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THE FOREIGN POLICY
RESEARCH INSTITUTE SERIES
The Foreign Policy Research Institute
University of Pennsylvania
Number 6





THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
UNIVERSITY OF PEN NSYLVANIA
THE
RECONSTRUCTION
OF
|RAQ: 1950 - 1957
by Fahim I. Qubain
with a foreword by
RoberT strausz-Hupé
FREDER ICK A. PRAE GER . Publisher
NEW YORK . N. Y.


HC,
£ BOOKS THAT MATTER
Q.5 First published in the United States of America in 1958
by Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publishers
15 West 47th Street, New York 36, N. Y.
C 1958 in the United States of America
by The Foreign Policy Research Institute
All rights reserved
Library of Congress catalog card number 58-10098
Printed in the United States of America
This is the sixth in a series of studies to be published by
Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, under the auspices of the
Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Penn-
sylvania, established under a grant of the Richardson Founda-
tion, Greensboro, North Carolina. This study was subjected
to the extensive and critical discussion of the Associates of
the Foreign Policy Research Institute. However, the views
expressed in THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ are the author’s own.


. . . . . .” º
-, - ?
ºr 22 - A ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The publication of this study was made possible by a grant
from the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University
of Pennsylvania. This grant permitted me to revise and bring
up to date a manuscript which had its origins in a Ph.D.
dissertation written at the University of Wisconsin under
the direction of Professor Llewellyn Pfankuchen of the De-
partment of Political Science. -
The Staff Conference of the Associates of the Foreign
Policy Research Institute reviewed the manuscript and
offered many helpful comments on my work. The Institute
arranged for the editing of the entire manuscript and its
preparation for publication by Mr. William Sands, Editor
of the Middle East journal.
Many people helped me during both my research and
writing. I especially want to express my heartfelt gratitude
to my friend and teacher Professor Pfankuchen, who never
failed to give me his support and counsel. He supervised my
early research and criticized the original manuscript. Thanks
are also due to Professors James McCamy, Richard Hart-
shorne and Theodore Morgan, all of the University of Wis-
consin, for their helpful advice and encouragement. The
financial aid of the Social Science Research Council enabled
me to do field work in Iraq and neighboring countries.
Special thanks are due to Professor Robert Strausz-Hupé
and Mr. Erasmus H. Kloman, Jr., both of the Foreign Policy
Research Institute. They offered many valuable criticisms
and suggestions concerning content and manner of presenta-
tion.
Needless to say, I am alone responsible for all statements—
whether of fact or opinion—made in this book.
FAHIM I. QUBAIN
Washington, D.C.
March 31, 1958





FOREW ORD
In July, 1958 the pro-Western government of Iraq was
abruptly and violently overthrown by a military coup. The
revolution in Iraq raised grave questions for American foreign-
policy makers. Since Iraq was the one Arab state which ad-
hered to the Baghdad Pact concluded in 1955, the tremors of
the upheaval in Iraq were bound to affect fundamentally the
West’s strategic position in the Middle East. But even more
importantly, the fall of the Hashemite Kingdom raised a
question of vital concern to the entire range of America’s
foreign economic policies.
No country of the Middle East had progressed farther along
the path of economic progress than had Iraq under the direc-
tion of King Faisal and Nuri as-Sa'id. The program of the
Iraqi Development Board represented a well-considered and
systematic utilization of 70 per cent of Iraq’s oil resources for
the development of the national economy. But economic
development did not assure political stability. The obvious
question raised by events in Iraq is whether efforts to promote
economic growth have any significant effect on political align-
ments and ideological orientation.
Regardless of the political complexion of the future regimes,
Iraq’s basic problems of development will remain the same.
In all probability the Development Board or a device similar
to it will continue to be the principal instrument for promot-
ing economic growth. This study by Dr. Fahim Qubain pro-
vides an objective and detached view of the basic problems
involved in the transformation of a rural and static society in-
to an urban and dynamic one. Dr. Qubain's study, although
enlivened by a deep awareness of the social and economic
changes which are taking place throughout the Middle East,
avoids political controversy. It focuses on the underlying
economic problems which must be understood before judg-
ment can be passed on Iraq’s politics and role in regional
affairs.
Among the Ottoman Empire’s outlying Arab possessions,
the vilayets of Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah, comprising
most of ancient Mesopotamia, were among the most neglected


and the poorest. The ministrations of the Sultan’s govern-
ment were largely confined to the collection of taxes. The
population was sparse and, especially in the river valleys,
ridden by endemic diseases. From these three provinces was
formed, upon the breakup of the Ottoman Empire in 1918,
the state of Iraq. Its first king, Amir Faisal, was crowned in
1921. Yet, only in 1932, when Great Britain relinquished her
League of Nations mandate, did Iraq acquire full sovereignty.
Thus, independent Iraq has existed for less than three de-
cades. The achievements of Iraq in the field of economic and
social development must be measured by the burden of
neglect, inherited from Turkish rule, and the short span of
national experience.
Unlike most of the states carved from the territory of the
Ottoman Empire, Iraq had to start virtually from scratch
in laying the foundations of a modern state. Ever since the
beginning of the nineteenth century, Syria, Lebanon and
Egypt had been open to Western influences. In these Arab-
speaking countries of the Levant, long before they won
national independence, Western education and trade had
fostered the growth of a middle class composed of Western-
trained physicians, engineers, teachers, public servants and
businessmen. The newly created state of Iraq, situated at
the eastern periphery of the Middle East and isolated by
distance and desert from the lively, prosperous Levant, could
boast of but a small cadre of Western-trained army officers
and a handful of graduates from Ottoman Western academic
institutions. That Iraq has been able, amidst the trouble of
the turbulent Arab world and great power conflicts con-
verging upon the Middle East, to assemble a corps of civil
servants and technical experts capable of administering so
complex and so sophisticated an undertaking as the program
of the Iraq Development Board bespeaks the tenacity and
inborn intelligence of the Iraqi people. Although foreign
administrative and technical advisers assisted in the task
of modernization—and where in the Middle East have they
been absent?—native talent now operates Iraq’s departments
of government, including the economic services.
Iraq has put its own resources to work in developing an


ix
“infrastructure”—the basic public services—as well as
agricultural productivity and light industries. The Iraqi
performance compares favorably with that of other Afro-
Asian nations who are now launched on various programs
of accelerated economic development. True enough, relatively
few among the latter enjoy the economic potential of Iraq.
Not every “underdeveloped” country can rival Iraq’s econom-
ic endowment and hence hope to equal Iraq’s economic
progress. The unequal distribution of natural resources among
countries is one, although not the only, reason that invalidates
a global, albeit superficial, approach to the problem of in-
ternational economic development. A country that can call
freely upon all the capital it can use for social, agricultural
and industrial investment enjoys an obvious advantage over
those nations which cannot wring sizeable savings from their
subsistence economies. Iraq has benefited from a steadily
and rapidly growing international demand for oil. In a
sense, oil revenues provided the artificial stimulant of an
economy which, but for this fortuitous boon, could not
hope to break the vicious circle of oppressive penury and a
rapidly increasing population.
But the problems facing Iraq in the present stage of its
development are by no means devoid of meaning for other
underdeveloped countries. In the first place, Iraq is far from
the richest of the oil-producing countries of the Middle East.
Many of the presently “underdeveloped’ countries in Africa
and Asia are discovering resources which, once their rational
exploitation has been undertaken, will find ready markets.
Secondly, Iraq’s central problem is one which, to a greater
or lesser degree, confronts all backward economies—the
inadequate supply of technically trained personnel capable
of meeting the demands of an expanding economy. Despite
the remarkable increase of native talent, Iraq has not been
able to dispense with the assistance of foreign technicians
and advisers. The very rate of Iraq’s economic progress and
the increase of trained personnel are racing one another.
Iraq, just as many other countries, appears to have labored
under the illusion that plenty of capital, a pile of imported
industrial equipment and a battalion of foreign experts and


X
technicians somehow add up to national economic develop-
ment. These factors, necessary and desirable as they are,
cannot work lasting results within a society that is indifferent
or hostile to the exacting disciplines of Western technology.
This lesson Iraq had to learn the hard way. There has been
waste; there have been failures. Current planning places
more emphasis, than in the past, upon the development of
human resources as the first and indispensable step towards
the exploitation of the country’s natural wealth. The successes
and failures of the Iraq government in joining native skills
to the nation’s physical assets provide significant lessons to
other nations.
Iraq’s unusually favorable position is based on a combina-
tion of several factors: a low density of population; an abun-
dant supply of water; large tracts of fallow land that can be
brought under cultivation by irrigation; a vast potential
supply of hydroelectric energy; and, most importantly, the
revenue from proven and producing oil deposits sufficient
to meet all of Iraq’s capital requirements for the foreseeable
future. The low population density suggests, in fact, that Iraq
might be able to relieve the serious overcrowding in other
Middle Eastern areas. Although the prospects for large-scale
immigration to Iraq are barred at present by international
political controversies, Iraq could furnish a safety valve of
Middle Eastern population pressure. The unity of Arab-
Islamic culture and the evident trend towards union among
the Arab states will no doubt operate to diminish the obstacles
which mass migration encounters in less homogeneous areas.
The plans of the Development Board are comprehensive
and ambitious; they must be both, for the forces of social
change are all-pervasive—and the Middle East is not one
of those few remaining tranquil regions where comparative
remoteness insulates domestic affairs from world politics. The
Iraqi model of economic progress is being scrutinized by all
the peoples of the Middle East, and not all critics are friendly.
The men of the Development Board are in a hurry, for not
only must they prove the worth of their scheme to their own
people, but they also know that the eyes of all Arabs are upon
them. It is all the more to their credit that, notwithstanding


xii
tracting firms have submitted their bids on a competitive
basis. Sometimes, this competition has been rugged, and the
Board as well as the Iraqi people have been the principal
beneficiaries of this wholesome international rivalry.
The economic development of each country is a unique
experience, and its lessons are not easily transferable to
another one. There is no model of economic growth; there
are some preconceived notions about what economic growth,
its cause and rate, might be, provided all other things were
equal—which they never are. Thus the Iraqi experience
should not be compared without stringent qualifications
with that of, let us say, Egypt or Syria or Iran. Yet the Iraqi
record will be scanned closely by many peoples in the throes
of transition from a static to a dynamic economy and, espe-
cially, by the peoples of the Middle East.
Not so long ago, Mesopotamia could look to little else
but the sunken ruins of the past and their enigmatic message
of futility. Today’s Mesopotamia, Iraq, is a new country.
Its people are swept along in a universal tide: the “revolution
of rising expectations.” Not all the new in Iraq has been
built well; not all the expectations aroused by the popular
slogans of progress can be fulfilled. This is not surprising;
even in the richest and most advanced countries, the benefits
of progress are contested by the pains of dislocation; and
performance hardly ever lives up to expectation.
ROBERT STRAUSz-HUPá
Philadelphia
July, 1958


CONTENTS
Foreword vii
Introduction xvii
Part 1
The Background
1: The Population Structure of Iraq 1
2: The Background of Development 17
3: The Development Board 30
Part 2
The Development of Agriculture
4: Control over the Water Resources 54
5: The Problem of Land Tenure and Agrarian Reform 80
6: Agricultural Techniques, Facilities, and Services 105
7: Beneficiaries of Reform—Landlord or Peasant? 120
Part 3
The Development of Industry
8: The Oil Industry 129
9: Industrialization, Communications, and Electrification 162
Part 4
The Development of Human Resources
10: The Challenge of Education 205
11: Public Health 226
12: Community Development and Welfare 241
Part 5
13: Conclusions 254
Appendixes 263
Index 265


LIST OF MAPS AND CHARTS
The Development Board 33
Flood Control and Irrigation 36
Wadi Tharthar Project 66
State Land Reclamation and Distribution Program 97
Oil Fields, Refineries, and Pipelines 134
Suggested Chemical Industry for Iraq 179
General Population Census Appendix I
Population of Chief Cities Appendix II


GLOSSARY OF TERMS
FALLAH
FALLAHEEN
IRAQI FILs
IRAQI DINAR (ID.)
IRAQI DUNUM
LIWA
MESHARA
MUTASSARIF
NAHIYA
QADA
SHAIKH
VILAYET OR WILAYET
A peasant, a farmer. The word
can also refer to the whole class of
peasants or farmers.
Plural of fallah.
1,000 fils equal one dinar (see
below).
A currency unit equal to one
pound sterling or $2.80.
A land unit measurement equal to
0.62 acres.
A province.
division.
An administrative
An Iraqi dunum (see above).
A governor of a liva, or province.
A sub-district, a county. An ad-
ministrative division.
A district. An administrative divi-
sion.
The head of a tribe. Can also mean
a Muslim religious leader, or a
teacher of the Quran.
A political and/or administrative
division.





The Reconstruction of Iraq:
I950-1957


INTRODUCTION
Today a silent social and economic revolution is taking
place in Iraq. Its inspirational roots go back to a glorious
past when, during the Abbassid Caliphate (754 A. D.-1258
A. D.), the country is said to have supported a population of
some twenty million people. During this era, Baghdad became
the cultural center of the civilized world. The arts, philosophy,
science, and medicine, as well as commerce and navigation,
flourished and prospered. An intricate irrigation system was
constructed, and Iraq was the granary of a great empire.
The canal system being developed today follows, to an amaz-
ing degree, the ruins of its ancient counterpart.
In 1258, following a period of political decline, Iraq was
invaded by Mongol hordes who reduced its splendor into
dust. The canal system was virtually destroyed; the desert
gradually encroached on the farmland; security was absent;
the population decreased rapidly and nomadism spread. This
era is regarded as the darkest period in Iraq’s history. Only
in recent years has the country begun to recover from the
ravages wrought by the Mongol invasions.
In 1534 the Ottoman Turks under Sulaiman the Magnifi-
cent invaded Iraq. With the exception of a brief period
(1621-38), the country remained an insignificant Ottoman
province until World War I. Generally speaking, Ottoman
rule was characterized by weakness and corruption. Governors
were virtually independent from the central authorities;
tribal chieftains ravaged the countryside, warred against
each other, and were a constant menace to the cities.
In the nineteenth century some measures of reform were
effected. The country was reorganized into three administra-
tive provinces. The bureaucracy and the financial arrange-
ments were improved. During the governorship of Midhat
Pasha (1869-72), an enlightened reformer, land tenure reform
was initiated, a more effective police system introduced, and
an attempt at town-planning and at enforcement of modern
laws was made. In addition, a few secular schools were
established, and the tribes were brought under much closer
discipline. The genesis of the modern irrigation system dates


xix -
back to the last years of Turkish rule, just before the outbreak
of World War I, when Sir W. Willcocks made his famous
report on the control and utilization of the waters of the
Tigris-Euphrates river system.
When the war broke out, the Arabs, under the leadership
of Sherif Husayn of Mecca, joined the Allies with the under-
standing that their independence would be recognized. For
various reasons not within the scope of this book, their ex-
pectations did not materialize. At the San Remo Conference
on April 25, 1920, Iraq was awarded to Britain as a mandated
territory.
The announcement of the mandate was immediately
followed by a general uprising which lasted from July to
October (1920). Some 133,000 troops, including huge re-
inforcements from India, were employed to suppress the
rebellion. The losses in human life, money and property were
staggering. When the end came, the toll had risen to some
10,000 casualties. The number of Iraqis killed has never been
accurately ascertained, but is estimated at about 4,000 in
addition to those injured. Over 400 British lost their lives
in addition to over 1,880 wounded or missing. The cost to the
British treasury was over forty million pounds. The damage
to property was immense.
The rebellion demonstrated to the British the need for some
concessions to national sentiment. In October (1920), Sir
Percy Cox, an able statesman, arrived in Baghdad as British
High Commissioner. He immediately organized a provisional
Arab government with limited powers, composed of ten
leading Iraqi personalities. On August 23, 1921, Amir Faisal,
son of Sherif Husayn, was proclaimed king. An Anglo-Iraqi
treaty was signed on October 10, 1922, and the drafting of a
constitution completed in the fall of 1923. Both were approved
by the Constituent Assembly which was convoked for the
first time in March, 1924.
The treaty, and not the constitution, was in fact the basic
instrument. It established the foundation and framework of
the new state, as well as defining its relations with Britain and
the League of Nations. Iraq was nominally recognized as a
sovereign state, yet the conditions imposed left it in a mandate


.xx
status. This anomalous position became popularly known
in Iraq as al-Wad’ al-shadh (the abnormal position). On June
30, 1930, a new Anglo-Iraqi treaty was signed which recog-
nized the full independence of Iraq but, at the same time,
protected British interests. The treaty remained in force
until 1955, when all special ties with Britain were terminated.
On October 3, 1932, upon the recommendation of the British
government, Iraq was admitted as a full-fledged member of
the League of Nations.
Iraq is a constitutional monarchy with a king, a Parliament
composed of two chambers, a cabinet theoretically responsible
to Parliament, and an independent judiciary. The govern-
ment, however, is highly centralized and is characterized
by the subordination of Parliament—and sometimes even the
judiciary—to executive power. The cabinet, modeled after
the British system, functions in actual practice after the
French. This is due to the absence of an organized party
system and the lack of party solidarity.
The exploitation of the oil wealth of Iraq has a long political
history. Rivalry between British and German interests began
in the opening years of the twentieth century. In 1914 the two
parties joined forces when the Foreign Office Agreement was
signed. The Agreement stipulated that the Anglo-Persian
Oil Company receive a 50 per cent interest in the newly
created Turkish Petroleum Company (T. P. C.), and that
Deutsche Bank and Anglo-Saxon Company (a subsidiary
of Royal Dutch Shell) receive 25 per cent each. Following the
agreement, T.P.C., supported by the British and German
governments, pressed the Turkish government for a con-
cession. On June 28, 1914, the Grand Vizier agreed to lease
the company the oil rights in the provinces of Mosul and
Baghdad. Further negotiations were suspended by the out-
break of the war.
After the war, following several years of negotiations among
British, French, and American interests on both the business
and diplomatic levels, T.P.C. (renamed in 1931 Iraq Petrol-
eum Company) was reconstituted by the famous Red Line
Agreement of 1928 providing for the present division of
ownership. In the meantime, T.P.C. received its first con-


xxi
cession from the Iraqi Government on March 14, 1925.
Oil was struck in commercial quantities at Baba Gurgur
near Kirkuk on June 27, 1927.
Oil is Iraq’s Third River. The Tigris and Euphrates,
properly harnessed, supply life-giving water to the vast but
hitherto idle lands of the country. Oil, in addition to its in-
dustrial potentialities, supplies the funds to finance the
development of its natural and human resources. Oil revenue
began to assume some significance in the late twenties. After
1950 a new fifty-fifty profit-sharing agreement was signed,
and a Development Board was established to utilize the
vastly increased revenue. What the Iraqis have done and
are doing with these great resources will be the subject matter
of this book.





PART I The Background
CHAPTER l
THE POPULATION STRUCTURE OF IRAQ
In 1934, the population of Iraq was estimated to be around
3.8 million persons. In 1947, when the first census in the
history of the country was taken, it was found to be 4,816,185.
In 1955, it was put at about 5,113,000."
Iraq is not a nation in the Western sense of the term. It is
rather a conglomeration of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and
ecological groups. Primary loyalties in many cases still belong
to immediate social units rather than to the nation-state.
Strong forces are at work, however, gradually welding the
various groups into a whole and effectuating a transference
of primary loyalty to the state. In the first place, the culture,
traditions and socio-economic institutions of the country
have an Arab-Muslim base. This, in itself, is a strong unifying
force which has proved its effectiveness in times of external
danger. Others which appeared recently are: nationalism,
the spread of education, secularization and a rational view
of the universe; patriotic indoctrination of the young in
the educational system; vast expansion in the social and
economic activity of the state; urbanization; and, finally,
increased population mobility.


2 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
The Muslim Arabs
Over four million or about 93 per cent of the population
of Iraq are Muslims divided into two main sects: Shi’a and
Sunni. -
Since the 1947 census ignored sectarian divisions among
the Muslim population, no accurate statistical data exist
as to the number of the Shi'a. They do constitute the largest
single community in the country, and it is generally believed
that they form between 50 and 60 per cent of the total
population, concentrated mostly in the central and southern
part of the country. With the exception of a small number of
Kurds, Lurs, Shabaks, and some Iranians, the Shi’a are
Arabs.
Despite their numerical majority, the Shi'a have tradition-
ally played the role of a minority group in the country. This
is because, despised as heretics, they have suffered almost
continuous persecution at the hands of Sunni rulers from the
Abbassid Caliphate (est. 750 A.D.) to the end of the Ottoman
Empire after World War I.
The exact number of the Sunni Arabs is not known. It
is, however, believed that with the Kurds, the majority of
whom are also Sunni, they are numerically almost equal to
the Shi’a.
The Sunni Arabs are not as geographically concentrated
as the Shi'a. They engage in a wide variety of occupations
including a majority in agriculture. In economic status,
they range over the whole spectrum from the wealthiest to
the poorest. However, they are heavily represented in govern-
ment, and most of the members of the economic, political,
and intellectual élite are drawn from among them. They
play an influential role in the country.
The Kurds and Other Muslims
Second in numbers after the Arab Muslims are the Kurds.
They are Sunni by religion and speak several Kurdish dia-
lects, although they are gradually adopting the Arabic
language. The latest considered estimate, that of Hourani
in 1947, placed their number at about 800,000 persons, or
about 16 per cent of the total population of Iraq.


THE POPULATION STRUCTURE 3
In the 1920’s, there was a fairly strong movement for the
formation of a Kurdish state, including also the Kurds of
Iran and Turkey. The state did not materialize, and, after
the failure of their movement, the Kurds began to play an
important role in the life of Iraq. This is in part because
they share the Sunni faith with the Arab political majority
and in part because their leading families identified them-
selves with Arab-Iraqi nationalism. Several Kurds have
occupied cabinet and other high posts in the government
and particularly in the army.
The Kurds are concentrated in the mountain border
regions of the North and Northeast. The Sulaimaniya prov-
ince is almost exclusively Kurdish, and the provinces of
Mosul, Arbil, Kirkuk, and Diyala contain large majorities.
In many respects they still maintain a tribal form of social
organization and are characterized by extreme clannishness.
In addition to the Kurds, there are some 75,000 Turkomans
who are Sunni by religion; about 60,000 Lurs who are Shi’a;
and about 12,000 Shabak who practice another variant of
the Shi'a faith. All these groups, however, are being gradually
Arabicized.
The Tezidis
The Yezidi minority, according to the 1947 census, number-
ed 32,434 persons. It is one of the two most interesting mi-
norities in Iraq, the other being the Mandaean community.
Inbreeding will probably result in extinction of the Yezidis
before long.
The religious beliefs of the Yezidis are held in strict secrecy.
They have been erroneously called devil worshipers. Basically,
their religion is dualistic and recognizes two forces in the
universe: good and evil. These two are in perpetual struggle,
but Shaitan (Satan) is most powerful on earth and therefore
must be appeased. To escape his attention, the Yezidis
avoid the use of words beginning with the sound sh.
During the Ottoman regime they were regarded as a
heretical Muslim sect. As such they were not allowed, like
the Christians and the Jews, the status of millet (sect) and
were consequently deprived of all the attendant legal bene-


4 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
fits. They were subjected instead to constant persecution
and periodic raids from their Turkish rulers and Kurdish
neighbors.
This struggle for survival has made them the most tightly-
knit and most regimented community in Iraq. Their social
organization is both semi-political and religious. This brings
them occasionally into conflict with the central authorities.
In addition, some of their religious beliefs inhibit the educa-
tion of children, which makes the task of government difficult.
The Yezidis speak a Kurdish dialect but many of them
speak Arabic also. Almost all of them live in the province of
Mosul. Because of their religious beliefs and their social
isolation, they stand apart from the main stream of Iraqi
life. They fall into the lowest economic brackets in the country.
The Mandaeans
The Mandaeans are another picturesque religious minority.
In 1947 they constituted an urban community of 6,597 per-
sons scattered in various towns south of Baghdad. Their
main town is Suq al-Shuyukh in the southern province of
Muntafiq.
Assimilation may soon lead to the extinction of the Man-
daeans, whose number is rapidly diminishing even now.
Mandaean women are highly in demand by other groups
as wives, since they are renowned for their beauty. The
Mandaeans do not object to marrying off their women to
outsiders.
Their religion appears to be of gnostic origin. They are
sometimes called the “Followers of St. John” or the “Christians
of St. John,” and they themselves claim descent from the
ancient Sabaeans. Two outward manifestations of their
religion are pacifism and baptism. The latter is observed not
only once, as in the Christian faith, but after the commission
of any sin. They are reputed for their honesty, gentleness,
and industry.
The Jews
In 1947, according to the census, the Jewish community
numbered some 118,000 persons. Estimates, however, ran


THE POPULATION STRUCTURE 5
as high as 150,000. In 1950-51 the bulk of the Jewish com-
munity left the country for Israel, India, Europe, and the
United States. It is estimated that some 10,000 are still left
in Iraq.
Before their exodus, the Jews were an urban community
holding a very important position in the economic life of
the country. They were prominent in business and banking
and had almost exclusive monopoly of the money-changing
trade.
T he Christians.
In 1947 there were some 150,000 Christians of all de-
nominations. Half live in Mosul—the traditional Christian
center in Iraq. The other half are scattered throughout the
country, but particularly in urban centers such as Baghdad,
Basrah, Kirkuk, and Ramadi.
As in all Arab countries, the Christians in Iraq were the
first to avail themselves of the advantages, such as education,
offered by the West and to adopt Western techniques and
attitudes. At the same time, however, they generally identified
themselves with the Arab nationalists and took over the
outlook and aspirations of the Sunni political majority. On
the whole, they live in harmony with their fellow nationals
and cannot be distinguished from the rest of the populat-
ion.
An exception are the Nestorians, who claim descent from
the ancient Assyrians. Until recent years they have been in
constant conflict with both the government and the majority.
Although no reliable data are available, it is believed that
they number around 25,000 in Iraq.
There are two main sources of conflict. The Nestorians
claim to be a nation and in the twenties attempted to es-
tablish a state in the north of Iraq along the Turkish border.
Their patriarch, who now resides in the United States, still
claims political as well as religious authority over them. This
fact, along with the tendency of many constantly to petition
foreign governments and international bodies for redress of
real or imaginary wrongs, has created considerable resent-
ment against them among other Iraqis.


THE POPULATION STRUCTURE 7
Geographic Distribution of the Population
The total population in 1947 was 4,816,185 persons,
divided into 2,257,345 males or 46.6 per cent, and 2,558,840
females or 53.4 per cent. There is reason to believe that there
was considerable under-reporting of both males and females—
the former to escape military conscription and the latter
because of Islamic tradition.
The country is divided into fourteen administrative prov-
inces with an average density for the whole country (ex-
cluding desert areas) of twenty-one persons per square
kilometer. The provinces of Baghdad and Dulaim have the
highest and lowest densities with sixty-seven and five persons
per square kilometer respectively.
The urban population comprises about 34 per cent of the
population. In fact, this figure is not a precise one, for urban
population is defined by the census as all persons living
within municipalities.
TABLE 1.
PoPULATION of IRAQ: 1947 Density Per Cent
Per Urban
Square Popula-
Liwa Total Male Female JNomads Km. tion.
Baghdad 817,205 408,404 408,801 64 67
Mosul 595,190 288,199 306,991 70,000 20 35
Diwaniya 378,118 159,875 218,243 25 21
Muntafiq 371,867 148,034 223,833 30,000 25 15
Basrah 368,799 183,723 185,076 30 40
Amara 307,021 138,207 168,814 17 20
Kirkuk 286,005 129,365 156,640 14 33
Karbala 274,264 132,116 142,148 125,000 45 42
Diyala 272,413 133,749 138,664 17 19
Hilla 261,206 124,897 136,309 48 28
Arbil 239,776 108,488 131,288 13 21
Sulaimaniya 226,400 101,767 124,633 24 24
Kut 224,938 103,987 120,951 14 22
Dulaim 192,983 96,534 96,449 25,000 5 20
4,816,185° 2,257,345 2,558,840 250,000 21 34
*In 1957 a new census was completed. The preliminary results, which have
just been published, are incorporated as Appendixes I and II at the end of the
book. (Table continued on following page)


8 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Cities Total Male Female
Greater
Baghdad 523,870 270,685 253,185
Greater Basrah 101,535 53,762 47,773
Mosul 133,625 67,392 66,233
Kirkuk 68,308 36,852 31,456
Najaf 56,261 25,683 30,578
Amara 48,110 23,719 24,391
Kazimain 48,676 24,390 24,286
Karbala 44,150 20,964 23, 186
Source: 1947 Census, I, 3. Percentage figures tabulated.
Close to 550,000 live in the city of Baghdad and its suburbs,
300,000 in the three cities of Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk, and
about 350,000 in towns with a population of 15,000 and over.
This brings the total urban population to about 1.25 million,
or about 25 per cent of the total population.
About half a million people live in a hundred or so towns
of less than 15,000 population. These are usually the ad-
ministrative and market centers of minor political subdivisions.
Most of them are no more than large villages. They con-
stitute a semi-rural category intermediate between the
village and the town.
The population can then be divided as follows: 250,000
or 5 per cent are nomadic (it is believed that the number is
larger); 1,250,000 or 25 per cent are urban; 500,000 or 10
per cent are semi-rural; and 3 million or 60 per cent are
rural. The city of Baghdad accounts for 11 per cent of the
total population and for 44 per cent of the urban population.
Age-Sex Distribution
Iraq is a very young nation. 34.5 per cent of the total
population—excluding nomads—was, in 1947, between the
ages of one and nine; and 16 per cent fifty years and over.
In other words, the economically productive population
ranging between the ages of ten and forty-nine constituted, in
1947, 51.5 per cent of the total population (see Table 2).
This is a picture fairly representative of underdeveloped
countries, where both fertility and mortality rates are very
high.


THE POPULATION STRUCTURE 9
TABLE 2
PopULATION of IRAQ. BY AGE AND SEx: 1947
(Nomads Excluded)
Percentage
Age Male Female Total Male Female Total
Under 5 409,039 430,101 839,140 9.0 9.4 18.4
5-9 337,433 399,231 736,664 7.4 8.7 16.1
10-19 317,967 415,448 733,415 7.0 9.1 16.1
20-29 201,224 285,468 486,692 4.4 6.3 10.7
30–39 250,650 301,695 552,345 5.5 6.6 12.1
40-49 252,224 232,262 484,486 5.5 5.1 10.6
50-59 148,176 144,576 292,752 3.2 3.2 6.4
60 & Over 209,561 228,980 438,541 4.6 5.0 9.6
2,126,274 2,437,761 4,564,035 46.6 53.4 100.0
Source: 1955 Statistical Abstract, p. 16. Data based on 1947 census. Percentage
figures tabulated by the writer from the data.
Marital Status
In 1947, 56 per cent of those aged ten and over (2,958,231)
among the settled population were married. An additional
ten per cent were widowed, divorced, or separated. Of those
married, 92.3 per cent had one wife, 7 per cent had two
wives, and a little over one-half per cent, three wives or
more (see Table 3). The figures indicate that marriage and
the family are an established institution in Iraq. They also
show that polygamy has to all practical purposes ceased to
be an acceptable social institution among the Muslims. The
factors operating to limit polygamy are the gradual conversion
from subsistence to money economy with concomitant
economic pressures on the poorer classes; education and
westernization, especially among the upper strata of society;
and, finally, the appearance of new prestige values.
Death and Birth Rates
According to government sources in 1950, the crude birth
rate in Iraq is twenty-seven per thousand; the crude death
rate, twelve per thousand, and the infant mortality rate
ninety-seven per thousand babies born.”
Estimates of medical authorities and other writers, how-
ever, indicate that the above figures are way off the mark.


10 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
TABLE 3
, MARITAL STATUS: 1947
(Nomads Excluded)
Male Female Total
Single 542,502 494,511 1,02- old
Divorced, separated,
or widowed” 37,137 253,673 299.310
v.
Married: ise.:
One wife or married 738,515 860,846 * -
Two wives 56,283 * -,
Three wives 5,304 92-
Four wives 1,131 1,1:
Total Married 801,233 860,846 l, --,-
Source: 1955 Statistical Abstract, p. 18. Data based on 1947 census.
*This category is composed mostly of “widowed.” There were 34,271 widpwed
men and 243,197 widowed women.
Adams, writing in 1956, estimated the crude birth ral
about fifty per thousand, the crude death rate at thirty
thousand, and the infant mortality rate for the whole coul
at 300-350 per thousand with regional variations going tº
high as 500 per 1,000 babies born in malarial areas.” -
Prima facie evidence indicates that mortality is on ti
decline, and that the rate of decline will accelerate quickr,
over the next few years. The effects of the new public healti.
program are not as yet recorded, but drastic measures are,
being taken to eradicate malaria and other endemic diseases.
Sanitation, pure water, and medical facilities are being in-
creasingly introduced to towns as well as to rural areas.
Education is being provided to a much larger segment of
the population, and real income is rising.
On the other hand, evidence also indicates that the birth
rate is extremely high, and the traditional beliefs of the
population favor high fertility. It has been stated that govern-
ment activity will soon reduce mortality considerably. No
such measures can be imposed to limit fertility. Social mores
and traditions have a way of hanging on for years and cannot
be changed by legislation. The conclusion is obvious: the


THE POPULATION STRUCTURE 11
rate of net natural increase will steadily climb higher for
some years to come. Fortunately for Iraq, no Malthusian
docin need be predicted. The country at present is under-
populated. It has large resources which, if properly developed,
as jº.now being done, can support a much larger population
at a higher standard of living. However, the high rate of
gro. 7th does place a considerable burden on the state in
n iding adequate social services such as educational and
...th facilities.
138.9ec.
º Migration
*Irecent years there has been very heavy migration from
gºu god reas to urban centers. The main recipients have been
Baghdad and Basrah, where literally thousands of immigrants
save created sarifa camps and barely exist in makeshift reed
and mud huts under the most unhygienic conditions.
As can be expected, most of these rural immigrants are
ºng adults or adolescents, mostly male. An index of the
**bf the movement to the city is that the 1947 census
*wed a high proportion of the very young (under ten) and
**ery old (over fifty) living in rural areas, as well as a
iáºil proportion of females.
The flight to the city has not subsided since 1947, but has,
2d the contrary, increased. Recently, the director of the
*icultural machinery administration stated that “recent
official agricultural statistics show that less than 15 per cent
of the manpower on the farm remain to work in the field,
while 85 per cent migrated to the main cities.”4
The “pull factor” in this migration follows the same pattern
as that of other areas where the process of urbanization
and industrialization takes place: the expectation of better
wages and advancement, the lure of city pleasures, com-
parative freedom from traditional ties and from the tyranny
of the family are the usual incentives. The “push factor”
is the depressed condition of the fallah in rural areas. This
latter is probably the predominant factor.
The heavy migration to urban centers has in recent years
created rather serious problems in the cities. In the first
place, the immigrants have aggravated the housing shortage;


12 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
secondly, the makeshift hut camps which they build create
slums which become breeding places for disease and epi-
demics; finally, being willing to accept low wages, they
compete with city labor and tend to depress wage rates.
Literacy
Of the five million people in Iraq only 369,864 persons, or
8 per cent, could read and write in 1947. Of these, 312,319
persons, or 79 per cent, were men and 85,545 persons, or 21
per cent, were women. The literate males were 14 per cent
of the total male population, while the literate women con-
stituted 3 per cent of all females.
The provinces of Baghdad and Muntafiq had the highest
and the lowest percentages, respectively, of literates in the
country with 18 and 3 per cent. Baghdad Province had 34.5
per cent of all literate men and 48 per cent of all literate
women. Literacy in 1947 was still a city luxury. The prov-
inces of Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk, with large
urban centers, accounted for about 50 per cent of the total
literate male population and 76 per cent of literate women.5
Distribution of the Labor Force
Statistics on occupational distribution in Iraq hardly
exist. Data gathered by the 1947 census can serve only as a
general guide since they contain wide margins of error. Ac-
cording to the census, there were in 1947, 1.3 million people
economically active in the following occupations:
Percentages of
Employed
Agriculture 56
Service; government and private 12
Commerce 10
Manufacture 7
Workers (not specified) 9
Miscellaneous 1
Apprentices (under ten) 1
100


THE POPULATION STRUCTURE 13
The above percentage figures for agriculture (fifty-six)
and industry (seven) do not coincide with other data. It
would seem, from what is generally known, that a much
higher percentage of the labor force is engaged in agriculture.
This contention is supported by the Agricultural Census of
1952-53 which gave the number of those actually employed
on farms as 1,400,152 persons." Similarly, the percentage
allotted to industry seems high for 1947, although it may not
be far off the mark today after ten years of further industrializa-
tion. The Industrial Census of 1954 gave the number of
those employed in industry (of all categories) as 90,291
persons.”
In any case, there is no dispute as to the order of importance.
The majority of the labor force is engaged in agriculture,
followed in descending order by government and private
services, commerce, and industry.
JNational and Per Capita Income
In 1949 the Statistical Office of the United Nations es-
timated the national and per capita incomes of Iraq at 424
million dollars and eighty-five dollars a year respectively.*
Two years later, the International Bank Mission to Iraq
attempted to make a rough estimate, but the reports were
so conflicting and important data either so unreliable or un-
available that the attempt was abandoned. It did, however,
reach the conclusion that the estimate of the Statistical
Office was roughly correct.” In fact, the above estimate is
at best an informed guess.
Since 1951 two developments have taken place: a sharp
increase in oil revenues, coupled with a consistent policy
of plowing back the major part of these revenues into the
development of the idle resources of the country.
Oil revenue rose from 5.35 million dinars in 1950 to 73.74
million ($206.5 million) in 1955, an increase of over fourteen
times. If we assume that the oil revenue today averages about
200 million dollars a year (it is actually more) and if we also
assume that, as a result of capital investment in flood control,
land, agriculture, industry, roads, health, etc., the national


14 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
income from all sources other than oil rose to 500 million
dollars a year, then, roughly speaking, the total national
income of Iraq in 1957 was about 700 million dollars. If
we divide by five million, the number of the population,
then the annual per capita income would now be around
140 dollars.
It should be noted that the per capita income figures are
national averages which, in fact, do not reflect enough such
income frequencies to make them representative. They are
only broad estimates that can only show general orders of
magnitude. In a certain sense they are almost meaningless,
for it is only too well known that, with the exception of a
small middle income group, there is a large majority whose
income falls much below the national average and a small
wealthy minority whose income is much above.
Disposition of Family Income
There is hardly any information on this subject. It is
reasonable to assume that a fairly large part of the income
of wealthy families goes to luxury items. On the other end
of the scale, among laborers and fallaheen, most, if not all,
of the income goes to the maintenance of a minimum level of
existence.
In January and February, 1954, a sample survey of house-
holds with monthly incomes of twenty dinars or less was
conducted in Baghdad to determine the expenditure habits
of various economic groups. The households were selected
so as to provide a representative cross-section.
Two hundred ninety-one households covering 2,025 persons
were selected in the built-up area. The mean family size
among this group was found to be 6.96 persons. Fifty-nine
more households covering 335 persons in a sarifa camp were
also selected. The mean family size of this group was 5.68
persons. The results of the survey were as follows:


THE POPULATION STRUCTURE 15
Built-Up Area Sarifa Camp
Item Dinar Per Cent Dinar Per Cent
Food
Cereals 4.674 23.65 4.042 33.17
Meat 2.092 10.59 1.252 10.28
Fats 1.307 6.61 .463 3.80
Vegetables .887 4.49 .536 4.40
Fruits .291 1.47 .000 0.00
Sugar .664 3.36 .836 6.86
Tea .523 2.65 .549 4.51
Eggs .252 1.28 .051 - 0.42
Other .557 2.82 .257 2.11
Total Foods 11.247 56.92 7.986 65.55
Clothing 1.408 7.13 .935 7.67
Fuel & Light
Electricity ..198 1.00 .000 0.00
Other Fuels 1.236 6.26 1.240 10.18
Total Fuel & Light 1.434 7.26 1.240 10.18
Cleaning Material .686 3.48 .358 2.94
Furniture & Utensils .309 1.56 .137 1.12
Rent 1.786 9.03 .000 0.00
Misc. (cigarettes, movies,
cafes, buses, etc.) 2.889 14.62 1.528 12.54
Grand Total 19.759 100.00 12.184 100.00
Source: Statistical Abstract for 1955, pp. 132-33.
The survey shows that in the case of both the dwellers in
the built-up area and the sarifa camp, over 80 per cent of
the family income goes to the absolute necessities of life:
food, clothing, rent, and fuel. It is also to be noted that the
sarifa dwellers do not use electricity and do not pay rent.
This is because the sarifas are huts made up of reeds and mud
which the occupants, mostly immigrant laborers from rural
areas, built themselves.
Under the food category, cereals (mainly wheat and rice),
meat, and fats receive the major share of expenditures.
Vegetables are consumed in small quantities, and fruits only


16 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
in the built-up area. Expenditures on sugar and tea are
particularly high among the sarifa dwellers. Very sweet
hot tea is the national drink of Iraq.
Cigarettes are evidently regarded as a necessity. They
account for 5.43 per cent of expenditures in the built-up area
and for 6.72 per cent in the sarifa camp. Coffee houses are
still the chief entertainment and account for 3.23 and 2.27
per cent respectively. Movies have become popular in the
built-up area (1.17 per cent), but sarifa dwellers probably
cannot afford them (0.38 per cent).
To be noted also is the comparatively high percentage
spent on fuel, and the very small percentage spent on house
furniture—an index of the low level of existence of these
people.
1. Iraq Government, Ministry of Economics, Statistical Abstract, 1955 (Baghdad:
1956), p. 8. Henceforth referred to as Statistical Abstract followed by year. A
second census was completed in 1957. See preliminary results in Appendix
I at end of book.
2. Iraq Government, Directorate General of Health, Annual Bulletin of Health and
Vital Statistics for 1950 (Baghhad: 1952), pp. 1-4.
3. Doris Adams, “Current Population Trends in Iraq,” The Middle East Journal,
Vol. 10 (Spring, 1956, pp. 159, 161.)
4. Iraq Times, May 2, 1956.
5. Data based on 1947 census.
6. Iraq Government, Ministry of Economics, Report on the Agricultural and Live-
stock Census of Iraq, 1952-53 (Baghdad: 1954), Vol. I, p. 18). Henceforth re-
ferred to as the Agricultural Census.
7. Iraq, Ministry of Economics, Report on the Industrial Census of Iraq, 1954 (Bagh-
dad: 1956), p. 9. Henceforth referred to as the Industrial Census.
8. U. N. Dept. of Economic Affairs, Statistical Office, National and Per Capita
Income of Seventy Countries (New York: 1951), pp. 14, 22.
9. International Bank for Reconstruction & Development, The Economic De-
velopment of Iraq (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), pp. 131-32
Henceforth referred to as IBRD.


CHAPTER 2
THE BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT
Conditions in 1920-21
Iraq has a comparatively vast natural wealth in land,
water, and minerals, in addition to its human resources.
When the state came into being, however, conditions in the
country were, in the words of an early Iraqi Health Director,
“like those described in the Book of Genesis.”
The native provisional government took over from the
British in the midst of widespread unrest and tension; the
government administrative machinery itself had to be organiz-
ed; the form of government had to be decided upon; out
of the heterogeneous religious, linguistic, racial, and tribal
blocs a nation had to be created; the traditional schism be-
tween government and people so characteristic of Middle
East society, with its resultant fears and suspicions, had to
be overcome. There were no statistical data and no surveys!
upon which to establish criteria.
Health and Education. Over 98 per cent of the population
were illiterate. In 1920, the country had eighty-four primary
schools, all for boys, with 363 teachers and 6,743 students.
There were also three trade schools, one secondary school,
and one small law college.”


18 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Medical facilities were equally lacking. During the same
year, there were one or two hospitals worthy of the name,
although twenty-eight so-called hospitals were listed, as
well as fifty-one dispensaries and a few specialist institutions.
There were twenty-five Iraqi doctors and forty British
medical officers.”
Agriculture. Of the country’s vast land wealth, less than
5 per cent was under cultivation. Control and utilization of
the water resources were to all practical purposes non-existent.
The country was subject to disastrous floods in the spring
and to severe droughts in the summer. There was always the
danger of frequent drastic shifts in the courses of the twin
rivers and their tributaries.
Age-old methods of production were used in agriculture
and yields were very low. Few landholders were certain of
their claims to the land. In addition to floods, a variety of
insects, including locusts, and diseases plagued the main
industry of the country. Livestock production was primarily
an occupation of the nomads.
Industry, Trade, and Transport. Aside from handicrafts and
some cottage industry, there was no other industry worth
mentioning. Factories were virtually unknown. Commerce
and trade were the main occupations of the people after
agriculture.
The communications system was still in an embryonic
stage. In 1920 there were some 3,500 miles of dirt roads, the
majority of which were impassable in the winter.4. Before
1914, there had been no mechanized vehicles.5 Postal and
telegraph services were in the process of organization.6 The
total length of the railroad system was 1,139 miles, consisting
of “a number of unconnected sections built, for the most
part, of secondhand rails. . . and the rolling stock was a
heterogeneous collection of such secondhand or worse vehicles
as could be spared from the Indian Railways.” The port of
Basrah, which was brought by the military into fairly good
working condition during the war, was able to handle 428
ships in 1920-21.8
An inefficient installation pumped crude river water into


BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT 19
Baghdad, but no other town in the country had either electric-
ity or piped water.”
Experiments in Progress
It is against the above background that the progress of
Iraq must be considered. There was an early awareness of
the potentialities of the resources of the country and the
need to develop them. The three decades between 1920 and
1950 witnessed faltering attempts by the government to
translate the dreams of a better future for Iraq and its people
into reality.
For illustrative purposes, some of the laws regarding de-
velopment which were enacted year after year and sum-
maries of their contents, are cited below. The general prin-
ciple followed throughout this period, was to have one bud-
get, an “ordinary budget,” to take care of current expenses
of government, and another, an “extraordinary budget,”
the accounts of which would be exclusively devoted to
“productive capital works.” The sources of income for
the extraordinary budget were to come from oil royalties,
profits of the Iraqi Currency Board, sales of government
land and loans. The difference between the two budgets,
however, remained more theoretical than real. Some of
the laws enacted are as follows:
1. Law No. 79 (1931). This law provided for the
expenditure of 2,210,000 dinars” from oil revenue to be
spent on “capital works” from 1931-35 inclusive.
2. Law JNo. 39. (1934). This revoked the above
law. Instead, it allotted 3,237,000 dinars to be spent from
1934-38 inclusive. The revenue was to be provided from the
government reserve account.
3. Ordinance JNo. 26 (1935) and Law JNo. 26 (1936). These
created the Three-Year Plan. They provided for the ex-
penditure of 761,180 dinars from 1935-37 inclusive. The
money was to be provided from the excess funds of the ordi-
nary budget.
4. Ordinance No. 28 (1935) and Law JNo. 33 (1936).
These revoked Law No. 39 (1934). Instead, they allotted
*For value of the dinar see Glossary of terms for Arabic words used in the text.


