fortifications to stand between us and the progress of an active enemy. in the result the policy of constructing imposing passive defence-works on our coast was adopted. the fortifications had to be multiplied. dependence on that class of defence inevitably leads to discovery after discovery that some spot open to the kind of attack feared has not been made secure. we began by fortifying the great dockyard ports--on the sea side against a hostile fleet, on the land side against hostile troops. then it was perceived that to fortify the dockyard ports in the mother country afforded very little protection to the outlying portions of the empire. so their principal ports also were given defence-works--sometimes of an elaborate character. again, it was found that commercial ports had been left out and that they too must be fortified. when this was done spots were observed at which an enemy might effect a landing in force, to prevent which further forts or batteries must be erected. the most striking thing in all this is the complete omission to take note of the conditions involved in the command of the sea. evidently it had not been understood that it was that very command which alone had enabled the armies of western europe to proceed, not only without serious interruption, but also without encountering an attempt at obstruction, to the field in the crimea on which their victories had been won, and that the same command would be necessary before any hostile expedition, large enough to justify the construction of the fortifications specially intended to repel it, could cross the sea and get within striking distance of our shores. it should be deeply interesting to the people of those parts of the british empire which lie beyond sea to note that the defensive system comprised in the fortification of the coast of the united kingdom promised no security to them in the event of war. making all proper allowance for the superior urgency of defending the heart of the empire, we must still admit that no system of defence is adequate which does not provide for the defence of other valuable parts of the great body politic as well. again, the system of defence proved to be imperfect. every part of the empire depended for prosperity--some parts depended for existence--on practically unrestricted traffic on the ocean. this, which might be assailed at many points and on lines often thousands of miles in length, could find little or no defence in immovable fortifications. it could not be held that the existence of these released the fleet from all duty but that of protecting our ocean commerce, because, if any enemy's navy was able to carry out an operation of such magnitude and difficulty as a serious attack on our home territory, it would assuredly be able to carry out the work of damaging our maritime trade. power to do the latter has always belonged to the navy which was in a position to extend its activity persistently to the immediate neighbourhood of its opponent's coast-line. it is not to be supposed that there was no one to point this out. several persons did so, but being mostly sailors they were not listened to. in actual practice the whole domain of imperial strategy was withdrawn from the intervention of the naval officer, as though it were something with which he could not have anything to do. several great wars had been waged in europe in the meantime, and all of them were land wars. naval forces, if employed at all, were employed only just enough to bring out how insignificant their participation in them was. as was to have been expected, the habit of attaching importance to the naval element of imperial defence declined. the empire, nevertheless, continued to grow. its territory was extended; its population, notably its population of european stock, increased, and its wealth and the subsequent operations of exchanging its productions for those of other countries were enormously expanded. at the same time the navy, to the strength and efficiency of which it had to look for security, declined absolutely, and still more relatively. other navies were advancing: some had, as it were, come into existence. at last the true conditions were discerned, and the nation, almost with one voice, demanded that the naval defences of the empire should be put upon a proper footing. let no one dismiss the foregoing retrospect as merely ancient history. on the contrary, let all those who desire to see the british empire follow the path of its natural development in tranquillity study the recent past. by doing this we shall be able to estimate aright the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire. we must examine the circumstances in which we are placed. for five-and-thirty years the nations of the world have practically lived under the rule of force. the incessant object of every great state has been to increase the strength of its armed forces up to the point at which the cost becomes intolerable. countries separated from one another only by arbitrary geographical lines add regiment to regiment and gun to gun, and also devise continually fresh expedients for accelerating the work of preparing their armies to take the field. the most pacifically inclined nation must do in this respect as its neighbours do, on pain of losing its independence and being mutilated in its territory if it does not. this rivalry has spread to the sea, and fleets are increased at a rate and at a cost in money unknown to former times, even to those of war. the possession of a powerful navy by some state which has no reason to apprehend over-sea invasion and which has no maritime interests, however intrinsically important they may be, commensurate with the strength of its fleets, may not indicate a spirit of aggression; but it at least indicates ability to become an aggressor. consequently, for the british fleet to fill its proper position in the defence of the empire it must be strong. to be strong more than large numbers will be required. it must have the right, that is the best, material, the best organisation, the best discipline, the best training, the best distribution. we shall ascertain the position that it should hold, if we examine what it would have to do when called upon for work more active than that of peace time. with the exception of india and canada no part of the empire is liable to serious attack that does not come over-sea. any support that can be given to india or canada by other parts of the empire must be conveyed across the sea also. this at once indicates the importance of ocean lines of communication. war is the method adopted, when less violent means of persuasion have failed, to force your enemy to comply with your demands. there are three principal ways of effecting this--invasion of his country, raids on his territory, destruction or serious damage of his sea-borne commerce. successful invasion must compel the invaded to come to terms, or his national existence will be lost. raids upon his territory may possibly so distress him that he would rather concede your terms than continue the struggle.[ ] damage to his sea-borne commerce may be carried so far that he will be ruined if he does not give in. so much for one side of the account; we have to examine the other. against invasion, raids, or attempts at commerce-destruction there must be some form of defence, and, as a matter of historical fact, defence against each has been repeatedly successful. if we need instances we have only to peruse the history of the british empire. [footnote : though raids rarely, if ever, decide a war, they may cause inconvenience or local distress, and an enemy desiring to make them should be obstructed as much as possible.] how was it that--whilst we landed invading armies in many hostile countries, seized many portions of hostile territory, and drove more than one enemy's commerce from the sea--our own country has been free from successful invasion for more than eight centuries, few portions of our territory have been taken from us even temporarily, and our commerce has increased throughout protracted maritime wars? to this there can only be one answer, viz. that the arrangements for defence were effectual. what, then, were these arrangements? they were comprised in the provision of a powerful, well-distributed, well-handled navy, and of a mobile army of suitable strength. it is to be observed that each element possessed the characteristic of mobility. we have to deal here more especially with the naval element, and we must study the manner in which it operates. naval war is sea-power in action; and sea-power, taken in the narrow sense, has limitations. it may not, even when so taken, cease to act at the enemy's coast-line, but its direct influence extends only to the inner side of a narrow zone conforming to that line. in a maritime contest each side tries to control the ocean communications and to prevent the other from controlling them. if either gains the control, something in addition to sea-power strictly defined may begin to operate: the other side's territory may be invaded or harassed by considerable raids, and its commerce may be driven from the sea. it will be noticed that control of ocean communications is the needful preliminary to these. it is merely a variant of the often employed expression of the necessity, in war, of obtaining command of the sea. in the case of the most important portion of the british empire, viz. the united kingdom, our loss of control of the ocean communications would have a result which scarcely any foreign country would experience. other countries are dependent on importations for some part of the food of their population and of the raw material of their industry; but much of the importation is, and perhaps all of it may be, effected by land. here, we depend upon imports from abroad for a very large part of the food of our people, and of the raw material essential to the manufacture of the commodities by the exchange of which we obtain necessary supplies; and the whole of these imports come, and must come to us, by sea. also, if we had not freedom of exportation, our wealth and the means of supporting a war would disappear. probably all the greater colonies and india could feed their inhabitants for a moderately long time without sea-borne imports, but unless the sea were open to them their prosperity would decline. this teaches us the necessity to the british empire of controlling our maritime communications, and equally teaches those who may one day be our enemies the advisability of preventing us from doing so. the lesson in either case is driven farther home by other considerations connected with communications. in war a belligerent has two tasks before him. he has to defend himself and hurt his enemy. the more he hurts his enemy, the less is he likely to be hurt himself. this defines the great principle of offensive defence. to act in accordance with this principle, a belligerent should try, as the saying goes, to carry the war into the enemy's country. he should try to make his opponents fight where he wants them to fight, which will probably be as far as possible from his own territory and as near as possible to theirs. unless he can do this, invasion and even serious raids by him will be out of the question. more than that, his inability to do it will virtually indicate that on its part the other side can fix the scene of active hostilities unpleasantly close to the points from which he desires to keep its forces away. a line of ocean communications may be vulnerable throughout its length; but it does not follow that an assailant can operate against it with equal facility at every point, nor does it follow that it is at every point equally worth assailing. lines running past hostile naval ports are especially open to assault in the part near the ports; and lines formed by the confluence of two or more other lines--like, for example, those which enter the english channel--will generally include a greater abundance of valuable traffic than others. consequently there are some parts at which an enemy may be expected to be more active than elsewhere, and it is from those very parts that it is most desirable to exclude him. they are, as a rule, relatively near to the territory of the state whose navy has to keep the lines open, that is to say, prevent their being persistently beset by an enemy. the necessary convergence of lines towards that state's ports shows that some portion of them would have to be traversed, or their traversing be attempted, by expeditions meant to carry out either invasion or raids. if, therefore, the enemy can be excluded as above mentioned, invasions, raids, and the more serious molestation of sea-borne commerce by him will be prevented. if we consider particular cases we shall find proof upon proof of the validity of the rule. three great lines--one from the neighbourhood of the cape of good hope, one from the red sea, and a third from india and ceylon--converge near the south-western part of australia and run as one line towards the territory of the important states farther east. if an assailant can be excluded from the latter or combined line he must either divide his force or operate on only one of the confluents, leaving the rest free. the farther he can be pushed back from the point of confluence the more effectually will he be limited to a single line, because the combining lines, traced backwards, trend more and more apart, and it is, therefore, more and more difficult for him to keep detachments of his force within supporting distance of each other if they continue to act against two or more lines. the particular case of the approaches to the territory of the united kingdom has the same features, and proves the rule with equal clearness. this latter case is so often adduced without mention of others, that there is some risk of its being believed to be a solitary one. it stands, however, exactly on all fours with all the rest as regards the principle of the rule. a necessary consequence of an enemy's exclusion from the combined line as it approaches the territory to be defended is--as already suggested--that invasion of that territory and serious raids upon it will be rendered impracticable. indeed, if the exclusion be absolutely complete and permanent, raids of every kind and depredations on commerce in the neighbourhood will be prevented altogether. it should be explained that though lines and communications are spoken of, it is the area crossed by them which is strategically important. a naval force, either guarding or intending to assail a line, does not necessarily station itself permanently upon it. all that it has to do is to remain, for the proper length of time, within the strategic area across which the defended or threatened line runs. the strategic area will be of varying extent, its boundaries being determined by circumstances. the object of the defence will be to make the area from which the enemy's ships are excluded as extensive as possible. when the enemy has been pushed back into his own waters and into his own ports the exclusion is strategically complete. the sea is denied to his invading and important raiding expeditions, and indeed to most of his individual cruisers. at the same time it is free to the other belligerent. to effect this a vigorous offensive will be necessary. the immediate theatre of operations, the critical strategic area, need not be, and often ought not to be, near the territory defended by our navy. it is necessary to dwell upon this, because no principle of naval warfare has been more frequently or more seriously misapprehended. misapprehension of it has led to mischievous and dangerous distribution of naval force and to the squandering of immense sums of money on local defence vessels; that is, vessels only capable of operating in the very waters from which every effort should be made to exclude the enemy. failure to exclude him from them can only be regarded as, at the very least, yielding to him an important point in the great game of war. if we succeed in keeping him away, the local defence craft of every class are useless, and the money spent on them has been worse than wasted, because, if it had not been so spent, it might have been devoted to strengthening the kind of force which must be used to keep the enemy where he ought to be kept, viz. at a distance from our own waters. the demand that ships be so stationed that they will generally, and except when actually cruising, be within sight of the inhabitants, is common enough in the mother country, and perhaps even more common in the over-sea parts of the british empire. nothing justifies it but the honest ignorance of those who make it; nothing explains compliance with it but the deplorable weakness of authorities who yield to it. it was not by hanging about the coast of england, when there was no enemy near it, with his fleet, that hawke or nelson saved the country from invasion, nor was it by remaining where they could be seen by the fellow-countrymen of their crews that the french and english fleets shut up their enemy in the baltic and black sea, and thus gained and kept undisputed command of the sea which enabled them, without interruption, to invade their enemy's territory. the condition insisted upon by the australasian governments in the agreement formerly made with the home government, that a certain number of ships, in return for an annual contribution of money, should always remain in australasian waters, was in reality greatly against the interests of that part of the empire. the australasian taxpayer was, in fact, made to insist upon being injured in return for his money. the proceeding would have been exactly paralleled by a householder who might insist that a fire-engine, maintained out of rates to which he contributes, should always be kept within a few feet of his front door, and not be allowed to proceed to the end of the street to extinguish a fire threatening to extend eventually to the householder's own dwelling. when still further localised naval defence--localised defence, that is, of what may be called the smaller description--is considered, the danger involved in adopting it will be quite as apparent, and the waste of money will be more obvious. localised defence is a near relation of passive defence. it owes its origin to the same sentiment, viz. a belief in the efficacy of staying where you are instead of carrying the war into the enemy's country. there may be cases in which no other kind of naval defence is practicable. the immense costliness of modern navies puts it out of the power of smaller states to maintain considerable sea-going fleets. the historic maritime countries--sweden, denmark, the netherlands, and portugal, the performances of whose seamen are so justly celebrated--could not now send to sea a force equal in number and fighting efficiency to a quarter of the force possessed by anyone of the chief naval powers. the countries named, when determined not to expose themselves unarmed to an assailant, can provide themselves only with a kind of defence which, whatever its detailed composition, must be of an intrinsically localised character. in their case there is nothing else to be done; and in their case defence of the character specified would be likely to prove more efficacious than it could be expected to be elsewhere. war is usually made in pursuit of an object valuable enough to justify the risks inseparable from the attempt to gain it. aggression by any of the countries that have been mentioned is too improbable to call for serious apprehension. aggression against them is far more likely. what they have to do is to make the danger of attacking them so great that it will equal or outweigh any advantage that could be gained by conquering them. their wealth and resources, compared with those of great aggressive states, are not large enough to make up for much loss in war on the part of the latter engaging in attempts to seize them. therefore, what the small maritime countries have to do is to make the form of naval defence to which they are restricted efficacious enough to hurt an aggressor so much that the victory which he may feel certain of gaining will be quite barren. he will get no glory, even in these days of self-advertisement, from the conquest of such relatively weak antagonists; and the plunder will not suffice to repay him for the damage received in effecting it. the case of a member of the great body known as the british empire is altogether different. its conquest would probably be enormously valuable to a conqueror; its ruin immensely damaging to the body as a whole. either would justify an enemy in running considerable risks, and would afford him practically sufficient compensation for considerable losses incurred. we may expect that, in war, any chance of accomplishing either purpose will not be neglected. provision must, therefore, be made against the eventuality. let us for the moment suppose that, like one of the smaller countries whose case has been adduced, we are restricted to localised defence. an enemy not so restricted would be able to get, without being molested, as near to our territory--whether in the mother country or elsewhere--as the outer edge of the comparatively narrow belt of water that our localised defences could have any hope of controlling effectively. we should have abandoned to him the whole of the ocean except a relatively minute strip of coast-waters. that would be equivalent to saying good-bye to the maritime commerce on which our wealth wholly, and our existence largely, depends. no thoughtful british subject would find this tolerable. everyone would demand the institution of a different defence system. a change, therefore, to the more active system would be inevitable. it would begin with the introduction of a cruising force in addition to the localised force. the unvarying lesson of naval history would be that the cruising division should gain continuously on the localised. it is only in times of peace, when men have forgotten, or cannot be made to understand, what war is, that the opposite takes place. if it be hoped that a localised force will render coast-wise traffic safe from the enemy, a little knowledge of what has happened in war and a sufficiently close investigation of conditions will demonstrate how baseless the hope must be. countries not yet thickly populated would be in much the same condition as the countries of western europe a century ago, the similarity being due to the relative scarcity of good land communications. a part--probably not a very large part--of the articles required by the people dwelling on and near the coast in one section would be drawn from another similar section. these articles could be most conveniently and cheaply transported by water. if it were worth his while, an enemy disposing of an active cruising force strong enough to make its way into the neighbourhood of the coast waters concerned would interrupt the 'long-shore traffic' and defy the efforts of a localised force to prevent him. the history of the great war at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth teems with instances of interruption by our navy of the enemy's coast-wise trade when his ocean trade had been destroyed. the history of the american war of supplies other instances. the localised defence could not attempt to drive off hostile cruisers remaining far from the shore and meaning to infest the great lines of maritime communication running towards it. if those cruisers are to be driven off at all it can be done only by cruising ships. unless, therefore, we are to be content to leave our ocean routes, where most crowded and therefore most vulnerable, to the mercy of an enemy, we must have cruisers to meet the hostile cruisers. if we still adhere to our localised defence, we shall have two distinct kinds of force---one provided merely for local, and consequently restricted, action; the other able to act near the shore or far out at sea as circumstances may demand. if we go to the expense of providing both kinds, we shall have followed the example of the sage who cut a large hole in his study door for the cat and a small one for the kitten. is local naval defence, then, of any use? well, to tell the truth, not much; and only in rare and exceptional circumstances. even in the case of the smaller maritime countries, to which reference has been made above, defence of the character in question would avail little if a powerful assailant were resolved to press home his attack. that is to say, if only absolute belligerent considerations were regarded. in war, however, qualifying considerations can never be left out of sight. as the great napoleon observed, you can no more make war without incurring losses than you can make omelettes without breaking eggs. the strategist--and the tactician also, within his province--will always count the cost of a proposed operation, even where they are nearly certain of success. the occupation of a country, which would be of no great practical value to you when you got it, would be a poor return for the loss to which you would have been put in the process. that loss might, and probably would, leave you at a great disadvantage as regards enemies more nearly on an equality with yourself. it would, therefore, not be the improbability of breaking down the local naval defence of a minor maritime state, but the pressure of qualifying and only indirectly belligerent considerations, that would prevent its being attempted. in a struggle between two antagonists of the first rank, the circumstances would be different. purely belligerent considerations would have fuller play. mistakes will be made, of course, for war is full of mistakes; but it may be accepted that an attack on any position, however defended, is in itself proof that the assailant believed the result hoped for to be quite worth the cost of obtaining it. consequently, in a struggle as assumed, every mode of defence would have to stand on its intrinsic merits, nearly or quite unaided by the influence of considerations more or less foreign to it. every scrap of local defence would, in proportion to its amount, be a diminution of the offensive defence. advocates of the former may be challenged to produce from naval history any instance of local naval defence succeeding against the assaults of an actively aggressive navy. in the late war between japan and russia the russian local defence failed completely. in the last case, a class of vessel like that which had failed in local defence was used successfully, because offensively, by the japanese. this and many another instance show that the right way to use the kind of craft so often allocated to local defence is to use them offensively. it is only thus that their adoption by a great maritime power like the british empire can be justified. the origin and centre of our naval strength are to be looked for in the united kingdom. the shores of the latter are near the shores of other great maritime powers. its ports, especially those at which its fleets are equipped and would be likely to assemble on the imminence of war, are within reach of more than one foreign place from which small swift craft to be used offensively might be expected to issue. the method of frustrating the efforts of these craft giving most promise of success is to attack them as soon as possible after they issue from their own port. to the acceptance of this principle we owe the origin of the destroyer, devised to destroy hostile torpedo-boats before they could reach a position from which they would be able to discharge with effect their special weapon against our assembled ships. it is true that the destroyer has been gradually converted into a larger torpedo-boat. it is also true that when used as such in local defence, as at port arthur, her failure was complete; and just as true that she has never accomplished anything except when used offensively. when, therefore, a naval country's coast is so near the ports of another naval country that the latter would be able with swift small craft to attack the former's shipping, the provision of craft of a similar kind is likely to prove advantageous. war between great powers is a two-sided game, and what one side can do the other will at least be likely to attempt. nothing supports the view that it is well--either above or beneath the surface of the water--to stand on the defensive and await attack. everything points to the superiority of the plan of beating up the enemy's quarters and attacking him before he can get far from them on his way towards his objective. consequently the only justification of expending money on the localised vessels of which we have been speaking, is the probability that an enemy would have some of his bases within reach of those vessels' efforts. where this condition does not exist, the money expended is, from the belligerent point of view, thrown away. here comes in the greatest foe of belligerent efficiency, viz. political expediency. in time of peace it is thought better to conciliate voters than to prepare to meet an enemy. if local defence is thought to be pleasing to an inexpert electorate, it is only too likely to be provided, no matter how ineffectual and how costly in reality it will turn out to be. not only is the british empire the first of naval powers, it is also the first of colonial powers. one attribute is closely connected with the other; neither, without the other, would be applicable. the magnitude of our colonial domain, and especially the imposing aspects of some of its greater components--the dominion, the commonwealth, south africa, new zealand--are apt to blind us to a feature of great strategical importance, and that is the abundance and excellence of the naval bases that stud our ocean lines of communication. in thinking of the great daughter states we are liable to forget these; yet our possession of them helps greatly to strengthen our naval position, because it facilitates our assuming a far-reaching offensive. by themselves, if not too numerous, they can afford valuable support to the naval operations that are likely to prove most beneficial to us. the fact that they are ours, and not an opponent's, also constitutes for us an advantage of importance. of course, they have to be defended, or else they may fall into an opponent's hands. have we here a case in which highly localised or even passive defences are desirable? no doubt we did act for a time as though we believed that the question could only be answered in the affirmative; but that was when we were under the influence of the feelings engendered by observation of the long series of land wars previously discussed. perhaps we have not yet quite shaken off the effects of that influence; but we have at least got so far as to tolerate the statement of the other side of the question. it would be a great mistake to suppose that the places alluded to are meant to be ports of refuge for our ships. though they were to serve that purpose occasionally in the case of isolated merchant vessels, it would be but an accident, and not the essence, of their existence. what they are meant for is to be utilised as positions where our men-of-war can make reasonably sure of finding supplies and the means of refit. this assurance will largely depend upon their power of resistance if attacked. before we can decide how to impart that power to them we shall have to see the kind of attack against which they would have to be prepared. if they are on a continent, like, for example, gibraltar, attack on them by a land force, however improbable, is physically possible. against an attack of the kind a naval force could give little direct help. most of our outlying naval bases are really or virtually insular, and are open to attack only by an expedition coming across the sea. an essential characteristic of a naval base is that it should be able to furnish supplies as wanted to the men-of-war needing to replenish their stocks. some, and very often all, of these supplies are not of native production and must be brought to the base by sea. if the enemy can stop their conveyance to it, the place is useless as a base and the enemy is really in control of its communications. if he is in control of its communications he can send against it as great an expedition as he likes, and the place will be captured or completely neutralised. similarly, if we control the communications, not only can supplies be conveyed to it, but also no hostile expedition will be allowed to reach it. thus the primary defence of the outlying base is the active, sea-going fleet. moderate local defence, chiefly of the human kind, in the shape of a garrison, will certainly be needed. though the enemy has not been able to obtain control of the communications of the place, fitful raids on it will be possible; and the place should be fortified enough and garrisoned enough to hold out against the inconsiderable assaults comprised in these till our own ships can drive the enemy's away. outlying naval bases, though but moderately fortified, that contain depots of stores, docks, and other conveniences, have the vice of all immobile establishments. when war does come, some of them almost certainly, and all of them possibly, may not be in the right place with regard to the critical area of operations. they cannot, however, be moved. it will be necessary to do what has been done over and over again in war, in the latest as well as in earlier wars, and that is, establish temporary bases in more convenient situations. thus much, perhaps all, of the cost and trouble of establishing and maintaining the permanent bases will have been wasted. this inculcates the necessity of having not as many bases as can be found, but as few as it is possible to get on with. the control of ocean communications, or the command of the sea, being the end of naval warfare, and its acquisition being practicable only by the assumption of a vigorous offensive, it follows as a matter of course that we must have a strong and in all respects efficient mobile navy. this is the fundamental condition on which the continued existence of the british empire depends. it is thoroughly well known to every foreign government, friendly or unfriendly. the true objective in naval warfare is the enemy's navy. that must be destroyed or decisively defeated, or intimidated into remaining in its ports. not one of these can be effected without a mobile, that is a sea-going, fleet. the british empire may fall to pieces from causes as yet unknown or unsuspected: it cannot be kept together if it loses the power of gaining command of the sea. this is not a result of deliberate policy: it is inherent in the nature of the empire, scattered as its parts are throughout the world, with only the highway of the sea between them. such is the position of the fleet in the defence of the empire: such are its duties towards it. duties in the case are mutual, and some are owed to the fleet as well as by it. it is incumbent on every section of the empire, without neglecting its land forces, to lend zealous help in keeping the fleet efficient. it is not to be supposed that this can be done only by making pecuniary contributions to its maintenance. it is, indeed, very doubtful if any real good can be done by urging colonies to make them. it seems certain that the objections to this are greater than any benefit that it can confer. badgering our fellow-subjects beyond sea for money payments towards the cost of the navy is undignified and impolitic. the greatest sum asked for by the most exacting postulant would not equal a twentieth part of the imperial naval expenditure, and would not save the taxpayer of the mother country a farthing in the pound of his income. no one has yet been able to establish the equity of a demand that would take something from the inhabitants of one colony and nothing from those of another. adequate voluntary contribution is a different matter. there are other ways in which every trans-marine possession of the crown can lend a hand towards perfecting the efficiency of the fleet--ways, too, which would leave each in complete and unmenaced control of its own money. sea-power does not consist entirely of men-of-war. there must be docks, refitting establishments, magazines, and depots of stores. ports, which men-of-war must visit at least occasionally in war for repair or replenishment of supplies, will have to be made secure against the assaults which it has been said that a hastily raiding enemy, notwithstanding our general control of the communications, might find a chance of making. moderate fixed fortifications are all the passive defence that would be needed; but good and active troops must be available. if all these are not provided by the part of the empire in which the necessary naval bases lie, they will have to be provided by the mother country. if the former provides them the latter will be spared the expense of doing so, and spared expense with no loss of dignity, and with far less risk of friction and inconvenience than if her taxpayers' pockets had been nominally spared to the extent of a trifling and reluctantly paid money contribution. it has been pointed out on an earlier page that a country can be, and most probably will be, more effectually defended in a maritime war if its fleet operates at a distance from, rather than near, its shores. every subject of our king should long to see this condition exist if ever the empire is involved in hostilities. it may be--for who can tell what war will bring?