S. HRG. 106–1121

# U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
## UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 19 AND 28, 2000

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U. S. DEPOSITORY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

82–437 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800
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# U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

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**TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000**

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:39 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, Thurmond, Allard, Hutchinson, Levin, Kennedy, and Reed.

Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director, and Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director.

Professional staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, John R. Barnes, Gary M. Hall, Mary Alice A. Hayward, George W. Lauffer, Thomas L. MacKenzie, and Eric H. Thoemmes.

Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, staff director for the minority, and Richard D. DeBobes, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Shekinah Z. Hill, and David P. Nunley.

Committee members' assistants present: George M. Bernier III, assistant to Senator Santorum; Thomas A. Vecchiolla, assistant to Senator Snowe; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; Michael P. Ralsky, assistant to Senator Hutchinson; Arch Galloway II, assistant to Senator Sessions; Menda S. Fife, assistant to Senator Kennedy; William K. Sutey, assistant to Senator Robb; Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland; and Elizabeth King, assistant to Senator Reed.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman WARNER. The committee will come to order. This morning we conduct the second in a series of hearings on the situation in Iraq and U.S. policy regarding the conduct of our security forces in that region, as well as our diplomatic policy.

On July 20, this committee conducted a closed hearing to receive intelligence and operations briefings from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Central Intelligence Agency on the situation in and around Iraq and U.S. military operations in the region. Next Thursday, September 28, the committee is scheduled to conduct a hearing to receive testimony from retired General Tony Zinni, Ambassador Richard Butler, and Mr. Richard Perle, and there may be other witnesses at that hearing.

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Today we receive testimony on U.S.-Iraq policy from a distinguished panel of administration officials, Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe, Assistant Secretary of State Ambassador Walker, and Commander in Chief Central Command General Franks. We welcome our witnesses today.

It is my personal view that it is incumbent upon this committee on behalf, not only of the committee but the Senate, to continue its in-depth oversight of the continuing use of U.S. military operations in Iraq, our goals and objectives in the region, and the strategy by which we intend to pursue those goals.

Every day, and I want to stress that, every day the U.S. is placing young men and women wearing the uniform of our country in harm's way both in the air and, indeed, in many respects where they are stationed in this region of the world, highly known for its terrorist attacks. So wherever they are stationed, when they are on their missions they are in harm's way, and very few Americans are aware of this operation and the risks these young people are taking.

It is incumbent on those of us who are involved in the policymaking to understand and be able to clearly articulate to those in the military our goals and strategy, indeed, to the American public, and the reasons why these young men and women are being asked to carry out the dangerous missions.

It has been over 10 years since Iraq invaded a virtually defenseless Kuwait. The United States, together with over 30 nations, responded with overwhelming military power and resolved to defend the principles of liberty and basic human rights.

While the coalition was successful in liberating Kuwait, the international community has thus far been tragically unsuccessful in obtaining Iraqi compliance with clear obligations Iraq accepted formally in 1991 at the end of the Persian Gulf conflict. I remind my colleagues that Iraq accepted in writing the requirements and obligations contained in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, the resolution which set forth the terms of the cease-fire agreement.

What were those requirements and obligations? First, that Iraq accept the UN-designated land border with Kuwait and Kuwait sovereignty. That requirement was finally fulfilled in 1994.

Second, that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or render harmless under international supervision of (a) all chemical and biological weapons, (b) all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.

The resolution further establishes the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), a special commission to monitor Iraqi compliance with this requirement, that provides for ongoing monitoring and verification of Iraqi compliance or noncompliance.

Third, that Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons-usable material, and submit to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection of Iraqi compliance with this requirement.

Fourth, that Iraq return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq and account for Kuwaiti missing-in-action persons.

Fifth, that Iraq make reparations for the damage and injuries caused by Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait.

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Sixth, that sales of all commodities and products to Iraq other than food and medicine are prohibited until Iraq fully implements relevant UN security resolutions, and finally that Iraq not commit or support any active international terrorism.

What has been achieved by way of compliance with these clearly enunciated in writing conditions? In my opinion, I regret to say very little, and that is not because of the extraordinary effort on behalf of the UN and the Security Council, the United States, Great Britain and, regrettably, only a few other countries to try and get this compliance. As but one example of the ongoing stalemate between Iraq and the international community as we meet today, Iraq continues its defiance of UN efforts to resume weapons inspections, inspections which have been suspended since 1998.

On December 17, 1999, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1284 that created a new inspection program and offered a way to temporarily suspend sanctions dependent on Iraqi compliance. Unfortunately, three permanent members of the Security Council, including our valued NATO ally, France, abstained on the vote on Resolution 1284, thereby undercutting the power and impact of the Security Council mandate.

Iraq has seized on this division within the Security Council and has steadfastly refused to comply with this latest UN Security Council resolution, and yet almost every day U.S. and British airmen—no longer French, I repeat, but U.S. and British airmen only fly into harm's way over Iraqi missiles fired at these planes to enforce the no-fly zone over northern and southern Iraq.

Sailors of the U.S., British, and, indeed, other nations conduct risky maritime interdiction operations in the Gulf to enforce the UN sanctions against Iraq. To give but a few statistics to demonstrate the magnitude of U.S. military effort, during this calendar year 2000 U.S. pilots have flown, on average, 10 to 15 days a month enforcing the no-fly zone over northern Iraq, and an average of 20 to 25 days a month over southern Iraq, and during calendar year 1999 U.S. and British ships boarded 700 vessels suspected of violating the UN sanctions regime.

Boarding those vessels is a highly risky operation. We have an oversight obligation on this committee and, indeed, Congress to review and question whether such value we derive from such military operations is worth the personal risk to which our airmen and our sailors and others are subjected.

What is the dollar cost and measure of increase in the already severely stretched operations tempo (OPTEMPO) with the U.S. military? What goals are we trying to achieve? What is the likelihood that we can achieve those goals? Do we have the best policy? Is there a better one?

These are the questions that are before this committee and, indeed, Congress, and we are obligated on behalf of these young men and women to periodically review and ask these tough questions. Why is the United States virtually alone, other than Great Britain, in this military effort regarding Iraq, alone in the world of diplomacy to enforce the Security Council resolution?

I repeat, two nations alone in the world are enforcing the UN Security Council resolutions, endeavoring to enforce them. Does the

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international community have a better policy, if so, what is it, to which more nations might give support in this risky business?

It is the responsibility of this committee to thoroughly examine these and other questions concerning our military presence in the Gulf region, with the focus on our strategy and purpose. Foremost in all of this is the safety and well-being of our men and women in uniform. We are asking much from them. What is the return?

Senator Levin.

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me join you in welcoming our witnesses. The hearing comes at a time when Saddam Hussein is sending signals of increased hostility toward his neighbors, toward us, toward the UN Security Council, toward the entire international community, and, indeed, toward his own people.

For example, Iraq has repeatedly stated, even in advance of any formal request, that it will not cooperate with the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). It should be noted there have been no UN inspections in Iraq since December 1998.

Iraq has denied entry to a UN envoy—a Russian diplomat—who is looking into the cases of people missing since the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

Last month, in a speech on August 8 to commemorate the 10th anniversary of the Persian Gulf War, Saddam Hussein railed against Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and accused them of being partners in crimes against Iraq.

And in response to that speech and similar accusations by senior Iraqi officials, the Gulf Cooperation Council's Ministerial Council, on September 2 observed anew that, "Iraq continues its procrastination and evasion of implementing basic parts of the relevant Security Council resolutions." In addition, the Gulf Cooperation Council's Ministerial Council took note of "the Iraqi regime's renewal of its hostile and feverish campaigns against the Gulf Cooperation Council member states." Finally, it expressed its strong denunciation and condemnation of the speech by the Iraqi regime's president and statements made by a number of senior officials who attacked the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Recently, Iraqi aircraft not only overflew the southern no-fly zone, but two of its aircraft penetrated into the air space of Saudi Arabia.

In a September 8 report to the Security Council, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan reported that Iraq refused to discuss arrangements for using oil-for-food funds to purchase local goods and services and to give visas to UN experts on that issue. The Security Council had called for that issue to be investigated as a way to improve the economic situation in Iraq.

In his report, the Secretary General also reported that Iraq indicated that it does not intend to cooperate with or issue visas for independent experts that he appointed to investigate to report on the humanitarian situation and needs in Iraq. The Security Council had called for that investigation in an effort to improve the humanitarian situation in Iraq.

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At the same time that Iraq is refusing to cooperate with UN efforts to alleviate the suffering of its people, Saddam Hussein purportedly has met with a group of Iraqi sculptors, designers, and architects to discuss the building of a large monument in Baghdad to commemorate the 1991 Gulf War.

Finally, I would note that just a couple of days ago Iraq accused Kuwait of siphoning Iraqi oil when it was pumping its own oil. This accusation is particularly chilling in that Iraq made a similar accusation in the days leading up to the 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

So there are many questions to be asked of our witnesses. I look forward to their testimony. In addition to the questions which the Chairman has outlined, I think we should explore the question of whether there are any alternatives to our policy of containment that might be better than the current policy. That is the issue before us, as this matter heats up again. We need to explore whether there are options for us that might be better than the current particular program which we are implementing.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin. That was a very good statement, and I noted your reference to the Gulf Council and those nations and their concerns and at the same time a number of those member nations are this day conducting diplomatic relations and trade relations with Iraq. There are a lot of anachronisms and conflicts within that region as to how those nations, once threatened, are now dealing with Iraq. Senator Thurmond, do you wish to make a statement?

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, after more than 45 years in the Senate it takes a great deal to surprise me. However, I did not anticipate that 10 years after Operation Desert Storm this committee would still be holding hearings on the U.S. policy regarding Iraq. I did not expect Saddam Hussein to survive, and expected that the Iraqi people would overthrow what was left of his forces.

Mr. Chairman, I compliment you for holding this hearing and bringing back into focus our Nation's policies concerning Iraq. It appears that the current policy is a failure. Not only is Saddam still in power, and the people of Iraq as miserable as ever, but the grand coalition built upon our leadership has fallen apart. France is openly supporting Iraq, and many other members are prepared to lift the sanctions that have been in effect since 1991.

The Arab members of the coalition are under intense pressure to limit the U.S. presence in the region, and to reach accommodations with Iraq for the sake of Arab unity. A sign of the policy's failure is that the United States and Great Britain are the only two nations who on a daily basis risk their pilots' lives trying to enforce the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.

What do we have to show for the risk and the cost associated with these missions? There is relative peace and security in northern Iraq, but in the south, poverty and repression reign. There is no indication that these flights have had a direct impact on Saddam Hussein and his regime.

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Mr. Chairman, it is time to review our policy not only regarding Iraq but also as it pertains to the rest of the Persian Gulf region. I hope these hearings will be the genesis for a new approach to remove Saddam's stranglehold on the people of Iraq and to bring peace and stability to this vital region of the globe.

Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel of witnesses. They are all very professional public servants and experts in their field. However, they represent the status quo. It is for that reason that I look with great expectations to the hearing you have scheduled later this month to hear from witnesses who have a different and hopefully more innovative approach to our policy on Iraq.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

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A sign of the policy's failure is that the United States and Great Britain are the only two nations who, on a daily basis, risk their pilots' lives trying to enforce the no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. What do we have to show for the risk and the costs associated with these missions? There is relative peace and security in northern Iraq, but in the south, poverty and repression reign. There is no indication that these flights have had a direct impact on Saddam Hussein and his regime.

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Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Thurmond, for a very good statement. Do my other two colleagues desire to make brief preliminary remarks?

Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, I do not. I would like to move on with the witnesses. Thank you.

Senator HUTCHISON. I likewise will defer.

Chairman WARNER. Secretary Slocombe, we welcome you. You have appeared before this committee for many years, and this is about as tough an issue that has ever faced you and our distinguished former colleague, Secretary Cohen. Please do not interpret the hearing as anything critical. It is just our obligation to determine from the administration how it hopes to achieve the goals of its present policy and what are the alternatives, if they exist. I thank you. Welcome.

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## STATEMENT OF HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is, as always, an honor to represent the Department of Defense here before this committee today to discuss our policy toward Iraq generally and particularly the Department of Defense's role in it.

You began, sir, by saying that we send our people into harm's way not only through the no-fly zone enforcement and the maritime intercept operations, but also by their very presence. That is certainly true, and it is absolutely right that this committee and the country should pay careful attention to why that is being done.

To give you my conclusions, sir, and that of the administration, those risks and the costs, which are real and substantial, are nonetheless very necessary for our interests and our security. For the reasons that both you and Senator Levin have outlined, Iraq remains a very serious threat to our vital interests because it is a threat to the security of a critical region.

In order to meet this threat, the United States has, since 1991, since the end of the Gulf War, joined with our friends and allies to pursue a policy which is fully consistent with the relevant UN Security Council resolutions, that has as its objective to contain Iraq and prevent renewed aggression, pending the time when a different regime in Iraq is prepared to take the actions necessary for Iraq no longer to be a threat to its neighbors and international security generally.

This is a policy that is not without risks, and it certainly carries substantial costs, but compared with ignoring the problem, or seeking simplistic quick fixes, it is both cheap and safe. We are obviously prepared to consider and we do consider on a continuing basis how we need to adjust our policy to take account of new circumstances and, where there are better ideas, to adopt them, but we are satisfied, over intense consideration over a long period of time, that there is no better fundamental alternative than the basic policy which we are following.

The key elements of our efforts to this end are familiar, and they call on the full range of instruments of international policy, political, economic, diplomatic, intelligence, informational, if you will, and military.

They include maintenance of the system of UN-imposed sanctions, our forward military presence in the region, our capacity to enforce that presence rapidly if need be, the no-fly zone enforcement operations, monitoring Iraq's actions to detect preparations for renewed aggression or reconstitution for Saddam's programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction, diplomatic efforts, and close consultation with friends in the region, other coalition members, and at the UN, efforts to counter smuggling in violation of the sanctions regime, information efforts through the full range of available channels to tell the truth about Saddam and his actions, support for meeting humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, and support for resuming effective, genuine UN inspections of potential WMD programs and other steps to bring Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions and, finally, steps to advance the day when Iraq will have a government consistent with stability in the region and justice for its people.

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Managing the Iraq problem is not a short-term effort. It requires patience, vigilance, perseverance, and a sensitivity to the realities in Iraq and the region and at the UN. In particular, it requires work with other nations who, with very few exceptions, share our basic reasons for resisting Saddam's ambitions but have their own perspectives, interests, and approaches.

So far as our fundamental military policy, we have been entirely clear. If Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction program, threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces, or moves against the Kurds, we maintain a credible force in the region and are prepared to act in an appropriate time and place of our own choosing.

This warning, the so-called red line, serves as a clear signal of our resolve that aggression will not be tolerated. At the same time, we need to recognize that there are no military solutions to many of the problems in dealing with Iraq, and that military overreaction could disserve our interests and needlessly endanger our personnel.

The statements of General Franks and of Ambassador Walker provide an overview of our military posture and operations, and our diplomatic and political efforts respectively. With the committee's indulgence, I would suggest that we now turn to those two statements, and then I will make some summary observations and then take your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. WALTER B. SLOCOMBE

DEFENSE ASPECTS OF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, and other members of the committee, it is an honor to return here again on behalf of the Department of Defense to discuss DOD's role in implementing our Iraq policy.

Nearly 10 years after the defeat of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Saddam Hussein remains a threat to the region and to our interests. Iraq's recent statements against both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia remind us (and them) of the continuing threat Saddam Hussein poses to his neighbors. Similarly, his pre-emptive refusal to cooperate with the new UN inspection regime or to permit independent UN-sponsored assessment of humanitarian needs reconfirms his complete unwillingness to comply with the requirements imposed by the UN. His efforts to provoke a military confrontation on his terms demonstrate his continuing recklessness and aggressive potential. His efforts to maintain a capability to develop and produce long-range missiles and terror weapons for them to carry make clear that he is a danger to the whole region and indeed the world, not just the immediate neighbors. Of course, his continued tyranny over the people of Iraq and his exploitation of their needs for propaganda advantage show on a continuing basis, his unfitness to govern.

As a result, the U.S. has, since 1991, joined with our friends and allies to pursue a policy, fully consistent with the relevant UN resolutions, that has as its objective to contain Iraq and prevent renewed aggression, pending the time when a different regime in Iraq is prepared to take the actions necessary for Iraq no longer to be a threat to its neighbors and international security generally. This is a policy that is not without risks and it certainly carries substantial costs; but compared with ignoring the problem and seeking simplistic quick fixes it is both cheap and safe.

The key elements of our efforts to this end are familiar—and they call on the full range of instruments of international policy, political, economic, diplomatic, intelligence, "informational," and military. They include:

- maintenance of the system of UN-imposed sanctions,
- our forward military presence in the region,
- our capacity to reinforce that presence rapidly if need be,
- the no-fly zone (NFZ) enforcement operations,
- monitoring Iraq's actions to detect preparations for renewed aggression and reconstitution of Saddam's programs to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD),

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- diplomatic efforts and close consultations with friends in the region, other coalition members, and at the UN,
- efforts to counter smuggling in violation of the sanctions regime,
- information efforts, through the full range of available channels, to tell the truth about Saddam and his actions,
- support for meeting the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people,
- support for resuming effective UN inspections of potential WMD programs and other steps to bring Iraq into compliance with UN resolutions, and
- steps to advance the day when Iraq will have a government consistent with stability in the region and justice for its people.

Managing the Iraq problem is not a short-term effort. It requires patience, vigilance, perseverance—and a sensitivity to the realities in Iraq, in the region, and at the UN. In particular, it requires work with other nations, who, with very few exceptions, share our basic reasons for resisting Saddam's ambitions, but have their own perspectives, interests, and approaches.

So far as our fundamental military policy, we have been clear:

- If Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction program,
- threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces,
- or moves against the Kurds,

we maintain a credible force in the region and are prepared to act in an appropriate time and place of our choosing. This warning, the so called "red-lines", serves as a clear signal of our resolve that aggression will not be tolerated. At the same time, we need to recognize that there are no military solutions to many of the problems in dealing with Iraq and that military over-reaction would disserve our interests and needlessly endanger our personnel.

The statements of General Franks and of Ambassador Walker provide an excellent overview of our military posture and operations and our diplomatic/political efforts, respectively. Rather than repeat what they say, let me focus on the Defense Department's role in a few of the key areas of the American policy toward Iraq.

## IRAQ'S UNITED NATIONS OBLIGATIONS

Over the course of almost 10 years the United Nations has set a clear and unambiguous set of conditions that would allow Iraq to rejoin the world community of nations in good standing. Instead, Saddam has chosen to ignore and defy these multilateral conditions. UNSCR 678, passed in November 1990, was the basis for the use of military force to free Kuwait. In April 1991, UNSCR 687, the cease fire resolution, clearly defined Iraq's post-conflict obligations, especially as they apply to the elimination of WMD programs and continuation of sanctions until compliance is achieved. UNSCR 688, passed 2 days later, insisted Iraq end its repression of its own citizens and allow humanitarian access to all parts of the country. This resolution, with others, serves as the basis for the no-fly zones and their enforcement. UNSCR 949, passed in 1994, condemned Iraq's military deployments to the south, demanded Iraq withdraw its forces, not threaten its neighbors, and ordered that Iraq take no action to enhance its military capability in the south. That resolution is buttressed by our declaration, supported by key coalition members, that we will take action to stop any such enhancement before it could represent a significant threat.

## DETERRENCE

A key part of our military operations in the region is, of course, our maintenance of substantial forces in the region. These forces not only enable us to conduct ongoing operations, notably the NFZs and oil embargo enforcement, but also to respond immediately to Iraqi provocations and aggression. Our presence and continuous interaction with the militaries in the region reinforce the coalition's unity of purpose and resolve, and the capacity of local forces to contribute to the defense of the region. The in-place forces are backed up by our capacity and that of our allies to reinforce rapidly as needed, a capacity that depends on preparations, such as prepositioning of equipment and maintenance of facilities, and on the readiness of regional powers to accept both the in-place units and, as needed, additional forces.

### *Weapons of Mass Destruction*

That Saddam Hussein should be prevented from having a WMD capability is not just a critical interest for the U.S. and our friends in the region; it is a requirement unambiguously approved by the United Nations Security Council.

Today, Iraq refuses to comply with this requirement, and specifically, to abide by UNSCR 1284, adopted in December 1999 to lay out a road map for Iraq's coopera-

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tion in meeting its key UN obligations, particularly as regards WMD and for a phased easing of sanctions in parallel with that cooperation. As explained in greater detail in Ambassador Walker's statement, Resolution 1284 created a new disarmament commission (UNMOVIC) to resume inspections and set up a mechanism for Iraqi actions to comply with its WMD obligations.

The essential element in implementing 1284 is for UNMOVIC to be able to operate to verify that Iraq has divested itself of all weapons of mass destruction and that the appropriate monitoring systems for their continued compliance are established. It is critical, of course, that any international monitoring be meaningful. A sham monitoring regime would be a great deal worse than none at all, because it would give a false sense of security and provide a basis for calls to dismantle sanctions without meaningful compliance. UNSCR 1284 provides for a monitoring system that would fully meet the standard. We are pleased that Hans Blix has quickly assembled and trained a professional team for UNMOVIC to begin its task in Iraq and we expect the Iraqi regime to comply with UNSCR 1284. We stand ready to support UNMOVIC when (and if) it is able to carry out its functions, just as we supported its predecessor, UNSCOM.

To date, however, Iraq has rejected the resolution and refused to cooperate with UNMOVIC. So long as inspectors are excluded, we continue to pay special attention to Iraq's potential for rebuilding its WMD program. We are willing, and have demonstrated in the past our ability, to use military force in response to Iraq's failure to meet its obligations regarding the elimination of weapons of mass destruction.

*No-Fly Zones*

As a result of attacks by the Iraqi regime on its own citizens in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, no-fly zones have been established by the coalition in the north and south of Iraq. The United States leads Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch to ensure the no-fly zones are maintained.

Following Operation Desert Fox in 1998, we have continued this effort, with more robust procedures. Operations Northern Watch and Southern Watch have the authority to respond to violations of the NFZs and to threats to coalition aircraft.

General Franks' statement explains the important benefits, military and otherwise, that flow from enforcing the NFZs. In summary, the enforced zones prevent Saddam from using aircraft against Iraqi citizens in large segments of the country. The enforcement of the NFZs also reduces the capabilities of the Iraqi military and limits their ability to conduct training. It also provides significant information about Iraqi troop movements in the zones, particularly action to enhance military capability in the south, in violation of UNSCR 949.

Iraqi air defense forces continue to challenge coalition aircraft flying in both NFZs. As the committee is aware, coalition forces respond to these challenges by strikes at Iraqi military targets, with broad flexibility for the commanders in the field to shape the response. General Frank's statement describes the policies and key facts regarding our NFZ enforcement efforts. Response strikes are directed at military targets, and, if Iraq wishes to stop response strikes, all it need do is stop violating the NFZs and threatening the coalition aircraft that enforce them.

ANTI-SMUGGLING OPERATIONS

In 1989, the last full year before the invasion of Kuwait, Iraq earned $15 billion from oil exports, and spent $13 billion on its military. This year, Iraq is projected to earn nearly $20 billion from its oil exports authorized under the oil-for-food program. This income, however, must be devoted to purposes consistent with UN resolutions. As a result, Iraq cannot use these revenues for military purposes. To provide funds for the regime's priorities, Iraq seeks to circumvent the United Nations sanctions by smuggling.

The U.S. leads a multinational Maritime Interception Force (MIF) in the Gulf to enforce the UN sanctions by intercepting smugglers carrying illicit oil, other illegal exports, and other contraband. These operations are conducted under UNSCR 665, which was passed in 1990 and authorizes the use of force to halt all maritime shipping in order to inspect cargo and destinations and ensure the strict implementation of sanctions. Some 18 different nations have provided support to the MIF since its inception and today coalition partners Canada, the United Kingdom, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates are participating in MIF operations in the Persian Gulf. The patrols of the MIF are supplemented by extensive diplomatic efforts to disrupt complicity in Iraqi smuggling and secure cooperation with the sanctions and their enforcement.

While not a perfect system, the MIF and the associated diplomatic efforts have been highly successful in serving as a deterrent to large scale illegal export operations and thereby sharply limiting the ability of Iraq to gain hard currency for the

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regime's priorities, notably to rebuild its military. Iraq's illegal exports are only a tiny fraction of its total oil exports. Without the MIF, there would be little to prevent Saddam from vastly expanding the part of his oil revenues that are under his exclusive control.

HUMANITARIAN RELIEF

We are all sympathetic to the suffering that the Iraqi people have endured and we have supported an increasingly effective oil-for-food program to reduce that suffering. Our quarrel is with the Iraqi regime, not its people. Saddam Hussein is deliberately contributing to the hardship of the Iraqi people in a cynical attempt to manipulate international sympathy and deflect the blame for Iraq's internal problems.

The government of Iraq has no direct access to revenue generated by the UN-monitored oil sales under the oil-for-food program. Funds from these oil sales are deposited directly into a UN escrow account, and purchases are approved by the UN sanctions committee. The Department of Defense assists the State Department in screening contracts for possible dual-use and military applications.

The oil-for-food program allows Iraq to use the proceeds from its oil sales only on humanitarian and other approved items. To date, Iraq refuses to take full advantage of these humanitarian opportunities. Nonetheless, the oil-for-food program has improved the lives of the Iraqi people and will continue to do so. The increase in revenue under the program from $4 billion the first year to a projected $20 billion this year means a tremendous amount of money is available for humanitarian goods for the Iraqi people, even after part of the proceeds are set aside for the UN compensation commission to compensate victims of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait and for other UN-approved purposes.

The oil-for-food program has been a particular success in northern Iraq, where the UN implements the program and the overall health of the people, especially children, living there has improved. Even in southern and central Iraq, where the Iraqi government administers the program, there has been a substantial improvement in food supplies. To the degree child mortality and disease rates are higher in central and southern Iraq than in the north, it is due to corruption, smuggling, and the regime's apparent willingness to deliberately increase the suffering of the Iraqi people for propaganda purposes.

Critics of sanctions, who say that they are a hardship on the Iraqi people, should know it doesn't have to be that way. The UN Security Council resolutions have established Iraq's obligations, and it is clear what Iraq has to do to get sanctions suspended and then lifted. The UN Security Council resolutions also permit Iraq to use the assets sitting in its escrow account to provide nourishment and much needed medicine for its people.

COALITION SUPPORT

The key to our efforts in the region is the support of the coalition of nations who share our determination to contain Iraqi aggression, prevent acquisition of WMD capabilities, and to improve the lives of the Iraqi people—and ultimately see a different regime in Baghdad. From a military point of view, cooperation with regional friends is critical because we can conduct operations and remain forward deployed in the Gulf on the necessary scale only at the invitation of and with the willing support of, our coalition friends and partners. Equally, maintenance of sanctions and insistence on compliance with UN standards, notably those regarding WMD, depends on the political support of nations in the region and around the world.

We share with our friends in the Gulf and beyond a broad common interest. Our coalition partners know that Saddam Hussein is a threat to them and their nations and that he is responsible for the hardships and oppression of the Iraqi people. They know the effects of Saddam's aggression and they support both our continued military presence in the region and our overall strategy.

Maintaining the coalition requires constant effort and sensitivity. Without the dedicated work of our diplomats throughout the region and the recurring engagement of the thousands of men and women in uniform assigned to United States Central Command and European Command, we could not maintain the solidarity and support of our coalition partners. DOD plays a key role in sustaining the coalition by enforcing the NFZs, operating the MIF, and maintaining significant forward deployed troops.

DOD personnel, both military and civilian, also play a key role in the consultation that is essential to sustain the coalition. Secretary Cohen will be visiting the region this fall—his eighth trip in 4 years—and his discussions will continue to reaffirm our strong security partnership with our allies. The regional CINC, General Franks

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and his predecessors, Generals Zinni, Peay, and Hoar, play, with the whole command, a crucial role in building these relationships. General Franks has just returned from a tour of the region and we have just completed our annual Joint Planning Committee meetings with our Saudi Arabian counterparts and we will do the same in Kuwait early next year. Additionally, our continuing series of exercises throughout the region, including Operation Desert Spring, provide us an excellent opportunity to remain engaged with the region's militaries. We have had open and honest discussions with our coalition partners and we understand the regional pressures they face on a daily basis.

Sustaining the coalition is a demanding job, and sometimes requires that we adjust our actions to take account of our partners' concerns, which we do not entirely share. Working with a coalition requires constant effort and painstaking efforts to do what is necessary to secure coalition support for our policies.

This process can be frustrating, both for those who work on the problem directly and those who watch the process, hoping for quicker results or action more in line with strict American ideas. However, the coalition—and the compromises maintaining it requires—is essential. It is hard to build an Iraq policy based on a coalition, but without a coalition it would be simply impossible to carry out any effective Iraq policy.

We have, overall, been remarkably successful in sustaining the effort for a decade. Sanctions remain in place. Our friends in the region accept unprecedented levels of U.S. military presence, and have been willing to cooperate as needed to support U.S. operations, both on-going and emergency. The UNSC continues to insist on effective implementation of resolutions as the price of sanctions relief.

## REGIME CHANGE

The Department of Defense works closely with the State Department's Special Coordinator for Transition in Iraq with regard to regime change. The Department of Defense has a comprehensive program providing non-lethal aid, under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA), aimed at improving the opposition's effectiveness as a political force. We are working with the Iraqi National Congress (INC), the main umbrella organization for the opposition, and have developed with the INC a comprehensive training plan based on its requirements. Training focuses across a wide spectrum of over 30 different courses of instruction, including public affairs, international law, health care skills, the management of humanitarian assistance, and the provision of basic services (power, water, etc.). To date, 31 students have received training and 13 are currently enrolled in courses. We have identified courses for the remaining candidates provided by the INC and training will continue through the end of 2001.

Of course, training the members of the INC will not alone bring about the regime change in Baghdad that we all desire. We will continue to work with people and groups both inside and outside Iraq that share our common interests—a peaceful Iraq that does not threaten its neighbors, is free of weapons of mass destruction; an Iraq that supports the basic human rights of all its citizens, and an Iraq that is prepared to rejoin the community of nations. We stand ready to assist such a new government. At the same time, our efforts in supporting the opposition to the Iraqi regime must be based on a clear-headed assessment of the situation and the need to avoid needlessly putting at risk the lives of those who share our goals.

## ENDING MILITARY OPERATIONS

The committee has asked, in its invitation to this hearing, that I address the consequences of ending our military operations in the area.

Dealing with Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a long term problem. Saddam knows that the only way he can prevail and break out of the "box" in which he has put himself is by outlasting the U.S. and undermining coalition and UN efforts. Our efforts are costly in dollars and in the burden it places on our personnel; the on-going military operations inevitably involve risks and the commitments we have made potentially involve very substantial ones. Nonetheless, if we let impatience or unwillingness to tolerate reasonable current costs and risks drive us to abandon our long term effort, Saddam will have won in the only way he can, and the costs to our interests would be immense.

Accordingly, our military contribution to the overall effort must continue on a long term basis. The operations are conducted as efficiently as we know how. We regularly review our operations and deployments to determine what is needed in the light of changing circumstances and adjust accordingly. We are careful not to be drawn into situations where military over-reaction exposes our personnel to unnecessary risks or compromises our broader strategic interests. But our operations and

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presence do involve real costs—in money, in burdens on personnel and equipment, in impact on competing priorities, and in risk of casualties.

However, the consequences of ending our military operations would be severe not only for the people of Iraq and for the region, but for critical U.S. interests. If we reduced our military presence in the region below the levels assessed as needed in prevailing conditions, we would simultaneously encourage Iraqi aggression and cripple our ability to meet it. We would compromise our ability to respond rapidly to aggression or preparations for it. We would be less capable of responding to other violations of our red lines. We would also severely undermine regional confidence in our commitments, with accompanying loss of support, not only for our diplomatic efforts, but also for our arrangements to respond and to reinforce in times of crisis.

This general observation about the effect of withdrawing militarily would also apply were we to cease our NFZ and MIF operations. If we stopped our active enforcement of the NFZs, Saddam would quickly take advantage to augment his forces in the zones, and would be able to use air power effectively in his internal suppression efforts. Ending NFZ operations would also cost us important intelligence, particularly about possible Iraqi preparations for aggression.

Without the MIF operations, Saddam would be free to shift increasing shares of his oil exports from UN-controlled oil-for-food channels into smuggling routes through the Persian Gulf, where he controls the proceeds. His ability to import contraband would be increased drastically. That would increase his resources to rebuild his military, develop WMD, and serve his other priorities.

Moreover, ending or sharply curtailing our deterrent presence, our NFZ enforcement, or our MIF operations would hand Saddam a huge political and strategic victory. That action would say to the regime and to the world that Saddam had been able to outlast the U.S. and break out of key elements of the restraints under which he has been placed. Maintaining our non-military efforts—notably in the region and through the UN—would be vastly more difficult. Those who seek to replace Saddam's regime would be discouraged, and his ability to block their actions increased.

CONCLUSION

Our overall policy toward Iraq has been successful in containing Iraqi aggression. It is a policy that the Department of Defense, in cooperation with the State Department and other agencies of government, executes on a daily basis. It is a policy that has required and will continue to require patience, tact, and perseverance. We have developed and are implementing this policy because if left to pursue its objectives unhindered by international sanctions and coalition forces, Iraq would pose an unacceptable threat to our national interests and the interests of our allies and friends in both the Middle East and around the world.

