Hume on Free Will (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
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Hume on Free Will
First published Fri Dec 14, 2007; substantive revision Wed May 27, 2020
But to proceed in this reconciling project with regard to the
question of liberty and necessity; the most contentious question of
metaphysics, the most contentious science… —David
Hume (EU, 8.23/95)
It is widely accepted that David Hume’s contribution to the free
will debate is one of the most influential statements of the
“compatibilist” position, where this is understood as the
view that human freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled
with (causal) determinism. Hume’s arguments on this subject are
found primarily in the sections titled “Of liberty and
necessity”, as first presented in A Treatise of Human
Nature (2.3.1–2) and, later, in a slightly amended form, in the
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding (sec. 8). Although
both contributions share the same title, there are, nevertheless, some
significant differences between them. This includes, for example, some
substantial additions in the Enquiry discussion as it relates
to problems of religion, such as predestination and divine
foreknowledge. These differences should not, however, be exaggerated.
Hume’s basic strategy and compatibilist commitments remain much the
same in both works.
This article will be arranged around a basic contrast between two
alternative interpretations of Hume’s compatibilist strategy: the
“classical” and “naturalistic”
interpretations. According to the classical account, Hume’s effort to
articulate the conditions of moral responsibility, and the way they
relate to the free will problem, should be understood primarily in
terms of his views about the logic of the concepts
of “liberty” and “necessity” In contrast with
this, the naturalistic approach maintains that what is essential to
Hume’s account of the nature and conditions of responsible conduct
is his description of the role that moral
sentiment plays in this sphere. How we interpret Hume’s
core arguments relating to the free will debate must be understood, on
this view, with reference to these psychological claims and concerns (which also accounts for the use of the label “naturalism” in this context). On either account, the contrast between these two interpretations will be of importance, not only for our general understanding of Hume’s
philosophical system, but also for any adequate assessment of the contemporary value and relevance of Hume’s views on this subject.
The first two sections of this article present and contrast the
classical and naturalistic interpretations. Hume’s views on causation
and necessity are highly relevant to both these interpretations. The
following three sections sections consider the contemporary
significance of Hume’s contribution, particularly as interpreted
by the naturalistic account. The sixth and final section examines the
relevance of Hume’s views on free will for matters of religion.
1. Liberty and Necessity – The Classical Reading
2. Free Will and Moral Sentiment – The Naturalistic Reading
3. Hume’s Naturalism and Strawson’s “Reconciling Project”
4. Virtue, Luck and “the Morality System”
5. Moral Sense and Moral Capacity
6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion
Bibliography
References to Hume’s Works
Secondary Literature
A Brief Guide to Further Reading
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries
1. “Liberty and Necessity” – The Classical Reading
For many years the established view of Hume has been that he is a
principal and founding figure of classical compatibilism, as located
in the empiricist philosophical tradition that stretches from Hobbes,
through Hume, on to Mill, Russell, Schlick and Ayer. Classical
compatibilists believe, with libertarians, that we need some adequate
theory of what free action is, where this is understood as providing
the relevant conditions of moral agency and responsibility.
Compatibilists, however, reject the view that free action requires the
falsity of determinism or that an action cannot be both free and
causally necessitated by antecedent conditions. According to the
classical compatibilist strategy, not only is freedom compatible with
causal determinism, the absence of causation and necessity would make
free and responsible action impossible. A free action is an action
caused by the agent, whereas an unfree action is caused by some other,
external cause. Whether an action is free or not depends on the type
of cause, not on the absence of causation and necessity. An uncaused
action would be entirely capricious and random and could not be
attributed to any agent, much less interpreted as a free and
responsible act. Understood this way, the classical compatibilist
strategy involves an attempt to explain and describe the
logic of our concepts relating to issues of freedom
and determinism. It is primarily concerned with conceptual issues
rather than with any empirical investigations into our human moral
psychology. On the classical interpretation this is how Hume’s
core arguments should be understood.
As Hume’s title “Of liberty and necessity” makes
plain there are two key ideas in play are “liberty”
(freedom) and “necessity” (causation and determinism). In
his Abstract of the Treatise Hume emphasizes that
his “reasoning puts the whole [free-will] controversy in a new
light, by giving a new definition of necessity” (T Abs. 34/
661). Despite this, the classical interpretation places heavy weight
on the significance of his views on the nature of liberty as the
relevant basis for explaining Hume’s position on this subject.
The strategy that Hume follows, according to this reading, is much the
same as that which was pursued by Hobbes. It is the distinction
between two kinds of liberty that is, on this account, especially
important. Hume’s views on liberty in the Treatise are not, however, entirely consistent with his later views as presented in the Enquiry.
In the Treatise Hume distinguishes between two kinds of
liberty.
Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of
spontaneity, as it is call’d in the schools, and the
liberty of indifference; betwixt that which is oppos’d
to violence, and that which means a negation of necessity and causes.
The first is even the most common sense of the word; and as ’tis
only that species of liberty, which it concerns us to preserve, our
thoughts have been principally turn’d towards it, and have
almost universally confounded it with the other. (T 2.3.2.1/407–8)
Liberty of spontaneity involves an agent being able to act according
to her own willings and desires, unhindered by external obstacles
which might constrain or restrict her conduct (e.g., the walls or bars
of a prison [T 2.3.1.17/406]). This kind of liberty does not imply an
absence of causation and necessity, unless we incorrectly assume that
what is caused is somehow compelled or forced to occur. In the
Enquiry Hume drops the distinction between two kinds of
liberty and instead provides an account of what he calls
“hypothetical liberty” (EHU 8.23/ 95). A liberty of this
kind involves “a power of acting or not acting, according to
the determinations of the will; that is, if we choose to remain
at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.” According
to Hume this sort of hypothetical liberty is “universally
allowed to belong to every one, who is not a prisoner and in
chains” (ibid.). Although Hume is committed to the existence of
both liberty of spontaneity and hypothetical liberty, they are not the
same. A person may enjoy liberty of spontaneity and act according to
the determinations of her own will, and still lack hypothetical
liberty. If she chose otherwise her action might still be obstructed
(e.g., as with a person who chooses to remain in a room but could not
leave if she chose to because the door is locked).
In the Treatise Hume tends to identify liberty with
indifference rather than spontaneity and even suggests “that
liberty and chance are synonimous” (T 2.3.2.8/ 412; cf. T
2.3.1.18/ 407; but see also EHU 8.25/ 96). For this reason he presents
his arguments as aiming to show that liberty, so understood
(qua indifference), is, if not contradictory, “directly
contrary to experience” (T 2.3.1.18/ 407). In placing emphasis
on this negative task of refuting “the doctrine of
liberty or chance” (T 2.3.2.7/ 412), Hume is
happy to present himself as coming down firmly on the side of
“the doctrine of necessity” (T 2.3.2.3/ 409), which he is
careful to define in a way that avoids any confusion between causation
and compulsion or force (as is explained in more detail below). The
account that Hume offers in the Enquiry strikes a more
balanced note. In this work Hume presents his position as not so much
a refutation of “the doctrine of liberty” or
“free-will” (T 2.3.1.18/ 407; cf. T 2.1.10.5/ 312), but
rather as a “reconciling project with regard to the question of
liberty and necessity” (EHU 8.23/ 95; although even in the
Enquiry his references to liberty are not uniformly to
spontaneity). Although these differences should be noted, it is
important not to exaggerate them. In the Treatise Hume makes
clear that liberty of spontaneity is “the most common sense of
the word” and the “only… species of liberty, which
it concerns us to preserve” (T 2.3.2.1/ 407–8). It is evident,
therefore, that there is also a “reconciling project”
implicit in the Treatise and that his arguments against
“the doctrine of liberty” remain tightly focused on
liberty of indifference.
