I Mil -- - - -- - ---- --- -------- ------ -- ---- ------ ----- Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers 1936 (In Five Volumes) Volume I General The British Commonwealth United States Government Printing Office Washington : 1953 DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 5395 Division of Publications For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office Washington 25, D.C. - Price $4.25 (Buckram) PREFACE The documents published in these volumes were selected with a view to presenting a comprehensive record of the diplomatic relations between the United States and Japan in regard to matters related to the causes of conflict between the two countries from the beginning of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria on September 18, 1931, to the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the declaration of war by the United States on December 8, 1941. The amount of background material here printed has been limited by the necessity of keeping the publication within a reasonable compass. It was obviously impossible to include an absolutely com- plete selection of even the more important of the pertinent reports coming to the Department from American diplomatic representatives and other observers during the ten years covered. Therefore only reports of special significance have been selected. While the American Government consulted with other interested powers and at times took parallel action in dealing with crises arising in the Far East during this period, it was not its practice to take joint action. It has therefore been thought advisable to limit the selection to those documents relating directly to American-Japanese relations without entering into the ramifications of discussions with third powers. The correspondence with the Japanese Government with respect to losses by American nationals due to bombings and other acts of the Japanese armed forces in China is so voluminous that documents in record of representations in many individual cases have been omitted. This printed record therefore includes only the record of representations of a general character and a number of notes on particular incidents which were thought to be typical. It is contemplated that additional documents relative to some of the developments treated in the present publication and to other phases of the policy of the United States toward the Far East during the years 1931–1941 will be published in the regular annual volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States. SUPT. OF DOCUMENTS FEB 18 '44 1053362 IV PREFACE e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this there is one qualifica- tion—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternatives presented to the Department when the decision was made. No deletions shall be made without clearly indicating the place in the text where the deletion occurs. 045.3 Clearance RE shall obtain the following clearances of material for publication in Foreign Relations of the United States: a. Refer to the appropriate policy officers such papers as would appear to require policy clearance. b. Refer to the appropriate foreign governments requests for per- mission to print certain documents originating with them which it is desired to publish as part of the diplomatic correspond- ence of the United States. Without such permission the docu- ments in question will not be used. In keeping with the spirit of the above quoted Department regula- tion, the research staff is guided in compiling the record by the princi- ples of historical objectivity. It is the rule that there shall be no al- teration of the text, no deletions without indicating the place in the text where the deletion is made, no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision, and that nothing should be omitted with a view to concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. In the selection of papers the editors have attempted to give a substantially complete record of American foreign policy as contained in the files of the Department of State together with as much background material as possible, while keeping the volumes within reasonable limits with respect to size and number. In the preparation of Foreign Relations for the decade pre- ceding World War II special attention has been given to the inclusion of documents of significance with respect to the origins of that conflict. The responsibilities of the Historical Division (formerly the Divi- sion of Historical Policy Research) for the preparation of the Foreign Relations volumes are entrusted, under the general supervision of the Chief of the Division, G. Bernard Noble, to the Chief of the Foreign Relations Branch (Editor of Foreign Relations), E. R. Perkins, and the Assistant Chief of the Branch, Gustave A. Nuermberger. The re- search staff of this Branch is organized with a Special Problems Sec- tion and area sections for the British Commonwealth and Europe, the Soviet Union, the Near East and Africa, the Far East, and the Ameri- can Republics. The 1936 volumes were prepared, under the direction of the Editor of Foreign Relations, by Mr. Nuermberger and by Ma- tilda F. Axton, Rogers P. Churchill, N. O. Sappington, John G. Reid, PREFACE V Francis C. Prescott, and Shirley L. Phillips of the present staff and George Verne Blue, Morrison B. Giffen, Victor J. Farrar, and Henry P. Beers, former staff members. The Division of Publications is responsible with respect to Foreign Relations for the proofreading and editing of copy, the preparation of lists of papers and indexes, and the distribution of printed copies. To expedite publication, indexes for the 1936 volumes have been drafted by a private company under contract. Under the general direction of the Chief of the Division, Robert L. Thompson, the edi- torial functions mentioned above are performed by the Foreign Relations Editing Branch in charge of Elizabeth A. Vary. For 1936 the arrangement of volumes is as follows: Volume I, Gen- eral, The British Commonwealth; Volume II, Europe; Volume III, The Near East and Africa; Volume IV, The Far East; Volume V, The American Republics. E. R. Perkins Editor of Foreign Relations December 1,1953. DIRECTORY SECRETARIES OF STATE OF THE UNITED STATES : Stimson, Henry L., March 5, 1929-March 4, 1933 Hull, Cordell, March 4, 1933– UNITED STATES AMBASSADORS IN JAPAN: Forbes, William Cameron, June 17, 1930-March 22, 1932 Grew, Joseph Clark, February 19, 1932-December 7, 1941 PRIME MINISTERS OF JAPAN: Wakatsuki, Baron Reijiro, April 14, 1931-December 11, 1931 Inukai, Ki, December 13, 1931-May 15, 1932 Saito, Admiral Viscount Makoto, May 26, 1932–July 3, 1934 Okada, Admiral Keisuke, July 8, 1934-February 26, 1936 Hirota, Koki, March 9, 1936-January 23, 1937 Hayashi, General Senjuro, February 2, 1937-May 31, 1937 Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, June 4, 1937-January 4, 1939 Hiranuma, Baron Kiichiro, January 5, 1939-August 28, 1939 Abe, General Nobuyuki, August 30, 1939-January 14, 1940 Yonai, Admiral Mitsumasa, January 16, 1940-July 16, 1940 Konoye, Prince Fumimaro, July 22, 1940-October 16, 1941 Tojo, General Hideki, October 18, 1941- JAPANESE MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS : Shidehara, Baron Kijuro, July 2, 1929–December 11, 1931 Inukai, Ki, December 13, 1931-January 14, 1932 Yoshizawa, Kenkichi, January 14, 1932-May 16, 1932 Saito, Admiral Viscount Makoto, May 26, 1932-July 6, 1932 Uchida, Count Yasuya, July 6, 1932-September 14, 1933 Hirota, Koki, September 14, 1933-April 2, 1936 Srita, Hachiro, April 2, 1936-January 23, 1937 Sato, Naotake, March 3, 1937-May 31, 1937 Hirota, Koki, June 4, 1937-May 26, 1938 Ugaki, General Kazushige, May 26, 1938-September 30, 1938 Arita, Hachiro, October 29, 1938–August 28, 1939 Nomura, Admiral Kichisaburo, September 25, 1939-January 14, 1940 Arita, Hachiro, January 16, 1940-July 16, 1940 Matsuoka, Yosuke, July 22, 1940-July 16, 1941 Toyoda, Admiral Teijiro, July 18, 1941-October 16, 1941 Togo, Shigenori, October 18, 1941-September 1942 JAPANESE AMBASSADORS IN THE UNITED STATES : Debuchi, Katsuji, October 24, 1928-February 13, 1934 Saito, Hirosi, February 13, 1934-December 22, 1938 Horinouchi, Kensuke, December 22, 1938-October 20, 1940 Nomura, Admiral Kichisaburo, February 14, 1941-December 7, 1941 VI CONTENTS Page 3REFACB Ill List of Papers xi Jenebal: The Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, Geneva: 1936 phase 1 London Naval Conference, 1935: Second phase, January 6-March 25, 1936 22 Efforts to relate other powers to the London Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936, by accession or by separate bilateral treaties 102 Rejection by the United States of British proposal for renewal of article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, February 6, 1922 122 Retention of naval tonnage by the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan under articles 17 and 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 132 Signature of proces-verbal, November 6, 1936, relating to part IV (rules of submarine warfare), London Naval Treaty, signed April 22, 1930. 160 Views of the Department of State with respect to neutrality legisla- tion 165 Analyses and reports by American diplomatic missions regarding Euro- pean political developments affecting the preservation of peace . . 180 The German-Japanese Accord of November 25, 1936, against the Com- munist International 390 Negotiations for the suppression of liquor smuggling into the United States: Belgium 407 Canada 424 Cuba 427 France 428 Mexico 436 Netherlands 437 Norway 439 Interest of the United States in the efforts of the League of Nations to promote international economic cooperation 453 Principles underlying the policy of the United States for restoration of international commerce and finance 486 Interest of the United States in liberalizing the policy of the Interna- tional Rubber Committee with respect to the world supply of rubber 503 Preliminary discussions with respect to an international conference on production and marketing of sugar 521 Tripartite financial stabilization agreement by the United States, France, and the United Kingdom, set forth in simultaneous statements, September 25, 1936 535 Status of intergovernmental debts owed the United States by reason of the First World War 566 vn VIII CONTENTS General—Continued Page Position of the Department of State with respect to the treatment of foreign war debts 587 France 579 Italy 590 Rumania 597 Opposition of the Department of State to proposals to increase tariff rates on imports from countries in default on war-debt payments . 599 Views of the Department of State on bill providing for acquisition of essential commodities by crediting purchases as payments on war debts and by other methods 603 Representations by foreign governments against proposed legislation restricting tourist cruises from American ports to American ships . . 605 Representations of certain foreign governments against proposed legisla- tion providing for additional requirements with respect to radio facilities on cargo ships 618 Participation by the United States in the Conference for the Suppression of the Illicit Traffic in Dangerous Drugs, Geneva, June 8-26, 1936 . 625 Participation by the United States in the international conference for the standardization of the keeping and operation of herdbooks, Rome, October 12-14,1936 626 Extradition treaties signed between the United States and certain other countries 628 The British Commonwealth of Nations: United Kingdom: Efforts of the Secretary of State to secure the cooperation of the British Government in his international trade program; prelimi- nary discussions respecting a trade agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom 629 Informal discussions regarding proposed restriction of trade between Australia and New Zealand to British shipping 706 Supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand respecting the tenure and disposition of real and personal property, signed May 27, 1936 . . 716 Reciprocal arrangements effected by the United States with the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State for trans-Atlantic air service 720 Refusal of the British Government to recognize the right of the United States to exercise control outside territorial waters over any vessel flying the British flag, except as provided by treaty 730 Informal representations against proposed preferential tariff rates in certain British West African colonies favoring Empire trade . . 731 Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 736 Australia: Unsatisfactory trade relations between the United States and Australia 742 Informal arrangements between the United States and Australia respecting the importation of American aircraft and aircraft parts into Australia 774 CONTENTS DC The British Commonwealth of Nations—Continued Canada: Page Informal discussions between officials of the United States and Canada with respect to trade relations 783 Convention between the United States and Canada respecting income taxation, signed December 30, 1936 790 Protests of the Canadian Government against certain provisions of the liquor tax bill; settlement of United States claims against Cana- dian distillers 796 Negotiations respecting the revision of the convention for the preserva- tion of the halibut fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea 825 Proposed negotiation of a new treaty to deal with the Great Lakes- St. Lawrence Basin as a whole, including the Niagara Falls . . . 834 Irish Free State: Disinclination of the United States to enter into a trade agreement with the Irish Free State 847 New Zealand: Representations regarding discrimination against American commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa 852 Union of South Africa: Efforts to meet complaints from South Africa that American import regulations unduly restricted South African exports to the United States 855 Index 879 LIST OF PAPERS OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA BY JAPAN AND STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES-Continued Date and number Subject Page 1931 Oct. 24 (193) Oct. 24 Oct. 26 (259) Nov. 3 (217) Nov. 5 (219) Nov. 6 (209) From the Chargé in Japan (tel.) Note from the Foreign Minister and accompanying state- ment (texts printed), setting forth Japan's position with re- gard to the Treaty for the Renunciation of War and disclaim- ing any thoughts of recourse to war for the solution of out- standing differences with China. Resolution Voted Upon by the Council of the League of Nations Recommendations for solution of the difficulties between China and Japan. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Summary of the action of the Council of the League in re- gard to the Sino-Japanese conflict; impasse over Japan's de- mands that long-standing problems be settled in advance of the withdrawal of Japanese troops. To the Chargé in Japan (tel.) Memorandum to be presented to the Foreign Minister (text printed) reinforcing the position taken by the League with reference to the Japanese demands. To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Explanation of the Department's policy in reinforcing the position of the League; and information that the suggestion is being made to the President of the Council that the impasse might be resolved by direct negotiations between the two Governments in the presence of neutral observers. From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Statement by the Foreign Minister of the five principles which the Japanese Government considers must be affirmed by both Governments before troops are withdrawn. From the Japanese Embassy Outline of the Japanese position with respect to the settle- ment of fundamental problems as a condition precedent to withdrawal. To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.) Instructions to proceed to Paris to be available for conferences with members of the Council, in view of the fact that the dis- cussions of the Manchurian situation will involve American interests; background information and general instructions. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Secretary stated that he could not but regard the occupation of Tsitsihar by Japanese troops as a violation of the Kellogg Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty, and that he must reserve full liberty to publish all U. S.-Japanese correspondence on the Manchurian situation. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Ambassador stated that his Government would withdraw its forces from Tsitsihar as soon as possible and that it intended to adhere to the policy outlined in the Embassy's memoran- dum handed to the Secretary on November 9, and in which the Ambassador reported that Japan was now willing to con- sent to a neutral commission. Undated [Rec'd Nov. 9] Nov. 10 (326) Nov, 19 Nov. 21 46 LIST OF PAPERS (Unless otherwise specified, the correspondence is from or to officials in the Department of State.) GENERAL THE CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF ARMAMENTS, GENEVA: 1930 PHASE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Aug. 17 (1815 Pol.) Sept. 9 (1830 Pol.) Sept. 25 (1067) Sept. 26 (1069) (511) Sept. 29 (1070) Sept. 29 (512) Oct. 1 (1071) From the Consul at Geneva Observations on preparatory work in connection with the pos- sible resumption of the Disarmament Conference, as set forth in memoranda (texts printed) by officers of the League of Nations Secretariat. From the Consul at Geneva Transmittal of draft statement, prepared by the Disarmament Section of the League Secretariat for delivery in case the dis- armament matter is raised in the forthcoming Assembly meeting, and of a memorandum dealing with the attitudes of the various governments. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) French desire that the Council consider calling the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference, and hope that the 1935 commit- tees considering traffic in and manufacture of arms, and budgetary publicity, will resume work. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Speculation as to French position in forthcoming Conference Bureau meeting, and request for instructions if Department wishes energetic support for reopening of disarmament dis- cussions. To the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Department's position relative to reopening subject of dis- armament and desire for further information on present prospects of a positive result; instructions for Minister to attend Bureau session if called. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Advice of move of Scandinavian and Netherland delegations to have disarmament question taken up by the Assembly Third Committee, and inquiry as to whether the British and French should be approached formally to ascertain their positions on the subject. To the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Reason for view that formal approach to the British and French would be inadvisable. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Information that the Third Committee was set up by the Assembly; and that France would support reexamination of budgetary publicity, control of manufacture and traffic in arms, and limitation of air forces. 11 13 13 14 15 16 16 XI xn LIST OF PAPERS DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE Date and number 1936 Oct. 2 (1073) Oct. 4 (1074) Oct. 5 (1075) Oct. 7 (1078) Oct. 10 (1079) Dec. 24 (4735 L.N. No. 3484) Subject Page From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Election of Lange of Norway as President of the Third Com- mittee, and his attitude that its work would be a useful preface for the meeting of the Bureau. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) British attitude toward budgetary publicity, and toward gen- eral disarmament discussions at this time. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Decision of Third Committee to support French move for con- vocation of the Bureau; reiteration of their positions by the French and British. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Approval by Third Committee of a report to the Assembly favoring an early meeting of the Bureau. From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) Council's authorization to its President to set date of meeting of Bureau, and its decision to communicate information of actions taken, relative to disarmament, to members of the Bureau, and to states represented at the Conference. From the Minister in Switzerland Communication from Council's President (text printed) stating that he has decided to refer the question of the date of meeting of the Bureau to the Council itself in January. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935: SECOND PHASE, JANUARY 6-MARCH 25, 1936 1936 Jan. 7 Jan. 7 (8) Jan. 8 (38) Jan. 9 (39) Jan. 9 (10) Jan. 10 (41) To President Roosevelt Transmittal of draft telegram for the President's consideration (text infra). (Footnote: President's approval of communication.) To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Advisability of securing clear-cut statement as to whether Japan would be willing to reach agreement on other phases of the naval question in the absence of agreement to a "common upper level"; Department's view on continuance of discussions. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Account of conversations with British Foreign Office officials, who disagreed as to securing an early termination of conversa- tions with the Japanese. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Agreement of Foreign Secretary Eden with U. S. desire for early determination of Japanese position on the matter of a com- mon upper limit; his doubts as to even a consultative pact with the Japanese. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Comments relative to conversations reported in No. 38, of January 8. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Information from Eden regarding Japanese concern when he told them the British were ready to discuss and come to a deci- sion relative to the common upper limit; practical agreement of French and Italians to join in rejecting common upper limit. LIST OF PAPERS xm LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE Date and number Subject rage 1936 Jan. 10 (43) Jan. 10 (12) Jan. 11 (45) Jan. 11 (H) Jan. 12 (9) Jan. 13 (11) Jan. 14 (46) Jan. 14 (47) Jan. 16 (55) Jan. 16 Jan. 18 (20) Jan. 20 (23) From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Request for Department's views as to Japan's continuation in naval negotiations in capacity of observer if she withdraws from active participation in consequence of rejection of common upper limit. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Department's inability to see any basis for objection to pres- ence of Japanese observer or observers. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Request that delegation be kept fully informed of conflicting views between Foreign Office and the Navy in Tokyo. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Advice that U. S. Ambassador in Japan has been informed of request in No. 45 of January 11. From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Advice of reports indicating disagreement on Naval Confer- ence between the Navy and the Foreign Office which desires to avoid blame for complete rupture; belief that disagreement is on methods and tactics and not on objectives. From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Foreign Minister's confirmation that he had won out in con- test with Navy over immediate withdrawal of delegation from London. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Further developments in relation to Japanese participation in the Conference; comment of Nagai, one of the Japanese dele- gates, that what Japan wants is to leave in most friendly spirit. From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Discussion with British of entire situation, including their unwillingness to accede to Japan's desire that other matters be taken up before the subject of parity; observations relative to British views on qualitative agreement. (Footnote: Citation to text of Japanese withdrawal an- nouncement of January 15.) From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Observations disagreeing with reported statement of Senator Key Pittman to the effect that future efforts to limit naval arma- ment are futile, and that Japan withdrew to institute a naval race. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Analysis of the effects of Japanese withdrawal, in which issue is taken with observations made in No. 55 of January 16. To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) Explanation that Japanese withdrawal has considerably les- sened U. S. interest in the Conference, and that initiative in the Conference should be left to European powers. (Footnote: Citation to text of statement of Chairman Davis of January 15.) To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) President Roosevelt's opinion that Department should still seek an agreement, within the tonnage limits in existing treaties, with an escape clause in event Japan exceeds limitations. XIV LIST OF PAPERS LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 21 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (62) Importance of agreement among European naval powers to U. S.-British agreement; difficulties connected with quantitative and qualitative disarmament. Jan. 23 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (64) Resume of conversations indicating the general French atti- tude toward continuation of the Conference, and French oppo- sition to inviting Germany to participate at this time. Jan. 23 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (66) Development of U. S.-British disagreement as to status of previous informal understanding on gun caliber and tonnage of capital ships; contention of U. S. delegation that understanding was contingent on agreements which were not consummated; desire to avoid evidence of difference of opinion. Jan. 24 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (67) Detailed r6sum6 of conversations with the British relating to gun caliber and tonnage of vessels, and request for Department's views on British compromise proposals. Jan. 26 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (72) Further explanation of British proposals, with indication of escape clauses. Jan. 29 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (28) Inquiry as to whether there was any discussion on question of scrapping. Jan. 29 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (29) Department's position relative to British proposals discussed in telegrams from Chairman Davis. (Footnote: Marginal notation that Department's telegram was read and approved by Admiral Taussig, and one specified part by President Roosevelt.) Jan. 30 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (76) Doubt as to meaning of portion of Department's No. 29 of January 29; further explanation of status of conversations, and opinion as to what should be accepted. Jan. 30 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (77) Hope that the President, the Department, and the Navy will approve delegation's recommendations on cruisers; acknowledg- ment that qualitative limitation would have definite advantages and would be better than no agreement. Jan. 31 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (31) Memorandum of the Navy General Board suggesting changes in proposals as set forth by the delegation, and requesting further information. Feb. 1 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (81) Information requested by the General Board. Feb. 3 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (82) British intentions in regard to scrapping. Feb. 3 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (83) Reasons why the British are unable to give any definite assurance as to ultimate tonnage of the light surface category, and observations as to probable future British construction capacity. LIST OF PAPERS XV LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Feb. 4 From the Consul General at Beirut, Temporarily at Paris (92) Conversation with an official of the Foreign Office relative to German participation in international disarmament discussions. Feb. 6 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (33) Instructions as to basis of discussions; and information relative to President Roosevelt's approval, with the request that impli- cations of agreement on that basis be noted. Feb. 12 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (94) Account of conversations with the French, who are considering probable political consequences of German participation, and wish, before acquiescing therein, to come to an agreement with the British concerning possible future violation of the Rhineland. Feb. 14 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (96) Information from Eden of his conversation with a French delegate who was told that a naval agreement, essential to the British, necessitated German participation. Eden's willingness to assure French that the British would stand by Locarno. Feb. 17 From the Ambassador in France (tel.) (123) Discussion of present situation in naval negotiations with the Minister of Marine, who explained French acquiescence in German participation in a naval treaty upon agreement to later conversations on air and land forces. Feb. 18 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (97) Conversation with French delegate, who conveyed French willingness to initial treaty to go into effect when certain "general political questions" were solved, and was informed by Chairman Davis that the United States could not sign an agree- ment contingent on a European political settlement. Feb. 19 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (99) Conversation with another French delegate to whom Chairman Davis intimated his displeasure at attempt of French Govern- ment to secure U. S. position on capital ships through the French Ambassador in Washington, and reiterated his position as stated in No. 97 of February 18. Feb. 20 From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) (58) Information indirectly from the Japanese Ambassador that in a Council of State at Tokyo the ranking Admiral advocated Japanese withdrawal from the Conference, but gave assurances that Japan had no intention of building in competition with British or U. S. navies. Feb. 20 To President Roosevelt Information of French Ambassador's representations regarding capital ships. Request for approval of indicated method of steering negotiations back to London. Feb. 20 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (40) Account of French Ambassador's representations regarding capital ships, and U. S. reply indicating hope that the French would take up matter at the Conference. Feb. 20 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (41) Observations as to Department's position on tonnage of capital ships and caliber of guns. XVI LIST OF PAPERS LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Feb. 21 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (102) British position on the importance of a naval agreement to which Germany would be a party, agreement with U. S. position against acceptance of treaty contingent upon a political agree- ment, and plan for representations to the French. Feb. 21 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (43) Approval of position Davis has taken relative to avoiding an agreement dependent upon political developments or settlements. Feb. 21 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (103) Observations as to uncertainty of the Italian position regard- ing a naval agreement and relative to possible influence of the Abyssinian question on that position. Feb. 25 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (44) Department's objection to the anomalous position of having to wait for signing of treaty pending settlement of European political questions; request for advice on suggestion to speed final agreement. Feb. 25 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (105) Account of conversation with officials of the Foreign Office, in which Davis proposed that the naval treaty, as contemplated, be drawn up and initialed by Britain and the United States, and left open for adherence by other powers. Feb. 25 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (46) Counter suggestion of a memorandum indicating type of treaty the United States would be willing to sign before end of year. Feb. 25 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (106) Information from the British as to French proposal for the conclusion of a four-power treaty with a later bilateral British supplementary treaty with Germany, and as to the German and Italian positions, Feb. 25 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (107) Advice of attempt to speed reaching of conclusions, and of Eden's opposition to further dillydallying. Feb. 26 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (47) Nonobjection to French proposal, but instructions to indicate that the United States will take no part in the bilateral agree- ments with Germany. Feb. 26 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (108) Information that negotiations are still going on, but that delegates have had idea suggested in No. 46, February 25 in mind, in case something more satisfactory cannot be reached. Feb. 26 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (109) Information from Italian Delegate Grandi that Italy would not sign agreement at present, but might adhere in the future. Feb. 27 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (110) Presentation of three alternatives of action contingent on specific developments. Feb. 27 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (48) Comment on alternatives, including statement of willingness to enter an agreement with England and France with appro- priate safeguard clauses. (Footnote: Indication of President's approval of telegram.) LIST OF PAPERS xvn LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Feb. 28 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (112) Explanation by Italian delegates that they wished to remain in the Conference although for political reasons they would not sign a treaty at the present time; that they would, however, indicate it was for technical reasons; and that Italy hoped to adhere later. Feb. 28 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (50) Information from Italian Ambassador that Italy is unable at this time to enter into a naval treaty, with reasons therefor. Feb. 28 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 78 (51) Suggestion for consideration of a gentleman's agreement between Great Britain, France, Italy, and the United States, and, through England with Germany, for notification of every decision to lay down vessels of over 100 tons. (Footnote: Information that this instruction embodied sub- stance of a memorandum from the President.) Feb. 28 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 79 (113) For the President and the Secretary: Detailed analysis of situations which are making agreement difficult, and suggestion of two possible lines of procedure which might prevent the termination of the Conference without concrete results. Feb. 29 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) SI (114) For the President and the Secretary: Suggestion as to action in case none of the other powers, except Britain and the United States, are prepared to sign. Feb. 29 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 82 (54) Comments on analysis and suggestions of the delegation. Mar. 3 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 83 (119) Understanding of condition under which the United States can agree to reduce the gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches; recommendation that delegation not insist upon condition. Mar. 4 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 84 (120) Advice of French formula pertaining to capital ships, and modification suggested by the delegation for Department's approval. Mar. 5 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 86 (58) Approval of modifications of French formula. Position that further discussions relative to reduction in tonnage or gun caliber of capital ships might better take place in 1941, with arrangement to take effect as from January 1, 1942. (Footnote: Approval of telegram by Navy officials.) Mar. 9 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 86 (64) Request for opinion as to possibility of expediting discussion of any pending technical questions, and as to early return of the delegation, in view of entirely new turn of events brought about by German action in the Rhineland. Mar. 9 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) 87 (129) Information that treaty completion will take ten days longer, and question as to Senate ratification in time for treaty to come into force January 1, 1937; importance of having it effective on that day. 885223—54—VOl. I- xvm LIST OF PAPERS LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 10 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (lel.) (132) Hope of concluding treaty with France and England in ten days; probable effects of German Rhineland matter on negotia- tions. Mar. 11 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (68) Discussion of ratification of treaty, and conclusion it would be best for Davis to initial draft of treaty at this time and appoint some later time for signature in order not to jeopardize Senate acceptance of treaty. Mar. 13 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (137) For the President and the Secretary: Request for definite information as to whether it is proposed to obtain ratification before the end of the year and reasons for request, with a general resume of the situation as seen from London. Mar. 14 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (138) For the President and the Secretary: Further information relative to ratification, and suggestion of signing and withholding treaty from Senate pending clarification of international situa- tion. Mar. 14 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (72) Further views on ratification, and advice of President's views on submission of the treaty to the Senate (instructions as to further steps in connection with initialing or signing. Mar. 16 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (141) Conversation with an official of the Foreign Office, who indi- cated the British decision to go ahead with the naval treaties, while Davis explained the U. S. position on ratification. Mar. 19 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (146) Suggestion that, since the new treaty does not provide for quantitative agreement, a statement including idea of parity be agreed to; British sympathy with idea. Mar. 19 From the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (147) Explanation of safeguarding clauses found in articles 24 and 25 of the draft treaty. Mar. 21 Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of Stale Desire for clarification in treaty relative to building vessels during interim period before treaty becomes effective. Mar. 23 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (80) Confirmation of telephone conversation conveying President's thought that the affirmation of the parity principle be incor- porated in an exchange of private notes with Eden which need not be made public. Mar. 23 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (83) Expression of thanks for work of delegation leading to the conclusion of the treaty. Mar. 23 To the Chairman of the American Delegation (tel.) (84) Suggestion of oral exchange relative to the parity principle, with an exchange of memorandums of the conversation instead of letters. LIST OF PAPERS xrx LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 28 Mar. 30 To the Secretary of the Navy Information of the notes exchanged (text printed) between Davis and Foreign Secretary Eden regarding the maintenance of parity between the navies of the United States and the British Commonwealth. To President Roosevelt Advice that interests of the United States relative to building in the interim period before the treaty becomes effective are fully protected. (Note: Citation to text of Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed March 25, and of Protocol of June 30, 1938. List of signatories and dates of deposit at London of instruments of ratification of the Treaty.) 98 100 100 EFFORTS TO RELATE OTHER POWERS TO THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF MARCH 25, 1936, BY ACCESSION OR BY SEPARATE BILATERAL TREATIES 1936 May 28 (287) July 2 (333) July 9 (A 5678/ 4/45) July 25 (280) July 31 (385) Aug. 1 (101) Aug. 27 (172) Sept. 29 (392) From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice of British bilateral conversations relative to adherence to 1936 Naval treaty with the Poles, who seek explanation of the situation, and with the Soviets, who desire to make reservations before signing. Scandinavian inclination toward general treaty. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Deposit of instruments of ratification of Treaty of March 25; readiness of Russians to accept treaty with reservations; con- tinuance of British conversations with Germans and French. From the British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the First Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom Advice of Japanese communication, in reply to British ad- vances, indicating that Japan has no intention of adhering to the London Treaty under present conditions. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to ascertain British view as to present status of 14-inch gun provision of treaty, which was made contingent on its acceptance not later than April 1, 1937, by Washington Treaty powers. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) British view that Japanese cannot be presumed to have refused to accept 14-inch limit unless they make declaration to that effect before April 1, 1937; British intention to seek views of their Am- bassador in Japan. To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Explanation of situation with respect to 14-inch guns. From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Agreement with British colleague that inquiry as to Japan's position on the 14-inch question should be put point-blank even- tually, and comments as to Japan's probable stand on question. From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) Reasons for Italy's refusal to sign the London Treaty, and her readiness to work with the Locarno powers. 102 102 104 104 105 106 106 107 XX LIST OF PAPERS LONDON NAVAL TREATY Date and number Subject 1936 Oct. 2 From the Minister in Switzerland (128) Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with British Admiral Bellairs, who recounted British conversations aimed to secure adherence of continental powers to the London Treaty. Oct. 9 From the Ambassador in Italy (lel.) (408) Belief of British Ambassador that Italy's real objection to signing was unwillingness to cooperate in naval matters until a more definite program of European cooperation was agreed to. Nov. 16 To the Chargi in Japan (1141) Instructions to consider the advisability of making formal in- quiry as to Japan's position on the 14-inch gun matter, with a detailed presentation of background material on the matter. Dec. 2 To the Ambassador in Japan (iel.) (151) Further instructions as to urgency of action upon receipt of instruction No. 1141 of November 16. Dec. 3 From the Ambassador in Japan (lel.) (249) Suggestion of possibility of handling gun matter through the Naval Attache in Tokyo, in line with a suggestion made to the British by Ambassador Yoshida at London. Dec. 3 To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (circ. tel.) Information that President ratified London Naval Treaty, drafted to come into effect on January 1, 1937, on May 28; request for information as to intentions of Government to which Ambassador is accredited. (Footnote: Sent also to Embassies in France and Italy.) Dec. 3 To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) (434) Review of background of attempt to secure Japanese view on question of 14-inch guns, and instructions to ascertain present status of question as between the British and Japanese. Dec. 7 From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) (599) Reluctance of the Foreign Office to proceed on matter of 14- inch guns until negotiations with Soviets and Germans relative to signature of Treaty have been concluded. Dec. 10 To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (157) Advice that conversations are now going on between the British Foreign Office and the Japanese Ambassador at London relative to gun calibers, and that Department will not broach matter be- fore end of December. Dec. 12 To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) (447) Information as to probable early ratification of the London Treaty by France and Italy, and instructions for representations indicating Department would deem it unfortunate if a lapse in naval limitation were to occur. Dec. 14 From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) (609) Position of France, Great Britain, and Italy on ratification. Dec. 18 From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (262) Detailed report on Japan's position on naval disarmament, and on the precarious situation of the Government. Dec. 22 From the Minister in Norway (340) Information from Bureau Chief of the Foreign Office of a recent meeting leading to an agreement in principle between Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Finnish officials to accept British invita- tion to participate in London Naval Treaty. LIST OF PAPERS XXI LONDON NAVAL TREATY Date and number Subject Page 1936 Dec. 30 (1304) From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Desire of French to put off ratification of Naval Treaty until conclusion of present discussions with Germany; plan to ratify some time in January. 121 REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF BRITISH PROPOSAL FOR RENEWAL OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY, FEBRUARY 6, 1922 1936 Sept. 11 Sept. 16 Sept. 25 (347) Oct. 14 Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western Euro- pean Affairs British Charge's proposal to renew article 19 of the Washing- ton Naval Treaty, providing for nonfortification of certain in- sular possessions in the Pacific, with change permitting modern- ization and extension of existing fortifications. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of Western European Affairs Analysis by representatives of the State, Navy, and War Departments of the British proposal to renew article 19 of the Washington Treaty, and decision not to discuss renewal with the British. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Oral reply made to the British Charge (text printed) indicating U. S. reasons for not joining Great Britain and Japan in the renewal of article 19. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Explanation of what appeared to be an inconsistency in British position relative to Hong Kong fortifications by indica- tion of radical change in British attitude toward rearmament. 122 124 130 131 RETENTION OF NAVAL TONNAGE BY THE UNITED STATES, THE UNITED KINGDOM, AND JAPAN UNDER ARTICLES 17 AND 21 OF THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF 1930 1936 Apr. 30 (1223) May 15 June 4 (191) July 15 (348) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Request for information on British and Japanese plans on scrapping tonnage in excess of amounts indicated in article 16 of the London Treaty of 1930, or on possible invocation of article 21, the escalator clause. To the Secretary of the Navy Reply to inquiries relating to British and Japanese position in the matter of excess tonnage. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Notification of forwarding of copy of memorandum acknowl- edging receipt of British memoranda relative to destroyer excess tonnage. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) British invocation of article 21 of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 with view to retaining 40,000 tons of overage destroyer tonnage in excess of allowance in article 16. 132 133 134 135 xxn LIST OF PAPERS NAVAL TONNAGE Date and number Subject 1936 Aug. 14 (105) Sept. 3 Sept. 7 (421) Sept. 10 (114) Sept.. 25 (445) Sept. 29 (1442) Oct. 27 Oct. 28 (385) Nov. 5 (139) Nov. 21 (413) Dec. 15 (448) To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Memorandum for presentation to Japan (text printed) indi- cating British action, and containing an announcement of U. S. intention to exercise right under article 21 in view of British action. (Footnote: Transmittal to Embassy in the United Kingdom of a memorandum similar in substance for communication to British Government.) Memorandum by the Secretary of State Receipt of memorandum from Japanese Ambassador indicating Japan's intentions in view of the British action on destroyers. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice from Foreign Office of receipt of Japanese note of August 31 indicating decision to retain excess tonnage in de- stroyers and submarines; British alarm at retention of submarine tonnage. To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) U. S. position that there is no legal warrant for Japanese reten- tion of submarine tonnage, in lieu of adequate destroyer tonnage, without recourse to article 21. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Conversation with Craigie, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who gave an outline (text printed) of the British position on Japanese retention of excess submarine tonnage and indicated British desire to retain five "C" class destroyers. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Tentative decisions, in meeting of officials of the State and Navy Departments with the Counselor of the Embassy in the United Kingdom, pertaining to problems connected with certain categories of vessels, and with the Anglo-Soviet Bilateral Naval Agreement. Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Ambassador Resume of long conversation with Craigie on various naval problems, including those on which tentative conclusions had been reached in the Washington meeting. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) U. S. attitude toward British retention of cruisers beyond tonnage allowed by Treaty of 1930; instructions to inform Craigie that the United States is obliged to insist on strict application of article 21. To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Instructions to present to the Japanese Government a mem- orandum stating that U. S. Government has decided to retain 19,000 tons of destroyers under article 17. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to hand to Craigie a memorandum (text printed) relative to U. S. position on the application of article 21 to the British retention of excess cruiser tonnage. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Request for information as to status of British and Japanese projected action under article 21, in view of scrapping compli- cations. LIST OF PAPERS xxm NAVAL TONNAGE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Dec. 16 (618) Dec. 17 Dec. 17 (450) Dec. 24 (624) Dec. 28 (284) Dec. 29 (458) Dec. 29 (291) Dec. 30 (166) Dec. 30 Dec. 30 From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (fel.) Advice that Japan is giving favorable attention to British pro- posals relative to " C" class cruisers, and to application of escala- tor clause to retain submarines. Memorandum by Messrs. William T. Turner and Eugene H. Doomarij of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Conversation with an official of the Japanese Embassy who desired approval of two points in connection with formal notifica- tion of invocation of article 21 in connection with submarines; informal statement (text printed) on the two points. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (fel.) Information relative to Japanese invocation of article 21, in order to retain submarine tonnage. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (fel.) British notification of invocation of article 21 relative to reten- tion of cruiser tonnage. From the Japanese Ambassador Notification of retention of 15,598 tons of submarines in excess of tonnage permitted under article 18, and of invocation of article 21. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (lel.) Instructions to present note (text printed) acknowledging re- ceipt of British notification of invocation of article 21 and indi- cating U. S. intention to increase by proportionate amount its cruiser tonnage. From the Japanese Ambassador Notification that, in response to British invocation of article 21, Japan has decided to retain the subcategory cruiser Tsushima. To the Ambassador in Japan (lel.) Information of Japanese note and Department's reply (infra) indicating U. S. intention to retain proportionate amount of sub- marine tonnage. (Footnote: The same to the Ambassador in the United King- dom.) To the Japanese Ambassador Acknowledgment of Japanese note and statement of U. S. in- tention to retain proportionate amount of submarine tonnage. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Reiteration to Counselor of the British Embassy of U. S. posi- tion in favor of a reduction of armaments, and regret that it has been found necessary to increase naval armament by invocation of article 21. 153 154 155 156 156 157 157 158 158 158 SIGNATURE OF PROCES-VERBAL, NOVEMBER 6, 1936, RELATING TO PART IV (RULES OF SUBMARINE WARFARE), LONDON NAVAL TREATY, SIGNED APRIL 22, 1930 1936 Mar. 10 (130) From the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (tel.) British plan for reconfirming commitment to part IV of the London Treaty of 1930 pertaining to submarines. 160 XXIV LIST OF PAPERS SUBMARINE WARFARE Date and number Subject Page 1936 Mar. 20 Mar. 20 (76) Mar. 28 (104) Aug. 15 (399) Oct. 6 (462) Oct. 8 (367) Nov. 6 (515) To President Roosevelt Explanation of attempt of London Naval Conference to obtain wider adherence to rules of submarine warfare as set forth in 1930, by authorizing the British to invite other countries to sign a proces-verbal. Request for authority for American delegation at Conference to sign. (Footnote: Authority given as requested.) To the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (tel.) Advice of President's authorization of signature of proces- verbal. (Footnote: Department's receipt of information that Japanese would not have instructions in time to sign the proces-verbal be- fore the following week.) To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) For the Ambassador or Atherton: Authority to sign proces- verbal in view of departure of American delegates to the Confer- ence. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) British efforts to secure favorable replies from France and Italy in respect to proces-verbal. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice from Foreign Office of Italian readiness to sign, and of arrangements for early signature of instrument; request as to full power for signature. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Authorization to sign proces-verbal and advice of dispatch of full power signed by President. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice of signature of proces-verbal. (Note: Citation to text of proces-verbal, and Department's statement.) 160 162 162 162 163 163 164 164 VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH RESPECT TO NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION 1935 Dec. 28 (507) Dec. 31 (257) 1936 Jan. 2 (1) To the Ambassador in France (tel.) List of suggestions, made by various persons, with respect to permanent neutrality legislation; request for comment thereon. Instructions to repeat to London, Berlin, and Bern. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Question as to desirability of any permanent neutrality legis- lation in sense of "mandatory" legislation; belief that the Exec- utive should have as complete discretion as possible. From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) Inclination in support of allowing belligerent to buy any ma- terials in "normal volume," as being in substantial compliance with treaty obligations and consonant with neutrality. 165 165 160 LIST OF PAPERS XXV NEUTRALITY LEGISLATION Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 2 (2) Jan. 2 (3) Jan. 3 (362) Jan. 9 Jan. 22 Feb. 1 (32) Feb. 4 (84) Feb. 28 Dec. 15 From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Reference to his previously expressed views; indication that President should be given latitude to specify what commodities should be embargoed and to whom as an aggressor the embargo should apply. From the Ambassador in France (lel.) Belief that neutrality legislation should be in general terms and that, by implication, sales might be permitted to nations on a cash and carry basis; indication of varying views of Embassy staff. From the Minister in Switzerland (lel.) Comments on the various alternatives in No. 507 of December 28, and indication of strong feeling that any legislation beyond that affecting arms and implements of war should be left to the discretion of the President. Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control Explanation of the passport provisions of the neutrality bills, at the request of the Counselor of the Italian Embassy. From the Secretary of War Suggestion that, due to its special status, the Panama Canal Zone be specifically excluded from the neutrality bills before Congress. To the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (tel.) Request for Chairman's comments on possibility of inter- national consideration of the use of neutral ports by armed merchant vessels instead of inclusion of subject in U. S. neu- trality bill. From the Chairman of the American Delegation to the London Naval Conference (tel.) Tentative comments including belief that only possible method of approach between the naval powers would be as corollary to part IV of the London Treaty. To the Secretary of War Discussion of neutrality measures before Congress and promise to keep matter of Panama Canal Zone in mind in connection with any future legislation on neutrality. Memorandum by the Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control Explanation, in reply to questions of the Turkish Ambassador, of U. S. position on export of certain bombers for which Turkey has contracted. 168 169 172 173 174 175 176 178 178 ANALYSES AND REPORTS BY AMERICAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS REGARDING EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFFECT- ING THE PRESERVATION OF PEACE 1936 Jan. 3 (1) From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Account of French Ambassador's conversation with Hitler in which the Italian-Ethiopian situation and the Franco-Soviet agreement were discussed; concern of French Embassy over pos- sible effect of agreement on demilitarized zone. 180 XXVI LIST OF PAPERS EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject Page 1936 Jan. 19 (373) Jan. 27 Feb. 6 (40) Feb. 8 (2651) Feb. 12 (46) Feb. 13 (58) Feb. 15 (48) Feb. 17 (49) Feb. 21 (2563) Feb. 22 (62) Mar. 7 (168) Mar. 7 (67) From the Minister in Czechoslovakia Conversation with Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs in which the recent visit of the Austrian Chancellor was discussed, including its economic and political significance. From the Minister in Switzerland Detailed resume of activity of the ninetieth session of the Council of the League of Nations, with special attention to its position on the Ethiopian question and on sanctions in connec- tion therewith. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Rdsume of Embassy Counselor's conversation with a Foreign Ministry official, who stated that Germany was building up to announced 36 divisions, but would reduce armaments if others did so. From the Ambassador in Germany Analysis of German situation; conclusion that time is ripe for discussion with Germany on armament limitation and related questions; opinion regarding efficacy of threat of encirclement. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Further remarks on encirclement idea; information from British Ambassador that his Government is absolutely com- mitted to great armament. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Explanation of trend of British policy toward temporization. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) German position that Franco-Soviet pact is a breach of Locarno, and concern over "spirit" which may develop in the two countries; hint of possible army influence toward improve- ment of Soviet-German relations. From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (tel.) Survey of international relations, including information from Soviet Commissar of Foreign Affairs Litvinov and from Polish Foreign Minister Beck. From the Ambassador in France Conversation with new Prime Minister Sarrant on the broader aspect of world problems, including Sarrant's suggestion of an international conference to consider the question of securing for each nation raw materials, markets, and outlets for surplus population. From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) Evaluation of Italian foreign policy following a long talk with Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Suvieh, who gave assurance that there are no negotiations in process for military or political cooperation with Germany. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Unconfirmed press report that small detachment of German Army has entered Cologne; French view of violation of Locarno treaty. To the Ambassador in France (tel.) Instructions to keep Department closely informed of develop- ments arising out of German action. (Footnote: Sent also to Embassies in the United Kingdom and Germany.) LIST OF PAPERS xxvn EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject 1936 Mar. 7 (60) Mar. 7 (76) Mar. 7 (79) Mar. 8 (89) [Mar. 8] (61) Mar. 8 (175) Mar. 9 Mar. 9 (66) Mar. 9 Mar. 9 Undated (Rec'd Apr. 1) Mar. 10 (70) From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Memorandum sent by Germany to the Locarno powers (excerpt printed); Foreign Office comments on memorandum and assurance that entry of troops into demilitarized zone was devoid of military significance. From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) Detailed r6sum6 of Suvich's explanation of the Italian view of the German action and its probable effects. From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (tel.) Attitude of various members of the diplomatic corps and of Litvinov toward the German action. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice of British general view of German action, and of Foreign Secretary Eden's conferences with representatives of the Locarno powers, and with the Prime Minister. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Discussion of content and reception of Hitler's Reichstag speech, and information of Military Attache's estimate that about 45,000 soldiers are being moved into the Rhineland. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Foreign Minister's observations relative to the situation created by the German action; and his request, in view of British vacillation, that President Roosevelt or the Secretary condemn on moral grounds any unilateral repudiation of a treaty. To President Roosevelt Transmittal of a memorandum relative to German action, with indication that the action appears to be a violation of the Versailles Treaty and the Locarno pacts, but not of the U. S.- German treaty of August 25, 1921. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Advice of favorable attitude of the Foreign Office toward a League invitation to attend a Council meeting to discuss the German action. From the Ambassador in Mexico (tel.) Hope that opportunity may offer itself for a tender of good offices by the President to avert war in Europe. Memorandum by the Minister in Austria Discussion of background and meaning to Europe of German violation of Locarno Pact, and probable consequence to Europe if England and France permit Germany to get away with this fait accompli. Memorandum by the American Minister in Rumania of a Conver- sation With the Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, March 9, 1936 Conversation with Foreign Minister Titulescu, who was criti- cal of the mild course of France, and indicated readiness of Ru- mania to join in sanctions against Germany if the League voted them. To the Ambassador in France (tel.) Advice that Department does not feel that it could appropri- ately make the statement requested in No. 175 of March 8, in view of procedure provided for application to present situation. XXVIII LIST OF PAPERS EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject 1936 Mar. 10 From the Ambassador in France (lel.) (184) French demands in connection with the German situation as set forth in a meeting of the Locarno signatories. Mar. 10 From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (lel.) (100) Cabinet decision that Hitler's proposal (made in his Reichstag speech) should be considered; critical views of pro-French ele- ment in official quarters. Mar. 11 From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (89) Summary of trends relative to the German situation, including remarks on the improbability of the adoption of sanctions, un- certainty of Balkan representatives as to views of their Govern- ments, and fear of involvement by some countries. Mar. 11 From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) (102) _ Trends prior to meeting of Locarno powers in London, includ- ing a stiffening of the French position, British unwillingness to perpetuate promise of temporary support to France and Belgium, and Soviet opposition to negotiations with Germany. Mar. 11 From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) (69) Advice of German plan for demilitarization of Franco-German frontier, and of German belief that French are not in any mood for discussions. Mar. 11 From the Ambassador in France (tel.) (197) Foreign Minister Flandin's disappointment that the United States could not give support requested for French thesis, and his satisfaction over Belgian support of sanctions with its prob- able effect in Great Britain. (Footnote: Reference to despatch setting forth Belgian posi- tion relative to demands for sanctions against Germany.) Mar. 11 From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) (71) Information that Mussolini is sending the Brenner Pass zone, and that U. watched by all powers. Mar. 12 From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) (108) Report on deadlocked negotiations, including: British attempt to seek basis for French-German agreement, pressure on France by Soviet Union and the Little Entente, British view of Belgian position, and Italy's cynical onlooker's attitude. Mar. 12 To the Ambassador in Mexico (tel.) (51) Advice of President's appreciation of message relating to good offices, and of his hope that necessity for drastic action will be obviated. Mar. 12 From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) (74) Comments on a German official statement, which includes a discussion of proposals of March 7, and on the German military situation. Mar. 12 From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) (113) Information of British-French conversation, and of German position at the London Locarno meetings. Mar. 12 From the Ambassador in Poland (1053) Advice of French Ambassador's views of Hitler's proposals, and of French intention of satisfying French-Soviet agreement. Foreign Minister Beck's promise that Poland would remain faith- ful to Franco-Polish agreement; observations thereon. two army divisions to . attitudes are closely LIST OF PAPERS xxrx EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number 1936 Mar. 13 (115) Mar. 13 (116) Mar. 13 (117) Mar. 13 (80) Mar. 14 Mar. 14 (75) Mar. 14 (2) Mar. 14 (754) Mar. 16 (78) Mar. 16 (79) Mar. 17 (ID Mar. 17 (80) Mar. 17 (139) Subject From the Chargi in the Untied Kingdom (lel.) French Ambassador's assessment of situation to date; British attitude and changes therein, due to a better understanding of the French and Belgian positions. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Report on Belgian plan offered at meeting of the Locarno powers, and on rumors relative to British approach to Hitler. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Question as to attendance as visitor at the League Council meeting. To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Department's view that he should not attend meeting. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Explanation of U. S. position in the present European situa- tion in reply to a request from the Turkish Ambassador. