untitled


What is Epistemological Violence in the Empirical Social
Sciences?

Thomas Teo*
York University

Abstract

This article discusses the meaning of epistemological violence in the empirical social sciences. It is
argued that the concept is closer to personal than to structural violence in that it has a subject, an
object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical: the subject of violence is
the researcher, the object is the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented
as knowledge. Using a hypothetical example, the problem of interpretation in empirical research
on the Other is discussed. Epistemological violence refers to the interpretation of social-scientific
data on the Other and is produced when empirical data are interpreted as showing the inferiority of
or problematizes the Other, even when data allow for equally viable alternative interpretations.
Interpretations of inferiority or problematizations are understood as actions that have a negative
impact on the Other. Because the interpretations of data emerge from an academic context and
thus are presented as knowledge, they are defined as epistemologically violent actions. Problems,
consequences, and practices surrounding this concept are discussed.

Introduction

Forty-one years ago, Galtung (1969) encouraged the conceptualization of ‘theoretically
significant dimensions of violence that can lead thinking, research, and potentially, action,
toward the most important problems’ (p. 168). Following this maxim, he developed the
now famous distinction between personal and structural violence, arguing convincingly that
structures such as social injustice can be understood as violence. The term epistemological
violence (EV) that I discuss here is, however, closer to personal violence in that it has a
subject, an object, and an action, even if the violence is indirect and nonphysical. I argue
that in the empirical social sciences, the subject of violence is the researcher, the object is
the Other, and the action is the interpretation of data that is presented as knowledge.

A Hypothetical Example

Once upon a time, a writer proposed that humanity should be divided into large-eared
and small-eared people. The writer suggested that small-eared people do not listen, have
lower musical ability, are deficient in the ability to empathize with others, and much
more. Because they lack interpersonal skills, small-eared people are also responsible for
cruelty and some of the greatest evils in world history. The government of the time
endorsed the writer’s ideas and enacted laws that divided children, based on the new con-
cept of earedness, into separate kindergartens and schools. As a consequence, the whole of
society was divided into large- and small-eared classes, with separate education, health,
and legal systems, and with separate housing and recreational spheres for each group.

Later, and at the time when psychology became an independent discipline, researchers
began to test hypotheses regarding earedness with empirical means. They found that

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several of the assumptions regarding earedness, although not all, had empirical support.
More recently, evolutionary psychologists discussed the adaptive advantage of ear size;
clinical psychologists used the concept as a broad diagnostic tool; psychologists of religion
found that religious founders had disproportionately larger ears than their contemporaries;
historians of psychology estimated the large-earedness of psychological pioneers using
paintings, photographs, and ear descriptions; and debates as to whether Kant had larger
ears than Descartes, or whether Kant’s large-earedness had been overestimated, took place
among personality psychologists.

Yet, some criticism of the concept also emerged: Methodologists argued that earedness
must be adjusted for by height and gender and that the variable is continuous rather than
discontinuous. Other critics argued that earedness is a social construct. However, defenders
of the concept pointed out that empirical studies confirm the significance of earedness, that
the variable is an excellent predictor of professional success, and that earedness demon-
strates high correlations with many other psychological variables. They also pointed out
that the average person knows that earedness has always existed and that to deny it would
contradict common sense.

To put critics to rest, a leading research team of psychologists provided a large-scale
study and a meta-analysis of previous earedness studies. All results showed that there is a
consistent difference between large-eared and small-eared individuals, and twin studies
demonstrated that the trait is highly heritable. The psychologists interpreted the results in
the following way: ‘Because the pattern of differences between large-eared and
small-eared groups can be found in numerous studies and in this meta-analysis, we must
conclude that the difference is an irrefutable fact. Earedness has a biologic correlate that
can be measured objectively and reliably, and twin studies show that earedness is a highly
heritable trait. Because the difference in empathy between small-eared people and
large-eared people is inherited, it is reasonable to separate these two groups into different
spheres of social life.’

Approaching Epistemological Violence

One could challenge the original theory of earedness or the social construction of the
concept, assess the motivations of researchers, understand the economic interests involved,
or analyze the methodologies that were used – and all these actions would be legitimate.
My argument is focused on the interpretation of data and the lack of hermeneutic
awareness about what goes into an interpretation. I suggest that interpretations, as most
often expressed in the discussion section of empirical articles, are a form of action, and if
concrete interpretations have negative consequences for groups – even though alternative,
equally plausible interpretations of the data are available – then a form of violence is
committed. Because the interpretations are presented as knowledge, or because they
emerge from science, they represent EV (see Teo, 2008).

