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Stand Up and Be Counted:

The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • Committee on Armed Services

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations

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Command – Iraq (MNSTC-I) (see figure 1). The Vinnell contract was not renewed, and Coalition forces began their efforts to train the Iraqi Army. MG Petraeus tasked his Chief of Staff, Colonel James Greer, to create a plan.[9] The number of military members needed for this mission has continually increased, and the Iraqi security organizations the Coalition is training have continually changed.

Figure 1: Organizational Chart.



Once MNSTC-I trained and equipped Iraqi forces, operational control was transferred to the Multi-National Corps – Iraq (MNC-I). MNC-I would conduct unit-level training through an advisory mission and partner Coalition units. The Corps originally drew advisors from units already in Iraq. Later, MNC-I started to levy requirements through Central Command (CENTCOM) for advisors. These advisors, whether "out of hide" from partner units or specifically deployed for the mission, formed Transition Teams, to be embedded with Iraqi military forces and some units of the Ministry of Interior. This mission would traditionally have been classified as Security Assistance managed by the Department of State and conducted with Special Operations Forces (SOF). While SOF have trained the Iraqi Special Forces units and several others, advising the rest of the Iraqi military and police was too large and complex for the small Special Operations Command organization, which was also heavily tasked with other missions. Because SOF could not take on the entire advisory mission, MNC-I Requests for Forces were originally focused on reserve component personnel who

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(2) The number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that have assumed responsibility for security of specific geographic areas; and
(3) The assessed capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessment reports.

Before transfer of security responsibilities can occur, ISF units must meet certain standards for operational effectiveness, reliability, leadership, equipment, and sustainment/logistics.

In support of this strategic end, Congress has provided a considerable sum for training, equipping and providing logistics support to the ISF. Between the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraqi Security Forces Fund (ISFF), Congress has appropriated over $19.0 billion. The Government of Iraq had budgeted $5.4 billion in calendar year (CY) 2006 and has designated $7.3 billion in the CY07 budget for security. Congress is now considering the President's request for $2.0 billion in ISFF for the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Global War on Terror.

Four years after U.S. forces invaded Iraq, significant challenges remain in the U.S. effort to develop the ISF. Iraq's security forces are not yet ready to assume responsibility for the nation's security. Nevertheless, many have joined the fight as evidenced by the increasing number of ISF casualties (see figure 2).[37] U.S. military leaders propose that while they may still reach initial operating capability between January and March of 2008, full operational capability will take at least 12 more months. Beyond that time period, the Iraqis will still require trainers and advisers, as well as critical combat enablers including logistics and intelligence support.

Figure 2: Average Daily Casualties.



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population security" to the primary security focus being on Iraqis providing population security, which is intended to facilitate the transfer of security responsibility to the Government of Iraq (GOI).[21] Another "key operational shift" is movement away from "gradual transfer of security responsibility to ISF" toward "accelerate[d] transfer of battlespace and Provincial Iraqi Control to Iraqis."[22] At the tactical level, the NSC slides also reflect the Prime Minister's Initiative (PMI) to expand the Iraqi Army and replenish the Iraqi Security Forces.[23] These initiatives will be addressed in greater detail below.

Figure 3: Evolution of the Objectives and Assumptions of U.S. Stabilization and Reconstruction Efforts.



Sources: GAO analysis of CPA plans, NSSI, NSVI, and State reports.

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Embassies. [71] Once a province transfers to PIC, the Coalition provides support in the form of "operational overwatch." [72]

While the Department has reported in the past that "the Iraqi Army does not have to assume the lead in a province before Coalition forces may begin to transfer control,"[73] it is clear that the capabilities and operational effectiveness of the ISF forces play a critical role in moving provinces toward PIC and the GOI toward Iraqi Security Self-Reliance.

The Coalition uses Transition Readiness Assessments (TRAs) to assess the capability of the ISF. For the Iraqi Police Service, the Coalition supplements the TRAs with Iraqi Police Station Field Reports (IPSFR) or Police Station Monthly Reports (PSMRs).[74] Transition Teams prepare the TRAs and other reports on the particular Iraqi military unit or police organization they advise. These reports "take into account a variety of criteria similar to but not identical to what the U.S. Army uses to evaluate its units' operational readiness focused on personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, and leadership."[75] The TRAs include an assessment of objective criteria, such as manning levels and equipment on hand. They also include a subjective evaluation, known as the commander's assessment, which provides "a narrative that takes into account leadership of the Iraqi unit, the unit's current operational experience, the unit's ability to execute intelligence based operations, and life support issues impacting the Iraqi unit."[76] The narrative gives an overall assessment of the unit, reports the number of months before the unit is expected to be able to assume the lead, and should "explain shortfalls, changes from the previous month and other significant issues."[77]

Operational readiness, as measured by TRAs, is an important tool that evaluates whether a unit is ready for combat. It does not, however, predict or evaluate combat effectiveness. Nor are TRAs the same as an "after action report," which U.S. units are required to complete to address the unit's performance in combat. MNC-I recognized that comparing a unit's actual operational experience with its transition readiness assessment rating sometimes identified a gap in the utility of the TRAs. For example, MNC-I updated the TRA implementing instructions to add an assessment category on "Operational Effectiveness and Reliability" because some units received high training proficiency ratings, but "turn[ed] in poor operational performances."[78] The TRAs report operational effectiveness by measuring the Iraqi unit's ability to plan, execute, and sustain operations, based on the unit's operational experience and the level of outside assistance it needs.[79] MNC-I recognizes that the reliability assessment in the TRA is "highly subjective" and includes an assessment of: "willingness to deploy and fight in another Area of Operation, militia influence, selective decisions on which missions they will conduct, and doing the bare minimum."[80] The TRA implementing instructions require that the commander's assessment highlight deficiencies in either operational effectiveness or reliability.[81]

> *"My nightmare – the thing that keeps me up at night – is a failure of the Iraqi security forces, somehow, catastrophically, mixed with a major Samarra-mosque-type catastrophe."*
>
> -- Major General Joseph F. Fil Jr.

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"The Government of Iraq has available assets… but it does not yet have the mechanisms to spend them."[1]

-- DOD 9010 Report, March 2007

FINANCE

The U.S. Investment

Since 2003, the United States has invested more than $19.0 billion in the development of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). This funding primarily has been drawn from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and the Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF):

Table 1: U.S. Appropriations for ISF.