--that the people of some great trans-marine dependency will have to choose between allowing a campaign to be conducted in their country or forcing the enemy to tolerate it in his. if they choose the latter they must be prepared to furnish part at least of the mobile force that can give effect to their choice. that is to say, they must be prepared to back up our sea-power in its efforts to keep off the tide of war from the neighbourhood of their homes. history shows how rarely, during the struggle between european nations for predominance in north america, the more settled parts of our former american colonies were the theatre of war: but then the colonists of those days, few comparatively as they were, sent strong contingents to the armies that went campaigning, in the territory of the various enemies. this was in every way better--the sequel proved how much better--than a money contribution begged or extorted would have been. helping in the manner first suggested need not result in dissociating our fellow-subjects beyond the seas from participation in the work of the active sea-going fleet. it is now, and still would be, open to them as much as to any native or denizen of the mother country. the time has fully come when the people of the greater outlying parts of the empire should insist upon perfect equality of treatment with their home fellow-subjects in this matter. they should resent, as a now quite out-of-date and invidious distinction, any difference in qualification for entry, locality of service, or remuneration for any rank or rating. self-respect and a dignified confidence in their own qualities, the excellence of which has been thoroughly tested, will prompt the king's colonial subjects to ask for nothing but equal chances in a force on which is laid so large a part of the duty of defending the empire. why should they cut themselves off from the promising career that service in the royal navy opens to the capable, the zealous, and the honourable aspirant of every grade? some of the highest posts in the navy are now, or lately have been, held by men who not only happened to be born in british colonies, but who also belong to resident colonial families. surely in this there is a strong moral cement for binding and keeping the empire together. it is unnecessary to expatiate on the contrast between the prospect of such a career and that which is all that a small local service could offer. it would soon be seen towards which the enterprising and the energetic would instinctively gravitate. in the defence of the british empire the fleet holds a twofold position. to its general belligerent efficiency, its strength and activity, we must look if the plans of an enemy are to be brought to nought. it, and it only, can secure for us the control of the ocean communications, on the freedom of which from serious interruptions the prosperity--indeed, the existence--of a scattered body must depend. in time of peace it can be made a great consolidating force, fostering every sentiment of worthy local patriotism whilst obliterating all inclination to mischievous narrow particularism, and tending to perfect the unity which gives virtue to national grandeur and is the true secret of national independence and strength. xi naval strategy and tactics at the time of trafalgar[ ] [footnote : written in . (read at institute of naval architects.)] the subject on which i have been invited to read a paper, and which is taken as the title of the latter, would require for anything like full discussion a much longer time than you can be expected to allot to it. to discuss it adequately, a volume of no diminutive size would be necessary. it may, however, be possible to indicate with the brevity appropriate to the occasion the main outlines of the subject, and to suggest for your consideration certain points which, over and above their historical interest, may furnish us with valuable guidance at the present day. in taking account of the conditions of the trafalgar epoch we have to note two distinct but, of course, closely related matters. these are the strategic plan of the enemy and the strategic plan adopted to meet it by the british. the former of these was described in the house of commons by william pitt at the beginning of the war in words which may be used without change at the present time. on th may the war, which had been interrupted by the unstable peace of amiens, was definitely resumed. the struggle was now to be a war not so much between the united kingdom and the french nation as between the united kingdom and the great napoleon, wielding more than the resources of france alone. speaking a week after the declaration of war, pitt said that any expectation of success which the enemy might have must be based on the supposition that he could break the spirit or weaken the determination of the country by harassing us with the perpetual apprehension of descents on our coasts; or else that our resources could be impaired and our credit undermined by the effects of an expensive and protracted war. more briefly stated, the hostile plan was to invade the united kingdom, ruin our maritime trade, and expel us from our over-sea possessions, especially in the east, from which it was supposed our wealth was chiefly derived. the plan was comprehensive, but not easily concealed. what we had to do was to prevent the invasion of the united kingdom and defend our trade and our outlying territories. as not one of the hostile objects could be attained except by making a maritime expedition of some kind, that is to say, by an expedition which had to cross more or less extensive areas of water, it necessarily followed that our most effective method of defence was the keeping open of our sea communications. it became necessary for us to make such arrangements that the maritime paths by which a hostile expedition could approach our home-coasts, or hostile cruisers molest our sea-borne trade, or hostile squadrons move to the attack of our trans-marine dependencies--that all these paths should be so defended by our navy that either the enemy would not venture to traverse them or, if he did, that he could be driven off. short as it is, the time at my disposal permits me to give a few details. it was fully recognised that defence of the united kingdom against invasion could not be secured by naval means alone. as in the times of queen elizabeth, so in those of george iii, no seaman of reputation contended that a sufficient land force could be dispensed with. our ablest seamen always held that small hostile expeditions could be prepared in secret and might be able to slip through the most complete lines of naval defence that we could hope to maintain. it was not discovered or alleged till the twentieth century that the crew of a dinghy could not land in this country in the face of the navy. therefore an essential feature of our defensive strategy was the provision of land forces in such numbers that an invader would have no chance of succeeding except he came in strength so great that his preparations could not be concealed and his expedition could not cross the water unseen. as our mercantile marine was to be found in nearly every sea, though in greater accumulation in some areas than in others, its defence against the assaults of an enemy could only be ensured by the virtual ubiquity of our cruising force. this, of course, involved the necessity of employing a large number of cruisers, and of arranging the distribution of them in accordance with the relative amount and value of the traffic to be protected from molestation in different parts of the ocean. it may be mentioned here that the term 'cruiser,' at the time with which we are dealing, was not limited to frigates and smaller classes of vessels. it included also ships of the line, it being the old belief of the british navy, justified by the experience of many campaigns and consecrated by the approval of our greatest admirals, that the value of a ship of war was directly proportionate to her capacity for cruising and keeping the sea. if the ocean paths used by our merchant ships--the trade routes or sea communications of the united kingdom with friendly or neutral markets and areas of production--could be kept open by our navy, that is, made so secure that our trade could traverse them with so little risk of molestation that it could continue to be carried on, it resulted as a matter of course that no sustained attack could be made on our outlying territory. where this was possible it was where we had failed to keep open the route or line of communications, in which case the particular trade following it was, at least temporarily, destroyed, and the territory to which the route led was either cut off or seized. naturally, when this was perceived, efforts were made to re-open and keep open the endangered or interrupted communication line. napoleon, notwithstanding his supereminent genius, made some extraordinary mistakes about warfare on the sea. the explanation of this has been given by a highly distinguished french admiral. the great emperor, he says, was wanting in exact appreciation of the difficulties of naval operations. he never understood that the naval officer--alone of all men in the world--must be master of two distinct professions. the naval officer must be as completely a seaman as an officer in any mercantile marine; and, in addition to this, he must be as accomplished in the use of the material of war entrusted to his charge as the members of any aimed force in the world. the emperor's plan for the invasion of the united kingdom was conceived on a grand scale. a great army, eventually , strong, was collected on the coast of north-eastern france, with its headquarters at boulogne. the numerical strength of this army is worth attention. by far the larger part of it was to have made the first descent on our territory; the remainder was to be a reserve to follow as quickly as possible. it has been doubted if napoleon really meant to invade this country, the suggestion being that his collection of an army on the shores of the straits of dover and the english channel was merely a 'blind' to cover another intended movement. the overwhelming weight of authoritative opinion is in favour of the view that the project of invasion was real. it is highly significant that he considered so large a number of troops necessary. it could not have been governed by any estimate of the naval obstruction to be encountered during the sea passage of the expedition, but only by the amount of the land force likely to be met if the disembarkation on our shores could be effected. the numerical strength in troops which napoleon thought necessary compelled him to make preparations on so great a scale that concealment became quite impossible. consequently an important part of his plan was disclosed to us betimes, and the threatened locality indicated to us within comparatively narrow limits of precision. notwithstanding his failure to appreciate all the difficulties of naval warfare, the great emperor had grasped one of its leading principles. before the peace of amiens, indeed before his campaign in egypt, and even his imposing triumphs in italy, he had seen that the invasion of the united kingdom was impracticable without first obtaining the command of the sea. his strategic plan, therefore, included arrangements to secure this. the details of the plan were changed from time to time as conditions altered; but the main object was adhered to until the final abandonment of the whole scheme under pressure of circumstances as embodied in nelson and his victorious brothers-in-arms. the gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft, which to the number of many hundreds filled the ports of north-eastern france and the netherlands, were not the only naval components of the expedition. fleets of line-of-battle ships were essential parts of it, and on their effective action the success of the scheme was largely made to depend. this feature remained unaltered in principle when, less than twelve months before trafalgar, spain took part in the war as napoleon's ally, and brought him a great reinforcement of ships and important assistance in money. we should not fail to notice that, before he considered himself strong enough to undertake the invasion of the united kingdom, napoleon found it necessary to have at his disposal the resources of other countries besides france, notwithstanding that by herself france had a population more than per cent. greater than that of england. by the alliance with spain he had added largely to the resources on which he could draw. moreover, his strategic position was geographically much improved. with the exception of that of portugal, the coast of western continental europe, from the texel to leghorn, and somewhat later to taranto also, was united in hostility to us. this complicated the strategic problem which the british navy had to solve, as it increased the number of points to be watched; and it facilitated the junction of napoleon's mediterranean naval forces with those assembled in his atlantic ports by supplying him with allied ports of refuge and refit on spanish territory--such as cartagena or cadiz--between toulon and the bay of biscay. napoleon, therefore, enforced upon us by the most convincing of all arguments the necessity of maintaining the british navy at the 'two-power standard' at least. the lesson had been taught us long before by philip ii, who did not venture on an attempt at invading this country till he was master of the resources of the whole iberian peninsula as well as of those of the spanish dominions in italy, in the burgundian heritage, and in the distant regions across the atlantic ocean. at several points on the long stretch of coast of which he was now the master, napoleon equipped fleets that were to unite and win for him the command of the sea during a period long enough to permit the unobstructed passage of his invading army across the water which separated the starting points of his expedition from the united kingdom. command of the sea to be won by a powerful naval combination was thus an essential element in napoleon's strategy at the time of trafalgar. it was not in deciding what was essential that this soldier of stupendous ability erred: it was in choosing the method of gaining the essential that he went wrong. the british strategy adopted in opposition to that of napoleon was based on the acquisition and preservation of the command of the sea. formulated and carried into effect by seamen, it differed in some important features from his. we may leave out of sight for the moment the special arrangements made in the english channel to oppose the movements of napoleon's flotillas of gunboats, transport boats, and other small craft. the british strategy at the time of trafalgar, as far as it was concerned with opposition to napoleon's sea-going fleets, may be succinctly described as stationing off each of the ports in which the enemy's forces were lying a fleet or squadron of suitable strength. though some of our admirals, notably nelson himself, objected to the application of the term 'blockade' to their plans, the hostile ships were to this extent blockaded, that if they should come out they would find outside their port a british force sufficient to drive them in again, or even to defeat them thoroughly and destroy them. beating them and thus having done with them, and not simply shutting them up in harbour, was what was desired by our admirals. this necessitated a close watch on the hostile ports; and how consistently that was maintained let the history of cornwallis's command off brest and of nelson's off toulon suffice to tell us. the junction of two or more of napoleon's fleets would have ensured over almost any single british fleet a numerical superiority that would have rendered the defeat or retirement of the latter almost certain. to meet this condition the british strategy contemplated the falling back, if necessary, of one of our detachments on another, which might be carried further and junction with a third detachment be effected. by this step we should preserve, if not a numerical superiority over the enemy, at least so near an equality of force as to render his defeat probable and his serious maltreatment, even if undefeated, a certainty. the strategic problem before our navy was, however, not quite so easy as this might make it seem. the enemy's concentration might be attempted either towards brest or towards toulon. in the latter case, a superior force might fall upon our mediterranean fleet before our watching ships in the atlantic could discover the escape of the enemy's ships from the atlantic port or could follow and come up with them. against the probability of this was to be set the reluctance of napoleon to carry out an eccentric operation which a concentration off toulon would necessitate, when the essence of his scheme was to concentrate in a position from which he could obtain naval control of the english channel. after the addition of the spanish navy to his own, napoleon to some extent modified his strategic arrangements. the essential feature of the scheme remained unaltered. it was to effect the junction of the different parts of his naval force and thereupon to dominate the situation, by evading the several british fleets or detachments which were watching his. before spain joined him in the war his intention was that his escaping fleets should go out into the atlantic, behind the backs, as it were, of the british ships, and then make for the english channel. when he had the aid of spain the point of junction was to be in the west indies. the remarkable thing about this was the evident belief that the command of the sea might be won without fighting for it; won, too, from the british navy which was ready, and indeed wished, to fight. we now see that napoleon's naval strategy at the time of trafalgar, whilst it aimed at gaining command of the sea, was based on what has been called evasion. the fundamental principle of the british naval strategy of that time was quite different. so far from thinking that the contest could be settled without one or more battles, the british admirals, though nominally blockading his ports, gave the enemy every facility for coming out in order that they might be able to bring him to action. napoleon, on the contrary, declared that a battle would be useless, and distinctly ordered his officers not to fight one. could it be that, when pitted against admirals whose accurate conception of the conditions of naval warfare had been over and over again tested during the hostilities ended by the peace of amiens, napoleon still trusted to the efficacy of methods which had proved so successful when he was outmanoeuvring and intimidating the generals who opposed him in north italy? we can only explain his attitude in the campaign of trafalgar by attributing to him an expectation that the british seamen of his day, tried as they had been in the fire of many years of war, would succumb to his methods as readily as the military formalists of central europe. napoleon had at his disposal between seventy and eighty french, dutch, and spanish ships of the line, of which some sixty-seven were available at the beginning of the trafalgar campaign. in january , besides other ships of the class in distant waters or specially employed, we--on our side--had eighty ships of the line in commission. a knowledge of this will enable us to form some idea of the chances of success that would have attended napoleon's concentration if it had been effected. to protect the passage of his invading expedition across the english channel he did not depend only on concentrating his more distant fleets. in the texel there were, besides smaller vessels, nine sail of the line. thus the emperor did what we may be sure any future intending invader will not fail to do, viz. he provided his expedition with a respectable naval escort. the british naval officers of the day, who knew what war was, made arrangements to deal with this escort. lord keith, who commanded in the downs, had under him six sail of the line in addition to many frigates and sloops; and there were five more line-of-battle ships ready at spithead if required. there had been a demand in the country that the defence of our shores against an invading expedition should be entrusted to gunboats, and what may be called coastal small craft and boats. this was resisted by the naval officers. nelson had already said, 'our first defence is close to the enemy's ports,' thus agreeing with a long line of eminent british seamen in their view of our strategy. lord st. vincent said that 'our great reliance is on the vigilance and activity of our cruisers at sea, any reduction in the number of which by applying them to guard our ports, inlets, and beaches would, in my judgment, tend to our destruction.' these are memorable words, which we should do well to ponder in these days. the government of the day insisted on having the coastal boats; but st. vincent succeeded in postponing the preparation of them till the cruising ships had been manned. his plan of defence has been described by his biographer as 'a triple line of barricade; -gun ships, frigates, sloops of war, and gun-vessels upon the coast of the enemy; in the downs opposite france another squadron, but of powerful ships of the line, continually disposable, to support the former or attack any force of the enemy which, it might be imagined possible, might slip through the squadron hanging over the coast; and a force on the beach on all the shores of the english ports, to render assurance doubly sure.' this last item was the one that st. vincent had been compelled to adopt, and he was careful that it should be in addition to those measures of defence in the efficacy of which he and his brother seamen believed. concerning it his biographer makes the following remark: 'it is to be noted that lord st. vincent did not contemplate repelling an invasion of gunboats by gunboats,' &c. he objected to the force of sea-fencibles, or long-shore organisation, because he considered it more useful to have the sea-going ships manned. speaking of this coastal defence scheme, he said: 'it would be a good bone for the officers to pick, but a very dear one for the country.' the defence of our ocean trade entered largely into the strategy of the time. an important part was played by our fleets and groups of line-of-battle ships which gave usually indirect, but sometimes direct, protection to our own merchant vessels, and also to neutral vessels carrying commodities to or from british ports. the strategy of the time, the correctness of which was confirmed by long belligerent experience, rejected the employment of a restricted number of powerful cruisers, and relied upon the practical ubiquity of the defending ships, which ubiquity was rendered possible by the employment of very numerous craft of moderate size. this can be seen in the lists of successive years. in january the number of cruising frigates in commission was , and of sloops and smaller vessels , the total being . in the numbers were: frigates, ; sloops, &c., ; with a total of . in the figures had grown to frigates, sloops, &c., the total being . most of these were employed in defending commerce. we all know how completely napoleon's project of invading the united kingdom was frustrated. it is less well known that the measures for defending our sea-borne trade, indicated by the figures just given, were triumphantly successful. our mercantile marine increased during the war, a sure proof that it had been effectually defended. consequently we may accept it as established beyond the possibility of refutation that that branch of our naval strategy at the time of trafalgar which was concerned with the defence of our trade was rightly conceived and properly carried into effect. as has been stated already, the defence of our sea-borne trade, being in practice the keeping open of our ocean lines of communication, carried with it the protection, in part at any rate, of our transmarine territories. napoleon held pertinaciously to the belief that british prosperity was chiefly due to our position in india. we owe it to captain mahan that we now know that the eminent american fulton--a name of interest to the members of this institution--told pitt of the belief held abroad that 'the fountains of british wealth are in india and china.' in the great scheme of naval concentration which the emperor devised, seizure of british colonies in the west indies had a definite place. we kept in that quarter, and varied as necessary, a force capable of dealing with a naval raid as well as guarding the neighbouring lines of communication. in we had four ships of the line in the west indian area. in we had six of the same class; and in , while the line-of-battle ships were reduced to four, the number of frigates was increased from nine to twenty-five. whether our government divined napoleon's designs on india or not, it took measures to protect our interests there. in january we had on the cape of good hope and the east indies stations, both together, six sail of the line, three smaller two-deckers, six frigates, and six sloops, or twenty-one ships of war in all. this would have been sufficient to repel a raiding attack made in some strength. by the beginning of our east indies force had been increased; and in the year itself we raised it to a strength of forty-one ships in all, of which nine were of the line and seventeen were frigates. had, therefore, any of the hostile ships managed to get to the east indies from the atlantic or the mediterranean ports, in which they were being watched by our navy, their chances of succeeding in their object would have been small indeed. when we enter the domain of tactics strictly so-called, that is to say, when we discuss the proceedings of naval forces--whether single ships, squadrons, or fleets--in hostile contact with one another, we find the time of trafalgar full of instructive episodes. even with the most recent experience of naval warfare vividly present to our minds, we can still regard nelson as the greatest of tacticians. naval tactics may be roughly divided into two great classes or sections, viz. the tactics of groups of ships, that is to say, fleet actions; and the tactics of what the historian james calls 'single ship actions,' that is to say, fights between two individual ships. in the former the achievements of nelson stand out with incomparable brilliancy. it would be impossible to describe his method fully in such a paper as this. we may, however, say that nelson was an innovator, and that his tactical principles and methods have been generally misunderstood down to this very day. if ever there was an admiral who was opposed to an unthinking, headlong rush at an enemy, it was he. yet this is the character that he still bears in the conception of many. he was, in truth, an industrious and patient student of tactics, having studied them, in what in these days we should call a scientific spirit, at an early period, when there was but little reason to expect that he would ever be in a position to put to a practical test the knowledge that he had acquired and the ideas that he had formed. he saw that the old battle formation in single line-ahead was insufficient if you wanted--as he himself always did--to gain an overwhelming victory. he also saw that, though an improvement on the old formation, lord howe's method of the single line-abreast was still a good deal short of tactical perfection. therefore, he devised what he called, with pardonable elation, the 'nelson touch,' the attack in successive lines so directed as to overwhelm one part of the enemy's fleet, whilst the other part was prevented from coming to the assistance of the first, and was in its turn overwhelmed or broken up. his object was to bring a larger number of his own ships against a smaller number of the enemy's. he would by this method destroy the part attacked, suffering in the process so little damage himself that with his whole force he would be able to deal effectively with the hostile remnant if it ventured to try conclusions with him. it is of the utmost importance that we should thoroughly understand nelson's fundamental tactical principle, viz. the bringing of a larger number of ships to fight against a smaller number of the enemy's. there is not, i believe, in the whole of the records of nelson's opinions and actions a single expression tending to show that tactical efficiency