20 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
4,120,000 dinars to be spent during 1936-40. The program
was to be financed from oil revenues.
5. Law JNo. 45 (1938). This law revoked Law No.
33 (1936). It provided, however, for the expenditure of
8,230,000 dinars between 1938-42 inclusive. The program
was to be financed from oil revenue, profits of the Currency
Board, revenue from repatriated loans to municipalities,
the railways, the Port Authority, and from sales of state land.
6. Law No. 37 (1939). This replaced the above law.
It allotted 11,135,000 dinars to be spent on capital works
during 1939–42. The sources of income were to be oil royalties,
revenue from the Currency Board, the I.P.C. loan to the
Government, sale of state land, and from repatriated loans
to municipalities and the railways.
Each of these laws had a schedule attached, specifying
how and on what the funds were to be spent. The contem-
plated projects covered the whole spectrum of social and
economic life: the construction of government buildings,
schools, hospitals, clinics, special schools for mothers, mu-
seums, cultural and athletic clubs, low-cost housing, resort
hostels, and a refinery. They also included the building of
roads, bridges, dams, reservoirs, canals, grain stores and silos,
quarantine stations, wireless, telephone and telegraph lines,
as well as the establishment of an agricultural-industrial
bank, land settlement schemes, loans and grants to local
industries, loans to farmers in times of crop failure and,
finally, price support for agricultural products.
In actual fact, however, “capital productive works”
within the extraordinary budget consisted mainly of irrigation
and flood control projects, such as the Kut Barrage on the
Tigris, construction of roads, bridges and other means of
communications and public buildings, including schools and
hospitals. These works excluded development projects of the
Basrah Port Authority, the Fao Dredging Scheme, the
Railways Administration, the Tobacco Monopoly, and
similar other public undertakings. Each of these has been a
semi-autonomous organization, has its own budget separate
from the government budget, and carries out its own develop-
ment programs. They also excluded other development


BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT 21
undertakings carried out by the various government minis-
tries and credited to the ordinary budget. Therefore, ex-
penditures under the “extraordinary” budget do not in
actual fact reflect the full attempt of the government to
develop the resources of the country.
Table 4 below gives a statistical summary of expenditures
on “capital works” from 1933 to 1950, and their percentile
relationship to total government expenditures. It will be
noted that during the thirties expenditures were constantly
rising in absolute terms. In relative terms they rose from 18
per cent of the budget in 1935 to an all-time high of 30 per
cent in 1936. During the war years and in the immediate
post-war era, they dropped considerably. The drop was
much more severe than indicated in the table because the
the real purchasing power of the dinar had dropped to about
half its prewar level. Expenditures on capital works did not
TABLE 4
ExPENDITUREs on CAPITAL Works IN MILLIONS
of IRAQI DINARs AND ExPENDITUREs As PER CENT
of Total GovernmENT ExPENDITURES
Million
Tear Dinars Per Cent
1933 .43 10.3
1934 .42 9.8
1935 1.03 18.2
1936 2.18 30.5
1937 2.37 27.6
1938 2.46 27.2
1939 2.23 24.6
1940 2.71 27.5
1941 .96 11.0
1942 .98 8.4
1943 1.65 10.7
1944 0.00 00.0
1945 1.54 7.2
1946 3.05 11.9
1947 3.57 13.4
1948 3.93 12.3
1949 3.38 11.3
1950 3.60 12.3
Source: Statistical Abstracts for 1947; 1950, p. 292; 1952, p. 258. U. N. Dept.
of Economic Affairs, Public Finance Information Papers: Iraq, N. Y., 1951, pp. 34-
35; Muzaffar H. Jamil, Trade Policy of Iraq, Cairo, 1949, p. 216 (in Arabic).


22 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
recover their prewar magnitude until 1951 when, with a
new arrangement for the sharing of oil profits, Iraq entered
a new era of development programs.
Problems of Development
Between 1920 and 1950 the country registered appreciable
progress, especially in its physical plant. On the whole,
however, development was painfully slow, and the major
part of the natural resources of the country remained idle.
There were many reasons for this. Some of them were peculiar
to Iraq, and others characteristic of most, if not all, under-
developed countries.
1. Political Problems. A consistent policy of develop-
ment requires a measure of public tranquility and national
cohesion, both of which were absent. The period was one
of turmoil during which the attention of both the public and
the government was focused on political problems.
Internally, the central government was almost continually
preoccupied with maintaining and consolidating its own
position and in dealing with secessionist movements and
dissident groups. For example, it had to deal with the Kurdish
problem, the Assyrian problem, the Yezidi problem and,
finally, the volatile Bedouin tribes, who regarded all organ-
ized government as a nuisance and were ever ready to flout
its authority at the least sign of weakness. They were particu-
larly inclined to do so since the central authorities put a stop to
their ancient sport of raiding, both of defenseless villages
and among themselves.
Externally, there was always the ever-present question
of relations with Britain and the Palestine question. Then came
World War II, and soon after that the Arab-Israeli conflict.
2. Frequency of Cabinets. In theory, the Iraqi cabinet
system is modeled after the British. In practice, it functions
after the French system. Since 1921 there have been more
than fifty cabinets, an average of one cabinet for each seven
to eight months. This has affected the progress of the country
considerably, since a continuing policy of development was
not possible.


BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT 23
There is no responsible party system in Iraq. As in several
Arab countries, there are, instead, political groupings which
revolve around personal leadership. As a result, generally
speaking, each cabinet that came into power either materially
changed or discarded the program of its predecessor and
instituted its own, which in turn was discarded or changed
by the succeeding cabinet. This situation continued until
the establishment of the Development Board, which is by
law fairly insulated against political pressures and unaffected
by cabinet changes.
3. Administration. Another factor which affected devel-
opment was the absence of a career civil service corps trained
in the efficient administration of government and the execu-
tion of policy. For centuries the Turks had ruled the country
with the aid of a few Arab officials. When they left, there were
only a few Iraqis adequately trained to replace them. This
problem is not peculiar to Iraq, but applies to many other
underdeveloped countries which have become independent
in recent years.
The organization and operation of the civil service in
Iraq was until recent years subject to patronage. The system
generally attracted the incompetent and discouraged the
able and resourceful. Many civil servants regarded govern-
ment employment as a “business” and lacked the sense of
devotion to duty so necessary for an efficient administration. As
late as 1955, Lord Salter, in his report to the Development
Board, was moved to state:
The chief limiting factor to the success of development in
Iraq may prove to be neither the amount of money for invest-
ment, nor even the limits of skilled labor and materials available,
but the efficiency of the administrative machine.”
The corruption and inefficiency in the government ma-
chinery were officially recognized through a speech from the
Throne to Parliament on December 1, 1955. The King
stated in part:
The Government is aware of the weak machinery of govern-
ment due to the presence of inefficient individuals and persons


24 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
of ill-repute in the government service. It has therefore resolved
to reform this machinery, making it reliable and effective, so
that it can care for the interests of the country and fulfill its
duty in the best possible manner. The Government, therefore,
is seeking enactment of legislation which will guarantee the
public interest and a full measure of justice. ... **
In recent years the reform of the civil service has been
the subject of several reports, the last of which was made in
July, 1954 by Mr. William Brownrigg, an American public
administration specialist. He recommended the establishment
of a central personnel administration incorporating both
the merit system and career service principles, the adjustment
of and increase in salaries, and training in administrative
methods.
In June of the same year a committee was set up to draft
a new Unified Civil Service Law. Upon the recommendations
of the committee which incorporated Mr. Brownrigg’s
suggestions, a new Civil Service Law was passed in May,
1956, providing for a considerable increase in salaries.”
4. Conservatism. The cabinets which have been in power
so far are generally composed of members who belong to the
“old generation.” They have a paternalistic concept of
government, tend to be quite conservative and wary of
bold programs of development or radical economic re-
forms. With the exception of King Faisal I (1921–33), no
dynamic personality has so far appeared in Iraq able to
capture the public imagination and galvanize the energies
of the nation behind him.
In addition, big landowners are the strongest social and
political group. With but few exceptions they are reactionary
in both orientation and outlook. They have resisted, and for
the most part successfully so, any program of economic re-
form that might threaten their privileged position. Their
effective opposition has been a serious limiting factor in the
progress of the country, for, in the words of Lord Salter, the
government’s guiding principle in this respect has generally
been not “what is most desirable” but rather “what is
politically feasible.”


BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT 25
5. Shortage of Skilled Labor and Technicians. The num-
ber of skilled workers even today is very small, and the
number of those who could be imported was also restricted
by a variety of considerations.
Moreover, the educational system instituted in the twenties
followed the European tradition of emphasizing “classical”
subjects at the cost of technical education. Consequently,
today there is an oversupply of university and college men
trained in the humanities and social sciences, as compared
with the meager number of those trained in the natural
sciences.
6. Shortage of State Revenues. Until 1951, the revenue of
the state could not finance integrated large-scale development
programs. Income from oil royalties was very small.
Alternatively, it was not possible for the state to use taxation
as a means of financing development. As in all underdeveloped
countries, indirect taxes are the largest source of regular
revenue.
A graduated income tax was introduced in 1939 and amend-
ed in 1943, but it excluded agricultural income. The law
established rates ranging from 6 per cent to a high of 15
per cent on income over 1,200 dinars; in addition there was
a surtax ranging from 5 per cent (after exempting the first
1,500 dinars which are actually already taxed) to a high
of 45 per cent on income over 9,500 dinars a year.
The major burden of the tax fell on the urban class, of
whom a large number are employes of government and
private establishments. In any case, revenue from this source
has been comparatively small (Table 5 below). Since 1952
there has been a decline in the number of individuals subject
to the tax because exemption limits were raised to 350 dinars
for single persons and to 450 dinars for married persons,
plus 30 dinars for each child.
In the agricultural sector, the fallaheen are too poor to be
heavily taxed and it has not been politically possible to im-
pose a tax on large landowners commensurate with their
income. Consequently, revenue from taxes on agriculture
has generally been very small (Table 6 below), especially


26 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
when the fact that agriculture is the main source of national
income is taken into consideration.
TABLE 5
INCOME TAx IN MILLIONS OF IRAQI DINARs
Individuals Companies
Tear JNumber Tax & Surtax Number Tax & Surtax Total
1948/49 33,361 2.0 165 .8 2.8
1949/50 30,405 1.6 463 .7 2.3
1950/51 28,123 1.3 163 .6 1.9
1951/52 27,307 1.3 154 .6 1.9
1952/53 26,282 1.4 134 1.0 2.4
1953/54 24,319 1.2 195 1.0 2.2
1954/55 25,914 1.2 729 1.0 2.2
1955/56 23,735 2.5* 332 1.1 * 3.6
Source: Statistical Abstracts for 1950, p. 284; 1952, p. 255; 1954, p. 124;
1955, p. 127; 1956, p. 203. Figures have been rounded.
*No surtax in 1956 figures.
State revenue from agriculture comes from two main
taxes: (a) the istihlaq (consumption tax) which is collected
when the produce is sold. At present the rate is 10 per cent
of the value on such main products as cereals, dates, etc.
In 1953 the tax was abolished on local consumption of
several commodities such as meat, fats, vegetables, fruits,
hides, wool, cotton, etc., but was raised to 20 per cent on
the same products when exported. Probably the object is
to encourage local consumption of such commodities and
to combat inflation. (b) The Land Tax. This was originally
conceived as a rental for the use of state land. The rate
varies between 2.5 per cent and 10 per cent of the value of
the produce. In operation the tax discriminates against those
who regularly lease land from the state (usually small land-
holders) and favors holders of lazma grants, usually big
landlords (see Chapter V). Many of the latter, on the basis of
tenuous claims, escaped the tax completely. Revenue from
the land tax is meager, especially so since a large part of
the land under cultivation is state land.


BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT 27
TABLE 6
STATE REvenue FROM TAxes on AGRICULTURE
IN MILLIONS OF IRAQI DINARs
Tear Tax
1946/47 4.4
1947/48 3.6
1948/49 3.9
1949/50 4.0
1950/51 5.0
1951/52 4.7
1952/53 3.9
1953/54 3.6
1954/55 3.4
1955/56 2.7
Source: Statistical Abstracts for 1950, p. 291; 1952, p. 261; and 1955, p. 321;
1956, p. 241. Revenue is composed mostly of tax on produce, land tax, tax on
livestock products, etc. Figures have been rounded.
7. Lack of Private Capital. Most, if not all, of the above-
mentioned factors relate to state action. The past three
decades, however, have also been characterized by lack
of progress on the private level. No significant industrial
development or basic change in the method of agricultural
production took place until the late forties.
One of the obvious reasons is lack of capital. The Middle
East economy has for many centuries been a hand-to-mouth
one, with little or no savings for capital investment. In addi-
tion, the savings that were made were traditionally either
hoarded in the form of jewelry (mostly gold and silver)
or invested in real estate or trade where, it was believed, the
capital would be safe and the returns high.
In the agricultural sector, those who had the means, the
big landlords, lacked the initiative to improve their lands.
With few exceptions, they were generally content to live
in urban centers on the substantial income from their holdings.
8. Religion and Tradition. Religion (whether Islam or
Christianity) in the Middle East is an all-embracing force
which for many centuries has not only satisfied the spiritual
yearnings of its adherents but also regulated their everyday


28 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
conduct and social life. Even today, it still remains the
major medium of personal identification.
Institutional religion (both Christian and Muslim) in
the Middle East has been, on the whole, detrimental to
economic progress. It glorified as an ideal a life of contem-
plation and repose, de-emphasized the importance of time
(“hurry is the devil’s work” is a common proverb in the
Middle East), and placed a very heavy emphasis on respect
for tradition and authority. In such a tradition-bound society,
initiative, innovation, enterprise, experimentation, and new
creative ideas—all cornerstones of progress—are usually not
only suspect, but reviled as dangerous to the public good and
to time-honored institutions.
In addition, the emergence and development of modern
banking and credit, insurance and the stock exchange, all
necessary vehicles of economic expansion, were handicapped
by the theories of Islam on “risk” and its ban on interest.
It is only in recent years that these institutions have begun
to make headway in Iraq.
On the whole, the three decades were a period during
which the foundations were laid for future development.
The end of World War II heralded a new era.
1. The attitude of the local population towards statistics in earlier years, which
still finds an echo today, is illustrated by a letter of the Qadi (judge) of
Mosul. In reply to an inquiry from an English traveler as to the size of
Mosul, the number of its inhabitants, commerce, history, etc., he wrote:
“My Illustrious Friend, and Joy of My Liver! The thing you ask of me is
both difficult and useless. Although I have passed all my days in this place,
I have neither counted the houses nor have I inquired into the number of
the inhabitants; and as to what one person loads on his mules and the other
stows away in the bottom of his ship, that is no business of mine. But, above
all, as to the previous history of this city, God only knows the amount of
dirt and confusion that the inhabitants may have eaten before the coming
of the sword of Islam. It were unprofitable for us to inquire into it.” Austen
H. Layard, Discoveries among the Ruins of JNineveh and Babylon (New York:
G. P. Putnam & Co., 1853, p. 663.)
2. Great Britain, Colonial Office, Special Report . . . to the Council of The
League of Nations on the Progress of Iraq. During the Period 1920-31 (London:
H. M. S. O., 1931), p. 224. Henceforth cited as Special Report, 1931.
3. Ibid., pp. 65-67.
4. Ibid., pp. 137-39, passim.
5. Ibid., p. 137.
6. Ibid., p. 142.


BACKGROUND OF DEVELOPMENT 29
7. Ibid., p. 157.
8. Ibid., p. 171.
9. Ibid., p. 141.
0. Lord Salter, The Development of Iraq: A Plan of Action. A Report submitted
to the Iraq Development Board (London: The Caxton Press, 1955), p. 96.
11. Iraqi Embassy, Washington, D.C., Bulletin, January 1956, p. 3. Henceforth
referred to as Bulletin.
12. Iraq Times, May 28, 1956.
1


CHAPTER 3
THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD
With the end of World War II, and particularly after
1951, Iraq entered an era of accelerated economic and
social development which has had no parallel in the history
of the country since the golden age of the Abbassid Caliphate
some twelve centuries ago.
The primary factor which has brought about this change
is the vast increase in oil revenues. Prior to 1951, the amount
of oil revenue was comparatively small, though it averaged
about 13 per cent of the total income of the state between
1934 and 1950. From 1951 on, however, it began to increase
very rapidly, until by 1955 it accounted for over 30 and
perhaps up to 40 per cent of the total national income (see
Table 7). These funds, almost all in foreign exchange, made
it possible for the state to initiate programs of development
without the necessity of going through an austerity period
or one of heavy taxation, either of which would probably
have created considerable political unrest.
Another principal factor is that of a social awakening.
Existing economic and social conditions are no longer ac-
ceptable to the masses. This is even more true of the urban
middle class and the intelligentsia. This discontent resulted,
in the years after the war, in almost universal social unrest
and in widespread radical and extremist movements in the


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 31
cities. Most observers of a few years ago, if not all, believed
that Iraq was on the brink of a revolutionary upheaval which
would fundamentally change its political and social order.
As one writer recently put it, “The parallel with Czarist
Russia is uncomfortably obvious.” In short, the issue re-
solved itself into a race between reform and revolution.
TABLE 7
ToTAL Government REVENUE, Government OIL REVENUE, AND OIL
REvenue As PER CENT OF ToTAL GovernmENT REVENUE IN MILLIONS
OF IRAQI DINARs
1927-1955
Total Oil
Tear Govt. Revenue Revenue Per Cent
1927-33 .64a
1934 5.02 1.02 20.3%
1935 5.36 .59 11.0
1936 6.03 .60 9.9
1937 6.94 .73 10.5
1938 7.84 1.98 25.2
1939 9.21 2.02 21.9
1940 9.72 1.58 16.2
1941 10.16 1.46 14.3
1942 13.83 1.56 11.4
1943 18.10 1.88 10.4
1944 18.89 2.22 11.4
1945 20.22 2.32 11.4
1946 25.10 2.33 9.3
1947 26.02 2.35 9.0
1948 26.72 2.01 7.5
1949 28.63 3.24. 14.3
1950 33.49 5.28 15.8
1951 37.53b 13.93
1952 50.54 37.630
1953 47.72 51.34
1954 52.17 68.37d
1955 65.28 73.74.
Source: Jamil, op. cit., p. 211; Public Finance Papers: Iraq, op. cit., pp. 40–41;
Statistical Abstracts for 1947, 1950, 1952, 1955, 1956; Industrial Census, op. cit.,
p. 207.
*Annual average for 1927-33 inclusive.
b From 1951 on, only 30 per cent of the oil revenue was included in the
government budget. Seventy per cent was allotted to the Development Board.
• Including 5 million dinars for settlement of previous claims.
d Including readjustment for the retroactive 1954 settlement in conformity
with the March, 1955 agreement.


32 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Thirdly, over the past three decades, Iraq was able to
build a small skilled and semi-skilled labor force. In addition,
a fairly large number of Iraqis, either on their own or through
state support, received advanced training and education in
the universities of the West. These persons are now making
a valuable contribution to the development of their country.
Finally, a factor which began to play a positive role in
recent years is technical assistance and the importation of
personnel from abroad. These come from three main sources:
a) The United States through its Point Four program.
At present there are about 100 U.S. technicians and specialists
assisting in the development of the country.
b) United Nations agencies, such as WHO, UNESCO,
UNICEF, the International Bank, etc., either conduct
pilot projects or provide technical personnel or do both.
c) Western business, at the expense of the Iraqi govern-
ment, provides technicians and carries out most of the techni-
cal construction now taking place.
Unlike assistance in the past, the various technical assist-
ance programs of today are also designed to train Iraqis to
undertake the work themselves. This, for example, is one of
the main objectives of the U. S. Point Four program and
the programs of the U. N. agencies. In addition, all business
concerns undertaking technical construction for the Iraqi
government are required to train their Iraqi workers.
Organization of the Development Board
It became clear to the government after the war that a
much more energetic and consistent policy must be followed
in developing the resources of the country. The two main
questions in this respect were: (1) what was the most efficient
method of administration, and (2) how was this development
to be financed?
The pre-war experience of Iraq had clearly demonstrated
that development programs suffered gravely from partisan
politics and from frequent cabinet changes. Moreover,
allocations for capital works were often raided to meet the
ordinary expenses of government. The answer was clear.
If development was to have a fair chance of success, then an


;
-unist ER
THE
P. R. E. s. I d E N T
DEVELOPMENT O
BOARD PRIME M I NISTER
DE PUTY PRESIDENT
ministER ExEcutive Executive Executive
of ºf ||º ºf ºuts ||º II ºf
DEVELOPMENT - -
Specialist specialist
designated in
Director Generol. Administration
Director Generol, accounts
Director General. Controcºs
ond legal Affairs
chairman of Committee for
Development of Miri Sir lands
Economic Advisor
Technicol section
irrigation and Droinage
Technical section
Roods, Bridges ond Buildings
Technical Section
Industries, Mining ond Electrification
Technicol section
Lond reclamation, forests ond
Underground water
Technical Section
Housing
Council of
Minister-
secret a R1 at
by irrigation
directorate of
advice and Publicity
Economic
Research Dept.
Supervisor of
administration
ond Personnel
student Missions
Bureau


34 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
autonomous agency, protected from cabinet changes and
partisan politics, must be created. Such an agency would
have a budget completely separate from that of the govern-
ment and would be run primarily by experts rather than by
political appointees.
As to the second question, it soon became evident that
development could be entirely financed from oil revenues
which were expected to increase very rapidly, as in fact they
did. At first it was thought that all the oil income should be
diverted to development. Later, however, due to the increasing
functions of government and the needs of the regular de-
partments, the oil revenue was divided: 70 per cent to de-
velopment and 30 per cent to the government budget.
In 1950, with the above objectives in mind, the govern-
ment established, under Law No. 23 (1950), a Development
Board and diverted to it 100 per cent of the oil revenues.
Two years later, the above law was amended to restrict
the income of the Board to 70 per cent. Under Law No. 6
(1952) the Board was constituted in the following manner:
The president of the Board is the Prime Minister. The
members are: the Finance Minister and six other executive
members, three of whom must be experts, one in finance
and economics, another in irrigation, and the third in a field
to be specified by the Council of Ministers. One of the expert
members is to be the Secretary-General of the Board.
The executive members are to be appointed by the Council
of Ministers and are to hold office for a term of five years
each, which terms may be extended. No executive member
may hold any other governmental, legislative, or judicial
office, nor may he have private interests, during his member-
ship, which may benefit from the activities and program of
the Board. Two of the executive members are, by practice,
foreigners—one British and one American. So far, two Ameri-
cans and two British experts have been executive members.
Powers and Duties
1. The Board shall have a juristic personality.
2. It is empowered to “contract loans, issue bonds,
mortgage its assets or borrow funds. . . etc., in its own right.”


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 35
3. The Board shall present. . . a general economic and
financial plan for the development of the resources of Iraq and
the raising of the standard of living of her people.”
4. “After the general programme has been approved by
Parliament, the Board shall proceed to carry out the proj-
ects mentioned in the programme.”
5. The Board shall make “a report on its operations for
the preceding year indicating the extent to which the general
program previously approved has been completed and the
expenditures made in connection thereof.”
Finance
The Board shall have its own budget. Its revenues shall
derive from “70 percent of the net revenues received from...
the oil companies. . . and from such other sums as may from
time to time be allotted to it by Parliament. . . and from the
proceeds of any income domestic or foreign contracted by
the Board under this law.”
Voting
Each member of the Board shall have one vote. Decisions
are by majority vote, and in case of a tie, the president or
vice-president may cast the deciding vote.”
Administration
To assist the Board in formulating and executing policy,
technicians and specialists were recruited and technical
departments, called “sections,” were created. Since the
Board was not a regular government agency, its employees
did not come under the Civil Service Law. In this manner,
it was able to offer fairly high salaries and attract personnel
of high caliber–Iraqis, other Arabs, and Europeans. The
salaries of Americans working in the various sections, how-
ever, are usually paid by the U. S. government under its
Point Four program.
The 1953 Reorganization
As constituted in 1950, the Board was an autonomous
agency, fairly protected from political pressures and pro-


1 RAQ
FLOOD CONTROL
AND IRRIGATION
* * * International boundary
* Proposed dam site
- Dam and barrage under construction
- Existing barrage
~ Existing eansl
•--- Proposed canal
New IRRIGation Projects
! Mussyab -7 Makhmut
2 Hille 6 Hawise
3. Babº 9 Adheim
* Shamiya No Lower Nahrawee
5 tikra tº Dujah
6 tshaq, 12 Ghats!
o so so 90 tºo tºo
tººk
-
~e? . arºs ./
Basra"
suwart 2.


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 37
vided with a continuity of policy. Liaison with the Govern-
ment and Parliament was provided through its President,
the Prime Minister, and the Finance Minister, a member.
Soon after its establishment, the Board began to run into
difficulty. In the first place, its budget, under the control
of only a few men, exceeded the total regular governmental
budget. This caused resentment and even consternation in
some political circles.
It was also argued that the Council of Ministers had
hardly any authority over the Board and received too little
information from it with which to answer intelligently ques-
tions and criticisms in Parliament.
The Board made the fatal mistake of failing to establish
an adequate public relations program to inform and guide
public opinion.
Finally, it made the further mistake of formulating a
program which, as shall be explained later, could not but
lead to disappointment. It promised a development-starved
population what it could not possibly deliver within the
time limits it had set for itself. This caused the Board to
become, temporarily, very unpopular with the public, a
situation which was exploited by some politicians to bring
about its reorganization.
In 1953 the cabinet in power secured from Parliament the
passage of a law (No. 27 of 1953) which in effect subverted
the original intent for which the Board was created, restricted
its powers, and made fundamental changes in its organiza-
tional structure.
The new law created a Ministry of Development and
transferred all the staff (except the secretariat) and the
technical sections of the Board to it. The Minister of Develop-
ment became the ninth voting member of the Board.
Lord Salter describes the significance of the change in
the following manner:
This change fundamentally altered the character and authority
of the Board. The new Minister, unlike the other ex-officio
members, had no duties outside the same problems of develop-
ment with which the Board is concerned and could therefore
devote his whole time to their study. He alone had the technical


38 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
staff to advise on policy; he alone had the staff to implement it.
The Board could only obtain the necessary technical advice
and information on which to base their decisions from staff
responsible to him, not to the Board itself, and could not execute
them through him.
The original purpose of the Act of 1950 was thus frustrated
and the Board made dependent for positive action upon agree-
ment with Ministers changing with governments. All it could
do otherwise was, by a majority, to veto the allocation of funds.
There are limits even to this negative power, as has been shown
more than once, both before and since the new law.”
The new law also created anomalies in the structure of
the Board itself, which Salter pointed out. For example, the
Minister of Development may be opposed to a certain policy
or program but may be outvoted by the Board. On the one
hand, being the representative of the Board on the Council
of Ministers and its link with Parliament, he is required under
the law to defend the policy to which he is opposed in Parlia-
ment; on the other hand, since he alone is vested with the
power of execution, he can frustrate it and render it ineffective.
The new law also made important changes in the manner
of execution of development plans and restricted the maneuver-
ability of the Board.
Article 3(a) of the 1950 law, as amended, left a fairly wide
margin of freedom for the Board. Moreover, when Parlia-
ment approved the Six-Year Plan in 1951, it allowed the
Board to add unspent sums to the following year or years
and to shift expenditures within major allocations.” Article
12 of the 1953 law restricts this freedom. First, it requires
that each program be executed in a period of not more than
seven years. Secondly, it requires the Board to carry out
the works of each year during the year to which they relate.
Thirdly, it requires that the program set forth in detail the
forms of development it is designed to cover. “The Minister,”
Article 12 states, “shall present to the Council of Ministers
the general programme of the Board accompanied by de-
tailed studies showing its justification, its economic con-
sequences, its effect on raising the standard of national
income, method of execution for each year, total cost of the


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 39
projects approved for each year, total cost of the programme,
and actual or approximate cost of each project.” Article
13, however, allows the Minister of Development to “present
to the Council of Ministers any recommendations and pro-
posals by the Board for such amendments to be made in the
general programme as may appear to the latter necessary. . .
provided that such amendments shall be within the policy
laid down in Article 12.”
Article 15 of the same law, probably with a view to de-
centralization, introduced another important change. It
divided the Board’s projects into two main categories: One,
“capital development projects,” which will continue to be
executed by the Board; two, “small development projects”
which, although conceived and financed by the Board, shall
be entrusted by it to the appropriate government department
for execution.
Results of Reorganization
The immediate repercussions of the 1953 reorganization
were the down-grading of the salaries of Iraqi employes
as they were incorporated in the civil service and the con-
sequent resignation of several members of the staff, resulting,
it is reported, in some lowering of efficiency.
The long-term results cannot as yet be determined. The
Board was created in 1950 by the Nuri as-Sa'id cabinet,
which remained in power until 1952, thus becoming the
longest in power since the establishment of the state. His
resignation in 1952 was followed by a period of agitation,
disorder, and violence, during which four cabinets rapidly
succeeded each other. It was during this period, in 1953,
that the Board was reorganized. In 1954, Nuri as-Sa'id re-
turned to power and remained in control until July, 1957
when he was succeded by a political ally. Thus from 1954 to
1957 there was only one Minister of Development, a fact
which lent stability to the operations of the Board. Now that a
new Prime Minister and a new Minister of Development are in
power, it is not certain how the Board will function. These men
may or may not support the policies of their predecessors.”
*Nuri as-Sa'id returned to power in March, 1958.


40 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
In any case, the Board has, to all practical purposes, lost
its independence. The only effective power it has left is a
negative one: that of the veto by a majority vote. The smooth
functioning of its operations has become dependent on the
ability, goodwill, and cooperation of the Minister of Develop-
ment, a politician who may change with each cabinet.
Since cabinets have changed frequently, and since there is
no responsible party system in Iraq but, rather, factional
groupings, it is probable that the work of the Board will
suffer from the revision of its structure described above.
On the other hand, it may be possible that the Board will
become so entrenched and so popular with the public, be-
cause of its evident contributions, that no politician would
dare to subject it to serious pressure, or seriously obstruct
its work. This possibility is in the realm of political dynamics
which are beyond organizational charts, legal authority,
or an author’s prescience. In the final analysis, Board mem-
bers do have a minimum tenure of five years, while the life
expectancy of a cabinet—if previous patterns will begin
to operate again—is between seven and nine months. This
fact, in itself, is one of the intangibles which can be a source
of considerable strength to the Board.
The Operations of the Board
Since its organization, the Board has presented to Parlia-
ment three programs: one in 1951, another in 1955, and
a third in 1956. It will be noted that the second program
was presented two years after the reorganization of the
Board.
The Six-Year Plan
In accordance with its terms of reference, the Development
Board prepared a six-year program (1951-56) in May, 1951,
which was approved by Parliament the following month.
The program was presented in the form of six major alloca-
tions (votes), within which there were fifty-one subheadings,
with financial provisions under these latter for specific
projects for each of the six years (see Table 8.)


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 41
TABLE 8
DevelopMENT BoARD PROGRAM for 1951-56
Iraqi Dinars
Administration, Studies and Organization Expenses 3,180,000
Irrigation Projects 53,374,000
Main Roads and Bridges 26,766,000
Buildings 18,018,000
Reclamation of Land and Other Schemes 22,986,000
Industrial and Mining Schemes 31,050,000
TOTAL 155,374,000
Source: Compilation of Laws Concerning the Development Board, op. cit.,
p. 8, Schedule “A”.
The proceeds of the Board during the same period were
estimated at 168.74 million dinars—ID. 164.64 million to
come from oil revenue, ID. 3.965 million from the Inter-
national Bank loan,” and ID. 135 thousands from other
Sources.
The Board, in addition to its own operations, granted
several loans to municipalities and other governmental and
semi-governmental agencies, which amounted (up to the
end of financial year 1953/54) to 14,113,000 dinars.
As can be readily seen from Table 9, the Board, during
its first years of operation, failed to come anywhere near its
projected targets. Planned expenditures from 1951 to 1954
were 58.2 million dinars. Actual expenditures, however,
came only to 26.8 million, leaving a surplus of almost 32
million dinars. This result demonstrates in a spectacular
manner that capital by itself is only one among many in-
terlocking factors necessary for the success of a development
program.
It is not surprising that expenditures lagged behind sanc-
tioned amounts. Such a possibility was anticipated by the
International Bank Mission to Iraq before the program was
launched.” It is not easy to spend money in such magnitude,
rapidly and efficiently, on a well-conceived development
program. This has been the experience not only of Iraq, but
of almost every country, including India, which embarked on
a consistent policy of development. The International Bank,
for example, “has noted that disbursements on its loans to


42 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
underdeveloped countries seldom conform to original sched-
ules.”
The fact is that the government machinery was not geared
to such large-scale spending. Such a program, involving
comparatively large expenditures, requires a high level of
administrative efficiency and careful planning and coordina-
tion. It requires a large number of technicians and an enor-
mous amount of technical study. It is interesting to note in
this respect that the building program, which does not re-
quire a great deal of technical work, was the most advanced;
while the industrial and irrigation programs, which do,
lagged far behind. Above all, perhaps, the program requires
that the whole government administrative machinery be
galvanized into action and imbued with a sense of mission
and participation. All these factors were either absent or
partly lacking when the program was launched. When the
International Bank Mission visited Iraq in 1951, almost a
year after the Board was organized, it noted that some govern-
ment officials were not even aware of its existence, and where
there was awareness, the tendency was to be cynical and
to disparage possible results.”
The Development Board itself gave the following reasons
for its failure to reach its targets during 1951/52:
(a) “Delay in sanctioning the budget.”
(b) “The inability of the different ministries to execute
the projects and works entrusted to them by the Board.”
(c) “The necessity of providing adequate time for
the preparation of estimates of costs and detailed specifica-
tions for inviting tenders for the various works. Sufficient
time was also to be given to prospective tenderers to enable
them to inspect the sites of the proposed works and to study
the specifications prior to the submission of their tenders.”
The first two or three years of the program have to be
regarded as essentially a period of preparation. It would
have been folly to proceed with the program otherwise. It
was one during which the government machinery was
gradually geared to heavy spending, technicians and special-
ists recruited, technical studies of specific projects prepared,
relations established with qualified foreign engineering


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 43
firms, and technical assistance from abroad utilized. It is
to be noted that, from 1953 on, the work began to proceed
much more rapidly. For example, in 1955 actual expenditures
came to 46,607,327 dinars—thus exceeding original planned
expenditures for that year (32,335,000) by more than 14
million dinars.
TABLE 9
ALLOTMENTs (A) & ACTUAL ExPENDITUREs (E) of THE DEVELOPMENT
BoARD, 1951/52 To 1953/54
(In Thousands of Iraqi Dinars)
1951/52 1952/53 1953/54 Total
A E A E A E Surplus
Administration 170 110 460 260 600 300 560
Irrigation 3,024 1,733 7,100 1,064 10,840 4,000 14,167
Roads & Bridges 2,066 836 3,800 2,933 4,700 2,500 4,297
Buildings 2,368 1,368 2,650 2,650 3,100 2,900 1,200
Reclamation, etc. 1,736 953 3,450 2,076 4,150 2,150 A,157
Industry, etc. 6 3,000 5 5,000 500 7,489
9,364 5,006 20,460 8,988 28,390 12,350 31,870
Source: Iraq Government, Development Board, Annual Reports for the Fi-
nancial Tears, 1951, p. 11; 1952/53, p. 23; 1953/54, pp. 5, 9, 49.
The Five-Year Plan: 1955–59
No new program was presented to Parliament until 1955.
In April of that year, the Minister of Development presented
and Parliament approved a new Five-Year Plan to supersede
the first one. In the view of the Board, the new plan had
become necessary for several reasons. In the first place,
expected oil revenues far exceeded original estimates. The
cost estimates of the first plan were also no longer realistic
and the 1953 law had changed the basis of financing proj-
ects of other departments and agencies.
The plan called for the expenditure of 304,306,100 dinars
($852,057,000) from 1955 to 1959 inclusive. The revenue
for the period was estimated at about 252,685,000 dinars,
including 37 million dinars of unobligated balances from


44 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
the previous program. The deficit, some 50 million dinars,
was to be covered from expected increases in oil revenue
and from anticipated savings on the estimated total cost
of the program.
TABLE 10
THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN: 1955–59
Iraqi Dinars
Chapter I: Main Projects
Administration Expenses 5,450,000
Irrigation, Drainage & Flood Control 107,935,000
Roads & Bridges 53,700,000
Airfields 5,000,000
Railways 15,500,000
Main Buildings 28,550,000
Industry, Mining & Electrification 43,571,000
Development of Animal, Plant, and
Underground Water Resources 6,475,000
TOTAL–Chapter I 266,181,000
Chapter II: Small Projects
Buildings & Institutes 32,250,000
Miscellaneous Projects 5,875,000
TOTAL–Chapter II 38,125,000
GRAND TOTAL 304,306,100
Source: Law No. 43 (1955), Schedule (A).
The Six-Year Plan: 1955-60
In May, 1956 the Minister of Development proposed a
new supplementary Six-Year Program (1955-60) to Parlia-
ment to replace the one submitted the previous year. The
new program was approved in June. Three main reasons
prompted the Board to propose the new program: a sharp
increase in oil revenues, the completion of several studies
and surveys which now needed implementation, and, finally,
the recommendations of Lord Salter, the economic adviser,
in favor of a more flexible and inclusive program.
The new plan contemplates the expenditure of 500 million
dinars ($1,400,000,000) between 1955 and 1960, including
some ID. 46 million which had already been spent in 1955.
The revenue for the same period is estimated at about ID.
400 million. The deficit, about ID. 100 million, is expected


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 45
to be covered from unobligated balances of previous years
amounting to more than ID. 50 million, and savings on the
1955-60 expenditures estimates—totaling about 15 per cent.
The new plan differs from previous ones in many respects.
First, it is of much greater financial magnitude. It contem-
plates a rate of expenditure averaging about 85 million
dinars a year, as against ID. 31 million for the first plan and
ID. 61 million for the 1955 plan.
Then, unlike the first plan, execution is much more de-
centralized. The program is divided into “main” and “small”
projects; the latter are to be executed by the appropriate
government departments. This is a step in the right direction,
since on the one hand it gives some relief to the administrative
machinery of the Board and, on the other, it gives the regular
government departments a sense of participation in the
development of the country.
Finally, and also unlike the first plan, the program was
presented to Parliament as a tentative proposal. Contem-
plated new projects may or may not be executed depending
on whether, after careful study, they are found to be econom-
ical. Moreover, the Board may propose to Parliament, if
necessary, a supplementary program either in the light of
new studies or if oil revenues increase or decrease sharply.
In other words, the program is much more flexible than its
two predecessors.
The new plan differs also in content. Flood control, irriga-
tion, and drainage in all three plans receive first priority
in allocations. But where emphasis in the first plan was on
the flood control aspect, the emphasis in the present one is
on irrigation, drainage, and reclamation. This is because
the flood menace has been brought under a reasonable
measure of control through the completion of the major
control projects. Attention can now be properly diverted
to the constructive aspect of agriculture, i.e., improvement
of existing areas and bringing new land under cultivation.
In both the 1955-59 and the present program, far more
emphasis is placed on the transportation system, particularly
roads and bridges. This new direction is probably due to
two main factors: the greater realization that it would be


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 47
Plants under Construction 16,424,217
Mining Survey 126,000
Electrification 12,669,000
Improvement of Existing Industries and
New Industries 37,900,000 67,119,217
8. Development of Animal, Plant &
Underground Water Resources
Research & Laboratories 1,500,000
Plant Resources Development 2,500,000
Animal Resources Development 2,000,000
Forests 1,000,000
1955 Allocations for All Above 1,036,818
State Land Reclamation 1,125,000
Artesian Wells 3,000,000
Main Water Projects 1,125,000
Agricultural Machinery 250,000
Agricultural Schools & Centers 750,000 14,286,818
TOTAL-Chapter I 430,732,327
Chapter II: Small Projects
9. Buildings & Institutes
Health Institutions 5,750,000
Elementary & Other Schools 8,000,000
Housing for Labor 1,800,000
Buildings for Government Departments 28,825,000
Secondary Roads & Bridges 8,500,000
Telephone, Telegraph & Wireless 4,500,000
Eradication of Malaria 2,000,000 59,375,000
10. Miscellaneous Projects
Minor Irrigation Works 6,500,000
Improvement of Drinking Water 1,500,000
Filling of Swamps 300,000
Aerial & General Surveys 850,000
Other 750,000 9,900,000
TOTAL-Chapter II 69,275,000
GRAND TOTAL 500,007,327
Source: Law No. 54 (1956), Schedule (A).
The new program is by far more balanced and inclusive
than the two preceding it. Unlike the others, it strikes a
reasonable balance between long-term “brick and mortar”
development projects and short-term projects geared to meet
immediate human needs. Housing, which was almost com-
pletely ignored in previous plans, moved to fourth place and


48 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
receives more than ID. 24 million. Expenditures on hospitals,
clinics, drinking water, and other direct and indirect health
measures receive a sharp boost. Allocations for education,
including colleges, secondary, elementary, technical and
agricultural schools and training centers are vastly increased.
Similarly, there is a much greater balance between ex-
penditures on new projects and expenditures on the im-
provement of existing plant. The tendency in earlier plans,
particularly the first one, was to allocate most of the avail-
able funds for launching new projects: new dams, new land,
new roads, new factories, new schools, new hospitals, etc.,
with few allocations for improving those facilities already
in existence. This was particularly true of irrigation proj-
ects. In the present program proper attention is paid to
this aspect.
The main question concerning such a mammoth plan,
involving the expenditure of an average of ID. 85 million
a year in addition to some ID. 20 million spent annually
by other departments, is whether the Board and the minis-
tries are administratively capable of implementing it. The
evidence indicates that they may be, or at least that the
new plan will have a far greater success than the first one.
Both the Board and the ministries have now had over five
years of practical experience in intensive development prob-
lems and are probably far more administratively efficient
than in 1950. Very heavy reliance in the execution of proj-
ects is now placed on competent foreign firms which have
had wide experience in their respective fields. Too, many
of the technical studies, the lack of which caused considerable
delay in the past, are now completed and ready for implemen-
tation. Finally, Iraq has also drawn heavily upon the technical
resources of the United Nations, the United States, European
countries, particularly Britain, and those of neighboring
countries.
The Objectives of the Board
The Board was entrusted by Parliament to carry out
programs for the “development of the resources of Iraq and
the raising of the standard of living of her people.”


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 49
As for the first part, “the development of the resources of
Iraq,” the Board in its first and second plans imposed a
narrow construction on its mandate and concerned itself
mainly with the physical type of development. By and large,
its conception did not seem to include the “development of
human resources.” A glance at the first two plans shows
clearly the heavy concentration on long-range projects
such as dams, irrigation works, roads, bridges, industrial
plants and so forth. Few projects related to the immediate
human problem.
According to Lord Salter, the primary reasons why the
Board was reluctant to enter heavily into the social welfare
field was the question of departmental jurisdiction. It is
wary of slipping into the habit of subsidizing current govern-
ment operations under the umbrella of development. In
some cases the lines of demarcation fade out and it be-
comes difficult to determine where “development” ends and
an ordinary departmental operation begins. For example,
is combatting malaria a development function or an ordinary
government operation? Good arguments can be made for
both views.
In any case, after the program gained momentum it
became clear that an efficient plan of development has to
be balanced and integrated. A new industrial plant needs
skilled workers to run and maintain it, and efficient pro-
duction requires a labor force free from debilitating diseases
such as malaria and hookworm. Moreover, the Board’s
policy of emphasizing—almost exclusively—long-range proj-
ects soon made it unpopular with the public and was one of
the main factors exploited to bring about its reorganization
in 1953.
The present plan reflects the shift which has taken place
in the development philosophy of the Board. This was brought
about by the realization mentioned above, through popular
discontent, and finally by the wise advice of Lord Salter
in his report to the Board.
The pattern of the Board’s expenditures leaves little doubt
that one of its chief aims is the development of agriculture:
to increase vastly the land under cultivation, increase pro-
|


50 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
ductivity per unit, diversify agricultural production, intro-
duce intensive farming, and gradually to mechanize. Ex-
penditures on agriculture (i.e., flood control, irrigation,
drainage, etc.) average, in all three plans, about 35 per cent
of total planned expenditures. This emphasis is understand-
able, since land and water are the country’s most valuable
natural resources.
The second objective of the Board is to move Iraq from
its present stage, in which agricultural production dominates
the economy, into a second stage where agriculture, industry,
and other economic activities such as trade and services
are more or less on an equal footing. Among other things, this
will mean considerable investment in industry, siphoning
off part of the agricultural labor force from the land and a
geographical and occupational redistribution of the popula-
tion.
Quantitatively, what do the programs of the Board mean
in terms of raising the standard of living—the second part
of the Board’s mandate? The rise or decline in the standard
of living is governed by one basic factor: the relation between
the rate of population growth and the rate of increase in the
national income. Increase in the national income, however,
is also governed by two basic factors: the rate of productivity
and the rate of capital investment.
Net annual population growth has been estimated at
about 2.3 per cent. It may be that, as a result of the various
health measures now being undertaken by the government,
this rate may soon go up to 3 per cent.
The capital income ratio in Iraq has been recently estimated
at 6:1 (i.e., six units of invested capital produce one unit of
income). Thus, according to an Iraqi economist, taking into
consideration population growth, Iraq must, in order to
maintain the standard of living existing around 1950, make
an annual capital investment at the rate of 13.8 per cent of
the total national income (2.3 x 6 = 13.8).9
l
In 1951 the IBRD Mission to Iraq estimated the national
income at about 150 million dinars ($424 million). Between
1951/52 and 1955/56, a five-year period, excluding other


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 51
government departments and the private sector, the Board
alone made a total capital investment of over 150 million
dinars (or 30 million dinars a year) equal to 20 per cent
of the national income in 1951. This exceeds by 6.2 per cent
the amount of investment necessary (13.8 per cent) to main-
tain the standard of living.
We have already stated that in Iraq each unit of capital
investment produces one unit of product or income (capital
productivity coefficient equals one-sixth). Hence the annual
investments of the Board (20 per cent of the national income)
increase the national income by 3.3 per cent annually
(20 x 1 = 3.3). But the population increases at the rate of
6
2.3 per cent a year, thus leaving a surplus of 1 per cent. In
other words, the Board’s rate of investment between 1951/52
and 1955/56 should have raised the standard of living by 1
per cent each year.
Under the present program, the Board plans to spend an
average of 85 million dinars a year. Assuming, for theoretical
purposes, that all other factors have remained constant (not
a correct assumption), then this rate of investment equals
about 56 per cent of the national income in 1951. Such a
rate should theoretically produce 9.3 per cent increase in
the national income annually (56 x + = 9.3). If 2.3 per
cent, the annual growth of population, is deducted, then this
leaves a 7 per cent increase in the standard of living a year.
All the above data are, of course, based on theoretical
formulations which, because of other variables, may not
coincide with actual results. Despite probable wide margins
of error, however, they do show rough approximations of
trends.
It is quite obvious that the activities of the Board have on
the one hand placed great quantities of money in circulation
in the form of wages, and expenditures on services and
materials. On the other hand, these activities were apt to
cause shortages in certain materials, particularly in con-
struction. Unless adequate measures are taken, this trend
will tend to cause inflation and nullify an apparent rise in
income.
*


52 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
The government wisely took various measures to forestall
such an eventuality. It undertook the sale of some foods,
particularly bread. It removed the istihlaq (consumption)
tax on the local consumption of some commodities and raised
it on the same if exported. It reduced import taxes on some
consumer products and, finally, floated internal loans to
siphon off some of the money in circulation. As a result of
these and other measures, there has been no appreciable
increase in prices, as table 12 indicates.
TABLE 12
WHOLESALE PRICE INDEx
(Monthly Average)
Base Year 1939 = 100
1945 1950 1951 1954 1955 1956
Grain & Dates 592.9 530.0 557.2 462.1 452.5 543.5
Meat & Milk Products 665.2 627.7 597.1 584.9 595.9 637.3
Other Foods 309.6 346.0 365.3 329.5 336.0 335.0
Other Animal &
Vegetable Products 412.9 615.3 708.3 514.1 510.1 502.9
Building Materials 634.5 488.8 653.6 517.7 590.8 602.4
Textiles 944.0 792.5 890.5 620.7 597.8 597.7
Fuels 138.7 149.0 162.5 153.7 154.2 154.8
Other Goods 535.0 428.6 509.7 355.1 335.5 327.3
General Price Index 494.4 475.1 520.8 427.9 432.1 463.1
Source: Statistical Abstract for 1955, p. 137; 1956, p. 159.
Other Government Agencies
Development work is by no means restricted to the Board
and the Ministry of Development. Other state agencies carry
out important major works which have averaged in recent
years some 20 per cent of the total expenditures of the ordinary
government budget.
1. There are “capital works” and “economic projects”
in the general budget of the government. These have averaged
more than four million dinars a year since 1951.


THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD 53
2. There are also expenditures for “administrative local
councils and expenses of elementary education” and other
projects carried out by the councils. These have also averaged
over four million dinars a year (1953/54, ID. 4.5 million;
1954/55, ID. 6.1 million).
3. Various government banks such as the Industrial
Bank, the Agricultural Bank, the Mortgage Bank, etc., carry
out their own important projects.
4. Semi-governmental agencies such as the State Rail-
ways, the Port of Basrah, the Tobacco Monopoly, the Date
Association, etc., finance many of their own projects in
addition to any assistance they may receive from the Board.
5. There are also programs of the U. S. Point Four and
United Nations agencies.
The chapters that follow will discuss in detail the trans-
formation taking place in all sectors of Iraqi life, principally
as a result of the activities of the Development Board and
the Ministry of Development, but also of other government
agencies and of private investment, both native and foreign.
1. Walter Z. Laqueur, Communism and JNationalism in the Middle East (New York:
Praeger, 1956), p. 202.
2. Iraq Government, Development Board, Compilation of Laws Concerning
the Development Board, (revised) (Baghdad: Government Press, 1952).
3. Salter, op. cit., p. 97.
4. Articles 4 and 5 of Law No. 35 (1951).
5. In 1950 the Government of Iraq contracted a loan from the International
Bank for 12.8 million dinars for the Tharthar project. Actually only a little
over six million dollars of the loan were used. The loan was paid back in
full by 1956.
6. IBRD, p. 76.
7. Ibid., p. 79.
8. Annual Report for the Financial Year 1953-54, op. cit., p. 5.
9. Abdul Sahib Alwan, “Population Increase and Economic Development in
Iraq,” Majallat al-Zira’a al-Iraqiya, (Special Issue), Vol. 12, No. 1, January-
February-March, 1957, pp. 77-84. Published by the Ministry of Agriculture
at Baghdad, in Arabic.


PART II The Development of Agriculture
CHAPTER 4
CONTROL OVER THE WATER RESOURCES
Control and utilization of its water resources have been for
generations—and indeed for centuries—the principal prob-
lem of Iraq. Although nature has endowed the country with
abundant supplies sufficient to irrigate all the arable land,
the desired amounts are not delivered when and where
they are needed. Droughts scorch a thirsty land during
the sowing season, and spring floods lay waste the crops
when they are almost ready for the harvest, and devastate
villages and even urban centers such as Baghdad.
Iraq is divided into two zones: a rainfall zone and an
irrigation zone. Since the amount of rain is not controllable,
agricultural expansion in the Mesopotamian valley must
therefore depend on harnessing the waters of the Tigris-
Euphrates river system.
Regional Aspects of the System
Both the Tigris and Euphrates originate in Turkey. The
Euphrates flows through Syria for some considerable distance
before entering Iraq. Headwaters of the Lesser Zab and the
Diyala, tributaries of the Tigris, are in the Iranian mountains
and the east bank of the Shatt al-Arab forms one of the


WATER RESOURCES 55
frontiers with Iran. Clearly then, both the Tigris and Eu-
phrates are international rivers.
Iraq being a lower riparian country is in a very vulner-
able position vis-a-vis Turkey, Syria, and Iran. Theoretically,
there is very little that Iraq can do if any or all of these states
embark on schemes for extensive exploitation and diver-
sion of the waters of the two rivers and their tributaries.
Moreover, anti-erosion measures, such as afforestation of
the watershed areas of the system to protect the water storage
works being built in Iraq from silting up, can be effective
only with the cooperation of Turkey and Iran. A stable
river development in Iraq is therefore contingent upon the
execution of bilateral or multilateral agreements with the
other riparian states concerned. The ideal would be one
agreement to which Turkey, Iran, Syria, and Iraq would all
be parties.
In the case of Iran, because of the mountainous terrain
in which the watersheds of the Tigris tributaries are located,
there is little likelihood that this country will divert any
significant quantities of water. Its only objection could be
concerning the possible deterioration of the Shatt al-Arab river
for navigation. This eventuality seems remote.
Syria poses a different problem. Large areas there, ad-
jacent to the Euphrates, are suitable for agricultural develop-
ment. Actual large-scale projects, such as the proposed
Yusuf Pasha dam, have been under consideration for some
time. This would seriously reduce the amounts of water flow
into Iraq from the Euphrates. Similarly, a proposed dam at
Ana on the Euphrates in Iraq would back up the water into
Syria over a distance of some sixty kilometers.
There is no agreement between Syria and Iraq concerning
river control and allocation of water supply. A convention
was signed in Paris on December 23, 1920, between France
and Britain, as mandatory powers for Syria and Iraq, which
called for the formation of a commission which would examine
all proposed irrigation schemes in Syria which may seriously
diminish “the waters of the Tigris and the Euphrates at
the points where they enter the area of the British mandate
in Mesopotamia.” No such commission was set up. In any


56 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
case, the convention is probably no longer binding. Iraq,
upon the termination of the British mandate in 1932, de-
clared herself bound by all the agreements made on its be-
half by the Mandatory Administration. No such declaration
was made by Syria when the French mandate was terminated
in 1945.
The principle of cooperation (even though limited) be-
tween Iraq and Turkey over river control was established
in the Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly Relations signed
by the two governments on March 29, 1946. In Protocol I
of the treaty Turkey allowed Iraq to establish meteorological
stations in its territory, to conduct geological surveys for
possible flood-control dam sites, and consented in principle,
subject to confirmation in each case, to the construction by
Iraq, in Turkey, of water works found to be necessary.
Turkey also obligated itself to inform Iraq of any contem-
plated projects on the two rivers. Under the treaty, Iraq has
so far established three meteorological stations in Turkish
territory but no river works have been constructed there.
More recently, closer cooperation between Turkey, Iraq,
and Iran over river control is being effected through the
“Baghdad Pact.” A Joint Irrigation Projects Committee
has been established as a subdivision of the Pact's Economic
Committee. There is also a subcommittee on cooperation
in agricultural planning.
At a meeting of the Joint Irrigation Projects Committee held
at Ankara in July, 1956, the Iranian and Turkish Govern-
ments undertook to establish meteorological and hydrological
stations at the headwaters of the Euphrates, the Tigris, and
their tributaries in their territories. The Committee also
undertook to make a survey of joint irrigation projects which
had been recommended by the Economic Committee at
its meeting in Teheran earlier in the summer.
Features of the Tigris-Euphrates System
Sir William Willcocks, the great Anglo-Indian engineer,
described the Nile as a “gentleman.” In contrast, the Tigris
and Euphrates can perhaps be described as two tempera-
mental ladies who need considerable persuasion and control.


WATER RESOURCES 57
Unlike the Nile, the seasonal distribution of the water
supplies of the system does not coincide with crop needs.
Winter crops in Iraq need water from May onwards. The
low-water season, however, lasts from July to December.
During this period the mean water discharges of the Tigris
and the Euphrates are 559 and 421 cubic meters per second
(cumecs), respectively. The two rivers reach their lowest
levels in September and October when water is badly needed.
When the crops are either half-grown or almost ready for
the harvest and water is no longer badly needed, they are
subject to the danger of inundation. Spring is the flood
season. During this period the mean water discharges of
the two rivers are 2,572 and 1,765 cumecs respectively.
In the case of summer crops which need water from April
to September, the situation is reversed. At first they receive
abundant supplies, then the supply declines gradually until
it reaches a low point in September.
Again, unlike the Nile which flows gently, the Euphrates
and the Tigris, particularly the latter, have very steep gra-
dients in the upper and central parts of the valley, but very
slight in the lower part. The bed of the Tigris slopes down
at a ratio of 5.7:10,000 between the Turkish frontier and
Baghdad, but from there on the ratio falls down to one in
20,000. The Euphrates, though not as steep (3.3:10,000),
also flattens out from Ramadi on.
This feature has several important consequences. Erosive
action in the upper reaches is extremely strong. Sediments
are carried during all parts of the year. The effectiveness of
water-storage and flood-control works and irrigation canals
is therefore constantly endangered by silting. Moreover, the
rivers during the flood season tend to be very violent (es-
pecially the Tigris). They thunder down the mountain slopes,
sometimes sweeping away irrigation works, causing con-
siderable damage to crops and carving themselves new
COurSeS.
On the other hand, the silt-laden waters have, during the
past 5,000 years, built the southern part of the valley. At
present, the delta on the shoreline of the gulf is being built
entirely by the Karun river which flows from Iran, while


58 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
the Tigris and Euphrates deposit their silt in the central
marshes.
The waters of both the Tigris and Euphrates are some-
what saline. The proportion of salt in both rivers near Baghdad
is thirty to thirty-three parts in 100,000. In the lower reaches
of the Euphrates, however, salinity goes up to ninety per
100,000. This has resulted in progressive salination of the
soil and declining crop yields. The Haigh Commission Re-
port (see below) estimated that some 60 per cent of the irriga-
ted areas have been affected by salination and that about
20–30 per cent of the cultivated land in the irrigation zone
has been abandoned in recent decades because it was no
longer suitable for cultivation.
Another feature of the system, which has had a favorable
effect on agriculture, is that the bed of the Euphrates from
north of Falluja southwards until the two rivers meet at
Qurna, is slightly higher than that of the Tigris. In modern
times, as in the past, this difference of elevation had been
utilized to build a network of gravity flow canals from west
to east to irrigate large areas of land.
Of the two rivers, the Euphrates is the more gentle and
easier to control. During its course after leaving Turkey,
only one main tributary, the Khabur in Syria, flows into
it. Otherwise, in Iraq, it only receives the discharges of
main wadis and seepages from the North Desert. Consequently,
its water discharge fluctuates less widely than the Tigris.
In contrast, the Tigris is to a high degree unruly and
difficult. It has a vast catchment area. As it flows from
Turkey towards the Persian Gulf, it receives several tributaries:
in Iraq, four: the Greater Zab, the Lesser Zab, the Udhaim
and the Diyala. Both the Udhaim and the Diyala are difficult
rivers. The floods of the former occur as a result of rain
storms rather than melting snow, and, therefore, they fluctu-
ate widely in volume and intensity. On the Diyala, floods
occur suddenly with little warning. Hence, the Tigris is
subject to periodic violent floods and is feared much more
than the Euphrates.


WATER RESOURCES 59
Reports on Water Control
To appreciate the scope and significance of the vast water
control program taking place now in Iraq, it is important
to summarize here, in a few paragraphs, two global reports
made on the subject in recent years. In fact, the present
program is a modified version of their recommendations.
They are the Haigh Commission Report* made in 1949
after some three years of field investigation, and the report
of Knappen-Tippets-Abbett-McCarthy (KTAM), a New
York engineering firm, made in 1952.”
The Haigh Report
The report estimated the total gross area in the valley
“available and suitable for cultivation” to be 27 million
dunums (see Table 13). Only 12.7 million of this total are
under cultivation, and only 5.2 million dunums are actually
planted annually in winter crops, while most of the rest is
left fallow.
With the installation of flood control works, water storage,
drainage, land reclamation, new irrigation canals, improve-
ment of existing canals, etc., the report states that 13 million
dunums more can be irrigated, bringing the possible total
to 25.7 million dunums.
The mean water supply of the Euphrates is 280 cumecs,
of which 228 cumecs are used to irrigate inadequately some
4.7 million dunums. Of this area only 1.9 million dunums
are planted in winter crops annually.
The report shows that by perennial live storage of some
17.2 billion cubic meters of water in Lake Habbaniya and
the Abu Dibbis depression, it is possible to raise the water
supply of the Euphrates to 510 cumecs, an amount sufficient
both to irrigate four million dunums of new land and to im-
prove the supplies of existing areas.
As for the Tigris and its tributaries, they have a mean
water supply of 351 cumecs, which is used to irrigate a gross
area of eight million dunums. Of this, only 3.3 million dunums,
the report estimates, are annually planted in winter crops.


WATER RESOURCES 61
TABLE 14
KTAM REPORT ESTIMATEs: 1952
Land Under Cultivation, New Land (Arable and Irrigable),
Plans of Development, and Water Requirements
Existing Areas JNew Land in Annual Water Requirements
Million Dunums Million Dunums in Billion Cubic Meters
Fallow Intensive Intensive Grand
System System System Total Total Euphrates Tigris Total
Euphrates -
Basin 4.9 - - 2.8 7.7 6.1 a - 6.1 a
Tigris Basin 8.1 - - 6.2 14.3 - 11.3a 11.3a
Total 13.0 - - 9.0 22.0 6.1 a 11.3a 17.4a
Plan “A” 13.0 - 9.0 9.0 22.0 12.1 26.1 38.2
Plan “B” 4.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 22.0 14.7 32.0 47.1
Source: KTAM Report, op. cit.
* Excluding new lands.
Under Plan “A”, the 13 million dunums of existing land
would continue to be cultivated under the fallow system with
improved drainage. However, the nine million dunums of
new land would be cultivated on the “basis of modern in-
tensive methods including crop rotation, improved methods
of cultivation and irrigation, livestock management, and
other related modern practices.” The annual water require-
ments under this plan would be 38.2 billion cubic meters of
Water.
Under Plan “B”, four million dunums would continue
to be cultivated under the fallow system (because of water
supply limitations), and 18 million under the intensive
system. The annual water requirements in this case would
be 47.1 billion cubic meters.
The report argues that the water requirements of either
plan “A” or “B” can be met from the available water supplies
of the two rivers. In the case of the Tigris, measurements
taken at Baghdad since 1906 show that its average annual
discharge for the period has been 38.8 billion cubic meters.
During 1930-34, a succession of dry years, the annual average
discharge for the period was 32.5 billion cubic meters.


62 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Similarly, measurements taken of the Euphrates since 1924
at Hit show an average annual flow for the period of 26.4
billion cubic meters. During the dry five-year period (1930–
34), the average annual flow was 17.2 billion cubic meters.
The above figures show that the water supply is assured
in both cases. The problem reduces itself to one of perennial
storage. “If storage reservoirs are built, it will be possible
to store water during a wet year and use it during a succeed-
ing dry year; therefore, the flow during a single dry year is
not necessarily critical.”
The report estimates the total population of the valley
as 3.3 million persons (against 5.1 for the whole country)
of whom 1.2 million are urban and 2.1 million are rural.
On the basis of these population estimates, the farm income
of the inhabitants of the valley would rise in the following
Inanner:
Present
(13 mil. dunums
Fallow System) Plan “A” Plan “B”
Dinars Dinars Dinars
Gross Farm Income
(Includes Produc-
tion Cost, Labor
Cost & Surplus) 118,000,000 542,000,000 764,000,000
Net Farm Income,
(Includes Labor
Cost & Surplus) 62,000,000 295,000,000 416,000,000
Average Net Farm
Income Per Head
of Inhabitants
(3.3 million) 19 89 126
This vast increase in farm income, which would make
the farm population of Iraq the most prosperous in the Middle
East, is made contingent by the report on meeting certain
basic requirements:
(a) Construction of new facilities
1. Drainage
2. Water storage facilities


WATER RESOURCES 63
3. Irrigation canals and control works
4. Flood control facilities
(b) Management
1. Improved farm practices
2. Organization and training
3. Maintenance of completed works
The program of development would depend primarily
on flow irrigation. Lift irrigation by comparison is very costly.
The total cost of the program, excluding cost of flood and
storage reservoirs, would be 198 million dinars ($555.4
million) with expenditures spaced over a period of twenty-five
years.
At present, the target of the Development Board is—and
correctly so—more modest than the KTAM proposals. Dur-
ing the past five years the Board has concentrated mainly
on building basic facilities such as flood control and water
storage works. In the recent program the emphasis has
begun to shift to drainage and irrigation. The rest of this
chapter will be devoted to the accomplishments of the Board
in the fields of flood control, storage, irrigation, and drainage.
Flood Control and Water Storage
Until 1952 very little was done to control the flood menace.
Minor works, mostly embankments called “bunds,” were
constructed, and Lake Habbaniya was utilized to some extent
for overflow from the Euphrates. These measures could cope
with the danger of moderate floods only. No wonder, then,
that the Development Board gave first priority in its pro-
gram to flood control projects.
In 1956, the two major flood control works were com-
pleted, bringing a good measure of safety to Iraq for the
first time in its long history. Others which are now under
construction will bring the flood menace under full control,
making it a memory of a dreaded past.
The Euphrates
The worst recorded flood on the Euphrates, that of May
5, 1929, had a maximum discharge of 5,200 cubic meters


64 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
per second at Hit. Flood control and storage on the Euphrates
centers around the Lake Habbaniya water complex reduce
the maximum possible flood danger from 5,200 to 2,000
cumecs. With the use of the Abu Dibbis depression, it can
be reduced still further to 1,500 cumecs, thus giving full
protection against flood from the Euphrates.
The complex is composed of six major components:
1. Lake Habbaniya itself, which serves the dual purpose
of a flood escape and a storage reservoir. Until 1956, its
storage capacity was 1.3 billion cubic meters. In that year,
however, work on raising its dykes from 49.5 to 51 meters
above sea level was completed, giving it a storage capacity
of 2.3 billion cubic meters. This has now reduced the flood
danger from 5,200 to 4,000 cumecs.
2. The Ramadi Barrage. Work on this barrage started
in 1953. Its total cost came to 1.4 million dinars. It is located
across the Euphrates and is 209 meters long and fourteen
meters high. It has a fish ladder and a navigation lock to
allow the passage of river craft.
The barrage arrests the upstream waters of the river
and thus reduces the flood danger further to 2,000 cumecs,
and makes it possible to fill the lake to a higher level. The
excess flood water is diverted to the lake through the Warrar
regulator.
3. Warrar Inlet Canal and regulator. Both the canal and
the regulator were completed in 1952. The canal is 8.5
kilometers long and connects the river with the lake. Dur-
ing floods, its regulator can divert water through the canal
at the rate of 2,800 cumecs.
4. The Dhibban Outlet Canal and regulator. Both were
completed in 1951. The canal is thirteen kilometers long
and connects the lake with the Euphrates. Its purpose is to feed
the river from water stored in Lake Habbaniya during the
dry season. Its regulator has a discharge capacity of 250
CuIIleCS.
5. The Majjara Escape Canal. This was completed in
1945. It is 8.2 kms. long and connects the lake with the
Abu Dibbis depression. Should floods exceed the storage


WATER RESOURCES 65
capacity of the lake, the regulator on the canal can discharge
water to the depression at the rate of 850 cumecs. At present
another escape canal to the depression, with a discharge
capacity of 2,800 cumecs, is under study.
6. The Abu Dibbis Depression. This is a natural de-
pression with no outlet canal. At present it is used only for
flood control purposes: that is, to receive the water over-
flow from Lake Habbaniya through the Majjara Escape
Canal.
The new storage provided by the Habbaniya complex
has now raised the available water supplies of the Euphrates
from 280 to 440 cumecs. This amount can now provide
sufficient water supplies to existing cultivated areas and in
addition bring under cultivation some 2.4 million dunums
gross of new land.
It is possible to increase the water supplies of the Euphrates
and provide for additional flood protection by using the
Abu Dibbis for storage (see preceding summary of Haigh Report).
The depression would have a storage capacity of 21 billion
cubic meters gross or 14.5 billion net. This would reduce
the flood danger still further to 1,500 cumecs and increase
the water supply of the Euphrates to a total of 510 cumecs.
The IBRD Mission, however, had very serious reservations
about the usefulness of the depression for irrigation storage
because of its high salt content, which would render water
stored there useless for irrigation purposes.”
The above question is now under study. If it is proved
that the water stored in the depression is usable for irriga-
tion, then the full potential development of the Euphrates
basin, insofar as water supplies are concerned, has already
been achieved. Otherwise, an alternative storage site will
have to be found.
The Tigris and Its Tributaries
Many studies have been made to determine the best sites
for flood control and storage works on the Tigris and its
tributaries. Several proposed sites are now under investiga-
tion by engineers; some are under construction and one
has been completed.


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WATER RESOURCES 67
The Wadi Tharthar Project. The major flood control
work on the Tigris and, for that matter, in the whole of
Iraq is the Tharthar project. It was officially inaugurated by
the king on April 2, 1956 in an imposing ceremony attended
by foreign diplomats, government leaders, and most of the
prominent personalities in the country.
Work on the project started in 1952 with an average labor
force, until completion, of about 3,000 workers and 140
engineers. The earthwork removal came to about 60 per
cent of that carried out for the construction of the Suez
Canal. The cost, up to March 1956, amounted to 12.1
million dinars ($33.88 million); 4.5 million dinars more are
expected to be spent before completion.
The maximum recorded flood discharge of the Tigris
at Samarra where the barrage of the project is located, was
12,000 cumecs (in February 1941). The project reduces
this maximum danger to 3,500 cumecs, thus giving Baghdad
and downstream areas a considerable margin of safety.
The project consists of three main parts.:
1. The Wadi Tharthar. This is a vast natural depression
which lies between the Tigris and Euphrates about forty
miles northwest of Baghdad. Its lowest point is three meters
below sea level, but its edges rise to a height of 60 meters above.
The wadi is 100 kilometers long and some forty kilometers
wide with an area of 2,025 square kilometers. When filled to
a height of sixty meters, it forms a lake with a gross capacity
of sixty-eight billion cubic meters, comparable in size to the
Dead Sea in Palestine. Its live (net) storage, however, de-
pends on how high the depression is filled and on how low
an outlet irrigation canal is drawn. For instance, if the de-
pression is filled to a height of fifty-eight meters, and the
outlet canal is drawn at a height of thirty-eight meters, then
the dead storage would be 33 billion cubic meters, and the
live storage, thirty billion cubic-meters.
2. The Inlet Canal and regulator. The canal is sixty-
five kilometers long and connects the Tigris with the de-
pression. Its regulator can discharge water at the rate of
9,000 cumecs. Consideration is now being given to enlarging
the canal and the discharge capacity of the regulator.


68 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
3. The Barrage. This lies across the Tigris near the
town of Samarra. It backs up the upstream waters of the
Tigris and diverts the excess flow to the depression through
the canal. The barrage has an estimated potential capacity
of generating 112,000 kilowatts of electric power.
As in the case of the Abu Dibbis depression, there are
doubts that the Wadi Tharthar depression is sufficiently
water-tight for irrigation storage. The Haigh Commission
was certain that it is. Other experts and consulting engineers
who have studied the project since are not so certain. In the
view of Lord Salter, its usefulness, according to the criteria
of salinity and seepage, cannot be determined before 1961 and,
in any case, it will take ten years for the depression to fill to
the level at which water can be used.
Should the depression be found suitable for irrigation
storage, there will be very little need for any further storage
works, for, along with the dams under construction, it will
be able to meet all the water requirements of existing and
new lands in the Tigris Basin. An interesting project, which is
under study now, is a canal connecting the Habbaniya com-
plex with the depression.
The Dokan Dam. This project is located on the Lesser
Zab river at the Dokan gorge some 60 kilometers northwest
of the town of Sulaimaniya near the Iranian border in the
northeast of Iraq. Work on the dam started in 1954 and is
scheduled to be completed in 1958. The budgeted cost of the
dam proper is 13 million dinars ($36.4 million).
The dam, when completed, will be the largest of its kind
in the Middle East. It consists of a massive concrete arch-
shaped wall across the gorge, 325 meters long and 108 meters
high. The thickness of the wall at the bottom will be fifty
meters and at the top nine meters. It will create a mountain
lake fifty square kilometers in area with a storage capacity of
6.8 billion cubic meters.
The structure will also have two diversion tunnels, 12.5
and 11 meters in diameter respectively, to be used as spill-
ways for flood water. In addition, it will have five outlets, each
3.65 meters in diameter, for future generation of electric power.


70 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
the water of the river itself and that conveyed by the feeder
canal from the Batma dam. The structure is expected to
irrigate an estimated area of 214,000 dunums on its right
bank, and 662,000 dunums on the left bank.
Other Proposed Dams. Two more dams have been under
study and investigation for some time: The Bekhme on the
Greater Zab river, and Eski Mosul on the Tigris north of
Mosul. Their suitability as dam sites has been established.
Studies indicate that if a dam is erected on the Bekhme
gorge to a height of 165 meters, it would have a storage
capacity of 8.3 billion cubic meters of water in addition to
generating 600,000 kilowatts of electric power. It is estimated
that the Eski Mosul dam would have a storage capacity of
eight billion cubic meters. Funds have been allocated for
these two dams in the 1955-60 program. However, construc-
tion will take place only when and if it is determined that
there is need for further water storage. Such a decision may
be reached towards the end of 1959.
Irrigation
Canal building in Iraq was brought to the level of a fine
art by the ancient Babylonians and was further developed
by the peoples that followed them. Historical evidence
indicates that, up to the thirteenth century A. D., there was
a much larger area of land under cultivation than at present.
The canals of today follow to a surprising degree the ruins
of those built centuries ago.
When the Development Board was organized, there was
already in existence an intricate system of canals, a large
number of which were built during the past three decades.
The Board’s task in this respect is twofold: first, to improve
the efficiency of the existing system by the installation of
barrages, regulators, pumping plants, and desilting works;
by reclamation of canals which had silted up; and by re-
modeling, expanding and extending others; second, to build
new canals where needed. Through such measures, water
supplies to areas under cultivation can be improved, large
areas of land can be reclaimed, and finally, the danger from


WATER RESOURCES 71
floods can be reduced further by diverting excess waters
to where they can do no harm.
As pointed out above, the emphasis during the past six
years has been more on building dams and less on improving
existing facilities. In recent programs far more emphasis
is being placed on irrigation and drainage than before. For
instance, in the first Six-Year Plan (1951-56), the amount
allotted to irrigation was ten million dinars, most of which
was not spent. In the second Six-Year Plan (1955-56),
irrigation was allotted more than 30 million dinars under
various expenditure categories. What is more important
is that the allotments are actually being spent. In the following
few pages some of the main irrigation projects either under
study or construction will be discussed.
The Euphrates
1. The Hilla Canal System.
This canal is commanded by the Hindiyah barrage built
in 1913. It is the largest canal in Iraq served by a single in-
take. With its four main branches, it serves some 2.7 million
dunums of land in the Euphrates basin. One of its branches,
the Dagharra, has deteriorated to the point of becoming
useless.
Investigations by the engineering firm KTAM show that
if the Hilla system is expanded, remodeled, and desilting
works installed, it can be made to serve 1.8 million dunums
more of government land. This land can be divided into
small holdings and cultivated under the intensive system.
The estimated total cost of improving the canal is 25 million
dinars. Ten million have been allocated for it during the
1956-60 program.
As a first step the Board has already approved the ex-
pansion of the Hilla Canal from its head down to its first
branch, the Babil Canal, together with the expansion of
the Babil Canal itself, to provide water for 400,000 dunums
of government land. Aside from enlargement, the work also
includes earth embankments, one cross regulator on the
Hilla Canal, two cross and one inlet regulator on the Babil
Canal.


72 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
2. The Greater Musayyib Project.
Work on this project began in 1953 and was completed
in the fall of 1956. It brought under irrigation 250,000 dunums
of new land, the distribution of which began in November 1956
(and brought reassured supplies of water to 85,000 dunums
which were already under irrigation and privately owned).
The work consisted of two parts. First, enlarging, re-
modeling, and extending the old canal. It is now 50 kilo-
meters long, has twelve lateral canals, and a 500-kilometer
network of small canals. Second, providing full drainage
facilities to the areas to be irrigated. In addition to excava-
tion, the work also involved installing cross, main, and small
regulators, pumping stations, etc.
3. Euphrates Tail Regulators.
In the rice-growing area just above Lake Hammar in
the south, constant erosion has made the bed of the Euphrates
there so low in relation to the silted land that water distribu-
tion in the dry season has become almost impossible. To
control erosive action, and to raise the water level in the
river when needed, work on the installation of five regulators
on the tails of the Euphrates before Lake Hammar, began
in 1954 and is due to be completed in the early part of 1957.
Expenditures on this project amounted to some 700,000
dinars.
4. The Shamiyah Canal Project.
The Shamiyah is actually a branch of the Euphrates
which has been canalized. It needs extensive improvements,
including remodeling and expansion. This, however, is
still under study. In the meantime, erosive action, a phe-
nomenon known in Iraq as naggarat, lowers the bed of the
canal and its subsidiaries in the dry season, making the
distribution of water in this rice land very difficult. As partial
measures, a main regulator was installed at the tail of the
canal (250,000 dinars), and the Directorate of Irrigation on
behalf of the Board is at present installing eleven small
regulators (total cost 37,000 dinars) on both sides of Mish-
Khab, in addition to constructing bunds, a cross regulator,
a side regulator, and a navigation lock (total cost 33,000
dinars).


WATER RESOURCES 73
The Tigris
1. The Gharraf Canal Project.
The Gharraf is the main canal system on the Tigris. It
is commanded by the Kut barrage built in 1939. With its
two branches, the Shatrah and the Bad'a, the Gharraf serves
an area roughly estimated at about 2.3 million dunums.
Studies show that with remodeling, enlargement, and ex-
tension, water supplies to existing areas can be improved
and 600,000 dunums of new government land can be brought
under irrigation. The consulting engineers, KTAM, rec-
ommended the construction of the following works:
a. Drainage: The Western and Eastern outfalls, also the
Dujailah outfall.
b. Four regulators on the Gharraf with bunds and lateral
gates.
c. Seven regulators on the Badºa canal.
d. A new canal extension to irrigate new government
land in the Jazirat area.
Some eight million dinars have been allocated for this
project. Construction of the regulators is scheduled for com-
pletion in 1958, and construction of the new canal is expected
to begin in 1957 with the hope that by 1960 some 10 per
cent of the new land will be served with water.
The Lesser Zab and Udhaim Basin
The construction of the two dams on the Lesser Zab and
the Udhaim to utilize the waters of the Dokan dam will
necessitate the enlargement of one canal, and the construction
of one feeder canal to irrigate some 1.3 million dunums of
land. The areas that will benefit are as follows:
Makhmur 162,000 dunums
Hawija 253,000 “
Udhaim right bank 214,000 “
Udhaim left bank (Ghurfa) 663,000 “
1,291,000
The Hawija canal is at present being enlarged. Con-
struction of canals and related works was scheduled to begin


74 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
in 1957 and to be completed in 1958. Construction of other
structures and canals was also to begin in 1957. It is expected
that 15 per cent of the area will be served by 1960.
Other Projects
1. Reclamation of Nahrawan Lands
These lands are located on the eastern bank of the Tigris
south of the Diyala river. They constitute about 1.2 million
dunums. Study of their reclamation is under way and con-
struction of canals and related works is scheduled to begin
in 1958. Very little land, if any, however, will be ready to
be served with water by 1960 when the present program
terminates.
2. The Ishaqi Area
Irrigation of the Ishaqi area on the Tigris south of the
Tharthar barrage is now under study. Construction of canals
and drainage is expected to begin in 1958 and it is hoped
that about 15 per cent of the area will be served with water
by 1960.
3. Basrah Lands
Improvement of irrigation, flood control on the Shatt
al-Arab and Lake Hammar, and land reclamation in the
Basrah area have been under study for some time. Four million
dinars have been allocated to this project between 1955-60
and construction is expected to begin in 1957.
4. Northern Districts Project
Studies of small irrigation projects in Mosul, Arbil, and
Kirkuk and Sulaimaniya livas for relocation of persons
displaced by the Dokan and Darband-i-Khan reservoirs
are now under way. Construction in each case will commence
when plans are ready. Eleven million dinars have been
allocated for these and other irrigation projects in the north.
5. Diyala Basin Project
The Diyala barrage built in 1939 commands six canals
which irrigate an area of some 1.3 million dunums. Water
from the Darband-i-Khan Dam is expected to irrigate 1.5
million more dunums of new land. Studies are now under
way to enlarge and remodel some of the existing canals and
build new ones to irrigate the new land to be brought under


WATER RESOURCES 75
cultivation. Five million dinars have been allocated for the
Diyala lands project.
Drainage
Salination of the soil is a deadly enemy of the Iraqi fallah.
The Haigh Commission estimated that 60 per cent of the
flow-irrigated area has been affected and 20 to 30 per cent
abandoned in the past three decades because it became
either not profitable or impossible to cultivate it. Crop yield,
it was also estimated, declined by 20 to 50 per cent.
The high concentration of salt in the soil, especially in
the flow-irrigated areas, is due primarily to continuous
irrigation and flooding combined with the high rate of
evaporation that obtains in these climatic conditions. Irriga-
tion keeps the sub-soil water table high, just below the
ground surface, exposed to the hot summer sun. When
evaporation takes place, it leaves salt deposits in the plant
root zone. As the years go by, the salt accumulation be-
comes toxic in quantity, gradually causes a decline in crop
yield, and finally makes further cultivation impossible.
Fortunately, the chemical composition of the salt in most
of Iraq is such that it can be “washed out” of the land by
drainage. With deep drains, the sub-soil water table is
lowered; accumulated salts are flushed and further accumula-
tion prevented. Moreover, in this manner, as the KTAM
Report states, “The root zone of the plant will be deepened,
more minerals that are available in the soil will become avail-
able to the plants, stagnant waters will be removed, the
growing season will be lengthened... crop rotation. . . will
become possible; in general, the health and yields of crops
will be greatly improved.”
Hardly any measures were taken to combat salination
during the past thirty years. Even new settlement projects
such as Dujailah (1945), in which the government invested
considerable amounts of money, were not provided with
drainage facilities, so that after ten years of cultivation
salt began to appear and the land began to deteriorate.
The “drainage movement” began in earnest when the
Development Board was organized. Since its creation, the


76 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Board has become more and more drainage-conscious. In
its first program, the total allocation for drainage amounted
to 4.1 million dinars. In its second program, it rose to 13.9
million, and in the last program, the allocation jumped to
28.3 million dinars. Drainage of cultivated areas is now
taking place on a fairly large scale. Excavation of new canals
and reclamation of new land go hand in hand with in-
stallation of drainage facilities. In the following few pages,
the main drainage schemes that have been completed or
are under construction or study will be discussed.
The drainage program consists of three main parts. First
is the excavation of drainage outfalls. These are very large
channels. Because of the vast areas they serve, they will be
almost small rivers when completed. To protect them from
silt- and sand-laden winds, especially in undeveloped areas,
windbreaks consisting of trees and other vegetation are also
planned as part of the program. Secondly, deep main drains
and their subsidiaries are being excavated. These are de-
signed to lower the underground water table. They will
empty into rivers and natural depressions or into outfalls.
Finally, some of the drains will flow by gravity. In the case
of a large number, pumping will be required.
The KTAM Report mentioned previously estimated the
total cost of a full drainage program at 79 million dinars
($221 million), divided as follows:
a) 7 drainage outfalls — 26,700,000 dinars
b) main drains
21 in Euphrates Basin— 19,648,000 “
12 in Tigris Basin — 32,508,000 “
78,856,000 “
Some 30 million dinars have been allocated for the period
up to 1960. Assuming this sum is fully spent, then at the
termination of the present program in 1960, only 38 per
cent of the drainage work needed will have been completed.
1. The Musayyib Project Drains. This is the first project
to be fully completed providing drainage for some 335,000


WATER RESOURCES 77
dunums of land. Work on excavating both the Musayyib-
Babil outfall and the main drains began in 1954 and was
brought to completion in the closing days of 1956.
TABLE 15
DEvelopMENT BoARD ALLOCATIONS FOR DRAINAGE
(in 1,000 Iraqi Dinars)
Actually
spent up
to March
31, 1956 56 57 58 59 60 Total
Left Bank of
Euphrates &
Hilla Canal
including
Rumeitha 825 1,100 1,000 650 500 750 4,825
Right Bank of
Euphrates &
Hilla Canal 245 300 700 1,350 1,300 1,350 5,245
Land on the
Gharraf Canal
Project 200 500 1,600 4,000 5,700 12,000
Diyala Land
Project 180 200 500 1,000 1,700 1,600 5,180
Others 450 500 300 400 500 600 2,750
Total 1,700 2,300 3,000 4,980 8,000 10,000 30,100
Source: Law No. 54 (1956), p. 19.
2. The Dujailah Project. As a pilot project, 25,000 dunums
of the Dujailah settlement were provided with drainage
facilities. Work began in 1954 and was completed the follow-
ing year. Work on drainage for the whole area continues.
The excavation of the Dujailah outfall was scheduled to start
in 1956 with the expectation that the greater part of it will be
completed by 1960.
3. The Saqlawiyah Drain. Through this project some
166,000 dunums of land on the Saqlawiyah and Abu Ghraib
canals will be provided with drainage facilities. Work began
in 1954 and is due to be completed in 1957.


78 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
4. The Tuwairij Drain. Work on providing drainage
for some 31,000 dunums in the Hindiyah area began in 1954,
and will be completed in 1957.
5. The Ba‘quba Drain. This provides drainage for 11,800
dunums of land on the Khoraisan canal on the Diyala river.
The work has now been completed.
6. The Hawija Settlement. Work on providing drainage
for the Hawija settlement on the Lesser Zab began in 1955
and still continues.
7. The Shamiya Drain. Work on the eastern drain of
the Shamiya canal area began in 1954 and still continues.
8. Construction of Outfalls. Construction of the Euphrates-
Tigris outfall began in 1950. Only a small part of it however
will be completed by 1960. Work on the Shamiya and Gharraf
outfalls was scheduled to begin in 1956.
9. Scheduled Projects. Work will begin soon in earnest to
provide drainage to the areas served by the following canals:
left and right banks of the Euphrates and Hilla canal; the
Gharraf, Abu Ghraib, Yusafiyah, Bani Hasan, and Husseini-
yah. All these, with the exception of the Gharraf, are on the
Euphrates.
Conclusion
Iraq is well under way in its agricultural development
program. Within the short span of six years, it has forged
ahead of every country in the Middle East. By 1960, most
if not all the water reservoirs and flood-control structures
will have been built. The effort will then shift almost ex-
clusively to the improvement of the irrigation system, drain-
age and land reclamation.
The total cost of the agricultural development program
was estimated by the Minister of Development in 1955 at
282 million dinars. By 1960, if the program keeps on schedule,
some 180 million will have been invested. This means that
over 60 per cent of the program will have been completed.
About a million and a half dunums of new land will also
have been reclaimed and developed by then.
Tangible effects of the agricultural development program
have just begun to be felt. The floods of 1956 were completely


WATER RESOURCES 79
averted; crop yields are beginning to improve in both quality
and quantity; landless peasants are being settled on new
lands in increasing numbers and lands which remained
desert wastes for centuries are beginning to bloom again.
Agricultural development in Iraq is of significance not
only for the country itself, but also for the Middle East. Iraq
can become the main supplier of agricultural products,
particularly of cereals, to the area. This would be far less costly
to the Middle East than importing these commodities from
distant areas such as Canada and Australia. In times of war,
the Middle East would not have to suffer food shortages be-
cause of lack of transportation facilities on the high seas. Dur-
ing World War II, such shortages did occur and it was neces-
sary for the British and American Governments, which con-
trolled the shipping in the area, to organize the Middle East
Supply Center to control distribution of basic commodities.
Moreover, this new development would encourage intra-
regional trade, the lack of which has been one of the chief
economic problems of the area during the past three decades.
1. Iraq Government, Directorate General of Irrigation, Report on the Control
of the Rivers of Iraq and the Utilization of Their Waters. Submitted by the Irriga-
tion Development Commission, F. F. Haigh, president. (Baghdad: The
Baghdad Press, 1951.) Hereafter referred to as Haigh Report.
2. Knappen-Tippetts-Abbett-McCarthy, Engineers, Report on the Development
of the Tigris and Euphrates River Systems. A report submitted to the Iraq De-
velopment Board, (mimeographed) (New York: 1952.) Hereafter referred to
as KTAM Report.
3. IBRD, p. 186.


CHAPTER 5
THE PROBLEM OF LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM
Forms of Land Tenure
For all practical purposes, a class of independent farmers
who own the lands they farm does not exist in Iraq. The land
is owned, largely, under various forms of land tenure by a
very small group of tribal shaikhs, aghas, and city landlords.
The great majority of the farming population is composed
of what would be called in the United States sharecroppers.
Since over 70 per cent of the population is employed in agri-
culture or allied industries, land tenure is the human prob-
lem par excellence in Iraq. In one way or another, it lies be-
hind most, if not all, of the social, economic, and political
problems of the country.
In theory, the state has ultimate ownership of almost
all lands and the underground water and mineral resources
pertaining to them. Within this framework, four main forms
of tenure are recognized:
1. Mulk. Land held in absolute private ownership. In
most cases, this is restricted to urban property.
2. Matruka (literally, “What is left”). Land reserved
for public purposes. In actual practice this is treated
as state land.


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 81
3. Waqf. Property or land in trust. There are two types
of waqf.
(a) True waqf. Property or land administered for the
benefit of religious institutions by the government
Awqaf Administration, or for the benefit of private
persons by individuals appointed by religious
COUrtS.
(b) “Untrue” waqf. Property or land from which taxes
or revenues were assigned in the past to religious
institutions.
4. Miri land. State land, of which there are three kinds:
(a) Miri Tapu. Land held in permanent tenure from
the state amounting to absolute private owner-
ship. Documentary proof of registration is required
for such tenure. Otherwise, factual evidence that
the land has been productively used by the holder
or his predecessors for at least ten years during
which no rent was paid, or that it was planted with
trees. Tapu land can be mortgaged, sold, or in-
herited.
(b) Miri Lazma. Land held under the same general
conditions as tapu lands. The holder must prove
that he has made productive use of the land during
the preceding fifteen years. In contrast to tapu,
however, the government may veto the transfer
of lazma.
(c) Miri Sirf. Land which definitely and exclusively
belongs to the state.
Although tapu and lazma lands are still officially regarded
as state or miri lands, in actual practice they can hardly
be distinguished from full private ownership. Tapu land,
as mentioned above, may be mortgaged, sold, or inherit-
ed. The same applies to lazma with certain reservations
which are now very seldom employed. Legally, ownership
of both lazma and tapu lands may lapse if they are not pro-
ductively used for three and four successive years respectively
but this rarely, if ever, happens. Before 1939, holders of both
lazma and tapu lands were assessed an annual payment for


82 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
“rent” and water rights, which was a little higher for lazma
than for tapu. In that year these assessments were abolished.
With this furtherance, very little distinction remained be-
tween tapu and lazma lands and between tapu and lazma and
full ownership.
History of Land Tenure
The land tenure system is the result of historical forces,
legal concepts, and tribal traditions which go back to ancient
times. When the Arabs first occupied Iraq (641 A.D.),
land was classified into two kinds: kharaj (tax-land) and
‘ushr (tithe-land). During the Abbassid Caliphate (750–1257)
these two were expanded into five classifications: the King’s
lands, feudal lands, mulk (private property), masha'a (common
land) and wafq (religious trust land).
The period between 1258, when the Mongol hordes in-
vaded Iraq, and 1534, when the Ottomans established their
rule, was one of general retrogression. The great irrigation
canals were destroyed, the blooming gardens and green
fields gradually became wasteland, the desert encroached
on the farmland, the population decreased rapidly, and no-
madism spread. Internecine tribal warfare became the order
of the day. Only in the twentieth century did Iraq begin to
recover from the havoc and devastation wrought by the
Mongols and subsequent war lords. :
From this period until the nineteenth century laws were
loosely enforced. Both individuals and tribes, in most cases,
claimed title to the land by the simple expedient of occupying
it without making any special effort to seek or obtain legal
sanction. Tribal land was regarded as the common property
of the tribe.
As the tribes changed their nomadic mode of existence
and began a settled life, their shaikhs, being powerful, were
able to assert their claim to tribal land as their personal
property. Their free warrior tribesmen gradually became
their subservient sharecroppers. In addition, large land
grants were made by the state to tribal chieftains either to
bribe them into good behavior or to reward them for ser-
vices rendered.