In both the Treatise and the Enquiry Hume claims
that the most original or interesting part of his contribution to free
will rests with his definition or understanding of what we mean by
necessity (T 2.3.1.18, 2.3.2.4/ 407, 409–10; see also EHU 8.1–3,
8.21–25/ 80–81, 92–96). It is this issue, Hume claims, that has been
the primary obstacle to resolving this controversy. According to Hume
there are “two particulars, which we are to consider as
essential to necessity, viz. the constant union and the
inference of the mind; and wherever we discover these we must
acknowledge a necessity” (T 2.3.1.4/ 400). In order to explain
this, Hume begins with a description of causation and necessity as we
observe it in “the operations of external bodies” (T
2.3.1.3/ 399) or in “the actions of matter” (T Abs. 34/
661). Here we find “not the least traces of indifference or
liberty” and we can see that “[e]very object is
determin’d by an absolute fate” (T 2.3.1.3/ 400). What
this means, Hume explains, is that we discover that there exist
constant conjunctions of objects, whereby resembling objects of one
kind are uniformly followed by resembling objects of another kind
(e.g., Xs are uniformly followed by Ys). (See, in particular, T 1.3; T
Abs. 8–9, 24–26/ 649–50, 655–57; and also EHU 4 and 7). When we
experience regularities of this sort we are able to draw relevant
inferences, and we deem objects of the first kind causes and those of
the second kind their effects.
The crucial point, on Hume’s account, is that we can discover no
further “ultimate connexion” (T 1.3.6.11/ 91)
between cause and effect beyond our experience of their regular union.
There is no perceived or known power or energy in a cause such that we
could draw any inference to its effect or by which the cause compels
or forces its effect to occur (T 1.3.12.20, 1.3.14.4–7/ 139, 157–59).
Nevertheless, on the basis of our experience of regularities or
constant conjunctions of objects, the mind, on the appearance of the
first object, naturally draws an inference to that of the other (T
1.3.14.20–22, 31/ 164–66, 169–70; cf. EHU 7.28–29/ 75–77). In other
words, our experience of regularities serves as the basis upon which
we can draw inferences to the existence of an object on the appearance
of another. All that we find of causation and necessity in bodies or
matter, Hume argues, is this conjunction of like objects along with
the inference of the mind from one to the other. The relevant
question, therefore, is do we find similar features in the operations
of human action?
Our experience, Hume maintains, proves that “our actions have a
constant union with our motives, tempers, and circumstances” and
that we draw relevant inferences from one to the other on this basis
(T 2.3.1.4/ 401). Although there are some apparent irregularities in
both the natural and the moral realms, this is entirely due to the
influence of contrary or concealed causes of which we are ignorant (T
2.3.1.11–12/ 403–4; cf. EHU 8.15/ 88).
[T]he union betwixt motives and actions has the same constancy, as
that in any natural operations, so its influence on the understanding
is also the same, in determining us to infer the existence of one from
that of another. If this shall appear, there is no known circumstance,
that enters into the connexion and production of the actions of
matter, that is not to be found in all the operations of the mind; and
consequently we cannot, without a manifest absurdity, attribute
necessity to the one, and refuse it to the other. (T 2.3.1.14/ 404)
In support of this claim Hume cites various regularities that we
observe in human society, where class, sex, occupation, age, and other
such factors are seen to be reliably correlated with different motives
and conduct (T 2.3.1.5–10/ 401–3). Regularities of this kind make it
possible for us to draw the sorts of inferences that are needed for
human social life, such as in all our reasoning concerning business,
politics, war, and so on (T 2.3.1.15/ 405; EHU 8.17–18/ 89–90). In the
absence of necessity, so understood, we could not survive or live
together.
Hume goes on to argue that not only is necessity of this kind
essential to human society, it is also “essential to religion
and morality” (T 2.3.2.5 410), because of its relevance to the
foundations of responsibility and punishment. If the motives of
rewards and punishments had no uniform and reliable influence on
conduct then law and society would be impossible (ibid.; cp. EHU 8.28/
97–98; see also T 3.3.4.4/ 609). Beyond this, whether we consider
human or divine rewards and punishments, the justice of such practices
depends on the fact that the agent has produced or brought about these
actions through her own will. The “doctrine of liberty or
chance,” however, would remove this connection between agent and
action and so no one could be properly held accountable for their
conduct (T 2.3.2.6/ 411). It is, therefore, “only upon the
principles of necessity, that a person acquires any merit or demerit
from his actions, however the common opinion may incline to the
contrary” (ibid.; EHU 8.31/ 99). Read this way, Hume is mostly
restating a claim found in many other compatibilist accounts, that necessity (determinism) is needed to support a generally forward-looking, utilitarian theory of moral
responsibility and punishment.
Why, then is there so much resistance to “the doctrine of
necessity”? The principal explanation for this resistance to
“the doctrine of necessity” is found, according to Hume,
in confusion about the nature of necessity as we discover it in
matter. Although in ordinary life we all rely upon and reason
upon the principles of necessity there may well be some reluctance to
call this union and inference necessity.
But as long as the meaning is understood, I hope the word can do no
harm.… I may be mistaken in asserting, that we have no idea of
any other connexion in the actions of body.… But sure I am, I
ascribe nothing to the actions of the mind, but what must readily be
allow’d of.… I do not ascribe to the will that
unintelligible necessity, which is suppos’d to lie in matter.
But I ascribe to matter, that intelligible quality, call it necessity
or not, which the most rigorous orthodoxy does or must allow to belong
to the will. I change, therefore, nothing in the receiv’d
systems, with regard to the will, but only with regard to material
objects. (T 2.3.2.4/ 410; cp. EHU 8.22/ 93–94)
The supposition that there is some further power or energy in matter,
whereby causes somehow compel or force their effects to occur, is the
fundamental source of confusion on this issue. It is this that
encourages us to reject the suggestion that our actions are subject to
necessity on the ground that this would imply some kind of violence or
constraint – something that would be incompatible with liberty
of spontaneity. When confusions of this sort are removed, all that
remains is the verbal quibble about using the term
“necessity” – which is not itself a substantial
point of disagreement.
Hume’s suggestion that our ideas of causation and necessity should be
understood in terms of constant conjunction of objects and the
inference of the mind became a central thread of the classical
compatibilist position. A key element of this is his diagnosis of the
source of incompatibilism as rooted in a confusion between causation
and compulsion. What are we to make of this aspect of the
compatibilist strategy? The first thing we need to consider is how
this argument stands in relation to the other compatibilist arguments
already described? We may begin by noting that Hume’s strategy, as
built around his “new definition of necessity” (TA, 34/661), appears
to concede that a stronger metaphysical “tie” or “bond” between cause
and effect would indeed “imply something of force, violence, and
constraint”. From the perspective of the (core) compatibilist
argument, as developed around the notion of “liberty of spontaneity”
and “hypothetical liberty”, this is a basic mistake. The distinction
that is crucial to the original argument is that between actions that
have causes that are internal to the agent (i.e., motives and
desires of some relevant kind) and those that have external causes. It
is the latter that are compelled or constrained actions (such as we
find in the case of the prisoner who is in chains: EU, 8.23/95). This
crucial distinction between actions that are brought about through the
agent’s motives and desires and those that are not is not compromised
by “metaphysical” (non-regularity) accounts of causation. What is
relevant to whether an action was compelled or not is the nature of
the cause (i.e., the object), not the nature of the
causal relation. Hume’s argument relating to the advantages
of his “new definition of necessity” directly challenges this –
so one or other of these two claims must be abandoned.
Another crucial claim of the original strategy was that if an agent is
to be (justly) held responsible for her actions then she must be
causally connected to them in the right way. Hume’s “new
definition of necessity” presents some awkward problems for this
requirement. More specifically, it may be argued that if we remove
“metaphysical” necessity of any kind from our conception of the causal
relation, and all objects are “entirely loose and separate...
conjoined but never connected” (EU, 7.26/73–4
– Hume’s emphasis), Hume’s own form of compatibilism is
vulnerable to the same objection that he raised against the suggestion
that free actions are uncaused. That is to say, a mere
regular conjunction between events cannot serve to adequately
connect the agent with her action. Hume’s theory of
causation, therefore, threatens to saw off the compatibilist branch
that he is sitting on.
Apart from these “internal” difficulties among Hume’s core arguments,
it may also be questioned whether Hume’s alternative account of
causation serves to allay or diffuse other (and deeper) worries that
libertarians and incompatibilists may have about his proposed
“reconciliation”. What libertarians seek – particularly but not
exclusively in the 1818th c. context – is an account of moral agency
that rests with agents who possess active powers of some kind
such that they have genuine open alternatives in the same (causal)
conditions. Related to this, libertarians also insist on making a
distinction between agents who can intervene in the natural
causal order and, on the other side, beings who are simply part of the
natural causal order and fully integrated within it. Real agency
requires the causal series to begin with the agent, not to run through
the agent. Hume’s revisionary “new definitions” of causation and
necessity satisfies none of these fundamental concerns or
requirements. Although Hume suggests that “a few intelligible
definitions” should immediately put an end to this controversy (EU,
8.2/81), he must have been well aware that he was far from providing
the sort of metaphysical resources that libertarians are seeking or
satisfying the demands that they place on free, responsible moral
agency.
