A-F)Qi
*
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida, Chairman
LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana
GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York
DON BONKER, Washington
GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts
DAN MICA, Florida
HOWARD WOLPE, Michigan
GEO. W. CROCKETT, Jr., Michigan
SAM GEJDENSON, Connecticut
MERVYN M. DYMALLY, California
TOM LANTOS, California
PETER H. KOSTMAYER, Pennsylvania
ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey
LAWRENCE J. SMITH, Florida
HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
MEL LEVINE, California
EDWARD F. FEIGHAN, Ohio
TED WEISS, New York
GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
MORRIS K. UDALL, Arizona
CHESTER G. ATKINS, Massachusetts
JAMES McCLURE CLARKE, North Carolina
JAIME B. FUSTER, Puerto Rico
JAMES H. BILBRAY, Nevada
WAYNE OWENS, Utah
FOFO I.F. SUNIA, American Samoa
WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York
ROBERT J. LAGOMARSINO, California
JIM LEACH, Iowa
TOBY ROTH, Wisconsin
OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine
HENRY J. HYDE, Illinois
GERALD B.H. SOLOMON, New York
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska
ROBERT K. DORNAN, California
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida
MICHAEL DeWINE, Ohio
DAN BURTON, Indiana
JAN MEYERS, Kansas
JOHN MILLER, Washington
DONALD E. "BUZ" LUKENS, Ohio
BEN BLAZ, Guam
John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff
Toni G. Verstandig, Staff Consultant
Dara M. Schueker, Staff Assistant
(ID
it


LEGISLATION TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS AGAINST
IRAQI CHEMICAL USE
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 1988
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met in open markup session at 1:10 p.m., room
2172, Rayburn Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Dante B. Fascell
(chairman) presiding.
Chairman Fascell. The first order of business is H. Con. Res. 369
which the chief of staff will report please.
[Whereupon the committee proceeded to other business.]
Chairman Fascell. Now the next order of business is draft legis-
lation concerning the use of chemical weapons by Iraq.
The purpose of the draft legislation is to demonstrate Congres-
sional concern against Iraq's use of chemical weapons against its
Kurdish population. This legislation enjoys strong bipartisan sup-
port and puts the Committee on record demanding that the Iraqi
use of poison gas against Kurdish rebels and civilians must stop,
that Iraqi abuses of Kurdish human rights must end, that the cease-
fire between Iran and Iraq must hold, and that peace negotia-
tions must progress.
On September 8, 1988, Secretary of State Shultz stated that all
the evidence available had convinced United States Government
that Iraq has used chemical weapons in its military campaign
against the Kurdish rebels and that the most recent use had taken
place in August, after the ceasefire with Iran, causing tens of thou-
sands of Kurds to flee to Turkey.
Briefly, the legislation being considered takes a graduated ap-
proach to sanctions, invoking some sanctions immediately and
specifying other sanctions that may be imposed in the future. The
immediate sanctions deliver the urgent message that the use of
chemical weapons by Iraq must cease and there must be assur-
ances by Iraq that chemical weapons will not be used in the future.
If such assurances are not forthcoming, the President must then
invoke additional sanctions, which are specified in the legislation.
This approach allows some time and flexibility to achieve a success-
ful diplomatic solution without undermining the ceasefire agree-
ment.
While this measure deals chiefly with the abhorrent use of chemi-
cal weapons by the Iraqi Government, our concern for the long-suf-
fering Kurdish minority in Iraq extends beyond the use of chemical
weapons. Thus the resolution urges the Iraqi Government to re-
(1)


IRAQ010
5
1 to Iraq.
2 (4) Opposition to multilateral economic
3 ASSISTANCE.—Oppose any loan or financial or technical
4 assistance to Iraq by international financial
5 institutions in accordance with section 701 of the
6 International Financial Institutions Act.
7 (5) DOWNGRADING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.—Downgrading or
8 suspending diplomatic relations between the United States
9 and Iraq.
io (d) Contract Sanctity.—For purposes of export controls
11 imposed in accordance with subsections (a)(3) and (c)(2) of
12 this section, the date described in section 6(m)(l) of the
13 Export Administration Act of 1979 shall be deemed to be
14 September 15, 1988.
15 (e) REPORTS TO CONGRESS.—The President shall report to
16 the Congress periodically on the actions taken pursuant to
17 this section.
18 SEC. 4. CONDITIONS FOR LIFTING SANCTIONS.
19 The President may waive any sanctions imposed pursuant to
20 section 3(a) or (b), including sanctions described in section
21 3(c), if the President determines and so certifies in writing
22 to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
23 chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the
24 Senate—
25 (1) that the Government of Iraq is not using chemical


