Y 4.AR 5/2 A:
2005-2006/32

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–32]

IRAQ'S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
APRIL 6, 2005

Pennsylvania State University
Libraries
Documents Collection
U.S. Depository Copy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26–143 WASHINGTON : 2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

Digitized by Google
Original from
PENN STATE

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

DUNCAN HUNTER, California, *Chairman*

CURT WELDON, Pennsylvania
JOEL HEFLEY, Colorado
JIM SAXTON, New Jersey
JOHN M. McHUGH, New York
TERRY EVERETT, Alabama
ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland
HOWARD P. "BUCK" McKEON, California
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas
JOHN N. HOSTETTLER, Indiana
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina
JIM RYUN, Kansas
JIM GIBBONS, Nevada
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina
KEN CALVERT, California
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia
W. TODD AKIN, Missouri
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia
JEFF MILLER, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey
JEB BRADLEY, New Hampshire
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
THELMA DRAKE, Virginia
JOE SCHWARZ, Michigan
CATHY McMORRIS, Washington
MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas
GEOFF DAVIS, Kentucky

IKE SKELTON, Missouri
JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina
SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas
LANE EVANS, Illinois
GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
NEIL ABERCROMBIE, Hawaii
MARTY MEEHAN, Massachusetts
SILVESTRE REYES, Texas
VIC SNYDER, Arkansas
ADAM SMITH, Washington
LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVE ISRAEL, New York
RICK LARSEN, Washington
JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JIM MARSHALL, Georgia
KENDRICK B. MEEK, Florida
MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TIM RYAN, Ohio
MARK UDALL, Colorado
G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
CYNTHIA McKINNEY, Georgia
DAN BOREN, Oklahoma

ROBERT S. RANGEL, *Staff Director*
ERIC R. STERNER, *Professional Staff Member*
ERIN C. CONATON, *Professional Staff Member*
HEATHER MESSERA, *Staff Assistant*
JORDAN REDMOND, *Intern*

Digitized by Google
Original from PENN STATE

CONTENTS

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS

2005

Page

HEARING:
Wednesday, April 6, 2005, Iraq's Past, Present and Future 1

APPENDIX:
Wednesday, April 6, 2005 59

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 6, 2005

IRAQ'S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Hunter, Hon. Duncan, a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services 1
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services 1

WITNESSES

Clark, Gen. Wesley, U.S. Army (Ret.), Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command 3
Perle, Hon. Richard, Fellow, American Enterprise Institute 6

APPENDIX

PREPARED STATEMENTS:
Clark, Gen. Wesley 63
Perle, Hon. Richard 69

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Documents submitted.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD:
[There were no Questions submitted.]

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

IRAQ'S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 6, 2005.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

Today we have two very distinguished witnesses, General Wesley Clark, United States Army, (Ret.), former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and the Honorable Richard Perle, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense, two gentlemen who have been following the warfight very closely in Afghanistan and Iraq, and have been looking at the big picture.

We thought it might be helpful and instructive for the committee to have their observations and their comments on how we are doing as we, gentlemen, are getting ready to put the defense bill together. And we have lots of ham-and-eggs work to do with that bill.

There are lots of fairly mundane aspects to the defense bill, some policy aspects, but obviously, putting the bill together is something that must be subordinated at times to keeping our eye on the big picture, which is the warfight and the handover, particularly the handover in Iraq. And so we have asked you to be with us today to give us your candid assessment on how things are going and what you think we are doing right, what you think we can improve on, and just your very best assessment.

So we thank you for being with us today.

Without further ado, I would call on the ranking member, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make.

STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me thank you for holding this hearing. I join you in welcoming our distinguished witnesses.

Gentlemen, you have testified before, and thank you for coming back.

Digitized by Google
Original from PENN STATE

Two years ago this week Iraqis knocked down the statue of Saddam Hussein. Today Iraq took the next step toward forming a transitional government with the choice of a president and two vice presidents. They also continue to strengthen their security forces, but there is a long way to go before Iraq is strong enough to handle security on its own. As we have said to Secretary Rumsfeld and to our senior military leadership, we must have a military strategy to ensure success. Our witnesses have helped shape Iraqi policy and General Clark has led warfighters in the field.

So I ask both of you, what does a success strategy for Iraq look like? How should we measure progress toward success? What are the Administration's current strategies that are working well and what should be changed to make long term success more likely? I hope you will both assess what is going well and what mistakes were made in the last two years.

You both testified before this committee on September—in September 2002, and at that time we were prepared to vote on a resolution authorizing the use of force. You offered your predictions, some of which were spot on and some of which were, to coin a phrase, wildly off the mark. You are in a great position now to offer your candid assessments.

There were certainly extraordinary military victories in the initial campaign. The recent elections were also a real success moving the Iraqi government forward, to name another achievement. But there have been many errors of judgment as well. Most critical and the one highlighted by General Clark, and me in my two letters to the President before the war, was a failure to plan adequately for the postwar. We failed to use all of our diplomatic strength either to get our allies on board or to get Turkey's agreement to let us send the 4th Infantry Division in through their territory.

I welcome your views on what we should learn from our experience in Iraq so that we perform better in future conflicts and in postconflict situations. I also welcome your thoughts on what course of corrections, if any, we should take.

Finally, I would like to hear your views, particularly General Clark's, on the state of our armed forces as you see them, on the suitability of the all-volunteer force as we have it in general. I fear that we have taken them almost to the breaking point. We are extraordinarily proud of our men and women in uniform and we look forward to hearing your testimony today.

Thank you so much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

And, gentlemen, again thank you for being with us. You know, one other aspect, I think, since you are both big-picture guys that I would like you to comment on is the fact that we are always admonished not to prepare our military for the last war. And this war is unique. It may be a long, long time before we have an occupational role like the ones that we are exercising right now in Afghanistan and Iraq.

So as we look at other threats around the world, we look at the Korean peninsula and other areas, I would like your comments on where you think we are taking the general shape of the force and whether we are making a mistake in terms of reshaping our force, that came out of the successful conclusion to the Cold War, in such

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

a way that it may be difficult to shape it back should we have threats that are totally different from those that we meet today in the two warfighting theaters.

So having said that, I thank the gentleman from Missouri for his opening statement.

General Clark, you have been before us many, many times. We certainly appreciate your advice and your observations and the floor is yours, sir.

STATEMENT OF GEN. WESLEY CLARK, U.S. ARMY (RET.), FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE, AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

General CLARK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton and distinguished members of the committee. I submitted a statement, and I ask that that be put into the record. And with your concurrence, I will just make a few summary remarks here in opening.

First, I want to say how grateful I am to this committee for the support that you give to the men and women in uniform and to their families. I was a beneficiary of that support during the time that I was in service. It is absolutely vital, and the leaders, especially the armed forces, know how important your role is. I just have to thank you for that.

I also want to commend the men and women in uniform. You can't normally do this when you testify as a general before the Armed Services Committee because you are one of them. But our men and women in uniform, especially in Iraq, have performed the most incredible feats of courage and bravery and innovation and adaptability on the battlefield.

They have gone beyond, far beyond, anything they were trained to do. They have taken the ability to operate in a high-intensity environment and use those skills to operate in a very difficult and very different environment in Iraq. We should be incredibly proud of them and grateful to them. I just really admire them; from top to bottom, they have done wonderfully.

In September 2002, you all invited me to testify here. I came with Richard Perle, and we talked about the upcoming congressional resolution, the war with Iraq. I have given some thoughts on that in my opening statement.

But essentially, at the time, I did warn that what we needed was a strong congressional resolution that we didn't need to authorize the use of force, that we had to, instead, express an intent to use force if the U.N. didn't work, that we needed time to build a diplomatic process, build our coalition, and figure out what happened once the troops were successful. I warned that the Iraqi regime could collapse in as little as two weeks once we began the assault, and we had to be prepared for what happened next.

Unfortunately, the momentum of the process and for whatever reason we moved in there, we didn't have the diplomatic support, we didn't have the coalition, and we didn't have the planning for what happened after we got to Baghdad.

So the first year, from 2003 to 2004, is now history. We know the mistakes on the ground in Iraq, the disestablishment of the Iraqi armed forces, the outlawing of the Baath Party and many other

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

factors, including the inability to form a common structure between the military and political leadership that the U.S. provided, the coalition authority, which complicated the mission. But beyond that, I think we have to recognize that there are some other issues here associated with Iraq.

The real problem that we had two and a half years ago was how to deal with Saddam Hussein without compromising our other security interests, the threat of North Korea, the Iranian effort to gain nuclear weapons. But the truth is that we did focus on Iraq.

North Korea then moved past the red lines that had been established. They have reprocessed—according to the intelligence, they have reprocessed the fissile material that was in the spent uranium fuel rods. Presumably, they have the capacity to produce six to eight more nuclear weapons than they had, and that is a nuclear development program that continues, uncapped.

Over two and a half years ago, we were worried about the Iranian nuclear potential, but Iran is still working. They are in negotiations. Most of us who spent our lives in diplomacy and strategy understand that negotiations on the part of the Iranians, they could be sincere, they could also be hedging. We don't know exactly what the outcome is going to be, but we have to assume that they are moving forward with a nuclear program in some fashion, even as they continue to talk. So we have got to be aware of the wider aspect of the mission in Iraq. In addition, the mission in Iraq has been complicated by factors other than an exclusive focus on success in Iraq.

Apparently, the operations to destabilize Iraq were viewed as a part of a broader campaign to destabilize or overthrow a number of governments in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Libya and Sudan. Libya has now renounced its threat; it has been welcomed back into the community. Syrian forces are pulling out of Lebanon, but we are not quite sure what the overall strategy of the Administration was at the time, and even today, in terms of the larger picture in the region.

Now we know the Administration is pressing for democracy. But what this means is that our forces inside Iraq have had to carry an additional burden, because U.S. diplomacy in the region did not work with regional governments the way it could have to assure that the mission in Iraq wasn't a threat to them.

Instead, they had the view that our success in Iraq meant that they were next on the chopping block. Whether that is right or wrong is a strategic call at the national level, but it did impact our men and women in uniform in Iraq.

Now, what to do to succeed in Iraq? A three-part mission: number one, we have got to continue to improve security, reduce the exposure and commitment of U.S. forces, strengthening the ability of the Iraqis to take up the burden themselves; number two, we have got to facilitate further political development inside Iraq; number three, we need to reduce regional resistance to the emergence of a democratic Iraq.

So on the first track, I think the U.S. military has to shift away from the battlefields. It has got to move into more of a reserve role. It has got to increasingly have a cadre of U.S. advisors to strength-

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

en the newly minted Iraqi forces, and this is the direction we seem to be moving in.

It does entail risks because, as we turn over combat responsibilities, we have got to pace the turnover not only to the strength of the Iraqi security forces, but to the suppression of the insurgency, and we have got to have an advisory structure in place. I compliment General Abizaid and General Casey. They are moving in this direction and, thus far, I think that it shows some signs of working.

On the second track, our embassies obviously play a behind-the-scenes role, and it has got a continuing role to play in helping the Iraqis form a government. We don't want to usurp Iraqi responsibilities, but we have got to be able to do, I think, more than we have done to gain local political information to shape alternatives and to facilitate the emergence of democratic governments inside Iraq.

For the first 15 months of the mission, very little was accomplished. Since John Negroponte has arrived and George Casey came in to take over—and they have built a strong relationship—we have moved a long way. I am hopeful that that progress will continue. But it is too soon to make a definitive call. There are a number of key issues that remain to be resolved inside the Iraqi political system.

On the third track, I think we have to be talking to all of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran, in the regional framework. Delaying this until we change governments in Damascus and Tehran, which seems to be the current policy, puts increasing pressure on our troops and raises the risks inside Iraq.

The truth is, to answer Congressman Skelton's issue about the U.S. Armed Forces, we are caught with an overly extended ground campaign that is rapidly using up our ground combat strength from the Army and Marine Corps.

Just look at it in equipment terms. One year on the ground in Iraq for our equipment is five years wear and tear on the equipment. We didn't budget, plan, prepare or size the structure of the force to put up with that kind of maintenance backlog.

Moreover, when we went to the reserve components, we cross-leveled a lot of equipment. Much of that equipment is being left in Iraq, so when the reserves come home, they can't immediately begin training and preparing for their next deployment. They don't have the equipment. So we have got a substantial materials bill there to pay.

But more important are the human costs. We built an all-volunteer force with the guard and the reserve integral to that force. We did assume, if we went to war, we would always call up the guard and reserve. That was the lesson of Vietnam.

Well, we have done it here. The guard and reserve have performed magnificently. But we have a force commitment in Iraq which cannot be sustained by the size of force that we have today. Seventeen brigades on the ground in Iraq cannot be sustained by a 33-brigade active force, even with the reserve call-up that we have had. We have got to increase the size of the active force.

Moreover, if we are going to retain our reserve structure, we have got to do much more for our reservists, our guardsmen and

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

especially for our veterans. As one general put it to me, he said, "You know, sir, the United States Army is fully mobilized and going at this war. But the American people aren't. They are not behind this war in the way that the Army is."

So our veterans, our reservists, our guardsmen are suffering as a result. We have got homeless veterans, we have got people who are being shoved out of the—off active duty without adequate transition time. We have got enormous problems building with our Veterans Administration and for our reserve component force. I think it is incumbent upon this committee to take the lead in dealing with those issues.

We simply need to augment the size of the active force substantially. We need to fully fund our material requirements. We need to enhance the benefits and support the reserve force. And as both a pragmatic and moral imperative, we need to fully fund the Veterans Administration and improve our support structure for veterans.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to take your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General Clark.

[The prepared statement of General Clark can be found in the Appendix on page 63.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Perle, thank you. You also have been a very frequent witness for this committee, and we have greatly appreciated your recommendations and your observations over the years, and thanks for being with us this morning. How do you think we are doing and where do we need to go?

STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD PERLE, FELLOW, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

Secretary PERLE. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you again for inviting me. It is always an honor to appear before this committee. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you some ideas and observations about the situation in Iraq and, more specifically, some of the lessons we should take away from our experience there.

Within the Department of Defense and among its many advisors and consultants, there have already been several important lessons learned, assessments. I imagine you have been briefed on some of those. These cover everything from the effectiveness of the specific weapons systems, procedures, organizations and training to the performance of individual units, flows of information, logistics, intelligence and the like.

Our military lives or dies by the lessons it learns and, for this reason, it is deeply introspective. Those who have made and continue to make these assessments are far more qualified than I am to think about the next generation of plans, procedures, operations and guidance that will flow from this process of critical self-examination. I wish simply to draw a few broad lessons that are likely to be applicable to future situations in which we find it necessary to use military force to combat our terrorist enemies.

I am also quite happy to address the other question of what we need to do with respect to regional wars.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

First, it is essential that we are clear about and carefully align our political and military objectives. Our achievement in applying force is the product of our effectiveness in pursuing both. If we succeed at one and fail at the other, we will fail overall, or pay a heavy price to secure an eventual success after enduring the burdens of political miscalculation.

American forces working with the indigenous opposition to the Taliban regime went into Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, less than a month after the attack of 9/11. Our objective was to dislodge the Taliban regime that had sponsored and sheltered Osama bin Laden and disrupted al Qaeda operations there and elsewhere so their capacity to carry out an attack on the scale of 9/11 would be greatly diminished.

We went in with a small force, never more than 10,000, and despite the criticism that the force was too small and that we were facing a quagmire as a result, some of which appeared—the criticism, that is—in as little as three weeks, we quickly achieved our objective.

Since then, we have seen the Afghans adopt a democratic constitution, enfranchising women, and conduct an open and fair election that empowered a government with broad public support. The power of the warlords who once dominated the country has been greatly reduced, and opinion surveys have shown that the approval of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is now around a 70 to 80 percent level, a degree of approbation that most institutions can only dream of.

In Iraq, we succeeded in driving Saddam Hussein from office in three weeks. And while we were received in Iraq as liberators in the days following the collapse of Saddam's army and regime, we did not enjoy the benefit of a close collaboration with the indigenous opposition to his brutal, sadistic dictatorship.

This brings me to my second lesson. In aligning our political and military strategy, we should make sure we have the support of a significant segment of the local population. Even more, we should work with those whose interests parallel our own, taking them into our confidence and planning to operate in close collaboration with them.

In the case of Iraq, Mr. Chairman, the object should have been close collaboration with the Iraqi opposition. There was altogether too much talk about how many states we could line up as supporters, building the coalition, and too little attention to how many Iraqis would work with us at the outset and after the fall of Saddam's regime.

We did this in Afghanistan. We had a close collaboration. But we did not do it in Iraq despite the fact that we had a year to organize and prepare for hostilities that brought 130,000 Americans to a place they didn't know or understand. Even during the three weeks of fighting, leading to the fall of the regime, we would have benefited from knowledge that we did not have the location of weapons caches, the importance of implications of looting, the nature and extent of the retreat and potential reorganization of elements of Saddam's regime and the like. More significantly, we were slow to recognize how central the Iraqis were to the postwar stabilization of the situation on the ground.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

I believe we would have been wise to go into Iraq with several thousand Iraqis at our side. After all, the Congress, with the support of most and possibly all members of this committee, had approved the Iraq Liberation Act, which authorized political, material and moral support for the Iraqi National Congress and embroiled a group of opposition organizations and other Iraqi opponents of the Saddam regime.

With thousands of Iraqis at our side, we might well have dealt more effectively with the turmoil and looting that followed the collapse of the regime, and we might have jump-started the transition to an emerging Iraqi democracy.

But there was little support within the Executive Branch for implementing the Iraq Liberation Act, for taking the Iraqi opposition into our confidence, or for training Iraqis to fight alongside us. Central Command opposed serious intelligence plans that could have provided thousands of Iraqi troops to help us evaluate the situation on the ground, interpret information about who was trustworthy, where hostile forces and weapons were hidden, otherwise to supply much-needed intelligence.

The State Department and the CIA actively opposed working with the Iraqi opposition, with the result that very little of the material support supported by Congress before the war was actually spent. By the time those favoring a much closer collaboration between the United States and Iraqi opposition forces got agreement to begin training some Iraqis, for example, we were on the verge of war. Sadly, as we went to war, only a handful of Iraqis had graduated from a much-delayed training program that had vastly more potential than we were to realize.