was considered by him to be due to superiority in size of individual ships of the same class or--as far as _matériel_ was concerned--to anything but superior numbers, of course at the critical point. he did not require, and did not have, more ships in his own fleet than the whole of those in the fleet of the enemy. what he wanted was to bring to the point of impact, when the fight began, a larger number of ships than were to be found in that part of the enemy's line. i believe that i am right in saying that, from the date of salamis downwards, history records no decisive naval victory in which the victorious fleet has not succeeded in concentrating against a relatively weak point in its enemy's formation a greater number of its own ships. i know of nothing to show that this has not been the rule throughout the ages of which detailed history furnishes us with any memorial--no matter what the class of ship, what the type of weapon, what the mode of propulsion. the rule certainly prevailed in the battle of the th august off port arthur, though it was not so overwhelmingly decisive as some others. we may not even yet know enough of the sea fight in the straits of tsushima to be able to describe it in detail; but we do know that at least some of the russian ships were defeated or destroyed by a combination of japanese ships against them. looking back at the tactics of the trafalgar epoch, we may see that the history of them confirms the experience of earlier wars, viz. that victory does not necessarily fall to the side which has the biggest ships. it is a well-known fact of naval history that generally the french ships were larger and the spanish much larger than the british ships of corresponding classes. this superiority in size certainly did not carry with it victory in action. on the other hand, british ships were generally bigger than the dutch ships with which they fought; and it is of great significance that at camperdown the victory was due, not to superiority in the size of individual ships, but, as shown by the different lists of killed and wounded, to the act of bringing a larger number against a smaller. all that we have been able to learn of the occurrences in the battle of the japan sea supports instead of being opposed to this conclusion; and it may be said that there is nothing tending to upset it in the previous history of the present war in the far east. i do not know how far i am justified in expatiating on this point; but, as it may help to bring the strategy and tactics of the trafalgar epoch into practical relation with the stately science of which in our day this institution is, as it were, the mother-shrine and metropolitical temple, i may be allowed to dwell upon it a little longer. the object aimed at by those who favour great size of individual ships is not, of course, magnitude alone. it is to turn out a ship which shall be more powerful than an individual antagonist. all recent development of man-of-war construction has taken the form of producing, or at any rate trying to produce, a more powerful ship than those of earlier date, or belonging to a rival navy. i know the issues that such statements are likely to raise; and i ask you, as naval architects, to bear with me patiently when i say what i am going to say. it is this: if you devise for the ship so produced the tactical system for which she is specially adapted you must, in order to be logical, base your system on her power of defeating her particular antagonist. consequently, you must abandon the principle of concentration of superior numbers against your enemy; and, what is more, must be prepared to maintain that such concentration on his part against yourself would be ineffectual. this will compel a reversion to tactical methods which made a fleet action a series of duels between pairs of combatants, and--a thing to be pondered on seriously--never enabled anyone to win a decisive victory on the sea. the position will not be made more logical if you demand both superior size and also superior numbers, because if you adopt the tactical system appropriate to one of the things demanded, you will rule out the other. you cannot employ at the same time two different and opposed tactical systems. it is not necessary to the line of argument above indicated to ignore the merits of the battleship class. like their predecessors, the ships of the line, it is really battleships which in a naval war dominate the situation. we saw that it was so at the time of trafalgar, and we see that it has been so in the war between russia and japan, at all events throughout the campaign. the experience of naval war, down to the close of that in which trafalgar was the most impressive event, led to the virtual abandonment of ships of the line[ ] above and below a certain class. the -gun ships and smaller two-deckers had greatly diminished in number, and repetitions of them grew more and more rare. it was the same with the three-deckers, which, as the late admiral colomb pointed out, continued to be built, though in reduced numbers, not so much for their tactical efficiency as for the convenient manner in which they met the demands for the accommodation required in flag-ships. the tactical condition which the naval architects of the trafalgar period had to meet was the employment of an increased number of two-deckers of the medium classes. [footnote : experience of war, as regards increase in the number of medium-sized men-of-war of the different classes, tended to the same result in both the french revolutionary war ( to ) and the napoleonic war which began in . taking both contests down to the end of the trafalgar year, the following table will show how great was the development of the line-of-battle-ship class below the three-decker and above the -gun ship. it will also show that there was no development of, but a relative decline in, the three-deckers and the 's, the small additions, where there were any, being generally due to captures from the enemy. the two-deckers not 'fit to lie in a line' were at the end of the trafalgar year about half what they were when the first period of the 'great war' began. when we come to the frigate classes we find the same result. in the earlier war frigates of and guns were introduced into our navy. it is worth notice that this number was not increased, and by the end of the trafalgar year had, on the contrary, declined to . the smallest frigates, of guns, were in , and at the end of the trafalgar year. on the other hand, the increase in the medium frigate classes ( , , and guns) was very large. from to the end of the trafalgar year the -gun frigates increased from to , and the -gun frigates from to . ------------------------------------------------------------- | | | napoleonic war to | | | french | the end of the | | | revolutionary war | trafalgar year | | classes of ships |-------------------|-------------------| | |commence-|commence-|commence-|commence-| | | ment of | ment of | ment of | ment of | | | | | | | |-------------------------------------------------------------| | -deckers | | | | | | -deckers of | | | | | | guns, and above | | | | | | and gun ships | | | | | | -deckers not 'fit | | | | | | to lie in a line' | | | | | | frigates guns | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | | " " | | | | | ------------------------------------------------------------- the liking for three-deckers, professed by some officers of nelson's time, seems to have been due to a belief, not in the merit of their size as such, but in the value of the increased number of medium guns carried on a 'middle' deck. there is, i believe, nothing to show that the two-deckers _gibraltar_ ( tons) and _coesar_ ( ) were considered more formidable than the three-deckers _balfleur_ ( ), _glory_ ( ), or _queen_ ( ). all these ships were in the same fleet, and fought in the same battle.] a fleet of ships of the line as long as it could keep the sea, that is, until it had to retreat into port before a stronger fleet, controlled a certain area of water. within that area smaller men-of-war as well as friendly merchant ships were secure from attack. as the fleet moved about, so the area moved with it. skilful disposition and manoeuvring added largely to the extent of sea within which the maritime interests that the fleet was meant to protect would be safe. it seems reasonable to expect that it will be the same with modern fleets of suitable battleships. the tactics of 'single ship actions' at the time of trafalgar were based upon pure seamanship backed up by good gunnery. the better a captain handled his ship the more likely he was to beat his antagonist. superior speed, where it existed, was used to 'gain the weather gage,' not in order to get a suitable range for the faster ship's guns, but to compel her enemy to fight. superior speed was also used to run away, capacity to do which was not then, and ought not to be now, reckoned a merit in a ship expressly constructed for fighting, not fleeing. it is sometimes claimed in these days that superior speed will enable a modern ship to keep at a distance from her opponent which will be the best range for her own guns. it has not been explained why a range which best suits her guns should not be equally favourable for the guns of her opponent; unless, indeed, the latter is assumed to be weakly armed, in which case the distance at which the faster ship might engage her would be a matter of comparative indifference. there is nothing in the tactics of the time of trafalgar to make it appear that--when a fight had once begun--superior speed, of course within moderate limits, conferred any considerable tactical advantage in 'single ship actions,' and still less in general or fleet actions. taking up a position ahead or astern of a hostile ship so as to be able to rake her was not facilitated by originally superior speed so much as by the more damaged state of the ship to be raked--raking, as a rule, occurring rather late in an action. a remarkable result of long experience of war made itself clearly apparent in the era of trafalgar. i have already alluded to the tendency to restrict the construction of line-of-battle ships to those of the medium classes. the same thing may be noticed in the case of the frigates.[ ] those of , , and guns relatively or absolutely diminished in number; whilst the number of the -gun, -gun, and -gun frigates increased. the officers who had personal experience of many campaigns were able to impress on the naval architects of the day the necessity of recognising the sharp distinction that really exists between what we should now call the 'battleship' and what we should now call the 'cruiser.' in the earlier time there were ships which were intermediate between the ship of the line and the frigate. these were the two-deckers of , , , , and even guns. they had long been regarded as not 'fit to lie in a line,' and they were never counted in the frigate classes. they seemed to have held a nondescript position, for no one knew exactly how to employ them in war any more than we now know exactly how to employ our armoured cruisers, as to which it is not settled whether they are fit for general actions or should be confined to commerce defending or other cruiser service. the two-deckers just mentioned were looked upon by the date of trafalgar as forming an unnecessary class of fighting ships. some were employed, chiefly because they existed, on special service; but they were being replaced by true battleships on one side and true frigates on the other.[ ] [footnote : see footnote .] [footnote : see footnote .] in conclusion, i would venture to say that the strategical and tactical lessons taught by a long series of naval campaigns had been mastered by our navy by the time of the trafalgar campaign. the effect of those lessons showed itself in our ship-building policy, and has been placed on permanent record in the history of maritime achievement and of the adaptation of material means to belligerent ends. xii the supply and communications of a fleet[ ] [footnote : written in . (read at the hong-kong united service institution.)] a problem which is not an attractive one, but which has to be solved, is to arrange the proper method of supplying a fleet and maintaining its communications. in time of peace as well as in time of war there is a continuous consumption of the articles of various kinds used on board ship, viz. naval stores, ordnance stores, engineers' stores, victualling stores, coal, water, &c. if we know the quantity of each description of stores that a ship can carry, and if we estimate the progressive consumption, we can compute, approximately but accurately enough for practical purposes, the time at which replenishment would be necessary and to what amount it should be made up. as a general rule ships stow about three months' stores and provisions. the amount of coal and engineers' stores, measured in time, depends on the proceedings of the ship, and can only be calculated if we know during what portion of any given period she will be under way. of course, this can be only roughly estimated. in peace time we know nearly exactly what the expenditure of ammunition within a given length of time--say, a quarter of a year--will be. for war conditions we can only form an estimate based upon assumptions. the consumption of provisions depends upon the numbers of officers and men, and in war or peace would be much the same. the greater activity to be expected in war would lead to more wear and tear, and consequently to a larger expenditure of naval stores. in peaceful times the quarterly expenditure of ammunition does not vary materially. in case we were at war, a single action might cause us to expend in a few hours as much as half a dozen quarterly peace allowances. there is a certain average number of days that a ship of a particular class is under way in a year, and the difference between that number and is, of course, the measure of the length of time she is at anchor or in harbour. expenditure of coal and of some important articles of engineers' stores depends on the relation between the time that she is stationary and the time she is under way. it should be particularly noted that the distinction is not between time at anchor and time at sea, but between time at anchor and 'time under way.' if a ship leaves her anchorage to run an engine-trial after refit, or to fire at a target, or to adjust compasses, or to go into dock--she burns more coal than if she remained stationary. these occasions of movement may be counted in with the days in which the ship is at sea, and the total taken as the number of days under way. it may be assumed that altogether these will amount to six or seven a month. in time of war the period under way would probably be much longer, and the time spent in expectation of getting under way in a hurry would almost certainly be considerable, so that expenditure of coal and machinery lubricants would be greatly increased. the point to be made here is that--independently of strategic conditions, which will be considered later--the difference in the supply of a given naval force in war and in peace is principally that in the former the requirements of nearly everything except provisions will be greater; and consequently that the articles must be forwarded in larger quantities or at shorter intervals than in peace time. if, therefore, we have arranged a satisfactory system of peace supply, that system--defence of the line of communications being left out of consideration for the present--will merely have to be expanded in time of war. in other words, practice in the use of the system during peace will go a long way towards preparing us for the duty of working it under war conditions. that a regular system will be absolutely indispensable during hostilities will not be doubted. the general principles which i propose to indicate are applicable to any station. we may allow for a squadron composed of-- battleships, large cruisers, second-class cruisers, smaller vessels of various kinds, and destroyers, being away from the principal base-port of the station for several months of the year. the number of officers and men would be, in round numbers, about , . in estimating the amounts of stores of different kinds required by men-of-war, it is necessary--in order to allow for proper means of conveyance--to convert tons of dead-weight into tons by measurement, as the two are not always exactly equivalent. in the following enumeration only estimated amounts are stated, and the figures are to be considered as approximate and not precise. it is likely that in each item an expert maybe able to discover some variation from the rigorously exact; but the general result will be sufficiently accurate for practical purposes, especially as experience will suggest corrections. a thousand men require about . tons of victualling stores, packages included, daily, we may make this figure up to . tons to allow for 'medical comforts' and canteen stores, consequently , men require about tons a day, and about tons for six months. the assumed squadron, judging from experience, would require in peace time about tons of engineers' stores, about tons of naval stores, and--if the ships started with only their exact allowance on board and then carried out a full quarterly practice twice--the quantity of ordnance stores and ammunition required would be about tons, to meet the ordinary peace rate of expenditure, we thus get for a full six months' supply the following figures:-- victualling stores , tons. engineers' stores " naval stores " ordnance stores and ammunition , " ----- total , " some allowance must be made for the needs of the 'auxiliaries,'[ ] the vessels that bring supplies and in other ways attend on the fighting ships. this may be put at per cent. the tonnage required would accordingly amount in all to about . [footnote : the per cent. mentioned in the text would probably cover nearly all the demands--except coal--of auxiliaries, which would not require much or any ammunition. coal is provided for separately.] the squadron would burn in harbour or when stationary about tons of coal a day, and when under way about tons a day. for harbour-days the consumption would be about , tons; and for days under way about , : so that for coal requirements we should have the following:-- harbour consumption , tons. under-way consumption , " ------ total for fighting ships , " per cent. for auxiliaries (say) , " ------ grand total , " some time ago (in ) a representation was made from the china station that, engine-room oil being expended whenever coal is expended, there must be some proportion between the quantities of each. it was, therefore, suggested that every collier should bring to the squadron which she was supplying a proportionate quantity of oil. this has been approved, and it has been ordered that the proportions will be gallons of oil to every tons of coal.[ ] it was also suggested that the oil should be carried in casks of two sizes, for the convenience of both large and small ships. [footnote : i was informed (on the th december ), some time after the above was written, that the colliers supplying the united states navy are going to carry gallons of oil for every tons of coal.] there is another commodity, which ships have never been able to do without, and which they need now in higher proportion than ever. that commodity is fresh water. the squadron constituted as assumed would require an average of about tons of fresh water a day, and nearly , tons in six months. of this the ships, without adding very inconveniently to their coal consumption, might themselves distil about one-half; but the remaining , tons would have to be brought to them; and another thousand tons would probably be wanted by the auxiliaries, making the full six months' demand up to , tons. the tonnage requirements of the squadron and its 'auxiliaries' for a full six months' period would be about , , without fresh water. as, however, the ships would have started with full store-rooms, holds, and bunkers, and might be expected to return to the principal base-port of the station at the end of the period, stores for four-and-a-half months', and coal to meet twenty weeks', consumption would be sufficient. these would be about tons of stores and ammunition and , tons of coal.[ ] [footnote : to avoid complicating the question, the water or distilling vessel, the hospital ship, and the repair vessel have not been considered specially. their coal and stores have been allowed for.] the stores, &c., would have to be replenished twice and--as it would not be prudent to let the ships run right out of them--replenishment should take place at the end of the second and at the end of the fourth months. two vessels carrying stores and ammunition, if capable of transporting a cargo of nearly tons apiece, would bring all that was wanted at each replenishment. to diminish risk of losing all of one description of supplies, if carried by itself in a separate vessel, it has been considered desirable that each supply-carrier, when employed, is to contain some ammunition, some stores, and some provisions. there are great advantages in having supply-carriers, including, of course, colliers, of moderate size. many officers must have had experience of the inconvenience and delay due to the employment of a single very large vessel which could only coal one man-of-war at a time. several vessels, each carrying a moderate amount of cargo, would permit much more rapid replenishment of the ships of a squadron. the inconvenience that would be caused by the loss or breakdown of a supply-carrier would be reduced by employing several vessels of moderate cargo-capacity instead of only one or two of great capacity. each battleship and large cruiser of the assumed squadron may be expected to burn about tons of coal in five weeks, so that the quantity to be used in that time by all those ships would be tons. the remaining ships, scattered between different places as most of them would probably be, would require about tons. therefore, every five weeks or so , tons of coal would be required. four replenishments would be necessary in the whole period, making a total of , tons. each replenishment could be conveyed in five colliers with tons apiece. moderate dimensions in store- and coal-carriers would prove convenient, not only because it would facilitate taking in stores and coaling, if all the squadron were assembled at one place, but also if part were at one place and part at another. division into several vessels, instead of concentration in a few, would give great flexibility to the system of supply. a single very capacious cargo-carrier might have to go first to one place and supply the ships there, and then go to supply the remaining ships lying at another anchorage. this would cause loss of time. the same amount of cargo distributed amongst two or more vessels would permit the ships at two or more places to be supplied simultaneously. you may have noticed that i have been dealing with the question as though stores and coal were to be transported direct to the men-of-war wherever they might be and put straight on board them from the carrying-vessels. there is, as you all know, another method, which may be described as that of 'secondary bases.' speaking generally, each of our naval stations has a principal base at which considerable or even extensive repairs of the ships can be effected and at which stores are accumulated. visits to it for the sake of repair being necessary, the occasion may be taken advantage of to replenish supplies, so that the maintenance of a stock at the place makes for convenience, provided that the stock is not too large. the so-called 'secondary base' is a place at which it is intended to keep in store coal and other articles in the hope that when war is in progress the supply of our ships may be facilitated. it is a supply, and not a repairing base. a comparison of the 'direct' system and 'secondary base' system may be interesting. a navy being maintained for use in war, it follows, as a matter of course, that the value of any part of its equipment or organisation depends on its efficiency for war purposes. the question to be answered is--which of the two systems promises to help us most during hostilities? this does not exclude a regard for convenience and economy in time of peace, provided that care is taken not to push economy too far and not to make ordinary peace-time convenience impede arrangements essential to the proper conduct of a naval campaign. it is universally admitted that a secondary base at which stocks of stores are kept should be properly defended. this necessitates the provision of fortifications and a garrison. nearly every article of naval stores of all classes has to be brought to our bases by sea, just as much as if it were brought direct to our ships. consequently the communications of the base have to be defended. they would continue to need defending even if our ships ceased to draw supplies from it, because the communications of the garrison must be kept open. we know what happened twice over at minorca when the latter was not done. the object of accumulating stores at a secondary base is to facilitate the supply of fighting ships, it being rather confidently assumed that the ships can go to it to replenish without being obliged to absent themselves for long from the positions in which they could best counteract the efforts of the enemy. when war is going on it is not within the power of either side to arrange its movements exactly as it pleases. movements must, at all events very often, conform to those of the enemy. it is not a bad rule when going to war to give your enemy credit for a certain amount of good sense. our enemy's good sense is likely to lead him to do exactly what we wish him not to do, and not to do that which we wish him to do. we should, of course, like him to operate so that our ships will not be employed at an inconvenient distance from our base of supplies. if we have created permanent bases in time of peace the enemy will know their whereabouts as well as we do ourselves, and, unless he is a greater fool than it is safe to think he is, he will try to make us derive as little benefit from them as possible. he is likely to extend his operations to localities at a distance from the places to which, if we have the secondary base system of supply, he knows for certain that our ships must resort. we shall have to do one of two things--either let him carry on his operations undisturbed, or conform to his movements. to this is due the common, if not invariable, experience of naval warfare, that the fleet which assumes the offensive has to establish what are sometimes called 'flying bases,' to which it can resort at will. this explains why nelson rarely used gibraltar as a base; why we occupied balaclava in ; and why the americans used guantanamo bay in . the flying base is not fortified or garrisoned in advance. it is merely a convenient anchorage, in a good position as regards the circumstances of the war; and it can be abandoned for another, and resumed, if desirable, as the conditions of the moment dictate. it is often argued that maintenance of stocks of stores at a secondary base gives a fleet a free hand and at least relieves it from the obligation of defending the line of communications. we ought to examine both contentions. it is not easy to discover where the freedom comes in if you must always proceed to a certain place for supplies, whether convenient or not. it may be, and very likely will be, of the utmost importance in war for a ship to remain on a particular station. if her coal is running short and can only be replenished by going to a base, go to the base she must, however unfortunate the consequences. it has been mentioned already that nearly every item on our store list has to be brought to a base by sea. let us ascertain to what extent the accumulation of a stock at a place removes the necessity of defending the communication line. coal is so much the greater item that consideration of it will cover that of all the rest. the squadron, as assumed, requires about , tons of coal every five weeks in peace time. some is commonly obtained from contractors at foreign ports; but to avoid complicating the subject we may leave contract issues out of consideration. if you keep a stock of , tons at your permanent secondary base, you will have enough to last your ships about four-and-a-half weeks. consequently you must have a stream of colliers running to the place so as to arrive at intervals of not more than about thirty days. calculations founded on the experience of manoeuvres show that in war time ships would require nearly three times the quantity used in peace. it follows that, if you trebled your stock of coal at the base and made it , tons, you would in war still require colliers carrying that amount to arrive about every four weeks. picture the line of communications with the necessary colliers on it, and see to what extent you are released from the necessity of defending it. the bulk of other stores being much less than that of coal, you could, no doubt, maintain a sufficient stock of them to last through the probable duration of the war; but, as you must keep your communications open to ensure the arrival of your coal, it would be as easy for the other stores to reach you as it would be for the coal itself. why oblige yourself to use articles kept long in store when much fresher ones could be obtained? therefore the maintenance of store depots at a secondary base no more releases you from the necessity of guarding your communications than it permits freedom of movement to your ships. the secondary base in time of war is conditioned as follows. if the enemy's sphere of activity is distant from the base which you have equipped with store-houses and fortifications, the place cannot be of any use to you. it can, and probably will, be a cause of additional anxiety to you, because the communications of its garrison must still be kept open. if it is used, freedom of movement for the ships must be given up, because they cannot go so far from it as to be obliged to consume a considerable fraction of their coal in reaching it and returning to their station. the line along which your colliers proceed to it must be effectively guarded. contrast this with the system of direct supply to the ships-of-war. you choose for your flying base a position which will be as near to the enemy's sphere of action as you choose to make it. you can change its position in accordance with circumstances. if you cease to use the position first chosen you need trouble yourself no more about its special communications. you leave nothing at it which will make it worth the enemy's while to try a dash at it. the power of changing the flying base from one place to another gives almost perfect freedom of movement to the fighting ships. moreover, the defence of the line communicating with the position selected is not more difficult than that of the line to a fixed base. the defence of a line of communication ought to be arranged on the same plan as that adopted for the defence of a trade route, viz. making unceasing efforts to attack the intending assailant. within the last few years a good deal has been written about the employment of cruisers. the favourite idea seems to be that peace-time preparation for the cruiser operations of war ought to take the form of scouting and attendance on fleets. the history of naval warfare does not corroborate this view. we need not forget nelson's complaint of paucity of frigates: but had the number attached to his fleet been doubled, the general disposition of vessels of the class then in commission would have been virtually unaltered. at the beginning of , the year of trafalgar, we had--besides other classes-- frigates and sloops in commission; at the beginning of we had . it is doubtful if forty of these were attached to fleets. it is sometimes contended that supply-carriers ought to be vessels of great speed, apparently in order that they may always keep up with the fighting ships when at sea. this, perhaps, is due to a mistaken application of the conditions of a land force on the march to those of a fleet or squadron making a voyage. in practice a land army cannot separate itself--except for a very short time--from its supplies. its movements depend on those of its supply-train. the corresponding 'supply-train' of a fleet or squadron is in the holds and bunkers of its ships. as long as these are fairly well furnished, the ships might be hampered, and could not be assisted, by the presence of the carriers. all that is necessary is that these carriers should be at the right place at the right time, which is merely another way of saying that proper provision should be made for 'the stream of supplies and reinforcements which in terms of modern war is called communications'--the phrase being mahan's. the efficiency of any arrangement used in war will depend largely on the experience of its