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) German decision not to give way to pressure for some gesture to France in withdrawing part of Rhineland forces, and not to send a representative to the Council meeting at this time; sum- mary of rumors and conjectures. From the Minister in Czechoslovakia (tel.) Czech views on German action of March 7, and attitude toward sanctions. From the Ambassador in Belgium Outline of seven points of Belgian position, and information as to probable Belgian aim in efforts to reconcile views of British and French. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Analysis of German situation including relation thereto of the Ethiopian question and U. S. isolationism, and request that this communication be shown to the President. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Foreign Office comments on reply to invitation to participate in the League Council meeting, with indication that the Govern- ment was prepared to accept provided the German proposals would be considered; observations on general situation. From the Minister in Yugoslavia (tel.) Information from Foreign Minister that in case of failure of peaceful solution of the German problem, Yugoslavia would give France full and unqualified support. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) British assurance that German and other proposals would be discussed at Council meeting in due course; German decision to send delegation to London headed by Ribbentrop, Ambassador- at-Large. From the Minister in Norway Possible effects of Danish Foreign Minister's refusal to support sanctions in his capacity as representative of the Scandinavian countries at the Council meeting. Page 241 243 244 244 244 245 246 247 249 251 252 252 253 XXX LIST OF PAPERS EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject 1936 Mar. 18 From the Minister in Norway (tel.) (20) Information from various sources that the British will propose at intervals a comprehensive peace plan providing inter alia for equality for Germany and security for France and Belgium. Mar. 18 From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) (85) Considerations relative to London discussions in general, and the French position in particular. Mar. 18 Memorandum by the Minister in Switzerland Foreign Minister's inclination toward British point of view, and against the French, which he thinks too legalistic; his posi- tion on sanctions, and on the proper scope of work of the League. Mar. 20 Report by the Military Attachi in Germany (14,593) Detailed explanation of the Rhineland occupation as a defen- sive measure from the German point of view; discussion of points on which Germany will not yield, and of the probable outcome of the cribis. Mar. 20 From the Minister in the Netherlands (381) Foreign Minister's view of the European situation, with special attention to the complications deriving from the German struggle for equality, and his belief that Hitler's peace plan might have good results, but that his country would refrain from joining entangling alliances. Mar. 20 From the Minister in Norway (tel.) (21) Italy's allegation of inability to participate in any Rhineland patrol schems which might be adopted by League Council; expected trend of Council meetings. Mar. 21 To the Minister in Norway (tel.) (6) Expression of appreciation of Minister's No. 20, March 18, and indication of continuing interest in telegrams of type similar to No. 21, March 20. Mar. 21 From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) (88) Foreign Office opposition to accord adopted in London March 19, but desire to continue negotiations; Hitler's election cam- paign appeal. Mar. 23 Memorandum by the Chargi in Belgium Background of accord adopted in London by the Locarno powers, and Van Zeeland's r61e therein; German astonishment at firm stand taken. Mar. 23 To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) (89) Expression of appreciation of Charge's reports on meetings of the Council and the Locarno powers. Mar. 24 Memorandum by the Chargi in Lithuania Explanation by a Foreign Ministry official of Lithuanian attitude toward a non-aggression pact with Lithuania mentioned in the German memorandum of March 7. Mar. 25 From the Ambassador in France (tel.) (251) Restatement of French position by an official of the Foreign Ministry, including information concerning opposition in Germany to Hitler's Rhineland action. (Sent also to London, Rome, Brussels, Berlin, and The Hague.) LIST OF PAPERS XXXI EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject 1936 Mar. 26 From, the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) (153) Information from Dieckhoff of the German delegation in London that German official opinion concerning Rhineland action was united, except as to number of troops to be sent. Mar. 28 From the Ambassador in France (tel.) (266) Foreign Minister's regret that British Government did not take a firm attitude from the beginning of the German Rhine- land conflict, since it would have removed, at least for some time, the danger of war. Mar. 28 From the Minister in Switzerland (4319) Observations on a London meeting of representatives of the Scandinavian countries and Holland, Spain, and Switzerland, who decided that powers nonsignatories of the Versailles Treaty or Locarno Pact, but members of the League, had no responsi- bility in the present situation. Apr. 1 From the Ambassador in Belgium (776) Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with Van Zeeland, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, who commented on parliamentary government, the German situation, English sympathy with Germany, Anglo-Belgian military conversations, and the forthcoming Belgian elections. Apr. 2 From the Ambassador in Poland (1078) Foreign Minister Beck's remarks relative to Poland's position at London, and his gratification at statement of Neville Chamber- lain, leader of the Conservative Party, that Great Britain would abide by obligations as a League member to guard Poland against aggressive attack. Apr. 2 From the Chargi in Estonia (604 Account of conversations with Estonian and Latvian officials Diplo.) relative to the effect on the Baltic countries of the German Rhine- land occupation, and the Hitler peace proposals. Apr. 2 From the Ambassador in Germany {tel.) (103) Analysis of local non-German reaction to German proposals and Hitler's tendency to talk directly to the people; opinion that Hitler's bluff for peace should be called since the powers do not seem willing and capable of calling his bluff for war. Apr. 4 From the Ambassador in Germany (2747) Advice of probability that no action will be taken on Hitler's proposals until after French elections, and review of German relations with the Danubian countries, Italy, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and Poland. Apr. 6 From the Minister in Norway (tel.) (25) Information concerning a French plan in respect to the Rhine- land, British desire to end Italian-Ethiopian hostilities, pro- German attitude of English people, including high army circles, and forthcoming conclusion of German-Japanese military ar- rangements. Apr. 7 From the Consul at Geneva (1649) Comprehensive survey of the general European situation from Geneva viewpoint, including the view that how Great Britain reconciles her European and African interests is, next to Ger- many's policy and intentions, the great problem in the situation. Page 208 269 270 271 273 275 278 279 282 282 xxxu LIST OF PAPERS EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number 1936 Apr. 9 (105) Apr. 14 (789) [Apr. 16] Apr. 17 (431) Apr. 22 (116) Apr. 27 (228) May 1 (807) May 18 May 19 (269) May 20 (270) May 20 Subject From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) German receipt of French plan and preliminary official com- ment thereon; press repudiation of plan in detail and in tone. From the Ambassador in Belgium Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with Van Zee- land's Chef de Cabinet, pertaining to the meeting of the Locarno powers, other than Germany, at Geneva, April 10. Memorandum by the Minister in Yugoslavia Assistant Foreign Minister's views on the Austrian establish- ment of conscript service, possibility of similar Hungarian ac- tion, eventual success of Italy in Ethiopia, and views on the French position. From the Minister in Czechoslovakia Detailed consideration of Czechoslovak concern relative to possible repercussions of recent developments in Germany, especially in their effect upon the relation of France to the Little Entente and upon Hungary. Prophecy that Germany will at- tain aims. From the Chargi in Germany (lel.) Resume of situation as seen from Berlin, including comments on views of Foreign Office as to satisfactory relations with the British, and on French Embassy's distrust of German intentions in Austria. Belief that situation is focusing on French-German rivalry for European hegemony, and the new element of Italy. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Analysis of British trends, including the passing of the high point of pro-German opinion, the awakening to the possible dangers from Nazi policies, and the awareness of necessity of rearming; opinion of the importance of the time element in four factors of international import. From the Ambassador in Belgium Evaluation of increasing Belgian tendency of an orientation toward Great Britain rather than toward France, and of eco- nomic and other reasons for the change. Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union Lengthy conversation with German Foreign Minister Von Neurath, who talked, without apparent reserve, about German intentions and relations to other European powers, and gave the impression that Germany will attempt to avoid commitments until her fortifications in the 'West are completed. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Resume of the British situation, with attention to the appre- hension in official circles that Hitler does not wish to effect ap- peasement through negotiation, in view of his attitude toward a British questionnaire and other matters. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Foreign Office position that it is in the British interest to re- construct a front of the Western powers, a step which necessitates the termination of the Anglo-Italian situation and adjustment of Italy's position in the League. Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union Conversation with Van Zeeland, who was concerned about the effect of the immense decrease of French prestige and the military weakness of England, and who expressed his views as to desirable changes in the League Covenant. LIST OF PAPERS XXXIII EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject Page 308 310 310 311 312 314 315 316 321 1936 May 21 May 22 (275) Mav 26 (2852) May 28 (161) May 30 (136) June 16 (691) July 3 (206) July 11 (825) July 13 (345) July 15 (219) Memorandum by the Ambassador in the Soviet Union Information from a French Foreign Office official of French Government's willingness to use force to prevent construction of German fortifications on the French and Belgian frontiers, but his acknowledgment of possible difficulties with public opinion. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Information of Hitler's opening of indirect discussions with Mussolini. From the Chargi in Germany Explanation by Foreign Office official that Germany, by a note of April 1 to the British, feels herself bound not to increase the garrison in the Rhineland for four months, but is not bound as to fortifications; information that fortifications are under way. From the Chargi in Germany (tel.) Account of conversations with British and French Ambassa- dors and with Dieckhoff on various subjects, including Italo- German relations, Hitler's economic stabilization plan, resurgence of German military power, and work on German reply to British questionnaire. From the Minister in Albania Presentation of two U. S. military attaches to King Zog, who gave his views as to when general war, started by Germany, might break out, and suggested its possible prevention by col- laboration between the British and Americans. From the Minister in Egypt Examples of prevailing opinion on the inevitability of a new world war. From the Chargi in Germany (tel.) Belief that a reply to the British questionnaire will soon be made, and that the French are anxious to have Germany par- ticipate in the Brussels Locarno discussions. Advice from the French of German fear of a monarchical restoration in Austria I at Mussolini's initiative. From the Minister in Austria Transmittal of a "sketch" (text printed) of conversations between Chancellor Schuschnigg and the German Minister, which is expected to lead to completion of an agreement in which Germany would recognize Austrian independence and agree to noninterference in Austrian internal affairs. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Information from Foreign Office official on British views rel- ative to the Austro-German agreement, French notification of termination of Mediterranean mutual assistance accord, and on proposed Brussels meeting. (Footnote: Eden's announcements of mutual assistance agree- ment lapses.) From the Chargi in Germany (tel.) Analysis of and observations on the possible significance of the Austro-German agreement, including its effect on German relations with Italy and Great Britain; speculations as to Hitler's next move. 322 885223—54—VOl. I- XXXIV LIST OF PAPERS EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject Page 1936 July 16 (607) July 23 (508) July 24 (645) July 25 (511) July 28 (234) July 29 (236) Aug. 5 (650) Aug. 6 (722) Aug. 18 (256) Sept. 3 (3019) From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Foreign Office view of Austro-German accord, including obser- vation that the countries that have the most to worry about are Czechoslovakia and Poland. From the Chargi in Czechoslovakia Foreign Minister Krofta's fear of growing German power, but belief that Hitler knows he would not be allowed to absorb Czechoslovakia; Krofta's concern, however, over a possible Ger- man offer of a "political and commercial pact." From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Views of Vienot, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, on results of a London Conference of representatives from Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, July 23, and his belief that Hitler would not answer the British questionnaire until at least after the Olympic games. (Footnote: Information that Germany did not reply to ques- tionnaire.) From the Chargi in Czechoslovakia Summary of optimistic observations of President BeneS on the general European situation, including his assertion that Czechoslovakia has implicit faith in her allies. From the Chargi in Germany (tel.) German willingness to participate in a five-power Locarno conference in the fall after careful preparation, and views as to possible agenda. (Footnote: Information that conference was not held.) From the Chargi in Germany (tel.) Information from the British Chargi of concern over French position on Eastern European problems, and German failure to reply to questionnaire; from the French Counsellor of concern over German position on Soviet Russia. To the Chargi in Germany Detailed instructions for special study and reports relative to policies and plans of the German Government and leaders in respect to the countries of Eastern Europe. From the Chargi in France (tel.) Soviet Charge's belief that Germany and Italy accepted invi- tation to projected Locarno conference to conciliate British opinion in respect to Italian aid to Spanish insurgents; and view that Germany would utilize conference to protest against Soviet Russia and Communism. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) View of Schacht, Minister of Economic Affairs, that German cooperation for world peace depended on international guarantee of colonial possessions and room for her increasing population, and his desire that President Roosevelt call a conference to make proper concessions. From the Ambassador in Germany Analysis of background of present turmoil in Europe and probable future trends, with special attention to Germany's resurgence, her relation to Italy, and the influence of the Soviet Union and Communism on that relationship. 325 326 327 328 330 331 332 334 335 335 LIST OF PAPERS XXXV EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject Page 339 342 345 347 347 350 353 355 350 358 359 359 1936 Sept. 5 (546) [Sept. 10] Sept. 12 (210) Sept. 16 (976) Sept. 18 (3047) Sept. 21 (3052) Sept. 22 (906) Sept. 28 (294) Oct. 2 (7) Oct. 8 (978) Oct. 12 (301) Oct. 14 (1005) From the Minister in Czechoslovakia Detailed summary of Krofta's comments on the European situation, with emphasis on the relationship of Czechoslovakia to the other countries of Europe. Memorandum by the Minister in Austria Comprehensive analysis of unlimited German objectives and the external and domestic influences determining the rate of their realization. From the Chargi in the Soviet Union (lel.) Litvinov's reasons for denunciation of the Blum government in France; belief of German observers in Moscow that the Krem- lin is dissatisfied with the United Front experiment in France. From the Chargi in Belgium Information from a Foreign Office official of the tendency of Italy and Germany to put off the Locarno Conference with the expectation of securing better strategic positions meanwhile. From the Ambassador in Germany Comprehensive survey of the attitudes of the German people, and conclusion that Hitler for the present at least can count on an overwhelming majority in support of any venture he might un- dertake. From the Ambassador in Germany Discussion of the international aspects of the Nuremberg Con- gress, forming the first of three despatches devoted to that event, and indicating the clarification of foreign policy, especially rela- tive to the Soviet Union and Italy. From the Chargi in France (lel.) Observations of a Foreign Office official on German foreign policy with special reference to the ulterior motives behind the anti-Soviet campaign, and to the drive for colonies. From the Ambassador in Germany (lel) Advice of projected increase in German military strength, and of signs of mutual cooperation between Germany and Italy. From the Ambassador in France Conversation with Leger of the Foreign Office, who explained the military promises made during General Rydz-Smigly's visit, and analyzed German policy in respect to a possible attack on France. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Foreign Minister's remarks on removal of trade barriers, de- sirability of an economic conference, and reason why the agreed- on military conversations with the Soviet Union have not taken place. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Information of German action to increase military strength, effective October 11. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Views of Beck, Foreign Minister of Poland, on a Locarno agreement, and his opinion that nothing could be done except to meet each situation which arose, in a spirit of moderation and reasonableness. XXXVI LIST OF PAPERS EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number Subject Page 1936 Oct. 19 (561) Oct. 21 (422) Oct. 24 Oct. 28 (2037) Nov. 2 Nov. 9 (67) Nov. 13 Nov. 14 (332) Nov. 16 (335) Dec. 2 Dec. 3 (1080) Dec. 7 (609) From the Minister in the Netherlands 360 Netherland approval of declaration of King Leopold of Bel- gium on October 14, which stated that his country's efforts must be directed not to preparing for war in a coalition, but toward keeping war away from Belgian territory. From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) 363 Advice of Italian reply to British proposals relative to a Lo- carno meeting, indicating a desire to return to original Locarno undertaking. Memorandum by the Third Secretary of Embassy in Belgium 363 Information from Le Ghait, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister, that the Belgian reply to the British invitation to a five-power conference was in line with the recent statement by King Leopold on foreign policy. From the Chargi in the Soviet Union 364 Soviet concern over King Leopold's statement as a sign of the beginning of the fall of the structure of so-called collective secu- rity, and denial that there is a connection between the Belgian shUt in policy and the Franco-Soviet pact. Memorandum by the Secretary of State 365 Discussion with the Hungarian Minister as to the consequences of continuing increase in European armaments. Report by the Naval Attachi in Belgium 366 Discussion of meaning and effects of King Leopold's statement of October 14 recommending an "exclusively and integrally Bel- gian policy" in order to keep Belgium out of its neighbors' con- flicts. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs 368 Detailed information from the Rumanian Minister relative to the last meeting of the Little Entente Council and the rifts therein, including difference of views on Soviet policy and on the restoration of the Hapsburgs. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) 370 Assessment of the possible influence of present Italo-German rapprochement upon Central Europe in general and Czechoslovakia in particular. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) 372 Advice of Germany's unilateral denunciation of part XII of the Versailles Treaty relating to German waterways; uncer- tainty as to reason for the action and timing of denunciation. (Footnote: Information of few mild protests lodged with Foreign Office.) To the Director of Naval Intelligence, Navy Department 374 Comments on a report pertaining to Belgium's new neutrality policy, forwarded by the Director. From the Ambassador in Belgium 374 Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with Le Ghait, who indicated that a favorable reply would be sent to the British suggestion of Belgian participation in a new Western pact. From the Minister in Czechoslovakia 375 Resume of a discussion with Veverka, presently Czechoslovak Minister in Austria, in which the waning power of Italy in Central Europe was mentioned, but major stress placed on differences with Germany in the Sudeten area. LIST OF PAPERS XXXVII EUROPEAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS Date and number 1936 Dec. 9 (3179) Dec. 16 (1262) Dec. 17 (264) Dec. 17 (1266) Dec. 18 (1273) Dec. 19 (1094) 1937 Jan. 7 (1438) Jan. 16 (68) Subject From the Ambassador in Germany Advice that the German Government has given no formal notification to the United States of the denunciation of part XII of the Versailles Treaty, the rights and advantages of which were given to the United States under the U. S.-German treaty of 1921. From the Ambassador in France (lel.) Information of French and German advances requesting U. S. assistance in reaching a reconciliation; suggestion of possible statement by President Roosevelt after preparation of ground. From the Chargi in Latvia Finnish Minister's observations concerning the relations of his country with the Soviet Union and Germany and Finland's hope to remain neutral in case of war in Eastern Europe. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) French intention of going ahead with conversations with the German Ambassador concerning a Franco-German understand- ing, despite British opposition to previous conversations in which the matter of colonies was mentioned. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) French pressure on Little Entente to alter mutual obligations for defense against Hungary and Bulgaria into obligations for defense against Germany. From the Ambassador in Belgium Digests (texts printed) of (1) British note of September 17, proposing a Western pact, (2) replies thereto of Belgium, France, Germany, and Italy, and (3) British supplementary note of November 19. From the Ambassador in Poland Foreign Minister Beck's optimistic views on European situa- tion, and his satisfaction in Polish relations thereto. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Information of no progress in connection with French offer to enter into pacts of mutual assistance with Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia against attack from any source. Page 379 380 381 382 383 384 387 389 THE GERMAN-JAPANESE ACCORD OF NOVEMBER 25, 1936, AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL 1936 Oct. 27 (2101) Nov. 11 (231) Nov. 13 (232) From the Chargi in Japan Memorandum (text printed) of a conversation with the Bel- gian Ambassador, who said he believed that an informal German- Japanese military accord has existed for some time, but that a more concrete agreement was being reached. From the Chargi in Japan (tel.) Local reports of an important diplomatic project having to do with Germany. From the Chargi in Japan (tel.) Japanese ban on foreign press despatches relative to rumored negotiations with Germany; belief in informed sources that any agreement reached will be a declaration opposed to Communism, aligning Japan with Fascist nations. 390 391 391 xxxvm LIST OF PAPERS GERMAN-JAPANESE ACCORD Date and number 1936 Nov. 17 (279) Nov. 17 (468) Nov. 18 (281) Nov. 18 (1126) Nov. 18 (470) Nov. 20 (343) Nov. 23 (238) Nov. 25 (294) Nov. 25 (349) Nov. 27 Nov. 27 (137) Nov. 28 (351) Subject From the Chargi in the Soviet Union (tel.) Information from Litvinov, Commissar of Foreign Affairs, relative to signature of German-Japanese declaration calling for an international campaign against Communism, and his com- ments thereon. From the Ambassador in Italy (lel.) Press comments relative to agreement. From the Chargi in the Soviet Union (tel.) Press report relative to agreement. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Information of the German Foreign Minister's view as of last May on an agreement with Japan. Soviet Ambassador's infor- mation that agreement had secret clauses making it virtually an alliance against the Soviet Union. From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) Information from the Japanese Ambassador that he under- stood an agreement had been initialed in Berlin, that there was no hidden military understanding, and that Berlin had taken the initiative. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Assurance from Foreign Office informant that nothing in the nature of a real agreement exists with Japan; intimation, how- ever, that there may be a Japanese declaration against Com- munism in the near future. From the Chargi in Japan (tel.) Foreign Office official's summary of proposed anti-Comintern agreement with Germany, explanation of its character, and assurance that it was not directed against any particular power. From the Chargi in the Soviet Union (tel.) Information from the Chinese and French Ambassadors and the Japanese Charge concerning developments in the Far East with special reference to relations between Japan and Germany. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Receipt from Foreign Minister of copy of agreement with Japan, signed November 25 (text printed), and his assurance that it covered the entire agreement, that there were no secret clauses. (Footnote: Citation to text of secret additional agreement signed the same day.) Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State of a Conversation With the Polish Ambassador Ambassador's assertion that Poland is not a party to the German-Japanese Agreement and does not propose to be; his mention of close arrangement with Rumania for self-protection. From the Chargi in Poland (tel.) Information that Poland has not the slightest intention of joining German-Japanese anti-Communist front. From the Ambassador in Germany (tel.) Attempt to assess the German situation in the light of the agreement with Japan; feeling that Hitler is proceeding on a clever line which can lead in any one of several directions. Page 392 393 394 394 395 396 397 398 400 401 402 402 LIST OF PAPERS xxxrx GERMAN-JAPANESE ACCORD Date and number Subject Page 404 405 1936 Dec. 4 (251) Dec. 22 (288) From the Ambassador in Japan (lel.) Apparent surprise of Foreign Office over adverse reaction to agreement both in Japan and abroad; belief of Diplomatic Corps that secret military understanding accompanied agreement; views of British and Soviet Ambassadors. From the Ambassador in China Transmittal of memoranda of conversations with the Foreign Minister and the French and German Ambassadors, indicating various attitudes toward the agreement. NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF LIQUOR SMUGGLING INTO THE UNITED STATES Belgium 1936 Jan. 25 Feb. 7 Mar. 10 (332) Mar. 10 (10) May 20 (D. 6738 No. 2129) May 20 (28) May 21 May 22 (29) Memorandum by the Secretary of State Expression of hope that Belgium would take steps, by the requirement of bonds for the production of landing certificates, to eliminate the smuggling of alcohol into the United States from Belgian ports. Memorandum by the Consul General at Antwerp, Temporarily in the United States Belgian Ambassador's presentation of his Government's posi- tion that it is the duty of the U. S. Government to protect its own coast from smuggling; Consul General's reiteration of argu- ments for a regime of landing certificates. To the Ambassador in Belgium Belief that Belgian Ambassador will send report recommend- ing action on lines desired by the United States, and instructions to facilitate Belgian action. Information of recent Mexican cooperation in smuggling matter. To the Ambassador in Belgium (lel.) Advice of Belgian Ambassador's plan to gain desired action; request that instructions of March 10 be disregarded. From the Belgian Embassy Desire of Belgium to collaborate despite the fact that the Bel- gian laws do not permit imposition of a system of landing cer- tificates; indication of past and possible future means of collabo- ration. From the Ambassador in Belgium (tel.) Embassy representations to the Foreign Office in attempt to prevent the departure of the Ilillfern with a cargo of alcohol; Belgian insistence on inability to prevent departure legally. From the Consul General at Antwerp (lel.) Seizure of Hillfern by Commissioner of the Port, and release by Minister of Marine; finding of purchaser for alcohol at Rotter- dam. From the Ambassador in Belgium (tel.) Account of further fruitless representations, and request as to how far the Department wishes to go in the matter. 407 408 410 410 411 412 413 414 XL LIST OF PAPERS SUPPRESSION OF LIQUOR SMUGGLING Belgium—Continued Date and number 1936 May 22 May 20 May 27 May 28 May 28 June 1 (18) June 22 (43) July 2 (22) July 7 (47) Subject Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with the Belgian Charge^ to whom a statement (text printed) was read as an oral representation on the Hillfern situation, and indication made of the disastrous effect the matter would have if aired in the press. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with the Belgian Ambassador, who expressed great concern regarding smuggling operations in Antwerp; Department's reiteration of its serious view of the situation. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs io the Under Secretary of Stale Information relative to cooperation in the prevention of smuggling by France, Mexico, and the Netherlands, submitted as of possible interest in connection with the Belgian negotiations. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Belgian Ambassador's delivery of note verbale (infra) relative to the steps taken in regard to the Hillfern, and his request for copies of the U. S. anti-smuggling laws, and for information as to those of the Netherlands. (Footnote: Information from Consul at Rotterdam, tele- graphed May 23 and 28, that Hillfern unloaded alcohol at Rotterdam.) From the Belgian Embassy Explanation of Belgian action in the Hillfern case as being the limit to which the Government could go under present legislation, and information that study of a draft law is being considered. To the Ambassador in Belgium (tel.) Advice of Belgian note of May 28 and instructions to express gratification to the Foreign Office at steps it is proposed to take, and information as to status of Netherland legislation. From the Chargi in Belgium (tel.) Foreign Office assurance of cooperation to stop alcohol smuggling, its hope that legislation might be passed to require landing certificates, and that the U. S. Consul General might assist by attending meeting of experts. (Footnote: Department's instructions in connection with attendance at meeting.) To the Chargi in Belgium (tel.) Instructions to communicate to the Belgian authorities an excerpt (text printed) from a letter of the Secretary of the Treas- ury explaining operation of U. S. anti-smuggling laws. From the Chargi in Belgium (tel.) Advice of new regulations providing for the shipment of alcohol from Belgium in barrels too heavy to transship at sea without a crane. Page 415 417 418 418 419 420 421 422 423 Canada 1935 Nov. 22 (138) To the Minister in Canada (tel.) Information of loading of vessels with alcohol at Antwerp for delivery to smuggling vessels on the high seas near Canada; instructions to discuss possible willingness of Canada to join in representations to Belgium to require landing certificates. 424 LIST OF PAPERS XLI SUPPRESSION OF LIQUOR SMUGGLING Canada—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 Apr. 3 (564) Aug. 5 (481) From the Minister in Canada Advice of willingness of Canada to participate in representa- tions to Belgium, and request for information as to U. S. repre- sentations. To the Minister in Canada Reasons why no action was taken in connection with Canadian participation in representations; and advice of Belgian decree, effective August 1, designed to prevent illicit shipments. Cuba 1936 June 13 (950) To the Ambassador in Cuba Hope that Embassy will be successful in its efforts to obtain a continuation of the present system to prevent smuggling of Cuban alcohol into the United States; amendment desired by the Secretary of the Treasury (text printed) if the bill to change the system is considered on the floor of the Senate. (Footnote: Information that bill was voted down in the Senate, after passage by the House, despite pressure by Cuban distillers.) France 1936 Feb. 20 Apr. 16 (123) June 26 (1384) Oct. Nov. 10 (453) Nov. 13 (1105) To the French Embassy Advice of violation of anti-smuggling decree of April 9, 1935, at St. Pierre-Miquelon; and belief that France will wish to take measures against further violations. To the Ambassador in France (lel.) Instructions for representations against a new decree proposed to replace that of April 9, 1935. To the Ambassador in France Instructions to express appreciation of French action to pre- vent further smuggling, and hope that the Administrator at St. Pierre-Miquelon will be given assistance in his task of en- forcement. (Footnote: Ambassador's advice that customs forces have been augmented, and a night patrol service inaugurated.) From the Vice Consul at St. Pierre-Miquelon- (tcl.) Advice of proposed decree (text printed) abrogating that of April 9, 1935, except insofar as it concerns foreign alcohols now in warehouses, and of accompanying resolution prohibiting the importation of all foreign alcohols. To the Ambassador in France (lel.) Instructions to endeavor to secure assurances that no distillery will be permitted at St. Pierre; and that no French alcohol, known as "trois-six" will be exported from St. Pierre-Miquelon. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Foreign Office assurance that measures will be taken to pre- vent operation of distillery, and explanation that "trois-six" is a "foreign alcohol" and hence will be prohibited. XLTI LIST OF PAPERS SUPPRESSION OF LIQUOR SMUGGLING France—Continued Date and number Subject Page 1936 Nov. 23 To the Ambassador in France (tel.) 434 (475) Suggestions of Treasury Department on which favorable French consideration is desired. Dec. 4 From the Ambassador in France (tel.) 434 (1194) Foreign Office readiness to make certain suggestions to the Ministry of Colonies in connection with the new decree. Dec. 16 To the Ambassador in France (tel.) 435 (530) Comments on Foreign Office suggestions, with indication of changes desired. Dec. 18 From the Ambassador in France (tel.) 436 (1275) Consideration by the Foreign Office of changes desired, and indication that no definite action will be taken before consulta- tion between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Colonies. Mexico 1936 Jan. 24 (3238) Feb. 29 (40) From the Ambassador in Mexico 436 Information from the Minister of Hacienda that decree will be promulgated shortly, providing that shipments of alcohol out of Mexico must carry a bond for the production of a landing certificate. From the Ambassador in Mexico (tel.) 437 President's signature of decree on February 29. (Footnote: Promulgation on March 22.) Netherlands 1936 Apr. 18 From the Chargi in the Netherlands 437 (403) Note from the Foreign Minister (text printed) relative to legislation to be submitted shortly to control fraudulent im- portation into the United States of alcohol originating from the Netherlands. May 21 To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.) 438 (9) Request for information as to status of anti-smuggling legis- lation, and question as to informing Belgium of contemplated Netherland legislation. May 22 From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.) 438 (20) Information as requested, and indication that the Foreign Office has no objection to U. S. notification to Belgium of con- templated legislation. Aug. 3 From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.) 439 (26) Advice that legislation awaits approval of the Minister of Finance before submission to the States General where prompt approval is expected. (Footnote: Information that apparently the legislation was still under consideration when the Government moved to Lon- don in 1940.) LIST OF PAPERS XLHI SUPPRESSION OF LIQUOR SMUGGLING Norway Date and number Subject 1936 Jan. 24 From the Minister in Norway (93) Advice of investigation by Norwegian authorities of the case of the Reidun, which had unloaded alcohol on the high seas, and also of Oslo attorney's question relative to what action might be taken against the vessel should it enter a U. S. port. Mar. 18 From the Norwegian Minister Representations against the detention of the Reidun in New York, with reservation of rights to claim damages. Mar. 26 To the Minister in Norway (lel.) (8) Advice of seizure of Reidun and legal basis for the action. Apr. 8 From the Minister in Norway (lel.) (26) Foreign Minister's view as to the illegal nature of the Reidun seizure, and possible infringement of Norwegian treaty rights. Apr. 15 To the Minister in Norway (tel.) (14) Information that liquor treaty of May 24, 1924, has no appli- cation to Reidun since the vessel came voluntarily into U. S. jurisdiction. Apr. 23 To the Norwegian Minister Resume of events connected with the'l.RetdurTcase/'now pend- ing in the courts, and indication that there is no action which the executive authorities can take in the matter. Apr. 27 To the Norwegian*Minister Informal observations relative to the note of April 23, expres- sing belief that the Norwegian Government was not fully advised of the actual situation in connection with the Reidun. May 7 To the Minister in Norway (48) Information that a District Court order for release of the Reidun was suspended to permit the U. S. Government to file an amended libel or to consider advisability of appeal to a higher court. May 27 From the Minister in Norway (187) Observations on the seizure of the Reidun, and on Foreign Office viewpoint; belief that the action of the U. S. authorities was useful in halting use of Norwegian ships in smuggling activ- ities. June 12 To the Chargi in Norway (lel.) (20) Dismissal of suit and countersuit in Reidun case. June 13 From the Norwegian Minister Confirmation of conversation with the Assistant Secretary, in which the Minister expressed expectation that Norwegian vessels suspected of having engaged in smuggling should have free access to American ports, and gave assurance of Norway's continuing efforts against smuggling. June 17 From the Norwegian Minister Advice that Norway has waived any and all claims against the United States in respect to the Reidun case, and reiterated assur- ance of June 13. XLIV LIST OF PAPERS SUPPRESSION OF LIQUOR SMUGGLING Norway—Continued Date and number 1936 June 23 Subject To the Norwegian Chargi Statement by appropriate U. S. authorities that, in view of Norwegian assurances of cooperation to prevent use of Nor- wegian vessels in smuggling enterprises, the U. S. customs offi- cers will be instructed to permit entry of two specified Norwegian vessels. Page 452 INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE EFFORTS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO PROMOTE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 1936 May 26 (195) July 14 (1776 Pol.) Aug. 26 (98) Sept. 14 (331) Sept. 15 (106) Sept. 15 (338) Sept. 18 (885) Sept. 25 (444) From the Consul at Geneva (lel.) Advice from Stoppani, Director of the Economic Relations Section of the League, of the forthcoming meeting of the Eco- nomic Committee, with the question of the most-favored-nation clause on the agenda; Stoppani's suggestion of a possible alter- nate to J. H. Rogers, American member of the Committee. From the Consul at Geneva Report on possible trend of discussions on economic questions at forthcoming sessions of League bodies, including consideration of a provisional international accord as envisaged by Stoppani. To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) For Stoppani from Rogers: Designation of Leo Pasvolsky, an American economist, as his alternate; intention of both to attend meeting of Economic Committee. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Report of Rogers and Pasvolsky on Economic Committee meeting, including outline of Committee's general report. (Footnote: Release of Committee's full report on September 23.) To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Comment on Committee report as highly satisfactory support of general program of U. S. Government, and instructions to inform the Secretariat orally of this judgment. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to secure copy of Committee report, and to as- certain from proper officials what instructions will be given as to the disposition of the report by the League Council and As- sembly; permission to make known favorable U. S. reaction to the report. (Footnote: Sent also to Paris.) From the Minister in Switzerland, Temporarily at Paris (tel.) Advice of representations made as directed, and transmittal of aide-mimoire (text printed) received from the Foreign Office, indicating that the French on the whole will support the prin- ciples of the Committee report. (Sent also to Geneva and London.) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) British aide-mimoire (text printed) indicating general support of report, but inability, at the moment, to state what the final instructions to British representatives will be. 453 454 456 456 457 458 459 460 LIST OF PAPERS XLV INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION Date and number Subject 1936 Sept. 26 From the Consul at Geneva (lel.) (362) Information that Secretariat officials are not yet aware of any definite plan for discussions in Second Committee following the announcement of French devaluation. Sept. 29 From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (371) Speech of Australian representative to the League referring to tripartite stabilization agreement of the United States, France, and Great Britain of September 25, and urging the Assembly to follow this lead. Sept. 30 From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (373) British survey of reaction to a possible resolution for a study of the question of access to raw materials. Stoppani's statement on the situation (text printed), suggesting multilateral collabora- tion in economic field similar to that begun in the monetary field. Sept. 30 From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (374) Conversation with Saavedra Lamas, Argentine Foreign Min- ister and President of the League of Nations Assembly, who planned to carry out the Secretary's wish that he take action to increase internationally the effect of American economic policy, and requested practical suggestions as to accomplishment. Oct. 1 From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (382) Conversation with Avenol, Secretary-General of the League, who disclaimed knowledge of a French project; but spoke of his impression of U. S. interest in an international conference, and of interest of the Locarno powers in economic issues. Oct. 1 To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (113) Suggestion for Saavedra Lamas that common interests might best be served by emphasizing and dramatizing the Economic Committee's report insofar as it relates to most-favored-nation policy and exchange stability, and comments relative to Monte- video Conference. Oct. 1 From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.) (373) Desire of Frencli Foreign Office official to secure cooperation of Great Britain and United States in a statement on economic matters before the Second Committee; suggestion of possible later U. S. supporting statement. Oct. 2 To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (115) Statement of U. S. position indicating endorsement and sup- port of conclusions of Economic Committee, and the application of the principles embodied therein; reservation of judgment as to proposal for multilateral conversations, pending further study. Oct. 2 From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (386) Agreement of Saavedra Lamas to points set forth in Depart- ment's No. 113 of October 1. Oct. 2 From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (389) Advice of contemplated French decree relaxing some trade restrictions, and of French intention to inquire as to U. S. willing- ness to join conversations of French, British, and possibly other countries, on economic subjects. Oct. 3 To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) (118) Further statement of U. S. position on economic matters; and indication of interest in a conference of European countries, but unwillingness to make any commitments in that connection. XLVI LIST OF PAPERS INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION Date and number Subject Page 471 473 475 475 476 476 477 477 477 478 479 480 481 1936 Oct. [3] (394) Oct. 3 (395) Oct. 4 (396) Oct. 4 (120) Oct. 5 (397) Oct. 10 (431) Nov. 23 (146) Nov. 24 (478) Nov. 24 (480) Dec. 2 (487) Dec. 5 (495) Dec. 5 (72) Dec. 10 (604) From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Further French inquiries relative to U. S. position on partici- pation in an economic conference. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Information of favorable British attitude toward the French proposal, and British reasons for not wishing to proceed through the League. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) British denial of a French press item that the French and British have worked out a project to submit to the League. To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Instructions to inform French of U. S. preference for direct diplomatic channels instead of a general conference, and hope that governments at Geneva will support report of Economic Committee. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) French intention of approaching the United States through regular diplomatic channels, and of presenting to the Second Committee a resolution of general endorsement of the conclusions of the Economic Committee's report. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) French delegate's plea for removal of trade obstacles made when introducing report and resolutions of Second Committee; their approval by the Assembly. To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Instructions to ascertain latest date for possible suggestion of American for appointment to the Economic Committee. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Advice that person might be named to Stoppani as late as January 7. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Stoppani's summary of factors connected with question of setting up a committee on raw materials; and request to be informally advised respecting U. S. attitude on participation. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Inquiry by German Consul General as to U. S. attitude toward a committee on raw materials, and his indication of German willingness to participate, especially if meetings took place away from Geneva; German belief that first move should come from Great Britain. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Tentative list of states proposed as participants in the meetings of the raw materials committee; plan that committee would tech- nically not be composed of government representatives. From the Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State (tel.) For the Secretary of State and Feis: Advice that the League Assembly requested the Council to appoint a committee on raw materials, summary of related developments, and inquiry as to Secretary's view of U. S. participation and composition of the committee. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) British views on composition, function, and scope of proposed committee; also, information that British have no intention of approaching any governments except through League channels. LIST OF PAPERS XLVn INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION Date and number Subject Page 481 482 483 484 484 485 1936 Dec. 14 (58) Dec. 15 (160) Dec. 17 (520) Dec. 30 (162) Dec. 31 (527) Dec. 31 (163) From the Secretary of Stale to the Acting Secretary of State (tel.) Instructions to inform Consul at Geneva of inclination to participate if committee is to be one of technical inquiry with no direct discussion of European political problems; suggestion that President Bowman of Johns Hopkins University be named U. S. representative. To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) U. S. willingness to participate under certain conditions; request that Consul confer with Stoppani and report whether TJ. S. understanding of plans is correct. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Stoppani's summary of purpose, membership, and probable scope of discussions of the projected raw materials committee. To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Department's consideration of appointment of same person to both Economic and Raw Materials Committees; request for in- formation as to coordination, frequency, dates, and duration of meetings. From the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Stoppani's general reply to Department's inquiry. To the Consul at Geneva (tel.) Suggestion of Henry F. Grady, Dean of the College of Com- merce, University of California, as appointee to the Economic Committee, and also possibly to the Raw Materials Committee. PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING FOR RESTORATION OF FINANCE THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE AND 1936 Mar. 11 (1231) June 17 June 20 (25) June 20 (1226) To the Ambassador in France Transmittal of memorandum paraphrasing conversations with the British Ambassador relative to the merits of multilateral trade on a basis of equality, and comments thereon; instructions to lose no opportunity to explain policy to responsible officers. (Note: List of missions to which the same or similar instruc- tions were sent.) To the Minister in Austria (circ. tel.) Instructions to report on visit of Schacht, President of the Reichsbank and German Minister of Economic Affairs, and to explain to members and officials of the Government the U. S. broad economic program of trade agreements, pointing out ultimate dangers of narrow bilateral agreements. (Instructions to repeat to Budapest, Belgrade, Athens, and Sofia.) From the Minister in Hungary (tel.) Account of Schacht's visit to Budapest, including information from a high bank official that conversations consisted merely of an exchange of ideas. ' | g From the Minister in Greece Account of Schacht's visit to Athens, including Legation's understanding that it represents a further step in Germany's economic penetration of the Near East. 486 487 488 488 489 XLVIII LIST OF PAPERS COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL POLICY Date and number Subject Page 1936 June 23 (245) June 24 (813) June 25 (538) From the Minister in Bulgaria Account of Schacht's visit to Sofia, including comment on Schacht's remarks of a political nature; information on Bulgarian attitude toward American policy of trade agreements. From the Minister in Austria Account of Schacht's visit to Vienna, with a detailed analysis of the economy of Southeastern Europe, and German present and possible future relation thereto, accompanied by due consideration of political currents, and assessment of relation to U. S. economic policy. From the Minister in Yugoslavia Analysis of Yugoslav economy in the light of Schacht's recent visit to Belgrade, with observations on U. S.-Yugoslav trade relations. 491 493 499 INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN LIBERALIZING THE POLICY OF THE INTERNATIONAL RUBBER COMMITTEE WITH RESPECT TO THE WORLD SUPPLY OF RUBBER 1936 May 1 (423) Sept. 16 (26) Sept. 22 (36) Sept. 23 (548) Sept. 24 (27) Sept. 24 (442) From the Minister in the Netherlands Information relative to increase in rubber consumption and reduction in stocks; comment on the operation of the rubber producers' restriction agreement of 1934, in respect to raising of production quota and to use of export duties to restrict native production. To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.) Instructions to make representations relative to U. S. concern over the rubber situation, in order to prepare way for forthcoming meeting of the International Rubber Regulation Committee meeting in London; advice of departure of American representa- tives to the meeting. (Footnote: Substantially same telegram to Ambassador in United Kingdom.) From the Chargi in the Netherlands (tel.) Advice that American delegates may not come to The Hague before the opening of London meeting; Netherland position on the rubber situation, and question of deferment of protest in view of that position. From the Chargi in the Netherlands Indication that Netherland officials are strongly opposed to British idea of higher rubber prices, and their experts do not feel there is any danger of a world rubber shortage; suggestion of adjustment of U. S. and Committee's figures on tonnage. To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.) Advice relative to figures on tonnage, and instructions to in- form authorities of U. S. hope that Netherland representatives at the meeting will support additional increases of 5 to 10 percent. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Conversation with Sir John Campbell, Economic and Finan- cial Adviser to the Colonial Office; impression that Campbell will not favor further quota release at September 29 meeting. 503 504 506 507 508 509 LIST OF PAPERS XLIX INTERNATIONAL RUBBER COMMITTEE Date and number Subject 1936 Sept. 26 (348) Sept. 28 (448) Sept. 28 (42) Sept. 29 (553) Oct. 1 (451) Dec. 5 (438) Dec. 12 (68) Dec. 15 (612) Dec. 17 (449) Dec. 24 (43) Dec. 28 (614) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Authorization, if no objection is seen, to present to Campbell or other appropriate official certain itemized facts relative to rubber control, supporting suggestions of the American rubber interests. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice that facts enumerated were covered previously, and that no useful purpose could be served in their repetition. From the Chargi in the Netherlands (tel.) Information from Netherland rubber expert indicating agree- ment with U. S. point of view. From the Chargi in the Netherlands Possibility that altered exchange rate will automatically force the Committee into further releases of rubber. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Opinion of Townsend, one of the American representatives, that Embassy representations had been beneficial, and indica- tion that he expected the October 27 meeting would authorize a further release of rubber. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice of forthcoming arrival of Townsend to attend Com- mittee meeting of December 7 to represent the American rubber industry; and detailed instructions as to representations to Government officials in behalf of consumers of rubber. (Footnote: Similar telegram sent to the Netherlands.) From the Chargi in the Netherlands (tel.) Arrival of Townsend, who did not consider oral or written representations to the Government necessary. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) For Butterworth, Embassy official temporarily in Washington: Satisfaction of American representatives with amount of rubber agreed upon for release; resentment of Campbell over interfer- ence of U. S. Government, and its effect on American representa- tives. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Justification of U. S. official intervention; authorization to discuss with Foreign Office. To the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.) Instructions to indicate to the Netherlands Government the interest of the U. S. Government in the rubber question, its belief that action of Committee on releases is inadequate, and hope that a maximum release will be made from the Netherlands Indies. From the Chargi in the Netherlands Compliance with Department's instructions; Foreign Min- ister's general assurances. 885U23—54—VOl. I- LIST OF PAPERS PRELIMINARY DISCUSSIONS WITH RESPECT TO AN INTERNA- TIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRODUCTION AND MARKETING OF SUGAR Date and number Subject 1936 Jan. 3 (4) Jan. 10 (8) Feb. 6 (47) Feb. 8 (53) Apr. 2 Apr. 20 May 9 (307) May 11 (1236) May 19 (168) Aug. 10 (2439) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (lel.) Substance of British informal note proposing reconvening of International Sugar Conference, if there is a prospect of its suc- cess, outlining a possible basis for it, and inquiring as to U. S. participation and observations on points made. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to inform Foreign Office of U. S. interest and sympathy, and of reasons for postponement of reply. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Request for information concerning rumor that invitations to Sugar Conference are delayed on ground of probable inability of the United States to support Conference commitments. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice that rumor was also current in Great Britain and is believed to have originated in United States; statement of British official that United States has not yet been officially consulted. Memorandum by the Agricultural Altachi in the United Kingdom to the Chargi Account of a conversation with the Parliamentary Under Secretary during which he was given a resume' of the Ktatus of U. S. sugar legislation and assured that no bar existed to U. S. participation from the standpoint of agriculture. To the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department Draft of radiogram (text printed) containing information relative to participation in the Sugar Conference, and addressed to the High Commissioner in the Philippines for his use in bringing the matter to the attention of the Philippine Govern- ment. (Footnote: Information that telegram was sent to the High Commissioner on April 22.) From the High Commissioner in the Philippine Islands to the Chief of the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department For the Department of State: Communication (text ptinted) from Philippine President Quezon to the High Commissioner indicating willingness of bis Government to participate and to cooperate with the U. S. delegation, but reserving the right to vote in accordance with its own interests in case of disagreement. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Memorandum approved by the President for transmittal to the Foreign Office (text printed) indicating probability of U. S. participation in projected Sugar Conference and describing in detail the far-reaching steps already taken to stabilize the sugar industry. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Request to inform Foreign Office orally of Philippine intention to participate in the proposed conference. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom 8* Letter from the Foreign Office (text printed) summarizing replies of various countries to requests for their views, and indi- cating referral of replies to the International Sugar Committee and Dr. Colijn of the Netherlands. LIST OF PAPERS LI TRIPARTITE FINANCIAL STABILIZATION AGREEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES, FRANCE, AND THE UNITED KINGDOM, SET FORTH IN SIMULTANEOUS STATEMENTS, SEPTEMBER 25, 1936 Date and number Subject 1936 June 6 (467) June 15 June 23 Sept. 4 (831) Sept. 4 (337) Sept. 8 (843) Sept. 9 (844) Sept. 9 (342) Sept. 14 (348) Sept. 15 (870) Sept. 17 (884) From the Ambassador in France (tel.) From Cochran: Discussion, relative to devaluation of the French currency, with Finance Minister Vincent Auriol, who suggested a plan for a monetary truce based on bilateral conver- sations leading to an announcement of a general agreement. Memorandum by the Chargi in the United Kingdom Concern of the Chancellor of the Exchequer lest there develop in Washington a prejudice against British policy and methods, and his explanation of British attitude on trade relations, devalu- ation of French currency, and the British Equalisation Fund. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation between the President and the French Financial Attach^ at London, temporarily in Washington, who expressed desire for U. S. and British support in the French program of devaluation; President's suggestion that matter be approached through London. From the Chargi in France (tel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Auriol's request for advice as to procedure for submission of a prepared draft of a pre-stabilization agreement; understanding as to content of draft. To the Chargi in France (tel.) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Advice of prefer- ence for simultaneous presentation of draft document to Treas- uries of Great Britain and the United States. From the Chargi in France (tel.) From Cochran: Receipt of draft, and intention to cable English translation September 9. From the Chargi in France (tel.) From Cochran: Confidential text of proposed French note relative to cooperation with Great Britain and the United States on currency devaluation, and text of proposed pre-stabilization agreement. To the Chargi in France (tel.) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Text of message to be delivered verbatim to the French Government, containing a statement of the U. S. position, without specific suggestion of revision of French text. To the Chargt in France (tel.) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Advice of British note (summary printed), with indication that the posi- tion taken in it is similar to that of the United States; instruction to inform French of receipt of British note. From the Chargi in France (tel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Advice of execu- tion of instructions; comments on the financial situation by an official of the Finance Ministry. From the Chargi in France (tel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Proposed text of joint declaration, with French comments thereon, including a declaration of intention to secure the adherences of Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium. (Footnote: Citation to text of adherences of the three extra countries.) LII LIST OF PAPERS TRIPARTITE STABILIZATION AGREEMENT Date and number Subject 1936 Sept. 18 (892) Sept. 19 (893) Sept. 19 (359) Sept. 23 (908) Sept. 23 (367) Sept. 24 (920) Sept. 25 (370) Sept. 26 (926) Sept. 25 Sept. 26 Oct. 6 (970) From the Chargi in France (lel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: French willing- ness to consider U. S. suggestions, including those relative to simultaneous texts and omission of reference to eventual return to the international gold standard. From the Chargi in France (tel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: French advice that British also objected to mention of the eventual return to the gold standard and suggested revision in phraseology; and that Auriol still insists upon a simultaneous common declaration. To the Chargi in France (tel.) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Restatement of U. S. position, with text of a statement the United States would be prepared to make. From the Chargi in France (tel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Request for reply to two questions, raised by an official of the Bank of France, relating (1) to the exchange of dollars against gold and (2) to the closing of stock and exchange markets for a short period prior to declaration of agreement. To the Chargi in France (tel.) To Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Confidential copy of possible reply (text printed) to the first question; and informa- tion that the United States would not close exchanges, but that influence might be used to prevent speculators from taking ad- vantage of the temporary situation. From the Chargi in France (tel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Transmittal of a British draft text which the British and French are willing to accept integrally. To the Chargi in France (tel.) From Secretary of the Treasury to Cochran: Transmittal of U. S. redraft of proposed simultaneous declaration, with instruc- tions to ascertain views of the French; and advice of similar approach to the British. From the Chargi in France (tel.) From Cochran: Simultaneous release of French declaration with corresponding British and U. S. declarations. Statement by the Secretary of the Treasury Text of statement made by authority of the President. (Footnote: Information of similar statements issued simul- taneously by the United Kingdom and France.) Statement by the Secretary of State Issued to the Press Gratification over virtually identical statements of policy issued by the three powers and characterization of them as an advance toward stability. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) For Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Reference to telephone conversation in which the Secretary of the Treasury mentioned a possible statement on gold to be made simultane- ously with the British and French; suggestion that only one by i the United States is needed, with full reasons for his position. LIST OF PAPERS MI TRIPARTITE STABILIZATION AGREEMENT Date and number Subject Page 1936 Oct. 6 (971) Oct. 8 (393) From the Ambassador in France (tel.) For the Secretary of the Treasury from Cochran: Conversa- tion with the Minister of Finance, who expressed gratification over the simultaneous currency declarations, and at their favor- able reception by most European countries, Germany being the principal exception. To the Ambassador in France (tel.) For Cochran from Secretary of the Treasury: Transmittal of proposed statement on gold, which, if satisfactory, will be released October 13, with explanation of purpose and meaning. (Note: Citation to text of statement of October 13, which is the same as that transmitted.) 563 565 565 STATUS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL DEBTS OWED THE UNITED STATES BY REASON OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 1936 (Note: Citation to summary of intergovernmental debts and correspondence connected therewith.) 566 POSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE WITH RESPECT TO THE TREATMENT OF FOREIGN WAR DEBTS 1936 Apr. 14 May 11 June 19 Dec. 29 Memorandvm by the Legal Adviser Review of legislation providing for loans to foreign countries during World War I and of Congressional authorizations toward settlement; conclusion that the Secretary of State would not be warranted in entering into negotiations for their readjustment without prior Congressional authorization. Memorandum by the Assistant Economic Adviser Analysis of procedures and agencies involved in connection with the attempt to collect the war debts, and consideration of probable difficulties in the way of future attempts at settlement. Memorandvm by the Assistant Economic Adviser Notation that in the course of a conversation on another sub- ject the Secretary of State told the Secretary of the Treasury that the latter's Department had full jurisdiction in war debt matters. Memorandvm by Mr. John H. Spencer of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Analysis of textual changes in replies of Italy, Great Britain, and France to debt statements, and attempt at evaluation of their possible import. 567 570 575 575 France 1936 Apr. 17 (2693) From the Ambassador in France Excerpts from an election speech by former Premier Herriot, in which his references to the debt to the United States seemed to indicate a certain interest in the reconsideration of the debt by the leftist parties. 