Chairman WARNER. We will proceed with Secretary Walker. The full text of your submitted statement will be made a part of the record.

**STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR EDWARD S. WALKER, JR., ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS**

Ambassador WALKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will just highlight the key points of that written record now.

Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed, and defiant. Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace and security as long as he remains in power. Just last week, an Iraqi official accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil in terms that are very reminiscent of charges which Iraq leveled against Kuwait 10 years ago. It is clear that the Iraqi regime will not live in peace with its neighbors, and not relinquish what remains of its weapons of mass destruction, and will not cease its repression of the Iraqi people.

For the past 10 years the United States has been committed to containing the threat posed by the Iraqi regime while providing a means for Iraq to meet its international obligations and rejoin the

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international community. Iraq has used every opportunity to reject its international requirements. Most recently, it rejected UN Security Council Resolution 1284, under which the Security Council could consider suspending sanctions if Iraq fulfilled key disarmament tasks and cooperated with weapons inspectors for 120 days.

Mr. Chairman, that is an open door. The UN Security Council Resolution 1284 is a resolution we worked hard on, that we voted for, and that we are committed to implementing, but the Iraqi regime rejected it, just as it has refused to implement any of the previous resolutions passed by the Security Council, and the regime has gone even further than that. It has rejected, manipulated, and obstructed measures to ease the burden its refusal has imposed on its own people or on others whom its aggression has victimized.

For 4 years, Iraq rejected the U.S. proposed oil-for-food program. When Iraq finally agreed to allow the program to operate, it sought every opportunity to undercut its purpose and turn its operation to the advantage of the regime. It has rejected offers of humanitarian assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. It declined to permit the visit of a humanitarian assessment mission the Security Council asked the Secretary General to send. It will not allow UN experts to visit to discuss the modalities of using oil-for-food funds to make local purchases now permitted under 1284. It has refused to permit the visit of the Secretary General's Special Envoy for Kuwait Missing Persons. For over 9 years, it has not allowed the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights to visit the country.

Our objective has remained constant: an Iraq that lives in peace with its neighbors and respects the rights of its people. However, we have come to the conclusion that the character of this regime and its evident intention to retain its weapons of mass destruction at all costs means that the chances of achieving those objectives with this regime in place are very small.

That means that even if Iraq were to meet its international obligations under the Security Council resolutions and sanctions were suspended and eventually lifted, Iraq would still represent a threat to our interests and those of our allies. It would still need to be contained until the Iraqi people overthrew the criminal enterprise that passes itself off as a government.

That is why our policy is containment until regime change, but there should be no confusion here. I said we would implement UN Security Council Resolution 1284 if Iraq meets its obligations, and we will.

We are also committed to the implementation of all the other Security Council resolutions pertaining to Iraq. Without sanctions, however, given what we know about the current Iraqi regime, we would need to find other ways to contain the regime's threat until the regime is gone.

In the meantime, we will contain the threat the regime represents, an effort for which the forces of General Frank's command are a linchpin. We will continue to prevent the regime from using its aircraft against its own people by enforcing the no-fly zones in the north and the south. We will continue working to improve the oil-for-food program to ensure that Iraq's resources are used for the benefit of the Iraqi people.

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We will continue to support Iraqis who seek the removal of the current Baghdad regime and its replacement by a new government under which Iraq can resume its rightful place in the Arab and international communities. We will continue working with the Iraqi National Congress to take full advantage of the training and material support provided for under the Iraq Liberation Act and to develop new programs and a range of activities, including humanitarian relief. We will intensify our efforts to hold Saddam Hussein and his lieutenants accountable for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Walker follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. EDWARD S. WALKER, JR.

Mr. Chairman: I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss U.S. policy towards Iraq. As Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs, I deal directly with overall policy towards Iraq, particularly our over-arching policy of containing the Iraqi regime, alleviating the humanitarian conditions of the Iraqi people, and promoting regime change.

Iraq under Saddam Hussein remains dangerous, unreconstructed, and defiant. Saddam's record makes clear that he will remain a threat to regional peace and security as long as he remains in power. He will not relinquish what remains of his WMD arsenal. He will not live in peace with his neighbors. He will not cease the repression of the Iraqi people. The regime of Saddam Hussein can not be rehabilitated or reintegrated as a responsible member of the community of nations. Experience and objective judgment make this manifest. That is why the United States is committed to encouraging and supporting the forces of change in Iraq, and that is why we will contain Saddam Hussein as long as he remains in power. At the same time, we are committed to working to alleviate the suffering of the Iraqi people, who are forced to live under a regime they did not choose and do not want. We are also committed to efforts to hold Saddam Hussein accountable for his crimes against humanity and his war crimes.

Let me first review the elements of containment, which remains an effective and successful policy for preserving peace in the region, though containment alone can not end the suffering of the Iraqis nor end the lingering threat Saddam's regime poses to regional stability. We contain Saddam through UN sanctions which severely limit the resources needed to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction and rebuild a conventional arsenal; through maintenance of no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq; and through a military presence in the region and a readiness to use force as necessary and appropriate.

Sanctions are the most critical element of containment and must continue until the current regime complies with all its obligations under UN Security Council resolutions. In the absence of the sanctions regime and a comprehensive international system of controls, Saddam Hussein would have unhindered control over Iraq's oil revenues—estimated at $20 billion this year alone—to spend on the priorities of his regime: be they reconstituting his nuclear program, producing chemical and biological weapons, bolstering his oppressive security apparatus, or building opulent palaces. Given the chance, it is inevitable Saddam would once again threaten the region and continue to ignore the plight of the Iraqi people.

In fact, we have seen nothing to indicate Iraq's thirst for weapons of mass destruction and long-range missiles has slackened. For current evidence of its continuing menace, we need look no further than the signs of activity at sites previously associated with Iraq's weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missile programs. Only this month, Saddam took the unprecedented step of personally addressing Iraq's nuclear scientists, and only last week the regime rejected French encouragement to pass legislation on the cessation of nuclear activities. These developments are of particular concern given the nearly 2-year absence of UN inspectors.

The Security Council, in adopting Resolution 1284, re-affirmed that Iraq has failed to fulfill its obligations under previous Security Council resolutions to declare and destroy its weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, Resolution 1284 strengthened containment. All members of the Security Council—even the four that abstained from the resolution—committed to implementing it, pressing Iraq to accept inspectors, and maintaining sanctions until Iraq complies with the terms of the resolution.

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Resolution 1284 established a new arms control organization, the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission, or UNMOVIC, to replace UNSCOM. UNMOVIC retains UNSCOM's broad mandate and authorities. It has the right to conduct inspections into Iraq's past WMD programs, as well as to monitor to prevent future development of WMD. It has the right to immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access to any and all sites, records, and facilities. An effective disarmament and monitoring regime inside Iraq would strengthen containment by further limiting Iraq's efforts to rearm. In the absence of inspectors on the ground, we must rely on national technical means which cannot provide the same level of assurance as effective monitoring on the ground.

Since adopting Resolution 1284, the UN Security Council has steadily moved towards its implementation. Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed Hans Blix of Sweden, former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, and Dr. Blix took up his duties on March 1. We have met repeatedly with Dr. Blix since his appointment, and he has made clear his commitment to putting in place a robust, technically-proficient organization which will require nothing less than Iraqi cooperation in all respects. He has had extensive experience with the deceitfulness of Saddam's regime and the lengths to which it goes in order to preserve its WMD programs.

In consultation with Dr. Blix and members of the Security Council, Secretary General Annan named a 16-member College of Commissioners for UNMOVIC to provide advice and guidance to Dr. Blix. The commissioners are a qualified group of experts, including Assistant Secretary of State for Non-Proliferation Robert Einhorn. They serve only as an advisory body, and Dr. Blix retains full authority to report his judgments to the Security Council. Dr. Blix is required to convene the commissioners every 3 months to solicit their advice. He did so in May and August and is scheduled to do so again in November.

In April, Dr. Blix submitted to the Security Council his organizational plan for UNMOVIC. Based on that plan, he has now nearly finished hiring approximately 40 core personnel—including several Americans—to staff UNMOVIC's New York office. In August, UNMOVIC concluded, with U.S. assistance as the host country, its first training program for personnel.

Dr. Blix has also issued his second quarterly report on UNMOVIC's activities to the Security Council. The Security Council is scheduled to discuss the report on September 22. The report is straightforward and factual. It discusses the College of Commissioners, recruitment, training, and on-going activities. Notably, it states that UNMOVIC "could plan and commence" preparatory inspections activities in Iraq now.

We believe Dr. Blix has rightly decided against traveling to Iraq until Baghdad accepts UNSCR 1284. In so doing, he has made it clear that his job is not to sell the resolution, but to implement it. We are satisfied Dr. Blix is preparing his organization to discharge its mandate when conditions permit.

If weapons inspectors are allowed back into Iraq, the next step is for UNMOVIC and the IAEA to draw up the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq. If Iraq fulfills these tasks, and cooperates with weapons inspectors for 120 days after reinforced monitoring is fully operational, the Council could act to suspend sanctions temporarily, provided appropriate financial controls are in place, and bearing in mind the humanitarian purposes of the Council's decisions. The embargo on military imports would remain in place, and dual-use items would continue to require prior approval. If Iraqi cooperation ceased, sanctions would be re-imposed automatically. Renewal of the suspension would require a positive Council decision every 120 days.

The condition for lifting sanctions on Iraq—full compliance with UN Security Council resolutions—remains unchanged. Unfortunately, we do not expect Iraq to meet that standard anytime soon. In fact, we doubt that Iraq will take the sensible steps necessary to obtain the lifting or suspension of sanctions so long as Saddam Hussein remains in power. Only in the last few days, Baghdad barred the Secretary General's experts from making an independent assessment of the humanitarian situation in Iraq. Beyond that, the regime has twice barred entry of experts seeking ways to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the oil-for-food program. Since the adoption of Resolution 1284, the regime has also refused the visit of the Chairman of the Sanctions Committee; denied thousands of its own citizens the opportunity to perform the Hajj; turned back Russian diplomat and UN Special Envoy Yuli Voronstov's efforts to look into the cases of missing persons; hindered efforts to carry out humanitarian demining in northern Iraq; refused to meet with UN Human Rights Rapporteur for Iraq; and—as already noted—rejected French suggestions to pass legislation on the cessation of nuclear activities. Most ominously, last week, Baghdad raised the same assertions regarding Kuwait that preceded its 1990

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invasion, accusing it of looting Iraqi oil fields and threatening it with unspecified measures.

As long as sanctions remain in place, it is essential that we address the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. An effective oil-for-food program, which provides the Iraqi people with basic civilian and humanitarian goods while denying the regime access to the most dangerous dual-use goods, serves both humanitarian interests and regional security. It is morally right for the international community to assist the Iraqi people, who are the pawns of Saddam Hussein. Doing so also reduces the risk of sanctions erosion and alleviates international pressure to ease or lift the mechanisms which keep Iraq's revenue out of Saddam's unfettered control.

Iraqi propaganda notwithstanding, UN sanctions have never targeted the Iraqi people and have never limited the import of food and medicine for the Iraqi people. In fact, the United States was an original sponsor of the first oil-for-food program, adopted in 1991. Tragically, Baghdad rejected that program, and it was not until 1996 that Iraq finally accepted oil-for-food. Since the first oil-for-food supplies arrived in Iraq in 1997, the program has brought tremendous improvements in living conditions. Iraqi per capita caloric intake has risen from 1,300 calories before the program began to over 2,000 calories now provided by a UN ration basket which is augmented by Iraqi agriculture. In fact, food imports are now at about pre-war levels.

Saddam Hussein, however, has abused the program to the detriment of the Iraqi people in an attempt to have sanctions lifted without compliance. Since the first delivery of oil-for-food supplies in March 1997, the government of Iraq has refused to work with UN authorities to maximize the benefit to the Iraqi population. Only last week, Baghdad barred the Secretary General's experts from making an independent assessment of the living conditions of Iraqis and improving the oil-for-food program by devising a system that would allow Iraq to spend oil-sales money to buy goods locally and stimulate the economy.

The needs of the most vulnerable groups, including children and the elderly, have been of particular concern. The Secretary General reported in March that Iraq had still not implemented the supplementary feeding programs, recommended for years by the UN, for malnourished children under five and for school children. These programs have been very successful in the north, where oil-for-food is administered by the UN in full cooperation with Kurdish authorities. By contrast, vaccination levels in Baghdad-controlled areas are worse than they were in 1994. The Iraqi government's ordering of food, medicine, and humanitarian supplies remains slow and erratic, and the distribution of goods after they reach Iraq continues to be a problem.

To get the clearest picture of the oil-for-food program and its potential, it is helpful to compare its operation in northern Iraq, where the UN controls distribution, to its operation in southern and central Iraq, where Saddam controls the distribution of goods. A UNICEF study on child mortality in Iraq conducted last year reported a disturbing rise in child mortality rates—more than double pre-war levels—in south and central Iraq, the parts of the country controlled by Saddam Hussein. But the report also revealed that child mortality rates in northern Iraq, where the UN controls distribution of the oil-for-food program, had dropped below pre-war levels. These numbers demonstrate that oil-for-food can work to meet the needs of the Iraqi people if the government can be prevented from interfering or can be compelled to manage the program efficiently with the well-being of the Iraqi people in mind.

Publicity surrounding the release of this survey last year led Baghdad finally to place orders for nutritional supplements—something the UN had long advocated. Early last year, the UN Secretary General reported that there were $275 million worth of medicines sitting in Iraqi warehouses undistributed. As a result of the publicity generated by this report, stockpiles were eventually reduced.

Even with the successes of the oil-for-food program, more can and should be done. That is why the U.S. supported Resolution 1284, which introduced further enhancements of the oil-for-food program. The resolution permits Iraq to sell as much oil as needed to meet the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. As of July 31, the UN reported that 11,500 oil-for-food contracts for humanitarian goods worth over $14 billion had been approved. More than $8 billion in food, medicine, and other supplies have now been delivered, and another $6 billion in humanitarian goods are on the way. Iraq's sales of oil will soon exceed pre-war levels and this year will go up to $20 billion.

Resolution 1284 also streamlined the contract approval process to facilitate the supply of legitimate goods and authorized the use of oil-for-food funds to purchase local goods, such as wheat, to provide a boost to Iraq's agricultural sector. Unfortunately, Iraq has blocked the agricultural possibility of local procurement under the oil-for-food program by refusing to allow experts into Iraq to consider options for im-

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plementation of this project. For our part, we have been examining our own national procedures for reviewing oil-for-food contracts to ensure that they are optimized to meet our priorities: maximizing assistance to the Iraqi people while denying the regime access to goods it could use to reconstitute its WMD programs.

The United States has been criticized for the number of holds we have placed on oil-for-food contracts. We recognize that some of this criticism reflects humanitarian concern, and we continue to review our procedures with this concern in mind. However, we must also be objective, as well as compassionate, in assessing and balancing the threat of the Iraqi regime and the plight of the Iraqi people.

The regime of Saddam Hussein has used chemical weapons against the Iraqi people and Iraq's neighbors. It has launched ballistic missiles, developed biological weapons, and had an active nuclear program. It has obstructed weapons inspections for 9 years in an effort to conceal these programs. This regime has the expertise and will to produce weapons of mass destruction, and a long track record of repeatedly lying about them. We cannot hand it the goods it needs to turn those intentions into reality—particularly in the absence of weapons inspectors. Consequently, we will continue to place holds on all prohibited items, including dual-use items which can be used to develop weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, we will do all we can to ensure that the Iraqi people receive the quality and quantity of food and medicine they need to improve their condition.

Following sanctions, the second key element of containment is the maintenance of no-fly zones. We have maintained a no-fly zone over northern Iraq since 1991 and over southern Iraq since 1992. These zones were established to prevent Saddam Hussein from using his air force against the civilian populations of these areas, as he has done so brutally in the past. We have been highly successful in this effort. The zones also provide critical buffers to detect any Iraqi troop movements north or south posing a threat to Iraq's citizens, its neighbors, or coalition forces. Iraqi propaganda denounces the no-fly zones as a pretext for ongoing military action against Iraqi forces, a charge which some others have repeated. In fact, the no-fly zones are protective, not offensive, in nature. Since December 1998, following Operation Desert Fox, Saddam Hussein has mounted a sustained challenge to our aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones. Our forces are fully prepared and authorized to defend themselves, and we have responded to these challenges with strikes on Iraq's integrated air defense system. Saddam Hussein will not deter us from our commitment to maintaining these zones as an important element of protection for the Iraqi people.

The third key element to our containment policy is the presence of U.S. military in the region. We currently maintain a credible force in the region and are prepared to act at an appropriate time and place of our choosing if Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction programs, threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces, or moves against the Kurds. The presence of this force is a constant deterrent to Iraqi aggression and intimidation and a continuing assurance of our commitment to the region and the Iraqi people. Its withdrawal would rekindle Baghdad's ambitions and give it a freer hand to directly threaten and coerce countries throughout the region.

Our rigorous and responsible approach to sanctions and the oil-for-food program, our maintenance of the no-fly zones, and our military presence have earned the support of countries inside and outside the region. Our efforts have elicited criticism and complaint from others who have chosen to turn a politically or commercially blinded eye to Iraq's hostile ambitions and continuing threat. Some of these countries have been motivated by Iraq's cynical manipulation of the oil-for-food program to bribe and coerce cooperation. They orchestrate contributions to Iraq's efforts to politicize, flout, and undermine the sanctions regime. Their actions do nothing to help the Iraqi people, but only encourage the Iraqi regime to continue its attack on the requirements of the Security Council and the international community.

As we work to strengthen containment and alleviate the condition of the Iraqi people, we also continue to support Iraqis who seek the removal of the current Baghdad regime and its replacement by a new government under which Iraq can resume its rightful place in the Arab and international communities. An important element of our regime change effort is our ongoing program of assistance to the external Iraqi opposition. We continually tell the Iraqis that they can and must determine the future of Iraq. We will assist them as we can, but we will not, indeed should not, be the ones to decide who will be the next leader of Iraq.

Since I last testified, the Iraqi National Congress has begun building the organization and staffing needed to take full advantage of the training and material support provided for under the Iraq Liberation Act. The first four INC members were invited under the ILA to participate in a military training course in November 1999 at Hurlburt Air Force Base. Since then, over 40 more opposition members have received or are receiving training, of something approaching 200 candidates in the

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pipeline. The Defense Department has prepared an extensive list of training options for free Iraqis and, in cooperation with the INC, has begun filling the pipeline to provide the same training to free Iraqis that is enjoyed by other allied and friendly officers. Since the beginning of summer, INC members have received training in security assistance, emergency medical technician/hospital corpsmanship, cargo and warehouse management, civil-military relationships, and public affairs. Other courses are scheduled throughout the fall and winter.

We also have signed our first grant agreement to provide direct funding to the INC. This funding has enabled the INC to renew its efforts to reach out to constituents and to establish the infrastructure necessary to accomplish its objectives and to take advantage of U.S. programs.

Another fundamental function the INC will focus on is providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqis inside Iraq. This important responsibility dovetails with our own national goals of alleviating the suffering of the Iraqi people. The INC will develop an infrastructure to deliver critically needed humanitarian goods to segments of the Iraqi population that Saddam Hussein has ignored. We look forward to assisting them in taking this and other steps toward building a humane and democratic government and civil society in Iraq.

As a government, we are also stepping up our efforts to hold accountable the top Iraqi leadership for crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. This effort has three components. First, we are gathering evidence from U.S. Government files and declassifying and releasing as much as we can. Second, we are supporting the work of NGOs that make important contributions to holding the Iraqi regime accountable. We have already provided $2 million to four separate but related activities: making captured Iraqi documents available on the Internet; gathering videotape and imagery of Iraqi crimes; gathering witness statements to justify prosecution of top Iraqi officials; and helping to focus the international public on the crimes committed by the Baghdad regime. We also expect the Iraqi opposition to make a major contribution to the campaign to bring the Baghdad regime to justice, and many groups and individuals have already begun to do so. Third, we have increased our diplomatic activity on the issue, discussing the possibilities of a UN tribunal or committee of experts with other UN Security Council members. We are also encouraging those governments who can bring appropriate cases under international conventions like the UN Convention Against Torture to do so within their laws.

This heightened attention by NGOs to the crimes of the Iraqi leadership has already borne fruit. Over the last year a number of Iraqi officials have been compelled to become far more fearful of where they travel, lest they find themselves in the arms of the law.

No one can predict when this criminal regime will end or what will follow. But by supporting sanctions, maintaining the no-fly zones, remaining prepared to use force, promoting regime change, and seeking accountability for top Iraqi leaders, we increase the pressure on the regime. We contain the threat it poses to the region and the Iraqi people. We hasten the day when Iraq will resume its place among the family of free nations.

I welcome any questions you may have.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. General Franks.

## STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA, COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, Senator Levin, Senator Thurmond, members of the committee, it is an honor to appear today before the committee to discuss the military aspects of our Iraq policy. I have provided a written statement and would ask that it be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to offer a few brief opening remarks as well.

To begin with, I would like to thank the committee for your recent support during my confirmation some 2 months ago. It has been an exciting 2 months. We completed initial visits to our forces and leaders in the region, as well as concluded consultations with leaders in both the Defense and State Departments here in Washington.

I will offer several initial observations at this point. First, Mr. Chairman, the men and women who proudly serve our Nation in

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uniform are absolutely magnificent. They serve selflessly, with great skill, in the central region every day. They serve in severe conditions, often at the risk of their own lives. I am proud of these young people. They represent the United States of America very well. They take their jobs seriously, and I take my obligation to care for them equally seriously.

Next, a few points, sir, on our partners in the region, namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman. In each case, we share common interests with these states. Those interests are security and stability in the region. Each of our partners recognize Saddam Hussein is a threat to his own people, to his neighbors, and to the peace and prosperity they seek for their own people.

These states provide valuable cooperation in every case, and support to our efforts to contain Saddam Hussein. In some cases, they host our forward presence forces, provide infrastructure, and allow prepositioning of our stocks. In other cases they host Operation Southern Watch or maritime intercept forces and provide substantial assistance in kind. In yet other cases, they provide construction support and direct monetary support.

All provide access, overflight, or bed-down facilities during contingency operations in the region, and in every case our core military relationships are strong and growing.

Now, sir, that said, maintaining coalitions is hard work. It is not without problems and frustrations. Each of these sovereign states has interests and priorities, and without the dedication of diplomats in the region as well as the day-to-day engagement activities of our men and women in uniform and Department of Defense civilians, as the Secretary said, we would not be able to sustain the support of these critical partners.

Finally, permit me to offer a few observations on Iraq. In my view, our military objectives vis-a-vis Saddam Hussein are clear and appropriate. We reinforce, or we enforce the no-fly zones and the no-enhancement zone to protect the Iraqi people and to prevent threats to Saddam Hussein's neighbors.

We execute maritime intercept operations to limit his ability to sell illicit oil, the proceeds from which certainly do not help the Iraqi people, and we maintain sufficient military capability in the region to respond to aggression. We are prepared to enlarge that capability in support of our policy, if required.

These objectives are not easy objectives. They involve commitment of dollars. They involve risks to the lives of Americans every day. The stakes are high. That said, I believe the objectives are the right objectives. U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) has played an effective role in the execution of our strategy in the region in the past, and I am committed to continuing that role for so long as may be necessary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to take any questions the committee may have for me.

[The prepared statement of General Franks follows:]

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## PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEN. TOMMY R. FRANKS, USA

### INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee. Last month marked the tenth anniversary of Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait. In response to this unprovoked act of aggression, the United States organized a broad international coalition to liberate Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm. Had the United States not met this challenge, the Middle East would be a much more dangerous, unstable place today. We remain, however, engaged in unfinished business in the Central Region: Saddam Hussein is still in power, and were he free to act as he wishes, he would almost certainly once again plunge his country and the region into war. The peoples of Iraq and the region would suffer as a result of his policies.

I intend to describe USCENTCOM's role in U.S. policy regarding Iraq and leave the description of overall U.S. policy to my esteemed colleagues from OSD and State Department. USCENTCOM is working to ensure that Saddam does not threaten his neighbors in the region and we add to the security of Iraqis in both northern and southern Iraq by enforcing no-fly zones.

Indeed, the U.S., together with its allies, plays a key role in containing Iraq. USCENTCOM and USEUCOM are at the forefront of this effort, which consists of several components: a significant forward military presence; no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq, a no-enhancement zone in southern Iraq; and maritime interdiction operations.

*Forward Presence*

By maintaining a significant forward presence in the region, the U.S. seeks to deter and, if need be, to defeat Iraqi aggression. To this end, at any given time, some 30 naval vessels, 175 military aircraft, and between 17,000–25,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are in the CENTCOM AOR. In recent years, CENTCOM has taken steps to strengthen our forward presence and our ability to rapidly project forces to the region through Operation Desert Spring exercises in Kuwait, and our post-Operation Desert Storm pre-positioning efforts. We have taken steps to reduce the impact of deployments on readiness, and we have worked to minimize the vulnerability of our troops in the region to terrorism. Thanks to these efforts, both we and our allies are comfortable with current force levels, and believe we can sustain such levels for the foreseeable future.

*No-Fly Zones*

CENTCOM and EUCOM are responsible for enforcing no-fly zones over southern and northern Iraq, respectively. U.S. aircraft have flown more than 200,000 sorties in support of Operation Southern Watch (which has patrolled the southern no-fly zones since August 1992) and more than 16,000 sorties in support of Operation Northern Watch (which succeeded Operation Provide Comfort in January 1997).

The no-fly zones are a key component of containment, and the aircrews who risk their lives daily by patrolling the skies of northern and southern Iraq are making an important contribution to U.S. policy. For the Iraqi people who live in both the north and south, the no-fly zones provide a degree of protection from Saddam Hussein. The no-fly zones are a constant reminder of coalition resolve, and are thus a key component of America's deterrent posture. Moreover, by limiting training opportunities for the Iraqi air force, the no-fly zones have helped degrade Iraq's military capabilities. These operations also yield valuable intelligence concerning Iraqi forces, and provide an invaluable additional margin of early warning regarding potential threats to Kuwait.

The additional warning margin afforded by the southern no-fly zone ensures that we are much better prepared today to deal with Iraqi threats to Kuwait than we were in 1990. In this regard, our readiness posture is aided by constraints on Iraqi ground deployments (thanks to the no-enhancement zone established in the south by UN Security Council Resolution 949 in October 1994), and our improved ability to rapidly project forces to the region.

Since Operation Desert Fox in December 1998, much public attention has focused on ongoing coalition operations against Iraqi ground-based air defenses in the no-fly zones. In the wake of Operation Desert Fox, aircraft supporting Operation Southern Watch have responded to some 650 Iraqi violations or provocations on 80 different occasions, while aircraft supporting Operation Northern Watch have responded to more than 110 violations or provocations on some 40 occasions. Each one of these actions has been in response to hostile action by Iraqi air defenses, and we have gone to extraordinary lengths to select targets and specific weapons so as to minimize collateral damage.

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*Maritime Interdiction Operations*

CENTCOM also conducts Maritime Interdiction Operations to enforce UN sanctions on Iraq. The Maritime Interdiction Force (MIF) was created in 1990 to help enforce UN Security Council Resolution 665, which grants UN member states authority to enforce UN sanctions; it incorporates naval vessels from eight countries (Argentina, Australia, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the UAE, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.). The MIF has impounded millions of dollars worth of oil illicitly exported by the Iraqi government as part of its efforts to generate unsupervised income. The MIF presence also aids in constraining Baghdad's ability to import prohibited items by sea. For the last several years, Iranian naval forces have facilitated Iraqi maritime oil smuggling. This has made enforcing UN sanctions on Baghdad more difficult for the MIF. Iranian complicity has allowed Baghdad to smuggle on average 309,000 metric tons (or about 2.265 million barrels) of oil a month to world markets, primarily through Iranian coastal waters, earning Saddam Hussein in excess of $500 million annually. These figures should, however, be seen in context. Iraq has smuggled approximately 76,000 barrels per day (b/d) of oil through the Gulf while legitimate exports average 2.5 million barrels per day, or said another way—this year, the amount of oil smuggled through the Gulf has averaged less than 3 percent of total exports.

*Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Weapons Inspections*

Iraq's WMD capabilities remain a key concern. It has been more than a year and a half since UN weapons inspections last occurred in Iraq, and Saddam Hussein has thus far refused new inspections. In the absence of inspections, we suspect that WMD research, development, and even production activities may have continued although we have no firm evidence that they have. These concerns underscore the need for UNMOVIC—the new UN weapons inspection organization established by UN Security Council Resolution 1284 in December 1999—to begin work in Iraq. Resolution 1284 offers a fair deal: the suspension of economic sanctions in return for full compliance. Were Saddam Hussein genuinely interested in assuring the welfare of his people, he would accept such a bargain. Baghdad's record of using WMD against its own population and Iran, underscores the urgency of efforts to account for Iraq's remaining capabilities in this area, and preclude the development and/or acquisition of new WMD capabilities.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

In sum, despite the difficulty and frustration inherent in sustaining our current policy, I believe we should stay the course, while seeking to advance our policy objectives in Iraq, safeguard the security of our coalition partners in the region, and provide for the welfare of the Iraqi people.

Saddam Hussein will continue to challenge our resolve. He will challenge our pilots in the no-fly zones, he will continue to seek sympathy for the plight of the Iraqi people—for which he alone is responsible—and he will attempt to rebuild the capability to threaten his neighbors.

We must be ready for such challenges, and in consultation with our allies and coalition partners, we must ensure that Saddam Hussein is denied his ultimate objective of regional domination. The soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines of CENTCOM remain committed to the task.

Chairman WARNER. Secretary Slocombe, you wish to have a wrap-up.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me just address one question that was asked explicitly in the committee's invitation of this hearing, and that is the consequences of ending our military operations in the area. Dealing with Saddam Hussein's Iraq is a long-term problem. Saddam Hussein knows the only way he can prevail and break out of the box in which he has put himself is by outlasting the United States, undermining our coalition and UN efforts.

These efforts are costly in dollars and in the burdens they place on our personnel and, inevitably, the ongoing military commitments involve risks, and the commitments that we have made to deal with contingencies potentially involve very substantial risks and costs.

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Nevertheless, if we were to let our own patience or unwillingness to tolerate these costs drive us to abandon the longer term effort, Saddam Hussein would have won in the only way he can, and the cost to our interest would be immense.

Accordingly, it is our judgment that military contributions to the overall effort will need to continue on a long-term basis. The operations are conducted as efficiently as our commanders know how. We regularly review our operations and deployments to determine what is needed in light of changing circumstances and adjust accordingly.

We are careful not to be drawn into situations where military overreaction exposes our personnel to unnecessary risks or compromises our broader strategic interest, but our operations and our presence do involve real cost in money and burdens on personnel and equipment, and impacting on competing priorities, and in risk of casualties. This is inevitable.

But the consequences of ending our military operations would be severe not only for the people of Iraq and for the region, and for the credibility of the United Nations, but for U.S. interests.

Specifically, if we reduced our military presence in the region below the levels assessed as needed in prevailing conditions, we would simultaneously encourage Iraqi aggression and cripple our ability to meet it. We would compromise our ability to respond rapidly to aggression or preparations for it. We would be less capable of responding to other violations of our red lines. We would also severely undermine the regional confidence in our commitments with accompanying losses not only for our diplomatic efforts but also for our arrangements to respond and reinforce in times of crisis.

This general observation about the effect of withdrawing militarily also applies were we to cease either our no-fly zone or our antismuggling operations. If we stopped our active enforcement of the no-fly zones, Saddam Hussein would rapidly take advantage to augment his forces in the zones and would be able to use air power effectively against his internal suppression efforts. Ending no-fly zone operations would also cost us important intelligence, particularly about possible Iraqi preparations for aggression.

Without the maritime intercept operations, Saddam Hussein would be free to shift increasing shares of his oil exports from UN controlled oil-for-food channels into smuggling routes through the Arabian Gulf, where he has complete control of the proceeds. His ability to import contraband would be increased drastically. That would increase his resources to rebuild his military, develop WMD, and serve his other priorities.

Moreover, ending or sharply curtailing our current presence, our no-fly zone enforcement or our MIF operations, would hand Saddam a huge political and strategic victory. That action would say to the regime and to the world that Saddam had been able to outlast the United States and break out of key elements of the restraints under which he has been placed. Maintaining our nonmilitary efforts in the region and through the UN would be vastly more difficult. Those who seek to replace Saddam's regime would be discouraged, and his ability to block their actions increased.

Our overall policy toward Iraq has been successful in containing Iraqi aggression, and it is a policy that the Department of Defense,

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in cooperation with the State Department and other agencies of Government, executes on a daily basis. It is a policy that has required and will continue to require patience, tact, and perseverance.

We have developed and are implementing this policy because we are satisfied that, if left to pursue its objectives unhindered by international sanctions, coalition forces, current military operations, and our other efforts, Iraq would pose an unacceptable threat to our national interest and the interest of our allies and friends in both the Middle East and around the world.

