WIULl^tRL.IDIVUM HX 4AGE $ WID-LC DS70.6 .S6 1979 Iraq, a country study Widener hi >ook series 3 2044 000 588 830 II Iraq a country study i HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY /" .JH.-.HJ.A \)1 1 I.. — ♦ Iraq a country study Foreign Area Studies The American University Edited by Richard F. Nyrop Research Completed February 1979 HARVARD UNIVERSITY USRARY DEC 161980 On the cover: Textile pattern of Iraqi design U) l D l uring -the period of the monarchy after independence (1932-58) the cabinets were almost completely composed of a small body repre- sentative of the traditional Sunni elite. As the scholar Abid al- Marayati has observed, forty-five cabinets were formed during the monarchical period with a total of only twelve different prime ministers. Those twelve individuals occupied a total of 123 minis- terial posts. One of the dramatic changes after the 1958 coup was Iraq: A Country Study the entrance of some middle- and lower-class Iraqis into political life. The chief political leaders since then have all been from modest socioeconomic backgrounds. But with rare exceptions the leaders in 1979 were, as before, from the Sunni community. For the great majority of the people Iraqi society's recent past is seen as a struggle for national freedom—first against the Otto- man Turks, later against the British, and finally against "Western imperialism" and Israel, which Iraq describes as the creation of Western imperialism. The native heroes vary with the ethnic and religious affiliation of the viewer, but a majority of the people share a common suspicion of all non-Arabs. History thus becomes an active factor in the contemporary scene and an instrument available to and used by political contenders. The anti-Western sentiments aroused during and since the British Mandate worked to the disadvantage of the Hashimite monarchy (1921-58) with which it was associated and to any political leader seeking to main- tain an alignment with the West. The platform of the ruling Baath Party was designedly its founder Michel Afiaq^ a Damascenef Christian, aslf solution to the cTiromcproblerns besetting a multigroup society. A common Arab identity as the end result of thirteen centuries of Islamic civiliza- tion was ideally to obliterate other differences including national- ity. The Baath was the first left-wing, pan-Arab party, and as such it had wide appeal. The Baath has come in conflict, however, with the many who were more exclusively nationalistic in outlook. Since the execution of Qasim in 1963 subsequent governments have all been pan-Arab to one degree or another, adding to the discomfort of the Shiites who fear (with historical precedent to do so) the submergence of the already Sunni-ruled state into an even larger transnational body of Sunnis. The army has continued to be a persistent factor in postrepubli- can Iraqi history and politics, as is the case in much of the Middle East. Iraq was subject to centuries of foreign rule and hence was deprived of the experience of self-government. Moreover, given the deep-seated cleavages within the society, Iraq continued to experience difficulties in generating political consensus and ap- peared unable to develop procedures for resolving internal con- flicts other than through rule by decree and the frequent use of repressive measures. The political leaders are cognizant of the importance of the loyalty of the army and have kept it the pre- serve of the Sunni elite of the Baath Party (see Armed Forces and Society, ch. 5). The dominant role of the military in turn has contributed to Iraq's failure to develop a multiparty system (see Power Elite, ch. 4). Repression and purges, usually carried out both by and in the army as a common feature of the new regimes, have discouraged political expression even on those rare occasions when it was per- missible. Discussing this aspect of Iraqi life, Middle Eastern expert 6 Historical Setting Majid Khadduri has noted that "the people of Iraq . . . seem to be prepared to tolerate restrictions on individual freedom and achieve an equitable distribution of wealth rather than to tolerate disparity between classes." While foreign observers generally are optimistic that a broader representation of the citizen body in its political life may eventu- ally occur, their common perception of Iraq's contemporary situa- tion may be best stated by the outstanding scholars Edith and E. F. Penrose: "Iraq has been, and . . . remains, in a state of arrested political development. Politics, in the constructive sense of free public debate and popular participation, is non-existent while the exercise of political power in government is autocratic, and has become increasingly ruthless, depending on the army, lacking the legitimacy either of tradition or of popular endorsement." Some Western scholars have suggested that two traditional, recurring, yet countervailing impulses operate in most Arab soci- eties: one, an attraction to—almost a search for—a dynamic leader who identifies and interprets problems and then articulates the correct solutions; the other, a strongly felt need for and insistence on consensus in selecting leaders and in reaching important deci- sions. With some minor modifications, Iraq in the late 1970s ap- peared to fit that mold. On the one hand two men, rather than one, dominated governmental and political affairs. President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr was not only chief of state and head of government but also—and of more importance—the commander in chief of the armed forces, chairman of the Revolutionary Com- mand Council (RCC), and secretary general of the Regional Com- mand of the Baath Party (see The Baath Party, ch. 4). Saddam Husayn was vice chairman of the RCC, deputy secretary general of the party, the nation's political strongman, and Bakr's presumed successor. These two dominated the party; the party controlled the RCC; and the RCC, through the Council of Ministers, gov- erned the nation (see Preface). On the other hand there were indications of collegial decision- making that limited the freedom of action of and yet was used by Bakr and Saddam Husayn. In late 1978 an Iraqi official asserted that when the RCC was considering an issue of national impor- tance there "must be a showing of hands" before a decision could be reached. The law governing the operations of the RCC pro- vides for a two-thirds majority of its twenty-two members. Yet foreign observers, albeit with little concrete evidence, speculated that on truly vital matters Bakr and Saddam Husayn carefully sought to secure the consensus of the other leaders; that is, they worked for a unanimous vote as an illustration of party and RCC solidarity and as a process for ensuring support by RCC members for RCC policy. Among the issues that were of continuing priority to the nation's leaders was the use of funds from the country's oil exports. NBy the. mid-1970s the oil industry accounted for over 50 percent or"flie Iraq: A Country Study grogs Hnmp'itir- product (GDP), about S2 percent of budget reve- nues, andover 90 percent of foreign evchange earnings (see The Oil Industry, ch. 3). In 1977 foreign journalists reported estimates that placed Iraq's oil reserves at over95 billion barrels (see barrels per day—Glossary), which if true wouTd place Iraq second only to Saudi Arabia's 150 billion barrels. United States government sources and American petroleum industry sources, however, es- timated Iraq's reserves at over 36 billion barrels. The reserves and the oil industry have been owned and operated by the govern- ment since nationalization in 1972 (see Nationalization of the For- eign-Owned Oil Companies, ch. 3). As a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Coun- tries (OPEC), Iraq played an active role in the OPEC deliberations in 1973 and 1974 that led to a quadrupling of international oil prices (see Appendix B). The sharp jump in oil revenues and GDP after 1973 turned Iraq almost overnight from a poor developing country into one much richer in terms of per capita GDP. The increase largely removed the financial constraints on domestic growth, but it did not alter quickly the income and living condi- tions of the average Iraqi. Time and change were needed to trans- form the sudden boost in revenues into jobs, production, and in- come. It was much easier to convert oil revenues into buildings and machinery, particularly when whole plants were purchased from foreign suppliers; Iraqis had been doing this for many years. In 1979 the central economic problem was efficient operation of those projects in which so much had been invested. The major radical measures of the past—land reform and nationalization of much of the economy—were primarily political acts undertaken to remove groups that posed a threat to the regime in power. Removal of the groups also deprived Iraq of their managerial skills, however. The governments since 1958 have attempted to supply the missing economic functions, and the results of these attempts have ranged from modest to unimpressive. A basic as- sumption of land reform, for example, was that land ownership would stimulate a cultivator's long-term interest in the soil's condi- tion and productivity and hence result in greater production. De- velopments since 1958 have not only largely thwarted this basic concept but have appeared as well to alienate even further the farmer's interest in the land he tilled. The large investments made in plants and equipment in the 1970s will add to economic production as they are completed. A certain growth of output is thus ensured by continuing invest- ments. But significant economic development, growth of personal income, improved social services, and reduction of the disparity in living conditions that posed a threat to the social fabric required much better management and greater efficiency in operations throughout the economy. Government officials acknowledged these shortcomings and began a program in late 1976 to improve management and coordination, but more time and effort would be 8 Historical Setting required before Iraq realized the economic potential frequently ascribed to it. Ancient Mesopotamia Sumer, Akkad, Babylon, and Assyria Contemporary Iraq occupies the territory that traditionally has been viewed by historians as the site of the earliest civilizations of the ancient Near East. Geographically modern Iraq is the Mesopo- tamia of the Old Testament and other more ancient Near Eastern texts. In Western mythology and in its religious tradition, the land of Mesopotamia in the ancient period was a land of lush vegeta- tion, abundant wildlife, and copious if unpredictable water re- sources. As such it attracted people from neighboring but less hospitable areas at a very early date. By 6000 B.C. Mesopotamia had been settled, chiefly by migrants from the Turkish and Iranian highlands. By 3500 B.C. the complex and highly influential civiliza- tion of Sumer had developed a confederation of city-states in the marshy area north of the Persian Gulf (see fig. 2). The Sumerians are widely believed to have been the first cereal agriculturists and the first people to develop a form of writing based on phonogramic as well as pictorial signs. Most important of the city-states of Sumer were Uruk, Eridu, Kish, Lagash, Agade, Akshak, Larsa, and Ur, birthplace of the prophet Abraham. The cities had populations ranging between 15,000 and 250,000. The base of Sumer's economy was a highly developed agricul- tural system that boasted refined irrigation and water control sys- tems. Because the Sumerians possessed the technical ability to control the flows of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, daily life in Sumer lacked many of the horrors attendant on other ancient civilizations. Gavin Young describes Sumer as a kind of paradise: "The green, well-watered gardens, orchards and seemingly end- less date-forests of Sumer; the gloriously intricate cobweb of canals and dykes that made Mesopotamia the granary of the near east; prosperous farmers with their thousands upon thousands of sheep and cattle; singing boatmen in the giant reeds fishing and hunting undisturbed: such was the golden prospect when southern Iraq was young." By the middle of the third millennium the Sumerians had devel- oped the wheeled chariot. At approximately the same time the Sumerians—who had refined the use of copper—discovered that tin and copper when smelted together produced bronze, a new, more durable, and much harder metal. The wheeled chariot and bronze weapons became increasingly important as the Sumerians developed the institution of kingship, and individual city-states began to vie for supremacy. Although Mesopotamia enjoyed adequate rainfall and alluvial soil, climatic changes were highly irregular, unlike conditions in Egypt, the other great civilization of the time. Heavy rainfalls and violent storms often caused flooding that destroyed the mud and 9 Iraq: A Country Study Source: Based on information from George Roux, Ancient Iraq, Cleveland, 1965. Figure 2. Ancient Mesopotamia 10 Historical Setting 11 Iraq: A Country Study clay settlements. In an effort to appease the unpredictable gods to whom such activities were attributed, the Sumerians developed elaborate religious rituals and a powerful priesthood to intervene with the gods. Because all property belonged to the gods, decisions relating to land rentals, other agricultural questions, trade, com- mercial relations, and war were determined by the priesthood. The priests ruled from their temples, called ziggurats, which were essentially artificial mountains of sunbaked brick built in staircases that tapered toward the top. One ziggurat survives at Ur. Because the well-being of the community was dependent on a close observation of natural phenomena, scientific or protoscien- tific activities occupied much of the priests' time. Each of the gods was believed to be represented by a number. A legacy of the Sumerians was their use of the number sixty, sacred to the god An, as their basic calculation. The minutes of an hour and the nota- tional degrees of a circle were Sumerian concepts. In approximately 3500 B.C. an unusually severe and wide-rang- ing flood decimated the area. Fearful that such a disaster would happen again, the Sumerians (and the Babylonians after them) wrote obsessively of the flood and the angered gods who caused it. One man, Utnapishtim, and his family were saved, along with animals and plant life that one of the gods had ordered him to take into his ark. Sometime after the Third Dynasty of Ur (ca. 2110- 2010 B.C.) was invaded by eastern nomads, the patriarch Abraham departed for the area now known as Turkey with his family and effects. He also took with him the legends of the land, and part of the legacy of the Mesopotamians to the Israelites— Abraham's decendants—was the story of Utnapishtim, which is the prototype for all Near Eastern inundation stories. The genius of the Sumerians is most easily seen in the develop- ment of the world's first epics. The most famous and the one that has survived most completely is the Epic of Gilgamesh, king of Uruk, a moving story of the king's devastating sorrow at the death of his friend and of his consequent search for immortality. The epic of Gilgamesh, who actually ruled in approximately 2700 B.C., is evidence of the intellectual sophistication of these people. The unknown author wrote: Fearing death I roam over the steppe; The matter of my friend rests heavy upon me. How can I be silent? How can I be still? My friend whom I loved, has turned to clay. Must I, too, like him, lay me down Not to rise again for ever and ever? In approximately 2300 B.C. a Semitic-speaking people north of Sumer in the land called Akkad conquered Sumer. Their leader was Sargon I, who has the reputation of being the first imperialist in history. Sargon maintained Sumerian institutions and ruled 12 Historical Setting through troops and representatives. Akkadian supremacy was dis- lodged, however, by invasions of the Guti from the east. Sumerian city-states rallied, and the Guti were defeated by the king of Ur. Under its next king, Ur was able to establish hegemony over much of Mesopotamia. By 2000 B.C., however, the combined attacks of the Amorites, Semitic-speaking people from the west, and the Elamites from the east had destroyed the Third Dynasty of Ur. The invaders nevertheless became heir to and carried on the Sumero-Akkadian cultural legacy. The Amorites established cities on the Tigris and Euphrates and made Babylon, a town to the north, their capital. During the time of their sixth ruler, King Hammurabi (1792-1750), Babylonian rule was firmly established in most of the Tigris-Euphrates valley. Hammurabi, in addition to conquering or subduing local princes, issued in a period of peace and prosperity during his forty-three- year rule. Hammurabi's great achievement was the issuance of a law code designed "To cause justice to prevail in the country, to destroy the wicked and the evil, that the strong may not oppress the weak." The Code of Hammurabi, not the earliest to appear in the Near East but certainly the most complete, dealt with land tenure, rent, the position of women, marriage, divorce, inheri- tance, contracts, control of public order, administration of justice, wages, and labor conditions. Beginning in approximately 1600 B.C. Indo-European-speaking tribes invaded India; others settled in Iran and Europe. One of these groups, the Hittites, allied itself with the Kassites, a people of unknown origins, and conquered and destroyed Babylon in approximately 1600 B.C. Kassite rule persisted until the twelfth century B.C. when their civilization was devastated by Elamites from Iran. One of the cities that flourished in the middle of the Tigris Valley in the third millennium was that of Ashur, named after the sun-god of the Assyrians—Semitic speakers who for a brief period in the thirteenth century were able to occupy Babylon. Invasions of iron-producing peoples into the Near East and the Aegean region in approximately 1200 disrupted the indigenous empires of Mesopotamia, but eventually the Assyrians were able to capitalize on the new power alignments in the region. Because of what has been called "the barbarous and unspeakable cruelty of the Assyri- ans," the names of such Assyrian kings as Ashurnasirpal, Tiglath- Pileser, Sennacherib, and Ashurbanipal continue to evoke images of powerful, militarily brilliant, but brutally savage conquerors. The Assyrians began to expand to the west in the early part of the ninth century B.C. By 859 Assyrians reached the Mediterra- nean, where they occupied Phoenician cities. Damascus and Bab- ylon fell to the next generations of Assyrian rulers. During the eighth century control over their empire appeared tenuous, but Tiglath-Pileser III (745-727 B.C.) seized the throne and rapidly subdued Assyria's neighbors, captured Syria, and crowned himself 13 Iraq: A Country Study King of Babylon. He developed a highly proficient war machine by creating a permanent standing army under the administration of a permanent bureaucracy, the first instance of a regular army in history. Sennacherib (704-681) built a new capital, Nineveh, on the Tigris River, destroyed Babylon where its citizens had risen in revolt, and made Judah a vassal state. He proclaimed himself "the great king, the mighty king, king of the universe, king of Assyria, king of the four quarters." His son conquered Egypt where revolts against Assyria's harsh rule were continuous. Ashurnasirpal describes how he dealt with rebellion, which was to visit atrocities on the civilian as well as the military: "I built a pillar over against his city gate and I flayed all the chiefs who revolted and I covered the pillar with their skins. Some I walled up within the pillar, some I impaled upon the pillar on stakes, and others I bound to stakes round the pillar. . . . And I cut the limbs of the officers, of the royal officers who had rebelled." In 612 revolts of subject peoples combined with the allied forces of two new kingdoms, the Medes and the Chaldeans (Neo- Babylonians), effectively extinguished Assyrian power and razed Nineveh. The hatred that the Assyrians inspired, particularly for their policy of wholesale resettlement of subject peoples, was suffi- ciently great to ensure that little trace of Assyrian rule remained two years later. The Assyrians used the visual arts to depict their many conquests, and Assyrian friezes, executed in minute detail, remain the best artifacts of Assyrian civilization. The Chaldeans became heir to Assyrian power in 612 and con- quered formerly Assyrian-held lands in Syria and Palestine. King Nebuchadnezzar (605-562) conquered the kingdom of Judah and destroyed Jerusalem in 586. The Chaldeans were conscious of their ancient past and sought to reestablish Babylon as the most magnificent city of the Near East. It was during the Chaldean period that the Hanging Gardens of Babylon, famed as one of the Seven Wonders of the Ancient World, were created. Because of an estrangement of the priesthood from the king, the monarchy was severely weakened and unable to withstand the rising power of Achaemenid Iran. In 539 Babylon fell to Cyrus the Great (550- 530) who, in addition to incorporating Babylon into the Iranian empire, released the Jews who had been held in captivity there. Iranian and Greek Intrusions Mesopotamia, for 2,000 years a stronghold of Semitic-speaking peoples, now fell to Indo-European rule that persisted for 1,176 years. With the exception that calendars were incised with the name of the Iranian king, few Babylonians were affected initially by the change from independent status to an Iranian colony. Sa- traps, representatives of the Iranian king, ruled in a fashion similar to that of Babylonian governors. The Babylonians, however, were quick to join in the general rebellion of Iranian colonies after the death of the Iranian monarch Cambyses in 522. According to 14 Babylon Wall Courtesy Iraqi Press Office, Washington, D.C. historian Georges Roux, the Babylonian rebels were men "in whose hearts the flame of freedom was still burning high." Darius (520-485) boasted that his general, Vindafarna, was able to cap- ture the rebels and impale the ringleaders. During Darius' long and ruthlessly efficient reign Babylon remained quiescent. In 482, however, the Babylonians made a last attempt to oust the Iranian rulers. The rebels were unsuccessful, and the repression that fol- lowed was great. In addition to the death by torture of those who had taken part in the uprising, Babylon itself was severely dam- aged. Most significant for the future of Iraq was the decline of critical services in the infrastructure. The nature of the land of Mesopo- tamia and of the Tigris River was such that only a strong central power could command and organize labor to ensure that dams and dikes were built and kept in repair, so that arable land neither flooded nor reverted to desert. The first Iranian kings to rule Iraq had conscientiously followed Mesopotamian practices in regard to the land, but between 485 B.C. and the conquest by Alexander the Great in 331 very little in Babylon was attended to. And in Assyria, for instance, only one city was intact; the rest had become villages or were in ruins. Trade was greatly reduced because the estab- lished trade route from Sardis to Susa did not go through Babylo- nia. Furthermore the Iranians, much closer to the Orient, were able to absorb trade from India and other eastern points. Babylo- nia and Assyria, together forming the ninth satrapy, became economically isolated and therefore poor. Their poverty was ex- 15 Iraq: A Country Study acerbated by the immense taxes levied on them. In addition to the extortionate demands of the local administrators, they owed to the Iranian crown 1,000 talents of silver a year and had the responsi- bility of feeding the Iranian court for four months every year. Under Iranian rule the already ethnically varied Mesopotamian population underwent increased change. In addition to the many ethnic groups that had filtered into Iraq voluntarily or by enslave- ment during its periods of self-rule, Iranians were now added to the population. Because of Darius' decree that Aramaic was the official language of the empire, Mesopotamian languages were used only by an ever-decreasing number of scholars and eventu- ally disappeared. When the Iranian forces stationed in Babylon surrendered to Alexander in 331, all of Babylonia hailed him as a liberator, par- tially because of the respect he displayed toward Babylonian tradi- tion, such as the worship of their chief god, Marduk. Alexander's grandiose schemes for Babylon included making it one of the two seats of his empire, rendering the Euphrates navigable to the Persian Gulf, and building a great port there. Alexander's plans for Babylon never came to fruition. On his return from his expedition to the Indus River he fell ill, most probably from malaria con- tracted in Babylon, and died there on June 13, 323, at the age of thirty-two. In the politically chaotic period after Alexander's death, his generals fought for and divided up his empire. Many of the battles between the Greek generals were fought on Babylo- nian soil, and there "was weeping and mourning in the land." In the latter half of the Greek period campaigns for Phoenician ports removed Babylonia from the sphere of action. The city of Babylon lost its preeminence as the center of the civilized world as political and economic activity shifted to the Mediterranean, where it was destined to remain for many centuries. Despite the fact that Alexander's major plans for Mesopotamia were unfulfilled and that his generals did little that was positive for Mesopotamia, the effects of the Greek occupation were note- worthy. Alexander and his successors built scores of cities in the Near East on the model of Greek city-states. One of the most important was Seleucia on the Tigris. The hellenization of the area included the introduction of Western deities, Western art forms, and Western thought. Business revived in Mesopotamia because one of the Greek trade routes ran through the new cities. Mesopo- tamia exported barley, wheat, dates, wool, and bitumen; the city of Seleucia itself exported spices, gold, precious stones, and ivory. Cultural interchange between Greek and Mesopotamian scholars was responsible for the saving of many Mesopotamian scientific, especially astronomical, texts. In 126 B.C. the Parthians, an intelligent and nomadic people who had migrated from the steppes of Turkestan to northeast Iran, finally captured the Tigris-Euphrates river valley. Having previously conquered Iran, the Parthians, or Arsacids as they came 16 Historical Setting to be known, were able to control all trade between the East and the Greco-Roman world. Usually they chose to retain existing social institutions and to live in preexistent cities. Mesopotamia was immeasurably enriched by this, the mildest of all foreign occu- pations of the region. The population of Mesopotamia was enor- mously enlarged chiefly by Arabs, Iranians, and Aramaens. With the exception of the Roman occupation under Trajan and Sep- timus Severus, the Arsacids ruled until a new force of native Iranian rulers, the Sassanians, conquered the region in A.D. 227. Little data are available on the Sassanian occupation, which persisted to 636. It is known that the north was devastated by battles fought between Romans and Sassanians. It appears that with few exceptions Mesopotamia was neglected. By the time the enfeebled Sassanian Empire fell before the most significant con- quest of all—that of Muslim Arab warriors—Mesopotamia was in ruins, and Sumero-Akkadian civilization was entirely extin- guished. The Sassanians had neglected the canals and irrigation ditches vital for agriculture and the continuation of water and therefore of livability to the cities. Without dikes the rivers flooded the land and made parts of it sterile. To quote Roux, "the ancient cities of Iraq were rapidly buried beneath the sand of the desert and the silt of the valley." Mesopotamian culture nevertheless passed on many traditions to the West, some of which were preserved via the conquests of Alexander. In addition to the basic principles of mathematics and astronomy, the coronation of kings and symbols such as the tree of life, the Maltese Cross, and the crescent are part of its legacy. The Arab Conquest and the Coming of Islam The power that toppled the Sassanians came from an unex- pected source as far as the Iranians were concerned. Arabs and Iranians were known to each other because of their mutual trad- ing activities and because for a brief period Yemen, in southern Arabia, was an Iranian satrapy. The Iranians also knew that Arabs, a tribally oriented people, had never been organized under the rule of a single power and were at a primitive level of military development. Events in Arabia changed rapidly and dramatically in the sixth century when a member of the Hashimite clan of the powerful Quraysh tribe of Mecca claimed prophethood and began gather- ing adherents for the monotheistic religion of Islam that had been revealed to him (see Religious Life, ch. 2). The conversion of Arabia proved to be the most difficult of the Islamic conquests because of the entrenched tribalism of the area. Within one year of the death of the Prophet Muhammad in A.D. 632, however, Arabia was secure enough for the Prophet's secular successor Abu Bakr, the first caliph, to begin the campaign against the Byzantine and Sassanian empires. Islamic forays into Iraq began during the reign of Abu Bakr 17 Iraq: A Country Study (632-634). In 634 an army of 18,000 Arab tribesmen, under the leadership of the brilliant general Khalid ibn al Walid (aptly nick- named "The Sword of Islam"), reached the perimeter of the Eu- phrates delta. Although the occupying Iranian force was vastly superior in techniques and numbers, its soldiers were militarily exhausted after their unremitting campaigns against the Byzan- tines. Sassanian troops fought ineffectually, lacking sufficient rein- forcement to do more. The first battle of the Arab campaign be- came known as the Battle of the Chains because Iranian soldiers were reputedly chained together so that they could not flee. Khalid offered the Iraqis an ultimatum: "Accept the faith and you are safe; otherwise pay tribute. If you refuse to do either, you have only yourself to blame. A people is already upon you, loving death as you love life." Most of the tribes of Iraq were Christian at the time of the Islamic conquest. They decided to pay the jizya, the tax required of non-Muslims living in Muslim-ruled areas, and were not further disturbed. In the meantime the Iranians under their hero Rustam rallied and attacked the Arabs at Hirah, west of the Euphrates, where they suffered a devastating defeat. The next year the Arabs defeated the Iranians at the battle of Boweib. Finally in May 636 at Al Qadisiyah, a village south of Baghdad on the Euphrates, Rustam was killed and the Iranians, who outnumbered the Arabs six to one, were decisively beaten. From Al Qadisiyah the Arabs pushed on to the Sassanian capitol at Ctesiphon (Madain). The fleeing Sassanians had no time to carry with them their fabulous imperial treasure, and it became the booty of the Arabs, whose histories are hyperbolic in description of it. The Islamic conquest was aided by the fact that both the Byzan- tine and Sassanian empires were culturally and socially bankrupt, and the native populations had little to lose by cooperating with the conquering power. Because Muslim warriors were at this time fighting a jihad (holy war)—as they perceived it—they were regu- lated by religious law that strictly prohibited rape and the killing of women, children, religious leaders, or anyone who had not actually engaged in warfare. Further the Muslim warriors had come to conquer and settle a land under Islamic law. It was not in their economic interest to destroy or pillage unnecessarily and indiscriminately. Umar (caliph from 634 to 644) ordered the founding of two garrisons (amsar) to protect this important territory: Kufah, named as the capital of Iraq, and Basra, which was also to be a port. Umar also organized the administration of the conquered Iranian lands. Acting on the advice of an Iranian, Umar continued the Sassanian office of the divan—an institution to control income and expenditure, one that would be used henceforth throughout the lands of the Islamic conquest. Dihqans, minor revenue collection officials under the Sassanians, retained their function of assessing and collecting taxes. Tax collectors in Iraq had never enjoyed 18 Hatra Courtesy Iraqi Press Office, Washington, DC 19 Iraq: A Country Study universal popularity, but the Arabs found them particularly noi- some, "by reason of their nationality, their office, and their over- efficiency. . . . 'remembering even the husks of the rice'." The Arabs adopted the Sassanian coinage system and thus, strangely enough, retained the iconography of a Zoroastrian fire altar with a priest on either side even when the coins were re- minted. Eventually the priests and fire altar became conventional- ized as three parallel lines. This kind of coin enjoyed popularity and was used in Islamic lands as distant as southern Spain. Arabic replaced Persian as the official language, which slowly filtered into common usage, and Iraqis intermarried with Arabs and converted to Islam. By 650 Muslims had reached the Amu Darya (Oxus) River and had conquered all the Sassanian domains, though some were more strongly held than others. Shortly after, Arab expansion and con- quest virtually ceased, and energy was directed to maintaining the status quo by those groups that held power and to political and religious rebellion by those outside the major power structure. The ideologies of the rebellions were usually couched in religious terms. Frequently the interpretation of a point of doctrine was sufficient to spark armed warfare. More often religion was the rationalization for dissatisfactions that might more adequately be described as nationalistic or cultural in nature. The Sunni-Shia Controversy The most critical problem that faced the young Islamic commu- nity revolved around the rightful successor to the office of caliph. A key figure was Ali ibn Abu Talib, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law by virtue of his marrying the prophet's only surviving issue, Fatima. Uthman, the third orthodox caliph, had encountered opposition during and after his election to the caliphate. Ali had been the other contender for the caliphate, but his pietism seemed certain to dislodge vested-interest groups that perceived the more con- servative Uthman as more likely to continue the policies of the previous caliph, Umar. Discontent increased, as did the formal opposition to Uthman led by Ali, whose opposition to Uthman was based on religious grounds. He claimed that innovations had been introduced that were not consonant with Quranic directives. For most of the other members of the opposition, economics was the key factor, but this too acquired religious overtones. As a result of the rapid military expansion of the Islamic move- ment financial troubles beset Uthman. Many beduin had offered themselves for military service in Iraq and Egypt. Their abstemi- ous and hard life contrasted with the leisured life of many in the Hejaz—in the western part of the Arabian Peninsula—who were enjoying the benefits of conquest. The volunteer soldiers ques- tioned the allocation of lands and distribution of revenues and pensions. In Ali they found a ready spokesman. 20 Historical Setting Groups of malcontents eventually left Iraq and Egypt to seek redress at Medina in the Hejaz. Reforms were promised to them, but on the return journey to their posts they intercepted a mes- sage to the governor of Egypt commanding that the rebels be punished. The rebels turned riotous and besieged Uthman in his home in Medina, eventually slaying him. Uthman's slayer was a Muslim and a son of the first caliph, Abu Bakr. The Muslim world was shaken. Ali had not taken part in the siege and was chosen caliph. Two opponents of Ali then enlisted Aisha, a widow of the Prophet Muhammad, and together they demanded lex talionis for Uthman's death, pointing the finger at Ali. The three went to Iraq to seek support for their cause. Ali's forces engaged theirs near Basra. Aisha's two companions were killed, and Ali was clearly victorious. Muawiyah, a kinsman of Uthman and the governor of Syria, then refused to recognize Ali and demanded the right to avenge his relative's death. Ali's forces met his at the Plain of Siffin near the largest bend of the Euphrates. This was perhaps the most important battle fought between Muslims. Muawiyah's forces, seeing that they were losing, proposed arbi- tration. Accordingly two arbitrators had to decide whether Uth- man's death had been deserved, which would give his slayer status as an executioner rather than as a murderer and would remove the claims of Uthman's relatives. Their decision was against Ali, who then protested that the verdict was not in accordance with sharia (Islamic law) and declared his intention of resuming the battle. Ali's decision came too late for the more extreme of his follow- ers. Citing the Quranic injunction to fight rebels until they obey, his followers insisted that Ali was morally wrong to submit to arbitration, which would be the judgment of men as opposed to the judgment of God that would have been revealed by the out- come of the battle. Those who felt this strongly withdrew. Known as Kharajites from the verb kharaja (to go out), they seceded, an action that had far-reaching political effects on the Islamic com- munity in the centuries ahead. Before resuming his dispute with Muawiyah, Ali appealed to the Kharajites; when the appeal failed, he massacred many of them. Most of Ali's forces deserted him, furious at his treatment of pious Muslims, and Ali was forced to return to Kufah—about 150 kilometers south of Baghdad—and await developments within the Islamic community. A number of leaders of the community met at Adruh in Jordan, and the same two arbitrators of Siffin worked on a solution to the succession problem. At last it was announced that neither Ali nor Muawiyah should be caliph, and Abd Allah, a son of Umar, was proposed. The meeting terminated in confusion, and no final deci- sion was reached. Both Ali and Muawiyah bided their time in their separate governorships: Muawiyah (who had been declared caliph by some of his supporters) in newly conquered Egypt and Ali in 21 Iraq: A Country Study Iraq. Muawiyah fomented discontent among those only partially committed to Ali. While praying in a mosque at Kufah, Ali was murdered by a Kharajite; Muawiyah induced Ali's eldest son, Hasan, to renounce his claim. Hasan died shortly thereafter, prob- ably of consumption, but the Shiites later claimed that he had been poisoned and dubbed him Lord of all Martyrs. Muawiyah was declared caliph by the majority of the Islamic community. He became the first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty; its capital was at Damascus. The importance of these events for the history of Islam cannot be overemphasized. They created the greatest of the Islamic schisms, between the party of Ali (the Shiat Ali, known in the West as Shiites or Shias) and the upholders of Muawiyah (the Ahl al Sunna, the Sunnis), who believe they are the followers of or- thodoxy. In most Muslim countries where both sects are present, the minority tends to suffer and seldom resigns itself to the ruling power since to do so would be a matter of religious disobedience. Iraq is the one constant exception to this rule. In the 1970s Shias continued to constitute a decided majority, but Iraq remained, as it always had, under the rule of a Sunni elite. Ali's unnatural death ensured the future of the Shiite movement and quickened its momentum. With the single exception of the Prophet Muhammad no man has had a greater impact on Islamic history. The Shiite declaration of faith is: "There is no God but God; Muhammad is his Prophet and Ali is the Saint of God." Yazid I, Muawiyah's son and successor in 680, was unable to contain the opposition that his strong father had vigorously quelled. Several groups rose against him, partly out of hatred at a strong govern- ment and partly because they thought a more rigorously theo- cratic government would satisfy their needs. Husayn, Ali's second son, refused to pay the commanded homage and fled to Mecca, where he was asked to lead the Shiites—mostly Iraqis—in a revolt against Yazid I. Ubayd Allah, governor of Kufah, discovered the plot and sent detachments to dissuade him. At Karbala in Iraq, Husayn's band of 200 men and women, unwilling to surrender, was finally cut down by perhaps 4,000 Umayyad troops. Yazid I received Husayn's head, and Husayn's death on the 10th of Muharram (October 10, 680) continues to be observed as a day of mourning for all Shiites. Ali's burial place at An Najaf, some 130 kilometers south of Baghdad, and Husayn's at Karbala, some eighty kilometers south- west of Baghdad, are holy places of pilgrimage for Shiites, many of whom feel that a pilgrimage to both sites is equal to a pilgrimage to Mecca (see Religious Life, ch. 2). During his caliphate Ali had made Kufah the capital of the empire. The transfer of power to Syria and its capital at Damascus aroused envy among the Iraqis because of the loss in prestige. The desire to regain preeminence prompted numerous rebellions in Iraq against Umayyad rule. Only men of unusual ability were sent 22 Historical Setting to be governors of Basra and Kufah. One of the most able was Ziyad ibn Abihi, who was initially governor of Basra and later also of Kufah. Ziyad divided the Kufans into four groups (not based on tribal affiliation) and appointed a leader for each one. He also dispatched 50,000 beduin to Khorasan (in northeast Iran), the easternmost province of the empire, which was under the jurisdic- tion of the cities of Basra and Kufah. The Iraqis once again became restive when rival claimants for the Umayyad caliphate waged civil war between 687 and 692. General al Hajjaj was sent to restore order in Iraq. Arriving in Kufah unexpectedly he mounted the pulpit of the mosque and delivered a short speech that has since become famous: "I see heads ripe for cutting. People of Iraq, I shall not let myself be crushed like a soft fig. . . . The Commander of the Faithful has drawn the arrows from his quiver and tested the wood, and has found that I am the hardest. . . . And so, by Allah, I will strip you as men strip the bark from the trees.... I will beat you as straying camels are beaten." He pacified Iraq and encouraged both agricul- ture and education. The Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258) Many of the unsuccessful insurrectionists of Iraq and Iran had fled to Khorasan in addition to the 50,000 beduin who had been sent there by Ziyad. There, at the city of Merv (present-day Mary in the Soviet Union), a faction that supported a descendant of the Prophet's uncle, Al Abbas, was able to organize the rebels under the battle cry, "The House of Hashim." Hashim, the Prophet Muhammad's grandfather, was an ancestor of both the Shia line and the Al Abbas line, and the Shiites therefore actively supported the group leader, Abu Muslim. In 747 Abu Muslim's army attacked the Umayyads and occupied Iraq. In 750 Abd al Abbas (not a Shiite) was established in Baghdad as the first caliph of the Abbasid dynasty. Supporters of the Abbasids called the line "the blessed dynasty" and presented themselves to the people as divine right rulers who were initiators of a new era of justice and prosperity. Their political policies were, however, remarkably similar to those of the Umayyads. During the reign of its first seven caliphs, Baghdad became the center of power where Arab and Iranian cultures mingled to pro- duce a blaze of philosophical, scientific, and literary glory. This era is remembered throughout the Arab world and by Iraqis in partic- ular as the pinnacle of the Islamic past (see fig. 3). This particular Iraqi memory is perceived by many scholars to have strongly influenced the Baath Party's articulation of the necessity and desirability of Arab unity under, of course, the aegis of Baghdad once again (see The Baath Party, ch. 4). It was the second Abbasid caliph, Mansur (754-775), who de- signed and ordered constructed the famous round city of Bagh- dad. Within fifty years the population outgrew the city walls as 23 Iraq: A Country Study to in a an to 35 >■* -* i- o >< * 55 •* B ^ "S> ^J -* C> 5 K >—T .■" q X uL ^ a «? 0 i « li **■* £ a c o ti >5 e 1 c r: fc o 7«* ■n P. id M BD 03 %•> 91 c o 3 3 O .&3 «5 24 Historical Setting people thronged to the capital to become part of the Abbasid's enormous bureaucracy or to engage in trade. Baghdad became a vast emporium of trade linking Asia and the Mediterranean. By the reign of Mansur's grandson, Harun al Rashid (786-806), Bagh- dad was second in size only to Constantinople. Baghdad was able to feed its enormous population as well as to export large quanti- ties of grain because the political administration realized the im- portance of controlling the flows of the Tigris and Euphrates. In addition to reconstructing canals, dikes, and reservoirs, the Abba- sids drained the swamps around Baghdad making the city malaria free. Harun al Rashid, the caliph of the Arabian Nights, actively supported intellectual pursuits, but the great flowering of Arabic culture that is credited to the Abbasids reached its apogee during the reign of his son, Mamun. Harun al Rashid initiated relation- ships with those outside of the Muslim world and is known to have sent Charlemagne, his contemporary in Europe, the gift of a baby elephant. After the death of Harun al Rashid quarreling between his sons, Amin and Mamun, over the succession to the caliphate soon erupted into civil war. Amin was backed by the Iraqis, while Mamun had the support of the Iranians. Mamun (813-833) also had the support of the garrison at Khorasan and thus was able to take Baghdad in 813. Although Sunni Muslims, the Abbasids had hoped that by astute and stern rule they would be able to contain Shia resentment at yet another dynasty of Sunni rule. The Irani- ans, many of whom were Shia, had hoped that Mamun would make his capital in their own country, possibly at Merv. Mamun eventually realized that the Iraqi Shiites would never counte- nance the loss of prestige and economic power if they no longer had capital status and so resettled in Baghdad. Disappointed, the Iranians began to break away from Abbasid control. A series of local dynasties appeared: the Tahirids in 820, the Saffirids in 867, and the Saminids in 892. The process repeated itself in the West: Spain broke away in 756, Morocco in 788, Tu- nisia in 800, and Egypt in 868. In Iraq there was trouble in the south. In 869 Ali ibn Muhammad (Ali the Abominable) founded a state of black slaves known as Zanj. The former slaves brought a large part of southern Iraq and southwestern Iran under their control and in the process enslaved many of their former masters. The Zanj Rebellion, as it came to be known, was finally put down in 883 but not before it had caused great suffering. The decay of Abbasid power was prompted by the Sunni-Shia split that had weakened the effectiveness of Islam as a single unify- ing force and as a sanction for a single political authority. Although the intermingling of various linguistic and cultural groups con- tributed greatly to the enrichment of Islamic civilization, it was also a source of great tension. In addition to the cleavage between Arabs and Iranians and 25 Historical Setting other eminent scholars were brought to the Seljuk capital at Bagh- dad and were encouraged and supported in their work. After the death of Malek Shah in 1092, Seljuk power disinte- grated as petty dynasties appeared throughout Iraq and Iran, and rival claimants to Seljuk rule dispatched each other. Between 1118 and 1194 nine Seljuk sultans ruled Baghdad; only one died a natu- ral death. The atabegs (see Glossary) who initially had been major- domos for the Seljuks began to assert themselves, and several founded local dynasties. At Mosul an atabeg originated the Zangid dynasty, which was instrumental in encouraging Muslims to op- pose the invasions of the Christian Crusaders. Tughril (1177-94), the last Seljuk sultan of Iraq, was defeated and killed by the leader of a Turkish dynasty, the Khwarizm shahs, who lived south of the Aral Sea. Before his successor could establish Khwarizm rule in Iraq, Baghdad was overrun by the Mongol horde. The Mongol Invasions A powerful leader, Temujin, had brought together a majority of the Mongol tribes and lead them on a devastating sweep through China. About this time he changed his name to Genghis (Chinghiz) Khan (world conqueror). In 1219 he turned his 700,000 forces west and quickly devastated Bokhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Merv (all in present-day Soviet Union), and Nishapur (present-day Ney- shabur, Iran), where he slaughtered every living thing. Before his death in 1227 he had reached western Azarbaijan in Iran pillaging and burning cities along the way. After Genghis' death the area enjoyed a brief respite that ended with the arrival of Hulagu Khan (1217-65), Genghis' grandson. In 1258 he seized Baghdad and killed the last Abbasid caliph. While in Baghdad Hulagu made a pyramid of the skulls of Baghdad's scholars, religious leaders, and poets and deliberately destroyed what remained of Iraq's canal headworks. The material and artis- tic production of centuries was swept away (see Population, ch. 2). Iraq became a neglected frontier province ruled from the Mongol capital of Tabriz in Iran. After the death in 1335 of the last great Mongol khan, Abu Said, also known as Bahadur the Brave, who had mounted the throne at the age of twelve, a period of political confusion ensued in Iraq until a local petty dynasty, the Jalayirids, seized power and ruled until the beginning of the fifteenth century. Jalayirid rule was abruptly checked by the rising power of a Mongol, Timur Lang (Tamerlane), who had been atabeg of the reigning prince of Sa- markand. In 1401 he sacked Baghdad and massacred many of its inhabitants. Tamerlane killed thousands of Iraqis and devastated hundreds of towns. Like Hulagu, Tamerlane had a penchant for building pyramids of skulls. Despite a showy display of Sunni piety, Tamerlane's rule virtually extinguished Islamic scholarship and Islamic arts in all areas with the exception of his capital, Samarkand. 27 Iraq: A Country Study In Iraq political chaos, severe economic depression, and social disintegration followed in the wake of the Mongol invasion. Bagh- dad, so long a center of trade, rapidly lost its commercial impor- tance. A major preoccupation of the governmental authorities had been to keep the peace in order to maintain agricultural produc- tion essential to the whole economy of Iraq. As central controls weakened, nomadic tribes encroached on settled areas. This con- flict between nomadic and settled tribes, which has been a leit- motif of Middle Eastern history, intensified after the death of Tamerlane in 1405. The rising power of the new native Safavid dynasty (1502-1794) in Iran was able to capitalize on conditions in Iraq. Its founder Ismail Shah (1502-24) conquered Iraq in 1509. The Safavids were the first to declare Shiite Islam the religion of Iran. The Sunni Ottoman Turks who ruled from Istanbul were concerned that Shiism would spread to Anatolia (Asia Minor), via Iraq, thus posing a threat to Ottoman control. Sultan Selim the Grim attacked Is- mail's forces in 1514. Selim was the first in a line of many Ottoman sultans to engage the Safavids in a series of protracted wars that lasted until 1639. By 1535, however, Baghdad had been con- quered by the sultan Suleyman the Magnificent. Iraq would re- main under Sunni Ottoman control until 1916 with only a brief interlude of Safavid rule from 1623 to 1638. The political and religious hub of the Islamic world was thus shifted for the first time out of the Islamic heartlands to the Sublime Porte (see Glossary) in Istanbul (see fig. 4). The Ottoman Period: 1534-1918 During the four centuries of Ottoman occupation Iraq was di- vided into. three and sometimes four vilayets, or provinjcesJIhe- three vilayets of greatest importance were Baghdadj-Mnsulj a"d- Basra. Governors, called pashas, administered each vilayet, and were directly answerable to the Sublime Porte. However, during the first period of Ottoman rule, from 1534 to 1621, their control of Iraq was tenuous. There were large areas where the Ottomans had not penetrated, and in those regions where Ottoman repre- sentatives did rule, they did so capriciously with little direction from Istanbul. In 1623 the Safavid ruler Shah Abbas (1587-1629) seized Bagh- dad, and the Safavids held Iraq until 1638. During this period of Iranian rule the Sunni population was decimated by torture, mur- der, and enslavement. As Joseph Malone writes, "The new Persian regime put heavy demands on its chroniclers in terms adequate to describe either the hatred which inspired it or the barbarity which the hatred produced." In addition to the Iranian desire to control the Shiite holy places in Iraq, Baghdad had become for the Iranians the symbol of em- pire. Whoever could hold Baghdad was a force to be reckoned with. The Ottomans wanted Iraq as a Sunni-controlled buffer state 28 a. 3 95 Source: Based on information from Roderic H. Davison, Turkey, Englewood Cliff's, 1968, p. 51; and Philip K. Near East in History, New York, 1961, p. 334. Figure 4. The Ottoman Empire in the Mid-Seventeenth Century Hitri, The to Iraq: A Country Study ,.■■• bgtweeu AnatQliaAnd Iran and were aware of the symbolic value of the old Abbasid capital. In 1638 the dynamic Ottoman sultan Murad IV executed a series of brilliant military maneuvers against the Safavids in Iraq. Murad's seizure of Baghdad was accomplished only with much bloodshed, the Iraqi Arabs and Kurds being the chief sufferers. Once regained Iraq was difficult and costly for the Ottomans to hold. The nomadic population swelled because of migrations of beduin from Najd in the Arabian Peninsula, and it became impos- sible to curb beduin raids on settled areas. The constant and divi- sive factor of religious politics complicated the process of rule. Northern Iraqis, including the Kurds, were Sunni; Baghdad was evenly divided between Sunni and Shia; and the south, home of perennially rebellious chiefs, was Shia. In the late seventeenth century the rise of the Kurdish Baban dynasty, which organized Kurdish resistance, made it impossible for the Ottomans to main- tain even nominal suzerainty over Iraqi Kurdistan (land of the Kurds). Between 1625 and 1668 and from 1694 to 1701 the marsh- lands, home of the Madan or Marsh Arabs, and Basra were exclu- sively in the hands of local shaykhs who ignored the Ottoman governor of Baghdad (see Major Geographical Features, ch. 2). When Hasan Pasha was made governor of Baghdad in 1704, he instituted a unique system whereby the pashalik passed to his son, then to the husbands of his granddaughters, and finally to Mamluk governors who had been raised in the households of the pashas. Thus between 1704 and 1831 the appointment of the governor of Baghdad was purely a local concern. The Georgian Mamluk rulers of this period, known as the slave- pashas, were a great improvement over Ottoman administrators. Ottoman rule has been described by Stephen Longrigg and Frank Stoakes as "corrupt, maladroit, and rapacious, high office normally for sale, self-enrichment the prevailing motive." Daoud Pasha (1817-31), the last of Baghdad's Mamluk rulers^ surrendered toTme Ottoman's representative only when plagues- flood, and famine had brought Baghdad to its knees. Although both Basra and Baghdad were ruled by Georgian Mamluks, Mosul was ruled by an eminent local family, the Jalilis. "Each province had a unique set of problems. In Mosul rule was difficult because of the Yazidis (see Glossary) who even at that time had a reputation for ferocity; the Kurds who lived in the foothills; and the locusts and famines, which were an integral part of the Iraqi experience in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth cen- turies. In addition to Sunni Muslim Arabs and Sunni Kurds, large numbers of Christians, the majority of whom were Nestorian, lived in the north around Mosul. Many were merchants, but a considerable number were village cultivators. Baghdad's difficulties came chiefly from marauding tribesmen, both Sunni and Shia, who steadfastly refused to recognize any authority but their own. In this period the power of the great tribal 30 Historical Setting confederations—the Anaiza, Shammar, Dhafir, Muntafiq, Chaab, Bani Lam, and Zubaid—was consolidated since there was no effec- tive central authority to check their growth. Baghdad also had to grapple with sporadic attacks from Sunni Wahhabi (see Glossary) warriors from Najd who in 1802 attacked and virtually destroyed the Shia shrine of Husayn at Karbala. Basra^sfortunes were dependent on those of thp F.nrppeans who usecTthe. jrity_as__a cgnmaercial-entrepot^The-Portuguesepthe .Dutch, and the British had aJLeslahliahad agencies there, and the business of the city attracted many foreigners, particularly Indians and Iranians. Basra also had large communities of Jews and of Armenian Christians. The slave, coffee, and silk trades kept every- ^one in business. However, periodic famine, pestilence, and foreign invasion limited the city's growth. Two new sultansin Tstanhul,.Selim III (1789-i807).and Mahmud 1111180^39), initiated a series of adrninistrative and military.re-- ^fjoxms that strengthened the Ottoman position. Mahmud was suffi- ciently organized in 1831 to send Ali Ridha Pasha to retake the three provinces of Iraq from its local rulers. True reform that could be felt in Iraqi vilayets was the work of Midhat Pasha (1869J- 72). Within three years Midhat began a newspaper, a hospital, Schools, and munitions factories. He instituted conscription for the army and established city councils and a postal service. A major effort was made to settle tribesmen. After his death reforms con- tinued to be enacted but more slowly. Much of the impetus for reform came from the example of the Europeans and from the desire of the Ottomans to appear modern in European eyes. The British had had a consulate at Baghdad since 1802 and the French shortly after, and European interest in modernizing Iraq to accommodate and facilitate their commercial interests coincided with Ottoman reforms. Steamboats appeared on the rivers in 1836, and the telegraph was introduced in 1861. Externally the decline of Ottoman rule after the eighteenth century coincided with the rise of European seapower and the worldwide competition among European powers for commercial benefits and for spheres of influence. The impact of this rivalry was not fully felt in Iraq, however, until after 1899 when Germany obtained from the Ottomans a concession to build a railroad from Konya in southwest Turkey to Baghdad; in 1902 Germany re- ieivedL the additional right to build a line from Baghdad to Basra. JThe British feared that this scheme of the rising and politically hostile German power would interfere with their vital lines of communication to India via Iran and Afghanistan, menacing Brit- ish oil interests in Iran and perhaps even India itsel£_And although Russia was at odds with Britain because of mutually conflicting interests in Iran, Russia became willing to compromise with Brit- ain because of the greater fear of Germany. Russia's major desire was for warm-water ports, but it also wished to consolidate its strategic position wherever possible in view of the humiliating 31 Iraq: A Country Study defeat sustained in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Accord- mgly^a^cornpromise settlement known as the~T5gIq^Russian_ Aj*ree"ment of 1907 was signed^.which was^cfifected in part against, .Germany. Part of the pact included~lhe division of Iran_jnta spheres of influence. jOEerfne 1907 entente the Germans and the British became the pfirhary^contendefsTbT Influence!!! Iraq.Bec-ause Cfstf ong British ^Ejections, for example, German plans to make Kuwait the ter^l" minus of the Berlin-Baghdad-Basra railroad were abandoned, in. June 19r4^_On^ another occasionJthe British combined with the ruler of Kuwait, Abd al Aziz—the powerfursKavkrrbFtrie~SautL. -clan in Arabia—and a semi-independent local Iraqi ruling grnnp to^>revenTaTeassertion of the pro-German Ottoman powerin-the loweTTJelta area around Basra^. -Encouraged by the Young Turks Revolution of 1908, nationaJists- iriTraq stepped up theirpoIificaT activity. Iraqi nationalists metin _ Cairo with_, the QttomaiTT/eceritralization JParty, which„was_ founded in 1912, and many Iraqis joined the Young Arab Society^ which moved to Beirut in 1913. Because of its greater exposure-to- Westerners who encouraged the nationalists, Basra became the center from which Iraqi nationalists began to demand a measure- of autonomy. Tp 19] 1 SayiH Talih al Nagjb, an important landlord from Basra, founded Jimyat al Basra al Islahiya (The Reformist. League of._ Basra),lvhich produced a newspaper, Al Dustur. Under the guise of a literary club, Al Nadi al Adabi (The Literary Club^was formed at UaghdadT Tts newspaper Al Nahda discussed jsjues,i:eIafingf|Q Arab" nationalism^ In Istanbul Iraqi students began secret societies. Two oTtKe most important were Al Alam al Akhdar (Tbie Green ■Banner) and Al Yadd al Sawda (The Black Hand). The Black Hand was avowedly a terrorist organization that planned to assassinate any Arab leaders who appeared opposed to Arab independence. A- compromise organization, Al Ahd (The Covenant}i.was founded nrt9±3i3yAtt al Misririts platform was internal autonomy within an -Ottoman federation. World War land the British Mandate Iraqi nationalism was alive by 1914 but hardly articulate. Edu- cated upper- and middle-class Arabs in many parts of the Middle East and particularly in the Levant (see Glossary) had become politically conscious to the extent that they were beginning to question the overlordship of the Ottomans, but there was not yet any organization or program. The outbreak of war between the Ottoman Empire, the "sick man of Europe," and Britain and its allies checked Iraqi nationalism for a time. The Iraqis were for the most part passive observers of the war fought on their land for their land. Britain was especially concerned to protect British oil production in southern Iran, which dated only from 1912. From India the British sent a force that landed in the Shaat al Arab and 32 Historical Setting quickly and bloodlessly occupied Basra. By the summer of 1915 British forces were well established at towns in the south. Embold- ened, the British under General Charles Townshend attempted to take Baghdad in the autumn. The unsuccessful effort brought re- taliation from the Turks who besieged the British garrison at Al Kut for 140 days. In April 1916 the garrison was forced to surren- der unconditionally. The British quickly regrouped their forces, which they renamed the Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force. Ports, bases, roads, rail- roads, and communications were secured, and General Stanley Maude began a forward movement in December 1916. Baghdad was netted in March 1917, and the next spring the British began to take the north. Mosul was occupied in October, and before the end of 1918 the British held the whole of Iraq. On capturing Baghdad, Maude proclaimed that Britain in- tended to return to Iraq some control of its own affairs, stressing that this step would pave the way for ending the subjection to alien rule that" the Iraqis had experienced since the latter days of the Abbasid caliphate. The proclamation was in accordance with the encouragement the British had given to Arab nationalists, such as Jafar al Askari, his brother Nuri as Said, and Jamil al Midfai, who sought emancipation from Ottoman rule. The nationalists had supported the Allied powers in expectation of the defeat of the Ottomans and the freedom many nationalists assumed would come with an Allied victory. During the war the course of events in Iraq was greatly in- fluenced by the Hashimite family of Husayn ibn AH, sharif of Mecca, who claimed descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad. Aspiring to become king of an independent Arab kingdom, Husayn had broken with the Ottomans, to whom he had been vassal, and thrown in his lot with the British. The British, anxious for his support, gave Husayn reason to believe that he would have their endorsement at the cessation of hostilities. Ac- cordingly in June 1916 Husayn and his sons led the revolt of the Arabs, marching northward in conjunction with the British into Transjordan, Palestine, and Syria. Anticipating the fulfillment of Allied pledges, Husayn's son, Prince Faisal, then head of a new Arab regime set up in Damascus with British support and later destined to become modern Iraq's first king, arrived in Paris in 1919 as chief spokesman of the Arab cause. Much to his disappointment Faisal found that the Allied powers were less than enthusiastic about Arab independence and were contemplating the notion of a mandate as a compromise for former Ottoman territories. At the Paris Peace Conference Iraq was disposed of under Arti- cle 22 of the League of Nations Covenant and formally made a Class A Mandate entrusted to Britain. This award was completed on April 25, 1920, at the San Remo Conference in Italy. Palestine was also placed under British Mandate and Syria under French 33 Iraq: A Country Study Mandate. Faisal, who had been proclaimed king of Syria by a Syrian national congress in Damascus in March 1920, was ejected by the French in July of the same year. The civil government of postwar Iraq was originally headed by Chief Political Officer Sir Percy Cox and his deputy, Colonel Ar- nold Talbot Wilson. To them came the task of dealing with Iraq's age-old problems, compounded by some new ones. The British were confronted with demands from villagers that the tribes be restrained and demands from tribes that their titles to tribal ter- ritories be confirmed and the amount of land held be extended. Merchants demanded more effective legal procedures, courts, and laws to protect their activities and interests. Municipal authorities appealed for defined powers and grants-in-aid in addition to the establishment of public welfare and educational facilities. Land- lords pressed for grants of land, for the building of canals and roads, and for the provision of tested seeds and livestock. The holy cities of An Najaf and Karbala in the Middle Euphrates and their satellite tribes were in a state of near anarchy, which was not eased by British reprisals after the murder of a British officer in An Najaf. The Anaiza, Shammar, and Jubur tribes of the western desert were beset by violent infighting. British administration had yet to be established in the mountains of Kurdistan. And from the Hakkari Mountains beyond Iraq's northern frontier and from the plains of Urmiya in Iran, thousands of Assyrians—Nestorian Chris- tians—began to pour into Iraqi territory seeking refuge from Turkish savagery. More striking than all other problems was the growing anger of the nationalists who felt betrayed at being accorded Mandate sta- tus, which they viewed as a flimsy disguise for colonialism. The experienced Cox had been compelled to delegate governance of the country to Wilson, who governed Iraq with the paternalism that typified British rule in India. The young Wilson, impatient to establish an efficient administration, used experienced Indians to the exclusion of Iraqis for subordinate positions within the ad- ministration, which added humiliation to Iraqi discontent. Three important anticolonial secret societies had been formed in Iraq during 1918 and 1919. At An Najaf, Jimyat al Nahda al Islamiya (The League of the Islamic Awakening) was organized; it had numerous and varied members including ulama (religious leaders), journalists, landlords, and tribal leaders. It was the Jimyat that assassinated a British officer in the hope that the killing would act as a catalyst for a general rebellion at Iraq's other holy city, Karbala. Al Jimya al Wataniya al Islamiya (The Muslim National League) was formed with the object of organizing and mobilizing the popula- tion for major resistance. In February 1919 in Baghdad, Haras al Istiqlal (The Guardians of Independence) was formed, which represented a coalition of Shiite merchants, Sunni teachers and civil servants, Sunni and Shia ulama, and Iraqi officers. The Istiqlal had member groups in Karbala, An Najaf, Al Kut, and Al Hillah. 34 Historical Setting There had been local outbreaks against British rule even before the news reached Iraq that the country had been given only the status of a Mandate. The death of an important Shiite mujtahid (religious scholar) in early May 1920 provided an opportunity for Sunni and Shia ulama to put aside their differences as the memo- rial services metamorphosed into political rallies. Ramadan, the Islamic month of fasting, fell later in the month of May and once again, through the medium of nationalistic poetry and oratory, the people were exhorted to throw off the bonds of imperialism. Vio- lent demonstrations and strikes followed the British arrest of sev- eral leaders. When the news of the Mandate reached Iraq late in May, a group of Iraqi delegates met with Wilson and demanded indepen- dence. They were dismissed by Wilson as a "handful of ungrateful politicians." Political activity was stepped up and the grand mujta- hid of Karbala, Imam Shirazi, and his son, Mirza Muhammad Riza, began to organize the effort in earnest. Arab flags were made and distributed, and pamphlets were handed out urging the tribes to prepare for revolt. Riza acted as liaison between insurgents in An Najaf, Karbala, and the tribal confederations. Shirazi then issued afatwa (religious ruling), pointing out that it is against Islamic law for Muslims to countenance being ruled by non-Muslims, and called for a jihad against the British. The British became engaged on several fronts simultaneously. By July 1920 Mosul was in rebellion against British rule, and the insurrection moved south down the Euphrates River valley. The southern tribes who cherished their long-held political autonomy needed little inducement to join in the fray. They did not cooper- ate in an organized effort against the British, however, which limited the effect of the revolt. For three months the country was in a state of anarchy; order was restored only with great difficulty and the assistance of Royal Air Force bombers. British forces were obliged to send for reinforcements from India and Iran. The Iraqis with pride called this episode Al-Thawra al Iraqqia al Kubra, the Great Iraqi Revolution. There were many important local shaykhs and urban notables who remained aloof from the insurrection, as did the Iraqi police and security forces. Nevertheless the revolt gave dramatic evidence of Iraqi dissatisfaction with British rule and marked the debut of Iraqi nationalism. The British people, citing the cost to Britain in both lives and money, demanded the reduction of commitments in Iraq. In re- sponse to that demand the military regime was replaced by a provisional Arab government assisted by British advisers and an- swerable to the supreme authority of the high commissioner for Iraq, Cox. The new administration served as a channel of commu- nication between the British and the restive population and gave an opportunity for Iraqi leaders to come forward to prepare the way for eventual self-government. 