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Agency Stovepipes vs Strategic Agility:

Lessons We Need to Learn from Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES • COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations

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41-409

A soldier with the 10th Mountain Division Tactical PSYOPS Team speaks with a group of Afghan children in Afghanistan, January 2007. *(Air Force Photo/Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez)*

It was one of the best experiences of my military career.

PRT Civil Affairs Officer
Panjshir Province, Afghanistan
2006-2007

This is the best job in the Foreign Service, and I feel that we are contributing to this part of Iraq being able to function when CF [coalition forces] leave.

PRT Team Leader
Al Anbar Province, Iraq
2007-2008

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have two Army civil affairs teams with four soldiers each. The U.S. model also typically includes a military police unit, a psychological operations unit, an explosive ordinance/demining unit, an intelligence team, medics, a force protection unit, and administrative and support personnel.[3] An Afghan representing the Ministry of Interior may also be part of the team.[4] These PRTs should include a single representative each from the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). However, a June 2006 interagency assessment of PRTs reported that not all PRTs had a full civilian complement, and the subcommittee found this still to be the case.[5] U.S.-led PRTs are usually co-located on a military base with combat maneuver units operating in the same area or battlespace.

In Iraq, there are two types of U.S.-led PRTs: 11 PRTs in a program originally inaugurated by Secretary of State Rice in November 2005,[6] and 13 additional PRTs that were subsequently formed as part of the President's "New Way Forward" in 2007. These latter 13 are called "embedded" PRTs (e-PRTs) because, unlike the original Iraq PRTs, they are embedded in BCTs or RCTs. In addition to PRTs, other kinds of units do similar work, including Provincial Security Teams and Regional Reconstruction Teams. Coalition members Britain, Italy, and the Republic of Korea each lead a PRT.

Picture taken after a ribbon-cutting of a micro-hydro electric plant built in the Qarghayi District of Laghman Province, Afghanistan, June 2006. *(Air Force Photo/Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez)*

In contrast to the Afghanistan PRTs, Department of State personnel lead the Iraq PRTs. Civilians (including many contractors) staff the original PRTs. As in Afghanistan, each PRT is different. Security for the original PRTs is provided by either a contracted Personnel Security Detail or a Military Movement Team provided by a nearby unit. The original PRTs may have as many as 100 team members. They can include personnel from DOS, USAID, USDA, the Department of Justice, Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), the Gulf Region Division of the Army Corps of Engineers, USAID contractors (Research Triangle International), and locally employed Iraqi staff.[7] These PRTs are located on forward operating bases (FOBs).

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[3] Robert Perito, *The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified*, Special Report 152, United States Institute of Peace, October 2005, p. 5.

[4] *Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An Interagency Assessment*, Department of State, Department of Defense, and U.S. Agency for International Development, June 2006, p. 8.

[5] Ibid.

[6] The United States leads 8 of the original 11 PRTs. See, *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program Expansion in Iraq*, SIGIR-07-014, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, July 25, 2007, p. 1.

[7] "Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability Within Iraq's Provincial Governments," Department of State Cable 4045. See also *Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq*, SIGIR-06-034, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, October 29, 2006, p. 1.

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increased to 15. As of March 2008, the Department of Defense reported that the number of e-PRTs decreased to 13, which may be due to the redeployment of the brigade combat teams within which they were embedded. During that same timeframe, the number of PRTs increased from 10 to 11.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams exemplify the type of interagency stability operations units deemed by the Administration to be essential to reconstruction and counterinsurgency. General Petraeus specifically included e-PRTs in his 10-point counterinsurgency guidance and recognized that to fully use military and civilian capabilities, the e-PRT civilians needed to be integrated in all aspects of MNF-I operations "from inception through execution."[15] However, PRTs and e-PRTs are not subject to a unified or comprehensive plan for stability, security, transition, and reconstruction in either Iraq or Afghanistan. The December 7, 2005 National Security Presidential Directive-44 (NSPD-44) established the interagency policy framework for preparing, planning for, and conducting stabilization and reconstruction activities. It directs the Department of State to lead these USG efforts in close enough coordination with the Department of Defense "to ensure harmonization with any planned or ongoing U.S. military operations across the spectrum of conflict." The Secretary of Defense issued guidance that the Department should prioritize stabilization and reconstruction activities at a level comparable to combat operations in the form of DOD Directive 3000.05, published in November 2005. However, earlier this year, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England directed the revision of DODD 3000.05. Reportedly, the new directive will incorporate stability operations into the *Irregular Warfare Roadmap*.[16]