Funding Source (by fiscal year)	Budget Authority (in billions)
2004 (IRRF)	$5.0
2005 (ISFF)	$5.7
2006 (ISFF)	$3.0
2007 (ISFF)	$5.5
TOTAL	**$19.2**

While this funding has been executed through Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) for a variety of purposes – including building infrastructure and training centers for the military and police, developing Iraqi logistical capability, and creating an Iraqi leadership structure within the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Ministry of Interior (MOI) – it has been primarily focused on recruiting, training, and equipping the ISF.[2] As the initial force generation mission has begun to wind down, however, spending has been reoriented toward improvement of logistics and sustainment capabilities, without which the ISF will be incapable of operating as an independent force.[3]

As of the end of March 2007, more than $13.4 billion of the funds appropriated to support the ISF had been obligated – that is, legally committed for approved requirements.[4] Almost $6.0 billion in funding remains unspent, though available amounts may be lower due to the lag time between when MNSTC-I decides to use funds for a specific requirement and when those funds are actually obligated against that requirement.[5]

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4: THE IRAQI POLICE SERVICE AND MINISTRY OF INTERIOR

"Although early on, the CPA and CJTF-7 decided to make the IPS the primary Iraqi internal security agency and began a process of handing over responsibility for urban security to the force, neither the CPA, CJTF-7, Washington, nor London ever gave the IPS the priority it deserved."[1]

-- RAND, Developing Iraq's Security Sector, the Coalition Provisional Authority's Experience (2005)

INTRODUCTION

The Iraqi Police Service (IPS) is the largest of the civil security forces that are under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and is considered "the foundation of the Ministry of Interior Security Forces."[2] The IPS, which is reported to include 135,000 personnel, consists of "patrol, traffic, station and highway police, as well as specialists, such as forensic specialists" who are "assigned throughout Iraq's 18 provinces."[3] The IPS "mission is to enforce the law, safeguard the public, and provide internal security at the local level."[4] They are the local "beat cops" who are intended to carry out a community policing function.[5] However, they are also currently being used for counterinsurgency and combat patrols.

> *"Few military units can match a good police unit in developing an accurate human intelligence picture of their area of operation. Because of their frequent contact with the populace, police are often the best force for countering small insurgent bands supported by the local populace."*
>
> --FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, 6-19

Administration reports to Congress reveal troubling issues that demand additional focus and oversight by the Coalition. Despite the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) declaration of 2006 as the "Year of the Police," the development of the IPS is not the priority it should be, particularly given the importance of police in counterinsurgency. Transferring responsibility for the IPS to the Government of Iraq (GOI) after a single year of focused effort on force generation appears to have been premature and ill-advised for the following reasons: (1) lack of personnel and equipment data,[7] (2) lack of visibility into the vetting process,[8] (3) inability to determine whether police personnel have received appropriate training,[9] (4) lack of familiarity with community policing in Iraqi society,[10] (5) immaturity of the MOI and the lack of capacity to support the IPS in the field,[11] (6) lack of maturity in the judicial and penal systems to support the police work,[12] (7) unclear chain of command between the MOI and the provincial

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Table 2: Ministry of Interior Organization Levels.[8]

COMPONENT	OPERATIONAL
NATIONAL POLICE	26,314
BORDER ENFORCEMENT	28,360
ERU	750
FORENSICS	4,000
DIGNITARY PROTECTION	500
TOTAL	**59,924**

National Police

The CPA recognized the need for a "high-end" paramilitary police force in early 2004.[9] However, the National Police (NP), originally called the Special Police Forces,[10] lack a "charter" in CPA orders that established other security organs. The National Police include special police commando brigades and public order brigades. The special police commando units were an Iraqi Minister of Interior initiative created without Coalition assistance.[11] Public Order units were to act, "… as a bridging force to restore and maintain law and order in cities where the police force [had] not yet been established or [would] be reconstituted due to insurgent activity."[12]

The MOI tasked these forces with "providing a national rapid-response capability to counter armed insurgency, large-scale civil disobedience, and riots.[13] Additionally, the MOI created a mobile capability in the 1st Special Police Mechanized brigade to provide route security along the highway between the International [Green] Zone and Baghdad International Airport.[14] By September 2005, the MOI Special Police Forces had grown to 12 public order battalions, 12 special police command battalions, 2 mechanized battalions, and an emergency response unit.[15] In August 2005, the Special Police Forces were renamed the National Police Forces.[16] The May 2006 DOD 9010 Report to Congress recounts how this transpired:

> The Minister of Interior signed an order to reorganize and merge the Police Commandos, the Public Order and Mechanized Police, and the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) to form a single force, the Iraqi National Police, on April 1, 2006. The National Police are organized with a National Police [Command] Headquarters, under which will fall the 1st and 2nd National Police Divisions, the 1st National Police Mechanized Brigade, and the ERU. These two divisions were formed from the Commando Division and the Public Order Division.[17]

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to light the current operational capability, unit readiness, or exact number of personnel still serving.

Table 3: Ministry of Defense Personnel Levels.[40]

COMPONENT	OPERATIONAL[41]
ARMY (including Support Forces)	150,777[42]
IRAQI SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES	1,673
AIR FORCE	1020
NAVY	1,148
TOTAL	**154,588**[43]

"The actual number of present-for-duty soldiers is about one-half to two-thirds of the total due to scheduled leave, absence without leave, and attrition."

-- DOD, *9010 Report* (March 2007)

One of the challenges the IAF faced was to move from a force focused on external threats, referred to as the "current" force concept, to a force that is focused on defeating an insurgency, or the "objective" force concept. The Department considers this transformation of the IA complete.[44]

MOD forces consist primarily of a 10-division army, and a small navy and air force. Pending the planned expansion of the IA, there are 36 brigade headquarters and 112 combat battalions, and two special operations battalions.

Prior to its dissolution in May 2003 by CPA Order 2,[45] the former MOD was populated by uniformed military personnel.[46] The CPA established the new MOD in March 2004, with 250 employees under which it reinforced the principle of civilian authority over the military.[47]

The IAF JHQ is the organization that will assume MNSTC-I's current role "when ready."[48] DOD reporting, however, describes the JHQ planning and coordination processes as "immature" and "currently hampered by bureaucracy, lack of trust and understanding, lack of experience with strategic planning, and dependence on Coalition support and funding."[49] MNSTC-I recognizes these deficiencies and has tasked the JHQ-Transition Team (TT) with helping the Iraqi headquarters address its shortcomings.[50] Additionally, MPRI, a defense sector company specializing in institutional capacity building, has provided advisors to the MOD in almost all of its directorates.[51]

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Table 4: Ministry of Defense Organization.[52]