579 1IV LIST OF PAPERS FOREIGN WAR-DEBT POLICY France—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 May 14 (410) May 19 (2768) May 23 Undated Dec. 1 (1176) Dec. 1 (1177) Dec. 10 (1225) Dec. 31 From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Information from French sources that Socialist Party leader Blum will, upon assuming Premiership, present to Parliament a foreign policy statement including reference to the advisability of settling the war debt to United States. From the Ambassador in France Advice of Blum's personal statement before the American Club indicating intention of reopening debt issue when he becomes Premier on June 3; background of statement, and discussion of press comments. From the Ambassador in France to President Roosevelt Advice of press intimation that the Secretary of the Treasury plans conferences linking currency stabilization and war debts; references to Ambassador's previous suggestion, and to present French interest in debt settlement. (Footnote: Informal referral of letter to the Department of State.) Suggested Draft of a Letter for the Signature of President Roosevelt to the Ambassador in France Nonintention of linking war debts to stabilization, or too closely to American purchases of foreign goods and services. (Footnote: No record in the files that the letter was sent.) From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Conversation with Blum, who was informed of U. S. determina- tion to stay out of European wars and involvements and, also, that French reconsideration of debts would not cause the United States to take the position it took in 1917. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Continuation of rfisume of conversation with Blum relative to war debts in which Blum was told that "war stocks" could not be separated from a general debt agreement. From the Ambassador in France (tel.) Discussion of debts with Blum and Auriol, during which the latter explained French desire to announce their intention to work out a debt settlement, and suggested method of raising funds. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs for the Acting Secretary of State French Ambassador's account of a conversation with the President, who thought the time inopportune for discussions of French war debts. Italy 1936 Jan. 31 Feb. 27 (17) From the Ambassador in Italy to President Roosevelt Suggestion that U. S. purchase of present Embassy could be applied against Italian war debt, balance of which could then be completely liquidated by the Italian Government. To the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) Instructions to ascertain definitely if settlement can be ar- ranged and the Embassy secured as part payment, in accordance with the Ambassador's suggestion of January 31. LIST OF PAPERS LV FOREIGN WAR-DEBT POLICY Italy—Continued Bate and number Subject 1936 Mar. 2 (66) Mar. 14 (80) Apr. 14 (106) Apr. 20 (107) June 1 (185) June 3 June 5 (56) June 8 (199) Nov. 13 Dec. 2 (503) From the Ambassador in Italy (fel.) Foreign Minister Suvich's interest in arrangement. From the Ambassador in Italy (fel.) Belief that Italian authorities are considering the debt matter; Suvich's reference to a U. S. settlement with Greece. From the Ambassador in Italy (fel.) Continuing interest of the authorities in a settlement. From the Ambassador in Italy (lel.) Mussolini's interest in regularizing his position with the United States so that Italy could float a loan there through private bankers. From the Chargi in Italy (fel.) Information from the Finance Minister that Italy wishes U. S. views as to how conversations pertaining to a debt settlement might be initiated and where held. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Secretary of the Treasury's approval of draft reply to Rome; its submission to the President. To the Chargi in Italy ((el.) Information that notification of debt payment due, sent to the Italian Ambassador, states that the U. S. Government is fully disposed to discuss through diplomatic channels any pro- posals the Italian Government may have. From the Chargi in Italy (tel.) Communication of information to the Minister of Finance, who said he would confer with the Chief of the Government. Memorandum of Press Conference Reply, in answer to correspondent's inquiry, that the Depart- ment has heard that the Italians were trying to borrow privately in New York, but that the Department has nothing to do with the matter; comments on the Johnson Act. From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.) Advice from a variety of well-informed sources that the Italian Government plans to inaugurate discussions in Washington on its war debts. Rumania 1936 Dec. 14 Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in France Inquiry of Rumanian financial representative in Paris as to possibility of negotiating a new settlement of war debts, and reply that U. S. Government is prepared to consider any proposal for submission to Congress; comments relative to French position. LVI LIST OF PAPERS OPPOSITION OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO PROPOSALS TO INCREASE TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTS FROM COUNTRIES IN DEFAULT ON WAR-DEBT PAYMENTS Date and number Subject Page 599 1935 Feb. 1 1936 Apr. 20 To Representative Robert L. Doughton, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee Statement of the case against H. R. 2051, providing for addi- tional tariff on goods from countries in default on debts, includ- ing the warning that retaliation begets counter-retaliation—all hurting not only the country against which resentment is di- rected but also the volume of general trade. To Representative Harry B. Coffee Reply to inquiry relative to a 10 percent ad valorem tariff on all imports from countries in default on debt payments, with a tabu- lation of trade figures of the principal debtors, and transmittal of a copy of the letter to Doughton. 601 VIEWS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE ON BILL PROVIDING FOR ACQUISITION OF ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES BY CREDITING PURCHASES AS PAYMENTS ON WAR DEBTS AND BY OTHER METHODS 1936 Mar. 19 Apr. 6 From the Acting Director of the Budget Request for Secretary's views on H. R. 11001 providing for the common defense by acquiring essential commodities by crediting purchases as payments on war debts and by other methods. To the Acting Director of the Budget Department's agreement with objectives of bill because of U. S. need for the minerals mentioned therein; belief, however, that methods authorized in the bill would raise questions relating to the field of U. S. foreign policy for the answering of which the bill offers no solution. 603 603 REPRESENTATIONS BY FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST PRO- POSED LEGISLATION RESTRICTING TOURIST CRUISES FROM AMERICAN PORTS TO AMERICAN SHIPS 1936 Mar. 17 Mar. 17 Mar. 18 Mar. 19 From the Canadian Legation Canada's objections to H. R. 112 (Bland Bill) restricting to American ships tourist cruises from American ports, with illus- trations of adverse effect on Canadian shipping. From the French Ambassador Representations against H. R. 112, including citation of a letter by former Secretary of State Stimson objecting to an identic measure proposed in 1932. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Information that when the French Ambassador presented his Government's case against the proposed measure, he pointed out that its passage would invite retaliation. From the German Embassy Expression of serious objections to H. R. 112 as a restriction of the principle of freedom of navigation, and as being incom- patible with the U. S.-German treaty of 1923. 605 608 610 610 LIST OF PAPERS LVII PROPOSED SHIPPING LEGISLATION Date and number Subject 1936 Mar. 20 (914) Mar. 23 Mar. 23 Mar. 23 Mar. 23 Dec. 22 From the Nelherland Minister Objections to H. R. 112 which, if enacted, would ruin an important branch of Netherland trade; failure to see how certain voyages, affected by the bill, could possibly be classed as coast- wise trade reserved for American ships. From the Polish Embassy Explanation of effect measure, if passed, would have on Polish shipping; argument that it is in contravention to the U. S.-Polish treaty of 1931; and indication of position of Stimson, former Secretary of State, on an identical proposal of 1932. To Representative Schuyler 0. Bland Information of Swedish objections similar to those made in 1932 against an identical proposed measure, and transmittal of the Swedish note of February 24, 1932. Advice of earlier trans- mittal of Canadian and Netherland representations. To the French Ambassador Receipt of note relative to H. R. 112, and information that it is being transmitted to the appropriate agencies. (Footnote: Similar replies to other countries lodging protests.) To Representative Schuyler 0. Bland Detailed expression of objections to H. R. 112 in reply to a letter from Bland; intention to name representatives to attend hearing as suggested. (Footnote: Names of representatives attending hearing, and citation to text of testimony.) Memorandum by the Assistant to the Legal Adviser Information, in reply to inquiry of an official from the German Embassy, that no action had been taken by the House Com- mittee on the "Cruises to Nowhere Bill" (H. R. 112). 612 612 614 C15 615 617 REPRESENTATIONS OF CERTAIN FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS AGAINST PROPOSED LEGISLATION PROVIDING FOR ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS WITH RESPECT TO RADIO FACILITIES ON CARGO SHIPS 1936 May 15 May 18 May 25 May 26 (1713) From the British Embassy Objections to S. 4619, introduced by Senator Copeland, requiring certain cargo vessels to carry two radio operators or one operator and an automatic alarm apparatus. From the Swedish Legation Protest against the pending safety measure as being in some respects more burdensome for certain foreign vessels than the Convention of 1929, not yet ratified by the United States. From the Norwegian Legation Objections to S. 4619 as implying important alterations on a large number of Norwegian ships, and as tending to counteract aim of the Convention of 1929, to provide for safety through similarity of laws in all countries. From the Netherland Chargi Objection to pending legislation as tending to defeat the very object of the Convention of 1929, the promotion of uniformity in safety] regulations. 618 619 020 621 LVIII LIST OF PAPERS PROPOSED RADIO LEGISLATION Date and number Subject Page 621 622 624 624 1936 June 3 June 8 June 10 (2332) June 11 From the Danish Legation Objection to proposed measures raising requirements for vessels over those required by the Convention of 1929. To Representative Schuyler 0. Bland Transmittal of copies of protests against safety measure (S. 4619), passed by the Senate and now in committee in the House; Department's favorable view of every possible safeguard for life at sea, but fear of retaliatory legislation if measures are applied to foreign vessels. From the Belgian Embassy Objection to pending legislation as having provisions which exceed obligations of those of the Convention of 1929. From Representative Schuyler 0. Bland Committee decision to table bill for remainder of the session. (Footnote: Information that interested Embassies and Lega- tions were notified of decision by telephone.) PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE CONFERENCE FOR THE SUPPRESSION OF THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN DANGER- OUS DRUGS, GENEVA, JUNE 8-26, 1936 1936 (Note: Citations to text of proceedings of the Conference, text of Convention signed by all participants except the United States, and U. S. statement setting forth reasons for inability to sign; also citations to other material pertaining to American participation.) 025 PARTICIPATION BY THE UNITED STATES IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE STANDARDIZATION OF THE KEEPING AND OPERATION OF HERDBOOKS, ROME, OCTOBER 12-14, 1936 1937 [Jan. 13] Memorandum by Mr. John H. Lord of the Division of Protocol and Conferences List of countries represented at the Conference by delegates with full powers to sign a convention, and information that J. Clyde Marquis signed for the United States. (Note: Explanation of extent of U. S. governmental interest in the convention.) 626 626 EXTRADITION TREATIES SIGNED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CERTAIN OTHER COUNTRIES 1936 (Note: Citation to texts of supplementary treaties with Den- mark, France, and Rumania, and to text of an original treaty with Liechtenstein.) 628 LIST OF PAPERS LIX THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS UNITED KINGDOM Efforts of the Secretary of State To Secure the Cooperation of the British Government in His International Trade Program; Preliminary Discussions Respecting a Trade Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom Date and number Subject 1936 Jan. 22 Feb. 5 Feb. 13 (1130) Feb. 26 (79) Feb. 28 (81) Feb. 28 (70) Feb. 29 (82) Mar. 18 (84) Mar. 19 (136) Mar. 28 (103) Mar. 30 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Rdsume of a conversation with the British Ambassador in which the fundamentals of the U. S. international trade agree- ments program were discussed and the importance of world eco- nomic rehabilitation was stressed. Memorandum by the Secretary of Stale Conversation with the British Ambassador in regard to con- ferences between the United States and Great Britain to bring about British cooperation in a U. S. trade agreements program. To the Chargi in the United Kingdom Memorandum on U. S. international trade policy (text printed), and instructions to open preliminary conversations with Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, pointing out that British tendency to force trade into controlled bilateral channels may check U. S. effort to revive general world trade. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Eden's agreement with Charge's opinion that it is vital for the economic welfare of the world that the two great trading nations agree in principle to work for the abolition of trade barriers; his promise to take up the matter with Government officials. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (Id.) Speech by Runciman, President of the Board of Trade (ex- cerpts printed), criticizing U. S. trade policy. To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Request for information as to whether Eden had talked to Runciman on the subject of trade agreements before the speech was made. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice that Eden had not talked to Runciman before the latter made his speech. To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Inquiry as to whether a copy of Department's memorandum had been given to the Foreign Office or any other Government official. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Information that the memorandum was read to Eden but that no copy was given to him. To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Memorandum on U. S general trade policies (text printed), with instructions for bringing the matter to the attention of the British Government. Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Submission of the two memoranda on U. S. general trade policy to the British Ambassador with the assurance that all that was desired at this time was a general declaration of intention and policy. LX LIST OF PAPERS UNITED KINGDOM Efforts of the Secretary of State To Secure the Cooperation of the British Government in His International Trade Program; Preliminary Discussions Respecting a Trade Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 Apr. 1 Apr. 7 (184) Apr. 11 (124) Apr. 11 (125) Apr. 28 (231) Apr. 29 (234) May 1 (238) May 26 (277) Mav 26 (281) Memorandum by the Secretary of State British Ambassador's indication that it might be difficult for the British Government to reverse its present course of restrictive commercial policy and to announce the intention to move in the direction of liberal commercial policy, as proposed by the U. S. Government. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Submission to Eden of memorandum quoted in Department's No. 103 of March 28; Eden's intention to avoid a conflict of trade policy between Great Britain and the United States. Board of Trade official's view that the Cabinet favored continuance of a policy of economic expediency in view of the European political situation. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Secretary's statement at press conference (text printed) in response to questions regarding negotiations for a reciprocal trade agreement between the United States and Great Britain. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Intention to continue efforts to induce the British Government to make a public announcement indicating its plans of lowering trade restrictions and putting trade arrangements on a basis of equality; instructions to present informal memorandum (text printed) to Eden and Runciman. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Presentation of memorandum to Eden, who welcomed the op- portunity for an exchange of views and referred to the preparation of a British memorandum. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Presentation of memorandum to Runciman, who maintained that British aims are substantially similar to those of the United States. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Summary of Runciman's Chamber of Commerce speech in which he indicated that the British Government would be ready to cooperate with the United States in promoting a freer flow of international trade. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Receipt of memorandum on British commercial policy from Eden, who was pleased at measure of cooperation from the Board of Trade. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) British memorandum (text printed) explaining reasons for and operation of British commercial policy, and expressing the belief that no real divergence either of interest or of policy exists on the part of the two countries; willingness to restate previous policy announcements regarding the improvement of the inter- national trade position. (Footnote: President Roosevelt's comment on the British memorandum.) LIST OF PAPERS LXI UNITED KINGDOM Efforts of the Secretary of State To Secure the Cooperation of the British Government in His International Trade Program; Preliminary Discussions Respecting a Trade Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 June 17 June 18 (214) June 19 (319) June 24 June 25 (323) June 26 (326) July 3 (234) July 9 (341) July 20 July 25 (283) Memorandvm by Mr. William A. Fowler of the Division of Trade Agreements Resume of a discussion between Department officials and Mr. Chalkley, Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy, regarding the preparation of a tentative list of products on which concessions could be granted, with view to preparing a basis for an Anglo-American trade agreement. To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to present a memorandum (text printed) to the British Government, stating that a declaration along the lines of the British memorandum of May 26 would be of greatest value in furthering the reduction of obstacles to international trade. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Presentation of memorandum to Eden, who expressed the wish to handle the matter personally after his return from Geneva. Memorandum by Mr. Richard Eldridge of the Division of Trade Agreements Conversation with Chalkley, who presented a tentative list of commodities for which concessions would be requested and in turn asked for a list of products entering the United Kingdom. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Presentation of U. S. memorandum of June 18 to Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer; conversation with Runciman, who favored a British policy declaration but felt it would be more effective if followed by an announcement of practical achievement. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Conversation with Chamberlain, who referred to pending trade agreement negotiations, and felt the time not propitious for the contemplated public policy declaration. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Secretary's disappointment at deferment of commercial policy statement, and instructions to leave with Cabinet mem- bers a memorandum (text printed), urging courageous leadership in the fight for sane and peaceful trade conditions. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Opinion as to inappropriateness of presenting memorandum to other Cabinet Ministers during Eden's absence; suggestion of changes in memorandum. Memorandvm by the Secretary of State Informal discussion with the British Ambassador of Runci- man's speech in the House of Commons July 15 (extract printed), and expression of disappointment over British lack of action in seeking a liberal commercial policy. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Advice that, in the light of Runciman's speech, the memo- randum transmitted in Department's 234, July 3, should not be presented until revised. ixn LIST OF PAPERS UNITED KINGDOM Efforts of the Secretary of State To Secure the Cooperation of the British Government in His International Trade Program; Preliminary Discussions Respecting a Trade Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 July 28 (378) Sept. 3 (324) Sept. 9 (425) Sept. 19 (439) Sept. 21 Sept. 29 Oct. 22 Nov. 3 Nov. 16 Nov. 20 (552) Undated [Rec'd Jan. 12, 1937] From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (lel.) Conversation with Eden, who explained the circumstances of Runciman's speech. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to resume discussions with Eden and Runciman and to leave a memorandum (text printed) with the British Government. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Information that attempt will be made to see Eden as soon as he recovers from an illness. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Account of a conference with Eden upon presentation of memorandum embodied in Department's No. 324, September 4. Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs Conversation with Chalkley, who inquired about the outlook for continuing conversations regarding a trade agreement with the United Kingdom. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements Informal discussion with Chalkley as to the status of studies in regard to trade agreement negotiations. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Elaboration, in informal discussion with the British Am- bassador, on the advantages of U. S. international trade policy as an alternative program of peace and trade restoration in con- trast to British defensive foreign policy. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Reiteration, in informal discussion with British Ambassador, of scope and nature of U. S. economic program, and stress of the necessity of a joint U. S.-British proclamation of the funda- mentals of the program. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Constant Southworth of the Division of Trade Agreements Exploratory discussion between technical representatives of United States and United Kingdom; informal exchange of ten- tative concessions (texts printed) likely to be requested by the two countries as possible basis for a trade agreement. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) R6sum6 of a conversation with Eden, who presented a memo- randum (text printed) on trade policy, in reply to U. S. memo- randum transmitted in telegram No. 324, September 3. Memorandum by the American Ambassador in the United Kingdom of a Conversation With the President of the British Board of Trade, December 18, 1936 Runciman's opinion that some of the informally discussed U. S. proposals ran counter to the Ottawa Agreement to which his Government was pledged, but that an agreement along the lines of the U. S.-Canadian agreement might be accomplished. LIST OF PAPEHS TiXTTT UNITED KINGDOM Efforts of the SecretartTof^ State To' Secure the Cooperation of the British Government in His International Trade Program; Preliminary Discussions Respecting a Trade Agreement Between the United States and the United Kingdom—Continued Date and number Subject Page 703 704 1936 Dec. 19 Dec. 26 Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State Information from the British Ambassador that his Govern- ment was giving close consideration to the matter of a trade agreement with the United States. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements Chalkley's statement that the British Government definitely- wanted to negotiate a trade agreement, but was anxious to find a mutually acceptable basis before starting official negotiations; his promise to submit a detailed statement specifying concessions the British could make. Informal Discussions Regarding Proposed Restriction of Trade Between Australia and New Zealand to British Shipping 1936 Feb. 10 (124) Feb. 24 Apr. 29 (183) Oct. 26 (312) Oct. 28 Nov. 3 Dec. 3 From the Consul General at Sydney Conversation with Prime Minister, who outlined Australian determination to join in principle with New Zealand in taking measures to "preserve British shipping lines on the Pacific", in- cluding the reservation of the Tasman trade. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John B. Minter, of the Division of Western European Affairs Conversation between the Commercial Counselor of the British Embassy and a Department official regarding the con- templated legislation in Australia and New Zealand concerning the Tasman trade. From the Consul General at Sydney Advice of London conference between representatives of Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand as to ways and means of enabling British shipping to successfully compete in the Pacific with the Matson Line. From the Consul General at Sydney Information that the New Zealand Government has introduced enabling legislation to restrict the Tasman trade to British shipping; Australian intention to take parallel action. Memorandum by the Secretary of Slate Conversation with the British Ambassador indicating that British position on the Tasman trade matter, set forth in a note of October 23, may lead to a U. S.-British controversy; sugges- tion that the interested American and British shipping groups present their complaints to the Shipping Board. Memorandum by the Secretary of State British willingness to withdraw note of October 23 and to discuss the Australian-New Zealand shipping matter orally. From the Consul at Sydney (tel.) Advice that enabling legislation was introduced in Australian Parliament to exclude American vessels from the Tasman trade. 706 708 710 711 714 715 716 LXIV LIST OF PAPERS UNITED KINGDOM Supplementary Convention Between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand Respecting the Tenure and Disposition of Real and Personal Property, Signed May 27, 1936 Date and number Subject 1935 Dec. 27 (1888) 1936 Jan. 27 (1933) Feb. 15 (55) Apr. 2 (171) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Attempt to secure British reply as to the status of a draft convention relating to the disposal of real and personal property, extending the convention signed March 2, 1899, to outlying territories of both countries. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom British reply (text printed) enclosing draft of the proposed supplementary convention between the United States and the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, but not the Union of South Africa. To the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Approval of draft convention, and instructions to inquire at the Foreign Office about certain technicalities. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) Information requested on February 15. (Note: Citation to text of supplementary convention signed May 27, 1936.) Page 716 717 719 719 719 Reciprocal Arrangements Effected by the United States With the United Kingdom, Canada, and the Irish Free State for Trans-Atlantic Air Service 1936 Apr. 30 (141) June 29 (328) July 9 (245) Aug. 18 (2464) Oct. 9 (2569) Dec. 30 (633) To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to present a note to the Foreign Office (text printed) relative to the establishment of trans-Atlantic air service, indicating U.S. readiness to approve application of Imperial Airways, Ltd., pending British confirmation of certain points. From the Chargi in the United Kingdom (tel.) British reply (text printed) explaining position on U.S. points, and expressing hope that on basis of these explanations the United States will grant permits to Imperial Airways in exchange for British permits to Pan American Airways. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to communicate two notes to the Foreign Office (texts printed): (1) setting forth consideration of the British position and (2) confirming the acceptability of Pan American Airways for the proposed services. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Note from the Foreign Office (text printed), with draft per- mits for Pan American Airways. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Copy of Embassy's note to the Foreign Office (text printed) indicating U. S. acceptance of British suggestions relative to a permit for Imperial Airways, and suggesting certain changes in the Pan American Airways permit. From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Foreign Office note (text printed) in regard to Pan American Airways permits necessary to the commencement of the trans- Atlantic service. (Note: Information that reciprocal exchanges of permits with the United Kingdom, Irish Free State, and Canada were effected in the spring of 1937.) 720 722 724 727 728 730 730 LIST OF PAPERS LXV UNITED KINGDOM Refusal of the British Government To Recognize the Right of the United States To Exercise Control Outside Territorial Waters Over Any Vessel Flying the British Flag, Except as Provided by Treaty Date and number Subject Page 1936 Sept. 21 (305) From the British Chargi Reference to a bill approved by Congress on June 22, denning jurisdiction of U. S. coastguards, and advice that the British Government cannot recognize the U. S. right to exercise any powers outside territorial waters over vessels flying the British flag, except as provided for by the Convention of January 23, 1924. (Footnote: Information that U. S. note of September 28 acknowledged receipt of this communication.) 730 Informal Representations Against Proposed Preferential Tariff Rates in Certain British West African Colonies Favoring Empire Trade 1936 Aug. 18 (2466) Sept. 21 Oct. 13 (1460) Oct. 23 (379) From the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Memorandum prepared by the Agricultural Attache (text printed) regarding possible imposition by Nigeria and the Gold Coast of preferential duties on Empire-grown tobacco, and ad- visability of early attempt to forestall action. Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John R. Minter of the Divi- sion of Western European Affairs Representations to Chalkley, British Commercial Counselor, against the proposed preferential duty. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom Transmittal of a memorandum prepared in the Department of Agriculture on West African tobacco trade; instructions to in- formally express U. S. concern over proposed action. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions for informal representations against proposed preferential duties as inconsistent with recently expressed policies by leading trading nations, including Great Britain, and detri- mental to future trade agreement negotiations. (Note: Assurance by British Foreign Secretary that no steps would be taken without consultation.) 731 733 734 734 735 Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a Reciprocal Country Under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920 1935 Dec. 30 (367) 1936 June 3 From the British Ambassador Advice that the British Secretary of Mines has received appli- cations for oil prospecting licenses from the Anglo-American Oil Company; inquiry whether under the U. S. Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, the United Kingdom is regarded as a re- ciprocal country. To the British Ambassador Attorney General's opinion (text printed) indicating that under certain conditions Great Britain is to be regarded as a reciprocal country. 885223—54—vol. i 5 736 738 LXVI LIST OF PAPERS UNITED KINGDOM Recognition of the United Kingdom by the United States Government as a Reciprocal Country Under the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920—Continued Date and number Subject Page 1936 July 6 (203 (C. 277)) July 20 From the British Ambassador Information that the Secretary of Mines is prepared to grant licenses to the Anglo-American Oil Company if the U. S. Gov- ernment does in fact regard Great Britain as a reciprocal country. To the British Ambassador Advice that the Interior Department is prepared to recognize Great Britain as a reciprocal country under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. 740 741 AUSTRALIA Unsatisfactory Trade Relations Between the United States and Australia 1936 Mar. 4 Mar. 6 Mar. 16 Apr. 2 Apr. 6 Apr. 10 Apr. 24 May 7 From the Consul General at Sydney (lel.) Request by Sir Henry Gullet, Minister in charge of trade treaties, that United States initiate trade negotiations in view of Australian serious trade position. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Instructions to inform Gullet of reasons for U. S. disinclination to undertake suggested negotiations at this time; and to enlarge on the ultimate benefits to Australia from the generalization of concessions to other countries. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Gullet's disappointment over U. S. decision, and his opinion that the Government may be forced to introduce measures to restrict U. S. trade, in view of the precarious position of Aus- tralia's London funds. From the Consul General at Sydney (lel.) Gullet's announcement in Parliament that a special subcom- mittee had been appointed to explore possibilities of correcting the adverse trade balance; opinion that some formal adverse action is to be expected. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Probability that Parliament will advocate legislation dras- tically affecting U. S. trade; suggestions for a letter to the Prime Minister to counteract this trend. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Communication to Prime Minister (text printed) explaining the aims of the trade agreements program and expressing the hope that Australia's commerce will indirectly benefit from U. S. program of gradually lowering trade restrictions. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Impression that drastic action restricting U. S. trade with Australia may be postponed. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Explanation, in Prime Minister's reply (extracts printed), to Secretary's letter that considerations of restrictions against the free flow of imports are dictated by Australia's economic situ- ation. 742 743 743 744 745 746 748 749 LIST OF PAPERS LXVII AUSTRALIA Unsatisfactory Trade Relations Between the United States and Australia—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 May 21 May 22 May 23 May 27 May 29 June 1 June 1 June 4 June 2 June 5 June 6 From the Consul General at Sydney (iel.) Indication that the Prime Minister will present an amending tariff schedule to Parliament, designed to correct the adverse trade balance with the United States. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Imposition of drastic measures by the Government, including higher duties on certain products and prohibiting importation of certain items from countries outside the British Empire except under license issued by the Minister of Customs. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Analysis of Government's new trade measures. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Note for formal delivery to the Government (text printed) protesting against import restrictions on U. S. items to be applied under a tariff measure tabled May 22; U. S. intention to continue concessions extended to Australia as long as it is able to enjoy equal treatment by Australia. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Information that Parliament is in recess and that the note will be delivered in Melbourne; belief that Government will not be deterred from its discriminatory policy, and request for instruc- tions as to publicity. To the Consul at Melbourne (tel.) For Moffat: Instructions that sense of note may be used in any conversation, but not for publicity at the present time. From the Consul at Melbourne (tel.) From Moffat: Presentation of note (dated May 29) to the Minister for External Affairs, who held out no hope of any modification of Government policy. To the Consul General at Sydney (iel.) Instructions to inform the Australian Government of the alarm caused among American exporters by Australia's recent actions; suggestion that Government broadcast sufficient in- formation as to the true implications of its restrictive measures: From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Inadvisability of requesting formal broadcast of information; brief summary of situation insofar as it affects American trade. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Formal note for Australian Government (text printed) request- ing advice as to whether the Customs Collector in Sydney is acting under instructions in refusing applications for U. S. prod- ucts while licenses for like products of other foreign origin were granted. Contemplated countermeasures in event of unfavor- able reply. From the Australian Minister for External Affairs to the American Consul General at Sydney Reply to note of May 29, explaining reasons for trade meas- ures, and indicating that benefits from the U. S. trade agree- ments program are more theoretical than real. LXVIII LIST OF PAPERS AUSTRALIA Unsatisfactory Trade Relations Between the United States and Australia—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 June 10 June 24 June 25 June 27 June 29 Aug. 7 (278) Aug. 26 Oct. 10 Oct. 12 Oct. 16 (376) Oct. 27 Oct. 31 and outline of possible ap- From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Belief that suspension of trade agreement rates can no longer be postponed if confirmation is obtained that Customs Collector was acting under instructions. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Bequest for clear evidence as to actual discrimination against U. S. trade before recommendation of suspension of trade agree- ment concessions is made to the President. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Advice that customs collectors are continuing to refuse import licenses for U. S. goods while granting them for like goods of other countries; citation of actual cases of discrimination. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Australian reply to note of June 5 (excerpts printed), including the statement that customs collectors, in declining U. S. im- port permits, were acting in accordance with the policy of the Government. To the Consul General ai Sydney (tel.) Instructions to inform the Government that the President has directed the suspension of trade agreement concession, effective August 1. From the Consul General at Sydney Analysis of Australian situation, proach to improve trade relations. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Resume of informal conversation with British Charge and Premier Stevens of New South Wales, during which the Secretary discussed the objectives of U. S. trade agreements program and expressed disappointment over Australian obstruction of the program. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Request for suggestions relative to a contemplated note (draft printed), expressing hope for better trade treatment from Australia, to be handed to Foreign Secretary Eden for trans- mittal to Australia. From the Consul General at Sydney (iel.) Suggestions as to text of note, and opinion that note should be handed to Eden only in case of active British support of U. S. thesis. To the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (tel.) Instructions to call on Eden and to enlist British aid in the appeal to Australia to alter its trade policy. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Expected approval of Government's trade diversion policy in Parliament debates November 4 and 5. To the Consul General in Sydney (tel.) Advice that Eden has promised an early reply in the Australian trade matter; instructions to go ahead with delivery of note, if Eden's reply does not come soon. LIST OF PAPERS lxdc AUSTRALIA Unsatisfactory Trade Relations Between the United States and Australia—Continued Date and number Subject Page 1936 Nov. 5 Nov. 18 Nov. 19 Nov. 20 From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Delivery of note, which will be considered at next full Cabinet meeting. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Inquiry as to whether special representations in specific cases would be of avail in securing import permits. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Extension of tariff measures to December 1, and postponement of debate on trade diversion program. (Footnote: Information in telegram dated December 4 that Australian trade diversion policy was passed by both Houses of Parliament.) From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Opinion that individual representations in regard to import permits would constitute tacit acceptance of Australia's trade diversion policy and weaken U. S. position in trying to effect a general recommendation. 772 773 773 774 Informal Arrangements Between the United States and Australia Respecting the Importation of American Aircraft and Aircraft Parts Into Australia 1935 Dec. 21 1936 Feb. 1 Feb. 10 Feb. 12 Mar. 13 Mar. 30 From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Summary of a formal note of December 16 from the Minister of External Affairs, outlining conditions under which license permits for import of American aircraft will be issued. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Opinion that conditions outlined in Australian note are un- reasonable; instructions to endeavor to persuade Australian authorities to accept procedure outlined in the arrangement in force between the United States and Great Britain. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Doubt that Australia will be willing to exchange notes along lines of the present British-American agreement, but may modify procedure to bring it into line with other countries. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Australian objection to a reciprocal exchange of notes and insistence on a unilateral proposal of requirements, but willing- ness to consider U. S. suggestions. From the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) Australian unwillingness to agree to an informal temporary arrangement to cover planes already ordered, but readiness to make certain modifications in proposals of December 16. To the Consul General at Sydney (tel.) U. S. counterproposal, agreeing to furnish the Australian authorities with certain technical data and documents upon receipt of a note that import license has been furnished. 774 775 776 777 778 779 IXX LIST OF PAPERS AUSTRALIA Informal Arrangements Between the United States and Australia Respecting the Importation op American Aircraft and Aircraft Parts Into Australia—Continued Date and number 1936 July 24 1937 Jan. 5 (345) Subject To the Consul General at Sydney Reply to a despatch from the Consul General regarding Australian readiness to enter into an arrangement based on U. S. counterproposal; preference to have arrangement effected by an exchange of notes. From the Consul General at Sydney Opinion that it would be wise not to suggest a formal exchange of notes, since the system evolved is working satisfactorily despite the Australian Government's diversion policy. Page 780 781 CANADA Informal Discussions Between Officials of the United States and Canada With Respect to Trade Relations 1936 June 4 Nov. 3 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to the Under Secretary of Stale Transmittal of two memoranda (one printed) covering con- versations with the Canadian Prime Minister in Ottawa with re- spect to U. S.-Canadian trade relations; elaboration on matters not covered in these memoranda. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the Canadian Minister and the Counselor of Legation, during which the Secretary summed up the present and prospective status of the reciprocal trade program and its relation to economic welfare and peace. 783 786 Convention Between the United States and Canada Respecting Income Taxation, Signed December 30, 1936 1936 Oct. 26 Undated [Rec'd Nov. 4] Nov. 28 Dec. 14 Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Conversation with the Counselor of the Canadian Legation relative to a treaty on taxation, in which it was agreed to post- pone negotiations until November. From the Canadian Legation Transmittal of draft of a proposed agreement between the United States and Canada to prescribe maximum rates of taxa- tion to be levied by either Government on income paid to indi- viduals and corporations of the other country. Memorandum by Mr. Francis Colt de Wolf of the Treaty Division Informal discussion between members of the State and Treasury Departments and Canadian Legation officials regard- ing the proposed treaty on taxation; acceptance of the Treasury draft (text printed) with few exceptions. From the Canadian Legation Transmittal of revised draft of tax convention. (Note: Citation to text of convention, signed December 30, 1936.) 790 791 793 795 795 LIST OF PAPERS LXXI CANADA Protests of the Canadian Government Against Certain Provisions of the Liquor Tax Bill; Settlement of United States Claims Against Canadian Distillers Date and number 1936 Jan. 13 Jan. 18 Jan. 20 Jan. 20 Mar. 12 Mar. 12 Mar. 18 Mar. 19 Mar. 23 Mar. 24 Mar. 25 Mar. 25 Subject To the Secretary of the Treasury Objections by Mr. Wrong, the Canadian Charge^ to section 403 of the Treasury's proposed liquor tax bill. Letter of Secre- tary of State to the Attorney General (excerpts printed) express- ing doubts as to the effectiveness of the proposed measure. Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who said that Prime Minister King had made forceful representations against section 403 of the proposed liquor tax bill. From the Secretary of the Treasury Intention to recommend to Congress that provisions of section 403 be modified. Memorandum by the Economic Adviser Conversation between the Secretary of the Treasury and Wrong, who felt that his Government's attitude toward the United States might be affected by the liquor tax matter. Memorandum by Mr. James C. II. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who ex- plained the vigorous opposition in the Canadian Government to the proposed liquor tax bill. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Explanation to Wrong of Department's efforts to prevent adoption by the Senate Finance Committee of section 403 of the liquor tax bill. To the Assistant Secretary to the President R6sum6 of the situation in the Canadian liquor matter, includ- ing possibility that Canada will denounce the trade agreement with the United States; Wrong's disappointment in the redrafted version of section 403. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with Wrong, who conveyed his Government's dissatisfaction with redraft of section 403. From President Roosevelt Suggestions as to minimum requirements for the settlement of U. S. claims against Canadian distillers. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Discussion with the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and Wrong in regard to President Roosevelt's suggestions. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Instructions telephoned to the Minister in Canada to follow up representations made to Wrong. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who re- ported Canadian desire for a conference between the Treasury Department and representatives of Canadian distillers against whom the Treasury Department has claims. LXXII LIST OF PAPERS CANADA Protests of the Canadian Government Against Certain Provisions of the Liquor Tax Bill; Settlement of United States Claims Against Canadian Distillers—Continued Date and number Subject 1936 Mar. 26 Mar. 27 Mar. 28 Mar. 28 Mar. 31 Apr. 1 Apr. 1 Apr. 11 Apr. 15 Apr. 27 (37) Apr. 27 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Record of a conversation between the Under Secretary of State and Wrong, who brought a memorandum (substance printed) expressing desirability of settling claims in a conference between Canadian distillers and the Treasury Department. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Resume of a conversation with Wrong, who reviewed the Canadian position. From the Acting Secretary of the Treasury Treasury's willingness to enter into discussions with Canadian distillers provided practical assurances mentioned in President Roosevelt's note of March 23 are given. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Transmittal of a message to Wrong, based on a letter from the Treasury to the Department; Wrong's doubt as to usefulness of contemplated meeting under conditions laid down by the Treas- ury Department. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 3O, 1936 Inconclusive discussions between representatives of the State and Treasury Departments and Canadian officials and represen- tatives of Canadian liquor interests. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conference at the Treasury Department on March 3I, 1936 Continuation of conversations with Canadian distillers who offered a proposal for settlement of the tax matter. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with Wrong, who presented a memorandum of the discussions prepared by the distillers' representatives, and inquired about the prospects for continued delay in the Senate. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs U. S. proposal for an amicable settlement of the liquor tax matter (text printed), handed to Wrong by the Under Secretary on April 10. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with Wrong, who presented the reply by the Canadian distillers to U. S. proposals, indicating acceptance of proposals in substance, but suggesting minor changes. To the Minister in Canada (tel.) Concern over lack of progress in Washington talks with Canadian distillers, and instructions to make representations to the Canadian Under Secretary. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Resume of a conversation with Wrong, who said that the stand of the Treasury and Justice Departments would end in complete disruption of the negotiations. LIST OF PAPERS LXXIII CANADA Protests of the Canadian Government Against Certain Provisions of the Liquor Tax Bill; Settlement of United States Claims Against Canadian Distillers—Continued Date and number Subject Page 821 821 824 824 1936 Apr. 29 May 9 May 12 May 13 Memorandum by Mr. James C. H. Bonbright of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with the Minister in Canada, who sum- marized his conversations with the Prime Minister and Under Secretary and said that the latter seemed to favor the Govern- ment's withdrawal from the negotiations. Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs to the Secretary of State Report on the unsatisfactory negotiations of the Treasury and Justice Departments with the Canadian distillers; indication that failure to reach a settlement would be a serious blow to U. S.- Canadian relations. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Transmittal to Wrong of President's proposal that U. S. claims be settled for $3,000,000, as a gesture of good will to Canada. (Footnote: Willingness of Canadian distillers to settle for $3,000,000.) Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs Telephone conversation with Justice Department official con- cerning desire of one Canadian company for assurances through the State Department and the Canadian Legation in respect to criminal aspects of case; indication that the U. S. Government regards the cases as closed and that State Department will com- municate this information to the Canadian Legation. Negotiations Respecting the Revision of the Convention for the Preser- vation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea 1936 Mar. 5 (267) May 8 (41) May 14 (62) July 21 (466) Sept. 28 (967) To the Minister in Canada Advice of a report submitted by the International Fisheries Commission proposing changes in the Halibut Convention now in force between the United States and Canada; instructions to sub- mit a new draft convention (text printed) to the Dominion authorities for their consideration. To the Minister in Canada (tel.) Request for information regarding any changes in draft con- vention the Canadian Government may desire. From the Minister in Canada (lel.) Canadian Government's favorable view of U. S. suggestions, and consideration of further alterations of its own. To the Chargi in Canada Comments on Canadian suggestions for alterations in the draft convention, contained in a Canadian note of June 16. From the Minister in Canada Canadian note (text printed) indicating views with regard to certain alterations in the draft convention. 825 S29 830 830 832 lxxiv LIST OF PAPERS CANADA Negotiations Respecting the Revision of the Convention fob the Preser- vation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea—Continued Date and number Subject Page 1936 Nov. 27 (591) To the Minister in Canada Transmittal of revised draft convention, incorporating changes suggested by the Canadian Government; authorization to sign the convention. (Footnote: Information that convention was signed January 29, 1937.) Proposed Negotiation of a New Treaty To Deal With the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin as a Whole, Including the Niagara Falls 1935 Feb. 21 (038) 1936 Jan. 20 (201) Feb. 25 (262) Feb. 26 (441) Mar. 10 (474) Mar. 11 (481) May 19 Dec. 7 (1058) To the Minister in Canada Review of unsuccessful attempts to secure ratification of a 1929 convention between the United States and Canada for the preser- vation and improvement of Niagara Falls; instructions to present a note to the Canadian Government, requesting consideration of an arrangement for joint construction of the planned remedial works. To the Minister in Canada Transmittal of copy of a letter from Representative Andrews of New York to President Roosevelt, indicating continued interest in the preservation of Niagara Falls through construction of remedial works. To the Minister in Canada President Roosevelt's proposal to have the St. Lawrence Treaty and Niagara Falls Convention withdrawn from Senate, and to negotiate a new treaty with the Canadian Government, embodying principles of the two conventions. From the Minister in Canada Account of interview with the Prime Minister, who expressed doubt that the waterways portion of the treaty would be of benefit to Canada at the present time. From the Minister in Canada Summary of Canadian reaction to the question of reopening the St. Lawrence Waterway Treaty matter. From the Minister in Canada Further report regarding Canadian reaction to the waterways question, and Prime Minister's opinion that time is not propitious for reopening the matter. Memorandum by the Minister in Canada Explanation of President Roosevelt's interest in the suggested new treaty to the Prime Minister, who continued to show little enthusiasm for the project. From the Minister in Canada Informal conversations between visiting American and Cana- dian Government officials, during which the various phases of the waterways question were discussed. LIST OF PAPERS LXXV IRISH FREE STATE Disinclination of the United States To Enter Into a Trade Agreement With the Irish Free State Date and number Subject Page 847 848 1936 Aug. 3 Aug. 5 Memorandum by the Economic Adviser Irish desire to negotiate a commercial agreement with the United States in view of the fact that Irish purchases of U. S. goods greatly exceeded U. S. purchases of Irish goods. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Trade Agreements Conversation between Department officials and the Secretary of the Irish Legation, during which the impediments to negotia- tion of a trade agreement were considered, the benefits of the U. S. trade agreements program to Irish trade were explained, and continuation of most-favored-nations treatment was suggested. NEW ZEALAND Representations Regarding Discrimination Against American Commerce in the New Zealand Mandate of Western Samoa 1936 June 5 (2242) From the Chargi in the United Kingdom Foreign Office note (text printed) transmitting New Zealand's reply to U. S. request for national treatment for U. S. vessels and goods throughout the mandated territory of Western Samoa. 852 UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA Efforts To Meet Complaints From South Africa That American Import Regulations Unduly Restricted South African Exports to the United States 1936 July 18 July 20 July 22 July 29 To the Consul at Capetown (lel.) Instructions to investigate truth of a press report indicating that the South African Wine Growers Association is exhorting its members to buy British goods, in view of its inability to sell South African wines in the United States due to U. S. import regulations. From the Consul at Capetown (tel.) Advice that Association is conducting a violent propaganda campaign against American goods, obtaining support from deciduous fruit growers; request that it be ascertained from Agriculture Department whether revision of Plant Quarantine Order 362 is contemplated. To the Consul at Capetown (tel.) Information from Agriculture Department that BPQ 362 makes provision, under certain specifications, for entry of grapes from countries where the Mediterranean fruit fly exists, and that experiments are under way to devise methods more suitable for South African needs. To the Consul at Capetown (tel.) Information that an investigation in regard to complaints by the Wine Growers Association has revealed no discrimination against South African wine imports which are subject to the same regulations as similar imports from other countries. 855 855 856 856 LXXVI LIST OF PAPERS UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA Efforts To Meet Complaints From South Africa That American Import Regulations Unduly Restricted South African Exports to the United States—Continued Date and number 1936 July 30 Aug. 8 Aug. 15 Aug. 24 Aug. 26 (7) Sept. 14 Sept. 14 Sept. 18 Sept. 19 (8) Nov. 13 (10) Dec. 19 1937 Jan. 12 (1) Jan. 27 (4) Subject Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of the Division of Western European Affairs of a Conversation Between the South African Minister and the Assistant Chief of the Division Resume of unsatisfactory discussion regarding alleged dis- crimination by the United States against South African products. To the South African Minister Memorandum (text printed) containing a study made in the interest of finding a mutually satisfactory solution to the diffi- culties connected with shipments of South African wines and fruits. To the South African Minister Detailed information regarding regulations for wine and spirits, and expression of hope for an early settlement of the trade difficulties. From the South African Minister Informal note explaining reasons for the rising tide of South African resentment against the United States, and suggesting changes in U. S. import regulations. To the Minister in the Union of South Africa (tel.) Account of efforts to clear up the wine and fruit matter. Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State Resum6 of a conversation between the South African Minister and an Agriculture Department official regarding plans of Agri- culture Department to admit grapes. Memorandum by Mr. John R. Minter of the Division of Western European Affairs Information given to a representative of a group of exporters regarding plans of the Agriculture Department to admit South African fruits. To the South African Minister Information as to encouraging developments in solution of wines and spirits question and grape question. To the Minister in the Union of South Africa (tel.) Advice regarding future changes in regulations and considera- tion by Agriculture officials for ultimate admission of South African grapes and fruits. To the Minister in the Union of South Africa (tel.) Instructions to convey to appropriate officials developments leading to the ultimate admission of grapes sterilized outside the United States. To the South African Minister Acknowledgment of receipt of two notes concerning the first trial shipment of grapes. To the Minister in the Union of South Africa (tel.) Explanation for delay in trial shipment due to misunderstand- ing regarding the inspection of vessels. From the Minister in the Union of South Africa (tel.) Advice that authorities are satisfied with U. S. efforts to assist in the inauguration of shipments. (Footnote: Information regarding departure of two shipments of grapes.) LIST OF PAPERS LXXVII ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY_Continued Date and number Subject Page 761 761 762 763 1938 Jan. 15 | To the Consul General at Shanghai (tel.) (45) Instructions to inform the Japanese Consul General that, while as a matter of courtesy the Japanese and Chinese are being informed so far as practicable of the movements of U. S. vessels, the U.S. Government claims absolute freedom of movement of its ships on the Yangtze. Apr. 4 From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs Request that the Japanese Government take steps to cause the removal of restrictions preventing U.S. missionaries and business men from returning to Nanking, in view of the fact that the area of hostilities has passed far beyond that city. Apr. 12 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister in regard to cur- rency exchange control in North China; Foreign Minister's assurance that Japan will continue to support the principle of equal opportunity and the open door in China. Apr. 12 From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs Statement that the U.S. Government would welcome as- surances from the Japanese Government that it will not sup- port or countenance financial or other measures in the areas occupied by Japan which discriminate against U. S. interests; full reservation of U.S. rights and interests in occupied areas of China. May 17 | From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (315) Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which strong rep- resentations were made regarding the hardships caused by the refusal of Japanese authorities to grant passes to Americans to enter peaceful areas where Japanese civilians are freely per- mitted to go. May 31 From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese (945) Minister for Foreign Affairs Expectation of the U.S. Government that the Japanese Government will take steps to cause the return to their owners of the premises of the University of Shanghai and other U. S. property occupied by Japanese forces and that it will issue in- structions to effect the removal of the obstacles to the return of U.S, nationals to certain areas. June 1 From the Consul General at Shanghai (tel.) (746) From Tokyo, May 31, 1938: Conversation with the new Foreign Minister who stated that he would guarantee the pro- tection of U.S. interests in China. June 2 From the Consul General at Shanghai (tel.) (762) Conversation with the Japanese Minister at Large in China in which the Consul General expressed the hope that the Japanese authorities in Shanghai would cooperate toward re- moving the obstacles in the way of U.S. business and mission- ary enterprises. 763 764 766 767 LXXVIII LIST OF PAPERS ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY_Continued Date and number Subject Page 1938 June 2 767 June 3 768 June 27 769 June 30 770 771 June 30 (399) Press Release Issued by the Department of State Information that the Japanese authorities have returned certain U.S. mission property in the Chapei district of Shang- hai; that they have agreed to the return of U.S. missionaries to Nanking; and that, in regard to the University of Shanghai, the Japanese Government is sending a committee to the Jap- anese-controlled area in Central China to investigate the situ- ation there. Press Release Issued by the Department of State Expression of gratification in regard to the steps taken by the Japanese Government and confidence that it will take ap- propriate action with regard to the remaining questions. Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan Conversation with the Director of the American Bureau in regard to a statement issued on June 25, 1938, by the spokes- man of the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai, affirming that for- eign nationals in Japanese-occupied areas in China do not enjoy extraterritorial rights. Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan Conversation with a representative of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office who explained that a mistake had been made and that what the spokesman of the Japanese Embassy at Shanghai had said was that foreigners enjoying extrater- ritorial rights could not invoke them to refuse search by Jap- anese soldiers in Japanese-occupied areas. From the First Secretary of Embassy in China (tel.) Telegrams from five different U.S. consular offices in China (texts printed) reporting on the commercial difficulties caused by Japanese interference. From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan Decision of the Imperial Government that the Japanese forces will withdraw from the University of Shanghai by July 5, 1938, but that the school cannot be allowed to open until such time as it will not hinder military operations, exposition of the difficulties involved in allowing foreigners to return to ap- parently peaceful areas. Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in Japan Conversation with the Director of the American Bureau in regard to a statement (text printed) which the Japanese Gov- ernment desired published with the Japanese note of July 6, 1938. From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Opinion that the evacuation of the property of the University of Shanghai by Japanese troops without returning the property to its rightful owners does not lessen the responsibility of the Japanese Government for damages, etc., and that this action leads to the interpretation that the Japanese authorities hope the property will become useless to the owners, thereby mak- ing its purchase possible. Request that appropriate steps be taken to effect prompt return of the property to the full control of its owners. 774 July 6 (66, Amer- ican I) July 16 776 July 29 (1013) 777 LIST OF PAPERS LXXIX ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY_Continued Date and number Subject Page 778 779 781 782 1938 July 30 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambas- sador made full representations regarding the University of Shanghai, and the Foreign Minister replied with an explana- tion of Japanese reasons for restricting the occupation of the University and a denial of any intention to purchase the property. July 30 Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Representations regarding the failure of the Japanese author- ities to return the University of Shanghai to its owners. Oct. 3 | Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Prime Minister, at present also Foreign Minister, for the purpose of presenting the U. S. de- siderata; the Prime Minister's assurances that any delay in meeting all U.S. desiderata would be only temporary and stated that the new “China Organ” was being formed to deal with such questions. Oct 3 Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Discussion of the restrictions and violations of U.S. rights in China; presentation of measures which the President of the United States requests that the Japanese Government take to implement the repeated assurances given to the U.S. Govern- ment. Oct. 6 From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Prime (1076) Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs Statement of various instances in which Japanese author- ities are subjecting U.S. citizens in China to discriminatory treatment and violating the rights and interests of the United States; apprehension lest in other occupied areas of China there develop a situation similar in its adverse effect upon com- petitive position of U.S. business to that which now exists in Manchuria. Request that Japan implement its assurances by taking certain measures. Oct. 26 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the new Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs in which the Vice Minister's attention was called to the several hundred U.S. notes regarding Japan's depredations against U.S. property already on file in the Foreign Office which would give the Vice Minister the necessary background for such rep- resentations as the Ambassador might be called upon to make in the future. Nov. 2 To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (373) Instructions to approach the Foreign Minister and take up in a vigorous manner the entire question of freedom of naviga- tion on the lower Yangtze River and to press for a favorable reply setting an early date subsequent to which Japan will not impede free navigation. 