Chairman WARNER. Let me pick right up on that, Secretary Slocombe. The future security of this Nation is highly dependent on our ability to form coalitions with other nations, to use force if diplomacy fails. We have watched in the Bosnia and Kosovo conflict in the Balkans through the years a very strong united front in the several coalitions that have been formed to bring about peace and stability in that region. Today, in Kosovo, we have French forces, Russian forces, forces of 30 nations doing the peacekeeping, and that was to contain a despot not unlike Saddam Hussein, Milosevic.

Now, you move to Iraq. We have but two nations, the United States and Great Britain. France, a very valued ally, indeed, an integral part of NATO and an integral part of the leadership in Europe, actively working against us, Russia playing whatever card it wishes, but not participating, and China likewise voting against it.

Now, draw a parallel between those situations and provide the American people with an explanation why in one area to contain a despot we have the strong coalitions, and in another we are going it alone.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, I do not dispute in any way that there is not as broad participation, especially in ongoing military operations in the Arabian Gulf area, as there is in the Balkans, but I do think it is something of an exaggeration to say we are going it alone. As General Franks reviewed in his statement, we do get very substantial and very important and absolutely essential support in the region, countries which are most directly threatened and most immediately involved. Also, while——

Chairman WARNER. Wait a minute. Let us not leave that point. If you are referring to the Gulf nations which are providing bases for our forces and other infrastructure support, I can name three of those nations that are actively conducting diplomatic and trade relationships with Iraq at the same time they are housing and providing for our troops.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that if we were able to tell other countries exactly how to conduct their Iraq policies we would tell them different, and I think we are right and they are wrong. That is the issue.

On the other hand, it is the case that we get very substantial support for our military operations, and I forget whether it was you or Senator Levin that read this statement from the Gulf Council. We certainly agree they should cut back or they should eliminate some of these activities that you identified. Different countries have rather different perspectives on how to manage this, but in the region we get substantial support. I would like it if we got

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more, but we get substantial support. We get what we need to do the job that really needs to be done.

Even at the United Nations, for the immense frustrations of dealing with the other members of the Security Council and the other countries, we have had, over remarkably long period of time for something as controversial as this, we have had substantial support. I mean, even the French, the foreign minister said in substance, "we did not vote for Resolution 1284, but we believe it should be followed, and the Iraqis should not look to us to rescue them."

Chairman WARNER. Well, that is speaking with a forked tongue, when they say "we did not vote for it but it ought to survive." That sends a signal to Saddam Hussein.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I mean, what you are saying now, it is clear that what Saddam Hussein is hoping is that by refusing to comply with Resolution 1284 he will get a further watering down of the conditions, and I think it is significant. It would be perhaps appropriate to ask Ambassador Walker on this issue.

Chairman WARNER. Let me also put in the record, I think it is important in General Franks' statement, page 4, he points out, we are receiving in the maritime operation help from Argentina, Australia, Kuwait, the Netherlands, New Zealand, UAE, United Kingdom, and the U.S.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think other NATO countries have as well.

Chairman WARNER. Let us make sure the record has all of those countries in there through the years. But again I say, Mr. Secretary, the Gulf states are offering this help at the same time some of them are participating in the smuggling operations. Some of them have diplomatic relations. Some of them are trading with Iraq. There is a high degree of hypocrisy, I find.

Now we will shift to Secretary Walker. I will pose a question and you can take it from there. When you see the United Nations unable through its member nations to get a coalition together and to have a strong vote to send to him, does that not just render in the eyes of many the UN as just nothing but a paper tiger, and here we are putting at risk our men and women to try and support that resolution of the United Nations Security Council.

Ambassador WALKER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out, it is true some of the Gulf nations have trading relations with Iraq. These relations are for the most part, except for sanctions busting, accepted under Resolution 1284 and are part of the oil-for-food program and, indeed, many countries have that kind of trading relationship with Iraq.

In addition, there are quite a few states that have diplomatic representation in Iraq and the Gulf states are not unique in that regard.

Chairman WARNER. I think it would be helpful if you would provide for the record exactly those states in the Gulf and the extent to which they have relationships with Iraq.

Ambassador WALKER. Yes, certainly, I would be happy to do that.

[The information referred to follows:]

Countries that have participated in the Maritime Interception Force (MIF) include: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Ku-

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wait, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I should have said, Mr. Chairman, there was a huge trade, legal trade sanctioned under the oil-for-food program. It covers more than food in the literal sense.

Ambassador WALKER. For the UN and its ability to enforce its decisions, Mr. Chairman, I think that the record speaks for itself.

There have been 10 years in which these sanctions have been held against Saddam Hussein, and let us remember what those sanctions were there for. They are principally there to prevent Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his military structure, from developing his weapons of mass destruction, and to ensure that he does not have the cash in hand to violate those sanctions to the extent possible.

These purposes have been served. Saddam Hussein does not represent the kind of threat that he represented in 1990 against his neighbors. His weapons of mass destruction program, which at the time in 1990 UNSCOM estimated was 1 year away from development of nuclear weapons, has not developed nuclear weapons, so I would say that in its basic premises the Security Council resolutions, the sanctions regime has been very effective.

It has not led to the demise of the Saddam Hussein regime. That was not its purpose. Certainly the only way that we can see that Iraq will return to the family of nations is when that regime disappears.

Chairman WARNER. Given those very valid reasons as to why this policy should be enforced, and we indeed are enforcing it, why would France, Russia, and China abstain in the face of the world not to try and help us contain this despot?

Ambassador WALKER. I do not want to pretend to speak for France, Russia, or China, but I can say this. There are two sets of concerns that are out there today, without naming specific countries: those who are genuinely concerned about the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and the poor state of health of particularly infants and so on that has occurred there, and then those who are concerned about gaining contracts and achieving money, so both of those concerns are out there.

Some countries have humanitarian concerns and for that reason we are doing everything we can to improve the oil-for-food program to increase the amount of the caloric intake going to the children in Iraq, and to take whatever steps we can to ensure that humanitarian——

Chairman WARNER. That transitions to my last question. On December 16, 1998, this Nation launched a military attack called Operation Desert Fox to enforce the UN resolutions to try and get the inspectors back in. Now, that failed to take place. We had the Blix team ready to go in, and Saddam Hussein defiantly saying that they shall not cross the border. Is a military option now being reviewed to try and enforce the UN resolution to take the Blix team and put it in, and if not, why not?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. First of all, Mr. Chairman, to be clear, the purpose of the 1998 Operation Desert Fox was emphatically not to try to bomb the inspectors back in. It was mounted because we had reached a point where, although the inspectors were physically

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present in Iraq, or some of them, they were not able to do their job. That was the conclusion which Richard Butler reached, and it was not that we had a perfect inspection regime and for some reason we kicked it out and decided to bomb. We did the operation because we had reached the conclusion, or Butler had reached the conclusion, that UNSCOM was not able to do its job, and we thought it was an appropriate reaction.

With respect to what we will do in the current situation, I outlined in my statement what has been said by far more senior officials in the Government than me as to the conditions under which we would use force. Resolution 1284 is a binding resolution on Iraq. It requires Iraq to allow the inspectors in. It makes clear that if he does not do that, sanctions will remain in place, and it provides, looked at from the other side, a way in which he can by cooperation ease sanctions. That is our position with respect to that.

Chairman WARNER. I infer from that a military option is not on the table.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is not what I said, and that is not what has been said by senior officials, regardless of what has been reported in the press.

Our position on what we will—we will make our decisions on the basis of what we think our national interest requires, and in particular, if those three red lines, one of which relates to the reconstitution of WMD, is crossed.

Chairman WARNER. Do you wish to expand on that, Secretary Walker, in terms of what is the decision process now with regard to the defiance by Iraq to allow the new team to go in?

Ambassador WALKER. Mr. Chairman, Resolution 1284 itself is self-enforcing, in the sense that it holds the promise of continued sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein does not accept the resolution, and it holds—as the Secretary has said—the key for Saddam Hussein to take his path out of the sanctions, to suspension and finally to a lifting of the sanctions.

That is the principal mechanism that we believe should be used to try to get the inspectors back into Iraq, and we have to remember that Saddam Hussein has never immediately leapt to accept any previous inspection regime, when UNSCOM was proposed, for example, so let us see where this process goes.

Chairman WARNER. Over how much time are we going to do "let's see" and have our American pilots and British pilots continue to take risks?

Ambassador WALKER. Well, Senator, I cannot speculate on how long it is going to take for Saddam Hussein to decide that his interests, his best interests lie in accepting the UN sanctions regime, or accepting the Resolution 1284 way out of the sanctions regime. He has certainly proven himself to be obdurate in the past, but I can say that so long as he refuses to take the road out of sanctions he remains a credible threat to the region.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. After France abstained on the vote on Resolution 1284, did it also then notify Iraq that the only solution for Iraq was to comply with the resolution?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not know the timing, but that has been the French Government's position, yes.

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Senator LEVIN. Is that your understanding?

Ambassador WALKER. That is my understanding, yes.

Senator LEVIN. The report that we read in the *New York Times* and which quotes the foreign minister of France says, "that I met with Tariq Aziz the day before yesterday—this is September 13. I told him that the only solution for Iraq was to comply with Resolution 1284." That is your understanding of the French position even though they abstained on it?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. They notified Iraq their only choice was Resolution 1284?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The significance of that, apart from stating what is in fact Iraq's obligation, is I think it is important that it makes clear that the French do not intend to support an effort to now have a new set of conditions which would be less onerous. It is a very important action of support for the UN resolution.

Senator LEVIN. Now on the question of what is the key to the lifting of sanctions. Is it correct that economic sanctions will be lifted when Iraq complies with the inspections regime? Is that the key?

Ambassador WALKER. Senator, there are two phases to this. In the first phase, once UNMOVIC Chairman Hans Blix has identified a set of key provisions that Iraq has to comply with, and they establish a monitoring system and 120 days of cooperation have taken place, then the Security Council would have the ability to suspend sanctions.

Thereafter, Saddam Hussein would have to comply with all of the Security Council resolutions in order to get an actual lifting of the sanctions, and in addition I would say that even under suspension there would still be constraints, controls over any arms deliveries or dual use items for weapons of mass destruction, and finally there would be controls over the financial flow of cash into his coffers.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But the short answer is, the only way he can get sanctions taken off is to comply.

Senator LEVIN. But the compliance is specifically with the inspections. It does not involve resolution of claims, is that correct?

Ambassador WALKER. That is correct. The suspension applies only to the key tasks which Hans Blix and his people will identify, and these are key tasks in disarmament.

Senator LEVIN. Now, let's discuss the use of military force. I take it you have looked at that option to try to enforce the resolution and the inspections. You have decided that that is not the best option for us, that the option would be considered if and when three or four red lines are crossed. One of them would be that he has reconstituted a weapons of mass destruction capability, is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have not ruled out any decision, but subject to any decision that we have ruled something in or ruled something out, what you have said is accurate.

Senator LEVIN. Then, what is the meaning of the three red lines?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The three red lines are in effect things that we have ruled in. If any of those three red lines were crossed, we then would have the capability and have demonstrated we are prepared to use it.

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Senator LEVIN. But you are not ruling out the use of military force, even in the absence of one of those red lines being crossed.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am not ruling it in or not ruling it out.

Senator LEVIN. In the absence of those lines being crossed.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In the absence of those lines being crossed.

Senator LEVIN. Now, you have indicated in your statement that you are willing and have demonstrated in the past our ability to use military force in response to Iraq's failure to meet its obligations.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes, that's right.

Senator LEVIN. But the obligations could include the willingness to allow in an inspection team. As I understand it, and I want to be real clear, that is not one of the red lines, is that correct?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Failure to meet inspections is not, per se, one of the red lines, that is correct.

Senator LEVIN. I think we have to have real clarity.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I do not want to be in the position of being reported as having made some threat that we have not made, but I also do not want to be in the position of giving the committee the impression that we have ruled something out when we have not ruled it out. Red lines have the distinction of that scenario where we have in effect said, you cross these red lines, and you will face the very real possibility of an American military response.

Senator LEVIN. The reason I am pressing you on that is that in your statement you have used the word obligation. One of the obligations under the resolution is to allow in the inspection team, so that the word obligation is not to be taken as synonymous with red lines.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As every obligation of Iraq, but there have been situations, of course, in which we have used force because of threats against aircraft and so on.

Senator LEVIN. General Franks, Iran cracked down on the smuggling of Iraqi oil in April and May of this year, but subsequent to that Iran apparently facilitated Iraqi oil smuggling. Can you tell us what that situation is at present? Do you see any pattern in Iran's decisionmaking as to whether either to block or to facilitate Iraqi oil smuggling?

General FRANKS. Senator Levin, as I said in my remarks for the record, Iran does, in fact, facilitate the movement of smuggled oil that comes out of Iraq through Iranian territorial waters. As to extent of this activity, I will give you the metrics on it.

Thus far this year since the beginning of January we have queried 850 vessels in the Arabian Gulf. We have boarded 340 of those vessels. We have cleared 285 of these vessels, and we have diverted 55 of those vessels.

Off and on during these 8 or 9 months we have had spikes and lulls with respect to how much oil has been smuggled through the Iranian waters, and that is probably as close to your specific question as I can get, sir.

Senator LEVIN. Finally, General, the question about readiness. Are you satisfied with the readiness and capability of the forces under your command. Can you tell us what steps you have taken to reduce the impacts on readiness?

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General FRANKS. Sir, U.S. Central Command does not have large standing forces, which is to say we take our forces on a task and mission basis from the various Services of our Armed Forces as well as from other unified commands.

On a given day, we will have 19,000 to 20,000 soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines involved in our activities in the area of operational responsibility, some 175 to 200 aircraft, and somewhere in the vicinity of 25 or so ships involved in that.

I will tell you, sir, and I will tell this committee that in every case the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines arrive under my control fully trained, ready, and motivated and so, sir, what I would say is I have no concerns about the readiness of American forces or British forces who appear in our area of responsibility.

I will be quick to say that it is obvious that the operating tempo of our Armed Forces is very high, and the Service Chiefs are much engaged with this committee as well as this body in discussion of these issues. But I would further say that as recently as yesterday when I spoke to Rick Shinseki, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the thing that he applauds is that the training and warfighting skill opportunities that are provided in our region for the troops who rotate there are very good. Reenlistment has proven over time to be very high.

So on the one hand with this long answer I would say that the readiness is very good, the operating tempo remains very high, but we do not see a degradation of readiness of the forces who have come to us. In fact, they arrive good, but they leave better, because they have had an opportunity to acquaint themselves with the region and, as you would certainly know, this area being an area of vital and enduring interest to the country, is also what we call one of our major theaters.

Senator LEVIN. My time is up. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. I am going to interject here. This important colloquy between Secretary Slocombe and Senator Levin about the red line, for those who do not have a copy of your statement, on page 3 you outline what those red lines are, and I will read them.

So far as our fundamental military policy, we have been clear, if Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction, threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces, and I assume that would include British forces and allies participating, or moves against the Kurds—and you leave out any reference to the southern operation. I do not know why. Is that purposely done?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. Then you might explain that at some point in time.

Lastly, General Franks, when you said there were some 19,000 of our troops, every one of those persons to some degree is taking personal risk, am I not correct? We focus on the airmen, but indeed those based in very diverse locations throughout this region have the risk of terrorism at sea, possible interdiction by some hostile force, am I not correct in that?

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, you are correct, and added to that are the normal safety issues associated with very high operating tempo in even a peacetime environment, so yes, sir, we have the Iraqi threat in the maritime as well as in the no-fly zones. We

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have the ever-present terrorist threat, and we have the normal operating tempo safety considerations with which the Chairman is very aware.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you.

Senator Thurmond.

Senator THURMOND. Thank you very much.

Ambassador Walker, there is considerable pressure to resume scheduled flights to Baghdad. Both Russia and Jordan have been indicated their hope to resume flights. In typical fashion, the UN Security Council is divided over the air embargo, with Russia and France saying there are no specific provisions banning civilian flights.

What is your understanding of this matter, and what will the administration do if either Jordan or Russia resumes flights?

Ambassador WALKER. Senator, I would say that our understanding is that the Security Council in their resolutions do, indeed, preclude the scheduled passenger flights to Iraq. Any flights in the past have been referred to the Sanctions Committee. The recent Russian flight that just went to Baghdad was referred to and approved by the Sanctions Committee.

The lawyers at the UN have indicated that such flights, scheduled or not, which are passenger or cargo, do fall within the nature of the sanctions and are covered by them. There are certain provisions in which an aircraft that overflies a country would have to land to be inspected to ensure it had no prohibited cargo, but also another provision which says that aircraft cannot fly to Iraq without the permission of the Sanctions Committee.

Therefore, we continue to believe that such flights must be on a case-by-case basis, controlled and approved by the Sanctions Committee. Thus far, we have seen no effort on the part of the Russians or any other major state to violate the sanctions.

Senator THURMOND. Mr. Ambassador, although both the United Nations and Iraq are using the oil-for-food program to their advantage, what are the concerns regarding the effectiveness of the program? With the western nations paying record prices for crude oil, one would assume that the common people of Iraq are benefiting greatly from the windfall. What percent of the revenue from Iraq's total oil production is going to the people and how much is Saddam diverting for his own benefit and that of his clique?

Ambassador WALKER. Senator, I think that specific statistics are difficult to get in this case, because they are controlled by Iraq and we cannot rely on any Iraq statistics.

Their oil sales at current prices would account for approximately $20 billion this next year. We hope, of course, those prices do not prevail over the long period. Their oil income pre-war was $15 billion a year. A substantial part of that income at the time, up to $13 billion, was devoted to rebuilding or to building the military force after the Iran-Iraq war.

It is clear that a substantial amount of the money that goes even through the oil-for-food program is diverted by Saddam Hussein from his own people. We have clear indications some of this is sold, then, on the open market, or smuggled outside of Iraq. Some of it goes to favored areas and provinces, while other provinces get virtually nothing. There are clear problems with the distribution sys-

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tem which he uses consciously in order to reward those who support him and punish those that are opposed to him.

I think the greatest evidence of how the program is manipulated is the distinction between the Kurdish north and the southern areas which Saddam Hussein controls. Oil-for-food distribution in the Kurdish areas is controlled by the UN, and in that area malnutrition among children under 5 has dropped by one-third since 1996, whereas in the southern area the drop has been less. Child mortality is lower in the north than in the pre-war periods. In the south, it has increased substantially.

So you can see a clear distinction and a manipulation that is taking place in the south as opposed to the north, where it is being fairly distributed.

Senator THURMOND. General Franks, on September 14 the *New York Times* carried a story that an Iraqi jet flew into Saudi Arabian air space.

The article further stated that American and British aircraft that patrolled the no-fly zone were not flying that day and were unable to scramble quickly enough to challenge the Iraqi plane. More concerning than this incident was the allegation that Iraqi jets have entered the southern zone more than 150 times since December 1998.

Are the issues as reported in the article correct, and if so, how many of the 150 incursions did our aircraft actually intercept, and what is Saddam Hussein trying to demonstrate with these activities?

General FRANKS. Senator, to begin at the end, Saddam Hussein attempts to lure our aircraft and our aviators who enforce these no-fly zones into positions where they can be engaged by his air defense assets. We have not and we will not permit ourselves to be taken in by that sort of tactic, and so I would say that with respect to the article, there are some inconsistencies.

This year we have flown about 6,000 sorties up into Iraq in Operations Southern Watch and Northern Watch. There have been approximately 250 antiaircraft or radar illuminations of our activities up in those no-fly zones. There have, in fact, been 12 aerial no-fly zone violations by aircraft so far this year. The number is 12, and we have responded.

I am reluctant to give the exact number, but we have responded more than 20 times to those provocations at times and in places of our choosing so as to retain our initiative in response to those activities.

Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Walker, in the eyes of world public opinion Iraq appears to be winning the propaganda war regarding the impact of sanctions on the people of Iraq. The sick Iraqi children make a powerful impact on the media. What is the administration doing to refute these charges, and how do you measure success in your efforts?

Ambassador WALKER. Senator, that is a very good question, and it is a very difficult problem. One of the principal difficulties is that the base we started from was very low. In 1991 we proposed the oil-for-food program. It was not until 1996 that Saddam Hussein accepted that program. By that time, extraordinary damage had been done to his own people.

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When the UN human rights report was prepared it was noted that this had a devastating impact, this refusal to take oil-for-food had had a devastating impact, and so 1995, if you take it as the baseline, there has been an improvement in the malnutrition statistics by one third in the north and one fourth in the south since that time, based on the effects of oil-for-food.

There has also been a complete turn-around in infant mortality in the north, where the UN operates the program. The statistics in the south are not nearly as good, unfortunately.

One of the things we are trying to do to improve the situation—of course, we did in the context of Resolution 1284. UN Security Council Resolution 1284 took the cap off oil exports so that there would be ample funds for Saddam Hussein to purchase the necessary products for his people's welfare. There has never been any sanction against foodstuffs. There has never been any sanction against medicine. Those should flow freely. Unfortunately, they do not always.

We have also undertaken to review our procedures for dealing with contract holds. That is, those contracts which we feel may have dual use and be useful in his development of weapons of mass destruction program.

Since March, we have released $1.3 billion worth of contracts that we had on hold. We are very mindful of the humanitarian situation and the impact it has on the world, and on the sanctions regime ultimately itself, therefore it is in our interests to see what we can do to improve the situation, but in the final analysis there is only one man who can improve the situation, and that is Saddam Hussein, and unfortunately he does not place much value on the lives of Iraqis.

Senator THURMOND. My time is up. I ask that the rest of my questions be answered for the record.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Thurmond.

My understanding is that Senator Kennedy will now proceed.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our panel.

I want to indicate to the General we are very proud of our Massachusetts Air National Guard—the 102nd Fighter Wing. Their F–15s were over there last year, April through June and this year September through November. The 104th Fighter Wing has been overseas as well.

General FRANKS. Senator, they are doing a great job.

Senator KENNEDY. The 104th, I think, had been up in Kosovo as well. We had a good chance to meet them not long ago. They have been very active, very involved, and have a very high sense of morale and a great sense of pride in the work that they do.

I would like to, if I could, just ask Secretary Slocombe to sort of think along with me. I am wondering who has who in a box here. That is what my question is. There is no question that we have Saddam Hussein in one form in a box, and that is because of American servicemen, as has been brought out by the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member. American servicemen are the ones that are over there paying the piper.

There is high morale, but this comes at an important cost in terms of defense readiness. The point was made earlier about the

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attitudes of our allies, and what they have been doing with regard to Iraq. I think the Chairman and the Ranking Member pointed out the increasing numbers of countries in the area, Turkey, Jordan, and Oman, all opening up oil lines, Jordan working out contracts on oil lines. These kinds of negotiations are going on, and there is some indication that the pipelines are actually being completed.

We are now in a situation where they are producing, as I understand it, 2.3 million barrels per day. Prior to the Iraqi war it was 2.6, and we are importing a good percent of that. We are also headed for a very cold winter over here.

The whole question of the cost of home heating oil, while not the top thought of those who are out there flying those jets, is, I will tell you, in the minds of people in my state. I have just been around Massachusetts and around New England, and this is going to be an enormously significant and important issue.

It is not just the cost, people paying more, but it has a real impact on their quality of life, particularly for the elderly people. As winter approaches, there are going to be all kinds of excuses that are going to be offered, and lots of blame to go around. But, I am just concerned about who has who in the box on this, when they are producing the amount of oil they are? Who is going to make up the oil needs in colder areas of the country?

We are now in a very serious—we are going into a very serious kind of situation. We have these countries in the Middle East—Saudi Arabia is going to increase capacity, the Kuwaitis are doing, as I understand from the various reports, and you may have different information, about what they can. But, other Gulf states could produce more.

I find back home people who say to me, "well, we have Saddam Hussein in a box and we need to continue to be concerned about these weapons." But, then we know that these other countries are going along with some kind of trade agreements with Iraq. We do not like that. At least these other nations, they could be increasing production of oil and easing the burden on those of us who are paying the freight, and sending American servicemen over there.

What are you doing to help us try and give some kind of explanation to the people that are suffering in New England from high home heating oil prices, and in terms of other gas prices? It is not going to take long before diesel fuel for the truckers goes up in price. Then, it is going to be the farmers that are going to be affected. It is going to affect the whole economy. People want to know, that while it is not going the way that we want it to, their government is, at least, doing something to demonstrate to these countries the need to have some kind of understanding for our problems.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The administration is putting a very high priority on trying to deal with the question of oil prices and availability of oil. As you suggested, it is not directly a DOD responsibility, so I am not the best person to ask about the details. However——

Senator KENNEDY. Now, wait a minute, Mr. Slocombe, I am going to let you talk about it, but that is a completely baloney answer. I mean, if you are going to be in discussions with the elite over there, and when we have interests over there that are directly

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related to our national interest here at home—on this heating oil matter—you need to send a very powerful message to them. They should understand that we are going to give them troops to protect them, and we are glad to have them stay, but then to not talk to them about oil? I mean, Bill Richardson is going to be over here sometime soon, to talk to us about it.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, you stopped me before I could barely get started. We have been talking very intensively to all of the oil-producing countries, including Saudi Arabia, which is the leader on this. The Saudis have agreed to make very substantial increases in oil production. Whether that will have any impact on the market that we, and for that matter they want it to have, remains to be seen.

I think it is absolutely clear that our ability to influence the decisions of the Arab oil-producing states is intimately connected with the fact that we are providing a substantial commitment to their security. That is one of the real ways in which we have a strong cooperative relationship with them, and it is an absolutely essential entre for any serious discussion with them of trying to keep oil prices down and availability up.

So although we are not involved in the day-to-day details of these negotiations, the contribution that the Defense Department makes to this process is absolutely essential.

Now, Ambassador Walker can provide more details on the specifics of our efforts to get production up.

Senator KENNEDY. I would be glad to hear it, but Mr. Secretary, it seems you are reading different information than I am. Secretary Richardson was over there several months ago and we made this announcement to increase production. But, we remain in a real energy crisis.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. At core the problem is——

Senator KENNEDY. If I could finish, now. What has been done has not been satisfactory. I do not think we ought to have those that are representing the interests of the United States suggest that what has been done in the past to deal with this energy crisis has been in any way satisfactory.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is not satisfactory, and I did not say it was. The central problem, unfortunately, which actually you alluded to at the beginning, is that we are no longer living in a world where there is a vast amount of excess capacity to be produced.

There is some, and it has been our position, and we have had some success, although not enough. We have had some success in getting that excess capacity released, but the fact is that at the moment at least there is not a big overhang of excess capacity. There is some, and a good deal of it has been released. The Saudis have increased their production substantially.

I think it is clear that we are going to have to have a comprehensive approach to this, and all I am saying is that the role of the Defense Department and of the United States in providing security is a critical element in getting people to take us seriously where we talk about issues where to some degree at least we have conflicting economic interests.

Senator KENNEDY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Kennedy.

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Senator Reed.

Senator REED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me direct my question to Secretary Slocombe, but General Franks and Secretary Walker might want to respond also. It is a variation on this of the impact of the increased oil prices, and my focus would be, or I would ask you to respond, how has this altered Saddam Hussein's strategy and his position within the region, and also, how has it affected the commitment of our allies to continue to bear with us on this long struggle to keep Saddam in the box?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think in the long run—and it is maybe not entirely politically correct to say this, but in the long run the reason a lot of countries recognize Iraq is a problem is because of his threat to world oil supplies ultimately, and so in the long run that is very much a factor on our side.

There is no question that, as Senator Kennedy suggested, Iraq has the potential to disrupt world oil markets in the short term. They have tried to do it periodically. There are some pretty serious costs to them if they do it. Some of those costs are measured in not having the resources for the oil-for-food program.

They figure they can bear those costs because they would not be borne by the regime, at least in the short term. I think Iraq would pay a huge price in terms of international sympathy and support for creating a spike, even if it was no worse than a spike in the oil prices.

To some degree, to the degree that there is excess capacity, I think if for nothing than just obvious economic self-interest oil-producing countries would step in to fill some of the gap. The question is whether in the short term they could fill the whole gap, because there is not that much excess capacity.

I think it would be useful to hear from Ambassador Walker.

Ambassador WALKER. I think it is appropriate to get on the record that in the efforts that Secretary Richardson made after those efforts Saudi Arabia increased production by 600,000 barrels per day, and OPEC raised its ceiling.

More recently just a week ago OPEC raised its ceiling by another 800,000 barrels per day, which would be shared out among the parties.

As Under Secretary Slocombe said, virtually none of the oil producers have excess capacity at this point, except for Saudi Arabia and perhaps the United Arab Emirates (UAE), the biggest problem being that when oil prices were very low there was no investment in excess capacity, in developing more excess capacity, and so you are caught by previous pricing policies.

That does not mean to say we are over a barrel when it comes to Iraq. There could be an effort to disrupt the oil market, although I think that the arguments that Under Secretary Slocombe made are very telling as to how that would not be in his interest, but in the first instance, Saudi Arabia has made it very clear that they will step in to fill the gap to the extent that they have capacity left, and they do have capacity left.

Furthermore, we have under the International Energy Agency and in our own reserves, petroleum reserves, we have the capacity to cover a gap which is significantly larger than any gap that Sad-

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dam Hussein could possibly take in his oil income, so I do not think that it is a realistic threat on his part.

Senator REED. Let me follow up with another question, which relates to the Chairman's point about the south of Iraq. In your view, or General Franks' view, has Saddam Hussein fully asserted his authority over the south, even though we have a no-fly zone, and is he effectively dismantling any potential opposition to his regime in the south?

General FRANKS. Senator, first, let me say that one of the key issues with Saddam Hussein is his sovereignty, and if you look at Iraq and you look at the southern no-fly zone and the northern no-fly zone, then what that leaves is that Saddam Hussein can fly his aircraft in about 35 to 40 percent of his country. In the other 60 percent, the sovereignty of the air space has, in fact, been limited by these sanctions.

Having said that, going to the point of what is he able to do in the south, according to UNSCR 949 he is not permitted to enhance his position there by sending equipment or his more capably trained troops into the south, and so in my view that is good for us.

He is not able to enhance his air defense or his integrated air defense capability in the south, and I think that is good for us.

I will stop with just those two points to say, without the southern no-fly zone enforcement that our troops are undertaking, he would be able to fly against the Shia in the south, the population in the south, and in my personal view they would be much worse off than in fact they are now.

I am not in a position to say whether I believe they constitute a threat to Saddam Hussein's regime, or whatever like that, but I do believe, sir, that they are much better off as a result of the no-fly zone.

Senator REED. Secretary Slocombe, do you have a view as to whether he has effectively asserted his control?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that within a few weeks of the end of the Gulf War, after the uprising was suppressed, Saddam Hussein was able in the southern part of the country effectively to reassert a very large degree of control, particularly if you compare it to the northern areas. That is an obvious fact, and for the record, the things that have been done down there are quite horrible, both in human and environmental terms.

Senator REED. As I recall the response to my first question, I wonder if you might elaborate on the effect on our allies. I do not know if you touched upon that. You talked about Saddam's possible ability to disrupt oil, but has the increase in oil prices caused a weakening of the resolve of our allies? Perhaps being blunt about it, would they prefer to see him back in business because it is getting cold in Europe?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Given the reactions in Europe to some sense of the level of fuel prices, because there are about 85 percent taxes in Europe, anything that Iraq does which has the effect of producing even a short-term substantial increase in the price is not going to make him more popular in Europe.

Ambassador WALKER. Senator, if I could add, the fact is that the sanctions allow Saddam Hussein to pump to capacity, and he is

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doing that. The sanctions also under Resolution 1284 specifically allow the opening of new avenues of oil exports for Saddam Hussein, which is why several countries are looking at oil pipelines now.

This is in our best interest, because the more oil that is pumped out of Saddam Hussein's Iraq under the sanctions regime, the less money he has available, cash in hand, to be able to smuggle through the smuggling channels, and the more oil that is out there on the market. So I do not think that the oil issue itself is one that is going to create a problem with our friends in Europe.

Senator REED. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator.

General Franks, I want to go over very carefully the risks to our men and women in the Armed Forces. Tragically, we could awaken here in the United States one morning and learn that Saddam Hussein has a prisoner of war, an American or a British pilot.

Now, I want to make sure that those people following this hearing, and it is on the record and open, certainly here in the United States Senate, that almost every day we are flying some type of mission over his territory during which our pilots encounter hostile fire from the ground to aircraft, and I recognize in many instances Saddam does not utilize his full technical ability in directing that fire, namely the radars, for fear of retaliation against those radars, but there could be a stray round that would make contact, or the plane itself—mechanically could have a malfunction irrespective of what mission it is on, such as an engine failure, an air frame problem, or a fly-by-wire problem.

I want you to clearly put in this record the risks that those people are taking, first in the aerial operations, and then those on the ground who could be subjected to a terrorist attack because of their support of these missions over Iraq or for other reasons.

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, there is absolutely no question that in just this year alone, as I mentioned, with some 6,000 flights over or in the no-fly zones, and with some 255 different air defense and radar illuminations, or air defense firings, anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) firings, and radar illuminations, there is risk to our men and women in uniform.

There is absolutely risk. There is no way that USCINCCENT is ever going to be comfortable with that risk. I will, however, say, Mr. Chairman, that the risk to those pilots in those no-fly zones is low, and I will tell you why. Before we place our aviators in that sort of a flight environment they are very carefully trained, and the processes and procedures, the tactics, the techniques that we undertake during those operations are very simply geared to be able to defeat that one-to-one personal threat to our aviators.

