id	author	title	date	pages	extension	mime	words	sentences	flesch	summary	cache	txt
work_jqv2t74nqzhrnj4vcuf2mzhndu	Kimberley Brownlee	Freedom of Association: It's Not What You Think	2014.0	17	.pdf	application/pdf	8922	613	56	associative contributions are not required; and (iii) a highly constrained, contentsensitive moral claim-right that protects only those wrongful associations that It is secondary to positive associative claim-rights that protect our fundamental Freedom of intimate association with family members, friends and acquaintances is not what we tend to think it is. positions, intimate associative freedom is neither a general moral permission to associate or not as we wish nor a content-insensitive moral claim-right that a claim-right, associative freedom is highly constrained and content-sensitive. The positive associative claim-rights that curtail our moral permissions dependency, we have no positive right to have intimate associates just as we may have a moral claim-right not to associate that protects us when we act Now, if associative freedom is a claim-right of conduct, what is the protected First, our associative claim-rights do not protect us in forming friendships case, More's (and the Duke's) claim-rights do not protect the association.	./cache/work_jqv2t74nqzhrnj4vcuf2mzhndu.pdf	./txt/work_jqv2t74nqzhrnj4vcuf2mzhndu.txt