IRAQ010
6
1 weapons in violation of international law, including the
2 1925 Geneva Protocol (relating to the use of chemical
3 weapons in war) and Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
4 Conventions (relating to the protection of victims of
5 war); and
6 (2) that the Government of Iraq has provided reliable
7 assurances that it will not use chemical weapons in the
8 future in violation of international law; and
9 (3) that—
10 (A) the Government of Iraq is willing to allow
11 on-site inspections by United Nations observers or
12 other internationally-recognized, impartial
13 observers, or
14 (B) other reliable means exist,
15 to ensure that the Government of Iraq is not using
16 chemical weapons.
17 SEC. 5. ACTIONS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF TURKEY.
18 The Congress—
19 (1) urges the Government of Turkey to cooperate with
20 any United Nations or other appropriate investigation of
21 Iraqi use of chemical weapons; and
22 (2) commends the Government of Turkey for its
23 humanitarian decision to host thousands of Kurdish people
24 fleeing Iraq.
25 SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL ACTIONS.


17
Chairman Fasckll. I will say to the gentleman that it is abso-
lutely my understanding. Mr. Yatron, we would like to see that
and we encourage the government of Turkey to coordinate their
relief efforts with the international community and to accept the
offers to provide humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees
in Turkey, from such relief agencies as the International Commit-
tee of the Red Cross, for example.
So, yes, we would very much want their cooperation and wel-
come it.
Mr. Yatron. I thank the chairman.
Chairman Fascell. Mr. Solarz.
Mr. Solarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have a few questions I would like to ask to a representative of
the Administration.
Chairman Fascell. All right. Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State, Peter Burleigh, would you please step up.
Mr. Solarz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burleigh, could you lay out for us, briefly if possible, exactly
what the evidence is which has led us to the conclusion that Iraq
used chemical weapons in late August against its Kurdish minori-
ty. In particular, how do you relate that evidence to the findings of
Turkish physicians who according to press reports have concluded
after examining Kurdish refugees in Turkey that they don't seem
to have found evidence of the use of chemical weapons by Iraq?
STATEMENT OF PETER BURLEIGH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRE-
TARY, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AND SOUTH ASIAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Burleigh. Congressman, we reached the conclusion by the
8th of September which was the day we made our announcement
of that conclusion, based on several categories of information avail-
able to the U.S. government. Those included reports of eyewit-
nesses including some of our own officials on the Turkish side of
Turkey/Iraq border. And also other information
Mr. Solarz. We had U.S. officials who personally witnessed
chemical weapon attacks?
Mr. Burleigh. No, who met with and interviewed some of the
Kurdish refugees on the Turkey side of the border.
And we have other information which I can't discuss in this
forum which led us to the conclusion that chemical weapons had
been used, as we so announced on September 8th.
The problem, I believe, in establishing—publicly establishing the
use of chemical weapons is a complicated one for doctors and it
takes trained and skilled doctors with experience in chemical weap-
ons to make the kind of absolute confirmation, which the Turkish
doctors say they have not been able to do thus far, which is the
reason we have called for an objective international investigation
of the issue.
Mr. Solarz. Have we sent any doctors to examine these refugees
who do have these medical qualifications?
Mr. Burleigh. We have not. We have formally approached the
UN Secretary General and asked him to send such a team.