Spc. Ashley N. Stermole, a medic with the Gardez PRT, diagnoses children during a MEDCAP mission at the Gardez Orphanage. *(Army photo/Sgt. Chuck D. Meseke)*

[15] David Petraeus, "Multi-National Force – Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance," http://www.forceaerienne.forces.gc.ca/cfawc/Contemporary_Studies/2007/2007-Jun/2007-06-06_MNF-I_COIN_Guidance-Summer_2007_v7_f.asp. Accessed August 29, 2007.

[16] "England Commissions Wide-Ranging Irregular Warfare Directive," *InsideDefense.com*, February 8, 2008.

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available for PRTs in Afghanistan. However, in fiscal year 2007, CERP obligations in Iraq increased to $879.9 million while decreasing to $206.0 million in Afghanistan. The rationale for this trend is unclear, but it could reflect the growing use of CERP funding in support of wider counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

Other actors (BCTs, RCTs, and agencies represented at the Embassy) have funds to apply to programs similar to those the PRTs typically fund, including humanitarian aid, governance, rule of law, and development projects. The chart below, provided to the subcommittee staff at a DOD, DOS, and USAID joint briefing, highlights the complexity facing PRTs as far as funding is concerned, and highlights why national-level coordination is needed. PRTs have the greatest access to funding where the circles overlap as between the Local Governance Program and the Provincial Reconstruction Development Council funds. They have some, but not direct, access to funds where the circles touch. They do not have access to the funds where the circles do not touch or overlap. The briefers indicated that this chart, identifying all of the various U.S. Government funding sources that have an impact at the provincial level, had to be specially created for the briefing. The briefers told staff the chart had taken a fair amount of time and consideration to construct because the funds are not controlled or coordinated centrally; rather, different agencies control the different funds.[24]

USG Funding Sources with Provincial Impact

- **Program funds are controlled by various agencies**
- **Economic Support Fund (ESF) is the primary program funding source for PRTs**
- **PRTs serve as a coordination tool to ensure alignment of strategy, minimize duplication, and maximize synergy**



[24] Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, Department of State, and Agency for International Development briefings for House Armed Services Committee and House Committee on Foreign Affairs staff, January 10-11, 2008. Dollar amounts have been deleted.

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As of August 2007, the United States was spending approximately $20.0 million per year per PRT in Afghanistan. The subcommittee could not find this type of data for Iraq. The lack of clear cost data, measurable objectives, and a specific PRT strategy limited the subcommittee's goal of assessing the value of U.S. resources invested in PRTs. The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended increased congressional oversight of funds used by PRTs, and the subcommittee has requested that GAO produce a study of PRT cost data.[25]

Mike Stevens, Baghdad-7 e-PRT agricultural advisor, shakes hands with Sayifiyah, Iraq, landowners as he distributes seeds after their third farmers union meeting Feb. 28, 2008, at Patrol Base Whitehouse. *(Army Photo/ Sgt. Kevin Stabinsky)*

[25] GAO-07-801, *Securing, Stabilizing, and Reconstructing Afghanistan: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight*, The United States Government Accountability Office, May 2007, p. 22.

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Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State adopted an "ends, ways, and means" approach to determine and measure PRTs' progress and their alignment with operational and strategic goals. Nor have they adopted a performance monitoring system to provide an assessment tool that can measure the PRTs' effectiveness and performance and their progress in meeting milestones for clearly defined objectives.

There are no standard metrics by which PRTs are judged. Metrics that have been used have not been effective in measuring mission accomplishment or support to a national or theater strategy. Some data has been gathered on the location, staffing, resources, and other specifics about PRTs, but there is no comprehensive collection of this type of data for all PRTs. In addition, some outputs have been measured, such as the amount of funds spent or number of schools built, but this output data does not give planners and strategists a true sense of PRT impact. We understand that effects are not easily measured and that assessments of PRTs will be more subjective than quantitative. Still, decision makers must be able to judge the relative merit of actions taken. They must be able to judge effectiveness against a strategy in order to adapt plans to changing conditions on the ground. Interagency leaders and those who direct the PRT effort must engage in the *art* of measuring, even if one can argue that such a *science* does not exist. Instead, the departments and agencies are left with a variety of unofficial, anecdotal measures—from the ability of local and provincial governments to obtain and obligate funds, to the number of projects completed in an area, to levels of violence, to whether or not local nationals wave at U.S. personnel when they drive through a neighborhood.