35 Iraq: A Country Study The provisional government was relatively successful, partially because of the large number of trained Iraqi administrators who returned home when the French ejected Faisal from Syria. Like all earlier Iraqi governments, it was not representative, composed as it was chiefly of Sunni Arabs. Most important among the per- sonalities to emerge were Naqib, Askari, and Nuri. In the autumn of 1921 such notables as Winston Churchill, Ger- trude Bell (a British official in the region during and after World War I), T.E. Lawrence, and H. St. John Philby as well as Cox and Wilson began to plan Iraq's future. A monarchy was decided on as the only possible government for Iraq, and Faisal was chosen to be the first monarch. A plebiscite of one question was carefully arranged, which had a return of 96 percent in favor of Faisal. Because Faisal traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad and because his ancestors had held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the tenth century, he was endowed with traditional Arab standards of political legiti- macy that he could invoke to install himself as Iraq's first modern monarch. Faisal's leadership qualities, in addition to his achieve- ments as a leader in the Arab emancipation movement, earned him the support of most levels of Iraqi society. Nationalists, includ- ing former Iraqi officers in the Ottoman army who had given weight to the 1916 revolt against the Turks, felt that with Faisal they had the best chance to build a national government. His candidacy, however, was not sponsored from within Iraq but rather sponsored by the British to repay Hashimite assistance in World War I. The British also knew that Faisal would cooperate with them. The endorsement of a plebiscite was insurance that Faisal would not be seen as merely a British puppet. There was no way, however, that the plebiscite could have failed to return Faisal. The plebiscite has been described as "politics running on wheels greased with extremely well-melted grease." Faisal's cere- monial accession took place on August 23, 1921. Faisal and a few Iraqi politicians, chief of whom was Faisal's close friend, Nuri, began to rule with the new, more subtle assist- ance of British advisers. The British ground troops were pulled out of Iraq and replaced by the Royal Air Force stationed to the west of Baghdad. A preliminary constitution was drafted, government offices were organized, and the country was divided into fourteen liwas (provinces or governorates) each administered by a gover- nor. Security was improved, and modest improvements were made in education, which included the publication of history books that made no reference to the Iraqi rebellion of 1920. As Amal Vinogradov writes, "modern Iraq began in 1921 but neither the British nor their proteges felt safe or at ease." In a letter to her father shortly after the accession of Faisal, Bell, who played a key role during World War I and the Mandate period, wrote, "You may rely on one thing—I'll never engage in creating a king again; it is too great a strain. Sir Percy and I, as we drove home, felt we 36 Historical Setting had jumped another hedge, but we agreed that we were in a very stiff country." The British decided that a treaty was in order and began prepar- ing the field. Nationalists continued to be adamant that the British presence in Iraq should be limited. The mujtahids of An Najaf and Karbala added Shiite theocratic sentiment to the demands of urban Sunnis that Faisal not compromise Iraq by promising a twenty-year commitment to a foreign power. Faisal chose a mod- erate approach in dealing with the British to avoid a repetition of his experience in Syria, but he was disappointed by the contents of the treaty and complained, "This is not the kind of treaty which Mr. Churchill promised me in London." Nevertheless the Anglo- Iraqi Treaty of October 10, 1922, embodied the provisions of the Mandate, albeit softened by giving Iraq limited control in the spheres of both foreign and domestic affairs. After the treaty was signed Iraq readied itself for the country- wide elections that had been provided for by publishing the Elec- toral Law in May 1922. There were important changes in the government at this time. Cox resigned his position as high commis- sioner to Sir Henry Dobbs, and Iraq's aging Prime Minister, Abd al Rahman al Gailani, stepped down and was replaced by Abd al Muhsin al Saadun. In April 1923 Abd al Muhsin signed a protocol that shortened the treaty period to four years. As a result of the elections Abd al Muhsin was replaced by Askari, a veteran of the Arab rebellion and an early supporter of Faisal. The elected constitutional assembly met for the first time in March 1924 and formally ratified the treaty despite strong (and sometimes physical) opposition on the part of many in the assem- bly. The assembly also accepted the Organic Law that declared Iraq to be a sovereign state with a representative system of gov- ernment and a hereditary constitutional monarchy (see Constitu- tional Development, this ch.). Yasin al Hashimi, a former Turkish corps commander, then replaced Askari as premier. In 1925 the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs was founded, and consuls to Iraq were appointed from many nations, some of which recognized Iraq because of pressure from Britain. The British connection was also extremely helpful, if not indispensable, in the matter of the Mosul vilayet to which Turkey put forth claims in 1923 at the first Lausanne Conference. Britain, representing Iraq, opposed Turkey's claim, and the matter was referred to the League of Nations. The situation was complicated by the fact that the Mosul vilayet contained many Kurds who had staunchly re- sisted the rule of both Turkey and Iraq. The Turks had contributed to keeping the area around Mosul in a state of anarchy from 1921 to 1924; this was only ended in early 1925 by the eviction from the area of the most troublesome individuals. The League of Nations decided in favor of Iraq but suggested that the four years of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty be extended to twenty-five as a protection for the Kurdish minority who intensely 37 Iraq: A Country Study distrusted the Iraqi government. The Iraqis were also to give due regard to Kurdish sensibilities in matters of culture and language. Although reluctant to do so, the assembly ratified the treaty in January 1926. Turkey was eventually reconciled to the loss by being promised one-tenth of any oil revenues that might accrue in the area, and a tripartite Anglo-Turco-Iraqi treaty was signed in July 1926. This settlement was to have important repercussions, both positive and negative, for the future of Iraq. Vast oil revenues would accrue from the Mosul liwa; but the inclusion of a large number of Kurds in Iraqi territory added the problems of dealing with yet another minority, and this one was well armed, continu- ally restless, and had a long tradition of hating Arabs. The collaborative efforts of British officers and Iraqi bureaucrats and politicians produced an Iraq in the 1920s that had an active, albeit immature, political life. During this period the power of the mujtahids waned, and because Shia mujtahids had usually repre- sented their coreligionists' interests, it meant that the urban Shiites in particular were less represented than before. Shiites did enter the cabinet, however. The most noteworthy during the 1920s were Abd al Husayn al Chalabi, Muhammad al Sadr, Muhammad Ridha al Shabibi, and Salih Jabr. Sunnis, accustomed to a monopoly of power in Iraq, resented the desire for greater representation by the Shias. Most of these Sunnis were connected to one of the plethora of "parties" that appeared in the 1920s: the "Nationalist," the "People's," the "Free," the "Awakening," the "Popular," and the "National Inde- pendence." These parties had little in the way of a platform exclu- sive of the general desire for independence from the British. Rather the parties were merely vehicles for the advancement of a few personalities. To belong to a party meant that one supported the founder of it in elections. Nevertheless many Iraqis were ac- tive in the political life of the country. Minorities, although hardly having proportionate representation, did make their appearance in the cabinet. There were several Christian ministers, and the first minister of finance, Sasun Haskail, was a Jew. In December 1927 a treaty more favorable to the Iraqis was presented to them but remained unratified because of the desire by nationalists for an unconditional promise of independence. This was made by the new high commissioner Sir Gilbert Clayton in 1929. The confusion occasioned by the sudden death of Clayton and the suicide of Abd al Muhsin delayed the writing of a new treaty. A new treaty eventually was signed on June 30, 1930, by the new prime minister, Nuri. The treaty supported uncondition- ally the admission of Iraq into the League of Nations and opened negotiations with the Iraqi government toward a treaty of alliance defining future relations between the two countries. This move was precipitated by the Labour Party coming to power in London. This change of regime was paralleled by the emergence of a lib- eral nationalist government in Baghdad under Nuri, who British 38 Historical Setting authorities believed was capable of leading the country to self- rule. A new pact called the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty was signed in June 1930, which provided for the establishment of a "close alliance" and for "full and frank consultations between them in all matters of foreign policy" and mutual assistance in case of war. Iraq granted the British the use of air bases near Basra and at Al Hab- baniyah and the right to move troops across the country. The treaty, of twenty-five years' duration, was to come into force on Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. Although the nationalists in Iraq took a different view, the Brit- ish military occupation of Iraq from 1915 to 1920 and the British Mandate from 1920 to 1932 had a beneficial effect on many of the institutions of the young country. In addition to the retention of Mosul Province, the stabilization of Iraq's frontiers, and the estab- lishment of the monarchy, the British assisted in drawing up the constitution, the design of the elected assembly, and the organiza- tion of the least corrupt governmental bureaucracy ever to appear in Iraq. Law courts with revised legal codes were installed throughout the country, a modern police force was begun, and a modern, if small, Iraqi army was established. A new currency was introduced, the Turkish land revenue system was amended, and an income tax was established. Trade and young industries re- ceived government support, and agricultural improvements, in- cluding the erection of controlled-flow irrigation works, substan- tially increased output. Among the most important of the developments during the Mandate period was the oil concession covering northern and central Iraq that the Iraqi government contracted to the Turkish Petroleum Company in 1925. By 1927 the company had located large reserves in an area near Kirkuk. A pipeline from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean was begun with terminals at Haifa in Palestine and Tripoli in Lebanon. In 1923 the Anglo-Persian Oil Company discovered smaller amounts of oil at Naft Khaneh, about 120 kilo- meters northeast of Baghdad, and this was also under exploitation by the end of the Mandate. The discovery and exploitation of this immense natural asset was the single most important develop- ment on which the future of Iraq would depend. Communications within Iraq were vastly improved. The Basra- Baghdad-Kirkuk and the Baghdad-Sharqat railroad lines were re- paired and extended. A highway was laid linking Baghdad with Beirut and Damascus. Some river bridges were built and others planned. Iraq joined the Universal Postal Union in 1929 and ex- panded its internal and external telegraph system. An airport was built at Baghdad and landing strips at Basra and Ar Rutbah in the far west near the borders with Syria and Transjordan. The port of Basra, which the British army created during the war, was main- tained; dredging was done at the Al Faw bar, which for the first time enabled deep-draught vessels to use this port. 39 Iraq: A Country Study The few social services that existed before the Mandate were almost the exclusive preserve of Islamic philanthropic institutions. During the Mandate modest educational advances were made; elementary, secondary, and technical schools were established, as were a handful of colleges for law, medicine, theology, and engi- neering. Hospitals or clinics were established in all towns of any size, and programs to combat epidemic diseases were begun. Nei- ther the educational nor health care systems, minimal as they were, answered the needs of Iraq's citizens, but they were a begin- ning on which the independent state of Iraq could build. Iraq as an Independent Monarchy: 1932-58 On October 13, 1932, Iraq became a sovereign, independent state and was admitted to the League of Nations. None of the problems inherent in a state that is a mosaic society composed of many minorities had been solved by the date of Iraq's indepen- dence. Attempting to mold this fragmented society into a group, the British had endeavored to integrate into the ruling Sunni elite important Shia personalities, particularly tribal chiefs and reli- gious figures. Kurdish and Turkoman chieftains, in addition to notables from the Jewish and Christian communities, were also installed in the military as well as in civilian positions. This impor- tant precedent continued into independence as a member from each minority community was given a cabinet post. As Abbas Kelidar notes, "Cabinet government became an assortment of unstable communal coalitions." The Sunni-Shia conflict, a problem that had been with Iraq since the domination of the Umayyad caliphate in A.D.650, continued to plague the forces that attempted to mold Iraq into a political community. The Shia tribes of the southern Euphrates joined with urban Shias in fearing the possibility of complete Sunni domi- nation in the government. This fear was well founded because there was a disproportionate number of Sunnis in administrative positions; they had been favored by the Ottomans and thus had much more administrative experience. However, many of the more traditional Sunnis were also at odds with the government, perceiving Faisal's 1916 revolt against the Ottoman sultan-caliph as an impious act because, according to Islamic political philoso- phy, acts against a Muslim authority are justified only when that authority ceases to uphold sharia. And some Sunnis were Turko- phile for purely political reasons; particularly because they wished to supplant the British influence and the Hashimite dynasty, which they perceived to be an extension of British rule. Most important among this group were Rashid Ali, Naji Shaukat, and Hikmat Suleiman. Additionally almost every minority group was opposed to the government because it represented the accession of another Arab dynasty. In 1932 the two most vociferous minorities were the Kurds (Sunni Muslims) and the Assyrians. The restless Kurds, the major- 40 Historical Setting ity of whom lived in the area around Mosul, were long noted for their fierce spirit of independence and of separatism. During the Ottoman occupation of the Mosul vilayet, the Kurds had sup- ported the Ottomans in exchange for a measure of local autonomy and had remained loyal to the Ottomans during World War I. In an effort to placate the Kurds during the tumultuous year of 1920, the Allied powers and Turkey had conditionally agreed to the establishment of "an independent Kurdish state" to be known as Kurdistan. The state was to be carved out of the predominantely Kurdish areas that bordered on Iraq, Turkey, and Iran. When political conditions in Turkey changed under Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk), the Kurdish scheme was abandoned, and the Kurds resorted to a series of anti-Kemal revolts in Turkey. During the years from 1922 to 1924 the Kurds engaged in a series of revolts as the British attempted to encroach on areas of traditional Kurdish autonomy. When the League of Nations awarded Mosul to Iraq in 1925, Kurdish hostility increased be- cause the Kurds preferred Turkish to Arab rule. The Iraqi govern- ment maintained an uneasy peace with the Kurds in the first year of independence. The relationship of the Iraqi government with the Assyrians, however, was more openly mutually hostile in 1932 and 1933. As a result of the frontier settlements with Turkey, approximately three-fourths of the Assyrians who had sided with the British dur- ing World War I now found themselves citizens of Iraq, a situation that was objectionable and dangerous to them. Thousands of As- syrians had been incorporated into the Iraq Levies, a British-paid and British-officered force separate from the regular Iraq army. They had been encouraged by the British to consider themselves superior to the majority of Arab Iraqis by virtue of their profession of Christianity. Pro-British, they had been apprehensive of the coming of independence to Iraq. The Assyrians were concerned not only because of the Iraqi Arabs but also because the British had used them for retaliatory operations against the Kurds in whose lands they had chiefly settled. They therefore feared Kurdish re- prisals once the British were no longer in power. The Assyrians had sought a region of their own where they hoped to form a nation-state. When no unoccupied area suffi- ciently large could be found, the Assyrians continued to insist that at the very least their patriarch, the Mar Shamun, be given some temporal authority. This demand was flatly refused by both the British and the Iraqis. In response the Assyrians, who had been permitted by the British to retain their weapons after the dissolu- tion of the Iraq Levies, flaunted their strength and refused to recognize the government. In retaliation the Iraqi government held the Mar Shamun under virtual house arrest in mid-1933, making his release contingent on his signing a document renounc- ing forever any claims to temporal authority. During July some 800 armed Assyrians headed for the Syrian border, for reasons that 41 Iraq: A Country Study have never been explained, where they were repelled by the Syrians. During this time King Faisal was outside of the country for reasons of health. In the meantime interior minister Suleiman had, according to scholarly sources, adopted a policy aimed at the elimination of the Assyrians. This policy was apparently imple- mented by a Kurd, General Bakr Sidqi, who, after engaging in several clashes with the Assyrians, permitted his men to kill some 300 Assyrians, including women and children, at the Assyrian village of Simel (Sumayyil). Faisal was aghast at the news and returned to Iraq on August 2. Ignored by the cabinet, he left for Berne for medical treatment. He died there on September 8. Faisal was succeeded by his twenty-one-year-old son, Ghazi, an ardent but inexperienced Arab nationalist. Faisal's death meant the loss of the main stabilizing personality in politics and the one figure with sufficient prestige to draw the politicians together around a concept of national interest. Faisal had been able to balance nationalist and British pressures within the framework of the Anglo-Iraqi alliance. Ghazi was unable to control either the increasing factionalism stemming from tribal and communal ten- sions or the clamor of voices against Britain's dominant influence in Iraqi affairs. The political climate of Iraq in the early 1930s was characterized by the numerous cliques that surrounded promi- nent political personalities, by a small, self-serving ruling class drawn chiefly from the families of ruling tribal shaykhs and land- owners, and by an intelligentsia composed of students, lawyers, physicians, ex-officers, and journalists. The press was perhaps the least responsible of all the groups. It was marked by an ill- informed xenophobia that chose to play up the divisions rather than any unity that might have existed among the various factions. The years during which no stability was provided by royal au- thority were also years of increased desire for an effective role of government in promoting national welfare. There was a growing demand during the 1930s for general reform, including measures in the spheres of land improvement and distribution, roadbuild- ing, irrigation, commerce, industry, public health, and communi- cations. Some politicians, seeking to capitalize on these demands and to lead the growing intelligentsia, responded with liberal and social democratic slogans and programs, while others looked to the emerging authoritarian governments in Europe as models for Iraqi development along vaguely fascist or communist lines. In this situation the military, a necessary ingredient for maintaining power in the Middle East, began to inject itself into the political scene. Given the divisive and potentially violent nature of Iraqi soci- ety, the establishment of a national army was crucial. In a memo- randum to his cabinet ministers Faisal had pointed out that while more than 100,000 rifles were in private hands, the Iraqi army could produce only 15,000. Thus it became critical to increase the size and efficiency of the army so that it could at least match the 42 Historical Setting forces that might appear in local rebellions. Because such a na- tional institution was as vulnerable as any other in Iraq to sectar- ian, ethnic, and communal pressures, the government attempted to maintain the officer corps as the preserve of the Sunni Arab elite. This policy proved impractical, especially because most of the minorities had more military experience than did the Sunni Arabs. It was natural, therefore, that the same forces that ap- peared in the society at large would also be manifested within the army. In 1936 Iraq experienced its first coup d'etat at the hands of the military, which was also the first coup d'etat in the modern history of the Arab states. The agents of the coup—General Bakr Sidqi and two politicians, Suleiman and Abu Timman, who were Turkoman and Shia respectively, represented a minority response to the pan-Arab Sunni government of Hashimi. The Hashimi govern- ment was the most successful and longest lived (eighteen months) of the eight governments that came and went during the reign of King Ghazi (September 1933 to April 1939). Hashimi had used Bakr Sidqi to repress tribal insurrections and then had proceeded to attend to some of Iraq's many development needs. An agricul- tural and industrial bank was opened, the development of munici- pal infrastructures promoted, conscription enforced, a labor code formulated, and irrigation headworks constructed. Hashimi's gov- ernment was nationalistic and pan-Arab in platform but was re- sented by many because of its authoritarianism and its staunching of honest dissent. Suleiman, a reformist, sought to engineer an alliance of other reformists and minority elements within the army. The political sensitivities of the reformists ran the gamut from Communism, to orthodox and unorthodox socialism, to more moderate positions. Most of the more moderate formed them- selves into the Ahali group named after their newspaper. After Bakr Sidqi moved against Baghdad, Suleiman formed an Ahali cabinet. Hashimi and Rashid Ali were banished, and Nuri fled to Egypt. In the course of the assault on Baghdad Nuri's brother-in-law, Minister of Defense Askari, had been slaughtered, and Nuri vowed vengeance. Suleiman's government was sanc- tioned by King Ghazi even though it had achieved power uncon- stitutionally. The Ahali-Suleiman-army alliance was of short dura- tion, however. Bakr Sidqi's excesses alienated both his civilian and military supporters, and he was finally murdered by a military group in August 1937. Suleiman withdrew from the Ahali, which had become increasingly unpopular because its support of land reform threatened certain vested interests. Financial difficulties impeded development, but there were some achievements in communications and in irrigation projects. This government proved no more supportive of civil liberties than its predecessors. The only solid achievement of the Suleiman government consisted of the agreements it made with other states. In 1936 the Treaty of Alliance was signed with Saudi Arabia. 43 Iraq: A Country Study In July 1937 Iraq signed a treaty with Iran temporarily settling a long-held dispute over the Shatt al Arab. In 1937 Iraq also joined the Saadabad Pact, essentially a mutual defense treaty, with Iran, Turkey, and Afghanistan. The precedent of the military coup had been established in Iraq; between 1936 and 1941 it was to experience seven coups d'etat, which tended to be motivated chiefly by personal goals rather than political issues. A coup d'etat in 1938 against the government of Midfai, successor to Suleiman, placed Nuri as premier and Ra- shid Ali as head of the Royal Divan, an unlikely alliance made possible only by the bond of hatred they both had for Suleiman and his clique. In April 1939 King Chazi was killed in an automobile accident and succeeded by his infant son, Faisal II. Ghazi.s first cousin, Amir Abd al Illah, was made regent. Another coup in February placed Nuri in power once again, but his position was fragile, and his government lasted only a month because of the extreme internal conflict being generated as World War II approached. Since 1937 relations with Britain had deteriorated, chiefly be- cause of Iraqi resentment of British policy in the British Mandate over Palestine, which added many more politicians to the nation- alist cause. The Germans had capitalized on this and hoped that Iraq would eventually be wooed to the Axis cause. The Iraqis severed diplomatic relations with Germany in 1939, as they were obliged to do because of their treaty obligations with Britain. Ra- shid Ali, an ardent anglophobe in the interest of nationalism, had succeeded Nuri as prime minister and was reluctant to break completely with the Axis powers, which were more successful militarily than the Allies in 1940. Rashid Ali, under pressure from the more extreme of Iraqi nationalists, had refused to sever rela- tions with Italy, and it was known that the Italian legation in Baghdad was an important center of anti-British activity. Rashid Ali had also imposed restrictions on British troop movements in Iraq. The regent and Nuri, both proponents of close cooperation with Britain, opposed Rashid Ali's policies, and the regent pressed him to resign and refused to dissolve a chamber that was unfavorable to pro-Axis sympathies. Rashid Ali's response to this pressure was to convince the army that a fifth military intervention was called for. On this occasion Rashid Ali was barely in power one month when disaffected forces within the army placed General Taha al Hashimi at the head of government. Rashid Ali made peace with the army as the regent, and Nuri fled to Transjordan. This 1941 coup was called the Golden Square uprising because of the domi- nant influence of four Iraqi generals. Rashid Ali then found himself at the head of a military government to which he quickly ap- pointed an ultranationalistic civilian cabinet. Britain declined to recognize this government. When Iraq answered British requests in April 1941 for troop 44 Historical Setting landings in Iraq with only conditional assent, the British retaliated by landing forces at Basra, justifying this second occupation of Iraq by citing Rashid Ali's violation of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. Many Iraqis, still in the flush of their recently won independence, regarded the move as an attempt to restore British rule. They rallied to the support of the Iraqi army, which received a number of aircraft from the Axis powers. The Germans were preoccupied with campaigns in Crete and preparations for the invasions of the Soviet Union, however, and could spare little assistance to Iraq. As the British steadily advanced, Rashid Ali and his government fled to Egypt, and an armistice was signed May 30. Shortly after Abd al Illah returned as regent, and Rashid Ali and the four generals were tried in absentia and sentenced to death. The generals re- turned to Iraq and were subsequently executed, but Rashid Ali remained in exile. In January 1943 Iraq declared war on the Axis powers under the terms of the 1930 treaty with Britain. For the remainder of the war Iraq was completely cooperative with the British under the successive governments of Nuri (1941-44) and Hamdi al Pachachi (1944-46). Iraq became a base for the military occupation of Iran and of the Levant. In March 1945 Iraq became a founding member of the League of Arab States (Arab League), which also included Egypt, Transjor- dan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the Yemen. The Arab League was designed to promote "cooperation in economic, cul- tural, social, and other matters" in a loose framework of Arab unity. Postwar Iraq, however, did not regain the preeminence it enjoyed in the Arab world before the war, which it had had as a result of its early independence. In December 1945 Iraq joined the United Nations (UN). Internally a prominent feature of postwar politics was the con- tinued dominance of men whose names had appeared regularly on cabinet lists since independence. Chief among them was that tirelesss campaigner, Nuri, who sought to maintain stable govern- ment through firm and frequently autocratic measures. He fa- vored alignment with Britain and the West and attempted to modernize the country gradually by the use of rapidly increasing oil revenues. Though not always prime minister, he was consis- tently recognized as the ultimate arbiter in affairs of state and, together with Abd al Illah, personified the government. Men who entered political life after 1946 found Nuri and the regent out of sympathy with their liberal, reformist sentiments. Even before the end of the war nationalists had been demanding the restoration of political activity, which had been banned during the war in the interests of the security of the state. It was not until the government of Tawfiq Suwaidi (February-March 1946) that political parties were permitted to form. Within a short period six parties formed, and they soon became sufficiently vociferous against the government that the government closed or curtailed 45 Iraq: A Country Study the activities of the more extreme of the left. During the postwar years the first Shiite prime minister to hold office, Salih Jabr (1947- 48), was elected, largely through the offices of Nuri. The most notable event of Jabr's government was the signing in January 1948 of a new treaty with Britain to replace that of 1930. By its terms Britain was to evacuate its air bases at Ash Shuwaybah and Al Habbaniyah, and a board composed of Iraqis and British would decide on all defense matters of mutual interest. The people were not prepared for the terms of the treaty, and rioting broke out in Baghdad of sufficient strength and duration to cause Iraq to repu- diate the treaty. The rioting against the treaty continues to be celebrated as Al Watbah, the glorious uprising. Iraq bitterly objected to the UN decision of 1947 to partition Palestine and sent several hundred recruits to the Arab-Israeli war that began May 15,1948. After the war began Iraq added between 8,000 and 10,000 troops of the regular army that they withdrew in April 1949. Many Iraqi Jews emigrated to Israel after the war, particularly during 1951 and 1952 when about 120,000 moved to Israel. One development of the Arab-Israeli war that hurt Iraq until nationalization of the oil industry was the disconnection of its southern oil pipeline to the Mediterranean at the Jordan-Israel frontier. The years between 1948 and 1953 were economically difficult also because of bad harvests and the expenses of war. In 1952, already agitated by the country's depressed economic situa- tion, the populace in several cities began to riot, ostensibly en- raged because demands for direct elections had not been met. The government cracked down by declaring martial law, dissolving political parties, and arresting many opponents of the govern- ment. Although there was no immediate benefit, Iraq's expansion of the oil industry boded well for its future. In 1949 new pipelines were built to Tripoli and in 1952 to Baniyas in Syria. The National Development Board, created in 1950, became a ministry in 1953, a change necessitated by rapidly increasing revenues as a result of a 1952 agreement whereby the oil companies ceded 50 percent of profits before taxes to the government. Financially sound for virtually the first time since independence, Iraq initiated several development projects, the most important of which were the flood control and irrigation works opened in 1956 at Samarra on the Tigris and Ar Ramadi on the Euphrates. Although Iraq opposed the creation of Israel in 1948, its external orientation was strongly pro-Western in postwar years. In April 1954 the nation accepted military assistance from the United States; in January 1955, during one of Nuri's premierships, diplo- matic relations were suspended with the Soviet Union. Addition- ally in February 1955 Iraq and Turkey signed a mutual defense and cooperation treaty (popularly known as the Baghdad Pact) that Britain acceded to in April, promising also to terminate the 46 Martyr's Mosque, Baghdad Courtesy Middle East Photographic Archive, London 47 Iraq: A Country Study 1930 agreement and to evacuate its air bases. Pakistan and Iran joined during the autumn, thus completing a defensive cordon running along part of the Soviet Union's southern frontier. Antigovernment sentiments continued to grow as Iraq aligned itself with the West. These sentiments were also precipitated by government corruption and the limited political expression availa- ble to the Iraqi public as a result of Nuri's maintaining the equiva- lent of a police state. Pan-Arab nationalism as a popular ideology of the masses and middle class became a strong rallying ground for the many in Iraq who aspired to closer relations with other Arab states. This trend accelerated after the British and French armed intervention against Egypt in the Suez crisis of October and No- vember 1956 and Israel's temporary seizure of the Sinai Penin- sula. At home the oil revenues, widely publicized by the govern- ment as the means by which Iraq would become prosperous, appeared to many to enrich only the already affluent officials and landlords. To these criticisms were added the new resentments caused by the authoritarian tactics employed by the government. Opposition politicians were denied access to power by controlled elections and in many cases were branded as subversive and were deported. Iraq's pro-Western policy culminated in the formation of the Arab Federation (Iraq and Jordan) on February 14,1958, as a counterweight to the avowed neutralist but anti-Western United Arab Republic (UAR) of Egypt and Syria that had been formed on February 1, 1958. The federation was designed to strengthen the two Hashimite royal families of Iraq and Jordan. Republican Iraq The 1958 Revolution and the End of the Monarchy The kingdom of the Hashimite family in Iraq was overthrown on July 14, 1958, in a swift predawn coup executed by officers of the 19th Brigade under the leadership of Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim and Colonel Abd al Salam Arif. According to later state- ments by Qasim, he had planned such a move for many years. The coup—the July 14 Revolution, or 1958 Revolution as the Iraqis have called it since—met virtually no opposition. King Faisal II and Abd al Illah were executed, as were many others in the royal family. Nuri was also killed after attempting to escape disguised as a veiled woman. The proclamations of the revolution brought crowds of people into the streets of Baghdad cheering the deaths of Iraq's two "strong men," Nuri and Abd al Illah. The young king's death was regretted because he was regarded as a helpless bystander in the intrigues of Iraqi politics, but he was not mourned. In the ensuing mob demonstrations against the old order, the British embassy was severely damaged by angry crowds. The leaders of the new regime, who declared their nation a republic, envisioned a reformed, egalitarian, and democratic Iraq, united in spirit with the Arab world and committed to a 48 Historical Setting foreign policy of nonalignment. Qasim declared his determina- tion to resist all foreign ideologies whether "Communist, American, British or Fascist." Amnesty was declared for politi- cal prisoners, and exiled opponents of the old regime were in- vited to return home. When they did, however, the govern- ment dealt severely with the more than 100 leading supporters of the ousted regime. These acts on the part of the new gov- ernment were entirely within the Iraqi political tradition and suggested the trend of future events. Within one month the new government was recognized by most states. The Qasim government was troubled, however, by divisive rivalry within its ranks and by serious internal threats to its survival. Many young people, government officials and civilians alike, became disillusioned by Qasim's inability to consolidate au- thority and bring about any improvement in either political life or material prosperity. The first open split came two months after the revolution when Deputy Prime Minister Arif, who was in sympa- thy with the influential Baath Party, declared himself in favor of establishing closer ties with the UAR. Qasim first dismissed and then arrested Arif, charging him with activities detrimental to Iraq's interests. A propaganda war ensued between Egypt and Iraq, which Qasim stepped up when an unsuccessful Baathist anti- Qasim plot was discovered that was rumored to have been orga- nized with foreign assistance. Arif was brought to trial on treason charges and condemned to death in January 1959; he was subse- quently pardoned in December 1962. Stability was also affected by friction between nationalists and the growing number of Iraqi Communists. Originally tolerated by Qasim—apparently as a counterweight against the powerful pan- Arab Baathists and pro-Nasser groups—the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) rapidly gained influence after 1958 by infiltrating nearly all social and political organizations, including government i agencies. The ICP functioned through certain professional organi- V zations and also through a militia known as the People's Resistance \ Force. When fighting broke out in Kirkuk between Turkomans \ and Kurds, who were supported by the People's Resistance Force, ) Qasim charged the People's Resistance Force with responsibility / for the deaths that occurred and ordered the People's Resistance Force disbanded; he also restricted other ICP activities. Mean- while opposition from the pro-Nasser group continued unabated as indicated by an assassination attempt by Baathists in October 1959 on Qasim's life in which he was shot and wounded. Qasim had no particular ideology, with the exception of his xenophobia, but he sought to win public support by accelerating economic development and agrarian reform. His aims were frus- trated, however, by bureaucratic delays and mismanagement in addition to the Kurdish rebellion that broke out in September 1961. Also many of Qasim's stated objectives did not come to fruition because of the immense amount of time and energy he 49 Iraq: A Country Study devoted to denouncing Egypt's President Gamal Abdul Nasser. The stance of Iraq became, however, decidedly pro-Soviet during his regime. He reestablished diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, denounced and abrogated the Baghdad Pact, and in- creased Iraq's relations with communist countries. Growing disenchantment with Qasim's personal dictatorship— he was known in Iraq as "Sole Leader," a title he gladly accepted —and mounting pan-Arab sentiments culminated in the over- throw of Qasim's regime on February 8, 1963. Qasim was ex- ecuted the next day, but the urban poor whom Qasim had ar- dently courted remained for many years unconvinced of his execution and looked for his return as a mahdi (messiah). The Kurdish Rebellion of 1961-63 During the course of his rule Qasim had sought to enlist Kurdish sympathies for his regime. He personally invited the leader of the Kurdish opposition, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, to return from his exile of many years in the Soviet Union. Qasim had completely underestimated the Kurdish desire for autonomy and showed no interest in ceding the land the Kurds needed to create a Kurdis- tan. Barzani realized this by the end of 1960 and began consolidat- ing his position in the northern highlands. In March 1961 Barzani in his role as president of the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, a party he established after his return from exile, led large numbers of Kurds in rebellion against the government. Later in the same month he proclaimed the existence of the independent state of Kurdistan. It appeared that the Kurds did have a de facto state, controlling as they did more than 400 kilometers of mountainous terrain along the Iraqi-Turkish and Iraqi-Iranian frontiers. During the course of 1962 the Kurds consolidated their positions. Each spring and summer of these years the central government won territory from the Kurds that they lost again each autumn. The Iraqis used airpower, rockets, tanks, and napalm, but the Kurds were masters of guerrilla tactics and frequently were able to iso- late and cut off supplies to the Iraqis' northern garrisons. By De- cember 1963 the Kurds were as far south as Khanaqin, about 150 kilometers northeast of Baghdad, and were close to holding the chief road linking Iraq to Iran. The cost to the Iraqi government was approximately US$60 million a year. A cease-fire took place in February 1964, as a result of negotia- tions at As Sulaymaniyah. The government assured the Kurds that their national claims would be appropriately recognized in a new provisional constitution and that there would be a general am- nesty for all the Kurdish insurrectionists. The Kurds replied that they would wait for the government's promise to be kept before they laid down their arms. Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy: 1963-68 In the meantime Iraq had experienced two coups. The Febru- ary 1963 coup that had ousted Qasim was carried out by members 50 Historical Setting of the Baath Party who were aided by their supporters and sympa- thizers within the armed forces. The National Council of Revolu- tionary Command (also known as the National Revolutionary Command) was established as the highest policymaking body. Its slogan was "unity, independence, freedom." Brigadier Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, a Baathist leader, became prime minister, and Arif was elevated to the nominal position of president. Within the party, however, dissension quickly arose between those who fa- vored a pro-Nasser line and those who opted for a pro-Syrian policy. The Baath Party had been founded in Syria in the early 1940s. It described itself as dedicated to the ideals of Arab unity, free- dom, and socialism. In Iraq, however, members of the Baath, who were numerous, were divided between those who favored a union with Egypt and those who were violently opposed to it. For a brief period after the February coup there was a move to create a United Arab Republic that would consist of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. However, after a pro-Nasser revolt in Damascus in July 1963— which was vigorously suppressed—there was a complete deterio- ration of Egypt-Syrian relations. President Arif, who was pro-Nasser, then directed a military coup against the Baath itself on November 18, 1963. A new na- tional council of revolutionary command was established, a non- party organ that placed the most important political powers in the hands of Arif, who remained president. Arif immediately declared the Baath Party illegal and went about the usual Iraqi postcoup activity of "cleansing" the country of enemies, i.e., those who opposed Arif. Externally the new government sought friendly relations with all nations and in particular with Nasser's Egypt. During 1964 steps were taken to hasten the integration of the military, eco- nomic, social, cultural, and information policies of Iraq and Egypt; this was expected to lead to the political union of the two nations in 1966. In Iraq this process was called "Egyptianization without the Egyptians." In May 1964 the Joint Presidency Council was formed, and in December the Unified Political Command was established to expedite the ultimate constitutional union of the two. The Interim Constitution was proclaimed in May 1964, declar- ing Iraq a republic that was a "democratic, socialist state, deriving the principles of its democracy and socialism from the Arab heri- tage and the spirit of Islam" (see Constitutional Development, this ch.). In July 1964 Arif announced that henceforth all political parties would coalesce to form the Iraqi Arab Socialist Union. More important for the future of Iraq, he also announced that insurance companies, all banks, and such essential industries as steel, cement, and construction—along with the tobacco industry, tanneries, and flour mills—would be nationalized. Essentially Arif 51 Iraq: A Country Study was copying the socialist program that President Nasser had initi- ated in Egypt in 1961. As the time drew near for the proposed union with Egypt, however, it appeared that Arif had lost his enthusiasm for the merger. A number of pro-Nasser ministers were dismissed, and others resigned. Nevertheless the new prime minister, Brigadier Arif Abd al Razzaq, was pro-Nasser. Observing President Arif s move from the Nasser camp, Razzaq staged an unsuccessful coup d'etat in September 1965, his first month in office. In April 1966 Arif was killed in a helicopter crash, and his brother Major General Abd al Rahman Arif, with the approval of the National Defense Council and the cabinet, was installed in office. In June 1966 Razzaq, who had fled to Egypt, made another unsuccessful coup attempt. It is an important feature of Iraqi poli- tics in the modern period that the majority of coups or coup attempts came from those who worked closely with the regimes against which the coups were directed. After Razzaq's first coup attempt Arif had appointed Abd al Rahman Bazzaz to head the government. Bazzaz was the first civilian prime minister since the days of the monarchy. Although he was an Arab nationalist, Bazzaz' position on this issue as well as his economic position was moderate. He described his course of action as "prudent socialism." He endeavored to make the Five- Year Economic Plan (1965-69) viable, to streamline the bureauc- racy, and to encourage private and foreign investment. Even though the economy was on the upgrade in 1965, the pace of development was slow because of the tremendous cost of the Kurdish campaigns, an unworkable land "reform" program, and a series of failures or near failures of grain crops (see Agriculture, ch. 3). Lacking sound economic advice Iraq, in both the private and the public sector, had embarked on capital-intensive and high-technology industrial development for which it was ill suited. Landlords continued to dominate the agricultural sector, giving peasants little incentive to remain on the farms, and thus there was a continual drift of the poor to urban centers. Additionally much needed social legislation had inflated labor costs and this, combined with population increases, resulted in a decline of the number of wage earners proportionate to the population. This coincided with an increase in the service sector of those working in parttime and/or menial occupations who were paid wages hardly sufficient to stave off starvation. A solution to the Kurdish problem remained the government's top priority. The cease-fire of February 1964 was but a brief in- terlude before hostilities resumed. Casualties on both sides were particularly numerous during the 1965-66 winter campaign. The need for some rapprochement with the Kurds increased as skirmishes between government forces and the Kurds took place on the Iran-Iraq border. Violations of Iran's frontiers exacerbated already tense relations between Iran and Iraq, 52 Historical Setting which progressively worsened during the first half of 1966. In June 1966 Prime Minister Bazzaz, after providing emer- gency relief to the Kurds, formulated new proposals toward a settlement of the conflict. Amnesty was extended; in Kurdish areas. the Kurdish language was to have a status equal to Arabic; and Kurds were to administer their educational, health, and municipal 1 institutions. Early elections wherein Kurds would have propor- tional representation in national as well as provincial assemblies were planned. The Kurds were also promised equal opportunity in government hiring. Finally the 15,000 Kurdish armed forces/ were to be dissolved. When Barzani indicated that these proposals \ met with his approval, it was widely assumed that the Kurdish conflict had been ended. Despite Bazzaz' many achievements he had numerous critics in Iraq. The army disliked the idea of conciliation with the Kurds, and the political left and intelligentsia were critical of the rap- prochement that Bazzaz had initiated with Saudi Arabia and Iran. President Arif yielded to pressure and asked for Bazzaz' resigna- tion. His successor, General Naji Taleb, a pro-Nasserite, had been instrumental in the 1958 revolution. Taleb and his large faction perceived the Kurdish peace plan as a potential detriment to plans for Arab unity by diluting the Arab character of the nation. Arif remained firm, however, that Bazzaz' policies be continued, and the president visited Kurdish areas where he promised the ap- pointment of Kurds to ministerial rank. The cabinet of May 1967 had more Kurds than ever before. <_. Arif also sought to amplify the better relations with Iran that had been initiated by Bazzaz. He visited Tehran in the spring of 1967, and at the conclusion of the visit it was announced that the coun- tries were to hold more meetings aimed at a joint oil exploration in the Naft-e Shah and Naft Khaneh border regions. They also agreed to continue negotiations on the collection of tolls and navi- gation rights on the Shatt al Arab and on the demarcation of the Persian Gulfs continental shelf, which would be critical if oil were to be discovered there. Trade and cultural agreements were also planned for. This rapprochement was significant in terms of the Kurdish situation, because the Kurds were thereby denied access to their traditional place of asylum and recovery from Iraqi on- slaughts. During the winter of 1966-67 Arif was faced with a crisis ema- nating from a new source, Syria. The Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) transported oil from its northern fields to Mediterranean ports via pipelines in Syria. In 1966 Syria claimed that the IPC had been underpaying Syria based on their 1955 agreement. In com- pensation Syria demanded back payments and immediately in- creased the transit fee it charged IPC. When the IPC did not accede to Syrian demands, Syria impounded IPC property, includ- ing some 500 kilometers of pipeline, numerous pumping stations, and the installations at Baniyas. In the opinion of many analysts of 53 Iraq: A Country Study Iraqi affairs the Syrian dispute with the IPC was a ploy, the basis of which was political rather than economic in nature. Joseph Malone writes, "The Syrian Baathist regime welcomed an oppor- tunity to divert attention from its domestic problems and the IPC crisis was incorporated into a feverish propaganda featuring monopolies, imperialism and Zionism." In December Iraqi oil ceased to flow to its Mediterranean ports with a significant loss in revenue to Iraq. Prime Minister Taleb met with Syrian officials in Damascus, where it was suggested that the presence of more Baathists in the Iraqi cabinet might make Syria less intractable. In March 1967 a new agreement was signed be- tween the IPC and the Syrian government wherein Syria received larger fees for oil transported across its lands. Iraq also renego- tiated its agreement with the IPC (see The Oil Industry, ch. 3). The loss of revenue to Iraq restricted the government's ability to implement important projects, particularly in the agricultural sector, and increased the animosity of President Arif s opposition, which stood far to the left of his position. Taleb resigned, and Arif briefly headed the government, which in May 1967 included rep- resentatives of the various minorities. During this period Arif con- tinued the policy of former Prime Minister Bazzaz of improving diplomatic relations with Iraq's neighbors. Overtures of friendship were extended to Turkey, which had been cool to Iraq since the dispute over the Mosul region during the British Mandate; rela- tions with Iran continued to improve. Arif s diplomatic advances were forgotten with the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli June 1967 War. The Iraqi government cooperated with other Arab states and moved troops to Jordan. Iraqi airfields were included in Israeli preemptive strikes on June 5 (see National Security Concerns, ch. 5). Iraq broke diplomatic relations with the United States and Britain for their alleged support of Israel. Iraq called a meeting of the oil-producing Arab states and recom- mended an oil embargo against the United States and Britain that was accepted by the other Arab states. After the war Arif resigned as premier to enable him to attend the many meetings held in the Arab world to formulate a postwar policy. Arif participated in the Khartoum Conference where the oil-producing Arab states agreed to assist those Arab states most hurt by the war. Gradually relations with the West improved, and oil embargoes were lifted. Diplomatic relations with Britain resumed in May 1968, although relations with the United States remained broken. As a result of President Charles de Gaulle's condemnation of Israel during the war, relations between Iraq and France were warm. Arif made an official visit to Paris in February 1968, and in April France announced that over the 1969-73 period it would supply Iraq with fifty-four Mirage jet aircraft. General Tahir Yahya, who had been appointed prime minister when Arif resigned, headed a cabinet that, catering to the coun- 54 Historical Setting? try's postwar mood, was almost exclusively left in its political ori- entation. Notably absent from the cabinet's concerns was any pro- gram to implement promises made to the Kurds. And by the end of 1967 Barzani was once again threatening revolt. In an attempt to garner greater popular support for their re-~ gime, Arif and Yahya relaxed the civil restraints placed on the universities. Far from being appeased, the intelligentsia used this rare opportunity for free speech by denouncing the government and calling for a more stringent anti-Israel line. The army, an enemy of the Arif governments because of their attempted con- ciliation of the Kurds, was purged several times in an effort to root out the most dissident members. When ICP members began to coordinate their activities with Baathists, it was clear that it was only a matter of time until the Arif government was overthrown. The Baathist Coup of 1968 The first of the post-Arif coups d'etat occurred on July 17,1968. The leaders of the bloodless coup were a combination of civilian and military Baathists and other more conservative military lead- ers. Arif was deposed and sent into exile; Prime Minister Yahya was imprisoned on corruption charges. General Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, who had become prime minister after the 1963 coup, be- came president, Colonel Abd al Razaq al Nayif, prime minister, and Colonel Ibrahim al Daud, minister of defense. There were also two Kurds in the initial cabinet, a placatory gesture made in the hopes of broadening the regime's base of support. Although a coalition was deemed necessary to effect an initial coup, President Bakr and his closest colleagues—chief among whom was Saddam Husayn al Tikriti—planned from the beginning to rid the cabinet of non-Baathist elements. Bakr's cousin, Colonel Hammad Shihab al Tikriti, who later became chief of staff and minister of defense, was ordered to continue his march on Baghdad, begun before the coup. On July 30 Shihab and other Baathist officers staged another coup. The cabinet was dismissed for its "reactionary tendencies," and President Bakr took on the added posts of prime minister, commander in chief, and chairman of the Revolutionary Com- mand Council (RCC). The core of the RCC completely excluded moderate or conservative elements and thus alienated many citi- zens who would otherwise have supported an anti-Arif move- ment. The RCC became the essential governing unit of the coun- try and was directed, in collaboration with Bakr, by Saddam Husayn, who had distinguished himself by an assassination at- tempt on Qasim in 1959. Other key figures were General Hardan al Tikriti, minister of defense; General Salih Mahdi Ammash, min- ister of interior; General Shihab, chief of the general staff; and Colonel Saadun Ghaidan. Bakr, Hardan, Saddam Husayn, and Shi- hab shared, in addition to their political beliefs, a common origin in the vicinity of the village of Tikriti. 55 /f Country Study than two months after the formation of the Bakr govern- coalition of pro-Nasser elements, Arif supporters, and con- servatives from the military attempted another coup. This event provided the rationale for the numerous purges directed by Bakr and Saddam Husayn against the opposition, which was extensive. Allegations against enemies of the regime ranged from accusa- tions of Zionist sympathies to complicity with American and Brit- ish intelligence services. Through the remainder of 1968 and 1969 trials of "spies" were continual as were private and public execu- tions, many of which were televised. Among the victims were Nasser al Hani, a former foreign minister, and former Prime Minis- ter Bazzaz, who was tortured but eventually permitted to leave Iraq for hospitalization in London. Freedom of speech was en- tirely absent, and many Western professionals were expelled from the country. The purging and suppression of the opposition, tradi- tional features of Iraqi political life, became hallmarks of Bakr's rule. Civil unrest was most notable in Kurdish areas. In October 1968 hostilities directed by Barzani broke out for the first time since the June 1966 cease-fire, and they picked up momentum during the next winter and spring. In March 1969 the Kurds attacked IPC installations at Kirkuk; attempts by the Iraqi army and air force to quell the rebellion were unsuccessful. The government attributed Kurdish successes to aid from Iran and Israel. Meanwhile Barzani sought UN mediation and announced to the Iraqi government that only the creation of an autonomous Kurdish state would sat- isfy Kurdish demands. The Kurdish Settlement Before the government would negotiate with Barzani, it at- tempted to split the Kurdish movement by giving support to Kurdish leaders opposed to Barzani—Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmad. They were invited to Baghdad and permitted to publish a newspaper; eventually they collaborated with government forces against Barzani. It soon became apparent, however, that Talabani and Ahmad had the support of only a small minority of Kurds, and the government was finally forced to negotiate with Barzani. In March 1970 the RCC and Barzani announced that a fifteen- article peace plan had been agreed on. The peace plan was essen- tially a restatement of the Bazzaz-Kurdish settlement that had never been implemented. The plan provided that there would be five Kurdish cabinet appointments; there would be Kurdish ad- ministrators and officials in areas of great Kurdish concentration; the Kurdish language, in addition to Arabic, would be the official language in Kurdish areas; and the provisional constitution would include Kurdish rights. The Kurds were immediately pacified by the settlement, particularly as Barzani was permitted to retain his 15,000 Kurdish troops, which then became an official Iraqi frontier 56 Historical Setting force called the Pesh Merga (those who face death). The plan, however, was not completely satisfactory because the legal status of the Kurdish territory remained unresolved. At the time of the signing of the peace plan Barzani's forces controlled territory from Zakhu in the north to Halabjah in the southeast and already had de facto Kurdish administration in most of the towns of the area. Barzani's group, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), was granted official recognition as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish people. The government had conceded to Kurdish demands to bring a measure of stability to the country and to better utilize a large part of the army, which of necessity had been deployed in the north. Although the settlement did bring a measure of temporary stabil- ity, it also sharpened differences within the RCC. The vice-presi- dent, General Ammash, who was also campaigning for nationaliza- tion of the IPC, headed the group opposed to conciliation with the Kurds. In March 1971 one of Ammash's cohorts was assassinated while in Kuwait. Six months later Ammash and Abd al Karim Shaikly, the foreign minister, were relieved of their posts. At the same time Saddam Husayn emerged as the vice chairman of the RCC, while retaining his post as deputy secretary general of Iraq's Regional Baath Party. This move was necessitated in part by the steady decline in Bakr's health. (For a variety of reasons, the RCC ordered its members and the press to discontinue the use of re- gional or tribal designations in their names; as examples, Saddam Husayn dropped "al Tikriti," and another RCC member, Taha Yasin Ramadan, dropped "al Jazrawi.") Saddam Husayn concentrated on solutions to Iraq's deepening economic difficulties caused by an expensive foreign policy, an inordinately costly internal security set up, and a resumption of difficulties with the Kurds. A full year after the Kurdish settlement there had been few implementations of the government's official policy toward the Kurds. Barzani demanded that a minimum of 10 percent of the national budget be devoted to development in Kurdish areas. He also wished to see Kurdish representation in the RCC, aware that it was in this body, and not in the cabinet, that power was vested. Iraq had increased taxes on its crude oil, but this revenue was not sufficient to offset inflation (see Role of Government, ch. 3). The Soviet Union was able to increase its ties with Iraq as a result of the latter's economic difficulties. By mid-1971 the Soviet Union had already undertaken several development projects in Iraq and had agreed to bring the Ar Rumaylah oil field into production (see The Oil Industry, ch. 3). Iraq in 1972 was also seeking a new arrangement with the IPC whereby the Iraqi government would become the major share- holder. This was in line with the determination of members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to partic- 57 Iraq: A Country Study ipate in the ownership of oil companies operating in their coun- tries (see Appendix B). Iraq was particularly insistent because under the agreement concluded at San Remo in 1920 Iraq had been promised 20-percent participation, which had never been honored. In addition to participation in ownership, Iraq also desired among other things that IPC offices be relocated in Bagh- dad (as opposed to London); that there be an agreement between IPC and the government on an oil development policy; and that there be a continuous audit. By March 1972 IPC and the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC) accepted the principle of 20-percent participation. In the spring deliveries of oil from Mediterranean ports fell to about half the production capacity, which the Iraqis interpreted as a pressure tactic; they therefore offered the IPC and BPC the ultimatum of restoring fuel productivity or losing the concession. Proposals from the companies were inadequate, and on June 1, 1972, the government nationalized the IPC and set up the Iraqi Company for Oil Operation (ICOO) to replace IPC in the north (see Nation- alization of Foreign-Owned Oil Companies, ch. 3). By January 1971 most of Iraq's 20,000 estimated troops had been removed from Jordan but, in spite of the extreme position Iraq continued to advocate on the Palestinian issue, Radio Cairo reported that as of March 1971 Iraqi contributions to the Palestine Liberation Army had ceased. During the first half of 1971 it ap- peared that Iraq desired to reduce its self-imposed isolation from the majority of Arab states caused by the government's denuncia- tion of even the idea of a Middle Eastern peace proposal. Jordan's 1970 attack on Palestinian guerrillas within its borders incited Iraq to denounce Jordan, however, and demand its expulsion from the Arab League as well as forbidding Jordan's participation in the Eighth International Baghdad Fair. Iraq, however, did not permit its own troops in Jordan to aid the Palestinians (see Iraq and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, ch. 5). Relations with Iran deteriorated during the same period. Iraq accused Iran of aiding Kurdish insurrectionists as well as of con- tributing to an attempted coup in 1970. Iran, in turn, accused Iraqi Baathists of complicity in an attempted coup against the shah. In November 1971 Iraq broke diplomatic relations with Iran when Iran seized the two Tunbs Islands in the Persian Gulf. Relations with the West, with the exception of France, re- mained poor. The Soviet Union remained Iraq's closest non-Arab ally, particularly when the Soviets began to supply Iraq with large amounts of military equipment (see Foreign Military Ties, ch. 5). In March 1972 Iraq signed the fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union. Wary of too great a de- pendence on the Soviet Union, however, in July 1972 President Bakr indicated that he was not opposed to better relations with Western countries, and the United States accordingly opened an interests section in Baghdad (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). 58 Historical Setting In July 1973 an unsuccessful coup attempt by a civilian faction within the Baath Party led by Nazim Kazzar, the chief of the Security Police, resulted in the death of General Shihab, minister of defense. The RCC subsequently amended the Provisional Con- stitution to give the president greater power. Another result of the coup attempt was the formation of the Progressive National Front between the Baath and the ICP (see The Politics of Alliance: The Progressive National Front (PNF), ch. 4). The outbreak of the October 1973 War once again altered Iraq's foreign relations. Because President Anwar al Sadat of Egypt had not consulted Iraq before the onset of hostilities, Iraq withdrew its land forces from the Syrian front as soon as the cease-fire went into effect. As a further snub, Iraq refused to attend the November 1973 Arab summit in Algeria. At Iran's initiation diplomatic relations were resumed in Octo- ber 1973, but relations had deteriorated by early 1974 as a result of fighting along the frontier. Normal relations were restored with the help of a UN mediator only to break down again by August. Several meetings between Iraqi and Iranian diplomats in Istanbul failed to produce an accord. Eventually, however, the situation with the Kurds brought the two countries together. Another document of great importance is the National Ac- tion Charter that was proclaimed by President Bakr on Novem- ber 15, 1971. The charter was intended to serve as a basis for negotiations for further cooperation and the establishment of a front between the Baath Party and the ICP. The United Na- tional Front, set up in 1957, which included among others the Baath and the ICP, had assisted in the overthrow of the monar- chy in 1958. In the years between the abolition of the monar- chy and the Baath revolution of 1968, however, the national front existed primarily in name alone because of the intense ri- valry between ICP members and Baathists. After 1968, secure in their position, the Baathists initiated a rapprochement with the ICP and invited discussions on the National Action Charter published in the Iraqi press. The charter called for unity among the various parties resting on principles "providing for intensification of struggle against im- perialism, Zionism and reaction, enabling the masses to lead their battle, the availability of absolute revolutionary democratic atmo- sphere, liquidation of all manifestations of oppression against the masses and their cultural institutions, liquidation of all forms of imperialistic influence, and closing doors forever against the im- perialistic states' heinous attempts at exploiting the current condi- tions in the Arab homeland to stage a come-back and occupy new political and economic positions." Certain specific steps to achieve these principles were enumerated, among which were the pro- mulgation of a permanent constitution, autonomy for the Kurds, the betterment of living and working conditions by implementing suitable agricultural and industrial projects, and the development 59 Iraq: A Country Study of a foreign policy designed to protect the best interests of the Arab people. In discussions after the promulgation of the charter, Saddam Husayn and Tariq Aziz represented the Baathists, and Aziz Muhammad and Amir Abd Allah represented the ICP. By March 3, 1972, an agreement on the basic principles to be contained in the charter was reached, and the two parties then formulated the internal regulations of the front. They stipulated that the front was a form of revolutionary union among progressive parties and groups who had agreed to work toward the accomplishment of the goals stated in the charter. A central executive committee called the High Committee of the Progressive National Front was estab- lished as the principal executive organ. Of the sixteen positions within the High Committee, eight are reserved for the Baath, three for the ICP, three for the KDP, and one each for the Progressive Nationalists and the Independent Democrats. The High Committee meets once monthly under the direction of the secretary general of the Regional Baath Party or his deputy. In addition to the High Committee, a secretariat of seven members exists, which supervises study groups and commit- tees. Constitutional Development In 1921 the British drafted the text of a constitution, which after necessary modification was approved and signed by King Faisal I in March 1925. Known as the Organic Law of 1925, it remained in effect until the overthrow of the monarchy in July 1958. The Organic Law established a constitutional monarchy within a uni- tary state and provided for a system of checks and balances. In theory, the Council of Ministers of the executive establishment was accountable to a bicameral parliament, but the legislature was seldom able to control or successfully challenge a policy desired by the executive branch. Royal authority was no longer absolute under the constitution but, in recognition of the need for a strong executive, the king was given substantial decisionmaking power. He could issue decrees when parliament was not in session and dismiss the prime minis- ters "if the public interest renders it necessary." The relationship between the king and the Council of Ministers was such that one or the other might prove the stronger, depending on the per- sonalities involved and the events taking place. For example, dur- ing his lifetime the preeminence of King Faisal I (reigned 1921- 33) was never challenged, but after his death the Council of Ministers, controlled by the prime minister, dominated the na- tional scene. After the 1958 revolution the regime abrogated the Organic Law and almost immediately promulgated a provisional constitu- tion with the explanation that it would remain in force "during the transitional period until such time as a permanent constitution is 60 Historical Se+%ng adopted." The provisional constitution provided for a republican form of government in which the Council of Ministers would enact laws on its own authority. Although legislation technically required the approval of a three-member council of sovereignty that functioned as the col- lective "head of state," this approval was only a formality. The constitution guaranteed the independence of the judiciary. Basic civil rights, including freedom of thought and expression, the invi- olability of the home, and the protection of private property, were to be safeguarded within limits set by law. Landholding was to be regulated by law. In addition, the provisional constitution declared Iraq to be a part of the "Arab Nation," a provision implying the intention of cooperation with other Arab states in a manner that had been impossible while the old regime was aligned with Great Britain and the West (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). It also proclaimed Islam as the state religion and noted that "Arabs and Kurds are consid- ered partners in this nation." The 1958 provisional constitution was designed primarily to authorize Prime Minister Qasim and his cabinet to mobilize the full resources of government to maintain public order and to im- plement the reforms considered necessary during the transitional period. Prime Minister Qasim's reformist goals presupposed that the government should assume a strong guiding role in economic and social life but, despite his expressed hope to write a perma- nent constitution in 1960, political conflict within the governing group and accompanying instability prevented his regime from initiating any effective action at that time. The provisional constitution of 1958 was superseded in May 1964 by a new fundamental law that was to remain in force during a transitional period of three years from May 1964 or until the promulgation of a permanent constitution. The constitution pro- claimed the Republic of Iraq to be "a democratic, socialist state, deriving the principles of its democracy and socialism from the Arab heritage and the spirit of Islam." It described Islam, the state religion, as "the fundamental basis" of the constitution. It also stated that the Iraqi people constitute "a part of the Arab Nation" and expressed the hope for ultimate Arab unity to be achieved initially through a "union with the United Arab Republic." The constitution directed the state to steer the national econ- omy within the framework of a comprehensive plan based on collaboration between the private and public sectors. Natural re- sources were declared the property of the state, and landholding was limited by law "in a way that shall not give rise to feudalism." The rights and duties of the citizens were defined and were to apply equally to all regardless of race, origin, language, or religion. The "national rights of the Kurds" were affirmed within the con- text of "a brotherly national unity." Other principles guaranteed were the freedom of residence, trial through the due process of 61 IreH ntry Study * ition of torture, rights to education, and provisions for « al security benefits. mber 21,1968, a new interim constitution was promul- gated by the Baathist regime that had seized power in July. On July 16, 1970, that interim charter was replaced by yet another provisional constitution that, as amended in 1973 and 1974, re- mained in effect in early 1979 (see Constitutional Framework, ch. 4). The first article declares that Iraq is "a sovereign people's democratic republic" the principal aim of which is to achieve "the United Arab State and establish the Socialist System." Iraq is de- scribed as being part of the Arab nation and is said to include two principal nationalities: Arab and Kurd. Islam is defined as the state religion, but religious freedom is to be afforded to the adherents of other religions. Although Arabic is named as the official language of the state, Kurdish was declared to be equally official in the area of high Kurdish concentration. The rights of other minorities to use their languages for religious purposes, for special radiobroadcasts, and in academic institutions are also recognized. One of the most important provisions of the Provisional Constitution is the estab- lishment of limited autonomy "in accordance with what is defined by the law" for areas of Kurdish majority, i.e., the governorates of As Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, and Irbil (see Local Government, ch. 4). The Kurdish War and the Iraq-Iran Treaty On March 11, 1974—the deadline for implementation of the government's agreement with the Kurds—Saddam Husayn, dep- uty secretary general of the Regional Command of the Baath and vice chairman of the RCC, announced that Iraq would give lim- ited autonomy to the Kurds. The Kurdish Revolutionary Party, a minority Kurdish group led by Abd al Sattar Sharif, indicated its acceptance of the government's offer. Barzani, as head of the KDP, announced that Saddam Husayn's offer fell too short of full governmental participation for the Kurds and refused to accept it. The Pesh Merga began armed insurrection in the north. The RCC then replaced the five Kurds in the cabinet with ones more dis- posed to accept Saddam Husayn's proposals and appointed Taha Muhi al Din Maruf, a conciliatory Kurd, as vice president of Iraq. In August 1974 fighting stepped up as the Iraqi government deployed bombers, tanks, and field guns against Kurdish positions. The Pesh Merga, supplied with arms and other necessities from Iran, was able to counter the government's offensives and in the meantime sent its women, children, and old men, estimated by some at 130,000 people, for refuge in Iran. It was therefore to everyone's great astonishment when, at an OPEC meeting in Algi- ers in March 1975, Iran and Iraq announced that an accord had been signed that "completely eliminated the conflict between two brotherly countries." The accord formally ended the Kurdish war as both countries further agreed to end "infiltrations of a subver- 62 Historical Setting sive character." Without Iranian assistance the rebellion of the Kurds could not continue, and Barzani was forced to flee to Teh- ran. At a cease-fire arranged on March 13, the government an- nounced that amnesty would be granted to all Kurds who laid down their arms by the first of April. Of the 200,000 Kurds who fled to Iran it is estimated that 150,000 returned to Iraq. The Iraq-Iran accord was formalized by the Baghdad Treaty in June 1975. An important feature of the treaty was what appeared to be the final settlement of the long-standing Shatt al Arab dis- pute (see Boundaries, ch. 2). The frontier on the Shatt al Arab was defined as the thalweg that follows the middle of the deepest shipping channel. Land frontiers were accepted as those drawn by the 1913 Protocol of Constantinople. • • * Probably the best single work on the ancient history of Iraq is George Roux's Ancient Iraq, which covers the period from prehis- tory through the hellenistic period. The article by D. Sourdel, "The Abbasid Caliphate," in The Cambridge History of Islam provides an excellent overview of the medieval period. Peter Slu- glett's Britain in Iraq 1914-1932 is a useful study of the Mandate period. Stephen Longrigg's and Frank Stoakes' Iraq is a superb work that contains a historical summary of events before indepen- dence as well as a detailed account of the period from indepen- dence to 1958. Majid Khadduri's Republican Iraq is the best single study of Iraqi politics from the 1958 revolution to the Baath coup of 1968. His Socialist Iraq, A Study in Iraq Politics Since 1968 details events up to 1976. Edith and E. F. Penrose's Iraq: Interna- tional Relations and National Development is a brillant and care- ful study of the political and economic development of Iraq from its foundation as a state to 1977. An extremely useful article is Abbas Kelidar's "Iraq: the Search for Stability." (For further infor- mation see Bibliography.) 