A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY of MODERN IRAQ A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY of MODERN IRAQ BY Abid A. Al-Marayati, Ph.D. Foreword By Waldo Chamberlin, Ph.D. mau ROBERT SPELLER & SONS Publishers, Inc. NEW YORK 36, NEW YORK Copyright 1961 by Robert Speller & Sons, Publishers, Inc. Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 59-13907 First Edition All rights reserved TX 1581 Printed in the United States of America 117 Picus DEDICATION For my grandfather AL-HAJ GHAZI ABOUD in gratitude and loving memory. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ VII ....... 65 Chapter The Mosul Affair 1924-1926 ....... The Decisions of the League Council ......... Iraq's Attitude toward the Mosul Decision .................... .......... Syria-Iraq Border Question, 1931-1932 ......... The Assyrian Question, 1932-1937 .............. The Council's Decision .................. Iraq's Attempts at a Settlement ............... The Assyrian Uprising, August 1933 ........64 The Council's Attempts to Settle the Problem, 1933-1937 ...... Iraqi Attitude toward the Settlement .......... The Iraqi-Persian Boundary Dispute, 1934-1937 ............ .............. Conclusions ................................................. V. IRAQ'S VIEWS ON OTHER DISPUTES ....... Syria and Lebanon .. The Palestine Question in the League of Nations Iraq's Attitude toward the Partition of Palestine ..... Jewish Immigration into Palestine .......... Iraq's Attitude toward the Jews . ............ Summary: Iraq and Palestine in the League of Nations Palestine in the United Nations ................ Conclusions VI. IRAQ'S ATTITUDE ON OTHER MATTERS .... Collective Security ...... ......... Ethiopia .......... ........... ............. .......... • • • • • • • • • Korea ...... ........ ...... .. Regional Arrangements Economic and Social Questions Minorities .......... Conclusions ............ ............91 92 VIII Table of Contents ........95 .................. 99 Chapter Page VII. IRAQ'S PARTICIPATION AT THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION Iraq Adheres to the United Nations Declaration ............... Iraq's Participation in Inter-War International Conferences and Organizations ......... Invitation to the San Francisco Conference ....100 Character of the Iraq Delegation to the San Francisco Conference ....... .101 Officership at the Conference ......................102 Iraqi Participation in the Conference Secretariat ........................... .............103 Advance Preparation ................................... 103 Conference Committee Assignments ............103 Iraq's Positions at the Conference ............105 The Question of Syria and Lebanon ..........105 Peaceful Settlement and Enforcement Measures ............108 Structure and Procedures of the Security Council ............112 Self-determination ..... ..............115 Regional Arrangements ............ .............121 Legal Matters ..................................... Economic and Social Matters ................. 128 Signature and Ratification ...... ..............129 Iraq's Attitude toward the San Francisco Conference ......... 130 VIII. PARTICIPATION IN THE ORGANS OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS Participation in the Councils Participation in the Assemblies ....... Delegations ........ 135 ........ 32 UICIIS ........ 135 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Main Committees Officerships ............139 Participation in Debates and Submission of Proposals ..........141 Sub-committees and Commissions ............ 142 The Secretariat ............ ............143 Conclusions .... ..............145 IX. CONCLUSIONS ........ ..............147 Participation in the League of Nations .........148 Participation at the San Francisco Conference ....... ...................149 Peaceful Settlement of Disputes ..................151 Collective Security .......... ..................152 Regional Arrangements ...... ...152 Self-Determination ....................153 Economic and Social Matters ......................153 Representation in International Organizations ....... .............................154 Participation in United Nations Organs ........156 Improved Educational Facilities ..................156 Improved Economic and Social Conditions 159 Table of Contents . . .................... APPENDIX I— Number of Substantive Political Ques- tions Considered by the Security Council and the General Assembly During 1946-1957 ...... Page 162 APPENDIX II-Growth in the Primary Schools 1920- 1933 .................. ....... Page 163 APPENDIX III-Growth in High Schools (Secondary and Intermediate) 1920-1933 .............. Page 164 APPENDIX IV-Growth in Students in Primary Teachers Training Schools, Law College, and Voca- tional Schools (Industrial and Home Economics) 1920-1933 .............................. Page 165 APPENDIX V-Comparison of Increase in Iraq's Gov- ernment Budget and Education Budget 1920-1957 ....... Page 166 APPENDIX VI–Break-down of Government Personnel in 1920 ................................ Page 169 APPENDIX VII–Decline in Government Posts Held by Foreigners ........................... Page 169 APPENDIX VIII–Increase in the Number of Students in Iraq's Higher Institutes of Learning 1920-1959 ................ Page 170 APPENDIX IX-Committee Assignments at the United Nations Conference on International Organization :..::....... Page 171 APPENDIX X-Comparison of the Participation of Iraq and Certain Other States in the Councils of the United Nations 1946-1958 ............... Page 172 APPENDIX XI–Participation of Arab States in the Councils of the United Nations 1946-1958 .. Page 173 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ XI APPENDIX XII–List of Members of the Iraqi Delega- tions to the League Assembly 1932-1939 .... Page 174 APPENDIX XIII–List of Members of the Iraqi Delega- tion to the United Nations Conference on Interna- tional Organization ...... ................ Page 176 APPENDIX XIV-List of Members of the Iraqi Delega- tion to the Thirteenth Session (1958) of the General Assembly .............................. Page 176 APPENDIX XV-Number of Members of Selected Delegations to the Thirteenth Session of the General Assembly Listed as Doctors and Professors .. Page 177 APPENDIX XVI—Size of Iraqi Delegations (Including Secretaries) ............................ Page 179 APPENDIX XVII-Comparison of Iraqi Participation in the Main Elective Offices With That of Selected Members of the United Nations 1946-1957 .. Page 180 APPENDIX XVIII–Participation of Arab States in Major Elective Offices of the General Assembly 1946-1957 .............................. Page 182 APPENDIX XIX-Iraq's Participation in Committees and Visiting Missions of the Trusteeship Council 1947-1952 ............ ............. Page 183 APPENDIX XX-Iraq's Participation in United Nations Committees and Commissions Except the Trustee- ship Council 1946-1958 ................... Page 187 APPENDIX XXI-Comparison Between Iraq and Se- lected Countries, Including Original Arab Members of the United Nations in Regard to Numbers of Nationals in the Secretariat 1946-1958 ...... Page 189 APPENDIX XXII–Summary of Assistance Received and Provided Under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance 1950-1958 ........... Page 190 APPENDIX XXIII–Assistance Received and Provided Under the United Nations Childrens Fund 1947- 1958 ................................... Page 191 APPENDIX XXIV-Comparison of Increase in Iraq's Oil Production and Oil Revenues 1932-1958 Page 192 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The writer is very deeply indebted to Professor Waldo Chamberlin of New York University for his invaluable super- vision of this study, and to the Rockefeller Foundation, spe- cifically to Professor Kenneth W. Thompson and Dr. Erskine W. McKinley of that Foundation. Without the generous aid and guidance of these mentors this work could not have been carried out. I also wish to express my gratitude to Professors Richard N. Swift, Thomas Hovet, Jr., and Thomas M. Franck for their most helpful advice and suggestions. I am deeply thankful to the Embassy of the Republic of Iraq at Washington and to the Office of the Cultural Attaché of that Embassy, to the Consulate and the Permanent Mission to the United Nations of the Republic of Iraq at New York, as well as to the Iraqi Delegations to the United Nations Gen- eral Assembly, for their kind assistance and advice. Special thanks are due to Miss Sara Andreassian and Mr. Mansour Ali Faridi of the Woodrow Wilson collection, to Mr. Harry Winton at the United Nations collection in the United Nations Library, Headquarters, and to the staff of the United Nations collection at New York University. Last, but not least, I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Miss Gerda M. Andersen for her editorial assistance and her to Missvaluable suggestalso like to thank In closing I would also like to thank the many persons, too numerous to mention by name, who in various ways have assisted me in this work. A. A. A. New York, June, 1959. XIII FOREWORD This is one of the few books available in the English lan- guage on the conduct of the diplomacy, as contrasted to the evolution of the foreign policy, of Iraq or any other Arab state. The emphasis is more on what was done between 1920 and the present than on broad analysis of foreign policy. The author is an Iraqi and he tells the remarkable story of the de- velopment of Iraq from 1920, when it could hardly, in the language of the political scientist, be called either a country, a nation, or a state, following centuries of Turkish misrule, to 1959 when it occupies an important diplomatic position in the world. To demonstrate this development, the author uses the preparation of Iraq for participation in the United Nations. During the lifetime of the League of Nations the members of the Iraqi delegations seldom spoke in the League's Assembly and then only on issues in which Iraq was a direct participant or disputant. No Iraqi ever served as an officer of any organ, commission or committee or on the Secretariat. The situation in the United Nations is very different, partly because there was more development in Iraq than was the case in any other mandate. This, in turn, helped to bring about the early termination of the Mandate in 1932, the only mandate so terminated during the life of the League of Nations. An- other important factor was Iraq's program of education, be- gun even before 1932, which provided some trained citizens from whom could be drawn the necessary cadres of civil servants. Dr. Al-Marayati notes that the young men educated since the end of the Ottoman Empire became the young secretaries of the delegations of the League, and later, members of and heads of delegations to the United Nations. Iraquis began to be elected to officerships in international organizations as early as 1944 and the tables in this book show that no new state, and few countries of comparable size, have held more positions of importance in the United Nations. Iraq was fortunate in XIV INTRODUCTION This book, A Diplomatic History of Modern Iraq, originally was a dissertation submitted to the Department of Government of New York University and approved in May 1959. Its title then was Iraq's Preparations for Participating in the United Nations. With but few additions the contents of the book is sub- stantially the same as that of the dissertation. The study describes mainly what Iraq did in the League of Nations, but, as its original title indicated, does not include any detailed analysis of Iraq's activities in the United Nations. Rather, it focuses attention on the similarity and dissimilarity between Iraq's roles in the League and in the United Nations. The purpose of this study is to analyze the events and experiences that made it possible for a state, which gained its independence in 1932, to participate in the League of Nations from 1932 to 1939, and, more effectively, in the United Nations from 1945 to 1958. It should be pointed out that power politics traditionally is great power politics. This was so even in 1919, when the Covenant of the League of Nations was drafted. Neverthe- less, the League of Nations introduced a new type of diplomacy in which small states can play a greater role in international relations, a development that progressed even further in the United Nations. These changes in power politics can be seen in the story of Iraq. In 1920 it became a Class “A” mandated territory; in 1932 it became a member of the League; in 1945 it par- ticipated in the drafting of the United Nations Charter. At the United Nations Iraq undertook to play a far greater role than in the League, and, collectively with other small states, it acquired progressively greater responsibilities. A. A. A. XVI CHAPTER I The Role Of Small States In International Organizations Throughout history devastating wars have activated ideal- ists as well as realists to seek ways and means of controlling or eliminating such man-made catastrophes. However, again and again the endeavors of men of goodwill to limit even lesser conflicts have proved unsuccessful, and in the case of world-wide conflagrations the task has seemed superhuman. But man's aspiration to peace and security will not be thwarted, for it is eternal; and despite repeated setbacks, many ideas and plans for world peace have been put forward and tried. An impressive experiment for outlawing war and preserving peace followed World War I when, in 1919, the Allies embodied an elaborate plan for an international organi- zation in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The League was established "in order to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security." However, owing to the predominant position of the great powers in shaping world policies, "the small states hardly had a deter- mining voice” 1 in the deliberations at the Paris Peace Con- ference which ended with the signing of the Covenant. Initially, the Covenant-making Committee was composed of fifteen members, two from each of the five great powers, and five others of the smaller states. At the first meeting of the Committee the smaller powers protested against this preponderance of the big powers, with the result that four * Inis L. Claude, Jr., Swords Into Plow-Shares (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 54. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ more representatives of smaller countries were added.? How- ever, in the end the great powers still dominated the proceed- ings that were to establish the League of Nations.8 On the other hand, the small powers were able at the Paris Peace Conference to extract such concessions from the great powers as four seats on the Council of the League, provisions for equal participa- tion of all members in the Assembly, and the general grant of an indiscriminate veto power in all the arrangements of voting in the new organization.* But because of the influence which the great powers wielded, and also because Europe as the chief actor on the stage of world politics had been more deeply engaged in the war than any other part of the world, the founders accepted a League of Nations with the great powers as predominant members and "Europe as the central core of the world political system.”3 Moreover, the inequalities that existed among states had been endorsed by the wording of Article 4 of the Covenant and accepted by every member of the League: The Council shall consist of Representatives of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, together with Representatives of four other Members of the League. These four Members of the League shall be selected by the Assembly from time to time in its discretion. Because of the practical limitations imposed upon the small powers, the legal inequalities between states, and the fact that the League "operated under the influence of nine- 'F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (2 vols.; Lon- don: Oxford University Press, 1952), I, 33. • Claude, p. 53. • Ibid., p. 54. * Ibid., p. 59. * These powers were the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States. Small States In International Organizations teenth century ideas,” ? the great powers played a preponder- ant role in shaping the decisions of the League. Their prominence was clearly demonstrated by the manner in which the League handled such important issues as dis- armament, Manchuria, and Ethiopa where, in effect, the big powers ultimately decided what course of action the League was to adopt. The big powers also demonstrated their influence in the League Secretariat, and even after the changes adopted by the Assembly in 1932, each permanent member of the Council was still entitled to appoint one of its nationals as Under Secretary-General. The big powers were even able to arrange that judges from their countries were elected to the Permanent Court of International Justice. Furthermore, since most important committees and com- missions were appointed by the Council, the great powers also held a privileged position in determining their member- ship.10 Despite the great powers' predominant position, the small states were still able to make themselves heard. They could voice their opinions in the Assembly, and in that way had an opportunity to focus world public opinion on the questions under debate. The lesser states also provided the Assembly with most of its presidents, 11 and furnished a number of arbitrators, mediators and conciliators to the League as well as members of various committees and subcommittees. 12 'Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents (2d ed. rev.; Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949), p. 82. • Walters, II, 557. William E. Rappard, “Small States in the League of Nations," Problems of Peace, Ninth Series, Pacifism Is Not Enough, Lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations, August 1934. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935), p. 32, herein- after cited as Rappard, “Small States in the League." 10 Ibid. "Daniel S. Cheever and H. Field Haviland, Jr., Organizing for Peace, International Organization in World Affairs (New York: Hough- ton Mifflin Company, 1954), p. 78. "Rappard, "Small States in the League," p. 43. Small States In International Organizations Iraq at a disadvantage vis-a-vis European and Latin-American states. 15 Iraq nonetheless was directly involved in disputes before the League, and Arab and Middle East affairs occupied a central position in Iraq's work there. Iraq only participated in League debates touching its own vital interests, and it never proposed anything except on an issue that concerned it directly. Iraq never was a member of the Council, never had any of its nationals in the Secretariat, and was a member of but a few committees. This limited role notwithstanding, Iraq's participation in the League of Nations was, in effect, a "rehearsal” for future, more extensive participation in other international organizations. In 1939, the League-of-Nations experiment collapsed with the outbreak of aggressive war which, by 1941, had spread to all continents. As the war continued, the pressing need of international cooperation for world peace and security be- came more and more clear, and in 1945 it brought the representatives of fifty governments to the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. Their aim was to establish a successor to the League. The Allies or, as they had called themselves since January 1942, the United Nations, met in order to save the succeeding genera- tions from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” 16 The San Francisco Conference differed considerably from the Paris Peace Conference, and the differences indicated the great changes that had occurred in world politics. Because the war was still in progress, the Conference on International Organization was held in the geographically well-located city of San Francisco, and the selection of this site pointed up the important roles the United States and Asia had acquired in world politics. 17 That the San Francisco 5 In 1938 there were thirteen Latin-American members in the League. 16 Preamble of the United Nations Charter. 17 Amry Vandenbosch and Willard N. Hogan, The United Nations Background, Organization, Functions, Activities (1st ed.; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1952), pp. 83-84. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Conference, unlike the Paris Peace Conference, was held during the war was owing to the initiative of President Roosevelt, who wanted the wartime United Nations to draft a Charter while they were still cooperating fully.18 Drafting the United Nations Charter, unlike the League Covenant, was not entrusted to a committee of the representatives of a few states, with the big powers in a preponderant position. Rather, the delegates turned over the task to technical com- mittees and commissions composed of representatives of all the participating countries. The Conference also benefited from the presence of several well known personalities from small and medium states. They included Paul-Henri Spaak and Henri Rolin (Belgium), Eelco van Kleffens and Hubertus J. van Mook (The Netherlands), William L. Mackenzie King and Louis S. St. Laurent (Canada), Peter Fraser (New Zealand), Herbert Vere Evatt (Australia), Ezequiel Padilla (Mexico), Guillermo Belt (Cuba), Trygve Lie (Norway), Jan Masaryk (Czechoslovakia), and Jan Christian Smuts (South Africa). Asia also contributed many able men such as V. K. Wellington Koo and T. V. Soong (China), A. Rama- swami Mudaliar (India), Carlos Romulo (The Philippines), and Nasrollah Entezam (Iran); and from the Arab world came Abdel Hamid Badawi (Egypt), Charles Malik (Leb- anon), and Faris El-Khouri (Syria). 19 Iraq's presence at San Francisco was in itself a symbol of the progress it had made. For the first time in its history Iraq was attending a big conference in order to draft a charter for an international organization. Iraq came to the conference backed by seven years' experience in the League. In many domestic fields Iraq had advanced considerably, a fact already visible in the higher educational background of many of the members of its delegation as compared to that of its delegations to the League. Moreover, on this occasion Iraq sent the largest delegation it had ever had to an international conference. Iraq in the meantime had succeeded in solving 1 Ibid., p. 83. "Spaak, van Kleffens, Evatt, Padilla, Romulo, Entezam, and Malik were to become future Presidents of the General Assembly, while Lie became the first Secretary-General of the United Nations. Small States In International Organizations the problems which had involved it directly in the League, but the questions of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon were still pending. Iraq also had become a member of the Arab League, four other members of which attended the conference, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. The Arab bloc held fre quent caucuses to consolidate its position in the Conference.20. The fifty states participating in the Conference included eight Asian countries. This was in contrast to the member- ship of the Covenant Committee, in which there had been only three members from Asia: one from China and two from Japan, the latter being a great power. Under these more favorable circumstances, the small powers of Asia and Iraq were able to play a more significant role at San Francisco than at the Paris Peace Conference. The small states cam- paigned for increased power for the General Assembly, for an increase in the number of non-permanent members in the Security Council, for automatic or compulsory jurisdiction for the International Court of Justice, for endowing the Assembly with the right to interpret the Charter, for an easy amending process, and for restricting the veto power. 21 Iraq, in particular, fought hard to have its views on the trusteeship question respected, especially where Arab terri- tories such as Palestine and Libya were involved. Although the small powers were unable at the San Francisco Conference to dislodge the great powers from the dominant position the latter had arrogated to themselves in the Dum- barton Oaks proposals, they nevertheless succeeded in changing many of these proposals before the Charter was finally signed. For instance, owing to the efforts of the small powers, the Charter provides that: The General Assembly may discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter or relating to the powers and functions of any organs provided for in the present Charter and, except as provided in Article 12, may make recommendations to the members of the United Nations 20 Eugene P. Chase, The United Nations in Action (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1950), p. 55. * Vandenbosch and Hogan, p. 87. º the meprovided provided or relatiny DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ or to the Security Council or to both on any such questions or matters.22 The small powers succeeded in strengthening the provisions on economic and social matters and in making the Economic and Social Council a principal organ of the United Nations. They were also able to delegate to the Assembly "the ultimate responsibility for guiding the Trusteeship System.” 23 The small powers provided the San Francisco Conference with most of the officers for the various commissions and technical committees, and nine out of the fourteen members on the Executive Committee and the Coordination Commit- tee were nationals of lesser states. 24 As for Iraq, it played a greater role than it had ever before attempted in any major conference. It debated many questions, and even presented a formal proposal on the trusteeship system. Moreover, an Iraqi was elected rapporteur of the Committee on the International Court of Justice. This ex- panded role was only the harbinger of things to come at the United Nations. Moreover, although Iraq and other small powers “got less than they wanted in their San Francisco campaign to establish the predominance of the General Assembly," they nevertheless "left the Conference with the firm resolve to exploit every opportunity" to enhance the power of the Assembly.25 It is important to note that there was already an opportunity for the small powers, since the Dumbarton Oaks decision to have majority voting in the General Assembly had already opened the "Pandora's box” whereby the United Nations has seen the diminishing role of great power domination. The influence of the great powers on the conduct of inter- » Article 10 of the United Nations Charter. % Cheever and Haviland, p. 101. United Nations, Information Organizations and the Library of Congress, Documents of the United Nations Conference on Inter- national Organization, San Francisco, 1945, 22 vols.; London and New York, 1945-1955, I, 79, hereinafter cited as U.N.C.I.O., Documents. * Claude, p. 178. Small States In International Organizations national affairs remained very important, despite the increasing role played by smaller states in the United Nations. The realities of power politics were such that the smaller states had to accept this great-power role. Though the United Nations is based on the principle of "sovereign equality," Article 27 had conferred the veto right on only China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Therefore, no decision can be made by the Security Council against the will of any one of these permanent members of this Council. The special role in the Security Council for the five permanent members assumed that the big powers would agree among themselves, but when this hope turned out to be illusory, the Security Council, and with it, of course, the predominant role of the five big members, became less important than anticipated by the founders of the United Nations. The big powers did nonetheless continue to influence the behavior of member states in the General As- sembly, but owing to lack of unanimity among the former, the role of the Security Council declined while the General Assembly gained greater stature than foreseen by the founders.26 The United Nations General Assembly also seemed to achieve greater status than the League Assembly had. Thus in 1957 the General Assembly adopted thirteen resolutions on political matters, while in 1938 the Third and Sixth Com- mittees of the League Assembly had only considered four political items. This growing role of the General Assembly afforded the lesser states an opportunity to take a greater share in the conduct of the United Nations. Moreover, the role of the General Assembly was further enhanced under the “Uniting for Peace Resolutions," and this expanded role was evidenced by the cases of Korea, Hungary, and Suez. * This is evidenced in Appendix I, where it will be seen that in 1946 the General Assembly treated only two political questions, while in the same year the Security Council considered five. During the 1948-49 session, the Assembly considered eleven political questions while the Council considered eight. For other years Appendix I in- dicates a similar or even greater role for the General Assembly. 10 DIPLOMATIC (ATIC STO HISTORY OF IRAQ : Another reason for the enhanced influence of the small powers is the fact that voting in the Assembly has developed in blocs. Thus a power like India is able to place a stronger power, such as the Soviet Union or the United States, in a difficult position, maybe in a downright dilemma, if it can muster the votes of the Asian-African group. Actually, the General Assembly cannot adopt a resolution against the united vote of this group, of which Iraq is a member. Aware of their growing influence, the smaller powers none- theless seem to have realized that they have more to fear from a big-power conflict that eventually could lead to war, than from the constitutionally privileged position of the great powers. Therefore the smaller powers have busied themselves as conciliators, or played the role of mediators betwen dispu- tants in the hope of bringing about agreement.27 They have also had great influence in making the General Assembly focus attention on issues such as colonialism and economic development. The small powers have also provided members for various organs of the United Nations and have participated in the work of the committees, subcommittees and commissions. All Presi- dents of the General Assembly have hailed from small or medium-sized states and five of the thirteen came from Asia. The smaller powers have provided many nationals for the Secretariat. In fact, in 1958, fourteen out of twenty-two officers of the rank of Under-Secretary came from small and medium states. Although no Iraqi has been President of the General As- sembly or been an Under-Secretary, * Iraq was better equipped for filling a stronger position in the United Nations than in the old League. It continued to progress socially, educationally and politically. Economically its oil resources became an im- portant element in its national power, as well as in that of other oil-producing Arab countries. In 1958, there were ten Arab states in the United Nations, all belonging to the Asian- * Herbert V. Evatt, The Task of Nations (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949), p. 52. * However, an Iraqi, Dr. Sabih Al-Wahbi, was elected president of the World Health Assembly in 1957. CHAPTER II The Establishment Of The Mandate An understanding of Iraq's activities in international organi- zations cannot be appreciated without bearing in mind that Iraq, within its present political boundaries, has existed only since 1918 when it was occupied by British troops. Even then Iraq's frontiers were not precisely defined, and owing to incompatible Allied and Arab plans for its future, its status remained rather uncertain until 1920. For over three centuries of Turkish rule very few Iraqis had had any experience in government. Therefore the coming of the Mandate was a matter of tremendous importance to Iraq, especially to politi- cally conscious Iraqis. It will be recalled that Iraq constituted only a part of the Arab territories under Ottoman domination. The defeat of the Turkish troops in the area, with the help of the indigenous population, created many problems in regard to the post-war status of the region. Even before the armistice, there were negotiations involving Britain, France, and Iraq which led to a variety of conflicting and incompatible arrangements for the future.1 * Accounts of these complex negotiations are found in: George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs (3rd ed.; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1953); George Antonious, The Arab Awaken- ing (3rd ed.; Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1955); Nejla Izzeddin, The Arab World— Past, Present and Future (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1953); and Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Middle-East, A Political and Economic Survey (2nd ed.; London: 1954), hereinafter cited as R.I.I.A., Political and Economic Survey. I 2 Establishment Of The Mandate Pre-1919 Anglo-French Policy in the Middle East The Allied Powers provided for the post-war status of Iraq in two sets of contradictory declarations and agreements. Firstly, there were the joint pledges by Sir Henry McMahon and King Husain, aimed at the establishment of Iraq as part of a contemplated independent Arab state. This arrangement was confirmed by the declaration of March 19, 1917, made in Baghdad by Lt. Gen. F. S. Maude, commanding the British forces in Iraq on behalf of the Allied Powers;3 by the Anglo-French declaration of November 7, 1918;4 by the policy of self-determination expressed by the British Prime Minister in January, 1918;5 and by President Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points presented before a Joint Session of Congress on January 8, 1918.8 Secondly, in direct contrast to the view expressed in these arrangements, the Sykes-Picot Agreement of May 16, 1916 provided that Iraq would be divided into three parts, each with its own status; Great Britain was to obtain control of southern Iraq and Baghdad and was to enjoy a sphere of influence in the area between Baghdad and Mosul. The latter was to fall under French influence.? Under the terms of the Clemenceau-Lloyd George Agreement of December, 1918, however, France agreed to include Mosul in the British sphere * For the text of the Husain-McMahon correspondence, see An- tonious, Appendix A, pp. 413-427. • For the text of the Baghdad declaration, see Philip Willard Ireland, Iraq, a Study in Political Development (London: Jonathan Cape, Ltd., 1937), Appendix I, pp. 457-458. * For text of Anglo-French declaration, see: Antonious, Appendix E, pp. 435-436. Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, Iraq, 1900 to 1950 (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 114. For the text of the address, see Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace, Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers (1917-1920), edited by Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (2 vols.; New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1927), I, 155-166. 'For the text of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, see Antonious, Appendix B, pp. 428-430. For a map of the proposed partition of Syria and Iraq, see pp. 248-249. 14 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ in exchange for a share in Iraq's northern oil deposits® and a free hand in Syria. Article 22 of the Covenant Between the end of World War I and the conclusion of the peace treaties, Iraq remained in a state of constant un- certainty. This period was marked by rising popular discontent with British rule and increasing nationalist activities directed toward the realization of Iraqi independence.10 At the Paris Peace Conference, various plans were put for- ward for the disposal of the former non-Turkish Ottoman provinces and the German colonies scattered around the globe.11 Some Allied leaders were for outright annexation, while others favored some form of international administra- tion.12 The existence of the earlier pledges and counter-pledges complicated further any arrangements for the future status of the Arab territories. However, the delegates to the Peace Conference accepted a compromise which became the mandate system, envisaged under Article 22 of the Covenant of the League. Article 22 specified that "the character of the mandate must differ according to the stage of the development of the people, the geographical situation of the territory, its economic conditions, and other similar circumstances.” Furthermore, paragraph 4 of the same article stated: Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recog- Lenczowski, p. 73. Also see: R.I.I.A., Political and Economic Survey, p. 262. Antonious, p. 353. 10 For discussions of this period of Iraq's political history, see: Ire- land, Chapters XIII, XIV; Izzeddin, Chapter XI; Lenczowski, Chapter III; and Longrigg, Chapter IV. "See League of Nations, Mandate System, and Quincy Wright, Mandates Under the League of Nations (Chicago: University of Chi- cago Press, 1930). * Wright, p. 24. Establishment Of The Mandate 15 nized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone. The wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory. In conformity with the understanding reached by the Council of Ten at Paris, the allocation of the mandate was to be made by the Allied Supreme Council.18 This Council, consisting of France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and (in the initial period) the United States, 14 prepared three classes of mandates—A, B and C-each corresponding to one of the three types specified in Article 22 of the Covenant.16 Iraq was considered to fall in Class “A” and was entrusted to the United Kingdom on April 25, 1920. The assignment of the mandate over Iraq thus was a compromise between the policy of Anglo-French domination, envisaged in the Sykes- Picot Agreement, and the pledges made to the Arabs for the establishment of an Arab kingdom. Iraqi Attitude Toward the Mandate The word "mandate” became a discredited title. Most Iragis found this term extremely distasteful, considering it to be a disguise for another form of colonialism, and continuous efforts were made to abolish this status. Even after the estab- lishment in 1921 of an Arab kingdom in Iraq under King Faisal, the Government of Iraq expressed “determined op- position" to the draft mandate prepared by the British Gov- ernment for the approval of the League Council.16 A further source of opposition lay in Faisals unwillingness to accept the throne of Iraq under a mandatory regime.17 18 Ibid., p. 43. * H. Duncan Hall, Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship (Wash- ington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948), p. 145. 16 Wright, p. 47. 16 Royal Institute of International Affairs, "Memorandum on the Termination of the Mandatory Regime in Iraq” (London: Information Department, 1932), mimeographed, p. 6. i7 Majid Khadduri, Independent Iraq (London: Oxford University Press, 1951), p. 4. 16 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ The announcement of the mandate on May 3, 1920, though it "was accompanied by a carefully considered explanation that the ultimate goal was the development of independent institutions . . . only spurred the nationalist activity.” 