The subcommittee disagrees with those who suggest that the only metric for success of the PRTs is when they are no longer needed, and we welcome recent efforts to assess how well or poorly these units are meeting goals and objectives that support national and theater strategies. Although it appears that little was done related to Baghdad Embassy Cable 4045 direction to design and collect PRT metrics from 2006 until late 2007, Phyllis Powers, the new Director of the Office of Provincial Affairs in Iraq, has recently tasked all Iraq PRTs (including coalition PRTs) to complete their workplans and to begin to measure performance against a development "maturity model," which is a structured collection of elements that describe certain aspects of maturity in developing states. A maturity model can be used as a benchmark for assessing different provinces for equivalent comparison. The goal was to have an initial set of yardsticks in place before the April 2008 Ambassador Crocker testimony to Congress. In addition, the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization has visited a number of PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan. In Afghanistan, S/CRS representatives have been coaching and mentoring leadership teams on how to set appropriate measures of effectiveness. Finally, the Foreign Service Institute has invited S/CRS to present lessons

Soldiers from 1st Platoon, 76th Engineer Company, Fort Knox, KY, build a hut in Jalalabad, Afghanistan. *(Army photo)*

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on designing effective metrics for stability and reconstruction operations. The subcommittee does recognize these efforts as progress. We further recognize that the Office of Provincial Affairs, despite experiencing turmoil as the result of a rapid turnover in leadership in its first few months, is now led by a director who has made a two-year commitment to the effort. In addition, the Office of Provincial Affairs is actively recruiting for strategic planners whose job it will be to coordinate strategic direction of the PRT program with Multi-National Force - Iraq, Multi-National Corps - Iraq, and the Department of State, and ensure that the PRT mission, objectives, and transition strategy are aligned with and supported by military planning.[26]

The bottom line, however, is that until PRTs receive consistent and clear direction from higher headquarters, they will not be able to maximize their efforts or judge their success. In this environment, resources cannot be programmed or applied effectively. The heroic tactical work being done by PRTs will go for naught without more coherent strategic and operational level guidance and oversight. In the absence of such guidance and oversight, resources, instead of supporting strategic agility, may be poorly prioritized and coordinated and, in some cases, squandered.

A teacher and his students sit in an outdoor classroom in the village of Alikheyl, Mehtar Lam District, Laghman Province, Afghanistan, February 2007. *(Air Force Photo/ Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez)*

[26] International Resources Group Announcement, http://www.IRGLTD.COM/Contacts/recruitment.htm#iraq_sp. Accessed March 24, 2008.

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typically focus on training and empowering local officials (capacity building) and building intra-governmental ties to Kabul.

These coalition-led PRTs sometimes communicate with U.S.-led PRTs, sharing information, best practices, and goals. Communication is somewhat more structured in Afghanistan under ISAF, but overall there is no formal process in place that causes the PRTs to communicate with one another. U.S. representatives are embedded in almost all coalition PRTs as liaisons to facilitate a two-way flow of information and coordination. Partner PRT representatives are sometimes included in conferences, video discussions, and email exchanges, but their experiences and perspectives rarely appear to be factored into U.S. decision-making. Some American PRT representatives heading to Afghanistan as part of a coalition-led PRT may attend a week of training in Germany with their partner counterparts. The resulting personal connections contribute to better communications and coordination. This should be required training for U.S. personnel serving with coalition-led PRTs.

Coalition partner PRTs have several major drawbacks for which the U.S. has had to compensate. Many of them are severely under-resourced, without access to funding streams such as CERP. For example, the Korean-run PRT in Irbil, Iraq has engaged with local officials, but is unable to provide significant resources to back up that engagement with real projects and programs. Others are able to provide varying levels of security and logistics support to their PRTs; few have a direct link to combat or security forces. While the Lithuanians in Afghanistan have provided a security force of approximately 125 military personnel, they rely on U.S. logistics and have no direct link to larger combat forces. On the other hand, Italy's PRT in Iraq and New Zealand's PRT in Afghanistan have been cited as models from which the United States could learn.