63 Chapter 2. The Society and its Environment Textile pattern of Iraqi design The Society and its Environment IRAQI SOCIETY IS composed of sizable and distinct social groups whose differences and divisions have been only slowly and fitfully challenged by the emergence of a strong, centralized political regime and state apparatus. Moreover there are regional and envi- ronmental differences between the scattered mountain villages whose economic base is rain-fed grain crops and the more densely populated riverine communities of the south that are dependent on intricate irrigation and drainage systems for their livelihood. There also are linguistic and ethnic differences. The most im- portant exception to the Arab character of Iraq is the large Kurd- ish element; it was estimated to be over 18 percent of the total resident population, which in early 1979 was about 12,070,000. Turkomans and other Turkic-speaking peoples retained an ethnic identity distinct from Arabs and Kurds but accounted for only 2 to 3 percent of the population. There were no reliable estimates of the number of Iranians who have settled around the Shia (see Glossary) holy cities of Karbala and An Najaf or, to a lesser extent, in the commercial centers of Baghdad and Basra; they probably numbered in the tens of thousands. Divisions along religious lines are deeprooted. Although be- tween 93 and 95 percent of Iraq's population is Muslim, this larger community is composed of Sunnis (see Glossary) and Shiites; the latter, a minority in the Arab world as a whole, constitute an estimated 50 to 55 percent of the population (see The Sunni-Shia Controversy, ch. 1). Of the non-Muslim communities, fragmented Christian sects made up perhaps 3 percent of the population in 1977, concentrated mainly in the governorates of Nineveh and Dahuk. Their rate of increase is probably lower than that of the Muslim majority. The Jewish community, even smaller, was heav- ily concentrated in urban areas, especially Baghdad. The establish- ment of the State of Israel in 1948 and the defeat of the Arab armies in 1948-49 rendered the situation of Iraqi Jews untenable and led to a mass exodus, chiefly to Israel. Fewer than 5,000 Jews were counted in the 1957 census, and in early 1979 there was no reason to think that the rate of natural increase had compensated for further emigration in the years since. In the late 1970s social differences based on unequal distribution of power, wealth, and prestige continued to characterize the soci- ety as did a considerable cleavage between urban and rural inhabi- tants. Nevertheless the shifts and developments of the 1960s and 1970s have been profound. The sharp polarization of landlord and tenant, based on the highly concentrated land tenure patterns that developed over the first half of this century, had been sup- planted by a less rigid stratification pattern in the countryside, the main features of which were not yet clear. The strong demo- graphic shift to the urban areas (defined as any place having a 67 Iraq: A Country Study municipal government) has swelled the growth of middle-class and working-class groups. In the opinion of some observers these shifts may gradually assume greater importance in the society than ethnic and, especially, religious differences. Geography and Population Boundaries Iraq's boundaries were, for the most part, fixed by Britain after World War I by combining three vilayets (provinces or governor- ates) of the former Ottoman Empire into a new political entity (see World War I and the British Mandate, ch. 1). The bounda- ries are not marked by significant physical features, with the ex- ception of the Shatt al Arab (see fig. 1; fig. 5). The boundaries in the northeast and north cross mountain ranges that are exten- sions of, respectively, Iran's Zagros mountain range and Turkey's Taurus Mountains. In the west and south Iraq's desert areas merge imperceptibly with the deserts of Syria, Saudi Arabia, Jor- dan, and Kuwait. In 1922 British officials concluded the Treaty of Mohammara with Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman Al Saud, who in 1932 formed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The treaty provided the basic agree- ment for the boundary between the eventually independent na- tions. Also in 1922 the two parties agreed to the creation of the diamond-shaped Neutral Zone of approximately 7,025 square kilo- meters adjacent to the western tip of Kuwait in which neither Iraq nor Saudi Arabia would build permanent dwellings or installa- tions. Beduin from either country could utilize the limited water and seasonal grazing resources of the zone. In May 1938 Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed an additional agreement regarding the ad- ministration of the zone. In April 1975 an agreement signed in Baghdad fixed the borders of the countries; in July there was an agreement providing for the formal division of the Neutral Zone. As of early 1979, however, the zone had not been divided. The boundary with Kuwait was fixed in a 1913 treaty between the Ottoman Empire and British officials acting on behalf of the Kuwait ruling family, which in 1899 had ceded control over for- eign affairs to Britain. That boundary was accepted by Iraq when it became independent in 1932, but in the 1960s and again in the mid-1970s the Iraqi government advanced a claim to parts of Kuwait (see Kuwait, ch. 5). Although Iraq subsequently withdrew this claim, the claim reflected Iraqi concern over its limited access to the sea, which is confined to its approximately seventy-eight- kilometer coastline on the Persian Gulf, known in Iraq as the Arabian Gulf. The land border with Iran, extending southward from the junc- tion with Turkey, was demarcated in 1914. A treaty negotiated between Iraq and Iran under British auspices in 1937, however, specified that at the head of the Persian Gulf the international boundary would in part be at the low water mark on the Iranian 68 The Society and its Environment side of the Shatt al Arab. These provisions became a source of contention between the two countries; Iran insisted that the 1937 treaty had been imposed on it by "British imperialist pressures," that it was in violation of common international practice, and that the proper boundary was the thalweg. The issue came to a head in 1969 when Iraq in effect told the Iranian government that the Shatt al Arab was an integral part of Iraqi territory and that the waterway might be closed to Iranian shipping. Almost immedi- ately two Iranian ships supported by naval craft traversed the waterway; they met no Iraqi interference. Neither, however, did Iraq indicate a willingness to abandon the 1937 treaty and negoti- ate a new one. Through Algerian mediation Iran and Iraq agreed in March 1975 to normalize their relations, and three months later they signed a border treaty in Baghdad (see The Kurdish War and the Iraq-Iran Treaty, ch. 1). The treaty defines the common border along the Shatt al Arab estuary as the thalweg based on depth. It also specifies land frontier lines to run according to maps worked out for the 1914 border agreement. Major Geographical Features Most geographers, including those of Iraq's government, discuss the country's geography in terms of four main zones or regions: the desert in the west and southwest; the rolling upland between the upper Tigris and Euphrates rivers; the highlands in the north and northeast; and the alluvial plain through which the Tigris and Euphrates flow. Iraq's official statistical reports give the total land area as 438,446 square kilometers. Official United States publica- tions give larger figures, however, one of slightly over 447,000 square kilometers and another of 445,480 square kilometers. The desert zone, an area lying west and southwest of the Eu- phrates River, is a part of the Syrian Desert, which covers sections of Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The region, sparsely inhabited by pastoral nomads, consists of a wide, stony plain interspersed with rare sandy stretches. A widely ramified pattern of wadis— watercourses that are dry most of the year—runs from the border to the Euphrates. Some are over 400 kilometers long and carry brief but torrential floods during the winter rains. The uplands region between the Tigris north of Samarra and the Euphrates north of Hit is known as Al Jazirah (the island) and is a part of a larger area that extends westward into Syria between the two rivers and into Turkey. Water in the area flows in deeply cut valleys, and irrigation is much more difficult than it is in the lower plain. Much of this zone may be classified as desert. The northeastern highlands begin just southwest of a line drawn from Mosul to Kirkuk and extend to the borders with Turkey and Iran. High ground, separated by broad, undulating steppes, gives way to mountains ranging from 1,000 to nearly 4,000 meters near the Iranian and Turkish borders. Except for a few valleys, the 69 Iraq: A Country Study Figure 5. Terrain and River System 70 The Society and its Environment Caspian I Sea 51 I Lake Urmia l5.. h% Great Zob« \'Si V International boundary ® National capital Spot elevations in meters 100 Miles 100 Kilometers Persian Gulf -IRAQ- "\ \ SAUDI ARABIA \ 43 NEUTRAL ZONE I. -1 51 71 Shatt al Arab Courtesy Iraqi Press Office, Washington, D.C. main channel of the Tigris. Water from the Tigris thus enters the Euphrates through the Shatt al Gharraf well above the confluence of the two main channels at Al Qurnah. Both the Tigris and the Euphrates break into a number of chan- nels in the marshland area, and the flow of the rivers is substan- tially reduced by the time they come together at Al Qurnah. Moreover the swamps act as silt traps, and the Shatt al Arab is relatively silt free as it flows south. Below Basra, however, the Karun River enters the Shatt al Arab from Iran, carrying large quantities of silt that present a continuous dredging problem in maintaining a channel for oceangoing vessels to reach the port at Basra. The waters of the Tigris and Euphrates are essential to the life of the country, but they may also threaten it. The rivers are at their lowest level in September and October and at flood in March, April, and May when they may carry forty times as much water as at low mark. Moreover one season's flood may be ten or more times as great as that in another year. In 1954, for example, Baghdad was seriously threatened, and dikes protecting it were nearly topped by the flooding Tigris. Until the mid-twentieth century most efforts to control waters were concerned primarily with irrigation. Some attention was given to problems of flood control and drainage before the revolu- tion of July 14, 1958, but development plans in the 1960s and 1970s were increasingly devoted to these matters, as well as to irrigation projects on the upper reaches of the Tigris and Euphra- 73 The Society and its Environment its disadvantages. Until the recent development of flood con- trol, Baghdad and other cities were subject to the threat of in- undation. Moreover the dikes needed for protection have effec- tively prevented the expansion of the urban areas in some directions. The growth of Baghdad, for example, was restricted by dikes on its eastern edge. The diversion of water to the Mil- hat ath Tharthar and the construction of a canal transferring water from the Tigris north of Baghdad to the Nahr Diyala have permitted the irrigation of land outside the limits of the dikes and the expansion of settlement. Climate Roughly 90 percent of the annual rainfall occurs between No- vember and April, most of it in the winter months from December through March. The remaining six months, particularly the hottest ones of June, July, and August, are dry. Except in the north and northeast, mean annual rainfall ranges between ten and seventeen centimeters. Data available from sta- tions in the foothills and steppes south and southwest of the moun- tains suggest mean annual rainfall between thirty-two and fifty- seven centimeters for that area. Rainfall in the mountains is more abundant and may reach 100 centimeters a year in some places, but the terrain precludes extensive cultivation. Cultivation on nonirrigated land is limited essentially to the mountain valleys, foothills, and steppes, which have thirty or more centimeters of rainfall annually. Even in this zone, however, only one crop a year can be grown, and shortages of rain have often led to crop failures. Mean minimum temperatures in the winter range from near freezing (just before dawn) in the northern and northeastern foothills and the western desert to 2°-3°C and 4°-5°C in the alluvial plains of southern Iraq. They rise to a mean maximum of about 15.5°C in the western desert and the northeast and 16.6°C in the south. In the summer mean minimum temperatures range from about 22.2°C to about 29°C and rise to maximums between roughly 37.7° and 43.3°C. Temperatures sometimes fall below freezing and have fallen as low as — 14.4°C at Ar Rutbah in the western desert. They are more likely, however, to go over 46°C in the summer months, and sev- eral stations have records of over 48°C. The summer months are marked by two kinds of wind phenomena. The southern and southeasterly sharqi, a dry, dusty wind with occasional gusts to eighty kilometers an hour, occurs from April to early June and again from late September through November. It may last for a day at the beginning and end of the season but for several days at other times. This wind is often accompanied by violent duststorms that may rise to heights of several thousand meters and close airports for brief periods. From mid-June to mid-September the prevailing wind, called the sha- mal, is from the north and northwest. It is a steady wind, absent 75 Iraq: A Country Study only occasionally during this period. The very dry air brought by the shamal permits intensive sun heating of the land surface, but the breeze has some cooling effect. The combination of rain shortage and extreme heat makes much of Iraq a desert. Because of very high rates of evaporation, soil and plants rapidly lose the little moisture obtained from rain, and vegetation could not survive without extensive irrigation. Population The census of October 1977 reported the total population as 12,171,280. This figure included some 142,280 Iraqis living abroad. Despite many difficulties encountered by the census tak- ers, the results were judged by outside observers as reasonably accurate. In early 1979 the resident population of the country was probably about 12,070,000. The population has fluctuated considerably over the region's long history. Between the eighth and twelfth centuries A.D. Iraq —particularly Baghdad—was the flourishing center of a burgeon- ing Arab civilization, and at the height of the region's prosperity it may have supported a population much larger than the present- day society. Some estimates range as high as 15 to 20 million. Decline came swiftly in the late thirteenth century, however, when Mongol conquerors massacred the populace, destroyed the cities, and ravaged the countryside. The elaborate irrigation sys- tem that had made possible agricultural production capable of supporting a large population was left in ruins (see The Mongol Invasions, ch. 1). A pattern of alternating neglect and oppression characterized the Turkish rule that began in the sixteenth century, and for hundreds of years the three vilayets of Baghdad, Al Basrah, and Mosul—which the British joined to form Iraq in the aftermath of World War I—remained underpopulated backwater outposts of the Ottoman Empire. In the mid-1800s the area had fewer than 1.3 million inhabitants. At independence in 1932 the departing British officials es- timated the population at about 3.35 million. The first census was carried out in 1947, showing a population of about 4.8 million. The 1957 census gave a population of about 6.3 million, and the 1965 census returned a count of slightly above 8 million (see table 2, Appendix A). The preliminary report of the October 1977 census gave the annual rate of population growth as 3.3 percent. In common with many developing countries, Iraq's population is young; nearly 60 percent of the population was under the age of twenty (see fig. 6). The government conducts no birth control program to limit popu- lation growth, and in fact it endorses early marriages and large families. About 63.5 percent of the population was listed as living in 76 The Society and its Environment FEMALE Age Group 80 and older 70-79 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 1-4 Under 1 year 16 14 12 10 8 2 0 0 2 Percent of total 8 10 12 14 16 Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Office, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1977, Baghdad, 1978, p. 40. Figure 6. Age and Sex Distribution of Population, 1977 urban areas; this was a marked change from 1965, when only 44 percent resided in urban centers. Fewer than 95,000 persons were identified as nomadic or seminomadic beduins. This figure is higher than the 57,000 listed in the 1957 census and probably reflects either an improved counting procedure or a change in definition or classification. Nonetheless the nomads and semino- mads constituted less than 1 percent of the population, whereas 77 Iraq: A Country Study Persons per square Kilometer Figure 7. Population Density in 1867 they had been estimated at about 500,000, or 35 percent of the population. The population remains unevenly distributed. Baghdad Gover- norate had a population density of about 605 persons per square kilometer, whereas Al Muthanna Governorate possessed only three or four persons per square kilometer. In general the major cities are located on the nation's rivers, and the bulk of the rural population lives in the areas that are cultivated with water taken from the rivers (see fig. 7). The People Although the data are not precise, observers conclude that about 71 percent of the people are Arabs, slightly more than 18 percent are Kurds, and 2.4 percent are Turkomans; Assyrians, Armenians, numbers of various Iranian linguistic or tribal groups, and Jews make up the remainder. Between 93 and 95 percent adhere to Islam, and about 3 percent are Christians (see Religious Life, this ch.). An estimated 50 to 55 percent of the total popula- tion observe the tenets of Shia Islam. All but a few of the estimated 2.2 million Kurds are Sunni, and the Sunni Arabs, who historically 78 The Society and its Environment Figure 8. Ethnic and Religious Distribution have been the dominant religious and ethnic group, therefore constitute a decided minority vis a vis the Shiite majority of about 6 million (see fig. 8). Almost all Iraqis speak at least some Arabic, and it is the mother tongue for the Arab majority. Arabic, one of the more widely spoken languages in the world, is the mother tongue of over 150 million people from Morocco to the Arabian Sea. One of the Se- mitic languages, it is related to Aramaic, Phoenician, Syriac, He- brew, various Ethiopic languages, and the Akkadian of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. Throughout the Arab world the language exists in three forms: the Classical Arabic of the Quran; the literary language developed from the classical and referred to as Modern Standard Arabic, which has virtually the same structure wherever used; and the spoken language, which in Iraq is Iraqi Arabic. Educated Arabs tend to be bilingual—in Modern Standard Arabic and in their own dialect of spoken Arabic. Even uneducated Arabic speakers, who in Iraq are about 60 percent of the population, can comprehend the meaning of something said in Modern Standard Arabic al- 79 Iraq: A Country Study though they are unable to speak it. Classical Arabic is known chiefly to scholarly specialists. Most of the words of Arabic's rich and extensive vocabulary are variations on triconsonantal roots, each of which has a basic mean- ing. The sounds of Arabic are also rich and varied and include some made in the throat and the back of the larynx, which do not occur in the major Indo-European languages. Structurally there are important differences between Modern Standard Arabic and spoken Arabic, such as the behavior of the verb; the voice and tense of the verb are indicated by different internal changes in the two forms. In general the grammar of spoken Arabic is simpler than that of the Modern Standard Arabic, having dropped many noun declensions and different forms of the relative pronoun for the different genders. Some dialects of spoken Arabic do not use special feminine forms of plural verbs. Dialects of spoken Arabic vary greatly throughout the Arab world. Most Iraqis speak one common to Syria, Lebanon, and parts of Jordan and, as is true of people speaking other dialects, they proudly regard theirs as the best. Although they converse in Iraqi Arabic, there is general agreement that Modern Standard Arabic, the written language, is superior to the spoken form. Arabs gener- ally believe that the speech of the beduin resembles the pure classical form most closely and that the local dialects used by the settled villagers and townspeople are unfortunate corruptions. Within the same region a city dweller speaks slightly differently from a villager, and a tribesman speaks differently from either. The tribesman has some different sounds and different ways of expressing things, and his vocabulary includes words fitted to his special way of life, as does that of the villager and townsman. Grammatical structure differs as well. Kurdish Distribution and Distinguishing Characteristics Kurds represent by far the largest non-Arab ethnic minority, accounting for an estimated 18 percent of the population, or more than 2 million. They are a vast majority in As Sulaymaniyah and Irbil governorates. Their claim to be a majority in the region around Kirkuk is hotly disputed by the central government, which has its own reasons for minimizing their numbers, especially in this oil-rich area. Kurds are well represented in Dahuk and Diyala as well. Ranging across northern and northeastern Iraq, the Kurds here are part of the larger Kurdish population (probably number- ing from 8 to 10 million) that inhabits the wide arc from eastern Turkey and the northwestern part of Syria through Soviet Ar- menia, Soviet Azerbaijan, and Iraq to the northwestern Zagros Mountains in Iran. Although the largest numbers live in Turkey, the Kurds form a higher percentage of the total population of Iraq than of any other state. They inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys and tradition- ally have been organized on a tribal basis. One tribal grouping is 80 The Society and its Environment the Badinan, whose members live in villages from the Syrian bor- der to the Great Zab River. The Suran live between the Great and Little Zab rivers. The Baban live between the Little Zab and Diyala rivers. Each confederation is made up of seminomadic herdsmen, freehold and tenant farmers, and agricultural workers. Once mainly transhumant, today most Kurds have settled in vil- lages; tribal movements are restricted to the mountain slopes in summer and the lowlands in winter. They have been mainly a rural people, engaged in agriculture, herding, and arboriculture. Migration to the cities was until the early 1960s quite limited but nonetheless significant, as the new young intelligentsia helped reinforce the development of Kurdish nationalism and comple- ment as well as rival the traditional tribal leadership in this regard. Since the early 1960s the urban Kurdish areas have grown ra- pidly. Kurdish migration—in addition to being part of the general trend of urban migration—was prompted by the escalating armed conflict with the central authorities in Baghdad, the destruction of villages and land by widespread bombing, and such natural disas- ters as a severe drought in the 1958-61 period. In addition to destroying traditional resources the severe fighting had hindered the development of education, health, and other social services. The historic enmity between the Kurds and the central Arab government has contributed to the tenacious survival of the tradi- tional and tribal characteristics of Kurdish society. The Kurds most distinguishing characteristic, and the one that binds them to one another, is their language. The most recent phase of intensive armed struggle against the central regime erupted in 1974 and was defeated in 1975 after an agreement between the Iranian and Iraqi regimes in March ended Iranian military support for the Kurdish movement (see National Security Concerns, ch. 5). A lim- ited autonomy plan was promised by the regime, but its degree of implementation has been a matter of sharp dispute, particularly on the important question of an accurate and impartial census. The Kurdish military threat to Baghdad seems to have been con- tained, however, and reforms, investments, and the provision of services will continue to make their mark in the Kurdish areas. Other Minorities The Yazidis are of Kurdish stock but are distinguished by their unique religious fusion of elements of paganism, Zoroastrianism, Christianity, and Islam. They live in small and isolated groups, mostly in the Sinjar Mountains west of Mosul. They are impover- ished cultivators and herdsmen who have a strictly graded reli- gious-political hierarchy and tend to maintain a more closed com- munity than other ethnic or religious groups. Historically they have been subject to sharp persecution owing to their heretical beliefs and practices. The Turkomans are village dwellers in the northeast living along the border between the Kurdish and Arab regions. Most are 81 Iraq: A Country Study Sunnis, but perhaps a third are Shiites. They were brought in by the Ottomans and settled at the entrances of the valleys into the Kurdish territory to guard against tribal raids. This historic pacify- ing role has led to strained relations with the Kurds. By the late 1970s they numbered only a few thousand and were being rapidly assimilated into the general population. Religious Life Between 93 and 95 percent of Iraqis are Muslim, and Islam is officially recognized as the state religion. Islam came to the region with the victory of the Muslim armies under Caliph Umar over the Sassanians in A.D. 637 at the battle of Al Qadisiyah (see The Arab Conquest and the Coming of Islam, ch. 1). The majority of inhabi- tants soon became Muslim, including the Kurds, although small communities of Christians and Jews remained intact in the area of present-day Iraq. Iraq has been the scene of many eventful epi- sodes in the early history of Islam, including the schism over the rightful successor to Muhammad. Islam Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-encompassing way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the Prophet Muhammad the rules governing society and the proper conduct of society's members. It is incumbent on the individual therefore to live in a manner prescribed by the revealed law and on the community to build the perfect human society on earth according to holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no distinctions between church and state. The distinction between religious and secular life and religious and secular law is a recent development that reflects the more pronounced role of the state in society and Western economic and cultural penetration. The religious group in Muslim countries has an importance in daily life far greater than that found in the West after the Middle Ages. The Ottoman Empire organized society around the concept of the millet, or autonomous religious community. The non-Muslim "People of the Book" (Christians and Jews) owed taxes to the government; in return they were permitted to govern themselves according to their own religious law in matters that did not con- cern Muslims. The religious communities were thus able to pre- serve a large measure of identity and autonomy. In 610 Muhammad, a merchant of the Hashimite branch of the ruling Quraysh tribe in the Arabian town of Mecca, began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the polytheistic paganism of his fellow Meccans. Be- cause the town's economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrim- age business to the shrine called the Kaaba and numerous other pagan religious sites in the area, his censure earned him the en- mity of the town's leaders. In 622 he and a group of followers accepted an invitation to settle in the town of Yathrib, later known 82 Iraq: A Country Study requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom, to emphasize sites associated with God and Abraham, founder of monotheism and father of the Arabs through his son Ismail. During his lifetime Muhammad held both spiritual and tempo- ral leadership of the Muslim community. He established the con- cept of Islam as a total and encompassing way of life for man and society. Religious and secular law merged, and all Muslims have traditionally been subject to sharia, or religious law. A comprehen- sive legal system, sharia developed gradually during the first four centuries of Islam, primarily through the accretion of precedent and interpretation by various judges and scholars. During the tenth century legal opinion began to harden into authoritative doctrine, and the figurative bab al ijtihad (gate of interpretation) closed. Thenceforth, rather than encouraging flexibility, Islamic law emphasized maintenance of the status quo. After Muhammad's death the leaders of the Muslim community consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time some persons favored Ali, Muhammad's cousin and the husband of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the Shiat Ali, or Party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. The next two ca- liphs (successors)—Umar, who succeeded in 634, and Uthman, who took power in 644—enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled in the name of his mur- dered kinsman Uthman. After the ensuing civil war Ali moved his capital to Iraq, where he was murdered after a short while (see The Sunni-Shia Controversy, ch. 1). Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox cali- phates and the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized a single caliph. Muawiyah proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The Shiat Ali refused to recognize him or his line, the Umayyad caliphs, and withdrew in the first great schism to establish the dissident sect, known as the Shia or Shiite, supporting claims of Ali's line to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction, the Sunni, adhered to the position that the caliph must be elected, and over the centuries they have represented themselves and have come to be identified as the orthodox branch. Sunnis Originally political, the differences between Sunni and Shiite interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical over- tones. Ali's two sons, Hasan and Husayn, killed after the schism, became martyred heroes to the Shiites and thus repositories of the claim of Ali's line to mystical preeminence among Muslims. The Sunnis retained the doctrine of leadership by consensus. Reputed descent from the Prophet still carries great social and religious prestige throughout the Muslim world. Meanwhile the Shiite doc- 84 The Society and its Environment trine of rule by divine right became more and more firmly estab- lished, and disagreements over which of several pretenders had the truer claim to the mystical power of Ali precipitated further splits. In principle a Sunni approaches his God directly. His religion provides him no communion of saints, no clerical hierachy, and no prescribed liturgy. Some duly appointed religious figures, how- ever, exert considerable social and political power. Imams usually are men of importance in their communities. In the larger mosques they generally are well-educated men who are con- cerned about the political and social affairs of the day. An imam need not have any formal training, however; among beduin, for example, any literate member of the tribe may read prayers from the Quran. Committees of socially prominent worshipers usually run the major mosque-owned land and gifts. In Iraq, as in several other Arab countries, the administration of awqaf (religious en- dowments) has been taken over by the government. Qadis (judges) and imams are appointed by the government. The Muslim year has two religious festivals—Id al Adha, a sacrifi- cial festival on the tenth of Dhul al Hijjah, the twelfth month; and Id al Fitr, the festival of breaking the fast, which celebrates the end of Ramadan on the first of Shawwal, the tenth month. To Sunnis these are the most important festivals of the year. Each lasts three or four days, during which time people put on their best clothes, visit, and congratulate and bestow gifts on one another. Cemeteries are visited. The Id al Fitr is celebrated more joyfully, as it marks the end of the hardships of Ramadan. Celebrations also take place, though less extensively, on the Prophet's birthday— which falls on the twelfth of Rabi al Awwal, the third month—and on the first of Muharram, the beginning of the new year. Shias Shiism is often viewed as a deviant or heretical form of Islam, but the elements for a Shiite interpretation of Islam are present in the Quran and the hadith. Shiites maintain that Sunni-Shia polemics are not as much over who should have succeeded the Prophet as over the function of the office and the qualifications of the man to hold it. The distinctive institution of Shiism is the Imamate, which in- cludes the idea that the successor of the Prophet be more than merely a political leader. He must have walayat, the ability to interpret the inner mysteries of the Quran and of sharia. Only those who have walayat are free from error and sin and have been chosen by God through the Prophet. The five principles of Shiism are belief in the Imams as successors of the Prophet and in divine unity, prophecy, resur- rection, and divine justice. The latter two beliefs are not ac- cepted by Sunnis. Implied in the last is that the Imams, be- cause of the special qualities they alone possess, are imbued 85 Iraq: A Country Study with a redemptive quality as a result of their sufferings and martyrdoms. Although not divine, they are regarded as sinless and as infallible in matters of faith and morals. The idea that man needs an intermediary between himself and God is an Iranian idea that long predates Islam and can be found in sev- eral Iranian religions, as is the idea of a savior or messiah (mahdi) who will come to redeem man and cleanse the world of corruption. To expect that the mahdi, the twelfth and last Imam, will really come is a religious virtue. The Imamate began with Ali; he is the key figure of the Imamate because it is his descendants who were the Imams. Two distinctive and frequently misunderstood Shia practices are mutah, temporary marriage, and taqiyah, religious dissimula- tion. Mutah is a fixed-termination contract that is subject to renewal. It was practiced by the first community of Muslims at Medina but was banned by the second caliph. Mutah differs from permanent marriage in that it does not require divorce proceed- ings to terminate it. It can be for a period as short as an evening or as long as a lifetime. The offspring of such an arrangement are the legitimate heirs of the man. Taqiyah, condemned by the Sunnis as cowardly and irreligious, is the hiding or disavowal of one's religion or its practices to escape the danger of death from those opposed. Persecution of Shia Imams during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates reinforced the need for taqiyah. The tomb of Imam Ali is in An Najaf and that of Imam Husayn is in Karbala. They are important shrines, and pilgrimages there are a duty for Shiites. Tens of thousands go each year, and the visitation of non-Iraqis is reflected in the Farsi, Indian, and Turkish elements in the local dialect. Many Iraqis make the trip once a year, and there are processions in the towns and villages of south- ern Iraq on the tenth of Muharram (Ashur), the anniversary of Husayn's death. Ritual mourning (taaziya) is performed by groups of men five to twenty each. Membership is voluntary, or it may be pledged by a baby boy's mother on his behalf. Contributions are solicited in a village or town to pay transportation for a local group to go Karbala for taaziya celebrations forty days after Ashur. There is great rivalry among groups from different places for the best performance of the ritual. In the villages religious readings occur throughout Ramadan and Muharram. The men may gather in the mudhif (tribal guest- house), the suq (market), or a private house. Women meet in homes. The readings are led either by a mumin (a man trained in a religious school at An Najaf) or by a mullah who has apprenticed with an older specialist. It is considered the duty of shaykhs, elders, prosperous merchants, and the like to sponsor these readings, or qrys. Under the monarchy these public manifestations were dis- couraged, as they emphasized grievances against the Sunnis. One 86 The Society and its Environment Western observer perceived a quality similar to Christian funda- mentalism. Sunni-Shia Distribution and Significance A prevailing line of contemporary political analysis of Iraq focuses on the sectarian division of the country between a ruling Sunni minority and a deprived Shia majority as a "key" to under- standing Iraqi society. Although official census statistics are not broken down on sectarian lines, there is general agreement that Shiite Iraqis constitute a majority of the population and are located chiefly in the environs of Baghdad and in the southern half of the country. The Sunni population, in Baghdad and the north, is fur- ther divided ethnically into Arabs and Kurds. Despite their nu- merical inferiority, however, Sunni Arabs have systematically dominated the political and military leadership of the country since the time of the Abbasid Caliphate (750-1258). Because of the historical record in Iraq and the contemporary dominance of the Arab Socialist Baath (Resurrection) Party (Baath Party) by Sunnis and because of the resurgence in the 1970s of Islamic fundamentalism and sectarian strife and violence in such states as Afghanistan, Egypt, Iran, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Turkey, most foreign observers identify the cleavage between the Sunni Arab and Shiite communities as potentially one of the more seri- ous problems in Iraqi society. Other observers, however, tend to discount the seriousness of the sectarian differences. According to the latter category of observers, sectarian affilia- tions and differences must be related to other important and often overlapping points of social cohesion and division, including those of family, kinship, and locality. Sunni urban dominance, rein- forced by Ottoman and British rule, lies behind the phenomenon of "minority rule." Only in Basra do the Sunnis not constitute the bulk of the urban population. As city dwellers Sunnis occupied administrative and military posts and were most exposed to "mod- ernizing" influences. By contrast, the Shiites had little contact with state authorities. The holy cities were virtually self-governing entities. Elsewhere urban Shias were mainly engaged in commerce or theology rather than administration. There were few if any Shias among the trained Ottoman officials. Schools and opportunities for secular education were located almost exclusively in the larger towns, especially Baghdad. Thus Sunnis, not Shiites, were channeled into teaching and administrative and military careers. Under the mon- archy Sunni and Shia shaykhs collaborated fully in maintaining the status quo. In contrast to the situation in the northern region, the fundamental social conflict in the southern half of Iraq was be- tween landlord and peasant; virtually all the peasants and most of the landlords were Shiites. These facts are deeply rooted in the sharp sectarian division within Islam, but the sectarian element itself has been progres- 87 Iraq: A Country Study sively modified and diluted as Iraqi society has undergone wrench- ing changes during the middle decades of the twentieth century. Since the 1958 revolution the growing importance of local ties has been pronounced. Under the reign of Abd al Karim Qasim, him- self of mixed Sunni-Shia parentage, these localistic concerns were acknowledged and played off against one another. Since 1963, under the Arif regimes and culminating in the Baath regime that seized power in 1968, local ties have become even more promi- nent, but the sectarian element seems to be least important. The Baath regime did not emphasize its Sunni character. There was opposition, but—according to this argument—it cannot be iden- tified as Shia per se. The geographical base of the regime corre- sponds to what Abbas Kelidar terms the "Sunni triangle" between Baghdad, Mosul, and Ar Rutbah but reflects ties of coresidence, kinship, and family, not sect. This high concentration in the Baath Party of Sunnis from the north and particularly from around the Tikrit area contrasts with the party's professed interest in broadening its social and geo- graphical base, but it coincides precisely with the weakening of the social and geographical correspondence of sectarian ties. In summary, according to this minority viewpoint, the massive mi- gration of destitute and largely Shiite peasants to the cities, espe- cially Baghdad—along with the expansion of educational and other social services and more recently the large-scale industrial investments to the countryside—steadily lessens the significance of the Sunni-Shia division. Social Systems The impact of Western penetration on the indigenous social and demographic structure in the nineteenth century was profound. It took the initial form of transportation and trading links and the orientation of tribal-based subsistence agriculture toward cash crop production—mostly dates—for export (see Agriculture, ch. 3). As this process accelerated the nomadic population decreased both relatively and in absolute numbers, and the rural sedentary population increased substantially, particularly in the southern region. This was accompanied by a pronounced transformation of tenurial relations: the tribal, communal character of subsistence production was transformed on a large scale into a landlord-tenant relationship; tribal shaykhs, urban merchants, and government officials took title under the open-ended terms of the newly pro- mulgated Ottoman land codes. Incentives and pressures on this emerging landlord class to increase production (and thus exports and earnings) resulted in expanded cultivation, which brought more and more land under cultivation and simultaneously ab- sorbed the "surplus" labor represented by the tribal, pastoral, and nomadic character of much of Iraqi society. This prolonged pro- cess of sedentarization was interrupted by the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire during and after World War I, but it 88 The Society and its Environment resumed with renewed intensity in the British Mandate period, when the political structure of independent Iraq was formed (see World War I and the British Mandate, ch. 1). This threefold transformation of rural society—pastoral to agri- cultural, subsistence to commercial, tribal-communal to landlord- peasant or landlord-serf—was accompanied by important shifts in urban society as well. There was a general increase in the number and size of marketing towns and their populations; but the de- struction of handicraft industries, especially in Baghdad, by the import of cheap manufactured goods from the West led to an absolute decline in the population of urban centers. It also indeli- bly stamped the subsequent urban growth with a mercantile and bureaucratic-administrative character that is still a strong feature of Iraqi society. Thus the general outline and history of Iraqi population dynam- ics in the modern era can be divided into a period extending from the middle of the nineteenth century to World War II character- ized chiefly by sedentarization and a period since then character- ized chiefly by urbanization, with a steady and growing move- ment of people from the rural (especially southern) region to the urban (especially central) region. Furthermore the basic trends of the current period are rooted in the particularly rapacious and exploitative character of agricultural practices as regards both the land itself and the people who work it. Declining productivity of the land, stemming from the failure to develop drainage along with irrigation facilities, and the wretched condition of the pro- ducers have resulted in a potentially fatal demographic trajectory —the depopulation of the countryside—that in the late 1970s con- tinued to bedevil the government's efforts to reverse the decades- long pattern of declining productivity in the agricultural sector. The basic features of Iraq's population dynamics as recounted above can also be seen in M. S. Hassan's statistical reconstruction. The share of the northern region in the overall population stood at 20.7 percent in 1867, rose to 28.9 percent in the late 1930s, and in 1965 stood at 26.6 percent. The central region accounted for 38.4 percent in 1867, declined to 33.0 percent in 1890 and was at that level in 1919, but grew to 48.2 percent by 1965 and was even higher in the late 1970s. This growth of the central region since World War II has been mainly at the expense of the southern region, which declined from a high of 43.5 percent in 1890 to only 25.2 percent of the population in 1965. The accelerated urbanization process since World War II is starkly illustrated in the shrinking proportion of the population living in rural areas: 61 percent in 1947, 56 percent in 1965, and only 36 percent in 1977. The rural exodus has been most severe in Al Basrah, Al Qadisiyah, and Dhi Qar governorates. The propor- tion of rural to urban population was lowest in the governorates of Karbala (27 percent in 1965 and 18 percent in 1975), Al Basrah (37 percent and 27 percent), and Baghdad (48 percent and 16 89 Iraq: A Country Study percent). It was highest in Maysan, Wasit, As Sulaymaniyah, and Al Qadisiyah governorates. Between 1957 and 1967 the popula- tions of Baghdad and Al Basrah governorates grew by 73 percent and 41 percent respectively. During the same years the city of Baghdad grew by 87 percent and the city of Basra by 64 percent. Rural Society The sedentary, rural features that continue to characterize much of contemporary society are infused with aspects of the largely tribal mode of social organization that prevailed over the centuries and that still survives—particularly in the more isolated rural areas, such as the rugged tableau of the northwest and the marshes of the south. This tribal mode probably originated in the unstable social conditions that resulted from the protracted de- cline of the Abbasid Caliphate and the subsequent cycles of inva- sion and devastation. In the absence of a strong central authority and the urban soci- ety of a great civilization, society devolved into smaller units under conditions that placed increasing stress on prowess, deci- siveness, and mobility. Under these conditions the tribal shaykhs emerged as a warrior class, and this process facilitated the ascend- ancy of the fighter-nomad over the cultivator. The gradual process of sedentarization that began in the mid- nineteenth century brought with it an erosion of shaykhly power and a disintegration of the tribal mode. Under the British Mandate and the monarchy that was its legacy, a curious reversal took place. Despite the continued decline of the tribe as a viable and organic social entity, the enfeebled power of the shaykhs was restored and enhanced by the British in their effort to develop a local ruling class that could maintain security in the countryside and otherwise head off political challenges to British access to Iraq's mineral and agricultural resources and Britain's paramount role in the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms. Through the specific im- plementation of land registration, the traditional pattern of com- munal cultivation and pasturage—with mutual rights and duties between shaykhs and tribespeople—was superseded by the insti- tution of private landed property and the expropriation by the shaykhs of tribal lands as private estates. The status of the tribes- people was drastically reduced to that of sharecroppers and labor- ers. The additional ascription of judicial and police powers to the shaykh and his retinue left the tribespeople-cum-peasants as vir- tual serfs, continuously in debt and servitude to the shaykh turned landlord and master. The social basis for shaykhly power had been transformed from military valor and moral rectitude to an effec- tive possession of wealth as embodied in vast landholdings and a claim to the greater share of the peasants' production. This was the social dimension of the transformation from a sub- sistence, pastoral economy to an agricultural economy linked to the world market. It was, of course, an immensely complicated 90 P*«K 9 Marsh Arabs Courtesy Middle East Photographic Archive, London Traditional houses of Marsh Arabs Courtesy Middle East Photographic Archive, London 91 Iraq: A Country Study process, and conditions differed in various parts of the country. The main impact was in the southern half—the riverine economy —more than in the more sparsely populated, rain-fed northern area. A more elaborate analysis of this process would have to look specifically at the differences between Kurdish and Arab shaykhs, between political and religious leadership functions, between Sunni and Shia shaykhs, and between nomadic and riverine shaykhs, all within their ecological settings. In general the biggest estates developed in areas most recently restored to cultivation through dam construction and pump irrigation after World War I. The most autocratic examples of shaykhly rule were in the ricegrowing region near Al Amarah, where the need for organized and supervised labor and the rigorous requirements of rice culti- vation generated the most oppressive conditions. Here the size of the shaykh's private army (hushiyyah) exceeded the general ratio of one for every ten tribesmen that prevailed elsewhere in the south. The role of the tribe as the chief political-military unit was already well eroded by the date of the overthrow of the mon- archy in July 1958. The role of some tribal shaykhs had been abolished by the central government. In Al Amarah, Al Kut, and elsewhere many of the shaykh-landlords functioned as agents of the central government. The tribal mode survived longest in the mid-Euphrates area, where many tribesmen had managed to register small plots in their names and had not be- come mere tenants of the shaykh. Here the shaykh's role had been reduced to a mainly ceremonial one revolving around provisions for religious feasts, especially the Shiite observance of Muharram (see Islam, this ch.). Depending on the character of the individual shaykh, he might also have a traditional jural authority in the settlement of disputes and raising the neces- sary labor to maintain irrigation facilities. Despite the erosion of the historic purposes of tribal organiza- tion, the prolonged absence of alternative social links has helped to preserve the tribal character of individual and group relations. The complexity of these relations is impressive. Even in the south- ern, irrigated part of the country there are notable differences between the tribes along the Tigris, subject to Iranian influences, and those of the Euphrates, whose historic links are with the Arab beduin tribes of the desert. Since there were virtually no ethno- graphic studies available in early 1979 on the Tigris peoples, the following discussion is based chiefly on the research done in the Euphrates region. The absence of shared stratification patterns and even terminology for tribal units in the reports on the re- search is remarkable. The tribe represents a concentric social system linked to the classical nomadic structure but modified by the sedentary envi- ronment and limited territory characteristic of the modern era. The primary unit within the tribe is the named agnatic lineage 92 The Society and its Environment several generations deep to which each member belongs. This kinship unit shares responsibilities in feuds and war, restricts and controls marriage within itself, and jointly occupies a specified share of the tribal land. The requirements of mutual assistance preclude any significant economic differentiation, and authority is shared among the older men. This primary family unit rests within the clan, composed of two or more lineage groups related by descent or adoption. Nevertheless a clan can switch its allegiance from its ancestral tribal unit to a stronger, ascendant tribe. The clans are units of solidarity in disputes with other clans in the tribe, although there may be intense feuding among lineage groups within the clan. The clan also represents a shared territorial inter- est, as the land belonging to the component lineage groups cus- tomarily is adjacent. Several clans united under a single shaykh form a tribe (ashira). This traditionally has been the dominant political-mili- tary unit although, because of unsettled conditions, tribes fre- quently banded together in confederations under a paramount shaykh. The degree of hierarchy and centralization operative in a given tribe seems to correlate with the length of time it has been sedentary: the Bani Isad, for example, which has been settled for several centuries, is much more centralized than the Al Shabana, which has been sedentary only since the end of the nineteenth century. In the south only the small hamlets scattered throughout the cultivated area are inhabited solely by tribesmen. The most wide- spread social unit is the village, and most villages have resident tradesmen (ahl as suq—people of the market) and government employees. The lines between these village dwellers and the tribespeople have at least until recently been quite distinct, al- though the degree varies from place to place. As the provision of education, health, and other social services to the generally im- poverished rural areas increases, the number and the social influ- ence of these nontribal people are certainly augmented. Repre- sentatives of the central government, such as the irrigation engineer, take over roles previously filled by the shaykh or his representatives. A government school competes with the religious school. The role of the merchants as middlemen—buyers of the peasants' produce and providers of seeds and implements as well as of food and clothing—has not yet been superseded in most areas by the government-sponsored cooperatives and extensive agen- cies. Increasingly government employees are of local or at least rural origin; in the 1950s they probably were Baghdadis who took their assignments as exile and punishment and who contributed to the mutual antagonism that flourished between them and the peasants. In the late 1970s the economic base was still agriculture and, to a lesser but increasing extent, animal husbandry. Failure to re- solve the technical problem of irrigation drainage contributed to 93 Iraq: A Country Study declining rural productivity, however, and accentuated the eco- nomic as well as the political role of the central government. The growth of villages into towns and whatever signs of recent pros- perity were to be seen were more the result of a greater govern- ment presence than of locally developed economic viability. The increased number of government representatives and employees added to the market for local produce and, more important, pro- moted the diffusion of state revenues into impoverished rural areas through infrastructure and service projects. Much remained to be done in this area; in the mid-1970s the government an- nounced a campaign to provide electricity and clean water to the villages, the majority of which were still without these basic provi- sions. Most rural inhabitants lived in villages. In 1957 the average size was 265 persons in forty to forty-five households. The houses and buildings were monotonously similar; even the mosque was indis- tinguishable except perhaps for a plaque bearing an inscription from the Quran. In the south, which had about half of Iraq's crop- land and supported more than two-thirds of the rural population, the houses were made of mud and reeds. In the north they were more substantial, because of the availability of stone. The villages were located mainly along rivers or canals, and the dwellings were built in irregularly patterned clusters con- nected by narrow, winding alleys. The larger villages had a central area where the mosque and one or more coffeehouses and shops were located. Farmers, tradesmen, and government administrators (including the doctor, teachers, and so on) tended to live in their own defined neighborhoods and rarely intermingled. The mudhif was the social locus for the tribes- men. The coffeehouse served that function for the merchants, while the administrators and professionals kept each other's company at the Administrator's Club. Until recently there was little mobility between these groups, and each tended to look down on the others. The administrators probably had no kin ties in the region, wore Western clothing, had been exposed to the outside world, and often counted the days until they would be posted to a larger town or city. Very often Sunni administrators were posted to Shia villages. The merchants were from the region—if not from the same village—and were usually the sons of merchants. Educational facilities and expand- ing government roles in the rural areas were beginning to modify this pattern in the late 1970s. Impact of Agrarian Reform One of the most significant achievements of the fundamentally urban-based revolutionary regime of Abd al Karim Qasim (1958- 63) was the proclamation and partial implementation of a radical agrarian reform program (see Agriculture, ch. 3). The scope of the reform program and the drastic shortage of an administrative 94 The Society and its Environment cadre to implement it, coupled with political struggles within the Qasim regime and its successors, limited the immediate impact of the program to the expropriation stage. This accomplished the political task of the revolution, however, which was to break deci- sively the power of the landlord class while retaining the principle of private property. The largest estates were easily confiscated, but distribution lagged owing to administrative problems and the wasted, saline character of much of the land expropriated. More- over landlords could choose the best of their lands to keep for themselves. The actual impact of the reforms on the lives of the rural masses can only be surmised on the basis of uncertain official statistics and rare observations and reports by outsiders, such as the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). In certain cases the reform was merely nominal: the shaykhs of the Shammar tribe in northern Mosul, for example, continued to take up to 90 percent of the cultivators' crops—as payment for machine cultivation. In other places government officials ex- pressly saw their role as replacement of the shaykhs, and their open bias against the peasants as lazy and uncivilized louts hin- dered any modification of the tribespeople's historic distrust of the authorities. The development of cooperatives, especially in their capacity as marketing agents, was one of the most obvious failures of the program, although isolated instances of success did emerge. In some of these instances traditional elders were mobilized to serve as cooperative directors, and former sirkals, the clan leaders who functioned as foremen for the shaykhs, could bring a working knowledge of local irrigation needs and practices to the cooperative. The continued impoverishment of the rural masses was evi- dent in the tremendous migration that continued through the 1960s and 1970s from rural to urban areas. According to the Ministry of Planning, the average rate of internal migration from the countryside increased from 19,600 a year in the mid-1950s to 40,000 a year in the 1958-62 period and to 57,000 from 1966 to 1970; Baghdad alone received half of these migrants. More re- cent statistics suggest that some 80,000 to 90,000 persons annu- ally migrated to the urban areas in the 1973-75 period. A study of 110 villages in Nineveh and Babylon governorates concluded that depressed rural conditions and other variables—rather than job opportunities in the modern sector—accounted for most of the migration. There was little doubt that this massive migration and the land reform had significantly reduced the number of landless peasants. The most recent comprehensive tenurial statistics available in early 1979, the Agricultural Census of October 1971, put the total farmland (probably meaning cultivable land, rather than land under cultivation) at over 5.7 million hectares, of which more than 98.2 percent was held by "civil persons." About 30 percent of this Iraq: A Country Study had been distributed under the agrarian reform. The average size of the holdings was about 9.7 hectares; but 60 percent of the holdings were smaller than 7.5 hectares, accounting for less than 14 percent of the total area. At the other end of the scale 0.2 percent of the holdings were 250 hectares or larger, amounting to more than 14 percent of the total. Fifty-two percent of the total was owner operated, 41 percent was farmed under rental agree- ments, 4.8 percent was worked by squatters, and only 0.6 percent was sharecropped. The status of the remaining 1.6 percent was uncertain. Political instability throughout the 1960s hindered the im- plementation of the agrarian reform program, and the present regime has made considerable effort to reactivate it. Law 117 (1970) further limited the maximum size of holdings, eliminated compensation to the landowner, and abolished payments by beneficiaries, thus acknowledging the extremity of peasant in- debtedness and poverty. By 1975 the total expropriated reached about 2.55 million hectares, and distribution accounted for over 1.5 million hectares; nearly 1.3 million hectares were still under "temporary lease." The reform created a large number of smallholdings. It is likely, given the experience of similar efforts in other countries, that a new stratification has emerged in the countryside, characterized by the rise of middle-level peasants who, directly or through their leadership in the cooperatives, control much of the agricultural machinery and its use. Membership in the ruling Baath Party is an additional means of securing access to and control over such re- sources. The party seems to have few roots in the countryside. Early Baathist literature makes some references to land reform. Although the party has attracted many from rural backgrounds, these have typically been sons of small shopkeepers and petty officials interested in bettering their individual status rather than individuals from the peasant class. By the late 1970s there was a higher level of prosperity in the countryside, more as a result of the infusion and altered distribu- tion of income from the central government and the provision of various welfare services than of any increase in productivity. The establishment of schools and clinics and the provision of utilities were gradually altering the traditional isolation of the rural vil- lages. But this seemed to encourage rather than stem the flow of urban migration, given the significantly greater level of amenities available in the cities. Migration poses a serious threat of protracted labor shortages, particularly of the skilled labor essential to the mechanized agri- cultural projects being developed. In mid-1977 there was a report that the Planning Board had asked the Ministry of Interior not to alter the "profession" category on a peasant's identity card with- out proof that he had discharged any loan commitments to the 96 The Society and its Environment cooperative society, the Agricultural Bank, or other government agencies. Urban Society Iraq's society in the late 1970s was undergoing profound and rapid social change, and this change had a definite urban focus. The city has historically played an important economic and polit- ical role in the life of Middle Eastern societies, and this was cer- tainly true in the territory that is present-day Iraq. Trade and commerce, handicrafts and small manufactures, and administra- tive and cultural activities have traditionally been central to the economy and the society, notwithstanding the overwhelmingly rural character of most of the population. In the modern era—as the country witnessed a growing involvement with the world market and particularly after the development of oil exports en- hanced the commercial and administrative sectors—the growth of a few urban centers, notably Baghdad and Basra, has been astounding. Official demographic estimates in 1975 projected an increase in the rural population between 1970 and 1980 of only 2.7 percent, from 3,988,000 to 4,094,000. The urban population, by contrast, was expected to grow by 67.3 percent, from 5,452,000 to 9,120,- 000. In early 1979 population figures or estimates for individual cities and towns were not available after 1965. The census data to that date show the remarkable growth of Baghdad in particular, from just over 500,000 in 1947 to 1,745,000 in 1965. Its proportion of the total urban population increased from 30 to 48 percent, its proportion of the total population from 10 to 21 percent. In 1976 Baghdad's population was about 3.5 million, and observers be- lieved that the population of the capital might reach 4 million by 1980. The port city of Basra actually had a higher rate of growth from 1957 to 1965, 90 percent as compared with Baghdad's 65 percent, and displaced Mosul as the second largest city in Iraq. A number of towns in the north, including Irbil, As Sulayma- niyah, and Dahuk, have also witnessed very rapid growth; in- security resulting from hostilities between the government and Kurdish nationalist forces added to the familiar economic and social motivations in that area. In contrast to the central and southern parts of the country, where urban growth was heavily concentrated in Baghdad and Basra respectively, in the north the migration appears to have been more dispersed, to regional urban centers rather than to the major northern cities of Kir- kuk and Mosul. Descriptive and statistical details of the impact of these patterns of urban growth on the physical and spatial character of the cities were lacking for the 1960s and 1970s. In Baghdad, and presuma- bly in the other cities as well, there was little initial planning to cope with this explosion of people and the growth of slum areas. 