18 The nationalists conducted public and secret meetings in the main cities of Iraq to protest the mandate 19 An appeal for Moslem unity was brought out in joint meetings of the two main Moslem religious sects in Iraq, the Sunnis and the Shi'is.20 Moreover, fifteen Iraqi spokesmen protested the man- date status to the British authorities in Iraq and requested the United Kingdom to take immediate steps toward the independence of their country.21 In addition, the mandate conflicted with the independence aims of two Iraqi political organizations—the Iraqi-Ahd Society and the “Independence Gurad” Society. * The mandate also caused disappointment and disaffection in the ranks of the leaders of the Arab army that had fought in the Syrian campaign under the British General Allenby. Most of these leaders were Iraqis, and many were from Baghdad. 22 These officers claimed to have fought for the liberation of their country, and “were particularly active" in the cause of Iraqi independence. With the aim of uniting their country with Syria,23 they assisted the nationalist movement in Iraq 18 Henry A. Foster, The Making of Modern Iraq (Norman, Okla- homa: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935), p. 79. Abdul Razak Al-Hassani, Tarikh Al-Irak Al-Siyasi Al-Hadith [Modern Political History of Iraq) (3 vols.; Sida, Lebanon: Al Arafan Press, 1938), I, 31, hereinafter cited as Al-Hassani, History. 20 Foster, p. 79, and Longrigg, p. 119. * Foster, pp. 178-179. * The Al-Ahd Society aimed toward complete independence within the framework of Arab unity and in the natural boundaries of Iraq. The “Independence Gurad” Society went further, claiming that British assistance was not required. Even if outside aid were necessary, they argued, it should come from some Power other than the United King- dom. For further discussion of the positions of both groups, see Al- Hassani, History, I, 114. * According to a statement by Gertrude Bell as quoted by Foster, p. 77. * Foster, pp. 77-78. Establishment Of The Mandate 19 The Establishment of an Arab Kingdom in Iraq What one writer has termed "the first straightforward public announcement of a concrete and specific policy" toward Iraq by the United Kingdom since the armistice,86 was made in Baghdad on June 20, 1920. In this statement, the United Kingdom authorized the High Commissioner for Iraq to call into being ... a Council of State under an Arab President and a General Elective Assembly, representative of and freely elected by the population of Mesopotamia. And it will be his duty to prepare, in consultation with the General Elective Assembly, the permanent organic law.87 In accordance with this policy, the Council of State of the first Arab government in Iraq since the Abbassids* met on November 2, 1920.38 Nine days later, the United Kingdom, in another proclamation,39 called to mind its original announce- ment, and the British High Commissioner considered it: "expedient that, pending the convocation of such General Assembly and the framing thereby of an organic law, the Government of the country should be conducted subject to my supervision and direction, by a provisional National Gov- ernment.” He further proclaimed that: * Ireland, p. 221. * For the text of the announcement, see Ireland, p. 221. * The Abbassids were one of the dynasties that ruled the Moslem Empire, establishing their rule in the year 750 A. D. During their period in power, they established Baghdad as their capital, and it was under the Abbassids that Baghdad achieved its fame for culture and beauty. The best known of the Abbassid Caliphs was Haron Al-Rashid. In 1258, their regime and their capital city were destroyed by the Mongols under Hulāgū, a grandson of Chingīz Khan. See: Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs from the Earliest Times to the Present (6th ed.; London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1956), Chapters XXIII, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, and XXVIII. * Ireland, p. 285. * For the text of the proclamation, see Ireland, p. 287. 20 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ 1. There should be constituted a Council of State con- sisting of a President, Ministers for the following Depart- ments: Interior, Finance, Justice, Auqaf [the Department dealing with religious property], Education, Health, Defence, Public Works, Commerce, and such other members without portfolios as may be nominated. 2. Until the organic law is promulgated and brought into effect, the Council of State and Ministers shall be responsible for the conduct, subject to my supervision and control, of the administration of Government, excluding foreign affairs, military operations and in general military affairs, except such military affairs as concerns solely the locally recruited forces. hat the first Conrovember 13, 1920mhe Council of State Consequently, the first formal session of the Council of State was conducted on November 13, 1920. It was at this session that the first Constitution of Iraq was adopted. 40 The Cairo Conference of British officials, led by Winston Churchill, then Colonial Secretary, was called in March, 1921 to dispose of the Arab question. At this conference it was decided to establish an Arab government for Iraq under Faisal, 41 who had already lost his Syrian throne. His candi- dature was accepted by the Provisional Government on July 11, 1921.42 The King ascended the throne on August 23, 1921. Previous to his accession, Faisal had managed to obtain a promise from Churchill that future Anglo-Iraqi relations would be governed by a treaty. Thus, as one writer put it, Faisal "not only obtained another throne for himself, but also won for Iraq more advantageous terms than Great Britain had been prepared to give without him.” 43 On November 17, 1921, the British Government informed the League Council that political developments in Iraq led them to the conclusion that "obligations vis-à-vis the League can be most effectively discharged if the principles on which “ Ireland, p. 286. For the text of this Constitution, see Ireland, Appendix VI. "Izzeddin, p. 191. " Al-Hassani, History, I, 173. * Khadduri, pp. 4-5. Establishment Of The Mandate 21 they rest are embodied in a treaty." 44 Consequently, the original text of the mandate was replaced by treaties, sub- sidiary agreements and protocols between Iraq and the United Kingdom that were approved by the Council.48 The regime thus established and the subsequent treaty relations with the United Kingdom were the results of negotia- tions concerning practical situations, and Iraq gained a unique position among the mandated territories. Nevertheless, British control over Iraq remained extensive. British Influence Although the United Kingdom established an Arab Kingdom in Iraq, and in spite of the fact that the High Commissioner reported to the Permanent Mandates Commission in 1926 that the system of government was "Iraq governed for Iraqi and by Iraqi helped by small numbers of British advisors and inspectors,” 46 British influence nevertheless, remained con- siderable. At the time the above statement was made, the Commissioner also told the Mandates Commission that he “had the right to advise the Government of Iraq in regard to the finances of the country and the right to insist that this advice should be accepted.” Furthermore, he asserted that Iraq could not claim the assistance of the British forces in the repression of disorders or invasions provoked by actions or by a policy entered upon against the advice of the British Government. . . . This clause, together with the right of the High Commissioner to intervene in financial matters, was sufficient to secure the acceptance by the Government of Iraq of any necessary advice in really important matters. 47 acceterrenesether adviccked “ League of Nations, Council, Fifteenth Session (1921), Official Journal, p. 36. * League of Nations, Mandate System, p. 21. * Wright, p. 203 The High Commissioner was Sir Henry Dobbs. " League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Tenth Session (1926), p. 52. ܐܐ DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Two years later B. H. Bourdillon, Counsellor to the High Commissioner, told the Mandates Commission that: There is nothing in the treaty to compel the Iraq Government to accept the advice of the British Government, but it knows that if it does not do so the British Government will be in a position to say: "You have refused to accept our advice in such-and-such a matter. Owing to that refusal, you have not continued your rate of progress. Therefore, we are unable to recommend for the acceptance of the Council your applica- tion for admission to the League of Nations." 48 Mr. Merlin, a member of the Commission, observed that: The accredited representative had assured the Commission that the British Government would always be able to bring pressure to bear upon the Government of Iraq should its actions prove in any respect to be contrary to the terms of the mandate. On the other hand, he also noted that "no stipulation of this kind, however, was to be found in the new treaty." 48 In addition, commenting on the extent of British influence over Iraq, Professor Rappard stated, and Sir Henry Dobbs agreed, that "on matters of foreign policy and finance” British "advice was tantamount to instructions, but it consisted in mere counsel in matters affecting, for instance, health ad- ministration." 80 In spite of the extensive British control and supervision, there was, nevertheless, in Iraq, a Government that included a King and a Legislative Assembly. The exercise of sovereignty was limited, however, by the terms of the treaties concluded with the United Kingdom and approved by the Council of the League. The resulting situation evoked discussions throughout the country on the character of the mandate. 48 League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Fourteenth Session (1928), p. 194. 49 Ibid., p. 195. 50 League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Tenth Session (1926), p. 55. 26 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ dom of Iraq and by concluding with the State thus newly constituted a treaty of alliance on a footing of equality.58 But he added that "nevertheless, it could not be denied that there continued to be a mandate for Iraq, though it was different from the other mandates in Asia Minor."59 At the same session, Sir F. Lugard observed that: In regard to Iraq, the British Government was speaking on behalf of an independent Government. Her position there- fore . . . was quite different from that of any other mandatory Power. ... Iraq possessed an independent Government, and the Commission had never examined any report as yet upon it from Great Britain, which was its sponsor. In this respect, Iraq was unique, and could not be compared with Syria or with any other mandated territory. 60 William Rappard observed that Iraq could be compared to a two-faced Janus-one face, looking towards Geneva, wearing the expression of a mandate, and the other face, looking towards Bagdad, wearing the expres- sion of a treaty. . . . It was quite clear that Iraq was admin- istered under Article 22 of the Covenant. 61 Rappard further summed up the character of the Iraqi mandate by saying that the administration of Iraq was "like a tree the trunk of which was firm but of which the boughs could be swayed by the wind. The principles of Article 22 of the Covenant concerned only the trunk." 62 Quincy Wright, commenting on the treaties which the League Council had approved, noted that Iraq appeared to be "a mandate in substance if not wholly in form.” He added, in fact, "the form of the documents seems to comply more ** Ibid., p. 13. 60 Ibid Ibid., p. 10. « Ibid., p. 123. « League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Tenth Session (1926), p. 55. Establishment Of The Mandate 27 accurately with the terms of article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant than is the case with any other Class A mandate.” 88 George Lenczowski expressed a similar view, and added that these instruments had been "properly sugar-coated for the Iraqi taste." 84 The opinions cited above demonstrate that the establishment of an Arab kingdom in Iraq, plus the continuance of British tutelage and supervision, gave the mandate a special character that provoked a considerable amount of discussion and even created doubts as to the country's status as a mandate. The conditions obtaining under such an ambiguous arrangement made it possible to develop self-government in Iraq to an extent not found elsewhere in the mandate system. The establishment of the mandate over Iraq, even as am- biguous as it was, predisposed Iraqis to take an unfavorable view of the League, especially since other Arab lands were under the mandate system. Iraq, after it became a member of the League, persisted in its efforts to emancipate the mandated territories of Syria, Lebanon and Palestine. It continued this policy in the United Nations, working actively for the inde- pendence of other Arab countries: Palestine, Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. * Wright, p. 60. " Lenczowski, p. 218. CHAPTER III The Development Of Self-Government For a nation to govern itself is a great responsibility and no country can hope to do so without some experience and train- ing. Moreover, no state can play its part in international organizations unless it has some experience in governmental and diplomatic procedures. Iraq was fortunate in having acquired some of this before it became self-governing; first under the Turks and then under the British mandate. In the years before World War I, Iraq was part of an Empire whose central government was despotic, short-sighted and corrupt. “The governing authority (over Iraq] was foreign, unloved, and deadly poor.” 1 Nevertheless, in spite of this Turkish rule, and indeed, partly because of it, there existed by the time an Arab kingdom was established, a group of national leaders who had worked both secretly and openly for Arab independence. The country had the advantage of a limited number of civil servants, was familiar with legislative processes, and possessed a cadre of seasoned army officers. The struggle of a colonial people for independence begins with an idea, and Iraq was no exception to this rule. Undis- mayed by temporary set-backs and the difficulties attending any program pursued largely by trial and error, Iraq's national- ist leaders demonstrated from the days of World War I that they were determined to establish an independent state for their people. Nowhere was this determination more clearly Longrigg, p. 35. 28 Development Of Self-Government 29 evident during the period of the mandate than in the working of the department of education. Education The progress which Iraq made in education during the mandate period was truly remarkable.? During the Turkish domination there were never more than 7,377 students en- rolled in all the schools in Iraq, yet by 1922, the third year of the mandate, the number of elementary school students had risen to 15,275, and in ten years this number more than doubled to 37,472. In 1920, there was but one teachers' college and one institution of higher education, but by 1931 the former numbered three and the latter four.* Iraq, to the extent that it was autonomous under the man- date, placed great emphasis on the development of education. Starting with 2.3 per cent of the budget in 1921, the expendi- tures for education rose steadily until by 1932 they amounted to 8.5 per cent of the total national budget. This is not an impressive total when compared with other small countries such as Sweden, but it was remarkable in an entirely new country that was not even independent. Under the British, the expenditure for education in 1918 amounted to only 1.08 per cent of the total budget; in 1920 it was increased to 1.9 per cent. The stringency in appropria- tions for education was not due to lack of funds, because the amount devoted to the headquarters administration was in- creased by 220 per cent between 1918-1919 and 1919-1920.7 As one writer put it: "Indeed, the explanation for the failure to create adequate social services must be found, not in the * See Appendices II, III, IV, V, and VIII. • Izzeddin, p. 197. * Roderic D. Mathews and Matta Akrawi, Education in Arab Coun- tries of the Near East (Washington, D.C.; American Council on Edu- cation, 1949), p. 140. * See Appendix V. • Ireland, p. 127. 'Izzeddin, p. 197. Development Of Self-Government Administrative Experience Nothing is more necessary to make a new state viable than a supply of trained administrators. Under Ottoman rule gov- ernment civil servants were inefficient, poorly trained, and suffered from too great centralization of authority. The Turkish Government of Iraq "was bound by a thousand ill- applicable rules which precluded local initiative; it was ill- served, ill-housed, ill-equipped and incapable of maintaining forces adequate to its clearest needs.” 11 The highest ranking officials in the period before the mandate were Turkish, while Iraqis occupied the middle and lower civil service posts. However, many Iraqis served in the Turkish armed forces. Among those the Ottoman government employed were Nouri Al-Said, Jafar Al-Askari, Yassin Al- Hashimi and Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani. All of these men became prime ministers later, after the establishment of an Arab kingdom in Iraq. Under the mandate, the United Kingdom with its excellent administrative tradition, permitted the training of administra- tive cadres from among the indigenous population. The rapid- ity with which Iraqis were able to assume administrative posts under the mandatory regime is evidenced by the data in Appendices VI and VII, showing that although the total num- ber of British and Indians in government service in 1920 was 3,238, the total of aliens was reduced to 196 by 1931—the year preceding the end of the mandate. It was from the group of Iraqi civil servants recruited in the 1920's that the Iraqi government was later to draw its representatives to the League of Nations and the United Nations. 1 Iraq. Legislative Experience Because, while under Turkish rule a number of Iraqis had served in the Ottoman parliament, Iraqis had had some experi- ence in legislative work. "Longrigg, p. 38. 32 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ After the “Young Turks" emerged in 1908 and consolidated their power in 1909, Iraqis were allowed to send deputies to the Ottoman parliament in Constantinople. The first deputies from Baghdad were Mohammad Bey, Tawfiq Bey Al-Khalidi, Murad Bey, Fu'ad Bey Al-Daftari, and the noted Iraqi poet Jamil Al-Zahawi, and a Jew, Sasun Hasqayl.12 Later, after the establishment of an Arab government in Iraq, Tawfiq Bey Al-Khalidi became Minister of Justice in 1922, and Sasun Hasqayl served as Finance Minister in several cabinets. Many Iraqi leaders also participated in the secret society, Al-Ahd, which was founded by Arabs in Constantinople to work for the independence of the Arab provinces.13 In 1918, this organization was divided into a Syrian Ahd and an Iraqi counterpart.14 The Iraqi division had branches in the three main cities of Iraq, Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul.15 On November 11, 1920, the United Kingdom proclaimed that it was establishing an Iraqi provisional government, super- vised and controlled by a High Commissioner who was respon- sible for administering the country until an elective general assembly could promulgate an organic law. There were de- lays in completing the elections, but the Constituent As- sembly finally began its work on March 27, 1924.16 It ratified the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922 and promulgated an organic law of state. The first Iraqi Parliament met on July 16, 192517 and, before Iraq's admission to the League, had held seven18 ordinary and three extraordinary sessions.18 The Iraqis who gained experience in the Turkish Parlia- ment and later in their own Parliament during the mandate were to become leaders of the new state in 1932 and some of its representatives in the League of Nations and the United Nations. 12 Ibid., p. 43. 18 Izzeddin, p. 188. 14 Al-Hassani, History, I, 114. 15 Izzeddin, p. 188. 16 Khadduri, p. 15. 17 United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 31. 18 United Kingdom, Report ... Iraq, 1932, p. 1. 10 United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 31. Development Of Self-Government Diplomatic Experience e The ambiguous character of the mandate mentioned earlier was evident in the opportunity afforded Iraqis to obtain diplo- matic experience, to an extent unprecedented in other man- dates, even before their country had a diplomatic service of its own. This experience provided Iraq's delegates to inter- national conferences with a background and knowledge which was unmatched even by representatives of many League members. Iraqis had participated in the negotiations between King Husain and Sir Henry McMahon which had led to the Arab revolt against the Turks. Together with the Syrians they had demanded specific assurances from the British regarding the future status of the Arab people before they would join the Allied war effort.20 At the end of World War I, Iraqis in the service of Faisal assisted in the attempt to negotiate Allied recognition for an independent Arab state. Furthermore, Faisal, a principal Arab spokesman at the Peace Conference, later became King Faisal I of Iraq. Many Iraqi leaders remained with King Faisal in Syria after hostilities ended.21 There were at least 240 expatriate Iraqi officers who served with Arab forces in Hejaz and Syria; most of them returned to Iraq in March 1921.22 Among the Iraqis who remained in Syria23 was Jafar Al- Askari, former governor of Aleppo. After returning to Iraq, he twice held the office of Prime Minister. Another was Nouri Al-Said, “Iraq's strong man," fifteen times Prime Minister. Others who had remained in Syria included Naji Al-Swaidy, twice a member of the cabinet; Yassin Al-Hashimi, twice Prime Minister; Jamil Al-Madfai, Prime Minister on at least three occasions; and Maulud Moukhles, a leading political figure and at one time President of the House of Representatives. The first major task of the Government of Iraq was to es- 90 R.I.I.A., Political and Economic Survey, p. 22. * Izzeddin, p. 189. * Ireland, pp. 289-290. * The names are listed in Ireland, p. 289. 34 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ tablish definite frontiers. In fact, pre-1932 Iraqi diplomatic experience is in part the story of very modest beginnings of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 192424 and a history of vir- tually continuous boundary disputes and negotiations with Turkey, Persia, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Transjordan. The border with Turkey was defined in 1926 as a result of the Mosul dispute when Iraq concluded the Treaty of An- kara with Turkey and the United Kingdom. The negotiations marked the first direct diplomatic intercourse between Iraq and any of its neighbors.25 Amiable contacts with Turkey grew when, in July 1931, King Faisal, accompanied by some of his ministers, visited the Turkish capital,26 and when early in 1932, Nouri Al-Said negotiated treaties of residence, com- merce and extradition with the Turks.27 Relations with Iraq's eastern neighbor, Persia, were for some time difficult, owing principally to the exclusion of Persian subjects from the privileges of a judicial agreement which was subsidiary to the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922.28 Persian-Iraqi relations improved, however, after March 1929, when the British Government proposed in the League to abolish the judicial agreement and to create a uniform sys- tem of justice in Iraq. After an exchange of courtesies between the Shah of Persia and the King of Iraq, Persia and Iraq agreed provisionally in August 1929, to exchange diplomatic and consular missions and most-favored treatment. This agree- ment was renewed twice, in August 1930 and again in Febru- ary 1931.29 A trip to Tehran in 1932 by the High Commissioner for Iraq to discuss matters of mutual interest between Iraq and Persia led to an official visit to Persia by King Faisal and Prime Minister Nouri Al-Said. It was on this visit that Al-Said was able to “pave the way for the negotiation of treaties concern- » United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 33. * Ibid. * Longrigg, p. 217. "United Kingdom, Report . . . Iraq, 1932, p. 13. * United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 34. so Ibid. Development Of Self-Government 35 ing the control of frontier tribes, residence and extradition."30 In southern Iraq the existence of nomad tribes and the ab- sence of a fixed frontier along the boundary between Nejd and Iraq-a boundary which runs over 500 miles—strained rela- tions between the two governments for some time. However, attempts to establish normal relations between the two king- doms led to an agreement in May 1922, signed by the United Kingdom, Iraq and Nejd. This agreement determined the nationality of nomadic tribes, guaranteed the safety of pil- grims, and established free commercial intercourse between the subjects of Nejd and Iraq. A protocol to the agreement was signed in December of the same year which described the frontier line between the two states. 31 In 1924, Iraq and Nejd attended a conference sponsored by the United Kingdom to discuss their differences. In 1925, the good offices of the United Kingdom led the two govern- ments to conclude the Bahra Agreement. This agreement set- tled issues concerning the treatment of migratory tribes and provided for a special joint tribunal to fix responsibility for raids and assess damages. 32 Iraq was still troubled, however, in May and August 1928, by Nejdi raids into Iraqi territory. A British representative, accompanied by an Iraqi official, discussed this matter and others with King Ibn Saud. In February 1930, the United Kingdom promoted a meeting between King Saud and King Faisal, which led the monarchs to pledge themselves to set- tle the question of the desert posts peacefully and further smoothed relations between the governments. 88 In April 1931, Iraq signed with the Government of Hejaz- Nejd an agreement of bon voisinage and extradition.34 In July of the next year, Amir Faisal, son of Ibn Saud, visited Bagh- dad and cemented amiable relations between the two coun- tries.35 30 United Kingdom, Report ... Iraq, 1932, p. 14. a United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 35. * Ibid. * Ibid., pp. 35-36. * Ibid. * United Kingdom, Report ... Iraq, 1932, p. 15. 36 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Meanwhile, the indefinite boundaries between Iraq and Syria required Iraq to communicate through the British High Commissioner with the French mandatory authority. The boundary situation also brought officials from Iraq and Syria to cooperate in settling frontier and tribal matters.36 Further- more, provisional departmental agreements were concluded between respective departments in both states.37 With her southwestern neighbor, Transjordan, Iraq con- cluded a treaty of friendship in March 1931.38 July 1932 saw Iraq and Transjordan arranging to define their common fron- tier“more precisely"; and later in the same year King Faisal visited Transjordan.39 Iraq also concluded a treaty of mutual recognition with Yemen in 1931,40 and signed an extradition treaty with Egypt in the same year. 41 In March 1930, Iraq also signed a convention with the United States. Under the terms of this convention, the United States recognized the established regime in Iraq in return for securing, for United States nationals in Iraq, treatment equal to that awarded the nations of members of the League. 42 Before the League of Nations admitted it, Iraq had been * United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 36. * The following provisional departmental agreements were con- cluded between Syria and Iraq in this period: Transit Trade Agree- ment, 1925; Provisional Agreement for the Prevention of Illicit Traffic in Antiquities, 1926; Provisional Agreement for the Regulation of the Affairs of the Frontier Tribes, 1927; Provisional Parcel Post Agree- ment, 1928; and Provisional Agreement for the Extradition of Crimi- nals, 1929. United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 37. * United Kingdom, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 'Iraq for the Year 1931 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1932), p. 35, here- inafter cited as United Kingdom, Report . . . Iraq, 1931. * United Kingdom, Report ... Iraq, 1932, p. 17. sº United Kingdom, Report . . . Iraq, 1931, p. 35. a Ibid. " United Kingdom, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of 'Iraq for the Year 1930 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931), p. 36. Development Of Self-Government formally recognized by Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Nor- way, Persia, Poland, Sweden, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. France, Germany, Persia and Turkey had both diplomatic and consular representatives in Iraq, while a number of other countries had consular missions, in- cluding Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Den- mark, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the United States. 48 Iraq was represented abroad by a Minister in Ankara,44 a Minister Plenipotentiary in both London and Tehran, a Con- sul-general in Cairo, Consuls in both Alexandria and Kerman- shah, and a Vice-consul at Muhammerah.45 Iraq had also adhered to various international conventions, including the treaty for the renunciation of war.48 It is significant that Iraq's main diplomatic undertakings and the source of her most important diplomatic experience, were those relating to the United Kingdom. Virtually constant bargaining took place between the two states, and these nego- tiations shaped the destiny of Iraq and constituted the domi- nant news items in the country. Through these negotiations, Iraq not only gained experience by dealing with astute British diplomats but also achieved membership in the League. Anglo-Iraqi Negotiations, 1921-1930 The intensive negotiations which took place between Iraq and Great Britain during the years 1921-1930 gave this decade the utmost importance for the future development of Iraq. The diplomatic bargaining had considerable impact upon Iraqi public opinion and was followed with deep interest and, at times, with anxiety. Iraq's goal in these negotiations was complete self-rule. The - United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 37. * United Kingdom, Report ... Iraq, 1932, p. 13. 45 United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 37. 4 For a list of the international conventions that were applicable to Iraq at that time, see United Kingdom, Special Report, pp. 37-38; Report . . . Iraq, 1932, p. 12. 38 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ United Kingdom, conscious of Iraq's economic and strategic potentials, was also aware of the country's deep desire for in- dependence. Somewhere between the two positions was that of the League of Nations, concerned with establishing and maintaining the mandate arrangement. Given these considerations, developing a formula taking all interests into account was obviously difficult. But King Faisal I had had a "bitter experience in Syria (which) taught him the lesson never to clash with a Great Power in Iraq."47 He accepted what the British offered at every stage, while continuing to press "for further concessions under more favor- able circumstances."48 He, therefore, “followed a policy aptly called in Arabic 'take and ask, or, in Western terminology, 'step by step.' "49 The British, on their side, followed a colonial policy which "allowed dependencies to develop towards self- government by a slow and peaceful method.” They demon- strated that they were "prepared to grant Iraq her independence piece-meal.”50 The League of Nations was also able to modify its position and to approve a treaty instead of a mandate char- ter. The willingness of Faisal and his governments to accept what the British would yield at each stage made possible con- stant negotiations and produced a series of compromises which the League Council approved After Faisal became King of Iraq, the United Kingdom pro posed a treaty containing the substance but not the form of a mandate.51 The Government of Iraq, which wanted a treaty of alliance between two sovereign states, found this draft treaty unacceptable.52 The positions of the two parties were diffi- cult to reconcile without a sacrifice by one of the parties and a compromise by the other.68 Faisal "in an hour of despair" complained that “this is not the kind of treaty which Mr. "Khadduri, p. 5. " Ibid. 40 Ibid. to Ibid., p. 6. "Khadduri, p. 5; Lenczowski, p. 218. ** Al-Hassani, History, II, 9. 68 lbid. Development Of Self-Government 39 Churchill promised me in London.” Nevertheless, “though hot-tempered and impatient ... [he] took a hopeful view ... and ordered his Ministers to sign it."54 The treaty which was signed on October 10, 1922, was to operate for twenty years; it gave Great Britain the right to appoint advisers, assist the army, protect foreigners, and coun- sel on foreign and fiscal matters. 55 As a compromise to Iraqi nationalist aspirations, the United Kingdom pledged itself to use its influence to make the League admit Īraq “as soon as possible," and agreed to reduce to four years the effective period of the treaty. Nevertheless the nationalists continued to exert pressures against the treaty, 66 and there was even doubt as to whether the Constituent Assembly would be able to effect its ratifica- tion.57 This agitation brought a British threat to withdraw the treaty and restore direct British rule.58 However, on March 27, 1924, the Constituent Assembly, which included forty tribal leaders favoring ratification and whose other members were subjected to "strong British pressures” ratified the treaty. 5° On September 27, 1924, the Council of the League approved the treaty, "as giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant."ão However, as a result of another decision to award Mosul to Iraq, the Council wanted to prolong the man- * Khadduri, p. 5. * For the text of the Treaty, Protocol, and Agreements, see League of Nations, Treaty Series, Publication of Treaties and International Engagements Registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations (205 vols.; Geneva: 1920-1946), XXXV (1925), 13-174, herein- after cited as League of Nations, Treaty Series. 69 Izzeddin, pp. 191-192; Lenczowski, p. 219; Khadduri, p. 6. Abdul Rozok Al-Hassani gives accounts of the nationalist activities against the treaty in Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al-Irakia [History of Iraqi Cabinets] (6 vols.; Sida, Lebanon: Al Arafan Press, 1933-1953), I, 82-83, 90-91, hereinafter cited as Al-Hassani, Cabinets. 57 Lenczowski, p. 219. 58 Izzeddin, p. 192. 5° Lenczowski, p. 219. "O League of Nations, Council, Thirtieth Session (1924), Official Journal, pp. 1346-47. 40 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ date to twenty-five years, unless Iraq became a member of the League in the meantime.61 Despite nationalist pressures, Iraq and the United King- dom concluded a new treaty in 1926, which met the Council's conditions in the Mosul award, but also relaxed British con- trol.62 The Council also approved this treaty on March 11, 1926.63 This treaty was not the last in the series. In fact, from 1924 to 1930, Iraq's demands for a greater measure of freedom grew more vocal,"64 and these demands gave rise to further negotiations and new treaties. While the Iraqi Parliament was considering the treaty of 1926, the United Kingdom undertook to amend the financial and military agreements appended to it.68 Moreover, after ratification, many Iraqis agitated for "speedy admission into the League of Nations."88 This agitation led to further nego- tiations, during which Iraq unsuccessfully asked the British to sponsor a request to admit Iraq to the League in 1928.87 In July 1927, however, the mandatory power agreed "to take up with the League of Nations in 1932 the question of the admission of 'Iraq to membership of the League, provided that all went well in the interval and the present rate of progress in 'Iraq was maintained."68 During the 1927 negotiations, both parties also agreed to revise the earlier treaty and its agreements.89 It was also as- sumed that, before Iraq joined the League, Britain and Iraq would sign a new treaty of a non-mandatory character to de- fine subsequent relations between them.70 So important were * League of Nations, Council, Thirty-Seventh Session (1926), Official Journal, pp. 191-192. ** Lenczowski, p. 219. * League of Nations, Council, Thirty-Ninth Session (1926), Official Journal, p. 503. " Lenczowski, p. 219. es United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 17. 06 Foster, p. 200. 07 United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 18. es Ibid. " Ibid.; Foster, p. 201. 70 United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 18. Development Of Self-Government 41 these negotiations that King Faisal personally participated in the discussions that took place in London.71 Britain's desire to postpone Iraq's entery into the League cre- ated many differences between the two sides. At one point Prime Minister Jafar Al-Askari actually started home to resign in protest against what he considered "unwarranted interference in Iraqi affairs by the High Commissioner,"72 Sir Henry Dobbs, considered to be of the "Indian School" and a man who "acted with virtually undiminished authority."73 Despite the conflict- ing opinions, however, a new treaty was signed in December 1927, less than a month after negotiations began in London. This instrument repeated Britain's qualified promise of July 1927 about trying to get the League to admit Iraq in 1932.74 The League learned officially of the new treaty in August 1928, but delayed considering it because further negotiations were still in progress. The new treaty was never ratified owing to difficulties which arose over the proposed military and finan- cial agreements.75 Moreover, the treaty remained a mandate document in "essence," and the British promise to support Iraq's admission was only a qualified one and was, therefore, objectionable to the Iraqis.78 So the treaty "never won popular favour."77 At the beginning of 1929, the Iraqi Cabinet resigned. After three months, a new cabinet was formed; it abandoned the treaty on the understanding that Britain would not withdraw its promise to support Iraq's admission.78 Late in 1929 the Labour Party came to power in Great Britain and gave liberal promises to Egypt,79 and on Septem- ber 14, 1929, the British announced that they would support Iraq's candidacy for League membership in 1932 "without T1 Ibid. " Foster, p. 201. ** Lenczowski, p. 219. " United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 18. 75 Ibid., p. 19. 