Sgt. Amanda Timmer of the Wasit PRT in Iraq talks with students at the Kut Girls Secondary School after the ribbon-cutting ceremony for a new Internet center March 10, 2008. The center features 10 new computers and furniture. *(Army Photo/ Sgt. 1st Class Stacy Nides)*

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designing a "strategic framework" and seek to conclude a Status of Forces Agreement and a diplomatic presence agreement. All of these activities and plans must take into account some transition in the composition and mission of the various kinds of PRTs, or the completion of their mission.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAM STRATEGIES AND EFFECTIVE, MEASURABLE PLANS AND MILESTONES

Findings:

(1) Section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) requires the President, acting through the Secretary of Defense, to report, among other things, on the long term strategy, mission, and objectives for each United States-led Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan; the first report is due at the end of April 2008. However, neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State has yet established a PRT strategy in Afghanistan or Iraq.

(2) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State adopted an "ends, ways, and means" approach to determine and measure Provincial Reconstruction Teams' progress and their alignment with operational and strategic goals; nor have they adopted a performance monitoring system that measures the PRTs' effectiveness, and progress in meeting clearly defined objectives.

(3) Provincial Reconstruction Team tactical and operational objectives should be aligned with coalition operational and strategic goals and host nation development plans to ensure unity of effort.

(4) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State can provide basic information about what each Provincial Reconstruction Team is attempting to do or what progress PRTs are making individually or collectively.

(5) The Department of Defense and the Department of State have not established clearly defined Provincial Reconstruction Team goals and milestones for achieving set objectives.

(6) Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of State set measures of effectiveness or measures of performance to assess the immediate, short-term, or longer-term impacts of Provincial Reconstruction Team activities.

(7) The Department of Defense and the Department of State have only recently begun, and have yet to complete, plans to transition the Provincial Reconstruction Team mission in Iraq to more traditional diplomatic and development efforts.

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Recommendation:

The Departments of Defense and State should adopt a Provincial Reconstruction Team strategy (using an "ends, ways, and means") approach to determine and measure PRTs' progress, and to determine whether the PRT activities align with overall operational and strategic goals. The Departments of Defense and State should also adopt a performance monitoring system that measures the PRTs' effectiveness and performance and their progress in meeting milestones for clearly defined objectives, including milestones for the eventual transition of the PRT mission to more traditional diplomatic and development efforts.

Provincial Reconstruction Team (and Stabilization and Reconstruction) Interagency Unity of Command

Findings:

(1) Neither the stabilization and reconstruction activities, nor the civilian and military personnel serving on Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq, enjoy unity of command. This shortcoming inhibits unity of effort, which can result in uncoordinated, and even counterproductive, outcomes.

(2) Rather than having unity of command, PRTs in both Iraq and Afghanistan operate under complicated, disjointed and, at times, unclear chain(s) of command and receive direction from multiple sources.

Recommendation:

The Departments of Defense and State should unify leadership and command of Provincial Reconstruction Teams to match accountability with authority and to ensure unity of effort.

Use of the Commanders' Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds in Iraq and Afghanistan

Findings:

(1) The demand for Commanders' Emergency Response Program funds in Afghanistan is rising. Reasons for this increased demand include: increased military presence and activity in southern Afghanistan; expanded work and funding needs of Provincial

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Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Teams after Provincial Iraqi Control and the Expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790

Findings:

(1) When a province transitions to Provincial Iraqi Control, U.S. military presence is usually reduced and units move to a posture of operational overwatch.

(2) The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iraq are negotiating a strategic framework agreement to provide the requisite authorities for U.S. presence in Iraq subsequent to the expiration of United National Security Council Resolution 1790 on December 31, 2008.

(3) As the security situation in Iraq improves and the U.S. moves from a United Nations Security Council Resolution mandate to a strategic framework agreement, U.S. military presence in Iraq will likely decline and the work of Provincial Reconstruction Teams, with their focus on governance and economic development, will take on greater importance.

(4) It remains unclear:
   a. whether embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams whose brigade combat teams or regimental combat teams redeploy will remain in place;
   b. whether PRTs operating in a province under Provincial Iraqi Control will be able to carry out their objectives, and whether they will continue to need significant coalition military support; and
   c. whether all or some of the PRTs will remain in place when a strategic framework agreement takes effect.