785 790 791 LXXX LIST OF PAPERS ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY-Continued Date and number Subject Page 792 795 797 Ameri 1938 Nov. 7 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Initial interview with the Foreign Minister of a negative and unsatisfactory character in which the Ambassador inquired whether the Foreign Minister would renew the assurances of his predecessor and whether he would interpret a certain pas- sage concerning Japanese policy contained in the Prime Min- ister's speech of November 3, 1938; the Foreign Minister's counsel of patience, especially with respect to pressing for a reply to the U.S. note of October 6, 1938. Nov. 7 From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Min- (1111) ister for Foreign Affairs Reiteration of the U.S. Government's request that the Japanese Government implement its repeated assurances with regard to U.S. navigation rights on the Yangtze by discon- tinuing the restrictions on U.S. trade thereon between Shang- hai and Hankow. Nov. 14 From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American (101, Ambassador in Japan Asia Í) Reasons why the Japanese Government does not consider that the time has yet been reached when recognition of free- dom of navigation on the Yangtze can be immediately given; hope that the Ambassador will appreciate the fact that there is no intention of wilfully hindering U. S. commerce. Nov. 18 From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American (102, Ambassador in Japan Views of the Japanese Government with regard to the in- can I) stances of violations of U.S. rights in China set forth in the Ambassador's note No. 1076, October 6, 1938; and statement that Japan does not intend to object to the participation of third powers in the reconstruction of East Asia when such participation is undertaken with an understanding of the pur- port of Japan's intentions in East Asia. Nov. 19 | Memorandum by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan Informal interview with the Foreign Minister who stated his reasons for declining to repeat the assurances of his prede- cessors regarding the principle of the open door, which assur- ances he stated had not been intended to be unconditional since the time had passed when Japan could give an unqualified undertaking to respect the open door in China. Nov. 21 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador spoke concerning the principles of policy and the broad objectives of the United States in the Far East; and in which the Foreign Minister denied the allegation that Ameri- cans would be expected to deal only through Japan's middle- men and stated that, while Japan intended to assure for herself certain raw materials, there would be a large field for U. S. trade which would be welcomed. Nov. 21 Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Representations with regard to the open door in China and outline of the obvious steps which the Japanese Government should take to prevent the steady deterioration of Japanese- American relations, 801 806 808 LIST OF PAPERS LXXXI ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY--Continued Date and number Subject Page 811 813 814 1938 Dec. 1 Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Conversation between the Assistant Secretary of State and a representative of the Japanese Financial Commission abroad who made inquiries as to the prospects of concluding a trade agreement between Japan and the United States; to which the Assistant Secretary replied that such an agreement was not politically feasible in view of Japanese policy in China and pointed out that the Japanese reply to the U.S. note of October 6, 1938, was unsatisfactory and not responsive to U.S. griev- ances. Dec. 8 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister who, in presenting his oral comments in an unofficial paper, stated "off the record” that an improvement in the situation could hardly be expected until Chiang Kai-shek had been eliminated, and did not hesi- tate to talk, although in general terms, about what the United States would be permitted to do or not to do in China. Dec. 81 Memorandum Handed by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan Assurances that, while foreigners will not be allowed to establish businesses competitive with certain industries which might be granted monopolistic privileges as measures of pro- tection, they may participate in those industries within the scope of the established plans; also that in the field of trade there will not be established, as a rule, any special discrimina- tion against third countries either in customs duty or other systems of trade barrier. Dec. 19 Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Explanation of the necessity for a close cooperation between Japan, “Manchoukuo," and China, politically, as a measure of self-defense against communism, and economically, as a measure of self-preservation in the presence of a world-wide tendency to erect high customs barriers and to employ eco- nomic measures for political ends. Dec. 26 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Am- bassador explained that the U.S. Government and press found it difficult to appraise the recent assurances of the Japanese Government in view of the number of qualifying phrases with which they were circumscribed. Dec. 30 From the Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for (1153) Foreign Affairs Statement that the Japanese note of November 18, 1938, appears to affirm that it is Japan's intention to make the ob- servance of the principle of equality of opportunity in China conditional upon an understanding by other Governments of a "new order in the Far East as fostered by Japanese authori- ties; reiteration of the U.S. position that such principles are not subject to nullification by a unilateral affirmation; reser- vation of all U.S. rights. 816 818 820 469186–43—vol. 1-46 LXXXII LIST OF PAPERS ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY_Continued 1939 Date and number Subject Page 827 828 830 831 1939 Jan. 12 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who con- gratulated the Secretary on the accomplishments at Lima and was informed that the reaffirmation of the doctrine of equality of commercial opportunity was an outstanding fea- ture of the broad basic program adopted at Lima and that the United States asserts and will continue to assert this principle; the Ambassador's intimation of a desire to enter into an understanding about protection of all U.S. rights and interests. Jan. 27 | Extract From an Address Delivered by the Under Secretary of 1 State on “Some Aspects of Our Foreign Relations" Discussion of relations with countries in the Far East. Feb. 17 | Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which he stated, in reply to the Ambassador's oral statement (text printed) inquiring as to Japanese intentions in connection with the occupation of Hainan Island, that Japan had no territorial ambitions in China and that the occupation would not go beyond military necessity. Mar. 11 From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Min- (1207) ister for Foreign Affairs Hope that the Japanese authorities will not countenance the new drastic trade restrictions imposed by the Japanese- sponsored regime in North China and that they will, on the contrary, remove existing restrictions. Apr. 13 From the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American (34, 1 Ambassador in Japan Com Statement that the Japanese Government believes that the mercial new trade measures in North China have been enacted and III) enforced with impartiality and that Japan is determined to support them without stint. Apr. 18 From the Counselor of Embassy in China (tel.) (193) Information that the new North China Transportation Co. has been formed and will take over the work of the South Manchuria Railway in administration of railways, etc., in North China and Meng Chiang, thus consolidating all trans- portation facilities in those regions under one management, primarily Japanese. Apr. 20 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador during which the Secretary read to the Ambassador a statement (text printed) relating certain facts concerning the interference with the legitimate movements of U.S. citizens in China on the part of Japanese military and other officials. Undated From the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American [Rec'd Embassy in Japan May 3] Information that an adjustment of present conditions in the International Settlement at Shanghai is believed necessary in order to render possible active Japanese cooperation in its administration and to accomplish a revision of the administra- tive machinery. 833 834 834 838 LIST OF PAPERS LXXXIII ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY-Continued Date and number Subject Page 841 842 844 845 1939 May 13 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister who stated, in reply to the Ambassador's oral representations regarding press report of possible Japanese occupation of the International Settlement at Shanghai (text printed), that Japan had no in- tention of occupying the Settlement. May 17 From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs Exposition of views regarding matters contained in Japanese aide-mémoire of May 3, 1939; opinion that Settlement authori- ties are prepared to continue their best efforts toward meeting any reasonable requests for further adjustments. May 17 Oral Statement by the Counselor of Embassy in Japan, Accom- panying “Aide-mémoire" of May 17, 1939 Advice that the Chinese courts in the Settlement do not try anti-Japanese terrorists and that in other criminal cases where Japanese have been complainants the decisions have been rendered without prejudice; information that the text of the American aide-mémoire will be released to the press imme- diately. May 17 Press Release Issued by the Department of State Reasons for the landing of a small U.S. naval detachment in the International Settlement at Amoy. Undated Extract From the Report of the Embassy in Japan for May 1939 Report that on May 24, 1939, a Foreign Office spokesman stated that Chinese sovereignty still extended over foreign settlements in China and that, as it was Japan's aim in China to control Chinese sovereignty, this sovereignty might also be controlled in the settlements. June 2) To the Chargé in Japan (tel.) (149) Tentative outline for an approach to the Foreign Office (text printed) setting forth the U.S. position that neither the Chinese nor any other Government has any right unilaterally to interfere with the administration of the International Settlements. June 9 To the Chargé in Japan (tel.) (157) Authorization to make the approach outlined in the Depart- ment's telegram No. 149, June 2, 1939, with certain changes. June 12 From the American Chargé in Japan to the Japanese Minister (1298) for Foreign Affairs Information that the conditions brought about by the trade restrictions in North China cannot be reconciled with the ob- jectives set forth in the Foreign Minister's note of April 13, 1939; hope, therefore, that the Japanese Government will not continue to stand behind these measures and will remove exist- | ing restrictions. 845 846 848 848 LXXXIV LIST OF PAPERS ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY— Continued Date and number Subject Page 1939 Aug. 17 (1357) 849 Aug. 26 851 Aug. 26 From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs Data relating to various claims of U.S. concerns against the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway; request that steps be taken to have payments resumed; reservation of rights of U.S. firms arising from the taking over of the Peiping-Suiyuan Railway by a Japanese agency or Japanese-controlled company; similar reser- vation with respect to any railways taken over by the North China Transportation Co. Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Ambassador presented a paper in regard to the reports that the Japanese were instigating anti-American movements in China, and the Secretary replied by reading a list of instances of transgressions by Japanese in China to the detriment of U.S. interest, of which the Ambassador requested a copy and was told that one would be sent to him. From the Japanese Ambassador Information offered in proof of the falseness of the reports of anti-American movements in North China; hope that steps will be taken to eradicate from the mind of the U.S. public any suspicion which might have been left by the false reports. To the Japanese Embassy Statement on the subject of anti-foreign propaganda in China, furnished in response to the Japanese Ambassador's request during the conversation of August 26, 1939. Press Release Issued by the Department of State Information that the difficulties at Amoy have been settled and that the U.S. landing force is being withdrawn. Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs Conversation with the Counselor of the Japanese Embassy who was informed that the cases recently settled by the Japa- nese authorities were more or less surface matters and did not touch some of the more fundamental difficulties such as the economic restrictions on U.S. interests in Japanese-occupied China. Sept. 5 Oct. 18 Nov. 14 1940 1940 Mar. 20 (1498) 860 From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Information that Japanese naval authorities in South China refuse to permit U.S. oil companies to ship kerosene to the Nanhoi District; request that they be directed to withdraw these and other restrictions calculated to prevent U.S. oil companies from freely operating in the areas of China under Japanese occupation. From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs Request that the new discriminatory regulations on imports into North China be removed; and full reservation of U.S. rights in regard thereto. July 15 861 LIST OF PAPERS LXXXV ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY_Continued Date and number Subject Page 1940 Aug. 9 (797) 862 Aug. 23 864 Aug. 23 866 872 Sept. 18 (1636) To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) Transcript of an oral statement handed to the Japanese Ambassador expressing the concern of the U.S. Government over the actions to which certain Japanese agencies appear to be resorting as a means of exerting pressure upon the author- ities of the foreign-administered areas of Shanghai and upon the nationals of third powers (text printed); and an illustrative list of recent restrictions (text printed) which was also handed to the Japanese Ambassador. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador who called to present a memorandum replying to the memorandum handed to him during the conversation on August 9, 1940. From the Japanese Embassy Japanese explanation of the restrictions listed in the memo- randum handed to the Japanese Ambassador on August 9, 1940. From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Min- ister for Foreign Affairs List of representations made by the U.S. Embassy at Pei- ping to the Japanese Embassy there in regard to interferences with U.S. trade in petroleum products; types of interferences involved; emphatic protest against such restrictions; and full reservation of U.S. rights in the matter. Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Under Secretary presented an oral statement in reply to the Ambassador's memorandum of August 23, 1940, and, speaking of the Japanese ultimatum to the Government of French Indochina, informed the Ambassador that, in view of Japanese aggressions in the Far East, the Japanese Government would certainly have no ground for complaint because the United States rendered assistance in the form of supplies, munitions, et cetera, to China and to Indochina in the event that the latter was attacked. To the Japanese Embassy Statement that the Japanese Embassy's memorandum of August 23, 1940, is unresponsive to the U. S. Government's complaints in regard to economic restrictions which adversely affect U.S. interests in Japanese-occupied China. Expres- sion of regret for the tone and language used in some parts of the Japanese memorandum. (Footnote: Handed to the Japanese Ambassador on Sep- tember 20, 1940.) From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Hope that the situation set forth in the Ambassador's note No. 1653 of the same date will receive the Foreign Minister's personal attention and effective intercession. Sept. 20 877 Undated 881 Oct. 11 883 LXXXVI LIST OF PAPERS ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY · RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY—Continued Date and number Subject Page 883 884 889 Oct. 25 891 1940 Oct. 11 From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese (1653) Minister for Foreign Affairs Statement calling attention to the apparent intentions of the Japanese authorities to institute controls over the trade of Shanghai similar to the controls which have prac- tically eliminated American trade from Manchuria and North China. Oct. 15 From the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American (163, Embassy in Japan Asia Í) Reply to U.S. aide-mémoire of July 15, 1940; explanation why the Japanese Government is convinced that the new regulatory measures are necessary for the protection of the welfare of North China. Oct. 24 From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese (1665) Minister for Foreign Affairs Protest against the new measures regulating the move- ment of vegetable fibers, animal hair, leather, and furs in North China; especial request for the exemption of the furs and skins now covered by purchase contracts. From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Min- ister for Foreign Affairs Hope that the Foreign Minister will give his earnest and early consideration to the difficulty set forth in the Ambas- sador's note No. 1665 of October 24, 1940. Nov. 10 Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Information from the Association of Fur Exporters and Importers that the Japanese firms in North China are readily receiving permits to export their furs whereas other firms are unable to secure permits. Nov. 20 From the Ambassador in Japan (5158) Oral statement to the Foreign Minister, November 15, 1940 (text printed), expressing regret that the Japanese Govern- ment should have deemed it proper, without the permission of the Chinese Government at Chungking, to undertake to alter the status of Chinese courts in the French Concession at Shanghai. Undated From the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American [Rec'd Embassy in Japan Dec. 18] Conviction that steps taken regarding Chinese courts in the French Concession at Shanghai will contribute to the mainte- nance of order and security; inability, in view of Japanese non- recognition of the Chungking regime and determination not to deal with it, to agree with the argument set forth by the U.S. Government. Dec. 17 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister who presented an oral statement in reply to certain U.S. notes of June 10 and September 15, 1940; the Ambassador's refutation of the | Foreign Minister's charges. 891 892 893 895 LIST OF PAPERS *XXXVII ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY-Continued Date and number Subject Page 895 1940 Dec. 17 Oral Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan General explanations and excuses in regard to cases com- plained of in the U.S. notes of June 10 and September 15, 1940; charge that the various points at issue might have been settled locally but for the State Department's insistence upon legal principles. Dec. 17 | Oral Statement by the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador in Japan Information that the authorities on the spot have been ordered to investigate the cases complained of in the Ambas- sador's note No. 1638, September 18, 1940, but that before these reports are received it is possible to state: (1) that the restrictions on shipments into unoccupied areas are necessary to prevent certain supplies from reaching Chiang Kai-shek, and (2) that all restrictions with regard to price fixing are applicable to Japanese and foreigners alike. 899 1941 901 901 904 1941 Jan. 7 Oral Statement by the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Information that the U.S. Government regrets that the Foreign Minister's oral statement of December 17, 1940, cannot be considered as responsive to the representations made by the U.S. Government. Feb. 6 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Director of the American Bureau who came in to report on his observations during his recent visit to China but offered little or nothing which could be regarded as either helpful or hopeful. Mar. 25 Memorandum by the Second Secretary of Embassy in Japan Conversation with the Director of the American Bureau in which the Second Secretary gave the Director an oral state- ment with reference to interference with petroleum trade in the Canton area and was informed by the Director that he would investigate the difficulties and see what could be done although he felt that progress would be slow and better results would be obtained by not pressing the matter too urgently at the present time. Mar. 25 From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs Oral representations concerning interference with petroleum trade in the Canton area. Aug. 41 From the Counselor of Embassy in China (tel.) (203) Memorandum left at the Japanese Embassy, August 1, 1941 (text printed), setting forth instances of arbitrary action by the Japanese authorities against Americans and American interests in many parts of China. 905 905 LXXXVII LIST OF PAPERS ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY_Continued Date and number Subject Page 906 907 907 908 1941 Aug. 6 From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry (1871) for Foreign Affairs Report that armed guards were posted on July 28, 1941, at five U.S. firms in Chefoo and that the Foreign and Chinese staff were detained;request that guards posted on U.S.property in Chefoo be removed and that steps be taken to prevent further instances of the detention of Americans or the unwar- ranted detention of non-American employees of American firms. Aug. 71 From the American Embassy in Japan to the Japanese Ministry (1873) for Foreign Affairs Report that Japanese armed forces occupied U.S. properties at Tsingtao on July 28, 1941, and were still in occupation on July 29; request that steps be taken to effect the withdrawal of any forces which may yet be in occupation of U. S. properties and to prevent the occurrence of similar incidents in the future. Aug. 13 Memorandum by the Secretary of State Conversation with the Japanese Ambassador in which the Secretary handed the Ambassador a statement of instances of mistreatment of Americans and injury to American rights in places under Japanese jurisdiction, in reply to which the Ambassador said that he would be glad to take the matter up with his Government. Undated to the Japanese Embassy Statement of recent cases of interference with U.S. rights and interests in Japan and in Japanese-occupied areas of China. (Footnote: Handed to the Japanese Ambassador August 13, 1941.) Aug. 15 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador supported the representations made by Secretary of State on August 13, 1941, and brought to the Foreign Minister's attention the serious matter of the inability of a group of U.S. officials and citizens departing for the United States to obtain passage to Shanghai on Japanese vessels; the Foreign Minister's understanding that the Coolidge arrange- ments had broken down because of U.S. condition limiting passengers to officials, which the Ambassador denied, stating that that condition had been laid down by the Japanese Government. Aug. 16 | From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Confirmation of his statement made the previous day that the condition limiting passengers exclusively to officials should the Coolidge call at Yokohama, had been laid down by the Jap- anese Government and that it was that condition which had wrecked the whole project. Sept. 13 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan Conversation with the Foreign Minister in which the Ambassador presented a letter in regard to further instances of interferences with U.S. citizens and the Foreign Minister promised to give his best efforts to removing these grounds for complaint. 911 913 913 LIST OF PAPERS LXXXIX ACTS OF JAPAN IN OCCUPIED CHINA INTERFERING WITH AMERICAN TREATY RIGHTS AND EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY-Continued Date and number Subject Page 914 917 921 1941 Sept. 13 | From the American Ambassador in Japan to the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs Memorandum (text printed) giving further instances of obstructions, interferences, and inconveniences imposed on U.S. citizens within the Japanese Empire and Japanese-con- trolled areas. From the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the American (105, Embassy in Japan Ameri Reply to the Secretary's representations of August 13, 1941, can I) concerning interferences with U.S. rights and interests; in- formation that instructions have been issued to prevent the measures from being applied unreasonably or unnecessarily; addendum (text printed), reporting details of those cases which have been clarified. Oct. 7 From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (1577) Foreign Office note, October 3, 1941, explaining the neces- sity for posting guards on the property of certain U.S. firms at Chefoo and denying that there were any detentions of nationals of third powers. Oct. 21 From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (1663) Report of the receipt of a Foreign Office note dated October 10, 1941 (summary printed) which the Ambassador considers unsatisfactory in that it attempts to explain away a number of isolated cases without discussing the general principles under- lying U. S. complaints. Oct. 28 From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (1702) Report of the receipt of a Foreign Office note dated October 22, 1941 (summary printed) in continuation of the note dated October 10, 1941. Observation that except in one instance the notes are similar in tone and that the general comments expressed in previous report apply to both. Nov. 25 From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.) (1846) Information that a personal letter was addressed to Foreign Minister on November 22, 1941, informing him that the language of the Foreign Office replies was in some respects unusual; that the abrupt denial of carefully prepared reports of U.S. officials would seem to imply that Japanese officials placed no credence in such reports; and concluding with a request for the removal of transportation interferences. 921 923 924 STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES To RELINQUISH BY AGREEMENT EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS IN CHINA 927 1940 July 19 | Statement by the Acting Secretary of State Comments to the effect that, although discussions in regard to U.S. extraterritorial rights in China have been halted by Sino-Japanese hostilities, the United States yet adheres to its announced policy of relinquishing such rights as rapidly as possible by orderly processes. 1941 May 26 From the Appointed Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs Farewell message and affirmation that China's policies are in full harmony with the views of the Government of the United States. 927 XC LIST OF PAPERS STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES To RELINQUISH BY AGREEMENT EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS IN CHINA-Con. Date and number Subject Page 1941 May 31 929 To the Appointed Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs Expression of gratitude for the Minister's letter of May 26, 1941; statement of the profound interest of the United States in the progress of China and of the U.S. Government's inten- tion, when peace again prevails, to move rapidly toward the relinquishment of all U. Š. special rights in China. OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA BY JAPAN AND STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES GENERAL THE CONFERENCE FOR THE REDUCTION AND LIMITA- TION OF ARMAMENTS, GENEVA: 1936 PHASE l 500.C1113/72 The Consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to the Secretary of State No. 1815 Political Geneva, August 17, 1936. [Received August 26.] Sir: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a memorandum dated June 22, 1936, concerning prospects respecting a resumption of dis- armament activities of the League of Nations, prepared by Mr. Field of the Disarmament Section of the Secretariat, together with a copy of a covering memorandum by M. Aghnides, Director of the Section, which is addressed to the members of the Section under date of August 4, 193C. These papers were confidentially made available to me and I beg to request that they be considered in that light. From conversations with various members of the Disarmament Sec- tion, I am furthermore able to report the following respecting the status of these memoranda and concerning the data embodied therein. M. Aghnides has left Geneva for a leave of absence of approximately one month. He has requested that during his absence the members of his Section make a critical study of the memorandum of June 22 with a view to its possible revision. It appears to be understood in the Section that M. Aghnides' policy is that the Third Committee of the Assembly be reconstituted during the forthcoming Assembly for the consideration of the situation re- specting disarmament. The Department will recall that the Third Committee has not met during recent years. I am told that in discuss- ing this with members of his Section M. Aghnides made clear that the Third Committee was not competent to discuss disarmament per se, which is a function of the General Conference, and that it was envis- aged that the Committee would concern itself only with procedure. M. Aghnides emphasized this point by stating that the reason the 'For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, pp. 1 ft.; see also League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 158, Rec- ords of the Seventeenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly . . . Minutes of the Third Committee (Reduction of Armaments), Geneva, 1936. 2 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Third Committee should not impinge on the functions of the Confer- ence was that certain states members of the Conference were not rep- resented on the Committee. Certain members of the Disarmament Section tell me that they be- lieve that M. Aghnides would not have spoken so positively concerning the prospects of a meeting of the Assembly Third Committee had not some political arrangements been worked out to that end. These ar- rangements are considered as presumably centering in Paris in view of the French Government's preoccupations concerning an interna- tional consideration of the question of private manufacture (see Con- sulate's despatch No. 1737 Political, June 17, 19362). Indeed, this whole effort is seen as primarily a French move. I encounter greatly differing views among the officials of the Dis- armament Section respecting the policy for action which the memo- randum implies. The French member, for example, speaks favorably respecting the resumption of disarmament activities; while the British member characterizes such an effort as entirely apart from reality. The British member in particular in speaking to me objected to any extension of the London naval discussions in Geneva, an element upon which the memorandum touches. In respect of the views expressed by these officials, it may be presumed that to a rather definite degree they reflect the positions of their respective governments. Among certain other members of the Disarmament Section, grave difficulties are seen in carrying out the projects envisaged in the memo- randum as well as serious objections to such attempts. In the first place, possibly more harm than good to the general cause of disarma- ment is seen to lie in a resumption of disarmament efforts under circum- stances which would appear to render a successful issue so questionable. In the second place, in the present delicate posture of European affairs, it is felt that the discussions which might take place in the Third As- sembly Committee and in any subsequent meeting of a Conference body might serve only to sharpen European political issues. Indeed the apprehension is felt that certain states might employ such an opportunity as a platform for the advancement of their political aims, which might indeed be directed with disturbing results against such an absentee state as Germany. In view of these differences of opinion, it is very difficult to see at present how these matters may eventuate. As germane to the foregoing and also of more general interest, I desire to report that strong rumors have been current here for some days to the effect that the convocation of the Assembly, now set for September 21, will be adjourned to some date in November. These rumors appear to originate with functionaries of the League Secre- 'Not printed. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 3 tariat who assert that correspondence indicating such a postpone- ment has taken place between the Secretary-General and certain governments. I may say that the natural presumption is that such a deferment of the meeting of the Assembly would be in order that the Assembly might take place subsequent to the five-power discussions3 which, from information here, are now tentatively set for some date in October. The thought in this respect is that the results of such a five-power conference might constitute something tangible to present to the As- sembly in respect of a European settlement upon which the project for League reform on the Assembly agenda directly depends. A further view is that a deferment of the Assembly would avoid possibly unfortunate public discussions of certain political questions which might create an atmosphere disturbing to the projected five-power con- ference. It is alleged here that London is favorable to an Assembly adjournment. In this connection, I refer specifically to the final para- graph of my telegram No. 267, June 20 [30] ,2 p.m.4 On the other hand, as the Department is aware, such a five-power conference—concerning which the date and even the fact of its meet- ing I have recently heard questioned—is supposed to be only prelimi- nary to a European conference wider in scope. Thus the whole scheme for conferences of this nature seems not only not to be a settled matter but also that its success or duration can by no means be foretold. With respect to the Assembly, it is almost technically necessary in League affairs for an Assembly to be held each year. Moreover, to omit an Assembly in any one year would doubtless be most injurious to League morale. One would thus be inclined to believe that wisdom will suggest that the Assembly not run the risk of a deferment of date which might not only be fruitless but might lead to greater complications. Those who hold this latter opinion believe that every effort should be made that the Assembly be as short as possible, that it be restricted to the greatest possible degree to technical questions, and above all that con- tentious political discussions be avoided. In a recent conversation with my German colleague here, he told me that Berlin would be opposed to any postponement of the Assembly to the extent that such a deferment was related to the five-power dis- cussions. He stated that Berlin would resent even the aspect being presented that such discussions were preliminary to, or subject to re- view by, the League Assembly. I may say that this whole matter may * The proposed five-power conference was not held. * Vol. in, p. 174. 4 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I indeed already have been settled among the great power capitals. From Geneva, however, I can only report the currents in the situation which are in evidence here. Respectfully yours, Prentiss B. Gilbert [Enclosure] Memorandum by the Director of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations Secretariat (Aghnides) To the Members of the Disarmament Section I attach herewith for your comment a memorandum prepared by Mr. Field dealing with the possible resumption of certain activities of the Disarmament Conference. In view of the anticipated early receipt of a communication from the French Government outlining its views with respect to the control of the trade in and manufacture of arms and munitions, the question is likely to become active during the course of the forthcoming session of the Assembly, and I consider it important that the Disarmament Section be prepared to furnish any desirable suggestions to the Secretary-General and to the assembly and to answer any requests for information and material that may be made in the circumstances. I would therefore ask each member of the Section to give some thought to (a) the possible procedure by which the disarmament question might be dealt with in the Assembly and (b) the substance of the action which the Assembly might be recommended to take. I should particularly like to have your observations on a possible alternative to the procedure outlined by Mr. Field, along the following lines: The President of the Third Committee might convene this Com- mittee with a view to the preparation of an Assembly Resolution requesting the Secretary-General to call a session of the Special Com- mittee on Arms Manufacture and Trade on the following grounds: a. The Conference—in accordance with the Bureau's decision of November 1934—undertook to embody in separate agreements such questions as might be ripe for solution; b. The Special Committee on Arms Manufacture and Trade consequently prepared certain draft texts which were forwarded to the Governments; c. The French Government has now submitted its observations and suggestions respecting the Special Committee's drafts; d. This important document represents a further step in the direction of the conclusion of a separate agreement on arms manu- facture and traffic, in harmony with the Bureau's decision of November 1934; DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 5 e. It makes it possible for the Special Committee charged with the preparation of such an agreement to resume its work in the light of the French Government's observations and any other observations which may subsequently be received. Aghnides [Geneva,] August 4,1936. [Subenelosure] [Geneva,] June 22,1936. Resumption of the Disarmament Conference A. Present status of the Conference. At its last meeting on November 20th, 1934,8 the Bureau of the Con- ference adopted the President's suggestion that the programme of the Conference, approved at the last meeting of the General Com- mission on June 8th, 1934,* should be modified in view of the trend of political events by endeavouring, without necessarily awaiting the completion of an entire Convention, to embody in separate agreements such questions as were considered ripe for solution—notably the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, Publicity of National Defence Ex- penditure, and the Permanent Disarmament Commission. During the following months, meetings took place of the Special Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War (referred to here- after as the Special Committee), the Technical Committee of the National Defence Expenditure Commission (referred to hereafter as the Technical Committee) and of the Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions. The Special Committee, on April 13th, 1935, adopted a report, containing certain draft texts, which was forwarded to the Governments (Conf. D./C. G. 1C8). The Technical Committee, on January 14th, 1935, issued a complementary report in which it in- corporated the final draft of the Convention on Publicity of National Defence Expenditure. This report was also forwarded to Govern- * See telegram No. 949, November 20, 5 p. m., from the American delegate Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. i, p. 187. * This programme, briefly, invited the Bureau "to seek, by whatever means it deems appropriate and with a view to the general acceptance of a Disarma- ment Convention, a solution of the outstanding problems, without prejudice to the private conversations on which Governments will desire to enter in order to facilitate the attainment of final success by the return of Germany to the Conference." While providing for a further technical study of the question of security, air forces and anus manufacture and trade, the General Com- mission left it to the Bureau "to ensure that when the President convenes the General Commission it will have before it, as far as possible, a complete draft Convention." (Minutes of the General Commission, pp. 681-688). [Footnote in the original.] 885223—54—VOl. I 0 6 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I ments (Conf. D./C. G. 160 (1), also Conf. D. 158). Vol. IH.f The Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions decided to adjourn the dis- cussion of the Soviet proposal for a Permanent Peace Conference, which the Bureau had referred to it, and assisted the Special Com- mittee in preparing the texts relating to the setting up of the Per- manent Disarmament Commission. No meetings of the Bureau, Gen- eral Commission or other bodies of the Conference have taken place since April 1935. The Sixteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly did not deal with Disarmament. However, in view of the death on October 20th, 1935, of the President of the Conference, the Council, during its ninetieth session, decided (January 22nd, 1930) that circumstances were still unpropitious for the resumption of the work of the Conference, but that as soon as a proposal for the convening of the Conference is made, either by the Council's Rapporteur on Disarmament questions (M. Ruys Guinazu) or by a Member or Members, the Council could em- power the Secretary-General to consult the Bureau of the Conference on the question of summoning the Conference, and that the latter would then begin by electing a President and proceed to consider the general situation! (Conf. D. 172). B. Future of the Conference. It would seem that circumstances continue unpropitious for a re- sumption of the full Conference. It may be, however, that the time has arrived when renewed consideration should be given to the pos- sibility, suggested by Mr. Henderson and approved by the Bureau in November 1934, of the conclusion of separate agreements covering particular aspects of the disarmament problem which may be ripe for solution. In addition to the Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War, Publicity of National Defense Expenditure and the Permanent Disarmament Commission—already envisaged by Mr. Henderson—a partial solu- tion of the problem of naval armaments appears practicable as a result of the conclusion of the London Naval Treaty of 1936.8 In view of the limited programme and in order not to arouse exag- gerated hopes, it seems preferable not to convene the Plenary Con- ference or the General Commission until final agreements have been tThe Technical Committee held its last meeting on April 16th, 1935, after framing certain principles to be applied in the examination of information re- ceived from Governments. [Footnote in the original.] tThe question of election of a new President will not be dealt with in this memorandum. [Footnote in the original.] * Department of State Treaty Series No. 919, or 50 Stat. 1363. For correspond- ence concerning negotiations leading to the signing of the treaty on March 25, see pp. 22 ff. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 7 completed. A feasible procedure might be for the Seventeenth Ordi- nary Session of the Assembly to reconvene its Third Committee which might note the possibility of achieving progress in certain specified fields and submit a resolution to the Assembly asking the Council to call a meeting of the Bureau within the near future for the purpose of preparing a new programme of work along the lines suggested. The Bureau might then convene (a) the Special Committee with instructions to reexamine the texts elaborated in April 1935 in the light of the observations from the Governments and to prepare a final draft Convention; (b) the National Defence Expenditure Commission with instruc- tions to consider, in the light of the observations from the Govern- ments, the draft Convention on Publicity of National Defence Expenditure elaborated by the Technical Committee and to prepare a final text; (c) the Committee on Miscellaneous Provisions with instructions to consider, in the light of the observations from the Governments, Chapter IV of the Draft Texts prepared by the Special Committee (Conf. D. 168, pages 21-31) and to prepare a final text in the form of a separate Convention; (d) the Naval Commission, with instructions to consider the Lon- don Naval Treaty 1936, in the light of the observations from the Gov- ernments,! and prepare a final text of a Convention embodying the principles and provisions of this Treaty. In view of the interrelationship of the subjects to be dealt with, it is desirable that the four Committees and Commissions be in session simultaneously in order that they may co-ordinate their work and mutually assist each other. The reports of these Committees and Commissions would be sub- mitted to the Bureau which would convene the General Commission, either upon receipt of each separate report or upon receipt of all four reports, with a view to the final consideration and adoption of each Convention and the possible preparation of a Protocol of Signature, or Final Act, linking all four Conventions. Thereafter a Plenary session of the Conference could be called for the purpose of signing the instruments adopted by the General Commission. The participation of delegates of States not at present represented in the Conference might be invited at each successive stage, and all States could in any event be invited to attend the final session for the purpose of signing the agreements arrived at. These agreements would presumably remain open to the accession of all non-Signatories. § The Secretary-General on May 6th, 1936, suggested that such observations be submitted, through this agency, to the British Government (C.L.74.1936.IX). [Footnote in the original.] 8 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I The question of whether some or all of the agreements should be con- ditioned upon their coming into force simultaneously could be left to the decision of the General Commission. C. Regulation of the Trade in and Private and State Manufacture of Arms and Implements of War. The report (Conf. D. 168) adopted by the Special Committee on April 13th, 1935, and forwarded to the Governments contains: (a) texts unanimously adopted; (b) texts proposed by the Committee, but subject to reservations or to alternative proposals submitted by certain delegations, and (c) alternative texts proposed by these delegations. The Special Committee emphasised that the texts in no way bound the Governments represented in respect to their final attitude and pointed out that the final success of its task depended on the solution of certain questions of principle. In general, the texts unanimously adopted envisage a system of licenses for the manufacture and permits for the export or import of certain categories of arms and implements of war, and a system of publicity through the Permanent Disarma- ment Commission which would also watch over the execution of the obligations of the Convention. The Committee did not achieve unanimity with regard to the extent of publicity and the degree of control to be exercised through the Permanent Disarmament Com- mission (see also Section E below). The question of transit was left unsolved in the absence of adequate instructions on the part of some delegations. D. Publicity of National Defence Expenditure. The Conference originally considered budgetary publicity in con- junction with a general scheme of budgetary limitation. Agreement on such limitation having proved impossible, the General Commission, on June 8th, 1933, decided that the first general Convention for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments should contain provisions for the application of the principle of Publicity of National Defence Expenditure, subject to international supervision, and instructed the Technical Committee to prepare the necessary texts (Minutes of the General Commission, page 629). On December 11th, 1933, the Tech- nical Committee unanimously adopted a draft containing a series of articles to be incorporated in the Convention, with five Annexes con- veying the necessary instructions. (Conf. D./C. G. 160). The draft was reconsidered by the Technical Committee in the autumn of 1934 in the light of additional documentary material re- DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 9 ceived from the Governments, and a few minor changes were made in the text which was now issued as a final draft Convention (Conf. D./C.G. 160(1)). In the words of the President, "No particular difficulties were en- countered in the field of Publicity, and the relevant articles of the draft Convention, with their Annexes, are available for immediate application" (Conf. C. 171, page 158). The final draft provides for a system of publicity, through the Permanent Disarmament Commission, of all national defence ex- penditure, including draft budgets, budgets, closed accounts, state- ments of changes, etc. It should be noted that the texts prepared by the Special Committee also include provisions for publicity of ex- penditure on manufacture and purchase of arms and implements of war (Article 7, C (&)). E. The Permanent Disarmament Commission. The draft articles relating to the Permanent Disarmament Com- mission are now included in Chapter IV of the texts prepared by the Special Committee. The functions of the Commission as defined in this chapter relate primarily to the execution of the obligations re- garding manufacture of and trade in arms and implements of war. The texts, nevertheless, are capable of adaptation in such manner as to permit of their incorporation in a separate instrument which would cover the functions of the Commission with respect also to such other fields as to Which agreement may be attained. Alternatively, the par- ticular functions of the Commission in each field might be dealt with in the respective Conventions, so that the special Convention dealing with the Commission per se could be confined to its setting up, compo- sition, rules of procedure, etc. On certain fundamental questions of principle, especially as to a system of continuous and automatic examination and supervision on the spot—complete agreement has yet to be arrived at. Unanimous approval was, nevertheless, achieved in the. Special Committee to the effect that a Permanent Disarmament Commission should be set up at the seat of the League, composed of one representative of each Contracting Party and to be entrusted with the duty of watching over the execution of the Convention; this Commission should meet in ordinary session at least once a year and in extraordinary session in accordance with the requirements of the Convention and whenever its Bureau should so decide either on its own motion or at the request of one of the Contracting Parties or of the Council of the League. It was also unanimously agreed that, in addition to the information 10 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I specifically called for by the Convention, the Contracting Parties should be required to furnish any supplementary particulars or obser- vations the Commission might request. F. Extension of the principles of the London Naval Treaty 1936. The London Naval Treaty 1936, intended to come into force upon the expiration at the end of the current year—1936—of the 'Wash- ington Naval Treaty of 19227 and the London Naval Treaty of 1930,8 and to remain in effect for six years until the end of 1942, was signed on behalf of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations (with the exception of the Irish Free State and South Africa), by France and by the United States of America, and is open to the accession of Italy and Japan as co-signatories of the London Treaty of 1930. While abandoning quantitative limitation, the Treaty per- petuates, elaborates, and in some instances reduces the qualitative limit of the earlier Treaties, thus eliminating competition in types of ships. It continues in more comprehensive form the exchange of information as to naval construction called for by the older Treaties and adds a new system of advance notification of annual building programmes, thereby removing, in the quantitative field also, those elements of secrecy, uncertainty, and surprise which in the past have recognisedly been important factors in naval competition. A six-year holiday in the building of 8 inch gun cruisers and of cruisers exceeding 8,000 tons has been established. Finally, the continuity of the naval disarmament effort has been assured by providing for consultation in 1940 with a view to a new conference in 1941 and to a possible reduction in unit tonnage and in caliber of guns of capital ships. Negotiations for the extension of the principles of this Treaty to other naval Powers, by means of bilateral agreements with the United Kingdom,* have to date been undertaken by the United Kingdom Government with the Governments of Germany, Poland, and the U. S. S. R. Moreover, the Secretary-General, at the suggestion of the President of the London Naval Conference, Mr. Anthony Eden, has invited the non-Signatory Governments (to which he has pre- viously circulated the text of the Treaty and its two Protocols) to communicate, through his agency, any observations they might wish to offer on the text to the United Kingdom Government, which latter would be glad to furnish any explanations it might be in their power to give (Circular letter of May 6th, 1936, C. L. 74.1936.IX). It will be necessary, before reaching a decision as to the inclusion of the naval question in the future programme of the Conference, to * Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247. 'Ibid., 1930, vol. i, p. 107. 0 See pp 102 ff. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 11 determine whether the method now being pursued of bilateral nego- tiations should be continued, or a general treaty under the auspices of the Disarmament Conference be sought which would incorpo- rate—with such modifications as circumstances might require—the provisions of the London Treaty. The question of whether such general Treaty would be open to the signature of all Powers or only to the States not signatories to the London Naval Treaty 1936, or, alternatively, only to the States not signatories to the London Naval Treaty 1930, would also have to be considered. 500.C1113/74 The Consul at Geneva {Gilbert) to the Secretary of State No. 1830 Political Geneva, September 9, 1936. [Received September 22.] Sir: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 1815 Political of August 17 and to my telegram No. 325 of September 9, 10 a. m.,10 concerning preparatory work in the Disarmament Section of the Secretariat against the possibility of the disarmament question being raised in the forthcoming Assembly. In this regard, there is enclosed a copy of a draft statementu pre- pared in the Disarmament Section for delivery by the President of the Third Committee in case the disarmament matter is raised in the Assembly and referred to the Third Committee. This draft, which is almost entirely historical, follows along the lines of Mr. Field's memorandum transmitted with my despatch under reference. There is likewise enclosed a copy of a memorandum, in French, submitted by Mr. Friis of the Disarmament Section to Mr. Aghnides, as well as an English translation thereof prepared in the Consulate.11 In this memorandum Mr. Friis refers to a request that he prepare a draft resolution on disarmament, describes the views of various governments, as expressed in recent communications on League re- form, regarding consideration of disarmament in the forthcoming Assembly and advises against attempting to prepare a draft resolu- tion at that time (September 3). I understand, however, that such a resolution has since been prepared, but I have been unable as yet to obtain a copy. In amplification of the information conveyed in my telegram un- der reference, I understand that Mr. Aghnides favors a controlled and 10 Latter not printed. u Not printed. 12 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I limited discussion of specific subjects (such as arms manufacture and trade); that he regards it as inevitable that the question should come up and wishes the Secretariat to be prepared to give such guidance as it can to keep the discussion on safe and constructive grounds. His view is believed to be based in part on an expectation (possibly acquired during conversations while attending the Montreux Con- ference 18 as Secretary-General) that the French Government is plan- ning to submit a memorandum containing new suggestions with re- spect to arms manufacture and trade. I have reason to believe that during a recent visit to Paris Mr. Aghnides further discussed this is- sue with officials there, and urged them to take account of practical possibilities and not submit another unrealizable all-or-nothing plan designed purely for home effect. Several members of the Disarmament Section, in particular the British member, are understood to question the wisdom of any dis- cussion of armaments at the Assembly. In their view, the Confer- ence has been inactive since April 1935 pending an improvement in the general political situation; there has been no improvement which would justify resumption at this time; on the contrary, a new effort would be bound to lead to failure and still further undermine the League's prestige. Moreover, it would be difficult to keep the dis- cussion within constructive limits; and embarrassing issues would almost certainly arise, such as the question of German or Russian armaments or that of the rearmament of Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The British member is particularly opposed to any in- tervention of the League with respect to the naval negotiations now being conducted by Great Britain. He is being supported in this by Mr. Field. A new element has been introduced as a result of the replies of sev- eral governments, notably those of the Scandinavian states, on the question of League reform. These contain more or less detailed sug- gestions respecting disarmament; and some League officials believe that the submission of these replies to the Assembly will automati- cally raise the disarmament question. They feel that the draft pre- pared by the Disarmament Section is to that extent already superseded. As the Department is aware, disarmament is not included on the published agenda of the Assembly. It would, therefore, have to be raised at a plenary session by one or more delegations before the ques- tion of reference to the Third Committee could arise. It is requested that the enclosures to this despatch be treated as strictly confidential. Respectfully yours, Prentiss B. Gilbert a Held June 22-July 20,1936; see vol. ni, pp. 503 fl. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 13 500.A15A4 Steering Comnrittee/488 : Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 25,1936—5 p.m. [Received September 25—12: 35 p.m.] 1067. Supplementing my 1066, September 25,11 a. m.,14 Massigli15 informs me that the French are sending a note tomorrow to the Presi- dent of the Council asking the Council to discuss the advisability of calling the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference. Massigli says that his Government hopes to have the commissions that were sitting in February and March 1935 resume work on control of the traffic in and manufacture of arms and budgetary publicity. I am contemplating sending you tomorrow a telegram in greater detail on the subject after discussion with other delegations. How we should treat this problem has raised questions in my mind which I would like to put before you. Wilson 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/489 : Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 26,1936—11 p.m. [Received September 27—12: 59 p.m.] 1069. My 1068, September 26, 6 p. m.14 The French are reticent as to exactly what they will propose in the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference. I find the British and other delegations as well as the Secretariat equally unaware in regard to French aims. As near as I can estimate them the French will suggest as a development of the first step of the solution which Delbos1S proposed that the committees on traffic in and manufacture of arms and budgetary publicity be called again into existence to continue their work. The British tell me that they will be consulted by the French and that they have not changed their attitude as shown in the discussions of February and March 1935. It may be however that the French [intend] to make some offer more capable of acceptance by the British. I must admit that I find widespread skepticism as to positive results developing from the French initiative. Germany and Italy will be 14 Not printed. M Rene Massigli, Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs; assistant delegate to the League of Nations Assembly. "Yvon Delbos, French Minister for Foreign Affairs; delegate to the League of Nations Assembly 14 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I absent from the Bureau. I am convinced after numerous attempts that no document completed in Germany's absence will gain Ger- many's adherence. I can conceive of useful work being done under one hypothesis only, namely, that the French will so modify their atti- tude on the traffic in and manufacture of arms as to gain the acquies- cence of the British. In this case a second reading of the text might be undertaken provided that the work were stopped at the end of that second reading so that Germany and Italy could participate in the final preparation of the treaty text. On the other hand it may well develop that [if?] no modification of the positions in respect to traffic and manufacture is apparent, an attempt will be made to gain agree- ment on budgetary publicity alone. As you remember although the latter draft was satisfactory to the majority of the committees the United States had grave objections and we had reserved our final position. The Bureau will presumably be called in the near future and unless you instruct me to the contrary I shall assume that you desire me to attend. Although the situation is unclear it may be possible to foresee two contingencies. Hypothesis 1: that the French have nothing new to offer other than resumption of the work of the committees. In this event since we were in a large measure responsible for this draft I should be inclined to take the position that the first reading showed such wide divergencies of views that I saw no useful purpose [would] be served in the mere reiteration of these conflicting theses and to ask whether the French or the other delegations could inform me of any change in attitude which would make the work more fruitful now than it was 2 years ago. I make this suggestion because it seems to me that there has developed in the public a certain impatience with repeated fruitless efforts in the field of disarmament, Hypothesis 2: that the French or any other delegation make a con- structive suggestion. In this event I should prefer to consult with you before making our attitude clear at a subsequent meeting of the Bureau. If, however, you feel that it is advisable that we should support energetically any attempt whatsoever to reopen the subject of disarmament I would appreciate your instructions. Wilson 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/489 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sicitzerland (Wilson) Washington, September 28, 1936—6 p.m. 511. Your 1069, September 26, 11 p. m. After considering the facts reported in your telegram in the light of the general situation, DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 15 we have come to the conclusion that it would be advisable for us to support an attempt to reopen the subject of disarmament, with par- ticular emphasis upon those sections of the work in which a large measure of accord has already been realized. We believe that we should adhere to our position of 1934-1935, that a contractual ob- ligation should be entered into as soon as possible between the nations most concerned with regard to the Manufacture of and Trade in Arms and publicity on Budgetary Expenditure. We are of the view that a Permanent Disarmament Commission might be a most effective instrument for supervising and controlling this obligation. Finally, we believe that this obligation should be entered into without awaiting the realization of a General Disarmament Convention. It would seem necessary to us, however, to obtain in advance a clarification of the present views of the French and British Govern- ments with regard to these specific subjects and with regard to the general disarmament situation in order that we might have some idea of the present prospects of a positive result developing from the renewal of the discussions and possibly from a second reading of the draft text. It would be unfortunate and would merely further exacerbate public opinion if there were to be mere recurrence of the cleavage between the British and French positions which was so apparent in 1935 and which forced an adjournment of the discussions in the hope that the bases of a general accord might be reached. In short, any information regarding the actual situation which may come to you would be appreciated by us. In any event, however, we shall wish you to attend the session of the Bureau, if it is called, and to make clear that our interest in the success of disarmament efforts has not abated and that we wish to contribute to a full extent in efforts which would mean the lessening of anxiety and an increase of confidence in the world. Hull 500.C111/961: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, September 29, 1936—3 p.m. [Received September 29—12:12 p.m.] 1070. Your 511, September 28, 6 p.m. In yesterday's meeting of the Assembly the President read a letter translation of which follows: "During the general discussion several speakers have raised the question of resuming the work on international disarmament. The delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway, The Netherlands and Sweden have the honor to support the suggestion which has already been discussed by the general committee of the Assembly that the third committee should be set up to consider the possibility of resum- ing its work." 16 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I I have learned this morning from members of these delegations that the Norwegians and the Danes who are not members of the Bureau of the Disarmament Conference felt that they desired to make declarations on the disarmament problem. They have no desire to prevent the meeting of the Bureau and indeed hope that their declarations will facilitate the work of the Bureau. Reflecting upon your 511, September 28, 6 p.m., I believe that I cannot learn more than I have at present about the British and French positions unless I take up the matter officially with the chief delegates of those states. I would appreciate your advice as to whether it would be expedient to approach them formally in writing telling them of your interest in a basis of discussions and asking them specifically what they have in mind. Wilson 500.C111/901: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) Washington, September 29,1936—6 p.m. 512. Your 1070, September 29, 3 p.m. Referring to last para- graph of the above it would seem inadvisable for us to put ourselves in the position of making a formal approach to the British and the French. We wish you to follow closely the developments in respect of disarmament, reporting any further facts as to the British and French positions as they may come to you but without exposing us to the possibility of being regarded as an intermediary in the present complex stage of disarmament-security negotiations in Europe. Hull 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/491: Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 1, 1936—5 p.m. [Received 7 p.m.] 1071. The Third Commission was set up by the Assembly this morn- ing, the Hungarian delegate declaring that on account of the attitude of other powers towards equality of treatment his delegation would abstain from attending meetings. A talk with Vienot18 later gives me some further light on the French attitude in disarmament. Vienot said that his delegation would of course attend the Third Commission but that if he spoke at all in the name of France it would "Pierre Vienot, French Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; delegate (substitute) to the League of Nations Assembly, September 21-October 10,1936. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 17 be merely to reserve his views for the Bureau which organ was more representative of the great armed powers. He anticipates that the Bureau will meet in the next few days. Requesting me to regard the information as confidential he said that at the Bureau the French representative would state that it [was] believed that the time was ripe for a "reexamination" of the ques- tions of budgetary publicity, control of the manufacture of and traffic in arms and limitations of air forces. The first two the French delegation believed could be undertaken by a second reading [of the] draft conventions already existing. As for the third, they had not worked out the final details of what they hoped to propose. The French delegation would not push the other task to an im- mediate and decisive answer but would propose a second meeting of the Bureau [after a] certain delay to enable the delegates to consult with their governments. Whether this second meeting should take place before or after the Locarno conversations would be a point to be determined in the Bureau. Following the lines of your 511, September 28, 6 p.m., I spoke of the great interest of the United States in seeing these conventions brought into being but reminded him of the wide divergence of view between the British and French delegations in the last discussions and added that I thought it would be unhappy to see these divergences in public in the present situation. I gained the impression from Vienot that he knew even less about the British attitude than I. He said the French were deeply concerned, that the essential first step was the control of the production of armaments. Limitation might follow but he did not believe that limitation could precede or be simultaneous with the control of production. He admitted that the wiser procedure would be for the French Government to work with the British after the first Bureau meeting and urge them to examine how far they could revise their attitude. Vienot [said that] in its initiative the French was hoping to have not only the approval of the United States but the same vigorous support from that country that had characterized the debates in the last meetings. I replied that my Government was as anxious now as then to see these conventions realized but stated that it seemed to me that the crux of success for a second [reading] in the absence of Germany lay in the British and French ironing out the differences. In replying as I did to Vienot I tried to give him the impression that while we earnestly desired success and would aid enthusiastically if there were any hope, we would be reluctant to waste effort on a gesture condemned to failure at the start. Wilson 18 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.C1113/76 : Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 2, 1936—7 p.m. [Received October 2—2: 48 p.m.] 1073. The Third Committee of the Assembly met this afternoon for the first time and elected Lange of Norway, President. Lange summarized the work before the Committee as being that of exploration and a useful preface for the meeting of the Bureau. He states that his task would be to review the subject of disarmament with particular reference to the statements made during the general debate of the Assembly and to make possible recommendations for the re- sumption of useful work on this subject. The meetings of the Third Committee would give the prestige of the Assembly's sanction to the resumption of work which would actually take place in the Bureau but only limited results can now be expected. Even these, he said, can only be achieved if certain powers are prepared to make concessions from positions taken in which they are more or less isolated. The general discussion will open and [at] the next meeting. Wilson 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/492 : Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 4, 1936—noon. [Beceived October 4—9: 50 a.m.] 1074. A [statement by?] Cranborne19 throws light on the British position respecting disarmament. Cranborne feels that the whole sub- ject is considered untimely in England and somewhat harassing. Certain conservative elements in the Government have for years been convinced of the necessity of rearmament, they have struggled hard to carry conviction to the rest of their party and finally, aided by German building, to the rest of the nation. The nation has now for the first time reluctantly but seriously accepted a program of rearma- ment hence the Government hesitates to welcome anything that even psychologically cuts across this state of mind, unless, Cranborne added, it shows possibility of real reduction in armament throughout the whole of Europe. For a partial measure such as the French seem to have in mind they cannot have any ardent sympathy. We then went more in detail into the subject. The British are will- ing to accept an agreement for budgetary publicity but in their minds "Viscount Robert A. J. C. Cranborne, British Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; member (substitute) of the British delegation to the League of Nations. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 19 such newspaper publicity is an unilateral act and subject to no control. I know from my conversations with the French that such is not their conception respecting manufacture of and trade in arms. Cranborne deplored the fact that Great Britain had had to oppose France on this subject and again would have to oppose France on it if the French pushed for a formal notice. Cranborne added that no change of attitude on the part of the British Government in this respect could be expected before the Royal Commission sitting on this matter had given its report. He did not know what kind of report the Com- mission would make. It had been sitting for a year and a half and the testimony was voluminous. He hoped it would give its report soon so that the Government could clarify its attitude. Wilson 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/493 : Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 5, 1936—8 p.m. [Received October 5—6: 45 p.m.] 1075. At the meeting of the Third Committee this afternoon the five states responsible for its convocation reiterated their belief that work in the disarmament field could usefully be resumed in the Bureau and outlined a limited program which seemed to offer pros- pect of achievement: namely, a convention to include publicity of budgetary expenditures, control of trade in and manufacture of arms and the establishment of the Permanent Disarmament Commission. In this they were in general supported by the other speakers. Paul-Boncour -° stated that France would not have taken the initiative of requesting the summoning of the Bureau if it had not felt that there were chances of some accomplishment but did not press for its immediate convocation. He reiterated France's basic con- ception that any settlement must be founded on the twin principles of publicity and control. He was followed by Malcolm MacDonald for Great Britain who repeated what Eden21 had said before the Assembly in respect to the possibility of achieving a convention on budgetary publicity. MacDonald also reviewed the British position with respect to the control of arms manufacture and trade in terms similar to those used by the British during the committee meetings of 1935 and stressed the need for a treaty of this nature which would be both practical and possible of general acceptance. *°Jean Paul-Boneour, permanent French representative on the League of Nations Council. "Anthony Eden, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 20 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I The President closed the general discussion and will report to the Assembly that the Third Committee supports the French move for convocation of the Bureau. Wilson 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/495 : Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 7,1936—9 p.m. [Received October 7—1: 55 p.m.] 1078. The Third Committee this afternoon approved a report22 to the Assembly which summarized its deliberations and states that "while the Committee expresses the hope that there will be an early meeting of the Bureau, it nevertheless realizes that the date of con- vocation and the result of its discussions depend very largely on the important negotiations which are so frequently mentioned at present." A resolution was also prepared for the Assembly's approval wel- coming the initiative taken by the French with a view to the early convocation of the Bureau.23 Wilson 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/498 : Telegram The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State Geneva, October 10, 1936—11 a.m. [Received October 11—10: 40 a.m.] 1079. The Council adopted last night a resolution the pertinent part of which follows: "Referring to the Third Committee's report approved by the As- sembly on October 10th, 1936; Authorizes the President of the Council, after consultation with his colleagues, to settle, as soon as circumstances permit and in any case before the end of the year, the date of the meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, and to instruct the Secretary-General to proceed with its convocation; And decides to communicate the report and the minutes of the Third Committee, together with the minutes of the present meeting, to the members of the Bureau and to all the states represented at the Conference." Wilson 'League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 158, Annex, p. 26. 1 Ibid., No. 153, p. 19. DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE 21 500.A15A4 Steering Committee/501 The Minister in Sicitzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State No. 4735 Bern, December 24, 1936. L. N. No. 3484 [Received January 6,1937.] Sir: I have the honor to quote below a communication (Conf. D.-Bureau-70) by the President of the Council of the League of Nations, dated December 23,1930, entitled, "Conference for the Reduc- tion and Limitation of Armaments. Bureau of the Conference." "By a resolution adopted on October 10th, 193G, the Council author- ised its President, after consultation with his colleagues, to settle, as soon as circumstances permitted and in any case before the end of the year, the date of the meeting of the Bureau of the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments and to instruct the Secretary-General to proceed with its convocation. In coming to this decision the Council took into consideration the resolution adopted the same day by the Assembly, in which the latter welcomed the action initiated by the French Government 'with a view to the early convoca- tion at the most opportune date' of the Bureau of the Conference. "The President of the Council has just consulted his colleagues in accordance with the above-mentioned resolution of October 10th. "Having regard to all the considerations by which the Assembly and the Council were guided in October last, to the opinion expressed by the members of the Council during the recent consultations and more particularly to the suggestion made by one of them, and also bearing in mind the proximity of the next session of the Council, the President has thought it preferable to refer the question of the date of the meeting of the Bureau of the Conference to the Council itself in January. To this end the Secretary-General has been re- quested to take the necessary steps." Respectfully yours, Hugh R. Wilson 885223—54—VOl. I- LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE, 1935: SECOND PHASE, JANUARY 6-MARCH 25, 1936 » 500.A15A5/599 The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt Washington, January 7,1936. My Dear Mr. President: It is obvious that the Japanese have no intention of accepting any agreement in London which will not recog- nize their demand for parity with the American and British navies and it seems perfectly clear to me that there is very little use in con- tinuing the discussions too long in London in the face of this appar- ently fixed attitude of the Japanese Government. I am attaching hereto, therefore, a draft of a telegram to our Delegation in London2 which I would like to submit for your consideration. This draft has received the approval of the Secretary of the Navy and the Acting Chief of Naval Operations, and, if you concur in its sense as now drafted, I shall be very glad to send it forward as soon as you may let me know that it meets with your approval.3 Faithfully yours, Cordell Hull 500.A15A5/599: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 7, 1936—6 p.m. 8. We feel firmly convinced that the Japanese have no intention of receding from their insistence upon parity with the British and our- selves and that they have no intention of becoming a party to any 1 For previous correspondence, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. I, pp. 64 ft., and Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. i, pp. 277 ft. For other documenta- tion in connection with the Conference, see Department of State Conference Series No. 24: The London Naval Conference, 1935, Report of the Delegates of the United States of America, Text of the London Naval Treaty and Other Documents (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1936) ; and Documents of the London Naval Conference, 1935 (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1936). * For the telegram as sent, see infra. * This letter was returned with the notation : "O. K. F. D. R." LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 23 agreement on any other phase of the naval situation which does not recognize their demands for a "common upper limit". It would seem advisable to have a clear-cut decision as early as possible on whether the Japanese would be willing to reach an agreement on any phase of the naval situation in the absence of an agreement which would grant parity to them. If the Japanese are eventually to refuse any agree- ment which would not include recognition of their right to build to a "common upper limit", I question the advisability of continuing to discuss ways and means of arriving at an agreement with them as the very fact of continuing to discuss such possibilities will, if continued beyond a reasonably short exploratory period, undoubtedly weaken the position which we must eventually take publicly. If the con- ference is to end on a note that the Japanese have made and insisted upon a demand which is entirely unacceptable to the British and our- selves, it would seem to be desirable that this should take place early rather than after a too long drawn out series of attempts to arrive at a conclusion which could have become evident in the early stages of the Conference. To continue discussion in such circumstances would only result in confusion in the public mind and may meanwhile offer an opportunity for the militarist element in Japan to use the news from London in a manner tending to justify their own aims and to intensify antagonism on the part of the Japanese people toward the United States. I would suggest, therefore, that you consider the advisability of discussing the situation with the Chairman of the Con- ference with a view to ascertaining whether the procedure of the Conference may be so formulated as to develop an early definite answer to the question of whether an agreement involving Japan is possible at this time. In the event that such an agreement does not appear to be susceptible of realization, I would also suggest that you study the possibilities of such agreement as may be feasible which would include the other nations present at the Conference and to which Japan might possibly adhere later and, if no agreement seems to be possible of achievement within a reasonably short time, you might discuss with the Chairman the advisability of adjourning the deliberations of the Conference until such time as the prospects for some agreement become more favorable. These suggestions are entirely for your own consideration and dis- cussion with the Chairman of the Conference and not to be put for- ward at this time as proposals of the American Delegation. I should be very glad to receive a report of your views on the subject. The President has seen and approved this telegram. Hull 24 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/601: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 8,1936—10 p.m. [Received January 8—7: 12 p.m.] 38. Your 8, January 7, 6 p.m. We entirely concur in the views indicated by you and have been thinking very much along the same lines. Unfortunately, Eden 4 has been so swamped this week in get- ting installed in his new office and entertained by all the Ambassadors and Ministers that he has not been able to come to grips with the naval matter. He has, however, written me that he wishes to have a good talk with me in the very near future and I think it desirable to discuss fully with him the questions raised before reaching a final decision as to our course. As reported in a separate cable,5 the Japanese almost brought mat- ters to a head today by refusing even to discuss the British, French and Italian proposals for an exchange of information.* After the meeting today Craigie7 told me he would like to have at once a talk with Phillips8 and me in which Monsell9 later joined. Craigie in substance said they were satisfied that the Japanese Admiralty wished to bring the Conference to a head without delay but that the Japanese Foreign Office is still anxious to keep the Con- ference going and desirous of getting some kind of a so-called political understanding that would enable them in effect to agree to continue the naval status quo. The British would therefore like to discuss further the question they had raised with regard to a pact of non- aggression. We told him frankly that we could not consider such a pact.10 Craigie then suggested as an alternative a consultation pact which would state in effect that in a desire to cooperate for the promotion of peace in the Far East and to remove sources of misunderstanding, etc., we would consult when necessary. He said that this would really be meaningless but would give the Japanese some justification and help save their pride. We told him it would be difficult to explain to our Senate why we had signed a treaty that had so little * Anthony Eden, Rritish Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 'Telegram No. 37, January 8, 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation; not printed. * See Report of the Delegates of the United States . . ., pp. 199 ff. 'Robert L. Craigie, Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and adviser to the Rritish delegation. 'William Phillips, Under Secretary of State of the United States and Ameri- can delegate. * Viscount Monsell, First Lord of the Admiralty and British delegate. M See telegram No. 34, January 6, 9 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, vol. iv, p. 1. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 25 meaning and that it would also raise questions as to Russia, China, the Dutch East Indies, and all other powers interested in the Far East. Craigie replied that the Covenant of the League11 would protect them insofar as these other powers were concerned but we explained that we were not in the same position. I then asked Craigie if Eden were in favor of such a suggestion and he said that so far he had had very little time to discuss it with Eden who has not yet made up his mind. (In this connection before the Conference this afternoon Phillips called on Eden at the latter's invitation with Ambassador Bingham, Craigie also being present. The two pacts above mentioned were brought up during the course of conversation by Craigie but Phillips got the impression that Eden did not seem to regard them as practica- ble though he felt a pact of consultation might be worthy of study.) Craigie then said that he could understand our basic objection to such a limited pact of nonaggression but that it was so vitally impor- tant to them to get a naval agreement with Japan, if possible, that he hoped we would think over further the possibility of a so-called pact of consultation mainly as a means of helping to save the Japanese face. We told him that while we were glad to do anything reasonable to promote an agreement our reaction was distinctly unfavorable, but that if after thinking it over further we had any possible suggestions to make we would let him know. Monsell and Craigie told us they were going to have a meeting with the Japanese tomorrow at the Foreign Office and tell them that since they know perfectly well that their common upper limit will be re- jected the British would like to know if the Japanese wished to have this done immediately and if they are then ready to attempt to get an agreement on any other basis; and if not what they propose doing. The British felt that after this meeting it was very important for us to have a meeting and decide what to do. Monsell then said that they could not consent to having Japan dictate to the Conference what we may discuss and agreed with us that since the Japanese are forcing the issue it is better once and for all to definitely and finally to reject the common upper limit. Craigie evidenced a desire to keep the Japanese on even as observers but Monsell agreed more with our attitude. Monsell said he would rather have the Japanese run out by refusing even to discuss the French, Italian and British proposals for exchang- ing information as to future construction than on a flat rejection of the common upper limit, he added that if they were to pull out as now seems probable he thought we should go ahead and negotiate a four- power naval agreement which would have an escape clause and would provide for Japanese adherence later if she so desires. The British u Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xin, p. 69. 26 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I now believe France and Italy would be willing to join in such a treaty. Both the latter powers have shown of late a marked interest in a four- power agreement. Davis 500.A15A5/604 : Telegram The Chamnan of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 9, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 9—5: 05 p.m.] 39. In a talk I had with Eden alone this afternoon I told him that apparently the Conference had reached a stage which made it impor- tant for us to determine very carefully what our next move should be and that although I knew he was overwhelmed with the duties of his new office, I hoped very much we could have the benefit of his counsel and cooperation. He replied that he was impressed with the impor- tance of doing this and had, in fact, had a long meeting of the British delegation this morning with a view of bringing himself up to date on the questions at issue and preparatory to the meeting they are to have with the Japanese this afternoon at which he will preside. I then told him that the British and American delegations had been cooperating most harmoniously and satisfactorily but that I was afraid there was a little too much tendency, particularly on the part of Craigie, to avoid coming to an issue on certain fundamentals which had been raised—such as the common upper limit—in the hope that by prolonging the Conference they might ultimately bring Japan into line. I then gave him fully the views expressed in your 8, January 7, 6 p.m., and his reply was that this appealed to him as being very sound. In order, finally, to dispose of the questions which had been raised before, originally by Craigie, as to a pact of nonaggression or of consultation, I explained the fundamental objections and he replied that he had been thinking this over since Craigie brought the matter up to him and had come to the conclusion that a pact of nonaggression was out of the question and that he still had doubts as to the wisdom of even a consultative pact that would not include all of the parties to the Nine Power Treaty12 plus Russia and to which Japan would probably not be favorable. He then told me he would like to read to me just what he had decided in conference this morning to say to the Japanese this afternoon which was to the following effect—that the British, having taken the re- sponsibility of calling the Conference, were entitled to expect coop- eration from all the powers represented and particularly on a question "Signed at Washington, February 6,1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 276. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 27 of mere procedure; one power should not attempt to dictate to the other four; that he would like to know if the Japanese wished to discuss the common upper limit and have it finally disposed of and once that was done, which would certainly be unfavorable to them, he would like to know if they were prepared to attempt an agreement on any other phases of the naval problem and if so, on what, and if not, what did they propose to do. He then asked what I thought of the advisability of hinting to the Japanese that if they wished to go home without an agreement the other four powers would probably stay on in an effort to reach a naval agreement to which Japan might later adhere if she so desires. I told him I saw no objection to this. I said, however, that I entirely agreed with the position he pro- posed to take with the Japanese and felt that if we showed any further tendency to evade the issue on the common upper limit we would begin to appear ridiculous, and therefore the sooner we disposed of this matter the better. He replied that he agreed entirely with me and that his effort would be to work most closely with us. Eden said that he would see me at the official dinner tonight and inform me exactly what happened with the Japanese this afternoon. Davis 500.A15A5/601: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 9, 1936—7 p.m. 10. Delegation's 38, January 8, 10 p.m. I approve the steps taken by the Delegation. Might it not be useful to remind Craigie that the principle and the substance of cooperation and consultation are laid down in the pre- amble and article 7 of the Nine Power Treaty? The Department, in the expectation that the British themselves will come to the conclusion that neither proposal is practicable, suggests for your consideration that you might care in future discussions with the British to go no further toward definitely disposing adversely of Craigie's suggestions. Such tactics would tend to safeguard against the development of a situation wherein the British might feel that we are blocking proposals which some of them may feel at this stage offer promise. The Department shares the views expressed by Monsell as reported in the last paragraph of your telegram. The major strategy of the Delegation should continue to conform to the Department's telegram No. 8, January 7, 6 p.m. Hull 28 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/606: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 10,1936—2 a.m. [Received January 9—3: 34 p.m.] 41. Referring to my 39, January 9, 7 p.m. After the official dinner tonight Eden and Monsell told me that the former had in the meeting this afternoon told the Japanese exactly what he had informed me this afternoon he would tell them. The Japanese seemed disconcerted. Eden had then told them that if they wished to have the common upper limit or quantitative limitation first discussed and disposed of, the British were quite agreeable to do so and that they would consult the other delegations on this point. The Japanese then asked that the Conference be adjourned over the week end to give them time to consider and communicate with Tokio. Eden told them that in case they would not agree to continue actively in the Conference after the common upper limit had been rejected, the British wished to know if the Japanese would like to continue as observers or otherwise while the other four powers negotiated a naval agreement in which case the Japanese might determine whether or not they desire to become parties to such a treaty. This seemed to dis- turb them even more. Eden and Monsell then said they thought it important that the Brit- ish and ourselves make substantially similar statements in rejecting the common upper limit at the next meeting and that we should en- deavor to get the French and Italians to come along. Later we talked separately with the French and Italians who practically agreed that they would definitely join in rejecting the common upper limit. The French asked whether if it should be rejected we would be willing to negotiate a four-power naval agreement to which Japan could later adhere. I told them that if the others wished to do so we were agreeable subject to agreement on the agenda. The Japanese told the French tonight that if the common upper limit is rejected they will withdraw from the Conference unless their instructions are altered in the meantime. Eden, Monsell and Chatfield M expressed the opinion that the Japanese would not do so. Our information is that the Japanese delegation is divided on the question that their naval people are in favor of withdrawal on rejection of the common upper limit but that the diplomatic members of the delegation wish to continue in the Conference. I might add that Monsell told me that if the four-power conference were able to arrive at an agreement it might be possible later to invite "Sir Ernie Chatfleld, First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff; adviser to the British delegation. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 29 Germany and Russia to join in the deliberations. In this connection it may be interesting to note that the only other government representa- tives present at the dinner tonight besides those of the five naval powers were the German and Soviet Ambassadors. Davis 500.A15A5/609 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 10,1936—7 p.m. [Received January 10—2: 30 p.m.] 43. Your No. 10, January 9,7 p.m. 1. I did point out to both Eden and Craigie that the principle and substance of cooperation and consultation as regards China are con- tained in the Nine Power Treaty and that as regards the Pacific consul- tation is provided for in the Four Power Pact14 and that there could be no reason for any additional agreement for cooperation and con- sultation unless it were for the purpose of extending this to include Russia. 2. In order to keep the record clear as to the issues we have sug- gested to the British that they report to the committee at the next meeting that the Japanese have refused to proceed with a discussion of the proposals for notification as to building programs and con- struction and have insisted upon turning to a discussion of the com- mon upper limit. We have not got complete British agreement on this as yet but are to discuss it further on Monday. 3. If the Japanese walk out the delegation has been discussing the pros and cons of Japan's continuing in the naval negotiations in the capacity of observer. We feel that while there are objections to having the Japanese delegation as a whole remain on and sit in in technical discussions it would be inadvisable for us to object to their having an observer because this would be construed as a desire on our part to eliminate them altogether and concoct something against them. Since the French and Italians sat in at the Geneva conference as observers" without a voice and since the League has an observer at the present Conference, we question the advisability of our objection to the Japanese having the same right. The Japa- nese may settle this matter themselves but please give us your views if possible before the meeting on Monday. Davis "Treaty signed at Washington, December 13, 1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 33. "At the three-power conference for the limitation of naval armament, June 20-August 4, 1927; see telegram No. 66, May 17, 1927, from the Ambassador in Italy, Foreign Relations, 1927, vol. i, p. 39. 30 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500A15A5/609: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 10,1936—7 p.m. 12. Your 43, January 10, 7 p.m. We see no basis upon which an objection should be made by this Government to the presence of a Japanese observer or observers in the event that the Japanese with- draw from the Conference and the remaining nations proceed to dis- cuss an agreement. Hull 500.A15A5/610: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 11, 1936—11 a.m. [Received January 11—6: 08 a.m.] 45. In view of the most important developments just now it would be very helpful if Grew 18 would keep the delegation as fully in- formed as possible as to the situation in Tokyo and the trend in conflicting views between the Foreign Office and the Navy. Davis 500A15A5/610: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 11, 1936—4 p.m. 14. Your 45, January 11, 11 a. m. Department has informed Grew " and will relay to you as promptly as possible Grew's responses. Unnecessary though it be, Department would caution Delegation against any assumption, on the basis of reports or evidence regarding the indicated conflicting views, that a technical victory by the Japanese Foreign Office would imply any change in the fundamental thought and objectives of the Japanese nation and government in regard to Japan's general program of expansion and matters appertaining thereto. HtTLIi "Joseph C. Grew, American Ambassador in Japan. "Department's telegram No. 6, January 11, 4 p.m., to the Ambassador In Japan; not printed. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 31 500.A15A5/611: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, January 12,1936—7 p.m. [Received January 12—10: 10 a.m.] 9. For Davis, London. Department's 6, January 11, 4 p.m.18 1. Final instructions to Nagano19 drafted in 6-hour conference be- tween Foreign Office and Navy officials last night and approved by Cabinet this afternoon. I understand that Navy officials were pre- pared to break up Conference by withdrawal, but that Foreign Office was able to secure Japanese continuance in order to avoid blame for complete rupture. It is reported that Nagano is instructed to make clear Japan's proposals to provide real reduction, but that Japan can- not enter temporary agreements which would continue inequalities and will not discuss qualitative apart from quantitative reduction. Delegates may, however, remain in effect as observers and may par- ticipate in later phase of Conference for discussion submarine warfare and other subsidiary subjects. Definite confirmation of foregoing report is lacking. 2. It is my belief that the Foreign Office, while wishing to avoid forcing a formal vote on quantitative limitation which would oblige Japan to quit the Conference and thus accept the onus for a complete break, will, nevertheless, welcome a definite and final clarification of the parity issue so that this chapter may be closed and some new pro- gram involving political agreements set in motion. The Japanese press has recently carried various tentative suggestions along these lines as allegedly emanating from London which I am reliably in- formed are "kite flying" pure and simple. I am unaware whether there is any basis for the report published here today alleging Eden's reference in the private Anglo-Japanese conversation on January 9th to the question of the eventual fortification of the Philippines and Hong Kong. 3. The situation here is as usual shrouded in fog owing to the dis- crepency in views between the Foreign Office and the Navy and the consequent lack of unanimity in the Government not in point of gen- eral objective, but regarding methods and tactics. Obviously the Japanese Navy in demanding parity had principally the American Navy in view, but failed to foresee the complications which their atti- tude would create in Europe. Having burned their bridges, a recon- "See telegram No. 14. January 11. 4 p.m. to the Chairman of the American delegation, supra. "Admiral Osami Nagano, War Counselor to the Emperor and Japanese dele- gate to the Naval Conference. 32 JAPAN, 1931-1941, VOLUME I which, in case the negotiations failed, would be finally presented as representing the unanimous views of the Council members, with the exception of the disputants, in regard to what was considered just and right in the circumstances. 5. It soon became evident in the course of the negotiations that the Chinese position presented less difficulty than that of the Japanese, since the former was more conciliatory and seemed to be readily adapt- able to the terms and spirit of the Council resolution of September 30. Briand's chief concern therefore was to obtain from the Japanese an exact statement of their demands, and subsequently to induce them to modify those demands to meet the minimum demands of China and so as to conform to the spirit of the Council's resolution of September 30. It was felt that this resolution which formed the basis of the Council's negotiations could not be abandoned, not only because this would have meant a loss of ground, but also because as a result Chinese public opinion would have probably forced China to go to war. There was in existence at one period a draft interim resolution (the purport of which has been reported to you 49) upon which for a short time negotiations with Japan were based. Certain features of this were framed with a view to meeting more nearly Japan's general de- mands. Upon Japan's refusal of this resolution, however, it seemed desirable to withdraw these concessions and to go back in spirit to the terms of the September 30th resolution in order that there should be no sign of the Council weakening in its position without tangible re- sults being obtained thereby. There was moreover always a question as to whether China would have accepted this interim resolution. The Japanese position was not made clear even to Briand until after long delay. Only after the negotiations were well under way were Briand and Drummond informed in strict confidence that the Japanese demanded as a preliminary to evacuation an agreement with China through direct negotiations on certain points (reported in a previous telegram 50) which Japan stated were essential in order to guarantee the safety of Japanese lives and property. It was evident to Briand that the crucial point of these demands did not involve simply measures connected with “immediate security” as envisaged by the Council resolution of September 30th, but related to a general settlement of problems of a more permanent nature between China and Japan in Manchuria including particularly questions connected with the South Manchurian Railway. The acceptance of this demand would have signified an acquiescence in the occupation of Manchuria 49 Telegram not printed. 50 Not printed. See the memorandum by the Under Secretary of State of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, October 14, 1931, p. 24. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 33 agree to this and that they would propose that the other powers remain to discuss a naval agreement to which Japan might later adhere if she so desired. Later on Nagai came up to me and said he wished to tell me per- sonally how deeply he regretted their inability to reach an agreement and that this would necessitate their leaving the Conference. I asked him if there would be any hope of their reaching an ultimate agree- ment or if it would be helpful to them to carry the delegates on for another month or so. He said their situation at home was such that they could not come to any kind of agreement now and their only hope was to bring matters to a head now which might result in such a change in public opinion in Japan as thereby enable a resumption of negotia- tions later on perhaps this year. Nagai concluded that what Japan wants above all is to leave in a most friendly spirit and that nothing must be done to disturb Japanese-American relations. Davis 500.A15A5/617: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 14, 1936—7 p.m. [Received January 14—3: 47 p.m.] 47. At the meeting between the British and American delegates at the Foreign Office this morning the British told us of their talk with the Japanese, the substance of which was covered in my 46, January 14,1 a.m. The Japanese had also said that while they could not reach any naval agreement after the rejection of the common upper limit, they would like beforehand to discuss rules of submarine warfare with a view to perpetuating the terms of part IV of the London Naval Treaty.23 The British said they would be very glad to do so after disposing of the common upper limit. The Japanese repeated that under the circumstances they would be unable to remain for any nego- tiations and again suggested that part IV be taken up first. The British replied that they had done everything possible to meet the Japanese wishes but that they were not willing to depart from the procedure to that extent. The British then told us the Japanese had questioned the legality of continuing the Conference once Japan withdraws24 since the Con- a Signed April 22,1930, Foreign Relations, 1930, vol. i, p. 107. "For announcement of withdrawal of the Japanese delegation, January 15, see Foreign Relations, Japan, 1931-1941, vol. i, p. 297, and Report of the Delegates of the United States .... p. 240. 34 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I f erence was called under the Washington Treaty25 and since the treaty envisages only a conference of the five powers and not a four-power meeting. The British disagreed with this and told them there was no reason why the other powers should not remain to negotiate a naval agreement since such agreement could not become effective until after the expiration of the Washington and London Treaties when without some sort of new agreement there would be chaos. Furthermore, they told the Japanese that in negotiating an agreement, the other powers would have in mind the possibility and hope that Japan might ulti- mately become a party to it. The British definitely considered that the obligation of article 23 of the Washington Treaty was fulfilled by the convocation of the Conference in December. The British told the Japanese they would have no objection to two or three Japanese observers. After some discussion this morning we agreed that the Japanese should have observers but that they would have no right to sit with expert committees for technical discussions. They could, however, be kept informed of the results. We inquired what the British views were with regard to later in- vitations to Germany and Russia. They replied that they were keep- ing both informed of what is taking place but that France and Italy wished to include Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in which case Sweden, Holland and Spain and perhaps the South American coun- tries would also have to be invited. The British said they were of the opinion that if once you go beyond the major naval powers it would be better to include all naval states and that after all this might from a practical and psychological viewpoint be of considerable ad- vantage. If all the other naval powers, with the exception of Japan, were to enter into an agreement the effect would be so overwhelming they believed that Japan would in a short time wish to join. The British recognize, of course, that with Japan out many difficulties would arise but that we should proceed in general on the theory that Japan would ultimately want to come in. In the meantime an ade- quate escape clause should be provided as a counterpoise to Japan's freedom. The British who want above all qualitative limitation now state that without Japan the last hope of achieving quantitative limitation has gone except perhaps in so far as it might result from operation of agreed building programs. The British desire for qualitative lim- itation without quantitative is no doubt partly determined by their "Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 247. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 35 -wish to bring France and Italy into agreement and their realization that a quantitative agreement between these two countries is now impossible and also by the fact that qualitative limitation would leave the way open for later adherence of other powers. Davis !500.A15A5/622: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 16, 1936—2 p.m. [Received January 16—9: 50 a.m.] 55. It is reported that Senator Pittman28 has made a statement to the effect that future efforts to limit naval armaments are futile and that it is manifest that Japan is withdrawing in order to institute a naval race. The general consensus here is that Japan is not intending to start a naval race and that aside from the political situation in Japan which forced the Government to take the unreasonable and unwise position it did they seem to have had in mind only the building of relatively small craft such as submarines and destroyers since they realize that they could not possbily keep up in any race in the heavier ships. It also seems clear that they had not envisaged the possibility of the other powers continuing without them and that this is dis- turbing them very much. I therefore think that in spite of the difficulties of formulating a comprehensive naval treaty for naval reduction or limitation without Japan it is highly important for the other naval powers to show that they can proceed without Japan. If an agreement between them should result it is all the more likely that Japan will react and seek some means for getting in again, that she will be less likely to start a naval race and that if she does it will be easier to cope with it if the other naval powers are acting more or less in agreement as to their respective building programs to counteract what Japan is doing. An escape clause to solve any contingency would of course be provided. I am convinced that this is the best way to deal with the Japanese situation and certainly there is no risk or disadvantage to us in attempting to do so. If you wish I suggest you show this message to Pittman. Dams "Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 36 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/631 Memorandum by the Chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (Hornbeck) [Washington,] January 16,1936. Reference, press item attached, from today's New York Times," and Mr. Davis' telegram from London, 55, January 16, 2 p.m., copy attached. Of course the Japanese do not intend "to institute a naval race". But it may be regarded as certain that they intend that the Japanese Navy shall be brought as rapidly as they can make it so to a position, in proportion to the American and the British Navies, which will render Japan invulnerable—and unrestrainable—in the western Pacific. The proposals which they have made at London indi- cate that they would be willing to see that objective attained by a general reduction of naval armament; but, having failed in that, they will exert themselves to the utmost to attain that objective by adding to the Navy which they already possess. 'Whether this will mean a "naval race" will depend on the action taken by the United States and Great Britain in response to increases in Japan's building program. If, as the Japanese build, we increase our building, there will begin a "race". What the Japanese are hoping is that we will not build. They are already ahead of us on the basis of the 5-5-3 ratio. We are engaged in bringing our naval forces up to the 5-3 point. They are hoping that, as they build above the 3 point, we will not go be- yond the 5 point and there will thus come about an altering of the ratio in their favor. That in a real race they could not keep up is of course obvious. But, they can afford to go beyond the present 3 point, and there is every reason for expecting that they will do so. Mr. Davis states "It also seems clear that they had not envisaged the possibility of the other powers continuing without them and that this is disturbing them very much." I have doubt with regard to the accuracy of this estimate. If and as the other powers continue, and if the other powers make an agreement, the agreement will be for naval limitation. The Japanese desire that there be naval limitation. The fact of there being limitation and of their knowing the limita- tion to which the other powers agree will be, if and when, of definite value to the Japanese. True, they do not like to be left out of anything that the major powers are doing. But being outside has its compen- sations: in this case it will enable them to know to what the others are committed without their being themselves committed. Whether they will thereafter "seek some means for getting in again" will de- pend entirely on their own estimate, at the time, of their interest. 'Not reprinted. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 37 An escape clause may or may not "solve any contingency". The ques- tion of national honesty and of national ability to conceal and/or to discover will have a bearing on that question. Mr. Davis concludes with the statement, "I am convinced that this [a conference among the other powers]28 is the best way to deal with the Japanese situation and certainly there is no risk or disadvantage to us in attempting to do so." There is room for doubt with regard to the soundness of a part at least of this view. The contemplated conference of the other powers may or may not be "the best way to deal with the Japanese situation"; but the idea that it involves "no risk" is surely open to question. First of all, it is notorious that the United States is more sincerely committed to the concept of limitation of armament than are the other countries which will participate in the conference (with the possible exception of Great Britain); and when the process of bargaining begins, we have the reputation of being more given than are the others to the making of concessions. Second, it may with reason be doubted whether, in the world as it is, multilateral agreements with regard to armament can, unless pre- ceded and connected with agreements with regard to political matters, rest on any sound foundation, and whether, even if associated with political agreements, their net effect is not that of deceiving the peace- fully inclined nations into a false sense of security without in any way really placing effective obstacles in the way of aggressively dis- posed nations. In other words, it may be asked: Should nations rich in resources and desirous of peace limit their right to arm and thereby make easier for nations less rich but aggressively disposed to prepare for and engage in predatory activities? It also may well be asked: Might it not be well to permit the na- tions to enter upon a period of unrestricted naval competition; might not such a course bring about an approach on Japan's part asking for naval limitation at a date earlier than such an approach may be expected if the other powers enter into an agreement for reasonable limitation, the terms of which will be immediately and fully known to Japan. There is "risk". On the one hand, we have the statement of opinion that is attributed to Senator Pittman; on the other hand, the statement of opinion which Mr. Davis makes. It may be well to show Senator Pittman, as suggested by Mr. Davis, Mr. Davis' telegram. It might be well at the same time to say to Senator Pittman that it is felt in the Department that there is con- siderable room for middle ground as between the two views. S[tanlet] K. H[oenbeck] 'Brackets appear in the original. 885223—54—vol. i^—8 38 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/628a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 18, 1936—2 p.m. 20. I thought it might interest you to have some of my impressions and reflections on the present stage of the Naval Conference. I have been very pleased to see that the Conference is showing every indication of endeavoring to speed up its work and to confine its agenda to at least reasonably important points upon which early agreement may be possible. The general impression here resulting from the situation created by the withdrawal of the Japanese is not unfavorable to our position. Your statement of our position has been well received and to my mind entirely covers the ground as far as the attitude of the United States is concerned.29 There has been some skepticism expressed with regard to continuing the conference without the Japanese. This I do not share, but I am under the impression that our interest in the Conference has become considerably lessened by the withdrawal of the Japanese, and therefore that the interests concerned from now on will be European and that the questions discussed from now on are of primary importance to the continental nations and Great Britain and particularly the latter. If I am correct in this impression, it follows that, to a corresponding extent, we should not take a leading part in the activities of the Con- ference, but should rather continue as a friendly and responsive par- ticipant without taking the lead and leave the initiative to other powers. I am sure you are fully aware of the sentiment now present in the country against involvement in European affairs and I think it would be well therefore not to take any steps which might be construed as indicating a desire or willingness on the part of our Government to take any unwarranted initiative in European questions. Hull 500.A15A5/628b: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 20,1936—2 p.m. 23. In a conversation on the naval situation, the President expressed the opinion that as far as any new agreement which may be negotiated "Statement made on January 15 to the Naval Conference; for text see Report of the Delegates of the United States . . ., p. 222, or Department of State, Press Releases, January 18,1936, p. 89. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 39 at the Conference as now constituted is concerned, we should still seek an agreement in the first instance within the tonnage limits in the existing treaties, with an escape clause in the event Japan exceeds her existing treaty limitations. You should, therefore, endeavor to make that your first principle as the conversations proceed. The question of cruiser tonnage increase, if insisted on, remains as pre- viously outlined. In other words, you should seek compensating decreases in other categories. Hull 500.A15A5/629 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 21, 1936—2 a.m. [Received January 20—9 p.m.] 62. Your 20, January 18, 2 p.m. I welcome your views as to what our attitude should be in negotiating a naval agreement with European powers. While it is true that Great Britain is particularly interested in getting an agreement among the European naval powers in which we should play only a secondary part it is important from our stand- point as I see it that there should be agreement among such powers because of the bearing which this has upon the agreement between the British and ourselves. Furthermore such an agreement would increase the pressure upon Japan either to come into an agreement ultimately or at least not to start a naval race. I had rather suspected that with Japan out England, France and Italy might wish to take up matters which strictly concerned them such as the Mediterranean but so far there has been no indication whatever of any such intention at least within the Conference itself. With regard to your 23, January 20, 2 p. m. For the reasons how- ever in the last paragraph my 47, January 14, 7 a. m. [p.m.] a general quantitative agreement now is out of the question. The only hope I can see now of any quantitative limitation would be through an ex- change of building programs. It is evident from our discussions in the last day or so that even with regard to qualitative limitation there are certain difficulties that will have to be concurred in [in] the absence of a quantitative agree- ment and with regard to adequate escape clauses to provide for such contingencies as may arise in connection with Japan in case she defi- nitely refuses to adhere. We are at present exploring possible solu- tions of these difficulties and shall cable you our suggestions very shortly. Davis 40 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/632 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 23,1936—3 a.m. [Received January 22—11 p.m.80] 64. The French Ambassador came to see me last night to discuss the future procedure of the Conference, particularly with regard to invit- ing Germany and Russia in at an early date as the British wished to do. He said that while France, until the Anglo-German naval accord,31 favored bringing Germany into the naval negotiations, conditions had now changed radically. In the first place the political situation in France is now very precarious, and in the second place the British naval agreement with Germany raises serious questions for France. He said that they were now doubtful of the wisdom of making a naval agreement with Germany unless they could get a secondary agreement as to land and air armaments which he admitted was now impossible. Furthermore, he said that sitting in conference with Germany to negotiate a new naval agreement would be construed as a condonement of Germany's violation of the Treaty of Versailles. The French consider it desirable to try to reach some agreement temporarily to which we should endeavor to get Japan, Germany and Russia to adhere at a later date, but that unless Japan, at least, were to become a party to the agreement they could not see that it would be of much value. I told him that if such an agreement were only to be made effec- tive on condition that Japan adhere he could be sure that Japan would refuse, but that if provision were made in such treaty for freedom of action on the part of the contracting powers in case of departure from its limits by a noncontracting power the latter would have more incentive to abide by the limits fixed. I added that the question of German participation was primarily one for France and England to determine since we are not a party to the Treaty of Versailles and since we do not wish to mix in European political problems. Monsieur Corbin then asked if there was a possibility of substan- tial reductions in types which would justify us in going ahead. I told him we could at least agree not to increase any of the types provided for under existing treaties, either as to tonnage or calibre of guns and that I thought we might perhaps agree upon certain reductions which I proceeded to outline. "Telegram in two sections. "For correspondence concerning accord, see Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, pp. 162 ff. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 41 He said that if that was all the reduction we could get it would be a very great disappointment to the French. I replied that although the minor reductions that could now be agreed upon might be disappointing to certain powers it would be infinitely better to agree not to increase existing types than to have no qualitative agreement and an ensuing naval race which in the course of years would make the present types seem small indeed. He remarked that this was an important aspect to consider. In conclusion Monsieur Corbin said that he was waiting for a further reply from his Government in answer to his report of the talks he had had with the British regarding Germany and that as soon as he received a reply be would like to have another talk with me as they were anxious to work out something if now possible. In a conversation with Reber32 tonight Boncour and Deleuze83 reiterated what Corbin had said about the impossibility from the political angle for France to agree at this time to include Germany in the conference. No government in France could survive if it agreed to making such advance to Germany. They said that the British who had told them last summer that Germany would agree to what- ever qualitative limits were accepted by the five naval powers were now insisting that she must be given an opportunity to express her own views and must therefore be brought into the conference at some future date. The French are convinced that the Anglo-German naval accord is only valid pending the conclusion of a more comprehensive naval agreement and that the British fear that if the wider agree- ment were to prove unacceptable to Germany the bilateral accord would fall and Germany regain her complete freedom of action. The only solution which Boncour considers might be acceptable to his Government is to have the four powers prepare the best qualita- tive agreement possible and leave it open until the end of this year for the adherence of Germany and of Japan. If these two powers have not accepted by that time the others are going to again recon- vene to discuss the situation. The French add that even in this case England must accept the responsibility of presenting this agreement to Germany. The political situation in France is such, Boncour explained, that if some such solution cannot be found the French feel that it might be better to end the conference now and wait at least until after the elections have taken place in France before resuming negotiations. They add that this delay may also make Japan's return easier. In order, however, to avoid making the German issue the cause for "Samuel Eeber, technical assistant for the Department of State. "Jean Paul-Boncour and Capt E. E. Deleuze, technical advisers to the French delegation. 42 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I adjournment they may insist upon lower qualitative limits—which they in any case would prefer—than are acceptable either to England or to ourselves thus precluding any further progress at this time. Boncour leaves for Paris tomorrow to seek final instructions as to the position France will adopt at the next meeting of the First Com- mittee now scheduled for January 29. In a talk with Lord Monsell this evening he told me that while the French were taking a very irreconcilable position just now he was convinced that they would ultimately recede from it and accept a qualitative agreement such as contemplated because it is of vital importance to France that the Anglo-German naval agreement which is a protection to France as well as to England should continue. Moreover, it is most important for the French to have an agreement limiting the number of 8-inch gun cruisers which Germany can build and providing for exchange of information. The British have intimated to us that it is essential that any qualitative agreement shall include Germany. DAVI8 500.A15A5/634 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 23, 1936—10 p.m. [Received January 23—7: 24 p.m.] 66. My 62, January 21, 2 a.m., last paragraph. A difference of opinion between the British and ourselves has developed as to the meaning of the informal understanding arrived at in the bilateral conversations last September and October with regard to qualitative restriction for capital ships and cruisers and a limitation upon the number of 10,000-ton cruisers of both subcategories. Our contention is that the tentative agreement as to gun caliber and tonnage of capital ships was conditional on a qualitative agree- ment to which Japan was a party and that the tentative agreement to build no more category (a) cruisers except as replacements and to limit the number of 10,000-ton category (b) cruisers was conditional on a quantitative agreement. The British contend that as we have both for some time envisaged the possibility that Japan would pull out and that no quantitative agreement was possible among the re- maining powers that we should proceed with qualitative limitation with the understanding that the caliber of capital ships guns be reduced to 14 inches, that no further 8-inch gun cruisers be built except as replacements, and that no further 10,000-ton 6-inch gun cruisers be laid down after January 1, 1937. The British, of course, LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 43 envisage adequate provision for freedom of action in case Japan fails to abide by the limits imposed. The British point out that as early as last September they recognized the virtual impossibility of getting Japan to agree to the continuance of quantitative limitation or perhaps to enter into any treaty at all. They consequently asked us at that time "whether, if Japan would not join in any agreement, the United States would be willing to consider a pact (to include France and Italy) with a let out clause" (see Embassy's telegram No. 439 Sept. 12, 8 p. m. 1935 34). We informed them that we would be willing to do so and that "it would be advisable under these circumstances that such an agreement be in effect a continuation of existing naval treaties with such modifications as the circumstances may require and that it should be left open for Japanese adherence at any time" (Depart- ment's 261 September 19, 6 p. m. 1935 M). In the discussions in London which followed, the American repre- sentatives were authorized to state that we concurred in the British suggestions as to the reduction of gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches, subject to British and Japanese concurrence and that "as part of a comprehensive accord on cruisers" we could agree to the noncon- struction of category (a) cruisers other than as replacements (Depart- ment's 300 October 14,1935, 6 p. m.38) In a conversation on December 8, which Mr. Phillips, Admiral Standley and I had with the First Lord, the First Sea Lord, and Craigie (see memorandum enclosure to despatch of Dec. 2337) we informed them after ascertaining, as we then understood, that what they desired was to increase the numbers of their cruisers 60 including 10 overage, that within the limits of this proposition we could agree not to insist upon building any further 10,000-ton ships either in the 8-inch or 6-inch gun class except as re- placements, although we would not scrap any of the 10,000-ton ships already laid down. This, of course, was still upon the assumption of a comprehensive agreement. While the American acceptance of these qualitative reductions was made conditional upon a comprehensive agreement, the British con- tend that throughout the discussions that have taken place since the arrival of the American delegation it has been evident that Japan would not adhere to such an agreement and that quantitative limita- tion had become impossible. They claim that they were therefore under the impression that we would not make the nonparticipation of Japan an obstacle to continued negotiations along the lines agreed upon last year. M Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, p. 109. M Ibid., p. 113. "Ibid., p. 125. *' Ibid., p. 156. 44 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I The British argue that while it is politically difficult for Japan to make a reasonable naval agreement now, Japan realizes the futility of starting a naval race and a qualitative agreement between us with adequate escape provisions would serve as a powerful deterrent to hold Japan in line. The view which we have repeatedly set forth to the British is that the concessions we were willing to make in the qualitative field were the price we were willing to pay for a comprehensive quantitative agreement. The British are very much disturbed by the possibility of an Anglo- American disagreement now that the subject of qualitative limitation is before the Conference, especially since the other powers, although preferring greater reductions, appear to be willing to accept the limi- tation reduction involved in restricting future capital ship gun grada- tions to 14 inches and in the nonconstruction for at least some years of additional 10,000-ton cruisers in both subcategories. Moreover, there is the danger that this difference will become public and be played up as evidence of American unwillingness to participate in any important qualitative reductions in the absence of Japan. There seems to be no difficulty with respect to agreements reached on aircraft carriers, submarines and the nonconstruction zone. I naturally want to avoid, if possible, any evidence of a difference of opinion or to be the one that is blocking a qualitative agreement. The adjournment during these few days has given us time for further conversations with the British in the hope of working out a com- promise. I am sending another telegram giving the results to date of these conversations. Davis 500.A15A5/635: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 24,1936—8 p.m. [Received January 24—8 p.m.88] 67. My 66, January 23, 10 p. m. In a recent conversation Monsell and I had agreed that representatives of our navies should meet to discuss a possible compromise between our differences—such com- promise to be considered by us and if it gives promise of acceptance to be referred by me to you for approval. Following this understanding Schuirman3B and Danckwerts" met on Wednesday to discuss on purely personal and unofficial basis any ** Telegram in four sections. "Commander R. E. Schuirman, U. S. N., technical adviser for the Navy Depart- ment. "Capt. V. H. Danckwerts, R. N., Admiralty adviser to the British delegation. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 45 possible methods to reconcile American and British views on size of guns of capital ships and on qualitative limits of cruisers and numbers of 10,000-ton cruisers in both subcategories. Schuirman and Danck- werts exchanged suggestions and with these suggestions in mind Admiral Chatfield called on Admiral Standley41 Thursday for further discussion on these points. Part I. Cruisers. In opening the cruiser discussion Chatfield said they will build 25 or more of smaller type in the next 5 or 6 years. It is of great im- portance to them that their cruisers should not be individually out- matched by larger vessels. He hoped Japan will not build more 8-inch gun cruisers or more large 6-inch gun cruisers. He said the United States might not want as many small cruisers as Britain but pointed out that there is nothing to prevent the United States from matching the increase in British cruiser tonnage by building other types such as aircraft carriers. Quantitative limitation is gone forever he said. In regard to qualitative limits for cruisers Standley said that it was essential that the new treaty provide for both category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers. Also that we could not agree never to build any more 10,000-ton cruisers as these categories are necessary when replacements become due and to enable us if necessary to reply to Japanese building in those types (we also had in mind excessive cruiser building by Great Britain). The British are ap- parently ready to [agree to?] retention of these types provided that a 5- or 6-year building holiday commencing January 1, 1937, is agreed to. It should be noted that our agreement to this holiday means con- senting to a quantitative limitation on these two types in a treaty which is otherwise purely qualitative. The reason for fixing the length of the building holiday at 6 years instead of a shorter period, say 3 years, was because a nation might delay all cruiser construction for a short period in order subsequently to build the larger types, whereas if it were for 6 years every nation would have to undertake some cruiser construction and would there- fore become committed to the smaller type. Also unless this were done nations might start replacements of 8-inch gun cruisers ahead of the time when they were normally due and before the British had completed their program of smaller cruisers. The first category A replacement cruiser in any navy is due to be laid down by Japan in 1943. The British suggest that the termina- tion of the 10,000-ton cruiser building holiday in both subcategories might therefore logically be fixed as January 1,1943. Admiral Stand- ley suggested that we must consider a building holiday in big cruisers as provided in the British plan until January 1,1942. "Admiral William H. Standley, Chief of Naval Operations, U. S. N, and Amer- ican delegate. 46 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Chatfield also stated that the British intend to lay down two 9,000- ton 6-inch cruisers this year which the London Treaty permits; that would give them [fifteen] category A and ten category B cruisers over 8,000 tons against our eighteen category A and nine 10,000-ton category B cruisers. Chatfield made the point that their ten 9,000- ton cruisers would be a tonnage balance against our nine 10,000-ton cruisers. (We do not know whether or not Great Britain intend to invoke the escalator clause to retain any or all of the Hawkins class but we will endeavor to ascertain their intentions.) Admiral Standley stated that we had indicated our willingness to refrain from building large cruisers over a certain period of time. We could not agree to no more big cruisers for all time. If the British cruiser fleet became no larger than 60 we might match in cruiser tonnage their increase but with their program unlimited we could not agree to such an undertaking. If the British have 70 cruisers we would not want to match them all in cruiser tonnage. From what Chatfield said the conclusion is inescapable that the British position on qualitative limits is inextricably bound up with the details of the European situation generally and their naval agree- ment with Germany particularly. We agreed that their problem was much more complicated than ours and pointed out that that fact made it more difficult for us to deal with them, as any compromise on our part had to be such as would enable the British to fit it into their agree- ment with German}' and the consequent effects of this agreement on France and Italy and still satisfy the British position vis-a-vis Japan. We pointed out that the proposed compromise between the United States and Great Britain to limit category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers for a period of years was a delicately balanced one to meet a particular situation between those two nations and that when it emerged from the First Committee after discussion by France and Italy it might bear but slight resemblance to the original. It should be noted that the expressed British intention to build 25 or more cruisers in the next 6 years will result in a large increase over the present allowed cruiser tonnage and, if overage cruisers are retained, will result in at least 70 cruisers and not 60 as we under- stood on December 8 (see memorandum, enclosure despatch of Dec. 234*). Summarizing as to cruisers, the British proposal is an agreement for all powers after January 1, 1937, not to build for a period of 6 years any more 8-inch gun cruisers nor any more 6-inch gun cruisers over 8,000 tons. They propose to group all combatant ships under 8,000 and over 100 tons with a gun not larger than a 6.1 in a category to be known as "light service [surface] vessels". "Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. i, p. 156. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 47 Having in mind that the British proposal, although apparently only qualitative, involves limitation on the number of cruisers of categories A and B for a period of years and that it provides no other limit of total tonnage in other categories, an expression of the Department's views as to the acceptability of the British proposal is desired. Part II—Capital Ships. In presenting our views as to the capital ships, Standley emphasized the fact that in this as in other matters we had done everything we could to foster and support a closer Anglo-American accord. He also pointed out that the 16-inch gun was a superior weapon for our needs and that with Japan free, American public opinion would not understand and would not support an agreement which in effect weakened our relative strength as compared with Japan. He stated that in his opinion our position would be best sustained by accepting the existing limits of the Washington Treaty, i. e. 35,000 tons with 16-inch guns with a proviso that if all signatories to the Washington Treaty would prior to January 1, 1937, so agree to the size of the guns would be limited to 14 inches for the life of the treaty or for a definite period. The British counterproposal was to rephrase our proposal to read that the limit would be 35,000 tons with 14-inch guns and if Japan or any other principal naval power refrained from coming into this agreement by January 1,1937, the permitted gun calibre would revert to the Washington Treaty limits. Chatfield in presenting their view said in substance that all Europe wants smaller ships but the British do not feel as strongly about that as they did. They have no intention of pressing their limits but for public consumption they may lead off in the Conference by repeating their desire for smaller ships. There would be considerable moral advantage from a disarmament point of view if we could agree on 14-inch guns. The British will lay down two ships next year. What- ever happens they state these ships will have to be 14-inch gun ships and will have to be fast ships to meet the building of fast ships in Europe. They believe a 14-inch, 35,000-ton ship is better balanced than one with 15-inch or 16-inch guns. Chatfield stated that phrasing the treaty their way is more likely to appeal to the world and would be more likely to exert moral pressure on Japanese authorities. He said the result is the same but it is a matter of tactics. Chatfield told us that the British want the 14-inch gun because they cannot build both a [fast?] ship and a 16-inch gun ship on 35,000 tons. In addition, their design has proceeded to the point where a change to a 16-inch gun, if made, would involve a delay in laying down their first two battle cruisers which they intend to do early in 1937. 48 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Obviously, the difference as regards capital ships is one of ap- proach. As Chatfield stated the results will be the same in either case. The Department's views on the proposed conditional reduction to the 14-inch gun are requested. Davis 500.A15A5/638: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 26,1936—9 p.m. [Received January 26—6: 35 p.m.] 72. Further study of my 67, January 24, 8 p.m. leads me to fear it may be confusing. The facts are that the proposed cruiser com- promise was offered by the British and was discussed by our naval advisers on the understanding that it was purely tentative and sub- ject to approval by Washington. Standley believes it acceptable in view of our present status in 10,000-ton cruisers but desired the views of Washington before definitely committing us. I fully concur in Standley's views as to the acceptability of the cruiser compromise. In substance this proposal provides within the framework of a qualitative treaty what is in effect a quantitative restriction on 10,000- ton cruisers until 1942 but without quantitative restrictions on smaller cruisers or any other types. This would be subject, however, to two escape clauses. 1. To provide that in case any high contracting power felt itself menaced by excessive building in any category by any power, it would be free of the restriction on numbers of 10,000-ton cruisers. This clause would be invoked by us in case Japan should exceed her present ratios in 10,000-ton cruisers or in case of excessive cruiser building by Great Britain—say beyond 70. 2. A general escape clause in case any power did not abide by the qualitative limits to be fixed in the new treaty. Davis 500.A15A5/638a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 29,1936—6 p.m. 28. Has there been any discussion on the question of the scrapping called for under the present treaties? Hull LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 49 500.A15A5/638: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)43 Washington, January 29,1936—7 p.m. 29. Your 72 and previous telegrams on subjects of capital ships and cruisers. The following is our position with regard to the proposals discussed in your telegrams: A. Limitation of capital ship guns to 14 inches in caliber subject to adherence by all other principal naval powers prior to January 1,1937. It seems to the Navy and State Departments that it is preferable to maintain as a starting point the status quo, namely, the 16-inch gun limitation, and to develop a formula of agreement that during this year no signatory would lay down any ship with over 14-inch gun caliber, but that if Japan does not adhere all will be free at the end of the year. We feel that the Japanese are not likely to subscribe and that it would be better strategy to stand by the existing limitation while making an offer of a concession rather than to move away from this, the 16-inch gun, limitation and then have to take an initiative and action in order to move back to it. We should prefer, if possible, to avoid the risk of being maneuvered into a position a year hence where we might have to take the primary responsibility, in view of Great Britain's apparent decision in any case to use 14-inch guns in their new construction, for moving again to the 16-inch limit with the attendant possibility of creating an apparently direct issue between the Japanese and ourselves. If the Japanese accept the offer of a concession to a 14-inch gun limitation, the British and our own purposes would be served and the Japanese could share with the British and us the credit for having made possible this lowering of the limitation on gun caliber, and thus the all-around psychological effect would be to the advantage of all three countries and of relations among them. B. Proposed holiday from January 1, 1937 until January 1, 1943 in the building of cruisers of category (a) and of cruisers of category (5) over 8,000 tons. C. The proposed setting up of a quantitatively unlimited category of "light surface vessels" with displacement limits of 8,000 to 100 tons and guns of not more than 6.1 inches in caliber. 48 Marginal notation: "This telegram was read and approved by Admiral Taussig and the first paragraph after (A) was approved by the President, J[ames] C[lement] D[unn]." 50 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Proposals B and C deal generally with cruisers and must be con- sidered together. The Navy and State Departments concur in the view that exist- ing qualitative definitions of categories should, if possible, be main- tained, certainly not enlarged, and that a reduction rather than an extension of quantitative limits in categories is desirable. We still favor granting to the contracting powers the option of meeting their own individual needs through a limited system of transfers between established categories. The proposals in B and C have the effect of maintaining the status quo in 8-inch gun cruisers and large 6-inch gun cruisers, which is in itself a quantitative limita- tion while permitting, by means of a proposed new category with certain wide qualitative limits and no quantitative limits, the possi- bility of new unrestricted building. If it is desired to discuss further the proposal for this new broad category, we would wish to have more detailed information as to the reasons for establishing this suggested new classification and also as to the ultimate tonnage contemplated and whether the destroyer and exempt classes will be merged therein. Hull 500.A15A5/639 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 30, 1936—6 p.m. [Received January 30—2: 23 p.m.] 76. Your 29, January 29, 7 p. m. We understand your decision regarding proposal A but remain in doubt as to your views on the cruiser question. In particular we do not understand the phrase "reduction rather than an extension of quantitative limits in cate- gories is desirable". We have stated, see our 47, January 14, 7 p. m., last paragraph and 62, January 21, 2 p.m. [a.m.'] that except for the proposed holiday in the construction of 8-inch gun cruisers and 10,000- ton 6-inch gun cruisers there will be no quantitative features whatever in the new treaty. It will be qualitative solely. Under these con- ditions there will be no possibility of limiting any category quanti- tatively either by the number of ships or the total tonnage in the category or globally. There will be no purpose in providing for transfers between categories since there will be no figure to which or from which transfers can be made. While the British would probably agree to quantitative limitation in all categories provided France and Italy would agree it is im- possible to get these two powers to do so because it raises between them the unsoluble question of ratio or parity which they have tacitly LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 51 agreed to leave undetermined. Furthermore, the failure of Japan to agree on quantitative limitation on a basis acceptable to either Great Britain or ourselves makes such limitation all the more impracticable. It is very clear the new broad category of 8000 tons and under with guns not exceeding 6.1 inch is the inability of the European powers particularly France and Italy to agree upon any distinction between small cruisers, destroyers or other small surface craft. Since there will be no quantitative limitation in this broad category it is their opinion that a division into subcategories would serve no useful pur- pose. In any event the proposed exchange of information will give details as to the characteristics of every ship to be built. There will be unrestricted building in this broad category as stated in your 29; there will also be unrestricted building in every other category except category A cruisers and 10,000-ton category B cruisers. The existing exempt and special vessels would either fall within this new broad category or would be provided for in the new treaty by new exempt and special classes similar to those of the London Treaty. There is no information regarding ultimate tonnage except the re- cent British statement of their intention to have a total of 70 cruisers including 10 overage and their statement last year of a desire [to] retain 50,000 tons of overage destroyers. These intentions will of course not appear in the new treaty. We are of the opinion that we should accept (1), a building holiday in category A and 10,000-ton category B cruisers; (2), a category of light surface vessels comprising combatant vessels from 100 tons to 8000 tons mounting a gun not in excess of 6.1 inch. Admiral Standley would like to feel assured that the General Board concurs in this opinion. Unless instructed to the contrary we shall proceed on the assump- tion that in the light of the additional explanation contained in this [telegram] these proposals are acceptable to the State and Navy De- partments and to the President. Davis 500.A15A5/640: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, January 30,1936—8 p.m. [Received January 30—4: 04 p.m.] 77. Personal and confidential for Phillips.44 After my telephone conversation with you yesterday I gained the impression that there "William Phillips, Under Secretary of State. 52 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I was no difficulty about the cruiser proposals and expected that our cable of instructions would approve. My interpretation, however, of your January 29,7 p.m., is that it neither approves nor disapproves of the cruiser proposals recommended by us. I hope that my 76, January 30, 6 p.m., will clear up the situation satisfactorily and will meet with the full concurrence of the President, the Department and the Navy. If, however, there is not concurrence in any particular please advise as soon as possible for we have reached the stage where we must either proceed with formulating agreement or try to back off from an agreement which in my opinion would vary only slightly in essence from what we have been discussing with the British since last September to which I consider that with an adequate escape clause we are in a way committed. As you are aware we were specifically authorized to negotiate a qualitative agreement and the British have repeatedly stated since the beginning of negotiations last September that a quantitative agree- ment with the possible but improbable exception of building programs seemed most unlikely. Furthermore it seems clear to me that although a quantitative re- duction and limitation would be more desirable a qualitative limita- tion would have definite advantages for us and be decidedly better than no agreement. Davis 500.A15A5/639 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, January 31,1936—7 p.m. 31. Your 76, January 30, 6 p. m. The General Board has drawn up the following memorandum with regard to the cruiser question: "1. Referring to American Delegation despatch number 76 of 30 January 1936, the General Board requests that information be ob- tained from our delegates as to why the new proposed category of light surface vessels does not include all of previous category (&). If not included, is it the intention to retain 10,000-ton 6.1-inch cruisers in a separate category? In connection with a possible agreement to re- frain for a period from further building of 10,000-ton cruisers, the General Board suggests that this be so phrased as not to imply a discon- tinuance of these types but as a natural result of adherence to the pertinent clauses of the London Treaty. 2. The General Board questions the advisability of making com- mitments as to delay in building cruisers until definite assurance is given by the British concerning the ultimate limits of British cruiser and destroyer classes, including overage tonnage if such retention is LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 53 desired. The definite restriction on 10,000-ton 8-inch and 6.1-inch types seems inconsistent in a treaty in which all other types will be unrestricted." As we understand it, their position is that the formula for providing for a holiday in the building of 10,000-ton cruisers should be so phrased that there will be no abandonment of the types in which a holiday is agreed to and that there will be no question at the end of the holiday period of the right to build those types, nor will there be any question of the right to build such types in the event of the holiday be- ing terminated by reason of the action of other naval powers. Also, there appears to be a range between 8,000 and 10,000 tons which is not clearly covered. We suggest it might be well to submit a draft of a possible formula to cover the proposed holiday. As far as concerns paragraph 2 of the memorandum the General Board desire further information and assurance, if possible, regarding the British intentions concerning the ultimate limits of the new pro- posed light surface category. We hope you will be able to give us sufficient information on which a decision can be reached. Hull 500.A15A5/644 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 1,1936—7 p.m. fReceived February 1—4: 45 p.m.] 81. Your No. 31, January 31,7 p.m. Beplying to paragraph 1 Gen- eral Board memorandum as to why the new proposed category light surface vessels (mentioned in our 76, January 30, 6 p.m.) does not include all of previous category B cruisers, British yesterday circu- lated a paper containing their proposals for new definitions. In this paper the former proposed definition (see also our 67, January 24, 8 p.m.) of "light surface vessels" has been changed to read as follows: "Surface vessels of war other than aircraft carriers or exempt ves- sels, the standard displacement of which does not exceed 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) and which do not carry a gun above 8 inches (203 mm. calibre). The category of light surface vessels is divided into two subcate- gories as follows: (a) Vessels carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre. (b) Vessels not carrying a gun above 6.1 inches (155 mm.) calibre." 885223—54—VOl. x- 9 54 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I It will be noted that 10,000-ton cruisers with 8-inch guns and 10,000- ton cruisers with 6-inch guns are now included in the definition of light surface vessels. The delegation will insist that the treaty be so phrased that 10,000-ton cruisers of both subcategories are still recognized as permissible types and that there is no agreement either expressed or implied to abolish these types or to continue the building holiday in these types beyond the date agreed upon. However, the British pro- posal with which we are in accord will defer further building of 10,000- ton cruisers with 8-inch guns and 6-inch gun cruisers above 8,000 tons for a definite period of years. We are alive to the necessity for adequate escape clauses to cover every contingency, see our 72, January 26,9 p.m. Replying to paragraph 2, it must be realized that in the absence of any limitation on the total tonnage of the light surface vessel cate- gory it will be very difficult, if not impossible, to obtain definite assur- ances as to the tonnage of this category. However, we will endeavor to ascertain from the British what, if any, definite information can be given as to their program and will further advise the Department on Monday. Davis 500.A15A5/646: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 3,1936—8 p.m. [Received February 3—7: 12 p.m.] 82. Your 28.44a Admiral Standley met Chatfield today and learned the present British intentions in regard to scrapping are as follows: 1. To scrap all cruisers in excess of the 339,000 tons permitted by treaty by December 31,1936. 2. To convert three of the Hawkins class to cruisers mounting a gun less than 6 inches in calibre for use as anti-aircraft ships and to demilitarize the other in accordance with annex II, section V, art. (b), par. 2, of the London Treaty, for use as a training ship. That is three of the Hawkins class would be retained as category B cruisers in lieu of an equal tonnage of "D" class cruisers. By the above means they would comply with the terms of the London Treaty both as to the number and tonnage of category A cruisers and as to the tonnage of category B cruisers. To sum up the British completed cruiser tonnage on December 31,1936, would be approximately as follows: (1) Fifteen cruisers A of approximately 146,000 tons. (2) Thirty-two cruisers category B composed of the following vessels: three Hawkins 29,600 tons; sixteen "C" and "D" class 72,480 tons; two Emeralds 15,130 tons; eight Leanders 55,940 tons; and three Arethusas 15,640 tons. **• January 29, 6 p. m., p. 48. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 55 The British intend to invoke the escalator clause in order to retain 40,000 tons of destroyers which would otherwise have to be scrapped. They plan to maintain 150,000 tons of underage and 40,000 tons of overage destroyers in the future. Davis 500.A15A5/647 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 3, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 3—7: 05 p.m.] 83. Referring to your 29, January 29, 7 p. m. and my 81, February 1, 7 p. m. The British are unable to give any definite assurance as to the ultimate tonnage of the light surface category for the reasons outlined below: France refuses now to commit herself as to the ratio she intends to maintain relative to Germany. Italy's construction will depend on that of France. British building will in turn be influenced by French and Italian as well as by Japanese building. Under the Anglo- German agreement giving Germany a 35 per cent ratio with the British fleet, any increase in the latter would permit an increase in the German fleet and thus again affect French and Italian construction. This vicious circle makes it impossible for the British to bind themselves in advance with respect to their cruiser building especially as the French and Italians refuse to announce their programs for a period of more than 1 year. Again, the present Government can no more bind Parlia- ment for a period of years without its consenting in some way, such as by ratification of a treaty, than our Government can bind Congress without its consent. Also, a Cabinet Committee is now sitting on the question of land, sea, and air defense of the Empire and no decision has been reached even as to what naval construction will be included in the budget for the financial year commencing next April. Even if definite information and assurance could be obtained as to the amount of British construction, we believe it would be unwise to base a decision on such assurance unless it were in contractual form as this undoubtedly would lead to difficulties when the treaty was pre- sented to the Senate and might cause future misunderstanding if the British found it necessary to exceed whatever program they may now contemplate. However, it is apparent that, unless emergency measures are re- sorted to, the expansion of naval forces which can take place by Jan- uary 1942 is naturally limited by available building facilities, the problem of personnel increase, et cetera, and finance. 56 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Chatfield stated today that although he could not commit the British Government, the present intention of the Admiralty is to have 60 underage cruisers as soon as possible after 1942. The last of the cruisers necessary to attain 60 underage would be laid down in 1940 and completed in 1943. In addition they intend to retain 10 overage cruisers so that in 1943 they would have 60 underage and 10 overage cruisers. The majority but not all of the cruisers laid down would be of 8,000 tons, the remainder would be somewhere around 5,000 tons displacement. We estimate that the resultant increase in British underage cruiser tonnage will be between 125,000 and 150,000 tons and in addition 10 overage cruisers of about 50,000 tons will be re- tained, so that the total increase over the cruiser tonnage allowed by present treaties will be between 175,000 and 200,000 tons. The British intend to maintain 150,000 tons of underage and 40,000 tons of over- age destroyers, a total of 190,000 tons. (See my 82, February 3, 8 p.m.) In this connection, it should be borne in mind that even on the basis of the 50 cruisers which the British were able to retain under the London Naval Treaty they would have to increase their total tonnage beyond the 339,000 provided by that treaty, because the replacement of their small wartime cruisers by larger units would add approxi- mately 70,000 tons to their present treaty strength. (See Craigie memorandum of July 25, 1934.) 45 The large increase in underage tonnage now forecast by the British is, therefore, not entirely due to an increase in numbers but is in part accounted for by the replace- ment of small cruisers built for special service in World War. The question at issue is whether or not a treaty for qualitative limi- tation is of sufficient value to the United States for it to accept a building holiday in category A and 10,000-ton category B cruisers for a period of years. A decision on this question must be reached without definite assurance from the British either as to the ultimate tonnage of the light surface vessel category or as to the ultimate ton- nage of any other category. Admiral Standley and I agree that in view of the fact that we have eighteen category A and nine 10,000-ton category B cruisers built or building, we can afford to forego further construction of those two types for a period of 5 or 6 years with the treaty reservations of course that there is no agreement expressed or implied either to abolish these types or to continue the holiday beyond 5 or 6 years—and we have been proceeding upon the assumption that a qualitative agreement upon these terms is advantageous. Davis 'Foreign Belationg, 1934, vol. I, p. 300. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 57 B00.A15A5/648: Telegram The Consul General at Beirut (Marriner), Temporarily at Paris, to the Secretary of State Paris, February 4,1936—1 p.m. [Received February 4—11 a.m.] 92. This morning I talked with Massigli48 and asked him if he thought any progress was being made in getting Germany into the naval discussions in London. He said that the British were most anxious to do so as they had not been satisfied with the appeasement arising out of their naval agreement with Germany last year. He said that it appeared that the Germans were willing to make further concessions in order to come into any international discussion on armaments but that the French felt that they must profit by this to obtain discussion on other arms, notably on air. I said that in my opinion France had many times missed an oppor- tunity to obtain some real measure of disarmament in certain arms by a continued insistence on obtaining reduction or limitation of all of them at once. Massigli said that he realized the danger of missing the present op- portunity and felt that in time something could be done to take advantage of the desires of Germany to enter into discussion on the naval question and perhaps a formula could be found by which an agreement could be concluded and ratification of it postponed awaiting the fulfillment of certain other conditions or at least sufficient delays intervene to give time for progress toward limitation or reduction in the other arms. Marriner 500.A15A5/647 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 6,1936—2 p.m. 33. Your 81, February 1, 7 p.m. and 83, February 3,10 p.m. Upon the basis of the information and conditions contained in the above two telegrams, the Navy and State Departments agree that you may proceed with the discussion of a holiday for a period of 5 or 6 years in building Category A and 10,000-ton Category B cruisers with the reservation that there is no agreement, express or implied, either to abolish these types or continue the holiday period beyond 5 or 6 years. "Ren6 Massigli, Assistant Director of Political and Commercial Affairs, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 58 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I On the basis of the information there is no objection to the reclassi- fication of light surface vessels proposed by the British as reported in your 81, February 1,7 p.m. We are very anxious to receive even proposed tentative drafts of phraseology of provisions for a holiday as well as any other draft proposals as soon as they may be available. When the foregoing was brought to the attention of the President he approved it. However he asked that your attention and that of Admiral Standley should be called to the fact that by this agreement we would revert in new cruiser construction to 6-inch gun cruisers of less than 8,000 tons displacement. He does not object if the Navy approves reverting to the smaller tonnage type of cruiser, but he points out that any large increase of such type by Great Britain or other powers would have to be matched by us and the total cost of a large number of such ships will be very high in the United States. Hull 500.A15A5/657 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 12,1936—9 p.m. [Received February 12—5: 30 p.m.] 94. I learn very confidentially from the French Delegation that their delay in coming to agreement is due to the fact that the French Government is considering the political consequences of the partici- pation of Germany or adherence in some form to the naval agreement. The French Cabinet feels that since French acquiescence in German participation would, in a measure, condone the violation of the mili- tary clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it would be disastrous to the French Government if this were followed by a step over which the French are very apprehensive, namely, a further violation of the treaty through the military occupation of the Rhineland.47 The French, therefore, desire, before acquiescing in German participa- tion, to iron out with the British the attitude which the latter will take in the event of such violation. The French assure me that they are prepared to make a four-power treaty regardless of Germany. Since, however, the British are insistent upon bringing Germany in, and the French themselves admit that this is most desirable, the French believe they can work out a satisfactory method for German partici- pation if the Rhineland question between England and themselves can be satisfactorily adjusted. The French urge us in the meantime to be patient and not press them too much for immediate decisions on technical questions. "See pp. 180 ff. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 59 The French like the proposal for a protocol as they would like to have the four powers reach an agreement now and defer the actual signing of the treaty with Germany until after the French election. In spite of the French preoccupation about the political aspects and consequences, I am satisfied that while they desire eventually to get the Germans into an agreement for exchange of information and qualitative limitation, they want us to trade on the British desire and need for German participation. They also seem to have an idea that for some reason Germany will be willing to pay something to get into the agreement which I somewhat question. The French understand perfectly well, as I told them, we would have nothing whatever to do with any extra treaty adjustments between ourselves and the British but that we have no objections to their trying to clear up questions as between themselves that would facilitate a naval agreement so long as this does not affect the naval agreement itself and does not unduly delay the termination of our work. The French intimate that once they have cleared up the Rhineland question with the British, which they seem to think they can soon do, they will meet us on the question of battleships which is the chief unsettled question regarding qualitative limitation. In case there should be any leak and press despatches about any political discussions between the European powers, you may, of course, if occasion arises, state that we are in no way participating in them. Davis 500.A15A5/661: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 14,1936—6 p.m. [Received February 14—2: 05 p.m.] 96. At luncheon with Eden today he told me in strict confidence of a conversation he had tills morning with Corbin, the French Ambassador, which was in substance as follows: Corbin reiterated the French objections from a technical and politi- cal standpoint to agreeing upon a battleship of the characteristics upon which we are insisting. Eden explained that notwithstanding their objections in which the British partially share it was advisable to acquiesce and necessary to do so in order to get an agreement and that an agreement would outweigh any of the objections. Corbin then raised the question of French objection to binding themselves to sign at a fixed date a naval agreement to which Germany would be an original signatory. Eden told him that Great Britain considered it of vital importance to get a naval agreement and that in order to get it it was essential that Germany should be 60 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I brought in and to do this it was necessary that she be given the opportunity to become an original signatory; furthermore, that Great Britain had done very much in many ways to meet the French views and that in this particular case they must ask the French to do something as a favor to them which after all was distinctly to the advantage of France herself. He also told Corbin that it was im- portant to get this agreement without much delay and not try to bring in extraneous questions. Corbin told him he would go to Paris this afternoon to talk the matter over fully with Flandin43 and would see him again, and also me, on Monday. I told Eden just what I told the French, that if it is necessary to clarify certain questions between themselves precedent to a naval agreement it is important that they do so without delay and that it should not affect the naval agreement itself in which alone we are interested and concerned. He said he understood this perfectly and that if the French should attempt further to bring in extraneous Eu- ropean political questions he was going to tell them frankly that he would be prepared to take up such questions with them after the Naval Conference but that it was not fair to the United States or wise to use the Naval Conference as a means of bringing up questions that had nothing to do with the naval question itself. And for that reason Eden said that if the French insist on further commitments he would tell them that Great Britain would stand by Locarno but would refuse to make more precise the provisions of that pact48 and particularly in such a way as to alienate Germany and close the door to any possible appeasement with Germany. Davis 500.A15A5/663 : Telegram The Ambassador in France (Straus) to the Secretary of State Paris, February 17,1936—1 p.m. [Received February 17—12: 40 p.m.] 123. Referring to the Embassy's No. 120, February 15, noon,80 Pietri, Minister of Marine, came to the Chancery by appointment at 10: 30 this morning to discuss the present situation of naval negotiations in London. He said that technically he found no objection to the decision arrived at by Great Britain and the United States regarding the upper limit of unit tonnage but that politically it would be difficult for France to accept such an upper limitation and that he would be very anxious to secure some modification thereof. He said that he would be willing to agree on some other limit, say 32,000 tons, and that he hoped that modification to that end could be accomplished. "Pierre Etienne Flnndin, French Minister for Foreign Affairs. • See pp. 180 ff. "Not printed. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 61 I advised him to go to London himself and talk with Norman Davis whom he knows very well; that I was sure that Mr. Davis would be very glad to get his views; and that I was convinced that he could present his views much better in person; that it was curious that he, the head of the naval delegation, had not gone to London, and that now as the Conference was approaching its termination it would seem highly advisable for him to have direct contact. I judged from his immediate acquiescence in the suggestion that it was what he had come in to seek, perhaps for the purpose of using it as an argument with the Cabinet and the Prime Minister who perhaps were opposed to his visit. Pietri, in reply to my question, stated that the French are now pre- pared to sign a naval accord, without regard to an accord on air and land armaments, on condition that it should be agreed that subsequent to the naval accord there should be a conference on air and possibly also on land but stating, however, that land was a very much more difficult question to solve. He stated that the French are perfectly agreeable to an endeavor to get Germany to agree to a naval treaty provided Germany would agree to enter into later conversations as to air and land forces. Repeated to Davis and Geneva. Straus 500.A15A5/665: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 18,1936—1 p.m. [Received February 18—10: 25 a.m.51] 97. Captain Deleuze who returned from Paris last night showed me this morning a copy of an instruction which the French Government sent yesterday to de Laboulaye82 requesting him to approach you and if possible the President to ascertain whether the position we have taken as to battleships is the last word and also to explain how im- portant the French consider it to get a reduction which they suggest should lie between 35,000 and 28,000 in tonnage. I repeated to Deleuze our position with regard to the battleship. First, that we are just as desirous as any one to save money by re- duction as long as we can do so without a sacrifice of efficiency and need. Second, that not having built any battleships for so many years we could not determine to what extent if any it will be possible to get any reduction until we have actually constructed two or three or "Telegram in three sections. "Andre de Laboulaye, French Ambassador in the United States. 62 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 36, VOLUME I four battleships; that with Japan out of the treaty it was unreasonable for France to expect us to make our needs conform to theirs but that after we have gained some experience through construction we would be prepared to consider the possibility and desirability of any reduction thereafter in tonnage but that the promise to exchange views should not be construed as any commitment for a reduction. I told him, however, that after all it was somewhat unrealistic to lay so much stress on the question of battleships when that is not the chief obstacle as yet in the way of French agreement. I asked him point-blank whether if he got a solution on the capital ship France would sign at once. Deleuze replied that they would be willing to sign tomorrow but it would be subject to general reserves. He stated that Massigli was now working on a formula under which the states here present would initial the treaty with the proviso that when certain "general political questions" were solved the treaty would go into effect. I told Deleuze we could not sign any naval agreement that was conditional upon a European political settlement, that from a purely practical standpoint I thought France had always made the mistake of trying to get an all-embracing settlement of every question with the result that they had destroyed the possibility again and again of making any progress towards agreement with Germany and with the result of constant German rearmament. I said I also thought it was a mistake even if we were disposed to do so to try to inject European political questions into this naval conference. Deleuze then inquired how I envisaged the signing of an agreement. I told him that my idea was that a real obligation as to signature should be taken by the four powers here and now. In the event that these powers considered the American ratification to this agreement necessary before January next the signature could only be delayed a very short time. If, however, they did not consider such immediate ratification essential we had no objections to delaying some months the putting into effect of the treaty or its actual signature. They might feel that an undertaking by the President to abide by the term of the treaty until the Senate could consider it would be sufficient for their needs. Deleuze indicated that the French would consider this sufficient and gave the impression that he was favorably disposed toward a solution such as I envisaged. We further discussed how such an undertaking should be made in respect to signature and agreed that it was advantageous for Japan, Germany, and Russia to be "original signatories" to the treaty and that other naval powers might be invited subsequently to adhere. Davis LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 63 500.A15A5/667 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 19, 1936—8 p.m. [Received February 19—4: 20 p.m.] 99. Corbin, who returned from Paris last night, came to see me this afternoon. He first told me he did not know until afterwards that his Government had communicated directly to de Laboulaye about the battleship and he was sorry it had gotten into the press which they had expected to avoid. I told him I was glad in a way to have them find out direct if they wished that the position taken here had been in conformity with your views but I felt it was rather unusual for Monsieur Pietri not to have come here first to discuss these ques- tions directly at the Conference which had been called for dealing with such matters at least before making an appeal direct to Wash- ington. Aside from the question of procedure, however, I particu- larly deplored the fact that the Havas Agency had learned about it and published a dispatch with the result that our newspapermen here were today all excited about it but that I had endeavored to make little of it. Corbin said that while he could not say his trip to Paris had been a success he felt that he had made headway in getting his Government to realize the importance of reaching a naval agreement and the bad effect which would result from a failure to do so. His Government, while now recognizing this, is considering ways and means or condi- tions upon which Germany might be brought into the agreement or how best to explain to the French people the reasons for making an agreement with Germany on naval questions without getting an agree- ment on other matters of concern to them. He said that although they did not want to inject us into any extraneous arrangements which he knew would be objectionable he wondered if it would not be possible to make their ultimate ratification of the naval agreement conditional upon a prior settlement of other matters. I told him I felt this would be particularly objectionable to us and that it would be difficult for us to justify entering a naval agree- ment that was conditional upon some European settlements even though we should in no way be a party to such agreements. I told him that aside from our own position with regard to this it seemed to me that from their own standpoint it would be advisable and more practicable to make clean-cut naval agreement and to have Germany made a party to it hoping that this would help create a better atmos- phere whereby they might later take up other matters which they wished to get settled with Germany. 64 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Corbin said he personally felt that there was much to be said for this. He will talk with Eden in a day or so as soon as he hears further from his Government and that while there might be a few days' delay he was hopeful that they would find a satisfactory way of working out a solution and agreement. Davis 500.A15A5/669 : Telegram The Ambassador in Italy (Long) to the Secretary of State Rome, February 20,1936—11 a.m. [Received February 20—9: 50 a.m.] 58. Last evening I had a short talk with Drummond.53 He said that he had recently talked to Sugimura, the Japanese Ambassador here. He and Sugimura are very warm friends having known each other for years at Geneva. Drummond said that Sugimura had told him that there had been held in Tokyo a Council of State under the presidency of the Emperor in which there was discussed the ques- tion of naval armament and the policy of the Japanese Government in respect to building and tonnage. The ranking Admiral was pres- ent and had advocated the withdrawal of Japan from the Naval Con- ference and the resumption of her full freedom of action. Ishii54 or one of the other counsellors of state had asked for assurances that the resumption of freedom would not mean an enormous building program and consequent heavy costs to the Government. The Ad- miral had given such assurances and had stated that Japan had no intention of building in competition with the United States or with England. Drummond felt that this assurance given in the presence of the Emperor was a very solemn undertaking and expressed himself as being satisfied that Sugimura, who is not of the military clique in Japan, had told him of the incident because of their long and inti- mate acquaintance and without any ulterior motive. Drummond said he had advised his Government. Drummond himself saw Mussolini night before last to discuss the Italian naval point of view vis-a-vis the Naval Conference program in London. He discussed that subject only. No reference was made to the political situation developing out of Geneva or Abyssinia.55 Acting Naval Attache requests Navy be notified. Repeated to American delegation London. Long "Sir Eric Drummond, British Ambassador in Italy. "Viscount Kikujiro Ishii, Japanese Privy Councilor. ■ In connection with the Ethiopian-Italian conflict; for correspondence con- cerning this subject, see vol. m, pp. 34 ff. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 65 500.A15A5/670 The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to President Roosevelt Washington, February 20,1936. Dear Mr. President: Under instructions the French Ambassador called upon us to make an appeal with regard to a reduction in ton- nage of capital ships. His instructions, moreover, authorized him to take the matter up with you personally, which, however, he does not feel it necessary to do. Our suggestion is contained in the accompanying instruction to Davis,88 which, with your approval, I would like to read to de La- boulaye. In this way we would be steering the negotiations away from Washington and back to London, where they belong. Faithfully yours, William Phillips 500.A15A5/670 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 20,1936—3 p.m. 40. The French Ambassador called at the Department on the 18th instant under instructions which he said were of a very "insistent" character to ask if this Government could not find it possible to agree to a reduction in the unit tonnage and gun caliber of capital ships. The substance of his representations was as follows: The French Government observes that the desire to reduce ton- nage of ships and gun caliber is a world-wide tendency at the present time and will be found in all international efforts; the difficulties with regard to the reduction of tonnage of battleships and the size of their guns are so serious that the French Ambassador had been in- structed in the most "insistent" way to bring the views of the French Government to the attention of the Department and, possibly, of the President; all the naval delegations in London except that of the United States have agreed to a reduction from 35,000 to 28,000 tons and from 16-inch gun caliber to 12-inch; the French Government would regret to see the conference ended by a decision which in prac- tice maintains the status quo in the capital ships category; for itself, the French Government does not feel, in the absence of any real prog- ress in this category, that the signature of the agreement would offer to them any real technical interest. The French "insist", though with the utmost cordiality, in seeing whether something can be done "Telegram No. 40, February 20, 3 p.m., infra. 66 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I in this matter. It would be regrettable, the French maintain, if a convention were signed to take the place of the Washington and London treaties, if there were no reduction in capital ship tonnage or gun caliber, especially when the governments having heavy financial obligations to assure their own national defense could in this way be relieved partially without compromising their own security. M. Flandin asks whether it would not be possible for the American Navy to make an effort in this direction and agree to some tonnage reduction between the 35,000 and 28,000 tonnage. The French Gov- ernment will not take a definite attitude on this subject before having the American answer. Before leaving, the Ambassador offered his own opinion that a slight reduction in capital ship tonnage might even make it pos- sible for them to accept the agreement; otherwise he felt that it would be dangerous for the French Government to risk the unfavorable public reaction to what might be regarded as the recognition of a change in the Versailles Treaty.57 We have today informed the Ambassador that we felt that too much stress should not be laid upon a slight tonnage reduction in one type of naval vessel when there appears to be a real possibility of a general acceptance of the other points now before the Con- ference; and that we feel an earnest effort should be made to reach an agreement on battleships along the lines of the British basis of discussion and that we hoped that this and other phases before the Conference would be taken up directly by the French Delegation at the Conference. Hull 500.A15A5/670 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 20, 1936—4 p.m. 41. Our 40, February 20, 3 p.m. For your information, we are giving you our observations on the subject of the French desire for re- duction in unit tonnage of capital ships, as follows: We are deeply sympathetic with any desire to effect economy in naval construction. As far as concerns effecting a saving by a re- duction of the size of capital ships, however, there would appear to "Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, signed June 28, 3919, Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, vol. xm, p. 55. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 67 be no assurance of a saving by such a reduction in one category in the absence of quantitative limitation in this and all other categories. Furthermore, the inadvisability of arbitrarily and radically reducing the characteristics of one type of vessel that has reached its present stage after a long period of gradual development will readily be recognized. As you recall, the Navy Department has made very exhaustive studies of the possibility of a reduction in the unit tonnage of capital ships and in a reduction of the caliber of guns mounted thereon. We have already agreed to accept a reduction in gun caliber to 14 inches provided such a limitation is accepted by the principal naval powers. We consider this reduction of gun caliber as a possible first step in the reduction of the size of capital ships and after we have had an op- portunity to test out new construction methods and design we would be willing to consider any possibilities of reduction in unit tonnage which might appear feasible, having in mind the characteristics neces- sary for our defensive needs. It might be pointed out that if no agreement for reduction of gun caliber below 16-inch is entered into generally, capital ships con- structed to carry 16-inch guns and to incorporate the characteristics considered necessary for defense under modern conditions would very likely materially exceed 35,000 tons. This Government maintains its position that economies could most equitably be accomplished by a reduction in total tonnage propor- tionately applied to all categories and not by radically changing the type of ship in any single category. Public impression has been created through the press here that any reluctance on the part of France to sign a treaty containing agree- ment upon the qualitative characteristics of vessels along the lines generally of the proposed British bases of discussion would not be primarily by reason of an inability to accept these limitations for the comparatively short period covered by the agreement. According to the press reports, the hesitancy of the French Government to ac- cept the agreement is based rather upon their reluctance to enter into a naval treaty to which Germany would be a cosignatory. Such a reluctance on the part of the French Government would very likely appear to the American public to be based upon political reasons outside of the scope of the naval conference and outside of the agenda of the conference which the United States understood to be the basis of discussion when the invitation to the meeting at London was accepted. Hull 68 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/672: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 21,1936—2 p.m. [Received February 21—11: 30 a.m.] 102. In a talk with Eden last evening he told me in substance the following: Their Ambassador in Paris had under instructions made representations to Flandin to the effect that a naval agreement is vitally important to both Great Britain and to France. That if such an agreement is to be satisfactory and effective it is essential that Germany be a party. Hence the British Government must ask the French Government as an act of friendship to aid in bringing about such agreement. Furthermore the Ambassador informed Flandin that it is essential for Anglo-French cooperation that France give this concrete evidence of her desire to cooperate in the proper spirit and that if the French should block a naval agreement it would have a very serious reaction on public opinion in England. Eden said he was somewhat hopeful as French were now showing more of an inclination to fall into line. I told Eden that Corbin had indicated to me (see my 99, February 19, 8 p.m.) the idea of making a naval agreement dependent upon general political development and what my reply had been. Eden said he thought I was quite correct in refusing to have a naval agree- ment dependent upon political developments or settlements; that while the British would be glad to have an air agreement they were opposed to making such an agreement dependent upon a naval agree- ment or vice versa. He will make it clear to the French that the best preparation for a subsequent air agreement would be an uncondi- tional naval agreement with Germany as a party to it. He will fur- thermore point out that if an attempt were made to get an air and a naval agreement at the same time the result would be not to get either one. I suggest for your consideration that if de Laboulaye approaches you again, or if there is an opportunity to do so, it would be helpful if you take a similar line while explaining, of course, that what the French and British do as between themselves is of no concern of ours except as it affects a general naval agreement. Davis LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 69 500.A15A5/672: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 21,1936—6 p.m. 43. Your 102, February 21, 2 p.m., and previous telegrams on the subject. The Department entirely approves of the position you have taken in avoiding having the naval agreement become in any way dependent upon political developments or settlements. We are pleased that you are keeping the position of this Government entirely clear in this regard. For your own information: Of course there is, as you know, al- ways a possibility of press reports of political questions entering into the general atmosphere of the Conference producing an un- favorable reaction in this country. We realize fully, however, from your own communications and from the press reports concerning the Conference, that you are entirely aware of this situation. Hull B00.A15A5/673 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 21,1936—6 p.m. [Received February 21—2: 25 p.m.] 103. In a brief talk with Grandi38 after a luncheon today he told me he doubted if in the last analysis Mussolini would agree to sign a naval agreement now. I expressed some surprise and said that since the Italians had been cooperating satisfactorily without raising any serious difficulties I had assumed they would of course be in favor of an agreement. He said that while a naval agreement was not of any particular advantage to Italy they had thought it better to have one than not. Mussolini had expected that before the Naval Conference reached a climax there would have been a settlement of the Abyssinian question. Since, however, there has been no such settlement and the British fleet was still in the Mediterranean he suspected that under the circumstances Mussolini would find it diffi- cult to justify a naval agreement which offered no advantages to Italy to which he could point. I cannot of course tell whether the "Dino Grandi, Italian Ambassador in the United Kingdom and delegate to the Naval Conference. 885223—54—VOl. I 10 70 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Italians are taking this tack to help instigate another move for the Abyssinian settlement. Eden told me yesterday that Drummond had just had a talk with Mussolini on the naval question which led him to believe the Italians would offer no difficulties as to a naval agree- ment but intimated that they might hold aloof from any European questions such as an air agreement until the question of sanctions is disposed of. My guess is that if and when France is ready to close a naval agreement she will persuade Italy to do so, too. Davis 500.A15A5/676 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 25, 1936—2 p.m. 44. In view of Rome's 62, February 22, 8 p.m.,58 which in Section 2 reports the Italian Under Secretary of State as indicating doubt as to whether Italy will sign naval treaty and in view of the uncertainty as to whether the French Government will engage itself now to sign a naval treaty to which the Germans might be cosignatories, there is a possibility of our being put in an anomalous position by having to wait in London for the initialing or signing of a treaty or agree- ments until certain political conditions in Europe are settled to the satisfaction of some of the governments participating in the Con- ference. We would not want to be at all precipitous in judging this situation from here, but we would like your comment on the advis- ability of perhaps arranging, in the event the Conference cannot ter- minate its labors within a short time, to indicate in a friendly way to the Chairman of the Conference that in order not to lose any of the support we now have in this country for the objectives of the Con- ference, it would be best for our Delegation to indicate the general extent and form which we would be willing to accept with regard to the naval agreements before the Conference, and our willingness to authorize an initialing or signing of such agreements at any future date agreeable to the members of the Conference. We are putting forward this suggestion merely for your comment and advice at this time. Hull "Not printed; see telegram No. 103, February 21, 6 p.m., from the Chairman of the American delegation, supra. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 71 500.A15A5/677: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 25,1936—2 p.m. [Received February 25—11: 35 a.m.] 105. Monsell and Craigie told me last evening of their talk with the Italians yesterday and with the French Friday and Saturday. In substance the Italians indicated that they would find it difficult to justify signing a naval agreement so long as sanctions are being ap- plied against Italy unless they could at least show that something has been gained by such agreement such as even a slight reduction in the tonnage of capital ships. They did not, however, definitely refuse to do so and it is believed they are trying to use this as a means of bring- ing pressure to bear for initiating a move for the future peaceful set- tlement of the Abyssinian question. The French said that as far as capital ships were concerned they wished to defer their decision until they received a reply from Wash- ington. (Apparently Corbin had not been informed of your reply of last Thursday80). As regards a general agreement the French took the position that they would either sign a protocol providing for Ger- many's participation as an original party to the initialed treaty con- ditional upon the settlement prior to the date of signature of other questions such as an air agreement or sign at a fixed date a four-power treaty which would not be conditional upon German adherence but which would permit the subsequent adherence of other powers in- cluding Germany. The British rejected the first alternative but stated that they would take up the second alternative with Germany in order to ascertain whether Germany would later join in an agreement with- out specific provision being made beforehand since the British are unwilling to conclude a four-power treaty without the assurance that Germany will come in. Monsell doubts if Germany would come along on these conditions but Craigie felt confident they would. Monsell then asked whether if France and Italy continue to impose so many conditions and to put an impossible price on their adherence we would be disposed to enter into a naval agreement with Great Britain and Germany to which the other powers would be invited to adhere and which he believed would bring the others in very quickly. 1 told him this was a matter we would have to consider very carefully but I was inclined to think there might be serious objections to this. "February 20; see Department's telegram No. 40, p. 65. 