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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BRIEFING ON CURRENT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA, IRAQ, AND YUGOSLAVIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 29, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY

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JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF BRIEFING ON CURRENT MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA, IRAQ, AND YUGOSLAVIA

FRIDAY, JANUARY 29, 1993

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in room SR-222, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam Nunn (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Nunn, Exon, Levin, Bingaman, Glenn, Graham, Thurmond, Warner, Cohen, and Kempthorne.

Committee staff members present: Arnold L. Punaro, staff director; Andrew S. Effron, general counsel; Richard D. DeBobes, counsel; Elizabeth I. Solomon, research assistant; and Lucia M. Chavez, research assistant.

Professional staff members present: John W. Douglass, Richard D. Finn, Jr., John J. Hamre, and Michael J. McCord.

Minority staff members present: Anthony J. Principi, minority staff director; Romie L. Brownlee, deputy staff director for the minority; Judith A. Ansley, George W. Lauffer, Durwood W. Ringo, Jr., Mark B. Robinson, Tom Moore, and Charlie Abell, professional staff members.

Staff assistants present: Camden Jones Flick and Mary J. Kyle.

Committee members' assistants present: Andrew W. Johnson, assistant to Senator Exon; David A. Lewis, assistant to Senator Levin; Patricia J. Buckheit and Suzanne M. McKenna, assistants to Senator Glenn; Melvin G. Dubee, assistant to Senator Byrd; Al Cumming, assistant to Senator Graham; James M. Bodner, assistant to Senator Cohen; Samuel D. Adcock, assistant to Senator Lott; Thomas L. Lankford, assistant to Senator Smith; Buzz Fawcett, assistant to Senator Kempthorne.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SAM NUNN, CHAIRMAN

Chairman NUNN. The committee will come to order.

The committee meets this morning to receive a briefing on current military operations in Somalia, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. Our briefers are Lieutenant General Martin Brandtner, Director of Operations, J-3, of the Joint Staff and Rear Admiral Mike Cramer, Director of Current Intelligence, J-2, of the Joint Staff.

General Brandtner last appeared before the committee on December 9, 1992, to brief us on the operation called Restore Hope,

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which had commenced in Somalia on the previous day. I believe that this is Admiral Cramer's first appearance before the committee, correct? Glad to have you, Admiral, General, I extend a warm welcome to both of you.

I think it is important to note that these three military operations are similar, and that each is being carried out pursuant to United Nations Security Council resolutions which authorize the use of all necessary means to accomplish the specified goals of the United Nations. They are also similar in that each operation, at least in part, is being carried out for humanitarian purposes, establishing a more secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, protection of the Kurds in Northern Iraq, the Shi'ites in Southern Iraq, and the air delivery of humanitarian relief supplies to Sarajevo.

There are also differences between the operations in terms of the missions, whether U.S. forces are playing a lead or supporting role, and so forth. Since we will be covering three separate operations, I suggest that we allow the briefers to make their presentations on Somalia first, then we will have questions on Somalia; then we will repeat the process for Iraq, and then we will do the same thing for former Yugoslavia.

I want to note that neither of our briefers are policymakers in that sense of the word, and thus, they will not be able to respond in detail to questions relating to policy. They are here to advise us on operational and intelligence matters and to answer our questions on these matters. We will receive these briefings and have questions on these three operations in open session, and then to the extent that we cannot get certain information in open session, if necessary we will go into closed session. But I think it is very important for as much as possible to be in open session so the American people will be able to get a glimpse of what is really happening in these three important areas.

Senator Thurmond, before I turn to General Brandtner and the admiral, I will call on you for any remarks.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join you in extending a warm welcome to our witnesses from the Office of the Joint Chiefs.

Today, the United States is involved in two large operations. American forces in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf are keeping a close watch on Saddam Hussein. In Somalia they are bringing some order out of chaos. And thanks to their efforts, starving women and children are able to eat instead of having food snatched out of their mouths by armed thugs and warlords. We may soon be drawn more deeply into a third crisis—The Bosnian-Serbian crisis—although I hope the new Commander in Chief will think long and hard before committing American servicemen to that confusing, complex situation.

The world is still a dangerous, uncertain place, even though the threat from the former Soviet Union is decreasing. There are enough ethnic hatreds, traditional enemies, and old scores to be settled to keep conflict raging all over the globe. Some of these conflicts may jeopardize U.S. interests. Others will not threaten us, and we must resist the temptation to think we have a dog in every fight.

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But even if we carefully limit the scope of U.S. military intervention around the world, we cannot plan for every possibility. There will always be contingencies, emergencies, unanticipated crises, and aggression by dictators that may require U.S. troops. Saddam Hussein's rape of Kuwait is a good example. Desert Storm was a war we did not plan to fight and did not want to fight, but in the end, had to fight.

My primary concern as ranking member of the committee is this—will we be able to intervene with sufficient force if another dictator challenges us in some distant but critical corner of the globe? Today, the United States has the best military forces in the world, the best we have ever had. But how long will they remain the best if we cut the defense budget too deeply?

Mr. Chairman, I want to make sure that in the future we will be able to protect our vital interests if we are challenged in two or three places at the same time. I want our future soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen to have the best weapons and equipment. I want to see the discipline, morale, cohesion, and combat effectiveness of the forces remain high. If we cannot achieve these goals, then we can expect to pay a high price in the future. The price will be the blood of Americans in uniform and diminished security for all other Americans.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. General Brandtner, we will ask you to begin first. I believe you plan to start on Somalia, is that right?

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. MARTIN L. BRANDTNER, USMC, DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (J-3), OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

General BRANDTNER. Yes, sir. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, it is an honor to be here. Both Admiral Cramer and I appreciate very much the opportunity to tell what I think in large measure is the success story of U.S. involvement in a number of operations which we will brief. We have a lot of ground to cover, and with your permission, what we would like to do is have Admiral Cramer from the intelligence perspective sort of set the stage and let you see where we are with respect to each of these regional areas, and then I will discuss the operational aspects of it, and then, we would be happy to answer questions pertaining to that particular aspect, and then we would move on sequentially through.

Chairman NUNN. Good.

General BRANDTNER. First of all, what I would like to do is turn it over to Admiral Cramer and have him give you a background and situation brief on the Somali situation.

SOMALIA

SITUATION UPDATE

STATEMENT OF REAR ADM. MIKE W. CRAMER, USN, DIRECTOR OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE (J-2), OFFICE OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

Admiral CRAMER. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Senators.

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What I would like to do is to step through very quickly the general security situation as we see it now in Somalia, the threats to U.S. forces as we recognize them, and then give you a picture of each of the cities, an assessment of our security situation of each of those cities, talk a little bit of what we anticipate in Somalia, and then turn it over to General Brandtner for specific operational considerations.

The security situation overall on our first graphic here to the left is taken directly from our personnel who have just returned and, of course, from reports by Lieutenant General Johnston's staff in the field on the situation as they see it.

First of all, in terms of a general statement, in Somalia there was overwhelmingly positive Somali reaction to the deployment of the coalition, and the provision of the security by U.S. and coalition forces. It is a very popular operation. There are certainly some exceptions to that, and I will discuss those. But overall, our operation was overwhelmingly successful.

However, it is also important to note that the Somalis' expectations of what we were there to achieve also, we believe, was too high. In addition to providing a security environment through which humanitarian assistance could flow, many Somalis also thought we would concomitantly restore the infrastructure and return society, if you will, to normal in rapid form. That was not our original mission, but nonetheless, that was the expectation of many of the Somalis.

The immediate impact of Restore Hope is absolutely reduced factional fighting. That does not mean that occasional fighting does not occur. Over the last couple of days—for example, this past weekend, we had some factional fighting in the Kismayo area. But by and large, there has been none—no—zero—organized resistance to either U.S. forces or the coalition forces by any of the major factions.

Particularly because of the good work of Ambassador Oakley and his team, politically, there clearly has been reopening of talks among the factions. We saw that initially between Aideed and Ali Mahdi. We saw it most recently at the conference in Addis Ababa.

Gradually, at least in the major cities, and perhaps even more importantly, the smaller cities around the countryside, are beginning to return to normal commerce and economic relations. Now, in some cases the food being traded is, in fact, humanitarian relief food, but at least a barter economy and other aspects of life slowly are beginning to return to normal, particularly outside Mogadishu and Kismayo.

Internationally, it is remarkable the humanitarian support—I would say almost the heroic humanitarian support—that is being provided by many of the official organizations, and nongovernmental organizations that are there. Their performance has been magnificent.

As far as humanitarian relief is concerned, I think it is very fair to say that in those areas which we control directly, humanitarian relief is flowing well because of the security that we have provided. There are still many examples in areas where coalition forces are not present that International Red Cross and others food deliveries

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will be attacked, or looted by local bandits, but not by a major faction as had been the case prior to this operation.



Moving on specifically now to the threat that we see to U.S. forces in Somalia, most serious is just common crime. If our soldiers and individuals who are out as unprotected individuals on the streets, do not present a solid, strong front, particularly in the case of Mogadishu, and Kismayo, if they appear vulnerable, they are subject to common crime—looting, stealing, that kind of thing, right off the trucks. Serious criminal activity continues to occur.

There are certainly occasions when there is an inadvertent contact—our forces find themselves between partial factions and crossfire. Those things still happen. They happened as recently as this weekend in Kismayo. But in terms of deliberately planned factional actions, there has been very little of that.

We also have a problem, frankly, with the drug trade. Khat, as we all know, is legal in Somalia. It is an accepted practice. It is culturally accepted in Somalia. To the extent to which our forces find themselves interfering directly or indirectly with the khat trade, we find ourselves in threatening situations.

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Next, I would like to give you just a graphic lay-down. It is also contained in your background documents, which lay out the current in color-coded section here—various Somali factions. It is still very much a hodgepodge of many factions, and this graphic lays those out rather clearly.

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

The next graphic, is perhaps the most important—security situation as we see it today. On the screen to my left you will see the security status with each of the cities. On my right, you will see the specific definitions of what stable, unstable, relatively stable mean.

Most importantly, in Mogadishu, we still find the situation unstable. For example, within the last 24 hours we had four significant incidents with coalition forces in which shooting or acts of violence actually took place. It is very typical. The last 24 hours is representative of what we have seen, frankly, over the last couple of weeks or so. In each case they were isolated incidents. Fortunately, there continued to be no coalition casualties, but is rather typical of the kind of thing that you see in Mogadishu.

Kismayo, pretty well falls in the same category.

Generally, the rest of the country is stable, secure, and the security situation is much improved. So really, in summary the two big cities still present—are our two most significant security threats.

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



I already alluded to the military challenges that we face in Mogadishu and Kismayo. Another is in Central Somalia in the Galcacio area. We know there are concentrations of heavy weapons,

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technicals, and so on in that area. Many of these have deployed from the Mogadishu area up into the central part of Somalia. To be honest, they are not in an area which presents a security threat directly to either U.S. forces or coalition forces. We are just watching them, monitoring them, but they are not a direct threat to our forces.

I will be happy to turn the presentation over to General Brandtner to get into direct specific operational considerations.



General BRANDTNER. The operation, as you know, is called Operation Restore Hope.

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I would like to first of all show the missions that were assigned to the task force commander and they are shown here on the slide to your left. As you can see, it was a broad mission, but also was very focused on the purpose of making certain we were able to secure the ports and the installations to open passage of relief supplies to the Somalis, and in addition to provide assistance to the nongovernmental organizations in the United Nations, as shown.

The initial concept of operations is shown here on the left, and you will note that it was in a four-phase operation. And if you would look to the slide on your right you will see that the initial concept is shown here graphically where we would have U.S. forces inserted into Mogadishu and where they took down the airport facility and the seaport, as you recall. This occurred on the 9th of December. The overall phases are shown here in color codes to indicate how we had intended to secure these various sites as we moved forward out into the region to begin the security operations.

Note that down in the lower left of the slide you will see that the JTF—Joint Task Force—Provide Relief continued to operate out of Mombasa, providing relief to interior parts of the country that had been going on for some time. We had offshore the task force U.S.S. *Tripoli,* the carrier *Battle Ranger,* and three maritime prepositioned ships that were supporting the Marine forces ashore.

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MISSION

USCINCCENT CONDUCTS JOINT / COMBINED MILITARY OPERATIONS IN SOMALIA TO:

- SECURE MAJOR AIR AND SEA PORTS INSTALLATIONS AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION POINTS
- OPEN AND FREE PASSAGE OF RELIEF SUPPLIES
- PROVIDE SECURITY FOR CONVOYS AND RELIEF SUPPLIES
- ASSIST UN / NGOS IN PROVIDING RELIEF UNDER UN AUSPICES

INITIAL CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

- PHASE 1: SECURE MOGADISHU AIRFIELD AND SEAPORT WITH AFLOAT MARINE FORCES AND SECURE BAIDOA.
- PHASE 2: DEPLOY UNITAF FORCES INTO BAIDOA AND EXPAND SECURITY OPERATIONS INTO CENTRAL SOMALIA.
- PHASE 3: EXPAND SECURITY OPERATIONS TO THE SOUTH TO INCLUDE KISMAYO AND BARDERA.
- PHASE 4: TRANSITION FROM UNITAF TO UNOSOM II

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

The end of Phase I occurred on the 16th of December, and as you can see, we had U.S. Marine Corps forces in Baidoa, Bale Dogle, and a combined task force of Marines and French Legionnaires had secured Mogadishu. We had increased our forces somewhat in the Provide Relief by bringing in some United Kingdom aircraft support. The position of U.S. forces offshore remained the same.

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

Phase II commenced at that point, and ended on the 28th of December, way ahead of schedule, by the way I might add, as posed by the unified commander, and on the 28th of December of 1992 the portrayal of forces shown here did exist at that time. We had seized Kismayo, Bardera—the Kismayo operation was a combined Belgium and U.S. Marine Corps operation—the others, as shown here. Oddur was taken and secured by the French, Gialalassi by the Italians, and Belet Weyne was secured by the Canadians. We also had operations with ships offshore down in the Kismayo area, and as you can see, we also brought in some German aircraft to support the Operation Provide Relief, which had now been folded into Restore Hope. And at this point, we had established eight humanitarian relief sectors which are portrayed by the circled areas on the slide.

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

Phase III commenced immediately after that, and as you can see, we brought in significant elements of coalition forces, both naval, air, and ground forces. We established a UNITAF headquarters in Mogadishu, which is a joint and combined headquarters under the aegis of General Johnston, who is a commanding general of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force.

As of the 29th of January, the forces portrayed here—the Moroccan forces were brought in, the Marines had been relieved in toto by the Belgians at Kismayo and had also extended out into other areas and had begun to clear surface routes of transportation among and between the humanitarian relief sectors that were established.

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

This slide portrays a list of essentially the amounts of effort that have been put out in terms of both strategic lift in the airlift and intratheater lift, both in terms of supporting the forces ashore and in continuing to support the relief missions. I show you this not to give you just numbers crunching; but to demonstrate the magnitude of the effort that has been put forth to date by U.S. and coalition forces.

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RESTORE HOPE AIRLIFT SUMMARY

STRATEGIC LIFT

	C-141	C-5	KC-10	COML	TOTAL
MISSIONS	402	211	140	60	813
PASSENGERS	4,540	5,089	686	15,157	25,472
CARGO (MTONS)	6,904	11,803	5,408	2,582	26,697

INTRA-THEATER LIFT

C-130 / C-160 (US / UK / GE)

	CUMULATIVE MISSIONS	CUMULATIVE CARGO (MTONS)
RELIEF MISSIONS	2,079	23,923
SUPT MISSIONS	505	12,499
TOTAL INTRA-THEATER	2,584	36,422

The sealift summary shown on this slide on the right gives you also a magnitude of effort in terms of the sealift, and I have also shown down at the bottom, to give you an example, that D + 49 in similar times, the comparison of the effort that it took during Operation Desert Shield versus Operation Restore Hope. And you can see that while Operation Desert Shield was significantly greater, nonetheless, the amount of airlift that has been employed in this operation is indeed enormous.

The number of U.S. personnel in the UNITAF headquarters in operating forces are shown here. I will just make sure you understand the abbreviations. JSO is Joint Special Operations Forces, ARFOR are the Army forces, AFFOR are the Air Force forces, MARFOR, the Marine Corps forces, NAVFOR are the Navy forces, JCSE is a joint communications support element which comes out of the command at MacDill, and this provides connectivity activity with the United States here, and the JTF Provide Relief which was absorbed into the task force which is still located in Mombasa and the liaison personnel from the various coalition countries that are supporting the operation which are attached to the UNITAF headquarters working with General Johnston.

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US PERSONNEL IN UNITAF

HQ CTF-S	4,519
JSOFOR-S	77
ARFOR-S	5,660
AFFOR-S	1,068
MARFOR-S	8,855
NAVFOR-S	3,800
JCSE	74
JTFPR	78
LIAISON PERSONNEL	34
TOTAL	24,165

RESTORE HOPE SEALIFT SUMMARY

US SHIPS

MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND

6 FSS
1 RRF
1 MSC
1 OPDS
7 CHARTERED

TOTAL SEALIFT 270,020 MTONS

PREPOSITION SHIPS

5 MARITIME PREPOSITION SHIPS
4 ARMY PREPOSITION SHIPS

31 COALITION SHIPS

13 UN / NON-GOVT RELIEF SHIPS

HISTORICAL AIRLIFT COMPARISON

AT D+49

OPERATION DESERT SHIELD 5,878 C-141 EQUIVS

OPERATION RESTORE HOPE 1,807 C-141 EQUIVS

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Although any casualties are too much, I would submit that this operation has been enormously successful in this regard. Regrettably, two Marines have lost their lives, but considering the effort put forth in this and the amount of troops and the highly, highly dangerous environment we are in, I think we have been blessed by good fortune here, and I think this is a tribute to the training, equipment, and leadership that these forces have.



The coalition forces that are involved in this operation which are currently deployed in-country are shown here, both in terms of the country and the numbers of forces that are participating. And you can see that it is a significant number. I have indicated in asterisk here those countries which have agreed formally to participate in the UNOSOM effort which will follow this UNITAF effort in the peacekeeping element that will occur under U.N. aegis.

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

The next slide shows those UNOSOM II forces that have agreed to commit forces to this, and you can see that the numbers are significant and they are within range of those numbers that we desire to have participating in that force. And of course, as you all know, this is a very delicate and sensitive negotiation process ongoing with the United Nations, and we hope to have more Nations participating in this. But so far we have had substantial commitment from those countries shown.



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I know there are a number of questions that have occurred with respect to the disarmament policy that is in effect there. As you know, we are not there to disarm the country or to put in some form of gun control or other types of things like that. However, we are there to secure the operation and to maintain the ability of the task force to carry out its operation, essentially the right to self defense.

As shown on this slide, there are essentially two major elements of the commander's intent to establish the security. And they are shown here reducing the weapons in the relief sectors and neutralizing the political factions and the bandits' capabilities to commit violent crimes. The method we have done to neutralize factional forces and bandits has been we have designated cantonment areas and we have then allowed the various factions to store their weapons inside these cantonments under the supervision of their own forces, but obviously closely observed and monitored by the coalition forces.

We have declared all weapons that are heavy weapons or so-called technicals outside of these storage areas as illegal, and they will be, in fact, confiscated if they are seen on the site. We have allowed them to maintain some weaponry to secure their own headquarters sites, their own storage sites, and other places of this nature. Obviously, to maintain order and try to reduce some of the chaos that has been ongoing, as was so clearly described by my colleague, Admiral Cramer.

We also have given the task force commanders in the various regional sectors that we have established, freedom to build policies that are in general agreement with this, but which have been adapted to the site that they are operating. For example, the situation in Baidoa has been much more benign than it has been in Mogadishu or Kismayo. Therefore, they can have a different form and a somewhat more liberal interpretation of these rules, again at the judgment of the commander to make sure security is maintained.

The weapons that are subject to immediate confiscation are those that are under these rules shown here, and as you know there have been a number of instances where U.S. forces have engaged Somali gunmen and other types of bandits and have, in effect, executed this policy, I think very effectively. There is no doubt in my mind that the Somalis understand the risk. However, that does not necessarily mean that they will abide, but we will continue to ensure that these rules are carried out as we continue our operation there.

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UNITAF DISARMAMENT POLICY

MAINTAIN PEACETIME RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

"RIGHT TO SELF DEFENSE"

UNITAF COMMANDER'S INTENT, INCREASE SECURITY BY:

- REDUCING WEAPONS IN HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SECTORS (HRS)
- NEUTRALIZING POLITICAL FACTIONS AND BANDITS CAPABILITIES TO COMMIT VIOLENT CRIMES AND EXTORTION

NEUTRALIZE FACTIONAL FORCES AND BANDITS CAPABILITIES

- USE OF DESIGNATED CANTONMENT AREAS (AUTHORIZED WEAPONS STORAGE SITES - AWSS).
- DECLARE HEAVY WEAPONS OR TECHNICAL WEAPONS OUTSIDE AWSS AS ILLEGAL.
- PERMIT FACTIONAL FORCES TO MAINTAIN LIMITED TECHNICAL WEAPONS TO PROTECT HIGH VALUE FACTIONAL FACILITIES:
  - HEADQUARTERS
  - AWSS
  - RADIO STATIONS / ETC
- ALLOW TASK FORCE HRS COMMANDERS TO IMPLEMENT SPECIFIC POLICIES FOR SMALL ARMS.

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

Of course, the key to success, and we believe we have already succeeded in this effort, is to transfer the UNITAF operation over to UNOSOM II, and this transition phase is going on right now. As you know, a certain element of U.S. forces, the Third Battalion, 9th Marine, has been withdrawn, and plans are currently being made for the continuation of that withdrawal process.

So the establishment of the nine humanitarian relief sectors has occurred. We are going to reduce those, as we compress, down into four larger areas for ease of management, entering the transition process. I would submit at this point in time that the operation is ahead of the schedule that was originally set forth by the unified commander, based on his estimate.

And we are hopeful that our negotiations with the United Nations in terms of forming a command, getting forces committed, and all the other elements such as the expanded rules that would allow those forces to operate, are clearly in our interest to pursue. And we are, of course as you know, actively doing that right now. The transition to UNOSOM II should be shown there in terms of the slide on the left—your left, it gives the breakdown of those areas.

At this time I would now entertain questions that you have relative to the Somali operation.

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UNITAF TO UNOSOM II TRANSITION

- OPERATION RESTORE HOPE AHEAD OF SCHEDULE
- PHASE 3 (STABLIZATION) IN PROGRESS
- NINE HUMANITARIAN RELIEF SECTORS (HRS) SECURED
- NINE HRS REDUCED TO FOUR FOR TRANSITION



Chairman NUNN. Thank you, General. Do you have, thus far, any kind of estimate of how much it is going to cost before we complete the mission? Cost to the United States, if you have it.

General BRANDTNER. We are putting in a supplemental of about $586 million, which I am told will service us for a period of 90 days, and that is an estimate right now. And I will get more specific numbers if they are available to you, but that is right now.

Chairman NUNN. Is that 90 days from now or 90 days backing up to the beginning of the operation?

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General BRANDTNER. That was 90 days backing up from the beginning of the operation.

Chairman NUNN. And how long have we been over there now?

General BRANDTNER. We arrived there on the 9th of December, so we have been there just shy of—roughly 50 days or so.

Chairman NUNN. So just proportionally, in rough ballpark figures, we would have probably spent something like $300 million now. And if you get a $500 million supplemental, then that will take us for another 40 days.

General BRANDTNER. By those figures, yes, sir, that is roughly approximate. We also are getting supplemented by—trying to achieve funds from the United Nations in the amount of about $400 million, which would assist us to support the coalition forces over there. And those monies have now been supported by some nations in the world that are involved in this, and we are continuing to solicit those kinds of monies.

