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            © 2017 Nikola Gjorshoski                                          
         This is an open access article distributed under the CC-BY 3.0 License.  

         Peer review method: Double-Blind  

         Date of acceptance: March 08, 2017 
         Date of publication: May 05, 2017 

         Review article 

            UDC 342.74:28]:342.4 
 

 

 

 

Nikola Gjorshoski  
Law faculty, University “St. Kliment Ohridski” - Bitola, Macedonia 

ngjorshoski@gmail.com 

 

 

Abstract 

 
Modern constitutional and political concepts, in a broad sense, represent an expressed codification of the 

elements of value that structure the relevant society or the particular group that tries to project or channel 

them through the existing order. The secularism vs. Islamism dichotomy is a part of such a conceptual 

framework. The author elaborates and compares both ultimate constitutional and political designs, specifying 

them through the example of Turkey and Iran, as well as to shows the basic characteristics through the prism 

of their political legitimacy, the organization of power, the human rights and freedoms, as well as the 

possibility of political activism. The thesis that the author notes develops in the direction of a warning that the 

extremes contained in the constitutional provisions in the vividly ideologically divided societies can be a 

source of a conflict and/or can generate instability or suffocation of the pluralism in the political arena.  

 
Key words: Secularism; Islamism; Velajet-i-Faqih; Kemalism; Atli ok; Constitutional-political design  
 

 
 

 

INTRODUCTION 

 

The phenomenon of the secularism-Islamism dichotomy in the modern 

constitutional design of the contemporary Muslim societies became characteristic 

especially after the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and conceived after the victory of the 

Kemalists in Turkey in 1924. This paper is but a general conceptual illustration aimed at 

determining several key respects. Firstly, what constitutes the core of the secular and the 

Islamist constitutional postulate and what are its visible features? Secondly, what are the 

essential differences in the access to political and societal value components, manifested 

through the prism of the organization of power, human rights and freedoms and the 

possibility of a political action?  



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Lastly, yet not less ephemeral, the paper illustrates the historical genesis of the 

occurrence of the respective constitutional and political groups, and, thus would assume the 

trajectory of their impact on the social life. 

The political system gains its primary social category codification through the 

primacy of the constitutional design. Thereto, its essential determinant is its stabilization 

and valorization of the political value elements of the mainsail of the social fabric or a 

particular group. The latter domain depends largely on his consistent output. Heywood is 

absolutely right when he notes that although the idea of constitutionalism is closely 

associated with liberal tendencies, there is nothing that would prevent the undemocratic 

character of the constitution (Hejvud 2004, 542). Thus, if the constitutional conception is 

undemocratic, it ejects certain subjects in the affirmative or subordinate role, and we cannot 

talk about a democratic political system. 

This statement aims to reconfirm our next question: Are there, actually, in the 

constitutional political design of Turkey and Iran, provisions that affirm some at the 

expense of other political parties, and what generation gets through the political discourse? 

Can the other thesis, the one of Fareed Zakaria strengthen the “illiberal democracy” 

(Zakaria 1997, 27) to be plausible in our case? Can we identify a system that would be 

basically democratic and not open–plural, and to what extent can such a system be 

modeled? To which extent the existing constitutional and political systems of Turkey and 

Iran are willing to be open to individuals with different political and ideological platforms 

of the established official doctrine? 

The attempt of copying a constitutional political order inherent in the Western 

European regimes in Turkey under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in 1924 and its acute rejection 

and the designing of their own “Islamic” model in Iran led by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1974 

paved the way in the Muslim world for the future model of a socio-political organization 

and orientation. In fact, the two countries represent, to a greater or a lesser extent, an 

identification basis, or an initial burst and a benchmark for the countries of the Muslim 

provenance – though quite often degenerated and transformed into an authoritarian regime, 

especially after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the communist regimes and 

the Soviet Union. Both countries contain fairly homogeneous religious or, even, ethnic 

structure, and produce radically different socio-political and constitutional creeds as the 

basic creed of political action, domestically and internationally. This narrative would, 

undoubtedly, lead to a polarization of the political climate and the social existence in 

general. Hereafter, the author would address exactly those components. It is especially 

important to note that the concepts in the paper are related to the basics of the constitutional 

and the political design and it does not include the recent developments in Turkey, such as 

the attempted coup and the initiative last constitutional changes that strengthen the power 

of President Erdogan. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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KEMALIST TURKEY: 

MILITANT SECULARISM AND TURKISH NATIONALISM 

 

Happy is the one who says, I am a Turk 

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 

 

The transformation of Turkey as a pro-Western state with institutions such as the 

Western European ones began after the defeat in the First World War. A lot of factors 

contributed to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the change into a secular republic. 

