id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
link-springer-com-190		Compounding of Wealth in Proof-of-Stake Cryptocurrencies | SpringerLink			.html	text/html	2700	350	74	This is consistent with the adversarial model considered in PoS systems (e.g., Ouroboros [15]) that elect a single leader per block slot. Both honest and adversarial parties see the main chain \(B_t\); we let \(B_t(n)\) denote the block (i.e., leader) of the nth slot, as perceived by the honest nodes at time t. Regardless, the size of the state space is considerably larger than it is in prior work on selfish mining in PoW [24], where the computational cost of creating a block forces the adversary to keep a single side chain. (1) The adversary matches by choosing a side chain \(\tilde{B}_t^i\) and releasing the first \(h_t\) blocks. (2) The adversary overrides by choosing a side chain \(\tilde{B}_t^i\) and releasing the first \(h = h_t+1\) blocks. Fanti, G., Kogan, L., Oh, S., Ruan, K., Viswanath, P., Wang, G.: Compounding of wealth in proof-of-stake cryptocurrencies.	./cache/link-springer-com-190.html	./txt/link-springer-com-190.txt