Ministry of Defense Organization
Ministry of Defense
Iraqi Armed Forces Joint Headquarters
Iraqi Army (Iraqi Ground Forces Command)[53]
- Nine infantry divisions[54]
- One mechanized division
- Support Units (includes 9 Motor Transport Regiments and 3 Logistics battalions)
- Strategic Infrastructure Force (3 brigade headquarters commanding 17 battalions)
Special Operations Force[55]
- One brigade commanding a counter-terrorism battalion, a commando battalion, a support battalion, and a special reconnaissance unit
Air Force
- One Training Squadron
- Three Transport Squadrons
- Two Reconnaissance Squadrons
Navy
- One Patrol Boat Squadron
- One Assault Boat Squadron
- One Marine battalion
Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command
National Defense University

The Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) is the IA's operational headquarters. Established in May 2005, it currently provides command and control for eight of the 10 Iraqi Army divisions, its support establishment, and the Strategic Infrastructure Force.[56] According to the most recent DOS report to Congress, the 5th and 7th IA Divisions "remain under MNF-I operational control" and are "on track for transition to Iraqi control by the summer of 2007."[57] The units under the IGFC's command and control still require substantial Coalition logistics and sustainment.[58]

Iraqi Army

The IA consists of nine light infantry divisions and one mechanized division.[59] Each light infantry division has between three to five light infantry brigades. Within each brigade there are two to five light infantry battalions. The 9th Mechanized Infantry Division is outfitted with T-72 main battle tanks and BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. MNSTC-I made a decision to develop ground forces lacking fire support: heavy mortars, artillery, or aircraft capable of close air support. In fact, it considered this capability "counterproductive" to its efforts, stating that, "counter-insurgency warfare does not rely on artillery or jets."[60] Originally, the CPA had planned to withhold even tanks from the IA. In an interview with *The Financial Times* in June 2004, the Director of Defense Policy for CPA said, "Iraq will have a lightly-

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armed standing army and no heavy field artillery … if *tanks* and attack aircraft were needed, Iraq will have to rely on US-led forces."[61] It was at Interim Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's insistence that an armored (tank) capability was added,[62] making its debut during the January 2005 election.[63]

Some experts believe that the composition and the recruiting of the IA units will challenge the Army's ability to be a truly national force that can be deployed Iraq-wide.[64] In his prepared testimony before the subcommittee, Dr. Cordesman described the effects of recruiting methods on the ethnic composition of Army and National Guard units:

> While the nationally recruited divisions are more representative of Iraq's ethno-religious composition, the even-numbered divisions were originally formed as National Guard units, to be deployed in their respective local regions. These units continued to be more ethnically and religiously representative of their region, not of Iraq as a whole.[65]

In his Combat Institute Studies monograph on the order of battle of the IA, Colonel John McGrath gives details on each of the ten Iraqi divisions:[66]

Figure 5: Map of Iraqi Army Division Locations.

The 1st Division was originally formed from the battalions of the Iraqi Intervention Force (IIF). The 2nd Division's battalions are former ING units, and most are manned predominately

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> and independence than the Department of Defense has claimed in its reports and testimony to Congress. Far too many of such claims have been more cosmetic than real. Many units "in the lead" have demonstrated little or no real mission responsibility or capability, and were extremely dependent on MNF-I command, planning, and support. In practice, they could only act under the leadership of embedded advisors and/or in cooperation with partner units.[135]

It should be noted that units that are "in the lead" are not fully independent and still require substantial Coalition assistance with "enablers" such as fire support, logistics, and intelligence. Many also need U.S. force protection to operate.[136]

Additionally, an "in the lead" appraisal could equally apply to a seasoned combat veteran battalion or to a battalion in a quiet garrison environment. More meaningful readiness data requires unit-specific assessments in categories contained in TRAs, such as personnel, command and control, training, sustainment, logistics, equipment, and leadership. TRAs remain classified, and DOD reporting to Congress does not capture the trends embodied in the subjective, narrative portion of these assessments.[137] Neither the numbers of battalions "in the lead" nor the peacetime readiness indicators in the TRAs are necessarily valid measures of the operational effectiveness in fighting an insurgency. They do not take into account the ability of units to provide security for the civilian population in their areas of responsibility, or mission effectiveness.[138]

Only 32% of Iraqis "feel safe and secure outside [their] neighborhood."

-- DOD, *9010 Report* (June 2007).

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE CAPACITY[139]

As described in a previous chapter, the GOI has experienced severe budget execution problems.[140] According to the Department, "MOD suffers from a lack of strategic policy development and implementation, and an inefficient procurement and budgeting process. A culture of distrust coupled with incompetence in certain key areas has made committing and obligating funds very difficult."[141] MOD spent 76% of its calendar year (CY) 2006 budget for salaries by November 2006, but only 24% of its budget for goods and services, 1% of its budget for capital goods and projects, and only 32% of its overall budget of $3.4 billion.[142] Additionally, personnel management and logistics also continue to pose severe challenges to the MOD.[143]

The MOD must confront these challenges and other capacity issues if the IAF are to achieve and sustain independence and long-term success. In fact, building and sustaining institutional capability is MNSTC-I's "main effort" for 2007.[144] MNSTC-I has an embedded an MOD-TT of approximately 50 civilian advisors, primarily contractors, along with six U.S. military personnel, and 12 civilian advisors from other Coalition countries. A similar team operates at

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JHQ.[145] These teams provide "mentoring support" to senior MOD officials, "developing their capacity to manage key ministerial functions, such as personnel management, budgeting, logistics, intelligence and security, acquisitions and contracting, plans and policies, communications, and inspections and investigations."[146] Ultimately, MNSTC-I will have achieved its objective for MOD when the Ministry is "capable of directing, supporting, and sustaining their forces in support of the conduct of counter terrorist/counter insurgency operations, and when a 'Defense Management Process' capable of planning for the future development of the ISF is in place."[147] The MOD has a long way to go, as TRA reporting shows that the MOD is not regarded as "effective" in any category.[148]

Equipment and Logistics

When the Coalition began developing ISF in 2003, it decided that this effort would be dedicated almost exclusively to generating combat units.[149] The generation of combat support and combat service support units, as well as the logistics system, was intentionally postponed until most of the combat forces were trained and equipped and put into action. The Coalition planned to fill the gap in necessary logistics support until Iraqi logistics institutions, units, and infrastructure could be generated. Now that most of the MOD and MOI security forces have been trained and equipped, the generation of logistics capability has become a major focus.

