Trust - Bibliography - PhilPapers Sign in | Create an account PhilPapers PhilPeople PhilArchive PhilEvents PhilJobs Syntax Advanced Search New All new items Books Journal articles Manuscripts Topics All Categories Metaphysics and Epistemology Metaphysics and Epistemology Epistemology Metaphilosophy Metaphysics Philosophy of Action Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Religion M&E, Misc Value Theory Value Theory Aesthetics Applied Ethics Meta-Ethics Normative Ethics Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality Philosophy of Law Social and Political Philosophy Value Theory, Miscellaneous Science, Logic, and Mathematics Science, Logic, and Mathematics Logic and Philosophy of Logic Philosophy of Biology Philosophy of Cognitive Science Philosophy of Computing and Information Philosophy of Mathematics Philosophy of Physical Science Philosophy of Social Science Philosophy of Probability General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science, Misc History of Western Philosophy History of Western Philosophy Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy 17th/18th Century Philosophy 19th Century Philosophy 20th Century Philosophy History of Western Philosophy, Misc Philosophical Traditions Philosophical Traditions African/Africana Philosophy Asian Philosophy Continental Philosophy European Philosophy Philosophy of the Americas Philosophical Traditions, Miscellaneous Philosophy, Misc Philosophy, Misc Philosophy, Introductions and Anthologies Philosophy, General Works Teaching Philosophy Philosophy, Miscellaneous Other Academic Areas Other Academic Areas Natural Sciences Social Sciences Cognitive Sciences Formal Sciences Arts and Humanities Professional Areas Other Academic Areas, Misc Journals Submit material Submit a book or article Upload a bibliography Personal pages we track Archives we track Information for publishers More Introduction Discussion forums Submitting to PhilPapers Frequently Asked Questions Subscriptions Editor's Guide The Categorization Project For Publishers For Archive Admins Contact us PhilPapers Surveys API Bargain Finder About PhilPapers Syntax Advanced Search Sign in Create an account Syntax Advanced Search Normative Ethics > Moral Psychology > Moral States and Processes > Trust Trust Edited by Edward Hinchman (Florida State University) Related categories Siblings: Alienation (41) Altruism (263 | 6) Anger (132) Boredom (48) Courage (90) Cruelty (8) Disgust (87) Emotions (6,679 | 2,671) Empathy and Sympathy (600) Envy (67) Forgiveness (135) Gratitude (108) Guilt and Shame (150) Happiness (998) Hope (495) Hypocrisy (56) Jealousy (84) Kindness (17) Philosophy of Love (1,225 | 680) Moral Deliberation (39) Moral Imagination (162) Moral Intuition (69) Moral Perception (73) Moral Phenomenology (59) Pride (90) Resentment (24) Schadenfreude (16) Self-Deception (376) Tolerance (31) Moral States and Processes, Misc (21) Jobs in this area McGill University Associate Professor or Professor University of St. Andrews Senior Lecturer Omniphysical LLC Consultant Jobs from PhilJobs 798 found Order:Listing date book price First author Impact Pub year Downloads Order Options 1 filter applied BibTeX / EndNote / RIS / etc Export this page: Choose a format.. Formatted text Plain text BibTeX Zotero EndNote Reference Manager Limit to items. Restrictions online only open access only published only Viewing options show categories categorization shortcuts hide abstracts open articles in new windows Open Category Editor Off-campus access Using PhilPapers from home? Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server. Monitor this page Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it: Email   RSS feed Editorial team General Editors: David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Lynne Tirrell Aness Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers import / add options Add an entry to this list: (help) Batch import. Use this option to import a large number of entries from a bibliography into this category. 1 — 50 / 798 added 2020-11-22 Defending a Risk Account of Scientific Objectivity.Inkeri Koskinen - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1187-1207.detailsWhen discussing scientific objectivity, many philosophers of science have recently focused on accounts that can be applied in practice when assessing the objectivity of something. It has become clear that in different contexts, objectivity is realized in different ways, and the many senses of objectivity recognized in the recent literature seem to be conceptually distinct. I argue that these diverse ‘applicable’ senses of scientific objectivity have more in common than has thus far been recognized. I combine arguments from philosophical discussions (...) of trust, from negative accounts of objectivity, and from the recent literature on epistemic risks. When we call X objective, we endorse it: we say that we rely on X, and that others should do so too. But the word ‘objective’ is reserved for a specific type of reliance: it is based on the belief that important epistemic risks arising from our imperfections as epistemic agents have been effectively averted. All the positive senses of objectivity identify either some risk of this type, or some efficient strategy for averting one or more such risks. (shrink) Epistemic Objectivity in Epistemology Inductive Risk in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-11-22 Trusting the Scientific Community: The Development and Validation of an Instrument to Measure Trust in Science.Matthew Slater - detailsTrust in the scientific enterprise — in science as an institution — is arguably important to individuals’ and societies’ well-being. Although some measures of public trust in science exist, the recipients of that trust are often ambiguous between trusting individual scientists and the scientific community at large. We argue that more precision would be beneficial — specifically, targeting public trust of the scientific community at large — and describe the development and validation of such an instrument: the Scientific Community Trust (...) Index (SCTI). We show the results of initial field testing to establish instrument reliability and validity. We then demonstrate certain advantages of the SCTI against other measures of trust and deference, and present correlations between the SCTI and participant scores in two trust-in-science scenarios. Our results suggest that the SCTI is a useful and compact tool for measuring public trust in the scientific community. (shrink) Sociology of Science in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-11-16 Uncertainty: How It Makes Science Advance.Kostas Kampourakis & Kevin McCain - 2019 - Oxford University Press.detailsScientific knowledge is the most solid and robust kind of knowledge that humans have because of its inherent self-correcting character. Nevertheless, anti-evolutionists, climate denialists, and anti-vaxxers, among others, question some of the best-established scientific findings, making claims unsupported by empirical evidence. A common aspect of these claims is reference to the uncertainties of science concerning evolution, climate change, vaccination, and so on. This is inaccurate: whereas the broad picture is clear, there will always exist uncertainties about the details of the (...) respective phenomena. This book shows that uncertainty is an inherent feature of science that does not devalue it. In contrast, uncertainty advances science because it motivates further research. This is the first book on this topic that draws on philosophy of science to explain what uncertainty in science is and how it makes science advance. It contrasts evolution, climate change, and vaccination, where the uncertainties are exaggerated, and genetic testing and forensic science, where the uncertainties are usually overlooked. The goal is to discuss the scientific, psychological, and philosophical aspects of uncertainty in order to explain what it really is, what kinds of problems it actually poses, and why in the end it makes science advance. Contrary to public representations of scientific findings and conclusions that produce an intuitive but distorted view of science as certain, people need to understand and learn to live with uncertainty in science. This book is intended for anyone who wants to get a clear view of the nature of science. (shrink) Climate Change in Applied Ethics Epistemic Luck in Epistemology Evidence and Proof in Law in Philosophy of Law Explanation