working gained in time of peace. why do we not work the direct system of supply whilst we are at peace so as to familiarise ourselves with the operations it entails before the stress of serious emergency is upon us? there are two reasons. one is, because we have used the permanent base method so long that, as usually happens in such cases, we find it difficult to form a conception of any other. the other reason is that the direct supply method is thought to be too costly. the first reason need not detain us. it is not worthy of even a few minutes' consideration. the second reason deserves full investigation. we ought to be always alive to the necessity of economy. the only limit to economy of money in any plan of naval organisation is that we should not carry it so far that it will be likely to impair efficiency. those who are familiar with the correspondence of the great sea-officers of former days will have noticed how careful they were to prevent anything like extravagant expenditure. this inclination towards a proper parsimony of naval funds became traditional in our service. the tradition has, perhaps, been rather weakened in these days of abundant wealth; but we should do our best not to let it die out. extravagance is a serious foe to efficient organisation, because where it prevails there is a temptation to try imperfectly thought-out experiments, in the belief that, if they fail, there will still be plenty of money to permit others to be tried. this, of course, encourages slovenly want of system, which is destructive of good organisation. we may assume, for the purposes of our investigation, that our permanently equipped secondary base contains a stock of , tons of coal. any proportionate quantity, however, may be substituted for this, as the general argument will remain unaffected. as already intimated, coal is so much greater in bulk and aggregate cost than any other class of stores that, if we arrange for its supply, the provision of the rest is a comparatively small matter. the squadron which we have had in view requires an estimated amount of , tons of coal in six months' period specified, and a further quantity of tons may be expected to suffice for the ships employed in the neighbouring waters during the remainder of the year. this latter amount would have to be brought in smaller cargoes, say, five of tons each. allowing for the colliers required during the six months whilst the whole squadron has to be supplied an average cargo of tons, we should want twenty arrivals with an aggregate of , tons, and later on five arrivals of smaller colliers with an aggregate of tons to complete the year. the freight or cost of conveyance to the place need not be considered here, as it would be the same in either system. if we keep a stock of supplies at a place we must incur expenditure to provide for the storage of the articles. there would be what may be called the capital charges for sites, buildings, residences, jetties, tram lines, &c., for which £ , would probably not be enough, but we may put it at that so as to avoid the appearance of exaggeration. a further charge would be due to the provision of tugs or steam launches, and perhaps lighters. this would hardly be less than £ , . interest on money sunk, cost of repairs, and maintenance, would not be excessive if they amounted to £ a year. there must be some allowance for the coal used by the tugs and steam launches. it is doubtful if £ a year would cover this; but we may put it at that. salaries and wages of staff, including persons employed in tugs and steam launches, would reach quite £ a year. it is to be noted that the items which these charges are assumed to cover cannot be dispensed with. if depots are established at all, they must be so arranged that the stores deposited in them can be securely kept and can be utilised with proper expedition. the total of the charges just enumerated is £ a year. there are other charges that cannot be escaped. for example, landing a ton of coal at wei-hai-wei, putting it into the depot, and taking it off again to the man-of-war requiring it, costs $ cents, or at average official rate of exchange two shillings. at hong-kong the cost is about s. d. a ton. the charge at s. per ton on , tons would be £ . i am assured by every engineer officer to whom i have spoken on the subject that the deterioration in coal due to the four different handlings which it has to undergo if landed in lighters and taken off again to ships from the coal-store cannot be put at less than per cent. note that this is over and above such deterioration as would be due to passing coal direct from the hold of a collier alongside into a ship's bunkers. if anyone doubts this deterioration it would be well for him to examine reports on coal and steam trials. he will be unusually fortunate if he finds so small a deterioration as per cent. the lowest that i can remember having seen reported is per cent.; reports of and even per cent. are quite common. some of it is for deterioration due to climate and length of time in store. this, of course, is one of the inevitable conditions of the secondary base system, the object of which is to keep in stock a quantity of the article needed. putting the purchase price of the coal as low as s. a ton, a deterioration due to repeated handling only of per cent. on , tons would amount to £ . there is nearly always some loss of coal due to moving it. i say 'nearly always' because it seems that there are occasions on which coal being moved increases in bulk. it occurs when competitive coaling is being carried on in a fleet and ships try to beat records. a collier in these circumstances gives out more coal than she took in. we shall probably be right if we regard the increase in this case as what the german philosophers call 'subjective,' that is, rather existent in the mind than in the external region of objective, palpable fact. it may be taken as hardly disputable that there will be less loss the shorter the distance and the fewer the times the coal is moved. without counting it we see that the annual expenses enumerated are-- establishment charges £ , landing and re-shipping , deterioration , ------- £ , this £ , is to be compared with the cost of the direct supply system. the quantity of coal required would, as said above, have to be carried in twenty colliers--counting each trip as that of a separate vessel--with, on the average, tons apiece, and five smaller ones. it would take fully four days to unload tons at the secondary base, and even more if the labour supply was uncertain or the labourers not well practised. demurrage for a vessel carrying the cargo mentioned, judging from actual experience, would be about £ a day; and probably about £ a day for the smaller vessels. if we admit an average delay, per collier, of eighteen days, that is, fourteen days more than the time necessary for removing the cargo into store, so as to allow for colliers arriving when the ships to be coaled are absent, we should get-- x x £ , x x , ------- £ , as the cost of transferring the coal from the holds to the men-of-war's bunkers on the direct supply system. an average of eighteen days is probably much too long to allow for each collier's stay till cleared: because, on some occasions, ships requiring coal may be counted on as sure to be present. even as it is, the £ , is a smaller sum than the £ , which the secondary base system costs over and above the amount due to increased deterioration of coal. if a comparison were instituted as regards other kinds of stores, the particular figures might be different, but the general result would be the same. the first thing that we have got to do is to rid our minds of the belief that because we see a supply-carrier lying at anchor for some days without being cleared, more money is being spent than is spent on the maintenance of a shore depot. there may be circumstances in which a secondary base is a necessity, but they must be rare and exceptional. we saw that the establishment of one does not help us in the matter of defending our communications. we now see that, so far from being more economical than the alternative method, the secondary base method is more costly. it might have been demonstrated that it is really much more costly than the figures given make it out to be, because ships obliged to go to a base must expend coal in doing so, and coal costs money. it is not surprising that consideration of the secondary base system should evoke a recollection of the expression applied by dryden to the militia of his day: in peace a charge; in war a weak defence. i have to say that i did not prepare this paper simply for the pleasure of reading it, or in order to bring before you mere sets of figures and estimates of expense. my object has been to arouse in some of the officers who hear me a determination to devote a portion of their leisure to the consideration of those great problems which must be solved by us if we are to wage war successfully. many proofs reach me of the ability and zeal with which details of material are investigated by officers in these days. the details referred to are not unimportant in themselves; but the importance of several of them if put together would be incomparably less than that of the great question to which i have tried to direct your attention. the supply of a fleet is of high importance in both peace time and time of war. even in peace it sometimes causes an admiral to pass a sleepless night. the arrangements which it necessitates are often intricate, and success in completing them occasionally seems far off. the work involved in devising suitable plans is too much like drudgery to be welcome to those who undertake it. all the same it has to be done: and surely no one will care to deny that the fleet which has practised in quiet years the system that must be followed in war will start with a great advantage on its side when it is at last confronted with the stern realities of naval warfare. postscript the question of 'communications,' if fully dealt with in the foregoing paper, would have made it so long that its hearers might have been tired out before its end was reached. the following summary of the points that might have been enlarged upon, had time allowed, may interest many officers:-- in time of war we must keep open our lines of communication. if we cannot, the war will have gone against us. open communications mean that we can prevent the enemy from carrying out decisive and sustained operations against them and along their line. to keep communications open it is not necessary to secure every friendly ship traversing the line against attacks by the enemy. all that is necessary is to restrict the enemy's activity so far that he can inflict only such a moderate percentage of loss on the friendly vessels that, as a whole, they will not cease to run. keeping communications open will not secure a friendly place against every form of attack. it will, however, secure a place against attacks with large forces sustained for a considerable length of time. if he can make attacks of this latter kind, it is clear that the enemy controls the communications and that we have failed to keep them open. if communications are open for the passage of vessels of the friendly mercantile marine, it follows that the relatively much smaller number of supply-vessels can traverse the line. as regards supply-vessels, a percentage of loss caused by the enemy must be allowed for. if we put this at per cent.--which, taken absolutely, is probably sufficient--it means that _on_the_ _average_ out of ten supply-vessels sent we expect nine to reach their destination. we cannot, however, arrange that an equal loss will fall on every group of ten vessels. two such groups may arrive intact, whilst a third may lose three vessels. yet the per cent. average would be maintained. this condition has to be allowed for. investigations some years ago led to the conclusion that it would be prudent to send five carriers for every four wanted. the word 'group' has been used above only in a descriptive sense. supply-carriers will often be safer if they proceed to their destination separately. this, however, depends on circumstances. index adventure, voyages of agincourt, battle of alcester, lord alexander the great alexandria, bombardment of american war of independence; sir henry maine on ---- war of secession; raids in ---- war with spain ammunition, supply of; alleged shortage at the defeat of the armada army co-operation athenian navy; at the battle of syracuse australian fleet, localisation of austro-prussian war baehr, c. f balaclava, capture of bantry bay, french invasion of battleships, merits of; coal consumption of beer, for the navy benedek, general blockades bounty for recruits brassey, lord bright, rev. j. f. brougham, lord brunswick-oels, duke of burchett, quoted burleigh, lord byng, admiral (_see_under_ torrington, earl of). cadiz, expedition camperdown, battle of camperdown, lord cardigan bay, french invasion of carnot, president carrying trade, of the colonies; of the world carthaginian navy; fall of cawdor, lord centralisation, evils of charles ii, king 'chatham chest' chevalier, captain; quoted chino-japanese war chioggia, battle of coal, allowance of; bases for; cost of coast defence (_see_also_under_ invasion) collingwood, admiral, at trafalgar colomb, vice-admiral p. h.; on the chino-japanese war; on the command of the sea; on nelson's tactics at trafalgar colonies, naval bases in the; contributions by the; and terms of service in the navy command of the sea; and the claim to a salute; in the crimean war; local and temporary; and the french invasion; land fortification and; in war; and our food supply; essential to the empire commerce, protection of naval; destruction of; at the time of trafalgar communications, in war; control of; with naval bases; of a fleet corbett, mr. julian; on nelson cornwallis, admiral crécy, battle of crimean war; command of the sea in; mortality in cromwell, oliver cruisers, necessity for; their equivalent at trafalgar; coal consumption of; duties of crusades dacres, rear-admiral de burgh, hubert de galles, admiral morard de grasse, admiral de la gravière, admiral de ruyter, admiral defence, of naval commerce; against invasion; offensive; inefficiency of localised; against raids desbrière, capt. destroyers, origin of dewey, admiral 'dictionary of national biography' dockyards, fortification of dornberg, colonel drake, sir francis drury lane pantomime dryden, quoted duncan, lord; life of; quoted dundonald, lord duro, captain dutch east india co. ---- navy ---- war economy and efficiency edward iii, king egypt, french expedition to ekins, sir charles elizabeth (queen) and her seamen empire, the defence of; and control of ocean communications english channel, command of the exploration, voyages of fishguard, french invasion of fleet, positions in war for the; duties of the; and the defence of empire; supply and communications of the 'fleet in being' food supply and control of the sea foods, preservation of foreign seamen, in our merchant service; their exemption from impressment franco-german war froude's history fulton, quoted gardiner, dr. s. r., quoted genoese navy german navy, in the baltic gibbon, quoted gibraltar; siege of gravelines, battle of greek navy green, j. r., quoted grierson, colonel b. h. grouchy, admiral gutteridge, mr. hall, mr. hubert hammond, dr. w. a. 'handy man' evolution of the hannay, mr. d. hannibal hawke, lord hawkins, sir j. herodotus, quoted history, influence of naval campaigns on; of war hoche, general holm, adolf hood, lord; and nelson hosier, admiral howard of effingham, lord; quoted howe, lord; at gibraltar; his tactics hughes, sir edward humbert's bxpedition _illustrious_ training school impressment; exemption of foreigners from; inefficiency of; legalised forcible; popular misconceptions of; exemptions from (_see_also_under_ press gang) indian mutiny international law, and the sea; and the sale of bad food invasion, prevention of; of british isles; over sea and land raids; land defence against; as a means of war ireland, french invasion of jamaica, seizure of james, quoted japan and china war jena, battle of jessopp, dr. a. joyeuse, admiral villaret keith, lord killigrew, vice-admiral kinglake, quoted la hogue, battle of laughton, professor sir j. k.; 'defeat of the armada,'; on nelson lepanto, battle of lindsay, w. s. local defence, inefficiency of; of naval bases lyons, admiral lord mahan, captain a. t.; on the roman navy; on sea commerce; on early naval warfare; on the naval 'calling'; on the american war of independence; influence of his teaching; on the spanish-american war; on control of the sea; on impressment; on nelson at trafalgar malaga, battle of manoeuvres marathon, battle of marines and impressment martin, admiral sir t. byam medina-sidonia, duke of mediterranean, command of the mends, dr. stilon ---- admiral sir w. merchant service, foreign seamen in our; historical relations of the navy with the; its exemption from impressment (_see_ _also_under_ commerce) minorca mischenko, general mortality from disease in war motley, quoted mutiny at the nore napoleon, emperor; and the invasion of england; expedition to egypt; on losses in war naval bases; defence of; cost of _naval_chronicle_ naval strategy; in the american war of independence; the frontier in; and command of the sea; the fleet's position in war; compared with military; and the french expedition to egypt; in defence of empire; for weak navies; at the time of trafalgar ---- tactics, nelson's achievements in; at trafalgar; consideration of cost in ---- warfare, influence on history of; the true objective in (_see_also_under_ war) navies, costliness of; strength of foreign navigation act ( ) navy, necessity for a strong; and army co-operation; human element in the; changes in organisation; conditions of service in the; peace training of the; historical relations with the merchant service; impressment in the; records of the; queen elizabeth's; victualling the; pay in the; its mobility; and the two-power standard; question of size of ships for the; economy and efficiency in the navy records society nelson, lord; on blockades; and the 'nile'; his strategy; and trafalgar; his tactics netley hospital newbolt, mr. h. nile, battle of the oil, ship's allowance of oppenheim, mr. m. oversea raids palmer, six henry peace training, and war; of the 'handy man' pepys, quoted pericles, quoted persian navy peter the great phillip, rear-admiral arthur phoenician navy pitt, william; quoted piracy pocock, rev. thomas poitiers, battle of policing the sea port arthur, battle off ports, fortification of portuguese navy press gang; popular misconceptions of the; facts and fancies about the; in literature and art; operations of the price, dr. quiberon bay, battle of raiding attacks; prevention of raids, oversea and on land raleigh, sir walter recruiting, from the merchant service; by the press gang recruits, bounty for rhodes navy robinson, commander rodney, lord rogers, thorold roman navy rooke, sir george roosevelt, mr. theodore, quoted russo-japanese war ---- turkish war st. vincent, lord salamis, battle of salute, the claim to a saracen navy schill, colonel sea, international law and the sea power, history and meaning of the term; defined; influence on history of naval campaigns; of the phoenicians; of greece and persia; of rome and carthage; in the middle ages; of the saracens; and the crusades; of venice, pisa and genoa; of the turks; in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; of portugal and spain; rise in england of; and exploration and adventure; and military co-operation; of the dutch; and naval strategy; in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries; examples of its efficiency; in recent times; in crimean war; in american war of secession; in russo-turkish war; in chino-japanese war; in spanish-american war sebastopol, siege of seeley, sir j. r. seymour, lord henry ships for the navy, question of size of; for supply sismondi, quoted sluys, battle of smith, sir sydney spanish armada, defeat of the; records of; queen elizabeth and the ---- american war spanish indies ---- navy spartan army stirling, sir james stores, reserve of ship's strategy (_see_under_ naval strategy) stuart, general j. e. b. suffren, admiral supply and communications of a fleet supply ships, sizes of syracuse, battle of tactics (_see_under_ naval tactics) tate, colonel themistocles; and the greek navy thucydides, quoted _times_, quoted torpedo boats, defence against torrington, earl of tourville, admiral trafalgar, battle of; tactics of; british losses at; the attack; contemporary strategy and tactics training (_see_under_ peace training) turkish navy united states navy venetian navy victualling allowances; and modern preserved foods walcheren expedition, mortality in wales, french invasion of war, and its chief lessons; human element in; the unexpected in; under modern conditions; how to avoid surprise in; mortality from disease in; methods of making; command of the sea in; compensation for losses in; napoleon on loss of life in; supplies in (_see_also_under_ invasion, naval warfare, and raids) washington, george water, ship's allowance of waterloo, battle of wellington, duke of william iii, king wilmot, sir s. eardley xerxes; his highly trained army the end medical life in the navy by gordon stables published by robert hardwicke, picadilly, london. this edition dated . medical life in the navy, by gordon stables. ________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________ medical life in the navy, by gordon stables. chapter one. by rail to london. little moonface. euston square. i chose the navy. i am not at all certain what it was that determined my choice; probably this--i have a mole on my left arm, which my gossiping old nurse (rest the old lady's soul!) used to assert was a sure sign that i was born to be a rover. then i had been several voyages to the arctic regions, and therefore knew what a sea-life meant, and what it didn't mean; that, no doubt, combined with an extensive acquaintance with the novels of captain marryat, had much to do with it. be this as it may, i did choose that service, and have never yet repented doing so. well, after a six weeks' preparatory read-up i packed my traps, taking care not to forget my class-tickets--to prove the number of lectures attended each course--a certificate of age and another of virtue, my degree in surgery (m.ch.), and my m.d. or medical degree; and with a stick in my hand, and a porter at my side, i set out for the nearest railway station. previously, of course, i had bidden double adieus to all my friends, had a great many blessings hurled after me, and not a few old shoes; had kissed a whole family of pretty cousins, ingeniously commencing with the grandmother, although she happened to be as yellow as a withered dock-leaf, and wrinkled as a malaga raisin; had composed innumerable verses, and burned them as soon as written. "ticket for london, please," said i, after giving a final wipe to my eyes with the cuff of my coat. "four, two, six," was the laconic reply from the jack-in-the-box; and this i understood to mean pounds shillings pence of the sterling money of the realm--for the young gentleman, like most of his class, talked as if he were merely a column in a ledger and had pound shilling penny written on his classic brow with indelible marking ink, an idea which railway directors ought to see carried out to prevent mistakes. i got on board the train, a porter banged-to the door so quickly that my coat-tails were embraced between the hinges; the guard said "all right," though it wasn't all right; the whistle shrieked, the engine puffed, the wheels went round with a groan and a grunt, and presently we were rattling over the bridge that spans the romantic dee, with the white walls of the granite city glimmering in the moonlight far behind us. after extricating my imprisoned garment, i leant over the window, and began to feel very dull and sentimental. i positively think i would have wept a little, had not the wind just then blown the smoke in my face, causing me to put up the window in disgust. i had a whole first-class compartment to myself, so i determined to make the best of it. impressed with this idea, i exchanged my hat for a glengarry, made a pillow of my rug, a blanket of my plaid, and laid me down to sleep--"perchance to dream." being rather melancholy, i endeavoured to lull myself to slumber by humming such cheering airs as `kathleen: mavourneen,' `home, sweet home,' etc--"a vera judeecious arrangement," had it continued. unfortunately for my peace of mind it did not; for, although the night train to london does not stop more than half-a-dozen times all the way, at the next station, and before my eyes had closed in sleep, the door of the compartment was opened, a lady was bundled in, the guard said "all right" again, though i could have sworn it wasn't, and the train, like the leg of the wonderful merchant of rotterdam, "got up and went on as before." now, i'm not in the habit of being alarmed at the presence of ladies--no british sailor is--still, on the present occasion, as i peered round the corner of my plaid, and beheld a creature of youth and beauty, i _did_ feel a little squeamish; "for," i reasoned, "if she happens to be good, `all right,' as the guard said, but if not then all decidedly wrong; for why? she might take it into her head, between here and london, to swear that i had been guilty of manslaughter, or suicide, or goodness knows what, and then i feared my certificate of virtue, which i got from the best of aged scottish divines, might not save me." i looked again and again from below my highland plaid. "well," thought i, "she seems mild enough, any how;" so i pretended to sleep, but then, gallantry forbade. "i may sleep in earnest," said i to myself, "and by george i don't like the idea of sleeping in the company of any strange lady." presently, however, she relieved my mind entirely, for she showed a marriage-ring by drawing off a glove, and hauling out a baby--not out of the glove mind you, but out of her dress somewhere. i gave a sigh of relief, for there was cause and effect at once--a marriage-ring and a baby. i had in my own mind grievously wronged the virtuous lady, so i immediately elevated my prostrate form, rubbed my eyes, yawned, stretched myself, looked at my watch, and in fact behaved entirely like a gentleman just awakened from a pleasant nap. after i had benignly eyed her sleeping progeny for the space of half a minute, i remarked blandly, and with a soft smile, "pretty baby, ma'am." (i thought it as ugly as sin.) "yes, sir," said she, looking pleasedly at it with one eye (so have i seen a cock contemplate a bantam chick). "it is so like its papa!" "is it indeed, ma'am? well, now, do you know, i thought it just the very image of its mamma!" "so he thinks," replied the lady; "but he has only seen its carte-de-visite." "unfortunate father!" thought i, "to have seen only the shadowy image of this his darling child--its carte-de-visite, too! wonder, now, if it makes a great many calls? shouldn't like the little cuss to visit me." "going far, ma'am?" said i aloud. and now this queer specimen of femininity raised her head from the study of her sleeping babe, and looked me full in the face, as if she were only aware of my presence for the first time, and hadn't spoken to me at all. i am proud to say i bore the scrutiny nobly, though it occupied several very long seconds, during which time i did not disgrace my certificate of virtue by the ghost of a blush, till, seeming satisfied, she replied, apparently in deep thought,--"to lon--don." "so am i, ma'am." "i go on to plymouth," she said. "i expect to go there myself soon," said i. "i am going abroad to join my husband." "very strange!" said i, "and _i_ hope to go abroad soon to join my," (she looked at me now, with parted lips, and the first rays of a rising smile lighting up her face, expecting me to add "wife")--"to join my ship;" and she only said "oh!" rather disappointedly i thought, and recommenced the contemplation of the moonfaced babe. "bah!" thought i, "there is nothing in you but babies and matrimony;" and i threw myself on the cushions, and soon slept in earnest, and dreamt that the director-general, in a bob-wig and drab shorts, was dancing jacky-tar on the quarter-deck of a seventy-four, on the occasion of my being promoted to the dignity of honorary-surgeon to the queen--a thing that is sure to happen some of these days. when i awoke, cold and shivering, the sun had risen and was shining, as well as he could shine for the white mist that lay, like a veil of gauze, over all the wooded flats that skirt for many miles the great world of london. my companion was still there, and baby had woken up, too, and begun to crow, probably in imitation of the many cocks that were hallooing to each other over all the country. and now my attention was directed, in fact riveted, to a very curious pantomime which was being performed by the young lady; i had seen the like before, and often have since, but never could solve the mystery. her eyes were fixed on baby, whose eyes in turn were fastened on her, and she was bobbing her head up and down on the perpendicular, like a wax figure or automaton; every time that she elevated she pronounced the letter "a," and as her head again fell she remarked "gue," thus completing the word "ague," much to the delight of little moonface, and no doubt to her own entire satisfaction. "a-gue! a-gue!" well, it certainly was a morning to give any one ague, so, pulling out my brandy-flask, i made bold to present it to her. "you seem cold, ma'am," said i; "will you permit me to offer you a very little brandy?" "oh dear, no! thanks," she answered quickly. "for baby's sake, ma'am," i pleaded; "i am a doctor." "well, then," she replied, smiling, "just a tiny little drop. oh dear! not so much!" it seemed my ideas of "a tiny little drop," and hers, did not exactly coincide; however, she did me the honour to drink with me: after which i had a tiny little drop to myself, and never felt so much the better of anything. euston square terminus at last; and the roar of great london came surging on my ears, like the noise and conflict of many waters, or the sound of a storm-tossed ocean breaking on a stony beach. i leapt to the platform, forgetting at once lady and baby and all, for the following tuesday was to be big with my fate, and my heart beat flurriedly as i thought "what if i were plucked, in spite of my m.d., in spite of my c.m., in spite even of my certificate of virtue itself?" chapter two. doubts and fears. my first night in cockneydom. what if i were plucked? what should i do? go to the american war, embark for the gold-diggings, enlist in a regiment of sepoys, or throw myself from the top of saint paul's? this, and such like, were my thoughts, as i bargained with cabby, for a consideration, to drive me and my traps to a quiet second-rate hotel--for my purse by no means partook of the ponderosity of my heart. cabby did so. the hotel at which i alighted was kept by a gentleman who, with his two daughters, had but lately migrated from the flowery lands of sunny devon; so lately that he himself could still welcome his guests with an honest smile and hearty shake of hand, while the peach-like bloom had not as yet faded from the cheeks of his pretty buxom daughters. so well pleased was i with my entertainment in every way at this hotel, that i really believed i had arrived in a city where both cabmen and innkeepers were honest and virtuous; but i have many a time and often since then had reason to alter my opinion. now, there being only four days clear left me ere i should have to present myself before the august body of examiners at somerset house, i thought it behoved me to make the best of my time. fain--oh, how fain!