The Department summarizes the present state of ISF logistics capabilities and the importance of the MOD and MOI forces becoming self-reliant in controlling and sustaining their logistics operations in the following statements:

> *"The most significant shortcoming in both MOD and MOI forces' capabilities is in planning and executing logistics and sustainment requirements."*[150]
>
> *"Failure to develop logistics capability could lead to a prolonged U.S. and Coalition presence and potentially unravel progress and investments made up to this point."*[151]

MOD Logistics Organization[152]

MNF-I is building a logistics organization within the MOD and capabilities within the IAF that are able to support counterinsurgency operations. The MOD Concept of Logistics Support, which is the guiding document for logistics, outlines the development of maintenance, transportation, supply, and health logistics capabilities.[153]

The MOD logistics organization consists of the following components from the ministerial level to the unit level:[154]

MOD Director General Acquisitions, Logistics and Infrastructure (DG, AL&I): Directs and funds the raising, training, equipping and development of the IAF. Manages and controls IAF acquisition, logistics, and infrastructure operations.

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training logisticians and mechanics.[164] The authorization level for MOD logistics organizations is 53,182 personnel and MNF-I reports that as of May 2007 42,043 personnel for these organizations have been trained.[165] However, the number of personnel in logistics units is less than 20,000, and many of these units are not active.[166] For example, the manning level of personnel at four out of five RSUs is less than 50%.[167] One source of this problem is Iraqi commanders diverting logistics personnel to combat roles after training.[168] For unknown reasons, there is also a retention problem; however, MOD is offering incentives to keep skilled technicians and mechanics.[169] MOD is also pursuing a change in current personnel regulations to allow skilled laborers to join the IAF as civilian workers.[170]

MNSTC-I is developing automated logistics and modern maintenance systems for the MOD that require reliable and clean electrical power, computer systems and networks, climate-controlled environments, and modern tools and diagnostic equipment. [171] None of these are readily available in Iraq. For example, electrical power supply is well below demand (as shown in Figure 6) and most locations in Iraq have electrical power for only a fraction of the day.[172]

Figure 6: Monthly Electricity Demand and Available Capacity.



The U.S. military logistics system is based on concepts of preventative maintenance, personal responsibility, and immediate attention to problems. Preventative maintenance is not part of the Iraqi culture, as they tend to wait to perform repairs or just forego repairs and cannibalize the equipment instead.[173] There is also a reported tendency to hide problems such as equipment breakage, for fear of being blamed.

SIGIR states that MNF-I officials informed MOD in 2006 that the Coalition would not provide any supplies or funds to sustain IA operations in 2007, except in emergency situations.[174] It is likely that this was an attempt by MNF-I to exert pressure on MOD to

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Figure 7, is an example of the increasing self-reliance.[188] Although almost all fuel for the IAF is now delivered by the MOD, the monthly allocation provided by the MOO is less than half of the requirement, and fuel supply remains one of the biggest supply problems.[189] The recently announced increase in the size of the MOD forces will exacerbate this fuel supply problem.[190]

Figure 7: Fuel Provided to Iraqi Security Forces by Coalition Forces.



Meeting Logistics Transfer Timelines

There have been numerous references to the transfer of most, if not all, logistical functions and responsibilities to the MOD by January 2008, including:

- Full transition of logistics capabilities such as Motorized Transportation Regiments (MTRs), RSUs, GSUs, TND, and the Support Command to the MOD are expected by January 2008.[191]
- Full transition of sustainment responsibilities such as Class I Life Support, Class II and IV uniforms and building supplies, Class III Fuel, Class V Ammunition, Class VII Vehicles, Class VIII Medical Supplies, Class IX Repair Parts, and Transportation to MOD by June 2007.[192]
- Transitioning control of IAF logistics units to MOD control is supposed to occur from May through December of 2007.[193]
- "The National Ammunition Depot at Taji is currently guarded and operated by a [245-man Coalition-funded] contract that is due to transition to Iraqi funding in May 2007."[194]
- Transfer of the National Maintenance Contract to MOD funding (via FMS) and control. The current contract expired March 31, 2007.[195]

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Table 6: Example of Police Station Level PTT Structure.[44]

Role	Key Responsibilities
Team Chief	MP squad or platoon leader (depending on number of stations). Mentors and assists Iraqi station commanders in working with community, government agency, and tribal leaders; teaches and coaches Iraqi police officers; enhances and improves readiness of police station operations; and facilitates logistics and equipment requests.
Deputy Team Chief	Assists team chief, oversees daily station operations, collects data for IPFSR; supervises investigations, community policing, patrol plans, and police training tactics; with IPLO advisor conducts training of station section chiefs.
Medic	Provides medical care to the PTT. Also performs health and welfare checks on prisoners. Trains Iraqi police on medical tasks.
Security (9)	MP squad members who train and coach Iraqi police patrol officers and provide force protection for the PTT.
Criminal Intelligence Specialist[45]	Mentors Iraqi police in investigative functions for major crimes.
Civilian Advisors (3-5)	IPLOs provide continuity for the PTTs; assist district, station, and shift commanders and police officers with training and management. IPLOs do not participate in combat missions. IPLOs also train and coach Iraqi police staff sections on personnel and logistics procedures.
Personnel/Logistics Advisors	
Linguist	Civilian interpreter (Iraqi or U.S. citizen).

FORCE REQUIREMENTS AND SELECTION

TT members are expected to possess the ability to assess, train, mentor, advise, liaise, and fight. This requires skills in collaboration, communication, cultural sensitivity, counterinsurgency, force protection, tactical specialties, and combat and team support (e.g., team interaction, getting supplies, etc.).[46] MNC-I is responsible for generating the requirements (RFFs) for TTs. Ideally, team members are selected on the basis of their military specialty, experience, military education, and recent assignments. Team chief selection is intended to be based on recent combat experience, as well as brigade- and division-level operations and staff assignments.[47] The Iraq Study Group recommended that "the most highly qualified U.S.

"We started this thing with not the B Team, but the D Team! I replaced non-promotable captains, reservists, and guardsmen with no operational experience. We had retirees out of the Army 5-10 years. One major was a Vietnam Vet, retired policeman .... He had been told he was [going to teach] classes .... Quality of manning is the most fundamental MiTT challenge facing us today. To ensure the success of this mission, we must have the best and brightest our military has to offer."[48]

-- Former MiTT Leader, April 2007

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officers and military personnel should be assigned to the embedded teams, and American teams should be present with Iraqi units down to the company level. The United States should establish suitable career-enhancing incentives for these officers and personnel."

Selection of Transition Teams

The sourcing of TTs has evolved since 2004. Originally "internal" teams were drawn largely from units already in Iraq.[49] When MNF-I instituted the current TT program in 2006, external teams were created by selecting individual augmentees from units across the Army, Air Force, and Navy, and then assembled and trained at Fort Riley, Kansas. The Marine Corps continues to use its "internal teams." Most TTs are drawn from the Army and Marine Corps.