Firstly, the continuum consists of: the growth of the Young Turks movement, a series of 

numerous national liberation uprisings of the various ethnicities in the Empire and, finally, 

the defeat in the Balkan Wars, the Great War and the peace Treaties of Sevres and 

Lausanne. On October 29, 1923 it was proclaimed the Republic and the very same day 

Mustafa Kemal was elected as its first president. Schulz notes that it, in fact, was the first 

victory of the urban nationalists over the old regime in the modern Islamic world, and the 

republic came to symbolize the victory. Its ideals, such as sovereignty and share of power, 

fully corresponded to urban the Turkish nationalist worldview, aimed at the “European 

discourse” (Schulze 2000, 53). Ataturk strengthened its position by implementing a single-

party system, and under the guise of pacifism expressed in the motto “Peace at home – 

peace in the world”, he removed all the competitive forces that would threaten his power 

and authority. The multiparty system established itself almost a decade after his death. 

Before the brief examination of the organization of the government, the central 

institutions and the fundamental values of the constitutional and the political order of 

Kemalist Turkey, several essential activities that contributed to de-islamization of the 

Turkish society should be pointed out: the abolition of the Sultanate, the abolition of the 

Madrasas, the abolition of the Caliphate, the acceptance of the Latin alphabet instead of the 

Arabic script, the prohibition of the fez and the turban as a social reactionary decadence, 

the declaration of Sunday as a holiday instead of Friday (Juma), the agrarian reform and the 

abolition of polygamy, as well as the legal equality accompanied by the suffrage of women 

etc. The series of such steps determines the roadmap towards Westernization and the exit 

from the traditional Orientalism. 

Turkey is a Parliamentary republic whose political system is largely based on the 

position of the Parliament and the cooperation with the bi-cephalous executive. The 

constitutional order has experienced three general metamorphoses; from the concentration 

of power in the hands of the Parliament and the unreal separation of the powers between the 

legislative and the executive (the 1924 Constitution), through a bi-cameral legislative – 

introducing a Senate as a second (upper) House and strengthening the Government's 

position – the Ministerial Council (Bakanlar Kurulu) and the prime Minister (Bashbakan), 

the creation of the Constitutional Court, the separation of the party membership and the 

militarist provenance of the President (the 1961 Constitution), to the final stipulation of the 

fundamental human rights and freedoms as an integral part of the Turkish society, as well 

as strengthening the powers of the President, mirroring the French Fifth Republic and the 

abolition of the Senate (the 1982 Constitution), (Demiri 2009, 114). 

The central institutions under the current Constitution have the following 

characteristics: first, legislative power is unicameral. The Turkish Great National Assembly 

(Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi) counts 550 MPs with a five-year mandate that almost 



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always expires prematurely, due to the political preferences of the parties. The scope of 

authority is almost identical in all hybrid (parliamentary-presidential) modes: making and 

changing laws, political control of the Council of Ministers, budget approving, ratification 

of international agreements, decisions of war and peace, etc. Second, the executive is bi-

cephalous with increased powers of the President (Cumhurbashkan) expressed through 

several parameters: to convoke a special session of the Assembly, the right to veto laws, to 

call a referendum on constitutional amendments, the appointment of the first Minister and 

pressing charges against legal and natural persons of disrespect for the Constitution and the 

laws, to appoint members of the High Education Council, rectors of universities, judges in 

the constitutional, military and cassation court etc, (Ahmad 2006, 1371).  

On the other hand, the Council of Ministers (Bakanlar Kurulu) and the Prime 

Minister (Bashbakan) are accountable to the Assembly for the implementation of the 

current domestic and foreign policy, whereupon the ministerial solidarity, apart from the 

individual responsibility is characteristic. Third, the courts, according to the provisions of 

the Constitution are independent and make decisions on the basis of the Constitution and 

the laws, and the Constitution in its regulations notes the State Council, the Supreme 

Administrative Court, the Supreme Military Administrative Court, the Supreme Military 

Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court as organs of the justice system in the 

Republic. After the central state organs were briefly elaborated, let us view the fundamental 

values and principles of the political system of Kemalist Turkey. 