I will say again, there is risk to our pilots when they are in the air, but the intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activity we undertake gives us the ability to identify and to mitigate those risk factors. I will never sit before this committee or this body and say that there is not a chance we will lose an American in this operation. Mr. Chairman, there is a chance we will lose an American in this operation, either to a safety consideration, to a training consideration, or to hostile fire.

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Going back to the end of the Gulf War, we have flown more than 235,000 sorties into the no-fly zones in Iraq. I am sorry, overall. 150,000 of those sorties have been inside Iraqi air space in the business of enforcing the no-fly zones.

With respect to the second half of your question, sir, that being what is going on with the terrorist activity, our men and women and DOD civilians and diplomats in the region are under observation and in some cases being stalked every day, 24 hours a day, because the terrorist threat in this region is very real, and those who would not believe that should take a look at the Khobar Towers circumstance.

Chairman WARNER. The bombing?

General FRANKS. The bombing.

Chairman WARNER. Which is still largely unresolved to this day, am I not correct?

General FRANKS. That is correct.

Chairman WARNER. I think you have summarized it. You said we are taking tactics to limit the ability of the ground-to-air interdiction, but that a pilot could have a mechanical failure. We have been fortunate with the number of flights that we have not had an engine failure or something else.

Secretary Slocombe, would our problems not be vastly more complicated if Saddam Hussein got into his possession a downed U.S. or British airman?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It would certainly be a very serious problem, but I want to say we for very good reasons put people at risk. We do not put them at risk without good reasons. But this is a situation where we have very good reasons for what we are doing. We do it so as to minimize the risk to the degree possible.

Senator, I do not think the United States can be an effective country in our own interest if we adopt a position, which I know you are not suggesting and I do not think the American people believe, that when we lose one person we have to stop an operation.

Chairman WARNER. I understand that.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. You see the same reports I do, I am sure.

Chairman WARNER. I would just point out I think it is an obligation of this committee to put on the public record that that risk exists, because if it were to happen, so few people recognize what is going on every day, and we should prepare this record to explain why we are doing it.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In consciousness, one of the real contributions of an exchange like this is, it makes clear that there is no such thing as a risk-free military operation. There is no such thing as having a risk-free military operation.

Chairman WARNER. Let me go on. One of the red lines, one of the underlying reasons for this action is to preclude Saddam Hussein from reconstituting his weapons of mass destruction program that is biological, chemical, and such fissionable material as he might employ somehow.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The missiles to deliver it.

Chairman WARNER. We have seen this man use terrorist attacks against Israel, the firing of those missiles throughout the Gulf War on Tel Aviv for no military purpose other than terrorism. We have

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seen them use poison gas in previous conflicts against his neighboring nations, indeed, his own people.

Now, to what extent do we have knowledge about his current programs relating to weapons of mass destruction, and since we do not have any inspection teams on the ground, and the likelihood of getting them there is—certainly in this hearing we have laid no foundation that encourages me to think we are going to achieve it.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, there is not much you can say in detail in a public session.

Chairman WARNER. But the public is entitled to know, to the extent that you can tell us.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is no question that Saddam Hussein remains interested in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, that the infrastructure has the inherent capacity to build them, as he demonstrated in the past. There was a very substantial dismantling right after the war, that in spite of what some people are saying now, I think there is no reason to believe that that dismantling was complete, and nor, to be direct, do I think that anybody working on UNSCOM was able to say confidently what was going on in the whole country.

In some sense they were able to focus on the places they were allowed to focus on, which included monitoring identified facilities, which is important and useful, but the whole process, the whole events which brought things to a head was their inability to go out and investigate whether things were going on in other places, then gradually they began being restricted even in what they could do in the identified sites.

So the inspections I think would obviously be useful, but they are not a panacea, and there are certain aspects of things which he is doing which we watch very carefully to determine the scale. There was a substantial set-back particularly to his missile capacity following Operation Desert Fox, and we watched for signs that that capability is being reconstituted in other places.

There is no question that he has an ambition.

Chairman WARNER. He is testing missiles within the 150 kilometer range, and of course the test data he gets back from that can be translated to larger weapons.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. To some degree.

Chairman WARNER. To some degree. So there are indications that he has an ongoing program to restore his military capabilities, and in all likelihood in the areas of weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think there is no question that there are elements of that program.

Chairman WARNER. Now, let's talk about the stability of the regime. Senator Thurmond mentioned in his statement—and I remember so well at the conclusion of the Gulf War there was considerable speculation that the people of Iraq would see the folly of this despot and throw him out, but he seems to strengthen himself and strengthen his position. You need only look at the vote on Resolution 1284. Nations did not participate in going against him. You need only look at the Gulf states that are working with his country now. Is he not stronger than he was in the years past, and growing stronger?

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Mr. SLOCOMBE. He is certainly not stronger than he was before the invasion of Kuwait, and I think it is easy to overstate the degree to which he is stronger, he has gained strength as he has gone along.

Within the country he has very substantial, effective control, but it is one of the reasons why we need a policy of containment pending a change in the regime.

I do not think his international position is a very strong one.

Chairman WARNER. I was suggesting more his internal strength.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. His internal strength outside the Kurdish areas is clearly very substantial, as I said in response to Senator Reed, but that has always been true. He runs a ruthless dictatorship.

Chairman WARNER. The intentional harm he is inflicting on his own people in denying them the basic nourishment and the essentials to maintain a minimum quality of life, that is clearly as a direct result of his allocation of food and medicine and other things. Is that not correct, Secretary Walker?

Ambassador WALKER. That is absolutely correct, Senator.

Now, I do not think you are going to find too much problem getting what you want if you happen to live in Takrit, where he comes from, so there are some areas which are not doing too badly in Iraq, those areas where he has the loyalty of the people historically, and where he has contacts, but there are other areas, particularly in the south, which have been consistently hostile to him, where the poverty level is incredibly high. He is using his control of the system in order to reward and to punish, and that is atrocious.

Chairman WARNER. But not only that, he is incurring sympathy and favor from other nations as they look at his people being deprived of basic food and medicine. Am I not correct?

Ambassador WALKER. You are correct, and part of it is because of an uncertain knowledge of exactly what is going on in Iraq. There are no independent surveys, and when the Secretary General, under the instruction of the Security Council, suggested that an independent panel of experts go to Iraq, you saw the Iraqi regime turn away as fast as it could. It did not want to have independent experts coming in to look at things.

Chairman WARNER. To what extent are nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) primarily oriented to humanitarian relief able to penetrate and go into Iraq and help those people?

Ambassador WALKER. To some extent they are able to. Certain organizations have some access and are able to do that, but by no means is this a free ride for the NGOs.

Saddam Hussein has approved some of these activities, but he has also rejected a number of them. The Saudis, the Kuwaitis, both, as I said, provided or suggested or offered to provide humanitarian assistance and he rejected those offers.

The Security Council resolutions clearly state that he must accept humanitarian assistance from NGOs, but he has not accepted them.

Chairman WARNER. To what extent are nations sending diplomats or others to Iraq to consult with him or to work with his cabinet and so forth. What is the flow of international personages do we see coming and going in Baghdad?

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Ambassador WALKER. It is certainly greater than it was. There was pretty much of a complete boycott of him up until this past year. In reality, a number of states never broke relations with him, so a number of countries have diplomatic relations with Iraq, and they have representatives there, embassies, ambassadors, and so on, but for the most part he has been isolated. There is relatively little traffic back and forth.

But as I say, this is less so today than it was.

Chairman WARNER. In years past, certain Russian office holders—I remember one foreign minister, I think you and I met him when we were over there—worked very diligently for such causes that I think fostered Russian interests primarily, but it was a strong tie with Russia at one time, and Saddam Hussein, a tie in the sense that they were trying to bring about some resolution of the conflict. To what extent is Russia actively involved now with Baghdad?

Ambassador WALKER. Russia has been actively involved in trying to get Saddam Hussein to accept the provisions of Resolution 1284, but they have been more inclined than we are ever going to accept to negotiate with Saddam Hussein on the provisions involved. We are not prepared to accept that. There are no negotiations over Resolution 1284. The resolution speaks for itself.

They have also been anxious to institute commercial air travel, as someone mentioned earlier. They have not done that yet because it is sanctioned, and they have not got permission from the Sanctions Committee, but I would say there are times when we feel that the Russians are working in a very counterproductive way.

Chairman WARNER. Would you say that the Blix mission under the UN Security Council resolutions is just totally at a stalemate, or do you see any juncture at which the UN, the Security Council, and/or both are trying to work about the fulfillment of that Resolution 1284?

Ambassador WALKER. Well, Hans Blix has filed his report with the Security Council. He is prepared now to take the preparatory steps to make his mission effective, but that will require, as he has said, Saddam Hussein's acceptance of Resolution 1284. He is not prepared to go to Iraq in the absence of that acceptance, so we are at an impasse until and unless Saddam Hussein accepts Resolution 1284.

Chairman WARNER. So we are at a stalemate?

Ambassador WALKER. We are at a stalemate with Hans Blix's mission.

Chairman WARNER. So whatever policies we discussed here today, it looks like they are the only ones in place for the foreseeable future.

Ambassador WALKER. Now, I would recall that when Resolution 687 was imposed by the Security Council, that Saddam Hussein did not accept UNSCOM at first either, and it was about 6 months or so before he ever accepted that, and he also, as I said, did not accept the oil-for-food program for 4 years, so the fact that he has not accepted the Blix mission today does not necessarily mean he will not accept it at some point in the future.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin.

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Senator LEVIN. He seems to have gone out of his way in recent days to emphasize his unwillingness to cooperate with the UN. He has undermined whatever support he has had in the UN. He has refused to accept Blix. I gather there is even a Russian diplomat who has been trying to get in, perhaps for some time, to see if he cannot ascertain the location of missing people.

Why do you think Hussein at this particular moment has chosen to act in this manner? If anything seems to be more intransigent than before.

Ambassador WALKER. Senator, my impression is, every time Saddam Hussein thinks he is on top of things he gets more intransigent, and he has been encouraged by the very legitimate concern that many countries have had over the humanitarian situation. He has been playing the card as much as he can. He thinks that he is on a winning streak, and therefore he thinks he can afford to ignore the United Nations and ignore those procedures by which he could relieve himself from sanctions, because he thinks he can undercut the sanctions regime through other measures without any weapons inspections taking place.

It is very important, and the point that we make to our friends and our allies is that it is very important to stand firm in the face of this so-called charm offensive that Saddam Hussein has been engaged in, to stand up to Saddam Hussein, not to let him buy your votes with contracts, and not to give him comfort that he will find some way other than compliance, strict compliance with Security Council resolutions to get himself out of the box.

Senator LEVIN. Either you or Secretary Slocombe I think testified that before the war, that the majority of his oil revenue was going to building up his army.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is right.

Senator LEVIN. But that is not true now. That presumably means that a much larger number of billions of dollars per year is going into food and medicine from oil revenues than was going in before. If that is not true, why is it not, since it is supposed to be a oil-for-food program?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. The last time I looked, Iraqi food imports, taking both the north and the south into account, were higher than they were, or higher now than they were before the war. He, of course, had some other resources before the war, including a lot of borrowing.

But the bottom line is that because of oil-for-food, and because of the sanctions, the great bulk of his available money from his oil supplies has to be used for food and other humanitarian purposes, and he cannot use it for military purposes.

Senator LEVIN. Are you saying the imports of food now are higher than pre-war?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That was true at one point. I believe that to be true now, yes.

There is also an issue of domestic production, but there is no question that the situation in Iraq is very hard for very many ordinary Iraqis, particularly because, as Ambassador Walker said, he manipulates supplies in different areas. Some areas do quite well. Some areas do not.

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Senator LEVIN. The next question is on supplies, and what capability the UN has, and what capability it is using to observe the distribution of food. It is not controlling the distribution of food and medicine, as I understand it.

We know that is being delivered for the revenues, but we do not know how it is being distributed, is that correct?

Ambassador WALKER. That is correct, Senator. There are observers for the oil-for-food program, but there are very few of them, and they do not have the capacity to be able to really inspect the system.

Senator LEVIN. Is there any way for the UN to gain greater control over the custody and distribution of food and medicine?

Ambassador WALKER. We are actually considering the possibilities of that now. It would require a new resolution. We want to look into the components of such a resolution. It might increase the UN's control of distribution particularly to the most affected regions, where he does not want to see the food going.

Senator LEVIN. The suffering is obviously immense. If there is anything we can do in that area we ought to do it without playing into his hands.

Ambassador WALKER. I agree with you 100 percent, Senator.

Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Walker, I think your colleague, David Scheffer, proposed at the Press Club within the last couple of days for the UN to establish a war crimes tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and other Iraqi officials. Any possibility of that happening in the Security Council?

Ambassador WALKER. I would say it is going to be difficult, at least in the short term, to get the Security Council to do so. We may be able to get an independent commission established in order to review the crimes against humanity, but there is also the possibility of getting a country which has appropriate laws on the books against genocide and war crimes to actually put indictments out with the appropriate evidence.

That is one of the reasons that we have a substantial program with several NGOs in order to develop the evidence that it would take to get such an indictment. I do not discount the possibility of ultimately getting UN action on this, but it is going to take time, and it is going to be difficult, as any tribunal of this nature is a matter of some dispute among countries whether it should be under the Security Council or whether it should be in some larger framework.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, let me just end by commending you for scheduling these hearings. I agree with you and other members of the committee that the information we receive and put on the public record is really essential for the public to know. I think it is also essential for us to know, frankly, so that if there are any better alternatives to a containment policy, that they be suggested to the administration.

I do not have any off-hand. If colleagues do, I know the administration would welcome them. I think the one thing we should focus on while we pursue this containment policy is as low a risk as we possibly can, which is obviously all of our goal. We also need to try to find ways that, consistent with keeping the pressure on Saddam

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Hussein, we try to make sure that the food and the medicine is getting to the Iraqi people, who are suffering terribly at his hands.

He does have the key to lifting the sanctions. The inspections are the key. Following the UN resolution is the key. But until he takes that key in hand and turns it, I do not see a better alternative than trying to contain him to reduce his ability to threaten his neighbors and the world with weapons of mass destruction. In the meantime, we need to use every mechanism we can to try to soften the terrible suffering that has been inflicted on the Iraqi people by Saddam Hussein.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. I thank you, Senator. Indeed, you and I worked very cooperatively on this in other hearings, and with your support we have put together a very good hearing, because we have laid before the American people the risks associated with this operation, and as you say, if there are those who have a better idea as to how to affect the world's goals to limit this despot from inflicting harm in the future on others, bring them forward, and we can sit here with a certain degree of frustration, and an enigmatic understanding of what we are achieving. Nevertheless, if someone has a better idea—and what is France's idea? What is Russia's idea? Have the Chinese any better idea? Why do they not come forward and tell the world about their solution?

General Franks, I am going to ask you primarily to prepare the following for the record, because I think it is important that we have a clear understanding of that amount of defense funding that is devoted to this operation.

Now, in preparing this, you would have a baseline that the United States, with or without Saddam Hussein, needs to maintain a presence in this region. Those forces that are deployed into this region and have been for many years now go through normal training and operational cycles, and it seems to me those costs are there. They are fixed in order to fulfill our forward-deployed strategy, which is the very basis of our military doctrine.

But over and above that are the risks not only that we have covered here today, but also the added cost of the operation, whether it is Operation Northern Watch, Operation Southern Watch, or all the adjunct things that go in to support it, and also the added utilization of our aircraft and equipment, the wear and tear. It impacts on readiness, and we know now that our readiness, which we will have a hearing here shortly with the chiefs, is very severe and that our military are forced to lower the readiness of the training commands at home and, indeed, forces deployed elsewhere in the world in order to keep the forces which you have under your command, which are directly involved in hostile operations, at the very highest degree of readiness.

So I want you to try and wrap this up so that we can focus on just exactly what it is costing to maintain this operation, together with primarily Great Britain in the air, and the other allies at sea.

General FRANKS. I would be pleased to do that.

[The information follows:]

Combatant command components and services capture and report incremental costs associated with contingency operations. Incremental costs are defined as costs that are above and beyond baseline training, operations, and personnel costs and

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would otherwise not be incurred but for the support of contingency operations (CONOPs). The table below depicts the incremental costs (in millions of dollars) for all services and agencies involved in Southwest Asia since fiscal year 1991.

[In millions of dollars]

| Fiscal Year | Southwest Asia [1] Incremental Costs |
|---|---|
| 1991 | 346.5 |
| 1992 | 106.4 |
| 1993 | 838.5 |
| 1994 | 424.8 |
| 1995 | 864.4 |
| 1996 | 665.2 |
| 1997 | 793.1 |
| 1998 | 1,638.8 |
| 1999 | 1,261.4 |
| 2000 | 1,138.9 |
| Total | 8,078.0 |

[1] Actuals for Operations Southern Watch, Northern Watch, Provide Comfort, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Fox, Desert Thunder, Intrinsic Action, Desert Spring, as well as Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) missions and United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

The incremental costs of contingency operations are the cost to address and respond to a perceived threat. The costs related to long-term forward presence are usually outside the scope of contingency operations. The USCENTCOM "Desert Shift" initiative for Southwest Asia is a case in point. The Downing Commission Report, published following the Khobar Tower bombing, included recommendations to correct force protection deficiencies and to reduce USAF force profile in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA). The relocation of Headquarters, Joint Task Force Southwest Asia (JTF–SWA) from Eskan Village to Prince Sultan Air Base is an implementation of Downing Commission recommendations that is estimated to cost $43 million in fiscal year 2001.

Defense Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) are the overarching legal documents that provide a framework for implementing our engagement strategy. Among other things, they provide for pre-positioning access and use of host nation facilities. Except for Saudi Arabia, the United States has DCAs with its friends in Southwest Asia. While these DCAs and their associated Implementing Agreements allow us to implement our regional strategy, they do not specifically define forward deployment levels. Rather, our forward presence force levels are dictated by our national interest in maintaining regional stability.

The immediate threat to regional stability continues to be Iraq, and enforcement of United Nations sanctions against that country remains an ongoing international mission. But, even if Iraq were not a player, there are other regional threats that would require U.S. attention. Iran continues to pose a potential threat to national interests, as do the hostilities between Israel and its neighbors and those between India and Pakistan. Countering the spread of international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) throughout the region is another important U.S. interest. Taken together, these threats preclude a return to pre-Operation Desert Storm levels of minimal regional presence and in themselves help to establish a baseline for continued U.S. presence within the region.

The embedded cost of persistently high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) may be reflected in degradations in personnel, training, equipment, and supply readiness in the near-term, and modernization, transformation, infrastructure, and recapitalization in the long-term. The current levels of combat credible forward presence and engagement have placed stress on U.S. forces and challenge the ability to respond to a two major theater war (MTW) scenario. Specific impacts include:

— High OPTEMPO exacerbates the fatigue on air and ground legacy equipment, some of which have already exceeded programmed service life.
— The higher usage of equipment adversely impacts the spare parts inventory, resulting in increased costs in terms of dollars and time to maintain equipment.
— High OPTEMPO degrades the ability to conduct large-scale high intensity combat training.
— Increased personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) as a result of persistently high OPTEMPO has had some impact on quality of life throughout each of the services. While deployments are an accepted fact of military life, histori-

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cal data has shown that persistently high OPTEMPO negatively impacted the military's ability to recruit and retain quality personnel.

Chairman WARNER. Secretary Slocombe, one other question. We did not cover Iran and how they figure into this very complex situation. Saddam Hussein inflicted enormous damage on Iran in that prolonged war.

Indeed, he used poison gas, and I think some biological agents in that war, and yet Iran seems to, on and off, as my colleague in his statement stated, facilitate the shipping of illegal products out of Saddam Hussein's oil to get money. Sometimes they open their border, sometimes they close it. It seems to go like this, and it is sort of enigmatic. Can you throw a little light on that? Is it pure dollars?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think the motive for the facilitation of the smuggling is 98 percent money. I frankly think that the ups and downs on it too, are often very substantially arguments about money and not about the principle. Iran and Iraq, and Ambassador Walker is one of our leading experts on that part of the world, are basically hostile. They have periodic border skirmishes.

On the other hand, as two countries that are outsiders with respect to the rest of the world, they sometimes try to work together on things. I think probably Ambassador Walker ought to comment.

Ambassador WALKER. I think no one in Iran has forgotten the Iran-Iraq War, or the terrible cost—Iran paid grotesque costs in terms of lives.

Chairman WARNER. Does he still not have a number of POWs?

Ambassador WALKER. We believe he does still have several POWs from Iran, as well as Kuwait.

On the smuggling issue, my understanding is today—and I only got this right before I came up here—was that there was an announcement by the Iranians that they would henceforth seize both ships and cargo, ships that were bringing smuggled oil. We will have to see whether that has any impact or not on the overall process, but Senator, there is a great deal of internal tension in Iran these days, which has forces of reform seeking to put a reform agenda through the legislature.

At the same time there are conservative forces that seek to hold on to past practices, and this tension creates some of the ambiguity that you see when it comes to both the interception of Iraqis and also the reaction to Iraqi behavior.

Chairman WARNER. Secretary Slocombe, I presume the administration, in conjunction with our allies, constantly monitors this situation and looks at any option by which to break the stalemate in the UN and so forth. Pragmatically speaking, you do not see on the horizon for the balance of President Clinton's administration any likelihood that some major breakthrough will occur in the change of policy with regard to containment?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I hate to say this, but I think until there is a substantial internal change inside Iraq, Iraq is going to be a problem, that subject to new ideas and change in circumstances and opportunities, the basic policy that we have followed is one which, or to which there is no alternative unless we are prepared fundamentally to change our objectives with respect to containment, and at

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some point Iraq might get smart and start to do the right thing, but until they do we are going to need to carry out this policy.

There are only 4 months left in this administration, and obviously the new administration, whoever is President will have to evaluate the situation, so that I think this is a situation, like some others in the world, which calls for patience and perseverance, because the only way Saddam Hussein can break out of this box is to undermine the set of constraints, military and political and so on, economic, under which he has been placed.

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to support the comments by the Secretary with respect to patience and my comments would have to do with the impact of patience on our military operations there.

The fact that we have a policy, a well-understood policy, the fact that we have military objectives associated with that policy, and the fact that we do what the Secretary mentioned with respect to patience provides an absolutely critical operational multiplier for us. Because, it keeps us from feeling as though we need to put our airmen in harm's way unnecessarily and, in fact, it is patience which offers us the greatest lever we have in the conduct of our military operations.

I would, sir, remind the committee that in conducting our operations we respond at times and places of our choosing, and that is an especially important force protection issue with me.

Chairman WARNER. I only take respectful disagreement with one phrase, well-understood policy. I think that policy is not well-understood, particularly in terms of France, Russia, and China and that is the reason why we are having this hearing.

They may understand it, but for some reason they are defying it.

General FRANKS. Mr. Chairman, I meant well-understood by those of us in the military, who are implementing just our end of it.

Chairman WARNER. I thank you. We have had an excellent hearing. We thank our witnesses, and members of the committee. We are adjourned.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

IRAQI OPPOSITION GROUPS

1. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Slocombe, Congress has allocated funds and has encouraged opposition groups, both inside and outside Iraq, to work toward the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. I understand what the administration is doing to support these groups; my question to you is what actions have these groups taken and what progress are they making toward the goal of establishing democracy in Iraq?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. The most important step the opposition groups have taken to date is to come together under the banner of the Iraqi National Congress (INC). The ability to replace their diverse individual agendas with a spirit of cooperation and unity of purpose will make it a much more effective organization and will foster democratic ideals and values in Iraq. The INC is steadily building its base of support and ability to affect change within Iraq. The INC is steadily building its base of support and ability to affect change within Iraq. They have an office in London that serves as the central coordinating point for their actions and they actively recruit and train new members. The INC has worked diligently to provide students for the training the U.S. conducts for its members and they have a long-range plan to reestablish their presence inside Iraq. The INC has begun working on a media campaign focused inside Iraq dedicated to providing the facts to the Iraqi people

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about the Saddam Hussein regime. Furthermore, they have indicated their desire to work inside Iraq distributing humanitarian goods in an effort to help promote their ideas on the need for regime change and to foster democratic values. This is a long-term project that will take time and a dedicated effort by the INC, but with the continued support we believe they will be successful in helping change come from within Iraq.

IMPACT OF CHANGES IN JORDAN AND SYRIA

2. Senator THURMOND. Secretary Slocombe, what impact have the deaths of King Hussein and President Assad of Syria had on the political climate in the Middle East, especially on Iraq's relationship with these countries?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. In common with other countries in the region, Jordan and Syria have both made moves in the recent past to improve relations with Baghdad, especially in the economic sphere. These moves probably have more to do with trends in the region generally than with the leadership succession in particular.

Syria has begun allowing oil to flow into the Iraq-Syria pipeline while Jordan recently renewed its special barter arrangement for Iraqi oil on terms that permit additional Jordanian goods to flow into Iraq.

In the case of Syria, we expect that deep suspicions and animosities and the long-standing rivalry over the leadership of the radical faction of the Arab world will also continue to influence relations between Damascus and Baghdad.

GROUND FORCES IN REGION

3. Senator THURMOND. General Franks, I understand that the United States maintains a continual presence of ground forces in Kuwait and other countries in the region. What are the commitments in terms of the number of ground forces the other coalition partners, such as France and Britain, have deployed to the region?

General FRANKS. Current ground forces in the region consist mainly of U. S. forces. In Kuwait, we have a rotating U.S. task force and the Kuwaitis maintain a deployed Kuwaiti task force. The French and British have no ground forces currently deployed. Both have air forces in the region.

USE OF FORCE TO ENSURE ARMS INSPECTION

4. Senator THURMOND. Ambassador Walker, at a recent press conference, Secretary Albright, when questioned about the use of force to ensure resumption of international arms inspection, responded that force was not the answer to getting cooperation from Saddam Hussein on arms inspection. What are the specific steps that you propose to ensure Saddam cooperates? How do they differ from those currently in place?

Ambassador WALKER. UN Security Council Resolution 1284 provides for the suspension of sanctions if Iraq fulfills its disarmament obligations. UNSCR 1284 is mandatory and is binding on Iraq. Iraq must comply with its obligations or sanctions will remain in place. UN sanctions, which severely limit Iraq's resources needed to reconstitute weapons of mass destruction and to rebuild a conventional arsenal, are a major element in containing Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Other major elements are the coalition's maintenance of no-fly zones in the north and south of Iraq and our military presence in the region.

Regarding the use of force, if Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction programs, threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces, or moves against the Kurds, we maintain a credible force in the region and are prepared to act in an appropriate time and place of our choosing. The use of force to return inspectors to Iraq has neither been affirmed nor has it been ruled out.

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QUESTION SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

COSTS TO TAXPAYERS

5. Senator INHOFE. Secretary Slocombe, what is the estimated additional cost per barrel of oil that our defense presence in the Persian Gulf costs taxpayers?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. Secretary Slocombe did not respond in time for printing. When received, answer will be retained in committee files.

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICK SANTORUM

### BURDEN OF PROOF

6. Senator SANTORUM. Ambassador Walker, it has been noted that the UN Security Council, in creating UNMOVIC, has reversed the burden of proof, from obliging Iraq to show it has abandoned WMD capabilities to making UNMOVIC prove it has not. Do you agree with this observation? In a related observation, unlike the UNSCOM inspection team, members of UNMOVIC work directly for the United Nations, not for their own countries. In the event that inspections resume, do you believe this to be a positive or negative development?

Ambassador WALKER. UN Security Council Resolution 1284 has maintained the burden for action where it should be: on Iraq. Iraq still must fulfill a set of obligations in order for the Security Council to consider suspending sanctions against Iraq. Resolution 1284, similar to UN Security Council Resolution 687, requires that UNMOVIC, like its predecessor UNSCOM, report to the Security Council. We have confidence in UNMOVIC's Executive Director Hans Blix' abilities; he has taken a serious approach to carrying out the Council's tasks and has made steady progress in organizing, staffing, and training his organization. We believe Hans Blix and the inspection commission should be given every opportunity to fulfill its mandate.

Whether UNMOVIC inspectors are employed by the UN or by their host governments (the latter is possible at the discretion of the Executive Chairman), we believe UNMOVIC will be best served by people who are technically qualified and committed to the mission of the organization—verifying Iraq's compliance with its UNSCR obligations. The expertise and dedication of the inspectors outweigh the source of their paycheck.

### USE OF FORCE

7. Senator SANTORUM. Ambassador Walker, Secretary Albright recently stated that the U.S. would not resort to force to compel the Iraqis to admit UN weapons inspectors. Given Saddam Hussein's pattern of resistance to comply with United Nations Security Council resolutions, how likely is it that Saddam Hussein will allow UNMOVIC inspectors into Iraq?

Ambassador WALKER. Regarding the use of force, if Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction programs, threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces, or moves against the Kurds, we maintain a credible force in the region and are prepared to act in an appropriate time and place of our choosing.

It is Iraq's obligation to comply with UNSCRs. If Iraq does not comply, sanctions will remain in place. The use of force to return inspectors to Iraq has neither been affirmed nor has it been ruled out.

### IRAQ LIBERATION ACT OF 1998

8. Senator SANTORUM. Secretary Slocombe, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 [P.L. 105–338] authorized the President to dispense $97.0 million in defense articles to properly designated Iraqi opposition groups. In May 1999, the President authorized the draw down of $5.0 million worth of training in "non-lethal" defense equipment. Other than this $5.0 million draw down, how much funding has been devoted to these opposition groups? What has been the nature of training provided to date? How strong are the Iraqi opposition groups? What is the administration doing to strengthen the unity of the Iraqi opposition groups?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. The focus of assistance to the external opposition has been to improve their ability to work together and to carry the message that there is a democratic alternative to the Saddam Hussein regime. We signed our first agreement for direct funding with the Iraqi National Congress (INC) in March. That agreement provided the organization with $267,784 which allowed the INC to open offices, hold a meeting of its Central Council, undertake a mission to the United Nations General Assembly, and begin organizing itself so that it may better act as the voice of free Iraqis. On September 29, we signed a second agreement with the INC for $4 million. This agreement allows the INC to expand its activities significantly; it will resume radio and satellite TV broadcasting, administer the growing program of training under the ILA, initiative a program of humanitarian relief, and act as an advocate for the Iraqi people with foreign governments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations.

To date, 40 INC students have received training under the ILA program and an additional 13 students are attending courses in the U.S. Training courses include basic journalism, emergency medical technician, LAN and fiber optics, international

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defense management, basic still photography, war crimes prosecution, cargo and warehouse management, logistics and convoy planning, as well as a public affairs seminar conducted for the INC's leadership.

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR TIM HUTCHINSON

### POSSESSION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

9. Senator HUTCHINSON. Secretary Slocombe, I would appreciate your helping me answer some very simple questions from my constituents by providing some very simple answers. After more than 7 years of subjecting Iraq to the most intrusive arms control inspection regimen in the history of the world, can the American people be confident that Iraq no longer possesses chemical weapons?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. UNSCOM oversaw the destruction of large chemical weapons stockpile and production facilities. However, as the committee is aware, UNSCOM was not permitted by Iraq to carry out the inspections, or given the information necessary, to reach a conclusion that Iraq had met its obligations under the applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions to completely eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile or its capability to produce them.

Iraq refuses to abide by UNSCR 1284, adopted in December 1999 to lay out a road map for cooperation in meeting key obligations, particularly in regards to WMD. The essential element in implementing Resolution 1284 is for UNMOVIC to be able to operate to verify that Iraq has cooperated with a work program consisting of a list of key remaining disarmament tasks and the establishment of a fully operational monitoring system. With or without inspectors, we will continue to pay special attention to Iraq's potential for rebuilding its WMD program.

### PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

10. Senator HUTCHINSON. Secretary Slocombe, can you assure the American people that Iraq is, at least, no longer capable of producing chemical weapons?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. UNSCOM oversaw the destruction of large chemical weapons storage and production facilities. However, as the committee is aware, UNSCOM was not permitted by Iraq to carry out the inspections, or given the information necessary, to reach a conclusion that Iraq had met its obligations under the applicable United Nations Security Council resolutions to completely eliminate its chemical weapons stockpile or its capability to produce them.

Iraq refuses to abide by UNSCR 1284, adopted in December 1999 to lay out a road map for cooperation in meeting key obligations, particularly in regards to WMD. The essential element in implementing Resolution 1284 is for UNMOVIC to be able to operate to verify that Iraq has cooperated with a work program consisting of a list of key remaining disarmament tasks and the establishment of a fully operational monitoring system. With or without inspectors, we will continue to pay special attention to Iraq's potential for rebuilding its WMD program.

### POSSESSION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

11. Senator HUTCHINSON. Secretary Slocombe, can you assure the American people that Iraq does not possess any biological weapons?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. In 1995, Iraq declared reluctantly that it had produced biological agents after years of claiming that it only had conducted defensive research. The Iraqi regime prevented UNSCOM inspectors from carrying out their UN mandated inspections and Iraq continues to withhold information. Accordingly, UNSCOM could not conclude that Iraq had met its disarmament obligation with respect to biological weapons.