Chairman NUNN. Do we expect to be reimbursed for any of this, or is the basic money that we are getting from the U.N. going to be used for other forces?

General BRANDTNER. We will be reimbursed for the forces that we support directly in this context, plus the U.N. fund will also go to nations that cannot afford to provide their own support, and they will be funded directly.

Chairman NUNN. But of the $500 million plus the money we spend every month we are there, we will not be reimbursed that.

General BRANDTNER. The $500 million we will not.

Chairman NUNN. So roughly $160, $165 million a month is what it is costing now.

General BRANDTNER. Based on those averages, that is approximately what it is, yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Do you have any idea now about the length of time that will be required to complete the mission?

General BRANDTNER. I would hope that it would be wrapped up fairly quickly. I know there are plans to move more forces out. General Johnston is confident that things are moving along very quickly. I would be reluctant to set a specific time, because a lot of this is based on our ability to negotiate with the United Nations in the turnover process and establishing the command headquarters and those necessary rules that we need to follow. I know that is being pursued very aggressively by the administration, as I know the chairman is aware.

Chairman NUNN. General, I think you put a chart up there that showed this, but I want to make sure we understand it completely; this has been one of my concerns from the very beginning, the question of exactly what our mission is in Somalia. Do you have a chart showing precisely the mission?

General BRANDTNER. I do have.

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

Chairman NUNN. So these are the four bullets: To secure major air and seaports, installations, and food distribution points; to open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief supplies; and to assist U.N. and nongovernmental forces in providing relief under U.N. auspices.

I would assume that the first two of those are basically completed. Is that right?

General BRANDTNER. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. Now, the third one is an ongoing, am I correct?

General BRANDTNER. That is an ongoing operation, yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Providing security for convoys is ongoing. And the forth one is assist nongovernmental entities in providing relief under U.N. auspices; I assume that is ongoing.

General BRANDTNER. That is ongoing.

Chairman NUNN. Now, if you divide those four missions up, when we leave, who is going to perform mission number one?

General BRANDTNER. The UNOSOM force that goes in there is going to be structured to have essentially the same capability, in terms of both combatant and supportive aspects, that the force in there now has. The idea is to have a seamless turnover so that the capabilities inherent in each of these sectors, that will be essentially down to four, will be the same that is there now.

The forces will have the ability to enforce the peace. They will have the ability to secure the convoys. They will have the ability to deploy combat forces, if necessary, and also the support capability necessary to carry on the relief.

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Chairman NUNN. So all four of those missions will continue to be carried out.

General BRANDTNER. Exactly.

Chairman NUNN. In effect, they are all ongoing, even though the first two bullets up there, we have pretty much handled while we are there right now.

General BRANDTNER. That is correct.

Chairman NUNN. Now how many forces do you believe—what approximate number do you believe will be required to take our place and to carry out those four missions?

General BRANDTNER. We have working in the estimates a range between 15,000 and 20,000 that would be, given that much of the security of the port and so on, the initial requirements from a zero base to build up has been accomplished. And those numbers essentially are what we are looking at, so we are well along in getting the commitments from those nations necessary.

Chairman NUNN. Okay. Now, you say that 15,000 is what we approximately need, 15,000 to 20,000.

General BRANDTNER. 15,000 to 20,000.

Chairman NUNN. And your chart up on the right shows that we have already gotten committed 15,000.

General BRANDTNER. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. And those are firm commitments.

General BRANDTNER. Those are firm commitments.

Chairman NUNN. Do they have time frames on them?

General BRANDTNER. In the sense of how long they would stay there.

Chairman NUNN. No, in the sense of how long it will be before they get there.

General BRANDTNER. Some of them are there now, as you know.

Chairman NUNN. What percentage would be there now, roughly?

General BRANDTNER. If we could show that other slide over here.

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You can see that some of these countries, the one with asterisks, have people there now. There may not necessarily be the same people or the same capability from each of these countries, but there will be, of course, some that will remain in place as UNOSOM II comes in there.

Chairman NUNN. What is your best estimate now as to when the necessary forces, not simply numbers but the right forces, will be there to replace U.S. forces? What is your best estimate, based on the commitments you already know about?

General BRANDTNER. The commitments we know about now, it is in terms of their getting there. It is more a function of establishing the command and control mechanism and getting the United Nations effort on board. Once that infrastructure and oversight is established, which we hope to do very quickly, then we can begin to flow these forces. So they will be able to move in as soon as we are ready to assume the control. Others are phasing in that would come in under the aegis of both functions and would be able to just remain in place internally.

Chairman NUNN. And what is your best estimate of when that can be accomplished? I am not trying to pin you down to a date certain, I am just asking for a general range of time.

General BRANDTNER. I would hope that we could accomplish that within the next month, month and a half. I am just—that is really a hope estimate rather than an intelligent guess.

Chairman NUNN. And how many U.S. forces do you believe will need to remain in the residual force?

General BRANDTNER. That is a very—what you might call an issue of discussion right now with the administration and dealing with the U.N. We are looking in terms of between 3,000 and 5,000 over a period of time, that would be withdrawn to probably half of that number, perhaps down to as little as 1,000. Mostly supporting-type forces.

We also, of course, have said that we would provide an ability to have a reaction force of some type that would either be in the country for a period of time or it could involve the residence of Marine forces offshore. Those are negotiating right now. In terms of the situation, we may find that the security there is such that we could actually even move a reaction force back to being staged in the United States.

Chairman NUNN. Okay, thank you. My time has expired. Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, if we leave a mobile or rapid reaction force in Somalia to back up United Nations peacekeeping forces, would these Americans be under United Nations or American command?

General BRANDTNER. The command of those forces would be—or the way we are trying to work it out is that they would be under the UNITAF. And these are sensitive negotiations, Senator, with regard to how this would come out, but the hope would be, and this is my opinion, that they would come under UNITAF, which would be part of this other force, so that the command arrangement of that force would hopefully remain under U.S. command.

I am aware of the sensitivities there, and I think that is how they would probably make this agreement work. The UNITAF

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commander would probably be dual-hatted as a deputy to the UNOSOM commander, who would have overall command and control.

Senator THURMOND. General, could American troops remaining in Somalia ever be committed to substantial combat without the express authorization of the Congress under such command arrangement?

General BRANDTNER. Well, I think that the resolutions that govern the operation that is currently there would permit the application of U.S. combat power in an emergency, but I have no doubt that this would be done after consultation and I can assume that these kinds of things would be done as a matter of routine. I cannot speak to how that would occur. That is really beyond the purview of my authority to give that opinion, but I am certain that this would not be done in isolation.

Senator THURMOND. General, historically United Nations peacekeeping forces have bent over backwards to avoid the use of force. We saw a graphic example recently when a Bosnian Government minister was murdered while under the presumed protection of French troops in the U.N.'s contingent.

My question is this; if American troops remain in Somalia under U.N. command, or if they are ever committed to Bosnia under U.N. command, how would that affect the operational doctrine and rules of engagement, and would they be able to fight as Americans are trained to fight, or would they have to pull their punches?

General BRANDTNER. Well, let me speak to Somalia, because I can assure you that the rules of engagement that are being worked out for the charter, if you will, of the forces that would be in UNOSOM II, would have the authorities and the necessary means at their disposal to exercise rights of self defense and carry out operations as required to provide security and accomplish the missions that you have seen earlier.

So the answer to your question is in a Somalia UNOSOM II operation, before that operation is undertaken and we agree and all nations are a part of it, they will have the necessary authorities to do that, and not just be a benign force sitting on the ground.

Senator THURMOND. General, we have some very fine civil affairs units in this country. They played a vital role in World War II, and in many other instances since then. The Army civil affairs units, both active and reserve, have the training and skilled personnel to assist Somalia in rebuilding the country. Are the Chairman and service chiefs considering sending civil affairs units to Somalia? If not, why not?

General BRANDTNER. Well, of course, consideration of what units from the United States will remain there for whatever period of time is based on the requirement that will exist after we have determined what host nation support is there, which is minimal, what other countries will bring what types of capabilities.

We are, of course, trying to rely on nongovernmental organizations, on the U.N. relief organizations. We will hope that some of these types of support will be provided by contractors and others, and to reduce the residual U.S. presence over there to the minimum amount possible.

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If it is determined that U.S. civil affairs units, active or reserve, would be required to meet some of those needs, and it was a judgment of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to recommend that to the Secretary, I am sure that we would, indeed, put those types of units in there.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Thurmond. Senator Exon.

Senator EXON. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Gentlemen, I have several questions on the follow-up discussions that we are going to have, as I understand it, on the situation in Iraq and in Bosnia.

But let me ask one question now. I want to preface my question with the statement that I have been in Saudi Arabia, I have been in Kuwait, and I have been in Iraq, I have never been in Somalia, so the question that I am going to ask you first has to do with a question to which I do not know the answer. Are the weather conditions, the desert conditions, the temperature, the winds, the climate generally in the parts of Somalia that our troops are operating in similar to that that we encountered in the Gulf war?

General BRANDTNER. No. The part of Somalia we are in now has arid parts, but it also has parts that do receive rain. They can grow crops there. There is an ability, if the infrastructure is established, to grow their own food. They have water. It needs to be processed of course; we need to build up that kind of infrastructure. But the nature of the terrain in that part of Somalia—agreed, there are some that are very very barren as you get more into the desert—there are sustenance abilities there, and once the country is back on its feet they can begin to grow.

They did have some agriculture, as you know, before. They raised cattle and other types of livestock which were, indeed, able to flourish there at some point in time. Mike may have some other thoughts on that. But that is essentially the kind of environment there.

Senator EXON. Well then, basically, if we can maintain a degree of peace and understanding and stop the wholesale killing and the fear, then there is a chance that that particular part of the world can overcome, at least partially, the hunger and starvation which was going on, which really forced us to go in. Is that right?

General BRANDTNER. I agree with that assessment and I would also say that the problem is more the actual stealing and deprivation of the food as much as a lack of food. And in trying to get it distributed to many of these people there was just—as you know, of course, the constant moving about, the devastation of these small villages out there where they just essentially became nomadic or they were just dying in place, prevented them from any kind of agricultural enterprise to help themselves sustain themselves.

Senator EXON. So if we can get them back into their village or tribal settings, we have a chance of solving this problem, to some degree, more quickly.

General BRANDTNER. There is a chance to do that. I will say that it is going to be a long and difficult process, but I have hope that it will be achieved over time.

Senator EXON. I saw a program on television not too long ago that in certain areas, I believe, the French took the initiative

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where they had, I believe, armed and, I believe, put uniforms on Somalians who controlled and patrolled the town, a la policemen, which relieved the French and other regular military people from that action. Is that widespread or was that isolated—are you familiar with what I am referencing?

General BRANDTNER. That was a specific event in a limited area. I would say that offers a measure of hope, and certainly as we evolve, and especially in the UNOSOM II environment, that this kind of activity should be encouraged. I think the development of a local police establishment that could begin to be robust, have credibility, be capable, with assistance of the UNOSOM to train them up, is obviously an ideal situation to allow them then to take charge of their own lives, their own security, and their own well-being.

Senator EXON. I do not think you discussed in detail at all, and maybe you could just briefly—it seems to me that we are going to have potential difficulties in that part of the world until some semblance of national and local governments are rekindled, and I understand that has been pretty much decimated by the roving bands.

From an intelligence standpoint, what prediction can you make to us on the chances, and how are we going to encourage and put together under the United Nations forces, if that is part of our assignment, a government? Because without a government we could lapse back in very quickly to what we had when we went in.

Admiral CRAMER. Senator, really that is the other half of the mission out there that Ambassador Oakley, on the State Department side of the house, has pursued vigorously. I think there are a couple of things that bode well. For example, his ability to get Ali Mahdi and Aideed together early on, really 2 days after the landing on the 11th of December, and they met under his general auspices but agreements were reached there. At the Addis conference, at least there has been an agreement for a ceasefire, that holds some promise.

But in terms of really reestablishing some kind of a political entity or a government or an infrastructure along the lines of which you are discussing here, in my discussions with the State Department, which is certainly more qualified to answer the question than I am, it is going to be a while. There is going to be no near term solution for any kind of a political settlement.

I would remind you that as recently as last weekend in Kismayo, General Morgan's forces had a major confrontation with forces generally allied with Aideed, and we had to go in with the Belgians to basically separate the two warring parties. This was probably the largest confrontation, where we used Cobra helicopters, and so on, still in a military sense.

So the interfactional fighting, interaction, and competition certainly have not stopped. But there is even a good part to that story, and that was that Ambassador Oakley, within a day, had gone down to Kismayo, had basically got the warring factions somewhat under control, had met with Aideed—excuse me, he did not go to Kismayo, these meetings took place in Mogadishu.

Met with Aideed and Aideed pulled out, the leader that was causing most of the problems down there, and General Morgan

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withdrew. So there seems to be at least political solutions to what really had only been resolved militarily as recently as a few weeks ago. So progress is slow, but again, in discussions with CIA, and more importantly in discussions with the State Department, I do not think there is any near term political solution. But that is the other half of the game and that is exactly what Ambassador Oakley and the U.N. are there to provide.

Senator EXON. My time is up, just one last question and I think you can give me a short answer. From what you have just said in response to my question, it indicates to me that we and other nations under the auspices of the United Nations are likely to be there for some extended period of time, as opposed to some of the talk initially that we could get out of there completely in 90 days.

Admiral CRAMER. I think that is a very fair assessment, certainly on the political side of the house, in any event. I think, as General Brandtner has very correctly assessed, our military contribution, particularly in the combatant sense, is going down—will go down dramatically, indeed has already begun that process. But in terms of creating the political environment, that is going to take time.

Senator EXON. Thank you, gentleman. Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Exon. Mr. Kempthorne.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

General, it was referenced in your remarks just a moment ago that expectations are too high on the part of the Somali people. What, if anything, are we doing to deal with that, and what impact will it have if, upon our departure, those expectations that are too high are not met?

General BRANDTNER. Well, first of all, as I mentioned earlier, the mandate of UNOSOM II is hopefully going to be the same, or a seamless transition will occur so that the Somali people will have the same type of environment in which to attempt to bring themselves back to their feet. That is the desire and intent of UNOSOM II.

Their expectations, I think, when they initially saw American forces come in, and then as they saw them build up with the addition of the coalition forces, I think they were, at that time, of the view that everything was going to be solved in a very short period of time, that all their needs would be met, and that the situation was going to quickly right itself.

Of course, it is such a volatile place that is so complex, and there are so many factions that are being dealt with, that they then began to realize that, over a period of time, things did not happen as quickly as they thought they would. That some of their misery continued because they were not subject to immediate relief.

And I think these are things that we are dealing with on a day-to-day basis. As this evolution matures, I would say that we can probably come to some point where their level of expectation will begin to come more in line with reality, and they will then address that on its own terms and begin to recover themselves with the UNOSOM II assistance.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Have the warlords or the bandits been put out of business, or are they simply lying in wait until U.S. and U.N. forces pull out?

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General BRANDTNER. I think—and I will let Mike talk to this too because, from his standpoint, he has a great deal of knowledge. From my operational perspective, I think that we have essentially gotten agreement with the major factional leaders to cease and desist, to try to come to terms with one another, and also to assist, in their own way, this effort.

I would submit that bandits and other bands that rove around that are essentially out of the immediate control of these larger factional leaders will continue to be a problem, and I suspect that they will become essentially a police problem over the longer term.

Mike, do you have anything?

Admiral CRAMER. I would agree with that. I think the most important thing is that none of these relatively large factions—and some of them are not too large—but none of the large factions at all are conducting organized resistance to the coalition. They never have. If anything, they are more fractionalized than they were when we arrived. So in terms of military capability, their capability continues to attrite each day.

That is the first point. The second point is, however, and General Brandtner addressed it, we are seeing bandits from these factions begin to moonlight. Now, what do I mean by that?

For example, we had an incident within the last 24 hours in which some of our Army units on a road from Mogadishu to Afgoi found 12 Somalis who appeared to be in the process of being robbed by local bandits. They stopped the situation. It turned out that was not the case at all. These 12 Somalis were about to be assassinated by the local bandits. So obviously they saved the lives on the spot of 12 Somalis.

Again, a different plan was the issue here. Then they started to trace back where these bandits had come from. In fact, they were aligned with one of the major coalitions, but we had one of the major—factions, not coalitions. But then upon further scrutiny it was clear that these individuals, their numbers were small, were literally out doing this ad hoc on their own.

So, again, it falls very much in what General Brandtner had described, more of a police action situation. So I would not characterize that, again, as organized, directed. It was an independent operation, but nonetheless the result could be very tragic. We still see those kinds of situations. I would see—not on that scale, but we see two to four of those kinds of situations generally every day in Mogadishu, a fewer number in Kismayo, and a much fewer number in the cities outside the main concentration area.

General BRANDTNER. I would add too that part of the mandate of the UNOSOM II forces is to establish a police force, as I alluded to earlier. But this is an objective not only desirable, but one of the objectives that they seek to establish and then maintain that. Hopefully, then, that, as it matures—and, again, the time required to do this is going to be considerable, because there is zero there now. It is, indeed, however hopefully going to be overtaken, that problem.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Since undertaking this major operation, have any significant weaknesses in our execution of the operation been identified?

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General BRANDTNER. I cannot think of anything, frankly, that has caused us any difficulty. There are always little what I would call glitches that occur, but without trying to send you a commercial, sir, I would tell that this has been a very, very well executed operation from the minute it started and up to the present time.

I would also tell you that this occurred on very short notice when one considers that it was a matter of days from the time that the President made the decision to do this until the actual execution occurred. So I think all aspects of it, the sealift, the airlift, the movement of Marine and Army forces and Air Forces, have all been great.

Senator KEMPTHORNE. Thank you, General, Admiral.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kempthorne.

Senator Bingaman.

Senator BINGAMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me ask about your disarmament policy. Where does this lead? As I understand it, you are picking up heavy weapons and so-called technical weapons, having them stored in cantonment areas, and I am just wondering where all that leads. What happens to the weapons at the end of all of this? Do they stay in cantonment areas? Do we destroy them? What is the capability of these groups to replenish their supply of weapons? Where are we going with these weapons?

General BRANDTNER. Well, first of all, those weapons that are stored in cantonments, we have agreed that they can remain there because they continue to provide some stability for the factional element, if they feel secure that they can retain some of their capability to defend themselves and have some secure means. Whether we like it or not, it is probably the only way we can get to an accommodation with them in that regard.

It also keeps them off of the streets and out of the hands of the bandits, so there is a very valuable aspect to that. As regards to——

Senator BINGAMAN. So those weapons, then, are still owned by, controlled by the factions?

General BRANDTNER. That is correct.

Senator BINGAMAN. It is just that we are not permitting them outside those areas.

General BRANDTNER. That is correct. Also, as you look down the road, in the context of building a police force and eventually other security forces that might operate to maintain stability in the longer term, some of these weapons may prove to be valuable to be used to arm those kinds of forces to provide them the means, rather than just destroying them all and starting over from scratch.

Obviously, the weapons that are confiscated on the street, that are taken away from dissident elements during confrontations and all, generally are collected and in many cases are destroyed because they are of no value, or they are put into a U.S. or coalition-type cantonment, if you will, to be determined by the commander as to how they will ultimately be disposed. A lot of these weapons, I know you have seen pictures of them, are jury rigged ancient kinds of things, stuff that we have not used for years that, you know, in the long term would just not be supportable, so they are going to probably be destroyed.

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Senator BINGAMAN. But many of them are also weapons that are freely available in any gun store in this country, as I understand it.

General BRANDTNER. The small arms and the assault-type rifles, yes.

Senator BINGAMAN. Okay. But the plan is to destroy those at some point.

General BRANDTNER. By and large, they will probably be destroyed. Many of them are now—some are being retained, and that is really the judgment of the commander on the scene. And my own personal opinion is that they would probably destroy the vast majority of those because it just makes it less of a problem for them.

Senator BINGAMAN. It would be an anomaly if we were to pick them up there, bring them back here, and sell them as Army surplus.

General BRANDTNER. They will not enter the United States, I am absolutely certain.

Senator BINGAMAN. All right. That is my final question. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator Bingaman.

Senator Cohen.

Senator COHEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. I think most of the questions have been asked. As I understand it, the mission is fairly simple, to stop the fighting and deliver food and other types of supplies, and that mission is going to be turned over to a United Nations force ultimately.

Now we have a total of, what, 24,000 troops roughly?

General BRANDTNER. Yes. Could we show that slide?

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

Senator COHEN. All right, 24,165, and that is going to be reduced to what level under the phase-in plan?

General BRANDTNER. It is still being negotiated, Senator, but we are looking in the numbers range of 3,000 to 5,000 for a certain period of time, and then to be reduced significantly after that by probably half.

Senator COHEN. And you indicated to Senator Nunn that we are now contributing roughly $165 million a month.

General BRANDTNER. Well, I had said that we had a $531 million supplemental that had been submitted that would cover roughly a 90-day period, and then the mathematics were just breaking it up.

Senator COHEN. Right, okay. Every nation, roughly, is contributing for the support of its own forces as it exists now, right?

General BRANDTNER. There are some nations who are being supported by a fund that is being developed by the U.N. for that purpose.

Senator COHEN. Well, the question I have is once we withdraw, what is going to happen to that U.N. fund? My understanding is that U.N. fund is being depleted quite rapidly. We have U.N.

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peacekeeping forces in Cambodia, we have them spread pretty thinly around the globe, and once the United States pulls out its 24,000, reduced down to X numbers, I assume our contribution, also, to that effort is going to be reduced, and I do not know whether we are up to date, as a matter of fact, on what we owe to the U.N. fund in any event. Where is the money going to come from?

General BRANDTNER. Well, certain amounts of the money that we spend to sustain our own forces will come out of our normal operating budget.

Senator COHEN. But we are going to reduce that. We are going to pull back to several thousands of troops rather than 24,000 troops. I assume that concomitant with that we will have a corresponding reduction in the amount of money that we are supplying, would we not?

General BRANDTNER. That makes sense, of course, and I assume that the nations who go in there to sustain themselves will continue to do that. The nations that have to have assistance are going to be provided the money by the U.N. I assume that the effort to get nations to contribute to that fund, which is being built up now, will continue throughout that process.

Senator COHEN. I doubt very much—maybe I can be proven wrong on this issue. I doubt very much whether that fund is being built up right now. I think it is being built down right now. And if we have a situation in which we now have the bulk of the contribution—we are making the bulk of the contribution in manpower, womanpower, and as we start to reduce that—and we are also making the bulk of the contribution, I would assume, by virtue of the fact that we are supplying the money right now, most of it, are we not?

General BRANDTNER. Well, we are supplying money to support our own forces.

Senator COHEN. Right, but we have got the bulk of the forces. The bulk of the force is ours, the bulk of the money is ours, and as we start to reduce the size of our forces we are going to be pulling back the money, we hope to sustain basically the same kind of mission; keep the forces in Somalia from fighting and deliver the food. It is probably going to take at least a comparable sized force to do that, and the question I have is where is the money going to come from? I do not think we have a U.N. fund that will support an operation without major contributions from the United States.

General BRANDTNER. A couple of things here, sir. And one, of course the idea, the fund has to be built up and maintained, no question about that. The numbers of people that would be sustained in a UNOSOM II environment are significantly less than what we are seeing over there right now, the combined U.S.-coalition forces. So the amount of effort in terms of monetary support would be reduced.

I also think it is fair to say in the overall context that, and this is in fairness to the U.N. effort, that when you look worldwide, the other nations and the U.N. effort, compared to our U.S. involvement in those, they make significant contributions and we have a very limited contribution. As you know, there is a law that limits us in our participation.

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So this is sort of balancing it out. I am not making an apology. I am just saying that we are obviously going to have to source it.