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 83
In 1858 the Ottoman government attempted to bring
some order into the chaos. Through the Land Code which
it promulgated in that year and the Land Registration Law
of the year after, it sought to establish one system of tenure,
the tapu. The attempt was not only a failure but also added
to the general confusion.
For one thing, because of the existing system of shifting
agriculture, it was difficult in many cases to determine what
land belonged to whom. Grants were made in most cases
without examination of conflicting claims and were used as
a means of rewarding some and punishing others. Influential
notables and tribal chiefs with the help of corrupt officials
were also able to register huge tracts of lands in their names.
In the northern districts whole villages and their lands
were registered as the personal property of local notables
and aghas. These had previously served as intermediaries
between the state and the cultivators, collecting taxes and
performing other functions.
Land-grabbing by the powerful few was assisted to some
extent by the cultivators themselves. Many of them were
apprehensive that registration might mean more taxes and/or
military service (not a farfetched assumption). Moreover,
they were powerless against the periodic raids of nomadic
tribes, or against the ubiquitous money-lender. With prom-
ise of protection against all these dangers, many of them
were willing to register their lands in the names of neighbor-
ing influential notables and tribal chieftains. Later, as was
to be expected, these latter claimed the lands as their own
and the original owners became their tenants.
During the British mandate (1920-32) the Ottoman Land
Code continued to operate. The administration’s policy
tended to use the land for political purposes, to win supporters
and punish troublemakers. By special decrees some large
holdings were given to shaikhs, some land sold and the owner-
ship of some transferred to others.
A new complication appeared during this period with
the introduction of fuel-pump irrigation. Many financially
able city merchants entered into agreements with holders
of miri land whereby they supplied the pumps and in return


84 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
received a specified share of the crop. This added one more
claim to the many unresolved existing claims.
By the time the national government assumed full power,
the land problem had become extremely serious. When the
Turks left the country, they either took with them or destroyed
all the land registry records so that there was very little
documentary proof of ownership left. Almost invariably,
ownership was contested among various parties, which
many times led to tribal warfare. Very few, if any, felt
legally secure in their claims to the land which they held.
In his report to the government on the subject, Sir Ernest
Dawson, a British land expert, wrote:
No man engaged in the management and cultivation of a
landholding, large or small, can be expected to sink his capital
in the land and devote his energies unreservedly to its develop-
ment, if he is uncertain whether he and his heirs will benefit
by his husbandry. ...
The injurious effect of the existing welter of uncertainty and
dispute upon both the agricultural prosperity of the country
and public order, can hardly be exaggerated. . . . Indeed the
most diligent enquiry would be unlikely to reveal anywhere
any appreciable number of holdings, large or small, held in
undisputed possession and free from hampering and conflicting
claims. It needs no great effort of the imagination to appreciate
the blighting effect of these unhappy conditions prevailing
throughout the country, upon the prosperity of the main na-
tional industry and the welfare and contentment of the people
as a whole.”
In line with the recommendations of Sir Ernest Dawson,
the government took concrete steps. In 1932 it passed the
Land Settlement Law (replaced in 1938), which recognized
the four forms of tenure discussed at the beginning of this
chapter and inaugurated a cadastral survey to be conducted
by settlement committees. The task of these committees
was to survey the whole country, to investigate conflicting
claims and to adjudicate ownership under the forms of tenure
recognized by the law. The survey has been going on since
1933 and is at present almost complete in most of the prov-
InCCS.


86 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
fied, only 15.7 per cent belongs to small peasant proprietors.
Over 67 per cent is owned in holdings of over 1,000 dunums.
These are national averages and do not reflect the full pic-
ture. For instance, of the private land classified in six prov-
inces, up to 1951, holdings of 10,000-100,000 dunums ac-
counted for the following percentages: Amara, 75.8; Kut,
47.5; Karbala, 31.3; Mosul, 27.2; Baghdad, 20.9; Diwaniya,
20.6.
TABLE 16
TYPE of LAND Ownership
CLASSIFIED BY THE CADASTRAL SURVEY
1933-1956
In Thousand
Dunums Per Cent
Mulk 239 0.3
Matruka 5,136 6.5
Waqf 840 1.1
Tapu 12,348 15.6
Lazma 11,649 14.8
Miri Siri wºol * 61.7
Total 78,913 100.0
Source: Statistical Abstract for 1956, p. 70.
It is true that some of these holdings are owned by more
than one person. This is more than counterbalanced by
the fact that many persons own a number of holdings in
several administrative areas. These have been registered as
separate units. For instance, the survey lists only one holding
over 100,000 dunums in the Kut province. It is a well-known
fact, however, that there are several holdings there, each of
which is over 300,000 dunums. These figures illustrate the
central point, namely, that the country to all practical pur-
poses is devoid of small peasant proprietors and that the
land is mostly owned by large landholders, most of whom are
tribal shaikhs and city notables. Data available since 1951
support the above picture. Table 17 shows the number of


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 87
lazma grants in holdings of over 10,000 dunums and their
total areas, made between 1933 and 1954 in nine of the pro-
vinces. Sixty-six of these holdings are owned by single in-
dividuals. It should be noted that several of these holdings
may be owned by one person.
Condition of the Fallah
As has been shown, the greater part of the private agri-
cultural holdings are owned by a very small landed aristoc-
racy. Conversely, the large majority of the fallaheen are
tenant sharecroppers.
Until recent years, the lot of the fallah in Iraq has been
a very sad one. His income barely served to keep body and
soul together. In 1948, Doreen Warriner reported the follow-
ing distribution of the crop as being typical in southern Iraq:
Per Cent of Crop
Government 10.0
Landowner (shaikh or notable) 40.0
First tenant (shaikh) 7.5
Shaikh’s bailiff 2.5
Fallah (sharecropper who works the land) 40.0
Total 100.0
In 1945 an Iraqi writer estimated the income of the fallah
including his family of five or six dependents to be, in prewar
prices, ten to twelve dinars in the south and fifteen to twenty
dinars in the north.3 In the same year, Alfred Bonné estimated
income on the same basis as six to ten dinars in the northern
provinces and in the order of nine to fifteen dinars in the
south.4
In 1951, the Bank Mission after noting that “conditions
[were] extremely varied and information virtually non-
existent,” suggested that “a hypothetical example of the
condition of a fallah in the irrigation zone, where barley is
the principal crop, may serve as a rough guide.” It calculated
his share of the crop (two-fifths) as three tons which he could


88 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
sell at the prevailing 1951 local prices of ten dinars a ton. His
share of the summer crops was estimated at about ten dinars."
TABLE 17
LAzMA GRANTS IN Holdings
of Over 10,000 DUNUMS
1933-54
JNo. of Lazma Grants Total Area of Lazma Grants
Liwa Over 10,000 dunums Over 10,000 dunums
Kut 37 755,964
Mosul 28 521,252
Diwaniya 14 240,244
Hilla 6 143,930
Amara 3 86,483
Baghdad 2 38,627
Diyala 2 37,275
Erbil 2 21,331
Kirkuk 1 15,442
Total 95 1,860,578
Source: Agricultural Reform and Land Development, op. cit., pp. 146–50.
Now let us add up the gross income in 1951 of this “hy-
pothetical” fallah with five or six dependents in the irrigation
zone. His income from winter and summer crops is forty
dinars. If we add a maximum of thirty dinars to cover casual
work during the off season, home consumption, and in-
come from other sources, then his total annual income would
be at maximum, about seventy dinars a year. If we divide
this by five, the number in the family, this would bring the
income per head of a fallah’s family to a maximum of fourteen
dinars a year.
Until recently, the government provided the fallaheen with
extremely limited economic or social services. Negatively,
the legal and social system reduced them into a state of
virtual servitude.
The law “Governing the Rights and Duties of Cultivators,”
enacted in 1933 and still operative though apparently in-
effective, prescribes in one of its debt clauses that when
a sharecropper is dismissed or moves from a plantation, he
must pay his agricultural debt to the landlord immediately,


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 89
and that pending such payment, unless he receives a certifi-
cate of release from the landlord, he is prohibited employ-
ment on any other plantation, in any government office, or
in any private business establishment of any kind including
domestic service in private homes. Since the fallah is per-
petually in debt to his landlord or to the money-lender, the
law, at least theoretically, makes him and his children
virtually serfs attached to the land.
Aside from the human problem involved, the economic
effects of the depressed condition of the fallah and the pres-
ent sharecropping system are obvious. The fallah has no
incentive to improve the land beyond the year in which he
is cultivating it. He has no assurance that the same plot
will be leased to him the following year, or for that matter,
that he will be given a lease at all. If he manages to save
some money beyond his needs and the needs of his family,
he may buy a cow, a donkey, or a mule, but he is hardly
likely to invest in the land. Nor is he interested in improving
his methods of production such as terracing, crop rotation,
drainage, etc., for all these relate to “results” after the year’s
harvest.
As for the landlords, some of them have proved surprisingly
progressive and have introduced many improvements to
their benefit and the benefit of their tenants. The large ma-
jority of them, however, have had little interest in the land
beyond receiving huge incomes from it and spending them
in the city. In the case of some, there is hardly any link be-
tween them and the land. Many huge estates belong to a
family or a number of families, with each member usually
living in the city, receiving his pro rata share of the estate’s
revenue.
Neither the sharecropping system nor large land-holdings
as such are necessarily bad. Both of them, with an enlightened
approach on the part of the owners, can be of benefit to all
the individuals concerned and to the country as a whole.
The topography of Iraq is ideally suited to large-scale agri-
culture. There are holdings of comparable size, or even
larger, in progressive countries such as the United States,
Canada, and Australia. It is the anachronistic economic and


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 91
per cent of the land in Iraq still belongs to the state. This
is a vast reserve upon which the government can draw to
resettle all the landless peasants, without in the meantime
disturbing the status quo. In the long run, resettlement of
a large number of fallaheen would reduce the power and the
hold of big landowners.
Then too, the big landowners are the most politically
powerful social unit in the country. Any reform legislation
that might infringe on their privileged status or interests
can be blocked. Lord Salter, in his report to the Develop-
ment Board, expressed the problem very graphically when he
wrote: “It may be that some among the great landowners
will accept or welcome some changes on the principle of
‘reform that you may preserve.’ In the meantime, however,
successive Governments have usually felt that new legislation
on land tenancy must be kept within the bounds of what
will not be actively resisted by landowners.”6
Although the government is making some progress in its
resettlement program, as shall be pointed out later, its ap-
proach to the problem of land reform has its dangers. Re-
settlement, by its nature, is slow of results. Land has to be
reclaimed and developed, irrigation and drainage works
have to be installed and so forth. In the meantime, the time
element has become very important. As in all Arab areas,
there is considerable social discontent in Iraq which may
express itself as violently as has been the case in neighbor-
ing countries. Although the masses have little power in
legislative halls, they command, as Salter correctly stated,
“an ultimate power which is altogether out of proportion
to their present representation in Parliament and their
ability to influence legislation by constitutional means.”
The Land Settlement Law
In Law No.23 (1945), entitled “The Dujailah Land Develop-
ment Law,” the first planned scheme of resettlement was
initiated. In 1951 it was replaced by Law No. 43 (1951),
entitled “The Land Development and Settlement Law.”
This was further supplemented by Ordinance No. 52 (1952)
and amended by Ordinance No. 4 (1952).


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 93
c. Graduates of agricultural schools, retired army
and police officers; and servicemen and policemen who
have been in active service not less than four years, shall be
allowed not more than a total of 20 per cent of any one
settlement project, provided the authorities are satisfied
with the individual’s agricultural abilities.
d. Government employees who served not less
than eight years or are retired; persons with not less than
elementary education; and graduates of recognized religious
institutions, who are unemployed, shall be allowed a total
of not more than 25 per cent of any one settlement project,
provided the authorities concerned are satisfied with the
individual’s agricultural abilities and with his sincere intent
to work the land.
5. Benefits.
a. The land is to be given free.
b. The settler receives full tapu title to his plot
after ten years of continued occupation and development.
c. Upon the death of the settler before the ex-
piration of the ten-year period, his rights and obligations are
inherited in common by his successors. If death occurs after
the ten-year period, the land may be divided among the
successors provided that each share is not less than one-
fourth of the area of the plot. Otherwise, the plot must re-
main in common ownership.
d. Upon allocation of the plot to him, the settler
may borrow, on a supervised basis, from the appropriate
government authorities up to 100 dinars at 3 per cent in-
terest to be paid back in yearly installments over a period
of five years. In the event of flood or crop failure, payment
may be deferred for one year.
6. Obligations.
a. During the ten-year period, the settler may not
alienate, rent, or allow anyone else the right to cultivate
part or all of his plot, nor may he enter into any contractual
arrangements whatsoever concerning the plot or the crop


94 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
without the knowledge and approval of government author-
ities.
b. For ten years after receiving full title, the farmer
may not alienate his land in any way, or mortgage it except
to the State Agricultural Bank.
c. During the ten-year period, the settler must
follow the instructions of the authorities regarding the meth-
ods of production, the types and quantities of crops to be
planted, and the size of the areas to be planted of each kind.
d. The settler undertakes to follow the cooperative
system in the sale of his crops and in his consumption, and
to belong to and abide by the regulations of the cooperative
society established in his settlement for this purpose. (This
provision is part of the contract and not the law.)
e. The settler must build a house according to
the plans and specifications of government authorities.
Government authorities will plan the whole settlement
including houses and public buildings.
f. The settler must plant an orchard on a plot
of land specified by the authorities. The trees must be issued
by the authorities, and planted under their supervision and
the guidance of the officer concerned. (The latter part of
this provision is an administrative regulation.)
g. The settler undertakes to devote all his time
and the time of men in his family to the land (part of the
contract). Nor may he leave his land for more than five
days without the knowledge of the government officer in
charge (administrative regulation).
7. Water Distribution.
a. Distribution of water shall be restricted to
lands of the settlement project at no cost to the settlers.
However, it may also be distributed to tapu, lazma, and mulk
lands by a decision of the Council of Ministers, provided
the owner of such lands either (1) transfers to the govern-
ment, in one bloc to be selected by the authorities, the owner-
ship of one-fourth of the land to be irrigated, or (2) pays
the state treasury his pro rata share of the moneys spent by


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 95
the government on the construction of irrigation works
from which he desires his land to benefit.
b. In pump-irrigation projects, the settler shall
pay over a number of years his pro rata share of the money
the government spent on the installation of pumps and
other related works. He shall also pay his share of the annual
costs of maintaining and operating these pumps.
8. Administration. When the law was first enacted in
1945, a special Miri Sirf Department managed by a Central
Committee was created to administer the law. It was first
attached to the Ministry of Economics, then transferred to
the Ministry of Agriculture when the latter was established.
In 1954 it was transferred to the Ministry of Development
as a technical section.
The Committee, apart from its administrative and ex-
ecutive staff, is composed of an irrigation engineer, an
agricultural specialist, a doctor, and an agricultural econo-
mist. These are assisted by experts in various fields from
Iraq, U. S. Point Four, and the various United Nations
Agencies. Among foreigners, however, particular mention
should be made of Point Four specialists, of whom there
were ten attached to the Committee in 1956.
Criticisms
Several criticisms have been made of the law and its
operations. A government committee which was recently
organized to study the questions of land distribution and
water rights made the following recommendations:
1. The settlers should pay for the land they receive over
a long period of time. It was argued that it is morally wrong
to give away the land and that the settlers would be more
appreciative of its value if they paid for it.
2. The costs of irrigation works, drainage, and other
related structures are very great. New settlers and others
who benefit should at least pay part, if not all, of the cost.
The settler’s share can be incorporated in the cost of the
land and paid in a similar manner over a long number
of years.


96. THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
3. Ownership of ground and surface waters should re-
main vested in the state but water rights should be pred-
icated on continued usage. Non-settlers may use any excess
water supply under a special agreement with the govern-
ment, provided the latter reserves its right to the use of this
oversupply in its future projects when they are established.
4. Another question, which was not touched upon by
the committee, is the provision of the law which allows up
to 45 per cent of settlement projects to go to army personnel,
civil servants, and school graduates. This provision has been
severely criticized from various quarters. First, it cuts down
the amount of land available to the fallaheen, whom the law
is supposed to help. Secondly, with the Arab social back-
ground in mind, it is doubtful that army officers, civil ser-
vants, and school graduates would be sincerely interested in
tilling the soil themselves. They are more likely to hire
others to do the work for them. This would frustrate the
whole intent of the law.
Distribution of State Land
According to official sources, between 1945, when the
first law was enacted, and 1955, over 2.7 million dunums
(1.7 million acres) of state land were distributed (see Table 18).
Of this, about half a million were developed in settlements
under close government supervision and planning. Most
of the rest was distributed without reclamation or assisted
development. Some of the settlements that have been es-
tablished are discussed below.
The Dujailah Settlement
Dujailah, established in 1945, was the first and is still the
largest government experiment in planned and supervised
settlement of peasants. It has proven itself conspicuously
successful. The income of the farmers has risen to three and
four times its former level.
When the scheme was first inaugurated it met with strong
opposition from the shaikhs, and the government had con-
siderable difficulty in inducing the fallaheen to accept land
grants. Since then the idea has caught on like wildfire


1 RAQ
stateuana-ti-ation
-
distribution Program
H Projects Completed
Projects to be completed soon
E. Projects to be completed by 1960


98 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
TABLE 18
DISTRIBUTION OF MIRI SIRF LAND
Number of Persons on Settlement;
Number of Holdings;
Total Area of Holdings in Dunums up to the End of 1955
JNo. of JNo. of Total Area of
Settlement Persons Holdings Holdings
Dujailah 14,320 2,864 373,990s
Shahrzoor 2,545 509 33,830
Hawija 1,595 319 23,300
Latifiya 2,325 765 23,250
Musayyib 875 175 10,500
Makhmur 930 186 17,700
Sub-total 22,590 4,818 482,570
Karma 3,590 718 70,671
Saddah 325 65 5,200
Sanjar 39,350 7,870 1,568,750
Lands in other areas 14,680 2,936 169,870
Sub-total 57,945 11,589 1,814,491
Total 80,535 16,407 2,297,061
Land Distributed
but Unidentified Il.a. Il-3. 424,210
Grand Total 2,721,271b
Source: Agricultural Reform and Land Development, op. cit., pp. 7, 141.
See, however, conflicting date in Statistical Abstract for 1956, p. 98; also Salter,
op. cit., p. 204.
*This figure seems suspect. Up to the end of 1953 only 131,700 dunums had
been distributed. Other data indicate that land distributed and actually irri-
gated in the project amounts to 165,650 dunums. The explanation may be that
the 373,990 figure shows the land actually distributed, not all of which however
is yet settled or under cultivation. Also the number of holdings seems suspect
(i.e., 2,864). Other data indicate that they numbered 1,523 in 1955.
*This total seems suspect. The Minister of Development stated that up to
March 1956, 2,416,254 dunums had been distributed. (Iraq Times, March 29,
1956).
and the authorities are unable to keep up with the thousands
of requests they receive. By 1955, the Dujailah settlement had
grown into a prosperous community of 2,820 families com-
prising 14,320 persons.


100 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
on the farms and distant from each other. This proved to
be a mistake. First, with the lack of good transportation
facilities, it made movement within the settlement difficult.
It also made the provision of drinking water and other facilities
and services both expensive and cumbersome. Furthermore, it
does not fit the traditional pattern of gregarious Arab village
life, in which housing is concentrated in one village area from
which agricultural land radiates outwards in widening seg-
ImentS.
Health services include two clinics, a mobile clinic, and a
doctor who makes regular weekly visits from the nearby
town of Kut. A bilharzia center was also established to com-
bat that disease in the settlement. In 1955 the various clinics
treated 16,514 outpatient cases.
Primary education facilities, though not adequate, are
larger in number and far superior to other farming areas.
By 1954-55 six schools for boys were operating, with 605
students and seventeen teachers, and one school for girls with
forty-eight students and three teachers. One of the boys’
schools and the girls’ school were established and are run
by UNESCO under its program for “Fundamental Education.”
UNESCO’s program of fundamental education in Iraq
is centered in the Dujailah settlement. It is composed of a
health center and the two schools mentioned above. The
health center, in addition to treating patients, serves as a
demonstration unit to teach peasant women sewing, weaving,
child care, sterilization of drinking water, habits of cleanliness,
etC.
In the two UNESCO schools, advanced educational
techniques and concepts are used. The emphasis is more
on creating human beings fitted to live in their environment
than on classroom work where students are taught by rote
subjects that have little relation to their daily life.
In the boys’ school, students’ time is divided between
classroom work and practical application. They plant vege-
table gardens, crops of wheat and barley, and raise chickens.
They have built their own football and basketball fields.
In 1954-55 they established a cooperative shop.
In the girls’ school the same advanced methods are em-


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM IOI
ployed. Girls are taught not only the “three R's,” but also
sewing, ironing, needlework, cooking, hygiene, and sports,
in addition to practical training in agriculture.
Several modern light industries were established by the
government on the project. They consist of a small spinning
and weaving plant, a carpentry shop, a machine shop, and
two brick kilns. There are several objectives in establishing
these industries: to absorb concealed unemployment; to
train farmers and their children in complementary industries;
to provide them with supplementary income and to supply
them with essential, cheap, locally-produced articles and
services. Settlement farmers are also employed in the con-
struction of houses and public buildings, repair shops, and
in the construction of irrigation and drainage works in the
project.
From the preceding description, it can be seen that the
government has spent considerable time, effort, and money
to insure the beginning of a good life to the settlers and the
scheme has been, without question, very successful. An index
of the scheme is that in Iraq it is said, “You can tell a Dujailah
man from the way he walks.”
And yet, several serious mistakes were made. First and
perhaps the most serious, no drainage facilities were in-
stalled, so that within a relatively short time the land began
to deteriorate on account of salt accumulation. The authori-
ties are now installing the necessary drainage facilities at
considerably higher cost than if they had been installed
when irrigation works were excavated. Secondly, locating
the houses at such distances from each other in a sparsely
populated area created many hardships.
Encouraged by the success and popularity of the Dujailah
scheme and armed with the practical experience gained
from it, the government has since established several other
settlements. However, Dujailah still remains “the pet” of
the authorities. -
The Latifiya Settlement
Some of the experience gained in the Dujailah project
was applied in the Latifiya settlement, which was established


LAND TENURE AND AGRARIAN REFORM 103
The Greater Musayyib Settlement
This is the greatest reclamation and land settlement proj-
ect of its kind in the Middle East. It combines both irriga-
tion and drainage. The project will certainly revolutionize
agricultural concepts in Iraq since, for the first time, in-
tensive cultivation has been introduced into a large area
of land.
The settlement is located on the Greater Musayyib Canal
(see Chapter IV), and covers 335,000 dunums of land, of
which 250,000 dunums are reclaimed state land and 85,000
dunums are privately owned and presently cultivated.
Construction of irrigation and drainage works for the whole
area was completed in 1956 after four years of intensive work.
Official sources estimate that 15,000 persons will be settled
directly on the project in addition to some 35,000 persons
who will indirectly benefit from it. Two modern towns are
planned on the settlement, one to be located about thirty-
three kilometers east of the town of Musayyib, and another
at the end of the project area some fifty kilometers east of
Musayyib. In addition, fifty villages will be built on the
settlement, with fifty to ninety families each. The land will
be distributed in plots of sixty-seven dunums, of which fifty
dunums are to be devoted to winter and summer crops, five
for an orchard and twelve for a pasture, a house plot, roads,
irrigation, and drainage canals.
Actual distribution of land was officially begun on Novem-
ber 17, 18, 19, and 24, 1956, in the Biblical town of Cutha.
Press dispatches tell an interesting and human story. It is
reported that thousands of landless peasants poured into
the town to attend the four-day lottery. They came on foot,
on horseback, on donkeys, in truck loads, and in hired taxis.
They watched as the names of the winners were drawn by
government officials from a cardboard box containing the
names of approved applicants (some 30,000 had applied
for 2,000 plots). As the public drawing came to an end,
431 landless peasants were selected to settle on sixty-six
dunum plots comprising the land that was then ready.


104 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Other Projects
There are several other settlement projects, both super-
vised and unsupervised (see Table 18). They include Hawija,
Makhmur, and Shahrzoor. These are supervised in a similar
fashion as the ones discussed. Others include the vast Sanjar
area, lands in the provinces of Hilla, Dulaim, Diyala, Diwan-
iya, and others.
Conclusion
The government has made a good start in its land dis-
tribution program. It is hoped that, by 1960, 500,000 more
dunums will have been reclaimed and distributed in super-
vised settlements. With the completion of several flood con-
trol and storage works a major obstacle has been overcome.
The land distribution program can now proceed at an
accelerated rate. Through land distribution the government
is helping solve the major social and human problem of the
country. This should lead to both political stability and
economic prosperity.
1. Sir Ernest Dawson, An Inquiry into Land Tenure and Related Questions. Printed
for the Iraqi Government by the Garden City Press. (Letchworth, England:
1931), pp. 32-33.
2. IBRD, op. cit., p. 142.
3. Hashim Jawad, The Social Structure of Iraq, Baghdad, New Publishers Press,
1945, p. 21.
4. Alfred Bonné, The Economic Development of the Middle East. (London: Kegan
Paul, etc., 1945), p. 36.
5. IRBD, op. cit., pp. 132-133.
6. Salter, op. cit., p. 54.
7. Ibid., p. 55.
8. Iraq Government, Ministry of Development, Miri Sirf Central Committee,
Agricultural Reform and Land Development, Baghdad, 1956, p. 34 (in Arabic).


CHAPTER 6
AGRICULTURAL TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES, AND SERVICES
Prior to World War II, the government was not vitally
interested in agriculture, the mainstay of the majority of
the population. This is reflected in the fact that a Ministry
of Agriculture was created only after a recommendation by
a mission of the International Bank to Iraq in 1951. Until
then only a small directorate had existed.
The creation of a Ministry of Agriculture is symbolic of
the conceptual change which has taken place concerning
the function of government in public life. Gradually at first,
but then more rapidly, the government began to play a
positive role by providing services and creating institutions
and facilities which hitherto had been absent.
The preceding chapters discussed the efforts being made
to develop the agricultural sector through harnessing the
forces of nature and converting them into constructive use.
This chapter will deal with the introduction of new techniques
and the development of new services and institutions de-
signed to increase the quantity and quality of agricultural
production and to lift the peasant from his present impecun-
ious state. Many of these innovations are taken for granted
in the United States and other technologically advanced
countries, but in Iraq they are new. Despite their elementary


106 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
character, they represent a significant step forward on the
path of progress.
Administratively, unlike the building of dams, land rec-
lamation, bridges, etc., these new services do not come
under the jurisdiction of the Development Board, but are
regarded as routine government operations. Moreover,
they arose, not as a result of a coordinated plan, but gradually
in the different departments, with the expansion of govern-
ment functions. All these “innovations” are still in an em-
bryonic stage. Their significance lies not so much in their
immediate contribution, but rather in their cumulative
effect and in the role they will play in changing the socio-
economic base of agriculture in Iraq.
Farm Mechanization
It is perhaps of historical interest to note that the drive
for farm mechanization in Iraq was given its first impetus
by the United States Lend-Lease Program during the war.
Until then hardly any modern agricultural implements were
used. The wooden plow of ancient form reigned supreme.
With the war experience behind it, the government em-
barked on a policy of introducing and generating demand
for farm equipment among farmers. Several devices have been
used to put government policy into effect:
1. The Agricultural Machinery Administration was cre-
ated. It became a Directorate in 1956. This agency per-
forms several functions. At present it controls the importation
and licensing of all agricultural machinery. Originally, the
agency also held a complete monopoly on the sale of such
equipment. Following the recommendation of the Interna-
tional Bank mission, however, it now licenses private im-
porters with the stipulation that they also must import ade-
quate stocks of spare parts and erect service stations.
The agency itself owns a fairly large number of tractors,
combines, and other farm equipment which it rents out to
farmers. Until 1952, the rental rates were so low that the
agency operated at a considerable annual loss. Finally, the
agency provided technical help and service stations in var-
ious parts of the country.


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES 107
2. Settlers on state land are implicitly required to use
modern machinery.
3. Loans are advanced to independent farmers by the
State Agricultural Bank for the purchase of farm equipment.
Such loans may amount to as much as fifty per cent of the
purchase price.
Table 19 illustrates the results of government policy.
From 1945 to 1956 inclusive, 2,097 tractors and 1,368 com-
bines were sold. The Agricultural Census mentioned pre-
viously reported that, in 1953, there were 2,091 tractors on
agricultural holdings with a total of 88,000 horsepower. If
the number of tractors sold in 1954, 1955, and 1956 is added,
then at the end of 1956 there were some 3,061 tractors in
the country.
The flatlands of Iraq are ideally suited for the use of
heavy machinery. The main obstacle to their use is the
numerous irrigation canals. While there is little question
about the advisability of universal mechanization in the
future, there are arguments both for and against its speedy
adoption.
First, there is the question of relative costs. It is a known
principle that where labor is cheap and abundant, it is,
generally speaking, more economical in certain sectors to
use human labor. A reasonable argument can be made
that this is the case in Iraq. In addition, experience over
the past ten years has shown that the life expectancy of
agricultural machinery in Iraq is about half what it is in
the United States and other advanced countries. This is
because of the lack both of adequate training and main-
tenance facilities. Hence, in many cases, the use of heavy
equipment is not economical, especially when the com-
paratively large initial investment is taken into consideration.
Secondly, mechanization may create a social problem.
There has been a growing concern in Iraq that while speedy
mechanization may be economically desirable, it may also
aggravate further the rural problem through wholesale
displacement of tenant peasants and their consequent emi-
gration to the cities.
There are two arguments in favor of controlled mechaniza-


108 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
tion. At present mechanization is not of such proportions as
to constitute a serious problem. In fact, the contrary may
be true. Mechanization by landlords and as a government
policy is, at least in part, the result of considerable migration
of peasants to urban centers and the need for their replace-
ment. This was the main argument advanced in 1956 by
the director of the Agricultural Machinery Administration."
Mechanization as a state policy can be used to serve three
interrelated functions: to increase and improve the quality
of production; to distribute and exploit the labor potential
more efficiently. It is widely known, for instance, that there
is considerable concealed unemployment in agriculture.
Mechanization would force surplus labor out and transfer
it to other sectors of the economy where it is needed. Then, too,
it can indirectly aid in the breakdown of the present land
tenure system and other archaic traditions and social in-
stitutions in rural areas.
The government realized that mechanization, for some
time to come, will remain beyond the financial reach of
the majority of farmers. For the time being, the path of
improvement lies in the direction of introducing, on a uni-
versal basis, simple modern implements which farmers
can afford, which need little servicing, and the use of which
can be taught in a short time. With the advice of American
specialists, the government has been increasingly active
in this field. The most significant development in this respect
is the recent introduction of the steel moldboard plow.
Agricultural Credit
The establishment and development of the state Agri-
cultural Bank is another illustration of the expansion of
government activity in the agricultural sector. In Iraq, as
in most underdeveloped countries, one of the chief impedi-
ments to economic expansion is the lack of modern credit
institutions. Until recently, the few banks that operated in
Iraq were all foreign, and were primarily concerned with
commercial transactions. Moreover, to this day, banks
continue to be urban institutions of which the majority
of the Iraqi population are only vaguely aware. Credit,


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES 109
therefore, could only be obtained from the traditional money-
lender at rates of interest varying between 30 and 300 per
cent. Both landlord and peasant were perpetually in debt.
A story quoted by an Iraqi writer and alleged to be true is
illustrative: “A farmer borrowed the price of three chickens
which he served to a visiting guest. Interest compounded
at such a rate that the farmer was forced to sell two cows
to liquidate his debt.”
*Sº tº co cro co lo co cN co try
S 35 tº 3 & $ 3 3 S $3 #3
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108 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
tion. At present mechanization is not of such proportions as
to constitute a serious problem. In fact, the contrary may
be true. Mechanization by landlords and as a government
policy is, at least in part, the result of considerable migration
of peasants to urban centers and the need for their replace-
ment. This was the main argument advanced in 1956 by
the director of the Agricultural Machinery Administration.1
Mechanization as a state policy can be used to serve three
interrelated functions: to increase and improve the quality
of production; to distribute and exploit the labor potential
more efficiently. It is widely known, for instance, that there
is considerable concealed unemployment in agriculture.
Mechanization would force surplus labor out and transfer
it to other sectors of the economy where it is needed. Then, too,
it can indirectly aid in the breakdown of the present land
tenure system and other archaic traditions and social in-
stitutions in rural areas.
The government realized that mechanization, for some
time to come, will remain beyond the financial reach of
the majority of farmers. For the time being, the path of
improvement lies in the direction of introducing, on a uni-
versal basis, simple modern implements which farmers
can afford, which need little servicing, and the use of which
can be taught in a short time. With the advice of American
specialists, the government has been increasingly active
in this field. The most significant development in this respect
is the recent introduction of the steel moldboard plow.
Agricultural Credit
The establishment and development of the state Agri-
cultural Bank is another illustration of the expansion of
government activity in the agricultural sector. In Iraq, as
in most underdeveloped countries, one of the chief impedi-
ments to economic expansion is the lack of modern credit
institutions. Until recently, the few banks that operated in
Iraq were all foreign, and were primarily concerned with
commercial transactions. Moreover, to this day, banks
continue to be urban institutions of which the majority
of the Iraqi population are only vaguely aware. Credit,


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES 109
therefore, could only be obtained from the traditional money-
lender at rates of interest varying between 30 and 300 per
cent. Both landlord and peasant were perpetually in debt.
A story quoted by an Iraqi writer and alleged to be true is
illustrative: “A farmer borrowed the price of three chickens
which he served to a visiting guest. Interest compounded
at such a rate that the farmer was forced to sell two cows
to liquidate his debt.”
S S 3 g :: * $ $3 3 S 3 #3
-S on Go c * ury on tº ur,
S cº, cº, Co * to, co º-
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tº. ur)
§ 2 + s e i = 2 & 2 &
^ cº, CN - F. cN
so
tº-
§ 3 S 3 § 2 gº cN
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$ to ºr st tº co ur) on
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3 * co co º • * – c. §
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ta *
3 So co
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2 É § {s 3, § - $ 5; S: -
-- ur) - - - ſºlº
# 33 & 2 s ufo -4 cry ob ur “hº trº
< S ºr co ury cºn &f
p. § 3; 3 g º ºs • 3 * g & 8
B * CN
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g = wº- §
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co ur)
* $ 2 & 3 ° 3 * 2 T
# * Jº
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Sº H -- S
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§ 3 ; *E 5 § 3 ;
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§ E 3 3 Q +4 E
§ 5 # 3 # 5 # 8 ºf 3 ; tº
H C C H ºd 3 Q Ad C) Q &


I 10 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
The Agricultural Bank began operating after the war
with a moderate capital of one million dinars. In 1952 its
paid-up capital was raised to two million and, in 1957, to
three. The experiences of the bank illustrate the problems
of a new experiment. Despite many pitfalls, the bank steadily
expanded in size and in the scope of its operations. Initially
its loans went mostly to farmers of substantial means since
they could provide the necessary securities required. This
meant that the majority of small farmers were automatically
excluded from its services. Moreover, most of its loans were
of short duration.
Gradually the Bank began to enter new, less orthodox
fields. For instance, it now makes loans at five per cent for
the purchase of agricultural machinery. During 1953 and
1954, it made 581 such loans with a total value of 444,853
dinars. The loans made possible the purchase of 673 agri-
cultural machines including tractors, harvesters, and water
pumps. It now also makes loans to agricultural cooperatives
at 3 per cent interest.
In 1955 the Bank launched a pilot project to provide
credit to small farmers under expert supervision and guid-
ance. The scheme was initiated for the Bank by a Point
Four specialist in Hilla province where, during 1955-56,
some thirty farmers in three villages received supervised
loans totalling about 800 dinars ($2,240) at 3 per cent interest.
In December, 1956, after the limited experiment proved
successful and popular, the scheme was expanded to cover
the whole country and its administration was transferred
from the Bank to the directorate of agricultural economy in
the Ministry of Agriculture.
Table 20 shows the loans made by the Bank from 1948
to 1954. It indicates two trends. First, an increase in the
role of the Bank in the agricultural development of Iraq and,
secondly, a growing awareness on the part of the farmers
of the facilities with which such an institution can provide
them.
There is a growing awareness that the Bank also has an
educational function in addition to its regular duties. As
indicated previously, banking is a new phenomenon in


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES III
Iraqi economic life. Hence, by going out to the people, by
opening branches in rural areas, the Bank can also function
as an educational institution, in addition to providing badly
needed services. Its lack of initiative in this respect has been
one of the chief criticisms leveled against it.
It is quite obvious that the Bank still falls far short of
meeting the vast needs of the farmer for credit facilities. It
has taken initial steps on a long road that has yet to be travel-
ed. Its primary function is to lead the way, to act as a pioneer,
but it cannot in itself be the final solution. In the first place,
no matter how active the Bank can be, its facilities will
still remain inadequate in relation to the need. Secondly, as
business organizations, state agencies of this type everywhere
suffer from a crusading spirit and are apt to be comparatively
inefficient since their primary function is to serve rather
than to make money. The solution lies rather in the develop-
ment of private banking and private credit institutions. A
beginning in this respect has already been made, but until
such time as these are more numerous the state will continue
to play the major role in this field.
TABLE 20
LoANs of THE AGRICULTURAL BANK: 1948-54
JNo. of - Total Value
Tear Loans in Dinars
1948 264 121,247
1949 Il. a. Il. a.
1950 524. 144,621
1951 789 263,693
1952 1,256 660,010
1953 2,186 1,353,639
1954 1,894 882,952
Source: Agricultural Bank, 17th, 18th, and 19th Annual Reports for 1952-53,
1953–54 and 1954-55. (All in Arabic.)
The Agricultural Cooperative Movement
In 1944, with the passage of Law No. 27 (1944), the co-
operative movement reached Iraq, nearly a century after
it was first introduced in Europe. Unlike its European coun-
terparts, however, the movement is not doctrinaire and has no


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES 113
but in its great potential as a means of social change and
as a powerful instrument through which farmers can band
together for self-help. It is the antithesis of the growing de-
pendence on the state.
Agricultural Extension
The concept of extension work is very new in Iraq. The
counterpart of the American county agent was conspicuous
by his absence. An extension service worthy of the name
was organized only some four years ago. At the end of 1956
it had fifty-nine agents, six supervisors and five American
Point Four specialists.
Although the service is very limited in its scope, it has
shown quite healthy signs of growth. Perhaps what is most
significant at this stage is that it has taken roots, that it is
popular among the farmers, and that at this initial period
in its development, it has the guidance and advice of special-
ists from the United States, a country where this field is
most highly developed.
In addition to its direct functions, the extension service,
if and when it is fairly developed, may indirectly serve as
an important link of confidence between the government
and the peasant farmer. The schism between the two is
centuries old, and the latter almost instinctively distrusts
the government. The two main points of contact between them
have traditionally been the ubiquitous tax-collector and
military conscription. The extension agent, by working with
the farmers as their trusted friend, may provide part of the
link missing for many centuries.
Research and Training
Another facet of agriculture which has registered con-
siderable progress in recent years is research and training.
Whereas in the past only token attention was paid to this
field, it has now become a regular governmental function.
Agricultural research is carried out primarily by the var-
ious departments of the Ministry of Agriculture. Other
ministries also participate in areas of their particular in-
terest. The Ministry has five experimental stations. Here,


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES I 15
the Extension Service has a program for training agents;
the Agricultural Machinery Administration (which became
a Directorate in 1956) has a program in the use and main-
tenance of machinery; the Soils Laboratory, recently es-
tablished jointly by the Irrigation Department, the College
of Engineering, and Point Four, has a training program in
soil classification and analysis.
Finally, the rural school syllabus is being revamped in
favor of far greater emphasis on practical training in vo-
cational agriculture. This includes teaching children to
raise vegetables in garden plots, planting, taking care of
and harvesting field crops such as wheat and barley, and
organizing the counterpart of 4-H clubs. An Arbor Day
has also been set.
Crop Diversification
Agricultural production in Iraq is restricted to five princi-
pal products: two winter crops, wheat and barley; two sum-
mer crops, cotton and rice; one fruit, dates. These constitute
the bulk of Iraq’s exports in addition to animals (on the
hoof), raw wool and hides. Other fruits and crops are grown
only in limited quantities. Poultry and dairy farming are
almost non-existent. Animal husbandry is an adjunct to,
but not a part of, agriculture.
A number of economic and social factors must have brought
about this traditional pattern of production. Some of them
may only be guessed at. The salinity of the soil in the Mes-
opotamian Valley dictated the choice of hardy crops which
have a comparatively high resistance to salt. Hence the
choice of wheat and barley. Then the economy of Iraq was,
and still is, basically a subsistence rather than a money econ-
omy. Production was primarily geared to meeting consump-
tion needs. There was, therefore, not sufficient incentive
to raise cash crops. Too, dietary habits and lack of good
communications and storage facilities operate in favor of
the production of some foods and against others. For in-
stance, the staple foods of the Iraqi farmer are wheat and
barley (for bread). He eats very few vegetables and fruits
with the exception of onions and dates. Production of fruits


I 16 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
and vegetables is, therefore, necessary only for supply to
urban markets and for export. But this supply is hindered
by lack of good transportation and storage facilities, since
fruits and vegetables spoil quickly and require either immediate
delivery or refrigeration. Finally, the fallow system which
requires the land to “rest” in alternate years probably
operated to limit crop variation. For generations this system
was treated as sacred. All plans for agricultural expansion
were based on the assumption that it would continue to
be followed. Only in recent years has it begun to occur to
planners that there is nothing particularly sacrosanct about
the system and that, surely, after the advantages of other
systems have been demonstrated to the farmer he will not
be too reluctant to adopt them.
In recent years the state has begun to take an active in-
terest in the diversification of agricultural products. The
drive has several objectives: first, to increase the number
and variety of fruit trees. For instance, certain parts of
central-southern Iraq are suitable for the development of a
citrus industry, and others, to the north, for growing a variety
of fruits and nuts. Second, to increase the variety of crops.
In the 1920's cotton was introduced by the British as a cash
crop, and later tobacco was introduced for local consumption.
After several years of experimentation with sugar-producing
crops, the state has, in the last few years, introduced sugar
beet cultivation to provide raw material for the emergent
refining industry. More recently, jute cultivation began on
an experimental basis. Several other crops and legumes have
also been introduced. Third, to encourage vegetable cultiva-
tion on a much larger scale. Finally, to improve animal
husbandry and gradually to integrate it with agriculture.
Conclusions
The period beginning after World War II may be de-
scribed as a formative one in the history of agricultural
development in Iraq. Agricultural expansion (including
flood control, irrigation, reclamation, and drainage) became
almost overnight the most important activity of the govern-
ment. This stems from the recognition that agriculture is


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES 117
the most important sector of the economy and that it is the
springboard to economic expansion in all other sectors.
Initially the program of agricultural development suffered
from lack of adequate detailed planning and technical
studies. Consequently, the pace at which it moved was
slow indeed and the program was unable to meet its targets.
The first five-year program emphasized the construction
of flood-control and water-storage structures for protection
and for bringing more land under cultivation. Basically,
this objective has been achieved. The dams and reservoirs
that have been completed or are under construction are
more than adequate for Iraq’s immediate needs.
In recent programs the emphasis has shifted to irrigation,
drainage, and improvement of areas already under culti-
vation. This is a field which requires vast expenditures and
years of coordinated intensive efforts. Only a beginning has
so far been made.
Almost all the institutions and services necessary for a
modern agricultural system have either been created or are
in the process of being organized. They are all, however,
still in their formative stages. Their value is not so much in
the magnitude of their present contribution, for this is limited,
but in their potential, if and when they are fully developed.
No studies have been made to measure and quantify the
impact of the program. Prima facie evidence indicates that
it is beginning to have its effects. In all probability its im-
pact will not be greatly felt before 1960. By then, a large
number of the works under construction will have been
completed and their cumulative effects should become
visible. Also, the agricultural institutions which have been
recently created will have had time to grow into somewhat
more effective instruments.
The agricultural expansion program in Iraq is the only
one of this magnitude in the Middle East. Despite many
criticisms that may be made of its details, all the evidence
shows that, on the whole, it is well planned and effective.
If uninterrupted, it will probably be able to lift the standard
of living in Iraq to three and four times its present level by
1970.


118 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
The program has several characteristics:
1. It has some of the attributes of socialism in the sense
that it is being undertaken almost exclusively by state agencies,
principally by the Development Board, with hardly any
participation by private capital. Its benefits are designed to
go primarily to the small farmer. For instance, state land,
after being reclaimed and developed, is given away, but only
to landless persons, principally farmers. Irrigation and drain-
age works are in many cases planned in such a manner as
to avoid having big landowners derive any benefits from
them, sometimes even at the cost of greater efficiency. In
effect this amounts to a redistribution of public wealth in
favor of the masses. This is of great significance since more
than 61 per cent of the land in Iraq is owned by the state.
Side by side with this pronounced orientation of the pro-
gram, the government has avoided introducing any agri-
cultural reform, particularly in the land tenure system, which
might antagonize or be resisted by the big landlords. These
latter are very heavily represented in Parliament and are
able to block any reform legislation which might seriously
threaten their privileged position and interests. Thus the
tendency of the program is to outflank the problem rather
than to attack it directly. The big landlords are left in peace,
but the peasant, through land distribution and other benefits,
is given the opportunity to shed his economic and social
shackles, and to begin a new life.
2. Generally speaking, the program is fairly isolated
from politics and protected from the vicissitudes of changing
cabinets and the raids of party politicians. It has continuity
and is controlled and directed to a considerable degree by
experts. This arrangement is unique in the history of Iraq
and the other countries of the Middle East.
3. Due to personnel shortages in Iraq, the program
depends very heavily on the services of qualified foreign
technicians, consulting firms and construction companies,
in addition to technical aid from the United States and
United Nations agencies. For instance, nearly all heavy
construction (dams, drainage, etc.) is carried out under
contract by British, German, French, American, and Italian


TECHNIQUES, FACILITIES AND SERVICES 119
firms. American technicians and specialists are particularly
active as advisers in setting up new government agricultural
services and institutions, and in improving others.
1. Iraq Times, May 2, 1956.
2. Jafar Khayyat, The Iraqi Village. (Beirut: 1950), f, n., p. 66. (in Arabic).