18
Mr. Solarz. So our conclusion is based in part on interviews with
refugees whom Turkish doctors interviewed. We believe the refu-
gees and the Turkish doctors don't?
Mr. Burleigh. The combination of the testimony of the refugees
with our other information led us to the conclusion that chemical
weapons had been used.
Mr. Solarz. Do we have any rough estimates of how many vil-
lages these weapons were used against and how many victims
there have been?
Mr. Burleigh. I can't give you those figures, Congressman.
Mr. Solarz. Is it because you don't have them or you can't dis-
close them in public?
Mr. Burleigh. I don't have them with me today.
Mr. Solarz. Could you provide it for the record. Do we have any
evidence that they've used chemical weapons since the use of these
weapons in late August?
Mr. Burleigh. No.
Mr. Solarz. Do we believe that the use of these weapons in late
August constituted a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925?
Mr. Burleigh. We believe that they constituted a violation of
international law and we cite both the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
the 1949 Convention.
Mr. Solarz. How does it violate the 1925 Geneva Protocol which
I understood to apply to conflicts between states?
Mr. Burleigh. There is some debate in the international commu-
nity about that very issue. Our view is that the combination of the
undertakings that signatory states make to the 1925 Protocol and
the 1949 Convention bar any use of chemical warfare.
Mr. Solarz. But does the 1925 Protocol by itself bar any use,
even internally? I think it's wrong even if it doesn't, but I'm just
trying to establish whether we believe the 1925 Protocol itself pre-
cludes its use internally by a country.
Mr. Burleigh. Well, my understanding, and I'd like to, perhaps,
for the record submit the actual language is that it's an agreement
between states, between government s in the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
And that therefore there is some question about whether internal
use, domestic use would be covered.
Mr. Solarz. But in the event that the 1925 Protocol does not pre-
clude domestic use what other international law does?
Mr. Burleigh. The 1949 Convention on the protection of victims
of war, I believe it's called.
Mr. Solarz. In what way does that preclude it?
Mr. Burleigh. Well, that covers protection both internal and ex-
ternal.
Mr. Solarz. Has Iraq indicated whether it will provide access to
international team to determine what went on in these areas?
Mr. Burleigh. My understanding is that the government of Iraq
has turned down and refused to agree to the UN Secretary Gener-
al's request that a team of his choosing be dispatched to the areas
in Iraq.
Mr. Solarz. Have they agreed to let in anybody else?
Mr. Burleigh. Well, they have agreed to let in foreign journal-
ists. Many have gone to Iraq and toured the Kurdish populated
areas and then filed their stories.


22
Mr. Beeman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask the Secretary, given his position, given at
least—well, I think pretty explicit in this statement is a recogni-
tion that the utilization of chemical weapons as a horror which
must be deterred in the future, not only by Iraq but by other coun-
tries, far surpasses whatever geo-political aspects of our emerging
relationship with Iraq now exists; is that an unfair characterization
of what you have just said?
Mr. Burleigh. No.
Mr. Berman. Your disinterest in sanctions at this time distresses
me very greatly.
First of all, why didn't that disinterest apply back in 1984 when
the Administration or early '85 when the Administration unilater-
ally imposed sanctions on specific chemicals to Iraq that were
being utilized by Iraq at that time in the chemical weapons. This is
not a recent disclosure. This is not something from last month or
even from the time of Halabja, this has been going on for three or
four years and the Administration acted then to impose the most
limited kinds of sanctions on the specific chemicals.
If the philosophical opposition to sanctions is so great what ex-
plains that action?
Mr. Burleigh. We are not opposed to sanctions that are directly
related to chemical warfare, that's why we did unilaterally estab-
lish such as, when we began to get information that Iraq and some
other countries were developing a chemical warfare capability.
So nothing I have said should lead you to conclude that the Ad-
ministration is against sanctions that are directly related to chemi-
cal warfare. I'm talking about sanctions which are meant to go into
effect immediately and which, in our view, will have the effect of
undercutting our efforts which are intensive with the government
of Iraq to reach an understanding.
Mr. Lantos. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Berman. I will yield, but let me just follow up for one
moment.
The Iraq/Iran war is now—they're negotiating a cease fire.
Mr. Burleigh. Right.
Mr. Berman. In the past four years the Iraqi government has
sought this Administration's support in a variety of different areas,
on a diplomatic, on an economic level, and in fact a significant eco-
nomic relationship has developed with the approval and support of
this Administration.
During any of that period of time when that war was going on,
when Iraq was in great fear of losing that war, if this Administra-
tion's efforts at that time to dissuade Iraq from not utilizing chemi-
cal weapons, both in the war and then finally against its own
Kurdish people were not effective, what, at this particular time
now that Iraq has for all intents and purposes won that war and
the Iranians are in effect suing for peace, what is it about your
non-economic sanctions efforts now that will produce a more favor-
able result than this serious effort—initially modest, but presum-
ably subsequently significant—a economic sanctions would
produce?
Mr. Burleigh. We believe that the way to impact most effective-
ly on the Iraqi government policy is to coordinate a multilateral