 

Turkish nationalism and populism (Halkchilik) 

 

The transformation of the Ottoman Empire in a secular Turkish Republic took the 

Turkish nationalism and the doctrines of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as a starting point. This 

executed a radical shift in the identification database of the citizens and the legitimization 

of power. Instead of the former Islamic landmarks, nowadays, Turkish nationalism takes 

the role of a connective tissue of the Turkish society. Even the existing Constitution calls 

for Turkey to be devoted to the nationalism of Atatürk (Constitution of the Republic of 

Turkey, 1982, Preamble). Tamimi and Esposito suggest many political commitments that 

have modeled this concept. For example, the recomposing Turkish history, the elimination 

of much of the Ottoman past, the affirmation of the pre-Islamic perioid, the formation of 

the Turkish Historical Association and the Turkish Language Institution, even the 

mythological paradigm that Asia Minor is the homeland of Turkey, the cradle of humanity 

and civilization and the Turkish language the basis of all languages (Tamimi and Esposito 

2000, 3). Еxtreme nationalist tendencies were stirred up through a lot of attempts the 

Islamic religious practices (prayer and ezan), instead of in Arabic, to be conducted in 

Turkish. In addition, “Altit ok”, or the doctrine of “the six arrows” that follows the 

Turanism (Panturcism) as a foreign policy orientation. The general motto of populism 

(Halkchik) was expressed in the slogan “the people against the elites”, which certainly 

served to strengthen the nationalist rhetoric. 

 

 

 

 

 



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National sovereignty 

 

The establishment of the Turkish Republic on the remains of the former Ottoman 

Empire meant a change in the legitim aspect of the Government. The former Sultan used to 

bear several titles that gave him political and religious position in society: Caliph (leader of 

Muslims), Emir al-Mumin (leader of the faithful) and Shaykh Lab Islam (regulator of 

religious issues) (Kulenovic 2008, 43). There is an evident religious inclination. Kemalism 

drastically changes this framework. Ataturk was named the immortal and the eternal leader, 

unrivaled in national history. The republican polity and sovereignty are exclusively and 

unconditionally based on the Turkish nation. The Turkish nation expresses its sovereignty 

through the authorized institutions that operate on constitutional principles. The sovereignty 

of the Turkish nation can not be transferred to any individual, group or class that is not in 

accordance with the Constitution (Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, article 6). 

 

Militant secularism 

 

One of the determinant specifics of the Turkish constitutional order and political 

system is the militant secularism. The steps taken for the de-islamization of the Turkish 

society were already stated. In addition, a significant moment was the de-shariazation of the 

Turkish legal system, as well as some points that insulated the ulema and plunged it into a 

marginalized position of the political life. Thus, the previous Sharia law was replaced by 

the dull takeover of the Swiss Civil Code, the Italian Criminal Code and the German Trade 

Law. In this regard, the former Sharia judges were retired and the religious schools either 

banned or periodically opened, however under a strict state control. Religious clothes 

outside the mosques were banned, religious titles suppressed, religious teaching in public 

schools was prohibited, all Sufi orders were declared ilegal and Zakat (religious obligation) 

was strictly monitored by the state and military etablishment. Moreover, the fierce form of 

the social and militant secularism got another dimension, a military one, through the role of 

the military. The military was a self-declared “guardian of the secular Republic,” the 

defender of the secular ideology and stability of the country (Tamimi and Esposito 2000, 

3). Led by the self-set political iconography, the military itself, few times, directly or 

indirectly, participated in the overthrow of pro–Islamic governments (or Prime Ministers), 

the subject of the third part of the paper. Secularism was not founded only on the separation 

of religion and state, but it was contributed with hatred, bigotry, intolerance, rigidity and 

militancy against everything that showed even the smallest amount of religious affinities. 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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KHOMEINI’S IRAN: 

BETWEEN SHARIOCRACY AND MODIFIED THEOCRACY 

  

Islam is our full guidance 

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini 

 

Unlike Turkey, which is elaborated in the previous section, the situation in Iran is 

reversed. Iran has transformed its own political identity distinctively from West oriented to 

revival Islamist. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 was preceded by numerous turbulent 

political events that acted as a decisive factor for the revolutionary developments. Thus, in 

1941, the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi inherited the power from his father, Reza Khan 

Pahlavi. After the Second World War, he started implementing numerous pro-Western 

modernist reformations i.e. the “White revolution”, similar to Kemalist Turkey. The 

emphasis was placed on language and nationalism, religious symbols, such as the Hijab, 

was withdrawn from the public life, with incorporation of the civil society and the Western 

civil legal codex (except the family law that received a modified expression through state-

controlled Sharia courts). The victory of Mosaddegh on the parliamentary elections in 1951 