97 Iraq: A Country Study Expansion in the capital had been quite haphazard; there were many open spaces between buildings and quarters. This fact is probably accounted for by the lack of any physical barriers to lateral expansion, especially once the major flood control projects of the 1950s were completed. Thus the squatter settlements that mushroomed in those years were not confined to the city's fringes. By the late 1950s the sarifahs (reed and mud huts) in Baghdad were estimated to number 44,000, almost 45 percent of the total number of houses in the capital. These slums became a special target for Qasim's government. Special efforts were directed at improving the housing and liv- ing conditions of sarifah dwellers. Housing and municipal ser- vices have always been favored areas of government welfare spending. Between 1961 and 1963 many of the sarifah settle- ments were eliminated and their inhabitants moved to two large housing projects on the edge of the city—Madinat ath Thawra and An Nur. Houses were made of fired brick. Schools and markets were also built, and sanitary services were pro- vided. Transportation into the city, where casual daywork pro- vided subsistence incomes, was one promient drawback, but the inhabitants of these projects became the staunchest sup- porters of the Qasim regime in its difficult days. The phenomenon of sarifah clusters has not been eliminated, of course, because the symptoms and not the causes were treated. In fact, this policy only increased the attractiveness of the city to those considering moving from the countryside, and by the mid- 1960s the sarifah dwellers had about doubled in number, to 500,- 000. The condition of the new settlements has reportedly deteri- orated, but in mid-1978 there was little visual evidence around Baghdad or Basra of the slums that characterize the cities in many other countries of the region. Another striking feature of urban migration in Iraq has been that it was permanent and involved entire families. The major- ity were peasant cultivators, but shopkeepers, petty traders, and small craftsmen came as well. Contact with the point of rural origin was not totally severed, and visits were fairly com- mon, but reverse migration was extremely rare. There was, at least initially, a pronounced tendency for migrants from the same village or locality to settle in clusters in order to ease the difficulties of transition and maintain traditional patterns of mu- tual assistance. Whether this pattern continued in the late 1970s was not known, but the pattern of neighborhoods formed on the basis of rural or even tribal origin was still a fea- ture of urban life. With the provision of relatively decent hous- ing for the slumdwellers after the 1958 revolution, the dispar- ity between urban and rural living conditions, coupled with the political and economic disruption of the countryside, instigated the increased migration. The urban social structure of prerevolutionary Iraq was 98 ^^ [ miiii 1 •"■hi. ■ 1 ■ i * i 1 11 l V : .. —--*i—- ^ v1"*** v^iiSMwessw Sfreef Scene, Baghdad Courtesy Middle East Photographic Archive, London .St It 99 Iraq: A Country Study dominated by the upper, ruling class, concentrated principally in Baghdad. This was a clearly recognizable and internally co- hesive group, distinguished from the rest of the population by its considerable wealth and political power. The economic base of the ruling class was landed wealth, but during the decades of the British Mandate and the monarchy—as landlords ac- quired commercial interests and merchants and government officials acquired real estate—a considerable intertwining of families and interests occurred. The result was that the Iraqi ruling class could not be easily separated into constituent parts: the largest commercial trading houses were controlled by fami- lies owning vast estates; the landowners were mostly tribal shaykhs but included many urban notables, government minis- ters, and civil servants. The land-owning class controlled the Parliament, which tended to function in the most narrowly conceived interest of those landlords. There was a small but growing middle class that included a traditional core of merchants, shopkeepers, craftsmen, profes- sionals, and government officials, their numbers augmented by the increasing number of graduates from the school system. The Ministry of Education had been the one area during the monarchy that was relatively independent of British advisers, and thus it was expanded as a conspicuous manifestation of government response to popular demand. It was completely oriented toward white-collar, middle-class occupations. Within this middle class, and closely connected to the commercial sec- tor, was a small industrial bourgeoisie whose interests were not completely identical with those of the more traditional sectors. Iraq's class structure at mid-century was characterized by great instability. In addition to the profound changes occurring in the countryside, there was the economic and social disruption of short- ages and spiraling inflation brought on by World War II. Fortunes were made by a few, but for most there was deprivation and, as a consequence, great social unrest. Longtime Western observers compared the situation of the urban masses unfavorably with con- ditions in the last years of Ottoman rule. The mass exodus of Iraqi Jews in the late 1940s and early 1950s as a consequence of the establishment of the State of Israel led to the subsequent rise of Shiite merchants and traders. Abrupt shifts in fortune and class standing were even more common for individuals and families. In considering Iraqi social structure in this period, the element of diversity with regard to social origin, local ties, sectarian affiliation, and preurban social patterns of status and prestige should not be ignored. The so- cial crisis that characterized Iraqi urban society after World War II and continued until the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 stemmed from the structurally feeble character of Iraq's ruling class and its inability to cope with the transformation of Iraqi society engendered by the infusion of money from post- 100 The Society and its Environment war oil exports and the emergence of new middle-class ele- ments. A key ingredient in the revolutionary transformation of Iraq beginning in the 1950s was the growth of oil exports and the increased revenues made available to the state. The social effect of industry as such was minimal: total local disbursements, includ- ing wages, were less than ID9 million in 1954 (for value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary). The oil sector accounted for over 35 percent of the country's domestic production of goods and services but employed only 0.6 percent of the work force. The royalties made available to the monarchy, however, were used directly and in- directly to finance construction, manufacturing, trade, and real estate. The largest expenditures were for dams and irrigation pro- jects that, under the prevailing social structure, benefited the large landowners almost exclusively; yet these projects were an important part of the infrastructure for the expanding economy in later years. Manufacturing, construction, and utilities accounted for nearly 14 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1956, and 12.5 percent of the work force. Gross output, which was mainly in manufacturing, increased by 59 percent between 1953 and 19S and by another 48.4 percent by 1960. Much of the growth in output and employment, however, was in construction (mostly of buildings), which accounted for 35 percent of total government expenditures. Although commodity production, both agricultural and indus- trial, remained low and put the burden for meeting increased demand on imports, it is notable that in this period the growth of profits in manufacturing exceeded that in commerce and trade, but total profits in the latter category remained higher. Trade (wholesale and retail), banking, insurance, and real estate in 1956 accounted for 10.7 percent of GDP and 15 percent of the work force. Some notion of the character of economic and social devel- opment in Iraq in this period can be seen from the 96-percent increase in profits from banking, insurance, and real estate over the 1953-56 period; during that period GDP increased by 67 percent, making it a boom period. The remaining noncommodity sectors—services and transportation—accounted for 12.2 percent of GDP and 8.6 percent of the work force. Public administration and defense accounted for 6.5 percent of GDP and 8 percent of the work force. Perhaps the most important aspect in the growth of the public sector was the expansion of educational facilities, with consequent pressures to find white-collar jobs for graduates in the noncommodity sectors. The demographic growth of the cities, especially Baghdad, reflects the fact that in the 1970s the oil revenues and agricul- tural surplus continued to be concentrated there in trade, con- struction, and real estate speculation. The impoverished peas- ants fleeing the land found even the parttime unskilled, poorly 101 Iraq: A Country Study paid jobs an improvement over conditions in the countryside. There was some growth and diversification of wealth and prop- erty within the elite, which had links to the land, the regime, commerce and, increasingly, manufacturing (see Other Indus- try, ch. 3). The working class was larger but more fragmented. Only 30,000 workers were employed in manufacturing units of ten or more, whereas the total number of wage workers, in- cluding those in the services sector, was estimated at 442,000. Between the elite and the working masses was the lower mid- dle class, or petty bourgeoisie. The traditional component con- sisted of the thousands of small handicraft shops, which made up a huge part of the so-called manufacturing sector, and the even more numerous one-man stores. The newer and more rap- idly expanding part of this class was made up of the professionals and semiprofessionals employed in services and the public sector, including the officer corps, and the thousands of students looking for scarce jobs, whose orientation was unmistakably toward com- merce and the government bureaucracy. Stratification and Social Classes The prerevolution political system, with its Parliament of landlords and hand-picked government supporters, was increas- ingly incompatible with the changing social reality marked by the increasing pace of urban-based economic activity fueled by the oil revenues. The faction of the elite investing in manufac- turing, the petty bourgeoisie, and the working classes pressured the state to represent their interests. As the armed forces came to reflect this shifting balance of social forces, a radical political change became inevitable. The social origins and political incli- nations of the Free Officers (see Glossary) who carried out the 1958 overthrow of the monarchy and the various ideological parties that supported and succeeded them clearly reflect the middle-class character of the Iraqi revolution. It was a revolu- tion that underwent numerous coups and attempted coups in the subsequent decade as various groups contended for power (see Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy: 1963-68, ch. 1). Both the agrarian reform program and the protracted cam- paign against the foreign oil monopoly were aimed at restruc- turing political and economic power in favor of the urban- based middle and lower middle classes. The political struggle between the self-styled radicals and moderates in the 1960s mainly concerned the role of the state and the public sector in the economy; the radicals promoted a larger role for the state, and the moderates wanted to restrict it to the provision of basic services and physical infrastructure. There was a shift in the distribution of income after 1958 at the expense of the large landowners and businessmen and in favor of the salaried middle class and, to a lesser degree, the wage earners and small farmers. The Baath Party, in power since July 1968, 102 The Society and its Environment represented the lower stratum of the middle class: sons of small shopkeepers, petty officials, and graduates of teacher training schools, the law school, and the military academies. In the 1970s the largest employer was the government. The number of government personnel in 1977 was 580,132. This represented an increase of more than 50 percent since 1972 and 160 percent since 1968. The largest employer within the govern- ment was the Ministry of Interior, with 136,900 workers, almost as many persons as employed by all large public and private manu- facturing firms combined. These figures do not include the armed forces, estimated in late 1978 to number over 230,000 members. From the official statistics it is possible to construct an approxi- mation of the class configuration of Iraqi urban society. In 1976 there were 371,629 persons engaged in the commodity-producing sector: large and small manufacturing, utilities, and construction. This figure includes those not actually engaged in production— that is, employees in administration, marketing, and the like. An- other 307,097 persons were identified as working in the services sector: retailers, restauranteurs, transport workers, teachers, and health workers. Government personnel and the armed forces bring the total to 1.42 million, which is reasonably close to the 1.5 million estimated urban work force. Ascribing persons to the working class or middle class on the basis of occupational or educational categories alone is somewhat arbitrary and hazardous and obviously only an approximation, but data on income distribution simply were not made available by the government. Unskilled, semiskilled, and service workers in large manufacturing firms can be considered working class; skilled tech- nicians and those employed in marketing or administration can be considered middle class. In the small manufacturing sector, paid workers can be designated as working class; unpaid workers may be assumed to be owners or partners and thus petty bourgeoisie. The division for utilities and construction is equivalent to that used in large manufacturing. In the services sector, paid workers may be classified as working class; others are owners or partners and thus middle class or petty bourgeoisie. In the absence of any breakdown of transportation personnel, all those with a primary education or less may be considered working class: this number was 343,337 in 1976. The total of the urban working class so defined was about 670,000, of whom only 110,000 were produc- tion workers in large-scale units. Subtracting this number, plus those in the armed forces, from the earlier total, results in a some- what arbitrarily defined middle and lower class of almost 590,000, not counting the officer corps, lawyers, and other nonsalaried professionals. Many of those included here in the category of working class were so included mainly because it would be inappropriate or presumptuous to categorize them as middle class. With the breakup of large-scale private property and the almost total au- 103 The Society and its Environment a whole. The sharpest degree of divergence from these patterns occurs among educated urban Iraqis, an ever-increasing propor- tion of the society as a whole. Family life was until recently subject to regulation only ac- cording to religious law and tradition. All Muslims were brought under a single body of family law for the first time in 1959 with the enactment of a secular law on personal status, based on sharia, statutes from other Islamic countries, and legal precedents established in Iraqi courts; a brief amendment was enacted in 1963. The law spells out provisions governing the right to contract marriage, the nature of the contract, eco- nomic rights of the partners, divorce and child custody, as well as bequests and inheritance. The basic structural unit of the family consists of a senior couple, their sons, the sons' wives and children, and unmarried daughters. Other dependent relatives may also be attached to the group. The senior male is the head of the family; he manages its properties and has the final voice in decisions. Kinsmen are organized into still larger groups. The next level of organization is the lineage, composed of all persons, male and female, who trace their descent from a common male ancestor. The number of generations by which this ancestor is removed from the oldest living one varies; a depth of four to six generations is usual. Individuals or whole families of other descent sometimes attach themselves to a particular lineage in an arrangement of mutual advantage, becoming recognized after several generations as full members of the lineage on equal terms with those born into it. In small villages everyone is likely to belong to the same lineage; in larger ones there may be two or more lineages. In such places rivalry between lineages is common but is tempered by economic cooperation, intermarriage, and the authority of the village lead- ership or elders. Among nontribal Iraqis kinship organization and traditions of common descent do not go beyond the lineage. Awareness of distant kin ties is keen among recent immigrants to the cities and among the rural population. In rural areas new households are not usually set up until many years after the initial recognition of a marriage. In gen- eral the wife moves in with the parents of her husband, where the young couple remains for some time. Often this arrange- ment is maintained until the children of the third generation reach marriageable age or until the death of the father. Even when the father dies, the brothers sometimes stay together, forming joint family households that include themselves, their wives, and their children. The actual number of persons who make up the household is determined by the family's economic circumstances, pattern of living, and mode of habitation. In an agricultural setting, as long 105 Iraq: A Country Study as ownership of land and other possessions is vested in the family as a whole, the possibilities for a young man to set up an indepen- dent household are limited. In urban centers, on the other hand, young men can avail themselves of opportunities for wage-earning employment. In the cities there is a trend away from the extended family and toward a greater emphasis on the nuclear household as the principal operative unit. Authority within the family is determined by seniority and sex. The father, in theory, has absolute authority over the ac- tivities of the members of the household, both within the confines of the house and outside. He decides what education This children will receive, what occupations his sons will enter and, usually in consultation with his wife, whom his children will marry. These authority patterns also have been greatly weakened in the urban environment and by the shift of more and more responsibilities from the family to larger social insti- tutions, such as the schools. In practice, a wife may exert a considerable influence in the family, depending on the personalities involved. In a village the wife of a headman may influence the entire community. Moreover the wife in her later role as mother-in-law exerts significant au- y thority and influence over her sons' wives and children. Respect for masculine authority and seniority is carefully in- grained in children. Much attention is paid to the formal defer- ence owed to the father and elder brothers. In rural families sons —even after marriage—are expected to obey their fathers. A son may accompany his father to work in the field or to deliberations of the village council, but he should remain in the background and listen quietly to his elders. Within this general pattern a fairly wide range of variation can be observed. Among the Marsh Arabs, for example, a wife, both in theory and in fact, has little influence in family matters, scant authority over her children, and no opinions regarding management of the family finances. In towns and cities, by contrast, wives and children of middle-class families have in- creased weight in family affairs. Inequality of the sexes is fixed in customs and traditions to which the majority of the population remains attached. Great respect is given to men, especially to older men. Among women the possibilities for movement and the degree of free- dom are greatest for those of educated and middle-class fami- lies in urban environments. Even there, though, women are a distinct minority among the crowds in restaurants, cafes, and Xsuqs. Women's social life apparently still continues to revolve around activities in the home. The Muslim majority has traditionally regarded marriage as pri- marily a civil contract between two famlies, arranged by parents after negotiations, which may be prolonged and may be con- ducted by an intermediary. The arrangement of a marriage is a family matter in which the needs and position of the corporate kin 106 Baghdad University Courtesy Middle East Photographic Archive, London 107 Iraq: A Country Study group are the primary considerations. Often the prospective part- ners are known to each other. Frequently they come from the same village. Among educated urban dwellers the traditional pat- tern of contracting marriages is giving way to a pattern in which the young persons make their own choices, but parents must still x approve. Economic motivation and considerations of prestige and fam- ily strength all contribute to the traditional high value placed on large families. The greater the number of children, espe- cially sons, the greater the prestige of the father, and through him that of the family as a whole. Boys are especially welcome because they are the carriers of the family tradition and be- cause their economic contribution in an agricultural society is greater than that of girls. Between the ages of three and six children are given freedom to learn by imitating older siblings. Strong emphasis is then placed on conformity with elders' patterns and on loyalty and obedience. Family solidarity is stressed. The passage from adolescence to ma- turity is swift. Upon reaching puberty there traditionally is a sepa- ration of the sexes, and girls are excluded from male society except that of their close kin. Great emphasis is placed on premarital y chastity, and this is one reason for early marriages. Boys have greater freedom during adolescence than girls and begin to be drawn into the company of their fathers and the world of men. Education and Welfare Education The impact of government policies on the class structure and stratification patterns can be imputed from available statistics on education and training as well as employment and wage struc- tures. Owing to the historic emphasis on the expansion of educa- tional facilities, the leaders of the Baath Party and indeed much of Iraq's urban middle class were able to move from rural or urban lower class origins to middle and even top positions in the state apparatus, the public sector, and the society at large. This social history is confirmed in the efforts of the government to generalize opportunities for basic education throughout the country. Between 1968 and 1978 the number of primary-school students increased 101 percent; female students increased 156 / percent, from 29 to 37 percent of the total. The number of pri- mary-school teachers increased 66 percent over this period. At the secondary level the number of students increased by 132.5 per- cent, and the number of female students increased by 178 per- cent, from 25 to 30 percent of the total. Baghdad, which has about 27 percent of the population, has 30 percent of the primary stu- dents, 34 percent of the female primary students, and 40 percent of the secondary students. Education was provided by the government through a centrally organized school system. In the late 1970s the system included a 108 The Society and its Environment six-year primary (or elementary) level known as the first level. The second level, also of six years, consisted of an intermediate-second- ary and an intermediate-preparatory, each of three years. Gradu- ates of those schools could, as appropriate, enroll in a vocational school, one of the teacher training schools or institutes, or one of the various colleges, universities, or technical institutes (see table 3, Appendix A). The ratio of students to population is higher than average in the central region and lower in the northern and southern provinces, with the exception of Basra. The government has made considera- ble gains in lessening the extreme concentration of primary and secondary educational facilities in the main cities, notably Bagh- dad. Vocational education, which has been notoriously inadequate in Iraq, received considerable official attention in the 1970s. The number of students in technical fields had increased severalfold since 1972, to over 35,000 students in 1978. The Baath regime also seems to have made progress since the late 1960s in reducing regional disparities, although they are far from eliminated and no doubt are more severe than raw statistics would suggest. Baghdad, for example, is the home of most educa- tional facilities above the secondary level, although the universi- ties in Basra, Mosul, and As Sulaymaniyah between them enrolled more than one-fifth of all students in higher education in the late 1970s. Health and Welfare Almost all medical facilities were controlled by the government, and most physicians were Ministry of Health officials. Curative and preventive services in the government-controlled hospitals and dispensaries and the services of government physicians were free of charge. The ministry included directorates of health, preven- tive medicine, medical supplies, rural health services, and medical services. The inspector general of health, under the ministry, was in charge of the enforcement of health laws and regulations. Pri- vate medical practice and private hospitals and clinics were sub- ject to government supervision. In each province the Ministry of Health functions were carried out by a chief medical officer who also had a private practice to supplement his government salary. Provincial medical officers were occupied mainly with the administrative duties in hospitals, clinics, and dispensaries, which had been increasing even in the smaller towns. Their work in the rural areas was seriously curtailed by lack of transportation. One of the most serious problems facing the Ministry of Health was its shortage of trained personnel. The shortage was accen- tuated by the fact that most medical personnel were concentrated in the major cities, such as Baghdad and Basra (see table 4, Appen- dix A). Physicians trained at government expense were required to spend four years in the public health service, but they strongly 109 The Society and its Environment detail and observation. Rony Gabbay's work is useful, more for what it tells of the social origins of the members of the Iraq Communist Party than of the agrarian situation. And the de- tailed analysis by Edith and E. F. Penrose contains, inter alia, valuable observations on changing social conditions. (For fur- ther information see Bibliography.) Ill Chapter 3. The Economy Textile pattern of Iraqi design The Economy EARLY IN RECORDED time the people of Iraq found the will and the means to build a prosperous economy. Mesopotamia (the land between the rivers), despite its harsh environment, was turned into a granary for the region by a combination of organiza- tional and technological ingenuity. A large and efficient irrigation network was developed and maintained over thousands of years that contributed to the productivity of the fields that formed the economic base for much of the civilized world (see Ancient Mesopotamia, ch. 1). As a result of brutal invasions, the social organization weakened and changed, allowing the irrigation sys- tem to deteriorate. Productivity of the fields declined, and the area has languished in poverty for the past several centuries (see Population, ch. 2). Formation of the state of Iraq after World War I began a search for a combination of organizations and technology that would return prosperity to the inhabitants of historic Mesopotamia. The task proved formidable because of the need for numerous modifi- cations of existing customs and institutions, the many changes in leadership, and the abrupt shifts in economic policies. Even with the difficulties, progress was made. Between 1950 and 1976, for example, per capita national income increased from the equiva- lent of about US$85 to US$1,300, helped in large part by exploita- tion of the country's substantial crude oil reserves. By 1979 the economic achievements were not sufficient, how- ever, to provide a decent minimum standard of living for all Iraqis or a basis for self-sustaining growth in the future. Iraqi and foreign economists agreed that the high productivity of the soil of ancient times could be regained, and agriculture could again become a major contributor to the economy. An expanded farm output plus development of the country's several natural resources could pro- vide a base for substantial increases in industry. Most observers believed that Iraq had the ingredients to become prosperous again when the right combination of organization and technology was found. Growth and Structure of the Economy For hundreds of years before independence the economy had stagnated. Nearly all of the population was engaged in agriculture, largely in isolated villages. Production was by traditional tech- niques and implements, and yields were low. Most production was geared to the family's needs. The market for manufactured goods —the traditional handicrafts and utensils of local artisans—re- mained small. Elements of change began to appear after World War I. As petroleum-powered irrigation pumps, other farm machinery, and trucks became available, some investors recognized them as a 115 Iraq: A Country Study means of increasing crops, partly for marketing abroad. More im- portant, the government sought to modernize the economy and reduce the poverty of most of the population. When oil revenues began, the government became able to expand expenditures for economic development. Government services, construction, and import trade and distribution were the first sectors to benefit. The cycle of stagnation was broken, but economic growth and change continued at a slow rate for some time. By the early 1950s the economy was still quite primitive and poverty widespread. The bulk of the population was engaged in agriculture, which in 1953 accounted for 22 percent of gross do- mestic product (GDP). Irrigation had expanded, and commercial farming was increasing. Manufacturing was also beginning to de- velop. Most establishments were small, primarily for food process- ing, although a few relatively large plants, such as for textiles and cement, had been built. Other sectors, such as transportation and trade, were experiencing growth. In fact the period between 1946 and 1958 was one of substantial growth in many sectors as short- ages of goods induced by World War II, and accumulation of funds, and a rapid rise of crude oil exports—replacing in part the near cessation of oil exports from Iran in the early 1950s—stimulated production and investment. After 1958 economic expansion was subdued by a prolonged drought and the socialist transformation that was introduced after the revolution of July 14, 1958. As the development effort increased in the early 1950s, statisti- cal reporting was strengthened, and computation of national ac- counts began. Iraq, like other developing countries, had problems with the quantity and quality of its statistics. Collecting and proc- essing statistics involved many people as well as difficult concep- tual and definitional issues. A trial-and-error process was often required. Iraqi statistics were improving, although the reliability of some remained questionable. The process of improving usually required a new or revised series that made it difficult to make comparisons over time, and Iraqi economic statistics should there- fore be regarded as approximate rather than precise. The govern- ment regularly published only a small portion of the statistics compiled, hampering economic analysis, and a substantial time lag existed between events and publication. National accounts provided a convenient measure of the growth and changing structure of the economy. Between 1953 (the earli- est available) and 1976, GDP (in current prices) increased from ID323 million to ID4.58 billion (for value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary), an average increase of 12.2 percent a year. This high rate of growth was due partly to rising prices, particu- larly the sharp jump of crude oil prices in 1973 and 1974 obtained by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC— see Appendix B). A satisfactory method of computing GDP for this period for major oil-exporting countries had not been found. Al- though it is usually advantageous to treat growth in terms of con- 116 The Economy stant prices, this was not the case in Iraq in the 1970s. The rise of oil export prices in the 1970s represented an increased command over real resources for Iraq—in effect an abrupt favorable shift in the terms of trade. The 1953-69 period exhibited some interesting developments. Between 1953 and 1969 GDP (in constant prices) increased by an average of 6.3 percent a year. The oil industry exhibited the slow- est real growth, about 4.5 percent a year, because the rapid rise of Iraq's oil exports was before 1953; growth slowed in the 1960s because Iraq expropriated most of the concession areas of the foreign oil companies. The fastest growing sector was public ad- ministration (11.4 percent a year in constant prices) as govern- ment activities increased both before and after the revolution of July 14,1958. Manufacturing also grew rapidly (8.7 percent a year in constant prices), compensating for slow real growth by agricul- ture (5 percent a year) and construction (5.2 percent a year). In the 1970s the increases in the value of oil completely over- shadowed other developments. A constant prices series was una- vailable and was not desirable for the oil sector in the 1970s, although such a series would have been useful for other sectors. The mining sector, which was predominantly crude oil produc- tion, increased an average of 37 percent a year (in current prices) between 1970 and 1976. Construction activity exhibited an even higher growth rate (44 percent a year in current prices), reflecting the investment boom after the rise of oil prices. Other sectors expanded much more modestly. Manufacturing increased by 18.7 percent a year and agriculture by 8.1 percent a year between 1970 and 1976 in current prices. The difference in growth rates between sectors considerably altered the structure of the economy between 1953 and 1976. Agriculture, the source of employment for over half the popula- tion, became substantially less important in terms of value added and in terms of individual incomes during the period (see fig. 9). By 1976 manufacturing, including electricity, gas, and water, con- tributed almost as much to GDP as agriculture, and much more in terms of personal income of employees because employment in manufacturing was small. The mining sector, dominated by crude oil production, became much more important in the economy because of the rise of oil prices and in spite of a government policy to diminish dependence on oil. In the late 1970s the structure of the economy was expected to continue changing for the next several years. Government policy emphasized further efforts to make industry the main sector of the economy. Planners hoped to improve agriculture's performance —making the country self-sufficient in most foods and increasing the materials available for processing by industry—and to arrest the rapid decline in the sector.s relative share of total output. If these changes were accomplished, the oil industry would gradu- ally become less dominant in the economy. 117 Iraq: A Country Study GNP-1953 = 323 ID millions Agriculture 22% Other Services 9% Public Administration 6% Finance 1% Mining and Oil 407o Manufacturing Construction Transportation ™° and Communications 7% GNP-1976 = 4,583 ID millions Agriculture 8% Public and Private Services 10% Mining and Oil 54% Trade, Transportation, and Finance 12% Manufacturing 8% Figure 9. Structure of the Economy, 1953 and 1976 118 The Economy Labor Force and Trade Unions In 1976 the labor force was just under 3 million. Over half were employed in agriculture (see table 5, Appendix A). The other major source of employment was a variety of services (22 percent), of which government was the largest. In 1976 government social service employees totaled about 276,000, the largest number of which probably were teachers. Total public sector employment, including social services, amounted to 611,000, about 20 percent of the labor force in 1976. The number of women employed by the government increased sharply in the 1970s, but by 1976 they accounted for only 15 percent. A similar increase probably oc- curred in private nonfarm employment. The traditional position of women was changing, but slowly, and the bulk of the women in the working force were confined to farmwork. In 1976 over 19,000 foreigners were employed in non-farm- work. A large but unknown number of foreigners, most of whom were Egyptians, were engaged in farmwork. The public sector employed 4,535 Arab and 1,861 other expatriates in nonfarm jobs; over half of the total were technicians and specialists. The private sector employed 4,047 Arab and 8,901 other foreign workers. It was not clear if expatriates were included in the total labor force estimated by the government. Data on the labor force in the 1950s and the 1960s contained serious deficiencies. The investment and construction boom in the mid-1970s con- siderably increased the demand for workers in nonfarm employ- ment. Shortages developed in particular skills and perhaps in the overall supply of labor. Reports indicated some shortages of agri- cultural labor at harvesttime, for example. The planners an- ticipated a continuing migration of farmworkers to urban employ- ment between 1976 and 1980 and a decline of agriculture's share of employment to 44 percent even though farm production was expected to increase by over 7 percent a year. Importation of farm machinery and keeping it operational would be necessary if the required number of workers were to be released for nonfarm employment without affecting agricultural output. Unemployment was not a problem in the 1970s. Underemploy- ment was a problem, the extent of which was unclear. Observers usually noted an overstaffing in government offices and public sector enterprises. Planners hoped to improve the mobility of labor in the late 1970s in order that workers could and would shift from positions of underemployment or where their skills were not fully used to sectors in need of workers and particular skills. It was uncertain whether the supply of labor might become tight in the future or if shifts in kinds of employment would maintain the supply of workers for expanding industries. A considerable num- ber of workers were employed in petty trade and small shops at low wages; such workers' productivity would be much higher if they were employed in modern industry. 119 Iraq: A Country Study Shortages of a variety of skills were a major concern to the planners and to some economists represented the most important constraint to economic development. The shortages ranged from topflight managers and administrators to middle-level supervisors and foremen and to qualified technicians and skilled workers. In the 1970s considerable emphasis had been given to identifying the shortages and developing educational and vocational programs to meet the needs of the country. Many of the industrial projects purchased by the government from abroad included training pro- grams for the staff and workers. The government successfully en- couraged a number of trained and qualified Iraqis working in foreign countries to return and help in their country's develop- ment. The government guaranteed employment for all college graduates. The various measures contributed to raising the skills of the labor force, but the problem was a long-term one that would require even greater efforts in the future. In 1977 there were thirteen trade unions with a total member- ship of over 921,000. The unions were controlled by the Arab Socialist Baath (Resurrection) Party (Baath Party). Union functions included representing workers in negotiations with management, initiating grievance procedures, and providing such services for members as courses to acquire skills and political indoctrination. They played a collective bargaining role within well-defined lim- its. Strikes were legal after ten days' notice to the employer and the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. No strikes were known to have occurred since 1968. Free labor organizing was not allowed. The first trade unions were founded in the late 1930s and legal- ized in 1936, but they were proscribed and often persecuted dur- ing most of the period of the monarchy. In 1958 the United States Department of Labor estimated the number of Iraqi trade union- ists at a mere 821. After the 1958 revolution activity and applica- tions mushroomed, encouraged by the ensuing legislation. After the political turn to the right in the early 1960s—specifically the restrictions on and later persecution of the Communists—Iraq's trade unions reverted to a stifled existence. After 1968 the new regime largely met wage demands, intro- duced profit-sharing schemes, and institutionalized worker repre- sentation on the boards of various public and private enterprises in order to secure worker support. The representation, however, was token—representatives were selected from among the work- ers by the party, not by the workers themselve. By the mid-1970s signs of strain appeared between the regime and the unions, which it controlled, and the large firms, many of which it owned and managed. A concerted effort to raise worker productivity was launched in the fall of 1976. Responsibility for low productivity, which according to top government leaders had reached disastrous proportions, was allocated between manage- ment and labor. Most of the remedies, however, appeared to be at the workers' expense. The remedies included placing greater 120 The Economy stress on surveillance and discipline and trying wage increases to growth in productivity. Role of Government Since independence social considerations have been a major element behind economic policy. The thread of social concern linking economic measures was more obvious in some than in others, but seldom was it lacking. Social values better explained the sharp changes in policy affecting the economy—many of which turned out to be detrimental to productivity—than did purely economic goals, such as rapid economic growth. Although Iraqi governments were deeply committed to improving condi- tions for the bulk of the population, leaders of the different gov- ernments strongly disagreed on how to achieve that goal. The activities of leaders under the monarchy indicated a belief that an increase in the size of the economic pie would result in a larger piece for everybody even if some parts of the population obtained bigger pieces than others. In this view the role of govern- ment was to create the climate and conditions for economic growth. The government's development effort was largely confined to constructing water projects for agriculture, develop- ing the infrastructure, expanding the school system, and improv- ing health care. Very limited financial resources restricted the government's capital expenditures and the extension of services. Private invest- ment was encouraged through tax incentives and tariff protection. Before the 1950s tax revenues financed nearly all government expenditures because oil revenues were small. The tax system, essentially developed under British tutelage, relied heavily on indirect taxes because of their ease of collection. Early efforts to ameliorate the tenancy situation in agriculture were counterpro- ductive, and subsequent attempts were too small or were frus- trated by landowners with large holdings. The powerful landown- ers also were able to frustrate government efforts to tax their holdings, although they were the main beneficiaries of govern- ment expenditures on water projects. In many nations the oil industry differs from most other indus- tries in that payments for production and export go directly to the government and are in foreign exchange. This was the case in Iraq both when the foreign oil companies operated the industry and also since it was nationalized. This gave the government a power- ful tool to affect the direction and pace of economic development. In the early 1950s when the oil companies began to be taxed, government revenues increased substantially. The government at first allocated 100 percent of the oil revenues to capital expendi- tures for ecoonomic development but subsequently lowered the proportion as costs of current expenditures for such things as teachers' salaries and other services expanded. Under the monarchy a start had been made in developing the 121 Blacksmith in Kirkuk Courtesy FAO Photo by H. J. Hopfen 123 Iraq: A Country Study all levels was free, and health care was provided at a nominal charge or free. State stores sold basic foods at subsidized prices as part of a wider price control system. Subsidized housing (often part of state-run factories or farms), transportation, and credit were provided. By the late 1970s the government's role in the economy was pervasive. The number of government and public sector em- ployees had grown accordingly, amounting to 20 percent of the labor force in 1977. The quality of the staff in the government- owned sector of the economy left something to be desired, how- ever. Iraq, like most developing countries, had a severe shortage of a variety of skills in the labor force. Although educational and training programs had been rapidly expanded since the 1960s, the government's responsibilities and requirements increased more rapidly than qualified people became available. Observers noted overstaffing and bureaucratic delays in government operations. Unused capacity, poor quality control, and low productivity re- portedly caused operational losses in a number of industries. There were, however, some bright spots, such as the growing competence of Iraqi personnel in the oil industry and of some Iraqi managers of industrial plants. Since the Baath Party's accession to power in July 1968 govern- ment leaders have sought to improve the management of the economy. One example was the choice to increase government salaries, to reduce taxes and charges for electricity, water, and credit, and to expand imports as a method of distributing the sudden increase of oil revenues after 1973 instead of opting for higher levels of construction and investment as many other OPEC nations did. Because of this Iraqi officials partially avoided the high rate of inflation and other problems common in OPEC nations in the mid-1970s. Officials also emphasized completion of projects and full use of available capacity before starting new projects. Officials were aware of the huge role of government in the economy and the importance of improving operations and man- agement. Progress had been made on some problems, but observ- ers doubted that sufficient improvement could be achieved in a reasonable period of time. The form of economic organization chosen by Iraqi leaders demanded the skills and talents most lack- ing in the country. Many more able administrators, managers, and supervisors—and considerably more coordination between organ- izations—would be required in order to achieve the productivity and efficiency sought. The Budget The government's budget provided an important but only par- tial view of the public sector operations. Autonomous and semiautonomous public agencies had separate budgets, the sur- pluses or deficits of which were included in the government's ordinary (current) budget. Nationalized industries had separate 124 The Economy budgets, and net profits were distributed by law—part to finance development plans, part to employee social services, part to in- come taxes, and part to other accounts, including one to finance the enterprise's own expansion. A consolidated budget of public sector activities was not available, nor were data that would pro- vide an evaluation of nationalized industries. A complete view of the government's budget was readily availa- ble only occasionally. Published information primarily reflected revenues and expenditures of the government's ordinary budget and capital expenditures. The financing of development expendi- tures was published at times. In 1976, for example, proposed capi- tal expenditures were to be financed primarily by oil revenues (84 precent) and foreign borrowing (14 percent). Lacking more de- tailed information, it was not possible to discern year-to-year fiscal changes or causes for the changes. The broad trend of fiscal policy has been conservative, however. The emphasis has been on limiting expenditures to available financing. In 1972, for example, when the government anticipated a much sharper drop in oil revenues than actually occurred be- cause of nationalization of the main foreign oil company operating in the country, budget expenditures were cut sharply, and other measures were taken to restrict the impact on the budget and foreign exchange reserves. Borrowing, at home and abroad, was resorted to when necessary, but available evidence through 1978 suggested that debt burden was minimal, particularly after oil revenues increased dramatically in 1974. Revenues The source of government revenues altered considerably be- tween the late 1940s and the late 1970s. Up to the early 1950s government expenditures were financed primarily by indirect taxes, largely import tariffs and excise taxes. In fiscal year (FY—see Glossary) 1949 these taxes supplied 42 percent of government revenues, and oil revenues accounted for only 12 percent of total revenues. After taxing of oil company operations began in FY 1951, oil revenues increasingly became the source of government revenue. In FY 1970 oil revenues were 52 percent of total reve- nues. The sharp jump of earnings per barrel of oil exported after 1973 increased the importance of oil to the budget. Oil revenues accounted for 82 percent of total revenues in 1976. The growth of oil revenues reduced the importance of and the effort devoted to expanding the tax system. An important change occurred in the definition of oil revenues with nationalization. When foreign oil companies operated the fields (essentially before 1972), the government received royalty and tax payments in foreign exchange that were free of any ex- pense. After nationalization the government began operating a large business that required substantial payments for current ex- penses and investments. It was not clear what basis was used to 125 Iraq: A Country Study calculate oil revenues in the budget after 1972; the basis could be approximately gross sales or closer to net profits. Customs duties were the principal source of government in- come after oil (see table 6, Appendix A). Imports rose sharply after 1973, increasing customs duties accordingly. Income taxes were a minor source of revenue; they were collected primarily from large businesses, mostly in the public sector, and from salaried white- collar workers, mainly government employees. Revenues from government organizations appeared smaller than might be ex- pected, but the cause was not apparent. Agriculture was lightly taxed. Expenditures For many years government expenditures have been separated into ordinary and development budgets. The ordinary budget contained the recurring (current) expenditures, primarily the op- erating expenses of ministries. Defense was the most important until at least 1976, when it accounted for 33 percent of ordinary expenditures (see table 7, Appendix A). In the 1970s military spending rose rapidly because of greater force levels and escalat- ing costs of equipment (see Economic Impact, ch. 5). Subsidy costs contributed to the rapid rise of financial and economic expendi- tures, which exceeded defense costs in 1976. The capital budget was prepared by the Ministry of Planning and reflected annual allocations to implement the national devel- opment plans (see table 8, Appendix A). Since the 1950s the devel- opment budget has increased much faster than the ordinary bud- get, reflecting the increase of oil revenues and their allocation to economic development. In 1976 the proposed capital budget slightly exceeded the ordinary budget. Historically actual devel- opment expenditures have been substantially lower than the funds allocated in the budget. Development Plans A rudimentary form of development planning began early. When oil was discovered in 1927, the revenues were treated as a budgetary surplus, the start of the capital budget. A list of projects to be executed over three years was drawn up to use the funds. A series of multiyear plans followed. A formal organization, the Development Board, was established in 1950 in anticipation of much higher oil revenues. Initially all oil revenues were assigned to the board, but the proportion was re- duced to 70 percent in 1952. The board was charged with prepar- ing plans for development of the economy and increasing living standards. The board received exceptional autonomy, which was revoked in 1953 by revising membership and subordinating it to ministerial control. The Ministry of Planning was established in 1959, and the Plan- ning Board was created as a replacement for the Development Board. Oil revenues allocated to development planning were re- 126 The Economy duced to 50 percent at the same time. Some organizational changes occurred in the 1960s. By the mid-1970s the Planning Board established development policy and priorities including plan targets. The Ministry of Planning formulated the actual plans. An office of planning was established in each ministry concerned with development plans; financing and supervision were provided by the Ministry of Planning. The planning offices helped formulate sectoral plans and were responsible for their implementation. The cross-financing and control were intended to improve coordina- tion and follow-up between the Ministry of Planning and the sec- tor ministries and between the government's ordinary and devel- opment budgets. Several autonomous agencies, such as the Central Statistical Organization and a computer center, were placed directly under the Planning Board. Between 1951 and 1970 seven development plans were formu- lated, mostly to cover four- or five-year periods. Only the one covering the 1965-70 period ran its full course. The others were uncompleted largely because of coups and unexpected changes in oil revenues. The plans became more sophisticated over time and expanded in terms of social content. The total of investments in the plans also increased, partly because of rising costs but even more because of greater efforts to develop the economy. The seven plans anticipated total expenditures of over ID 1.9 billion between 1951 and 1970. Actual expenditures totaled nearly ID960 million, an implementation rate of slightly less than 50 percent. Implementation was much closer to the actual reve- nues allocated to the plan, reflecting in part the close link between oil revenues and economic development, although the link was not necessarily close each year. Broadly speaking the plans of the 1950s assigned priority to agriculture, and the 1960 plans slightly favored industry. Allocations for transportation and social infra- structure diminished in percentage terms in the 1960s, reflecting the growing economy and the funds that could be devoted to industry and agriculture. There was considerable variation in im- plementation between sectors in the different plans; but in gen- eral, housing and other building fared better, and agriculture fared the worst. Industry and transportation were in intermediate positions. The 1965-70 plan was the first to incorporate macroeconomic goals. Gross national product (GNP) was to increase by 8 percent a year (6 percent per capita); actual growth over the period was 5.4 percent a year (1.5 percent per capita). Consumption and investment growth equaled or exceeded the plan targets. Growth by sectors was substantially below the plan, particularly in agricul- ture and industry. The National Development Plan, 1970-74, aimed at improving the welfare of the population and diversifying the economy. The initial planned investments were ID952 million from the central government, financed primarily by oil revenues; ID495 million 127 Iraq: A Country Study from public organizations, mostly self-financed by the organiza- tions' own funds; and ID285 million from the private sector, largely for construction (particularly housing). This plan was sub- jected to considerable alteration. The central government's planned development expenditures were increased by nearly 80 percent during the second year of the plan. Actual expenditures were curtailed in 1972 when nationalization of the principal for- eign oil company was enacted. Planned government investments were raised again in 1973 and 1974, reaching ID 1.9 billion for the five-year period. Iraq's miniversion of the Persian Gulf investment boom was reflected in planned government investments, increas- ing from ID310 million in 1973 to ID1.17 billion in 1974. Actual investments were substantially less than planned (see table 9, Ap- pendix A). In the original draft of the 1970-74 plan agriculture regained priority in planned investments by the central government, ac- counting for 35 percent of the total. As investment goals were revised upward, agriculture's share diminished, however. After the upward revisions, agriculture and industry each were al- located about 20 percent of total central government planned investment. Implementation of government investments in indus- try was high—84 percent of that planned—and resulted in indus- try's receiving 28 percent of actual expenditures. Nationalized industries, especially oil, were to finance a substantial investment program, but the results were not available in early 1979. Data also were unavailable on the macroeconomic goals of the plan. The many plans exhibited a gap between expectations and re- sults, reflecting both overly ambitious programs and difficulties of implementation. The planning staff increased substantially in size and professionalism. Iraqi professionals had been trained in many universities abroad, and the plans reflected increasing sophistica- tion. But a tremendous difference existed between establishing goals and turning them into a working reality; the large expansion of programmed investments in 1974 illustrated that point. Many more people than planners were involved. In addition considera- ble coordination was necessary to assemble the proper pieces at the right time. The government's problems of personnel and or- ganizations in other economic activities were equally prevalent in plan implementation. Some economists had expected that the planning skills acquired abroad would have improved coordina- tion between the amount and kind of investment and the materi- als available and the shortages and strengths of the labor force. A new five-year development plan was not announced at the completion of the 1970-74 plan. The cause apparently was dis- agreement among the leadership about the scope and plan tar- gets. Annual development budgets filled the void from 1975 to 1977. In June 1977 a development plan for the 1976-80 period was ratified. The 1976-80 plan, at least in an English translation, did not 128 The Economy include investment goals, which reportedly were the equivalent of nearly US$50 billion over the five years. If these reports were true, a tremendous rise in the investment program was planned —more than a sevenfold increase over planned government in- vestments in the 1970-74 plan and an even greater increase over actual government development expenditures. Investments on the scale reported suggested a substantial planned increase of oil production and exports in the 1976-80 period. The 1976-80 development plan contained numerous sector goals. National income was targeted to increase 16.8 percent a year in constant prices (13.3 percent a year on a per capita basis), the oil industry 15.5 percent a year, processing industries 32.9 percent a year, and the agricultural sector 7.1 percent a year. Specific production targets were listed for many industrial and agricultural commodities although not for crude oil. Quantitative goals were also given for education, vocational training, and as- pects of health care. Continuation of the socialist transformation of the economy was stressed, although private sector activity in limited fields was encouraged. The plan goals appeared overly optimistic to many observers, for the goals represented substantial jumps over economic per- formance in earlier plans. The 1976-80 plan pointed out the diffi- culties and bottlenecks in the economy in the mid-1970s, but the planners appeared to assume they would be corrected quickly to allow production to achieve the targets. Rapid solution of the economic problems would sharply increase output and improve the living standards of the population. The Oil Industry The oil industry has been central to the development of the economy. In the years between the two world wars, it was a vehicle for the introduction of modernizing influences into the traditional way of life. The process was slow at first because pe- troleum activity remained primarily a foreign enclave that had little direct impact on other sectors, and oil revenues were a small part of total revenues. Nonetheless the growth of reve- nues and the diffusion of skills to other sectors by workers trained in the oil industry had a cumulative effect on the rest of the economy. The economic boost provided by petroleum accelerated after the 1940s as production and revenues per barrel increased, particularly in the 1970s. Since the 1950s oil exports have financed the bulk of the coun- try's economic development. In spite of the growth of other sec- tors, the importance of the petroleum industry increased because of the rapid rise of export prices for crude oil established by OPEC in the 1970s (see Appendix B). By 1976 the oil industry accounted for over half of GDP, 82 percent of budget revenues, and over 90 percent of foreign exchange earnings. In 1977 oil revenues amounted to about US$9.6 billion. Nonetheless government pol- 129 Iraq: A Country Study icy sought to diminish the importance of oil by diversifying the economy. The oil industry will continue to be a key sector of the economy for many years because of the country's plentiful petroleum deposits. The government does not publish official data about its oil reserves. United States government publications listing re- serves of the countries of the world showed Iraq's proven and probable oil reserves at the beginning of 1978 as 36 billion barrels and natural gas reserves as 35 trillion cubic feet. The Oil and Gas Journal and other petroleum publications indicated a similar mag- nitude for Iraqi oil reserves. Deposits of this size rank Iraq among the more important oil countries, roughly equal to the United States, the Soviet Union, Mexico, or the United Arab Emirates; but its reserves were considerably smaller than those of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, or Iran. Iraqi officials appeared optimistic about the size of the oil re- serves. For some years officials have suggested that reserves ex- ceeded 100 billion barrels. In 1977 journalists reported unofficial claims that the southern fields held 80 billion barrels of reserves and the northern fields 15 billion barrels, indicating that the coun- try's reserves were second only to Saudi Arabia's 150 billion bar- rels. In 1979 it was not possible to determine if Iraqis had a realistic basis for their optimism about very large reserves or if they were merely hoping for substantial discoveries in the future. Regardless of the questions about the country's oil reserves, Iraq was one of the more important oil countries of the world. Its reserves would permit production and exports for many years to come and at a level substantially higher than that of 1977. For reasons that are discussed below, Iraqi oil production for many years had been less than its known reserves would support. In 1977, nonetheless, the country ranked fifth among the world's producers and fourth among oil-exporting nations. Developments Through World War II Natural seepages fostered an early interest in Iraq's oil potential. After the discovery of oil at Baku (in the Soviet Union on the west side of the Caspian Sea) in the 1870s, foreign groups began seeking concessions for exploration in Iran and the area of the Ottoman Empire that became Iraq after World War I. A British group that over the years changed its name to the Anglo-Persian Oil Com- pany, then to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, and eventually to British Petroleum (BP) was granted a concession in Iran and dis- covered oil in 1908. Shortly before World War I the British gov- ernment purchased majority ownership of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In the late 1800s concession seekers began approaching the Ottoman government. They were primarily interested in Mosul and Kirkuk, where seepages had long suggested underground oil reservoirs. The discovery of oil in Iran stimulated greater interest 130 The Economy in oil in Iraq. Groups (largely financial) from several major nations approached the Ottoman government and engaged in protracted negotiations and considerable intrigue to obtain concessions. Al- though a few concessions were granted before World War I that related to oil, they resulted in little if any surveying or exploration. In 1912 several rival groups banded together to form the Turk- ish Petroleum Company (TPC) and to seek a concession. The guid- ing hand was Calouste Gulbenkian, who had been hired by British banking interests because of his knowledge and his ability to influ- ence decisions in the Turkish government. Although he initially had a larger share, his holdings in TPC were subsequently reduced to 5 percent—still enough to make him reportedly the richest individual in the world for many years and to give him the name of "Mr. Five Percent." The original purpose of TPC was to elimi- nate rivalry between the partners and to outflank the American concession seekers. The TPC did not eliminate the rivalry among the shareholders representing national interests. The British had long had a strate- gic interest in the Mesopotamian area of the Ottoman Empire because of its location relative to Britain's military and commer- cial routes to India. The British government's decision before World War I to convert the British fleet to oil as its fuel dictated control of supplies and transport of fuel for the country's needs. By early 1914 British officials had successfully reconstituted TPC —the Anglo-Persian Oil Company holding 50 percent of the shares—and exerted considerable pressure on the Turkish govern- ment to grant an oil concession to a British company, specifically to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In early 1914 the Turkish authorities provided a written promise to TPC of an oil concession, but World War I held up actual negotiations. World War I demonstrated to the major powers the importance of having their own sources of oil. The French claimed the Ger- man shares in the TPC that the British had seized in 1915 as enemy property. The British-French San Bemo Conference of 1920 provided for permanent British control of any company es- tablished to develop Mesopotamian oil but allocated Iraqi inter- ests 20 percent if they chose to invest. The French formed the Compagnie Francaise des Petroles (CFP) to hold the French shares in TPC. The Italian and American governments protested their exclusion. After prolonged and sharp diplomatic exchanges, American oil companies were permitted to buy into TPC, al- though negotiations were not completed until 1928. Groups other than TPC also sought oil concessions in the 1920s, but their chances were slight because they lacked the technical and finan- cial resources to carry out exploration and development. Although Iraq became a British Mandate in 1920, that appar- ently did not help in securing an oil concession. TPC, using the promise of a concession from the prewar Turkish government, began negotiating for one in 1921. A major point of contention 131 Iraq: A Country Study was the 20 percent of shares for Iraqis stipulated in the San Remo Conference. By the early 1920s TPC consisted almost entirely of oil companies, in contrast to its formation when financial groups were primarily interested in obtaining a concession that they could sell. The oil companies did not want Iraqi representation and interference in the management and operation of TPC. They successfully rejected Iraqi efforts to gain participation despite pressures by the British government to accept Iraqi shareholders. Many Iraqis felt cheated from the beginning of the concession, but some outside observers think that Iraqi participation in the com- pany would have made little difference in the development and performance of Iraq's oil industry. A concession was granted to TPC in March 1925. The term was for seventy-five years and covered twenty-four plots, to be se- lected by TPC. The Iraqi government would receive royalties at a flat fee per ton to be paid in English pound sterling but with a gold clause to guard against devaluation of the pound. Royalty payments were linked to oil company profits, but this clause be- came effective only after twenty years. The Iraqi government had the right to tax TPC at the rate of other industrial concerns. TPC was to build a refinery to meet the country's domestic needs and a pipeline for export of crude. The government had the right to lease other plots (apart from those TPC selected) for oil explora- tion and development, although TPC was not excluded from bid- ding on the additional plots. Iraqis have felt since then that the concession terms were far less than they should have obtained, and it was true that the government needed revenues more than the oil companies needed the concession. Nonetheless Edith and E. F. Penrose, well- known Middle East experts who were aware of the prevailing conditions of the world oil market and had studied the negotiating documents, concluded that Iraqi negotiators were knowledgeable and skillful and extracted the most that could have been obtained under the circumstances. TPC began constructing facilities and exploratory drilling after the concession was ratified by the government. Oil was discovered just north of Kirkuk on October 15, 1927 (see fig. 10). The well came in with tremendous pressure and poured tons of oil on the countryside before it was controlled. The signs indicated a large, valuable field, which in fact it turned out to be. The discovery of oil hastened the negotiation about the compo- sition and functions of TPC. The shareholders signed a formal agreement in July 1928. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Royal Dutch Shell group, the CFP, and the Near East Develop- ment Corporation (representing the interest of five large Ameri- can oil companies) each held 23.75 percent of the shares and Gulbenkian the remaining (but nonvoting) 5 percent. TPC was organized as a nonprofit company registered in Britain that pro- duced crude oil for a fee for the parent companies on the basis of 132 The Economy their shares. TPC was limited to refining and marketing for Iraq's internal needs to avoid any competition with the parent compa- nies. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company was awarded a 10-percent royalty of the oil produced to compensate for its reduced share in TPC. A major obstacle for American firms had been a clause of the 1914 reorganization of TPC whereby the shareholders agreed that any oil activity in the Ottoman Empire by any of them would be shared in by all partners in TPC. Gulbenkian had insisted on the clause so that the oil companies could not get around his interests by establishing other companies without him. This arrangement was continued in the 1928 reorganization where it became known as the Red Line Agreement. A red line demarked the former Ottoman Empire in which TPC partners could not act indepen- dently. The red line effectively precluded American and other TPC partners from concession hunting and oil development in much of the Persian Gulf region until after World War II. In 1929 the TPC was renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). IPC represented oil companies of diverse and sometime conflicting interests. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company and some of the American companies—especially Standard Oil of New Jersey (subsequently Exxon)—had major sources of crude oil outside of Iraq, in constrast to the CFP and one American company that wanted rapid development of Iraqi fields to augment their short supplies of crude. IPC had not selected its plots for exploration by the time specified in the concession, nor was a pipeline for tran- sporting crude to shipping terminals completed until 1934, appar- ently because not enough of IPC's parent companies were inter- ested in more crude. In response to these problems and others, IPC's concession agreement was renegotiated over three years and signed in March 1931 with a life of seventy years. The plot system was abandoned and IPC's exclusive area enlarged to 83,200 square kilometers, all east of the Tigris River. In return the government was to receive additional payments and loans, and pipelines to two Mediterra- nean terminals were to be completed by 1935. Some Iraqi politicians were suspicious of the IPC and particu- larly its monopoly position. In the late 1920s a group of British and Italian interests formed the British Oil Development Company (BOD) and sought to bid on plots held by the government. Subse- quently capital from other nations was added. In 1932 BOD re- ceived a seventy-five-year concession to about 120,000 square kilometers west of the Tigris and north of the thirty-third parallel. The terms were similar to those of IPC with the addition that the government was entitled to 20 percent of production for domestic consumption or to sell back to the concessionaire as a substitute for royalties. Although some oil was discovered, the finances of BOD proved insufficient. IPC helped BOD meet payments due the government and eventually bought out the other investors. By 133 Iraq: A Country Study Figure 10. Transportation and Oil 134 The Economy 135 Iraq: A Country Study 1941 IPC had taken over the BOD concession and formed the Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC), a wholly owned subsidiary, to explore and develop the area. The government was aware of the dangers inherent in IPC's monopoly position but also of the problems of attracting conces- sionaires of sufficient financial resources and technical expertise to find and develop oil fields. The experience with the BOD conces- sion underlined the latter problem. In 1938 when the government granted a concession for the southern region of Iraq—in which oilmen had become increasingly interested as oil was found lower in the gulf—the concession went to a sister company, the Basra Petroleum Company (BPC), formed by IPC shareholders. The terms were similar to the BOD concession, both of which were more favorable to the government than the earlier IPC terms. In particular the two latter concessions imposed drilling obligations and time limits for commercial development in an effort to coun- teract hesitation in developing Iraqi petroleum. Even though oil was discovered in 1927, production and export awaited completion of a pipeline. When France was allowed into TPC just after World War I, pipeline transit across its mandate territory of Syria was offered. The French wanted the coastal terminal at Tripoli, in what is now Lebanon. The Iraqis and the British preferred a terminal in Haifa. A line with a capacity of 4 million tons a year was completed in 1934; it led from the Kirkuk fields to Al Hadithah where it split, one branch going to Tripoli and the other branch to Haifa. Production and exports jumped to about 1 million tons in 1934 and nearly 4 million tons in 1935. Pipeline capacity became the limiting factor on growth of ex- ports in the 1930s, although the worldwide depression and the increasing amounts of oil produced in the gulf area also affected marketing. Additional pipelines were planned when World War II began. Italy's entrance into the war restricted shipping in the eastern Mediterranean, and Iraq's oil production declined from 4.5 million tons in 1938 to 1.8 million tons in 1941. In subsequent years it rose,and by the war's end exports exceeded the prewar level. The Oil Industry: 1946-61 With the end of World War II, IPC and its affiliates undertook repair and development of facilities in Iraq as rapidly as financing and materials became available. Exploration and drilling were particularly pressed in the Basra and Mosul areas to meet the concession terms. By 1951 commercial exports by BPC of good- quality crude had begun via a pipeline to Al Faw on the gulf, and prospects were favorable for additional discoveries. Oil reservoirs in the Mosul area were small and contained low-quality crude, but enough had been found by 1952 to permit commercial develop- ment and export, meeting the deadline of the concession. In 1952 production from Basra and Mosul approached 2.5 million tons 136 The Economy annually compared with about 15.5 million tons from the Kirkuk fields. Immediately after the war work was begun to remove the trans- port constraints on oil production. A larger pipeline to Haifa was nearing completion when the first Arab-Israeli war caused aban- donment of it and the line built earlier, reducing Iraq's oil produc- tion from 5.0 million tons in 1947 to 3.8 million tons in 1948. The larger pipeline to Tripoli was completed in 1949, however, per- mitting oil production to increase to 6.9 million tons in 1950. A thirty-inch pipeline (capacity of 13 million tons a year) was comp- leted in 1952 that led from the Kirkuk fields to Baniyas on the Syrian coast, effectively eliminating transport restrictions for a while. Between 1946 and 1960 oil production and export grew ra- pidly, production increasing from 5.0 million tons in 1946 to 47.8 million tons in 1960 (see table 10, Appendix A). Growth was greatest in the late 1940s and early 1950s because of the increased pipeline capacity and the decline of Iranian oil pro- duction and exports resulting from nationalization in that coun- try. Iraq's oil production jumped from 8.9 million tons in 1951 to 19.1 million tons in 1952 and 28.5 million tons in 1953. Iraq's oil revenues grew even more rapidly with the imposition of a 50-percent tax on the profits of all oil company operations in Iraq, the so-called profit-sharing arrangement introduced by Venezuela in the 1940s and first negotiated by Saudi Arabia in the gulf in 1950 (see Appendix B). IPC shareholders had to negotiate among themselves, with their governments, and with the Iraqi government before arrange- ments for the tax were signed in 1952, although the effective date was January 1, 1951. Since IPC and its affiliates were nonprofit companies producing crude oil at a fee for the parent companies, an artificial system of calculating profits had to be established. It was based on posted prices. The results of the tax more than doubled government revenues per ton of crude oil exported. The government also raised long-standing grievances with the IPC group during the negotiations. Since the 1920s Iraq had attempted to participate in develop- ment of its oil. The IPC negotiators had avoided the promise in the San Remo Conference that Iraqis would be allowed up to 20 per- cent of the shares in an oil company. In 1951 the Iraq government was still pressing for more involvement; in the negotiations re- quests were made for more training of Iraqis and for higher posi- tions for Iraqis in the IPC companies. Direct action was also initi- ated apart from the negotiations. Under the original concession, IPC was to supply domestic needs for petroleum products. This requirement was met by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. One of its subsidiaries operated a small refinery and distribution company southeast of Kirkuk near the Iranian border that supplied about 70 percent of the small 137 Iraq: A Country Study Iraqi market. The remainder of Iraq's needs (essentially in the south) came from the large refinery at Abadan, Iran. The system was efficient in economic terms but deficient in terms of Iraqi politics. Many Iraqis believed that local needs should be met locally, providing training and developing expertise in the process. As early as 1935 the government requested foreign advice about a local refinery; the report was unfavorable. In 1951 the government took over, with compensation, the small refinery and distribution company, temporarily retaining the Anglo- Iranian subsidiary as operator. At the same time an American contractor was hired to build a small refinery near Baghdad. This refinery was rushed into operation and expanded as a result of the decline of petroleum products available from Abadan during Iran's oil nationalization crisis. The Iraqis had taken the first step to control their own oil industry. During the remainder of the 1950s relations between the gov- ernment and IPC continued much as they had been. There was hard bargaining, and the government was always interested in improving its position. The government needed the oil companies and the revenues they produced; IPC was willing to continue investments and increase production even though it was the focus of considerable popular Iraqi hostilities. Production grew more slowly in the late 1950s, however, reflecting the return of Iran among the major oil producers and the increasing quantities of oil available from other Middle Eastern countries. Nationalization of the Foreign-Owned Oil Companies The 1958 revolution at first had little effect on the government's attitude toward IPC's activities. The government needed the oil revenues, and pronouncements were conciliatory. Moreover Iran's experience when the oil industry was nationalized was a constant reminder to the Iraqis of the power the oil companies still wielded. By late 1960, however, the government's attitude toward IPC had altered sharply. In early 1959 and again in mid-1960, the international oil com- panies unilaterally reduced the posted price for Middle East oil. Although there may have been a rationale in terms of the surplus of crude oil and the discounts being offered, the reduction of an artificial price reflected an insensitivity on the part of the oil com- panies to the problems of the governments of the countries in which they operated. A lower posted price significantly dimin- ished government revenues. The second reduction of posted prices—in 1960—resulted in a call by Iraq for a meeting in Bagh- dad of the major oil nations and subsequent formation in Septem- ber of OPEC (see Appendix B). Also in 1960 BPC announced a sharp reduction of future production because of increased port fees imposed by the Iraqi government. Government officials inter- preted BPC actions as attempted coercion. Whether these actions or others influenced the negotiators, 138 The Economy nues, and the oil companies needed the oil. The MPC was nation- alized in March 1973 when settlement of compensation claims was concluded with IPC. Settlement of the major issues—compensation for the national- ized assets and access of former IPC owners to Iraqi oil—de- pended in part on other activities. Iraq was trying to arrange oil sales, and IPC parent companies were involved in participation negotiations with several Arab oil states (see Appendix B). On February 28, 1973, a settlement was reached. IPC acknowledged Iraq's right to nationalize and agreed to pay the equivalent of nearly US$350 million in settlement of all government claims against the company, and in return the government agreed to provide 15 million tons of Kirkuk crude (its value at the time was over US$300 million) free of all costs in final settlement of all company claims. Some observers believed that IPC received a liberal settlement. The BPC was nationalized in stages. The October 1973 Arab- Israeli War provoked strong Iraqi statements and a call for an Arab oil boycott of the supporters of Israel. Although Iraq was subse- quently criticized by other Arab countries for not following the agreed cutback in oil production, Iraq did nationalize the Ameri- can and Dutch interests in BPC. In December 1973 Gulbenkian's shares (owned by his estate) were nationalized, and in December 1975 the remaining foreign interests were nationalized to com- plete government ownership and control of the oil industry. It required a full fifty years for the Iraqis to take over management of their most valuable resource, but in 1979 it remained to be seen whether Iraq could successfully meet its managerial manpower needs. National Control of the Oil Industry A basic reason for Iraq's striving to participate in IPC was to develop the skills and personnel needed so that Iraq could some- day run its own companies. Conversely the international oil com- panies were just as opposed to participation because, apart from troublesome interference in operations, they did not want to pro- vide the training that might hasten their own demise. And the ultimate weapon of the oil companies, which long restrained Ira- qis from asserting control over the oil industry, was the oil compa- nies' control of marketing. The increase in the number of buyers, particularly state-owned oil companies lacking large sources of crude oil of their own, gradually lessened the clout of the interna- tional oil companies after World War II (see Appendix B). Over the years Iraqis worked in IPC companies and developed various skills and learned aspects of the oil business. The number of Iraqis on the staff of IPC companies, for example, had increased from 241 in 1957 to 626 by 1967, and by the latter year only seventy-nine expatriates were employed out of a total staff of 705. The bulk of the fieldworkers were Iraqis. Nonetheless the highly 141 Iraq: A Country Study trained were too few to form more than a nucleus around which Iraqi organizations could be built. In 1951, when the government first took over domestic refining and marketing, the former own- ers and personnel had to be retained as agents to operate the business until Iraqis could be trained. In 1961, when the govern- ment expropriated 99.5 percent of the IPC group's concession area, the country lacked the personnel and organization to de- velop the area itself. Uncertainty and probably strong disagree- ment within the government held up formation of a national oil company. In February 1964 the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC) was established to engage in all aspects of the petroleum industry except refining and local distribution, which was already being carried out by other government organizations. INOC was closely linked to and supervised by the upper level of the government. For several years the company did little because of the lack of financial, technical, and managerial resources. Moreover there was indecision within the government about the role INOC should play. Some Iraqi officials thought the best results would be for INOC to work with the IPC companies, particularly in develop- ment of the North Rumaylah field. By 1967 attitudes had firmed within the government and precluded cooperation with IPC, par- ticularly allowing IPC to participate in development of North Rumaylah. In August 1967 these attitudes were formalized in law, granting INOC exclusive rights to develop the country's oil and prohibiting any further oil concessions. IPC was specifically restrained from regaining the North Rumaylah field, although IPC and other inter- national oil companies could associate with INOC in development of any of its areas. After the determination of government policy about the direc- tion of future oil development, INOC was reorganized in Septem- ber 1967. The company was placed under the office of the Presi- dent of the Republic, and the chairman of the board was given more authority in the government (i.e., the rank of cabinet minis- ter) and over the company. New departments were added and others strengthened to undertake the tasks planned. French, Egyptian, and Algerian experts assisted in the reorganization and the training of Iraqi personnel. Although INOC became much more active, it still lacked several necessary resources to develop Iraqi oil on its own. Foreign assistance was sought to develop the country's oil, par- ticularly from countries on which IPC might have difficulty apply- ing pressure or sanctions. Oil companies from France, Italy, Spain, Japan, and the Soviet Union expressed interest. The North Rumay- lah field was the primary attraction, eliciting bids even from IPC and one of its parent companies, CFP. On April 1968 the govern- ment made a distinction, reserving areas with proven reserves (essentially North Rumaylah) for exclusive development by INOC. 142 The Economy In November 1967 INOC concluded a service agreement with Enterprise de Recherches et d'Activities Petrolieres (ERAP)—a company owned by the French government—covering explora- tion and development in a large area in southern Iraq and offshore but excluding North Rumaylah. ERAP was to bear the full cost of exploration if oil in commercial quantities were not discovered but would recover costs if it were. ERAP was to finance development and be repaid with interest after production began. A 50-percent income tax would apply to ERAP operations; it would be able to buy a large part of the oil remaining after 50 percent of the reservoir was assigned to the Iraqi "national reserve"; various other terms were spelled out. Foreign experts disagreed on whether the financial benefits would be more favorable to Iraq than the IPC terms but, more important from the Iraqi point of view, the ERAP agreement provided financing and expertise but left decisions and control in Iraqi hands. ERAP discovered low- quality oil (heavy with a high sulfur content) in early 1970, but disagreements arose, and development lagged. Production started in mid-1976. In July 1977 Iraq took over operation and manage- ment of the ERAP fields but continued contractual deliveries to the French firm. During 1967 Iraq discussed assistance for oil development and for other sectors of the economy with officials of the Soviet Union, and a broad aid agreement was reached by the end of the year. Specific agreements relating to financing and to particular pro- jects in the oil industry apparently were delayed until about mid- 1969, in part at least because of the Baath Party coup in 1968. The Soviet Union supplied drilling rigs, pumps, tankers, and other equipment and a large contingent of technicians. By 1973 Soviet economic credits, probably covering some projects outside the oil industry, exceeded the equivalent of US$500 million. Part of the aid was for the North Rumaylah field and such necessary ancillary facilities as a pipeline and a deepwater port on the gulf for large tankers. There were indications that Soviet deliveries were slow compared with what the Iraqis were used to from international oil companies and what they expected, but INOC's schedule for pro- duction and export from North Rumaylah was met; in April 1972 the first tanker (Soviet, under charter to INOC) departed for the Soviet Union. This marked the official start of exports from North Rumaylah. In 1972 INOC produced nearly 4 million tons of crude, of which all or nearly all was from North Rumaylah. By the late 1960s Iraq obtained equipment, technical help, and contracting services from numerous other countries. France, Italy, and Japan, among the developed countries, and India and Brazil, among the less developed countries, were the more important. The latter two had service contracts to explore and develop areas and in return were given special terms for purchase of any oil discovered; in Iraqi eyes these were not concession agreements. The French provided considerable training as well as equipment. 