The third lesson is by now generally accepted. Our intelligence is sometimes dangerously inadequate. That was certainly the case as we went into Iraq. The appalling incompetence of the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community left us largely ignorant of such basic information as the state of Iraq's infrastructure and, therefore, the pace at which basic services could be established when the fighting ceased and the size, organization and tactics of Saddam's regime, which later emerged as the core of the insurgency.

There is reason to believe that we were sucked into an initial attack aimed at Saddam himself by double agents planted by the regime. And as we now know, the estimate of Saddam's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction was substantially wrong.

I wish I could share the optimism of those who have pushed through the reforms proposed by the 9/11 Commission that the structural changes enacted by Congress will solve the problem. But I believe the problem will not be solved simply by reordering the broken parts of our intelligence establishment. Far more radical reform is required, but I see little prospect that it will occur.

I have on previous occasions urged this and other committees of the Congress to conduct a quiet, retrospective analysis of the competence with which the intelligence community has rendered its analyses of the Middle East region and especially the Gulf, over the last 30 years. I believe such an analysis would show chronic failure, faulty estimates accompanied by smug confidence about future developments rendered in the face of repeated, nasty surprises.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Finally, Mr. Chairman, a fourth lesson. We must do everything possible to avoid becoming an occupying power. The occupation of Iraq did much to vitiate the goodwill we earned and deserved, as brave Americans risked and, in all too many cases, sacrificed their lives to liberate Iraq.

We should have turned Iraq over to the Iraqis on the day Baghdad fell or as soon thereafter as possible. I believe it could have been done in a few weeks, not the many months stretching to years that led inexorably to the insurgency that has caused so much death and destruction.

A quick handover would have given Iraqis an immediate stake in the establishment of order and a civil society. The Iraqis would have made some mistakes, of course, but we were not immune from mistakes, and ours were magnified many times over by our occupying presence.

The grand ambition of the Coalition Provisional Authority was profoundly mistaken. The image on Iraqi television of an American proconsul informing the Iraqi people of the rules we made for them and the arrangement of their lives for which we assumed responsibility contributed significantly to the difficulties we have had in Iraq. With the best of intentions and hard and admirable work by thousands of American administrators in Iraq, we simply got it wrong.

The Iraqi elections marked the end of the occupation, and the beginning of what I am confident will be a successful transition to a decent, humane self-government by and for the people of Iraq.

Having watched more than eight million Iraqis risk their lives to exercise the vote we so often take for granted, there is only one lesson we can draw, the courage of the Americans who came to free them has been matched by the Iraqis whom we have freed, and great honor belongs to both.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Perle.

[The prepared statement of Secretary Perle can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both, gentlemen, for very succinct statements. We look forward to discussing this with you.

General Clark, the ripple from American activity in the region is manifest, according to all analysis and even the most pessimistic of commentators—the move to multiparty elections in Egypt, Syria withdrawing from Lebanon. You have Mr. Qadhafi renouncing his adversity to the United States and at least turning over a fairly large package of weapons equipment that I think—some of which now resides at Oak Ridge in Tennessee.

Do you agree that those were a result of American action in the region, and were you heartened by that?

General CLARK. Well, I am very heartened by the continuing efforts of people in the region to reform their governments and achieve greater liberty and freedom and better treatment of the individual. It is a long-term process in the Middle East. We have seen it swing in cycles several times in our lifetimes.

The CHAIRMAN. But do you believe that that was a result, to some degree of American action in the region?

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

General CLARK. I think that America does have enormous influence in the region, both positive and negative, and there have been many ripples of the American action there.

I think we have got to be very cautious in taking a lot of credit for some of the changes. As far as I know, we had nothing to do with the death of Yasser Arafat, and that is what has really opened up the progress with the Palestinians.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, let me ask it in a positive way, though, General. Do you see any relationship, do you think that any of these things happening in Egypt, in Lebanon, in Libya, do you see any of those things as being the result of American foreign policy in Afghanistan and Iraq? Or is it just a coincidence?

General CLARK. Well, I think you would have to go through each one of them and look at them in detail. But I think that if you are going to try to, as a single matter, say we used force, we were tough, we are going in there to free these people and look at the great consequences, I think you are giving the United States and our military action too much credit.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, but my question to you, General——

General CLARK. Can I answer——

The CHAIRMAN. Do you give any credit or any connectivity?

General CLARK. Well, you are forcing me into a binary answer. I am trying to give you a real answer. You said we are big-picture people. Let us both be big-picture people.

Look, what is happening in the Middle East is the result of many different forces. What we have over there are a lot of people who are very angry at the United States. They do not want democracy, by our standards, imposed. They have fought for democracy for a long time. They will take advantage of the United States or Western Europe or the United Nations or anybody else who can help them, and they are grateful for that.

But if we really want to help democracy, we have got to do—in this country, we have got to do less crowing about the sunrise coming in the Middle East and a lot more behind the scenes to make it work.

In Lebanon right now, it is great that the Syrian forces are coming out. But there was an agreement between lots of parties in the region that helped get the Syrian forces in and establish stability. Now, what precisely can we do and are we doing to make sure that the withdrawal of Syrian forces is not accompanied in Lebanon by a resumption of conflict; that is where the United States can make a contribution.

So U.S. strength is always appreciated, but people in the region—I just returned from the region. They don't want the United States to say that we are imposing democracy on them.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, yes.

General CLARK. I think we shouldn't be trying to take credit for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, General. First, my questions presuppose no taking of credit. My question was to you, and to analyze American policy, you need to analyze its impacts.

So the question is, do you think there was any causation, any causal link between these good things that we all agree are good things and moving to multiparty elections—Mr. Qadhafi giving up

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

a part of his weapons campaign, moving it, allowing it to be shipped to the United States; Syria out of Lebanon? Do you think there was any causal link between our activities—any causal link between our activities in the two warfighting theaters and those occurrences?

Now, that is a pretty simple question.

If you don't think there was any, that it was just basically a coincidence or something that would have happened by the law of natural progression, you have every right to have that position. But that was the question.

General CLARK. Giving, Mr. Chairman, if I can give you a very simple answer. I understand your question. I am saying that there are many forces in the region, of which U.S. activities are one.

To take the case of Qadhafi, for example, Qadhafi had been under economic sanctions, there was a long-term British-led effort to get him to renounce his policy of terrorism, renounce weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and come back in. Did Qadhafi then say "Hey, we might get invaded"? Maybe he did say that. We don't know that. But what we do know is that it wasn't simply the U.S. invasion of Iraq which triggered this. This has long roots.

As far as Lebanon is concerned, if Syria had listened and looked at the United States invading Iraq and had feared that they would have to come out of Lebanon as a result, they might have come out right after we invaded Iraq. They didn't. They came out when Prime Minister Hariri was assassinated as a result of some Syrian intelligence miscalculation that they could knock off the pressure for Syrian independence by having Hariri knocked off. Instead, it backfired.

Bashar al-Asad is not—he is not a wise statesman. He is presiding over a very shaky regime. It is made shaky by a lot of things. I am sure it is part of our policy to change that regime. So if U.S. pressure is contributing to that, then we should take some credit for it; but it is not necessarily the fact that we invaded Iraq. That is my point.

I don't want to diminish the significance of what we are doing, but I do think we have to be careful because there is a fundamental difference between what happened in Eastern Europe in 1989 and what is happening in the Middle East today. In Eastern Europe, we never invaded. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the United States were there as a beneficent force.

Had we gone in and said, "Hey, we are going to start the ball rolling in Eastern Europe; we are going to knock off the Polish regime so democracy can spread." We don't know what the consequences would have been, but normally people resist when you come into their country, kick down their doors and cause trouble.

In the Middle East, we have invaded a country, and we have been very faithful in our support to Israel, we have been part of a lot of conflict in the region, and we are blamed for some of that conflict.

So my point is that there is a whole multitude of actions. I give credit to the United States for being strong, having strong values, bringing a lot of people over here for many, many years to be educated and seeing our way of democracy. But to attribute all of what has happened to the fact that we invaded Iraq, I couldn't do that.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

The CHAIRMAN. Nobody has asked you to, General. Same question, Mr. Perle.

Secretary PERLE. Well, it is—my answer is very different from Wes Clark's. I think it is very clear that American action, first in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, has touched off in the region a set of demands for political change that we didn't see before this.

It is not coincidental that suddenly you have people in the streets demanding, in their own countries, what they saw across the way in Iraq. No one should be surprised that the example of Iraqis voting and choosing their government has had a profound impact on Syrians, on Lebanese, on Egyptians, on Saudis, on Iranians.

I am astonished to hear Wes Clark say that he has just been in the region, and they don't want the United States imposing democracy. I don't know who he has been talking to. In any case, the issue isn't the United States imposing democracy. The people I talk to in the region—Iranians, Syrians and others—are enormously grateful for the pressure the United States has brought to bear in support of democracy.

Wes is not talking to the dissidents. He is not talking to the people who want their freedom and are heartened and encouraged by the fact that the United States has championed that freedom. By its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, both countries now having had open, democratic elections, has set in motion political change in the region that we hadn't seen before.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, gentlemen, thank you. General Clark, you mentioned the need to increase benefits for personnel and for veterans. I am looking at the increases that we have made since 2001, military retiree benefits, concurrent receipt for the first time in our history. You can get the disability check and the retirement, survivor benefit plan, special compensation for combat and severely disabled, TRICARE for Life now for retirees, TRICARE senior pharmacy benefits.

Our calculations are that the benefits that we have added over the last six years now exceed the services' entire aircraft and ammunition procurement budgets. As I recall, I think over the last four years for active service members, we have increased the base increase for military benefits, or military salary, is 25 percent.

So this committee has addressed—we understand the need to make sure that we serve the people who serve us. We have worked that issue.

But I have a question for both of you on this intelligence bill that we just passed. Obviously, all arrows point to the personnel, to the human side of intelligence, as being severely deficient. I am reminded that having one guy in the room when the bad guys make a decision to hit you is a lot more valuable than being able to have lots of boxes back here in Washington, D.C., with respect to the intelligence organization.

The military right now has a majority of contacts in these warfighting theaters because of the 140,000 personnel on the ground. All the contact we have with the communities, with the small contractors doing the small projects, the joint operations, all of that produces literally thousands of potential payoff relationships, not between intelligence agency personnel and people in the region, but between DOD personnel and people in the region.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

And my question is, do you have any recommendations in terms of going forward to make sure that we don't squander all of the intelligence contacts that we have made on the DOD side, on the basis that other agencies are in primary charge of this aspect of our national security? What should we be doing more to make sure, at least when we leave, when our presence recedes from these regions, that we hand off these intelligence contacts and allow them to be developed?

Any thoughts on that, General?

General CLARK. Well, several. First, if I could just thank the committee for what it has done for the retirees and the active duty military. I think you have—as you indicated, there are a number of things that are in our benefit. I do think that more needs to be done for the reserve components, for the National Guard, to facilitate their transition, and for veterans. Perhaps we can discuss that.

With respect to Richard's comment, if I could just say, I am very strongly in favor of what the United States can do to help people gain democratic rights. And I have talked to a number of dissidents across the region. But I think we have to understand both what our powers are and what the limits of our powers are, and we are much more powerful leading by example than we are by—leading by force.

I am one of those who believes force should be used as a last resort. It has caused a lot of backlash for us in the region, and I will be happy to discuss it, you know, in depth, in terms of how we use it to promote democracy later.

With respect to DOD intelligence, Mr. Chairman, I have always felt not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere, we have not adequately taken advantage of the relationships that we developed military to military and military to civilian. There just doesn't—there has never been a mechanism for really capturing these up and bottling them. Both in Europe and in the Middle East we have constant relationships and friendships that form and ideas that come in. They just don't percolate up.

I might say this is also true with the diplomatic community. When I was on active duty, I got some of my best intelligence by reading the diplomatic cables, rather than by reading the cables brought in by the intelligence community. Because the diplomats do go in and talk to top-level people; they are not in on the decision-making, but they are there.

So if I were to suggest a change that somehow we need a bank, an information repository. We need—and we could do it with the communications abilities we have with the Internet and so forth now—we need to retain a greater awareness of the people we are interfacing with around the world than what we have done in the past. Other governments do this; our government doesn't.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Perle, any thoughts on that?

Secretary PERLE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I think if you were to evaluate the performance in the gathering of actionable intelligence in Iraq, you would find—I believe you would find that our military personnel have done far better than our CIA assets in the country. The CIA assets in the country have performed poorly by comparison.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

We don't do enough, except in the context of a situation like Iraq, to exploit that intelligence capability. In other words, when we—when our forces leave, I suspect we will revert to normal, and we will be dependent upon the flow of intelligence, not from the contacts that have been developed, but from the traditional intelligence presence in the country, and that we will lose something very important when that happens.

I think it is a very good question, and a way should be found, and I believe could be found, to make continuing use of the information flows that have been developed by our military forces in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, gentlemen. The gentleman from Missouri.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will ask just one question now, and I will come back and ask other questions later. But, General Clark, I am interested in your comment about the American people not being behind the war.

Back during the Second World War, I remember President Roosevelt in several speeches, including a fireside chat, was talking about the sacrifice of all Americans. We, of course, had gas rationing, paper drives, Boy Scout scrap drives in the community, the flags denoting that service members from the family were in the windows, and that there was a—everyone knew, young and old, that we were in a serious war.

I think that many people understand we are at war, and we see bumper stickers that say support our troops, which is wonderful. But those that feel it viscerally, or as we say back home, "in their gizzards," are really the families of reservists, the National Guard and active duty folks who have and are in Iraq and Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Would you amplify what you meant when you said, "The American people are not behind the war," please?

General CLARK. Well, what I meant was that in terms of support that the all-volunteer force needs to go out and gain recruits, you can see the backing away that is going on right now.

After 9/11, there was a wave of patriotism that swept the country. But as the fighting continues in Iraq and we continue to suffer losses, and people understand the full consequences of coming in, the military and the people who are out there doing it are telling me they are not getting the full support that they would like to have. We are not getting the recruits that we used to get in.

The Army has missed its shortfall in February—or missed its recruiting objective in February. It has missed it in March, and the Army leadership, as it has reported to me, doesn't believe that this is simply a matter of dollars. They believe that it is more fundamental than that, that it is not a matter of doubling reenlistment bonuses or giving more access to schooling; rather that something is shifting, for whatever reason. The way they see it is, people weren't asked to sacrifice, and somehow it is translating now into their difficulties in meeting recruiting objectives.

I think there is still tremendous support and admiration for the men and women in uniform. I think it is a question of whether adequate numbers of people are going to volunteer to serve in uniform.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, I will reserve the rest of my questions, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Bartlett, and I just wanted to tell members of the committee, we are not going to break for the joint session, which is taking place right now. I wish we could, but we are going to have lots of folks who have a tight day, so we are going to go straight through. So if you want to go to the session and come back, feel free, but we are going to keep on going right now. The gentleman from Maryland.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony.

This morning at a breakfast meeting, Peter Brookes, now of Heritage Foundation, made the observation that all of the oil-producing countries in the world, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, are now tapped out—of course, with an improved infrastructure in Iraq, we potentially could get greater production there—that only Iraq has the ability to surge in oil production.

Do you think he is substantially correct?

General CLARK. I haven't done a detailed study of the oil industry in the last couple of years, but just from my reading, there are still reserves that are out there. It is a question of price and whether investors believe that the price of oil will stay high enough to justify tapping those reserves. So what we have seen in the past is, there is significant price elasticity on the supply of oil, that if the price stays high, we will get more oil.

Secretary PERLE. Alan Greenspan had some remarks on this yesterday, and I think he believes that we are in a temporary situation; that is to say, there will be an equilibrium.

Wes is certainly right that high prices will encourage not only new exploration, but there are wells that are not economic at lower prices that can be restarted. The Saudis clearly have some surge capability left. There are a lot of promising new developments. Oil from the former Soviet Union should increase very substantially, places like Kazakhstan are just beginning now.

We will find additional oil; there is no doubt about it. The prices will drive exploration.

Mr. BARTLETT. As a result of a number of observations during the 1940's and 1950's, a Shell Oil scientist-geologist by the name of M. King Hubbard, predicted that we would peak in oil production in the United States in about the 1970's. It turned out it was 1970. Every year since 1970 we have pumped less oil and found less oil in the United States.

In 1973, he predicted that the world would peak in its oil production, about 2000. Now, he couldn't have foreseen a worldwide recession that reduced the demand for oil.

There are a number of observers who believe that his prediction of 2000 is now coming true in 2005. If, in fact, it is true, that we have reached—essentially reached peak oil production in the world, that we will plateau for a little while and then start down the other side of that bell curve, falling off slowly at first and then more rapidly as we slide down that slope.

Shouldn't we be considering some of the geopolitical ramifications of that? We have two percent of the known reserves of oil in the world. We use 25 percent of the world's oil. Just last year,

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

China became the second largest importer of oil; they surpassed Japan. India is now using increased amounts of oil. China has been scouring the world for oil with contracts and securing assets to make sure they have oil available.

Is anybody looking at the geopolitical consequences, that if it is true that the world is peaking out in oil production with enormously increased demands on our part and China and India and the undeveloped world, who would like to do what we have done and industrialize to improve the quality of life for their people? Is anybody looking at the potential geopolitical consequences of that?

Secretary PERLE. I believe this is a subject of almost constant discussion without a lot of serious result. Yes, the answer is, of course, and it would be true even if we weren't peaking, simply because of where the oil is located, the instability.

Mr. BARTLETT. I don't see any consequences that we are doing that, sir. You know, more than half of the vehicles on the road are SUVs and pickup trucks, all of the indications that you are doing well and our country—you are consuming more energy. You have two or three SUVs, you are taking expensive vacations on airplanes, you are building an enormous house; and every one of these things means you are using more energy. I don't see any indication that we as a society or that we as a government have any indication that we may be reaching peak oil production in the world.

Secretary PERLE. Well, all of the methods for reducing oil consumption entail payment of one kind or another, and there has been a great reluctance to pay that price. You are absolutely right about that. There is a lot that we could do, including re-thinking some conventional wisdom, nuclear power, for example. How many years is it since we built a nuclear installation? France provides virtually 100 percent of its electric with nuclear power.

Mr. BARTLETT. I think about 80 percent, actually. We deal with 20 percent in our country, which will disappear because we are not licensing any new plants.