(followed by his nationalization of the oil industry), that the Shah could not prevent; his 

abdication in 1953, his re-intronization and return to power with the help of his British and 

American allies after six days – all these events started electrifying the society in Iran 

(Akhavi 1980, 42). Deprivation grew linearly with the growing authoritarianism of 1961, 

when the Shah suspend the Parliament and eliminated the political opponents with the help 

of the secret police called SAVAK. The leader of the Islamic Opposition, the ayatollah 

Khomeini, was in exile, primarily because of his explicit political confrontation with the 

Shah and his acute rhetoric against the US imperialism. The 1979 revolution absorbed all 

social strata dissatisfied with the Shah’s regime (Islamists, secularists, Marxists, liberals, 

etc.), yet, still, only the Islamic provenance managed to institutionalize order, based on the 

Khomeini’s doctrine. From the political scene, from the administrative bodies, from the 

educational institutions and virtually all other social segments were eliminated anti-Islam 

parties, primarily secularists and liberals. Political and socio-cultural reflections were 

evident through the obligatory wearing of the Islamic dress, censorship of certain content in 

the mass media, compulsory teaching of the religious doctrines, the Islamic ideological 

army, education and culture. Iranian nationalism has been replaced by the construction of a 

Muslim nation of Iran, as an inseparable part of the overall Muslim community (Ummah). 

This kind of a set of policy interventions became a constitutional category (Constitution of 

the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Preamble). The constitutional and political system of 

the Islamic Republic of Iran is a sui generis design, typical of the Persian territory, and its 

revolutionary and Islamic narrative – an inspiration for a series of attempts for installing an 

Islamic state. It is a combination of strong leadership, religious and legalistic establishment, 

nominal executive and consultative legislation. In addition, the most important of its 

features, through an institutional lens, are to be reviewed. 

First, the central institution in the Islamic Iranian model is the Supreme Leader 

(Vali Faqih) – Ayatollah (Khomeini, then Al Khamenei), who has not only ceremonial, but, 

also, a real political power. He is, also, a chairperson of the leadership council (valiet), 

composed of the most eminent experts in the Islamic law and the Shiite doctrine of the 

twelfth Imam. It names the head of the judiciary, six members of the Council of the Guards, 



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commanders of all the armed forces, leaders of the Friday Juma prayers, and the head of the 

national radio and television, and decides on war and peace, as well. The election of the 

President of the Islamic Republic must be confirmed by the Ayatollah (Demiri 2009, 264). 

As a result of the constellation, the Supreme Leader controls nearly all aspects of the 

political life. Despite the political, the Supreme Leader, also, asserts spiritual leadership of 

the Iranian Muslim nation, because he comes from the eminent Islamic jurists (mujtahid), 

exegesis experts, members of the leadership council mentioned above. Secondly, the 

supervisory authority is concentrated in the Assembly of Experts (Madzhma el Neza), 

whose task is to appoint, monitor and control the operation of the Supreme Leader, to assist 

him in the creation of his politics and to initiate the process of the impeachment if the 

Ayatollah does not perform his tasks in accordance with the Constitution. This body is 

elected to fixed terms of 8 years, proposed by the Council of Guardians (Constitution of the 

Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, articles 108-111). Third, one of the most powerful political 

bodies in charge of controlling the legislative party nominations for the elections and all the 

specific policy actions is the Council of the Guardians of the Islamic Republic (Shura-e 

Negbahan). It is composed of 12 members (six Islamic and six civil law experts – the first 

appointed by the Supreme Leader, and the latter by the Parliament and proposed by the 

Supreme Judicial Council), with a six-year term. The Council of the Guardians of the 

Islamic Republic has the right to veto on virtually any domestic political, economic and 

foreign trade initiative. Fourth, the executive, nominal and limited by the leadership and the 

Council of Guardians, is composed of the President and the Council of Ministers. The 

President is elected in general and direct elections, with obligatory confirmation by the 

Parliament to fixed terms of four years, with the right to one re-election. His role as head of 

the executive is to implement policies in line with the Constitution and the laws, setting and 

recalling of ambassadors, and a chairperson of the National Security Council. His power, as 

well as the power of his cabinet (the Council of Ministers) is limited by the institutions that 

listed above. Finally, the consultative legislation – the Parliament (Majlis Shura-i Islami) 

consists of 270 members elected for four years. The Constitution empowers this body to 

enact laws (actually, consults, because the final decision is to the Council of Guardians); it, 

also, empowers it to ratify international treaties, to elect Ministers in the President’s cabinet 

and to initiate investigations on any political issue in the country (Alaedini at al, 2006, 

621). As far as the judiciary is concerned, I would mention only the High Judicial Council 

composed of the head of the Supreme Court, the Attorney General and three members 

placed directly by the Supreme Leader, who at any time, may revoke. The Constitution 

guarantees their independence, impartiality and fairness. 