--would i have dashed care and my books, the one to the winds and the other to the wall, and floated away over the great ocean of london, with all its novelties, all its pleasures and its curiosities; but i was afraid--i dared not. i felt like a butterfly just newly burst from the chrysalis, with a world of flowers and sunshine all around it, but with one leg unfortunately immersed in birdlime. i felt like that gentleman, in hades you know, with all sorts of good things at his lips, which he could neither touch nor taste of. nor could i of the joys of london life. no, like moses from the top of mount pisgah, i could but behold the promised land afar off; _he_ had the dark gates of death to pass before he might set foot therein, and i had to pass the gloomy portals of somerset house, and its board of dread examiners. the landlord--honest man! little did he know the torture he was giving me--spread before me on the table more than a dozen orders for places of amusement,--to me, uninitiated, places of exceeding great joy--red orders, green orders, orange and blue orders, orders for concerts, orders for gardens, orders for theatres royal, and orders for the opera. oh, reader, fancy at that moment my state of mind; fancy having the wonderful lamp of aladdin offered you, and your hands tied behind your back i myself turned red, and green, and orange, and blue, even as the orders were, gasped a little, called for a glass of water,--not beer, mark me,--and rushed forth. i looked not at the flaming placards on the walls, nor at the rows of seedy advertisement-board men. i looked neither to the right hand nor to the left, but made my way straight to the british museum, with the hopes of engaging in a little calm reflection. i cannot say i found it however; for all the strange things i saw made me think of all the strange countries these strange things came from, and this set me a-thinking of all the beautiful countries i might see if i passed. "_if_, gracious heavens!" thought i. "are you mad, knocking about here like a magnetised mummy, and tuesday the passing day? home, you devil you, and study!" half an hour later, in imagination behold me seated before a table in my little room, with the sun's parting beams shemmering dustily in through my window, surrounded with books--books--books medical, books surgical, books botanical, books nautical, books what-not-ical; behold, too, the wet towel that begirts my thoughtful brow, my malar bones leaning on my hands, my forearms resting on the mahogany, while i am thinking, or trying to think, of, on, or about everything known, unknown, or guessed at. mahogany, did i say? "mahogany," methinks i hear the examiner say, "hem! hem! upon what island, tell us, doctor, does the mahogany tree grow, exist, and flourish? give the botanical name of this tree, the natural family to which it belongs, the form of its leaves and flower, its uses in medicine and in art, the probable number of years it lives, the articles made from its bark, the parasites that inhabit it, the birds that build their nests therein, and the class of savage who finds shelter beneath its wide-spreading, _if_ wide-spreading, branches; entering minutely into the formation of animal structure in general, and describing the whole theory of cellular development, tracing the gradual rise of man from the sponge through the various forms of snail, oyster, salmon, lobster, lizard, rabbit, kangaroo, monkey, gorilla, nigger, and irish yahoo, up to the perfect englishman; and state your ideas of the most probable form and amount of perfection at which you think the animal structure will arrive in the course of the next ten thousand years. is mahogany much superior to oak? if so, why is it not used in building ships? give a short account of the history of shipbuilding, with diagrams illustrative of the internal economy of noah's ark, the great eastern, and the rob roy canoe. describe the construction of the armstrong gun, king theodore's mortar, and mons meg. describe the different kinds of mortars used in building walls, and those used in throwing them down; insert here the composition of gunpowder tea, fenian fire, and the last new yankee drink? in the mahogany country state the diseases most prevalent among the natives, and those which you would think yourself justified in telling the senior assistant-surgeon to request the surgeon to beg the first lieutenant to report to the commander, that he may call the attention of your captain to the necessity of ordering the crew to guard against." then, most indulgent reader, behold me, with these and a thousand other such questions floating confusedly through my bewildered brain--behold me, i say, rise from the table slowly, and as one who doubteth whether he be not standing on his head; behold me kick aside the cane-bottomed chair, then clear the table with one wild sweep, state "bosh!" with the air and emphasis of a pasha of three tails, throw myself on the sofa, and with a "waitah, glass of gwog and cigaw, please," commence to read `tom cwingle's log.' this is how i spent my first day, and a good part of the night too, in london; and--moral--i should sincerely advise every medical aspirant, or candidate for a commission in the royal navy, to bring in his pocket some such novel as roderick random, or harry lorrequer, to read immediately before passing, and to leave every other book at home. chapter three. a feline adventure. passed--hooray! conversation of (not with) two israelitish parties. next morning, while engaged at my toilet--not a limb of my body which i had not amputated that morning mentally, not one of my joints i had not exsected, or a capital operation i did not perform on my own person; i had, in fact, with imaginary surgical instruments, cut myself all into little pieces, dissected my every nerve, filled all my arteries with red wax and my veins with blue, traced out the origin and insertion of every muscle, and thought of what each one could and what each one could not do; and was just giving the final twirl to my delicate moustache, and the proper set to the bow of my necktie, when something occurred which caused me to start and turn quickly round. it was a soft modest little knock--almost plaintive in its modesty and softness--at my door. i heard no footfall nor sound of any sort, simply the "tapping as of some one gently rapping, rapping at my chamber-door; simply that and nothing more." "this," thought i, "is sarah jane with my boots: mindful girl is sarah jane." then giving voice to my thoughts, "thank you, sally," said i, "just leave them outside; i'll have finnon haddocks and oatcake for breakfast." then, a voice that wasn't sally's, but ever so much softer and more kitten-like in tone, replied,-- "hem! ahem!" and presently added, "it is only _me_." then the door was pushed slightly open, while pressing one foot doubtfully against it i peeped out, and to my surprise perceived the half of a little yellow book and the whole of a little yellow face with whiskers at it, and an expression so very like that of a one-year-old lady cat, that i remained for a little in momentary expectation of hearing it purr. but it didn't, merely smiling and repeating,-- "it's only me." "so i see," said i, quite taken aback as it were. "so i see." then "_me_," slowly and gently overcame the resistance my right foot offered, and, pushing open the door, held out the yellow tract, which i took to be of a spiritual nature, and spoke to "i" as follows:-- "we--that is, he! he! my father and me, he! he! you see--had heard of your going up to join the navy." at that moment it seemed to "i" the easiest thing in the world, short of spending money, to "join" the royal navy. "and so," continued "_me_", "you see, he! he! we thought of making you a call, all in business, you see, he! he! and offering you our estimate for your uniform." uniform! grand name to my ear, i who had never worn anything more gay than a homespun coat of houden-grey and a gordon tartan kilt. i thought it was my turn to say, "hem! hem!" and even add an inaudible "ho! ho!" for i felt myself expanding inch by inch like a kidney bean. "in that little book," _me_ went on, "there,"--pointing to the front page--"you will find the names of one hundred and fifty-seven officers and gentlemen who have honoured us with their custom." then i exclaimed, "dear me!" and me added with animation, "you see: he! he!" was it any wonder then, that i succumbed to such a flood of temptation, that even my native canniness disappeared or was swept away, and that i promised this gentleman of feline address that if i passed i would assuredly make his father a call? alas! unfortunate greenhorn that i was, i found out when too late that some on the list had certainly given him their custom, and like myself repented only once but for ever; while the custom of the majority was confined to a pair or two of duck inexpressibles, a uniform cap, a dozen of buttons, or a hank of sewing silk. "we can proudly refer you," me continued, as i bowed him to the door, "to any of them, and if you do us the honour of calling you will be enabled to judge for yourself; but," added he, in a stage whisper, at the same time making a determined attempt, as i thought, to bite off my ear, "be aware of the jews." "what," said i, "is your father not then a jew? the name i thought--" "oh-h-h!" he cried, "they may call us so; but--born in england--bred in london--neighbourhood of bond street, highly respectable locality. army and navy outfitters, my father and me, you see, he! he! we invite inspection, give satisfaction, and defy competition, you see, he! he!" and he glided silently down stairs, giving me scarcely time to observe that he was a young man with black hair, black eyes and whiskers, and wearing goloshes. i soon after went down to breakfast, wondering, as i well might, how my feline friend had found out all about my affairs; but it was not till i had eaten ninety and one breakfasts and a corresponding number of dinners that i discovered he belonged to a class of fellows who live by fleecing the poor victims they pretend to clothe. intending candidates, beware of the jews! tuesday came round at last, just as tuesdays have always been in the habit of doing, and at eleven o'clock precisely i, with my heart playing a game of cricket, with my spine for the bat and my ribs for the wicket, "repaired"--a very different mode of progression from any other with which i am acquainted--to the medical department of somerset house. i do not remember ever having entered any place with feelings of greater solemnity. i was astonished in no small degree at the people who passed along the strand for appearing so disgustingly indifferent,-- "and i so weerie fu' o' care." had i been going to stand my trial for manslaughter or cattle-lifting, i am certain i should have felt supremely happy in comparison. i passed the frowning gateway, traversed the large square, and crossed the rubicon by entering the great centre doorway and inquiring my way to the examination room. i had previously, be it observed, sent in my medical and surgical degrees, with all my class tickets and certificates, including that for virtue. i was now directed up a great many long stairs, along as many gloomy-looking corridors, in which i lost my way at least half a dozen times, and had to call at a corresponding number of green-baize-covered brass tacketed doors, in order to be put right, before i at length found myself in front of the proper one, at which i knocked once, twice, and even thrice, without in any way affecting or diminishing the buzz that was going on behind the door; so i pushed it open, and boldly entered. i now found myself in the midst of a large and select assortment of clerks, whose tongues were hard at work if their pens were not, and who did not seem half so much astonished at seeing me there as i felt at finding myself. the room itself looked like an hypertrophied law office, of which the principal features were papers and presses, three-legged stools, calf-bound folios, and cobwebs. i stood for a considerable time, observing but unobserved, wondering all the while what to say, how to say it, and whom to say it to, and resisting an inclination to put my finger in my mouth. moreover, at that moment a war was going on within me between pride and modesty, for i was not at all certain whether i ought to take off my hat; so being "canny" and a scot, i adopted a middle course, and commenced to wipe imaginary perspiration from my brow, an operation which, of course, necessitated the removal of my head-dress. probably the cambric handkerchief caught the tail of the eye of a quieter-looking knight of the quill, who sat a little apart from the other drones of the pen; at any rate he quickly dismounted, and coming up to me politely asked my business. i told him, and he civilly motioned me to a seat to await my turn for examination. by-and-bye other candidates dropped in, each of whom i rejoiced to observe looked a little paler, decidedly more blue, and infinitely greener than i did myself! this was some relief, so i sat by the dusty window which overlooked the thames, watching the little skiffs gliding to and fro, the boats hastening hither and thither, and the big lazy-like barges that floated on the calm unruffled bosom of the great mysterious river, and thinking and wishing that it could but break its everlasting silence and tell its tale, and mention even a tithe of the scenes that had been acted on its breast or by its banks since it first rolled its infant waters to the sea, through a forest of trees instead of a forest of masts and spires, or tell of the many beings that had sought relief from a world of sin and suffering under its dark current. so ran my thoughts, and as the river so did time glide by, and two hours passed away, then a third; and when at last my name was called, it was only to inform me that i must come back on the following day, there being too many to be examined at once. at the hour appointed i was immediately conducted into the presence of the august assembly of examiners, and this, is what i saw, or rather, this was the picture on my retina, for to see, in the usual acceptation of the term, was, under the circumstances, out of the question:--a table with a green cover, laid out for a feast--to me a ghastly feast--of reason and flow of soul. my reason was to form the feast, my soul was to flow; the five pleasant-looking and gentlemanly men who sat around were to partake of the banquet. i did not walk into the room, i seemed to glide as if in a dream, or as if i had been my own ghost. every person and every thing in the room appeared strangely contorted; and the whole formed a wonderful mirage, miraculously confused. the fire hopped up on the table, the table consigned itself to the flames at one moment, and made an insane attempt to get up the chimney the next. the roof bending down in one corner affectionately kissed the carpet, the carpet bobbing up at another returned the chaste salute. then the gentlemen smiled on me pleasantly, while i replied by a horrible grin. "sit down, sir," said one, and his voice sounded far away, as if in another world, as i tottered to the chair, and with palsied arm helped myself to a glass of water, which had been placed on the table for my use. the water revived me, and at the first task i was asked to perform--translate a small portion of gregory's (not powder) conspectus into english--my senses came back. the scales fell from my eyes, the table and fire resumed their proper places, the roof and carpet ceased to dally, my scattered brains came all of a heap once more, and i was myself again as much as ever richard was, or any other man. i answered most of the questions, if not all. i was tackled for ten minutes at a time by each of the examiners. i performed mental operations on the limbs of beings who never existed, prescribed hypothetically for innumerable ailments, brought divers mythical children into the world, dissected muscles and nerves in imagination, talked of green trees, fruit, flowers, natural families, and far-away lands, as if i had been linnaeus, columbus, and humboldt all in one, so that, in less than an hour, the august body leant their backs against their respective chairs, and looked knowingly in each other's faces for a period of several very long seconds. they then nodded to one another, did this august body, looked at their tablets, and nodded again. after this pantomime had come to a conclusion i was furnished with a sheet of foolscap and sent back to the room above the thames to write a dissertation on fractures of the cranium, and shortly after sending it in i was recalled and informed that i had sustained the dread ordeal to their entire satisfaction, etc, and that i had better, before i left the house, pay an official visit to the director-general. i bowed, retired, heaved a monster sigh, made the visit of ceremony, and afterwards my exit. the first gentleman (?) i met on coming out was a short, middle-aged shylock, hook-nosed and raven-haired, and arrayed in a surtout of seedy black. he approached me with much bowing and smiling, and holding below my nose a little green tract which he begged i would accept. "exceedingly kind," thought i, and was about to comply with his request, when, greatly to my surprise and the discomposure of my toilet, an arm was hooked into mine, i was wheeled round as if on a pivot, and found myself face to face with another israelite armed with a _red_ tract. "he is a jew and a dog," said this latter, shaking a forefinger close to my face. "is he?" said i. the words had hardly escaped my lips when the other jew whipped his arm through mine and quickly re-wheeled me towards him. "he is a liar and a cheat," hissed he, with the same motion of the forefinger as his rival had used. "indeed!" said i, beginning to wonder what it all meant. i had not, however, long time to wonder, being once more set spinning by the israelite of the red tract. "beware of the jews?" he whispered, pointing to the other; and the conversation was continued in the following strain. although in the common sense of the word it really was no conversation, as each of them addressed himself to me only, and i could find no reply, still, taking the word in its literal meaning (from con, together, and _verto_, i turn), it was indeed a conversation, for they turned me together, each one, as he addressed me, hooking his arm in mine and whirling me round like the handle of an air-pump or a badly constructed teetotum, and shaking a forefinger in my face, as if i were a parrot and he wanted me to swear. _shylock of the green tract_.--"he is a swine and a scoundrel." _israelite of the red_.--"he's a liar and a thief." _shylock of the green_.--"and he'll get round you some way." _israelite of red_.--"ahab and brothers cheat everybody they can." _shylock of green_.--"he'll be lending you money." _red_.--"whole town know them--" _green_.--"charge you thirty per cent." red--"they are swindlers and dogs." _green_.--"look at our estimate." _red_.--"look at _our_ estimate." _green_.--"peep at our charges." _red_.--"five years' credit." _green_.--"come with us, sir," tugging me to the right. _red_.--"this way, master," pulling me to the left. _green_.--"be advised; he'll rob you." _red_.--"if you go he'll murder you." "damn you both!" i roared; and letting fly both fists at the same time, i turned them both together on their backs and thus put an end to the conversation. only just in time, though, for the remaining ten tribes, or their representatives, were hurrying towards me, each one swaying aloft a gaudy-coloured tract; and i saw no way of escaping but by fairly making a run for it, which i accordingly did, pursued by the ten tribes; and even had i been a centipede, i would have assuredly been torn limb from limb, had i not just then rushed into the arms of my feline friend from bond street. he purred, gave me a paw and many congratulations; was so glad i had passed,--but, to be sure, knew i would,--and so happy i had escaped the jews; would i take a glass of beer? i said, "i didn't mind;" so we adjourned (the right word in the right place--adjourned) to a quiet adjoining hotel. "now," said he, as he tendered the waiter a five-pound bank of england note, "you must not take it amiss, doctor, but--" "no smaller change, sir?" asked the waiter. "i'm afraid," said my friend (?), opening and turning over the contents of a well-lined pocket-book, "i've only got five--oh, here are sovs, he! he!" then turning to me: "i was going to observe," he continued, "that if you want a pound or two, he! he!--you know young fellows will be young fellows--only don't say a word to my father, he! he! he!--highly respectable man. another glass of beer? no? well, we will go and see father!" "but," said i, "i really must go home first." "oh dear no; don't think of such a thing." "i'm deuced hungry," continued i. "my dear sir, excuse me, but it is just our dinner hour; nice roast turkey, and boiled leg of mutton with--" "any pickled pork?" "he! he! now you young _officers_ will have your jokes; but, he! he! though we don't just eat pork, you'll find us just as good as most christians. some capital wine--very old brand; father got it from the cape only the other day; in fact, though i should not mention these things, it was sent us by a grateful customer. but come, you're hungry, we'll get a cab." chapter four. the city of enchantment. in joining the service! find out what a "gig" means. the fortnight immediately subsequent to my passing into the royal navy was spent by me in the great metropolis, in a perfect maze of pleasure and excitement. for the first time for years i knew what it was to be free from care and trouble, independent, and quietly happy. i went the round of the sights and the round of the theatres, and lingered entranced in the opera; but i went all alone, and unaccompanied, save by a small pocket guide-book, and i believe i enjoyed it all the more on that account. no one cared for nor looked at the lonely stranger, and he at no one. i roamed through the spacious streets, strolled delightedly in the handsome parks, lounged in picture galleries, or buried myself for hour's in the solemn halls and classical courts of that prince of public buildings the british museum; and, when tired of rambling, i dined by myself in a quiet hotel. every sight was strange to me, every sound was new; it was as if some good fairy, by a touch of her magic wand, had transported me to an enchanted city; and when i closed my eyes at night, or even shut them by day, behold, there was the same moving panorama that i might gaze on till tired or asleep. but all this was too good to last long. one morning, on coming down to breakfast, bright-hearted and beaming as ever, i found on my plate, instead of fried soles, a long blue official letter, "on her majesty's service." it was my appointment to the `victory,'--"additional for service at haslar hospital." as soon as i read it the enchantment was dissolved, the spell was broken; and when i tried that day to find new pleasures, new sources of amusement, i utterly failed, and found with disgust that it was but a common work-a-day world after all, and that london was very like other places in that respect. i lingered but a few more days in town, and then hastened by train to portsmouth to take up my appointment--to join the service in reality. it was a cold raw morning, with a grey and cheerless sky, and a biting south-wester blowing up channel, and ruffling the water in the solent. alongside of the pier the boats and wherries were all in motion, scratching and otherwise damaging their gunwales against the stones, as they were lifted up and down at the pleasure of the wavelets. the boatmen themselves were either drinking beer at adjacent bars, or stamping up and down the quay with the hopes of enticing a little warmth to their half-frozen toes, and rubbing the ends of their noses for a like purpose. suddenly there arose a great commotion among them, and they all rushed off to surround a gentleman in brand-new naval uniform, who was looking, with his mouth open, for a boat, in every place where a boat was most unlikely to be. knowing at a glance that he was a stranger, they very generously, each and all of them, offered their services, and wanted to row him somewhere--anywhere. after a great deal of fighting and scrambling among themselves, during which the officer got tugged here and tugged there a good many times, he was at last bundled into a very dirty cobble, into which a rough-looking boatman bounded after him and at once shoved off. the naval officer was myself--the reader's obsequious slave. as for the boatman, one thing must be said in his favour, he seemed to be a person of religious character--in one thing at least, for, on the day of judgment, i, for one, will not be able to turn round and say to him "i was a stranger and ye took me not in," for he did take me in. in fact, portsmouth, as a town, is rather particular on this point of christianity: they do take strangers in. "where away to?" asked the jolly waterman, leaning a moment on his oars. "h.m.s. `victory,'" replied i. "be going for to join, i dessay, sir?" "you are right," said i; "but have the goodness to pull so that i may not be wet through on both sides." "can't help the weather, sir." "i'll pay here," said i, "before we go alongside." "very good, sir." "how much?" "only three shillings, sir." "_only_ three shillings!" i repeated, and added "eh?" "that's all, sir--distance is short you know." "do you mean to say," said i, "that you really mean to charge--" "just three bob," interrupting me; "flag's up--can see for yourself, sir." "the flag, you see--i mean my good man--don't tell me about a flag, i'm too far north for you;" and i tried to look as northish as possible. "flag, indeed! humph!" "why, sir," said the man of oars, with a pitying expression of countenance and voice, "flag means double fare--anybody'll tell you that, sir." "nonsense?" said i; "don't tell me that any one takes the trouble of hoisting a flag in order to fill your confounded pockets; there is half a crown, and not a penny more do you get from me." "well, sir, o' condition you has me again, sir, you know, sir,--and my name's mcdonald;" and he pocketed the money, which i afterwards discovered was a _leetle_ too much. "mcdonald," thought i--"my grandmother's name; the rascal thinks to come round me by calling himself a scotchman--the idea of a mcdonald being a waterman!" "sir," said i, aloud, "it is my unbiassed opinion and firm conviction that you are--" i was going to add "a most unmitigated blackguard," but i noticed that he was a man of six feet two, with breadth in proportion, so i left the sentence unfinished. we were now within sight of the bristling sides of the old `victory,' on the quarter-deck of which fell the great and gallant nelson in the hour of battle and triumph; and i was a young officer about to join that service which can boast of so many brave and noble men, and brave and noble deeds; and one would naturally expect that i would indulge in a few dreams of chivalry and romance, picture to myself a bright and glorious future, pounds' weight of medals and crosses, including the victoria, kiss the hilt of my sword, and all that sort of thing. i did not. i was too wretchedly cold for one reason, and the only feeling i had was one of shyness; as for duty, i knew i could and would do that, as most of my countrymen had done before me; so i left castle-building to the younger sons of noblemen or gentry, whose parents can afford to allow them two or three hundred pounds a year to eke out their pay and smooth the difficulties of the service. not having been fortunate enough to be born with even a horn spoon in my mouth, i had to be content with my education as my fortune, and my navy pay as my only income. "stabird side, i dessay, sir?" said the waterman. "certainly," said i, having a glimmering idea that it must be the proper side. a few minutes after--"the admiral's gig is going there, sir,--better wait a bit." i looked on shore and _did_ see a gig, and two horses attached to it. "no," said i, "decidedly not, he can't see us here, man. i suppose you want to go sticking your dirty wet oars in the air, do you?"--(i had seen pictures of this performance). "drive on, i mean pull ahead, my hearty"--a phrase i had heard at the theatre, and considered highly nautical. the waterman obeyed, and here is what came of it. we were just approaching the ladder, when i suddenly became sensible of a rushing noise. i have a dim recollection of seeing a long, many-oared boat, carrying a large red flag, and with an old grey-haired officer sitting astern; of hearing a voice--it might have belonged to the old man of the sea, for anything i could have told to the contrary--float down the wind,-- "clear the way with that (something) bumboat!" then came a crash, my heels flew up--i had been sitting on the gunwale--and overboard i went with a splash, just as some one else in the long boat sang out. "way enough!" way enough, indeed! there was a little too much way for me. when i came to the surface of the water, i found myself several yards from the ladder, and at once struck out for it. there was a great deal of noise and shouting, and a sailor held towards me the sharp end of a boathook; but i had no intention of being lugged out as if i were a pair of canvas trowsers, and, calling to the sailor to keep his pole to himself--did he want to knock my eye out?--i swam to the ladder and ascended. thus then i joined the service, and, having entered at the foot of the ladder, i trust some day to find myself at the top of it. and, talking of joining the service, i here beg to repudiate, as an utter fabrication, the anecdote--generally received as authentic in the service--of the scotch doctor, who, going to report himself for the first time on board of the `victory,' knocked at the door, and inquired (at a marine, i think), "is this the royal nauvy?