Secretary PERLE. That seems to me it ought to be reexamined on security grounds for geopolitical reasons, economic grounds and environmental grounds.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

General CLARK. If I could just add to that, I think that we do need a wholesale look at the energy policy and its geopolitical ramifications in this country. We need a comprehensive energy policy that will move us toward less reliance on hydrocarbons that are imported in this country, using renewable energy, emphasizing renewable energy sources, conservation, and other energy sources. We can do a lot, and we need to do. It is an important component of national security and our economic well-being in the future.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of the witnesses for being with us today.

One of the things that bothers me, and maybe we can find a better way to protect the young men who are trying to join the military forces or the police forces in Iraq. There is a pattern that we have followed through the years or through the last couple of years that, when they are trying to enlist, here comes a suicide bomber,

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

15, 20, 30 of them are killed; or when they are graduating from the police academy or the training that is provided with our help, they are killed. Is there a way, because—I mean, to protect them? Because if this continues on, it might take a long, long time before we will be able for them to protect their own and their own country, to defend their country.

Another thing that struck out in the testimony is that—and I have heard this before—because at least 40, 45 percent of the reserves have been activated. Some of the equipment is not coming back. Now we are concerned with an attack inside our own country. When the equipment stays behind, they cannot train because the equipment is not with them. So how can they respond in case we have an attack from within?

These are the two things that really bother me, and maybe both of you can touch on those two things: when will they be able to take over? Number two, what will happen if we don't have the equipment so that our reserves or the National Guard can train in case something—God forbid, I hope never happens—happens in the United States?

General CLARK. Congressman Ortiz, I think the answer to the first, the issue of the insecurity in Iraq, is something that has got to be dealt with from the top down, starting with the building of the Iraqi government, establishment of legitimacy, building of the armed forces, local police forces, collecting intelligence, gathering security.

In the near term what is happening, of course, is U.S. Armed Forces are filling in for the need and using the Iraqi forces as they are trained; and I am sure that there are efforts under way to identify areas and times of specific vulnerability, such as when there is a graduation or a crowd gathering. And I am sure there are efforts under way—or there will be efforts under way, because this is just a function of good leadership on the ground, of assessing your vulnerabilities and developing a plan to protect yourself in those vulnerable areas. It is a question of what the capacity is of the Iraqis.

So where we are right now in this process as I see it is we are in the risk-taking stage. We are going to redeploy U.S. forces away from the most intense fighting. We are going to push the Iraqi forces out front to do more and more. We are going to be, I hope, establishing an advisory structure so that there is a linkage between the Iraqi forces on the ground and our ability to reinforce to—if they get something they can't handle in a timely fashion, and that will entail risk. As we disengage U.S. forces and put the Iraqi forces in, I think it is a risk that we have to take; and we know that the insurgency knows this and is targeting the Iraqis. So we are witnessing the ongoing conflict there.

There is no reason to believe that we can't establish an effective Iraqi security force, given time and adequate resources. And we are just—as someone who is not part of the Administration, I just have to watch it being developed. I know our generals who are doing the training. I have confidence in them. They simply have to ask and demand what they need to get the job done.

At home, we know our reserve components have given up a lot of equipment, and they have got a substantial recovery mode. And

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

we also know that the retention rate in the National Guard and reserves is going to be impacted by their tours in Iraq. So that is why I am saying we need to fully fund all of our equipment requirements. The Army needs to lay the bill in front of this committee to replace the equipment that has been left in Iraq so our reserve components have it to train with and to operate with, and we need to relook the incentives and the support structure for our reserve and National Guardsmen.

Some of these are very simple matters; for example, the Arkansas National Guard Brigade that just returned from Iraq. For some reason, these troops were more or less—it was suggested that they take leave en route to Iraq because of transportation delays. The leave they took was essentially at the convenience of the government, but it was chargeable against their individual leave.

So many of these soldiers are now coming back, being deprocessed and don't have adequate resources and time available to really transition back into their lives. They don't have any leave left because they used it up. Surely we can provide the authority for them to get another two or three weeks leave if it means a higher retention capacity.

There are a lot of issues like this that are specific to individual units that you won't see at this level, but I think what the leadership in the armed forces needs is a signal from the Congress that they have got—that the Congress will support the measures required to fully meet the needs of the reserve component, both for personnel and equipment.

Secretary PERLE. Well, I would only add that I hope that the equipment left behind is not needed in the United States for the defense of the United States, because that implies a kind of engagement on our territory that I certainly hope is not going to happen.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman from Texas; and I think, Mr. Ortiz, you brought up several good points. This one issue that has been raised about the leaving of equipment is I think something we have to look carefully at, what the standards are going to be as to whether or not you leave a Humvee in country or bring it back. I think we, as a committee, need to get into that; and I think we will.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much; and to the witnesses today on the panel, thank you for being here.

Mr. Perle, I guess I am—like anyone else in Congress, my heart aches every day I see on page five—it is not on page one where it should be—that we have lost an American soldier or Marine here or there. But I was so taken back, and I am reading your statement—I have read it ever since I got to this panel—there is reason to believe that we were sucked into an ill-conceived initial attack aimed at Saddam himself by double agents planted by the regime. And as we now know the estimates of Saddam's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction was substantially wrong.

I sat here with other members, and I remember the classified briefings and everything we were told, that, you know, why we needed to go into Iraq. And when I read that statement and I think

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

about the three or four funerals I have been to, Marines who have died, I am just amazed with that kind of statement.

Now let me tell you why. Let me ask you a yes or no question. In 1996, did you and others—and the others eventually became part of the Bush Administration—did y'all meet with the newly elected Prime Minister Netanyahu and try to encourage him and go in and remove Saddam Hussein? I think the plan was called Clean Break. Would you just give me a yes or no——

Secretary PERLE. The answer is no.

Mr. JONES. The answer is no.

Secretary PERLE. I have seen the same statements, but the answer is no.

Mr. JONES. Okay. I am pleased to hear that.

Let me ask you, were you aware or involved with the policy counterterrorism evaluation group headed by David Wurmser?

Secretary PERLE. Was I involved with it?

Mr. JONES. Right.

Secretary PERLE. No, I was not.

Mr. JONES. So you don't have any communications with that group? I am not discussing policy or anything.

Secretary PERLE. I am not sure what group it is you are referring to, to tell you the truth.

Mr. JONES. It is the Policy Counter Terrorism Evaluation Group headed by David Wurmser, under the office of Douglas Feith.

Secretary PERLE. No, I was not involved with that.

Mr. JONES. You have never heard about that group before?

Secretary PERLE. Well, I know that David Wurmser and some others did intelligence evaluation.

Let me just say that it is clear from the line of questioning that you have been reading substantially incorrect accounts of the way in which intelligence analysis was done within the Department of Defense. I am familiar with those accounts, and they are almost, without exception, wrong and in some cases absurdly wrong.

Mr. JONES. Well, I am delighted to hear your response, and particularly after I read this statement that you made that we were duped by Saddam Hussein to go into Iraq. I am glad to know, sir, that you were not part of any of this misinformation that has been printed about the relationships. I very much appreciate that.

But I will tell you that it is just amazing to me how we, as a Congress, were told that we had to remove this man—and I agree he was an evil and a horrible person, but the reason we were given was not accurate information. And when you make a decision as a Member of Congress and you know that decision is going to lead to the death of American boys and girls, some of us take that pretty seriously, and it is very heavy on our heart.

Secretary PERLE. I believe it was taken very seriously by the people who made the decision. And I also believe there were multiple reasons for going after Saddam Hussein's regime. It was not simply the belief that he possessed a stockpile of weapons of mass destruction.

This was a man who I certainly believed posed a threat to the United States because he had a history of weapons of mass destruction, he was involved with any number of terrorist organizations, some of which were headquartered in Baghdad. He hated the

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

United States. He had cheered the attack of 9/11. The issue the President faced was whether to leave him there and hope for the best—which is pretty much what we had done with bin Laden before 9/11—or to take some action. I believe he took the right decision.

Mr. JONES. Well, again, I am not saying that the end result might not prove to have been exactly the right thing to do, but my problem is the same thing that a lot of Americans feel.

I actually had—and I will close after I make this statement, with your permission. I actually spoke Saturday night to the College Republicans of North Carolina. A student from the University of North Carolina, who is in a journalism class, came up to me; and he said, "Congressman, I don't know how in the world to handle it, but with the fact being known now that the reason we went in was because of weapons of mass destruction, the potential of Saddam Hussein to build and develop a nuclear weapon—and that is what the American people were told, and that is why the American people right now in my opinion are so disappointed and frustrated," and I again—and I am closing on this, Mr. Chairman, but I will tell you that I share this frustration.

I take it upon myself to write letters to every family in America that has lost a loved one—and I sign them, by the way, myself. I have signed over 900 letters. I didn't start from day one. It was after I went to a Marine's funeral that left a wife and three children—twins he never saw—and I will tell you—and I apologize, Mr. Chairman, but I am just incensed with this statement. And I cannot believe that this statement—that you would even allow that to be printed, to be honest with you.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Secretary PERLE. Forgive me. I don't understand the source of your anger. I made the observation in my statement that there were intelligence errors, serious intelligence errors, and I did that because I believe that things should be done to improve the quality of our intelligence. Now why that should make you angry I don't understand.

Mr. JONES. Well, what makes me angry, I wish somebody—and of course you are not in the Administration now—would apologize for the misinformation that was given. Yes, we all make mistakes, and I can certainly understand how difficult it is to get the accurate intelligence. But, to me, there should be somebody that is large enough to say we made a mistake, we are there, we have got to finish the job, but I have not heard that yet, and that is what disappoints me.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. We are going to go to Mr. Taylor, but first the Ranking Member had an observation.

Mr. SKELTON. Yes. Very, very quickly, Mr. Perle.

Retired General Jack Keane testified here not long ago that the reason we went into the Iraq and invaded Iraq was that we were seduced—his words—we were seduced by Iraqi exiles. Your comment?

Secretary PERLE. It is not true. I mean, I have the highest regard for General Keane, but I think he is simply misinformed on that. The report just recently released by the 9/11 Commission that looked at intelligence failures addressed this specific issue.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

There is no question that the performance of the intelligence community in the preparation of national intelligence estimates and in the briefings that you heard and I heard and others heard was appalling. Things were believed to be true that it turned out were not true. There was serious inaccuracy. The judgments were based on all-source intelligence, which included intercepted communications, overhead photography, all of the things that we are familiar with. And the amount of information that went into those estimates that came from exiles was, in my judgment, insignificant; and some of what came from exiles was, in fact, accurate.

So I believe that rather than face up to and own up to the errors, there have been too many people in the intelligence community who have been pointing fingers and blaming others for their own errors. I watched this happen consistently with respect to the Iraqi opposition. To the best of my knowledge, it simply is not true that that was the source of our difficulty; and my reference in my testimony to having been suckered into that initial attack—which was the air raid that preceded the planned start of hostilities—was not in reference to any exile, it was in reference to people recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency who I have reason to believe may well have been double agents, that we were simply fooled by them, unfortunately.

So I share the view that there were serious intelligence failures. That is why I made the point in my testimony. But this was not the result of a few exiles whispering in someone's ear.

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, may I just have a moment, please?

First of all, I would like to thank Congressman Jones for his remarks, because I think he expresses the frustrations that so many Americans feel, and certainly I did from the beginning.

Of course, I wasn't part of the intelligence community, and I didn't have a need to know during that period. I did testify in front of this committee. But I think Congressman Jones has reminded all of us that we are all held accountable at all times for what we are saying, what we are implying and what we are pushing for.

With respect to the specific issue of intelligence, we have investigated the intelligence community. We have kicked them in the rear. Everybody who has ever worked with intelligence knows that you put a wide margin around intelligence estimates. They are never accurate, they are never going to be accurate, and I think policymakers bear a responsibility for what use they make of intelligence.

When I testified in front of this committee in September of 2002 we had a long discussion, Mr. Chairman, about whether time was on our side or not. After I left, my friend and colleague warned me that he was going to take apart my statement; and he was one of those who pushed us to move into Iraq in a very rapid fashion.

I think what I am trying to suggest is that when we are dealing with issues that involve the use of force that we need to be cautious, we need to look for other alternatives, and we need to use force as a last resort. We need to put a margin around our intelligence.

Because when you start to commit men and women to combat, the decisions, the results cannot be changed. Lives are lost. It is

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

permanent. It is not correctable. Those are lessons I learned in my military career, and I think they are lessons that every policy-maker has to bear in mind.

My concern is that what I am seeing in the national debate today is a lot of blame on some very honorable, hard-working and committed intelligence officers. Okay, they were wrong, but no one ever said they were always going to be right. People who are put in policy positions in the high levels of the armed forces or elected to positions or appointed to positions are expected to exercise judgment, and that is the accountability that Congressman Long and Congressman Jones and many others in America feel needs to be expressed now. We haven't had that accountability yet.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman, and I thank the gentleman for his response.

I am reminded, General, that we are all responsible and accountable for our votes, and they are out there in big red or green letters for the world to see, and that is why we have a fulsome debate on this issue.

I am also reminded that we are in the process of this handoff right now with the military and the government of Iraq, and we are looking forward to some good recommendations on how we proceed with that handoff.

The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both of these gentlemen for coming to be with us today.

Mr. Perle, prior to the war vote, a lot of the neoconservatives—certainly former Secretary Wolfowitz, but I also believe yourself—made a point of saying that this conflict would be paid for by the Iraqi oil revenues. To date, I note that I have voted for something in excess of $250 billion in supplementals. I voted for this. I take the responsibility of the taxpayers' money being spent that way. And apparently we are going to be voting on it some more. The question to you is, how could we have been so far off on that; and when do you anticipate that we get to a point when those revenues start helping to pay for this huge cost to the American taxpayer?

General Clark, going back to your testimony, I distinctly remember you coming before the committee and saying, look, we are going to win—I can't remember if it is going to be easy or hard, but we are going to win. But one thing you need to keep in mind is that we are going to be there for at least 10 years. And I think the whole committee kind of pushed back; and you said, think about it. We have been in Germany for 60 years; we have been in Japan 60 years; Korea, 50 years; at that point, Bosnia 5 or 6. You went on to say it was a lot like Bosnia. You had three groups that hated each other and they all had guns, and we are going to spend some times being referees.

I remember mentioning this to the President as he brought a group of us over to ask for our votes for this effort, and I was kind of taken aback that the President kind of dismissed it. It looks to me like you were pretty close to the mark. My question is, since you were pretty close to the mark on that, where do you think it goes from here?

And I want to—and, again, I have questions for both of you gentlemen, whatever order you wish to proceed in.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

General CLARK. Here is where I think we are right now. I think the military actions have been effective. General Casey did the right thing, in my view, in shutting down Najaf and Fallujah, and all that action that occurred in the fall. We did a good job of protecting the elections. I think there is effective training going on—maybe not at the pace we want it to go on—with the Iraqis, and we are going to create an advisory effort. I see no reason why that shouldn't work mechanically, sociologically in the region in Iraq. It should work. There is no superpower against us. There is no sanctuary out there that is totally—that is difficult for us to work against us, say what we had in Vietnam. So this is a military operation on the ground which should be winnable.

The real questions in this issue are twofold: first, what happens in the region? And, second, what is the impact on al Qaeda?

What happens in the region is unclear. The Syrians are pulling out of Lebanon. If you war game this and you figure that both Iran and Syria know they are next on the chopping block, then they don't want to see us succeed. And the more pressure we put on and the more we convince them that they have no future, those regimes have no future, the greater the efforts they will make to stall us in Iraq.

So it is unpredictable in the sense that the more we press against Syria, the more likely it is that Iran is going to use its leverage inside Iraq to complicate our work inside Iraq. So we are at the point where we have got our armed forces on the ground, and pressure can be put against our armed forces. For us to have greater strategic maneuver room in the region, we need to be pulling our armed forces out so we have got greater leverage on the situation.

We need to be working to reassure the Syrian regime at the same time we are working to transform and create a greater opening inside Syria. And I believe we need to be working and dialoguing with the Iranians, even as we want Iran to have greater respect for democracy and human rights in its own country.

I see a three- to five-year period of continued U.S. troop presence in Iraq, a possible mission to stabilize Syria—it could come as a result of a catastrophic collapse of the Syrian government—and unpredictable consequences with respect to Iran. I assume that at some point the Iranians will decide whether or not they are going to press ahead with nuclear weapons, and we will have decided whether or not we are going to take military action. I don't know if we will ever be able to have a good option where we can get a hundred percent of those weapons out, but if the United States believes what it has said, that we will not tolerate Iranian nuclear weapons, then if they persist, then we will attack. So I think the future is very uncertain in the region.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Perle, on the oil revenues.

Secretary PERLE. Yes. Well, I never expressed the view that oil revenues would pay for the war, and I am not quite sure what Secretary Wolfowitz said, but I really think it is careless, if I may say so, to contribute to neoconservatives as a group statement that may or may not have been made by one individual.

Mr. TAYLOR. I think it was made by more than one, Mr. Perle.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Secretary PERLE. Well, it may have been made by more than one, but I am unaware of any such statements. And, in any case, judgments about——

Mr. TAYLOR. Perhaps a follow-up question is, in your opinion, when do we get to the point when those revenues help at least get the American—the cost of the American forces being there to a break-even point, given the fact that our Kuwaiti ambassador just last week made me aware that the Kuwaitis, who have been very generous in providing free oil for our troops in the Iraqi theater, now want to renegotiate and have us pay for that.

Secretary PERLE. I can't tell you when the Iraqis will get production up to the four million barrels a day, which I think they are capable of. Clearly, the insurgency has done what it can to disrupt the production of that oil, but at some point, and particularly at these prices, there will be very substantial Iraqi revenues from the flow of oil.

Mr. TAYLOR. I thank both of you for being here. I think it has been a great discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Secretary PERLE. Mr. Chairman, if I could just say one quick word, I think——

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Secretary PERLE. I don't know what General Clark has in mind about reassuring the Syrian regime. That is the last thing in the world I think we should be doing. This is a regime that is doing a number of things that are hostile to our interests: They support terrorism. There are terrorist camps in Syria. They have been accommodating elements of the insurgency against us. Why in the world would we want to reassure the Syrian regime? If anything, we should be increasing the pressure on the Syrian regime to change its policies.