After the institutional design was briefly presented, now, the stress is to be put on 

the ideological values and the fundamental benchmarks of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 

 

God's sovereignty (Hakamia) and Modeled shariocracy 

 

What greatly reflects the Iranian Republic, at least on the ideological level, is the 

doctrinal divine sovereignty (hakamia). The Constitution notes that the sovereignty belongs 

to Allah s.a.w.t., which is legitimate, and it is a submission to His will (Constitutional 

principle II). Unlike popular sovereignty, according to which the expressed will of the 

citizens is essential for socio-economic and political action, the Iranian system is based on 

an a priori given philosophy and principles through a divine revelation (Quran), and all 



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authorities, including citizens, have a duty to implement. Authorities have merely “limited” 

forms of administrating, because Allah S.W.T. is sovereign of any forms of life and they 

are governors who need to fulfill His will. The Constitution is determined as a declaration 

of social, cultural, political and economic foundations of the Iranian society based on 

Islamic principles and norms, which reflect the genuine desire of the Islamic community 

(the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 1979, Preamble). This formulation clearly 

alludes to the Sharia as a legal order. However, the introduction of the republican model, 

alongside with the participation of citizens in the selection of holders of certain public 

functions (Constitutional principle I) for which there are no distinctively precise provisions 

in the Koran, as well as the modifying of some provisions of domestic, commercial and 

even criminal law, provides the opportunity, this model regime to be assessed as modeled 

shariocracy. 

Rule of eminent Islamic jurists (Velajet e Faqih) 

 

The Iranian Constitution affirms that the Islam is a comprehensive way of life, 

which serves as the basis of the Government and, also, regulates the legal relations of 

religion and society (Demiri 2009, 259). Yet, what is specific to this system is but the 

power of the eminent Islamic jurists (Velaet e Faqih). Since, as already mentioned, the 

system is based on hakamia and on the modeled shariocracy, with the authority of the 

Islamic experts (Faqih) and lawyers (mujtahid), a logical consequence is that, according to 

this worldview, the crucial guidelines for political action to be concentrated clearly in these 

figures. The supreme legal and religious experts (imams, Faqih) are concerned, that 

symbolize the fusion between the Islamic religion and politics as two mutually inseparable 

components. The system is still open to some level, because everyone has the right to study 

the Islamic law and to be Faqih. It is evident that this is a modified theocracy with 

Republican elements (available only for the participants of the Islamic affiliation), yet only 

through the prism of the European discourse, since the Islam does not recognize priesthood 

as an allusion to the religious establishment in Christianity. On the other hand, the practical 

discourse is very well perceived by Gellner, who states that in the absence of a tribal 

society and a support by His leadership (as the one of the Shah), the religious educated 

lawyers and experts can govern, tracing an egalitarian and an anti-intermediary current in 

the Islam (Gellner 1992, 18). 

Twelver doctrine (Ithna Ashariyyah) 

 

Inseparably connected to the Valiet Faqih principle of power is the official Shiite 

doctrine, Ithna Ashariyyah, which is overwhelmingly dominant in Iran. The doctrine 

recognizes twelve blood related successors (Imams) to the Prophet Muhammad, i.e. related 

by blood to His nephew and son-in-law Ali. The twelfth imam Muhamed al Muntazan 

“disappeared”, or retired from the world in 874. The return of the mysterious imam is 

expected in the last age of the world, when as a true believer and a leader (Mahdi), he 

would rule the country, establishing order, justice and a just Islamic order (Esposito 2003, 

62). In this sense, Khomeioni’s doctrine Valiet Faqih composes a system of governing until 

the reappearance of the twelfth imam. Thus, his absence is substituted by the Islamic jurists 

and the Grand Ayatollah. Should the question: how the system would look like on the 

possible “return” of the twelfth imam be posed, Khomeini solves the dilemma by 

transcendenting his power in a spiritual and a symbolic way. 