> *"One Army officer who has served in Iraq and would be well qualified for an advisory role told me recently that he was asked to become an ROTC instructor at home but not an advisor in Iraq. Those he sees being sent to help Iraqis tend to have "marginal career prospects." "No one is diverted from a school or command," he told me. "No one is sent after a successful command." Another experienced Army officer with a Special Forces background – exactly the kind of advisor we should be sending – actually tried to volunteer. He recalls being told by a personnel officer: "Boy, I would hate to waste you with an assignment like that. With your background and file quality, there are so many other billets I could assign you to."*[52]
>
> -- Max Boot, *Los Angeles Times*

Initially, the Army's personnel selection process for the advisory mission was not well planned or executed. Army interviews with senior officers from the 98th and 80th Training Divisions, who were involved in the initial deployments, confirm that the selection was ad hoc and resulted in sending trainers who generally had not previously deployed and had little or no combat experience.[50] In short, those initially selected by the Army were not the best qualified.[51]

The Army reports that it is addressing this problem. Trainers at Fort Riley believe they are now getting highly qualified senior officers and NCOs for the teams. A greater number have combat experience.[53] These officers and NCOs bring a wide range of combat and combat support specialties to the teams including operations, intelligence, logistics, communications, engineering, fire support, and medical and garrison operations.

> *"In a perfect world where talent was abundant and HRC could do more than fill potholes, I'd say a selection process with an interview would be in order."*[67]
>
> -- Former TT Chief

The Army's Human Resources Command (HRC) assumed responsibility for sourcing Army teams in March 2006.[54] IAG sets TT requirements (RFFs) for the Army which are validated by Army Headquarters and Forces Command Operations. HRC fills the requirements by selecting the "best **available** qualified" individual (*emphasis added*). HRC reports that it prioritizes an individual's skill, experience, occupational specialty, and time since last deployment.[55] Other evidence suggests, however, that Army TT selections are frequently based on availability. Thus individuals with limited advisory aptitude, or no background in logistics, intelligence, and communications, can be assigned to these functions.[56]

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In addition to specific skills, leadership is crucial to a TT's success. An Army study reported that the greatest personnel challenge for the TTs has been the selection of the right chief and deputy.[58] TT leaders have to be able to function in an environment where there are overlapping lines of authority. It takes a special type of leader to handle this responsibility, and conventional units do not foster this skill. Because advisory teams are usually far from higher command, the leader must be able to resolve challenges quickly and equitably. They must be comfortable with uncertainty. Conventional leaders are uncomfortable with things they cannot control, so they seek to control everything within their operational area. Unconventional leaders, on the other hand, thrive on uncertainty. Unconventional units, like Special Operations Forces (SOF), use individual talent to offset any negative effects from that uncertainty. MiTT commanders need SOF-like skills, as do their NCO deputies.[59]

> *"Not every good commander or staff officer is going to make a good advisor; we breed A-type take-charge personalities because its what we require to conventionally succeed; an Advisor has to be able to go into a lower gear and take a long term look .... As an advisor, it's not your success you should be worried about, it's not about you .... the really good work is the type where the ISF partner unit takes charge and develops the initiative to make their own decisions based on their goals and needs."*[61]
>
> -- Former TT Chief

Fielding this kind of leader requires appropriate incentives. While professionally rewarding, TT service is not currently viewed as career enhancing. General Petraeus, in addressing a recent Army symposium on security assistance, said advisors must be professionally rewarded, and that the Army's effort to select qualified advisors is improving. In addition to the role now played by the HRC, efforts are under way to ensure that the pool from which individuals are drawn is more selective.[60]

The advisor role demands skills that emphasize influencing, coaching, and mentoring.[62] JCISFA found that an individual's ability to influence, and therefore to achieve results indirectly, is best done by demonstrating value and credibility to the indigenous force. Advisors must also have a temperament that builds and keeps rapport by communicating understanding, respect, and trust.[63] These skills, critical to being an advisor, are not those that the Army typically emphasizes in its TT leader selection. HRC's process focuses on skills associated with command and tactical operations, not advising foreign militaries or working and fighting in

> *"What you had was a lot of people over there alone and unafraid, making things happen or failing to make things happen based on their own personalities and initiative. Basically it was whatever the Army could throw at it. You had a number of individuals who did great work over there, who volunteered to go over and who extended over there. They were able to adapt to the environment and found it challenging based on their own personality. You also had other individuals over there, though, who were frustrated and bitter and who simply couldn't adapt to the situation. It was a function of temperament and personality, which is something we as an Army don't really measure and track."*[63]
>
> -- Colonel Sean Ryan, USA, Deputy Director
> Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

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Report Status (Number of Errors)		Police Station Monthly Report (PSMR) (Version 0606.A)		Date:	Click Here
FFID:	NOFFID	Station / Facility Name:	0	Station / Facility Type:	0
Province:	0	Police District:	0	City:	0
Mil Grid Ref:	0	Facility Co-Located With:	0	Next Higher HQ:	0
Station Commander:		Rank:		Station / Facility Status:	0
PTT Team Leader:		Phone:		Phone:	

RESOURCES

Personnel & Training	Required	Coalition Supported	On Hand	Trained
M13 / M60: Total Personnel		0		0
M60: # TIP Trained Personnel				
M60: # Basic Academy Trained Personnel				
M16 / M63: Executives		0		
M15 / M62: Mid-Level Managers		0		
M14 / M61: First-Line Supervisors		0		
M64: Special Skills Trained Personnel				

Leadership	GO	NO GO
M45 (10): Station Chief		10
M46 (10): Station Staff		10

Casualties	KIA	WIA
M17: Station-Employed IPS (KIA-WIA This Calendar Year)		
M17: Station-Employed Civilians (KIA-WIA This Calendar Year)		

Type of Report (PSMR or Inventory): (Use Drop Down Options) — Click Here

Equipment	Required	Coalition Supported	On Hand	FMC
M89: Vehicles		0		
M90: Patrol Boats		0		
M91: Motorcycles		0		
M101: Pistols		0		
M102: Rifles		0		
M103: PKC/PKM Light machine Guns		0		
M104: Pistol Ammunition (9 MM)		0		
M105: Rifle Ammunition (7.62 X 39)		0		
M106: Light Machine Gun Ammunition (7.62 X 54)		0		
M95: Ballistic Vests		0		
M96: SAPI Plates (Pairs)		0		
M98: Winter Coats		0		
M97: Uniforms & Accessories		0		
M99: Iraqi Police ID (Badges)		0		
M100: Temporary Police ID / Weapons Card		0		
M88: Generators		0		

