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JUL 26 2005
DEPOSITORY

Alan Schwartz

Iraq Election Scenarios

Anticipating Alternative Futures

About the Report

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SCENARIO MATRIX
LEVEL OF VIOLENCE/ELECTION LEGITIMACY/FAIRNESS



was discussed that these two forces were not purely orthogonal. Greater violence could reduce the opportunity for voter education and election transparency. Likewise, less violence provides fewer incentives or excuses for acts of violence, while an unfair election process could provoke violence. Nonetheless, while the forces were not purely independent variables, their reinforcing nature did not substantially burden their distinctiveness for purposes of constructing scenario matrices.

Less violence provides fewer incentives or excuses for acts of violence.

In the upper right quadrant, increasing levels of violence, even with a fair election process, would put the Sunnis at a disadvantage as they would have difficulty turning out the vote. This could lead to either a Sunni boycott or efforts to dampen turnout in competing regions by exporting violence (e.g., to Kurdish strongholds).

In the upper left quadrant, a perceived fair and legitimate process combined with dampened violence would produce a level playing field where all parties could compete on their merits. Presumably this would invite robust participation by independent candidates and parties that organized around nontribal, nonreligious issues of policy.

In contrast, in the lower right quadrant, a perceived unfair election process combined with violence could endanger the election and any election results.

In the lower left quadrant, an election process that was not transparent and was not perceived to be fair would, in the absence of violence, advantage existing organizations, which could get out the vote, while independents and issue-oriented candidates would have a harder time connecting with the voters.

Second Workshop

Building on the base scenarios set out in the matrix, the second working group (held on November 9–10, 2004) focused on possible election outcomes, based primarily on the actions of various groups and leaders and election-day election processes. After review-

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