25
So what I'm arguing is that a widespread international effort is
what is required to reach the goal that we share, that is to stop the
use.
Chairman Fascell. Mr. Levine.
Mr. Levine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burleigh, I think I understand, to a considerable extent, the
difficulty the Administration has in making a decision about how
far it needs to pursue something privately in order to obtain a
result, versus making public statements on these issues. Where do
you draw the line in deciding when to give up on private efforts in
favor of public statements?
In terms of analyzing the statements that have come from the
Administration, both today and previously on this issue, I have
tried carefully to review what you may be doing or appear to be
doing privately and how that may or may not affect the public
statements that you make.
I was particularly interested in the colloquy between yourself
and my colleague, Mr. Berman, because he was exploring with you
specifically a number of the areas that you may be—and probably
are—pursuing privately.
Frankly, in listening to that colloquy, in hearing your statement,
and in reviewing the commentary—both from within the Adminis-
tration and from the reports about it—I have come to conclude
that much more needs to be said and should be said by the Admin-
istration—by our government—than has been said thus far. That is
one of the reasons I share Mr. Berman's disappointment with the
tepid quality of the statements that have come from the Adminis-
tration.
The framework from which I come to this conclusion is the fol-
lowing: you and I have spoken over the course of the recent past
about a number of issues pertaining to the Persian Gulf. And I
have come to believe that we have certainly been more than help-
ful to Iraq on a number of instances, some subtle and some not so
subtle, in the Persian Gulf over the past year.
It would seem to me that we would have quite a bit of influence
in the bank, if you will, with regard to the Iraqis when it comes to
an issue that ought to be preeminent.
And if there is any issue that ought to be preeminent it is the
use of poison gas and chemical weapons.
What frustrates me in reviewing the process over the course of
the past several years is that, in light of the relationships that
have developed between our government and the Iraqi government,
the Iraqi's should understand the importance that we attach to the
issue of chemical weapons and poison gas. You yourself put it in
the context of this relationship. It would seem to me, therefore,
that they shouldn't need additional efforts, additional private cajol-
ing, additional suggestions in order clearly to understand or both
our position and its importance to us.
It is in that context that it appears to me that we ought to be
saying more. We ought to be standing up and, frankly, screaming a
lot more loudly.
The press commentary that I've received on the Administration's
statements and positions with regard to Iraq and poison gas have
r


26
consistently, concluded that our silence has been deafening on this
issue.
Even though we have made some statements, they have been
carefully worded. They have been mild. And they have not made
the kind of points that need to be made—both to Iraq and to the
rest of the international community—to demonstrate the serious-
ness that we attach to the issue of the use of poison gas and chemi-
cal weapons.
I simply submit to you that, in light of what we ought to have in
the bank with regard to the Iraqis at this point, it's time to go
beyond the responses that I've heard thus far at this hearing. We
must stand up and make a very, very strong statement so that nei-
ther the Iraqis nor the remainder of the international community
can misjudge our intentions when it comes to the importance that
we attach to calling a halt and doing everything we can—morally,
politically, diplomatically, and practically—to the use of chemical
weapons and poison gas.
It is in that context that I respectfully submit we should be doing
more.
Mr. Burleigh. I take your point, it has been the Administra-
tion's policy to be loud and clear about chemical weapons use.
I don't think you could objectively describe the statement the
State Department made on the 8th of September when we received
confirmation of the use in August by Iraq as being tepid; it was
very strong. And that same tone has characterized our public state-
ments, our work at the United Nations, through those institutions,
ICRC, et cetera, as well as our private communications with gov-
ernments.
I don't believe that other governments including the Iraqis mis-
understand the seriousness with which we address this.
Mr. Levine. Then I would like to ask you this question: if they
don't misunderstand the seriousness with which we address this
issue, why aren't they responding? If they aren't responding even
though they understanding the seriousness, what more can we do,
short of the kind of legislative action we are suggesting here today,
that will get an affirmative result?
Mr. Burleigh. We can do what we are in fact doing. We have
intensified our discussions with the government of Iraq and with
the international community and there seems to be some positive
movement on the part of the government of Iraq as reflected in
that September 17 statement by the Foreign Minister.
Mr. Levine. I would certainly conclude by agreeing with Mr.
Berman that if Iraq does respond positively, then you can exercise
the waiver provision. Nonetheless, if you want to make clear that
there is no misunderstanding on the U.S. position you should be
supporting rather than opposing the legislation.
Chairman Fascell. Mr. Chris Smith.
Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Burleigh, I am concerned, too, about the trustworthiness of
the Foreign Minister's statements of September 17th. You have re-
peatedly cited that statement which really is a statement of a lie,
where the Foreign Minister is saying that they have abided by
the—respects and abides by all the provisions of the international
law including Geneva Protocol of 1925, and I think we ought to be