Senator COHEN. I am just raising the issue that has been talked about here this morning. Number one, we are not going in and rounding up all the weapons. We are going to have a situation in which a smaller force, with less U.S. participation, is trying to accomplish the same mission and it seems to me with less money.

So I do not know how you do that in the future. We are talking about the United States having a short-term commitment, but we really have got a fairly long-term commitment, and it seems to me it is going to be much larger than what we are talking about right here, in terms of shrinking our forces down. I do not see how we shrink our forces down and still increase our financial contribution in order to sustain the effort in Somalia. I do not think you will see that kind of political support for that.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator Cohen. Senator Graham.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of questions relative to the preplanning and your assessment of the international U.N. force.

What were the steps prior to the decision to insert our forces into Somalia, in terms of integration with other U.N. military forces?

General BRANDTNER. Well as you know, of course, this was an operation conducted under U.N. auspices, based on a resolution. As we developed a plan to do this—from the operator's perspective as I was working with the unified commander through the Chairman to develop the plan, there was a very large effort ongoing through the agency of diplomats or the State Department working with the U.N., working with the member nations, to achieve an agreement on what we would do that would be a coalition effort.

And many of the countries involved that are currently there, obviously those decisions and that support was clearly decided upon and agreed to before this operation was undertaken. And it was clearly understood that when we did initiate this on the 9th of December, that we had a large commitment from many allies and friends who had already offered support, and who began to come in very very quickly.

As you know within days, and I showed the phasing slides earlier, we had support from the Canadians, the Belgians, the French, the United Kingdom. The Germans have come in, the Moroccans, and other Asian and Muslim countries that have come in to support. A lot of it was timed based on the ability of the unified commander to absorb these forces in country, based on the buildup of infrastructure and support.

But a direct answer to your question is this was a very well orchestrated effort and it continues to be a very well orchestrated international effort. Through the auspices of our State Department, Ambassador Oakley on the scene out there has done a magnificent job working with these various nations. We have some 34 liaison personnel currently with UNITAF headquarters, that are working both in that environment and on to set the transition to UNOSOM II.

Senator GRAHAM. With that background, are there any lessons that you think we have learned here, as well as in our previous

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United Nations activities, particularly in Iraq, that we should be sensitive to in applying to future relationships?

General BRANDTNER. Well, some of the lessons we have learned, and we learned them in the Gulf war, naturally, and they have carried over to this environment—which I might add I think made some of this easier, if you will, because we understood better, in my view, the capabilities and limitations of some of these countries to support certain types of operations, both in terms of the political aspect and the military and support aspect.

So we were able to approach that in an intelligent way, being sensitive to their respective views of this. I think we have learned, as we evolve in our operations in the Gulf also, to appreciate and understand the sensitivities of some of these countries also. As the major contributor, I think it is fair to say that we have been the inspiration behind many of these ideas and have tried to make sure that the objectives that we see necessary in our view, are embraced by the U.N., and have had good success with that.

And not to say that we are driving the train, so to speak, but we certainly have a room in the engine compartment. And as a consequence, I think those kinds of lessons have paid off for us and we have been dramatically improved in our capability to gather these coalitions and maintain them.

Senator GRAHAM. When we transition from peace making to peace keeping, and the United Nations takes over that second phase, what number of U.S. forces do you anticipate will be involved in the peace keeping function?

General BRANDTNER. As I mentioned in an earlier question, sir, we are in the process of negotiating that now with the United Nations based on the capabilities we see the force having overall and what the United States can contribute that no one else could, for example. We have come to terms with numbers roughly between 3,000 and 5,000, and I am just reluctant to put a fix on that because, obviously, you get stuck with those things forever. But we say we are comfortable with that, and that as time evolves, some period of time, we would reduce that significantly as capabilities became more robust with UNOSOM II and other organizations.

Senator GRAHAM. Thank you.

Chairman NUNN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Graham. I believe we are at Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I join others in commending you and your subordinates, particularly in Somalia, for the superb professional manner in which you are discharging the military aspect of this humanitarian mission.

I just would be interested. Admiral, how long have you been in the Navy? Give or take a few years, near 30?

Admiral CRAMER. No, sir, not quite that long. I have been in the Navy about 24 years.

Senator WARNER. And General?

General BRANDTNER. He is a mere child. I have been in 33 plus years.

Senator WARNER. Well, as a former Marine, I know promotions have always come a little slower. But have you ever seen the young men in the military better equipped, better motivated today than in the years previous in your career, either of you?

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General BRANDTNER. I think the men and women in the Armed Forces today are absolutely superb.

Admiral CRAMER. I absolutely agree. And we have seen it come and go. It has never been better.

Senator WARNER. I think the American people understand that has come about by strong support from Presidents Reagan and Bush, and the Congress through those years. And it is my hope that we can expect that same strong support under President Clinton.

To the question of the mission this morning, the Chairman asked you about the components of the mission, and you provided it. Any change in that mission as the administration shifts from President Bush to President Clinton?

General BRANDTNER. There has been no change to that mission. It has been reaffirmed, and the administration has reinforced the objectives that we have had. And essentially from the operator's perspective, there has been virtually no change whatsoever.

Senator WARNER. When this mission was initially undertaken by the United Nations, the United Nations turned to the United States to perform the initial phases. Primarily, my understanding, is because that we were really the only Nation that had the equipment and the training to cross the beaches and go in. Am I correct on that, General?

General BRANDTNER. Yes sir, you are. There is no other country in the world that could have done that.

Senator WARNER. Right. Well, that is the thing that troubles me because I am deeply concerned that this Nation is being drawn into conflict after conflict because we are the only Nation that has the equipment and the trained men and women to perform these missions.

Now, as a result of this learning experience, do you detect among other nations the desire to begin to provide for themselves this same type of equipment to go inland, over the beaches, and this type of training?

General BRANDTNER. I have not seen any emerging initiatives nor have I heard said to me these kinds of things. I would submit that other countries, our major allies, have extraordinary capabilities in their own right which could be brought to bear in some of these other instances where they would have capability to do this.

So, I would say that we are unique in our amphibious capabilities. Certainly, there are other capabilities that the other armed forces have which are held by other countries.

Senator WARNER. That is clear, but I just think it is important that we begin to make certain that we are not called on each time for this type of mission, where we have got to go over the beach, and the United States is the only one that can perform it.

The world is going to begin to share on some basis of equivalency these burdens of helping people, primarily for humanitarian purposes. I think that burden should be evenly borne by the other nations, and that should require them to begin to acquire and train for this type of mission.

Chairman NUNN. Senator Warner, let me just interject one thing there. I agree with your basic point, I think it is fundamentally sound. But I do think we need to keep it in perspective.

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Before we went into Somalia, and General, you can correct me if I am wrong on this, if you look at the United Nations deployments around the whole world, before we went into Somalia there were some 50,000 U.N. forces deployed around the world in various trouble spots—in the Middle East, Cyprus, all over, Cambodia. Of those, the United States had 500.

So, before Somalia we—and I think we have always done our job because we provide intelligence, we provide logistics, we provide airplanes and so forth. But I do think that the U.N. has an awful lot going on where we are involved in any substantial way on the ground. And Somalia brings it out of kilter, because we have so many involved there.

I do not in any way disagree with your underlying point. I think all of us are going to have to start looking at this. But there are a lot of countries out there in the U.N. uniform.

Senator WARNER. That is true, Mr. Chairman, and I am familiar with those statistics, and we have discussed this before. But I come back to the point that there are levels of risk associated with these U.N. missions throughout the world. All of them have some measure of risk.

But when you are coming off an amphibious vessel, and on that small vehicle coming up on a beach, you do not know quite what to expect. And there is a higher degree of risk with some of these amphibious missions than peace keeping missions inland. But that is an issue that I will undertake to work on.

General, this committee for several years now has been trying to equip in an even fashion the various components of our military, the Army and the Marine Corps. And during the Gulf operation, it came to our attention that the Marines were very short in the equipment of night vision equipment. And, indeed, at some point you had to take some and borrow some from the Army to perform your missions.

Now, I am concerned about, as you and others are, the loss of life of this brave Marine on a night patrol. My question is, was he equipped with night vision goggles? Do the Marines there have night vision equipment?

General BRANDTNER. Whether that particular Marine was wearing night vision goggles I do not know. I will find the answer for you, sir.

Units that are in theater right now are, on a selected basis—and I will also get this for you—equipped with night vision goggles. All mobile units, obviously, have them; the helicopters that fly. Whether each individual marine on a night patrol is equipped, I honestly do not know the answer to that. But I will take the question, if I might, and get an answer for you.

[The information follows:]

Some members of the patrol were wearing night vision goggles, but the Marine that you are referring to was not. Night vision goggles severely restrict field of view, and in a city environment, where there are numerous bright light sources that can temporarily blind goggle wearers, common procedure is for only one or two patrol members to wear them.

The Marine patrol consisted of three fire teams and a machine gun team that totaled 19 personnel. There were five sets of night vision goggles with the patrol. The standard issue of night vision goggles for a patrol of this size would be three, one per fire team. The marine killed was the point man for the patrol and was not

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wearing night vision goggles. His team leader, the number two man in the patrol, was wearing a set of night vision goggles.

Senator WARNER. Well, it seems to me that they should be so equipped because we have come to learn that this is a very, very valuable piece of equipment. And it is my hope that your answer comes in that they do have it.

General BRANDTNER. I would offer in this case that having used night vision goggles in a combat environment under different circumstances, that in the context of what happened to that young marine, I would not want to leave a false sense of security that wearing those goggles would have changed the circumstances.

Senator WARNER. I understand that quite clearly, but at least he should have the option to have that equipment. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner. I believe Senator Levin is next.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my voice of thanks and commendation as well. I was in Somalia a month ago with a number of colleagues and was deeply impressed by what we saw there.

Senator Warner's point that there is a different level of risk in peace enforcement from peacekeeping I think is an important point and is one that I share, whether that peace enforcement is hitting the beaches or whether it is coming over land in an attack. The rules of engagement that we have in Somalia now are a lot different from peacekeeping, where there is already a peace in place and we just simply are there to monitor, under rules of engagement that we only shoot back when we are shot at.

So the typical peacekeeping, would you not agree, is much less risky than the peace enforcement that we are now doing.

General BRANDTNER. In terms of the typical peacekeeping environment, I agree with you. I would submit, sir, that the environment in Somalia, as the UNOSOM II takes over, is going to be in a transition between peacemaking, and enforcement, and peacekeeping. And as a result, we are working with the U.N. to have the mandate expanded to include the ability to conduct operations, not merely react, so that they can go out and aggressively pursue, based on intelligence, an operational plan that will reduce a threat before it is emergent upon them.

Senator LEVIN. So, what you are proposing is that the force to which we would turn over the operation, would have the same rules or similar rules of engagement to what we now operate under?

General BRANDTNER. That is correct, sir.

Senator LEVIN. And that, then would be pretty close to peace enforcement.

General BRANDTNER. It would be, except that the environment, hopefully by the time we have chosen to withdraw and feel successful, which is very close upon us, I might add, that we would have taken care of the larger aspects.

If you recall, when we went in there, other than some negotiations that had occurred some days beforehand, there had been no attempt to try to create any sort of rules, if you will, on the ground. So, it was total chaos.

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Senator LEVIN. I understand that. But just so that we get the terms clear, what is going on now is peace enforcement under rules of engagement that allow us to go after potential threats, and not wait until we are attacked.

General BRANDTNER. Right.

Senator LEVIN. And what you are recommending is, basically, that the force to which you turn over the operation would have those same peace enforcement rules of engagement?

General BRANDTNER. Yes, sir.

Senator LEVIN. All right. I think the terminology here is very important. There is an awful lot of confusion about it, and I want to keep using just those terms.

Now, when we leave troops there, as you are proposing to do in much reduced numbers, are we going to be placing those troops under U.N. command?

General BRANDTNER. We had discussed this earlier, and the way, hopefully, it will work out is that there will be a command arrangement where a U.S. commander will be in the structure of the UNOSOM force who will be dual hatted, if you will, and will command the U.S. contingent. So that when they are operating, they will operate under his aegis and he, in turn then, will operate within the context of the UNOSOM command.

Senator LEVIN. Would the U.N. commander have command over our U.S. commander in that context?

General BRANDTNER. He would.

Senator LEVIN. So that we would be under U.N. command?

General BRANDTNER. In theory we would. However, we would still be meeting our own litmus test, if you will, of maintaining U.S. control of our own forces.

Senator LEVIN. All right. But, again, that control would be—I am not disagreeing with you. I just want to find out clearly what you are recommending. That control would in turn be under a U.N. commander.

General BRANDTNER. In theory, that would be the case.

Senator LEVIN. Now currently we have a dual hatted commander out there, is that not correct? General Johnston is both U.S. commander and U.N. commander?

General BRANDTNER. No, sir. General Johnston is not a U.N. commander, but a U.S. commander operating under a U.N. mandate.

Senator LEVIN. Is it not true that a number of the forces that have been assigned to him including, I believe, the French, the British, the Canadians, have been assigned to him only in his U.S. command hat?

General BRANDTNER. I honestly do not know the answer to that question. I will take it—I do know some of it, but I do not know all of it.

[The information follows:]

UNITAF is a U.S. led coalition, operating under a U.N. mandate. Forces provided to UNITAF by coalition countries operate under General Johnston, a U.S. commander.

Senator LEVIN. Well, I will then say that he told me a very interesting fact that at least the French, as I remember, were assigned

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to him exclusively in his U.S. commander hat, not in his U.N. commander hat. This is a very sensitive point.

I mean, it sounds abstract, and I am sure a number of people are trying to figure out why all this discussion about U.S.-U.N command; what hat is someone wearing. But it is a very critical issue—whether or not the commander is a U.N. commander with rules of engagement which amount to peace enforcement or not. Because if we have a U.N. commander there, which I support, with peace enforcement rules of engagement, which I support, we are taking a very significant step toward multinational peace enforcement under a U.N. hat.

I think we have got to do it for reasons, by the way, which Senator Warner alluded to. He may not have been agreeing with my own conclusion, exactly, but I do believe we have to move in this direction or else the United States alone is going to end up being the policeman of the world, and we cannot be. We have got to have multinational enforcement; not necessarily under the U.N. It may be a NATO or an expanded NATO enforcement.

But so that we are really clear, we have a new thing happening here which is peace enforcement, not peacekeeping, by the U.N. In other words, we have rules of engagement which allow those forces, under U.N. command and control, to go out and address potential threats and future threats, and not just respond to attack when attacked.

Do you want to comment on that?

General BRANDTNER. I wanted to say that under UNITAF, all the forces that are attached and operating under the aegis of General Johnston and wearing that hat operate under the same rules of engagement. And they have all come forward, and obviously agreed.

Senator LEVIN. One final question. Could you put up the slide that is coalition UNOSOM II, and it has the 12 countries on it? Is that something that you can put your hands on really easily?



It is the coalition UNOSOM.

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COALITION UNITAF (ENFORCEMENT) FORCES

DEPLOYED IN COUNTRY

COUNTRY	PERSONNEL	COUNTRY	PERSONNEL
* AUSTRALIA	1,141	* NEW ZEALAND	67
* BELGIUM	617	* NIGERIA	4
BOTSWANA	302	* PAKISTAN	880
CANADA	1,359	SAUDI ARABIA	643
* EGYPT	240	* SWEDEN	150
FRANCE	2,372	TUNISIA	133
* GERMANY	64	* TURKEY	300
* INDIA	282	UAE	105
* ITALY	3,539	UNITED KINGDOM	90
KUWAIT	93	* ZIMBABWE	150
MOROCCO	1,239		
		TOTAL	13,770

* UNOSOM II PARTICIPATION

That one there. Given our conversation, our discussion right now, would you not agree that the word "peace keeping" that is in parentheses there, probably should be "enforcement" given that the rules of engagement are going to be the same rules of engagement as the UNITAF.

General BRANDTNER. I understand your concern and definitional thing. The intent here is to ensure that it is understood the UNOSOM is a force there to maintain the peace that was established by the peacekeeping UNITAF force. What we are saying, however, is that in order to give them the right or the capability to operate if the environment does turn hostile, that they have the rules of engagement and the mandate necessary to be more than just a monitor. They can, in effect, operate. So, hopefully the environment will be a peacekeeping environment.

Senator LEVIN. But the rules of engagement would be the enforcement rules of engagement?

General BRANDTNER. They will be the enforcement rules, and they will be robust.

Senator LEVIN. I would suggest that somehow or other you make that point clear, because we are taking a dramatic step here, an important step for the world and I am all for it. The faster we turn this over to a U.N. enforcement force, the happier I am, providing they have got rules of engagement which will allow them to do what we are doing now, and the capability to do what we are doing now.

I think we ought to be very careful as to how we use those words, "peacekeeping," and "peace enforcement" so that we do not blur or confuse what is really going on, which is the transfer of enforcement capability from a U.S. to a U.N. force. My time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Levin. Senator Glenn.

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Senator GLENN. Thank, Mr. Chairman. General, the Marines are not actually distributing food to the people. That is done by other organizations, right?

General BRANDTNER. The intent is to have the other organizations do that. However, in the early stages, in order to ensure that food did get delivered under certain circumstances they did.

Senator GLENN. Yes. My question is very basic, and I do not ask this facetiously. I ask this in terms of the whole operation—is it working? We saw all these horror pictures of a thousand kids a day dying, and starving, and all of those things are what got us involved.

The international community was just in—you know, you could hardly watch some of those things. You think about your own kids and things like that, and look at those things and just cringe. People said they did not want to watch the TV pictures, even. That is what got us into this thing. They estimated about a thousand people a day, mainly children, were the ones that were dying.

And my question to you is, is it working? Are we down from a thousand a day, down to 50 a day, or 500 a day, or 750? I am concerned about organization, and all these other things that we have been talking about here.

But my bottom line on this is, is it working and are we really helping to stamp out some of the terrible, terrible, terrible situations, and can you put numbers to it? Is it now down to 500 a day, 200 a day? What is it?

General BRANDTNER. First of all, I will let Mike talk to the numbers, but it is indeed working. I think it is a success story. They have made extraordinary progress, and I think you do have some data.

Admiral CRAMER. Senator, it was either Bardera or Baidoa, one of the two. We received a report in. It was a U.N. statistically valid report, that they had been suffering 300 deaths a day due to starvation when this operation started. Within the last 48 hours, that number is down to 64 a day.

Now, you may say that is a terrible number. But, unfortunately, as you are aware, some of these people literally were so far gone that they literally could not be turned around.

That is one particular statistic that we have had within the last couple of days. There are comparable examples, and maybe we could take that question for the record and get back to you.

Chairman NUNN. Do we have figures for the whole country for this, because they estimated there were 1,000 a day for the country.

Admiral CRAMER. It is much lower than that, much lower. I will not give you a number because I just do not have one, but we can get one for you. And I certainly know the number is much, much lower than that.

Senator GLENN. That is the bottom line to me. I do not think you have any problem getting the American people to support something like this. I have no problem with Americans helping in situations like this. If we are to become the world's policeman for things like this, so be it. And I welcome the opportunity to help out, myself.

But I do want to know that these things are effective, and all the effort we are putting forward. We have lost a few lives over there,

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not very many, but any are too many. But really, is the program working so that we really are stopping the starvation?

Baidoa is one spot. That is where we have pretty good security. But there are a dozen other places out there in the countryside that were in that estimate of 1,000 a day. And I would be interested in getting a figure from that. If you would supply that for us, I would appreciate it.

[The information follows:]

No accurate statistics exist on numbers of deaths. Neither State Department nor CIA could provide this information. Nonetheless, a rough estimate of the current number of deaths is possible.

— The first step in calculating the death rate would be to accept the pre-intervention figure of about 1,000 deaths per day in southern Somalia due to starvation, and to combine it with current fragmentary data.

— OFDA reports that in December the daily death toll in Bardera was 250 to 300, and in Baidoa it was 250. These two towns, then, represented roughly half the daily death toll in southern Somalia.

— OFDA also reports that the current daily death toll in Bardera is 64 and in Baidoa it is as high as 60.

— Therefore, if Bardera and Baidoa still constitute half of the current death toll, this figure would be somewhat more than 240 per day. This number represents a daily decline of about 75 percent.

A number of other indicators suggest improving conditions:

— Increasingly secure lines of communication are aiding in food delivery to the countryside.

— Somalis are leaving the refugee centers and returning to their home villages, especially in the agricultural area.

— Good rains this year, with the exception of the Belet Weyne area, should produce a better-than-expected harvest. However, a note of caution: The harvest is not sufficient to cover sustenance, marketing, storage, and planting. Relief support is still needed to help plan for the future.

— To prepare for the next planting season, NGO's have started distributing the necessary seeds and tools.

— Many NGO's have started to distribute dry rations instead of maintaining so many feeding kitchens.

— Vaccination and rehabilitation programs for the existing livestock have also begun.

— According to U.S. forces in Somalia, the price of wheat has decreased (November 1992–$100 for 50 lbs; February 1993–$30 for 50 lbs) and the price of an AK–47 has increased (November 1993–$50; February 1993–$300).

— The Somali Auxiliary Security Force began work in Mogadishu on February 6. This force was a Somali initiative, encouraged by Ambassador Oakley and other U.S. representatives in Somalia.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you Senator Glenn. I believe Senator Cohen has one more question before we move to Iraq.

Senator COHEN. It is really more an observation. I would like to float a question mark to the suggestion that perhaps other nations ought to have the same capability that we have.

There has been a traditional argument in the country that if we do not have the weapons, then we will never be in the position to use them. And there have been members in our society who have, time after time, lobbied against the development of, let us say, the cruise missile, you name the system, with the argument that if we do not have it, we can never use it. And, therefore, the best way to ensure that we will not go to war is not to have the means to go to war.

I do not believe that is a valid argument for this Nation's national security interests. It seems to me that there are two options that we have, if we follow that line of argument. We can either elimi-

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nate the means; cancel the systems. We may do that in any event. Or we can insist that others build them.

Now, if you put that chart back up on the screen to show which Nations are now contributing, I would like to go down through that list and ask each one of our colleagues which one of those countries is going to be in the position to develop the kind of amphibious landing capability that the United States has? Which one of those countries has the capability or will ever have the capability of having the kind of aircraft carriers that we have in our inventory?

I would go further and then ask, would we rather have what used to be the Soviet Union have the kind of aircraft capability and amphibious landing capability that we have. (At one time the Soviet Union had an interest in developing those kinds of capabilities.) That was quite threatening to many, many people in this country and around the globe. Or China, which is developing an amphibious capability in the southern part of its country. Or do we want Japan to develop an amphibious landing capability?

I think that we have to exercise some caution in urging other countries to develop the kind of unique capability that we have developed over the years, because it does have not only military consequences, it has great diplomatic consequences as well.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Cohen. I think your words are very wise.

Let me suggest this. We are going to move to the briefing on Iraq. We took an hour and 35 minutes to make that round on Somalia. We have Iraq, and we also want to definitely get to former Yugoslavia. I would suggest, General, that we complete the briefing on Iraq, complete the briefing on Yugoslavia, and then come back for a round of questioning in the interest of time, because I would hate for us to get to about 12:30 and not have gotten to Yugoslavia. I think most people would like to hear both before they have to leave.

IRAQ

SITUATION UPDATE

General BRANDTNER. I will turn it over to Admiral Cramer again, as we did before. He will set the stage and provide background for the operation.

Admiral CRAMER. If I could, I would like to stand up and use the pointer on this. I would like to take a couple of minutes on the Iraq situation that brought us to where we are today. I will give today's situation as well.

As we all know, in late November we saw a major movement of aircraft out of the Baghdad area, down to Al Jarrah, toward the 32nd line. The purpose of that clearly was on the part of Saddam Hussein to take down U.S. aircraft.