CHAPTER 7
BENEFICIARIES OF REFORM-LANDLORD OR PEASANTº
Since the majority of the population in Iraq is engaged
in agriculture or associated enterprises, landlordism may
be said to be at the root of almost all the ills that have plagued
the country for several centuries. There is hardly any prob-
lem, whether political, social, or economic, which in one
way or another is not related to this central fact. It follows,
therefore, that no development program in agriculture can
be really effective if it is not accompanied by a program of
agrarian reform.
Large land holdings, as such, are not necessarily bad. In
the United States, Canada, and Australia there are holdings
comparable in size to those of Iraq. In Iraq, however, land-
lordism is a way of life with rigid lines of demarcation de-
noting economic, social, and political status with little or no
mobility. Such a system means that the peasant leads a
marginal existence with no hope for a better life, while the
landlord receives most of the income from agricultural pro-
duction and retains effective control of the political institu-
tions of the country.
The devastating effects of such a system are obvious.
Economically, it results in very low productivity. While most
of the landlords take little interest in the land beyond en-


BENEFICIARIES OF REFORM 121
joying its income, the peasants have no special concern for
improving it since they have little or no stake in it. Socially,
the system leaves the peasant in virtual economic bondage,
deprives him of his dignity as a human being, and limits his
capacity to develop his potentialities or to contribute to the
community. Politically, such a system in a twentieth-century
world can only lead to instability and to the emergence of
subversive movements. There is increasing realization that
such a system is not an immutable law of nature, and that
each individual has a right to a more equitable share of the
goods of this earth and to a voice in the determination of his
own destiny.
Iraq today stands at the threshold of a new era. If there is
to be economic and social progress, if the transition is to be
effected peacefully without revolutions, then ways and means
must be found to solve this problem effectively and with dis-
patch.
What are the possible basic objectives of a program of
agrarian reform in Iraq” First, to increase the productivity
of the agricultural sector of the economy; secondly, to provide
the peasant with economic security and a higher standard of
living; and thirdly, to restore to him his dignity as a hu-
man being by liberating him from ignorance and disease,
and at the same time allowing him to develop his potentialities.
There are two alternatives open to the Iraqi government
in dealing with the matter of land distribution. One approach
would be to expropriate, in one way or another, large land
holdings and redistribute them among landless peasants.
Such a move, even if politically feasible, would be unsound.
The land is ideally suited for large-scale agricultural tech-
niques, including the use of heavy machinery. If the land-
lords can be induced to use modern techniques, this would
result in far greater increase in productivity than if the land
were to be broken into small units.
The second approach, the one which has been taken by
the Government of Iraq thus far, is to leave the big landlords
alone and to distribute the vast state-owned land reserve
among the landless peasants. In addition to the land grant,
the government extends to the new owner various types of


BENEFICIARIES OF REFORM 123
destroy the foundations of landlordism as practiced in Iraq,
leaving the landlord in virtually the same position as that of
his counterparts in more advanced economies.
One important question remains to be answered: how
persistent and how speedy has the government been in im-
plementing this program? It is in this area that criticism can
justly be made. Although the plan was initiated in 1945, the
number of landless peasants who have actually been settled
is still comparatively small. Successive conservative ad-
ministrations have been charged with failure to give ade-
quate attention to the program. But these charges, although
largely true, should be examined in the light of certain con-
siderations. The program, in its initial stages, was a new
venture for which the existing administrative machinery was
not prepared. The natural tendency was to proceed slowly.
Secondly, it was only after 1951 that funds became available
on a sufficiently large scale to finance the program on more
than a skeleton basis. Finally, preparatory work had to be
carried out before distribution; plans had to be drawn, land
surveyed, classified, and reclaimed and irrigation and drain-
age works had to be constructed. In the last few years the
program has picked up considerable momentum and is
proceeding at a more rapid rate.
The efforts of the government during the last few years to
give the peasant a measure of economic security and in-
dependence have not been insignificant, especially if judged
in the light of the millions of dollars that have been invested
in improving land and water resources. The legislation au-
thorizing this investment provides that only landless peasants
shall benefit from such improvements. Landlords are pro-
hibited from participating in benefits. The Development
Board has gone to considerable lengths to insure that no
landlord will benefit from its activities. In some irrigation
and drainage projects efficiency has been sacrificed in order
to live up to the letter of the law.
Now let us turn to the human aspects of agrarian reform,
namely the activities of the government in the fields of
education, health, rural welfare, and community development.
So much needs to be done in each of these fields that,


124 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
no matter how extensive the efforts of the government, they
can never be considered adequate. Over 95 per cent of the
peasant population is illiterate. Almost every peasant is the
victim of one endemic disease or another. As of 1956, 80
per cent of all houses in the country were either mud or
reed huts, or tents; 79 per cent had no piped water supplies;
83 per cent had no electricity; 67 per cent had no toilets;
and 90 per cent had no baths. The national average of
occupancy per room was 2.73. Conditions in rural areas
are generally much worse than in urban districts.
Each year in the postwar period the government of Iraq
has intensified its efforts to improve the basic conditions
of the masses. Expenditures of the Ministry of Education
rose from 1.6 million to 10.5 million dinars a year in the
period from 1946 to 1957. This excludes expenditures of the
Development Board and of other ministries and the costs
of most college education. The number of elementary, in-
termediate, and secondary schools during the same period
rose from 1,003 to 2,070; the number of students from 130,000
to 430,000; the number of teachers, from 5,371 to 14,679.
In recent years the number of elementary schools has been
increasing at the rate of about 150 schools per year. College
facilities have been considerably expanded, and a number
of new colleges and technical schools have been opened.
In 1956/57, over 3,000 Iraqis were studying at universities
abroad—about a thousand of them at state expense.
Elementary school facilities in the rural areas are being
expanded quite rapidly. Whereas the children of peasants
a few years ago had few or no opportunities for education, to-
day it is possible for a peasant’s son to go all the way through
a university at state expense. Thus, the benefits which used
to be restricted to a privileged few are now being more
widely extended. The gap which separates the peasant from
the upper class is being gradually closed, and the possibility
that his children may move up the social ladder, although
still limited, has nevertheless become a reality. Such basic
changes constitute a state-sponsored socio-economic revolution
more significant than the political developments usually
headlined in the press. These changes herald the gradual


BENEFICIARIES OF REFORM 125
destruction of class lines, the rejection and replacement of
existing social and economic institutions and traditions,
and the adoption of a rational view of the universe and of
man’s place and functions in Society. In the wake of such
a revolution, a readjustment, either peaceful or violent,
in the distribution of political power is sooner or later in-
evitable.
Similar progress has taken place in public health. Rural
hospital and clinic facilities are being increased rapidly.
The shortage of trained personnel is the main problem
in this program. Perhaps the most encouraging progress
has been made in the recent extensive campaigns to wipe
out the endemic diseases which have long ravaged Iraq,
particularly the countryside. Malaria, which used to kill
some 50,000 persons each year, most of them peasants, has
now been brought under reasonable control. In 1946, over
742,000 malaria cases were treated. Ten years later, in 1956,
the figure was brought down to 217,000 cases. The facilities
and functions of the Endemic Diseases Institute have under-
gone considerable expansion in the last few years, and a
Malaria Board was established in 1957.
Until the past three years the government has not been
active in rural community development in the fields of
housing, water purification, and sanitation. In 1956, how-
ever, a Rural Community Development Council on the
ministerial level was under consideration. During the same
year a housing census was completed. At the same time,
the Development Board in its 1955-60 plan allocated some 25
million dinars to housing throughout the country. Ultimately,
it plans to construct some 125,000 housing units in rural
areas. Work on providing clean water supplies in rural
communities has been intensified.
The activities of the government designed to improve the
living conditions of the poorest classes of the population
reveal a basic interest in the general welfare. The government
is, in effect, sponsoring changes which in the Western world
required a long time to take hold. It should be pointed out
that most of these state activities represent new concepts
which, in contrast with the conservative environment of the


126 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
country, are revolutionary in character. In view of the fact
that state responsibility for safeguarding human welfare was
virtually unrecognized until after World War II, progress in
this respect may be considered significant.
The question of whether the state effort is “adequate”
involves a difficult value judgment. The human needs in
Iraq are virtually limitless, and vastly greater sums could
be absorbed in programs attempting to meet them. A scale
of priorities must be established, however, which will provide
for the most judicious expenditure of the considerable, but
limited, capital for investment.
When both are badly needed, which should take preced-
ence, a dam or a hospital? Should priority be given to the
physical plant or to human resources? Or should there be
some balance in expenditures? The expenditures of the De-
velopment Board provide the best index as to policy.
During the first years of operations the Board gave a de-
cisive priority to the physical plant. This policy was based
on the theory that to raise the standard of living there must
be an increase in production which, in turn, required im-
provement and expansion of the physical plant. A study of
the 1950-55 plan, however, reveals that over 45 per cent of
all planned expenditures went to the construction of flood
control works, water storage schemes, irrigation, drainage,
and land reclamation. As noted previously, the main bene-
ficiary of these works is the peasant and not the big landlord.
In other words, although the peasant was not receiving any
immediate benefits from the activities of the Board, the land
distribution program assured that, when the government’s
investment began to pay dividends, the peasant was to be the
main recipient.
The 1955-60 plan reflects a decisive shift in the policy
of the Board. The physical plant still receives the major
share of expenditures. However, comparatively large sums,
a total of about 70 million dinars, are also allotted to educa-
tion, health, housing, and water purification. Agricultural
works, from which the peasant is the principal beneficiary,
constitute the largest single allocation.
It is sometimes said that the development of the physical


BENEFICIARIES OF REFORM 127
plant has not been accompanied by a “concurrent program
of social and agrarian reform,” that the government is not
“doing enough quickly enough” to win the support of the
people, and that, despite painstaking precautions against
profiteering, the vast expenditures of the Development
Board are “benefiting the contractors and entrepreneurs
far more than the great sharecropping mass of the populace.”
As to the first point, the previous discussion demonstrates
that this is not the case and that a program of social and
agrarian reform does exist. It is true that, in its initial stages,
it was slow in taking hold. But in the last few years reform has
gathered considerable momentum.
The second point raises a completely different issue.
Should the Development Board, originally organized so as to
be isolated from political pressures, become the handmaiden
of political expediency? Should the Development Program,
planned and executed by capable and presumably honest
specialists, be oriented toward winning popular appeal at
the expense of the welfare of the country? If this is to be the
case, would the capital made available from oil revenues
not be wasted on elaborate social welfare schemes? Would
the country not eventually find itself economically more or
less in the same position in which it started in 1950? Would it
not be the better part of wisdom and political strategy to
withstand pressures for immediate benefits in order to assure
greater benefits later? This is not to say that the develop-
ment program is perfect or that more funds should not be
allocated to meet immediate human needs. It does mean
that, if the program is to be effective, it cannot be sub-
ordinated to political expediency or oriented to satisfying
the whims of popular fancy.
As to the third point, it is true that contractors absorb
a considerable part of the expenditures of the Board. Un-
fortunately, this is a necessary evil. The government admin-
istrative machinery is not capable (nor should it be) of
carrying out the construction work itself. Part of the reason
for the failure of the 1950-55 plan to reach its objectives
was the inability of the various government departments to
carry out the work entrusted to them by the Board. Experience


PART III The Development of Industry
CHAPTER 8
THE OIL INDUSTRY
Ownership
There are two oil industries in Iraq: one extractive, pro-
ducing only crude oil, essentially a foreign enterprise financed
and developed by foreign capital and skill; the other, very
recent, principally engaged in refining, financed and owned
by the state. The state industry will be treated in the next
chapter along with other new industries. This will be de-
voted to the extractive industry.
The development of the oil reserves of Iraq represents
the largest industrial enterprise in the country. The complex
political history of its evolution and its political significance
will not be discussed except where necessary to make clearer
the economic design.
There are four international companies exploiting the oil
resources of Iraq: the Khanaqin Oil Company, a subsidiary
of the British Petroleum Company (previously Anglo-Iranian
Oil Co.); the Iraq Petroleum Company (I.P.C.), the Mosul
Petroleum Company (M.P.C.), and the Basrah Petroleum
Company (B.P.C.). The last three are actually one, and are
owned by the same interests. Stock participation in each of
them is as follows:


130 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Percent
Near East Development Co. (American)" 23.75
Cie. Française des Pétroles (French) 23.75
Royal Dutch Shell Group (British-Dutch) 23.75
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (British) 23.75
Estate of C.S. Gulbenkian (Armenian, British national) 5.00
The Khanaqin Oil Company is the smallest. Its production
is small, and its concession covers only the “transferred
territories,” a small area of about 648 square miles on the
Iraqi-Iranian frontier.
The company’s first concession was signed on August 30,
1925, and was revised in 1926. In accordance with the agree-
ment, the company produces oil from the Naft Khaneh field
and operates a small refinery at Alawand for the supply of
refined products to Iraq. In 1932 it organized a marketing
subsidiary, the Rafidain Oil Company, for the distribution of
oil and oil products in the country. In 1927, a twenty-five-
mile pipeline was completed, connecting the refinery with
the oil field.
On December 25, 1951, the government reached an agree-
ment with the company and its subsidiary, whereby the
government took over, as of January 1, 1952, the Alawand
refinery and the distributing facilities of the two companies.
However, it was agreed that the Rafidain Oil Company
will continue to operate the refinery for the account of the
government until otherwise requested and, for the ten years
from 1952, will continue to be the distributor of oil products
in Iraq on behalf and for the account of the government.
It was agreed further, that the Khanaqin Oil Company shall,
within seven years from date of agreement, commence
regular exports of crude oil at a rate of not less than two
million tons a year, or will surrender its concession. Profits
from exports shall be shared equally between the company
and the government.” In 1954 the crude oil production of the
company amounted to a little more than half a million long
tonS.
The Iraq Petroleum Company operates in north central
Iraq. Its first concession agreement with the Iraqi government
was signed on March 14, 1925. It was revised on March 24,


THE OIL INDUSTRY 131
1931, giving the company exclusive rights to exploit all lands
situated east of the Tigris river, covering an area of about
32,000 square miles.
The Mosul Petroleum Company has exclusive rights to
exploit all lands in the Mosul and Baghdad provinces west
of the Tigris river and north of the thirty-third parallel, an
area of about 46,000 square miles. The company now operates
only in the north around Ain Zala. Actually, the company
inherited this concession. The first concession agreement
was signed on April 20, 1932 with the British Development
Co. During the same year, the Mosul Oil Fields, Ltd., with
British, German, Italian, Dutch, French-Swiss, and Iraqi
participation, was organized to buy up the share capital of
the British Oil Development Company. By 1935, the Italians
were the majority shareholders with 52 percent stock interest.
In 1936, the Iraq Petroleum Company organized a sub-
sidiary, Mosul Holdings, Ltd., for the purpose of acquiring
the stock shares of the Mosul Oil Fields, Ltd. By 1937, the
I.P.C. was in effective control. In 1941, the British Oil De-
velopment Company assigned its 1932 concession to Mosul
Holdings, renamed Mosul Petroleum Company. Both B.O.D.
and Mosul Oil Fields, Ltd., retired from the scene.
The Basrah Petroleum Company, which operates in the
south near Basrah, obtained its concession on December 4,
1938. The concession covers all areas not included under
previous concessions, including the Iraqi part of the Iraqi-
Saudi Neutral Zone—a total area of about 93,000 square
miles.
Thus, by 1938, the Iraq Petroleum Company and its affili-
ates had exclusive control on the production of oil in all Iraq
with the exception of the small “transferred territories” con-
cession. This final settlement was achieved after over thirty
years of struggle, beginning in 1904, among many interests
for the control of Mesopotamian oil.
The “Fifty-Fifty” Formula
The agreements signed with the oil companies were basic-
ally identical. The principal provision, so far as we are here
concerned, was that the companies were to pay the govern-


THE OIL INDUSTRY 133
7. The I.P.C. is to supply the government refineries all the
necessary crude oil for local consumption at 5.5 shillings
(current sterling) per ton. [First Schedule, Point 5 (2).]
8. If production is halted, due to force majeure or an act of
God, the companies are to loan the government a minimum
of five million pounds a year, provided the amount loaned
and unpaid does not exceed ten million pounds at any one
time. (Article 8.)
9. If, in the future, higher royalty levels obtain in neigh-
boring countries, the government has the right to ask for
similar increases, and the company shall be willing to discuss
the matter with the government."
10. Each of the companies is to appoint two Iraqis on its
Board of Directors. (Schedules 1, 2, and 3.)
11. Payments of the companies to the government are to
be in pounds sterling.
Discovery
Exploratory drilling by the I.P.C. began on April 5, 1927.
Two months later, on June 27, 1927, oil was struck at Baba
Gurgur on the Kirkuk structure. By the end of 1930, twenty-
eight producing wells had been completed, and in 1934 pro-
duction began on a commercial basis.
In the Mosul concession farther north, drilling began in
1933 and continued with heavy expenditures until 1939
without success. A few days before the outbreak of the war
(1939) deposits of light oil were discovered at a depth of
five to six thousand feet at Ain Zala.
In the Basrah concession actual drilling did not begin until
after the war. In 1948 oil was discovered in commercial
quantities at Zubair at depths of ten to eleven thousand feet.
The Pipeline System
Due to the inland location of most of the oil fields, the
production of oil in Iraq is governed to a considerable extent
by the availability of transport. Hence, the industry depends
on an intricate pipeline system which carries its crude oil to
sea terminals for export to the world markets.


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THE OIL INDUSTRY 135
The first international pipelines to be constructed were
two twelve-inch lines, with an annual capacity of two million
metric tons each, from Kirkuk to Haditha, a distance of 150
miles. From there they branched off; one taking a southern
route and terminating at Haifa, a distance of 470 miles, and
the other taking a northern route and terminating in Tripoli,
Lebanon, a distance of 380 miles. They were completed in the
last weeks of 1934 and officially inaugurated in January, 1935.
Due to the Arab-Israeli hostilities, the pumping of oil to
Haifa ceased on April 17, 1948, and has not been resumed
Since.
In October, 1946, the construction of a sixteen-inch parallel
pipeline, to follow the same route of the twelve-inch pipeline
and to have an annual capacity of eight million tons (four
million each) was begun. Again due to the Arab-Israeli
hostilities, the work on the Haifa branch was suspended in
1948 after the completion of 575 miles of line—then only
forty-two miles short of its destination. The Tripoli branch,
531 miles in length, was completed in the latter part of
1949.
Work on a thirty- to thirty-two-inch single pipeline linking
the Kirkuk and Mosul fields with Banyas on the Mediterra-
nean in Syria, a distance of 556 miles, began in April, 1950, and
was completed in April, 1952, at a cost of forty-one million
pounds. The line has a capacity of 13.5 million tons a year.
In July of the same year (1952), a single 135-mile, twelve-inch
pipeline connecting Ain Zala (Mosul oil fields) with Baiji
(K-2 station) on the main Kirkuk pipeline system was com-
pleted.
After the development of the oil industry in southern Iraq,
a new pipeline system was begun, connecting the southern oil
fields with the Persian Gulf at the Fao sea terminal on the Shatt
al-Arab. In 1948 work began on a single seventy-five mile,
twelve-inch pipeline to connect the Zubair oil fields with Fao.
It was completed in October 1951. Due to the expansion in
production, another seventy-five-mile, twenty-four-inch par-
allel pipeline was found necessary and completed on Jan-
uary 1, 1954. After the discovery of a new oil field at Ru-
maila, southeast of Zubair, a twenty-mile, twelve-inch


136 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
pipeline was constructed connecting Rumaila with Zubair
and the B.P.C. pipeline system.
An interesting development is the entry of the Iraqi Govern-
ment into the refining business, and it will be discussed in
greater detail later. For this purpose a government 135-mile,
twelve-inch pipeline was completed in 1954, connecting
Baiji on the I.P.C. pipeline system with its newly-built re-
finery at Dawrah near Baghdad.
At present there are various plans for expanding the pipe-
line system. Putting these into effect is complicated by political
factors. A new twenty-four-inch pipeline from Kirkuk to
Banyas on the Mediterranean in Syria will soon, it is hoped,
be completed. The pipeline has an annual capacity of nine
million tons. It was originally scheduled to terminate at
Tripoli in Lebanon, but a recent decision switched the terminal
point to Banyas. The line has been completed as far as Homs
in northern Syria. Another plan calls for the diversion of the
idle Kirkuk-Haifa pipelines (annual capacity 7.5 million
tons) from Mafraq in Jordan to Sidon in Lebanon, across
Syrian territory. In 1956 extensive discussions took place in
this connection, and in late September 1956 final agreement
was reached with the Lebanese government.”
Similar negotiations between Iraq and Kuwait were con-
ducted for the construction of a pipeline from the Basrah oil
fields to Mina al-Ahmadi oil terminal on the Persian Gulf in
Kuwait. The pipeline would have an annual capacity of four
million tons. Its purpose is to make possible the shipment of
oil on larger tankers which are unable to enter the shallow
waters of the Shatt al-Arab. Agreement in principle is said to
have been reached.”
A plan which has received considerable publicity in the
world press calls for the construction of a forty- to forty-two-
inch pipeline system commencing at Kuwait, going through
Iraq, and terminating in Alexandretta on the Mediterranean
in Turkey, just north of Syria. Several international oil
companies would underwrite its cost, and it would serve
Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran.* The plan is still in the speculative
stage. A more recent plan was sponsored by the Saudi-Arab-
ian government in late 1957. The plan calls for the formation


THE OIL INDUSTRY 137
of a corporation which would own and construct all future
pipelines. The Arab governments in the area would be the
stockholders.
Reserves and Production
The estimated proved oil reserves of the Middle East at the
end of 1956 were some 144.4 billion barrels. Iraq held a little
over fifteen per cent of this total (see table 21).
TABLE 21
EstimateD PRoved OIL RESERVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST
(End of 1956)
Million U. S. Barrels
Kuwait 50,000
Saudi Arabia 40,000
Iran 30,000
Iraq 22,000
Qatar 1,500
Neutral Zone (Kuwait-S. Arabia) 650
Bahrain 205
Israel 50
144,405
Source: U. S. Senate, Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations and the
Committee on Armed Services, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. on S. J. Res. 19 and H. J. Res.
117. (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1957), Part I, p. 32.
Iraq’s production remained comparatively low until after
World War II. This was due to several factors. First, in the
initial stages, the I. P. C. was reluctant to begin production
until a settlement had been reached on concessions and its
position was secure. Secondly, because of the location of the
Kirkuk oil fields, the only producers at that time, production
depended on the availability of transport facilities. Until
pipelines had been constructed, production had to remain low.
Thirdly, oil production in Iraq is extremely sensitive to inter-
national political tensions. For instance, during the war a good
number of the producing wells of the Kirkuk and Ain Zala
areas were destroyed by the British military command in
Iraq in anticipation of a possible southward advance by Ger-
man forces. Similarly, two pipelines with a total annual
capacity of over six million tons have been idle since 1948.


138 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
The Suez conflict of 1956 caused a temporary suspension of
pumping to the Mediterranean with an estimated revenue
loss to Iraq of some seventy million dollars. -
Table 22 shows crude oil production in Iraq. From 1927
to 1933 production was insignificant. In 1934, with the com-
missioning of the Kirkuk-Haifa-Tripoli pipelines, it jumped
to over a million tons, and in each of the years 1937 and 1938,
it was over four million.
With the outbreak of the war in 1939 production began to
decline, reaching a low of over 1.5 million tons in 1941. In
1942 it began to pick up, rising in 1944 to its pre-war levels.
In 1949, with the completion of the sixteen-inch pipeline to
Tripoli, it made an uninterrupted rise. In 1951, production
jumped to 8.5 million, and since then, with the completion
of a variety of pipelines, the temporary shutdown of the
Iranian oil industry, and the demands in the world markets,
the rise has been in leaps and bounds. In 1952 it rose to over
eighteen million and by 1955 reached over thirty-three
million.
TABLE 22
CRUDE OLL PRODUCTION IN IRAQ
(in thousand long tons)
Thousand Thousand
Tear Tons Tear Tons
1927 110 1942 3,555
1928 120 1943 3,804
1929 120 1944 4,300
1930 120 1945 4,621
1931 110 1946 4,698
1932 100 1947 4,746
1933 100 1948 3,470
1934 1,060 1949 4,168
1935 3,677 1950 6,545
1936 4,013 1951 8,561
1937 4,257 1952 18,549
1938 4,288 1953 27,740
1939 3,954 1954 30,141
1940 2,621 1955 32,188
1941 1,609 1956 29,469
Source: Iraq Government, Principal Bureau of Statistics, Report on the In-
dustrial Census of Iraq, 1954. (Baghdad: al-Noor Press, 1956), p. 203; Statistical
Abstracts for 1956, p. 192.


140 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
and where both Iraqi and foreigner alike work on equal
terms for the common good.
The outward manifestations of this change are many.
Among others, they are reflected in the profit-sharing formula.
Westerners in top positions are being replaced at an increasing
rate by Iraqi nationals. Workers receive much higher wages
than before. Working conditions, health, housing, and recrea-
tion benefits have been vastly improved. The industry takes
an active part in public life and community affairs. These
include fairs, fire-fighting, charities, city and village cam-
paigns, athletic contests, and so forth.
The Role of the Industry
The petroleum industry has now become the central factor
affecting the economic and, indirectly, the political stability
of the country. Its influence, directly or indirectly, permeates
every aspect of economic and social development. An idea
of its strategic position may be gained from the fact that
it alone accounts for over one-third of the total national
income. Any extended interruption of the flow of oil would
bring in its wake chaos, poverty, and political unrest.
Oil Revenue
Between 1934 and 1950, revenue from the industry averaged
about 14 per cent of the total revenue of the state. From there
on it began to rise steadily until in 1955 it reached 73.74
million dinars (see Table 8), thus exceeding government
receipts from all other sources by some forty-five million
dinars. Oil revenue has been directly significant in three
respects:
a. It exclusively underwrites the program of the Develop-
ment Board. Not only that, but such a program would
otherwise have been impossible, since no alternative sources
of income of the same magnitude are available.
b. Between 1927 and 1950, oil revenue paid a minor part
of the costs of government. From 1950 on, in addition to
supporting the development program, it has been partly re-
sponsible for the expansion that has taken place in govern-
ment services in the fields of health, education, credit, agri-


THE OIL INDUSTRY 141
culture, social welfare, etc. Thirty per cent of the oil revenue
goes to the regular government budget to defray the cost of
ordinary operations.
c. It supplies Iraq with the necessary foreign exchange
for her international trade. Iraq’s perennial problem in her
trade relations with other countries has been the great gap
between the value of imports and the value of exports. The
foreign exchange deficit over the years has usually been
covered by income from the transit trade; expenditures by
pilgrims and tourists; expenditures by foreign vessels and
recently airlines; expenditures by British forces for goods and
services prior to, during, and after the war; oil royalties which
represent income from the export of petroleum, and foreign
exchange disbursements by the oil companies and expendi-
tures of their foreign employes in the country.
It is important to note that the oil industry after 1927 be-
came an important factor influencing Iraq’s balance of trade.
On the one hand, the heavy imports of the oil industry be-
came one of the factors contributing to the import surplus,
and on the other, foreign exchange payments by the oil indus-
try in royalties, local disbursements, and expenditures of its
foreign employes, have been the major source from which
Iraq covered its trade deficit.
From 1947 to 1949, payments of the oil industry failed to
cover the trade deficit and Iraq drew heavily on its sterling
balances and other assets which had accumulated during the
war. Since 1940, owing primarily to income from the oil in-
dustry, there has been an increase in Iraq’s foreign assets.
The foreign assets of the National Bank of Iraq (which acts as
a central bank), almost all in sterling, stood at 77.6 million
dinars in September 1954.9
Labor
The oil industry is the largest industrial enterprise in the
country and the largest employer after the government. Its
character and location are the two main determinants of the
size of the labor force and the role employment plays in the
national economy.
The industry produces only crude oil. Unlike the case in


142 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Iran, it does not engage in any refining operations for com-
mercial purposes. Once a well is drilled and connected, it
needs little attention. The labor force is therefore comparative-
ly small compared to the size of the industry, and is mainly
concerned with drilling, maintenance, and pumping opera-
tions. For instance, the labor force in the Iranian oil industry
was about 60,000 in 1948; the industry’s labor force in Iraq
during the same year was only 14,200.
The second feature of the industry in Iraq is the dispersion
of its operations in various parts of the country. Therefore, he
recruitment of the labor force is not concentrated in one area.
Because of the size of the labor force and its dispersion the
oil industry in terms of employment occupies no com-
manding position, as is the case in Iran, Bahrain, and Saudi
Arabia.
Nor does the industry have an exclusive monopoly on
labor but—especially today—has to compete for it under pro-
gressively adverse conditions because of competition from the
Development Board and industrial expansion. While the
industry is required to employ only Iraqi labor, unless other-
wise absolutely necessary, Iraqi labor is free to move to other
areas, such as Kuwait, in search of better opportunities. Dur-
ing the last few years there has been an acute shortage of in-
dustrial labor in Iraq.
Table 23 shows the number of workers in the oil industry
in 1938 and from 1943 to 1956 and local disbursements of the
industry during the same period. From 1927 to 1938 (not
indicated in the table) the number of workers ranged between
three and four thousand. During the early years of the war the
number dropped considerably, but in 1943 it returned to
its pre-war level. In 1946, the year in which expansion began
in earnest, the number jumped to 11,000 and in 1956 it
reached close to 16,000.
As shown by the table, the labor force is composed mostly of
Iraqis, with a sprinkling of Jordanians, Syrians, Lebanese,
and Palestinian refugees. Hardly any other nationality, with
the exception of Europeans, is represented. The difficult
question of employment of foreigners does not, therefore,
arise as it does in Bahrain and Kuwait.


THE OIL INDUSTRY 143
In terms of rank, position, privileges, facilities, and salaries,
the labor force is divided into three main groups.
1. The Covenanted Staff. This group constitutes the executive,
administrative, and higher technical labor force. The salaries
of this group are calculated on an annual basis.
The “staff” is divided into two categories. “London
covenanted” are mostly Europeans—and primarily British–
who sign a contract with the London office. Their salaries
and allowances are geared to the European wage scale.
TABLE 23
NUMBER of IRAQI AND Foreign WoRKERs; AND
Local DISBURSEMENTS OF OIL CoMPANIES
IN MILLIONs of IRAQI DINARs
Local Dis-
1 car Iraqis Foreigners Total bursements
1938 Im.a. Im.a. 3,600 0.58
1943 3,804 158 3,962 Il.a.
1944 4,311 232 4,543 Il.a.
1945 5,486 256 5,742 Im.a.
1946 10,756 504 11,260 2.14
1947 13,900 656 14,556 5.60
1948 13,463 778 14,241 7.03
1949 12,069 814 12,883 6.49
1950 10,578 796 11,374 4.39
1951 10,385 659 11,044 5.69
1952 12,317 997 13,314 7.18
1953 12,279 906 13,185 8.76
1954 11,949 821 12,770 8.91
1955 14,468 860 15,328 11.a.
1956 14,914 918 15,832 Im.a.
Source: Statistical Abstracts for 1950, p. 170, 1952, p. 235, 1955, p. 236, and
1956, p. 193; EDME, 45-54, p. 97; Iraqi Embassy, Washington, D.C., Bulletin,
March, 1956.
The second group is called “local covenanted staff.” These
sign a contract with the Baghdad office and their salaries are
geared to wage levels in the Middle East. The great majority
of this group are Iraqi nationals, many of whom are paid at
higher rates than those prevailing in the area as a whole.
Other than differences in salary scale, the two groups enjoy
the same privileges and facilities (clubs, cinemas, mess halls,
housing, etc.) The local staff comprises only a small percent-
age of the total staff. Since 1950, however, a drastic change in


144 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
policy has taken place. Local staff, increasingly and wherever
possible, is replacing foreigners.
2. The Monthly Rate. The salaries of this group are cal-
culated on a monthly basis. It consists mostly of clerical and
skilled workers. Usually the members of this group are high
school and local college graduates, skilled artisans, foremen,
and the like. It comprises about 15-20 per cent of the total
labor force and probably represents its more stable elements.
This group is second in importance to the first mentioned,
although the gulf between them is very wide. It has many
privileges not enjoyed by others.
3. The Daily Rate. The salaries of this group are calculated
on a daily basis. It represents the lowest rung in the employ-
ment ladder. It consists of unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled
workers. On the whole the workers are either new with the
industry, or do not have sufficient skill to be placed on the
monthly payroll. A large majority of this group is illiterate.
The above three groups constitute the regular labor force.
In addition, during heavy construction periods the industry
makes arrangements with contractors to supply labor at
specified rates for definite periods of time.
From the preceding discussion, it is evident that the im-
portance of the industry as an employer in the industrial
sector of the economy is steadily increasing. Between 1945
and 1955, the number of workers increased nearly three times.
It is also significant in another respect. There is an increasing
trend among workers to regard their employment as a life-
time Occupation rather than a temporary measure. For in-
stance, at Kirkuk (I.P.C.) in January, 1953, the total monthly
and daily labor force was divided in length of service as
follows:10
Daily Monthly Total Percent
1 year and above 2,254 304 2,558 47.4
5 years and above 1,664 362 2,026
10 years and above 339 80 419 45.6
15 years and above 171 91 262
20 years and above 34 38 72
25 years and above 6 13 19 7.0
4,468 888 5,356 100.00


THE OIL INDUSTRY 145
Wages
The legal minimum wage rate for unskilled workers in
Iraq is 250 fils (seventy cents) per day. The oil industry
generally tries to stay close to the legal minimum. Its wages
are therefore divided into two parts—basic wage geared to
legal minimum requirement, and a high cost of living allow-
ance. The basic wage does not change frequently, but fre-
quent increases are made in the allowance.
Since the daily and monthly rate payrolls constitute over
90 per cent of the total labor force of the industry, the dis-
cussion will be restricted to these two groups. Table 24 shows
the wage structure of the Iraq Petroleum Company and its
affiliates as of January 1953. In April 1954 there was a general
boost in allowances bringing about an increase of 10 to 15
percent in total wages.
There are seven grades (one to seven) in the monthly rate
payroll. Within each grade there are four basic wage incre-
ments. The allowance remains constant within each grade.
Similarly, there are seven grades (zero to six) in the daily
rate payroll, with identical arrangements with the exception
of grades zero and six. -
TABLE 24
WAGE STRUCTURE OF THE I.P.C., B.P.C., M.P.C.
In IRAQ. As of JANUARY, 1953. IRAQI DINARs.
Monthly Payroll Daily Payroll
Grade Basic/M HCLA/M. Total/M Grade Basic/D HCLA/D Total/D
1 11. 10. 21. 0 .17 .24 .41
12. 22. .18 .42
13 23.
14 24.
15 25.
2 15.5 11 26.5 1 20 26 46
16.5 27.5 22 48
17.5 28.5 24 50
18.5 29.5 26 52
19.5 30.5 28 54
3 20.0 12 32. 2 .30 28 58
21 33. .32 60
22 34. 34 62


146 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Manthly Payroll Daily Payroll
Grade Basic/M HCLA/M. Total/M Grade Basic/D HCLA/D Total/D
4. 25.50 12. 37.50 3 .40 .30 .70
26.75 38.75 .43 .73
28.00 40.00 .46 .76
29.25 41.25 .49 .79
30.50 42.50 .52 .82
5 32.00 12. 44.00 4 .55 .35 .90
33.25 45.25 .58 .93
34.50 46.50 .61 .96
35.75 47.50 .64 .99
37.00 49.00 .67 1.02
6 39.00 12.5 51.50 5 .70 .40 1.10
40.75 53.25 .73 1.13
42.50 55.00 .76 1.16
44.25 56.75 .79 1.19
46.00 58.50 .82 1.22
7 49.00 12.5 61.50 6 .87 .40 1.27
51.00 63.50
53.00 65.50
55.00 67.50
57.00 69.50
Source: I.P.C., Kirkuk, Personal Communication, January 21, 1953. Basic/M.
means basic wage per month. HCLA/M. means high cost of living allowance
per month. The same applies to D., meaning Daily.
There is little doubt that the oil industry is the wage leader
in the country. Its wage policy apparently attempts to stay
just a little ahead of the going market rate. For instance, the
lowest wage paid by the I.P.C. and its affiliates in 1953 was
410 fils per day for a newly-hired unskilled worker. Actually
very few workers remain at this wage level for long. Prevailing
wages for such workers at Baghdad and Basrah in 1953 were
250 fils and 280 fils per day respectively (see Table 25).
The great majority of the labor force falls within grades
one to six in both the monthly and daily rate payrolls. These
range from semi-skilled workers with few months of training
to skilled mechanics, electricians, fitters, turners, wireless
operators, painters, carpenters, clerks, draftsmen, store-
clerks, accounts clerks, etc. The wage for this group (one to
six) begins with a low of nearly 500 fils (half a dinar) per day
for a new semi-skilled worker and proceeds to a high of
nearly two dinars a day for a grade six monthly worker. As
can be seen from Table 25, these rates are higher than prevail-
ing rates in both 1953 and 1955.


THE OIL INDUSTRY 147
TABLE 25
DAILY WAGEs for CoNTRActors’ LABOR IN BAGHDAD
Liwa AND THE Port of BASRAH IN 1953 AND 1955
(in Iraqi Fils)
Contractors (Baghdad Liwa) Basrah Port
End 1953 jan. 1955 End 1953 Jan. 1955
Carpenter 900 900-1,200 4.25- 555 465- 595
Tractor Driver 800 750 425- 525 465- 565
Electrician 700 1,200 425- 525 465- 565
Turner 1,000 1,300 600- 700 640- -740
Mechanic 700 700- 900 525- 660 565- 700
Blacksmith 700 800 425- 525 465- 565
Crane Driver 1,000 1,000 515- 595 545- 635
Fireman 600 600 355- 395 395- 435
Greaser 450 400- 600 335- 375 375- 415
Laborer 250 250- 350 280- 335 320- 375
Storekeeper 1,330 1,500 1,930-2,130 1,970-2,530
Clerk 1,330 1,500 615- 860 655- 900
Source: Lord Salter, Development of Iraq, A Report Submitted to the Iraq
Development Board (London: Caxton Press, 1955, p. 153.)
An idea of the wage position of the oil industry in the indus-
trial sector of the economy can be gained from comparing
annual wage bills. In 1954 the annual wage bill of the four
oil companies which then employed 15,249 (including re-
fineries and distribution, otherwise 12,770) was 6,200,349
dinars. This amount exceeded by some 444,000 dinars the
total wages paid by all other manufacturing industries in the
country (total wage bill: 5,756,024 dinars) which then
numbered 22,460 establishments and employed 90,291 work-
ers.11 It should be pointed out that approximately 37 per cent
of the workers in these industries are small owners, partners,
or unpaid family workers and do not therefore receive wages.
Wages in the final analysis are not the only criteria for


T48 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
comparison. Workers in the oil industry receive many other
tangible and intangible benefits which in most cases are not
available outside the industry: fairly speedy advancement;
assurance of a steady job; good working conditions; sub-
sidized meals, housing, medical treatment and so forth.
Table 23 shows the disbursements of the oil companies in
Iraq for both wages and services. It is assumed that the major
part of the expenditures went to the payroll. On the whole
they indicate a steady increase in wages per worker even
though the number of workers also increased considerably.
Expenditures rose from about 600,000 dinars in 1938 to
nearly nine million in 1954. The increase in real wages, how-
ever, is not as great as might be surmised from the table. This
is because the purchasing power of the dinar has declined to
more than half its pre-war level.
Hours and Conditions of Work
Conditions and hours of work in the industry are governed
by the Iraqi Labor Law No. 72 (1936) as amended by Law
No. 36 (1942). A new labor law recommended by the Inter-
national Labor Organization was approved by the Cabinet
in June, 1956 for presentation to parliament, but was not,
at the time of writing, passed.” The existing law covers daily
workers only and, until recently, it applied in practice only
to the oil industry and a few other enterprises, since there
was hardly any other industry in Iraq.
In accordance with the law, the work day in the industry
is eight hours and the work week forty-eight hours, for which
the worker receives seven days’ pay. Since 1945 the work day
during the month of Ramadhan (the Muslim fast) has been
only seven hours.
Friday, the Muslim Sabbath, is the weekly holiday. The
law requires that workers receive leave with full pay at the
rate of one day for each month employed and sick leave at
the rate of four days for every three months. In case the sick
leave has been utilized and the worker still requires treat-
ment, he may use his ordinary leave.
Workers receive a week’s notice before being discharged.


150 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
with accumulated interest on them, are called “A” account.
The company contributes a similar 10 per cent plus a yearly
bonus of 5 to 7.5 per cent of the total annual earnings of the
worker. These contributions, together with accumulated
interest on them, are called “B” account. Upon leaving the
service of the company, the monthly worker receives the
whole of “A” account in addition to:
50 per cent of “B” account after five years of service.
p y -
75 per cent of “B” account after ten years of service.
p y -
100 per cent of “B” account after fifteen years of service.
2. The Employees Saving Scheme. This plan is open to both
the monthly and daily rate workers. It is designed to help
the workers save part of their earnings. Membership and
amount of saving are voluntary. Upon joining, the employe
decides on the amount he desires to save, and it is then
checked off by the paymaster and sent to the thrift office.
The money is deposited in banks at rates of interest between
2.5 and 3 per cent.
The company’s contribution lies in its encouragement of
workers to join, and in providing the clerical and administra-
tive staff, office space, and equipment free of cost. The scheme
was initiated around 1950 in Kirkuk and subsequently in-
troduced at Ain Zala and Basrah. It has been fairly successful,
although some of the employes use it as a checking account.
The year 1956 may be regarded as a turning point in the
history of labor in Iraq. It has already been stated that a new
comprehensive labor law was approved by the Cabinet in
June, 1956. According to press accounts, the proposed law
extends the definition of workers to include white-collar
employes, expands the indemnity clauses of the 1942 labor
law and provides for more adequate compensation for indus-
trial injury. It further provides for compulsory unionization
in industries which employ over a certain number of workers.
During the same year the first Social Security Law in the
history of the country was passed. On December 1, 1956 it was
put into effect in five of Iraq’s fourteen provinces. These five—
Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Hilla—were chosen
because of the heavy concentration of workers in them. The


THE OIL INDUSTRY 151
law gave initial coverage to some 65,000 workers in private
enterprises, oil companies, and government establishments.
The main provisions of the law are as follows:
1. Coverage. It brings under coverage every employe who
is working for an employer—whether for wages, or as an
apprentice or as a probationer. The coverage is not restricted
to industry but extends to every occupation.
2. Contributions. The employer is required to pay the
Social Security Fund fifteen fils for every day of service of the
employe excluding rest days, provided that such rest days
are not more than one day a week. The state pays fifteen fils,
and the worker ten fils. In other words, the employer pays
37.5 per cent, the state 37.5 per cent and the worker 25 per
cent of the fund.
3. Benefits. The law provides for the following benefits
which the worker covered can receive from the fund at one
time or another: (1) old age benefit, (2) permanent invalidity
benefit, (3) survivor’s benefit, (4) marriage benefit, (5)
maternity benefit, (6) funeral benefit, (7) unemployment
benefit, and (8) sickness benefit.
4. Administration. Responsibility for the program is lodged
in a Social Security Commission of three members appointed
by the Council of Ministers. The Commission has a juristic
personality and is authorized to buy property and otherwise
invest the funds. The operation of the program is administered
by a directorate in the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Before its passage, the law had been under discussion since
1951. Representatives from both industry and commerce
were consulted concerning its various provisions. The knowl-
edge that such a law would be passed may have been the
reason why the oil companies took no action on their own
in recent years to give their workers more adequate protec-
tion. It should be remembered that the policy of the industry
is one of integration. Such a concept implies not being too far
ahead, and not too far behind general trends and develop-
ments in the country.
Labor Unions and Relations
The labor law provides for the formation of labor unions.


152 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
In actual practice, there is a mass of cumulative evidence
from impartial observers indicating that, on the whole, the
government does not look with favor on the union movement.
Moreover, union leaders seem to have no clear concept of
union work, and it is believed the union membership (total in
the country about 500) is infiltrated with state security agents.
According to a report of the United States Embassy in
Baghdad, the government activity in the labor field is mainly
confined to suppressing elements of potential threat to internal
stability.” For instance, the union of cigarette workers which
organized an effective strike in 1953 was disbanded by the
government in 1954. In September, 1954, a new ordinance
authorized the Council of Ministers, upon the recommenda-
tion of the Minister of Interior, to suspend or close down
permanently any association, including labor unions, for
actions endangering public security and order. The following
month (October, 1954) the government issued regulations
and set up machinery for conciliation and arbitration of labor
disputes. One provision requires strikers to give a minimum
of fourteen days’ notice to the Ministry of Social Affairs
before stopping work.
Whatever may be the attitude of the government, as of
this writing no labor union exists in the oil industry. The only
organizational channel through which the workers have some
way of presenting their views or grievances to management
is the Joint Consultation Committee System. This system
was found effective in England during the war. It was in-
troduced in one department in Kirkuk in 1950 and has since
then been installed in all departments at Kirkuk, Ain Zala
and Basrah.
a. Objective. The objective of the Joint Consultation Com-
mittee, according to the charter of the oldest committee at
Kirkuk, is “to provide regular meetings between management
and employes' elected representatives to discuss matters of
mutual interest, to secure cooperation through explanation
of measures proposed or taken on behalf of the interest of
both parties.”
b. Functions. The functions of the committee are complete-
ly advisory. They are limited to discussion of such subjects


THE OIL INDUSTRY 153
as promotion of physical welfare, improvement of working
conditions and general work discipline. No subject covered
by the labor law may be discussed.
c. Composition. Each department elects three sub-com-
mittees (each sub-committee has between six and eight mem-
bers), one for each group of workers—the daily paid, the
monthly paid, and the staff. Each sub-committee then elects
two members to represent it on the Joint Consultation Com-
mittee of the whole department. In addition, management
appoints two members to represent it. Thus the Committee is
made up of eight members; two each, to represent manage-
ment, staff, daily paid and monthly paid workers.
Housing
Up to 1950 the oil companies in Iraq to all practical pur-
poses provided no housing for their employes. Very adequate
housing was provided for the “staff,” composed mostly of
Europeans, and also housing for everyone on the pipeline
stations in the desert. Other than that, there was hardly any
housing scheme worthy of mention. Since 1950, however,
housing has been provided for a larger and larger number of
employes and workers.
At Kirkuk, a modern housing development was begun
which by the end of 1952 had some 500 houses. The develop-
ment has a shopping center, schools, a modern sewage system,
and all the other necessary amenities.
The houses are of current design and are of two sizes. The
larger size has three bedrooms and the smaller two. Both
have a living room, a kitchen, a store-room, a bathroom,
and a toilet. They are provided with electricity and running
water, in addition to electric ceiling fans and radiators. Heat
is supplied from a central plant.
Rent is very low. Priority is based on a point system. Each
year of service is given two points, and each grade two points.
But in any case, before becoming eligible, a worker must have
served two years with the company. In effect, the point sys-
tem leaves most of the daily workers out, until the needs of
the monthly rate employees and those who have been long
with the company are satisfied.