Hume also advances two other explanations for resistance to “the
doctrine of necessity”. One of these concerns religion, which we
discuss further below. The other concerns, what we might describe as
the phenomenology of agency and the way in which it seems to discredit
Hume’s necessitarian claims. Hume concedes that when we consider our
actions from the agent’s perspective (i.e., the first person
perspective) we have “a false sensation or experience even of
the liberty of indifference” (T, 2.3.2.2/408 – Hume’s emphasis;
cf. EU, 8.22n18/94n). The basis of this is that when we are acting we
may not experience any “determination of thought” whereby we infer
the action to be performed. However, from the spectator’s (third
person) perspective the situation is quite different. The spectator
will “seldom feel such a looseness and indifference” and will reliably
infer actions from an agent’s motives and character. For this reason,
although when we act we may find it hard to accept that “we were
govern’d by necessity, and that ’twas utterly impossible for us to
have acted otherwise” (T, 2.3.2.1/407), the spectator’s perspective
shows that this is simply a “false sensation”. Put another way, the
agent perspective may encourage the view that the future is “open”
with respect to how we will act but this supposition is contradicted
by the opposing spectator perspective, which is generally reliable. It
is worth adding that this claim is consistent with Hume’s account in
the Enquiry of “hypothetical liberty”. There is no
contradiction between a spectator being able to reliably infer how an
agent will act and the fact that how that agent will act depends on
how he wills in these circumstances.
The above interpretation suggests that Hume’s primary aim in his
discussion “Of liberty and necessity” is to defend an account of moral
freedom understood in terms of “liberty of spontaneity”. Our tendency
to confuse this form of liberty with indifference is a result of a
mistaken understanding of the nature of causation and necessity. The
significance of Hume’s contribution, on this interpretation, rests
largely with his application of his “new definition of necessity” to
this issue. All this is, in turn, generally consistent with arguments
by leading representatives of classical compatibilism who came after
Hume (viz. Mill, Russell, Schlick, Ayer, et al). If this is an
accurate and complete account of Hume’s approach then it is liable to
all the objections that have been levelled against the classical compatibilist view.
The first and most obvious of these objections is that “liberty of spontaneity” is a wholly inadequate
conception of moral freedom. Kant, famously, describes this account of
moral freedom as a “wretched subterfuge” and suggests that
a freedom of this kind belongs to a clock that moves its hands by
means of internal causes. If our will is itself determined by
antecedent natural causes, then we are no more accountable for our
actions than any other mechanical object whose movements are
internally conditioned. Individuals who enjoy nothing more than a
liberty of this nature are, the incompatibilist claims, little more
than “robots” or “puppets” subject to the play
of fate. This general line of criticism, targeted against any
understanding of moral freedom in terms of “spontaneity”, leads
directly to two further important criticisms.
The incompatibilist maintains that if our willings and choices are
themselves determined by antecedent causes then we could never choose
otherwise than we do. Given the antecedent causal conditions, we must
always act as we do. We cannot, therefore, be held responsible for our
conduct since, on this account, we have no “genuine
alternatives” or “open possibilities” available to
us. Incompatibilists, as already noted, do not accept that Hume’s
notion of “hypothetical liberty”, as presented in the
Enquiry, can deal with this objection. It is true, of course,
that hypothetical liberty leaves room for the truth of conditionals
that suggest that we could have acted otherwise if we had
chosen to do so. However, it still remains the case, the
incompatibilist argues, that the agent could not have chosen otherwise
given the actual circumstances. Responsibility, they claim,
requires categorical freedom to choose otherwise in the same
circumstances. Hypothetical freedom alone will not suffice. One way of
expressing this point in more general terms is that the
incompatibilist holds that for responsibility we need more than
freedom of action, we also need freedom of will –
understood as a power to choose between open alternatives. Failing
this, the agent has no ultimate control over her conduct.
Hume’s effort to draw a distinction between free and unfree (i.e.,
compelled) action itself rests on a distinction between internal and
external causes. Critics of compatibilism argue that
this—attractively simple—distinction is impossible to
maintain. It seems obvious, for example, that there are cases in which
an agent acts according to the determinations of his own will but is
nevertheless clearly unfree. There are, in particular, circumstances
in which an agent may be subject to, and act on, desires and wants
that are themselves compulsive in nature (e.g., as with a drug addict
or kleptomaniac). Desires and wants of this kind, it is claimed, limit
and undermine an agent’s freedom no less than external force and
violence. Although it may be true that in these circumstances the
agent is acting according to his own desires or willings, it is
equally clear that such an agent is neither free nor responsible for
his behaviour. It would appear, therefore, that we are required to
acknowledge that some causes “internal” to the agent may
also be regarded as compelling or constraining. This concession,
however, generates serious difficulties for the classical
compatibilist strategy. It is no longer evident, given this
concession, which “internal” causes should be regarded as
“constraining” or “compelling” and which
should not. Lying behind this objection is the more fundamental
concern that the spontaneity argument presupposes a wholly inadequate
understanding of the nature of excusing and mitigating
considerations.
Finally, on this reading, Hume is understood as defending an
essentially forward-looking and utilitarian account of moral
responsibility. Following thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, Hume points out
that rewards and punishments serve to cause people to act in some ways
and not in others, which is clearly a matter of considerable social
utility (T, 2.3.2.5/410; EU, 8.2897–98). This sort of
forward-looking, utilitarian account of responsibility has been
further developed by a number of other compatibilists with whom Hume
is often closely identified (e.g., Moritz Schlick and J.J.C. Smart).
Forward-looking, utilitarian accounts of responsibility of this kind
have been subject to telling criticism. The basic problem with any
account of this kind, incompatibilists have argued, is that they are
entirely blind to matters of desert and so lack the required
(backward-looking) retributive element that is required in
this sphere. Moreover, any theory of responsibility of this kind,
critics say, is both too wide and too narrow. It is too wide because
it would appear to make children and animals responsible; and it is
too narrow because it implies that those who are dead and beyond the
reach of the relevant forms of “treatment” are actually
responsible for their actions. For all these reasons, critics argue,
we should reject compatibilist theories constructed along the lines of
these distinctions.
2. Free Will and Moral Sentiment – The Naturalistic Reading
What we need to ask now is to what extent the classical interpretation
serves to capture the essentials of Hume’s position on this subject?
From the perspective of the alternative naturalistic reading there are
two fundamental flaws in the classical reading:
First, and foremost, the classical reading fails to provide any proper
account of the role of moral sentiment in Hume’s understanding of (the
nature and conditions) of moral responsibility. Part of the
explanation for this is that the classical interpretation treats
Hume’s views on free will in isolation from other parts of his
philosophical system. In particular, it fails to adequately integrate
his discussion of free will with his theory of the passions (T,2.1 and
2.2). We are more vulnerable to this mistake if we rely too heavily on
Hume’s discussion “Of liberty and necessity” as presented in the
Enquiry.
Second, and related to the first issue, the classical reading suggests
an overly simple, if not crude, account of the relationship between
freedom and moral responsibility. Whereas the classical account
suggests that responsibility may be analyzed directly in terms of free
(or voluntary) action, the naturalistic interpretation suggests a very
different picture of this relationship. It would not be correct, for
example, to interpret Hume as endorsing what J.L. Mackie has called
“the straight rule of responsibility”: which is that “an agent is
responsible for all and only his intentional actions” (Mackie, 1977):
208; and also 221–2). This is, nevertheless, a view that the classical
interpretation encourages.
In order to see where the classical interpretation goes wrong we need
to begin with an examination of Hume’s arguments in support of the
claim that necessity is essential to morality and that “indifference”
would make morality impossible (T, 2.3.2.5–7/410–2).
Hume’s claim
that necessity is essential to morality runs parallel to his claim
that necessity is also essential to social life (T,2.3.1.8–15/401–05).