Recommendations:

(1) The Secretaries of Defense and State should notify Congress when they disband a PRT or e-PRT, or merge any combination of PRTs or e-PRTs in Iraq.

(2) The Secretaries of Defense and State should report to Congress on:
   a. how the United States provides for the security and support of PRTs, e-PRTs, and similar units operating in provinces under Provincial Iraqi Control; and
   b. how the United States will provide for the security and support of PRTs, e-PRTs, and similar units, subsequent to the expiration of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1790.

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Whether military or civilian, selecting qualified personnel, supporting them, and rewarding them properly is critical. Because not enough people with the appropriate skills and experience have been available, PRT positions have too often been filled by personnel who happen to be available or who volunteer. The subcommittee's PRT surveys show that some military and non-military personnel did not so much willingly volunteer, as were volunteered by their organizations, in spite of lack of skills and experience. This practice, however necessary, obviously causes morale, mission, and other problems. Many of the skill sets required for stability and reconstruction operations do not currently exist in our government agencies. The government has had to hire from the private sector or establish new recruiting and training programs. Despite the recognition that there is a dire need, no organization yet has the ability to identify systematically or formally its few personnel who may have the requisite skills, training, or experience either in their private or professional capacity. Some have started to gather this information. However, the subcommittee found no plans to ensure that agencies are establishing new recruiting philosophies and processes, or that people now serving will have special experience identifiers in their records for future assignment and promotion purposes. Finally, we have only guarded optimism that the departments will follow through on their stated intention to recognize and promote otherwise deserving PRT members with their peers who have served in more traditional assignments.

Civil Affairs (CA) soldiers are one group of military personnel in general purpose forces (GPF) who already possess some of the needed stability and reconstruction skills, but there are not nearly enough of them to staff an enduring mission. CA units' operations and training should inform efforts related to PRTs. While the services do not have enough CA personnel to fully man all PRTs, the subcommittee found that CA personnel were recruited into some PRTs or have served with them. Although the curriculum for CA training and Army PRT training at Fort Bragg were essentially alike, no one attempted to match the two.

In 2006, the Department of Defense directed the realignment of operational command and control of the bulk of the Army's CA units from the U.S. Army Special Operations Command to the U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC). This transfer essentially divided the active duty CA units from the reserve component units, which are the vast majority of CA units. The units transferred to the USARC are now part of the GPF and are intended to support other GPF units. The units retained by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command support Special Forces units. The U.S. Army Special Operations Command retains proponency for all CA units, including doctrine, combat development, and institutional training for both the active and reserve component CA units, notwithstanding the division in their command and control.

A DOS representative USAF Lt. Col. Brad Bredenkamp, PRT commander, speak with villagers in Alingar District of Laghman Province, Afghanistan, about supporting the Afghan government, Aug. 2006. *(Air Force Photo/Capt. Gerardo Gonzalez)*

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The *Roadmap* also directed the U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) to provide the Department with a plan of action for integrating interagency planning at the combatant command, joint task force, and major subordinate command levels. JFCOM developed a draft concept of operations to improve interagency planning but the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy "has declined to take further action on it."[33]

Coordination is necessary, but not sufficient. While we know that many people in many places are trying to make improvements to interagency planning and operations throughout the government, without direct Presidential involvement, these efforts are not enough. Action is needed. At the end of the day, someone has to be in charge. The subcommittee found a lack of unity of direction and "unity of command." This results in a lack of unity of purpose. Among the efforts at staffing, training, applying lessons learned, and planning, there is no one person or organization in the lead for the "whole of government". When "no further action" is taken, but the mission is not complete, someone must step up to lead. That leader must be empowered to direct the "whole of government" PRT, and larger, stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

CAPT Brian Rick, a doctor from the Herat PRT, performs medical exams for children in Saghar, Afghanistan. *Army photo/Sgt. Jeremy A. Clawson.*

[33] Joint Forces Command briefing and point papers for House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations staff, February 15, 2008.