### PRODUCTION OF BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

12. Senator HUTCHINSON. Secretary Slocombe, can you assure the American people that Iraq is, at least, no longer capable of producing biological weapons?

Secretary SLOCOMBE. As stated in the previous answer, Iraqi non-cooperation made it impossible for UNSCOM to conclude that Iraq had carried out its obligation regarding biological weapons, including production capability. Iraq refuses to abide by UNSCR 1284, adopted in December 1999 to lay out a road map for cooperation in meeting key obligations, particularly in regards to WMD. The essential element in implementing Resolution 1284 is for UNMOVIC to be able to operate to verify

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that Iraq has cooperated with a work program consisting of a list of key remaining disarmament tasks and the establishment of a fully operational monitoring system. So long as inspectors are excluded, we continue to pay special attention to Iraq's potential for rebuilding its WMD program.

NO-FLY ZONES

13. Senator HUTCHINSON. General Franks, would it be fair to say that American aircrews have flown the preponderance of the more than 200,000 sorties conducted to enforce the northern and southern no-fly zones over Iraq?

General FRANKS. With respect to sorties flown in the southern no-fly zone, the answer is yes. American aircraft have flown nearly 90 percent of Operation Southern Watch sorties to date, with our British and French partners flying the rest. [Deleted.]

U.S. European Command and the Combined Task Force—Operation Northern Watch (CTF–ONW) track sorties flown in the northern no-fly zone. Since they report data in different categories than USCENTCOM, I recommend that you consult them directly for data on American and allied sorties flown for Operation Northern Watch.

14. Senator HUTCHINSON. General Franks, can you please quantify the cumulative cost these flights are having on our aging fleet of aircraft? For example, what percentage of the useful life of our fleet of F–16s has been expended in the skies over Iraq?

General FRANKS. In fiscal year 1999, Air Combat Command (ACC), USAF Europe (USAFE), Air Mobility Command (AMC), and Pacific Air Force (PACAF) flew more than 70,000 hours in Southwest Asia. The data provided below approximates the percentage of the useful life of our fleet expended in no-fly zone enforcement. However, the impact of these operations on readiness is a more complex issue that is not adequately captured in an isolated review of flying hour data.

If these hours had not been flown in support of this contingency, some would have been required to be flown to maintain pilot proficiency.

| Aircraft Deployed | Total Active Inventory (TAI) [1] | Typical Design Life [2] | Fiscal Year 1999 Total Southwest Asia Flying Hours [3] | TAI Fleet Design Life Expended (%) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A/OA–10A | 367 | 16,000 | 7,465 | 0.13 |
| E–3B/C | 32 | 30,000 | 5,097 | 0.53 |
| F–15C/D | 401 | 12,000 | 16,536 | 0.34 |
| F–15E | 217 | 12,000 | 3,772 | 0.14 |
| F–16C | 1,088 | 8,000 | 16,833 | 0.19 |
| HC–130P | 21 | 40,000 | 600 | 0.07 |
| HH–60G | 104 | 8,000 | 1,231 | 0.15 |
| KC10A | 59 | 42,000 | 6,277 | 0.25 |
| KC135E/R/T | 545 | 36,000 | 11,076 | 0.06 |

Notes:

[1] Aircraft assigned to operating forces for mission, training, test, or maintenance functions.

[2] The determination of aircraft life is not straightforward. We are able to extend an aircraft in our inventory by conducting structure assessments and necessary modifications or repairs.

One of the best examples is the B–52. Originally designed for 10,000 hours, the B–52H is now intended to stay in the inventory until well past 50,000 hours (2040). Another example is the A–10. It was designed with the goal of 6,000 flight hours. However, the A–10 is being extended to over 16,000 flight hours.

[3] Flying hours for fiscal year 1999 were used because this is the most recent data for a year that only involved operations devoted to enforcing the no-fly zone.

15. Senator HUTCHINSON. General Franks, how many dollars have been expended enforcing the northern and southern no-fly zones?

General FRANKS. Combatant command components and services capture and report incremental costs associated with contingency operations. Incremental costs are defined as costs incurred by units deploying in support of contingency operations (CONOPs) that would not have been incurred otherwise. The table below depicts the incremental costs (in millions of dollars) for all services and agencies involved in Southwest Asia since fiscal year 1991.

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[In millions of dollars]

| Fiscal Year | Southwest Asia [1] Incremental Costs |
|---|---|
| 1991 | 346.5 |
| 1992 | 106.4 |
| 1993 | 838.5 |
| 1994 | 424.8 |
| 1995 | 864.4 |
| 1996 | 665.2 |
| 1997 | 793.1 |
| 1998 | 1,638.8 |
| 1999 | 1,261.4 |
| 2000 | 1,138.9 |
| Total | 8,078.0 |

[1] Actuals for Operations Southern Watch, Northern Watch, Provide Comfort, Vigilant Warrior, Desert Fox, Desert Thunder, Intrinsic Action, Desert Spring, as well as Air Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) missions and United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

16. Senator HUTCHINSON. General Franks, how many man-years have been expended enforcing the no-fly zones since 1993?

General FRANKS. The chart below depicts personnel deployment history for fiscal year 1995 through 2000 (not available prior to fiscal year 1995). Rotation overlaps and other factors preclude a direct correlation of deployed end-strength to man-years, however the data provided approximates man-year expenditures.




PERSONNEL DEPLOYED (FISCAL YEAR AVERAGE)

[In thousands]

| Fiscal Year | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1995 | 1996 | 1997 | 1998 | 1999 | 2000 |
| 19.4 | 19.1 | 20.3 | 29.0 | 27.3 | 23.4 |

Deployment history for Operations Southern Watch, Vigilant Warrior, Vigilant Sentinel, Arabian Gulf Maritime Intercept Operations, Air Expeditionary Force, Desert Focus, Desert Strike, Northern Watch, and Desert Spring.

17. Senator HUTCHINSON. General Franks, please explain to me exactly how the typical American citizen is made safer by the continuing enforcement of the northern and southern no-fly zones?

General FRANKS. The continued enforcement of the no-fly zones gives USCENTCOM the invaluable capability to gather intelligence and respond early to any Iraqi provocation. Our ability to see the warning signs of trouble and react deci-

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sively, early in a situation make it extremely difficult for Iraq to threaten its neighbors to the south. The stability and security of the key energy-producing states ensures access to vital resources. Operation Southern Watch makes the typical American safer in two significant ways.

First, every American is protected from the real economic hardship that a threat to the flow of energy resources would cause, not only in the United States but also in the world economy. Although the United States imports only 15 percent of the oil exported from the Arabian Gulf, Europe and Japan account for 80 percent of oil exports from the Gulf. If these exports were interrupted, the negative effects to the lives of every American would be real and immediate.

Second, the typical American is much less likely to have to pay the significant economic and personal cost that would be required to support a major deployment to the Arabian Gulf. As a direct result of maintaining OSW, USCENTCOM has the capability in the area of responsibility to deter, identify, and if necessary, respond immediately to any Iraqi provocation. If that capability did not exist, we would respond to Iraqi aggression with major force deployments. While the final outcome would not be in doubt, the cost in dollars and the risk to American servicemen and women responding to Iraqi aggression after the fact would be much higher.

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## QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR CARL LEVIN

### UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

18. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Walker, UN Security Council Resolution 1284 of December 17, 1999 provided in operative paragraph 33 that it was the Security Council's intention to suspend for a period of 120 days, renewable by the Council, the economic sanctions imposed on Iraq upon receipt of reports from UNMOVIC and IAEA that Iraq has cooperated in all respects for a period of 120 days after the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational.

In operative paragraph 38 of that resolution, the Security Council reaffirmed its intention to terminate the economic sanctions in accordance with the relevant provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 687 of April 8, 1991. Operative paragraph 22 of Resolution 687 essentially provided for termination of the economic sanctions upon the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of all weapons of mass destruction programs and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and the acceptance by Iraq of plans for the future ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with its undertaking not to use, develop, construct or acquire items specified in that resolution relating to weapons of mass destruction programs and ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers.

At the time of the UN Security Council's adoption of Resolution 1284, Russia, China, and France explained that they had abstained because they believed the resolution was ambiguous on criteria for suspending and lifting the economic sanctions. Would you verify that the information contained above is correct or, if it is incorrect, provide the correct information?

Ambassador WALKER. UN Security Council Resolution 1284 and related resolutions detail Iraq's disarmament-related obligations and lay out a road map suspending and terminating sanctions if Iraq fulfills its obligations. The United States strongly supports UNSCR 1284 and the related resolutions and views their implementation, by Iraq's fulfillment of its obligations, as the path to suspension and terrnination of sanctions. The Security Council is united in its desire to implement UNSCR 1284. Even those Security Council members who abstained from the vote are unanimous in calling on Iraq to cooperate fully with UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

As for the correctness of the description of UNSC Resolutions 1284 and 687 in the question above, a more precise and fuller description of the resolutions regarding Iraq's disarmament obligations and possible suspension and termination of sanctions follows:

*On Iraq's disarmament obligations, UNMOVIC and IAEA's work:*

In operative paragraph 1 of UNSCR 1284, the Security Council established the UN Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which replaced the Special Commission (UNSCOM).

In operative paragraph 7 of UNSCR 1284, the Security Council decided that UNMOVIC and the IAEA, not later than 60 days after they have both started work in Iraq, will draw up, for approval by the Security Council, a work program for the discharge of their mandates, which will include both the implementation of the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification, and the key remaining disarmament tasks to be completed by Iraq pursuant to its obligations to comply with the disarmament requirements of Resolution 687 and other related resolutions,

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which constitute the governing standard of Iraqi compliance. In the same operative paragraph, the Security Council also decided that what is required of Iraq for implementation of each task shall be clearly defined and precise.

UNSCR 687, in operative paragraphs 8 to 13 spells out Iraq's disarmament obligations required for the lifting of sanctions. In summary, Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of its chemical and biological weapons, stocks, research and development facilities, etc.; and of all its ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers along with related major parts, and repair and maintenance facilities. Iraq shall also unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon-usable material or subsystems or components and to accept on-site inspection and destruction, removal, or rendering harmless of such items and to accept a plan for ongoing monitoring and verification of its compliance with these undertakings.

CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO BE SUSPENDED

19. Senator LEVIN. Ambassador Walker, would you state the precise position of the United States with respect to the conditions that Iraq must meet for the economic sanctions to be suspended?

Ambassador WALKER. *On possible suspension of sanctions:*

In operative paragraph 33 of UNSCR 1284, the Security Council expressed its intention, upon receipt of reports from the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA that Iraq has cooperated in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA, in particular in fulfilling the work programs in all the aspects referred to in operative paragraph 7, for a period of 120 days after the date on which the Security Council is in receipt of reports from both UNMOVIC and the IAEA that the reinforced system of ongoing monitoring and verification is fully operational, to suspend with the fundamental objective of improving the humanitarian situation in Iraq and securing the implementation of the Security Council's Resolutions, for a period of 120 days renewable by the Security Council, and subject to elaboration of effective financial and other operational measures to ensure that Iraq does not acquire prohibited items, prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq, and prohibitions against the sale, supply, and delivery to Iraq of civilian commodities and products other than those referred to in paragraph 24 of Resolution 687 (i.e., arms, arms technology, and personnel and training related to arms) or those to which the mechanism established by Resolution 1051 applies (i.e. dual-use items).

In operative paragraph 25 of UNSCR 1284, the Security Council decided that the suspension of sanctions should be terminated on the fifth working day after either the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC or the Director General of the IAEA report that Iraq is not cooperating in all respects with UNMOVIC or the IAEA or if Iraq is in the process of acquiring any prohibited items.

CONDITIONS FOR ECONOMIC SANCTIONS TO BE CANCELED

20. Senator LEVIN. Would you state the precise position of the United States with respect to the conditions that Iraq must meet for the economic sanctions to be canceled?

Ambassador WALKER. *On possible termination of sanctions:*

In operative paragraph 38 of UNSCR 1284, the Security Council reaffirmed its intention to act in accordance with the relevant provisions of Resolution 687 on the termination of prohibitions referred to in that resolution, i.e., "sanctions." Operative paragraph 22 of UNSCR 687 states that after the Security Council has agreed that Iraq has completed all actions contemplated in operative paragraphs 8 to 13 of UNSCR 687 (detailed above), the prohibitions against the import of commodities and products originating in Iraq and the prohibitions against financial transactions related thereto contained in UNSCR 661 shall have no further force or effect.

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARY L. LANDRIEU

HEALTH OF SADDAM HUSSEIN

21. Senator LANDRIEU. Ambassador Walker, there have been reports that Saddam Hussein may have cancer. If this is true, could you please shed some light on the situation as well as any plans to deal with his possible successor?

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Ambassador WALKER. We have seen those reports but have not seen evidence to support them.

After Saddam Hussein, the United States looks forward to an Iraqi government that would permit us to enter into a dialogue leading to the reintegration of Iraq into normal international life. The United States wants Iraq to rejoin the family of nations as a freedom-loving and law-abiding member. This is in our interest and that of our allies within the region. We look forward to new leadership in Iraq that can live at peace with its people and its neighbors. The United States is providing support to opposition groups from all sectors of the Iraqi community that could lead to a popularly supported government.

FORCE STRENGTH

22. Senator LANDRIEU. General Franks, since Saddam Hussein has regenerated his threats to Kuwait, have you increased your number of troops in the region? If so, can how long do you plan to sustain the increase?

General FRANKS. Yes, additional forces were deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in response to Iraqi provocations. We expect these forces to remain deployed at least through the election period. [Deleted.]

IRAQI TROOP MOVEMENT

23. Senator LANDRIEU. General Franks, are you seeing any build-up or troop movements by the Iraqis?

General FRANKS. We have not seen any build-up of Iraqi forces in southern Iraq to threaten Kuwait, nor have we seen any significant movement of troops toward the Kurds in northern Iraq. The Iraqi ground forces routinely move forces out of garrison to train during this time of year. While this is cause for concern, we do not believe these movements are directly related to an impending threat against Kuwait or the Kurds of northern Iraq.

Recently, Iraq deployed several divisions west of Baghdad as a show of force in support of the Palestinians. These forces are now redeploying back to their garrison locations.

IRAQ TROOP STRENGTH

24. Senator LANDRIEU. General Franks, in your opinion, how formidable is Saddam's force today?

General FRANKS. Iraq's military remains capable of defending its borders and conducting limited offensive operations against its neighbors.

Because of the impact of sanctions, Republican Guard and regular army forces have downsized since Operation Desert Storm, but remain a significant threat to regional countries. Iraq's ground forces are capable of defending its borders, conducting limited offensive operations against its neighbors, defeating any internal threat to the regime, and conducting counterinsurgency operations against southern insurgents. Iraqi air and air defense forces continue to pose a threat to our forces patrolling the northern and southern no-fly zones.

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the committee adjourned.]

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# U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

**THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 28, 2000**

U.S. SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:43 a.m. in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding.

Committee members present: Senators Warner, Allard, Levin, and Cleland.

Committee staff members present: Romie L. Brownlee, staff director; and Judith A. Ansley, deputy staff director.

Professional staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, Mary Alice A. Hayward, George W. Lauffer, Thomas L. MacKenzie, and Joseph T. Sixeas.

Minority staff members present: David S. Lyles, minority staff director; and Richard D. DeBobes, minority counsel.

Staff assistants present: Beth Ann Barozie, Shekinah Z. Hill, Lisa O'Beirne, and Suzanne K.L. Ross.

Committee members' assistants present: Gregory C. McCarthy, assistant to Senator Inhofe; George M. Bernier, assistant to Senator Santorum; Robert Alan McCurry, assistant to Senator Roberts; Douglas Flanders, assistant to Senator Allard; G. Wayne Glass, assistant to Senator Bingaman; and Andrew Vanlandingham, assistant to Senator Cleland.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN

Chairman WARNER. The committee will begin its hearing.

I say with heartfelt sincerity that the world and indeed particularly our Nation could awaken tomorrow morning and be startled by the news that there is a downed airman, an American or maybe a Brit, being paraded through the streets of Baghdad. Few, so very few, people in our country and really the rest of the world recognize the risks that a bold band of airmen, Americans and British, are taking every day to enforce a policy which is very confusing, which few understand, and, in fairness to the administration, few have been able to come forward with a better policy. It is a policy that is being followed by this administration, Great Britain, and other allies to enforce the restrictions on Saddam Hussein and Iraq in the Gulf region by way of air patrol and naval interdiction.

So we start this hearing this morning by welcoming two of our three distinguished witnesses. We have reason to believe the third will be here soon.

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This committee has approached this subject with great seriousness. As a committee we began these hearings on July 20 with a closed hearing to receive an intelligence and operations briefing from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CIA on the situation in and around Iraq, and U.S. military operations in that region.

Last Tuesday, September 19, we received testimony on current administration policy on Iraq from a panel of administration officials: Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe, Assistant Secretary of State Walker, and Commander in Chief of the Central Command General Franks. Today we hear from another distinguished panel of experts on this region of the world. We look forward to your insights on this critical issue, to your views on what is right about the current policy, what, in your judgment, may not be right, and if there are any, what are the alternatives to the present policy being followed.

As I have said at our previous hearings on Iraq, we must always be mindful of the fact that every day the U.S., together with Great Britain, is placing its military men and women in harm's way in an effort to contain Saddam Hussein. This committee has an obligation on behalf of the men and women in uniform first and foremost, on behalf of the citizens of this country, and indeed the citizens of the world, to carefully examine this containment policy, to try to understand the goals this policy is intended to achieve, to consider whether we have the best policy in place for achieving these goals, and to evaluate whether the value derived from conducting the military operations against Iraq, the containment policy, is worth the risk of the lives and the wellbeing of our airmen and our sailors.

Ten years after the brutal and unprovoked Iraqi attack against Kuwait, the world is still faced with the threat of aggression from Iraq. Yet the United States and Great Britain seem to be alone in their efforts to contain Saddam Hussein. Over the past several years we have seen a weakening of the resolve of the international community to force Saddam Hussein to comply with the terms and conditions he accepted—accepted in writing—at the conclusion of the Gulf War in 1991.

What is at stake here is the credibility of the United Nations and the enforcement of its Security Council mandates. Yet two permanent members of the Security Council, Russia and France, are now openly defying Security Council resolutions by conducting flights into Baghdad without prior UN approval. How can the world, how can we, hope to secure Iraqi compliance with Security Council resolutions when Iraq sees such behavior by permanent Council members? Iraq senses weakness and division and is making the most of it with its continued defiance of the United Nations and the Security Council.

Throughout all of this, as the U.S. administration considers its next move, U.S. pilots are patrolling the skies over Iraq and U.S. sailors, together with sailors from other nations, are patrolling the sea lanes of the Persian Gulf. For what purpose? Why is there so little support for our efforts and those of Great Britain and other nations in enforcing the UN mandates while others stand by doing nothing?

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When we initiated these hearings in July, I hoped that they would lay the foundation for a clear understanding of U.S. goals and strategy in the region and a solid justification for the continued use of our military in almost daily operations to enforce this strategy. Thus far, we are still struggling to get the clarity we had sought.

Last week's testimony by administration witnesses really, in many ways, raised as many questions as we had hoped they would answer about current U.S. policy towards Iraq. Some of us came away from that hearing unclear about the administration's plan to get Saddam Hussein to accept new UN weapons inspections, unclear about what the U.S. response would be if Saddam Hussein continued to defy the international community by denying access to inspectors, unclear on when and under what circumstances the United States would be prepared to use force again, if indeed that use of force against Iraq is an option, to seek compliance with the UN mandates.

We were told of three red lines: if Iraq reconstitutes its weapons of mass destruction program, or threatens its neighbors or U.S. forces, or moves against the Kurds. Those are the three red lines where the option of force would be considered, in the judgment of the administration witnesses. As I understand it, we would be prepared to use force, but would not necessarily use force if any of these red lines singularly were crossed or multiples of them were crossed.

So we are not entirely sure where the use of force would be an option. Curiously and explicitly left out of this set of red lines was an Iraqi move against the Shia in the south and failure to allow the return of UN weapons inspectors. Since we are enforcing a no-fly zone in the south for the specific purpose of preventing Saddam Hussein from repressing the Shia people, I found the exclusion of a move against the Shia from the list of red lines perplexing. It leads me and others to question why our airmen are being asked to risk their lives on an almost daily basis to enforce this no-fly zone in the south if we are not willing to use force to defend the Shia from an Iraqi attack. Why the difference in the treatment of the Kurds in the north and the Shia in the south? Both are human beings.

As I recall, we executed Operation Desert Fox in December 1998 specifically because Iraq would not allow the return of UN weapons inspectors. We are faced with a continuation of that situation today. Again, is the use of force an option?

The American people and particularly those in uniform and their families need and deserve a clear explanation of U.S. policy and a clearer path ahead than has been provided thus far. We look to this distinguished panel this morning to inform this committee and those following this hearing with the benefit of your knowledge, drawn on many years of experience in dealing with the issues in this region. We are indeed privileged to have you.

Senator Levin.

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN

Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join you in welcoming our three distinguished witnesses here this morning.

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General Zinni, I believe this is the first appearance since your retirement. You have 40 years of distinguished service to this country under your belt, and I know there are many more ahead. We particularly want to welcome you and wish you well after your retirement from active service.

Ambassador Butler, I think this is the first time you have appeared in the Senate since you were in S–407 of the Capitol at the invitation of Senator Warner and myself over 2 years ago. I have not seen you since you left your position as head of the inspection effort for the United Nations. Your extraordinary service to this world should not go unnoted and we are all grateful to you.

Welcome, of course, Ambassador Perle. We always are happy to see you here.

As Senator Warner has noted, this is our third hearing within recent weeks on Iraq. I want to commend him again for scheduling these hearings. We have a heavy responsibility to look at what our policy is, to understand it, analyze it, and critique it, if appropriate. Perhaps most important, I think it is our responsibility, and that of our counterparts in the House, to determine whether or not we have any recommendations to make, if we see any better options than the ones that we are now exercising. It is our responsibility, if we do believe there are better options or changes that should be made, for us to say so as a body or as a Congress.

That is ultimately where these hearings could lead. I do not know if they will or not. Offhand, I am not sure I see better options than the policies we are now following, although there may be some tweaking here and there. I am not sure that I can see a better alternative, although surely the current policy is not achieving the result of removing Saddam. I believe we are containing him, so far at least. We have not succeeded in removing him, which I think is every civilized person's desire both in and outside of Iraq.

As our chairman has indicated, we have received testimony last week from Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe and Assistant Secretary of State Walker. They described the policy to contain Iraq and also to prevent renewed aggression by Iraq until there is hope for a new Iraqi regime and until Iraq is no longer a threat to its neighbors or to international security.

Our witnesses last week advised us as to what the so-called "red lines" were. The Chairman has identified them and has indicated that if those red lines are crossed, the U.S. is prepared to act at an appropriate time and place of our choosing. We are not going to tell Saddam in advance where that place is or what that time is, but he does know that those are three bright lines. Whether there should be additional bright lines or not is surely a matter that this committee and Congress should consider.

They also indicated that even though it is not a red line, that the United States has not ruled out or ruled in the use of force if Iraq continues to refuse to allow the resumption of UN weapons inspections. We have seen a list of signals that Saddam has sent recently of increasing hostility toward his neighbors, toward us, toward the international community, toward his own people. There is nothing new about any of those. But there are some additional recent signals of hostility, and that includes Iraq's accusation that Kuwait was siphoning off Iraqi oil. That is the same type of accusation

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which Iraq made in the days leading up to its 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

As the Chairman pointed out, despite these statements and hostile signals from Iraq, Russia and France have recently sent aircraft to Iraq without approval from the UN Sanctions Committee. Jordan has done the same thing, by the way. Also, there are a number of nations that have called for sanctions on Iraq to be lifted.

The reason for those calls is obviously humanitarian. I do not think anybody can do anything but commiserate with the situation that the Iraqi people find themselves in. They are the first victims of Saddam. It is understandable that people call for the sanctions to be lifted, even though most of us have agreed that they cannot be lifted until Saddam is removed or until he complies with the inspections requirements of the UN. Sanctions can be lifted when Saddam decides to comply with UN resolutions.

That, in my judgment, is the only hope that we have to keep him contained, keep the pressure on, and to let him know what the consequences would be if there is any future aggression against his neighbors.

Yesterday, the UN reached agreement to lower, from 30 to 35 percent, the percentage of oil revenues from the oil-for-food program that are set aside to pay for claims resulting from the Gulf War. That should make it possible for additional food and medicine to get to the people of Iraq.

So again, I want to welcome our witnesses. I look forward to their views as to: where U.S. policy is or is not the right policy; how it should or should not be changed; any proposals they have as to how Saddam can be contained; and any improvements over our present policy, that might result in the improvement in the situation of the people of Iraq, the security of her neighbors and the security of the world, facing, as we do, the aggressive dictator that we have in Saddam.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin, thank you for an excellent statement. The point that you raised prompts me to mention one other thing by way of an opening statement. Yesterday, Senator Levin and I were here with numerous colleagues on both sides and this room was absolutely overflowing as the Joint Chiefs of Staff advised this committee with regard to the shortfall in funds now and in the foreseeable future to maintain the military capability which most of us believe this Nation must have.

This operation is a very costly operation to the American taxpayer. The prime motivation of this hearing is for the physical safety of those performing these missions, but indeed a secondary consideration is the cost to the American taxpayers and, the cost to Great Britain, which likewise faces a stringent military budget.

Perhaps, General Zinni, you could give us or provide for the record otherwise, some idea of the cost over and above the normal operational costs for our regularly deployed units in this region. We keep units in the Gulf, of course, for a variety of security reasons, as we do in other areas. But clearly there is a delta on top of the base costs for forward deployment occasioned by this operation.

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Also, our troops being forward deployed to carry out this mission in various parts of the world are in areas where there is a high personal risk to themselves, their associates, and such family as they may or may not have, and that is an added risk. So perhaps you can touch on that in your testimony.

I see the arrival of another one of our colleagues. We have just completed, Senator Levin and I, brief opening statements. If you would like to address the panel, please join us.

Senator ALLARD. I do not have any opening statement. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you for coming.

Before recognizing our witnesses, without objection I place in the record at this time a statement by our distinguished colleague, Senator Thurmond.

[The prepared statement of Senator Thurmond follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY SENATOR STROM THURMOND

Mr. Chairman, at the previous hearing on the administration's policy regarding Iraq, I stated that I thought the policy was a failure and that it would not result in the downfall of Saddam Hussein. Events during the intervening days have supported my contention. France and Russia openly flouted the embargo against civilian flights. India has suggested that it was considering its own protest flight to Baghdad and has denounced sanctions. Other nations are cautiously eying these activities and have indicated their opposition to the embargo.

Mr. Chairman, we need a new policy on Iraq. A policy that will force Saddam to loosen his stranglehold on Iraq and its people, and bring stability to this vital region of the globe. The status quo is no longer acceptable. I am optimistic that today's distinguished panel will provide the committee with a fresh look at our role in the Persian Gulf and especially on our relations with Iraq.

Mr. Chairman, I join you in welcoming Ambassador Butler, Secretary Perle, and General Zinni to this important hearing and look forward to their testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman WARNER. We do not have any particular order of witnesses, but I do believe that we should recognize our distinguished former CINC in this region and let you start off this testimony.

General Zinni, such statements as you have, I say to the witnesses, will be placed in the record in their entirety.

## STATEMENT OF GEN. ANTHONY C. ZINNI, USMC, RET., FORMER COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General ZINNI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no prepared statement, but I would like to address some of the issues that both you and Senator Levin brought up in your opening statements.

In addition to the issue of costs and risks, I would like to say a few words about our presence there, the containment policy, military action, and the removal of Saddam, because they seem to me to be at least four key issues that you have dealt with over this series of hearings.

Chairman WARNER. General Zinni, this record will be read and studied by many. Would you put in it exactly the period of time you were there as CINC, your area of operation, and how it embraced this region?

General ZINNI. Yes, sir. I have been involved in this region actually for over 10 years. I was in the region during the Gulf War, in the north with the Kurds, in Israel when we put the Patriots in, working out of European Command. I had spent time in the Horn of Africa in Somalia, which is part of CENTCOM's region. When

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I commanded the First Marine Expeditionary Force, this was one of our regions that we were responsible for and committed to.

I was the Deputy Commander in Chief for 1 year and then the Commander in Chief of the Central Command for 3 years. So the vast majority of the last decade has been focused on the 25 countries that make up Central Region, from central Asia to the Persian Gulf to the Horn of Africa to Egypt and Jordan.

Mr. Chairman, we have a presence there that grew from the beginnings of the creation of Central Command. CENTCOM was created because of threats to the energy resources and to the region for different reasons, at that time the Soviet threat in the mid-1980s. I think we have come to realize the importance of this region.

Most of the discussions I had with leaders in the region before I left actually discussed the post-Saddam era and our presence beyond Saddam. I did not find any leader in the region that wanted us to withdraw, obviously those that are our friends and allies in the region. In fact, I would tell you that, if anything, there was more interest in either reconfiguring or increasing our presence in the region. They saw American presence, American military presence specifically, as a force of stability in the region and they saw the stability of the region as its important value to the world. I would agree, for four reasons.

The first is obviously, the energy resources. I can quote you the statistics: 65 percent of the world's oil, probably close to 40 percent of the world's liquefied natural gas, and maybe more, and the highest quality of these resources.

In addition to that, I see this region as growing economically. Several times when I have been out there, I looked at ports like Dubai and Jebbalali, Salallah in Oman, Aden, Jeddah. These places are growing. They are becoming major transshipment and distribution points. The geography tells you that the natural historical tendency for this to be the hinge plate and the center for trade is returning in a major way, and I think, given stability, this could blossom economically and we could see something that looks like Hong Kong in several places in the Gulf. It is beginning to happen.

Of course, stability in this region is important to us. Historically, when this region destabilizes or there are influences that destabilize the region, we feel it, the world feels it. Whether it is extremism, whether there are hegemons that take charge, whether we see proliferation of WMD causing trouble, it stretches beyond the region and it touches us, no matter how much we would like it to be otherwise.

Chairman WARNER. If I might interject, indeed the flow of oil issue is one area of great instability, and that could easily be affected by the stability of the security relationships among these nations. We saw that with Saddam Hussein and his invasion.

General ZINNI. Absolutely. I think that is an excellent point.

Chairman WARNER. Under those circumstances, this country had to open its strategic oil reserve. That was the one time. That was the clear case.

General ZINNI. If we go back to the days of Earnest Will when we reflagged the tankers and protected the flow of oil, I think that illuminates the point you brought out, Senator, about the instabil-

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ity could be created just by virtue of who controls or who threatens the flow of oil.

The final point of interest is just freedom of navigation. I think sea lines of communication, air lines of communications, it is the hinge plate of three continents and clearly we have to maintain those.

I racked my brain for over 4 years thinking about a policy other than containment that would work, a short quick answer to resolving the problem of Saddam Hussein. I have to be honest with you: I did not come up with a better one. I mean, we have been involved in containment of people like Kim Jung Il, Kim Il Sung in Korea, Fidel Castro, the Soviet Union. Containment seems to be what you end up doing when it is difficult to generate the political will, the popular support to take military action. Containment is difficult, sanctions are difficult, and I am not going to go over all the reasons why because everybody in this room knows them as well as I do.

Military action is the third point I want to talk about. When we talk about military action, I am not sure we are clear on what we mean by military action. Every time we have decided to take military action, as I went around the Gulf talking to the leaders there to gain their support, I get the same questions each time: Are you serious this time? Is this another pinprick? Are we just going to go north and drop some bombs and then a defiant Saddam lives through this and looks stronger in the end?

It is difficult to muster the will to take the military action to resolve this, because I can tell you what it would take and it is clear in our war plans what it would take, but it would be a major commitment. It would take the political will, popular support, coalition building around the world, international support that may be difficult to muster. Absent that, we are stuck with pinpricks as a means of responding if Saddam crosses the line and does things or commits actions that are unacceptable.

The last point I would like to talk about is removing Saddam——

Chairman WARNER. Can I add one word? You say it may be difficult to muster the coalition support, and indeed this operation from its origin in 1991 was based on a coalition. Maybe you better say difficult or impossible. I do not know on what basis.

General ZINNI. Senator, I am not sure. I would tell you that if we were serious, whatever that means, if there was reason to take military action that was going to remove this regime as its ultimate end state and objective, I think that you could get the support to do that.

Chairman WARNER. It would require facts of provocation or potential that have not been brought forth yet.

General ZINNI. Absolutely. I don't think you could do it without a provocative action that gave reason for it to be conducted. But Saddam tends to give us plenty of reasons. Sometimes our reaction is maybe less than our friends in the region would like to see us take and results in bigger problems at the end than before.

Removing Saddam is not the issue. The issue is what kind of Iraq and what kind of region do we end up with. There are many ways that Saddam could be removed, and again I am not going to go through all of them because I think the committee has heard many proposals. What is important is what comes out of this is a

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stable Iraq, one that is intact, territorially intact, politically intact, and still a major influence in the region, but in the right direction.

If we continue on this track, my biggest fear is not the explosion of Saddam Hussein and Iraq striking out at neighbors, but the implosion and collapse of Iraq and what that may mean. That may be more difficult to muster interest and involvement, but would be absolutely necessary so we do not create a failed or incapable state that ends up being another disaster in the region and is even more destabilizing than the situation we have now.