To live in society people must be able to infer the actions of others
from their motives and characters. Similarly, unless we were able to
infer character from action no one could be held responsible and
morality would be impossible. To understand the basis of this claim we
need to get a clearer picture of what it is to be held
responsible on Hume’s account – a picture that is very different
from the forward-looking, utilitarian-oriented view suggested by the
classical interpretation. Holding a person responsible is, for Hume, a
matter of regarding a person as an object of the moral sentiments of
approval and disapproval. Approval and disapproval are “nothing
but a fainter and more imperceptible love and hatred” (T,
3.3.5.1/614). They are, more specifically, calm forms of love and
hatred, which are themselves indirect passions.
In order to understand the relevance of necessity for the conditions
of holding a person responsible we we need to understand the workings
of “the regular mechanism” of the indirect passions (DP,
6.19). In his discussion of love and hatred Hume says:
One of these suppositions, viz. that the cause of love and hatred must
be related to a person or thinking being, in order to produce these
passions, is not only probable, but too evident to be contested.
Virtue and vice, when consider’d in the abstract… excite
no degree of love and hatred, esteem or contempt towards those, who
have no relation to them. (T, 2.2.1.7/331)
Our virtues and vices are not the only causes of love and hatred.
Wealth and property, family and social relations, bodily qualities and
attributes may also generate love or hate (T, 2.1.2.5; 2.1.7.1–5/279,
294f; DP, 2.14–33). It is, nevertheless, our virtues and vices,
understood as pleasurable or painful qualities of mind, that are
“the most obvious causes of these passions” (T,
2.1.7.2/295; cp. 3.1.2.5/473; and also 3.3.1.3/574–5). In this way, by
means of the general mechanism of the indirect passions, virtue and
vice give rise to that “faint and imperceptible” form of
love and hatred which constitutes the moral sentiments. This is
essential to all our ascriptions of moral responsibility.
Hume makes clear that it is not actions, as such, that give rise to
our moral sentiments but rather our more enduring or persisting
character traits (T, 2.2.3.4/348–9; and also 3.3.1.4–5/575). The
crucial passage in his discussion “Of liberty and
necessity” is the following:
Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where
they proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of
the person, who perform’d them, they infix not themselves upon
him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if
evil. The action itself may be blameable. The action itself may be
blameable… But the person is not responsible for it; and as it
proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or constant, and leaves
nothing of that nature behind it, ‘tis impossible he can, upon
its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance. (T,
2.3.2.6/411; cp. EU, 8.29/98; see also T, 3.3.3.4/575: “If any
action…”)
Further below, in Book II, Hume expands on these remarks:
‘Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only
the motives that produc’d them, and consider the actions as
signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and temper. The
external performance has no merit. We must look within to find the
moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and therefore fix our
attention on actions, as on external signs. But these actions are
still consider’d as signs; and the ultimate object of our praise
and approbation is the motive, that produc’d them. (T,
3.2.1.2/477; cp. 3.2.1.8/479; EU, 8.31/99)
In these two passages Hume is making two distinct but related points.
First, he maintains that “action”, considered as an
“external performance” without any reference to the motive
or intention that produced it, is not itself of moral concern. It is,
rather, the “internal” cause of the action that arouses
our moral sentiments. It is these aspects of action that inform us
about the mind and moral character of the agent. Second, the moral
qualities of an agent that arouse our moral sentiments must be
“durable or constant” – they cannot be
“temporary and perishing” in nature in the way actions
are. This second condition on the generation of moral sentiment is
itself a particular instance of the more general observation that Hume
has made earlier on in Book II that the relationship between the
quality or feature that gives rise to the indirect passions (i.e., its
cause) and the person who is the object of the passion must not be
“casual or inconstant” (T, 2.1.6.7/293). It is,
nevertheless, the first point that is especially important for our
present purpose of understanding why necessity is essential to
morality.
In order to know anyone’s motives and character we require
inference, from their actions to their motives and character (T,
2.1.11.3; 3.3.1.7/ 317, 576). Without knowledge of anyone’s
character no sentiment of approbation or blame would be aroused in us.
Without inferences moving in this direction – from action to
character (as opposed to from character to actions) – no one
would be an object of praise or blame and, hence, no one would be
regarded as morally responsible. In these circumstances, praising and
blaming would be psychologically impossible. Along the same lines,
external violence, like liberty of indifference, also makes it
impossible to regard someone as an object of praise or blame. When an
action is produced by causes external to the agent we are led away
from the agent’s character. Clearly, then, actions that are
either uncaused or caused by external factors cannot render an agent
responsible, not because it would be unreasonable to hold the person
responsible, but rather because it would be psychologically impossible
to hold the person responsible, where this stance is understood in
terms of the operation of the moral sentiments. It is in this way that
Hume brings his observations concerning the operation of the indirect
passions to bear on his claim that necessity is essential to morality
and, in particular, to our attitudes and practices associated with
responsibility and punishment.
In light of this alternative account, we may conclude that the nature
of Hume’s compatibilist strategy is significantly misrepresented by
the classical interpretation. Hume’s arguments purporting to
show that necessity is essential to morality are intimately connected
with his discussion of the indirect passions and the specific
mechanism that generates the moral sentiments. Whereas the classical
interpretation construes his arguments as conceptual or logical in
nature, the naturalistic interpretation presents Hume as concerned to
describe the circumstances under which people are
felt to be responsible. Interpreted this way, Hume’s
arguments constitute a contribution to descriptive moral psychology
and, as such, they are an important part of his wider program to
“introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral
subject” (which is the subtitle of the Treatise).
3. Hume’s Naturalism and Strawson’s “Reconciling Project”
The next question to consider is whether or not the issues that divide
the classical and naturalistic interpretations are of any contemporary
significance or interest? The first thing to be said about this is
that from a contemporary perspective, classical compatibilism seems
too crude an account of both freedom and moral responsibility and very
few philosophers would still press the claim that incompatibilist
prejudices can be explained simply in terms of confusion about
necessity arising from a conflation between causation and compulsion.
In contrast with this, Hume’s concern with the role and
relevance of moral sentiment for our understanding of the free will
problem anticipates several key features of P.F.
Strawson’s highly influential contribution to the contemporary
debate. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment”
[hereafter FR] is arguably the most important and influential paper
concerning the free will problem published in the second half of the
twentieth century. The most striking affinity between the approaches
taken by Hume and Strawson is their shared appeal to the role of moral
sentiments or reactive attitudes, which both use as a way of
discrediting any supposed sceptical threat arising from the thesis of
determinism.
On Strawson’s account, both classical compatibilists (who he refers to
as “optimists”) and libertarians (who refers to as
“pessimists”, because they suppose determinism threatens
moral responsibility) make a similar mistake of
“over-intellectualizing the facts” by seeking to provide
some sort of “external ‘rational’
justification” for moral responsibility (FR, 81). The classical
compatibilist does this on the basis of a “one-eyed
utilitarianism”, whereas the libertarian, seeing that something
vital is missing from the classical compatibilist account, tries to
plug the gap with “contra-causal freedom” – which
Strawson describes as “a pitiful intellectualist trinket”
(FR, 81). Against views of these kinds, Strawson argues that we should
focus our attention on the importance of reactive attitudes or moral
sentiments in this context. By this means he hopes to find some middle
ground whereby he can “reconcile” the two opposing camps.
Our reactive attitudes or moral sentiments, Strawson argues, should be
understood in terms of our natural human emotional responses to the
attitudes and intentions that human beings manifest towards each
other. We expect and demand some degree of good will and due regard
and we feel resentment or gratitude depending on whether or not this
is shown to us (FR, 66–7). Granted that these emotions are part of our
essential human make-up, and are naturally triggered or aroused in
relevant circumstances, it is still important to recognize that these
responses are in some measure under rational control and we can
“modify or mollify” them in light of relevant
considerations (FR, 68).
There are two kinds of consideration that Strawson distinguishes that
may require us to amend or withdraw our reactive attitudes. First,
there are considerations that we may describe as exemptions, where we
judge that an individual is not an appropriate or suitable target of
any reactive attitudes. These are cases where a person may be viewed
as “psychologically abnormal” or “morally
underdeveloped” (FR, 68; and also 71–2). On the other hand, even
where exemptions of this sort do not apply, ordinary excusing
considerations may nevertheless require that us to alter or change our
particular reactive attitudes as directed toward some individual (FR,
68). Considerations of this kind include cases where an agent acts
accidentally, or in ignorance, or was subject to physical force of
some kind. Where these considerations apply we may come to recognize
that the conduct in question, properly interpreted, does not lack the
degree of good will or due regard that we may demand. Even if some
injury has occurred, no malice or lack of regard has been shown to us.