In this particular example, one could make the argument that the study of earedness
itself is a form of EV. However, as introduced, the concept of EV is limited to the
interpretation (discussion) part of an empirical article. This specific limitation on the
hermeneutic part of discussion provides a framework for concrete analysis. In the example
provided, there are at least two forms of EV in the interpretation part: (i) the interpreta-
tion itself is a form of violence, for instance, because the concept of earedness is not
challenged and (ii) the interpretation is violent because specific policy recommendations
are made or accepted (i.e., regarding the separation of the two groups). Traditional
psychologists will have fewer problems with the second kind of EV, because it reinforces

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the distinction between facts and decisions. However, the first form of EV might be more
contentious among traditional psychologists because it requires an understanding of the
historical and theoretical situatedness of a concept such as earedness, as well as an accep-
tance of the idea that empirically validated research itself can have a negative impact on
human groups (e.g., the interpretation that one group is by nature less empathic than
another group can have a negative impact).

Theoretical Justification of the Concept

The term epistemic violence has been used by postcolonial researchers such as Spivak (1988)
who applied the concept in a very general sense whenever the Other had been con-
structed. I would like to introduce the concept to the empirical social sciences and iden-
tify the very moment in which violence is produced. To do that, we begin with an
analysis of the relationship between data and the interpretation (discussion) of data. Of
course, one could locate the process earlier when hypotheses are developed and data are
collected. Hypotheses can be violent, but such a qualification may depend on the inten-
tions of the researcher whereas the interpretation of data is an action that can be assessed
epistemologically and ethically.

The relationship between data and interpretation of data has been the subject of
numerous philosophical and psychological studies. The argument was originally developed
in the context of the natural sciences: The physicist Pierre-Maurice-Marie Duhem
(1861–1916) (1905 ⁄ 1954) suggested that experiments in physics contain observations of
phenomena and theoretical interpretations that cannot be separated. In North America,
the underdetermination of theory by data is often associated with Quine (1969). In
psychology, the critical German psychologist Klaus Holzkamp (1964 ⁄ 1981) published a
monograph on the problem. He argued that the theoretical interpretation of experimental
results is not binding and there exist no criteria in experimental psychology for establish-
ing particular theoretical interpretations as valid. Indeed, the book addresses an issue that
has not been solved in the more than four decades since its publication.

Holzkamp (1964 ⁄ 1981) labeled the ambiguous relationship between theory and
experiment in psychology as the problem of representation, meaning the mode in which
experimental propositions are representative (or not) of theoretical propositions. The
problem arises because for any given experimental proposition, additional theoretical
propositions can be supplemented through interpretation, and because each experimental
proposition has infinite theoretical meanings. There exists no methodological principle
that forces a researcher to interpret any given experimental proposition in a specific way.
On the other hand, theoretical propositions allow for a variety of experimental designs so
that both elements in this process demonstrate plural meanings.

A set of data may be interpreted in many different ways. Usually data are interpreted
within the original framework from which the empirical research was developed.
However, this is not a necessity because data do not determine interpretations. If that
were the case, psychologists would not need interpretations (discussions of empirical
results) and we could end empirical research (quantitative or qualitative) with just the
data. However, discussions or interpretations of data are often the most important part of
a research article in the sense that they may be summarized in textbooks or conveyed to
students, the mass media, and the public.

Interpretations produce meaning within a theoretical framework. Empirical psychologists
cannot operate without interpretations that are based on an understanding of the meaning
of results. One problem arises when these interpretations (i.e., theoretical propositions

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derived from the empirical propositions) are presented as facts or knowledge. Yet, knowledge
that is produced in empirical psychological studies contains empirical results and theoretical
interpretations. These interpretations are not determined by data and require a hermeneutic
process. For example, if one finds differences in IQ between racialized groups, which may
be an empirical result, the interpretation that this difference is a result of genetic factors, is a
theoretical interpretation that is not determined in any way by data showing empirical
difference.