79 Ibid., p. 18; Foster, pp. 201-202. " United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 19. ** Ibid. * Foster, p. 202. Development Of Self-Government by Iraqis to free their country from the mandate. Various negotiations had been undertaken to improve and define Anglo-Iraqi relations during the decade from 1920 to 1930, but the very existence of a mandate remained a constant irri- tant. Removing obstacles to smoother Anglo-Iraqi relations had been difficult, especially since the task moved forward in the midst of conflicting Iraqi and British policies. From 1920 to 1932, Iraq had thirteen governments,88 and none of them es- caped the pressing issue of Iraq's relations with Britain. Prime Minister Abd Al-Muhsin As-Sa'dun, who made great efforts to conclude the 1930 treaty, even committed suicide while under nationalist pressure.84 This pressure focused Iraq's de- termination to free itself from the mandate and led to the treaty ending the discredited mandate and ushering in a new era in Iraq's political history. As agreed on September 14, 1929, the United Kingdom requested the Council in November not to discuss the treaty signed with Iraq in 1927. Instead, the British proposed that the League admit Iraq to the League of Nations in 1932.88 The Council, on September 4, 1931, requested the Permanent Mandates Commission to submit an opinion on the British proposal to terminate the mandate. 86 The same resolution also requested the Commission to consider the proposal in the light of the Council's views on the general conditions to be ful- filled by a territory before a mandate terminated. 87 During its twentieth session, the Permanent Mandates Com- mission examined the special report submitted by the United Kingdom on the progress made in Iraq during the years 1920- 1931. Furthermore, the British Government supported the proposal for emancipation, as evidenced by the declaration of its representatives to the Commission: * For a chronological list of the Iraqi cabinets from October 23, 1920 to September 16, 1950, see Khadduri, Appendix II, pp. 278-280. * Khadduri, p. 227. * League of Nations, Permanent Mandates Commission, Sixteenth Session (1929), Annex III, p. 183. " League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1931, p. 2058. ** Ibid., pp. 2055-2056. Development Of Self-Government 45 mously to admit Iraq into the family of the League of Na- tions. As a result, the mandate over Iraq was terminated, and Iraq became the fifty-seventh member of the League of Na- tions, the third Middle-Eastern member, the only mandated territory to achieve membership, and the first Arab state to be admitted to the League.* In welcoming Iraq, M. Nicolas Politis, ** President of the Thirteenth Session of the Assembly, declared with satisfac- tion that Iraq had: received the well-merited reward of the praiseworthy efforts she has made during the past few years to organize the country, to establish her political status, to delimit her frontiers and to cope with the multiple problems confronting her rulers as the outcome of the needs of national life and the complexities of international relations. Now, after many centuries of foreign domination, Iraq has at least recovered her liberty. . . . Henceforward, she will know no other form of submission than that which is known to all of us here: obedience to the rules of inter- national law and respect for the general obligations specifically assumed towards the League of Nations. 96 He further considered that this event: bears witness to the League's capacity to achieve pacific successes and to keep abreast of changes which the life of the people make necessary. Thanks to that power, we see in the example of Iraq, with the consent and to the satisfaction of all concerned, the birth of a new State which, without the League ... would probably never have taken place save by of Ibid., p. 47. * Hejaz had been eligible to become an original member, but re- fused to ratify the Covenant because it endorsed mandates over Arab territories and the Jewish National Home in Palestine, see Izzeddin, p. 206. Egypt became a member of the League in 1937; the other Middle-Eastern members were Persia, a member since 1920, and Turkey, which was admitted in 1932. ** He was a former Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs. * League of Nations, Assembly, Thirteenth Session (1932), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 48. 46 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ violence. The League thus ... shows that, by the very action of its rules, it does in fact afford an opportunity of attaining by evolution what otherwise could in most cases only be obtained by revolution.97 At the same meeting, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Said de- livered Iraq's first statement before an important international conference. He declared that Iraq appreciated "very greatly the high honour" of being admitted to the League and felt that the League decision had "rendered justice to a nation” which never ceased to aspire eagerly to its “complete and lasting in- dependence."98 În Baghdad the speech from the throne delivered on Novem- ber 1, 1932, recalled that Iraq for some time had been devot- ing the greatest possible effort to achieve independence, and expressed pleasure at Iraq's admission to the League on the basis of complete equality with all other member states. The King added that this event was of great historical significance in Iraq's political history and had placed great responsibilities upon Iraq before the whole world. Therefore, the King urged the people and government of Iraq to strive as hard as pos- sible to fulfill their responsibilities: Iraq would thus prove to the world that it was a nation deserving international con- fidence, able to perform its share serving civilization and hu- manity especially in its part of the world.99 Iraq's entry into the League brought joy to Iraqis because it ended the hated mandate system in Iraq. The leaders of the new state were aware of the great responsibility of self-govern- ment and had, perhaps, more experience and training than has been the case with some other new states that have been created since 1932. The men concerned had worked with Turkish and British officials, as well as against them, and had been taught the elements of diplomacy in the hard school of experience. This knowledge was put to the test when Iraq was emancipated from the mandate and assumed a responsible role in international organizations. of Ibid., p. 49. 18 Ibid. Al-Hassani, Cabinets, III, 258. CHAPTER IV Disputes Before The League Of Nations Which Involved Iraq Directly In 1924, Iraq-still a mandate–became involved in the Mosul dispute, which was not settled until 1926. Immediately before Iraq's admission to the League of Nations it became in- volved in the Syrian-Iraqi border question and the Assyrian problem. The former was settled in 1932, while the latter re- mained unsolved until 1937. In the meantime Iraq had be- come involved in a border dispute with Persia (later Iran) which came to the attention of the League Council in 1934 and was settled in 1937. Iraq more than many countries was predisposed to look with favor on the League of Nations even before it became a member. Iraqis were not enthusiastic about the League in 1920 because of their dismay at being forced to accept the mandate. By 1932, this dislike had gradually melted. The change came about because the people of Iraq believed that the League had treated them fairly in the Mosul question; thus they welcomed efforts made by the League to settle the boundary problem with Syria in 1931. In both disputes, more specifically in the former, Iraq's interests were deeply involved. The favorable disposition of the Mosul and Syrian questions by the League was almost matched by the treatment received Though Arab questions are of direct interest to Iraq, in this study the term “direct concern" means the four questions with which Iraq was involved in the League: the Mosul question, the Assyrians, the Syrian-Iraqi border question, and the Iraqi-Persian border dispute. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ in two other disputes of direct national concern, the Assyrian question, 1932, and the Iraq-Persian border controversy, 1934. THE MOSUL AFFAIR 1924-1926 The first of the disputes directly involving Iraq concerned Mosul, a former province of the Turkish Empire. It had almost a million inhabitants and possessed rich oil deposits indis- pensable to Iraq's economic and social development. The British were interested in the area for strategic considerations as well as by the oil deposits. Consequently, British and Iraqi interests coincided, and Iraq gained a strong champion for its cause. Under the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which con- cerned the future of Arab territories, Mosul was assigned to France.? However, in December 1918 France yielded the province to the United Kingdom. British troops had already occupied Mosul and with Iraqi assistance established a de facto regime in the area. Under the Treaty of Sèvres Turkey was deprived of all title and right to Iraq. During the negotiations which produced the Lausanne treaty, however, Turkey insisted on retaining Mosul. Therefore the treaty provided that Turkey and the United Kingdom would settle future border arrangements between Turkey and Iraq within nine months. It also stipu- lated that in the event agreement was not possible, the question should be referred to the Council of the League. After fruitless negotiations between the parties, the British Govern- * See Antonious, Appendix B, pp. 428-430. * Lenczowski, p. 73. See also R.I.I.A., Political and Economic Survey, p. 262. * Foster, p. 127. 6 Articles 27, 132; for text see: Great Britain, Treaty Series, No. 11, “Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Sèvres, August 10, 1920," Cmd 964 (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1920), pp. 14- 15, 31. Walters, I, 305. 'Article 3, para. 2; for text of the treaty see League of Nations, Treaty Series, XXVIII (1924). Disputes Involving Iraq Directly 49 ment on August 6, 1924, requested the matter of Iraq's fron- tier with Turkey to be placed on the Council's agenda. 8 Iraq, as a mandated territory, was unable to present her case directly before the League, but the United Kingdom, as the mandatory power, did so. The Treaty of Lausanne did not provide for Iraq to participate in settling this question, and therefore Iraq channelled its efforts into the form of urging the United Kingdom to win Mosul for her. During the dis- cussion of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922, the British High Commissioner in Iraq in a communication to the King of Iraq stated that his government would never in negotiating with Turkey abandon Iraq's just claims to the territory. The resolution by which the Iraqi Constituent Assembly ratified this treaty stipulated that the treaty and its subsidiary agreements would be “null and void” if the United Kingdom failed to safeguard "in its entirety” Iraq's right in the Mosul area.10 . The treaty also stipulated that no Iraqi territory be ceded, leased or placed under the control of any foreign power. 11 This clause gave Britain an argument against Turkish claims in the territory.12 lated that Iraqi che territoriating i The Decisions of the League Council · The question of Mosul was put on the agenda of the Council during its thirtieth session. Turkey was invited to take part in deliberating on this matter. The United Kingdom and Turkey presented various arguments and documents. The Council, having secured the assurances of both parties to accept in advance its decisions and, ad interim, to respect the status quo, decided on September 30, 1924, to establish a special commission to collect all information, views and docu- ments that would assist the Council in reaching a solution and * League of Nations doc. C.384.1924.VII., p. 2. Al-Hassani, Cabinets, I, 85. The communication was dated April 26, 1924. 10 Foster, p. 123. * Article VIII, see League of Nations, Treaty Series, XXXV (1925), 16. 1 Foster, pp. 163-164. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly 51 an advisory opinion on voting procedure from the Permanent Court of International Justice.21 Meanwhile, charges and counter-charges in regard to viola- tions of the Brussels Line prompted the Council on September 24, 1925, to dispatch to the area a representative of the League to investigate the matter and to report to the Council.22 J. Laidoner of Estonia was appointed as the Council representa- tive23 but Turkey refused to admit him on its side of the border. Therefore, his mission was limited to the southern part of the Brussels Line, i.e. Iraq.24 In his report Laidoner found that the Turkish authorities had violated the Brussels Line25 and noted certain Turkish activities against Christian communities, as well as assistance given by the Government of Iraq to those refugees who had been able to arrive in Iraq.26 Some historians considered the Turkish activities against Christians to have had a certain influence on the Council in arriving at its final decision.27 The Permanent Court of International Justice met in a special session on October 22, 1925. Turkey refused to attend the proceedings of the Court,28 and the United Kingdom made two oral presentations, but both parties submitted documents and information.29 On November 21, 1925, the Court advised that a Council decision on the Mosul dispute would be binding, and that its decision should be unanimous, but that the votes of the disputing parties should not be counted.30 ecial sessions of the Couf both parties * League of Nations, Official Journal, October 1925, p. 1377. » Ibid., pp. 1383, 1386. 23 Ibid., p. 1405. League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1926, Annex 829, p. 302. * Ibid., p. 303. * Ibid., Annex 829 and 829A, pp. 304-308. * Toynbee and Kirkwood, Turkey, p. 284, cited by Foster, p. 171. * Longrigg, p. 155. * Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, Collection of Advisory Opinions, No. 12, "Article 3, Paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier between Turkey & Iraq)," 1925, p. 9, cited here- after as Permanent Court of International Justice, Advisory Opinions. 30 Ibid., p. 33. 52 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ On December 8, 1925, the Council accepted the Court's advice and eight days later, at a meeting which Turkey did not attend, fixed the Brussels Line as the frontier between Iraq and Turkey. The United Kingdom was invited to con- clude within six months a new treaty extending the mandate for Iraq for a period of twenty-five years, unless Iraq should become a member of the League in the meantime.31 In January 1926 Iraq and the United Kingdom signed a treaty as requested by the Council, and on March 11, 1926, the Coun- cil declared its previous decision on December 16, 1925, final.32 Though Iraq did not participate directly in the Council's disposition of this affair, it nevertheless cooperated with the Commission of Enquiry by supplying information, including a memorandum submitted by the King 83 There were discrepan- cies between the Turkish and British figures on the various racial and religious groups in the area; the Commission, there- fore, used Iraqi figures as the most reliable. Furthermore, the government of Iraq appropriated 75,000 rupees toward the expenses of the Commission84 and appointed Sabi Bey as its representative to the Commission.35 On the non-governmental level the inhabitants of border areas sent to the League various communications expressing preferences for union with Iraq.36 When Mosul was awarded to Iraq feeling in Turkey ran high, and war was considered as an alternative to losing the province.37 The tension was eased when, having won their case in the League of Nations, Iraq and the United Kingdom signed a treaty with Turkey at Ankara on June 5, 1926, recognizing the Brussels Line as the frontier. Iraq agreed to pay to Turkey, for a period of twenty-five years, ten per cent of all royalties received from the Turkish Petroleum Company * League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1926, pp. 128, 191-192. * League of Nations, Official Journal, April 1926, p. 503. * League of Nations doc. C.400.M.147.1925.VII., pp. 6-7. 24 Al-Hassani, Cabinets, I, 147. 85 League of Nations doc. C.400.M.147.1925.VII., p. 6. * League of Nations doc. C.82.1926.VII., pp. 1-2. 87 Longrigg, p. 156. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly 53 and from persons, companies, or subsidiary companies, which might be authorized to exploit oil under the concession of March 14, 1925, given to the Turkish Petroleum Company.88 Thus the question of the frontier between Iraq and Turkey was definitely settled. The settlement was re-affirmed in the Turkish-Iraqi Agreement signed in February 1946.39 Iraq's Attitude toward the Mosul Decision In expressing Iraq's deep interest in Mosul, King Faisal I told the Commission of Enquiry that it would be impossible, both strategically and economically, for a Government in Baghdad to live if Mosul is detached from it ... nor can a real life be hoped for the people of Iraq without Mosul. . . . Therefore I consider that Mosul is to Iraq as the head is to the rest of the body, and it is my unshakeable conviction that, though the question is only one of fixing a boundary between Iraq and Turkey, it is nevertheless and in fact the question of the Iraq as a whole. Accordingly, the happiness or misery of four millions of human beings is placed in the hands of the members of your honourable Commission. 40 The speech from the throne on July 16, 1925, expressed con- fidence in the honesty, right and justice of the Commission. 41 Therefore, because of the importance of Mosul to Iraq and Iraq's confidence in the League, the decision awarding Mosul to Iraq considerably affected Iraq's attitude toward the League. An adverse decision would have created frustration and bitterness, especially since Iraq had been unwillingly placed under the mandate. There would have been reverberations in other parts of the Arab world, particularly in the light of their past experiences with Ottoman rule. Hejaz, the first Arab state to be associated with the League as an original member, had sent a telegram to the Council stating that * Articles 1, 14, see League of Nations, Treaty Series, LXIV (1927), 383, 387. ** Longrigg, p. 336. “ League of Nations doc. C.400.M.147.1925.VII., p. 7. 41 Al-Hassani, Cabinets, I, 173. 54 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Mosul was an “inseparable part of Arab territories” and “should [the] League act in disregard to this fact [the] Arabs will consider themselves free to take every precaution to safeguard their rights."42 The Iraqis welcomed the Council decision to award Mosul to Iraq: the press was jubilant, work stopped and there was much feasting. 48 On December 17, 1925, the day following the Council's decision, Iraq's prime minister telegraphed to Geneva his country's “deeply felt thanks for the just resolution ... which has been received in all parts of Iraq with greatest satisfaction.” 44 However, Iraq did resent the continuation of the mandate for twenty-five years. When the new Anglo- Iraqi treaty giving effect to the Council's decision was ratified, it was passed by the Iraqi house of representatives only over stormy opposition. 46 On the whole, however, the Council's action in the Mosul affair tended to predispose the people of Iraq favorably toward the League. SYRIA-IRAQ BORDER QUESTION, 1931-1932 Another border dispute before the League Council was also settled on terms Iraq considered satisfactory. The question of the frontier between Iraq and Syria did not affect as much territory nor as large a population as did that of Mosul. Furthermore, it involved no oil deposits. Nevertheless, the question was one of considerable importance to Iraq because settling it favorably would have defined Iraq's western frontier, established better control over tribal matters, 46 and enhanced Iraq's position for admission to the League. The boundary between Iraq and Syria was dealt with « League of Nations doc. C.427.1924.VII. * Al-Hassani, Cabinets, I, 189. * League of Nations doc. C.829.M.285.1925.VII. * Al-Hassani, Cabinets, I, 192. The author gives an interesting account of this excited session. - For a discussion of the tribal difficulties in the Syrian-Iraqi border area, see Longrigg, pp. 160, 218. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly 55 in the Franco-British convention of December 23, 1920,47 which called for establishing a commission "to trace on the spot the boundary line.” It also stipulated in Article 2 that "in case any dispute should arise in connection with the work of the commission, the question shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations, whose decision shall be final.” 48 In 1921, an attempt to trace the boundary failed because it did not take into account the local conditions of the area. 49 Another Anglo-French attempt in 1929 also resulted in failure, not only because of the same difficulties as in 1921, but also because both sides found themselves disagreeing about the interpretation of the convention itself.50 Consequently, in identical notes, dated November 10 and November 11, 1931, France and Great Britain requested the League Council to settle the problem.51 On December 9, 1931, the Council established a Commission of Enquiry to investigate, collect information on the spot, and make recommendations.52 The chairman of this Commission was Colonel Jame De Reynier of Switzerland, former president of the Danzig Harbour and Water Ways Board, Commissioner of Plebiscite Archives in the Saar Territory, and former chairman of the mixed Greco- Bulgarian Emigration Commission. Other members were: Pedro Marrades, Commercial Attaché at the Spanish Embassy in Berlin, and former Spanish Consul at Damascus, Jerusalem, i Beirut, and Sète; and Carl Petersén, who was a Swedish citizen, Director of a section at the Secretariat of the International League of Red Cross Societies. Unfortunately, De Reynier met with a fatal airplane accident while en route from Damascus to Baghdad, and Colonel Frederic Iselin, also of Switzerland, was appointed the new chairman.58 " For text of Convention, see League of Nations, Treaty Series, XXII (1924), 355-361. 48 Ibid., Article 2, p. 357. - League of Nations doc. C.843.1931.VI., p. 3. 50 Ibid., p. 4. 61 Ibid., pp. 1-6. 5 League of Nations doc. C.578.M.285.1932.VI., p. 11. 68 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 56 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ The Commission proceeded to the area in March 1932, where it was joined by C. J. Edmonds, 54 advisor to the Ministry of Interior, and Colonel Sabih Najib,65 Director-General of the Iraqi Police.58 During its investigation on the Iraqi side, the Commission interviewed Iraqi officials and nationals and was assisted by Iraq in its undertaking. 57 On September 10, 1932, the Com- mission submitted to the Council of the League a report which outlined a boundary between Iraq and Syria.58 The Council considered the report of the Commission of Enquiry on October 3, 1932—the same day that Iraq joined the League—and declared itself “disposed to adopt as a final settlement of the frontier between Iraq and Syria” the border line recommended in the report. However, the Council also requested the Perma- nent Mandates Commission to give an opinion on whether this frontier was in the best interests of the territories concerned. 59 At the same meeting, acting upon a joint Franco-British request, the Council decided to appoint a neutral chairman with arbitral powers for a demarcation commission.60 In a meeting on November 25, 1932,61 the Council accepted the Mandates Commission's views and declared that the conclusions of its Commission of Enquiry were final.62 Iraq, like the United Kingdom and France, had accepted * He later joined the Iraqi Delegation to the League for various sessions. See Appendix, XXVI. ** Like Edmonds, he also joined the Iraqi delegations to the League. He was at one time Iraq's Permanent Representative to the League. See Appendix XXVI. 6League of Nations doc. C.578.M.285.1932.VI., p. 12. ** Ibid., pp. 13-14. 58 For the report of the Commission entrusted by the Council to study the frontier between Iraq and Syria, see League of Nations doc. C.578.M.285.1932.VI. 5° League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1932, pp. 1751- 1752. 60 Ibid., p. 1752. 01 For the report of the Permanent Mandates Commission to the Council, see: League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1932, p. 2260. Iraq, having just joined the League, participated in this meeting. * League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1932, p. 1955. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly 57 in advance the decision of the Council, 83 and a speech from the throne expressed Iraq's relief at the settlement of this problem.64 Having obtained advantageous decisions on its frontier problems with both Turkey and Syria, Iraq now could look forward to participate as a member of the League of Nations. However, before the latter border dispute ended, Iraq had become involved in another dispute, the Assyrian question. This problem had serious consequences because it affected Iraq's international prestige as a new state in the family of nations. It affected Iraq's undertakings in the Council on the protection of minorities before becoming a member of the League, and this question became an argument to bolster colonialism in Arab territories. THE ASSYRIAN QUESTION, 1932-1937 The Assyrian question concerned several mountain tribes who had revolted against Turkey during World War I and had fled to Iraq. “This small group of tribes, quarrelsome, ignorant, and poor,” as one writer put it, was united by strange and romantic heritage. . . . They acknowledged spiritual headship of a hereditary Patriarch, the Mar-Shimun, who also exercised a vague but consider- able authority of a more general kind. It was a misfortune that at this crisis in their history the Mar-Shimun was a young and inexperienced man, not lacking in courage, but narrow, obstinate, and unable to distinguish between the interests of his office and that of the people as a whole. His fixed idea was to see all the Assyrian tribes settled side by side under his spiritual and temporal authority, and enjoying a condition of autonomy save for the allegiance which they would owe, through him, to the King of Iraq.65 The desire of refugees to return to their former homes was * League of Nations, Official Journal, November 1932, p. 1862. " Al-Hassani, Cabinets, III, 258. 05 Walters, II, 574-575. 58 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ land in thelistrict. In e return acceptable to the United Kingdom and Iraq, but Turkey refused to accept their return.66 During the Mosul negotia- tions the Commission of Enquiry and Turkey turned down British attempts to place some Assyrian villages in Turkey on the Iraqi side of the Brussels Line.67 In June 1932 As- syrian leaders drew up a national pact in which they demanded recognition as an almost completely autonomous group, not merely as a racial or religious community. They demanded a province in Iraq with a headquarters at Dahouk open to all Assyrians, or, as an alternative, the return of their former homes in the Hakkiari district. In addition they demanded registration of land in their name, provision of funds, priority for Assyrians in administrative appointments in their area, recognition of the temporal and ecclesiastical authority of the Mar-Shimun, retention of their rifles, and an Assyrian deputy in the Iraqi parliament.68 These demands contained in the Assyrian national pact were unreasonable and impractical. As mentioned above, Turkey, supported by the Commission of Enquiry on Mosul, had refused to include the former homes of the Assyrians in Hakkiari as part of the area awarded to Iraq.69 On the other hand, Turkey refused to permit the Assyrians to return to Turkish territory. 7° As to the Assyrian demand for a province in Iraq, yielding would bring similar claims from the many other racial and religious groups, and it would involve the eviction of another minority, the Kurds. R. S. Stafford, com- menting on this Assyrian demand for a province, stated that "every effort had been made to find such lands but simply they did not exist." 71 Iraq also felt that it had already accepted more than its share of Assyrians and that it would be un- reasonable to expect Iraq to open its doors to more of them. ** See, R. S. Stafford, The Tragedy of the Assyrians (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1935), pp. 39, 40, 118; League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1932, Annex 1418 A, Appendix I, p. 2291. 87 Walters, I, 308-309. * For text of this Assyrian national pact, see Stafford, p. 117. • Walters, I, 308-309. 70 Stafford, pp. 40, 118. 11 Ibid., p. 119. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly 61 unable to settle in Iraq to go to some other country to live and requested Iraq to keep it informed.78 These measures having been adopted, Nouri Al-Said ex- pressed Iraq's sympathy for the hardships the Assyrians had undergone and assured the Council that his government would do its utmost to carry out its obligations under this resolution.rº The representative of the United Kingdom then stated that there would seem to be no reason why the Assyrians should not find in Iraq the prosperity, security and contentment which everyone wished for them. But their future lay largely in their own hands; it must be to their own interest to abandon impractical ideals, to face up to the facts and, following the advice given by the Permanent Mandate Com- mission last year, to become good and loyal citizens of the Iraqi state. 80 He felt sure that the Iraqi government would ... treat the Assyrians gener- ously and well; by so doing, it would not only gain a new and valuable source of strength to its country, but, what was more important, it would have established the good faith of Iraq before the nations of the world. 81 Iraq's Attempts at a Settlement The government of Iraq informed the League on May 14, 1933, that a newly appointed foreign expert would help with the settlement plan, that a Special Settlement Committee had been established in Mosul, that an advisory board composed of Assyrian leaders would assist the Special Settlement Commit- tee, that land titles and substantial remittances were promised Assyrians coming under the land settlement plan, that the next budget would include an appropriation for this plan, and *Ibid., p. 1985. 70 Ibid. * Ibid. a Ibid. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ that work on it would begin in the Dischtazi district in the near future.82 In a parallel effort to solve the problem, the government of Iraq attempted to establish an understanding with the leader of the Assyrian community because of his un-cooperative attitude toward Iraq's settlement plan and the strong influence he was capable of exercising upon his followers. So he was invited to come to Baghdad, 83 where the Minister of the In- terior asked him to sign an undertaking that recognized him as a spiritual leader, but wherein he would promise to refrain from acts that would make land settlement difficult. 84 The Mar-Shimun refused to sign the undertaking and in- cluded in his reply a statement reaffirming his own temporal authority: This Patriarchal authority is a great historical and tra- ditional usage of the Assyrian people and Church and it has been one of the established and most important customs. The temporal power has not been assumed by me but it has descended to me from centuries past as a legalised delegation of the people to the Patriarch.85 Thus the Mar-Shimun was adamant in refusing to admit the historical changes that had occurred since the day his predecessors received temporal power. The Iraqi government, unable to reverse the course of history, could make no exception in the Assyrian case. Negotiations between the Mar-Shimun and the government continued without result88 and ended in failure, as was probably inevitable. The situation deteriorated and the government detained the Mar-Shimun in Baghdad to prevent his non-cooperative attitude from disrupting the 82 League of Nations, Official Journal, June 1933, p. 737; League of Nations doc. C.322.1933.VI. 88 Stafford, pp. 124-125. ** For text of the letter, see League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1933, Appendix to Annex 1478 B, p. 1791. For various documents on the Assyrian question, see Annex 1478, pp. 1784-1841. ** Ibid., p. 1792. 86 Stafford, p. 129. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly settlement program, which would have adversely affected the prestige of the government. In spite of the difficulties with the Mar-Shimun, the govern- ment called a meeting of Assyrian leaders in Mosul in order to explain the settlement program. The Mutassarif (Governor) of Mosul addressed the gathering. He explained that his government would receive those Assyrians who wished to establish themselves in Iraq, would facilitate the departure of those who wished to leave, would employ qualified As- syrians in governmental posts, and would engage the services of a foreign expert to assist in carrying out the program. He requested the Assyrians to hand over some of their rifles, in keeping with the government's policy of reducing the arms held by the various tribes in the country. 87 The Mutassarif went on to explain that Iraq recognized the Assyrians in the same manner as it recognized other religious sects, but could not grant temporal rule to any individual, the Mar-Shimun not excepted. The government would treat each person directly and on an individual basis. The Administrative Inspector, Colonel Stafford, also ad- dressed the conference. He encouraged the Assyrians to live in Iraq as Iraqi citizens and to communicate with the govern- ment. In regard to their possible immigration to another country, he explained that since there were Armenian refu- gees in Syria, the French authorities were unable to take in any more refugees. Furthermore, Turkey did not want to take them, and Persia would only accept a few, on the condition that they hand over their rifles to the Persian authorities. Stafford explained that they would live scattered in various areas, would receive no financial assistance and would not acquire the right to land allotted to them in Persia. As to the situation in other countries, he explained that owing to the world economic situation no country was in a position to accept Assyrian immigrants. He concluded his address with the statement that the Assyrians should apply for land, or for their right to culti- vate it and to live in Iraq as Iraqi citizens, as had other on For text of statement, see League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1933, pp. 1803-1804. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly 65 of life and destruction, and in the heat of the uprising high- handed measures were taken. On August 6, Iraq informed the League that the Mar- Shimun and his followers had obstructed the settlement efforts, that Iraq was willing to take back unarmed Assyrians, and that the French authorities had allowed Syria to be used as a base for incursions into Iraq.86 The Council's Attempts to Settle the Problem, 1933-1937. On August 31, 1933, the representatives of the Irish Free State, Mexico and Norway requested the Council to take up the Assyrian question anew.97 Subsequently the government of Iraq on September 20, 1933, stated that owing to the past events the question required de novo consideration.98 On October 14, 1933, the Council again dealt with the Assyrian Question. The representative of Iraq, Yassin Al- Hashimi,99 recalled his government's efforts to settle the As- syrian people and said that, owing to obstruction and the subsequent rebellion, further progress had become impossible. He reiterated his government's charge that the French author- ities in Syria had re-armed the Assyrians before their return to Iraq. In regard to the excesses that had occurred during the fighting, Al-Hashimi announced that Iraq “deplored them no less sincerely than the governments represented in the Coun- cil.” 100 He informed the Council of Iraq's measures to establish peace and order and to relieve suffering. Under the circum- stances, the efforts of the Iraqi authorities to provide a new home for the Assyrians had been of no avail. Iraq, therefore, requested the Council to consider ways and means to place in some other country those Assyrians who either wished to leave or refused to cooperate with the Iraqi authorities, as had been * League of Nations, Official Journal, October 1933, pp. 1112- 1113. or League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1933, Annex 1478, p. 1784. es Ibid., Annex 1479, p. 1830. " See Appendix XXVI. 100 League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1933, p. 1645. 66 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ contemplated in the Council's resolution of December 15, 1932. To this end Iraq sought the assistance of the League and expressed its willingness to help. 101 The Council took note of Iraq's assurances that it was deter- mined, using all its powers, to prevent a repetition of such incidents. It noted that what most hampered solving the Assyrian question was that some Assyrians refused to become a part of the Iraqi community and that, consequently, those Assyrians would prefer to settle down in some other place. Accordingly the Council decided to establish a committee com- posed of representatives of Denmark, France, Italy, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. The committee was to cooperate with the government of Iraq to help relocate Assyrians wishing to make their home in another country.102 In the search for new places, some hope was aroused when Brazil proposed to establish Assyrians on the estates of the Parana Plantation at an estimated cost of £600,000. The plan seemed to provide a way out, but it had to be abandoned owing to the failure of the League to bear the cost. Another reason for failure was a new, severe anti-immigration law passed by the Brazilian Congress in June 1934.103 The Council Committee then considered a British offer for settling the Assyrians in the uplands of British Guiana. After surveying the region, this idea was also abandoned, because the land could not support the whole Assyrian community and anyhow, the transfer would of necessity be slow and on an experimental basis. 104 In the meantime, Assyrians who had been interned during the uprising of August 1933, had moved with their families to a new home along the bank of the upper Khabur in Syria. By 1935 six thousand Assyrians had come to live there. 105 A new program for an Assyrian colony in the Ghab region of Syria was considered in 1935. The Council Committee was 201 For text of statement, see League of Nations, Official Journal, December 1933, pp. 1644-1646. 102 Ibid., pp. 1647-1649. 103 Walters, II, 576. 104 Ibid., II, 576-577. 