However, the crucial point for Strawson is that while our reactive
attitudes may well be modified or withdrawn in these circumstances,
there is no question of us altogether abandoning or suspending our
reactive attitudes (FR, 71–3). In particular, there is nothing about
the thesis of determinism that implies that either exemptions or
excuses, as Strawson has described them, apply or hold universally
(FR, 70–1). Moreover, and more controversially, Strawson also
maintains that even if determinism did provide some
“theoretical” basis for drawing this sceptical conclusion,
any such policy is “for us as we are, practically
inconceivable” (FR, 71). In other words, according to Strawson
our natural commitment to the fabric of moral sentiment insulates us
from any possible global sceptical threat to the whole fabric of moral
responsibility based on theoretical worries about the implications of
determinism.
If we read Hume along the lines of the classical interpretation, then
his position on these issues looks as if it accords very closely with
the typical “optimist” strategy associated with such
thinkers as Schlick. The classical interpretation, however, entirely
overlooks the role of moral sentiment in Hume’s reconciling strategy.
It emphasizes the relevance of the (supposed) confusion between
causation and compulsion in order to explain the more fundamental
confusion about the nature of liberty (i.e., why philosophers tend to
confuse liberty of spontaneity with liberty of indifference). With
these features of Hume’s position established, the classical
interpretation points to Hume’s remarks concerning the social utility
of rewards and punishments and the way in which they depend on the
principles of necessity. From this perspective, Hume’s discussion of
freedom and necessity clearly constitutes a paradigmatic and
influential statement of the “optimist’s” position. So
interpreted, Hume must be read as thinker, like Schlick, who has
“over-intellectualized the facts” on the basis of a
“one-eyed-utilitarianism”; one who has ignored “that
complicated web of attitudes and feelings” which Strawson seeks
to draw our attention to. In this way, we are encouraged to view Hume
as a prime target of Strawson’s attack on the
“optimist” position.
The naturalistic interpretation, by contrast, makes it plain that any
such view of Hume’s approach and general strategy is deeply mistaken.
Hume, no less than Strawson, is especially concerned to draw our
attention to the facts about human nature that are relevant to a
proper understanding of the nature and conditions of moral
responsibility. More specifically, Hume argues that we cannot properly
account for moral responsibility unless we acknowledge and describe
the role that moral sentiment plays in this sphere. Indeed, unlike
Strawson, Hume is much more concerned with the detailed mechanism
whereby our moral sentiments are aroused, and thus he is particularly
concerned to explain the relevance of spontaneity, indifference, and
necessity to the functioning of moral sentiment. To this extent,
therefore, Hume’s naturalistic approach is more tightly woven into his
account of the nature of necessity and moral freedom. In sum, when we
compare Hume’s arguments with Strawson’s important and influential
discussion, it becomes immediately apparent that there is considerable
contemporary significance to the contrast between the classical and
naturalistic interpretations of Hume’s reconciling strategy.
The overall resemblance between Hume’s and Strawson’s strategy in
dealing with issues of freedom and responsibility is striking. The
fundamental point that they agree about is that we cannot understand
the nature and conditions of moral responsibility without reference to
the crucial role that moral sentiment plays in this sphere. This
naturalistic approach places Hume and Strawson in similar positions
when considered in relation to the views of the pessimist and the
optimist. The naturalistic approach shows that, in different ways,
both sides of the traditional debate fail to properly acknowledge the
facts about moral sentiment. Where Hume most noticeably differs from
Strawson, however, is on the question of the “general
causes” of moral sentiment. Strawson largely bypasses this
problem. For Hume, this is a crucial issue that must be settled to
understand why necessity is essential to responsibility and why
indifference is entirely incompatible with the effective operation of
the mechanism that responsibility depends on.
4. Virtue, Luck and “the Morality System”
We have noted that the classical and naturalistic interpretations
differ in how they account for the relationship between freedom and
responsibility. According to the classical interpretation
responsibility may be analysed directly in terms of free action, where
this is understood simply in terms of an agent acting according to her
own will or desires. While classical compatibilists reject the
incompatibilist suggestion that free and responsible action requires
indeterminism or any special form of “moral causation”
they are, nevertheless, both agreed that a person can be held
responsible if and only if she acts freely. On the naturalistic
interpretation, however, Hume rejects this general doctrine, which we
may call “voluntarism”.
Hume maintains that it is a matter of “the utmost
importance” for moral philosophy that action must be indicative
of durable qualities of mind if a person is to be held
accountable for it (T, 3.3.1.4/575). This claim is part of
Hume’s more general claim that our indirect passions (including
our moral sentiments) are aroused and sustained only when the
pleasurable or painful qualities concerned (e.g. the virtues and
vices) stand in a durable or constant relation with the person who is
their object (T, 2.1.6.7/292–3; DP, 2.11). In the case of
actions, which are “temporary and perishing”, no such
lasting relation is involved unless action is suitably tied to
character traits of some kind. Two important issues arise out of this
that need to be carefully distinguished.
(1) Does Hume hold that all aspects of virtue for which a person is
subject to moral evaluation (i.e., approval and disapproval) must be
voluntarily expressed? That is to say, are virtues and vices to be
assessed entirely on the basis of an agent’s deliberate choices
and intentional actions?
(2) Granted that virtues and vices are to be understood in terms of a
person’s pleasant or painful qualities of mind, to what extent
are these traits of character voluntarily acquired (i.e., acquired
through the agent’s own will and choices)?
Hume’s answer to both questions is clear. He denies that
voluntary or intentional action is the sole basis on which we may
assess a person’s virtues and vices. Furthermore he also
maintains that moral character is, for the most part, involuntarily
acquired. The second claim does not, of course, commit him to the
first. Nor does the first commit him to the second, since a person
could voluntarily acquire traits that, once acquired, may be
involuntarily expressed or manifest. Plainly the combination of claims
that Hume embraces on this issue commits him to a position that
radically deflates the significance and importance of voluntariness in
relation to virtue – certainly in comparison with some familiar
alternative accounts (e.g. as in Aristotle).
Let us consider, first, the relevance of voluntariness to the
expression of character. As we have already noted, Hume does take the
view that actions serve as the principal way in which we learn about a
person’s character (T, 3.3.1.5/575). Action is produced by the
causal influence of our desires and willings. The interpretation and
evaluation of action must, therefore, take note of the particular
intention with which an action was undertaken. Failing this, we are
liable to attribute character traits to the agent that he does not
possess (and consequently unjustly praise or blame him). Although
intention and action do have a significant and important role to play
in the assessment of moral character, Hume also maintains that there
are other channels through which character may be expressed. More
specifically, a virtuous or vicious character can be distinguished by
reference to a person’s “wishes and sentiments,” as
well as by the nature of the person’s will (T, 3.3.1.5/575).
Feelings, desires and sentiments manifest themselves in a wide variety
of ways – not just through willing and acting. A person’s
“countenance and conversation” (T, 2.1.11.3/317),
deportment or “carriage” (EU, 8.15/88), gestures (EU,
8.9/85), or simply her look and expression, may all serve as signs of
character and qualities of mind that may be found to be pleasant or
painful. Although we may enjoy some limited degree of control over our
desires and passions, as well as how they are expressed, for the most
part our emotional states and attitudes arise in us involuntarily and
may even be manifest or expressed against our will.
We may now turn to the further question concerning Hume’s
understanding of the way in which virtues and vices are
acquired and, in particular, to what extent they are shaped
and conditioned by our own choices. It is Hume’s view that, by
and large, our character is conditioned and determined by factors
independent of our will. In the sections “Of liberty and
necessity” (T, 2.3.1–2; EU, 8) he argues that not only do we
observe how certain characters will act in specific circumstances, we
also observe how circumstances condition character. Among the factors
that determine character, he claims, are bodily condition, age, sex,
occupation and social station, climate, religion, government, and
education (T, 2.3.1.5–10/401–03; EU, 8.7–15/83–8; see esp. EU,
8.11/85–6: “Are the manners ...”). These various causal
influences account for “the diversity of characters, prejudices,
and opinions” (EU, 8.10/85). Any accurate moral philosophy, it
is argued, must acknowledge and take note of the forces that
“mould the human mind from its infancy” and which account
for “the gradual change in our sentiments and
inclinations” through time (EU, 8.11/86). The general force of
these observations is to establish that “the fabric and
constitution of our mind no more depends on our choice, than that of
our body” (ESY, 168; see also T, 3.3.4.3/608; ESY, 140, 160,
579).