--'cause i'm come till jine." the story bears "fib" on the face of it, for there is not a scottish schoolboy but knows that one ship does not make a navy, any more than one swallow does a summer. but, dear intending candidate, if you wish to do the right thing, array yourself quietly in frock-coat, cap--not cocked hat, remember--and sword, and go on board your ship in any boat you please, only keep out of the way of gigs. when you arrive on board, don't be expecting to see the admiral, because you'll be disappointed; but ask a sailor or marine to point you out the midshipman of the watch, and request the latter to show you the commander. make this request civilly, mind you; do not pull his ear, because, if big and hirsute, he might beat you, which would be a bad beginning. when you meet the commander, don't rush up and shake him by the hand, and begin talking about the weather; walk respectfully up to him, and lift your cap as you would to a lady; upon which he will hurriedly point to his nose with his forefinger, by way of returning the salute, while at the same time you say-- "_come_ on board, sir--to _join_, sir." it is the custom of the service to make this remark in a firm, bold, decided tone, placing the emphasis on the "_come_" to show clearly that you _did come_, and that no one kicked, or dragged, or otherwise brought you on board against your will. the proper intonation of the remark may be learned from any polite waiter at a hotel, when he tells you, "dinner's ready, sir, please;" or it may be heard in the "now then, gents," of the railway guard of the period. having reported yourself to the man of three stripes, you must not expect that he will shake hands, or embrace you, ask you on shore to tea, and introduce you to his wife. no, if he is good-natured, and has not had a difference of opinion with the captain lately, he _may_ condescend to show you your cabin and introduce you to your messmates; but if he is out of temper, he will merely ask your name, and, on your telling him, remark, "humph!" then call the most minute midshipman to conduct you to your cabin, being at the same time almost certain to mispronounce your name. say your name is struthers, he will call you stutters. "here, mr pigmy, conduct mr stutters to his cabin, and show him where the gunroom--ah! i beg his pardon, the wardroom--lies." "ay, ay, sir," says the middy, and skips off at a round trot, obliging you either to adopt the same ungraceful mode of progression, or lose sight of him altogether, and have to wander about, feeling very much from home, until some officer passing takes pity on you and leads you to the wardroom. chapter five. haslar hospital. the medical mess. dr gruff. it is a way they have in the service, or rather it is the custom of the present director-general, not to appoint the newly-entered medical officer at once to a sea-going ship, but instead to one or other of the naval hospitals for a few weeks or even months, in order that he may be put up to the ropes, as the saying is, or duly initiated into the mysteries of service and routine of duty. this is certainly a good idea, although it is a question whether it would not be better to adopt the plan they have at netley, and thus put the navy and army on the same footing. haslar hospital at portsmouth is a great rambling barrack-looking block of brick building, with a yard or square surrounded by high walls in front, and with two wings extending from behind, which, with the chapel between, form another and smaller square. there are seldom fewer than a thousand patients within, and, independent of a whole regiment of male and female nurses, sick-bay-men, servants, cooks, _et id genus omne_, there is a regular staff of officers, consisting of a captain--of what use i have yet to learn--two medical inspector-generals, generally three or four surgeons, the same number of regularly appointed assistant-surgeons, besides from ten to twenty acting assistant-surgeons [note ] waiting for appointments, and doing duty as supernumeraries. of this last class i myself was a member. soon as the clock tolled the hour of eight in the morning, the staff-surgeon of our side of the hospital stalked into the duty cabin, where we, the assistants, were waiting to receive him. immediately after, we set out on the morning visit, each of us armed with a little board or palette to be used as a writing-desk, an excise inkstand slung in a buttonhole, and a quill behind the ear. the large doors were thrown open, the beds neat and tidy, and the nurses "standing by." up each side of the long wards, from bed to bed, we journeyed; notifying the progress of each case, repeating the treatment here, altering or suspending it there, and performing small operations in another place; listening attentively to tales of aches and pains, and hopes and fears, and just in a sort of general way acting the part of good samaritans. from one ward to another we went, up and down long staircases, along lengthy corridors, into wards in the attics, into wards on the basement, and into wards below ground,--fracture wards, lazarus wards, erysipelas wards, men's wards, officers' wards; and thus we spent the time till a little past nine, by which time the relief of so much suffering had given us an appetite, and we hurried off to the messroom to breakfast. the medical mess at haslar is one of the finest in the service. attached to the room is a nice little apartment, fitted up with a bagatelle-table, and boxing gloves and foils _ad libitum_. and, sure enough, you might walk many a weary mile, or sail many a knot, without meeting twenty such happy faces as every evening surrounded our dinner-table, without beholding twenty such bumper glasses raised at once to the toast of her majesty the queen, and without hearing twenty such good songs, or five times twenty such yarns and original bons-mots, as you would at haslar medical mess. yet i must confess we partook in but a small degree indeed of the solemn quietude of wordsworth's-- "--party in a parlour cramm'd, some sipping punch, some sipping tea, but, as you by their faces see, all silent--and all damned." i do not deny that we were a little noisy at times, and that on several occasions, having eaten and drunken till we were filled, we rose up to dance, and consequently received a _polite_ message from the inspector whose house was adjoining, requesting us to "stop our _confounded_ row;" but then the old man was married, and no doubt his wife was at the bottom of it. duty was a thing that did not fall to the lot of us supers every day. we took it turn about, and hard enough work it used to be too. as soon as breakfast was over, the medical officer on duty would hie him away to the receiving-room, and seat himself at the large desk; and by-and-bye the cases would begin to pour in. first there would arrive, say three or four blue-jackets, with their bags under their arms, in charge of an assistant-surgeon, then a squad of marines, then more blue-jackets, then more red-coats, and so the game of _rouge-et-noir_ would go on during the day. the officer on duty has first to judge whether or not the case is one that can be admitted,--that is, which cannot be conveniently treated on board; he has then to appoint the patient a bed in a proper ward, and prescribe for him, almost invariably a bath and a couple of pills. besides, he has to enter the previous history of the case, verbatim, into each patient's case-book, and if the cases are numerous, and the assistant-surgeon who brings them has written an elaborate account of each disease, the duty-officer will have had his work cut out for him till dinner-time at least. before the hour of the patient's dinner, this gentleman has also to glance into each ward, to see if everything is right, and if there are any complaints. even when ten or eleven o'clock at night brings sleep and repose to others, his work is not yet over; he has one other visit to pay any time during the night through all his wards. then with dark-lantern and slippers you may meet him, gliding ghost-like along the corridors or passages, lingering at ward doors, listening on the staircases, smelling and snuffing, peeping and keeking, and endeavouring by eye, or ear, or nose, to detect the slightest irregularity among the patients or nurses, such as burning lights without orders, gambling by the light of the fire, or smoking. this visit paid, he may return to his virtuous cabin, and sleep as soundly as he chooses. very few of the old surgeons interfere with the duties of their assistants, but there _be_ men who seem to think you have merely come to the service to learn, not to practise your profession, and therefore they treat you as mere students, or at the best hobble-de-hoy doctors. of this class was dr gruff, a man whom i would back against the whole profession for caudle, clyster, castor-oil, or linseed poultice; but who, i rather suspect, never prescribed a dose of chiretta, santonin, or lithia-water in his life. he came to me one duty-day, in a great hurry, and so much excited that i judged he had received some grievous bodily ailment, or suffered some severe family bereavement. "well, sir," he cried; "i hear, sir, you have put a case of ulcer into the erysipelas ward." this remark, not partaking of the nature of question, i thought required no answer. "is it true, sir?--is it true?" he continued, getting blue and red. "it is, sir," was the reply. "and what do you mean by it, sir? what do you mean by it?" he exclaimed, waxing more and more wroth. "i thought, sir--" i began. "you thought, sir!" "yes, sir," continued i, my highland blood getting uppermost, "i _did_ think that, the case being one of ulcer of an _erysipelatous_ nature, i was--" "erysipelatous ulcer!" interrupting me. "oh!" said he, "that alters the case. why did you not say so at first? i beg your pardon;" and he trotted off again. "all right," thought i, "old gruff. i guess you are sorry you spoke." but although there are not wanting medical officers in the service who, on being promoted to staff-surgeon, appear to forget that ever they wore less than three stripes, and can keep company with no one under the rank of commander, i am happy to say they are few and far between, and every year getting more few and farther between. it is a fine thing to be appointed for, say three or four years to a home hospital; in fact, it is the assistant-surgeon's highest ambition. next, in point of comfort, would be an appointment at the naval hospital of malta, cape of good hope, or china. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ note . the acting assistant-surgeons are those who have not as yet served the probationary year, or been confirmed. they are liable to be dismissed without a court-martial. chapter six. afloat. a storm in biscay bay. a word on bass's beer. for the space of six weeks i lived in clover at haslar, and at the end of that time my appointment to a sea-going ship came. it was the pleasure of their lordships the commissioners, that i should take my passage to the cape of good hope in a frigate, which had lately been put in commission and was soon about to sail. arrived there, i was to be handed over to the flag-ship on that station for disposal, like so many stones of salt pork. on first entering the service every medical officer is sent for one commission (three to five years) to a foreign station; and it is certainly very proper too that the youngest and strongest men, rather than the oldest, should do the rough work of the service, and go to the most unhealthy stations. the frigate in which i was ordered passage was to sail from plymouth. to that town i was accordingly sent by train, and found the good ship in such a state of internal chaos--painters, carpenters, sail-makers, and sailors; armourers, blacksmiths, gunners, and tailors; every one engaged at his own trade, with such an utter disregard of order or regularity, while the decks were in such confusion, littered with tools, nails, shavings, ropes, and spars, among which i scrambled, and over which i tumbled, getting into everybody's way, and finding so little rest for the sole of my foot, that i was fain to beg a week's leave, and glad when i obtained it. on going on board again at the end of that time, a very different appearance presented itself; everything was in its proper place, order and regularity were everywhere. the decks were white and clean, the binnacles, the brass and mahogany work polished, the gear all taut, the ropes coiled, and the vessel herself sitting on the water saucy as the queen of ducks, with her pennant flying and her beautiful ensign floating gracefully astern. the gallant ship was ready for sea, had been unmoored, had made her trial trips, and was now anchored in the sound. from early morning to busy noon, and from noon till night, boats glided backwards and forwards between the ship and the shore, filled with the friends of those on board, or laden with wardroom and gunroom stores. among these might have been seen a shore-boat, rowed by two sturdy watermen, and having on board a large sea-chest, with a naval officer on top of it, grasping firmly a cremona in one hand and holding a hat-box in the other. the boat was filled with any number of smaller packages, among which were two black portmanteaus, warranted to be the best of leather, and containing the gentleman's dress and undress uniforms; these, however, turned out to be mere painted pasteboard, and in a very few months the cockroaches--careless, merry-hearted creatures--after eating up every morsel of them, turned their attention to the contents, on which they dined and supped for many days, till the officer's dress-coat was like a meal-sieve, and his pantaloons might have been conveniently need for a landing-net. this, however, was a matter of small consequence, for, contrary to the reiterated assurance of his feline friend, no one portion of this officer's uniform held out for a longer period than six months, the introduction of any part of his person into the corresponding portion of his raiment having become a matter of matutinal anxiety and distress, lest a solution of continuity in the garment might be the unfortunate result. about six o'clock on a beautiful wednesday evening, early in the month of may, our gallant and saucy frigate turned her bows seaward and slowly steamed away from amidst the fleet of little boats that--crowded with the unhappy wives and sweethearts of the sailors--had hung around us all the afternoon. puffing and blowing a great deal, and apparently panting to be out and away at sea, the good ship nevertheless left her anchorage but slowly, and withal reluctantly, her tears falling thick and fast on the quarter-deck as she went. the band was playing a slow and mournful air, by way of keeping up our spirits. _i_ had no friends to say farewell to, there was no tear-bedimmed eye to gaze after me until i faded in distance; so i stood on the poop, leaning over the bulwarks, after the fashion of vanderdecken, captain of the flying dutchman, and equally sad and sorrowful-looking. and what did i see from my elevated situation? a moving picture, a living panorama; a bright sky sprinkled with a few fleecy cloudlets, over a blue sea all in motion before a fresh breeze of wind; a fleet of little boats astern, filled with picturesquely dressed seamen and women waving handkerchiefs; the long breakwater lined with a dense crowd of sorrowing friends, each anxious to gain one last look of the dear face he may never see more. yonder is the grey-haired father, yonder the widowed mother, the affectionate brother, the loving sister, the fond wife, the beloved sweetheart,--all are there; and not a sigh that is sighed, not a tear that is shed, not a prayer that is breathed, but finds a response in the bosom of some loved one on board. to the right are green hills, people-clad likewise, while away in the distance the steeple of many a church "points the way to happier spheres," and on the flagstaff at the port-admiral's house is floating the signal "fare thee well." the band has ceased to play, the sailors have given their last ringing cheer, even the echoes of which have died away, and faintly down the wind comes the sound of the evening bells. the men are gathered in little groups on deck, and there is a tenderness in their landward gaze, and a pathos in their rough voices, that one would hardly expect to find. "yonder's my poll, jack," says one. "look, see! the poor lass is crying; blowed if i think i'll ever see her more." "there," says another, "is _my_ old girl on the breakwater, beside the old cove in the red nightcap." "that's my father, bill," answers a third. "god bless the dear old chap?" "good-bye, jean; good-bye, lass. ah! she won't hear me. blessed if i don't feel as if i could make a big baby of myself and cry outright." "oh! dick, dick," exclaims an honest-looking tar; "i see'd my poor wife tumble down; she had wee johnnie in her arms, and--and what will i do?" "keep up your heart, to be sure," answers a tall, rough son of a gun. "there, she has righted again, only a bit of a swoon ye see. i've got neither sister, wife, nor mother, so surely it's _me_ that ought to be making a noodle of myself; but where's the use?" an hour or two later we were steaming across channel, with nothing visible but the blue sea all before us, and the chalky cliffs of cornwall far behind, with the rosy blush of the setting sun lingering on their summits. then the light faded from the sky, the gloaming star shone out in the east, big waves began to tumble in, and the night breeze blew cold and chill from off the broad atlantic ocean. tired and dull, weary and sad, i went below to the wardroom and seated myself on a rocking chair. it was now that i began to feel the discomfort of not having a cabin. being merely a supernumerary or passenger, such a luxury was of course out of the question, even had i been an admiral. i was to have a screen berth, or what a landsman would call a canvas tent, on the main or fighting deck, but as yet it was not rigged. had i never been to sea before, i would have now felt very wretched indeed; but having roughed it in greenland and davis straits in small whaling brigs, i had got over the weakness of sea-sickness; yet notwithstanding i felt all the thorough prostration both of mind and body, which the first twenty-four hours at sea often produces in the oldest and best of sailors, so that i was only too happy when i at last found myself within canvas. by next morning the wind had freshened, and when i turned out i found that the steam had been turned off, and that we were bowling along before a ten-knot breeze. all that day the wind blew strongly from the n.n.e., and increased as night came on to a regular gale of wind. i had seen some wild weather in the greenland ocean, but never anything before, nor since, to equal the violence of the storm on that dreadful night, in the bay of biscay. we were running dead before the wind at twelve o'clock, when the gale was at its worst, and when the order to light fires and get up steam had been given. just then we were making fourteen knots, with only a foresail, a fore-topsail, and main-topsail, the latter two close-reefed. i was awakened by a terrific noise on deck, and i shall not soon forget that awakening. the ship was leaking badly both at the ports and scupper-holes; so that the maindeck all around was flooded with water, which lifted my big chest every time the roll of the vessel allowed it to flow towards it. to say the ship was rolling would express but poorly the indescribably disagreeable wallowing motion of the frigate, while men were staggering with anxious faces from gun to gun, seeing that the lashings were all secure; so great was the strain on the cable-like ropes that kept them in their places. the shot had got loose from the racks, and were having a small cannonade on their own account, to the no small consternation of the men whose duty it was to re-secure them. it was literally sea without and sea within, for the green waves were pouring down the main hatchway, adding to the amount of water already _below_, where the chairs and other articles of domestic utility were all afloat and making voyages of discovery from one officer's cabin to another. on the upper deck all was darkness, confusion, and danger, for both the fore and main-topsails had been carried away at the same time, reducing us to one sail--the foresail. the noise and crackling of the riven canvas, mingling with the continuous roar of the storm, were at times increased by the rattle of thunder and the rush of rain-drops, while the lightning played continually around the slippery masts and cordage. about one o'clock, a large ship, apparently unmanageable, was dimly seen for one moment close aboard of us--had we come into collision the consequences must have been dreadful;--and thus for two long hours, _till steam was got up_, did we fly before the gale, after which the danger was comparatively small. having spent its fury, having in fact blown itself out of breath, the wind next day retired to its cave, and the waves got smaller and beautifully less, till peace and quietness once more reigned around us. going on deck one morning i found we were anchored under the very shadow of a steep rock, and not far from a pretty little town at the foot of a high mountain, which was itself covered to the top with trees and verdure, with the white walls of many a quaint-looking edifice peeping through the green--boats, laden with fruit and fish and turtle, surrounded the ship. the island of madeira and town, of funchal. as there was no pier, we had to land among the stones. the principal amusement of english residents here seems to be lounging about, cheroot in mouth, beneath the rows of trees that droop over the pavements, getting carried about in portable hammocks, and walking or riding (i rode, and, not being able to get my horse to move at a suitable pace, i looked behind, and found the boy from whom i had hired him sticking like a leech to my animal's tail, nor would he be shaken off--nor could the horse be induced to kick him off; this is the custom of the funchalites, and a funny one it is) to the top of the mountain, for the pleasure of coming down in a sleigh, a distance of two miles, in twice as many minutes, while the least deviation from the path would result in a terrible smash against the wall of either side, but i never heard of any such accident occurring. three days at madeira, and up anchor again; our next place of call being saint helena. every one has heard of the gentleman who wanted to conquer the world but couldn't, who tried to beat the british but didn't, who staked his last crown at a game of _loo_, and losing fled, and fleeing was chased, and being chased was caught and chained by the leg, like an obstreperous game-cock, to a rock somewhere in the middle of the sea, on which he stood night and day for years, with his arms folded across his chest, and his cocked hat wrong on, a warning to the unco-ambitious. the rock was saint helena, and a very beautiful rock it is too, hill and dell and thriving town, its mountain-sides tilled and its straths and glens containing many a fertile little farm. it is the duty of every one who touches the shores of this far-famed island to make a pilgrimage to longwood, the burial-place of the "great man." i have no intention of describing this pilgrimage, for this has been done by dozens before my time, or, if not, it ought to have been: i shall merely add a very noticeable fact, which others may not perchance have observed--_both sides_ of the road all the way to the tomb are strewn with _bass's beer-bottles_, empty of course, and at the grave itself there are hogsheads of them; and the same is the case at every place which john bull has visited, or where english foot has ever trodden. the rule holds good all over the world; and in the indian ocean, whenever i found an uninhabited island, or even reef which at some future day would be an island, if i did not likewise find an empty beer-bottle, i at once took possession in the name of queen victoria, giving three hips! and one hurrah! thrice, and singing "for he's a jolly good fellow," without any very distinct notion as to who _was_ the jolly fellow; also adding more decidedly "which nobody can deny"--there being no one on the island to deny it. england has in this way acquired much additional territory at my hands, without my having as yet received any very substantial recompense for my services. chapter seven. the modern roderick random. half a servant. a pretty picture. the duties of the assistant-surgeon--the modern roderick random--on board a line-of-battle ship are seldom very onerous in time of peace, and often not worth mentioning. suppose, for example, the reader is that officer. at five bells--half-past six--in the morning, if you happen to be a light sleeper, you will be sensible of some one gliding silently into your cabin, rifling your pockets, and extracting your watch, your money, and other your trinkets; but do not jump out of bed, pray, with the intention of collaring him; it is no thief--only your servant. formerly this official used to be a marine, with whom on joining your ship you bargained in the following manner. the marine walked up to you and touched his front hair, saying at the same time,-- "_i_ don't mind looking arter you, sir," or "i'll do for you, sir." on which you would reply,-- "all right! what's your name?" and he would answer "cheeks," or whatever his name might be. (cheeks, that is the real cheeks, being a sort of visionary soldier--a phantom marine--and very useful at times, answering in fact to the nobody of higher quarters, who is to blame for so many things,--"nobody is to blame," and "cheeks is to blame," being synonymous sentences.) now-a-days government kindly allows each commissioned officer one half of a servant, or one whole one between two officers, which, at times, is found to be rather an awkward arrangement; as, for instance, you and, say, the lieutenant of marines, have each the half of the same servant, and you wish your half to go on shore with a message, and the lieutenant requires his half to remain on board: the question then comes to be one which only the wisdom of solomon could solve, in the same way that alexander the great loosed the gordian knot. your servant, then, on entering your cabin in the morning, carefully and quietly deposits the contents of your pockets on your table, and, taking all your clothes and your boots in his arms, silently flits from view, and shortly after re-enters, having in the interval neatly folded and brushed them. you are just turning round to go to sleep again, when-- "six bells, sir, please," remarks your man, laying his hand on your elbow, and giving you a gentle shake to insure your resuscitation, and which will generally have the effect of causing you to spring at once from your cot, perhaps in your hurry nearly upsetting the cup of delicious ship's cocoa which he has kindly saved to you from his own breakfast--a no small sacrifice either, if you bear in mind that his own allowance is by no means very large, and that his breakfast consists of cocoa and biscuits alone--these last too often containing more weevils than flour. as you hurry into your bath, your servant coolly informs you-- "plenty of time, sir. doctor himself hain't turned out yet." "then," you inquire, "it isn't six bells?" "not a bit on it, sir," he replies; "wants the quarter." the rogue has lied to get you up. at seven o'clock exactly you make your way forward to the sick-bay, on the lower deck at the ship's bows. now, this making your way forward isn't by any means such an easy task as one might imagine; for at that hour the deck is swarming with the men at their toilet, stripped to the waist, every man at his tub, lathering, splashing, scrubbing and rubbing, talking, laughing, joking, singing, sweating, and swearing. finding your way obstructed, you venture to touch one mildly on the bare back, as a hint to move aside and let you pass; the man immediately damns your eyes, then begs pardon, and says he thought it was bill "at his lark again." another who is bending down over his tub you touch more firmly on the _os innominatum_, and ask him in a free and easy sort of tone to "slue round there." he "slues round," very quickly too, but unfortunately in the wrong direction, and ten to one capsizes you in a tub of dirty soapsuds. having picked yourself up, you pursue your journey, and sing out as a general sort of warning-- for the benefit of those happy individuals who never saw, or had to eat, weevils, i may here state that they are small beetles of the exact size and shape of the common woodlouse, and that the taste is rather insipid, with a slight flavour of boiled beans. never have tasted the woodlouse, but should think the flavour would be quite similar. "gangway there, lads," which causes at least a dozen of these worthies to pass such ironical remarks to their companions as-- "out of the doctor's way there, tom." "let the gentleman pass, can't you, jack?" "port your helm, mat; the doctor wants you to." "round with your stern, bill; the surgeon's _mate_ is a passing." "kick that donkey jones out of the doctor's road,"--while at the same time it is always the speaker himself who is in the way. at last, however, you reach the sick-bay in safety, and retire within the screen. here, if a strict service man, you will find the surgeon already seated; and presently the other assistant enters, and the work is begun. there is a sick-bay man, or dispenser, and a sick-bay cook, attached to the medical department. the surgeon generally does the brain-work, and the assistants the finger-work; and, to their shame be it spoken, there are some surgeons too proud to consult their younger brethren, whom they treat as assistant-drudges, not assistant-surgeons. at eight o'clock--before or after,--the work is over, and you are off to breakfast. at nine o'clock the drum beats, when every one, not otherwise engaged, is required to muster on the quarter-deck, every officer as he comes up lifting his cap, not to the captain, but to the queen. after inspection the parson reads prayers; you are then free to write, or read, or anything else in reason you choose; and, if in harbour, you may go on shore--boats leaving the ship at regular hours for the convenience of the officers--always premising that one medical man be left on board, in case of accident. in most foreign ports where a ship may be lying, there is no want of both pleasure and excitement on shore. take for example the little town of simon's, about twenty miles from cape town, with a population of not less than four thousand of englishmen, dutch, malays, caffres, and hottentots. the bay is large, and almost landlocked. the little white town is built along the foot of a lofty mountain. beautiful walks can be had in every direction, along the hard sandy sea-beach, over the mountains and on to extensive table-lands, or away up into dark rocky dingles and heath-clad glens. nothing can surpass the beauty of the scenery, or the gorgeous loveliness of the wild heaths and geraniums everywhere abounding. there is a good hotel and billiard-room; and you can shoot where, when, and what you please-- monkeys, pigeons, rock rabbits, wild ducks, or cobra-di-capellas. if you long for more society, or want to see life, get a day or two days' leave. rise at five o'clock; the morning will be lovely and clear, with the mist rising from its flowery bed on the mountain's brow, and the sun, large and red, entering on a sky to which nor pen nor pencil could do justice. the cart is waiting for you at the hotel, with an awning spread above. jump in: crack goes the long caffre whip; away with a plunge and a jerk go the three pairs of caffre horses, and along the sea-shore you dash, with the cool sea-breeze in your face, and the water, green and clear, rippling up over the horses' feet; then, amid such scenery, with such exhilarating weather, in such a life-giving climate, if you don't feel a glow of pleasure that will send the blood tingling through your veins, from the points of your ten toes to the extreme end of your eyelashes, there must be something radically and constitutionally wrong with you, and the sooner you go on board and dose yourself with calomel and jalap the better. arrived at cape town, a few introductions will simply throw the whole city at your command, and all it contains. i do not intend this as a complete sketch of your trip, or i would have mentioned some of the many beautiful spots and places of interest you pass on the road--rathfeldas for example, a hotel halfway, a house buried in sweetness; and the country round about, with its dark waving forests, its fruitful fields and wide-spreading vineyards, where the grape seems to grow almost without cultivation; its comfortable farm-houses; and above all its people, kind, generous, and hospitable as the country is prolific. so you see, dear reader, a navy surgeon's life hath its pleasures. ah, indeed, it hath! and sorry i am to add, its sufferings too; for a few pages farther on the picture must change: if we get the lights we must needs take the shadows also. chapter eight. a good dinner. enemy on the port bow. man the life-boat. we will suppose that the reader still occupies the position of assistant-surgeon in a crack frigate or saucy line-of-battle ship. if you go on shore for a walk in the forenoon you may return to lunch at twelve; or if you have extended your ramble far into the country, or gone to visit a friend or lady-love--though for the latter the gloaming hour is to be preferred--you will in all probability have succeeded in establishing an appetite by half-past five, when the officers' dinner-boat leaves the pier. now, i believe there are few people in the world to whom a good dinner does not prove an attraction, and this is what in a large ship one is always pretty sure of, more especially on guest-nights, which are evenings set apart--one every week--for the entertainment of the officers' friends, one or more of whom any officer may invite, by previously letting the mess-caterer know of his intention. the mess-caterer is the officer who has been elected to superintend the victualling, as the wine-caterer does the liquor department, and a by-no-means-enviable position it is, and consequently it is for ever changing hands. sailors are proverbial growlers, and, indeed, a certain amount of growling is, and ought to be, permitted in every mess; but it is scarcely fair for an officer, because his breakfast does not please him, or if he can't get butter to his cheese after dinner, to launch forth his indignation at the poor mess-caterer, who most likely is doing all he can to please. these growlers too never speak right out or directly to the point. it is all under-the-table stabbing. "such and such a ship that i was in," says growler first, "and such and such a mess--" "oh, by george!" says growler second, "_i_ knew that ship; that was a mess, and no mistake?" "why, yes," replies number one, "the lunch we got there was better than the dinner we have in this old clothes-basket." on guest-nights your friend sits beside yourself, of course, and you attend to his corporeal wants. one of the nicest things about the service, in my opinion, is the having the band every day at dinner; then too everything is so orderly; with our president and vice-president, it is quite like a pleasure party every evening; so that altogether the dinner, while in harbour, comes to be the great event of the day. and after the cloth has been removed, and the president, with a preliminary rap on the table to draw attention, has given the only toast of the evening, the queen, and due honour has been paid thereto, and the bandmaster, who has been keeking in at the door every minute for the last ten, that he might not make a mistake in the time, has played "god save the queen," and returned again to waltzes, quadrilles, or selections from operas,--then it is very pleasant and delightful to loll over our walnuts and wine, and half-dream away the half-hour till coffee is served. then, to be sure, that little cigar in our canvas smoking-room outside the wardroom door, though the last, is by no means the least pleasant part of the _dejeuner_. for my own part, i enjoy the succeeding hour or so as much as any: when, reclining in an easy chair, in a quiet corner, i can sip my tea, and enjoy my favourite author to my heart's content. you must spare half an hour, however, to pay your last visit to the sick; but this will only tend to make you appreciate your ease all the more when you have done. so the evening wears away, and by ten o'clock you will probably just be sufficiently tired to enjoy thoroughly your little swing-cot and your cool white sheets. at sea, luncheon, or tiffin, is dispensed with, and you dine at half-past two. not much difference in the quality of viands after all, for now-a-days everything worth eating can be procured, in hermetically sealed tins, capable of remaining fresh for any length of time. there is one little bit of the routine of the service, which at first one may consider a hardship. you are probably enjoying