And I have a similar view of dialogue with the Iranians. The Iranians are doing what they can do make life difficult for us in Iraq. I believe they will continue to do that. They consider that their interests are fundamentally opposed to ours. And Iran, as we all know, is probably the single most consistent supporter of terrorist operations in the region. So I believe that the approach that General Clark is recommending is exactly the wrong approach.

The CHAIRMAN. General Clark, do you want to comment? This is a free-wheeling discussion.

General CLARK. Absolutely. I think this is a fundamental distinction here between the two policies. I would not have gone into Iraq with military force when we did or the way we did. I did see a need to continue to work for reform in the region, and I would have put pressure on Saddam Hussein, but I believed our primary objective was al Qaeda.

My friend and colleague represents a group who didn't believe that. They believed, starting at the end of the Gulf War, that, with the fall of the Soviet Union, this was an opportunity for the United States to use military force to clean up the Middle East. It has been expressed in any number of ways, and it included a sweeping list of countries.

I was shown a memo once in the Pentagon after 9/11—right after 9/11 that predicted that this was the way we were going to go: Knock off Iraq, Syria, Lebanon. It is a great recipe, and it would

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

be wonderful if they were all exactly like democratic states that were friendly with the United States, but how you get there is very important and at what price.

Now the issue is how do we succeed in Iraq? And my point is this, that if you want to succeed in Iraq, you isolate the problem. You don't make it larger. You make it smaller. You focus on it, and you work it.

If you want to make the problem larger and make it a regional problem, fine, that is what we are doing, but we don't have the armed forces for this. Our armed forces are not ready and capable right now to send a three-division force to clean up in Syria, at least not what I have seen. Could we do it? Yes. Could we sustain it? No. And that still leaves us weaker when it comes time to confront Iran or North Korea.

If we believe what the President said, that the most pressing problem of our time is to keep the worst people from getting the worst weapons, then we are not doing that. We are operating off a different agenda. We are working to make the Middle East safe for Israel and for democracy, but we are not focusing on the national security problem the President laid out in 2002. So I think that is the difference.

I would work with Syria and Iran to transition those regimes to improve their human rights, to introduce democracy there, and if they fall, they fall. But the strategy that we are pursuing right now is a sort of regional dominoes strategy that is making it more difficult for our troops in Iraq. And that is the difference between I just want to eat the elephant a bite at a time because that is the biggest appetite we have got right now.

Secretary PERLE. What in the world does it mean to work with the mullahs in Iran to bring about democracy or with Asad's regime in Syria? What are you talking about?

General CLARK. I know before we bombed Milosevic and Kosovo, we talked to them. I don't see any harm in talking to the Iranians face to face, in tough terms, about their nuclear aspirations, about human rights, about the way they treat people. I think we should press for an opening in Iran, but I don't think that means you don't talk to them. And the same goes with Syria.

You know, when you talk to people in the regions—I am sure you do, Richard—you will find out that one of their great concerns is that in our press to impose or liberate the region, impose democracy, institute democratic standards in the region, we are going to destabilize at a greater rate than we can stabilize. All of these countries in the region are connected economically in one way or another, they are connected culturally in one way or another, and those responsibilities is what Colin Powell said, "You break the china, you own it." We are about to break Syria. We are going to own it. And the same with Iran, we just better be ready for it.

I am only counseling that, if you want to succeed in Iraq, you should isolate the battlefield. That is the basic rule of military strategy. If you want to make the battlefield bigger, you better provide more forces and more resources and get ready for a bigger fight.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Perle, we will let you enlarge the battlefield briefly, and then we are going to move to Dr. Snyder.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Secretary PERLE. Well, I think you have to understand the battlefield. It isn't a question of enlarging it. And the mullahs in Iran are doing what they can to make life difficult for us in Iraq because they understand perfectly well that their rule is illegitimate, that they are despised by the mass of the Iranian people. The example of liberation and democracy in Iraq is a direct threat to them. They do not want us to succeed, and sending someone over to talk to them isn't going to change that view, and the idea of imploring these dictators to become democrats I think is ludicrous.

The same thing is largely true of the Syrian regime, which is a brutal dictatorship. What are we going to do, send somebody over and say to Assad that we would be grateful if you would establish a democracy and leave office? What sort of dialogue are we going to have with the Syrians? I know that there are elements of Saddam's regime operating from Syrian territory with the approval of the Syrian government, so what are we going to say to them?

General CLARK. This is the distinction between those who say use force as a last resort and those who say use force because it is more convenient, it feels better or looks better.

I am just saying, on behalf of the men and women in uniform and this country, I understand all the evils of these regimes, but before we commit our men and women in a long-term peacekeeping mission there, we better do everything we can to put our priorities in order and get ready for it. And we are not ready to go into Syria or Iran right now in a long-term occupation.

Secretary PERLE. I am not suggesting we do, but I am also not suggesting that we go talk to them, the way you are suggesting.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, this is a good discussion. We are going to involve Dr. Snyder in it. The gentleman from Arkansas.

Dr. SNYDER. It is illegal to fight dogs in Arkansas, so we are not going to get in the middle of this right now.

I appreciate you both being here.

Mr. Perle, I went back and looked at a transcript of a couple of years ago, and one of the things I think you were right on—I am just going to read what you said. It was in response to a question of Mr. Saxton about intelligence or knowledge of things in the area. You said, it is difficult to collect intelligence in these areas, but the bigger problem, in my view, has been a stunning lack of competence among our own intelligence agencies. They have simply proved incompetent in this area. And then you mention your previous testimony on that in years past and mentioned it again here today.

The problem I have with the discussion you are having right now, where you criticized General Clark for suggesting that we should talk to people, yet how can you reach a conclusion about whether it would be advantageous or not to talk to a regime when you say that our intelligence in these areas is stunningly incompetent?

Secretary PERLE. Well, Congressman, talking to the mullahs in Teheran has political consequences.

Dr. SNYDER. But you are reaching a conclusion—you are saying we have very poor intelligence. I assume you are basing your conclusion about whether we should talk or not talk with somebody on intelligence.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Secretary PERLE. No, certainly not.

Dr. SNYDER. On information, the public information.

Secretary PERLE. One of the reasons why our intelligence has been so inadequate is that we don't pay sufficient attention to what is in the public domain, to what the mullahs say themselves, to what they are doing in the open, that is reported in the press. We have become addicted to information that we can steal that comes from agents we can recruit, and we don't read what people are saying in the open literature, and some of our worst intelligence failures have resulted from a failure to read what people are saying.

Can I give you one——

Dr. SNYDER. Well, my only point—and we have very limited time, but my only point is you make some very strong statements, and you have to be basing it on something. And you based your very strong advocacy and support for the President's position on the war two years ago on something, but in your testimony you talked about the stunning incompetence of our intelligence-gathering organizations, and to me those are conflicting statements.

General Clark, you were right on with some things two years also. You talked about the potential fall of al Qaeda, having a recruiting machine if things go poorly.

And, also—I was going to read one of your statements, too—you talked about the lack of planning and you said, we should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required for post-conflict Iraq are prepared and ready. This includes dealing with requirements for humanitarian assistance, police, judicial capabilities, emergency medical, reconstruction assistance, and preparations for a transitional governing body in eventual elections. And I think it is pretty clear that there was not adequate post-conflict planning.

What I want to ask, a very specific question—you brought it up, General Clark—this whole issue of taking care of our troops. You brought up the issue of the leave policy for the National Guard, and it is the kind of thing—and maybe we can enlist the chairman's help. Two or three weeks ago, the delegation from Arkansas sent letters to both General Helmly in the Army Reserve and General Boone in the National Guard. The issue is, they were down there. They were there. Apparently, they didn't need them for further training. They said, we don't need you for 11 days. And a lot of them were assured, hey, this is not going to count as leave. A lot of them went back to Arkansas. They came back, went overseas, come back, and they are now told, no, that is leave.

And it is—I want to involve one of my employees. It is not a problem for him because his employer is the Federal Government, but for those people who don't have the Federal Government as an employer, it is a real problem, and we don't have an answer yet. I would think this is somehow—this decision-making process could be working more quickly than it is, because they are back home now, a lot of them. And that is the kind of, I think, detailed thing you are talking about, to pay attention to how we take care of our troops.

General CLARK. Yes, sir, it is.

I would just say, if you really to want look at the center of gravity of the American armed forces, active and reserve, it is the fam-

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

ily. And these seem like technical matters. There is a dollar figure attached to this, and it is administrative, but it is a big thing for the families. The word from the troops, active and reserve, when they come home, the biggest thing they worry about is their families.

I have talked to the chaplains, I have talked to other people, and it is just inevitable. We see the same thing after every deployment but especially here. We want to hold these families together. Because if we are going to keep a volunteer force together we have got to keep the families on the team. We need help. And this is a small thing that we would be asking the Department of the Army for a small number of troops, but in this case it is well warranted.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me assure the gentleman from Arkansas that in terms of helping military families and our folks that—I represent both the active and the guard and reserve side. No Democrats or Republicans on this committee. We are just all supportive. And since you have double-teamed us here on behalf of the Arkansas National Guard, let's look forward to working with the gentleman here and try to solve that.

Thank you.

Dr. SNYDER. It is an issue that is important to you, Mr. Chairman, because it does involve—from the reserve component perspective, they see the active folks who are sent home, they did not have to take leave because they lived right there in the area, they were near the post, and yet in order for our guys to get home they had to take leave. I appreciate your willingness to help——

The CHAIRMAN. Let's work this thing and see what we can do. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Hostettler.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Perle, what was your affiliation with the Administration in May of 2003?

Secretary PERLE. Well, the only affiliation with the Administration is I served as chairman for a while of the Defense Policy Board.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. I am intrigued by a statement that I don't think that I have heard before from someone in the Administration or someone that close to the Administration in your testimony when you say, quote, "The occupation of Iraq did much to vitiate the goodwill we earned—and deserved—as brave Americans risked, and in all too many cases sacrificed, their lives to liberate Iraq. We should have turned Iraq over to the Iraqis on the day Baghdad fell—or soon thereafter as possible," end quote.

Is this a sentiment that you made clear to the Administration at that time?

Secretary PERLE. Yes, this has been my consistent view. In fact, I was in favor of recognizing a government in exile even before we went into Iraq so that—in order to facilitate the handover to Iraqis.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. But this ultimately did not become a policy that was——

Secretary PERLE. No, unfortunately a different policy was adopted.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Since that time, what do you think—well, later, you go on to say, quote, "The grand ambition of the Coalition Provisional Authority was profoundly mistaken." Do you think that we have improved since that time, since the coalition, since the CPA's

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

original ambition was—because you later say that the image on Iraqi television of an American pro-consul informing the Iraqi people of the rules we made for them and the arrangement of their lives for which we assumed responsibility contributed significantly to the difficulties we have had in Iraq.

Do you think that has improved?

Secretary PERLE. Yes, Congressman, I think it has very much improved. A decision—a midcourse correction was made when it was understood that the Coalition Provisional Authority—which had the ambition to remain in Iraq for an additional two years beyond its dissolution—was mistaken, and the policy was then reversed. The deadlines were set for the transition. And what we have seen since, the establishment of the interim government and then the election process and so forth, is a product of that change in policy. But until that change the policy anticipated a rather long occupation. It was done with goodwill. The desire was to put things in order and then depart. The mistake was in believing that we could put things in order better than the Iraqis and that our effort to do so would be tolerated over a long period of time.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. One more question. You mentioned that if we had turned Iraq over to the Iraqis on the day that Baghdad fell—do you think that would have been the better time or when we had actually captured Saddam Hussein because of the concern that would have been in the hearts and minds of the Iraqi people to say that, while Baghdad had fallen, that he was still out there. So do you think it is the day that we saw the statues being toppled or when we actually—troops actually brought Saddam Hussein out of that hole?

Secretary PERLE. I believe that if, as Baghdad fell, we had established the interim government that we ended up establishing more than a year later—I think 15 months later—with a mandate to prepare for elections, in other words, to do everything that was subsequently done, if we had done that the day Baghdad fell we would have been much better off. We would have still have been there, but we would have been there in a very different capacity, and the Iraqis would have seen their own interim leadership emerging. They would have been invested in a different way, and I think it would have been far more difficult to mobilize insurgents against us.

You can never replay history, but no one wants to be occupied, even a benign occupation, even an occupation that has followed a liberation. And this is a lesson that I hope we will take, if there should be future conflicts, into those conflicts.

Mr. HOSTETTLER. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you, gentlemen, for being before us today. My questions are for General Clark today.

General, there are actually two major issues or questions that I have had in mind over this past year on this committee that continue to worry me, and I don't seem to have good answers. I keep

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

going out to Iraq and I keep trying to understand what is going on, and it comes down to a couple of things.

The first one is what our military really looks like for the future and whether we do need more end strength, and I guess that has a lot to do with how long are we in Iraq and what are we doing in Iraq and what do we do with Iraq. It seems to me that this Administration has chosen that, in order for us to make progress in Iraq, it is really about whether the Iraqi army units are capable of operating without American—direct American forces so that we can bring our troops home.

You know, this Administration has thrown numbers all around about what we have got out there as far as Iraqi army and bodyguards and policemen and everything, and I just don't even believe them anymore. But I do think that in order for an Iraqi Army to operate on its own we need not just number of troops, but we need them trained, we need them equipped, we need control capabilities, command and control capabilities, logistics, et cetera.

Colonel Aziz Shati Samir, of the Iraqi army, in *USA Today* on March 9th said, "Iraq's Defense Ministry is so disorganized that it can't keep straight what parts of Baghdad Iraqi forces are supposed to be responsible for." So my question to you is, what do you think we really have right now with respect to the Iraqi army? Are they capable? Do they have logistics? Is the Ministry of Defense capable? What is it going to take for us to get that right so we can turn that over and get our troops out?

And, second, if we need to increase our end strength, what would that look like? Having been pretty high up and a general and understanding what we need to look like, what would that look like?

General CLARK. First of all, with respect to the Iraqi army, I am not there, and I am not working with them, and I don't have any access to the reports. I can't answer.

What I can tell you is there is a process that you have to look at, and you have to set the process up right. The process is to find the lower-risk areas, redeploy U.S. troops away from those lower-risk areas, put Iraqis in, and then check to make sure the insurgency is not taking root underneath the Iraqis. And you have to have a feedback mechanism.

And, if I could suggest, what members of the committee should be doing when they are visiting over with our troops, they should be looking at this process. It is not where the oil level is right now. It is the process you have got to check your oil level, whether you have got a gauge or not. Because this process is going to take years to work and train Iraqi forces, to put the Iraqi defense establishment up and so forth, unless the insurgency melts overnight, and there is no indication of that. It is still there. There are still numerous incidents every day. They are mounting large-scale attacks. So this is an active fight. It is going to take a process to win it, and what we should be looking at is what is that process and is it in place.

Process entails taking risks, and it entails resourcing the training and resourcing an advisory effort, and those are the appropriate gauges to look at to see if we are moving in the right direction.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Like I said earlier with respect to the conversation with Richard Perle, a lot of what is going on with Iraq is going to be overshadowed or potentially overshadowed by what is happening in the region, and so everything we can do to free up our forces now is important. So taking some risk is justified.

You asked me a second question, also.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, if we are going to increase our end strength, what would that look like? What would you suggest? Where would we do it? How would we do it? What time frame would that take? If you were redesigning it, what would it look like?

General CLARK. Right now, the Army is the equivalent of about 650,000 people on active duty, counting the reserves. What we are authorized is, as I recall, something like 494,000 plus 30,000 that were unauthorized over strength. Out of the active force, we think we are going to be able to create 44 brigade-level combat units under the Army chief's reorganization. To sustain seven brigades in Iraq will take at least 51 combat brigades, so we would be seven short. Each of those brigade groups would have maybe 3,500 troops in it. So you would say, okay, immediately that is 30,000 troops.

But to sustain those troops you have to have the follow-on echelons, and that slice is double the forward slice. So you would say, if you were going to size the force adequately and do it right, we probably need beyond the 525,000. We probably—my figure would be about another 90,000, and that is strictly—that is ballpark, old, retired general's back-of-the-envelope scratching on this.

Ms. SANCHEZ. That is Army.

General CLARK. That is Army active. That doesn't demonstrate what needs to be done for the reserve component.

Chairman Hunter asked early on about the overall shape of the Army, armed forces in the transformation effort. And I do think it is important to keep in mind that every military operation is unique. When we set up the paradigm for the modern armed forces in 1996 with Joint Vision 2010, we said we had to achieve full-spectrum dominance. That meant we had to be more effective than any conceivable grouping of adversaries at the high-end-most intense combat and throughout the range of combat. We knew we had problems not at the high end but at the low-intensity end because we hadn't invested in it.

What this occupation duty in Iraq is forcing us to do is train and invest for mid-intensity and low-intensity conflict, but we cannot forget the fact that we have got to have dominance at the top end, too.

So there is still a need for—there is going to be a need for F/A–22 fighters, maybe not for 500 of them, but for F/A–22 fighters. We have a need for Navy network-centric warfare to make our forces work in the Pacific. And we need something like future combat systems for the Army to provide network-centric capabilities on the grounds. We need unmanned aerial vehicles. We need higher performing systems in every service.

So we can't become so mesmerized by the problem of Iraq that we have destroyed our R&D or our procurement for the high-intensity spectrum. This is the problem that this committee faces, obviously, in terms of resources because there aren't enough. And what I am trying to suggest is the most urgent problem is to retain the

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

capacity of the all-volunteer force, meaning the Army and the Marine Corps. We can't lose that because that is a 30-year problem to try to restart that. But we need to retain our grip on high-intensity combat also.

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Andrews. Welcome back, Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be here. Thank you. I would like to thank the witnesses for their testimony and effort this morning.

Secretary Perle, I think that the biggest question confronting the aftermath of the 9/11 Commission's work is not whether we reorder the organization table of the defense community but whether we reorder its mission and priorities.

I think the central lesson of 9/11 is that we built an intelligence capability designed to protect us in a global struggle between two superpowers, not an intelligence capability capable of assessing the scope of asymmetric threats that are far more relevant.

You said in your testimony today that you are not optimistic about the reforms that came out of the 9/11 legislation and that you think that far more radical reform is required. What would that radical reform look like?