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POLITICAL REPERCUSSIONS OF TURKISH AND IRANIAN 

CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 

 

That government is best which governs least 

Henry David Thoreau  

 

Secularism and Islamism as concepts of the constitutional and the political model 

represent a model and a condition of all spheres of the political system in the contemporary 

Muslim states. The repercussions resulting from such a political constituency in the design 

of Turkey and Iran are visible, primarily, in terms of the actions of the central institutions, 

the political parties, the civil society and the political culture they create as agents of the 

political socialization. In addition, the two most important components where such 

repercussions are most pronounced would be discussed. 

 

Ideological and political indoctrination 

 

Both systems are highly ideological and their consequent indoctrination is helped by 

two key institutions. In Turkey, it is the army and in Iran – the Council of Guardians. The 

ideological and the political indoctrination reflect all segments of society. Thus, in Turkey, 

despite the Turkish nationalism elaborated in the previous section, the image and the act of 

Mustafa Kemal Ataturk is clearly cultivated to the high level of sacrament. His photos are 

visible everywhere, and his posters, banners and similar symbols were part of every 

manifestation. Even the Constitution stipulates him as an eternal and an indisputable leader 

of Turkey, unrivaled in national history. Ayse Kadioglu notes that the political inclinators 

of Ataturk are related to the hatred of religion, even when sometimes the populist used 

religious symbols for respect (Ayse Kadioglu 1998, 11). A good example of the hypocrisy 

of the Turkish authorities, apart from recomposing of history, was the February 1998 law 

according to which the children were required first to complete eight years of secular 

education, and then to be allowed to attend the madrassas. The summer and the weekend 

study of the Quran were completely banned. Female pupils, female students and female 

teachers were forbidden to wear Hijab, even in Islamic schools, and such a ban existed 

many years before in other educational and government institutions (Tamimi and Esposito 

2000, 5). The monopoly of the Turkish secularism is visible even in the work of the Islamic 

Community, so, in all religious ceremonies, it is insisted on putting special emphasis on the 

Turkish nationalism, the respect for civil law and order, as well as the governing authority. 

Iranian case represents the other side of the same coin. Almost no activities 

incompatible with the Koran and the Islamic religion were permitted. The obligation of 

wearing Islamic dress in public life and the so called “Cultural revolution” that aimed at 

Islamization of all spheres of society, including universities, grew at a fast pace. Non-

Muslims were ordered to refrain from “behavior offensive to Muslims” and were excluded 

from all departments, except foreign languages and mathematics (Bakhash 1984, 226).  

The rhetoric was full of indignation, fanaticism and grotesquely shaped pacifism. 

The following statement of Khomeini best confirms our findings: “We want to expand 

Islam everywhere, but that does not mean that we will exported with bayonets [...] If 

governments adhere to Islamic principles we will support, if they will not, we will fight 

them without fear of anybody!” (Esposito 2001, 172).  



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What is more, the request of a death penalty of Salman Rushdie, the author of The 

Satanic Verses, only serves as a mobilization base for the militant Islamic structures and the 

affirmation of Iran's position in the region and, primarily, for the strengthening of the 

ideological and political indoctrination in society.  

 

Controlled and doctrinaire - limited multipartism  

 

The Turkish and the Iranian constitutional political model are but exclusive modes 

or systems exclusively open to entities that adhere to extremely ideological constitutional 

and political formations. In the first case, the limitation applies to entities that do not accept 

rigid secularism, while in the second, the political actors that express preferences beyond 

the Islamic doctrine. Such a designed framework narrows down the circle of possible 

participants in the political process.  

Until 1998, the Iranian constitutional and legal order did not recognize the existence 

of political parties. The Shiite religious and political paradigm perceives itself as a party 

(the party of Ali) and the Husein’s martyrdom in Kerbel, as well as the defeat of his forces 

of the army by Jezid the Caliph in 680 had a particular influence on the emerging of the 

Revolution in 1979. In that context, after the revolutionary transformation, a party system 

led by the Islamic Republican Party was established. However, the “stabilization” of the 

system and the attempts for the “democratization” and openness resulted in the 

Constitutional Amendment which approved the existence of political parties, provided they 

are not contrary to the Islam, the national sovereignty and the Islamic unity (Alaedini at al. 

2006, 623). Such a constitutive formulation, obviously, leads to a controlled multipartism, 

lead by a key institution with the authority to check their loyalty to the existing order and to 

approve or to veto their work for the Council of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. 