AFRN Radio Equipment	Coalition Supported	On Hand	FMC
M117: Base Station Radios	0		
M119: Vehicle Radios	0		
M120: Hand Held Radios	0		

UHF Radio Equipment	Coalition Supported	On Hand	FMC
M117: Base Station Radios	0		
M119: Vehicle Radios	0		
M120: Hand Held Radios	0		
M118: UHF Radio Repeater	0		

HF Radio Equipment	Coalition Supported	On Hand	FMC
M117: Base Station Radios	0		
M119: Vehicle Radios	0		

Info Technology Equipment	Coalition Supported	On Hand	FMC
M108: Computers (With Monitor)	0		
M109: UPS	0		
M110: Printers	0		
M125: Cell Phones	0		

Facilities

Force Protection	GO	NO-GO	N/A
M126 (5): Entry Control Points			
M127 (6): Perimeter Defense			
M128 (5): Barriers / Blast Protection			
M129 (3): Response Team Armory			

Communications	GO	NO-GO	N/A
M116 (5): Landline			

Utilities	GO	NO-GO	N/A
M130 (3): Facility Connected to Public Electric Grid			
M131 (4): Back-up Electrical Power (Generator)			
M132 (3): Facility Connected to Public Water Sys			
M133 (3): Facility Connected to Public Sewer Sys			

Facility Armory	GO	NO-GO	N/A
M130(4): Armory			

Habitability	GO	NO-GO	N/A
M134 (6): Facility Heating, Ventilation & AC			
M135 (6): Facility Sanitation			
M136 (6): Facility Condition			
M137 (2): Furniture / Furnishings			

Comments (Facilities & Force Protection):

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SYSTEMS							
Budget	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M19 (6): Budget				M20 (8): Headquarters Budget & Budget Oversight			
Intelligence	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M26 (5): HQs Performs Intelligence Collection Management & Dissemination				M27 (8): HQ Performs Criminal Analysis to Support Police Operations			
Investigations	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M29 (10): Police Possess Basic (Tactical) Investigative Questioning Skills				M34 (3): Exploit Available Data Sources and Develop Leads			
M30 (8): Recruit and Manage Confidential Informants				M35 (8): Conduct and Manage Criminal Investigations			
M31 (10): Police Possess Ability to Write Basic Reports				M36 (6): Assemble and Manage a Case File			
M32 (11): Collect and Document Evidence at a Crime Scene				M37 (5): Maintain Information System			
M33 (6): Maintain the Chain-of-Custody of Evidence				M38 (4): Coordinate Investigations Between Stations, Districts, and Provinces			
Command & Control	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M39 (6): Roll Call Formation at Shift Change (Orders, Briefing, Inspection, Accountability)				M42 (3): Use crime tracking and analysis information in planning operations			
M40 (4): Perform synchronized tracking - maintain operational picture				M43 (6): Reporting Procedures			
M41 (6): Operations / Dispatch Center - Assess the Service Call system				M44 (8): NCC, NJOC, PJCC, & JCC operating in a synchronized system			

SYSTEMS							
Station Training	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M65 (6): Apprenticeship / Sponsorship Process				M69 (10): Collective Training - Joint Exercises with Coalition Forces			
M66 (8): Sustainment Training				M70 (13): Process for Tracking Training			
M67 (7): Rule of Law - Justice Integration (PETL) Training				M71 (3): HHQ's process for tracking subordinate training programs			
M68 (9): Collective Training - Joint Exercises with Iraqi Army							
Comments (Training):							
Force Protection	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M72 (11): Collective Training - Force Protection Exercises				M77 (9): Station Defense - Quick Reaction Force (QRF) - Drills			
M73 (1): Force Protection Checklist / SOP / TTPs / Battle Drills (written or unwritten)				M78 (11): HQ designates and synchronizes subordinates' QRF deployments			
M74 (12): Station Defense - IP Ground Force Drills				M79 (3): PHQ HQ inspects / checks subordinate element QRFs			
M75 (7): Station Defense - IP Station Response Team (RT) Drills				M80 (9): Station Defense - ERF - if constituted - Exercises			
M76 (3): Response Team / Guard Force Command and Control				M81 (3): DHQ or PHQ HQ has procedures for use of the ERF (if constituted)			
Logistics & Maintenance	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M82 (5): Equipment Accountability - Receipt Procedures				M85 (2): Maintain Equipment Readiness Status			
M83 (2): HHQ Command Supply Discipline Program - of Subordinates				M86 (2): Maintenance / Readiness Knowledge Used in Ops Planning			
M84 (4): Maintain a Maintenance Tracking System				M87 (2): Supervise Subordinate HQ / Stations Maintenance Programs			
Comments (Logistics):							
Communications	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M114 (6): Voice Communications Network Plan				M115 (5): Voice Communications Maintenance Management			
Computers	GO	NO-GO	N/A				
M107 (11): Computer & Automation Systems							
Operations	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M47 (5): Respond to a Complaint?				M50 (3): Apprehend the Suspect?			
M48 (3): Identify if a crime has occurred (dispute or crime?)?				M51 (7): Collect & Prepare Evidence (documentary, testimonial, forensic) for Trial?			
M49 (1): Identify the suspect?				M52 (4): HQ - Ensure Subord. Performing Adeq. Shift Chg Opers & Police Proc			
Comments (Operations):							
Information Operations	GO	NO-GO	N/A				
M57 (7): Operations - Information Operations (IO) Other than Public Affairs							
Personnel / Finance	GO	NO-GO	N/A		GO	NO-GO	N/A
M1 (6): Accurate Personnel Accountability?				M10 (4): HHQ Verifies Accuracy of Subordinate Station Payrolls?			
M2 (11): Accurate payroll?				M11 (4): Are all Local, DHQ & PHQ Personnel Properly Trained?			
M5 (3): Disciplinary Action Program For Station Personnel?				M12 (6): PHQ Ability to Recruit, Coordinate Training, & Predict Placement?			
M6 (5): Personnel Records Maintenance?				M3: Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period)?			
M7 (2): Are Station Personnel Properly Trained, Training Arranged?				M3: Assigned Personnel (On Hand This Pay Period) - Received Pay?			
M8 (3): Staffing Adequate to Manage the Personnel & Finance Departments?				M4: Total Personnel Receiving Pay (includes personnel not assigned)?			
M9 (9): HHQ Verifies Subordinate Personnel Accountability?							
Comments (Personnel):							