Secretary PERLE. I believe, and have believed for some time, that particularly with respect to the region we are talking about today, the Gulf region, the Middle East more broadly, we have over the years had a poor record of performance and very little change in the personnel who have created that poor record. I think we need very substantial personnel changes in that part of the intelligence community that deals with the region. I think they too easily adopted a point of view that had the effect of filtering out useful and important intelligence. We had too few people who understood the language, history and the culture of the region. I think you are quite right to talk about the shadow cast by the 50-year establishment of an intelligence organization to fight the Cold War and——

Mr. ANDREWS. What might this new personnel do? I mean, what are we lacking that would give us an information gathering facility and an analytic facility that would help us solve this problem?

Secretary PERLE. I am a big believer in competitive intelligence, in making sure that all voices are heard and that there are opportunities to question what emerges as the dominant point of view, and in that sense I have worried about the centralization that could result from the reorganization recommended by the Commission.

Mr. ANDREWS. I think there is no greater evidence of your worry than the huge damage our credibility has taken in the world because of the lack of debate in WMD intelligence leading up to Iraq. We had yet another report issued last week—this was early this week—that talked about this. If I read that report correctly, what it essentially says is that there wasn't the kind of healthy and vigorous debate within the community that you advocate with respect to the WMD. Do you share that report's conclusion?

Secretary PERLE. Well, I am more familiar over many years with the absence of debate over large political questions in the region, but I believe it was also true on WMD.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Just to give you one example, in 1979, when the Shah was in a very shaky position, in the last days of the regime of the Shah, no one at the CIA had read the Ayatollah Khomeini's then most recent book in which he outlined exactly what he had in mind for Iran. And the government of the United States, if anything, was tilted toward Khomeini as opposed to the Shah, and we learned very quickly what a disastrous mistake that was. Now to not have read what he had written was astonishing.

Mr. ANDREWS. I must tell you that I am deeply troubled today with what I view as the inadequate intelligence about the state of Iranian public opinion. It seems to me that a major foundation of this Administration's policy toward Iran is a rather unfounded optimism that there is this popular movement in Iran waiting to burst out into the streets. I hope that is right. I would be delighted if it were. But I would be dismayed if we followed a course of diplomacy and military policy to assume that without knowing it is true.

Without jeopardizing any obligation of confidentiality, what is your degree of confidence about the present intelligence about the state of popular opinion in Iran?

Secretary PERLE. To the best of my knowledge, the intelligence community is not reporting wide-spread dissatisfaction. Those reports are coming from other sources, including from the many contacts between Iranian Americans and family back home and from reports of visitors to Iran.

The intelligence community has, I think, been slow to make these observations. And I give you, as an example, after 9/11, there was a candlelight vigil in Tehran in which 30,000 Iranians expressed sympathy with the United States, and that went unreported by the Central Intelligence Agency. I am not sure it appeared in the press——

Mr. ANDREWS. By much of the U.S. media, obviously. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry that I did miss all the discussion and being present for President Yushchenko's presentation, but I wanted to just go back, I think, to one of the comments that you made, Mr. Perle, and perhaps this was already addressed, but you mentioned how we had a year to organize and prepare for the hostilities in Iraq, and yet there are a number of things that we didn't do.

And I suspect the discussion has gone around some of that.

Was there another role that should have been played by the intelligence community at that time? We talk about having Team A, Team B, the counter to that. What, why didn't that happen then? Where were the voices that were encouraging more organization, that really weren't heard? And—I am sorry, perhaps you have already gone through this.

Secretary PERLE. No, I haven't.

What I and others had urged is that we work closely with Iraqis; that we recruit Iraqis, train them, and plan to go into Iraq, if that was the ultimate decision, with a significant number of Iraqis at our side. And there were proposals for the training of several thousand Iraqis. Those proposals were debated for a long time within

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

the Administration and never got sufficient support, so that the effort could be launched, until very late—very late, a matter of weeks before we went in. A decision was made to train some Iraqis to go in with us, but unfortunately it came so late that only a handful were trained. I think we suffered from not having some thousands of Iraqis at our side as we went in.

You know, you send our terrifically talented and courageous young people into combat in Iraq without people who know the language or the geography or who, when an area is taken, can immediately establish a relationship with people who can be helpful to us. I think it was just a terrible mistake.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. I know in this committee we have spoken about the need for more linguistic support, more cultural understanding of the community, as well as coming from the community, but part of the community. But I have to say that I do not recall discussions of whether or not we could have trained a thousand or so Iraqis to be part of our effort there. And I am not sure where that discussion was, but I don't remember a part of that.

I don't know, General Clark; was that something that we should have been talking about that just didn't enter the discussion to the extent that it should have, so at least the committee was more concerned and pushing for that?

General CLARK. There was always an idea that there be some kind of an Iraqi force that could go in. I wasn't as close to those discussions as Richard Perle was, so I defer to his accounting of it. It is clear that had we taken the time, we could have prepared not only that, but we could have had someone who could have gone into each community and explained what was happening to the Iraqi people. We could have had pamphlets prepared, we could have had radio programs prepared, we could have done the kind of public information tasks that are required when a country comes in and occupies with forces.

We could have also had adequate forces to do the job on our own, to do the postconflict job and even, you know, created like an interim government. Instead, we did it all the hard way. And not having the Iraqi forces was just part, a small part, of the problem.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Are we likely to learn from those mistakes? Do you think that in the future there would be enough?

General CLARK. Well, if I could be so bold as to suggest this, I think this committee should be holding hearings right now on what the United States plans to do when Syria collapses, because that is clearly the aim of our policy. You have heard Richard today express that that is what should happen. We should be holding those hearings.

I mean, that doesn't necessarily involve—they shouldn't involve me; they should be classified hearings. But you should be encouraging the Executive Branch to put the foresight into this and the planning into it so that if that government collapses, there is something there other than anarchy.

Now, the United States Government, I don't know if it would participate and say this was the policy or not. But what I see is, I see us going into this again both with Syria—with Lebanon, Syria, and Iran, pushing for a result without doing the hard work

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

beforehand to make sure, when we get the initial result we want, that we can follow through.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Did you want to respond to that Mr. Perle, at all?

Secretary PERLE. Well, there is turbulence in the region, there is no doubt about that. I think much of it is attributable to the example of what is happening in Iraq; because while we are concentrated, understandably, on solving day-to-day problems in Iraq, protecting our men and women who are in uniform in Iraq, and encouraging the evolution of democratic institutions in Iraq, seen from the point of view of a Syrian or a Lebanese or an Iranian, something extraordinary is happening in Iraq, and that is people are voting for their leaders. And if you live in a country where you have never had a chance to vote for your leader and you despise your leader, that is going to have consequences.

And that is what I believe we are seeing when a million people turn out in the streets of Beirut and when you start to hear demands in places like Syria for a liberalization.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. I guess the concern would be whether we assume that that is going to be the reaction or we plan for something different.

Secretary PERLE. Well, we can't always know what the reaction is going to be. But I am certainly not suggesting that we go into Syria or that we go into Iran. What I am happy to suggest is that we work with Syrians and Iranians who want to change their government.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you. Thank you to both of you.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper.

Mr. COOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would encourage you to follow up on General Clark's suggestion, that we do have hearings on Syria so we are a little more prepared for this possible conflict.

The CHAIRMAN. I just tell the gentleman, I think he has made an excellent point. I think we may entitle it, though, if General Clark appears on it, "Freedom can be hell," because it brings instability, and the torment that we went through when we took down the Soviet empire was that there was going to be turbulence.

But I think, obviously, looking into the aftermath, the long picture in the entire region is, I think, something that is very appropriate; and I can assure the gentleman we will do that, probably mostly in classified form.

The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. COOPER. I thank the Chair. Mr. Chairman, the Bible says, "By their fruits we shall know them." I think, if you look at the testimony that both these gentlemen delivered to this committee prior to the war, there is no question as to who ended up being more correct. I think it is General Clark by a wide margin. And I could read all the statements in here—I would encourage folks to look it up on the Web, but it is results that matter for the American taxpayer.

Regardless of the pros and cons of entering into the war, we are there now. Somehow we have got to pay for it, we have got to get

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

out of it, and we hope and pray it doesn't do too much damage to our magnificent military.

We have in front of us a retired four-star general, we have a defense intellectual, a civilian. I think—I trust and I think that most American taxpayers trust the professional military more than so-called defense intellectuals, because it matters that we do these things right—with planning, with preparation, and with minimum ancillary damage.

And right now, several of my Republican colleagues—and I appreciate their pointing it out—have pointed out some of Mr. Perle's new outrageous statements. I would like to point out one at least that alarms me, because in my talks with a top Special Forces officer, who has just completed three tours of duty in Afghanistan—and Mr. Perle suggested that military intelligence is sometimes better than CIA intelligence, in fact, often is.

When Mr. Perle says, quote, "The power of the warlords who once dominated the country has been greatly reduced"—this is in Afghanistan—my Special Forces contact would strongly contradict you. He would point out that Afghanistan is now the largest heroin-growing country in the world, and that Hamid Karzai might be little more than a front for the warlords who have done more to entrench their economics and their power than most Americans realize. And maybe that is the best we can do.

But you are very artful in couching your statements, Mr. Perle, and I suggest the American people are probably more hopeful about the Afghan situation than they should be, given the evidence of my Special Forces friend. He knows far more about it than you or I because he has risked his life for his country in three tours now.

But there are other problems. My colleague from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor, pointed out we are a quarter of a trillion at least into Iraq already. It will probably be a half trillion, maybe a trillion dollars, and almost none of this is paid for. Under the first President Bush, the net cost to the American taxpayer of the Iraq war was about $4 billion because our allies willingly, eagerly, paid $80 billion.

Now we have virtually no allies; they have offered to pay maybe 12; I think we have collected, what, $1 or $2 billion? The war revenues are not being produced. And you blithely suggested a few moments ago, well, when oil prices go high enough, maybe they will start producing more.

Secretary PERLE. Forgive me, I didn't say that.

Mr. COOPER. You said when market prices—maybe production will increase.

Secretary PERLE. I was not talking about—in the case of Iraq, production will increase when the sabotage of facilities subsides and the infrastructure can be reestablished.

Mr. COOPER. But the American taxpayer is paying through the nose today for gasoline. We are not paying for the war. Are you asking them to pay it in the form of higher gas prices? Because unquestionably a risk premium is attached today to the price of a barrel of oil, whether it comes from Saudi Arabia or Iraq or wherever; and part of that risk premium is due to the uncertainty in the Middle East.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

You know, the American people want answers to these questions, and I don't think they are getting them. And for you to suggest in your testimony that we should have just pulled out immediately after the fall of Baghdad or, quote, "as soon as possible thereafter," I don't think any professional military person in the country would have said, "Oh, we can break and leave."

Secretary PERLE. I didn't say that.

Mr. COOPER. In your testimony, you said, and I quote, "We should have turned over Iraq to the Iraqis on the day Baghdad fell or as soon as possible thereafter." That is a quote from your testimony.

Secretary PERLE. Yes. But I did not suggest and didn't say that we should have left. The Iraqis should have accepted responsibility for governing Iraq; we obviously had to be there.

What I was——

Mr. COOPER. How long? Where were our plans? Who is going to pay for it? Who is paying for it? The Chinese are paying for it today. Is that an appropriate national strategy? Do you want our volunteer force damaged the way it is being damaged today? Recruitment is suffering. Where are the answers to these questions?

You may have done——

Secretary PERLE. I think you are raising a question about whether we should have gone to war in Iraq at all.

Mr. COOPER. We are there. Let us figure out a way out. Let us figure out a way to pay for it. What are your ideas for paying for this war?

Secretary PERLE. The way we pay for wars is by imposing taxes on the American people.

Mr. COOPER. Are you suggesting a tax increase, Mr. Perle?

Secretary PERLE. I am suggesting that whatever the cost of the war, it will have to come from tax revenues.

Mr. COOPER. Therefore, you are suggesting a tax increase?

Secretary PERLE. Not necessarily. Within the top line, decisions have to be made about priorities.

Mr. COOPER. You are aware how, even in the defense budget, even though it is the largest in our history, Iraq is crowding out so many of our needs. General Clark spoke eloquently to that earlier. Weapons systems, research, the needs of our troops are being crowded out in order to pay for the aftermath of this conflict that we were clearly not prepared for.

General Clark says specifically in his testimony back two years ago, "We should not be using force until the personnel, the organizations, the plans that will be required in postconflict Iraq are prepared and ready."

And you were the Chairman of the Defense Policy Board; you must have known we had little, if any, postwar planning—little, if any.

Secretary PERLE. I don't agree with that.

Mr. COOPER. Well, what plans did we have?

Secretary PERLE. Well, I think there was a tremendous effort that went into attempting to anticipate developments and organize responses to those developments.

Mr. COOPER. Where is the evidence of that? General Keane himself, as Mr. Skelton pointed out earlier, suggested that we were se-

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

duced by Iraqi exiles. You know, your version of the facts is quite different than some other knowledgeable, professional, lifetime military in this country, and yet you are a defense intellectual and you know better.

Secretary PERLE. All I can say is, if you don't want to hear my views because I am a defense intellectual, then don't invite me to testify.

Mr. COOPER. No, I am asking for evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask the gentleman: You have laid out 25 or 30 questions to Mr. Perle, and when he starts to answer, you have got another question for him. If you want a response, let us let him give it.

Does the gentleman have a particular question he wants to have a response to?

Mr. COOPER. How are we going to pay for this war?

Secretary PERLE. Well, as I said, the funds to pay for this war, like any other war, like any other expenditure of the government, will come from tax revenues. What lies behind the question is frustration at how costly the war has proven to be, and I share that frustration. It has proven to be very costly indeed. I don't know of any other way to pay for it.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman has waited a long time to have his questions. Do you want to have any questions of General Clark? And then we will move to Mr. Saxton.

Mr. COOPER. I appreciate the Chair's indulgence. Overall, I appreciate the accuracy of General Clark's prior testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not being here earlier. Mr. Perle, I recently read the book that you and David Frum wrote, and you know that I enjoyed it because you and I had a conversation about it subsequent to that. And one of the—the concluding paragraph of chapter three is an interesting one, and I just wanted to give you a chance to talk about this concept a bit.

The paragraph reads, "This murderous rage must be met and defeated on three fronts"—of course, talking about the Islamic terrorist threat—"on three fronts: at home where it attempts to penetrate our defenses and murder our young people; abroad where it inspires governments and terrorist troops to plot nuclear and biological jihad against us; and finally, in the minds of the men and women in the Islamic world."

I was particularly interested in the last of those three, "In the minds of the men and women in the Islamic world." that is a task which you might define as an uphill battle. And I just wanted to give you an opportunity to talk about that for a few minutes, because I know that you have great concern with regard to that subject.

Secretary PERLE. Thank you, Congressman Saxton.

Look, I believe that within the Muslim world there is a division of opinion. The overwhelming majority of Muslims would behave as would the humane citizens of any country. They are not interested in holy war, they are not interested in terrorism, they are not interested in assassination, beheadings, kidnapping, and all the rest.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

A small number of people, driven deeply ideologically to create a world in their vision which is a world in which we are all forced to live by their values, a small number of people holding those views, are responsible for acts of terror against us and against other Muslims, as we are now seeing.

This is a battle, an intellectual battle, a moral battle, that has to be fought out among Muslims. Lectures from the United States are not going to change minds.

What we do in the world does have an impact. What we are doing in Iraq has an impact. And that is understood by the terrorists that we are trying to deal with, which is why Zarqawi has railed against the development of democracy in Iraq because he understands how that will be seen by hundreds of millions of Muslims around the world and especially by the Arab world.

So the struggle for those minds is one that, A, will have to take place among Muslims, and B, can be influenced by the United States, in my view, principally by what we do to promote decent governments in the region. And we may have to rethink—I would hope we would rethink—the easy commitment that we have made over the years to stability at the expense of allowing regimes to remain in power who become the breeding ground for the terrorists we are dealing with. They have come from Egypt, from Saudi Arabia, from countries in which dictatorial governments oppress ordinary citizens. And these are the young people who are being recruited into the terrorist cause, with very dangerous consequences and potential for all the rest of us.

So I get very uncomfortable when I hear us talking about how we might destabilize a nation, or even a region, because it seems to me that the stability we thought was at our service prior to 9/11 was proven not to have been at our service on September 11. Those terrorists came from countries with which we had good official, formal, political relationships; and the countries in the region where we are admired are the countries where we don't get along with the governments at all, like Iran, like Iraq.

So by identifying the stability with the corrupt dictatorships of the region, we have, without ever intending to do so, played into the hands of those ideologically driven terrorists who are recruiting from among people living under those appalling political conditions.

Mr. SAXTON. May I follow up, Mr. Chairman?

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. Free-wheeling discussion. Follow up.

Mr. SAXTON. I recently last week had an opportunity to talk with a gentleman by the name of Dagan who was the head of Mossad in Israel. And I brought up the issue of seeming progress that we see in promoting free governments in places like Egypt and Lebanon. And the Mossad leader said, "You know, that is right, that is good." But he said, "You know, we have got a lot of work ahead of us because, take it from me, the most organized groups in those countries are groups like Hezbollah and, in the Palestinian case, Hamas."

What is your view of the—what do you see transpiring in those countries in terms of building the kinds of governments that we are aiming to promote?

Secretary PERLE. Well, it is a very serious problem, of course, that in societies in which political opposition has been repressed,

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

what is likely to emerge is a political organization that, when things ease up a bit, tends to center around the extremists. And so his observation is quite right.

I think we should be in there actively working with political forces who share our values, who share our beliefs. We are not doing it. We are not giving support, for example, to the opposition in Iran. I don't believe we have been giving support to the opposition in Egypt, even to those opposition figures in Egypt who share our values and our beliefs.

We need a much more aggressive political program in this regard, and we have failed in the past to embark on such a program in the belief that good relations with the government and the stability that flows from that makes it impossible for us to work with internal oppositions. But we did it in Europe, we did it in Spain and in Portugal. We did it in the former Yugoslavia.

We have had the new leader of Ukraine here today in the House Chamber. We did it there. The absence of aggressive political action in the Middle East and, in particular, in the Arab world is, I think, a serious mistake. We are losing very valuable and very important time. And the pace is greatly accelerated since the liberation of Iraq. So we should get on with it.