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Selection, Incentives, and Recognition for Military and Civilian Provincial Reconstruction Team Personnel

Findings:

(1) The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates that when there is inadequate non-DOD civilian capacity to deploy for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations, military and DOD civilian personnel will be employed to carry out stability operations even if they do not possess the requisite skills, technical expertise, or training. Over time, the Department of Defense has made an attempt to consider the civilian skills of military personnel when placing them in these assignments.

(2) Individual reserve component units informally keep track of civilian skills and experience, but there is no institutional requirement or formal means of doing so.

(3) Currently, there are no special skills identifiers for military or DOD civilian personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Team assignments, nor is there any formal means to track military or civilian personnel with PRT experience.

(4) Although there is no career track or special experience identifier in the military services for stability operations, the services understand that assignment with, and command of, Provincial Reconstruction Teams must be incentivized and valued.

(5) Currently, there is no career track in the Department of State or other departments and agencies for personnel assigned to Provincial Reconstruction Teams or performing stability and reconstruction operations.

Recommendation:

The Secretaries of Defense and State, and other departments and agencies, should improve current selection processes, career incentives, and forms of recognition in order to encourage service with and select qualified personnel for staff Provincial Reconstruction Teams and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations in the future. Further, the Secretaries should report to Congress on their respective processes, incentives, and forms of recognition for military personnel and civilians who have served on PRTs or other stability and reconstruction missions.

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CIVIL AFFAIRS ROLE IN STABILITY OPERATIONS

Findings:

(1) While the Army has increased the number of Civil Affairs (CA) personnel in its force structure, and the other services have established CA units or are developing civil affairs capabilities, there is no joint CA effort or command.

(2) Civil Affairs skills closely resemble those needed to conduct stability operations, which DOD Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) establishes as a core military mission on par with combat operations. DODD 3000.05 requires the military to prepare to perform all stability operations tasks needed to establish and maintain order when U.S. government civilians cannot do so.

(3) Some Civil Affairs (CA) reservists provide functional expertise from their civilian experience and education, similar to those required in stability operations. CA units traditionally have a very high personnel and operations tempo. Army Force Generation and Army Reserve Expeditionary Force requirements and mobilization authorities can impact CA units' training and availability for deployment for Provincial Reconstruction Team and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.

(4) The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates that the military could provide personnel to man the PRTs, but the non-Civil Affairs general purpose forces personnel deployed did not have the requisite training or desired technical and specialty skills to perform the PRT mission effectively.

Recommendation:

The Secretary of Defense should determine the role Civil Affairs (CA) forces will play as the Department makes stability operations a core military mission on par with combat operations and as stability operations are conducted throughout the full spectrum of conflict, including determining:

a. the overall anticipated CA requirement;
b. whether the programmed CA force structure supports the direction of the Secretary of Defense to make stability operations a core mission on par with combat operations;
c. whether proponency for the general purpose CA units is appropriately placed;
d. whether sufficient stability operations competencies are being developed in the non-CA general purpose forces;
e. whether additional innovative authorities would assist in bringing needed CA competencies into the force on a temporary basis;
f. whether the active/reserve component mix is appropriate given the continued demands for CA units and personnel; and
g. whether a joint command structure for CA is appropriate.

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Improving Provincial Reconstruction Team Training

Findings:

(1) Former Provincial Reconstruction Team members, both military and civilian, emphasized the importance of training the military and civilian leadership together as early as possible in order to build the team prior to deployment. At a minimum, even if the PRT members could not train with their assigned team, all former PRT members supported the value of interagency training.

(2) The Army is analyzing how to institutionalize its training capability for future Provincial Reconstruction Teams and is considering moving the training to Fort Polk.

(3) The Marines Corps' role in Provincial Reconstruction Team-related training includes providing a Marine Corps instructor to teach Foreign Service Institute (FSI) courses. In addition, the First Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) sent 15 Marines to attend FSI courses and the MEF headquarters conducted two-day "economic reconstruction roundtables," which included regimental combat team commanders, interagency participation, non-governmental organizations, and private industry.

(4) The Departments of State (DOS) and Defense (DOD) have shared the costs for DOS trainees to get to training locations, and the Department of Defense has covered DOS trainee expenses while at Fort Bragg's Provincial Reconstruction Team training. The Department of Defense also reimbursed the Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development for PRT trainer expenses. The Department of Defense is reportedly willing to do whatever it takes to get federal civilians to interagency training because this supports DOD's missions.