143 Iraq: A Country Study Italy's state-owned company made studies and supervised con- struction of major additions to the pipeline network. Japan pro- vided loans, equipment, and technical services to a number of projects, only part of which were in the oil industry. The purpose of the many and varied arrangements was twofold. On the incoming side, INOC needed investment funds, equip- ment, and technical help. On the outgoing side, INOC was mar- keting oil. During the 1960s INOC had only small amounts to offer, and some of the barter arrangements, such as the Soviet and ERAP agreements, were based on future production. Moreover until the mid-1970s when nationalization claims were essentially settled, the IPC companies threatened and in a few cases under- took legal action against buyers of INOC oil. Thus Iraqis were forced into many relatively small transactions in their early search for buyers. Nationalization of IPC in 1972 tremendously increased the quantity of oil for which INOC had to find markets, for the Kirkuk fields still accounted for the bulk of Iraq's production. The CFP quickly agreed to purchase the amount of oil formerly obtained from IPC. The communist countries accepted large quantities of oil, usually in barter arrangements, immediately after nationaliza- tion of IPC, but by late 1973 the Iraqis were primarily attempting to sell on a cash basis and to broaden the range of outlets. By 1977 Iraq had fifty bilateral agreements covering oil sales, and substan- tial amounts were sold directly to consumers under short-term contracts. INOC's marketing ability had improved considerably and was still improving in the late 1970s. Little information was available on the terms of INOC sales. Reportedly the Soviets obtained a substantial price discount in agreements negotiated in the early 1970s by which Iraq could repay loans with crude oil exports. Between 1975 and 1977 several Middle East OPEC members complained that Iraq was cutting prices; although they denied the charge, Iraqi officials may well have had to accept lower prices for some crude in order to arrange sales. Oil production has fluctuated since nationalization of IPC. In 1972 production fell about 14 percent as a result of the change of ownership and perhaps because of a shortage of buyers. In 1973 production jumped to 99 million tons, a substantial increase over 1971 when IPC was operating the fields. Production fell slightly in 1974 as the industrialized countries encountered a recession and attempted to conserve on fuel expenditures because of the sharp increase of petroleum prices. In 1977 oil production report- edly fell to 115 million tons from 119 million tons in 1976. The government did not publish information about the relative impor- tance of its oil fields, but in 1977 some data indicated that the Kirkuk fields probably still accounted for between 55 and 60 per- cent of total crude production. Oil revenues increased continuously and much more sharply 144 The Economy than production as a result of the price jumps implemented by the OPEC countries after 1971 (see Appendix B). Between 1973 and 1974 alone oil revenues increased from US$1.8 billion to about US$5.7 billion. The government announced that oil income amounted to the equivalent of US$9.6 billion in 1977. The nature of oil revenues changed after nationalization. Before 1972 the government received tax and royalty payments free of any ex- pense to be used for whatever purpose. After nationalization the government received the money for oil exports but incurred in- vestment and maintenance expenditures formerly carried out by the oil companies. Data were not available to evaluate the success of Iraq's national companies in keeping costs down and operating as commercial ventures. By 1978 Iraqi organizations were gaining in experience and competence. Exploration and drilling were under way by local teams, and new fields had been discovered with foreign help. Eight refineries were in operation with a total annual capacity of 9.3 million tons, a near doubling of capacity between 1967 and 1977. The two largest were located at Basra and Baghdad, each with a capacity of 3.5 million tons a year. Small pipelines from the refineries distributed products to major consumption centers. Dis- cussions had started with Japanese firms for construction of a large export refinery, but in early 1979 it was doubtful that work was under way. In the mid-1970s more than 85 percent of the natural gas associated with crude oil production was flared. By 1978 a start had been made on a gas-gathering system to feed power stations, petrochemical plants, and smaller facilities. By 1978 the govern- ment had a tanker fleet of twenty-seven vessels (1.8 million dead- weight tons) to transport part of the country's petroleum exports. By 1978 the government had completed major expansions of pipeline facilities for the export of crude oil. The expansion was partly attributable to difficulties with Syria over transit fees. In 1972 the Syrians nationalized the IPC pipeline and terminals at the same time Iraq nationalized IPC. When a new agreement was required because of the nationalizations, Syrian demands for tran- sit dues were high. Iraq was in a poor bargaining position and settled for terms close to Syria's demands. The agreement expired at the end of 1975, and Iraq stopped using the old IPC lines across Syria in March 1976 when agreement could not be reached on Syria.s new and higher demands—political as well as economic (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). According to the Iraqis, Syria's de- mands would have made Iraq's oil uneconomical at Mediterra- nean terminals. In early 1979 the Iraqis and Syrians discussed a resumption of pumping, and some oil began to flow, but it was unclear what level of use would eventually be achieved; the capac- ity of the pipelines across Syria was about 55 million tons a year. Meanwhile the Iraqis had built more flexibility into the pipeline system as a result of large investments. A "strategic" pipeline was rushed to completion in December 1975 that linked Al Hadithah 145 Iraq: A Country Study (on the old IPC lines to Syria) to the southern oil fields and the gulf sea terminals at Al Faw. The new line, which interconnected Iraq's fields with terminals on the gulf and on the Mediterranean, could pump in either direction. In 1978 capacity probably was about 50 million tons a year going south from Kirkuk to the gulf and about 44 million tons a year pumping north. In 1976 when Iraq discontinued pumping across Syria, the north-south pipeline was not yet up to full capacity and substantially less than the capacity via Syria, which restricted the volume of oil exports from northern fields. In May 1973 Iraq and Turkey reached agreement on a forty- inch pipeline from the Kirkuk fields across Turkey to a Mediterra- nean terminal at Dortyol (near Iskenderun). The line was comp- leted in January 1977 and had a reported capacity of 35 million tons a year. The agreement allowed Turkey to purchase about 10 million tons a year of the oil from the pipeline for its own use. According to news reports the line operated much below capacity in 1977, and part of the oil was taken by Turkey without payment, building up a reported debt of US$234 million. Iraq stopped pumping via Turkey at the end of 1977 or early 1978. In late August 1978 the Turks and Iraqis reportedly reached a settlement by which Turkey would repay its debt with grain and other ex- ports; and Iraq would resume pumping via Turkey for a fee, al- though the Turks would pay cash immediately for any oil they used in the future. The outcome of this agreement was uncertain. A gas pipeline had also been discussed with the Turks at the time of planning the crude oil pipeline, but construction of the gas pipeline apparently had not started by early 1979. In 1976 the structure of the oil industry was revamped. The Committee for Follow-up of Oil Affairs and Implementation of Foreign Agreements, headed by Saddam Husayn who was vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, exercised pri- mary control of the sector, established oil policy, and marketed oil abroad. The Ministry of Oil directed planning and construction in the petroleum sector and was responsible for oil refining, gas proc- essing, and internal marketing of products through several subsid- iary organizations. INOC, the third major petroleum organization, was responsible for the production and transportation of crude oil and gas. INOC operations were carried out by its own organiza- tions or foreign service companies or contractors. The State Orga- nization for Northern Oil, subordinate to INOC, replaced ICOO as the operating company in the northern fields. A similar organi- zation operated the southern fields. INOC had subsidiaries for other activities including operation of oil tankers. In the 1970s government leaders became more closely involved with the oil industry. The industry was not allowed to develop as strictly a commercial operation but increasingly reflected govern- ment policy in development, production, and marketing because each was very important to the country's stability, economic de- 146 The Economy velopment, and foreign relations. The focus of the political elite on the oil industry was not likely to change for many years because so many aspects of the country's political and economic life de- pended on it. In late 1978 government officials reported a production capacity of 4 million barrels per day, but peak production had reached only 3 million barrels per day in September 1978. Many observers attributed the difference to policy decisions rather than marketing or transport constraints. Iraq's leaders had stated that develop- ment of fields and production would be based on the country's need for funds to expand other sectors of the economy. The an- nounced Iraqi intention was to hold oil in the ground rather than expand monetary reserves and foreign investments—as other Middle Eastern oil countries had done—because of a high rate of production. Future production might be kept much lower than the country's reserves could support in order to have oil available to finance economic development for many years ahead. Other Industry Since independence manufacturing has been a fast-growing sec- tor, partly because it started from a very low base. Under Ottoman rule industry consisted almost entirely of handicrafts, artisan shops, and animal-powered activities. Between World War I and World War II larger scale manufacturing began, stimulated in part by the construction of roads and the availability of electric power in urban centers. The pace of industrialization accelerated after the early 1950s, largely financed by the growth in oil revenues. Nevertheless manufacturing (including electric power and water) was at an early stage, accounting for only 7 percent of GDP and 9 percent of employment in 1976. By the late 1970s industry was based primarily on agricultural products and such easily processed natural resources (except for oil) as rock, sand, clay, and nonmetallic minerals for construction materials (gravel, stone, glass, brick, and cement). Other natural resources that had been discovered included salt, phosphates, sul- fur, and some iron and copper ores in addition to oil and natural gas. Exploitation of sulfur deposits in northcentral Iraq began in 1972 through aid from Poland. In 1975 annual capacity was 1 million tons, and 1977 production was about 600,000 tons. Exploi- tation of phosphate deposits near the Euphrates Biver and the Syrian border was scheduled to begin in 1979 when a railroad spur was to be completed to the mine. The scheduled capacity of the mine was 3.4 million tons a year. A processing complex, being erected with Belgian and other foreign technical help, was sched- uled to have a daily capacity of 1,100 tons of phosphoric acid, 4,500 tons of sulfuric acid, and about 3,000 tons of phosphate-based fertilizer. Exploitation of other natural resources, apart from oil and gas, would depend on the result of feasibility studies. In the 1970s substantial investment had been made in plants to process 147 Iraq: A Country Study oil and gas, and development of the country's hydrocarbon re- sources would continue to receive priority into the 1980s. Since independence the electric power base has been en- larged manyfold, but supply was still inadequate in the mid- 1970s. After World War I only Baghdad and a few other towns had a local electric supply system. By the early 1950s generation capacity for public use had reached about sixty-five megawatts, the bulk of which supplied Baghdad. Iraqi electric power con- sumption per capita was among the lowest in the world. After the early 1950s generation capacity expanded rapidly, reaching 950 megawatts in 1975. Most power was generated by large oil- or gas-based thermal plants, but two major hydroelectric installa- tions were in operation in the late 1970s. Transmission lines linked most major population and industrial centers, but about 45 percent of the population (in rural villages) reportedly lacked electricity in 1975. Demand for electric power was rising sharply, exceeding 12 percent a year throughout the 1970s. Power generation (in billions of kilowatt hours) increased from 2.9 in 1973 to 4.6 in 1976 and to 5.7 in 1977. Nonetheless power shortages existed in the mid-1970s and disrupted industrial pro- duction. The 1976-80 development plan called for generation capacity of 4,000 megawatts by 1980 along with the extension of transmission lines and a rural electrification program that would reach 65 percent of the rural population. Development of industry progressed slowly after indepen- dence. For many years individuals were hesitant to invest in manufacturing. Such investments were considered riskier than the usual investment choices—real estate and commercial ven- tures that often afforded a high and quick return. The size of the market also discouraged investors. The population was widely dis- persed, incomes were extremely low, and transportation was primitive and difficult. During the monarchy and particularly before the 1950s, the bulk of industrial investments came from the private sector. The government built a few plants that were considered too large for the financial and technical resources of private individuals. Gov- ernment policy, however, focused primarily on the infrastructure —expanding transportation and providing such facilities as water and electricity—and improving the investment climate through tax incentives and tariff protection. After World War II manufacturing began to grow more rapidly, output of the sector increasing by more than 10 percent a year in the 1950s. The effects of government policy, increasing urbaniza- tion (often accompanied by higher incomes), improved transpor- tation, shortages of goods and services resulting from the war, and the large public sector investments after 1951 made possible by the jump in oil revenues combined to stimulate industrial growth. Investments and growth were concentrated in food processing, textiles, leather goods, and such construction materials as sand, 148 The Economy gravel, bricks, and cement. Private investors usually confined themselves to small establishments. Expansion of manufacturing slowed after the 1958 revolution, increasing by about 6 to 7 percent a year in the 1960s. The socialist rhetoric and land reform measures of the revolution frightened private investors, and capital began leaving the country; but the regime of Abd al Karim Qasim took no strong action toward indus- try in contrast to agriculture and the oil industry. On July 14,1964, however, a new government decreed nationalization of the twenty-seven largest private industrial firms and a reorganization of other large companies, putting a low limit on individual share holdings, allocating 25 percent of corporate profits to workers, and setting up worker representation in management of industrial concerns. The series of decrees effectively relegated the private sector to a minor role and provoked an exodus of managers and administrators from the private sector, accompanied by a flight of capital. The government was not prepared for the role it set for itself. Although public sector investments increased considerably during the 1960s, they were substantially less than the amounts allocated to industry. The government also lacked the personnel and organi- zations to operate efficiently the industrial concerns absorbed into the public sector. Education and vocational training were in- creased, and several organizational structures were tried. Industry was less disrupted than agriculture by the socialist transformation of the economy; nonetheless manufacturing expanded at a slower rate than the sector was capable of because of problems with government operations. In the decade after the Baath Party came to power in 1968, considerable effort was made to improve the performance of manufacturing. The public sector was reorganized, creating by 1978 some ten semi-independent state organizations for such major subsectors as spinning and weaving, chemicals, and engi- neering industries. Factory managers were given more autonomy, and efforts were made to hold them responsible for meeting goals. Import restrictions were eased, which allowed plants easier access to parts and materials abroad. A clearer line was drawn between the public and private sectors, and considerable encouragement in the form of tax incentives, subsidized credit, and freedom from competition from the public sector was given private investments in designated small-scale, largely consumer-oriented industries. Finally the flow of investment funds to industry increased substan- tially, particularly after the sharp rise in oil revenues that began in 1973. Between 1970 and 1976 the value added by manufactur- ing (including electric power and water) increased by 18.7 percent a year (in current prices), and between 1971 and 1976 the index of the volume of output by manufacturing increased by 13 percent a year. In 1977 industrial output reportedly increased by 31 per- cent over 1976 and totaled ID420 million. 149 Iraq: A Country Study In spite of the improved growth rates of manufacturing in the 1970s experts questioned how much improvement had been ob- tained in management of the industrial sector. Observers noted heavy layers of bureaucracy and a reluctance to make decisions that impeded the operations of government-run enterprises in obtaining materials at the proper time or in responding to changes in market conditions. Social legislation made it nearly impossible to lay off workers or to transfer labor where it was needed most, resulting in considerable overstaffing in public sector industry. Even though there were improved accounting procedures and better trained personnel in the 1960s, figures for plants and na- tional statistics were still suspect. Government officials acknowl- edged considerable waste in unused capacity, overstocking of in- ventories, and lost production time because of shortages or disruptions in supply. Economists attributed much of the improved performance of manufacturing in the 1970s to the completion and the start of production of a number of public sector plants. Some of the new investments added capacity to existing industries, such as electric power, oil refining, cement, textiles, and sugar refining; but a number of new industries began, such as chemical fertilizer, trac- tor and vehicle assembly, household appliances, and metal pro- ducts. In the 1970s the range of domestically manufactured goods broadened considerably, although there were notable gaps, such as metal, engineering, and electronic products. The jump in oil revenues after 1973 resulted in a surge of indus- trial investments. Iraqi officials attempted a much more modest industrial expansion than most OPEC nations but still encoun- tered many of the same problems although on a smaller scale, e.g., shortages of goods and labor, port congestion and other transpor- tation difficulties, and price inflation. Most of the large industrial projects were purchased abroad as complete plants, including training Iraqi workers and managers. The government used cred- its on some projects but discouraged direct foreign investment in Iraq. Many of the plants were based on the country's hydrocarbon resources, particularly utilization of the natural gas associated with crude oil production. The largest project was a US$1 billion petrochemical complex near Basra scheduled for completion in the 1980-81 period. It was designed and being constructed by an American and a West Ger- man firm. Annual capacity was to be 150,000 tons of polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride and 40,000 tons of caustic soda. A US$570 million urea plant was under construction in the south by Japanese firms. The first unit was scheduled to begin production in 1979 and the second in 1980. Planners anticipated urea exports of about 1 million tons a year when the plant was fully operational. Development of the phosphate deposits in western Iraq and completion in 1979 of the chemical complex there to use the country's sulfur, natural gas, and phosphates would result in a 150 Road construction in Kirkuk Courtesy Middle East Photographic Archive, London Rice combine-harvester Courtesy FAO Photo 151 Iraq: A Country Study number of chemical products, including phosphate fertilizers. Much of the production was scheduled to be exported. An iron and steel complex based on natural gas and imported ore was under construction in the southeast, the initial phase by French firms. Trial operations were scheduled for 1979. The project included a unit to produce 1.2 million tons a year of sponge iron (partly for export) and a steelworks to produce 400,000 tons a year of bars and shapes. The planners anticipated 1.2 million tons of sponge iron and 1.1 million tons of iron and steel products by 1980. A number of smaller projects were also started with completion scheduled by 1980. Japan built a papermill that would use reeds from the marshes in southeast Iraq. In 1977 a light engineering complex was under construction to manufacture fans, washing machines, electric irons, spark plugs, and locks. The investment boom created shortages of bricks and cement, and considerable expansion of these industries was undertaken. Seven cement plants were scheduled for completion between 1977 and 1978. Cement production was planned to increase from 2.8 million tons a year in 1975 to 7 million tons by 1978 and 10 million tons by 1980. The additional production from the many new plants would maintain a high rate of growth for the manufacturing sector into the 1980s. The structure of Iraqi industry consisted of many small shops and only a few large (for Iraq) plants. In 1977 there were 41,000 small establishments—privately owned and with fewer than ten employees—employing 94,300 workers with an output valued at ID274 million. The number of establishments with ten or more workers was 1,553, of which 1,273 were in the private and mixed sector and employed 41,800 with an output valued at ID 199 mil- lion. Public sector industry consisted of 280 establishments em- ploying 103,000 workers with an output valued at ID508 million. These figures indicated that the private sector provided 57 per- cent of industrial employment and 48 percent of industrial pro- duction in 1977. Stated another way, nearly all of modern industry was in the public sector, resulting in a substantially higher output per employee than in the private sector. In 1979 industrial activity was concentrated in the Baghdad area with lesser concentrations around such other large towns as Basra, Mosul, and Kirkuk. The government provided incen- tives to private investors to locate in other regions to give the country more balanced development, a policy that was achiev- ing some success. Public sector plants were sited in under- developed localities when feasible. The bleak area near the town of Az Zubayr, southwest of Basra, was the location of a number of large projects, such as petrochemical plants and iron and steel complexes. Az Zubayr and its port provided a devel- opment center for the poor southeast region having access to oil, natural gas, electricity, water, and ocean shipping. The planners evidently anticipated that Az Zubayr would in time 152 The Economy become a major industrial center as additional manufacturing plants locate there to process part of the output from the large installations under construction. Iraqi officials were optimistic about industrial development. The 1976-80 plan projected an annual average real growth rate of 17.8 percent for the value added by mining and manufacturing over the plan years. It would be difficult to achieve this goal even though mining included crude oil production, which could easily expand particularly if the late 1978 and early 1979 disruptions to Iranian oil production persisted for long. Manufacturing alone was expected to increase by nearly 33 percent a year. The plan assumed that unused manufacturing capacity would be eliminated, that projects would be completed on time, and that the flow of materials would be adequate and timely. In 1976 a nationwide productivity campaign lowered but did not eliminate the underutilized manufacturing capacity. Some projects under construction were acknowledged to be behind schedule in 1976 and 1977, partly because of delays in obtaining materials. More- over there were not enough qualified workers, managers, and administrators in spite of the increased training available. Few economists believed that the many industrial problems and bott- lenecks would be remedied quickly enough to meet the plan's goal, but the prospects were good that production by the manufac- turing sector would achieve a growth rate above that in the first half of the 1970s. Agriculture Since the beginning of recorded time agriculture has been the primary economic activity of the people of Iraq. Even in 1976, over half of the labor force was employed in agriculture, although the value of farm production had been overshadowed by other sectors, particularly the oil industry. In 1976 agriculture's share of GDP was just under 8 percent. Nonetheless government planners and foreign experts believed that farming had a considerably greater potential than was being realized. Growth of the agricultural sector had been the slowest in the economy since the 1940s, gradually diminishing the sector's im- portance. Economists encountered difficulties with the quality and quantity of Iraqi agricultural statistics, but some concluded that growth of real output of the agricultural sector since the 1950s was only a little higher than population growth—probably about 5 percent a year. The increase of incomes and improving diets of urbanites since World War II caused a growing reliance on im- ports to meet the country's food needs. Weather caused considera- ble fluctuations in output from year to year, however. For exam- ple, production of wheat (the principal crop) fell from 1.3 million tons in 1976 to 696,000 tons in 1977. These sharp variations made it difficult to discern trends and obviously affected the amount of food imported each year. 153 Iraq: A Country Study Land Use Iraq's total area is about 434,000 square kilometers (exclud- ing the Neutral Zone and territorial waters) of which 39 per- cent is desert (primarily in the south and west), 21 percent mountainous (in the north and northeast), 30 percent plains, and 10 percent foothills (see Geography, ch. 2). About 4 per- cent of the land area (about 192,000 hectares) was classified as woodland and forest, although the amount of commercial tim- ber was small. Seasonal grazing occurred in parts of the moun- tains and deserts; otherwise about three-fifths of the country had little agricultural value. Since at least the 1940s the amount of potentially cultivable land has been given as about 12 million hectares. An area of about 4 million hectares of this cultivable land was the plains and uplands between the mountainous north and the central part of the coun- try; this area primarily depended on rainfall for cultivation (see fig. 11). In the south about 8 million hectares of cultivable land de- pended on irrigation in order to be cropped. Some observers be- lieved that the amount of land classed as cultivable was unrealisti- cally high because it was doubtful that water could be made available to begin cultivation. The area actually cropped annually has been about 3 million hectares, but the cropped fields differ from year to year. The statistics available do not reveal changes in cultivated area, cropped acreage, or irrigated land over time. Modern Iraq had not had the shortage or the high density of population in relation to available agricultural land so common in many developing countries. Water Resources Iraq has more water available for agriculture than most Middle East countries. Use of this water formed the basis for some of the world's earliest and most advanced civilizations (see Ancient Mesopotamia, ch. 1). Greater and better use of the country's water resources offered the potential for substantial future development of farm output. Two main regions, comprising less than one-fifth of Iraq's area, encompass nearly all of the country's farmland. Rainfall is suffi- cient in the upper plains and mountain valleys in the north and northeast to support cropping. About half of the country's cul- tivated land lies in this area of adequate rainfall. Rainfall is more dependable at the higher elevations and becomes less reliable south and away from the mountains. Most of the grain crop is grown in the rain-fed region, where part of the crop is subject to sharp fluctuations in the amount and timing of the rains. Cereal production from marginal land accounted for a considerable part of the year-to-year variation of agricultural production. Wells, pumps, and impoundments have helped to supplement rainfall in cropping, but first there has to be enough rain for farmers to plant a crop. Irrigation in the rain-fed area has expanded and will con- 154 The Economy 'toke BoundoF/ representation XirmtO noi "*«***sori^' aythar.ttatn Figure 11. Land Use tinue to do so, but the region will remain primarily dependent on rainfall. The other major area of cultivation is in the lowland valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris rivers. Rainfall is extremely light, and cropping depends on irrigation. Both rivers are fed by snowpack and rainfall in eastern Turkey and northwestern Iran. Discharge by the rivers is concentrated between March and May, too late for winter crops and too early for summer crops. The flow of the rivers varies considerably each year. Destructive flooding is not uncommon, particularly of the Tigris, and some people have placed the numerous legends about "the Flood," including the biblical story of Noah and the ark, on these rivers. Conversely years of low flow make irrigation and therefore cropping diffi- cult. These rivers also created other problems for cultivators of the lower reaches. In common with other large rivers, the Tigris and Euphrates carry large amounts of silt downstream each year. Part of the silt has been deposited in river channels, man-made canals, and on the land itself, the net effect of which, combined with the destruction of floods, hampered or altered drainage and made irrigation more 155 Iraq: A Country Study difficult. Drainage becomes increasingly important as elevation diminishes. Baghdad, although 550 kilometers from the gulf, is only about thirty-four meters above sea level, indicating a very slight gradient. There are salts in the soil, and the rivers bring more down each year. Raising the water table by floods or irriga- tion can bring the salts up to a plant's roots directly or by capillary action, particularly during the hot, dry summer months, retarding growth or killing the plants. Conditions are harsh for people and plants in the lower reaches of the Tigris and Euphrates. The early civilizations developed the organization and technology—and made the investments in irri- gation and drainage—to cope with the problems. Some archaeolo- gists believed the high point in the development of the irrigation system came about 500 years into the Christian Era. A strong government and careful attention to the hydraulic system permit- ted cultivation of a large area, and the fields became a granary for the region. Some researchers believed that the irrigation and drainage canals were not maintained and that they had deteri- orated considerably by the twelfth and thirteenth centuries when the Mongols destroyed what remained of the system (see The Mongol Invasions, ch. 1). Little was done to rebuild the system before the late 1800s, and agricultural activity and productivity remained at a low level. In the twentieth century investments in water projects ac- celerated. Several large dams and control projects were built, some old canals were rehabilitated, and new irrigation systems were constructed. The large projects were multipurpose—to pro- vide additional water for irrigation of new land and reclamation of old, to prevent flooding, and to generate electric power where possible. The country's irrigated area expanded substantially as a result of the water projects and the growing use of pumps to lift water from the rivers directly onto the fields. The larger projects entailed water storage. Barrages were con- structed on both the Tigris and Euphrates to channel water into natural depressions as flood control measures. It was also hoped that the water could be used for irrigation after the rivers had peaked in the spring, but the combination of high evaporation from the reservoirs and absorption of salt residues in the depres- sions made some of the water too saline for crop use. Some dams that provided large reservoirs were constructed in the valleys of tributaries of the Tigris. These reservoirs lessened flooding in the spring and evened out the supply of water over the cropping seasons. Iraq is handicapped in water control by its location. The usually flat terrain provides relatively few dam sites, and most of the drainage area of both the Tigris and Euphrates lies in other coun- tries. Ideally a regional authority including Turkey, Syria, and Iraq would develop the whole of each river basin for mutual benefit, but strained political relations so far have precluded such an ar- 156 The Economy rangement. In fact the countries have competed for the available water. Both Syria and Turkey have dams and irrigation projects on the rivers. In the early 1970s Syria and Turkey completed large dams on the Euphrates and began filling the reservoirs. Iraqi offi- cials protested the sharp decline in the river's flow, claiming that irrigated areas along the Euphrates dropped from 136,000 to 10,- 000 hectares between 1974 and 1975. A satisfactory agreement on water use had not been reached by early 1979. The issue had been a major economic factor in the strained relations between Syria and Iraq in the mid-1970s in spite of mediation efforts by Saudi Arabia. The apparent reconciliation of political differences between Syria and Iraq reported at the end of 1978 suggested an accommodation on water use might be reached. An agreement was necessary because experts claimed that water projects planned in the three riparian nations would require more water than would be available when the projects were completed. Iraq, at the lower end of the rivers, would suffer most from unregulated withdrawals upstream. The area of irrigation increased from a little over 1 million hectares in 1918 to about 5.6 million hectares in 1953 and to about 8 million hectares in the early 1970s (although far less was cropped each year partly because of the practice of leaving fields fallow at least every other year). The number of pumps had increased from 143 in 1921 to 3,775 in 1951 and to over 18,000 by 1974. Estimates of water withdrawal from the Tigris-Euphrates system by Iraqis were about 19 billion cubic meters in the 1940s and 49 billion cubic meters in the 1960s. The expansion of irrigation has contributed to serious drainage problems. The additional water combined with the shallow gradi- ent of the terrain from above Baghdad to the gulf raised the water table and brought salts close to the surface, affecting plant growth. Some observers believed that as much as 60 percent of irrigated areas had salinity problems and that 20 to 30 percent of the irri- gated land had been abandoned over the years because of it. The practice of leaving fields fallow in the irrigated areas was largely to allow the water table to fall and draw the salts below root level. Salinity has two main causes. Little regulation yet existed over water use, and farmers usually overwatered their fields. The other cause was insufficient drainage facilities, particularly connecting fields to large drainage networks. A master plan for drainage pro- jects, drawn up in the 1970s, would not be completed until the twenty-first century. It would require costly investments and in some cases as great a network as the irrigation system. It was true that the country's agriculture had considerable po- tential. If the irrigated land could be cultivated each year instead of periodically laying fallow, if extensive double and triple crop- ping could be achieved by evening out the seasonal flows of the rivers, and if the irrigated land could be substantially increased, Iraq could again become a granary for the region. The ifs were 157 Iraq: A Country Study large and not susceptible to quick solutions. The government planned to continue its substantial investments in the hydraulic system, gradually improving farm productivity; eventually the riparian nations would need to tackle the problems jointly. Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform The land tenure system and attempts to change it were impor- tant factors in the low productivity of farmers and the slow growth of the agricultural sector. Land rights evolved over many centu- ries, incorporating elements of different cultures and countries. The Ottoman Land Code of 1858 attempted to bring order by establishing categories of land and calling for surveys and registra- tion of landholdings. By World War I only limited registration had been accomplished, and land titles were insecure particularly under tribal tenure whereby the state retained ownership of the land, but tribal members used it. By the early 1930s large landowners became interested in more secure titles because a period of agricultural expansion was under way. In the north urban merchants were investing in land devel- opment, and in the south tribal leaders were installing pumps. One result was a growth of grain output beyond the country's needs and hence the export of wheat and barley. Another result was a law in 1932 empowering the government to settle title to the land to speed up registration of titles. Under the law a number of tribal leaders and village headmen received title to the land being worked by community members. The effect was to increase dramatically the number of sharecroppers and tenants. An addi- tional law in 1933 provided that a sharecropper could not leave if he was indebted to the landholder. Since landowners were al- most the sole source of credit and hardly any sharecropper was free of debt, the law effectively bound many tenants to the land. The land tenure system under the Ottomans and as modified under Iraqi governments provided little incentive to improve the productivity of the land. By 1958 more than two-thirds of the cultivated land was concentrated in 2 percent of the holdings, while at the other extreme 86 percent of the holdings covered less than 10 percent of the cultivated land. Most farming was by share- croppers and tenants who received only a portion, frequently a small proportion, of the crop. The shares varied by region, by kind of irrigation, by the input supplied by the owner, and by other factors, but the owners were in a position to extract the most from any increase in productivity. Most owners were not interested in large or costly improvements. Few were even involved in farm operations, relying instead on managers. Before 1958 the government was aware of the inequalities in the countryside and the poor conditions for most sharecroppers. The landlords were strong politically during the monarchical era, however, and were able to frustrate remedial legislation. The gov- ernment did work on the problems of the sharecroppers but in- 158 The Economy directly. New lands were opened and sold to individual farmers for their own operation. Some development projects were located in rural areas to provide alternative employment. By such means the government hoped that landowners would be forced to im- prove terms for tenants in order to retain them. This method was too slow and localized to improve appreciably the incomes and living conditions of the bulk of the rural population. The idea of land reform kindled part of the popular enthusiasm for the 1958 revolution. Moreover the powerful landlords threat- ened the new government. Although few people in or out of government understood the complexities and problems of Iraqi agriculture, the regime promulgated land reform legislation be- fore it was in office three months. The 1958 law was modeled after one of Egypt's, although many conditions in the two countries were dissimilar. In Iraq the maximum a single owner could retain was 250 hectares of irrigated land or 500 hectares of rain-fed land. Holdings above the maximum were to be expropriated and com- pensation paid in government bonds; that compensation was with- drawn later. The law provided for expropriation of 75 percent of the privately owned arable land. The expropriated land, in parcels of between seven and fifteen hectares of irrigated land or double that amount of rain-fed land, was to be distributed to individuals. The recipient would repay the government over twenty years, and he had to join a cooperative. The law also had provisions relating to tenancy and sharecropping payments. Between expropriation and distribution of land to indi- vidual farmers, landlords were to continue the management of the land and supply of customary inputs to maintain production, but the landowner's share of the crop was considerably reduced. Land was expropriated much more rapidly than it was dis- tributed. By 1968, for example, 1.7 million hectares had been expropriated, but less than 440,000 hectares of sequestered land had been distributed; a total of 645,000 hectares had been dis- tributed to nearly 55,000 families, however, because some 210,000 hectares of government land was included in the distribution. The situation in the countryside became chaotic. During the 1960s the government lacked the personnel, the funds, the expertise, or even the transportation to undertake the functions—e.g., credit, seed, pumps, marketing, whether in the form of cooperative or otherwise—formerly supplied by landowners. Moreover the farm- ers had little interest and no experience in cooperatives and joined them slowly and unwillingly. Even the best intentioned landlords found it difficult to act as they had before land reform because of the open hostility on all sides. A prolonged drought of several years occurred about the same time as land reform. Agricultural production fell and during the 1960s never really recovered. The land reform of 1958 was probably unavoidable politically because conditions in the countryside had reached such a low point. The measures taken effectively curtailed the political power 15^ Iraq: A Country Study of the large landowners, but it is difficult to find economic benefits for the country or improvements for the majority of farmers- sharecroppers. The migration from rural to urban areas increased in the 1960s as agricultural production largely stagnated in spite of substantial government investments, albeit primarily in large water projects rather than in more pressing and mundane needs for transportation and storage facilities, extension workers, and trained personnel for other tasks. In the 1970s agrarian reform was carried further. Legislation in 1970 reduced the size of maximum holdings to between ten and 150 hectares of irrigated land (depending on the kind of land, irrigation, and crop) and between 250 and 500 hectares of nonirri- gated land. Holdings above the maximum were to be expropriated without compensation except for actual investments, such as buildings, pumps, and trees. The law permitted the government to lower the maximum holding under certain circumstances and to disposses new or old owners for a variety of reasons. In 1975 an additional reform law was enacted to break up the large estates of Kurdish tribal landowners. By the beginning of 1977 official data showed that nearly 1.9 million hectares had been sequestered, and an additional 700,000 hectares had become state land under the land reform laws—a total of 2.6 million hectares. The same data showed that 1.9 million hectares had been distributed to nearly 223,000 recipients. Gov- ernment data on land reform was difficult to interpret and at times contradictory, however, and there was a possibility that figures had been arranged to present the best possible appearance. Some economists, working with different statistics, found that land dis- tribution had moved more slowly than the above data indicated and that in the mid-1970s over one-third of the farmland was rented from the government on an annual basis by small farmers. Even with the difficulties the statistics caused, it was very clear that agrarian reform had affected over half of the country's farm- land—an area nearly equivalent to that being harvested each year in the mid-1970s. Whereas the original intent of land reform was to break up the large estates and establish many small, owner-operated farms, when agriculture stagnated during the 1960s, the aim was changed to develop collectivized capital-intensive farming. The land reform laws of the 1970s worked toward this goal. The change in policy, however, placed an even greater responsibility on the government—which had showed an ineptness in managing industry—to improve farm incomes. One problem is the Iraqi farmer's independent attitude. He joined cooperatives reluctantly and participated minimally. By 1971 there were 831 cooperatives and 129,000 members. The land reform measures of the 1970s combined with a larger govern- ment staff and facilities accelerated the growth of cooperatives. By the end of 1977 there were 1,940 cooperatives and nearly 342,800 160 The Economy members. By the late 1970s cooperative membership had ex- panded significantly beyond just the recipients of state land who were required to join. At the beginning of land reform cooperatives were viewed as the institution that would undertake the functions formerly pro- vided by estate owners and their managers. The government was hopelessly unprepared in terms of personnel, organizations, and facilities to form cooperatives rapidly enough and to supply their needs for seeds, pumps, credit, and other services. The situation improved during the 1960s but not fast enough to overcome the many problems. Hence, in the 1970s the government turned to collectivization as a solution. Collective farms (the conversion of a cooperative into a unit worked as single farm under collective management) increased rapidly in the early 1970s, from six in 1972 to seventy-two in 1974. Growth was much slower thereafter, and the total stagnated at seventy-nine in 1976 and 1977. Membership in collective farms peaked in 1974 at about 11,250, but by the end of 1977 there were only 8,540 members. The area of collective farms continuously increased, however, amounting to 180,000 hectares in 1977. In addition state farms were established; In 1975 there were eight with a total area of 9,400 hectares. A lack of qualified technical and managerial personnel hampered the government's efforts to ac- celerate collectivization and raise farm output. Cropping and Production The bulk of farming consists of a single crop a year. In the rain-fed area the winter crop, primarily grain, is planted in the fall and harvested in the spring. In the irrigated areas of central and southern Iraq summer crops predominate. A little multiple crop- ping exists where irrigation water is available over more than a single growing season. Vegetables were probably the crops most frequently used in multiple cropping. Even with some double or triple cropping, the intensity of culti- vation was usually on the order of about 50 percent because of the practice of leaving about half of the cultivated land fallow each year. In the rain-fed region land was left fallow to accumulate moisture and to increase fertility by plowing in weeds and other plant material that grew during the fallow period. In the late 1970s chemical fertilizers were relatively unused on rain-fed crops. On the irrigated land, fallow periods also contributed some humus to the soil. Wheat was by far the most important crop. The amount and timing of rainfall strongly affected both the area planted and the harvest. In 1971, for example, the area planted in wheat amounted to about 950,000 hectares, and the harvest was 822,000 tons com- pared with about 1.9 million hectares and 2.6 million tons in 1972. The record 1972 harvest came after several years of poor weather and low production. Wheat production diminished in subsequent .-*■ 161 Iraq: A Country Study years. The net harvested area amounted to about 1.5 million hec- tares in 1976 and 851,000 hectares in 1977; production was about 1.3 million tons and 696,000 tons respectively (see table 11, Ap- pendix A). The northcentral rain-fed governorates were the prin- cipal wheat producers, although some wheat also was grown in the southern area. Barley was the other major crop. It required less moisture than wheat and was more tolerant of salinity in the soil. Barley acreage varied depending on rainfall, even increasing on some occasions as a substitute for wheat when the rains were below normal in the rainfed region. Barley had been replacing wheat in some of the southern provinces troubled by salinity. The net harvested area amounted to 575,000 hectares and production to 579,000 tons in 1976 and 536,000 hectares and 458,000 tons in 1977. Barley and wheat were winter crops and usually accounted for about 80 per- cent of the area cultivated. Small amounts of rice were grown as a summer crop on irrigated land in the southern part of the coun- try. In 1977 rice acreage amounted to about 63,000 hectares, and production (paddy) was 199,000 tons. A number of other crops were grown, although acreage and production were small. In 1977 cotton production was almost 26,- 000 tons from nearly 20,000 hectares. Several varieties of oilseeds were sown as winter or summer crops, depending on the area. Small amounts of corn were grown. Leguminous plants were cul- tivated for human and animal consumption but apparently not in a rotation cycle to build up nitrogen in the soil. Both beets and cane were grown for sugar, but domestic production was substan- tially less than consumption. Iraq is the principal producer and exporter of dates. Several varieties are grown in the south between Baghdad and the gulf. The richest date groves are found along the Shatt al Arab. Govern- ment estimates of date palms were over 22 million, and produc- tion amounted to 578,000 tons in 1977. Dates have long been a staple in the Iraqi diet. Grapes and some other fruits were grown in small quantities. Vegetable production was expanding, particularly near urban centers where a comparatively sophisticated marketing system had developed. Vegetable gardening usually employed relatively modern techniques, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides. Tomatoes were the largest crop, production amounting to over 400,000 tons in 1977, although eggplant, beans, and okra were also important market vegetables. Crop production accounted for about two-thirds of the value added by agriculture in the late 1970s, and the raising of livestock contributed about one-third. In the past a substantial part of the rural population was nomadic, moving animals between seasonal grazing areas, including the desert regions. Some nomads had been settled, and others had moved to urban areas for better 162 Weighing of seed grain Courtesy FAO Photo by U. Pizzi 163 The Economy cultural land, and the movement toward greater collectivization maintained a substantial amount of tenant farming even in the late 1970s. Little progress had been made toward a tenure system that stimulated farmers' interest in the long-term fertility and productivity of the soil. Some observers believed that the government had concen- trated expenditures on large, costly water projects at the expense of institution building in the countryside. Since the 1950s most of the funds allocated to the agricultural sector were invested in flood control and expansion of irrigation resulting in major im- provements in both. Farmers tended to overuse the improved availability of water, however, aggravating the salinity problem in the south. Other riparian nations of the Tigris and Euphrates riv- ers also expanded irrigation, causing some experts to predict that availability of water could become a major constraint on Iraqi agriculture in the 1980s. Some experts advocated that the govern- ment develop water conservation measures and regulate water use while gradually installing sprinkler systems and other availa- ble techniques for economizing on the use of water. In the 1970s the government gave greater attention to building rural institutions. Cooperative organizations were strengthened, more agricultural experts and extension workers were trained, greater supplies of machinery, improved seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides were provided, and agricultural credit was expanded, although more of everything was needed. It was not clear that the government had reduced the magnitude of its tasks because of the increased governmental responsibilities resulting from the em- phasis on collective and state farms. In 1979 the government continued to transform farming from that of numerous private individuals working small plots to large- scale, capital-intensive agricultural entities, aided in part by the continuing rural-urban migration of small farmers fed up with the problems, the low income, and the lack of amenities in the coun- tryside. It was a distinct possibility that the exodus would continue as state and collective farmworkers gained experience with ma- chinery and acquired other marketable skills that would increase their incomes and standards of living. The planners hoped that the government's efforts would raise the real value added by agriculture by 7 percent a year between 1976 and 1980. That would be a substantially higher growth rate than in the past several years and was considered overly optimistic by some observers unless a period of good weather prevailed. In broad terms for the 1980s, the planners wanted the country to become self-sufficient in most foods, to increase the amounts of animal protein in the Iraqi diet, and to enlarge the supply of such agricultural products as wool, cotton, sugarcane, sugar beets, and tobacco for processing by local industry. The broad goals were achievable if part of agriculture's potential was realized. Merely replacing the practice of fallow fields with crop rotation that built 165 Iraq: A Country Study up the soil would considerably expand the cultivated acreage and harvest in much of the rain-fed region. Additional double crop- ping was possible in parts of the irrigated south if different crops were planted and water used more judiciously. But realization of the potential usually returned to the central problem of how wisely and how well the government would act to stimulate growth of agricultural output. Foreign Trade Since the early 1950s oil revenues dominated the country's sources of foreign exchange and largely determined the level of imports each year. Until nationalization of IPC in 1972 oil reve- nues were not directly associated with crude oil exports, which in turn were not included in total exports. Through at least 1977 Iraqi officials continued the practice of excluding crude oil exports from the trade statistics. Crude oil exports amounted to about 73 million tons in 1970 and rose to about 110 million tons in 1976. Although Iraq did not publish data about destination of oil exports, other sources made clear that most of it went to the industrialized countries of Western and Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, and to Japan. In spite of government efforts to increase non-oil exports little success was achieved until the 1970s. In the early 1950s and the early 1970s the value of non-oil exports was about the same, but non-oil exports dipped during the first half of the 1960s. In the 1970s the value of non-oil exports increased substantially, partly because of higher prices and partly because new products were being exported. Agricultural products, particularly dates, domi- nated non-oil exports until 1976 and 1977 when exports of petro- leum products sharply increased (see table 12, Appendix A). It was not clear whether petroleum products would continue to be the primary export as they were in 1977. Cement had been the only manufactured commodity of significance, but exports ceased in the mid-1970s because of the internal construction boom. Instead substantial imports of cement were required to meet local needs until domestic production increased in the late 1970s. Exports of chemical fertilizer were increasing and should continue to rise as new plant capacity is completed. Traditionally non-oil exports went largely to Arab states and nearby Asian countries. Communist countries and Western Europe were smaller but nonetheless significant purchasers of Iraqi's exports. Most of the increase in the value of non-oil exports since 1975, however, was the result of expansion of exports to India, China, and the People's Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Since the 1950s imports closely followed the pattern of oil reve- nues. During the 1950s when oil revenues expanded rapidly, im- ports increased an average of 14 percent a year helped in part because imports started from a low base in 1950. During the 1960s imports expanded at an average rate of 2.8 percent a year, partly 166 The Economy because of the slower increase of oil receipts. Between 1970 and 1977 imports rose at an average rate of 30 percent a year, reflect- ing primarily the rapid increase of oil revenues while including substantial price inflation of imported goods. Between 1974 and 1975 imports increased by an astounding 85 percent (from ID773 million in 1974 to ID1.43 billion in 1975). Imports were reduced in 1975 and 1976, stabilizing at ID 1.15 billion in each of these years. It was unlikely that import statistics for Iraq included mili- tary equipment. In the 1970s the rapid increase of imports sharply altered the commodity composition. Imports of foods were basically deter- mined by the Iraqi harvest. After 1973, when foreign exchange was much more plentiful, restrictions were loosened on consumer goods, including imported food, in order to ease inflationary pres- sures, but consumer goods still lost ground. The main shift in composition and the major reason for the higher level of imports was because the investment boom required much larger quanti- ties of intermediate materials, such as iron, steel, cement, machin- ery, and transportation and construction equipment. By 1977 ma- chinery and equipment alone accounted for 54 percent of imports, a sharp contrast to 19 percent for 1972. In 1977 interme- diate goods were 28 percent of imports and consumer goods (pri- marily foods) 18 percent. West European countries have been the primary source of im- ports for many years, accounting for 49 percent of total imports in 1977. The Federal Bepublic of Germany (West Germany) was by far the most important, although the United Kingdom, France, and Italy were major suppliers. The other major source of imports was Asia, accounting for 26 percent of imports in 1977. Japan supplied nearly all imports from Asia.) Communist countries sup- plied a minor proportion of imports, amounting to about 15 per- cent in 1974 and about 12 percent in 1977. The Soviet Union was the most important supplier, then China and the countries of Eastern Europe. Iraqi imports from the United States were larger than from the Soviet Union but still minor, amounting to ID56 million or less than 5 percent in 1977. Until about 1974 the government was under strong fiscal re- straints on spending, including for imported goods. Soon after independence legislation provided control over the use of foreign exchange. After 1964 when the large private import and export firms were nationalized, foreign trade increasingly became a pub- lic sector activity. Staffs from related activities were amalgamated into a few state companies responsible for the bulk of foreign trade and part of internal distribution. In 1977 the public sector handled 87 percent of imports and about 80 percent of exports. Certain items could be imported only by government organizations. In 1979 trade and exchange controls remained extensive and effective even though some loosening occurred after the nationali- zation claims with IPC were settled and after oil revenues in- 167 Iraq: A Country Study creased. Control of foreign exchange was the responsibility of the Central Bank and was exercised largely through licensed dealers. An annual foreign exchange budget, including an import pro- gram, allocated foreign earnings to priority needs. Private traders needed licenses for imports approved under the import program. Additional regulations and licenses ensured government control of foreign exchange receipts and payments. Monetary and trade transactions with Israel, South Africa, and Southern Rhodesia were prohibited. Because of its large oil revenues, Iraq was freer of balance-of- payment constraints than many other developing countries. Pres- sure was not as great to find and develop export products for foreign markets, for example. The fact that oil revenues were paid directly to the government facilitated control over foreign ex- change and the way it was used. Nonetheless factors affecting oil exports and revenues were largely beyond control of Iraqi officials —even after nationalization. Until 1974 the government was seri- ously restricted by the budget and the balance of payments, and it often had to postpone or borrow for priority imports and pro- jects. Even after 1973, when oil revenues increased sharply, the balance of payments continued to impose some restraints on offi- cial aspirations and spending. Oil revenues, however, diminished the need to achieve efficiency and productivity of investments. Iraqi officials, through extensive controls over foreign exchange and imports, usually maintained foreign exchange payments close to earnings. This often meant that imports were kept below ex- ports and oil revenues in order to cover imported transportation and service costs and to repay earlier debts or to rebuild foreign exchange reserves. If calculations went awry or military equip- ment and economic projects were deemed sufficiently important, new loans from abroad were negotiated. In the 1970s the balance of payments exhibited the same con- servative approach. The balance of goods and services was favor- able through 1975 (the latest data available in early 1979) even though Iraqi officials substantially increased grant aid after 1973 (see table 13, Appendix A). Imported services increased rapidly in 1973 and 1974, partly reflecting increased transportation costs for a larger volume of imports and partly reflecting imported services in connection with development of the oil industry and large industrial projects that included design, training, and supervision costs. Between 1972 and 1974 the balance of payments included sev- eral large transactions effecting settlement of nationalization claims of the oil companies. In 1972, for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff estimates of the withdrawal of direct investment by the oil companies amounted to about US$770 mil- lion consisting of the valuation of nationalized assets plus the value of Iraqi claims of IPC arrears on taxes and royalties. The value of disinvestment was partially offset in 1972 by a counterentry of a 168 Iraq: A Country Study A substantial part of Iraq's external public debt was believed to be owed to communist countries. By 1966 the Soviet Union was estimated to have provided the equivalent of US$184 million in economic credits. An additional US$365 million of economic credit was negotiated in the late 1960s. In 1976 an agreement was signed for an estimated US$150 million of Soviet economic aid, raising the total of Soviet credits to US$700 million by the end of 1977. It was not known how much had been used or what sums had been repaid. By the end of 1977 East European communist countries had agreed to supply the equivalent of US$419 billion of economic aid; agreements reached in 1977, for which no amounts were known, would boost the total. China had agreed to supply economic aid of US$45 million by the end of 1977. As with the Soviet Union's economic credits, it was not known how much aid remained to be drawn and what sums remained to be paid. In 1977 the communist countries, essentially the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, remained interested and involved in Iraq, suggesting an increasing indebtedness. Soviet deliveries of mili- tary equipment amounted to the equivalent of US$600 million in 1977 after having been at a high level for several years. A large number of economic projects were negotiated with the Soviet Union and East European countries during 1977, the total cost of which will eventually exceed US$3 billion, but apparently only a small part will be financed by loans. A number of the projects were in irrigation and drainage but also included oil field development, expansion of refinery capacity, and help in developing the iron and steel complex. In 1977 arrangements reportedly were comp- leted for the Soviet Union to build the Mosul Dam on the Tigris, which would be one of the world's largest when completed and would irrigate 1.6 million hectares and provide 500 megawatts of hydroelectric power. In 1977 some 6,300 communist economic technicians were estimated to have worked in Iraq during the year. The financial arrangements for the many communist projects announced in 1976 and 1977 were not disclosed. Presumably Iraq would minimize indebtedness and match receipts of equipment and services as nearly as possible to oil exports. Moreover the lag in Iraqi statistics made it difficult to discern if a change in policy was reflected in the announced projects. In the 1970s, while Iraq largely depended on communist sources for military equipment, much greater diversity was reflected in purchases of economic equipment and materials. Official statistics through 1975 indicated a considerably higher reliance on Western Europe, and especially West Germany, than on communist countries for the imports the country required. The communist countries may have a high interest in developing ties with Iraq, and they have achieved considerable publicity for their agreements; but Iraqi officials have shown an inclination toward pragmatic foreign economic policies, a sensitivity to entangle- 170 Iraq: A Country Study board was abolished, and the National Bank of Iraq (established in 1947 and government owned) took over note issue and mainte- nance of reserves. Iraq kept the dinar linked to and equal to the British pound, thus devaluing it in 1949 to ID1 equal to US$2.80, the same as the British did. The National Bank of Iraq was re- quired to maintain 100-percent reserves behind outstanding do- mestic currency. In 1959 Iraq withdrew from the British sterling area as a mark of its independence, but the value of the dinar remained at parity with the British pound until the British subse- quently devalued in 1967. The dinar remained at ID1 equal to US$2.80 until December 1971 when realignments of world cur- rencies began. With the devaluation of the United States dollar in 1973, the dinar appreciated to ID1 equal to about US$3.39, where it remained as late as February 1979 (for fluctuations in the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary). Commercial banking, although initiated during the late years of Ottoman rule, had become fairly active in foreign trade by the early stages of the Mandate period. British banks predominated. Some domestic credit and limited banking services continued to be carried on by traditional moneydealers. The limited use of money, the small size of the economy, and the few people with savings hampered extension of banking services. By the mid-1930s the government decided to establish banks to make credit availa- ble to sectors other than foreign trade. The Agricultural and Industrial Bank was formed by the govern- ment in 1936 to provide credit to those sectors. In 1940 this bank was split into the Agricultural Bank and the Industrial Bank, each with substantially increased capital provided by the government. The government-owned Rafidian Bank was established in 1941, partly to act as banker to the government. After the creation of the National Bank of Iraq it became the government's banker. The Real Estate Bank was formed in 1948, primarily to finance pur- chase of houses by individuals. The Mortgage Bank was estab- lished in 1951 and the Cooperative Bank in 1956. Besides the government-owned banks, branches of foreign-owned banks and privately owned Iraqi banks were opened as the economy ex- panded. In 1956 the National Bank of Iraq became the Central Bank. Its responsibilities included issue and management of currency, con- trol over foreign exchange transactions, and regulation and super- vision of the banking system. It kept accounts for the government and handled government and semigovernment loans of all kinds. Over the years legislation has considerably enlarged its authority. On July 14, 1964, all banks and insurance companies were na- tionalized, and over the next decade the number of banks was consolidated. By 1979 the banking system consisted of the Central Bank, the Rafidian Bank (for commercial operations), the Agricul- tural Bank, the Industrial Bank, and the Real Estate Bank (for houses and farmbuildings). The last three banks were so-called 172 The Economy specialized banks and provided short- to long-term credit in their respective activities. In addition the Iraq Life Insurance Com- pany, the Iraq Reinsurance Company, and the National Insurance Company conducted the country's insurance business. Post offices maintained savings accounts for small depositors. The banking system played a relatively small role in the econ- omy. In 1976, for example, 75 percent of the money supply con- sisted of currency in circulation, an even higher ratio than