The CHAIRMAN. And, General Clark, go right ahead.

General CLARK. Just to follow up on that, there are organizations, many of them, taking active work inside countries in the Middle East right now. The National Endowment for Democracy is one that is very active there. There are a number of other institutions. They deserve the support of the American people, and we need to encourage our allies and friends around the world to join in these efforts.

It is one of the reasons why I believe we should be talking with governments, because when we talk with governments, it lets us facilitate the support of human rights workers and democracy organizations around the world.

But there is another issue that Richard has brought up, that he didn't fully come back to, that I would like to stress in front of the committee. When we are fighting terrorism, we are fighting a battle for the minds of the men and women. But it is not a battle that is necessarily going to be won by improving either their participation in government or their material conditions. Rather than simply jailing terrorists and holding them there without release, or shooting them, what at least one government in the Middle East has begun to do is send in Islamic clerics to talk with them. Many of the people who are terrorists against us, who are so committed to what they believe in that they are willing to sacrifice their lives for it, are people who have strong religious beliefs that can be argued. And so there are examples of terrorists actually being argued with for days and days and days and renouncing their previous convictions that the Koran suggested they use force.

So I just want to underscore to the committee that when we are talking about the threats we face, this threat of terrorism is an ideological challenge to the United States and what we believe in about the rights of man and human dignity. It is no different in its challenge than the threat of communism was; and just as we fought against communism on an ideological basis, as well as on a

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

material basis, we need to encourage our friends in the Islamic world to use the appropriate ideological combat to change the minds of men and women.

It can work, and it might even—if we did it in Guantanamo, it might even provide a solution to the vexing problem of what we are going to do with these people we are holding in Guantanamo.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. General Clark, this is very interesting. We have got—the leader of the Ukraine is here right now and addressing Congress. And I can recall, when Ronald Reagan made some very forward-leaning, proactive moves with respect to the Soviet Union, there were a lot of people who argued in the interest of stability that he was going in exactly the wrong direction, and that this pushback against communism and the build-up of a military forces was, There you go again; Ronald Reagan is going to start World War III, and everything is going to go to hell.

And when we would point out the problems with dictatorships and with the manifestations of the dictatorship of the Soviet Union, the answer would be to the effect, The devil that you know is better than the devil you don't know and this new freedom can be, literally, hell.

To some degree, that theme as we have gone over these nations in the Middle East, which I would argue have been moved to some degree by the American presence—the pushback against Syria in Lebanon; the multiparty elections in Egypt; Mr. Qadhafi picking up the telephone and saying, "Let us talk," and I doubt if he did that because he got a call from the National Endowment for the Arts, or Democracy.

All those things have been met to some degree today with your reiteration of this theme that "Freedom Can Be Hell," that we are causing a destabilization in Syria, we are causing a destabilization in Iran because of our presence in Iraq and Afghanistan.

And yet Mr. Yuschchenko's presence today reminds us that while the future is not predictable and while there is going to be turbulence that follows dictatorships being disassembled, we have had to a large degree a good experience with respect to the disassembly of the Soviet empire; and that these movements—for example, the movement in Egypt has not been a throw-out of the present regime. It has been a move toward multiparty elections that is a fairly benign step.

The demonstrations in Lebanon haven't been a bloody coup against Syria; they have been just that, demonstrations in Lebanon.

Mr. Qadhafi calling up and saying, "I want to work with the West now," and his transport of all of this machinery for his weapons complex to the United States, some $60 million worth of machinery, that wasn't a bloody uprising, that was a fairly benign move and yet one that is considered to be beneficial for our country.

So my question is, are you overstating the potential danger of pushing back against these dictatorships and using the American presence and the Iraq model, if you will, in these elections? Because I think it was the elections and watching the sincerity of the widely publicized pictures of people going down to the polls under

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

some condition of danger, and embracing this new thing called freedom, called an election, called a ballot process. I think that is what largely has moved—not just the American military presence in the Middle East; we were protecting that process. But I think that process itself largely moved these ripples that we are seeing in that region.

So, do you think that you are overstating the dangers of freedom, if you will?

General CLARK. No, I am not in any way overstating the dangers of freedom. But, first of all, you know how much of a high regard I have for you and what you have done for the armed forces. We have got a long relationship going back a long way.

I did review the testimony from 2002 prior to coming here, and you were—you had a theme then about how long we could wait before we went into Iraq, and why I kept saying time was on our side. And you kept challenging me about the efficacy of inspections, and I never could quite satisfy you with my answer. But—and I will let the records speak for themselves on the urgency of going into Iraq.

Now, with respect to——

The CHAIRMAN. Yeah, but we put that against the backdrop also of the urgency of 1991 where, when the U.N. inspection teams got there, they came to the conclusion that Saddam was six months away at that point from having a system. And you may be reminded of all the folks who said time was on our side at that point and, in retrospect, it was exactly the opposite.

General CLARK. Well, without replaying that debate, I think in terms of 2003 and the urgency of going to war, even though I couldn't answer the logic of your question, I think what we are trying to do here is discuss judgment. So let me just talk about the issue you raise now.

First of all, remember that in Europe it wasn't just Ronald Reagan and his labeling the Soviet Union an "evil empire" that brought it down, although I am have very proud of what President Reagan did and I am proud of Richard Perle's policies at the time which helped us succeed. It started with the Helsinki Accord, it started with discussions and dialogue.

The Pope was a huge factor in bringing down Eastern Europe. So were the labor unions and the AFL–CIO, which has strong liaisons that were used as a channel. So were Citibank and all of the Western industrial and economic institutions which gradually undercut the legitimacy.

President Reagan never invaded Eastern Europe. In fact——

The CHAIRMAN. No, but he did move ground launch—or start the movement of ground launch cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in response to the SS20's, and he did push back against the Russians in Central America and he did push back against the Russians in Afghanistan. So his rhetoric was matched with some fairly—and the military buildup we shouldn't discount.

So his rhetoric was matched with what I would call a forward-leaning military track.

General CLARK. But let us be technically accurate. The relationship with the Pope began under President Carter, not under President Reagan. It was Brzezinski who went to Afghanistan and said,

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

We can do something here. And it was General Haig who called for an answer to the SS20 during the Carter Administration.

So I want to give full credit to the United States, but I don't want this to be a partisan issue. What I want to do is try to put it in context. It was—Reagan was a very sophisticated player; he talked to Gorbachev. Reagan—when the Marines were struck in Beirut and we lost 283 Marines, Reagan did not invade Lebanon to seek vengeance for those Marines. He pulled back out. So he was a subtle and sophisticated player.

Now, when you translate that to where we are today, I think the example of elections is an important example all the way around the world. The example of Eastern Europe has had a powerful impact on the Middle East. The example of Ukraine has had an impact on the Middle East. But you are not suggesting, are you, that the invasion of Iraq pressured——

The CHAIRMAN. No. You suggested that elections are powerful. That is precisely what I said, General. And that is that the massive publicity that was given the Iraq elections, even though we were there as protectors of that electoral process, I think the massive publicity that was given to those elections showed beyond a shadow of a doubt that they were genuine, that the people of Iraq wanted to embrace freedom, none of which could have happened without the American presence, that that has been the prime reason, or one of the prime reasons, for the other changes that we are seeing now in the Middle East, the—what I would call "the Iraqi model," not as carried out—not because of the American military force, but because of the democratic process that the American military force protected.

Just as you said, elections in other—during the Cold War were inspiring and motivating and had political meaning, I think that those elections in Iraq had political meaning also. Do you agree with that?

General CLARK. I don't disagree with what you are saying that it has political meaning. All of U.S. policy has been pushing for elections for a long time. I think we should have been pushing harder on Hosni Mubarak.

But I want to be very careful on—two points here, I think, are critical. Point number one, the President has said that we want democracy in the Middle East for our own national security purposes. I think we have to be very careful with that notion.

We want democracy for them because we want people everywhere to have the benefits and the same rights and liberties and dignity that we enjoy. That is what their citizens come and immigrate to America to have. There is no reason why they shouldn't have it at home. But to trumpet that we want this for our purposes excites a resistance which, in fact, is counterproductive.

And, second, we have been pushing for destabilization of regimes that has nothing to do with democracy. The majority of the terrorists, of course, came from Saudi Arabia. Why then did we invade Iraq and are we pushing on Syria the way you have heard Richard Perle describe for other reasons?

Now, I am happy to push Syria out and push Assad out; I would love to see a democracy there. But here is the point: If Assad leaves and we destabilize this, we have to be prepared to help pick up the

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

pieces. How would we do that? With the United Nations mission? Calling on the Saudis? Maybe get the Egyptians there? We don't know that.

But it is irresponsible for the United States, as the dominant player in the world right now, to be threatening governments and pushing them down and then not being prepared and working to help create the conditions which can meet their citizens' needs.

People in the region say, "Look, give us a chance." They say they want, they all want democracy, but they don't want to go through—they do not want the condition of lawlessness that we have allowed to happen in Iraq.

The CHAIRMAN. But don't you think it was a condition of democracy of the Iraqi model and the American presence that protected that model to actually operate, that inspired hundreds of thousands of people to demonstrate in Beirut? That wasn't the Americans demonstrating; those were Lebanese that inspired people to begin moving toward multiparty elections in Egypt, and it probably was, in my estimation, the American presence, along with the long dialogue that we have been having.

As I understand, our folks have been working, discussing, having discussions with Mr. Qadhafi long before those shipments of armaments or his weapons complex machinery began moving to the United States. But those, all those things were not, in my estimation, a function of intimidation, but were a function of people looking at the Iraqi model and these elections and saying, We would like to have that for our country.

Don't you agree with that?

General CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I think we are trying to talk past each other. I am trying to talk about national strategy and the big picture, and I feel like what you are trying to do is take political credit.

The CHAIRMAN. No, I am not trying to take political credit.

General CLARK. Then let us talk about the Iraq problem.

The CHAIRMAN. What I am saying is, when you have a democracy, General, when you have a democracy and you have a country that embraces democracy, that country then has—generally speaking, our historic experience has been it has a benign relationship with the United States which lends itself toward stability. That is why we are not worried about Britain even though Britain has nuclear weapons.

And so while I agree that you don't go out and bash countries with the idea that we only want you to be free because it is in the American interest, I think it is good news when you have nations that turn toward freedom; and that the experience of discomfort and turbulence to some degree that you meet, that you find and discover when dictatorships are disassembled is something—is a cost that sometimes we simply have to pay. And I don't see a way to move seamlessly and without any turbulence at all from brutal dictatorships to free societies.

General CLARK. We moved in Eastern Europe, we moved in Poland, in the Czech Republic, in Slovakia, in Hungary.

The CHAIRMAN. But with the disassembly of the Soviet empire?

General CLARK. And we did that without a war.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

The CHAIRMAN. I didn't say a war. I said without some discomfort.

General CLARK. But what is happening in Iraq——

The CHAIRMAN. Now, General, if you are watching the news——

Mr. SKELTON. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. SKELTON. Let the gentleman answer the question.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to let him answer the question, but I want to make one statement. And, General, I will be happy to let you respond.

When Ronald Reagan was standing up to the Soviet Union with a policy of peace through strength, you may have called him a diplomat and a deep-thinking individual, and I would agree with you. But if you read the newspapers of the times, the political pundits didn't call him a visionary or an intellectual; they called him lots of other names, and most of them were not complimentary. And there was great consternation among lots of commentators, lots of leaders, lots of pundits, lots of political opponents to the effect that Ronald Reagan was causing the United States a real problem by what we called "standing up to the Soviet Union."

Now, in hindsight, you and I both agree he did the right thing. And I am saying to some degree there is a parallel between what he did there in creating models, democratic models, the creation of which all had some military component, a very forward-leaning military path, that corresponded with his diplomatic efforts in the Cold War.

There is some correlation and some parallel between that and the present situation; do you agree?

General CLARK. Well, that is what I have been trying to talk about, Mr. Chairman. What I am suggesting is that—in the first place, that there is a fundamental difference between—let me just say this. Yes——

The CHAIRMAN. Excuse me one second, General.

Mr. Udall, let me apologize, because I have gotten into this long discourse with the General and with Mr. Perle and am forgetting that you have been here for a long time, waiting to ask a question. So as soon as—when the General finishes, we are going straight to you; and please accept my apologies.

General, go right ahead.

General CLARK. First, let me say—and my Democratic colleagues know this—Mr. Chairman, I voted for Ronald Reagan. That is a matter of public record. I have said it. I supported it. It is not just in hindsight; I believed in it. I believed in what he said and what he stood for for the advance of freedom.

The difference is, we did not invade Eastern Europe, we did not excite patriotic East Europeans to fight American soldiers. We did not kick down people's doors, throw their women on the ground, rifle through their belongings, and shoot them up. We have had to do that in Iraq. So, please, be very careful when you say "the Iraqi model." the Iraqi model, to you it may only mean when you say it that there are elections, but to the rest of the world what it means is, the United States invaded a country under false pretenses—that turned out to be false, bad intelligence; there weren't weapons of mass destruction—had ulterior motives that Mr. Perle has sug-

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

gested, didn't go in there just for WMD, went in there for a lot of different reasons; and then occupied the country and finally got elections; and in the meantime put the Iraqi people through chaos.

So what I am suggesting is, I am all in favor of the liberalization of the Middle East and democratization. I don't think Hosni Mubarak is putting elections in in Egypt because we invaded Iraq, though. I think he recognizes, just as the Saudis do and everybody in the region, that governments, if they are going to survive, must have legitimacy. These governments, these ruling families, they are trying to survive, and they know that they have got to be legitimate.

Part of it is, they are seeing it on television. But—it is not just on Iraq, but part of it is the threat of al Qaeda, who is coming in and undercutting their legitimacy. So I am sure you wouldn't want to give al Qaeda any credit for the democracy movement in the region. But when I travel through the region and I listen to rulers speak, what they are telling me is, what they are telling other people is, you either reform or you will be thrown out. So there are a lot of influences at work here.

My concern is for the United States government and for our armed forces, if we are pursuing actively, overtly or covertly, a policy to destabilize and topple old regimes like Syria, then we had just better be prepared to pick up the pieces or help somebody else do so, because we don't want the reputation of going in and knocking down governments and abandoning people.

And there is still chaos in the streets of Iraq. You are not hearing it in the newspapers, but I talk to people who have been there. They tell me horrible stories of kidnappings and abductions and murders and beheadings and common criminals in the streets. We don't want that to happen.

And, you know, when it first started in Iraq, I remember Secretary Rumsfeld said, "Well, you know, freedom is a messy thing and these things are going to happen." He couldn't have been more wrong. The first thing we learned when we went into Haiti in 1994 was, the United States Armed Forces are on the ground, they are responsible. If we destabilize these governments, we are responsible. And that is all I am trying to say.

I am all in favor of democracy and freedom. I supported Ronald Reagan, and I want to see every person in the Middle East have a vote and have the same rights we do. I just want to do it in a smart, intelligent fashion that supports our national security, not detracts from it.

The CHAIRMAN. Fair enough. Mr. Perle, any comments? And then we are going to go to Mr. Udall and then Mr. Schwarz.

Secretary PERLE. I think things would be as they were in the region had it not been for what has happened in Iraq. It is not a coincidence. It is not that Mubarak has suddenly discovered that he needs to open his political process. It was the image of Iraqis voting that has put tremendous pressure on those leaders.

And I would make just one very small remark. General Clark referred to President Reagan talking to Gorbachev, and it is true, he did talk to Gorbachev. But he didn't talk to Brezhnev, he didn't talk to Chernenko and he didn't talk to Andropov. And it is important to know who you should be talking to and when, and to talk

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

to Khatami and Rafsanjani would be a little bit like talking to Brezhnev, and so let us wait until we have got a Gorbachev we can talk to.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Fair enough. Mr. Udall, you have been long suffering here. Thank you for bearing with us. The gentleman from Colorado.

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Secretary Perle and General Clark both for your testimony, for the spirit of this dialogue we have been having here.

I am hoping to have two questions in. The first one I want to direct to General Clark with a prelude.

I think many of us were asking the question, as the President proposed this invasion, on four fronts: With whom are we going to go? For how long? What is it going to cost? And how many troops are we going to need? And I think we have only had an answer to that first question, with whom, and that of course has been an evolving situation.

General Clark, I recently had a chance to visit with Senator Gary Hart, who I think is well respected across the spectrum of military thought; and he pointed out—he asked me a question, "How many casualties have we had in Iraq?" And of course I said, "Well, it is in the order"—well, first, I said, "Too many; one is too many." But I said something in order of about 1,600.

He grabbed his dictionary and he looked up "casualty," and he pointed out to me that a casualty in a war is somebody who has been killed, wounded, injured. And the number is more in the order of, if you take those criteria, of 25,000 men and women, I believe, people who have been badly injured or wounded, people who we are now treating for post-traumatic stress disorder.

Would you care to comment on that number and what you think our obligations are in that regard?

The CHAIRMAN. For the gentleman, before you answer that question, too, General, there is a categorization that is more precise, and that categorization is the number of people who are wounded who don't return immediately to their unit, which may mean that they have gotten slightly injured, but not so injured that they can't simply go back to duty that same day.

So there is a number that splits that 25,000, I believe, and we will try to get the gentleman the precise number.

General CLARK. Well, first of all, I can tell you with respect to U.S. casualties that nobody has the exact number of people who will end up injured, wounded, psychologically damaged after the combat. My guess is, it will be significant, because I think when you kill people at close range under stress for a prolonged period, as many of our soldiers have, even if you are totally unscratched, that psychologically comes back to haunt you.

You may feel totally justified by it at the time; it may be a fear reaction. But there are likely to be several thousand, tens of thousands, who experience long-term aftereffects in terms of anger, depression, or other symptoms.

You can't calculate the impact on families from the separation and the stress that this entails. And this is why the Army is undergoing to such care in bringing people back and postprocessing. But if you talk to the people in the units, they will tell you that di-

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

vorces are rampant, family problems are everywhere. These are just—these are enormous scars that people carry for the rest of their lives, physical or emotional or mental from these conflicts.