156 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
mentary education are selected by the company for a five-
year course of apprenticeship training. During this period the
students receive from the company about ten dinars a month
each month the first year. The pay is then annually in-
creased until by the last year it reaches twenty dinars a month.
Part of the pay is withheld, either as savings for the student
or payments to the parents. Kirkuk students live at home but
they are charged for books and sports gear. The others are
housed and fed by the company, for which seven dinars a
month are deducted from their pay.
The training is divided into two parts: during the first two
years all students go through a broad program of study with
concentration on English, mathematics, physics, chemistry,
engineering drawing, laboratory work, and workshop training
in wood and metals. After the first two years the students are
divided into three groups according to aptitude and ability.
One group receives artisan training, the second, training in
advanced engineering and science, and the third, training in
commercial practice.
The Center opened at Kirkuk in late 1951. It has a modern
classroom building, and an imposing array of training work-
shops. By the end of 1952 the Center had 100 students and
it was expected that enrollment by 1956 would be around
300 students.
In addition, the Center carries out an adult education pro-
gram in the evening. Workers between the ages of twenty-
five and thirty-five are given instruction in English, commer-
cial subjects, and office methods. It should be noted that day
students under the regular program are not under obligation
to work for the company when they complete their five-year
COUIrSe.
c. Training in the United Kingdom. Company artisans who
show ability and promise are sent to the United Kingdom
for one or two years of practical industrial training with part-
time attendance at technical colleges. The scheme was initiated
around 1951.
d. Trainees’ Schemes. There is a complex variety of “learner”
and “trainee” schemes at the Training Workshops in Kirkuk,


THE OIL INDUSTRY 157
to which the associated companies send the men they select.
The training varies in length from a six-months basic course
to a two-year program.
e. The company pays the tuition fees and other incidental
expenses of approved correspondence courses with schools
in the United Kingdom. Payment, however, is conditional
upon the worker’s successful completion of the course.
f. On the job Training. Workers receive training while on
the job under the direction of skilled artisans.
g. “Sandwich.” Training. The companies accept a limited
number of students from technical schools in the country
for training at company workshops during their summer
vacations.
h. Evening Classes. Evening classes at various installa-
tions of the companies and under a variety of arrangements
are given in either English or Arabic or both. An increasing
number of workers, especially from the lower grades, are
taking advantage of this opportunity.
These various training programs are probably one of the
more valuable and permanent contributions of the industry
to the development of the country. There is an acute shortage
of skilled labor in Iraq which is expected to become progressive-
ly more severe. The industry’s efforts in this field are part
of a countrywide drive to produce as many skilled workers
as possible within the shortest period of time. This will be
discussed later in another connection.
Medical Facilities and Services
In all, the oil companies have six hospitals with a total
capacity in 1955 of 200 beds. The central hospital of the
industry is located at Kirkuk. It serves the Kirkuk area and
takes care of the major operations of the Mosul area and
the pump stations. The hospital is fully equipped and com-
petently staffed. It carries out an average of 1,200 operations
a year. The total number of outpatient attendances at the
hospital in 1952 were 72,005 of which 13,668 were non-
employees.
Both Ain Zala and Basrah have smaller hospitals. In addi-


158 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
tion all areas have several clinics. Every pump station has
its own medical arrangements including a doctor, a clinic,
a detention ward, etc., to handle minor cases.
The services of the medical departments extend over a
wide area:
a. Every employe prior to his engagement is examined
and vaccinated against smallpox and inoculated against
typhoid and paratyphoid.
b. All employes receive free medical treatment including
hospitalization. This service in many cases extends to the
employe's immediate family.
c. The company hospitals and clinics, especially in isolated
areas, serve not only company personnel but also neighboring
villages.
d. The medical departments are responsible for the
general sanitation of the camps including supervision of
water, food in the canteens, sanitation in houses on company
estates, and other such functions.
e. They carry out, in cooperation with the local authorities,
various campaigns to control disease in the areas in which
they operate. The most extensive are the malaria campaigns
which include larval control (spraying of water, etc.) and
adult control (spraying of buildings).
Welfare
The welfare movement in the companies started around
1950. There are now welfare committees elected by workers
in all areas. Their functions are purely advisory.
1. Food. In all areas the cost of food is subsidized. It is
provided to monthly and daily rate personnel in most areas
by contractors. The company usually supplies the contractor,
free of cost, room space, equipment, part of the fuel, electricity
and water, in addition to a straight monthly subsidy, or a
per person subsidy or per plate subsidy, In return, it specifies
the meal prices which the contractor may charge, specifies
the kind of food he may serve and supervises the cleanliness
of the mess hall. In addition there are tea and coffee rooms
which are also subsidized.
2. Recreation. The extent of recreation facilities depends on


160 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
felt. Production was low, the labor force was small, royalties
comparatively meager, and local disbursements not too
significant.
With the conclusion of the 1952 agreement, however, the
oil industry became suddenly the central factor affecting the
stability and development of the country. Negatively, there
is little doubt that, if the industry were to close down sudden-
ly, the government machinery would collapse and economic
and social chaos would follow. Positively, it is the one im-
portant single force responsible directly or indirectly for
economic progress and social reform and for pushing Iraq
by forced march into the twentieth century.
The industry is the largest enterprise in the country. From
its inception it set the pace for wages, industrial social wel-
fare, and liberal treatment of labor. Since 1950 labor benefits
such as housing, training, recreation, food, medical treat-
ment, and so forth have been vastly expanded. Periodic in-
creases are also made in wages, and the wage scale is higher
than prevailing rates in the country. The industry’s attitude
towards the labor force is, however, paternalistic and there
is reason to believe that the formation of labor unions is dis-
couraged. In any case, no labor unions exist in the industry.
About 1950 the industry initiated a policy of integration
with the country and its people. In one sense, such a concept
implies not being distinctly recognizable as “different” or
“foreign,” not creating an élite labor force physically and
spiritually segregated from the community and in general
not being too far ahead nor too far behind developments in
the country. In another, it implies identification with local
interests and local life, increasing the number of Iraqis in
responsible positions, better and more humane treatment of
labor, participation in community affairs, rising along with
local interests to meet emergencies, constructive sensitivity
to public opinion and, in general, overt concern for the wel-
fare of the country.


THE OIL INDUSTRY 16]
i
. Owned equally by Standard of New Jersey and Socony Mobil.
. Iraq, Agreement Between the Government of Iraq and Khanaqin Oil Co., Ltd., and
Rafidain Oil Co., Ltd., 25th December, 1951 (London: Cooper and Sons, Ltd.,
1952.)
. The formula has several variations, but is generally known as the “Fifty-
Fifty” agreement.
. I.P.C., M.P.C., B.P.C., Agreement with the Government of Iraq Made on the 3rd
Day of February, 1952, Together with Law No. 4 of 1952, (Hertford, Herts,
England: Stephen Austin and Sons, n.d. In English and Arabic.)
. This was not actually part of the agreement. The promise was made by an
exchange of letters between the Minister of Economics, dated September 28,
1951, and a reply from the General Manager of the three companies, G. S.
Gibson, also dated September 28, 1951.
. USIA, Baghdad, Press Dispatch, October 4, 1956.
. USIA, Baghdad, Press Dispatch, December 13, 1956.
. See, for instance, Time Magazine, May 27, 1957, pp. 29-30.
. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Economic De-
10.
. Industrial Census, 1954, op. cit., pp. 9, 211, 213.
12.
13.
14.
15.
welopments in the Middle East, 1945-1954 (New York: 1955, p. 102.) Hereafter
referred to as EDME, 45-54.
I.P.C., Kirkuk, personal communication, January 23, 1953.
Iraq Times, June 12, 1956.
U. S. Embassy, Baghdad, Annual Labor Report, Iraq 1954 (Dispatch No. 562
of May 21, 1955). Quoted by Iraq Handbook, New Haven, H.R.A.F., 1955.
I.P.C., Kirkuk, Home Ownership Scheme Handbook, an unpublished typescript.
This obligation is actually not part of the 1952 agreement. It is more in the
nature of a gentleman's understanding—probably based on article 29 of
the 1925 concession agreement.


INDUSTRIALIZATION
packing, tailoring, brick-making, metal products, bakeries,
construction, motor vehicle repair, cigarette and tobacco and
grain-milling. In terms of annual wage bills, spinning and
weaving were also the most important, followed by construc-
tion, brick-making, railway workshops, bakeries, grain-
milling, cigarettes and tobacco, electricity and water, motor
vehicle repair, and cement. The wage bill of each of these
industries was over 200,000 dinars.
TABLE 26
INDUSTRIAL SUMMARY OF IRAQ:
(Excluding Oil)
Number of Establishments
JNumber of Workers:
Men 67,373
Boys 10,611
Women 10,270
Girls 2,037
Literate 22,813
Illiterate 67,478
Total Value of Machinery, etc., in Dinars
Annual Expenditures in Dinars:
Costs of raw materials
Costs of oil and electricity
Annual Wage Bill
Total Annual Receipts (Gross) in Dinars
Motive Power Used:
JNo.
Electric Motors 6,157
Oil Engines 1,561
Steam Engines 26
7,744
Water Wheels 216
7,960
22,460
90,291
90,291
15,658,000
15,024,000
995,000
5,756,000
21,775,000
39,198,000
Horsepower
37,403
98,052
59,256
194,711
1,110
195,821
Source: Iraq, Industrial Census of Iraq, 1954. (Baghdad: 1956), pp. 9-19.


164
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
TABLE 27
MAIN INDUSTRIEs of IRAQ: 1954 Annual
JNumber of Wage
Establish- JNumber of Workers Bill in
Industry ments Men Women Total Dinars
Spinning, Weaving, etc. 2,248 7,871 1,187 9,058 695,881
Construction 39 4,644 35 4,679 546,848
Brick-Making 203 6,770 70 6,840 485,802
Railway Workshops 8 2,506 2,506 434,690
Bakeries 1,563 3,754 1,445 5,199 311,566
Grain-Milling 954 3,648 135 3,783 273,373
Cigarettes & Tobacco 1,057 3,417 571 3,988 267,173
Electricity Generating 49 1,338 21 1,359 250,008
Electricity & Water 22 1,383 1 1,384 249,603
Motor Vehicle Repair 1,239 4,044 2 4,046 219,999
Cement, Juss, Gypsum, etc. 266 2,552 6 2,558 215,759
Fruit-Preserving, Date-
Packing, etc. 98 3,166 5,051 8,217 175,883
Metal Products 2,346 5,370 5 5,375 169,770
Shoemaking 1,239 3,103 83 3,186 166,452
Tailoring 4,236 6,072 1,313 7,385 166,300
Printing 132 955 4. 959 118,155
Soap & Misc. Chemicals 53 1,020 80 1,100 112,884
Water Supply 34 815 815 79,900
Shipbuilding & Repair 5 442 442 74,124
Carpentry 1,914 3,318 19 3,337 70,868
Soft Drinks & Soda Water 56 567 567 68,758
Canneries 96 641 5 646 68,608
Furniture-Making 184 696 2 698 65,682
Pottery- and Tile-Making 140 718 12 730 63,922
Sweets-Making 176 732 77 809 51,602
Spirits, Brewing, etc. 7 303 1 304 50,864
Source: Industrial Census, 1954, op. cit., pp. 10-13.
TABLE 28
INDUSTRIEs of IRAQ. AND BAGHDAD CITY: 1954
Iraq Baghdad City
Size of Firm— Mo. of T Total No. JNo. of Total JWo.
JNo. of Workers Firms of Workers Firms of Workers
1- 4 19,896 35,406 3,874 7,420
5- 9 1,837 10,475 456 2,750
10- 19 433 5,718 119 1,556
20- 99 199 8,185 75 3,041
100-249 59 9,527 32 4,886
250-499 24 7,835 7 2,628
500-999 8 5,336 7 4,499
1,000-Over 4. 7,809 3 6,587
TOTAL 22,460 90,291 4,573 33,367
Source: Computed from Industrial Census, 1954, op. cit.


INDUSTRIALIZATION 1.65
The three preceding tables show statistically the basic
characteristics of the industrial establishment in Iraq. It is
still in an embryonic stage, using for the large part human
labor and simple machinery. It consists mostly of hundreds
of small shops and family enterprises, a very large number of
which cannot be classified as “modern industries” but are
more in the nature of handicraft and cottage industries.
For instance, most of the spinning and weaving, tailoring and
shoemaking establishments fall into this category. It consists
entirely of light industries, including some service industries
such as vehicle repair shops. It produces entirely for the
domestic market and, finally, it is very highly concentrated
in the city of Baghdad. In the whole country there were
22,460 firms employing 90,291 workers. Baghdad City ac-
counted for 4,573 firms or 20 per cent of the total and 33,367
workers or 36 per cent of the total. Included in these totals
are ninety-five firms employing over 100 workers each, with a
total labor force of 30,507 persons. Of these, Baghdad City
had forty-nine firms or 51.5 per cent, and 18,600 workers
or sixty-one per cent.
Another index of the concentration of industry in Baghdad
City is its share of the annual wage bill and the value of in-
dustrial machinery, plant, and equipment. The annual wage
bill for the 22,460 establishments mentioned was estimated in
1954 at 5,756,000 dinars of which the industries of Baghdad
City paid 3,359,000 dinars or 58 per cent. The value of
machinery and other installations in factories employing
twenty persons and over in the whole country (excluding oil)
was found to be about 12.1 million dinars. Of this, Baghdad’s
share was eight million or 66 per cent.
Industrial Policy
Although the economic structure of the country precludes
the immediate creation of substantial large-scale industry,
Iraq has either entirely neglected or inadequately exploited
some very valuable industrial raw materials. Industrial ex-
pansion based on these resources can produce new wealth,
raise the standard of living, and, perhaps most important of
all, develop human skills. In particular, Iraq possesses an


166 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
abundance of potential thermal and hydroelectric power,
mineral deposits and chemicals, and agricultural lands.
A fairly sizeable industrial complex can be built on the basis
of these resources.
Since 1950 several reports have been submitted by special-
ists to the Iraqi Government concerning industrialization.
Basically, they all subscribe to the same thesis: that industrial-
ization should not be forced through tariff protection and
government subsidies and that primary attention should be
given to agriculture in preference to industry.
The International Bank Mission, after recommending
certain specified industries, warned that “Particular care
should be taken that government assistance does not foster
inefficient industries at the expense of the country’s standard
of living.”
Professor Iversen in his report to the National Bank of
Iraq came to the conclusion that:”
Since fertile land is undoubtedly the most valuable asset of
Iraq (even counting oil) it seems to be most appropriate to
choose the first alternative [i.e., agriculture].
This does not mean, of course, that industry should not be
allowed to develop; on the contrary, it is to be expected that
in the very long run Iraq will have to follow the path of other
countries towards an increasingly industrialized stage of de-
velopment. But in a world in which the problem of providing
food for an evergrowing population is one of the most serious,
it seems in the best interest of Iraq not to force this develop-
ment, but to concentrate on raising the efficiency of agricultural
production.
Iversen, in discussing the “diversification of exports,”
adds: “Iraq has large comparative advantages in agricultural
production, whereas the possibilities of creating new indus-
tries able to compete on equal terms with producers abroad
are more limited and more remote.” He further states that,
from this, it is not to be inferred that industrialization should
be neglected, but that “to force this development, e.g.,
through strong protective measures . . . would probably in
most cases be unwise . . . .”
|
º


;
INDUSTRIALIZATION 167
Lord Salter, in his report to the Development Board, sub-
scribed to both the reasons and conclusions of Iversen and
added a few of his own. He points out that “There is every
prospect that, in spite of short-term variations, there will be
a chronic and increasing tendency for the terms of trade to be
adverse to those industrialist countries which do not include
large primary-producing areas.”
Salter further pointed out that the self-sufficiency argument
does not hold in the case of Iraq since “Her rich oil supplies
require foreign markets and provide the resources which
enable her to import advantageously all the manufactured
goods she needs as an addition to those which she can produce
economically.” A case for industrialization can be made for
countries whose population is already too great for the limited
land available. “Here,” he argues, “under penalty of starva-
tion or semi-starvation, industrial production is a necessity.”
In the case of Iraq, he states, this does not apply, and “will
not do so for many years to come. On the contrary, the poten-
tial increase in cultivable land largely exceeds the labor re-
quired for it.”
In short, the basic argument of the Bank Mission, Iversen,
and Salter is that forced industrialization should be avoided.
The Arthur D. Little Report (1956), which proposed a com-
prehensive plan for immediate industrial development, was
generally in sympathy with the above view. In recommending
specified industries the report applied the following criteria:
1. The proposed industry must be able to produce at a
cost below the landed price of comparable imported goods or
materials before import duty is levied. “If an industry can
produce goods in Iraq at a price equal to or lower than the
landed price without import duty, its establishment is truly
economic. In the future it may be desirable to apply a less
stringent test, but at the moment a number of industrial
opportunities promise a profitability that does not need ad-
ditional assistance. It is clearly desirable that they should be
established first.”
2. The technical processes of the proposed industries must
have been in successful use elsewhere for a reasonable period
of time.


168 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
3. Because of the present limitations of the domestic market,
several industries were recommended which will produce
mainly for the export market. “Improved levels of national
income can be obtained only by fuller utilization of domestic
economic resources. As Iraq’s two great resources are agri-
cultural and chemical, development cannot proceed on the
basis of the internal domestic market alone.”
Some of the principal factors contributing to lack of in-
dustrial development in Iraq follow the familiar pattern in
underdeveloped countries. Lack of technical knowledge and
industrial labor; inadequate markets and marketing facilities;
lack of stock market and banking institutions and the inability
or unwillingness to invest in industrial enterprises. Savings in
the past were either hoarded (in the form of gold, silver, or
jewelry) or invested in land, urban property, or commerce
where the capital was believed to be more secure and the
returns much higher.
For the above reasons, industrial expansion in recent years
is almost exclusively sponsored by the state. Expansion has
taken three forms: (1) State enterprises mainly financed by
the Development Board. The major part of industrial invest-
ment in Iraq goes to these industries. (2) Enterprises initiated
and financed by both private capital and the government
mainly through the government Industrial Bank. (3) Private
enterprises which, however, do receive extensive aid in the
form of loans, tax exemptions, and tariff protection. Each
of these will be discussed separately.
State Enterprises
Major industrial projects in Iraq are usually undertaken
by the Development Board. The allocations of this agency for
industrial development have increased each year since its
establishment. In the first Six-Year Plan (1951-56) alloca-
tions amounted to 31 million dinars. In the second program
(1955–59) they rose to 43 million and in the third plan (1955-
60) they rose further to 67 million. It should be noted that
in the previous two plans the budgeted targets were never
reached, mainly because technical studies were not complete.
Most of the Board’s enterprises are still either under con-


INDUSTRIALIZATION 169
struction or in the planning stage. However, the first results
began to appear in 1955 with the emergence of the state oil-
refining industry.
The State Refining Industry
The creation of a refining industry in Iraq has been the
subject of government and public concern since the genesis
of the oil industry. Up to 1951 the production of the Alawand
refinery did not exceed 375,000 tons a year and considerable
quantities of refined products were imported from Abadan
in Iran.
After the Abadan refinery was closed down in 1951, pro-
duction at Alawand was stepped up to 492,000 tons in 1952,
and in order to close the gap between domestic'supplies and
requirements a new refinery was hastily constructed by the
government at Muftiyah near Basrah. It was built largely
from improvised materials and was put into operation in
September, 1952.
In 1952 the government took the first steps to create a state
refining industry capable of meeting the country’s require-
ments. In that year it organized the Government Oil Re-
fineries Administration (GORA) to be responsible for the
administration of all government refineries. It also con-
structed the Muftiyah refinery and purchased from the
Khanaqin Oil Company its marketing facilities in Iraq and
the Alawand Refinery. Since then three more plants have
been constructed by the government.
1. The Dawrah Refinery. This refinery, located near Bagh-
dad, was completed in 1955 at a total cost of 10.5 million
dinars. It was designed to have a capacity of 24,000 barrels
of crude per day, but has proved capable of handling 27,000
b/d, and if necessary its capacity can be stepped up to 30,000
b/d. It produces gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, diesel oil, fuel
oil, and Bunker “C” oil. The refinery commenced operations
in June, 1955 with a staff of about 1,000 workers. Plans are
already in progress to expand its capacity to 40,000 barrels
per day.
Crude oil for the refinery is supplied by a new government
twelve-inch 135-mile pipeline extending between the main


170 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
I.P.C. pipeline system at Baiji (K2) and Dawrah. The refinery
was sited at Dawrah because of its proximity to Baghdad City,
which consumes about 40 per cent of the country’s total
demand for refined products. The refinery is largely self-
sufficient. It has adequate storage facilities for both refined
and crude oil, a tin-can factory, filling stations, maintenance
workshops, power plant, and electricity generating station.
The Dawrah Lubricant and Asphalt Plant. This plant is an ex-
tension of the Dawrah refinery. It is financed by the Develop-
ment Board and was scheduled for completion in April, 1957
at a total cost of 3.6 million dinars. The plant is designed to
produce annually 25,000 tons of various grades of lubricants
in addition to 18,000 tons of road asphalt.”
The Qayarah Asphalt Refinery. This refinery located at
Qayarah, south of Mosul, was financed by the Development
Board and completed in early 1956 at an estimated total cost
of 2.2 million dinars. It now employs some 250 workers and
has an annual production capacity of 60,000 tons of asphalt
and 29,000 tons of various gas oils. A drum manufacturing
plant with a capacity of 600 drums daily was recently erected
near the refinery. It is said to be able to produce asphalt at
eight dinars a ton as against thirty dinars per ton which
Iraq had to pay for imported asphalt.
The Muftiyah Asphalt Refinery. This is a small plant located
at the refinery near Basrah. It was completed in 1955 and
has a production capacity of 6,000 tons of asphalt a year.”
By the end of 1957 Iraq was to have attained a large meas-
ure of, if not full, self-sufficiency in refined products. Since
1955 it has not imported for local consumption any motor
spirit, kerosene, gas oil, or fuel oil. Aviation oil continues to
be imported, although plans are in progress for its domestic
production. Iraq will also produce all its needs of asphalt
and most lubricating oils.
Between 1952 and 1957 state investment in the refining
industry reached some 16.3 million dinars, excluding the
costs of the Muftiyah refinery and the purchase price of the
Alawand refinery and the marketing facilities of the Khanaqin
Oil Co. This investment is justified for many reasons. Pro-
duction costs are lower than the costs of similar imported


INDUSTRIALIZATION 171
products. The state will not only be able to make a profit, but
may be able to sell at lower prices. This is particularly true of
lubricants and asphalt. Local consumption of refined products
is expected to rise steadily. For instance, imports of lubricating
oils rose in value from 0.6 million dinars in 1949 to 1. 1
million in 1955. Between 1951 and 1955 local consumption
of kerosene rose from 31.6 million gallons in 1951 to 61.6
million in 1956; fuel oil from 895 million to 135.7 million;
motor spirit from 26.6 million to 53.7 million; gas oil from
9. 1 million to 32.3 million gallons. When the industry is
operating at full capacity it will probably be able to provide
employment for some 5,000 workers. Finally, it will help
increase the skilled labor force in the country.
Mosul Textile Factory
The consumption of cotton fabrics has declined consider-
ably in recent years in Iraq. For instance, in 1949 Iraq im-
ported 51.5 million square meters of cotton yard goods. By
1956 imports declined to 27.9 million square meters. Part
of the decline is due to local production, but part of it is also
due to lack of demand and the shift in tastes. This is evidenced
by the rise in the imports of rayon fabrics. Such imports rose
from 4.2 million square meters in 1949 to sixty-six million
in 1955.
Although the domestic market for cotton fabrics was not
expanding, the Development Board properly concluded that
the market was large enough to justify the establishment of a
factory using local cotton for raw material. Consequently,
construction of such a plant, located near Mosul in the
north, began in 1954 and was completed in late 1956 at an
estimated total cost of 4.9 million dinars. This figure included
costs of housing for workers (894,000 dinars) and the cost of a
training program (62,000 dinars). The housing is not yet
complete.
The factory has a production capacity of twenty million
square meters of cotton fabric a year. It is believed that its
production, together with the production of other private
factories, will meet the major part of Iraq’s present needs for
cheap cotton yard goods. The factory will commence opera-


INDUSTRIALIZATION 173
The Sugar Industry
Up to 1956 Iraq produced no sugar. Its consumption of
this commodity has been steadily increasing in recent years.
The volume of sugar imports rose from 52,000 tons in 1949 to
140,500 tons in 1956. The establishment of a local industry
would indeed be attractive, if it were feasible, since there is
an expanding domestic market.
The establishment of such an industry has been under
study since 1951, when the International Bank Mission
recommended that the project be held in abeyance until
there was a reasonable certainty that the necessary raw mater-
ials would be available locally.
Since then the government has been experimenting with
growing a variety of sugar raw materials in Iraq. Sugar
beets were found to be suitable for cultivation in the north
and the government encouraged the development of sugar
beet culture there.
In 1956 the Development Board felt justified in proceeding
with the project. On May 9, 1956, it awarded a contract for
two million dinars to a German firm for the construction of a
plant near Mosul to be completed in November, 1957. The
estimated total costs of the plant, including workers’ housing,
is three million dinars. The plant will produce 10,000 tons of
sugar a year from locally-grown beets and, until such time as
beet production in Iraq is sufficient to keep it operating the
whole year, it will also refine 25,000 tons of imported raw
sugar annually.19
In 1956 a new law was in the process of being drafted to
make the manufacture of sugar a state monopoly. Its stated
purpose is the encouragement of local sugar beet agriculture,
since, it is suggested, private sugar manufacturers may turn
to imported raw materials, and in this way destroy the infant
sugar beet culture.11
Plans for the possible expansion of the sugar industry are
already in progress. The Development Board is considering
establishing another factory at Sulaimaniya”. It was also
suggested by consultants that a sugar plant might eventually
be established in Basrah, since soil and climatic conditions


INDUSTRIALIZATION I75
Industrial Planning
From the previous discussion it can be seen that between
1952 and 1956 investment in state industries exclusive of the
refining industry came to some fifteen million dinars. In
each case the industry depends on local raw materials, caters
to the domestic market only, and was selected after years of
study and planning. The state industrial program fell
behind its scheduled targets, but in the long run it seems
much more advisable to fall behind schedules than to be
hurried by various pressures into establishing, without ade-
quate study, industries which might later prove inefficient
and uneconomical—provided, of course, that “adequate
study” is not taken as a blanket excuse for laxity and in-
effectiveness.
Many new industries are either being planned or are ready
to be launched by the Development Board or some other
government agency. The Little Report, mentioned previous-
ly, proposed a phased program for implementation in a
period of some six years (see Table 29). The program con-
templates creating a chemical industry with a variety of by-
products, establishing date industries, a steel-rolling mill and
a steel furnace, and expansion and improvement of the
agricultural products, metal products, and building materials
industries.
TABLE 29
SUGGESTED PHASING of INDUSTRIALIZATION PROGRAM
(The Little Report:1956)
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV
Rayon Textile Rayon Textile Rayon Plant Steel Furnace
Mill Mill Plastic Ma- Plastic Ma-
Sulfur Extrac- Steel-rolling terials Plants: terials Plant:
tion Plant Mill Ethylene Polyvinyl
Paper Plant Fertilizer Poly- Chloride
Date Industries: Plant ethylene Caustic Soda
Syrup Plant Plant
Animal Feed Date Industries:
Plant Syrup Plant
Animal Feed
Plant


176 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV
Extension & Extension & Extension & Extension &
Improvement of: Improvement of: Improvement of: Improvement of:
Agricultural (Same as (Same as (Same as
Products First Phase) Previous Previous
Industry Phase) Phase)
Metal Products
Industry
Building Materials
Industry
Approximate Total Investment in Million Dinars:
14 13.5 8
Source: The Little Report, p. 6.
The Six-Year Plan (1955-60) of the Development Board
seems to follow fairly closely the program suggested above.
In addition to electrification (to be discussed below) the
Board’s program contemplates the following breakdown:
Estimated Expenditures:
Industry 1956–60
In Millions of Dinars
1. Extension and Improvement of:
Agricultural Products Industry
Metal Products Industry
Building Materials Industry
2. JNew Industries:
Sulfur Extraction Plant
Paper Mill
Date Syrup Plant
Date Animal Feed Plant
Rayon Textile Mill
Steel-Rolling Mill
Steel Furnace 12. 3
3. New Plants (Under Study):
Fertilizer Plant
Plastic Materials Plant
Caustic Soda Plant
Mining Projects
11. 5
Natural Gas Pipeline 10. 7
4. Development of Other Industries,
including Atomic Energy. 4.67
Total: 39.17


178 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
countries and the obstacle of tariff barriers; her geographical
position places her in a favorable position to supply the ex-
panding Near and Far Eastern markets.” The Report then
proceeds to suggest the possible lines along which a chemical
industry might be developed in Iraq. It states:
The nature of the chemical industry is such that joint prod-
ucts or by-products often result from the productive process.
The economics are generally such that, unless markets can be
found for these extra products, it is not profitable to produce
the main product. As a result, the chemical industry consists
of a series of complex, interdependent plants; despite the large
sales of products to other industries, the chemical industry has
now become its own best customer. Products of one plant are
used by another in manufacturing a product required by an
external industry; the second plant in turn produces joint or
by-products that are used by a third plant; and so on. The
possible line of development of a chemical industry in Iraq
illustrates this interdependence.
Investigation has disclosed that the establishment in Iraq
of plants to produce rayon and paper and to recover sulfur from
natural gas is economically justified. A rayon plant and a paper
mill of the recommended size would between them require
5,600 tons annually of caustic soda. This, coupled with the
demand of existing industries, would by 1960 result in a probable
total demand of 8,000 tons of caustic soda, which would justify
its production in Iraq. The only method of producing this
chemical that would be economical on this scale, the electrolytic
method, would result in the production of about 0.9 ton of
chlorine for each ton of caustic soda produced. Unless markets
can be found for this it would be cheaper to import the caustic
soda. The proposed plastic-material industry offers a potential
market for chlorine, as it is required as a raw material for
polyvinyl chloride. Natural gas can be used to produce ethylene,
a raw material for both polyvinyl chloride and polyethylene,
which are widely used plastics with growing world markets.
The sulfur in the Kirkuk natural gas could supply, in addition
to export markets, the rayon plant with the sulfur and sulfuric
acid it would need. At the same time it would make it possible
to produce fertilizer in Iraq, as sulfur would be required in
substantial quantities to produce ammonium sulfate. Ammonium
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180 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
and urea, would require ammonia, which could also be manu-
factured from natural gas.
Between these two extremes—a chemical industry (which
is fairly large, interdependent, and for which domestic and
foreign markets have to be created or found), and a build-
ing materials industry (consisting of medium or small in-
dependent production units, with domestic market demand
far ahead of supply)—lie the agricultural and animal products
industries. In this case, both domestic and foreign markets
exist with considerable potential for growth. An industry
also exists but requires some expansion and vast improve-
ment.
The leather products industry is a good example. Iraq
produces its own leather in addition to some imports. Local
tanneries are protected by high import tariffs. Yet local
leather is generally of poor quality, has a limited range of
colors, and is expensive compared with foreign products.
At the same time, the annual per capita consumption of shoes
is 0.2 pair.” It is quite obvious that, with the rising standard
of living, a substantial increase in the consumption of shoes
is most likely. If the consumption rises to no more than one
pair a year per person, this would entail a fivefold increase.
Measures for improvement would have to begin at the source
and proceed all along the line, such as improvement in live-
stock nutrition, protection from diseases, etc., forcing tanner-
ies to improve their processes, possibly through removing
tariffs on imports of leather, and so on.
Another illustration is the dairy products industry. The
consumption of dairy products is extremely low in Iraq, but
with the rise in the levels of income, a substantial increase is
to be expected. Hence, there is a potentially expanding
market for products of modern dairy industries.
Similarly, there is a potential domestic market for vege-
table oils and fats. The per capita consumption of these products
in Iraq is 4.3 kilograms annually, as against a world average
of ten kilograms and a United States average of 30 kilo-
grams.” There are two modern factories at Baghdad more
than capable of meeting the present local market demands,


182 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
in the city of Baghdad, where the standard of living is gener-
ally higher than the rest of the country, showed that people
spent only a little over 1.5 per cent of their incomes on
household furniture and utensils.” In other words, they bought
only absolute minimum necessities. Since the houses are al-
most bare, it is therefore reasonable to assume that people,
with the rise in their real income, would want to spend more
on furnishing their homes, an important prestige factor.
The estimated rate of some 22,000 housing units to be con-
structed annually by 1960 will, in effect, lead to a substantial
increase in the demand for household goods, since new
houses need furnishings. The demand will not be only for more,
but also better furniture. The houses being built or planned are
much better in design and quality than those the public,
especially in the lower income groups, has been used to.
There would be little inclination to furnish a hut nicely, but
there would be much incentive to do so in a nice house, signi-
fying a change in social status.
In any case, the potential local market demand would
probably justify establishment or expansion in the near future
of modern light industries manufacturing such articles as
kitchen utensils (in oversupply at the time of the report),
metal furniture, kerosene stoves, and heaters (widely used in
Iraq), air coolers (now being manufactured there), small
low-cost refrigerators with imported motors, and similar
articles.
3. Service Industries. There is an urgent need for service
industries to supply other industries, such as those of agri-
cultural machinery and motor transport, with spare parts
and components and to provide servicing and maintenance
facilities. The lack of spare parts and service facilities usually
results in long delays, considerable expense to owners, and
waste to the country. The Little Report suggests the estab-
lishment of central machine shops and foundries in Baghdad,
Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk (the four main cities), and a
central garage in Baghdad. The machine shops could organ-
ize mobile repair units to service agricultural equipment in
the various provinces. In Turkey this procedure has proved
fairly successful.


INDUSTRIALIZATION 183
The discussion on industrial planning above serves to illus-
trate two main points. First, the wide range of opportunities
for industrialization to meet the demands of the present and
future local market. Second, the type of policy questions the
Development Board will be seized with for the next five
years. For example: which industries should receive priority?
Which industries should be undertaken by the Board and
which by private capital? Which private industries should re-
ceive assistance from the Board? What are the best ways of
providing assistance? What organizational structures should
be established to administer state industries and to super-
vise private industry? What are the best ways of insuring
efficiency, high standards, and high quality? What are the
best ways to increase the skilled labor force at such a short
notice? The list could go on.
State Participation in Private Enterprise
The chief instrumentality of state assistance to private in-
dustry is the Industrial Bank. The concept of direct state aid
to industry was put into practice in 1936, when the State
Agricultural-Industrial Bank was organized. The assistance
which the bank afforded industry was insignificant. The total
value of its industrial loans—its only contribution—from
1936 to 1945 came to some 64,000 dinars.22 In 1946 it was
replaced by the Industrial Bank and the Agricultural Bank.
In 1946/47 the government created the Industrial Bank
with a capital of half a million dinars. In 1952, its nominal
capital was raised to three million. According to its charter,
its functions are: (1) to grant loans for the establishment
of new industries or the expansion or improvement of ex-
isting industries, (2) to participate in stock industrial enter-
prises, (3) to start new industries on its own initiative if
necessary, and (4) to offer various services connected with the
import of machinery and materials and the export of prod-
ucts. 23
In many ways the Bank has been very successful. It has
contributed materially to the development of private industry
through capital participation, and has shown substantial
profits. Table 30 shows twelve companies in which the Bank


INDUSTRIALIZATION 185
Bank was created is to assist in the industrial development of
the country and not to involve government in business. Con-
sequently, once a company is established as a going concern
and its success is assured, the bank tries to dispose of its stock
to the public. This has two objectives: (1) to release the
Bank’s funds for investment in new industries, and (2) to help
create a very badly needed capital market and to educate
the public in the use of stocks.
TABLE 31
LOANs of THE INDUSTRIAL BANK
Total Value of
Tear JNo. of Loans Loans in Dinars
1948/49 35 50,298
1949/50 81 132,110
1950/51 87 281,225
1951/52 151 655,380
1952/53 Il-3. Il.a.
1953/54 172 734,140
1954/55 242 1,367,602
Source: Industrial Bank, 2nd and 3rd Annual Reports for the years 1948–49,
1949–50; National Bank of Iraq, Annual Report for 1952; Statistical Abstract for
1955, p. 181.
On the other hand, the Bank has been criticized on two
counts. It seems to set a high value on profits and has a ten-
dency to measure its success in that context. Although the
Bank should make some profit in order to create public con-
fidence in its operations, it was not created to make money
but to assist and develop industry. Therefore, it should partic-
ipate not only in ventures that show considerable profits
but also in industries which benefit the country as a whole,
even though their profit margin may be low.
The Bank has a tendency to participate only in fairly large
enterprises. It should in addition help in the establishment
and improvement of handicraft industries and small repair


186 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
shops. This would contribute to social stability since it helps
to create a class of independent artisans in the cities.
The second main function of the Bank is to assist in the im-
provement and expansion of industry through loans. The
Bank has become increasingly active in this field as a glance
at Table 31 will show. In 1948/49—the second year of its
operation—it made thirty-five loans totaling in value 50,-
298 dinars. Six years later, in 1954/55, the number of its
loans rose to 242 with a total value of 1,367,602 dinars. They
vary in amount from 150 to 150,000 dinars and more, and are
extended to small and large establishments, although the
latter seem to receive the lion’s share.
It is apparent that the Bank is playing an increasingly
vital role in the industrialization of Iraq. It will be recalled
that among the major allocations of the Development Board
for the 1955-60 industrial program were included unspecified
amounts for the Industrial Bank and the Ministry of Eco-
nomics. Apparently, insofar as private industry is concerned,
the Bank is to become the executive arm of the Board.
Lord Salter recommended that where industrialization was
concerned the Board should separate policy function from
administrative functions and should delegate administrative
functions to a separate body. This was endorsed by the Little
Report. The report specifically recommended that the Indus-
trial Bank be reorganized and transferred to the Ministry of
Development, with additional loan and capital funds above
those now at its disposal. It further recommended that the
Board facilitate the establishment of an Industrial Develop-
ment Finance Corporation owned by private and state banks.
Such a corporation should have a line of credit from the
Board. Its function would be to provide capital and loan funds
to private industry. Once it is formed it should take over the
functions of the Industrial Bank with regard to private in-
dustry. The Development Board would, however, remain the
policy-making body determining the scope and direction of
industrialization. The report cites the Industrial Bank of
Turkey as a successful example of an industrial bank in the
Middle East.


INDUSTRIALIZATION 187
Private Industry
Basically, the rise of modern private industry dates back to
the war years. From 1936 to 1943 total capital investment in
industry came to a little over one million dinars.” During
the war, shortages of manufactured goods and expectations
of high profits resulted in some industrial expansion. From
1943 to 1948 private industrial investment totaled 3.1 million
dinars.” Some of the factories that were established were in-
efficient and could survive only as long as there was no com-
petition from foreign goods. Consequently, in the years im-
mediately following the war, these industries experienced
considerable distress.26
In any case, by the end of 1952, in addition to other indus-
tries, there were ten large-scale industries totaling in number
twenty-two establishments.” Their total capital was nearly
five million dinars (4,835,755), and the value of their annual
output was 4.4 million dinars (4,424,339). They employed
4,553 workers with an annual wage bill of close to 600,000
dinars (599,366).28
Since 1952 there has been substantial development. In 1954,
according to the census, there were ninety-five firms employ-
ing 100 workers and over each, with a total labor force of
18,600 workers.” Four of these employed 1,000 workers and
over each, with a total of 7,800 workers (see Table 28). These
figures exclude the oil industry.
It can be stated—probably without much exaggeration—
that since 1950 private industry has come into being almost
exclusively as a result of state effort. The activities of the In-
dustrial Bank have already been discussed at some length.
But in addition to direct financial aid, new industries receive
extensive privileges. In 1950 a new law (No. 43 of 1950),
called the Encouragement of Industry Law, replaced an old
one passed in 1929. The new law awards new industries the
following benefits: (1) exemption from income and surtaxes
for four years, (2) exemption from import duty on machinery,
material, equipment, and spare parts, (3) exemption from
property tax for ten years, and (4) use of government land
not in excess of 25,000 square meters, free of rent for ten years.


188 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Also, industry is afforded varying degrees of protection.
For instance, heavy import duties are imposed on leather,
while the importation of cotton yarn and beer is entirely pro-
hibited. Other goods are subject to a quota system.
The main obstacles which have so far stood in the way of
the development of private industry are being gradually
removed. The foremost is probably lack of capital, with a
concomitant hesitancy or reluctance to invest in industry.
Through state financial aid and various other inducements
the volume of private capital invested in industry is increasing
year by year. As knowledge of the “mysteries” of industry in-
creases and the benefits from it become clear, it is reasonable
to expect that the rate of investment will increase and that
private capital will become more venturesome in spirit. The
second main obstacle is lack of technical knowledge and
shortage of skilled labor. This, again, is being rectified by the
state. The third main obstacle is market limitation. As has
been demonstrated, the market in Iraq for many commodities
is no longer static. It is either expanding or expandable.
On the whole, however, state investment in industry for
some years to come will far exceed private investment. If the
present trend continues, the state may eventually own most—
if not all—the most important industrial enterprises in the
country. This raises the question of the desirability of state
ownership of industry versus private ownership.
It is argued that state investment in industry is only a tem-
porary measure, necessitated by the lack of private capital
and the immediate need and/or desire for a measure of in-
dustrialization to utilize valuable natural and human re-
sources now completely idle or only partially exploited.
The wisdom and the need for the present state action are
beyond question. There is little doubt that, if there is to be
any significant industrialization, major investment will have
to be by the state since it alone has the necessary capital. How-
ever, there is a real possibility that what began as a temporary
measure, until a capital market could be developed, may
become permanent. Three main arguments support this
conclusion:
1. Experience in other countries has shown that once an


INDUSTRIALIZATION 189
organization is created, it becomes extremely difficult to dis-
lodge it, for it generally entrenches itself and develops vested
interests. Particularly in government, temporary measures
and organizations have a way of becoming permanent.
2. Ownership of industry by the state may become more
and more attractive as a revenue-raising instrument. As the
volume of profits from state industries increases, there will
probably be considerable reluctance to give up this lucrative
source of revenue. On the contrary, this may provide further
temptation to increase state industrial holdings.
3. Although there is no conclusive evidence based on actual
study, there is reason to believe that, generally speaking, the
vocal segments of the Iraqi public and particularly the in-
telligentsia, would prefer state ownership of the important
industries to private ownership. This statement would probab-
ly hold true in all countries of the Middle East. Conceptually,
state ownership has the advantage of appealing to the public
in terms of “public property” to be used for the general good
rather than to enrich the few. Conversely, private ownership
of industry brings with it mental association with “capitalism,”
a term which in the Middle East carries unpleasant and some-
times even sinister connotations.
The ultimate outcome will probably depend on state policy.
At present the tendency, whether by choice or necessity,
seems to be toward more state ownership. It remains to be
seen whether this trend will continue.
Electrification
The consumption of electricity in Iraq is still almost entirely
restricted to the four main cities of Baghdad, Kirkuk, Basrah,
and Mosul. Among them, they account for about 90 per
cent of the consumption of electricity in the country. The
other ten per cent is distributed among the other smaller
towns. No electricity is consumed in rural areas.
Between 1947 and 1955 consumption increased over eight
times (see Table 32). However, as can be seen from the table,
the greatest part of the increase took place in the two cities of
Baghdad and Kirkuk. Over 90 per cent of the electricity in
Kirkuk is consumed by the oil company.