Critics of Hume’s position on this subject will argue that if a
person has little or no control over the factors that shape her
character then virtue and vice really would be, in these
circumstances, matters of mere good or bad fortune and no more a basis
for moral concern than bodily beauty or ugliness. (See Reid 1969:
261: “What was, by an ancient author, said of
Cato…”.) If people are responsible for the characters
their actions and feelings express, then they must have acquired that
character voluntarily. Hume’s reply to this line of criticism
is that we can perfectly well distinguish virtue and vice without
making any reference to the way that character is acquired. Our moral
sentiments are reactions or responses to the moral qualities and
character traits that people manifest in their behavior and conduct,
and thus need not be withdrawn simply because people do not choose or
voluntarily acquire these moral characteristics. Hume does recognize,
of course, that we do have some limited ability to amend and alter our
character. In particular, Hume acknowledges that we can cultivate and
improve our moral character, in some measure, through self-criticism
and self-understanding. Nevertheless, the points he emphasizes are
that all such efforts are limited in their scope and effect (ESY, 169)
and that, beyond this, “a man must be, before-hand, tolerably
virtuous” for such efforts of “reformation” to be
undertaken in the first place.
Hume’s views about the relationship between virtue and
voluntariness do much to explain one of the most controversial aspects
of his theory of virtue: his view that the natural abilities should be
incorporated into the virtues and vices (T, 3.3.4; EM, App 4). With
respect to this issue he makes two key points. The first is that
natural abilities (i.e., intelligence, imagination, memory, wit, etc.)
and moral virtues more narrowly understood are “equally mental
qualities” (T, 3.3.4.1/606). Second, both of them “equally
produce pleasure” and thus have “an equal tendency to
produce the love and esteem of mankind” (T, 3.3.4.1/606–07). In
common life, people “naturally praise or blame whatever pleases
or displeases them and thus regard penetration as much a virtue as
justice” (T, 3.3.4.4/609). (See, e.g., Hume’s sardonic
observation at EM, App. 4.5/ 315: “It is hard to tell...”)
Beyond all this, as already noted, any distinction between the natural
abilities and moral virtues cannot be based on the consideration that
the natural abilities are for the most part involuntarily acquired,
since this also holds true for the moral virtues more narrowly
conceived. It is, nevertheless, Hume’s view that the
voluntary/involuntary distinction helps to explain “why
moralists have invented” the distinction between natural
abilities and moral virtues. Unlike moral qualities, natural abilities
“are almost invariable by any art or industry” (T,
3.3.4.4/609). In contrast with this, moral qualities, “or at
least, the actions that proceed from them, may be chang’d by the
motives of rewards and punishments, praise and blame” (T,
3.3.4.4/609). In this way, according to Hume, the significance of the
voluntary/involuntary distinction is largely limited to our concern
with the regulation of conduct in society. To confine our
understanding of virtue and vice to these frontiers is, however, to
distort and misrepresent its very nature and foundation in human life
and experience. (For more on Hume’s views on virtue in relation to his
position on free will see Russell, 2013.)
These observations regarding Hume and the doctrine of voluntarism are
of considerable relevance to the contemporary ethical debate as it
concerns what Bernard Williams has described as “the morality
system” (Williams, 1985: Chp. 10). Although Williams’
(hostile) account of the morality system is multifaceted and defies
easy summary, its core features are clear enough. The concept that
Williams identifies as fundamental to the morality system is its
special notion of obligation. Flowing from this special concept of
obligation are the related concepts of right and wrong, blame and
voluntariness. When agents voluntarily violate their obligations they
do wrong and are liable to blame and some measure of retribution. To
this extent the morality system, so conceived, involves what Williams
calls “the blame system”, which focuses on particular acts
(Williams, 1985: 194). According to Williams there is pressure within
the blame system “to require a voluntariness that will be total
and will cut through character and psychological or social
determinism, and allocate blame and responsibility on the ultimately
fair basis of the agent’s own contribution, no more and no
less” (Williams, 1985: 194).
One reason why the morality system places great weight on the
importance of voluntariness is that it aspires to show that morality
— and moral responsibility in particular — somehow
“transcends luck” (Williams, 1985: 195). This is required
to ensure that blame is allocated in a way that is “ultimately
fair”. Despite the obvious challenges this requirement poses,
compatibilists have typically tried to satisfy these aspiration of the
morality system by way of offering a variety of argument to show that
compatibilist commitments do not render us vulnerable to the play of
fate or luck in our moral lives (e.g. Dennett, 1984). Hume, however,
makes little effort to satisfy these aspirations. (A point that
Williams notes in Williams, 1995: 20n12.) In the final analysis, Hume
claims, just as every body or material object “is
determin’d by an absolute fate to a certain degree and direction
of its motion, and can no more depart from that precise line, in which
it moves, than it can convert itself into an angel, or spirit, or any
superior substance” (T, 2.3.1.3/400), so too our conduct and
character is similarly subject to an “absolute fate” as
understood in terms of the inescapable “bonds of
necessity” (T, 2.3.2.2/408). In these fundamental respects,
therefore, Hume takes the view, along with Williams, that morality
does not elude either fate or luck. In this Hume, perhaps, shares more
with the ancient Greeks than he does with those moderns who embrace
the aspirations of the morality system (see, e.g., Williams,
1993).
5. Moral Sense and Moral Capacity
From a critical perspective, it may be argued that there remains a
significant gap in Hume’s scheme as have so far described it.
Even if we discard the aspirations of the morality system, any
credible naturalistic theory of moral responsibility needs to be able
to provide some account of the sorts of moral capacity involved in
exempting conditions, whereby we deem some individuals and
not others as appropriate targets of moral sentiments or
“reactive attitudes”. As it stands, what Hume has to say
on this subject is plainly inadequate. According to Hume, it is an
ultimate inexplicable fact about our moral sentiments (qua calm forms
of the indirect passions of love and hate) that they are always
directed at people, either ourselves or others. This account leaves us
unable say why some people are not appropriate objects of
moral sentiments (e.g. children, the insane, and so on). There are,
however, several available proposals for dealing with this gap.
Perhaps the most influential proposal is to adopt some general theory
of reason-responsiveness or rational self-control. According to
accounts of this kind, responsible agents need to have control over
their actions, where this involves performing “those actions
intentionally, while possessing the relevant sorts of normative
competence: the general ability to grasp moral requirements and to
govern one’s conduct by light of them” (Wallace, 1994:
86). While proposals of this general kind help to plug a large gap in
Hume’s theory, they also suggest a particular understanding of
moral responsibility that is not entirely in keeping with Hume’s
own account.
There are two points of divergence that are especially significant
with respect to to issue. First, rational self-control may be
explained, as it is on Wallace’s account, in terms of
specifically Kantian conceptions of practical reason and moral agency
(Wallace, 1994: 12–17). Even if commitments of this kind are
avoided, theories of this kind are still too narrowly based on moral
capacity as it relates solely to actions and intentions. On
Hume’s account, moral capacity must be related to wider patterns
and dispositions of feeling, desire and character. The scope of moral
evaluation should not reduced or limited to concern with (fleeting and
momentary) acts of will modelled after legal paradigms. Moral capacity
must be exercised and manifest in a larger and more diverse set of
propensities and abilities that make up moral character, including the
operation of moral sentiment itself.
Second, and related to the previous point, although Hume does not
provide any substantial or robust theory of moral capacity, it is
possible to find, within what he provides, material that suggests a
less “rationalistic” understanding of moral capacity. It
may be argued, for example, that in Hume’s system there is an
intimate and important relationship between moral sense and virtue.
Our moral sense should be understood in terms of our general capacity
to feel and direct moral sentiments at both ourselves and at others.