For example, much of the ideological opposition (royalists, Marxists) were forced into 

exile. First, the Iranian Resistance Movement led by Shakur Baktair of the Social 

Provenance was forced to act from Paris. Yet, Ayatollah Khomeini was not merely limited 

to the ideological competitors. Also, the eminent political and religious experts and 

activists, such as Ali Sharia, Bazargan, Talikani and Sherijatmadari were forced to resign, 

to go into exile or to be processed due to alleged involvement in the conspiracy. We should 

not be fooled by the intentions of the reform wing, whose representative was Khatami, also, 

we should not be fooled by the Iranian Green Movement lead by Hussein Mousavi to adapt 

and liberalize some institutions (for example, increasing the power of the Parliament). The 

intention to democratize the Islamic political structures was permitted, yet not the 

ideological opposition. No legal political structure in Iran attacks the Valette Faqih 

principle, otherwise it would not be granted with its existence and the run for parliamentary 

elections. The main Parties: the Coalition of Builders of Islamic Iran (Ahmadinejad), the 

Islamic Coalition Party (the Asgaroladi) and the Union of Islamic Architects (Muhammad 

Reza Bahor) are firmly committed to the Islamic constitutive political principles. 

The Turkish case is largely equivalent to the Iranian model. Kemal Ataturk’s 

establishment of the militant secularist order resulted, primarily, in a one party system – the 

Republican People's Party. The situation did not change until 1946, when, for the first time, 

multiparty elections were held, and the Republican People's Party was defeated and the 

Government took over the Democratic Party. However, the key player in the multiparty 

system was the military. It made a coup three times: in 1960, in 1971 and in 1980. The first 



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time, led by General Cemal Gursel, the Government of the first democratically elected 

Prime Minister – Adnan Mendeles, was removed from the administration, due to the close 

relations with Moscow, as well as, initially, due to the affirmation of the Islamic affiliation. 

After the coup, he was sentenced to death by hanging, and, later, rehabilitated. The second 

time, due to internal unrest, the government of Suleyman Demirel was toppled. The army 

headed by General Memduh Tamac intervened in the political events, arbitrarily 

interpreting the existing political order as unsustainable. The third time, one of the most 

prominent events of 1980, the 1980 coup d’état, showed the true side of the war 

establishment. The series of violence, the religious “awakening”, the trade unions and the 

strikes were, again, a reason for the military to take over the power. Yet, this time, it 

resulted in the establishment of a military junta, the suspension of the activities of all 

political parties and in the arresting of many of the political leaders. General Kenan Evren 

(who, later, via a referendum, was elected a President), together with the head of his 

cabinet, Bulent Ulus, again, ousted the re-elected Prime Minister Demirel, and they 

declared martial law and banned all the political and trade union organizing. The action 

brought to nearly half a million people (among which prominent leaders, such as Suleyman 

Demirel, Bulent Ecevit and Nedzhmatin Erbakan) and processed about 280 000, with about 

50 death sentences. The military estimated each power according to its own ideological 

worldview, putting itself in the role of an undisputed guardian of the secularism, and 

against the conservative and Islamist currents. It was the organizer and the controller of the 

elections in 1983, and only 3 of 15 newly-formed parties were allowed to candidate for the 

elections (Ahmad 2006, 1368). Finally, in 1995, when Turkey received its first Islamist 

Prime Minister, Nedzhmatin Erbakan, the military forced him to resign his Memorandum 

and his Welfare Party (Refah) was banned. In this regard, General Cevik Bir, in April the 

same year, publicly announced that the Supreme priority of the military is to combat with 

the anti-secular Islamists (Tamimi and Esposito 2000, 5). Almost three and a half decades, 

the military had dominated initiatives for banning by the Constitutional Court and some 

political and religious organizations. Consequently, from the political life were eliminated: 

the National Party, the transformed National Salvation Party (both of Erbakan) and the 

groups “Followers of the Light” and the Sufi brotherhood (Mardin 1983, 144). The 

emergence of the Justice Party and the Development Party (AKP), as well as the leader 

Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the political ether, moved this discourse, bringing affirmation of 

the religion in the social life and recognizing the contribution of it in the moral construction 

of the individual; yet it must not be forgotten that it is essentially secularist and with 

Islamic inclinations. The strong traces of Kemalism limit every Islamist tendency to 

manifest in its original frames and force each entity to accept secularism as a priori 

designation in its action. Although a lot of laws and judicial processes limited the military's 

political involvement, AKP, accepting the Kemalism contribution, as well as banning the 

National worldview Islamic group (Milli Goruz), the Hismet and Fethullah Gulen 

movement, only managed to curb the militant secularism, (yet, still remaining within the 

secularist discourse) and it managed to give another dimension to the further political 

developments. 