Recommendations:

(1) The Secretary of Defense, with the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development, should further integrate the training of military and civilian personnel for Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq and for stability and reconstruction training more widely. This training should be required rather than optional. Where appropriate, they should further standardize this training including both classroom instruction and field training, specific both to stabilization and reconstruction operations and to force protection and combat life-saving skills. They should also arrange for earlier and more extensive integration of non-DOD civilian PRT members into the training process, including, where appropriate, training with the maneuver units with which they will serve as embedded advisors.

(2) The Secretary of Defense should take immediate action to ensure that the Department of Defense (DOD) civilian and military personnel who will fill non-DOD billets on

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Provincial Reconstruction Teams receive the PRT training administered by the Foreign Service Institute.

(3) The subcommittee supports the Departments of Defense and State, and other federal agencies in their willingness to share expenses for trainers and trainees not only for Provincial Reconstruction Team training, but also for other interagency training, exercises, and experiments.

(4) The Secretary of the Army should report on the Army's plans to institutionalize the Provincial Reconstruction Team training capability for both Afghanistan and Iraq PRTs and for future stabilization and reconstruction operations for Army and the other services' active and reserve component personnel and DOD civilians.

STABILIZATION, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION LESSONS LEARNED

Department of Defense Findings:

(1) The Department of Defense (DOD) has established programs to collect lessons learned at all levels within the Department, including from exercises and operations. The Army's Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute supports efforts to take the lessons learned from ongoing operations, particularly the PRT experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, and encourage units to incorporate them into current operations and activities. However, the integration of lessons learned into actual planning remains weak. Planners do not consistently examine past results as they develop future contingency plans, in part because DOD's guidance for incorporating lessons into its plans is outdated and does not specifically require planners to take this step; accessing lessons learned databases is cumbersome; and, the review process does not evaluate the extent to which lessons learned are incorporated into specific plans.

(2) The 2006 *Joint Operating Concept for Military Support to Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations* emphasizes the importance of implementing a continuous learning process that incorporates lessons learned into ongoing and future operations, including through constant observation of tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs); assessing best practices; understanding how to implement best practices; and adapting TTPs. However, it has not been fully implemented at the combatant command or service level.

Recommendation:

(1) The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should update their planning guidance to direct combatant commanders and service planners to include lessons learned and best practices as stability, security, transition, and

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STRENGTHENING INTERAGENCY PLANNING

Findings:

(1) The National Security Presidential Directive-44 framework provides unclear and inconsistent guidance on agencies' roles and responsibilities. In addition, the lack of an agreed-upon definition for stabilization and reconstruction operations poses an obstacle to interagency collaboration.

(2) All the geographic combatant commands, as well as Transportation Command, Special Operations Command and Joint Forces Command, use some form of interagency coordinating body, but their placement within those commands, and their organization, staffing, and functions vary widely.

(3) Special Operations Command created a new headquarters staff element, the J-10, with responsibility for irregular warfare in June 2007. Among other functions, the J-10 assists in coordinating plans integration, at least in part by establishing a "collaborative network of the DOD and the interagency to facilitate United States Government application of Irregular Warfare Strategies in support of U.S. national objectives."

Recommendations:

(1) The Secretary of Defense should seek clarification from the Secretary of State as to the respective roles and responsibilities of various Department of State bureaus and offices particularly those of the Office of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction relative to the regional bureaus in whose geographic area of responsibility complex reconstruction and stabilization contingencies may occur.

(2) The Secretary of Defense should improve integration of interagency partners from the outset of planning and operations in its six-phase model: 1) shape, 2) deter, 3) seize initiative, 4) dominate, 5) stabilize, and 6) enable civil authority.

(3) While a draft Joint Forces Command concept of operations to improve interagency planning exists, the Secretary of Defense should report to Congress why no action has been taken and what alternatives to improve interagency planning are being considered.

(4) The National Security Council (NSC) should move forward to fully implement National Security Presidential Directive-44 with a greater sense of urgency. The priority accorded to interagency coordination and direction for stability and reconstruction operations within the NSC should be elevated.

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MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ROLES IN STABILITY OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE SPECTRUM OF CONFLICT

Findings:

(1) The Provincial Reconstruction Team experience in Afghanistan and Iraq demonstrates that, where inadequate civilian capacity to deploy for post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction operations exists, military and Department of Defense civilian personnel will be employed to carry out stability operations, regardless of whether they possess the requisite skills, technical expertise, or training.