Let me touch on the two questions that you brought up about costs and risks, Senator. It is difficult to measure costs. It sounds like a simple thing, but do you deduct the pay of every soldier, sailor, airman, and marine there? We own no assigned forces in Central Command. These come from somewhere else. They would exist and be operating somewhere else.

Do we look at a unit like the Army Battalion Task Force in Kuwait and measure the cost of deploying them there and subtract the training value of what they get? Many of those units do not need to go to the National Training Center (NTC) once they have gone there. They will tell you that it is the finest training they get anywhere in the Army, arguably better than the NTC, because of the ranges, maneuver space, and the combined arms that we have located there that we could use.

We have to measure the contributions that our friends in the region provide. When I was there it got as high as $500 million plus to support our presence in 1 year. I think the last year I was there it was close to $300 million. $500 million was during Operations Desert Fox-Desert Thunder when there were added costs. This is support in kind—food, water, fuel—this is support in facilities; many special projects conducted, like the Saudis in building a $200 million complex for the housing of our troops that is amongst the finest troop housing that you would find anywhere that we have in the military.

We build confidence because of our presence. These forces also engage in coalition-building and allow us to exercise our war plans. It encourages the forces in the area to buy American, if you will, which is not only good economically for us, but the interoperability issue then from a military point of view is enhanced. I think the last time I totaled it up in the last decade, over $100 billion, well over $100 billion, worth of American defense items were purchased by countries in the Gulf, in this region.

So it is hard to compute those against the costs. Those things might not be there if we did not have our presence there, and those things end up being benefits back here. The Saudis and others invest heavily in our country. They certainly do not want to see us in a condition where the problems with gas and oil put our economy in recession or worse. It affects them. They invest in America because they believe in us and they see us as a force of stability. So there is some come-back on what it costs us to operate there and what it costs us for fuel.

They certainly do not want to see the price of oil up where it is. By all accounts that I know, they want to see it down at a price that they can plan and program without one so low that it causes

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them to be unable to pay those bills, especially the ones that they owe to us, some of which I mentioned.

I would just close my opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, in saying that this is a very complex problem. What concerns me most are short little quickie strategies that people think we can execute and get this over very neatly. My biggest fear is we are going to inherit a failed state in Iraq that is going to require a tremendous amount of nation-building and we might not be able to generate the international cooperation and interest, the intergovernmental requirement here because there will be humanitarian problems, diplomatic problems, not just security problems, to deal with this condition, and we have to think about not letting this happen.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much for an excellent statement, General.

A PROTESTER. Why can we not use diplomacy instead of war?

A PROTESTER. Feed Iraqi children, do not bomb them.

Chairman WARNER. We will suspend for just a minute, please.

A PROTESTER. Feed Iraqi children, do not bomb them.

A PROTESTER. Diplomacy, not war.

A PROTESTER. Feed Iraqi children, do not bomb them.

A PROTESTER. We are sorry to disturb you, but we cannot stand for children to die. Children are dying every day, hundreds of them. Stop killing Iraqi children. Stop killing Iraqi children. [Pause.]

Chairman WARNER. I would say that the issue of the sad state of the Iraqi people as a consequence of Saddam Hussein and his policies is very much in the mind of not only those of us here in this room, but the entire world. However, it is irrefutable that almost all of their suffering is a direct consequence of the intentional actions of Saddam Hussein. There exist adequate supplies of medicine and food and indeed the adjustment which the UN made yesterday, as stated by my distinguished colleague, is a reflection of the effort in the world to try and alleviate that suffering, at the same time as we, by necessity, continue this policy of containment.

Ambassador Butler.

Senator LEVIN. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could just interrupt the Ambassador for 10 seconds, just to add to your thoughts here.

Chairman WARNER. Yes.

Senator LEVIN. How I wish that message which we just heard could be heard by Saddam in a free Iraq with democratic elections. He would not be there if there were democratic elections to hear the message. But, in the meantime, how we all wish that that feeling that we just heard expressed could be heard by that dictator who has used gas on his own people, much less deprived them of food and medicine.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator Levin.

Ambassador, I would appreciate it if you would sketch your very long career of involvement with this issue. You have dedicated so much of your life to the very thing that we just heard, the persecution of people in this region, whether it is those who are persecuted in Kuwait and elsewhere in the Gulf or the people in Iraq. Certainly this policy is not directed toward people; it is directed towards a political regime. Thank you. Would you sketch your career, sir.

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## STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR RICHARD BUTLER, DIPLOMAT-IN-RESIDENCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

Ambassador BUTLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief in responding to your request to sketch my career. My career has been spent substantially in the Australian Foreign Service. I am now Diplomat-in-Residence at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. I am a permanent resident of the United States, I am proud to tell you.

My last job before joining the Council on Foreign Relations was as Executive Chairman of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the body created by the Security Council to disarm Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction and to establish a monitoring system to see that Saddam does not make those weapons again.

Chairman WARNER. Give the year that was established?

Ambassador BUTLER. The Commission was established at the end of the Gulf War in 1991. I was its head from 1997 to 1999, its last 2 years.

Before taking up the position at UNSCOM, I had served 5 years as Australian Ambassador to the United Nations. Overall, my career in international relations has had arms control at its center. That is what I have worked mostly on. That is what I have conducted research on and taken higher degrees in.

But because of the demonstration we just saw, let me also point out that I am an economist and amongst the very many positions I held at the United Nations, elected positions, one of them was President of the Economic and Social Council in 1994, the chief organ under the Charter of the UN charged with responsibility for economic and social policies. I was also Vice Chairman in 1995, again elected to that job, of the Global Conference on Social Development.

Relevant to my time in Baghdad, one of the things I did when I was Australian Ambassador to Thailand a number of years ago was that I was lead negotiator for Australia in the business of bringing about peace in Cambodia. I sometimes think, Mr. Chairman, that my brief experiences with the Khmer Rouge at that time were an unwitting preparation for my subsequent work in Baghdad.

Before I start my remarks on the subject at issue, if you would permit me, I would like to say a word to those who have just protested in this room. There can be no doubt about their sincerity and about the goodness of their wish that the people of Iraq, of which there are some 22 million, enjoy a standard of living that they deserve and have better standards of health and nutrition than they currently experience.

Let there also be no doubt in this room that there is an utterly single and abiding reason why the good people of Iraq are not enjoying that standard today, and it is the policies of the head of their government, the dictator of Iraq. Specifically to come to weapons, the legal and political system established at the end of the Gulf War by the Security Council was deliciously simple. It was this: You will suffer sanctions until you give us your weapons.

He therefore has always had in his hands the key to the release of the Iraqi people from sanctions from day one, and it was to put on the table his weapons of mass destruction. Senator, he has reso-

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lutely refused to pick up that key and turn it. The first victims of that are the people he purports to serve.

Chairman WARNER. The children seem to have borne almost a disproportionate burden, have they not?

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, I do not want to divert too far from our weapons-related purpose, but you do make an important point. I do not think any of us know accurately the state of affairs throughout Iraq, for example, with respect to children. There are UNICEF reports, there are various somewhat credible reports. One of them, by the way, is to the effect that in the region of Iraq, that is the polity of Iraq, but the region not directly governed by Saddam, namely in the north, which is managed on a local basis by the Kurdish people, there the standards of nutrition and health and welfare are far better than elsewhere. There the food and medicines that are provided under the oil-for-food program, which are administered by the Kurds, not by the Saddamist regime, those foods and medicines get through. There, the standard of welfare is much better.

But one point I would want to make before perhaps leaving the sanctions subject, but I will come back to the sanctions subject in its relation to arms, is this. Again I say to the good people who have just had to leave this chamber that, make no mistake about it, Iraq is awash with money. The consequences of the flourishing black market are simply enormous. The regime is in great shape. There is no shortage of a capacity to provide what the people need, were there the will to do just that, leave aside the oil-for-food arrangements.

But instead what we now see revealed, and perhaps the unkindest cut of all, is evidence that some of the UN-provided food and medicine is actually being seized by the regime and exported for sale outside Iraq.

So my word on what we have just heard in this chamber, Mr. Chairman, is I agree, I agree that the ordinary people of Iraq are suffering greatly. I do not agree that it is the direct consequence of sanctions. I think the responsibility for that suffering lies with the leader of the government of Iraq.

Now, can I turn to the weapons-related subject?

Chairman WARNER. Yes. Thank you for the clarity of that statement. I think it is important.

Ambassador BUTLER. Uttered with great regret, may I say.

Now, I thank you very much for asking me to be here today on what I consider to be an enormously important subject. I am honored to be in the company of General Zinni and Ambassador Perle. I have distributed to the committee a document which I have called "Speaking Notes for Statement" before this committee and I propose, Mr. Chairman, not least for economy of time, but also because I would like to be rather direct, to set those notes aside and hope that they might be read, and on their basis make the following somewhat simplified remarks.

First, what is fundamentally at issue in our dealing with Iraq and its dictator is weapons of mass destruction. That is the central issue. It has been for the last 10 years. It is an intrinsically important issue because of the great danger that he and his addiction to those weapons has offered to the region and the world.

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It is also an important issue for a wider reason, namely that if he gets away with breaking out of the legal obligations that have been put upon him by the Security Council and that his own country entered into, such as its signature of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, if he gets away with breaking those regimes, the consequences for wider weapons of mass destruction control will be very serious indeed.

Second, it is now 22 months since Tariq Aziz, speaking for Saddam Hussein, told me on the August 3, 1998, in Baghdad that Iraq is disarmed and that Iraq would no longer cooperate with the commission that I led, that our work was ended, and that it was my duty to go back to New York and tell the Security Council that Iraq was disarmed, a demand which I immediately and utterly refused on the ground that I was not prepared to tell a lie. They are not disarmed. They had refused to give us the evidence for their claim and I refused to do what he demanded.

In that 22 months there has been no further work in the disarmament of Iraq and there has been no monitoring of their ongoing activities with respect to the creation of weapons of mass destruction.

Chairman WARNER. At that juncture can you say, do you have any evidence or facts that, while those issues have just been idled, that he is proceeding to manufacture, research, develop, or otherwise work on weapons of mass destruction?

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, and by your leave, Mr. Chairman, that was to be my next point.

Chairman WARNER. Well, I apologize.

Ambassador BUTLER. No, no. Please, I am at your disposal.

Chairman WARNER. But you are so precise, I wanted to put it in the record at that point.

Ambassador BUTLER. I am at your disposal. May I quickly note two aspects of that breakout on August 3, 1998. One was its motive and the other is how that was possible. Its motive is crystal clear. It was to preserve what then remained of Iraq's WMD holdings and to be free to make new weapons, no question. I had given them a list of the remaining items we needed and, Senator, that list was right. Had we taken away those items in the missile, chemical, and biological fields, their weapons holdings would have been harmed, and they did not want to do it.

But more important than their motive is how that could be possible. The answer is because they knew that they would be defended in the Security Council by permanent members who had themselves helped author the very law that we were seeking to enforce.

Now, what have they done in that 22 months? We cannot know—this is your question. We cannot know with utter precision. That is the logic of inspection and monitoring. That is why we need it, to be able to know with more precision exactly what they are doing. You cannot know what you cannot see.

But what we do know is this. They are back in business in all fields. They are seeking to extend the range of their missiles. That was work that was under way as I left. The last technical conversation I had personally with the Iraqi general in charge of their missiles was one in which I said to him: I can see what you are doing

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and it is wrong and you must stop. He said: I will not and see you later. So they are doing that again and that is a fact.

Chairman WARNER. I think at that point we should put in the record that he was permitted under the framework of agreements to develop a missile providing that the range, I think, was 42 kilometers.

Ambassador BUTLER. The limit, Senators, Mr. Chairman, is 150 kilometers.

Chairman WARNER. Yes, that is right, 150 kilometers.

Ambassador BUTLER. They were attempting to take the engine from a surface to air missile, put it in a surface to surface missile, and make it fly longer. I said, that is against the rules.

Chairman WARNER. I just wanted to lay the foundation. He can build them and he was trying to extrapolate that technology into extending the range.

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, by the means I have just described and by some other means, and I assume, General Zinni, I am not here to cross-examine you, but you know what I am talking about and that is basically sound.

General ZINNI. Yes.

Ambassador BUTLER. You can bundle two engines together and make a given missile fly longer. There are various things you can do. But they were seeking then to extend the range of their missiles and the evidence available today, and I do not see it all any more, but it certainly makes clear to me that they are back in that business.

But missiles are only vehicles. They have to carry something. What do we say about that? The evidence that I have seen, to go through it very quickly, is this. Their chemical warfare agent manufacturing facilities have been rebuilt. The same is true of their biological capacity, and I have seen evidence that I accept that he has recalled their nuclear weapons design team.

So in summary, Mr. Chairman, they are back in business, which is precisely what was not to happen. Remember, my leitmotif here is that essentially we are talking about weapons of mass destruction.

Now, one of the main instruments that was to be employed by the international community to prevent this development was actually sanctions, sanctions tied to adequate disarmament and arms control performance. I am sure when we enter into discussions we will come back to this.

All I want to say about sanctions at this juncture is—and I want to say this very carefully—if their fundamental purpose after their initial purpose, which was to encourage him to get out of Kuwait, which did not work and so we had to send in a coalition of force, but if their purpose thereafter was to oblige his conformity with the requirements of arms control, of disarmament and monitoring—I want to say this very carefully—the only sensible conclusion to come to today is that they are not working.

They may have worked for a period of time. They may have helped bring about some of what we achieved. It is a bit hard to dissect that with great accuracy, but let us assume they did. But what I want to say now is, given the last 22 months, given today's circumstances of crumbling sanctions, given the fact that he is back

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in the arms business, Mr. Chairman, it follows as the night follows the day for me to say what I am saying: These sanctions are not working.

Now, the key issue is what to do about all of this. We are aware of the administration's policies involving continuing commitment to the disarmament and certainly monitoring of the Saddamist regime, and we are aware of the three red lines that they have mentioned. Now, what I think must be added to that picture is what I call a fourth red line, and it is the absence of this that concerns me.

It is the need for the administration to achieve—they may say they have used adequate effort; that will be for them to say if they choose to answer this—but the need for the administration to achieve the one thing that is fundamentally necessary if there is to be a possibility of putting an end to or having adequate monitoring on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction-related behavior, and that is the re-establishment of a consensus in the Security Council that this man will not be allowed to disobey its laws.

Fundamentally, Mr. Chairman—and this is my fourth red line—that means a major effort by the United States Government, whether it is this administration or the next, to make clear to the fellow permanent member that is most chiefly responsible for Saddam's breakout—and I am talking about Russia—to make clear to Russia that its behavior in the patronization of the dictator of Baghdad, a man declared by international observers to have the worst human rights record since Adolf Hitler, to make clear to Russia that it is not acceptable for it to patronize such a person, to make clear that we have a common interest in the security of the non-proliferation regimes on weapons of mass destruction, and that when Security Council consensus on such issues disappears the only beneficiary is the rogue, and that behavior of patronage of such a rogue is unworthy and unacceptable from a permanent member of the Security Council.

This is a tough task, but, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is essential if there is to be a chance of Saddam being brought back into the required arms control regime. Now, one of the ways in which such restoration of consensus may be able to be achieved is if this failing sanctions regime is modified, and the inner logic of that, it seems to me, is crystal clear. What is it about? It is about weapons of mass destruction. It is not about harming Iraqi babies.

So it seems to me that within such a new consensus consideration should be given to refocusing the sanctions to make sure that they are targeted against any militarily-related goods and against the financial welfare of the leadership of the government of Iraq. Targeted sanctions could be a part of such a new approach.

It must be fundamental to such a deal that monitoring be restored. If Iraq were to be given a revised sanctions arrangement targeted on weapons and the finances of the leadership, but by definition liberating some other parts of the regime, it could only be on the clear understanding that full-scale monitoring is returned to Iraq so that we can see what they are doing in their missile, nuclear, chemical, and biological activities.

Whether or not the Russians would be prepared to buy such an arrangement, it seems to me, cannot be predicted in advance. They

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have their own interests and set of problems. But I strongly suggest to you and to this committee that the most strenuous effort must be made to forge that kind of consensus within the Security Council. Only then might the system have a chance of working as it should.

The alternatives in failing to do that are what we were talking about a moment ago, what General Zinni was so ably talking about, and what others have spoken about in another place in this city 2 days ago. Do you use that formulation here, refer to the other house as "another place?"

Senator LEVIN. "That other body."

Chairman WARNER. "That other body."

Ambassador BUTLER. "That other body."

Senator LEVIN. Somewhere. [Laughter.]

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, in my Australian parliamentary background it is called "the other place."

In that other body, there was reference to the unilateral use by the United States of armed force. I do not rule that out. General Zinni is far more expert than I in saying what needs to go into that calculation and what the costs are. One of the red lines is, were there to be a further breakout in terms of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam, then the administration has said it would consider using force.

That is a very tough issue and it is the other way to go. What I am saying—and I do not think it should be taken off the table, quite frankly—is that I do not think signals should be sent to Saddam that this is not going to happen.

But before getting to that, it seems to me a much more strenuous effort must be made in our relations with the Russians in making clear to them that the way to solve the weapons of mass destruction issues is by a restoration of common international purpose here, a restoration of Russia doing what it should do as a permanent member of the Security Council, and that is both to make the law required and participate in its enforcement, rather than go in for some old-fashioned Cold War-type client statism as we now see it doing with Iraq.

I think, Mr. Chairman, I have probably spoken for longer than I intended, but that is my take on the present situation and I am happy to enter into any discussion which may ensue.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Butler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT BY RICHARD BUTLER

Twenty-two months have passed since any disarmament or monitoring work has been conducted in Iraq. In these circumstances, it is difficult to know, with precision, what Iraq has done in this interim period to develop its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. However, there are credible reports that Saddam Hussein is back at work on those weapons.

It seems clear, for instance, that Iraq is attempting to extend the range of its missiles. In this context, Iraq withheld some 500 tons of Scud-specific missile fuel from UNSCOM. The administration has indicated, publicly, that Iraq has rebuilt its chemical and biological weapons manufacturing facilities. Other reports indicate that Saddam has taken steps to reassemble his nuclear weapons design team. In this latter context, it should be recalled that, after the Gulf War, nuclear experts concluded that Iraq had been only 6 months away from assembling an atomic bomb. Iraq has the required design and know-how for the assembly of a nuclear explosive device. Its sole deficiency is the required special fissionable material. This deficiency

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could be eliminated by the resumption of relevant work inside Iraq and/or by the importation of the material for the weapons core.

Iraq's efforts to rebuild its capacity to deploy weapons of mass destruction are utterly unsurprising. The possession of such weapons remain a major Iraqi priority; its government has shown that it will bear virtually any cost to further its goal and, in the current period, the divisions in the Security Council have served to remove political pressure on Iraq to meet its arms control obligations.

Two years ago, in June 1998, in my capacity as Executive Chairman of UN Special Commission, I provided the Security Council with a plan titled, "Necessary Conditions for Resolution of Priority Disarmament Issues." This informal note was essentially intended as a "road map"—a list of the necessary, rather than sufficient, conditions for the completion of UNSCOM's disarmament work in Iraq. At that time, I believed that these necessary conditions could become sufficient if Iraq provided all the materials, documents, and information relating to its prohibited weapons specified in the road map, and if it also agreed to terminate its concealment efforts. The road map highlighted three areas:

- In the missile area, Iraq had failed to provide evidence relating to: its indigenous production of missiles; its warhead material balance; and its claimed unilateral destruction of Scud-specific propellants.
- In the chemical weapons area, Iraq had refused to provide UNSCOM with verifiable evidence of the disposition of special munitions, including 155-millimeter mustard shells and R–400 chemical/biological aerial bombs, or of its efforts to clarify the full extent of its efforts to produce the chemical warfare agent VX.
- In the biological weapons area, UNSCOM needed a completely revised account of Iraq's program, including: evidence of the acquisition, production, and disposition of all relevant materials, equipment, weapons agents, and munitions.

UNSCOM attempted to implement the terms of the road map through an intensive program of inspections and meetings with Iraqi authorities. Those actions, in mid-1998, never received the required level of cooperation from Baghdad. Instead, in August 1998, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz stated that Iraq would no longer participate in UNSCOM's disarmament work and insisted that I would report immediately to the Security Council that Iraq no longer had any proscribed weapons, related materials, or capability.

I told Aziz that I could not issue such a report without evidence to support it, and subsequently reported to the Security Council that Iraq had failed to provide the cooperation and materials requested. UNSCOM would not be able to conduct the substantive disarmament work mandated to it by the Security Council or give to the Council the assurances it required with respect to Iraq's prohibited weapons programs. After Iraq responded by suspending all UNSCOM activities in its territory, the situation deteriorated to the point that the United States and the United Kingdom launched Operation Desert Fox in December 1998.

In January 1999, I directed UNSCOM to provide the Security Council with a comprehensive review of Iraq's then current status. We provided a list of priority areas that needed to be addressed in disarmament, monitoring, and verification. Having considered the findings of this report and taken advice from independent experts, the Council reaffirmed that the disarmament of Iraq had not been completed.

Throughout 1999, however, the political contours of the debate over Iraqi compliance shifted significantly. Three permanent members of the Security Council—Russia, China, and France—showed they were no longer willing to support the kind of rigorous inspections needed to fully uncover the extent of Iraq's illegal weapons holdings. In December 1999, these three members refused to endorse the establishment of UNMOVIC—the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Commission—as the successor to UNSCOM, even though this new body would lack the organizational and technical independence of UNSCOM. These abstaining members of the Security Council largely objected to the condition that was still required of Iraq—to give "immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access" to UNMOVIC inspectors. Security Council resolution 1284, under which UNMOVIC operates, also lifted the ceiling on Iraqi oil production, but kept in place the oil-for-food program. Iraq has since reiterated its refusal to cooperate with any further inspections or monitoring.

Saddam's success in facing down the Security Council, and ignoring Iraq's obligations under international law, constitutes a crisis for the system of collective management of global security. Its successful challenge to the authority of the Security Council weakens that body, overall. Iraq's illegal weapons programs are a threat to the credibility of existing non-proliferation and arms control regimes, and they are

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a threat to its neighbors, exacerbating insecurities and tensions in an already unstable region. Beyond the Middle East, Saddam's regime may represent a menace to global security by its own direct actions or by sponsoring terrorist groups.

But before embarking on any new policy course in response to these threats, the United States and its allies must recognize the constraints of the present situation. First, it must be acknowledged that sanctions have become ineffective; the Iraqi government has completely transferred their effects to the Iraqi people and has built a lucrative black market. More recently, member states of the United Nations, including two permanent members of the Security Council, are acting against sanctions. Second, we should concede that there is no political consensus, beginning here in the United States, on the use of military force to remove Saddam Hussein or to compel Iraq to submit to inspections.

What actions, then, can be taken to counter the threat posed by Iraq?

The United States must begin by forging a new consensus in the Security Council on enforcing arms control in Iraq. It must insist on the appropriate standard of behavior from its fellow permanent members in the Security Council. This administration and the next to follow must draw a new red line for U.S. foreign policy. Just as the United States made clear that it would not tolerate Iraqi aggression towards Kurds or its neighbors, or the visible emergence of new weapons of mass destruction, the United States must now make clear to Russia that patronage of regimes such as that of Saddam Hussein (and Slobodan Milosevic) is unacceptable in U.S.-Russian relations. This is the essential condition for any possible restoration of consensus in the Security Council.

That consensus should include: restoring WMD monitoring in Iraq, re-targeting sanctions to the financial activities of the Iraqi leadership, and preventing the importation by Iraq of any military goods.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. You certainly took very valuable time and it was well worth it. We will come back to you in the course of our questions.

Our next witness is our good friend and longstanding witness on many subjects before this committee for I have forgotten how many decades, my memory goes back three, maybe four. We welcome you, Ambassador Perle.

**STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD N. PERLE, RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE**

Ambassador PERLE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for inviting me to participate in these discussions, and I want to thank you for holding them. This is a vital issue that has not had the attention it deserves.

Your effort is aimed at encouraging the executive branch to develop an effective policy for dealing with Iraq. This will not be easy. It is a long time since the administration had any coherent policy toward Saddam, much less an effective one. It is also a long time since the administration has been open to suggestions from Congress about how to fill the policy vacuum that the White House has created.

Let me quickly summarize my view of the current situation. The UN inspectors who once scoured Iraq for illegal weapons have been driven out and are unlikely to return. The American policy of containing a belligerent Iraq with intrusive inspections and economic sanctions, punctuated by episodic bombing and the occasional half-hearted coup attempt, has clearly failed. I agree entirely with Ambassador Butler that the sanctions policy is a failure.

It is increasingly clear in my view that the only solution to the danger posed by Saddam Hussein is a sustained, determined plan to remove him from power. I disagree profoundly with General Zinni, who seems to believe that the risk of destabilization is greater than the risk of Saddam remaining in power.

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The Security Council coalition once arrayed against Saddam is ever more deeply divided about how to make Iraq comply with the Council's own brave but unconvincing resolutions prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. I wish I could muster some optimism for Ambassador Butler's solution, which is to hope that the Security Council will coalesce behind a tough policy. It will not.

The last time he and I were together discussing this issue was a few weeks ago in New York. He expressed the same hope then. If anything, the situation has deteriorated since then and I think the likelihood of persuading the Russians or even the French, for that matter, to change their policy is extremely low.

Russia and France now openly support Saddam when they see opportunities to do so. While we have several times resorted to bombing to gain access for UN inspectors, Saddam has emerged from each new bombing stronger than before.

The Iraqi people are aware of the frequent bombing of radars and other low value targets and when bombing continues year after year without significant effect it becomes an empowerment of Saddam, a vindication of Saddam's view that he is impervious to western air power. So it does not help the situation, it makes it worse.

Support for sanctions, whose most visible effect, although I agree entirely that Saddam has maneuvered the implementation of the sanctions and the flow of humanitarian relief to worsen the situation of his own people, is sinking fast. Unless we find a more effective policy, Saddam Hussein, with the chemical weapons he has hidden from inspectors and sheltered from air attacks, will emerge from the ruins of containment as the ultimate victor in the mother of all battles and the continuing scourge on his own people and the Gulf region.

For at least the last 2 years, the central issue concerning Iraq has been Saddam's compliance with UN resolutions concerning prohibited weapons programs. But even when UN inspectors were in place, there was no realistic prospect they would unearth all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Iraq is too big and the space necessary to conceal those weapons too small.

The intelligence supplied by Saddam's defecting son-in-law brought us briefly closer than we could have hoped. Saddam reacted by halting inspections that might have exploited the late Hussein Kamel's leads and by moving the illegal material and incriminating documents to new hiding places. Even if UN inspectors were now allowed to return, we would be hunting needles in haystacks, and Saddam's de facto veto over who will inspect him next, which led to the choice of a weak successor to Richard Butler, makes a mockery of the idea of a tough independent inspection regime.

Even if we managed to locate nerve gas or missiles or biological weapons, there can be no assurance that we could seize or destroy them. So what should we do? What new policy should we substitute for an illusory containment, in which Saddam's weapons programs continue uninspected and western policy drifts toward capitulation and the coup de gras of the lifting of sanctions? And the lifting of sanctions will come.

The United States, alone if necessary, with our friends if possible, should aggressively support the nascent opposition to

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Saddam's regime. We should organize, finance, equip, train, and protect an Iraqi opposition broadly representative of all the people of Iraq. Such a program would be neither quick nor certain.

I cannot help but comment, Mr. Chairman, that General Zinni's characterization of all other policies as a search for short, little, quickie solutions is an unfair unwillingness to examine serious alternatives. Support for the opposition is not a short, little, quickie solution. It is a serious contender for a policy more effective than the one we have now, and it was General Zinni—and if anyone is looking for the headline from this hearing, who said it, it was General Zinni who said that the air attacks have been pinpricks. That is what they are and they will not succeed in fundamentally altering the situation.

So we must look at alternatives and the alternatives need not, should not, be dismissed derisively as short little quickie solutions, because they are more than that.

I believe that support for the opposition has a better chance and is a more worthy contender than a new round of inconclusive air strikes or yet another abortive effort to organize an anti-Saddam conspiracy among retired Iraqi generals.

A serious program to remove Saddam would begin by challenging disparate opposition groups to coalesce behind a leadership and a concrete plan. Debilitating quarrels would have to be set aside as a condition of western support. In the absence of such support, with a divided opposition languishing in understandable despair, it is hardly surprising that Kurdish factions quarrel over scarce resources or exiled politicians assert rival claims to leadership.

The key to their cohesion is the promise of support in confronting Saddam, and to the degree to which those promises have been made we have already begun to see the emergence of a far more coherent opposition than we had even a few months ago.

To finance an opposition coalition, we should disburse some of the billions in blocked Iraqi funds. Then we should announce a readiness to lift the sanctions on any territory not under Saddam's control. As it happens, much of Iraq's oil lies in areas he cannot now control or over which he would quickly lose control if an opposition government were established within them. This would trigger significant economic growth and attract defectors, especially among the military, from within Iraq. We have seen in the past the magnetic effect of removing some territory from Saddam's control. There were significant defections in the past and would be again in the future.

Next we must be prepared to give logistical support and military equipment to the opposition. It is 2 years since the United States Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the Iraq Liberation Act, intended to do just this. Unfortunately, the current administration opposes the action called for under the Iraq Liberation Act and has sabotaged its implementation.

The Iraq Liberation Act offers the promise of full support to those Iraqis aligned in opposition to Saddam. The President signed it. But on the contrary, the administration has maneuvered endlessly to avoid following through on the congressional mandate to help the Iraqi opposition. Of the $100 million or so that have been authorized to support the opposition, a few tens of thousands have

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been expended. This is not simply bureaucratic delay, although bureaucratic delay has been placed at the service of the administration's policy, which is fundamental opposition of the sort that General Zinni was expressing a moment ago.

Finally, we must stand ready to use air power to defend the opposition in any territory over which it achieves control. Politically, Saddam could not allow opposition administration of significant Iraqi territory to go unchallenged. But to reclaim such territory, he would have to mass his armor in the quantities an attacking force typically requires to dislodge a defending one. This would render an army, on much of which he cannot even now rely, vulnerable to withering fire from western air forces.

Opponents of this plan will raise the specter of catastrophe if air power alone proved insufficient to protect the opposition from Saddam's army. But they assume wrongly that the opposition would take the offensive in large-scale engagements with Iraqi forces when a defensive posture would be far more effective.

It is true that we cannot fight all the world's wars in all the ways they can be fought. But we can help those who share our goals and are willing to fight where they can contribute most. We need not send substantial ground forces into Iraq when patriotic Iraqis are willing to fight to liberate their country, although measured numbers of Special Forces should not be ruled out.

The principal objection to a plan like this is that it cannot succeed because the Iraqi opposition is weak and ineffective. General Zinni has said this on a number of occasions. Of course the opposition is weak, and of course it is now ineffective. So was the opposition to Caucescau in Romania right up to the very day he was brought down. Skeptics too easily discount the empowerment of the opposition that would flow from western support and its transformation into an effective instrument.

The Iraqi National Congress has managed to achieve an impressive degree of cohesion and a serious sense of purpose, and it has done this without the support the Iraq Liberation Act contemplates. With that support, they will be able to challenge Saddam directly, not quickly and not easily, but directly.

The Clinton administration and its supporters underestimate the power of a credible challenge to the fundament of Saddam's regime, the sense among Iraqis that he is invincible, that opposition cannot succeed. Once it is shown that he is not, the fear of the Iraqi people will give way to their desire to be rid of as brutal a dictator as we have seen in modern times.

The United States is sometimes accused of indifference to the suffering of Muslims. The Muslims of Iraq are suffering horribly under Saddam's regime and Iraq's Muslim neighbors are threatened by him. America can demonstrate its concern for the people of Iraq and the Gulf region by helping Iraqi freedom fighters liberate their land.

Mr. Chairman, I put this forward because it is an alternative to the current bankrupt policy. In their own ways, General Zinni and Ambassador Butler have testified to the bankruptcy of the current policy. The administration hides behind the term "containment." I do not know what "containment" means in this sense. It is 10 years

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since the Gulf War, 10 years since a crushing defeat of Saddam Hussein, and he is still in power.

It is 2 years, 22 months, since he defied the international regime put in place following the war that requires inspections and the international community has been unable even to reassert its fundamental capacity to make inspections. Is this containment?

It is true that he has not again invaded Kuwait. To say that Saddam is contained would be a little bit like saying in 1938 that Hitler was contained by the policy of appeasement. If you are not going forward, you are going back. You cannot stand still, and Saddam is winning this protracted struggle against the West.

All that remains now is for the sanctions to be lifted, and they will be lifted. They are unsustainable in the long term because the people who are most eager to see them succeed must out of a sense of honesty, as Ambassador Butler did, say to you they are not working, and a policy that does not work cannot be sustained indefinitely.

So we need a new policy, and I hope that this morning and in other places serious consideration will be given to getting behind the opposition. It is a relatively low risk alternative to a failed policy.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Perle follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD PERLE

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for inviting me to participate in your deliberations and for the committee's effort to encourage the executive branch to develop an effective policy for dealing with Iraq. This will not be easy. It is a long time since the administration had any coherent policy toward Saddam Hussein, much less an effective one. It is also a long time since the administration has been open to suggestions from Congress about how to fill the policy vacuum the White House has created.