two decades earlier. The use of bank accounts increased, particularly in the 1970s, largely by the public sector. Individuals substantially increased funds in time accounts in the mid-1970s. The use of life insurance and other kinds of insurance was limited. The banking system contributed little to marshaling resources for develop- ment, although the rapid growth of oil revenues in the 1970s made the effort unnecessary. The banking system also provided limited credit because the government supplied the bulk of funds for development. Tradi- tionally credit in Iraq has been and continues to be largely for trade and particularly foreign trade. Credit to agriculture was inadequate in the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1970s the use of fertiliz- ers and other inputs increased, but it was not clear whether the funds came via the banking system or from government minis- tries. The Industrial Bank had been relatively active, providing short-term and long-term as well as equity capital to private and mixed sector manufacturers, but still the amounts were small. During the 1970s the extension of credit to the private sector increased modestly, but the public sector became a net creditor to the banks, resulting in negative credit to the economy in 1974 and 1976. In the 1950s and the 1960s the money supply increased about 8 to 9 percent a year, a rate not difficult to handle. As a conse- quence the pressure on prices was slight. Iraq maintained price controls, and a number of basic necessities were subsidized. Con- trols have been relatively effective because of active policing and punishing of violators. Government-operated shops and licensed stores sold such basic commodities as food, which also made the controls effective. The main price index available over time was that for the cost of living in and around Baghdad. This index strongly reflected the government's price control efforts and therefore was a poor measure of inflation. An attempt to adjust the cost-of-living index to measure inflation of wholesale prices during the 1960s indicated an average increase in prices of about 2 per- cent a year. Even if the adjustment was poor and the rate of inflation low, 2 percent a year appeared indicative of slight infla- tionary pressures. In the 1970s the sharp rise in oil revenues rapidly increased the money supply, an average rate of 27 percent a year between 1971 and 1976. The pressure on prices was compounded by port con- gestion and transportation bottlenecks that hampered the import 173 Iraq: A Country Study and distribution of goods to meet the escalating demand, particu- larly after 1973. The wholesale price index, although suffering statistical deficiencies as well as including many controlled and subsidized commodities, partly reflected the pressure on prices. The index increased at an average rate of 11.6 percent a year between 1973 and 1976. Most observers suggested that the rate of inflation was much higher. Shortages developed; black markets of sorts evolved for such crucial materials as cement and bricks; and private sector wages rose dramatically. That individuals, pre- sumably in or near the government, profited personally from the situation was reflected in a strong government campaign against corruption and profiteering. By 1979 the inflationary pressures had eased. Port congestion had nearly disappeared, and transportation bottlenecks had been largely eliminated. The flow of imports in conjunction with in- creased domestic production of such products as cement and bricks largely satisfied demand. The wholesale price index in No- vember 1977 (the latest available in early 1979) had stopped climbing. The apparent halt of Iraq's period of high inflation re- sulted from efforts in many problem areas, including a diminishing of government expenditures that had fueled the investment boom in the first place. The rapid increase of government investments after 1973 and the ensuing problems raised questions about the planners' estimate of the absorptive capacity of the economy. Other Sectors The construction industry, like its counterparts throughout the world, was subject to violent swings, reflecting the rise and fall of investments. The investment boom after the rise in oil revenues greatly expanded construction activity. In 1976, for example, con- struction's contribution to GDP was larger than that of either manufacturing or agriculture in contrast to many years when it was a small fraction of either. Construction also played an impor- tant role by providing the initial jobs for many of the migrants from rural areas. Employment in construction increased from 67,- 500 in 1970 to nearly 113,000 in 1976, by which time 65 percent of the workers were employed by the socialist sector. In 1976 the value of construction activity was similarly about two to one in favor of the socialist sector compared with private construction. Residential housing was an important component of construc- tion, although considerably overshadowed by other construction activity since 1973. Maintaining housing standards in the face of rapid urbanization since independence was an impossible task although a major concern of all Iraqi governments. A periodic destruction of the mud and reed huts (sarifahs) of the squatter settlements around cities accompanied by resettlement in mod- ern, brick housing complexes enhanced the attractions of the city. No data were available on the public housing constructed, but the number was large and included urban units and worker housing 174 Textile factory in Mosul Courtesy Middle East Photographic Archive, London 175 Iraq: A Country Study in conjunction with industrial and agricultural projects. Nonethe- less the housing backlog was great, although Iraqi cities lacked the visual evidence of extensive slums so common in many Middle Eastern cities. A substantial portion of the construction activity since indepen- dence has been devoted to developing the transportation system. In the 1950s and 1960s roughly a quarter of actual government investments went to providing transportation and communication links between important economic and population centers. Be- tween 1970 and 1975 about 15 percent of actual public sector development expenditures was spent on transportation and com- munications. By 1979 the country had a relatively good basic transport system in contrast to the disjointed and primitive system inherited from the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The most important transportation axis is roughly north and south between Mosul, Kirkuk, Basra, and the gulf via Baghdad and paralleling the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. Highway transport was the main method of moving people and cargo. In 1976 the road system consisted of 11,859 kilometers, 6,566 of which were paved. Nearly all of the administrative and economic centers were linked by paved roads. The secondary and feeder roads were pri- marily unpaved. The heavily used major links, many built soon after independence, required considerable maintenance because of increases in the size and number of trucks. There were pres- sures to extend the system and to upgrade the heavily used por- tions by straightening, improving bridges, and adding lanes. The country inherited two separate railroads at independence —one standard gauge and one meter gauge. The standard gauge ran from Baghdad through Mosul to the Syrian border and to an eventual connection with the Turkish railroad. Until the 1960s cargo had to be transloaded to meter-gauge cars at Baghdad to move south toward Basra and the gulf. The Soviet Union helped extend the standard gauge to Basra. By 1977 the total length of railroads was 1,589 kilometers, of which 1,129 kilometers were standard gauge. The railroads could play a more important role because of the relatively long distances between major centers. The planners were trying to eliminate constraints by upgrading rolling stock, gradually converting to standard gauge, and extend- ing lines to points of origin for bulk shipments. By the 1980s the plan anticipated an approximate doubling to 3,000 kilometers of tracks and substantial increases of rail freight, reflecting the min- ing, processing, and exporting of large quantities of sulfur, phos- phates, and fertilizers and related products. At independence the country had little port capacity, a fact that reflected the low level of foreign trade and the partial orientation westward toward Turkey and Syria. Since then the gulf port of Basra has expanded many times, and it will continue to be en- larged. In 1977 about 4.7 million tons of dry cargo was handled at Iraqi ports, about 90 percent of which went through Basra. A new 176 The Economy port, Umm Qasr, had been built partly to relieve pressure on Basra. In 1976 a plan was announced to build a large industrial complex and port at Az Zubayr for anticipated growth of fertilizer exports and imports of iron ore for the developing iron and steel complex. A canal must be completed and docks and warehouses constructed before the port becomes operational. Oil terminals existed at Al Faw and a deepwater terminal, Mina al Bakr, offshore for larger tankers. The potential of river transport had been exploited only slightly by 1979. Planners were investigating the feasibility of more reli- ance on inland shipping in the future. Air flights between major towns were available but only slightly used for passengers or freight. Baghdad's international airport provided international connections in most directions. Basra also had an international airport. The pipeline network had been expanded substantially in the 1970s and provided considerable flexibility in delivering Iraqi crude oil to gulf or Mediterranean terminals. The planners had slighted the communications system before the 1970s because of greater priority for transportation. In the 1970s large sums were invested in automated equipment to im- prove and expand various components of communications. By 1979 the phone and telex system had been upgraded in both internal and international service, and further additions were in progress. * * * Anyone desiring more information, greater insights, and a bet- ter understanding of the interplay of politics, geography, and other factors in Iraq's economic development should turn to Edith and E. F. Penrose's Iraq: International Relations and National Development. The Balance of Payments Yearbook Vol. 29 (and succeeding annual volumes) provides detailed estimates on the settlement of nationalization claims between the government and IPC and the aid provided and received by Iraq, data generally unavailable elsewhere. Iraqi government publications, such as the Annual Abstract of Statistics and the Statistical Pocket Book (an- nual), supply a range of statistical information, although many tables may be of little use. For financial and some other data the Central Bank's quarterly Bulletin and IMF's monthly Interna- tional Financial Statistics publish the latest available summaries. A number of books and articles cover the 1960s phase of Iraq's land reform, two of which—Doreen Warriner's Land Reform and Development in the Middle East and "Land Reform in Iraq" by H. Charles Treakle—were readily available. The Economic Devel- opment of Iraq presented an appraisal of the Iraqi economy in the early 1950s undertaken by a World Bank team. (For further infor- mation see Bibliography.) /* i77 Textile pattern of Iraqi design Government and Politics THE POLITICAL SYSTEM of Iraq in 1979 was in what was offi- cially characterized as a "transitional" phase. This description was taken to mean that the current mode of rule by decree would continue unchanged until the goal of a socialist, democratic repub- lic with Islam as the state religion was attained. The end of the transition was to be marked by the formal enactment of a perma- nent constitution, but when and under what specific circum- stances the transitional stage would be terminated was far from clear. Iraq remained under the regime of the Arab Socialist Baath (Resurrection) Party (Baath Party), which had seized power through a coup in July 1968. The legality of government institu- tions and actions was based on the Provisional Constitution of July 16, 1970, which embodied the basic principles of the Baath Party —unity, freedom, and socialism. These principles were in turn rooted in the pan-Arab aspirations of the party, aspirations sanc- tified by the party as the historic right and destiny of all Arabs to unite under the single leadership of "the Arab Nation." The core of the power structure was the party's Regional Com- mand, the membership of which was identical to that of the Revo- lutionary Command Council (RCC), the top executive organ of the state and, for all practical purposes, the arm of the party. National leadership reflected the dominance of two salient personalities: President Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, also the chairman of the RCC, the prime minister, the commander in chief of the armed forces, and the secretary general of the party; and Saddam Husayn, vice chairman of the RCC and deputy secretary general of the party. The two represented the military and civilian wings of the Baath organization, respectively, and were generally recognized as being roughly equal in the level of power and respect each could command. From its early days the party was continually troubled by per- sonality clashes and factional infighting. During the 1970s, how- ever, intraparty fissures were generally held in check, though by no means eradicated, by Bakr and Saddam Husayn. With Bakr's advanced age and reportedly failing health, however, the issue of succession—and the attendant question of stability—became a matter of growing speculation. At issue was whether Saddam Hu- sayn, widely viewed as highly competent and most likely to suc- ceed Bakr, could command the loyalty of both the military and the Baath Party apparatus (see Preface). The ability to balance the endemic intraparty tensions—as be- tween military and civilian elements and among personalities across boundaries of specialization—was always regarded as the key to success in Baghdad. Harmony in a military-civilian coalition was pivotal. For one thing, the military always constituted the 181 Iraq: A Country Study backbone of power, and its stabilizing role in the political process was seldom questioned in the years after the first army coup in 1936 (see Iraq as an Independent Monarchy: 1932-58, ch. 1). Equally significant was the role of the party and its link to the people, however tenuous that link might appear. Iraqi politics under the Baath regime was, to all intents and purposes, geared to mobilization. Loyal opposition had no place and was not recognized as legitimate. Adversary politics based on a free interplay of competing interests was considered to be ill suited to Iraq, at least during the indefinite transitional period. Partisan politics was maligned for its supposedly damaging conse- quences on unity and integration. The legacy of ethnic and re- gional cleavages was evoked in justification for the regime's rigor- ously harsh political posture; it continued to underline the regime's resolve to err, if it must, on the side of limiting political expression. Some sources assert that the Baath regime is less than repre- sentative of cross-sectional interests of the population. Perhaps the most frequently cited omission of the predominantly Sunni-con- trolled regime was the allegation that the Shiites, who accounted for a majority of the population, were considerably underrepre- sented at the top of the Sunni-dominated power structure. For many years, therefore, the lack of equitable sharing of power was generally blamed for the latency of sectarian tensions. For all practical purposes, however, what effects the shortcomings at- tributed to the regime would have on the future of Iraq remained largely unanswered. Iraq had held no free, popular elections for a quarter of a century. Popular attitudes toward national leaders, institutions, and issues remained conjectural. Opposition politi- cians or groups were firmly discouraged. For most political aspir- ants the choice was to join the highly selective Baath Party, to remain dormant, to go into exile, or to join the Baath-sponsored Progressive National Front (PNF; also referred to as the Patriotic and Progressive National Front—PPNF). In the years after 1973 the PNF in fact provided the only risk- free forum for political participation, but even this channel was denied to those whose inclinations were suspect and considered to be reactionary. The front appeared to lend some semblance of broad popular support to the regime as well as to provide the facade of alliance between the Baath Party and other progressive and nationalist forces. The Baath Party's predominance within the front was beyond question, however, and the inequity in the distri- bution of power continued to be a source of unhappiness for the non-Baathist elements within the front, such as the Iraqi Commu- nist Party (ICP), Kurdish representatives, and a handful of pro- gressive and nationalist personalities. As 1979 opened, relations with neighbors continued to domi- nate the attention of President Bakr and his associates. If public statements emanating from both Baghdad and Damascus were to 182 Saddam Husayn, who succeded to the presidency on July 16,1979 Courtesy Iraqi Press Office, Washington, D.C. 183 Iraq: A Country Study be believed, years of strains between Iraq and Syria would soon be replaced by an era of friendly cooperation. If the Iraqi-Syrian quest for political, economic, and military unification were suc- cessful, Iraq would doubtless emerge as the principal if not the only claimant to the leadership of the Arab world. Meanwhile the Iraqi regime appeared to be taking a flexible though cautious stand toward the Iranian situation in which Shiite religious leaders brought down the monarchy. Iraq's main concern was that the Shiite resurgence in Iran or the Sunni-Shiite rioting in Turkey might spill across the frontiers, providing impetus to potential Shiite unrest. Constitutional Framework The governmental system in early 1979 was based on the Provi- sional Constitution of July 16, 1970, which was a modification of an earlier one that had been issued on September 21, 1968. The 1970 Constitution was the fifth basic law of the land after Iraq first began the trial and error of constitutionalism in the 1920s under what was known as the Organic Law of 1925 (see Constitutional Development, ch. 1). The 1925 document was scrapped in 1958 when, upon the overthrow of the Hashimite monarchy in a mili- tary coup, a new constitution was announced to provide for a republican form of polity (see Republican Iraq, ch. 1). The 1958 constitution was, in turn, replaced by a new one in 1964, only to be superseded by yet another one in September 1968, two months after General Bakr seized the reigns of power. The Constitution proclaims Iraq "a sovereign people's demo- cratic republic" dedicated to the ultimate realization of "one Arab state" and the establishment of a socialist system. Islam is declared the religion of the state but, presumably because of the secularist orientation of the Baathist leadership, it is no longer referred to as the basic source of Iraqi laws and constitutions. The place of the Kurds in Iraqi society is given specific constitutional recognition in deference to the historic Kurdish pressure for self-rule. As amended in March 1974, the Constitution provided for autonomy for the Kurds in the region where they constitute a majority of the population. Along with Arabic, the Kurdish language is designated as the official language in the Autonomous Region; that is, for both administrative and educational purposes. In an obvious effort to ensure internal solidarity, however, the Constitution prescribes that the "national rights" of the Kurds and the "legitimate rights" of all minorities as well are to be exercised only within the frame- work of the unity of Iraq. The Constitution sets forth two basic aims: the establishment of a socialist system based on "scientific and revolutionary princi- ples"; and pan-Arab economic unity. The state is to assume an active role in "planning, directing, and guiding" the economy. National resources and the means of production are defined as "the property of the people," and they are to be exploited by the 184 Government and Politics state "directly in accordance with the requirements of the general planning of the national economy." Public properties and the properties of the public sector are described as inviolable. The ownership of property is classified as "a social function that shall be exercised within the limits of society's aims and the state's programs in accordance with the provisions of the law." Private ownership and individual economic freedom are guaranteed "within the limits of the law, provided that individual ownership will not contradict or be detrimental to general economic plan- ning." Private property is not to be expropriated except for the public interest and then not without just compensation. The size of agricultural ownership is to be defined by law, and the excess is to be regarded as the property of the people. Real estate holding is forbidden to foreigners unless legally exempt. Fundamental rights and duties are spelled out in detail. The right to fair trial through due process, the inviolability of person and residence, the privacy of correspondence, and the freedom to travel are guaranteed. Among other safeguards mentioned are those relating to religious freedom; the freedom of speech, publi- cation, and assembly; and the right to form political parties, trade unions, and societies. The Constitution also directs the state to eliminate illiteracy and ensure the right of citizens to free educa- tion at all levels of formal instruction. One of the aims of education is to oppose "capitalism, exploitation, reaction, Zionism and colonialism" so as to ensure the achievement of unity, freedom, and socialism—the familiar three-pronged motto of the Baath Party. The Constitution contains other stipulations concerning the powers and functions of various government institutions. These include the RCC, the National Assembly, the presidency, the Council of Ministers, and the Judiciary (see fig. 12). The 1970 Constitution is to remain in force until the permanent constitution is promulgated. It may be amended only by a two-thirds majority vote of the RCC. Government The Constitution provides for a governmental system that in appearance is divided into three mutually checking branches: ex- ecutive, legislative, and judicial. In reality this is not the case because, despite the often-publicized intentions and plans, as of early 1979 the national parliament had not been revived since its demise in 1958. Legislative initiatives continued to be made by executive authorities. The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) In 1979 the top decisionmaking body of the state continued to be the RCC. Chaired by President Bakr, the RCC was first formed in July 1968 and has since exercised executive as well as legislative powers. Mentioned in the Constitution as the supreme organ of the 185 Iraq: A Country Study state, the RCC is charged with the mission of carrying out popular will by removing power from the reactionary, dictatorial, and corrupt elements of the society and returning it to the people. By a two-thirds majority the council is to elect the chairman, who is to serve concurrently as the president of the republic. In case of the chairman's official absence or incapacitation, his constitutional powers are to be exercised by the vice chairman, also elected by the RCC from among its members. Thus the vice chairman (Sad- dam Husayn since 1969) was first in line of succession. The council members, including the chairman and vice chair- man, are answerable only to the RCC, which may dismiss any of its members by a two-thirds majority and may also charge and send to trial any member of the council, any deputy to the presi- dent, or any cabinet minister for wrongdoing. Initially new mem- bers of the council were to be co-opted from the Regional Com- mand of the Baath Party—the top policymaking and executive body of the Baathist organization (see The Baath Party, this ch.). A constitutional amendment, announced in September 1977, stipulated that all members of the Regional Command should be regarded as members of the RCC, thereby enlarging the council membership from five to twenty-two at the time. The interlocked leadership structure of the RCC and the Regional Command strengthened the party's influence in governmental affairs. The council's constitutional powers are wide ranging. It may perform legislative functions, pending the establishment of the National Assembly; approve government recommendations con- cerning national defense and internal security; declare war, order general mobilization, conclude peace, and ratify treaties and agreements; approve the general budget of the state; lay down the rules for the impeachment of its members and set up the special court to try those so impeached; authorize the chairman or the vice chairman to exercise some of the council's powers except for legislative ones; and provide the internal regulations and working procedures of the council. The chairman is specifically empow- ered to preside over the council's closed sessions, sign all laws and decrees issued by the council, and supervise the work of cabinet ministers and the operation of the institutions of the state. The National Assembly The Constitution provides for a parliament called the National Assembly, but as of early 1979 the assembly was not yet formed. In 1979 it was unclear when the legislature would be established. In any case, even if the assembly were formed, its legislative competence probably would be circumscribed and reduced to that of a pro forma body for ratifying the legislative decisions already made by the Baath Party and funneled to the assembly through the RCC. Under the constitutional amendment an- nounced in July 1973, the 100 members of the assembly are to be selected by the RCC rather than by open, popular elections. Tech- 186 Government and Politics >* I I >s 0) Si 0) o o T3 o o ail: o s= ° C 3 o S t5£ = tionary Courts mouSj a.M3a', :isions of these to the RCC o i:§J 3-g| o c o o> E s E ° O T> on — o o o E E c >» c o g.E o o w Revolu autono the de taken z< a: a o» *£ UJ U < J ! •; A 1 i u ' ..J JJ •: I 1 ! HI »s c s m 3 5* W0 5 t. a. "c U u o ti o U w u. a. 187 Iraq: A Country Study nically, however, these members are to be answerable to the Na- tional Assembly, rather than to the RCC. With an endorsement of one-fourth of its members, the assem- bly would be able to draft bills on any matters other than those expressly exempt: national defense and internal security matters would be reserved for the RCC. It would deliberate bills proposed by the RCC or by the president through the Council of Ministers and approve, amend, or reject them within fifteen days of receiv- ing them. It would possess no veto power; if the assembly's amend- ment or rejection were not acceptable to the RCC, the difference would be resolved by a two-thirds majority of both bodies in a joint session. As part of its deliberative functions, the assembly would call the cabinet ministers for questioning, subject to prior presi- dential consent. The President and the Council of Ministers The president is the chief executive authority of the nation. He may exercise authority directly or through the Council of Minis- ters, the cabinet. He must be a native-born Iraqi. The Constitution has no specific provisions or limitations on the president's term of office. Succession is presumably automatic by way of the vice chairman of the RCC, although he is not expressly designated as the vice president of the state. There is a separate, largely ceremonial post known as the vice president of the state, a position reserved for a Kurd under the terms of self-rule for the Kurdish Autonomous Region. In 1979 this post was held by Taha Muhi al Din Maruf, who was appointed to it in 1974. The vice president is appointed or removed by the president at his sole discretion. The Council of Ministers is the presidential executive arm. Pres- idential policies are discussed and translated into specific pro- grams through the council. The council's activities are closely monitored by the diwan or secretariat of the presidency. The head of the diwan is a cabinet-rank official, and his assistants and support staff are special appointees exempt from the scope and procedures of the Public Service Council, which serves as a clearinghouse for all civil service matters. Cabinet sessions are convened and presided over by the presi- dent. Some senior members of the RCC are represented on the cabinet. By convention about one-third of the cabinet positions may be reserved for members of the Baath Party. At the end of 1978 the cabinet consisted of thirty-one members including Presi- dent Bakr and Vice President Maruf. Ministerial portfolios in- cluded agriculture and agrarian reform; communications; culture and arts; defense; education; finance; foreign affairs; health; higher education and scientific research; industry and minerals; informa- tion; interior; irrigation; justice; labor and social affairs; oil; plan- ning; public works and housing; religious trusts; trade; transport; and youth. Additionally there were two ministers of state, respec- 188 Government and Politil?s tively, for the Autonomous Region (Kurdish affairs) and foreign affairs; and five ministers of state without portfolio. Of the cabinet members, the president and the ministers in charge of communi- cations, defense, education, interior, oil, planning, public works and housing, and trade were also members of the powerful twenty-two-member RCC. As of mid-1977 there were a total of 580,000 public servants assigned to various ministries and semigovernment bodies (exclu- sive of members of the armed services). This figure was more than double the size of those who were on public payrolls in 1964. Of the 1977 total, women accounted for 15.4 percent, up from 9 percent in 1964. The Judiciary As far as could be determined in early 1979, the judiciary con- sisted of civil, criminal, religious, and special courts. Administra- tively it was under the Ministry of Justice. All judges were ap- pointed by the president. Courts continued to function partly on the basis of the French model first introduced during Ottoman rule and since modified and partly on Islamic customs. The domi- nant schools of Islamic jurisprudence were Hanafite among the Sunni Arabs, Shafiite among the Sunni Kurds, and Jafari among the Shiites. The Christians and Jews applied their own religious laws. For judicial administration, the country was divided into five appellate districts centered, respectively, in Baghdad, Basra, Al Hillah, Kirkuk, and Mosul. Major civil and commercial cases were referred to the courts of first instance, which were of two kinds: those with unlimited competence and those with limited jurisdic- tion. The former were established in the capitals of governorates (provinces); the latter were located in the district and subdistrict centers, in addition to the governorate capitals. Minor litigations also were handled by peace courts, situated in each of the five judicial district centers, except for Baghdad, which had two peace courts. Appeals from these courts were taken to the six courts of appeals (two in Baghdad). Serious criminal offenses were adjudicated by the courts of ses- sions, of which there were six (two in Baghdad) in 1979; these courts also reviewed cases on appeal from the decisions of the lower penal or magistrate's courts. The personal status of Muslims, either Shiite or Sunni, and disputes arising from administration of the awqaf (religious trusts or endowments) were decided in sharia courts. Christians and Jews and other religious minorities had their separate communal councils to administer justice. Civil litigations against government bodies and the "socialist sector" and between government organizations were brought be- fore the Administrative Court under a law promulgated in No- vember 1977. Jurisdictional conflicts between this court and other courts would be adjudicated by the Court of Cassation, which on appeal could also review decisions of the Administrative Court. 189 T mntry Study irt of last recourse for all judicial matters (excluding ises) was the Court of Cassation. It consisted of a presi- i*~~M presidents, no fewer than fifteen permanent members, and a number of deputized judges, reporting judges, and religious judges. The highest court was divided into general, civil, criminal, administrative affairs, and personal status benches. Apart from its appellate function, the Court of Cassation assumed original juris- diction over crimes committed by high government officials, in- cluding judges. Offenses against the internal and external security of the state—be they economic, political, or financial—were tried before the Revolutionary Court (see Crime and Punishment, ch. 5). Local Government In early 1979 there were eighteen governorates, each under a governor who was appointed by the president (see fig. 1). Each governorate was divided into districts headed by district officers; the district, into subdistricts under the responsibility of subdistrict officers. Cities and towns were headed by mayors. Municipalities were classified into several categories, depending on the size of local revenues. Baghdad, the national capital, had special status, and its mayor was a presidential appointee, as were mayors in a few other major cities. Beginning in the early 1970s the government sought in earnest to narrow the traditional distance between itself and the grass roots. The need for this step was expressed in the National Action Charter, which the government proclaimed on November 15, 1971, as a statement of fundamental principles and guidelines for all its policies and actions (see Constitutional Development, ch. 1). The charter specifically mentions "popular councils" that are to be established in all administrative subdivisions; these councils are to exercise the power of supervision, inspection, and criticism with respect to "the state officialdom." In 1975 the Baath Party de- scribed these councils as "popular organizations that have con- tributed to the creation of democratic practices within the soci- ety." As far as could be determined in early 1979, the popular (or people's) councils, which were most likely appointive, existed in Baghdad and other major cities and in some governorates, dis- tricts, and subdistricts. Apart from their watchdog functions, these councils were intended to serve other purposes: e.g., channel pop- ular grievances and needs to the authorities; inform and educate the public concerning the Baath Party-controlled government policies and programs; and encourage active popular support of and involvement in government-initiated activities. Kurdish Autonomy Of the eighteen governorates, three in the north—Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulaymaniyah—were sometimes collectively called Kurdis- tan (land of the Kurds). The Kurds constitute a majority in this 190 Iraq: A Country Study distant lowlands (see The Kurds as a Threat to National Integrity, ch. 5). Politics The Baath Party In early 1979 the Baath "revolution" in Iraq continued to stress parallelism focused on "regional" (quotri) and "national" (qawmi) dimensions. This was conditioned by the Baath doctrine that the territorially and politically divided Arab countries were but "re- gions" of the common entity called "The Arab Nation," and hence the Baath movement in one country constituted merely an aspect or stage leading to the eventuality of "a unified democratic social- ist Arab nation." That nation, if it materialized, would be under a single, unified Arab national leadership. Theoretically, therefore, success or failure at the regional level would have a corresponding effect on the forward march toward that Arab nation. Moreover the critical test of legitimacy for any Baath regime would necessarily hinge on whether the regime's policies and actions were compatible with what had been the basic aims of the revolution since the 1940s—aims epitomized in the principles of "unity, freedom, and socialism." The Baath Party in Iraq, like its counterparts in other Arab regions, descends from the organization that sponsored the official founding congress in Damascus in April 1947. In Baghdad the party was formed in the late 1940s after a group of Iraqi students and intellectuals returned from Syria, where they had been in- spired by pan-Arab intellectuals, notably Michel Aflaq and Salah al Din al Bitar; they had also participated in the founding congress of 1947, together with peers from other Arab countries. From the early years the Iraqi organization had support from a small number of college and high school students, intellectuals, and professionals—virtually all of whom were Sunni urbanites. Another base of support was the army, whose critical political importance since the nation's first military coup in 1936 was not lost on the Baathists. Intensive, covert organizational work within the military in the early 1950s helped to popularize the Baath cause. Among the early converts were Ahmad Hasan al Bakr, Salih Mahdi Ammash, and Abd Allah Sultan, all of whom figured promi- nently in Iraqi political affairs in later years. The Baathists were able to shed their clandestine status for the first time and emerge as a political force after taking part, al- though in a minor capacity, in the coup of July 1958. Their support of the coup regime, dominated by non-Baathist military officers under Brigadier Abd al Karim Qasim, was brief, however, because of Qasim's lack of zeal for pan-Arab union between Iraq and Egypt. After a bungled attempt on Qasim's life in late 1959 (in which Saddam Husayn took part), the Baath Party was suppressed, but in February 1963 it succeeded in forming the first Baath re- gime in Iraq, only to be overthrown in November 1963. In July 192 Government and Politics 1968 the party, under the direction of General Bakr, regained hegemony through a bloodless coup. After the takeover the Bakr regime embarked on a path aimed at the establishment of a "socialist, unionist, and democratic" Iraq. This was done, if the official line was to be believed, with scrupu- lous care for balance between the revolutionary requirements of Iraq on the one hand and the needs of the "Arab nation" on the other. According to the party's pronouncement in January 1974: "Putting the regional above the national may lead to statism, and placing the national over the regional may lead to rash and child- ish action." The protestation notwithstanding, the regime's pri- mary concern after 1968 was on domestic issues. In 1968 the Bakr regime confronted a wide range of problems, such as the age-old ethnic and sectarian tensions stemming from the disparate nature of the population; the stagnant situation of agriculture, industry, and commerce; the inefficiency and corrup- tion in government; and the lack of any consensus acceptable to the three main social bases of the political system—the Shiites, the Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds. Compounding the difficult issue of consensus building were the pervasiveness of apathy and mistrust at the grass roots regardless of sectarian boundaries; the shortage of qualified party cadres to serve as standard-bearers of the Baath regime; and the Kurdish armed insurgency. Rivalry with Syria and Egypt for influence within the Arab world and the frontier dispute with Iran also complicated the regime's efforts to address the issue of nationbuilding. The regime's endeavors through formal government channels were accompanied by extensive political campaigns designed to eradicate what it called "harmful pre-revolutionary values and practices," namely exploitation, social inequities, sectarian loyal- ties, apathy, and lack of civic spirit. The old way of life should be changed, according to official statements, to a new one in which the citizens would refashion their lives on the basis of patriotism, national loyalty, collectivism, participation, selflessness, love of labor, and civic responsibility. These "socialist principles and prac- tices" would be implanted through the party's own examples, the state educational system, and youth and other popular organiza- tions. Particularly important in the scheme of the regime was the emphasis to be placed on "military training" for the youth and popular organizations; the training was regarded as essential to the creation of "new men in the new society" and the defense of the republic from the hostile forces of Zionism, imperialism, right- ists, opportunists, and reactionaries (see Paramilitary, State Secu- rity, and Police Organizations, ch. 5). In reflecting on the period from 1968 through 1973, the Baath Party readily acknowledged that its missions were nothing short of "colossal." At the Eighth Regional Congress held in January 1974 party leaders struck a somber note by saying, "We must confess that the success achieved during the past phase was not as 193 Iraq: A Country Study great as it should have been" and that it would take "a generation of time and ceaseless work to achieve full results" in all ideological, political, administrative, organizational, and technical fields. On the positive side, the party listed major achievements for the 1968-73 period. These were "the consolidation of the Revolution's authority and Party's leadership"; "political and economic inde- pendence" as evidenced by the nationalization of the Iraq Petro- leum Company in 1972; the "democratic and peaceful settlement of the Kurdish problem"; and the establishment of the PNF in July 1973. The regional congress adopted a set of policy objectives as a basis for all government policies and actions during "the next phase"—an open-ended phase that started in 1974. The objec- tives, which were binding in early 1979, were wide ranging and generally phrased. Obviously first in importance was the need to consolidate and preserve party solidarity on both regional and national levels. The process of consolidation was to be accom- plished by fortifying the ideological and organizational content of the party machine and by purging the government of "all con- spiratorial and suspect elements." The task of enlisting cooperation from other political forces through and within the framework of the PNF was also considered to be important, as was "adherence" to the peaceful and demo- cratic solution of the Kurdish question based on terms announced on March 11, 1970. The elimination of delays and gaps in the economic, social, and cultural domains pointed out still another critical factor as a means of lending substance to the "material and moral" content of socialism in Iraq. The concept of "balance" was uppermost in the party's analysis of revolutionary situations on both the regional and national levels. The question of transition to socialism obviously merited close scrutiny at the Eighth Regional Congress. A doctrinaire approach was apparently ruled out by the regime, which counseled "flexibil- ity in revolutionary transformation." Specifically the transforma- tion was to be based on what the regime called a "democratic" process, namely the establishment of the National Assembly and popular councils; an expanded role for the Baath Party, govern- ment press, and popular organizations in the political arena; the adoption of a permanent constitution; and elections to the Na- tional Assembly and the locally formed popular councils. As part of the democratic process, popular discussions and dialogues on issues of public interest were to be encouraged; and the scope of popular participation would be broadened. In early 1979 Iraq was no nearer to the democratic process than it had been in 1974. The building of "popular democracy" as a national objective still remained essentially unfulfilled. Political activities continued to be restricted to the terms outlined by the Baath regime. The adversary system of political management fa- miliar to Western societies was alien to Iraqi political culture. 194 Government and Politics Official explanation was that Iraq lacked a "tradition of democ- racy" and, given the country's history of political turmoil and instability, "no rash steps should be taken" before "objective prerequisites" were satisfied. Prudence and vigilance were key words in Baghdad. This was evident in the economic domain of the Baath regime. The expan- sion of the socialist sector in agriculture, industry, trade, and ser- vice, the improvement of living conditions, and the more effective planning and use of internal resources were major economic aims of the regime. These aims and attendant policies apparently were tempered by prudent thinking that either haste or an unduly doctrinaire approach would almost certainly provoke counter- reactions. Such a defensive posture was born of the belief that Iraq was encircled by what the party called "a rich capitalistic and imperialist sphere of influence." As of mid-1978 the party claimed a total of 1.5 million support- ers, about 12 percent of the population. Of the total, party regulars or cadres were estimated at roughly 50,000. They formed the nucleus of party organization, which, placed in every corner of the society, performed the multifaceted role of leader, motivator, teacher, administrator, and watchdog. Generally, operational procedures emphasized selectivity rather than quantity in recruit- ment. The self-arrogated elitist role of the party derived from the principle that the party's effectiveness could only be measured by demonstrable ability to mobilize and lead the people, not by "size, number or form." As a result, participation in the party movement was a requisite for social mobility. The core of party leadership was identified with the Regional Command, the top decisionmaking body of twenty-two members who were elected to a term of five years (two years until 1975) at the regional congress of the party. The secretary general (also called regional secretary) of the command was the leader of the party and was assisted by the deputy secretary general, second in rank and power within the party hierarchy. The members of the command were theoretically responsible to the regional congress that, as a rule, was to convene annually to debate and approve ;the party's policies and programs; actually the members were chosen by several senior party leaders to be "elected" by the regional congress, a formality seen as essential to the legitimation of party leadership. The Regional Command controlled a far-flung structure, the basic units of which were circles and cells. Immediately above these were "groups," which would then constitute "sections" at the next higher level. The sections in turn would report to eigh- teen "branches," one in each governorate. The provincial-level branches were each represented on the Regional Command. Heavy emphasis was placed on penetration into every segment of society. The party's penetrative efforts were carried out by cadres in all governmental and popular organizations in urban as 195 Iraq: A Country Study well as rural areas. Duties were varied: to educate and indoctri- nate the non-Baathist population; to provide guidance at all levels of the society according to the party's principles and policies; to improve the party's image among the traditionally suspicious seg- ments of the population; and to monitor the activities of various groups for purposes of government surveillance or corrective ac- tions. Another important function was to portray the party as the intermediary between the state and the people and thus as the true and concerned advocate of popular interests. Equally signifi- cant, part of cadre activity was to acquire on-the-job training and experience in various fields, partly to enhance the party's stature as the leader of the nation and partly to improve the chances for "Baathisizing" the whole society. The Regional Command was linked to the National Command of the Baath Party, which had been first set up in Damascus as the highest policymaking and coordinating council for the Baath movement throughout the Arab world. The National Command consisted of representatives of all regional commands and was responsible to the National Congress, which convened periodi- cally. It was vested with broad powers to guide, coordinate, and supervise the general direction of the movement, especially with respect to relationships among the Baath parties and the external policies these parties were to take relative to the outside world. These powers were to be exercised through a national secretariat in charge of bureaus. The actual status of the National Command to oversee the Baath movement as a whole remained somewhat clouded in 1979, as it had in the past. The command had no central, unified authority to speak for the movement. This was because there had been two rival national commands—one in Damascus and the other in Baghdad—and these commands continued to vie for exclusive legitimacy. The rivalry originated in the open rupture of factional splits in early 1966 involving the Syrian Baathist leadership and the National Command. At that time the command was in Damas- cus and was led by Afiaq, who was called the Founder and Secre- tary General of the Arab Socialist Baath Party. The upshot of the infighting was the expulsion from Syria of Afiaq, Salah Bitar, and other associates; they went into exile in Beirut where they formed a rival command, and after the Baathist assumption of power in Iraq in 1968, they transferred the command to Baghdad. Mean- while, in Damascus, the original national command was recon- stituted in late 1966 and was soon brought under the control of Syrian President Hafiz al Assad, who in 1979 led both regional and national commands in Syria. The Politics of Alliance: The Progressive National Front (PNF) In the two decades of turbulent Iraqi politics after 1958, the successive regimes went through the motion of appealing to com- peting groups for unity and cooperation. The need for cooperation 196 Freedom Monument by Jawad Salim Courtesy Iraqi Press Office, Washington, D. C. was brought home because, without exception, the regimes came to power through coups; were based on narrow circles of per- sonalities or cliques; ruled by decree—and not infrequently by repressive means—and hence faced the ever-present specter of alienation, disaffection, and countercoups. As a result alliance or coalition was regarded as an expedient means of ensuring political stability, of minimizing conflict and rivalry, and of winning over as broad a segment of the population as circumstances permitted. Truce and cooperation were considered to be all the more essen- tial in view of the series of setbacks sustained by the Arab progres- sive forces—all because of their failure to unite against "imperial- ism, Zionism, and reactionary forces." Admittedly the task of forging an alliance between the Baath regime and other groups was "extremely difficult and complex." Iraqis had not been steeped in the tradition of mutual trust and, according to the party, the people were prone to "automatic psy- chological reflexes" against either cooperative work or consensus building. The party was nonetheless determined to enlist the sup- port of all progressive forces. In the years after 1973 the PNF came to epitomize the politics of alliance building. The need for internal reconciliation became pressing soon after 1968. Of particular concern to the regime was the Kurdish insur- gency that had seriously exercised the governments in Baghdad in 197 Iraq: A Country Study terms of its damaging consequences for economic development, maintenance of internal security, and political integration. An- other major source of concern was the ICP, the main competitor to the Baath Party within the left-of-center political spectrum. The Baath-ICP rivalry before 1968, for example, made it difficult for either group to make any notable gains in evoking grass-roots support. The regime's quest for reconciliation produced the first ten- tative result on March 11, 1970. After nearly two years of peace talks between the government and Mullah Mustafa Bar- zani's Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), the two sides agreed on a set of conditions that became the basis for ending the costly, protracted armed hostilities. These terms, which were outlined in what was called the March 11 Manifesto, the March Declaration, or the March 1970 agreement, set the stage for negotiations through the first weeks of 1974. The negotiations, taking place against the historical backdrop of mutual suspi- cion, were punctuated by charges and countercharges of bad faith on either side; the Kurds were especially dissatisfied with what they believed was the regime's disinclination to honor the pledges it had made under the March 11 Manifesto. Unable to narrow the differences on the substance of autonomy to be granted the Kurds within the framework of what the regime called "the unity of the people and the homeland and the country's constitutional system," the antagonists resumed armed hostilities in the spring of 1974. Unfolding contemporaneously with the Kurdish equation were exploratory talks aimed at ending rivalry between the Baath Party and the ICP. The possibility of entente was raised in 1968 when the ICP welcomed the Baathist assumption of power and publicly proposed, although not for the first time, a joint struggle against "feudalism, imperialism, and Zionism." The convergence of the ICP overture and the Baath Party's own self-interest combined to produce the National Action Charter, which President Bakr pro- claimed on November 15, 1971, as a comprehensive framework for the alliance of various political groups (see Constitutional De- velopment, ch. 1). In presenting the charter for public discussion, Bakr invited "all national and progressive forces and elements" to work for the goal of "a democratic, revolutionary, and unitary" Iraq by participating in "the broadest coalition among all the national, patriotic and progressive forces." The National Action Charter remained in 1979 an embodiment of the Baath regime's goals and principles concerning the nature of the political system envisaged, the armed forces, the bureauc- racy, the Kurdish question, the national economy, the society and culture, and foreign relations. An unmistakable aspect of the char- ter was the salient theme that the Arab revolutionary movement, on both regional and national levels, would be led by the Baath Party, which the charter said represented "the interests of the 198 Government and Politics broadest masses from among workers, peasants and other hard- working groups." Public discussions were encouraged in the ensuing months in a way calculated to generate popular support for the principles underlying the charter. As a result, on July 17,1973, the Baath and the ICP—reportedly under the prodding of the Soviet Union— agreed to accept the charter as a common program for coopera- tion. The formal establishment of the PNF not only legalized the ICP for the first time since its inception in 1934 but also gave it a token share of power at the cabinet level (see Power Elite, this ch.). The 1973 agreement came against the backdrop of pessimism that hostilities would almost certainly be renewed in the Kurdish areas. According to renowned political scientist Majid Khadduri, "Faced with a possible showdown with the Kurds, the Ba'th lead- ers prudently reconciled their differences with the Communists and set up the Progressive National Front in 1973." It seemed obvious at the same time, however, that the alliance with the Kurds, if it materialized, could perhaps have balanced out the ICP members in the PNF—not to mention the cessation of the Kurdish insurgency. As it turned out, the Baath regime's overture for unity with the Kurds, which it said would be like "the foundation stone in national coalition," was fruitless. Apparently the Kurds re- garded the Baath-ICP partnership as yet another attempt to iso- late the Kurds. As initially announced, the PNF was to be directed by the High Council through a secretariat. The first secretary general of the secretariat was then, as in 1979, a Baathist named Nairn Haddad, who was a member of both the Regional Command and the RCC. The High Council was to consist of sixteen seats, of which eight were assigned to the Baath Party. The ICP, which agreed to ac- cept the Baath Party's "privileged" or leading role in the national front, had three seats. Three additional seats were reserved for the KDP if the latter chose to join the PNF. The balance was for other progressive forces. The appearance of power sharing within and through the PNF had, of course, no correlation with the actuality of the power structure. In signing the National Action Charter, the ICP agreed that only the Baath Party would have control of the RCC, the armed forces, and internal security apparatuses. For its part, the ICP, aside from some minor cabinet posts, was allowed to carry on its activities openly as long as it stayed out of the armed forces and its actions did not contravene the spirit and letter of the National Action Charter. In January 1974 the Baath Party renewed its attempt to broaden and transform the PNF into "a working proposition in reality and not merely in form." It was not until after March 1975, when the Kurdish revolt collapsed, that the PNF came to include the fac- tionally split Kurds. The High Council was enlarged from sixteen 199 Iraq: A Country Study to eighteen, the two additional seats being necessary to accommo- date Kurdish factions. As a group the Kurds came to be repre- sented by the KDP under the new leadership of Aziz Aqrawi (the party's former leader, Barzani, had departed the country, to live first in Iran and later in the United States); by the Kurdish Revolu- tionary Party under Abd al Sattar Tahir Sharif, founded in 1972 as a splinter group from Barzani's party; and by other Kurds profess- ing to be either "independent" or "progressive." In 1975 two other groups joined the PNF. These were the Inde- pendent Democratic Group, led by Muzhir al Azzawi, a moderate formerly associated with the right-wing National Democratic Party; and the Progressive Nationalist Group, under Hishal al Shawi, a mixture of nationalists of varied stripes. There were other groups or personalities having the potential to act assertively if left to operate openly and without restrictions. However, they were regarded as feudal and reactionary because of their past activities and hence as beyond the pale of any political reformation; they were not invited to join the PNF. In 1979 the groups existed, if at all, in name only, and their leaders were either in political retirement or residing abroad. Two of the better known of these nonactive groups were the Independence Party, associated with Siddiq Shanshal and Faiq al Samarrai, and the National Democratic Party, which had briefly backed the Qasim regime but had not shared the pan-Arab ideals of other Iraqi groups. Mohammad Hadid, Husayn Jamil, and Yusuf al Hajj were the principal persons identified with this party. In 1978 the Baath regime continued to hold the position that the PNF was indispensable as long as the Arab revolutionary move- ment faced dangers in Iraq and in other parts of the Arab home- land as well. It insisted that the regime's policy of combining its "leading role" within the front with a cooperative relationship based on "mutual respect and confidence" among the front's members was correct and that in fact this was a major accomplish- ment of the Iraqi regime. In early 1979 the regime's relationship with the PNF remained correct and generally stable and yet showed signs of residual strains, especially with respect to the Kurds and the ICP. It was no secret that these two partners, resentful of continued monop- oly of power by the Baathists, pressed, if cautiously, for a more rapid democratization of the political process, starting with a di- rect popular election to the National Assembly (see Power Elite, this ch.). The Kurdish issue receded gradually in the latter half of the 1970s. First and foremost the insurgency was crushed in 1975 after the Kurds were denied the Iranian arms that had been the backbone of their strength against the regimes in Baghdad (see The Kurds as a Threat to National Integrity, ch. 5). The provision by Iran of arms and other equipment stopped after March 1975 when Iraq and Iran agreed to normalize their strained relations 200 Government and Politics (see Foreign Policy, this ch.). Moreover defections and infighting within the Kurdish community all but sealed the fate of militant Kurds. Nonetheless the age-old aspirations of Kurdish nationalism remained undiluted and continued to provide a potentially vola- tile issue. On balance, however, a majority of the Kurds appeared to favor coexistence and cooperation rather than furtive war. The basis for such coexistence was the framework of self-rule as pro- claimed by the government on March 11, 1974, on the fourth anniversary of the original March 11 Manifesto. In 1979 the Kurd- ish experiment was still under way; the government was engaged in extensive efforts to improve the living conditions of the Kurds and to satisfy the Kurdish needs for self-assertion—within the lim- its of political and national security requirements. The Kurdish situation was not without underlying tension, how- ever. The regime's sometime policy of coercing the Kurds into the mainstream of Iraqi life apparently proved counterproductive in some instances. Such policy, even though evidently well inten- tioned, offended the cultural sensibilities of the Kurds. According to the May 1978 issue of The Middle East, the regime's policy involved such measures as "forced Arabisation, the immigration into Kurdistan of tens of thousands of Arab peasants from the Basra marshes, forced transfer of tens of thousands of Kurds from their mountains to the southern lowlands into .protected villages' reminiscent of Vietnam and the regular execution of Kurdish pa- triots." These measures, which were implemented especially in the 1976-78 period, apparently enraged some Kurdish villagers and resulted in sporadic armed resistance. Despite the occasional government assurances that the villagers were no longer forcibly removed from their ancestral lands as well as reports that most of those previously transferred had been allowed to return to the traditional Kurdish area, there were occasional unconfirmed re- ports of armed clashes between the Kurds and border security forces during 1978. In early 1979 the Kurds were being watched for the slightest sign of unrest in the light of the Iranian turmoil and the predictable concern in Baghdad about the possible revival of unrest among Iraq's Kurds, aided by Iranian ill-wishers across the border. The Baath alliance with the ICP continued in early 1979 with no apparent major discords in foreign affairs; but in domestic mat- ters there were latent and occasionally visible signs of strain. Through no fault of the Baathists, ICP members were evidently perturbed by their failure to make any appreciable headway in winning over the workers, peasants, and other disadvantaged groups. For a substantial majority of the Iraqi population, be they Sunnis, Shiites, or Kurds, politics based on ideology or class war- fare appeared to have little relevance as an object of commitment. Islam and loyalties based on ethnic and regional identifications mattered more than doctrinaire interpretations of sociopolitical affairs. Compounding the communist difficulty was the fact that 201 Iraq: A Country Study their movement—led in 1978 by Aziz Muhammad, Zaki Khairi, and Amir Abd Allah—in the eyes of many Iraqis was still identified as being alien and associated with the Soviet Union. Under the circumstances the ICP pretense to champion the progressive cause of the working class sounded somewhat hol- low; in any case it was devoid of any distinctive appeal, if only because the more resourceful Baath Party propounded a simi- lar if not identical position. To be sure, a small number of intel- lectuals, students, disaffected Kurds, and impoverished Shiite tenants supported the communist theme of class conflict, but they could in no way arouse the masses and mobilize them from below into a powerful united front against the Baath re- gime. The need for a united front from above—alliance at the top with the ruling Baath Party—thus took on added impor- tance in the late 1970s; but even there the political realities of Iraq did not hold out much promise for any substantial be- nefits. All things considered, what the ICP wanted most was the advent of open, competitive politics outside the restrictive confines of the PNF. In early 1979 there was no indication that the Baath leadership was prepared to loosen its grip on the po- litical scene; the promised transition toward "popular democ- racy" remained still in an indeterminate stage. The ICP frustration and impatience were not unanticipated in view of the constraints and contradictions inherent in the working of the PNF. The alliance with the Baath leadership was to be anchored on mutual trust, but the trust was not sufficient and did not entitle the ICP to the sharing of power. The stark reality of a patently unequal relationship of power offered little or no basis for revolutionary optimism; despair was aggravated by the growing self-consciousness of impotence. Doubtless, the ICP had no intention of playing second fiddle forever. This perhaps explains why the party sought to step up its political work in the 1976-78 period, clamoring for an early demo- cratization of the Iraqi political process. In fact, if the Baathist statements are to be taken at face value, the ICP tried to infiltrate into and carry out propaganda activities within the armed forces. Retributions were swift and severe. Not having forgotten their long-standing antipathy toward communism, in 1978 the Baathists executed a number of Iraqi Communists who were convicted of having participated in the formation of cells within the military (see The Communists as a Threat to National Stability under Baath Rule, ch. 5). The Communists made no secret of their unhappiness. In No- vember 1978, for example, they complained of "large scale" gov- ernment persecution and harassment "for more than a year." This "continuing and escalating" trend, if unchecked, would only give aid and comfort to the enemies of the Iraqi people. In affirming the continued importance of mutual cooperation through the PNF, the Communists also let it be known that their efforts to 202 Government and Politics clarify the situation through "meetings or memorandums" were to no avail. Power Elite In a pioneering study on leadership trends in Iraq for the 1948-68 period, Phebe Ann Marr stated in 1970 that the leader- ship of Iraq was at that time less known than "any other country in the Middle East," among other things because of "strict censor- ship," "the continuous turnover of leadership at the top," and the ensuing policy shifts. Nearly ten years after this observation the leadership issue was still abstruse. Clearly Baath leaders had set- tled into a mood of self-confidence that had been lacking in the late 1960s. Despite possible intraparty bickerings over succession, the stability of the regime did not appear to be threatened. How long the apparent calm would continue was unclear. The develop- ment of serious schisms between the military and civilian factions of the party, especially after Bakr's departure from the scene, could lead to political turmoil. Other than the absence of any overt tension, however, not much was known about the inner workings of the power elite. There was little or no reliable information on that elite and the process of decisionmaking or the pattern of cooperation and con- flict among key leaders. Secretiveness was still pronounced every- where. Observations concerning the interplay of forces impinging on the Baath leadership were at best superficial—and hazardous. Institutionally the Regional Command of the Baath Party and the RCC were the top two readily identifiable centers of power. Actually the two were one and the same because of their overlap- ping membership. This developed after September 1977 when Article 38 of the Provisional Constitution was amended so that all members of the Regional Command would thenceforth serve con- currently as RCC members. The amended constitution fixed the RCC membership at twenty-two (see Government, this ch.). Theoretically the high command of the regime operated ac- cording to the principle of collective leadership; the reality was different. Obviously some leaders were more influential than oth- ers. What the party called "balance between centralism and de- mocracy in the Party, government, and popular organizations" remained a delicate issue facing the leadership. Autocracy was to be rejected, as was an ineffectual oligarchy. In a real sense, given the conspiratorial nature of politics at the top as evidenced in recent decades, harmony of balance among key leaders continued to be essential to the maintenance of the status quo. In early 1979 Bakr and Saddam Husayn were unquestionably the dominant figures. The inner circle of power that these two headed included Saadun Ghaidan, minister of communications and a longtime associate of Bakr; Adnan Khayrallah Talfah, minis- ter of defense; Muhammad Mahjub, minister of education; Izzat Ibrahim Duri, minister of interior; Tayih Abd al Karim, minister 203 Government and Politics ble for the most part to the northern Tigris and Euphrates area. This region, sometimes referred to as the Sunni Arab territorial triangle linking Baghdad, Mosul, and Anah (near the Syrian bor- der), emerged as a broad political center of gravity in the 1960s. The prominence of the region was not traceable to any single reason. Many national leaders of the British Mandate and mo- narchical periods originated from the triangle, and the trend was actually reinforced after the early 1960s; at one time all eighteen members of the Regional Command were identified with the area. Perhaps of greater importance in the 1970s, within this particular area the town of Tikrit—it being the birthplace of Bakr, Saddam Husayn, and many top Baath leaders—gained more salience than other cities. Most of the notables originating from the triangle were Sunni Arabs who wielded power out of proportion to their number, which was roughly 25 percent or less of the total population. At the top layer of power, perhaps as many as two-thirds of the key government posts were held by Sunni Arabs in 1979. After 1975 Kurdish representation increased considerably, but this gain was in the context of limited self-rule in the Autonomous Region and not at the national level. In Baghdad the vice presi- dent of the state was a Kurd, but he was not a member of the RCC. The Shiite share of representation also increased in recent years, but the gain was apparently still far short of their expectations. In absolute numbers there were probably more Shiites than Sunnis in all government institutions—including the armed forces—but their numbers did not translate into power. To be sure, the re- gime's policy of political integration based on its secularist ap- proach might in time defuse the Sunni-Shiite sectarian tensions, and the policy of Baathisizing the whole society would doubtless lead to more opportunities for the non-Sunnis at the top. In the opinion of foreign observers, however, the Sunni-dominated Baath Party will in the short run probably be viewed with suspi- cion by the Shiites or the Kurds, neither of whom share the cause of pan-Arabism with the Sunnis of the triangle. In any case, al- though all Iraqis were encouraged to join the Baath Party, as of the late 1970s virtually no non-Sunnis had been co-opted into the party's high command. On the surface, Shiite underrepresentation posed a potentially festering problem. Whether or not this issue would boil over politi- cally—and if so under what circumstances—was far from clear. Iraqi politics and the stability of the Baath regime would have to take into account factors other than sectarianism. For instance, social tensions in the Shiite half of the country south of Baghdad —and the opportunities they presented for possible communist exploitation—were perhaps less sectarian than economic, occa- sioned as they were by economic and social injustices inherent in the traditional land tenure system there (see Rural Society, ch. 2; Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform, ch. 3). The landlords in that 205 Government and Politics Foreign Policy The foreign policy environment of Iraq was punctuated by a high degree of uncertainty in early 1979. This was because the major variables affecting the process of Iraqi foreign affairs were themselves subject to forces over which neither Iraq nor any of its neighbors had any effective control. Generally the major foreign policy issues confronting the Baath regime were the Egyptian- Israeli peace process and its uncertain implications for the Arab world; the issue of substance and style in the Iraqi-Syrian quest for reconciliation; the unsettling effect of the revolution in Iran for the Middle East in general and Iraq in particular; and the future of Iraq as an avowed nonaligned state. These issues all intersected, and the way in which they had been addressed by the Iraqi gov- ernment was complex, to say the least. No factor could be singled out as being determinative of Iraqi foreign affairs—other than the paramount imperative of any nation-state, i.e., the integrity of the national territory and independence. The principal themes under- lying the conduct of Iraqi foreign relations—such as pan-Arabism, the stability of Baath rule in Iraq, industrialization, economic pros- perity, peace with neighbors, and pragmatism in dealing with superpowers—were in effect subordinate to the doctrine of na- tional self-preservation. Obviously the relative salience of these themes varied depending on the assessment of opportunities and constraints inherent in the changing realities of Iraq's operational milieu. In early 1979 what the Baath regime called the "Arab frame- work" for foreign policy was undeniably more prominent than at any time in the past. Iraq was relentless in its bid for pan-Arab unity, which it declared was "the fate and destiny" of the Arab people. This posture was maintained with particular reference to the so-called Palestine question and the broader context of Arab- Israeli confrontation. As viewed from Baghdad, allies and enemies were identified on the basis of whether or not the other countries supported the Iraqi position. Iraq belonged to the so-called hard-line camp on the question of peace in the Middle East. It had yet to recognize the existence of Israel. Nowhere was this intransigence more evident than in its nonuse of the term Israel for any public consumption in Iraq. Israel was still alluded to as "the Zionist entity," "Zionism," or "the Zionist enemy." Moreover to many Iraqis the distinction between Zionism and imperialism was obscure, Israel being portrayed in propaganda and official statements as a creation of "imperialist circles." Iraq's position on the Arab-Israeli and Palestinian questions was consistent even to the point of being rigid. It called for an uncondi- tional withdrawal of Israeli forces from the occupied territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state "in Palestine" for "the people of all religions including the Jews" who had been living 207 Government and Politics tor." The results of Sadat's efforts to elicit support from the Arab world were less than positive; his plan to convene in Cairo a conference of the parties directly concerned—Israel, Syria, Leba- non, Jordan, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the United States and the Soviet Union (as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference), and the United Nations (UN)—brought positive re- sponse only from the United States, the UN, and Israel (which qualified its acceptance with the proviso that the PLO would not be allowed to participate). Anti-Sadat protests found a more or less unified forum in an Arab summit conference that was held in Tripoli in the first week of December 1977. The conference was convened apparently at the initiative of Syria and, in