and Understanding in General Philosophy of Science Explanation in the Sciences, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Genetic Testing in Applied Ethics Inductive Risk in General Philosophy of Science Nature of Science in General Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Science, General Works in Philosophy of Science, Misc Scientific Metamethodology in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science Sociology of Science in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Vaccines in Philosophy of Science, Misc $22.30 new   $27.46 used   $29.95 direct from Amazon   Amazon page Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-10-26 Mapping the Stony Road Toward Trustworthy AI: Expectations, Problems, Conundrums.Gernot Rieder, Judith Simon & Pak-Hang Wong - forthcoming - In Marcello Pelillo & Teresa Scantamburlo (eds.), Machines We Trust: Perspectives on Dependable AI. Cambridge, Mass.:detailsThe notion of trustworthy AI has been proposed in response to mounting public criticism of AI systems, in particular with regard to the proliferation of such systems into ever more sensitive areas of human life without proper checks and balances. In Europe, the High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence has recently presented its Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI. To some, the guidelines are an important step for the governance of AI. To others, the guidelines distract effort from genuine AI regulation. (...) In this chapter, we engage in a critical discussion of the concept of trustworthy AI by probing the concept both on theoretical and practical grounds, assessing its substance and the feasibility of its intent. We offer a concise overview of the guidelines and their vision for trustworthy AI and examine the conceptual underpinnings of trustworthy AI by considering how notions of 'trust' and 'trustworthiness' have been discussed in the philosophical literature. We then discuss several epistemic obstacles and moral requirements when striving to achieve trustworthy AI in practice before concluding with an argument in support of the establishment of a trustworthy AI culture that respects and protects foundational values. (shrink) Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Moral Status of Artificial Systems in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-10-21 Ecological Risk: Climate Change as Abstract-Corporeal Problem.Tom Sparrow - 2018 - Revista Latinoamericana de Estudios Sobre Cuerpos, Emociones y Sociedad 10 (28):88-97.detailsThis essay uses Ulrich Beck’s concept of risk society to understand the threat of catastrophic climate change. It argues that this threat is “abstract-corporeal”, and therefore a special kind of threat that poses special kinds of epistemic and ecological challenges. At the center of these challenges is the problem of human vulnerability, which entails a complex form of trust that both sustains and threatens human survival. Climate Change in Applied Ethics Environmental Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Trust in Normative Ethics Vulnerability in Social and Political Philosophy Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-10-12 The Roles of Institutional Trust and Distrust in Grounding Rational Deference to Scientific Expertise.Frédéric Bouchard - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (5):582-608.detailsGiven the complexity of most phenomena, we have to delegate much epistemic work to other knowers and we must find reasons for relying on these specific knowers and not others. In our societies, these other knowers are often called experts and we rely on their epistemic authority more and more. For many complex phenomena such as climate change, genetically modified crops, and immunization, the experts that are called upon are scientific experts. For that reason, finding good reasons and justification for (...) deferring to their knowledge is of paramount societal importance. As we shall see, many have analyzed this epistemic dependence on scientific experts and have tried to show in what contexts are there good... (shrink) Epistemic Norms in Epistemology Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Sociology of Science in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-10-09 Judaeo-Christian Faith as Trust and Loyalty.Michael Pace & Daniel J. McKaughan - forthcoming - Religious Studies.detailsDisputes over the nature of faith, as understood in the Judaeo-Christian tradition, sometimes focus on whether it is to be identified exclusively with trust in God or with loyalty/fidelity to God. Drawing on recent work on the semantic range of the Hebrew ʾĕmûnâ and Greek pistis lexicons, we argue for a multidimensional account of what it is to be a person of faith that includes trust and loyalty in combination. The Trust-Loyalty account, we maintain, makes better sense of the faith (...) of exemplars, including Abraham, and fits well with the biblical language of faith. Further, a normatively appropriate combination of trust and loyalty towards others is a recognizable social virtue, aimed at promoting flourishing relationships. Finally, we consider how to make sense of ancient and modern exemplars of faith who protest against God, such as Job and Elie Wiesel, and argue that the Trust-Loyalty view is uniquely well suited to accommodate them. (shrink) Faith in Philosophy of Religion Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-10-07 Trustworthiness in Explanation: The Obligation to Explain Well.Sheralce Brindell - 2000 - Science and Engineering Ethics 6 (3):351-364.details‘Scientific integrity’ certainly requires that data and references be beyond reproach. However, issues within the theory of scientific explanation suggest that there may be more to it than just this. While it is true that some contemporary, pragmatic analyses of explanation suffer from the ‘problem of relevance’, it does not seem to be true that the addition of formal, metaphysical constraints is necessary to solve this problem. I argue that, when viewed as requests for help with an epistemic problem, explanation (...) -seeking questions reveal the existence of a set of moral criteria centered in trust which, when satisfied, prevent trivial or irrelevant explanations from being offered, thereby broadening the concept of ‘scientific integrity’. (shrink) Pragmatic Theories of Explanation in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-09-28 Experts, Public Policy and the Question of Trust.Maria Baghramian & Michel Croce - forthcoming - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen De Ridder (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. London, UK: Routledge.detailsThis chapter discusses the topics of trust and expertise from the perspective of political epistemology. In particular, it addresses four main questions: (§1) How should we characterise experts and their expertise? (§2) How can non-experts recognize a reliable expert? (§3) What does it take for non-experts to trust experts? (§4) What problems impede trust in experts? Political Epistemology in Social and Political Philosophy Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-09-23 Why Think for Yourself?Jonathan Matheson - manuscriptdetailsLife is a group project. It takes a village. The same is true of our intellectual lives. Since we are finite cognitive creatures with limited time and resources, any healthy intellectual life requires that we rely quite heavily on others. For nearly any question you want to investigate, there is someone who is in a better epistemic position than you are to determine the answer. For most people, their expertise does not extend far beyond their own personal lives, and even (...) here we can sometimes find others who are more reliable. Without relying on them we would know very little about the world. Since others are typically better positioned to determine the answers to the questions we have, it should make us wonder why we should bother to try and figure out much of anything at all for ourselves. After all, when trying to find an answer to a question, we should take the best route to the answer, and the most reliable route to the answer to most questions is to rely on the minds of others. At the same time, there is something defective about an intellectual life that outsources nearly all of its intellectual projects. That is, it seems that individuals ought to think for themselves, at least about some issues and at least some of the time. The puzzle is in determining why it is epistemically valuable to think for yourself, since doing so will almost always not be the best available route to the answer of your question. In this paper, I will first clarify our central question and sharpen this puzzle regarding epistemic autonomy. Having done so, I will argue that autonomous deliberation can be epistemically valuable to inquirers both when it is successful, as well as when it is unsuccessful. I conclude by gesturing at how these considerations point us toward an account of epistemic autonomy as an intellectual virtue. (shrink) Collective Epistemology in Epistemology Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download   Translate     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-09-12 Well-Ordered Science and Public Trust in Science.Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - forthcoming - Synthese.detailsBuilding, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Philip Kitcher’s takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of “well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his. However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand (...) how his extended model and its implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of it. We argue that even though Kitcher’s ideal model and his proposals for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, they can be addressed with the resources of our account. (shrink) Inductive Risk in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Research Ethics in Applied Ethics Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-09-12 What Is Epistemic Public Trust in Science?Gürol Irzik & Faik Kurtulmus - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1145-1166.detailsWe provide an analysis of the public's having warranted epistemic trust in science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy regarding the connection between autism and measles–mumps–rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science (...) requires various societal conditions, which we briefly introduce in the concluding section. (shrink) Inductive Risk in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   3 citations   added 2020-09-01 Elections, Civic Trust, and Digital Literacy: The Promise of Blockchain as a Basis for Common Knowledge.Mark Alfano - detailsFew recent developments in information technology have been as hyped as blockchain, the first implementation of which was the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. Such hype furnishes ample reason to be skeptical about the promise of blockchain implementations, but I contend that there’s something to the hype. In particular, I think that certain blockchain implementations, in the right material, social, and political conditions, constitute excellent bases for common knowledge. As a case study, I focus on trust in election outcomes, where the ledger records (...) not financial transactions but vote tallies. I argue that blockchain implementations could foster warranted trust in vote tallies and thereby trust in the democratic process. Finally, I argue that if the promise of blockchain implementations as democratic infrastructure is to be realized, then democracies first need to ensure that these material, social, and political conditions obtain. (shrink) Civic Virtue in Social and Political Philosophy Participatory Democracy in Social and Political Philosophy Representative Democracy in Social and Political Philosophy Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-08-19 Trust and Distributed Epistemic Labor‎.Boaz Miller & Ori Freiman - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook on Trust and Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. ‎341-353‎.detailsThis chapter explores properties that bind individuals, knowledge, and communities, together. Section ‎‎1 introduces Hardwig’s argument from trust in others’ testimonies as entailing that trust is the glue ‎that binds individuals into communities. Section 2 asks “what grounds trust?” by exploring assessment ‎of collaborators’ explanatory responsiveness, formal indicators such as affiliation and credibility, ‎appreciation of peers’ tacit knowledge, game-theoretical considerations, and the role moral character ‎of peers, social biases, and social values play in grounding trust. Section 3 deals with establishing (...) ‎reliability standards for formation and breaching of trust. Different epistemic considerations and their ‎underpinning of inductive risks are examined through various communication routes within a ‎discipline, between disciplines, and to the public. Section 4 examines whether a collective entity can ‎be trusted over and above trust that is given to its individual members. Section 5 deals with the roles ‎technological artifacts play in distributed research and collective knowledge. It presents the common ‎view in which genuine trust cannot, in principle, be accorded to artifacts, so as an opposite view. We ‎show that what counts as a genuine object of trust is relevant to debates about the boundaries of ‎collective agency and as a criterion for extended cognitive systems.‎. (shrink) Collective Epistemology in Epistemology Epistemology of Testimony in Epistemology Extended Epistemology in Philosophy of Mind Inductive Risk in General Philosophy of Science Sociology of Science in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-07-27 Trust and Sincerity in Art.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.detailsOur life with art is suffused with trust. We don’t just trust one another’s aesthetic testimony; we trust one another’s aesthetic actions. Audiences trust artists to have made it worth their while; artists trust audiences to put in the effort. Without trust, audiences would have little reason to put in the effort to understand difficult and unfamiliar art. I offer a theory of aesthetic trust, which highlights the importance of trust in aesthetic sincerity. We trust in another’s aesthetic sincerity when (...) we rely on them to fulfill their commitments to act for aesthetic reasons — rather than for, say, financial, social, or political reasons. We feel most thoroughly betrayed by an artist, not when they make bad art, but when they sell out. This teaches us something about the nature of trust in general. According to many standard theories, trust involves thinking the trusted to be cooperative or good-natured. But trust in aesthetic sincerity is different. We trust artists to be true to their own aesthetic sensibility, which might involve selfishly ignoring their audience’s needs. Why do we care so much about an artist’s sincerity, rather than merely trusting them to make good art? We emphasize sincerity when wish to encourage originality, rather than to demand success along predictable lines. And we ask for sincerity when our goal is to discover a shared sensibility. In moral life, we often try to force convergence through coordinated effort. But in aesthetic life, we often hope for the lovely discovery that our sensibilities were similar all along. And for that we need to ask for sincerity, rather than overt coordination. (shrink) Aesthetic Cognition in Aesthetics Aesthetics and Ethics in Aesthetics Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-07-27 Trust-Based Theories of Promising.Daniele Bruno - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):443-463.detailsThis paper discusses the prospects of a comprehensive philosophical account of promising that relies centrally on the notion of trust. I lay out the core idea behind the Trust View, showing how it convincingly explains the normative contours and the unique value of our promissory practice. I then sketch three distinct options of how the Trust View can explain the normativity of promises. First, an effect based-view, second, a view drawing on a wider norm demanding respect to those whom one (...) has invited to something, and finally, as a new suggestion, a Normative Interest View. This view holds that promising is a normative power that serves our interest in facilitating or enabling the relationship of trust between promisor and promisee. I argue that only those embracing the third view can fully account for the distinctive obligation that results from the giving of a valid promise in all cases. (shrink) Moral Pluralism in Normative Ethics Obligation in Normative Ethics Promises in Normative Ethics Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-07-27 The Ethics and Epistemology