change in Baghdad will require a substantial increase in U.S. forward-deployed forces, probably followed by a multinational occupation of Iraq that is likelyto include a significant U.S. military component. 
Even if regime change does not occur in Iraq, other factors are likely to put pressure on the United States to alter the shape of its military posture toward the region. The enduring long-term campaign against global terrorism will still demand a closer look at U.S. policies toward the Persian Gulf that undermine this effort, including the U.S. military presence. Political and social trends in Saudi Arabia will make the ruling family even more wary of U.S. forces on their soil. Iran and Iraq are likely to improve their conventional capabilities and, more importantly, to deploy chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons and longer-range ballistic missiles to threaten 
U.S. access and force projection capabilities. In addition, the demands of the war on terrorism, and U.S. defense strategy more broadly, could make it increasingly difficult to sustain current military operations in the region. 
With or without a regime change in Iraq, the U.S. military posture toward the region will become increasingly brittle unless it adapts in creative ways to these looming changes. If the Gulf security environment stays on its present course-continued deterioration and eventual collapse of dual containment and no American effort to reorder the geopolitical landscapethe central dilemma facing U.S. policymakers will be reconciling the military requirements of a containment strategy with the political imperatives of reducing the American military profile in the Gulf. By the same token, the elimination of Iraq as a strategic threat or the installation of a new but equallyantagonistic regime would confront the United States with a number of complex and novel policy choices: the role of Saudi Arabia in U.S. regional security strategy, the degree to which a friendlyand pro-American Iraq could become the focus of 
U.S. regional defense strategy, and the type of military presence the United States should maintain in the region if the removal of the Saddan1 regime ushers in a period of prolonged instability and disorder inside Iraq and beyond. 
Regional Dynamics 
In thinking about alternative U.S. force postures in the region under a variety of circumstances, a keyquestion is how changing 
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security priorities and threat perceptions will affect Gulf State attitudes toward U.S . presence. If the geopolitical status quo continues, the key factors influencing Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) defense and security pol icies are likelyto diverge from those of the United States in several important ways. 
From the GCC perspective, neither Iraq nor Iran is seen as a major or imminent danger to regional security. Iraq has been effectively weakened and contained, Iran has been tamed, and concerns about Iraqi or Iranian weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation take a back seat to addressing domestic difficulties. 
' ~ 
with or without a regime change in Iraq, the U.S. military posture toward the region will become increasingly brittle unless it adapts in creative ways to looming changes 
U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has eroded U.S. influence in the Gulf and increased the sense of vulnerability of Gulf Arab regimes. Furthermore, public opinion in the GCC states is wary of the U.S .-led war on terrorism, viewing it mainly as an anti-Islamic campaign. In this climate, many Gulf State rulers see their ties to the United States as a growing political liability. 
Support for sanctions against and isolation of Iraq has evaporated. Saddam has gained the backing of most Arab and Muslim states for an end to sanctions and opposition to a unilateral U.S. military attack. He has also been able to mend fences with Saudi Arabia and paper over tensions with Kuwait. United Nations (UN) agreement on reshaping sanctions to ease their impact on the Iraqi population will not restore support for sanctions an1ong GCC governments or populations. 
The preference of GCC governments is to restore a balance of power similar to the one that existed prior to Operation Desert Storm
a. balance maintained by de facto partnership with a regional power and backed by a less visible U.S. milita1y presence. The realization of this vision will require a delicate balancing act between maintaining a necessary U.S. 
military presence, gradually improving relations with Iraq and Iran, and moderating domestic discontent over American policies. Regardless of how the Gulf States cope with this dilemma, theywill remain at odds with the United States over their willingness to reach an accommodation with a weakened Saddam and a cautious, internallydivided Iran, even as both countries acquire WMD and long-range ballistic missiles. This fault line is unlikely to prompt the Gulf States to seek a complete witl1drawal of 
U.S. forces or to leave the U.S . security umbrella. However, when coupled with popular outrage at U.S. support for Israel, it will lead GCC governments to distance themselves further from U.S. policies and reduce their cooperation with U.S. military forces. 



Deteriorating Status Quo 
The future survival of Saddam Husayn's Iraq will be the most critical variable in determining the evolution of the U.S. military presence in the region. As long as Iraq constitutes a threat to U.S . interests in the Gulf, the United States has little choice but to maintain the capability to deter or defeat that threat with a combination of in-theater and rapidly deployable forces. The decision of previous administrations to deal with Iraqi defiance of UN Security Council resolutions through a policy of containment has until now driven the United States to maintain the status quo in its force presence rather than adopt a more sustainable concept of Gulf security at reduced levels of presence, as was envisioned immediately after Desert Storm. Under present conditions, therefore, the U.S. military footprint in the Gulf is determined by the military concept of operations for the region's defense against Iraq. 
Adecision not to use U.S. military force to evict Saddam in favor of continuing long-term containment must confront three realities: first, sanctions are alreadyalmost impossible to enforce; second, Iraq will eventuallypossess and deployWMD and longer-range ballistic missiles; and third, the U.S. military presence in the region, especially Saudi Arabia, is a source of growing resentment and a mounting domestic liability for the ruling families of host countries. Hence, the political and military risks to the U.S. force posture in the region are likely to grow, and efforts to maintain the status quo will only exacerbate these dangers. Containing a hostile Iraq under these circumstances over the long term would require a 