‘Knowledge’ About the Other and a Definition of Epistemological Violence

Yet, if an empirical difference is interpreted as inferiority or problematizes the Other,
whether this theorizing has epistemological or practical consequences, one should speak of
a form of violence that is produced in ‘knowledge.’ In these cases, interpretations of data
(and not data!) turn into epistemological violence. Epistemological violence is a practice that is
executed in empirical articles and books in psychology, when theoretical interpretations
regarding empirical results implicitly or explicitly construct the Other as inferior or prob-
lematic, despite the fact that alternative interpretations, equally viable based on the data,
are available. Interpretations of inferiority, or problematizations (see Teo, 2004), are never
determined by empirical results; yet, they have a negative impact on the Other. Thus,
interpretations are the actions of a subject against an object that one must label as violent.

The epistemological part in this concept suggests that these theoretical interpretations are
framed as knowledge about the Other when in reality they are interpretations regarding
data. The term violence denotes that this ‘knowledge’ has a negative impact on the Other
or that the theoretical interpretations are produced to the detriment of the Other. The
negative impact can range from misrepresentations and distortions to a neglect of the
voices of the Other, to propositions of inferiority, and to the recommendations of adverse
practices or infringements concerning the Other. The term epistemological violence as it is
used in the argument does not refer to the misuse of research in general but is specific to
theoretical interpretations of empirical results that have negative connotations for the
Other in a given community.

The idea that Black individuals are intellectually inferior by nature (see Rushton, 1995)
when expressed in an academic article has consequences for the Black reader or for
non-Black readers who might construct the Black person as intellectually inferior, which
might change their behavior or attitudes. A close look at this type of research shows that
the theory (Blacks are intellectually inferior by nature) has never been tested directly but
that empirical findings of difference are interpreted that way. I submit that such a
theoretical proposition is violent in that it leads to harm. It should also be mentioned
from the history of race studies that policies were changed because of the theoretical
interpretations of researchers and psychologists (e.g., see Gould, 1996, on the US Immigra-
tion Restriction Act). Because the harm is accomplished by researchers and is epistemologi-
cal in nature, I use the term epistemological violence. This violence and damage is done
under the authority of social science and knowledge.

Epistemological-Ethical Aspects of the Concept

The concept of epistemological violence is descriptive although it has clearly ethical
connotations. The concept is not about political correctness but about scientific correct-
ness. It is relatively easy to train individuals to identify epistemological violence in an
article: they need to look at the problem of representation (do the empirical propositions

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allow one to test the theoretical propositions and do the theoretical propositions represent
the empirical data?), the problem of underdetermination (do the empirical results determine
the theoretical interpretations or are there are equally viable alternative theoretical
interpretations?), and at the question of whether the Other is constructed as inferior or as
problematic.

At this point, it should be mentioned that progressive interpretations of differences
regarding the Other may also be underdetermined by data. However, if the theoretical
propositions do not construct the Other as inferior or problematic, then these theoretical
propositions are not epistemologically violent. For example, to interpret the empirical
difference, namely the underrepresentation of women faculty at elite universities in the
United States, as indicating that women are less intelligent than men, is an epistemologi-
cally violent interpretation of empirical data. To interpret the same difference of the same
empirical study as indicating that women are oppressed at elite universities also should be
identified as a problem of underdetermination and representation, but such a proposition
would not be epistemologically violent to women.

Because interpretations are actions, we can evaluate the concrete consequences of
interpretations (see also Austin, 1975). If interpretations are beneficial to the Other, then
they may still be underdetermined by the data, but they may not lead to harm. On the
other hand, some actions have harmful consequences for the Other. In such cases,
communities of the negatively constructed Other should be the source for establishing the
criteria for harm. There exists collective violence (wars), individual violence (one person
against another), and violence executed by scientists (epistemological violence). EV is
likely to be asymmetrical: EV executed by scientists cannot be countered by public
rejection because the name of science has a higher status than theoretical criticism
expressed by a marginalized Other.

At this point in reflection, one could raise the question of whether a theoretical
interpretation that is epistemologically violent should also be considered a hate crime. Is
epistemological violence the equivalent of an academic hate crime? I have suggested that
the concept of EV is intended as descriptive rather than legal. If it were a legal matter,
then, at least in parts of North America, one would have to begin with the distinction
between a hate crime and hate speech. A hate crime involves a criminal act, whereas in
hate speech, the speech itself is punished (see Gerstenfeld, 2004). Although the law distin-
guishes between a conduct and an expression, this distinction is not completely clear from
a philosophical (and a legal) perspective because expressing propositions in writing or
through a presentation is a form of action. Still, I would emphasize that a theoretical
interpretation of empirical results, as epistemologically violent as it may be, should not
have the same legal status as lynching. If interpretations contain calls for action (e.g.,
Siemens, 1937, asking for the sterilization of the feeble-minded), then they may reach the
same level, but such an assessment can often only be established a posteriori (in hindsight).
I prefer to have this discussion developed in the social-scientific domain by pointing out
the relationship between empirical research and theoretical propositions of interpretation,
by discussing the history and its consequences for the construction of the Other, and by
identifying epistemological violence committed by academics against the Other.