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Detention Operations	GO	NO-GO	N/A		Qty
M53 (8): Detention Opns - Health, Welfare, and Medical Care				M56: What is the Stations Detention Facility Capacity?	
M54 (7): Detention Opns - Legal / Human Rights				M56: How Many Detainees Are Being Held - On Average?	
M55 (9): Detention Opns Tracking System					
Public Affairs	GO	NO-GO	N/A		
M18 (6): Community Engagement Plan					
Internal Affairs	GO	NO-GO	N/A		Qty
M21 (12): Investigate IA Complaints from the Community				M23: Number of **Sustained** Community Complaints Directed at the Station (CY)	
M22 (5): Supervise Subordinate Station IA Complaints from the Community				M23: Total Number of Community Complaints Directed at the Station (CY)	

Comment Block - Types of IA Complaint Categories:

SYSTEMS

Medical - Station Capabilities	Qty		Qty
M24: Size of the Medical Space (Infirmary, Dispensary, Etc.) in square feet?		M24: How Many Physician Assistants or Nurses are Assigned?	
M24: How Many Beds are in the Medical Space?		M24: How many Doctors Are Assigned to the Station?	
M24: How Many Station Employees Were Treated Within The Last Month?		M24: How many Station IPs are Combat Life Savers (Current Validation)?	
		M24: How Many Functional / Complete CLS Bags are Present at Station?	

Comments:

Medical - Local Capabilities (Outside the Station)	Qty		Qty
M25: What is the Distance (In Km) to the Nearest Local Clinic?		M25: How Many Clinics or Hospitals are closer that refuse to treat IPs?	
M25: What is the Distance (In Km) to the Nearest Local Hospital That Treats IPs?			

Comments:

EFFECTS

Neighborhood Law Enforcement Operations	Qty	N/A	Insurgency & Crime	Qty
			M59: Number of Station Attacks (Station or Station Personnel) this Calendar Year	
M58: Number of escorted (With CF) IP Patrols Conducted During The past Month?			M59: Number of AOR (Not Station) Attacks on General Population this Calendar Year	
M58: Number of Unescorted IP (w/o CF) Patrols Conducted During The Past Month?			M59: Civilians in AOR (Not Employed by IPS) KIA this Calendar Year	
M58: Average Number of Escorted (With CF) Patrols Conducted During Any Given Night Shift?			M59: Civilians in AOR (Not Employed by IPS) WIA this Calendar Year	
M58: Average Number of Unescorted (w/o CF) Patrols Conducted During Any Given Night Shift?			M59: Number of Militia Organizations Currently Active in the Station AOR	

List names of Active Militia Organizations:

Comments (Effects):

Station Area of Responsibility Demographics	Qty		Qty
M28: Population Within the Stations Jurisdiction?		M28: Estimated Unemployment Rate Within the Stations Jurisdiction?	
M28: Provide the % Estimated Breakout of Ethno religion Demographics Within Stations Jurisdiction Below:		M28: Average Annual Income (Iraqi Dinars) Within Stations Jurisdiction?	

Arab-Sunni	Arab-Shia	Kurd-Sunni	Kurd-Shia	Turkoman	Christian	Other (1)	Other (2)

PTT TL's Subjective Assessment of Station Overall TRA Level (M139)	Not Rated	Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level 1	
		Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level 2	
		Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions To Level 3	

M140: PTT Team Leader's Justification of Subjective Assessment:

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Station Transition Readiness Assessment

تقييم الحالة الإستعدادية لمركز الشرطة

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Resources المصادر		Systems البرنامج		Effects المؤثرات	
Resources Assessme تقييم المصادر	63%	Systems Assessment تقييم البرامج	72%	Effects Assessment تقييم التأثير العام	NA
Personnel الأفراد	70%	Personnel الأفراد	75%	Population Support دعم السكان للشرطة	NA
Leadership القادة	0%	Public Affairs الشؤون العامة	70%	Insurgency / Crime - Independent Opns المتمردون -الجريمة -و رأي الأشخاص	0%
Training التدريب	70%	Budget الميزانية	70%	Insurgency / Crime - Adversary Activity المتمردون -الجريمة -وتأثيرها العام	V High
Equipment التجهيزات	67%	Internal Affairs الشؤون الداخلية	70%	**Overall Assessment التقييم النهائي**	
Vehicles السيارات	100%	Medical العناية الطبية	NA	**Objective Metrics Assessment التقييم الحسابي المطلوب**	4
Uniforms / Protective Equipment الزي الرسمي -وسائل الحماية	70%	Intelligence الإستخبارات	70%		
ID Cards/Badges الهويات	0%	Investigations التحريات	70%	**PTT Team Leader's Subjective Assessment تقييم رئيس الفريق للمطلوب**	
Weapons & Ammunition السلاح -العتاد	70%	Command & Control القيادة و السيطرة	70%		
Information Technology تكنولوجيا المعلومات	70%	Operations العمليات	70%	PTT Team Leader's Comments - see the TRA Comments Sheet (page two of the TRA) ملاحظات قائد الفريق -انظر إلى ورقة الملاحظات من تقييم الحالة الإستعدادية لمركز الشرطة صفحة رقم 2	
Communications - الاتصالات	70%	Detention Operations عمليات الحجز	78%		
Facilities البنايات	70%	Information Operations العمليات المعلوماتية	NA		
Force Protection قوة الحماية	70%	Station Training التدريب بالمركز	70%		
Utilities (المرافقات الخدمية)مثل المعسكرات	70%	Force Protection قوة الحماية	70%		
Habitability أماكن الإستراحة	70%	Logistics & Maintenance الميرة والصيانة	70%		
Communications - الاتصالات	70%	Computers الحاسبات	70%		
Armory المشجب	70%	Communications الإتصالات	80%		

Projected # of Months Until Station Transitions to:	
Level 1 (≥85%) Capable جاهز (≥85%) المستوى الاول	0
Level 2 (≥70%) Capable w/ Support جاهزة مع الدعم (≥70%) المستوى الثاني	0
Level 3 (≥50%) Partially Capable جاهزة جزئيا (≥50%) المستوى الثالث	0
Level 4 (<50%) Incapable/Forming تكوين ضعيف (<50%) المستوى الرابع	