(2) Military personnel are performing stability operations in certain instances where the employment of civilian personnel would be appropriate and preferable.

(3) Joint Forces Command and the services are developing operational concepts and doctrine for stability operations.

(4) The Army is considering how to develop an enduring capability to train teams of military personnel to perform Provincial Reconstruction Team-like missions.

(5) Currently, there is no career track or special experience identifiers in the military services for stability operations, yet the services understand that assignment with, and command of, Provincial Reconstruction Teams must be incentivized and valued.

(6) Currently, there is no career track for personnel performing stability operations in the Department of State or other departments and agencies.

(7) In none of the departments or agencies did the subcommittee find overwhelming confidence among PRT members and veterans that they would be promoted ahead of or equal to their peers in classic combat, diplomatic, or development posts despite performing dangerous, critical, joint, interagency, and multinational stability and reconstruction missions.

(8) Several different sources of funding have been employed in Afghanistan and Iraq to perform stability and reconstruction operations.

(9) Non-governmental organizations play a significant role in pre-conflict and post-conflict environment, but currently they do not participate regularly in stability and reconstruction operations planning.

(10) Military units in Afghanistan and Iraq have performed stability and reconstruction operations, without particular specialized training, as part of their mission.

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APPENDIX C: PRT SURVEYS

INTRODUCTION

Between September 2007 and March 2008, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations conducted more than 100 surveys and interviews with recent and current members of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). The surveys were conducted both formally, with the assistance of the service legislative liaisons, and informally, through colleagues and when staff traveled to theater. The responses received reinforce the subcommittee's findings and recommendations and illustrate the depth of commitment military and civilian team members have to the Provincial Reconstruction Team program.

More than 87% of survey respondents were military (Army, Air Force, and Navy) in either the active or reserve component, ranging in enlisted rank from E-3 to E-7 and officer rank from O-2 to O-6.[1] The remaining respondents were civilian employees of the Departments of State and Agriculture, in both the foreign and civil service. 81% of those who responded to the survey served in Afghanistan,[2] while 19% served in Iraq[3] (see Figure 1). The majority of survey participants (79%) served on a PRT within the past two years, and many are currently deployed.[4]



Figure 1

[1] The Marine Corps have few personnel directly assigned to PRTs, and declined to provide a response.
[2] Respondents served in the following Afghan provinces: Balkh, Farah, Gardhez, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, Oruzgan, Paktia, Paktika, Panjshir, Parwan, Wardak, and Zabul.
[3] Respondents served in the following Iraqi provinces: Anbar, Babil, Baghdad, Diyala, Kirkuk, Najaf, Salah ad Din.
[4] Although USAID conducted its own surveys, the agency was unable or unwilling to share its results.

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filling. One wrote, "the canned advertisement does not really tell the story and people don't know what they are getting into." Several survey respondents offered additional suggestions for improving recruitment and retention in the future, including allowing current PRT members to interview their replacements and establishing greater communication with civilian agencies to better emphasize the importance of participation in the PRT program.



Figure 3[6]

When asked what incentives currently exist for PRT assignments, participants mentioned increased hazard pay, credit for a "joint" assignment (for military officers who command a PRT), additional leave time (for civilians), and tax breaks. They frequently cited as motivating factors a sense of personal duty and accomplishment. However, survey participants also cited a worrying number of disincentives for PRT service, including the long length of tours, and a fear that the PRT skill set would make them a target for future deployments. Some were disappointed in the PRT's perceived inability to increase the pace of change, the "frustration because of the inability to accomplish anything here and feeling like a stupid 'Pollyanna' for volunteering." Many fear that service outside of a traditional career path will not be recognized. One respondent wrote, "Can only hope that Promotion Boards understand that IA [individual augmentee] tour on PRT is cutting edge, fall more in realm of Special Operation [than] in world of conventional forces." PRT members perceived that their tours were undervalued by their home department or military service, and thus had a negative impact on career progression. One respondent summarized the feelings of many when she wrote that PRT service is a "probable career disruption rather than enhancing; agencies view

[6] Based on overall survey responses. Common responses grouped and tallied.

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