addition to Libya as the host, was attended by Iraq, Algeria, Syria, the People's Democratic Repub- lic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden)], and the PLO. Its attempt to chart a joint anti-Sadat line fell short of unanimity. Although the so- called Tripoli Declaration was issued, the participants were split along radical-moderate lines, Iraq and Libya opting for a hard-line posture against a moderate line advocated by Syria. In the end Iraq stormed out of the summit, asserting that Syria subscribed to a capitulationist policy of negotiations. In any case the five signato- ries (except Iraq) to the declaration agreed, among other things, to establish the Syrian-led "front for steadfastness and confronta- tion" and to "freeze" (but not sever) diplomatic ties with Egypt. The Tripoli summit, which was answered by Egypt's severance of diplomatic relations with Iraq and other Arab states, also set the stage for an Arab people's conference, an ostensibly nongovern- mental forum. Iraq did attend this conference, held in Tripoli days after the summit, and joined others in adopting resolutions that called for, among other things, withdrawal of diplomatic recogni- tion from "the Sadat regime," expulsion of the regime from the League of Arab States (Arab League), and the trial by an Arab people's tribunal of Sadat on charges of "political pan-Arab crime." There was little doubt that Iraq, for years the Arab world's odd man out, sought to end its relative isolation from the rest of the Arab countries and enhance its own stature at the expense of Egypt and Syria as well. It was actually during the Tripoli summit that Iraq unsuccessfully tried to lay the groundwork for a new anti-Sadat summit in mid-January 1978 under its aegis in Baghdad. Instead, another summit was held in Algiers in early February, featuring the same cast of participants as in Tripoli, save Iraq. Reportedly Iraq's absence was occasioned by its strained ties with Syria. For decades relations between Iraq and Syria waxed and waned. In the 1940s Iraq did not oppose the idea of a Greater Syria state to be composed of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan (present-day Jordan). It had its own idea of a federation—called the Fertile Crescent Plan—which would have brought Syria and 209 Modern Baghdad Courtesy Iraqi Press Office, Washington, D. C. Jordan under an Iraq-centered regional entity. This plan did not go unnoticed in Cairo. Egypt, the rival claimant to Arab leader- ship, was not loath in encouraging Syria to refrain from the Iraqi scheme. For its part Iraq made known its historic affinity to Syria, especially after Syria and Egypt merged and became the United Arab Republic (UAR) in February 1958. In September 1961 Iraq extended a hearty welcome to Syria upon the latter's secession from the Egypt-dominated UAR. In June 1962 President Qasim expressed the hope that the frontiers with Syria would "disappear shortly ... for we are one people and one country." Seizure of power by the pan-Arab Baathists in the two countries in February and March 1963, respectively, further enhanced the prospects for closer ties, not only between them but also with Egypt. This was evidenced in April 1963 when the three countries agreed in prin- ciple to federate, but their differences on the specifics of federa- tion were too much to overcome. Iraqi ties with Syria began to sour in November 1963 when the Baath regime in Baghdad was overthrown in a coup, and some of its members obtained sanctuary in Syria to oppose the new Iraqi regime of President Abd al Salam Arif (see Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy: 1963-68, ch. 1.). The situation went from bad to worse after 1966 when Syria's Baathist generals expelled party founder Aflaq and his civilian associates from Damascus, resulting in the split into rival commands of what was until then the unified National Command of the Baath Party-^-one under the military in Damascus and the other, a coalition of military-civilian wings, in 210 Iraq: A Country Study action." This was to be accomplished by economic means. Appar- ently convinced that Sadat's separate peace initiative was precipi- tated by his government's economic difficulties, Iraq called on "the financially able Arab countries to set up a national fund to assist Egypt"—provided that Egypt renounce the Camp David accords. This fund also would be used to finance the military needs of the western, northern, and eastern fronts as well as the needs of the PLO and of the Palestinian Arabs in the Israeli-occupied territories. Specifically the level of funding for the aid scheme would be at least US$9 billion a year, subject to ad hoc increases in case of military necessity, for a period of ten years. The proposed amount of contribution toward the fund was Saudi Arabia, US$3.0 billion; Libya, US$1.5 billion; Kuwait, US$1.5 billion; Iraq, US$1 billion; the United Arab Emirates, US$1 billion; Algeria, US$0.5 billion; and Qatar, US$0.5 billion. Of the annual total, one-half was to be earmarked for Egypt and the balance for the other so-called con- frontation states against Israel. Formal invitations were sent on October 10 to all Arab coun- tries, except Egypt, and the PLO for participation in a Baghdad summit scheduled for November 2; there was to be a preparatory conference of Arab foreign ministers on October 20. Realistically the Iraqi attempt to rally an anti-Sadat opposition hinged first on its own reconciliation with its archrival Syria. Such a possibility was in doubt as recently as in the previous month when Iraq was absent from the summit conference of Arab leaders held in Damascus. Apparently, however, the two countries grew acutely concerned over the prospect of an Egyptian-Israeli settlement that would not resolve the issues of the Golan Heights and state- hood for the Palestinians. Against this backdrop there took place a series of behind-the- scenes maneuvers that resulted in the Iraqi-Syrian decision to lay aside their long and sometimes bloody feud. One of the develop- ments that made this possible was Iraq's apparent decision to refrain from criticizing Syria's acceptance of the principle of a negotiated peace in the Middle East. President Assad's visit to Baghdad, the first since 1973, was preceded by the reopening of borders and air links closed in November 1977 and set the stage for two days of intensive negotiations. On October 26 presidents Bakr and Assad signed the Charter for Joint National Action. The charter laid the framework for bilateral cooperation in the "political, military, economic, cultural, information and other fields." This would take place under the supervisory, coordinative, and integrative functions of the fourteen-member Joint Higher Political Committee; the seven Iraqi members on the committee were the nucleus of the top power elite—President Bakar, Sad- dam Husayn, Izzat Ibrahim, Ramadan, Aziz, Adnan Husayn, and Talfah. The higher political command was to meet every three months, 212 Government and Politics or more often if necessary, alternately in Baghdad and Damascus. Its broad functions were to be carried out by several subordinate committees. The first of these bodies was for military cooperation, specifically with the mission of formulating "a joint defense pact" that would provide the framework for "complete military unity" between the two countries. The other committees were to be responsible, respectively, for political information and cultural affairs; economic affairs and technical cooperation; and education, higher education, and scientific research. The first sign of coopera- tion was evident already on October 28 when the two sides agreed to take specific measures to increase bilateral trade. The Iraqi-Syrian amity was a timely and notable achievement for both countries, coming as it did on the eve of the Arab summit in Baghdad. It not only helped to boost the morale of the Arab leaders gathering for the summit but for the first time brightened the prospects of closer Arab unity. Equally important, the recon- ciliation lent some potentially powerful military substance to the toothless steadfastness front. The three-day Baghdad summit was as notable for what it did agree on as for what it failed to agree on. According to the com- munique issued on November 5, 1978, twenty heads of state or their equivalents agreed to reject the Camp David agreements, which they said "harmed the Palestinian people's rights and the rights of the Arab nation in Palestine and the occupied Arab terri- tory"—and "did not lead to the just peace that the Arab nation desired." They also forbade any unilateral Arab action in solving "the Palestinian question in particular and the Arab-Zionist con- flict in general." The solution of both issues was to be in accord- ance with "a resolution by an Arab summit conference convened for this purpose." There was also an agreement that military strength along the borders with Israel should be substantially bol- stered. Another agreed point was that an Arab summit conference should be held annually in November. Otherwise the participants were not unanimous on whether Sadat should be punished for his peace initiative or what sanctions should be imposed on Egypt if Sadat signed a separate peace accord with Israel. (Differences were subsequently ironed out at a later summit conference that did adopt sweeping economic and diplomatic sanctions against Egypt.) Disagreement was evident also on the suggested joint aid fund and the schedule of financial contributions as first proposed by Iraq. Although not included in the final communique, the sanctions included measures for sus- pension of Egypt's membership in the Arab League and the trans- fer of Arab League headquarters from Cairo to any other Arab country. The Baghdad summit also scaled down the level of fund- ing for the joint aid fund. Unconfirmed reports stated that the fund would total US$3.5 billion to be dispensed to Syria, Jordan, Leba- non, the PLO, and Palestinians in the occupied territories. Contri- butions assessed by countries were Saudi Arabia, US$1 billion; 213 Government and Politics tary, diplomatic, and commercial levels. In the light of the Iranian revolution, the future of these ties was somewhat unpredictable in early 1979. Nonetheless it appeared quite possible that, whatever the direction, Iraqi-Iranian relations would in one form or another be susceptible to the influence that Shiite leaders might wield— perhaps more so than ever now that an "Islamic republic" existed in Iran. In the past Shiism had been neither a catalyst nor a diplomatic tool in Iraqi-Iranian relations. It should be pointed out, though, that the Baath regime of Iraq and the Iranian government of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi had not been unmindful of the poten- tially destablizing effect Shiite unrest or revivalism would have on the stability of the other—and the effect of that stability or the lack of it upon its own. These two countries were the only states in the Islamic world where Shiites were numerically dominant (up to 55 percent in Iraq and 90 percent in Iran). In Iraq the Shiite commu- nity was underrepresented within the power elite, whereas in Iran the religious leaders engineered a successful revolution (although other issues also played an important part) by asserting that the Pahlavi monarchs had consistently violated basic tenets of the Shiite faith and had sought to destroy the Shiite religious hierar- chy. Coincident or not, Iraq and Iran came to share the mutuality of concern about the latent antiregime potentials of Shiites in their respective countries. After the eruption of Shiite riots in early 1977 at An Najaf and Karbala in the heartland of Shiism, Iran sent a number of influential persons, including then Empress Farah Diba, to the two holy cities. Their visits could be seen as a show of assurances on two fronts: to reassure the Iraqi Shiites that they had little to fear from the Baath leadership in Baghdad and to reaffirm Iran's unequivocal support for President Bakr's leader- ship and policies. Iraq returned the favor in early October 1978 by expelling Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini—ironically into the limelight of the Western mass communications media in Paris. Until that time Khomeini had been virtually unknown to the outside world, hav- ing been in exile at An Najaf since being banished from Iran in late 1964 for his strident opposition to the shah's secularist reform measures. After mid-1978 his presence in Iraq had perturbed not only Baghdad but also Iran, which had grown uneasy about Khomeini's anti-shah statements made in connection with Iran's escalating crises. Iran's aroused concern as conveyed to the Iraqi authorities only hastened the latter's decision to release Khomeini from what was reported as "virtual house arrest." In any case, the Iraqi government's official position was that the Iranian Shiite leader had left for Paris at his own request. Viewed from a different perspective, how the Iranian equation might affect the old Iraqi-Iranian rivalry for influence in the Per- sian Gulf remained to be seen. Because of the economic and strate- 215 Iraq: A Country Study gic implications of the gulfs oil reserves for their respective enti- ties, the security of the gulf was always a major policy concern, underlining the steady arms buildup programs pursued in both capitals. Whatever the new position of post-shah Iran might be concerning the gulfs security, Iraq's drive for premier stature in the gulf area would probably continue. In fact it could possibly be stepped up in view of its consistently hard-line position calling for linkage between the Arab countries' "oil weapon" and the pan- Arab approach to the settlement of peace in the Middle East. Through early 1979 there was nothing to suggest that the Baath regime altered its posture on this linkage and its own ambitions to emerge as the dominant Arab power in the gulf region. Such posture was proclaimed, if not for the first time, in January 1974 —against the backdrop of the Arab oil embargo—when the Baath Party declared: "Iraq, being the largest Arab country in the area and the most advanced, carries the main burden in safeguarding the area. The national [i.e., pan-Arab] importance of the area cannot be overemphasized, and the dangers facing it are serious." Supremacy in the Persian Gulf, if realized, would doubtless bol- ster Iraq's claim to pan-Arab leadership. All things considered, such a goal was by no means unrealistic, but in the complicated, shifting contexts of intra-Arab regional politics, the regime in Baghdad would be facing some obstacles. Perhaps the worst enemy in this regard was that of its own making—the hidebound ideological line that often aroused suspicions from the moderate ranks within the Arab arena. This was especially true in Iraqi relations with the generally conservative monarchies of the Per- sian Gulf. As a result, after the mid-1970s the Iraqi government—evi- dently under the influence of Saddam Husayn, the principal archi- tect of the foreign policy aimed at ending its isolation—generally pursued a course of moderation in dealing with its gulf neighbors, notably Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. In April 1975, on the heels of the Iraqi-Iranian accord reached in the previous month in Algiers, Iraq and Saudi Arabia agreed to define their long-disputed borders in the area of the Iraq-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone (see Major Geo- graphical Features, ch. 2). Also in the same month the two coun- tries pledged to reconstruct the An Najaf to Medina road, consid- ered important for pilgrims from Iraq and Iran to the Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia. The Saudi settlement left the Iraqi border with Kuwait the only unresolved dispute in the gulf area as of early 1979. The issue stemmed initially from the decision of Great Britain in 1961 to terminate its protectorate over oil-rich Kuwait and recognize its independence. Almost immediately Iraq laid claim to Kuwait as an integral part of its territory, assertedly because Kuwait was once part of the province of Al Basrah in the former Ottoman Empire; Iraq also alleged that the British protectorate itself, estab- lished in 1899, had been illegal. In October 1963 Iraq nonetheless 216 Government and Politics recognized Kuwait's independence, and the two countries agreed in 1968 to settle their differences by appointing a joint study group. But tensions persisted to the point of border skirmishes in the mid-1970s (see Kuwait, ch. 5). It was not until early 1975, however, that any serious effort got under way. The difficulty of the border issue stemmed from the fact that the two Kuwaiti islands of Bubiyan and Al Warbah virtu- ally block the access to Umm Qasr, one of Iraq's two gulf outlets. This was the basis for the Iraqi demand that the two tiny islands be leased to Iraq for a ninety-nine-year period in return for Bagh- dad's concessions on the land border with Kuwait. Talks continued intermittently through 1978, the two sides only agreeing in July 1977 to withdraw their security forces from the disputed land border. For the time being at least, the two countries appeared to be inclined to gloss over their differences and focus on economic and commercial cooperation. In 1979 Iraq continued the policy of what it called "positive neutrality and nonalignment." This was aimed at achieving two objectives: first, to identify Iraq's needs and aspirations with those of the "progressive" nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and enlist the support of these countries for the pan-Arab struggle against "the imperialist-Zionist alliance" and second, to maximize the scope of freedom and options for Iraq to deal with the "haz- ards of the policies of war, aggression, military pacts and blocs, political hegemony, and economic domination." Of the two objec- tives, there was little question that the second was the more chal- lenging because of the need to reconcile the conflicting pressures from not only the immediate regional milieu but the superpowers. Seen in a broad perspective, the nonalignment policy, as practiced by the Baath regime, was strongly overlaid with the generalities of anti-imperialism. The anti-imperialist and anti-Western posture was rooted in the circumstances surrounding the birth of the Baath movement in the region and was buttressed by the legacy of enmity and bitterness spawned by the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948 and the ensuing hostilities. Iraq's unbridled anti-imperialist hyperboles, however, sometimes tended to obscure noteworthy aspects of its external relations: pragmatism and flexibility. Initially, when nonalignment and neutrality were adopted by the Qasim regime after toppling the pro-Western Hashimite mon- archy in 1958, Iraq tilted toward the communist bloc, the Soviet Union in particular. The resulting anti-Western orientation was moderated somewhat after 1960 and, by taking a middle path between the East and the West, Iraq managed to maintain prag- matic ties with the rival blocs at the commercial, technical, and military levels. Upon the outbreak of the Arab-Israeli June 1967 War, the Iraqi drift toward the communist nations was noticeable if only because the Soviet Union and its East European allies sided with the Arab states. Soviet inroads into the Arab camp, notably Iraq, Syria, and Egypt, became considerable. Nonetheless Iraqi 217 Chapter 5. National Security Textile pattern of Iraqi design Iraq: A Country Study Baathist coconspirators in the July 17 Revolution into exile, and during the next decade they successfully eliminated considerable subversive opposition to their rule through a pervasive and effi- cient intelligence network and through repressive means of coer- cion. Attempted coups in 1970 and 1973 were put down and occasioned thoroughgoing purges of the armed forces (see Armed Forces and Society, this ch.; Coups, Coup Attempts, and Foreign Policy: 1963-68, ch. 1). In addition both the armed forces and the nation's civilian population have been objects of considerable ideological indoctrination in an effort to secure their loyalty. Per- haps the most important determinant of the Baathist success in terms of security, however, was its 1975 victory against the Kurds. The conclusion of the Iraqi-Iranian agreement in March 1975, which was subsequently formalized in the Baghdad Treaty in June 1975, resolved a number of disputes between the two countries, including the termination of Iranian support for Iraqi Kurds, whose struggles for autonomy had periodically plagued Iraqi gov- ernments for sixty years. Subsequently Iraqi authorities undertook a variety of measures to emerge from their long-standing isolation in the region surrounding the Fertile Crescent. From what could be learned of the still security-conscious and secretive politicomilitary atmosphere of Iraq in early 1979, most foreign analysts felt that despite continued suggestions of opposi- tion—as indicated by ongoing purges within the civilian and mili- tary hierarchy—the Baath regime, under the leadership of Presi- dent Ahmad Hasan al Bakr and Saddam Husayn, vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), enjoyed a more fa- vorable national security situation than had existed for many years. Nevertheless the government remained vulnerable to chal- lenges to its authority in the absence of any legitimate means of political dissent (see Preface). Domestic The Kurds as a Threat to National Integrity The most persistent and militarily effective security threat dur- ing Iraq's modern history has stemmed from the sixty years of resistance by the Kurdish minority centered in the northern governorates of Dahuk, Irbil, and As Sulaymaniyah (see fig. 1). The Kurdish rebellion was born in 1919 as a campaign against British Mandate authority in an effort to create a Kurdish state. The rebel- lion has continued since 1932 as a struggle against Iraqi authorities for autonomy within independent Iraq. The military capabilities of the large Kurdish populations of Turkey and Iran have been frequently neutralized but never completely crushed, and in 1979 the Kurds in Iraq remained a potential destabilizing factor in the military and security balance of the region. Early Kurdish rebels were led by Shaykh Mahmud Barzinji, who commanded the Kurdish National Army and set up a short-lived government independent of Baghdad before the army was driven 224 National Security from positions in Iraq's rugged northern mountains by Iraqi troops and the British Royal Air Force in 1922. The revolt was revived in 1931, when again Iraqi and British troops were called on to quell tribal disturbances led by the powerful Shaykh Ahmad Bar- zani, whose brother, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, was to become the spearhead of the Kurdish rebellion from 1943 until 1975. World War II saw the revival of Kurdish national aspirations arising from the foreign influences in the area. In 1943 Barzani's tribal warriors cleared the area surrounding the town of Barzan of government troops and for two years held effective control of the region. In 1945, after a change of governments in Baghdad, Iraqi troops again moved into Kurdish territory to restore govern- ment authority. Barzani considered this an act of war and began attacking government positions. Government troops prevailed, and in 1946 Barzani moved to Mahabad, Iran, which had been proclaimed the Republic of Mahabad (also known as the Kurdish Autonomous Republic) in January with the blessing of the Soviet Union and with the aid of Soviet troops, which during the war had occupied parts of northern Iran. World pressure forced a Soviet retreat, and shortly afterward the Kurdish state collapsed in the face of an Iranian military offensive. Barzani escaped to Iraq but was unwelcome there and moved, together with some 500 Bar- zani tribesmen, to the Soviet Union, where he remained until the overthrow of the Iraqi monarchy in 1958. Initially the postrevolutionary regime of Abd al Karim Qasim was sympathetic to Kurdish demands for direct participation in the governing of those areas that had predominantly Kurdish populations. But as early as 1959 the Qasim government began to interfere in Kurdish attempts to police themselves and organize their own militia, and by 1961 it was clear that differences would not be resolved peaceably. In December of that year the Iraqi air force bombed Kurdish military positions in several villages, an act that touched off a war that was to cost thousands of lives and large portions of the central government budget during the remainder of the decade. The nine-year war was militarily inconclusive: after initial Kurdish successes, government troops secured a precarious hold on the larger valleys in the Kurdish region, but Kurdish guerrillas never relinquished their control of the more rugged mountainous areas. Faced with a stalemate and under growing political pressure to end an unpopular war, the government acceded to Kurdish political demands in the so called March Mani- festo of 1970. Shortly after the March 1970 end of hostilities, however, it be- came apparent that the Baath government's concept of Kurdish autonomy differed significantly from that of Barzani and his fol- lowers. Over the next four years it became increasingly clear that on at least two points—Barzani's control over the Kurdish military force, known as the Pesh Merga (Those Who Face Death), and Kurdish fiscal control over the oil-rich Kirkuk region—neither side 225 Iraq: A Country Study would be willing to compromise. While the Iraqi government supported Kurdish rivals of Barzani in attempts to undermine his leadership, Barzani's Pesh Merga, which was reported to number 50,000 to 60,000 men during the early 1970s, at various times received arms and aid from the Soviet Union, Iran, Israel, and the United States and, ironically, training by the Iraqi armed forces, who enlisted several thousand of its members as border guards. By 1974 the power of the Pesh Merga posed an unacceptable chal- lenge to the government. On the fourth anniversary of the March Manifesto the government offered Barzani a plan for Kurdish au- tonomy that excluded Kirkuk. He promptly rejected it, and Bagh- dad authorities decided to crush the Kurdish revolt by force. The renewed warfare broke out in early April, and for almost a year the Iraqi armed forces waged a successful offensive that largely destroyed the conventional military capability of the Kurds. General Barzani (a military title he had received while in the Soviet Union) abandoned the traditional guerrilla tactics of the Pesh Merga and fought a disastrous frontal war against the govern- ment's well-equipped infantry and armored units. By the summer of 1974 it was clear that the Kurdish rebels could not continue to withstand the assault alone, and they came to rely increasingly on arms and ammunition supplied by Iran. Although accounts of the fighting vary considerably, most ana- lysts attribute the success of the government offensive to the mis- calculations of Barzani, both in his decision to engage the Iraqi armed forces in conventional warfare and in his reliance on for- eign governments to furnish support troops, ammunition, and weapons to the Pesh Merga. During the 1974-75 winter Kurdish rebels lost considerable ground to the Iraqi advance and were pushed back into the northeast corner of the country against the Turkish border, which was closed to them, and the Iranian border, where supply lines protected by Iranian troops allowed the Kurds to hold off the 100,000-man Iraqi army for several months. Sud- denly and without warning, Iraq and Iran signed an agreement at the Summit Conference of the Organization of Petroleum Export- ing Countries (OPEC) at Algiers on March 6, 1975, that settled a whole series of long-standing disputes between the neighbors and closed the border between Iran and Kurdish Iraq. Cutting the Iranian supply line proved disastrous to the Kurdish military effort; by the end of March the remaining Kurdish positions had been abandoned, and tens of thousands of Kurds fled into Iran to escape the rapid Iraqi advance. After its military victory over the Pesh Merga, the Iraqi govern- ment undertook a variety of measures designed to subdue the Kurds and prevent any future large-scale insurgency by them. Among the most important were pledges to devote record funds from the central government budget to the development of infra- structure and economic projects in the Kurdish region; an offer of amnesty to all Kurds returning from exile, which was accepted by 226 National Security most of those who had fled to Iran; the creation of a twenty- kilometer-wide buffer zone, devoid of population, along the Iranian and Turkish borders; and the deployment of a substantial number of Iraqi army troops in the region as enforcers of the authority of the central government. The relative calm between 1975 and early 1979 testified in part to the effectiveness of these policies. Many foreign observers noted, however, that the govern- ment's heavy-handed approach to implementing some aspects of its Kurdish policies—in particular the alleged arrest and mistreat- ment of some of those returning under the promise of amnesty and the forcible removal of thousands of Kurds from their tradi- tional homelands in order to create the buffer zone—has created a renewed sense of hostility toward the Baghdad authorities among some groups. The relative calm may additionally be attributed to the sound defeat of the Pesh Merga in 1975 and its inability to regroup after Barzani, the leader for over thirty years, fled the region. Disillu- sioned with military support from foreign, Western-oriented na- tions, the remaining elements of the Pesh Merga, which num- bered no more than a few thousand, were reluctant to become tied to or dependent on any foreign power. In addition to the Pesh Merga, which was the armed wing of the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), Kurdish rebels were fighting under the banner of the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) under the leadership of Jalal Talabani. In late 1977 PUK merged with two other Marxist- oriented Kurdish groups and during 1978 reportedly engaged in several pitched battles with its KDP rivals. PUK was known to have military and financial backing from neighboring Syria, and although foreign support for the Pesh Merga could not be confirmed, some foreign observers believed it received aid from nonregional sources. During the late 1970s military activity was limited to isolated guerrilla actions directed against the central government and the occasional battles between rival Kurdish factions. At least three foreigners were kidnapped by Kurdish guerrillas during 1977, and in 1978 a slight increase in the number of Kurdish attacks on Iraqi military outposts was reported. Four Iraqi army divisions were deployed in the three governorates to check sporadic but continu- ing activity, but neither Kurdish leaders nor the Iraqi authorities felt in early 1979 that the Kurds could launch another major mili- tary campaign in the near future. The Communists as a Threat to Political Stability under Baath Rule Iraq's small but well-disciplined Iraqi Communist Party (ICP) has seen its fortunes rise and fall repeatedly throughout the forty-five years since its founding by Yusuf Salman Yusuf (known as Comrade Fahd) in 1934. Until the revolution of July 14,1958, the clandestine ICP struggled for survival in the face of severe repression imposed 227 Iraq: A Country Study by Iraq's monarchy and the widespread feeling among Iraqis that communism was contrary to the teaching of both Islam and Arab nationalism. Their persecution under the monarchy, however, raised Communists to a status of near-martyrs in the eyes of the avidly antimonarchical postrevolutionary leaders. Although the ICP remained technically illegal, it became closely aligned with the Qasim regime, which used the communist militia organization to brutally suppress its opponents. By 1963 Qasim had lost all his former political allies save the IPC, and after he was overthrown in February 1963 the new Baathist leaders carried out a massacre of thousands of IPC members to revenge their past complicity with the hated Qasim regime. The first Baa- thist rise to power was short-lived, however, and Baathists and the ICP remained bitter rivals despite their both being supressed dur- ing the regimes of Abd al Salam Arif (1963-66) and his brother, Abd al Rahman Arif (1966-68). After the successful 1968 Baathist coup d'etat, both ICP and Baath leaders called for a reconciliation of their decade-long rivalry. During the subsequent decade of Baathist rule the ICP rose to new prominence. A high point was reached in 1973 when the ICP became legal for the first time and joined with the Baath Party in the creation of the Progressive National Front (PNF), thus attain- ing a legitimate, albeit clearly secondary, voice in government decisionmaking (see The Politics of Alliance: The Progressive Na- tional Front (PNF), ch. 4). Despite its legitimacy the ICP has con- tinued to be distrusted by the security-conscious Baathist leaders, who, many foreign observers contend, viewed the ICP as an in- strument of Soviet foreign policy goals and at times a vehicle for subversion, especially within the armed forces, of Baath political hegemony. Reliable data on ICP membership were unavailable. One 1978 estimate was 2,000. Other foreign sources indicated that the party was growing and implied a much larger ICP membership. Al- though some foreign analysts note little dissension within the ranks of the ICP, others report that a splintering that produced a pro-Peking faction under the leadership of Aziz al Hajj in 1964 continued to plague the ICP in the 1970s. These latter observers noted that Aziz Muhammad's Central Committee was dominated by Sunni Arabs and Kurds, while its rival faction, called the Cen- tral Command, consisted primarily of Shiite Arabs. Central Com- mand members were said to clash occasionally with Iraqi military forces in Shiite-dominated southern Iraq, and Amnesty Interna- tional noted in its 1977 Annual Report that it had received reports that it viewed as reliable that a number of Central Command members were being held as political prisoners by Iraqi authori- ties. The fact that Baathist leaders continued to view the ICP as potentially subversive, despite its inclusion within the PNF gov- ernment, was illustrated in June 1978 when the government an- 228 Iraq: A Country Study were centered on the demands of Shiite religious leaders, aroused fears in Baghdad of their spilling over into Iraq's Shiite commu- nity. On two occasions during the mid-1970s indications of unrest among Iraqi Shiites became available to outside observers. In De- cember 1974 five Shiite notables from the holy city of An Najaf were reportedly executed for having protested "excessive Shiite casualties" in the recently renewed fighting in Kurdish areas in the north. Some sources indicated that these executions were de- signed to silence extensive Shiite criticism of the 1974-75 Kurdish war. Far more serious were the large-scale riots in the Shiite cities of Karbala and An Najaf on February 5 and 6, 1977. Although explanations vary—a Syrian provocateur, a mob attack on an Iraqi police post, an Iraqi army attack on a peaceful religious procession —it is clear that the disturbances reflected widespread dissatisfac- tion among the Shiites. A special tribunal was set up after the disturbances to try 110 detainees: eight were sentenced to death, fifteen to life imprisonment, and eighty-seven acquitted. Unoffi- cial accounts indicated that many more were killed and arrested during the riots. It was unclear in early 1979 whether the Shiite community had any political organization or effective leadership through which to express its interests. One foreign analyst indicated that the Fatimid Party, formed by Iranian interests in 1959, may still func- tion clandestinely in Iraq for that purpose. Radio Damascus re- ferred in 1977 to the newly formed National Islamic Front within Iraq. One United States official felt that the clandestine Muslim Brotherhood may be active among Iraq's Shiite community. Re- gardless of their political organization, the potential of Shiite dis- satisfaction as expressed in the February 1977 riots reportedly was taken seriously by the Baath Party leaders (see Preface). Foreign Iraq and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Although Iraq does not border on Israel, domestic and foreign policy considerations have led its leaders to oppose Zionist activi- ties in Palestine since the 1930s. During the Arab-Israeli War of 1948-49 Iraq sent 12,000 to 15,000 troops to the eastern front, where they fought along with the Arab Legion against the nascent Israel Defense Forces. Although unsuccessful in their military ob- jectives, Iraqi troops returned to Baghdad in 1949 as national heroes. During the 1956 War in the Sinai Peninsula, Iraq again dispatched troops to Jordan in the event that the conflict would spread, but they saw no combat and again returned home. Iraq became immediately involved in the June 1967 War when a squadron of its MiG-21s was destroyed on the ground at its forward air base near the Jordanian border during the morning of June 5. Ground forces were based in Jordan to reinforce the Syrian and Jordanian war efforts, but they saw little activity during the six 230 Iraq: A Country Study days of fighting. Three divisions of nearly 15,000 Iraqi soldiers remained in Jordan after hostilities, however, to support the Jor- danians in case of renewed fighting with Israel. Iraq's participation in the October 1973 War was considerably greater than that in the three preceding Arab confrontations with Israel. Although not previously notified of the coordinated Egyp- tian-Syrian offensive of October 6, within two days two squadrons of Iraqi MiGs were in operation over the Golan Heights, and within five days two Iraqi mechanized divisions were fighting with Syrian troops in an effort to fend off the Israeli counteroffensive toward Damascus. The International Institute for Strategic Stud- ies estimated that before the end of the fighting on the Syrian front on October 24, Iraq had deployed three squadrons containing sixty fighter aircraft and three army divisions totaling some 30,000 men and 400 tanks. The combat efficiency of the Iraqi forces during the 1973 war was mixed. In the air several Iraqi fighters were reported to have been shot down by Syrian missiles because of incompatibility with Syrian radar systems. Iraqi fighters were no match for the Israelis in air battles but were said to have demonstrated ground attack capability. Losses were reported to include twenty-one aircraft. On the ground, Iraqi armored and mechanized units were said to have provided valuable relief to their besieged Syrian counter- parts, but the overall level of performance was hampered by the poor condition of their vehicles after the long overland trip from Iraq. Foreign observers were impressed by the rapid mobility of the Iraqi units, which were reportedly dispatched to the Syrian front without the use of tank transports. Ground force casualties were estimated at 125 soldiers killed, 260 wounded, and eighty tanks lost. Iraq's limited military role in the Arab-Israeli conflict has not been because of a lack of commitment to fight Israel. On the contrary, Iraq has been among those Arab states most dedicated —at least verbally—to an ongoing military, as opposed to a politi- cal, solution to the "Zionist occupation of Palestine." Iraq was alone among the Arab combatants in refusing to sign an armistice agreement with Israel after the 1948-49 war and has since con- tinued to regard itself as in a state of war with Israel. Iraq has refused to accept United Nations Resolution 242, which calls for Israel's withdrawal from territories it occupied in 1967 in ex- change for Arab diplomatic recognition, and has consistently re- jected all efforts at a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Iraq's comparatively minor role in the four Arab-Israeli wars is generally explained by practical rather than ideological considera- tions. First of all, Iraq faces considerable logistical problems in fighting the Israelis because of its distance from likely fields of battle and the generally short duration of Arab-Israeli wars (Iraq's western border is some 400 kilometers from Jerusalem; Baghdad is nearly 1,000 kilometers away). Secondly, Iraqi leaders have 232 National Security been unable or reluctant to send large numbers of troops out of the country to face Israel because of persistent threats closer to home emanating from Iran and from the Kurds. Other foreign observers suggest that Iraq's verbal commitment to fight Israel reflects a political necessity to appear in the forefront of pan- Arabism but that actual military involvement will remain slight as long as Israel does not endanger Iraq's own security interests. Several developments during the mid-1970s suggested that the role of the Iraqi armed forces might increase in the event of renewed Arab-Israeli warfare. First, the Baghdad Treaty consider- ably reduced the perceived threat from Iran and led to an appar- ent victory over the Kurdish revolt, thus freeing more of Iraq's armed forces from these two missions. Secondly, informed foreign observers noted that Iraqi training maneuvers between 1973 and 1978 concentrated on and were successful in developing a highly mobile armored and mechanized force that could overcome some of the military's logistical difficulties. The 1977 purchase of long- range transport aircraft additionally enhanced Iraqi troop mobil- ity. Third, the collapse of the monarchy in Iran and the accompa- nying disintegration of Iran's armed forces in early 1979 radically changed the regional balance of power for at least the immediate future. In early 1979 it was too soon to know the impact of a fourth development, the Iraqi-Syrian rapprochement of late 1978. A clause of the Charter for Joint National Action between Syria and Iraq, issued before the November 1978 summit conference of Arab leaders in Baghdad, called for a binational subcommittee of military cooperation to formulate a "joint defense pact providing the groundwork for complete military unity between the two countries." If this clause were implemented, Iraq would suddenly join Syria as a "confrontation state" in the front line against Israel. Because of traditional Iraqi-Syrian rivalries and the history of un- successful attempts to express pan-Arab rhetoric in politicomili- tary unions among Arab nations, however, foreign observers doubted that the goals formulated at the Baghdad conference would be achieved, at least not in full. Most analysts at the time doubted that Syria would allow any more than a token number of Iraqi troops to be stationed on its soil, out of fear both of provoking Israel into preemptive actions and of political activities of a large number of armed Iraqis within Syria. Nevertheless any degree of military cooperation between Iraq and Syria is likely to increase Iraq's military role in any subsequent Arab-Israeli confrontation. Iraq's uncertain role in the Arab-Israeli conflict is reflected in its relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The PLO was founded in 1964 and in 1969 came under the leadership of Yasir Arafat, who also heads Al Fatah, the predominant organi- zation under the PLO umbrella. Iraq has supported the PLO with financial assistance for both military and nonmilitary efforts since 1964, although during the 1970s Iraq's support became more qua- 233 Iraq: A Country Study lified and directed to factions within the PLO supporting Iraq's stated policy of ongoing armed struggle against Israel. Strains between Iraq and the PLO first arose as a result of events in September 1970, known as Black September, because of the bitter defeat of Palestinian guerrillas at the hands of King Hussein of Jordan. The decision of Iraq, which at the time had a considera- ble number of troops stationed in Jordan under a post-1967 war agreement, not to intervene on behalf of the PLO initiated a distrust of Iraq within the PLO leadership. It was the emergence after the October 1973 War of moderate elements within the PLO leadership, some of whom were apparently willing to negotiate a peace with Israel based on the creation of a Palestinian state within the Gaza Strip and the West Bank of the Jordan River, however, that inaugurated the Iraqi-PLO hostility that erupted in armed conflict during 1978. Subsequent Iraqi support was apparently confined to those ele- ments that rejected the PLO moderates within Al Fatah. On the one hand a July 1978 PLO memorandum charged that Iraq had closed Al Fatah offices in Iraq, stopped financial assistance to the PLO, seized Al Fatah arms factories in Iraq, and confiscated siza- ble amounts of arms in transit from China to the PLO in Lebanon. On the other hand Saddam Husayn declared at that time that "certain factions of the Palestinian resistance get our assistance without any interference in their aims and policies or the way they're carried out." Most foreign observers agreed that the primary recipients of Iraqi aid were factions within the PLO's "Rejection Front" wing that formed in 1974 to combat the emerging moderate position within the PLO. In 1978 the Rejection Front consisted of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a sizable group led by George Habash, thought to have been responsible for many international terrorist incidents since its founding a decade earlier; the Arab Liberation Front (ALF), a small organization led by Abd al Rahim Ahmad and founded in 1969 by the Iraqi Baath Party; and the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), a small pro-Iraqi group formed in 1977 from a faction of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command and led by Abul Abbas. Iraq was also believed to have links to other Palestinian terrorist groups founded by extremist PLO dissidents: the "Special Opera- tions Branch" of the PFLP that was led by Wadei Haddad until his death in March 1978 and "Fatah the Revolutionary Council," led by Abu Nidal (alias Sabri al Banna), who was also connected with a group calling itself Black June. These groups were thought to have been responsible for most of the Palestinian-inspired hijack- ings, bombings, and assassinations outside Israel during the mid- 1970s, and it was Iraq's support of Abu Nidal that brought it into armed confrontation with the PLO in 1978. Formerly the Baghdad representative of Al Fatah, Abu Nidal was safeguarded by Iraqi authorities in Baghdad after his opposi- 234 Country Study joellious Baluchi tribesmen in southern Iran, Iran's support for Iraq's Kurdish revolt was far more significant (see The Kurds as a Threat to National Integrity, this ch.). At the outbreak of the Iraqi offensive against the Kurds in April 1974, Iran supplied the Pesh Merga with small quantities of arms and ammunition. With rapid Iraqi advances in October, however, Iran moved heavy artillery into the border region, significantly increased the flow of arms and ammunition, and conducted maneuvers in support of Kurdish actions near the border. For several months the threat of an all-out war that could have embroiled both nations' oil fields grew omi- nously until the sudden agreement, reached with the mediation of Algerian leaders, announced in March 1975. The Baghdad Treaty brought an immediate halt to Iranian military activity along the Iraqi border, a pledge by both parties to end their sup- port of subversive activities within the other country and to begin cooperation in matters affecting internal security, and a resolution of the Shatt al Arab dispute (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). This rapprochement continued in force in early 1979 despite the collapse of the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran and its replacement by a council of Shiite religious leaders under the direct and per- sonal control of Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini. Khomeini had lived in An Najaf, Iraq, from 1964, when he had fled from Iran, until October 1978, when the Iraq government forced his departure from the country. After a brief sojourn in a village near Parish from which he orchestrated the anti-shah demonstrations in Iran, Khomeini returned in triumph to Iran on February 1, 1979. He at once set about the task of creating a government that would rule in accordance with Shiite doctrine as interpreted by Khomeini and his religious followers. In early 1979 it was too early to discern whether Khomeini's at least temporary triumphs were a purely Iranian phenomenon—as his mode of governance seemed to suggest—or whether Shiite revivalism would find some expression among the Shiite majority in Iraq. In any event, the much-vaunted Iranian military collapsed with the monarchy, and in early 1979 it was impossible for outside observers to determine when, or if, the military could be suffi- ciently reorganized and reenergized to pose a potential challenge to Iraq. Kuwait Since the 1958 coup d'etat Iraqi leaders, in an expression of their antimonarchical fervor as well as their rivalry with Iran over influ- ence in the Persian Gulf region, have actively promoted political instability in the oil-rich monarchies of the Arabian Peninsula. In Kuwait; Iraq's neighbor to the southeast, the ideological conflict has been compounded by a border conflict based originally in a claim to the entire nation and, more recently, to two islands that dominate the approach to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. Shortly after Iraq achieved independence, King Ghazi called for 236 Iraq: A Country Study to achieve agreement over oil transit fees, resulted in an Iraqi decision to cease pumping oil through its pipeline in Syria, thus depriving Syria of considerable government revenues. This action raised the level of hostilities, and shortly afterward Syria was re- ported to be harboring and financing Kurdish rebels from Talabani's PUK, which clashed with Iraqi troops near the Syrian border on various occasions during 1977 and 1978. The November 1978 summit meeting of Arab leaders in Bagh- dad, which was convened to formulate a united Arab response to the Camp David Agreements reached between Egypt's President Anwar al Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin, was preceded by a sudden rapprochement between Iraq and Syria. The need to present a united opposition to an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and to impress on Sadat that he must not abandon the cause of Arab confrontation with Israel was more pressing, for the moment at least, than the twelve-year-old Syrian-Iraqi rivalry. The public invectives, assassinations, and bombings ceased on both sides of the border almost immediately. In early 1979 it was impossible to foresee how long this truce born out of political necessity would last; but few foreign observers felt that the mutual acrimony and subversion between Iraq and Syria would cease permanently as long as the two rival Baathist regimes remained in power. The Regular Armed Forces Size, Equipment, and Organization The decade 1968 to 1978 saw an unprecedented growth in the manpower and equipment inventory of the Iraqi armed forces. During the first half of the decade the growth was modest, from about 80,000 to 100,000; but between 1973 and 1978, after the October 1973 War and the spectacular increase in Iraq's oil reve- nues, the expansion of its military capabilities was extraordinary. By 1978 active Iraqi military personnel numbered some 230,000, and Iraq was equipped with some of the most sophisticated weap- onry of the Soviet military arsenal. Informed sources within the United States government believed that if Iraq continued to ex- pand its military capability at its mid-1970s rate, it would consti- tute the second most potent military force within the Arab world, surpassed only by Egypt, by 1980. Iraq is a signatory to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but in 1978 several foreign reports cast doubts on the extent of its commitment. A senior member of the Iraqi RCC was quoted as saying, "If Israel owns the atom bomb, then the Arabs must have an atom bomb." The chief of staff of the Israel Defense Forces stated in 1977 that Iraq would be able to use nuclear weapons "in about five to seven years." Other foreign observers pointed out that the French-supplied Osiris nuclear reactor, for which con- struction began outside Baghdad in 1976, is fueled with bomb- grade uranium, which Iraq began receiving in 1978. 238 Iraq: A Country Study Figure 13. Military Headquarters and Major Bases, 1978 propelled antiaircraft guns. The vast majority of the army's equipment inventory was of Soviet manufacture, although a small number of French tanks and missiles had been acquired in Iraq's ongoing attempt to diversify its sources of armaments (see table 14, Appendix A). In 1978 the small, 4,000-man navy was under the command of an army officer, Brigadier General Alaiddin Qassim Hammad. It was headquartered in Basra, where the majority of its fleet of some forty vessels was based. Iraq's second naval facility at Umm Qasr was scheduled to become a large navy base, but in early 1979 it remained comparatively small. European and Japanese firms were contracted to expand the port facilities at Umm Qasr, where So- viet ships made occasional courtesy calls. Some analysts felt that Iraq's recent acquisition of fourteen fast Osa-class patrol boats equipped with Styx surface-to-surface missiles signaled its inten- tion to upgrade considerably this traditionally neglected arm of Iraq's armed forces (see table 15, Appendix A). In 1978 the air force consisted of 28,000 men, of whom some 10,000 were attached to the subordinate Air Defense Command. In that year there appeared to have been a major reshuffling of air 240 Military equipment secured from the Soviet Union 241 National Security A man could volunteer as an alternative to conscription, or at any other time between ages eighteen and forty-three, for a two-year period that could be extended by periods of two years. After two years of compulsory active service, both conscripts and volunteers were obliged to spend eighteen years in a reserve unit. The extent of periodic training of these units was not known, but reserve draft calls during periods of manpower shortages required certain units to return to temporary active duty on short notice. Women were not conscripted, but under a law passed in 1977 they could be appointed officers if they held a health-related uni- versity degree, and warrant officers or noncommissioned officers in army medical institutes if they were qualified nurses. A small number of women served in combat functions, but the vast major- ity of women in the armed forces held administrative or medical- related positions. The source of most army officers was the Military College located in Baghdad, which was founded in 1924. Candidates must be secondary-school graduates, of Iraqi nationality, physically qua- lified, and display political loyalty. Cadets were divided into two groups, combatant (combat arms) and administrative (technical and administrative). They studied common subjects during the first two years and specialized according to their group designa- tion in the final year. On graduation cadets received commissions as second lieutenants in the regular army. A second source of army officers was the Reserve College, which was founded in 1952. This school enrolled two classes annually, one for holders of professional degrees, such as medicine and pharmacy, and one for secondary-school graduates. Some 2,000 reserve officers were graduated each year, and those with profes- sional degrees were commissioned second lieutenants; those with- out a college education were appointed warrant officers. The army also maintained a system of service schools for combat arms as well as technical and administrative services. Most of these schools were located in or close to Baghdad and conducted courses for both officers and noncommissioned officers. Since 1933 the air force has maintained its own college as a source of officer personnel. In 1971 it was moved from Rashid Airbase to Tikrit. In addition to administrative and flight training courses, it conducted courses for the training of technical special- ists and flight schools. In mid-1977 the navy also opened its own academy, called the Arabian Gulf Academy for Naval Studies, for the training of officer personnel. Since 1928 the army has also maintained a two-year staff college for the training of selected officers in all services for high com- mand and staff positions. The highest level of military training in Iraq was conducted at Al Bakr University for Higher Military Studies in Baghdad, founded in 1977. Two separate one-year courses of study were pursued at this new facility. At the War College, high-ranking officers studied modern theories and meth- 243 Iraq: A Country Study ods of warfare in preparation for their assumption of top command and support positions in the armed forces. The course at the Na- tional Defense College was developed, according to its dean, "for the purpose of training and preparing the vanguard leaders and the elements who will be candidates for positions of leadership in the [Baath] Party, in the army, and in the sensitive state offices, with the most advanced and modern knowledge and studies on the revolutionary view of the concept of the job of national de- fense, its strategic national meaning and its social, political, eco- nomic, and military dimensions." Until 1958 military training assistance was provided principally by Britain. Iraqi pilots also received training in India. Since then most foreign training assistance has been provided by the Soviet Union, and since 1968 it has been almost exclusively so (see For- eign Military Ties, this ch.). Little was publically known about the content of Iraqi military training, although in 1978 it was thought to be one of the best managed and effective systems in the Arab world. One informed observer noted a concentration on the de- velopment of rapid mobility in the training of army personnel. It was also believed that political and ideological indoctrination ac- companied military training at all levels. Conditions of Service, Morale, and Military Justice As already noted, conditions of service in the Iraqi army have historically been poor. In addition to low and irregularly received pay is the fact that soldiers have been embroiled, during much of Iraq's modern history, in an increasingly costly and unpopular war with Kurdish rebels that has caused considerable morale problems and desertion, particularly among the army's Kurdish recruits. By early 1979 there was increasing evidence, however, that the 1975 victory against the Kurds had done much to solve long-standing morale problems and that conditions of service had improved markedly. On at least two occasions between 1975 and 1979, the govern- ment offered amnesties to all soldiers and security personnel who had deserted during the Kurdish conflict. More important, how- ever, was the 1975 passage of the comprehensive Military Service and Pension Law that established pay scales, allowances, benefits, and retirement pay designed to attract officers and enlisted men from the civilian sector through the offer of guaranteed financial rewards within a military career. A second lieutenant was author- ized to receive ID65 (for the value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glos- sary) a month as base pay, with an increase of ID20 for each rank above. An adjustable cost-of-living allowance was established, as was a family allowance amounting to a 5-percent increase in salary for each dependent. Service allowances were also granted to those with special skills or duties to perform. Retirement pay was fixed to be commensurate with rank and civilian retirement benefits, and indemnities were established for the families of soldiers dis- 244 Iraq: A Country Study of punishment allowed in each category varied according to the rank of the commander. Uniforms, Rank Insignia, Awards, and Decorations Iraqi uniforms are similar in style to those of the British army. They consist of service and field uniforms for both summer and winter and a dress uniform and a mess jacket for officers. The winter service dress uniform of olive drab wool consists of a single- breasted coat with turned-down collar and patch pockets with squared flaps. Khaki shirts and ties are worn, and trousers are usually without cuffs. The British-style garrison cap is worn, usu- ally with colored piping to denote the branch of service. Mounted officers wear breeches and boots (or leg wraps), and officers as- signed to armored units wear berets. The summer dress uniform is similar in style to the winter uni- form but is made of light tan gabardine or cotton twill. The winter field uniform is the British-style olive drab wool battle dress with waist-length jacket and a high collar worn open. The summer field uniform is identical in cut but made of lighter material. Both field uniforms include a web belt, beret (or British-style helmet), short leggings, and ankle-high, sturdy-soled shoes. Commissioned officers' rank insignia are identical for the army and the air force except in color: silver for the air force and gold for the army. Officer ranks are the Arab standard but are often indicated in English by the British equivalent. Thus the highest ranking Iraqi officer, Mushir Hasan al Bakr, is often designated Field Marshal Hasan al Bakr. Naval officer rank insignia are the standard gold worn on the lower sleeve. Enlisted personnel wear diagonal stripes to designate rank, while the single warrant officer rank consists of a gold bar below a gold dot (see fig. 14). The government and the high command of the armed forces recognize the beneficial morale effect of giving recognition for conspicuous bravery or outstanding service. In general liberal use is made of decorations and awards to members of the armed forces, and medals are worn with pride on all appropriate occa- sions. The following awards and decorations are listed in their general order of precedence; the listing is complete as of April 1968. The highest award of the government was the Decoration of the Re- public, established on May 24, 1959. It may be awarded to both military personnel and civilians for distinguished services rend- ered to the republic. It may also be presented to foreigners in appreciation of their exceptional services to the nation. The Rafi- dian Military Medal, also established on May 24, 1959, is awarded in three grades to both military personnel and civilians. It is simi- larly conferred for outstanding services to the nation and may be presented to foreigners. The Bravery Medal (May 24,1959) is presented to both military and civilians for outstanding bravery during military operations or 246 e •3 stud]vambg safvjs patfu/j pua vtuSisuj quay pj sxndig ^ ay >□ ('."•!'>! '•'"-- >l i([UOiiiuiOQ. (E-0M3) S33/J30 iNMJ!/VM J3IH3 ,-0M3) v3IvO INVWIVM J3/H3 (M3M3) \miuo iNVHi/VM J3IH3 (7/-OM3) v3/3J0 iNVHHVM 33IH3 (0/«) H33ivO (OM) v3U30 JNVSWM J.NV33»3S »31Si'iV J3IH3 HOIVW iNY33!/3S JW3DS3S vISi7W HOIvS 1W33vS Sf3J.S*W J.NV33vS sraisnv ssru isi 1W33S3S 1NV33S35 7V3INH33J, JNV3383S vVJ.S J.NV33vS vUS SSV73 iS I wwv SSViD ISI 31YMVJ HHV 9/VN iVMMV lONHf SiODIddO iNViiaVM ONV 7.3NNOSH3d a31SHN3 3DD0J mv ONV AWdV cq IVilllVOy 133i3 ivsmvav 33m ImitVOV W3S V30NVWWOD 3ovio HOiNnr !vlvAino3 s n n TT m *A»N A WW 3H1 JO v3v3 7W3v9 J.NVN3jn3H v3v3 SO7VW 7Vvv3 H3KJV9IH8 73N0703 Ltivvinin iNVNiivn isi iNVNunv az Jv7VAID03 S 0 30U0J K« ONV AMU* tvmmv 6raw Oravj a/ov 8/OYN wizvinw AAVN ONV3DJICW SH33I330 Q3NOISSIWWOD Iraq: A Country Study abroad in their mission to seek out and eliminate opponents to the Baath Regime. Lastly the regular civil police function to safeguard state secu- rity in addition to their duties with respect to common crime, traffic control, and the like. The regular police, under the Ministry of Interior, were centralized under the command of the director general of police in Baghdad. There were thought to be several specialized components of the police, including forces assigned exclusively to traffic, narcotics investigation, and railroad security. The police operated at least two schools: the Police College for those with secondary degrees and the Police Preparatory School for those without secondary education. Police officers carried mili- tary ranks identical to those of the regular armed forces. Foreign Military Ties The development of Iraq's modern armed forces has been highly dependent on foreign military assistance since the fall of the Ottoman Empire during World War I. In 1921 British Man- date authorities undertook the task to train and regroup Iraqi soldiers who had served under the Ottomans into a force to uphold domestic law and order and put down frequent tribal revolts. Until 1958 British officers guided the development of the armed forces, and their influence was reflected in the organization, train- ing, and equipment of the Iraqi military. Senior Iraqi officers were regularly sent to Britain or India to receive advanced training. Iraq's generally Western-oriented military posture throughout this period culminated in the 1955 Baghdad Pact. The revolution of July 14,1958, and the coming to power of Abd al Karim Qasim completely altered Iraq's military orientation. Disagreement with the British (and the Western world's) stance vis-a-vis Israel and growing pan-Arab nationalism led to Qasim's abrogation of the Baghdad Pact and his turning to the Soviet Union to supply arms. For the next twenty years the Soviet Union remained Iraq's chief arms supplier and its most essential foreign military tie. In April 1972 the two nations signed the fifteen-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in which Iraq and the So- viet Union agreed to "continue to develop co-operation in the strengthening of the defense capabilities of each." By no means, however, has Iraq become a "satellite" of the Soviet Union. Iraq has consistently insisted on its independence in policymaking; and on several key issues, including the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria's role in Lebanon, and military policy in the Horn of Africa, the two nations held opposing foreign views (see Foreign Policy, ch. 4). Furthermore communist ideology is basically anti- thetical to Iraq's Baathist philosophy; some foreign observers linked the 1978 executions of twenty-one Iraqi ICP members to an ongoing fear of Moscow-inspired subversion within the Baathist regime. Throughout most of the 1970s Iraq has insisted on its freedom to buy weapons from Western nations, and in 1978 there 250 Iraq: A Country Study so-called Eastern Front Command. Although designed to provide a joint command of all these armies, the multilateral agreement broke down in 1970 under the weight of Iraqi-Syrian rivalry. The most serious subsequent Iraqi attempt at pan-Arab military cooperation accompanied the sudden Iraqi-Syrian rapproche- ment of late 1978. Leaders of both nations pledged themselves to closer military ties in the future, with the ultimate goal of "com- plete military unity between the two countries." Most foreign observers at the time, however, felt that this alliance would fail to materialize much as had past Iraqi attempts at military coopera- tion with fellow Arab states (see National Security Concerns, this ch.). Armed Forces and Society Political Role The political history of modern Iraq is riddled with the interven- tion of the armed forces in the political life of the nation. Military interventions have been concentrated in two time periods: from 1936 to 1941, when there were seven coups d'etat, and between 1958 and 1968, when there were four additional military seizures of power. Military intervention has been motivated by a variety of factors, perhaps most important of which was the weakness of civilian regimes and the comparatively high level of institutional development of the military, whose leaders felt they alone were capable of maintaining a strong, stable government. Personal and ideological factionalization within the armed forces, however, fos- tered heightened instability and a cycle of coups that culminated in the Baathist seizure of power on July 17, 1968. The Baathist officers who led the coup were determined to end the cycle of military intervention in politics, and throughout the decade the political potency of the military was gradually and steadily reduced. Whereas the initial Baathist five-member RCC of 1968 was composed exclusively of military officers, by 1978 the RCC had been expanded to twenty-two members, only three of whom were active-duty officers. In early 1979 these three officers were also the only military men in the Council of Ministers: Presi- dent Bakr, Minister of Defense Talfah, and Minister of Communi- cations Saadun Ghaidan. During the 1960s cabinet positions had been dominated by military officers. Although in 1979 Bakr continued as the titular head of state as chairman of the RCC, president of Iraq, as well as prime minister, most analysts agreed that Saddam Husayn, a civilian and architect of the gradual "civilianization" of the Baathist regime, had be- come the nation's leading political figure (see Preface). At the same time Saddam Husayn has carefully cultivated a camaraderie with the military establishment, especially among young officers, symbolized by his acceptance of an honorary rank of general and a degree from the Military College. These gestures were an indica- tion that the support of the armed forces remained essential to the 252 National Security survival of the Baathist regime despite the reduced active political participation by military officers during the 1970s. On two occasions during the 1970s military officers unsuccess- fully attempted to overthrow the Baathist regime. In January 1970 an attempted coup led by two retired officers, Major General Abd al Ghani al Rawi and Colonel Salih Mahdi al Samarrai, was discov- ered and thwarted as the conspirators entered the Republican Palace. In June 1973 a plot by Kazzar, chief of the security police, to assassinate Bakr and Saddam Husayn was foiled, although Minis- ter of Defense Shihab was kidnapped and assassinated before Kaz- zar and his coconspirators were arrested while attempting to flee the country. Both coup attempts were followed by summary trials, executions, and purges of the armed forces. Purges within the upper ranks of the military have been ongoing since 1968, as have Baath Party recruitment and indoctrination throughout the officer corps. By 1977 most command positions were filled by party mem- bers, and promotion of officers depended on loyalty to the Baath regime, if not active party membership. Political activity by any non-Baathist organization within the armed forces was illegal; even retired officers were barred from any non-Baathist political affiliation. It was under these laws that twenty-one ICP members were executed in June 1978 for having organized party cells within the army. These legal sanctions, to- gether with the continual purge of the armed forces, have less- ened the possibility of a non-Baathist military uprising against the Baathist political leadership; if the military were to renew its past patterns of intervention in the political process, it would more likely arise from personal and ideological rivalries among Baathist officers. Economic Impact National security matters affect the Iraqi economy principally in two ways: the burden of government expenditures for its national security apparatus and the unavailability to the civilian economy of the manpower required by the armed forces. The output of defense-related industries was insignificant. The manpower effects were likely to have been quite detrimental during the mid-1970s owing to the growth of military manpower by some 100,000 in a period of a relatively low rate of unemployment. This adverse effect would be tempered, however, to the extent that military service provided vocational training applicable to civilian employment. Government expenditures for defense have long posed a major burden to the national economy, primarily because of the costly and protracted war against the Kurds in Iraq's northern provinces. From 1967 to 1978 this burden was compounded by Iraq's grow- ing involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the rapid expan- sion of the size, sophistication, and thus the cost of its equipment purchases. In the decade from 1967 to 1976 expenditures for 253 Iraq: A Country Study national defense and security grew approximately sixfold in cur- rent prices (see table 17, Appendix A). These expenditures con- sumed between one-third and one-half of total government ordi- nary (i.e., noncapital) expenditures. From 1974 to 1978 the latter figure declined steadily because of the rapid growth of oil reve- nues, although the amount spent for defense continued to grow. In another measure of the burden of defense expenditures, in 1975 Iraq spent the equivalent of US$168 per capita on its military expenditures. This figure could be compared with US$33 per capita devoted to public education and US$6 per capita for public health services. The Sociology of the Military With universal male conscription as law since 1934, one would expect the armed forces to reflect the ethnic, religious, and class structures of Iraqi society. This has been true among enlisted per- sonnel, and several analysts have pointed to the armed forces as the most important unifying institution in a nation that is ex- tremely heterogeneous in its sociological makeup. Selective re- cruitment policies for the Military College, however, that were instituted by the British in the 1920s favored the Sunni Arab minority community and have been practiced ever since by a self-perpetuating Sunni political and military elite. Shiites con- tinue to be represented in the officer corps far below the level that their majority in the society as a whole would warrant; Kurds were well represented during the 1920s and the 1930s but since have been disfavored. Bakr Sidqi, who was Kurdish and led Iraq's first military coup in 1936, and Qasim, who was of Sunni-Shia parent- age and who ruled between 1958 and 1963, increased the non- Sunni Arab component of the officer corps. Both were over- thrown, however, by Sunni officers who restored the traditional Sunni hegemony. The majority of the officers were of lower middle-class, urban background, the sons of minor government officials and small trad- ers, for whom a career in the military promised considerable social mobility. Family ties to other officers also played an important role within the officer corps. Minister of Defense Talfah is the son-in- law of President Bakr, reflecting a pattern of family relations among Iraq's top military leaders that dates back to the early years of independence. In the mid-1970s many of the nation's top mili- tary commanders were from the small town of Tikrit, on the Eu- phrates River in the heart of the Iraqi Sunni Arab community. Crime and Punishment The Iraqi Baathist regime has introduced a variety of laws, most important a new penal code in 1969, that have expanded the definition of crime to embrace acts detrimental to the political, economic, and social goals of the state. The Baathist hegemony in the political sphere, for example, is enforced by a law making it a crime to publicly insult the state or its leaders. Economic goals 254 National Security are enforced by several laws: a 1970 trade regulation, for example, makes either the selling of goods at prices other than those fixed by the state or the production of inferior products a felony. The government's free education program is enforced by a law making it a crime to refuse to participate. With respect to more traditionally defined kinds of crime, Iraqi patterns seem to follow those of most developing countries, al- though the lack of adequate statistical data for Iraq makes any analysis difficult or impossible. Data compiled by the Prisons Ad- ministration in 1970 indicated that theft, forgery and bribery, homosexuality, and the misappropriation of public funds had, in that order, the greatest incidence among convicted criminals. There was also a high incidence of murder, which was attributed in large part to Iraqi traditions of family honor and vengeance. Smuggling, traditionally a major source of crime in Iraq, was sig- nificantly curbed after pacification of the Kurds and the rapp- roachement with Iran. In 1970 it was reported that 177,474 peo- ple, or 1.9 percent of the Iraqi population, were convicted on criminal charges. The incidence of crime was highest among urban, adult males. Crime in rural areas accounted for only 22 percent of the total crime rate. In 1970 the crime rate among women and juveniles was extremely small, reflecting both traditional Muslim mores and a pattern throughout the less developed world. With respect to socioeconomic categories, the highest number of criminal offend- ers were wage earners, then peasants and government officials. The regular criminal court system consisted of courts of first instance (including magistrates' courts), courts of sessions, and a court of cassation. Major crimes against state security were tried in the Revolutionary Court, which operated separately from the regular judicial system (see The Judiciary, ch. 4). In general this court system followed the French pattern as first introduced dur- ing the rule of the Ottoman Turks, although it has undergone several modifications during the twentieth century. Juries are not used anywhere in the Iraqi system of criminal courts. Most petty crimes, or contraventions, which carried penalties of from one day to three months' imprisonment or fines up to ID30, were tried in local magistrates' courts. These third-class courts, which were located in all local municipalities, may be presided over by municipal council members or other local administrative officials. First- and second-class criminal matters, which corre- sponded to felonies and misdemeanors, respectively, were tried within appropriate penal courts attached to civil courts of first instance, located in provincial capitals and district and subdistrict centers. Misdemeanors were punishable by three months to five years' imprisonment; felonies by five years to life imprisonment or the death penalty. One judge conducted the trials at each of these courts of original jurisdiction for criminal matters. Courts of session, of which there were six (two in Baghdad) in 255 Iraq: A Country Study 1978, held original jurisdiction in the most serious criminal mat- ters and acted as courts of appeals from lower penal or magistrate's courts. Four of these courts were identical to the civil courts of appeal; two were presided over by local judges from the courts of the first instance. Three judges heard cases tried in the courts of session. The Penal Body within the Court of Cassation, which was located in Baghdad, acted as the nation's highest court for criminal matters. The Penal Body sits with no less than three judges, and in cases punishable by death, five judges must be present. This body served as the highest court of appeals and could confirm, reduce, remit, or suspend sentences from the courts of sessions or order retrials under certain circumstances. It also assumed origi- nal jurisdiction over crimes committed by judges or high-ranking government officials. The Revolutionary Court, composed of three judges, sits perma- nently in Baghdad to try crimes against the security of the state. Crimes against security were broadly defined to include actions that were considered to undermine the state, such as corruption, trade in narcotics, and economic crimes, in addition to the ordi- nary security-related offenses such as rebellion and spying. Ses- sions were held in camera, decisions were often harsh, and there was no appeal mechanism from the Revolutionary Court. It was also believed that regular judicial procedures did not apply in these special courts, summary proceedings being common. On three occasions during the 1970s—after the attempted coups of 1970 and 1973 and in 1977 after the riots in An Najaf and Karbala—the RCC decreed the establishment of special tempo- rary tribunals to try large numbers of security offenders en masse. Each of these trials was presided over by three or four high gov- ernment officials who, not bound by ordinary provisions of crimi- nal law, rendered swift and harsh judgments. In 1970 fifty-two of an estimated ninety persons accused were convicted and thirty- seven subsequently executed during three days of proceedings. During two days of trials in 1973 some thirty-five were believed to have been sentenced to death and twenty acquitted. In a one- day trial in 1977 eight were sentenced to death and fifteen to life imprisonment; eighty-seven persons were believed to have been acquitted. Those sentenced to death were executed, either by hanging or by firing squad, immediately after the trials. The penal system, which is administered by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, was dominated by the central prison at Abu Ghreib near Baghdad, which contains some 2,500 prisoners, and three smaller branch prisons located in Al Basrah, Babylon, and Nineveh governorates. Smaller centers of detention were located throughout the country. At the end of 1973 it was reported that 6,100 people were in Iraqi prisons, although this figure was believed not to include those jailed for security-related crimes. Iraqi leaders rarely grant amnesty to prisoners; but in July 1978 256 Appendix A Tables 1 Conversion Coefficients and Factors 2 Population by Sex, Selected Years, 1934-77 3 Teachers, Students, and Schools, School Years 1976-77 and 1977-78 4 Medical Personnel and Facilities, 1976 5 Distribution of Labor Force by Sector, 1976 and 1980 (Planned) 6 Summary of Ordinary Budget Revenues, 1973-76 7 Summary of Ordinary Budget Expenditures, 1973-76 8 Planned Development Expenditures by the Central Government, 1970-77 9 Actual Development Expenditures by the Central Government, 1970-75 10 Oil Production and Revenues, Selected Years, 1934-77 11 Production and Area of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1957-77 12 Non-Oil Exports, Selected Years, 1971-77 13 Summary of Balance of Payments, 1972-75 14 Army, Major Military Equipment, 1978 15 Navy, Major Military Equipment, 1978 16 Air Force, Major Military Equipment, 1978 17 Government Expenditures for National Defense and Security, 1967-78 259 Iraq: A Country Study Table 1. Conversion Coefficients and Factors When You Know Multiply By Millimeters 0.04 Centimeters 0.39 Meters 3.3 Kilometers 0.62 Hectares (10,000 m2) 2.47 Square kilometers 0.39 Cubic meters 35.3 Liters 0.26 Kilograms 2.2 Metric tons 0.98 1.1 2,204 Degrees Celsius 9 (Centigrade) divide by 5 and add 32 To Find inches inches feet miles acres square miles cubic feet gallons pounds long tons short tons pounds degrees Fahrenheit Table 2. Population by Sex, Selected Years, 1934-77 (in thousands) Year Female Male Total 19341 1,692 1,688 3,380 19472 2,559 2,257 4,816 19573 3,155 3,185 6,340 19653 3,964 4,133 8,097 1977" 5,805 6,224 12,029 1 Estimate. 