72 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I The British suggested that if we objected to entering into an Amer- ican-Anglo-German treaty to which other powers would be invited to adhere we might sign an Anglo-American agreement and then England could enter into a bilateral agreement with Germany if feasible [in conformity with] this and likewise with France. Then the two of us might be able to bring Japan into such an agreement later. I told them that while I realized it might be possible to work this out through a series of bilateral agreements my first thought on the matter was that it would be better to have one treaty to which every one would be invited to adhere instead of a series of bilateral agreements. I suggest that we might consider the possibility of going ahead and drafting a naval treaty as contemplated to be initialed by Great Britain and ourselves and then by an exchange of notes agree that we would invite the other naval powers to adhere. We might also agree to exchange information as between ourselves and to adhere to the prin- ciples of the treaty so much as the other powers did not depart there- from. I told them I was not prepared to commit us in any way to such ends but that if it appealed to them we would think it over further and consult Washington. The British replied that the idea appealed to them very much as it would have the advantage of avoiding complications because of the susceptibilities of the French and the Germans and would perhaps be the most practical and likely way of bringing them and all the other naval powers into line during the course of the year. For our guidance I should very much appreciate the views of the President and yourself as to these various suggestions. Davis B00.A15A5/685a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 25,1936—8 p.m. 46. Your 105, February 25, 2 p.m. We suggest for your considera- tion a line of action somewhat as follows: That we offer to leave with the British Government as the inviting power to the conference, a memorandum indicating the type of a treaty, on the lines of the British basis of discussion, which we could accept provided it is accepted by the principal naval powers. At the same time we could signify our willingness to sign such a treaty at any time before the end of this year with, of course, the appropriate escape clauses if it has not been accepted by all the naval powers. Of course, the date and time of acceptance does not appear to us to be a LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 73 matter of urgency and we could therefore leave to the British, as the inviting power to this conference, the order and the manner in which the acceptance of the other naval powers might be obtained. The memorandum of the type Treaty should however be referred to the President before initialing. Hull 500.A15A5/681: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 25,1936—11 p.m. [Received February 25—7: 25 p.m.] 106. Craigie telephoned me tonight that the French had suggested today that the best way to deal with the difficulty and embarrassment with regard to Germany would be for the four powers here to make a treaty and for England to enter into a bilateral supplementary treaty with Germany incorporating the provisions of the four-power treaty. Craigie told the French that he was not certain whether this would be acceptable to Germany or the other powers but that they would take the matter under consideration. We see no ob j ections from our standpoint to such an arrangement and if you have any contrary views please advise at once for my guidance in case the matter is defi- nitely submitted to us. Craigie also told me that he had had a long conference today with the German Naval Attache discussing the proposed agreement in detail. His impression was that the Germans have no objections to the proposed technical provisions but that they expect a definite reply from the German Government tomorrow. He said that he had not yet broached the more delicate question of the manner in which Ger- many would be brought into the treaty itself. Craigie told me that the Italians had informed him today that not- withstanding the political difficulties which had been raised with re- gard to their signing a naval agreement now, they would be disposed to do so anyhow if they could clarify certain technical questions and get more definite assurance as to the eventual reduction of battleship unit tonnage. Craigie said the Italians were suspicious that the sugges- tion that in 3 or 4 years and after experience gained by construction consideration would be given to the possibility of a reduction of 2,000 or 3,000 tons was "eyewash." He thought, therefore, that it would be helpful for Admiral Standley and me to talk with Grandi and Ad- miral Raineri-Bisciaai to remove their apprehension and to assure them of our good faith. I will arrange such a meeting. "Italian deputy delegate. Davis 74 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 19 36, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/682 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 25, 1936—midnight. [Received February 25—7: 10 p.m.] 107. Your 44, February 25, 2 p.m. Sharing your preoccupation as to the anomalous position in which we would be placed if we were to hang on in London for any undue length of time waiting for a con- summation of our labors until European powers can adjust certain political questions, I have already indicated to the Chairman of the Conference the difficulties which this might raise for us and have en- deavored to impress upon all of them the importance of reaching conclusions without undue delay. Eden said he quite understood the situation and was opposed to further dillydallying on the naval question. As indicated in my 105, February 25, 2 p.m. and my 106, February 25, 11 p.m., the negotiations are reaching a stage where the Confer- ence must soon come to a head. Davis 500.A15A5/681: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 26,1936—8 p.m. 47. Your 106, February 25, 11 p.m. We offer no objection to the French suggestion that four powers now in conference enter into a treaty and for British to enter into bilateral treaty with Germany. You should make it clear, however, that the purpose of the American mission is to extend existing Washington and London treaties which included five original powers and that the United States takes no part in a British, French, Italian arrangement by which a bilateral treaty would be made to include Germany—this being essentially a Euro- pean problem. Hull 500.A15A5/688: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 26, 1936—10 p.m. [Received February 26—5: 50 p.m.] 108. Your 46, February 25, 8 p.m. We have had in mind recom- mending a line of action such as that suggested by you in case it is not possible to achieve something more definite and satisfactory. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 75 I have felt, however, that it would be unwise to let up in our efforts until we have exhausted every possibility of agreement because if we once give up and leave the situation becomes even more confused and uncertain as to the future. We are still negotiating on naval questions and Italy and France are not making much headway with the British in their efforts to in- ject political issues. As long as this remains true I think we shall not become too impatient. Also, there seems to be a growing feeling among the other delegations that we must soon conclude the work here. Davis 500.A15A5/687: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 26,1936—midnight. [Received February 26—8 p.m.] 109. Grandi, who came to see me this afternoon, said that he ex- pected to see Eden tomorrow or Friday and inform him of the Italian position, but that he felt he should tell me in confidence that Italy would be unable to commit itself now to a naval agreement. The difficulties are both political and technical and his instructions re- ceived last Friday are to refuse to sign now on political or technical grounds, or both, as he sees fit His desire is to refuse in the least harmful way, having in mind an ultimate agreement. He said that Mussolini had been most desirous of joining in a naval treaty, but as long as Italy was at war and sanctions are being applied against her with the threat of military measures, it was not possible to find any way to do so which would not have a harmful effect on public opinion. From a technical standpoint, the navy would like a reduction in battleship unit tonnage, but that [sic] its chief objection to the pro- posed agreement is the zone of no construction between 10,000 and 20,000 tons particularly as long as there is no assurance that Italy is going to be at peace with England. If it were not for the political hurdle he said that Mussolini could concede on the technical questions. I asked Grandi whether Italy could initial a four-power agreement without a definite commitment to sign but with the understanding that she may subsequently sign at a given date if conditions then justify it. He said that to initial a treaty would be construed in Italy as a definite commitment. He then asked if it would not be possible for England, France and the United States to make an agreement now which would be left open for subsequent Italian adherence. He ad- vanced this for transmission without authority, but he felt that if we should decide to take this course he could persuade his Government to approve. 76 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I I told him I did not know how France would feel about that since France is still making difficulties even to a four-power agreement. Insofar as concerns us, I would think the matter over, but my present impression was that it might be the best thing to do under the circum- stances particularly if Germany is also a party to such a treaty. He then told me that Eden's recent speech had been very helpful. He was hopeful it would now be possible for England and Italy to begin direct discussion looking to a settlement of the Abyssinian war to be worked out by and through the League. He said Italy was particularly anxious to maintain its traditional friendly relation- ship with England and indicated that Rome was becoming more dis- posed now to seek a settlement than heretofore. Davis 500.A15A5/689: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 27, 1936—noon. [Received February 27—9: 05 a. m.] 110. Supplementing my 109, February 26, midnight, Grandi sug- gested that we might keep the Naval Conference going a few weeks as there was a possibility that the Abyssinian question might be settled or reach a stage which would enable Italy to proceed with the con- summation of a naval agreement. I told him such a delay on political grounds would be unacceptable to us. Since it seems definite that the Italians will not now join in a naval agreement three possible alternatives remain. 1. An agreement to be signed by England, France and the United States. In this case it would be necessary to determine whether Germany shall be brought in as a party now or later and Germany be brought in through an Anglo-German treaty which would conform to the provisions of the multilateral treaty. Please give me as soon as possible your views as to this alternative. The second alternative to be considered in case France should refuse to come along now would be for Great Britain and ourselves to initial a treaty to which all the naval powers would be invited to adhere before a given time as indicated in my number 105, February 25,2 p. m. I should also like your views on this. The third alternative would be to adopt as a last resort the sugges- tion contained in your number 47 [46] February 26 [25], 8 p. m. We shall be careful in any event to avoid having any agreement we might make mixed with European political questions. In fact the British themselves seem definitely opposed to tieing the naval agreement in any way to other questions. Davis LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 77 500.A15A5/689: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)*2 Washington, February 27, 1936—6 p.m. 48. Your 110, February 27, noon. With regard to your alternatives based on the possibility that the Italians will not now join in a naval agreement, our views would be as follows: Your first alternative. We would be willing to enter into an agree- ment with England and France with the appropriate safeguard clauses. As far as the manner of German adherence is concerned, we refer you to our 47, February 26,8 p. m. Your second alternative. We prefer to follow the procedure out- lined in our 46, February 25, 8 p. m. It might be misunderstood here if we assumed the position of joint inviting power with the British for obtaining the adherences of other countries to the naval treaty, particularly in view of the political atmosphere now prevailing on the continent. Hull 500.A15A5/692: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 28,1936—2 p.m. [Received February 28—11: 42 a.m.] 112. The Italian delegation called on Admiral Standley and me this morning to elucidate the position taken by them in their meeting with the British yesterday. They explained that while the fundamental reason for their inability to commit themselves now on a naval agree- ment is political they decided after full consideration that if they refused on the ground that they could not agree to limit their naval armaments as long as sanctions are being applied against Italy with the threat of military force it might appear that Italy was trying to blackmail the sanctionist powers either to withdraw sanctions or to negotiate a settlement. Accordingly they felt it advisable to state that for technical and other difficulties they were not for the moment ready to sign a treaty. They said that while they were in favor of a reduction in battleship displacement after a certain number of battleships are built and were in favor of limiting the nonconstruction zone between 10,000 and 17,000 tons they would be able to concede these points were it not for the political difficulties. They, therefore, wished to assure us categorically that once the political situation has 'Marginal notation: "O. K. F[ranklin] D. K[oosevelt]". 78 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I so ameliorated that Italy can join in a naval agreement they will raise no objections on technical grounds. They wish to remain in the Con- ference and collaborate in the preparation of a text for a treaty with the understanding, however, that they are not expected to commit themselves at present but are aiding in the formulation of a draft which they would hope later to accept. Such reservations as they would have to make now with regard to the battleship and the zone of nonconstruction would not be done in such a manner as to make it difficult for them to accept subsequently. They expressed the hope that Great Britain, France and ourselves would thus be able to com- plete and sign a treaty now along the lines we had been negotiating leaving it open for subsequent Italian adherence and that by having continued to participate with us in the work it would be easier for Italy to adhere. They said they had not put this up to their home government yet but believed it would be acceptable. Davis 500.A15A5/696 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 28,1936—7 p.m. 50. The Italian Ambassador called at the Department this morning and stated that he had received a telegram from his Foreign Office indicating that the Italian Government was unable at this time to enter into a naval treaty. The Ambassador mentioned that the Italian Government felt that before it could accept a naval agreement certain questions in addition to technical details had to be settled, namely, the sanctions now pend- ing against Italy and the unsatisfactory reply of the British Govern- ment to the Italian representations regarding mutual assistance against Italy by Great Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece.83 Hull 500.A15A5/697 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis)''4 Washington, February 28, 1936—8 p. m. 51. We suggest for your consideration the obtaining of a gen- tleman's agreement as between Great Britain, France, Italy and our- "See British Cmd. 5072, Ethiopia No. 2 (1930) : Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy. "This Instruction embodied the substance of a memorandum of February 28, 1936, from President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 79 selves, and through England from Germany, whereby each nation would agree to notify the others of every decision to lay down naval vessels of any size over 100 tons. These four or five powers could, if such a gentleman's agreement were obtained, then jointly or sever- ally invite Japan to do the same thing. Hun. 500.A15A5/695 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 28,1936—10 p.m. [Received February 28—8 p.m.85] 113. For the President and the Secretary. Your 48, Feb. 27, 6 p.m. As I interpret your 46, Feb. 25, 8 p.m., the only substantial difference in the procedure suggested by you and the second alternative outlined in my 110, Feb. 27, noon, is with regard to inviting other powers to adhere to the draft treaty. I concur entirely in your view that the British, who have taken the initiative, should keep it and do the inviting. Eden told me today that since our last talk he had had two long conversations with the German Ambassador and that he was still encountering some difficulties with Germany due to the unfortunate publicity with regard to the questions raised by the French as to the method of Germany's being brought into the naval treaty. The Germans apparently have no objection to the technical provisions of the proposed treaty but object to run[ning] the risk of being put into a position of committing themselves to sign a treaty if and when the French navy permit. Eden thinks he may be able to obviate this difficulty through a supplementary bilateral treaty with Germany but, as he has explained to the Germans, he will do this only in case of necessity and as a preliminary step towards bringing Germany ultimately into a multilateral treaty. Eden says that the French are becoming more nearly disposed to reach agreement but have not yet given definite assurances to that effect. If this is not done before Monday, he will take the matter up direct with Flandin in Geneva. He is very hopeful that the French will come alone [along\ on a three-power agreement although they claim that Italy, in refusing to join in an agreement partly on technical grounds, makes it more difficult for France to make the necessary con- cessions to meet the British and ourselves. He thinks that if the Italians will give the same assurance to the French that they gave to us today it would be most helpful (see my 112 Feb. 28, 2 p. m.). Eden "Telegram In two sections. 80 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I expressed the opinion that while we should not let up in our efforts to get France to agree to a draft treaty which the three of us may at least initial, it would be a tragic thing in the situation that exists in the world today if we should terminate our efforts here without any concrete ac- complishments and that the United States and Great Britain should consider what agreement or measure of accord they can reach and what steps they may best take to bring about an ultimate general agreement. In case it is not possible to get France to come along, the British think this may be the only way to break the political deadlock which has been injected into the Conference and which now prevents a four- power naval agreement and may prevent France from reaching a three-power agreement despite the fact that there are no insuperable technical difficulties. Eden stated in effect that the United States and Great Britain should make every possible effort to prevent other naval powers from injecting extraneous questions and thereby to stymie both of us completely in an effort to work out a solution of the naval problem. Furthermore, that Great Britain was prepared to cooperate with the United States to the fullest extent compatible with the limita- tion of our policy. In view of the extremely critical situation now existing and particu- larly the recent developments in Japan,88 we share Eden's opinion that it is highly important that at least Great Britain and the United States as the two principal naval powers should show that they are in some measure of agreement and that it would be most unfortunate for the Conference to terminate without putting on record any definite ac- complishment. We recognize, of course, the objections to signing a bilateral naval treaty. We, nevertheless, think that something could be worked out in accord with the suggestions in your 46 and which would be acceptable to the British. In order to be sure that our views are in complete harmony with yours, I may say that what we have in mind is to complete a draft treaty, incorporating into it the technical agreements already reached and the remaining one as to battleships, doing so in collaboration with the British and such of the other delegations as are willing to co- operate. This draft would be left open by a recorded decision of the Conference or by a memorandum of such delegations as may agree for subsequent signature on a date prior to December 31, 1936, to be de- termined. The British Government, as the inviting power, would sub- mit the draft to the other powers and, on the basis of the replies re- ceived, determine the time and method of signature. We have thought of two lines of procedure. One would be for such powers as are in agreement to initial the draft treaty or, two, signify "* For correspondence concerning political developments in Japan, see vol. rv, pp. 706 ff. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 81 through a memorandum their willingness to sign the treaty at the time fixed, provided in the meantime the other principal naval powers agree to sign or to do so with the appropriate escape clauses if any of the other naval powers refuse. In case Great Britain and the United States should be the only ones now prepared to initial the draft or to signify their willingness to sign such a treaty, we must determine whether or not subsequent signature of the treaty shall be conditional upon it being signed by one or more of the naval powers. If at least three of the Washington Treaty powers sign the pro- posed treaty no difficulty will arise for us provided adequate escape clauses are included. On the other hand, there are two other contin- gencies which may possibly arise and which we feel should be con- sidered. One is that only Great Britain and ourselves may be ready to sign upon any fixed date. While the President expressed himself as willing to reach an understanding with the British as to naval policy, he was opposed to negotiating solely an Anglo-American naval treaty. He may feel, however, that the objection he had in mind would not hold if the two of us are the only ones to enter a treaty to which all of the naval powers had been previously invited to adhere and which continues to remain open to them. If, notwithstanding this, the President's objection still holds, we could agree with the British that in case no other principal power agrees to sign the proposed treaty, we may then determine through an exchange of views whether the draft may serve as a basis for a naval understanding between our two Governments either through simultaneous declaration on an exchange of notes or just what action we shall take. The other contingency is that Germany might not care to be the only other power besides Great Britain and ourselves to agree in the end to sign the proposed treaty. If you think this possibility might raise political difficulties for us it could be obviated by a provi- sion to the effect that in order that such a treaty be effective it must be signed and ratified by say at least three of the Washington Treaty powers. Davis 500.A15A5/698: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, February 29,1936—noon. [Received February 29—8 a.m.] 114. For the President and the Secretary. Supplementing our 113, February 28, 10 p.m., it is of course unlikely that all of the principal naval powers will decline to come into a treaty. 82 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I If, however, in such an unlikely event you should deem it inad- visable to sign alone with Great Britain or to commit yourself in ad- vance to do so I suggest that we do not go on record specifically to that effect at the present but that we stipulate in a memorandum that in case none of the other Washington Treaty powers or any other principal naval power as the case may be except the United States and Great Britain are prepared to sign the proposed treaty the United States and Great Britain will then exchange views and de- termine what action they shall take under the circumstances with a view of at least preventing a naval race as between themselves and of promoting an ultimate general limitation and reduction in naval armaments. My reason for this suggestion is that other naval powers will be more likely to sign if they are kept guessing as to what the United States and Great Britain will do in the event that all or some of them do not adhere and they will have less incentive to try to bargain or dictate conditions upon which this [theyf] will come along. Davis 500.A15A5/702 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, February 29,1936—4 p.m. 54. Your 113, February 28, 10 p.m., and 114, February 29, noon. We agree with your view that it would be appropriate to complete a draft treaty to be left open either by a recorded decision of the Conference or by a memorandum given by each delegation to agree to sign the treaty later. The time for signing might be postponed to a date which would give the British Government, as the inviting power, time to submit the draft to the other powers and to determine the method of signature and the limit of time for signing or adhering. Whether we initial the draft, or signify by a memorandum our willingness to sign later, seems to us immaterial provided our agree- ment to enter into the treaty is subject to the final adherence of the other principal naval powers, and provided the treaty has appropriate escape clauses in case all the principal naval powers do not come in. I do not see any difficulty in our signifying our willingness now to enter into the treaty at a later time even if Great Britain and our- selves are the only ones who might be prepared at this time to signify such acceptance. In this case, I think it would be preferable for us not to initial the treaty with Great Britain, but to signify our willing- ness by depositing a memorandum to that effect with the British Government. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 83 I consider it advisable to defer at this time any decision as to the action we might take in the event the British and ourselves are the only ones who are ready to sign the treaty at the end of the limit of time for which it would be left open for signature. We could, it seems to me, assure the British, but not formally, that we would be glad to confer at the end of the time limit as to the procedure to be adopted in the event that our two countries are the only ones ready to enter into a treaty. As far as Germany is concerned, an American-Anglo-German Treaty seems inadvisable. I suggest the British be informed that in view of the essentially European aspects of the German Navy and the fact that the German Navy even under the proposed Treaty would not exceed more than approximately a third of the total British naval force, the United States would greatly prefer a bilateral British- German arrangement if based essentially on their ratios as at present agreed on. A way of avoiding a three-power treaty including only ourselves, Great Britain and Germany, would be to adopt the pro- vision you suggest to the effect that in order that the new treaty be effective it must be signed and ratified by at least three of the Wash- ington treaty powers. Hull 500.A15A5/703 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 3,1936—8 p.m. [Received March 3—3: 03 p.m.] 119. Your 29, January 29, 7 p.m. One of the conditions on which we can agree to reduce the gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches is "that during this year no signatory would lay down any ships with over 14-inch guns." The United States, British Empire and Japan are prohibited by tho London Treaty from laying down any capital ships this year. France and Italy have never ratified any part of the London Treaty and therefore retain their right under the Washington Treaty to lay down this year capital ships mounting guns not in excess of 16 inches. Italy does not contemplate laying down any capital ship this year. France intends to lay down shortly a 15-inch gun ship which will give her two such ships to balance the two 15-inch gun ships now building by Italy. It is understood the design of this ship is completed and to change the gun caliber to 14 inches will delay the ship for a con- siderable time and it is extremely unlikely that France will consent to the restriction "that during this year, et cetera." 84 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Summarizing, the United States is protected under the London Treaty against the laying down of any capital ship during this year by Japan or Great Britain. The question of the laying down this year of a capital ship carrying guns in excess of 14 inches by France, Italy, Germany or Soviet Russia is mainly a European question. In view of the above Admiral Standley and I recommend that we do not insist upon the condition mentioned in [paragraph] one of this despatch. Please advise immediately if you do not agree. Daves 500.A15A5/704 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 4,1936—1 a.m. [Received March 3—9: 40 p.m.87] 120. After several days discussion within the French Government, in which the final outcome hung in the balance, the French delegation today received instructions to abandon its insistence on reducing the unit tonnage of capital ships and to accept a continuance of the Wash- ington Treaty standard of 35,000 tons, subject to the following two conditions: (a) That in 1940 the high contracting parties would exchange views through diplomatic channels to determine whether in the light of cir- cumstances then prevailing and on the experience gained in the inter- val in the construction of capital ships, it is possible to agree to any reduction in the tonnage or gun calibre of capital ships to be laid down after January 1, 1941; (b) that the gun calibre of capital ships be provisionally fixed at 14 inches but might return to 16 inches if by January 1,1937, all of the Washington Treaty powers have not under- taken to respect these limits as to tonnage and gun calibre of capital ships. The first condition is in line with what you have authorized us to agree to (your 41, February 20, 4 p.m.) and we therefore pro- pose to accept it subject to agreement as to actual wording. The sec- ond condition, as now worded, is in conflict with the position taken by the Department in its 29, Jan. 29, 7 p.m. and is open to the serious objection that it would require a positive act on the part of an individ- ual high contracting party to return to the 16-inch gun in the event that Japan should not adhere. We have endeavored to persuade the French to accept our formula for a 16-inch gun to be reduced to 14 inches if accepted by the five "Telegram In three sections. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 85 Washington powers. After telephoning Paris this afternoon they have been instructed to refuse this and to insist upon the 14-inch limitation but are authorized, in order to meet our views, to insert a provision to the effect that the 14-inch gun is regulation upon accept- ance prior to January 1, 1937, by the Washington powers. The French declare that a formula along these lines suggested by them would have a much more favorable reaction in France and, since they have met us in every other respect, insist that we should meet them to this extent. While we cannot, of course, accept the wording of the French formula as presented to us and which is quoted in section two of this cable, we believe that it is capable of a rewording acceptable to them and which would meet our preoccupations by automatically establishing a 16-inch gun in the event of Japanese nonadherence prior to January 1, 1937. In section three, we are cabling you a possible compromise draft which we think the French might be prepared to accept and on which we should like to have your instructions without delay. The French formula for the limits of capital ships follows: "1. None of the high contracting parties will lay down or acquire a capital ship of standard displacement above 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) or carrying a gun with a calibre in excess of 14 inches (356 mili- meters). 2. If prior to January 1, 1937, all powers signatory to the Wash- ington Naval Treaty of 1922 have not undertaken to respect the limits fixed in paragraph 1 above for the characteristics of capital ships or if prior to December 31, 1936, any power lays down a capital ship carrying a gun of a calibre in excess of 14 inches (356 milimeters), the high contracting parties will be authorized to return to the maxi- mum characteristics fixed by the above-mentioned Washington Treaty. These provisions are without prejudice to the rights that France and Italy have under the treaty for the limitations of armaments signed at Washington on February 6,1922." We are submitting to you the following compromise formula which should be read in connection with article 1, annex 1 of the draft incor- porated in our 104, February 22, 1 p.m.,88 and if you approve, we will endeavor to get the French to accept: (A) No capital ship shall exceed 35,000 tons (35,560 metric tons) standard displacement. (B) No capital ship shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 14 inches (356 milimeters) provided, however, that, if any of the Wash- ington Treaty powers should fail to undertake to conform to this provision prior to January 1, 1937, the maximum calibre for guns carried by capital ships shall be 16 inches (406 milimeters). Davis •Not printed. 885223—84—VOl. I 11 86 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/705 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) w Washington, March 5, 1936—5 p.m. 58. Your 119, March 3, 8 p.m. We agree with you that it would not seem appropriate for us to insist upon the condition in agreeing to the reduction of gun caliber of capital ships to 14 inches "that during this year no signatory would lay down any ship with over 14-inch guns." Your 120, March 4, 1 a.m., and 122 March 5,1 p.m.70 Your draft formula, as contained in Section 3 of the above telegram is acceptable to us provided that in the language of (B) the word "undertake" is changed to "enter into an agreement." With regard to the arrangements for an exchange of views through diplomatic channels in order to determine whether it might be possi- ble to accomplish a reduction in the unit tonnage limitation of capital ships, we could not be sure that we would be ready to discuss a reduc- tion in the tonnage or gun caliber of capital ships to be laid down from January 1, 1941. It might be that a delay in our ship construction program or delays in shipbuilding might prevent our having com- pleted and tried out a new capital ship in time to enter into discussions for an agreement which would take effect January 1,1941. We would suggest that the discussions might better take place during 1941 with a view to having any arrangement arrived at take effect as from January 1, 1942. Hull 500.A15A5/710a : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 9, 1936—2 p.m. 64. As a result of the entirely new turn of events brought about by the German action in the Rhineland,71 there will no doubt be many exaggerated reports and rumors which, though they may have no foundation in fact, will undoubtedly be disturbing in their effects. In the course of these developments there is, of course, a possibility that there may be rumors or news stories tending to connect up this country with some of the developments. In any event we are unquestionably entering into a period of increasing tenseness in European affairs. What do you think of informally discussing with the Chairman of the "Marginal notation: "All matters in this telegram discussed with and approved by the Acting Secretary of the Navy (Admiral Andrews), Admiral Taussig and Admiral Greenslade. J[ames] C[lement] D[unn] March 5, 1936." 10 Latter not printed. "i. e., the military reoccupation of the Rhineland on March 7; see pp. 180 ff. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 87 Conference the possibility of expediting the discussion of any of the technical questions now pending in order that the delegation may have arrived at a substantial clarification of the important parts of the proposed treaty, so that as soon as possible the delegation might be in a position to plan to return on the assumption that the majority of the technical questions before the conference will be clarified probably in time for the delegation to sail before the end of this month? I would be glad to have your comment on this suggestion in the light of the new situation which has arisen in Europe. Hull 500.A15A5/710: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 9,1936—11 p.m. [Received March 9—8: 45 p.m.] 129. Under present prospects, it will probably take approximately 10 days more to complete the naval treaty and we will, therefore, not be able to get a signed text into your hands before the end of the month. This raises the question as to whether it will be possible to obtain ratification of the treaty during the present session of Congress. We consider it of the greatest importance that the treaty be rati- fied so that it come into effect on January 1, 1937. As you are aware certain important provisions of the treaty as now drafted depend upon its coining into force not later than the end of this year. The Washington and London Treaties, moreover, will come to an end on December 31, and it would be most unfortunate if there were to be an interval of perhaps several months in which no naval treaty whatsoever would be in effect. At any rate, I believe it would have a very undesirable effect if the coming into force of the treaty were to be held up through a delay in ratification on the part of the United States. In particular, it would tend to discourage the adherence of Japan which is unlikely to sign the treaty before it has been ratified by us. In this connec- tion, it should be borne in mind that the agreement as to 14-inch guns on capital ships is conditional on Japan's entering into a similar undertaking prior to January 1. I do not know when Congress is expected to adjourn or whether you consider it possible to obtain ratification during the present ses- sion but I suggest that the President may, in the circumstances, wish to examine the possibility of asking the Congress not to adjourn until the Senate has taken final action on the treaty, or alternatively, the amendment calling a special session of Congress as in the case of the 1930 treaty. 88 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I I should appreciate receiving an early estimate of the prospects, since if it is regarded as unlikely that ratification can be obtained before the end of the year, we shall have to explore ways and means of meeting this difficulty as far as possible. This situation has been envisaged and the reports, both of the Qualitative Limitation Subcommittee and its Categories Subcommit- tee, point out that "the draft text has been drawn up to meet the situation should the treaty come into force on January 1,1937. Should the treaty come into force on any other date alterations will be necessary to the text now proposed to meet the situation then arising and some transitional arrangements will be necessary to bring into force for the year 1937 provisions for advance notifications and ex- change of information." I cannot too strongly urge the desirability of our ratifying the treaty before the end of the year. Davis 500.A15A5/714: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 10,1936—9 p.m. [Received March 10—5: 30 p.m.] 132. Your 64, March 9, 2 p.m. I entirely agree with you that in view of the tenseness and uncertainty which will result from the Ger- man action in the Rhineland, it is most important to expedite a con- clusion of the work of the Naval Conference and we are accordingly pressing matters as rapidly as possible. We have in fact now disposed of all the technical questions and, with the exception of the escape clauses upon which we hope to reach agreement in the next few days, we are all ready to draw up a final treaty. I had thought that the German action might make France and England more hesitant about finally committing themselves on a naval treaty. The French, however, expressed themselves as eager to expedite and complete the naval agreement. Although Craigie told me today he thought we could be ready to sign within 10 days, I sus- pect that the British are feeling some qualms about the advisability just at this moment of signing a supplementary bilateral treaty with Germany. Craigie also told me the Germans had insisted that Eng- land should also get Russia bound by a bilateral treaty and that the Russians had offered no objection. He had received no definite reply and was fearful that there would be some delay on this because the Russians act very slowly. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 89 At any rate, I see no reason why we cannot get the draft of a treaty agreed upon in another 10 days or so, and if France or England for any reason is not then prepared actually to sign the treaty, I do not think we should wait any longer. We now see no reason why we should not sail on March 26 and are planning to do so. Davis 500.A15A5/710: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 11,1936—7 p.m. 68. Your 129, March 9,11 p.m. I have discussed with the President the question of the ratification of the new treaty. As the session is now so far advanced, we had not thought that the question of ratification would arise because we have been under the impression that, owing to the difficulty of the nations other than Great Britain and ourselves to sign the treaty at this time, it would probably be only initialed now with a time fixed for signing later in the year. The situation here is becoming more complicated day by day, due to the innumerable cross currents arising in Congress as the legislative program progresses, and the uncertainties of ratification may make it entirely inadvisable pure- ly in the interest of obtaining our agreement to the contemplated naval accord to present the treaty for consideration and ratification at this session. For it to be presented and fail of ratification at this late stage of the session would be worse than the other course proposed. In the light of this situation you should therefore arrange to initial the draft treaty at this time and appoint some time later in the year for affixing our signature. This whole matter has been given careful consideration and we have come to the conclusion that a postponement of signature is advisable in order not to commit ourselves to presentation to the Senate at this session and thus possibly jeopardize the acceptance of the new treaty. Hull 500.A15A5/718: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 13,1936—6 p.m. [Received March 13—3: 43 p.m.] 137. For the President and Secretary. Your 68, March 11, 7 p.m We appreciate that in the present international situation as well as the legislative situation at home it may be undesirable to sign a treaty that would have to be presented now for ratification. 90 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I The idea of initialing a treaty to be signed at a later date to be fixed originated in an effort to overcome certain political difficulties the details and sequence of which have all been reported in our previous despatches. We have stated our willingness to go along with this or any other plan which would result in a satisfactory accord but have in every case persistently insisted upon some positive action which would result in something definite, always visualizing a treaty which would come into effect on January 1, 1937, thus leaving no interim between the termination of the Washington and London Treaties and the new treaty. It was realized that if there were much delay in signing the treaty there would be less probability that it would be signed and ratified before the end of this year. In compliance with our instructions we have pressed for a treaty to be signed by Great Britain, France and ourselves which would be left open for the signature of the other two Washington powers. We have also taken the position that it is immaterial to us whether Great Britain signs a supplementary bilateral naval treaty with Ger- many except insofar as it may affect the attitude of Great Britain and France in entering into a satisfactory naval agreement with us. If at this late date we should have to take the initiative in proposing a delay in the signing of such a treaty the reasons for our sudden reversal of attitude would be somewhat difficult to explain. However, it is very possible that on account of recent develop- ments Great Britain and perhaps France may decide that it is inad- visable to sign a treaty now. At present there is a difference of opinion among the British with regard to this. One point of view is that it would be inadvisable for the British Government to sign a new naval treaty in the present disturbed situation. The other point of view is that if advantage is not taken of this opportunity to complete a general naval agreement the chances are that there will be no treaty at all. It is nevertheless impossible in the present tense situation to forecast developments and we must be prepared for the contingency that we may have to propose a delay and if so we should like the reasons on which you think it best to base such a proposal. The fundamental question is not whether we shall sign or whether we shall initial a treaty now but whether the treaty whether signed or initialed now is to be presented to the Senate for ratification before the end of this year. The drafting committee is now drawing up the treaty on the as- sumption that it will come into effect on January 1, 1937. If it is not our intention to have it ratified by that date the treaty must be LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 91 considerably redrafted. For example the reduction to 14-inch guns is contingent on Japan's entering into an agreement before [January] 1,1937, to such reduction. Numerous other alterations would have to be made including provision for the interval between the expiration of present treaties and the coming into force of the new treaty and there is danger that in redrafting the balance between the various provisions may be upset. Whether we sign or whether we initial the other powers who sub- scribe to this [draft] will do so in the belief that every effort will be made to put it into effect by January 1, 1937, and if we make no attempt to obtain ratification by that date we will be open to a charge of bad faith. The initialing of a treaty by Great Britain and France would as we understand constitute for them an engagement which would be practically equivalent to our signing a treaty. If it is not possible to submit a treaty at the present session we wonder whether it might not be possible to do so at a special session called in November. While we cannot, of course, judge from here we have thought that the new treaty would not encounter in the Senate so much opposition as did the London Treaty because the Naval General Board is in accord with the present treaty whereas it was opposed to the London Treaty. Admiral Standley is of the opinion that there will be no serious opposition from any naval source. We must have definite information as to whether it is proposed to obtain ratification before the end of this year as the drafting committee is working on the assumption that the treaty will come into effect on January 1,1937. Davis B00.A15A5/719 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 14, 1936—1 a.m. [Received March 13—10: 10 p.m.] 138. Personal for the President and the Secretary. Supplementing my 137, March 13, 6 p.m. There is a division of opinion among the British as to the advisability of signing a treaty now. It is generally believed that a three-power naval treaty must be paralleled by a supple- mentary bilateral treaty with Germany. One group, however, wishes 92 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I to delay signature of the three-power treaty because they feel that to sign a new treaty with Germany now in the face of Germany's denun- ciation of the Locarno Pact and before the crisis created thereby has passed would be politically impossible or at least dangerous. The other group holds that the treaty should be signed now but that signature of the bilateral treaty to which Germany has consented should be postponed until a more propitious time. This latter group also con- tends that if we do not sign a three-power treaty now there is little chance of its being ratified before the end of this year which they feel is most important and that if it is not possible before the end of the year to sign a treaty with Germany it will mean that the situation will have so deteriorated that no treaty of any sort has any prospect of coming into force. While the outcome is uncertain it is more probable that the opinion of the first group will prevail. If England and France should decide that it is advisable to initial a draft treaty now to be signed at a later fixed date there will be no difficulty or embarrassment. On the other hand if they should advo- cate signing now and we should propose that the treaty be initialed and signature postponed it seems to me that it would be difficult to explain at home and here why we were willing to initial a treaty which we were not willing to sign. It might in such event cause less trouble if we were to sign and then, if you do not think it advisable, to present it now, to withhold it on the ground that you wish to study it further and to await the clarification of the international situation before determining whether or not to present the treaty to the Senate for ratification. If Congress is to adjourn by May 1, it would seem to me that in view of the shortness of the time which they would have in which to pass on it you would be justified in withholding it. Davis 500.A15A5/719: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 14, 1936—3 p.m. 72. Your 137, March 13, 6 p.m., and 138, March 14, 1 a.m. In view of the lateness of the session of Congress, the President con- siders it extremely inadvisable to commit himself to the presentation of the treaty for ratification at this session. It may be that either the French or the British, or both, will be reluctant to sign a treaty at this time, in which case the resort to the memorandum method of leaving on record the type of treaty we would be willing to accept LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 93 would serve our purpose and obviate the question of ratification at this session arising. Such a contingency would of course require that the date on which the treaty would become effective be changed from January 1, 1937, until either the 1st of April or the 1st of May, 1937, (thus leaving a gap between the expiration of the old treaties and the beginning of the new) or, if the constitutional requirements of any of the signatory or adhering powers make necessary a ratifi- cation by a legislative body, 8 weeks after the treaty has been presented in such legislative body with a view to ratification, such date in no case to be later than April 1st or May 1st, 1937. The same condition should also apply to such agreements as that on 14-inch guns or similar provisos. This gap could very well be taken care of by a declaration of intention on the part of each of the conference powers and others who might signify their adherence to the treaty to inform the other parties or adherents of any or all construction which might be undertaken in the interval between the treaties. We do not be- lieve that if the treaties are acceptable to the signatory powers or adherents there would be any building by them during the interval between the treaties which would not come within the restrictions provided for in the new treaty. If you find no reluctance or hesitancy on the part of the remaining conference powers to sign or initial a treaty at this time, you should explain that in order not to jeopardize the ratification of this Gov- ernment's signature to the treaty it would be distinctly preferable so to arrange the time of signing that it will not be necessary for the President to submit the treaty for ratification at this advanced stage of the session when the Executive legislative program has been completed. Your 138 seems to indicate that the British and French might themselves consider it advisable to avoid signing now, in which case there would appear to be no difficulty in arranging for signature at a later date in view of the existing European situation. I would suggest that at a convenient time you canvass the situation in order that the positions may be clarified with regard to signing or initialing the treaty. It is also possible that you would find there would be no objection on the part of the French and the British to our initialing or signing the treaty on the understanding that as this Government may not consider it advisable to add the treaty to its legislative pro- gram at this stage, the President would not be under any obligation to do so if he thought it best to withhold it. Phillips 94 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/722 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 16, 1936—8 p.m. [Received March 16—4: 15 p.m.] 141. Craigie has just told me he was authorized to inform me in the strictest confidence at a meeting of the British Cabinet this morn- ing it was decided to sign when necessary the supplemental naval treaty with Germany. He also told me they see no reason now why Great Britain, France, and the United States should not proceed to sign the proposed treaty which we should have ready by the end of this week or the early part of next week. He said there might be some necessary delay in signing the treaty with Germany, since Germany has so far insisted that Russia be bound to the limitations of the general treaty through an Anglo- Russian treaty and that Russia has not yet given a definite reply but that if for this or any other reason they were unable to sign with Germany now, he thought we should sign the three-power treaty anyhow and provide therein for an escape in case the supplemental treaty with Germany is not signed during this year and before ratification. I explained to Craigie that while we are prepared to sign or initial a treaty now, it must be with the understanding that we cannot give any promise or hold out any hope that it will be ratified this year; because of the advanced stage of the present legislative program and the short remaining time before the adjournment of Congress, the President would not feel justified to commit himself in any way to submit the treaty for ratification during the present session or to get it ratified before the end of this year. Craigie said they had realized that the longer the delay in getting the treaty signed the less probable would it be that it could be ratified by us now and he regretted there had been so much delay. Although they quite understood that on account of the difficulties indicated our ratification this year could not be counted upon, they thought it would be most advisable if we could possibly get it ratified before January which must be done because of the effect it would have upon Japan. He, nevertheless, accepted our position gracefully and we then dis- cussed what modifications or additions in the treaty would be required to cover the gap from January 1 to April 1, 1937, in case of a delay in ratification. Craigie also told me in confidence that the Irish Free State had just decided not to sign the naval treaty, not because of any objections to the treaty itself but because Ireland is an independent state which at LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 95 present has no navy whatever and that the Union of South Africa might for the same reason refrain from signing. Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have, nevertheless, approved and will sign. Davis 500.A15A5/729 : Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 19,1936—4 p.m. [Received March 19—11: 45 a.m.] 146. For the President and Secretary. In view of the fact that the new naval treaty does not provide for quantitative limitation and hence does not establish parity as between the British Empire and the United States, we all believe it would be wise to guard against any possible embarrassment or misunderstanding with regard to this in the future and furthermore that it would have a good effect to reiterate a principle which has now become embodied in the conscious- ness of the peoples of the two nations. I have told the British that personally I was inclined to think it might be wise to reiterate our adherence to this principle and that if they thought it advisable I would be glad to ascertain the views of our Government. The British have now informed me that they are quite sympathetic with the idea and suggest that instead of making a public declaration which at this time might possibly have an adverse effect on the Japanese the best way to deal with it would be for the two to have a final meeting together of which minutes would be kept and which could be used at any time that might be necessary. It has occurred to me that when the treaty comes up for ratifica- tion that this question might possibly be raised in the Senate and that it would be well to be prepared for it in which case the minutes of the proposed meeting could be used if necessary. My idea is to make of record a declaration to be agreed upon beforehand, some- thing along the following lines: Notwithstanding the fact that some of the principal naval powers have not as yet agreed to become parties to the new naval treaty which has been executed now to replace the Washington and London Treaties which expire on December 31,1936, and which treaty does not provide for a continuance of quantitative limitation as provided in the two former treaties, it is the intention of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America to avoid at least as between ourselves any competition in naval construction. Parity as between the fleets of the British Empire and the United States of America has become an established principle acceptable to both Governments and peoples thereof. Furthermore the conditions and the circumstances which determine their respective naval requirements are such that the prin- 96 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I ciple of parity should continue to be the governing factor in the naval policies of the Governments of Great Britain and the United States of America and it is believed that adherence to this principle will con- tribute to the furtherance of friendly relations between the two Governments and to world peace. Please inform me as soon as possible if you approve of doing something along the lines indicated. Davis 500.A15A5/728: Telegram The Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) to the Secretary of State London, March 19, 1936—5 p.m. [Received March 19—12: 20 p.m.] 147. Your special attention is called to the safeguarding clauses found in articles 24 and 25 of the draft treaty and in particular the provision for consultation and 3 months' delay before a departure from the provisions of the treaty may be made and if possible for agreement as to extent of such departure. This provision was in- serted with a view to making it less easy to depart from the treaty hastily and without justification. However, a failure to reach agree- ment does not prevent departure from the treaty. The provisions concerning agreement, therefore, do not stipulate that such agree- ment must be "duly made in accordance with the constitutional method of the respective powers" as does article 22 of the Treaty of Wash- ington of 1922. The two cases, however, are not similar. Article 22 of the Washington Treaty provides for the amending of a treaty which obviously would require senatorial approval whereas in the present treaty it is a question which involves a departure in the carry- ing out of certain executory provisions of a treaty as to which agree- ment is desirable but not necessary. It seems to us sufficient therefore to leave open for determination when the question arises whether our acquiescence in the extent to which another party to the treaty has announced its intention to depart would require the advice and consent of the Senate or could be made by Executive action alone. Davis 500.A15A5/760 Memorandum by President Roosevelt to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips) Washington, March 21, 1936. In the Naval Treaty I hope one point is perfectly clear: If, for example, the Treaty should be ratified by July 1, 1937, and if during the intervening period Great Britain or another power LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 97 should actually lay down a number of light cruisers, and if during the same period our Congress did not authorize or appropriate for a similar number of cruisers—in such an event, would we later on— say in 1938—have the right to authorize or appropriate for the num- ber of cruisers we had fallen behind during this coming interim period? In other words, the United States should have the right at any future date to make up for deficiencies occurring during the interim period. F[ranklin] D. R[oosevelt] 500.A15A5/729: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 23, 1936—noon. 80. For the Delegates. Your 146, March 19, 4 p.m. Confirming telephone conversation of March 20 for your record, it was the Presi- dent's thought to have you both write a letter to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs between now and your departure from London thanking him for the courtesies extended to the Delegation by the British Government and expressing the pleasure and satisfaction you have had in your association with the British Delegation during the conference. You could incidentally mention the fact that although the new treaty does not provide quantitative limitations such as pro- vided in the former naval treaties, it is the intention of this Govern- ment to avoid, at least as between the British and ourselves, any competition in naval construction; that parity as between the fleets of the British Empire and the United States has become a well-recognized and established principle acceptable to both Governments and that the conditions and circumstances which determine their respective naval requirements are such that the naval policies of the two Governments should continue to be based on the principle of parity and that it is believed that adherence to this principle will contribute to the fur- therance of friendly relations between the two Governments and to world peace. The Secretary for Foreign Affairs could reply to your letter em- bodying expressions similar to those regarding competition in naval construction and parity. In this manner the exchange of communi- cations would be contained in private correspondence which there would be no call to make public and the reference to these subjects would be incidental in your letter of appreciation to the British Secretary and his reply. Hull 98 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/746b : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 23,1936—4 p.m. 83. I wish to express on behalf of the President and myself our sin- cere appreciation of the splendid work which you, and Admiral Stand- ley and the entire staff of the delegation, have done in carrying out the aims of this Government in the conclusion of the naval treaty you are signing on Wednesday.72 We realize the great difficulties with which you have been faced and commend you all most highly for your patience and efficiency in overcoming them. Hull 500.A15A5/729 : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Chairman of the American Delegation (Davis) Washington, March 23, 1936—6 p. m. 84. With reference to the proposed exchange of letters, after fur- ther consideration here it is suggested that the substance of the ex- change might be contained in a conversation between you and Admiral Standley and the Chief of the British Delegation, of which both dele- gations would afterward make a memorandum record. In this way there would be no documents to be withheld from publication and, therefore, no embarrassment in connection with the subject matter. For your own information, there have already been intimations in the American press that there was some sort of secret understanding between the British and American delegations as to the cooperation of our two navies, a report which has already been denied by the Department. Hull D00.A15A5/747 The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of the Navy (Swanson) Washington, March 28,1936. My Dear Mr. Secretary: On March 25,1936, at London, the Hon- orable Norman H. Davis, Head of the American Delegation, and the Right Honorable Anthony Eden, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, exchanged communications regarding the maintenance of parity between the navies of the United States and the British Commonwealth. 12 See bracketed note, p. 100. LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE 99 In order that the records between our two Departments may be kept clear, I am transmitting to you the following texts of the American communication and the British reply thereto, as transmitted to the Department of State on March 24, 1936, by Mr. Norman Davis over the telephone: "My Dear Foreign Secretary: On the eve of completion of the work of the naval conference and our departure from London I desire to express in behalf of the entire American Delegation our appreciation of the many courtesies ex- tended to us during our stay here. "I also want to record our appreciation of the patience and the un- tiring efforts of the United Kingdom Delegation and their contribu- tion to the success of the conference in reaching the various agreements which have been incorporated in the treaty we are about to sign. "There is one thing further I should like to mention. "In view of the fact that the new treaty does not provide for con- tinuance of quantitative limitation as established by the Washington and London treaties, which expire at the end of this year, Admiral Standley and I had, as you will recall, some discussion with the United Kingdom Delegation during the course of the conference with regard to maintaining the principle of naval parity as between the fleets of the members of the British Commonwealth and the United States which was fixed by those treaties and which now have become a well established principle acceptable to the peoples as well as the governments of our respective countries. "As a result of the conversations on this subject it is our understand- ing that we are in agreement that there shall be no competitive naval building as between ourselves and that the principle of parity as be- tween the fleets of members of the British Commonwealth and the United States shall continue unchanged." "Honorable Norman Davis, Chairman American Delegation: "The First Lord and I very much appreciate the kind references which you make in your letter of March 23 to the efforts of the United Kingdom Delegation to bring about naval agreement. "I can assure you that the friendly relations which prevail be- tween the United States and the United Kingdom Delegations have been a source of pleasure to all of us and we are greatly indebted to yourself, Admiral Standley and the other members of your Delega- tion for the wholehearted co-operation throughout the difficult period of negotiation which now lies behind us. "I am glad to be able to confirm the correctness of your understand- ing with regard to the maintenance of the principle of parity. We are in full agreement that there must be no competitive building between our two countries and that neither country should question the right of the other to maintain parity in any category of ship. "I can, indeed, go further than this and say that in estimating our naval requirements we have never taken the strength of the United States Navy into account." Sincerely yours, William Phillips 100 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/76O The Under Secretary of State (Phillips) to President Roosevelt Washington, March 30,1936. Mt Dear Mk. President: In your memorandum of March 21,1936, you raise the question as to whether, if prior to ratification of the Naval Treaty, another Power should engage in a large amount of building, the United States would have the right to make up for any deficiencies at a future date. An examination of the terms of the Treaty shows that the interests of the United States in this respect are fully protected. Inasmuch as the Treaty contains no quantitative limitation whatsoever—aside from the holiday in the construction of cruisers exceeding 8,000 tons—, the United States will be free, even after the Treaty has gone into effect, to build any amount of vessels it desires in any category other than cruisers exceeding 8,000 tons. As regards the cruiser holiday, you will recall that we agreed to this provision on the understanding— made explicit in a statement before the Conference by Mr. Davis— that we would be free to invoke the "escape clause" in the Article relating to the cruiser holiday in the event that Great Britain should engage in an amount of cruiser construction in excess of that fore- shadowed in the recent White Paper on British defense policy. Since it is a physical impossibility for Great Britain to exceed her announced program within the period allotted for ratification of the Treaty, no difficulty will arise under this head. In any case, paragraph (1) of the Protocol of Signature—which I quote below—serves as a pro- tection against any excessive building in the period before the Treaty goes into effect: "If, before the coming into force of the above-mentioned treaty, the naval construction of any Power or any change of circumstances should appear likely to render undesirable the coming into force of the treaty in its present form, the Governments of the countries on behalf of which the treaty has been signed shall consult as to whether it is desirable to modify any of its terms to meet the situation thus presented." Faithfully yours, William Phillips [The Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament was signed at London, March 25, 1936; for text, see Department of State, Treaty Series No. 919; 50 Stat. 1363; or Report of the Delegates of the United States . . ., page 27. The signatory states which ratified the treaty, together with the date of deposit at London of the instruments of ratification were as OCCUPATION OF MANCHURIA 101 tion of the happenings affecting the fundamental spirit and the appli- cation of the Kellogg Pact: I did not intend to make use of the occa- sion to attack Japan. Consequently I was particularly careful about using the word 'aggressor which I am told has been so severely criti- cised in Tokyo. I especially preceded it with the indefinite article in order that I might express myself in the abstract.” JOHNSON 793.94Commission/325: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in China (Johnson) [Paraphrase] WASHINGTON, August 17, 1932–6 p. m. 264. Legation's 953, August 15, 9 a. m. With reference to the docu- ment handed to the members of the League Commission by the Japanese Assessor, the statements attributed to the Secretary differ in varying degree from the Department's record of the statements made on August 10 to the Japanese Ambassador by the Secretary, with the consequence that the distorted version which was supplied to the Com- mission gives the impression that the attitude of the Secretary is more lenient toward Japanese operations in Manchuria and more strictly an expression of the Secretary's personal opinion than is actually the fact. In summing up his views on the Manchurian situation, the Secretary of State mentioned to the Ambassador his sympathy with Japanese rights in Manchuria, with which he asserted he had no desire to inter- vene. Further, the Secretary said he knew that there was no desire on the part of the United States to intrude or become a political rival of Japan in Manchuria. Whatever his own views might be, he said he had no intention of saying anything in his speech of August 8 for the purpose of annoying Japan; that on the contrary his preparation of the speech had been very painstaking in order to make certain that nothing was said in the speech which might justly cause irritation. However, the Secretary very seriously pointed out to the Ambassador his real position: namely, that the speech of August 8 was a statement of his views and those which in his opinion were the views of the people of the United States toward the Kellogg-Briand Pact; that he and the people of this country felt that this pact was of the utmost importance to the United States and to the civilized world and that in the event it came to a question between permitting the destruction of that peace treaty on the one hand and annoying Japan on the other, he would unhesitatingly, even though it caused regrettable annoyance to Japan, take his stand for the preservation of the treaty. The Secre- tary also called the Ambassador's attention to the fact that in the press he had noticed that Japanese discussion had been aroused by an alleged statement which he had not made and he pointed out the fact that instead of the words “the aggressor” he had used the words "an aggressor." 