APPENDIX 6: TRANSITION TEAM SURVEY FORM

TT Interviews

Notes Database

1	**General Information**	
1.1	Interview Type	
1.2	Contact Name	
1.3	Rank	
1.4	Military Occupational Specialty	
1.5	Role on TT Team	
1.6	Dates of In-Country Service	
1.7	Location in Iraq	
1.8	Iraqi Partner Unit	
1.9	Contact Info	
1.10	Date of Interview	
1.11	PSM Contact	
1.12	Recommended by	
	Question	
2	**Key Takeaways and Key Quotes**	
2.1	Key Takeaways from Interview	
3	**Mission & Operations**	
3.1	What was your MiTTs/PTTs mission while deployed? Was this mission different than the mission the team organized and equipped for?	
3.2	What were the major operations and/or typical activities the unit conducted.	
3.3	Were you given the necessary authority and assets to conduct your mission, or did you feel that echelons above your unit maintained too much control?	
3.4	Were the roles of the Iraqi unit commander and MiTT Commander clearly defined and did the relationship work as intended; were conflicts effectively managed?	
3.5	What was the capability and effectiveness of command and control at the battalion and below levels versus the brigade and above levels?	
3.6	Were Rules of Engagement clearly defined and how did they affect your ability to perform your mission?	
3.7	What was the capability, effectiveness, and availability of intelligence at the battalion and below levels versus the brigade and above levels?	
3.8	To what extent did you believe that your requirements for Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) were met?	
3.9	Did you get timely information from the use of ISR assets such that it enhanced your unit's ability to conduct operations?	
3.10	Which ISR assets (HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, satellite, airborne, ground based) were most responsive and useful (timely and accurate)?	
3.11	Did you request and receive ISR support as needed - all the time, some of the time, none of the time?	
3.12	What surveillance assets do you wish you had more of or more support time from? What did not work effectively? Why?	
3.13	In conducting operations in the urban environment, how well were you able to remain in contact with other ground forces? If communication was a challenge, what equipment is needed to resolve this issue? Where were the major interoperability problems?	
3.14	Once in theater who was responsible for the operational control of the transition team and assessing it's performance?	

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4	**Internal vs. External Sourcing of Transition Teams**
4.1	Generally based on your experience what proportion of the transition teams in Iraq at the time of your service had been externally versus internally sourced?
4.2	How does the training of the transition teams differ from the training of combat and combat support forces going to Iraq and what if any differences are there between the training of internally and externally sourced teams?
4.3	What are the advantages and disadvantages of internal versus external transition teams?

5	**Role & Functioning**
5.1	MiTTs are assigned to Iraqi Army Battalions, Brigades and Divisions, should they be assigned to company level units?
5.2	MiTTs typically follow a standard staffing pattern e.g. 10-12 in number, with each member trained for a distinct role; does this pattern work in actual operations?
5.3	To what extent are MiTTs actual role advisory/training vs. being a liaison to Coalition Forces?
5.4	Is the number of members on a team sufficient to perform both the advisory and training role?
5.5	Are the members of MiTTs performing roles they were trained and slotted for or are they wearing many hats-with what impact?
5.6	Are there a sufficient number of Arabic interpreters available to the MiTTs if not what has been the impact, and are remedies are anticipated of underway?
5.7	To what extent is the MiTTs operational model based on the Special Forces advisory teams' model?
5.8	MiTTs train and deploy together to a particular Iraqi unit and stay for a tour of one year and rotate out, is this an effective model or should portions of teams rotate in and out so that experience and know how are passed along to newcomers?
5.9	How have the original concept and plan for embedding advisors/trainers with Iraqi units worked; what has had to change and what further changes are anticipated or needed?
5.10	How and when is the effectiveness of the team measured before and during its deployment to Iraq?
5.11	To what extent have the MiTTs actually been able to train ISF in the midst of combat operations?
5.12	Did any legal issues relative to the Geneva Conventions, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Iraqi and U.S. domestic law arise during your tour on the MiTT/PTT, if so could your describe?

6	**Selection & Training**
6.1	There were reports that military personnel initially sent to train the ISF had little to no experience in training, combat, or operations in Iraq - is that the case and has it changed?
6.2	Did you find that our most highly qualified personnel being assigned to these teams?
6.3	Are career-enhancing incentives in place to reward service in Transition Teams as recommended by the Iraq Study Group? If so, what are they?
6.4	What are the selection criteria for MiTT members and how has it changed since the inception of the program?
6.5	To what extent is the training curriculum for embedded trainers and their partner units based on training & methods successfully used by the Special Forces in the past?
6.6	How effective was the cultural awareness and language training and are recent changes sufficient to meet needs identified in the field?
6.7	How well did the training prepare the MiTTs to use technology available to them?
6.8	What improvements can be made to the training?
6.9	What is the current situation in terms of recruiting advisor/trainers and being able to select individuals who are suitable for the advisor/trainer role?
6.10	What is the basis for criteria used in recruiting and selection of advisors/trainers and how has the criteria been validated?
6.11	How is the training for teams assigned to Iraqi Police units different or similar to training for MiTTs?

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7	**Performance, Effectiveness, and Availability of Equipment**
7.1	What piece of equipment that you used regularly to perform missions caused you the greatest concern that a failure of that equipment would lead to mission failure. Provide examples if possible?
7.2	Is technology and equipment such as hardened vehicles, communications and navigational systems available and easy to use by MiTTs and was it effectively utilized?
7.3	For the vehicles you commonly traveled in how well did they support your mission?
7.4	Were the vehicles outfitted with adequate, armor, blue force tracking and communication suites?
7.5	Did you have any specific problems or concerns with primary small arms such as M4s, M16s, M249s, and M240s? Please describe.
7.6	How was the adequacy of ammunition supply? Small caliber ammunition, grenades, etc.?
7.7	For Night vision equipment was the supply and distribution adequate and how did these assets perform? Any durability or reliability concerns?
7.8	For radios was the supply and distribution of radios adequate?
7.9	For other personal equipment what pieces of your personal gear did you buy yourself?

8	**Contractor Role and Oversight**
8.1	Did your MiTT/PTT have contractor support and what type of support was provided and if so was it effective?
8.2	How are civilians or contractors used in DOD training of the ISF, how do they work in conjunction with the MiTTs?
8.3	Are foreign contractors or citizens utilized by DOD for training the ISF in conjunction with MiTTs - if so what types of controls are in place in using these types of contractors?
8.4	What types of contracting mechanisms are used?
8.5	Who is typically the contracting officer's representative and how do they do the technical oversight of the contract?
8.6	What protections and benefits do civilians & contractors have relative to possible casualties in doing this mission, what are the implications for MiTT's?
8.7	What the legal issues relative to the Geneva Conventions, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and Iraqi and U.S. domestic law have seen as a result of using contractors with MiTTs?

9	**Conclusion**
9.1	Do you have any additional suggestions that you would like to share?
9.2	May I follow up with you if we have any additional questions?

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