I should begin with a quick summary of the current situation. The UN inspectors who once scoured Iraq for illegal weapons have been driven out and are unlikely to return. The American policy of containing a belligerent Iraq with intrusive inspections and economic sanctions—punctuated by episodic bombing and the occasional half-hearted coup attempt—has failed. It is increasingly clear that the only solution to the danger posed by Saddam Hussein is a sustained, determined plan to remove him from power.

The Security Council coalition once arrayed against Saddam is ever more deeply divided about how to make Iraq comply with the council's own brave, but unconvincing, resolutions prohibiting weapons of mass destruction. Russia and France openly support Saddam when they see opportunities to do so. While we have several times resorted to bombing to gain access for UN inspectors, Saddam has emerged from each new bombing stronger than before. Support for sanctions, whose most visible effect is the impoverishment of the Iraqi people, is sinking fast. Unless we find a more effective policy, Saddam Hussein—with the chemical weapons he has hidden from inspectors and sheltered from air attacks—will emerge from the ruins of "containment" as the ultimate victor in the "mother of all battles," and a continuing scourge on his own people and the Gulf region.

The dangers of Saddam Hussein as the dominant presence in the Gulf are terrible to contemplate. A man who has executed thousands of his countrymen, who has used nerve gas against whole villages, who has invaded some neighbors and launched missiles at others—and who continues to conceal work on chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons—surely demands a more formidable response than leaky trade restrictions, cruise missile pin pricks, and appeasement by Kofi Annan. For at least the last 2 years, the central issue concerning Iraq has been Saddam's compliance with UN resolutions concerning prohibited weapons programs. But even when UN inspectors were in place, there was no realistic prospect they would unearth all of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Iraq is too big—and the space necessary to conceal those weapons too small. The intelligence supplied by Saddam's

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defecting son-in-law brought us briefly closer than we could have hoped. Saddam reacted by halting inspections that might have exploited the late Hussein Kamel's leads, and by moving the illegal material and incriminating documents to new hiding places. Even if UN inspectors were now allowed to return, we would be hunting needles in haystacks. Saddam's de facto veto over who will inspect him next, which led to the choice of a weak successor to Richard Butler, makes a mockery of the idea of a tough, independent inspection regime.

Even if we managed to locate nerve gas or missiles or biological weapons, there can be no assurance that we could seize or destroy them.

So what should we do? What new policy should we substitute for an illusory containment in which Saddam's weapons programs continue uninspected and western policy drifts toward capitulation and the coup de grace of the lifting of sanctions?

The United States, alone if necessary, with our friends if possible, should aggressively support the nascent opposition to Saddam's regime. We should organize, finance, equip, train, and protect an Iraqi opposition broadly representative of all the people of Iraq. Such a program would be neither quick nor certain. It would certainly not be easy. But it has a better chance, and is a more worthy contender, than a new round of inconclusive air strikes or yet another abortive effort to organize an anti-Saddam conspiracy among retired Iraqi generals.

A serious program to remove Saddam would begin by challenging disparate opposition groups to coalesce behind a leadership and a concrete plan. Debilitating quarrels would have to be set aside as a condition of western support. In the absence of such support, with a divided opposition languishing in understandable despair, it is hardly surprising that Kurdish factions quarrel over scarce resources or exiled politicians assert rival claims to leadership. The key to their cohesion is the promise of support in confronting Saddam.

To finance an opposition coalition we should disburse some of the billions in blocked Iraqi funds. Then we should announce a readiness to lift the sanctions on any territory not under Saddam's control. As it happens, much of Iraq's oil lies in areas he cannot now control or over which he would quickly lose control if an opposition government were established within them. This would trigger significant economic growth and attract defectors, especially among the military, from within Iraq.

Next, we must be prepared to give logistical support and military equipment to the opposition. It is 2 years since the United States Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, the "Iraq Liberation Act," intended to do just this. Unfortunately, the current administration opposes the action called for under the Iraq Liberation Act and has sabotaged its implementation. The Iraq Liberation Act offers the promise of full support to those Iraqis aligned in opposition to Saddam. The President signed it. But his administration has done nothing to keep the promise. On the contrary, it has maneuvered endlessly to avoid following through on the congressional mandate to help the Iraqi opposition.

Finally, we must stand ready to use air power to defend the opposition in any territory over which it achieves control. Politically, Saddam could not allow opposition administration of significant Iraqi territory to go unchallenged. But to reclaim such territory he would have to mass his armor in the quantities an attacking force typically requires to dislodge a defending one. This would render an army—on much of which he cannot even now rely—vulnerable to withering fire from western air forces.

Opponents of this plan will raise the specter of catastrophe if air power alone proved insufficient to protect the opposition from Saddam's army. But they assume, wrongly, that the opposition would take the offensive in large scale engagements with Iraqi forces, when a defensive posture would be far more effective.

It is true that we cannot fight all the world's wars in all the ways they may be fought. But we can help those who share our goals and are willing to fight where they can contribute most. We need not send substantial ground forces into Iraq when patriotic Iraqis are willing to fight to liberate their country, although measured numbers of special forces should not be ruled out.

The principal objection to a plan like this is that it cannot succeed because the Iraqi opposition is weak and ineffective. Of course it is. So was the opposition to Caucescau—right up to the very day he was brought down. Skeptics too easily discount the empowerment of the opposition that would flow from western support.

The Iraqi National Congress has managed to achieve an impressive degree of cohesion and a serious sense of purpose—and it has done this without the support that the Iraq Liberation Act contemplates. With that support, they will be able to challenge Saddam directly. The Clinton administration and its supporters underestimate the power of a credible challenge to the fundament of Saddam's regime: the sense among Iraqis that he is invincible. Once it is shown that he is not, the fear

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of the Iraqi people will give way to their desire to be rid of as brutal a dictator as we have seen in modern times.

The United States is sometimes accused of indifference to the suffering of Moslems. The Moslems of Iraq are suffering horribly under Saddam's regime. Iraq's Moslem neighbors are threatened by him. America can demonstrate its concern for the people of Iraq and the Gulf region by helping Iraqi freedom fighters liberate their land.

Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Ambassador Perle.

I will lead off my first question on that very point. I made notes. I had not included it in my opening statement, but on two occasions I have been with other Senators when we have had brief meetings with the opposition and I have read about it from the limited sources that have been put before me. You obviously have spent more time on this subject and have had some extensive personal contact, and it is your judgment that there is a possibility that they could begin to foment within Iraq some dissension which would be very troubling.

Ambassador PERLE. Yes, Senator. There is evidence that when they were receiving support prior to——

Chairman WARNER. When you say "when," we did the Iraqi Liberation Act.

Ambassador PERLE. Right.

Chairman WARNER. I think it was $100 million.

Ambassador PERLE. Although almost nothing has flowed.

Chairman WARNER. Yes, I understand. So when did they get support in the context of that legislation and timing?

Ambassador PERLE. There was covert support earlier, up until 1996, for example, during which time there were broadcasts into Iraq, which were enormously successful. Those broadcasts have been terminated and should be restarted immediately. We are handing Saddam a monopoly or a virtual monopoly over the flow of information within Iraq. It is a foolish gift to Saddam at a time when we are threatened by him.

So the first thing we should do—and we could do it tomorrow—is make it possible for the opposition to Saddam to have a voice to communicate with the people of Iraq.

But the evidence is that when the northern third of Iraq was not under Saddam's control there were significant defections from the Iraqi armed forces. We know, and I am sure General Zinni will confirm this, that Saddam goes to great lengths to insulate himself from potentially disloyal troops within his own military establishment because he trusts almost no one and has drawn a narrower and narrower circle around himself as the extent of opposition among his own military has been revealed from time to time.

Well, you cannot expect the potential opponents of Saddam within Iraq, including within the military, to commit suicide. There has to be some reason to believe that there is a chance to succeed, and I believe that requires significant overt support and some sanctuary, some means of expressing that support by defecting, by joining the opposition. The single biggest inhibition to an effective opposition to Saddam is the absence of support for that opposition.

Chairman WARNER. Well, let us probe that just a step further. We have been for many years, those of us around the table, the witnesses and so forth, involved in foreign policy issues, myself over 30 years. Why would the administration not provide the

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money, given the action by Congress, given the appropriation of the money—what reason would they have for not doing it?

They have to have certain internal frustrations with regard to the containment policy, the least of which would be our deterioration in relations between France and the United States and Russia and the United States at a time when we are trying to establish stronger ties with Russia.

What would be the reasoning?

Ambassador PERLE. I have asked myself that many times. I have had some conversations with administration officials, some of whom seem obsessed with what I can only call the Bay of Pigs syndrome, the fear that if we support the opposition and the opposition gets into trouble it will be a terrible debacle and they will have to accept responsibility for that debacle, whereas the current slow suffocation of our interests is not the sort of debacle that has important political consequences. So I think they are fearful of taking even a small risk and have been prepared to sacrifice our long-term interests to avoid taking that risk.

Chairman WARNER. Ambassador Butler, would you have any views on just the opposition issue? Then I will turn to General Zinni for the views that you may have on it.

Ambassador BUTLER. No, I do not, Senator.

Chairman WARNER. All right. General Zinni.

General ZINNI. Well, let me clarify my position rather than have Mr. Perle give it. First of all, I have always said that I support the support for the opposition groups. What I have concern about is this military scheme. Now, I defer to the vast military experience of Mr. Perle, but I happen to have been the commander of the central region. That air power, those Special Forces troops, that enclave, that protection, those are the things that were going to fall to me to provide.

Those are very vague. I would have to spell that out on the ground: What is my obligation to this force that goes in? What is my obligation if they get in trouble? Do I ensure their success and escort them to Baghdad?

I have had visits from the opposition groups trying to convince me that 1,000 men armed, placed into Iraq, would have the entire regime topple, the regular army would fold. This is while my pilots are flying over there, destroying 30 percent of their air defenses, and we have yet to see a gunner on a AAA or a SAM site back down. But they are going to back down from 1,000 lightly armed $97 million opposition group.

This is going to fall to the United States military to handle with a half-baked scheme. When this law was being considered here and these military schemes were being designed, they were being done in the back room. No one ever called the Commander in Chief of U.S. Central Command or any uniformed military officer that I know of to ask about the feasibility of these plans. Certain retired generals were mustered up that added to it.

I am emotional about this because these were my soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, and this scheme is the region of the world that I was responsible for.

Does it strike you as funny that not one leader in the region, not one—and I have talked to every one of them—supports this

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scheme, will not even hear a discussion over it? Where do we think we are going to get the bases to conduct these operations? Where are these so-called camps going to be located? What happens at the end if the region does not support it?

Some of these groups, debilitating quarrels, they fight with each other, they kill each other. They have yet to show cohesion.

Now, I do support building the opposition and I think that $97 million can be better spent in building that opposition in a way that it becomes credible in the region, credible with each other and demonstrates cohesion, and in addition to that, once it achieves that level, then gets the cooperation and support of people in the region for conducting this. They will live there.

But before we sign up the American military to little short terms like "protect," "air power to defend," "a few Special Forces in there to just control the region," be careful. Bay of Pigs could turn into Bay of Goats.

Chairman WARNER. Richard Perle, I will give you an opportunity to respond, but I only have a brief period under my time. But you will get adequate opportunity to give your views, because I think this is quite an interesting colloquy we have.

Now, it seems to me—and I will direct this to Ambassador Butler with such other testimony as either witness may wish to add—Saddam Hussein has another weapon. It would not be in the category of weapons of mass destruction, but it is a very potent one in my judgment, and that is the percentage of the world's oil supply which he is currently putting into this fungible pool worldwide.

We have just seen our President—I think ill-advisedly, but I am not going to raise that further—open the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) to drop in a trickle. But Saddam could, as opposed to the trickle out of the SPR, turn a valve and really cause disruption—I think it is several percentage points of the world's oil supply that now comes from Iraq. Indeed, some of it is circling around in terms of being a fungible product, being refined here, put in the very planes that are flying the missions against him. Now, that tends to get a little colorful, but I think one can show facts to substantiate it.

What might he do if we suddenly started either stronger actions or a military option or some of the very incisive actions that you have recited? What might he do with that weapon to foster his own interests and deter the use of a tougher policy against him?

First, can someone give me the actual percentage?

Ambassador BUTLER. It is 3 million barrels a day.

Chairman WARNER. Three million.

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, 3 million barrels a day from Iraq. A proportion of the United States' oil imports comes from Iraq.

Chairman WARNER. Yes, there is no question.

Ambassador BUTLER. That proportion escapes me now, but I think it is in the mid-1920s. It is not a small proportion. Whether that ends up in jet kerosene in U.S. fighters over Iraq, I do not know, but I think it is entirely possible, as you point out.

Chairman WARNER. If you say he is awash in cash, he might be able to sustain himself for a period and stop that export. Now, not only the legal export, but the illegal export.

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Ambassador BUTLER. I think, Senator, you have made a very important point in pointing out that Saddam has at his disposal a considerable weapon, which is oil and our need for it.

Chairman WARNER. The world's need for it.

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, the world's need for it, true.

I am looking for my notes that I took when General Zinni made his introductory statement. He did, of course, refer to four things as motivating our continuing interest in and concern about the Gulf region, and the first of those was energy. He pointed out that 65 percent of the United States' oil requirements come——

General ZINNI. The world's.

Ambassador BUTLER.—the world's requirements, come from that region. So I think the facts are clear. This is a very important issue. It is a very important potential weapon that Saddam has in his hands. I would be uncomfortable if attention were drawn too far away from the more significant weapon that he has, which is the ability to either deploy directly in the future weapons of mass destruction against us or, perhaps more likely, to put those weapons in the hands of a terrorist group to send into western cities. I think that is a very serious issue.

But to your point, what is he going to do just now? There has been a lot of speculation about that and nobody knows. What he will have to balance out is this. He has two sources of income, the oil that he sells legitimately, from which portions are taken off the top for compensation for his invasion of Kuwait and so forth, the provision of oil-for-food, and then a remaining amount is available to him.

The other proportion—and by the way, that remaining amount is a new development. That is only in the last 12 months. Previously it was put into escrow accounts. Now, that is a concession that was made after Operation Desert Fox in the period of these 22 months without monitoring.

Now, second, he has a very substantial black market trade going on and that has been the main source of what I previously called, and I stand by it, that this regime is awash with money. There are thousands of trucks—that is not an exaggeration; imagery says that, does it not?—that go to Turkey each day. I do not mean to put you on the spot, but it is in excess of 1,000 trucks that are seen from the air each day going across the Turkish border.

Chairman WARNER. With illegal——

Ambassador BUTLER. With illegal product in it.

Now, there are the boats that leave the south at Basra and go along the Iranian coast and with some Iranian—I am not saying Iranian government, but Iranian nationals cooperating—ship oil across the Gulf.

Now, the force that General Zinni commanded had as a major component there the interdiction force to prevent that from happening and which succeeded in capturing I think tens of millions of barrels of oil, and up to a point that has helped.

But they are his two sources of financial strength; one illegal, one legal, although proportions of it are taken off the top. What will he do? It must be tempting to him, especially as yesterday in Geneva it was agreed that he must pay Kuwait a further $15 bil-

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lion for invading the country and setting alight over 200 oil wells and he does not want to do that.

Now, were he to say, I am out of here, I am not going to pump oil any more, why should I, you are taking all this percentage off the top that I object to, I am not going to do that, and by that means clearly put pressure on us, he would by that action be at the same time cutting back the proportion that is given for oil-for-food. Quite frankly, I do not think he cares about that at all. I think he has shown manifestly and continually a lack of care about the welfare of his people. But he would be criticized for that and so maybe he would not do that.

But that current oil-for-food contract comes up for renewal in December. So it must be tempting, I think, for him to think later on at the time of the renewal of that contract—and December is also the month where the Security Council will check, after 1 year of operation of the new resolution, the new organization that succeeded UNSCOM, to check how all that is doing. It could be a short meeting. But December is that month when all that will occur.

I think we should not rule out that that is the time that he will say: I am not going to play any of this any more; I do not want a new oil-for-food contract; planes are landing at my airport, Russia, France, Jordan, others—and there will be others—are breaking sanctions; I do not want to do any of this any more, and begin that protest to get sanctions finally removed by withdrawing for a period from the oil market.

Mr. Chairman, he has done it before. I am not expert enough in oil market pricing phenomena to know what the withdrawal of 3 million barrels a day would do to the barrel price.

Chairman WARNER. Well, if we are trying to pump 1 million in to save it, what about three? That gives you some basis.

Ambassador BUTLER. Quite frankly, some have said to me horrible figures, which it is best if I do not repeat. I think that they are exaggerated, but you get my drift. Not small, is the answer, a not small increase in the per barrel price.

So that if and when, if he will play that card, we do not know. I believe that it must be very tempting for him to do it. Will he do it before the presidential elections? Probably not. Look at December would be my suggestion.

Chairman WARNER. Briefly, either witness want to comment on the oil situation as a leverage for him to in some way foster his own goals? Ambassador Perle?

Ambassador PERLE. There is no doubt that, were he to withhold oil from the market, which he could comfortably do consistent with his other objectives, that it would have a catastrophic effect on the stability of those markets. It reinforces in my view the urgency of coming up with an alternative to the current policy, because the current policy leaves him very much in control, and he is capable of the kind of action we are talking about.

Ambassador BUTLER. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman WARNER. Go ahead, Ambassador Butler.

Ambassador BUTLER. Could I just say very quickly, I agree with that last statement and I left that out of what I said a moment ago. The meaning of this oil card is that we must come up with now an alternative policy. I agree with Mr. Perle on that.

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Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much.

General Zinni, on the oil issue.

General ZINNI. I think Ambassador Butler covered the situation with the oil.

Chairman WARNER. I thank my colleagues for their indulgence.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. First of all, on your proposal, Ambassador Butler, on retargeted sanctions, I am not sure that they would work. But assuming that is the right policy, assuming Russia would suddenly really say, OK, we are now with you. By the way, you left France out. You talked about Russia, but France has also not been supportive at the Security Council. Jordan is now flying into Baghdad.

Nonetheless, let us assume for a moment we can get Russia on board on your targeted sanctions and they would then presumably take the position that they would put some pressure on Iraq. Let us assume that Iraq says, forget it, we are not going to buy your targeted sanctions any more than we bought your other sanctions. Now what? Where do you go from there?

Ambassador BUTLER. Thank you. Just a quick word on my beastliness in leaving out France. It is not that I have not been paying attention to their policy of seeking to walk both sides of the street, but I was trying to highlight that Russia has been the central force here in the Security Council in seeking relief for Saddam Hussein.

Russia, France, and China did not vote for the resolution which established the new organization. They abstained on it. France actually hedged its bets during the last week of negotiations on that resolution and called for a 2-day delay in the vote while it urgently tried to persuade Russia to come on board in supporting the resolution so that it could maintain its position of western solidarity.

But when Russia finally decided no, it was going to abstain and not support the resolution, as ever, France had a choice: What is more important to it here, solidarity with the West or the pursuit of its other identified national interests, including things like its antipathy towards a unipolar and Anglophone world, its belief that it had some exquisite and historic interest in the Middle East, and so on? It not wanting to be separated from Russia on a Middle East issue, it decided to abstain and went with Russia.

Now, the motives for each of these permanent members is actually different, Russia's is much more in the context of trauma it has gone through, loss of status as a superpower; France's is as I have just described it. China's attitude is based on the fact that it sees everything through the prism of national sovereignty. I sat many times at the table of the Security Council and I think every Chinese speech I heard on the Iraq issue began with the words: Of course, it is of fundamental importance that national sovereignty be preserved.

What they are saying here is that they have a deep allergy to any successful multilateral intervention anywhere because if it is successful it will raise the question of, well, why can that not happen with respect to Tibet, for example.

So all of their motives are different. Now, these three states did not support the establishment of the new organization, and if you have any doubt about where Russia stands, has stood on that, I invite your attention to a letter that the Russian ambassador sent to

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the Security Council on the 14th of April this year. After the Council embraced the new organization laid out by my successor, Dr. Blix, Russia the next day wrote a letter saying: While we participated in approving his general organizational plan, there were no arrangements set forth for the inspection or monitoring of Iraq and we tell you in writing we will approve of none of which Iraq does not approve. Thus, putting the fox in charge of the chicken coop.

Now, that is, I think, very seriously wrong. However, if you want to try every avenue before being compelled to very much more difficult areas of unilateral action, whether what Ambassador Perle has proposed or General Zinni or former Representative Steven Solarz proposed on Tuesday in the other body, you must first seek to restore consensus in the Security Council.

Senator LEVIN. But on this question: What if Russia joins us and Iraq says, sorry, we do not want your targeted sanctions any more than we are going to accept your other sanctions, where do you go from there?

Ambassador BUTLER. I am not sure that I am prepared to concede that that would happen.

Senator LEVIN. OK.

Ambassador BUTLER. The way the deal would be worked, as I envisage it, would involve Russia and its great friends in Baghdad coming to an understanding which would have the elements in it that I have suggested. Above all, Senator—and I apologize for speaking at such length; I got a bit carried away with my ruminations about the superpowers.

The gut point would be, in exchange for getting monitoring back into Iraq, that sanctions would be different from what they are now. They have almost gone now, but that there would be clear sanctions on military goods.

Would Iraq accept that deal? I do not know.

Senator LEVIN. On their own leadership. Not just on the military goods. It is also on their own leadership, business transactions.

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, that is right.

Senator LEVIN. But basically you would have to have Iraq agree to that in order for it to work.

Ambassador BUTLER. It would not work with us and Russia unless Iraq and Russia had also worked it out. What I am saying is I believe it is an avenue that needs to be explored vigorously. If it does not work, either because the Russians will not do it or Iraq will not enter into it, then what are we left with?

We are left, Mr. Chairman, with these other unilateral options.

Senator LEVIN. I want to just explore one of those quickly with General Zinni. General, I think you have made a very powerful case against casual commitment of the American military to protect some force of Iraqis that are injected into Iraq, and that that could lead us to the kind of an open-ended commitment of our forces which this committee is very much concerned with in general. We always seek clarity of mission, clarity of purpose, exit strategies, and just a program to protect an Iraqi insurgent force with American forces seems to me to have all kinds of dangers which you have outlined very powerfully for us. I share the concerns which you have outlined.

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My question for you is this. The sanctions policy does not seem to be working and is gradually fading. The no-fly zone is being enforced and has some risks to it. We risk, as our chairman pointed out, loss of an airman. The British do too. We want to make sure that that risk is justified by the benefits of enforcing the no-fly zone.

I wonder if you would tell us whether in your judgment there are benefits that justify the risks that are being taken every day by our airmen?

General ZINNI. Well, Senator, there are two parts to this requirement, this enforcement of the no-fly zone. There is also the no-drive zone. The no-drive zone prevents Saddam from reinforcing his existing units in the south with a much more powerful Republican Guard or bringing down additional tanks or armor.

In a way, that not only prevents him from bringing further military forces to bear upon the marsh Arabs and the Shia in the south, but in addition to that it gives us time and warning. Had he had open rein to move those units anywhere in the country, we could find them on the Kuwait border. We operate in a very difficult time line if he rattles his saber along the border. We have experienced that since the Gulf War in the days of Operation Vigilant Sentinel and Operation Vigilant Warrior, when he brought forces to the border and we were scrambling to get there, to get sufficient force in front of him, so should he cross we would not lose Kuwait.

So the no-fly zone buys us not only the time and keeps those units out and protects the Kuwaiti border, but it also gives us the observation and the view. Our pilots are flying every day over potential targets they would have to hit in the eventuality that we had a need to strike or he did come south or there was a reason to strike. So there are benefits that come militarily that come from this no-fly zone.

His threats are serious and we take them seriously. But we make every attempt to minimize those in the tactics we use, the procedures we use, and certainly the skill and training and discipline that our pilots exercise. When I was a commander in chief, I went out and met personally in a ready room with our pilots that fly these airplanes. I wanted to hear from them how they sensed this threat. I do not want to be back here telling you the threat is minimal if that young man or woman in that cockpit does not feel it.

There are times they felt that it had increased. There were times when the AAA got more intense, more concentrated, some of the science projects that Saddam uses on his surface-to-air missiles were getting more dangerous, and we took appropriate action in response in our series of strikes to eliminate those and discourage those.

Chairman WARNER. Excuse me, General. Do not eliminate from the risks simply mechanical failure of an aircraft. I think that should be added here.

General ZINNI. Yes. There are two things that worried me when I went to sleep at night as the commander in chief. One was exactly that. Since the end of the Gulf War we have flown well over 200,000 sorties, well over, probably getting closer to 300,000 now, over the skies of Iraq and have never lost a plane. That is remark-

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able, and that is a tribute to the maintenance under very tough conditions that you see our young mechanics and flight line crews performing in 140-degree heat in the desert. But the odds are not with you for that long a time, so that is a very real concern.

The other concern was the lucky shot, the million to one shot. He cannot turn on a radar, but he can shoot ballistically a missile. He floods the skies with AAA fire, and we try to fly over that. We know where the concentrations are. We try to avoid it. But it is not a perfect system.

So even though we have minimized the risk, the risk is not gone, and there is a danger of losing a pilot. He has put $1 million on a pilot's head. He wants to parade a pilot through downtown Baghdad, I think not realizing what the consequences might be to that. But that is a political decision that will be made here.

Chairman WARNER. Well, you say here, the commander in chief has the first responsibility under the Constitution to make those decisions. I must tell you, this hearing room is virtually empty, but Senator Levin and I and Senator Cleland and others feel very strongly about this issue. If no other goal is achieved by this hearing, we have made a record and laid it before the American people of this extremely complex, almost insoluble foreign policy decision.

Without trying to point fingers, we may have our disagreements with the administration, France, Russia, and others, but it is an extraordinary case of facts in contemporary foreign policy that you see a split of the permanent members of the Security Council on such a vital issue and, as Ambassador Butler said, on a man who is linked in terms of wrong doing with Adolf Hitler in parallel.

Senator Cleland, you have been very patient. Please take such time as you wish.

## STATEMENT OF SENATOR MAX CLELAND

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for having the hearing, and we are hearing things we would not necessarily want to hear, but we need to hear. Thank you, gentlemen, for being here.

Ambassador Butler, it is obvious that Saddam Hussein is attempting to compile weapons of mass destruction and the ability to deliver them. What do you see is the intent? What is the rationale? Is it political blackmail? Is it physical overtaking of nearby countries? Is it leverage? What is the objective? Is it to defend himself against Iran, to influence American policy in the Middle East, particularly Israel?

What do you see is the objective? Why devote the entire resources of his country and engender the hostility of the western world, go through all of this stuff, sanctions and everything, for one purpose, and that is weapons of mass destruction? What is the further intent for the usage of those weapons?

Ambassador BUTLER. Senator, thank you for your question. To some extent, an answer to it involves attempting to read the mind of Saddam, and that of course is not entirely possible. But if you follow the principle of analyzing the behavior of a person, as distinct in particular from the rhetoric, although not ignoring the rhetoric altogether, I think we can arrive at four reasons.

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The first of them stands out above all others, and that is to stay in power in Iraq. Nothing concentrates his mind more firmly than that. He believes that it is necessary for him to be as muscular and as highly armed as possible to stay in power in Iraq. My evidence for that contention is his use of all of his weapons one way or another, including weapons of mass destruction, on his own citizens, especially the Kurds, who have had the temerity to actually suggest that they do not much like living under him. So he then used chemical weapons on them. So first and foremost, to stay in power.

Second, his own representatives attempted to answer those questions to me when I posed them. I have recorded this in the book that I have recently published on dealing with Iraq in the last few years. Very simply, they said: We consider ourselves to be threatened by the Persians and the Jewish people. They tend to use ethnocentric terms rather than political terms. They did not call them "Iran" or "Israel," but they consider themselves to be threatened in the northeast by Iran and in the southwest by Israel, and had said to me quite frankly that this is why they had acquired missiles, chemical and biological weapons, to deal with those two states.

Might I say as a footnote, Tariq Aziz said that to me about biological weapons in private, that they had acquired them in order to deal with Iran and Israel, while in public telling me and the Security Council that Iraq had no biological weapons.

Third, Saddam has a Pan-Arabist ambition, and this is where his rhetoric comes into play. If you look at statements he has made, especially in times of crisis, including crisis with the United States, he has posited the existence of an Arab nation with a small "n", not a particular country, but all the Arab peoples, 40-odd million of them, who are in need of a leader, and this is him. I think he believes that the possession of serious weapons helps him state his case to lead the whole Arab world.

My fourth and last reason is one that is harder to analyze, but I do not believe should be ruled out, and it is ultimately, if necessary, to threaten the West, either directly or by the supply of his weapons to terrorist groups. That becomes quite irrational, but I believe there is evidence that supports the belief that that is also a motive.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much. Brilliantly analyzed. Thank you very much.

General Zinni, you have been on the ground there. There is no substitute for being in that position and looking at the situation, especially militarily. I am concerned about the constant no-fly zones. As you said, I think we are maybe pushing our luck, pushing the envelope, and can get ourselves into trouble. If one pilot went down today and that pilot were alive and paraded through the streets of Baghdad, this hearing room would be piled with people and we would have 100 percent participation here, pointing the finger and asking somebody why or how did this happen, or how did we get from here to there, and now how do we get out of it, that kind of thing.

Is there any alternative to the no-fly zone regime, both in the south and in the north? I gather we are in the north to "protect the Kurds." In the south, as you have mentioned, there is a ration-

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ale for it. Is there any way out of this, this burden that we are carrying right now and the risks that we obtain by it?

General ZINNI. Senator, I think that if we stopped patrolling the no-fly zone we certainly can look operationally and tactically at other ways for monitoring, maybe less patrolling, less risk. Saddam will poke back. Every time he detects us either drawing back or it looks like we are drawing back, he will poke back. Recently he sent an aircraft to violate the air space over Saudi Arabia.

I think that if we stop patrolling the no-fly zones, he will fill the vacuum and you will see units come down from the central part of Iraq even to the south. This will complicate the problem of our ability to react to protect Kuwait and will compound the problem, maybe even raise the requirement of what we have on the ground in Kuwait, so we would end up paying Peter at the other end.

He definitely will put, I think, attack aircraft and fighter aircraft in the skies to make the point and assert his authority after that, perhaps even use them in some way, even if it is not that effective, as a demonstration of his sovereignty in the south. He will have won.

Now, that is not a good answer and I know we would like to find another way. But it will be seen as a withdrawal and a lack of resolve on our part. It will be seen as a victory for Saddam.

Over the course of the last 10 years, I really believe that Saddam's conventional forces have degraded significantly. They are half of what they were in the Gulf War. He has not modernized his equipment. He has done a good job of keeping it up reasonably well and chugging along with spare parts, but he does not have the latest generations of equipment that he would need—tanks, surface to air missiles, that sort of thing. That line will continue. It is painful, but it is a long way.

I would defer to Ambassador Butler on the WMD. I am sure, especially on the chemical-biological side, he has stockpiles. We certainly can see what he attempts to do on delivery systems. Operation Desert Fox was simply an attempt to set the program back. It was not designed, as I have heard here, as a mission to force the reinsertion of UNSCOM. I would not have told the President of the United States that the military could do that or air strikes could do that.

As a matter of fact, when I was asked what it could do, I said: I can tell you exactly what it can do, and it is a very limited reduction of WMD capability, probably a capability that can be reestablished within 1 to 2 years, and mainly focused on delivery systems, because we do not know about where the production of the pointing end of those systems might be done, and without an UNSCOM-like inspection regime we would never know.

I think that what is important here is trying to generate, as I think the chairman alluded to, more support for what we do, more international involvement in what we do. We get this to a greater degree on the maritime intercept side. There is greater participation out there. I think there could be more. I was encouraged before I left CENTCOM to see that there were additional countries that were willing to provide ships out there.

It is harder on the no-fly zone, but I think we need to pressure allies to participate to some degree, even if it is not fighter aircraft,

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even if it is tankers and support aircraft, but to show resolve and to build the commitment again.

I am not opposed to opposition groups. I think opposition groups have to, one, get their own act together, spend a little more time in the region convincing others they are credible than spending time up here convincing us that they are credible. I think they have a long way to go politically to state what they are after. They could be very dangerous to Saddam if the manifesto or the agenda they put out disavows designs on neighbors, disavows use of WMD, shows their solidarity, demonstrates their cohesion. That has to all be done first.

I am admittedly opposed to schemes that we think we can get away with which show our military getting a little bit pregnant into this, little bits of support. I do not think there is anyone here in this panel that feels instinctively that that is not dangerous, that that is not something that is fraught with problems and something we better think through. More often than not, we have committed our military to fuzzy little open-ended commitments like this and then bought into having to rebuild a nation or committed ourself to the responsibility for whatever these forces are doing. That is what I would caution against.

Chairman WARNER. Somalia being a case in point, which you personally experienced.

General ZINNI. I lived Somalia for 3 years. I went in with Ambassador Oakley to get Warrant Officer Durant out. I had to meet with General Aidid to get him and a Nigerian prisoner out. I was there during the humanitarian operation and I commanded the forces that covered the withdrawal of the UN forces as we left those devastated beaches, ports, and airfields.

Chairman WARNER. They were shooting at you every minute and actually made some hits.

General ZINNI. Yes, sir.