469186—43—vol. 1- 13 EFFORTS TO RELATE OTHER POWERS TO THE LONDON NAVAL TREATY OF MARCH 25, 1936, BY ACCESSION OR BY SEPARATE BILATERAL TREATIES 500.A1BA3/1782 : Telegram The Charge in the United Kingdom, (Atherton) to the Secretary of State [Extract] London, May 28, 1936—6 p.m. [Received May 28—2 p.m.] 287. Bilateral conversations1 with the Poles took place yesterday and will be continued next week. Poles so far are only seeking for ex- planation of present situation. Bilateral conversations with the Soviet will continue next week. So far Soviets are adamant that there must be two reservations in any bilateral agreement made with England: (1) that any European agreement must be dependent on Germany completing its bilateral agreement and (2) that the question of the Soviets' fleet in the Far East must be reserved until sueh time as Japan likewise negotiates a similar treaty. Soviets frankly stated they were most anxious to conclude with the Japanese at the same time with the naval agreement a political treaty including a pact of nonaggression with military and air provisions. Diplomatic conversations indicate Scandinavian countries more prepared to enter into a general naval agreement than bilateral one. Atherton 500.A15A5/798: Telegram The Charge in the United Kingdom (Atherton) to the Secretary of State London, July 2, 1936—2 p.m. [Received July 2—12: 50 p.m.] 333. I deposited today the President's instrument of ratifications of the Naval Treaty of March 25, 1936.2 Certified copy of protocol of "On the part of the British Government. 'For correspondence concerning negotiations leading to the signature of the London Naval Treaty on March 25, see pp. 22 ff. 102 LONDON NAVAL TREATY 103 deposit will be forwarded by mail as soon as received from, tbe Foreign Office. As regards the Russian naval negotiations Craigie3 stated Soviets were [at?] present [ready?] to accept the London Naval Treaty under certain reservations, that is: 1. They would abide by the treaty as long as Japan also restricted herself within those limits. Even should Japan not conform Rus- sia would be prepared to continue the exchange of information, et cetera as regards that portion of her fleet intended for European waters, but would not be bound by restrictions for vessels intended for Asiatic waters. 2. The Soviets' first demand was for 16-inch [gun] battleships but Craigie feels negotiations have practically reached a point where they will be satisfied with the construction of two 15-inch gun battleships. 3. The Russians point out the difficulty, since all Soviet vessels are state-owned, of supplying lists of auxiliary vessels laid down under the treaty. Foreign Office inclined to waive this for the present with the understanding that should all other interested nations adhere and desire this information from Russia, Soviets would agree. 4. Russia desires to build 8,000-ton cruisers with 7.1-inch guns (from Soviet sources I learn they desire to lay down nine new ships of this type, four for Far Eastern waters and five for European). British have pointed out however that any such extended construction will enlarge the German demands for five cruisers (see my confidential letter to Dunn of June 5th 4) and consequently the French and the Italians and probably the Japanese would likewise start increased cruiser construction which would mean an end of the cruiser holiday. This point is still under negotiation between the Foreign Office and the Soviets. As regards Germany the British are continuing technical discus- sions on the June 1935 Anglo-German agreement5 now that the quali- tative limitations are defined. The French Government have proposed a new procedure for the submarine protocol, details of which go forward by pouch today. Early next week Ambassador Bingham will be handed at the For- eign Office a formal notice by Great Britain of her intention to escalate (see your 191, June 4, noon8). At the same time an oral inquiry will be addressed to the Ambassador with specific reference to the Ameri- can memorandum whether, if the proposed conversion of the four 'Sir Robert Leslie Craigie, British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 'Letter to James Clement Dunn, Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, not found in Department files. 'See Foreign Relations, 1935, vol. I, pp. 162 ff. * Post, p. 134. 104 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Hawkins class cruisers is undertaken by the British, any objection would be entered either formally or informally by the American Government. I venture to urge that instructions on this point be tele- graphed to enable the Ambassador to make an oral reply. Atherton 500.A15A5/806 The British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Craigie) to the First Secretary of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom (Johnson)1 No. A 5678/4/45 London, 9 July, 1936. Dear Johnson: In order that your Government may be kept in- formed of developments in regard to our naval conversations with other Powers I am writing to let you know that on 3rd April last a Communication was addressed by us to the Japanese Charge d'Affaires stating that in the event of the Japanese Government wishing to offer any observations on the text of the London Naval Treaty 1936 His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would be glad to receive them and furnish any explanations which it might be in their power to give. At the same time the hope was expressed that after careful reflection the Japanese Government might be able to see their way to accede to the Treaty. On June 29th Mr. Fujii communicated to the Foreign Office a written reply to our note of 3rd April to the effect that under the pres- ent conditions the Japanese Government had no intention of acceding to the London Naval Treaty 1936. He was informed that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom would naturally receive this communication with regret and earnestly hoped that a change of conditions would permit of Japanese accession in the future. It was explained that His Majesty's Government fully understood the par- ticular difficulties of the Japanese Government in this matter and had no desire to press them unduly. Yours sincerely, R. L. Craigie 500.A15A5/809a: Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, July 25, 1936—1 p.m. 280. In view of the refusal of the Japanese Government to adhere to the London Naval Treaty 1936, notified to us in a communication 'Copy transmitted to the Department by the Ambassador in his despatch No. 2335, July 10; received July 22. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 105 from Craigie dated July 9, 1936, enclosed in your despatch No. 2335, July 10,1936,8 you are requested to inquire informally of Craigie what, in his Government's view, is the present status of the stipulations of the Treaty limiting the calibre of guns on capital ships at 14 inches. You will recall that this limitation was contingent on its being ac- cepted not later than April 1, 1937, by all the Powers signatory to the Washington Treaty, otherwise the maximum calibre of guns would remain at 16 inches. For your information the Navy Department is most anxious to com- plete the plans for the two capital ships which will be laid down early next year. From a technical standpoint much depends on whether these ships are to be armed with 14 or 16 inch guns. If the Japanese action in refusing to adhere to the Treaty is to be interpreted as a refusal to accept the qualitative stipulations of the Treaty the Navy will wish to complete its plans at once to arm the new ships with the higher calibre guns. You will readily appreciate therefore that an immediate informal expression of the views of the British Government is urgently necessary. Hull 500.A15A5/812: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, July 31,1936—2 p.m. [Received July 31—11: 20 a.m.] 385. Your 280, July 25, 1 p.m. In an oral statement yesterday of his Government's view regarding your inquiry Craigie stated: (1) That the British Government do not regard the Japanese action in refusing to adhere to the treaty as necessarily carrying with it re- fusal to accept the qualitative stipulations of the treaty (article 4, paragraph 2) with respect to the calibre of guns on capital ships. The British feel that the Japanese cannot be presumed to have refused to accept the 14-inch limit unless they make declaration to that effect and this they are not obliged to do before April 1,1937. The Japanese note to the Foreign Office conveying their refusal to adhere to the London Naval Treaty 1936 contained the expression that the Japanese Government had no intention of acceding to the treaty "under the present conditions". Craigie said that in a recent conver- sation with the Japanese Ambassador on the subject the latter pointed out and emphasized the words "under the present conditions". Craigie did not, however, give the impression that the British hope for eventual Japanese adherence to the treaty. * See footnote 7, p. 104. 106 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I (2) Regarding the problem of ascertaining in fact what are the Japanese intentions in regard to the calibre of guns on capital ships, the British feel that, with so much time yet to elapse within which the Japanese may [agree] to the limit stipulated in article 4, paragraph 2, of the treaty, they are reluctant to press them now for an immediate declaration. On the other hand, if the Japanese have already decided to exceed the 14-inch limit it obviously is highly important for the signatories of the treaty to be appraised of this fact. The British, therefore, have requested their Ambassador at Tokyo for an expression of his views on the matter and he will probably be instructed to consult with the American Ambassador. The British Ambassador's reply will be immediately communicated to the other signatories of the 1936 treaty. Bingham 500.A15A5/815a : Telegram The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, August 1, 1936—3 p.m. 101. The British Ambassador will consult with you shortly regard- ing the intentions of the Japanese Government in respect of the pro- vision of Part II, Article 4 (2) of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, which would limit to 14 inches in caliber the guns of capital ships. For your information, we recently made informal inquiries of the British Government with regard to this matter through the Embassy at London and the Embassy has replied that the British do not regard the Japanese action in refusing to adhere to the Treaty as necessarily carrying with it a refusal to accept the qualitative stipulation relating to the caliber of guns on capital ships. The British feel that the Japanese cannot be presumed to have refused to accept the 14 inch gun limit unless they make declaration to that effect any time between the present and April 1,1937, but in view of the importance of a knowledge of the Japanese attitude to the signatories of the Treaty they have requested an expression of his views from their Ambassador at Tokyo who will be instructed to discuss the matter with you. Hull G00.A15A5/821: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, August 27,1936—11 a.m. [Received August 27—9: 15 a.m.] 172. Department's 101, August 1, 3 p.m. 1. The British Ambassador on coming down to Tokyo from his sum- mer residence called on me yesterday and discussed the situation out- lined in the Department's telegram. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 107 2. Sir Robert Clive and his Naval Attache think it doubtful if the Japanese Navy has yet come to a decision concerning the future build- ing of capital ships or the caliber of future guns. The Vice Minister of the navy stated yesterday to our Naval Attache that the navy was "investigating" and that no decision had yet been reached. The Minister of the Navy recently said to Captain Rogers that the navy had much to do but very little money with which to do it. On the one hand it may be said that the tremendous outlay already envisaged in the budget for the armed forces of the nation would seem to dictate economy in this direction. On the other hand, it was Japan who first adopted the use of 16-inch guns; amour propre is a powerful force in Japan and a feeling of inferiority must exist owing to the fact that the United States and Great Britain together at present have the marked superiority of six ships with 16-inch guns as against Japan's two. 3. My British colleague and I believe that the only practical method of obtaining information concerning Japan's plans in connection with the caliber of guns would be eventually to ask the question point-blank and officially although it is impossible to forsee whether a frank answer would be given. Fairly strong reasons could be adduced why it would be in Japan's own interest to communicate the desired information. Indirect approach would be futile. 4. From the local angle there seems to be no reason for haste in making the [inquiry]. At present the reply would almost cer- tainly be that no decision had yet been reached. If our own Gov- ernment should desire that the question be broached it might be well to take the action in my initial talk with the Foreign Minister after my return from the United States in the middle of November on the basis of direct conferences in Washington. 5. In this general connection the Vice Minister of the Navy recently said to the Naval Attache that owing to unsettled condi- tions in Japan and in the world at large, especially in Europe, it would be out of the question for Japan to enter any naval limitation treaty for probably the next 10 years. Grew 500.A15A5/829 : Telegram The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, September 29, 1936—6 p.m. [Received September 29—3: 50 p.m.] 392. In the course of an informal after-dinner conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday I said that as one of the three American delegates to the London Naval Conference I was much interested in this subject and had always hoped that the Italian 108 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Government could see its way to signing the treaty. I mentioned the vivid interest of the American people in any step taken towards the limitation of armament and said that Italy's signature to this treaty would make a splendid impression throughout the United States. The Minister explained that in view of the present European situa- tion and notably the recent developments at Geneva the Italian Gov- ernment was not in a position to sign the treaty. Italy could not in view of the seating of the Ethiopian delegation make any gesture at this time towards the European collaboration required by the treaty. He mentioned other reasons which made Italian collaboration diffi- cult such as the eastern European tour of King Edward and the assembling of more British ships in the Mediterranean. I said that it seemed to me a pity that such a far-reaching movement as that which inspired the treaty should be crippled by something which had hap- pened in Geneva affecting Italy only at the present session of the Assembly. Count Ciano replied that it remained to be seen whether the seating of the Ethiopian delegation was confined to this session of the Assembly. I asked him whether that meant that Italy could not consider the signing of the treaty until the next session of the As- sembly to which he did not answer. I understand that Ciano recently informed a chief of mission here that the events in Geneva had not altered the Italian attitude towards the proposed meeting of the Locarno powers 9 and that the Italian Gov- ernment was ready to collaborate in preliminary preparation for the conference in conformity with its previous declaration on the matter, see Embassy's 381, September 21, 5 p.m., 376, September 16, 7 p.m.,10 and previous. Phillips 500.A15A5/831 The Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) to the Secretary of State No. 128 Geneva, October 2, 1936. [Received October 9.] Sir: I have the honor to report that Admiral Bellairs,11 who ac- companied the British Delegation to the Assembly, called on me today to give me an account of the British conversations with the •Belgium, Fiance, Italy, Germany, and the United Kingdom, signatories of the treaty of Locarno, October 16, 1925. For comment on the proposed discus- sions In October 1936 among these powers, in connection with matters affecting the status of the treaty subsequent to the occupation of the Rhineland, March 7, 1936, by Germany, see pp. 180 ff. "Neither printed. "Rear Adm. R. M. Bellairs, British naval representative on the Permanent Advisory Committee of the League of Nations. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 109 Continental Naval Powers in respect to aligning those Powers with the British naval strength, with the ultimate expectation of gaining general agreement to the London 1936 Naval Treaty. I append hereto a memorandum of the conversation prepared by Mr. Reber.12 Respectfully yours, Hugh R. Wilson [Enclosure] Memorandum by Mr. Samuel Reber of a Conversation Between the Minister in Switzerland (Wilson) and Admiral Bellairs, October 2,1936 Admiral Bellairs called to explain recent developments in the British bi-lateral naval conversations with Russia, Germany and the Scandi- navian Powers. He stated that the principal technical difficulty which had arisen in connection with the Russian agreement, a copy of which had been furnished Washington,13 related to the construc- tion of cruisers carrying guns of more than 6 inches in calibre. The Russians had designs and material for the construction of ten 7.1-inch cruisers. Should they complete this number of heavily armed cruis- ers, the Germans would not be content to keep their total of large cruisers down to three, but would revert to their previous demand for five of these vessels. This in turn would cause the French to insist upon the construction of new cruisers above their present total of seven, thus destroying the efficacy of any holiday in the con- struction of these vessels. Following the Montreux conversations,14 the Russians however seemed disposed to accept a limitation of seven large cruisers and the British have reason to believe that this will be acceptable to the Germans, who will not therefore demand more than three 8-inch cruisers. He hoped therefore that the French would be content with seven under these conditions. Bellairs added that of course this information should be regarded as purely tentative and confidential, as no final agreement had been reached. He was, however, hopeful as to the possibilities of shortly concluding a definite accord on these terms. The other remaining technical difficulty as regards the Russians was in connection with the construction of two capital ships of 15- inch guns, but he felt that this would not give rise to any serious complication. "Samuel Reber, Second Secretary of the American Embassy in Italy, tem- porarily at Geneva; Mr. Reber had been technical assistant for the Department of State at the Naval Conference. "See passage numbered 5, of instruction No. 1442, September 29, to the Ambas- sador in the United Kingdom, p. 140. M See vol. in, pp. 503 ff. 110 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I The conversations held with representatives of the Scandinavian Powers had been most satisfactory but no agreement had been con- cluded, as their representatives had returned to their respective coun- tries for consultation with their governments. The only issue still remaining unsettled was the question of the construction of one or two coast defense vessels by Sweden which might fall within the "zone of non-construction." Bellairs said that his Government was con- vinced however that this could be arranged, possibly by an exchange of notes between the Naval Powers. Conversations have also been going on with the Poles who have indicated their general acceptance of the principles of the London Naval Treaty of 1930. Thus the two principal naval questions still unsolved were those of Italy and Japan. Bellairs said that every effort would be made during the Locarno conversations to persuade the Italians to adhere to the London Naval Treaty of 1936. He reiterated the British understanding that the Italian objections were entirely political and not technical and might be met in these discussions. In so far as the Japanese were concerned, Bellah-s had no infor- mation regarding their attitude save what was generally made public during the summer. He wondered whether it would be possible to obtain any prior assurances from the Japanese as to their intentions concerning the calibre of guns to be placed on future capital ships. Bellairs continued that the British were turning over in their minds how these various bi-lateral agreements could be co-ordinated into a whole, but stated that until the technical questions had all been solved they had no specific ideas on this subject. Samuel Reber D00.A15A5/830: Telegram The Ambassador in Italy (Phillips) to the Secretary of State Rome, October 9,1936—1 p.m. [Received October 9—9 a.m.] 408. I discussed with the British Ambassador15 the matter of the signature of the Naval Treaty by Italy and he expressed the opinion that once the Locarno powers had agreed definitely to meet on a given program the Italians would no longer hold out against signing the treaty. He did not think the real objection to signing was as they stated, see my 392, September 29, 6 p.m., but rather their unwillingness to cooperate in naval matters until a more definite program of general European cooperation had been agreed upon. I told the British Ambassador of my conversation with Count Ciano 1 Sir Eric Drummond. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 111 and the hope that I had expressed to him that Italy having been one of the negotiators of the treaty might find her way to become a signatory at an early date. Phillips 500.A15A5/837a The Acting Secretary of State to the Charge in Japan (Dickover) [Kxtractl No. 1141 Washington, November 16, 1936. Sir: You are requested to consider, in the light of the general political situation in Japan, the advisability of approaching the Japanese Government with a formal inquiry as to whether it proposes to proceed in accordance with Article 4, paragraph 2, of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, which provides: "No capital ship shall carry a gun with a caliber exceeding 14 inches (356 MM); providing, however, that if any of the Parties to the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at Washington the 6th of February, 1922,1G should fail to enter into an agreement to conform to this provision prior to the date of the coining into force of the present Treaty, but in any case, not later than the 1st April, 1937, the maximum caliber of guns carried by capital ships shall be 16 inches (406 MM)." In a communication, dated July 9, 1936," the British Government notified us of the Japanese Government's refusal to adhere to the London Naval Treaty, 1936. This raises the question whether Japan's refusal to adhere to the 1936 Naval Treaty includes a refusal to accept the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 2, quoted above. For us a prompt reply to this question is imperative in view of the fact that the Navy Department is now completing the plans for the two capital ships which will be laid down early next year and much depends, from the technical standpoint, on whether these ships are to be armed with 14 or 16-inch guns. You will readily appreciate, therefore, that a clarification of the views of the Japanese Government in respect of the 14-inch guns is urgently necessary. We would wish you, however, before taking any action, to inform us of your conclusions so that we might consult with the British Government. On October 15, the British Charge d'Affaires in Washington in- formed us orally that he had received a telegram from his Govern- ment stating that Ambassador Clive, in reply to the question which had been put to him whether the time was opportune for making a formal inquiry of the Japanese Government in respect of the action M Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. I, p. 247. "Ante, p. 104. 112 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I it intended to take with regard to the limitation on caliber of guns on capital ships, had informed his Government that, in his opinion, the time was not opportune to place this matter before the Japanese Government. Nevertheless, the British Government had decided, in view of the fact that there was no evidence that the situation between China and Japan18 would improve in the immediate future, that it could no longer put off the presentation of this matter to the Japanese Government. The British wished, however, to ascertain beforehand whether this Government would concur in their addressing this in- quiry to the Japanese Government, namely, whether the Japanese were prepared to conform to a 14-inch caliber limit on guns to be mounted on capital ships to be completed after the expiration of the present Naval Treaties on December 31 of this year. That same day we replied to the British Charge d'Affaires that we were agreeable in principle to the stand of the British Foreign Office to put the question in respect of gun calibers on capital ships to the Japanese Government but in the name of the British Government alone, not in the name of both Governments. We stressed, moreover, that the question should be considered of the effect the action of put- ting this question to the Japanese Government at this time would have and, further, what effect the causing of the Japanese Government to formulate a reply would have on the internal domestic political sit- uation in Japan. We expressed our belief that, as far as these con- siderations were concerned, the man on the spot would be in the best position to decide. There seems to be a struggle at present be- tween various elements in Japan as to the formulation of major policies and we would desire to avoid having any action taken which might have an adverse effect on the development of major policies in Japan. Finally, on October 27, 1936, Sir Robert Craigie informed Mr. Atherton19 that some time in the previous week he had asked the Japanese Ambassador in London what he considered was the position of his Government in regard to the caliber of guns on capital ships. Ambassador Yoshida replied, according to Craigie, that he felt cer- tain that his Government wanted the 14-inch gun but could not bind itself to this in view of public opinion and the fact that Japan had in the current year withdrawn from the Naval negotiations. Craigie felt, however, from what the Japanese Ambassador said, that his Government might be prepared to give an official assurance in writing that Japan would limit itself to 14-inch gun construction, with a face-saving device technically permitting it to notify interested Gov- ernments if it should decide to the contrary. "See vol. iv, pp. 1 ff. M See memorandum dated October 27, by the Counselor of Embassy in the United Kingdom, p. 145. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 113 It is desired that the Embassy give careful thought to the facts above set forth and determine at its earliest convenience whether, in the light of the existing political situation in Japan and of other related circumstances, an approach to the Japanese Government sim- ilar to that contemplated by the British Government should be made by this Government. It is requested that you inform the Department by telegraph of your conclusions and that, in the event of your arriving at the conclusion that such an approach should be made, you take no action in the matter pending the receipt of appropriate instructions. Very truly yours, R. Walton Moore 300.A15AS/839: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 2, 1936—6 p.m. 151. An instruction, No. 1141 of November 16,1936, was sent to you with regard to 14-16 inch guns. In view of publicity regarding new capital ships here it has become most urgent for the Navy De- partment to have this matter clarified at the earliest possible moment. Please, therefore, telegraph your conclusions as soon as possible after receipt of above-mentioned instruction so that the Department may determine the course which should be followed. You should, how- ever, take no action in the matter pending the receipt of instructions. Moore 500.A15A5/841: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 3,1936—4 p.m. [Received December 3—9: 20 a.m.] 249. Department's 151, December 2, 6 p.m. My British colleague informed his Foreign Office in August of our belief that only a direct approach on the subject of 14- or 16-inch guns might elicit a definite statement as to Japanese intentions and that such an approach might appropriately be made after my return from leave of absence in November. The British Foreign Office replied that they felt the matter should be taken up more promptly whereupon Clive recom- mended that the subject be broached in London rather than in Tokyo. Accordingly the British Government approached Ambassador Yoshida on November 11th with a view to arriving at an under- standing on the question of gun calibers. Yoshida replied that he thought it unwise to take up Ihe subject with Tokyo himself because 114 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I an impression that the British Government was exerting diplomatic pressure might thereby be conveyed and such an impression might impede rather than facilitate a favorable result. Yoshida recom- mended that it would be better for the British Admiralty to discuss the question directly with his Naval Attache as a purely technical matter. Clive apparently does not know whether this has yet been done. As Yoshida understands the psychology of his own naval author- ities the Department may wish to consider whether similar procedure would be preferable to an approach through diplomatic channels pro- vided that the Department's instruction No. 1141 envisages such action. Should an approach through naval channels be considered logical I would suggest that it be made by our Naval Attache here rather than through the Japanese Naval Attache in Washington. The former enjoys friendly relations with the Navy Ministry here and would be in a favorable position to make at least a provisional and technical inquiry concerning Japanese intentions with regard to gun calibers. Grew 500.A15A5/841b: Circular telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham)20 Washington, December 3,1936—6 p.m. The President ratified the London Naval Treaty, 1936, on May 28. So far no other Government has ratified although the Treaty was drafted to come into effect on January 1, 1937. Any information which may come to you with regard to the intentions of the Govern- ment to which you are accredited in respect of ratification of the Treaty should be promptly reported. Moore 500.A15A5/841a : Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 3, 1936—8 p.m. 434. 1. In view of publicity here regarding the new capital ships and the short time remaining for the completion of final plans for these ships, it has become most urgent for the Navy Department to "The same telegram was sent to the Embassies in France and Italy. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 115 have the matter clarified of Japan's position with regard to Article 4, Paragraph 2, of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, relating to the calibre of guns on capital ships. 2. You will recall that in August Clive informed British Foreign Office that only a direct approach on this subject might elicit a definite statement as to the Japanese intentions21 and that such an approach might appropriately be made after Grew's return from leave of ab- sence in November. The Foreign Office replied that in their view the matter should be taken up more promptly. Whereupon we under- stand Clive recommended that the subject be broached not in Tokyo but in London. 3. The Foreign Office then, on October 15,22 requested the British Embassy at Washington to obtain an expression of our views. We replied that we were agreeable in principle to their putting the ques- tion to the Japanese, that, however, it should be put in the name of the British alone, that, in view of the internal domestic situation in Japan, the man on the spot would be in the best position to decide since we would wish to avoid any action which might have an adverse effect on the development of major policies in Japan. 4. In your despatch No. 2613 of October 27, 1936,23 you reported Craigie as stating that he had discussed this matter with Yoshida2i who had indicated Japanese might be prepared to give an official assur- ance in writing that they would bind themselves to 14 inches, with a face-saving clause. Now Grew telegraphs that Clive has been in- formed Craigie had second conversation with Yoshida on November 11 in which Yoshida said it would be unwise for him to take the sub- ject up with Tokyo himself and recommended that the Admiralty discuss the question directly with his Naval Attache. Clive, however, has no information indicating whether the Admiralty actually did make the approach to the Naval Attache. 5. Before considering taking any action ourselves we wish to ascer- tain precisely where the question lies as between the British and the Japanese, whether Craigie actually agreed with Yoshida that the Admiralty should approach the Japanese Naval Attache and whether this approach has been made. Please investigate and report by tele- graph. Mooke 21 See paragraph 3, telegram No. 172, August 27, from the Ambassador iu Japan, p. 106. a See instruction No. 1141, November 16, to the Charge in Japan, p. 111. "Not printed. "Shigeru Yoshida, Japanese Ambassador in the United Kingdom. 116 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I 500.A15A5/842 : Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 7,1936—8 p.m. [Received December 7—3: 22 p.m.] 599. Department's December 3, 6 p. m. Foreign Office informs me they are reluctant to proceed until British negotiations with the Soviets and Germans have been completed.25 Foreign Office under- stands the same applies to Paris as well. The Soviet and German negotiations are now practically only concerned with the Russian reservation for the placement of 16-inch guns on the two first capital ships to be constructed. British Government can ratify the contract since no Parliamentary sanction is necessary, but regretful as the Foreign Office would be to have a lapse it seems possible British ratification may not take place until early next year. Foreign Office point out the outcome of the Russian reservation regarding 16-inch guns referred to above also has bearing on the posi- tion of Japan, referred to in Department's telegraphic instruction 434 December 3, 8 p.m. This matter was discussed by Craigie and Yoshida on Friday last and the Japanese have been told that the British must have an answer before the end of the year. As regards paragraph 4 of the Department's instruction last above referred to, Craigie now talks of a Japanese "semiofficial" assurance which might read that the Japanese Government have no plans for the construction of ships carrying guns larger than 14 inch and agree not to undertake any steps preparatory to the construction of vessels carrying guns of larger caliber without previous notification to the British Government. As regards the second part of paragraph 4 Craigie says there is a misunderstanding in that Yoshida was entirely willing to take up the matter with Tokyo himself and that the pro- posed technical discussions between the British Naval Attache in Tokyo and the Japanese Admiralty supplementing Yoshida's reports have been negatived. I stressed to Craigie the importance of this caliber question to the United States and he again urged a tolerant attitude towards Japan in this connection at least through the remaining days of this month. Bingham * Bilateral naval agreements on the part of the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union and Germany were concluded on July 17, 1937; see British Cmd. 5518 and 5519, respectively. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 117 500.A15A5/841: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Grew) Washington, December 10,1936—7 p.m. 157. Your 249, December 3, 4 p.m. Bingham now reports that the British are discussing the matter of 14 or 16-inch guns directly with the Japanese, that the conversations between the Japanese Admiralty and the British Naval Attache in Tokyo have been voided, that Craigie is dealing directly with Yoshida and that the basis of the conversation is the possibility of the Japanese giving a "semi-official" assurance to the effect that they have no plans for the construction of ships carry- ing guns larger than 14 inches and will not take any steps preparatory to the construction of vessels carrying guns of larger caliber without previous notification to the British Government. The British re- quest a tolerant attitude on our part towards the Japanese in this matter at least through this month. In view of the circumstances above mentioned, consideration is not being given to the question of an approach before the end of December by this Government to the Japanese Government. How- ever, we would appreciate your giving continued thought to the matter and telegraphing any conclusion you may reach in the light of our recent instruction. Moore D00.A15A5/842: Telegram The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) Washington, December 12, 1936—3 p.m. 447. Your 599, December 7, 8 p.m. We have now heard from Paris and Rome with regard to ratification of the London Naval Treaty, 1936. Bullitt2e reports that a bill will be introduced shortly in the French Parliament authorizing ratification of the Treaty, that the Government expects no debate or difficulties and that ratification should take place before January 1. Phillips quotes Drummond as expressing confidence, on the basis of his recent conversations with Ciano, that the Italian Government is disposed to ratify as soon as it is advised that the three principal signatories of the Treaty have completed ratification. While we would not wish to appear to press Craigie unduly in his negotiations with the Germans and Russians we would consider it M William Bullitt, Ambassador in France. 885223—54—VOl. 1—13 118 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I most unfortunate if a lapse were to occur in the naval limitation sys- tem and hope that this matter of ratification may be completed before the close of this year. If you deem it wise, in the light of your knowledge of the most recent developments in the Russian and German naval negotiations, you may mention our views informally to Craigie. Moore 500.A15A5/845: Telegram The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Bingham) to the Secretary of State London, December 14, 1936—5 p.m. [Received December 14—12: 45 p.m.] 609. Department's 447, December 12, 3 p.m. Foreign Office con- firmed again today its understanding that the French Government desires to be in a position to ratify if and when negotiations with Germany are concluded. However, both the French and British Gov- ernments are desirous of avoiding a lapse. Ciano has informed Drummond it would be difiicult for the Italian Government to sign the treaty until it has been ratified by the original signatories. Bingham 500.A15A5/846: Telegram The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State Tokyo, December 18,1936—noon. [Received December 18—9: 35 a.m.] 262. Department's 157, December 10,7 p.m. 1. The vernacular press reports the following statements made by the Navy Minister December 15 while explaining the naval budget at a meeting of representatives of political parties: the new arma- ment scheme is not aimed at obtaining quantitative parity. It seeks to build up a fleet suitable for the national circumstances and national traits at minimum cost. Our objections to participation in the Lon- don agreement are that it does not provide for the entire national defense plans of each signatory to be disclosed to the others. Third replenishment program for 1937-1938 and subsequent fiscal years is a continuous expenditure. The Navy intends to preserve its secrets concerning naval construction. Publication of its defense plans for future years would impair security of national defense and entail dragging Japanese Government into naval competition, thus bringing about a financially deplorable situation. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 119 2. Opinion prevails among Naval Attaches here that Japan will not revert to the 14-inch gun, that construction of one or more battle- ships as large as 50,000 tons with adequate protection against bombs, torpedoes and shell fire and mounting 16-inch or their equivalent in larger calibers is possible on the theory that such type might render obsolete the present types thus giving qualitative parity. Further- more, analysis of the budget figures indicates that approximately 130 million yen will be allocated during the next fiscal year for the third replenishment program. 3. My British colleague has revealed to me in personal and confiden- tial conversation that his Government possesses information to the effect that the Japanese Navy is now testing not only 16 but also 18-inch guns probably according to the British Naval Attache on specially constructed monitors. 4. Our Naval Attache has no direct information concerning the fore- going statement but concurs in the opinion that the construction of 16-inch gun types is being contemplated. 5. The British Ambassador believes that the Japanese will try to obtain some kind of a naval agreement next year but he feels that nothing can be done at present to ascertain their plans concerning calibers. If his information concerning the present testing of 16 and 18-inch guns is correct it would appear doubtful if the Japanese Navy is yet ready to formulate any agreement or that any concrete reply would be given to an inquiry concerning their intentions. Nevertheless the Japanese Navy can hardly fail to realize that if they intend to limit their gun calibers to 14 inches it is obviously to their interest that our own navy should be given timely information of that intention and that mutual and adequate guarantees should be af- forded. 'When therefore the Department on the basis of its contacts in London feels that the time is ripe for an approach on our part we believe that nothing is to be lost and that something might be gained by frankly asking the Japanese what they intend to do so that we may be guided in our own naval plans for the future. 6. So far as the psychological moment for such an approach is con- cerned it may be said that the Japanese Government is at present in a politically precarious position. The Government has played its cards badly through inviting public censure over the agreement with Ger- many 27 which has led to the impasse with Soviet Russia on the fish- eries treaty.28 The Government is likewise incurring serious public criticism as a result of the failure of the negotiations with China. Its natural reaction in this situation is to seek closer relations with "German-Japanese anti-Comintern agreement, signed at Berlin, November 25,1936, Foreign Relations, Japan 1931-1941, vol. n, p. 153, "Protocol signed at Moscow, December 28, 1936, to regulate leasing of fishing grounds for one year; see despatch No. 2203, December 80, 1936, from the Am- bassador in Japan, vol. rv, p. 451. 120 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I the United States and Great Britain but on the other hand to avoid any step which might incite further public criticism of its diplomacy. Any implication that the Government was yielding to foreign diplo- matic pressure in matters affecting the Japanese Navy would have to be carefully avoided. There is no reason to believe that this status of affairs will alter appreciably in the near future. 7. From an informal casual conversation during the first official call of our Naval Attache on the new Vice Minister of the Navy the Naval Attache is now of the opinion that it is doubtful whether the navy officials will divulge any information relating to the building program. We therefore now feel that the only satisfactory method of obtaining information from the Japanese Government as to whether it proposes to proceed in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2, of the London Naval Treaty, 1936, is by formal and direct inquiry through diplomatic channels whenever the Department may find such an approach desirable. 8. The Naval Attache has read and concurs in the contents of this telegram. Grew 500.A15A5/849 The Minister in Norway (Biddle) to the Secretary of State No. 340 Oslo, December 22, 1936. [Received January 9, 1937.] Sir : I have the honor to refer to the attached copy29 of a translation of an article which appeared on December 21st in Tidens Tegn, con- cerning a meeting on December 19 and 20 in Stockholm between Com- mander Bull and Bureau Chief Skylstad of the Norwegian Foreign Office, representing Norway, and Swedish, Danish, and Finnish naval officers and members of their respective Foreign Offices. In conversation with Bureau Chief Skylstad today, he informed me that the above-described meeting resulted in an agreement in principle between the Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, and Finnish officials to accept the recent invitation on the part of Great Britain to participate in the Naval Treaty of London of March, 1936. Mr. Skylstad considered this a constructive step in view of the confused political situation throughout Europe. This was, furthermore, an added step towards solidifying the Scandinavian front. In describing reactions of the Scandinavian representatives at the Stockholm meeting, Mr. Skylstad said that the clause in the treaty agreement having regard to the exchange of data relative to naval 'Not printed. LONDON NAVAL TREATY 121 programs drew especially favorable attention. Such an exchange tended to eliminate the element of surprise and was a practical basis for consultation. As regards Norway's participation, Mr. Skylstad had been assigned the task of seeking the legal means whereby his Government could enjoy membership either directly or indirectly. He was confident he could determine a course. He was equally confident his Govern- ment would approve the proposed participation. Respectfully yours, A. J. Dbexel Biddle, Jr. 500.A15A5/848 : Telegram The Ambassador in France (Bullitt) to the Secretary of State Paris, December 30, 1936—1 p.m. [Received December 30—9: 30 a.m.] 1304. Embassy's 1211, December 8, 4 p.m.30 The Foreign Office now states that the British Government does not desire to ratify the Naval Treaty until after the conclusion of the discussions at present going on with the Germans regarding naval questions which will probably be after the middle of next month. In view of this and of the fact that the French Parliament has more than a full calendar because of the effort to pass the budget before the end of the year the French Government plans to ratify the Naval Treaty some time in January. Bullitt "Not printed. REJECTION BY THE UNITED STATES OF BRITISH PRO- POSAL FOR RENEWAL OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE WASH- INGTON NAVAL TREATY, FEBRUARY 6, 1922 500.A4B/695 Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Hickerson) [Extract] [Washington,] September 11,1936. Mr. Mallet* called to discuss "naval matters". After reviewing in a general way the recent Japanese note with regard to the retention of submarines2 and asking about Secretary of the Navy Swanson's press conference, Mr. Mallet said that the real object of his visit was with reference to Article XIX of the Washington Naval Treaty, 1922, which reads as follows: [Here follows the text of article XIX, Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed February 6, 1922, Foreign Relations, 1922, volume I, pages 247, 252.] Mr. Mallet then recalled that on February 18 last, Mr. Fujii, the Japanese Charge d'Affaires in London, informed the British Govern- ment that the Japanese Government was prepared to consider the renewal of Article XIX of the Washington Treaty of 1922,3 dealing with the non-fortification of certain insular possessions in the Pa- cific. The British took note of this desire on the part of the Japanese to renew Article XIX and communicated the information to the American Embassy in London. Since that time the British Government has been giving careful consideration to the question of a renewal of Article XIX and, after a careful review of all the circumstances, it has come to the conclu- sion that this Article should be renewed in a separate instrument. The British Government believes, however, that it might be a good thing to make a changs in one particular, namely, that there should be provision for bringing up to date and extending existing fortifications. 1 Victor A. L. Mallet, British Charge d'Affaires. 1 See telegram No. 114, September 10, 1 p. m., to the Ambassador in Japan, p. 137. * The Japanese Government denounced the treaty on December 29, 1934; see Foreign Relations, 1934, vol. I, pp. 405 ff. 122 WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY 123 Mr. Mallet emphasized "existing fortifications" and pointed out that the extension of these fortifications could only have the effect of increasing the defensive capacity of the territories involved and would remedy a somewhat anomalous situation in which out of date defenses have to be maintained without their being any very clear idea of the extent to which they can be modernized without infring- ing the Treaty. Mr. Mallet added that from every standpoint, psy- chological, political, as a deterrent to the race in armaments, and in the general interest of peace, it would be well to preserve Article XIX, and his Government was most anxious to have it preserved. Mr. Mallet said that this was to be regarded as an oral message. His Government was most anxious to know the views of the Government of the United States with regard to this proposal and was making a similar communication through the Embassy in Tokyo to the Jap- anese Government. If the principle of the renewal of Article XIX were accepted by the Government of the United States of America his Government would submit a detailed text incorporating its views. Next Mr. Mallet stated that he had a very confidential communica- tion to make upon instructions from his Government—a communica- tion which was not being made to the Japanese Government. First, he repeated with emphasis that his Government would view with grave concern the lapsing of Article XIX which it considered it was vital to maintain. He then said that the provision specifying that there should be more liberty to bring up to date and extend exist- ing fortifications was included in order to enable his Government to modernize the fortifications at Hongkong. He said that his Govern- ment felt that it was most imperative to bring these fortifications up to date and that in accepting the renewal of Article XIX in a separate instrument it should have this in mind. He said, moreover, that his Government was convinced that the renewal of Article XIX could not be regarded as a bargaining factor in general or naval nego- tiations, that it must be considered as a unit in itself. Mr. Hickerson remarked that this Article had been agreed upon in 1922 as part of a general bargain and asked Mr. Mallet if his "oral message" was the consequence of some new move by the Japanese. Mr. Mallet replied that he did not know. He thought, however, that it was merely the natural outcome of the Japanese communica- tion of February 18. In conclusion, Mr. Hickerson assured Mr. Mallet that the proposal of the British Government would be accorded careful consideration and a reply would be communicated in due course. ■ •••••• J[ohn] D. H[ickerson] 124 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I S00.A4B/695a Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Robert T. Pell of the Division of Western European Affairs [Washington,] September 16, 1936. There were present: Mr. Norman H. Davis. For the State Department: Mr. Dunn, Mr. Hickerson, Mr. Dooman, Mr. Pell. For the War Department: Major General Stanley Embick, Brig. General Walter Krueger. For the Navy Department: Admiral W. H. Standley, Captain Ingersoll, Commander Schuirmann. Mr. Davis said that the meeting was called to discuss the reply which should be made to the British oral proposal to renew Article 19 of the Washington Naval Treaty, 1922, as a separate instrument. He asked for comment. Admiral Standley observed that before replying we must have it clear in our own minds what our position is with regard to fortifica- tions in the Pacific. Fortifications are of very little value without a base. We certainly are not going to fortify Manila and Corregidor and there is nothing else. General Embick said that in the opinion of the Army the Philip- pines are indefensible. Mr. Davis remarked that the first question to consider was whether or not it is in our interest to fortify. If we propose to fortify we had better let the Treaty go by the board and free our hands. By renewing the Treaty we would not have the freedom to do what we might wish to do. Mr. Davis recalled his first two meetings with Sir Robert Craigie4 last winter. After the Admiralty had given a hint that they were indifferent to the renewal of Article 19 but thought that it might serve as a trading point, Craigie had pointed out to him that it seemed important to his Government to renew the Article since, if it were not renewed, there would be great pressure in England to fortify Hongkong. This would be a red flag to Japan and would serve as a pretext for the Japanese to fortify Formosa. Mr. Davis replied on that occasion that when Japan left the Naval Conference5 the question of Article 19 went off the agenda because the fortifications provision was merely a link in a chain. Japan had broken the chain in three or four places. To take an isolated 4 British Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. 'For correspondence concerning the London Naval Conference, see pp. 22 ff. WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY 125 link on the morrow of Japan's departure from the Conference and keep it was illogical. If we should decide to keep it, it would have to be related to something else. In any event, Mr. Davis refused to be drawn into a discussion of this Article at that time. Craigie, at a second meeting, said that his Government would take the mat- ter under consideration and perhaps discuss it with the other Gov- ernments involved later on. Looking at the present situation Mr. Davis said that it was his belief that if we allow ourselves to be drawn into a negotiation we will soon have presented for our consideration a pact of non-aggression including the United States, Great Britain and Japan. The purpose of such a pact would be to tie the hands of Britain and the United States, leaving Japan a free rein in deal- ings with the U.S.S.R. The British might go into a pact of this nature in return for concessions in respect of China. Admiral Standley said that he agreed with the observations just made by Mr. Davis. The United States had held the Philippines for 38 years and had failed to fortify them. It was absurd to talk of fortifying them now. General Embick said that in the event of war with Japan the Phil- ippines would be a detriment from the military standpoint. Admiral Standley here inquired as to exactly what the British might mean by "modernization" of existing fortifications. Would it not enable us to send our guns out to the Philippines? General Embick said that this would serve no purpose. Corregi- dor was merely a refuge, a place where the flag might be kept flying. Moreover, General Embick questioned the good faith of the Statement made by the British that their purpose in renewing Article 19 with the proposed amendments was to enable them to fortify Hongkong. It looked more like an effort on their part to draw us into a negotia- tion and leave us holding the bag. Hongkong was of questionable military value. It would be a hostage in Japanese hands. Its de- fense from a military standpoint would require tremendous prep- aration. Hongkong was exposed to attack from the mainland and to hold it the defending force would have to control an enormous stretch of the mainland. Mr. Davis remarked that what worried him was the inconsistency of the two statements by the British. Craigie, in February, said that his Government wished to renew Article 19 in order to resist pressure to fortify Hongkong. Now his Government wished to renew Article 19 with an amendment in order to be able to fortify Hongkong. Mr. Davis said that in his opinion the first question to settle was, Should we go into this negotiation at all. What could the possible advantages be? It might be advantageous for us to encourage the British to strengthen their position in the Far East by fortifying Hongkong. Mr. Davis did not believe that the British were going to give in to 126 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Japan any more and for reasons of general policy we might wish to go along with the British to this extent. Looking at the problem from the other angle, if we should refuse to agree to a renewal of Article 19 the Japanese might interpret it as evidence of hostility on our part. On the other hand, Article 19 was accepted by us as part of a general settlement. There would be no rhyme or reason for us to enter into an agreement on this specific point with Japan immediately after Japan had refused to enter into a naval agreement with us. Mr. Davis then requested the views of the others present. Admiral Standley said that he was in complete agreement with Mr. Davis' concluding statement. General Embick agreed. Mr. Dunn agreed. Mr. Dooman agreed. Mr. Davis remarked that once we begin discussing the proposal of the British with them the fat is in the fire. The pact of non-aggression would bob right up. Admiral Standley observed that Japan was still holding out for the recognition of parity. He did not believe that while the Japanese were in this state of mind we should stick our necks out. Mr. Dunn said that he could see no good reason why we should ignore the fact that the Japanese have refused to come into the Naval Treaty. General Embick stressed his belief that we should not discuss a renewal of Article 19. Mr. Dooman observed that not only was the naval situation in a state of flux; the political situation in the Far East was also in a state of flux. Until that situation had become more stabilized it would be highly dangerous to lift out one factor in the situation and crys- tallize it. Mr. Davis remarked that at Washington we had agreed to surrender our position of superiority in the Pacific in consideration of a pledge of political stability. Instead, we have had a condition of extreme political instability. Here Mr. Hickerson observed that in his conversation with Mr. Mallet, the British Charge d'Affaires," he had asked him if the Jap- anese had recently made fresh inquiries with regard to the renewal of this Article. Mr. Mallet had replied that he did not know. Mr. Davis said that he believed the British had probably let the matter rest until Ambassador Yoshida's arrival in London. Yoshida was seeking a general agreement with the British and this matter had probably come up in connection with this fresh effort on the part of the Japanese. • See memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs, September 11, supra. WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY 127 Mr. Dooman said that just before the meeting he had made a search of the unpublished Minutes of the Washington Conference with regard to the manner in which the provision relating to the status quo on fortifications in the Pacific had come into the Washington Naval Treaty. He then read the following: On December 1,1921, Mr. Balfour had a private conversation with Admiral Baron Kato, Chief of the Japanese delegation, in the course of which Baron Kato had suggested that there be a cessation of forti- fication in the Pacific.7 The minutes of that conversation are not, unfortunately, available, but I shall go back to the minutes of a con- versation which took place on the following clay between Mr. Hughes, Mr. Balfour and Baron Kato,8 underlying the views upon which that suggestion was based (quoted from the minutes): . . . The ratio of 10-10-7 which the Japanese experts had supported had, as a matter of fact, been worked out some time ago in Tokio. Moreover, these views were supported by the Japanese Government and Parliament. On the present occasion, however, he had no desire to argue the question on technical is- sues, as such a controversy was likely to lead to no result. He would only say that he himself believed that Japan was en- titled to a ratio of 70 per cent in capital ships. As an instance he also referred to the question of the Mutsu. He recalled that this ship had been practically completed some months ago; that she had steamed 500 miles under her own steam; and, finally, that she had been put in commission two days ago, and was about to join the active fleet. To put her on the scrap heap would be most difficult for him to justify, and very unwelcome to public opinion in Japan. In these circumstances he had had to ask him- self, supposing we were willing to concede the 60 per cent, by what arguments could he justify it to his own people? Unless he could completely satisfy them, the concession to the American point of view in regard to the 60 per cent ratio in capital ships and the Mutsu would rankle in the minds of the Japanese people and leave public opinion in a state which was contrary to that good feeling between the two peoples which was an essential part of a real settlement and which he himself so warmly desired. He had pondered deeply over these matters during the last few days, with the result that he felt in a condition of the utmost difficulty and doubt. He would like to be helped by suggestions as to how he could justify himself to his own people. It was in these circumstances that he had had his conversation with Mr. Balfour. Baron Kato admitted that the conclusion of the pro- posed quadruple agreement in regard to the Pacific would be of great assistance to him. Yet another thought had occurred to him which might help matters. He had noticed that whenever news was received in Japan of the erection of fortifications in the American Islands in the Pacific it had caused a feeling of alarm and apprehension. It would therefore be of great assistance if an agreement could be reached to maintain the status quo in the 'See note dated December 1,1921, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. i, p. 74. "Ibid., p. 75. 128 FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1936, VOLUME I Pacific in regard to the fortification and the creation of naval bases. What would help him would be if the United States of America could agree not to increase the fortifications or the naval bases at Guam, the Philippine Islands and Hawaii. If this could be conceded, Japan on her part would agree not to fortify the four islands named to Mr. Balfour. (The islands named to Mr. Balfour by Baron Kato were:—Formosa, the Pescadores and Oshima). Even if this were granted, however, Baron Kato said he would have considerable difficulty in accepting the 60 per cent. Going back to the meeting on December 1, Mr. Hughes averted to the fact that Baron Kato had emphasized that there would be strong naval and military opposition to the proposal for naval limita- tion put forward by the American delegation. Mr. Hughes said that in the United States also naval and military opinion had a way of becoming reflected in Congress and in the press. He went on to say (quoted from the minutes): . . . The American people would probably refuse to fetter themselves in regard to their right to fortify their own posses- sions. In this connection, Mr. Hughes differentiated between the establishment of a base which might be regarded as an offensive work, and the mere fortification for defensive purposes. He then proceeded to outline a plan of his own, explaining that it was a purely personal idea, which he had not laid before his colleagues or the President. This plan was that America and Japan should reciprocally agree that if either one or the other were to desire to erect fortifications in the Pacific, the opposite party should be notified, and should then have the right to terminate the whole of the naval agreement. If, for example, the American public were to insist upon the fortification of Guam, Japan should have the right to denounce the whole arrangement and would be free to build ships.9 Following the statement made by Admiral Kato which is outlined in the minutes first quoted above, Mr. Hughes gave a very comprehen- sive discussion of the entire position of the United States with regard to the problem of naval limitation. He said that the Japanese proposal with regard to the status quo of fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific could not be given consideration except as part of the accept- ance by the Japanese of a comprehensive agreement including the Four Power Treaty10 in the Pacific and the American proposal on naval limitation. He stressed the point that it would be impossible, after having made the important concessions involved in the American naval proposal, for the United States to continue to make further con- cessions. Mr. Hughes then said that the American delegation might be willing to consider some such proposal as that put forward by the .Japanese, provided that the limitation on fortifications would be un- dertaken mutually and reciprocally by all the parties to the Four Power Treaty. 'Note dated December 1, Foreign Relations, 1922, vol. I, p. 74. 10 Signed at Washington, December 13,1921, ibid., p. 33. WASHINGTON NAVAL TREATY 129 It is entirely clear from the records that the status