of Trust.J. Adam Carter & Mona Simion - 2020 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.detailsTrust is a topic of longstanding philosophical interest. It is indispensable to every kind of coordinated human activity, from sport to scientific research. Even more, trust is necessary for the successful dissemination of knowledge, and by extension, for nearly any form of practical deliberation and planning. Without trust, we could achieve few of our goals and would know very little. Despite trust’s fundamental importance in human life, there is substantial philosophical disagreement about what trust is, and further, how trusting is (...) normatively constrained and best theorized about in relation to other things we value. This entry is divided into three sections, which explore key (and sometimes interconnected) ethical and epistemological themes in the philosophy of trust: (1) The Nature of Trust; (2) The Normativity of Trust, and (3) The Value of Trust. (shrink) Epistemology of Testimony in Epistemology Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-07-07 Experts: What Are They and How Can Laypeople Identify Them?Thomas Grundmann - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.detailsIn this chapter, I survey and assess various answers to two basic questions concerning experts: (1) What is an expert?; (2) How can laypeople identify the relevant experts? These questions are not mutually independent, since the epistemology and the metaphysics of experts should go hand in hand. On the basis of our platitudes about experts, I will argue that the prevailing accounts of experts such as truth-linked, knowledge-linked, understanding-linked or service-oriented accounts are inadequate. In contrast, I will defend an evidence-linked (...) account of expertise. In the second part of the chapter, I address the question of how laypeople can identify experts in this sense. Here, I will argue that agreement among experts plays a major role. I will outline how laypeople can follow this criterion without running into circularity. (shrink) Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-06-16 Trust in Medicine.Philip J. Nickel & Lily Frank - 2020 - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy.detailsIn this chapter, we consider ethical and philosophical aspects of trust in the practice of medicine. We focus on trust within the patient-physician relationship, trust and professionalism, and trust in Western (allopathic) institutions of medicine and medical research. Philosophical approaches to trust contain important insights into medicine as an ethical and social practice. In what follows we explain several philosophical approaches and discuss their strengths and weaknesses in this context. We also highlight some relevant empirical work in the section on (...) trust in the institutions of medicine. It is hoped that the approaches discussed here can be extended to nursing and other topics in the philosophy of medicine. (shrink) Medical Ethics in Applied Ethics Medicine in Professional Areas Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-06-13 Werte, Wahrheit, Wissenschaft.Nicola Mößner - forthcoming - In R. Rothenbusch & Oliver Wiertz (eds.), Umstrittene Wahrheit. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit in Philosophie und Religionen. Munich, Germany:detailsScience and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Practice, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download   Translate     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-05-20 Rebuilding Trust in an Era of Widening Wealth Inequality.Patti Tamara Lenard - 2010 - Journal of Social Philosophy 41 (1):73-91.detailsDemocracy in Social and Political Philosophy Distributive Justice in Social and Political Philosophy Equality, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Justice, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Social Activities in Social and Political Philosophy Social Relationships in Social and Political Philosophy Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-05-09 Trust and Belief.Arnon Keren - forthcoming - In Judith Simon (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Trust and Philosophy. New York, USA: pp. 109-120.detailsOne fundamental divide among philosophers studying the nature of trust concerns the relation between trust and belief. According to doxastic accounts of trust, trust entails a belief about the trustee: either the belief that she is trustworthy with respect to what she is trusted to do, or that she will do what she is trusted to do. Non-doxastic accounts deny that trusting entails holding such a belief. The chapter describes and evaluates the main considerations which have been cited for and (...) against doxastic accounts of trust. It argues that a preemptive reasons account of trust neutralizes some of the key objections to doxastic accounts, and that considerations favoring a doxastic account appear to be stronger than those favoring non-doxastic accounts. The chapter also suggests that the debate about the nature of trust, and the mental state required for trusting can benefit from linking it with the debate about the value of trust. -/- . (shrink) Epistemology of Testimony in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-04-01 The Humility Heuristic Or: People Worth Trusting Admit to What They Don’T Know.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Social Epistemology:1-14.detailsPeople don't always speak the truth. When they don't, we do better not to trust them. Unfortunately, that's often easier said than done. People don't usually wear a ‘Not to be trusted!’ badge on their sleeves, which lights up every time they depart from the truth. Given this, what can we do to figure out whom to trust, and whom not? My aim in this paper is to offer a partial answer to this question. I propose a heuristic—the “Humility Heuristic”—which (...) is meant to help guide our search for trustworthy advisors. In slogan form, the heuristic says: people worth trusting admit to what they don't know. I give this heuristic a precise probabilistic interpretation, offer a simple argument for it, defend it against some potential worries, and demonstrate its practical worth by showing how it can help address some difficult challenges in the relationship between experts and laypeople. (shrink) Formal Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-03-25 Matters of Trust as Matters of Attachment Security.Andrew Kirton - forthcoming - International Journal of Philosophical Studies:1-20.detailsI argue for an account of the vulnerability of trust, as a product of our need for secure social attachments to individuals and to a group. This account seeks to explain why it is true that, when we trust or distrust someone, we are susceptible to being betrayed by them, rather than merely disappointed or frustrated in our goals. What we are concerned about in matters of trust is, at the basic level, whether we matter, in a non-instrumental way, to (...) that individual, or to the group of which they are a member. We have this concern as a result of a drive to form secure social attachments. This makes us vulnerable in the characteristic way of being susceptible to betrayal, because how the other acts in such matters can demonstrate our lack of worth to them, or to the group, thereby threatening the security of our attachment, and eliciting the reactive attitudes characteristic of betrayal. (shrink) Moral Emotion in Normative Ethics Moral Phenomenology in Normative Ethics Promises in Normative Ethics Social Relationships in Social and Political Philosophy Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-03-22 Believing to Belong: Addressing the Novice-Expert Problem in Polarized Scientific Communication.Helen De Cruz - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (5):440-452.detailsThere is a large gap between the specialized knowledge of scientists and laypeople’s understanding of the sciences. The novice-expert problem arises when non-experts are confronted with (real or apparent) scientific disagreement, and when they don’t know whom to trust. Because they are not able to gauge the content of expert testimony, they rely on imperfect heuristics to evaluate the trustworthiness of scientists. This paper investigates why some bodies of scientific knowledge become polarized along political fault lines. Laypeople navigate conflicting epistemic (...) and social demands in their acceptance of scientific testimony; this