In mid-December, we began to see violations of the 32 no-fly zone. Most all those violations took place—there were 16 multiple violations in this shaded area here; this triangular or grey area.

Following this we saw, early on the 27th of December, an attempt by Saddam's MiG–25s to shoot down American F–15s that were flying in the area. Later in that day we, in fact, an F–16 shot

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down a MiG–25. The details of all this General Brandtner will present.

We then saw violations continue. About the beginning of the year, at the end of December, we saw the deployment of additional SAM missiles, some SA–2s, some SA–3s down into this area, into what then became known as a SAM trap. Saddam was attempting to lure our aircraft into this area, then shoot it down. If they could not shoot it down with an aircraft, shoot it down with a surface-to-air missile.

We saw, on the 2nd of January, when we had one of our U2s that was flying up in this area, an attempt again by the Iraqis to shoot down the U2. They were unsuccessful. These violations continued on until the 6th of January when, of course, we had the demarche.

The demarche did not really slow the Iraqis down. They did, in fact, begin to redeploy after the demarche some of the missiles in the southern area back up to the 32 no-fly zone. And, again, began a critical shell game of moving SA–3 missiles back down, still in a very threatening way, below the 32 no-fly zone.

On the 8th of January, Saddam prohibited the U.N. flights into Baghdad and effectively neutralized our inspection process at the time. He then began to do the same kind of operation and deploy missiles out of garrison, SA–2s and SA–6s into the 36 no-fly zone up north.

On the 10th, the violations had been several but this particular violation came down in the Kuwait DMZ, violated the bunkers that were in the area, and moved equipment, including Silkworm missiles directly against U.N. sanctions.

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And at that point, on the 13th we conducted our air strikes to neutralize the air defense sector which was controlled from An Najat down to Samawah, at Tallil and back to Al Amarah, basically, the air defense and control network Saddam has to run his air defense system in the southern no-fly zone, as well as go after these SA–3 missiles that were still operationally deployed.

Again, General Brandtner will have details on this.



Following on from there, we then started to have a significant increase in events to the north. We had British, French, and U.S. aircraft, and all received instances of AAA fire. Fortunately, none of the aircraft were hit. We also saw Saddam begin to deploy his aircraft and violate in a rather routine way the 36 no-fly zone with aircraft out of Qayyarah West. And then also we began to see him move his SAM missiles into that area. As well, we had the violations of the zone.

And then on the 17th of January, we shot down one of the MiG–29s north of the 36 no-fly zone. And on the 17th, we had the TLAM strikes into Zaafaraniyah. Again, the details you will have.

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The next day we went back, also, and finished the last work in the air defense zone, and completely destroyed it, and neutralized it in the south, and went after the remaining SAM sites that are located south of the 32 no-fly zone.

At that point, Saddam then began to respond. He removed the border post which had been in violation since the 15th—the police post along the border, turned over the oil fields. However, he did continue a series of AAA instances that took place above the 36 no-fly zone until about the 23rd of January. There have been instances since the 23rd of January.

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

And really, since those strikes there has been a redispersal and deployment of aircraft back to their original zones, and original aircraft fields.

The situation as it exists today is two operational SA–3 sites in the southern area. This entire air defense capability in the south has been effectively destroyed. It is not functioning today. And we, again, have no violations since the 23rd of January.

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

This basically just lays down the situation. As of today, he is in his 5th day of meetings, looking at his air defense system.

He is very dissatisfied with that. We still have a couple of SA–2s deployed in the north; two SA–3s in the south, as well as SA–6s. And, again, the meetings continue. And that is where I will turn it over to General Brandtner for the operational considerations.

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

General BRANDTNER. I would first like to discuss the military operations in Northern Iraq. As you know, we have two no-fly zones, one north of the 32 and one north of 36. And one south of 32.

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US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN IRAQ



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

The operation is called Provide Comfort II, and the mission is shown on this slide.

The residual forces that we have there as of the current time are shown on this slide.

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OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT II
MISSION

- RESIDUAL FORCES SERVE AS A SYMBOL OF COALITION RESOLVE AND AS A DETERENT TO IRAQI MILITARY ENCROACHMENT INTO THE SECURITY ZONE IN NORTHERN IRAQ. MAINTAIN AIR PRESENCE ABOVE THE 36N PARALLEL AS PROVIDED BY THE DAILY ATO. BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT AIR COMBAT OPERATIONS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ AS DIRECTED.

CTF PROVIDE COMFORT 201415Z JUL 91 (OPLAN)

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OPERATION
PROVIDE COMFORT II
RESIDUAL FORCE (AS OF 26 JAN 93)

AIRCRAFT

32 US FIGHTERS
20 COALITION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
23 SUPPORT
75 TOTAL

PERSONNEL

TOTAL PC II - 1970

TOTAL US - 1535

You will note that there is a significant participation in terms of aircraft in the coalition, and also, of course, the nations that we are operating with there have been very supportive.

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PROVIDE COMFORT II
CURRENT OPERATIONS

- MCC REPRESENTATIVES MEET WEEKLY WITH SENIOR IRAQI MILITARY OFFICER FOR REGION. ALSO MEETS ROUTINELY WITH KURDISH OFFICIALS

- COALITION AIRCRAFT FLYING AN AVERAGE OF 55 OPERATIONAL SORTIES PER DAY WITH 35 OVER NORTHERN IRAQ

- PATROLS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ TO PROVIDE VISIBLE PRESENCE, MONITOR POSITIONS OF IRAQI GROUND FORCES AND ENFORCE NO-FLY-ZONE (NFZ)

- 1-2 TIMES EACH MONTH A LARGE PACKAGE (30-40 AIRCRAFT) FLYS A COMBINED FORCE MISSION (CFM) OVER NORTHERN IRAQ

The current operations that we are involved with and Provide Comfort II involve the elements shown on this slide. It is a busy operation that is in the air all the time. You can see we are flying an average of 55 operational sorties per day, a large share of them—generally about 35 or so—are always over Northern Iraq.

We also have on a 1 or 2-time a month basis what we call a combined force mission, which is a large combined force package that flies simulated strike missions for training purposes over selected areas that are obviously there to make sure our presence is known.

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Admiral Cramer had mentioned that there were a number of events that occurred. I do not want to go through a laundry list, but I would just throw these up there in your book, if you wanted to just flip through them, and they give you some more detail about the events that occurred.

Essentially, they were all as a result of some Iraqi action that posed a threat to U.S. or coalition aircraft to which those aircraft responded either by engaging with laser guided weapons, or actually strafing, or using a missile to take down an aircraft.

Chairman NUNN. General, have there been any actual missiles fired at our aircraft, or has it all been AAA fire?

General BRANDTNER. I will let Mike take that one.

Admiral CRAMER. There was actually an attempt on the 27th of December. When the MiG–25 tried to shoot down one of our aircraft, he actually fired a missile. The missile was ineffective. He was out of range. But they clearly fired an air-to-air missile. I can give you the details of that.

Chairman NUNN. Any ground missiles fired?

General BRANDTNER. Not that we have known. They have illuminated height finding radar and things of that nature that acquire the target. And when that occurs, it is immediately preempted. So, we essentially take it out by the use of the HARM missile to destroy the radar capability so the missile cannot be launched.

Admiral CRAMER. They did, of course, fire ground missiles during the Tomahawk strike on Baghdad.

Chairman NUNN. At our cruise missiles.

Admiral CRAMER. What they thought was, that is right.

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General BRANDTNER. I will continue to go through the slides on the confrontations.

RECENT CONFRONTATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

15 JAN 93

-- AAA FIRE UNCONFIRMED

16 JAN 93

-- 2 F-111 TOOK 23MM FIRE (VISUAL CONFIRMATION) NO HITS

17 JAN 93

-- F-16 ON NFZ PATROL RECIEVED 37MM AAA FIRE. NO HITS.

-- CTF AIRCRAFT (FRENCH F-1 RECCE) ESCORTED BY USAF F-4G ILLUMINATED BY IRAQI HEIGHT FINDER RADAR (SIDE NET) ASSOCIATED WITH SA-6 SITE. TWO HARM MISSILES FIRED. SIGNAL STOPS. OCCURRED 10 NM SOUTH OF MOSUL.

-- MIG-23 CROSSES 36 NORTH LINE. F-16 PURSUES BUT BREAKS OFF AT 36N. NO SHOTS.

-- USAF F-16'S ENGAGE AN IRAQI MIG 29 NORTH OF 36 DEGREES. FOLLOWING VISUAL IDENTIFICATION F-16 DOWNS MIG WITH AIM-120 ADVANCED MEDIUM RANGE AIR TO AIR MISSILE (AMRAAM).

RECENT CONFRONTATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

18 JAN 93

-- AAA FIRE AT CTF AIRCRAFT (BRITISH JAGUAR) 5 NM NORTH OF MOSUL.

-- CTF AIRCRAFT (USAF F-4G) FIRED HARM AT SIDE NET HEIGHT FINDER RADAR 10 NM SW OF MOSUL.

-- CTF AIRCRAFT (USAF F-4G) FIRED HARM SAME VICINITY.

-- CTF AIRCRAFT (USAF F-16) RECIEVED AAA FIRE. DROPPED 4 X CBU 87 AT BASHIQAH AFLD AAA SITE.

-- F-111 RECEIVES AAA FIRE. NO HITS.

Again, it is just a rehash of what occurred.

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RECENT CONFRONTATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

19 JAN 93

-- F-4G FIRES HARM AT SA-6 SITE 12 NM SE OF MOSUL

-- F-16 REPORTED AAA FIRE 3 NM WEST OF SADDAM DAM

-- F-16 FIRED ON BY AAA SITE 10 NM NORTH OF MOSUL.

-- 2 F-16 DROP 4 X CBU 87 ON AAA SITE AND OBSERVE SECONDARY EXPLOSIONS.

20 JAN 93

-- NO REPORTED INCIDENTS

The summary of activity in Provide Comfort II is that we continue to operate in air operations over Northern Iraq.

PROVIDE COMFORT II SUMMARY

- COALITION PARTNERS CONTINUE AIR OPERATIONS OVER NORTHERN IRAQ

- NO IRAQI CHALLENGES TO OPERATIONS SINCE 22 JAN 93

We have not had any challenges to our air operations there since the 22nd of January.

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RECENT CONFRONTATIONS IN NORTHERN IRAQ

21 JAN 93

-- FRENCH F-1 ON RECCE MISSION ESCORTED BY F-4G AND F-16 ILLUMINATED BY HEIGHT FINDER RADAR 10 NM SOUTHWEST OF MOSUL AND RECEIVES AAA FIRE FROM A SITE 2-3 NM NORTH OF MOSUL. F-4G FIRES HARM MISSILES AND F-16 DROPS 2 X CBU-87 ON SITE. DAMAGE REPORTED TO VANS AT THE SITE.

22 JAN 93

-- F-4G FIRES 2 X HARM MISSILES AT SA-3 SITE LOCATED APPROXIMATELY HALFWAY BETWEEN MOSUL AND ERBIL. AIRCRAFT CONFIRMED TARGET TRACKING GUIDANCE FROM SA-3 AND THAT HE WAS IN THREAT ENVELOPE.

I will move on to Southern Iraq. Operation Southern Watch, which is a no-fly zone, which is established south of 32.

The mission is shown on this slide.



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OPERATION SOUTHERN WATCH MISSION

- CONDUCT PRESENCE AND MILITARY SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS OVER IRAQI TERRITORY SOUTH OF 32 DEGREES NORTH LATITUDE TO MONITOR AND REPORT ON IRAQI COMPLIANCE WITH UNSCR 688

In the current operations that are being conducted, we fly approximately 75 operational sorties per day with roughly 50 or 60 of those over Southern Iraq. We also use both land and carrier-based aircraft, and the types of aircraft are shown here.

We have surveillance by AWACS. Combat air patrol. We fly electronic warfare and air defense suppression missions. And we also conduct reconnaissance of Iraqi ground units. We do have participation by both the British and French, as well as the Saudis and Kuwaitis, participating over their own territory.

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SOUTHERN WATCH
CURRENT OPERATIONS

- CURRENTLY FLY APPROXIMATELY 75 OPERATIONAL SORTIES PER DAY WITH 50-60 OVER SOUTHERN IRAQ
- PARTICIPATION BY LAND AND CARRIER BASED AIRCRAFT INCLUDES:
  - SURVEILLANCE OF AIRSPACE BY AWACS
  - COMBAT AIR PATROL (CAP)
  - ELECTRONIC WARFARE AND AIR DEFENSE SUPPRESSION
  - RECONNAISSANCE OF IRAQI GROUND UNITS
- BRITISH AND FRENCH PARTICIPATION OVER IRAQ
- SAUDI AND KUWAITI PARTICIPATION OVER OWN TERRITORY

We have had a number of violations of the no-fly zone that are shown on this slide. And in each case you can see that we have made some reaction to these. And I will give you more detail on the strikes momentarily.

The last event that we have there was on the 23rd of January, when an A–6 from a carrier dropped a laser-guided bomb on a AAA battery that he believed had been shooting at him.

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SOUTHERN IRAQ

10-26 DEC 92	NUMEROUS VIOLATIONS OF SOUTHERN NFZ
27 DEC 92	F-16 SHOOTS DOWN IRAQI MIG-25
31 DEC 92-5 JAN 93	IRAQ MOVES SURFACE TO AIR MISSILES (SAM) INTO SOUTHERN NFZ AND CONTINUES VIOLATIONS OF NFZ
6 JAN 93	PERM 4 DEMARCHE TO IRAQ TO REMOVE SAMS
7-12 JAN 93	IRAQ REJECTS DEMARCHE, LEAVES SAMS SOUTH OF 32 DEGREES AND RESTRICTS UN FLIGHTS
13 JAN 93	COALITION AIR STRIKES ON SAM/COMMAND AND CONTROL SITES IN SOUTHERN NFZ
17 JAN 93	COALITION TLAM STRIKE ON ZAAFARANIYAH NUC FACILITY
18 JAN 93	COALITION AIRSTRIKES ON SAM/COMMAND AND CONTROL SITES IN SOUTHERN NFZ
23 JAN 93	AAA FIRES AT A-6 NEAR BASRAH, AIRCRAFT DROPS LGB ON SITE

On the coalition air strikes, the targets that we have struck are shown here. I would emphasize that these are targets that essentially are involved with the command and control of the air defense system. We have gone after command bunkers, communications, data links, and radars.

We have not targeted the mobile missiles per se. If they were in the zone and were struck, that was an ancillary benefit of the mission. And our objective was as shown. To disable the systems south of 32.

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COALITION AIRSTRIKES

TARGETS

- TARGETS WERE SAM/COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES
    - -- COMMAND BUNKERS
    - -- COMMUNICATION/DATA LINKS
    - -- RADARS
- MOBILE MISSILE LAUNCHERS NOT TARGETS
- OBJECTIVE WAS TO DISABLE THE INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM SOUTH OF 32 DEGREES

The coalition air strike that occurred on the 13th of January had a package of 112 aircraft, 80 of which were strike. Of that, 38 were bomb-droppers, and also you had suppression of air defense. And then 32 were support aircraft—tankers, AWACS, and electronic warfare—those kinds of aircraft.

We conducted the strike at night to minimize the air-to-air and SAM threat, and we used the high-altitude weapon release to minimize exposure to AAA. And to the maximum extent possible, we utilized precision guided munitions.

We did not choose to use the TLAM for this particular set of missions because of the mobile systems and the command bunkers that move about. We felt that the TLAM, in terms of—I know you are familiar with the targeting procedures. It was more flexible to use aircraft for this strike, and we did have participation by coalition nations for the strike.

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COALITION AIRSTRIKE 13 JAN 93

CONCEPT

- 112 AIRCRAFT PACKAGE; 80 STRIKE (38 BOMB DROPPERS), 32 SUPPORT
- NIGHT STRIKE TO MINIMIZE AIR TO AIR AND SAM THREAT
- HIGH ALTITUDE WEAPONS RELEASE TO MINIMIZE EXPOSURE TO AAA
- UTILIZED PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS (PGM) TO MAXIMUM EXTENT
- TLAM NOT SUITABLE FOR TARGET TYPES. (MOBILE SYSTEMS, COMMAND BUNKERS)
- COALITION (BRITISH AND FRENCH) AIRCRAFT PARTICIPATION

The strike sequence is shown here. We established our airborne warning and control system and the Rivet Joint, which is electronic warfare aircraft, to establish tracks along the border to build the air defense picture, and to give information to the attacking aircraft on exactly what the threat was, what radars were operating, and what the state of affairs was at each of the target areas.

We established tanker orbits, the fuel combat air patrol guarding the tankers, suppression of enemy air defense, and strike aircraft mission profiles, and also a combat air patrol barrier established along the 32 line to prevent any aircraft that should go airborne from the Iraqis from pursuing U.S. and coalition forces as they returned from the mission.

We did a sequential hit of the targets. The whole strike took approximately 15 to 20 minutes. It was a staggered type of hit based on the type of target, the type of munitions being dropped, and it was in order to manage the flow of aircraft into the target area.

We viewed that mission as highly successful, and we would be prepared to discuss detailed battle damage assessment, but we would ask that we do that in a closed session.

The TLAM strike that occurred on the 17th of January was targeted against the Zaafaraniyah nuclear fabrication facility. We fired a total of 45 TLAM missiles which were launched from surface platforms in both the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. We had 37 missiles that we can account for hitting the targets, and as noted on the slide we had one missile booster that failed and went into the sea that was destroyed.

We had six that were near-misses inside the target area or just adjacent to it in an orchard, which did not cause any collateral

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damage. And then the one that we believe was shot down by Iraqi air defense systems and which impacted near the Rasheed Hotel. We do not believe that that was an explosion but, rather, a kinetic energy damage that was caused by the weight of the missile coming in at about .8 mach that caused the damage you saw there.

Chairman NUNN. Are we certain that missile was shot down?

General BRANDTNER. We cannot be sure. However, when we saw the missile come in, you recall the photographs. It was on fire, so we believe it had been struck and what we saw was the fuel burning. And when the missile struck, if it had been in a program mode, it would have no doubt probably exploded and would have probably destroyed the hotel.

So, we believe it was falling out of the sky in pieces. And the evidence we were able to see so far indicated it was falling apart when it hit the ground.

COALITION AIRSTRIKE
13 JAN 93

STRIKE SEQUENCE

- AWACS AND RIVET JOINT ESTABLISH TRACKS ALONG BORDER TO BUILD AIR DEFENSE PICTURE
- TANKERS ESTABLISH ORBITS AND FUEL CAP, SEAD AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT
- FIGHTER CAP ESTABLISH BARRIER ALONG 32 DEGREE LINE
- SEAD AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT SEQUENTIALLY HIT TARGETS
- STRIKE AND SEAD AIRCRAFT EGRESS PROTECTED BY CAP
- CAP EGRESS

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TLAM STRIKE
17 JAN 93

- TARGET - ZAAFARANIYAH NUCLEAR FABRICATION FACILITY

- 45 MISSILES FIRED = 37 MISSILES HIT AIMPOINTS

  -- 1 MISSILE BOOSTER FAILED
  -- 3 CRATERS INSIDE FACILITY
  -- 3 CRATERS IN ORCHARD
  -- 1 ASSUMED SHOT DOWN NEAR RASHEED HOTEL

- ALL TARGETED BUILDINGS DAMAGED

The coalition air strike on the 18th of January was a follow up strike to hit targets that were not completely destroyed during the 13 January strike, and also some other sites that had emerged in the intervening period.

We decided to go with a day strike to assist the target acquisition. We used, again, high altitude weapons released to minimize exposure to AAA, and again utilized precision guided munitions to the maximum extent possible.

The sequence and the flow of the strike, and the target packaging, and the method of entry and egress from the area were the same as the strike conducted on the 13th of January.

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COALITION AIRSTRIKE 13 JAN 93

STRIKE SEQUENCE

- AWACS AND RIVET JOINT ESTABLISH TRACKS ALONG BORDER TO BUILD AIR DEFENSE PICTURE
- TANKERS ESTABLISH ORBITS AND FUEL CAP, SEAD AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT
- FIGHTER CAP ESTABLISH BARRIER ALONG 32 DEGREE LINE
- SEAD AND STRIKE AIRCRAFT SEQUENTIALLY HIT TARGETS
- STRIKE AND SEAD AIRCRAFT EGRESS PROTECTED BY CAP
- CAP EGRESS

We also are prepared to discuss that in more detail, but the bottom line was that was a very successful strike, very, very damaging to the air defense system.

COALITION AIRSTRIKE 18 JAN 93

- FOLLOW-UP STRIKE TO HIT AIMPOINTS NOT DESTROYED DURING 13 JAN STRIKE
- DAY STRIKE TO ASSIST IN TARGET ACQUISITION
- HIGH ALTITUDE WEAPONS RELEASE TO MINIMIZE EXPOSURE TO AAA
- UTILIZED PGM TO MAXIMUM EXTENT POSSIBLE
- SAME STRIKE SEQUENCE AS 13 JAN

The summary of our activities in Southern Watch is shown on this slide. We continue today to conduct air operations in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 688. We do have sufficient air

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and naval presence in that area to conduct these operations and to respond to any provocations. And, as mentioned earlier, we have not had any challenges to our efforts in that area since the 23rd of January.

We will, per the chairman's direction, now proceed on with military operations in former Yugoslavia. And, again, I will turn it over to Admiral Cramer to give you the intelligence picture and set the stage for what is currently going on.

SOUTHERN WATCH
SUMMARY

- COALITION PARTNERS CONTINUE AIR OPERATIONS OVER SOUTHERN IRAQ IN SUPPORT OF UNSCR 688

- SUFFICIENT RESIDUAL AIR AND NAVAL FORCES AVAILABLE FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN RESPONSE TO IRAQI PROVOCATIONS

- NO IRAQI CHALLENGES TO OPERATIONS SINCE 23 JAN 93

Admiral CRAMER. I know yesterday you had a pretty comprehensive briefing on the background of Yugoslavia, so I will step through this rather quickly, but there are a few points we would like to make.

First of all, in terms of the crisis in Yugoslavia itself, despite a lot of fighting and a lot of pulling and hauling, we have not really seen a significant change in who controls what really over the last 6 months or so.

Although international peace efforts certainly have been ongoing, if you had to evaluate it today unfortunately they have had some limited effectiveness.

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The Bosnian crisis itself—if you look at the graphic at the right, I know you saw this yesterday, is the ethnic breakdown of which groups live where. You can see the genesis of the entire crisis in Bosnia.

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Moving on to the next graphic, we can see fighting erupted last March. That portion which you see in the pink color is essentially what the Serbs control today. Those in white are controlled by the Croats and the Muslims, although there is some variation to that as well.

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

The next graphic is a more specific breakdown of what is actually under Serbian control today. That which is in yellow is Croat and Muslim control.

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The next graphic just shows the lay down of force levels in Bosnia depicting pretty well who has what, and what arms they control.

The next graphic is a summary.

Chairman NUNN. Let us look at that a little bit more.

Admiral CRAMER. The Bosnian Serb Army, of course, was created from the residue of the Yugoslavian Army, which had served in Bosnia at the time. Some 70 to 80 percent of the equipment which the Bosnian Army—the Bosnian Serb Army had received, of course, was left over from the Yugoslavian National Army.

Chairman NUNN. Correct me if I am wrong on that chart, but it appears to me that primarily the disadvantage the Muslim defense forces have and the Croat defense forces, is the lack of any kind of mortar or tanks, or the heaver equipment, longer range equipment. Is that right?

Admiral CRAMER. That is essentially correct, Senator. That is certainly correct in the case of the Muslim forces. The Croats do have some limited artillery capability, limited tank capability. But the Muslim forces are by and large left to what they overrun and what they are able to obtain on the battlefield in terms of residue.