Contexts of Reflection

Theoretical propositions about the Other are very powerful in psychology because they
appear to be based on empirical studies. The past successes and to a certain degree the
current shaping of discourse on the Other can be attributed to psychologists’ accepted

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usage of mainstream empirical methods that are applied, for example, to the comparison
of various racialized groups. Social, historical, philosophical, and political challenges to
this type of research are quickly dismissed by the argument that critics do not use statisti-
cal testing. An analysis of the context of discovery is seen as irrelevant to the actual results
of experimental and empirical studies. Thus, I suggest that empirical research on the Other
requires a three-pronged challenge:

(i) An analysis of the context of discovery: this approach is focused on why researchers are
interested in studying the Other. Critical reconstructions might look at underlying
cultural, political, economic, and personal interests and might identify the social origins of
hypotheses, concepts, and theories (see also Danziger, 1997; for an example, see Teo,
2009). (ii) An analysis of the context of justification: this approach refers to identifying
selective sampling or selective data reporting, as well as the reliability, validity, and
objectivity of the concepts and instruments used, or the presentation of correlation as
causation, and so on. Studies in this tradition investigate the logic of research that, for exam-
ple, has led to scientific racism. (iii) An analysis of the context of interpretation: here, one
analyzes the relationship between theory, data and discussion and assesses the quality of
the interpretation of data in psychological studies. One would also be interested in the
consequences of interpretation. This hermeneutic perspective does not exclude the two
former perspectives. On the contrary, all types of reconstructions complement each other
and provide a better understanding of empirical research in the social sciences.

For instance, a critical study would be focused on those socio-historical developments
that led to an interest in studying IQ differences, the validity of the concept of IQ, and
how an empirical finding of IQ differences is representative of a theory of inherited dif-
ferences between racialized groups. In addition, one would look at how empirical findings
of IQ differences are interpreted and at the consequences of interpretations of inherited
differences on the Other, the public, or the academic discourse. An important part of such
a program would not only be the deconstruction of the concepts of race or IQ but also an
assessment of the relationship between empirical research and interpretations.

Earlier I mentioned that ideas and hypotheses themselves could be labeled as violent.
Indeed, it would not be difficult to identify violent hypotheses or ideas (‘do women
enjoy being abused,’ ‘was there ever a Holocaust’). But hypotheses and ideas are not
considered knowledge within the traditional logic of research; yet, the theoretical
interpretation of empirical data is presented and understood as knowledge. Some research-
ers enjoy pointing out that there should be no censorship on what hypotheses can be
studied. Thus, a focus on and a critical analysis of violent hypotheses would soon be
trapped in a debate over what research should be allowed. This would put critics quickly
on the defensive. Yet, a focus on the theoretical interpretation of empirical data (knowl-
edge) would put the onus on the researcher to justify his or her interpretations, whereas a
critic would need to identify the issue of representation and underdetermination and
point to the hermeneutic deficit within research on the Other.

Hermeneutic Deficits and Responsibility of the Social Scientist

Finally, I would like to consider the idea of epistemological responsibility (see also Code,
1987). Do researchers need to be conscious of the consequences of their interpretations
on the Other? I would argue that they must consider the problem of the hermeneutic
surplus of interpretations and the hermeneutic deficits of empirical research and that they
must take into account the need to become self-reflective and, if possible, educated
and trained in hermeneutics (the art of interpretation) and knowledgeable regarding the

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relationship between data and interpretation. Yet, social scientists who are experts in
particular areas assume that they have a superior understanding of the events and objects
in their area of research. That may be a self-misunderstanding. Instead, I recommend that
besides studying the context of discovery and justification, researchers should become
aware of the possible limitations of their own interpretations and should be particularly
careful when interpreting differences between ‘us’ and the Other.