So I wish I could come to you with the right strategy. It is very complex. I would just say in ending my remarks here, we keep saying Saddam has won. I keep hearing that he is the victor, he is stronger than ever. I do not believe that. I do not believe it. I believe that he holds on ruthlessly and ever more ruthlessly, like a thug. He has to use more force.

His people and the people in the region know why people are suffering. They would like to see sanctions relieved because they think somehow maybe that will force Saddam to give food to the people. But there are no easy solutions to this, and I think it could be a long haul. What we need to do is generate the support, the burden-sharing, the international involvement in this problem.

Right now I think the reason you do not see it is because we are doing it. There are things that we get told privately about everybody feels really good about what we are doing, but we cannot say it publicly. I mean, I have heard that in the region and elsewhere, because we have taken up the burden. It is as simple as that.

I would just caution against strategies that sound good and sound cheap and sound like they can be effective. I am not trying to belittle the opposition groups. I am not trying to put down those that are sincerely trying to offer alternatives in any way.

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My only obligation was to ensure the commitment of the U.S. military was done in the proper manner, and that is where my lane was. All sorts of people got into my lane and I do not appreciate that, and I know the members of this committee, with their vast experience, protect us from that, which I appreciate.

Thank you.

Senator CLELAND. Well, thank you very much, General.

Chairman WARNER. Senator, your question was so important and he listed that in his judgment Saddam is weaker. May I suggest we allow the other two witnesses, to the extent they wish, to comment on that point.

Senator CLELAND. Yes, sir.

Ambassador PERLE. Well, I disagree with that, Senator. The coalition that was once reasonably staunch is shattered. We cannot muster the will to respond to his expulsion of the inspectors. Other members of the Security Council, including an ally of the United States, is openly violating the restrictions on Saddam with respect to travel.

By almost every measure, the western position is weaker today than it was 5 years ago, 7 years ago, 10 years ago. So I think it has been a process of deterioration and it cannot go on. It simply is not good enough to have no serious alternative.

I do not want to be misunderstood as suggesting that there are cheap or easy solutions or that I can give you a detailed blueprint, a detailed military operational plan for how to make the most effective use of the internal opposition to Saddam Hussein. But it seems to me that those people who have responsibility for dealing with Saddam, for protecting our interests, ought to be developing those plans. I would love to see General Zinni sit down and develop a plan.

He may take the view that there is no conceivable plan, that with all of the resources of the military establishment of the United States we cannot come up with a plan in which we develop the strengths of the opposition with the ultimate objective of removing Saddam from office. I submit to you that part of the problem is the view—and it is deep and it is often not even entirely conscious—that displacing Saddam could create an even bigger problem.

General Zinni in his remarks said: I fear an implosion from within. The Bush administration at the very end worried about stability to a degree that it seems to me ignored the consequences of leaving Saddam in power for the long term.

So I believe there are alternatives and I believe those alternatives deserve study, careful serious study, getting a group of the appropriate planners together and saying: All right, gentlemen, we have a policy that is not working. I think we all agree it is not working. Here is one alternative. Let us not dismiss it out of hand derisively. Let us not say that all alternative solutions that entail the opposition are a search for quick and easy solutions. Let us see if we can put something together that has a better prospect than what we have now. I do not believe that that effort has been made. I do not believe that General Zinni convened his planners and said: All right, gentlemen, let us talk about how we might build on the potential strengths of the opposition in, not a quick and easy solution, but a longer term alternative to the current situation.

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Somebody ought to do that, whether it is General Zinni's successor or the next administration. But to not exhaustively examine options when you know that the current policy is failing seems to me short-sighted and irresponsible.

Chairman WARNER. Ambassador Butler.

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, just quickly. I should have perhaps made clear earlier that the current circumstances in which there has been virtually 2 years without the special arrangements for monitoring of Iraq that it deserves because it is such a special case, not only have they not been there, I think it should be recorded and appreciated that nor have the other, more regular arrangements for inspection of Iraq been there.

What I mean specifically is that Iraq is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Chairman WARNER. The IAEA.

Ambassador BUTLER. The IAEA has not been there. So in a sense it is worse than dreadful. Not only is the special stuff that was created for Iraq not being done, but even the regular inspections are not being done.

Chairman WARNER. Which is being done in other nations.

Ambassador BUTLER. Absolutely.

Chairman WARNER. As you point out, it is a uniform application of the treaty provisions.

Ambassador BUTLER. Absolutely, over some 160 countries, including this one, are inspected by IAEA.

Now, I want to just respond in particular, though, to General Zinni's point, and I think this is what you were coming back to, about Iraq's conventional force being degraded, not this question of whether Saddam has won or not. I think that is something of a debating point. My fundamental contention is that on weapons of mass destruction he is back in business. As I have just said, it is worse than dreadful. Those monitoring regimes, regular and special, need to be restored, I think through, hopefully through, a negotiation that begins with the Russians.

But with respect to conventional weapons capability, this introduces the question of sanctions. I think General Zinni is right, Iraq's conventional capability is not what it was when it invaded Kuwait. How do we know that? This gets to the sanctions issue. Because it is out there in the marketplace seeking to acquire refurbishment, new equipment, and repairs, busting sanctions doing it. There is a credible report that it was in Kiev in the Ukraine 6 weeks ago, signing a $100 million deal with Russia, not with the Ukraine—the point of meeting was in the Ukraine—but with Russia for the refurbishment of its conventional air force, not the weapons it would carry, but the planes.

Now, that is why I say the negotiation that needs to be conducted, if it included retargeting of sanctions, must address militarily relevant goods. It would be abysmal if a relief of sanctions were simply to enable Saddam, or some mitigation of sanctions, to enable Saddam to do deals like the one that I have just referred to that was being done in the Ukraine.

Finally, my last word on sanctions, an extraordinary assumption is frequently made that if the sanctions on Iraq are removed altogether, that we will see an immediate and automatic increase in

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the welfare of the ordinary Iraqi peoples. All I can say with all respect, Mr. Chairman, is do not hold your breath. They will as a first priority seek to spend that money on refurbishing their armed forces. That is the track record, not a cynical or suspicious prediction by me. But going on track record, as I say, we would be foolish to hold our breath.

Senator CLELAND. So, then, have sanctions worked to a certain extent, to at least attrite the capability of the conventional forces?

Ambassador BUTLER. I think that they have up to a point. With all respect, Senator, earlier in the day before you were able to be here I drew a distinction between a period earlier on where sanctions seemed to serve us well and the current period, and I said, without criticizing the past, I want to say of the current period they are not working today.

Senator CLELAND. Just a couple of more questions real quickly.

Chairman WARNER. Yes, go ahead, Senator.

Senator CLELAND. Mr. Perle, I was in NATO headquarters a couple of years ago and talked to a French diplomat and we were just talking about Iraq. I said: Well, what do you think? He said: Well, either kill a tiger or deal with it. I think that realpolitik of the French has been played out.

But he said: I think Saddam Hussein's worst nightmare is flying Madeleine Albright into Teheran, meaning a stronger relationship between the United States and Iran, or what they call "the Persians," where they feel obviously some sense of pressure or threat and begin playing a balance of power game. Have you thought about that a little bit? It would not eliminate the weapons of mass destruction or anything like that, but in terms of, shall we say, the balance of power in southwest Asia, is Saddam Hussein is looking over his shoulder constantly at the Persians? If all of a sudden things got better between us and Iran, Iran got stronger, so forth, so forth, would that begin to provide—what impact would that have on Hussein, any at all?

Ambassador PERLE. I do not think it would have a significant impact in the near term. I actually think if one looks at the way in which Saddam has reacted to various things over the years, that he fears the opposition as much as anything.

Senator CLELAND. In country?

Ambassador PERLE. Yes. He goes ballistic at indications that the United States might support the opposition. Every time there is an indication of that, he floods the airwaves with attacks on that policy. So look, anyone who rules as Saddam rules, by terror, knows that the moment an opposition can get some purchase on his tenure in power he is in deep trouble. It is the lesson of history and it is true of every scoundrel whose grip has been slightly loosened, whether it is Mussolini or Caucescau. The list is long. So he lives in dreaded fear that the opposition will get some purchase, which is one reason why I think we are missing a significant opportunity.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you. One more question.

Mr. Butler, there is an African proverb that says that when the elephants fight the grass gets trampled. There are three big elephants, Russia, the United States, and China. Is there much doubt in your mind that if somehow, as you articulate the priorities in terms of Russia, the United States could bring in Russia and China

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on this particular problem and there was some kind of consensus or some kind of agreement between these three entities, that we could do some things vis a vis Iraq that we need to do and again moving in a good direction there?

Ambassador BUTLER. Simply, I guess the answer is yes. I cannot say precisely how the deal would be worked out and what its details would be, but I make this point. When the permanent members stood together on Saddam Hussein, relatively good things were able to be achieved. His current period of prospering in many ways has been exactly coterminous or simultaneous with the end of Security Council unity.

Whether the restoration of that unity would answer all of the problems is a little bit hard to predict. But I think it is the case that as long as the Security Council is divided over the issue of dealing with him, nothing good will happen.

Senator CLELAND. Thank you very much. Well said. Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. We must draw on that point. That is a very pivotal piece of testimony we have received today. But I would just follow it up. In your memory of the UN and that of Ambassador Perle, has there been this degree of disunity in, say, the last decade on other issues, the decade before?

Ambassador BUTLER. Not in the post-Cold War period.

Chairman WARNER. Not in the post-Cold War.

Ambassador BUTLER. I think it would be wrong to compare the two periods. They worked under different imperatives. In the post-Cold War period nothing has compared to this and, as you said in your opening statement, I think, Mr. Chairman, it does have embedded within it, among other things, the very authority of the Council itself.

Chairman WARNER. Right.

Ambassador BUTLER. Some people argue that the Council matters less today than it did as designed in San Francisco after the defeat of Hitler. Maybe that is true.

Senator LEVIN. What about the bombing of Yugoslavia?

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, the bombing of Yugoslavia was done over the Council's dead body, frankly, Senator. You know that. It was because——

Senator LEVIN. There was disagreement inside.

Ambassador BUTLER. Because this country knew that something that it believed absolutely had to happen, were it to have been submitted to the Council, would not have been approved of, it went around the Council.

Senator LEVIN. I agree, but there was disagreement within the Council.

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes. But I think on the stakes at issue—weapons of mass destruction, the Middle East, the security of the WMD non-proliferation regimes, the authority of the Council itself, et cetera—the stakes at issue are higher here than in any other post-Cold War subject. The disagreement within the Council has been deeper, more profound, and more damaging, I think, than any other subject in the post-Cold War Council.

Chairman WARNER. Would you comment on that, Ambassador Perle?

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Ambassador PERLE. I agree, this is almost without precedent in terms of the depths of the disagreement, to the point where an American ally is now openly violating the rules.

Chairman WARNER. France. I shall mention it.

Ambassador PERLE. Yes.

Chairman WARNER. Which is very distressing.

Iran, which was raised, was going to be a question of mine. Have we covered fully the ramifications of Iran in this very complex situation? Anything further on that subject that either of you would like to contribute? We are perplexed here. It is the arch-enemy, the great foe, but at the same time, maybe not governmentally, but somehow they sanction periodically the smuggling of oil along the border.

Ambassador Butler?

Ambassador BUTLER. I would make the very obvious point, Mr. Chairman. We also have a problem in Russian technology engagement with Iran. That is a serious intrinsic problem. I think that also pushes in the direction of changing the dialogue with Russia about these issues.

But I make this point: If we cannot deal adequately with the Iraq issue and it means Saddam continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, how would you figure our chances would be of winding down Russian cooperation with Iran on missiles, for example, or even nuclear materials? Not good, I would have thought.

Chairman WARNER. Anything on that issue, Ambassador Perle?

Ambassador PERLE. No, I agree with that. Senator Cleland was looking, I think, at the possibility that we might somehow play an Iranian card.

Chairman WARNER. Engage them to our benefit.

Ambassador PERLE. I think that is an unpromising start. For one thing, Saddam would use any such movement on our part as a justification, not only for what he is doing now, but for more of the same.

Chairman WARNER. Turning to the question of previous testimony by administration officials, I mentioned in my opening statement the red lines, which is the way, I think rather skillfully and properly, that Secretary Slocombe expressed how and when force could be used to deal with certain provocation. But the administration eliminated, General Zinni, any reference to the south, if Saddam's forces were to march on the south. Do you know of any reason for that or why that should be?

General ZINNI. No, Senator, I do not. There is obviously a continuing insurgency in the south. The brutalization of the marsh Arabs, the burning of the marshes, has been horrible.

Chairman WARNER. But you also point out, which I wish I had thought of in the earlier hearing, if he were to move forces south and it was not viewed as a provocation, it then complicates our commitments in terms of the coalition of nations to defend Kuwait.

General ZINNI. I think we have to view any violation of the no-drive zone, significant forces there in the south, as something we have to take action against. I mean, I think that it would be intolerable for us to allow Saddam to put forces right next to Kuwait because of our ability and time lines to reinforce our forces on the

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ground there, if nothing else, and our commitment to the defense of Kuwait.

Senator, might I just add a little bit to several points that were mentioned, because I think they are important to clear up. That is the U.S. support to opposition groups. We heard a view that that is Saddam's biggest fear. I heard an opposite view in the region from virtually everybody I talked to in the region at the highest levels, that if the opposition groups are seen as U.S.-supported, propped up, inserted, controlled, that would be disastrous.

So U.S. support I think is something we have to be very careful with. It should be there. I believe the U.S. should support the opposition groups. But these have to be seen as home-grown and standing on their own.

Chairman WARNER. That is interesting. How would that differ from our actively, militarily pursuing the containment policy with our aircraft and our ships? I mean, if we thought that maybe a group of persons could begin to degrade his power, why would the Arabs feel so strongly against that? I presume it would be an Arab region.

General ZINNI. The Arabs feel—and this is what has been expressed to me—that the opposition must come from inside. They worry about those that are outside, that spend a lot of time here seeking help, and the image that that creates, in that this is a U.S.-supported, propped-up organization, although obviously that is not what we are after to do.

My caution is we have to be careful about how we state this U.S. support and how it is put.

Chairman WARNER. Well, it is out in the open. We passed an act of Congress, the President signed it, and we appropriated millions of dollars.

General ZINNI. My point is, Senator, these opposition groups have to be seen as standing on their own. I mean, although they get material support from us, resources from us, they cannot be viewed or allowed to be propagandized into the perception that they are U.S. puppets being inserted into Iraq. That is the theme that obviously Saddam uses and other anti-American forces in the region use, and this is the caution that I have received.

Second, we have to decide whether Saddam is stronger or weaker. On the one hand we hear he is so weak if we insert some opposition groups with some weapons he will topple. Next we hear he is stronger than ever and our strategy is defeated. I would just suggest that hard facts about some measure of where Saddam is—the intangibles are difficult: the sentiment on the Arab street, the value of his propaganda campaign. But there are many other things that are measurable and quantifiable, and I would suggest that our intelligence community can give us a true picture, instead of being all over on this, because this has been a point of contention regarding the opposition groups.

The third point I would make is about shattered coalitions. There is no shattered coalition in the Gulf. We have a lot of issues, a lot of concerns. The Gulf States do not always see things exactly the way we do. They have never failed to support an action we have wanted to take, even though they have disagreed or have had problems with it.

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As I said in my opening statement, they want to see our presence there beyond Saddam and they encourage it. They tell me we are a force of stability. I heard from two countries, beginning in Kuwait, that there has been a change in the last couple years, a sense or a feeling by the people of Kuwait that they are safe. Their military has responded tremendously in its readiness, in its call-up, in its ability to believe they are going to fight side by side with the Americans if the time comes.

If there is a shattered coalition, and I cannot speak for those outside, whether it is Europeans or others, it is not in the Gulf. Certainly there is a lot of work to be done and there are differing views, but that is the nature of two countries or several countries trying to come to some common agreement.

I do not want anybody to leave here to think we have a shattered coalition or shattered relationships in the Gulf. It is hard work and it takes constant work. I spent over half my time in that region in the 4 years I was there, and I have talked to the highest levels of leadership, to the vendors on the street, and I did not see this sense of a shattered coalition and a failed U.S. I had seen some problems and some points of difference on some approaches we have taken.

Chairman WARNER. Let us expand on that. I think this record should reflect that a number of Gulf nations have reopened diplomatic relations with Iraq, a number of Gulf nations overtly, actively trade with Iraq, I suppose within the bounds of sanctions, but who knows. Would you expand on that a little bit?

General ZINNI. I think again we see some of the differences. I think that these nations separate their relationship with the Iraqi people and view it and approach it differently than their relationship with Saddam Hussein. When it comes to Saddam Hussein, I do not think there is any difference in how we all view him and his need to go in the region.

I think in terms of what the relationship is with the Iraqi people and what they want it to be afterwards, it leads them to do some of these things that frankly I wish they did not do, and they see it differently. But their motivation is not always because they favor a rehabilitation of Saddam or they see him as not a threat if sanctions are lifted and he is allowed to regrow his capability.

Their approach is different and at times troubling. I do not deny that, and I wish it would not be that way. Sometimes they allow it to happen for the benefit of their own people in their view, because these are people that have traded and moved their dhows up and down for years and done this and they see they would harm their own people by preventing it or clamping down.

I would just tell you one small story. I was discussing smuggling with a certain authority in one of the countries and they seemed confused because we were trying to convince them to clamp down on some of the smuggling. They said: Oh, you mean illegal smuggling? So Eskimos have eight words for "snow." There may be more words for activities like this than the kind of delineations we make.

I am not an apologist for what goes on out there and I do not agree with some of these things.

Chairman WARNER. But there are cultures which go back centuries and that is not going to be changed.

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My last question is to Ambassador Butler. Put yourself in the shoes of Ambassador Blix. What is he thinking right now and what is the next move of the UN or the Ambassador? I do not know what they do to occupy themselves each day, but there they are. What is the calendar of events as that issue is addressed and what do these people do?

Ambassador BUTLER. Dr. Blix has been assiduous in following the progress of events that the Security Council has laid out for him. I think he is showing very great care to avoid the sort of political criticism that I was the recipient of in the past. He has trained his crew and he has told the Council that he is basically ready to resume work in Iraq. But he acknowledges that, while that is a desirable condition, it will not actually change anything until the Council is prepared to make very clear to Iraq that not only is he ready, but they must accept the restitution of monitoring.

Up to the present time, however, the Council has not been prepared to do that, for the reasons we have been discussing today, and Iraq has not been prepared to change its stance, which from the adoption of that resolution that established the new organization has been to say: We will have nothing to do with it.

Sadly, the Security Council met last Friday, a week ago from tomorrow, and had before it Ambassador Blix's report in which he said, we are ready, and the Council essentially said: Thanks, you might like to go and do a bit more training, and sort of do not call us, we will call you. That is, sadly, where the matter now rests.

Chairman WARNER. Is there any juncture point, say the December decisionmaking process on Iraq, that could once again bring this to the forefront?

Ambassador BUTLER. Well, yes. In Resolution 1284 that established the new organization, that was adopted on December 16, 1999, it says no later than 1 year since the adoption of this resolution there will be an overall review on what has happened. It actually goes on to imply that sanctions as a whole might be then removed. But that is provided Iraq had received new inspections, and of course it has not done that.

So I assume that around about December 15 that foreseen meeting after passage of a year will take place, and I think the signals are that the friends of Iraq will, irrespective of Iraq's failure to accept the new inspections, seek to force some reconsideration of the overall situation. That in my view is another reason why an urgent effort is required by the administration, starting with the Russians, to try to work out by that time what might happen, rather than deal with it reactively somewhat on the run or late.

Chairman WARNER. Well, we are coming to the end of this administration. I do not say this critically, but I am doubtful that matters of that importance could be resolved in the brief period of time remaining. More likely it would have to await the next administration to address it. That is just one person's view.

Senator Levin.

Senator LEVIN. Just a couple of questions. Ambassador Butler, you say that in Resolution 1284 some are implying that sanctions would be lifted if Iraq accepted inspections. Is that not clear somewhere, that if inspections were allowed that the sanctions would be lifted? Does that have to be implied?

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Ambassador BUTLER. Resolution 1284 has periods in it.

Senator LEVIN. Phases.

Ambassador BUTLER. Phases, that is right, phase one for 60 days or so and then another one for 90 days, being increasing degrees of acceptance by Iraq of inspection. But getting down to the core of it, if Iraq had allowed monitoring inspections to be restored for 90 continuous days and Dr. Blix is prepared to say they are cooperating, then the resolution, which willy-nilly, I mean in any case, calls for a meeting 1 year after the adoption of the resolution, but it carries the implication that if Iraq had been complying continuously for 90 days then in that review the overall issue of sanctions would be revisited. There is language in it which implies that all restrictions would then be removed.

Senator LEVIN. Why should it not be explicit that if Iraq behaves in certain ways, reverses its current path, if Iraq allows inspections for 90 days, 180 days, whatever the period is, that at the end of that period of good behavior and open inspections that then sanctions would be removed? Why should that be left to implication?

Ambassador BUTLER. That is a very good question, if I may say so, and that is how it was negotiated. You know the old saying that a camel is a horse designed by a committee.

Senator LEVIN. Yes, but what is the thinking behind that?

Ambassador BUTLER. Let me finish. There are some very clearcut examples of that kind of outcome in Security Council resolutions. Some dignify it by calling it "creative ambiguity."

That is how it was negotiated, and in that context I want to point this out. The Russian ambassador insisted that the word "full" not be in the resolution connected to cooperation. The previous, the draft text, called for "full Iraqi cooperation" for 90 days. Russia insisted that the word "full" be removed.

Now, I guess the quid pro quo for that was that it was not going to be stated explicitly that after 90 days sanctions would be completely removed, because the notion of the quality of the cooperation was obviously at issue.

Senator LEVIN. In your judgment, if they fully cooperated for X period of months, is there any reason why, given that as the condition, then sanctions should not explicitly be lifted?

Ambassador BUTLER. The view I have put to this committee today is this——

Senator LEVIN. Oh, no, not the view—this is a different issue. I am not talking about your proposal today. I am talking about——

Ambassador BUTLER. Is there any reason why not.

Senator LEVIN. Is there any reason why we should not tell Iraq clearly that if they fully cooperate and lay out what the terms are——

Ambassador BUTLER. I get your question. I am already on record, because I was asked obviously, as saying that if that resolution is implemented in full, my answer to your question is no. But do you hear what I am saying?

Senator LEVIN. Yes.

Ambassador BUTLER. I mean a truly serious monitoring.

Senator LEVIN. I understand.

I think we ought to ask the State Department on this one, Mr. Chairman, that if Iraq fully, as we define the word "fully," complies

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with an inspection regime for a period of time which we consider to be adequate, why we should not then make it clear—under that strict observance of those conditions, however we define the conditions—that the sanctions should be lifted.

I think we ought to find out what our position is on that question, not from you folks, but from our own State Department. I do not want to stop you all from commenting on it, but I think we ought to clarify that with our people, because that has been troubling.

One final question. There has been a little ambiguity on that floating around. I think we should clarify it, because in my judgment if we lay out the terms and conditions——

Ambassador BUTLER. Could I just comment on that? I would not seek to dissuade you from what you propose and the chairman has just authorized. I think that could be quite illuminating. But for history's sake let me say that 2 years ago I was very disturbed by Iraq, the success of Iraqi arguments that said, even if we complied with you guys, meaning UNSCOM, the United States has made clear that it still would not agree to the lifting of sanctions because of the presence of Saddam Hussein as the head of our government.

I sought clarification of that from the cabinet level of the government of the United States and was authorized to say to the Iraqis in Baghdad: That is not true; if you really give us the weapons and we really are running a proper monitoring system, I will report so to the Council and I am assured from the highest levels of the government of the United States that the United States would then see things through and the sanctions would be lifted.

Senator Levin, the Iraqis received that news with deep distress.

Senator LEVIN. I am sure.

Ambassador BUTLER. That is not what they wanted to hear.

Senator LEVIN. I am sure.

Ambassador BUTLER. They much preferred to play this card that said: No matter what we do, the U.S. is never going to love us. It was too valuable to them in propaganda terms and they did not receive that well.

Senator LEVIN. That is why we ought to deliver it.

Ambassador BUTLER. But I think you should by all means seek that.

Senator LEVIN. That is why we should deliver it, is to just absolutely flush that out. Because when they raise that kind of argument it seems to me we ought to abolish the argument, by saying: No, the message that you deliver is the position of this government.

Ambassador BUTLER. But Mr. Chairman, I must be very clear about this. I am agreeing to what you are saying as a theoretical proposition, but on the strict understanding between you and me that we are talking about that the condition for this is the institution of a truly serious monitoring system, not a bogus one.

Senator LEVIN. Absolutely. Any condition we want as we define it, which obviously means——

Ambassador BUTLER. Fine.

Senator LEVIN. Now, let me just quickly ask one other question. France's Foreign Minister, Mr. Vedrine, who abstained, I believe, on Resolution 1284——

Ambassador BUTLER. Correct.

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Senator LEVIN.—is quoted as saying before that vote in the UN that he told Tariq Aziz that the only solution for Iraq was to comply with Resolution 1284 and to cooperate. Now, I am very critical of France's position. I think there has been a lot of other criticism we have heard here this morning, and as far as I am concerned it is deserved. However, is it your understanding that that message was delivered, that even though they abstained on that vote, that nonetheless they have informed Iraq that the only hope that Iraq has is to comply with inspections? There may be disagreement over sanctions, but there is no disagreement that Iraq is part of over the question of whether Iraq must comply with inspections; is that accurate or not?

Ambassador BUTLER. Yes, it is, except with one slight difference of no particular consequence. The statement you are referring to was made by Foreign Minister Vedrine 2 weeks ago at the General Assembly of the UN. The vote on Resolution 1284 was a year prior to that, where France's position was it is better to have inspections with no sanctions than sanctions with no inspections. That is, they say, why they abstained on the resolution. I have given you another version today of why they abstained.

But to come to Foreign Minister Vedrine's recent statement, I welcome it. I welcome that statement, because it does add a voice to those who are making clear to Iraq that, all your caterwauling about sanctions is one thing and is more or less convincing—I find it unconvincing—but if you really, truly want to get out of sanctions, there is one thing you must accept, is that there will be a reimposition of arms control monitoring in your country. I think it was a welcome thing that the foreign minister of France said that.

Chairman WARNER. Let us just dwell one moment on this position that is very important that my colleague brought up, that statement of France that it would be better to have inspections without sanctions than sanctions without inspections. What is your view on that? If you had inspections without sanctions, history has shown that step by step they curtail the ability of those inspectors to do their job, and then sooner or later they become almost totally ineffective.

Ambassador BUTLER. My view, Mr. Chairman, is this, that what we have learned from this unique Iraq case—and Richard Perle and I agreed earlier that it is a unique one in the Security Council since the end of the Cold War, unique in rather nasty ways—one of the things that we have learned in this case is that sanctions as the main non-military instrument that the Council has at its disposal for getting compliance with the law is a flawed one, and that when it is confronted with an immoral dictator who is prepared to go for any length of time to see it through, then they will crumble.

I want to be very clear by what I mean when I say "immoral." "Dictator" speaks for itself. Saddam Hussein had elections a year and a half ago for his job in Baghdad and he won 99 percent of the vote. The joke going around was that he gave an instruction saying: Find those 1 percent and we will deal with them. But that is hardly the result that you—did not anyone think that was funny? I thought it was.

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Anyway, that is hardly the result that you typically see in a democracy. But the "immoral" part that I am referring to is the preparedness to see 22 million people be isolated, suffer from sanctions and so on, traded off for his wish to have a weapons of mass destruction program. I think that is the height of immorality.

Now, if someone is determined and ruthless in that way, then sanctions will crumble, and that is what we have learned from the Iraq case. I think the lesson we should derive from that is that in the future sanctions must be designed in a much more targeted way, and the targets I propose in this case are certainly weapons-related materials and, if possible, the financial welfare of this immoral leadership.

Now, so my answer to your question is, yes, it is better to have inspections as a first priority, provided they are real, provided it is a genuinely effective system of monitoring. If the only way to achieve that is to relieve overall general sanctions, which I have just sought to explain will in the end crumble anyway, then fine, but provided there is adequate import control on goods that will either feed the weapons of mass destruction program or in other ways strengthen this outlaw state militarily.

Chairman WARNER. That would be an effective sanction carryover.

Ambassador BUTLER. Then it would not be general sanctions, you see. It would be something else. There are many export-import control regimes in the world now. There is a very important one under the Chemical Weapons Convention, where like-minded countries agree on what they will and will not allow in international trade in substances related to the manufacture of chemical weapons, or at the very least notify the transfer of these substances so that we all know who is doing what.

It is not cruel and unusual treatment for Iraq in that sense. It is where the civilized world is going. But the idea that what we must now do to poor Iraq is throw all of those controls away, in some way apologizing for what we have "done" to them in the past, I think is nonsense. The way ahead is a proper set of monitoring arrangements, and they only work if you have associated with it proper import-export controls on strategic and militarily significant goods. That is what I am proposing.

Ambassador PERLE. Senator, could I just make one small point?

Chairman WARNER. Yes, of course.

Ambassador PERLE. I have come to the conclusion, and others may disagree, that there is no inspection regime operating in Iraq with Saddam's approval that will have a high probability of unearthing all of his illicit programs. For one thing, the database which was painstakingly developed, much of it under Ambassador Butler, has been devastated by the interruption. Everything of interest has been moved.

So we know much less now than we knew 3 years ago, and much less than we knew at the time that we had an intelligence windfall in the defection of Saddam's son-in-law, who told us things that, among other things, indicated how unsuccessful we had been in ferreting out things that were going on under our nose. Had it not been for that defection, we would never have known about very important programs that were taking place.

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So I think the prospects of an ideally designed inspection regime serving the ultimate purpose of assuring that he has no weapons of mass destruction, that prospect seems to me extremely remote.

Ambassador Butler said something a moment ago. Sort of in passing, he said if he gave up the weapons. Now, that is an objective for which one should be willing to trade a great deal. But there is a difference between an inspection regime for 90 days or 180 days and separating Saddam from those weapons of mass destruction, because he is very good at hiding what he is doing.

Senator LEVIN. Could Ambassador Butler comment on that?

Chairman WARNER. Yes, of course.

Senator LEVIN. That there is no inspection regime which will work with a high degree of probability, because that——

Chairman WARNER. Without Saddam Hussein's concurrence, I think that was it.

Senator LEVIN. Well, no, an inspection regime which does not require his concurrence. I am saying, is it possible——

Chairman WARNER. Hold on. Let us get the predicate.

Senator LEVIN. Is it possible to design an inspection regime which will work with a high degree of probability?

Ambassador BUTLER. I am only hesitating, Mr. Chairman, because the whole issue of arms control verification is a voluminous one and I get the sense that we are at the end of our time. I am not taking that line to avoid the question. I am just trying, Senator Levin, to encapsulate it as quickly as I can.

Anyone who tells you that any arms control regime and associated verification mechanism will give you a 100 percent success rate is misleading you. That is not conceivable or designable if you make the assumption that there will be from time to time persons in the world who are either insane or criminal or both and will seek in a concerted way to make a prohibited weapon clandestinely. The possibility of literally stopping every such case is not 100 percent.

But, having said that, to go to the alternative extreme, as some do—not many, but some do—and say that therefore we should place no reliance at all in these treaty and inspection regimes for weapons of mass destruction arms control is to throw the baby out with the bath water, is to go to an extreme that I feel very strongly is a mistake.

What it is within the wit of humankind to do is to design a regime and a method of inspection that in a very large number of cases, if it will not actually prevent bad behavior, will tell you that it is happening and will tell you that early enough for you to be able to do something about it. That detection, it seems to me, is both intrinsically important, because it is safe, it gives us safety, we can decide to do something about it, and it very often, very often, serves as a deterrent to bad behavior.

Now, a little while ago, Senator, I said I agree to your proposition provided we are talking here about a serious monitoring system. To clear up a possible misunderstanding between myself and Ambassador Perle, my proposal today is not for something for 90 days. That is what is in Resolution 1284, which I think is inadequate. My proposal is something that would have an indefinite

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time scale on it, and it is for a monitoring system that would meet the test that I have just outlined to you.

It may not be absolutely able to prevent Saddam if he chose to go really deeply underground and be very wicked, which I think he probably already has, but it would position us in a vastly different position from where we are today. We would be able to see this Mack truck coming down the pike in a way that we cannot today because we are nowhere near the highway, and that would help us then defend ourselves and take action before the truck got to where we are standing.

Thank you.

Chairman WARNER. Gentlemen, I say, and I am sure my colleague joins me, this has been an extraordinarily fine hearing and we have put together the record that Senator Levin and I desired on behalf of the committee and the Senate on this subject with these series of hearings. I thank you for your public service, the time you have given, the interest, and the many years of your career devoted to this region of the world in trying to bring about some understanding and some direction to how the free world must move in this troubled region. I thank you very much.

Senator Levin, do you have anything further?

Senator LEVIN. No, thank you.

Chairman WARNER. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:32 p.m., the committee adjourned.]

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S. HRG. 106–1121

# U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAQ

## HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

## COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
## UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

SEPTEMBER 19 AND 28, 2000

Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

U. S. DEPOSITORY

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

82–437 PDF WASHINGTON : 2002

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