But you are absolutely correct, in terms of the overall balance of heavy artillery and tanks, certainly it falls dominantly in the Serbian and Bosnian-Serbian area.



Moving on to the next graphic, which is a lay down in terms of what we have seen in terms of no fly activity and no fly zone activity.

One, the no fly enforcement was placed around the middle of December. We have seen a significant fall off to that time.

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You have really got to go back until the 10th of October to find a verifiable, confirmable example of where the Bosnian Serb Air Force used fixed wing aircraft in air to ground attack. There clearly have been violations, and the U.N. has laid these out very carefully—of helicopters and so on that have flown. But if you really want to go to the Banja Luka area and look at the Oraos and the Astra Galebs that have been used fairly extensively over the summer and somewhat effectively in air to ground attack. This has not occurred since the middle of October.

Chairman NUNN. In other words, even if the coalition were to completely enforce the no fly zone with no planes flying, you are saying, as I understand what you are saying, it would not make an appreciable military difference?

Admiral CRAMER. Yes, sir, that is correct. That is what I am saying.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying it would have no military effect?

Admiral CRAMER. I did not say "no." I would use the chairman's word, no appreciable effect.

Senator, you are absolutely right, that there are logistics flights, some quasi-humanitarian flights, probably some command and control work that is going on there, not only, by the way, with Bosnia and Serbian Helos, but also Croat Helos across the area. But I essentially agree with the chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Am I reading that last bullet right up there, where it says, now most violations are resupply flights to Croatian to Muslims?

Admiral CRAMER. Yes. In terms of specific numbers. Also, I want to caveat these, sir. And I need to do so carefully. Our ability to monitor all these flights is not absolute. It depends on when NATO AWACS is in there and other sources that we use. So there certainly could be a few flights, but the number is a few more than what you see here in terms of flights.

But overall, the majority of flights are of a logistic nature and that last bullet applies.

Chairman NUNN. Based on what you are saying right here then, if we were to decide tomorrow morning to enforce the no fly zone and if the patterns—I guess this is the last, what, 60 days——

Admiral CRAMER. Yes, sir, that is correct, the last 90 days.

Chairman NUNN. If we look at the last 60 days, if we shot down every aircraft that flew, you are saying we would be shooting down more Croatian aircraft than we would Serbian?

Admiral CRAMER. Perhaps that would be the case. I would have to say perhaps, because the most recent activity over the last couple of days, 3 or 4 days, we have had some Bosnian-Serbian helo activity, particularly related to what is going on in sector one, sector south, I should say.

But if you want a specific answer, I would take it for the record that——

Chairman NUNN. Would you get it for the record?

Admiral CRAMER. I will.

Chairman NUNN. As best you can tell.

[The information follows:]

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If the pattern of violations of the no-fly zone over B–H by Croats and Bosnian Serbs since mid-December continues, Croat aircraft flying into Cazin airfield [deleted].

Since mid-December, the Bosnian Serb air force is documented as having flown [deleted] while the Croats have flown [deleted] into Gazin airfield.

The number of aircraft flown by the Croats [deleted] flying into Cazin is far less than the total aircraft available to the Bosnian Serbs (21 fixed wing and 30 helicopters). Should the Bosnian Serbs opt to fly despite a no-fly zone enforcement provision, Bosnian Serb aircraft would then run the greatest risk of shootdown.

Civilian relief agency aircraft also violate the no-fly periodically and will be at risk if enforcement procedures are implemented.



Admiral CRAMER. But sir, I agree with you, that the no fly zone in terms of military impact is there. It is there but it is not a significant contributor to what really the Bosnian Serbs are able to do on the ground with artillery and other means.

Moving along, this is the current conflict as it really is today and describes, of course, strategically, the importance of what we refer to often as the northern corridor. You see the green line that extends through the northern part of Bosnia, which really is the line that links up Serbia generally with the sectors.

Each of those orange sectors, if you will, although they physically exist in Croatia (part of the Vance plan), are dominantly ethnically Serbian in nature. It is this northern corridor that allows the Serbians to link these sectors, again dominantly Serbian in ethnic concentration, with what is referred to as Serbian Krajina.

Serbian Krajina is all the way on the western side there. Again, most of it, all of it frankly, or the vast majority of it is in Croatia itself, but that northern corridor is strategically very important for the Serbs.

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And that is why you are seeing all the fighting going on in the southern sector over the last 2 or 3 days. And you saw the dam problem and all of that.

What is crucial to them is strategically linked Croatia itself and the Croatian Dalmatian coast to the south. So what we are seeing right now in the last couple of days is very important strategic fighting from the Croatian standpoint.

As far as the Muslims are concerned, they by and large are being concentrated down into this yellow zone that you see in the middle and even really concentrated more than that into enclaves and places like Sarajevo, Tuzla, Gradacac, et cetera and in a small group up in Behash. The Moslims by far are the largest losers in terms of net gain of territory in this conflict so far.

Turning to the last graphic, which is the offensive that we have really seen within the last 3 or 4 days and what is going on there. The Croats particularly in the Maslenica Bridge area, again, have, it appears, been frustrated by—particularly in these pink zones—the lack and the inability of the U.N. to make progress in turning these areas over to the Croats for Croatian control. Now it seems they have taken matters into their own hands.

President Tudjman has said such. And they are now mounting an offensive that would allow them to link, again, central Croatia with Croatian Dalmatian coast south and of course, the Serbs, particularly the Krajinan Serbs, are just as determined to ensure that that does not happen.

If, in fact—and this is a big if—if the strategic situation here, particularly in the Krajina area, really turns and takes its worst form, we would be back essentially to where we were before the

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Vance Plan. Because if this does occur and the Croats mount a major offensive into the southern sector, we believe that the Yugoslavian national army and Serbians will respond in a very large way. So it is a very critical period that we are going through just now as this fighting is going on.

With that background, we would certainly be happy to answer all your questions later. But I will turn it over to General Brandtner for the operational considerations.

Chairman NUNN. Let me ask just one question, just informational. Do you have any charts showing the Yugoslavian army if they were to intervene what the order of battle is?

Admiral CRAMER. Yes, sir, I have—I could take that on follow-up. But I do have it.

Chairman NUNN. Maybe you could follow that up.



General BRANDTNER. U.S. military operations in former Yugoslavia are in three categories, as shown; humanitarian aid, U.N. operations support and U.S. unilateral operations which have occurred.

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US MILITARY OPERATIONS

- THREE MAJOR CATEGORIES
  - -- HUMANITARIAN AID
  - -- UN OPERATIONS SUPPORT
  - -- US UNILATERAL OPERATIONS

The map graphic here gives a lay down of the locations in broad sense of these activities and some numbers associated with them. And I will talk in more detail to each of those.

The humanitarian aid situation is that prior to the operation Provide Promise, the United States had provided the amount of equipment and supplies through the means shown here, essentially a fairly conservative effort. Nonetheless, it did provide a lot of food and equipment, blankets and medical supplies to the area.

And we also had a number of sea containers that were trucked in to assist, as you can see, a very large amount of food.

Humanitarian aid that has continued is that we support the U.N. lead on humanitarian relief. We began Operation Provide Promise on the 3rd of July 1992 and currently we have a three-person liaison team that is attached to the UNHCR headquarters in Geneva, which is under EUCOM control and is supporting there. And coordinates the U.S. airlift and the supply.

We have five C-130 aircraft that are dedicated to delivering aid along with our other allies. And the average schedule is eight U.S. and some 14 allied sorties per day, which as you know, has been interrupted from time to time by events and weather and so on.

The number of flights shown on the slide represent what have you accomplished to date and the amount of supplies that have been lifted by U.S. forces.

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US MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA



HUMANITARIAN AID

- PRIOR TO OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE THE US PROVIDED:

  -- 5 X C-141 SORTIES TO SARAJEVO (18-19 APR 92)
  --- 90,000 MEALS READY TO EAT (MRE), 18,000 BLANKETS, $250,000 MEDICAL SUPPLIES

  -- 2 X C-141 SORTIES TO GRAZ, AU (15 JUN 92)
  --- $3.5 MILLION MEDICAL SUPPLIES (SUPPLIES SUBSEQUENTLY MOVED VIA LAND TO YUGOSLAVIA)

  -- 155 X SEA CONTAINERS (29 JUN 92) TRUCKED FROM ROTTERDAM AND PISA TO ZAGREB
  --- 3.2 MILLION MREs

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HUMANITARIAN AID (PROVIDE PROMISE)

- US IS SUPPORTING UN LEAD ON HUMANITARIAN RELIEF
- OPERATION PROVIDE PROMISE BEGAN 3 JUL 92
  - -- 3 PERSON LIAISON TEAM TO UNHCR, GENEVA
    --- COORDINATES US LIFT AND SUPPLIES
  - -- AIRLIFT OF HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES TO SARAJEVO
    --- 5 X C-141 AIRCRAFT DELIVER AID WITH OTHER ALLIES
    --- AVERAGE SCHEDULE IS 8 US/14 ALLIED SORTIES PER DAY
    --- 639 US FLIGHTS TO DATE - 1,781 ALLIED FLIGHTS
    --- 7137.3 SHORT TONS OF GOODS DELIVERED BY US

In addition to that shown, we also have a 10 person mobile aerial port squadron, essentially cargo handlers and logisticians who are in support of the operation at Zagreb. They are under EUCOM control and working in support of the U.N. high commissioner for refugees. They are not what we call blue helmeted troops.

There is also a 16 person staff augmenting to the UNHCR in Zagreb, Belgrade, and Metkovic and they are there to provide technical assistance. Again, they are under the operational command of EUCOM, working in support of the UNHCR as technical advisors. And they are not under blue helmet aegis, if you will.

We do, however, have by arrangement with the United Nations, the appropriate diplomatic protection. We also have two officers that are attached to an air operations cell at Zagreb who are under the command of EUCOM. And they assist in providing real time monitoring of air lift support to Sarajevo.

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HUMANITARIAN AID (PROVIDE PROMISE)

-- 10 PERSON MOBILE AERIAL PORT SQUADRON (MAPS) DETACHMENT, ZAGREB
--- IMPROVE AIRPORT CARGO HANDLING AND OPERATIONS

-- 16 PERSON STAFF AUGMENTATION TO UNHCR (ZAGREB, BELGRADE, METKOVIC)
--- PROVIDE TECHNICAL EXPERTISE

-- 2 OFFICERS TO AIR OPERATIONS CELL, ZAGREB
--- REAL TIME MONITORING OF AIRLIFT SUPPORT TO SARAJEVO

Our operations in support of the United Nations in the operational area continue to monitor the maritime economic sanctions under the U.N. Security Council resolutions 757 and 787. And we support it as shown here. We support NATO's operation Maritime Monitor Guard. We have four P3 aircraft that are OPCON to SACEUR, a frigate that has been attached to the standing Naval force Mediterranean, which is currently the U.S.S. *McInerney*. And we also have Coast Guard law enforcement attachments that are aboard various ships to assist in any kind of interdiction that inspection that occurs.

We also, as Admiral Cramer has discussed, we are in the process of monitoring the no fly zone established by the Security Council Resolution 781. And we have those three officers to that monitoring command and control cell, communications cell in Zagreb.

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UN OPERATIONS SUPPORT

- MARITIME ECONOMIC SANCTIONS MONITORING AND ENFORCEMENT - UNSCR 757 & 787

  -- SUPPORT NATO'S OPERATION MARITIME MONITOR/GUARD
  -- 4 X P-3 MARITIME PATROL AIRCRAFT (OPCON TO SACEUR)
  -- 1 X FRIGATE TO STANDING NAVAL FORCE MEDITERRANEAN (CURRENTLY USS MCINERNEY)
  -- 4 X US COAST GUARD LAW ENFORCEMENT DETACHMENTS

- BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA NO-FLY MONITORING - UNSCR 781

  -- 3 X OFFICERS TO MONITORING COMMAND AND COMMUNICATION CELL (MCCC) - ZAGREB (US OFFICER IS COMMANDING)

We also have provided a mission support in the form of a 60-bed field hospital, which consists of 343 U.S. personnel at Zagreb and they are under U.N. control and wear blue helmets.

There also are seven personnel to augment UNPROFOR headquarters at the Bosnia/Hercegovina headquarters at Kiseljak. They provide staff support to UNPROFOR BH, whose mission is to escort security convoys or provide escort security to the convoy. And those U.S. personnel are under U.N. control and work for General Morehill and they are blue-helmeted troops.

Our U.S. unilateral operations, which have since been overtaken by a coalition member on a rotational basis, were to provide search and rescue operations, using the Mediterranean amphibious medical group assets in the Adriatic. They were under the operational command and control of the Commander, Sixth Fleet and as you can see, they operated in a permissive environment.

And on the 21st of December, we transferred the SAR operation responsibility to UNPROFOR, but we still participate on a rotating basis. And as you know, the carrier battle group operates in and around the Mediterranean, maintaining U.S. presence; and in conjunction with our allies, goes in and out of the Adriatic on an operational basis.

Gentlemen, that concludes the operational brief on our involvement with U.S. forces in Yugoslavia. Admiral Cramer and I would be happy to answer your questions.

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UN OPERATIONS SUPPORT

- UNPROFOR MISSION SUPPORT

  -- 60 BED FIELD HOSPITAL (343 PERSONS), ZAGREB

- 7 PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT UNPROFOR B-H HEADQUARTERS, KISELJAK

  -- PROVIDE STAFF SUPPORT TO UNPROFOR B-H WHOSE MISSION IS ESCORT SECURITY TO UN CONVOYS

Admiral CRAMER. This is basically a lay down of the Yugoslav Army versus the Croatian National Army. It is clear that Yugoslavia, at least in terms of numerical strength and many other ways, is a far superior force. However, you have got to put that in context a little bit.

They also have far broader missions than does Croatia, and looking at the situation in Kovoso, Macedonia, Montenegro and within Bosnia itself, if the two forces were lined up side by side, you would have to anticipate the Yugoslavian National Army would win. But I am not sure that would ever be the case in the field.

So whether it has a decisive capability against the Croatian Army remains to be seen.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, would you yield? Is there a precise definition as to what is the Yugoslavian National Army? Because the warlords have a lot of troops, the volunteers that have come over to the Yugoslav——

Admiral CRAMER. Yes, when we talk about the Yugoslavian National Army, we are really talking about those forces that are in current Serbia, Belgrade, outside of Bosnia. I am not including—in none of these forces do you see——

Senator WARNER. Correct.

Admiral CRAMER. So the warlords or the irregulars, the Bosnian Serb Army and so on that I referred to are exclusive from the forces that you see here.

Senator WARNER. And what sort of approximation of size?

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Admiral CRAMER. Here we are in the left side over here. Sir, if you can see it, we have the Bosnian Serb Army here, which was essentially the Yugoslavia National Forces which were left in Bosnia when the Yugoslavian National Army pulled out. So about 80 percent of the equipment that had been in Bosnia before, as you said or alluded to, is now part of the Bosnian Serbian Army.

But that is in Bosnia. This is in Serbia.

Senator WARNER. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman NUNN. Do those last two numbers, where you have the Bosnian-Croatian Forces and Croatian Defense Forces, those are in Bosnia?

Admiral CRAMER. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Are those included in that number over there, the 52,000 or is that separate?

Admiral CRAMER. Those are separate, sir. And also, it is fair to say, those Croatian Defense Forces essentially move in and out with some regularity.

Chairman NUNN. Okay. Let us start the round of questioning and we can have more than one round if people would desire.

A couple of questions first on former Yugoslavia. General, we have not used much sea lift and of course, all of us on this committee know that it takes a huge number of air flights to compensate for one large ship pulling up at a port.

Why is it that we have not used sea lift or are we beginning to?

General BRANDTNER. Well, in terms of the kinds of operations that we are conducting in Sarajevo, for example, because of the conditions on the roads, trying to go in there, it has been an enormous bottleneck in trying to maintain that.

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Obviously, it would be preferable to use sealift and surface routes of transportation to enhance the movement of large amounts of cargo. We have used some sealift, but largely the U.S. aspect of it has been air.

Chairman NUNN. Are we not flying a lot of the aircraft, some of the aircraft at least, for some of the relief into Belgrade?

General BRANDTNER. Yes, we are. And there is some surface movement there. As I mentioned, we would obviously prefer to do this relief operation with mostly surface means.

Chairman NUNN. It just looks like to me on this map—maybe I am not looking at it right—that from the port that we are using, Ploce, the port to Sarajevo is really much closer than the route you have to take from the airport, from Belgrade.

General BRANDTNER. The problem is both security and condition of the road network. You are driving through any number of different factional types of areas of responsibility, if you will. And trying to get through there is an extremely difficult problem. If it can be done at all, it has been not successful and they are subject to essentially varying degrees of intimidation along the way, to include armed conflict.

In addition, the road itself—and Admiral Cramer can give you some more details of that—is essentially in many cases impassible in bad weather.

Chairman NUNN. Okay, let me go on to the next question. I would like to get into that later, but what, General Brandtner, do you think would be the situation if the U.N. lifted its embargo and supplied arms to the Bosnian Muslims, which a number of people have advocated, including me for instance.

But what do you think would be the military result of that?

General BRANDTNER. I think it would be continued chaos, sir, with all due respect. You open it up to providing more arms for other factions, I think you would discover that the effect would be that each of the sides would continue to acquire illicit and legalized support. I think it would just be contributing to the violence and would have no salutary effect.

Chairman NUNN. Well, the Muslims, though, are so outgunned and so outnumbered and they have lost all their territory, clearly the territorial gains have gone to those who had the guns.

General BRANDTNER. But I do not think the solution is to open the embargo and just let them have access to more of that. I think there is probably a political solution that has to be applied here to try to reduce the violence, rather than giving them increased capability to up the violence.

Chairman NUNN. Okay, we talked a great deal about a stable Persian Gulf area during the Persian Gulf war and we talked about it right after it.

We talked about having some kind of gulf council of defense forces with Egypt participating. It seemed to me that that was very, very important to get that done. But what it appears—correct me if I am wrong—it appears to me that right now what has happened in the last year, year and a half, is that the gulf countries and Egypt have not done much in terms of getting together. There is really no strong gulf defense force, so the countries in that region are basically saying to the United States implicitly, well, we

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like you protecting us; and we are going to let you protect us from now on.

Let us just say Kuwait right now, could Kuwait protect itself, even from what is left of the Iraqi forces without the United States coming back in? Would Kuwait and the other Gulf States be able to put up a defense even against the remnants of what is left from Iraq without us?

General BRANDTNER. My own personal judgment is that if Iraq mounted an attack with the residual forces it has, which I will tell you I believe we would have very ample indications and warning of such an attempt. But let us say it were to occur without U.S. forces on the scene.

Chairman NUNN. Let us say without the United States helping at all.

General BRANDTNER. I think that Kuwait would be in dire straits. I do not think they could.

Chairman NUNN. Well, we are then taking on a permanent protecting role, it seems to me, unless we, on the other hand, start doing something to tell the Gulf States, which have plenty of money and Egypt, which has plenty of manpower, that you had better get your own act together. That we are not going to be here for the next 50 years.

I mean, I have seen this before and I think as long as we act like we are going to protect Kuwait forever and those other countries out there, they will not do much in terms of getting together for collective defense.

We started off saying that was our goal. I guess my question is, what has happened to that goal? What are they doing? Are they working with Egypt? Are they developing any kind of defensive resources of their own?

General BRANDTNER. I think, first of all, that question would be better answered by the unified commander, who is involved in a day-to-day basis working with those countries to build those capabilities. And I think that he could give you a much better answer than I.

I will say that I know that a large effort is ongoing by him and the State Department to attempt to try together, to enhance the ability of these nations to function militarily. We are working with them to deployments for training. And, as you know, we are selling arms and equipment to upgrade their armed forces. And there are exercises and all kinds of assistance in terms of training being offered to them on a continuing basis throughout that region.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you. I will pursue that with others, General. I appreciate your answer.

I would just say this and then I will yield. Unless Egypt is tied into it, there is no way in the world those small countries are ever going to have a collective defense that is going to be able to protect them against Iraq or Iran.

What I hate to see us do inadvertently, just sliding into a permanent, looks like dependency, by those countries on the U.S. forces.

And what I really worry about, down the line, is how they are going to protect themselves from indigenous forces that are not coming across the border, but may be guerrilla forces from within at some point. That would propose a much more difficult situation

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for us because it would not be an invasion, like we saw from Iraq, but rather more of a guerrilla warfare.

That is not all your responsibility, General; I think somebody better start thinking about that.

Senator EXON. I do not think that he answered fully your question. The question, I believe, was: Could the Iraqi forces overrun Kuwait?

I believe you also included Saudi Arabia in that.

Could they also, without intervention of American or other forces, continue and overrun Saudi Arabia, which is what got us into the Gulf war in the first instance?

General BRANDTNER. I honestly do not know whether he would have the capability to sustain operations, militarily. I would defer to my colleague, the intelligence officer, to give you a better assessment.

My own judgment is that that would be extremely difficult for him to do. And I would also submit that based on what he has remnant now, that any long-term effort which would be very, very demanding both on his logistics and sustainment, his ability to command and control it, I think would be not very effective. I would be speaking more in terms of a foray, an incursion, that might strike and do damage, a raiding kind of thing. But I doubt seriously, in my own judgment, that he could sustain that.

Senator EXON. Was that not part of your question?

Chairman NUNN. Yes.

Admiral CRAMER. I certainly would go along with what General Brandtner says. For example, the Iraqis, right now, have only got eight divisions south of 32 degrees north. They only have five divisions north of 36 degrees.

And, to be honest with you, they are very concerned—more concerned, frankly, about the Kurds, the Shia problem and, most importantly, the security of the Baath Party around Bagdad, and the regime's continuity, than to push these divisions out in any aggressive way against either Saudi Arabia or Kuwait.

I just do not see it on the horizon. You could come up with a hypothetical, a theoretical, a few months or years downstream, if the situation changes, that they might be in a different category than they are right now. But I will guarantee you, at least in the north and the south, the vast majority of their military capability is directed against the security problems just mentioned rather than direct it at any external threat.

Also important to note, although we did see some infiltration examples, three Iraqi soldiers into Kuwait here recently, throughout all of this evolution and confrontation that we have just had with Iraq, in no time, in no case was there any generation of force which indicated movement external to Iraq.

So, yes, it is possible. But it is more likely they would do it in other ways, terrorist ways, those kinds of ways, than any overt military action, given their current military capability.

Chairman NUNN. My time has expired, but at some other point I will pursue the Iranian threat, which is something I think we are not looking at very carefully now.

My point was not in any way implying that we were about to have another invasion from Iraq but, rather, that the time now

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being given Kuwait and those other Gulf countries should be taken advantage of in building up their own capability to defend themselves over a period of time, or at least to put up enough defense so we would be able to get our forces over there in time to help.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Brandtner, what role do Serbian heavy artillery and tanks have in the Bosnian conflict, and how difficult would it be to neutralize these weapons?

General BRANDTNER. Well, first of all, right now, the role they have is essentially harassment. They are applying artillery, and the tanks are there more as a presence. There have not been any major tank battles. They are there as intimidation. They can be used in roadblocks and other kinds of things.

The artillery is being fired, essentially, in my own personal judgment, in an indiscriminate way, as a weapon of terror. It is not being applied as a military support mechanism to sustain operations.

So that is my view of how they are being employed by the Serbs.

The targeting of weapons like this in the environment and the terrain that we are seeing there, the circumstances are very, very difficult. They are highly mobile. In order to conduct effective air strikes on targets of this nature, you need to have forward air controllers on the ground that can target these through the use of precise coordinates offered up, based on weapons activity, the use of laser-type of acquisition means, and so on.