might explain their deference to scientific fringe theories, which often goes together with denying established scientific theories. I evaluate three approaches to mitigate denialism: improving the message, improving the messenger, and improving the environment in which the message is conveyed. (shrink) Social Epistemology in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-03-06 Negative Epistemic Exemplars.Mark Alfano & Emily Sullivan - 2019 - In Benjamin Sherman & Stacey Goguen (eds.), Overcoming Epistemic Injustice: Social and Psychological Perspectives. Rowman & Littlefield.detailsIn this chapter, we address the roles that exemplars might play in a comprehensive response to epistemic injustice. Fricker defines epistemic injustices as harms people suffer specifically in their capacity as (potential) knowers. We focus on testimonial epistemic injustice, which occurs when someone’s assertoric speech acts are systematically met with either too little or too much credence by a biased audience. Fricker recommends a virtue­theoretic response: people who do not suffer from biases should try to maintain their disposition towards naive (...) testimonial justice, and those who find themselves already biased should cultivate corrective testimonial justice by systematically adjusting their credence in testimony up or down depending on whether they are hearing from someone whom they may be biased against or in favor of. We doubt that the prominent admiration­emulation model of exemplarism will be much use in this connection, so we propose two ways of learning from negative exemplars to better conduct one’s epistemic affairs. In the admiration­emulation model, both the identification of what a virtue is and the cultivation of virtues identified thusly proceed through the admiration of virtuous exemplars. We show that this model has serious flaws and argue for two alternatives: the envy­agonism model and the ambivalence­avoidance model. (shrink) Feminist Epistemology in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology Virtues and Vices in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download   Translate     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-02-25 Vulnerability in Social Epistemic Networks.Emily Sullivan, Max Sondag, Ignaz Rutter, Wouter Meulemans, Scott Cunningham, Bettina Speckmann & Mark Alfano - 2020 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 28 (5):1-23.detailsSocial epistemologists should be well-equipped to explain and evaluate the growing vulnerabilities associated with filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization in social media. However, almost all social epistemology has been built for social contexts that involve merely a speaker-hearer dyad. Filter bubbles, echo chambers, and group polarization all presuppose much larger and more complex network structures. In this paper, we lay the groundwork for a properly social epistemology that gives the role and structure of networks their due. In particular, (...) we formally define epistemic constructs that quantify the structural epistemic position of each node within an interconnected network. We argue for the epistemic value of a structure that we call the (m,k)-observer. We then present empirical evidence that (m,k)-observers are rare in social media discussions of controversial topics, which suggests that people suffer from serious problems of epistemic vulnerability. We conclude by arguing that social epistemologists and computer scientists should work together to develop minimal interventions that improve the structure of epistemic networks. (shrink) Formal Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Sociology of Knowledge in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-02-24 A Metacognitive Approach to Trust and a Case Study: Artificial Agency.Ioan Muntean - 2019 - Computer Ethics - Philosophical Enquiry (CEPE) Proceedings.detailsTrust is defined as a belief of a human H (‘the trustor’) about the ability of an agent A (the ‘trustee’) to perform future action(s). We adopt here dispositionalism and internalism about trust: H trusts A iff A has some internal dispositions as competences. The dispositional competences of A are high-level metacognitive requirements, in the line of a naturalized virtue epistemology. (Sosa, Carter) We advance a Bayesian model of two (i) confidence in the decision and (ii) model uncertainty. To trust (...) A, H demands A to be self-assertive about confidence and able to self-correct its own models. In the Bayesian approach trust can be applied not only to humans, but to artificial agents (e.g. Machine Learning algorithms). We explain the advantage the metacognitive trust when compared to mainstream approaches and how it relates to virtue epistemology. The metacognitive ethics of trust is swiftly discussed. (shrink) Bayesian Reasoning, Misc in Philosophy of Probability Moral Status of Artificial Systems in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-02-24 The Moral Limits of Open‐Mindedness.Matt A. Ferkany - 2019 - Educational Theory 69 (4):403-419.detailsEpistemologists have long worried that the willingness of open-minded people to reconsider their beliefs in light of new evidence is both a condition of improving their beliefs and a risk factor for losing their grip on what they already know. In this paper I introduce and attempt to resolve a moral variation of this puzzle: A willingness to engage people having strange or (to us) repugnant moral ideals looks like a condition of broadening our moral horizons, but also a risk (...) factor for doing the wrong thing or becoming bad. I pursue a contractualist line according to which such hazardous engagement is a virtue only when it matters to our interlocutors whether they can justify themselves to us on terms we can accept—and for our sake or for the sake of their own virtue, not instrumentally or to get something out of us. When it does not so matter, openness can be unintelligent or gullible, i.e. not virtuous. (shrink) Moral Contractualism in Normative Ethics Moral Disagreement in Meta-Ethics Philosophy of Education in Philosophy of Social Science Trust in Normative Ethics Virtues and Vices in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2020-02-12 In AI We Trust Incrementally: a Multi-layer Model of Trust to Analyze Human-Artificial Intelligence Interactions.Andrea Ferrario, Michele Loi & Eleonora Viganò - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (3):523-539.detailsReal engines of the artificial intelligence revolution, machine learning models, and algorithms are embedded nowadays in many services and products around us. As a society, we argue it is now necessary to transition into a phronetic paradigm focused on the ethical dilemmas stemming from the conception and application of AIs to define actionable recommendations as well as normative solutions. However, both academic research and society-driven initiatives are still quite far from clearly defining a solid program of study and intervention. In (...) this contribution, we will focus on selected ethical investigations around AI by proposing an incremental model of trust that can be applied to both human-human and human-AI interactions. Starting with a quick overview of the existing accounts of trust, with special attention to Taddeo’s concept of “e-trust,” we will discuss all the components of the proposed model and the reasons to trust in human-AI interactions in an example of relevance for business organizations. We end this contribution with an analysis of the epistemic and pragmatic reasons of trust in human-AI interactions and with a discussion of kinds of normativity in trustworthiness of AIs. (shrink) Ethics of Artificial Intelligence, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Moral Status of Artificial Systems in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)   Translate     Export citation     Bookmark   2 citations   added 2020-01-21 Can Novices Trust Themselves to Choose Trustworthy Experts? Reasons for (Reserved) Optimism.Johnny Brennan - 2020 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):227-240.detailsNovices face a problem when it comes to forming true beliefs about controversial issues that they cannot assess themselves: Who are the trustworthy experts? Elizabeth Anderson offers a set of criteria intended to allow novices to form reliable assessments of expert trustworthiness. All they need to assess experts is a high-school education and access