And, in addition, I just want to say, one other thing that strikes me is that we are talking about American casualties. One of the things we didn't do—and I understand why General Franks didn't want to do this; he said, he is not doing a body count, so he didn't keep track of the enemy losses. But we just don't know what the figure is on total Iraqi losses.

I don't have any idea. I have heard the figure 100,000, I have heard it refuted and said it is way too high. But I think the important point is that when you talk about the cost, you have to not only talk about the cost to Americans but you have to talk about the cost to the Iraqis. People in Iraq are citizens of the region. They are not only that, they are related to people in the region. So when I am in Kuwait or Bahrain, I find people who have cousins in Iraq. And their family members—some of them speak English, some have been educated in this country—they are part of the casualty toll of this operation.

And I just think it makes sense when we talk about the costs—and we are, especially as the Chairman was talking about with democracy and how we can help propel it forward in the Middle East—that we recognize it is not just American lives that are at risk here; it is a lot of lives from a lot of different groups.

Mr. UDALL. Thank you, General Clark.

The second question I want to ask builds on the, should I say, "spirited dialogue" that you and the chairman just had, and we have had, in the two-plus hours we have been here.

And, Mr. Chairman, if I could weigh in, I think we all agree we have to be cold realists about the different dynamics. And I think there is—to use a cliche, there is an important distinction here to make that what happened with the Soviet Union may be an apple and what is happening in the Middle East may be an orange, and we don't want to confuse apples and oranges here. We have learned some lessons in dealing with Communists and Communist systems, but Islamic fundamentalism has some very different characteristics.

I worry that we have embraced an old model, an old nation-state symmetrical model when we look at how we are deploying our military force and using it. And it seems to me we are in—and this is where I would invite Mr. Perle to comment as well—we were using an old mindset when we invaded Iraq that we were going to a nation-state to somehow solve a problem of terrorism, which of course we are learning is a tactic, it is not a movement.

And I would invite each one of you to comment on that particular question.

General CLARK. I think you are exactly right. And I can't speak for why it was done inside the Administration. I have read it, I guess Richard Perle should speak to it more directly.

It was told to me by the generals who were involved in the discussions that this Administration more or less decided to go after Iraq because they didn't know what to do and didn't feel confident they could really deal with the problem of terrorism directly. So they went after it in a proxy form by going after states. If they

Digitized by Google
Original from PENN STATE

couldn't get the terrorists, at least get the states that support it. And then it looked like the best state to go after was Iraq; and there were a whole host of other reasons why you could do that.

But the truth is that we do have to fight terrorism not only through democratization and the improvement of living standards around the world, but we also have to fight the ideology, and we need to be able to confront the ideology of Islam. We can't do it. I can't do it; I am not Islamic. But people who are Islamic scholars can debate on the interpretations of various sections of the Koran, and they have had some success in doing so and even changing the minds of some of these people who are terrorists.

I think ultimately that is the way you win. We should be trying to take terrorists and turn them around. During the Cold War there was a guy named Eric Hoffer who was—many of us read him in school. He was a Communist and he was, as I recall, a dock worker in the 1930's; and he became the greatest apostle for freedom because he had been there and he knew how to address it.

We should find people who are Islamics, who have been terrorists who have had their minds changed. We should be letting those people speak, giving them platforms, encouraging them, because we could win ideologically; and that is the best way to win this war.

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Chairman, I know that you are indulging me. My time is——

The CHAIRMAN. Go right ahead.

Mr. UDALL. Mr. Perle, I think Mr. Hoffer wrote a book called *The True Believer*. And if we can change the minds of Communists, why can't we change the minds of Islamic fundamentalists?

Mr. Perle, I would invite your comments.

Secretary PERLE. I think Eric Hoffer would have been classified as a neoconservative today. He was a great man.

Mr. UDALL. You need a few more allies, so maybe he would be willing to be on that list.

Secretary PERLE. I think, if you look at the challenge of 9/11 through the eyes of the President of the United States, whoever that President might have been, we discover suddenly that assumptions we had made about the risks and the potential costs of the terrorists' act involved a serious underestimation of how much damage can be done by a terrorist act. We came to understand that it had been perpetrated by people who we knew were in Afghanistan, plotting against us. They had done it before; we hadn't taken action against them before, at least not sufficient action, because we didn't think the dangers justified the action that we could have taken. We obviously could have gone into Afghanistan in force to deal with bin Laden, but we waited.

Now, you are the President and it is September 12th, and you look around and you say to yourself, "What if there is another terrorist act?" What might the nature of that terrorist act be? Where might it originate, with what possible consequences? And I think you are bound to come to the conclusion that the next terrorist act could entail a weapon of mass destruction, could dwarf in terms of the fatalities the attacks of September 11th, and could come from terrorist organizations that could expect to receive support or might receive support from the states who had been sponsoring terrorism.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Afghanistan had hosted al Qaeda, and when you looked around the world, it was clear you had to go after al Qaeda in Afghanistan and after Afghanistan for having harbored al Qaeda. So we did that.

You then looked at the rest of the world. And there was Iraq, there was Saddam who had cheered on September 11, who had a history of weapons of mass destruction; and you had an intelligence community telling you that he possessed them. That was also the view of the United Nations and British intelligence and French intelligence and German intelligence and so on. He had an established relationship with terrorist organizations, some of them actually operating in Baghdad. And you then had to ask yourself, can I afford to wait? Can I afford to do nothing with respect to Saddam Hussein and hope for the best?

That, I think, was the calculation in the President's mind. I know it was the thinking of a great many experienced, distinguished policy officials who served on the Defense Policy Board, because at that time I sat in on those meetings and I heard what they had to say. And there was something approaching a consensus among the members of that board that that was how a President would, of necessity, look at the challenge posed by Saddam Hussein.

Secretary PERLE. So unlike the sense of some of the comments that have been made today, I believe the President acted to manage the risks involved in what Saddam Hussein was capable of doing and allowing to be done, what he was capable of facilitating; and these are always issues of managing risk. You can always choose to do nothing and hope that the worst has not materialized or you can take hard measures. That is what I think was going through the mind of the President when the decision was made to go after Saddam Hussein.

It was not that we didn't have any ideas about what to do. It was very much connected with the idea that we had waited too long before dealing with Osama bin Laden, that the countries that had weapons of mass destruction or a history of weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorists posed a particular danger, and we would have to find a way to deal with them.

Mr. UDALL. I appreciate that recitation of the history.

I think after Afghanistan, as more paths diverged, there were many of us—and I put myself on this list—who felt that there were greater threats, including those presented by the loose nukes in the old Soviet Union, by the developments in North Korea, by al Qaeda's presence itself, and that we defaulted to an old, symmetrical mindset and invaded Iraq.

I have taken my time, and I appreciate the extra time, Mr. Chairman. I am long suffering, but not because of you, but because I have teenagers in my household. So I thank you for this hearing. I look forward to these two gentlemen returning again, perhaps two years hence, and we will see where we are.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank the gentleman and thank him for his line of questions.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Mr. Chairman, I parachuted into this fray a little late, so all I can say is I have enjoyed the past hour of political dis-

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

course with an edge on it, formulations from all sides of the issue. It is a little different, Mr. Chairman, than the occasional lobbing of softballs back and forth, the fact that we have here on occasion. I enjoyed the discourse between yourself and General Clark, and I yield back my time. I have no questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, you see, General Clark, we have performed a service here by talking and having a spirited debate. We actually shortened the hearing time a little bit.

I thank the gentleman. It is great to have you on the committee, Mr. Schwarz, I might say, and bringing your military experience with you.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton, reserved most of his questions for the end here. Ike, the floor is yours.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have reserved my questions.

The term "risk involved" was mentioned a few moments ago. Let's go back to September, 2002. I wrote a letter to the President of the United States and I sent copies of the letter to policymakers in the Administration saying that we can't take the first without considering the last and that we needed a detailed postwar plan for reconstruction, for governance and for dealing with the ethnic division and with security.

Two of the high-level Administration officials were kind enough to come see me. Looks like it is going to be all right.

I sent a second letter in March, 2003, which was immediately before the war started, giving bad outcomes of what might happen that needed to be considered in planning for the aftermath, such as unwillingness of the Sunnis to participate and Iran others meddling in Iraqi affairs. Well, those risks were run, and we are where we are.

Mr. Perle, let me ask you a question. A short while ago, you told us that you did not agree with General Keane's discussion or statement that we were seduced by Iraqi exiles; is that correct?

Secretary PERLE. Yes, I haven't seen the statement, but if that is what he said——

Mr. SKELTON. Well, that is exactly what he said.

Secretary PERLE [continuing]. I disagree with that.

Mr. SKELTON. But in your prepared remarks, and I will read them so I hope I can be of help to you: "There is reason to believe we were sucked into an ill-conceived initial attack by Saddam himself, by double agents planted by the regime."

First, what is the difference between Jack Keane's comments and this comment?

Secretary PERLE. Oh, I had a specific reference, Congressman Skelton, and that was to people who have been called, in public writing, the "rock stars," who were officials of Saddam's regime, recruited by the CIA, who supplied information to the CIA, not the exiles. The exiles were the opponents of Saddam's regime.

This was, I believe, a successful intelligence operation by Saddam Hussein in which we were led to believe that he was in a certain location, and he wasn't there. How much we relied on these sources, I don't know. I think the committee would do well to inquire deeply into that, because I think we were seriously misled by Saddam himself.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Mr. SKELTON. Are you in a position to tell us who the double agents are?

Secretary PERLE. No, I am not.

Mr. SKELTON. So you would not know?

Secretary PERLE. No, I don't know.

Mr. SKELTON. Let me ask each of you—let us go back in time. Each of you are in full power to make decisions in Iraq immediately when the initial conflict ended. Each of you can make decisions on what you would do differently for a better outcome than what happened. For instance, and I use these as examples only, allowing the looting, disbanding the Iraqi army, giving them a pick and shovel and a paycheck.

Mr. Perle, why don't you go first?

Secretary PERLE. Well, I thought a lot about this and had suggestions to make even before the war. I would have turned to a group of individuals, opponents of Saddam's regime, many of whom have devoted their lives to trying to mobilize against Saddam's regime. It included the—the group included Sunnis, it included Kurds, it included Shia. I would have brought them together and asked them to form an interim government to prepare for elections to take place in a limited period of time. A year probably would have been sufficient.

I would have put a political—an Iraqi political institution in place to which Iraqis could turn. I would have supported them with American forces working alongside them.

I think the political consequences of that would have been far different from the occupation that we subsided into. I don't think it was ever quite planned in that way, but that is how it evolved, and I think that was the root cause of much of our difficulty.

Because, if you recall, in the early days there was no significant insurgency. It took a few months before that began to take shape. It took shape in a period in which the United States was held responsible for every conceivable thing that went wrong, which is not surprising.

So I would have turned things over to the Iraqis, and indeed I would have gone into Iraq with a government in exile ready to assume those responsibilities and with some thousands of Iraqis in whom we could pose some confidence. I think we would have understood the situation far better. We would have had Iraqis on the ground to deal with matters like the looting that took place. Unfortunately, we didn't do that.

But I believe the occupation was a serious mistake. It cost us at least a year and maybe a year and a half. It is now over, and I think the political process that has inspired others in the region and inspired the Iraqis, as we saw on election day, has now taken over from that earlier period of occupation.

So I think we are now on the right path, and I am optimistic. I am optimistic that we will be turning additional responsibility over to the Iraqis as they are trained. They are fighting better. They are far more dedicated than they were when they were simply working for an occupying power. I think we are going to look back on this—with all of the pain and all of the costs and all of the suffering, we will look back on this, and we will say that what

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

we have done in Iraq was truly an act of liberation and an inspiration to the whole region.

Mr. SKELTON. I was with the family of a soldier who was killed just a few days ago back in Missouri; and, for their sake, I hope you are right.

General.

General CLARK. Well, Congressman, your question is assuming you couldn't have changed anything before the fall of Baghdad. Obviously, you know, I would have slowed the pace of action until we had our planning and preparation caught up, run through and exhausted the diplomatic efforts and demanded a number of things from Saddam Hussein and his regime as we went through that.

So my idea would have been to infiltrate intelligence operatives and human rights monitors and democracy workers and a whole lot of people into Iraq during this process that the inspections were under way and to have tried to disassemble the Iraqi Government in pieces during that period. It could have been a prolonged period, unless we hit a trigger point and we had to strike.

During that period, we would have done some of the things that Richard suggested, building up our government in exile, training Iraqi forces in case we did have to fight and so forth.

Set aside all of that, it is the 9th of April or so of 2003. The first thing we needed was a unified authority on the ground in Iraq representing the United States of America and the coalition. We didn't have that. We had a U.S. military commander who was commanding two deputies, a military deputy and then Jay Garner, who was reporting through the military commander to the Secretary of Defense. That doesn't work.

We should have had a top-level leader. You need a Richard Holbrooke kind of guy, to put him on the ground in Iraq, tell military commanders, support him, he is setting up, get the directions from the government, do what you have to do to maintain security. You go in there and work with the Iraqis and put that together. We didn't have that in place until we put John Negroponte on the ground last summer of 2004. So we wasted a lot of time without an effective unified authority on the ground in Iraq.

Second, we didn't have enough troops. We should have immediately brought forward more troops more rapidly. We should have called on the United Nations and Arab governments to join us in that we probably needed, during the initial period 250,000 to 300,000 troops just for presence purposes, to be there on the ground, to walk through the area, say we are here. We are not going to hurt you. You know, go about your business. In places like Fallujah, they didn't see us for six weeks until someone drove through. So this was a mistake. We needed more forces there.

Third, we should have pushed interpreters forward, even when we had forces there or we didn't have the ability to communicate with the Iraqi people. I don't know why we didn't go out to the Arab American community and bring in tens of thousands of native Arabic speakers, people from Iraq and Yemen and everywhere in the region, who can communicate with the people on the ground in Iraq and say, come in, here is a six-week program of getting you trained. We are going to give you extra pay. Come over here and

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

do your duty for both your old country and your new country and help us do that. We didn't do that.

I think we should have ordered the Iraqi military and the Iraqi ministries to stay on duty. We should have had the Iraqi military back in their barracks. We should have had inspections. We should have lined them up. We should have looked them in the eye. We should have then started a debriefing program to find out who was what, what they did and so forth and move through this in a logical way to take them apart.

I hope these are the kinds of lessons—and then one more thing. If I could say that, after we got into this, we should have had a transition program that would have turned over U.S. political authorities as rapidly as possible to the Iraqis themselves and answered that to a United Nations mandate that would have put someone in other than the Americans leading to the constitution and the elections.

Now, obviously, you are leading the witnesses here, sir, because you want us to tell you these things. I hope that they will be applied to the next government that falls in the next region in the Middle East. I hope we will have the planning ready, the forces ready, the diplomacy ready, the translators ready, all that can be done. It is as easy to do that as it is—it is as easy to get it started as it is to start with the Syrian Accountability Act, which we passed. We should be preparing the way if we have to use it, not be caught flatfooted.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

I have one last question, which is really bottom line, each of you. What would be the one thing you would recommend to this Administration to increase the chances of achieving success in Iraq? Either one? Both of you?

General CLARK. In Iran?

Mr. SKELTON. What did I say? Iraq, excuse me.

General CLARK. I want to hear Richard's answer, because I have got several different things. But, basically—well, let me say this before I surrender my time so quickly.

The CHAIRMAN. That can be a very dangerous thing around here.

General CLARK. Exactly.

I think the action is actually—I think things are moving in the right direction, from everything I can see. I think it is a matter of—I think the principal problem for us is sustaining our ability to remain engaged. I think we are trying to work with the Iraqi people. I think we are trying to train the Iraqi security forces. I think the military is trying to get the advisory position in place.

I think that we have got—if there is only one thing else we could do, it is to take away the regional resistance. We need a little diplomatic action in the region to bring in some other Arab states to reinforce us. I was over there, and of course leaders told me they would be happy to send troops, but we hadn't asked. I don't know if that is true or not, but that is what I heard.

I do go back to the idea of a regional council in which not only Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Turkey and Jordan are present but also Iran and Syria and in which we hold those nations accountable to some extent to help us in Iraq, rather than keeping them on the outside of the circle and making them the next targets.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

So those are the approaches I would take in Iraq; and then we have got to sustain our military, add to the force so we can do our job there.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Perle.

Secretary PERLE. I think we have seen now the emergence of an elected government in Iraq. I think we have to support that government. They will do a better job than many people have feared. They have done a remarkable job as it is in resisting all of the provocations that could have led to an out-and-out civil war. I think things are moving in the right direction.

The last thing I would do is try to bring in the Arabians and the Syrians who, I believe, are fundamentally on the other side. They are fearful about success in Iraq because it almost certainly spells the end for them. Imagine what the attitude of Iranians and Syrians will be when they can look across at a functioning and growing and prospering democracy in Iraq. So we will get no help from countries whose interests are diametrically opposed to our own.

And the notion that we should bring them in, I think, is as fundamentally wrong. Quite the opposite. We need to recognize that they are part of the problem. The Iranians are part of the problem, the Syrians are part of the problem, and the other dictatorships of the region, for their own reasons, do not want to see us succeed. That is an unpleasant but brutal reality, and I think we have to face that reality. It is no good saying that we should somehow transform our opponents into our allies. It isn't going to happen.

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, let me thank our witnesses for their excellent testimony, as well as for their longevity today. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I thank the gentleman; and I want to join my colleague, Ike Skelton, in thanking you. I think we have had a very good dialogue, great discussion; and let me ask you one last question, gentlemen, as we prepare to leave here.

We have talked about—probably spent too much time talking about the situation up to now and probably not enough in terms of how we go forward. But we are obviously in the midst of a military standup and handoff with respect to the military forces of Iraq. There are two ways to go and maybe some gradients in between, but there is the "throw them in the pool and let them try to swim" or the one in which we spend an extensive amount of time, the long slow handoff, in which we maintain the bulk of the security responsibilities, especially the hard stuff, and make a gradual handoff to the Iraqi armed forces.

Understanding, I think we all agree, that occupations are tough on two parties, the occupied nation and the occupying nation, and understanding that the military forces are the most apparent manifestation of our occupation, do you go for a very quick handoff with respect to the military or what I would call a slower handoff, a more extended handoff?

General CLARK. Oh, I would go for a longer handoff, but you would have to support that, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Which one?