In an environment where you would go in and conduct an air strike against this target, your margin of success is vastly reduced from the kind of environment you saw in the Gulf, for example, where targets were exposed and open, such as recently in southern Iraq.

Senator THURMOND. Admiral Cramer, in view of the Vance-Owen peace talks in Geneva, what do the Croatians hope to achieve with that current offensive?

Admiral CRAMER. Sir, I think as I alluded to in my remarks, on the one hand, there seems to be real frustration on the part of the Croatian leadership with the inability of the U.N. to make good on the pink zone turn over that we had talked about, particularly around the southern sector.

I think it is rather clear what they are trying to do is, again, reestablish the strategic link from northern Croatian to the Dalmatian Coast, and that is exactly what this fighting is all about.

Senator THURMOND. General Brandtner, in view of the situation now in Iraq, if you had the power of decision, what would you do from the best interests of the United States?

General BRANDTNER. Well, I think the idea of building up the capability of the regional forces of the nations there and the support of the large Arab capabilities of Egypt and others, we would continue the efforts we have now to strengthen that coalition of forces to prevent Saddam Hussein from beginning to believe he could reconstitute and have an impact.

I think we are meeting with success, and it is a long process. The countries involved clearly have a mutual interest in doing this.

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I would also begin to gradually withdraw our presence there in staged bases—and this again is hypothetical—that we would allow this transition to occur. I think it is important for our own national interest that we retain a capability to defend those interests over there in a form that is appropriate to the situation.

Senator THURMOND. General Brandtner, is there any question in your mind that Saddam Hussein will continue as a dictator as long as he can and, in view of that, is there any further steps that should be taken by the United Nations at this time?

General BRANDTNER. Well, I think that Saddam Hussein is going to attempt to remain in power to the best of his ability as long as he has the capability to do that. And I would submit that the United Nations should continue to put the sanctions into effect, to attempt to make him conform and to comply with those resolutions that have been put into effect, and that that effort should continue.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator EXON [presiding]. Senator, thank you very much.

I would ask a series of questions, and I will leave it to each one of you as to who you think would best answer, to try to move things along.

First, I would like to back up to a matter that has been put on the back burner now, and that is the repeated and frequent reports that we hear about our soldiers that were involved in the Desert Storm war, several or many have come back with some kind of a disorder, evidently based on a nerve disorder of some kind that has mystified the medical profession.

There has been some speculation that possibly they were affected in some way with some kind of chemical warfare that maybe was not used directly at them, but maybe partially destroyed by the air strikes that we made, and filtered down. Do either of you have any information at all as to that mystery that seems to be still confounding us?

General BRANDTNER. I will answer, and then I will let the admiral also.

I have no information whatsoever to indicate the nature of the illnesses that are being suffered. I can say that there was never any report of any type of incident with respect to chemical munitions being employed by the enemy.

There was one spurious report which you may have read in the newspaper, where one commander believed that he was under a chemical attack. That was later determined to be not true. It was based on circular reporting that had come around, and he was actually reading a message, I believe.

The other thing I would say is that, given the circumstances, the fact that we did not have evidence of any chemical weapons being employed, the chances of a chance encounter with them—we did not until well after the war discover caches of munitions that had chemical capability, in every case that I am aware of, and I am aware of virtually every one I believe, these were stored in a situation where they were not leaking or contaminating the area.

Senator EXON. Okay. I understand all that. To conserve time, you have heard the reports that I have heard about these soldiers being ill-affected, have you not?

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General BRANDTNER. I have heard reports that there are soldiers who are ill or suffering from some malady which they do not know the cause of.

Senator EXON. You do not know anything about that?

Admiral CRAMER. Sir, I have read the same reports. I have the same concern you do. I have nothing to substantiate it.

Senator EXON. All right. Let us move back to the situation in Bosnia.

We heard reports which clearly indicate what most of us have felt, that while at the present time we are not even enforcing the no-fly zone, if we would enforce that it might help some. If we would make selective air strikes it has been pretty well established this morning from your testimony that that is not likely to have any quick effect, at least, on bringing the hostilities to an end.

We certainly should keep, in my view, the embargo in place. That may be helping the cause some now. The administration is reportedly studying this very intently at the present time, and are not planning any action in the near term, as I understand it.

But let me ask you. You must have done some assessment. What would happen if we would decide, and if the United Nations would decide to commit ground troops, how many ground troops would it take, and over what extended period, regardless of where the troops came from, a combination or otherwise, what would be the force necessary to really do anything as to bring order over there? And if so, how long would it take?

General BRANDTNER. Well, first of all, I know that there has been testimony before this committee before in similar terms. But let me just say that this is so mission-dependent because there are so many ways that you could apply ground forces there, providing convoy security, conducting security of cantonment areas or villages that would set up as feeding sites, much along the lines that we do in Somalia.

Are you going to essentially reduce the Serbs' capability to wage war?

So, it is problematic as to how many you would say, and it varies, depending on those terms.

I know you have heard numbers of up to half a million and numerous corps size activities. I would submit to you, in the general sense, that no matter what you do on the ground in this location, you are going to have a requirement for a force that is going to have to be able to fight. Because I doubt seriously if this is going to be done in a benign environment.

We know from experience, and I know you have been told this before by other witnesses, the experiences of the German Army during World War II and others attempting to maintain control of this area. And those forces were, by the way, some of their very best armed forces that were dedicated to that job.

I would submit that you here have to have a clear objective in mind before you do that, that the cost would be very heavy, that it would be very long-term, and that you probably, without a specific, very focused objective that you had in mind with what you were trying to achieve and when it was accomplished, this would be an enormous pool that would drain resources. And I just do not believe this is an effective way.

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Senator EXON. Thank you. I think that covers it.

Admiral, do you have anything to add to that?

Admiral CRAMER. No, sir.

Senator EXON. Let me go back to Iran now. Chairman Nunn brought that up. I was also going to get into that.

Could you tell us what has happened to all of those airplanes—and how many of them you think there were—transferred during the Gulf war by Saddam into Iran? I still have never quite understood that.

Are the Iranian forces using those planes? Are they in their inventory? Are they still there?

And, second, what can you tell us in open session about what might be a likely chance for Iran to recoup their losses in the war that they basically lost to Saddam if he should start some kind of incursion into the south?

It would seem to me it would be almost an open invitation for Iran to, quote, get even, and pretty effectively.

Admiral CRAMER. Let me take the first part of the question, sir.

There were 130-some-odd aircraft during Desert Storm and so on that flew from Iraq into Iran. Most all of those aircraft—as a matter of fact, all of those aircraft are still there. None have been returned at all.

Some of the aircraft, like SU–24 Fencers and so on, as best we can tell, are being integrated into the Iranian Air Force. Some of the other aircraft are still in static positions. And maybe for the record or in another session I would be happy to give you a run down of the types and where they are now.

But, in direct answer to your question, none have been returned, at least that I am aware. In some limited numbers they have been integrated into the Iranian Air Force, particularly where the Iranian Air Force had the same type of aircraft.

And then of course we still have commercial aircraft also that are in Jordan and other places. For example, as when we recently had the problem of flights for the inspectors into Baghdad, one of the Iraqi proposals was: we have got these commercial aircraft that are in Jordan, and if you would allow us to bring those back on line we would, give you a cut rate to bring the inspectors in.

So, the bottom line of that question is none of the aircraft have been returned. Maybe some of the commercial aircraft. But I would have to take that for the record. But, militarily, those that have gone to Iran are still there.

Senator EXON. Thank you.

How about the rest of the question, General Brandtner?

General BRANDTNER. Well, in an open session environment I would simply say that we are of course concerned about the capabilities that Iran possesses and the efforts she is making to build up her capabilities. And I would submit that we are looking at that very, very closely.

Senator EXON. I understand that that is about as far as you can go in open session.

Thank you, gentlemen.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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Mr. Chairman, I want to say that some weeks ago Senator Levin and I asked Chairman Nunn for this hearing. And it has developed the testimony that I hoped it would develop. And I wish to thank the Chair and others for making it possible.

I am going to say a few words here, and I am going to preface it, in fairness to you, by saying that for months now I have advocated and I have been on the side of those advocating great caution as we get further and further into the temptation for U.S. involvement in the former State of Yugoslavia. I have spoken on the floor of the Senate many times about it, and today, we have gotten the information that is useful to those of us who continue to believe that this caution should be exercised. We can use this testimony as further debates take place.

Here is what concerns me.

This is an advertisement that appeared in the paper here in Washington on January 27. It is an open letter to President Clinton and the U.S. Congress:

Stop genocide in Bosnia. We are now witnessing in Bosnia a replay of one of the darkest eras of modern history, the invasion of one sovereign nation by another. It is the attempted genocide of people who have lived in peace and tolerance with their neighbors for centuries. The scale of atrocities and appalling human suffering tell the story.

And it goes on.

We all agree with that. This, and I presume it is accurate, there are three Presidents who have allowed their names to be used: Ford, Reagan and Nixon.

There are three Secretaries of Defense, Democrat and Republicans. A totally bipartisan group of persons, and many of whom that I and other members of this committee have known for years. And they have held responsible positions in our government.

And after a description of these violent crimes, and no one disputes the violence and the inhumanities going on, it concludes by saying: Join certain international organizations and international leaders in coalition for international security in calling for a meaningful peace.

Now, my concern is that the readers of this are very concerned—and they should be—the people in this country. And I think to themselves, well, we are succeeding in Somalia. We succeeded in the Gulf operation. Let us do the same thing in Yugoslavia.

But you have given the testimony today to point out the differences between the situation in the former State of Yugoslavia and those two immediately past military operations. I am hopeful other leaders in our country will be cautious as they go out and call on President Clinton, to take action, and stop to read and understand what you, the experts, are telling us. Because I think there is the danger of raising the hopes of the American people that we can stop this genocide in some manner.

Now, yesterday we had testimony, General, in closed session, but that part relating to the World War II experiences was spelled out. Not only were there 700,000 casualties in connection with the German forces occupying this region, but at the very time that World War II was raging throughout Europe, these same peoples, the Croatians and the Serbians, were conducting their own civil

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war. Upwards of a million casualties were experienced in that civil war going on at the same time there was a major conflict in Europe.

My own research on this indicates that, for reasons which—and I will ask our senior intelligence person here, Admiral Cramer—but these people have fought each other for not hundreds of years, but thousands of years for religious, ethnic, cultural differences.

You mentioned the indiscriminate use of artillery by the Serbs in Sarajevo. I took it upon myself, and others have done this, to go to Sarajevo and actually witness this indiscriminate firing. And I have had some modest experience in military matters myself. But there is no targeting. They just fling the shells about—both sides, as far as I know—not knowing where they would land or the damage that would be inflicted.

So that is why I am so concerned about injecting into this situation American men and women of our Armed Forces. Indeed, many of the persons who allowed their names to be used here have said, "Oh, well, no U.S. ground forces." No U.S. ground forces. Let somebody else do the heavy lifting if the decision is decided along the lines of the question of Senator Exon about the need to go in for ground operations.

And we have also gotten today the evidence, that the enforcement of the no-fly zone will be some sort of quick solution. I think it is clear from your testimony that the use of both fixed wing and rotary air is very small, in terms of the relationship to military operations. And even if you were to suppress it all, it would have a de minimus effect on the military operations over there.

You have been very candid in your views about lifting the embargo which would allow arms to freely flow to the Bosnians. That has a lot of appeal. On the floor of the Senate we have had some fierce debates on that very subject.

As a matter of fact, there is one action by the Senate, which I opposed, authorizing up to $50 million to buy arms, approved by the U.S. Senate, to buy arms to help the Bosnians.

You have made it very clear today in your professional opinions that would just exacerbate the situation and result in more killing.

Furthermore, given the terrain of this country, which is highly mountainous, and the severity of the weather, the fighting conditions both for those in uniform doing the fighting and the civilians in proximity to the fighting, again, you are looking at serious number of casualties, both with the civilians that are there and the military forces fighting.

So my question to you, Admiral: As we continuously search in our own minds why, why, why, this killing and rape and pillage, is there any answer? Are there any answers to why these people, who live peaceably side by side, intermarry, go to the same churches, held an international sports event in Sarajevo, why is it that they fall upon themselves periodically, and have done this for a thousand years?

Admiral CRAMER. Sir, I wish I had the answer to your question, and perhaps if we had the answer we could begin to resolve the situation in Bosnia. But there is certainly a history, going back, at least into my study of the problem, as far as the 13th century, of

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constant ethnic and religious fighting among and between these groups.

Indeed, I would say that except for the post-World War II period, when Tito had control——

Senator WARNER. With an iron fist.

Admiral CRAMER. With a very iron fist, in a dictatorial sense, that was the only period where there was, as you would characterize in your article, peaceful living together.

Basically, since the Tito regime, nothing has replaced it, in terms of the iron fist approach, there has been no political capability to continue living together in a peaceful situation.

Sir, I simply do not have an answer for your question.

Senator WARNER. We in this country and, indeed, other countries, have searched for that answer for several years now, to try to get an understanding of this conflict and what it is that we, the free world, might do, either through diplomacy or political endeavors or military action to bring about a measure of peace and stability for these people.

Admiral CRAMER. Yes, sir.

It would seem to me that the only solution, ultimately, will be essentially when the Serbs and the Croatians achieve their military objectives. But, regrettably, the Bosnian Muslims, of course, are the net loser in that process.

Senator WARNER. They are the victims.

Admiral CRAMER. Yes, sir.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to a second round of questioning when the time arrives.

Senator EXON. Yes, Senator Warner.

Let me just say that we are checking now with the chairman to see what his wishes are. If there are additional questions that you and others have we will try and stay here.

Senator WARNER. I would think another 5 minutes for the Senator from Virginia.

Senator EXON. Senator Levin would be next. And I was hopeful after that maybe we could have an agreement on some time and wind up in the next 15 or 20 minutes.

Senator WARNER. Yes.

Senator EXON. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, let me say I agree with Senator Warner on a number of points, but we disagree in our conclusion. First of all, much of the testimony here this morning has been helpful to those of us that believe we should enforce the no-fly zone.

The testimony this morning is very important for lots of reasons. It shows differences, for instance, between Somalia and Iraq. And yet we acted in both.

I agree with Senator Warner there are major differences between Bosnia and Somalia, major differences. That does not mean that you act in one and do not act in the other. It means there are major differences and you have got to look at each situation on its own: its own complications, its own history, its own difficulties, its own risks not only of acting, but of not acting.

And we heard a lot about the risks of not acting yesterday, by the way, in terms of the spreading of a war from Bosnia into sur-

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rounding countries. And I want to get to that with both of you in a moment.

But, basically, I agree: There are differences between Bosnia and Somalia, and between Bosnia and Iraq, and between Somalia and Iraq. That does not solve the problem of whether we should do anything or not.

It is also incredibly complicated. I happen to agree with Senator Warner on that. And there are great risks, particularly in ground action, which no one is recommending. There are also risks in any enforcement using air power.

The reason we come out differently is I emphasize and look at the risks of not acting, not enforcing the no-fly zone after the United Nations has imposed a no-fly zone.

We have enforced a no-fly zone in Iraq. Has it been militarily decisive?

No.

Has it knocked out Saddam Hussein?

No.

We have enforced it.

Have I supported the enforcement?

I have.

I think it has been useful.

Has it been decisive?

No.

I would also like to read from some newspaper clips. One says that our new Secretary of State has reiterated the fact that the President favors action by the United States and its NATO allies to enforce the no-fly zone that the United Nations has declared over Bosnia. That is Mr. Christopher, who is a very cautious person in terms of the use of force.

And even a more cautious person is our NATO commander. I want to quote to you from General Shalikashvili's apparent views as quoted in the Los Angeles Times of January 12:

> General Shalikashvili has suggested that a punitive air strike on Serbia might have some value in deterring an aggressive Serbian move into Kosovo, a Serbian province where most of the population is ethnic Albanian, and laying down a marker that if the Serbs move in an aggressive way into Kosovo, the West is prepared to punish such action.
>
> Sending such a signal is crucial, said Shalikashvili, Supreme Commander of NATO, because if the fighting spreads to Kosovo, it could escalate the Bosnian crisis from a human tragedy into a nightmare scenario into which neighboring countries would be drawn into the combat.
>
> Shali's comments on Kosovo and his conviction that it would be disastrous to permit fighting to spread there have been echoed by some Bush administration officials. The General maintained that enforcement of a no-fly zone is not terribly important from a military point of view. There have been few Serbian flights, he said, and those that have occurred have not contributed significantly to the Bosnian carnage.
>
> But stiff international enforcement of the no-fly zone would deliver to Serbia an important message of international resolve, he said.

That is similar to what we have heard offered as the reason for enforcement of the no-fly zone in Iraq.

Is the JCS familiar with Shali's position on enforcement of the no-fly zone?

General BRANDTNER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. Do you agree with it?

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General BRANDTNER. Essentially, I agree with it, yes. The issue of resolve, I think, is a perceptive type of thing.

Senator LEVIN. Is it important?

General BRANDTNER. I think it is important. I think there are other ways, also, that you could demonstrate resolve, and I showed a chart that had a very large force posture staged in the Adriatic, and also the intent to continue relief operations demonstrates resolve.

Senator LEVIN. Is it a legitimate objective to weaken the capability of the Bosnian Serbs?

General BRANDTNER. If one were to say that that was the mission, it would be indeed a legitimate objective.

Senator LEVIN. Might it be? Let me put it that way. Might it be a legitimate objective to weaken the military capability of the Bosnian Serbs?

General BRANDTNER. Yes, in those terms, I would say so.

Senator LEVIN. Might it be a legitimate military objective to weaken the military capability of Serbia itself?

General BRANDTNER. Again, you have——

Senator LEVIN. I am saying might it be, I am not saying is it. I am just saying might it be a legitimate military objective?

General BRANDTNER. I would say yes.

Senator LEVIN. Might it be a legitimate objective to act in a way which would weaken the will of Serbia to continue to support the Serbs in Bosnia?

General BRANDTNER. That is a little more complex because you would have to be sure that what you did would, in effect, do that.

Senator LEVIN. But if that is your objective. I agree with you that the question is could you achieve it through a particular action. Might it be a legitimate objective to weaken the will of Serbia to support the Bosnian Serbs?

General BRANDTNER. It would be a legitimate objective, but I would caveat that by saying that history has proven that we have very seldom weakened the will of nations by the kind of action that is contemplated.

Senator LEVIN. Okay. Fair enough.

Might it be a legitimate objective to weaken the ability of Serbia to resupply the Serbian Army in Bosnia?

General BRANDTNER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. I guess my time is up.

Senator WARNER. Go ahead and finish, Senator, because I will follow on your questions.

Senator EXON. Go ahead and finish the question.

Senator LEVIN. Those might all be legitimate objectives. That is all I wanted to obtain from you is that those might all be legitimate military objectives.

Have our commands and has NATO prepared contingency plans for military action, either enforcing the no-fly zone or otherwise, in Bosnia?

General BRANDTNER. I will not——

Senator LEVIN. I am not asking what the plans are; I am just asking have plans been produced?

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General BRANDTNER. There are any number of negotiations and considerations ongoing, Senator, that would—clearly, professional military thinkers have thought a lot about this.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying that in open session you are not able to tell us whether there are options that have been prepared, is that what you are saying? I am not asking what the options are, I am just asking, in open session, are you able to tell us whether options have been prepared?

General BRANDTNER. I do not think that I should get into whether we have or not done anything in that regard.

Senator LEVIN. Okay.

I have got a lot of other questions, but I do not know that I should continue now.

Senator EXON. Thank you, Senator Levin.

I would be next.

I am going to, in the interest of time, hold I believe what questions I have for the record and ask you to respond as quickly as you can to those. And I suspect there may be some questions for the record from other Senators, which would be proper and in order at this time.

Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. Well, I want to follow along.

Mr. Chairman, my good friend, Senator Levin, and I have been on this committee now together 14 years, and we do have strong differences here. And you will forgive me if I will just recite a very significant personal experience that I had many years ago.

I had it twice. And that was right after the Korean war, I had returned from Korea after a brief time over there, and I was awaiting release. I was made a casualty officer. Maybe you two gentlemen have had that experience. You were asked to go to a home and see a parent or a wife or a child and look them in the eye—you went up and knocked on the door—you were in uniform, and you walked into that living room and you had to explain to them why their son or their loved one—sons at that time—were lost.

And I did that also when I was Secretary of the Navy.

Senator, I could not walk into a living room and say, your son was lost in this conflict, and he was just on what we think was a useful mission. Or he or she was on a mission.

I think when we decide to commit our people in harm's way, we have got to have a plan, a clear objective, and know with the greatest degree of precision we can that this individual, if he or she lays his or her life on the line, has done it, and that anyone of us in this room can go in and explain that to the family.

I have yet to find that justification in this complex situation in the former State of Yugoslavia.

That is where we have our differences, my good friend.

Senator LEVIN. I do not disagree with you. I think before anybody could recommend any course of action they have got to be able to do that. They have got to be able to say to themselves that the mission is clear, the purpose is clear, the objective is clear, and they could look a parent in the eye and say, this is why your son or daughter was placed in harm's way.

I totally agree with you on that.

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Senator WARNER. But, for instance, Secretary Shultz got up, stood up before the world and said, let us conduct some surgical strikes, and that will do it.

Senator LEVIN. No, he did not say that will do it.

Senator WARNER. Well, he talked about conducting surgical strikes.

Senator LEVIN. In fairness, he did not say that will do it.

Senator WARNER. Well, let us go back. We will ask that it be put in the record the exact words of Secretary Shultz.

[The information follows:]

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IT'S TIME FOR THE WEST TO USE FORCE IN BOSNIA

BY GEORGE SHULTZ

The problems that we have heard and read about in Bosnia must grip any human being. I speak about it now with a kind of controlled rage, because I believe that if we are to do any good we have to know how to connect what we feel in our gut to what we develop in our heads, and put those two things together so we can do something effective.

First of all, what is the problem? It's a humanitarian problem, without a doubt. But the very fact that the humanitarian assistance that we wish to send is so difficult to deliver shows that the problem is broader than that. It is on the basis of the broader problem, as well as the humanitarian, that I think we must take action.

So what should we do? I know that material has been submitted to the U.N. Security Council and that the Council has given attention to it. However, it seems that we should now go further. We need to make this operational so that the leaders and their followers know that the world is aware of their inhumanity: the war crimes, the criminal activity, whatever you call it, it's murder . . .

Justice has to come out of case law. The U.N. Security Council in the Iraq-Kuwait war passed a resolution that set out war crime criteria and invited countries to give evidence, which was done. Saddam Hussein is undoubtedly guilty, but whenever the big guns come to California from New York and Washington, I say to them, "Whatever happened to that resolution?" It just draws a blank.

Why doesn't anybody follow up? If we were to follow up, it would make those who are tormenting the people in Bosnia, take notice. Resolutions without follow through are empty threats and nobody takes them seriously. So we must follow up with action . . . Now I think we have to go further. We have to be ready to use force. People don't like it much. I don't like it particularly. Anybody who has been in war and combat doesn't like it. But I'm convinced that those who say, "Let's not use force, let's try diplomacy," don't understand the problem. Power and diplomacy go together. It's clear in this situation that if you don't exhibit a willingness to exert adequate power to allow people who want to fight for their homes, to get the weapons to do so, you're not going to get anywhere with your diplomacy.

What can we do? We have a U.N. resolution that says, "you shouldn't fly," but it's not being observed. We know how to stop that. We can do that. We should do it. There are endless cease-fires negotiated and broken. Who breaks them? We must know with our intelligence capabilities not only where there is direct firing, but where it is coming from, and where the backup is, where the arms cachets are, where the military headquarters are, and we should be ready to take them out. We can do it. This is a definable, doable mission, and it doesn't involve getting bogged down in a swamp.