206 Ibid. Disputes involving Iraq Directly 69 Iraqis, including King Faisal 1,120 believed that the Council resolutions had dissipated in the minds of many Assyrians the hope of obtaining an autonomous province in Iraq, and had furthered agreements with other powers to give a new home to the Assyrians. In addition, the debate in the League enabled Iraq to present to the world its point of view. A speech from the throne on November 1, 1933, expressed satisfaction with the results achieved at Geneva.121 On the whole, Iraqis seemed to believe that the decisions of the Council had been reasonable and favorable to their country and consequently looked with favor upon the League. THE IRAQI-PERSIAN BOUNDARY DISPUTE, 1934-1937122 Before the League had disposed of the question of Iraq's borders with Syria, the Assyrian question came before the Council. Again, before the Council had settled the problem of the Assyrians, Iraq became involved in a boundary dispute with Persia, a dispute in which Iraq ultimately received most of what it wanted. The government of Iraq, on November 29, 1934, charged Persia with "persistent disregard and violation" of the Iraqi- Persian boundary lines which had been established by the Treaty of Erzerum of 1847, the Constantinople Protocol of November 4, 1913, and by the Delimitation Commission of 1914. Other means of composing the controversy having failed, Iraq requested the Council of the League to deal with it under Article 11, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant. The charge also referred to instances which Iraq regarded as “flagrant acts of aggression.” 123 100 King Faisal I went as far as to request his government to accept back Assyrians from Syria even though they would be armed. Al- Hassani, Cabinets, III, 175. 121 Ibid., p. 214. 1* Persia officially took the name Iran in March 1935—Lenczowski, p. 161. 123 For text of request see: League of Nations doc. C.531(1).M.- 242(1).1934.VII. 70 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Nouri Al-Said presented Iraq's case to the Council on Jan- uary 14, 1935. He stated that the difficulties stemmed from Persian interference with navigation on Shatt Al-Arab, 124 establishment of police posts and patrols on Iraqi territory, un- lawful claims to a small strip of territory called Sarkoshk, and damming of the Gunjan Cham river. 125 Iraq insisted that the boundary lines had been fixed by the instruments mentioned above and that, accordingly, the left bank of the Shatt Al-Arab constituted the frontier. Iraq argued that, consequently, except for the Muhammerah Anchorage, Persia could claim sovereignty over no other part of · the river. Iraq recognized the thalweg as constituting the boundary, but insisted that a boundary on the bank of a river could be agreed upon between states. It requested the Council to arrange for a judicial body to examine this question where- upon other matters would be settled by negotiation. Pending the legal decision, Iraq requested the Council to obtain from the Persian government an undertaking that it would respect the boundary as delimited earlier and that, in particular, Persian warships would abide by the Iraqi rules and regulations at the port of Basra. 128 The Council appointed Baron Aloisi of Italy as its Rap- porteur,127 and on January 21, 1935, he stated that he needed more time to complete his inquiries and proposed that the Council postpone the discussion until its next session 128 Iraq expressed regret that the Council was not able to advance further toward composing the dispute, or even to deal pro- visionally with it. Iraq offered to refer the question to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory opinion, promised to prevent incidents that would aggravate the situation, and called upon Persia to act similarly. 129 Persia 14 Shatt Al-Arab is the river formed by the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers north of Basra, Iraq's only port; it empties into the Persian Gulf. 125 League of Nations, Official Journal, February 1935, p. 114. 198 Ibid., pp. 114-117. 127 Ibid., p. 117. 18 Ibid., pp. 190, 192. 190 Ibid., p. 190. 72 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ various international controversies. Sullaiman, the Prime Min- ister who concluded the treaty, held that since the British alone benefited from Shatt Al-Arab there should be no dispute between Iraq and Persia.137 During the negotiations Turkey, because Italy occupied Abyssinia in 1935, used its good offices to bring the disputants to an agreement, in the hope that both would join a regional security pact in the Middle East, the so-called Sa'dabad Pact.188 Toynbee asserts that a feeling of insecurity on the part of the small powers also contributed to the settlement. He states that it was not the diplomatic action of the League Council's Italian Rapporteur Baron Aloisi in Europe, but the military action of Baron Aloisi's master in Africa that brought the two middle eastern disputants to reason.189 The Sa'dabad Pact was signed on July 8, 1937, four days after the boundary treaty. The speech from the throne on December 23, 1937, stated that the boundary treaty signed between Iraq and Iran and the Sa'dabad Pact firmly cemented friendly relations between the two states. 140 CONCLUSIONS During Iraq's association with the League of Nations it had been a direct party to four disputes. Three were dealt with while Iraq was a member of the League, but two had been on the agenda of the League Council at the time Iraq was ad- mitted to membership. That meant that Iraq had been involved in disputes before the League for a period of almost eight years. This situation put considerable strain on a small, new state that was still a less developed country. On the other hand, it provided Iraq with a store of experience which helped pre- pare the young state for its future participation in the 187 Al-Hassani, History, III, 327. 138 Khadduri, p. 246. 140 Quoted by Khadduri, p. 246. 140 Al-Hassani, Cabinets, V, 19. Disputes Involving Iraq Directly United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco and, later, in the United Nations. The hearings of, and deliberations on, the disputes in the League of Nations offered Iraq a forum where it gained experience in presenting and pleading cases and in the formal- ities of submitting proposals. It also learned something about the important behind-the-scenes negotiations that usually take place before the formal deliberations come under way. In this way, Iraq acquired greater experience in, and knowledge of, the art of diplomacy and the procedures of international organiza- tions than many another League member. It so happened that the disputes in which Iraq then was, or had been involved were settled to its satisfaction, wherefore the nation became favorably disposed toward international organi- zations as such. In the Mosul dispute the Permanent Court of International Justice had made a favorable decision, so Iraq also wanted the Court to assist in settling the dispute with Persia. Later, in the United Nations, Iraq proposed submitting legal issues in connection with the Palestine problem to the decision of the International Court of Justice. To summarize: Iraq, on the basis of its own experience, had reason to be favorably disposed toward international organizations for solving difficult problems. However, Iraq's experience was not matched by other Arab territories, such as Syria, Lebanon and Palestine, where decisions in the League of Nations were unfavorable. Iraq shared the disappointment of these Arab countries. But it was to be even more disap- pointed by the manner in which the United Nations was to handle the question of Palestine. In fact, its feeling of disap- pointment on this score was unequalled in the records of Iraq's participation in the work of international organizations. CHAPTER V Iraq's Views On Other Disputes In four disputes before the League of Nations Iraq obtained most of what it aspired to for itself. They were disputes in which it had a direct and vital interest, but Iraq was also greatly concerned about the independence of the other Arab countries. However, in the League of Nations Iraq was not successful in its efforts on behalf of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. SYRIA AND LEBANON Syria and Lebanon were liberated from Ottoman domina- tion during World War I. But like Iraq they were established as Class “Ă” Mandates, and France was entrusted with their administration as the mandatory power. The question of Syria and Lebanon, despite certain set- backs, furnished Iraq with another reason for taking a favor- able view of international organizations. For the pressure generated by the Arabs on France at the San Francisco Conference, and later at the United Nations, contributed to the final establishment of both countries as completely independent states. The very first speech an Iraqi representative made at the League of Nations Assembly in 1932 contained a statement concerning independence for Syria and Lebanon. It is im- * League of Nations, Assembly, Thirteenth Session (1932), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 49. 74 Iraq's Views On Other Disputes 75 portant to note that in this speech Syrians, Lebanese and Palestinians were referred to as “brothers." In 1934, Iraq stated that the educated and highly trained people of Syria were capable of self-government, and expressed its hope for Syrian membership in the League. In 1936, there was satis- faction at Syria's apparent emancipation from the mandate system, as there was disappointment in 1937, when it became clear that the French Parliament would not ratify the agree- ment ending the mandate over Syria and Lebanon. Again in 1938, Iraq stated its hope for the early emancipation of Syria. Thus in the six years from 1932 to 1938, Iraq's steady and consistent urging of independence for Syria and Lebanon achieved no notable results. But later, before and during the San Francisco Conference of 1945, Iraq together with members of the Arab League revived the pressure for the final emancipation of Syria and Lebanon from their mandate status, and this time with success.? THE PALESTINE QUESTION IN THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS The question of Palestine was not presented as a formal issue to the League Assembly, but was discussed in the debate on mandates before the Sixth Committee (Political Questions) and the plenary meetings of the Assembly. From 1932 to 1939 Iraq's position remained consistent. On October 3, 1932, the day of its admission into the League * League of Nations, Assembly, Fifteenth Session (1934), Official Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 73. • League of Nations, Assembly, Fifteenth Session (1934), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 75. * League of Nations, Assembly, Seventeenth Session (1936), Official Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 49. • League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 66. • League of Nations, Assembly, Nineteenth Session (1938), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 64. 'For further discussion on Iraq's attitude on the question of Syria and Lebanon, see Chapter VII, pp. 105-108. 76 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ of Nations, Iraq called for the emancipation of Palestine from the mandate system, and in 1934 argued that Palestine "had many qualifications” which entitled it to independence and membership in the League. Two years later Sabih Najib hoped for an early solution that would ensure to the Arabs their legitimate rights, and would be satisfactory and conciliatory and thus contribute toward the prosperity and tranquility of the Near East.10 Tawfik Al-Swaidy informed the Assembly in 1937 that no solution could be applied without the consent of the original inhabitants of Palestine who, despite the Jewish immigration, still constituted two-thirds of the population 11 Also in 1937 Iraq informed the League that the only solu- tion to the problem of Palestine would be the establishment of a united independent Palestinian state with "the strongest constitutional guarantees for the liberties of all its citizens.” 12 Answering the representative of Norway, who distinguished between the Arab and Jewish civilizations and concluded that they clashed because of the more advanced civilization of the Jews, the representative of Iraq informed the League that like other countries, Palestine had its peasantry and also its highly urban inhabitants. He also recalled the statements of the representative of Egypt, who had outlined the role of Arab civilization, including that of Palestine, in the develop- ment of European civilization. Iraq added that if the dif- ference between Jewish and Arab civilizations implied a distinction comparable to that existing between European pioneers and the people of “darkest Africa,” then, in Iraq's * League of Nations, Assembly, Thirteenth Session (1932), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 49. ° League of Nations, Assembly, Fifteenth Session (1934), Official Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 73. 1° League of Nations, Assembly, Seventeenth Session (1936), Offi- cial Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 50. u League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Plenary, p. 66. "League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 39. Iraq's Views On Other Disputes 77 opinion, the sooner the situation changed, the better it would be for all concerned.18 Moreover, since the mandate over Palestine endorsed the Balfour Declaration 14 Iraq challenged the legal validity of the regime there as being contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations. Iraq added that "the only legal basis for the status of Palestine is the Covenant as a whole and Article 22 in particular. Every accretion which is contrary to the letter or spirit of this article must be regarded as null and void.” 15 The Balfour Declaration, said the Iraqi representative, in- volved giving away something that already belonged to others, and Iraq would not concede the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine, nor in any part of it. In order to dispel Arab fears and misunderstandings the British government had pub- lished the "Churchill Memorandum" in June 1922.18 Iraq put it to the League members whether they themselves would recognize a document such as the Balfour Declaration as a legal instrument of "unimpeachable validity," if it con- cerned their own territories. Recalling British promises to King Husain that included Palestine in the territory of the contem- plated Arab State which was to be established at the end of World War I, Iraq stated that Palestine belonged to the Arabs by natural right, and so there was no need of any promise to validate that right.1? Iraq informed the League of Nations that for racial and religious, economic and strategical reasons, it was vitally concerned about the Palestine question.18 It added that the inhabitants of Palestine being Arabs like the Iraqis, “Iraq can- not remain indifferent” to the fate of Palestine; further, that any disorder in the Holy Land “must have repercussions in 18 Ibid., p. 38. 14 Izzeddin, p. 226. 15 League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Plenary, p. 66. 10 League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 38. 17 Ibid. 18 League of Nations, Official Journal, August-September 1937, p. 660. 78 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Iraq," wherefore "the maintenance of public order and tran- quility is at stake.” Under these circumstances, the representa- tive of Iraq declared that "we shall not abate our efforts to secure justice for our brethren." 19 Because of Iraq's vital interest in Palestine it declared before the League that it felt "the greatest pain and anxiety” in regard to the situation in Palestine.20 In 1938 Iraq stated that“ the longer a solution acceptable to our brothers, the autochthonous inhabitants of the country, is delayed, the more the situation will become difficult and dangerous.” 21 Therefore Iraq again expressed the view that the only real solution would be one that would ensure the rights of the Arab people.22 - Iraq's Attitude toward the Partition of Palestine Iraq maintained that according to the Covenant of the League no solution of the problem of Palestine could be valid unless “acceptable to the original inhabitants of the country." Therefore, any plan for the partition of Palestine imposed and carried out against the will of the inhabitants would be con- trary to the Covenant and also would be "doomed from the outset to failure.” 23 Thus in 1937 when a British Royal Commission submitted a plan for the partition of Palestine, Iraq, in a letter dated July 31, 1937, addressed to the Secretary-General, reiterated its vital concern with the Palestine question. Iraq's earlier efforts for peace and order were recalled, as were its obliga- tions to assist in a permanent solution of the problem. Conse- quently, Iraq lodged an "emphatic” protest against this 19 League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 67. 20 League of Nations, Assembly, Seventeenth Session (1936), Offi- cial Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 50. * League of Nations, Assembly, Nineteenth Session (1938), Offi- cial Journal, Plenary, p. 64. » Ibid. * League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Plenary, p. 66. 80 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Iraq asked why "a grateful Europe was proposing to reward the Jews for their services to philosophy and the arts by grant- ing them, not a smiling province or two in Europe, but some- body else's property in Asia.” 28 Iraq stated its conviction that "it was no remedy to make Palestine suffer" for Europe's economic difficulties and the Jewish problem.29 Iraq believed that Palestine should not be "sacrificed or made an international problem" in order to "provide a solution for the domestic problems of other governments.” 30 Despite Iraq's opposition to Jewish immigration, "over 500,000 foreign Jews” entered Palestine during the twenty-five years of British mandate over that territory. 81 Again, even though Iraq opposed Jewish immigration into Palestine, it nevertheless undertook to propose measures for the solution of the Jewish problem. Iraq's concern about the Jews was also evidenced by the attitude it adopted in regard to protective measures for this religious group in various parts of the world. Iraq's Attitude toward the Jews From the outset Iraq made it clear that its quarrel was not with the Jews as such; rather, the difficulties it encountered stemmed from the Zionists' aims in Palestine. Thus Jafar Al- Askari declared in the League that "the Jews—the cousins of the Arabs—were a very noble and proud race, having a common ancestor with the Arabs—Abraham." 32 * League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Sixth Committee, pp. 37-38. 20 Ibid., p. 39. * League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Plenary, p. 67. * United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, 1947, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, Sixth Meeting, p. 27, hereinafter cited in the form U.N., GA.II(1947), ORs. ... * League of Nations, Assembly, Fifteenth Session (1934), Offi- cial Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 73. Iraq's Views On Other Disputes :: 81 Iraq called attention to the non-existence of a Jewish prob- lem in the Near and Middle East. Jews in Iraq comprised a large and prosperous community within the state; Jews, Moslems and Christians all enjoyed the same rights in the country, and the only distinction was between an Iraqi citizen and an alien.38 However, since there were various prejudices against Jews in many states, Iraq wanted the League of Nations to call an international conference to draft a convention on the protection of Jews.34 Summary: Iraq and Palestine in the League of Nations : During all the years that Iraq was a member of the League of Nations its position on Palestine remained consistent and firm. Palestine belonged to the people who inhabited it, and there could be no solution to the Palestine problem except by the establishment of an independent state. Study of the text of speeches made in the League of Nations by Iraqi delegates suggests that they and their Foreign Office would be particu- larly well prepared to participate in discussion of the Palestine problem when it finally reached the United Nations in 1947. In the meantime, however, Iraq and the other Arab states had one more opportunity at San Francisco to prepare themselves for the Palestine crises that were to occupy so much time and attention of the United Nations after 1947.35 PALESTINE IN THE UNITED NATIONS Iraq's basic view on the principles of Arab rights in Palestine have undergone no fundamental change since the original statement in the League of Nations Assembly in 1932. This is evidenced by the statements made by Iraqi representa- * League of Nations, Assembly, Eighteenth Session (1937), Offi- cial Journal, Sixth Committee, p. 38. "For a discussion of Iraq's attitude on the question of minorities, see Chapter VI, pp. 92-93. ** Iraq's position on Palestine during the San Francisco Conference is treated in Chapter VII, pp. 115-121, 110-111. DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ tives in 1947 and 1958. In 1947 Nouri Al-Said informed the United Nations that: In 1917, Mr. Balfour had promised to promote the estab- lishment of a Jewish National Home without prejudice to the rights of the non-Jewish communities. The anxious Arab rulers had been assured by the British Government that politically it was not intended that the Jewish National Home should be a State. The United Kingdom had maintained that point of view in its military proclamations of 1917, 1918 and 1919, [in] the White Papers of 1922, 1930 and 1939, [in] its parliamentary statements and [in] its annual reports to the League of Nations. He added that the Government of the United Kingdom had stated that: it would indeed regard as contrary to its obligations to the Arabs under the Mandate as well as to the assurances which had been given to the Arab people in the past, that the Arab population of Palestine should be made the subjects of a Jewish State against their wish. According to the Command Paper of 1922, the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was not the imposition of a Jewish nation- ality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole but (was supposed to] further development of the existing Jewish community in order that it might become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole, on grounds of religion and race, might take an interest and a pride.36 In 1958, Hashim Jawad in his first intervention in the general debate of the United Nations General Assembly as representative of the new Government of Iraq, stated that the most important aspect of the struggle between Arab national- ism and foreign domination was the Palestine problem, charac- terizing it as being "in reality the core of the instability and strife in the area.” He said: The creation of Israel in the heart of the Arab world, at the U.N., GA.II(1947), ORs, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question, 6th mtg., p. 26. Iraq's Views On Other Disputes 83 expense of, and in violation of the rights of, the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Palestine, constituted an act of unparalleled historical injustice. Even now, after it has become abundantly clear that Israel is the main source of danger to the peace of the area, that country is being given military assistance. We have seen the use to which Israel has put the weapons supplied to it by its Western friends. Israel's repeated acts of aggression against its Arab neighbours have been condemned by the Security Council. However, we are now more than ever convinced that Israel was not created solely for the purpose of finding a home for the Jews, but primarily to make Israel an instru- ment that can be used whenever it becomes necessary to impose the will of some big Powers against the rising nations of the Arab East. This role of Israel as a willing tool of imperialism was amply demonstrated in the role it played as the spearhead of the tri-partite aggression against Egypt and more recently by its ill-concealed threats to take over the western bank of the river Jordan 37 Between 1947, when the West's staunchest ally Nouri Al- Said made one of his statements, and 1958, when the repre- sentative of the new Republican regime Hashim Jawad made the statement just quoted, Iraq had informed the United Nations in 1949 that "peace could not be achieved by a policy of expediency dictated by the fait accompli.” 38 Iraq believed that "unless and until the United Nations forced the Jews to recognize the Arabs' rights in Palestine and abide fully by its successive decisions there was no hope of a settlement.” 39 In 1950 Iraq had called upon the United Nations to resort to Article 41 of the Charter to bring about implementation U.N., GA.XIII(1958-1959), ORs, Plenary, 760th mtg., p. 179. Mr. Jawad appeared for the first time at the Fifteenth Session of the League of Nations Assembly (1936) as a secretary in the delegation of Iraq. * U.N., GA.IV(1949), ORs, Ad Hoc Political Committee, 47th mtg., p. 279. 30 U.N., GA.IV(1949), ORs, Plenary, 223rd mtg., p. 17. Iraq's Views On Other Disputes 85 League of Nations, at the United Nations Conference on In- ternational Organization, or in the United Nations. For many years Iraq repeatedly called upon the United Nations to implement its resolutions on the Palestine problem, but in vain. Iraq therefore has felt it necessary to lodge many strong protests on the matter, and the records of the League of Nations, the San Francisco Conference and the United Nations contain none stronger. CHAPTER VI Iraq's Attitude On Other Matters Iraq seldom played an active role in the League of Nations except on matters which it considered to be of direct and vital concern to itself, but it did participate in the debate on some important issues. Collective Security Iraq in its first statement to the League Assembly declared that it would “co-operate loyally and to the utmost of its ability” in the work of the Assembly "in the cause of universal peace and general prosperity." 1 While such interventions were not frequent they were usually to the point, as in 1938 when the principles of collective security were reaffirmed. In that same year Iraq supported the declaration of the United King- dom that action to be taken under Article 16 "cannot be determined in advance," and that each case should be con- sidered on its merits, because if "no unconditional obligation exists,” each member "would be the judge of the extent to which its own position would allow it to participate in any measures which might be proposed” under Article 16. How- ever, the declaration noted that a "general obligation" to * League of Nations, Assembly, Thirteenth Session (1932), Offi- cial Journal, Plenary, p. 49. * League of Nations, Assembly, Nineteenth Session (1938), Offi- cial Journal, Plenary, p. 63. 86 88 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ The position that Iraq took on the Ethiopian crisis served as a model in the case of Korea in 1950. Korea Iraq considered the United Nations by its intervention in Korea to have "carried out one of its basic and sacred duties ... to help South Korea against the invasion from North Korea,” 9 and therefore Iraq appreciated such action.10 However, owing to its limited military strength, Iraq informed the United Nations on July 30, 1950, “that the provision of arms and military equipment of the Iraq army have fallen so short that it is hardly capable at the present to meet the requirements of the internal security," wherefore it regretted its inability to respond to the appeal made by the Security Council to give effective assistance to the Republic of Korea. 11 Iraq voted in favor of a resolution that found Communist China: by giving direct aid and assistance to those who were already committing aggression in Korea and by engaging in hostilities against United Nations forces there, has itself engaged in aggression in Korea.12 Iraq also voted in favor of a resolution proposed by the additional Measures Committee and amended in the First Committee which recommended to every state to: apply an embargo on the shipment to areas under the control of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic • U.N., GA.VII(1952-1953), ORs, Plenary, 379th mtg., p. 30. 10 U.N., GA.IX(1954), ORs, Plenary, 479th mtg., p. 79. U.N. doc. S/1649, “Cablegram dated 30 July 1950 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq addressed to the Secretary-General in reply to the Secretary-General's Cablegram of 14 July 1950 (S/1619) concerning the Security Council Resolutions of 25 and 27 June, and 7 July 1950 (S/1501, S/1511, S/1588)," 31 July 1950, mimeographed. " U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), ORs, Plenary, 327th mtg., p. 696; U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), Resolutions, No. 498. Iraq's Attitude On Other Matters 89 of China and of the North Korean authorities of arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, petroleum, transportation materials of strategic value, and items useful in the production of arms, ammunition and implements of war.18 Moreover, each state was requested by this resolution to report within thirty days to the Additional Measures Committee on the measures which they undertook in accordance with this resolution. Iraq, on July 30, 1951, informed the United Nations that "the competent Iraqi authorities have taken all necessary steps within their power to make the embargo effective and to pre- vent any infringement and circumvention of the controls that have been applied.” 14 Thus Iraq in the Korean crisis followed a pattern very similar to that in the Ethiopian situation twenty-five years before. In both cases Iraq supported collective security action, including the imposition of an embargo on its own citizens. Regional Arrangements Iraq's support of the principle of collective security is also evidenced by the fact that since 1937 it has been a member of one form of regional arrangement or another. In 1937 Iraq concluded with Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey the Sa’dabad Pact.15 However, this regional arrangement "like its counterpart 18 U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), ORs, Annexes, Vol. II, Agenda item 76, pp. 20-22, doc. A/1799, “Report of the Additional Measures Com- mittee," 14 May 1951; U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), ORs, Plenary, 330th mtg., p. 742; and U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), Resolutions, No. 500. 14 U.N. doc. A/1841/Add.2, "Additional Measures to be Employed to meet the Aggression in Korea, Reports from governments on measures taken in accordance with General Assembly resolution 500 (V) of 18 May 1951," 9 August 1951, mimeographed, p. 3. * For the text of the Sa’dabad Pact, see: J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East (2 vols.: Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1956), II, 214. Iraq's Attitude On Other Matters 91 ing held in London in July 1958 and in Karachi in January 1959. Thus it can be said that Iraq has withdrawn from this alliance for all practical purposes since July 14, 1958. On March 24, 1959, Prime Minister Abdul Karim Kassim formally announced Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact.22 Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact does not mean, however, that Iraq's basic views on regional arrangements have changed. Iraq's continued membership in the Arab League makes it clear that it still supports regional arrange- ments, but has changed its preference. In conclusion, Iraq was well prepared for the concepts of regional self-defense set forth in Articles 51-54 of the United Nations Charter. This was the result of Iraq's experiences prior to 1945, which were such that it could accept regional arrange- ments when it came to signing the United Nations Charter and to continue its support of the principle of such arrangements in the United Nations.28 Economic and Social Questions Iraq, like some other small states in the League of Nations, was only mildly interested in the economic and social work of that organization. The primary reason for this was the fact that League of Nations efforts in the economic and social fields were heavily weighted in the direction of stabilizing the situa- tion in the developed countries. Little attention was given to under-developed new nations, of which Iraq was one. Iraq did believe that all members could learn from the knowledge and experience of one another. In 1938 it supported the work of the League's technical organizations and called upon member states to cooperate in the work of such organizations in order to help recover “lost ground” and to "ensure the realization” of the League's ideals.24 What little part Iraq took in discussion » The New York Times, March 25, 1959, p. 1. » For further discussion on Iraq's attitude toward regional arrange- ments see Chapter VII, pp. 121-125 and Chapter IX, pp. 152-153. 24 League of Nations, Assembly, Nineteenth Session (1938), Offi- cial Journal, p. 63. Iraq's Attitude On Other Matters 93 At the United Nations, despite the Arab-Zionist conflict, Iraq expressed its concern for the welfare of the Jews and re- quested that measures be taken for their protection.28 More- over, Iraq declared at the United Nations that it believed "all men should be free and equal in dignity and worth and should be entitled to similar treatment and equal opportunities.” 29 Evidence to support a conclusion that Iraq was ready for active participation in the work of the United Nations on minorities may be found in its continuous election to one of the bodies of the United Nations that deals with minority problems. Iraq was a member of the Human Rights Commis- sion from 1956 to 1958 and of the Social Commission from 1946 to 1950 and again from 1952 to 1956. . CONCLUSIONS Iraq was ready to and did participate in collective security measures in 1936, as it did in 1950. Iraq's own experience with regional arrangements prepared it for ready acceptance of Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Iraq's participation in the fields of economic and social de velopment at the League of Nations was limited. In the United Nations, however, Iraq more than many of the new states of the world possesses great natural resources that permit it to move ahead faster than many of its peers, and to participate actively in the debates and programs concerned with social and economic developments. 28 U.N., GA, First Special Session (1947), ORs, First Committee, 54th mtg., p. 260; U.N., GA, First Special Session (1947), ORs, General Committee, 31st mtg., p. 56; and United Nations, Secretariat, Yearbook of the United Nations, 1947-1948 (Department of Public Information: New York, 1949), pp. 126-129, hereinafter cited in the form U.N., Yearbook, 1947-1948. 29 U.N., GA.III, Part I (1948), ORs, Third Committee, 96th mtg., p. 100. CHAPTER VII Iraq's Participation At The United Nations Conference On International Organization Before Iraq came to the United Nations Conference on International Organization in 1945, it had already been asso ciated with the League of Nations since 1920, first as a man- dated territory, and from 1932 as a member of the League. During these years of contact with the League, Iraq had been able to obtain satisfactory solutions to four problems directly touching its national interests. In addition, the seven years of League membership had provided Iraq with diplomatic ex- perience and first-hand knowledge of the conduct and proce- dures of international conferences. The growth of educational facilities in Iraq had continued despite the war, a factor that was important in providing the personnel needed for adminis- tration and the conduct of foreign relations. Appendix VIII shows that between 1939 and 1946 the number of college stu- dents in Iraq rose at a progressive rate. Thus during 1938-1939 only 887 students attended higher educational institutions in Iraq, whereas during 1945-1946 the number had gone up to 2146. The number of women students in such institutions in- creased at an even higher rate, from 39 during 1938-1939 to 284 during 1946. This was especially remarkable seeing that there had been no women students at this level in 1935, and in 1936 only nine. The rise in the number of women Government of Iraq, Ministry of Education, Al-Takrir Al-Senawi Ahn Sayr Al-Ma'arif le Senat 1955-1956 [Annual Report, Education Progress 1955-1956), (Baghdad, Al-Zahra Press, 1957), pp. 68-69, 75, hereinafter cited as Ministry of Education, Report. 1955-1956. 94 U.N. Conference On International Organization 95 students at higher educational levels indicated the rapid change in social conditions that was taking place in Iraq dur- ing this period. It should be noted, however, that the educational system mostly aimed at increasing the number and quality of educated Iraqis by turning out lawyers, doctors, educators, etc. It neither included specialization in international relations nor a special foreign service school. However, many Iraqis did, and do, study international relations and allied subjects abroad. On appoint- ment to Iraq's diplomatic service, junior officers are required to undertake an eighteen months' training program in the for- eign office, and in certain grades, to gain promotion, officers must submit a thesis. As a result of the continued progress in higher education, training in the foreign office, and experience in foreign rela- tions achieved by close association with the League and by constant negotiations with foreign powers, Iraq was able to send to the San Francisco Conference the largest delegation that ever represented it at an international conference. Iraq came to the San Francisco Conference with a reservoir of diplomatic experience and trained personnel which it was determined also to use in behalf of other Arab brothers. This intention became very evident in the cases of Palestine, Syria and Lebanon, Arab territories placed under the mandate sys- tem after World War I. At San Francisco Iraq pursued a more active course than it had in the League, not only because it had gained in strength by 1945, but also because four other Arab states—Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, and Saudi Arabia-were rep- resented at the Conference. Collectively the five Arab powers could raise a strong voice on matters of mutual interest, es- pecially on Arab questions. Thus Iraq could look forward to a more influential role at San Francisco in 1945, and later in the new organization that was to supplant the League. Iraq Adheres to the United Nations Declaration Iraq's first step toward joining the new organization was its decision to adhere to the United Nations Declaration, which it did on January 16, 1943. 96 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ The need for a new organization to deal with the problems of post-war international relations was felt by world statesmen. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had indicated such thoughts even before the United States became formally involved in the war, when he and Prime Minister Winston Churchill on Au- gust 14, 1941 issued the joint declaration of hopes and poli- cies known as the Atlantic Charter. On December 7, 1941, the United States came into the war, and the purpose of the Atlantic Charter was affirmed in the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942. On that date, at Washington, twenty-six governments subscribed to the prin- ciples and aims of the Atlantic Charter. At the same time they invited other states which already contributed, or might later contribute, to the war effort against the Axis, to adhere to the Declaration 3 The background for Iraq's decision to adhere to the United Nations Declaration which, as noted, was carried out on January 16, 1943, briefly was the following: In Iraq the speech from the throne on November 2, 1942, recalled the promises of the United Kingdom of independence to Arab countries whose independence had been delayed, but the Regent expressed Iraq's confidence that the promises would be fulfilled. He stated that Iraq's foreign policy aimed at the implementation of these promises. The Regent felt that the cause of the United Nations was also the cause of the Arab world. He added that everything set forth in the Atlantic Charter, the statements by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the President of the United States, and those of the Prime Minister of the Union of South Africa before the British House of Commons were in full accord with Iraq's foreign policy. In the same speech the Regent stated that Iraq hoped all the principles announced by the leaders of the Allies would be implemented at the end of the war.4 Ten days later thirty-two deputies submitted proposals to * United States, Department of State, Bulletin, V (August 16, 1941), 125-126, hereinafter cited as U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin. * Ibid., VI (January 3, 1942), 3. * Al-Hassani, Cabinets, VI, 90-91. U.N. Conference On International Organization 97 the government recalling the speech from the throne in regard to the aims of the Arab countries and their desire for freedom and independence. They held that such aims and the inter- ests of Iraq and the other Arab peoples would be best served if Iraq adhered to the Atlantic Charter, and asked the govern- ment to take the requisite measures with all speed. On January 11, 1943, Prime Minister Nouri Al-Said sub- mitted a memorandum to the Council of Ministers explaining Iraq's efforts since the end of World War I to establish a sov- ereign, democratic state. He pointed to Iraq's obligations under the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1932 and the Covenant of the League of Nations. He outlined the aggressive policies of the Axis which the rest of the world should have resisted immedi- ately and which had since cost many states their independence. The Prime Minister stated that the Axis powers intended to enslave Iraq and the other Arab countries, but he thought the Atlantic Charter might ensure peace and security in the world and singled out Articles II and III as those most important to Iraq. These two articles, the Prime Minister believed, would help realize the aims of the Arab world. Al-Said further recalled the United States policy of isolation after World War I, which had contributed to weaken international justice and confidence. This United States policy gave a free hand to the other Allied Powers, creating difficulties and bad results of which the Arab world had its share. But he thought that because this policy had tended to create problems throughout the world, the United States surely would never return to isolation, especially since the American people, led by their President, were now determined to enter the arena of world affairs. He said that the United States' return to world affairs would ease prob- * Ibid., p. 92. Also, Khadduri, p. 250. • Article II: “They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.” Article III: “They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live, and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.” U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, V (August 16, 1941), 125. U.N. Conference On International Organization 99 President of the United States14 expressed their pleasure to see Iraq as one of the United Nations. Iraq's Participation in Inter-War International Conferences and Organizations Pul-Ayubi was appomittee of the first had taken plac The heavy schedule of international conferences from 1943 to 1945 resulted in a change in Iraq's hitherto relatively silent and passive role in international organizations. The first break in this pattern came in May, 1943, when Iraq attended the United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture at Hot Springs, Virginia.15 This conference has been called a "rehearsal” for the later United Nations Organi- zation.16 An Iraqi, Darwish Al-Haidari, was appointed a mem- ber of the Interim Committee of the Food and Agriculture Organization. Later in Quebec in 1945, Al-Haidari was ap- pointed to the Executive Committe of F.A.O., and Ali Jawdat Al-Ayubi was appointed to the Credentials Committee and the Nominations Committee of the first session.17 This innovation clearly indicated the changes that had taken place in Iraq since 1932, particularly in regard to the number of trained personnel available for diplomatic conferences. Other important international conferences attended by Iraq after it adhered to the United Nations Declaration included the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, beginning July 1, 1944, which formulated proposals of the establishment of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the International Mone- tary Fund.18 Iraq was a member of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration;19 it participated in the In- ternational Conference on Civil Aviation held at Chicago in » Al-Hassani, Cabinets, VI, 102-103. 15 Longrigg, p. 315. 16 Cheever and Haviland, p. 61. 17 Food and Agriculture Organization, Report of the First Session (Washington, 1946), pp. x, xi, xvii. 18 Longrigg, p. 315. 19 United Nations Information Office, Guide to United Nations and Allied Agencies, 1945, New York. 100 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ November 1944;20 it attended the twenty-sixth session of the International Labour Office at Philadelphia in 1944,21 and took part in the sessions of the Committee of Jurists which met from April 9 to April 20, 1945, for the purpose of drafting proposals on the United Nations judicial organ, later to be debated by the United Nations at San Francisco.22 Invitation to the San Francisco Conference The most important international conference Iraq attended was the United Nations Conference on International Organi- zation at San Francisco in the spring of 1945, to which it was invited on March 5, 1945. Events which led to this invitation briefly were as follows: On October 30, 1943, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., and the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. issued the Moscow Declaration. Article IV of this declaration recognized "the necessity of es- tablishing at the earliest practicable date, a general interna- tional organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small, for the maintenance of inter- national peace and security.23 Concrete steps toward the establishment of the United Nations were taken in the summer of 1944, resulting in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the establishment of the United Nations. 24 20 Ibid.; Longrigg, p. 315. 21 International Labour Office, International Labour Conference, Twenty-Sixth Session, Philadelphia, 1944, Record of Proceedings (Montreal, International Labour Office, 1944), p. XXI. 22 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XIV, 23; United Nations Information Office, Guide to the United Nations and Allied Agencies. 23 U.N., Yearbook, 1946-1947, p. 3. * These proposals emanated from discussions undertaken (in the period from August 21 through September 28) by the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R. on the one hand and (in the period from September 29 through October 7) by the United States, the United Kingdom, and China, on the other hand. Ibid., p. 4. 102 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ eign advisors (three). The remaining eight members29 of the delegation were tangible evidence of Iraq's progress in the drive to improve education begun in 1921. All were gradu- ates of Iraqi and various Western educational institutions; four had doctorates, and two were professors. 30 The San Francisco Conference was in fact the last inter- national conference at which Iraq found it necessary to use non-Iraqis as advisors or assistant delegates. Besides Judge H. I. Lloyd, foreign advisor to the Ministry of Economics, who served as an assistant delegate at San Francisco, the delegation included two other non-Iraqi advisors. They were George M. Barakat, former member of the United States Board of Eco nomic Warfare, and Faris Malouf, Honorary President of the Syrian-Lebanese-American Federation. The importance of the San Francisco Conference to Iraq was highlighted by the Foreign Minister himself heading the delegation. Moreover, with the exception of Al-Jamali, who attended the Conference with the rank of Minister, all the other delegates were former Foreign Ministers; one of them had even been Prime Minister. All had high political standing and had acquired diplomatic status in the Foreign Office. The other members of the delegation included important govern- ment officials and professors. This pattern of high-level rep- resentation, set at the San Francisco Conference, was also adapted for the Iraqi delegations to the United Nations. Officership at the Conference During the Conference one Iraqi delegate, Nasrat Al-Farsy, served as the Rapporteur for the First Committee of the Fourth Commission,31 thus continuing the break with the practice of the past begun by the appointment to international office of Darwish Al-Haidari and Ali Jawdat Al-Ayubi at the Hot 20 The four secretaries are not referred to here. $0 For a list of the members of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Conference On International Organization see Appendix XIII and for information on their backgrounds see Appendix XXVI. *1 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, I, 12. Committee 1: International Court of Justice, of Commission IV: Judicial Organization. U.N. Conference On International Organization 103 Springs and the Quebec Conferences in 1943 and 1945. These conference officerships were actually the forerunners of more to come after the United Nations was established. Iraqi Participation in the Conference Secretariat Although no Iraqi had served as a member of the Secre- tariat of the League of Nations, Iraq and other states were invited, as the San Francisco Conference began, to suggest the names of nationals who might be seconded to the Secre- tariat.32 Iraq did not at that time have sufficient personnel to spare for these tasks. Within a year, however, Iraq was able to provide officers for the United Nations Secretariat. Advance Preparation There is no published material that suggests that the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs undertook any formal advance preparations for the San Francisco Conference comparable in any way to the groundwork carried out by the United States Department of State.33 The fact that Iraq did not present any comments or proposed amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals34 supports the belief that there was no advance sub- stantive preparation. On the other hand, as mentioned above, its participation in earlier international conferences had served to prepare Iraq for the San Francisco Conference, particularly because many of the delegates sent there had been delegates to other inter- national conferences. Conference Committee Assignments The San Francisco Conference was the largest international meeting of its kind the world had ever seen, and the range of Statement to the author by Waldo Chamberlin, Documents Officer of the San Francisco Conference. * See: United States, Department of State, Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation 1939-1945 (Washington: 1949). 3 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, III, v. 104 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ subject matter required a very large conference structure. There were sixteen committees dealing with various aspects of the proposed Charter:85 Commission I: General Provisions 1. Committee 1: Preamble, Purposes, and Principles 2. Committee 2: Membership, Amendment, and Secretariat Commission II: General Assembly 3. Committee 1: Structure and Procedures 4. Committee 2: Political and Security Functions 5. Committee 3: Economic and Social Cooperation 6. Committee 4: Trusteeship System Commission III: Security Council 7. Committee 1: Structure and Procedures 8. Committee 2: Peaceful Settlement i Committee 3: Enforcement Arrangements 10. Committee 4: Regional Arrangements Commission IV: Judicial Organization 11. Committee 1: International Court of Justice 12. Committee 2: Legal Problems An international conference with twelve "working com- mittees" placed a heavy burden upon a relatively small dele- gation such as Iraq's. As indicated in Appendix IX, only twelve members88 of the delegation served on the twelve "working committees," and it was necessary for each delegate and as- sistant delegate to work on two or more committees. In addi- tion, they participated in the work of the Executive Committee, in the plenary, and in the work of the four Commissions. The major interests of Iraq in the work of the Conference are suggested by the fact that while one of the four delegates was assigned to each committee, two were assigned to Com- mittee IȚ/4 (Trusteeship), Committee III/1 (Structure and Procedure of the Security Council-voting), Committee III/2 (Peaceful Settlement) and Committee III/4 (Regional Ar- rangements—the Arab League). * For a chart on the Organization, Functions and Officership of the San Francisco Conference, see: U.N.C.I.O., Documents, I, 79. "Two foreign advisors (Barakat and Malouf) did not serve as dele- gates; Lloyd, however, did serve. U.N. Conference On International Organization 105 It is not clear why the chairman of the delegation appointed economists such as Al-Haidari to Committees II/2 (Political and Security Functions) and III/3 (Enforcement Arrange- ments), and Haidar to Committee III/1 (Structure and Pro- cedures), or an educator such as Al-Chalabi to Committee III/4 (Regional Arrangements), unless these assignments were necessitated by Iraq's having to cover the twelve work- ing committees at San Francisco with a delegation of only twelve delegates and assistant delegates. · IRAQ'S POSITIONS AT THE CONFERENCE Iraq's major interests at the San Francisco Conference as suggested by the assignment of delegates to committees and the record of participation in debates were self-determination, peaceful settlement of disputes, enforcement measures, re- gional arrangements, and membership and voting in the Se- curity Council. Since Iraq was a member of the Arab League and interested in the future of other Arab countries, the pat- tern of interventions in the Conference shows that the ques- tions of Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and the Arab League played the most important role in determining Iraq's positions. The Question of Syria and Lebanon · At San Francisco, Iraq was interested to see that Syria and Lebanon achieved full independence. It will be recalled that the two states had been placed under the mandate system as Class “A” territories after World War I. Iraq had tried in the League of Nations to bring about the independence of both these Arab states but without measurable results. After the collapse of France in June 1940, the Vichy regime assumed the mandate over Syria and Lebanon. This situation was brought to an end by a joint Anglo-Free French occupa- tion of Syria and Lebanon in 1941. On June 8th of that year General Catroux in the name of Free France and its leader, General de Gaulle, proclaimed the termination of the man- 106 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ date and the independence of Syria and Lebanon. This step was endorsed by the British authorities. 37 However, the Free French “regarded themselves as trus- tees for France's position, seeking to maintain themselves by installing Syrian and Lebanese supporters of France in the seats of authority."38 Despite the formal emancipation, “France was neither willing nor ready to transfer major functions of government to the new republic."38 The new republics were themselves ready, however, to as- sume international responsibility despite their difficulties with France. Thus the Syrian Chamber of Deputies declared war against Germany and Japan on February 26, 1945. The next day Lebanon followed suit, and both countries adhered to the United Nations Declaration.40 But Syria and Lebanon were not included in the list of invitations sent out on March 5 to thirty-nine states to participate in the forthcoming San Fran- cisco Conference. 41 This omission prompted Iraq, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia to join in an Arab League protest. “2 On March 28 the United States announced that the four sponsoring pow- ers—China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.—had agreed to extend invitations to Syria and Lebanon, and that France, which was not among the sponsor- ing powers, had “indicated its support of this action."48 How- ever, this French acquiescence soon proved questionable. Negotiations for a treaty which would define relations be- tween Lebanon, Syria, and France were scheduled to begin on May 19, 1945. But four days earlier France disembarked new reinforcements in Beirut, an action that precipitated strikes and violence which spread throughout Syria and Lebanon. The situation grew steadily worse, and when France bombarded Damascus for the third time in twenty years, the * R.I.I.A., Political and Economic Survey, p. 471; Izzeddin, p. 162. * R.I.I.A., Political and Economic Survey, p. 471. 30 Lenczowski, p. 244. 40 U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XII (April 1, 1945), 575; U.N., Yearbook, 1946-1947, p. 2. " The New York Times, March 6, 1945, pp. 1, 10. “ Ibid., March 22, 1945, p. 17. « U.S. Dept. of State, Bulletin, XII (April 1, 1945), 576. Ñ this had in cance. U.N. Conference On International Organization 107 United Kingdom ordered its Commander-in-Chief in the Mid- dle East to intervene in order to restore order. 44 At the San Francisco Conference, the Egyptian representa- tive addressed the Third Commission on June 20, 1945 on behalf of his own country, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Syria. He recalled “the sad events which took place in Syria and that the historical city of Damascus was burned,”45 and stated his belief that the Arabs did not think the French people "who have loved freedom and justice so conspicuously for such a long time, and who have suffered so greatly from the war”46 endorsed those actions. He noted, furthermore, that the Arab people did not believe "that the French people before they have recovered from the war, during a period when they have to devote all their energy to reconstruction, would en- courage aggressive action against a country, the representation of which they welcome so warmly at this Conference.” The Egyptian representative continued: We are convinced that when the French people have an opportunity to express their will, they will condemn these acts of aggression and hold out a helping hand to Syria, to both these countries, to aid them to recover their freedom, for they are two countries of a well-known and very high degree of civilization. 47 Although France regarded both Syria and Lebanon “as technically subject to League Class A Mandate,"48 Iraq, in col- laboration with the other Arab delegations, worked for a draft of what was to become Article 78 of the Charter.49 This Article had significance for Syria and Lebanon, because it made it clear that as members of the United Nations they could not be placed under the trusteeship system. * Lenczowski, pp. 246-247; Izzeddin, pp. 163-164; R.I.I.A., Political and Economic Survey, p. 472. · U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XI, 110. Ibid., pp. 110-111. *? Ibid., p. 111. Goodrich and Hambro, p. 437. 40 Statement to the author by a member of the Iraqi delegation to the San Francisco Conference. U.N. Conference On International Organization 109 clearly laid down” and should be so stated that they could, in practice, "be properly carried out by the states themselves. 956 Iraq believed that in cases where the Security Council failed to settle a dispute "likely to lead to armed conflict," the Gen- eral Assembly should have jurisdiction to deal with it, and that in such cases, the Secretary-General should immediately convene a meeting of the General Assembly.57 On the question of enforcement measures, Iraq believed that the United Nations, in order to ensure world peace, should be "armed with strong and efficient deterrent forces."58 It ad- vocated enforcement of decisions made by a two-thirds ma- jority of the General Assembly in disputes "likely to lead to armed conflict” among nations and which the Security Coun- cil had failed to settle 50 Furthermore, Iraq held that the duties and obligations of Member States that were to be specified in the Charter, should be liable to enforcement. 80 These views expressed at the San Francisco Conference con- tinued to be important for Iraq, as was evidenced in 1950 dur- ing the Fifth Session of the General Assembly when Iraq and Syria proposed, and the General Assembly adopted, a draft resolution recommending that the governments of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union: meet and discuss, collectively or otherwise, and, if necessary, with other States concerned, all problems which are likely to threaten international peace and hamper the activities of the United Nations, with a view to their resolving fundamental differences and reaching agreement in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Charter. 61 In 1952, in calling attention to the fact that no meeting of the permanent members had taken place in accordance with 5* Ibid., p. 446. BT Ibid. 68 Ibid., p. 445. 5° Ibid., p. 446. Ibid. *I U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), Resolutions, No. 377 C, part of the "Uniting for Peace” resolution, 3 November 1950. 110 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ the terms of the resolution adopted two years before, the Iraqi representative declared that his government: still maintain[s] that there is no other alternative for avoiding tension and war but to meet, discuss and settle differences. If this fails a group of impartial States must be asked to intervene for mediation or arbitration. This is the only way to avoid a major world catastrophe and to make the United Nations work. 62 Continued interest in the position taken at San Francisco may be seen in Iraq's welcome in 1951 of the suggestion made by the President of France for a “summit” meeting between the major powers.63 In 1954 Iraq still believed that world problems could be settled in a summit meeting using the principles of the 1950 resolution.64 The following year Iraq expressed its satisfaction that a summit meeting had been held in July 195585 and called upon the four Powers to consult, in the forthcoming meeting of their Foreign Ministers, with the states concerned on specific questions, both before and during their conference. In addi- tion, abandonment of secret diplomacy was urged "for the sake of international peace and mutual confidence.” After de- claring that: there can be no peace in the world if there is no peace in the Middle East, and there can be no peace in the Middle East until the Palestine question is settled on the basis of right and justice. . . . Any attempt to whittle down the fundamental rights of the Arabs of Palestine is an injustice to humanity, a denial of fundamental moral principles, and a source of constant trouble and subversion in the Middle East. Iraq called upon the powers responsible for establishing Israel to see to it that: 68 U.N., GA.VII(1952-1953), ORs, Plenary, 379th mtg., p. 30. 68 U.N., GA.VI(1951-1952), ORs, Plenary, 340th mtg., p. 73. * U.N., GA.IX(1954), ORs, Plenary, 479th mtg., p. 81. 85 This summit meeting was attended by the leaders of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union. U.N. Conference On International Organization III the United Nations resolutions on Palestine are at least respected and that Arab rights therein are not reduced. ... that Israel follows the provisions of those resolutions, which are the raison d'être of Israel itself. . . . that Israel stops ag- gression and is punished for all aggressive acts which it commits. To let it go unpunished, as has been done in the cases of Qibya, Nahhalin and Gaza, where flagrant atrocities and crimes resulting in the death of innocent men, women and children were committed, is certainly not conducive to peace. This encourages Israel to continue its aggressive acts.66 and chines resultinhhalin anaished, as thesive acts witong ang On Hungary, Iraq took a position similar to its stand as stated above on Palestine. In 1956 Dr. Al-Jamali declared that: the General Assembly should not tolerate defiance of its resolutions. Its Members must learn to obey and implement United Nations resolutions—that is, if we want to reduce tension in the world and achieve settlements of some of the most outstanding problems facing us today. 67 dressed its “deepents in Hungarycement me Iraq therefore considered the defiance by the Soviet Union and the Hungarian government of the United Nations resolu- tions had weakened the United Nations and found that by its unilateral action in Hungary "the Soviet Union has certainly dealt a blow to the prestige of the United Nations.” Iraq ex- pressed its “deep sorrow and great disappointment” in regard to the "tragic events in Hungary.” Iraq's strong position on enforcement measures at San Fran- cisco in 1945 continued and was reflected in 1950 in the statement that an “important requisite for keeping world peace and making the United Nations efficient is to provide means for enforcing its decisions—at least by resorting to the appli- cation of Article 41 of the Charter."88In 1956 Iraq called for the outlawry of war and endorsed a United Nations police force with the statement that “a strong police force from na- * U.N., GA.X(1955), ORs, Plenary, 522nd mtg., p. 78. Or U.N., GA.XI(1956-1957), ORs, Plenary, Vol. I, 585th mtg., 606th mtg., pp. 153, 493. 68 U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), ORs, Plenary, 280th mtg., p. 36. I 12 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ tions other than the big Powers should be available to enforce or supervise the enforcement of United Nations decisions," and added that "any Power that initiates military action should be branded as an aggressor against which sanctions should be applied. "69 Structure and Procedures of the Security Council At the San Francisco Conference Iraq advocated a Security Council which would "insure a prompt and just settlement of disputes,” because any machinery which would delay “prompt decisions and effective action might result in stultifying the whole value of the award and the measures taken to enforce it.” In such cases "disaster might quite possibly follow from belated action.”70 One of the most controversial questions before the San Francisco Conference, and one which has remained so in the United Nations, was the question of voting arrangements in the Security Council. The proposed Yalta formula stipulated unanimity among the permanent members on all questions, except those of a procedural nature, including determining whether questions were substantive or procedural. Serious controversy arose about this proposal, and various amendments were presented during the Conference.71 However, the Spon- soring Powers and France successfully resisted attempts to change the Yalta formula. Although Iraq did express the view that equality among all states should be "observed in prac- tice,” it nevertheless recognized the "greater authority" and "special responsibilities” of the great powers. 72 The Iraqi rep- resentative in the Committee on the Structure and Procedures of the Security Council expressed the hope that the veto would be used "conservatively” and declared that his government would vote for the Yalta formula.73 * U.N., GA.XI(1956-1957), ORs, Plenary, 581st mtg., pp. 90-91. 70 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, I, 446. " Goodrich and Hambro, p. 215. 7U.N.C.I.O., Documents, I, 446. T3 Ibid., XI, 488, 518. U.N. Conference On International Organization 113 Iraq abstained from voting on the Australian amendment that sought to exclude the use of the veto on questions regard- ing peaceful settlement of disputes.74 Furthermore, Iraq viewed the question of the nomination of the Secretary-General by the Security Council as a substantive, rather than a procedural matter.75 Iraq also expressed the opinion that the membership of the Security Council should be increased to fifteen, in order to give due regard to "fair geographical representation."** This was an attempt to secure a non-permanent seat on the Security Council for a member of the Arab League.77 On May 6, 1945, in Committee III/1 Iraq supported France78 as a permanent member of the Security Council.Tº However, on June 20, 1945, the delegate from Egypt, speak- ing on behalf of all Arab delegations, recalled "the sad events" resulting from French military action against Syria and Lebanon on May 15, 1945. He said that the Arab delegations were aware that France, as a permanent member of the Se- curity Council, could have blocked the application of enforce- ment measures against such action. Therefore, the Arab delegations would abstain from voting on this paragraph, rather than vote negatively, because the French people who "loved freedom and justice” would, given the opportunity, "condemn these acts of aggression” and even help Syria and Lebanon.80 The problem of the veto became an important and recurring problem at the United Nations, especially in view of the sharp delegadote negatively, because iven the opportunity: Chanon.80 74 Ibid., p. 495. * Ibid., p. 569. *Ibid., I, 446, and II, 252. * Majid Khadduri, “The Arab League as a Regional Arrangement," The American Journal of International Law, XL (1946), 772, here- inafter cited as Khadduri, "The Arab League." 78 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XI, 254. Chapter VI, Section A, of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, which later became Article 23, Paragraph 1, of the Charter contained the sentence: "Representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Republic of China and, in due course, France, should have permanent seats.” For full text of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, see: U.N., Yearbook, 1946-1947, pp. 4-9. 90 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XI, 110-111. 114 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ and sometimes violent disagreements among the permanent members, disagreements often based on deep ideological dif- ferences. The fact that the veto had been cast over eighty times by the end of 1956 has contributed to the weakness of the Security Council.81 From the very beginning of the United Nations Iraq has expressed its dismay at the frequent use of the veto and has even stated its belief that such use is against the spirit and underlying principles of the Charter. Iraq had been consistent in the United Nations in its op- position to the veto. In 1947, Nouri Al-Said recalled that Iraq had supported the right of veto at San Francisco, not because it believed the veto was desirable, but in order to "secure a guarantee of unanimity among the five Powers," a unanimity "essential to international peace on critical matters in which the armed forces of one or more of the five Powers were in- volved."82 Iraq, he said, “never dreamt that the veto would ever be used to debar a peace-loving democratic country [Jor- dan), whose people served the Allied cause in two world wars, from joining the United Nations on the pretext by one of the big Powers that it had no diplomatic relations with that coun- try.”83 Despite the fact that unanimity was desirable, Iraq could not see "any justification for retaining the veto” and be- lieved "that special steps" should be undertaken to “abrogate" it. Iraq stated in 1949 that the veto had become a "weakness in the Charter";84 and in 1950 said that “the right of veto must be abolished” if the United Nations was "to avoid the paralysis of the Security Council, and hence the paralysis of the whole Organization."85 The necessity of abolishing the veto was also voiced by Iraq on other occasions. 86 Clyde Eagleton, International Government (3rd ed.; New York: The Ronald Press Company, 1957), p. 332. " U.N., GA.II(1947), ORs, Plenary, Vol. I, 84th mtg., 107-108. ** Ibid., p. 108. The U.S.S.R. prevented the admission of Jordan until 1955. * U.N., GA.IV(1949), ORs, Plenary, 223rd mtg., p. 16. * U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), ORs, Plenary, 280th mtg., Vol. I, 36. * U.N., GA.VI(1951-1952), ORs, Plenary, 340th mtg., p. 72; U.N., GA.X(1955), ORs, Plenary, 522nd mtg., p. 79; and U.N., GA.XI(1956-1957), ORs, Plenary, Vol. I, 581st mtg., p. 91. U.N. Conference On International Organization 115 Self-determination At the United Nations Conference Iraq drew upon its ex- perience as a former mandated territory and as a member of the League and participated most effectively in the debate on an "International Trusteeship System.” It also submitted a formal proposal on this matter, its only proposal at the Con- ference. Iraq's intervention in the question reflected its inter- est in Arab territories which might become involved in trusteeship relations, mainly Palestine. Iraq proposed on June 8, in Committee II/4, an amendment that was defeated, relating to a United States proposal87 which in substance became Article 80 of the Charter. The Iraqi amendment read: A. In the event of any territory being placed under the trusteeship system, nothing in this Chapter should be con- strued in and of itself to alter in any manner the rights of any state in any territory or to diminish the rights of the people of that territory. B. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, in the event of the transfer to the trusteeship system of any territory now administered on the basis of Paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, such trusteeship shall not apply to such a territory save within the limits and for the purposes laid down in the afore-mentioned paragraph of the Covenant.88 or The United States proposal read: 5. Except as may be agreed upon in individual trusteeship ar- rangements, made under paragraphs 3, 4, and 6, placing each terri- tory under the trusteeship system, and until such agreements have been concluded, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed in or of itself to alter in any matter the rights whatsoever of any states or any peoples or the terms of existing international instruments to which member states may respectively be parties. This paragraph should not be interpreted as giving grounds for delay or postpone- ment of the negotiation and conclusion of the agreements for placing mandated and other territories, as provided for in paragraph 3, under the trusteeship system. U.N.C.I.O., Documents, X, 515. * Ibid., pp. 515-516. 120 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ The general attitude of Iraq on the results of the San Fran- cisco Conference with regard to this question was expressed by Dr. Al-Jamali, who stated before the Second Commission that the draft Charter was not perfect, but "we have worked hard to make it as good as it is."101 In later years at the United Nations Iraq played an active role in promoting self-determination. Evidence of this may be found in Iraq's participation in the Trusteeship Council, the Committee on Factors, and the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. In addition, Iraq's declarations before the United Nations consistently have been of an anti-colonial tone. Iraq's interest was keener, of course, because this was a subject that involved many Arab territories - Palestine, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco. Iraq declared in 1947 that "the essential underlying prin- ciple of the Charter is the dignity of man and his right of self- determination.”102 From the outset Iraq considered that "independence is the natural right of all free peoples”103 and therefore "it is the duty of the United Nations to see to it that freedom prevails and that subjugation ends."104 In 1951 Iraq felt that the United Nations was inconsistent in its application of "the natural rights and freedoms of peoples." e individuporld, but the rightfu in other Human slavery on the individual level is universally pro- hibited throughout the civilized world, but a considerable part of the civilized world has not recognized the rightful aspira- tions of other peoples to independence and freedom; in other words, slavery is still being practiced on a national level while it is prohibited on the individual level.105 Wars have been waged because of the denial to some peo- 101 Ibid., p. 133. 103 U.N., GA.II(1947), ORs, Plenary, Vol. I, 84th mtg., p. 107. 106 U.N., GA, First Special Session (1947), ORs, Plenary, Vol. I, 77th mtg., p. 125. 104 Ibid., 71 st mtg., p. 42. 105 U.N., GA.VI(1951-1952), ORs, Plenary, 340th mtg., p. 72. U.N. Conference On International Organization 12 I ples of their right to freedom,106 and, therefore, Iraq saw as a prerequisite for peace "the liberation of all politically con- scious and freedom-loving peoples of the earth” who had not yet attained independence.107 In even more emphatic terms, Íraq had declared: If the nineteenth-century ideas of colonialism, superiority of the white man and the "white man's burden" are not finally abandoned by the colonial Powers, there is no hope for attaining peace, harmony and cooperation in the modern world and the seeds of war and unrest will germinate among nations. 108 In 1959, Foreign Minister Hashim Jawad declared that an objective of Iraq's foreign policy is the "cooperation with states in working for the liberation of the peoples which are still under foreign domination and the bolstering of the anti- imperialist states' independence.” 109 The consistent position of Iraq has been that the United Nations is under an obligation to assist peoples in Non-Self- Governing Territories "whenever they are mature and call for self-determination and freedom. ... Any hesitation or obstruc- tion with this assistance is certainly not in accordance with the spirit of the Charter.” 110 Regional Arrangements A strong and constant desire for Arab unity has character- ized politics in the Middle East since World War I. Several approaches to realize this aim were suggested, and a loose confederation of states in the Arab League emerged in March 1945 às the regional organization which seven Arab states 109 Ibid. 207 U.N., GA.V(1950-1951), ORs, Plenary, Vol. I, 280th mtg., p. 36. 108 U.N., GA.VII(1952-1953), ORs, Plenary, 379th mtg., p. 28. 100 Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Bulletin No. 4, Washington, D.C., June 1959, p. 6. 10 U.N., GA.X(1955), ORs, Plenary, 530th mtg., p. 195. I 22 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ joined.111 Thus one of the questions that faced Arab states at San Francisco was that of the relations between the new Arab League and the United Nations. The Arabs had joined the Allies during World War I as- suming that an independent Arab state would be formed after the victory which they anticipated would free them from Otto- man domination. But soon after the war they found out that their premises had been wrong; the Allied promise to establish an Arab Kingdom came to naught. Instead, the League of Nations established mandates over Palestine, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and what irked the Arabs even more: these territories were "forcibly divided by artificial frontiers im- posed upon them by Britain and France in 1920.” 