your deepest, sweetest sleep, rocked in the cradle of the deep, and gently swaying to and fro in your little cot; you had turned in with the delicious consciousness of safety, for well you knew that the ship was far away at sea, far from rock or reef or deadly shoal, and that the night was clear and collision very improbable, so you are slumbering like a babe on its mother's breast--as you are for that matter--for the second night-watch is half spent; when, mingling confusedly with your dreams, comes the roll of the drum; you start and listen. there is a moment's pause, when birr-r-r-r it goes again, and as you spring from your couch you hear it the third time. and now you can distinguish the shouts of officers and petty officers, high over the din of the trampling of many feet, of the battening down of hatches, of the unmooring of great guns, and of heavy ropes and bars falling on the deck: then succeeds a dead silence, soon broken by the voice of the commander thundering, "enemy on the port bow;" and then, and not till then, do you know it is no real engagement, but the monthly night-quarters. and you can't help feeling sorry there isn't a real enemy on the port bow, or either bow, as you hurry away to the cockpit, with the guns rattling all the while overhead, as if a real live thunderstorm were being taken on board, and was objecting to be stowed away. so you lay out your instruments, your sponges, your bottles of wine, and your buckets of water, and, seating yourself in the midst, begin to read `midsummer night's dream,' ready at a moment's notice to amputate the leg of any man on board, whether captain, cook, or cabin-boy. another nice little amusement the officer of the watch may give himself on fine clear nights is to set fire to and let go the lifebuoy, at the same time singing out at the top of his voice, "man overboard." a boatswain's mate at once repeats the call, and vociferates down the main hatchway, "life-boat's crew a-ho-oy!" in our navy a few short but expressive moments of silence ever precede the battle, that both officers and men may hold communion with their god. the men belonging to this boat, who have been lying here and there asleep but dressed, quickly tumble up the ladder pell-mell; there is a rattling of oars heard, and the creaking of pulleys, then a splash in the water alongside, the boat darts away from the ship like an arrow from a bow, and the crew, rowing towards the blazing buoy, save the life of the unhappy man, cheeks the marine. and thus do british sailors rule the waves and keep old neptune in his own place. chapter nine. containing--if not the whole--nothing but the truth. if the disposing, in the service, of even a ship-load of assistant-surgeons, is considered a matter of small moment, my disposal, after reaching the cape of good hope, needs but small comment. i was very soon appointed to take charge of a gunboat, in lieu of a gentleman who was sent to the naval hospital of simon's town, to fill a death vacancy--for the navy as well as nature abhors a vacuum. i had seen the bright side of the service, i was now to have my turn of the dark; i had enjoyed life on board a crack frigate, i was now to rough it in a gunboat. the east coast of africa was to be our cruising ground, and our ship a pigmy steamer, with plenty fore-and-aft about her, but nothing else; in fact, she was euclid's definition of a line to a t, length without breadth, and small enough to have done "excellently well" as a gravesend tug-boat. her teeth were five: namely, one gigantic cannon, a -pounder, as front tooth; on each side a brass howitzer; and flanking these, two canine tusks in shape of a couple of -pounder armstrongs. with this armament we were to lord it with a high hand over the indian ocean; carry fire and sword, or, failing sword, the cutlass, into the very heart of slavery's dominions; the arabs should tremble at the roar of our guns and the thunder of our bursting shells, while the slaves should clank their chains in joyful anticipation of our coming; and best of all, we--the officers--should fill our pockets with prize-money to spend when we again reached the shores of merry england. unfortunately, this last premeditation was the only one which sustained disappointment, for, our little craft being tender to the flag-ship of the station, all our hard-earned prize-money had to be equally shared with her officers and crew, which reduced the shares to fewer pence each than they otherwise would have been pounds, and which was a burning shame. it was the cape winter when i joined the gunboat. the hills were covered with purple and green, the air was deliciously cool, and the far-away mountain-tops were clad in virgin snow. it was twelve o'clock noon when i took my traps on board, and found my new messmates seated around the table at tiffin. the gunroom, called the wardroom by courtesy--for the after cabin was occupied by the lieutenant commanding--was a little morsel of an apartment, which the table and five cane-bottomed chairs entirely filled. the officers were five-- namely, a little round-faced, dimple-cheeked, good-natured fellow, who was our second-master; a tall and rather awkward-looking young gentleman, our midshipman; a lean, pert, and withal diminutive youth, brimful of his own importance, our assistant-paymaster; a fair-haired, bright-eyed, laughing boy from cornwall, our sub-lieutenant; and a "wee wee man," dapper, clean, and tidy, our engineer, admitted to this mess because he was so thorough an exception to his class, which is celebrated more for the unctuosity of its outer than for the smoothness of its inner man. "come along, old fellow," said our navigator, addressing me as i entered the messroom, bobbing and bowing to evade fracture of the cranium by coming into collision with the transverse beams of the deck above--"come along and join us, we don't dine till four." "and precious little to dine upon," said the officer on his right. "steward, let us have the rum," [note ] cried the first speaker. and thus addressed, the steward shuffled in, bearing in his hand a black bottle, and apparently in imminent danger of choking himself on a large mouthful of bread and butter. this functionary's dress was remarkable rather for its simplicity than its purity, consisting merely of a pair of dirty canvas pants, a pair of purser's shoes--innocent as yet of blacking--and a greasy flannel shirt. but, indeed, uniform seemed to be the exception, and not the rule, of the mess, for, while one wore a blue serge jacket, another was arrayed in white linen, and the rest had neither jacket nor vest. the table was guiltless of a cloth, and littered with beer-bottles, biscuits, onions, sardines, and pats of butter. "look out there, waddles!" exclaimed the sub-lieutenant; "that beggar dawson is having his own whack o' grog and everybody else's." "dang it! i'll have _my_ tot to-day, i know," said the assistant-paymaster, snatching the bottle from dawson, and helping himself to a very liberal allowance of the ruby fluid. "what a cheek the fellow's got!" cried the midshipman, snatching the glass from the table and bolting the contents at a gulp, adding, with a gasp of satisfaction as he put down the empty tumbler, "the chap thinks nobody's got a soul to be saved but himself." "soul or no soul," replied the youthful man of money as he gazed disconsolately at the empty glass, "my _spirit's_ gone." "blessed," said the engineer, shaking the black bottle, "if you devils have left me a drain! see if i don't look out for a to-morrow." "where's the doctor's grog?" cried the sub-lieutenant. "ay, where's the doctor's?" said another. "where is the doctor's?" said a third. and they all said "where is the doctor's?" and echo answered "where?" "steward!" said the middy. "ay, ay, sir." "see if that beggarly bumboat-man is alongside, and get me another pat of butter and some soft tack; get the grub first, then tell him i'll pay to-morrow." these and such like scraps of conversation began to give me a little insight into the kind of mess i had joined and the character of my future messmates. "steward," said i, "show me my cabin." he did so; indeed, he hadn't far to go. it was the aftermost, and consequently the smallest, although i _ought_ to have had my choice. it was the most miserable little box i ever reposed in. had i owned such a place on shore, i _might_ have been induced to keep rabbits in it, or guinea-pigs, but certainly not pigeons. its length was barely six feet, its width four above my cot and two below, and it was minus sufficient standing-room for any ordinary-sized sailor; it was, indeed, a cabin for a commodore--i mean commodore nutt--and was ventilated by a scuttle seven inches in diameter, which could only be removed in harbour, and below which, when we first went to sea, i was fain to hang a leather hat-box to catch the water; unfortunately the bottom rotted out, and i was then at the mercy of the waves. my cabin, or rather--to stick to the plain unvarnished truth--my burrow, was alive with scorpions, cockroaches, ants, and other "crawlin' ferlies." "that e'en to name would be unlawfu'." my dispensary was off the steerage, and sister-cabin to the pantry. to it i gained access by a species of crab-walking, squeezing myself past a large brass pump, and edging my body in sideways. the sick came one by one to the dispensary door, and there i saw and treated each case as it arrived, dressed the wounds and bruises and putrefying sores, and bandaged the bad legs. there was no sick-berth attendant; to be sure the lieutenant-in-command, at my request, told off "a little cabin-boy" for my especial use. i had no cause for delectation on such an acquisition, by no means; he was not a model cabin-boy like what you see in theatres, and i believe will never become an admiral. he managed at times to wash out the dispensary, or gather cockroaches, and make the poultices--only in doing the first he broke the bottles, and in performing the last duty he either let the poultice burn or put salt in it; and, finally, he smashed my pot, and i kicked him forward, and demanded another. _he_ was slightly better, only he was seldom visible; and when i set him to do anything, he at once went off into a sweet slumber; so i kicked him forward too, and had in despair to become my own menial. in both dispensary and burrow it was quite a difficult business to prevent everything going to speedy destruction. the best portions of my uniform got eaten by cockroaches or moulded by damp, while my instruments required cleaning every morning, and even that did not keep rust at bay. imagine yourself dear reader, in any of the following interesting positions:-- very thirsty, and nothing but boiling hot newly distilled water to drink; or wishing a cool bath of a morning, and finding the water in your can only a little short of degrees fahrenheit. to find, when you awake, a couple of cockroaches, two inches in length, busy picking your teeth. to find one in a state of decay in the mustard-pot. to have to arrange all the droppings and eggs of these interesting creatures on the edge of your plate, previous to eating your soup. to have to beat out the dust and weevils from every square inch of biscuit before putting it in your mouth. to be looking for a book and put your hand on a full-grown scaly scorpion. nice sensation--the animal twining round your finger, or running up your sleeve. _denouement_--cracking him under foot-- full-flavoured bouquet--joy at escaping a sting. you are enjoying your dinner, but have been for some time sensible of a strange titillating feeling about the region of your ankle; you look down at last to find a centipede on your sock, with his fifty hind-legs--you thank god not his fore fifty--abutting on to your shin. _tableau_-- green and red light from the eyes of the many-legged; horror of yourself as you wait till he thinks proper to "move on." to awake in the morning, and find a large and healthy-looking tarantula squatting on your pillow within ten inches of your nose, with his basilisk eyes fixed on yours, and apparently saying, "you're only just awake, are you? i've been sitting here all the morning watching you." you know if you move he'll bite you, somewhere; and if he _does_ bite you, you'll go mad and dance _ad libitum_; so you twist your mouth in the opposite direction and ejaculate-- "steward!" but the steward does not come--in fact he is forward, seeing after the breakfast. meanwhile the gentleman on the pillow is moving his horizontal mandibles in a most threatening manner, and just as he makes a rush for your nose you tumble out of bed with a shriek; and, if a very nervous person, probably run on deck in your shirt. or, to fall asleep under the following circumstances: the bulkheads, all around, black with cock-and-hen-roaches, a few of which are engaged cropping your toe-nails, or running off with little bits of the skin of your calves; bugs in the crevices of your cot, a flea tickling the sole of your foot, a troop of ants carrying a dead cockroach over your pillow, lively mosquitoes attacking you everywhere, hammer-legged flies occasionally settling on your nose, rats running in and rats running out, your lamp just going out, and the delicious certainty that an indefinite number of earwigs and scorpions, besides two centipedes and a tarantula, are hiding themselves somewhere in your cabin. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ note . officers, as well as men, are allowed one half-gill of rum daily, with this difference,--the former pay for theirs, while the latter do not. chapter ten. round the cape and up the 'bique. slaver-hunting. it was a dark-grey cloudy forenoon when we "up anchor" and sailed from simon's bay. frequent squalls whitened the water, and there was every indication of our being about to have dirty weather; and the tokens told no lies. to our little craft, however, the foul weather that followed seemed to be a matter of very little moment; for, when the wind or waves were in any way high, she kept snugly below water, evidently thinking more of her own convenience than our comfort, for such a procedure on her part necessitated our leading a sort of amphibious existence, better suited to the tastes of frogs than human beings. our beds too, or matresses, became converted into gigantic poultices, in which we nightly steamed, like as many porkers newly shaven. judging from the amount of salt which got encrusted on our skins, there was little need to fear danger, we were well preserved--so much so indeed, that, but for the constant use of the matutinal freshwater bath, we would doubtless have shared the fate of lot's wife and been turned into pillars of salt. after being a few days at sea the wind began to moderate, and finally died away; and instead thereof we had thunderstorms and waves, which, if not so big as mountains, would certainly have made pretty large hills. many a night did we linger on deck till well nigh morning, entranced by the sublime beauty and terrible grandeur of those thunderstorms. the roar and rattle of heaven's artillery; the incessant _floods_ of lightning--crimson, blue, or white; our little craft hanging by the bows to the crest of each huge inky billow, or next moment buried in the valley of the waves, with a wall of black waters on every side; the wet deck, the slippery shrouds, and the faces of the men holding on to the ropes and appearing so strangely pale in the electric light; i see the whole picture even now as i write--a picture, indeed, that can never, never fade from my memory. our cruising "ground" lay between the island and town of mozambique in the south, to about magadoxa, some seven or eight degrees north of the equator. nearly the whole of the slave-trade is carried on by the arabs, one or two spaniards sometimes engaging in it likewise. the slaves are brought from the far interior of south africa, where they can be purchased for a small bag of rice each. they are taken down in chained gangs to the coast, and there in some secluded bay the dhows lie, waiting to take them on board and convey them to the slave-mart at zanzibar, to which place arab merchants come from the most distant parts of arabia and persia to buy them. dhows are vessels with one or two masts, and a corresponding number of large sails, and of a very peculiar construction, being shaped somewhat like a short or blucher boot, the high part of the boot representing the poop. they have a thatched roof over the deck, the projecting eaves of which render boarding exceedingly difficult to an enemy. sometimes, on rounding the corner of a lagoon island, we would quietly and unexpectedly steam into the midst of a fleet of thirty to forty of these queer-looking vessels, very much to our own satisfaction, and their intense consternation. imagine a cat popping down among as many mice, and you will be able to form some idea of the scramble that followed. however, by dint of steaming here and there, and expending a great deal of shot and shell, we generally managed to keep them together as a dog would a flock of sheep, until we examined all their papers with the aid of our interpreter, and probably picked out a prize. i wish i could say the prizes were anything like numerous; for perhaps one-half of all the vessels we board are illicit slaveholders, and yet we cannot lay a finger on them. one may well ask why? it has been said, and it is generally believed in england, that our cruisers are sweeping the indian ocean of slavers, and stamping out the curse. but the truth is very different, and all that we are doing, or able at present to do, is but to pull an occasional hair from the hoary locks of the fiend slavery. this can be proved from the return-sheets, which every cruiser sends home, of the number of vessels boarded, generally averaging one thousand yearly to each man-o'-war, of which the half at least have slaves or slave-irons on board; but only two, or at most three, of these will become prizes. the reason of this will easily be understood, when the reader is informed, that the sultan of zanzibar has liberty to take any number of slaves from any one portion of his dominions to another: these are called household slaves; and, as his dominions stretch nearly all along the eastern shores of africa, it is only necessary for the slave-dealer to get his sanction and seal to his papers in order to steer clear of british law. this, in almost every case, can be accomplished by means of a bribe. so slavery flourishes, the sultan draws a good fat revenue from it, and the portuguese--no great friends to us at any time--laugh and wink to see john bull paying his thousands yearly for next to nothing. supposing we liberate even two thousand slaves a year, which i am not sure we do however, there are on the lowest estimate six hundred slaves bought and sold daily in zanzibar mart; two hundred and nineteen thousand in a twelvemonth; and, of our two thousand that are set free in zanzibar, most, if not all, by-and-bye, become bondsmen again. i am not an advocate for slavery, and would like to see a wholesale raid made against it, but i do not believe in the retail system; selling freedom in pennyworths, and spending millions in doing it, is very like burning a penny candle in seeking for a cent. yet i sincerely believe, that there is more good done to the spread of civilisation and religion in one year, by the slave-traffic, than all our missionaries can do in a hundred. don't open your eyes and smile incredulously, intelligent reader; we live in an age when every question is looked at on both sides, and why should not this? what becomes of the hundreds of thousands of slaves that are taken from africa? they are sold to the arabs--that wonderful race, who have been second only to christians in the good they have done to civilisation; they are taken from a state of degradation, bestiality, and wretchedness, worse by far than that of the wild beasts, and from a part of the country too that is almost unfit to live in, and carried to more favoured lands, spread over the sunny shores of fertile persia and arabia, fed and clothed and cared for; after a few years of faithful service they are even called sons and feed at their master's table--taught all the trades and useful arts, besides the mahommedan religion, which is certainly better than none--and, above all, have a better chance given them of one day hearing and learning the beautiful tenets of christianity, the religion of love. i have met with few slaves who after a few years did not say, "praised be allah for the good day i was take from me coontry!" and whose only wish to return was, that they might bring away some aged parent, or beloved sister, from the dark cheerless home of their infancy. means and measures much more energetic must be brought into action if the stronghold of slavedom is to be stormed, and, if not, it were better to leave it alone. "if the work be of god ye cannot overthrow it; lest haply ye be found to fight even against god." chapter eleven. an unlucky ship. the days when we went gipsying. inambane. quilp the pilot and lamoo. it might have been that our vessel was launched on a friday, or sailed on a friday; or whether it was owing to our carrying the devil on board of us in shape of a big jet-black cat, and for whom the lifebuoy was thrice let go, and boats lowered in order to save his infernal majesty from a watery grave; but whatever was the reason, she was certainly a most unlucky ship from first to last; for during a cruise of eighteen months, four times did we run aground on dangerous reefs, twice were we on fire--once having had to scuttle the decks--once we sprung a bad leak and were nearly foundering, several times we narrowly escaped the same speedy termination to our cruise by being taken aback, while, compared to our smaller dangers or lesser perils, saint paul's adventures--as a yankee would express it--wern't a circumstance. on the other hand, we were amply repaid by the many beautiful spots we visited; the lovely wooded creeks where the slave-dhows played at hide and seek with us, and the natural harbours, at times surrounded by scenery so sweetly beautiful and so charmingly solitary, that, if fairies still linger on this earth, one must think they would choose just such places as these for their moonlight revels. then there were so many little towns--portuguese settlements--to be visited, for the portuguese have spread themselves, after the manner of wild strawberries, all round the coast of africa, from sierra leone on the west to zanzibar on the east. there was as much sameness about these settlements as about our visits to them: a few houses--more like tents-- built on the sand (it does seem funny to see sofas, chairs, and the piano itself standing among the deep soft sand); a fort, the guns of which, if fired, would bring down the walls; a few white-jacketed swarthy-looking soldiers; a very polite governor, brimful of hospitality and broken english; and a good dinner, winding up with punch of schnapps. memorable too are the pleasant boating excursions we had on the calm bosom of the indian ocean. armed boats used to be detached to cruise for three or four weeks at a time in quest of prizes, at the end of which time they were picked up at some place of rendezvous. by day we sailed about the coast and around the small wooded islets, where dhows might lurk, only landing in sheltered nooks to cook and eat our food. our provisions were ship's, but at times we drove great bargains with the naked natives for fowls and eggs and goats; then would we make delicious soups, rich ragouts, and curries fit for the king of the cannibal islands. fruit too we had in plenty, and the best of oysters for the gathering, with iguana most succulent of lizards, occasionally fried flying-fish, or delicate morsels of shark, skip-jack, or devilled dolphin, with a glass of prime rum to wash the whole down, and three grains of quinine to charm away the fever. there was, too, about these expeditions, an air of gipsying that was quite pleasant. to be sure our beds were a little hard, but we did not mind that; while clad in our blanket-suits, and covered with a boat-sail, we could defy the dew. sleep, or rather the want of sleep, we seldom had to complain of, for the blue star-lit sky above us, the gentle rising and falling of the anchored boat, the lip-lipping of the water, and the sighing sound of the wind through the great forest near us--all tended to woo us to sweetest slumber. sometimes we would make long excursions up the rivers of africa, combining business with pleasure, enjoying the trip, and at the same time gleaning some useful information regarding slave or slave-ship. the following sketch concerning one or two of these may tend to show, that a man does not take leave of all enjoyment, when his ship leaves the chalky cliffs of old england. our anchor was dropped outside the bar of inambane river; the grating noise of the chain as it rattled through the hawse-hole awoke me, and i soon after went on deck. it was just six o'clock and a beautiful clear morning, with the sun rising red and rosy--like a portly gentleman getting up from his wine--and smiling over the sea in quite a pleasant sort of way. so, as both neptune and sol seemed propitious, the commander, our second-master, and myself made up our minds to visit the little town and fort of inambane, about forty--we thought fifteen--miles up the river. but breakfast had to be prepared and eaten, the magazine and arms got into the boat, besides a day's provisions, with rum and quinine to be stowed away, so that the sun had got a good way up the sky, and now looked more like a portly gentleman whose dinner had disagreed, before we had got fairly under way and left the ship's side. never was forenoon brighter or fairer, only one or two snowy banks of cloud interrupting the blue of the sky, while the river, miles broad, stole silently seaward, unruffled by wave or wavelet, so that the hearts of both men and officers were light as the air they breathed was pure. the men, bending cheerfully on their oars, sang snatches of dibdin-- neptune's poet laureate; and we, tired of talking, reclined astern, gazing with half-shut eyes on the round undulating hills, that, covered with low mangrove-trees and large exotics, formed the banks of the river. we passed numerous small wooded islands and elevated sandbanks, on the edges of which whole regiments of long-legged birds waded about in search of food, or, starting at our approach, flew over our heads in indian file, their bright scarlet-and-white plumage showing prettily against the blue of the sky. shoals of turtle floated past, and hundreds of rainbow-coloured jelly-fishes, while, farther off, many large black bodies--the backs of hippopotami--moved on the surface of the water, or anon disappeared with a sullen plash. saving these sounds and the dip of our own oars, all was still, the silence of the desert reigned around us, the quiet of a newly created world. the forenoon wore away, the river got narrower, but, though we could see a distance of ten miles before us, neither life nor sign of life could be perceived. at one o'clock we landed among a few cocoa-nut trees to eat our meagre dinner, a little salt pork, raw, and a bit of biscuit. no sooner had we "shoved off" again than the sky became overcast; we were caught in, and had to pull against, a blinding white-squall that would have laid a line-of-battle on her beam ends. the rain poured down as if from a water-spout, almost filling the boat and drenching us to the skin, and, not being able to see a yard ahead, our boat ran aground and stuck fast. it took us a good hour after the squall was over to drag her into deep water; nor were our misfortunes then at an end, for squall succeeded squall, and, having a journey of uncertain length still before us, we began to feel very miserable indeed. it was long after four o'clock when, tired, wet, and hungry, we hailed with joy a large white house on a wooded promontory; it was the governor's castle, and soon after we came in sight of the town itself. situated so far in the interior of africa, in a region so wild, few would have expected to find such a little paradise as we now beheld,--a colony of industrious portuguese, a large fort and a company of soldiers, a governor and consulate, a town of nice little detached cottages, with rows of cocoa-nut, mango, and orange trees, and in fact all the necessaries, and luxuries of civilised life. it was, indeed, an oasis in the desert, and, to us, the most pleasant of pleasant surprises. leaving the men for a short time with the boat, we made our way to the house of the consul, a dapper little gentleman with a pretty wife and two beautiful daughters--flowers that had hitherto blushed unseen and wasted their sweetness in the desert air. our welcome was most warm. after making us swallow a glass of brandy each to keep off fever, he kindly led us to a room, and made us strip off our wet garments, while a servant brought bundle after bundle of clothes, and spread them out before us. there were socks and shirts and slippers galore, with waistcoats, pantaloons, and head-dresses, and jackets, enough to have dressed an opera troupe. the commander and i furnished ourselves with a red turkish fez and dark-grey dressing-gown each, with cord and tassels to correspond, and, thus, arrayed, we considered ourselves of no small account. our kind entertainers were waiting for us in the next room, where they had, in the mean time, been preparing for us the most fragrant of brandy punch. by-and-bye two officers and a tall parsee dropped in, and for the next hour or so the conversation was of the most animated and lively description, although a bystander, had there been one, would not have been much edified, for the following reason: the younger daughter and myself were flirting in the ancient latin language, with an occasional soft word in spanish; our commander was talking in bad french to the consul's lady, who was replying in portuguese; the second-master was maintaining a smart discussion in broken italian with the elder daughter; the parsee and officer of the fort chiming in, the former in english, the latter in hindostanee; but as no one of the four could have had the slightest idea of the other's meaning, the amount of information given and received must have been very small,--in fact, merely nominal. it must not, however, be supposed that our host or hostesses could speak _no_ english, for the consul himself would frequently, and with a bow that was inimitable, push the bottle towards the commander, and say, as he shrugged his shoulders and turned his palms skywards, "continue you, sar capitan, to wet your whistle;" and, more than once, the fair creature by my side would raise and did raise the glass to her lips, and say, as her eyes sought mine, "good night, sar officeer," as if she meant me to be off to bed without a moment's delay, which i knew she did not. then, when i responded to the toast, and complimented her on her knowledge of the "universal language," she added, with a pretty shake of the head, "no, sar officeer, i no can have speak the mooch englese." a servant,-- apparently newly out of prison, so closely was his hair cropped,-- interrupted our pleasant confab, and removed the seat of our babel to the dining-room, where as nicely-cooked-and-served a dinner as ever delighted the senses of hungry mortality awaited our attention. no large clumsy joints, huge misshapen roasts or bulky boils, hampered the board; but dainty made-dishes, savoury stews, piquant curries, delicate fricassees whose bouquet tempted even as their taste and flavour stimulated the appetite, strange little fishes as graceful in shape as lovely in colour, vegetables that only the rich luxuriance of an african garden could supply, and numerous other nameless nothings, with delicious wines and costly liqueurs, neatness, attention, and kindness, combined to form our repast, and counteract a slight suspicion of crocodiles' tails and stewed lizard, for where ignorance is bliss a fellow is surely a fool if he is wise. we spent a most pleasant evening in asking questions, spinning yarns, singing songs, and making love. the younger daughter--sweet child of the desert--sang `amante de alguno;' her sister played a selection from `la traviata;' next, the consul's lady favoured us with something pensive and sad, having reference, i think, to bright eyes, bleeding hearts, love, and slow death; then, the parsee chanted a persian hymn with an "allalallala," instead of fol-di-riddle-ido as a chorus, which elicited "fra poco a me" from the portuguese lieutenant; and this last caused our commander to seat himself at the piano, turn up the white of his eyes, and in very lugubrious tones question the probability of "gentle annie's" ever reappearing in any spring-time whatever; then, amid so much musical sentimentality and woe, it was not likely that i was to hold my peace, so i lifted up my voice and sang-- "cauld kail in aberdeen, an' cas ticks in strathbogie; ilka chiel maun hae a quean bit leeze me on ma cogie--" with a pathos that caused the tears to trickle over and adown the nose of the younger daughter--she was of the gushing temperament--and didn't leave a dry eye in the room. the song brought down the house--so to speak--and i was the hero for the rest of the evening. before parting for the night we also sang `auld lang syne,' copies of the words having been written out and distributed, to prevent mistakes; this was supposed by our hostess to be the english national anthem. it was with no small amount of regret that we parted from our friends next day; a fresh breeze carried us down stream, and, except our running aground once or twice, and being nearly drowned in crossing the bar, we arrived safely on board our saucy gunboat. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ "afric's sunny fountains" have been engaged for such a length of time in the poetical employment of "rolling down their golden sands," that a bank or bar of that same bright material has been formed at the mouth of every river, which it is very difficult and often dangerous to cross even in canoes. we had despatched boats before us to take soundings on the bar of lamoo, and prepared to follow in the track thus marked out. now, our little bark, although not warranted, like the yankee boat, to float wherever there is a heavy dew, was nevertheless content with a very modest allowance of the aqueous element; in two and a half fathoms she was quite at home, and even in two--with the help of a few breakers--she never failed to bump it over a bar. we approached the bar of lamoo, therefore, with a certain degree of confidence till the keel rasped on the sand; this caused us to turn astern till we rasped again; then, being neither able to get back nor forward, we stopped ship, put our fingers in our wise mouths, and tried to consider what next was to be done. just then a small canoe was observed coming bobbing over the big waves that tumbled in on the bar; at one moment it was hidden behind a breaker, next moment mounting over another, and so, after a little game at bo-peep, it got alongside, and from it there scrambled on board a little, little man, answering entirely to dickens's description of quilp. "quilp!" said the commander. "quilp!! by george!" repeated our second-master. "quilp!!!" added i, "by all that's small and ugly." "your sarvant, sar," said quilp himself. "i am one pilot." there certainly was not enough of him to make two. he was rather darker in skin than the quilp of dickens, and his only garment was a coal-sack without sleeves--no coal-sack _has_ sleeves, however--begirt with a rope, in which a short knife was stuck; he had, besides, sandals on his feet, and his temples were begirt with a dirty dishclout by way of turban, and he repeated, "i am one pilot, sar." "can you take us over the bar?" asked the commander. "how much water you?" "three fathoms." "i do it, sar, plenty quick." "twenty shillings if you do." "i do it, sar. i do him," cried the little man, as he mounted the bridge; then cocking his head to one side, and spreading out his arms like a badly feathered duck, he added, "suppose i no do him plenty proper, you catchee me and make shot." "if the vessel strikes, i'll hang you, sir." quilp grinned--which was his way of smiling. "up steam, sar!" he cried; the order was obeyed. "go 'head. stabird a leetle." "and a half three," sung the man in the chains; then, "and a half four;" and by-and-bye, "and a half three" again; followed next moment by, "by the deep three." the commander was all in a fidget. we were on the dreaded bar; on each side of us the big waves curled and broke with a sullen boom like far-off thunder; only, where we were, no waves broke. "mind yourself now," cried the commander to quilp; to which he in wrath replied-- "what for you stand there make bobbery? _i_ is de cap'n; suppose you is fear, go alow, sar." "and a quarter less three." "steady!" and a large wave broke right aboard of us, almost sweeping us from the deck, and lifting the ship's head into the sky. another and another followed; but amid the wet and the spray, and the roar of the breakers, firmly stood the little pilot, coolly giving his orders, and never for an instant taking his eyes from the vessel's jib-boom and the distant shore, till we were safely through the surf and quietly steaming up the river. after proceeding some miles, native villages began to appear here and there on both shores, and the great number of dhows on the river, with boats and canoes of every description, told us we were nearing a large town. two hours afterwards we were anchored under the guns of the sultan's palace, which were belching forth fire and smoke in return for the salute we had fired. we found every creature and thing in lamoo as entirely primitive, as absolutely foreign, as if it were a city in some other planet. the most conspicuous building is the sultan's lofty fort and palace, with its spacious steps, its fountains and marble halls. the streets are narrow and confused; the houses built in the arab fashion, and in many cases connected by bridges at the top; the inhabitants about forty thousand, including arabs, persians, hindoos, somali indians, and slaves. the wells, exceedingly deep, are built in the centre of the street without any protection; and girls, carrying on their heads calabashes, are continually passing to and from them. slaves, two and two, bearing their burdens of cowries and ivory on poles between, and keeping step to an impromptu chant; black girls weaving mats and grass-cloth; strange-looking tradesmen, with stranger tools, at every door; rich merchants borne along in gilded palanquins; people praying on housetops; and the sultan's ferocious soldiery prowling about, with swords as tall, and guns nearly twice as tall, as themselves; a large shark-market; a fine bazaar, with gold-dust, ivory, and tiger-skins exposed for sale; sprightly horses with gaudy trappings; solemn-looking camels; dust and stench and a general aroma of savage life and customs pervading the atmosphere, but law and order nevertheless. people of all religions agree like brothers. no spirituous liquor of any sort is sold in the town; the sultan's soldiers go about the streets at night, smelling the breath of the suspected, and the faintest odour of the accursed fire-water dooms the poor mortal to fifty strokes with a thick bamboo-cane next morning. the sugar-cane grows wild in the fertile suburbs, amid a perfect forest of fine trees; farther out in the country the cottager dwells beneath his few cocoa-nut trees, which supply him with all the necessaries of life. one tree for each member of his family is enough. _he_ builds the house and fences with its large leaves; his wife prepares meat and drink, cloth and oil, from the nut; the space between the trees is cultivated for curry, and the spare nuts are sold to purchase luxuries, and the rent of twelve trees is only _sixpence_ of our money. happy country! no drunkenness, no debt, no religious strife, but peace and contentment everywhere! reader, if you are in trouble, or your affairs are going "to pot," or if you are of opinion that this once favoured land is getting used up, i sincerely advise you to sell off your goods and be off to lamoo. chapter twelve. pros and cons. of the "gentlemen of england who live at home at ease," very few can know how entirely dependent for happiness one is on his neighbours. man is out-and-out, or out-and-in, a gregarious animal, else `robinson crusoe' had never been written. now, i am sure that it is only correct to state that the majority of combatant [note ] officers are, in simple language, jolly nice fellows, and as a class gentlemen, having, in fact, that fine sense of honour, that good-heartedness, which loves to do as it would be done by, which hurteth not the feelings of the humble, which turneth aside from the worm in its path, and delighteth not in plucking the wings from the helpless fly. to believe, however, that there are no exceptions to this rule would be to have faith in the speedy advent of the millennium, that happy period of lamb-and-lion-ism which we would all rather see than hear tell of; for human nature is by no means altered by bathing every morning in salt water, it is the same afloat as on shore. and there are many officers in the navy, who--"dressed in a little brief authority," and wearing an additional stripe--love to lord it over their fellow worms. nor is this fault altogether absent from the medical profession itself! it is in small gunboats, commanded perhaps by a lieutenant, and carrying only an assistant-surgeon, where a young medical officer feels all the hardships and despotism of the service; for if the lieutenant in command happens to be at all frog-hearted, he has then a splendid opportunity of puffing himself up. in a large ship with from twenty to thirty officers in the mess, if you do not happen to meet with a kindred spirit at one end of the table, you can shift your chair to the other. but in a gunboat on foreign service, with merely a clerk, a blatant middy, and a second-master who would fain be your senior, as your messmates, then, i say, god help you! unless you have the rare gift of doing anything for a quiet life. it is all nonsense to say, "write a letter on service about any grievance;" you can't write about ten out of a thousand of the petty annoyances which go to make your life miserable; and if you do, you will be but little better, if, indeed, your last state be not worse than your first. i have in my mind's eye even now a lieutenant who commanded a gunboat in which i served as medical officer in charge. this little man was what is called a sea-lawyer--my naval readers well know what i mean; he knew all the admiralty instructions, was an amateur engineer, only needed the title of m.d. to make him a doctor, could quibble and quirk, and in fact could prove by the queen's regulations that your soul, to say nothing of your body, wasn't your own; that _you_ were a slave, and _he_ lord--god of all he surveyed. peace be with him! he has gone to his account; he will not require an advocate, he can speak for himself. not many such hath the service, i am happy to say. he was continually changing his poor hard-worked sub-lieutenants, and driving his engineers to drink, previously to trying them by court-martial. at first he and i got on very well; apparently he "loved me like a vera brither;" but we did not continue long "on the same platform," and, from the day we had the first difference of opinion, he was my foe, and a bitter one too. i assure you, reader, it gave me a poor idea of the service, for it was my first year. he was always on the outlook for faults, and his kindest words to me were "chaffing" me on my accent, or about my country. to be able to meet him on his own ground i studied the instructions day and night, and tried to stick by them. malingering was common on board; one or two whom i caught i turned to duty: the men, knowing how matters stood between the commander and me, refused to work, and so i was had up and bullied on the quarter-deck for "neglect of duty" in not putting these fellows on the sick-list. after this i had to put every one that asked on the sick-list. "doctor," he would say to me on reporting the number sick, "this is _wondrous_ strange--_thirteen_ on the list, out of only ninety men. why, sir, i've been in line-of-battle ships,--_line-of-battle_ ships, sir,--where they had not ten sick--_ten sick_, sir." this of course implied an insult to me, but i was like a sheep before the shearers, dumb. on sunday mornings i went with him the round of inspection; the sick who were able to be out of hammock were drawn up for review: had he been half as particular with the men under his own charge or with the ship in general as he was with the few sick, there would have been but little disease to treat. instead of questioning _me_ concerning their treatment, he interrogated the sick themselves, quarrelling with the medicine given, and pooh-pooh-ing my diagnosis. those in hammocks, who most needed gentleness and comfort, he bullied, blamed for being ill, and rendered generally uneasy. remonstrance on my part was either taken no notice of, or instantly checked. if men were reported by me for being dirty, giving impudence, or disobeying orders, _he_ became their advocate--an able one too--and _i_ had to retire, sorry i had spoken. but i would not tell the tenth part of what i had to suffer, because such men as he are the _exception_, and because he is dead. a little black baboon of a boy who attended on this lieutenant-commanding had one day incurred his displeasure: "bo'swain's mate," cried he, "take my boy forward, hoist him on an ordinary seaman's back, and give him a rope's-ending; and," turning to me, "doctor, you'll go and attend my boy's flogging." i dared not trust myself to reply. with a face like crimson i rushed below to my cabin, and--how could i help it?--made a baby of myself for once; all my pent-up feelings found vent in a long fit of crying. true, i might in this case have written a letter to the service about my treatment; but, as it is not till after twelve months the assistant-surgeon is confirmed, the commander's word would have been taken before mine, and i probably dismissed without a court-martial. that probationary year i consider more than a grievance, it is a _cruel injustice_. cabins? there is a regulation--of late more strictly enforced by a circular--that every medical officer serving on board his own ship shall have a cabin, and the choice--by rank--of cabin, and he is a fool if he does not enforce it. but it sometimes happens that a sub-lieutenant (who has no cabin) is promoted to lieutenant on a foreign station; he will then rank above the assistant-surgeon, and perhaps, if there is no spare cabin, the poor doctor will have to give up his, and take to a sea-chest and hammock, throwing all his curiosities, however valuable, overboard. it would be the duty of the captain in such a case to build an additional cabin, and if he did not, or would not, a letter to the admiral would make him. does the combatant officer treat the medical officer with respect? certainly, unless one or other of the two be a snob: in the one case the respect is not worth having, in the other it can't be expected. in the military branch you shall find many officers belonging to the best english families: these i need hardly say are for the most part gentlemen, and gentle men. however, it is allowed in most messes that "the rank is but the guinea's stamp, a man's man for a' that;" and i assure the candidate for a commission, that, if he is himself a gentleman, he will find no want of admirers in the navy. but there are some young doctors who enter the service, knowing their profession to be sure, and how to hold a knife and fork--not a carving-fork though--but knowing little else; yet even these soon settle down, and, if they are not dismissed by court-martial for knocking some one down at cards, or on the quarter-deck, turn out good service-officers. indeed, after all, i question if it be good to know too much of fine-gentility on entering the service, for, although the navy officers one meets have much that is agreeable, honest, and true, there is through it all a vein of what can only be designated as the coarse. the science of conversation, that beautiful science that says and lets say, that can listen as well as speak, is but little studied. mostly all the talk is "shop," or rather "ship." there is a want of tone in the discourse, a lack of refinement. the delicious chit-chat on new books, authors, poetry, music, or the drama, interspersed with anecdote, incident, and adventure, and enlivened with the laughter-raising pun or happy bon-mot, is, alas! but too seldom heard: the rough joke, the tales of women, ships, and former ship-mates, and the old, old, stale "good things,"--these are more fashionable at our navy mess-board. those who would object to such conversation are in the minority, and prefer to let things hang as they grew. now, only one thing can ever alter this, and that is a good and perfect library in every ship, to enable officers, who spend most of their time out of society, to keep up with the times if possible. but i fear i am drifting imperceptibly into the subject of navy-reform, which i prefer leaving to older and wiser heads. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ note . combatant (from combat, a battle), fighting officers,--as if the medical offices didn't fight likewise. it would be better to take away the "combat," and leave the "ant"--ant-officers, as they do the work of the ship. chapter thirteen. odds and ends. there is one grievance which the medical officers, in common with their combatant brethren, have to complain of--i refer to _compulsory shaving_; neither is this by any means so insignificant a matter as it may seem. it may appear a ridiculous statement, but it is nevertheless a true one, that this regulation has caused many a young surgeon to prefer the army to the navy. "mere dandies," the reader may say, "whom this grievance would affect;" but there is many a good man a dandy, and no one could surely respect a man who was careless of his personal appearance, or who would willingly, and without a sigh, disfigure his face by depriving it of what nature considers both ornate and useful-- ornate, as the ladies and the looking-glass can prove; and useful, as the blistered chin and upper lip of the shaven sailor, in hot climates, points out. from the earliest ages the moustache has been worn,--even the arabs, who shave the head, leave untouched the upper lip. what would the pictures of some of the great masters be without it? didn't the roman youths dedicate the first few downy hairs of the coming moustache to the gods? does not the moustache give a manly appearance to the smallest and most effeminate? does it not even beget a certain amount of respect for the wearer? what sort of guys would the razor make of count bismark, dickens, the sultan of turkey, or anthony trollope? were the emperor napoleon deprived of his well-waxed moustache, it might lose him the throne of france. were garibaldi to call on his barber, he might thereafter call in vain for volunteers, and english ladies would send him no more splints nor sticking-plaster. shave tennyson, and you may put him in petticoats as soon as you please. as to the moustache movement in the navy, it is a subject of talk-- admitting of no discussion--in every mess in the service, and thousands are the advocates in favour of its adoption. indeed, the arguments in favour of it are so numerous, that it is a difficult matter to choose the best, while the reasons against it are few, foolish, and despotic. at the time when the lords of the admiralty gave orders that the navy should keep its upper lip, and three fingers' breadth of its royal chin, smooth and copper-kettlish, it was neither fashionable nor respectable to wear the moustache in good society. those were the days of cabbage-leaf cheeks, powdered wigs, and long queues; but those times are past and gone from every corner of england's possessions save the navy. barberism has been hunted from polite circles, but has taken refuge under the trident of old neptune; and, in these days of comparative peace, more blood in the royal navy is drawn by the razor than by the cutlass. in our little gunboat on the coast of africa, we, both officers and men, used, under the rose, to cultivate moustache and whiskers, until we fell in with the ship of the commodore of the station. then, when the commander gave the order, "all hands to shave," never was such a hurlyburly seen, such racing hither and thither (for not a moment was to be lost), such sharpening of scissors and furbishing up of rusty razors. on one occasion i remember sending our steward, who was lathering his face with a blacking-brush, and trying to scrape with a carving-knife, to borrow the commander's razor; in the mean time the commander had despatched his soapy-faced servant to beg the loan of mine. both stewards met with a clash, nearly running each other through the body with their shaving gear. i lent the commander a syme's bistoury, with which he managed to pluck most of the hairs out by the root, as if he meant to transplant them again, while i myself shaved with an amputating knife. the men forward stuck by the scissors; and when the commander, with bloody chin and watery eyes, asked why they did not shave,--"why, sir," replied the bo'swain's mate, "the cockroaches have been and gone and eaten all our razors, they has, sir." then, had you seen us reappear on deck after the terrible operation, with our white shaven lips and shivering chins, and a foolish grin on every face, you would, but for our uniform, have taken us for tailors on strike, so unlike were we to the brave-looking, manly dare-devils that trod the deck only an hour before. and if army officers and men have been graciously permitted to wear the moustache since the crimean war, why are not we? but perhaps the navy took no part in that gallant struggle. but if we _must_ continue to do penance by shaving, why should it not be the crown of the head, or any other place, rather than the upper lip, which every one can see? one item of duty there is, which occasionally devolves on the medical officer, and for the most part goes greatly against the feelings of the _young_ surgeon; i refer to his compulsory attendance at floggings. it is only fair to state that the majority of captains and commanders use the cat as seldom as possible, and that, too, only sparingly. in some ships, however, flogging is nearly as frequent as prayers of a morning. again, it is more common on foreign stations than at home, and boys of the first or second class, marines, and ordinary seamen, are for the most part the victims. i do not believe i shall ever forget the first exhibition of this sort i attended on board my own ship; not that the spectacle was in any way more revolting than scores i have since witnessed, but because the sight was new to me. i remember it wanted fully twenty minutes of seven in the morning, when my servant aroused me. "why so early to-day?" i inquired as i turned out. "a flaying match, you know, sir," said jones. my heart gave an anxious "thud" against my ribs, as if i myself were to form the "ram for the sacrifice." i hurried through with my bath, and, dressing myself as if for a holiday, in cocked hat, sword, and undress coat, i went on deck. we were at anchor in simon's bay. all the minutiae of the scene i remember as though it were but yesterday, morning was cool and clear, the hills clad in lilac and green, seabirds floating high in air, and the waters of the bay reflecting the line of the sky and the lofty mountain-sides, forming a picture almost dreamlike in its quietness and serenity. the men were standing about in groups, dressed in their whitest of pantaloons, bluest of smocks, and neatest of black silk neckerchiefs. by-and-bye the culprit was led aft by a file of marines, and i went below with him to make the preliminary examination, in order to report whether or not he might be fit for the punishment. he was as good a specimen of the british marine as one could wish to look upon, hardy, bold, and wiry. his crime had been smuggling spirits on board. "needn't examine me, doctor," said he; "i ain't afeard of their four dozen; they can't hurt me, sir,--leastways my back you know--my breast though; hum-m!" and he shook his head, rather sadly i thought, as he bent down his eyes. "what," said i, "have you anything the matter with your chest?" "nay, doctor, nay; its my feelins they'll hurt. i've a little girl at home that loves me, and--bless you, sir, i won't look her in the face again no-how." i felt his pulse. no lack of strength there, no nervousness; the artery had the firm beat of health, the tendons felt like rods of iron beneath the finger, and his biceps stood out hard and round as the mainstay of an old seventy-four. i pitied the brave fellow, and--very wrong of me it was, but i could not help it--filled out and offered him a large glass of rum. "ah! sir," he said, with a wistful eye on the ruby liquid, "don't tempt me, sir. i can bear the bit o' flaying athout that: i wouldn't have my messmates smell dutch courage on my breath, sir; thankee all the same, doctor." and he walked on deck and surrendered himself. all hands had already assembled, the men and boys on one side, and the officers, in cocked hats and swords, on the other. a grating had been lashed against the bulwark, and another placed on deck beside it. the culprit's shoulders and back were bared, and a strong belt fastened around the lower part of the loins for protection; he was then firmly tied by the hands to the upper, and by the feet to the lower grating; a little basin of cold water was placed at his feet; and all was now prepared. the sentence was read, and orders given to proceed with the punishment. the cat is a terrible instrument of torture; i would not use it on a bull unless in self-defence: the shaft is about a foot and a half long, and covered with green or red baize according to taste; the thongs are nine, about twenty-eight inches in length, of the thickness of a goose-quill, and with two knots tied on each. men describe the first blow as like a shower of molten lead. combing out the thongs with his five fingers before each blow, firmly and determinedly was the first dozen delivered by the bo'swain's mate, and as unflinchingly received. then, "one dozen, sir, please," he reported, saluting the commander. "continue the punishment," was the calm reply. a new man and a new cat. another dozen reported; again, the same reply. three dozen. the flesh, like burning steel, had changed from red to purple, and blue, and white; and between the third and fourth dozen, the suffering wretch, pale enough now, and in all probability sick, begged a comrade to give him a mouthful of water. there was a tear in the eye of the hardy sailor who obeyed him, whispering as he did so-- "keep up, bill; it'll soon be over now." "five, six," the corporal slowly counted--"seven, eight." it is the last dozen, and how acute must be the torture! "nine, ten." the blood comes now fast enough, and--yes, gentle reader, i _will_ spare your feelings. the man was cast loose at last and put on the sick-list; he had borne his punishment without a groan and without moving a muscle. a large pet monkey sat crunching nuts in the rigging, and grinning all the time; i have no doubt _he_ enjoyed the spectacle immensely, _for he was only an ape_. tommie g--was a pretty, fair-skinned, blue-eyed boy, some sixteen summers old. he was one of a class only too common in the service; having become enamoured of the sea, he had run away from his home and joined the service; and, poor little man! he found out, when too late, that the stern realities of a sailor's life did not at all accord with the golden notions he had formed of it. being fond of stowing himself away in corners with a book, instead of keeping his watch, tommie very often got into disgrace, spent much of his time at the mast-head, and had many unpleasant palmar rencounters with the corporal's cane. one day, his watch being over, he had retired to a corner with his little "ditty-box." nobody ever knew one-half of the beloved nicknacks and valued nothings he kept in that wee box: it was in fact his private cabin, his sanctum sanctorum, to which he could retreat when anything vexed him; a sort of portable home, in which he could forget the toils of his weary watch, the giddy mast-head, or even the corporal's cane. he had extracted, and was dreamily gazing on, the portrait of a very young lady, when the corporal came up and rudely seized it, and made a very rough and inelegant remark concerning the fair virgin. "that is my sister," cried tommie, with tears in his eyes. "your sister!" sneered the corporal; "she is a--" and he added a word that cannot be named. there was the spirit of young england, however, in tommie's breast; and the word had scarcely crossed the corporal's lips, when those lips, and his nose too, were dyed in the blood the boy's fist had drawn. for that blow poor tommie was condemned to receive four dozen lashes. and the execution of the sentence was carried out with all the pomp and show usual on such occasions. arrayed in cooked-hats, epaulets, and swords, we all assembled to witness that helpless child in his agony. one would have thought that even the rough bo'swain's mate would have hesitated to disfigure skin so white and tender, or that the frightened and imploring glance tommie cast upward on the first descending lash would have unnerved his arm. did it? no, reader; pity there doubtless was among us, but mercy--none. oh! we were a brave band. and the poor boy writhed in his agony; his screams and cries were heartrending; and, god forgive us! we knew not till then he was an orphan, till we heard him beseech his mother in heaven to look down on her son, to pity and support him. ah! well, perhaps she did, for scarcely had the third dozen commenced when tommie's cries were hushed, his head drooped on his shoulder like a little dead bird's, and for a while his sufferings were at an end. i gladly took the opportunity to report further proceedings as dangerous, and he was carried away to his hammock. i will not shock the nerves and feelings of the reader by any further relation of the horrors of flogging, merely adding, that i consider corporal punishment, as applied to men, _cowardly, cruel_, and debasing to human nature; and as applied to boys, _brutal_, and sometimes even _fiendish_. there is only one question i wish to ask of every true-hearted english lady who may read these lines--be you sister, wife, or mother, could you in your heart have respected the commander who, with folded arms and grim smile, replied to poor tommie's frantic appeals for mercy, "continue the punishment"? the pay of medical officers is by no means high enough to entice young doctors, who can do anything like well on shore, to enter the service. ten shillings a day, with an increase of half-a-crown after five years' service on full pay, is not a great temptation certainly. to be sure the expenses of living are small, two shillings a day being all that is paid for messing; this of course not including the wine-bill, the size of which will depend on the "drouthiness" of the officer who contracts it. government provides all mess-traps, except silver forks and spoons. then there is uniform to keep up, and shore-going clothes to be paid for, and occasionally a shilling or two for boat-hire. however, with a moderate wine-bill, the assistant-surgeon may save about four shillings or more a day. promotion to the rank of surgeon, unless to some fortunate individuals, comes but slowly; it may, however, be reckoned on after from eight to ten years. a few gentlemen out of each "batch" who "pass" into the service, and who have distinguished themselves at the examination, are promoted sooner. it seems to be the policy of the present director-general to deal as fairly as possible with every assistant-surgeon, after a certain routine. on first joining he is sent for a short spell--too short, indeed--to a hospital. he is then appointed to a sea-going ship for a commission--say three years--on a foreign station. on coming home he is granted a few months' leave on full pay, and is afterwards appointed to a harbour-ship for about six months. by the end of this time he is supposed to have fairly recruited from the fatigues of his commission abroad; he is accordingly sent out again to some other foreign station for three or four years. on again returning to his native land, he might be justified in hoping for a pet appointment, say to a hospital, the marines, a harbour-ship, or, failing these, to the channel fleet. on being promoted he is sent off abroad again, and so on; and thus he spends his useful life, and serves his queen and country, and earns his pay, and generally spends that likewise. pensions are granted to the widows of assistant-surgeons--from forty to seventy pounds a year, according to circumstances; and if he leaves no widow, a dependent mother, or even sister, may obtain the pension. but i fear i must give, to assistant-surgeons about to many, punch's advice, and say most emphatically, "don't;" unless, indeed, the dear creature has money, and is able to purchase a practice for her darling doctor. with a little increase of pay ungrudgingly given, shorter commissions abroad, and less of the "bite and buffet" about favours granted, the navy would be a very good service for the medical officer. however, as it is, to a man who has neither wife nor riches, it is, i dare say, as good a way of spending life as any other; and i do think that there are but few old surgeons who, on looking back to the life they have led in the navy, would not say of that service,--"with all thy faults i love thee still." ------------------------------------------------------------------------ the end.