INDUSTRIALIZATION 191
in the city of Baghdad (other than oil). Finally, it shows an
increasing use of electricity for other purposes than lighting.
This indicates that electrical appliances are in much greater
use in the country.
Iraq possesses plentiful supplies of low-cost thermal and
potential hydroelectric energy resources. Nevertheless, until
1956 these resources were not utilized, although electric
supply is inadequate and comparatively expensive.
The question of increasing the supply of electricity has
been under discussion and study for several years. Lately it
has become more urgent, since the demand for domestic
use has been increasing steadily and the development of in-
dustry depends to a large measure on the availability of low-
cost electric power. An electrification program was included
in the first Six-Year Plan, but no concrete steps were taken
until 1956.
The program contemplates the gradual electrification of
the whole country. Present plans are based on the use of
natural gas and oil as sources of energy. This is because under
present conditions of low demand (i.e., in relation to potential
production capacity) and low-cost thermal fuels, the com-
paratively high cost of constructing hydroelectric plants
would be unjustified. Thirdly, intensive cost studies have
shown that electric power can be sold to industry and other
consumers at two fils (0.28 cents) per unit.
The program also calls for the construction of a power
plant at Dibbis near Kirkuk to serve northern Iraq, with an
initial generating capacity of 60,000 kilowatts, another at
Baghdad to serve central Iraq with a capacity of 60,000 kilo-
watts” and a third at Basrah to serve southern Iraq, with a
capacity of 45,000 kilowatts.31 The Development Board allo-
cated 12,669,000 dinars for electrification in its 1955-60 plan.
In July 1956 the Board awarded contracts to two German
firms to supply and install turbogenerators, boilers, and other
equipment for the Dibbis and Baghdad power plants. The
Dibbis station will use Kirkuk natural gas and the Baghdad
station crude oil, but the Baghdad plant will revert to natural
gas at a later date. According to the contract one generator
(15,000 k.w.) in each station should be installed and handed


192 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
over to the Board not later than twenty-one months after the
signing of the contract. The due date will then be in the spring
of 1958. The latest information available indicates that the
Board was ready in October 1956 to award contracts for the
Basrah station to be completed in 1959.3%
Communications
Administration, Nature, and Problems
of the Transport System.
Control over the transportation system in Iraq is vested
in several government agencies. The railways are state-
owned and are operated by the Railway Administration, an
autonomous agency which has its own budget independent
of the ordinary government budget. The Railway Administra-
tion is also responsible for operating the Iraqi Airways.
Control over and maintenance of the road system is vested
in the Public Works Department under the Minister of Com-
munications and Public Works. Roads within municipal
boundaries are the responsibility of municipal authorities.
The construction of major roads and bridges is carried out by
the Development Board. The Port of Basrah is operated by
the Basrah Port Directorate which, like the Railway Adminis-
tration, is an autonomous body with its own separate budget.
Geography and demography have bequeathed two distinct
features to Iraq’s transportation system. First, the major
part of the traffic in Iraq moves along a north-south axis from
Mosul to Basrah. This is the backbone of the transportation
system. Southwards must move the great quantities of grain
and other produce for the domestic and export markets;
northwards go all goods entering Basrah, the country’s only
port and its southern extremity. Second, the system is con-
centrated mainly in the populated and cultivated eastern
part of the country. It converges on two main points: Bagh-
dad, the capital and trade center, and Basrah.
A good transportation system is essential to economic
growth. Expansion in agricultural production, for instance,
is meaningless unless there are adequate facilities to carry the
produce to market centers. Industrial development is also
dependent in a similar manner.
|


194 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
standard gauge, connects Baghdad with Mosul and continues
to Syria and up to Turkey and from there to Europe. It is
the only railroad link which Iraq has with its neighbors.
The railway system consists entirely of single track lines.
Up to 1950 the system was more than adequate for the
country’s needs and was estimated to be able to carry about
15 per cent more than its 1950 average. Expansion was never-
theless deemed necessary because a sharp increase in the
movement of goods resulting from the development program
was anticipated. Moreover, a large part of the rolling stock
and engines was very old and needed immediate replacement.
In 1951 the International Bank Mission made the following
recommendations:
1. Extension of the railroad system to meet expected rise in
the movement of goods and passengers.
2. Gradual conversion from steam to diesel traction. It
was argued that diesel traction is much more efficient, es-
pecially since diesel fuel is available locally at favorable
prices.
3. Conversion from narrow gauge to standard gauge
throughout the system. It was suggested that large segments
of the narrow-gauge lines were old and would need replace-
ment in any case. In this way, too, the system would be unified
and facilitate the movement of goods and passengers. As
things stood, goods transported from Basrah to Mosul, for
instance, would have to go up to Baghdad on the narrow-
gauge line and there be moved to the standard-gauge line and
then transported to Mosul. In the words of the Mission, “the
operation is costly, inefficient, and time-consuming.”84
The Iraqi Railways administration, supported by Lord
Salter, did not agree with the last recommendation of the
Mission. It is in favor of building a new standard-gauge line
from Baghdad to Basrah and, at the same time, retaining the
old meter-gauge line. In this way the country would have two
complete systems: standard gauge from the Syrian border-
Mosul-Baghdad-Basrah and meter gauge from Erbil-Kirkuk-
Baghdad-Basrah. Transhipment of goods at Baghdad would
thus become unnecessary.
The Administration and Lord Salter argue that converting


196 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
The road system in 1950-51 was limited, and road condi-
tions were (and still are) very bad. Road traffic was very light
and the number of vehicles in the country even now continues
to be comparatively small (see Table 34).
TABLE 34
REGISTERED VEHICLES IN IRAQ
1945 1950 1955 1956
Passenger cars 3,771 11,438 20,603 23,815
Buses Im.a. 3,007- 3,311 3,451
Trucks 2,017 5,907 9,043 10,543
Motorcycles 127 1,626 2,091 2,420
Source: Statistical Abstracts, 1950, p. 249; 1955, p. 213; 1956, p. 135.
• Source: IBRD, p. 330.
The broad objectives of the road-building program were
laid down in 1950 by an Interdepartmental Committee of
Government Officials, assisted by a foreign expert. The Com-
mittee devised a ten-year program with the following order of
priorities: (1) trunk roads connecting Baghdad with Basrah
and Kirkuk, (2) roads in areas which do not and are not likely
to have railroad connections, (3) roads between centers which
are served or are likely to be served by rail, and (4) strengthen-
ing the existing paved roads.
There has been no basic change in policy since the Develop-
ment Board took over. Roads, in the words of Lord Salter,
are to serve as “ribs in the transport anatomy with the railroad
system as the backbone.” Emphasis is on trunk roads connect-
ing main centers and on feeder roads connecting rural areas
with main centers to facilitate the movement of agricultural
products. Whenever possible, roads will not follow the rail-
road routes, in order to avoid duplication and prevent waste-
ful competition.
The basic difference between the Board’s program and
that of the Committee is one of timing and speed. The former
is much more extensive and geared to be completed in a


198
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
TABLE 35
RoAD AND BRIDGE CONSTRUCTION IN IRAQ
(1952—January 1, 1956)
Road Design:
a. Location Surveys:
Completed
75% completed
Under 75% completed
b. Construction Plans:
Completed
50% completed
Under 50% completed
Road Construction:
a. Completed:
By P. W. D."
By Contract
b. Under Construction:
By P. W. D.
By Contract
c. Contracted but not started
Bridge Construction:
a. Completed:
By P. W. D.
By Contract
b. Under Construction:
By P. W. D.
By Contract
101
42
60
329
Kilometers
765
116
685
227
143
389
85
JNumber
18
25
Source: U.S.A., I.C.A., Baghdad, Iraq Progresses, Baghdad, August, 1956, n.p.
* Public Works Department.
|


INDUSTRIALIZATION 199
º
Navigation
In recent years river navigation has ceased to be a significant
factor in the country’s transportation system. This is because
river conditions have deteriorated steadily by heavy silting,
shifts of the channels, and a rising of the river bed. Emphasis
is now on using the river system for irrigation rather than
navigation. Consequently, the plans of the Development
Board do not include improvement of river transportation.
Basrah, Iraq’s only port for general cargo, was first devel-
oped as a modern port by the British during World War I.
Since then it has experienced considerable expansion and
improvement. It now handles very efficiently an ever-increas-
ing volume of passenger and cargo traffic (see Table 36). Its
varied activities extend along the Shatt al-Arab from the
main wharves at Magil (Basrah) to Fao, the oil terminal.
TABLE 36
MovemENT of OCEAN-GoING VESSELS
AT THE PORT OF BASRAH
1945 1950 1953 1955 1956
Vessels:
Arrived 128 372 430 434 453
Departed 128 363 424 434 457
Cargo Tonnage:
Imported 147,769 238,725 478,145 727,446 659,086
Exported 316,958 687,497 719,417 561,194 475,613
Passengers:
Arrived 2,344 16,415 14,466 20,753 15,670
Departed 428 16,075 12,830 16,224 11,808
Source: Statistical Abstract, for 1950, p. 257, and 1955, p. 118; 1956, p. 128.
At various times the Iraqi government has considered the
construction of a new port at Umm Qasr, on an inlet of the
Persian Gulf south of Basrah. The project has a certain appeal
in case of war and in view of the present congestion at Basrah.
Both the Bank Mission and Lord Salter recommended that
the project be abandoned, at least for the present. There


INDUSTRIALIZATION 201
TABLE 37
AIR TRAFFIC IN IRAQ
1947 1950 1953 1955 1956
JNo. of Planes:
Arrived 5,394 5,443 5,995 6,716 7,813
Departed 5,394 5,443 5,995 6,716 7,813
Passengers:
Arrived 12,376 21,453 31,412 45,818 57,744
Departed 12,882 44,448 30,962 42,976 57,204
In Transit 31,672 44,456 43,921 47,646 40,500
Source: Statistical Abstract, 1950, pp. 263-270; 1955, p. 123; and 1956, p. 133.
It has become fairly apparent that the facilities of the
Baghdad Airport are no longer adequate to meet the in-
crease in air traffic. In its 1955-60 program, the Develop-
ment Board allocated 8.85 million dinars for the expansion
of the existing Baghdad airport, the construction of a new
modern airport (at Baghdad) and other airports throughout
the country. Apparently, when the allocation was made no
final policy decision had been taken whether to enlarge the
present airport or to build a new one. This is indicated by the
recommendation of the Council of Ministers to the Develop-
ment Board in October, 1956 that it take immediate steps
either to build a new modern international airport or to en-
large and improve the existing Baghdad airport to meet the
proposed standards.”
Summary and Conclusions
The present industrialization program in Iraq represents
the first major step which the country has taken toward in-
dustrialization. No doubt it is also the first phase. The pro-
gram has certain distinct features:
1. For all practical purposes it is sponsored, planned,
financed, and executed by the state. Even private industrial
enterprises receive, in one way or the other, state financial
aid in addition to other benefits.
2. It is organic in the sense that it is primarily designed to
put into use idle national resources which have been either
completely neglected or only partially exploited.


PART IV. The Department of Human Resources
“IO
THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION
No more serious challenge confronts Iraq today than that of
education, both as a means of building a new social structure
and as an instrument of technological progress. The problem
is one of vast dimensions, In 1947 when the first census was
taken, only eight per cent of the population (excluding
nomads) could read and write. Of the total male popula-
tion about 14 per cent were literate, while the corresponding
figure for females was three per cent.
The problem is not only vast, but its solution has assumed
critical urgency in view of Iraq’s development program.
There has to be some balance, a proportional relationship,
between material and intellectual progress. In order to run
efficiently, the new physical plant abuilding in agriculture,
industry, etc., has to be manned and maintained by a fairly
skilled and literate labor force. However, the time gap be-
tween physical production and personnel training is wide.
It takes two to four years to build a factory or a dam, but it
takes a larger number of years to build up a skilled and
intelligent labor force. The terms “skilled” and “intelligent”
are used here in a broad sense. They include not only the
ability to read and to manipulate machines, but also the ac-
quisition and/or adaptation of philosophies, attitudes, be-


206 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
havior, and other intangible components necessary for a
society which aspires to a higher standard of living.
The tables that follow in this chapter serve to illustrate two
central points: (1) the almost pathetic inadequacy of the
educational establishment and (2) the desperate efforts that
are being made (since 1950) to improve it and enlarge it.
In Iraq, education is a state function. Authority, however,
is divided among various government departments. The
Ministry of Education has full administrative and financial
responsibility for intermediate, secondary, vocational, and
technical schools, teachers’ training schools, six colleges, and
most of the students studying abroad at government expense.
Until 1951 it also had similar authority over elementary
schools, but in that year, with a view to decentralization,
the government transferred responsibility for them to the
Provincial Administrative Councils. The Ministry, however,
retained supervisory powers and set the curriculum.
Seven other colleges come under the jurisdiction of various
other ministries, depending on the subject of specialization.
Finally, the Development Board is responsible for the con-
struction of schools and other educational institutions. In
TABLE 38
ACTUAL ExPENDITUREs of THE MINISTRY OF
EDUCATION, AND THEIR PERCENTILE RELATIONSHIP
To Total Government ExPENDITURES
Tear Thousand Dinars Percent
1920/21 130a 2.3
1925/26 171 4.2
1930/31 294 7.3
1935/36 431 9.6
1940/41 848 11.8
1945/46 1,612 9.0
1950/51 3,5998 14.0
1953/54 6,787 13.5
1956/57 10,560 16.3
1957/58 12,887° 18.3
Source: For 1920/21 to 1953/54, Ministry of Education, Annual Report
for 1953/54; for 1956/57 and 1957/58, Education in Iraq, op. cit., p. 2.
* All figures include costs of elementary education.
* All figures exclude high cost of living allowances.
* Estimated.


THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION 2O7
addition, the Board supports either directly or indirectly
educational enterprises that come within the purview of the
development concept as such.
Table 38 shows actual expenditures of the Ministry of
Education in selected years and their percentile relation-
ship to total government expenditures. These include the
costs of elementary education but exclude high cost of living
allowances and the expenditures of colleges and other in-
stitutions not attached to the Ministry. They also exclude
expenditures of the Development Board.
In the 1920’s expenditures began to rise slowly, and they
registered appreciable increases during the 1930's. During
the war years there was a considerable decline both in real
terms and in percentage of the total budgetary figure. The
increase in expenditures in 1945-46, for instance, was actually
offset by the decline in the purchasing power of the dinar
and a corresponding rise in the cost of materials and services.
After the war, expenditures on education began to re-
cover. In 1950/51, they reached a high of 14 per cent. Since
then they have risen sharply year after year. In fact, the table
does not show the full extent of the rise since, in the past, part
of the expenditures used to go to school construction. The
apparent percentage decline in 1953/54 is not real, for in
that year the Development Board assumed full responsi-
bility for the costs of school construction.
The role of the Development Board in the field of education
has increased considerably since it was organized in 1950.
In the first program (1951-56) its projected activities were
restricted to the building of schools, sending students abroad
to study technical subjects—mainly to meet part of its own
needs for skilled personnel—and to developing and improving
research facilities.
The conception of its role became broader in each succeed-
ing program. In the 1955-60 plan there were included the
establishment of technical schools, schools to develop agri-
cultural education, a public library, swimming pools, and
sports fields. In other words, in addition to increasing and
improving the physical plant, the Board also became con-
cerned with the development of human resources and skills.


208 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
TABLE 39
ALLocations of THE DEveLopMENT BoARD
FoR EDUCATION: 1955-60
Dinars
1. Student Missions 1,650,000
2. Research and Laboratories 1,550,000
3. Scientific Institutes and Primary Schools 8,000,000
4. Other Scientific Institutes 750,000
5. Technical Schools 1,250,000
6. Schools and short courses to develop agricultural
education 750,000
7. Iraqi University 2,000,000
8. Public Library 350,000
9. Students’ House 250,000
10. Swimming pools and sports fields 2,000,000
TOTAL 18,500,000
Elementary Education
Iraq is committed to the ideal of universal literacy. The
task is so formidable that only little progress has been made.
The achievements between 1920 and 1950 are impressive in
absolute terms, but are only “a drop in the bucket” in terms
of ultimate goals.
In 1920/21 there were eighty-eight primary schools with
some 8,000 students. Thirty years later, in 1950/51, their
number had increased to 1,101. In other words, they in-
creased at the rate of some thirty-three schools a year.
From 1950/51 on there was a radical departure from
previous patterns. This was due to the establishment of the
Development Board, which had become financially respon-
sible for the construction of schools, and to considerable in-
creases in the budget of the Ministry of Education. The
Board began building “schools by the hundreds” so that
between 1950/51 and 1956/57, a period of six years, 760 new
elementary schools were added, amounting to 70 per cent
of the number of all elementary schools opened during the
previous thirty years. Perhaps as significant is the fact that
even the annual rate of increase is not static. In 1951/52,
108 new schools were added. In 1953/54, the number rose to
128 schools. Between 1954/55 and 1956/57, it increased
rther to 141 new schools per year. It would not be sur-


THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION 2T1
TABLE 40
Government ELEMENTARY AND Secondary Schools”
1945/46 1950/51 1951/52 1952/53 1953/54 1954/55 1955/56 1956/57
Elementary Schools
Schools
Boys 723 819 901 984 1,094 1,154 1,062 Im.a.
Girls 169 190 204 228 256 270 261 Il.a.
Co-Ed. 52 92 104. 117 101 155 425 Il.a.
Total 944 1,101 1,209 1,329 1,451 1,579 1,748 1,861
Teachers
Men 3,361 4,376 5,051 5,544 6,070 6,679 7,274 Il.a.
Women 1,418 1,991 2,237 2,491 2,749 2,948 3,196 Il.a.
Total 4,779 6,367 7,288 8,035 8,819 9,627 10,470 11,607
Students
Boys 90,419 138,530 153,653 173,341 195,803 224,253 252,732 Il.a.
Girls 28,068 42,249 45,600 52,487 62,530 70,744 79,949 Il.a.
Total 118,487 180,779 199,253 225,828 258,333 294,997 332,681 378,384
Intermediate and Secondary Schools
Schools
Boys 36 64 73 86 92 109 107 Il.a.
Girls 23 31 31 39 42 50 45 Il.a.
Total 59 95 104 125 134 159 152 210
Teachers
Men 451 698 814 1,027 1,185 1,350 1,439 Il.a.
Women 141 301 356 430 535 662 699 Il.a.
Total 592 999 1,170 1,457 1,720 2,012 2,138 3,072
Students
Boys 9,480 17,594 18,553 23,015 26,666 32,036 34,040 Il.a.
Girls 2,693 5,112 5,525 6,926 8,144 9,448 10,558 Im.a.
Total 12,173 22,706 24,078 29,941 34,810 41,484 44,598 60,389
TOTALS
Schools 1,003 1,196 1,313 1,454 1,585 1,738 1,900 2,071
Teachers 5,371 7,366 8,458 9,492 10,539 11,639 12,608 14,679
Students 130,660 203,485 223,331 255,769 293,143 336,481 377,279 438,773
Sources: For 1945/46 through 1953/54, Iraq, Ministry of Education, Annual
Report for 1953/54; for 1954/55, Iraq, Statistical Abstract, 1955, pp. 109-111; for
1955/56, Statistical Abstract, 1956, pp. 74-76; for 1956/57, Iraqi Embassy, Office of
the Cultural Attaché, Education in Iraq (Washington, D.C.: n.d.), pp. 7 and 12.


THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION 213
better than a central bureaucracy. It is also more democratic
and, by giving local authorities responsibility (with assistance),
expansion of school facilities will probably proceed at a
faster rate. Some have expressed fear that the move may in-
crease divisive tendencies. This fear seems unjustified, since
the central authorities still retain supervisory powers and
still prescribe the curriculum and the rules and regula-
tions.
In addition to a few minor ones, elementary education in
Iraq confronts two special problems: (1) the problem of the
Yezidi minority, and (2) the problem of Bedouin education.
The Yezidis are a closely-knit, semi-political religious
minority comprising some 32,000 persons. Some of their
religious beliefs and taboos prohibit the education of children,
and the pronunciation of certain sounds and words. Even if
schooling were allowed, the second prohibition makes in-
struction nearly impossible.
The problem of Bedouin education has been the subject of
serious thought for many years. Since tribes migrate from one
area to another, the usual school organization does not apply.
A few mobile schools have been organized and move with the
nomads; and some of the tribes, such as the Shammar in the
north, are anxious to have their children receive instruction.
By and large, no serious effort has been made to solve the
problem. Probably, as the nomads become sedentarized—
and they are gradually becoming so—the educational system
will be expanded to include their children. In the meantime,
Bedouin children continue with little or no schooling.
Secondary Education
In order to qualify for secondary school, the student must
have completed a six-year elementary course and passed a
general examination set up by the Ministry of Education.
The secondary school system itself is divided into two stages:
an intermediate stage consisting of three years of study; and a
preparatory stage consisting of two years. The preparatory
stage has three divisions: science, literature, and commerce.
After completion of the intermediate stage, the student must
pass another general examination before proceeding to the


214 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
preparatory stage. Similarly a third examination must be
passed at the end of the two-year preparatory course before
receiving the secondary school certificate.
Both inadequate economic resources and conscious govern-
ment policy have tended to reduce substantially the number
of students who may continue their education from the ele-
mentary to the secondary stage. Each examination hurdle
eliminates between 40 and 50 per cent of the candidates. Those
who fail cannot proceed further. For instance, in 1955, out of
21,045 students who took the general examination after the
six-year elementary course, only 12,531 or 60 per cent passed.
Out of 7,256 participants in the intermediate examination, only
3,715 or 51 per cent passed. Out of 3,406 students who took
the secondary school examination, 1,644 or 48 per cent passed.
In all the three examinations, out of 31,707 participants,
17,890 or 56 per cent passed.
Despite these limiting factors, the number of schools and
students rose sharply, particularly in recent years (see Table
40). In 1920 there was only one school in the whole country,
located at Baghdad. By 1951 the number had risen to ninety-
five, including thirty-one schools for girls. As in the case of
elementary schools, 1951 was a year of departure from pre-
vious patterns. In a period of six years between 1951 and
1957, 115 new schools were added, bringing the total to 210.
Until 1956 secondary education in Iraq followed the
European tradition. Heavy emphasis was placed on classical
and literary subjects with a marked tendency toward pre-
paring students for the universities and the professions. The
repeated examinations tend to have a stultifying effect on
the students. In particular, the general examination after the
six-year elementary course categorizes students too sharply
and usually affects the candidate for the rest of his life.
Similarily the “science” examination, held at the end of the
two-year preparatory period, is so difficult as compared with
the “arts” examination that few students elect to take a
science major, thus creating another impediment to technical
education, so very badly needed at this stage in the develop-
ment of Iraq.4
The whole conception of what intermediate and secondary


216 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
into separate and optional programs: science, literature, in-
dustry, agriculture, commerce, and home economics.
Since 1952 secondary education has been completely free.
In addition, boarding school facilities are to be established
for students from small villages not likely to have secondary
schools of their own.
Progress—to the extent that money can achieve it—has
been impressive in recent years. Iraq has still to solve the
curriculum problem and the related problem of availability
of qualified teachers to meet the requirements of the new
curriculum proposed.
Technical and Vocational Training
Because of the development program and the growth of
industry, services, and mechanized agriculture in recent years,
the question of technical education has now assumed a special
significance. The level of technical knowledge in the country
is very low, even by Middle Eastern standards, and both the
number of technicians and of training facilities are entirely
inadequate to meet the present needs of the country.
Various theories have been offered from time to time to
explain the present dilemma. “The Arab mind,” it is said,
“has a flair for literature but none for natural science”;
young men prefer “white collar” jobs; working with one’s
hands is not considered dignified,” and so on. Some of these
generalizations are no doubt true, but they fail to provide
an adequate explanation, for—time and again—actual
experience has seemed to disprove them. The numerous oil
companies with specific objectives have found the Arab
receptive and capable, once given the incentive and oppor-
tunity, of acquiring quickly a relatively high level of technical
skill.” The oil companies have been able to train large bodies
of men in a bewildering variety of skills and trades. It seems
to this writer that the explanation is a simple one. On the
one hand, until recent years there has been no particular
demand in Iraq for artisans. The wages of skilled workers
were generally lower than those of office workers. Therefore,
no strong enough incentive existed for acquiring technical
skills. On the other hand, “white collar” jobs, in addition to


THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION 217
being better paid, carried with them social prestige, so that
it was only natural for young men to seek them in preference
to skilled work.
In any case, the technical training movement has gathered
considerable momentum in recent years. This was inevitable
since the success of the development plans rests to a large
degree on the availability of an adequate labor force.
In 1955 there were three technical schools (at Baghdad,
Kirkuk, and Basrah), and a fourth was opened the same year
at Sulaimaniya. In 1955/56 they had a total of some 808
students and were able to graduate 92 students. So far,
following the recommendations of the Committee mentioned
previously, the Ministry of Education opened, in addition to
the above, three commercial secondary schools, three agri-
cultural secondary schools, and two technical secondary
schools. The Development Board has allocated large sums of
money for the establishment of technical and agricultural
schools and other “scientific” institutes. The next few years
will probably see considerable expansion in technical train-
ing facilities although, for some years, the expansion will not
keep up with the demand.
Some progress has also been made in vocational education.
Courses in agriculture (since 1950) have been set up in rural
primary schools; in gardening for boys in the cities; in home
arts for girls. In addition, there is a school for nursing and
midwifery attached to the College of Medicine, which in
1954/55 had 134 women students; a Home Arts School for
girls (799 students in 1955/56), and an Institute of Fine Arts
(361 students in 1955/56).
Teachers’ Training
In spite of the increased and heavy demands on the supply
of teachers, training facilities have generally kept abreast of
the needs of the country, so that only occasional shortages
occur. Between 1950 and 1957 the number of elementary
school teachers increased by 82 per cent; that of secondary
school teachers by more than 207 percent (see Table 40).
In 1953/54 there were three schools for the training of
elementary school teachers: two for boys and one for girls.


THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION 219
Higher Education
In 1921 there was one institution of higher learning in the
whole country—the Baghdad Law College. In 1956/57, the
system of higher education consisted of thirteen colleges with
a total enrollment of over 5,000 students (see Table 41). Four
of these colleges have been established only since 1950: The
College of Agriculture (1950), the College of Dentistry (1952),
the College of Physical Education (1954), and the Veterinary
College (1956).
Financial responsibility and jurisdiction over the thirteen
colleges are divided among various government depart-
ments. The Ministry of Education has jurisdiction over seven
colleges; the Ministry of Health over three, the Ministry of
Agriculture over two; and the Directorate of Waqf over
one. All the colleges with the exception of Queen Aliya
College (for women), and the College of Religious Juris-
prudence (for men) are coeducational.
The College of Medicine admits only “science” majors
from secondary schools for a six-year course of study, includ-
ing one year of internship. After the successful completion of
the six-year course it grants the degree of Licencié in Medicine.
The same regulations apply to the College of Pharmacy and
Chemistry, except that it offers only a five-year course which
includes one year of internship for pharmacists and a four-
year course for a B.S. degree in chemistry. All the other
colleges admit only graduates of secondary schools for a four-
year course. All of them grant the degree of Licencié to students
who pass the prescribed examinations in the final year of
study.
In addition to the above colleges, there is a school of
nursing and midwifery and a school for health officials. Both
are attached to the College of Medicine. A police college
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior completes
the list.
Some of the colleges, such as the College of Arts and
Sciences, have attained a fairly high academic standing.
However, they all suffer from the fact that they are not


222 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Foreign study has not been an unmixed blessing, although
it must be stated that, on balance, it has proved not only a
very valuable but also a necessary experience. On the positive
side, it has provided Iraq with a large body of experts which
otherwise it would have been unable to obtain in such a
short time. Since Iraq has no facilities for such training, it is
hard to see how the needs of the Development Board, the
other government departments, agriculture, industry, etc.,
can otherwise be met. Certainly, in the long run, Iraq cannot
depend on the services of foreign experts.
Secondly, it offers the intelligent among the new generation
a far greater margin of social and economic mobility, and in
the process it creates a new élite based not only on family
heritage but on intelligence and on achievement.
Thirdly, it helps in the breakdown of narrow provincialism.
The students bring back a wide variety of personal experience
and a broader realization of the world which cannot but
have an impact on Iraqi society.
On the negative side, it is claimed that some students
choose inferior universities and do not receive enough reward
for their time and money; that many often choose subjects
of little value to themselves and to their country;” that social
conditions in the foreign countries they go to are so radically
different from their own background that considerable
damage is done to their personalities; and that some become so
acculturated to the West that when they return they are un-
able to readjust themselves to the traditional environment of
their country.
Some of the above statements are probably true, although
perhaps somewhat exaggerated. On the whole, however, the
benefits far outweigh the harm. Some of the misuses can be
corrected. Universities and disciplines can be more carefully
selected. In any case, until such time as Iraq has adequate
facilities there is no alternative to advanced foreign study.
Perhaps the most potent argument that can be made against
it is that it is comparatively very expensive. Iraq, therefore,
should begin to establish such facilities. This would have
the advantage of being less expensive and leaving the student
in his own environment.


THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION 223
Illiteracy Centers
The campaign against illiteracy began in the late twenties.
However, statistical data indicate that no consistent policy
was followed until 1950, so that the number of centers and
students used to fluctuate radically from year to year.
In 1927/28 there were thirty-one centers, all for men, with
2,074 students. In the thirties the movement gained consider-
able momentum, reaching in 1938/39 a high of 205 centers
for men, with 16,415 students, and seven centers for women,
with 218 students. During the war it declined sharply reach-
ing in 1948/49 a low of eighteen centers, all for men, with a
total of 1,498 students. From then on, however, the number of
centers and students began to climb steadily, with no set-
backs, until in 1954/55 there were 309 centers for men, with
26,178 students, and thirty-seven centers for women, with
3,693 students. In 1955/56 the number rose to 506 centers
with a total enrollment of 34,695 men and women.
Students attend two consecutive courses of four months
duration each, six nights a week, two classes each night. In
the first course, they study reading, writing, and arithmetic.
In the second, reading, writing, arithmetic, hygiene and
civics are studied.
In addition to the above centers, illiteracy classes are
conducted in jails, in the army and in the police. Also many
government departments, such as the Railways and the Port
Directorate, private companies, such as the oil companies,
and private philanthropic and volunteer organizations con-
duct similar classes.
Conclusions
Officially, the system of education in Iraq is described as
“democratic, progressive, and nationalist.” It is democratic
in the sense that available facilities are open to all without
discrimination for reasons of race, color, or creed. It is pro-
gressive in the sense that it is basically secular and has followed
Western methodologies of education. It is nationalist in a
dual sense. It attempts to inculcate in the Iraqi child love
and devotion to Iraq as a country and a political entity, and


224 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
similar sentimental loyalty to the “Arab Nation” of which
Iraq is only a part.
The country still faces a formidable task. Over two-thirds
of the children (at least) of primary school age receive no
instruction. The administrative structure is cumbersome, the
curriculum needs a radical reform, and considerable ex-
pansion in technical education is required. Perhaps the most
hopeful thought lies in the fact that the government is con-
scious of these problems, and that it is bending every effort to
meet the challenge and forge ahead in creating an enlighten-
ed society.
1. A law passed in 1945 provided for the creation of an administrative council
in each of the fourteen provinces. It is to be composed of representatives of
the province and presided over by the provincial governor representing the
central government. The purpose of the council is to assume some of the
responsibilities of the central government with regard to local affairs. Among
these is education. The Council receives grants-in-aid from the central govern-
ment for specific purposes. In a certain sense, these councils—very limited in
their powers as they are—represcrit an interesting experiment in real democ-
racy. Although the law was passed in 1945, the first council was not or-
ganized until 1954—some ten years later—in the province of Baghdad.
2. For details of the history of the movement see R. D. Matthews and M.
Akrawi, Education in the Arab Countries of the JNear East. (Washington, D. C.:
American Council on Education, 1949), p. 146.
3. Ministry of Education, Annual Report for 1953/54, op. cit., p. 23.
4. In 1953/54, 52.5 per cent of those who took the science examination passed,
as compared with 61.4 per cent for the “arts” examination, and 57 per cent
for the “commerce” examination.
5. Office of the Cultural Attaché, Embassy of Iraq. Education in Iraq. (Wash-
ington, D.C.: 1957, pp. 10-11.)
6. This writer has seen Arab students in the United States (who had never
done any manual work in their lives in their home countries) work as manual
laborers, waiters, and in factories. This goes to show that attitudes are not in-
flexible and that under given incentives and circumstances they change
quickly.
7. For instance, British labor supervisors at the I. P. C. in Kirkuk told this
writer that members of the Jabbur tribe have an amazing knack for handling
machinery.
8. The number of students who were sent by the Ministry or the Board (fully
supported) are as follows: 1950/51, 133 students; 1951/52, 234 students;
1952/53, 125 students; 1953/54, none (because of disturbances); 1954/55,
114 students; 1955/56, 120 students. Of these, the Development Board sent
a total of 317 students, of whom 102 have already returned.
9. In the case of bursary students, I have been unable to find evidence to sup-
port this allegation. In the first place, the subject of specialization is selected
by the Ministry of Education on the basis of the demands of government de-
partments. Secondly, I went through the subjects of specialization of all


THE CHALLENGE OF EDUCATION 225
bursary students sent between 1950/51 and 1953/54. The subjects are mostly
in the natural sciences, followed in a far smaller number by the social sciences.
This is in line with what Iraq needs today. The allegation may, however, be
true of students studying on their own.


“Il
PUBLIC HEALTH
The concept that the state is responsible for the health of
its citizens is accepted in Iraq without challenge. This is a
natural development, since Iraq began its national life almost
completely devoid of medical facilities, and the full burden of
responsibility fell upon the state. Therefore, almost the entire
medical profession itself as well as the physical plant existing
today are the creation of and in the service of the state.
Responsibility for public health is vested in the Ministry of
Health, which was created only in 1952. Prior to that, re-
sponsibility lay in a directorate attached to the Ministry of
Social Affairs. In line with the general development of the
country, expenditures of this department have increased
steadily. Between 1947/48 and 1954/56, they rose from 450,-
000 dinars to 4.3 million dinars, a ninefold increase in seven
years (see Table 42). Expenditures in 1955/56 represented
7.8 percent of the total ordinary expenditures of the govern-
ment.
Since 1950 almost all the expenditures of the Ministry have
been for operational activities. Since that time the Develop-
ment Board has assumed the major responsibility for financing
the construction of hospitals, clinics, and other health es-
tablishments. As in the case of education, the Board’s con-


PUBLIC HEALTH 227
ception of the role it should play became broader in each
successive plan and the magnitude of planned expenditures
increased. Between 1952 and 1956, it built fifteen hospitals,
forty-nine clinics, and a considerable number of houses for
medical staff.
TABLE 42
BUDGET OF THE MINISTRY of HEALTH
AND THE MEDICAL College
(Selected Years)
Per cent of Total
Budget in Dinars Government Budget
1947/48 448,332 7.8
1949/50 1,339,239 6.5
1950/51 1,829,198 6.2
1951/52 2,341,863 7.6
1952/53 Im.a. Il.a.
1953/54 2,973,849 5.9
1954/55 3,794,658 7.0
1955/56 4,327,158 7.8
Source: Statistical Abstracts for 1950, p. 287; 1952, p. 258; 1955, p. 318; and
1956, p. 238.
In addition to its direct contributions, the Development
Board plays an indirect role in improving health conditions:
through loans to municipalities and other agencies for drink-
ing water and sewage disposal schemes; through the drainage
or filling in of swamps; construction of low-cost housing;
extension and improvement of drinking water supplies; es-
tablishment of community centers and construction of sanitary
slaughter houses and other establishments which have a direct
bearing on raising the health standards in the country. The
direct allocations of the Board for health in its 1955-60 plan
are 18.2 million dinars. Direct and indirect expenditures
during the same period are estimated, however, to reach the
neighborhood of one hundred million dollars.
Since 1952 several international agencies have also been
active in improving health conditions in Iraq. These include
the United States Point Four Program, UNICEF, UNESCO,
and WHO. These organizations either conduct independent
programs of their own, collaborate in government programs,
or train Iraqis to undertake specific tasks.


228 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
TABLE 43
DevelopMENT Board ALLOCATIONS FoR HEALTH: 1956-60
Estimated
Beds Cost in Dinars
Baghdad Medical Centerx 1,000 4,000,000
Karkh Hospital (Baghdad)* 550 2,000,000
Kazimain Hospital (Baghdad suburb)* 300 700,000
Basrah Hospital” 400 900,000
Amara Hospital” 200 500,000
Other Hospitals and Clinics” 5,750,000
Eradication of Malaria Campaign” 2,000,000
15,850,000
Improvement of Drinking Water* 1,500,000
Filling of Swamps* 300,000
Milk Pasteurization Plant (at Abu Ghraib)f 550,000
Grand Total 18,200,000
x Planning completed.
* Construction in progress.
f Completed.
Attitudes Toward Medicine
To all practical purposes, no native practice of medicine—
as distinguished from modern practice—exists any longer in
Iraq, except perhaps in isolated villages where no other
facilities are available. On the contrary, people demand
medical facilities and in recent years a village which has a
clinic acquires prestige.
There are two exceptions to the above general rule: mid-
wives are still preferred to obstetricians. This may be due to
the traditional segregation of the sexes in Middle Eastern
society and because it is felt that such an intimate life process
as giving birth should be witnessed only by persons of the
same sex. Midwives are regarded with considerable respect
and affection, and homes are generally open to them at all
times. In many respects, especially in the villages, they occupy
a position similar to that of the priest. The government has
recognized their importance and influence, and in recent
years it has begun to establish training centers for them.
In contrast to midwifery, nursing, especially among the
Muslims, is not regarded as quite a respectable profession.


PUBLIC HEALTH 229
.
:
This is particularly true for a girl of good family. This attitude
prevails throughout the Middle East, but increases in intensity
as one moves towards the Persian Gulf and farther east.
A very serious problem of recruitment thus exists.
The second exception to the general lack of native medi-
cine, although far less significant, is the bone-setter. In some
isolated communities local bone-setters may still be found,
who are generally surprisingly efficient and knowledgeable
in their vocation.
An attitude which creates considerable difficulty is that
which has developed throughout the Middle East, including
Iraq, concerning tuberculosis. It is regarded as a “shameful”
disease. Consequently every effort is usually made to conceal
the fact from the neighbors, and there is great reluctance to
report cases to hospitals. In many instances, only when the
disease reaches a latent stage are the patient and his family
willing to take this step.
In contrast to the attitude toward tuberculosis, no stigma
seems to attach to bejel, a mild form of syphilis fairly common
among the Bedouins of Iraq.
In recent years a new difficulty has begun to appear in the
attitude of villagers toward mobile clinics. It seems that
mobile clinics which make it possible to serve a number of
villages (where a clinic for each would not be justified) are
not regarded by the villagers with the same degree of con-
fidence as permanent clinical installations. It may be that
this is a transitory attitude which will disappear with more
experience.
Medical Facilities
As in the case of education, in absolute terms the progress
achieved has been remarkable. In 1918 there were one or two
hospitals in the entire country. In 1950 there were eighty-
two hospitals (seventy-one government, eleven private),
4,901 beds (4,483 government, 418 private), and 448 dis-
pensaries. Assuming a population of five million in 1950,
there was about one hospital bed for each 1,000 population.
Between 1950 and 1955 the number of hospitals rose to
115 (ninety-eight government, seventeen private), and beds


230 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
to 7,745 (7,269 government, 476 private)—an increase of 40
per cent and 58 per cent respectively. The ratio of beds to
population rose to one per 650 persons.
No exact data are available as to the number of clinics that
have been constructed since 1950. A figure of sixty would
probably not be far off the mark, so that it can be estimated
that in 1955 there was a total of some 550 clinics.
Although statistically less impressive, similar increases took
place in the medical staff. In 1951 there were 762 registered
doctors (sixty-one of them foreigners), of whom 582 were
government officials. There were 274 pharmacists, 557 nurses,
938 male dressers, and 682 midwives. The figures for 1955
were 1,014 doctors (ninety-four foreigners), 305 pharmacists,
781 nurses, 1,309 male dressers, and 767 midwives. These
data do not include dentists, dental practitioners, vaccinators,
health officers, laboratory analysts, etc.
Iraq is still confronted with serious problems in regard to
both facilities and staff. Most of the hospitals are located in
urban centers such as Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk.
Some rural areas have no facilities whatsoever.
The most serious problem, however, is not the construction
of hospitals and clinics (for this can proceed fairly rapidly)
but the acute shortage of trained personnel. One new hospital
in the south, it is reported, remained unopened for two years
after completion because no personnel could be found to
man it.
Doctors are usually extremely reluctant to work outside
Baghdad. Of the 1,014 doctors in all of Iraq in 1955, 560
were located in the province of Baghdad alone. In essence,
this means the city of Baghdad and its suburbs. Young doc-
tors, after living in a foreign country or in Baghdad, find life
in rural areas drab and uninteresting. There is usually no
adequate housing, life is monotonous, and there is nothing
to do besides one’s job.
The shortage is not only in doctors but also in medical
aides. The Jewish girls who used to be the main source of
supply for nurses have gone with the general exodus of Jews
in 1950. Male “dressers” are recruited in order to fill part of
the need.


PUBLIC HEALTH 231
Some efforts are now being made to meet the problem of
personnel. Doctors trained at state expense are required to
serve a certain number of years outside the big cities (this
has always been the case). As an inducement to serve in the
provinces, adequate housing in rural areas is now being con-
structed for the medical staff. Training programs for doctors,
nurses, and male dressers have been stepped up, but they
still fall far short of meeting the requirements.
Preventive Medicine
Progress in preventive medicine has not been as evident
as in curative medicine. In fact, the preventive medicine
campaign can be said to have begun in earnest only since
1950. Between 1920 and 1950 epidemics which used to deci-
mate the area, such as cholera, the plague, smallpox, and
louse-borne typhus were either completely eradicated or
brought under substantive control. However, the principal
endemic diseases—such as malaria, trachoma, bilharzia,
hookworm, and other intestinal diseases—remained wide-
spread. The incidence of some of them, as will be pointed
out later, actually increased.
The reasons why progress in this field has not been as
marked are the complexity of the problem and the very
heavy expenditures involved. Amelioration requires a large
trained staff scattered throughout the country. It also re-
quires considerable expenditures on sewage disposal, latrines
in villages, pure drinking water, drainage works, and so
forth. Awareness on the part of government officials and the
public is needed; planning and coordination among the
various government departments are required. An example
cited by Salter gives a graphic illustration of this point. He
WriteS:
An old abandoned canal system was partly re-opened in 1941.
By the summer of 1943 some 7,000 people were beginning to
farm about 130,000 mesharas of newly irrigated land. Malaria
from which the district had, before the new irrigation, been
entirely free, at once appeared in a virulent form. Almost the
entire population was stricken. Many of the villages were
deserted. A review of the situation then showed that impervious


PUBLIC HEALTH
233
Carrier.
Malaria threatens about three-fourths of Iraq’s population.
persons a year.” Irrigation canals and stagnant pools are
now the main breeding grounds of the malaria mosquito
The worst areas are the north and northeast, and the foot-
hills and uplands of the northern Zagros mountains. It is
also serious in the low-lying coastal areas of Shatt al-Arab,
Hammar Lake, and the alluvial plains of central and south
doctors estimate that this disease alone kills some 50,000
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234 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
Iraq.8 Statistical data gathered over the years indicate that
malarial incidence is much greater during flood years.
Little was done to combat the disease until after the war, |
due to the prohibitive costs of wide-scale larvicide and
drainage projects, “the world’s main recourse until the ad-
vent of DDT.” Due to preventive measures taken since 1947,
malaria has completely disappeared in the cities of Baghdad,
Basrah, Mosul, and Kirkuk.
In 1950 the Endemic Diseases Institute (created in 1946) |
began concerting efforts to attack the malaria problem. Soon
thereafter, the World Health Organization began cooperating
by sending experts to train local specialists and to help
develop a “national malaria strategy.”
In 1952 UNICEF entered the scene. In addition to govern-
ment effort, UNICEF began sending trucks, jeeps, sprayers,
DDT, and field research supplies. Its efforts concentrated
on the Tanjero Valley in northern Iraq. In 1954, U. N. and
government operations were consolidated, giving protection
to some 1.7 million persons.4
In late 1955, with continued U. N. and United States aid,
2,000 malaria workers launched an eight-year campaign
which will protect two million persons during the epidemic
season and achieve total protection for all the threatened
population (three million) by 1963.
The UNICEF release cited previously states, “UNICEF
aid will cease in 1956 when the Iraq government, which all
along matched UNICEF’s investment, plans to take over !
full responsibility. For the task, Iraq is enlarging the Endemic
Diseases Institute at Baghdad; establishing five regional
malaria centers . . . .” The Development Board allocated
two million dinars to the Endemic Diseases Institute to be
spent between 1956 and 1960 on the eradication of malaria.”
The results of the work that has been accomplished since
1950 are reflected in the number of malaria cases treated at
health institutions (see Table 44). In 1950 there were over
537,000 cases. In 1956, only 218,000, a decline of sixty per
cent. The decline took place year after year (except in 1953),
and has been too steady to be simply a statistical accident.
* In 1957 a Malaria Board was established.


PUBLIC HEALTH 235
The social and economic significance of the decline in the
incidence of malaria is far-reaching. For one thing, malaria
has been one of the major causes of the high rate of infant
mortality—estimated to reach up to 500 per 1,000 babies born
in malarial areas, with an average of 300-350 per 1,000 for the
country as a whole. Once the malaria menace is removed, a
considerable drop in the infant mortality rate should follow.
This was, of course, the justification for UNICEF’s joining
the campaign against malaria in Iraq.
In addition to some 50,000 deaths it is said to cause each
year, malaria also causes much disability and saps energy
and vitality. It thus affects adversely the general level of
productivity in the country, and limits the prospects of
economic betterment for the individual.
2. Trachoma. With the decline in the incidence of malaria,
trachoma has now moved to statistical first place among the
problem diseases of the country. It is an eye disease, social in
origin, and arises from unhygienic practices and general un-
cleanliness. It is carried from one person to the other by the
common housefly.
Although the disease yields to curative treatment in its
early stages, unlike malaria (for which comparatively in-
expensive means of attack at the source has been found
through insecticides), its eradication can only be accom-
plished through a general rise in the level of sanitation which
would reduce fly-breeding areas and eventually eliminate the
carrier. People come to health institutions to be treated in an
ever larger number, while the source of the disease itself re-
mains untouched year after year.
No data are available as to the incidence of the disease
in the country as a whole. Illustrative examples only can be
cited. Out of 140,451 students examined in 1950/51, 23 per
cent were found to be afflicted with trachoma. In 1952/53,
the rate was also 23 per cent out of 199,359 students. In the
following year (1953/54), the percentage rose to 24.6 of
154,397 students examined." A UNESCO worker recently
estimated that trachoma incidence in the Dujailah settlement
is as high as 80 per cent. A guess that some 60 per cent of the


236 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
population in the entire country is afflicted with it would
probably not be too far wrong.
There is reason to believe that incidence may be on the
decline in Iraq. For instance, trachoma cases treated have
been decreasing since 1951 (see Table 44). It must be admitted
that this is not necessarily a reliable index, since many of
those afflicted either have no access to, or do not take the
time to visit, clinical facilities. Perhaps the best index is the
province of Baghdad which has superior facilities, accessible
to everyone, and where the population is more aware of the
problem than in other areas. It would therefore be reasonable
to assume that the majority of those afflicted would visit
health institutions for treatment. This is statistically indicated,
since about one-third of the cases treated in the entire coun-
try are located in this province." The number of cases treated
in Baghdad (province) dropped steadily year after year from
331,479 in 1951 to 102,789 in 1955, a decline of about 69
per cent. The pattern of decline followed that of the country
as a whole.
3. Bilharzia. Bilharzia (schistosomiasis) is a parasitic ail-
ment caused by a fluke which has a life cycle of human, vector
snail, human. The fluke is picked up through the skin of the
foot, develops in the human liver, reproduces, passes out
through the urine into water, goes through a stage of develop-
ment in the snail, and lives in stagnant and polluted waters
until it finds a human host.
The disease is debilitating. The main components of its
effects are lassitude, low vitality, and blood in the urine.
It is therefore of profound economic significance. It lowers
both the individual’s capacity for work and his ability to resist
and overcome other diseases.
As in Egypt—where the disease was first identified—it
predominates in the flow-irrigated areas of the Iraqi country-
side. A survey carried out by the Endemic Diseases In-
stitute (around 1950) showed that the disease does not occur
south of the town of Basrah; that it reaches its peak of in-
cidence in the Lake Region, but from there northward, it
declines steadily up to the Kurdish mountains, where it does
not occur at all. The same survey showed that its highest in-


238 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
4. Hookworm. Hookworm (ankylostomiasis) is another para-
sitic disease. Among its effects are anemia and very low
vitality. Like bilharzia, the parasite is picked up through the
skin of the foot (and through infected drinking water) and
lives in the intestinal tract. The disease thrives in areas where
there are inadequate sewage disposal and open drains.
The disease seems to predominate in the south, although
some Iraqi writers believe that some two-thirds of the entire
population are afflicted with it.” In 1954, over 50 per cent of
the pregnant women examined in one month at the Samawah
Health Center were found to have one or more types of
intestinal parasites.”
As is clearly evident, effective eradication of the disease is
dependent, like that of bilharzia, on a rise in the level of
sanitation, installation of sewage disposal facilities, stricter
enforcement of sanitary laws, and economic betterment.
In the meantime, of course, it can be treated clinically.
The number of cases treated during the last six years give
no conclusive indication whether the disease is increasing
or decreasing in the country (see Table 44). Cases which came
to clinical attention rose from over 9,000 in 1950 to over
23,000 in 1953. Then they dropped to something over 14,000
in 1954, but rose to an all time high of over 24,866 cases in
1956. It is probable that there has been some decline since
then, for improvement has occurred in sanitation and eco-
nomic conditions. In any case, a decline is clearly indicated in
the province of Baghdad. The number of cases treated there
fell steadily year after year, from 13,794 in 1952 to 3,023 in
1955.
5. Tuberculosis. The number of tuberculosis cases brought
to medical attention indicates that the disease does not
represent a serious danger. There is reason to believe, how-
ever, that its incidence is much higher, owing to the social
implications mentioned before.
In 1952 a national campaign, with the help of WHO and
UNICEF, was launched to combat the disease, by attempting
to discover its actual extent, by B.C.G. vaccination, and by
public education. It is reported that by the early part of 1955


PUBLIC HEALTH - 239
some 550,000 persons were X-rayed, and 220,000 were given
B.C.G. vaccinations.
6. Venereal Diseases. The principal causes of venereal
diseases in Iraq are prostitution, legal and illegal, and bejel,
a mild form of syphilis common among the Bedouins and
apparently passed on by parents to their children.
In recent years venereal diseases seem to have been
brought under reasonable control. This may have been due
to the widespread use of antibiotics and a much closer super-
vision of prostitution. In 1950, over 47,500 cases were brought
for medical attention. Six years later in 1956, their number
dropped to 4,000.
In 1950 the Directorate of Health estimated that some half
a million persons were afflicted with bejel, mainly among the
tribes in the provinces of Amara, Dulaim, Mosul, and Kirkuk.9
No data are available on the progress achieved with this
disease since 1950, although it is known that the Endemic
Diseases Institute assisted by the World Health Organization
is investing considerable time and effort in combatting it.
The fact that the Bedouins attach no stigma to this disease
should be of considerable help in eradicating it, once its
exact nature is determined.
Conclusions
Considerable amounts of money have been invested and
remarkable progress has been achieved since 1950 in the im-
provement and expansion of the medical facilities of the
country. Despite this progress, Iraq, as in the case with educa-
tion, is still a long way from solving its health problems.
Health facilities, particularly clinics and health centers, are
still extremely inadequate; severe shortages in medical
personnel exist; and the death rate is still very high. There is,
however, the desire to improve health conditions, and the
funds to do it.
Generally speaking, no aspect of the development program
has met with more enthusiastic response from the public
than the measures taken to raise the health standards in the
country.