Of course, it's easier said than done. There are all sorts of problems in the U.N., and we have to work through the U.N. The United States can't bear all these burdens. Personally, I think this is a mission for NATO to undertake. It's European, the United States is involved, it has civilian control. There's a military command structure already in place.

We have the assets. We have the bases. We should get on with the task.

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Senator LEVIN. And nobody that has said enforce the U.N. no-fly zone has said that will do it.

Senator WARNER. I know.

Senator LEVIN. No one who has said let us enforce the no-fly zone over Iraq, which you support.

Senator WARNER. You bet.

Senator LEVIN. Has said that will do it.

Senator WARNER. But it has done a lot. But I cannot see the same type of mission——

Senator LEVIN. Has it done it yet? Has it knocked out Saddam Hussein?

Senator WARNER. No, but it has gone a long way to contain that situation and to continue to convince Saddam Hussein that we must fulfill our mission of determining the extent to which he is continuing the production of weapons of mass destruction.

Senator LEVIN. History will not prove that accurate.

Senator WARNER. Well, we may have a difference here.

Senator EXON. Senator Warner.

Senator WARNER. If I may continue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

But I enjoy debating with my colleague. We have debated many times on many issues. But my point is, we could lose airmen very easily. And they could become prisoners of war. And then this thing takes on a whole new perspective and complexity.

So when we send them in, I want to make sure that we know what is the next step and the next step.

Senator LEVIN. I agree.

Senator WARNER. It was said here, you read something about Boutros Boutros-Ghali. And he said, we will punish you.

Senator LEVIN. I did not read that.

Senator WARNER. No, I think that was——

Senator LEVIN. I did not read anything that had to do with Boutros-Ghali.

Senator WARNER. Well, I am sorry.

The phrase, we will punish you if you do not——

Well, anyway, my point is, we had better know what that punishment requires and who is to inflict that punishment. I wrote it down as you read it, Senator.

But, anyway.

Let me ask one other question here. I realize the Chair and others are anxious, and the witnesses have been here for a long time. But I think this is an exceptional record.

Senator LEVIN. I think that Shalikashvili is the only person I referenced.

Senator WARNER. Excuse me. All right.

Senator LEVIN. He is our NATO commander. He is the only person I referenced.

Senator WARNER. I simply wrote down the phrase, we will punish you if. And that next step, what is the punishment? Who is to inflict it? And it is more than likely to be ground forces.

And we had better know where those ground forces are, if they are in place, and how many are involved.

And in response to Senator Exon's question earlier to General Brandtner, it was stated that you are talking hundreds and hun-

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dreds of thousands of ground forces to perform a military operation that would bring about the cessation of much of this fighting.

Am I not correct on that? Those are the figures that have been used before.

General BRANDTNER. Yes, that is correct.

Senator WARNER. Last question.

What nations are overtly or covertly supplying the various factions that are now fighting? The expenditure of this ammunition, the expenditure of food and logistics requires resupply. And I believe that there are some nations that are providing that logistic support.

Are you able here in an open session to identify which countries have provided logistical support to either, be it Croatian or Serbian or Bosnian?

Admiral CRAMER. Sir, the way I would respond to that question is the vast majority of the arms that are being used here and employed by all sides were, are and continue to be indigenously produced in Bosnia and Serbia and Croatia.

I would be happy for the record or in closed session to respond to those limited examples—but I do want to emphasize—limited examples of where outside forces are supplying the factions. It would be incorrect to leave the Senator with the impression that there is a great dearth or a lack of weapons or difficulty of arms and resupply. Regrettably, that is not the case.

Yugoslavia, as a country, before this conflict began, indigenously produced, I have been told, upwards of 80 percent of its own armament; indeed, was a net exporter of much of its equipment.

So the vast majority of the arms, sir, are contained in a zero-sum game within the factions.

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. Let me follow on with another question here. Yesterday, in our testimony, and I think this should be brought out here today, and I think both of you can do it, even though yesterday was a closed session.

If the United Nations begins to accelerate the military pressure, there is some likelihood that Russia will begin to be in strong disagreement with those actions.

For example, the enforcement of the no-fly zone—Senator Levin, as you heard yesterday, there is considerable disagreement in the United Nations as to what that would involve, just what type of operation would be involved.

So, can you address two questions: the nature of the disagreement now in the United Nations with respect to how you would enforce a no-fly zone; and second, the statement to date by Russia as to what their position would be in terms of that enforcement, and the likelihood that a strong ground contingent began to move in, what Russia would do.

I think the background is helpful, too, Admiral. Many of the cultures in Russia have a strong ethnic tie to the Serbian side. Would you elaborate on that when you start out?

Admiral CRAMER. I will try to answer and maybe we can give you a little bit of response for the record. But in general terms the

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situation, as I understand it, and the positions that have been taken by the U.N. and the various parties, seem to follow along with the following categories.

If the western allies conduct a major operation against the Serbs, particularly military and particularly on the ground, there seems to be real resistance on the part of Russia to support any such move.

Indeed, the Serbs believe—and I am not sure that this is a correct position—but the Serbs believe that Russia would come in and support them, at least diplomatically.

But on the other side of the fence, you have also got real growing concern on the part of countries like Turkey, some of the Persian Gulf States—and they have voiced this very clearly—about an inconsistent policy of how on the one hand, western allies would conduct and energize a very active no fly zone in Iraq, but would not apply with the same level of vigor a no fly zone over Bosnia; which for their part they think is an important gesture.

Of course there is a lot of pressure on the part of Turkey and some of the other Muslim countries to release the arms embargo and to have their Muslim brothers be supportive in that regard.

So it seems to me that we are kind of all around the yard in terms of which countries would support one action that we might do and those which would directly oppose it.

I do not know if that is an adequate response.

[The information follows:]

[Deleted.]

Opposition in Russia's Parliament to use of force is based on a combination of political factors.

— Russia has historic religious and ethnic ties to Serbia.

— Conservatives and some moderates oppose a Russian foreign policy that aligns Russia too closely with the West, and especially the United States. The West is seen as attempting to take advantage of Russia's weakness.

— Some Russian nationalists view the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in simplistic ethnic terms. They identify strongly with Serbia and ethnic Serbs in Bosnia as fellow Orthodox Slavs, ignoring the Slavic ethnicity of all the parties to the conflict.

— Russian Communists sympathize with the Milosevic government, and view efforts to impose sanctions on Serbia and on Bosnian Serbs as ideologically motivated.

[Deleted.]

Senator WARNER. It raises the point I wish to make, which it is not a static situation with relations of the border nations. If the United Nations starts in with a major ground action, this could well spill over and cause a lot of repercussions with the bordering nations.

I thank the Chair.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you, Senator Warner.

Before I recognize Senator Levin, let me just make a statement.

Ordinarily, I do not like to listen to lawyers argue—but I think the discussion that we have held here today between my two colleagues, the Senator from Michigan and the Senator from Virginia has been most informative. I congratulate both of you, which I generally do not do.

I really believe that this is a fundamental issue that we, as a committee, are going to have to address. I would like to say now, for the record, what I said yesterday and what I said before; that the more I hear about the pros and cons of the United Nations'

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action, the more I feel its critically important that this committee take the lead in holding hearings on the fundamental questions that nobody seems to be paying much attention to.

That is the slippery slope, as I call it, that I feel the United States of America and its forces and its Presidents—and I emphasize the plural there—seem to be getting ourselves into as being the police force of the world, almost at the direction of the United Nations.

Now I am not saying whether that is good, bad or indifferent. I am not asking anybody to draw any conclusions on it now. But it seems to me that it was true in Vietnam, it was true to some extent in Korea and certainly was true in the Gulf war and it is certainly true in Somalia; it is certainly true with the new emphasis that we are placing, indicating some strong arm tactics, warning Saddam Hussein not to once again try to invade Kuwait. And certainly it is even fundamentally true with regard to the considerations that are going on right now, however serious, about what we do for selective air strikes, and maybe eventually ground forces, in what was formerly Yugoslavia.

So I did want to say that I think that is very important. I do not believe that we have given much attention to that. But obviously, we are getting ourselves into a position where everyone seems to be looking at the United States of America as the ultimate, when necessary, police force.

With that, let me suggest, since we would like to wind this up as soon as possible, would it be agreeable to Senator Levin and Senator Warner if the Chair would now recognize Senator Levin for 5 minutes and then if Senator Warner would like 2 minutes for rebuttal, then we would try and wind up with the understanding that the chairman would like to come back in and ask a question or two.

Would that be reasonable?

Senator LEVIN. Other than the rebuttal, I do not have—Senator Warner, you can have all the time you want when I am done. And I will be done in 5 minutes.

I just want to spend a few more moments, and then I am done.

Senator WARNER. I just would like to say to the Chair, I believe this has been a very valuable hearing and I am hopeful that this record can be reproduced and made available publicly as soon as possible.

Would the Chair entertain trying to look into this, how quickly this record can be made available to the public?

Senator LEVIN. I would join that.

Senator WARNER. We are fortunate with the media being here, but I think this entire record should be read by people who want to run full page ads calling for action so that they know the problems.

Senator EXON. We will make every effort to expedite this being made available to the public.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. I hope that the record would also be read by people who think that by doing nothing we are solving a problem——

Senator WARNER. We are not doing nothing.

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Senator LEVIN [continuing]. If I could just continue. Anyone who thinks that by not enforcing U.N. resolutions we are somehow contributing to peace should read this record. I want to avoid the kind of horror which Senator Warner described when you have to notify a family.

There is a slippery slope involved here. There are two slippery slopes. One, is the United States going to gradually be drawn into more and more difficult situations? That is one slippery slope.

Frankly, I think all of us would like to avoid that slippery slope.

There is another one. By failing to address a situation more forcefully now, will that situation become worse and we will be drawn into a much more dangerous situation later on? That is the concern that our NATO commander, Shalikashvili, points out.

The risk of not acting more forcefully now in Bosnia is that this will spread possibly to Kosovo. Greece and Turkey could then become involved. Bulgaria could then become involved, and we would have a much more major conflagration. And then there will be thousands and thousands of parents that someone is going to have to go to and say, your child was lost.

But my goal is exactly the same. I happen to agree with Senator Warner, I think, in much of what he said. The question is, how do we reduce the risk to American people? That is the question. How do we make the world safer? That is our goal. How do we reduce the number of times that someone has got to go up and inform that mother or father about the loss of an American kid? That is our goal.

My hunch is there is a debate going on in the JCS on this issue now as to whether or not enforcement of a no fly zone is worth the risk. Does it accomplish enough militarily or send enough of a strong political signal that we ought to do it? Will it reduce the risk of this conflagration broadening?

Although I do not know—I am not a member of the JCS—my hunch is that debates are going on in the JCS, because we have a NATO commander who is urging that we take some stronger action now to prevent the broadening of this conflict.

I agree with our chairman, by the way, when he said we cannot be the policemen of the world. We cannot continue to act on our own to try to impose peace in other places. We have got to try to get other countries to act in their own defense regionally and work on regional alliances. I agree with all that.

That is why I believe we have to have a multi-national enforcement mechanism, be it NATO, be it the U.N. We need a multi-national enforcement mechanism. Every small country cannot defend itself. Every small country cannot arm itself to be able to defend itself against an Iraq. That is why we have the United Nations, hopefully. Some day it may be in a position to enforce some will of the world community. It is not in that position now.

And so we are put in this interim position. And I do not want to get more deeply involved unilaterally, believe me. But I also want to avoid being dragged into greater conflagrations next month or next year because of a failure to do some things this year, which involve risks and involve costs.

There is an option other than trying to get every small country, like Kuwait, to build up its defenses enough so that it can defend

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itself against an Iraq. That is to have the United Nations or a multi-national mechanism, that can be a policeman for the world. We cannot be that policeman. The United States cannot be the policeman for the world. But surely the world needs a policeman. Or else we are going to find ourselves dragged into major conflagrations like what happened in a number of world wars.

That is my own belief. Others have expressed their own beliefs here, so I will share mine.

I just would put in the record a letter which 29 or 30 of us signed which we prepared, which we got signatures on in just a couple of days here. I do not know if the majority of the Senate would support these sentiments or not.

But the key signatures on this letter are that of the majority leader and the Republican leader. Senator Lugar and I, a bipartisan group, circulated this letter and again, in a couple of days, got the 29 signatures.

But when Senators Mitchell and Dole sign something like this, it means that there is at least significant support for this sentiment. And let me read it to you and make it part of the record and then I will stop.

"Actions taken by the United States in the international community have failed to stop the aggression and territorial expansion of Serbia. The genocidal policy of ethnic cleansing constitutes a crime against humanity. It continues to take innocents lives and produce thousands of refugees.

"The credibility of the United Nations and international law have already been seriously undermined by the failure of the community of nations to take stronger actions or even to enforce previously adopted resolutions of the United States Security Council.

"We, the undersigned, urge you,"—President Bush—"to take a leadership role in formally requesting the United Nations Security Council to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia and to do so"—in other words, to ask the U.N. to do that—"even if other members of the security council threaten to veto such actions."

I would like that made part of the record, because it does show that there is significant sentiment here on a bipartisan basis to enforce the no-fly zone, not to inject troops on the ground. I share my colleagues sentiments on the risk of that, but to enforce the no-fly zone.

And again, my time is up. I also would like to make part of the record this interview with General Shalikashvili that appeared in the Los Angeles Times from which I have quoted at some length. And my time is up.

Chairman NUNN. Thank you very much, Senator Levin. Without objection, these will be put in the record.

[The information follows:]

U.S. SENATE,
Washington, DC, January 8, 1993.

President GEORGE BUSH,
The White House,
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW,
Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Actions taken by the United States and the international community have failed to stop the aggression and territorial expansion of Serbia.

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The genocidal policy of ethnic cleansing, constitutes a crime against humanity that continues to take innocent lives and produce thousands of refugees.

The credibility of the United Nations and international law have already been seriously undermined by the failure of the community of nations to take stronger actions or even to enforce previously adopted resolutions of the United Nations Security Council.

We urge you to take a leadership role in formally requesting the United Nations Security Council to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia and to do so even if other members of the Security Council threaten to veto such actions.

Sincerely,





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

1/8/93.

Senators who signed the Levin/Lugar letter to President Bush concerning U.N. enforcement of a no-fly zone over Bosnia.

Levin (D–MI)
Lugar (R–IN)
Biden (D–DE)
Bingaman (D–NM)
Cochran (R–MS)
D'Amato (R–NY)
Daschle (D–SD)
Dole (R–KS)
DeConcini (D–AZ)
Durenberger (R–MN)
Feinstein (D–CA)
Hatch (R–UT)
Heflin (D–AL)
Kerry (D–MA)
Leahy (D–VT)
Lieberman (D–CT)
Mathews (D–TN)
Metzenbaum (D–OH)
Mikulski (D–MD)
Mitchell (D–ME)
Mosely-Braun (D–IL)
Moynihan (D–NY)
Pressler (R–SD)
Riegle (D–MI)
Shelby (D–AL)
Simon (D–IL)
Thurmond (R–SC)
Wellstone (D–MN)
Wofford (D–PA)

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LOS ANGELES TIMES
(Wash. Ed.)
Jan. 12, 1993 Pg. 2

U.S. General Asks West to Do More in Balkans

■ Strategy: But the NATO commander stops short of advocating massive intervention by ground troops.

By MELISSA HEALY
TIMES STAFF WRITER

WASHINGTON—The U.S. commander of allied troops in Europe said Monday that America and its allies should do more to help ease the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but he stopped short of advocating intervention by huge numbers of ground troops.

Gen. John M. Shalikashvili suggested that the West use its troops to help enforce the arms embargo against Serbia and to help rebuild and deliver aid to Bosnia.

He also suggested that a punitive air strike on Serbia might have "some value" in deterring aggressive Serbian moves into Kosovo—a Serbian province where most of the population is ethnic Albanian—and laying down a "marker that, if the Serbs move in an aggressive way into Kosovo . . . the West is prepared to punish such action."

Sending such a signal is crucial, said Shalikashvili, supreme commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in Europe, because if the fighting spreads to Kosovo it could escalate the Bosnian crisis from a "human tragedy" into a "nightmare scenario" in which neighboring countries would be drawn into the combat.

His suggestions in an interview with The Times appeared to provide a road map for the incoming Clinton Administration to step up American help in Bosnia. But all his proposals would limit American troop involvement—a factor certain to make them more palatable to senior U.S. military leaders such as Gen Colin L. Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Shalikashvili's views are expected to be among the most important the new Administration will receive on the issue, since the general is both NATO's senior military officer and commander of the U.S. forces that would be used in such a conflict.

President Bush has been reluctant to commit American ground troops to the area, for fear of becoming bogged down in a Vietnam-style "quagmire" in mountainous Bosnia. But President-elect Bill Clinton has advocated stronger U.S. action in the area—to the consternation of some military authorities who share Bush's apprehension about launching ground operations there.

While the Bush Administration has pressed for greater enforcement of a Bosnian "no-fly zone," it has resisted entreaties to use American troops to expand humanitarian aid or to shut off the flow of arms to Serb-backed forces.

Shalikashvili's comments on Kosovo, and his conviction that it would be disastrous to permit fighting to spread there, have been echoed by some Bush Administration officials.

He also said that Washington's European allies are losing patience with Serbia and have eased their reluctance to enforce a Bosnian no-fly zone. France and Britain have argued that, if the Western allies send combat aircraft to clear Bosnian skies, their troops operating in the area under the U.N. flag might face reprisals from Serbs.

"My sense is that the nations by and large—including the nations that have soldiers on the ground—have come around to the view that if the peace effort now ongoing in Geneva breaks down, then it is important that we proceed with the enforcement of such a no-fly regime, even if we make the provision of humanitarian aid on the ground more difficult," he said.

The general, appointed NATO commander last June, maintained that enforcement of a no-fly zone is "not terribly important" from a military point of view. There have been few Serbian flights, he said, and those that have occurred have not contributed significantly to the Bosnian "carnage."

But stiff international enforcement of the no-fly zone would deliver to Serbia an important message of international resolve, he said.

Shalikashvili declined to say how many troops would be needed to bolster enforcement of an arms blockade, help rebuild the Bosnian infrastructure or to step up delivery of humanitarian aid.

Times staff writer Art Pine in Washington contributed to this story.

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Chairman NUNN. I understand Senator Warner wants to be recognized.

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just for a few minutes to again thank the Chair for this hearing. Senator Levin and I asked for it and it certainly has, in my judgment, come a long way to prepare a record.

And Senator, my point is, before we send these airmen in, if the United States is to participate—it is a decision of our President and the Congress and others to enforce this no-fly zone—I want to know how we are going to get a downed aviator out of there.

You recall very vividly that those of us in this room were active participants in the debate before the shooting started in the Gulf. We had strong differences of view, but nevertheless it was a good debate.

And we informed the American public as best we could, together with our advice and counsel from the professional military, of the parameters of that action and what would happen and what would the likely casualties be. And we thank God it did not turn out to be as high as some of the estimates.

But before I sign on around here, I want to know exactly how we are going to go in and get those downed flyers out. And if we are not going to contribute the ground troops—and I certainly do not want to do it—but if we are not, who is? In other words, I want the American people to be fully informed with respect to the parameters of this conflict to bring about the peace that everybody is asking for, what the casualties would be and what the expenditures would be, not just dollars, but I am talking about life and limb.

And what is the likely reaction of other countries? I asked the admiral. Some of them are not going to stand by. And which side are they going to join? So therein rest our differences, I would say.

Senator LEVIN. I fully agree with you. I think whoever makes this decision, the President of the United States should lay that out for the public just the way the President of the United States should know before we enforce the no-fly zone in Iraq, what will happen to get out a downed flyer in Iraq?

Those options, those contingency plans are there.

Senator WARNER. You bet, and you and I know it.

Senator LEVIN. They better be there in any military operation. I go with you 100 percent.

Senator WARNER. And the difference in the desert, my good friend, and in the mountains in the cold and the cloud cover.

Senator LEVIN. I am talking about an airmen who is downed in Iraq.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, this hearing has been, I think, the most thorough held to date in Congress by any committee. And we have begun to compile a record and I have asked the Chair, at the earliest possible time to allow this record to be made public.

Chairman NUNN. We are as public as you can get.

Senator EXON. What Senator Warner is referencing is something we talked about a few minutes ago. Since this is an important hearing, we would ask you to expedite the transcript of this record to make it public and as widely disbursed as possible, as soon as possible.

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Chairman NUNN. We will be glad to do that. We are having some real squeeze from the Rules Committee on how many transcripts we can get printed. We have a very limited budget and we have to carefully decide which ones are printed; Senator Warner is a member of the Rules Committee. I am sure, knowing my friend from Virginia, he will take good care of that problem.

Senator WARNER. We shall find the funds to make this record public.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we also include in the record a number of Senate resolutions which were adopted by the Senate last year relative to enforcing U.N. resolutions in Bosnia. Those are resolutions which the entire Senate has adopted and I would ask that they be made part of the record. They are very short. It will only be about two or three pages and would be a minute percentage of this record, I can assure the Chair.

And I know my good friend on the Rules Committee would make sure we have enough dollars added for those pages.

Senator WARNER. Mr. Chairman, could that insertion, which is a very important one because it would bring together in one place a record of what has transpired in the U.S. Senate in the last 18 months with respect to the former State of Yugoslavia in this conflict, but it should have an index to the Congressional Record of those debates that have accompanied the resolutions and the pages numbers and the dates.

Senator LEVIN. Absolutely.

Chairman NUNN. Without objection.

[The information follows:]

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Mr. LEVIN addressed the Chair.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Michigan is recognized.

ENFORCEMENT OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN THE FORMER TERRITORY OF YUGOSLAVIA

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of Calendar No. 479, Senator Resolution 306 regarding Yugoslavia. This has been cleared on both sides.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Without objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will report.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A resolution (S. Res. 306) relating to the enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions calling for the cessation of hostilities in the former territory of Yugoslavia.

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there objection to the immediate consideration of the resolution?

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the resolution, which had been reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations, with an amendment, as follows:

On page 3, line 9, strike the word "concurrent."

Mr. LEVIN. Mr. President, as I indicated this resolution has been cleared on both sides. It is cosponsored by Senators MITCHELL and DOLE.

As the crisis in the former Republics of Yugoslavia has escalated, the world has been horrified at the atrocities and the suffering of innocent noncombatants. Cease-fires are being violated with impunity, repression is succeeding, and chaos reigns.

Well over a million people have been displaced, thousands have died, humanitarian relief is being denied to innocent civilians, tens of thousands face starvation, and internationally recognized standards of decency and conduct are being ignored repeatedly and flagrantly.

The Serbian orthodox church itself openly denounced the Milosevic regime, breaking almost 50 years of silent submission to Communist power. In an unprecedented condemnation, the Bishop's Assembly of the Serbian orthodox church last month called for the replacement of the current regime of the Government of National Salvation and National Unity.

The resolutions of the United Nations have been ignored. On April 7, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 752, which demands that all parties in Bosnia stop the fighting immediately and that all forms of interference from outside of Bosnia cease. The U.N. resolution also demanded that the Yugoslav Peoples Army and elements of the Peoples Army must either be withdrawn or disbanded and disarmed under international monitoring.

Mr. President, that resolution was ignored, and so the United Nations passed another resolution on May 30, Resolution 757, which reaffirmed the prior resolution and instituted sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro. Those sanctions include a ban on all trade with the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro. They also sever international air travel, suspend cultural and scientific exchanges and exclude those two Republics from international athletic competition.

So the question now arises whether the United Nations should act to enforce its resolutions. It has long been a dream of international organizations and the peoples of the world that an international organization would have the ability to act to enforce its resolutions. The United States has a veto on the Security Council, so the United Nations in no event can act without our concurrence and our approval.