Iraq-as well as the damage inflicted by the change itself, and what kind of government succeeds Saddam Husayn. 
If regime change occurs without direct 
U.S. military involvement, the U.S. presence required in the region will depend to some extent on what kind of government replaces Saddam. Given the weakness and disorganization of the ostensibly democratic Iraqi opposition, the most likelysuccessor would be another strongman emerging from the existing political milieu and sharing its fundamentally hostile orientation. Somewhat less likely, but also plausible, would be a weak government focused primarilyon resolving internal economic and political problems. 
Depending on which of these comes to pass, the new regime mayrecognize the futility of continuing defiance of the international community and redirect resources from offensive programs, including WMD, effectively limiting its capabilities and allowing the United States to restructure its deterrent capability in the region. The problem is that judging what kind of regime we are dealing with is apt to be difficult, since even a hostile leader may find it tactically useful to play along with the international community by accepting WMD inspections, renouncing territorial claims, and taking whatever other steps are necessary to secure the end of sanctions and buy time to consolidate power. This uncertainty will be all the more serious should civil strife follow the collapse of the Ba'athist machinery of repression. In the face of such uncertainty, the United States will want to proceed cautiously before substantially reducing its quickresponse capabilities. Moreover, there will be a high risk that the United States will be called 
on by Iraq's worried neighbors to play a military role in the post-Saddam transition-at best, to provide humanitarian assistance; at worst, to intervene to prevent the collapse of the Iraqi state if order begins to deteriorate. 
If regime change comes about as a result of U.S. intervention, we will face a somewhat different set of demands. In the near term, a substantial U.S. military presence is very likely to be required in Iraq, either as an occupation force or to assist the new regime in getting control of and rebuilding the country. On the positive side, such a presence will allow the United States to satisfy itself that Iraqi weapons programs are totallyand completely dismantled and to shape the new government and the new Iraqi army to the greatest po sible degree. 
Furthern1ore, as long as U.S. forces are present in Iraq, the necessity of defending neighboring states against Iraq will cease to exist. On the negative side, the challenge of pacifying and policing the country should not be underestimated, nor should that of building rule of law and a functioning civil society where neither has existed for many years. 
Finally, neither of these alternatives-an internally driven succession or one achieved through U.S. intervention-leads easily to a stable, sustainable, legitimate outcome. A successor regime that comes to power by force and controls the country through a more or 
the longer the United States needs military access to the Gulf States, the longer it will be identified with resistance to political evolution 
less effective continuation of the historic pattern of authoritarian repression will share not only the present regime's methods and attitudes but also its lack of legitimacy. Conversely, a regime installed by U.S. military force could be viewed as a tool of neoimperialism and an American puppet regime. Groups that supported the U.S. intervention would be looking for a payoff afterward that in some cases would be contrary to the interests that the United States was trying to protect, such as the territorial integrity of Iraq. The steps that could be taken to mitigate those perceptions and disappointments, such as full enfranchisement of the entire population (that is, elections that resulted in political dominance by the 65 percent Shi'a majority in a democratic state and formal autonomy for the Kurds), would pose problems of their own . 
The precise permutations are thus practicallyunlimited. Nevertheless, it is reasonable, in thinking through U.S. responses to these differing outcomes, to identify three alternative models: 
• The European or East Asian model, under which the United States is viewed as the only credible and acceptable stabilizing force for acritical region. This assumes that either Iraq or Iran , if not both, would continue to present a threat to U.S. interests even under less objectionable regimes and that the GCC states would be unable or unwilling to develop their own capabilities to meet those threats. 
Under this alternative, the United States wou ld seek long-term access to bases in the lower Gulf for a robust but reduced ground and air presenceprobablyabout acomposite air wing and a heavy battalion task force-that would continue in the foreseeable future. In addition, this alternative would envision the presence in the Gulf of acarrier task force most if not all the time. 
• 
An over-the-horizon presence, similar to the normal pre-1990 arrangement but witl1 greater diversification of bed-down locations. The United States would attempt, through diplomacy and other means, to ensure that Iraq and Iran balance each otl1er in such away tl1at neither of them is strong enough to challenge vital U.S. interests. Meanwhile, the United States would attempt to strengthen friendly forces and ensure through acombination of prepositioning,exercises, transformed military capabilities and operational concepts, and assets to counter the antiaccess/area denial capabilities of Iraq and Iran, tl1at U.S. and coalition forces could return rapidlyin acrisis. 

• 
Acombination of relianceon local and U.S. capabilities, based on tl1e assumption that the regional situation would not tolerate acontinuing 


U.S. military presence at anything resembling current levels. Enhancements to local forces would be combined with active encouragement of regional cooperation,continued improvements in U.S. rapid deployment capabilities, and a continuing force presence well below that currently in place, maintained through aseries of deployments shifting among various locations. 
In sum, while more aggressive efforts to unseat Saddam would not be cost-free, neither would be the alternatives. Either a continuation of the policy of active containment or a policy of retrenched defense and deterrence would require the maintenance of a significant military presence in the Gulf, with all its attendant political and security risks for both the Gulf Arab countries and the United States. Moreover, the longer the United States needs military access to the Gulf States to deal with a continuing Iraqi threat, the longer it will be identified with resistance by some Gulf states to political evolution. 
Whither Iran? 
The second key variable that will determine U.S. success in bringing peace and stability to the Persian Gulf over the coming decade is how Iran's political evolution plays out and is reflected in Iranian foreign policy. Iran 's political factions are gridlocked, and 
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