240 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
:
:
. Salter, op. cit., p. 86.
. A Committee of Officials, Kingdom of Iraq. (Baltimore: The Lord Baltimore
Press, 1946), p. 91.
. Iraqi Embassy, Washington, D. C., Bulletin, August, 1955, quoting a
UNICEF press release of July, 1955.
. Ibid., p. 8.
. Iraq, Ministry of Education, Annual Reports for 1950–51 and 1953-54.
. Of course, it is possible that this is so because the incidence of the disease in
:
Baghdad is higher than the rest of the country. Such reasoning, however,
would be rather far-fetched and illogical since the level of sanitation is higher
in Baghdad than anywhere else. In the absence of definite data, it would be
more reasonable to accept the first assumption.
. Khayyat, op. cit., p. 33.
. Adams, op. cit., p. 160.
. Iraq. Directorate General of Health, Annual Bulletin of Health and Vital Statis-
tics for 1950. (Baghdad: Government Press, 1950), p. 20.


“12
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE
After World War I the cities and towns of Iraq grew
haphazardly with little planning or coordination. The old
sections, medieval in many of their features, are characterized
by narrow, winding streets and alleys, unsavory odors, open
drains, and generally unhygienic living conditions. Not in-
frequently, livestock are kept within municipal limits of some
of the main cities. To this day, not even Baghdad can boast
an adequate sewage disposal system.
In contrast, the new sections look impressive with broad
tree-lined, dual-carriage boulevards and modern apartment
buildings and villas for the rich. According to the Inter-
national Bank Mission, even the new sections were not
properly planned. It stated in part:*
Streets and traffic circles have been laid out according to pre-
scribed geometrical patterns without paying much attention to
their functions or to the need for creating integrated residential
areas with appropriate housing for different income groups and
provision for schools, shops and hospitals or clinics . . . Growth
has been, in fact, piecemeal and spasmodic rather than coordinated
and regular, and emphasis has been placed more on the ornament-
al than on the useful. Some traffic circles, for example, are un-
necessary; others are even safety hazards . . . . Sometimes
streets have been ruthlessly cut or widened through built-up


244 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
It is against this background that a conscious community
development movement began in earnest only recently. Its
general objectives are to make life more pleasant and bearable.
Among other things, its program includes better and more
coordinated planning of the physical layout of cities, towns,
and villages; the provision of schools, clinics, health and
community centers; better and more housing; gardens and
playgrounds; clean water; better sewage disposal in the
cities and latrines in the villages, etc. Some aspects of the
community development movement are discussed below.
Housing
The present housing program is carried out by three main
government agencies: the Development Board, the State
Mortgage Bank, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. In
addition, of course, should be mentioned private, municipal,
and industrial housing.
1. The Development Board. Initially, the Board’s housing
program was very limited in scope and conception. It was
designed primarily to help government employes and workers
of the Board. Between 1951 and 1956, however, thinking
developed considerably on this subject. This is reflected in
the fact that—against a small sum allotted for housing in
the first Five-Year Plan—the new program calls for the ex-
penditure of more than twenty-four million dinars between
1956 and 1960. In 1956 serious consideration was being given
to the formation of a Ministry of Housing, Villages, and Munic-
ipalities to be financed by the Board.
The Board’s ultimate objective is the construction of some
245,000 housing units; 125,000 in rural areas, and 120,000
in cities and towns. Of the latter, 47,000 are to be located
in Baghdad and 13,000 in Basrah.
For all practical purposes, the Board’s immediate program
was launched only in 1955. A Greek consultant recommended
by the International Bank acts now as the housing advisor
to the Board. He has recommended a two-fold program:
(a) a general program for the construction of 25,000 houses in
five years and (b) a short-term program whereby several
housing developments, each not to exceed 1,000 houses,


COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE 245
would be constructed: four in Baghdad, two in Basrah, two
in Mosul, one in Kirkuk, and one in Sarchinar (cement
factory). The houses are to be built in complete groups. Each
development will have its requirements of public services, i.e.,
roads, water supply, sewage system, electricity, and public
buildings such as schools, mosques, clinics, social and rec-
reational centers, markets, playgrounds, and parks.
The short-term program is now in operation. Some 2,000
houses are now under construction in Mosul, 600 in Kirkuk,
160 in Dibbis, 400 in Sarchinar, 5,000 in Baghdad, and about
1,800 at Basrah—a total of some 10,000 houses. Commission-
ing of new houses by the Board will probably reach some
10,000 a year by 1960.
The houses under construction seem to be designed pri-
marily to meet part of the needs of government employes,
workers of the Board’s industrial plants, and sarifa dwellers
at Baghdad and Basrah. Some of the houses are to be sold on
a long-term installment basis, while others are to be rented
at low rates.
2. The Ministry of Social Affairs. This department is
primarily concerned with the construction of low-cost housing
for government employes and workers. So far, it has con-
structed some 2,000 houses for that purpose. In addition,
it is now building a new township, Topchi, near Baghdad.
The township will include electricity, piped water, sewage
disposal, a shopping center, streets, a mosque, a hospital, a
school, a post office, a police station, and a park.
As planned, the Topchi development consists of 1,950
houses, some already completed, some near completion, and
some under construction in late 1956. Twelve hundred and
fifty of the houses will be allotted to government officials, em-
ployees and workers, and 700 to some of the 1954 flood
victims.
The main housing projects of the Ministry are financed
through grants from the Development Board.
3. The Mortgage Bank This state bank was founded
in 1948 with a nominal capital of half a million dinars, and
began actually operating in 1949. In 1952 its capital was
raised to two million dinars but the amount was not fully


246 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
paid up by the government until 1954. In 1954/55, the
bank had at its disposal a total of 3.2 million dinars in capital,
deposits and loans.
The purpose for which the bank was created is to facilitate
the construction of housing. It is authorized by law to perform
two main functions: (1) to build houses on its own account
and sell them at cost or at nominal profit on an installment
basis and (2) to make loans to individuals and organizations
to help them (a) construct new buildings or houses, (b) re-
pair or purchase buildings and houses, and (c) pay off existing
house mortgages which are usually at high rates of interest.
So far the bank has built 168 houses in Kirkuk, Baghdad,
and Sulaimaniya, as well as eighty-two houses for teachers
in Baghdad. In addition, eighty houses were under con-
struction in Mosul in 1956.
Under construction, also by the Bank, are two Baghdad
suburbs. Faisal City is primarily for army and police officers
and will consist of 4,450 houses. The second suburb, al-
Mamun Town—named after a famous caliph of Iraq–in-
cludes all the modern amenities such as electricity, piped
water, and sewage disposal, as well as schools, a shopping
center, a clinic, a park, and a police station.
This suburb is due to be completed in 1957 and will
consist of 500 houses, each fifty being in a different style.
Each house will include four rooms, a hall, a bath, and a
kitchen. Evidently the suburb is designed for the middle-class
income group.
Loans by the bank are limited to a minimum of 100 dinars
and a maximum of 2,000 at five per cent interest and re-
payable over a maximum period of twelve years. Between
1949/50 and 1954/55 the bank made the following loans:”
JNo. of Total Value Per Cent
Loans in Dinars of Total
Conversion of Existing
Mortgages 3,008 1,727,343 32.4
New Houses 1,651 1,650,540 31.0
Repairs and Purchase 4,126 1,939.423 36.6
8,785 5,317,306 100.0


248 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
|
in Baghdad. Rural areas received hardly any benefits of the
program up until 1957. It must be said, however, that the |
plan has only been launched. The 1955-60 program is ex-
pected to spread the benefits over a much larger geographical
area, including rural sections, and over a larger segment of
the population.
As in the case of almost every development activity, the
program confronts two main difficulties: scarcity of skilled
labor and shortages of materials. The first problem is being
met, at least in part, in three ways: (a) by employing foreign
workers, (b) by requiring all contractors to give unskilled
Iraqi workers on-the-job training, and (c) by establishing
training schools. For instance, one such school has now been
established, and has about 1,200 trainees. Most of the teachers
are foreign specialists. |
The second problem is being met through (a) the en-
couragement of new building materials industries, and (b)
the use of new materials. For example, a new factory, prob-
ably the largest of its kind in the Middle East, was recently
built to mass-produce construction materials such as tiles,
bricks, etc.
Pure Water Supply
In 1951, out of a total of 131 municipalities of all four
classes in the country, about forty of them, including most
towns with a population of over 6,000, had modern piped
water supply systems.” In 1955, water purification systems
were in operation or under construction in ninety towns and
cities.4
The increase is reflected in the figures on consumption of
pure water in the towns. In 1951, more than 44 million
cubic meters were consumed. By 1955, the consumption
reached to more than 77 million, an increase of 75 per cent
(see Table 46). This indicates two trends—an increase in
per capita consumption, and extension of the system to new
toWnS.
The water systems are managed by municipal Boards
under the direction of the Department of Municipalities in
the Ministry of Interior. The Development Board administers


| COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND WELFARE 251
Education, and Agriculture as members, and a secretary-
general with cabinet rank to administer the program.
The council will have a separate and autonomous Central
Board with full executive, financial, and administrative
powers. It is to be attached to the Council of Ministers, but
directly responsible to Parliament.
The secretary-general of the Council will be the board
chairman. He will be assisted by an advisory committee of
top-level specialists from the Ministries of Education, Health,
Agriculture, Social Affairs, Interior, Finance, Economics,
and Development, as well as heads of any other relevant
government department.
The object of the program is to improve the standard of
living of Iraq’s rural population, reduce the migration of
farmers to larger cities and towns, step up farm production
and provide solutions for such basic problems as ignorance,
disease, and unemployment.
The program calls for a total expenditure of six million
dinars over a ten-year period. Expenditures during the first
year are to be 1.5 million dinars, and, thereafter, half a
million each year for the duration.6
Several features of the plan are of special interest. First,
unlike any previous attempt, it is integrated and coordinated,
with all the appropriate departments participating. The rural
problem is also placed on the highest executive level, i.e.,
the ministerial level. Too, the “autonomous board” idea,
under the control of specialists isolated from politics, seems
to have taken root.
From the meager information available and the relatively
small amounts involved, it seems that the scheme is not
intended to replace other projects but rather to supplement
them. It is probable, however, that after some experience
and confidence have been gained, the plan will undergo
considerable expansion.
Sanitation
The extent of improvement in this field cannot be statistically
determined. Prima facie evidence indicates, however, that
progress has been more or less in line with the general develop-


PART V Conclusions
“13
CONCLUSIONS
Among the principal causes of political and social in-
stability in the Middle East are the abject poverty of the
majority of its peoples and their desire for a better life. The
area contains sources of potential wealth which, if properly
developed, can support a much higher standard of living.
All specialists agree that the best approach to development
in the area would be through a coordinated regional pro-
gram. For reasons which lie outside the scope of this book,
such an approach has not been possible so far. Development,
therefore, has taken place on a country basis, and, in most
countries, it has been rather sporadic, lacking in coordi-
nation and clearly defined objectives, and ineffectual in
terms of changing the basic pattern of the socio-economic
structure. Some countries have the capital for investment,
but no resources; others have the resources but no capital;
some have both, but lack an imaginative and wise leadership.
Iraq is considered to be among the less advanced countries
in the region. It is, however, blessed with the main com-
ponents necessary for development: capital for investment,
extensive resources in land, water, oil, undetermined quan-
tities of minerals, and a low population density in relation
to these resources.


CONCLUSIONS 255
The program initiated in 1950 is designed to employ these
favorable factors in the development of the country. The
program is by no means perfect. Justifiable criticisms may be
made—and have been made— of the individual components
of some of its schemes, of policies, of administration, and of
the slowness with which the work is sometimes executed.
Yet, as a whole, it remains a bold and imaginative program
representing a refreshing and radical departure from the
inefficient methods of previous years.
For the first time in the modern history of Iraq and, in-
deed, of all the Arab countries, development, through the
creation of an organizational structure (the Development
Board), is relatively insulated from politics and is left basic-
ally in the hands of competent specialists; large amounts
of capital are being continuously invested; comprehensive
and coordinated plans covering all sectors of the economy
and aiming at fairly well-defined objectives have been
drawn and are being implemented; and a large number of
specialists, technicians, and engineering firms have been
employed, not only to help in the execution of the program,
but also to train Iraqis to help themselves.
Some of the more immediate benefits of the program are
already visible. Unemployment has, for all practical pur-
poses, disappeared, and the real wage income has risen. In
1956 the country, for the first time in its long history, achieved
reasonable protection against the menace of floods, and, in
the summer of the same year, produced bumper crops—
almost double those of 1955. The number of children going
to school in 1956/57 was more than double that of 1950.
Malaria, which used to kill some 50,000 persons a year, is
being brought under a substantial measure of control. The
program should affect, either directly or indirectly, the very
foundations of the economic, social, and political institutions
of the country. It should be remembered that Iraq’s intensive
planned development began only in 1950. The various plans
of the Board and other government agencies and depart-
ments represent only initial steps in a grand design which
may take twenty to thirty years to reach fulfillment. It is
also assumed here that intensive development as a state


256 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
policy will not be interrupted except by circumstances over
which the government has no control, such as war.
What then is the significance of the program? Basically,
it is a means of speeding up the process of economic and
social change taking place, not only in Iraq, but throughout
the Middle East and most underdeveloped countries. The
essential difference between Iraq and some of her neighbors
is that she is forging ahead at a much faster pace and that
the country, because of its resources, holds the promise
of a more prosperous future for its people than some of her
less fortunate neighbors.
There are limits to what heavy government spending and
“crash programs” can do in bringing about change. Some-
times they create economic stresses, social dislocation, and
cultural chaos. It may be desirable at times to slow down
elements of a program so that its main components can
develop proportionately. This is particularly true in the
field of human relations. Habits, customs, and traditions
do not change or disappear overnight and new ones cannot be
imposed without explanation if they are to be effective. The
most healthy change is that which springs from the “grass
roots” with guidance and assistance from above. There is
also the ever-present danger that designs for change may be
borrowed from other societies without due regard to whether
they are adaptable to the Iraqi environment or congenial
to its people. This is probably the main criticism against
the program in Iraq. It is for the people, but not from them.
There is a considerable lack of communication between the
bureaucracy which administers the program and the com-
mon people whom it is designed to benefit. The bureaucrat
is contemptuous of the fallah and his customs, and believes
him to be an unintelligent dolt who has little to contribute
to progress, if anything; and the fallah has a deep-seated
suspicion of the bureaucrat and his designs, gained from
centuries of unpleasant contact with government which was
usually restricted to military conscription and the collection
of taxes. As one writer on Middle Eastern economic matters
has observed, “Government is alien.”


260 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
in Iraq is numerically small. The program, through in-
dustrialization, new economic opportunities, increased popu-
lation mobility and education, should cause a considerable
increase in its ranks. This means a greater rate of social
urbanization, the spread of middle class attitudes and way
of life, a geographical redistribution of the population, the
growth of urban areas, and an occupational redistribution
of the labor force resulting in a relative decline of the number
of those engaged in agriculture and a corresponding increase
of those in industry, trade and services.
3. As mentioned previously, many aspects of society in
Iraq, as in other Middle Eastern countries, have been under-
going change for many years. The program should soon be-
come the main force speeding up this process. Secularization
should reduce the differences among the various linguistic,
ethnic, and religious segments of the population, and weld
these blocs into a more cohesive unit with common beliefs,
aspirations, and loyalties.
The above changes should also bring about a much greater
degree of social mobility, both horizontal and vertical. For
instance, to take an extreme case, a short time ago the chances
of the son of a fallah receiving a university education and
moving out of his class and up the social ladder were rather
remote. Although still limited, such cases are now not in-
frequent. On the horizontal plane, social intercourse and
intermixture between the various population groups is
becoming more prevalent and should increase.
Iraqi society is also undergoing a cultural reorientation.
Until recent years the aspirations of Iraqis, as well as those
of most Arabs, were anchored in the past. Today, pre-
occupation with the glories of the past among the vocal
public is restricted mainly to religious divines, historians,
and antiquarians. Most educated young Iraqis are concerned
with the future and are groping for solutions to immediate
problems. Generally, they are interested in establishing a
new kind of society that will equip them to live the good life
in a twentieth century world.


CONCLUSIONS 26.
Political Impact
The political effects of development in Iraq are of a two-
fold nature: internal and external.
Internally, the short-term result of the program has been
the maintenance of a measure of public peace. Many com-
petent observers a few years ago believed that Iraq was on
the eve of a revolutionary upheaval.
This is a very real possibility. In almost all countries of the
Arab world, including Iraq, internal political issues have
been reduced to one of two alternatives: immediate reform or
revolution. In Iraq, in addition, there is considerable dis-
content in relation to foreign policy. Barring outside inter-
vention or a revolution, the development program may give
Iraq a “breathing spell” during which reform may be effected
in an orderly manner.
The long-term results of the program are also obvious. It
should bring about a redistribution of political power in
favor of the masses and particularly the middle class, which
includes the intelligentsia. This class today has considerable
influence over the masses and is far more powerful than its
representation in Parliament would indicate. The program
will increase its membership and strengthen its economic
position. As to the fallaheen, the landlords and the shaikhs
will no longer be able to exert over them the same degree of
political control which they do at present. It is, therefore,
hard to escape the conclusion that the traditional ruling
class will no longer have a monopoly on political power.
Finally, the social, economic, and cultural changes taking
place should effectuate the transference of loyalties from the
tribe, the religious group, etc., to the ideal of a nation.
Externally, the program requires that Iraq (at least for
the time being) dedicate itself to the cause of peace and
stability in the Middle East. An extended armed conflict
in the region would result in the suspension of the flow of
oil and oil revenue. The suspension of the program would
cause chaos in the governmental machinery and bring in
its wake hunger and poverty and severe public unrest.


262 THE RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ
On the other hand, Iraq, on the basis of its economic
potential and barring international disturbances, should
soon emerge as one of the major powers in the region.
Significance for the Middle East
Middle Eastern countries which may later initiate similar
programs can benefit from Iraq’s experience with intensive
development. Successful experiments can be imitated, and
mistakes avoided.
The development of Iraq, assuming political considerations
permit, can provide a partial solution—through emigration—
to the population problem of some Middle Eastern countries.
Finally, if at a later date a development plan for the
Middle East is formulated and agreed upon, the program in
Iraq will have laid some of the groundwork for the execution
of the regional scheme.


Appendix Il
POPULATION OF CHIEF CITIES, 1957 *
Greater Baghdad
Greater Mosul
Greater Basrah
Kirkuk
Karbala
Amara
Sulaimaniya
Nasiriyah
Arbil
1,085,232
444,883
164,623
120,593
60,804
53,311
48,450
39,060
34,751
ic
.On-
ntrie
r t
*Source: Embassy of Iraq, Press Attaché, Washington, D. C.


INDEX
Abadan, 169
Abbassid Caliphate, 2, 30, 82
Abu Dibbis depression, 59, 64, 65, 68
Abu Ghraib canal, 77, 78, 228
Adams, Doris, 10, 16
afforestation, 55, 115
Afghans, 6
aghas, 80, 83
agriculture:
Agricultural Machinery Adminis-
tration (Directorate), 11, 106,
108, 115
Agricultural Services, 105, 119
capital invested in, 14, 89, 126,
140-141
credit, 108-111 -
development program, 78, 117,
120, 165-167, 173-175, 192, 203,
258-259
experimental stations, 113-114
extension service, 99, 102, 113, 114,
115, 122
facilities for, 105-106, 114
farm management, 63
farming, dairy, 115
farms, demonstration, 99, 102
grain stores and silos, 20
large-scale, 89, 121
machinery, use and maintenance of,
106, 115, 183
mechanization of 11, 47, 60, 90,
106-110, 121-122, 166, 216, 222,
242
percentage of population in, 12,
13, 18
percentage of land cultivated, 18
production, 18, 27, 78, 91, 177, 197,
251, 257–258
reporting service, 114
research and training, 113-114
revenue from taxes on, 25-26
Soils Laboratory, 115
technical studies on, 117
techniques of, 105, 106, 122
see also: crops
Agriculture, Ministry of 53, 95, 105,
110, 112, 114, 219, 250, 251
Ain Zala, 131, 133, 135, 137, 150,
152, 154
air transport, 44, 192, 200–201, 203-
204
Alawand, 130, 169, 170
Alexandretta, 136
al-Mamun Town, 246
Alwan, Abdul Sahib, 53
Amara, 7, 8, 86, 88,90, 197, 228, 237,
239
Ana, 55
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.; see British
Petroleum Co.
Ankara, 56
ankylostomiasis; see hookworm
Aramco, 132
Arbil, 3, 7, 74
Arizona, University of, 114
army personnel, 93, 96
Asia, 139
Asia, Southeast, 200
asphalt, 170
Assyrians, 5, 6, 7, 22
atomic energy development, 176
Australia, 79, 89, 120, 257
Awqaf Administration, 81
Baba Gurgur, 133
Babil canal and outfall, 71, 77
Babylonians, 70
Badºa canal, 73
Baghdad, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 19, 54,
57, 58, 67, 86, 88, 104, 131, 136,
143, 146, 147, 150, 152, 161, 164,
165, 169, 170, 178, 181, 183, 189,
190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,
197, 200, 201, 203, 204, 214, 217,
218, 219, 220, 224, 228, 230, 234,
236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 245, 246,
247, 248,252
Baghdad Pact, 56
Bahrain, 137, 142, 200
Baiji, 135, 136, 170
Bani Hasan, 78
banking, 108, 110-111
banks:
Agricultural, 53, 94, 107, 108, 110,
111, 247
Agricultural-Industrial, 20, 184-185
banking institutions, 168
foreign, 108


266
INDEX
Industrial, 53, 168, 177, 178, 184,
185, 186, 187, 202, 204
Mortgage, 53, 178, 244, 245-247,
253
National, 166, 185
private, 111, 168, 186
Rafidain, 178
Banyas, 135, 136
Ba‘quba, 197
Ba‘quba drain, 78
barley, 87, 99, 100, 102, 115
Basrah, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 18, 20, 74, 131,
133, 136, 146, 147, 149, 150, 152,
154, 155, 159, 169, 170, 173-174,
183, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195,
196, 197, 199, 202, 204, 217, 228,
230, 234, 236, 245, 247, 252
Port, 53, 199, 200, 203
Port Directorate, 192, 247
Basrah Petroleum Co. (BPC), 129
Batma dam, 69, 70
Bedouins, 22, 213, 229, 239
bejel, 229, 239
Bekhme dam, 70
bilharzia, 100, 231, 233,236-237
Bonné, Alfred, 87, 104
bridges, 20, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46-47, 49,
106, 172, 192, 197, 198,203
Britain: see Great Britain
British Development Co., 131
British nationals, 6, 34
British Oil Development Co., 131
British Petroleum Co., 129, 131, 132,
161
Brownrigg, William, 24
bunds, 63, 72
Cabinet:
changes in, 22, 32, 34, 38, 39, 40,
118, 148, 150
conservatism in, 24
effect on development programs of,
23, 32, 34, 37
of Nuri as-Sa'id, 39
system, 22-23
Cairo, 200
Canada, 79, 89, 120, 257
canals, 20, 57, 59, 62, 67, 70-74, 76,
82, 107, 232, 233,237, 242, 249
see also: Abu Ghraib; Babil;
Ba‘quba; Dagharra; Dhibban;
Dujailah; Euphrates; Gharraf;
Hawija; Hilla; Husseiniyah;
Khoraisan; Majjara; Saqlawiyah;
Shamiyah; Shatrah; Ruwairij;
Wadi Tharthar; Warrar; Yusa-
fiyah
capital, 27, 50, 51, 118, 177, 183, 188,
202, 254-255, 259
increase in reserves of, 27, 50, 51,
118, 177, 183, 188,202, 254, 255,
259
lack of, for investment in private
industry, 188
private, 27, 53, 118, 177, 183, 188,
202
rate of investment of, 50-51
capitalism, 189
caustic soda plant, 176, 179
cement, 172
censuses:
agricultural, 13, 16, 107
housing, 8, 125
industrial, 13, 16, 161, 163
population, 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12,
16, 205
cereals, 26, 79, 257
cholera, 231
Christians, 3, 4, 5-6
Christianity, 27-28
citrus industry, 116
civil service, 23-24, 25, 39, 93, 96, 245,
247
classes:
intelligentsia, 2, 30, 189, 222, 261
masses, 2, 4, 9, 14, 91,261
middle class, 14, 30, 247, 257, 259-
260
peasants, 79, 91, 92, 103, 105, 107,
108, 109, 113, 118, 120, 121, 122,
123, 124, 126, 127, 210
upper, 2, 9, 14, 257
clover, 102
colleges, 48, 114, 124, 144, 206-207,
221-222
Baghdad Law, 17, 219
Higher Teachers’ Training, 218
Institute of Fine Arts, 217-218
Iraqi University, 208, 220
law, 17
of Agriculture, 114, 219
of Arts and Sciences, 219
of Dentistry, 219
of Engineering, 115


INDEX
267
of Medicine, 217, 219
of Pharmacy and Chemistry ,219
of Physical Education, 218-219
of Religious Jurisprudence, 219
police, 219
Queen Aliya, 218-219
school for health officials, 219
University of Baghdad, 220
Veterinary, 219
colonialism, 139
Communications and Public Works,
Ministry of, 192
communications and transportation,
18, 45, 79, 100, 115, 133, 137, 172,
183, 192-203
see also: air transport; bridges; postal
system; railways; river transport;
roads; telegraph system
community development and welfare,
123, 241-252
community enters, 244, 250
impact of, 257-262
loans to municipalities, 249
rural community development, 125,
250-252
Rural Community Development
Council, 125, 250
Compagnie Française des Pétroles, 130
conscription, military, 7, 113, 256
cooperation, international, 56
cooperative system:
agricultural, 110, 111, 112, 122
credit, 99, 112
housing, 112
sale and consumption, 94, 99, 100,
112
cotton, 26, 99, 102, 115, 116, 171, 188
councils, local administrative, 53, 232
crops:
diversification of, 50, 99, 115, 116
new, 114
rotation of, 61, 75, 89
see also; barley; cereals; clover, cot-
ton; dates; fruits; jute; onions;
rice; sugar beets; vegetables;
weed control; wheat
culture, 1, 256, 258, 260
Cutha, 103
\
Dagharra branch (Hilla Canal), 71
Damascus, 200
dams, 20, 48, 49, 56, 60, 68, 71, 106,
118, 126, 172, 197, 205
see also: Batma; Bekhme; Darband-
i-Khan; Diyala; Dokan; Eski
Mosul; Hindiyah; Kut; Ramadi;
Udhaim; Wadi Tharthar; Yusuf
Pasha
Darband-i-Khan dam, 69, 74
Date Association, 53
dates, 26, 115, 174, 175-176, 200
Dawrah, 126, 170, 195
refinery, 169
lubricant and asphalt plant, 170
Dawson, Sir Ernest, 84, 104
Dead Sea, 67
Development Board, 23, 28, 31, 32,
34-53, 63, 70, 71, 72, 75-76, 91, 106,
114, 118, 123-127, 142, 167, 169,
170, 172-173, 175-176, 183, 191,
192, 195, 196, 197, 200-201, 203,
206-208, 217, 220-222, 226-228,
232, 234, 237, 244-245, 249-250,
252, 254, 259,262
from establishment to reorganiza-
tion in 1953, 23, 34–37, 39-40,
43-45, 49
predecessors of, 19–20, 34, 38, 40,
17]
Development Board Plans:
First Six-Year Plan (1951-56), 38,
40-43, 71, 168
Five-Year Plan (1955-59), 43-44,
168, 244, 252
Second Six-Year Plan (1955-60),
44-48, 71, 125, 126, 168, 176, 186,
195, 197, 200, 201, 203, 207, 220,
227, 244, 248,252
development projects of other state
agencies:
government banks, 53
long-range, 47-49
semi-governmental agencies, 53
short-term, 49
Development, Ministry of, 38-39, 40,
43, 44, 53, 78, 95, 98, 104, 186, 251
devil worship; see Yezidi
Dhibban outlet canal and regulator, 64
Dibbis, 191, 245
diet and nutrition, 15, 16, 115, 158,
160, 209, 210, 232, 257
diseases:
degenerative, 232


270
husbandry, animal, 18, 61, 99,
102, 115, 116
Husseiniyah canal, 78
hydrological stations, 56
illiteracy, 17, 121, 124, 144, 163, 205,
209, 223, 251
sex distribution of, 12, 205
imperialism, 139
imports, 52, 106, 141, 167, 170, 171,
172, 173, 181, 182, 184, 188, 202,
203, 257, 258
income:
family, 14, 15
farm, 62, 96, 102, 122
level of, 181, 255
national, 13, 14, 25-27, 31, 38, 50,
51, 168,474, 257
of fallaheen, 18, 87, 88
per capita, 13, 14, 257
rate of increase of, 50, 232, 257
supplementary, 101
India, 5, 41
industrial development:
Directorate General of Industry, 204
Industrial Development Finance
Corporation, 186-189, 202
mechanization in, 165, 184
plant construction for, 47, 48, 49,
172-174,205
private industry plans for, 183-184,
186-189, 202
program for, 122, 142, 151, 162-163,
165-167, 175-176, 183, 186-189,
192, 197, 201-203, 205, 216, 222,
258, 259, 260
state investments in, 41, 185, 188-
189, 200-201, 246-247
state loans to municipalities for, 249
state loans for private, 168, 184, 188,
201
state ownership vs. private, 188
see also: state industrial enterprises
industry, private:
agricultural products, 175-176, 179
animal products, 179, 181
building materials and construc-
tion, 172, 175-176, 177, 179, 248
chemical, 175-180, 202
dairy, 181
fertilizer plant, 175-176, 179
INDEX
handicrafts and cottage, 18, 46, 50,
165
household products, 182-183
large-scale, 165, 187,202
light, 101-102, 165, 202, 258
metal products, 175-177, 182
paper manufacture, 175-176, 179
service, 12, 13, 165, 183, 216, 259,
260
small-scale, 165, 202
steel, 175-176, 182
textile, 178
vegetable oils and fats, 181
inflation, 51-52
instability:
political, 121, 254
social, 254, 256
Interior, Ministry of, 152, 219, 248,
250, 251
International Cooperation Adminis-
tration (ICA), 114
Iran, 3, 54, 55, 56, 57, 68, 69, 130, 131,
136, 137, 139, 142, 159, 169
Iranians, 2, 6
Iraq Petroleum Co. (IPC), 20, 130-
131, 132, 133, 136, 137, 145, 149,
150, 161, 170, 190, 224
Iraqi Currency Board, 19, 20
“Iraqi Levies,” 6
irrigation:
Committee, Joint Irrigation Proj-
ects, 56
Directorate of Irrigation, 72
projects, 20, 41, 42, 44, 45, 48, 49,
50, 55, 56, 60, 63, 65, 69-71, 74,
75, 78, 83, 91, 92, 98, 101, 102,
103, 116, 117, 118, 123, 126, 193,
249
use of rivers for, 199
Ishaki area, 73
Islam, 27-8
heretics: see Mandaeans
Israel, 5, 22, 135, 137,257
Istanbul, 200
istihlaq; see taxes, consumption
Iversen, Professor Carl, 166
Report to National Bank of Iraq,
166-167
Jabbur tribe, 224
Jadriyah, 220
Jamil, Muzaffar H., 22, 31, 204


272
INDEX
Latifiya settlement, 98, 101-102
laws:
Civil Service (May, 1956), 24, 35
General Education (1940), 218
“Governing Rights and Duties of
Cultivators,” (1933), 88-89
Labor, Comprehensive (June,
1956), 150
Land Code, Ottoman, 83
Land Registration, 83
Land Settlement (1932-38), 84
Social Security (May, 1956), 24
No. 6, (1952), 34
No. 23 (1945) (Dujailah Land De-
velopment), 91-92
No. 23 (1950), 34, 38
No. 26 (1936), 19
No. 27 (1953), 37, 38
No. 27 (1944), 111
No. 29 (1947), 247
No. 33 (1936), 19-20
No. 35 (1951), 53
No. 36 (1942), 148
No. 37 (1939), 20
No. 39 (1934), 19
No. 43 (1950) (Encouragement of
Industry), 44, 187
No. 43 (1951) (Land Development
and Settlement Law), 91
No. 45 (1938), 20
No. 54 (1956), 47
No. 60 (1956) (University Bill), 220
No. 72 (1936) (Iraqi Labor), 148-
149
No. 79 (1931), 19
Ordinance No. 4 (1952), 91
Ordinance No. 26 (1935), 19-20
Ordinance No. 28 (1935), 19-20
Ordinance No. 52 (1952), 91
lazma (land grants), 26, 81, 85, 86, 87,
88, 92, 94
leather goods, 188
Lebanese, 6
Lebanon, 135, 136, 159, 221
literacy, 12, 163
Little, Inc., Arthur D.; see Little Re-
port
Little Report, 46, 167, 175, 177, 178,
181, 183, 186, 202, 203, 204
livestock, 18, 61
London, 200
Lurs, 2, 3
Mafraq, 136
Magil, 199
Majjara escape canal, 64-65
Makhmur land, 69, 73, 98, 104
malaria, 10, 47,49, 125, 158, 228, 231-
235, 255
Mandaeans, 3, 4
mandate, British, 6, 55, 56, 83
mandate, French, 55, 56
markets and marketing facilities, 168,
188
masha'a (common) land, 82
materials, plastic, 175-176, 179
materials, raw, 165, 166, 167, 173, 175,
181-182, 258
matruka, 80, 86
meat, 16, 26, 52
medicine:
attitude of public toward, 228-231
native, 228-229
preventive, 231-232, 234, 237-239,
251, 259
Mediterranean, 135, 136, 137
Mesopotamia, 54, 55, 115, 131
meteorological stations, 56
Middle East, 17, 27, 28, 62,78, 79,90,
103, 117, 118, 132, 137, 139, 143,
186, 189, 216, 229, 254, 256, 257,
260, 261
population problem of, 262
Supply Center, 79
Mina al-Ahmadi, 136
Mines, Department of, 249
mining, 41, 44, 47, 176
mineral deposits, 166
Ministers, Council of, 34, 37, 38, 39,
94, 151, 152, 174, 201,251
minorities, 2-6
miri land, 81-83, 85-86, 98
lazma, 81, 82
sirf, 81, 85, 86, 98
tapu, 81, 82
Miri Sirf Department, 95
Central Committee of, 95, 104
Mish-Khab, 72
Mongol invasion, 82
Mosul, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12, 28, 70, 74, 86,
88, 130, 135, 150, 170, 171, 172,
173, 183, 189, 192, 194, 197, 230,
239, 245, 246, 252
Mosul Holdings, Ltd., 131
Mosul Oil Fields Company, 131


INDEX
273
Mosul Oil Fields, Ltd., 131
Mosul Petroleum Company (MPC),
129, 130, 131, 132, 161
Mosul Textile Factory, 171
Muftiyah Asphalt Refinery, 169, 170
mulk, 80, 82, 85, 86, 94
Municipalities, Department of, 248,
249
Muntafiq, province of, 4, 7, 12,90, 237
Muslims, 1, 2, 3, 9
see also: Sh’ia and Sunni sects
Musayyib Project, the Greater, 72,
76-77, 98, 103, 197
Naft Khaneh oil field, 130
naggarat, 72
Nahrawan Lands, 74
Najaf, 6, 7, 8, 197
Nasiriyah, 195, 197
nationalism, 1, 3, 5, 22, 139, 223
nationalization, 132
Near East; see Middle East
Near East Development Company,
130
Nestorians, 5-6
Neutral Zone (Kuwait-Saudi Arabia),
131
Nile river, 56, 57
nomads, 8, 18, 82, 83,92, 205, 213, 250
North Desert, the, 58
Northern Districts project, 74
Nuri as-Sa'id, 39
nurseries, experimental, 99, 102
occupational distribution, 12-13, 162
oil companies, international:
American, 130, 159
Armenian, 130
British, 129, 130, 159
British-Dutch, 130
Dutch, 131
French, 130, 159
French-Swiss, 131
German, 131
Italian, 131
oil industry:
extractive, 129, 130, 159, 187, 262
“fifty-fifty” formula, 131-132
hours, 148
housing, workers’, 247
labor, 141-142, 148, 160, 171
marketing and distribution,
132, 191
130,
medical facilities and services, 157-
158, 160
recreation facilities, 158-159, 160
refining, 20, 129, 130, 135, 136
revenues from, 13-14, 19–20, 25, 30-
31, 34-35, 43-45, 127, 130-133,
137, 140-141, 160, 259, 261
schools, 159, 223
training programs, l 14, 155-157,
160, 216, 222
wages, 145-149, 160
welfare program, 158, 160
see also: oil companies, international
onions, 115
orchards, planting of, 94, 99, 102, 103
Ottoman empire, 2, 3, 82, 83
Pakistanis, 6
Palestine, 22, 67
Paris Convention, 55-56
Parliament, 23, 35, 37, 38, 40, 43, 44,
45, 48, 91, 118, 148, 174, 250, 251,
261
pasture, 99, 102, 103
pensions:
industrial, 148
Persian Gulf, 57, 58, 135, 136, 199,229
pest control, 114
pests, insect, 18
plague, 231
plow, steel moldboard, 102, 108
Point Four program; see United States
politics:
partisan, 23, 32, 34, 118
party system, 23, 40
polygamy, 9
population:
age-sex distribution of, 7, 8-9
death and birth rates, 9, 10-11, 235,
239
decline of, under Ottomans, 82
density, 7, 254
distribution, geographic, 2, 7-8, 260
increase of, 50, 51
internal migration of 11-12, 15, 89,
107, 108, 242, 251
marital status of, 9
mobility of, 1, 260
redistribution of, 50
rural, 62
semirural, 8


274
INDEX
structure of 8
urban, 7, 8, 25, 62
postal system, 18
poultry, 115
power, electric:
consumption of, 15, 190-191
electrification, 44, 46, 102, 124, 153,
176, 189-192, 202-203, 242, 245,
246, 252
hydraulic generation of 19, 68, 69,
70, 166, 191, 202, 204
plant construction, 191-192
thermal generation of, 191
prestige values, 9, 182, 217, 258
prices, wholesale, 52
Prime Minister, 34, 37, 39, 250
productivity, 49-50, 120, 121-122,
126, 235, 259
prostitution, 239
Provident Fund, 149-150
Public Works, Department of, 192, 198
Qara Dagh, 197
Qatar, 137
Qayarh Asphalt Refinery, 170
Qurna, 58
Rafidain Oil Company, 130, 161
railways:
capital investment in, 44
conversion from steam to Diesel
traction, 194
meter gauge, 193-195, 203
Railway Administration, 192, 194,
195, 247
Railways and Port Directorate, 223
railway system, 18, 193-196, 204
standard gauge, 192-195, 203
Ramadi, 5, 57, 197
Ramadi barrage, 64
Raniyan, 197
rayon, 171, 179
reclamation, 41, 43, 45, 59, 70, 74, 76,
78, 79, 91, 92, 96, 99, 103, 106, 116,
118, 123, 126
see also: land, new
recreation, 140, 158-159
reform:
agrarian, 80, 85, 90, 91, 104, 118,
120-121, 123, 126
economic, 24
effect of, on intellectuals, 90
objectives of, 121
of civil service, 24
political, 261
social, 126, 160, 205
refugees:
Palestinian, 6
religion, 4, 17, 27–28, 261
see also: sects, religious
resources:
animal, 13, 44, 47, 258
chemical, 13, 166, 168, 177
human, 13, 17, 32,49, 126, 165, 203,
207,254
land, 13, 17, 18, 50, 254
mineral, 13, 17, 80, 254
oil, 13, 254
plant, 13, 44, 47, 258
underground water, 13, 17, 18, 44,
47, 54-79, 47,258
rice, 16, 72, 115, 232
river transport, 193
Iraq Shipping Company, Ltd., 200
navigation, 199-200
ports, 46
river development, 55
rivers, shifting of 18, 199
roads:
capital investment in, 14, 20, 41, 43,
44
construction program, 41, 45, 46-47,
172, 196-197, 203, 245
system of, 192-193, 195-196
traffic on, 195-196
under provisional government, 18
Royal Dutch Shell Group, 130, 159
Rumaila, 135, 136
Rumeitha, 77
rural areas, 10, 11, 12, 15, 124, 189,
203, 230, 244, 247, 250-252, 259
Russia, 31
Rutba, 197
Sabaeans, 4
Saddah settlement, 98
salination, 65, 68, 75, 101, 242
salinity, 58, 65, 68, 115
salt, 177
Salter Report, 23, 24, 29, 37-38, 44,
49, 53, 68, 91, 98, 104,147, 167, 172,
186, 194, 195, 196, 199, 203, 204,
231, 240
Samarra, 67, 68
Samawah Health Center, 238


276
INDEX
Suq al-Shuyukh, 4
surveys:
cadastral, 84, 85, 86, 92, 123
of expenditures by economic groups,
14-15, 182
of road location, 198
technical, 42, 44, 47, 48, 123, 168
syphilis; see bejel
Syria, 54, 55, 56,58, 135, 136, 159, 194
Syrians, 6
Tanjero Valley, 234
tapu land, 81-82, 83, 85, 86, 93, 94
tariffs, 166, 167, 168, 178, 181, 187,
188,202
taxes:
collectors of 113, 256
consumption, 26, 52
exemption from, 30, 168, 187
export, 52
import, 52
income, 25-26
indirect, 25
Land Tax, 25, 27
on agriculture, 25, 26
technical assistance:
from United Nations; see United
Nations
from United States;
States
from Western business firms, 32, 43,
118-119
Teheran, 56, 200
telegraph system, 18, 20, 47
telephone system, 20, 47
tension, international, 139, 261
Tigris, 20, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60,
61, 65, 67,68, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 78,
99, 131, 193
textile mills:
cotton, 171
rayon, 175, 176, 179
tobacco, 15, 16, 20, 116, 174
Topchi township, 245
trachoma, 231, 235-236
trade, 18, 27, 50, 79, 141, 151, 167,
168, 260
proportion of population engaged
in, 12, 13
unfavorable balance of, 258-259
traditions, 7, 11, 12, 25, 27, 28, 82, 108,
112,214, 222, 256
see United
Treaty of Friendship and Neighborly
Relations (Turkey and Iraq), 56
Tripoli (Lebanon), 135, 136, 138, 159
tuberculosis, 229, 233,239
Turkey, 3, 5, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 136,
159, 183, 186, 194, 257
see also: Industrial Bank of Turkey;
Treaty of Friendship and Neigh-
borly Relations
Turkomans, 3
Turks, 4, 6, 23, 84
Tuwairij drain, 77
typhus, 231
Udhaim Basin, 73
Udhaim dam, 69, 73
Udhaim river, 58, 69
Umm Qasr, 199, 200
underdeveloped countries, 9, 22, 23,
25, 42, 108, 168, 254, 256, 258
unemployment, 101, 108, 251, 255
unions, labor, 151-152, 160
United Nations, 48, 53, 95, 118, 234
Department of Economic and Social
Affairs, 16, 22, 161
International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (IBRD),
Mission of, 13, 16, 32, 41-42, 50,
53,65, 87, 103,105,106, 166, 167,
173, 174, 194, 199, 200, 204, 241,
244, 253
International Labor Organization,
148
Statistical Office, 13, 16
UNESCO, 32, 100, 227, 235, 250
UNICEF, 32, 209-210, 227, 234,
235, 238
WHO, 32, 227, 234, 238,239
United States, 5, 32, 48, 79, 89, 105,
112, 113, 114, 118, 120, 152, 181,
221, 224, 234
Lend-Lease Program, 106
Point Four Program, 32, 35, 53, 95,
110, 113, 114, 115, 159, 161, 227
unity, national, 1, 22
unrest, social, 30-31, 91
“ political, 17, 31
urban areas, 10, 11, 12, 27, 124, 189,
242, 247, 252,260
urbanization, 1, 11, 90, 107, 260
ushr (tithe-land), 82


INDEX
vegetables, 16, 26, 99, 100, 102, 115,
116
vehicles, motor, 18, 196
Vienna, 200
Wadi Tharthar depression, 60, 68
Wadi Tharthar:
barrage, 67-68, 74
project, 53, 67
wages, 11, 12, 143, 144, 145, 147, 165,
216
waqf (religious trust land), 81-82, 86
Waqf, Directorate of, 219
Warrar Inlet canal and regulator, 64
Warriner, Doreen, 87
Water resources:
development of, 17, 18-19, 47, 48,
50, 54, 59, 78, 122, 123, 153, 204,
242-246, 254
distribution of 94, 95; see laws
(No. 23)
Hammar Lake Project, 72, 74, 233
in Syria, 55
potable, 10, 47, 48, 100, 124-126,
158, 227–228, 231-232, 237-238,
248-250, 252
reports on; see Haigh and KTAM
Reports
rights to, 95, 96
storage of, 55, 57, 59, 60, 62,63, 64,
65, 67,68, 69-70, 104, 117, 126
277
underground, 75, 76, 80
see also: canals; dams; drainage;
floods; irrigation; wells
wealth:
redistribution of, 118
weed control, 114
welfare, social, 49, 88, 123, 125, 141,
149, 158-159, 232, 250
wells, 249-250
Westernization, 5, 9
wheat, 16, 99, 100, 102, 115
Willcocks, Sir William, 56
windbreaks, 76
wool, 26, 115
World War I, 2, 199, 241
World War II, 21, 22, 28, 30, 79, 90,
105, 106, 116, 125, 187, 207, 223,
241
Yezidi, 3–4, 22, 213
educational problems among, 4, 213
Yusafiyah canal, 78
Yusuf Pasha dam (Syria), 55
Zab River, the Lesser, 54, 58, 68, 69,
73, 78
Zab River, the Greater, 58, 70
Zagros mountains, 233
Zubair, 133, 135, 136


186
, 69 539 AA A 30 . * &





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