 

 

 

 



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CONCLUSION 

 

The models discussed in the paper undoubtedly represent exceptionally strong 

constitutive-political benchmarks that gave dimension to the structure of the Muslim 

countries in the recent decades. They themselves are a framework that paves the way for 

further developments of the political scene in the Islamic world. Such a constellation 

undoubtedly raises the issues that are imposed in the introduction. Based on the elaboration, 

some concluding remarks can be singled out. They would capture the general image of the 

upcoming presentations, as well as reconfirm the thesis. 

Firstly, the Constitutive political design in both cases is different. The relationship 

between the authorities and their mutual control and balance is expressed through different 

structures, but it does not transcend the impression that the main impetus is the individual 

leader (in Turkey, until some time ago, the Prime Minister and, recently, the President, 

while, in Iran, the Ayatollah). The relationship between them and the pivotal element in 

charge of controlling the political processes (the army, or the Council of Guardians) is of 

great importance, so in the Turkish case, periodic cohabitation can be noticed, while in the 

Iranian, a permanent harmony. 

Secondly, it is obvious that both systems have political and ideological exaltation 

that gets codified through the constitutional provisions and principles. The systems are very 

limited for the opposite ideological movements. The institutional “filters” of the regimes 

that keep the sacred Kemalist-secularist or Islamist vocation were the military (though, 

now, with limited powers, yet, still a strong influence) and the Council of Guardians of the 

Revolution. The substantive differences in the two types are precisely the emphasis of some 

vis-à-vis other fundamental values of the system, with almost equal mechanisms of their 

“protection” and control. 

Thirdly, it is indisputable that both models have exclusionist nature and that 

promote one, at the expense of other ideological and political subject. The Turkish model 

preferred the secularists, declaratively and practically, and the Iranian – the Islamists in 

their genesis and programmatic orientation. In such a manner, they essentially stifle the 

ideological and the political pluralism, that is to say, they create an explicit ideological 

superiority, leaving no opportunity for value match and dialectical development as a 

consequence. Furthermore, since both regard the discourse opponents as idiosyncrasy and 

indignation. 

Fourth, due to these variables, it can be concluded that the absence of a different 

ideological opposition, through controlled and doctrine-limited multipartism, characterizes 

the regimes as undemocratic. An essential agent of democracy is the political pluralism, not 

the facade multipartism. This is not case with the restrictions for safety reasons, although 

they are often invoked. The political parties discharged in the past had no indication of 

violent seizure of power or of inciting national or religious bigotry, so their sanction would 

be justified. 

The direction of future development, i.e. pluralism of Turkey and Iran, to some 

extent, remains an enigma because there are no indications that they would be open to the 

opponent political factors. Perhaps the situation in Turkey is slightly more predictable due 

to Erdogan's inclination towards religion and its respect in society. However, authoritarian 

tendencies associated with stalling of human rights and freedoms, in particular freedom of 

speech and the media, would not improve the image of the Turkish political system, that is 



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to say, one shortage would replace another. The reformist wing in Iran, again, shows 

attempts to democratize the Islamic Republic, to increase openness to the West, yet it is not 

yet ready to accept the secular political parties in its core, or to show inclination towards 

freedom of choice of lifestyle or towards the liberalization of other segments of the social 

milieu. In this regard, the thesis of Zakaria for illiberal (i.e. judging by our framework, 

unpluralistic) democracy seems illusory. Economic rights and freedoms, without political 

and civil society, cannot be sufficient for a society to be called democratic. 

Benchmarks that would lead to eventual harmonization in the divided Muslim world 

in both cases should be based on mutual tolerance among secularists and Islamists; or as 

Martin Heper says: “A marriage between Islam and democracy in Turkey can be 

consummated if the radical secularists stop trying to impose their preferred life-style and 

set of values upon the Islamists, and if the latter do not undermine by word or deed he basic 

tenets of the secular democratic state in Turkey” (Heper 1997, 45).  

The very same, but in reverse, would apply for Iran, too. The attempt of their 

leveling and of placing them together is not impossible, although such a “marriage” 

requires a long and difficult period of building.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 



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