112 During World War II the United Kingdom was mindful of Arab wishes for independence and unity. The British were aware of Nazi designs "to exploit Arab grievances and to stimu- late anti-British and anti-French sentiment.” 113 and after the outbreak in April 1941 of anti-British violence in Iraq led by Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani, Foreign Secretary Eden declared on May 29, 1941, that The Arab world has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last War, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such appeal from our friends should go un- answered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's 11 In 1958 ten Arab states were members of the Arab League, namely: Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic, and Yemen. The seven original mem- bers were: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen. 12 George Kirk, The Middle East in the War, Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, ed. Arnold Toynbee (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 333. 113 Sayegh, p. 117. U.N. Conference On International Organization 123 Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.114 The first response to this statement came from Amir Abdul- lah of Transjordan on July 2, 1941. He asked for reunification of geographical Syria, comprising Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan. Since at that time there was a threat of direct Arab involvement in the war, active planning for establishing an Arab Union did not take place until December 1942, when leaders from Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Egypt met informally in Cairo to discuss the matter.115 Early in 1943 Prime Minister Nouri Al-Said submitted to Richard G. Casey, then United Kingdom Minister of State Resident in the Near East, a "Blue Book” embodying his plan for a Fertile Crescent unity. The plan was to merge Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Palestine into one state. It also aimed to establish an Arab League "composed of Iraq and United Syria and vested with the prerogatives of federation.” The "Blue Book,” moreover, "alluded to the possibility that 'other Arab states' might join the 'Arab League.'” 118 On March 30, 1943, the Egyptian Government decided to take steps to explore Arab points of view concerning unity. In the following two years Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen held various discussions pre- paring the ground for their undertaking. 117 Nouri Al-Said's proposal in the “Blue Book,” which incorporated the "Greater Syria” proposal advanced by Amir Abdullah was not realized in the final arrangements for the Arab League, because Ab- dullah wanted to be King of the new state, Syria wanted to remain a republic, Saudi Arabia feared Abdullah's expansion of authority over Syria, Lebanon was not prepared to join, and the position of Palestine was complicated by the Zionist aims.118 The discussions, however, reached an agreement on a form of regional organization, and culminated in the promulgation, 114 Kirk, p. 334; Sayegh, pp. 117-118. 116 Sayegh, pp. 105-106, 118-119. 116 Ibid., pp. 106-107, 119. 117 Ibid., pp. 119-121. 110 Khadduri, Independent Iraq, p. 255. 124 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ on March 22, 1945, of the Pact of the League of Arab States.119 The Arab League thus formed was an association of Arab States aiming at collective action on behalf of members in mat- ters of common interest. Unfortunately, the machinery of the Arab Covenant turned out to be much weaker than the ad- vocates of "Pan-Arabism” had aspired to; nevertheless, it did represent a step forward on the road to Arab unity. The Pact of the Arab States entrusted the Council of the Arab League with determining "the means whereby the League will collaborate with the international organizations which may be created in the future.” 120 The Dumbarton Oaks pro- posals envisaged the establishment "of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the main- tenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, provided such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the purposes and prin- ciples of the organization.” 121 The proposals added that the Security Council, when "appropriate," should utilize such agencies "for enforcement action under its authority," and that "no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authoriza- tion of the Security Council.” 122 At the San Francisco Conference the Arab States had to obtain recognition of their regional arrangement, and deter- mine the nature and scope of relations between the Arab League and the United Nations. On April 28, 1945, Egypt submitted the Pact of the League of Arab States to the Con- ference as background information and for reference to the appropriate Conference committee.123 On May 1, the repre- sentative of Iraq told the Conference that the League of Arab States had been created in a spirit of mutual respect and in the hope of international peace; he added that five Arab 119 Sayegh, pp. 119-121. 120 For text of The Pact of The League Of Arab States, see: U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XII, 745-752. in U.N.C.I.O., Documents, III, Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, Chapter VIII, Section C, 1, p. 17. 193 Ibid., Section C, 2, pp. 17-18. 12 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XII, 763. U.N. Conference On International Organization 125 states had joined the Conference "to assist in creating an international organization capable of realizing all ideals for the welfare of humanity.” 124 Iraq, the first Arab state to join the League of Nations and an active participant in the development of the Arab League, did not present any other statement before the Conference on what became Chapter VIII of the Charter.126 On the question of the restrictions which the Dumbarton Oaks proposals imposed on the actions of regional agencies, the Arab delegates joined with the Latin American group in demanding that regional organizations be permitted to carry out enforcement actions without obtaining prior authorization from the Security Council. 126 During the discussions, the United States delegation presented an amendment to the Dum- barton Oaks proposals envisaging specific reference to the “Act of Chapultepec" in the United Nations Charter. The amend- ment was intended to permit member states of this Act to carry out enforcement measures for self-defense, should the Security Council fail in its duty to maintain peace and security.127 In turn, the Arab delegates claimed a similar privilege. 128 How- ever, the delegation of the United Kingdom was against refer- ring to any specific regional arrangement. The reason for this reportedly was, according to Clifford Hulme,129 that any reference to the Arab League might stir up the Palestine ques- tion and jeopardize the authority of the Security Council. Under the circumstances it was decided that the Charter should omit reference to specific arrangements. But a new paragraph on the right of collective self-defense was added to Chapter VII of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and became Article 51 of the Charter.180 11 Ibid., I, 445. * According to the General Index of U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XXI, 155-162. 120 Khadduri, “The Arab League," p. 772. 197 Ibid., p. 773. 198 Ibid. 1Clifford Hulme, San Francisco Conference (London, 1945), p. 36, cited by Khadduri, "The Arab League," p. 773. 140 Khadduri, “The Arab League," pp. 772-773. For further discus- sions on Iraq's attitude on this subject, see Chapter V, pp. 89-91. 126 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Legal Matters Iraq in the United Nations Committee of Jurists and at the San Francisco Conference stressed the importance of the Moslem legal system, favored increasing the number of judges in the future International Court of Justice in order to ensure a seat for a Moslem judge, and supported the principle of compulsory jurisdiction. In an effort to enhance the position of "the Moslem legal system and the Moslem civilization among the main forms of civilizations and principal legal systems of the world,” and consequently to assure the presence of a Moslem judge on the International Court of Justice, Iraq, together with other Near Eastern Moslem states, submitted a note131 on this question to the Committee of Jurists. The note recalled that the Inter- national Congress on Comparative Law held at the Hague in 1932 had decided that Moslem Law is “an entirely independent source of comparative law.” It also referred to the decision of the Second Congress on Comparative Law in 1938, stating that Moslem law is “an autonomous legal system which does not depend on other established systems." The note further pointed to communications sent by the Near Eastern Moslem states to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations in September 1939, in which they emphasized that the Moslem civilization is one of the main civilizations of the world. The note quoted some theories of the Moslem legal system in order to show that it is original, autonomous and can provide “in the settlement of international conflicts, theories extremely flexible and evolu- tive." These Moslem states, authors of the note, felt that the originators of Article 9 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice “must certainly have envisaged, among others, the Arabic civilization and the legal system of Islam.” Iraq in the United Nations Committee of Jurists deliberating on a Statute for the International Court of Justice supported an Egyptian motion favoring an increase in the number of judges, to permit all the principal legal systems of the world to be 181 Text of Note: U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XIV, 375-379. 130 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ the Charter took place. However, since Arshad Al-Omari, Chairman of the Iraqi delegation, had refused to sign 148 and had left San Francisco before the Conference had concluded its deliberations, Dr. Al-Jamali was authorized to sign on behalf of Iraq.147 The refusal of Al-Omari to sign the Charter was attributed to his dissatisfaction with the decisions of the con- ference on the trusteeship question.148 On October 15, 1945, a Royal Irada (decree) was issued, calling for a meeting of the Parliament on October 20 to discuss the Charter. The Committee for Foreign Affairs of the Iraqi lower house recommended its adoption; the Charter was rati- fied on October 24149 and the instrument of ratification was deposited on December 21, 1945.150 Iraq's Attitude toward the San Francisco Conference Despite dissatisfaction with the outcome of the trusteeship arrangements, Iraq "had high hopes for the world” 151 when it signed the United Nations Charter. The speech from the throne on November 25, 1945, stated that the Charter signed at San Francisco would guide Iraq in its relations with the United Nations and expressed the hope that the United Nations would be able to ensure peace and security based on justice and freedom. 162 In 1949 Iraq recalled the United Nations Conference on International Organization in these words: Those representatives who had been at San Francisco would remember the hard work, coupled with deep faith and bright hope, which had brought the United Nations Charter into being. Many had not been altogether satisfied with the formulation of the Charter, especially with the unanimity 146 Khadduri, “The Arab League," p. 771, Longrigg, p. 315. 19 U.N.C.I.O., Documents, XV, 544. 148 Khadduri, “The Arab League," p. 771; Longrigg, p. 315. 149 Al-Hassani, Cabinets, Vol. VI, 245-246. 150 U.N., Yearbook, 1946-1947, p. 34. 101 U.N., GA.II(1947), ORs, Plenary, Vol. II, 128th mtg., p. 1426. 162 Al-Hassani, Cabinets, VI, 283. U.N. Conference On International Organization 131 rule. . . . Some Members, including Iraq, had wanted the Chapters on Trusteeship to be more clear and positive about the future independence of the dependent Territories. Never- theless, they had been pleased with the Charter. It was the best that could be achieved; it was the best possible under the circumstances.163 Iraq felt that the results reached in the United Nations Conference on International Organization were the best that could be obtained at the time. As a small state benefiting from the principles of international cooperation for peace and security, Iraq hoped that the efforts of the United Nations to attain the lofty aims which Iraq had helped define would be crowned with success. 18 U.N., GA.IV(1949), ORs, Plenary, 223rd mtg., p. 16. CHAPTER VIII Participation In The Organs Of The League Of Nations And The United Nations The previous chapters of this study have discussed Iraq's preparation for membership in the United Nations, first while still a mandate, then as a new state in the League of Nations, and finally as an active participant in the drafting of the United Nations Charter at San Francisco in 1945. The empha- sis has been on substantive problems and procedures, which do not lend themselves to quantitative measurements. This chap- ter provides some such measurements of the comparability of Iraq's participation in the League of Nations and the United Nations and, at the same time, compares Iraq's participation with that of certain other states that are not too dissimilar. In general, the chapter shows an amazing change between the period 1932-1939 and 1945-1958. PARTICIPATION IN THE COUNCILS Iraq was never a member of the League's Council, probably because it was a small state with little power or authority, and because there were but ten Asian members of the League, as compared to 28 European, 21 American and 4 African.1 The general pattern of the geographical distribution of non-perma- - Waldo Chamberlin and Clyde Eagleton, Organization and Pro- cedures of the United Nations, Chapter VI. I am indebted to Pro- fessor Chamberlin for permission to read the manuscript of this volume to be published in 1959 by the Brookings Institute. 132 Organs Of The League And U.N. 133 nent seats in the Council was, until 1936, that there were five European members, three American, and one Asian-either China or Turkey. From 1937 to 1939 Asia had two seats, with China having one of these. Iraq could hardly expect a seat under such a formula, particularly with as strong a neighbor as Turkey among the Asian powers. Such status did not escape the attention of the members from Asia. During the session of the Assembly in 1936, Iraq supported an Iranian proposal to give Asia at least two seats in the Council, one for eastern Asia, and the other for western Asia.3 Iraq's interest in this question can be seen by the fact that Nouri Al-Said, chairman of the delegation, in supporting the plan for greater Asian representation in the Council, made the one and only intervention by a representative of Iraq in the first committee. Iraq's participation in the Councils of the United Nations has been extensive, probably because Iraq is now stronger than it had been in the League, because it is an associate of the Asian-African group, because one non-permanent seat on the Security Council was reserved for the Middle East under the 1946 "gentlemen's agreement," and because the United Nations has three Councils instead of one. Appendix X shows that Iraq, a former mandated territory, became one of the first non-administering members of the Trusteeship Council and has been elected either to the Trusteeship Council or the Security Council every year except for the years 1953-1956. *For a table of the states that had been non-permanent members of the Council, see: League of Nations, Information Section, Essential Facts about the League of Nations (10th ed., revised; Geneva: 1939), p. 89. • League of Nations, Assembly, Seventeenth Session (1936), Offi- cial Journal, First Committee, pp. 12-13. * Iraq was represented in the First Committee only in 1936 and 1938. * In 1959 the Asian-African group was composed of twenty-nine members. • Thomas Hovet, Jr., Bloc Politics in the United Nations (Cam- bridge: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1959), p. 43. I am indebted to Professor Hovet for per- mission to read this in manuscript. 134 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ During the four years when Iraq was not a member of a Council, it held important offices in the General Assembly and served on several important bodies, as shown in Ap- pendices XVII and XX. The seat that Iraq had occupied in the Trusteeship Council was held in 1953-1958 by another formerly mandated territory, the Arab state of Syria. Appendix XI also reveals a pattern whereby Arab states occupied two or three seats in the Councils every year except 1951. Although Iraq has held membership in the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council, it has never been elected to membership in the Economic and Social Council. However, since 1946 an Arab seat has been held alternately in this Council by Lebanon and Egypt, except for the years 1950 and 1951. Iraq's non-participation in the Economic and Social Council is balanced to some extent by the fact that it was a member of the Social Commission in the years 1946-1950 and 1952-1955, and of the Commission on Human Rights in 1956-1958. A comparison between Iraq's participation in the Councils of the United Nations with that of other Arab states who are original members of the United Nations as revealed in Ap- pendix XI shows that the seats in the Councils were shared between Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Egypt. The latter occu- pied seats in the Councils more frequently than the other Arab states. Lebanon, the smallest among them, participated the least frequently; Saudi Arabia was passive, while Syria and Iraq occupied seats in the Councils for an equal number of years. The equality between Iraq and Syria is even more remark- able: Iraq served on the Trusteeship Council in the years 1947-1952 and on the Security Council in 1957 and 1958, while Syria served first on the Security Council in 1947 and 1948 and later on the Trusteeship Council in the years 1953- 1958. The change from Iraq's former passive role in the Council of the League to a more active one occurred when it was elected to the Trusteeship Council, an election which was received in Iraq with much gratification. Appendix X indicates that Iraq participated more extensively 8. Organs Of The League And U.N. 135 in the Councils of the United Nations than several former League members such as Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Norway, Sweden, and Thailand, and that Iraq's participation was equal to that of Czechoslovakia. This suggests that mem- bers of the United Nations have confidence in Iraq. It is prob- ably true that Iraq's association with the Arab group is also a reason for election to the Councils. PARTICIPATION IN THE ASSEMBLIES The increase in Iraq's participation in the Assembly of the League and the General Assembly of the United Nations is as dramatic as the case of the Councils. This might be expected because in both the League and the United Nations, it has been the assemblies that have provided the greatest oppor- tunities for the small states to play active roles. Delegations From 1932 to the present, Iraq's practice has been to send to the Assemblies delegations composed of high-ranking gov- ernment officials. Although the delegations to the League Assemblies were small, they usually included influential Iraqis.? In 1932 the delegation was headed by the Prime Minister, and in all other years by the Foreign Minister, with the exception of 1939. Again with the exception of 1939, every delegation included other cabinet ministers, former prime ministers, ambassadors and high administrative officials. In 1936 and 1937 the secretaries of the delegation were young men who were to become the representatives of Iraq to the United Nations.8 The Iraqi delegations to the League's As- sembly were mainly staffed by persons of high political stand- ing in Iraq, but only a few had had much formal training in For a list of members of the Iraqi delegations to the League As- sembly (1932-1939), see Appendix XII, and for biographical resumes on members of Iraqi delegations to this Assembly, see Appendix XXVI. * They were Awni Khalidy and Hashim Jawad. 136 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ diplomacy. From 1933 to 1938 the delegations to the League's Assembly included a foreign advisor. For a country like Iraq, which was involved in many ques- tions of direct concern to it in the League, the delegation was very small. In fact, it never exceeded seven persons, and in 1934 and 1938 there were only four. Among the members of the Iraqi delegations were several persons who had been trained in pre-World War I Turkish educational institutions. The need for further trained personnel in diplomacy, however, was met by the continuous efforts to improve the educational status, as described in Chapter III. The early emphasis on education, begun after the establish- ment of an Arab Government in Iraq, showed tangible results quite early. In the Assembly session of 1933 were Moussa Al-Shabandar, a graduate of Lausanne University, and Yous- sif Al-Gaylani, a graduate of Oxford University, both of whom served as experts in the delegation. In the Assembly session of 1935 Abdullah Bakr, a graduate of the American University at Beirut, was a secretary in the delegation; in the Assembly session of 1936, the secretaries of the delegation were Hashim Jawad, a graduate of the American University at Beirut and the London School of Political Science and Economics, and Awni Khalidy, a graduate of the American University at Beirut; and in the Assembly of 1939, the representative of Iraq, Ata Amin, was a graduate of the Baghdad Law College. At the San Francisco Conference the early emphasis on education showed results in the persons of Dr. Al-Jamali, Dr. Abbas, Dr. Khadduri, Dr. Haidar, Jawad, Awni, Al-Chalabi, and Al-Haidari, who had behind them early studies in Iraq, advanced studies abroad, and training in diplomacy and ad- ministration in the service of their government. This pattern also applied to the various Iraqi delegations to the United Nations General Assembly in succeeding years. The change that had taken place by 1958 is remarkable, as all members of the Iraqi delegation to the General Assembly, with one exception, were graduates of Iraqi schools having later pursued advanced studies in France, England, Egypt, Organs Of The League And U.N. 137 Lebanon, and the United States. After the San Francisco Conference Iraq even dispensed with foreign advisors in its delegations. The biographical resumes of the various members of the Iraqi delegation to the League's Assembly and to the thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly contained in Appendix XXVI reveal considerable differences in educational background between Iraq's representatives to the two As- semblies. Iraq was able to send to the San Francisco Conference and to the United Nations a number of representatives with impressive educational backgrounds, several having doctoral degrees. In 1958 there were four of these, including the For- eign Minister, and perhaps most remarkable is the fact that one of them was a woman, Dr. Rose Khadduri. In order to appreciate the significance of this change it is necessary to recall that in 1921 there were only 462 girls in primary schools, and none in high schools,10 and that the first Iraqi woman successfully to attempt the College of Law did so in 1936. Dr. Khadduri was not, however, the first woman to repre- sent Iraq in the Assembly. Mrs. Badia Afnan was present dur- ing the first special session,11 and was joined later by Miss Sirria Al-Khoja in the Iraqi delegation at the second session. Both Miss Al-Khoja and Mrs. Afnan again were present during the fourth session in 1950. The inclusion of Iraqi women in various delegations of Iraq to the United Nations not only marks an important difference from the delegations to the League of Nations, but also gives an indication of the social progress made in Iraq during the last few decades. The inclusion of bra not only marks an imons, but also gives For a list of the members of the Iraqi delegation to the thirteenth session, see Appendix XIV. 10 See Appendices II, III, and IV. 1 Mrs. Badia Afnan served as secretary in the Iraqi delegation to the first special session, as an alternate representative at the second and sixth through twelfth sessions, as Advisor at the fourth and tenth ses- sions, and as press attaché at the fifth session. She was Iraq's repre- sentative in the Third Committee on many occasions and represented Iraq on the Social Commission. Organs Of The League And U.N. 139 Main Committees Attention has been called to the fact that the Iraqi delega- tions to the sessions of the League Assembly were usually quite small, never exceeding seven persons. This probably accounts for the fact that the records show that Iraq was represented in the Assembly's First Committee (Legal and Constitutional) only in 1936 and 1938; in the Second Com- mittee (Technical Organizations) only in 1937 and 1938; in the Third Committee (Armaments) in 1936, 1937 and 1938; in the Fourth Committee (Budget) only in 1937; in the Fifth Committee (Social and General) only in 1937 and 1938; but in the Sixth Committee (Political) every year.13 These figures suggest that Iraq was interested primarily in political questions, an hypothesis supported by the fact that the head of the delegation sat in the Sixth Committee, as well as by the empha- sis placed on the disputes discussed earlier. On the other hand, the records indicate that Iraq had developed since 1936 an interest in the other, non-political activities of the League. The records of the San Francisco Conference show that Iraq was represented in all committees of the Conference. In the United Nations Iraq has had representatives in all the main committees of the General Assembly at all sessions. Thus Iraq's pattern of representation on Assembly committees has been expanded far beyond the original, rather limited participation in the League. Officerships During the period of membership in the League, no Iraqi ever held a major elective post, such as chairman or rapporteur of a Main Committee. This pattern was broken at San Francisco, as noted in Chapter VII, when an Iraqi was elected as a rapporteur. Here 18 Statement is based on the lists of Iraqi delegates (or the absence of such lists), as printed in the Official Journal for each session of the League Assembly. 142 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Iraq was a small, new state preoccupied with its own external and internal problems. The League was dominated by the nations of Europe, and Iraq and Egypt were the only Arab members. This situation had changed by the time the San Francisco Conference met in 1945, when there were four other Arab states. Also by 1945 Iraq had solved many of its internal and external problems, had more international experience and had at its disposal more personnel for diplomatic service. These changed conditions allowed Iraq to express itself on various issues; this is shown by the fact that Iraq presented, for the first time, a proposal on a question which was not of direct concern to itself. The records of the United Nations indicate a marked con- trast with the record in the League of Nations. At the United Nations Iraq has taken an active part in debate and has submitted proposals in almost every field of United Nations activity. Sub-committees and Commissions The record of participation in the working bodies of an organization is a good yardstick for the confidence vested in nationals of a particular country by other states. For it is in the drafting sub-committees and the various commissions that meet between sessions of the General Assembly that much of the solid work of the United Nations is accomplished. While it is true that there is a need for geographical distribution in selecting the membership of this type of body, it is also true that members seek competence and experience. From 1932 to 1939 Iraq was a member of but five sub- sidiary organs of the League of Nations. These were the Sub-committee to report on the application of Afghanistan for membership in the League (1934), the Agenda Committee of the League Assembly (1937), the Nomination Committee of the Assembly (1938 and 1939), the Fiscal Committee (on which Iraq had a corresponding member), and the Petroleum Sub-committee established by the Committee of Eighteen to Organs Of The League And U.N. 143 administer petroleum sanctions against Italy, in the Ethiopian dispute.16 At the United Nations the situation has been very different. Appendices XIX and XX reveal that Iraq has been a member of forty-seven subsidiary organs serving on one hundred and two different occasions—or an average of more than eight each year, an average higher than the entire participation in the League over seven years. Of these forty-seven subsidiary organs, twenty-eight were committees and visiting missions of the Trusteeship Council, as shown in Appendix XIX; the remaining nineteen subsidiary bodies of the United Nations are indicated in Appendix XX. The total number of all such organs in which Iraq participated reached a peak of fourteen in 1950. Excluding sub-organs of the Trusteeship Council, high points were reached in 1953 and 1957 with seven each year; the low point of four in 1956 is misleading, because Iraq had just been elected a member of the Security Council in that year and accordingly had assumed membership in the Disarmament Commission. Moreover, an Iraqi had been elected to the Ad- visory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. Other important bodies in which Iraq has participated are the Peace Observation Commission, Social Commission, Com- mission on Human Rights, Executive Board of U.N.I.C.E.F., Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territor- ies, the visiting mission to West Africa, and the visiting mission to Western Samoa. The Secretariat No national of Iraq ever served in the Secretariat of the League. Commenting on this, Ranshofen-Wertheimer has said that “an explanation may be found in the passive role" of Iraq at that time, and "more important, in a not very wise, but 16 League of Nations docs. C.287.M.125.1934; C.24(1).M.16(1). 1936; C.193.M.138.1937; C.80.M.35.1938; and C.74.M.35.1939; League of Nations, Co-Ordination Committee, Official Journal, Special Supplement No. 150, pp. 148, 39; and also according to the records of the ordinary sessions of the League Assembly (1932-1939). 144 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ general underestimation of the political importance of the Near East prevailing in most chanceries of the world.” 17 The educational situation at that time in Iraq, as discussed in Chapter III, limited the number of Iraqis qualified for posts in the Secretariat of the League. Such persons found the admin- istrative system of the newly independent state in urgent need of their knowledge and training. This scarcity of qualified personnel also contributed to the fact that the delegations of Iraq were small. At the United Nations, however, Iraq was able to offer qualified personnel for service with the Secretariat. The num- ber of Iraqis in the Secretariat has fluctuated from one to four in the period 1946-1958; however, the highest-ranking Arab in the Secretariat is an Iraqi, at professional grade five. 18 Iraq did not comment on the question of geographical distribution of Secretariat posts during its membership in the League of Nations. In the United Nations, however, there being little reason to believe that there are more citizens of Afghanistan, Bolivia, Ecuador, or Thailand better qualified for employment in the Secretariat than the Iraqis, as Appendix XXI might suggest — Iraq expressed itself firmly and to the point on the matter. In 1958 Mohammed Alwan, Iraq's repre- sentative in the Fifth Committee, called the geographical distri- bution of the Secretariat staff "abnormal" and expressed the hope "that this unsatisfactory situation be remedied in the course of the next year when new appointments will take place." The Iraqi representative continued: The principle of geographical distribution, however, should be applied not only in numerical terms, but in an equitable distribution of posts at all levels, in particular the higher levels. It is rather surprising to find out from the Secretary- General's report that the 103 top-level posts at the D-1 class 17 Ranshofen-Wertheimer, p. 359. 18 This was Kamil Tooni in the operations section of the Office of General Services. In the autumn of 1958 the first Arab to hold the rank of Under Secretary-General was appointed, Mekki Abbas of the Sudan, as Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa. Organs Of The League And U.N. 145 :: and higher are distributed among twenty-nine Member States. Moreover, it is very alarming to note that more than : fifty of the top-level posts had been allocated to nationals of less than five countries. 19 - He regretted that eight of the ten new appointments to high-level posts during the period September 1, 1957, to August 31, 1958, had gone to countries already represented in the top-level posts. Consequently he considered that "no serious attempt has been made to apply" the Assembly's recom- mendation that "in future appointments to the staff of the United Nations Secretariat, at all levels, appropriate preference be given to nationalities which form a disproportionately small part of the Secretariat, subject to the provisions of Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations."20 CONCLUSIONS Thus the rather limited participation in the League of Nations helped to provide Iraq with experience that enabled it to become a very active Member in the United Nations in proportion to its size and power. In every respect cited in this chapter, immense improvement has been shown from Iraq's assumption of international responsibility in the League in 1932, to the present picture of intense participation in the United Nations Councils, Committees of the General As- sembly, subsidiary bodies, debates and submission of proposals and the Secretariat. Iraq had made its activities felt even in the specialized agencies. During 1945-1953, Ali Fuad represented Iraq in the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization. 19 Statement given to the author by Mohammed Alwan, Iraq's rep- resentative in the Fifth Committee, thirteenth session of the General Assembly. The statement was delivered to the Fifth Committee on October 29, 1958, during its 670th meeting. so See U.N., GA.XI(1956-1957), Resolutions No. 1097, p. 50. For tables of new appointments 1 September 1957 to 31 August 1958, to posts subject to geographical distribution, see U.N. doc. A/C.5/750, “Geographical distribution of the staff of the Secretariat of the United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General," 10 October 1958, mimeo graphed. 146 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ In 1957 Hashim Jawad represented Iraq as a member of the governing body of the International Labour Office;21 he was succeeded in this position by Ismat Kittani in 1959. Also in 1957 Dr. Sabih Al-Wahbi, an Iraqi, was elected President of the World Health Assembly.22 He had previously served as a President of the Executive Board of the World Health Organi- zation. Increased participation in International Organizations would seem to indicate a growing measure of influence and responsibility for Iraq in the future. » International Labour Office, Fortieth Session (1957), Record of Proceedings, p. 103. » World Health Organization, Assembly, Tenth Session (1957), Official Records, p. 14. CHAPTER IX Conclusions IRAQ, ONE OF THE NEWER STATES OF THE PRESENT CENTURY, a land inhabited by various racial and religious groups, in- herited a considerable number of economic and social ills from the Ottoman rule. The declaration of the mandate in 1920 and the establishment of an Arab kingdom in 1921 were the outcome of incompatible Arab and Allied arrange- ments made for Iraq. At the end of World War I, the new country's boundaries were not yet clearly defined, and this for some time remained a major problem. However, Iraq possessed considerable natural resources and a determination to advance, as well as a nucleus of experienced leaders. This combination of factors made it possible to make progress and eventually to participate effectively in international organi- zations. The people of Iraq, in the words of the Prime Minister in 1932, "never ceased to aspire eagerly to their complete and lasting independence.”1 During the era of tutelage and supervision Iraq concen- trated on development of political, social, and economic insti- tutions; on the precise definition of its frontiers; on building an army to face restless elements and troublesome neighbors; on improving relations with neighbors, and on the realization of complete independence. ? League of Nations, Assembly, Thirteenth Session (1932), Official Journal, Plenary, p. 49. 147 148 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Participation in the League of Nations On October 3, 1932, Iraq's emancipation from the mandate was declared by the League of Nations. The small, new state still had to make more external and internal progress before it could play an active role in international organization. There was a great need for trained personnel of all kinds; the edu- cational system was inadequate, and the foreign office and army were new and, for the most part, inexperienced. Ex- ternally, Iraq was involved in attempts to solve the Assyrian question, the Persian border controversy, and the problem at its frontiers with Syria. It also was deeply concerned with the status of its “brothers" in Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, who remained under mandate. Although the British mandate over Iraq ended in 1932, dependence on the United Kingdom continued: Iraqis were trained and educated in British institutions and Englishmen still held important posts in the administration. There also remained considerable economic ties, viewed by some Iraq governments as necessary to the development of the state. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 19302 stipulated that British forces would be stationed in Iraq for a period of twenty-five years. Establishment of an Iraqi army was regarded as a matter of utmost urgency, but this depended on British supply, main- tenance and training. Iraq was the sole Arab state in the League of Nations from 1932 to 1937, when it was joined by Egypt. Under these circumstances Iraq's possible influence in the League was limited, and it is not surprising that its participation in the League organs and committees was minor. Iraq always participated actively in the political committee of the Assembly and in the Council when issues of immediate concern were considered. The delegations to the League were mainly composed of high-ranking political leaders and diplo- mats, which set a precedent for succeeding delegations to the San Francisco Conference and the United Nations. But there were few men in the lower echelons to do the work of preparation and research. The scarcity of trained personnel, ? For text of treaty, see Davis, pp. 191-196. Conclusions 149 however, afforded an unusual opportunity for the few Iraq representatives who did engage in "behind-the-scenes" con- sultations and negotiations to obtain intensive diplomatic train- ing while still young men. Iraq's early impressions of the League were not favorable because the mandate was considered a betrayal of promises made by the Allies for the creation of an Arab kingdom in the former Ottoman provinces. Later the League's decisions on the Iraqi-Turkish (Mosul), Iraqi-Persian, and Iraqi-Syrian boundaries, and the Assyrian problem, inclined Iraqi public opinion toward approval of the League. This attitude was strengthened by the simultaneous termination of the mandate and Iraq's admission to the League in 1932. As a member Iraq was now able to voice Arab views from the world's highest rostrum. Its presence in Geneva enabled Iraq to assert its independence, reinforce its security, claim equality, and confer and plan with other states for security and progress. When the League's system for collective security toppled be- fore the onslaught of the Axis powers, Iraq joined with other states of the Near East in a regional arrangement and regarded this as a contribution to peace in the spirit of the League. The same was true when Iraq joined the Arab League. Iraq's experiences in the League caused it to look with favor upon the concept of international organization, prin- ciples of collective security, and regional arrangements at San Francisco and later in the United Nations. Moreover, the training obtained at the League in debate, consultation, and negotiation, as well as Iraq's own internal progress, pro- vided the tools for a larger role in the field of international organization, as evidenced by Iraq's activitiy as a member of the United Nations Conference on International Organization at San Francisco. Participation at the San Francisco Conference At San Francisco, Iraq was still a state with little power, but with some achievements to its credit. It had adjusted frontier difficulties with its neighbors, had settled its disputes with Persia and Turkey and established harmonious relations with these two states, had helped solve the Assyrian question, 150 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ and had made economic and social progress. It was a member of the Arab League, five members of which attended the Con- ference and joined together to voice their common interests. Iraq's goal was equal status for all states, and it called for the practical application of this principle. Iraq advocated moral and ethical principles as the basis of peaceful settlement of disputes and hoped that greater authority would be given to the General Assembly to settle controversies that might lead to "armed conflict and which the Security Council failed to settle. Iraq proposed that in such cases the Secretary-General should immediately convene the General Assembly rather than the Security Council as the Charter was to provide. Iraq further advocated enforcement measures to uphold decisions of the General Assembly, and the same, if necessary, to ensure that individual states fulfilled the obligations and duties incumbent upon them under the United Nations Charter. However, Iraq did not set forth in any detail the nature of such enforcement measures, nor the eventual pro- cedure to be followed in applying them. Iraq also recom- mended compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The records of the San Francisco Conference reveal that Iraq's most active contribution centered on the question of self-determination. It sought to have the Charter specify the rights already acquired by territories formerly under mandate, as provided in Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations. The only amendment that Iraq submitted at the Conference concerned this matter; it would have guar- anteed the rights of the people and of any state in such a territory and called for granting independence without "com- plications,” “problems," or "bloodshed.” Its special interest stemmed from the fact that Iraq itself had been a mandated territory and therefore was determined to work for the eman- cipation of other Arab lands still controlled by Foreign powers. Iraq and the other Arab states also wanted a specific reference to the Arab League in the Charter and asked for an amend- ment to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals that would permit the Arab League to initiate defense against aggression without Conclusions 151 the prior consent or authorization of the Security Council. Thus self-determination and regional arrangements, both involving the question of Palestine and the Arab League, were Iraq's main themes at San Francisco. In this respect its activities were similar in character to those in the League of Nations, i.e. they were primarily of a political nature. In the League Iraq had sought the independence of Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine; the first two having since achieved independent status, Iraq concentrated at San Francisco mainly on the question of Palestine, which remained a most important item in its foreign policy. The results achieved on matters of trusteeship at the United Nations Conference on International Organization were dis- appointing to the Iraqis who wanted stronger assurances and provisions than those incorporated in the Charter. Still, no serious objection to ratification was raised because Iraq, as a beneficiary of international collective law and order, hoped for future improvements. Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Iraq had been involved in many problems in the League of Nations and four of them had been settled, by and large, to Iraq's satisfaction. Therefore Iraq was disposed to refer to the United Nations such controversies as Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Iraq's interest in peaceful settlement is also demonstrated by the fact that it has presented many statements and has submitted numerous proposals concerning situations and disputes before the United Nations, including issues which are extraneous to the Arab world, and, together with other small states, has attempted to compose differences between the big Powers. In 1959 Iraq called upon other states to cooperate for the establishment of peace and security in the world in accordance with the United Nations Charter and through the procedures outlined therein.: 8 Statement made by Foreign Minister Hashim Jawad on May 24, 1959, to the correspondent of Radio Baghdad. 152 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Collective Security Iraq endorsed the principles of collective security at the League of Nations and at the San Francisco Conference. This approval can also be seen in Iraq's membership in regional arrangements for over two decades. At the United Nations Iraq like other lesser states was prepared to support United Nations action in Korea, just as it had supported the League's action when Italy attacked Ethiopia. Likewise, Iraq was in favor of establishing a United Nations police force. It also called for enforcement of United Nations resolutions, by using the measures listed in Article 41 of the Charter. Regional Arrangements Iraq, to a greater extent than many other states, had been prepared to join regional alliances. The motivations were that Iraq was a small state, was a member of the Arab world, and had considerable ties with Turkey and Iran. Thus in 1937 Iraq joined Iran, Turkey and Afghanistan in the Sa'dabad Pact. But Iraq's bonds with the Arab world are even stronger than with its neighbors to the north and east, and so it be- came a member of the Arab League in 1945. In 1955 Iraq joined the Baghdad Pact, but withdrew after July 14, 1958, and resumed active participation in the Arab League. Thus Iraq has been a party to regional arrangements for over two decades. An important point to note, however, is the kind of regional arrangement Iraq joined, the choice being determined by internal and external political considerations. Iraq, "an in- tegral part of the Arab Nation,"5 is eager to keep up good- * Iraq did not formally withdraw from the Baghdad Pact immedi- ately after the Revolution, but after July 14, 1958. The Pact Head- quarters in Baghdad were closed, Awni Al-Khalidy, Secretary General of the Pact resigned and Iraq did not attend the Council meetings held in London in July 1958 and in Karachi in January 1959. Thus it can be said that Iraq has withdrawn from this alliance for all prac- tical purposes. The prime Minister Abdul Karim Kassim formally announced Iraqs withdrawal from the Pact on March 24, 1959. See The New York Times, March 25, 1959, page 1. • Article II of the Interim-Constitution of the Republic of Iraq. For text of this constitution see: The Republic of Iraq, pp. 16-20. Conclusions 153 neighborly relations with Iran and Turkey without jeopardiz- ing its own interests nor those of the Arab world. Self-Determination Iraq had been involved in international controversies even before becoming an independent state. At the League Iraq was a direct litigant in four problems, besides which it took a great interest in the fate of other Arab countries. This ex- perience proved to be an important asset, especially in view of the ever-increasing role of Asia and Africa in world politics. In 1959 the Asian-African group in the United Nations in- cluded twenty-nine members. Collectively they are able to block any proposal in the General Assembly submitted by a great power, or even by a super- power. The purely Arab group includes ten members. Iraq assisted several of these in achieving their independence, and its expanded role on the question of self-determination is partly due to the increased influence of the Asian-African group which Iraq helped to create. At the League Iraq was concerned mainly with Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine. When the first two had won their independence, Iraq concentrated first on Palestine, and later on other Arab territories such as Libya, Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria. Iraq joined other small and medium-sized states to focus attention on colonial questions in the United Nations. Iraq's role in these matters can be seen from successive state- ments and proposals submitted in the General Assembly, the Trusteeship Council, the Committee on Factors, and the Com- mittee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories. Economic and Social Matters Iraq, a less developed country, endorsed the work of the League of Nations on economic and social matters. At the United Nations, together with other less developed states, it called for expanded activities in international economic and social cooperation. Its interest in this field may be seen in its statements, proposals, contributions and aid received. 154 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ Under the United Nations Expanded Program of Technical Assistance, Iraq has contributed $158,800 in the period 1950- 1958, while it has received assistance to the value of $3,258,439.6 It should be noted, however, that Iraq's con- tributions in 1958 represent an eleven-fold increase over its share in 1952. Under the United Nations Children's Fund, Iraq's contributions totalled $336,000 over the period 1947- 1958 and it received $1,450,400 in that period; but Iraq's contribution in the single year 1958 was exactly four times the amount it had contributed in the period 1947-1950.7 Iraq's interest in United Nations economic and social activities was further demonstrated in 1959. In this year it attempted to obtain membership in the Commission on Inter- national Commodity Trade. Failing in this, Iraq sent Fawzi Al-Kaisi as its observer to this Commission. Dr. Al-Kaisi, the observer, summed up Iraq's attitude on these matters as fol- lows: “Iraq, dependent on exporting oil to finance its devel- opment program, is also an importer of many commodities; thus Iraq is deeply interested in matters concerning inter- national trade and world economic conditions." 8 Representation in International Organizations At San Francisco Iraq was able to play a more prominent part than in the League of Nations, where its role had been "passive.” This increased activity was evidenced by the dele- gation's participation in debate, by the fact that for the first time Iraq submitted a proposal on a matter in which it was not directly involved, and by the holding of an important office in the conference. This expanded role was partly due to the fact that Iraq sent the largest delegation ever to represent it at an international conference, in addition to which the delegation included men of wide educational back- ground and experience. A new face was here seen for the • See Appendix XXII. See Appendix XXIII. 8 Statement to author by Dr. Fawzi Al-Kaisi, Acting Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Washington, D. C. 156 DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ personalities such as Al-Jamali, Al-Ayubi, Bakr, Al-Shabandar, and Jawad.10: . . Participation in United Nations Organs Iraq's participation in debates and submission of proposals before the League was very limited. At the United Nations Iraq has debated and submitted proposals on a multitude of matters, including many not of direct concern. For instance, during the Tenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly Iraq intervened in the debate on sixty-five ques- tions.11 Over the years Iraq has submitted proposals on a great many questions. These include such subjects as Palestine, Tunisia, Morocco, Libya, Algeria, West Irian, treatment of Indians in the Union of South Africa, collective security, peaceful settlement of disputes, disarmament, South West Africa, the Cameroons, Somaliland, the Ewe problem, admis- sion of new members, freedom of information, the status of women, technical assistance, economic development of under- developed countries, Charter review, and documentation. Iraq's representation in the various organs of the League of Nations was almost nil, whereas in the United Nations Iraq has been on a great number of committees and commissions, including two of the principal organs, the Security Council and the Trusteeship Council. The more extensive role was made possible by larger delegations than Iraq ever sent to the League. As more persons came to the General Assembly Iraq was represented in the Main Committees and made its activity felt in many other United Nations activities. Several Iraqis have also served in the Secretariat, although none has yet held an important post. Improved Educational Facilities An important factor enhancing Iraq's role on the inter- 10 There were other Chairmen of Iraqi delegations to the United Nations General Assembly, who did not serve in the League of Nations or the San Francisco Conference. Naji Al-Asil, Najib Al-Rawi, Dr. Abdul Jabber Al-Jomard and Ali Mumtaz Al-Daftari fall into this category. 1 United Nations, Index to Proceedings of the General Assembly, Tenth Session (1955), pp. 74-75. se per the inited Conclusions 157 national scene has been the progress made in education.12 In 1920-1921, there were 65 students enrolled in Iraqi in- stitutions of higher education. From this humble beginning, the total increased to 115 during 1932-1933 and to 2,146 during 1945-1946.13 The total was 7,883 in 1956-1957, with 5,363 students attending colleges in Iraq, and 2,520 in other countries. 14 The progress in education can also be seen in the number of students attending the University of Baghdad.16 In 1957- 1958, there were 5,538 students; in 1958-1959, 8,556 students.16 It is expected that there will be 10,000 during the academic year 1959-1960.17 In order to meet the increased 95 in England.dia, 421 in Turkey in * In 1920-1921 Iraq had a total of 8,176 students; in 1959, 653, 385 students, 21,326 teachers and 2,916 schools and colleges. By 1960 it is estimated that the student population will reach a million. Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Bulletin, No. 2, Washington, D. C., April 1959, p 7. 18 For the increase in the number of students in the higher institu- tions of Iraq during 1920-1959, see Appendix VIII. * During the academic year 1956-1957, there were 799 students studying in the United States, 481 in England, 119 in Egypt, 51 in Syria, 229 in Lebanon, 6 in Pakistan, 30 in India, 421 in Turkey, 4 in Iran, 2 in Italy, 98 in Austria, 115 in West Germany, 60 in Switzerland, 2 in Sweden, 5 in Belgium and 98 in France. Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Economics, Al-Takrir Al-Senawi Ahn Sayr Al-Tar- biaha Wal Talem Le Senat 1956-1957. [Annual Report on Education Progress, 1956-1957), Baghdad: Republic Government Press, 1958, p. 169, hereinafter cited as Report on Education, 1956-1957. During the academic year 1958-1959, there were 1,200 Iraqi stu- dents in the United States, and their number is expected to reach 1,300 in 1959-1960. Statement to the author by Dr. Fawzi Al-Kaisi, acting Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Washing- ton, D. C. 15 After a debate of more than three years, a bill was finally passed late in 1956 establishing the University of Baghdad. It opened in 1957. Fahim I. Qubain, The Reconstruction of Iraq: 1950-1957 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), p. 220. 18 Figures for 1957-1958 and 1958-1959 do not include the students in the institutions not under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education. 17 Statement to the author by Dr. Fawzi Al-Kaisi, Acting Cultural Attaché, Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Washington, D. C. 158 DIPLOMATIC DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF IRAQ demand for higher education, Iraq is building facilities for the University three times larger than had previously been planned.18 Between 1920-1959, the expenditures of the Ministry of Education increased tremendously.19 In 1920-1921, expendi- tures amounted to 130,360 Iraqi dinars; in 1932-1933, ID. 306,238; in 1945-1946, ID. 1,611,843; and in 1955-1956, ID. 10,044,757. The appropriations for 1959-1960 are 16,811,250 Iraqi Dinars.20 In 1959, an additional allocation of 25 million Dinars was made for the construction of the new facilities at Baghdad University.21 Iraq's progress in education has made possible larger and better prepared delegations to the United Nations. In 1958, for example, the Iraqi delegation to the General Assembly, with one exception, was composed entirely of individuals who had studied both in Iraq and abroad. This rapid development of educational facilities, however, would have been difficult without a rapidly expanding national economy. Improved economic conditions alone would not have fostered educational improvements without a national determination to use increased revenues for education. Be- tween 1931 and 1941 the government budget increased 179 per cent, while the proportion devoted to education increased 289 per cent. This trend continued. In the decade 1940-1950 the government budget rose 359 per cent, while the allocation for education rose 424 per cent. In 1950-1956 the budget rose 215 per cent; the expenditures for education 279 per 18 Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Bulletin, No. 4, Washington, D. C. June 1959, p. 3. 19 For a comparison of the increase in the budget of the Ministry of Education during 1920-1957, see Appendix V. 20 The appropriation for 1956-1957 was ID. 12,457,077 and for 1957-1958 was 11,311,250 Iraqi Dinars. Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Office of the Cultural Attaché Bulletin No. 1, Washington, D. C., undated, Report on Education, 1956-1957, p. 4. Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Bulletin, No. 4, Washington, D. C., June 1959, p. 2. Conclusions 161 Talat Al-Shiabani, Minister for Development, estimated86 that 1.416 per cent of Iraq's population owned 9 per cent of the cultivated land; .452 per cent owned 31 per cent of the land; .051 per cent owned 40 per cent of the land; and .004 per cent owned 20 per cent of the land. Thus, only 1.923 per cent of the total population owned Iraq's cultivated land.87 It is, therefore, a foregone conclusion that land reform and the betterment of the conditions of Iraq's rural population will have a favorable influence on the social, economic and political situation throughout the country. On September 30, 1958, the Government of Iraq enacted a land reform measure. The plan envisages the distribution of land to individual holders, with limits of one thousand donums of land irrigated by free-flow or by artificial means, or two thousand donums of land irrigated by rainfall. The program also provides for the establishment of agricultural cooperatives. Provision for compensation for seized land was included in the agrarian reform law.88 By July 1959, more than six million donums were taken over for distribution 39 Iraq's national commitment toward social and economic prog- ress indicates the country's advance from the status of an under- developed land to one with a growing viable economy: a country assuming a new role in the affairs of the world. ** Dr. Al-Shiabani's estimates were calculated on the basis that the population of Iraq is 6,500,000 and that its cultivated land is 22,000, 000 donums. . ? Dr. Talat Al-Shiabani, Wakai Al-Mulkia Al-Zuraiah Fy Al-Irak (Facts on ownership of Iraqs Cultivated Land) (Baghdad: Dar Al- Ahali, 1958), p. 13. * For the text of the agrarian reform law of the Republic of Iraq see: Embassy of the Republic of Iraq, Office of the Cultural Attaché Agrarian Reform Law of the Republic of Iraq (Washington, D. C., October 1958). * Speech delivered by Abdul Karim Kassim, Prime Minister of Iraq, on July 5th, 1959, as reported in Al-Ahali [The People), July 7th, 1959, Baghdad p. 1. APPENDIX 11 Number of Substantive Political Questions Considered by the Security Council and the General Assembly during 1946-1957 Period Security Council General Assembly Total Jan. 17, 1946- July 15, 1946 July 16, 1946- July 15, 1947 1947-1948 1948-1949 1949-1950 1950-1951 1951-1952 1952-1953 1953-1954 1954-1955 1955-1956 1956-1957 1 Source: Leland M. Goodrich, "The United Nations Security Council,” International Organization, Vol. XII, No. 3, Summer 1958, p. 277. 162 APPENDIX II Growth in the Primary Schools [1920-1933] Year Number of Schools Number of Teachers Co-ed. F 3 27 M 85 124 144 171 190 201 Total 88 151 173 198 221 228 m NNNNN 1920-21 1921-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 27 NO M 471 570 580 617 675 722 796 833 803 959 1,076 1,132 1,233 F 15 93 101 107 130 152 163 192 207 237 249 315 378 Total 486 663 681 634 800 874 959 1,025 1,090 1,190 1,325 1,447 1,611 Number of Students M F Total 7,539 462 8,001 12,226 3,049 15,275 13,741 3,492 17,233 15,039 3,519 18,558 16,599 4,055 20,654 18,659 4,053 22,712 19,727 4,443 24,170 21,827 5,879 26,706 22,997 5,036 28,032 24,885 6,003 30,888 27,467 7,046 34,513 28,987 8,485 37,472 33,265 10,912 44,177 219 249 39 232 232 247 269 282 314 268 273 291 316 336 390 2 45 49 67 NW 1 Source: Ministry of Education, Report 1955-1956, p. 43. It should be borne in mind that the number of students cited in this Appendix does not include those educated abroad or in private educational establishments. APPENDIX III Growth in High Schools (Secondary and Intermediate) [1920-1933] Year Number of Students Number of Schools M F Total Number of Teachers M. F Total 34 34 37 MF 110 229 243 333 49 49 31 46 405 1920-21 1921-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 46 56 78 56 Total 110 229 243 333 405 583 729 1,086 1,324 1,390 2,082 2,828 3,444 102 78 102 133 130 13 13 14 ONW 583 729 1,086 1,324 1,379 1,906 2,541 3,027 li 133 128 107 145 153 16 19 20 22 129 15 19 22 26 3 3 6 21 176 287 417 166 179 26 1 Source: Ministry of Education, Report 1955-1956, p. 54. It should be borne in mind that the number of students cited in this Appendix does not include those educated abroad or in private educational establishments. APPENDIX IV1 Growth in Students in Primary Teachers' Training Schools, Law College, and Vocational Schools (Industrial and Home Economics) [1920-1933] SYA . Year Teachers Schools Total м. School of Law Males Only 65 99 174 91 91 80 O 92 92 120 91 171 91 166 302 341 380 NN 1920-21 1921-22 1922-23 1923-24 1924-25 1925-26 1926-27 1927-28 1928-29 1929-30 1930-31 1931-32 1932-33 NOG Vocational Schools Total 80 120 167 167 210 210 211 211 210 210 60 60 148 148 134 134 148 148 120 120 148 183 58 241 167 131 93 136 243 303 294 252 282 290 286 255 136 59 38 86 135 138 168 100 387 56 58 420 458 386 296 166 65 75 94 41 148 30 115 1 Source: Ministry of Education, Report 1955-1956, pp. 57, 61, 68. 2 It was in 1936 that Iraqi women first entered the Law College. It should be borne in mind that the number of students cited in this Appendix does not include those educated abroad or in private educational establishments. APPENDIX V (continued) Comparison of Increase in Iraq's Government Budget and Education Budget (1920-1957) Government Ordinary Education Budget Percentage of Index of Allotment Year Budget (Iraqi Dinars) Education Budget to Education (Iraqi Dinars) to Govt. Budget 1945-1946 = 100 1935-1936 1936-1937 1937-1938 1938-1939 1939-1940 1940-1941 1941-1942 1942-1943 1943-1944 1944-1945 1945-1946 1946-1947 1947-1948 1948-1949 1949-1950 4,494,496 4,727,335 5,169,402 5,469,813 6,361,148 7,144,910 7,701,187 10,620,822 13,749,321 15,484,752 17,563,230 18,428,567 18,742,657 21,947,994 20,840,906 431,940 494,284 626,130 708,056 810,477 848,168 855,540 1,131,414 1,515,542 1,335,475 1,611,843 1,737,604 2,157,315 2,572,625 2,597,048 9.6 10.5 12.1 12.9 12.7 11.8 11.1 10.6 11.0 8.6 9.1 9.4 11.5 11.7 12.5 26.8 30.7 38.8 43.9 50.3 52.6 53.1 70.2 94.0 82.9 100.0 107.8 133.8 159.6 161.1 APPENDIX VI Break-down of Government Personnel in 1920 :: Salary over 600 Rupees per annum Salary less than 600 Rupees per annum Nationality 507 British Indian Arab ..7 515 2,209 8,546 20 * Source: Foster, p. 222. APPENDIX VII Decline in Government Posts Held by Foreigners Year Number of Aliens 1920 1923 1926 2,906 1,839474 1929 234 1931 196 * Source: United Kingdom, Special Report, p. 292. 169 APPENDIX X Comparison of the Participation of Iraq and Certain Other States in the Councils of the United Nations [1946-1958]" States IRAQ Afghanistan Belgium? E 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 Total TC TC TC TC TC TC SC SC TC,SC TC,SC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC ETC TC,SC TCSC TC TC 12 Ε Ε Ε E E SC SC E sc. SC Е Е E E E E E Bolivia Chile Czechoslovakia Ecuador Liberia New Zealand2 Norway Sweden Thailand Venezuela o ogronomo anno E,TC Ε E,TC TC TC E,TC SC RC CTC TC SC . Ε C,SC TC,SC TC E E E TECSC L E Sc E . E E TC TCTC Е sc Ε Ε Ε Е Е E - Economic and Social Council . SC – Security Council TC — Trusteeship Council 1 Source: U.N., GA.I-XII (1946-1957), Resolutions. These states, all of which participated in both the League and the United Nations, have been chosen from the various blocs of the United Nations on the basis of similarity to Iraq in either resources or population, or a combination of the above factors. 2 Belgium and New Zealand are administering members of the Trusteeship Council. APPENDIX XII List of Members of the Iraqi Delegations to the League Assembly, 1932-19391 1932—Thirteenth Session Nouri Al-Said: Chairman, Prime Minister. Rustam Haider: Delegate, Minister of Finance. Hussein Afnan: Expert, chargé d'affaires in London. Jamil Al-Madfai: Expert, member of Cabinet. Ibrahim Haim: Expert. Sullaiman Fattah: Expert. 1933— Fourteenth Session Nouri Al-Said: Chairman, Foreign Minister. Yassin Al-Hashimi: Delegate. C. J. Edmonds: Expert, Foreign Advisor. Dr. Moussa Al-Shabandar: Expert, First Secretary in the Permanent Delegation to the League of Nations. Youssif Al-Gaylani: Expert. Ahmed Wasfi: Expert. 1934— Fifteenth Session Nouri Al-Said: Chairman, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Jafar Al-Askari: Co-chairman, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London. Moussa Al-Shabandar: Delegate, Consul in Switzerland. C. J. Edmonds: Expert. 1 Source: League of Nations, Assembly, Thirteenth-Twentieth Ses- sions (1932-1939), Official Journal. 1935—Sixteenth Session Nouri Al-Said: Chairman, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Muzahim Amin Al-Pachachi: Delegate, Permanent Dele- gate to the League of Nations, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Rome. Nasrat Al-Farsy: Delegate, Director-General of the For- eign Office. C. J. Edmonds: Expert. Abdullah Bakr: Secretary. Tahir Al-Pachachi: Secretary. 174 1936-Seventeenth Session Nouri Al-Said: Chairman, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Sabih Najib: Delegate, Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations. A. MacDougall: Delegate, Foreign Advisor at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Awni Khalidy: Secretary, Secretary of the Permanent Delegation to the League of Nations. Hashim Jawad: Secretary. 1937—Eighteenth Session Tawfik Al-Swaidy: Chairman, Minister for Foreign Af- fairs. Nasrat Al-Farsy: Delegate, Envoy Extraordinary and Min- ister Plenipotentiary, Permanent Delegate to the League. Sabih Najib: Delegate, Delegate to the League of Nations. C. J. Edmonds: Expert. Saifullah Khandan: Secretary. Abdul Jabbar Jaddou: Secretary. Awni Khalidy: Secretary. 1938—Nineteenth Session Tawfik Al-Swaidy: Chairman, Minister for Foreign Af- fairs. Raouf Al-Chadirchi: Delegate, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in London. C. J. Edmonds: Expert. Abdullah Bakr: Secretary. 1939–Twentieth Session Ata Amin: Representative, Chargé d'affaires in Rome. 175 APPENDIX XIII List of Members of the Iraqi Delegation to the United Nations Conference on International Organization. Chairman: Arshad Al-Omari, Foreign Minister Delegates: Ali Jawdat Al-Ayubi, Minister to the United States Nasrat Al-Farsy, Member of the House of Representatives Dr. Mohamed Fadhil Al-Jamali, Director General of the Foreign Ministry Assistant Delegates: Judge H. I. Lloyd, Foreign Advisor to the Ministry of Economics Abdul Jabbar Al-Chalabi, Assistant Director General of Education Darwish Al-Haidari, Director of Experimental Station, Depart- ment of Agriculture Dr. Abdul Majid Abbas, Professor of International Law at the Law College, Baghdad Dr. Majid Khadduri, Professor at the Higher Teachers College of Baghdad Dr. Salih Mahdi Haidar, official in the Ministry of Supply Baha Awni, Legal Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Hashim Jawad, Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Advisors: Faris Malouf George M. Barakat APPENDIX XIV List of Members of the Iraqi Delegation to the Thirteenth Session (1958) of the General Assembly 1 Source: U.N.C.I.O. Documents, I, 28 2 Source: United Nations, Delegations to the United Nations, Thir- teenth Session of the General Assembly, September 1958, Revised, p. 76, hereinafter cited in the form U.N. GA.XIII (1958), Delega- tions. 176 Czechoslovakia 21 4.8 33.3 8 12 37.5 3 none 1 none 12.5 0 none none 0 13 none none 2 none O 0 8.3 84.6 10.5 0. 1 none none 13 11 none none 0 none Ecuador Liberia New Zealand Sweden Thailand Venezuela Norway Lebanon IRAQ U.A.R. Saudi Arabia United Kingdom United States France China USSR none 8 11 25.0 36.4 13.6 o o 18.2 22 3 none 8.3 none none none 39 58 60 none 0 0 0 none none 3 30 13.3 none 0 75 none 0 none 0 de mar zate de cons. * Source: U.N., GA.XIII (1958), Delegations. It should be borne in mind that some who hold the doctorate degree are not so identified in this publication, and that there may be some who were professors or were on temporary leave in order to attend the session or were teach- ing on a part-time basis. Delegations were selected on the same basis as in Appendices X and XI; the five permanent members of the Security Council have been included to give an additional basis for comparison. In Venezuela it is the general custom to use the title of doctor to indicate any professional degree, whether or not the particular degree is a doctorate or equivalent to a doctorate. 178 APPENDIX XVII Comparison of Iraqi Participation in the Main Elective Offices with That of Selected Members of the United Nations [1946-1957]1 Years: Countries Afghanistan Belgium Czechoslovakia Bolivia Ecuador CH(II) R(I RCII RI) R(VI) RII) VČCÍ) CH(II) R R(IV) RII) RI) RJt.I&VI) CH(III) Liberia New Zealand Sweden Thailand Venezuela CH(III) CH(I) CH(I) R(AHP) VCCĀHP) VCAHP) R(III) VC(1) VC(1) R (AHP) (AHP) R(Jt. II&III) VC(III)& Jt.(II&III) VC(IV) VC(III) CH(IV) R(V) CH(IV) V.P. CH(IV) VPVP IRAQ Chile Norway R(III) R(III) CH(III)& (Jt.II&III) CH((II) CH(II) CH(II) CH(II) VCCAHP) R(I) R(II) R(II) VC - Vice-Chairman of Assembly Main Committee R - Rapporteur AHP — Ad Hoc Political Committee P - President of General Assembly VP – Vice-President of General Assembly CH — Chairman of Assembly Main Committee APPENDIX XVII (continued) Comparison of Iraqi Participation in the Main Elective Offices with That of Selected Members of the United Nations [1946-1957]1 V VI X XII D. W) CH(VI) ou 60 00 00 A vaid w Years: 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 Total VII VIII IX XI IESS 2ESS Countries Afghanistan R(III) R(VI) 3 VČ(VI) Belgium VC(I) VC(III) CHI)' VC(AHP) R(IV) Czechoslovakia CHCVI) VC(II) CH(II) VCCIV) CHCIII)' VČ(IV) CH(VI) CH(II) Bolivia Ecuador VCCV) VP Liberia VC(AHP) R(AHP) VC(IV) New Zealand R(IŅ) CH(I) Sweden VC(AHP) R(I) R(IV) 8 Thailand CH(IV) CH(II) CH(VI) CH(V) CHCAHP) P. CH(IV) 8 Jt.(II&III) Venezuela VP VCCVI) CH(IV) VC(IV) CH(VI) 9 IRAQ VC(IV) CH(V) VC(II) VCCV) Chile CH(III)& PP ģ Jt.(ÌI&III) Norway R(IV) CH(I) CH(V) CH(III) 10 1 Source: U.N., GA.I-XII (1946-1957), Resolutions; and U.N., GA.I-XII (1946-1957), ORs, Main Committees. Coun- tries are selected on same basis as in Appendix IX. VP(GA) APPENDIX XVIII Participation of Arab States in Major Elective Offices of the Assembly [1946-1957]1 Saudi Egypt Lebanon on IRAQ 1946: I(1) I(2) 1947: I SS Syria CHEW Arabia Total VC(LN) CH(III) R(III) CH(VI) 1948: II SS III(1) III(2) (1948-49) 1949: CH(III)* CH(III) VC(II)* IV 1950: VC(IV) R(III) VP(GA) R(II) 1951: VI 1952: VII 1953: VIII 1954: IX 1955: VPCGA) R(V) VC(IV) CH(V) R(IV) VC(II) CH(IV) VCCV) R(II) 1955: CH(III) CH(V) 1956: XI I ESS II ESS 1957: XII VC(V) Grand Total: 27 P - President VP — Vice President CH — Chairman R— Rapporteur VC — Vice-Chairman LN - League of Nations Ctee * Held same post on the Joint II and III Committee. 1 Source: U.N., GA.I-XII (1946-1957), Resolutions; and U.N., GA.I-XII (1946-1957), ORs, Main Committees. The Arab states are those which were original members of the United Nations. 182 APPENDIX XIX Iraq's Participation in Committees and Visiting Missions of the Trusteeship Council (1947-1952]1 1949 V & 1 & II SS 1950 1950 1951 1951 1952 1952 Total VI VII VIII IX Xa XIL 1947- 1947 1948 1948 1949 Committees, Missions I II III IV Drafting Ctee on Rules of Procedure Ctee on Tanganyika Peti- tions Ctee on Composition of Visiting Mission to West- ern Samoa Ctee on Petitions Ctee on Resolutions Relat- ing to Petitions under Consideration by the 2nd Sess. of T.C. Drafting Ctee Drafting Ctee on Ques- tions to be Transmitted to Govt. of Union of So. Africa relating to report of Administration of South- West Africa for 1946 X APPENDIX XIX (continued) 1947- 1947 1948 1948 I II III 1949 V & IV I & 1949 II SS 1950 1950 1951 1951 1952 1952 Total VI VII VIII IX X XI Committees, Missions Drafting Ctee on Petitions Drafting Ctee on Report on Administration of Ru- anda-Urundi for 1947 Drafting Ctee on Report on Administration of New Guinea for Year 1 July 1946 to 30 June 1947 Drafting Ctee on Annual Reports on Trusteeship Visiting Mission to Trust Territories in West Africa Drafting Ctee for Pacific Islands Ctee for Italian Somali- land X XC X X Drafting Ctee on New Guinea APPENDIX XIX (continued) 1947- 1947 1948 1948 1949 I II III IV 1949 V & 1 & II SS 1950 1950 1951 1951 1952 1952 Total VI VII VIII IX X XIV X Xc X X X 5 Committees, Missions Drafting Ctee on Togoland Under British Administra- tion Drafting Ctee on Togoland under French Administra- tion Drafting Ctee on the Questionnaire Drafting Ctee on Ruanda- Urundi Ctee on Rules of Proce- dure Ctee on Visiting Missions Drafting Ctee on Nauru Ctee on Revision of Rules of Procedure Ctee of the Whole on An- nual Reports APPENDIX XIX (continued) 1947- 1947 1948 1948 1949 I II III IV 1949 V & 1 & II SS 1950 1950 1951 1951 1952 1952 VI VII VIII IX Xa XIV Total Committees, Missions Drafting Sub-Ctee on Tanganyika Drafting Sub-Ctee on Cameroons Under British Administration Drafting Ctee for the Pa- cific Islands Ctee on General Proce- dure of T.C. 3 X X X 3432454 4 3 2 2 Totals 1 Source: Trusteeship Council “Disposition of Agenda Items,” 1947-1952, and "Index to Proceedings of the Trusteeship Council," 1953. These documents appear under various numbers within two series of mimeographed documents that are issued under symbols T/INF and ST/LIB/Ser.B. a - Iraq served as Vice-President during the Ninth and Tenth Sessions. b — Iraq served as President during the Eleventh Session. e - Chairman APPENDIX XX Iraq's Participation in United Nations Committees and Commissions Except the Trusteeship Council [1946-1958]" 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 | Total Permanent Headquarters Ctee Ctee on Contributions X X Headquarters Commission X Social Commission X X X X X X X X X Interim Ctee of the G.A. X X X X X Executive Board of UNICEF X XXX XX* XX* Ad Hoc Ctee on Proposed Eco. Commission for Mid- dle East X X Peace Observation Commission X X X X X X X X X Special Ctee on Represen- tation of China X X Ad Hoc Ctee on Factors XXX Ctee on Administrative Budget of UNICEF X X X Ctee on Special Adminis- trative Questions X X 187 APPENDIX XX (continued) 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 Total X X X X X X X X X X Ctee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories Special Ctee on Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments Commission on Human Rights Special Ctee on Defining Aggression Advisory Ctee on Admin- istrative and Budgetary Questions Disarmament Commission Ctee on Control & Limita- tion of Documentation X X X . X X 4 4 4 4 5 5 6 7 5 6 4 7 5—66 Total Totals from Appendix XIX 0 3 7 6 9 7 4 0.000 0 0—36 Grand Total (Appendices XIX and XX 4 711 10 14 12 10 7 5 6 4 7 5–102 a — 1st Vice-Chairman b Chairman c - Vice-Chairman 1 Source: U.N., Yearbook, 1946-1957. 188 5 • 3 I lo-all Enl wäando il - lann-bool võawo | atch- - Power al anwan E-wono- alvörun al võwwameo- w سب سے ܝܝܣܝܩܬܝ ܐ ܣBPܚ ܚܚܚܗܝܙܢ awwa AWE o lūcot Cow NOWN auconwvool va anaw * งด งงงงงงงงง APPENDIX XXI Comparison between Iraq and Selected Countries, Including Original Arab Members of the United Nations, in Regard to Numbers of Nationals in the Secretariat [1946-1958]? Years** 1946* 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1956 1957 1958 Desirable Range of Posts 1958 Countries 1. 3 Afghanistan 12 - 21 Belgium Bolivia 3- 5 Chile 8 - 14 Czechoslovakia Ecuador Liberia New Zealand Norway Sweden • 3 Thailand . 7 Venezuela IRAQ 1 Egypt*** ww w 4 . Lebanon Saudi Arabia Syria United Arab Republic * 1946 HQ only: all other years include HQ and overseas staff. ** 1955 figures not available. *** United Arab Republic of Syria and Egypt. 1 Figures taken from the Secretary-General's annual mimeographed reports that bear some variation of the title: "Staff of the United Nations Secretariat, Report of the Secretary-General," docs. A/C.5/L.1(1949), A/C.5/L.48(1950), A/C.