Empirical psychologists turn a hermeneutic deficit (one interpretation among many
possible) into a surplus (one interpretation is presented as knowledge). The hermeneutic
surplus, the presentation of a particular interpretation as knowledge, imparts meaning to
data and makes results understandable. Data are understood better than they would be if
they were to present themselves. Interpretations have a hermeneutic function for the
authors themselves, for peers, and for other readers. Most clearly the hermeneutic surplus
is expressed in textbooks and in the mass media. Textbooks and mass media do not
report detailed data but provide a hermeneutic summary of the results based on authors’
hermeneutic interpretation of the results. Sometimes, this is solely expressed in one
sentence, as in the following: ‘Studies have shown that small-eared people are less
empathic than large-eared people and earedness is highly heritable.’ Of course, it should
be mentioned that presenting only the data and leaving out the discussion section in a
scientific article would not remedy the situation because interpretations would be
confined to laypersons’ interpretations of data. Given the political affordances of certain
topics (Teo, 2005), we should not expect that this would lead to better interpretations.
Indeed, the field would be left with a pandemonium of interpretations, or worse,
interpretations that reflect ‘common sense’ ideologies of racism, classism, and sexism.

The hermeneutic surplus goes hand in hand with the rhetoric of ‘facts.’ But facts or
empirical knowledge, or even truth, contain data and interpretations. This is not
understood sufficiently by scientists and psychologists. One could label this phenomenon
as a self-misunderstanding of empirical psychology: Although it is clear that data and
interpretations (discussions) are separated in a scientific article, authors often present their
discussions as knowledge and facts. Historical examples demonstrate the meaning of a
hermeneutic surplus more clearly because common sense interpretations or interpretations
embedded within a Zeitgeist have shifted away from these historical interpretations, and
the absurdity of the discussions is often clearly seen (e.g., the belief that Italians are by
nature less intelligent than Northern Europeans).

It appears to me that the discipline is lost when it comes to the interpretation of data.
Interpretation is left to the hermeneutic competence of the individual researcher, who
might not be aware of the role of understanding in interpretation and of his ⁄ her own
hermeneutic deficits. In the context of scientific racism, sexism, and classism, I suggest
that the methodological part is only secondarily responsible for biased research and that
the larger part is a result of the hermeneutic deficit combined with the worldviews and
ideologies of researchers. This hermeneutic deficit appears when the epistemological, the
ontological, and indeed, the ethical meaning of studying group differences is not under-
stood and when rules, criteria, and guidelines for valid interpretations are not provided
by the discipline.

Interpretations have an impact on people and they have practical and ethical conse-
quences. If I were to choose an interpretation that suggests that it is in the nature of
small-eared individuals to be less empathic than large-eared individuals – and this choice
is made in the context of an existing social division – then consequences are implied.
Opposing interpretations that suggest that small-eared people are actually superior in
certain respects to large-eared people are also embedded in a hermeneutic structure that

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is not determined by data. Bad interpretations may occur on all sides. The denial of the
impact of interpretations, a problem that is not understood in the empirical social
sciences, can also be traced back to the idea of value-neutrality. But rather than spending
time on defending something that is impossible, I recommend reflections on the implicit
and often biased forms of intuition (Teo & Febbraro, 2003) that guide empirical research-
ers.

Short Biography

Thomas Teo is Associate Professor in the History and Theory of Psychology Program at York
University and current editor of the Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology,
published by the Educational Publishing Foundation of the American Psychological
Association. He has published historical and theoretical articles in Theory & Psychology,
New Ideas in Psychology, Canadian Psychology, Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences,
History of Psychology, Humanistic Psychologist, etc. His latest monograph The Critique of
Psychology: From Kant to Postcolonial Theory was published in 2005 (Springer) and his latest
co-edited book from 2009 Varieties of theoretical psychology: International philosophical and
practical concerns (Captus) address the intersection of philosophy, metatheory, and psychol-
ogy. Currently, he analyzes the historical and theoretical foundations of psychology based
on critical-hermeneutic analyses, including the ontological, epistemological, and ethical
challenges to psychology. He reconstructs the history of psychology as the history of the
critique of psychology, the history of philosophical psychology, and the history and
theory of scientific racism in psychology and the human sciences. He is Fellow of the
Canadian Psychological Association and executive committee member in historical and
theoretical divisions of various academic organizations. More information can be found
on his website: http://www.yorku.ca/tteo.

Endnote

* Correspondence address: Thomas Teo, Department of Psychology, History and Theory of Psychology, York
University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. E-mail: tteo@yorku.ca.

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