General CLARK. Longer handoff. But in terms of advisories you will have to support it, and it means increasing the active in

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

strength of the American Army, and that is billions of dollars of resources we are talking about to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. But you don't think that the—I mean, to some degree then your theme has been, and Mr. Perle's, also, that we should have handed off the military, the civilian reins quicker than we did and that we would have served ourselves and the Iraqis—disserved the Iraqis by not doing that early.

By the same token, would you agree with the proposition that we are not going to develop good military leadership at the division brigade battalion level unless we hand off fairly large chunks of responsibility? The longer we hold off on that, the slower the Iraqi military is going to be in producing quality leadership.

I mean, there is an aspect to getting people to swim and that you want to get them into the water quickly and you want to do a little risk taking as opposed to the slow process.

Do you think that we are putting off the development of the Iraqi military to some degree by not giving them the tougher jobs, the tougher security jobs, the ones with more exposure?

General CLARK. I think it depends on how you define tougher security jobs. There are two things that are tough about it—there are three things that are tough. There is, first of all, the intelligence collection. They cannot do—and we are not going to give them the techniques to do right now all the sophisticated technical stuff we have got. So they are not going to have that.

The CHAIRMAN. No. Understanding that.

General CLARK. Number two is there is the sort of kicking down doors in the middle of night and pulling people out of their homes. Now it is my understanding they have hired back a lot of the people from the old regime who were part of the Ministry of Interior and are really good at doing this, and that is a very dangerous thing to have done, but that is what is being done, I am told. That means that we are building in an automatic conflict in between the government and its own servants in terms of standards of dignity and law, rule of law, so forth. That is a tough task.

We have already started turning over the Iraqis, and I am in favor of really close supervision of that one, as long as you can get away with that without it infringing too much on Iraqi sovereignty.

Then there is the tough task of using big battalions, combat support, air-ground coordination and so forth. You have got to walk up to this one. It takes us in the United States Army 16 years to train a battalion commander and longer for a brigade commander. So, assuming we have got some captains that have come in, two or three years of training, it is not asking too much.

At this point, having invested all these lives and all these hundreds of millions of dollars and all of our national prestige in this, then I think we need to do as much as we can to minimize the risk that something is going to go seriously wrong during this phase of the operation, and that means that I would err on the side of planning for, resourcing and preparing for a longer stay. Then if you can reduce it, fine. But not to try to cut corners now.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Mr. Perle.

Secretary PERLE. I would go for the longer handover as well, but I believe the emphasis should be on police and gendarmerie functions, rather than on battalion level military maneuver.

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

We are there to support the Iraqi forces, and I think the supporting role is the right one. Training and their ability to call us in if they get into a firefight I think is very important, motivating them and the outcome of those engagements. But the important thing is to train as rapidly as possible those Iraqis on the ground in a police and security function.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay, thank you very much. Gentlemen, thank you for a very robust discussion. We kept you a long time, but I think we have worn the committee out here.

Ike and I are the last ones standing and Mr. Schwarz. So we are going to go host our German contingent that has come over to talk with us.

Gentlemen, again, thank you. This is an important debate, I think, and an important conversation; and we hope to have you back many times.

The committee is adjourned.

Secretary PERLE. Thank you.

General CLARK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

APPENDIX

APRIL 6, 2005

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 6, 2005

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Statement of

General Wesley Clark, USA, (ret.)

Former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command

before the

House Armed Services Committee

on

April 6, 2005

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

Congressional Testimony

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of this Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. From moment one, this Committee has been strongly supportive of the men and women in uniform, and I want to commend you for that – and thank you for the support that so many of you gave to me during my time in the military. As a former soldier, I can't stress enough how important these deliberations are to our armed forces and military families stationed around the world – and to the thousands of veterans I've met with over the past two years. I have also heard from thousands of people over the internet who wish to express their gratitude for your efforts and concerns about the situation in Iraq. On their behalf and on behalf of my own family, I thank you.

It is a privilege to appear today to present my thoughts on Iraq and our armed forces, to offer a brief retrospective on the mission there, to sketch out a successful way ahead, and to discuss the implications for the U.S. armed forces.

In September 2002, you invited me to testify about the looming crisis in Iraq. At the time, based on the information provided by the U.S. intelligence community, we all believed that Iraq possessed some chemical and biological weapons, and had an ongoing effort to gain nuclear weapons. It made sense at the time to go to the United Nations and get strong diplomatic reinforcement to end Saddam's weapons programs.

But the critical issue then was how to end Saddam's weapons program without detracting from our focus on Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network, and our efforts to deal with other immediate, mid- and long-term security problems. As you may recall, I counseled at the time that we needed a Congressional Resolution – not at that point authorizing the use of force – but rather expressing the intent to use force if all other measures were to fail. I testified that we should then use this Congressional Resolution to press for UN action, that we should work patiently to forge world-wide legitimacy, and that force should be used only as a last resort, after all diplomatic means had been

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

exhausted -- and then only after we had fully prepared to handle the post-conflict process in Iraq.

After a Congressional Resolution and an aborted U.N. inspection effort, the U.S. invaded Iraq. We did not use the U.N. process effectively to enhance our legitimacy or build our coalition. The Administration did not heed the warnings of General Shinseki and others who warned of the force strength necessary to win the war *and* win the peace. In short, the Administration did not give our military adequate planning or sufficient resources to handle the post-conflict situation in Iraq. These errors were compounded by weak strategic decisions, including dissolving the Iraqi army and outlawing Baathist participation in new governmental structures. The prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib has provided our enemies with a propaganda bonanza resulting in a recruiting windfall in Iraq and throughout the Arab world.

More fundamentally, with its armed occupation of Iraq, the Administration lost focus, and was substantially distracted from worldwide efforts against Al Qaeda. Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda network are still at large, terrorist incidents have continued to take innocent life, and U.S. military actions in Iraq have provided a magnet for recruiting and training large numbers of extremist youth in continuing warfare. If Iraq is today the center of the war against terrorism, as some in the Administration have contended, it is not because the terrorists were there originally, but because they have been recruited there to the fight against us. Our military action in Iraq is more a catalyst for terrorists than a cure. Whatever results may ultimately come from removing Saddam Hussein from power, ending the terrorist threat against the United States of America is not likely to be one of them.

Of great concern today and, frankly, in the years ahead is that the focus on Iraq has deprived the Administration of the time, diplomatic support, and military resources to act effectively against other, more dangerous sources of WMD proliferation. The "red line" established by the Clinton Administration against North Korea's reprocessing of spent uranium fuel to make plutonium has now been breached. North Korea has announced

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

that they have reprocessed and presumably now have the fissile materials to make at least a half dozen additional nuclear weapons. Furthermore, this Administration has refused to participate in the discussions aimed at persuading Iran to permanently renounce its uranium enrichment capabilities.

From the outset, the military mission in Iraq has been complicated by factors other than making the best decisions for success. Operations to destabilize Iraq were apparently viewed as the start of a broader campaign to destabilize or overthrow a number of governments in the Middle East, including Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Libya, and Sudan. The start of the campaign was rushed, for reasons that have never been made clear by the Administration. And once U.S. forces were inside Iraq, U.S. diplomacy failed to take measures to undercut regional resistance from countries such as Syria and Iran.

If we are to succeed in Iraq, we must move along three tracks; first, improve security and at the same time reduce the exposure and commitment of the U.S. forces; second, strengthen our ability to facilitate Iraqi political development; third, we must reduce regional resistance to the emergence of a democratic Iraq.

On the first track, the U.S. military must shift away from the battlefields and move into more of a reserve role, relying on a cadre of U.S. advisors to strengthen the newly-minted Iraqi forces. This will entail risks, as U.S. forces turn over combat responsibilities, so it must be paced to improved Iraqi capabilities and the development of an advisory structure.

On the second track, our Embassy obviously has to play a behind-the-scenes role. Without usurping Iraqi responsibilities, we should be able to do more to gain local political information, shape alternatives and facilitate the emergence of democratic governance inside Iraq

On the third track, we should to be talking to all of Iraq's neighbors, including Syria and Iran in a regional framework. Delaying this until we can change the governments in

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

Damascus and Tehran, which seems to be the current policy, puts increasing pressure on our troops and raises the risks inside Iraq.

The U.S. armed forces are caught up in an over-extended ground campaign that is rapidly using up our ground combat strength. In equipment terms, each year in Iraq puts about five years of normal wear-and-tear on the equipment. The wheeled and tracked fleets from the first combat rotation into Iraq have not yet been fully repaired and restored. Reserve component units are leaving much of their equipment behind in Iraq for follow-on units, thereby crippling their recovery and retraining at home

Even more importantly, the human costs to the all-volunteer Army, especially, have been staggering. The Army currently has 17 brigades deployed in Iraq, from an active force of 33 brigades, which should grow to 44 brigades as the result of internal Army restructuring. Most reserve component brigades have already been called up and deployed. The result is that active duty soldiers can expect to be deployed every other year to Iraq for a year long combat tour, unless either the size of the American commitment to Iraq is reduced or the size of the active force is significantly increased.

And even maintaining the force at its current size is likely to be challenging. While the active force is meeting its retention objectives, recruiting for the Army and Marine Corps is lagging behind both for the active and the reserve component. Ultimately, if the current combat levels in Iraq continue, this recruiting gap is unlikely to be closed by more financial incentives. Most married soldiers just can't contemplate indefinitely deploying for a year, every other year, away from their families.

Even worse is the treatment that the United States is meting out to its returning reservists, Guardsmen, and other veterans. Over the past three years there has been a substantial erosion of veterans benefits – hospitals have closed or reduced treatments, usage fees have risen, returning reservists and Guardsmen have lost jobs, had their homes foreclosed on, credit scores ruined, suffered family tragedies, and significant stresses. The adjustment mechanisms to receive home our soldiers and then to sustain them and care

Digitized by Google

Original from PENN STATE

for them as a grateful nation should are simply inadequately developed and funded. We owe our veterans – and we owe their families as a pragmatic matter, if we don't do more, we'll never be able to raise the forces we need to sustain our commitments.

If we are to sustain the all-volunteer force, and restore our defenses, we will need to augment the size of the active force substantially, fully fund our materiel requirements, enhance the benefits and support for our reserve force, and as both a pragmatic and moral imperative, fully fund the VA and improve our support structure for our veterans.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you again for your support of our troops. I will be pleased to take your questions.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE

Fellow, American Enterprise Institute
Before the
Committee on Armed Services
United States House of Representatives
April 6, 2005

Mr. Chairman,

As always, I appreciate this opportunity to share with the Committee some ideas and observations about the situation in Iraq and, more specifically, some of the lessons we should take away from our experience there.

Within the Department of Defense, and among its many advisors and consultants there have already been several important "lessons learned" assessments. These cover everything from the effectiveness of specific weapons systems, procedures, organizations and training to the performance of individual units, flows of information, logistics, intelligence and the like. Our military lives or dies by the lessons it learns and for this reason it is deeply introspective.

Those who have made and continue to make these assessments are far more qualified than I to think about the next generation of plans, procedures, operations and guidance that will flow from this process of critical self-examination. I wish simply to draw a few broad lessons that are likely to be applicable to future situations in which we find it necessary to use military forces to combat our terrorist enemies.

First, It is essential that we are clear about, and carefully align, our political and military objectives. Our achievement in applying force is the product of our effectiveness in pursuing both: if we succeed at one and fail at the other we will fail overall—or pay a heavy price to secure an eventual success after enduring the burdens of political miscalculation.

American forces, working with the indigenous opposition to the Taliban regime, went into Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, less than a month after the attack of 9-11. Our objective was to dislodge the Taliban regime that had sponsored and sheltered Osama Bin Laden and disrupt al Qaeda operations there and elsewhere so their capacity to carry out an attack on the scale of 9-11 would be greatly diminished. We went in with a small force—never more than 10,000—and despite the criticism that the force was too small and that we were facing a quagmire as a result, some of which appeared in as little as three weeks, we quickly achieved our objective. Since then we have seen the Afghans adopt a democratic constitution enfranchising women and conduct an open and fair election that empowered a government with broad support. The power of the war lords who once dominated the country has been greatly reduced and opinion surveys have

Digitized by Google
Original from PENN STATE

shown that the approval of U.S. forces in Afghanistan is now around the 70-80% level, a degree of approbation that most institutions can only dream of.

In Iraq we succeeded in driving Saddam Hussein from office in three weeks. And while we were received in Iraq as liberators in the days following the collapse of Saddam's army and regime, we did not enjoy the benefit of a close collaboration with the indigenous opposition to his brutal, sadistic dictatorship.

This brings me to my second lesson: In aligning our political and military strategy, we should make sure we have the support of a significant segment of the local population. Even more, we should work with those whose interests parallel our own, taking them into our confidence and planning to operate in close collaboration with them. We did this in Afghanistan. But we did not do it in Iraq, despite the fact that we had a year to organize and prepare for hostilities that brought a hundred and thirty thousand Americans to a place they didn't know or understand. Even during the three weeks of fighting leading to the fall of the regime, we would have benefited from knowledge we did not have: the location of weapons caches, the importance and implications of looting, the nature and extent of the retreat—and potential re-organization—of elements of Saddam's regime, and the like.

More significantly, we were slow to recognize how central the Iraqis were to the post-war stabilization of the situation on the ground. I believe we would have been wise to go into Iraq with several thousand Iraqis at our side. After all, the Congress, with the support of most and possibly all the members of this committee, approved the Iraq Liberation Act which authorized political, material and moral support for the Iraqi National Congress and other Iraqi opponents of Saddam's regime.

With thousands of Iraqis at our side, we might well have dealt more effectively with the turmoil and looting that followed the collapse of the regime and we might have jump started the transition to an emerging Iraqi democracy. But there was little support within the executive branch for implementing the Iraq Liberation Act, for taking the Iraqi opposition into our confidence, or for training Iraqis to fight alongside us. Central Command opposed serious, intelligent plans that could have provided thousands of Iraqi troops to help us evaluate the situation on the ground, interpret information about who was trustworthy, where hostile forces and weapons were hidden, otherwise to supply much-needed intelligence. The State Department and the CIA actively opposed working with the Iraqi opposition with the result that very little of the material support voted by Congress before the war was actually spent. By the time those favoring a much closer collaboration between U.S. and Iraqi opposition forces got agreement to begin training some Iraqis, for example, we were on the verge of war. Sadly, as we went to war only a handful of Iraqis had graduated from a much delayed training program that had vastly more potential than we were able to realize.

The third lesson is, by now, generally accepted: our intelligence is sometimes, dangerously inadequate. That was certainly the case as we went into Iraq. The appalling incompetence at the CIA and elsewhere in the intelligence community left us largely

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

ignorant of such basic information as the state of Iraq's infrastructure (and therefore the pace at which basic services could be established when the fighting ceased) and the size, organization and tactics of elements of Saddam's regime, which later emerged as the core of the insurgency. There is reason to believe that we were sucked into an ill-conceived initial attack aimed at Saddam himself by double agents planted by the regime. And as we now know the estimates of Saddam's stockpile of weapons of mass destruction was substantially wrong.

I wish I could share the optimism of those who have pushed through the "reforms" proposed by the 9-11 Commission that the structural changes enacted by the Congress will solve the problem. But I believe the problem will not be solved simply by reordering the broken parts of our intelligence establishment. Far more radical reform is required, but I see little prospect that it will occur. I have, on previous occasions urged this and other committees of the Congress to conduct a quiet retrospective analysis of the competence with which the intelligence community has rendered its analyses of the middle east region, and especially the Gulf, over the last 30 years. I believe such an analysis would show chronic failure: faulty estimates accompanied by smug confidence about future developments rendered in the face of repeated nasty surprises.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, a fourth lesson: we must do everything possible to avoid becoming an occupying power. The occupation of Iraq did much to vitiate the good will we earned—and deserved—as brave Americans risked, and in all too many cases sacrificed, their lives to liberate Iraq. We should have turned Iraq over to the Iraqis on the day Baghdad fell—or as soon thereafter as possible. I believe it could have been done in a few weeks, not the many months, stretching to years, that led inexorably to the insurgency that has caused so much death and destruction. A quick hand-over would have given Iraqis an immediate stake in the establishment of order and a civil society. The Iraqis would have made some mistakes, of course. But we were not immune from mistakes—and ours were magnified many times over by our occupying presence. The grand ambition of the Coalition Provisional Authority was profoundly mistaken. The image on Iraqi television of an American pro-consul informing the Iraqi people of the rules we made for them and the arrangement of their lives for which we assumed responsibility, contributed significantly to the difficulties we have had in Iraq. With the best of intentions and hard and admirable work by thousands of American administrators in Iraq, we simply got it wrong.

The Iraqi elections marked the end of the occupation and the beginning of what I am confident will be the successful transition to a decent, humane self-government by and for the people of Iraq. Having watched more than eight million Iraqis risk their lives to exercise the vote we so often take for granted, there is only one lesson we can draw: the courage of the Americans who come to free them has been matched by the Iraqis who we have freed. And great honor belongs to both.

Digitized by Google

Original from
PENN STATE

PENN STATE UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES
A0000058937488
Digitized by Google
Original from
PENN STATE

Y 4.AR 5/2 A:
2005-2006/32

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–32]

IRAQ'S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
APRIL 6, 2005

Pennsylvania State University
Libraries
Documents Collection
U.S. Depository Copy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26–143 WASHINGTON : 2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

Digitized by Google
Original from
PENN STATE

Y 4.AR 5/2 A:
2005-2006/32

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–32]

IRAQ'S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
APRIL 6, 2005

Pennsylvania State University
Libraries
Documents Collection
U.S. Depository Copy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26–143 WASHINGTON : 2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

Digitized by Google
Original from
PENN STATE

Y 4.AR 5/2 A:
2005-2006/32

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–32]

IRAQ'S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
APRIL 6, 2005

Pennsylvania State University
Libraries
Documents Collection
U.S. Depository Copy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26–143 WASHINGTON : 2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

Digitized by Google
Original from
PENN STATE

Y 4.AR 5/2 A:
2005-2006/32

[H.A.S.C. No. 109–32]

IRAQ'S PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD
APRIL 6, 2005

Pennsylvania State University
Libraries
Documents Collection
U.S. Depository Copy

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
26–143 WASHINGTON : 2006

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001

Digitized by Google
Original from
PENN STATE