29
farmers than more farmers, they had never had the need for this
number of tonnage in terms of pesticides.
What do we do about that? Do we make direct overtures to our
allies?
Mr. Burleigh. We do, indeed, very aggressive one.
Mr. Smith of Florida. What has been the result of these direct
overtures? What has been the conversations and the upshot of
those conversations when we ask the German government to put a
clamp on companies that are selling the equipment, and it's highly
specialized and we know what it is, to countries like Iraq, and to
Iraq specifically?
Mr. Burleigh. In each case that I'm familiar with they take our
information, do their own research to confirm our information, and
then take steps consistent with their own laws and their own poli-
cies to put an end to the supplies.
Mr. Smith of Florida. Well, that's real nice. What does that
mean, Mr. Burleigh? I mean, has any country taken information
that we've supplied them and turned around to a company or com-
panies in their own country and said, that's it, you can't sell this,
you won't sell this, et cetera, have that done that?
Mr. Burleigh. Yes.
Mr. Smith of Florida. Where, for instance?
Mr. Burleigh. I believe Germany is one case in point. I would be
happy to try to submit to you
Mr. Smith of Florida. I certainly would appreciate that very
much.
The next thing is the statements of the Foreign Minister. As I
read the statements of the Foreign Minister, as Mr. Smith pointed
out, while he says that they follow the Geneva Accords and they
have not used chemical weapons, if I'm not mistaken he also added
a caveat that they follow the rule, but there are exceptions to
every rule; is that correct? Didn't the Foreign Minister say that?
Mr. Burleigh. No, I can read you his statement, but there is one
reservation which we also have, that is, if one is attacked by an-
other nation with Chemical Weapon one reserves the right to re-
taliate. I believe that's what he was referring to.
Mr. Smith of Florida. So in other words his claim would be that
Iraq was attacked by Iran with chemical warfare and therefore
they could have in fact done it themselves; correct?
Mr. Burleigh. I can't speak on his behalf on that.
Mr. Smith of Florida. I mean, that's what you're alluding to, that
he would have—if that was the exception that is what he's refer-
ring to. We assume it's Iran, we don't know of anybody else that
has attacked Iraq recently; correct?
Mr. Burleigh. He was not referring to an instance of use, to the
best of my understanding of his statement, but as a matter of legal
principle based on a reservation entered by the government of Iraq
at the time of signing the Protocol, which is similar to our reserva-
tion.
Mr. Smith of Florida. Has the government of Iraq in these dis-
cussions, and we've had discussions with them directly, have we
not?
Mr. Burleigh. Definitely.


38
Page 2
Likewise the Turkish authorities have repeated stated
that there was no evidence of use of chemical weapons by Iraq
against Kurds. The Turkish statements were based on
investigation undertaken by its medical authorities that found no
evidence that chemical weapons were used against Kurds who fled
to Turkey.
The Iraqi Government, for its part, has recently
welcomed all interested Western journalists, Americans and
others, who visited the Northern part of Iraq, selected the
places they wanted to see and reported in the American Press that
they could " neither confirm nor refute (?!) allegations that the
(Iraqi) army has used chemical weapons against the Kurdish rebels
(e.g Washington Times Sept. 20,1988).
Finally, I would like to remind you that the vast
majority of the Iraqi Kurds are honest people and loyal to their
country. It is unfair to the Kurds to lump them with the fringe
groups of mercinaries and traitors who in the past cooperated
with the Shah and the CIA (House Intellgence Comitt., Pike's
Report 1976) and recently with Khumeini's regime against their
own country and people while Iraq and Iran were at war. I trust
that any one genuinely interested in the welfare of the Iraqi
Kurds, and in the Arab American friendly relations would take
into consideration the above developments before rushing to
judgment.
I will be most grateful if your honor have this letter
entered into record.
Please accept my highest considerations.
Sincerely
Dr. Abdul-Amir Al-Anbari
Ambassador of Iraq
cc/ The Honorable William S. Bloomfield
The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton
The Honorable Benjamin A. Gilman


44
2
Whereas Iraq has been producing and stockpiling chemical
weapons;
Whereas United Nations investigators concluded in 1984, 1986,
and 1987 that Iraq had employed chemical weapons, and
the United Nations Security Council has condemned the use
of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war;
Whereas Iraq's chemical weapons attack on March 16, in which
hundreds of Kurdish civilians were killed on Iraqi soil, un-
derscores the horror of these weapons and their impact on
noncombatants;
Whereas the United States condemned that Iraqi attack as a
"particularly grave violation" of international law; and
Whereas it has been reported that Iran may be producing chem-
ical weapons, and Iran has warned that it might employ
chemical weapons against Iraq: Now, therefore, be it
1 Resolved, That the House of Representatives—
2 (1) condemns the use of chemical weapons by Iraq
3 and declares that such action violates international
4 law;
5 (2) calls upon Iraq to halt immediately and per-
6 manently the use of all chemical weapons;
7 (3) commends the President for his prompt con-
8 demnation of Iraq's recent chemical weapons attack on
9 civilians;
10 (4) urges the President to seek allied cooperation
11 to further tighten controls on the export of chemical
12 compounds to countries seeking to develop a chemical
13 weapons capability;
MKES 471 III