Hume points out that children acquire the artificial virtues,
involving the conventions of justice, by way not only of learning
their advantages but also learning to feel the relevant moral
sentiments when these conventions are violated (T,
3.2.3.26/500–01). The mechanism of the moral sentiments both
cultivates and maintains the artificial virtues. Hume has less to say
about the role of moral sentiment in relation to the natural virtues
but similar observations would seem to apply. As children grow up and
mature they become increasingly aware that their qualities of
character affect both others and themselves and that these will
inevitably give rise to moral sentiments in the people they will deal
with. This entire process of becoming aware of the moral sentiments of
others, and “surveying ourselves as we appear to others”
(T, 3.3.1.8, 3.3.1.26, 3.3.1.30, 3.3.6.6/576–7, 589, 591, 620;
EM, 9.10, App. 4.3/276, 314) surely serves to develop the natural as
well as the artificial virtues. Along these lines, Hume maintains that
this disposition to “survey ourselves” and seek our own
“peace and satisfaction” is the surest guardian of every
virtue (EM, 9.10/276). Any person who entirely lacks this disposition
will be shameless and will inevitably lack all the virtues that depend
on moral reflection for their development and stability.
If this conjecture regarding the intimate or internal relationship
between virtue and moral sense is correct, then it does much to
explain and account for the range of exemptions that are required in
this area. Hume’s understanding of the operation of moral
sentiment is not simply a matter of enjoying pleasant and painful
feelings of a peculiar kind (T, 3.1.2.4/472). On the contrary, the
moral evaluation of character involves the activity of both reason and
sentiment. The sort of intellectual activities required include not
only learning from experience the specific pleasant and painful
tendencies of certain kinds of character and conduct, as well as the
ability to distinguish accurately among them, but also the ability to
evaluate character and conduct from “some steady and general
point of view” (T, 3.3..15/581–2; EM,
5.41–2/227–8). Clearly, then, insofar as the cultivation
and stability of virtue depends on moral sense, it also requires the
intellectual qualities and capacities involved in the exercise of
moral sense. (One way of understanding this is to say that moral sense
and moral reflection serve as the counterparts to practical wisdom or
phronesis in Aristotle’s moral theory. See Russell, 2006.)
Given this, an animal, an infant, or an insane person will lack the
ability to perform the intellectual tasks involved in the production
of moral sentiment. We cannot, therefore, expect virtues that are
dependent on these abilities and intellectual activities to be
manifest in individuals who lack them, or when they are damaged or
underdeveloped.
Interpreting Hume in these terms not only goes a long way to filling
what looks to be a large gap in his naturalistic program, it also
avoids distorting his own wider ethical commitments by imposing a
narrower, rationalistic conception of moral capacity into his
naturalistic framework. Beyond this, interpreting moral capacity in
these more sentimentalist terms is both philosophically and
psychologically more satisfying and plausible. On an account of this
kind, there exists a close and essential relationship between being
responsible, where this is understood in terms of being an
appropriate target of moral sentiments or reactive attitudes, and
being able to hold oneself and others responsible, where this
is understood as the ability to experience and entertain moral
sentiments. It is a merit of Hume’s system, so interpreted, that
it avoids “over-intellectualizing” not only what is
involved in holding a person responsible, but also what is involved in
being a responsible agent.
6. Free Will and the Problem of Religion
In the Treatise, as was noted earlier, Hume argues that one
of the reasons “why the doctrine of liberty [of indifference]
has generally been better receiv’d in the world, than its antagonist
[the doctrine of necessity], proceeds from religion, which has been
very unnecessarily interested in this question” (T,
2.3.2.3/409). He goes on to argue “that the doctrine of
necessity, according to my explication of it, is not only innocent,
but even advantageous to religion and morality”. When Hume came
to present his views afresh in the Enquiry (Sec. 8), he was
less circumspect about his hostile intentions with regard to
“religion”. In the parallel passage (EU,
8.26/96—97), he again objects to any effort to refute a
hypothesis “by a pretence to its dangerous consequences to
religion and morality” (my emphasis). He goes on to say that his
account of the doctrines of liberty and necessity “are not only
consistent with morality, but are absolutely essential to its
support” (E, 8.26/97; my emphasis). By this means, he makes it
clear that he is not claiming that his position is
“consistent” with religion. In the final passages of the
Enquiry discussion of liberty and necessity (EU,
8.32–6/99—103) — passages which do not appear in the
original Treatise discussion — Hume makes it plain
exactly how his necessitarian principles have “dangerous
consequences for religion”.
Hume considers the following objection:
It may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected
to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is
a continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and
pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every
single volition of every human creature… . The ultimate Author
of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed
motion on this immense machine, and placed all beings in that
particular position, whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable
necessity, must result. Human action, therefore, either can have no
moral turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause; or if they
have any turpitude, they must involve our Creator in the same guilt,
while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. (EU,
8.32/99–100)
In other words, the doctrine of necessity produces an awkward dilemma
for the theological position: Either the distinction between (moral)
good and evil collapses, because everything is produced by a perfect
being who intends “nothing but what is altogether good and
laudable” (EU, 8.33/101), or we must “retract the
attribute of perfection, which we ascribe to the Deity” on the
ground that he is the ultimate author of moral evil in the world.
Hume treats the first horn of this dilemma at greatest length. He
draws on his naturalistic principles to show that the conclusion
reached (i.e., that no human actions are evil or criminal in nature)
is absurd. There are, he claims, both physical and moral evils in this
world that the human mind finds naturally painful, and this affects
our sentiments accordingly. Whether we are the victim of gout or of
robbery, we naturally feel the pain of such evils (EU,
8.34/101–2). No “remote speculations” or
“philosophical theories” concerning the good or perfection
of the whole universe will alter these natural reactions and responses
to the particular ills and evils we encounter. Hence, even if we were
to grant that this is indeed the best of all possible worlds—and
Hume clearly takes the view that we have no reason to suppose that it
is (D, 113–4; EU, 11.15–22/137–42)—this would
do nothing to undermine the reality of the distinction we draw between
good and evil (i.e., as experienced on the basis of “the natural
sentiments of the human mind”: EU, 8.35/103).
What, then, of the alternative view, that God is “the ultimate
author of guilt and moral turpitude in all his creatures”? Hume
offers two rather different accounts of this
alternative—although he does not distinguish them properly. He
begins by noting that if some human actions “have any turpitude,
they must involve our Creator in the same guilt, while he is
acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author” (EU,
8.32/100; my emphasis). This passage suggests that God is also
blameworthy for criminal actions in this world, since he is their
“ultimate author”. At this point, however, there is no
suggestion that the particular human agents who commit these crimes
(as preordained by God) are not accountable for them. In the passage
that follows this is the position taken.
For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences
whether the train he employed be long or short; so wherever a
continued chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either
finite or infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of
all the rest, and must both bear the blame and acquire the praise
which belong to them. (EU, 8.32/100)
Hume goes on to argue that this rule of morality has even
“greater force” when applied to God, since he is neither
ignorant nor impotent and must, therefore, have knowingly produced
those criminal actions which are manifest in the world. Granted that
such actions are indeed criminal, it follows, says Hume, “that
the Deity, not man, is accountable for them” (EU, 8.32/100; cf.
EU, 8.33/101).
It is evident that Hume is arguing two points. First, if God is the
creator of the world and preordained and predetermined everything that
happens in it, then the (obvious) existence of moral evil is
attributable to him, and thus “we must retract the attribute of
perfection” which we ascribe to him. Second, if God is indeed
the ultimate author of moral evil, then no individual human being is
accountable for the criminal actions he performs. The second claim
does not follow from the first. Moreover, it is clearly inconsistent
with Hume’s general position on this subject. As has been noted, in
this same context, Hume has also argued that no speculative
philosophical theory can alter the natural workings of our moral
sentiments. The supposition that God is the “ultimate
author” of all that takes place in the world will not, on this
view of things, change our natural disposition to praise or blame our
fellow human beings. Whatever the ultimate causes of a person’s
character and conduct, it will (inevitably) arouse a sentiment of
praise or blame in other humans who contemplate it. This remains the
case even if we suppose that God also deserves blame for the
“moral turpitude” we find in the world. In general, then,
Hume’s first formulation of the second alternative (i.e., that God
must share the blame for those crimes that occur in the
world) is more consistent with his naturalistic principles.