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But we have a rare opportunity that we have not had in 50 years to get united international action to enforce U.N. resolutions. The reason it is a new opportunity is that the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the Soviet Union which used to say "no, no, no," and "veto, veto, veto," to all the world's efforts to bring peace during this 50-year period. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Security Council could not proceed because of that veto.

But under chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council can create a military force for the purpose of maintaining international peace and stability. Until now, the United Nations has only authorized ad hoc coalitions to defeat international aggression in Korea and Iraq. But under the charter the United Nations can create a form—if all the members of the Security Council approve—which is comprised of units of those countries that voluntarily send such forces to the United Nations for use to deter aggression, to stop hostilities or to carry out humanitarian missions.

The resolution which is before us, which is cosponsored by Senators MITCHELL and DOLE, asks the President to urge the United Nations to prepare a plan to enforce its resolutions. The exact words of this resolve clause are that the Senate "calls upon the President of the United States to urge the United Nations Security Council to direct the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide a plan and budget for such intervention as may be necessary to enforce the Security Council resolutions seeking cessation of hostilities in the former Republics of Yugoslavia." Such a plan is essential before the United Nations could vote to act to enforce its resolutions because we do not know what resources would be required without such a plan. Just the adoption of that plan would be a strong signal to the Serbian forces of the serious intent of the United Nations to enforce its resolutions.

My own belief is that it is going to require a credible threat of international force to stop the aggression that we see going on in Yugoslavia. And I am talking about a force for which chapter VII provides, not after a cease-fire is in place but to enforce the resolutions of the United Nations to bring peace and cessation of hostilities to the area.

It is difficult enough to achieve a cease-fire, but we do not know that a cease-fire is going to be achieved. One after another cease-fire has been broken. The United Nations is doing extremely important, useful work in trying to achieve a cease-fire, and preparing to insert a force if and when that cease-fire is achieved.

But what the United Nations has authority to do under Chapter VII is to enforce militarily its resolutions to bring about a cessation of hostilities, whether or not parties themselves work out a cease-fire.

The only way the United Nations can determine whether to intervene, in a rational way, is to determine what resources would be necessary in order to intervene successfully.

The U.N. special envoy, Cyrus Vance, said recently that the United Nations does not have the resources to enforce its resolutions, and that is sadly true right now. But I do not think we can let it stop there, nor can the United Nations. The United Nations should determine what resources it would take, so it will know the costs of acting to enforce its resolutions, and then weigh that against the cost of not acting.

Our resolution Senate Resolution 306 was approved yesterday by the Foreign Relations Committee and it is now cleared for Senate passage. The United States cannot be the policeman of the world. What we can do is prod the international community to move towards enforcement of its own resolutions. World War I began in Sarajevo, and the conflagration going on there again can easily spread to surrounding areas, first to Kosova and Macedonia, and then beyond.

Time is short and this resolution is an important step in determining what it would take to give teeth to the United Nations Security Council resolutions. That is what they have to have, teeth. Without teeth they will merely be paper resolutions, and they will continue to be ignored until more and more of Europe, and then the world, becomes involved.

Mr. President, this resolution was cleared yesterday evening on both sides. I do not believe that there is anyone else who wishes to speak on the resolution at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. KOHL). Is there further debate on the resolution?

If there is no objection, the committee amendment to the resolution is agreed to.

The question is on agreeing to the resolution, as amended.

The resolution as amended, was agreed to.

The preamble was agreed to.

The resolution (S. Res. 306), with its preamble, is as follows:

S. RES. 306

Whereas continuing hostilities in the former republics of Yugoslavia are killing thousands of noncombatants, displacing hundreds of thousands of civilians, and causing massive destruction and starvation:

Whereas there is a threat of ever-widening conflict in the republics of the former nation of Yugoslavia, which conflict could extend to other nations in the region:

Whereas resolutions of the United Nations Security Council denouncing the hostilities in the former republics of Yugoslavia, and demanding that they cease, have not been heeded:

Whereas the United Nations Security Council, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, has adopted Resolution 737, imposing sanctions on the Yugoslav government, and requesting that the Secretary General work to create a security zone to assure unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies to Sarajevo and other destinations in Bosnia and Hertzegovina:

Whereas the United Nations Security Council may, under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, make plans for the application of armed force to maintain or restore international peace and security, and the United States and other permanent members of the Security Council may veto resolutions of the Security Council:

Whereas officials of the United Nations and the United States have not determined what resources would be required to enforce a cessation of hostilities and bring peace to the former republics of Yugoslavia and, specifically, to enforce Resolution 737;

Whereas knowledge of the resources and military forces needed for such a task would enable the United States and other nations to make an informed judgment about how to take such action:

Whereas the process of devising a plan and budget for such action could, in itself, signal greater resolve at the United Nations to take action; and

Whereas the United States cannot and should not be the world's policeman, but is the one nation with the moral authority and military strength to provide leadership at the United Nations for stronger international coalition efforts to enforce peace: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the Senate calls upon the President of the United States to urge the United Nations Security Council to direct the Secretary General of the United Nations to provide a plan and budget for such intervention as may be necessary to enforce the Security Council resolutions seeking cessation of hostilities in the former republics of Yugoslavia.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit this resolution to the President.

Mr. LEVIN. I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. MITCHELL. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. LEVIN. I thank the Chair. I thank the majority leader and the Republican leader for the effort they put into this legislation. They and their staffs have been extraordinarily helpful.

Mr. SYMMS addressed the Chair.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Idaho.

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...the result was announced—yeas 74, nays 22, as follows:

[Rollcall Vote No. 186 Leg.]

YEAS—74

Adams	Fowler	Biden
Akaka	Gorton	Bond
Baucus	Harkin	Nunn
Bradley	Hatch	Packwood
Breaux	Hollings	Pell
Bryan	Inouye	Pressler
Bumpers	Jeffords	Pryor
Chafee	Johnston	Reid
Cochran	Kassebaum	Riegle
Conrad	Kasten	Rose
Cranston	Kennedy	Rockefeller
D'Amato	Kerry	Sanford
Daschle	Kohl	Sarbanes
DeConcini	Lautenberg	Sasser
Dixon	Leahy	Shelby
Dodd	Levin	Simon
Dole	Lieberman	Simpson
Domenici	Lott	Specter
Exon	Lugar	Stevens
Ford	Mack	Symms
Fowler	Matsunaga	Thurmond
Garn	Mikulski	Wellstone
Glenn	Mitchell	Wirth
Graham	Moynihan	Wofford
Gramley	Nickles	

NAYS—22

Bingaman	Durenberger	Murkowski
Brown	Gorton	Roth
Burns	Grassley	Rudman
Byrd	Hatfield	Smith
Coats	Helms	Wallop
Cohen	Kerrey	Warner
Craig	McCain	
Danforth	McConnell	

NOT VOTING—4

Burdick	Helms
Gore	Seymour

So the resolution (S. Res. 330), as modified and amended, was agreed to.

The preamble, as modified and amended, was agreed to.

The resolution, with its preamble, is as follows:

S. RES. 330

Whereas the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina is internationally recognized as an independent state and is a member of the United Nations and a participant in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe:

Whereas attempts to bring about a permanent cessation of hostilities precipitated by Serbia and Serbian-backed forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina through negotiations have repeatedly failed:

Whereas horrible atrocities are being committed by Serbian-backed forces against the civilian population, including the "ethnic-cleansing" of regions inhabited by non-Serbs:

Whereas the United States and other Contracting Parties to the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide may, under Article VIII, "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide", or any of the other "Acts Constituting Genocide" enumerated in Article III:

Whereas officials of the International Committee of the Red Cross have been denied access to prison camps and internment camps throughout Bosnia-Hercegovina even though such officials are entitled to access to such camps under Article 143 of the 1949 Geneva Convention:

Whereas United Nations and Red Cross relief convoys carrying much needed supplies of food and medicine are being repeatedly blocked and in some cases have been attacked by Serbian-backed forces:

Whereas the Security Council of the United Nations voted unanimously to dispatch additional forces to reopen Sarajevo's airport, and the delivery of supplies of humanitarian assistance to the city's beleaguered population is taking place under the protection of these forces but with great difficulty:

Whereas the Security Council also endorsed the cease-fire plan negotiated by the European Community Envoy which would place all heavy weapons in the possession of factions in Bosnia-Hercegovina under international supervision:

Whereas the president of the democratically elected Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina has issued urgent appeals for immediate assistance from the international community:

Whereas the situation in Sarajevo and elsewhere in Bosnia-Hercegovina has reached a critical point requiring immediate and decisive action by the international community: and

Whereas the President on August 6, 1992, announced a six-point plan, to be implemented through the United Nations, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and NATO, to respond to the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and to attempt to prevent the conflict's spread into Kosova and neighboring countries: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the President should immediately call for an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council in order to authorize, under Article 42 of the United Nations Charter, all necessary means, including the use of multilateral military force under a Security Council mandate, giving particular consideration to the possibility of "demonstrations" of force, to give effect to Security Council decisions to ensure the provision of humanitarian relief in Bosnia-Hercegovina and to gain access for United Nations and International Red Cross personnel to refugee and prisoners of war camps in the former Yugoslavia;

(2) during such meeting, the Security Council should—

(A) develop the means by which to implement the July 17, 1992, United Nations-sponsored cease-fire plan, which includes placing heavy weapons belonging to all factions in Bosnia-Hercegovina under United Nations supervision;

(B) review the effects on Bosnia-Hercegovina of the arms embargo imposed on all states in the former Yugoslavia pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 and determine whether the termination or suspension of the application of that resolution to Bosnia-Hercegovina could result in increased security for the civilian population of that country; and

(C) convene a tribunal to investigate allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed within the territory of the former Yugoslavia and to accumulate evidence, charge, and prepare the basis for trying individuals believed to have committed or to have been responsible for such crimes;

(3) the United States Senate strongly supports the measures announced by the President on August 6, 1992;

(4) no United States military personnel shall be introduced into combat or potential combat situations without clearly defined objectives and sufficient resources to achieve those objectives; and

(5) the United States Senate pledges to provide such funds as may be necessary for United States participation in such humanitarian relief and multilateral military force activities, pursuant to such mandates as may be adopted by the United Nations Security Council, consistent with the terms of this resolution.

SEC. 2. (a) Congress makes the following findings:

(1) National elections for the President and Parliament of Romania are scheduled to be held on September 27, 1992.

(2) Romania lacks an historical tradition of political democracy.

(3) The Romanian elections of 1946, in a major step toward the Soviet and Communist enslavement of Eastern Europe, were fraudulently manipulated to bring the Communists to power.

(4) Romania, since the violent overthrow of the Communist Ceausescu regime in 1989, has professed to pursue a democratic course.

(5) Progress toward achieving democracy has been marred by acts of violence, perpetrated by groups of miners in June 1990 and September 1991, that were aimed either at suppressing political dissent or at undermining the democratic institutions of the Romanian government.

(6) In February 1992, the first free and fair local government elections in a half century were held in Romania.

(7) There are many encouraging signs that the parliamentary and presidential elections scheduled for September 27, 1992, can be fairly and democratically conducted.

(8) Among those signs is the recent enactment of legislation in Romania that creates an audiovisual council with the responsibility for fairly allocating radio and television access to the various candidates.

(9) Although international human rights monitors have observed that Romania has made progress in the area of human rights, the monitors have also identified significant unresolved problems with regard to free speech, the activities and control of the Romanian Intelligence Service, and the rights and treatment of minorities.

(10) Recent press reports indicate that Romania may be serving as a conduit for the transport of goods to Serbia and Montenegro in contravention of United Nations sanctions.

(11) A bilateral United States-Romanian trade agreement, which was signed on April 3, 1992, has been submitted to the Senate.

(12) To become effective, that trade agreement must be approved by the Senate.

(13) The support of the Senate for extending the favorable aid and trade treatment needed to help improve the performance and growth of the Romanian economy will depend heavily on the conduct of the fall election campaign and on the election day procedures.

(14) In considering the trade agreement, the Senate will also take into account Romania's record on human rights and its compliance with the United Nations sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro.

(15) The development of democratic procedures and institutions in Romania is at a critical stage, and the elections scheduled for September 27, 1992, represent an historic test of the commitment of the Romanian leadership and political system to developing such procedures and institutions.

(b) It is the sense of the Senate that—

(1) the elections for the President and Parliament of Romania that are scheduled to be conducted on September 27, 1992, will be an important measure of Romania's progress toward democracy;

(2) those elections should be conducted in a free and fair manner that includes reasonably equal access to the mass media by the major candidates;

(3) the Secretary of State should initiate an international effort to ensure that a sufficient number of United States and international observers are placed in Romania to monitor the scheduled elections, and any run-off elections that may be held, in order to ascertain whether such elections are conducted in a free and fair manner; and

(4) consideration by the Congress of any legislation to grant nondiscriminatory (most-favored-nation) trade status to Romania should be withheld until the Secretary of State has certified to the Senate that the elections in Romania scheduled for Septem-

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ber 27, 1992, and any subsequent run-off elections that may be held, are conducted in a free and fair manner.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote.

Mr. SYMMS. I move to lay that motion on the table.

The motion to lay on the table was agreed to.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll.

The bill clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. MITCHELL. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Chairman NUNN. I think it has been a very interesting hearing. We appreciate both of you being here. One of the most interesting points to me during this hearing was the fact that when the no-fly zone is enforced, if it is enforced, by military action and if the patterns continued, there will be as many Croatian aircraft shot down as the Serbian.

Everybody has talked about enforcing the no-fly zone, quote, against Serbia. That is the whole pitch of it. And yet we saw here this morning that both Croatia and Serbia are violating that no-fly zone. That to me was something that I had not heard.

Senator LEVIN. If the Chair would yield, the enforcement of the no-fly zone is against all military aircraft over Bosnia, no matter whether they are Croatians, Serbians, or whoever they are. Absolutely, the Chair is correct.

Chairman NUNN. I agree, but every news report I have seen for 3 months is talking about enforcing the no-fly zone against the Serbs.

Senator LEVIN. The Serbs are the ones who object to it and the Muslims in Bosnia are asking that we enforce it. That is the reason it is stated that way.

The President of Turkey, who has some sympathies with the Bosnian cause here, has urged us to enforce the no-fly zone. So the people who seek its enforcement tend to be those who feel the Bosnian Muslims have been principally the victims of aggression here.

That is the reason it is stated that way. But the Chair is correct. There are Croatian planes that violate that no-fly zone, absolutely. And they would be stopped as well.

Chairman NUNN. The only thing I would add to that, Senator Levin. I agree when the U.N. has sanctions, they ought to be enforced. But I think everyone who says, let us go out and enforce the no-fly zone has an obligation to take it another step or two further and say, what happens when our humanitarian forces are attacked and how are we going to defend them and what happens when our U.N. personnel are attacked and how are we going to defend them?

And then, are we ready to send in ground forces? Are we willing to retaliate and punish from the air? Do we think that air punishment is enough to save people on the ground who are providing humanitarian relief?

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I think that there has to be an additional series of things that people are willing to do when we take these first steps. And we have to think through them.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, if I could comment on that. I agree with you. We did ask here whether or not the options have been prepared, the military contingency plans have been prepared by NATO and by our other commands. And the answer, for understandable reasons, could not be given an answer to that question.

But I happen to agree with you. It is essential before any action is taken that we know the consequences of that action and what it might lead to. And that is why it is important that we understand what plans, if any, have been made——

Chairman NUNN. We may have to have some closed hearings on that subject. I think we need closed hearings when we get into contingency plans. I do not think contingency plans ought to be discussed in open hearings.

Senator WARNER. We have now reached, I think, a consensus among the group here as to what should be done. And the chairman has recited precisely my point. We have got to know in advance each of the steps.

Chairman NUNN. General, could you take a look at the contingency plans, give me a call next week and let me know, in terms of preparation for closed hearings, what you would be prepared to cover in that respect?

General BRANDTNER. Yes, sir.

Chairman NUNN. Admiral, General, thank you very much. The general has been here several times, and Admiral, we welcome you on your first appearance, I appreciate you being here. And to our good friends at C–SPAN, we appreciate you acquainting the public with this information. I think it has been important.

Thank you.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR J. JAMES EXON

YUGOSLAVIA

Senator EXON. The success of the recent Croatian offensive to recapture vital areas in its country from Serbian forces suggests that Serbia has militarily overextended itself in Bosnia and Croatia. What will be the long-term strategic consequence of the Croatian offensive? Will the fact that it broke a year old truce between the two countries prompt a Serbian counteroffensive or will it force Serbia to reestablish ceasefire terms?

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. The recent Croatian offensive against Krajina Serb forces in U.N. Sector South will spark local Serb counterattacks. However, it is unlikely to lead to a major offensive from Serbia, which has no regular military forces in Croatia. The Krajina Serbs quickly withdrew their heavy weapons from U.N.-monitored storage sites in response to Croatia's actions and have subsequently staged limited counterattacks and artillery strikes on Croatian positions in Sector South. While the local Serbs lack manpower, they have ample supplies of heavy weapons. The Bosnian and Krajina Serbs are probably overextended; they do not have the manpower to completely secure all of the territory they have seized. Serbia would prefer a new ceasefire and the continued presence of U.N. peacekeepers in Croatia to maintain local Serb control over the U.N.-protected areas. If the Krajina Serbs are seriously threatened by a renewed Croatian offensive, the Serbian Army (numbering about 85,000 troops) may intervene.

Senator EXON. Despite being a target of Serbian takeover itself, Croatia has expressed a desire to carve out a piece of Bosnia as it slowly is consumed by the Serbian invasion. How do you reconcile this paradox? Are the Croatians freedom-fighters or power hungry aggressors? Or both?

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General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. The Croatian Government has officially recognized Bosnia and Hercegovina and publicly denies that it has claims on Bosnian territory. Nevertheless, we believe Croatia has not abandoned its ultimate goal of annexing the Croatian regions of Bosnia. It has already extended dual citizenship to Bosnian Croatians and Croatian currency is used in the Croat region of Bosnia. The Croats are attempting to implement a long-held goal to consolidate all ethnic Croats into a single state. Bosnian Croat leaders are especially insistent on receiving the protection of Croatia. Croatian military units are currently fighting in Bosnia. The Croats see no contradiction between their attempt to control the territory within its own borders and attempts to annex parts of Bosnia and Hercegovina.

Senator EXON. How effective has the arms embargo against the former Yugoslavia been? Has it placed the Bosnians in an impossible position to halt the Serb onslaught?

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. The arms embargo has probably prevented the number and types of major weapons employed in the fighting from increasing. Bosnian Government forces have nonetheless been able to blunt most Serb attacks in recent months and have staged some successful counterattacks, especially in eastern Bosnia. Small arms, spare parts and ammunition continue to flow to a limited extent. Despite numerous reports of weapons being smuggled into Croatia and Bosnia, we have only limited information on actual arms deliveries. Serbia probably does not need to import weapons for its forces.

Senator EXON. In your estimation, what number of ground troops would be necessary to "make" the peace in Bosnia and keep open relief supply lines? What number of troops would be necessary to "keep" the peace if a ceasefire is brokered by the international community?

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. The number of ground troops required can not be determined until a clear definition of the mission, acceptable risk, and threat facing them can be determined. "Making peace" could be as high as half a million and numerous corps sized activities. Forces required to keep relief lines open is dependent on the resistance encountered, extent of routes, and type of units employed. Physically occupying the rugged terrain of the Former Yugoslavia will task any military organization to the limit, either to secure relief lines or to "keep the peace." Due to the long standing conflicts and intertwined disposition of belligerents, maintaining the peace will be an extraordinary task even with cooperation from all sides of the conflict.

Senator EXON. What can you tell us about the report in today's Washington Post that the Serbians mined the Peruca Dam in Croatia and as the Croatian forces move to take back the dam from the Serbians, who had in turn taken control from U.N. forces, they detonated the explosives endangering the lives of thousands of civilians? Reports today say that damage at the dam is extensive and that it is in danger of breaking.

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. The local Serbs did detonate several mines seriously damaging the Peruca Dam, although they claim the dam was damaged by Croatian artillery fire. The dam is no longer in danger of collapse.

SOMALIA

Senator EXON. Is the Somali armed resistance still active in the country taking orders from the warring clan leaders or are they carrying out their attacks and looting as uncontrolled vigilantes?

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. Organized Somali armed resistance against Coalition forces has not emerged as a major concern since the U.S. deployment began. Factional militias have directly challenged the Coalition at the direction of their warlords. Much of the violence since the Coalition arrival has centered around clan score-settling and criminal activity. Coalition efforts to get armed factions to declare and canton their weapons and forces is making some progress, reducing the probability of further armed clashes. Uncontrolled vigilantes have conducted harassment sniping and rock-throwing against Coalition troops, and this type of activity is expected to continue.

Senator EXON. How much heavy equipment have the warlord militias been able to save for future use when the U.S. and allied forces ultimately withdraw from Somalia? Will the native police force we leave behind have the ability to suppress any renewed attacks by the warlords?

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. Warlord militias retain much of their heavy equipment. The Unified Task Force did confiscate and seize some heavy equipment since its arrival, but the warlords dispersed and hid many of their heavy weapons in the countryside. Highly maneuverable "technicals" continue to operate outside the coalition areas. The clan militias have a limited number of T-54/T-55

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tanks, multiple rocket launchers, artillery, mortars, and "technicals" at their disposal. However, the operational condition and ability of the factions to effectively operate the equipment are questionable. Within the last 15 to 20 years, Somalia has received over $1.5 billion in weapons and ammunition. Much of this equipment is still around, not including the continued resupply of arms to the warlords. The U.N. must reduce the arms capability of the warlords before an indigenous police force can operate effectively.

IRAQ

Senator EXON. To what degree is Saddam Hussein's army using ground forces to persecute the Kurds residing in the northern no-fly zone and the Shiites residing in the southern no-fly zone?

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. Iraqi ground forces continue to harass Kurds in northern Iraq by shelling Kurdish towns, farms, and defensive positions. Army patrols along the border of the Kurdish autonomous region sometimes result in clashes, and random firings on Kurds have been reported. The Army helps enforce the economic blockade of the Kurdish autonomous zone, and essentially "occupies" the Kurdish area outside the autonomous zone. Specialized Iraqi intelligence/security forces, rather than the Army, are probably responsible for the bombings of trucks and other interference with U.N. relief convoys and at least some of the terrorist acts in the autonomous area and the PROVIDE COMFORT exclusion zone, although they probably call on the Army for support as required.

In the southern "no fly" zone, Iraqi ground forces continue to conduct routine, mainly preventive and defensive counterinsurgency sweeps against Shia insurgents. There are numerous small-scale clashes, with the Iraqis themselves sometimes attacked by the insurgents. Iraqi artillery continues to shell suspected concentrations of insurgents and soldiers man numerous security checkpoints and ambush positions in southern Iraq. Iraqi forces have not recently attacked civilians specifically, but are probably not very selective in their targeting or overly concerned about collateral casualties. As in the north, the Army essentially performs a role of military occupier. Reports of Army participation in large-scale massacres of Shia persist, but remain unconfirmed and are suspect.

Senator EXON. What is the general state of the remaining Iraqi armed forces? Does it have the weapons arsenal and troop cohesion to pose a threat to Iraq's neighboring countries?

General BRANDTNER/Admiral CRAMER. Iraqi forces are much reduced and weakened compared with pre-Desert Storm levels. Nevertheless, absent coalition deterrence, Iraq is a major threat to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and has some offensive capability against Iran and Syria. The Army, Republican Guard and Air Force are capable of protecting Iraq from domestic insurgents or a neighboring armed force. For the next several years, the regime will focus on stabilizing Iraq and rebuilding the armed forces. There are no indications from Baghdad that Iraq will militarily threaten its neighbors during this period.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]

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

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