to the internet. In this paper, I argue that novices face a much harder time using her criteria effectively than we would expect or hope. This problem (...) is amplified when novices hold the wrong opinions. Such novices need her criteria the most and are the least likely to use them correctly. Such novices lack knowledge necessary for using the criteria accurately, and are likely to resist correction of their wrong opinions due to cognitive biases. After providing reasons to be skeptical of the effectiveness of her criteria, I propose some supplemental criteria to increase their effectiveness: metacognitive reliability conditions aimed at getting novices to assess themselves in the way that they assess experts. Although these additional criteria show promise, we should be reserved in our optimism. (shrink) Testimony in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2020-01-03 Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction.Joseph Shieber - 2015 - Routledge.detailsThe epistemology of testimony has experienced a growth in interest over the last twenty-five years that has been matched by few, if any, other areas of philosophy. _Testimony: A Philosophical Introduction _provides an epistemology of testimony that surveys this rapidly growing research area while incorporating a discussion of relevant empirical work from social and developmental psychology, as well as from the interdisciplinary study of knowledge-creation in groups. The past decade has seen a number of scholarly monographs on the epistemology of (...) testimony, but there is a dearth of books that survey the current field. This book fills that gap, assessing the strengths and weaknesses of all major competing theories. All chapters conclude with Suggestions for Further Reading and Discussion Questions. (shrink) Collective Epistemology in Epistemology Epistemic Injustice in Epistemology Epistemology of Testimony in Epistemology Social Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Sociology of Knowledge in Epistemology Testimony, Misc in Epistemology The Nature of Testimony in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   3 citations   added 2019-12-31 The Fellowship of the Ninth Hour: Christian Reflections on the Nature and Value of Faith.Daniel Howard-Snyder & Daniel J. McKaughan - forthcoming - In James Arcadi & James T. Turner Jr (eds.), The T&T Clark Companion to Analytic Theology. New York, NY, USA: T&T Clark/Bloomsbury. pp. 69-82.detailsIt is common for young Christians to go off to college assured in their beliefs but, in the course of their first year or two, they meet what appears to them to be powerful defenses of scientific naturalism and crushing critiques of the basic Christian story (BCS), and many are thrown into doubt. They think to themselves something like this: "To be honest, I am troubled about the BCS. While the problem of evil, the apparent cultural basis for the diversity (...) of religions, the explanatory breadth of contemporary science, naturalistic explanations of religious experience and miracle reports, and textual and historical criticism of the Bible, among other things, don’t make me believe the BCS is false , I am in serious doubt about it, so much so that I lack belief of it. In that case, how can I have Christian faith? And if I don’t have faith, how can I keep on praying, attending church, affirming the creed, confessing my sins, taking the sacraments, singing the hymns and songs, and so on? I can’t, unless I’m a hypocrite. So integrity requires me to drop the whole thing and get out." Of course, our student is not alone. Many Christians find themselves for some portion of their lives somewhere on the trajectory from doubt to getting out. Indeed, Christians in the West struggle with intellectual doubt more than they used to, especially university-educated Christians. What should we say to them? Some will say “Get out!,” welcoming the development as a path to liberation. We explore a different response in this essay. (shrink) Faith in Philosophy of Religion Philosophical Traditions Religious Experience in Philosophy of Religion Religious Skepticism in Philosophy of Religion Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-12-21 Humility in Networks.Mark Alfano & Emily Sullivan - forthcoming - In Alessandra Tanesini, Michael Lynch & Mark Alfano (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. Routledge.detailsWhat do humility, intellectual humility, and open-mindedness mean in the context of inter-group conflict? We spend most of our time with ingroup members, such as family, friends, and colleagues. Yet our biggest disagreements —— about practical, moral, and epistemic matters —— are likely to be with those who do not belong to our ingroup. An attitude of humility towards the former might be difficult to integrate with a corresponding attitude of humility towards the latter, leading to smug tribalism that masquerades (...) as genuine virtue. These potentially conflicting priorities have recently come to the fore because “tribal epistemology” has so thoroughly infected political and social discourse. Most research on these dispositions focuses on individual traits and dyadic peer-disagreement, with little attention to group membership or inter-group conflict. In this chapter, we dilate the social scale to address this pressing philosophical and social problem. (shrink) Extended Epistemology in Philosophy of Mind Trust in Normative Ethics Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology Remove from this list   Direct download   Translate     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-12-21 Trust in a Social and Digital World.Mark Alfano & Colin Klein - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (8):1-8.detailsEpistemology of Testimony in Epistemology Extended Epistemology in Philosophy of Mind Sociology of Knowledge in Epistemology The Nature of Testimony in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download   Translate     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-12-19 Linking Faith and Trust: Of Contracts and Covenants.Ionut Untea - 2019 - Teoria 39 (1):157-168.detailsTrust is so intimately linked with faith that sometimes trust needs faith to unfold in a relationship. I argue that the role of this faith element in trust is to elevate the status of the one in which we trust so as to emphasize the equal dignity of all the participants in the relationship of trust. Against views that focus on a «rational» trust based on an exaggerated emphasis on the capacity of self-trust as a point of departure for the (...) trust in others, the essay develops toward the depiction of a kind of trust that is rooted in faith and still maintains a «reasonable» character. By way of discussing the implications of Thomas Hobbes’s reflections on covenants and contracts, and Annette Baier’s critique of what she sees as the Hobbesian «fixation» on contracts, I argue toward the identification of what I call a «covenantal trust» in contemporary political ontology. (shrink) Ethics of Belief in Epistemology Hobbes: Moral Psychology in 17th/18th Century Philosophy Moral Contractarianism in Normative Ethics Moral Contractualism in Normative Ethics Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-12-18 Trust as an Unquestioning Attitude.C. Thi Nguyen - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.detailsMost theories of trust presume that trust is a conscious attitude that can be directed only at other agents. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is not simply to rely on something, but to rely on it unquestioningly. It is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. To trust, then, is to set up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world — (...) to permit external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects. When I trust my climbing rope, I climb while putting questions of its reliability out of mind. Many people now trust, in this sense, complex technologies such as search algorithms and online calendars. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Such betrayal is grounded, not in considerations of inter-agential cooperation, but in considerations of functional integration. Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink) Agency in Philosophy of Action Extended Cognition in Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Technology in Philosophy of Computing and Information Trust in Normative Ethics Virtue Epistemology in Epistemology Virtues and Vices in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2019-12-01 Trust, Testimony, and Reasons for Belief.Rebecca Wallbank & Andrew Reisner - forthcoming - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. London: Routledge.detailsThis chapter explores two kinds of testimonial trust, what we call ‘evidential trust’ and ‘non-evidential trust’ with the aim of asking how testimonial trust could provide epistemic reasons for belief. We argue that neither evidential nor non-evidential trust can play a distinctive role in providing evidential reasons for belief, but we tentatively propose that non-evidential trust can in some circumstances provide a novel kind of epistemic reason for belief, a reason of epistemic facilitation. The chapter begins with an extensive discussion (...) of standard accounts of both kinds of trust and criticises especially the standard accounts of non-evidential trust. A new account of non-evidential trust is offered that avoids a number of difficulties that plague the standard accounts by rejecting what we call ‘attitude-liability assumptions’. (shrink) Epistemic Normativity, Misc in Epistemology The Nature of Testimony in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics $154.99 new   $155.00 direct from Amazon   (collection)   Amazon page Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-11-08 Exploitative Epistemic Trust.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York City, New York, Vereinigte Staaten: pp. 241-264.detailsWhere there is trust, there is also vulnerability, and vulnerability can be exploited. Epistemic trust is no exception. This chapter maps the phenomenon of the exploitation of epistemic trust. I start with a discussion of how trust in general can be exploited; a key observation is that trust incurs vulnerabilities not just for the party doing the trusting, but also for the trustee (after all, trust can be burdensome), so either party can exploit the other. I apply these considerations to (...) epistemic trust, specifically in testimonial relationships. There, we standardly think of a hearer trusting a speaker. But we miss an important aspect of this relationship unless we consider too that the speaker standardly trusts the hearer. Given this mutual trust, and given that both trustees and trusters can exploit each other, we have four possibilities for exploitation in epistemic-trust relationships: a speaker exploiting a hearer (a) by accepting his trust or (b) by imposing her trust on him, and a hearer exploiting a speaker (c) by accepting her trust or (d) by imposing his trust on her. One result is that you do not need to betray someone to exploit him – you can exploit him just as easily by doing what he trusts you for. (shrink) Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   2 citations   added 2019-11-08 Introduction: An Overview of Trust and Some Key Epistemological Applications.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - In Trust in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-40.detailsI give an overview of the trust literature and then of six central issues concerning epistemic trust. The survey of trust zeroes in on the kinds of expectations that trust involves, trust’s characteristic psychology, and what makes trust rational. The discussion of epistemic trust focuses on its role in testimony, the epistemic goods that we trust for, the significance of epistemic trust in contrast to reliance, what makes epistemic trust rational, and epistemic self-trust. Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2019-11-08 Loopholes, Gaps, and What is Held Fast.Nancy Potter - 1996 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 3 (4):237-254.detailsThis paper raises questions about who counts as a knower with regard to his or her own memories, what gets counted as a genuine memory, and who will affirm those memories within an epistemic community. I argue for a democratic epistemology informed by an understanding of relations of power. I investigate implications of the claim that knowledge is both social and political and suggest ways it is related to trust. Given the tendency of epistemology to draw lines that discriminate unfairly (...) against some, it is vital that efforts to create democratic epistemologies be sensitive to the potential for exploitation. Standards of credibility often favor members of dominant groups, and our ontological commitments may intersect with patterns of domination. While acknowledging difficulties in evaluating what counts as credible claims to memories, I argue that one’s engagement with clients must be mapped onto the larger moral and political domain. (shrink) Epistemology of Memory in Philosophy of Mind Knowledge in Epistemology Mental Illness in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Ontology in Metaphysics Philosophy of Consciousness in Philosophy of Mind Philosophy of Psychiatry and Psychopathology, Misc in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   5 citations   added 2019-10-27 The Public Understanding of What? Laypersons' Epistemic Needs, the Division of Cognitive Labor, and the Demarcation of Science.Arnon Keren - 2018 - Philosophy of Science 85 (5):781-792.detailsWhat must laypersons understand about science to allow them to make sound decisions on science-related issues? Relying on recent developments in social epistemology, this paper argues that scientific education should have the goal not of bringing laypersons' understanding of science closer to that of expert insiders, but rather of cultivating the kind of competence characteristic of “competent outsiders” (Feinstein 2011). Moreover, it argues that philosophers of science have an important role to play in attempts to promote this kind of understanding, (...) but that to successfully fulfill this role, they will have to approach central questions in the field differently. (shrink) Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   3 citations   added 2019-10-22 Trust, Preemption, and Knowledge.Arnon Keren - 2019 - In Katherine Dormandy (ed.), Trust in Epistemology.detailsThis chapter gives an account of epistemic trust. It argues that trust in general is a matter of declining to take precautions against the trustee’s failing to come through, and that this amounts in the epistemic case to declining to rely on evidence for the testified proposition, instead relying solely on the testifier. But if this is so, how can trust play a positive role in securing knowledge? The key, it is argued, lies in recognizing that trust is preemptive: Trusting (...) someone entails believing that she is trustworthy, and this belief preempts other evidence about whether she will come through. In other words, this belief gives the truster himself a good reason to desist from relying on evidence other than the trustee’s word. But if trust is preemptive, how is it compatible with epistemic responsibility, which seems to involve relying on your own evidence? Because, it is claimed, preempting your own evidence in favor of the testifier’s say-so enables your belief to be supported by her evidence – which, we may assume, is superior to your own. Far from forfeiting epistemic responsibility, then, epistemic trust on the preemptive account gives you justificatory access to a swathe of evidence that you would not otherwise have had. (shrink) Epistemology of Testimony in Epistemology Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-10-10 Trust, Autonomy, and the Fiduciary Relationship.Carolyn McLeod & Emma Ryman - 2020 - In Paul Miller & Matthew Harding (eds.), Fiduciaries and Trust: Ethics, Politics, Economics, and Law. Cambridge, UK: pp. 74-86.detailsSome accounts of the fiduciary relationship place trust and autonomy at odds with one another, so that trusting a fiduciary to act on one’s behalf reduces one’s ability to be autonomous. In this chapter, we critique this view of the fiduciary relationship (particularly bilateral instances of this relationship) using contemporary work on autonomy and ‘relational autonomy’. Theories of relational autonomy emphasize the role that interpersonal trust and social relationships play in supporting or hampering one’s ability to act autonomously. We argue (...) that fiduciary relationships, understood through the lens of relational autonomy, can provide a means of enhancing, rather than diminishing, beneficiaries’ autonomy. (shrink) Autonomy, Misc in Social and Political Philosophy Philosophy of Law, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Law Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   2 citations   added 2019-09-27 Disappointed Yet Unbetrayed: A New Three-Place Analysis of Trust.Edward Hinchman - forthcoming - In Kevin Vallier & Michael Weber (eds.), Social Trust.detailsThis paper engages two debates about trust, deriving from two distinct questions about the nature of trust. The first asks how to define trust. Does trusting B to φ involve anything more than relying on B to φ? The second asks about the normative structure of trust. Does trust most fundamentally embody a two-place or a three-place relation? I’ll defend a new position in the second debate that yields an equally new position in the first. -/- The standard three-place model (...) highlights ‘A trusts B to φ.’ The two-place model prefers ‘A trusts B.’ On my new three-place model, both are less fundamental than ‘A φs through trust in B.’ We do, of course, trust people to do things. But the most fundamental form of trust lies in doing something through trust in a person. I call this the Assurance View of trust because I’ll argue that trusting involves accepting another’s invitation to trust – an assurance, in effect, that the other is relevantly trustworthy. -/- Trust thereby differs from mere reliance by how it makes available a reason to rely on the trusted. In mere reliance, your reason to rely on B is exogenous to the reliance relation, emerging, for example, from B’s track record of relevant reliability. When you trust B, by contrast, you take yourself to have a reason to rely on B that is endogenous to your trust, a reason grounded not merely in B’s reliability, exogenously considered, but in B’s ongoing responsiveness to your relevant needs. -/- The Assurance View’s key insight emerges, I’ll argue, from cases wherein trust is disappointed – the trusted does not do what you trusted her to do – yet not thereby betrayed. (shrink) Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-09-20 Balancing the Normativity of Expertise.Markus Seidel - 2019 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8 (7):34-40.detailsSocial Epistemology, Misc in Epistemology Sociology of Knowledge in Epistemology Sociology of Science in General Philosophy of Science Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2019-09-16 Trust in Medicine: Its Nature, Justification, Significance, and Decline.Markus Wolfensberger & Anthony Wrigley - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.detailsOver the past decades, public trust in medical professionals has steadily declined. This decline of trust and its replacement by ever tighter regulations is increasingly frustrating physicians. However, most discussions of trust are either abstract philosophical discussions or social science investigations not easily accessible to clinicians. The authors, one a surgeon-turned-philosopher, the other an analytical philosopher working in medical ethics, joined their expertise to write a book which straddles the gap between the practical and theoretical. Using an approach grounded in (...) the methods of conceptual analysis found in analytical philosophy which also draws from approaches to medical diagnosis, the authors have conceived an internally coherent and comprehensive definition of trust to help elucidate the concept and explain its decline in the medical context. This book should appeal to all interested in the ongoing debate about the decline of trust - be it as medical professionals, medical ethicists, medical lawyers, or philosophers. (shrink) Conceptual Analysis in Metaphilosophy Medical Ethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list     Export citation     Bookmark   added 2019-08-22 Lying, Trust, and Gratitude.Collin O'neil - 2012 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (4):301-333.detailsAmong the various methods of deceit, lying is often thought to be a special affront on the grounds that it invites the victim’s trust. Such an explanation is incomplete without an account of the moral significance of trust. This article distinguishes two morally problematic relations to trust, betrayals and abuses, and, appealing to the idea that we should be grateful to be trusted, attempts to explain these wrongs as violations of distinct demands of gratitude for trust. Only the wrong of (...) abuse, not betrayal, is useful for distinguishing methods of deceit. Although lying commits an abuse of trust, it turns out that it is really the broader category of deceit by means of communication that is special in this way. -/- . (shrink) Deception in Applied Ethics Gratitude in Normative Ethics Social and Political Philosophy Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)     Export citation     Bookmark   3 citations   added 2019-08-19 Betraying Trust.Collin O'Neil - 2017 - In Paul Faulkner & Thomas W. Simpson (eds.), The Philosophy of Trust. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 70-89.detailsTrust not only disposes us to feel betrayed, trust can be betrayed. Understanding what a betrayal of trust is requires understanding how trust can ground an obligation on the part of the trusted person to act specifically as trusted. This essay argues that, since trust cannot ground an appropriate obligation where there is no prior obligation, a betrayal of trust should instead be conceived as the violation of a trust-based obligation to respect an already existing obligation. Two forms of trust (...) are evaluated for their potential to ground such a second-order obligation. One form counts as a gift to the trusted person only because it does not involve an expectation of trustworthiness; the other form cannot count as a gift but confers an honor because it does include an expectation of trustworthiness. Only trust that confers an honor generates a second-order obligation whose violation would be a betrayal of trust. -/- . (shrink) Moral Psychology, Misc in Normative Ethics Normative Ethics, Miscellaneous in Normative Ethics Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)   Translate     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   added 2019-07-25 Public Trust in Science: Exploring the Idiosyncrasy-Free Ideal.Marion Boulicault & S. Andrew Schroeder - forthcoming - In Social Trust.detailsWhat makes science trustworthy to the public? This chapter examines one proposed answer: the trustworthiness of science is based at least in part on its independence from the idiosyncratic values, interests, and ideas of individual scientists. That is, science is trustworthy to the extent that following the scientific process would result in the same conclusions, regardless of the particular scientists involved. We analyze this "idiosyncrasy-free ideal" for science by looking at philosophical debates about inductive risk, focusing on two recent proposals (...) which offer different methods of avoiding idiosyncrasy: the high epistemic standards proposal and the democratic values proposal. (shrink) Inductive Risk in General Philosophy of Science Science and Values in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Research Ethics in Applied Ethics Trust in Normative Ethics Remove from this list   Direct download     Export citation     Bookmark   1 citation   1 — 50 / 798 BibTeX / EndNote / RIS / etc Export this page: Choose a format.. Formatted text Plain text BibTeX Zotero EndNote Reference Manager Limit to items. Restrictions online only open access only published only Viewing options show categories categorization shortcuts hide abstracts open articles in new windows Open Category Editor Off-campus access Using PhilPapers from home? Create an account to enable off-campus access through your institution's proxy server. Monitor this page Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it: Email   RSS feed Editorial team General Editors: David Bourget (Western Ontario) David Chalmers (ANU, NYU) Area Editors: David Bourget Gwen Bradford Berit Brogaard Margaret Cameron David Chalmers James Chase Rafael De Clercq Ezio Di Nucci Barry Hallen Hans Halvorson Jonathan Ichikawa Michelle Kosch Øystein Linnebo JeeLoo Liu Paul Livingston Brandon Look Manolo Martínez Matthew McGrath Michiru Nagatsu Susana Nuccetelli Giuseppe Primiero Jack Alan Reynolds Darrell P. Rowbottom Aleksandra Samonek Constantine Sandis Howard Sankey Jonathan Schaffer Thomas Senor Robin Smith Daniel Star Jussi Suikkanen Lynne Tirrell Aness Webster Other editors Contact us Learn more about PhilPapers loading .. 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