What is crucial to Hume’s polemical purpose in these passages is not
the thesis that if God is the author of crimes then his human
creations are not accountable for them. Rather, the point Hume is
concerned to make (since he does not, in fact, doubt the
inescapability of our moral accountability to our fellow human beings)
is that the religious hypothesis leads to the “absurd
consequence” that God is the ultimate author of sin in this
world and that he is, accordingly, liable to some appropriate measure
of blame. Hume, in other words, takes the (deeply impious) step of
showing that if God exists, and is the creator of the universe, then
he is no more free of sin than human beings are. According to Hume, we
must judge God as we judge human beings, on the basis of his effects
in the world, and we must then adjust our sentiments accordingly.
Indeed, there is no other natural or reasonable basis on which to
found our sentiments toward God. In certain respects, therefore, we
can make better sense of how we (humans) can hold God accountable than
we can make sense of how God is supposed to hold humans accountable
(i.e., since we have no knowledge of his sentiments, or even
if he has any; cf. D, 58,114,128–9; ESY, 594; but see also LET,
I/51). It is, of course, Hume’s considered view that it is an
egregious error of speculative theology and philosophy to suppose that
the universe has been created by a being that bears some (close)
resemblance to humankind. The question of the origin of the universe
is one that Hume plainly regards as beyond the scope of human reason
(see, e.g., EU,
1.11–2;11.15–23;11.26–7;12.2634/11–13,
137–42, 144–47, 165; D, 36–8,88–9,107).
Nevertheless, Hume’s point is plain: On the basis of the (limited)
evidence that is available to us, we must suppose that if there is a
God, who is creator of this world and who orders all that takes place
in it, then this being is indeed accountable for all the (unnecessary
and avoidable; D, 107) evil that we discover in it.
Although it is evident that Hume’s discussion of free will in
the first Enquiry is part of his wider critique of the
Christian religion, it is nevertheless widely held that Hume’s
earlier discussion “Of liberty and necessity” in the
Treatise carries none of this irreligious content or
significance. This view is itself encouraged by a more general
understanding of the relationship between the Treatise and
the first Enquiry which maintains that the Treatise
lacks any significant irreligious content (because Hume
“castrated” his work and removed most passages of this
kind, perhaps including the passages at EU, 8.32–6). On this
view of things, the elements of Hume’s discussion that are
common to both Treatise 2.3.1–2 and Enquiry 8
are themselves without any particular religious or irreligious
significance. To show why this view is seriously mistaken would,
however, take us wide of our present concerns. (For a more detailed
account of Hume’s fundamental irreligious intentions throughout
the Treatise see Russell, 2008 and also Russell, 2016.)
Suffice it to note, for our present purposes, that throughout
his writings, Hume’s philosophical interests and concerns were
very largely dominated and directed by his fundamental irreligious
aims and objectives. A basic theme in Hume’s philosophy, so
considered, is his effort to demystify moral and social life and
release it from the metaphysical trappings of
“superstition”. The core thesis of Hume’s
Treatise — indeed, of his overall (irreligious or
“atheistic”) philosophical outlook — is that moral
and social life neither rests upon nor requires the dogmas of
Christian metaphysics. Hume’s naturalistic framework for understanding
moral and social life excludes not only the metaphysics of
libertarianism (e.g., modes of “moral” causation by
immaterial agents) but also all further theologically inspired
metaphysics that generally accompanies it (i.e., God, the immortal
soul, a future state, and so on). The metaphysics of religion, Hume
suggests, serves only to confuse and obscure our understanding of
these matters and to hide their true foundation in human nature.
Hume’s views on the subject of free will and moral responsibility, as
presented in the sections “Of liberty and necessity” and
elsewhere in his writings, are the very pivot on which this
fundamental thesis turns.
Bibliography
References to Hume’s Works
In the entry above, we follow the convention given in the Nortons’
Treatise and Beauchamp’s Enquiries: we cite Book.
Part. Section. Paragraph; followed by references to the
Selby-Bigge/Nidditch editions. Thus T,1.2.3.4/ 34: will indicate
Treatise Bk.1, Pt.2, Sec.3, Para.4/ Selby-Bigge pg.34.
References to Abstract [TA] are to the two editions of the
Treatise mentioned above (paragraph/page). In the case of the
Enquiries I cite Section and Paragraph; followed by page
reference to the Selby-Bigge edition. Thus EU, 12.1/ 149 refers to
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sect.12, Para. 1 /
Selby-Bigge pg. 149.
T A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A.
Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed. revised by P.H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon
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A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by David Fate Norton and
Mary J. Norton, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.
EU Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in
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Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition
revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, edited by Tom L.
Beauchamp, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
EM Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, in
Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the
Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd edition
revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by Tom L.
Beauchamp, Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1998
ESY Essays: Moral, Political, and Literary, rev. ed. by
E.F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1985).
DP “A Dissertation on the Passions” [1757], reprinted
in A Dissertation of the Passions & The Natural History of
Religion, edited by T.L.Beauchamp. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2007.
D Dialogues concerning Natural Religion (1779) in:
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Gaskin (Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
LET The Letters of David Hume, edited by J.Y.T. Greig, 2
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Human Liberty; reprinted in J. O’Higgins (ed.), Determinism
and Freewill, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976.
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reprinted in Davidson 1980, pp. 63–81.
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Clarendon Press.
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Worth Wanting, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
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–––, 2012. “Free Will”, in A. Bailey
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–––, 1651. Leviathan, R. Tuck (ed.),
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A Brief Guide to Further Reading
The above citations may be used as the basis for further reading on
this subject in the following way. Influential statements of the
classical interpretation of Hume’s intentions can be found in Flew
(1962), Penelhum (1975) and Stroud (1977). Prominent statements of
20th century classical compatibilism that are generally
taken to follow in Hume’s tracks include Schlick (1939), Ayer (1954)
and Smart (1961). Davidson (1963) provides an important statement of
the causal theory of action based on broadly Humean principles. A
complete statement of the naturalistic interpretation is provided in
Russell (1995), esp. Part I. For a critical response to this study see
Penelhum (1998; 2000a), and also the earlier exchange between Russell
(1983, 1985) and Flew (1984). The contributions by Botterill (2002)
and Pitson (2016) follow up on some the issues that are at stake here.
For an account of Hume’s views on punishment – a topic that is
closely connected with the problem of free will – see Russell
(1990) and Russell (1995 – Chp. 10). For a general account of
the 18th century debate that Hume was involved in see
Harris (2005) and Russell (2008), Chap. 16. See also O’Higgins
introduction [in Collins (1717)] for further background. The works by
Hobbes, Locke, Clarke and Collins, as cited above, are essential
reading for an understanding of the general free will debate that Hume
was involved in. Smith (1759) is a valuable point of contrast in
relation to Hume’s views, insofar as Smith develops a naturalistic
theory of responsibility based on moral sentiment (which Strawson
follows up on). However, Smith does not discuss the free will issue
directly (which is itself a point of some significance). In contrast
with this, Reid (1788) is perhaps Hume’s most effective and
distinguished contemporary critic on this subject and his contribution
remains of considerable interest and value. With respect to Hume’s
views on free will as they relate to his more general irreligious
intentions see Russell (2008 – esp. Chp. 16). Similar material
is covered in Russell (2016). Garrett (1997) provides a lucid overview
and careful analysis of Hume’s views on liberty and necessity, which
includes discussion of the theological side of Hume’s arguments and
concerns. Helpful introductions discussing recent developments in
compatibilist thinking, which are of obvious relevance for an
assessment of the contemporary value of Hume’s views on this subject,
can be found in McKenna (2004) and Kane (2005). Among the various
points of contrast not discussed in this article, Frankfurt (1971) is
an influential and important paper that aims to advance the classical
compatibilist strategy beyond the bounds of accounts of freedom of
action. However, as noted in the main text of this article, the work
of P.F. Strawson (1962, 1985) is of particular importance in respect
of the contemporary significance and relevance of Hume’s naturalistic
strategy. Finally, for discussions of Hume’s compatibilism as it
relates to his theory of causation see, for example, Russell (1988),
Russell (1995), esp. Chaps.1–3, Beebee & Mele (2002), Harris
(2005), Chap. 3, Millican (2010), and Berofsky (2012).
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