- 5/L.108/Rev. 1(1951), ST/AFS/R.5(1952), A/C.5/L,234 (1953), ST/ADM/R.7(1954), A/C.5/L.393/Corr. 1 (1956), A/C.5/L.456(1957), and A/C.5/750(1958). Countries are selected on the same basis as in Appendices X and XI. 24 ул ул 1 AW ул у APPENDIX XXII Summary of Assistance Received and Provided under the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (1950-1958] Assistance Received Assistance Provided No. of No. of Equipment Pledge to Experts Project Fellowship experts Fellowship Reaperted & supplies Recruited Placement Year costs2 in fields awards provided Accounts from country in country 1950-51 81,922 16 5,000 1952 547,869 40 5,000 1953 441,380 11,200 1954 321,786 41 14,000 1955 444,206 38 31,021 13,900 1956 441,965 35,848 28,000 1957 495,104 53 23,507 25,700 1958 484,207 56,000 Total Project Costs 3,258,439 Total Pledges Made 158,800 1 Source: U.N., United Nations Office of Public Information in collaboration with the Technical Assistance Board, "Technical Assistance Newsletter," July-August 1958, No. 44, pp. 18, 37, mimeographed. 2 The project costs for 1958 are estimated figures. 8 Information not available for 1950-51. 4 Information not available before 1955. 5 Information on 1958 pledge as given on June 1, 1958. 36 11 APPENDIX XXIV Comparison of Increase in Iraq's Oil Production and Oil Revenues: 1932-1958 Oil Production1 Oil Revenues2 Year (Thousand Metric Tons) (Iraqi Dinars) 1932 92 806,672 1933 86 583,796 1934 1,028 1,036,973 1935 3,656 895,906 1936 3,995 942,482 1937 4,236 1,063,583 1938 4,272 2,021,490 1939+ 3,934 2,069,761 19407 2,498 1,640,725 19417 1,551 1,534,046 1942 2,574 1,579,657 1943+ 3,562 1,884,254 1944 4,141 2,244,730 19457 4,594 2,315,599 1946 4,665 2,326,968 1947 4,693 2,346,280 1948 3,417 2,011,942 1949 4,066 3,237,965 1950 6,466 5,285,612 1951 8,389 13,800,000 1952 18,217 39,700,000 1953 27,378 51,300,000 1954 30,623 68,500,000 1955 32,703 73,700,000 1956 31,313 70,000,000 1957 21,880 48,928,500 1958 35,800 83,928,500 1 Figures for 1932-1953 are taken from Ribbhi Abu El-Haj, “Oil Indus- try; A Strategic Factor in the Economic Development of Iraq" (Unpub- lished doctoral dissertation, Faculty of Political Science, Columbia University, 1957), p. 15. Figures for 1954 and 1955 taken from Government of Iraq, Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract, 1956 (Bagdad, 1957), p. 192. Figures for 1956-1958 are taken from: The Magazine of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its Associated Companies, Iraq_Petroleum, Vol. 8, No. 6, May-June, 1959, p. 38. 2 Figures from 1932-1955 taken from Abu El-Haj, p. 13. Figures for 1956-1958 taken from The New York Times, March 15, 1959, Section 3, p. 2f. † The Oil Companies made loans to the Iraqi government totalling 1,000,000 dinars each year in 1939, 1940, 1941, and 1943, and 500,000 dinars in 1945. See: Abu El-Haj, p. 13. 192 APPENDIX XXV Allocations for Expenditure for the Five Year Plan [1955-1960]1 Part One: Major Projects of the Development Board Iraqi Dinars . .... ...... I Administration Studies and Organization Expenditures ...................... 7,350,000 II Flood Control, Irrigation and Drainage ....153,754,600 III Roads, Bridges and Communications: 1. Roads 63,686,000 2. Bridges ..... 22,890,000 3. Airports .................................... 8,851,550 4. Railways ...... 24,940,142 5. Ports 4,000,000 IV Main Buildings 1. Health Institutes ......................... 9,975,000 2. Educational Institutes and University ......... 6,314,000 3. Public Buildings .......................... 20,900,000 V Summer Resorts and Rest Houses ............ 2,580,000 VI Housing ......... 24,085,000 VII Industry, Mining, and Electrification ...... 67,119,217 VIII Development of Animal, Plant, and Underground Water Resources ........ 14,286,818 Total 430,732,327 Part Two: Minor Projects IX Public Buildings and Institutes .............. 59,375,000 X Miscellaneous Projects .......... 9,900,000 Total 69,275,000 Grand Total: 500,007,327 1 Source: Iraq Official Gazette, No. 3813, Law No. 54 of 1956, Schedule A. 193 APPENDIX XXVI Biographical Notes on Members of the Iraqi Delegations to the League of Nations, the United Nations Conference on International Organization, and the Thirteenth Session of the United Nations General Assembly.1 Dr. Abbas, Abdul Majid Received Ph.D. from Chicago University, taught international law at Baghdad Law College; member of the House of Represen- tatives; Minister for Public Works and Communications 1954; member United Nations Committee of Jurists; Assistant Delegate United Nations Conference on International Organization; Alter- nate Delegate, first session, first part, United Nations General Assembly; Delegate, second, third (Part II), sixth and seventh sessions, United Nations General Assembly; Permanent Represen- tative of Iraq to the United Nations until July 14, 1958. Abdul Jabbar, Tawfiq Graduated from Baghdad Law College, 1944; Lawyer, 1944- 1945; Administrative Officer, Ministry for Social Affairs, 1945- 1949; joined Foreign Office in 1949; Diplomatic Attaché, Karachi, 1949-1953; Vice-Consul, Damascus, 1953-1956; Third Secretary, Amman, 1956-1957; Acting Director of the Private Bureau, Foreign Office, 1957-1958; Second Secretary, Permanent Mission to the United Nations, 1958; Advisor, thirteenth session, United Nations General Assembly. Afnan, Hussein 1 The following publications have been consulted in the preparation of these incomplete biographical notes: E. J. Blattner, Managing Editor, Who's Who in Egypt and the Middle East—1950 (16th ed.; Cairo: Im- primerie Française, 1950); E. J. Blattner, Managing Editor, Who's Who in Egypt and the Near East—1956 (22nd ed.; Cairo: Imprimerie Française, 1956); E. J. Blattner, Managing Editor, Who's Who in Egypt and the Near East—1957-58 (23rd ed.; Cairo: Imprimerie Française, 1958); Christian E. Burckel, Editor, Who's Who in the United Nations (New York: Christian E. Burckel & Associates, 1951); L. G. Pine, Editor, The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who (London: Burke's Peerage Limited, 1954); United Nations Information Office, Who's Who, Delegates to the United Nations Conference on International Organization (New York: 1945); Time Magazine, June 17, 1957; Abdul Fattah Abu Alnasr Al-Yafi, Al-Irak Beyn Innkylabeyn (Iraq between two coups d'etat] (Beirut: Al-Makshouf Publishing House, 1938); and The Middle East- 1958 (London: Europa Publications Limited, 1958). and Makshouk Beyn Magazine, 194 - Attended Prep College at Istor of Amman afte Aide-de-Ca Charge d'affaires in London, 1932; Expert, thirteenth session of the League Assembly. Al-Askari, Jafar - 1885-1935 Attended preparatory military school of Baghdad; graduated from the Military College at Istanbul; joined Faisal's army during World War I; became Governor of Amman after World War I; later Governor at Aleppo; then became Senior Aide-de-Camp to King Faisal; on return to Iraq became Iraq's first defense minister, a post he occupied on many later occasions; Prime Minister in 1923-1924 and 1926-1928; in interval was Iraq's Minister to the United Kingdom, received a law degree while serving in this capacity; Senator; Vice-Chairman of the delegation to the fifteenth session of the League Assembly. Al-Ayubi, Ali Jawdat—1886- Educated at Istanbul Military College; served in Faisal's army during World War I; Governor of Aleppo, 1919; Director-General for Security in Syria, 1920-1923; in Iraq, Minister of Interior, 1923-1924; Minister of Finance, 1930-1933; Chief of the Royal Household and private secretary to the King, 1933; Prime Minis- ter, 1934-1935; held the same office on two later occasions, Presi- dent of the Chamber of Deputies, 1935; Senator, Minister to Britain, 1935; Minister to France, 1937; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1939-1941; First Minister to the United States; Director of Iraq Petroleum Ltd., British Oil Development Ltd., Iraq Cement Co., member of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society;2 Delegate, Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture, 1943, First Session of F.Ă.O., 1945, where he served as member of the Credentials and Nomination Committees; Delegate, I.L.O. Conference, 1944; International Civil Aviation Conference, 1944; United Nations Conference on International Organization, first session, first part, and first special session, United Nations General Assembly; Chair- man of the delegation, first session, second part, United Nations General Assembly. Al-Chadirchi, Raouf Special Envoy and Minister Plenipotentiary, London, 1938; Delegate, nineteenth session of the League Assembly. Al-Chalabi, Abdul Jabbar -1906- B.Sc., M.Sc., M.A., University of California and Columbia University; Lecturer at Iraq State Agricultural College, 1929; Agricultural District Officer, Kut, 1929-1932; Head Master, Najaf Secondary School, 1934; Senior Official, Ministry of Edu- 2 The Red Crescent Society is the Iraqi counterpart of the Red Cross. 195 - -- --_--... - - cation, until 1946; Deputy from Baghdad, 1946; Director-General of Communication and Public Works, 1946-1952; executive member of the Development Board; held cabinet posts on various occasions; Assistant Delegate, United Nations Conference on In- ternational Organization. Al-Farsy, Nasrat Graduated from Baghdad Law College, 1914; Member of the House of Representatives, 1925; Director-General of Justice, 1928, and later President of the Codification Department; Minis- ter of Finance, 1932; Director-General of the Foreign Office, 1935; Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, 1937; Member of Parliament, 1945; also served as President of the House of Representatives and on various occasions served as a cabinet member; Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations; Delegate to the sixteenth and eighteenth sessions of the League Assembly; Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization. Al-Gaylani, Youssif—1908- Educated at the American University of Beirut and Oxford University; Minister Plenipotentiary; Under-Secretary of State; Director General, Political Department, Ministry for Foreign Af- fairs; Expert, fourth session of the League Assembly; Delegate, sixth and ninth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly. Al-Haidari, Darwish Received B.S. and M.S. in the United States; Director of ex- perimental stations in the Department of Agriculture, 1945; Director-General of the Dates Society; Director of the Fourth Technical Committee of the Development Board; Director-General of the Department of Agriculture; Member, United Nations In- terim Committee on Food and Agriculture; Member, Executive Committee of Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.0.); Dele- gate to International Labour Organisation (I.L.O.) Conference, 1944; Assistant Delegate, United Nations Conference on Inter- national Organization. Al-Hasani, Baqir - 1914- Received B.Sc. from Columbia University, School of Business, 1939; law degree from Baghdad Law College in 1951; Director of Commerce and Registrar of Companies, Trade Marks and Patents, 1946-1951; Director-General of Contract and Economic Research Development Board, 1951-1953; Director-General of Income Tax, 1953-1954; Director-General and Chairman of the Tobacco Monopoly Administration, and Director, Rafidain Bank, 196 1954-1958; Chairman of the Anti-Corruption Committee in the administration of the Tobacco Monopoly, 1958; Iraqi Representa- tive, International Passport Conference, Geneva, 1947; observer at the First and Second International Islamic Economic Confer- ence; member of the Iraqi trade delegation to India and Pakistan, 1951; Alternate delegate, first session, second part, United Na- tions General Assembly; Delegate, thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Al-Hashimi, Yassin—1884-1937 Graduated Military College of Istanbul in 1902; after World War I was in charge of training and organizing Arab Army in Syria; later became Chairman of the Military Consultative Assem- bly of the Arab Government in Syria; returned to Iraq in 1922; became Governor, Minister for Public Works and Communica- tions, Member of the Constituent Assembly and the House of Representatives; Prime Minister in 1924; later became Minister of Finance on many occasions and in 1935 again became Prime Minister; attended fourteenth session of the League Assembly as a delegate. Dr. Al-Jamali, Mohamed Fadhil—1903- Studied in Baghdad to become an elementary school teacher; began teaching as an assistant teacher; taught four years prior to studies at the American University, Beirut, from which he gradu- ated in 1927; teacher at the Teachers Training College of Baghdad; came to the United States in 1929, on a Macy Grant from the International Institute of Teachers College, Columbia University; studied at Chicago University for one semester, re- ceived M.A. and Ph.D., Teachers College, Columbia University, 1932; appointed as attaché to the Monroe Commission in Iraq, 1932;; occupied the following posts in the Ministry of Education between 1932-1942: Supervisor-General, Director-General, In- spector-General, and again Director-General of Education and Public Instruction; during this period also lectured on educa- tional philosophy and school management at the Higher Teachers College, Baghdad; appointed Director-General of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was promoted to the rank of Minister in 1944; member of Parliament; President of the Chamber of Deputies; Iraqi Minister to Egypt, 1949; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1950; became cabinet member several times, Prime Minister, 1954; founder and Vice-President of the Iraqi 3 This commission was invited by the government of Iraq to carry on an educational survey for Iraq. 197 P.E.N. Club; founder and President of the New Educational Fel- lowship Society of Iraq; Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization; Vice-Chairman, second and fourth sessions, United Nations General Assembly; Chairman of the dele- gation, first special, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, and eleventh sessions of the United Nations General Assembly; Vice-President, sixth session, United Nations General Assembly; author of books and articles on education and politics. Dr. Al-Jomard, Abdul Jabbar Received doctorate degree from the University of Paris; mem- ber, House of Representatives, member of the United National Front;4 Foreign Minister, 1958; Delegate, third session, first part, United Nations General Assembly; Chairman of the delegation, third emergency special session and during his presence, thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly; author of The Constitution of Iraq. Allawi, Salim Attended Utah State College, 1950-1952; received B.A. in political science, American University of Beirut, 1954; Attaché, Foreign Office, 1955; Third Secretary, Foreign Office, 1957; Alternate Delegate, thirteenth session, United Nations General Assembly. Al-Madfai, Jamil—1890- Educated at the Preparatory Military School of Baghdad and the Royal Military College at Istanbul; participated in the Ahd Society and joined the revolt against Turkey; Military Counselor to King Faisal in Syria; as a result of participation in the Iraqi revolt of 1920, fled to Jordan, where became Governor and Di- rector-General for security forces; on return to Iraq became Gov- ernor, Member of Parliament, Member of Cabinet, President of the House of Representatives, President of the Senate, and five times Prime Minister; attended thirteenth session of the League Assembly as an expert. Al-Omari, Arshad—1888- Graduated in Istanbul as civil engineer, 1921; worked as civil engineer of the Islands of Istanbul; became head engineer of Mosul at the end of World War I; member of the first Iraqi Parliament; appointed as Director-General of Posts and Telegraph and served in this capacity until 1931; Director-General of 4 The United National Front is composed of various political groups which were opposed to the former regime in Iraq; at present it counts among its leaders members of the Iraqi Cabinet. 198 1942, 1947, and 1952; Prime Minister, 1946 and 1950; Foreign Minister of the defunct Arab Federation of Iraq and Jordan, 1957; Senator; Permanent President of the Arab League Economic Committee; Director, Arab Bank Ltd.; Chairman of the delega- tions, eighteenth and nineteenth sessions of the League Assembly, third session, second part, and fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly; author of Roman Law. Alwan, Mohammed-1922- Received B.A. in economics, American University of Beirut, 1948; M.A., American University, Washington, D. C., 1959; Attaché, Foreign Office, 1949; Diplomatic Officer in Damascus, 1949-1951; Vice-Consul, Khorramshahr, Iran, 1951-1954; Diplomatic Officer, Embassy, Tehran, 1954-1955; appointed First Secretary, Embassy, Washington, 1955; Advisor, twelfth session, United Nations General Assembly; Alternate Delegate, thirteenth session, United Nations General Assembly. Al-Zahawi, Wisam Attended Chestnuts Tutorial College, Henley-on-Thames, 1947-1948; attended University of Denver, 1949-1950; received B.A. in international relations, University of California at Los Angeles, 1953; served in the Ministry of Education, 1953-1955; Attaché, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1955; Third Secretary, Foreign Office, 1957; Alternate Delegate, thirteenth session, United Nations General Assembly. Amin, Ata—1897- Graduated from Baghdad Law College; also received the "Lycee Imperial Ottoman"; Assistant Secretary to King Faisal I, 1921-1925; Secretary, Iraqi Legation, London, 1925-1930; First Secretary, Legation, Ankara, 1930-1932, Rome, 1934; Counselor of Legation, London, 1935; Chargé d'affaires, Paris, Berlin, Rome, London, 1938-1943; Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, 1943- 1944; Minister to Turkey, 1944-1949, to France, 1949-1952; Director-General of Government Oil Refineries Administration, 1952-1955, and Chairman of Board of Directors, 1955; Delegate to I.L.O.; Delegate to twentieth session of the League Assembly; Delegate to the fifth and sixth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly; author of political articles. Bakr, Abdullah — 1907- Received B.A. degree in political science from the American University of Beirut, 1929; in the civil service of Iraq, 1929- 1931; Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 1931; joined the Foreign Office in 1932; Secretary, Palestine Conference in Lon- 201 don, 1939; Consul, Kermanshah, 1941; Director-General of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, 1942; Consul-General, Bombay, 1943-1946; Consul-General, Bombay, 1946-1948; Chargé d'affaires at Washington, 1948; also served as Chief of the Royal Household and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Secretary, sixteenth and nineteenth sessions of the League Assembly; Delegate, second special, third, fourth, fifth and seventh sessions of the United Nations General Assembly; Acting Chairman of the delegation to the second part of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly; Chairman of delegation, eighth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Barakat, George M. Graduated from Harvard Law School, 1937; lawyer, instructor at Princeton University; Member of United States Board of Economic Warfare, 1943-1945; Advisor, American Law Insti- tute, Human Rights Project; Assistant Director, Near East College Association, 1945-1946; Executive Director, American-Middle- East Relief Inc., 1948-1958; President of the Syrian-Lebanese Federation of the Eastern States; President, National Association of Federation of Syrian-Lebanese American Clubs; decorated with medals of merit by Syria and Lebanon; active participant in Arab- American affairs; advisor, United Nations Conference on Interna- tional Organization. Edmonds, Cecil John—1889- British advisor to the Government of Iraq following the Man- date; Advisor to Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1933; Advisor to Iraqi Ministry of Interior, 1935-1945; was an expert in the Iraqi delegations to the fourteenth, sixteenth, eighteenth and nineteenth sessions of the League Assembly. Fattah, Sullaiman Chairman of the Board of Directors, Al-Mansur Construction Company; attended the thirteenth session of the League Assembly as an expert. Haidar, Rustam—1889- Graduated, from the Royal College of Istanbul, the Sorbonne, and the School of Political Science at Paris; during World War I was a teacher of history and economics in Jerusalem; joined Faisal's forces after the Arab revolt against Turkey; later became a counselor to Faisal; joined Arab delegation to the Paris Peace Conference; became Chief of the Royal Household and private secretary to King Faisal in 1921; Envoy Extraordinary and Minis- ter Plenipotentiary to Tehran, 1929; Member of Senate, 1931; Political economicosia Turkey the paris private 202 Chief of the Royal Household and private secretary to King Ghazi, 1932; Cabinet member on various occasions; Delegate, thirteenth session of the League Assembly. Dr. Haidar, Salih Mahdi—1914- Received B.Sc. and Ph.D. from London School of Economics; high-ranking official in the Ministry of Supply, 1945; Vice- Governor and Acting Governor of the Central Bank;5 Director- General of Budget, Ministry of Finance; Director, Industrial Bank of Iraq, National Insurance Company, Vegetable Oil Extraction Company, Ltd.; Member of the Civil Service Commission, Visiting Professor at Columbia University, 1957-1958; Assistant Delegate, United Nations Conference on International Organization, author, Land Problems of Iraq and many articles. Haim, Ibrahim Expert, thirteenth session of the League Assembly. Jaddou, Abdul Jabbar Secretary, eighteenth session of the League Assembly. Jawad, Hashim Received B.A. degree in political science from the American University of Beirut, 1931, B.Sc. from the London School of Political Science and Economics, 1934; former officer of the In- ternational Labour Office; Director-General of Labor and Social Security; Secretary, delegation to seventeenth session of the League Assembly; Assistant Delegate, United Nations Conference on In- ternational Organization; Iraq's representative to I.L.O. Confer- ences; Alternate Delegate, first session, second part, United Nations General Assembly; Delegate, eleventh and twelfth ses- sions of the United Nations General Assembly; Delegate, first, second, and third emergency special sessions; Chairman of delega- tion to thirteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1956-1957; Delegate, Governing Board, I.L.O., 1957-1958; Counselor at the Foreign Office, 1957-1958; Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, 1958; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1959; author of many publications on conditions in Iraq, including The Social Structure of Iraq. Dr. Khadduri, Majid-1909- Received B.A., American University of Beirut, Ph.D., Chicago University; Visiting Lecturer in Near Eastern History at Indiana University, 1947-1948; Professor of Modern Middle-Eastern History at the Higher Teachers' College, Baghdad, 1948-1949; 6 Formerly known as the Iraqi National Bank. 203 taught Middle Eastern Politics at Chicago University and Harvard University, 1949-1950; Professor in Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 1950, Director of Research and Education, Middle East Institute, 1950—-; Visiting Professor, Princeton University, 1952-1959; Member, American Political Science As- sociation, Shaybani Society of International Law (Göttingen); Secretary and Treasurer, Baghdad P.E.N. Club; Member, Ameri- can Society of International Law; Assistant Delegate, United Na- tions Conference on International Organization; noted for his scholarly contributions on Iraq and the Arab world. Dr. Khadduri, Rose Received B.A. in education and psychology from the American University of Beirut, 1940; Principal of Baghdad West Side High School for Girls, 1940-1948; received E.D.D. from Teachers Col- lege, Columbia University, 1951; Teacher 1951-1954; dismissed due to her opposition to the regime of Nouri Al-Said in 1954, reinstated in 1957 as professor in the Women's College; the first Iraqi woman to receive the E.D.D. degree; active participant in various feminist and other organizations; Delegate, thirteenth ses- sion, United Nations General Assembly; author of "Elementary Education from the Psychological Point of View," unpublished doctorate dissertation. Khalidy, Awni—1912- Graduated from the American University of Beirut, 1933; instructor of history and political science at the Training College of Iraq, 1933-1934; Assistant Secretary in the European Section of the Foreign Ministry, 1934-1936; Vice Consul in Geneva and Secretary to the Permanent Delegation to the League, 1936-1937; Iraq's representative to the International Labour Conference, 1936; Secretary, Legation in Paris, 1937-1939; Secretary, Em- bassy at London, 1939-1945; Alternate Representative to the United Nations, 1950; Acting Representative to the United Na- tions, 1951-1953; Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 1953-1955; Secretary-General of the Baghdad Pact, 1955-1958; Counselor in the Foreign Office, 1958; Secretary, seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the League Assembly; Alternate Delegate, first session, first and second parts, second, second special, third session, first part, fourth and sixth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly; Delegate, fifth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth sessions of the United Nations General Assembly; Chairman Ad Hoc Committee on Factors, 1952-1953; Chairman, Committee on Administrative Budget of UNICEF, atste tien, first pambiy; Delegativations Genera; ations Genersions of the On Factors, 19 NICEF, 204 tion of Syrian-Lebanese American Clubs; active participant in Arab-American affairs; Advisor, United Nations Conference on International Organization. Najib, Sabih Graduated from the Military College at Istanbul; joined Faisal's army in Syria; later became aide-de-camp to King Faisal I; Dean of the Iraqi Military College; Director-General of Police; Coun- selor at the Legation in Berlin, 1935; Minister to Turkey; Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Permanent Represen- tative to the League, 1936; Delegate, sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth sessions of the League Assembly. Wasfi, Ahmed Graduate of Baghdad Faculty of Law; lawyer, Consul in Paris; Expert, fourteenth session, League Assembly. Yasseen, Mustafa Kamil Received law degree with high honors from Baghdad Law College in 1942; lawyer, 1942-1943; diploma of higher studies in public law from Cairo University, 1944; diploma of higher studies in private law, Cairo University, 1945; diploma from "Institut Des Hautes études Internationales,” 1947; diploma from "Institut De Criminologie,” 1949; “Docteur en Droit,” Lauréat de La Faculté de Droit de Paris, 1950; Teacher, Law College of Baghdad, 1950-1956; dismissed for opposition to the regime of Nouri Al-Said in 1956; reinstated as lecturer in private interna- tional law in 1957; head of the Department of International Law of Baghdad Law College in 1958; Delegate, thirteenth session, United Nations General Assembly; author of "Le Role De Juge dans l'incrimination," unpublished doctorate dissertation. I. BIBLIOGRAPHY Official Publications A. League of Nations 1. 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Request by the Iraqi Government under Article 11, Paragraph 2, of the Covenant. Geneva, December 17th, 1934. C.454.M.236.1935.VII. Settlement of the Assyri- ans of Iraq, Report by the Committee to the Coun- cil. Geneva, November 12th, 1935. 208 C.193.M.138.1937. Committees of the League of Nations. Geneva, March 31st, 1937. C.387.M.258.1937.VII. Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq, Report of the Committee to the Council for the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq. Geneva, September 25th, 1937. C. 80.M.35.1938. Committees of the League of Nations. Geneva, March 10th, 1938. C.74.M.35.1939. Committees of the League of Nations. Geneva, February 28th, 1939. Mimeographed documents: C.384.1924.VII. Frontier between Turkey and Irak, Note by the Secretary-General, Letter of the British Government to the Secretary-General. Geneva, August 11th, 1924. C.427.1924. VII. Frontier between Turkey and Irak, Telegram of the Government of the Hedjaz, Note by the Secretary-General. Geneva, August 27th, 1924. C.829.M.285.1925.VII. Frontier between Turkey and Iraq, Telegram from the Prime Minister of Iraq, Note by the Secretary-General. Geneva, De- cember 21st, 1925. C.82.1926.VII. Frontier between Turkey and Iraq, List of Telegrams received in connection with the Council Resolution of December 16th, 1925. Geneva, February 18th, 1926. C.843.1931.VI. Mandates, Frontier between Iraq and Syria . .. Letter from the French Govern- ment . .. Letter from the British Government. Geneva, November 12th, 1931. C.332.1933.VI. Settlement of the Assyrian Com- munity in Iraq, Letters from the Kingdom of Iraq. Geneva, May 22nd, 1933. C.24(1).M.16(1).1936. Committees of the League of Nations, List of Members, Note by the Secretary-General. Geneva, May 1st, 1936. C.282.M.171.1936.VII. Settlement of the Assyri- ans of Iraq, Report of the Committee of the Council on the Settlement of the Assyrians of Iraq. Geneva, July 2nd, 1936. C.341.M.207.1938.VII. Communication from the 209 Government of Iraq. Geneva, September 26th, 1938. 3. Permanent Court of International Justice Permanent Court of International Justice, Series B, Collection of Opinions, No. 12. “Article 3, Para- graph 2, of the Treaty of Lausanne (Frontier be- tween Turkey and Iraq).” A. W. Sythoff's Publish- ing Co., Leyden, 1925. 4. Permanent Mandates Commissioni Permanent Mandates Commission. Minutes of the Seventh Session Held at Geneva from October 19th to October 30th, 1925. Geneva, 1925. - Minutes of the Tenth Session held at Geneva from November 4th to 19th, 1926, Includ- ing the Report of the Commission to the Council. Geneva, 1926. . Minutes of the Fourteenth Session held at Geneva from October 26th to November 13th, 1928, Including the Report of the Commission to the Council. Geneva, 1928. -- _. Minutes of the Sixteenth Session Held at Geneva from November 6th to 26th, 1929, Includ- ing the Report of the Commission to the Council and Comments by Certain Accredited Representa- tives of the Mandatory Powers. Geneva, 1929. - Minutes of the Twentieth Session Held at Geneva from June 9th to June 27th, 1931, In- cluding the Report of the Commission to the Coun- cil. Geneva, 1931. i. Minutes of the Twenty-First Session Held at Geneva from October 26th to November 13th, 1931, Including the Report of the Commis- sion to the Council on the Ordinary Work of the Session, The Comments by the Accredited Repre- sentatives of the Mandatory Powers, and the Special Report of the Commission to the Council on the Proposal of the British Government with regard to the Emancipation of Iraq. Geneva, 1931. 5. Official Journal Official Journal. October 1924. -. November 1924. October 1925. 210 of the League of Nations. 205 volumes. Geneva, 1920-1946. Volume XXII, 1924. Volume XXVIII, 1924. Volume XXXV, 1925. Volume LXIV, 1927. Volume CXC, 1938. B. United Nations Conference on International Organiza- tion United Nations Information Office. Guide to the United Nations and allied agencies. New York, 1945. .. Who's Who, Delegations to the United Na- tions Conference on International Organization. New York, 1945. United Nations, Information Organizations and the Li- brary of Congress, Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization, San Fran- cisco, 1945, 22 vols.; London and New York, 1945- 1955. C. United Nations 1. General Assembly Official Records. First to Thirteenth Sessions (1946- 1958), First and Second Special Sessions (1947, 1948), and First, Second, and Third Emergency Special Sessions (1956, 1956, 1958), Plenary Meetings. .. First Special Session, Vol. II, General Committee (1947). -. First Special Session, Vol. III, Main Committees (1947). -. Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question (1947). -. Third Session, Part I, Third Committee (1948). - Fourth Session, Ad Hoc Political Com- mittee (1949). -. Ninth Session, First Committee (1954). Resolutions. First through Twelfth Sessions (1946- 1957), and First and Second Special Sessions (1947, 1948). Printed documents: Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifth Ses- 212 sion, Annexes, Volume II, 1950, New York. Agenda Items 76, pp. 5-6, document A/C.1/642/- Rev. 1, (First Committee), “Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen: draft resolution (first revision)," 24 January 1951. Agenda Item 76, p. 8 ff, document A/C.1/643, (First Committee), "Report of the Group on Cease-Fire in Korea," 2 January 1951. Agenda Item 76, p. 17, document A/1717, "In- terim Report of the First Committee," 13 De- cember 1950. Agenda Item 76, pp. 20-21, document A/1799, "Report of the Additional Measures Committee,” 14 May 1951. Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, Volume II, 12 November 1956 -8 March 1957, New York. Agenda Item 66, p. 62, document A/3557, “Af- ghanistan, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan: draft resolution,” 22 February 1957. Mimeographed documents: A/1822/Add.4. Uniting for Peace, Implementa- tion of paragraph 8 of resolution 377 (V) adopted by the General Assembly on' 3 November 1950. 9 August 1951. A/1841/Add.2. Additional Measures to be em- ployed to meet the aggression in Korea; Reports from governments on measures taken in accordance with General Assembly resolution 500(V) of 18 May 1951. 9 August 1951. A/C.1/642/Rev.2. (First Committee). Afghanis- tan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen: joint draft resolution (second revision). 29 January 1951. A/C.5/L.1, 21 September 1929; A/C.5/L.48, 25 September 1950; A/C.5/L.108/Rev.1, 31 Octo- ber 1951; A/C.5/L.234, 16 September 1953; A/C.5/L.393/Corr.1, 4 December 1956; and A/C.5/L.456, 12 September 1957. All are docu- ments of the Fifth Committee bearing some varia- 213 - Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Adminis- tration of 'Iraq for the Year 1930. Colonial No. 62. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1931. -. Report by his Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Adminis- tration of 'Iraq for the Year 1931. Colonial No. 74. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1932. - Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Council of the League of Nations on the Adminis- tration of 'Iraq for the Period January to October, 1932. London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1933. I. Government of the United States United States Department of State. Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945. Washington: Division of Publications, Office of Public Affairs, 1949. United States Department of State Bulletin, Vol. V, No. 112, August 16, 1941, pp. 125-126. -- Vol. VI, No. 132, January 3, 1942, p. 3. - Vol. VIII, No. 187, January 23, 1943, p. 83. _. Vol. XII, No. 301, April 1, 1945, pp. 575- 576. II. Books, Pamphlets, and Articles Abu El-Haj, Ribbhi. "Oil Industry; A Strategic Factor in the Economic Development of Iraq." Unpublished doctoral dis- sertation in Faculty of Political Science, Columbia Univer- sity, 1957. Antonious, George. The Arab Awakening. 3rd. ed. Beirut: Khayat's College Book Cooperative, 1955. Al-Hassani, Abdul Razak. Tarikh Al-Irak Al-Siyasi Al-Hadith [Modern Political History of Iraq]. 3 vols. Sida, Lebanon: Al Arafan Press, 1948. -. Tarikh Al-Wizarat Al-Irakia. (History of Iraqi Cabinets.] 6 vols. Sida, Lebanon: Al Arafan Press, 1933- 1953. Al-Shiabani, Talat. Wakai Al-Mulkia Al-Zuraiah Fy Al-Irak. [Facts on Ownership of Iraq's Cultivated Land.] Baghdad: Dar Al-Ahali, 1958. 217 Al-Yafi, Abdul Fattah Abu Alnasr. Al-Irak Beyn Innkylabeyn. [Iraq between two coups d'etat.] Beirut: Al-Makshouf Publishing House, 1938. Blattner, E. J., Managing Editor. Who's Who in Egypt and the Middle East-1950. 16th ed. Cairo: Imprimerie Française, 1950. Blattner, J. E., Managing Editor. Who's Who in Egypt and the Near East—1956. 22nd ed. Cairo: Imprimerie Fran- çaise, 1956. -. Who's Who in Egypt and the Near East—1957- 1958. Cairo: Imprimerie Française, 1958.. Burckel, Christian E., Editor. Who's Who in the United Nations. New York: Christian E. Burckel and Associates, 1951.. Chamberlin, Waldo, and Eagleton, Clyde. Organization and Procedures of the United Nations. In publication by the Brookings Institute, 1959. Chase, Eugene P. The United Nations in Action. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950. Cheever, Daniel S., and Haviland, H. Field Jr. Organizing for Peace: International Organization in World Affairs. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1954. Claude, Inis L. Jr. Swords into Plowshares. New York: Random House, 1956. Davis, Helen Miller. Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1953. Eagleton, Clyde. International Government. 3rd ed. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1957. ' Evatt, Herbert V. The Task of Nations. New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1949. Foster, Henry A. The Making of Modern Iraq. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1935. Goodrich, Leland M. "The U.N. Security Council,” Interna- tional Organization, Vol. VII, No. 3, Summer 1958, pp. 273-287. Goodrich, Leland M., and Hambro, Edvard. Charter of the United Nations, Commentary and Documents. 2nd and revised ed. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1949. Hall, H. Duncan. Mandates, Dependencies and Trusteeship. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1948. 218, Ranshofen-Wertheimer, Egon F. The International Secre- tariat. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1945. Rappard, William E. "Small States in the League of Nations," Problems of Peace, Ninth Series, Pacifism Is Not Enough, Lectures delivered at the Geneva Institute of International Relations, August 1934. George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1935. Royal Institute of International Affairs. The Middle East, a Political and Economic Survey. 2nd ed. London: 1954. - . "Memorandum on the Termination of the Man- datory Regime in 'Iraq.'” Mimeographed. London: In- formation Dept., 1932. Sayegh, Fayez A. Arab Unity, Hope and Fulfillment. New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1958. Stafford, S. R. The Tragedy of the Assyrians. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1935. Suleyman, Hikmat S. The Story of "Oil in Iraq." 2nd revised ed. Jerusalem, Jordan: The Commercial Press, 1957. Vandenbosch, Amry, and Hogan, Willard N. The United Nations, Background, Organization, Functions, Activities. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1952. Walters, F. P. A History of the League of Nations. 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1952. Warriner, Doreen. Land Reform and Development In The Middle East, A study of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. London: Oxford University Press, 1957. Wilson, Woodrow. War and Peace, Presidential Messages, Addresses, and Public Papers (1917-1924). Edited by Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd. 2 vols., authorized ed. New York: Harper & Bros. Publishers, 1927. Wright, Quincy. Mandates under the League of Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930. III. Periodicals Al-Istiqlal [Independence]. Baghdad, June 5, 1922. Al-Ahali [The People]. Baghdad, July 7, 1959. The Christian Science Monitor. Boston, October 18, 1958. The New York Times. March 6, 1945. March 22, 1945. October 12, 1958. December 3, 1958. March 15, 1959. March 25, 1959. Time Magazine, New York, June 17, 1957. 220