3Based on census data that excluded Iraqis living abroad. In 1977 an estimated 142,280 Iraqis resided outside the country, providing a total of 12,171,280 in October 1977. 'Based on census data that included Iraqis living abroad. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1977, Baghdad, 1978, p. 35. 260 Appendix A Table 3. Teachers, Students, and Schools, School Years 1976-77 and 1977-78 Lnri Teach^ —— ^SlS ___ Schoob Kindergarten 1976-77 2,291 51,840 24,223 27,617 274 1977-78 2,603 56,347 26,488 29,859 306 First Level 1976-77 70,799 1,947,182 687,220 1,259,962 8,156 1977-78 78,060 2,048,566 765,072 1,283,494 8,387 Second Level 1976-77 19,573 555,184 163,801 391,383 1,320 1977-78 21,256 664,297 196,133 468,164 1,384 Vocational School 1976-77 1,906 28,365 n.a. n.a. 82 1977-78 2,333 35,188 7,846 27,342 92 Teacher Training School 1976-77 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1977-78 666 17,337 12,685 4,652 32 Teacher Training Institute 1976-77 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 1977-78 241 6,252 3,233 3,019 13 University, College, or Technical Institute* 1976-77 4,008 81,498 24,584 56,914 n.a. 1977-78 4,496 85,399 26,493 58,906 n.a. n.a.—not available. •Includes As Sulaymaniyah University, Baghdad University, Basrah University, Foundation of Technical Institutes, Mosul University, Mustansiriyah University, University of Technology, and religious colleges. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1977, Baghdad, 1978, pp. 204-231. 261 Appendix A Table 6. Summary of Ordinary Budget Revenues, 1973-76 (in millions of Iraqi dinars)i „ _ Actual Proposed Revenue Source 1973' 1974' 19753 1976 Oil revenues4 411.6 1,123.3 427.7 1,049.0 Income and inheritance 28.8 28.6 29.6 29.8 Real estate tax 5.3 5.4 4.8 5.5 Agricultural land tax 2.3 1.9 1.3 2.6 Stamp duties 6.6 8.9 8.0 10.0 Customs duties 44.0 80.6 102.3 101.5 Excise taxes 29.6 34.3 27.7 30.4 Revenues from government organizations 33.7 79.7 47.4 62.5 Grants from development plans.... 7.3 2.4 10.0 2.7 Other 28.5 35.2 29.4 30.0 TOTAL5 597.9 1,400.2 688.0" 1.324.07 'For value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary. •Fiscal year begins April 1. 'April 1 through December 31, 1975—the transition year before fiscal and calendar year became the same in 1976. *Only that part of oil revenues allocated to the ordinary budget. Part of oil revenues were allocated to the development budget. "Figures may not add to total because of rounding. •Actual revenues were ID896.3 million, but a breakdown was unavailable in early 1979. 'Preliminary calculations of actual revenues were ID1.526.3 million, but a breakdown was unavailable in early 1979. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book, 1976, Baghdad, 1977, p. 116. 263 Iraq: A Country Study Table 7. Summary of Ordinary Budget Expenditures, 1973-76 (in millions of Iraqi dinars)i Actual Proposed 1973' 1974• 1975' 1976 Defense and security 214.7 491.2 175.4 504.2 Education 80.5 124.9 105.1 170.3 Labor, youth, and social affairs 2.4 3.4 3.0 5.9 Health 21.2 28.9 23.2 41.1 Information 2.1 3.6 3.2 6.1 Finance and economic affairs 63.3 139.0 121.7 553.3 Transportation and communication.... 1.0 1.5 1.0 0.3 Foreign affairs 3.5 4.7 4.1 7.2 Interior and justice 5.9 7.8 6.6 9.7 Municipal affairs 17.5 31.8 24.1 32.1 International obligations 2.0 15.5 28.9 101.1 Pensions and gratuities 29.8 40.7 23.0 41.8 Other 11.1 28.5 42.8 3.4 TOTAL4 454.9 921.4 562.05 1.476.66 'For value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary. "Fiscal year begins April 1. 'April 1 through December 31.1975—the transition year before fiscal and calendar years became the same in 1976. 4 Figures may not add to total because of rounding. 'Actual expenditures were ID753 million, but a breakdown was unavailable in early 1979. "Preliminary calculation of actual expenditures was ID 1,379 million, but a breakdown was unavailable in early 1979. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book, 1977, Baghdad, 1978, p. 116; and Iraq, Central Bank, Bulletin, Baghdad, April-June 1977. Table 8. Planned Development Expenditures by the Central Government, 1970-77' (in millions of Iraqi dinars)2 Sector 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 Agriculture 28 60 23 65 190 208 268 390 Industry 28 50 28 60 225 448 709 988 Transportation and communication 15 28 16 40 120 166 242 352 Buildings and services.. 13 28 22 45 175 188 213 368 Other 32 36 45 100 459 66 61 301 TOTAL 116 202 134 310 1,169 1,076 1,493 2,399 'Almost certainly fiscal years although not specified in source; April 1 through December 31, 1975—the transition year before fiscal and calendar years became the same in 1976. 3For value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book, 1977, Baghdad, 1978, pp. 58-59. 264 Appendix A Table 9. Actual Development Expenditures by the Central Government, 1970-751 (in millions of Iraqi dinars)2 Sector 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975' Agriculture 14 49 29 38~ 78 100 Industry 21 36 22 66 184 290 Transportation and communication 7 17 20 28 106 138 Buildings and services.... 10 18 17 36 91 101 Other 26 34 41 76 117 287 TOTAL 78 154 129 244 576 916 'Other government agencies and nationalized industries also undertook development expenditures; almost certainly fiscal years although not specified in source. 'For value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary. 'Actual expenditures from April 1 through December 31, 1975. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book, 1976, Baghdad, 1977, pp. 105-111. Table 10. Oil Production and Revenues, Selected Years, 1934-77 (in millions of metric tons and of United States dollars)* Year Production Revenue Year Production Revenue 1934.. . . 0.8 4 1962 49.5 266 1935.... 3.8 4 1964 61.7 353 1940.... 2.8 9 1966 68.3 394 1945.... 4.9 13 1968 ... 73.9 488 1950.... 6.9 19 1970 ... 76.0 521 1951.... 8.9 42 1971 ... 83.1 840 1952.... ... 19.1 93 1972 ... 72.1 575 1953.... ... 28.5 144 1973 ... 99.0 1,843 1954.... ... 31.2 162 1974 ... 96.7 5,700 1956.... ... 31.5 193 1975 ... 110.9 7,500 1958.... ... 35.9 224 1976 ... 118.8 8,860 1960.... ... 47.8 266 1977 ... 115.0 9,600 •Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) source published tonnage data in barrels and monetary data (through 1969) in English pound sterling. Source: Based on information from Annual Statistical Bulletin 1976, Vienna, 1977, tables 15 and 101; Middle East Economic Digest, London, October 6,1978, p. 29; and Middle East Economic Digest, London, December 31, 1977, p. 47. 265 Iraq: A Country Study Table 11. Production and Area of Major Crops, Selected Years, 1957-77 Production Area Crop (in thousands of tons) (in thousands of hectares) 1957 1975 1976 1977 1957 1975 1976 1977 Wheat . 757 845 1,312 696 1,533 1,408 1,500 851 Barley .... . 954 437 579 458 1,156 567 575 536 Rice . 147 60 163 199 91 30 52 63 Cotton 14 39 34 26 65 26 25 20 Tomatoes . . n.a. 389 492 402 n.a. 44 45 40 Eggplant.. . n.a. 82 112 121 n.a. 6 6 7 n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Statistical Pocket Book, 1977, Baghdad, 1978, pp. 17-21; and Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Handbook for the Republic of Iraq for the Years 1957-1967, Baghdad, 1968, p. 116. Table 12. Non-Oil Exports, Selected Years, 1971-77 (in millions of Iraqi dinars)1 1971 1973 1975 1977 Fruits and vegetables2 7.2 10.5 11.9 12.8 Petroleum products3 1.5 1.5 2.1 16.2 Hides and skins 1.8 3.7 1.6 2.6 Raw wool and cotton 1.5 0.7 1.0 2.0 Cement 2.7 3.4 0.6 0.0 Chemical fertilizer n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.6 Other 8.1 12.7 18.4 10.3 TOTAL 22.8 32.5 35.6 46.5 n.a.—not available. 'For value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary. 'Primarily dates. 3Fuels and lubricants. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Ministry of Planning, Central Statistical Organization, Annual Abstract of Statistics, 1977, Baghdad, 1978 (and earlier issues). 266 Appendix A Table 13. Summary of Balance of Payments, 1972-75' (in millions of United States dollars) 1972 1973 1974 1975 Current Account Export of goods (fob)2 1,364 2,205 6,980 8,301 Import of goods (fob)3 -667 -850 -2,754 -4,162 Export of services 181 256 554 543 Import of services4 -335 -800 -1,927 -1,712 Unrequited transfers (net)5 _ 3 -10 -235 -265 Balance of Current Account 546 800 2,618 2,705 Capital Account Direct investment6 -772 297 -214 11 Other government capital 406 -207 -292 -333 Long-term capital (noncentral government). 21 8 —25 —114 Total long-term capital -345 98 -531 -436 Deposit money of banks 1 2 42 —5 Other7 -4 15 -629 -2,036 Errors and omissions -28 -253 411 -726 Total short-term capital -31 -236 -176 -2,767 Total Capital Account -376 -138 -708 -3,203 Change in Reserves8 -170 -663 -1,911 498 'Includes estimates by International Monetary Fund (IMF) staff, relating in part to nationalization and transactions in the oil industry. includes IMF valuation of oil exported including that delivered to Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in settlement of nationalization claims. 3Excludes military equipment. ^Includes substantial payments for services in oil industry and other development projects in 1974 and 1975. 5 Almost completely grant aid by the government in 1974 and 1975. ."Settlement of claims after nationalization of oil companies. 'Primarily IMF estimates of oil exports late in the year for which payment was not received until the next year. 'Minus sign indicates an increase of foreign exchange reserves. Source: Based on information from Balance of Payments Yearbook, Vol. 29, Washington, December 1978, pp. 289-293; and International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, Washington, October 1978, p. 167. 267 Iraq: A Country Study Table 14. Army, Major Military Equipment, 1978 Type Designation Medium tanks T-54, T-55, T-62 Light tanks PT-76 Mechanized infantry combat vehicles .... BMP Armored fighting vehicles BTR-50, BTR-60, Quantity Country of Manufacture 2,400 100 120 Soviet Union Do. Do. BTR-152 > 1,500 Do. OT-62, VCR J Czechoslovakia Guns/howitzers 75mm, 85mm, 122mm, 130mm, 152mm 800 n.a. Self-propelled guns . .. SU-100 90 Soviet Union ISU-122 40 Do. Mortars .. 120mm, 160mm n.a. n.a. Multiple rocket launchers .. BM-21 122mm n.a. Soviet Union Surface-to-surface missiles .. FROG 7 26 Do. Antitank guided ScudB 12 Do. weapons . . Sagger n.a. Do. Self-propelled SS-11 n.a. France antiaircraft guns .. .. ZSU-23-4, ZSU-57-2 23mm, 37mm, 57mm, 85mm, 100mm (towed) 1,200 Soviet Union n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance 1978-79, London, 1978; and Janes Weapon Systems, 1971-72, New York, 1971. Table 15. Navy, Major Military Equipment, 1978 3 Soviet Union 6 Do. 8 Do. 10 Do. 2 Do. 6 Soviet Union, United Kingdom 2 Soviet Union 3 n.a. „ Description or Type „ , Designation Submarine chasers SO-1 Fast patrol boats Osa-I with Styx missiles Osa-II Torpedo boats P-6 Large patrol craft Poluchat-class Coastal patrol craft (under 100 tons) Minesweepers T-43 (inshore) Quantity Country of Manufacture n.a.—not available. Source: Based on information from The Military Balance 1978-79, London, 1978; and Jane's Fighting Ships, 1972-73, New York, 1972. 268 Iraq: A Country Study Table 17. Government Expenditures for National Defense and Security, 1967-78 Millions of Percent of Percent of Fiscal Year Iraqi Dinars at Total Ordinary Cross Domestic Current Pricesi Expenditures" Product (GDP) 1967/683-4 83.8 41 8.4 1968/69 111.0 46 9.2 1969/70 142.1 49 11.4 1970/71 143.6 47 11.2 1971/72 153.2 45 10.3 1972/73 153.4 44 10.4 1973/74 214.7 47 12.0 1974/754 491.2 53 19.5 1975 (9 months) 411.8 51 13.9 1976 504.2 34 n.a. 19773 491.5 30 n.a. 19783 500.2 27 n.a. n.a.—not available. i For value of the Iraqi dinar—see Glossary. 'Excludes government capital expenditures that usually run about one-fourth of total government expendi- tures. '1967/68-1976 figures are for Ministry of Defense and Police Departments; 1977 and 1978 figures are for Ministry of Defense only. •1967/68-1974/75 figures are actuals; 1975 and 1976 are revised estimates; 1977 and 1978 are estimates. Source: Based on information from Iraq, Central Bank, Bulletin, Baghdad, 1976; World Armament and and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook 1978, New York, 1978; and Quarterly Economic Review: Iraq. 1978 Annual Supple- ment, 1977-78. 270 Appendix B Summary of Developments in the International Oil Industry Affecting Iraq's Oil Revenues THE ERA OF cheap energy ended in the early 1970s when Iraq and other members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) took control of pricing from the international oil companies. Petroleum-exporting nations tremendously in- creased their revenues, and the sudden change shocked most of the world. One factor contributing to the sharp change in the price of energy was the steeply rising world demand caused by the me- chanization of so many activities during the previous 100 years. One estimate indicated that the fuel and power consumed by an average American amounted to the energy equivalent of 200 full- time servants. Between 1962 and 1971 the estimated world de- mand for energy increased at an annual rate of 4.8 percent, a rate that would result in a doubling of demand every fifteen years. Energy requirements were accelerating so rapidly that observers predicted critical energy shortages in the twenty-first century and the exhaustion of known oil deposits relatively soon. World oil production was expected to peak about 1990 and decline there- after. The primary energy sources—coal, oil, and natural gas— were being depleted at an astonishing rate. Accompanying the growth in energy demand was a radical shift in the source of energy. When the world's first oil well began producing in 1859, men and animals supplied much of the world's power needs, supplemented by waterwheels, windmills, and steam generated by burning coal and wood. Coal powered an early part of the industrial revolution; in 1910, for example, coal supplied 90 percent of American commercial energy require- ments. Coal still made up over half the world's commercial sources of energy in 1960, but oil was rapidly displacing it as the world's primary fuel. Petroleum was used long before the Christian era. Noah report- edly waterproofed his ark with bitumen, an asphalt of Asia Minor also used in ancient times in mud bricks and mortar. Early man used oil for medicinal purposes and as fuel for lamps. Remains of roads paved in antiquity with natural asphalt are still found today in Iraq. Until modern times petroleum was collected from natural seepage. Not until 1859, when a drilling rig was set up on Oil Creek near Titusville, Pennsylvania, was oil sought commercially. The oil industry grew rapidly after the first well came in. Within a decade Russia, Romania, Canada, Italy, and the United States were producing oil. Several more countries began producing soon afterward, and oil was discovered in Iran in 1908. From an early 271 Iraq: A Country Study date the area that became Iraq was believed to contain oil, but numerous factors delayed drilling, and oil was not discovered in Iraq until 1927. During the late nineteenth century petroleum was used primar- ily as a lubricant and as lamp fuel. In 1900 about 58 percent of petroleum consumption in the United States, the largest producer and consumer of oil, was in the form of kerosine for heaters and lamps; most of the rest was used as fuel oil for heating and in power plants. Development of the internal-combustion engine vastly ex- panded the demand for petroleum products. World War I and World War II greatly accelerated engine development. Improve- ments in petroleum refining accompanied diversification and refinement of engines. Research added to the uses for petroleum products: a whole new field of petrochemicals emerged, produc- ing dyes, fertilizers, and other products and increasing the de- mand for crude oil. Petroleum was cleaner, more convenient, and cheaper than other fuels. In addition it was the unique fuel for internal-combus- tion engines, feedstock for petrochemicals, and base for lubricants. As a result the market for oil grew much more rapidly than the total demand for energy. World consumption (excluding commu- nist countries) went from 1 million barrels (see Glossary) per day in 1915 to more than 5 million barrels per day in 1940 and 48 million barrels per day in 1976. Between 1962 and 1971 world consumption of petroleum increased at an annual rate of 7 per- cent, a doubling of consumption in ten years. Of the energy con- sumed in 1970 by noncommunist countries, a little more than one-half came from oil. Coal accounted for nearly one-fourth, nat- ural gas supplied about one-fifth, and nuclear power provided less than 0.5 percent; hydropower contributed the remainder. Another factor contributing to the sharp rise in the price of energy was the growing international trade in petroleum pro- ducts. The Soviet Union surpassed the United States as the largest producer of crude oil in 1974 as a result of the declining output of American fields (4 percent a year) that set in at the end of the 1960s. Both countries, however, consumed most of their own pro- duction. The Soviet Union began exporting relatively small amounts of petroleum in the 1950s, and the United States began importing increasing quantities of oil to meet consumption needs some years before. The main stimulus for the international petro- leum trade came from the rapid economic growth and increased oil consumption in Western Europe and Japan after World War II supplemented by rising energy needs in developing countries. These countries lacked significant crude oil deposits and required large and increasing imports to satisfy growing consumption needs. Between 1962 and 1971 the petroleum imports of Western Europe more than doubled, and Japan's increased more than four- fold. Petroleum became the most important commodity in value 272 Appendix B in international trade, and by the mid-1970s petroleum products accounted for more than one-half of all seaborne commerce. Geologists have determined the outlines of a large basin extend- ing from the Taurus Mountains in southeast Turkey to the Arabian Sea in the south and underlying western Iran, eastern Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and most of the Persian Gulf. In 1976 this basin held 55 percent of the world's proven reserves (see fig. 15). The devel- opment of these Middle Eastern fields after World War II made them the world's most important crude oil source, supplying about 37 percent of world production in 1976. Crude oil production costs have been low because pressure in these prolific fields is generally high; transportation costs have been low because the fields are relatively close to water routes. The countries owning these reserves have relatively small populations, little domestic oil consumption, and an interest in exporting oil. As a result these states became the most important exporters of petroleum pro- ducts, supplying nearly two-thirds of the oil in international trade in the mid-1970s. Structure of the International Oil Industry Another factor contributing to the sharp rise in the price of energy was the changing structure of the international oil indus- try. The industry is divided into several distinct phases—explor- ing, producing crude oil, refining into usable products, transport- ing, and marketing—and each phase requires costly investments. Even with modern techniques, for example, only 10 percent of the wells drilled in new fields produce oil or gas, and only 2 percent of the wells are significant producers. The industry as first devel- oped consisted of a few very large companies vertically integrat- ing all phases from exploration to marketing. The petroleum industry before World War II was dominated by seven or eight major oil companies. Five of these were American; the others were European. These major companies held most of the foreign concession agreements for exploration and develop- ment. This gave the companies a degree of horizontal integration; they could adjust the output of crude from various areas to match overall marketing needs. Before World War II the dominance of these companies, verti- cally and horizontally integrated, gave them a high degree of influence over supply and price through mutuality of interests if not collusion. The major oil companies were able to exert consid- erable control for some years after World War II; output from the prolific, low-cost Persian Gulf fields was phased into world markets without excessive disruption to pricing, petroleum investments, and employment in the United States and output and revenues in other high-cost crude oil areas. Coal mining throughout most of the world, which had become increasingly more costly as the richer seams were depleted, was less disrupted than it might have been had it been forced to adjust to cheaper oil. The price of 273 Appendix B entrance of smaller oil companies. Some, such as the Getty Oil Company, were private firms; others, such as the French and Italian national petroleum companies, were state-owned busi- nesses. The smaller companies won concessions in oil-producing countries by offering the host governments more favorable terms than those of the major oil companies. The Soviet Union also began to export oil over which the major companies had no con- trol. These developments occurred within the broader framework of the bipolar relations between the leading communist and non- communist countries. A group of developing countries, calling themselves the Third World, were asserting more control over their own destiny and natural resources at the insistence of domes- tic nationalistic groups. Diminishing dominance by the major oil companies meant an increasing inability to match petroleum sup- plies to consumption needs. By the end of the 1950s a growing supply of oil started to push prices downward. The downward pressure on petroleum prices was favored by the consumer, but it reduced revenues for the oil-producing states. Oil Pricing Oil pricing is a vast and controversial subject complicated by the vertical integration of much of the industry and the secretiveness of the companies involved. Price can simply match supply and demand, or it can incorporate political decisions to achieve some possibly noneconomic goal. The United States, though an avowed advocate of free enterprise and free trade, had long interfered in the pricing of some commodities—as in price supports for major agricultural crops—and regulated phases of the domestic oil and gas industry for particular goals that to a degree affected interna- tional prices of petroleum. Other oil-producing countries have also sought to exert various controls over their petroleum re- sources with the result that oil pricing and trade have reflected forces other than just supply and demand. The major international oil companies are largely housed in the United States and have domestic fields, refineries, and outlets. There have been many United States Congressional investigations of the oil companies, and their operations in foreign countries have been watched, threatened, and in some instances taken over by the host government. Contrary to their popular image the oil companies have not been free agents concerned only with maxi- mizing profits. This is not to say, however, that they have not wielded considerable domestic as well as international power, done unsavory things, or secured huge profits. Early in the 1900s the United States was the world's major oil exporter, and international crude oil pricing by the major oil com- panies was based on the United States price plus transportation costs. This was a base-point pricing system in which the price to the buyer was equivalent to the price of oil shipped to him from the Gulf of Mexico, regardless of actual source. There were other 275 Iraq: A Country Study oil-exporting countries at the time, but the oil companies' price was the same to India, for example, even if the oil was shipped from the Persian Gulf, with transportation costs substantially less than from the Gulf of Mexico. This system worked when there were only a few oil companies with mutual interests; it protected their investments in the United States and other areas and pro- vided a high return for developing fields, such as those in the Persian Gulf region. How much the oil company kept and how much the government owning the field received depended on the concession agreement, but there was not a downward pressure on the price of crude oil produced in the new foreign fields in the Caribbean and Middle East. Between 1945 and 1950 the increased supply of crude from foreign fields, the emergence of independent oil companies, and United States pressure applied through its help in rebuilding post- war Europe brought about major modification of the single base- point price system. The major oil companies set crude oil prices in conjunction with transportation costs from actual point of ship- ment to establish a series of equalization points—points where the landed price of Middle East oil was the same as crude from the Gulf of Mexico and Venezuela. The equalization point was first southern Europe, then London, and eventually New York. The shifting of the equalization point northward and westward in- creased transportation costs, thereby requring lower quotations for Middle East crude and revenues for these countries. When the equalization point was New York, Middle East oil had a competi- tive advantage in European markets formerly held by United States, Mexican, and Venezuelan crude. The oil companies were caught in conflicting squeezes. The cost of producing oil in the Middle East was a fraction of that in Venezuela, which in turn was substantially less than that in the United States. If prices were based on cost of production, Middle East crude would have forced other countries out of the market. The oil companies, American politicians, and American businesses did not want this. In fact Morris A. Adelman, in his authoritative study The World Petroleum Market, concluded that an effective coalition in the United States limited imports of foreign oil for the large United States market for at least ten years before official import quotas were established in 1959. The major oil companies would have profited from more imports, and the Middle Eastern oil-producing countries would have been happy, at least for a while, if the companies had taken more oil, because their revenues would have gone up. However, American, Venezuelan, and other relatively high-cost producers did not want to be forced out of crude production. Each producing country wanted to remain in the oil business and earn more money but did not want to suffer competition from cheap suppliers or have the price of its oil go down. The dominance of the major companies over the industry 276 Appendix B reduced for all producers the pain of adjustment to the large supply of low-cost Middle East crude entering the market. From about 1950 to the early 1970s there was a system of posted prices for each country—prices at which oil companies would sell crude oil to anybody. Transportation costs were not included. Because anybody generally meant independent oil companies that the major oil companies did not want to encourage, posted prices were higher than the actual price at which the bulk of crude oil sales took place. Moreover a short-term oversupply of crude developed in the late 1950s as newly discovered fields began to produce, causing a downward pressure on crude oil prices. By the 1960s, if not earlier, the posted price became only a reference point for calculating the taxes and royalty payments due oil-pro- ducing states under the concession agreements. Economists have had difficulty in analyzing the pricing system because of inadequate data to establish what actual market prices were; perhaps four-fifths of crude oil sales were bookkeeping tran- sactions within integrated companies. There is widespread agree- ment, however, that actual market prices of crude oil had a sub- stantial downward trend between 1950 and 1970, although posted prices remained fixed for prolonged periods. The posted price per barrel of Saudi Arabian light (34 degrees on the American Petroleum Institute [API] gravity scale) marker crude oil was US$2.05 in June 1948, US$1.70 in November 1950, US$2.08 in June 1958, US$1.80 in August 1960, and US$2.18 in February 1971. The marker price is the basic price for a typical regional crude—in this case Arabian light used for the Persian Gulf—from which regional prices are derived. The posted price of Iraqi light crude was close to the Saudi price (see The Oil Industry, ch. 3). Although the major oil companies exerted considerable influ- ence on crude oil prices, the oil industry was not a closed system, and market forces had an impact. Before 1973 crude oil was priced largely in the context of supply and demand; after 1973 crude oil pricing took into consideration the costs of other energy sources and the long-term supply of petroleum. The frame of reference for pricing decisions was vastly broader and less favorable to consum- ers than the one that had previously prevailed. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries The sheer size and integrated nature of the major international oil companies afforded them considerable advantages when.nego- tiating concession agreements with countries having known or probable deposits. Moreover many of the concession agreements were arranged with developing countries generally lacking in so- phistication and usually hard pressed for funds. The governments of these countries often failed to appreciate the value of their resources and were frequently so desperate for funds that they lacked bargaining power even if they understood the value of 277 Iraq: A Country Study concession agreements granted the oil companies. The more im- portant concessions had been granted before World War II, when the host governments had little bargaining power. As a result the financial return to the host governments was usually quite low. Venezuela started a major and important adjustment in conces- sion agreements in 1943 by legislating a 50-percent tax on the net income earned by oil companies in the country, and it became effective in 1947. A similar arrangement was discussed in Iran in 1948 but not put into effect until 1954. The so-called fifty-fifty profit sharing was negotiated by Saudi Arabia with the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) in 1950, and it had become standard in the Persian Gulf (including Iraq) by 1952. Profit-shar- ing arrangements substantially increased oil revenues for host governments. OPEC helped refine the calculations of taxes and royalties to the advantage of the host governments during the 1960s. OPEC also helped the oil-exporting governments negotiate considerably better terms in concession agreements granted after its founding. The June 1967 War between Israel and several Arab states started a chain of events that led to a transformation in the world energy market. The war closed the Suez Canal, and several Arab oil states, including Iraq, embargoed oil exports briefly. The canal remained closed until June 1975. The transportation problems of the much longer haul around Africa to Europe were partly offset by the use of new supertankers and by the increasing oil produc- tion in Africa, particularly in Algeria and Libya, which were close to southern Europe. Dependence on North African oil became even greater in 1970 as a result of civil war in Nigeria and disrup- tion of operations of the pipeline from Saudi Arabia to the Medi- terranean coast in Lebanon. The new military regime in Libya seized the opportunity of its enhanced position to cut back crude oil production and to secure higher posted prices and tax rates from the oil companies under the threat of cessation of exports if their demands were not met. An independent oil company, Occi- dental, agreed to the much more favorable terms for Libya, and other oil companies acceded to Libyan demands in September 1970. Meanwhile, in a July 1970 speech, the Algerian representative to OPEC requested that other members seize control of pricing their internationally traded crude oil, also a policy strongly ad- vocated by Iraq. OPEC followed with a unanimous resolution in December 1970 calling for substantial revisions and increases in crude oil pricing. Negotiations were held in Tehran in February 1971 for the Persian Gulf region. The posted price of Persian Gulf oil was raised by more than one-third, provision was made for yearly price increases of about 5 percent a year until 1975 to compensate for inflation, and the tax rate was raised to 55 percent. Libya negotiated an agreement in April 1971 whereby it won a substantially larger increase in the posted price plus an increase 280 Appendix B countries was tremendous. Saudi Arabia illustrated the situation for the oil states on the Persian Gulf. Saudi revenues per barrel increased from US$0.22 in 1948 to US$0.89 in 1970. By 1973 they had reached US$1.56 per barrel, and in 1974 they were above US$10.10 per barrel. By the beginning of 1976 revenues were US$11.15 per barrel because of the OPEC price increase in Octo- ber 1975. Iraq's oil revenues increased from US$1.5 billion in 1973 to US$7.2 billion in 1974. After 1973 OPEC members had control of crude oil pricing and a large degree of control over production. The members had not given OPEC authority to allocate production among producers, however, and OPEC had no formal means of matching supply to demand. This need arose immediately; world oil consumption de- clined in 1974 and declined further in 1975 because of a recession in the industrialized countries and conservation measures by all oil-consuming nations. Strains were apparent among OPEC mem- bers because of lower production and declining revenues. In early 1979 OPEC remained a loose confederation of diverse nations that had united to combat the power of the international oil companies. Its diversity had been its salvation so far in the difficult task of controlling supply to maintain price. There were two main groups within OPEC. The first was made up of oil ex- porters with large reserves and small populations, such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. This group might be called the low-price group, because they were earning more oil revenues than they could profitably invest. Immediate higher prices were not very attractive because they would probably intensify devel- opment by industrialized countries of new technology and energy sources. The countries' interest was in a moderate price and a slow rate of exploitation so that their reserves would continue to finance their economic development long into the future. The second group might be called the high-price advocates. It was made up of such countries as Iran and Indonesia, which had relatively small oil reserves, large populations, and economic po- tentials other than oil. Because their reserves would not last long, they wanted to maximize current earnings on their limited re- serves through high prices. They would then invest the earnings primarily in their own country to develop other resources and industries for self-sustaining growth. Some of these countries, Iran for one, had pushed for substantially higher oil prices since 1973 than those adopted by OPEC members. Although Iraq was in an in-between position in terms of oil reserves, other resources, and the size of its population, Iraqi officials for many years have strongly advocated higher crude oil prices (see The Oil Industry, ch. 3). In 1974 and 1975 OPEC members maintained their united front and even increased export prices in the face of reduced demand for crude oil by importing countries. Several countries cut back crude production to avoid an oversupply that might lead 283 Iraq: A Country Study to price cutting by members pressed for funds. Saudi Arabia, Ku- wait, and other Arab gulf states shouldered much of the burden of lower crude production and revenues to avoid pressure on OPEC prices in the years from 1973 through 1976. Saudi Arabia's huge reserves and production potential make it pivotal in OPEC discussions and provided nearly veto power in most OPEC decisions. Saudi officials advocated only a 5-percent price increase in September 1975, but they reluctantly accepted a 10-percent increase as a compromise between their position and that of members that wanted a 20- to 25-percent increase. The Saudis clearly indicated opposition to further increases in the im- mediate future, however. The OPEC meeting in Qatar in December 1976 produced a major test between members advocating higher prices and those favoring lower prices. Iran sought a 15-percent price increase, and others wanted an even larger increase. Iraq was one of the mem- bers arguing for an increase of at least 25 percent. Saudi Arabia indicated a willingness to accept a 5-percent increase at most. In an attempted compromise a 10-percent price increase for marker crude effective January 1, 1977, and a further 5-percent increase effective July 1, 1977, were proposed with the implicit under- standing that the July increase could be altered if circumstances warranted. Eleven of the thirteen members including Iraq voted for the compromise and put it into effect at the beginning of 1977 even though the decision was not unanimous. Iraq's sale price increased from US$11.46 to US$12.62 per barrel for light crude (35-degree API). Saudi Arabia and the UAE increased posted prices for marker crude by 5 percent, effective January 1, 1977 (from US$11.51 to US$12.09 per barrel for Arabian light 34-degree API). Moreover Saudi officials said that they would increase production if needed to minimize the impact of the larger price increase by most OPEC members. Saudi officials justified breaking with OPEC's price unanimity because the larger price increase would, in their judg- ment, threaten the weak economic recovery in progress in indus- trialized countries at the beginning of 1977 and perhaps under- mine political institutions in Italy, Great Britain, and France. OPEC's two-tiered pricing system caused considerable confu- sion in world oil markets and produced the most serious strains in the organization's history. Oil companies made an effort to buy the cheaper crudes; Saudi production increased at the expense of that of Iran and Iraq, for example. By mid-1977 the test of strength, essentially between Saudi Arabia and Iran, was compromised in the interest of OPEC unity. The Saudis increased their price by 5 percent in July and Iran, and the others that had voted with it, agreed not to implement the 5-percent increase scheduled for July. By midyear two-tiered pricing ceased to exist, and OPEC countries were again using a single price for marker crude. Another source of tension among OPEC members appeared in 284 Appendix B severely criticized Iraq for its failure to join in use of the oil weapon in support of the Arab cause. * * * The literature on the oil industry in general and on specific areas is quite large, rapidly growing, and often polemical. Morris A. Adelman's The World Petroleum Market is a basic study of the industry, though somewhat overtaken by events since 1973. Leon- ard Mosley's Power Play presents a readable account of the in- trigues and issues in the initial concessions granted by the oil states of the Persian Gulf regions. Michael Field's A Hundred Million Dollars a Day, Neil H. Jacoby's Multinational Oil, and Anthony Sampson's The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Made are among the many studies availble in the late 1970s. OPEC's Annual Statistical Bulletin provides a considera- ble amount of data, and most OPEC members publish statistical yearbooks. Edith and E.F. Penrose's Iraq: International Relations and National Development provides considerable information on Iraq's oil industry and its relationship to developments elsewhere. 287 Bibliography Chapter 1 al-Marayati, Abid A. The Middle East: Its Governments and Poli- tics. Belmont, Cal.: Duxbury Press, 1972. Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. 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Autonomous Region—Governorates of As Sulaymaniyah, Dahuk, and Irbil, the Kurdish majority area. In this region—popularly known as Kurdistan—Kurdish has status of official language, and residents enjoy limited autonomy from central government. barrels—See barrels per day. barrels per day—Production of crude oil and petroleum products is frequently measured in barrels per day, often abbreviated bpd or bd. A barrel is a volume measure of forty-two United States gallons. Conversion of barrels to metric tons depends on the density of the specific product. About 7.3 barrels of average crude oil weigh one metric ton. Heavy would be about seven per metric ton. Light products, such as gasoline and kerosine, would average close to eight barrels per metric ton. currency—See dinar. dinar—Currency unit consisting of 1,000 fils. Dinar equaled US$4.86 between 1931 and 1949 and US$2.80 between 1949 and 1971. As a result of the currency realignments that began in 1971, the average value of the dinar in terms of dollars was US$2.83 in 1971, US$3.00 in 1972, US$3.31 in 1973, and US$3.39 in 1974, where it remained through February 1979. downstream—The oil industry views the production, processing, transportation, and sale of petroleum products as a flow process starting at the wellhead. Downstream includes any stage be- tween the point of reference and the sale of products to the consumer. Upstream is the converse and includes exploration and drilling of wells. dunum—Local unit of measurement, an area equal to 2,500 square meters or four dunum per hectare. Also called meshara. fiscal year (FY)—Since 1976 same as Gregorian calendar year. FY 1975 was a transition year that ran from April 1 through Decem- ber 31, 1975. Earlier fiscal years began on April 1 and ended on March 31. Free Officers—Term applied retroactively to the group of young military officers that planned and carried out the revolution of July 14, 1958. FY—Fiscal year (q.v.). hadith—Tradition based on the precedent of Muhammad's nondi- vinely revealed deeds and words that serves as one of the sources of Islamic law (sharia). hijra (pi., hujar)—Literally to migrate, to sever relations, to leave one's tribe. Throughout the Muslim world hijra refers to the migration of Muhammad and his followers to Medina. In this sense the word has come into European languages as hegira and is usually and somewhat misleadingly translated as flight. 305 Iraq: A Country Study ID—Iraqi dinar. See dinar. Imam—A word used in several senses. In general use and lower- cased, it means the leader of congregational prayers; as such it implies no ordination or special spiritual powers beyond suffi- cient education to carry out this function. It is also used figura- tively by many Sunni (q. v.) Muslims to mean the leader of the Islamic community. Among Shiites (q.v.) the word takes on many complex and controversial meanings; in general, how- ever, it indicates that particular descendant of the House of Ali who is believed to have been God's designated repository of the spiritual authority inherent in that line. The identity of this individual and the means of ascertaining his identity have been the major issues causing divisions among Shiites. jihad—The struggle to establish the law of God on earth, often interpreted to mean holy war. Levant—Countries of the Eastern Mediterranean. shaykh—Leader or chief. Word of Arabic origin used to mean either a political or a learned religious leader. Also used as an honorific. Shia—See Shiite. Shiite (or Shia, from Shiat Ali, the Party of Ali)—A member of the smaller of the two great divisions of Islam. The Shiites supported the claims of Ali and his line to presumptive right to the cali- phate and leadership of the Muslim community, and on this issue they divided from the Sunni (q.v.) in the first great schism within Islam. Later schisms have produced further divisions among the Shiites over the identity and number of Imams (q.v.). Shiites revere Twelve Imams, the last of whom is believed to be in hiding. Shiite Islam—See Shiite. Sublime Porte—Ottoman Empire palace entrance that provided access to the chief minister, representing the government and the sultan. Term came to mean the Ottoman government. Sunni (from sunna, orthodox)—A member of the larger of the two great divisions of Islam. The Sunnis supported the traditional method of election to the caliphate and accepted the Umayyad line. On this issue they divided from the Shiites (q. v.) in the first great schism within Islam. Wahhabi—Name used to designate adherents of Wahhabism, the interpretation of Islam that prevails in Saudi Arabia. The faith is a puritanical concept of Unitarianism (the oneness of God— Al Dawah al Tauhid) that was preached by Muhammad ibn Abd al Wahhab, whence his Muslim opponents derived the name. Neither term is used in Saudi Arabia. World Bank—Popular name for the International Bank for Recon- struction and Development (IBRD), an agency of the United Nations. Yazidi(s)—Member(s) of a small religious group. The religion is little known to outsiders but contains elements of Islam, Juda- 306 Index Abbasid Caliphate: 23-28 Abd al Abbas: 23 Abd al Aziz ibn Abd ar Rahman al Saud: 68 Abd al Illah, Amir: 44, 45, 48 Abd al Jalil, Ghanim: 204 Abd al Muhsin al Saadun: 37, 38 Abd al Rahman al Gailani: 37 Abd al Razzaq, Arif: 52 Abd Allah, Amir: 202 Abu Bakr: 17, 21, 84 Abu Dhabi: 282 Abu Muslim: 23 Abu Nidal (alias Sabri al Banna): 234, 235 Abu Said Khan: 27 Abul Abbas: 234 Ad Diwaniyah: xx Adams, Robert McCormick: 74 Adelman, Morris A.: 276 Afghanistan: 44 Aflaq, Michel: 6, 192, 196, 210 agrarian reform (see also land): 94, 96, 122, 158-161, 164 agricultural bank: 172 agriculture (see also cooperatives; land; landlord class): xv, 9, 52, 75, 89, 93, 151,153-166,265; employment, 116, 119, 262; exports, 88, 266; planning for, 127, 128, 129, 264; productivity, 117 Ahali group: 43 Ahmad, Abd al Rahim: 234 Admad, Ibrahim: 56 air force: xvi, 240, 242, 243, 246, 269 air transport and airports: xvi, 39, 177 aircraft: 230, 232, 233, 242, 251, 269 Akkadians: 12, 13, 79 Al Abbas: 23 Al Amarah: xx, 92 Al Anbar Governorate: xx, 262 Al Basrah Governorate (see also Basra): xx, 216, 237, 262; population, 89, 90 al Daud, Ibrahim: 55 Al Fatah: 233, 234, 235 Al Faw pipeline terminal: xx, 136, 146, 177 Al Hillah: xx, 34 Al Jazirah: 69 Al Kut: xx, 92 Al Muthanna Governorate: xx, 78, 262 Al Qadisiyah Governorate: xx, 89, 90, 262 Al Qurnah: 73 Al Shabana tribe: 93 Al Warbah Island: 217, 237 Al Watbah celebration: 46 Alexander the Great: 16, 17 Algeria: 209, 213, 279, 280, 281, 286 Ali: 84, 86 Ali al Misri: 32 Ali ibn Abu Talib: 20, 21, 22 Ali ibn Muhammad: 25 Amir Abd Allah: 60 Amiri, Hassan Ali al: 203 Ammash, Salih Mahdi: 55, 57, 192 An Najaf Governorate: xx, 4, 22, 34, 86, 262; holy city, 215, 230 An Nasiriyah: xx Anaiza tribe: 31, 34 ancient cultural accomplishments: 9, 12, 14, 16, 17, 26, 27 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company: 130, 137 Anglo-Persian Oil Company: 39, 130, 132, 133 Aqrawi, Aziz: 200 Ar Ramadi: xx, 46 Ar Rumaylah oil field: 57 Ar Rutbah: 39, 88 Arab commercial companies: 286 Arab Federation: 48 Arab-Israeli wars: 54, 59, 140, 141, 207, 230-235, 280, 282, 286 Arab League: vii, 45, 210, 278 Arab Legion: 230 Arab Liberation Front (ALF): 234, 235 Arab Socialist Baath (Resurrection) Party. See Baath Party Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco): 280 Arabic language: viii, 20, 62, 79-80 Arabs (see also pan-Arab unity): 17, 78, 171 Arafat, Yasir: vii, 233, 235 309 Iraq: A Country Study archaeology: 3, 14 area: xiii, 69, 154 Arif, Abd al Rahman: 52, 53, 228, 251 Arif, Abd al Salam: 48, 49, 51, 54, 88, 210, 228 armed forces (see also air force; army; military aid; military manpower; navy): xvi, 238-244, 268-270; officer class, 102; political power, xi, 181- 182, 192, 199, 202, 204, 229, 245, 252-253 Armenians: 78 army (see also coups d'etat and coup attempts): xvi, 45, 239, 246, 268; po- litical factor, 6, 42, 102, 253; purges, 55, 224 Arsacids: 16, 17 art: 11,14; textile patterns, 66,114,180, 222 As Samawah: xx As Sulaymaniyah Governorate: xx, 90; capital, 97,110; Kurds, 5,62, 80,190, 262; university, 109 Ashurnasirpal: 14 Askari, Jafar al: 33, 36, 37, 43 Assad, Syrian President Hafiz al: x, 196, 212, 214, 235 Assyrians: 3,13-14, 15; modern, 34, 41, 78 At Tamim Governorate: xx, 262 atabegs: 27 Autonomous Region: xv, 184,189,191, 205, 262 awards and decorations: 246-247 awqaf: 85 Az Zubayr: xvi, 152, 177 Aziz, Tariq: 60, 204, 212 Azzawi, Muzhir al: 200 Baath Party: vii, ix, xiv, 4, 6, 7, 23, 51, 60, 87, 88, 102-103, 192-196, 199, 202, 207; armed forces and, 181, 253; communism and, 54, 59, 229, 250; Kurds and, 191, 198; leadership trends, 203, 205; militia, 248; 1968 coup, 55-56; unions and, 120 Baath Party in Syria: vii, 196, 235, 237 Baban tribe: 81 Babylon: ancient, 3, 13, 14, 15, 16 Babylon Governorate: xx, 95, 262 Badinan tribe: 81 Baghdad Governorate: xx, 27, 28, 30, 67,75, 88,99,189,192,262; housing, 98; industry, 89, 138, 148,152; medi- cal facilities, 109, 110; national capi- tal, 190, 204, 210; population, 76, 78, 87, 89, 95, 97; schools, 107, 108, 109; Shiites in, 5, 23, 25; transportation, 177; water, 110, 156 Baghdad Pact: 46, 250 Baghdad Treaty: 63, 224, 233, 235, 236 Bahrain: 286 Bakr, President Ahmad Hasan al: ix, xiv, 7, 51, 55, 57, 58, 59; commander in chief, 239; general, 184, 192, 193, 246; president, 181, 182, 185, 188, 198,203,207-208,211,212,214,224, 252 Bakr Sidqi: 42, 43, 254 balance of payments: 168, 169, 267 Bani Isad tribe: 93 Bani Lam tribe: 31 Baniyas: 53 banking: 171-174 Baqubah: xx, 74 Barzani, Mullah Mustafa: 50,53,56, 57, 62, 198, 200, 225, 226 Barzani, Shaykh Admad: 224 Barzinji, Shaykh Mahmud: 224 base point oil pricing: 275 Basra (see also Al Basrah Governorate): xx, 5,109; courts, 189; history, 18, 23, 28, 30, 31, 32; industry, 150, 152; oil, 136; population, 87, 97; port, xvi, 39, 176, 237, 240; water, 110 Basra Petroleum Company (BPC): 58, 136, 138, 141 Bazzaz, Abd al Rahman: 52, 53, 54, 56 Begin, Israeli Prime Minister Mena- chem: vii, 238 beduin: 20, 68, 69, 74, 77, 88, 164; lan- guage, 80; religion, 85 Belgium: xv Bell, Gertrude: 36 boundaries (see also Shatt al Arab): 68- 69, 223; border guards, 249 BP. See British Petroleum BPC. See Basra Petroleum Company Brazil: 143 British Mandate: 4, 32-40, 44, 89, 90, 171; Kurds and, 224, 225 British Oil Development Company: 133, 134 British Petroleum (BP): 130 Bubiyan Island: 217, 237 budget. See national budget Buwayhids: 26 310 Index cabinet. See Council of Ministers Camp David Agreements: vii, 211,212, 213, 238 capital investment: 8,128,129,267; pri- vate, 149 Carter, U.S. President Jimmy: vii censuses: 76,77, 81, 87,97; agriculture, 95 Chaab tribe: 31 Chalabi, Abd al Husayn al: 38 Chaldeans: 14 Charter for Joint National Action be- tween Syria and Iraq: 212, 233 children: 105, 108 China: 166, 170 Christians: 18, 41,67,78,82; Armenian, 431; in government, 38 church and state: 82 Churchill, Winston: 36 civil liberties: 43, 54, 61, 120, 185 Clayton, Sir Gilbert: 38 climate: 75 Cockburn, Patrick: xi coinage system: (see also currency): Sas- sanian, 20 collective and state farms: 161, 165 communications: 31, 176, 177, 262, 264 communist countries: 170; trade, 144, 166, 167, 268 Compagnie Frangaise des Petroles: 131, 132 conscription: xvi, 31, 242, 254 constitutions: (see also Provisional Con- stitution): 36, 37, 51, 60-62 construction industry: 117, 147, 152, 166, 167, 174, 184, 262, 264, 265 consumer goods: 167 cooperatives: 95, 159, 160, 161, 164, 165 Council of Ministers: 188,203-204, 252 coups d'etat and coup attempts: ix, 43, 44, 48, 50, 52, 55, 56, 59, 102, 182, 192, 210, 223, 224, 252, 253, 256 courts: 255-257; military, 245 Cox, Sir Percy: 34, 35, 36, 37 crime and punishment: 189, 245, 250, 254-257 crops: 92, 153, 161-162, 166, 266 Ctesiphon (Madain): 18, 19 Cuban advisers: 251 currency: xvi, 39, 171, 172 customs duties: 126, 263 Dahuk Governorate: xx, 67, 80, 190, 262; city, 97; Kurds, 5, 62 Daoud Pasha: 30 Darius, King: 15, 16 dates: xv, 162, 166 defense and security expenditures: xvi, 126, 253-254, 264, 270 Democratic Party of Kurdistan: 50 desert: 69, 76, 154 development planning: 52, 121, 125, 126-129,148,153,173,176,184,263, 264, 265 Dhafir tribe: 31 Dhi Qar Governorate: xx, 89, 262 diet and nutrition: 164 diseases: 40, 110 Diyala Governorate: xx, 74, 80, 262 Diyala River: 72 Dobbs, Sir Henry: 37 domestic trade: 101 Duri, Izzat Ibrahim: 203 economy: xv, 8, 115-177 Ecuador: 279 education (see also higher education; vocational and technical education): xiv, 36, 87, 100, 101, 108-109, 119, 122, 124, 149, 185, 204, 261, 264; compulsory, 255; rural areas, 94 Egypt: 45, 48, 49, 51, 59,171,192,193, 209, 211, 212, 213; AOPEC, 286; Arab leadership, 208; workers from, 119 elections: 182, 184, 191, 195; Electoral Law, 37 electric power: 148, 156, 262 elite class: 102; power elite, 203-207, 212 employment (see also government per- sonnel; military manpower): 103, 119, 150, 262; agriculture, 74, 96; in-' dustry, 101, 152, 174; oil companies, 141-142 English language: xiv Enterprise de Recherches et d'Activi- ties Petrolieres (ERAP): 143, 144 Euphrates River. See Tigris and Eu- phrates rivers executions: x, 256 exports: 166, 266, 267; oil, xv, 7, 8, 129, 130, 136, 137, 140, 143 Faisal I: 5, 33, 36, 42, 60 Faisal II: 3, 44, 48 311 Iraq: A Country Study Faisal ibn Husayn (see also Faisal I): 5 Fatimid Party: 230 fertilizer: 161, 166, 177, 266 flood control: 46, 155-156 flood legend: 9, 12, 155 foreign aid (see also military aid): given, 169, 171, 251; offered, 212, 213; re- ceived, 143, 147, 164, 170 foreign exchange: 8, 167, 168 foreign investment: 150, 152 foreign oil companies in Iraq: 130, 131, 132, 136, 141, 143, 144; expropria- tion, 117; nationalization, 122 foreign relations (see also names of indi- vidual countries): xv, 54,58,157,184, 193, 207-219, 230-238, 264 foreign trade (see also exports; imports): 166-171,173,219; loans from abroad, 168, 169 foreigners: awards, 246; employment, 119, 170; kidnapped, 227; real estate ownership, 185 France (see also French oil interests): 54, 152, 167, 169, 219, 284; arma- ments from, 242, 251, 268, 269 Free Officers: 102 freedom of speech: 54-55, 56, 185 French oil interests: 131,132, 136,142, 143, 144, 284 Futuwah (organization): xvi, 249 Genghis Khan (Temujin): 27 geography: xiii, 69 Germany (see also West Germany): 31, 44, 45 Ghaidan, Saadun: 55, 203, 252 Ghazali, Abu Hamid al: 26 Ghazi, King: 42, 43, 44, 236 Ghuzz Turks: 26 Golden Square uprising: 44 government (see also national budget Revolutionary Command Council role of government): xiv, 185-192 history, 5, 33, 48, 55; political values 193 government monopolies: 122 government personnel: 103, 109, 119 126, 128, 150, 189, 205 governorates: xv, xx, 189, 190, 262 Graham, Robert: 219 Great Britain (see also British Man- date): 5, 6, 31, 37, 46, 54, 169, 219 244; arms sales, 251, 268, 269; oil in dustry and, 32, 130, 131, 284 Greek domination: 16-17 gross domestic product (GDP): xv, 101, 116, 117, 127; oil revenues, 8, 129 Gulbenkian, Calouste: 131, 132, 133, 141 Habash, George: 234 Haddad, Nairn: 199 Haddad, Wadei: 234 Hadid, Mohammad: 200 Hajj, Aziz al: 228 Hajjaj, General al: 23 Hamdani, Adnan Husayn al: x, 203 Hammad, Brigadier General Alaiddin Qazzim: 240 Hammurabi, King: 13 handicraft industries: 89, 97, 102, 147 Hardan al Tikriti: 55 Harun al Rashid: 25 Hasan: 22, 84 Hasan al Bakr. See Bakr, President Admad Hasan al Hashimi, General Taha al: 44 Hashimi, Yasin al: 37, 43 Hashimites: 5, 6, 17, 33, 36, 48 Haskail, Sasun: 38 Hassan, M.S.: 89 health care: xiv, 109, 124, 254, 262, 264 higher education: xiv, 40, 55, 109, 261; abroad, 128; employment for gradu- ates, 120 hijra (hegira): 83 Hirst, David: xi holidays and religious festivals: 46, 85 hospitals: 40, 109, 262 housing: 98, 124, 127, 174, 176 Husayn: 22, 31, 84; tomb, 86 Husayn, Adnan: 212 Husayn, Barazan: 249 ibn AH, Husayn: 33 ICP. See Iraqi Communist Party Id al Adha festival: 85 Id al Fitr festival: 85 identity cards: 96-97 Imamate: 85 imports: xv, 166, 170; food, 153, 167; services, 168, 267 income: 102, 115, 129 Independent Democrats: 60, 200 India: xv, 143, 166, 171, 244 Indonesia: 279, 283 industry: 101, 103, 262; development 312 Index plans, 264, 265; local, 165; nationali- zation, 124-125, 149 inflation: 57, 124, 167, 173, 174 inheritance: 86, 105 insurance companies: 122, 172, 173 international oil industry: 271-286 IPC. See Iraq Petroleum Company Iran: (see also Kurdish rebellion): 48,53, 54,58,184; border, 193,214,227; his- tory, 14,15,16,17,18, 25, 26, 28, 32, 130; Iranians in Iraq, 5, 67; Kurds and, 62, 81, 200, 224, 226; oil indus- try, 138, 278, 282, 283, 285; revo- lution, vii, 206, 207, 229-230, 233; Shatt al Arab dispute, 5, 44, 68, 235, 236 Iraq National Oil Company (INOC): 142, 143, 144, 146 Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC): 53, 57, 133,136,137,138,142,144,194; con- cession area expropriated, 139, 140, 141 Iraqi Arabic language: 79 Iraqi Communist Party (ICP): xv, 59, 60, 182, 198, 199, 201, 227-229, 250; militia, 49 Iraqi Company for Oil Operations (ICOO): 58, 140-141 Irbil Governorate: xx, 5, 62, 80, 190, 262; capital, 97, 110, 191 irrigation: 39,72,73,75,76,89,93,101, 115, 154, 155, 157, 165, 170 Islam (see also Shiite Arab Muslims; Sunni Arab Muslims): 3, 78, 82-88; state religion, 61, 62 Israel (see also Arab-Israeli wars): vii, 6, 46, 48, 168, 207, 285; aid to Kurds, 226 Italy: 44; oil and, 131, 136, 142, 143, 144, 275, 284 Izzat Ibrahim: 212 Jabari, General Muhammad Yasin: 242 Jabr, Salih: 38, 46 Jalayirids: 27 Jamil, Husayn: 200 Japan: 142, 143, 144, 150, 152, 219; oil imports, 272; trade, 167 Jews: 31, 38, 46, 67, 78, 82, 100 jihad: 18 Jordan: 48, 58, 171, 230, 232, 234, 251 Jubur tribe: 34 judicial system: xv, 61, 189-190 juveniles: crime and, 255, 257 Karbala Governorate: xx, 89, 262; holy city, 5, 22, 34 Kazzar, Nazim: 58, 249, 253, 257 Kelidar, Abbas: 40, 88 Khabur River: 72 Khadduri, Majid: 7, 199, 237 Khairi, Zaki: 201 Khalid ibn al Walid: 18 Kharajites: 21 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruholla: vii, 215, 236 kinship groups: 93, 104-106, 254 Kirkuk: xx, 80, 189, 225; industry, 152; oil, 130, 132, 137, 140, 144; water, 110 Kufah: 5, 18, 23 Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP): 57, 60, 198, 199, 200, 227 Kurdish language: 5, 53, 56, 62, 81, 191 Kurdish rebellion (see also Autonomous Region): 49, 50, 52, 53, 62, 63, 198, 211, 224, 225, 248, 251; security threat, 55, 56, 81, 254; settlement, 56-57, 61, 62, 184, 226-227 Kurdistan, Iraqi: xv, 30, 41, 50, 190, 201 Kurds (see also As Sulaymaniyah Gover- norate; Dahuk Governorate; Irbil Governorate): 30; autonomy, xv, 40- 41, 190-192, 194, 199, 200; govern- ment and, 37, 160, 182; in govern- ment, 53, 188; in population, 5, 67, 78, 80-81; tribal estates, 160 Kuwait: 32, 213, 278, 281, 283, 284, 286; borders, 68, 214, 216-217, 236 land: (see also agrarian reform): expro- priation, 96, 159, 160; tenure, 61, 67, 96, 158-161, 164; tribal, 34, 90, 104; use, 154, 155 landlord class: 52, 87, 88, 95, 100, 121, 159, 185, 205 languages (see also Arabic language; Kurdish language): xiv, 16; dialects, 86; official, 20, 53 Lawrence, T.E.: 36 laws: 39; personal status, 105, 189; reli- gious law, 84, 105 League of Nations: 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 Lebanon: 45, 171, 211, 248 Libya: 209, 213; oil, 140, 251, 279, 280, 286, 291 literacy: xiv livestock: 162; buffalo herders, 74 313 Iraq: A Country Study local government: 90, 92, 190 Longrigg, Stephen: 30 Mahabad (Iran): 225 Mahjub, Muhammad: x, 203 Malone, Joseph: 28, 54 Mamluks: 26, 30 Mamun: 25 Mansur: 23, 25 manufacturing: xv, 116, 117, 147, 148, 149, 150, 153, 166, 175, 262 Mar Shamun: 41 Marayati, Abid al: 5 March Manifesto: 198, 201, 225 Marduk: 16 Marr, Phebe Ann: 203, 204 marriage: ix, 93, 104, 105, 106-108; large families, 76; temporary, 86 Marsh Arabs (Madan): 74, 91, 106 Maruf, Taha Muhi al Din: 62, 188 Mashhadi, Muhi Abd al Husayn: x Maude, General Stanley: 33 Maysan Governorate: xx, 90, 262 measurement conversions: viii, 260 medical personnel and facilities: 109- 110, 262 men: 106, 108, 242 Merv: 23, 25, 27 Mesopotamia: 9, 10-11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 115 Mexico: 278 middle class: 100, 102-103, 104, 108 Midfai, Jamil al: 33, 44 Midhat Pasha: 31 migration to urban areas: 81,88,89,95, 96, 97-98, 105, 160, 165 military aid (see also Soviet Union): 250-252; from United States, 46 military bases: 45, 240, 243 military justice: 245 military manpower: 103, 238, 253 Mina al Bakr: 177 ministries: 188-189; Ministry of De- fense, 239; Ministry of Education, 100; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 37; Ministry of Health, 109; Ministry of Interior, 103,250; Ministry of Justice, xv, 189; Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, 120, 256; Ministry of Oil, 146; Ministry of Planning, 46,95,126,127 missiles: 239, 240, 268 Mongol invasions: 27-28 Mosul: xx, 28, 30, 37, 39, 41, 88, 152, 204; courts, 189; dam, 170; oil, 130, 136, 141; university, 109; water, 110 Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC): 136, 141 Muawiyah: 21, 22, 84 Muhammad (prophet): 36, 82-83, 84 Muhammad, Aziz: 60, 201, 228 Muntafiq tribe: 31 Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Ataturk): 41 names: viii, ix Naqib, Sayid Talib al: 32, 36 Nasser, Gamal Abdul: 50 Nasser al Hani: 56 National Action Charter: 59, 190, 198, 199 national assembly: 186-188, 196, 206 National Bank of Iraq: 172 national budget (see also defense and security expenditures; oil revenues): 124-126; expenditures, 264, 265; Kurds, 57; planning, 128-129; reve- nues, 121, 263 National Revolutionary Command: 50 national security (see also defense and security expenditures; Kurdish rebel- lion): external, 230, 235, 236, 237; in- telligence organizations, 248, 249; in- ternal, xvi, 191, 201, 224, 227, 229; offenses against, 190, 255, 256 nationalism (see also pan-Arab unity): 32, 34, 35, 37 nationalization: industry, 51, 122, 124- 125, 149, 168, 172; oil companies, 8, 58, 137, 138, 139, 140, 145 natural gas: 130, 145, 146, 150 navy: xvi, 240, 243, 246, 268 Nayif, Colonel Abd al Razaq al: 55 Nestorian Christians: 30, 34 Neutral Zone (Iraq/Saudi Arabia): xx, 68, 154, 216 newspapers: 31, 32, 56 Nigeria: 279 Ninevah Governorate (see also Mosul): xx, 67, 95, 262 Nizam al Mulk: 26 nomads. See beduin nonalignment policy: xv, 217 North Rumaylah oil field: 139,142, 143 nuclear weapons: 238 Nuri as Said: 33, 36, 38, 43, 44, 45, 48 Occidental Oil Company: 280 oil concession agreements: 39,117,122, 276, 277, 280 314 Index oil industry (see also international oil industry; Iraq Petroleum Company): xv, 46,129-147; production, 147, 265 oil marketing: 142, 144 oil pricing: 272,274,275-277,281, 284, 285; barter, 144 oil reserves: 8, 130, 147; world crude, 279 oil revenues: xv, 7, 8, 48, 57, 101, 121, 122,125-126,129,138,144-145,150, 166, 168, 173, 263, 271-286 Omar Khayyam: 26 OPEC. See Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries Organization of Arab Petroleum Ex- porting Countries (OAPEC): 169, 285-287 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): 8, 57-58, 129, 138, 140, 144, 145, 271, 277-285 Ottoman empire: 6, 28-32, 82, 130, 131, 133, 158 Palestine: 33, 58, 234 Palestine Liberation Front (PLF): 234, 235 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO): 58, 209, 212, 233, 234, 235, 251 Pachachi, Hamdi al: 45 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza: Shah: vii Pakistan: 48 pan-Arab unity: 48, 207, 229, 250, 251- 252; The Arab Nation, 192, 193, 208 Paris Peace Conference: 33 participation agreements: 281 Patriotic and Progressive National Front: 182 Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK): 227, 238 peasant poverty: 52, 81, 96, 101-102 penal system: 245, 254-257 Penrose, Edith and E.F.: 7, 132 Pesh Merga: 57, 62, 225, 226, 227, 236 petrochemicals: 150 Philby, H. St. John: 36 pilgrimages: 22, 82, 83, 86, 216 pipelines: xvi, 53, 133, 136, 137, 143, 145, 146, 177 PNF. See Progressive National Front police: xvi, 249, 250 political parties (see also Baath Party): 43, 59, 200, 234; Kurds, 50, 198, 227, 238; opposition groups, xv, 7, 45, 46, 182, 194; political values, 193 political prisoners: 49, 257 political system: xiv, 181, 192-203 Popular Army: xvi, 204, 248, 249 Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: 234 population: xiii, 67, 76-78, 89, 97, 260, 262 Portuguese: 31 posted prices for oil: 277, 282, 284 presidency: xiv, 142, 188 prices (see also inflation; subsidies): 173, 174; controlled, 124 Progressive National Front (PNF): xv, 59, 60, 182, 194, 196-202, 228, 229 Progressive Nationalist Group: 200 Provisional Constitution: 59, 181, 203, 239; Kurds and, 5, 56, 191 PUK. See Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Qasim, Abd al Karim: 4, 6, 48, 49, 50, 61,88,94,98,149,192,210,228,237, 250, 254; Kurds and, 225 Qatar: 213, 279, 286 Quraysh tribe: 17 Rafidian Bank: 172 railroads: xvi, 31, 39, 176 rainfall: 72, 75, 154, 161 Ramadan (month): 35, 83, 85, 86 Ramadan, Taha Yasin: 57, 204,212, 248 Rashid Ali al Gailani: 40, 43, 44, 45 Rawi, Major General Abd al Ghani al: 253 RCC. See Revolutionary Command Council Red Line Agreement: 133 refineries: 137, 138, 145 Regional Command: ix, 186, 195, 196, 203, 204 religion: xiv, 81, 82-88 Revolutionary Command Council (RCC): ix, x, xi, xiv, 7, 55, 62, 181, 185-186, 189, 199, 203, 239 Revolutionary Court: 255, 256 rice: 92, 162, 266 rivers: 70, 72, 78, 94, 110 Riza, Mirza Muhammad: 35 roads and highways: xvi, 39, 152, 176 role of government: 94, 102; economy, 117, 121-122, 124-129, 148, 149; health and welfare, 109; trade, 168 Royal Divan: 44 315 Index Thi Qar. See Dhi Qar Governorate Tiglath-Pileser III: 13-14 Tigris and Euphrates rivers: xx, 72, 73; flood control, 3, 9,15, 16, 25, 46, 110, 156,170; use of waters, 155,211,214, 237 Tikrit: ix, xi, xx, 55,57,88,110,243,249, 254 Tikriti, Hardan al: 55 Timman, Jafar Abu: 43 Timur Lang (Tamerlane): 27 Townshend, General Charles: 33 TPC. See Turkish Petroleum Company trade unions: 120 Transjordan: 45 transportation: 148, 151, 176-177, 262, 264 treaties and agreements (see also oil concession agreements): 32, 38; bor- ders, 69; Great Britain, 37, 38, 39, 46 Iran, 43, 63, 214, 226; nuclear, 238. oil, 140,169; Saudi Arabia, 43-44, 68 Soviet Union, xv, 58, 143, 218, 250: Turkey, 44, 46, 146 Tughril Beg: 26, 27 Tunbs Islands: 58 Turkey: 34, 54, 80, 211; British and, 33, 37; oil, 39, 146; treaties with, 44, 46; water supply, 156, 157 Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC): 131, 132, 133, 136 Turkomans: 67, 78, 81-82 Turks (see also Ottoman empire): 6, 26 Umayyad dynasty: 22, 23, 84, 86 Umm Qasr: xvi, xx, 177, 217, 236, 237, 240 underemployment: 119 uniforms and insignia: 246, 247 United Arab Emirates: 213, 251, 279, 282, 283, 284, 286 United Arab Republic: 48, 49 United National Front: 59 United Nations: 46, 59, 95; Arab-Israeli conflict, 232; member, 45 United States: xv, 54, 58, 150, 218, 286; international oil companies, 131,132, 133, 141, 274, 275, 280; military as- sistance from, 46, 226; trade, 167 Ur kingdom: 12, 13 urban areas: 77, 97-102 Uthman, 20, 21, 84 Utnapishtim: 12 Uzaym River: 72 Venezuela: 137,276,278, 279, 280, 281 Vinogradov, Amal: 36 vocational and technical education: 109, 120, 253, 261 wages and salaries: 52, 104, 120, 124, 174; military pay and benefits, 244- 245 Wahhabi: 31 Wasit Governorate: xx, 90, 262 water resources: 69, 94, 110, 154-158, 164, 165; dams, 101, 156; rainfall, 72, 75, 154, 161 water transportation: 31, 264, 265; ports, 176, 177 weaponry and military equipment (see also aircraft): xvi, 169, 170, 238, 239- 242, 268, 269 welfare (see also health care): 40, 98 West Germany: 150, 167, 170, 219 wheat: 153, 158, 161, 162, 266 Wilson, Colonel Arnold Talbot: 34, 35, 36 wind phenomena: 75 women: army, 243, 249; crime, 255, 257; education, 108; employment, 119, 189; religion, 83, 86; status, ix, 106 working class: 102, 103-104 world oil consumption: 272 Yahya, General Tahir: 55 Yamani, Shaykh Ahmad Zaki: 281 Yazid I: 22 Yazidis: xiv, 30, 81 Yemen: 45; Aden, 209 Young, Gavin: 9 Yusuf al Hajj: 200 Yusuf Salman Yusuf (Comrade Fahd): 227 Zab rivers: 72 Zanj Rebellion: 25 ziggurats: 12 Zionism: 207 Ziyad ibn Abihi: 23 Zubaid tribes: 31 317 Published Country Studies (Area Handbook Series) 550-65 Afghanistan 550-98 Albania 550-164 Haiti 550-44 Algeria 550-151 Honduras 550-59 Angola 550-165 Hungary 550-73 Argentina 550-169 Australia 550-21 India 550-176 Austria 550-154 Indian Ocean Territories 550-39 Indonesia 550-175 Bangladesh 550-68 Iran 550-170 Belgium 550-31 Iraq 550-66 Bolivia 550-25 Israel 550-20 Brazil 550-182 Italy 550-168 Bulgaria 550-69 Ivory Coast 550-61 Burma 550-83 Burundi 550-177 Jamaica 550-30 Japan 550-166 Cameroon 550-34 Jordan 550-96 550-159 Ceylon Chad 550-56 Kenya 550-77 Chile 550-50 Khmer Republic 550-60 China, People.s 550-81 (Cambodia) Korea, North Republic of 550-41 Korea, South 550-63 China, Republic of 550-26 Colombia 550-58 Laos 550-91 Congo, People.s 550-24 Lebanon Republic of 550-38 Liberia 550-90 Costa Rica 550-85 Libya 550-152 Cuba 550-22 Cyprus 550-163 Malagasy Republic 550-158 Czechoslovakia 550-172 Malawi 550-45 Malaysia 550-54 Dominican Republic 550-161 Mauritania 550-79 Mexico 550-52 Ecuador 550-76 Mongolia 550-43 Egypt 550-49 Morocco 550-150 El Salvador 550-64 Mozambique 550-28 Ethiopia 550-35 Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim 550-167 Finland 550-88 Nicaragua 550-155 Germany, East 550-157 Nigeria 550-173 Germany, Federal Republic of 550-94 Oceania 550-153 Ghana 550-48 Pakistan 550-87 Greece 550-46 Panama 550-78 Guatemala 550-156 Paraguay 550-174 Guinea 550-185 Persian Gulf States 550-82 Guyana 550-42 Peru 319